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The Nomination of James M. Cox: The Democratic Convention of 1920

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THE NOMINATION OF JAMES M. COX:
THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION
OF 1920

by
Charles J. Werling

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

After riding the crest of exhilarating popularity at the end of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson turned the corner into 1920 a tragically changed man, broken in health and ridiculed by many of the same people who so recently had acclaimed him as a world hero. The difficult struggles with the other members of the Big Four at the peace conference, the bitter fight with the Senate to get the Treaty of Paris ratified, and the paralytic stroke he suffered at Pueblo while campaigning for his League had taken a heavy toll on him, but still he would not give up the fight for the ideal he cherished so dearly.

To the leaders of the Democratic Party fell the task of trying to pick up the pieces left by their battered leader and if at all possible to find a candidate who might be able to reverse the Party's downward trend and succeed to the Presidency in election year 1920. The man whom the Democrats finally chose to carry their banner, Governor James M. Cox of Ohio, had a certain combination of political qualities and background which made him as suitable as anyone for the position, but before Cox could get the nomination at the convention, he had to overcome

the formidable rivalry of William G. McAdoo, Woodrow Wilson's son-in-law; A. Mitchell Palmer, the Attorney-General; and possibly the President himself.

In four chapters the author will study the credentials of Governor Cox and his opponents, along with the problems that made the road for all candidates an uncertain one right up to the eve of the convention.

The Democratic Convention will be covered in Chapters VII and VIII: the first dealing with the platform and preliminaries, the second covering the balloting.

The final chapter will present a summary of the nomination of Governor Cox and an evaluation of the reasons for his selection over the popular William G. McAdoo. In particular, this thesis will attempt to show that Mr. Cox was chosen not simply because he received the backing of the big-city "wet" bosses, as has often been claimed, but also because the Southern "dry" states gave him timely support near the end of the balloting.

Dr. Wesley M. Bagby of West Virginia University has recently published a book, The Road to Normalcy: The Presidential Campaign and Election of 1920 (Baltimore, 1962), based on his doctoral dissertation, in which he covers the entire campaign of both major parties. Although his treatise includes a survey of all the potential candidates, Dr. Bagby presents an especially

thorough study of Woodrow Wilson's ambitions for a third term and William G. McAdoo's vacillations about running.

Dr. Raymond Justus Hanks in his unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Democratic Party in 1920: The Rupture of the Wilsonian Synthesis" (University of Chicago, 1960), leans heavily on Dr. Bagby's earlier work, but puts greater emphasis on the Democratic side. Whereas Dr. Bagby shows the transition to normalcy, Dr. Hanks concentrates on the demise of Wilsonian progressivism.

Although the present writer will repeat some of the findings of these and other researchers, this thesis will go further into the study of the convention itself to show that Mr. Cox was nominated by a combination of many factors, not just by the manipulations of the machine bosses. In fact, as this study will point out in the final chapter, the big-city bosses were conspicuous more by their absence in the last four ballots than by their presence.

Besides the materials mentioned above, the writer has relied heavily upon the Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention (1920), The New York Times, the Chicago Daily Tribune, the Dayton Daily News, contemporary periodicals, and the numerous biographies of men associated with the Democratic Party in 1920. Finally, since the author has had access to the Dayton Daily News, a Cox-owned newspaper, many

hitherto unused facts on the local level have been included. Unfortunately, the personal papers of Governor Cox in Dayton are still restricted.

CHAPTER II

WHY COX?

Judging from the carnival spirit in Dayton on June nineteenth, an observer would never have guessed that 1920 was supposed to be a Republican year. Two trainloads of conventioners, a glee club, a band, cheerleaders, and prominent citizens were preparing to board the "Cox Special" for the trip to the Democratic Convention in San Francisco, where they hoped their own Jimmie Cox would be nominated for the Presidency of the United States.¹ Many months of planning had gone into this excursion--stops along the way were scheduled so the travelers could take individual sightseeing trips on the side. Special entertainment was planned on the train itself. Even the very clothing bespoke the campaign spirit of the crowd, for each of the conventioners had been fitted out with a dark green suit (with an extra pair of white trousers); white shoes and cane; and a red, white, and blue hat and umbrella, compliments of the

¹ Dayton Daily News, June 19, 1920, p. 1; June 20, 1920, p. 1. Hereafter referred to as News. The New York Times, June 19, 1920, p. 3; July 1, 1920, p. 1. Hereafter referred to as Times.

Gen City Democratic Club.²

Earlier in the day the conventioneers, and many other well-wishers, had paraded to Trailsend, Governor Cox's mansion just south of Dayton, and now, fortified by the blessings and good wishes of their leader, they were anxious to get to San Francisco to put their man on the ticket.³

If someone had asked them why they were so "Coxsure"⁴ their candidate would get the nomination, any Ohio Democrat would probably have answered with his own confident question: Who else is more suitable for the nomination than James M. Cox? The Republican Convention a few weeks earlier had emphasized even more the need for Cox as the candidate, the Buckeyes maintained, for in that convention the GOP had nominated an Ohioan, Senator Warren G. Harding, and Ohio, as any student of Presidential campaigns knew, was a pivotal state with its twenty-four electoral votes. It was the fourth largest state in the Union, with borders touching the key Midwest, the East, and the fringe states of the South. Wilson had carried Ohio and won, and

² Lucullus, News, March 14, 1920, Review Section, p. 10; News, May 6, 1920, p. 1; June 19, 1920, p. 1.

³ News, June 19, 1920, p. 1.

⁴ The term "Coxsure" was a catch-word inaugurated by the Democratic managers in the post-convention campaign. -- "Coxsure," The New Republic, XXIII (August 11, 1920), 294-95.

election strategists believed that the man who won in Ohio in 1920 would also win the Presidency. The only person who could beat Harding in Ohio would have to be another Ohioan and Cox was that man.⁵

Rising optimism among Buckeye Democrats was discerned by Louis Seibold of the New York World as early as the first of May,⁶ but they bubbled over with confidence after reading certain press reactions to the nomination of Harding. In a front-page editorial The New York Times (Independent Democratic) bristled with disgust:

Upon a platform that has produced general dissatisfaction, the Chicago Convention presents a candidate whose nomination will be received with astonishment and dismay by the party whose suffrages he invites. Warren G. Harding is a very respectable Ohio politician of the second class. He has never been a leader of men or a director of policies.... Senator Harding's record at Washington has been faint and colorless. He was an undistinguished and undistinguishable unit in the ruck of Republican Senators who obediently followed Mr. Lodge in the twistings and turnings of that statesman's foray upon the Treaty and the Covenant. The nomination of Harding, for whose counterpart we must go back to Franklin Pierce if we would seek a President who measures down to his political stature, is the fine and perfect flower of the cowardice and imbecility of the Senatorial cabal that charged itself with the management of the Republican Convention.⁷

⁵ News, June 15, 1920, p. 2; Times, June 13, 1920, pt. 1, p. 5.

⁶ News, May 1, 1920, p. 3.

⁷ Times, June 13, 1920, pt. 1, p. 1.

The New Republic declared, "The nomination of Warren G. Harding as the Republican candidate for the President of the United States is under the circumstances nothing short of a calamity."⁸ It warned that the country was in a critical period, requiring a strong President, but labeled Harding as "a party hack, without strength of character, without administrative experience, without knowledge of international politics, without any of those moral and intellectual qualities which would qualify him even under ordinary conditions for statesmanlike leadership."⁹ The New York Evening Post (Independent) called the nomination "an affront to the intelligence and the conscience of the American people,"¹⁰ while The Nation (Independent) summarized the liberal press reaction by stating, "The only favorable thing to be said about the nomination of Senator Warren G. Harding by the Republicans is that it prevented something worse."¹¹ There were, of course, favorable comments about the Republican proceedings, but because Harding had defeated only narrowly an outsider, General Leonard Wood, in the Ohio primary, the Democrats of the Buckeye State

⁸"Harding," The New Republic, XXIII (June 23, 1920), 99.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰As quoted in Times, June 15, 1920, p. 10.

¹¹"Harding: Turning Back the Hands of Time," The Nation, CX (June 19, 1920), 816.

felt they had ample reason to celebrate.¹²

Governor Cox had run unopposed in the Ohio Democratic primary; but few people were aware that this feat had been accomplished only after some adroit political maneuverings on the part of the Cox managers. In the long-range campaign speculation of 1919, three Ohioans--Governor Cox, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, and Senator Atlee Pomerene--were mentioned as possible presidential timber.¹³ After Secretary Baker faded early from the scene, Senator Pomerene still loomed as a rival candidate for favorite-son honors as late as February, 1920. Meanwhile, the Governor set out to promote himself by a discreet polling of opinion in various districts. The majority preferred Cox, to the satisfaction of the Governor, and the differences that did occur were, for the most part, ironed out behind the scenes. Thus the maximum of unity was accomplished with the minimum of adverse publicity.¹⁴

Governor Cox could then have received almost unanimous endorsement by the state Democratic committee, but here he made his second strategic move by letting it be known that he preferred the choice be made by the people in a state

¹²News, April 30, 1920, p. 1; Times, April 28, 1920, p. 1.

¹³Lindsay Rogers, "American Politics in 1920," The Contemporary Review, CXVII (February 1920), 188.

¹⁴News, February 29, 1920, Review Section, p. 8; January 7, 1920, p. 1.

presidential primary.¹⁵ By this simple action the Governor scored two political ringers: first, he put the selection on the level of "the people's choice," while at the same time he forced Senator Pomerene's hand. Under Ohio primary law each district picked its own delegates to the Democratic Convention, and these delegates in turn voted for the Presidential preference of their districts. If Pomerene remained in the race, he would only create enmities within the state Democratic organization, and even then would not be able to win a solid delegation to the convention. Instead, he would only split the party and undoubtedly bury the chances for any Ohioans at San Francisco. The only choice left to him was to withdraw his name from the Presidential race and throw his lot in with the Cox camp. This he did on February 18.¹⁶ As a result, Governor Cox, the only Democratic candidate in the April Presidential primary,¹⁷ emerged as the unanimous choice of all Ohioans, with a following whose loyalty and enthusiasm caught the eye of many outside observers; but few, if any, of those who looked on were ever aware that intraparty maneuverings had taken place.

Although geography was an important element in the argument

¹⁵News, January 29, 1920, p. 1; Marcus, News, February 1, 1920, Review Section, p. 3.

¹⁶News, February 19, 1920, p. 1.

¹⁷News, March 11, 1920, p. 7; Times, April 28, 1920, p. 1.

for Cox, his followers could point to many other assets of the Governor. There was first his record as a successful businessman, Congressman, and governor. After working in Washington as a secretary for millionaire Congressman Paul Sorg of his own Third Ohio District, Jimmie Cox had returned home in the late 1890's,¹⁸ borrowed money to add to his own savings, and purchased a floundering Dayton newspaper. Although he had worked previously as a reporter, becoming a publisher was a bold venture for a young man of twenty-eight. Not only did he rebuild the old paper into a thriving new Dayton Daily News; he even expanded his enterprises five years later by purchasing another paper in nearby Springfield, Ohio.¹⁹

In 1908 Cox followed the example of his old Washington master by running for Congress from the Third District and winning. Two years later he won again, then returned home to campaign for governor of Ohio.²⁰

The Cox boosters pointed to such examples of business acumen and legislative experience, but more than anything, they directed attention to Cox's achievements during the eight years since

¹⁸James Middleton Cox, Journey Through My Years (New York, 1947), pp. 25, 34.

¹⁹Eugene H. Roseboom and Francis P. Weisenburger, A History of Ohio, ed. James H. Rodabaugh (Columbus, 1956), p. 327; see also Cox, Chapter IV.

²⁰Cox, p. 57-58, 95, and 126-27; Roseboom, p. 327.

1912. Here was a man, they boasted, with a quality all politicians pray for--a successful record as a "vote-getter." Already in 1910, when he was re-elected to Congress by thirteen thousand votes--the largest majority in the history of the district, Mr. Cox showed his vote-getting abilities.²¹ In 1912 Cox set his sights on the Columbus statehouse and won on a platform calling for progressivism and a revision of the state constitution.²² Immediately after being elected governor, Cox requested Professor Charles McCarthy, the framer of the Federal Trade Commission bill, to draw up a reform bill for Ohio. As McCarthy told the story, when the Governor saw the new draft, he predicted that if he passed it, he would be defeated in the next election, then re-elected again.²³ If the story is true, Cox was a prophet. His long fight to put this bill and other items of the new Ohio state constitution into operation (which fight, incidentally, he won against the opposition of Warren G. Harding, then of the Morning Star)²⁴ put Governor Cox in the Pyrrhic position of winning the battle but losing the campaign; but in

²¹William H. Crawford, Times, July 11, 1920, pt. 7, p. 2.

²²Roseboom, p. 327.

²³Donald Wilhelm, "James Middleton Cox," The Independent, CIII (July 17, 1920), 71.

²⁴Times, July 11, 1920, pt. 1, p. 2.

the two years following Cox's unsuccessful bid for re-election, so his followers would tell the story, the people of Ohio realized their mistake at the polls, and in 1916 they again chose the Dayton publisher and reformer to be their governor.²⁵

More significant than any other victory in his political career, however, was his third successful bid for the governor's chair in 1918. In a year that most Democrats preferred to forget, Governor Cox again defeated his perennial opponent, former Governor Frank B. Willis, in spite of the fact that the rest of the state ticket, both houses of the state legislature, and the United States in general went decidedly Republican. By carrying out such a feat, Governor Cox became the only Democrat in the history of Ohio to be elected governor three times. The only other person ever to claim such a distinction was a Republican, Rutherford B. Hayes.²⁶

But a politician is not a vote-getter by chance. Ohioans, aware of this, were prepared to recite a long list of reasons why Governor Cox had built up a reputation as "the people's choice"--a reputation he needed in a Presidential campaign. In the first place, Cox, the successful publisher and businessman, calmed the misgivings of the Wall Street Democrats, who feared

²⁵Cox, pp. 188 and 194; Roseboom, pp. 333 and 336.

²⁶Times, March 25, 1920, p. 17; Roseboom, p. 350.

the selection of any rabble-rousing candidate pledged to slay the moneyed giants. As a matter of fact, in a later campaign biography the writer unabashedly claimed, "Governor Cox is the only man ever nominated for President who owns wealth--real wealth."²⁷ In a word, Cox was "safe." Coupled with his years of service in Congress, during which time he worked on the Committee for Appropriations,²⁸ and his three terms as chief executive of a large state, he offered a background of business, legislative, executive, and political experience unmatched anywhere.

The moneyed interests, even though important, comprised only a small percentage of the vast electorate, however. It is the ordinary common man who makes or breaks any candidate, but here again the Buckeye Democrats were well armed with arguments. The laboring men were directed to look at the record of Cox's six years as governor. Did they want a progressive? Cox's only defeat came as a result of the progressive legislation enacted during his first term as governor; but people later realized the efficacy of these progressive laws and "apologized" to Cox by re-electing him for two more terms as governor.

Chief among his legislative acts was the compulsory Workmen's Compensation Law of 1913, written by State Senator

²⁷ As quoted in William Burlie Brown, The People's Choice: The Presidential Image in the Campaign Biography (Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Lc.1967), p. 126.

²⁸ Irving Stone, They Also Ran: The Story of the Men Who Were Defeated for the Presidency (Garden City, New York, 1943), p. 24.

William Green, who later succeeded Samuel Gompers as head of the American Federation of Labor. So effective and successful was this law that King Albert of Belgium, after a visit to the United States, praised it as the greatest piece of social legislation to be found anywhere in the world, while other states later used it as a model in formulating similar workmen's compensation laws. Other progressive legislation passed in 1913 included administrative and tax reforms; provisions for a state budgetary system--one of the first created in any state of the Union; school code reforms; widows' pensions; laws regulating the hours and working conditions of laborers; and prison reforms.²⁹

Urban laborers liked Cox, said a magazine writer, because of his quick action and quick results.³⁰ By temperament he was a man of the city, restless, dynamic, a hustler. Again he was described as "a downright and decisive character," "a positive personality with positive ideas."³¹ Governor Cox energetically guided his state through the disastrous flood in 1913 and World War I, but probably the best example of the Governor's "downright and decisive character" occurred during the 1919 steel strike in

²⁹Roseboom, pp. 327-29; Arthur M. Evans, Chicago Daily Tribune, June 17, 1920, p. 2 (hereafter referred to as Tribune). See also Cox's own account, Chapters XI and XII.

³⁰Roger Lewis, "The Two Ohio Editors Again," Collier's, LXVI (October 16, 1920), 6.

³¹Roger Lewis, "Ohio Presents Two Editors," Collier's, LXV (May 22, 1920), 26.

Canton, Ohio, when he removed the Democratic mayor of the city from office for not handling the strike effectively. On the other hand, the Governor, even though pressured from many sides, refused to send the state militia into Canton because he was convinced the matter could be settled without resort to military intervention.³² Governor Cox never once resorted to the use of the state militia in a strike situation, although throughout the rest of the nation the post-war years were a particularly strife-torn period in labor-management relations.³³

If Cox seemed to be especially suitable to the urban type, both in big business and labor, his organization was by no means ready to overlook the farmer. During his administration farmers in Ohio suggested twenty-five bills to the Governor, of which Cox guided twenty-three into law.³⁴ The head of the Pennsylvania State Grange assured the New York World that Cox could carry Ohio because he had a good record and was liked by both farmers and labor, while the chairmen of the National Farmers' Union and the National Board of Farm Organizations added their voices to the

³²Times, October 17, 1919, p. 6; October 26, 1919, p. 1; October 28, 1919, p. 2; News, October 25, 1919, p. 1; October 27, 1919, p. 1; November 1, 1919, p. 1; November 26, 1919, p. 1.

