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The Decision-Making Process and the Chicago Board of Education: The 1968 Busing Decision

Neil Ellsworth Lloyd
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THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

AND THE CHICAGO BOARD OF

EDUCATION: THE 1968

BUSING DECISION

by

Neil E. Lloyd

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Loyola University
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

Chicago, Illinois
June, 1974
VITA

The author, Neil Ellsworth Lloyd, is the son of Wilfred L. Lloyd and Irma M. (Kordick) Lloyd. He was born July 20, 1934, in Chicago, Illinois.

His elementary education was obtained in the parochial schools of Chicago, Illinois, and secondary education in the Chicago Public High Schools, where he was graduated in 1952.

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Following his return from the Armed Services in 1959, he taught in the public elementary and secondary schools of Chicago. In 1966 he completed his graduate studies in history at Loyola University, Chicago, and received his Master of Arts degree.

In 1969 he was admitted to the doctoral program in the Foundations of Education at Loyola University. From September, 1970, until June, 1974, he was a part-time lecturer in the Foundations Department of Loyola University.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: DESCRIPTION OF LASSWELL'S DECISION-MAKING MODEL AND APPLICATION TO CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION BUSING DECISION

This dissertation is a study of the Chicago Board of Education decision to bus children from two predominantly black schools to eight entirely white schools. This study is significant for at least three reasons: It clarifies the factors involved in the decision-making process as practiced by the Chicago Board of Education. It examines the policies employed by the Board as alternatives to busing programs. Finally, the study of this busing controversy, while considering only the local problems, is of use for further inquiries into the similarities and differences among the attempts in communities throughout the nation to solve the problems of integration. These decisions on integration will have an undoubtedly critical influence upon the future of our democratic society.

The scheme of analysis which this dissertation will employ has been suggested by Harold Lasswell. The hypothesis of this
dissertation is that the seven categories of functional analysis suggested by Lasswell will yield a comprehensive and exceptionally intelligible view of the decision-making process when related to the Chicago busing decision. The analytic questions suggested by the seven functions will direct research to pertinent and valuable observations. Lasswell remains a controversial figure among social scientists. His attempts to develop propositions governing the uses of power have been attacked as tending to "end in mechanical laws which, correctly formulated, would be irrelevant to human problems, and perhaps quite meaningless." The dissertation offered here is not so ambitious as to test the validity of this criticism of Lasswell. No attempt will be made to apply all of Lasswell's formulation of the basic concepts and hypothesis of political science as offered in his work, Power and Society.  

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2 Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). Lasswell presented his seven functions in a smaller work based upon the earlier study. His concern in the latter study was to develop classifications which would be "serviceable when they are tentative and undogmatic, and when they guide scholarly activity in directions that are presently accepted as valuable." Harold D. Lasswell, The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis (College Park, Maryland: Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Maryland, 1956), p. 2.
Use of Lasswell's model will help avoid, but not dismiss, the narrowed frame of reference adopted in numerous studies of the decision-making process. Some of these studies have concentrated on the formal process which considers the status quo to represent a tension between interest groups. The status quo is disturbed when some of these organized interest groups combine to bring about a change. Other studies deprecate the role of organizations and argue that an informal and non-public group of powerful leaders in a community account for the important decisions which are made.3

The Lasswell model lends itself to an administrative as well as politico-sociological analysis of the decision being considered. Its seven categories examine the stages in the decision-making process from the initial information gathering stage through a termination stage when the decision has been applied, appraised, and has become an apparent part of the operation of the system involved. These seven functions are listed below with analytic

The first category is the intelligence function. It considers information, prediction, and planning, and implies such questions as: How is information that comes to the attention of the decision-makers gathered and processed? What studies, reports, laws, judicial decisions, and community needs were known or available to the decision-makers? What formal or informal channels were being utilized in reaching the decision-makers? To what extent did the decision-making body control the source of its information?

The second category is the recommendation function. It considers promotion of policy alternatives and implies such questions as: How are recommendations made and promoted? What alternative decisions were considered? Who advocated these alternatives? Why were they rejected, accepted, or compromised? What audiences were reached by the recommendations? Whose function was it to recommend? What values were considered in performing the function? To what extent did the information made available disclose threats or opportunities pertinent to the present or potential value position of the decision-makers? Did

4Lasswell, The Decision Process, pp. 2-19, passim.
information made available to those concerned with the decision alter their views? Did pressure groups demand a greater participation in the recommending function as a result of the decision being considered?

The third category is the prescription function. It considers the enactment of the general rules and implies such questions as: How are rules prescribed? What was the final decision? What group really made the final prescription? Did any groups involved in the decision seek prescriptions of their own in order to redress their grievances as they saw them?

The fourth category is the invocation function. It considers provisional characterizations of conduct according to prescriptions and implies such questions as: In reference to whom is the prescription invoked? Who was responsible for administering the decision? Was the prescription invoked for all cases possible or only for selected cases? Was the decision challenged? How was the decision challenged?

The fifth category is the application function. It considers final characterization of conduct according to prescriptions and implies such questions as: How was the prescription applied? How were those affected reached and informed? Did any groups turn to other agencies for changes in the enforcement of the prescription?
Was the prescription violated by any individuals or by the agency responsible for the application of the prescription? Did the prescribed policy lead to changes in values?

The sixth category is the appraisal function. It considers assessment of the success and failure of policy and implies such questions as: How is the working of prescriptions appraised? Whose activities were appraised? Who did the appraising? How effectively and efficiently was the prescription executed? Did the structure of the agency lead to inefficient or indifferent administration of the prescription? Did the administration of the prescription lead to significant changes in the administrative agency?

The seventh category is the termination function. It considers the final arrangements entered into within the framework of the prescription and implies such questions as: How was the prescription integrated into the framework of the organization? Did expectations change? What aspects of the prescription, if any, were abandoned or revised?

This dissertation will use numerous sources to gather the information necessary to answer these analytical questions. Local histories and community studies will be consulted. Federal and state laws, commission studies, and court decisions will be cited.
Personal interviews with concerned citizens, teachers, and administrators will help to clarify the meaning and operation of various policies. The records of the proceedings of the Board of Education meetings will be introduced whenever pertinent. Numerous reports and studies commissioned by the Board will be examined. Local and city-wide newspapers, a major source of information, will fill in the flesh and blood missing from public documents.

The role newspapers play in Board matters has been recognized by a scholar who sat on the Chicago Board of Education. Joseph Pois has observed that newspaper reporters often become quite expert on school matters. Indeed, he discloses, it was not unusual for a reporter to direct a Board member's attention to details that might otherwise have gone unnoticed. The scrutiny of the press influences Board members to be mindful of their inconsistencies. Observant reporters are quick to detect the influence of commitments or cliques upon a member's vote. Pois observes some shortcomings of the press but states that "the press is by far the principal medium for publicizing the member's position on school issues as well as for mobilizing support."  

However, for numerous reasons, a newspaper account may be

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inaccurate. This is one reason that multiple citations will be given in footnotes in order to establish that more than one source was in agreement on the accuracy of a statement. When disagreement is found, an analysis will be made in the footnote. Another reason for multiple citations rests in the fact that often the information incorporated in a single sentence or paragraph may be drawn from more than one source. As this occurs with considerable frequency, the multitude of footnotes and explanations would be a greater irritation to the reader than checking a multiple citation.

The basic chronological approach of this study should result in minimal distortion of the Lasswell decision-making model. Indeed, a chronological sequence demonstrates that the use of the seven functions does not affect the free form a researcher may follow. The functions are useful because they direct attention to pertinent information when it is encountered. The classifications established by the functions are sufficiently broad to allow for their application to any decision-making body. An interplay does exist between the functions in that it may be necessary to consider two or more functions in their relation to a specific issue. For example, the intelligence function often requires consideration of prior decision-making situations so that numerous aspects of the entire seven functions are involved in developing
Indeed, Lasswell considers the functions as semi-autonomous, and a study could begin with any one of the functions being considered first. Thus, the "reform waves" experienced by cities usually begin with the appraisal function. Citizens become critical of past decisions and present activities. The intelligence function continues to focus attention on some form of corruption or mismanagement. Intelligence agencies, such as the public media, study the problem and suggest how it has been solved in other areas. The recommending function develops naturally from the prior process as civic organizations and other clubs begin to espouse methods of reform. The prescriptive function may appear in the form of legislation which alters the public policy. Indictments of corrupt officials and challenges to the legislation are aspects of the invocation function. The application function encompasses the various changes and reforms necessary to carry out the prescription. As time passes, the appraisal function is enforced less strictly and the cycle terminates with the development of a new corruption phase.  

The cardinal benefit of Lasswell's model is the systematic

organization of concepts concerning the decision-making process. These concepts help develop a series of analytic questions which expedite the research of a topic. Of course, caution is exercised that the concepts and questions do not serve to exclude other avenues of investigation that emerge during research. However, there is no model which should be employed without observing this warning. Finally, this student concurs with Lasswell's admonition that those developing a study should be "willing to adopt the goal values of human dignity as working postulates." This admonition is interpreted in this study as a warning against considering the demands or pleas of any group encountered as expressions of prejudice or bias. The goal to be desired is understanding, not judgment.

The hypothesis of this dissertation is that the seven categories of functional analysis suggested by Harold Lasswell will yield a comprehensive and exceptionally intelligible view of the decision-making process when related to the Chicago busing decision. The analytic questions suggested by the seven functions will direct research to pertinent and valuable observations. It will now be shown how the seven functions have been utilized within the framework of the chapters of this dissertation.

7 Ibid., pp. 15-21.
Lasswell's first step, the intelligence function, has been expanded in this study in order to consider the Chicago Board of Education as a decision-making body and to develop the complex background of data which served to inform the Board and helped shape its decision. Thus, in chapter ii of this dissertation, the political influences on the Chicago Board of Education are considered along with the individual perspectives of each Board member regarding integration. The changing relationship of the Board and its Superintendent of Schools is examined as they seek a redefinition of "quality education" when pressure mounts for school desegregation. The dependence of the Board for information from the superintendent and his staff is also scrutinized. The recommendation function appears in this chapter as various factions develop in the communities demanding that the policies of the superintendent or his opponents be prescribed. The demands of pressure groups contribute to the removal of the superintendent although the conflict publicly revolves around a conflict over the separation of intelligence, recommendation, and prescription functions between the Board and its Superintendent.

Chapter iii expands the intelligence function by examining some legal and judicial incentives for desegregating the school system. The recommendation function is introduced in this chapter
as alternatives are offered by a Superintendent of Schools. The Hauser and Havighurst reports further develop the recommendation function as the Superintendent of Schools challenges the right of individuals outside the school system to usurp his power of recommending. Reactions of developing pressure groups to the reports are investigated as are signs of growing demands for greater participation in the recommending function. Alternative policies for implementing desegregation are considered.

Chapter iv continues to expand the intelligence function as it considers numerous reports and studies of the demography of Chicago which were available to the Board when it made its decision. The recommendation function emerges in this chapter when stabilization is considered as an alternative policy to busing. Problems encountered in the use of this alternative are examined in detail. Policy statements expressing values subscribed to by the Board as a body are reviewed. Socio-economic factors in racially changing communities which helped solidify factions are recognized. The chapter continues to develop the recommendation function as it investigates the developing community organizations and attempts to establish who speaks for the community.

Chapter v concentrates on the recommendation function. A growing tendency of the Board to challenge the recommendations of
the superintendent is noted. The dissertation continues to trace the pressures exerted by pro-desegregation groups upon the Board. A general prescription in the form of a master plan offered by the new superintendent is analyzed. The acceptance of the plan by the Board, however, was not a commitment to implement its specifics. The full force of the superintendent's recommendation power is recognized when he submits a set of specific recommendations calling for busing programs to the Board for its approval. Again, the intelligence function of gathering and processing is considered in its relation to arriving at the final recommendation. Finally, the reaction of various pressure groups to the announced plan is noted.

Chapter vi concentrates on the prescription function. Use of political representatives by pressure groups is observed. The decision of the Board to hold hearings in the communities is examined in light of the debate on its propriety. The possibility of changing points of view as a result of making information available is noted. Motives are sought for the positions of various groups. Apparent reasons for the decisions not to initiate one plan while accepting another compromise plan are considered. The role of the superintendent in defining his recommending function and the Board's prescriptive function is examined.
Chapter vii encompasses aspects of the invocation, application, appraisal, and termination functions. Administrative problems involved in implementing the plan are noted. Challenges to the decision are enumerated and their disposition considered. A later decision by the Board not to continue a temporary busing program indicates that busing as an expandable policy is not considered within the framework of present alternatives. An examination is made of the continuation of some alternatives and the development of new prescriptions. The busing program is appraised in light of the fate of the area for which the plan was not ultimately prescribed. Finally, the decision of the Board to open direct lines of intelligence between itself and the community is examined.

Chapter viii concentrates on the appraisal function. The busing policy is assessed in light of the four goals stated by the Board of Education. The evaluations made by the school administration are utilized for the data they contain, but the failures and successes of the operating plan represent the judgments of this author rather than those of the school administration. Aspects of the termination function are developed as the study reviews those parts of the busing plan which were abandoned or revised. The integration of the prescription into the framework of the school
structure is studied. Finally, changing expectations, both of the Board and various interest groups, are considered in relation to the busing prescription.

Chapter ix returns directly to the analytic questions presented in the seven functions described by Lasswell. This chapter serves to summarize the significant findings of the dissertation. However, its prime purpose is to establish the utility of Lasswell's scheme in studying the decision-making process. Each function is restated, and the analytic questions indicated in this introduction are serially listed. Brief summaries of the investigation presented in this dissertation are given as answers to the questions. Chapter ix, then, demonstrates how the Lasswell model serves to guide research without prohibiting the development of a chronological presentation. The analytic questions function as guides in research but do not limit the investigation of relevant data as it appears to shed light on a developing aspect of the problem being studied.

This introduction has, therefore, presented the purpose, significance and hypothesis of this dissertation. It has demonstrated the application of the seven functions within the body of the work. A table of contents gives the pagination of each of the chapters for specific study. A relevant bibliography is presented. The Lasswell model is applied with chapters which are basically
chronologically arranged. The final chapter considers the analytic questions suggested by the seven functions in light of the entire study.
CHAPTER II

INTELLIGENCE AND RECOMMENDATION FUNCTIONS:

THE CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION AS

A POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING BODY

The Chicago Board of Education is a political body. While its members are appointed rather than elected, the Board's decisions reflect the numerous pressures which are exerted upon it. Over the years the direct influence of politicians on Board decisions has been well-documented. In 1917 the Illinois General Assembly established the Board as an autonomous unit in Chicago, and the State Supreme Court had even backed Board members who challenged the mayor's right to require undated resignations from nominees to the Board before appointing them.¹

Despite the letter of the law and its interpretation, Board members did not remain independent of political influence. During the terms of Mayor William H. Thompson, charges of corrupt

political influences were common. True bills were voted against a Board president, vice-president, and an attorney, along with numerous other political job-holders in the school system. None of the indicted were convicted, and, while Thompson lost the next election to William E. Dever, his return to power in 1927 brought with him another Board controlled by men of questionable intention.²

By the close of World War II political encroachments and Board mismanagement brought about strong demands for a thorough investigation of the public school system. The Commission for the Defense of Democracy Through Education, a part of the National Education Association, was induced to begin a study of the Chicago system. This body, operating independently of city control, found numerous violations of the NEA code of ethics. It was pointed out that the president of the Chicago Board of Education dominated not only the other members of the Board, but the Superintendent of Schools as well. Relatives of Board members

had been appointed to school positions. Politicians were found to be influencing appointments and contracts. Teachers and administrators rose in position on the basis of political contacts, and those who were opposed to this system of favoritism were threatened or punished with transfers. The public was kept ignorant of Board policy through the secretive conduct of Board meetings.3

Attempts by city officials to obscure the findings of the commission finally proved futile in the face of an aroused public indignation supported and abetted by such educational institutions as the National Education Association and the North Central Association. On April 2, 1946, Mayor Kelly appointed a Mayor's Advisory Committee consisting of five college presidents and the president of the North Central Association. Two reforms suggested by this group are of particular significance to this present study. First, a Commission on School Board Nominations was recommended and established. Second, the position of the superintendent relative to the Board was strengthened by requiring that all school officials report to the Board through the Office

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of the Superintendent. With the exception of the Board attorney, who may advise the Board directly, this recommendation became law in 1947.4

The Commission on School Board Nominations is commonly credited with upgrading the caliber of Board members. Representation on the commission has been expanded and contracted periodically from its original membership of eleven organizations and four universities. The University of Chicago, Northwestern and Roosevelt Universities were soon included along with the Citizens Schools Committee and the Cook County Physicians Association. In 1966 the Urban League was asked to name a representative. By 1968 representatives on one of the most controversial nominating commissions came from seven universities, two law groups, two labor groups, two business groups, two school groups, one Negro organization and one patriotic legion. Despite this broad array of interest, the nominating committees have been accused of representing top social groups rather than the white working class and Negro citizens whose children are attending the public schools.5

4 Ibid., pp. 13-16.
The relative independence of the members of the nominating committee has been questioned by critics who suggest that numerous considerations may act to limit their discretion. Joseph Pois, who served on the Chicago Board of Education between 1956 and 1961, points out that such expedient desires as fear of jeopardizing progress already made, a propensity for compromise, a concern to protect their own interest, and even the uncertainty of the public response may influence committee members. Certainly, group pressures and the influence of City Hall are factors in the choice of nominees. Mrs. Louise Malis, in 1961 a member of the Nominating Commission, criticized the mayor for suggesting that a name be added to the list of nominees after the commission had already completed its deliberations and submitted its choices. The mayor's nomination, however, was added to the list on this and other occasions.  

That the Mayor of Chicago is the ultimate power in deciding upon and appointing Board of Education members is most evident in the fact that he need not heed the recommendation of the Nominating Commission. The commission itself has no statutory sanction, and the mayor is not bound to the list it submits.

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6 Pois, Crisis, pp. 62-65.
This point is well illustrated in an incident which followed the busing controversy of 1967-1968.

The conservative position taken by the President and Vice-president of the Board of Education regarding busing and other innovations suggested by the new superintendent, James Redmond, led a large faction of the Nominating Commission to oppose the reappointment of Whiston and Murray. While some members argued that the commission should not "act in any way as a superboard or take the mayor's prerogatives away from him virtually," the commission by a nine to eight vote failed to renominate these men among the sixteen suggested individuals submitted to the mayor for the five vacancies on the Board. The mayor's response was to appoint three members to the Board who were not on the commission's list. He balanced the reappointment of the Board's president and vice-president by appointing the Negro secretary of the Urban League. The two other Board members he chose were considered to be liberals, so that a balance was retained between factions in the city.7

That this balance still remained conservative was evident

in that Frank Whiston and Thomas J. Murray were immediately re-elected as President and Vice-president of the Board. When it was evident two years later that Jack Witkowsky, newly appointed in 1968, would not vote for Whiston again, Mayor Daley passed over his reappointment and chose a candidate who did vote for Whiston. While Board members often deny that the mayor has any influence on their decisions, Harry M. Oliver, Jr., a Board member between 1966 and 1969, claims he saw signs that Daley "put pressure on the board not to try experiments with integration that would be opposed in certain white neighborhoods." A Chicago Sun-Times reporter has stated that "Insiders believe Daley is interested in three important areas of school board concern: labor negotiations; integration; and real estate."  

This is not to suggest that Board members are pawns of the mayor. But they have accepted past political practices and have challenged these. Thus, Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, when questioned about a recent controversy regarding wages paid to custodial staff,

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replied,

We've been paying prevailing wage rates for sixty years. It is nothing this Board of Education made the decision about. It is nothing the superintendent made the decision about... Now do you take a practice of sixty years and all of a sudden close up a school system because the BGA [Better Government Association] thinks it's a great idea?9

There has been no move by the Board to end such practices as paying top wages to custodial staff, rental of land to the city at rates lower than one might expect, and making decisions which are in accord with established real estate approaches to Negro expansion. Those members who might be likely to question these practices have not gained control of the Board. Denials by certain Board members that the mayor influences their decisions are probably irrelevant. It seems to be the case that a majority of the members of the Board are sympathetic to the mayor's political position and are likely to react in a manner similar to his. If they do not, and their vote is crucial, they should not expect to be reappointed.

Legally, to be eligible for a seat on the Board, one must be thirty years old and a resident of Chicago for five years prior to appointment. The five year terms are staggered so that two

members are appointed every year and three on every fifth year. No compensation is given for service and members are forbidden to hold any other public office. Thus, Board membership is limited to those who can afford to devote the considerable time and effort required for the often thankless job.

Appointees to the Board in 1968 certainly did not represent a geographical distribution over the city. Nine of the eleven members lived near the lake shore, and none of the members lived on the northwest or southwest sides of the city where much of the anti-busing protest was centered. All the members were of upper or upper-middle class status. Only three members had children in the public schools. The number of Catholics on the Board had fallen from a previous six to four members. As this Church has a parallel school system in Chicago representing over one-fourth of the total city school enrollment, talk of "escape" into this semi-private system was an important factor in the busing crisis. Four members of the Board were septuagenarians—all these four fell into the conservative block.

While representation of interest groups obviously varies

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10 Illinois, Revised Statutes (1965), c. 122, sec. 34–3, 4.
with the appointment of some particular individual, the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations have always accounted for two of the seats. Since the early 1960's, two Negroes had been appointed to represent the growing majority of Negro students in the system. A candidate of the Parent-Teachers Association has occupied a Board seat for many years. The growing representation of women on the Board had reached three by 1968. In matters concerning integration the organizational background of any Board member appears to be quite secondary to the individual's personal convictions. Generally, the Board members split into a conservative and liberal faction with two other members who could be considered as swing voters.

In the conservative block could be found Frank M. Whiston, Thomas J. Murray, Edward S. Scheffler, and Mrs. Wendell E. Green. The liberal element consisted of Warren H. Bacon, Harry M. Oliver, Jr., Bernard S. Friedman, Mrs. Louise A. Malis, and John D. Carey. The swing vote often depended upon Mrs. W. Lydon Wild and Cyrus Adams III.

Frank Whiston had served on the Board since 1948. The head of a real estate management firm, he had handled mainly commercial

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properties such as the elder Marshall Field's estate before his
death and the city's Civic Center. Whiston had opposed such
desegregation moves as the Hauser school transfer plan and had
been a major supporter of Superintendent of Schools Benjamin
Willis, whose policies were often criticized by civil rights
leaders. Whiston became President of the Board when Claire
Roddewig resigned after being picketed by the civil rights groups
in early 1964. Opposition, even at that time, to Whiston's
leadership of the Board was apparent when he had to vote for
himself in order to win the position. Murray, who became vice­

president, also found it necessary to vote for himself.13

Thomas J. Murray at seventy-six was still president of the
Building Trades Council and a powerful influence in the American
Federation of Labor. A staunch supporter of the neighborhood
school policy, he opposed any form of paid transportation which
would increase the likelihood of successful pupil transfer pro-
grams. His opposition was based on what he felt would be the

13 Chicago's American, May 26, 1966, p. 3. Chicago Daily News,
June 25, 1964, p. 12. Witkowsky, "Education of a School Board Mem-
ber," pp. 90-91. Board of Education, City of Chicago, Proceedings,
Board of Education, City of Chicago, (Chicago: Board of Education,
May 27, 1964), pp. 2360-64. Hereinafter referred to as Proceedings,
date of meeting, page number.
prohibitive cost of such a program. Despite the fact that he was a Catholic, he also protested that paying transportation costs would lead to having to pay the costs of transporting parochial school students as well as public school pupils. Murray felt that public opinion was opposed to any breach of the neighborhood school policy. When organized resistance to the busing plan of 1967 arose, Murray stated, "The recent weeks prove the extent to which the public can be aroused over this question, so it becomes apparent to me that the great majority of the citizens of Chicago hate to see the neighborhood school policy disappear also."14

Edward S. Scheffler, at seventy-one, was a retired judge in ill health who was frequently absent from meetings. He left the Board soon after the busing crisis. In 1964, protests were lodged against Superintendent of Schools Benjamin Willis which demanded, in part, that communities be allowed greater participation in the decision-making process. Scheffler, supporting the opinion of Murray, stated, "The thing I object to is everybody trying to run the school system. The main trouble is that every group, whether they have been organized for two weeks or a month

and whether they have a background in education, is trying to run the system." In refusing to support the Redmond Report, which suggested methods of integration, Scheffler contended,

> At present in our large cities in the field of school integration many impractical promises have been made, and the fulfillment of these promises has been discouraging. The Chicago Board of Education should not be compelled to make commitments as suggested in the report until such a time as we have good reason to believe that we can fulfill them.\(^\text{15}\)

Mrs. Wendell Green, the widow of Chicago's first Negro judge, at seventy-eight had moved somewhat from the position of her youth in which she wrote a master's thesis on the plight of Negroes. By 1964 Negro politicians attacked her reappointment to the Board as she was considered "totally alienated from the Negro community." In 1968 a leading Chicago Negro paper characterized her as "unswervingly consistent in her anti-Negro attitude." Much of Mrs. Green's difficulty came from her opposition to devices such as racial head counts and the use of quota systems to plan and implement desegregation. She certainly pinpointed a serious problem for desegregation plans when she noted,

> We already have an elementary Negro preponderance. If we bused in all directions right now, we would end up this evening with every elementary school in Chicago having more

Negro children, or black or Afro-Americans, than white children. So this means that we are setting up a system, a quota system, which not only discriminates against these Negro[es] . . . but also imposes segregation because of a 15% quota.16

Warren H. Bacon was a product of the Chicago school system and his children were also attending the public schools. He was vice-president of a life insurance company and then of a major steel corporation before being appointed at the age of forty-one to the Board of Education in May, 1963. The second Negro on the Board, he was committed to integration and openly hostile to the leadership of Whiston. His major criticism of community participation in the decision-making process was that at public hearings "all we do is listen and that's the end of it." Regarding integration, in 1967 he stated, "There are areas where we can bring about integration by changing the school boundaries. We could have done this years ago, but we failed. Instead, the board worked very hard at maintaining segregation by gerrymandering school districts."17


Bernard S. Friedman, a research chemist for a major oil firm, was a resident of the South Shore in Chicago—an area directly involved in the busing plan (although Friedman lived on the lake shore and was somewhat geographically removed from the area involved). Friedman actively supported the busing plan but felt that

Good reasons rationally put by organizations could make me skeptical about the success of the proposed busing program . . . if we reduce the percentage of Negro students at a South Shore school from sixty-seven percent to sixty-two percent, I don't see that we're accomplishing anything.

Friedman shared Bacon's view that the Board was always behind the times in acting and made its decisions always to respond and never to initiate.  

Mrs. Louise A. Malis was the wife of a furniture manufacturing representative, a past president of the Illinois Parent-Teacher Association Congress and had served as a member of the Mayor's Commission of School Board Nominations. Her children were, during her tenure with the Board until 1968, students in the public school system in the northeast area of Chicago. As a new Board member in 1964, Mrs. Malis announced that she favored

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adjusting school boundaries to desegregate. She supported the Redmond Report, arguing that if the funds to implement it were not immediately available, the Board should work without delay to obtain the means to put the plan into effect. Believing that integration is beneficial for all concerned, she recognized that busing was not the answer but saw it as part of the overall solution.19

John D. Carey was a steelworkers union organizer. A graduate of Bowen High School on the south side of the city, he continued to live in South Chicago and his daughter attended the public schools. Carey supported both the Redmond Plan and the busing plan suggested in late 1967. In one statement he reminded his fellow Board members that in 1964 the Board had adopted a resolution stating it would continue "to search for ways to increase the interracial association of students" and accepting "a responsibility to help preserve as far as possible such associations in areas where they now exist." Carey expressed the belief that the Redmond Plan "contains the essential elements that are necessary if Chicago is going to solve the massive educational problem" it faces. He saw the busing proposal as the first short

term recommendation evolving from the plan. Regarding public hearings he stated, "During these past several weeks I have attempted to listen to many voices on this proposal, vehement voices against, moral voices that cry for justice and equality and muted voices that represent the silent and inarticulate." Regarding the role that elected figures played in supporting and attacking the plan, he stated, "I view with regret those political voices that lack the courage of leadership and I applaud those political voices who would lean in the face of adversity." For Carey, "Racial isolation in the schools cannot produce quality education."^20

Harry M. Oliver, Jr., a bachelor and socialite, was vice-president of an insurance brokerage firm. While Oliver served only a little over two years between 1966 and 1969, he became one of the most outspoken critics of the Chicago Board of Education. Envisioning the schools' role as interacting with the community, he introduced a resolution backing fair housing and supported a resolution in which the Board promoted Project Good Neighbor, an attempt of the Leadership Council for Open Housing to educate

residents of Metropolitan Chicago regarding matters of integration.\textsuperscript{21}

Despite the unanimous approval by the Board of numerous resolutions opposing segregation, Oliver became frustrated at what he felt was a failure of the Board to take any concerted action to implement desegregation. He was especially critical of the fact that the Board had

as its vice-president a powerful labor union president whose members are employed by the school system and as its president a man who in every instance supports the position of organized labor although doing so has often meant taking away from education for our children and throwing us into a budget deficit.

Oliver felt that salary concessions made to the Chicago Teachers Union were especially responsible for failure to implement education and desegregation plans which would require large expenditures.\textsuperscript{22}

The failure of Board members to respond to various community organizations was another source of aggravation to Oliver. He felt a credibility gap had developed between the Board and communities as Board members were telling organizations "one thing and


\textsuperscript{22}Chicago Daily News, April 1, 1969, p. 3; June 12, 1969, p. 6 (Quote). Chicago Sun-Times, March 31, 1969, p. 3.
then doing another or nothing . . . related to building sites, construction plans, building completion dates, boundary changes, new programs, integration and others." Oliver felt the Board should organize district councils of parents in which "The citizens will be heard and felt. If the school system doesn't listen, the citizens will blow us right out of the water. There isn't much time left."23 How to determine which voices were to be listened to was more clear to Oliver than to other Board members.

Oliver's attacks on fellow Board members resulted in prepared defenses of union affiliations being read into the Proceedings of the Board meetings and shouted responses during the sessions. At the last meeting Oliver was to attend, a conciliatory farewell wish from Whiston evoked some poignant statements regarding the decision-making structure of the Board. Oliver responded to the president's farewell by observing that "no two of us ever seem to agree consistently." In reflecting on this statement Mrs. Malis agreed and stated, "we have all voted with different people on different issues, depending on the issues . . . I would like to state clearly that I know of no block voting on this Board or lobbying done by members of this Board in order to

get other members of this Board to vote with them." Oliver had already expressed his view that the Board President and Superintendent Redmond had repeatedly blocked efforts of individual Board members to become involved in the Board's legislative and financial programs. Thus, certain decisions might have been left in the hands of a few who were knowledgeable in that area, and, for lack of information, other members would be hesitant to protest.

Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, the wife of an executive of the Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company, had been a Chicago school teacher. She was active in numerous Catholic organizations and her child had attended the parochial schools in the South Shore area. A personal friend of Mayor Daley, she had been active in his campaigns. At the time of her appointment in 1963, she had stated that she would be willing to scrap the Board's neighborhood policy in order to achieve integration. Regarding community participation in the Board's decision process she commented in her usually lucid style, "To have everybody putting their two cents into a system is difficult. All you might get is utter confusion." In response to suggestions that the Board be elected from various areas of

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the city Mrs. Wild stated, "If we sat there as elected representatives, just think of what would happen if we all represented a different area. No decision would ever be reached." In July, 1967, Mrs. Wild took over the chairmanship of the South Side Boundary Committee from Murray. This committee, by adjusting school boundaries, can play a crucial role in desegregating schools. Mrs. Wild had already been accused of continually opposing desegregation by City Alderman Leon Despres. In August, 1967, she qualified her vote of approval of the Redmond Report by stating "we must not mislead the people involved that by accepting this in principle that we insure its immediate implementation, since we have . . . no funds available." In January, 1968, Whiston chose Mrs. Wild to sit on the busing hearings committee because, in his opinion, she was in the middle on the busing proposal.25

Cyrus Adams III was a descendant of a famous family and an executive of a leading Chicago department store. A graduate of Princeton, his own children had attended the Chicago Latin School.

He believed desegregation could be achieved within the neighborhood school concept. He supported the controversial Benjamin Willis in 1963, asking the Board to refuse his resignation. Regarding desegregation he stated, "The board has said they are against segregation; I would be too. When you get into integration--the word means different things to different people."²⁶

It was this middle-of-the-road attitude which had led Alderman Leon Despres of the City Council to oppose the reappointment of Adams. The alderman claimed Adams was a member of a "swing group which sides with the administration on crucial issues on the Board and Daley is always in the background pulling strings." But few agreed with the alderman's appraisal. The Chicago Daily News applauded Adams as being "a conscientious contributor to the board's discussions and decisions from a thoroughly developed knowledge of the problems of Chicago's schools."²⁷

Adams' middle position did not stop him from taking stands. In 1966 he issued a statement in which he openly favored extra pay for teachers working in inner-city situations. He favored publishing the achievement test results of Chicago students, but he


²⁷Chicago Daily News, May 11, 1966; p. 11 (First quote); editorial, May 7, 1966 (Second quote).
wanted the results published by school districts rather than individual schools in order to avoid any stigma on a particular school. He felt the cluster plan had mixed results and permissive transfers "make people move out in some cases." (The cluster plan had been suggested in 1964 by the Hauser Report to expand attendance areas so that students might choose between a few "clustered" high schools.) Adams favored the neighborhood school plan for small children because of the hazards of traveling. He thought open enrollment for high schools would be desirable but not during the current period of overcrowding.28

Perhaps most typical of Adams' attitude was his comment on community participation. He stated it was "appropriate to a point. You have to find a compromise between community participation in your affairs and the problem of too many cooks spoiling the broth." When controversy arose over a motion to grant extra support to integrated elementary schools, it was Adams who sponsored a compromise which led to its adoption. He was to play this role again in the final busing decision in 1968.29

The relationship between the Board and its Superintendent of


Schools has played a dramatic role in Chicago Public School history. The weakened position of the superintendent under corrupt Boards was a major concern of the Commission for the Defense of Democracy Through Education when it reported on the scandals which culminated during World War II. Herold Hunt began the reforms in Chicago. When he passed the reins to Benjamin C. Willis in 1953, a very strong leader entered the Office of the Superintendent of Schools. Dr. Willis built not only new schools but a school system which was renowned for its emphasis on "quality education."

Dr. Bernard Friedman, often a critic of Dr. Willis, has summarized one view of the controversial Superintendent when he stated,

Willis was here in an extremely difficult period. He was excellent in the development of schools--design and selecting locations was his forte. If only providing facilities, teachers, funds and programs was all that was needed, then there wouldn't have been nearly as many problems. But the problem was integration and desegregation. He just wasn't flexible enough.  

Dr. Willis obviously wished the Chicago Public School System to operate autonomously of the other institutions of the city. He often withdrew cooperation from those agencies which he could not control and set out to establish a strongly centralized professional body in the superintendent's offices. This policy would

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not only allow the Superintendent to purge corrupting influences from his teaching staffs—it also reflected a personality which would brook no challenges to authority.

By 1963 leaders of the developing civil rights movement were questioning Chicago school policies. Minority representatives claimed Dr. Willis was committed to de facto segregation. In August, 1963, a legal action resulted in the appointment of a committee chaired by Philip M. Hauser of the Sociology Department at the University of Chicago. The Hauser Panel was to analyze and study the school system in particular regard to schools attended entirely or predominantly by Negroes, define any problems that result therefrom, and formulate the report to this Board [of Chicago] . . . a plan by which any educational, psychological, and emotional problems or inequities in the school system that prevail may best be eliminated. . . .

Four months before the commissioning of the Hauser panel the Board Survey Committee had contacted Professor Havighurst of the Education Department at the University of Chicago to begin an exhaustive study of the entire school system. The Survey Committee

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Advisory Panel on Integration of the Public Schools, Report to the Board of Education, City of Chicago, March 31, 1964, Integration of the Public Schools—Chicago, Philip M. Hauser, Chairman (Chicago, Chicago Board of Education, 1964), pp. vii, 2. Herein-after referred to as Hauser Report. The report is examined in greater detail in chapter iv of this study.
had spent over eighteen months determining the scope of the report and choosing the director. Despite his prior approval of the commissioning of a study, Dr. Willis strongly objected to the Board's action, claiming he "had not been adequately consulted concerning the choice of a director and the design of the Survey."  

Actually, the superintendent had been frank in his off-the-record opposition to the survey. He was just as blunt in his opposition to the choice of Dr. Havighurst, who advocated overlapping and expanded school districts. At the May 22, 1963, Board meeting Willis said:

I can only surmise that the [survey] committee of the Board of Education, without asking for data from the administration, or its analysis, and without deliberative action of the Board of Education, has made a decision to change the direction of the policy away from the neighborhood school.  

The Board was able to assuage the superintendent's misgivings by establishing a committee of three to plan and direct the survey. As Willis was to sit as one of the committee, both he and the Board were able to save face. But definite problems could be identified.

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33 Pois, Crisis, pp. 106-07.
in the relationship of the Board with its superintendent. The growing pressures of the civil rights groups regarding de facto segregation were likely to increase tensions and further test the hazy border between the policy-making powers of the Board and the administrative powers of the superintendent. By giving in on numerous issues the Board had failed to establish any clear cut line as to when it would take a stand. When it did move to reverse the superintendent, the Board precipitated a crisis.34

When the school year began in September, 1963, two issues confronted the Board. As populations shifted in Chicago, school enrollments rose or fell. In order to meet the extra demands put on school facilities mobile class units were brought to some schools on a temporary basis. Most of the 625 mobile units had been placed on playgrounds of predominantly Negro schools. Civil rights groups argued this practice was meant to contain them and demanded the units be placed on playgrounds of predominantly white schools thus opening them to desegregation. Demonstrations were initiated demanding the resignation of Willis. Predominantly

34 Ibid., pp. 103-09. Pois cites a case where Dr. Willis accepted and worked on a survey of the Massachusetts schools for a large fee. This commitment, which would require the Superintendent to devote much time to another school system was finally approved by the Board.
white groups organized and responded with demands to keep the superintendent.35

The second and precipitating issue centered upon the opening of schools to pupils who did not live in the district. Under pressure to initiate some plan of desegregation, the school staff developed a selective permissive transfer plan in which students of outstanding ability would be permitted to transfer out of schools with limited numbers of such students into schools with a greater number of such students. The initial plan listed twenty-four receiving high schools. A month later Willis reduced this number to nine and went to great lengths pointing out that most of the eligible students were not interested in leaving their home schools as special programs had provided for their needs. At the next Board meeting, it was pointed out by Board members that representatives of the communities of the Hyde Park and South Shore High Schools had expressed a willingness to accept talented Negro students into their honors programs. The Board overruled Willis by authorizing the transfer of twenty-four students between these two

35Kerr, "Ben Willis After Chicago," p. 1. This problem will be developed further in chapters iii and iv of this study.
high schools which had been removed from the initial list.36

At first Willis refused to implement the decision, and then he resigned on October 4, 1963. Forces had already been mobilized on both sides of the issue. Civil rights groups hailed his resignation which they had helped to precipitate. The parents of students he had refused to transfer had immediately begun court proceedings which had resulted in a legal order to implement the transfers. The South East Community Organization had sent a letter to Board President Roddewig demanding the twenty-four students be transferred from Hyde Park to South Shore High School. When Willis resigned, in protest of what he considered a violation of his professional integrity, all the major newspapers, except the Chicago Tribune, ran editorials accepting his departure.37

But Willis was not without friends. Business leaders telegraphed their support for the man who had modernized the massive school system at a minimal cost. Administrators within the school system expressed their admiration for an effective and


tough leader. The chairman of the Illinois State Committee of the North Central Association, referring to the days of political domination, defended the powers of the superintendent. Indeed, the implication that Chicago schools might lose accreditation led Bernard Friedman to comment, "From the timing of it, it looked like a threat, a threat designed to influence the board when it meets Monday [October 7]. It was premature and certainly not appropriate." And on the fringes there were those uncounted numbers of citizens who supported Willis because his decision had, in effect, helped to keep some schools segregated.

The response of the Board to the resignation was affected by many factors. Some members undoubtedly supported the superintendent from the onset. President Roddewig took the position that the superintendent should run the schools. Already a month into the new year and with a deputy superintendent who was ill, there seemed little chance of finding another person to run the highly centralized structure Willis had been so influential in creating. At a special meeting on October 7, the Board refused to accept the Willis resignation by a six to two vote; Friedman and Bacon opposing the move. At the regular meeting on October 9,

the Board reversed itself on the transfer decision and also can-
celled hearings on public school issues. Board President Roddewig
had conferred with Willis regarding the establishment of a set of
rules to determine the relationship of the Board to its Superin-
tendent. Willis promised to draw up a set of guidelines. When
the superintendent reported to work on October 16, only Bacon,
newly appointed that May, refused to accept his return.39

The Board itself certainly had not been accepting the role
of leadership in the decision-making function. It was usually
enmeshed in petty details which preempted more important decisions.
Board members had tended to avoid controversial issues and to be
thankful that the superintendent would absorb the brunt of public
disdain. It might have appeared that the lack of a clear cut
statement of the relationship between the Superintendent and the
Board was at the base of the difficulties between the two com-
ponents of the school structure. Thus Willis had promised to
present a set of guidelines to distinguish the functions of the

39 Proceedings, October 7, 1963, pp. 447-49; October 9, 1963,
9, 1963, pp. 1, 8. Chicago Sun-Times, October 10, 1963, pp. 5,
32. Mary J. Herrick, The Chicago Schools: A Social and Political
History (Benerly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1971),
pp. 316-17.
It was not until April, 1964, that the "Statement of Principles and Procedures for Effective Cooperation Between the Board of Education and the General Superintendent of Schools" was considered by the Board. The Board was recognized to have powers of general supervision and management of the affairs of the schools. While policy-making was recognized as the prerogative of the Board, it was to exercise it on major issues, and access to information-gathering departments was controlled by the superintendent. The superintendent held the responsibility to present proposals and recommendations on major school issues. He was expected to support and clarify his suggestions with information gathered by his staff as well as to supply information to Board members upon their request.

The superintendent was expected to execute Board policy, and departure from a program was to be approved first by the Board. In return the Board was expected to support administrative acts performed in carrying out the decision. While the Board was

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40 Pois, Crisis, pp. 43-50, considers the numerous factors which led the Board to procrastinate in the decision-making process.

41 Proceedings, April 23, 1964, pp. 2212-14
recognized as the final authority on any issue, the guideline was so worded that those issues were to "be resolved through the regularly constituted administrative channels" if at all possible. Members were cautioned to support policies once the Board as a whole had accepted them, and individual members were reminded that their private intercessions had no binding power over the superintendent. Members of the Board were to make contact with the staff only through the superintendent.42

Ways and means of communicating with and serving the community were recognized as the function of the Board, but the General Superintendent was to supply advice and cooperate in all such endeavors. The superintendent was expected to keep the public informed of what the schools were doing. Appeals, complaints and applications made to Board members regarding administration of the schools were to be made known to the superintendent for investigation and report. The right of the Board to sit in closed sessions for purposes of informal discussion was upheld although meetings were expected to be open to the public.43

That these guidelines would not clarify the hazy line which exists between policy-making and administration is clear in a

42Ibid. 43Ibid.
perusal of the statement. By keeping tight control over the information gathering machinery, the superintendent would effectively limit the abilities of the lay Board to prognosticate needs or establish any policy in advance of a clamor from without or the suggestions of the superintendent from within. Thus Bacon could observe, "One of the board's characteristics is its failure to get pertinent information often needed to allow members to make decisions independent of the superintendent instead of ratifying action already decided by him." Furthermore, the superintendent could also refuse to collect data on request by arguing that his staff was overburdened with other duties.44

The guidelines reflected the opinion of most educational administration texts which discouraged standing committees of the lay Board. But it can also be argued that the operation of these committees would lead to independent sources of information and a more detailed study by some Board members of special problems. One ex-Board member has pointed out that on those committees which did exist, there may have been a tendency to appoint Board members to chairmanships who were not as adamant in suggesting innovations.45

44Pois, Crisis, p. 121. Chicago Tribune, June 25, 1964, p. 12 (Quote).