³³Stone, p. 25.

³⁴Times, July 10, 1920, p. 2.

opinion that the farmers were with Cox.³⁵

Finally, James M. Cox's record as Congressman from 1909 to 1913 placed him in good standing with one of the most vocal of all voter groups, the veterans, for of the 829 bills he introduced as a Congressman, 800 were for veterans' pensions.³⁶ Most of these were private bills, but on several occasions he fought for increased funds for veterans in appropriation bills being considered by the House. In his most notable speech on the subject, he showed that prisoners were better fed than the soldiers and that even the monkeys at the Washington Zoo were getting an increase in their food supply while the per capita allotment to the veterans in the soldiers' homes was being cut. Continued emphasis on such matters eventually brought government attention to the conditions in the soldiers' homes, and in a short time the residents there were enjoying a markedly improved status. Reciprocally, the men at the Dayton home showed their appreciation to Cox by supporting him overwhelmingly in his 1910 re-election.³⁷

If a man could claim such a vote-getting record and appeal

³⁵News, January 31, 1920, p. 1; March 16, 1920, p. 4; also January 29, 1920; Wilhelm, p. 71.

³⁶"Governor Cox, His Career and Ideals," The World's Work, XL (September 1920), 427; Stone, p. 24.

³⁷Cox, pp. 60-61; See also "Governor Cox, His Career and Ideals," p. 427.

to so many different classes of people, it seemed reasonable to assume he could carry his own state; but since Ohio's vote, even though pivotal, is only a small portion of the total needed to carry a national convention or an election, he would naturally have to garner votes from all corners of the United States; and Cox campaigners were ready once again to show that Cox was popular not only in Ohio, but elsewhere across the nation. In the first place, all the arguments put forth in his favor in Ohio could be extended to the national scope and command equal attention, but in addition he had the advantage of not being too intimately connected with the Wilson Administration, even though he favored the League of Nations. Since there was a strong movement in many circles to nominate a man not connected with Wilson's unpopularity, Cox from the Midwest seemed a logical choice.³⁸

In still another category, the liquor question, Governor Cox maintained an advantage for the simple reason that he was a good compromise man acceptable to both sides, or so his backers hoped. Although Cox had enforced the Volstead Act in Ohio because it was law, he was known to favor amendments permitting light wine and beer. As a result, he was anathema to the Anti-Saloon League

³⁸Louis Siebold, News, May 1, 1920, p. 3; Charles Merz, "Two Leading Candidates," The New Republic, XXIII (June 2, 1920), 12.

operating from his own back yard in Westerville, Ohio, but opposition from such an extremist group was considered more an asset than a liability.³⁹

Put into more concrete terms, the Cox boom just before the convention rested on the foundation of the solid delegation from Ohio and most of the Kentucky delegation, a total of about seventy votes. In Kentucky the state Democratic Convention had pledged its four delegates-at-large to Cox "as long as his name remains before the national convention," but no mention was made about the district delegates. However, of the twenty-two remaining delegates sixteen were ordered by their districts to vote for Cox, while the unpledged delegate from Owensboro declared he too would vote for Cox.⁴⁰

Beyond these definitely committed votes, the Governor's organization claimed strong backing from many other sections of the country--in particular, the states of Indiana, Illinois, and New York, which commanded an aggregate total of over 175 votes. As the delegates started their journeys to the West Coast, it was no secret that the Tammany group leaned to Cox because they felt he was the best man they could find to uphold the cause of the

³⁹ Louis Siebold, News, May 1, 1920, p. 3; N. O. Messenger, Washington Star, cited in News, February 8, 1920, Review Section, p. 8; Times, June 17, 1920, p. 3; March 26, 1920, p. 17.

⁴⁰News, May 5, 1920, p. 1.

wets and still not alienate all the dry forces. Furthermore, they were determined to stop the aspirations of Woodrow Wilson's son-in-law, William G. McAdoo, whom they thoroughly disliked, and Cox seemed the best man for the task.⁴¹ George Brennan, boss of the Chicago Democrats, concurred with this opinion, while Thomas Taggart, the head of the Indiana delegation, was expected to deliver needed votes when it became apparent that Vice-President Marshall could not win.⁴² A short time before the convention, Taggart had entertained Al Smith, and Charles F. Murphy, the boss of Tammany Hall, with a "golfing vacation" of several days at French Lick Springs, Indiana, and Democrats knowing the situation, agreed they did not spend their entire time discussing par four's and the value of mineral water. Although none of the three would say afterwards that they had formally agreed on any one candidate, most observers felt they were favorable to Cox as the man most suited to their situation with the best chance to succeed.⁴³

Besides these states Ohioans were certain they saw definite indications of support for their candidate from many other areas

⁴¹Times, June 17, 1920, p. 1; June 21, 1920, p. 3; April 12, p. 17; June 12, 1920, p. 6; June 15, 1920, p. 1.

⁴²Times, April 12, 1920, p. 17; May 19, 1920, p. 3; June 17, 1920, p. 1.

⁴³Times, June 13, 1920, pt. 1, p. 18; June 15, 1920, p. 1; June 17, 1920, p. 1.

of the country, especially the East and South.⁴⁴ Thomas R. Cone of Hartford, Connecticut, completed a tour of the New England states around the first of May and reported they were looking to Cox, for they felt Ohio would save the day for the Democrats again in 1920 as it had in 1916. Not even National Chairman Homer Cummings would be able to deliver his Connecticut delegation in opposition to Cox.⁴⁵ Around the same time, Louis Siebold of the New York World wrote that outside Washington and New York there was a decided opinion that a man from the Midwest should get the nomination, and New York, New Jersey, Illinois, and some New England states favored Cox.⁴⁶ Edward N. Hurley, Commissioner of the U. S. Shipping Board, declared much more emphatically, "It is remarkable the almost general sentiment in the East in favor of Governor Cox."⁴⁷

The New Jersey delegation was pledged wholeheartedly to its favorite-son governor, Edward I. Edwards; but the "soaking-wet" Edwards was a candidate more for an issue than an office, and once his point had been made for the "freedom-to-drink" sentiment,

⁴⁴News, February 23, 1920, p. 7.

⁴⁵News, May 3, 1920, p. 18.

⁴⁶News, May 1, 1920, p. 3.

⁴⁷News, April 20, 1920, p. 8.

his followers were expected to swing over to Cox.⁴⁸ In nearby West Virginia, another favorite son, Ambassador John W. Davis, figured in a promising darkhorse role; however, if the Davis candidacy did not develop--and Cox backers were hopeful it would not--most of the West Virginia contingent would join with neighboring Ohio, according to George White, assistant campaign manager for Cox. Mr. White also claimed "many friends" in Pennsylvania, a state controlled by rival candidate A. Mitchell Palmer. However, if and when Palmer dropped out of the race, Cox would capitalize.⁴⁹ William F. McCombs, former National Democratic Committee Chairman, predicted the nomination of Cox, giving as evidence his strength in the Midwestern states already mentioned, plus West Virginia, Tennessee, Maryland, Delaware, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Alabama, and Utah. Furthermore, the Michigan delegates said they would switch to Cox after the first ballot if he showed enough strength.⁵⁰

Down South, Senator Joseph Ransdall of Louisiana had predicted as far back as January that James Cox would be a front-running candidate because "he's one of the big men of the party, and has been re-elected governor of that big, pivotal state,"⁵¹

⁴⁸Times, June 17, 1920, p. 1; News, May 19, 1920, p. 1.

⁴⁹Times, April 12, 1920, p. 17.

⁵⁰News, May 19, 1920, p. 1; Times, June 18, 1920, p. 2.

⁵¹News, January 30, 1920, p. 1.

while at the same time over in Alabama the editor of the Tuscaloosa News was hoisting the Cox flags with the assertion that the Democrats had a good man in Cox to succeed Wilson.⁵²

According to The New York Times, increasing interest was building up in the South for Governor Cox, especially since the nomination of Warren Harding. Georgia was pledged to Palmer, but Cox sentiment was growing, whereas Mississippi, after giving a token first ballot to Senator Williams, was planning to jump onto the Cox wagon as early as the second ballot. Tennessee, it was claimed, would give support to Cox, as would many other states, too, once the name of Cox became better known.⁵³ Although few horns had been tooted in the South for the Ohio governor, by June that section was beginning to look upon Cox as a strong contender because of his geographic position, but also, according to the Tampa Morning Tribune (Democratic), because of his record.⁵⁴

Since Governor Cox had not campaigned for pledged delegates outside Ohio and Kentucky, his name was likewise little known in the West, but his followers still claimed much interest for him in those regions. As far back as December, 1919, a Portsmouth,

⁵²" 'Jimmy' Cox, Before and After Nomination," The Literary Digest, LXVI (July 24, 1920), 41.

⁵³Times, June 19, 1920, p. 2; June 23, 1920, p. 2; June 28, 1920, p. 2; June 19, 1920, p. 3.

⁵⁴As cited in News, June 6, 1920, pt. 1, p. 2.

Ohio, man toured the West and reported a considerable Cox sentiment there, saying that "while not exactly antagonistic to to the Washington administration, they feel that a new leader is necessary, and that Governor Cox has the greatest record of all men in public life today."⁵⁵ Then, just before the Republican nomination, former Congressman James Monahan, an attorney for the Non-Partisan League, asserted that if the GOP nominated a reactionary like Harding, Lowden, or Wood, and the Democrats nominated Cox, the Non-Partisan League was in a position to deliver forty-one electoral votes to the Democrats.⁵⁶

In May an editorial in the Rocky Mountain News (Independent) of Denver said, "There are no string attachments to Governor James M. Cox of Ohio." Therefore he had the advantage over McAdoo, the son-in-law of Wilson. On the positive side, the editorial noted that he was a "progressive and practical" Democratic governor in Republican Ohio--the only Democrat elected last time--and had done things for his state that would be good for the country. "The country is beginning to wake up to Cox of Ohio."⁵⁷ In the same vein Howard Burba of the Dayton Daily News learned a month later that eight of the twelve Colorado delegates

⁵⁵News, December 26, 1919, p. 13; see also Howard Burba, News, June 23, 1920, p. 2.

⁵⁶Raymond G. Carroll, News, June 7, 1920, p. 1.

⁵⁷As quoted in News, May 12, 1920, p. 6.

would vote for Cox on the first ballot and that all twelve would turn to him on the second.⁵⁸

Reports from San Francisco itself confirmed that Cox was surprisingly popular with all classes. "Left to a vote of San Franciscans, he'd win hands down."⁵⁹

After hearing and reading all these wonderful reports about their governor, was it any wonder the group of campaigners about to board the train in Dayton were in a carnival spirit? David Lawrence of the Washington Star (Independent) had written, "Certainly the selection of Harding would seem to insure Cox a place on the ticket. He says he will not run for vice-president."⁶⁰ Why should he? Here was the only man who could outrun Harding.

⁵⁸Howard Burba, News, June 22, 1920, p. 1. An examination of the actual Colorado vote at the convention reveals that Mr. Burba was highly over-optimistic in his reporting. See Appendix I.

⁵⁹C. C. Lyons, News, June 26, 1920, p. 3. New claims of strength were based on rumors that the Hoover Democrats were switching to Cox, especially in California and Washington. --News, June 4, 1920, p. 12; Times, June 4, 1920, p. 2.

⁶⁰As quoted in News, June 13, 1920, pt. 1, p. 2.

CHAPTER III

WOODROW WILSON

That Buckeye optimism was based more on campaign oratory and wishful thinking than on real votes is shown by a simple comparison of the claims of delegate strength and actual ballots recorded at the convention.¹ Cox strength was great in Ohio and neighboring Kentucky, and New York and Illinois were definitely casting favorable glances toward the Midwest's own Mother of Presidents; but the confidence and enthusiasm so noticeable in Ohio disappeared rapidly as one moved away from the area. Besides Governor Cox there were, of course, the usual leading contenders and a host of darkhorses appropriate for a Presidential campaign, each one having an over-optimistic following whose claims of delegate backing, if combined, would total far more than the 1,094 delegates actually voting at San Francisco. But underneath all the oratorical bluff, no candidate was assured of the necessary two-thirds vote needed to capture the nomination, nor even half the convention vote, for that matter. Even though many state preferential primaries had been held and several

¹See Appendix I.

aspirants had their hats officially in the ring, there was only a small percentage of the convention vote pledged to any specific candidate by convention time, Cox and Palmer being the front runners with fewer than eight committed votes apiece.²

If the Democratic Convention was a wide-open contest meeting under a cloud of question marks, the primary reason was that no one knew what was going on in the mind of the biggest Democrat of all--President Woodrow Wilson. For months politicians had been speculating whether or not Wilson would seek a third term, and as the day of reckoning came closer, they were no more certain of an answer than they had been in 1919. Nearly every Democrat in San Francisco was frankly hoping that the President would stay out of this race;³ but if he did choose to run, there would be nothing they could do but bolt the convention--an act likely to bring an end to the Democratic Party--or follow sheepishly behind their acknowledged leader. Bolting the party was unthinkable, but the second choice was no more palatable than the first because the prophets were already calling 1920 a Republican year and choosing a ticket headed by Wilson would certainly not increase Democratic chances.

² News, June 16, 1920, p. 1.

³ James J. Montague, News, June 26, 1920, p. 2; David Lawrence, News, January 2, 1920, p. 1; "The Presidential Sweepstakes," The Nation, CX (January 10, 1920), 31; "The Progress of the World," American Review of Reviews, LXI (January 1920), 10; Tribune, June 25, 1920, pp. 1 and 2; Arthur Sears Henning, Tribune, June 29, 1920, p. 2.

Since the crux of the President's reticence seemed to lie in the progress of the League of Nations issue, much depended on the outcome of that debate. If he could have gotten his treaty through the Senate, he would probably have retired on his laurels, but on the nineteenth of March the Senate rejected the League for the second time, and the question of the President's future came into even sharper focus.⁴ The following week both sides of the aisle in the House cheered heartily when Representative Benjamin Humphreys, Democrat from Mississippi, delivered a forty-minute speech asking the President to announce immediately that he was not in favor of a third term.⁵ Around the same time, Mr. Wilson told his physician, Admiral Grayson:

Tamulty has sent me a letter asking that I come out and say that I will not run again for the Presidency. I do not see anything to be gained at this time by doing so except to turn the leadership over to William Jennings Bryan. I feel that it would be presumptuous and in bad taste for me to decline something that has not been offered to me. No group of men has given me any assurances that it wanted me to be a candidate for renomination. In fact, everyone seems to be opposed to my running.

Warming up the subject, he continued:

The Democratic Convention in San Francisco

⁴Times, March 20, 1920, p. 1; "Getting the Presidential Bandwagon Started," Current Opinion, LXVIII (February 1920), 137.

⁵Times, March 26, 1920, p. 1; News, March 25, 1920, p. 1; Raymond Justus Hanks, "The Democratic Party in 1920: The Rupture of the Wilsonian Synthesis," Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (University of Chicago, 1960), p. 117.

may get into a hopeless tie-up, and it may, by the time of the Convention, become imperative that the League of Nations and the Peace Treaty be the dominant issue. The Convention may come to a deadlock as to candidates, and there may be practically a universal demand for the selection of someone to lead them out of the wilderness. The members of the Convention may feel that I am the logical one to lead--perhaps the only one to champion this cause. In such circumstances I would feel obligated to accept the nomination even if I thought it would cost me my life.⁶

Then Wilson asked Grayson if he thought he was strong enough to wage a campaign, but the Admiral declined to answer for fear of depressing the President.⁷

Although Grayson was getting an insight into the Wilson status, other Democrats were still in doubt, but still hoping for a pronouncement. In April Frederic Wile predicted an "historic vindication" of the President when Wilson would announce publicly he would not run for a third term. Then the whole country would feel sorry for the stricken President because they had abused him so much.⁸ At the same time Joseph Tumulty was planning with Louis Siebold of the New York World for the latter to hold a personal interview with the President in the hopes they could get Wilson to disclaim any intentions of a third

⁶Rear Admiral Cary T. Grayson, Woodrow Wilson: An Intimate Memoir (New York, c.1960), p. 116.

⁷Ibid., 117.

⁸News, April 19, 1920, p. 1.

term;⁹ but instead of achieving their own purposes, their strategy backfired, with the result that they served as unwitting promoters for a Wilson campaign. Although Siebold had a long list of questions to ask the President, he first had to submit them to Mrs. Wilson, who wrote opposite the item "Personal Plans?" that there was to be nothing in the published interview but exaltation of the President. When the reporter finally did get in to see Mr. Wilson around the middle of June, the Chief Executive dominated the interview by bringing up his own questions, answering them himself, and avoiding any references to a third term.¹⁰ As a result, the article that appeared in the New York World the next day portrayed not a sickly President fading into retirement, but an almost-recovered Wilson, working as hard as ever and ready to take on any challenger.¹¹ To complicate the situation, on the same day the interview was published, Wilson's son-in-law, William G. McAdoo, publicly withdrew from the presidential race.¹² Thus in contrast to the

⁹ John M. Blum, Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era (Boston, 1951), pp. 243-44; Wesley M. Bagby, The Road to Normalcy: The Presidential Campaign and Election of 1920 (Baltimore, 1962), p. 61.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Times, June 19, 1920, p. 1.

¹² Karl Schriftgiesser, This Was Normalcy: An Account of Party Politics During Twelve Republican Years: 1920-1932 (Boston, 1948), p. 40; Times, June 19, 1920, pp. 1 and 2.


many disclaimers written by reporters in the previous months, the number who were sure of the President's retirement dropped almost to nothing after June 19, and the Wilson odds on Wall Street dropped from twenty-to-one to two-to-one by June 30.¹³

As the convention date drew near, all the leaders of the Democratic Party were becoming convinced that Woodrow Wilson was receptive to a third term, and the reports they were getting from Grayson and Tumulty merely confirmed their opinions. Carter Glass, Homer Cummings, and Bainbridge Colby held conversations with the President just before leaving for San Francisco, and each came away with the same conviction.¹⁴ The situation regarding Wilson was clear, if uneasy, for the Democrats. Those inside the White House did not want the President to seek re-election for fear of his personal health, while those outside the White House did not want the President for fear of their own political health, but if Mr. Wilson decided to speak up for the nomination, no one could stop him. Leaders at San Francisco were convinced that Wilson would not openly seek the nomination, but would play the waiting game in the expectation that someone else would put Wilson's name before the convention and the delegates

¹³Times, June 30, 1920, p. 2.

¹⁴Times, June 19, 1920, p. 2; June 20, 1920, pt. 1, p. 1; Rixley Smith and Norman Beasley, Carter Glass: A Biography (New York, 1939), pp. 205-06; Hanks, p. 178; Bagby, p. 62.

would then stampede to the Chief Executive. Therefore, if the delegates could go about their business in California without letting the name of Wilson slip into the nominations, like so many mice busy working in the kitchen while the cat is decoyed elsewhere, they could nominate a candidate who would be healthy enough to run and healthier for the Party. The key lay in the Democrats' ability to muzzle any over-enthusiastic Wilsonites who might be ready to beat the drum for the President.



CHAPTER IV

McADOO

THE MAN TO BEAT, RUNNING OR NOT

If the problem of determining the President's mind had been the only nebulous factor at the convention in San Francisco, the managers of the various candidates might have been able to make definite plans; but as the month of June unfolded, the Democratic situation began to look like a case for Sherlock Holmes. In addition to Wilson's reticence, the managers were in a state of confusion because William Gibbs McAdoo, generally considered to be the front-running candidate, withdrew his name from the race just before the convention.¹ As a result, many Democrats found themselves in the awkward position of trying to avoid the head of the Party, who wanted the nomination, while at the same time backing a candidate who rejected it. Perhaps McAdoo did not really expect his withdrawal to be taken seriously, but if he did, would he accept the nomination if drafted? From the strategic point of view, did McAdoo's withdrawal actually end his candidacy, or did it merely serve to enhance his position as the most desirable candidate? Of all the candidates, McAdoo had the

¹Times, June 19, 1920, p. 1.

most illustrious camp of followers from the political and financial standpoint. As far back as September, 1919, the rumor circulated that Bernard Baruch and W. L. Chadbourne had offered to underwrite the "right candidate's" campaign with ten million dollars.² It was common knowledge that both Baruch and Chadbourne, men of great wealth, were confirmed McAdoo backers.

In Washington sentiment was decidedly favorable toward the former Secretary of the Treasury. Although Wilson refused to support any candidate, almost his entire Cabinet, with the exception of Attorney General Palmer, was strongly behind McAdoo.³ In addition, prominent Democrats for McAdoo included Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, author of the Federal Reserve Act and himself a former Treasury Secretary; Raymond T. Baker, head of the United States Mint; George Creel; Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt; and the astute politician, Daniel C. Roper.⁴ Speaking of sentiment in the nation's capital, Postmaster-General Albert S. Burleson had remarked in May that "everyone in Washington" believed McAdoo would get the nomination

²Hanks, p. 58; see also Bernard M. Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years (New York, 1962), pp. 161-62.

³Times, July 1, 1920, p. 2; Willis J. Abbot, "The Democratic Convention at San Francisco: II The Impressions of a Newspaper Correspondent," The Outlook, CXXV (July 21, 1920), 565.

⁴Times, July 5, 1920, p. 1; Frederic Wile, News, April 19, 1920, p. 9; "For President, (Among Others)--William G. McAdoo," Literary Digest, LXIV (February 28, 1920), 44; Hanks, p. 190.

on the first or second ballot.⁵ His statement was overly optimistic but his enthusiasm was endorsed by Washington observers, who gave McAdoo an even better chance to win than did the already confident New York odds-makers.⁶

Even though the campaign directors of Governor Cox were claiming nationwide support, the managers of William G. McAdoo were willing to concede nothing more to Cox than the state of Ohio. Since McAdoo was a dry and a native of Georgia, he was in a much stronger position to carry the South than Cox. As a corporation lawyer practicing in New York, his claims to Wall Street support were equally as valid as those of Cox, while on the labor scene he could point to the wage increases given to the railroad workers as an arguing point for labor support.⁷ The Metal Trades Council of Brooklyn, representing about fourteen thousand workers, had endorsed McAdoo in early May, along with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union in New York City; thus there was certainly no Cox monopoly on the labor vote, even in Tammany-dominated New York City.⁸ Actually,

⁵Bagby, p. 68.

⁶See, for example, Times, July 2, 1920, p. 2.

⁷Lindsay Rogers, "American Politics in 1920," The Contemporary Review, CXVII (February 1920), 187; "The Democratic Opportunity," Literary Digest, LXV (June 26, 1920), 18; Wile, News, April 19, 1920, p. 9; Times, June 27, 1920, pt. 7, p. 1; Hanks, p. 68.

⁸"What the Primaries Indicate," The Outlook, CXXV (June 2, 1920), 199; Hanks, p. 124.

as the New York World pointed out on June 28, 1920, the labor vote was probably split between McAdoo and Cox.⁹

The Ohioans' claims of vast support in the West were also fallacious in the opinion of McAdoo followers. The American Review of Reviews had reported in February of 1920 that McAdoo was very popular on the West Coast and that he was better understood and liked in the West and South than in the East.¹⁰ If proof of the McAdoo strength in the West was needed, a look at the delegations to the convention from Oregon, Washington, California, Arizona, Texas, Utah, and Idaho seemed sufficient.¹¹

McAdoo strength was revealed by the opinion poll conducted by the Literary Digest during the spring of 1920. Admittedly the poll had its failings in accuracy, but the overwhelming lead that McAdoo piled up was valid proof of the former Secretary's popularity. McAdoo, with 103,000 votes, tallied over fifty per cent more ballots than second-place Wilson; but considering the fact that the President was a highly doubtful candidate and third-place Governor Edwards was merely a rallying point for the liquor factions, the results become even more impressive. The next highest candidate was William Jennings Bryan, the focal

⁹Hanks, p. 249.

¹⁰"Democratic Candidates Still Shy," The American Review of Reviews, Albert Shaw, ed., LXI (February 1920), 131.

¹¹See, for example, Appendix I.

point for the dry forces, with forty-six thousand, followed by Governor Cox with thirty-two thousand.¹² In a smaller poll conducted by the Delineator, a woman's magazine, McAdoo also topped all Democrats with 315 votes, followed by a poor-second Bryan with 131, and Wilson with 51.¹³

Granting the fact that McAdoo was the most likely Democratic candidate from the popular point of view, the greater question by far was just what McAdoo himself intended to do with his position on the inside rail. After all, it was 1920, and most political observers felt that all the dogs in the Democratic race were only chasing a stuffed rabbit anyway. Although every candidate at San Francisco had to contend with the strong possibility that he was only chasing a dream, for McAdoo the problem was even more acute because of his peculiar relationship to the President of the United States. Under ordinary circumstances, being the son-in-law of the man living in the White House would be a distinct advantage for any politician, but for McAdoo the relationship was a hurdle, not a help.

In the first place, so long as the father-in-law did not reveal his political plans, neither could the son-in-law. All

¹²"Final Standing of the Democratic Candidates," The Literary Digest, LXV (June 12, 1920), 20.

¹³"A Presidential Ballot," The Delineator, XCVI (June 1920), 1, 33.

Democrats had to step lightly in order not to seem in contradiction with the President, but McAdoo had to show even more deference because he was a Democrat and a member of the Wilson family. Had the President bowed out graciously at the beginning of the campaign, McAdoo might have won hands down, but the longer Wilson kept silent, the more tenuous became McAdoo's position. Even if the President did not want a third term, McAdoo's own campaign would be handicapped without the expressed backing of his father-in-law. There was no such vote of confidence, nor would there ever be.

The close relationship between Wilson and McAdoo was an even greater hindrance to McAdoo because of the President's loss of popular support. There was a time when Woodrow Wilson was looked upon by many people as a great leader; but since the end of the World War, his popularity had waned considerably, primarily because of the long drawn-out fight he had waged with the Senate over the League of Nations issue. McAdoo was the most popular of all the Democratic prospects. Would his popularity, however, be enough to overcome all the adverse opinion that would naturally transfer to him because of his close relationship to Mr. Wilson? Since Woodrow Wilson had always been known to favor a strong executive, McAdoo would be wide open to the charge of "crown

prince" if he were the Democratic nominee.¹⁴

Even if he could be assured that Wilson would not stand in his way, McAdoo still faced strong opposition from the northern big-city machine bosses, who were determined to block any bid he might make for the nomination. These organization men were still smarting from the snub both Wilson and McAdoo had given them with regard to patronage positions, and they were determined upon revenge. Furthermore, they could not meekly sit back and allow a prohibitionist from the Wilson Administration to take charge, when their own constituents back home were decidedly wet and anti-Wilson.¹⁵ Finally, in the Literary Digest poll already mentioned, McAdoo proved to be by far the most popular of all Democrats; but he was not too short-sighted to see that in the overall picture he was surpassed by a number of Republicans, in particular, General Leonard Wood, who received twice as many votes as McAdoo.¹⁶ Since all political barometers were showing "Republican," an open contest for the Democratic nomination would be politically unwise.

Around the same time, Josephus Daniels pondered McAdoo's

¹⁴Times, May 24, 1920, p. 3; April 12, 1920, p. 17; June 15, 1920, p. 1; Mark Sullivan, "Your Move, Democracy," Collier's, LXV (June 19, 1920), 8; "The Presidential Sweepstakes," The Nation, CX (January 10, 1920), 31; CX (June 5, 1920), 741.

¹⁵Times, June 15, 1920, p. 1; Hanks, pp. 68, 184, and 255.

¹⁶"Final Standing of the Democratic Candidates," The Literary Digest, LXV (June 12, 1920), 20-21.

reluctance to enter into any primary races and wrote in his diary, "McAdoo's action due to possibility of WW running and not because he wanted an open and free convention."¹⁷

Under the circumstances McAdoo had no other choice but to declare publicly for a free and uncommitted convention, while working behind the scenes to gather all the support possible. Like most of the other candidates, he had to give the public impression that he was not actively chasing after a lost cause. In Ohio he scrupulously avoided any attempt to win delegates and even went so far as to suggest that Ohio Democrats back their own favorite son, James M. Cox. His ulterior motive was probably the hope that the Cox movement would eventually falter, in which case he might persuade the governor of politically important Ohio to join him as his Vice-Presidential running-mate.¹⁸ During the early spring such a combination seemed more than just a possibility, for Edmond H. Moore himself, the campaign manager of Cox, was assuring Mrs. Antoinette Funk of the McAdoo camp that party sentiment was for McAdoo and hinting that Cox might take the Vice-Presidency. By convention time, however, probably due in great part to Harding's nomination, the Cox forces were

¹⁷Hanks, p. 122.

¹⁸Times, July 1, 1920, p. 2; Bagby, p. 66; Hanks, p. 273.

determined to go the distance.¹⁹ When the results of the Michigan primary were tallied in early April, McAdoo, in spite of an unsuccessful attempt to withdraw from the race, showed the greatest strength of all the Democratic candidates, although again the dark clouds of Republican predominance loomed on the horizon. The GOP outpolled the Democrats 335,000 to 68,000, with over 13,000 of the Democratic total going to Herbert Hoover. Nevertheless, McAdoo's stock went up among the Democrats at the expense of A. Mitchell Palmer.²⁰ Even in Ohio and Pennsylvania, where McAdoo had kept his name off the primary ballots, the former Secretary received a substantial number of write-in votes.²¹

On the surface McAdoo was avoiding any conflicts with other potential candidates, as in the case of the Ohio situation already mentioned; but behind the scenes there was a running battle taking place between McAdoo and A. Mitchell Palmer. McAdoo withdrew permission to enter his name in the Georgia

¹⁹ Bagby, p. 114. Professor Bagby gives McAdoo's withdrawal as the reason for Cox forces dropping any Vice-Presidential plans, but it would seem the Harding nomination was more influential in the Cox strategy. See, for example, News, June 15, 1920, p. 2; Times, June 13, 1920, pt. 1, p. 5; June 16, 1920, p. 1.

²⁰ The Nation, CX (April 17, 1920), 499; CX (May 1, 1920), 570; Wife, News, April 8, 1920, p. 1.

²¹ "The Progress of the Presidential Primaries," The Outlook, CXXV (June 2, 1920), 199.

primary and left the door open for Palmer to run instead, but this was not an indication by any means that McAdoo was withdrawing from the entire race in deference to Palmer. A spirited rivalry continued between the two in which Palmer protested the write-ins for McAdoo in Pennsylvania and McAdoo countered with a charge that a Palmer manager had been sent to New York to try to win away supporters of McAdoo. While McAdoo conceded the open primaries to Palmer, he tried to whittle down Palmer's drive by calling for uninstructed delegations wherever the Attorney General sought to win committed delegates. Although he was not an avowed candidate for the Presidency, and on the surface even seemed to be constantly withdrawing himself from primary contests, McAdoo still kept his name before the public eye through periodic statements on public policy and current matters, and even made a trip to the West Coast as late as May and June of 1920.²²

By the middle of June, however, the biggest problem for McAdoo was not so much Palmer or Cox--although they were certainly not to be underestimated--but still the persistent silence of Wilson. When McAdoo had assured himself that his father-in-law was definitely not dropping out of the race, he probably decided the only way to protect his own interests from

²² Bagby, pp. 65-67, 116.

possible embarrassment was to withdraw formally from the presidential campaign. Accordingly on June 18, 1920, McAdoo wrote to his friend, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Jouett Shouse: "I cannot, therefore, permit my name to go before the convention; this decision is irrevocable." He urged, instead, that his followers transfer their support to Senator Carter Glass of Virginia.²³

The unexpected withdrawal of one of the leading candidates from the presidential race naturally caused a flurry of excitement and new speculation. The timing of McAdoo's withdrawal in conjunction with the New York World article on Woodrow Wilson led many to believe that McAdoo was withdrawing to make the way clear for the President to seek a third term, while others now looked to Cox as the favorite; Palmer, of course, figured to benefit greatly from the withdrawal, too.²⁴ But when the dust stirred up by all the excitement began to settle a few days later, the Democrats took a second look and realized that McAdoo was by no means out of the running after all.

Since it is impossible to fathom the inner regions of man's mind, no one can be certain what McAdoo's real intentions were when he made his statement of withdrawal, but the conclusions of

²³Times, June 19, 1920, pp. 1-2.

²⁴Times, June 21, 1920, pp. 1 and 3; News, June 19, 1920, p. 1; Wile, News, June 20, 1920, pt. 1, p. 1.

many politicians, in particular Daniel C. Roper, were that the statement aided, rather than hindered McAdoo's chances. From the notations of Carter Glass in his diary, the reader gets the impression that McAdoo actually felt his letter would put an end to his campaign for 1920 but that Roper felt otherwise.²⁵

Whether on his own volition or at the behest of his followers, after his withdrawal statement of June 18, McAdoo still left the door open for a popular groundswell movement to draft him, and his followers were out to achieve this very thing. McAdoo's retreat may have lost him some of his followers; but on the other hand his camp had expended too much in time, money, and prestige to throw the whole effort overboard at such a late stage in the game.²⁶ The strategy of the last few weeks before the convention, therefore, was to gamble away the advantage of an organized campaign for an active candidate on the chance that they could push through the nomination of an unwilling McAdoo under the appearance of a spontaneous movement of the rank and file of the convention for a "poor man's candidate."²⁷ If a few

²⁵Rixley Smith and Norman Beasley, Carter Glass: A Biography (New York, 1939), pp. 206-07.

²⁶Hanks, p. 244.

²⁷Times, June 23, 1920, p. 2. The McAdoo strategists had been working throughout the preceding weeks to avoid the semblance of an organized campaign, but had planned to set up a convention campaign headquarters in San Francisco with Daniel C. Roper in charge. After McAdoo's withdrawal even these plans were dropped. See Bagby, p. 67.

votes should be lost because of the absence of a centralized, open organization, the McAdoo workers felt certain the loss would be offset by the broader foundation of the new McAdoo appeal and the fact that McAdoo's reluctance discounted any accusations of a "crown prince" out to retain the position of "heir apparent."

McAdoo himself was the epitome of ambivalence, saying repeatedly he was not a candidate, but always keeping the door slightly ajar. He wired Committeeman Thomas B. Love of Texas, one of his strongest field generals, that he hoped Love would yield to his withdrawal and help keep him out of public life. Love replied that his sense of duty required him to proceed as planned, but McAdoo wired back that it was impossible for him to run. Love then consulted Daniel C. Roper, who advised him not to make any nominating speeches.²⁸ Love continued to pledge Texas' forty votes to McAdoo, however, and on the day the convention opened, McAdoo telegraphed his warm thanks to the Texas delegation for their support and also assured the North Carolina delegation he would make no more withdrawal statements. He advised his supporters to see Love, and expressed his hope that if he were recalled to public life, they would help him.²⁹ When Dr. Burriss Jenkins of Kansas City announced four days after McAdoo's withdrawal that Mr. McAdoo's name would still be

²⁸ Bagby, p. 69.