45Witkowsky, "Education of a School Board Member," p. 91.
Furthermore, the size and complexity of the large city system placed immense demands upon the time of Board members who were not paid for their efforts. Board members often spent a good portion of their working days meeting other demands in their lives. The fact that they devoted so much time to Board matters is indicative of the dedication of most of the members, but that they would often welcome the easing of their tasks by a strong superintendent would be quite understandable.

The Board members are lay people in education. That Willis wished to limit their penetration into the operations of the school system would be logical. To be sure, such a position was always in accordance with the superintendent's philosophy while in the Chicago school system. In 1954, a few months after he came to head the city's schools, Willis wrote that professional educators should be leaders, not errand boys. He stated, "Much of what is wrong with education today can be attributed to the fact that educators . . . have abdicated from positions of educational leadership, and have permitted themselves and their schools to be swayed by the winds of uninformed public opinion."  

Public opinion is an elusive specter; indeed, it is many specters. Undoubtedly, the crucial factor in most issues on the division of power is that there is disagreement on what goals must be achieved. Sometimes the goal is elusive because the name attached to it has different meanings for different publics. Thus, "quality education" meant one thing to Benjamin Willis, another to Warren Bacon and yet another to an element of the population of Chicago.

Willis described quality education in terms of neighborhood schools with good facilities, competent faculties, small class sizes, more programs, and the extension of programs the year round. It was the task of the public school system to offer children, youth, and adults "the best of all educational opportunities."\footnote{47 Proceedings, February 13, 1964, pp. 1945-46.} To Warren Bacon quality education was described in the 1954 Supreme Court decision--there could be no quality education without integration. And for another nebulous but vocal group there could be no quality education for their children if another racial group was attending school in the same building. Each of these opinions was held by a public and each public had different demands to make upon the Board. The Board's problem was not a lack of goals but
the lack of a goal.

The relationship between the Board and its Superintendent continued to degenerate as the various publics brought pressure to bear to achieve their often conflicting goals. The return of Willis brought renewed attacks by civil rights groups. Edwin Berry of the Urban League had stated that if Willis stayed on, members of the community "will take their battle into the courts and into the streets." The Coordinating Council of Community Organizations (CCCO) organized a boycott of the schools in which over one-half of the student body was absent. Finally, Board President Roddewig met with the CCCO organizer, Albert Raby, but complained that nothing was discussed. Nevertheless, he decided a statement of policy regarding integration would be necessary to stem the boycott. The final statement read in part:

"... this country would be healthier economically, educationally, and morally if Chicago, Illinois, and all sections of the County, reflected the kind of racial and ethnic diversity characteristic of the nation as a whole. ... [Board members have] already made clear our opposition to segregation or discrimination in planning attendance areas and educational programs. ... However, we see no overall step or action by which such diversity can be brought immediately to all schools by the Board of Education alone." 49


Despite the relative ambiguity and apparent lack of new direction in this Board statement, the superintendent could not bring himself to openly endorse it. Instead, he spoke of "quality education" and pointed out that:

America has a unique history in the world: a history of assimilation of peoples of diverse backgrounds; a history of upward mobility. The public schools of America have made the assimilation possible. It is education, that makes mobility upward possible.\(^5\)

In the fight for integration Negroes did not have to be reminded of the melting pot theory—what they desired was an implementation of the credo. If the Board promised little in its policy statement, the superintendent appeared even more intran- sigent. It was evident that the Negro communities would continue to protest as long as the uncompromising superintendent remained in office.

A middle group was also slipping away from supporting Willis. The Citizen Schools Committee had criticized the lack of cooperation and information that its representatives, Board members, and the Hauser and Havighurst committees had received from the school administration. Willis responded by severing relations with this group. The business community, which had been favorably impressed

\(^5\)Ibid., pp. 1945-46 (Quote on p. 1946).
with the superintendent's efficient and economical administration, was also becoming more critical of his ability to deal with the changing scene. One businessman is quoted as saying, "I thought him an extremely able fellow, but he stuck his foot in his mouth. He was too arrogant." Another estimated that by the time he left the support of the business community had dropped from about 90 percent to only about half.51 Havighurst and Hauser were reported to have stated in a WIND radio interview that Willis had done little to implement their reports and that he was hiding problems and deficiencies in the school system.52

Support for the superintendent on the Board also began to dwindle. In June, 1964, Cyrus Adams III, newly appointed that January, commented, "When we need help I will put my money on our own inside experts against hiring or inviting outside experts." But a year later Adams joined Mrs. Malis and Mrs. Wild, also newly appointed, in looking for a way to ease Willis out of the Superintendency.53 Warren Bacon remained a most outspoken critic of the


school administration, arguing "Education like war, is too important to leave to the professionals." Bacon continued to hammer away at administrative policies, questioning the effectiveness of the student transfer plan, the lack of implementation of the Hauser and Havighurst Reports, and the unwillingness to discuss any topics but the ones the superintendent introduced. 54

Raymond Pasnick, about to resign in 1965, found Willis to be insulting when he opposed the Board's demands that he offer the names of more than one candidate for appointment to a staff position. The superintendent argued that his responsibility required him to have control over personnel matters, and he went on to state that staff members feared a return to the days when appointments were made on a political basis. 55

As the time for renewal of the contract of Willis approached, the administrative staff did support the superintendent. The head of the Chicago Principals' Club wrote an open letter attacking the Board for not supporting the principals. The letter went on to defend the position of a resigning associate superintendent who


criticized the Board for requiring the staff to prove everything. Community organizations distributed buttons, collected signatures on petitions, and organized demonstrations at Board meetings in support of the superintendent.\(^{56}\)

But Willis' position had deteriorated since his stand against the encroachments of his powers by the Board in 1963. On May 14, 1965, a compromise proposal to renew the superintendent's contract, with the understanding that he would retire on his sixty-fifth birthday, was defeated by a seven to four vote. Whiston, who had made the proposal, was joined only by Murray, Scheffler, and Mrs. Green. Bacon, Clement, Friedman, and Pasnick were joined by Mrs. Malis, Mrs. Wild and Adams in defeating the contract agreement.\(^{57}\)

Emotions ran high in the communities. A threat on Bacon's life was reported. The Citizen Schools Committee entered the fray by issuing a letter criticizing the support of the superintendent from within the schools and asking Willis to issue a directive pointing out that such a campaign was not "sound professional


practice." While these divisions in the communities continued, Board members Mrs. Wild, Mrs. Malis, and Adams agreed to switch their votes. They were reported as expressing their opposition to the superintendent but felt that compromise was necessary. Willis accepted the new contract but refused to commit himself to the understanding that he would retire on his birthday in December, 1966.58

The decision was met with renewed protest in the Negro community. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People threatened to organize a boycott of Loop stores and other protests if Willis was not removed. The organization had already brought suit against the Board, challenging the mayor's method of appointing members. Continued pressure on City Hall led Mayor Daley to suggest a meeting between civil rights leaders and the Board.59

Pasnick resigned from the Board in 1965 with an attack upon Willis and the Board itself. He expressed frustration at "the


do-nothing attitude in this whole area of integration that has existed too long in the City of Chicago," and at the lack of action when we have opportunities to do something concrete, our reluctance to take specific positive action dealing with the questions so that we can make clear to the public generally where we stand insofar as integrating our schools and providing every child with an equal educational opportunity."60

Less than a year later Clement resigned in an open conflict with Willis. In a letter to Mayor Daley he listed factors of "personality, character and basic attitudes[as] an issue here." The superintendent was cited for his defensive and dictatorial positions and his "contempt for the judgment of any board member who has the temerity to disagree with him." Clement attacked the administrator's "refusal to accept the official board policy adopted over two years ago to continue to seek and promptly take any practicable steps [to increase] racial and ethnic diversity in the schools," and his lack of respect for parent organizations, neighborhood groups, employee organizations, and other citizens who are interested in the schools.61

Even if one questioned the possibility of identifying a

common factor in all these organizations on which to obtain a consensus to act, it was clear that too many elements had been alienated or embarrassed by the continuing controversy which had come to center on the superintendent. Mrs. Malis, addressing an educational seminar, could complain of "a perpetual tug-of-war in which all decision-making is hampered" that had grown during her tenure. She saw a somewhat new role for the Board in which the public expected it to be more responsive to needs and to assert itself as a body. "As a result," she stated, "boards are no longer willing to sit back and let the superintendent wave the baton and the orchestra will play." In May, 1966, the leader announced he would leave his office in August in order to allow a new superintendent to take over at the beginning of the academic year.

It is indicative of the breakdown of the relationship between Willis and his Board that the search for a new superintendent was begun almost immediately after his contract was renewed. President Whiston appointed Board members, Scheffler, Bacon, Friedman, Mrs. Malis, and Mrs. Wild to a special committee to seek a successor. Whiston stated, "In selecting the committee, I tried to prove the committee is not stacked for or against the

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Superintendent." Whiston appointed himself as an "ex-officio member" without a vote, but it became apparent that he would have a dominant voice in the selection of a new administrator.63

An early attempt to recruit leaders from the local universities to aid in the search failed when dissension occurred among the Board members and some university presidents protested that they had not consented to serve before the offer was made public. Business leaders supporting the Urban League issued a letter listing what they felt to be essential qualifications among which was "equal access to our public schools by all races, with a positive policy and program to eliminate segregation." Cyrus Adams commented that "equal access" was not realistic and said, "Segregation will be eliminated when segregation is eliminated in housing. The whole thing is utopian."64

By March, 1966, the search for a new superintendent was still continuing, and Whiston was reported as leading the committee. Indeed, the illness and eventual death of his son was offered as a reason for the lack of progress. When the search eventually

boiled down to two men, it was Whiston who made the final choice. The fact that this choice was accepted by a vote of ten to one, only Mrs. Green dissenting, indicates the general willingness to accept the new administrator on the basis of his qualifications.65

James F. Redmond, fifty years old in 1966, had an almost ideal background to bring to his new challenge. He came to Chicago in 1948 with his master's degree and doctorate in education from Columbia University. He had served under Harold Hunt as Assistant Superintendent and then Director of Purchasing, leaving the system in 1953 when Dr. Hunt left. He served as Superintendent of Schools in New Orleans from 1953 until 1961. There he made the acquaintance of Bishop Cody, who later came to Chicago as archbishop of the Catholic diocese. Both had been in key positions when the Federal Court ordered the desegregation of New Orleans. Redmond had at least some familiarity with the current Chicago School System as he had served as a consultant with Boaz, Allen and Hamilton, a management firm which had studied Chicago schools. At the time he was considered for the Chicago Superintendency, he was

chief administrator of the Syosset, New York schools.66

The position which Redmond was to fill was wrought with pitfalls. He no longer needed to fear the obvious corruption of past Boards, but the mayor's influence was still real, if more benign. Indeed, in its final composition the Board may be said to have reflected the wishes of the mayor--and the mayor obviously did not actively favor integration.

The city already divided over the issues of segregation, and organizations had formed ready to take action at the signs of any issue. The superintendent's position would depend upon his ability to balance the various publics. He could never allow one group to become so alienated that its protests would seriously disturb the equilibrium upon which the city's political structure and his effectiveness depended.

The composition of the Board abstractly represented factions within the city. It is natural for any political body to hesitate to make controversial decisions. During Willis' tenure the Board had never taken a clear stand, other than verbal, on integration. The guidelines for Board and Superintendent recognized that the ways and means of communicating with and serving the public were

the functions of the Board, but the superintendent was responsible for information gathering. While it would be the function of the Board to set policy, if Redmond did not defend the functions of his staff, he would leave the way open for the destruction of the mechanism built up by the prior two superintendents. Redmond was well aware that much would depend upon his personality and temperament in advising the Board. As he stated at the first Board of Education meeting he attended, "Please don't forget that you have a superintendent and staff who are your advisers."67

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CHAPTER III

INTELLIGENCE AND RECOMMENDATION FUNCTIONS:

THE CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION:

PRESSURES AND RESPONSES

The famous Brown v Board of Education decision of the United States Supreme Court in 1954 had established the principle that segregated schools were "inherently unequal," but by the early 1960's the ramifications of this decision were still not clear. While de jure segregation was undoubtedly unconstitutional, there were many questions regarding the extent of responsibility of school boards to correct de facto segregation in the schools. Obviously, all children were entitled to "quality education." It was not, however, clear to what extent desegregation would improve learning experiences or promote racial harmony and empathy. If some children were not achieving levels of performance as expected by academic norms, what guidelines could be established to help compensate for these deficiencies?¹

Early critics of Chicago Board of Education policies tended

to concentrate on physical characteristics of the school system. They argued that the Board and its Superintendent had fostered segregation in decisions regarding school district boundaries, construction sites and the use of mobiles to relieve overcrowding. They criticized the aspect of the neighborhood school policy which forbade students to transfer to schools beyond their neighborhood school boundaries when their own schools were overcrowded. They questioned the policy which allowed teachers in these overcrowded schools to transfer with the result that large numbers of inexperienced teachers were to be found in inner-city schools. They pointed to inequities in per-pupil expenditures between segregated white and Negro schools. When, in their opinion, suggestions for change went unheeded, they resorted to forms of picketing and boycotting and also sought remedy in the courts.²

In defense against these charges it was argued that many of these policies were inherited from past practice, and that the school Board had little power to alter factors in the community which fostered segregation and tended to concentrate large numbers of Negro children into confined areas. Furthermore, Illinois law was interpreted to forbid the taking of racial counts on which

²Ibid.
decisions could be made regarding desegregation. Inherent in the Board's policy, although often unspoken, was the fear that an active desegregation policy would drive white pupils from the schools and white residents from the city.³

Groups demanding changes regarding the Board's policies on desegregation did not become adamant until the 1960's. While Edwin C. Berry of the Chicago Urban League was active in criticzing Chicago as the most segregated large city in the United States during the 1950's, emphasis in his organization had been upon open housing and better job opportunities.⁴ In reports to the United States Commission on Civil Rights in 1962 vigorous protests against de facto segregation in the North were based on a New York Federal district court decision of January, 1961. In this case the Board of Education of New Rochelle was found to have denied Negroes equal protection under the law as granted under the Fourteenth Amendment by maintaining policies which in effect

³Ibid.
created and maintained racial segregation in one of its schools.5

In September, 1961, Negro parents in Chicago filed suit against the Board of Education seeking injunctions under the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent the school system from compelling their children to attend segregated schools. The complaint charged that the Chicago Board deliberately fostered segregation by use of the neighborhood school policy, gerrymandering attendance districts, selecting school sites, and refusing to utilize empty space in white schools. The plaintiffs alleged that their children were enrolled in overcrowded and inferior schools as a result of these Board policies.6

Litigation regarding these charges dragged on into 1963 when the Board agreed to an out-of-court settlement which initiated a panel to analyze and study the school system in particular regard to schools attended entirely or predominantly by Negroes, define any problems that result therefrom, and formulate and report to this Board as soon as may be conveniently possible a plan by which any educational, psychological, and emotional


problems or inequities in the school system that prevail may best be eliminated.\(^7\)

This panel, headed by University of Chicago sociologist Philip Hauser, would receive a lukewarm reception to its report in March, 1964, as will be discerned later in this chapter.

Protests in Chicago during 1961 tended to concentrate on empty classrooms which were found in predominantly white schools. The growing Negro population of Chicago, contained within two corridors in the south and west sides of the city, placed a great strain on school facilities in black neighborhoods. To alleviate this problem a great deal of the new school construction in the city was located in Negro neighborhoods. Despite this building program, Negro schools averaged about forty pupils per class, and almost all the schools in black neighborhoods were on split shifts.\(^8\)

Critics of Board policy argued that new construction was concentrated in Negro areas in order to contain black students within a ghetto. Advocates of integration pointed out that it also would

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\(^7\)Advisory Panel on Integration of the Public Schools, Report to the Board of Education, City of Chicago, March 31, 1964, Integration of the Public Schools--Chicago, Philip M. Hauser, chairman (Chicago: Board of Education, 1964), pp. v, vii (Quote), 2, 7-9. Hereinafter referred to as Hauser Report.

be less expensive to allow Negro parents to enroll their children in segregated white schools with empty seats. A major obstacle to utilizing empty seats lay in the fact that the school administration no longer reported empty classrooms. In September, 1961, the Board ordered a study on vacant classrooms. A series of reports given by Dr. Willis in October avoided any listings of vacant classrooms. A November report was confused by the introduction of plans to utilize elementary school classrooms for high school branches and a recommendation to redistrict eighty elementary attendance areas to balance class loads.9

In December the Chicago Urban League challenged the classroom figures reported and claimed that Dr. Willis had not counted 382 empty rooms. The existence of empty classrooms and the refusal of the school system to allow Negro students in overcrowded schools to utilize empty seats, if they existed, could be taken as evidence that Board policy did operate to segregate Negroes from whites. Proof of the existence of the empty classrooms became muddled in an array of statistics and new programs. High school branches

were established in numerous elementary schools. This utilized about 2000 desks which might have remained empty. The superintendent announced plans to end double shifts and relieve overcrowding by continuing new construction and utilizing mobile classrooms at schools which lacked facilities for reducing classroom sizes without double shifts.¹⁰

The introduction of these plans was met with rising resistance from the Negro community. The Chicago Urban League, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Congress of Racial Equality joined to call for a halt to any construction until facilities already existing were "accounted for and properly utilized."¹¹ The Board's building program was challenged by litigation in January, 1962, with the initiation of Burroughs v Board of Education. In September, 1961, the McDade School had been opened to relieve overcrowding at the Burnside School, which was located in the South Side of the city. An addition to the nearby Gillespie School was also completed later that fall. Students from areas of the Burnside School district were transferred to the other two schools, but all three schools


¹¹*Chicago's American*, December 20, 1961, p. 3.
remained overcrowded. Negro parents of children at the Burnside School demonstrated within the building against the boundary decision and sought an injunction against maintaining the nearby Perry School as an almost all-white facility. The Burrough suit charged that deliberate segregation was evident in the Board decision to assign Negro students to overcrowded schools while it maintained special classes for the handicapped to fill rooms in the Perry School. It is to be noted that the suit also charged that the Board discriminated against Negro children by forcing them to travel a greater distance than would be necessary. The suit further questioned the adequacy of lunchroom facilities.\textsuperscript{12}

In 1963 the Illinois legislature passed the Armstrong Amendment which stated, "In erecting, purchasing or otherwise acquiring buildings for school purposes, the board shall not do so in such a manner as to promote segregation and separation of children in public schools because of color, race or nationality.\textsuperscript{13} In 1965 the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations (CCCO), an integrated civil rights group on Chicago's South Side, complained


to the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare that the Chicago Board had actively lobbied against legislation which would require school boards to redistrict periodically to reduce segregation. 14

Members of the civil rights groups were not the only critics of Board policy who observed that its decisions may have been deliberately segregative. The Hauser Report, published in 1964, observed that of the seventy schools built since 1955 only six were desegregated in 1963. 15 The 1967 Civil Rights Report observed that the Board apparently did not heed the mandate of the Armstrong Act. It cited the opening of the Paderewski School on the West Side of Chicago as an example of gerrymandering of school attendance areas. When the Paderewski School was opened, the nearby Burns School sent almost all of its Negro students to the new school. The result was that the Burns School, which was about 60 percent Negro in 1963 was 98 percent white in 1964. The Paderewski School opened with a 98 percent black student body. Furthermore, while


15 Hauser Report, p. 62.
the class sizes in both schools increased, the average size at the Paderewski was 3.6 students greater than at the Burns.\textsuperscript{16}

The Hauser Report had cited a common practice which led to segregation in some schools when it noted:

The principal reason why segregated residential areas are usually served by segregated schools is that major natural boundaries, such as main streets or elevated railroads, become school attendance boundaries for reasons of safety, as well as being likely residential racial barriers.\textsuperscript{17}

However, the Civil Rights Commission Report noted that:

The railroad tracks, which are the common boundary between Burns and Paderewski, are not impassable to elementary children. Children crossed these track before 1964 to attend Burns and crossed them in 1965-66 in other attendance areas on the West Side. There are numerous underpasses in the area.\textsuperscript{18}

Community pressures and the Board's desire to stabilize neighborhoods by offering concessions to white residents played an overt role in Board decisions. While the Board may have found it convenient to concede to pressures to utilize building programs to separate the races in the 1950's, this was certainly not the case during the 1960's. The CCCO complaint in 1965 listed over


\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Hauser Report}, p. 63.

twenty cases in which, it was argued, Board decisions or lack of decisions had led to unnecessary segregation. 19

This growing demand of the Negro community to participate in decisions regarding school construction often resulted in long delays in building. One of these delays has been seen to have had a direct effect on the busing plan of 1968. As Negroes moved into the Austin community, the administration planned to build a new facility for 1500 children in grades six through eight to relieve overcrowding in the May, Spencer, and Emmet Schools. In reflecting on the difficulty of achieving community consensus regarding location, one administrator stated:

Had we had that building ready at the time when the adjustment and change were very clearly discerned . . . we would not have had to go to this kind of means [busing]. . . . we could not get the community to agree, first of all, on where the new school should be placed, and secondly, on the type of school that should be placed there. Five years we belabored that [1966-1971], five years, meeting after meeting after meeting, rehashing the same things. Nobody breaking down until finally, one day at a meeting down here at the Board Room, the Negro element in this community said they were sick and tired of fighting with the whites over where this school should be. Whites insisting it should be south of Lake Street [Negro community]. The blacks insisting it should be north of Lake Street. . . . This is the thing; we have to work with people. They all have feelings--pronounced feelings. There were very few people who were in between on this thing. They're either out there in left field or right out there along the right

19July 4, 1965 HEW Complaint, pp. 88-103. Not all the cases involved new building.
field foul line . . . and to get them to come together and reach down the middle was an enormous task . . . but it's at least five years too late. 20

It is difficult to speculate on what effect the new school would have had if it had been built in 1967. Often, these facilities were overcrowded on the first day they were opened. Furthermore, building plans originally designed under Superintendent Willis were under attack in 1967 as "need[ing] to reflect the Board of Education philosophy rather than that of a few Redmond assistants." The biracial Citizens School Committee complained that building plans would result in segregation that could be avoided. 21

Pressures for action which would reflect new integration policies under Dr. Redmond were evident, and a continuation of the old building program was certain to have met with much resistance.

The use of mobile classrooms was a less expensive approach to relieving temporary overcrowding. In March, 1962, twenty-six of these air conditioned, thirty seat mobiles were introduced into overcrowded Negro districts. A boycott against them was begun almost immediately. Complaints were directed at their location


on a busy street, lack of playground facilities, the inadequate notice given parents, and the fact that children had to walk past a new school on the way to the mobiles. The Woodlawn Organization, a militant Saul Alinsky confederation of South Side residents, led the protests against the "Willis Wagons." 22

Underlying the objections was the conviction expressed in a National Association of Colored People complaint that the mobiles were being used to avoid sending blacks into underutilized white schools. Prior to the installation of the units the Chicago Urban League had requested the Board not to use the trailers until empty classrooms were filled. Board member Raymand Pasnick stated that the use of mobiles was a segregationist policy. The Negro community organized "truth squads" to enter schools and photograph empty classrooms. Sit-in and walk-in demonstrations resulted in arrests which served to strengthen Negro militancy. 23


23 Coons, "Chicago," p. 197. Strickland, History of Chicago Urban League, p. 240. These objections to these mobiles was not directed toward their interior facilities which were often superior to those in the main school building. Some complaints were directed at the lack of security for staff members who were more subject to attack from intruders off the street, but in many neighborhoods the structures were not found to be objectionable. In a modified form they were still in use in the early 1970's.
Board policy regarding the empty classrooms and mobiles did not change in the following years. In late 1964 eighty-five mobiles were ordered purchased at a cost of $806,990. Board member Warren Bacon voted against the purchase complaining that the administration should investigate the use of empty classrooms which were estimated to number over 700 in the system. Board member Cyrus Adams III argued that over a period of years the mobiles would cost less than transporting pupils from crowded schools to the vacant rooms. He pointed out that mobiles would be used to stabilize desegregating neighborhoods.24

In 1966 the Board purchased 463 mobiles at a cost of $4,630,000 while the Chicago Daily Defender claimed there were 453 vacant classrooms. Superintendent Willis rejected busing pupils to underutilized schools as simply a means of moving students just for the sake of moving people.25 The empty classroom imbroglio was never resolved under Willis. When he left, it remained one of the major problems facing James Redmond. The use of mobiles to stabilize desegregating neighborhoods was not generally successful. Mrs. Wild would later reminisce that the Board


had provided mobile classrooms and other demands to white parents who were threatening to leave the area around O'Keeffe School in South Shore. She observed that the parents moved anyway and O'Keeffe became a black segregated school. 26

The establishing of boundary lines between schools in racially changing areas came under attack by civil rights groups in the early 1960's. Until 1948 evidence indicated that "neutral zones" had been used to allow white students to choose between attending an integrated school in their own area or transferring to a neighboring all-white school. In 1948 Superintendent Hunt ended this practice in all but eighteen areas. In 1962 the Board ended the practice almost entirely. However, complaints still remained that the administration was not redrafting attendance districts in fringe areas in order to create desegregated schools and relieve overcrowding. 27

In the spring of 1964 Willis suggested a boundary change between Marshall and Austin High Schools in order to alleviate overcrowding in the predominantly Negro Marshall High School. Within a year disturbances with racial overtones were reported.

26 Chicago Sun-Times, July 14, 1968, p. 11.

at Austin High School. Some groups contended that the boundary decision would lead to an exodus of white pupils in the Austin area. Willis felt that the problem had changed from a school to a community problem. Civil rights leader, Al Raby, argued that the flight of whites was caused by gerrymandering of school boundaries and not by the presence of Negro students. He contended that Austin High School was being held to a 14 percent Negro quota by Board gerrymandering. 28

In a complaint to federal authorities Raby's civil rights group listed numerous cases of gerrymandering in an attack upon the Board's neighborhood school policy. One example dealt with the Altgeld Gardens, an all-Negro public housing project built during World War II. New schools were built to serve the project children, and the nearby all-white Riverdale School district was gerrymandered to exclude black students while Riverdale graduates were allowed to choose to attend the all-white Fenger High School. A plan to end the gerrymander was suggested in July, 1964, but was deferred, and a new proposal was adopted in October, 1964, which allowed Riverdale graduates to continue attending Fenger. 29


Thus, white students were traveling about three miles to an all-white high school while living about five blocks from a predominantly black high school. Class sizes in the Riverdale School were considerably smaller, 16.8 students per room as compared to over 32 per room, than in neighboring schools serving black children. But very few observers would have contended that boundary adjustments could be used to integrate many of Chicago's public schools. The Hauser Report observed that because of the highly defined boundaries in the housing patterns of the city, even extreme manipulations of school district boundaries could not achieve integration of the city schools. Any plan for total integration would require the movement of large numbers of students over considerable distances.

Late in 1961, apparently in response to complaints about empty classrooms in white schools, Willis introduced a plan to create high school branches in various elementary schools to accept about 2000 students. The Chicago Urban League protested that these branches were being established to insure that schools would remain segregated. John E. Coons, professor of law at Northwestern University, in a report to the United States Commission on Civil

Rights in 1962, concluded that the Willis plans, "suggested uses which either would fill up space primarily with white students or leave the space unused."\(^\text{31}\)

There appears to be some room to suspect the purpose of the plan. Two branches were created for Schurz High School on the northwest side. At the time, the administration of the school had not found it necessary to go into an extended day to relieve overcrowding in the main building. The two branches, Beaubien and Irving Park Schools, were within two blocks of the Northwest (Kennedy) Expressway. Four branches were created for the Steinmetz High School which then went on a nine period day program while most high schools were functioning on schedules of ten periods or more.\(^\text{32}\)

If students were to be transferred from overcrowded schools into empty classrooms the branches would have to be closed. It was not until Willis retired that this action was taken. In the fall

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of 1966, Adams, one of the swing voters on the Board suggested that high school branches in elementary buildings should be abandoned. Complaints had been raised against the high school permissive transfer program on the grounds that high schools with branches should not be receiving schools. In the spring of 1967, Redmond, in office only one-half a year, first suggested the closing of six branches, only one of which would later become a receiving school in the busing program. By the end of April the Board had approved the closing of all the branches of Steinmetz High School for the following September. While the busing plan was not yet developed, classrooms were being made available for a future transfer of students in a plan for the northwest community.

In the South Shore area the situation was more complex. The community was integrating, and the Board was enmeshed in plans to stabilize the schools. The South East Community Organization was requesting that branches of South Shore High School be created at O'Keeffe, Bryn Mawr and Bradwell Elementary Schools. The high school had a Negro enrollment over forty percent, and it was projected that the ratio of white and black students in the main

building would be approximately maintained in 1967 by establishing the branches to serve the ninth grade. As the report read, "The maintaining of the 10, 11 and 12 grade students only in the main building will improve the educational climate." When South Shore High School opened in September, 1967, it was served by the Black, Bradwell, and O'Keeffe branches, but the Negro enrollment in the main building was over fifty percent. In September, 1968, when all the branches were closed, almost three-fourths of the students were Negroes.\textsuperscript{34} Stabilization in Southeast Chicago appeared to be an insurmountable problem. In face of the proximity of the Negro belt, white people had apparently chosen to run.

In March, 1964, the Panel on Integration of the Public Schools submitted its report to the Board. The premises of the study may serve as a reminder of the philosophy which demanded integration as a part of quality education. The report stated:

1. Racially segregated education, regardless of its causes, is incompatible with the ideals of a free society and its commitment to equal educational opportunity for all.
2. The quality of education for any child in a racially pluralistic community is improved when teaching and learning

are conducted in racially integrated schools.

3. There is no necessary conflict between the improvement of teaching and learning and racial integration in schools.

4. Neither potential administrative difficulties nor limitations of existing educational policy is a morally, socially or professionally defensible reason for failure to pursue the aims of quality education and racial integration simultaneously and with vigor, using all resources and methods presently available or which reasonably can be devised for their attainment.35

In a demographic study the Hauser Report noted the historical segregation of Negroes in Chicago, the impetus in black immigration, and the exodus of the white middle class from the city. Drawing parallels between white ethnic enclaves of immigrants and the prejudice against newly arrived groups, the study observed that the Negro had been unable to assimilate due in particular to his visibility. The schools alone could not overcome the forces of segregation. It would "require the active participation of religious institutions, business and labor organizations, civic and community groups, and social and fraternal societies as well as of all agencies of government." Finally, its readers were warned that, "unless the exodus of white population from the public schools and from the city is brought to a halt or reversed, the question of school integration may become simply a theoretical matter."36

The Hauser Report found few differences in the costs per

35Hauser Report, p. 27. 36Ibid., pp. 4-7, 12 (Quotes).
pupil for supplies and facilities offered students in white, inte-
grated, or Negro schools. The major discrepancies between white
and nonwhite schools were found to be in the overcrowded schools
with less experienced teachers which Negroes attended. The iden-
tification of quality education with expenditures per pupil,
library resources, textbooks, and supplies was the result of a
Chicago Urban League study presented to the Board in December, 1961,
which had concluded that discrimination against Negroes existed not
only in lower salaries reflecting less experienced teachers in
Negro schools but also in lower costs for other operating expend-
itures. However, the lower operating costs per pupil in crowded
Negro schools was apparently a reflection of the spreading of
fixed operating costs over a larger number of students.

To reduce overcrowding the Hauser Report suggested that mobile
classrooms be continued, but not "as a means for effecting or
perpetuating segregation." A plan was suggested which would permit
"any child to transfer to an underutilized school of his choice,
provided that each transferee assume the cost of his own transpor-
tation." A crucial recommendation suggested that "free transpor-
tation should be provided to convey students from overcrowded to

37 Ibid., pp. 69-78.

under-utilized schools when the distances are in excess of one mile. 39

The Report located areas on a map indicating vacant seats and excess pupils. The coincidence of crowded schools with segregated Negro schools was manifest. The map also clearly indicated the proximity of areas with an excess of students to areas with an

39 Hauser Report, p. 30. All of the thirteen recommendations made in the Report are not pertinent to this study. For the reader's convenience they are summarized here. Hauser Report, pp. 27-38.

1. Create open enrollment patterns in which two or more schools are clustered to accept students from larger attendance areas.
2. Use of transfer plans, free transportation and mobiles to relieve overcrowding.
3. Location of schools and school boundaries to foster integration.
4. Integrate faculties.
5. Assign teachers to create a fair distribution of experience and credentials.
6. Encourage teacher schools to develop more effective programs for teaching in schools with problems.
7. Create an in-service program emphasizing minority histories, teaching children of different cultural heritages, and emphasizing human relations practices.
8. Allocate greater learning resources to schools with special problems.
9. Intensify educational programs in basic skills in schools with a high student turnover.
10. Increase guidance and counseling services.
11. Develop pilot programs of educational saturation in one or more districts serving children with educational problems.
12. Seek additional revenues from city, state, and federal governments.
13. Develop effective school-community relationships.
excess of seats. An illustrative case was cited in which two schools were found, "only two miles apart, one of which was 47 percent over capacity, while the other was 40 percent vacant." While it was recommended that boundary lines be redrawn, it was concluded that even "if the most extreme procedures of redistricting school attendance areas to increase integration were to be used, there would still be all-Negro and all-white schools in the city."40

The analysis noted that, under the neighborhood school policy, integrated schools were found only in integrated or racially changing neighborhoods. Where rigid boundaries divided areas of Negro and white residences, the schools serving these students were usually segregated. Hauser suggested that the basic values of the traditional neighborhood school policy could be retained by modifying the enrollment boundaries of clusters of schools. It was proposed that the attendance areas of two or more elementary and three or more high schools serving contiguous areas be combined to allow pupils within the greater district to attend a school of their choice. Integration, educational advantage to the child, and proximity of residence were to be the criteria for admission to an

over-enrolled school. Vocational and special high schools were to be opened to city-wide enrollment.41

The Report emphasized the necessity for preparing a neighborhood for integration. Top leadership in Chicago was advised to "actively exert its influence and authority to elicit the co-operation of local community groups." It was cautioned that integration "cannot be achieved solely through pressure tactics or through brute force and compulsion." Leaders of both the civil rights movement and white citizens groups were chided for taking extreme positions which abetted confusion and suspicion. The Board was warned that the "extremists on either side of the desegregation issue must not be permitted to determine policy." On the other hand it was morally and legally imperative that the Board make a firm commitment to the policy of integration.42

A lack of communication within the school system and with the community was seen as one cause for difficulties in school integration. It was suggested that school officials adopt an open door policy with the public. The Board was advised to regularly publish statistical data regarding pupil achievement and enrollment,

41Ibid., pp. 27-30, 62.

42Ibid., pp. 40 (First quote), 41, 42, (Second, third quote), 43.
faculty distribution, use of facilities, and action taken or contemplated by the Board regarding the Report recommendations. The absence of any single administrator within the system was noted whose function was to coordinate and communicate policy with respect to integration. The resolution of this problem was left to the Board, but two committees were suggested.43

A biracial "Friends of the Chicago Schools" committee consisting of community leaders was recommended to work with the Board and Superintendent on integration problems. This committee would also serve to gain public support for integration programs and, in particular, work with religious leaders to help pave the way for school integration. A Schools Committee on Integration was suggested to be comprised of representatives from all staff levels. The purpose of this committee would have been to develop programs to implement the Report recommendations.44

The necessity of federal and state financial aid to implement programs of quality education was noted. The Report recommended a pilot educational saturation program in one or more administrative districts where high student turnover and low achievement were rife. Pre-school programs, extended days, enriched learning resources,

43Ibid., pp. 36-38. 44Ibid., p. 38.
school aides, expanded counseling services, and varied instructional techniques were some of the recommended innovations. The high cost of this program was recognized, but it was stated that the cost of unemployment, welfare, crime, and high morbidity would undoubtedly "far exceed the required expenditures for the program recommended by the Panel." 45

In initiating the Hauser Report to effect an out-of-court settlement in the Webb Case, the Board had promised on receipt of the Panel's study to "promptly take such action as it may determine is appropriate or required to work toward a resolution of any problems involved and any inequities found to exist." The reaction of Board members after the presentation of the Report was as ambiguous as their promise. Adams observed that while goals were stated, funds were lacking. Murray asserted that the Panel "didn't entirely abandon the neighborhood school policy. They chopped it up a little but it's still there." Scheffler declared, "You can't have integration without white students." Mrs. Green considered the Report "one of the great documents of our time," while Bacon noted that the recommendations were not particularly new but were

"pulled together and given a sense of urgency."

Reactions in the communities were much more pronounced. The president of the Wrightwood Improvement Association, on Chicago's southwest side promised to fight any breaches in the neighborhood school policy and threatened to bring court action against any Board programs which deviated from the policy. Al Raby of the Co-ordinating Council of Community Organizations led a demonstration at an elementary school to force implementation of the Hauser Report. Mail for and against the Report poured into the Board. During the summer of 1964 an advertisement appeared in the four leading Chicago papers in which 140 business, church, and civic leaders urged the Board to begin implementing the recommendations. A few weeks later a Chicago Daily News editorial, discussing a disorder at Bogan High School on the city's southwest side when Hauser appeared to explain the Report, concluded, "if leaders were to wait for complete community acceptance before acting, nothing would ever get done except by violence."
Board action seemed limited to commissioning further studies. A part of the thirteenth recommendation, calling for the establishment of the Friends of the Chicago Schools Committee, was the only suggestion immediately implemented. The first three recommendations, dealing with methods of student integration, were assigned to a Board committee. Recommendations four through eleven, dealing with teacher integration and teaching programs and services, were assigned to the superintendent and his staff for response. The staff report, made in July, 1964, was largely a defense of previous school policies and a listing of various programs which had already been initiated. It cited an Illinois law which forbade requiring information regarding color, race, nationality, and religious affiliation or assigning anyone on such a basis as an obstacle to integrating faculties. While it noted the use of state and federal financial assistance in developing programs, the response generally decried the lack of funds to implement projects.48

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A year after the Hauser Report was accepted a Chicago Urban League report observed that segregation in the schools was actually increasing. Al Raby, in a complaint to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, noted that the Friends of the Chicago Schools Committee was the only Hauser Report recommendation implemented and four members of this committee had resigned in protest against the misleading role of the group. During the controversy regarding the rehiring of Willis, Hauser had declared that his Report would not be implemented during the superintendent's tenure but the Board rehired Willis.49

Early in 1966 Board member Clement introduced a resolution concerning the urgent necessity to give support to integrated elementary schools. He cited the Hauser Report, the Armstrong Law, and the policy of stabilization in support of a compensatory education policy. His detailed plan was aimed at upgrading physical facilities, teaching resources and programs while increasing the types and numbers of personnel administrators, and community programs in integrated schools. The resolution was deferred three times in two months with no public discussion. It

was finally voted down late in April. Scheffler expressed the opinion that the resolution was illegal as it would be "placing integration before education." Mrs. Wild considered it a "paper plan [which] would get everyone stirred up when we know we don't have enough money to carry through." In supporting the plan Mrs. Malis noted "I don't know how anyone can vote against this motion in good conscience. Even those against integration would probably welcome such an effort to help stabilize neighborhoods." Bacon conjectured, "I don't think this Board has yet demonstrated that it wants to do what is stated in this motion. You can find all the spurious reasonable-sounding objections you want."50

A more comprehensive survey of the Chicago School System, under the direction of Dr. Robert J. Havighurst, was presented in November, 1964. A study by an outside agency had been requested in the spring of 1961 by the Chicago Parent-Teacher Association. The Association had conducted its own survey seven years before but complained that none of the problems it identified had been corrected. After the Citizen Schools Committee endorsed the request, the Board authorized the study in November, 1961. A Board committee was appointed, but no action was taken during 1962.

In 1963, Willis named Eldridge T. McSwain, a dean of Northwestern University, to direct a curriculum study which was an apparent substitute for the comprehensive study. McSwain stated he saw no need to appraise all aspects of the Chicago System. Soon after, Willis accepted a contract to conduct a survey of the Massachusetts's schools, and the Board faced renewed pressure from dozens of civic organizations that a comprehensive study be made of the Chicago School System. 51

In April, 1963, the Board Committee named Havighurst to direct the Survey. Willis threatened to resign, claiming he had not been adequately consulted concerning the choice of a director or design of the study. As a compromise, Willis was appointed to the study team and a third member, Dr. Alonzo Grace, Dean of the School of Education at the University of Illinois, was chosen by Havighurst and Willis. During the course of the survey, Willis did little to aid in the research. The final report observes that, while the original design was to use outside consultants and self-studies by school staff groups, the actual procedure soon developed

into a survey independent of school staff studies.  

The Survey characterized the Chicago Public School System under Willis as adhering to a "four walls" philosophy of education. In this school of thought educators were considered as professionals committed to doing the best possible job of educating each child. In order to accomplish their complex task educators were to make it clear that they were running the schools. Schools were to be kept out of local politics, and cooperation between schools and other institutions was to be kept at a minimum. The outside community was seen as a source of tension which could interfere with the efficient operation of the school system. While outside agencies were to be utilized, the relationship between them and the school was not to be allowed to overlap so that the educator's authority and expertise would be compromised. This philosophy was reported to be efficient and economical.  

In contrast to the four walls philosophy a concept of an "urban community" school was advocated by Havighurst. In this point of view the anxiety of urban parents was seen to be increased by the rigid rules and aloof attitudes of school administrators.  

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53 Havighurst Survey, pp. 28-29.
This difficulty would be alleviated only when educators became involved in the affairs of the community and in a quest for solutions to local problems. The active participation of educators in the social and urban renewal of the city was seen as a vital role for the school system. It was pointed out that school communities in Chicago could be kept integrated only if the Board of Education developed policies suited to the particular needs of an area rather than applying rules blindly to all situations. The schools were to be considered as a vital factor in the stabilization of a community. 54

The Havighurst Survey emphasized the role of the school as an agent of social change. It surmised that "if Negroes were not present as a large minority there would still be an urgent need for social urban renewal." The major problem facing the nations was seen as the necessity for "developing a pattern of social relations and of cultural life which makes the city attractive" and "a desirable place for all kinds of people, rich and poor, white and Negro, to live and raise their children." This renewal process was not simply a physical rehabilitation plan but depended heavily upon the development of a sense of community among the

54 Ibid., pp. 29-30, 370, 374.
people of an area. It required the cooperation of developers of commercial centers, churches, schools, parks, and housing to help people feel at home in a new environment.\textsuperscript{55}

The role of the schools in this process was to provide quality programs at all levels in order to help stabilize neighborhoods in "retaining white families, or in retaining middle class families." The report noted that problems of pupil behavior and low motivation were major causes for poor academic performance in low-income areas. It discovered "no deliberate attempt to give pupils in low-income areas an inferior education." Indeed, it found staffs in these areas often worked hard at developing effective methods of teaching. While the Survey called for continued efforts to develop effective methods, it concluded that "Negro children who go to \textit{de facto} segregated schools are getting an inferior education because of the fact of segregation.\textsuperscript{56}

These objectives left the school administration with its continuing dilemma--how does the system bring about integration and retain white families? The Havighurst Survey stated, "Residential segregation is the basic problem."\textsuperscript{57} That this problem is beyond the scope of the educational institutions was a position

\textsuperscript{55}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 373. \textsuperscript{56}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 373-74. \textsuperscript{57}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 374.
which must have appealed to many school administrators. But during the early 1960's pressures existed at many levels which would not brook such contentions, and the Chicago Board had already adopted a resolution embracing the principles of integration.