²⁹ Ibid., 71; Times, June 24, 1920, p. 2.

presented by popular demand, McAdoo urged him not to do so, and Dr. Jenkins complied.³⁰ It is interesting to note, however, that when reporters asked McAdoo about the "definite and final instructions" received in San Francisco that his name should not be presented to the convention, he only replied, "This action was taken with my entire approval."³¹ The statement would imply that by convention time the McAdoo organization was planning all the strategy, while McAdoo, after absolving himself by his letter of withdrawal, was taking the passive position of accepting whatever came his way.

At one point during the final days before the convention, though, McAdoo was stirred to action. On June 24, 1920, David Lawrence wrote in his column that McAdoo was suffering from tuberculosis of the throat.³² Infuriated, McAdoo told Bernard Baruch this was an example of the "dirty work the Palmer bunch" was doing, and immediately fired back a public statement deploring such "wanton falsehood" and "despicable methods." The optimistic Roper again felt the whole affair would strengthen the McAdoo campaign.³³

During the months preceding the Democratic Convention,

³⁰ News, June 22, 1920, p. 1; David Lawrence, News, June 29, 1920, p. 1.

³¹ Times, July 1, 1920, p. 1.

³² David Lawrence, News, June 24, 1920, p. 1.

³³ Bagby, p. 70.

McAdoo had definitely been undecided about his plans for the Presidential nomination, probably hoping that a split at the Republican Convention would open the way for him to win not just the Democratic nomination, but the raison d'etre for the whole campaign--the Presidency.³⁴ When, however, the united Republicans nominated Harding, McAdoo not only saw his hopes for a split destroyed, but interpreted the nomination of an Ohioan as strengthening the hand of his chief opponent, James M. Cox, and lessening any chance he might have of getting a McAdoo-Cox ticket. Since no encouraging words were forthcoming from the White House, McAdoo probably concluded that 1920 was not the year to be the leader of the Democratic Party and accordingly drafted his letter of withdrawal. His supporters, and particularly Daniel C. Roper, not wanting to see the entire McAdoo campaign shipwrecked just before the convention, persuaded McAdoo to agree at least to accept the nomination if drafted. For McAdoo this was a perfectly tenable position because having publicly withdrawn his name from the race, he really could not "lose" the nomination, while on the other hand if he were drafted in San Francisco and later lost in the November election, he was still in a position to say, "I told you so," and not have to shoulder the blame himself. To accommodate his supporters, McAdoo did not release his followers to their second choice, but

³⁴Times, June 5, 1920, p. 16.

urged them to back Carter Glass of Virginia. Since no Democratic Convention would ever nominate a Southern Senator for President, the likely intent was to keep the McAdoo vote united for a later move back to McAdoo.³⁵

After his letter of June 18, therefore, McAdoo sent a few more telegrams to his followers to emphasize the fact that he personally was not out to get the nomination, then turned the ball over to his supporters to see if they would score a touch-down or be stopped at the line of scrimmage. Daniel C. Roper changed his original plans to go to San Francisco to direct the attack, but there is little doubt that he was still coaching the team. Bernard Baruch and Thomas Chadbourne canceled their hotel reservations in San Francisco, leaving the quarterbacking job entirely up to Thomas Love, Mrs. Antoinette Funk, and the other McAdoo supporters on the field.³⁶ If the big wheels of the McAdoo machine seemed to be conceding defeat, they were only carrying out the masterplan. The chief hope of the campaign leaders was to get their man around the big organizations with the appearance that McAdoo's strength came not from organized interests, but from "the people." With the head man gone to the showers they looked like a team without organization, but there was still very much strength in the McAdoo camp. Although the

³⁵Hanks, p. 243.

³⁶Arthur Sears Henning, Tribune, July 1, 1920, p. 2; Bagby, p. 69.

withdrawal letter had caused a temporary setback for the McAdoo forces, they soon regained their strength so completely that when the contest began in San Francisco, the spectators still recognized the sides as McAdoo versus the field, with McAdoo the two-to-one favorite.³⁷

³⁷Times, June 29, 1920, p. 1; David Lawrence, News, June 30, 1920, p. 3; Tribune, June 29, 1920, p. 3; Henning, ibid., p. 1.

CHAPTER V

PALMER AND THE FIELD

The year 1920 could be classified as the Year of the Ostrich in the annals of Democratic pre-convention campaigning. Although a Presidential nomination was being held out for some worthy candidate, hardly anyone was willing to make an avowed fight for it. Woodrow Wilson was saying nothing; William G. McAdoo had repeatedly backed out of the contest; and Governor Cox restricted himself by openly seeking delegates only in Ohio and Kentucky. The reluctant race of McAdoo caused the Chicago Tribune to comment sarcastically: "Mr. McAdoo wishes us all distinctly to understand that if the San Francisco convention does not offer him the nomination he will not accept it."¹ Cox also affected political shyness. "Governor Cox has consented to this presentation of his name," read the endorsement by his own Third District, "only after he was convinced that as so large a number of his friends insisted upon his candidacy--it amounted to a call that he had no right to disregard."² Even when Cox's managers opened campaign offices to bid for delegates, they felt obligated

¹Tribune, June 21, 1920, p. 8.

²News, January 31, 1920, p. 1.

to offer the excuse that such action was being done because other Democratic candidates were not "playing square" in regard to uninstructed delegates.³ They failed to say what "other candidates" they had in mind.

In marked contrast to the guarded grabs at the nomination made by the other candidates was the forceful lunge made by the Attorney General of the United States, A. Mitchell Palmer. Being a member of the Wilson Administration, he was as vulnerable to the anti-Wilson attacks as McAdoo, except for the "crown prince" epithet; but instead of being discouraged, the Attorney General entered the fight with all the more determination. His strategy was to win as many primary elections as possible and bulldoze his way through the convention by means of a vast array of committed delegates. If he could garner enough pledged votes in the primaries, ordinary "bandwagon" psychology would do the rest.

In the early forecasts around the beginning of 1920, both McAdoo and Palmer shared the spotlight. Actually, most organization Democrats preferred Palmer to McAdoo because he had been less selfish and had worked harder for the Party. McAdoo had popularity, but Democratic leaders felt he had not always been "regular" with his patronage appointments. If the convention had taken place in February or March, most of the party

³News, March 26, 1920, p. 25; Times, March 27, 1920, p. 15.

regulars and probably even the Cabinet would have backed the Attorney General, for he alone seemed to be answering the call of the Democracy with the conviction so badly needed at the time.⁴

The first hurdle in Palmer's path to the convention occurred in Michigan in early April, and promptly it became a stumbling block. The Attorney General finished a poor fifth among Democrats in that primary, even behind Herbert Hoover, who by this time had already declared himself a Republican.⁵ Although politicians had foreseen handicaps in Palmer's appeal, they had not expected such a jolt. He was a fighter of the mold needed by the Democrats in 1920, but his aggressive manner was also his great political liability, for Palmer, both as Alien Property Custodian during World War I and later as Attorney General, went about his business with a determination that stepped on too many toes. There had been suspicions that organized labor would present a determined opposition to him because he had suggested, among other things, longer working hours with no increase in weekly

⁴David Lawrence, News, October 1, 1919, p. 19; N. O. Messenger, News, February 8, 1920, Review Section, p. 8; "The Presidential Sweepstakes," The Nation, CX (January 10, 1920), 31; Mark Sullivan, "Your Move, Democracy," Collier's, LXV (June 19, 1920), 8, 18; "The Progress of the World," The American Review of Reviews, LXI (January 1920), 11; Hanks, p. 128.

⁵Nation, CX (April 17, 1920), 499.

wages as a solution to the high cost of living;⁶ but no one expected the results to be as drastic as they were in Michigan. Nevertheless, the Michigan primary confirmed emphatically the feeling that no one in the labor movement would come to the support of Palmer.

Liberal leaders could see very little good in the Attorney General. Whether Samuel Gompers was writing or progressive magazines such as The New Republic or Nation were expounding, their opinions of Palmer were similar.⁷ As if he were not blamed enough for what he did, he was also ridiculed for what he did not do. For example, Palmer had openly promised to lower the high cost of living (a much-discussed topic at that time) by imprisoning the profiteers; but after long months of investigation the profiteers were still free and prices were still high.⁸

Although his poor showing in the Michigan Primary hurt Palmer considerably, he continued to fight for delegates. Georgia's twenty-eight votes were awarded to him, but only after a prolonged dispute between two rival delegations which finally

⁶John M. Blum, Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era (Boston, 1951), pp. 220-21; "Who's Who in the Presidential Race," The Literary Digest, LXIII (December 27, 1919), 11; "Democratic Availabilities," The American Review of Reviews, LXI (May 1920), 465; Lindsay Rogers, "American Politics in 1920," The Contemporary Review, CXVII (February 1920), 188; Times, April 12, 1920, p. 17; June 25, 1920, p. 1; Hanks, p. 80.

⁷News, March 15, 1920, p. 3; see Nation, Vol. 110 and The New Republic, Vols. 22 and 23.

⁸Nation, CX (March 13, 1920), 319; News, June 23, 1920, p. 1.

had to be settled by the National Democratic Committee.⁹ Senator Simmons of North Carolina and Secretary of Agriculture Meredith of Iowa, both McAdoo men, kept fifty delegate votes away from the Palmer camp by running as favorite sons in their respective states, thereby averting an early Palmer rush at the convention; but the Attorney General compensated for this loss by easily capturing the seventy-six votes from his own state of Pennsylvania.¹⁰ However, Pennsylvania, even though it voted a large and important bloc in the electoral college, was by tradition strongly Republican, and not even the presence of a favorite son on the November ballot could be counted on to change the trend.¹¹ Since Pennsylvania was already conceded to the Republicans, there seemed to be no point in choosing a candidate from that state when there were others who could swing doubtful blocs into the Democratic camp.

No one seeking the Democratic nomination in 1920 seemed to have more handicaps than A. Mitchell Palmer; yet no one struggled so persistently for the reward. He was from a staunchly

⁹ Nation, CX (May 1, 1920), 570; News, April 22, 1920, p. 1; May 21, 1920, p. 1; June 27, 1920, p. 1; "The Presidential Primaries," The Outlook, CXXV (May 5, 1920), 5; "The Progress of the Presidential Primaries," The Outlook, CXXV (June 2, 1920), 199; Tribune, June 29, 1920, p. 2.

¹⁰ Bagby, p. 67; "The Progress of the Presidential Primaries," p. 199.

¹¹ Times, June 25, 1920, p. 1; Mark Sullivan, "For Rent: A White House," Collier's, LXV (January 24, 1920), 6.

Republican state; he was too closely associated with Wilson; he had lost the Administration support to McAdoo; he was disliked by labor and liberal groups; his projected primary boom fizzled; yet in the home stretch before the convention he was still keeping up with McAdoo and Cox.¹² Most prophets saw little chance for a Palmer nomination, but while other candidates were withdrawing, Palmer was campaigning openly, and in the confused state of Democracy 1920, who could make any predictions? If Palmer could not get the nomination himself, he still controlled a large bloc of delegates who would play a vital role in either stopping or helping someone toward the necessary two-thirds majority. Nomination or no, Palmer was important.

Beyond the speculation surrounding the four most prominent Democratic candidates of 1920, or perhaps it would be better to say because of the speculation surrounding these men, the names of quite a few other prospects were pulled from the files and given the political acid test for strength and magnetic qualities. A perennial threat the Democrats constantly had to keep their eyes on was the Great Commoner, William Jennings Bryan. In recent years the Bryan star had been in eclipse, but

¹²Frederic Wile, News, June 26, 1920, p. 1; "The Candidates at San Francisco," The American Review of Reviews, LXII (July 1920), 19. See also the open letter from twelve prominent lawyers accusing him of cruelty, forgery, etc.--Times, May 28, 1920, p. 6.

now the prohibition issue was bringing the old stumping spirit back to his bones. Although no one was predicting the Party to clamor again for a three-time loser, the veterans of the political wars still remembered vividly the magical powers this Pied Piper held when standing on a rostrum; and now the delegates were taking on the characteristics of a herd of cattle in an electrical storm. Bryan had said in March that he would run "if the situation became such that my nomination was actually demanded," although he added that he hoped it would not be.¹³ Later he surveyed the field of candidates and put his stamp of approval on Secretary of Agriculture Edward T. Meredith of Iowa, but Meredith withdrew from the race in late June and threw his support to McAdoo.¹⁴ Bryan, however, even though admitting he was "personally fond" of McAdoo, felt the son-in-law charge would be too much of a hindrance.¹⁵ Whether Bryan would decide to run again or would back another candidate, he still controlled a zealous group of followers;¹⁶ and any zealous group with William Jennings Bryan at its head was always a threat.

Of all the favorite sons being considered, the man who

¹³News, March 14, 1920, Sport Section, p. 12.

¹⁴Times, June 28, 1920, p. 1.

¹⁵News, April 7, 1920, p. 2.

¹⁶"On to 'Frisco!" The Independent, CIII (July 3, 1920), 17; Hugh Baillie, also James J. Montague, News, June 27, 1920, p. 2.

seemed to be the most likely to succeed was John W. Davis of West Virginia, the American Ambassador to Great Britain.¹⁷ Although very little attention was paid to him in the early stages of the campaign, the New York Times started a Davis boom in May which was growing to considerable proportions by the eve of the convention.¹⁸ Some felt his position as Ambassador to Great Britain would hurt his chances with the Irish vote, while others looked askance at his conservative record and the fact that he came from a non-pivotal state; but generally speaking, most observers considered him a good man with a respectable record, although too little known publicly.¹⁹ Since, however, his supporters frankly weighed his prospects in the light of a three-way deadlock between McAdoo, Palmer, and Cox, the very fact that he was unknown gave him a considerable advantage as a darkhorse. As James J. Montague expressed it, "Nobody wants him particularly, but nobody doesn't want him aggressively."²⁰ Wall Street, which set his odds at a low three-to-one, was not

¹⁷"Democratic Abilities," The American Review of Reviews, LXI (May 1920), 465; Frederic Wile, News, June 27, 1920, p. 1.

¹⁸Times, May 23, 1920, p. 1; May 30, 1920, pt. 2, p. 2.

¹⁹Willis J. Abbot, "The Democratic Convention at San Francisco: II The Impressions of a Newspaper Correspondent," The Outlook, CXXV (July 21, 1920), 566; David Lawrence, News, July 4, 1920, pt. 1, p. 1; Mark Sullivan, "Your Move, Democracy," p. 8.

²⁰News, June 30, 1920, p. 2.

discounting his chances by any means.²¹

Early in 1920, Governor Edward I. Edwards entered the Presidential race as a favorite son from the state of New Jersey;²² but his candidacy was not taken seriously because he was running almost solely on the issue of anti-prohibition. However, many eyebrows were raised when he showed surprising strength in the Michigan April primary, polling more votes than Palmer.²³ Later in the month he captured the twenty-eight delegates from his own state of New Jersey in spite of a hard-fought campaign waged there by Palmer.²⁴ Then he aggravated Palmer's position even more by winning a considerable number of write-in votes in the May Pennsylvania primary.²⁵ Edwards was interviewed by The Independent magazine as one of the four most likely Democratic candidates, while in the Literary Digest poll he finished third in total Democratic votes behind McAdoo and Wilson, receiving in addition over thirteen thousand cross-over Republican votes, far more than any other Democrat.²⁶ Being an

²¹News, June 24, 1920, p. 1.

²²News, January 18, 1920, p. 1.

²³News, April 7, 1920, p. 1; Nation, CX (April 17, 1920), 49.

²⁴News, April 18, 1920, pt. 1, p. 9; May 23, 1920, p. 1.

²⁵"The Progress of the Presidential Primaries," The Outlook, CXXV (June 2, 1920), 199.

²⁶Bruce Bliven, "Hoover--and the Rest," The Independent, CII (May 29, 1920), 275; "Final Standing of the Democratic Candidates," The Literary Digest, LXV (June 12, 1920), 20.

out-and-out wet, he would have to overcome the immovable object known as Bryan; but his wet backers were zealots of the same mold. If perchance the three front runners locked their horns in a hopeless fight and the big-city machines won control of the convention, there was a chance for the Governor of New Jersey. If his chances were long, so were those of every other darkhorse.

Since there was such a bottleneck in the front ranks of the Democratic race, a host of other candidates of the favorite-son variety stood in the wings hopefully waiting to see if the main attractions might wrestle themselves to a boring standoff. Chief among these backstage hopefuls was the Vice-President of the United States, Thomas R. Marshall, whom Tom Taggart was trying to push forward as the Indiana nominee. Throughout the campaign Marshall had said he was not a candidate; but a week before the convention, he sent his secretary to San Francisco to sniff out the political winds. The breezes, however, were not too promising for the Vice-President.²⁷ Although Indiana boss Taggart had stumped hard for Marshall when he played host to Tammany boss Charles F. Murphy and Governor Al Smith at French Lick, there seemed to be no enthusiastic rush to the Vice-President, in spite of reports from French Lick that the

²⁷ Charles M. Thomas, Thomas Riley Marshall: Hoosier Statesman (Oxford, Ohio, 1939), 239; See also Arthur Sears Henning, Tribune, June 27, 1920, p. 1.

three leaders had agreed to back him.²⁸ If anything, the two New Yorkers were probably trying to cement an alliance with Taggart by paying lip-service to his choice without openly committing themselves to Marshall. They probably considered Marshall a possibility, but only in the event that all other means of stopping McAdoo failed.