The Havighurst Survey considered the limited success of open attendance and permissive transfer plans in achieving desegregation. While Chicago policies regarding transfers had been severely limited at the time of the study, it was observed that open attendance policies had not resulted in much integration in cities which had encouraged use of the method. The long distances usually required to travel from overcrowded to underutilized schools was identified as one factor which limited the numbers of volunteers for permissive transfer plans. Furthermore, it was observed that "the great majority of parents will send their children to the nearest school, no matter how good or bad it is." It was concluded that everyday living pressures and the uncertainties concomitant with sending their children to a distant school would keep most parents from utilizing a transfer program. These factors worked especially to limit the transfer of children of the lowest socioeconomic status, while children with ambitious parents were seen as more likely to utilize transfer plans. 58

58 Ibid., pp. 374-76, 377(Quote).
Thus it was argued that permissive transfer programs could help avoid conflicts at a receiving school between children of greatly varying socioeconomic levels, that might occur in a mandatory transfer program. But, because of the lack of voluntary transfers, it was pointed out that permissive transfer programs based in a concept of relieving overcrowded schools would neither achieve desegregation nor a balancing of class sizes. Indeed, the open attendance feature of the transfer program would permit white children to leave a largely Negro school. While the Havighurst Survey saw this as a positive value in keeping white families in a changing neighborhood, the result in some schools would be a resegregation of the student body.\textsuperscript{59}

The Havighurst Survey identified five necessary conditions for successful integration. First, compensatory education programs requiring added expenditures in all lower socioeconomic areas were advocated. Second, any plan for integration would have to respect the complex and diverse ethnic group feelings in the city. A pragmatic policy of integration was suggested in which the degree of opposition to desegregation would be taken into consideration. The Survey proposed that school desegregation policies would work best in those areas where community organizations already existed\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{59}Ibid., pp. 377-78.
to promote integration and stabilization. Other areas were to be chosen on the basis of the possibility of developing rational discussion of the problems involved in stabilizing a community. Some sections of the city would have to be written off for anything except long range integration plans. 60

Third, Havighurst agreed with Hauser that the neighborhood school policy be retained in principle but modified by the clustering of groups of schools into one attendance district. Fourth, it was suggested that the city could be broken into "local community areas" of about 250,000 residents which would contain segregated white and black areas within the larger integrated area. It was hoped that these large areas would develop "home rule" which would allow them to adopt long range plans and work for their realization. These home rule areas would thus be able to develop policies for their own unique problems without being seen as a threat by other communities within the city. In order to accomplish this task the Board of Education would have to set up districts contiguous with the defined areas. Strong community councils with power to call for local bond issues and special educational plans would be necessary. The Board would be expected to

60 Ibid., pp. 379-80.
cooperate not only with the community councils but with other city agencies to promote integration and urban development. Fifth, the Board would be obliged to consult with local community leadership in choosing sites for new buildings and additions to existing schools in order to alleviate crowded conditions which threatened the success of school programs.\textsuperscript{61}

Havighurst warned that school integration could take place only as a part of an overall city plan. The Board was to offer a program which would guarantee that schools being desegregated be kept 60 percent white. Pupils being allowed to transfer into such schools were not to be more than one year behind their age level in reading. Students were to retain their right to attend the school in their home district. The Board was to cooperate with local community organizations in choosing the location of desegregated schools.\textsuperscript{62} A crux of the entire Havighurst scheme for successful desegregation rested on the assumption that the intellectual community within an area would be able to exert a sufficient persuasive force to overcome the fears of the community at large and that desegregation would be most successful when the community participated.

\textsuperscript{61}Ibid., pp. 380-82. \textsuperscript{62}Ibid., pp. 382-83.
In order to implement integration policies the Havighurst survey called for the creation of an assistant superintendent's position directly responsible to the General Superintendent. This new administrator would have subordinates in each school district and be a specialist in school-community relations. It was further suggested that the citizens committee created under the Hauser Report expand its duties to include public hearings, define central issues and make recommendations to the Board and the public.\(^{63}\)

The Havighurst Survey identified three areas "where conditions appear to be ready for an active program of integrated education as part of a plan for community redevelopment and social urban renewal." The Austin community was not experiencing any considerable integration at the time of the survey and thus was not studied. The South Shore area, however, was designated as part of a southeast Chicago area "nationally famous for its demonstration of a stabilized integrated residential area in the Hyde-Park-Kenwood community [near the University of Chicago]." Numerous community organizations were cited as examples of responsible grassroots associations which could foster stabilization. It was recommended that Bowen, South Shore, and Hirsh High Schools be clustered in

\(^{63}\)Ibid., p. 384.
an open attendance area. The Board was asked to guarantee that South Shore and Bowen High Schools not be allowed to become less than 60 percent white. 64

When the Havighurst Survey was considered by the Board members in November, 1964, it met with a variety of evaluations. Mrs. Malis saw "nothing new" in the Survey. Bernard Friedman considered it "a logical approach to touchy issues" which the Board should begin implementing by early spring. Mrs. Wild had "no argument with any of it," but Edward Scheffler complained, "He's trying to do a lot of things in there that are impractical. . . . The difficulty is his trying to take care of school matters from a sociological point of view instead of a practical point of view."

Warren Bacon questioned the thesis that only areas which were receptive to integration should be considered for desegregation moves. He stated, "I believe that in those areas where there is allegedly some hostility, there are many many people who are not as hostile as it appears." But Bacon was pessimistic about the probability of implementing the Survey suggestions when he commented, "Just as in the Hauser Report, it raises the question of

64 Ibid., pp. 385 (First quote), 386-87, 388 (Second quote), 388-90. Board action on these recommendations is considered in chapter iv.
whether the Board will follow through."65

The cluster plan suggested by both the Hauser and Havighurst reports brought up the busing issue in 1964. Cyrus Adams spoke for many Board members when he stated his position regarding integration. He pointed out that white children would not be forced to attend schools in areas far from their homes, nor would Negro children be sent around to "overwhelm white schools." Children attending neighborhood schools would not be forced out to make room for transfer students from more distant schools. Children who were educational or disciplinary problems would not be allowed to utilize the transfer program, nor would the quality of teaching and the educational environment in any school be lowered by reasons of transfers into it. Finally, no money would be spent for transporting children for the sole purpose of desegregation, and under no circumstances would a great deal of money be spent to bus children all over the city.66

Statements such as those by Adams were obviously designed to alleviate the fears of those parents who were not in sympathy with the objectives of the Hauser and Havighurst reports. Within


a week Dr. Willis offered a plan which was seen as an alternative to the Havighurst Survey. At an estimated cost of one billion dollars Willis proposed to increase educational services and decrease class sizes throughout the system with emphasis on remedial programs in schools requiring these services. The plan was rebuffed by Bacon who stated it sounds very much like someone saying I can do this better than you can. We've just had the Havighurst study. It would have been better if Willis had incorporated his views in that study, since he was a member of the survey committee. Such figures as [one billion dollars] only serve to unnerve the citizenry—people will be scared to death their taxes are going up.67

In January, 1965, Willis again bore the brunt of the blame for the inaction of the school system regarding integration. In a radio interview Havighurst and Hauser stated they felt Willis had done little to implement their reports and that he was hiding problems and deficiencies in the school system.68 Community and federal pressures were increasing the tensions between the Superintendent and the Board, but the Superintendent's strong personality tended to make him the focal point for criticisms of the school system's lack of action on matters of integration.


68Chicago Daily Defender, January 25, 1965, p. 5. The newspaper was reporting a WIND radio interview between Havighurst, Hauser and two of the periodical's reporters.
Willis' contract was being considered for renewal during the summer of 1965 amid much turmoil as some factions within the city called for his continuance in office and others demanded his removal. At its first night meeting in eighteen years, called at the request of the mayor, the Board promised to expand its search for a successor to Willis and require a commitment to integration from the new superintendent. It denied the need to create a special staff to implement the Havighurst Survey but did concede that a position of assistant superintendent for integration should be created in accordance with the Survey recommendation.69

In August, 1965, Virginia Lewis was appointed to the newly created post of Assistant Superintendent for Integration. The superintendent took the occasion to reiterate his philosophy of quality education. He stated:

I wish to say again that we all recognize that it is desirable for children of different races to associate with, and to come to know and to understand each other. The achievement of integration, however, should and does involve every member of the professional and non-professional staff in the schools. . . . These all must be part of the continuing effort to have quality education for each child according to his needs.70


70Proceedings, August 11, 1965, pp. 228-29.
Raymond Pasnick, who was resigning from the Board in protest of Willis' leadership, complained that the Superintendent, has consistently objected to the creation of such a position arguing that a responsibility of this kind should be shared by the entire school system which in effect means we cannot pinpoint responsibility with respect to an important question of integration in our schools. . . . The Superintendent has even objected to the Board interviewing this candidate to ascertain her attitudes and her qualifications. 71

Pressure continued to build for more positive actions from the Board regarding integration. By October, 1965, in response to testimony of Chicago civil rights leaders at Washington, D.C., Office of Education Commissioner Keppel delayed federal funds earmarked for Chicago. The decision drew protests from Roman Pucinski, a United States Representative from a northwest district in Chicago and chairman of the House Subcommittee on Education. Warren Bacon felt the "government is perfectly right if they have the evidence," although Mrs. Wild denied that the public schools were deliberately segregated. 72

The funds were restored amid rumors that Mayor Daley had intervened, and the Board promised to take action regarding charges of segregation including the establishment of a committee for the

71 Ibid., pp. 232-33.

purpose of reviewing attendance boundaries, branch arrangements, high school feeder patterns and related policies. However, the threat of further federal intervention remained. In December, Health, Education and Welfare Secretary Gardner ordered that a team be sent to Chicago to investigate segregation in the city schools on reports that the Board committee headed by Cyrus Adams was stalling.\(^73\)

The plan for clustering schools rested at the heart of the Hauser and Havighurst suggestions for desegregating schools while retaining the neighborhood school pattern. Willis apparently ignored the Hauser recommendations for clustering when he submitted a voluntary transfer plan in May, 1964. Bacon accused Willis of making derogatory remarks about the Hauser Report and decried the emphasis the Board placed on overcrowded schools rather than integration. Under pressure from Bacon, Adams asked Hauser to meet with the Board committee to reconsider the cluster plan concept.\(^74\)

In August the Board suggested that Willis develop several


school clusters. Only Murray objected on the grounds that "the great majority of the people of Chicago are opposed." The Board specifically ordered the Superintendent to submit a plan detailing how Hyde Park, South Shore, Hirsch, and Bowen High Schools could be clustered. A plan was adopted involving Hirsh, South Shore and Bowen High Schools, but by the spring of 1965 the administration was accused of not informing eighth grade graduates of their right to choose between attending any one of the three schools.75

Requests for cluster plans were received from school and community groups which hoped to stabilize already integrated schools by linking them with nearby all-white schools. The only plan adopted was the Hirsh, Bowen, South Shore cluster, but the result was an ironical twisting of the Hauser objective of integration. White students used the plan to transfer from predominantly Negro Hirsh High School into the other predominantly white schools. By the spring of 1967 Superintendent Redmond observed that the flow of students was only in one direction out of Hirsch. South Shore High School had already been dropped from the plan and

the superintendent recommended its total termination as Hirsch High School was at 157 percent of capacity while Bowen had reached over 210 percent of its capacity. 76

Another program which met with only limited success for purposes of integration was the permissive transfer policy. Indeed, the plans were designed to relieve overcrowding and not to implement integration. In December, 1961, when Willis first introduced a scheme he suggested that students from schools with classroom sizes of forty or more might transfer to those schools with classroom sizes of less than thirty. As the transfers would be voluntary and no transportation costs would be paid, there was little doubt in many minds that few students would utilize the plan. The 1962 civil rights report observed that as most overcrowded classrooms were in Negro schools, the ratio set by the policy in effect insured that a student class size of forty would be established in black schools and a limit of thirty students per class would be common in white schools. 77

A new elementary permissive transfer program suggested late

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in 1963 dropped the minimum class size for a sending school to thirty-five students. Warren Bacon attacked the plan as being destined to failure. He pointed out that only twenty-eight students had used a similar plan in 1962. He complained that the plan was announced in the middle of the year thereby insuring that a transfer would cause a maximum disruption to the individual's education. He chided the administration for making little or no effort to prepare the community and the school for the reception of transfer students. He blamed this lack of preparation and the lack of expansion of the human relations staff for trouble which occurred in some areas. He pointed out that a list, exempting those schools, which had high school branches, special education classes, temporary structures, no lunchrooms or needing boundary adjustments, would allow neighborhood pressures to stop the acceptance of transfers into local schools. 78

As a method of desegregating the Chicago schools, the permissive transfer program was accused of having serious defects. The plan put its emphasis in the wrong place by permitting desegregation only on the basis of under-utilized or overcrowded classrooms. Its noncompulsory provision put the whole burden of the

decision to integrate on the parent. The lack of transportation provisions insured that few young children, certainly the most impressionable, would be involved. The Havighurst Survey had warned against these pitfalls while pointing out that the permissive transfer plan had not worked in other cities.79

In July, 1964, a Board committee recommended that transportation costs be paid for any child wishing to use a transfer plan. A deluge of mail descended on the Board which was estimated to be about nine to one against this policy. Thomas Murray opposed any form of paid transportation on the grounds that costs would snowball. Cyrus Adams suggested that private donations be sought to pay bus fares, but opposed the use of school funds. Warren Bacon estimated that it would cost twenty-six million dollars to provide facilities in overcrowded schools. He pointed out that the interest on this sum would provide the money necessary to pay transportation to underutilized schools.80

The debate continued but the Board took no actions to provide transportation costs. Adams summarized the Board's position when


The flatly stated, "No money is going to be spent for transporting children for the sole purpose of integration." Without an organized busing program providing free transportation there was little chance that children in the early elementary grades would utilize the program. Indeed, when it was suggested that pupils from kindergarten through fourth grade be permitted to participate in a city-wide transfer plan, Willis opposed the idea on the grounds that it would create health and safety problems.81

Fifteen hundred students used the permissive transfer program in 1966, but almost all transfers were at the high school level. No studies had been made on the effects of the plan when Mrs. Malis asked what results the program had on overcrowding, integration, academic and social problems. Undoubtedly, some high schools had been integrated as Negroes utilized the plan. But white students also were using the program to transfer out of integrating schools into those schools with almost all-white student bodies. Adams felt that Illinois law allowed white students as well as Negroes to take advantage of permissive transfers. He pointed out that there would be no way to keep whites from leaving the city if

attempts were made to force them into integrated schools. By the close of 1966 none of the various proposed methods of fostering integration had been successfully implemented in Chicago. The 1967 Civil Rights Report found 89 percent of Chicago's Negro students in elementary schools which had less than 10 percent white students, and 97 percent of the system's Negro pupils were in elementary schools with a Negro majority. Thus, if a 10 percent guideline was to be used to consider schools to be desegregated, only a relatively few black students attended these schools.

The Board had no active policy which was designed to bring about desegregation. Its stabilization policy was, at best, an attempt to slow down the white exodus from a changing neighborhood by controlling the number of black students allowed in previously all-white schools. Attempts to achieve desegregation by adjusting contiguous school boundaries probably did hasten the withdrawal of white students.

The permissive transfer program offered students, seeking what they hoped to be a better quality education, a chance to control some aspects of their learning by choosing to attend one of the less crowded schools. While this policy provided for the

desegregation of some previously all white schools, it also allowed whites to escape from schools which were desegregating and then resegregating with all-black student bodies. Also, the relatively long distances which a transferring student was required to travel had limited the use of the permissive transfer policy to high school students. Without an officially sponsored and publicly paid program of transportation, there was little chance of utilizing a transfer program for elementary school students.

While the discussions about methods of desegregation had little effect on the actual integration of the Chicago system, they had a pronounced effect on attitudes of residents in the city. As Adams observed, "Whenever we propose a transfer plan, the 'redneck' areas of the city start rumors that their [black] children are going to overwhelm their [white] schools. Such statements are either malicious lies or nonsense." 83 There seemed to be little chance that any program of rational discussion with community groups would lead to the curtailment of opposition to desegregation by a growing vocal element.

CHAPTER IV

INTELLIGENCE AND RECOMMENDATION FUNCTIONS:

THE COMMUNITIES AND THE SCHOOLS

Mayor Daley once said at a convention, "Some have criticized us because we reach out into nationality, religious, and racial groups. It's the greatest thing we have ever done. It's been the strength of our party from the beginning."¹ The mayor was talking about the Chicago Democratic Party's power base created by establishing an arbitrary balance of positions between various ethnic groups in the city. This base was created in the late 1920's by Mayor Anton Cermak. A decade later University of Chicago Professor Louis Wirth was identifying seventy-five distinct community areas in the city. These communities were differentiated from one another on the basis of their historical settlement and growth, the identification of local inhabitants with the area, centers of trade local to the community, and the existence of natural and artificial barriers such as rivers, railroads, and local

¹Chicago Tribune, April 23, 1964, p. 16.

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transportation systems. These communities were also classified by ethnic groups which tended to be predominant within the area. Through various organizations these communities were able to exert some influence on the decision-making process of the Democratic Party which has controlled the city since the 1930's.

For purposes of statistical comparison demographers have retained the boundaries of the seventy-five communities just as the Democratic Party has retained its ethnic orientation to continue winning elections. Not all groups had been equally represented in the party, just as the various ethnic groups were not equally represented in all of the communities. The maps on the following page indicate the geographical distribution of some ethnic groups throughout Chicago. While definite concentrations of population can be seen for people of all origins, it is easily detected that individuals of European background were able to move throughout the city. Groups arriving more recently in Chicago, such as the Puerto Rican and Mexican, were still concentrated closer to the center of the city, and dispersal was minimal.

The Negro, however, represented the most obvious exception

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MAP 1

MAPS SHOWING THE DISTRIBUTION OF VARIOUS ETHNIC GROUPS THROUGHOUT THE CITY OF CHICAGO IN 1960

SHOWING THE DISTRIBUTION OF NEGRO POPULATION IN CHICAGO IN RELATION TO THE COMMUNITIES WHICH WERE INVOLVED IN THE 1968 BUSING DECISION

to the dispersal of an ethnic group over a period of years. In 1920 about four percent of the city's population was Negro. In 1923 and 1928 national quota laws stemmed the immigration of white ethnic groups into this country. Thus, Negro migration into the city began to exceed the white immigration. The use of restrictive covenants to exclude Negroes from neighborhoods had become common during World War I in reaction to the growing movement of Negroes from the Southern United States. By 1930 the Negro population of the city, which had doubled and represented seven percent of the total number of inhabitants, was restricted to a few areas, mainly on the south side of Chicago (see map on preceding page). By 1950 the Negro population represented over thirteen percent of the city's population and the proportion leaped to twenty-three percent in 1960 and twenty-eight percent in 1966, as the nonwhite population of Chicago increased from about one-half million to around one million persons during this period.3

Despite this expansion of population, the Negro had not scattered throughout the city. He was held in a "black belt" area resembling an inverted "L" radiating south and west from the center of the city. This pattern of residential segregation became an

established practice by 1920, and concentration within all-Negro areas had steadily increased over the decades. As the number of Negroes expanded, it was obvious that the area of the city they would occupy would have to expand. However, this expansion was consistently limited to areas contiguous to or closeby the exclusively Negro section.4

Factors which tended to affect Negro migration into an area are somewhat nebulous, but some tendencies have been noted. Neighborhoods which drew strongly from one ethnic group had shown greater resistance to invasion. This was particularly true of people of a southern or eastern European background. Neighborhoods made up of owner-occupied housing tended to change over more gradually than in those areas where there were a large number of renters. Parks, railroad tracks, industrial districts, and major commercial streets often became barriers between the races.5

Sociologists have described the process in which an area

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changes over from white to non-white. This process of residential succession has been practiced by most ethnic groups throughout the history of the city as some group, achieving a higher socioeconic status, moved into outlying areas and was replaced by a newer group of lower socioeconomic status. Duncan and Duncan have described four stages in the process.

During the first stage called "initial entry" or "penetration" a Negro family bought a home in an area occupied totally by whites. Once entry occurred in an area contiguous to the Negro community, it was very uncommon that a new white family would move into the neighborhood. Thus, as members of the white group moved out, they were replaced by Negro families. The second stage referred to as "invasion" occurred when a substantial number of Negroes moved into the area.6

Two factors are worth noting at this point. First, as the black belt was generally contiguous to older and less desirable areas of residency, most of the Negro expansion had occurred into these poorer areas. However, Negro expansion tended to move along the paths of least resistance. It had been observed that in a contiguous area where the white residents were more affluent, 

they were more likely to move than less prosperous residents and more expansion occurred in these areas. Second, during this period of invasion, and during the next stage, integration was occurring. However, this integration had been only a temporary situation which existed until most whites were replaced by non-whites. 7

During the third stage called "consolidation" an increasing number and proportion of the area population became Negro. The fourth stage was characterized by a "piling up" of people as the population density continued to grow. Pierre deVise, a Chicago sociologist, pointed out that Negro population density in what also were Chicago's ten poorest communities was over forty percent higher than the average population per square mile figure for the entire city. If the four communities in which industrial and commercial properties occupy much land were excluded from the list of the ten poorest communities, then the Negro population density in the remaining six communities was actually double the city average. 8

This increase in population, which put a strain on all the

community's resources and particularly its schools, actually began with the invasion stage. As the newer group moved into a community, the age level of the families often dropped back into the period where there were more children of school age. Negro families were less likely to send their children into the Catholic schools whose enrollment represented about one-fourth of the total school enrollment of the city in 1967. The non-white fertility rate had also been higher than the white rate for the same age group. Furthermore, the newly arriving families were often of a lower socioeconomic status than the established residents and thus there was more doubling up of families in order to afford the facilities. These factors placed a new burden on the community schools and contributed to the decision of white parents to withdraw their children from the public schools as overcrowding and racial tension rose.

Throughout the 1960's white out-migration had steadily increased. In 1960 the white population of Chicago was 2,712,000. In 1965 this number dropped to 2,484,000, representing 68.6 percent of the city's population. The Real Estate Research Corporation estimated the total white population of the Chicago Standard

9RERC, Preliminary, pp. 21, 70-74.
Metropolitan Area would be about 2,300,000 in 1970. With the drop in white population there had not been a corresponding drop in the real number of white children in the public schools. Indeed, the white enrollment increased until the 1967 headcount. In this year the Chicago Board of Education began classifying Puerto Rican students separately and the Caucasian count dropped. When the Puerto Rican count is added to the Caucasian, the drop of white students does not occur until 1969. However, the steady increase in Negro students from 236,000 in 1963 to 313,000 in 1969 represented a much faster increase in the numbers of Negroes rather than of whites. Therefore the percentage of Negro students rose from 46.5 percent in 1963 to 53.9 percent in 1969.

In areas experiencing Negro invasion a drop in white attendance at public schools was often experienced. The Real Estate Research Corporation explained this situation by pointing out that white households with school age children were among the first to

10Real Estate Research Corporation, Report prepared for the Board of Education, City of Chicago, April, 1968, Projections of Population and School Enrollments by Community Area for the City of Chicago: 1970 and 1975 (Chicago: Board of Education, 1968), pp. II-2, II-3, IV-5. Hereinafter referred to as RERC, Projections. While this report was issued three months after the busing decision, the general information would have been available to Board members through the school system demographers.

move from changing neighborhoods. Other families transferred their children to Catholic schools, private schools, or used the permissive transfer program of the public school system to transfer their children out of a changing school. 12

By 1967 the black belt had reached the city limits along Roosevelt Road and gone beyond Cicero Avenue along Lake Street into the Austin Community. The northern border of the west side was determined by the Galena line of the Northwestern Railroad. By comparing the ethnic maps on page 120 with the map of Negro distribution on page 121, it may be seen that Polish and Italian neighborhoods were unyielding borders which channeled Negro expansion as it moved west. The Bohemian community along Cermak Road represented the southern border of the Negro west side.

The south side Negro community had extended to 99th Street by 1967, almost totally filling in the area between State Street and Cottage Grove Avenue. New expansion occurred west along 63rd Street to about Damen Avenue and south bordering Halsted Street to 85th Street as may be seen on the map. Eastward expansion into the communities of Avalon Park and South Shore was also evident.

In a "Comparison of Racial Enrollment and Block Statistics"

12RERC, Preliminary, pp. 70-74.
the Real Estate Research Corporation divided the city into three sections (see map on following page). In the area north of Chicago Avenue an estimated 2,184 Negro students, representing 4.4 percent of the increase in the total elementary school city enrollment, entered the public schools while twenty-four city blocks were changing from white to non-white. In the west corridor 15,543 Negro students, representing 31.2 percent of the total increase in elementary enrollment, entered the public schools while 172 blocks were changing. In the south section 32,081 students, representing 64.4 percent of the total increase in elementary enrollment, entered the public schools while 853 blocks were changing. From this data it was observed that Negro migration in the west section was most significant since 31.2 percent of the increase of Negro enrollment occurred in the confined area in which only 16.4 percent of the Negro block expansion occurred.13 In the period from 1965 to

13 RERC, Preliminary, pp. 65-67. RERC, Projections, pp. vi-8, vi-9. The data given here is from the Preliminary Report which was available in December, 1967, when the busing decision was being made. The Projection Report was issued four months later but most of the conclusions were already expressed in the Preliminary Report. Most of the changes in the later report were updatings of statistical estimates. The Projection Report divided the city into four sections separating the south into southeast and southwest areas. In the later report the total non-white enrollment increase was lowered from 49,808 to 48,508 students. Of this 2.4 percent enrolled in the north section, 30.3 percent enrolled in the west section, 24.7 percent enrolled in the southeast section and
MAP 3

COMPARISON OF RACIAL ENROLLMENT AND BLOCK STATISTICS

Negro Enrollment Increases

0.0% — as Percent of City Total, 1964-1967

0.0% — Blocks in which Nonwhite Migration has Occurred, 1964-1967

NORTH

4.4%

2.3%

WEST

31.2%

16.4%

SOUTH

64.4%

81.3%

LEGEND

No. Name
1 Rogers Park
2 West Ridge
3 Uptown
4 Lincoln Square
5 North Center
6 Lakeview
7 Lincoln Park
8 Near North Side
9 Edison Park
10 Norwood Park
11 Jefferson Park
12 Forest Glen
13 North Park
14 Albany Park
15 Portage Park
16 Irving Park
17 Dunning
18 Maunder
19 Belmont Cragin
20 Hermosa
21 Avondale
22 Logan Square
23 Humboldt Park
24 West Town
25 Austin
26 West Garfield Pk.
27 East Garfield Pk.
28 Near West Side
29 North Center
30 South Loop
31 Lower West Side
32 Near South Side
33 Archer Square
34 Douglas
35 Chalmers
36 Cool
37 Fuller Park
38 Grand Blvd.
39 Kenwood
40 Washington
41 Hyde Park
42 Hyde Park
43 South Shore
44 Chatham
45 Archer Park
46 South Chicago
47 Grand Park
48 Calumet Heights
49 Lawndale
50 Pullman
51 South Dering
52 East Side
53 West Pullman
54 Riverdale
55 Hegewisch
56 Garfield Ridge
57 Archer Heights
58 Brighton Park
59 McKinley Park
60 Bridgeport
61 New City
62 West End
63 Crag Park
64 Cleary
65 West Lawn
66 Chicago Town
67 Englewood
68 Englewood
69 Greater Grand Cty.
70 Oak Park
71 Auburn Gresham
72 Beverly
73 Washington Hts.
74 South Deering
75 Morgan Park
76 A. W. Blair Area 1950-1960

1967 Negro enrollment in elementary schools of District Four which serves Austin rose from 466 to 2,786 students.\textsuperscript{14}

That this expansion was also relatively rapid may be seen by observing on the map of Negro expansion on page 130 that Negro penetration into the Austin area had not reached a twenty-five percent proportion in any of the community's neighborhoods in 1965. This rapid expansion westward along Madison Avenue may in part be explained by the strong resistance of residents of Cicero to non-white penetration. Thus, geographical expansion of the Negro belt turned north and further west into Austin.\textsuperscript{15}

It is obvious from this data that a neighborhood school policy would result in segregated schools as neighborhoods change. Furthermore, static school boundaries will result in a period of overcrowding as change-over and piling-up occur and place great strain on inflexible school plants and facilities. The neighborhood

\textsuperscript{42.6}percent enrolled in the southwest section. For this data the elementary school headcount statistics were used, and the high school enrollment was not included.

\textsuperscript{14}Chicago Public Schools, \textit{Teacher Observation Headcount}, (Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1965, 1967). Hereinafter referred to as Headcounts. The map of Superintendent Districts on page 150 shows the large area served by District Four.

\textsuperscript{15}RERC, \textit{Projections}, pp. vi-6, ix-2.
school policy failed to meet the challenge of integration. Changing contiguous school boundaries had often failed to keep white students in changing schools. Yet altering school boundaries on the theory that a neighborhood may be "stabilized" during a period of change-over had been a major policy of the Chicago Board of Education.

In 1964 the Board had adopted a statement claiming its desire to "increase the interracial association of students," and recognizing "a responsibility to help preserve, as far as possible, such associations in areas where they now exist." In order to achieve this goal it asserted that "it is its policy to seek and take any possible steps which may help to preserve and stabilize the integration of schools in neighborhoods which already have an interracial composition." The difficulty with such a policy is that "integration" in a changing neighborhood had represented only a temporary stage between occupation by a white group and the final consolidation as a Negro neighborhood.

Efforts of the Board to increase integration through attendance area adjustments, voluntary permissive transfer programs,

open enrollments in vocational and technical high schools, and the planning of new building facilities had been evaluated in Superintendent Redmond's Report as meeting "with varying degrees of success." If a 15 percent criteria for integration was applied (used by the Chicago School System in implementing the busing plan of 1968), in which at least 15 percent of the students are Negro and at least 15 percent of the students attending the same school are white, then only thirty-eight Chicago elementary schools were integrated to this level in 1964. By 1967 twenty-five of these schools still fell into this category. However, the proportion of Negro students rose in all but four of these schools during the period between 1964 and 1967, although the percentage of Negro students increased by less than ten percent in thirteen more schools.  

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18 Headcounts, 1964, 1967. During this period 10 percent attendance by one race was still being considered the basis of integration. In 1967 Puerto Rican students were listed separately in the teacher observation headcounts. It was apparent that most school teachers had listed Puerto Rican students under the white category prior to this time. In computing the above 1967 integration data Puerto Rican students were considered as white. There were over four hundred elementary schools in the Chicago system in 1964.
This limited degree of success was more apparent in considering some elementary schools in the southeast area of Chicago. In 1965 District Twenty-two was created and three of its seven elementary schools fell within the fifteen percent definition of integration (although O'Keeffe Elementary had only 14.3 percent white students). By 1967 O'Keeffe Elementary had only 44 white students in a school body of 1198, and it was obvious that the other two schools were rapidly segregating (see chart next page).

In early 1967 the Chicago Region Parent-Teachers Association made a study of the stabilization policy of the Board of Education. They observed that the Negro population of the city had increased from 837,656 to 974,839 between 1960 and 1966. During this period the white population was estimated to have declined from 2,712,748 to 2,490,043. Seventeen of the seventy-five Chicago communities were predominately white (less than 3 percent non-white). Only nine communities were identified as integrated (between 24.9 percent and 43.6 percent non-white), and five of these communities were considered markedly unstable, as the non-white percentage was increasing rapidly.  

19 Illinois Congress of Parents and Teachers, Chicago Region, "A Study of Stabilization of Integrated Schools," Chicago, April 6, 1967, p. 5 (Mimeoographed). The difference between the Real Estate Research Corporation's estimate of non-white population and that of the Parent-Teachers Association is the result of the Real Estate
TABLE 1

INCREASING SEGREGATION IN SELECTED SCHOOLS
OF SOUTHEAST SIDE OF CHICAGOa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Enrollment</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Negro</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bryn Mawr Elementary--South Shore</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1114</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1207</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1209</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annex</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1302</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>1005</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annex</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mann Elementary--South Chicago</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1002</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1041</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1155</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>O'Keeffe Elementary--South Shore</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1195</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1334</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1380</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1296</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1198</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1149</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aData compiled from Chicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount, (Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, Districts Fourteen, Seventeen, Twenty-two). After 1965 all three were in District Twenty-two. Variations from total enrollment occurred as only students present on the day of the headcount were reported.

135
The Parent-Teacher study noted that elementary schools located on the border of the expanding Negro community were not remaining integrated. Indeed, the schools were changing in racial composition much faster than the neighborhoods were changing. In the nine integrated communities 48 percent of the schools were Negro, 18 percent were white and 34 percent were integrated. The study considered over ten percent enrollment of white or Negro students to be the basis of integration. Only one-half of the integrated schools were considered to be likely to remain integrated for any length of time. As the study noted, "The school is at once the 'most tender' of the community institutions in reaction to racial change and the most important potential instrument for stability."\(^{20}\)

One of the most identifiable characteristics of the unstable integrated school was overcrowding. In order to meet the demands of an enlarged student body, schools often surrendered services and special purpose rooms. The Parent-Teachers Association recommended that every effort be made to retain and expand special

\[^{20}\] Ibid., pp. 6-7.
services in unstable integrated schools.\textsuperscript{21} A brief description of two such schools may shed some light on the difficulty involved in attempting to use school policy to overcome socioeconomic problems in a community.

In 1963 the Bryn Mawr school had 989 students of whom 80 percent were white. In 1967 the school, with a branch, had 1522 students of whom 22 percent were white. Mrs. Jeanne Junker, principal of the school, reported that the teacher turnover at the school was less than average. The curriculum had been enriched with a Junior Great Books course, a bi-weekly paperback book fair, a cultural enrichment program, an art study program in conjunction with the Art Institute and an eighth grade music program. In 1970 the school and its two branches had 1912 students of whom 43 were white. At the Mann school white students represented 91.8 percent of the enrollment in 1963. By 1967 the white enrollment was only 23.3 percent of the student body. Six classes in typing were offered. A humanities program in conjunction with the Art Institute and a Junior Great Books course were enriching the curriculum. In 1970 the white students represented 1.1 percent of the student body.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid.

The Chicago Region Parent-Teachers Association study, which appeared five months before the Redmond Report, did not mention busing out some of the excess enrollment as a possible means of stabilizing an integrated school. In December, 1967, four months after the Redmond Report suggested busing as one possible method of decreasing segregation, the Real Estate Research Corporation observed:

A stable balance between white and non-white population within the city of Chicago will occur only if nearly all future net non-white population growth takes place in the suburbs. At present the reverse is true—nearly all such growth is occurring within the city. . . . [The] conclusion is inescapable that attainment of a stable population balance between white and non-white groups within the city of Chicago requires a major shift in the location of future non-white population growth to the suburbs. . . . educational policy . . . must be directed in part at shifting future non-white population growth to the suburbs.23

The Real Estate Research Corporation suggested that "one mechanism for encouraging such a shift would be undertaking policies that would continue the expansion of non-white residential areas directly toward and beyond the city limits on both the west and south sides." The report questioned the use of busing as a method of achieving long term racial integration. It pointed out that busing non-white students out of schools in racially changing

23RERC, Preliminary, p. 12.
neighborhoods, in an attempt to stabilize the white population near those schools, would probably fail. Failure would occur as it became impossible to find white families to move into those vacancies created by even a normal exodus of white families from the neighborhoods.²⁴

Indeed, the report argued:

. . . stabilization of white population in this part of the city[contiguous to black belt] would probably just divert non-white population growth to one or more other parts of the city. In those other parts racial transition will occur faster than if the busing policy had not been adopted. For non-white population expansion must occur somewhere.²⁵

One undeniable factor in integration was that white students must continue attending a school if it was to remain integrated. The existence of a large parallel system of schools in Chicago could offer a means of "escape" from the public schools by white students as integration occurred. Forty-three percent of the white students in Chicago attended parochial schools in 1967, while only seven percent of the non-white students attended these schools. However, by 1967 the enrollment in parochial schools had dropped from about one-third to around one-quarter of the combined public

²⁴Ibid.
²⁵Ibid., p. 13. Underlining in original report.
and parochial enrollment.26

This drop was the result of the reduced birth rate beginning in 1961, the movement of Catholic families to suburban areas, rising costs of private education, newly imposed ceilings on class sizes and urban renewal projects which reduced the number of school age children in some neighborhoods. Furthermore, the expanding Negro population did not utilize private and parochial schools to the extent that other ethnic groups had in the past. But not all non-public schools were experiencing contraction. In the integrating community of South Shore private and parochial schools were expanding facilities to accommodate new students while the white enrollment in the public schools of the community was dropping between 1964 and 1967.27

The leading Negro newspaper in Chicago had been critical of the Superintendent of Catholic Schools in the Chicago Archdiocese for supporting Chicago Schools Superintendent Willis and the


neighborhood school policy. However, there is little to indicate that any leader of this Church defended segregation. Indeed, the Catholic Interracial Council had been critical of Willis' policies concerning integration and Monsignor John Egan of the Chicago Chancery Office had been active in supporting community organizations which endorsed integration. The Interreligious Council on Urban Affairs had been originated by Msgr. Egan and included participation by representatives of the following churches: Roman Catholic, Episcopalian, Illinois Synod of Lutheran Churches in America, Presbytery of United Presbyterians, Church of the U.S.A., Rock River Conference of the Methodist Church, and the Jewish Council on Urban Affairs. It was reported that prointegration groups within Austin and the northwest side of Chicago received aid from this short-lived council.28

Although some community organizations such as the Back of the Yards Council dated back to 1939, these groups tended to rise and fall with the development of issues within the community. The Inter-Religious Council on Urban Affairs defined a community

organization as having a broad base of citizen participation rather
than representing some vested interest. Its leaders were to be
identified with and accepted by sub-groups within the community,
and its goals and programs must have been arrived at democrati-
ically. The discontentments which the organization expressed were
to be widely shared, and the group had to be able to focus and
channel the discontent into an organized plan of action relating
to specific problems. This definition would exclude those groups
which Bouma and Hoffman, in a study of school integration, warned
would arise to use school oriented issues not from genuine concern
for educational problems but to serve their own power interests.29

The fifty-one community organizations identified on the map
following this page consisted of numerous smaller affiliates.
The South Shore Commission, organized in 1954, claimed 3500 mem-
bers in 1967 in a community of 85,006 people with a large Jewish,
Irish, and Negro population. The South East Community Organization
established in 1960, claimed 158 affiliates in a community of
60,000 described as Jewish, Catholic, and about one-fourth Negro

29 Inter-Religious Council on Urban Affairs, Directory of
Community Organizations in Chicago, 1967-1968 (Chicago: Inter-
Religious Council on Urban Affairs, 1967), pp. 6-9, 29. Donald
H. Bouma and James Hoffman, The Dynamics of School Integration:
Problems and Approaches in a Northern City (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
MAP 4

/// INDICATING AREAS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE 1968 BUSING DECISION

MAP of COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

WEST
1. Rogers Park Community Council
2. North Side Community Council
3. North Creek Community
4. North River Community
5. Northwestern Conservation Commission
6. Uptown Chicago Commission
7. United People of Uptown
8. JICC Community Union
9. Lakeview Citizens Council
10. Logan Square Neighborhood Area
11. Lincoln Park Conservation Area
12. Wrightwood Neighborhood Area
13. Park West Community Area
14. South Side Neighborhood Area
15. South Triangle Area
16. Mid-South Area
17. Old Town Triangle Area
18. Lincoln Central Area
19. Northwest Community Improvement
20. Edgewater Neighborhood Council
21. The Organization or Palmer Square
22. Mid-North Area
23. Lincoln Park
24. Uptown Chicago Commission
25. The United Friends
26. The Organization for the Northwest Communities

NORTH
27. Organization for a Better Austin
28. Garfield Park Association
29. Oakwood Neighborhood Commission
30. Little Village Community Council
31. East Garfield Park Community Organization
32. Harbert Community Council
33. Neighborhood Associations
34. Side District Federation
35. West Side Community Area
36. Uptown Chicago Community Council
37. Pillar Neighborhood
38. West Side Organization
39. Together We Community

EAST
40. South Chicago Area
41. North Chicago Area
42. Chinese American Civic Council
43. Citizens for Equal Rights
44. Rock Island Neighborhood
45. Between the Tracks Council
46. Garfield Heights
47. Roseland Neighborhood Study Council
48. Oakwood Neighborhood Council
49. Northeast Community Council
50. Douglas Community Council
51. Douglas Organization
52. Chicago Park Commission
53. Hyde Park-Roseland Community Council
54. The Moscow Organization
55. South Shore Community Council
56. Englewood Civic Organization
57. Garfield Community Organization
58. United Southside Community Organization
59. Park Manor Neighborhood
60. South-Southwest Park Community Council
61. South Side Community Council
62. Organization for the Southside Community
63. Beverly Area Planning
64. Beverly Area Planning
65. Beverly Area Planning

SOUTH

In population. One stated goal of this organization was to elimi-
nate prejudice.30

In the Austin community the Organization for a Better Austin was established in 1967. It claimed 160 affiliates serving the area of 126,000 predominately Greek, Jewish, Italian, and Irish residents. About 6,000 Negroes were estimated to have entered the area. The purpose of this organization was "to unite all elements in Austin in an organization concerned with the common problems of the area." To the north of Austin the Organization for the Northwest Communities had been formed in 1967. Fifty affiliates were said to represent the 82,300 residents who were white and predominately Roman Catholic. Among the stated goals of this organization were neighborhood conservation and the study of city planning. 31

In March, 1967, a survey was made of participants in community organizations. In analyzing the results, Bogue and McKinley of the Interuniversity Social Research Committee observed that whites who reported membership in local clubs and associations were not any more likely to endorse civil rights for Negroes

31 Ibid., pp. 21-22, 24, 30 (Quote).
than their non-participating neighbors. However, active members in Parent-Teachers Associations were significantly more likely to hold liberal views in their attitudes toward civil rights. In general, the authors concluded that active members of organizations tended to hold more liberal views than inactive members and non-participants, but the chasm between white and Negro was marked, with a majority of whites interviewed opposing integration. It was observed that the views of "whites active in PTA (and similar groups) are as far removed from the views of active Negroes as the mass of whites is from the mass of Negroes, for such groups recruit not only disproportionate numbers of liberal whites but also disproportionate numbers of even more liberal Negroes."\(^{32}\)

The rise of community organizations represented the growing concern of citizens with the changes occurring in their neighborhoods. The attempts of these organizations to deal with change were bound to meet with varying degrees of success as they met resistance from vested interest groups and dissension within the community. The success of organizations such as the Woodlawn

Organization and the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations on the southeast side of Chicago in bringing about the eventual retirement of Superintendent Willis brought some hope to those who saw the superintendent as an obstruction to integration. But the fight which centered on Willis also helped to polarize factions within the city, and a countermovement of white resistance to integration developed. An underlying weakness of many community organizations was that in issues of integration there was little support from the white community and much outright resistance. City wide organizations with members who often live in suburbs, such as the Human Relations Council and the Better Schools Committee, would openly support integration plans, but grassroots organizations often faltered.

Thus, in the South Lynne community on the southwest side of Chicago, the community council had been severely criticized by Father Lawlor, a local leader of whites who had formed block clubs to stop Negro penetration into the area west of Ashland Avenue between 59th and 67th Streets. The community council was criticized for not dealing effectively with panic peddlers and youth gangs and not stopping the decline of small business districts. The council was condemned for its part in making Lindbloom High School a technical school. In becoming a technical school its
contributing area was extended further throughout the city and large numbers of Negro students entered the building which was west of Ashland. Within a few years the student body became predominantly Negro.33

Father Lawlor expressed the views of many whites regarding the perils of stabilization in a neighborhood when he stated, "I came to feel that everybody panics, nobody stays. The very root of the current racial crisis is the fear inspired by violence that occurs mostly along racially changing areas." He professed, "I do not blame this condition on the generality of the Negro population . . . for they too are victims of this violence." For advocates of Father Lawlor integration was "not an issue" because they would move if the boundary line between white and Negro was not held. People were experiencing a fear that control of their lives and their neighborhoods was not in their own hands but in those of "unconscionable bureaucrats."34

By 1960 the South Shore community was integrating. Germans, Russian Jewish, and Irish ethnic groups remained dominant with the

33 New World (Chicago), February 9, 1968, pp. 1, 16.
34 New World (Chicago), February 9, 1968, pp. 1, 16.
ten percent Negro population concentrated in an area west of Stony Island outside of School District Twenty-two. The median family income for the entire census area was $7,888 but 34.1 percent of the families were earning over $10,000. Only 21.1 percent of the housing was owner occupied. While 2 percent of the housing was considered substandard, only 6.2 percent of the housing units had been built since 1950.35

By utilizing the factors affecting Negro migration discerned by the Real Estate Research Corporation, it could be predicted that South Shore was likely to undergo further transition. The white ethnic groups of the area were not likely to organize in open resistance to Negro penetration as had occurred in South Lynne. The large number of rented units made white outmigration more likely. While housing units were not particularly low priced or substandard, deVise had pointed out that the Negro belt did not typically expand into areas of lowest quality housing. It was expanding along the paths of least resistance, typically into areas of middle income residency adjacent to the Negro belt.36

35Factbook, p. 100-01. The Real Estate Research Corporation estimated that the actual non-white population of South Shore was about twelve percent as the census had underestimated non-white population. RERC, Projections, Appendix, p. 2.