During his eight years as Vice-President, Marshall had not built any following outside his own state of Indiana;²⁹ and even there, his name was often overshadowed by that of Tom Taggart. In spite of the lack of enthusiasm elsewhere in the country, Taggart continued to pledge Indiana's thirty votes to its favorite son. Behind the scenes, however, the Ohio people closely watched the Hoosier situation, for the very weakness of the Vice-President's political foundation was the key to the Cox campaign, since Marshall could just possibly hold in the balance not only the Indiana vote but the Tammany delegation as well.³⁰

Just before the convention opened, the Cox campaign encountered another stumbling block they had not figured on previously. Until the first part of June it had been a foregone

²⁸ See Times, June 13, 1920, pt. 1, p. 18; June 14, 1920, p. 20; June 15, 1920, p. 1; June 16, 1920, p. 30; and June 17, 1920, p. 1.

²⁹ "Who's Who in the Presidential Race," The Literary Digest, LXIII (December 27, 1919), 11; Willis J. Abbot, "The Democratic Convention at San Francisco," p. 566.

³⁰ Times, June 15, 1920, p. 1; June 17, 1920, p. 1.

conclusion that the Tammany element would fall in behind Cox, even though they might give some support in the early ballots to Vice-President Marshall; but around the middle of June an unexpected groundswell began to develop for Governor Al Smith as a favorite son from New York, a boom which was augmented a short time later when Governor Cox announced publicly that he preferred not to have the prohibition issue included in the platform at all.³¹ Although most observers felt that Governor Smith was too new on the national political scene to be strong enough to capture the Presidential nomination and that the new Smith boom was merely a front to bide time behind until the New York delegation could decide which way the political winds were blowing, for the campaigners of Cox, the rise of Al Smith was a new and serious obstacle in the path of their own endeavors. When the chances of Al Smith should become hopeless along with those of Marshall, the Tammany bloc would swing over to Cox;³² but the danger for Cox was that (1) they might hold out too long, permitting someone else to start a more attractive bandwagon, or (2) the Smith boomlet might just become an unstoppable surge itself. Instead of only one person standing between Tammany and Cox, now there were two.

³¹ Times, June 16, 1920, pp. 1 and 3; June 25, 1920, p. 1; June 27, 1920, p. 1.

³² Times, June 25, 1920, p. 1; James J. Montague, News, June 28, 1920, p. 2.

Another name injected into the campaign at the eleventh hour was that of Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby. Around the same time Governor Al Smith came into the conversation of the New York contingent, the possibilities of Colby also appeared in the New York Times and gained greater momentum when William G. McAdoo tendered his withdrawal. Since Colby was the Administration choice for Chairman of the Democratic Convention, many wondered if he might be Wilson's choice for the Presidential nomination.³³ Old-line Democrats, however, did not warm up to such a possibility too cheerfully, for Mr. Colby, who had been a Bull-Moose Progressive in the days of Teddy Roosevelt, was still a new-comer to the Democratic Party and not yet a "tested" member in the eyes of many party leaders.³⁴ However, he might be able to draw the progressive vote, which was shocked at the nomination of Harding.

Besides the Secretary of State, every other member of the President's Cabinet was just as thoroughly scrutinized, talked up, or dropped, depending upon his relative merits as a potential candidate. Shortly before the opening of the convention, Secretary of Agriculture Meredith, who had been a prominent darkhorse possibility, threw his support to McAdoo to further enhance the new McAdoo boom developing under the guise of a

³³ Times, June 16, 1920, p. 2; June 20, 1920, pt. 1, pp. 1 and 2; June 22, 1920, p. 2.

³⁴ Frederic Wile, News, July 2, 1920, p. 1.

popular groundswell; but the Iowa delegation still elected to stick with its favorite son, at least for a number of ballots.

There had been a little talk about Josephus Daniels in the early months of the campaign, too, although his name was seldom mentioned after April of 1920. Coming from a Southern Democratic state and being a controversial figure in the Navy Department, Secretary Daniels lacked the proper credentials for the nomination.³⁵ However, the Democratic situation was such that everyone in Wilson's Cabinet got a "possibility" tag at one stage or another.³⁶

Another man whose high position served him in good stead as a potential candidate was Homer S. Cummings, the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Like so many of the other possibilities, his name rarely broke into the news until McAdoo's withdrawal created a new flurry just before the convention. Bryan had fired a few broadsides at him, accusing him of being a wet, but up to June 24, the Wall Street odds-makers were not even putting him on the boards.³⁷ As the men of the Party began to look around for a suitable darkhorse in the event of a three-way deadlock between McAdoo, Cox, and Palmer, however, Cummings'

³⁵"Who's Who in the Presidential Race," The Literary Digest, LXIII (December 27, 1919), 11; "The Progress of the World," ibid., 10.

³⁶"Who's Who in the Presidential Race," ibid., 11.

³⁷Times, May 14, 1920, p. 2; News, June 24, 1920, p. 1.

stock began to rise.³⁸

While looking around for a good name to inject into the convention in case of a stalemate, the Party leaders could not help recalling the memory of the man who almost received the nomination back in 1912. Even though many political writers who analyzed the prospects of House Minority Leader Champ Clark went away with a "no-chance" attitude, the fact remained that many were at least looking at the former Speaker from Missouri.³⁹

In the Literary Digest and the Delineator poll, he placed ahead of Attorney General Palmer;⁴⁰ and if the Party, seeing no hope for the present, but desirous of keeping the Party together for the future, decided to turn to a "good old Democratic name" to unite all the warring factions, that of James Beauchamp Clark at the head of the ticket would certainly bring out the party loyalty of all good Democrats. At age seventy, Clark would certainly be the oldest "favorite son" at the convention.

Other state sons who would go down in history at least with

³⁸David Lawrence, News, June 30, 1920, p. 1; News, July 1, 1920, p. 1.

³⁹News, October 21, 1919, p. 22; N. O. Messenger, News, February 8, 1920, Review Section, p. 8; News, April 18, 1920, pt. 1, p. 9; April 27, 1920, p. 1; May 29, 1920, p. 1; June 24, 1920, p. 1; David Lawrence, News, June 27, 1920, p. 1; Times, January 9, 1920, p. 2; June 27, 1920, pt. 7, p. 1.

⁴⁰"Final Standing of the Democratic Candidates," p. 20; "A Presidential Ballot," p. 1.

the distinction of having had their names presented in a nominating convention--and might even capture the nomination itself if the convention were deadlocked enough--included Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, Senator Robert Owen of Oklahoma, Senator Hitchcock of Nebraska, and Senator Simmons of North Carolina.

Carter Glass, the former Secretary of the Treasury and author of the Federal Reserve Act, had been an active leader in the campaign for William G. McAdoo; but when McAdoo withdrew his name from the race, he urged his followers to support Senator Glass. Although Glass remained a McAdoo backer, his own name was certainly on the list of potential candidates who might get the nod in the event of a logjam at the top of the Democratic heap.⁴¹ If the nomination came his way, he obviously would not turn it down.

Like Carter Glass, Senator Simmons was a favorite son from a Southern Democratic state, but with even less chance for the Presidency than Glass. Simmons realized he could never engender much support outside his own bailiwick, and never intended to, for his sole reason for entering the race was simply to block the drive of A. Mitchell Palmer. As a loyal supporter of William G. McAdoo, he planned, like Glass, to keep his own state delegation committed to himself until the opportune moment would come for

⁴¹David Lawrence, News, June 27, 1920, p. 5.

him to deliver the entire vote to the McAdoo cause.⁴²

Two Western states were presenting favorite sons whose names were often found in the same paragraph with that of William Jennings Bryan, but for opposite reasons. The hopes of Oklahoma rested on Senator Robert Owen, an advocate of prohibition and, therefore, a likely prospect to win the support of the Bryan forces.⁴³ With the nucleus of the twenty Oklahoma votes and the backing of Bryan, the Owen group pushed the argument that the Democratic Party would have to rely on the West again to achieve victory in November. As an advocate of the League⁴⁴ and a dry, Owen seemed a logical choice to capture the West, the dry South, and the pro-League Wilsonites in the East.

Bryan's own Nebraska delegation was pledged to Senator Hitchcock, but there the loyalty ended abruptly. In a fiercely fought primary between these two famous personalities, Hitchcock had defeated Bryan by a seven-to-one margin; however, Bryan had gained enough control of the delegation to be able to split the state vote wide open as soon as the procedural ballots were cast for Hitchcock,⁴⁵ and chances were Bryan would swing his share of

⁴²"The Progress of the Presidential Primaries," The Outlook, CXXV (June 2, 1920), 199.

⁴³News, June 23, 1920, p. 1; Mark Sullivan, "Your Move, Democracy," p. 8.

⁴⁴Times, June 27, 1920, pt. 7, p. 1.

⁴⁵News, April 22, 1920, p. 1.

the delegation to Senator Owen or some other prohibitionist. With his own house divided, therefore, Senator Hitchcock stood little chance of winning a national bid.

Finally, New York, which was already backing Governor Al Smith as its favorite son, had still two other prospects to offer in the event of a Democratic deadlock--James W. Gerard and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Gerard, the American Ambassador to Germany, was in the odd position of being a son of New York, yet having his only committed support from South Dakota.⁴⁶ He had been the first Democrat to announce publicly his candidacy for the nomination, having tossed his hat into the ring on December 15, 1919;⁴⁷ but unlike a truly avowed candidate, he told the audience at the Jackson Day Dinner the following month that the best candidate for the Presidency was not himself, but Herbert Hoover.⁴⁸ Although South Dakota committed its ten delegates to the Ambassador in March of 1920,⁴⁹ Gerard himself seemed to do little to further his own cause; and in the ensuing months his candidacy showed more signs of regressing than advancing, even though The Independent magazine in late May still

⁴⁶News, May 21, 1920, p. 1.

⁴⁷"Who's Who in the Presidential Race," p. 11; News, December 17, 1919, p. 1.

⁴⁸Oswald Garrison Villard, "Ordeal by Dinner," The Nation, CX (January 17, 1920), 68.

⁴⁹"The Progress of the World," The American Review of Reviews, LXI (January 1920), 12.

considered him as one of the four most likely Democratic candidates, along with McAdoo, Palmer, and Edwards.⁵⁰ With his own state backing Al Smith as a favorite son, Gerard's chances seemed dim, although there was evidence of a Gerard boom being started on the Tammany train headed for the West Coast.⁵¹

The New York Sun (Independent Republican) had suggested Franklin D. Roosevelt for President as early as May 22, 1919.⁵² At that time yet, people were still watching Mr. Wilson and the League issue, but the Roosevelt name continued to appear on occasion thereafter. Although several newspapers and magazines were mentioning him as a "possibility" by January of 1920,⁵³ his name dropped out of the Presidential picture after that, and instead the talk began to turn to Roosevelt for Vice-President.⁵⁴ His youth and comparative lack of experience were handicaps for a Presidential bid,⁵⁵ but with the Roosevelt name and his personal charm he seemed a perfect choice for the second place on the ticket. Besides, Roosevelt was aware that 1920 looked

⁵⁰ Bruce Bliven, "Hoover--And the Rest," The Independent, CII (May 29, 1920), 275.

⁵¹ Times, June 18, 1920, p. 2.

⁵² Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal (Boston, c.1954), p. 51.

⁵³ "Who's Who in the Presidential Race," p. 11; "The Progress of the World," The American Review of Reviews, p. 10.

⁵⁴ Times, July 4, 1920, pt. 1, p. 1.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

like a loser for the Democrats, and the top spot on a defeated ticket held out little promise to a rising young politician. As a Vice-Presidential candidate, however, Roosevelt would hardly have to shoulder the blame for the defeat if it did come, and most Democrats realized that it might. For them, 1920 was the Year of the Ostrich.

CHAPTER VI

PRE-CONVENTION SUMMARY

By the end of June, the Democratic situation had resolved itself to a pyramid of three different tiers. At the pinnacle stood President Wilson, who held the key to the entire convention. If he announced his candidacy for a third term, there was nothing more for the Democrats to do but endorse him and play "follow the leader"; but nearly all of the Party members were anxiously hoping he would remain silent and play the passive role, even though he might be hoping for the bid. In that event, they could bypass the President and get on to the more realistic work of nominating a man capable of leading the Party in 1920.

The leaders at the convention were reasonably confident they could circumvent the President, but not so sure they could manipulate a potential deadlock among the three leading contenders, McAdoo, Cox, and Palmer. McAdoo, despite his announced withdrawal, retained the strongest position, although his nationwide following, with its zenith in the West, was challenged by the formidable epithet of "crown prince" and the determined opposition of the big-city organizations. Since a two-thirds majority was needed to capture the nomination, the Tammany group was confident it could stop the McAdoo drive. On the other hand,

a strong antipathy toward machine politics could also tip the scale of reaction to the advantage of McAdoo.¹

Much depended on who would exert the greatest influence at the convention--the Administration forces, the big-city machine organizations, or the dry followers of Bryan. The principal struggle was between the Administration forces behind McAdoo and the urban machines who were out to stop him, while the Bryan forces were an unknown factor that might tilt the balance in the direction of McAdoo or might strike out into a third direction. The machine bloc--consisting of New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Illinois--in looking out for its own needs wanted a candidate who would appeal to their wet Irish and Italian constituents.² Because their constituents were anti-Wilson and because they themselves were still smarting from the patronage rebuffs inflicted upon them by Wilson (and McAdoo), the bosses of Tammany and the Chicago machine joined forces to dump the son-in-law of the President but not necessarily to support a common substitute. Governor Cox was considered the best choice in any "Stop McAdoo" campaign, but any strength Cox had from the anti-McAdoo forces was solely negative. Once McAdoo was halted, there was no guarantee that the bosses would

¹Frederic Wile, News, June 27, 1920, p. 1.

²David Lawrence, News, June 27, 1920, p. 1; see also Times, June 26, 1920, p. 1.

remain faithful. They were interested in Cox as a means not as an end.

The managers of the Cox campaign had deliberately concentrated their strategy around a hard-core following from Ohio and Kentucky by keeping their candidate relatively unknown in the other parts of the country until convention time.³ There was admittedly the danger that their candidate might remain unknown too long and get lost in the limelight of bigger-name personalities; but on the other hand, it often helped not to be known too well, since an unknown man had few enemies, and a lack of enemies was an important factor when the party leaders began looking for a compromise man in a many-sided race. Cox's managers had plotted their course well, for the Cox boom, which had been only a murmur in the early months of the campaign, grew considerably during the month of June, so that by the latter part of June, with the help of Harding's nomination and McAdoo's withdrawal letter, Cox had catapulted into the front position.

Although Cox looked like the man to beat after McAdoo

³Roger Lewis, "Ohio Presents Two Editors," Collier's LXV (May 22, 1920), 26; "Two Leading Democratic Candidates," The New Republic, XXIII (June 2, 1920), 1; "Cox Away from the White House," ibid., (July 14, 1920), 187; "James M. Cox, From Printer's Devil to Governor," The Literary Digest, LXVII (June 12, 1920), 57. James M. Cox is not even listed in the indices of The New Republic up to May, 1920, or The American Review of Reviews up to June, 1920. Cox's own Dayton Daily News made no editorial references about or endorsements of Cox until after he was nominated.

published his letter of withdrawal, a series of events just before the convention threatened to upset the bandwagon just when it seemed to be gaining its greatest momentum. First of all, the clearing of the atmosphere after McAdoo's letter revealed that he was not out of the race after all, that, in fact, he might have emerged from the incident stronger than before. Then just a few days before the convention opened, Governor Cox expressed his opinion that the Democratic platform should remain completely silent on the prohibition issue.⁴ Many Tammany delegates felt he was "pussy-footing" and talked of looking elsewhere for a candidate to support; but Cox's generals feverishly assured the liquor interests that the Governor still favored a moderate wet position agreeable to the big-city people.⁵ Finally, in the week before the convention opened, the hitherto unmentioned fact of Governor Cox's divorce from his first wife ten years previously was publicized and given headlines June 27 by a San Francisco newspaper.⁶ Cox's managers immediately responded with a full explanation of the situation,⁷ but the effect this news might

⁴Times, June 27, 1920, pt. 1, pp. 1 and 2.

⁵Lawrence, News, June 28, 1920, p. 1; Montague, News, June 29, 1920, p. 2; Times, June 28, 1920, p. 1; June 29, p. 6; June 30, pp. 2 and 3. For a different view of the Cox wet stand, see Times, June 25, 1920, p. 1; June 27, pt. 1, p. 1.

⁶Times, June 26, 1920, p. 1; June 25, p. 1; Lawrence, News, June 28, 1920, p. 2.

⁷Times, June 28, 1920, p. 5.

have on the Governor's chances at the convention was unknown. The Cox wagon had been gaining momentum steadily until it had even taken the lead about a week before convention time;⁸ but political prognosticators generally conceded that by "opening day" the Cox candidacy had weakened somewhat, to the benefit of McAdoo.⁹ The key for Cox was still the question of big-city machine support.

The third member of the triumvirate, A. Mitchell Palmer, was in fact the weakest, notwithstanding the first ballot victory claims from his campaign headquarters.¹⁰ Although most observers felt Palmer had only a slim chance of winning the nomination, he nevertheless controlled a large bloc of delegate votes which someone had to lure away before the necessary two-thirds majority could ever be achieved, and therein lay the key to the three-way race. Each of the three major candidates was more than happy to join forces with one of the others in order to stop the third, but none was ready to give up any delegates to help one of the others win.

Under such circumstances, the convention was destined to drag on for days until someone finally gave in. The only other

⁸Times, June 25, 1920, p. 1; June 26, p. 2; James W. Faulkner, News, June 26, 1920, p. 1; Wile, ibid.

⁹Wile, News, June 27, 1920, p. 1; Montague, News, June 29, 1920, p. 2; Times, June 29, 1920, p. 1. See also Hanks, p. 241.