In December, 1967, the Real Estate Research Corporation observed that middle-income Negroes were moving into every section of South Shore in dispersed but quite substantial patterns. An Interuniversity Social Research Committee report estimated that the Negro population in the area had risen from 7,579 in 1960 to 31,581 in 1966, representing 43.6 percent of the total community population. In the fall of 1965 a new school superintendent's district had been created to serve the schools of South Shore east of Stony Island Avenue, the northern tip of the South Chicago community and a fraction of the Avalon Park community (see map on following page).³⁷

This new district, which had the backing of the Friends of the Chicago Schools Committee, was created for the expressed purpose of stabilizing the integrated schools in the area. It was pointed out that a special staff in the smaller new district could work closely with community groups, especially the South Shore Commission which had provided constructive leadership in the past and had demonstrated its willingness to work for integration. A special program for South Shore included reducing class sizes to thirty students and saturating the curriculum with special course...

A cluster plan under which the attendance areas of South Shore, Hirsh, and Bowen High Schools were combined had been put into effect in January, 1965. The purpose of this plan, suggested by the Havighurst Survey, was to aid stabilization by allowing students to choose between the three high schools. However, the result was that white students transferred out of predominantly Negro Hirsh High School into the other less integrated schools. In the spring of 1967 Dr. Redmond discontinued the plan. High school branches created in the Bradwell and Luella Schools also tended to withdraw white students from the South Shore and Bowen High Schools as the percentage of white students was always substantially higher in the branches than in the main buildings. The Bradwell Branch was discontinued in 1968 and the Luella Branch

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was abandoned in 1969.39

As representatives of the school system attempted in various ways to deal with the problem of stabilization, fear grew among the residents of South Shore. In response to complaints of a growing crime rate in the area Paul Hartrich, president of the South Shore Community Organization, enumerated the services available in the community. Police protection had been increased and a citizens' radio patrol, maintained by area citizens, Negro and white, had been established to assist the police in law enforcement.40 Police statistics actually showed a decrease in the crime rate in the Fourth Police District which included the area to the south of 76th Street, although the Third Police District, which included Woodlawn, had one of the highest crime rates in Chicago. In response to the influx of young families which were replacing the older residents in the community, a tenant referral service had been established to aid new arrivals in securing apartments. The South Shore Open Housing Committee had an expressed goal of helping


white as well as Negro families in the area to create an integrated community. With the strong influence of University of Chicago faculty and students residing in the area, and the numerous programs aimed at stabilizing the area, South Shore might have appeared to be moving toward becoming one of Chicago's few integrated communities. But in 1967 Chicago sociologists had already classified South Shore as a slowly changing neighborhood rather than an integrated one.41

While Mrs. W. Lydon Wild lived in South Shore, another Board of Education member lived in the area directly south of the changing community. John Carey's position as a steel union official was directly related to the major steel companies which were located in the South Chicago community. In 1960 Poles and Mexicans were the dominant group among the foreign stock and an established Negro element had remained stable at about five percent of the population. The median family income for the entire census area was $6,949 with 23.2 percent of the families earning over $10,000. While income was relatively low, the 41 percent owner occupied

housing would have indicated a degree of stability for the community, although deVise ranked the community 194th in economic rank among the 250 communities of the Chicago Metropolitan areas.42

By 1966 it was estimated that little change had occurred in the percentage of Negroes in South Chicago. Negro students in School District Seventeen, which served the southern part of the community, had actually declined as the result of the creation of District Twenty-two in 1965. The new district then served South Shore and the South Chicago area north of 83rd Street. However, in this northern portion the Mann Elementary School showed a rapid increase in Negro enrollment from 26.6 percent in 1964 to 55.1 percent in 1966.43

To the west of the southern half of South Chicago lies the community of Calumet Heights. In 1960 Poles, Russians, and Germans were the leading nationalities among the foreign stock and only nine Negroes had been counted in the census. The median family income for the entire census area was $8,611 and the two census tracts in the middle of the community were above $9,000. In

42 Factbook, pp. 106-07.

stability of housing Calumet Heights remained very high with 77.2 percent of the units being owner occupied and about seventy-three percent of the units being single-family structures. In 1966 the community was ranked 68th in economic rank among 250 communities of the Chicago Metropolitan Area. In this year it was also estimated that the Negro population of the community had advanced to 1,224 people representing 6.2 percent of the total population. This increase was reflected in an increase of Negro students in the community's elementary schools from 67 in 1964 to 315 pupils in 1966. The McDowell Branch of Caldwell Elementary School, in the northwest corner of Calumet Heights, accounted for 269 of these students.44

To the south of Calumet Heights lies the community of South Deering. In 1960, among the numerous native born Americans, Yugoslavians, Russians, and Poles were the leading nationalities of foreign stock. In the Chicago Housing Authority's Trumbull Park Homes 125 Negroes represented less than one percent of the total community population. The median family income for the entire area was $7,768 with 27.1 percent of the families earning

over $10,000. Only 1.8 percent of the housing units were considered substandard and 72.2 percent were owner occupied with about seventy-nine percent of the units being single family structures. In 1966 South Deering was ranked 174th in economic rank among 250 communities of the Chicago Metropolitan Area. The Negro population was estimated to have dropped to 57 individuals although 59 Negro students were counted in the community's elementary schools.45

The Avalon Park community lies to the west of South Shore and the northern portion of South Chicago. In 1960 Irish and Germans remained the leading nationalities of foreign stock. Census data recorded only six Negroes. The median family income for the entire census area was $8,697 with 40.3 percent of the families earning over $10,000. Only 0.4 percent of the housing units were considered substandard and 74.2 percent were owner occupied with about seventy percent of the units being single family structures, about one-fourth having been built since 1940. In 1966 Avalon Park was ranked 122nd in economic rank among 250 communities of the Chicago Metropolitan Area. The Negro population had leaped to an estimated 3,161 and further penetration was

occurring. The number of Negro students in Caldwell Elementary School, the only Avalon Park public school in District Seventeen, had advanced from twenty-five in 1964 to 221 in 1966.46

An incident occurred in Marynook, an area in Avalon Park, which was indicative of a serious problem in developing a school integration policy which would not have negative effects on the community. In the spring of 1962 a large number of Negro students were transferred into Avalon Park Elementary School which served the Marynook neighborhood. When protests against the move failed to change the policy, thirty white families sold their homes to Negro buyers within a few months and it appeared that the area would change over rapidly. The efforts of the local Parent-Teacher Association, home owners' group, and the pastor of the neighborhood Catholic Church helped to slow down the succession process considerably, and it was not until 1967 that the school fell below the 10 percent criteria for integration. However, in an attempt to keep white students in the school, the Board of Education was obliged to make numerous changes in attendance areas and graduates


In reviewing the data concerning the five communities in the South Shore area it could be seen that most were experiencing some degree of new integration. South Shore and Avalon Park were changing rapidly as the black belt reached the community borders and advanced phalanx-like into the areas. Calumet Heights was beginning to change. The northern portion of South Chicago, bordering on South Shore was integrating. Only South Deering, still somewhat remote from the expanding belt, was apparently stable.

On the northwest side of Chicago the western arm of the black belt was advancing into the Austin area. Situated on the western edge of Chicago, this community extended from Fullerton Avenue (2400 North) at its northern tip to Roosevelt Road (1300 South) at its southern edge with Kolmar Avenue (4500 West) and the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad tracks as its eastern border. The extreme length and size of this community with its 125,133 residents counted in the 1960 census made generalizations hazardous, but if the five northern census tracts were excluded, no census tract area varied more than $771 from the median family income of
$7,602 for the entire census area and 27.4 percent of the families earned over $10,000. Only 37.7 percent of the housing units were owner occupied and 4 percent were judged substandard while three of the four tracts directly south of Ohio Avenue (600 north) varied from 11.6 percent to 21.6 percent substandard units with owner occupancy as low as 22.3 percent. The census counted thirty-one Negroes in the community.  

In 1966 Austin ranked 104th among the 250 communities of the Chicago Metropolitan Area. It was estimated that 774 Negroes lived in the community in April, 1966, but 1,995 Negro students were counted in the area high school and elementary schools in October, 1966. The Real Estate Research Corporation pointed out that resistance to Negro movement in the nearby areas of South Lawndale, Cicero, and Humboldt Park had intensified penetration into Austin, and an annual transition rate of thirty-six blocks occurred between 1964 and 1967. In 1964 only the May and Young Elementary Schools were integrated above the 10 percent criteria. By 1966 the May and Spencer schools were over fifty percent Negro (see chart on next page). The Young School, in the northeast corner of the community, remained stabilized at near 10 percent for the entire decade of

48 Factbook, pp. 64-65.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
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<th>White</th>
<th>Negro</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<td>38</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>1559</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>729(^d)</td>
<td>112</td>
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\(^a\)Data compiled from Chicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount, (Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, District Four). Variations from total enrollment occurred as only students present on the day of the headcount were reported.

Puerto Rican Students Included in White Students Count

\(^b\)41 students
\(^c\)69 students
\(^d\)8 students

160
1960. This was because Negro migration continued west and south into Austin rather than northward.49

In April, 1967, the Interuniversity Social Research Committee sent interviewers into the Austin area to poll white residents on attitudes toward integration. Over one-half of the people questioned in the sampling were Roman Catholic, about one-third were Protestant and less than two percent were Jewish. In ethnic background one-third were of British, German, or Scandinavian descent, about one-third were Irish and less than one-fifth were Italian. The remainder were of Polish or other central and eastern European ancestry. Two-fifths had lived in Austin over ten years while about one-fourth lived in the community two years or less. Membership in church related clubs was claimed by about one-fourth of the interviewees. Another 17 percent were members of parent-teachers associations. Only eighteen of the approximately 198 people answering questions claimed membership in neighborhood improvement or block clubs. Active membership in these organizations was not ascertained. Thirty-seven percent had school-age

49 deVise, Chicago's Widening Color Gap, pp. 145, 152. RERC, Projections, pp. x-1, x-2. Headcounts, 1966 (District Four). 444 Negro students in special schools for the handicapped have not been counted.
Austinites expressed great concern about conditions in the community. Although 87 percent considered their neighborhood a good place to live, 27 percent considered the immediate area as dangerous and 58 percent felt their area would be worse in the future. About two-thirds thought Austin would be integrated within five years and another 17 percent saw the community as probably all Negro within this period. Nearly one-half of the survey respondents living in integrated blocks said they were against Negroes living there. In all-white blocks 29 percent expressed opposition to integration of their neighborhood and only 5 percent said they would favor integration. Almost one-half of the interviewees said they intended to move within the next two years although 39 percent said they would not move.57

When compared to two other Chicago communities and two suburban areas which were surveyed, Austinites rated their schools "poor" far more frequently. It was ascertained that this dissatisfaction was associated with the number of Negroes in the local


52Ibid., pp. 10-20.
school. While only 8.7 percent of the Austinites with no Negroes in their school rated the schools "poor", 31.8 percent of the respondents in areas with over one-half Negro enrollment considered their schools to be substandard. The most frequent specific complaints were that schools were overcrowded (21.8 percent) and "too much integration" (16.7 percent). When questioned if white and Negro students should attend the same schools, almost seventy percent said they should, but 23.3 percent favored different schools. Regarding the degree of integration 54.1 percent of the respondents would not object if the school planned to make each classroom one-fourth Negro. When the planned integration was to be one-half Negro, those not objecting dropped to 40.2 percent of the Austinites. 52

All indicators in Austin pointed to a rapid succession through the invasion and consolidation stages in the southern portions. The area was situated directly in the path of the western expansion of the Negro belt. It could be estimated that

52David Street, Race and Education in the City: Findings on Chicago, Report Number 5 of the Interuniversity Social Research Committee, January, 1969 (Chicago: Community and Family Study Center, 1969), pp. 5-9. The other communities surveyed were: Ashburn, Rogers Park, Elmhurst, River Forest.
over 5000 whites had left the community between 1960 and 1966.\textsuperscript{53}

Almost one-half of the whites interviewed intended to move within two years. The large number of apartment units made mobility easier. The composition of ethnic groups was not likely to produce any organized resistance to penetration. Reports of panic peddling and blockbusting by real estate agents had been registered with the Chicago Council on Human Relations, and disturbances with racial overtones plagued Austin High School.\textsuperscript{54}

The community of Belmont-Cragin was directly north of Austin, being separated by the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railroad tracks. In 1960 Poles remained the largest foreign stock group with Italians and Germans representing the other leading nationalities. Only three Negroes were counted in the community of 60,883 persons. The median family income for the entire area was $7,547 and 25.8 percent of the families earned over $10,000. Over

\textsuperscript{53} deVise, pp. 143, 145. McKinlay and Shanas, \textit{Austin: Civil Rights and Integration in a Chicago Community}, p. 4. The decline in white population was computed by adding the estimated increase in Negro population in Austin between 1960 and 1966 to the estimated decrease in total population between 1960 and 1966 and reducing the sum by 30 percent to account for white replacement as indicated by the McKinlay and Shanas survey in which 29.9 percent of the interviewees had lived in the area for less than six years.

one-half of the housing units were owner occupied. By 1966 it was estimated that 349 Negroes lived in the community but no Negro students attended the two public schools in District Four, which served the western half of the area. Belmont-Cragin was placed 118th in economic rank among the 250 communities in the Chicago Metropolitan Area.55

The small community of Montclare was situated directly west of Belmont-Cragin. In 1960 Italians and Poles were the leading ethnic groups. Only one Negro was counted in the census among 11,802 residents of the area. The median family income was $7,843 with 28.3 percent earning over $10,000. Almost two-thirds of the housing units were owner occupied. In 1966 fifteen Negroes were estimated to be living in the community but no Negro students were counted in the Locke School which served the area. The economic rank of Montclare was 107th among the 250 communities in the Chicago Metropolitan Area.56

The community of Dunning ran west from Austin Avenue to Pontiac and Cumberland Avenues. It was bounded by Belmont Avenue


on the south and Irving Park Road on the north. Poles and Germans were the leading ethnic group, but large numbers of Italians were moving into the area in 1960. Two Negroes were counted in the census among 41,626 inhabitants. Median family income was $7,953 with 30.8 percent earning over $10,000. Four-fifths of the housing units were owner occupied. In 1966 twenty-one Negroes were estimated to be living in the community, but no Negro students were counted in the three schools and one branch serving the area. Dunning was placed 76th in economic rank among the 250 communities in the Chicago Metropolitan Area. 57

Portage Park Community was directly east of Dunning and only its four western census tracts were in the School District Four area. Poles, Germans, and Italians were the leading foreign stock in 1960. Seventeen Negroes were listed in the census among 65,925 inhabitants, of which 24,903 lived in the four western tracts. The median income in the western section varied from $7,210 to $8,532 with the percentage earning over $10,000 ranging from 23.1 percent to 33.8 percent. About seven-tenths of the housing units in the western area were owner occupied. In 1966 an estimated 140 Negroes lived in the community, but no Negro students were counted

These four communities to the north of Austin were well above the main movement of Negro expansion. They were not integrated, nor were they likely to experience integration in the next decade. While no studies had been made regarding attitudes toward integration, the large number of residents of central and southern European background indicated that some resistance to penetration might be expected, but the question would indeed be academic. The integration of schools in these areas would not be the result of integrating communities.

In the meantime, the schools in southern Austin were rapidly resegregating. By June, 1967, the North Side Boundary Committee of the Chicago Board of Education had been working for months with representatives of the Austin community to reduce overcrowding at the Spencer School. It was reported that "many plans have been considered and eliminated because of certain elements in the plan or because of rejection by a significant section of the community." Consideration was given to transferring 1400 students among most of the schools in Austin south of North Avenue to relieve

overcrowding. This plan was abandoned because of the magnitude of numbers of students being transferred. Instead, a plan for moving 288 students from the Spencer to the Hay Elementary School was considered. An attempt to stabilize a school by moving students to another school in a nearby area was very unlikely to solve any problems. As integration of the second school occurred, white parents were likely to withdraw their children and sell their homes to Negroes as had happened in Marynook. A plan to stabilize schools without causing further segregation was needed. It would have to be found soon. As the Real Estate Research Corporation observed, when considering the exodus of whites from Chicago, "Any policies aimed at achieving racially integrated education by stabilizing the racial balance in public schools must take effect almost immediately."59

CHAPTER V

INTELLIGENCE AND RECOMMENDATION FUNCTIONS:
A PLAN EMERGES

Negro community spokesmen hailed the departure of Benjamin Willis from the Chicago School Superintendency as "positive in itself and ending an era which was marked by a vigorous defense of the racial status quo." However, they held reservations about the ability of Superintendent Redmond to alter "the same social, political and economic forces that have successfully maintained the racial status quo [which] will continue operating inside and outside of the Chicago School system." As a yardstick against which future progress in school desegregation could be measured, it was pointed out that over 90 percent of Negroes in public elementary programs were in racially segregated schools in 1966. In high schools over 71 percent of the Negro students were racially segregated. At the same time almost 76 percent of white children on the elementary level and about 69 percent of white pupils at the secondary level attended public schools in which less than
10 percent of a minority group were present.\footnote{Harold M. Baron, \textit{Racial Segregation in the Chicago Public Schools, 1965-1966}, A pamphlet prepared by the Research Department of the Chicago Urban League, September 20, 1966 (Chicago: Urban League, 1966), pp. 1 (First and second quotes), 6-9, 18. The Urban League used the 10 percent guideline to define segregation. The statistics were based on an elaborate analysis of the racial headcount taken in the Chicago Public Schools by teachers.}

Certainly Redmond would not be able to alter these statistics without the backing of his policy-making Board. Two incidents may reflect the difficulty he would encounter in obtaining any consensus from this body on matters of integration.

In January, 1967, the United States Office of Education released a report criticizing the segregation in the Chicago Public Schools. A liberal Board member, pointing out the difficulty of initiating integration policies in a city which was residentially segregated, complained that "discriminatory practices by city landlords, lending institutions, and real estate brokers have accentuated the residential confinement of Negroes." Even the Federal Housing Authority had been responsible for increasing segregation by choosing housing project sites in all-black areas. At this time a movement to prohibit discriminatory practices in housing was underway in the state. In May the Board unanimously supported a resolution to pass a meaningful fair housing law.
In Chicago, "Project Good Neighbor" had been initiated by the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities to disseminate information on integration. But when Redmond requested that the Board grant permission to distribute Council leaflets dealing with fair housing questions in the schools, the Board denied the request in a five to four vote. Apparently a majority of Board members were willing to endorse principles but did not wish to involve the school system in any controversy in the communities regarding these principles.  

Another incident indicates the growing inclination of the Board to disregard recommendations from the superintendent. The Caldwell Elementary School in Avalon Park was about 30 percent Negro in October, 1966, and the growing number of black students was seen as a threat to the stability of the school. In order to alleviate fears of white residents and stabilize the racial mixture at the school, the superintendent recommended that a number of black students be transferred to the almost all-white Warren Elementary School further south in Chicago Heights. The plan was

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rejected by the Board in a seven to one vote, on the grounds that the students at the Caldwell School did not want to transfer.

When Redmond requested that the matter be referred back to the Board South Side Boundaries Committee, Mrs. Wild replied, "Doctor, we've had all that."³

Changes were made in the administration of the permissive transfer program. In February, 1967, Redmond commented:

While relieving overcrowding in some high schools the permissive transfer program has also had a marked effect on integration. Despite housing patterns only four high schools have no Negro pupils enrolled; two far Northside high schools have an enrollment of more than 10 percent Negro students as a result of the permissive transfer programs. In some schools, however, white children taking advantage of the permissive transfer plan have endangered integration as the percentage of white versus Negro students decreased sharply. In order to prevent resegregation and to contribute to the stabilization of communities, eight integrated schools should be eliminated from any list of sending or receiving schools.⁴

In accordance with this observation six high schools had been dropped from the transfer program in 1966. In the spring of 1967 Austin and South Shore High Schools, in rapidly changing


communities, were also withdrawn from the list of sending schools.5

But the Board did allow an exception. At a public hearing on the permissive transfer program held in April, 1967, the room was packed with protestors from Bogan High School on the southwest side of Chicago. These people complained of the Board's "underhanded and tyrannical tactics in making decisions without consulting the community," and threatened to "meet with total opposition any plan that even in the smallest way jeopardizes the neighborhood schools." They warned that any attempt to allow outside students to transfer to Bogan would cause white parents to run to the suburbs. In the face of this opposition the Board dropped Bogan from the list of receiving schools. It was contended that by withdrawing its branches back to the main building the school would be at the city-wide average of facility utilization. This capacity ratio was determined by comparing the number of students in a school to its facilities. If the ratio was above the city average, the students at the school qualified

to transfer to other schools which were below the city average.⁶

When Warren Bacon, an outspoken Board member who advocated desegregation policies, was asked if Bogan should be forcefully integrated, he replied, "No they are living in the nineteenth century. Perhaps in another century or two they might catch up to modern day thinking. . . . I think we have enough schools in Chicago where we can move ahead positively without bothering with Bogan."⁷

Not all integrationists agreed. The vice president of the Organization for the Southwest Community asked that Bogan be put back on the transfer list and stated, "We are shocked at the Board's capitulation to the local pressure of Bogan property owners' leaders on the issue of desegregation." Representatives of Mather and Sullivan High Schools on the far north side of the city also expressed their support of the transfer program.⁸

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⁶Proceedings, March 22, 1967, p. 2671; April 12, 1967, pp. 2740-42, 2837-38. Chicago Sun-Times, April 13, 1967, p. 8 (Quotes). The ratio was based on assuming the school had a nine period day and then computing overcrowding on the basis of how many students the school was built to hold. The city-wide average was 132.1 percent more students than the capacity of all the schools. If a school exceeded this percentage, it was a receiving school.


⁸Ibid.
Obviously, any choice of communities for purposes of integration would have to consider the hostility of the residents and the effect this would have on the program. Cognizant of the vast differences between communities within the city, Redmond called for more experimentation within a more decentralized school system. He identified three distinct major areas of concern among the vast ghetto areas, the fringe middle class areas and the peripheral areas of the city "where communities know neither integration nor crowding nor lack of opportunity and where city-wide techniques for sociological change have been questioned."  

Redmond saw the need for a saturation of all areas with innovative skills, services and programs. He emphasized building programs and facility development to help stabilize existing integrated neighborhoods and "make possible experiences of multi-racial, multi-cultural education" by building "ahead, not behind the movement of people." The schools had to be made more attractive if they were to be a factor in a city-wide plan to stabilize neighborhoods and provide for future growth. The need for programs to reduce class sizes, introduce innovative teaching

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9James F. Redmond, "Chicago Schools: Problems and Perspectives" (Speech delivered at University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, December 6, 1966). (Typewritten copy).
techniques, and provide better working conditions for teachers was reiterated by the new superintendent.¹⁰

In January, 1967, the Chicago School Superintendent had a more specific set of problems placed before him by the federal government. The United States Office of Education presented to the Chicago Board a brief of complaints about segregation in the school system which had been garnered over the prior few years. Special attention was paid to the segregation of faculty through assignment patterns, questionable boundary and student placement patterns, the lack of non-white students in the apprenticeship training program, and the development of open enrollment for vocational and trade schools.¹¹ In April, 1967, with a government grant, the Chicago School staff and advisors began to consider school desegregation policies which would remedy the problems presented in the government's complaint.

The Redmond Report, as the Chicago School response came to be called, admitted the segregation of the school system in the four aforementioned areas. It went on to complain that the

¹⁰Ibid.

Chicago system did not have the necessary staff to explain planned changes in order to gain necessary public support and called for more sophisticated communication and the development of a community relations department. The report emphasized that "people are not going to accept and support what they do not understand or believe in."\textsuperscript{12}

Regarding desegregation, the report observed that the task of obtaining quality and integrated education was made formidable by the large influx of children from rural families who had "suffered every form of deprivation." This influx had also resulted in a rapid increase of minority children as compared with the percentage of white children in the schools. This change in population "in large measure, reflects residential changes within the city which have been a cause for serious concern by those responsible or deeply interested in the future of Chicago." The report quoted the Chicago Region, Illinois Congress of Parents and Teachers statement that "unless this trend is reversed the city will continue to find its problems and expenses multiplying at the same time that its resources and tax base decline." Thus, the report summarized its major problem as "achieving extended

\textsuperscript{12}Redmond Report, pp. 1, A-3, B-16, C-5, D-7, D-8 (Quote), D-9--D-25.
integration while at the same time stabilizing the city through reassurances to the white community."¹³

In considering the implementation of school desegregation, plan consultants brought in from outside the school system agreed that the immediate short range goal must be to anchor the whites that still resided in the city. The major problem was seen to be in fringe areas which were undergoing racial change. White people in these fringe areas were generally "less secure economically and socially than their middle class counterparts" who lived on the periphery of the city. Much of the "integration" which city officials had calculated existed in fringe areas which would soon become black segregated areas. Attempts to integrate schools by changing boundary lines in fringe areas often hastened the white exodus. The consultants observed, "There is little reason in precedent for whites to believe that the school and neighborhood will remain integrated, and white perception of the situation is the determining factor in the consecutive resegregation of

¹³Ibid., pp. B-3 (First quote), B-4 (Second, third quote), B-5 (Fourth quote).
neighborhoods."  

The consultants concluded that while the fringe areas should be integrated, it was imperative that policy makers "avoid forcing the extreme pressures of school integration exclusively upon such vulnerable neighborhoods." To alleviate the pressure it was suggested that school administrators limit the minority percentage introduced into fringe schools and shift some of this pressure into more remote and unthreatened neighborhoods. While the committee was divided, it was suggested that Negro students be assigned, without choice, in transfers from their neighborhood school to a remote receiving school. This position was taken because of the historical fact that few Negroes transferred when a choice remained open to them. Because of the possibility of Negro rejection of the imposition of a compulsory plan and the apprehension that parents in the sending areas might have, the recommending committee was unable to present a unanimous report.

In selecting receiving schools it was suggested that criteria  

\[14\] Ibid., pp. B-15, B-16, B-17 (First quote), B-18, B-19 (Second quote). John E. Coons, Professor of Law, Northwestern University, was one member of the panel who had been an outspoken critic of the lack of a positive integration policy in the Chicago Schools.

\[15\] Ibid., pp. B-19 (Quote), B-20.
include non-threatened areas of somewhat higher income families in single residence homes relatively distant from the sending area. If schools in the receiving area did not have sufficient space for new students, it was recommended that mobiles and additions be used. To maintain a stable racial proportion in the schools, a quota system was endorsed as "the only feasible short range approach that will anchor sufficient members [numbers] of whites to make meaningful integration even a long range possibility."\footnote{Ibid., p. B-21.}

In specific plans the Redmond Report introduced some important innovations in Chicago school policy. In a union of integration and stabilization policy, it called upon the entire white community to share in the responsibility for integration by maintaining fixed racial proportions in the schools. In fringe area schools which were already experiencing integration, it was recommended that the number of minority students be limited to a "viable racial balance." In order to keep this viable balance it would be necessary to transfer some minority students living in the racially changing school attendance area to other schools which were not threatened by racial inundation. It was suggested that geographic blocks which were predominantly Negro within the
integrated school attendance area be selected, and the pupils in these blocks be assigned to schools in non-adjacent areas of the city where integration would result. Transportation would be provided with adult supervision on the buses between the sending and receiving schools.\(^1^7\)

In order to minimize opposition and allay any fears which might result in white flight from the receiving area, it was recommended that the number of students allowed to transfer from a sending school should be limited to not more than 15 percent of the total student body in a receiving elementary school. As students from non-contiguous attendance areas would also be eligible to attend the high school of the receiving school, it was recommended that this number be limited to 25 percent of the total student body in the high school. Provision was also to be made for additional educational staff and services to meet the needs of the newly enrolled pupils. The staffs of the receiving school were to be given in-service education in human relations.\(^1^8\)

Besides the non-contiguous assignment program, an intra-community pilot program was recommended in which the racial

\(^{1^7}\)Ibid., pp. B-6, B-7.

\(^{1^8}\)Ibid., pp. B-7, B-17.
percentages in selected schools of one area of the city would be equalized. The transfer of students between these intra-community schools would also require the busing of pupils. The non-contiguous and intra-community programs represented the two most novel plans for the Chicago schools. They were considered "short-term" recommendations, policies which could be put into effect within three years. 19

Other short term recommendations included: a continuation of the voluntary permissive transfer program; continuation of the examination of school attendance areas with racial integration as a factor to consider in establishing attendance boundaries; selection of school sites in accordance with the Armstrong Act which required that integration be considered; development of cooperative programs with private and suburban school systems. A magnet school offering superior instruction and programs in integrated classrooms and drawing from a city-wide area was proposed for an intermediate term objective, to be implemented within three to seven years. A long range plan called for a feasibility study on the possibility of establishing educational parks. 20

When the Redmond Report was presented to the Board it was

accepted by a ten to one vote. Judge Scheffler abstained on the grounds that acceptance involved the Board in making commitments it could not keep. He further contended that establishing racial quotas was illegal. Scheffler also complained that the Report made no cost projections. It was reported that the study deliberately avoided considering costs in order to keep the Board from becoming involved in arguments about whether it could afford the proposals.21

Board President Whiston accepted the Report in principle but reminded everyone that the Board members did not promise to authorize every specific proposal. He pointed out that meetings would have to be set up with Mayor Daley as the "plan affects the public and public finances to such a great degree that the mayor is certain to be interested in it." Mrs. Green and Mrs. Wild also had reservations about particulars in the Report and Mrs. Wild was concerned with the lack of funds for any immediate implementation.22

Board Vice-President Murray observed that the Report appeared to end the neighborhood school concept, but concluded that the


recommendations are "proper and right and should be implemented as soon as possible." Mrs. Malis felt the plan should be implemented immediately in light of racial change occurring in Austin, Lake View, Lincoln Park and South Shore communities. She, however, did later express doubts about forcing children to bus on a nonvoluntary basis. Redmond stated that in drawing up the Report "we didn't back away from things because someone thought they might conflict with law."  

Although the plan designated no specific areas, opposition to it was widespread in the peripheral areas of the city. An Illinois Senator from the southwest side promised to meet with other politicians to stop the Report from being implemented. While protests were especially strong in the Bogan High School area, the Kilbourn Organization of the northwest side and Operation Crescent, a suburban based group, were vocal in their opposition.

Representatives of the Negro community also found fault with the Report. Al Raby of the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations was opposed to the quota plan as stigmatizing Negro

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24 Chicago Sun-Times, August 24, 1967, p. 3.
children and implying "that a black Chicago would be undesirable and that Negroes will always be underpaid." Raby had been influential in stopping government funding in 1965 and again threatened to ask the government to withhold its support. While the Chicago Urban League praised the Report, by November, 1967, it was demanding that a clear statement of priorities be issued along with a timetable for implementing the major features. The Urban League showed more concern that education in the ghetto be improved and the intermediate range magnet schools and long range educational parks be developed than in the busing proposal. Indeed, one Negro newspaper was emphasizing that quality education in already integrated schools would be most effective. The Negro press displayed no great enthusiasm for busing to integrate in the period of 1967 following the Redmond Report.25

The Catholic press reflected the mixed feelings which Church members had toward the Report. In one article entitled, "Redmond Plan met with 'cautious' enthusiasm by Catholic educators," James

McDermott of the Catholic Interracial Council supported the plan arguing, "it gives the changing neighborhood a fighting chance for establishing interracial stability," and the quota plan was seen as an "opportunity for further interracial contact and not as something devised as a barrier impeding integration." However, other spokesmen felt the plan "writes off the present children in the inner city" by not emphasizing programs to alleviate their plight. Fr. Mallette, a priest in an inner city parish criticized the plan for not considering the growing demand for local control of neighborhood institutions, and Rev. John T. Richardson, the executive vice-president of DePaul University of Chicago, pointed out that the "plan could be dangerous if it engendered the feeling that our education system alone could solve our racial problem."²⁶

Despite complaints that the Redmond Report was not being implemented, and even an announcement by an assistant superintendent of Chicago Schools that busing would probably not begin until September, 1968, work was in progress during the summer of

²⁶New World (Chicago), September 1, 1967, pp. 1-2. The Redmond Report did recognize the plight of ghetto children and recommended that a "purely voluntary transfer plan be available" to them. Observing that "few families will avail themselves of the opportunity," the authors postulated that the offer would have "symbolic importance. It would suggest that the interests of the Negro child in the ghetto have not been subordinated to an all-encompassing policy of neighborhood stabilization." Redmond Report, p. B-21.
1967. United States Senator Dirksen of Illinois was considering submitting a proposal in Congress to forbid the use of federal funds to achieve racial integration by busing. School officials, however, felt $500,000 could be obtained under the Civil Rights Act to bus Negro children out of fringe areas where the racial balance of schools had been upset and an exodus of white families was threatened.27

Funds would be an issue in the busing program, but, as John Coons had observed in a civil rights report in 1961, paid transportation was critical to the success of any transfer program. Another caveat not so easily observed was that transfer students should be carefully screened to avoid sending children from culturally deprived backgrounds into an area where their poor social attitudes, preparation and interests might confirm stereotypes.28 However, as the plan developed this problem tended to resolve itself.


Another problem rested in the lack of any accepted guidelines defining racial imbalance. Neither the courts nor the 1964 Civil Rights Act had set any fixed ratio as the basis for an integrated school. Adam Clayton Powell had suggested a "community ratio" which would allow only a 20 percent deviation from the ratio in the community. Obviously, the committee which drew up the busing plan for the Redmond Report considered the community ratio to be untenable for the city in which over 50 percent of the public school students were Negro. The 15 percent quota for elementary schools and 25 percent quota for high schools appears to be an arbitrary figure chosen on the basis that it would not create undue unrest in segregated white areas marked for integration.

Other cities had initiated busing programs prior to the Chicago plan. A questionnaire was sent out by the Chicago administration to 128 cities asking reasons for busing, details about how it was carried out and an evaluation of the success of the program. Of the 104 cities which replied, about three-fourths were busing students other than the handicapped. The most common reason given for transporting students was that they lived beyond

a given distance from the school. However, twenty-eight systems listed overcrowding as a factor, twenty-nine systems listed integration as a purpose and another eleven gave the improvement of the educational program as a goal. A surprisingly few students were being bused--about 20,000 in all the replying cities.30

It was often difficult to relate many aspects of these other busing programs to the particular problems of Chicago. The Evanston, Illinois plan, mentioned frequently during the busing decision controversy in Chicago is a good illustration. Located just north of Chicago, this community of about 80,000 population differed considerably from Chicago in social and economic status as well as ethnic composition. With about one-fourth of its population contained in a Negro ghetto near the geographic center of the relatively compact suburb, it was not difficult to adjust boundaries and bus students in a two-way plan to achieve integration. Nonetheless, the implementation of the plan had taken

three years and was not actually begun until September, 1967. The two-way program, in which both white and Negro students were transferred, became a major aspect of the comparisons and debates in the Chicago imbroglio.31

Philadelphia was a city which was more easily compared to Chicago. About one-third of its population was Negro and over one-half of its public school enrollment consisted of black students. It had a large Roman Catholic system in which the student body was about 90 percent white. A busing program which began in 1964 had originally been designed to relieve overcrowding. Beginning with a few hundred students the program had expanded to over 1000 pupils. Philadelphia authorities were reported to see little evidence that the busing program had stabilized any neighborhoods and were introducing the magnet school and educational park concepts.

During the Chicago busing decision controversy, studies of the Philadelphia program were published pointing out that Negro students being bused into formerly all-white schools did better on

achievement tests than students from their neighborhood who were not bused. The effect was more pronounced in the earlier grades than for students at a sixth grade level. The study was reported to also indicate that white students in receiving schools performed better than children in all-white classrooms although no effect was discernible in the sixth grade. The children being bused in Philadelphia were chosen at random rather than being selected to avoid cultural clashes.32

Specific information about racial stability in neighborhoods of the city was a critical factor in determining the details for the busing plan. The Board had authorized the Real Estate Research Corporation to make a detailed study of demographic patterns in the city. The Interuniversity Social Research Committee, consisting of local universities, was conducting studies of attitudes on integration in selected neighborhoods. Chicago Board demographers also had access to racial spot surveys. All students in the public schools filled out a slip with their address, and teachers indicated the race of the student on the form. Local

32Chicago Sun-Times, February 25, 1968, pp. 20, 44. Northwest Times (Chicago), February 1, 1968, p. 8. The effects of busing in Chicago will be considered in the next chapters of this dissertation. The effects of busing in other cities are noted here as an indication of the information which was being made available to Chicago citizens by their local press.
school administrators then plotted the racial composition of each block in their district. These spot surveys, filled out in September, 1967, gave a relatively accurate indication of the race of public school students in each block of Chicago. 33

A choice of communities from which to obtain students for busing was not difficult to make. All evidence pointed to the South Shore and south Austin areas. Community organizations in South Shore had been asking the School Board to allow some form of planned integration to help stabilize the community, and Julian Klugmann of the South Shore Commission reported that his organization had specifically requested an intra-community plan in the fall of 1967. 34

In South Shore the Bryn Mawr, Mann, and Caldwell Schools had been resegregating. In 1963 the Bryn Mawr was over 80 percent white while in 1967 only about 22 percent were counted as white. At the Mann the comparable figures for these years were 92 percent

33Teraji, May 31, 1973, and McKeag, August 30, 1971. Chapter iv of this study deals in detail with numerous aspects of the data available to the school administration planners.

and 24 percent, while they were 95 percent and 35 percent at the Caldwell. These schools were overcrowded, and action would have to be taken immediately to keep the remaining white students in the building. 35

In the Austin area overcrowding at the May and Spencer Schools had become a severe problem. Classrooms had fifty to fifty-five pupils, and rooms normally used for such services as the library and auditorium had been pressed into use for classes. A new upper grade center (middle school) was to be built but was not near completion. Recommendations to adjust boundary lines in seven schools in order to relieve overcrowding at Spencer were abandoned on the basis that 1400 students would have been required to change their school affiliation. A substitute proposal scheduled about 300 students in the seventh and eighth grades of the Spencer to be transferred in September, 1967, to the Hay School which had space made available when it was closed as a branch of Steinmetz High School. 36


Nonetheless, the Spencer School opened in September with an enrollment of 1342 students to fill its thirty-four available classrooms. The May School had 1554 students in September with thirty-five available classrooms. The proportion of white students at the Spencer School had declined from about 99 percent in 1963 to 12 percent in 1967. At the May School the ratio of whites in the student body had dropped from about 87 percent to 13 percent. While it might well be argued that no plan was likely to keep these schools from resegregating, overcrowding and the necessity for action to prove good faith in implementing the Redmond Report required that action be taken. The broader concept of using the schools to help stabilize the community as a whole by taking some positive steps was a factor which could not be ignored.

A more difficult decision was the choice of stable areas into which the children could be bused. Under pressure for time, an ad hoc committee of Board planners surveyed communities which they felt might accept integration. Residents contacted in the Rogers Park community indicated that a majority favored nebulous integration plans. However, the long distance of this area from

the sending communities precluded any serious consideration of it for receiving schools. In retrospect, one planner recognized that no community was likely to have a majority of its citizens favor this social experiment.38

Thus, demographic data and geography determined the areas into which the students would be bused. The areas directly south of the three schools in south Chicago were relatively stable and middle-class communities. None of the schools in the area were integrated at a 10 percent level although most of them had Negroes in attendance. Many of the schools were filled to capacity and would require mobile units in order to accommodate new students. The Austin area offered a more comfortable situation. The communities to the north were stable, middle class, and the schools were not crowded. Unlike the area south of South Shore, these communities did not rest in the path of the expanding Negro ghetto. The busing of black students into the northern area was not likely to create a situation which might hasten an exodus of white residents as was possible in the southern area plan.39

No organizations were contacted during the time the plan was


being conceived. Local administrators in sending schools were contacted for particular information and were aware that a plan was being developed, but the number of people aware of specifics was kept to a minimum. One planner reported that the administration, "wanted the Board to get the report [busing plan] without too much flak from the community."40 The Redmond Report required action. Legal and moral imperatives were present. The decision to implement the busing plan, however, belonged to the Board, not the administration. The new Superintendent of Schools was observing the relationship in which it was his duty to recommend but the Board's task to make decisions. The way was open for the Board to bear the burden of accepting or rejecting a very controversial program.

On December 28, 1967, during the Christmas recess of the schools, the initial busing recommendation was submitted to the Board. The official statement was rather brief. Attention was called to the Redmond Report and its observation "that any plans undertaken by the Board of Education to promote stabilization and

integration must be implemented immediately, if they are to be effective." Data from the preliminary report of the Real Estate Research Corporation regarding school enrollment was cited to justify the decision to bus from the Austin and South Shore areas. Specific schools were not mentioned; rather, the recommendation utilized the rationale that overcrowding and racial imbalance in some of the elementary schools of the Austin Area dictate the need for implementing the Non-Contiguous Attendance area recommendation of the Desegregation Report immediately.

and overcrowding and racial imbalance in some of the elementary schools of the South Shore and related areas urge that immediate steps be taken to implement the Intra-Community Pilot Program which is a short term recommendation in the Desegregation Report.41

Board President Frank Whiston was reported to have no comments at the time the busing recommendation was made. Vice-president Thomas Murray felt the Board should delay action until further studies could be made of the effects of integration plans in other cities. Mrs. W. Lydon Wild objected to the assignment of students to different schools according to the blocks they lived on as "herding children like cattle." She favored deferment.

of the plans and indicated she would probably oppose the final plan which was to be presented on January 10, 1968. Warren Bacon observed that the plans represented a move to stabilize already integrated schools and cautioned that not to use vacant classrooms in outlying all-white areas would be indefensible in view of the Board's pressing financial needs. Cyrus Adams, considering the loss of white students in the public school system, urged that, "this is a trend we've got to arrest. This plan may or may not work, but we've got to try." Mrs. Louise Malis spoke of the need for stabilization and prophetically observed, "We will never get a consensus from an entire community, no more than we can get a consensus on this Board."42

As presented, the rationale for the plans was based on the proclaimed Board policies of stabilization and relief from overcrowding which now became entwined in a discernibly resolute desegregation policy. An outright rejection of the plans would have been difficult to justify for any Board member who might have been inclined to do so. A request that the recommendation be deferred to another meeting (a common Board policy on new business) was voted down with only the Board president and vice-president

favoring deferment. The Board would now enter the first phase of its encounters with community reaction.

Three of the four major Chicago newspapers announced their guarded approval of a busing program. The Chicago Daily News, while considering the plan to be controversial not only on an emotional plane but also at practical and educational levels, concluded that the program should be tried as "the future of the entire city is at stake in the battle to stabilize neighborhoods and to upgrade the quality of education throughout Chicago."

Chicago's American favored busing as "no other approach has been suggested . . . that seems likely to accomplish the goals of improving the schools and stopping the exodus of white families from an expanding Negro core." In considering protests against the busing program, the newspaper stated, "It is up to the opponents of this plan to come up with something better. They cannot merely block it and hope for some alternative to turn up." On the other hand the American's sister paper, the Chicago Tribune, contended that "nobody ever told the school board that its job was to make over the community in terms of some abstract sociological

The Tribune continued to oppose the busing plans during the period the decision was being made.

Early newspaper reports announced that 5000 pupils were to be bused in a two-way plan, moving both white and black students, to begin January 29, 1968. These accounts identified the Spencer and May Schools in the Austin district as sending schools and suggested that schools to the south of the South Shore District Twenty-two would be designated as receiving schools. As the plans developed, the number of pupils to be bused decreased, the two-way plan was dropped, and the date for commencing the program was pushed back as the Board expanded the number and scope of its hearings with the public.