¹⁰News, June 22, 1920, p. 1.

alternative was that the delegates at the convention, finally realizing that none of the three would ever reach the two-thirds mark, would give up on them completely and begin looking for a darkhorse. Standing by, the broad third tier of the political pyramid, was a large group of darkhorses, headed by Ambassador John W. Davis, who hoped that just such a stalemate would occur.

The political prospects for the Democratic Party in 1920 were so hazy that no candidate, with the exception of A. Mitchell Palmer, was willing to risk his prestige in an all-out campaign for the nomination; but each was hoping secretly that the Party would point its finger his way. Perhaps Governor Cox himself best expressed the sentiments of all the candidates when more than a month before the convention he said:

All my friends are urging me to open a vigorous campaign. But I prefer to wait. If, when the convention opens, they finally turn to Ohio, all right. We either have an ace in the hole, or we haven't. If we have an ace concealed, we win; and if we haven't, no amount of bluffing and advertisement can do us much good.¹¹

¹¹Roger Lewis, "Ohio Presents Two Editors," Collier's, LXV (May 22, 1920), 26.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONVENTION

PRELIMINARIES AND PLATFORM

"The Convention will be in order," shouted the Presiding Officer, J. Bruce Kremer of Montana, Vice-Chairman of the Democratic National Committee; and the several thousand milling Democrats on the convention floor and in the balconies began to settle down. The time was 12:20 P.M., Monday, the twenty-eighth day of June.¹ Immediately, the conventioners found a collective outlet for their pent-up emotions when the "Star-Spangled Banner" came to an end and the huge American flag above the speaker's platform was rolled up, revealing a large painting of President Woodrow Wilson. Instantly jubilant Democrats began to parade and cheer their titular leader and continued for half an hour in an obviously spontaneous tribute, marred only by a minor skirmish in the New York section brought on when delegate Franklin D. Roosevelt tried to wrest the state banner away from

¹Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention Held in San Francisco, California June 28, 29, 30, July 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, 1920 (Indianapolis, [1920]), p. 3; Times, June 29, 1920, p. 1; Tribune, June 29, 1920, p. 2; Arthur M. Evans, ibid., p. 1.

other reluctant New Yorkers. However, the other delegates in the convention hall carried on their enthusiasm oblivious to New York and were able to be quieted only after the spotlights in the coliseum were turned off.²

Following the introductory prayer by Monsignor Patrick Ryan and a speech by Kremer, Homer S. Cummings of Connecticut, the Temporary Chairman of the Convention, was escorted to the platform to deliver the keynote address. Professorial Cummings did not appear to be the convention-orator type, but he ripped into the Republicans with such fierceness and defended the ailing President with such sympathy and skill that he indirectly thrust his own name forward as the new man of the hour in the Democratic quest for leadership.³ Outside of these few events, however, little was accomplished on that first day in convention.

For the first few days, in fact, the spectator at the convention would have found small cause for genuine excitement. The delegates, with occasional exceptions, seemed to be doing nothing more than giving rubber-stamp approval to the various resolutions and lists presented to them. Behind the scenes, however, the situation was more electric, for it was in the committee and caucus rooms that the warring factions were each trying to win approval for their favorite programs or

²Official Report, p. 3; Times, June 29, 1920, pp. 1-2.

³Official Report, pp. 8-26; Times, June 29, 1920, p. 4; Arthur Sears Henning, Tribune, June 29, 1920, p. 2.

personalities. Although the chief purpose of the convention was to choose a Presidential candidate, many other factors, such as the party platform, could play an important part in the eventual outcome of the race. On the second day of the convention, for example, the permanent officers for the convention were appointed and approved with a unanimity that revealed none of the maneuvering that had taken place in preliminary caucuses.⁴ The anti-Administration forces had conceded most of the top positions to the Wilsonites, but not all. Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, serving as a delegate from the District of Columbia, was Wilson's choice for Permanent Chairman of the convention, probably because Colby was secretly Wilson's ex officio campaign manager and the chairmanship would be a convenient platform from which Colby could issue the call for Wilson's third nomination. For Chairman of the Resolutions Committee (in charge of writing the Democratic Platform) Wilson had designated Senator Carter Glass, who had already drawn up a platform to Wilson's specifications. The opposition forces, on the other hand, were campaigning for Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana for either of the two chairmanships. A victory for Walsh in either would be a serious blow for the Administration, since Senator Walsh was an outspoken opponent of Wilson's League of Nations. Before an impasse was reached, however, Cummings wired the President that Secretary

⁴Official Report, pp. 73-74.

Colby would be more useful on the platform committee helping Senator Glass steer the fight for Wilson's program. The President reluctantly agreed, and in the end the Walsh factions backed Senator Glass on the Resolutions Committee in exchange for Administration support for Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas for Permanent Convention Chairman.⁵ The opposition forces had failed to get control of the platform committee and had to accept a compromise Administration man for permanent convention chairman; but in the final analysis theirs was by far the greater victory. As matters developed, the platform proved to be of only minor importance; but had Secretary Colby succeeded in becoming Permanent Chairman of the convention, he would have been in an excellent position to present Woodrow Wilson's name before the delegates for unanimous approval, and the convention would have been forced to nominate the man most people did not want.

Another matter before the delegates on the second day of the convention was the adoption of the order of business to be followed throughout the deliberations. It had been the tentative agreement among the Democratic leaders to adopt the platform after choosing the Presidential candidate, but this could very well have worked to the disadvantage of many of the Presidential

⁵Hanks, p. 216; Bagby, p. 104; Smith and Beasley, Carter Glass, pp. 206 and 208; Times, June 14, 1920, p. 1; June 19, p. 1; June 29, p. 1; Official Report, pp. 83-84.

aspirants. Therefore the Rules Committee decided to adopt the platform first, then nominate a candidate.⁶

The final business on the second day of the convention was to make a decision on the debated question of the unit rule. The McAdoo followers were especially anxious to abolish the rule since many of their votes were scattered among states whose delegations would be compelled to vote as a bloc for another candidate. The anti-Administration machines, of course, favored the unit system because much of their strength came from the bloc vote. There was even a report that Tammany boss Murphy had tempted the Kansas delegation (which was important to McAdoo) that if Kansas would support the unit rule, Tammany would support McAdoo;⁷ but such a proposition seems unlikely since the anti-Administration forces could hardly have gained much from such a deal. The McAdoo men won a partial victory when the convention voted to enforce the unit rule only in delegations which by state law were compelled to follow instructions from a state convention.⁸ The ruling would eventually release twenty votes in New York to McAdoo, just to mention one state, although in other states some minority votes for all candidates would still

⁶Tribune, June 29, 1920, p. 1; Hanks, p. 214.

⁷Hanks, p. 256.

⁸Official Report, p. 84; Times, June 30, 1920, p. 2; Hanks, pp. 237-238.

be lost to another candidate by the portion of the unit rule that still remained in effect.

In the above case, as in most other decisions, the convention merely gave final approval to the actual conclusions reached by the committees. The construction of the platform, however, became such a heated topic that the Resolutions Committee held marathon sessions for five days before it could formulate a final draft.⁹ Even then, when the proposed platform was read to the entire convention, the opposing factions expressed their opinions once more for the benefit of the entire convention before it was finally approved by the delegates.

The two most controversial items in the platform debate were the League and the liquor issues, while the Irish question also produced its share of discussion. Synonymous with the name Wilson was the League of Nations charter without change, even to the "dotting of an 'i' or the crossing of a 't'." Many Democrats favored the League, but some believed the Party should compromise enough to allow certain reservations in order to assure ratification. Among this group were three members of the Resolutions Committee itself--William Jennings Bryan; Senator David I. Walsh of Massachusetts; and Senator Atlee Pomerene of Ohio, a Cox man.¹⁰ The Wilsonites fought hard to keep the

⁹ Bagby, p. 104; Hanks, p. 264.

¹⁰ Senator Thomas J. Walsh, the Irreconcilable, also served on the committee.--Hanks, pp. 218-220; News, July 1, 1920, p. 1.

Virginia Platform of Senator Glass intact, but Senator David I. Walsh finally managed to win approval for a phrase in the platform allowing reservations "which make more clear or specific our obligations to the associated nations."¹¹ Although Wilson later approved the platform, the addition effected a distinct departure from the President's stand, opened the door for fence straddling, and in effect deleted the League issue per se from the campaign.

If the League was a vital personal issue of Woodrow Wilson, the planks of alcohol and Irish independence were equally important to the big-city conventioners. The great metropolitan areas, in particular New York and Chicago, contained numerous Irish and Italian constituents who considered liquor and wine as a part of their daily fare. On the one side of the prohibition issue William Jennings Bryan fought for a dry pronouncement; W. Bourke Cochran of New York carried the banner for the wets. Following a prolonged battle, the Resolutions Committee voted to avoid the liquor issue completely; but when the platform was brought before the entire Democratic convention, both Bryan and Cochran again argued their respective sides. In the end the convention voted down both sides and remained completely silent on the issue.¹² The Irish, too, met with acute disappointment

¹¹Tribune, June 30, 1920, p. 1; Times, July 2, 1920, p. 1; Bagby, p. 104.

¹²Official Report, pp. 200-27, 256-60; Times, July 2, 1920, p. 1; July 3, p. 1; Tribune, June 30, 1920, p. 1; Hanks, p. 226.

when the convention, after some near-riot hearings, approved a plank which offered only "sympathy" for the Irish cause.¹³

Of all the planks discussed in the Resolutions Committee, the most important from James M. Cox's point of view was prohibition. He had always been for light wines and beer, whether expressed in the platform or not; but now there was a rumor that Boss Charles Murphy of Tammany might make a deal to back McAdoo in return for support of a wet plank.¹⁴ Shortly before the convention began, when Cox's managers announced that he did not believe there should be any alcohol plank in the platform, many of the wets immediately cried "pussy-footing" and talked of deserting Cox. It seems entirely logical, though, that in spite of the adverse criticism generated against Cox on the surface, his decision fit better with the overall wet strategy than an open appeal for a wet plank would have done. By calling for no liquor plank at all, Cox had everything to gain and nothing to lose. Under deeper analysis it seems unlikely that a compromise deal could ever have been made between the machine bosses and the McAdoo forces. First of all, McAdoo, an out-and-out dry, would be contradicting himself by running on a wet platform since there was never an in-between stage for the drys.

¹³Official Report, pp. 227-54, 264-65; Times, July 2, 1920, p. 1; Grafton S. Wilcox, Tribune, June 30, 1920, p. 1; Bagby, p. 125.

¹⁴Times, July 1, 1920, p. 1; July 5, p. 2; see also June 29, p. 6; Bagby, p. 112.

Those who were not for complete prohibition were, in the minds of most prohibitionists, in the camp of the liquor forces. Secondly, the prohibition issue was not the only objection the bosses had with McAdoo, nor was it even the greatest. The big-city men opposed McAdoo mainly because he represented a much-despised Administration, but he himself had further alienated himself repeatedly by snubbing the machines when giving out patronage jobs.¹⁵ The only way the bosses would throw their support to McAdoo would be if they smelled a winner and wanted (like any politician) to be on the bandwagon.

In spite of the disappointment of some wets, the absence of a liquor plank was actually to the benefit of Cox, and his managers were not so naive to overlook the fact. Expressing his opposition to any liquor plank might possibly increase Cox's ratings among the Bryanites (although the likelihood was slim). More important still, the absence of a wet plank in the Democratic platform would force the big-city politicians to double their efforts to nominate a wet Presidential candidate to save their own political necks from the axe of their predominantly wet constituents back home.

In fact, the city bosses themselves in due time deliberately stifled the drive for a wet plank. They evidently felt they did not have sufficient strength in the convention to control both

¹⁵See Hanks, p. 255.

the platform and the choosing of a candidate, and between the two, the candidate was more important for their political purposes. Besides, it was doubtful that they could even muster enough support to get a wet plank into the platform, although they were certain they could stop any attempts by Bryan to make the platform dry. Having decided to fight for a candidate rather than an issue, they planned their strategy to concentrate all their energies on that one goal and to eliminate all subordinate goals which might weaken the main effort, even if that meant sabotaging the battle for a wet platform. They realized that even if they succeeded in getting a plank favoring alcohol, their victory could work against their chances of picking a candidate. With a wet platform the chances were greater that some members of the liquor camp would rest on their laurels and allow the opposition forces to nominate the likes of William G. McAdoo. Although the machine bosses wanted spirits, they also wanted nothing to do with the President's son-in-law. By keeping alcohol out of the platform they would keep the liquor interests firmly united in the drive to nominate a man favorable to their cause, and in so doing they would keep their united front against McAdoo.¹⁶

When, therefore, the proposed platform emerged from the Resolutions Committee without a plank of any kind, the Cox men

¹⁶ Arthur M. Evans, Tribune, June 28, 1920, p. 3; News, June 26, 1920, p. 2; Hanks, p. 91.

were delighted. On the floor of the convention Bryan made a final effort to insert a dry statement, but was easily voted down, 929½ to 155½, whereupon Cochran's resolution in defense of man's right to drink freely was also defeated, 726½ to 356.¹⁷ The bosses realized there was little chance for their resolution, but by having Cochran wage the battle on the convention floor, they could at least show their constituents back home they were going down fighting to the bitter end for the cause of John Barleycorn. In private conferences, however, they had long ago given up the hope for a wet platform. Instead, they were regrouping their forces to nominate a candidate most agreeable to their liquid interests. And as the balloting drew closer, the most likely man was still James M. Cox.

Five days of spirited debate went into the writing of the Democratic Platform for 1920, but controversial issues were ultimately omitted or presented in watered-down form. The document that finally emerged was one which could be interpreted to be all things to all men. Comparing it with the Republican promises made just a few weeks before, one could rephrase both platforms and make them say almost the same thing. On the vital issue of the League of Nations, the Democrats called for ratification, but with reservations allowable; to the Irish they expressed merely "sympathy"; and the prohibition issue they

¹⁷Official Report, pp. 256-260.

dropped completely. Almost any man in the Party could have run on the Democratic Platform; but if there was one man who was pleased with the document, it was Governor Cox--pleased not so much by its statements, but by its silence.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONVENTION

NOMINATIONS AND BALLOTING

Although the convention had to wait until the platform had been approved before the delegates could go on with the business of choosing their party standard bearer, they were at least able to save some time by calling for the nominations while the Resolutions Committee struggled in the back chambers. On the morning of the third day, June 30, the nominating procedures began when Arizona yielded to Oklahoma and Mr. D. Hayden

Linebaugh presented the name of Senator Robert L. Owen.¹ After James W. Gerard, Homer S. Cummings, and Senator Gilbert Hitchcock were placed in nomination, Honorable John H. Bigelow of Pennsylvania arose to nominate Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. The first big demonstration of the day began.²

Thirty-six minutes elapsed before spokesmen from Illinois, Arkansas, and California could deliver their seconding speeches. Next to be placed in nomination was Secretary of Agriculture

¹Official Report, p. 95.

²Ibid., 103-19.

Edwin T. Meredith.³ Kentucky then yielded to Judge James G. Johnson of Ohio, who presented the name of Governor James M. Cox.⁴ The Meteor Silver Cornet Band of Piqua, in the right gallery, picked up the cue with "A Hot Time in the Old Town Tonight"; Cox boosters moved into the aisles ringing cowbells, beating tom-toms, and thumping water buckets and dishpans, while crates of oranges were opened and fruit was tossed throughout the convention hall. After about forty-five minutes, the demonstrators returned to their seats to hear Mrs. Cora Wilson Stewart of Kentucky and Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi give their seconding speeches.⁵ Harrison spoke to put the stamp of approval of a dry state on Cox, but he also took the opportunity to refute charges that the Hearst newspaper in San Francisco had printed about Cox's divorce.⁶

³Official Report, pp. 119-27; Times, July 1, 1920, p. 1; Salvatore A. Cotillo, "The Democratic Convention at San Francisco: The Impressions of a Delegate," The Outlook, CXXV (July 21, 1920), 563.

⁴Official Report, pp. 128-32; Times, July 1, 1920, pp. 2 and 4.

⁵Official Report, pp. 132-35; Arthur M. Evans, Tribune, July 1, 1920, p. 2. There is a difference of opinion about the tenor of the Cox demonstration. Evans (ibid., 1) reports it lasted forty-five minutes. David Lawrence in the News (July 1, 1920, p. 1) called it the biggest rally of all, while Salvatore Cotillo (p. 564) praised it as "more than spontaneous." The Times and Tribune, on the other hand, clocked the demonstration at only thirty-two minutes and called it artificial, weary, and staged "in a half-hearted fashion." (Times, July 1, 1920, pp. 1 and 2; Tribune, July 2, 1920, p. 3.)

⁶Times, July 1, 1920, p. 2; News, July 1, 1920, p. 1.

The most spontaneous and enthusiastic demonstration of the entire day came next when W. Bourke Cochran nominated the popular Governor Al Smith. The organ bellowed "Tammany," "The Bowery," "After the Ball," "The Good Old Summertime," and "Daisy," while the conventioners took a break from the dull and sometimes forced routine to pay their compliments to a man who no one really expected would even come close to winning the nomination. Both seconding speeches were made by New Yorkers, one being Franklin D. Roosevelt.⁷

The suspense for some delegates ended when Missouri was called and Reverend Burriss Jenkins formally presented the name of William Gibbs McAdoo. Although Rev. Jenkins did not give a lengthy nominating speech--the McAdoo organization wanted to maintain the air of spontaneity, the rally that followed dragged on for almost three-quarters of an hour, similar to the obviously well-planned demonstrations for Palmer and Cox. The delegations from New York, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and New Jersey, however, were conspicuously absent from the demonstration.⁸

⁷ Official Report, pp. 135-42; Evans, Tribune, July 1, 1920, p. 2; Tribune, July 2, 1920, p. 3; Cotillo, p. 563; David Lawrence, News, July 1, 1920, p. 1.