That the transportation of 5000 students was ever seriously contemplated by the school administration seems highly unlikely. Francis McKeag, who was Assistant Superintendent for School Planning, has denied that this number was being considered. When

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the initial recommendation was introduced to the Board in December, 1967, the superintendent estimated the cost to bus fifty children for a school year would be $5700. If the total $150,000 he asked to be appropriated for the plan was to be spent only on buses, 1300 would have been the maximum number of students which could have been involved. A number approximating this figure was being considered when the plans were introduced to the Board in December, 1967. However, as the Board's representatives met with community groups, adjustments were "made in plans discussed in order to minimize opposition in communities." One official observed, "Every time we went out to the community the thing got smaller." 46

The contemplated two-way busing referred to the South Shore area where community organizations had been working with the Board in attempting to stabilize the area. Both the South Shore Commission and the South East Community Organization had supported the Redmond Plan in principle. However, the South Shore Commission was much more adamant in its demands for a two-way busing plan involving thousands of students than the South East Community Organization which encompassed the area where receiving schools

would be located in District Seventeen.47

The president of the South Shore Commission expressed the belief that "many people want to raise their children in integrated communities but are afraid of 'inundation' and deterioration of education. Guaranteed racial quotas is reassuring to both whites and Negroes who want to prove that integration can work." In attempting to create this stable integrated community, several busing plans were discussed with school officials. The Commission's representatives expressed the belief that a two-way busing plan, involving fourteen schools and integrating all with a racial composition of 65 percent white and 35 percent Negro, was a workable design.48

However, school officials did not concur. On January 3, 1968, the Assistant Superintendent for Planning announced a plan to a group of principals and parent-teacher association presidents that involved compulsory busing of only Negro students. This scaled down plan was immediately attacked by liberal white elements


In the community. In a letter to the Superintendent of Schools, the chairman of the Seventh Ward Independent Voters of Illinois in South Shore complained that the announced plan discriminated against black children by eliminating the busing of white students.

The letter predicted "substantial opposition and resistance to compulsory busing which affects only Negro children." The compromise plan was considered to be a capitulation to white backlash sentiment and the "fears and prejudices of some individuals in the communities of the receiving schools." It was further contended that by reducing the number of pupils to be bused and not providing white students to replace the Negro students being transferred, the compromise plan had destroyed any possibility of stabilizing the neighborhoods and schools of South Shore. As an example it was pointed out that under the school administration plan the percentage of Negro students in the Bryn Mawr School would only be reduced from 77 percent to about 70 percent.49

The South Shore Commission also opposed the school administration's proposal. The organization's president announced that the plan was "so meager that the commission would prefer that the

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49 Saul Mendelson (a letter to James Redmond, from private file of Mr. Mendelson, Chicago, Illinois, January 5, 1968).
board drop it." The commission contended that "few South Shore residents voiced disapproval of the original plan. Now, however, the commission is trying to mobilize all South Shore residents in opposition to the compromise proposal." The commission apparently felt the integration of nine nearly all-white schools in District Seventeen and the relief of overcrowding in the three predominantly Negro schools were not sufficient palliatives for the apparent abandonment of the stabilization aspect of the plan.

While city-wide organizations such as the Catholic Interracial Council, the Women's Committee of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, and the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities had expressed their support of the proposed busing plans, these organizations did not necessarily reflect the grass roots opinion of a majority of people. The city-wide Chicago Parent-Teacher Association had given its immediate support to the busing proposal, but its president had warned that the organization was not in favor of large scale busing and expected opposition to busing from both black and white parents. Furthermore, the association feared opposition from factions not immediately involved in the busing plan and requested that the rest of the

city should leave the involved communities alone to work out their problems, because, "if it isn't worked out, both communities will go."51

Numerous conflicting public opinion polls were presented which supported or refuted the contention that the busing program would be accepted.

In a poll by the Seventh Ward Independent Voters of Illinois, 175 respondents favored provisions by the Board to increase opportunities for integration of students in the Chicago Public Schools while only seven people expressed opposition. When busing was proposed as a method of integrating schools and relieving overcrowding, 157 pollees favored busing while only twenty were opposed. When questioned on preference between the one-way plan, the two-way plan or another plan, only three favored the administration's one-way plan while 137 respondents expressed approval of the two-way plan and another twenty pollees desired other busing plans.52

However, this independent survey was open to serious question regarding the adequacy of the cross-section of the population being polled if a true picture of public opinion was desired. In a WGN


52Copy of poll obtained from private file of Mr. Mendelson.
radio survey taken in January, 1968, on "Chicago Speaks," over 60 percent of the respondents expressed opposition to busing as a means of achieving racial balance in the schools. A little over 19 percent favored busing, and over 20 percent had no opinion. In the segregated white northwest area of Chicago, a Lerner Press survey showed overwhelming opposition to busing. The poll asked, "Should busing be used as a method of stabilizing racial balance in the schools?" Over 95 percent of those who mailed in their questionnaires expressed opposition to busing.\(^{53}\) While these surveys were also not controlled to represent adequate cross sections in public opinion, they did represent a strong opposition to the busing program and lent credence to the statement of one South Shore mother who proclaimed, "When the South Shore Commission stands up and says it represents the thinking of the community, I take issue."\(^{54}\)

While opposition to the busing program was reported to be

\(^{53}\)*Chicago's American*, January 11, 1968, p. 4. *Northwest Times* (Chicago), January 25, 1968, p. 1; February 1, 1968, p. 1; February 8, 1968, p. 1. Three separate surveys were reported over a three week period by the Lerner Press. The exact figures were broken down into city and suburban respondents. They were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Suburbs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 28, 1968</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1, 1968</td>
<td>95.3%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 8, 1968</td>
<td>95.6%</td>
<td>96.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{54}\)*Chicago Tribune*, January 10, 1968, p. 2.
slow in organizing in the southeast receiving communities, anti-busing petitions were being circulated, and Board member John Carey denounced a "barrage of vicious propaganda" by neighborhood papers in the far south side of the city. Other Board members complained of numerous and often obscene telephone calls. Fears of some parents, especially of a two-way busing program, were expressed by one mother who stated,

We moved out of South Shore to put our children in decent schools. Now we're faced with this busing. . . . We left the day it was no longer safe for our daughter. My husband had to walk her to school and that was too much for us. The South Shore schools are not safe.

South side protests against busing continued to mount even after the compromise plan which deleted two-way busing was announced. At a rally held in the Croatian Hall on the south side, a petition signed by 7500 who opposed busing was presented to Board President Whiston. Liberal spokesmen denounced the compromise plan as inadequate. The opposition of numerous white parents was obvious, but black parents expressed opposition also. The one-way busing program singled out Negro children as the only students to be forced to bus. Furthermore, the plan would have

55Chicago Sun-Times, January 11, 1968, p. 32 (Quote).

no effect upon the majority of the city's Negro pupils who attended all-black ghetto schools. Parents of children attending the designated south side sending schools expressed opposition on the basis that "most Negroes in this community [South Shore] moved here because of better educational facilities." Black parents expressed the belief that their children had little to gain through the busing program. On the south side the Board faced almost universal opposition from all factions in the community.

Opposition in the northwest receiving communities was expressed at numerous meetings organized by protest groups and held in public park field houses. Emotions ran high at these rallies. The Board was criticized for discontinuing the Steinmetz High School branches in elementary schools. This action had produced vacant elementary school classrooms on the northwest side. A school administration official was reported to have left a meeting after being asked if Negro youngsters would be searched for weapons before being allowed into school buildings. Local politicians were beginning to respond to the clamor. United States Congressman Roman Pucinski, chairman of the House of Representatives'
Subcommittee on Education, attended meetings along with numerous state senators and representatives and city aldermen. One ex-state representative characterized the reaction of residents on the northwest side as "the sleeping dragon of democracy is awake and preparing to turn against a totalitarian school board."58

White parents in the fringe integrated areas of Austin tended to favor the busing plan. The Organization for a Better Austin, representing about 190 neighborhood groups in south Austin, announced its full support for the proposed busing plan. Emphasis was placed on the relief of the severe overcrowding in the sending schools. While no one could seriously believe that the plan would racially stabilize the sending schools which were already over 80 percent Negro in racial composition, stabilization of the rest of the community certainly appealed to some white parents. Because of the severe overcrowding in the Austin schools, Negro parents were also willing to accept the busing plan although there was little support among black parents for the integration aspects

Thus, in the Austin plan, the Board was not faced with the complete opposition of all the involved communities.

In the period between the announcement of the busing proposal on December 27, 1967, and the formal presentation of the plan at the January 10, 1968, meeting, school officials had contacted numerous concerned recognized community organizations, parent-teacher associations and lower echelon school officials in order to both explain the plans and work out further details. When the first plans had been originally formulated, some contacts had been made in the sending schools before the first announcement, but receiving schools were contacted only after the proposal was presented to the Board. All meetings concerned with formulating the plans were held privately, and the press was not invited to these meetings. On the basis of an Illinois law requiring public bodies to hold open meetings, a south side lawyer brought suit for an injunction against the busing plans because the planning sessions were not open to the public. However, the court refused to take action on the basis that the meetings did not come under the tenet

59Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 1. Ptak, August 14, 1972, and Bell, June 22, 1972. One administrator remembers a comment by a white parent who approved of the plan because it would allow the community to share its "black" with other communities.
of the law.60

At the January 10, 1968, Chicago Board of Education meeting the complete plans were presented for approval. In the Austin area the May and Spencer Elementary Schools were designated as sending schools in a non-contiguous attendance area plan. Pupils in grades one to six were to be transferred from selected blocks in the integrated school area to eight all white receiving schools located about four to seven miles away in the Belmont-Cragin, Montclare, Dunning and Portage Park communities. The initial percentage of children received was not to exceed 11 percent of the total enrollment of the receiving school. In September, 1968, pupils in the seventh grade were to be transferred, and in September, 1969, eighth grade pupils would be added. As these grades were added, the total percentage of transferred pupils was not to exceed 15 percent of the total enrollment of a receiving school.61

Geographic blocks within the integrated May and Spencer attendance areas were chosen on the basis that they were predominantly Negro and essentially at the greatest walking distance


from the May and Spencer Schools. The designated blocks were to be considered attendance areas of the receiving schools. As long as a student lived in one of the blocks, he was to remain in attendance at the receiving school. Upon graduation the student would attend the Steinmetz High School to which the receiving elementary schools contributed.62

A total of 573 pupils was to be involved in the program. The May School was to transfer 317 pupils to five schools, and the Spencer was to transfer 256 pupils to three schools. As a result of opening empty classrooms the average number of pupils per room actually dropped in five receiving schools. In two schools the class size increased and in one it remained constant. It was not necessary to use mobile classrooms to accommodate students at any of the receiving schools. As some receiving schools had no lunch-rooms, provisions were to be made for facilities. An adult who was to travel with the students on the bus would remain at the receiving school as an aide and lunch supervisor.63

In South Shore area the Bryn Mawr, Mann, and Caldwell Elementary Schools were designated as sending schools in an intra-community busing plan. Six of the nine designated receiving schools already

62Ibid. 63Ibid., pp. 2431, 2433.
**TABLE 3**

PROPOSED RACIAL PROPORTIONS AND AVERAGE CLASS SIZE BEFORE AND AFTER PROPOSED BUSING PROGRAM

AUSTIN PLAN\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Number Involved</th>
<th>Average Class Size Before</th>
<th>Average Class Size After</th>
<th>% Negro Before</th>
<th>% Negro After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridge</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burbank</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayre</td>
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<td>32.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.A. Thorp</td>
<td>90</td>
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<td>32.6</td>
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<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spencer</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>74.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smyser</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locke</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dever</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Data compiled from Board of Education, City of Chicago, Proceedings, Board of Education, City of Chicago (Chicago: Board of Education, January 10, 1968, pp. 2431, 2433.)
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had small proportions of Negro students, an indication of the fact that the receiving communities were in the path of the historical direction of expansion of the Negro belt in the city. Two area schools had been dropped as receiving schools on the basis that they were already over 15 percent Negro. Whereas the initial percentage of Negro children was not to exceed 11 percent of the total enrollment of the receiving school in the Austin plan, the proportion was immediately set at 15 percent in the South Shore plan.64

A total of 462 pupils was to be involved in the program. The Bryn Mawr School was to transfer 206 pupils to three schools; the Mann was to transfer 141 pupils to four schools; the Caldwell was to transfer 115 pupils to two schools. All the schools would have their average class size reduced; however, it would have been necessary to locate mobile classrooms at five of the receiving schools in order to accomplish this. Particulars regarding designated blocks, to be considered as attendance areas of the receiving school, were similar to the Austin plan. The right of transferred students to continue on to upper grade centers and high schools serving the receiving schools was essentially the same as in the

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64 Ibid., pp. 2436-39.
TABLE 4

PROPOSED RACIAL PROPORTIONS AND AVERAGE CLASS SIZE BEFORE AND AFTER PROPOSED BUSING PROGRAM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Number Involved</th>
<th>Average Class Size Before</th>
<th>Average Class Size After</th>
<th>% Negro Before</th>
<th>% Negro After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bryn Mawr</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luella</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sullivan</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>34.4&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warren</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mann</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending to:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoyne</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckingham</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>33.7&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coles</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>32.2&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnham</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caldwell</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>31.0&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldsmith</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>31.1&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Data compiled from Board of Education, City of Chicago, Proceedings, Board of Education, City of Chicago (Chicago: Board of Education, January 10, 1968, pp. 2438, 2439.

<sup>b</sup>The addition of mobile classroom units would be required to obtain these average class sizes.

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Austin plan. Provisions for bus and lunchroom aides were also similar.\textsuperscript{65}

The plans presented to the Board in January, 1968, had simply filled in geographic and administrative details left open in the earlier Redmond Report. The Board members could have been surprised neither with the general tenor of the presentation nor with the selection of the two areas in which the city was experiencing its most rapid racial change. With the plans before it, the question now became, "How would the Board go about acting upon its superintendent's proposals?"

\textsuperscript{65}Ibid.
CHAPTER VI

PRESCRIPTION FUNCTION:

A DECISION IS MADE

By the time the Board members met on January 10, 1968, to consider the formal busing proposals of the school administration, community action was already well-developed. The initial announcement of the plans was thoroughly covered in the newspapers. Meetings were held in the concerned communities by organized and ad hoc groups. While some groups announced their support of the proposals, most of the meetings were called to protest the plans. As opponents of busing became more organized, they turned to and received the support of local politicians. The support of these political representatives served to strengthen the anti-busing elements in the communities and to exert pressure upon members of the Board of Education.

An incident may serve to indicate the growing concern of politicians over the busing issue and the alignment of the Board president against implementing the plans. On the day the plans were formally presented to the Board, an estimated thousand
demonstrators packed the corridors of the Board of Education building to protest against any favorable Board action. Before the Board convened, Frank Whiston met in a closed door meeting with neighborhood political leaders. The president was reported to have said, "If I were a betting man, I would not expect busing this year." When the Board did vote to make a decision in February, Peter J. Miller, a state representative from a northwest side district, was reported to have declared, "Whiston said the busing would not take place in 1968. This [Board action] puts the president in a bad light. I don't doubt that he was sincere when he talked to us." Miller then turned to Whiston and said, "But this puts you in a position where you didn't keep your word--you were voted down." ¹

While Whiston and Miller denied having made these statements, Whiston's previous positions on matters of desegregation would lend credence to the possibility. However, events during and following the Board meeting indicated that the faction opposed to implementing the plan met strong resistance from the rest of the Board.

¹Chicago Daily News, January 10, 1968, pp. 1, 8 (First quote). Chicago Sun-Times, January 11, 1968, pp. 1, 32 (Second and third quotes). Christopher Chandler of the Sun-Times and Edmund Rooney of the Daily News reported substantially the same story about the Whiston encounter with Miller before and after the Board meeting.
members. This resistance could well have been bolstered by the manner in which the plans were introduced by the Superintendent of Schools. Redmond again reminded the Board that while it was his role to recommend, it was the Board's duty to set policy. He commented, "I am recommending deferral and referral to a Board Committee in order that you may have hearings to hear the people." He indicated that the plans were initial proposals and could "be modified (some are saying we are not doing enough; some are saying we are going too far)." He suggested that the plans be implemented "on or about Monday, January 29, 1968 [the beginning of the second half of the school year], but pointed out that the date could "be altered, [sic] (although Spencer and May are in critical condition)." He left little doubt as to where the responsibility for the busing decision rested when he stated, "The Board of Education must have an opportunity to examine our recommendations and give us direction on the policy of transporting children."  

Apparently not all Board members remembered the clashes between the Board and its previous superintendent over the decision-making roles of each body. Redmond's meticulous observation of the  

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rights and responsibilities of the Board led one member to complain, "He dumped these plans in our laps at the last minute, and then asked us for directions."³

During the meeting Whiston called for extensive hearings and an indefinite deferral of action on the plans. However, Bacon disagreed and urged speedy action. He said, "I think we ought to act with urgency. It is so ingrained in this board to put off these crucial decisions, and it's high time we decided to act."

Further discussion led to the decision not to hold hearings in the communities but only at the Board of Education building. When the final vote came, Carey moved for deferral of the reports with no definite date set. Bacon moved to amend the motion to put a limit on the hearings and set the last Board meeting in February for the Board to act one way or another on the proposals. When the roll was called, Green, Friedman, Bacon, Adams, Malis, and Oliver voted for the amended motion. Whiston, Murray, Wild, and Carey voted against the motion. Scheffler was absent.⁴

As the Board members left the meeting, they were greeted by


numerous angry politicians. State Representative Hyde was reported to have said that fifteen state representatives would promise to obtain more state aid to build more schools in overcrowded Negro neighborhoods if the Board would drop the busing plans. Other proposals were not as positive. Board members were warned that a school tax referendum would be voted down, and state aid would not be increased unless the busing plans were shelved. United States Representative Roman Pucinski, addressing the crowd in the lobby, stated, "Any school board member who doesn't have the courage to come out and talk to you in your community should turn in his resignation." For two hours the politicians haggled with Board members. When they left, they had a promise that the Board would hold hearings in the communities.5

The following day Whiston created a committee under the chairmanship of Mrs. Wild to hold hearings. Adams, Bacon, Friedman, and Malis, all proponents of the plan, were originally appointed, but Adams and Bacon refused to serve. At this time Adams said he would vote reluctantly to abandon the plans because of the furor encountered. He declined to serve on the committee, stating:

won't hear anything that I have not heard several times before over the last four years. In order to be fruitful, hearings such as these must be two-way streets. In this case I don't feel there will be communication either way. The committee won't hear anything new and the people won't listen to anything the committee says. These particular plans (for Austin and South Shore) are dead in my opinion. I feel it was a mistake to postpone implementation of the plan even though I voted for postponement. I become surer of this the more I think about it. . . . As I understand it the politicians persuaded the board to hold meetings in the community after the meeting [of the Board on January 10, 1968]. That was wrong. The whole thing is improper.6

Bacon contended that Whiston never asked him before announcing the members of the committee. He expressed his belief that the hearings would be "an exercise in futility," and expressed the belief that "the president and board are hell-bent on killing the busing plan." Regarding the advisability of hearings he stated, "I don't think matters of principle like integration should be put virtually to a vote like this. It's fallacious to think people

6Chicago Sun-Times, January 12, 1968, pp. 1, 16. Chicago Tribune, January 13, 1968, pp. 1, 2; January 19, 1968, pp. 1, 2. Northwest Times (Chicago), January 18, 1968, p. 1 (Quotes). Readers of the Chicago Tribune at the time may have been confused by some of its reports. On January 13, it reported that Adams "would vote reluctantly to scrap plan because furor has killed it." On January 19, it stated he felt the "board should vote down busing plan without hearings." This second report lent a different connotation to Adam's statement which conflicted with the Tribune's prior report and the January report in the Northwest Times.
should vote on something we know is right."

The committee, with Green appointed to replace Adams and Bacon, set about establishing a set of guidelines for determining who might speak at the hearings. It passed over the request that only parents of public school children be permitted to speak. Rather, it required that representatives of established school oriented civic organizations and community groups submit formal written requests to be heard. The schedule of the meetings was to be established after all requests were submitted by a January 26, 1968, deadline. Two meetings were to be held in each of the three school districts which were affected by the plans. In order to allow full participation by citizens the meetings were to be scheduled in the evening between 7:00 P.M. and 9:00 P.M. Only one speaker was to be allowed for each organization accepted and the speech was limited to five minutes. The speaker was to submit ten copies of the original statement on the night of the presentation so that they could be compiled for the full membership of the Board (Scheffler was ill and no longer attending meetings).  

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The Board had a short information bulletin drawn up summarizing the salient points of the plans. These fact sheets were sent to the organizations chosen to speak and any other individual who requested one, as well as the metropolitan and community news media. Separate fact sheets were developed for the two plans, but the majority of the information applied to both proposals. The Austin area fact sheet is duplicated in its entirety below. Where data for the South Shore area differed, the changes are inserted in brackets beneath the corresponding section.

January 26, 1968

KNOW THE FACTS ON THE CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION BUSING PROPOSALS

AUSTIN AREA

WHY?
- To relieve serious overcrowding at May and Spencer Schools.
- To promote stabilization throughout the Austin Area.
- To increase desegregation in District Four.
- To improve educational experiences for all children.

- To relieve serious overcrowding at Bryn Mawr, Mann and Caldwell Schools.
- To promote stabilization throughout the greater South Shore area.
- To increase desegregation in District Seventeen.
- To improve educational experiences for all children.

HOW?
- Transfer predominantly Negro pupils from selected blocks in the integrated school area to all white receiving schools where space is available. The blocks from which these pupils are transferred will become part of the receiving school attendance area.
- Only pupils in grades 1-6 will be included in the plan at this time. As these pupils progress the seventh grade will be added in September, 1968 and the eighth in September, 1969.
- No kindergarten children will be transferred.
- No students will be transferred from the receiving schools.
- Students graduating from the receiving elementary school will be eligible to attend the high school to which the receiving school contributes.

HOW MANY?
- 573 pupils in grades 1-6 will be involved in this program. May and Spencer Schools will transfer pupils to O.A. Thorp, Lyon, Burbank, Bridge, Smyser, Sayre, Locke, and Dever Schools. Children with severe social adjustment or physical problems, or with mental handicaps will be provided for under established procedures for children needing special education classes and services.
- 462 pupils in grades 1-6 will be involved in this program. Where receiving schools currently have grades 1-5, pupils in grades 6-8 will attend the upper grade centers assigned to the receiving school until they graduate.
- Bryn Mawr, Mann and Caldwell Elementary Schools will transfer pupils to Burnham, Luella, Sullivan, Warren, Hoyne, Buckingham, Coles, Anthony and Goldsmith Elementary Schools.
AVAILABILITY OF SPACE
- Adequate space exists in these receiving schools to permit each school to enroll up to 15 percent of its total enrollment from the sending school.

- Some classrooms are currently available to meet the needs of the transferring pupils. A quota will obtain which will limit the number of Negro children transferred to a receiving school 15 percent of the total enrollment of that school.

- Mobile classrooms will be needed to care for transferring pupils at some of the receiving schools.

TRANSPORTATION
- Only insured and reliable carriers will be considered in providing the means of transportation.

- Students involved in the sending program who reside at an excessive distance will be transported from a convenient point in their residential area to the receiving school and returned at the end of the school day.

- Pupils will be picked up and released within two blocks of their residences. The Child Welfare Attendant will escort children who must cross any main thoroughfare.

- The average daily travel time will be 20 minutes. The bus schedule will provide 30 minutes to cope with unusual weather conditions.

- Adult supervision on the buses will be provided through an assignment of a Child Welfare Attendant. A plan will be given the attendant to make certain that all children are in attendance.

LUNCH
- Where receiving schools have no lunchroom, children will bring their lunch from home and will follow the procedure that schools normally use for children who live too far to go home for lunch, especially in severe weather.

- The adult who supervises on the bus will be available for supervision during the lunch hour.

ILLNESS AND ACCIDENT
- Children in any school who become too ill to remain in school or have an accident that requires medical or parental attention are generally called for by a parent or other authorized relative or neighbor.
- In emergency cases the ill or injured child would be cared for in the same manner as is now the practice when a parent is not at home or cannot be reached.

PUPIL ACHIEVEMENT
- Cities which have bused Negro children to white schools report that the bused children in general made much greater academic gains than their counterparts who were not bused even though the latter were provided with a strong compensatory education program.
- Quality education programs will be offered in all of the receiving schools.
- All studies show that the white children of the receiving schools show no loss in academic achievement.

COST
- Chartered buses--$32.00 per bus capable of accommodating 55 pupils and 1 adult. 11 buses will be required for this program. 50 percent of the total cost is reimbursable from the State of Illinois. 11 Child Welfare Attendants at a total cost of $4,950 per month.
- Total cost of transportation program--$11,990 monthly, without considering the state reimbursement.

ADULT SUPERVISION
- Adult supervision on the buses and during the lunch period will be provided through the assignment of a Child Welfare Attendant. This person will also be available to assist in providing comfort to pupils who need special attention during the school day and to assist in the school generally under the supervision of the principal.
STAFFING

- New divisions in the receiving schools needed to accommodate the new pupils will make possible the transfer of interested teachers according to the established transfer policies and procedures. Additional divisions required in the receiving schools will be offset by the loss of teaching divisions in the sending schools.

While the Board was preparing to meet with concerned community organizations, pressures for and against busing continued to mount. Even before the hearings committee had set up guidelines, forty-eight requests to speak had been submitted for consideration. In the City Council, aldermen had moved to defer passage of the school budget levy because it included funds for the purpose of busing. In response, the president of the Woodlawn Organization announced that he would ask the federal government to cut off school aid pending the positive action of the Board on the busing proposals.10

A pro-busing rally was held in the Resurrection Catholic Church hall in south Austin. About 1500 people were reported to have listened to speakers representing mothers of students attending the May and Spencer Schools and the Organization for a Better Austin. Both black and white parents in this fringe area tended to support the busing plan on the basis that it would

relieve overcrowding in the schools and help stabilize the neigh-
borhoods of the desegregated community. Two hundred parents from
the May and Spencer Schools later marched on the Board in support
of busing. These parents also organized a boycott of the May and
Spencer Schools to protest the severe overcrowding. The United
States representative whose district included the south Austin
area as well as unaffected suburbs and a Negro area in west
Chicago, announced his support of the busing proposal. The 30th
Ward Democratic Organization of the Austin area also supported
busing.11

The majority of the support for the announced busing plans
came from groups in the fringe areas of south Austin and city-wide
organizations. Predominantly Negro organizations such as the
Urban League, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People and The Woodlawn Organization were joined by the
Citizens Schools Committee and the Leadership Council for Metro-
politan Open Communities in supporting busing. The Citizen Schools
Committee, representing 230 civic groups, criticized legislators
for reflecting the bias of their electorate and pointed out that

Tribune, January 17, 1968, p. 4. New World (Chicago), January
February 14, 1968, p. 4.
neighborhood schools were not the exclusive property of the neighbors. Rather, the schools belonged to the residents of the entire city, and school problems could only be solved with reference to the whole system and the good of the entire city. The president of the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities promised to appoint a committee to discuss implementation of the busing proposals with Redmond, Whiston, and Daley.\(^\text{12}\)

Many groups with religious affiliations supported the busing proposals. The Church Federation of Greater Chicago was among the first to announce its approval of the busing plans. Ninety-one ministers of the Methodist Church Northern Illinois Confederation voted to endorse the plans with only nine Chicago ministers withholding support. The executive director of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations announced the support of his organization. The Organization for Northwest Communities also favored the plans. This pro-integration group formed in 1967 in predominantly white north Austin was sponsored by the Community Renewal Society, a part of the United Church of Christ. On January 24, 1968, the Chicago Conference on Religion and Race announced that its members

were preparing a plan "similar to, and in support of, the busing plan proposed by Chicago Schools Superintendent James F. Redmond."\(^{13}\)

The Conference represented the Catholic Archdiocese, the Church Federation of Greater Chicago, and the Chicago Board of Rabbis. In a formal declaration the Conference called on the Chicago School Board to approve the busing programs. It announced that busing programs in religiously affiliated schools would be undertaken, however, even if the public schools did not initiate their program. Clergy associated with the Conference were called upon to announce the support of their Church for the busing proposals to their laity. While the news media observed that the Church busing plans were nebulous, the announcement of the program was important in that it cut off the possibility of using the religiously affiliated schools as an escape for parents involved in the public school plans.\(^ {14}\)

The moral admonitions of the Churches were met with


resistance by numerous organizations in the communities. These organizations often contained such epithets as, "taxpayers," "property owners," "homeowners," "protective," and "concerned parents," in their titles. Some of the most vociferous organizations were not in areas directly affected by the public school busing plan. "Operation Crescent" was headed by a suburban lawyer whose opposition to civil rights and open housing antedated his involvement in protesting the busing plans. The "Concerned Catholic Parishioners" had drawn its greatest strength in the southwest side Bogan High School area. This organization had taken stands against various changes in Catholic Church rituals and the introduction of a new catechism series which placed more emphasis on social issues. It was outspoken against busing and recommended reducing Sunday contributions to the local church to five cents as well as withholding payments to the city-wide church building fund as a protest against the involvement of the Catholic Church. 15

Bogan area residents also protested against the implications of the Redmond Plan. They demanded that public hearings be extended to consider the entire contents of the Redmond

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15 Concerned Catholic Parishioners, "Fact Sheet No. 3" Chicago, February 25, 1968. (Mimeographed.) These flyers were handed out by volunteers in front of churches. Southeast Economist (Chicago), February 1, 1968, p. 2.
recommendations and complained that their area had no representation in the membership of the Chicago Board of Education. When a motorcade was organized by leaders of the Concerned Catholic Parishioners of the Southwest Side to protest the Board's desegregation policies, it was joined by members of south Chicago organizations such as the Murray Park Civic Organization, the Bogan Women, the Concerned Parents of Bogan, the Hegewisch Property Owners, the Southwest Property and Homeowners Protective Association, the Southwest Side Polish Homeowners, and Operation Crescent.¹⁶

These organizations drew much of their support from people who feared the violence and racial changeover that had accompanied the desegregation of neighborhoods in the past. The fact that the busing plan was designed to alter this pattern did not alleviate these fears. At public hearing after public hearing this element of the community shouted down pro-busing speakers in a protest that they did not believe any plan would change the historical pattern.

A good deal of the protest came from white ethnic groups that drew heavily from first or second generation immigrants to the city. The significance of this observation, however, is clouded by the

fact that the city has always been a port of entry for those seeking new opportunities. As descendents of earlier immigrants have prospered, they have tended to move further from the city and some of its problems. Thus, to a great extent, it is the later immigrants who have lived in areas which experienced desegregation with the new Negro community. It would be unfair and nonproductive to conclude that this group was any more or less prejudiced than other Americans.

A possible fault in the busing plans rested in the fact that the city could not reach out into suburban communities where fear of inundation and previous unpleasant experiences with desegregation were absent. But suburban areas have not been receptive to proposals from the Chicago system for exchanging students. The Catholic busing program did involve busing children from the inner-city to suburban parishes, but the number of children remained small and has even declined. One Chicago administrator observed that suburban systems were in effect saying, "We ran away from it and we want to stay away from it . . . what do you think we left Chicago for."17 While this was an obvious oversimplification, it was unlikely that any suburban school administrator would wish to

become involved in this controversy when it could be avoided.

The inability of some white people to understand the problems of Negroes ran the gamut from open hostility to a subtle desire to stabilize their neighborhoods by limiting the further penetration of Negro families. In protesting the busing proposals one southeast side leader admonished, "Let the Negroes work hard like we had to do and pull themselves up by their own bootstraps." On the northwest side a protestor claimed Willis "built a great educational complex for Negroes in their own neighborhoods and that they should stay there. These are not ghettos." 18

The chairman of the Seventh Ward Independent Voters of Illinois observed that few Negroes had attended block councils to discuss busing proposals. He surmised that "there was too little evidence on the part of white people in South Shore of a real desire to foster integration, rather than to accept it where it already existed." Negroes, thus, were free to come "to the conclusion that whites here were interested exclusively in containment and stabilization and not in integration as a positive affirmation

of racial equality and democracy." \(^1^9\) Indeed, a perusal of the positions taken by various groups indicates that the greatest support for the busing plans came from white residents of areas which had already experienced integration. The greatest opposition came from whites not only in those neighborhoods chosen as receiving areas but also whites in non-integrated neighborhoods. These factors, coupled with the one-way aspect of the busing plans, could not have appeared very promising to any Negro who might have sought a white alliance for the successful implementation of a busing plan.

A poll taken for *Fortune* magazine during October and November, 1967, had indicated strong support in the black communities for integration. About 77 percent of 300 Negroes interviewed in thirteen cities indicated they favored integration limited to education, jobs and housing.\(^2^0\) But there is little to indicate that Negroes in Chicago supported the busing program in its specifics on the basis of integration. Indeed, the busing program, as proposed, met with Negro opposition, especially on the south side.


Black parents complained that the busing plans should have involved all-Negro and all-white segregated schools rather than schools which were already integrated. Black Alderman William Cousins, Jr., urged two-way busing. Others argued that stability was the responsibility of the whole community and using black children to maintain racial balance was "racism at its worst." One mother angrily exclaimed, "We will not allow our children to become helpless pawns in a desperate scheme to forestall the inevitable exodus of whites... nor do we particularly care to stem that exodus."²¹

As has already been established, many liberal white groups on the south side opposed the compromise busing plan on the basis that the one-way plan was a surrender to white backlash and discriminated against Negro children. The transfer of Negro students from the three sending schools without replacing them with white students would not significantly alter the racial composition of the schools nor help to stabilize the neighborhoods. A speaker for the South Shore Gardens Betterment Association opposed the busing program on the grounds that action by the Board would upset the plans formulated by the group to stabilize the integrated

neighborhood as it would speed the exodus of whites. By the time the first hearing on the south side was held, it was becoming apparent that the South Shore plan was not likely to be accepted.

Three public hearings were scheduled for the south side. The first, February 5, 1968, met at South Shore High School and was open to District Twenty-two groups only. The majority of the speakers expressed opposition to the Board plan. The Sullivan Parent Teachers Association, representing a receiving school with a largely Mexican student body, called for more studies to prove the necessity of busing. The Bradwell Parent Teachers Association represented a predominantly white school which was not involved in the plan as its student body was already over 15 percent Negro. A poll of its membership resulted in 291 responses favoring the neighborhood school policy, 31 responses favoring a two-way plan, and 36 responses favoring the one-way busing plan. The Coles School, with a predominantly white student body scheduled as a receiving school, tallied 100 votes in opposition with only 5 favoring the busing plan. The Mann School, with a student body almost three-fourths Negro and scheduled as a sending school,

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expressed general opposition to the Board plan. Their poll showed 148 respondents favored the neighborhood school policy, 139 respondents desired a two-way plan, 90 voted for one-way busing, and 41 responses indicated no preference. The Bryn Mawr School, with a student body over three-fourths Negro and scheduled as a sending school, expressed opposition to the one-way busing plan on the grounds that it would not stabilize the school.23

The two meetings at Bowen High School in District Seventeen reinforced the impression of almost total opposition to the Board's plan. The Hearings Committee had relaxed its original rule against allowing speakers from groups which were not established school-oriented organizations. Some of these groups had been newly organized to oppose the busing program. All the Parent-Teacher Associations announced their opposition to the plan. In the three south side meetings only six of forty-one speakers favored any program even close to the Board's proposal.24

In contemplating the results of the South Shore hearings Bernard Friedman expressed doubts about the success of the Board


24Southeast Economist (Chicago), February 11, 1968, pp. 1, 3; February 15, 1968, p. 1; February 18, 1968, p. 2. Chicago Tribune, February 13, 1968, p. 1. The meetings were scheduled on February 8 and February 12 at 7:00 P.M. at Bowen High School.
plan. He felt that much of the opposition expressed had been rational, and that the plan would not accomplish stabilization of the area. In contradiction to another Board member he did not feel that the opposition to busing was the fault of the school system staff. Rather, he felt it was a symptom of the Board's inability to act. He criticized the Board for responding to, but not initiating, new plans.  

Mrs. Wild claimed to be still undecided about the plan but expressed her concern with the strong opposition, as she felt the busing proposal could not succeed without community support. The compulsory aspect of the proposal also bothered Mrs. Wild, as she thought much of the opposition was because the plan was not voluntary. Cyrus Adams also felt a voluntary plan would be useful in reducing opposition to the plans. In speaking of the strong emotional objections of northwest side residents to busing he stated,

[it] seems to stem from a psychotic fear by parents that if we bus any children now into their schools, next week we'll be busing their children out. The voluntary approach will knock out that prop and unmask remaining opposition such as 'we don't want Negro kids in our schools'.
The situation in the Austin area differed from that in South Shore. Both whites and blacks in the sending areas tended to support the Board plan. Negro parents, concerned with the overcrowded conditions of their schools rather than with integration, were willing to accept the one-way busing proposal. White residents in Austin who favored busing seemed most concerned with the stabilization aspects of the plan. However, most residents of the northwest side, where the receiving schools were located, were adamantly opposed to the busing plan. The school superintendent of District Four, which encompassed both areas, felt compelled to announce at one meeting that:

the people are worried. They think if these pupils are bused in it will ruin the neighborhood. The important thing to remember, however, is control. These kids will be spread through the grades. No white child will be disestablished from a lunchroom facility. The kids will not be roaming around the neighborhood after school. They will be brought in under supervision and bused back home immediately after classes.27

Obviously, the plan lacked some aspects of a successful integration scheme. Racist emotions arose at numerous meetings. At

one assembly of the Organization of Northwest Communities a resolution was introduced to have an I.Q. test administered to all children being bused. While the resolution was defeated, it was recalled and then tabled. One state representative refused to speak at the meeting as thirty-five Negroes were present. The same representative had implored parents at an earlier meeting "not to make this a racial battle," which evoked a retort from the audience, "But it is!" The constant barrage of such outbursts had led the editor of the local newspaper, the Northwest Times, to observe, "Anyone who doubts that the main busing opposition has its roots in racism need only have attended one of the citizens' organizational meetings held on the Northwest Side during the past 10 days." 28

The first two Board hearings on the northwest side were held at Steinmetz High School in the receiving area. While Board member Green was applauded, the Board's human relations staff member was booed when she tried to explain the busing plan rationale to the audience. A representative of the Austin-Irving Council on the far northwest side reported that a poll showed almost all their members opposed busing, despite earlier reports that members were "not

28Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 6 (Quote); editorial, January 18, 1968, p. 6; February 1, 1968, p. 1.
crazy about the transfer program, but they see the cultural and economic need." The president of the Smyser Parent Teachers Association, a receiving school, reported that the vote was 402 to 18 against the busing proposal. She expressed fear of a two-way busing plan, argued that children should not be used to increase integration, and suggested that the money set aside for busing be spent on education classes for the parents of the children designated for busing so that they could help their children by themselves. The president of the Locke Parent Teachers Association called for the replacement of Redmond, argued that the main idea of the busing plan was to break up the family, contended that the plan was communistic, and questioned the proposal on the basis of moral, health, and discipline problems. Another speaker protested that the northwest side had no representative on the Board. At the second meeting the one speaker who favored busing was booed down by the audience in the capacity filled auditorium.29

The third hearing at Austin High School in the sending area presented a different picture. About five hundred persons attended the meeting at which nine of ten speakers supported busing. Another five scheduled speakers, representing the May and Spencer

29Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 1 (Quote); February 22, 1968, p. 3.
Schools, did not attend as a protest against the hearings which they felt should not have been held at all. The one Negro who did speak complained that when seventh and eighth grade students at the Spencer School had been transferred to the newly created Hay Upper Grade Center, the Board had not felt it necessary to hold public hearings. He saw the hearings as providing a platform for persons to "spew forth venom and racism disguised under community concern." He summarized his reasons for supporting the busing program when he stated, "We are sick and tired of seeing our children being led down the path of educational mediocrity. Integration is a secondary issue. May and Spencer are overcrowded, and we want those vacant classrooms filled."  

Other speakers chided the Board for having "so little respect for its own prerogatives and legal responsibilities" that it felt it had to "ask permission of communities with underused schools to share public facilities that are paid for out of public dollars." Censures were directed toward legislators who had instigated the

30Northwest Times (Chicago), February 29, 1968, p. 6. While public hearings had not been held in the months long efforts of the Board to reduce overcrowding at the Spencer, many meetings were held with community groups. Resistance from segments of the Austin community, especially in white areas contiguous to the racially changing area, had resulted in the abandonment of numerous plans. Proceedings, June 28, 1967, pp. 3310-11, 3339.
hearings while being "mainly responsible for the financial crisis facing the Chicago Schools." The single speaker who opposed the busing plan called for the building of new schools in south Austin and West Garfield Park (an area due east of south Austin).  

On February 14, the Board announced that two additional city-wide meetings would be scheduled to meet at the Jones Commercial High School located near the city's downtown area. In contrast to the six hearings scheduled within areas directly concerned by the plan, these meetings were programmed to allow organizations throughout the city to express their opinions on the busing plan. Friedman had objected to accepting speakers from community organizations all over the city. He preferred that city-wide organizations (which tended to be more favorable to the busing plans) be scheduled for these meetings.  

If any Board members hoped to find greater support for the busing plans at the city-wide meetings, they must have been disappointed. At the first meeting speakers opposed to the busing plans outnumbered the plans' proponents by over two to one. While the Chicago Region Parent-Teachers Association representative spoke in  

favor of the plans, representatives of seventeen local PTA groups expressed their opposition and only two locals voiced some support for the plans. This split between the parent group and its locals reflected a debate at an earlier general regional meeting at which efforts to have the regional PTA take a stand against busing were defeated by a reported two to one margin. When the executive board of the PTA announced its favorable stance regarding busing, the board was accused of adopting the policy without the approval of the membership of its locals. "Concerned parents" groups began to arise in opposition to the liberal stance of the larger PTA body.33

The second city-wide meeting was sparsely attended, but proponents from city-wide groups established a slight numerical edge over opponents of the plans. Speakers representing the American Friends Service Committee, the Chicago Youth Centers and the Chicago Urban League joined several other religious and civic groups in expressing support. They were joined by the United Auto Workers and the Chicago Teachers Union whose executive council had finally come out in support of the plans. Again, the opposition

came from local PTA groups, taxpayers' groups and southwest community groups. Operation Crescent and the Kilbourn Organization, two avowedly anti-civil rights groups, also sent speakers to protest the plans.34

The attitude of politicians regarding the busing plan followed a predictable path. There were no signs of any elected officials risking the loss of votes by antagonizing their constituencies. Indeed, some men with political ambitions appear to have seized the occasion as an opportunity to further their careers. The leader of the suburban based Operation Crescent was accused of creating agitation in order to draw attention to himself and keep funds flowing in from contributors. He later ran for the office of governor of Illinois. A dissenter on the southeast side of Chicago later ran for a ward committeeman's office, and on the northwest side a barkeeper who achieved some prominence in his opposition to busing ran for local office.35

Opponents of the busing program turned to politicians to help defeat the plans. One northwest side protestor proclaimed that

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"every alderman voting for the busing plan should be defeated in the next election." The Chicago aldermen did not vote directly on Board of Education policies, but they did vote to accept the Public School budget. In general, local politicians had little reason to fear accusations that they favored civil rights actions. Thirty-five of the fifty aldermen were on record as opposing integration through the building of public housing projects in their wards. All the northwest side aldermen had expressed their opposition to the busing proposal. They endorsed the neighborhood school policy, and one denounced the plan as "just something to appease those [Negro] people." Another said that the proposal was not fair to the children being bused, as it would be difficult for them to adjust to their new situation. The complaint was registered that "the residents are afraid Negroes are going to start buying houses around here," and "besides the racial aspect ... a number of northwest siders oppose busing on general grounds."36

The involvement of politicians brought back memories of the period when Chicago schools were deeply enmeshed in political scandals. Board member Carey cautioned, "Politics was taken out

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of the schools many years ago. It seems to me that this is an attempt to make a political football out of a very serious problem." The president of the Chicago Parent-Teachers Association reminded Chicagoans of the period when "teachers sought jobs through their aldermen; building and other contracts were awarded politically; principals were transferred on a moment's notice, without justification."37

However, the involvement of the schools in a controversial social issue was bound to bring politicians into the melee. The mayor of the city might have ended some of the involvement of local politicians by openly endorsing the plan as a necessity to meet federal guidelines for desegregation. He could have reviewed the busing rationale in the public media in an attempt to win wider support for the plans. But the mayor had usually operated under a political maxim not to become involved in local controversies, and he chose not to risk his or his party's popularity by endorsing the plans.

When asked about the busing proposals the mayor responded, "I don't know enough about these questions and ideas. All I want

are the best schools." He contended that the Democratic party had no official view on busing and stated, "This would be political, and the children should never be subject to politics." Asked if he had discussed the subject with the school Board president, Daley replied, "I never interfere with their administration and won't as long as I'm mayor." Regarding public hearings, the mayor stated, "This is a matter for the Board of Education, but I feel very strongly that any program today should have maximum participation in the neighborhoods. If the majority of people do not want something, who in government has the right to set themselves above the majority." He elucidated, "I am a democrat with a small 'd'... it's up to the people to decide finally, because these are the ones who make up our city." The Chicago Daily News saw the mayor's response as "the kiss of death" for any busing plans, and quoted an unidentified Board member as commenting that the mayor's position "will get certain Board members who were not enthusiastic to begin with to vote against the plans."38

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William J. Cullerton, a prominent Democratic northwest side politician, observed that in 1947 the city council had passed an ordinance prohibiting the interference of council members with Board of Education matters. However, he contended, "This is a matter concerning a community that has been one of the finest in the city. Our homeowners and taxpayers are proud of their homes, and I do not intend to permit anything to prevent the area from maintaining this high standard of living." At anti-busing rallies, where emotions ran high, politicians implored audiences to remain calm with entreaties such as, "Daley is working hard to make this a beautiful city. . . . If you move to the suburbs, sooner or later you will be faced with the same thing there. Don't leave, don't leave. You must stay."39

Some politicians did more than implore; they threatened to use their positions against the Board. Edwin Fifielski, an alderman on the city finance committee, told how he voted in committee against releasing a tax levy ordinance for the Board and would work against the referendum for school funds proposed for the following June. This threat could not carry much weight as the northwest and southwest sides had voted against prior school referendums. However, the schools were continually seeking more financial aid

from the state. The Better Schools Committee, consisting of the city's top businessmen, was working with the Board's president to raise 174 million dollars in 1968. One member pointed out, "Sooner or later we will need the assistance of the legislature." A southwest side state senator on the appropriations committee had stated, "I intend to take whatever action is necessary to guarantee that state funds will not be used for busing." The weight of such combined threats could not be taken lightly by Board members.

The Republicans in the city could not have been oblivious to the possibility of obtaining the white backlash vote in the November, 1968, elections. The Cook County Republican Central Committee Chairman issued a statement opposed to busing. Most of the Republican senators and representatives in Chicago formed a group of about twenty to "develop a positive legislative program to strengthen neighborhood schools in the city." Their program included: restricting funds so that state money would not be used for busing for the purpose of curing racial imbalance; creation of an elective non-partisan, non-political school board to give the people a voice in school board matters; provision of funds to provide improved police protection on school premises and around

school grounds.41

It was obvious that many legislators were expressing their own values rather than merely reflecting their constituencies' opinions. Henry Hyde, a northwest side representative who later served as speaker of the house in the state legislature, said he would oppose the busing plans "with every drop of blood in my body." He argued that children should not be used as pawns because of "what eggheads at the University of Chicago think is desirable." He attacked the composition of the Board of Education as it "is appointed on recommendation of a nominating committee which is hundreds of miles out to the left and chooses its nominees to agree with it. The people have no voice. The Board should be elected by the people from specific geographic areas."42

Peter J. Miller, another northwest side representative, was critical of the city administration's role in the busing issue. He criticized the mayor for not acting to quell the busing proposals. Referring to the mayor's intervention to end a Chicago


42Northwest Times (Chicago), January 11, 1968, p. 6. The role of the Commission on School Board Nominations is reviewed in chapter ii, pp. 19-22.
teachers' strike in early January, he said, "If he [Daley] can
stick his nose into the business of teachers' strikes, why doesn't
he stick his nose into this and stop this ill-advised program."
In what he saw as the absence of leadership from downtown poli-
ticians, the representative recommended that protestors join the
Greater Northwest Civic Association, which had been formed to
fight against the busing proposals. It was also suggested that
representatives from the Greater Northwest Civic Association attend
meetings of the more liberal Organization of Northwest Communities
to make their protest known.43

Opponents of busing came from both political parties and the
most outspoken came from areas marked for receiving schools. A
northwest side Democratic leader, Parke J. Cullerton, supplied
buses to take groups from the eight northwest receiving schools
to protest at a Board meeting. When members of the Greater North-
west Civic Association talked of the secession of their area from
the city, local politicians disowned the idea, although suburban
politicians expressed their guarded favor. The Association
demanded that Redmond be fired; a northwest side woman be appointed
to the Board; the Redmond Plan be rejected with a reaffirmation of

the neighborhood policy; and future plans be submitted to the people for their prior consent. While Mayor Daley dismissed the threat of secession as the emotional reaction of a few individuals, the Chicago Sun-Times had carried the secession announcement on its first page. The incident served as one more reminder that the educational issues in busing would not be separated from political issues in the minds of many Chicagoans.

The politician who became one of the most articulate spokesman for the opposition from the northwest side was Roman Pucinski, U.S. Representative and Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Education. At a meeting held during the beginning of the busing controversy, Pucinski had been hissed, apparently because of his identification with liberal civil rights legislation. However, he soon proved that he did not consider busing to be a solution for Chicago's school integration difficulties. Pucinski contended that federal guidelines did not require integration and expressly forbade the use of federal funds for busing. He pointed out that court decisions had not compelled school systems to integrate their


schools by busing in cases where segregation was de facto. He argued that the busing program gave no assurance that the sending schools would not be crowded again in the future. He pointed out that federal aid was available for the May and Spencer Schools to combat overcrowding and criticized the Board for not having found ways other than busing to solve the problems at the sending schools. 46

Pucinski argued that the children to be bused were being used as pawns by "those so committed to the idea of total integration that they will use any means to get it." He felt the bused children would suffer from the loss of federally funded remedial programs which would not be available at the receiving schools which were not in areas eligible for federal aid under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. He contended that quality education would suffer in the receiving schools as the bused children would be unable to keep up with the academic pace of their white classmates, and the entire class would have to slow down. 47

Pucinski also expressed the fears of white residents of the


47 Northwest Times (Chicago), January 25, 1968, p. 8. The validity of these arguments is considered in detail below in chapters vii and viii.
northwest side that the busing program would lead to the racial change-over of their schools and neighborhoods. The transition of the May School from a predominantly white to an almost totally black student body was attributed to a Board decision four years earlier to allow permissive transfers to attend the May School. This contention ignored the social dynamics of the expanding Negro ghetto on the city's west side and disregarded a salient feature of the non-contiguous plan, which was to relocate black students in an area that was not experiencing racial change. However, it did reflect the fear of white residents that the implementation of the plan would result in a diminished number of white buyers who would consider purchasing homes in the area.48

The Chicago Tribune in its opposition to busing did not see racism as an issue. Rather, it pointed out that the bused children would lose time in traveling to and from the receiving school. The trip in itself represented safety problems and the distance of a child from his home would make it difficult to act in situations when the child's health was impaired. The newspaper also observed the fear of busing opponents that the plans represented only the first step in a more extensive program with a loss of the

48 Ibid., January 22, 1968, p. 3.
parents' right to send their children to a school in their neighborhood.\footnote{Chicago Tribune, January 10, 1968, p. 2.}

The preliminary report on population projections and school enrollment prepared by the Real Estate Research Corporation was used by the \textit{Tribune} to discredit stabilization as an attainable goal through busing. The report had observed that stabilization of some neighborhoods would only serve to divert the expanding black population into other parts of the city. The newspaper emphasized that only a policy which diverted Negro expansion into suburban areas would further over-all racial stabilization in the entire city.\footnote{Editorial, Chicago Tribune, January 7, 1968, p. 28. The pertinent findings of the Real Estate Research Corporation are discussed above in chapter iv, pp. 123-150, \textit{passim}.}

When the Board met on February 28, 1968, to consider the fate of the busing proposals, there could be little doubt that numerous factions had presented their opinions. There could also be little doubt that the decision would rest with the Board itself and not the school system staff. It was perhaps only symbolic, but certainly pertinent, that at the height of the controversy the school superintendent had left the city with his assistant superintendents...
of school planning and integration to attend an educational conference. One Board member had complained that the administration had only presented one set of plans for consideration, but the Board was free to accept, alter, or reject the plans as it saw fit.51

When the hearings committee reported back to the Board as a whole, it made no recommendations. Friedman pointed out that, while he felt a recommendation should have been made, he soon realized that the four subcommittee members would not be able to agree among themselves. Thus, the report listed the dates of the eight public hearings and noted the positions of the speakers. Opponents of the plans numbered 106 organizations. Another 47 organizations favored the plans, and 11 groups wished refinements. It was noted that the South Shore plan had few advocates. Mrs. Malis observed that the number of members in the organizations varied widely, and that some groups had overlapping memberships. Mrs. Wild observed that she did not "think we heard anything different from what we had expected before the hearings." She stated that the animosities encountered had made the hearings "somewhat more difficult," and expressed surprise that the school

staff had not prepared the communities for the idea of busing.  

An estimated 1500 people packed the Board meeting room and corridors. The overwhelming majority were opposed to busing. They would return home that evening with an ambiguous victory. The South Shore plan was returned to the school staff with the recommendation to "work with people in the community both on preparation and revision." The vote was nine to one in favor of returning the plan. Mrs. Green cast her singular vote, not because she supported the original plan, but because she felt the plans in general discriminated against the majority of Negro students. She saw the great body of Negro students being "buried and forgotten" as the receiving schools obtained all the advantages and only a few Negroes were to be provided for by utilizing the quota system—a system which stigmatized the black children by labeling and numbering them. Mrs. Malis may well have saved the remnants of a future plan by stipulating that a revision must be presented no later than September, 1968.

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The Board was deadlocked on the disposition of the Austin plan. Friedman, Bacon, Malis, Carey, and Oliver voted for acceptance. Green, Murray, Wild, Adams, and Whiston voted against the report. Scheffler was absent during these final meetings but his opposition to the busing plans was well known. Some Board members made reference to the neighborhood school policy and the obvious opposition of numerous Chicagoans. Murray stated, "I have been consistently opposed to busing only because I hate to see the last vestige of the neighborhood school completely disappear." He felt, "Recent weeks prove the extent to which the public can be aroused over this question."54

Busing supporters viewed the community opposition in another way. Oliver saw it as "flak ... based on one single thing--they don't want black children in their schools." He felt, "The Board has no right acceding to that kind of demand." Carey reminded the Board of the 1954 Supreme Court decision that public education "must be made available to all on equal terms and that segregated education is unequal education." He recalled the 1964 Chicago Board policy statement on stabilization. He reminded his colleagues that when the Redmond Plan was submitted to the Board during the

previous summer, he considered it to be "the finest document dealing with the Chicago education problem that had been placed in my hands since my appointment to this Board." While not a member of the hearings committee, Carey attempted "to listen to many voices on this proposal, vehement voices against, moral voices that cry for justice and equality, and muted voices that represent the silent and inarticulate."\(^{55}\)

The busing proposal represented the first attempt to implement the Redmond Plan. Carey equated the adoption of the busing proposals with his responsibility to provide quality education for all the children of Chicago. He viewed "with regret those political voices that lack the courage of leadership," and applauded, "those political voices who would lean in the face of adversity." Bacon was more critical of the Board members themselves as the final arbiters of the fate of the busing plans. He stated, "The Board did not have faith in its commitment, so piously made, to adopt any reasonable plan. All the pious utterings by the people who voted against do not hide the fact that this Board does not have the will, the resolve, the commitment, to make the necessary

\(^{55}\text{Ibid.}\)
The Board's lack of resolution met criticism on all sides. The *Chicago Daily Defender*, noting that the South Shore plan was expected to fail, expressed surprise that the Austin plan did not pass. A *Chicago Sun-Times* editorial was almost irate, pointing out that the Board's "resolve melted before opposition fueled by demagoguery." The editorial pointed out that in both plans the Board "passed the buck back to School Superintendent Redmond without assuring him that any new suggestions would draw more courageous response."  

On the other hand, Philip Hauser saw the five to five split on the Board as sign of improvement in comparison to the period during the tenure of Willis. He stated, "It is beginning to acquire a spine." However, Hauser criticized the Board as still being unable to recognize "that the hysteria of first- and second-generation immigrants being Americanized is not to be confused with a majority of opinion in Chicago." Some politicians who had opposed the busing plans expressed their concern that the decision


"wasn't a clear-cut victory" which would end the possibility of busing once and for all. Indeed, Redmond did not see the decision as final and stated that the "Board has not cut off all my options and plans. I will proceed immediately to make future plans. This was not a defeat for the plan." 58

It was evident even to some Board members who had voted against implementing the Redmond busing plan that some action regarding integration was imperative if the Chicago Board wished to avoid federal intervention. Adams expressed his concern with this problem. While he had reservations about the busing plans, Adams apprehended the position of the Board regarding its integration policies. The boundary policies of the Board had been under attack, and the good faith of the Board might be established in deference to the initiation of a busing program. Adams expressed a rationale for accepting a busing plan when he said,

Rather than go over boundary lines that were drawn to preserve segregation, we decided to accept proposals for busing children from overcrowded, mostly Negro schools to white neighborhoods. If the busing element of the Redmond Plan is now abandoned, we would have to go into the question of those illegal boundaries,

for which our evidence is substantial. 59

As early as a week before the February 28, 1968, Board meeting, there were rumors of a compromise plan being proposed by Adams. While the South Shore plan was definitely to be abandoned, the Austin plan could be modified to allow parents of transfer students the option of taking their children out of the program. At the time the compromise was first leaked, it was denied by almost all the Board members interviewed. Mrs. Malis commented, "I think it's very unfortunate that a report like this would come out at this time [when] North side hearings are not completed yet, and the citywide hearings haven't even begun." Friedman denied any knowledge of a compromise and contended that the information referred to nothing more than a conversation between Wild and Adams. 60

However, when the compromise was introduced at the February 28 meeting, it could not have been a surprise to any Board member. Besides recommending that parents have the option to take their children out of the program, Adams also requested that the plan be revised to prohibit "the transferring of children with a poor

59Chicago Daily News, January 12, 1968, pp. 1, 4. The Board's policies on integration are considered in detail in chapter iii above.

60Southeast Economist (Chicago), February 22, 1968, p. 3.
disciplinary record or who are E[ducable] M[entally] H[andicapped], T[rainable] M[entally] H[andicapped] or emotionally disturbed." He urged these changes mainly, "to cut down the flak from the receiving schools" and assure white parents that their children would not be bused against their will."\textsuperscript{61}

Adams' motion was deadlocked by the same five to five vote with which the entire Austin Plan was sent back to Redmond. Adams and Wild expressed surprise that the busing supporters would not agree to the compromise. For her part, Mrs. Malis thought the compromise was "appeasement" and, "making it optional won't quiet the protesters either." She felt a moral obligation was involved as the "parents of students at May and Spencer Schools want the Board's moral support. If we make it optional, we would be putting the onus on them for sending their children to those Northwest Side schools." Mrs. Malis continued, "I personally don't think busing is earthshakingly important. But if the Board is going to go ahead with a busing program, it should be a good one, not a compromise."\textsuperscript{62}

However, if there was going to be any busing program, it appeared a compromise would be necessary. The pivotal votes of

\textsuperscript{61} Proceedings, February 28, 1968, p. 1534 (First quote).
\textsuperscript{62} Chicago Sun-Times, February 29, 1968, pp. 3-4.

\textsuperscript{62} Chicago Sun-Times, February 29, 1968, p. 3 (Second quote).
Adams and Wild were tied to the voluntary program. A discussion on working out the compromise followed immediately after the Wednesday session. The next day, Austin community leaders conferred with Redmond and expressed willingness to accept the compromise. A special meeting was called for Monday, March 4, 1968.63

When the Board assembled, Redmond took the occasion to consider some problems in the superintendent-board relationship. Observing that groups from the May and Spencer Schools had been bitter when discussing the fate of the busing plan, Redmond stated:

The criticism of me has been that I have not used my leadership role to influence your opinions and decisions. There is not one of us who could do anything in those days but question his own conscience as a board member, as superintendent, and as an American citizen. It was no easier for you to act than it was for me to recommend. I firmly believe that the issue before us points up most clearly the necessity for the division of responsibility: me to recommend and you after deliberation to establish policy. I have no right to ask you to change your mind on policy any more than you have the right to ask me to change my mind on recommendations.64

Regarding the racial issue, Redmond stated:

But above and beyond our personal feelings is an issue that has been brought forth so forcefully in the Kerner Committee report. As this report pointed out the issue is the assimilation of the black and white in an America which belongs to both of us by no merit of either one of us. However, it is

63Chicago's American, March 1, 1968, p. 3; March 2, 1968, p. 1; March 4, 1968, p. 11.

more than the issue of black and white which is our concern. It is our responsibility to all children—the Indian, the Japanese, the Chinese, the Puerto Rican and every other conceivable child of a minority group.

Let no one forget this and let us not forget to say it, lest we be misunderstood in this day when everything is misunderstood because of lack of communication.

I do not believe that the Board report before us will resolve the massive urban problems which face us. I do believe that it does recognize your commitment and mine to the dignity of every child in our school system.65

The amended proposal was accepted by an eight to one vote. Scheffler and Carey were absent. Scheffler had announced his intention of resigning and Carey was in Springfield to ask the state legislature to approve a raise in the tax rate being submitted to the voters in a bond issue. Mrs. Green cast the opposing vote. Again, it was the quota system which she found to be anathema to her principles. She observed:

Now when we look at the facts, as we face them this day of our Lord, 1968, we already have an elementary Negro preponderance. If we bused in all directions right now, we would end up this evening with every elementary school in Chicago having more Negro children or black or Afro-Americans, than white children. So this means that we are setting up a system, a quota system, which not only discriminates against these Negro, black, Afro-Americans, but also imposes segregation because of a 15% quota [which] is going to mean that all of those children who are over there, not only the 85%, but all of them are going to have to be in segregated schools. So this system not only means discrimination, it means

65Ibid.
segregation.66

Mrs. Wild stated that as far as she and other Board members were concerned, the main issue was overcrowded rooms. The Board could no longer tolerate overcrowding at one school while there were empty seats in another. The Board's decision was not a capitulation to "black power" but a question of doing what was morally right.67

In accepting the compromise proposal Bacon asked for clarification of several points. Under the amended plan the number of students to be bused was to be kept near the 563 originally proposed. In order to compensate for parents who would refuse the transfer of their children, the motion authorized the superintendent to select additional sending areas in the May and Spencer School districts. Once students were bused under the plan, they would continue to attend the receiving school until they graduated. Bacon also asked Redmond to watch for any signs of staff sabotage in which school employees might slow down implementation of the plan or discourage parents from taking advantage of the busing.


Redmond emphasized his intention to do so.68

As the school staff commenced working to achieve an implementation date set between March 11, 1968, and March 18, 1968, opposition in the communities began to organize. Parents at the eight northwest side schools called for a one-day boycott to keep their children home. In Springfield politicians called for a ten member joint committee to begin an investigation of Chicago protestors to Springfield. Bills were being introduced to prevent the Board from using state funds for busing to promote integration. The threat of demonstrations and violence at the receiving schools was a definite factor that the school staff would have to consider in implementing the plan.69

In the midst of all the emotional turmoil, it was too easy to miss the few voices on the northwest side which supported the busing plan. As one resident observed in a letter to the editor:

How can we the minority be heard--or dare we be heard? I'm almost afraid when I see so much emotionalism and so little rational thinking. This thing is at high pitch, and I'm afraid to disagree out loud.70

68Ibid.
CHAPTER VII
INVOCATION, APPLICATION, APPRAISAL
AND TERMINATION FUNCTIONS:
THE PLAN IN OPERATION

On March 11, 1968, one week after the Board made its busing decision, 249 students boarded buses to attend classes in the designated eight receiving schools. The children arrived at their new schools to face jeers, placards and ominous silence from white pickets assembled in groups estimated to consist of from 25 to 200 persons at each of the buildings. Seventy-five policemen were assigned to the receiving schools to insure the safety of the bused students. One school had been firebombed earlier in the day, but the damage was slight, and no further violence was encountered. The parents of 323 students had accepted the assignment of their children to the new schools. The absence of a large number of the students to be bused was attributed to parents' fear for the safety of their children. On March 12, 1968, 290 children boarded the buses.\(^1\)

The speed with which the plan was implemented was

commendable. Physical alterations such as the addition of classroom seats were completed before the new students arrived. Some staff members did complain of the short time allowed to prepare for the change of classes, the lack of clear cut definitions of responsibilities, confusion of time tables, and the sparsity of special personnel and human relations people. The administrators in the sending schools had been informed of the plans prior to those in the receiving schools.\(^2\) While staff at the sending schools did not complain of the lack of time involved, the task of convincing parents that they should allow their children to participate was a major problem.

The busing plan set 573 as the number of pupils to be bused from the May and Spencer Schools. Pupils in grades one to six who resided in selected geographic areas which were predominantly Negro and at the greatest walking distance from the sending schools were eligible for transfer. Eighteen of these areas were originally selected in which over 578 students resided. Children were

screened to exclude mentally handicapped and emotionally disturbed students. Notes were sent home with the children in the selected areas telling the parents their children would be bused. If parents returned the approval form indicating they did not wish their child to participate, the child was exempted. The May-Spencer United Committee sent representatives to visit parents urging them to allow their children to participate. Meetings were held to explain the plan and encourage acceptance. Emphasis was placed upon the chance for a better education in less crowded schools rather than upon integration.3

Despite these efforts, only 330 students received parental approval. It was necessary to add 13 supplementary blocks which made a total of 1157 students eligible for busing. By April 8, 1968 only 519 students had been recruited when the Board approved a recommendation that the transfer program be closed for the year to allow the sending and receiving schools to stabilize their classes for the remaining school year. Parents of the 638 students who did not participate were surveyed to find out why they chose

not to have their children bused. A "Summary of 'No' Responses" prepared by the area staff is reproduced on the following page.  

The large percentage (26.8 percent) of parents who gave no reason for refusing to send their children precludes any pretense to accuracy in determining anything but a general impression of the attitudes of those parents who refused. Preference for the neighborhood school was the most frequently given response. When coupled with objections to the distance their children would have to travel, worry that children were too young to go on the bus, not knowing what to do if children became sick, and pronouncements that they did not believe in busing, 35.4 percent of the 426 parents who responded could be classified as objecting to some aspect of busing. Another 8.6 percent either expressed fear that their children would be harmed or worried about the prejudice their children would face. Most of the remaining responses could be classified under problems originating at home such as conflicting work schedules of the parents, medical reasons and intentions to move. Eighteen parents (4.2 percent) objected to the time of year the plan was being initiated and one parent had a mistaken idea of the monetary cost of the plan to the parent. These objections

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### Table 5

**Why Some Parents Chose Not to Have Their Children Buseda**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason Given</th>
<th>May School</th>
<th></th>
<th>Spencer School</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phase I</td>
<td>Phase II</td>
<td>Phase I</td>
<td>Phase II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reason given</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer neighborhood school</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children needed at home to assist with younger ones</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of harm to children; lack of protection</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents work; schedule prevents meeting or preparing children</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family moving soon</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance too far from home</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at this time; wrong time of year</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too young to go on bus; want child in neighborhood</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudice facing children</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too many transfers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal reasons</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical reason; under doctor's care</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot buy lunch</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No need to go; don't believe in busing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided (at this time)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know what to do if child gets sick</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mistaken idea on cost</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child doesn't want to go</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>138</strong></td>
<td><strong>113</strong></td>
<td><strong>110</strong></td>
<td><strong>65</strong></td>
<td><strong>426</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Phase I--first 18 blocks**

**Phase II--additional 13 blocks**

---

reflected problems in the execution of the plan. The one parent was informed that transportation was free, but the inappropriate date for beginning the program had its origin in the decision-making process of the Board.\(^5\)

Despite the fact that parents of 55.2 percent of the children eligible for the busing program had denied their permission, waiting lists occurred in some areas. The number of students designated for a receiving school was determined by the quota system which governed the number of available seats in the receiving school. The total number of pupils transferring was not to exceed 11 percent of the total enrollment of the receiving school in the first year. As the seventh and eighth grades came to be included in the plan over the next two years a 15 percent quota limit was to be required. While it was the quota which determined the number of students who could attend the receiving school, the plan called for areas to be chosen to fill these seats, not students. Thus, if not enough parents accepted the transfer of their children from a certain area, the quota was not filled. If too many parents in a designated area accepted the transfer of their children, a waiting list occurred.\(^6\)

Orientation of the bused children included numerous factors. The children were to be at designated pick-up points at 8:15 A.M. and were to board the bus at 8:20 A.M. The bus ride was estimated at twenty to thirty minutes. A child welfare attendant with an attendance list rode along on the bus and remained at the receiving school as an aide for the day. As some schools had no facilities for providing lunches, students were instructed to bring their food. If a student became sick while at school, he was to be sent home in a cab with an adult, after notification of the parent. Stand-by buses were kept at the Burbank School to provide for any unexpected early closing of a school.7

When the children arrived at their new schools, they were assigned to classrooms according to their grade level. Receiving school teachers had attended a series of in-service meetings to prepare for the transferring students. In most cases the required new textbooks had been ordered during the week of the March 4 decision, and some texts were already delivered by March 11, 1968. Seventeen new classroom teachers were assigned to the receiving schools. While a local newspaper complained that they were all

7Ibid. Chicago Daily Defender, March 11, 1968, p. 3.
Robert Bell, Retired Superintendent of District Four, containing the Austin community, private interview at Schurz High Schools, Chicago, Illinois, June 22, 1972.
substitutes and not assigned teachers, the teacher-student ratio in all but two schools decreased. At the Bridge and Lyon Schools the ratio rose from 31.5 to 32.6 and from 32.9 to 33.2, respectively. All the schools received additional teacher aides, and two schools were given full-time adjustment teachers instead of their previous half-time teachers.8

However, the Area C staff evaluation recognized that "many legitimate complaints by parents might have been prevented" if further auxiliary services had been increased. Lack of funds was given as the reason for not appointing full-time physical education, library and adjustment teachers in all the receiving schools.9 Representative Pucinski had pointed out that these schools on the northwest side were not in poverty areas as designated under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and thus the new students did not bring in federal funds.

The cost of the busing program compared to a building program is not easily determined. During the sixty-five school day period between March and June, the twelve buses cost $24,960.00 to rent. The salaries for the busing attendants and teacher aides

amounted to $4,512.00 and $5,012.00 respectively for the two categories. Another $29,609.15 and $1,779.20 were required for watchmen and security guards. The latter two costs were necessitated due to the fear that the children would be harmed. In the following full school year only $200.00 was spent for security. The total cost for the 1968-1969 school year was $132,424.00. The busing enrollment during this year varied between a high of 621 in November which declined to 570 by June due to pupil transiency and decisions to return to the home school. Assuming a 600 student average, the cost per pupil was about $220.00. These costs, however, excluded teachers' salaries, textbooks, supplies and educational equipment—the operating expenses of a school excluding its physical plant.10

Thus, the cost of the busing plan should be compared to the capital investment required to build a 600 pupil elementary school. The Board was involved in constructing a 600 student facility at 102nd Street and Cottage Grove Avenue in 1968. The total estimated

cost for construction, site and development, equipment and architectural fees was $1,495,000. An equipment cost of $100,000 is retained in the total cost figure on the assumption that equipping a new school would entail considerably more expense than preparing an existing building for additional students. The average cost per pupil for the entire facility was $2,491.00.\textsuperscript{11} When compared to the $220.00 per pupil cost for busing, the cost of the new facility would be paid in about eleven years--assuming that the cost of busing would not increase during this period. But the cost of busing per pupil had increased each year. Taking the maximum number of students bused during a school year as the divisor, the cost per pupil for busing in 1969-1970 was about $285 and during 1970-1971 the cost was about $300.\textsuperscript{12} Thus, it seems apparent that

\textsuperscript{11}Proceedings, November 13, 1968, p. 812. The 102nd Street and Cottage Grove Avenue facility was later expanded to accommodate 1000 students at a cost per pupil of $1,985.00. The Orr School, being built for 485 students, was estimated to cost $1,294,000 about $2,668 per pupil. See Proceedings, June 11, 1969, pp. 3046-47.

the cost of the busing program would pay for a school building over a decade.

However, numerous other factors must be considered. The Board building program operates on borrowed money. The interest charges on the borrowed sum would have to be added to the cost of the building or subtracted from the yearly cost of busing if the building cost was not incurred. To simplify the computations it could be assumed that the Board has the $1,495,000 in cash. Rather than building a plant, it invests the sum at 5 percent simple interest and uses the interest to operate the busing program. This would provide $74,750 yearly, considerably less than the $132,424 required to operate the program during its least expensive year, but a factor in reducing the actual busing costs. The cost of the program to the Board is further reduced by the availability of state funds to defray transportation costs. In 1969-1970 this amounted to $43,185.28, but in 1970-1971 the amount dropped to

in 1969-1970 was $156,314.56 with a maximum of 575 bused students. In 1970-1971 the cost was $165,800 with a maximum of 532 bused students. As the number of students bused in the program fell below 600, the cost per pupil was used as a constant in computing the cost of the program compared to a 600 pupil facility.
The cost of the busing program can also be questioned in terms of the relative costs of operating a new plant compared to the expanded use of existing facilities. Thus, the cost of heating and a portion of the maintenance services at the receiving schools represent fixed costs which would increase only slightly with the increase in enrollment. These fixed costs would have to be entirely duplicated at a new facility. An approximation of the saving in heating and maintenance expenditures can be made by examining the costs in the Lyon and Smyser Schools for the budget years January, 1967, through January, 1970. At the Lyon School, where the enrollment hovered around 650 during these years, there was no appreciable difference in operations costs between the two years budgeted without busing and the two years budgeted with the busing program. Indeed, a minor readjustment in the scheduling of janitors for the building resulted in a $5,720.25 reduction in operation staff salaries from $36,963.25 in the 1968 budget to $31,243.00 in the 1969 budget. An increase in salaries accounted for the only rise in operation expenditures from 1969 to 1970.

13D.E., 1970, p. 30. D.E., 1971, p. 31. Capital loss through inflation can be ignored in the example as the Board building program operates on borrowed funds. The 5% interest may be conservative but is not unrealistic for the years involved.
The situation did not change considerably at the Smyser School, where the enrollment hovered around 600 students during the period. Again, a change in scheduling of custodial staff resulted in a reduction of salary costs from $36,484.80 in the last pre-busing budget to $30,964.00 in the 1969 budget. At both schools the heating and electricity costs did not indicate any appreciable differences between the period when the busing plan was in operation and prior periods. The effects of weather and sunlight are more apparent than the increase in student enrollment. Maintenance costs at both schools showed absolutely no relationship to the number of students in attendance.14

In light of this data it is appropriate to consider the costs of providing heating, lighting and custodial staff as fixed costs. These fixed costs do not fluctuate considerably with minor changes in the size of the student body such as were introduced by the busing plan. However, if a new building were erected to accommodate the total student body being bused, these fixed costs would arise in the new structure in addition to similar fixed costs in the existing buildings. Taking the lowest figures for the four year period considered among the two schools, we can compute a

reasonably accurate minimum operational cost for a new building. This would be: $30,964 for custodial salaries; $1,908 for electricity; $1,766 for fuel—a total of $34,638 for minimal fixed costs. When the $74,750 interest cost on the capital investment is added to the fixed cost, the sum totals $109,338. This figure approaches the $132,424 required to operate the busing plan. When state aid for busing programs is added, the true monetary cost of the busing program compared to a building program becomes insignificant.

The psychological cost of busing to the egos of the transported students is another factor to consider. The hostility in the receiving communities was overt in the beginning and only veiled as time passed. Of course, not all residents in the receiving communities were opposed to the busing plan. Some residents of the northwest side organized to express their favorable attitudes toward integration. Local school administrators reported a few letters of support and one even received a check to help the bused children. Some white children invited bused students to their homes for lunch. Even the anti-busing organizations disavowed threats of violence.

While no harm came to any of the bused children, their reception in the receiving community was hostile. Besides the
pickets stationed at the receiving schools; white parents had organized a boycott keeping their children out of classes. These boycotts were relatively effective, keeping about 700 students out of school on the first day of busing. Nor did they diminish in effectiveness during the first months of busing. Late in March a cycling boycott between the receiving schools was reported to have kept 217 of 546 students out of the Smyser School. Another, two days later, at the Locke School resulted in 455 absences while 390 students were present. In May, a united boycott involving the northwest, southeast and southwest sides of the city raised the city-wide absence rate from a normal 8 percent to 10.6 percent. As late as 1972, a local administrator, while judging community activity to have diminished, requested that parents in the area not be interviewed in fear that hostility might be awakened.15

Besides the boycotts, anti-busing adherents had called for the defeat of a pending bond issue, an elected rather than appointed school board, moving from affected communities, use of alternate schools, legislative intervention, court orders to

prohibit busing. In none of these areas were they particularly successful.

In June, 1968, the bond referendum for the schools passed with a 52 percent majority compared to the acceptance of a bond issue the year before by 62.6 percent of the voters. Heavy majorities in Negro wards offset the negative votes of residents of the predominantly white northwest and southwest sides. An estimated 80 percent to 92 percent of voters in inner-city wards voted for the referendum. In all the northwest side wards the negative vote varied between 53 percent and 77 percent. In the west side ward affected by the busing plan 94 percent of the votes cast were affirmative. In the two northwest side wards affected by the busing plan 79 percent and 84 percent of the votes cast were negative.\(^{16}\)

Anti-busing forces were also not able to convince a majority of the voters in the city that an elected school board would be advantageous. In June, 1971, city voters, by a three to one ratio, rejected a school referendum to elect members from fifteen neighborhood districts. The referendum was even defeated on the northwest and southwest sides where sentiment for it originated.

\(^{16}\)Chicago Daily News, June 12, 1968, pp. 1, 6.
The fear that elected members would become too enmeshed in politics was considered to be a dominant factor in the electorate's decision. Apparently, the electorate also agreed with Wild's observation that "if we all [Board members] represented a different area . . . no decision would ever be reached."17

The mayor had not been immediately responsive to the demands of residents in the western periphery of the city that Board members be appointed to represent their areas. Within weeks following the busing decision Daley announced that he would attempt to appoint members to represent a more equitable geographical cross-section of the city. He also expressed the desire to appoint members who would be sensitive to the feelings of the "average man in the neighborhoods." However, it became apparent that these were not his only considerations in making appointments. The retirement of Scheffler soon opened a position on the Board. At the same time the terms of Whiston and Murray expired. When liberal members of the nominating committee were able to exclude the names of the president and vice-president of the Board from the list of nominees, Daley appointed them without the recommendation. To balance the

appointment of the two conservative Board members Daley chose Mrs. Carey Preston, a Negro from the southeast Hyde Park area of the city. The western areas of the city remained without representation.\textsuperscript{18}

The overriding importance of keeping a man of his choice in the Board presidency was again apparent in the mayor's choices in 1968 and 1970. Bacon, an outspoken critic of Board policies, was challenging Whiston for the presidency. The appointment of Jack Witkowsky to replace Oliver on the Board resulted in a six to five vote for Whiston. Two years later, Witkowsky was ready to join with the minority of five to elect Bacon rather than Whiston. Despite the fact that he was renominated for his position Witkowsky was passed over by Daley and Gerald Sbarbaro was appointed to the Board. The significance of Sbarbaro's residency in the west side Austin area is clouded by the importance of his critical vote in reelecting Whiston.\textsuperscript{19}

In 1969 two more vacancies occurred with the retirement of Adams and Green. Daley's choices for their replacement were both

\textsuperscript{18}Chicago Daily News, March 16, 1968, p. 2 (Quote). This topic is also discussed above in chapter ii, pp. 21-24.

representatives of minority groups who lived in the southeast area of the city. Mrs. David Cerda was of Latin-American origin and lived in Calumet Heights which contained three elementary schools which had been designated as receiving schools in the defunct South Shore plan. Alvin J. Boutte, from Chatham to the west of Avalon Park, was the third Negro on the Board. Northwest and southwest side organizations opposed the appointment of these two new Board members on the grounds that they would not represent the views of the white communities. 20

When Whiston died, Mrs. Catherine Rohter was appointed to the Board. The first member to be appointed from the northwest side, she cast her crucial vote for Carey in his contest with Bacon for the Board presidency. Later in 1971, Murray died, and Daley appointed Thomas J. Nayder to fill the vacancy. While Nayder came from the southwest side, he stated he intended to represent the viewpoint of organized labor rather than his neighborhood. Nayder had succeeded Murray as president of the Chicago Building Trades Council and was also an officer of the Chicago Plan which was created to find construction jobs for minority groups--a

project which was not particularly successful in Chicago.21

In the spring of 1971 Carey had announced that he was not seeking reappointment to the Board. The problem of finding a new candidate for the presidency who would represent organized labor interests seems to have been the major incentive for the mayor's next action. In June, Carey announced that civic leaders had convinced him to seek another term. Without waiting for the nomination of his screening committee, Daley reappointed Carey. The mayor argued that Carey had been approved by the screening committee when he was first appointed, and stated, "After a man has once been approved by the citizens' committee, it is up to the mayor of Chicago to decide whether he has served well."22 Busing supporters certainly could not have interpreted the mayor's action to be hostile, as Carey had been one of the most outspoken supporters of the busing plan.

The mayor had no cause for alarm in the threats of angry whites that they would move from the city. Talk of the secession of the northwest communities never passed the formulative stage. Threats that white residents would move from the receiving


communities never materialized as fact. Reference to Table 6 on the following page shows the enrollment of white students in the first three years of the busing program to be almost steadily increasing in numbers in four receiving schools, the enrollment to remain stable in two schools, and only two schools that experience the loss of more than thirty-five students. If 1967 is used as a base year for computing percentage of increase or decrease by 1972, then five schools experienced a decrease in enrollment between 2.1 percent and 9.8 percent while three schools experienced an increase of between 1.3 percent and 15.2 percent.

However, if the total enrollment in the eight schools in 1967 is compared to the total enrollment in 1972 then there is an actual percentage increase in white enrollment of about 0.4 percent. If the Bridge School is dropped from the calculations because of its sudden increase in enrollment in 1969 (explained below), the total enrollment over five years dropped only 1.03 percent. The stability of white enrollment is all the more significant in light of the fact that the entire city lost a startling 35.7 percent of its non-Negro elementary school enrollment during this
### TABLE 6

**KINDERGARTEN THROUGH EIGHTH GRADE CAUCASIAN ENROLLMENT IN RECEIVING SCHOOLS: 1967--1972**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>Bridge</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>15.2 ↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burbank</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>382</td>
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<td>Dever</td>
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<td>850</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>806</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locke</td>
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<td>863</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>5.6 ↓</td>
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<tr>
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<td>448</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>1.3 ↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smyser</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>6.8 ↑</td>
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<tr>
<td>O.A.Thorp</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>3.4 ↓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4904</strong></td>
<td><strong>4897</strong></td>
<td><strong>5049</strong></td>
<td><strong>5155</strong></td>
<td><strong>5099</strong></td>
<td><strong>4923</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.4</strong> ↑</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Enrollment Without Bridge**

<p>| | | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td></td>
<td>4478</td>
<td>4484</td>
<td>4524</td>
<td>4562</td>
<td>4498</td>
<td>4432</td>
<td>1.0 ↓</td>
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**City-wide Non-Negroid Elementary School Enrollment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>196,152</td>
<td>194,125</td>
<td>190,440</td>
<td>187,795</td>
<td>180,908</td>
<td>126,362</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|         | 35.7    |         |         |         | ↓       |

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period.23

The use of alternative schools in which white students could escape integration was never a viable plan for northwest side residents. The cost of the necessary resources and personnel would have been beyond their lower-middle class means. The enrollment figures indicate they did not "escape" to suburban systems. The Catholic schools in the area could not accept a large increase in enrollment, and it was evident that they would not. The announced Catholic school busing plan, while totally voluntary on both sides in its final form, was nebulous enough in its early stages so that no one was certain how it would be developed. Indeed, parishioners talked of withdrawing their children from the Catholic schools to enroll them in the receiving schools so that the empty classrooms would be filled with neighborhood students. Again, the stable

23Chicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount, (Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, District Four). Hereinafter referred to as Headcounts. Board of Education, City of Chicago, Open Enrollment: A Progress Report (Chicago: Board of Education, November, 1972), p. 17. Hereinafter referred to as Open Enrollment Report. In 1970 Mexicans were counted separately. Before this year they were included in the Caucasian count. In compiling the statistics between 1967 and 1972, taking the non-Negroid city-count compensates for the sudden drop in Caucasian enrollment that appears to occur in 1970. As a cursory glance indicates the Mexican enrollment has increased since 1970, the actual decrease of Caucasian students may be greater than the percentage indicated in this paper. That is, the 35.7% drop in enrollment would represent the smallest possible drop in Caucasian enrollment.
enrollment figures show this did not occur. The one apparent exception is the large jump in enrollment at Bridge School in 1969. Interviews with area parents indicate that this was caused by the withdrawal of students from the local Catholic school. However, opposition to busing was not a motive. In this year the local Catholic school increased its tuition greatly and dropped the kindergarten program. Many parents, especially those with large families, then enrolled their children in the public school. 24

While overt opposition from parents in the receiving communities declined, there were still lingering protests. Some state legislators initiated an investigation of the school system and prepared bills to prohibit school boards from using state funds to promote integration. By June, 1968, it was apparent that two bills designed to outlaw school busing were faltering when not a single witness appeared at the hearing to urge their passage. On the other hand, the Chicago School Board president, the Chicago Teachers' Union president, the executive secretary of the Illinois

Federation of Teachers, and a representative of the Illinois Education Association testified against the bills. When the State Chicago School Board Study Commission, dominated by opponents of busing, issued its report in June, 1970, it received little attention in the city.25

But anti-busing sentiment has grown in the state and has certainly not died in the city. The busing program was challenged in the courts. While the Illinois Appellate Court did not uphold the protests, it did find the cases to be moot and dismissed them without prejudice in 1969. Thus, the Illinois courts have not shut the door to further legal challenges to busing. Subsequent actions by the state's Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction outlining integration plans for Illinois raised the ire of numerous state legislators. In 1973 two south suburban legislators introduced an anti-busing amendment to the Illinois School Code which became law during the year. The legislation, which amends the sections defining powers of the Chicago and other boards of education, states, "Nothing herein shall be construed to permit or empower the State Superintendent of Public Instruction to order,

mandate or require busing or other transportation of pupils for the purpose of achieving racial balance in any school."  

The Chicago Board of Education remained hesitant to expand its involvement in busing programs. As will be seen in the next chapter, the Austin busing program has not been expanded since the second year of its inception. In late 1968 parents of students in the Emmet School, on the western edge of the city in Austin, asked the Board to approve a voluntary busing plan to relieve overcrowding in the school. Black and white spokesmen for the predominantly white school (73.8 percent in September, 1968) wanted a program that would carry their children into northwest side schools. Two Board members, Friedman and Witkowsky, indicated their approval. However, Witkowsky was reported to have said that funds were not available for further busing programs and the pro-busing forces on

26 Illinois, Public Law 78-881 (passed September 19, 1973), amending chapter cxxii, section 10-22.5 and 34-18.7 of The School Code of Illinois. Section 10-22 deals with powers of boards of education in the state. Section 34-18 deals with powers of the Chicago Board of Education. Telephone calls to offices of National Association of Colored People and the Chicago Urban League, February 22, 1974, indicated they had no plans to contest the state amendment. Indeed, the office staff had no knowledge that the legislation existed. One group indicated that the law had probably slipped by their lobbyist as they were now concentrating on obtaining positions for minority members in decision-making roles.
the Board "didn't have the votes" to push the program through.27

In January, 1969, a busing proposal for the Emmet School suggested by Friedman was defeated in a nonrecorded vote. The Board continued with its policy of erecting semi-permanent "relo-
catables" while the school operated on a double shift. In March, 1971, the five branches of the Emmet School had 3,562 students compared to its enrollment of 1,448 in September, 1968. A busing program was finally initiated. However, the Emmet plan differed considerably from the May and Spencer program. Students from the Emmet West School, then over 95 percent black, were not allowed to decline to participate in the plan. About 350 students, in eleven classrooms containing grades two through five, were chosen to be transferred as units to five elementary schools. One receiving school was on the west side about three miles from the Emmet West. The other four schools were located on the near north side, about nine miles from the sending school.28

Two of the receiving schools had almost totally black student


bodies (95.2 percent and 99.1 percent in September, 1971). One receiving school was desegregated with about a 25 percent black student enrollment. The remaining two receiving schools had only a few black students enrolled (2.4 percent and 5.3 percent).