⁸ Official Report, p. 142; Times, July 1, 1920, pp. 1-2; Evans, Tribune, July 1, 1920, pp. 1-2; News, June 30, 1920, p. 1; Cotillo, p. 563; Bagby, p. 111.

New Jersey offered its favorite son, Governor Edward I. Edwards, just before the convention recessed at 7:00 P.M. On the following morning the roll call of the states continued with the nominations of Senator F. M. Simmons of North Carolina; Senator Carter Glass of Virginia; Ambassador John W. Davis; and last, Francis Burton Harrison, Governor of the Philippines. Wilbur M. Marsh of Iowa then moved that the rules be suspended and the convention proceed to the selection of a candidate until the Resolutions Committee was ready to report, but his motion was defeated. Therefore, Mr. Marsh moved to adjourn until 8:00 P.M., and to this the delegates were more amenable.⁹

The evening session opened at 8:47 P.M., but a temporary recess was taken at 8:50 for caucusing. When it was announced, after the convention resumed business, that the Resolutions Committee was still not ready to give its report, the delegates adjourned again at 10:23 until the following morning.¹⁰

When the platform had finally been presented to the convention and approved on the following evening, July the second, the stage was at last set for the all-important balloting to begin. Some delegates wanted to wait until morning to start the voting, but the majority in the convention were anxious to begin as soon

⁹Official Report, pp. 147-68; Times, July 2, 1920, p. 1.

¹⁰Official Report, pp. 168-77.

as possible.¹¹ Even if only a few ballots could be taken, at least some indications of trends might begin to appear; and the various strategists would have some tangible evidence to go on when they went into their middle-of-the-night planning sessions after adjournment. Therefore, in an almost anticlimactic mood the balloting began.

Only two ballots were cast that Friday evening, and the results showed only that a long convention lay ahead. McAdoo led the first round, as expected, with 266 votes, followed closely by Palmer with 254, then Cox with 134, Smith at 109, and so on down through a total list of twenty-three candidates to Oscar W. Underwood's half-vote.¹² McAdoo gained twenty-three votes in the second ballot to 289; Palmer upped himself to 264; and Cox rose to 159.¹³ However, the rules called for a two-thirds majority to achieve the nomination, or 729 out of the total 1,094 votes being cast. On the first ballot the votes of McAdoo, Palmer, and Cox combined totaled only 654, seventy-five votes short of the required number for one candidate. McAdoo's share of the first ballot was only 24 per cent; Palmer's, 23 per cent; and Cox's, an unpretentious 12 per cent of the total vote. Obviously many of the delegates were hiding behind favorite sons,

¹¹Ibid., 266.

¹²Ibid., 267-69.

¹³Ibid., 271-73.

waiting for someone else to show the way. Armed with such clues, the managers returned to their respective conference rooms to chart their next moves.

When the voting began, Wall Street odds-makers favored McAdoo, Wilson, and Smith at nine-to-five; Marshall and Davis at two-to-one; and Cox, Palmer, and Edwards at three-to-one.¹⁴ General opinion agreed it was McAdoo versus the field, although no one yet knew what the President would do. In fact, very few people at the convention realized that Mr. Wilson, with the help of Secretary of State Colby, had come very close to effecting a coup d' etat behind the scenes, but was stopped only at the last moment by the major Administration leaders. After the big demonstration for Wilson, Secretary Colby, misled by the enthusiasm of the convention, had rushed a message to Mr. Wilson at the White House declaring that, unless expressly forbidden to do so, he would present Wilson's name before the assembly "with the certainty that the convention would draft him to head the ticket."¹⁵ When Homer Cummings learned of the telegram, he immediately demanded that Wilson's friends in San Francisco be consulted. At a meeting held the following morning with Cummings, Josephus Daniels, Senator Joseph Robinson, Carter Glass, and

¹⁴Times, July 2, 1920, p. 2; Tribune, July 2, 1920, p. 3.

¹⁵Karl Schriftgiesser, This Was Normalcy: An Account of the Party Politics During Twelve Republican Years: 1920-1932 (Boston, 1948), p. 43.

Postmaster Burleson, Colby revealed his plans, which threw the meeting into turmoil. The others argued with Colby that the convention was definitely not in the mood to nominate Wilson; the President's health could not withstand the rigors of another campaign; and the very attempt to nominate him would only serve to embarrass him. Thereafter the Democratic leaders let Wilson down easily by sending him periodic messages that the convention deadlock was not so great as imagined. Mr. Wilson's name would be injected into the balloting when an unbreakable deadlock appeared (but of course the Democratic leaders of all camps were intent on forestalling such a deadlock). Wilson, however, did not seem to feel the matter was closed, for he wired back to Cummings suggesting further meetings with select Democratic leaders. Those in San Francisco, however, were perfectly content to let the episode die quietly.¹⁶

Presuming Mr. Wilson's name would not appear at the convention, McAdoo remained "most likely to succeed," even though his opponents needed only one-third of the convention votes to stop him. Being the man to beat, he had the advantage of unified support and the psychological boost accruing to any front runner. His opposition, meanwhile, consisted of coalitions-by-necessity

¹⁶ Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of War and After: 1917-1923 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1946), p. 555; Bagby p. 119; Schriftgiesser, p. 43; Eugene H. Roseboom, A History of Presidential Elections (New York, 1957), p. 398; Hanks, p. 261.

and was more prone to splits and factions. The McAdoo managers, therefore, decided upon the simple strategy of building up an early lead, winning converts from the weaker sections of the opposition, and using snowball psychology to attain victory.¹⁷ Defeating the major part of the unit rule had released many additional votes to the McAdoo column, but considerable amounts still remained tied up by that part of the rule still in effect. Even before the balloting began, the McAdoo men tried to invade Senator Pat Harrison's stronghold of Mississippi. It was reported that Harrison had once been a McAdoo supporter; but when the latter made his withdrawal statement, Harrison went over to become a lieutenant in the Cox army.¹⁸ Evidently feeling that Harrison could be won back to the cause, McAdoo's supporters tried to swing Mississippi to their side, but Ole Miss voted in favor of the unit rule and Cox.¹⁹

In Pennsylvania, too, the unit rule kept a considerable amount of McAdoo sentiment tied to Palmer,²⁰ and there was no chance of releasing those votes until Palmer withdrew from the race. A weak spot in the opposition armor existed, however, in the person of Tom Taggart of Indiana. Although Taggart was a

¹⁷Frederic Wile, News, June 30, 1920, p. 2.

¹⁸Bagby, p. 116.

¹⁹Times, June 30, 1920, p. 1; Hanks, pp. 252-53.

²⁰News, June 28, 1920, p. 3.

friend of the machine bosses, he also had his eyes on a Senate seat and therefore did not want to give the appearance of being against the Administration. Since he also had a lingering premonition that McAdoo would win (and he certainly wanted to be on the Administration side if it held the trump cards), there was a good chance that he could be persuaded to swing many or all of the Indiana votes to McAdoo.²¹

Of course, all but the greatest die-hards would go over to McAdoo if they sensed a victory; the problem was to win enough converts to start the snowball rolling. Right after McAdoo's nomination his managers tried to stir up excitement by claiming that Maryland, Idaho, and a good part of the delegations from Minnesota, Iowa, New York, Kentucky, Nebraska, and other states were starting the swing to McAdoo.²² Also they would entice a state delegation by dangling the Vice-Presidency to some worthy favorite son. The most desired goal of the McAdoo camp was a ticket of McAdoo and Cox; but the Ohio delegates were not interested in any second fiddle, at least not so long as the first chair was still available.²³

²¹James J. Montague, News, July 2, 1920, p. 8; David Lawrence, News, July 3, 1920, p. 10; Arthur Sears Henning, Tribune, July 2, 1920, p. 2; Times, July 2, 1920, p. 2; Bagby, p. 112.

²²Hanks, p. 247.

²³News, June 27, 1920, pt. 1, p. 5; July 1, p. 22; David Lawrence, July 3, p. 10.

All attempts by McAdoo to stampede the convention had been stopped at least for the first night of balloting; but considering the fact that McAdoo was leading at the end of the first round with a skimpy 24 per cent of the total, it was obvious that someone would have to begin making converts soon, or the convention would drag on indefinitely. The key to victory lay in the hundreds of wait-and-see delegates still committed to the twenty favorite sons.

The problems of McAdoo, though, were not nearly so involved as those of Palmer and Cox. Going one step beyond Janus, they were obliged to look in three directions. First and foremost, they had to stop McAdoo, a task which entailed constant vigilance and persuading with the likes of Tom Taggart to hold the line against the Administration forces. Since McAdoo was supposedly a ground-swell candidate and his strategists were pushing for an early victory, the anti-McAdoo coalition had a certain advantage of time. If they could prolong the convention for an extended number of ballots, they could strip the "popular enthusiasm" appeal from McAdoo; but there was considerable doubt in many minds they could hold McAdoo in check that long.

Even presuming they could cement their coalition long enough to dethrone McAdoo, each one still had to outmaneuver the other to replace McAdoo as leader. Simultaneously each had to continue bolstering up his own wavering cohorts while trying to convert others with the optimistic conviction that he held the best

chance of picking up the hundreds of stray votes.

Then to complicate matters even more, both had to keep a wary eye on the possibility that the convention might just give up on all three front runners as hopelessly deadlocked and turn to a darkhorse. After all, much of the strength behind both Palmer and Cox was simply anti-McAdoo or anti-Administration in sentiment and not necessarily pledged to a last-ditch support of either candidate. If the machine bosses became convinced that someone else had a better chance of defeating McAdoo, they would quickly shift their votes.

Both Cox and Palmer scouts tried unsuccessfully during the night to invade each others' ranks. Even supposing that one would release his delegates to the other, there was too much danger at the moment that many of the released would turn instead to McAdoo and possibly start a McAdoo stampede.²⁴ Therefore, the first order of business continued to be a united front against McAdoo until some new trends began to develop.

Edmond H. Moore declared optimistically at the end of the first night that McAdoo would never get the necessary two-thirds majority.²⁵ Still Moore did not pressure everyone to come running to Cox, but continued instead to keep only a loose-reined control over his delegates, even letting them drift to other

²⁴Times, July 2, 1920, pp. 1-2; July 3, 1920, p. 2; David Lawrence, News, July 3, 1920, p. 10; Hanks, p. 113.

²⁵Tribune, July 3, 1920, p. 1; Times, July 3, 1920, p. 1.

candidates without objection. His strategy was to build up a formidable array of second- and third-choice sentiment so that when McAdoo's star faded (presuming that it would), the delegates would turn to Cox as the compromise choice.²⁶ Palmer's headquarters, on the other hand, kept its Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Illinois delegations tight away from McAdoo; issued optimistic statements of certain victory; and hoped that the Administration crowds would turn to Palmer when--and if--McAdoo collapsed.²⁷ Palmer's was the sadder lot, however, for he was definitely the third man in the race. Throughout the deliberations he faced the prospect of George Brennan switching the Illinois delegation to Cox in the overall attempt to stop McAdoo.²⁸ And if that happened, who could fill in the gap?

Meanwhile the anti-McAdoo forces were not overlooking the eventual dropping of both Cox and Palmer for some other choice. They generally agreed to continue supporting one or both candidates for awhile; but the plans then called for a switch to a new face, probably Bainbridge Colby, since he was an Administration man, a wet, and ex-Bull Moose man, and therefore

²⁶ James M. Cox, Journey Through My Years (New York, 1946), p. 226; David Lawrence, News, June 29, 1920, p. 1; Hanks, pp. 112 and 115.

²⁷ Henning, Tribune, June 30, 1920, p. 2; Bagby, p. 73.

²⁸ Times, July 1, 1920, p. 3; Evans, Tribune, June 17, 1920, p. 2; Wile, News, June 26, 1920, p. 1; Hanks, p. 260.

acceptable even to Republicans.²⁹ Still others objected to Colby because he was too new to the Democratic Party and instead preferred someone like Davis or Cummings.³⁰ As the morning of the second day broke over San Francisco, it was still anybody's convention.

David Lawrence, in a syndicated column appearing in Cox's Dayton Daily News, predicted at the end of the Friday-night balloting that McAdoo would win the nomination on the following day; and convention rumors added further weight to an early McAdoo victory, possibly the fifth or sixth ballot.³¹ Indeed, McAdoo increased his lead on each of the next three ballots; but the sixty-eight votes gained still left him far from the necessary total. Cox, on the other hand, had gained only twenty-two, while Palmer had dropped back twenty.³² The Attorney General gained on the sixth ballot, however, when Iowa gave him the twenty-six votes it had been casting for favorite-son Meredith. Indiana, which on the previous ballot had made its first break from favorite-son Marshall by slipping four votes to

²⁹ Tribune, July 2, 1920, p. 1; Henning, ibid.; also July 3, p. 1; Times, July 1, 1920, p. 3; July 3, p. 1; Hanks, p. 114.

³⁰ Henning, Tribune, July 3, 1920, p. 5; July 2, p. 1; News, June 30, 1920, p. 1; Lawrence, News, July 1, 1920, p. 1; Wile, News, July 2, 1920, p. 1; Times, June 3, 1920, p. 1; July 2, p. 2; July 3, p. 2; Hanks, p. 187.

³¹ Lawrence, July 3, 1920, p. 10; Wile, News, July 2, 1920, p. 1; News, July 3, 1920, p. 1; Times, July 2, 1920, p. 1.

³² Official Report, p. 289.

Cox, now widened the breach with seventeen to Cox, and two to McAdoo.³³ Tom Taggart was beginning to sound out Cox, while not overlooking McAdoo completely. The Iowa switch over was the greatest surprise up to that point, however, since it showed that Meredith, who had actually withdrawn in favor of McAdoo, was not able to prevent Wilbur M. Marsh from winning a unit-rule decision in Iowa for Palmer.³⁴

Even so, there was very little excitement in the convention hall until the seventh ballot. As the roll call of the states began, a feeling of expectation permeated the assembly, especially since Indiana had started the break from favorite sons on the previous ballot. The voting followed the same general pattern as before until New Jersey passed up its turn to see how New York would vote. New York obliged by casting 68 votes for Cox, 16 for McAdoo, and 2 for Palmer. Immediately the Ohio boosters were on their feet cheering for their hero. Before the balloting was completed New Jersey also switched 25 votes to Cox and 3 to McAdoo, thus enabling Cox to jump one hundred votes and overtake Palmer 295½ to 267½, although McAdoo still retained the lead with 384.³⁵ The Administration forces nevertheless were jolted by the big switch, because on the eighth ballot

³³Ibid., 287-89; 291-93.

³⁴Times, July 4, 1920, pt. 1, p. 2.

³⁵Ibid.; Evans, Tribune, July 4, 1920, p. 3; Official Report, pp. 295-97.

McAdoo suffered his first loss in total votes since the balloting had begun.³⁶ Meanwhile Murphy, Cochran, and other Tammany men were gathering around Brennan, trying to get him to swing Illinois to Cox;³⁷ but little change was noticeable in the next few ballots.

Brennan finally made his move on the twelfth ballot when Illinois transferred 30 votes from Palmer to Cox, giving the latter 44 from that delegation. Once more the Ohio demonstrators filled the aisles with a ten-minute rally joined by the banners from Indiana, Maryland, New York, Kentucky, Florida, Mississippi, and Arizona.³⁸ Iowa then followed suit by declaring its 26 votes also for Cox, and more cheers went up. However, the Iowa vote was immediately challenged by a member of the delegation and a recount had to be taken; but after some debate Chairman Robinson awarded the votes to Cox, nevertheless. It looked as though the Cox boom might be on, for Cox had vaulted past McAdoo for the first time and into the lead, 404 votes strong.³⁹

Alabama led off tally thirteen with a bang by throwing seven new votes to Cox, but evidently the bandwagon fever had

³⁶Official Report, p. 301.

³⁷Evans, Tribune, July 4, 1920, p. 3.

³⁸Official Report, pp. 311-13; Evans, Tribune, July 4, 1920, p. 3; Times, July 4, 1920, pt. 1, p. 5.

³⁹Official Report, pp. 315-19.

not yet swayed the other states except Nevada.⁴⁰ Even so, the Cox boosters were parading after the fourteenth ballot and singing "Over on the Fifteenth."⁴¹ Tom Taggart, now persuaded, joined Cox with all thirty votes on the fifteenth. Even Nebraska, the domain of bone-dry Bryan, slipped in a vote for Cox, a fact that caught the humorous fancy of the crowd.⁴² However, by this time the Palmer and McAdoo forces were desperately building their own hasty defense alliance out of sheer self-preservation and were working for an adjournment to regroup their battalions.⁴³ Sweating through the sixteenth ballot, they succeeded in blocking a further rout and even maneuvered Tennessee into voting the unit rule for John W. Davis, a move that deprived Cox of a dozen important votes.⁴⁴

As soon as the votes were tallied and announced, Mr. Thomas Spellacy of Connecticut moved for adjournment until 8:00 P.M.; but Senator Pat Harrison immediately asked for a roll-call vote. However, the McAdoo-Palmer-and-associates bloc held sufficient

⁴⁰ Ibid., 320-22.

⁴¹ Evans, Tribune, July 4, 1920, p. 3.

⁴² Official Report, pp. 328-30; Times, July 4, 1920, p. 5.

⁴³ News, July 4, 1920, pt. 1, p. 1; Henning, Tribune, July 4, 1920, p. 2.