Parents at the Lincoln Schools (5.3 percent Negro) had indicated to the school planning staff their willingness to participate in the program. When announced, the Emmet busing plan was scheduled only for the period from March until June, 1971. Furthermore, it was emphasized that the plan was not for purposes of desegregation. Board member Bacon was quoted as observing, "This is really no different from a boundary change to relieve overcrowding." Mrs. Malis remarked, "The fact that children will get there by bus is incidental." 29

Despite the fact that the plan did not affect their areas, residents from the northwest and southwest sides of the city attended the Board meeting to protest the Board's decision. Representatives of organizations from these areas expressed their continuing opposition to busing programs and their fear that their

children would be bused at some future date. The hearings which preceded the Emmet busing decision had disturbed Mrs. Malis. She had encountered opposition to the plan not only from lay people but from some school staff members. This encounter provoked an attempt by Mrs. Malis to define the board-staff relationship.

She said:

I do not think that lay boards are supposed to be educators. I think that we pay educators, that we are here to set policy. . . . I think it is very, very difficult for those of us who know that in some instances policies of the Board of Education have been undermined by staff members at various levels, and when I use the word undermined, I mean that they are not always implemented according to the intent of the Board. When I read an editorial in a community newspaper that accuses the Board about poor planning, and, in fact, many times since I have been on this Board, we, as members, have also said this to staff . . . that you are not planning correctly, you are not projecting fast enough, you are not building fast enough, there are too many delays. . . . I take exception to the fact that Board members must take the brunt of this criticism since we must depend upon the information supplied to us by the staff. We, the members, have tried to respond to the needs of our schools and when an editorial says that it has become apparent that the Board of Education, as now constituted, is inadequate, incompetent, and worse, not terribly concerned.[sic] You can understand, I think, why I am disturbed by a statement such as this. . . . Therefore, Dr. Redmond, I think that it is a very important thing for you to consider. I don't know how many other Board members will agree with me, but I think it is a very important thing for you to consider that it is time for our staff at all levels, from teacher on up, to understand that when this Board sets a policy it means for it to be implemented according to the intent of the Board.30

Within a month after the implementation of this short-lived busing program, the staff submitted an interim evaluation of the Emmet West busing plan. This report emphasized that elements of the receiving communities were amenable to the program. Indeed, one community was "developing plans for the cooperative exchange of children" and "others wanted the bused children integrated into their own student body." All school staff members who were interviewed were reported to have been enthusiastic about the plan.31

The parents of the bused children who also had siblings in the sending school were reported to have noticed an "immediate and extensive improvement in both academic progress and social behavior in their children who remained at Emmet West and those who were bused." The sending school parents in all categories (those with children only at the sending school, only being bused, or a combination) were asked, "Would you prefer to have your child bused even after there is room for him at a neighborhood school?" The report found, "The overwhelming response was that they would prefer a neighborhood school that is uncrowded, with quality education."32

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31 Joseph J. Connery, District Superintendent, "Interim Evaluation of Emmet West Busing Program" (report presented to the General Committee of the Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, April, 1971), pp. 1, 2 (Quote), 3. (Typewritten.)

32 Ibid., pp. 3 (Second, third quotes), 4 (First quote).
Criticisms of the program were that the bused children were isolated by being kept in the same class groups that they had attended in the sending school. Some teachers from the sending school were inexperienced. The most frequently mentioned complaint was that the staff and community councils at the receiving schools were not included in the planning stage. There was no reason for them to express their concern. The Emmet busing program was scheduled to end by September, 1971, when "demountable" semi-permanent structures were located in the overcrowded community. Despite the expressed desire of some parents of the Lincoln School, the program was not extended into the next year. It has been suggested that the excessive travel time, about forty minutes each way, and the availability of better facilities in their own neighborhood dampened any interest among black parents in continuing the program.33

Building remained the major policy to relieve overcrowding in community schools under Redmond, as it had been under Willis. Mrs. Malis' comments on the Emmet School program indicate the emphasis placed upon this type of program. Every administrator interviewed made reference to the building program. Use of

33Ibid., pp. 3, 5, 7. "Demountable" structures are prefabricated units which may be assembled or disassembled rapidly at a site. A poured concrete slab on which the demountable is erected is considered the only permanent site cost.
temporary structures, additions to previous structures, the use of
nearby buildings which could be adapted for classrooms, and the
errection of entirely new schools have been the major means of com-
bating overcrowding.34

A serious obstacle to building permanent structures, besides
the non-availability of funds, has been disagreement about the
location of sites. Construction of the Austin Middle School was
delayed for years as black and white elements in the area fought
over its placement which would have affected desegregation in the
locality. Another problem associated with permanent structures
has been the changing demographic equation. Desegregating neigh-
borhoods have first experienced a rapid increase in public school
enrollment. However, as the neighborhood facilities are subjected
to severe overuse, an area has tended to decay rapidly. Thus, the
Board finds it has erected permanent structures to serve a popu-
lation which disappears.35

These changes in population dispersion have also had reper-
cussions on the effectiveness of the permissive transfer or open
enrollment program. The open enrollment plan is bound to the

34McKeag, August 30, 1971; Bell, June 22, 1972. (Above,
chapter ii, offers a more detailed analysis of these problems.)

35Ibid.
distribution of students throughout the schools. In the 1960's, the rapidly expanding black population of the city found its children were often crowded into schools built to serve a smaller school-age clientele. The white population of the city, usually residing in stable neighborhoods, often had schools which became underutilized as children grew up but their parents remained in the area. During this period a permissive transfer program could have some effect on desegregation as black students could move from overutilized schools to the less crowded schools in predominantly white areas. However, by the 1970's, the school capacity trend has reversed itself. The movement of the white population to the periphery of the city has resulted in overcrowding in predominantly white schools. Many black neighborhoods, with facilities suffering from overutilization, have lost a considerable segment of their population and student bodies. Thus, the permissive transfer program is unlikely to result in any considerable desegregation as white students have not transferred to predominantly black schools very frequently.36

Indeed, the black students had not utilized the permissive transfer plan to any great extent. The high school program, begun

in 1963, reached its maximum in 1966 when 1500 students participated. In 1967 the number fell to 957 and has almost steadily dropped to 329 in 1972. When the number of students who were eligible to utilize this plan is compared to the number who have, the failure of the program becomes more evident. In 1968 the percentage of students approved for transfers was 10.4 percent of the number of students eligible to transfer from a sending school. In 1972 this percentage had dropped to 4.4 percent. It must also be remembered that not all the students receiving transfers were black. Furthermore, not all the students accepted for transfer chose finally to use the plan.37

In 1972 a Chicago Schools work-study report examined the efficacy of the open enrollment program regarding desegregation. It recognized numerous factors which have operated to prevent the permissive transfer plan from becoming a viable factor in integration. The report observed that many minority students have not used the plan because of hostility in the receiving schools and the onus placed on students and parents to initiate the transfer themselves. The students who do choose to transfer often represent a group strongly interested in education whose absence from the

sending school may help to lower its morale and aspiration level. The transferring students are often faced with a long trip from their neighborhood to the school. They may discover that it is difficult to maintain strong bonds with peer groups both at the receiving school and in their own neighborhoods; that is, they may become disassociated from both groups. While all these factors may serve to discourage students from transferring, it is the demographic change which insures that there will be less utilization of the transfer plan. The number of white schools designated as underutilized is becoming smaller.\(^{38}\)

The work study report stated to the Board that voluntary transfer plans are ineffective in achieving integration. The report suggested that the "obvious alternative is the use of mandatory transfers in accordance with certain guidelines." These guidelines were those suggested in the Redmond Report of 1967. The Redmond Report had observed that voluntary "transfer programs have had largely symbolic effects, for few Negroes transfer," and the programs "do little or nothing to stem the flight of whites from the 'threatened' neighborhood." The work study report called attention to the short-term (transfer programs, boundary changes, and open enrollment report, pp. 7-9.\(^{38}\)
site selection and school pairing), the intermediate-term (magnet schools) and long-term (educational parks) suggestions of the Redmond Report. Issued in November, 1972, the work study report observed, five years after the Redmond Report and over four years after the Austin busing plan, that the strategy of the Redmond Report "has not been implemented to date." 39

Certainly, the educational park concept had progressed little beyond the initial study stage. The first feasibility study of a cultural park project had been made in February, 1968. This involved a rather grandiose scheme to build a complex of both educational and cultural plants at fifteen locations throughout the city. These centers would include facilities for educating children from pre-school through the secondary level. From 10,000 to 25,000 people would utilize the facilities each day. The leading black Chicago newspaper and the Urban League had called for about thirty-two such units in a series of articles which appeared to be a reaction to ex-Chicago School Superintendent Willis' neighborhood

39Ibid., pp. 27 (Quotes), 28-31. Pertinent parts of the Redmond Report are considered in chapter v, pp. 176-82.
By 1971, another study expanded upon the educational cluster concept. It continued to advocate several models adapted to Chicago's specific demographic problems. These clusters were to be more decentralized than the conventional educational park plans and allow for specialized interests at each center. The clusters would include: Schomes, which are neighborhood pre-school, cognitively oriented school-homes serving about 150 children between the ages of three to six and intimately associated with an elementary school; Elementary Centers, which emphasize individualized instruction; Middle Schools, which serve ages eleven through fourteen, paying special attention to the developmental needs of this age group; Modified Secondary Schools, which offer a diverse and flexible set of alternatives for the student; Planning Centers, which would offer diagnostic and preventive educational planning for students and staff as well as providing liaison services between schools, communities and educational administrative bodies.

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agencies. These planning centers would also coordinate the efforts of the cultural-educational clusters with art and cultural centers, junior colleges, universities, parochial schools and the public magnet schools. An estimate of the construction costs of the long-range program was set at about one and one-half billion dollars.\textsuperscript{41}

While the educational park concept is far from becoming a reality, the magnet school plan, suggested in the Redmond Report, has been set in motion. Three to seven magnet schools are contemplated. Each school would emphasize a special program such as performing arts, science, or business. A school would serve about 1800 students equally divided into three age groups; three to six, seven to ten, and eleven to fourteen years of age. The school is internally decentralized to minimize numbers and fear. Units housing about 200 students will be assigned teacher teams. Various groupings and individualized instruction will be emphasized. The magnet school is designed to develop willing integration among diverse economic and racial groups by offering a superior

Thus far the Walt Disney Magnet School on the northeast side of the city is the only magnet school in operation. However, a "mini-magnet" school concept was the basis of the plan finally submitted to the Board as a substitute for the intra-community busing plan rejected for South Shore. Two facilities, one located in the Black School and another in a Hebrew school, both in South Shore, were designated as receiving schools. Three hundred pupils in grades one through six were to be culled from twenty elementary schools in Districts Seventeen, Twenty-two and Twenty-seven. Attendance at the receiving schools was on a voluntary basis. The racial balance of the student body was deliberately managed by choosing among the volunteers so that the student body was equally divided among black and white students. The plan was "to offer a quality, integrated program of education superior to those now offered at any school in the area so that parents will voluntarily seek to enroll their children in the facilities."43

The plan was accepted unanimously by the members of the Board. The South East Community Organization approved the program.

42 Ibid., pp. 40-43.

Only a few dissenters appeared at the meeting to predict that there would be no volunteers from the schools which had almost totally white student bodies. Of over 1600 students who applied for admission about 300 volunteers were white. The students were chosen by factor of grade, sex, race, home school and then picked by lottery. In the first group 152 were white and 148 were black while there were an equal number of boys and girls. In 1971 the program was operating with 400 students. Reading scores were seven months above the national average. As the area has become increasingly resegregated black, it has become more difficult to recruit white students and the sending area has been expanded. The program still remains one of the most promising in Chicago.44

The mini-magnet plan was not designed to stabilize the South Shore area. Stabilization did not occur. In September, 1968, the total percentage of whites enrolled in the public schools of South Shore District Twenty-two was 30.7 percent. Two years later only 7.2 percent of the total enrollment in the district was Caucasian. By 1974 it was estimated that 80 percent of the residents in South Shore were black people. But if it were to be argued that the

implementation of the busing program would have hastened the exodus of whites from the designated receiving schools to the south of South Shore, it should be noted what happened in those schools when the busing program was not initiated. The Burnham School, 0.0% black in 1967, was 73.4% black in 1970. The Anthony School, 0.4% black in 1967 was 49.4% black in 1970. The Goldsmith School, 0.0% black in 1967 was 37.3% black in 1970. The Hoyne School, 1.3% black in 1967 was 89.1% black in 1970. The Luella School, 3.2% black in 1967, was 64.7% black in 1970. The Warren School, 3.1% black in 1967, was 58.6% black in 1970. The Buckingham School, 0.0% black in 1967, was 36.7% black in 1970. The Cole School, 6.1% black in 1967, was 74.1% black in 1970. Obviously, other forces than those which could be exerted by the Board of Education were working in the southeast communities. If the South Shore plan had been implemented, how much faster could these schools have changed? Would the Board's integration policy then have been blamed for the rapid changeover almost totally accomplished by 1972?

Stabilization remains a major policy of the Board of Education. The numerous failures of this policy encountered throughout this entire study indicate that the Board has chosen an

TABLE 7

DESEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION OF EIGHT ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 
IN SOUTHEAST CHICAGO WHICH HAD BEEN DESIGNATED 
AS RECEIVING SCHOOLS IN THE REJECTED 
INTRA-COMMUNITY BUSING PROPOSALa

<table>
<thead>
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<th>School</th>
<th>September, 1967 % Negro</th>
<th>October, 1970 % Negro</th>
<th>September, 1972 % Negro</th>
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<tr>
<td>Anthony</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>92.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Buckingham</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>84.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warren</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>96.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

impotent method of dealing with desegregation problems. The Real Estate Research Corporation had argued that "stabilization of white population . . . would probably just divert non-white population growth to one or more other parts of the city. . . . For non-white population expansion must occur somewhere." The corporation had suggested that the Board's educational policy "must be directed in part at shifting future non-white population growth to the suburbs." 46

The Chicago Region Parent-Teachers Association recognized that numerous factors which influence integration are outside of the jurisdiction of the Board of Education. While it suggested many methods of helping to stabilize desegregating schools, the association also recommended that the Board take actions which would influence the total community on integration. One such action would be to support the passage of a strong open housing law. But the enforcement of the law is not a function of the Board. 47


Philip Hauser, in his report, had observed that the schools alone could not overcome the forces of segregation. It would "require the active participation of religious institutions, business and labor organizations, civic and community groups, and social and fraternal societies as well as of all agencies of government." Robert Havighurst agreed that the schools should become involved in the communities and become agents of social change. While these men had elaborate plans for achieving their goals, they could not give a formula to end the fear and prejudice of numberous whites in changing neighborhoods. As Board member Scheffler observed of Havighurst's report, "He's trying to do a lot of things that are impractical. . . . The difficulty is he's trying to take care of school matters from a sociological point of view instead of a practical point of view."48

The stabilization policy has also been questioned by a growing number of blacks who view it as based in a subtle white racism. Most stabilization programs have manipulated the movement

of black children. Certainly, the busing program has been one-sided. Black parents have begun to see stabilization as the responsibility of the whole community—a responsibility which "should not be placed as a burden on the backs of Negroes." During the busing controversy one black mother had exclaimed, "We will not allow our children to become helpless pawns in a desperate scheme to forstall the inevitable exodus of whites . . . nor do we particularly care to stem that exodus." Al Raby, a leading civil rights worker, had attacked the quota plan as stigmatizing Negro children and implying "that a black Chicago would be undesirable and that Negroes will always be underpaid." 49

Of course, one may ask, "Who speaks for the community?" Even acknowledged leaders are recognized to have taken positions which are later proven not to have been supported by a majority of the group for whom they assumed they were speaking. Thus, during the busing controversy, one speaker could exclaim that his acquaintances "take issue with certain organizations which are purporting to represent this area, when in actuality, their intentions, philosophies, and programs do not represent the true feelings of the

majority of area residents and taxpayers."50 Perhaps the only question that should be asked is, "Who speaks for this group?"

To help determine who is speaking for a school community and to open a dialogue between the Board and the communities, advisory councils were organized in 1971. These councils were designed to permit parents to share in the process of arriving at decisions. In establishing these councils the Board developed a more direct line of communication with the communities and, to some extent, by-passed its traditional reliance upon the school staff as a source of information. Principals at all of the city's public schools were required to hold well publicized meetings to set up the councils, but their participation in the councils was limited.51

The guidelines, as they evolved for the councils, were designed to keep control of the organizations in the hands of parents of the local pupils. Only parents and teachers could vote at the first meeting in which the council was organized. It was required that the chairman of the council be a parent. While the school principal was required to attend meetings, he was later disqualified from holding an office. Council members were to be

50 Southeast Economist (Chicago), February 1, 1968, p. 1.

residents in the school attendance district or representatives of institutions in the district. A minimum of 60 percent of the membership was to consist of parents of children in the school. All officers were to be parents.52

The Board granted the council the power to select a principal when a vacancy existed. They could also make recommendations regarding discipline, vandalism, pupil conduct, curriculum, safety, physical condition of buildings, community problems, school policies and procedures, selection of textbooks, and lunchroom problems. While their powers were not limited to this list, the councils were cautioned that the Board retained the responsibility for fiscal policies, salaries of personnel, purchases and contracts, real estate transactions and construction of buildings, certification and tenure of personnel and negotiations with employee organizations. The school principal was expected to comply with council requests, but the councils were to recognize that a principal might not have the administrative power to comply with every resolution.53

The possibility that these councils may obstruct the


operation of local schools in attempts to obtain parochial objectives is a real danger. One of the receiving schools has been without a principal for over a year, as the council has blocked eligible applicants who apparently did not share their ideological views. In another community, representatives of an ethnic group were influential in bringing about the resignation of a principal. Their objective is obviously to choose a replacement from their own ethnic group. In Austin, a district council rejected a report from one of its own committees calling for racial balance in west and northwest side schools. It was observed that young blacks joined with whites to defeat the recommendation. The blacks preferred neighborhood control of the schools. One member of the council, who favored desegregation, lamented, "We feel this [creation of councils] is a move to shift the burden of responsibility from the Board to community people who have no power."54

The problems the Board faces seem to be mounting. There exists a diversity of agencies within the city which are not coordinated in any attempt to bring the races together. The evidence indicates that there is a polarization of the races. Stabilization, a mainstay of the Board's integration policy, has an

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54 *Chicago Tribune*, January 9, 1972, Section 10, p. 10 (Quote). *Chicago Sun-Times*, May 21, 1972, p. 76.
almost incredible record of failures. But, in fact, the Board has no policy, except inaction, to substitute for the stabilization concept. As factions vie for power within the city, the Board, perhaps reflecting the traditional response of public decision-making bodies, mirrors the lack of unity which characterizes this period.

While the Austin busing plan did not help stabilize the south Austin community, it did not disrupt the receiving school areas on the northwest side of the city. The Redmond Report was correct in predicting that an area not contiguous to the expanding black ghetto would not be subject to the panic and flight associated with contiguous areas. On the southeast side, where the intra-community plan was not initiated, the designated receiving schools experienced rapid change as they rested in the path of the expanding Negro community. It appears that the decisions and policies of the Chicago Board of Education are only a minor factor in the politico-socio-economic forces which are shaping the city.
CHAPTER VIII

APPRAISAL AND TERMINATION FUNCTIONS:

FOUR GOALS OF THE BUSING

POLICY APPRAISED

This evaluation of the Chicago Austin busing program utilizes the rationale offered by the Board in its "Fact" sheets issued during the public hearings. The four goals were: to relieve serious overcrowding at the May and Spencer Schools; to promote stabilization throughout the Austin Area; to increase desegregation in District Four; to improve educational experiences for all children. While the attainment of these four goals becomes the criteria for judging the success of the implementation of the Board's decision, it should not be considered as a judgement on busing for integration as a policy in any other circumstances. It is only the fourth goal which reaches the essential principles outlined by the Supreme Court in 1954.

The Board's first expressed purpose for the busing program was to relieve overcrowding in the May and Spencer Schools. Obviously, the transfer of about 600 students from two schools would serve to alleviate some pressure upon their facilities. The question becomes, "Was the number involved in the plan sufficient
in magnitude to offer permanent relief to the schools?" Evidence indicates that the plan was not large enough in scope to stem the rising enrollment for one-half a year. Furthermore, the plan was not sufficiently elastic to allow for the channelling of adequate numbers out of the sending schools to relieve overcrowding at a later date.

In September, 1967, the enrollment at May School was 1559 students. The following year, after the busing plan was in effect, the enrollment was 1586. In 1969, a branch was opened, but the enrollment at the main building was 1692. At the Spencer School, the 1967 enrollment was 1325. In 1968, it rose to 1624 and in 1969 it rose again to 2076. The enrollment at both schools has continued to increase each year through 1971 as may be seen by the chart on the following page. To mitigate the overcrowding the Board built modular units, added mobiles and remodeled rooms. Construction was begun on the Austin Middle School to draw off the upper grades. In September, 1967, seventh and eighth grade pupils at the Spencer School were transferred under a mandatory program to the newly created Hay Upper Grade Center. With the completion of a fourteen room addition to the Spencer School in 1968, the program was soon ended. The withdrawal of the Spencer students from the Hay Upper Grade Center helped to stabilize the white enrollment at the latter
TABLE 8

ENROLLMENT FIGURES FOR TWENTIETH DAY:
SOUTH AUSTIN SCHOOLS, 1967-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>1371</td>
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<td>78.1</td>
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<td>95.9</td>
<td>416</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>98.5</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>92.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmet N.</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>691</td>
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<td>Hay</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>387</td>
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<td>122</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>1559</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>1586</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>1692</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>2336</td>
<td>99.8</td>
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<td>May Br.</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nash</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1259</td>
<td>37.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spencer</td>
<td>1325</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>1624</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>2076</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>2132</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>2282</td>
<td>99.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>9.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9186</td>
<td>9869</td>
<td>11548</td>
<td>13084</td>
<td>13925</td>
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</table>

1) Overcrowding or segregation were not relieved at the May or Spencer Schools.
2) Continuing racial change may be seen in the above schools.


322
school, but in September, 1969, Mrs. Malis was complaining about the severe overcrowding at the May, Spencer and Emmet Schools in Austin.¹

Two flaws existed in the busing plan which prevented it from relieving overcrowding at the sending schools. First, the 15 percent maximum quota limited the number of students who could be transferred to a fraction of the residential enrollment at the receiving schools. Second, the permissive feature in the transfer program created problems in establishing exact numbers as many parents had refused the transfer of their children. Furthermore, these flaws are magnified by the inability of the school staff to establish a program which would continue to draw off a maximum number of students from the sending schools.

In establishing the basis for the quota system the original

proposal adopted by the Board stated:

... that initially the percentage of pupils received will not exceed 11% of the total enrollment of the receiving school. As grades 7 and 8 are added this figure should not exceed 15%.\textsuperscript{2}

Numerous factors are involved in setting the quota. First, a base of enrollment for the receiving school must be established. When the plan was initiated, a special count was taken in each school to determine the number of students in the building. In the following two years, the teacher observation headcount, taken on the twentieth school day served as the base for the enrollment in the school. Second, a question centers on interpretation of "total enrollment" in the Board directive. In the initial plan, total enrollment was computed as the sum of the residential membership in the kindergarten through eighth grades, plus any special education class enrollment, plus the number of bused students. This sum, which represented virtually every student in the building, was then divided into the number of bused (Negro) students to obtain the percent of integration in the school. This method of computing the percent of racial integration was used in the first two district evaluation reports for the school years 1967-68 and 1968-69. It is alluded to in the third report also, although the

\textsuperscript{2} Proceedings, January 10, 1968, p. 2431. Underlining inserted by author.
basis for calculations in this report is vague. Before the question of the interpretation of "total enrollment" is considered further, it is important to apply the total residential enrollment criterion to establish the maximum allowable number of students which could be bused in accord with the original directive.

If we use the twentieth day teacher observation headcount figures as a basis, we may establish the maximum number of students which could be bused based on the established quotas. This would follow the formula:

\[ Z_{11} = 11x + 89 \] for the 11% quota; \n\[ Z_{15} = 3x + 17 \] for the 15% quota.

Where: \( Z \) = number to be bused in order to establish a total student body of which the Negro bused group would be at the percentile quota established; and \( x \) = number of the total residential student

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body in kindergarten through eight plus special education students. The formula will yield a maximum number of students that could be bused based on the calculations which were used when the busing plan was established. That is, the number of the total student body including bused students is taken as the divisor and the number of bused students is the dividend.

The first set of figures in Table 9 records the total residential enrollment (kindergarten through eighth plus special education classes) of the receiving schools based on the twentieth day headcount. The stability of the residential enrollment in the receiving schools may be seen by comparing the twentieth day September, 1967, figures to the April, 1968, figures which were reported when the busing program was begun. The second set of figures records the number of students being bused during the particular month of the year that the busing program reached its optimum. This period of busing of the maximum number of students occurred after the twentieth day headcounts were taken. Thus, the percent of desegregation recorded by the headcount was inaccurate.

4The formulas were derived by establishing $Z_{11} = .11 (x+Z)$ and $Z_{15} = .15 (x+Z)$ and solving.
in establishing the most favorable ratio of black to white students. The figures on the chart establish the optimum operation of the plan.

By applying the quota formulas to the total residential enrollment \( (x \text{ in the formula}) \), the maximum number of students which could be bused to achieve an 11 percent and a 15 percent quota is shown on lines \( Z_{11} = 11x + 89 \) and \( Z_{15} = 3x + 17 \). The chart assumes an 11 percent quota for the period ending in June, 1969. When all eight grades were being bused, beginning in September, 1969, the 15 percent quota is applicable. In comparing the maximum number of pupils actually bused to the maximum number allowable under the quota, it may be seen that the actual percent of desegregation has reached 10 percent during only the first two years of full operation. During the 1969-70 school year the number of students was 318 less than the possible maximum. In the 1970-71 school year the number of students being bused was 385 less than the possible maximum, and in the 1971-72 year the deficiency was 349 students.

The drop below 10 percent would negate the desegregation aspect of the busing program by the lowest established criterion. Beginning in 1971 the district evaluations adopted a method of computing total enrollment and percent of desegregation which differed from the original method of calculation. Residential
TABLE 9

COMPARISON OF MAXIMUM NUMBER OF STUDENTS ACTUALLY BUSED TO NUMBER OF STUDENTS REQUIRED TO REACH LIMITS OF QUOTA PLAN

Total Residential Enrollment (Kg--8 + Special Educ. Classes)
Based on Twentieth Day Headcount

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<td>Bridge</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burbank</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>397</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dever</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>834</td>
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<tr>
<td>Locke</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayre</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smyser</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.A. Thorp</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Residential Enrollment (x)</td>
<td>4927</td>
<td>4928</td>
<td>4915</td>
<td>5068</td>
<td>5198</td>
<td>5155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maximum Number of Students Required to Reach Limits of Quota

$Z_{11} = 11x + 89$

11% Quota (608) 608 607

$Z_{15} = 3x + 17$

15% Quota 867 893 917 939

x = Total Enrollment of Receiving Schools
Z = Quota Based on Receiving School Enrollment

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## TABLE 9--Continued

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<td>45</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td>53</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>Dever</td>
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<td>87</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>Locke</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Sayre</td>
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<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smyser</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.A. Thorp</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Bused</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>560</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quota Limit</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>607/867</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>909</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Actual Percent of Desegregation Achieved by Busing Students

|                | 9.4 | 11.2 | 10.2 | 9.3 | 9.8 |


enrollment for grades one through eight rather than kindergarten through eight was used as the base for computing the ratio. This was explained on the grounds that the busing program did not involve kindergarten children. A second change occurred in that the residential membership of grades one through eight, rather than the sum of the residential membership and the bused membership, was used as the divisor.5

Thus, in computing the percent of desegregation under the new method of calculation, the number 4286, representing the residential students in grades one through eight in April, 1971, would become the divisor, and the number, 496, representing the number of bused students in April, 1971, becomes the dividend. The new formula yields \((496 + 4286) \cdot (100) = 11.57\) as the percent of desegregation. If the total enrollment in grades one through eight was used as the divisor, the formula yields \(\left[ 496 + (4286 + 496) \right] \cdot 100 = 10.37\) as the percent of desegregation. If one returns to the original method of calculation the figures for April, 1971, are not available, but the September, 1970, residential enrollment would be relatively accurate. We would obtain \(\left[ 496 + (5198 + 496) \right] \cdot 100 = 8.71\) as the percent of desegregation. It may be seen that

5D.E., 1971, pp. 4-5.
the new method of calculating the percent of desegregation results in a substantial and important alteration of the statistical data derived.  

This data imposes definite qualifications upon an assessment that the school system was successful in achieving its stated goals of relieving overcrowding and increasing desegregation. Undoubtedly, the busing of over five hundred students each school year must have relieved overcrowding at the sending schools to the extent that the bused students were no longer adding to the congestion in their neighborhood facilities. However, the overcrowding could have been relieved to a considerably greater extent if the plan had operated at its optimum figures rather than the greatly reduced numbers actually involved. Certainly, desegregation was furthered to the extent that black children were attending previously all-white schools which would not have had any black students if the busing program did not exist. But it is evident that the desegregation remained so minimal that it was necessary to change the method of calculating the percent of integration in order to conform with the lowest statistical criterion for desegregation.

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An analysis of the community pressures to which the Board has been subjected helps explain the slackened pace of the busing program. While the busing plan was being initiated, emphasis in the black communities was shifting from integration to black self-determination. Over 55 percent of the parents of students eligible for busing refused permission for their children to participate. School administrators emphasized smaller class sizes and educational opportunities, rather than integration, when explaining the plan to black parents. Thus, as facilities and programs have been expanded in the south Austin area, there has been less motivation for parents to involve their children in the busing program. Dr. Redmond, in considering the limitations of the permissive transfer program, has observed "a decreased interest in integration as a result of the black consciousness movement."\(^7\)

In contrast, the residents of the receiving community and a large segment of the white population in general, have remained opposed to busing as a means of integration. The American Institute of Public Opinion in late 1971 found 79 percent of the white

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population surveyed to be against busing. The plurality of surveyed blacks, 47 percent, also expressed opposition, although 45 percent of the Negroes questioned indicated their favor. The ambiguity in the black response was matched by the performance of the national government after the 1968 elections. While the federal courts have continued to press for desegregation, the federal administration has equivocated and disavowed ambitious busing proposals. In Chicago no court action designating that busing be utilized for integration has been initiated. The attention of federal authorities has turned to the integration of school faculties. There has been no pressure to expand the busing program and covert pressure to keep from expanding it.8

A third goal of the busing program had been "to promote stabilization throughout the Austin Area." When the plan was initially implemented, the percentage of white students at the May and Spencer Schools rose from 13 percent to 17.2 percent and from 11.9 percent to 16.4 percent respectively. For the few months left in the 1967-68 school year, and using the 15 percent quota guidelines, both schools had been reintegrated. But this increase

in percentage represented the drop in black enrollment rather than any influx of white students. The schools were well beyond the tipping point at which the white enrollment historically had rapidly declined. The following September, 1968, only 45 white students, representing 2.8 percent of May's enrollment, and 120 white students, representing 7.4 percent of Spencer's enrollment, attended the two schools. By 1971 only 11 white students were counted in attendance at the two schools.\textsuperscript{9}

Indeed, the dramatic changeover of the Austin community raced ahead of the predictions made by the Real Estate Research Corporation. The white enrollment at Austin High School dropped from 58 percent in 1967 to 49 percent in 1968 and 25 percent in 1969. Only 7.4 percent of the school's enrollment was Caucasian in 1970. By the end of 1969 it was evident that the block by block white-to-black change had reached the western edge of the city as the Emmet School changed from 20.3 percent Negro to 67 percent Negro in one year.\textsuperscript{10}

The district evaluations of the busing program recognized


that "it is possible that stabilization of the Austin Area, as a goal, should not have been an original consideration of the Austin busing plan because, historically, stabilization has occurred infrequently." The studies did observe that families of bused Negro students may not have moved as frequently as other families which did not have their children involved in the busing program. This hypothesis was based on the fact that most of the families of the bused children remained in the May and Spencer School neighborhoods. 11 The search for the reason that the families of bused students were more stable introduces one of the unresolved problems in analyzing the busing program. As the decision to allow children to be bused was an option of the parents, to what extent did this freedom of choice serve to separate out a group of students with backgrounds which would be more stable and, indeed, more academically motivated?

The fourth stated purpose of the busing plan was to "improve the educational experiences of all children." Improving educational experiences must be viewed not only in terms of providing optimal conditions for academic achievement, but also in terms of providing optimal conditions for social adjustment. The United

States Supreme Court had succinctly stated the case for integration when it observed of Negro children, "To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."12

Two factors separate the Chicago busing plan from Brown Case rationale: the segregation the Board had moved to correct was not de jure; the major motive black parents had in accepting the plan was escape from the overcrowded conditions in their local schools. Indeed, one could question whether the psychological factors involved in the Brown decision would not really work to the detriment of the children's hearts and minds. While desegregation was being achieved to the extent that Negro children were attending previously all-white schools, what would be the reaction of these children to the hostile reception members of the white community had extended? In terms of academic achievement the evidence indicates that the black children being bused would perform better than their counterparts who remained in the sending schools.

The scholastic achievement of the bused students has been

evaluated through four sources: parents, teachers, principals and comparative test scores. The parents of the bused students were asked to evaluate the scholastic progress and study habits of their children. The number of responses was considerable--461 survey questionnaires, representing 80 percent of the total number distributed, were returned in 1969, and 340 questionnaires, representing 64 percent of those distributed, were returned in 1970. Comments were tabulated according to categories of; Satisfied, In-Between, and Not-Satisfied. The high degree of satisfaction expressed by parents can be examined in Table 10 which follows this page. Some parents comments were: "We are for the busing program 100 percent. My son's interest in learning has been stimulated by a fine teacher and more desirable surroundings." "I think my son is getting a good education at ____ School." "She has taken more interest in her school work." "She is doing a lot better than when she started."13

Parents of students residing in the immediate area of the receiving schools were asked the same questions. In 1969, 2628 of the questionnaires were returned representing 65 percent of those

TABLE 10

TOTAL RESPONSES OF PARENTS OF BUSED PUPILS:
1968--1969--1970

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Question</th>
<th>1968a</th>
<th>1969b</th>
<th>1970c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>In-Between</td>
<td>Not-Satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholastic Progress</td>
<td>256 88</td>
<td>20 10</td>
<td>11 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Habits</td>
<td>251 88</td>
<td>22 10</td>
<td>10 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Relationships</td>
<td>245 88</td>
<td>26 9</td>
<td>8 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>197 87</td>
<td>21 10</td>
<td>9 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholastic Progress</td>
<td>358 92.5</td>
<td>16 4.1</td>
<td>13 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Habits</td>
<td>362 89.3</td>
<td>25 6.1</td>
<td>18 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Relationships</td>
<td>299 88.4</td>
<td>23 7.0</td>
<td>16 4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>294 90.1</td>
<td>18 5.5</td>
<td>14 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholastic Progress</td>
<td>242 92.4</td>
<td>15 5.7</td>
<td>5 1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Habits</td>
<td>242 88.3</td>
<td>27 9.8</td>
<td>5 1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Relationships</td>
<td>235 91.8</td>
<td>18 7.0</td>
<td>3 1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>207 95.4</td>
<td>8 3.7</td>
<td>2 .9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


sent out. In 1970, 2102 questionnaires, representing 45 percent of those sent out, were returned. Table 11 on the following page indicates the responses. The 1969 response is interesting in that well over one-half of the responders expressed satisfaction with the academic progress of their children, but in their open-ended comments they expressed great dissatisfaction with the program. In 1970, the number of responses indicating satisfaction with the scholastic progress of the children fell considerably. The movement to an "In-Between" position indicates the continuing apprehension white parents had about the busing program. The vast majority of comments on busing were opposed for social or administrative reasons, but some expressed academic objections such as "Enlarged class size is detrimental." 14 As will be shown later, there was no evidence to support any fears that the academic advancement of white children suffered as a result of the busing program.

Teachers were asked to evaluate the bused students' academic progress. The standards of the receiving school served as the criteria for an appraisal of progress as: Good, Fair, or None. Beginning with the 1969-70 school year, "Poor" was substituted for "None." It can be seen in Table 12 that this change of nomenclature

### TABLE 11

**TOTAL RESPONSES OF PARENTS OF PUPILS IN RECEIVING AREA 1969--1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>1969a</th>
<th>1970b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>In-Between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholastic Progress</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Habits</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Relationships</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholastic Progress</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Habits</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Relationships</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


was accompanied by an increased use of the "Poor" classification. The chart does not show the wide variation in teachers' responses from school to school. While over 41 percent of the students at five schools were classified in 1968 as "Good" in Academic Progress, only 20 percent were classified as "Good" at one school. Under "Study Habits" six schools classified between 30 percent and 50 percent of the bused students as "Good," but only 17 percent of the students at one school and no students at another school were classified as "Good."15

This deviation in range closed somewhat in the next two years. In 1969 between 29 percent and 48 percent were classified as "Good" in "Academic Progress" and between 35 percent and 61 percent were classified as "Good" in "Study Habits." In 1970 the variation in "Academic Progress" was ten points between 32 percent and 42 percent, while the percent classified as "Good" in "Study Habits" varied between 29 percent and 50 percent. This variation reflects the subjective criteria used by the teachers. However, over the four year period the total percentage evaluated in "Academic Progress" as "Good" in any year has varied only four points—between 36.5 percent and 40.5 percent. Only in 1970 did the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>1968a</th>
<th></th>
<th>1969b</th>
<th></th>
<th>1970c</th>
<th></th>
<th>1971d</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Progress</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>38'</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Progress</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Habits</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


percent of students evaluated below "Fair" rise above the 20th percentile. Teacher evaluation of "Study Habits" of the bused students, however, indicates that this area has consistently represented a major concern for the teachers. In only one year were less than one-fourth of the bused students ranked in the lowest category.16

The number of bused students that have been retained in the same grade for another year has been small. To some extent the policy of allowing bused pupils to return to their sending school at the request of parents may have influenced the number of non-promotions. Several returns were based on the appraisal of parents that their children could not keep up with their studies in the receiving schools. Table 13 indicates the failure rates in the receiving schools. In the year ending in June, 1968, ten of the thirty students not promoted came from the busing program. However, when the percentage of non-promotions is computed for each receiving school, no pattern may be discerned between the rates before and after the busing program. When the failure rate for the combined enrollment of the receiving schools is computed, no jump in the percent of failures occurs until the end of the second full

### TABLE 13

**COMPARISON OF FAILURE RATES IN RECEIVING SCHOOLS:**

**JUNE, 1967--JUNE, 1972**

**Total Enrollment and Failure Comparison**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receiving Schools</th>
<th>Total Enrollment</th>
<th>Number Failed</th>
<th>% of Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept, 1966</td>
<td>4750</td>
<td>June, 1967</td>
<td>28&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April, 1968</td>
<td>5447</td>
<td>June, 1968</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept-Nov, 1968</td>
<td>5546</td>
<td>June, 1969</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept-Nov, 1969</td>
<td>5609</td>
<td>June, 1970</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept-Oct, 1970</td>
<td>5730</td>
<td>June, 1971</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept-Oct, 1971</td>
<td>5715</td>
<td>June, 1972</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Failure Rates at Individual Receiving Schools**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bridge</td>
<td>0.00 (0)</td>
<td>0.00 (0)</td>
<td>0.65 (3)</td>
<td>0.17 (3)</td>
<td>0.76 (5)</td>
<td>0.30 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burbank</td>
<td>0.85 (3)</td>
<td>0.45 (2)</td>
<td>0.69 (3)</td>
<td>2.60 (12)</td>
<td>0.45 (2)</td>
<td>0.67 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dever</td>
<td>0.11 (1)</td>
<td>0.53 (5)</td>
<td>0.78 (7)</td>
<td>0.43 (4)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.10 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locke</td>
<td>0.00 (0)</td>
<td>0.21 (2)</td>
<td>0.20 (2)</td>
<td>2.13 (20)</td>
<td>1.51 (14)</td>
<td>0.33 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>1.10 (6)</td>
<td>1.20 (8)</td>
<td>0.75 (5)</td>
<td>1.51 (10)</td>
<td>1.39 (9)</td>
<td>0.84 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayre</td>
<td>0.00 (0)</td>
<td>0.30 (2)</td>
<td>1.48 (8)</td>
<td>0.34 (2)</td>
<td>0.68 (4)</td>
<td>0.00 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smyser</td>
<td>1.95 (10)</td>
<td>1.10 (7)</td>
<td>0.32 (2)</td>
<td>0.16 (1)</td>
<td>0.32 (2)</td>
<td>0.00 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thorpe</td>
<td>1.00 (8)</td>
<td>0.60 (5)</td>
<td>0.11 (1)</td>
<td>0.47 (4)</td>
<td>0.11 (1)</td>
<td>0.11 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>b</sup>Chicago Public Schools, Teacher Observation Headcount (Hand tabulated Xeroxed copies, Chicago, 1966, District Four). Estimate based upon using reported percentage of failure for each school, and multiplying this by enrollment reported in September, 1966. The whole number was taken as the true number failed and fractions were dismissed on the assumption that the June, 1967, enrollment would be lower than the initial enrollment.
year of busing, but the rate drops below the pre-busing percentage by the end of the fourth year.17

When the bused students are compared academically to the resident students at the receiving schools, they do not fare well. The median reading scores for the sixth and eighth grade bused students fall almost consistently within the lowest quartile of reading scores computed for the entire tested student body of the receiving school. Furthermore, the rate of progress between the sixth and eighth grade is considerably lower for the bused students than for the resident students of the receiving schools. The drop in the rate of progress for bused students graduating in 1971 is indicated in Table 14. An initial drop in the progress of students was also observed in a Berkeley study at the beginning of their desegregation plan. A retesting of the sixth grade class later indicated that the loss was, however, almost entirely recovered within six months. Studies of desegregation projects in Berkeley, California, and Hartford, Connecticut, indicate that gains in

TABLE 14

COMPARISON OF MEDIAN READING SCORES OF BUSED PUPILS IN 1971 GRADUATING CLASS WITH MEDIAN SCORES OF NATIONAL, SENDING, AND RECEIVING SCHOOL STUDENTS IN SAME YEAR AND GRADEa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade and Year</th>
<th>1965-66 Test Before Busing</th>
<th>1967-68 Test</th>
<th>1968-69 Test</th>
<th>1970-71 Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>3.3b</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>3.9b</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key
- National Median Scores
- Bused Students Scores
- Sending School Scores
- Receiving School Scores
- Including Bused Students


bApproximation made from interpreting graphs and data supplied.
achievement for the upper elementary grades noticeably depreciate. This tendency, evident in the Chicago 1971 bused graduate group, may very well reflect the fact that students in the lower quartile achievement group tend to continue to slip at an accelerating rate behind their peers who are in the higher quartiles. However, there is no evidence that the resident students are regressing. Table 14, showing reading scores for the 1971 receiving school graduating classes, indicates a close parallel to national median increases in achievement.\textsuperscript{18}

A comparison of the reading scores of the bused students to those of the students at the sending schools reveals that the bused students did better than their neighbors who attended the sending schools. As may be seen in Table 15, for the 1971 sixth grade, there was little difference between the median scores of the bused pupils and those of the students who remained at the sending schools at the third grade level. However, by the sixth grade level the bused students have progressed about one-half grade

TABLE 15

COMPARISON OF MEDIAN READING SCORES OF BUSED PUPILS IN 1973 GRADUATING CLASS WITH MEDIAN SCORES OF NATIONAL AND SENDING SCHOOL STUDENTS IN SAME YEAR AND GRADE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reading Score</th>
<th>7.0</th>
<th>6.0</th>
<th>5.0</th>
<th>4.0</th>
<th>3.0</th>
<th>2.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade &amp; Year</td>
<td>1967-68 test just prior to beginning busing</td>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key</td>
<td>National Median Scores</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bused Student Scores</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sending School Scores</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

beyond the level of the sending school pupils. This was the case for the graduating classes of both 1971 and 1973. The bused students in the eighth grade class of 1971 had outdistanced the students at the sending schools by almost a full grade.\(^{19}\)

The significance of these observations is clouded by numerous factors. The permissive aspect of the busing plan may have served to select a group of students whose parents would be more likely to encourage them to achieve. One of the most common observations made by principals of the receiving schools was that "those bused children who achieved in the receiving school would have achieved anyway."\(^{20}\) This observation is not supported by the test data for the 1967-68 third grade class (Table 15). These students had just been tested before the busing program was begun. As has already been established, there was only a small difference in the test scores of those students who were recruited into the busing program and those students who remained at the sending schools. Indeed,


\(^{20}\)Ibid., p. 26. Studies of parental motives for declining to allow their children to be bused have indicated that the refusers value education for their children as much, or more, than those who opted for busing. See Laurence T. Cagle and Jerome Beker, "Social Characteristics and Education Aspirations of Northern Lower-Class, Predominantly Negro Parents Who Accepted and Declined a School Integration Opportunity," Journal of Negro Education, XXXVII (Fall, 1968), 406-17, passim.
the median scores of the bused students in the class of 1973 were a bit lower than the scores of the remaining students.

However, due to the turnover of students in the south Austin area it may well be that the characteristics of the student body at the sending schools were changing. Certainly, the third grade classes at May and Spencer Schools, recorded in Table 14 for 1965-66, did not consist of the same students as the eighth grade classes of those schools in 1970-71. In 1965 no Negro students attended May and only 103 students, representing 10.1 percent of the student body attended the Spencer School. However, by 1967-68, when our data for comparison is becoming more significant, only 12 percent of the combined student bodies of the two schools consisted of Caucasians. In 1968-69 the percentage of whites at the two schools had dropped to 5 percent. By 1971, the enrollment of May School increased by 777 students, about 50 percent over its 1967 enrollment. The Spencer School experienced an increase of 857 students, about 65 percent over its 1967 enrollment.21

Thus, the bused students of the class of 1971 were about equal in reading achievement with a student body at May and Spencer Schools in 1965-66 which was on a par with the national median. By 1968-69 the student bodies of the May-Spencer Schools had fallen

considerably below the national median and so had the bused students. While the scores of the bused students remained higher than the changing student body of the sending schools, the scores of the bused students showed no significant gain in comparison to what might have been predicted to be their progress. However, the nature of the 1971 bused graduating class was also experiencing some change. The retention rate among the bused students at the receiving schools was 61.6 percent in 1968-69 and 89.9 percent in 1969-70.  

While the student bodies being compared were obviously in great flux, the fact that the bused students were residents of the area from which the sending schools drew their student bodies indicates a common social environmental background. Thus, the data in the graphs may be significant, but there is room to question whether the student body being compared is sufficiently homogeneous in character to allow comparisons. Some conclusions are warranted.

The 1971 graduating class, according to the data in the District Evaluation, showed less progress than should be expected between third and sixth grade. However, as the majority of this period was spent at the sending school, the influence of the busing...
program must have been minimal. Between sixth and eighth grade the bused students' reading level reached 6.2 as compared to 5.1 for the sending school students. However, the spread between the reading scores increased from 0.9 to 1.1 during the two year period. This represents a difference of only 0.2 between the median scores of the bused students and the students in the sending schools in the two year period, 1968-69 to 1970-71. This difference between the scores of the two groups is not large enough to justify any speculation on the effect of the busing program.

Data on the 1973 graduating class requires different conclusions. The classes were tested just prior to the beginning of the busing program. The group of students which began busing in third grade scored just slightly lower than the student bodies of the sending schools (2.8 compared to 2.9). Three years later when the students were tested again, the bused students scored 5.2 on the reading test compared to 4.6 for the students in the sending schools. This difference indicates that the bused students of the 1973 graduating class have progressed at a more rapid rate than their counterparts in the sending schools. While the evidence is conflicting, there are good reasons for considering the 1973 graduating class data to be more valid than the data for the 1971 graduating class. Students in the 1973 class began busing at an
earlier age when they would be more impressionable. The three year period between tests of the 1973 class was spent in the receiving schools compared to only a two year period for the 1971 eighth grade class. The student body at the sending school in 1968 was more homogeneous in comparison to the 1973 class than was the 1965 sending school body to the 1971 class.

Data concerning the attendance of the bused students also lends itself to contention that the busing program has been academically advantageous to the bused students. When the transfer program was being proposed, an argument against busing contended that the attendance of the bused students would suffer due to the inconveniences of the time consumed by the transportation. In analyzing Table 16 it can be seen that the attendance of the bused students in school year 1968-69 was better than the attendance of the students in the sending schools in seven months of the year. The attendance of the receiving school students, however, was noticeably better than the attendance of the bused students.

In the 1969-70 school year the attendance of the bused students has improved as compared to the attendance of a year earlier. However, the attendance of the students at the sending schools has declined from the previous year. The bused students' attendance is consistently higher than the attendance of the sending school
### TABLE 16

PERCENT ATTENDANCE OF BUSED STUDENTS COMPARED TO 
SENDING AND RECEIVING SCHOOL STUDENTS:
SEPTEMBER, 1968--JUNE, 1971

|--------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| **1968-69**  
M.P.   | 91.47 | 90.92| 90.36| 89.18| 88.35| 88.10| 86.89| 86.71| 86.88| 87.12 |
| S.P.   | 93.47 | 92.76| 92.61| 91.17| 90.15| 89.29| 88.21| 88.02| 88.00| 88.34 |
| B.P.   | 88.68 | 93.21| 92.29| 88.75| 89.78| 92.51| 91.35| 92.43| 92.33| 92.84 |
| R.S.P. | 96.05 | 95.88| 91.90| 94.45| 94.19| 93.94| 92.39| 92.84| 93.29| 93.79 |
| **1969-70**  
M.P.   | 89.41 | 86.86| 87.72| 87.84| 79.17| 85.04| 85.27| 85.71| 85.98| 86.83 |
| S.P.   | 86.12 | 89.50| 87.94| 86.50| 76.00| 85.31| 85.33| 85.30| 85.71| 87.30 |
| B.P.   | 94.61 | 94.21| 95.36| 94.48| 86.75| 90.11| 88.48| 92.08| 92.73| 93.37 |
| R.S.P. | 96.39 | 94.91| 94.41| 94.21| 91.43| 92.15| 92.46| 93.98| 95.33| 94.75 |
| **1970-71**  
M.P.   | 93.14 | 92.03| 90.77| 90.03| 88.89| 87.74| 87.92| 88.36| 88.50| 88.46 |
| S.P.   | 93.28 | 91.81| 90.67| 89.77| 88.63| 88.29| 88.26| 88.49| 88.67| 88.90 |
| B.P.   | 96.38 | 96.24| 95.15| 93.30| 94.88| 95.02| 95.80| 93.80| 96.73| 95.10 |
| R.S.P. | 96.55 | 96.22| 95.53| 95.17| 94.82| 93.95| 93.88| 94.43| 94.48| 94.69 |

**Key**

- M.P.--May Pupils
- S.P.--Spencer Pupils
- B.P.--Bused Pupils
- R.S.P.--Receiving School Pupils

---


pupils, and it is in closer accord with the attendance of the receiving school. In 1970-71 while attendance at the sending schools has improved, the attendance of the bused students has increased so that it is not only consistently higher than the percent attendance of the sending schools, but has also surpassed the attendance rate of the receiving schools during six months of the ten month year.

These figures show that although the bused students as a group were usually better in attendance than the students in the sending schools, the bused students' attendance continued to improve and drew closer to the attendance rate of the receiving schools. It is indicated that the bused students were developing attendance habits similar to the students in the receiving schools. As attendance at school is an important element in obtaining a quality education, this factor must be considered as a possible bonus in this particular busing plan.

Certainly, the social aspects of the educational experiences of all the students involved are an important goal in education. For the vast majority of the parents of the bused children the improvement of social relationships was clear. Table 10(page 338) shows the overwhelming percentage of parents who expressed satisfaction regarding the social relationships of their children.
Comments regarding this relationship were, "He has gained new strength and knowledge of people of other races." "Her school has a lot of extra curricular activities." "There were some hard times, but they have passed."23

The parents of students living in the receiving area did not perceive the social relationships of their children to be improved. Table 11 indicates that a majority of parents were less than satisfied with the social relationship aspect of their children's education. Their open end comments expressed even more dissatisfaction. Some parents expressed concern about the expansion of the program in such comments as, "Continued influx of busing students will eventually overcrowd our neighborhood schools to the point where we shall have to transport our neighborhood children to another school, long distances, and without busing privileges." "I will try to change schools or move anywhere where there is not so much tension since this last year."24

Other parents felt the racial encounters were detrimental to their children. They observed: "They [Negro children] are very arrogant and seems they like to bully the children at recess, or


in line, or in the washroom." "I do not approve of the four
letter words and worse that are used by the bused children. It
has been necessary at least once a week to explain the meaning of
foul language and signs and why they should be ignored and not
used." "It can be seen very clearly that these children have no
respect for adults or their schoolmates." Some parents felt no
social interaction was occurring and expressed this belief with
comments such as: "My child plays only with white boys and doesn't
mingle with the black children. From my own observations, they
stay in their own group showing their own partiality." "Busing
has not achieved integration." Some parents expressed a neu-
trality with such comments as, "My son has no complaint." "The
busing program has not affected my daughter in any way that is
evident to me. My daughter has never complained or felt that it
affected her in any situation." It was an unusual parent who
commented, "We are most grateful that our daughter has attended the
School for more reasons than one--but I know of no better
reason than the wholesome experience she gained as a result of the
busing program."25

25Ibid., pp. 22-23 (First, second, fourth, seventh, eighth
There was a wide variability among the evaluations of individual teachers. When their reports are tallied in Table 12 (page 342) it may be seen that they ranked the bused students highest in social progress in every year. In only one year were more than 18 percent of the students placed in the lowest category and in only one year did less than 51 percent rank in the highest category. Teachers also indicated that generally they received support from the parents of the bused pupils. However, they did express a desire that the program be designed to better screen the students being sent. In the 1968-69 school year twenty-four students were returned for reasons other than transfers from the sending district. In the 1969-70 year twenty-nine were returned. While these students were not returned for disciplinary reasons, the existence of the possibility of returning must have served to alleviate some of the most serious social problems.26

When the conduct grades assigned by teachers in the receiving schools are compared with the conduct grades received by the same students when attending the sending schools, an interesting disparity can be noted. Of forty-eight bused graduates in 1970, twenty-four had been graded "Excellent," fourteen received "Good,"

eight were marked "Fair" and two were considered "Unsatisfactory." In 1967 when these forty-eight were graded as students at the Spencer or May Schools, only fourteen students were graded "Excellent," twenty-seven received "Good," five were marked "Fair" and two were considered "Unsatisfactory." This improvement in deportment grades is evident again when the 1971 bused graduates are studied.\footnote{D.E., 1970, pp. 33, 37. D.E., 1971, pp. 23, 25.}

Two interpretations may be put forth to explain this discrepancy. The teachers at the receiving schools may have used a double standard in evaluating the bused students. They may have expected less acceptable behavior and therefore graded the bused students higher when they performed "normally." On the other hand, the change in environment may have resulted in an actual improvement in overt behavior on the part of many students. As the focus of a good deal more attention at the receiving school than at the sending school, the students may have had a greater incentive to conform to normally acceptable school behavior. The latter interpretation finds support in the observation of receiving school principals that "since most of the upper grade bused pupils have been in the school for three years, their behavior conforms more
to that of the residential pupils."^{28}

The choice of high schools may indicate some perceptions of the bused students regarding their social and academic adjustment. The program allowed bused students to choose between their home high school or Steinmetz High School which served the receiving schools. Classes of bused students began graduating from the receiving schools in 1970. As the chart on the next page shows there has been a steady increase in the number of students who have chosen to attend the receiving area school over the period 1970-72. This increase is rather significant, the percentage of students choosing to attend Steinmetz jumping from 45 percent to 84 percent within two years. The most obvious explanation is that, as students have attended the receiving schools for longer periods of time, they tend to prefer going on to the receiving area school with their classmates. Whether the peer group influencing them is black or white is not evident. One effect of this choice is that Steinmetz High School, which had only four Negro students in 1967, was 3.2 percent desegregated in 1972.^{29}


TABLE 17

CHOICE OF HIGH SCHOOLS BY BUSED STUDENTS: 1970-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Austin (Home Area School)</th>
<th>Steinmetz (Receiving Area School)</th>
<th>Lane (Academic-Engineering)</th>
<th>Vocational Type</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The evaluations of the busing program by principals of the receiving schools tend to reflect the negative aspects of the plan that they have encountered. On the positive side, principals saw signs of academic improvement among the bused students, especially at the lower grade levels. They could see no signs that the achievement level of residential students was falling. They also found the parents of bused students to be cooperative when contacted, although these parents seldom participated in school programs and activities.30

Early principal evaluations emphasized the need for more services to cope with the new situation. Every year they have observed that the bused students are performing at a lower academic level than the majority of resident students. One of the most

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frequent observations made by all the principals has been that those children who achieved well in the receiving school would have achieved well in the sending school, and children who did not achieve well in the receiving school would not achieve well in the sending school.

In social adjustment the principals observed that the transportation schedules did limit the opportunity for bused students to participate in after school events. But one might question the number of events in which the children would stay to participate. The covert and sometimes overt opposition of the receiving community was mentioned in every report. While most black parents were reported to be pleased with the plan, there were numerous accusations of racism and prejudice. The principals' concern with discipline problems was evident in that most continually called for better screening of the children chosen for busing and the establishment of a set of criteria for returning maladjusted children to their sending schools. Most of the discipline problems originated with a few children and usually during lunch or play periods.

The principals noted that the children in the primary grades played together more freely than the older children. Polarization of the races became more pronounced in the later grades. One
principal observed that this was especially true of the girls who reach puberty sooner than the boys. As the children moved up in the grades, discipline problems were reported to increase. However, it was generally concluded that these problems were more related to the difficulties of preadolescence than to race relations.

In conclusion, it may be observed that the objectives set for the busing program by the Board of Education have either not been achieved or can not be verified by this study. Severe overcrowding at the May and Spencer Schools was not immediately relieved by the initiation of the plan. Indeed, overcrowding was not alleviated until numerous other measures were taken to create more space for the rapidly expanding south Austin school population. However, to the extent that between five and six hundred students were moved to schools with empty seats, the overcrowding problem was ameliorated.

Stabilization of the Austin community and the May and Spencer Schools in particular was not accomplished by any but the most modest criterion. The south Austin community experienced rapid desegregation and resegregation. The only stabilization that may have occurred rests in the possibility that some families of children in the busing program may have chosen not to move in
order to remain in a sending area. On the other hand, the receiving neighborhoods remained stable despite the protests of many opponents of the plan that there would be a white exodus from the area.

In considering desegregation as a goal, we must distinguish it from integration. Desegregation may be considered to be an almost mechanical intermingling of people according to some prescribed quota. In achieving the quota, which may be as low as 10 percent, it is often assumed that certain positive educational and social effects will result from the proximity of the races. However, the achievement of desegregation as a goal does not require the attainment of the educational and social goals. Desegregation refers to the attainment of the prescribed quota.

Even when we assume this limited definition of desegregation, the busing program has still fallen short of attaining the 15 percent maximum designated in the original plan. Indeed, the administration has found it necessary to calculate the percent of desegregation on a different basis than in the original plan in order to obtain a minimal 10 percent quota figure. Three factors help to explain the stagnation of the busing program. Black parents originally saw the busing plan as an alternative to the overcrowded May and Spencer Schools. As new facilities and programs became available in south Austin, there has been less reason for
parents to turn to busing as a method of seeking quality education for their children.

Furthermore, Negro leaders in Chicago have been inclining toward black power positions which placed less emphasis on integration. Thus, school officials have encountered little pressure from the black communities for an expansion of the busing program. On the other hand, there has been a continuing, if covert, opposition to busing in a large segment of the white community. Given the existing community sentiments, it would indeed be startling to discover the Board exerting pressure to expand the program.

Finally, the goal of improving educational experiences for all children must be considered. The evidence remains moot for the residential students. Their test scores indicate no significant improvement or decline since the initiation of the program. No tests have been given to evaluate their perception of themselves or their bused peers. A majority of their parents who have responded to questionnaires have indicated less than a satisfied attitude toward the social and academic aspects of their children's education. These negative attitudes must have an undesirable effect on their children's conceptions of the bused students.

The effects of white prejudice have not been overt. Some parents of the bused students have complained of prejudice, but an
overwhelming majority of black parents have indicated that they are satisfied with the academic and social progress of their children. Their evaluation is supported by the teachers' reports for most of the students. Over two-thirds of the bused students have almost consistently scored fair or above in the teacher responses. The failure rate has been small among the bused pupils, although the bused students as a group remain academically at the bottom of the class.

Certain decisions of the bused students indicate their growing adjustment to their situation. Their attendance rate has continued to improve over that of their peers in the sending schools and has reached and even surpassed the attendance patterns of the residential pupils in the receiving schools. It is unlikely that a discontented group of students would have such an excellent attendance record. The improvement in the conduct grades of the bused students may indicate their adjustment to their receiving schools. This interpretation does fit in with the matrix of data indicating the social adjustment of the black pupils. The growing number of students choosing Steinmetz High School with its segregated white student body is further evidence of the social adjustment of the bused students.

The significance of the data regarding the reading scores of
the bused students is questionable. The data for the graduating class of 1971 is inconclusive as numerous factors cloud the validity of the comparisons which are made. However, the data indicates that the bused students in the 1973 graduating class made academic gains beyond the level achieved by their counterparts in the sending schools. There is no evidence to indicate that the rate of achievement of residential students in the receiving schools was affected positively or adversely by the busing program.

Although the first three goals established for the busing plan were not achieved, there is evidence that educational experiences have been improved for some children. This evidence is certainly sufficient to justify the continuance of the busing program. There are other reasons for continuing the program. The threat of renewed concern on the part of federal authorities if the Chicago Board of Education reversed its action on busing is an obvious factor in the continuance of the program. But there is a more valid reason for integration.

While a large segment of the Negro community may disdain busing for numerous reasons, a significant number of blacks are concerned with integration. Indeed, if we are to avoid the polarization warned against in the Kerner Report, positive action toward integration is a necessity. The strength of black separatism rests
in white rejection of integration. The underlying premise of black separatism is, "If you are going to have an entirely black community, then black people ought to control their life in it." School administrators and board members cannot use a lack of black interest in desegregation as an excuse for inaction. It has been the failure to act which helped slacken the black interest. Within this context the Chicago busing plan must not fade away, although a realistic appraisal indicates it is unlikely that the Board of Education will expand the plan.

31Benjamin E. Mays, "Integration as a Matter of Heart," The Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 1970, p. 11. The 1973 Gallup Poll found 58 percent of the nonwhite population responded that more should be done regarding school integration compared to the same response by only 26 percent of the white population. See George H. Gallup, "Fifth Annual Gallup Poll of Public Attitudes Toward Education," Phi Delta Kappan, LV (September, 1973), 47.
CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY IN WHICH THE ANALYTIC QUESTIONS DEVELOPED IN THE LASSWELL DECISION-MAKING MODEL ARE CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THE 1968 BUSING DECISION

In this concluding chapter the dissertation returns directly to the analytic questions presented in the seven functions described by Harold Lasswell. A description of each function will be followed by the analytic questions it suggests and a brief answer to these questions.

The intelligence function considers information, prediction, and planning. The first question asked is, "How is information that comes to the attention of the decision-makers gathered and processed?" A definite evolution of sources may be discerned in answer to this question. Under Benjamin Willis, the Superintendent of Schools was the major source of detailed information. However, this hegemony was challenged by the demands for special reports in which information was gathered by agents outside of the school administrative system. The conflict over this power of examination was one of the factors which led to the retirement of the
superintendent. When the new superintendent took office, he found a Board which was more inclined than it had previously been to turn to other sources in seeking information. He did not challenge this propensity of the Board. Indeed, when he presented the busing plans, he recommended that the Board members defer consideration until they met the public. The introduction of community councils created a direct line of communication between spokesmen for local groups and the Board members.¹

The second intelligence question asks, "What studies, reports, laws, judicial decisions, and community needs were known or available to the decision-makers?" This question expands on the first by drawing attention to the numerous sources outside the school administration which serve to influence Board members. In this dissertation a number of federal and state laws, court decisions, and reports are shown to have required that Board members be informed of problems related to integration. Reports commissioned by the Board, directed by Hauser, Havighurst, and Redmond, provided considerable information. Special studies by universities, the Chicago Parent-Teachers Association, and the Real Estate Research Corporation were available to Board members.²

¹Above, pp. 40-64, 219, 316-18.
²Above, pp. 67-117, 176-82.
The third intelligence question asks, "What formal or informal channels were being utilized in reaching the decision-makers?" The influence of the press upon Board members is noted. The personal contacts of Board members with members of their own neighborhoods is not explored, but some factions in the city deduced from the positions taken by Board members that information gained from personal contacts may have influenced them. Residents of the northwest and southwest areas of the city felt that the number of Board members residing in the southeast section of the city was a factor in the decision not to implement the busing plan in South Shore. This study found other reasons for the negative decision. However, the demand by residents of the western periphery of the city that members of the Board be appointed from their area indicated the conviction of these people that a Board member would be more informed about problems in his own neighborhood. The age of the Board members served as an indicator of their position on the busing program. All the members who were over seventy were opposed to the plan.  

Other factors which affected the Board members in their decision-making have been considered. Conflicts between the

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3Above, pp. 25-40, 286-90.
mayor and his Commission on School Board Nominations regarding the appointment of Board members indicate the control the mayor has retained over the composition and character of the Board. No direct influence of the mayor on Board members was established in this dissertation. The indirect influence he exerted in public announcements was considered. The influence of other politicians was evident. Their pressure was directly responsible for the Board's decision to hold hearings on the busing proposals in various communities. These public hearings served to further the Board's knowledge that large segments of the public were bitterly opposed to the proposed plans.4

The fourth intelligence question asks, "To what extent did the decision-making body control the source of its information?" The Board of Education had expanded its sources of information during its conflict with Willis. When the new superintendent took office, the area boundary committees were actively engaged in meetings with community representatives. Thus, when Redmond made a recommendation that the South Side Boundaries Committee reconsider a decision, he was rebuffed with a reminder that the committee had already gathered as much information as it deemed necessary. Prior to the introduction of the busing recommendation

the Board considered alternate plans for the South Shore and Austin areas and was in direct contact with community organizations in these areas.\textsuperscript{5}

The recommendation function considers promotion of policy alternatives. The first question asks, "How are recommendations made and promoted?" This function is considered in conjunction with "Whose duty is it to recommend?" The recommendation function has been definitely established as the prerogative of the Superintendent of Schools. This power has been guarded by Redmond, who reminded the Board on numerous occasions that it is the superintendent's duty to act as an adviser. The access of the superintendent through his staff to details of the operation of schools must give considerable weight to his recommendations. However, the Board remains the prescribing body and may call upon the superintendent to supply further information or alternative recommendations.\textsuperscript{6}

The second recommendation question asks, "What alternative decisions were considered?" This dissertation studies numerous alternatives which were utilized or considered as alternatives to busing. The neighborhood school policy, the stabilization policy, the adjustment of boundaries, the selection of new school

\textsuperscript{5}Above, pp. 39-64, 171-72. \textsuperscript{6}Above, pp. 64, 196, 263-64, 267.
sites, the voluntary permissive transfer program, the development of magnet schools, and the consideration of educational parks are noted. The development of a mini-magnet school in South Shore as an alternative to the intra-community busing proposal is examined.7

The third recommendation question asks, "Who advocated these alternatives?" Geographical, racial, and ethnic factors are considered in answering this question. The division of the black communities on the use of various alternatives is noted. The futility of singling out certain ethnic groups as being more resistant to change is discussed. The dissertation studies the positions that various city-wide and local organizations took regarding the alternatives. City-wide organizations tended to support the plan while local organizations in the receiving areas were often opposed.8

The fourth recommendation question asks, "Why were they rejected, accepted or compromised?" The reasons for the rejection of the South Shore intra-community busing plan are seen in the inability of the various factions to accept any compromise, the lack of facilities within the schools involved, and the rapid

7Above, pp. 52, 66, 75-80, 131-37, 304-15.
8Above, pp. 201-10, 228-58.
racial change already occurring in the areas concerned. The accepted plan for the Austin area was a compromise. Black parents residing in designated sending areas were no longer required to send their children but were required to decide whether or not their children should be bused. The compromise was a concession to fear of white parents that their children might be forced into a two-way busing program in the future. It also recognized the anger of a faction of black parents who felt their children should not be singled out to enforce an integration plan.\footnote{Above, pp. 237-47, 258-70.}

The fifth recommendation question asks, "What audiences were reached by the recommendations?" Prior to the announcement of the busing recommendations, the school administration had contacted as few groups as possible in order to minimize the development of resistance. The dissertation shows that the segments of the public which became concerned extended beyond those areas which were immediately involved in the plan. Some vocal opponents of the busing plan were members of organizations which had been created to defend segregationist positions in earlier conflicts. Many residents of the areas in which schools were designated to receive bused students sought membership in community organizations for the first time. Organizations which opposed the busing plans sought out each
other and these consolidated groups continued to remain united in their opposition to future recommendations regarding integration. Politicians from every level of government were called upon to represent the various factions. Church organizations became involved as the use of their schools became an issue in the debate. Newspapers took editorial positions on the issue. Only one city-wide newspaper opposed the busing plan.\textsuperscript{10}

The sixth question has been considered above in conjunction with the first recommendation question.

The seventh recommendation question asks, "What values were considered in performing the function?" Undoubtedly, the United States Supreme Court in the Brown decisions provided the basic value requiring action. Another value must have operated to motivate Board members who wished to escape various forms of punishment the federal government could mete out if some action were not taken to indicate the good faith of the Board regarding integration policies. The Redmond Report considered many values. It expressed the democratic principle that people must understand and believe in policies which they are expected to support. It restated the positions taken by the Board of Education which

\textsuperscript{10}\textit{Above, pp. 339-58.}
supported racial integration and stabilization as policies to be pursued by the Chicago School System.\textsuperscript{11}

Stabilization was a goal which reflected values. Integration could not be accomplished if white residents did not remain in a racially changing area. The tax base in the city would decline if middle-class whites continued to leave the city. A plan was offered to minimize white opposition and allay any fear which might result in whites fleeing from the city. A quota was established placing a fifteen percent limit upon the proportion of black students who would be admitted to any receiving school. This plan would appeal to many citizens with a pragmatic view toward accomplishing desegregation. However, many people considered it to be a violation of their principles to bus only black students and to guarantee whites that only a limited number of black people would be sent to "their" schools.\textsuperscript{12}

The eighth recommendation question asks, "To what extent did the information made available disclose threats or opportunities pertinent to the present or potential value positions of the decision-makers?" The position of federal authorities represented a threat to those whose values opposed desegregation. For

\textsuperscript{11}Above, pp. 176-83. \textsuperscript{12}Above, pp. 78, 95, 177-82.
those whose values favored desegregation an opportunity appeared in a Real Estate Research Corporation study which indicated that the South Shore and south Austin communities were experiencing rapid racial change. Stabilization was a policy endorsed by the Board members. It was imperative that action be taken immediately for any stabilization policy to succeed in these communities. The relief of overcrowding offered by the busing plan, when considered alone, offered an opportunity to achieve a value position held by all of the Board members. Indeed, this aspect of the plan was emphasized in presentations to the various concerned parties. The busing plan goal, to improve the educational experiences of all children, was nebulous. As the dissertation establishes, quality education was defined in different ways by various individuals. Desegregation was a goal which struck most poignantly at the values held by the decision-makers. For those who advocated the neighborhood school policy, desegregation by busing was a violation of their values. For those who advocated integration, the desegregation goal was a welcome policy.13

The ninth recommendation question asks, "Did the information made available to those concerned with the decision alter their

13 Above, pp. 52, 127-40.
views?" The Austin busing proposal was finally accepted by an eight to one vote with two members absent. There was no evidence to indicate that information gained from the hearings in the communities had influenced the decisions of the Board members. The vote on the proposal had been deadlocked until a compromise was finally accepted. Value positions, rather than additional information, were the crucial factors in the decision. When the final decision was made, it was emphasized that Board members saw the main issue to be the relief of overcrowding. The dissemination of information to the various factions of the public had little influence on their views. The public hearings and the continuing high percentage of opposition expressed in local public opinion polls make the lack of influence perfectly clear.14

The tenth recommendation question asks, "Did pressure groups demand a greater participation in the recommending function as a result of the decisions being considered?" The busing controversy evoked numerous demands for greater participation in the decision-making process. Established organizations such as the South Shore Commission expressed definite demands for specific policies. Ad hoc groups also emerged to make their demands known.

14Above, pp. 201-06, 269.
These groups, once formed, remained active in their opposition to other proposals which might have affected integration policy.\textsuperscript{15}

The prescription function considers the enactment of general rules. The first question asks, "How are the rules prescribed?"

This may be considered in conjunction with the fourth question which asks, "What group really made the final prescription?"

Rules are prescribed by a majority of the members of the Board of Education. They are prescribed at the recommendation of the Superintendent of Schools, although the Board may initiate a recommendation by requesting information and plans from the superintendent. The busing prescription was made in response to problems that arose in specific areas. These problems could be remedied by the application of four stated Board policies. These policies called for the relief of overcrowding in schools, the promotion of stabilization in neighborhoods, the increase of desegregation, and the improvement of educational experiences for all children. The decision was made by the members of the Board of Education. While many pressures were exerted on the Board, there is no doubt that the final decision was the responsibility of eleven individuals who finally resolved their

\textsuperscript{15}Above, pp. 83-84, 201-10, 232-38, 298.
differences although not the differences in the communities. The second prescription question asks, "What was the final decision?" The busing prescription was part of a series of decisions made by the Board of Education. These decisions may be seen as a part of a continuing succession of choices which the Board members must make regarding the implementation of the four policies stated above. However, when the final decisions were made on the South Shore and Austin busing proposals, they were to reject the South Shore plan and accept a compromise version of the Austin plan.

The third prescription question asks, "What group or agency appears to be most favored by the decision?" The compromise proposal represented concessions to both the segregationist and integrationist elements in the communities. Mrs. Malis saw the compromise, allowing parents the option of taking their children out of the program, as an appeasement to anti-busing opposition. No effective massive busing program could be implemented when parents were allowed the option of keeping their children in the neighborhood school. The busing of black children to schools with student bodies which were previously all-white may be

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considered a victory for desegregationists. But the victory was tempered by a quota guaranteeing that only a limited number of children would be bused. Both black and white citizens found objectionable features in the busing plan. Both segregationists and desegregationists found objectionable features in the plan. However, the prescription was most favorable to desegregationists.18

The fourth prescription question has been considered in conjunction with the first question.

The fifth prescription question asks, "Did any groups involved in the decision seek prescriptions of their own in order to redress their grievances as they saw them?" Alternative plans were especially abundant in the South Shore district. The inability of the various pro-integration groups in the area to win wide-spread support for their alternative plans, when combined with their own incapacity to compromise their positions, left no one to support the Board's busing plan.19

In the northwest side districts the busing proponents sought relief for overcrowding and were willing to accept a compromise. The opponents of busing offered no alternatives except a continuation of the building program and the establishment

of quality education programs. These two prescriptions were not viable alternative solutions to the immediate problem facing the Board.20

The invocation function considers provisional characterizations of conduct according to prescriptions. The first question asks, "In reference to whom is the prescription invoked?" The prescription had been explicit that students would be bused only from the overcrowded May and Spencer Schools into seven underutilized schools. The neighborhoods selected from the attendance areas of the May and Spencer Schools contained only black residents. When parents of a large number of the children eligible for busing refused to allow their children to participate in the program, supplementary geographic blocks were added to make more black children available for busing. These preparations insured that the plan would operate with black children whose parents approved of the busing program.21

The second invocation question asks, "Who was responsible for administering the decision?" The staff of the school system was directly responsible for administering the decision. Board member Bacon specifically asked School Superintendent Redmond to

watch for any signs of staff sabotage in implementing the plan. The administrative staffs of School District Four and the two sending schools were basically responsible for the selection and transportation of students who were to be bused. The administrative staffs and faculties of the receiving schools were responsible for establishing a professional and cordial environment for the new students. The compromise plan also created a responsibility for many parents who were forced to decide whether they would allow their children to be bused.  

The third invocation question asks, "Was the prescription invoked for all cases possible or only for selected cases?" The Austin busing program has remained unique in the Chicago School System. While students are commonly bused within the system, only one other program has resulted in the desegregation of schools, and that program lasted only about four months. The substitute plan for the rejected South Shore busing proposal offered a mini-magnet school as an alternative rather than another form of a busing plan. The Austin busing prescription called only for the involvement of the specified schools and the administration exempted none of those schools in implementing the plan. The

22 Above, pp. 269, 271-73, 299.
non-contiguous assignment program suggested in the Redmond Plan could have been implemented in other non-threatened white residential areas. The extension of this prescription to other areas has not been considered by the Board.  

The fourth invocation question asks, "Was the decision challenged?" This may be considered in conjunction with the fifth question, which asks, "How was the decision challenged?" The dissertation considers the numerous forms that protesters used to challenge the busing decision. The development of new organizations and the increased participation in established groups such as the local Parent-Teachers Associations were noted. Picketing, and boycotting, challenges in the courts, threats to defeat a school bond referendum, and attempts to influence the legislature to terminate or limit busing were among the forms of challenges to the decision. Protesters also sought to change the nature of the Board of Education. They called for the election rather than the appointment of School Board members and demanded that Board members be chosen to represent geographical areas of the city.

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23 Above, pp. 296-301, 309-10.

24 Above, pp. 232-58, 284-96.
The application function considers the final characterization of conduct according to prescriptions. The first question asks, "How was the prescription applied?" This question may be considered with the second question which asks, "How were those affected reached and informed?" The plan was implemented within a week of the final decision by the Board. The specific details of the plan were followed when the program was begun in March, 1968, although the staff was unable to obtain a sufficient number of students for busing to meet the initial specifications. The dissertation considers the administrative problems involved in implementing the program. The method of informing parents of the students designated for busing and the staffs of the schools involved is examined.25

The third application question asks, "Did any groups turn to other agencies for changes in the enforcement of the prescriptions?" Some citizens who questioned the decision to implement the Austin busing plan turned to the courts and to legislatures in attempts to alter or negate the prescription. The courts refused to interfere with the prescription on technical grounds but made no precise comment on the status of busing programs or

25Above, pp. 271-84.
the grounds on which the programs could be challenged. The state legislature has been less ambivalent, but not more effective, in challenging the busing prescription. A commission established to investigate the Chicago School System received little attention in the city. It was not until 1973 that an anti-busing law passed the legislature, and this act merely restricted the power of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction to require school systems to use busing for the purpose of achieving racial balance in any school.26

The fourth application question asks, "Was the prescription violated any individuals or by the agency responsible for the application of the prescription?" There was no evidence that any individual or agency involved in applying the function had attempted to violate the prescription. Indeed, in the face of hostility from some members of the communities designated to receive the bused students, numerous agencies took steps to see that the plan was implemented in accordance with the prescription. As the program entered its second full year, the number of students being bused did not reach the maximum number allowed under the quota system imposed by the plan. This aspect of the

26Above, pp. 294-96.
application of the prescription is developed under the appraisal function below.27

The fifth application question asks, "Did the prescribed policy lead to changes in values?" There is no evidence that opponents of the busing program altered their views as a result of application of the busing prescription. There is evidence that few parents altered their value system after the plan was in operation. Questionnaires were sent home with children who lived in the immediate area of the receiving schools. The returned responses, in 1969, indicated that 86.5 percent of the parents were less than satisfied with the busing plan. In 1970, the percentage indicating a lack of satisfaction was 89.0 percent. In 1971, the opposition which arose in the northwest side when another busing plan was suggested for the Emmet School in Chicago indicates that a considerable number of citizens remained opposed to busing.28

A national polling agency in 1971 found 79 percent of white persons interviewed to be opposed to busing as a method of achieving integration. During the busing controversy over 95 percent of the respondents to a local newspaper poll taken on the

27 Above, pp. 271-84, 323-31.

28 Above, pp. 296-301, 337-39.
northwest side of Chicago indicated their opposition to busing. But there is no reason to suspect that the lower percentage figure established by the later national poll reflects a change in values. The national poll was not interviewing people who thought they were being directly involved in a busing plan. While the evidence is incomplete or indirect, it indicates that the operating busing plan had little or no influence on the values of most white citizens who were opposed to busing as a means of achieving integration.29

There is reason to state that bused students as a group had experienced attitudinal changes. Questionnaires filled out by parents of bused students would reflect the parents' knowledgeable views of their children's progress. The comments made by these parents indicated an increasing degree of satisfaction with almost every aspect of their children's development in the succeeding years, 1968, 1969, and 1970. If these comments were the only evidence of changes in the bused students' values, there would be reason to doubt the sufficiency of data indicating the validity of the conclusion, but there is more evidence.30

An analysis of reading test scores indicates that students

who had been bused for a few years were performing at a higher level than their counter-parts who remained at the sending school. Further evidence of changed values is found in the steadily improving school attendance of bused students. At the third year of operation of the busing program the bused students' attendance had become considerably better than the attendance of students who remained at the sending school. Teachers at the receiving schools also assigned conduct grades to the bused students which indicated an improvement in deportment when compared to conduct grades assigned to the bused students before they entered the program. The growing number of bused students who chose to attend the predominantly white high school over other alternatives indicated a changing set of values. Any one of these indicators was open to varying interpretations regarding the motive for changed behavior. However, when considered together they presented a matrix of evidence which strongly suggests that bused students were experiencing value reorientations which were more academically acceptable.

The appraisal function considers the assessment of the success and failure of policy. The first question asks, "How is the working of prescriptions appraised?" The second question

31Above, pp. 340-62.
asks, "Whose activities were appraised?" The third question asks, "Who did the appraising?" During each year of the operation of the plan either the district superintendent of District Four or the associate superintendent for Area C commissioned a study of the busing program as a report to the Board of Education. Parents, teachers, and principals were asked to complete questionnaires for the first three reports. The performance of pupils was also evaluated. Later reports used the four goals for the busing program expressed by the Board as criteria for judging the success of the busing plan. The studies were usually lucid and factual. However, as the reports were basically self-evaluations by the administration of one of its duties, they are considered as biased information in the development of the dissertation. Figures and data are accepted as being correctly recorded, but the interpretation of the data is scrutinized and altered when evidence exists that other explanations appear possible. Thus, new interpretations or data are interposed throughout the analysis of the appraisals.\(^{32}\)

The fourth appraisal question asks, "How effectively and efficiently was the prescription executed?" The fifth question asks, "Did the structure of the agency lead to inefficient or

\(^{32}\)Above, pp. 271-368 are primarily an analysis of the reports.
indifferent administration of the prescription?" The evidence indicates that the school administration during the opening stage of application was relatively efficient in executing the prescription. No child was harmed. Damage to facilities was limited to the fire-bombing of one receiving school office and some broken windows. The major difficulty rested with obtaining enough students for busing to fill the prescription. Classroom reorganizations during the first months of the operation of the plan were disruptive, and recruitment of more students for busing was halted before the desired number of pupils was obtained.33

In terms of achieving the four stated goals of the busing program, the school system was not particularly effective. Overcrowding in the sending schools was not relieved as a result of the busing program. This failure reflected an unrealistic goal established in originally presenting the plan. The diversion of six hundred students from the overcrowded schools was unable to alleviate the crowding brought about by the rapid racial change occurring in the area. However, the busing plan, after the first full year of operation, was not operated to obtain the maximum number of students which was permitted under the quota plan. Indeed, the school administration resorted to using revised

33Above, pp. 271-84.
methods of computing the percentage of desegregation in order to meet a minimum desegregation standard. The failure to bus a sufficient number of students to achieve a desegregation goal was due both to the nature of the prescription and to the structure of the school agency. The decision to allow parents to deny permission for their children to be bused increased the difficulty of obtaining a sufficient number of pupils to participate in the plan. The decision, however, reflected the nature of the Board of Education as a decision-making body which was responsive to the demands of many factions of the public. The lack of any action to increase the number of bused students to the maximum indicated by the original plan reflected the lack of pressures being exerted upon the Board to utilize busing for integration. While the pressures to increase the busing program have been few, the pressures to refrain from further action have been many.34

The goal of achieving stabilization was achieved neither in the south Austin sending schools nor in the community. Again, the goal was too ambitious, especially in light of the past lack of success of stabilization as a policy. The final goal, improving educational experiences for all children, appeared to

34Above, pp. 320-32, 364-66.
have been achieved with moderate success. This success did reflect an aspect of the structure of the school agency. Teachers and administrators applied the prescription with an even hand. While there were some complaints of prejudiced treatment, the overwhelming majority of parents of bused students indicated satisfaction with the program. The school staffs obviously performed in a truly professional manner.35

The sixth appraisal question asks, "Did the administration of the prescription lead to significant changes in the administrative agency?" There were no changes in the administrative agency that could be traced to the application of the prescription. There was evidence that appointments to the Board of Education eventually reflected a broader geographical distribution throughout the city. Demands that Board members be chosen from areas on the western perimeter of the city had been initiated during the busing controversy. However, in appointing a Board member, it was evident that in the mayor's considerations other factors still took pre-eminence over the geographical residence of an appointee to the Board.36

The termination function considers the final arrangements entered into within the framework of the prescription. The first

question asks, "How was the prescription integrated into the framework of the organization?" The Austin busing plan has been operating continually since its inception in 1968. The number of students involved reached a maximum of 621 in its first full year of operation and then dropped to a number around 550 in the following years. The program appears to have become an integral part of the operations of District Four. While the plan has not been expanded to bus the possible maximum number of students, it has never been contracted to involve fewer students than were bused during the first months of operation.\(^\text{37}\)

The second termination question asks, "Did expectations change?" It is considered in conjunction with the third question which asks, "What aspects of the prescription, if any, were abandoned or revised?" Stabilization of schools and neighborhoods was not a factor in continuing the busing program. It became evident almost immediately that the plan would not stop the rapid racial change which occurred in the south Austin area. Relief of overcrowding continued to be a factor in the continuation of the program. No one could have contended that the busing program was relieving overcrowding in the sending schools, but the relief of overcrowding had been the major argument used by Board members

\(^{37}\)Above, pp. 320-31, 364-68.
to justify the program. Consistency required that the program be continued as long as overcrowding was a reality in the sending schools of south Austin.38

Opponents of the Austin busing program experienced changing expectations. Their challenges to the prescription had not terminated its operation. Their threats of dire consequences had not materialized. The receiving area neighborhoods remained stable, and few programs of the busing opponents were successful. However, the expectations of many black people were changing. Integration through busing was no longer a primary goal of the black organizations. Government agencies also became less interested in busing for desegregation. Desegregation remained an expected result of the Austin program; however the degree of desegregation was minimized as the expectations changed regarding the necessity of desegregation.39

In conclusion, this summary establishes the validity of the hypothesis that Lasswell's seven categories of functional analysis yield a comprehensive and exceptionally intelligible view of the decision-making process when related to the Chicago busing

decision of 1968. The analytic questions suggested by the seven functions direct research to pertinent and valuable observations. This dissertation has tried to establish the value of an analytic approach to the decision-making process which directs our scrutiny to the background of the decision and the myriad of repercussions to the decision, as well as the decision itself. It has, at least, indicated the need for more investigation of the decision-making process and of the use of busing to obtain quality education for all of our children.
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**Books**


The dissertation submitted by Neil E. Lloyd has been read and approved by three members of the Department of Education.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation, and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.