⁴⁴ Official Report, pp. 332-34.

defensive power to carry the vote.⁴⁵ Although Cox had suffered a fourteen-vote setback on the last ballot, he still led with 454½ votes and was now the man to stop. Palmer, who had slipped far back into third, was struggling for his life with 164½.⁴⁶ The McAdoo men, who had fought against adjournment on Friday night,⁴⁷ now found themselves one day later the bedpartners of the Palmerites in the desperate attempt to stop a sudden Cox boom. As the crowds left the San Francisco Coliseum for their two-and-a-half-hour break, the Palmer and McAdoo managers hastened to the back chambers to remap their strategy in light of the sudden turn of events.

During the recess the McAdoo forces met with Palmer, but when they asked Palmer to withdraw from the race in favor of McAdoo, the Attorney General reportedly left "in high dudgeon."⁴⁸ "If I am not nominated," he told reporters, "you can be assured that the nominee for President will be someone other than McAdoo or Cox."⁴⁹ Having reinforced his position, he remained determined to hold Pennsylvania and Georgia for himself and continue

⁴⁵Ibid., 336-38; Henning, Tribune, July 4, 1920, p. 1; Times, July 4, 1920, pt. 1, p. 2.

⁴⁶Official Report, p. 334.

⁴⁷Henning, Tribune, July 3, 1920, p. 1.

⁴⁸Ibid.; see also Bagby, p. 113.

⁴⁹Tribune, July 4, 1920, p. 1.

the deadlock.⁵⁰ After all, he would achieve nothing by withdrawing; but if Cox could be stopped as McAdoo had been, there was still the chance that the convention might yet give Palmer a shot at the 729 mark, although he admittedly had not increased his popularity with the bosses by joining with the Administration group in forcing a recess. In light of Palmer's determination, the only recourse left for the McAdoo managers was to hold the line on Cox, produce another deadlock, and try to eliminate Cox over the Sunday holiday. To this end they launched a campaign to show Cox as a reactionary, a wet, an opponent of Woodrow Wilson, and a pawn of the bosses.⁵¹

Meanwhile the Cox agents aggressively set out to probe the weaknesses of the opposition. Even though McAdoo had been the original beneficiary in the abrogation of the unit rule, it was now becoming clear that the McAdoo forces themselves were using what was left of the rule with advantage to ward off a stampede to the front runner. South Carolina, for example, was held to McAdoo under the rule by only one vote, while Kansas remained pledged to him by a mere half-vote.⁵² In fact, Kansas had almost switched to Cox in an earlier ballot; but when New York and New Jersey swung to the Ohio governor, Kansas, not wanting

⁵⁰Times, July 4, 1920, pt. 1, p. 3.

⁵¹Ibid., 2; July 5, p. 2.

⁵²Times, July 4, 1920, pt. 1, p. 2; July 5, p. 2.

to be identified with bossism, decided to hold back.⁵³ The Cox men reportedly dangled various temptations before the eyes of cliff-hanging delegations, such as the Vice-Presidential spot to Kansas' Governor Hodges;⁵⁴ nevertheless both Kansas and South Carolina remained in the McAdoo camp. And all the while President Wilson followed the proceedings closely without comment.⁵⁵

Back in the convention hall Cox broke up the Tennessee unit vote on the eighteenth ballot but lost the delegation to Davis again on the twenty-first when the Davis delegate who held the balance of power there returned from a brief absence.⁵⁶ Such was the equal division in some delegations.

On the twentieth roll call Indiana stirred up new action by tossing eleven votes into McAdoo's lap,⁵⁷ possibly because Tom Taggart was trying personally to break up the convention in one way or another, or else he might have been doing some political nest-feathering. Being anxious to please the Administration and yet being aligned with the bosses, he might have

⁵³Times, July 5, 1920, p. 2.

⁵⁴Times, July 4, 1920, pt. 1, p. 2.

⁵⁵Ibid., 1; Henning, Tribune, July 4, 1920, p. 1.

⁵⁶Official Report, pp. 343-44, 352-53; Times, July 5, 1920, p. 2.

⁵⁷Official Report, pp. 346-48.

sensed that McAdoo was a beaten man; therefore, this would be an opportune spot to give the President's son-in-law some backing without risking too much a stampede. At any rate, the action did seem to have some effect on the other delegations, for Georgia swung all twenty-eight votes to McAdoo, while other states followed suit to a lesser degree. Even though the return of that migrant delegate in Tennessee cost McAdoo ten votes (two more than Cox), McAdoo still upped his total by 55. At the same time Cox fell back 30; Palmer, 34.⁵⁸

When McAdoo showed a gain of thirteen votes on the twentieth ballot, his supporters took to the aisles for a twenty-minute demonstration. Immediately afterwards Senator Pat Harrison, probably fearing a new McAdoo surge, moved to adjourn until Monday; but in view of the boisterous cries of "no" which followed, he withdrew his motion.⁵⁹ When McAdoo made even greater strides on the next ballot, George Vice of California called again for adjournment and was followed once more by Senator Harrison, who asked for a poll of the states. Vote they did, but the motion was defeated, and the balloting continued.⁶⁰

If the McAdoo men had any hopes of a stampede, however, they were dashed on the twenty-second ballot when the Georgia

⁵⁸ Ibid., 352-53.

⁵⁹ Times, July 4, 1920, pt. 1, p. 1; Official Report, pp. 350-51.

⁶⁰ Official Report, p. 353.

delegation returned to the Palmer fold and McAdoo's total dropped again.⁶¹ Therefore, since it was already 11:30 P.M., the Administration men reverted to Plan A, joined forces with the Palmer and Davis groups, and successfully called for an adjournment until 10:00 A.M. Monday morning. This time the Cox forces voiced the negative opposition.⁶²

The conventioners had all day Sunday to hammer out deals or get new backing; but very little was accomplished because matters were so uncertain, no one really wanted to give up anything. The tie-breaking power still rested in the White House, if only the Chief Executive would finally throw his weight behind someone. On the last ballot Missouri had sent a chill up many spines when it cast two votes for Wilson, but a Wilson rally failed to materialize. Nevertheless, the shadow of the President remained over the convention.⁶³ A Wilson endorsement would put almost any candidate over the top and would resolve the lingering fears about the President's own aspirations, but Mr. Wilson refused to speak.

There was the persistent rumor circulating through the

⁶¹Ibid., 354-55. Georgia's original switch to McAdoo might also have been merely a tribute vote for the man who hailed from the Peach State.

⁶²Ibid., 355-56; Times, July 4, 1920, pt. 1, p. 1.

⁶³Times, ibid.; Official Report, pp. 354-55; E. O. Phillips, Tribune, July 4, 1920, p. 1; July 5, p. 1.

hallways, though, that the President in his pre-convention talk with Carter Glass had told him that Cox was persona non grata as a nominee.⁶⁴ When Cox telephoned the White House to get a denial of the rumor, Wilson still would not break his silence. Joe Tumulty therefore took it upon himself without the President's authorization to deny that the Chief Executive had voiced any opinions about Presidential candidates. Carter Glass also followed with a public statement: "A report that in recent conversations he [Wilson] had indicated men whom he opposed is not true."⁶⁵ Glass was strongly against Cox; but not wishing to contradict publicly the announcement of Wilson's own secretary, he probably felt obliged to discount the rumor, regardless of what the President might have really said. Although the rumor was probably true, the denials of Tumulty and Glass averted a possible catastrophe for the Governor and settled the dander in the Cox organization.

Meanwhile, Carter Glass himself was having problems with his own associates in the McAdoo camp. He had always professed himself to be a McAdoo backer although he was keeping the twenty-four votes of the Virginia delegation for himself as a

⁶⁴See Smith and Beasley, p. 208, and Cary T. Grayson, Woodrow Wilson: An Intimate Memoir (New York, c.1960), p. 118.

⁶⁵John M. Blum, Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era (Boston, 1951), p. 246; Times, July 5, 1920, pp. 1, 3; see also July 4, pt. 1, p. 1.

favorite son. This procedure was perfectly acceptable to the rest of the McAdoo strategists; however, when the call went out for all supporters to start the swing to McAdoo, Mr. Glass continued to hold the Virginia delegation to himself. For his action he received the sharp denunciation of the other McAdoo managers, but the opinion that Mr. Glass was not cooperating with his colleagues seems entirely erroneous.⁶⁶ The fact is that Glass was unable to declare his state for McAdoo, for the majority of his delegates were Palmer supporters and even included one of the Palmer managers.⁶⁷ When Glass finally released his delegates on the thirty-first ballot, they promptly voted 9 for Palmer, 1 for McAdoo. Five ballots later the vote had gone up to Palmer, 13; Cox, 4; McAdoo, 3--ample proof that Mr. Glass deserves a better fate from his critics.⁶⁸

The week-end worriers, in the meantime, continued their plotting, now with the fear of a darkhorse surge looming even larger. McAdoo had been stopped, but so had Cox, and Palmer was 87½ votes behind his original tally. After twenty-two ballots there were still nine candidates remaining in the field,

⁶⁶ See Bagby, pp. 70, 117.

⁶⁷ Times, July 4, 1920, pt. 1, pp. 1, 3, 5; July 5, p. 2; Tribune, July 3, 1920, p. 1.

⁶⁸ Official Report, pp. 385-88, 397-98.

each one a potential jambuster.⁶⁹ Still Edmond H. Moore felt so confident of a Cox victory he bet Mr. Spellacy of Connecticut five hundred dollars to a thousand that Cox would get the nomination within an hour and a half after the first roll call on Monday.⁷⁰ While the Alabama delegation was rumored to be on the verge of a swing to Cox, there was a threat that Mississippi would switch to McAdoo if Cox did not break the deadlock on the first ballot Monday; and Kentucky was also reported looking around for a bandwagon.⁷¹ The Murphy-Brennan-Taggart combination was perhaps ready for a big Cox push; but as before, they were just as ready to push a compromise man if they felt he stood a better chance of beating McAdoo.⁷² Nevertheless Cox remained the man of the moment for them, and around him they forged their deals.

On Sunday morning the McAdoo generals--Amidon, Mullen, Love, and Mrs. Funk--met to discuss their next move in the event a McAdoo nomination might prove impossible. Studying all the darkhorses, they found none to their liking, although there was

⁶⁹ Ibid., 354-55; Times, July 3, 1920, p. 2; July 4, pt. 1, pp. 1-3, 5; July 5, pp. 1, 2; Lawrence, News, July 4, 1920, pt. 1, p. 1; Henning, Tribune, July 4, 1920, p. 1; July 5, p. 1.

⁷⁰ Henning, Tribune, July 5, 1920, p. 1.

⁷¹ Tribune, July 5, 1920, p. 1; Phillips, ibid.; Times, July 5, 1920, p. 2.

⁷² Phillips, Tribune, July 5, 1920, p. 1; Times, July 5, 1920, pp. 1, 2.

some sentiment for Bainbridge Colby. The second choice of the delegates was mostly Cox; therefore, the leaders agreed to resist any turns to a darkhorse, if possible, and go to Cox if McAdoo failed. However, they still declared their intention to stay in the race as long as possible.⁷³

When Moore a short time later appealed to Mullen and Mrs. Funk to join Cox, the only agreement they could reach was a combined resolution to resist all darkhorses.⁷⁴ In the evening of that same Sunday the McAdoo managers made their last appeal to the Murphy-Brennan-Taggart combine to join them on a McAdoo-Cox ticket, but the big-city leaders would listen only if Cox headed the ticket. Since the McAdoo men refused this, the machine bosses told their followers the next morning to hold firm to Cox and began spreading the word that Franklin D. Roosevelt was their choice for the Vice-Presidential spot.⁷⁵

What was Palmer doing in all this flurry of activity? Primarily, he was just clinging to the belief that he could pull the nomination out of the fire after the fashion of the 1912 Convention. Although the Illinois delegation had given him every assurance they would return to him should the possibility

⁷³Bagby, p. 114; Hanks, p. 272; Henning, Tribune, July 5, 1920, p. 2.

⁷⁴Bagby, p. 114; Hanks, p. 272.

⁷⁵Phillips, Tribune, July 5, 1920, p. 1; Freidel, p. 65.

of his nomination arise during the deadlock, George Brennan talked more and more like a hard-core leader of the Cox organization.⁷⁶ If the deadlock continued, the machine leaders would probably give Palmer a last trial run for the big prize before turning to a darkhorse, and therein lay his only chance for success.

But the general opinion at the end of the day was that none of the big three would get the nomination,⁷⁷ especially if one of them did not break away from the pack early on Monday. The delegates by this time were frankly getting ready to jump on the first bandwagon that came along, for even though the weather in San Francisco was ideal, the patience--and the pocketbooks--of the delegates could hold out for just so long. Many New Yorkers, in fact, were already leaving for home.⁷⁸

The delegates who stayed behind to choose their new leader probably wished they had gone home, too, because the first six ballots on Monday produced nothing but anger, frustration, and boredom. (A few of the less serious delegates gave vent to their feelings by casting their votes for Ring Lardner and

⁷⁶Phillips, Tribune, July 4, 1920, p. 1; Times, July 4, 1920, pt. 1, pp. 1, 3.

⁷⁷Times, July 4, 1920, pt. 1, p. 1; July 5, p. 1.

⁷⁸Tribune, July 4, 1920, p. 1; Times, July 7, 1920, p. 2; Freidel, p. 64.

Irvin S. Cobb, but needless to say, neither boom materialized.)⁷⁹

"I have been in politics for thirty years and attended many conventions during that period," Edmond Moore had declared a few days before, "but I have never seen such a grasshopper convention as this. With the exception of six or seven states, the delegates are jumping around like flies."⁸⁰ While a few grasshoppers were still skittering around, the latest problem was that too many grasshoppers were tenaciously clinging to too many vines. Now Moore was venting his wrath on the delegates whose "pig-headed obstinacy" kept the convention from nominating "the only man who can beat Harding."⁸¹ In those first six ballots each of the big three actually lost a little ground, while the number of candidates receiving votes rose to ten (Cobb and Lardner no longer included). Still no one would give in.

Probably the only man to gain from those first ballots was the Party treasurer, for when Spellacy won his five-hundred-dollar bet from Moore, he donated the money to the Democratic campaign fund.⁸² Events had even come to such a pass that after

⁷⁹Official Report, pp. 357-60.

⁸⁰"The Democratic Convention: Its Candidates and Platform," The Outlook, CXXV (July 14, 1920), 488; Times, June 30, 1920, p. 2.

⁸¹Robert T. Barry, News, July 6, 1920, p. 11.

⁸²Tribune, July 6, 1920, p. 1.

the twenty-eighth ballot a delegate from Georgia moved that the lowest candidate hereafter be dropped after each ballot, but the gentleman was ruled out of order.⁸³

Once again it was Tom Taggart who stirred up the hornets when he deserted Cox completely on the twenty-ninth ballot and cast twenty-nine votes for William Gibbs McAdoo.⁸⁴ Whatever his intentions might have been on Saturday when he first swung votes to McAdoo, he was obviously trying to start a bandwagon rolling now, even though he let it be known that Indiana would leave McAdoo on the next ballot if nothing happened.⁸⁵ For all his assurances he knew full well that a big switch in a key delegation at a time when all the factions were tediously balanced one against another would more than likely cause the entire opposition to collapse under the onrush of eager politicians who sensed a victory. Taggart was tired of befriending both sides; he now saw his chance to be a hero and a king-maker. Notwithstanding his professed friendship with the bosses from the big cities, he was still a politician who could not pass up the chance for glory.

The big switch, and additional gains from the Washington

⁸³Official Report, p. 377.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Times, July 6, 1920, p. 3. It is interesting that in the McAdoo demonstration that followed, the Indiana banner was nowhere to be found.

delegation, pulled McAdoo to within ten votes of a jolted Cox.⁸⁶ More support began trickling in for McAdoo on the next ballot as the anti-Administration men worked feverishly to plug up the holes in their carefully-built dike, but all their efforts could not stop McAdoo from sneaking ahead of Cox once again, 403½ to 400½.⁸⁷ When Taggart had switched votes to McAdoo back on the twentieth ballot, the opposition forces were undisturbed but tried quickly for an adjournment to make sure their forces were intact. Now, however, the fever and sweat began to show as they stepped up their denunciation of the McAdoo campaign as a child of the federal officeholders and sang "Every Vote is on the Payroll" to the tune of "Battle Hymn of the Republic."⁸⁸

After the thirtieth ballot Senator Pat Harrison again offered the motion to drop the bottom man on each succeeding ballot. In the roll-call vote that followed, Harrison's state of Mississippi voted unanimously against the motion. Although the Cox delegates from New York voted in favor of the measure, Ohio passed up its turn in order to vote the same as Pennsylvania.

⁸⁶Official Report, p. 379.

⁸⁷Ibid., 380.

⁸⁸Cox, Journey Through My Years, p. 230; Times, July 5, 1920, p. 2; July 6, p. 1; Tribune, July 6, 1920, p. 5; see also Willis J. Abbot, "The Democratic Convention at San Francisco: II The Impressions of a Newspaper Correspondent," The Outlook, CXXV (July 21, 1920), 565.

When Pennsylvania voted against the motion, Ohio likewise helped veto it, probably as a gesture to Palmer to keep close to Cox. From the confused vote on the motion, it seems that Senator Harrison brought up the matter without prior consultation with the Cox managers,⁸⁹ but then again it might have been a planned attempt to stall the McAdoo drive.

Palmer gained nine on the next ballot, but Cox lost the same amount; McAdoo continued to whittle away at the favorite-son delegations. Another vote, and once again a slight gain for McAdoo, a half-vote loss for Cox.⁹⁰ Like a giant tug-of-war the McAdoo forces were slowly, painfully inching the opposition tuggers toward the center line; but the initial surge had been reduced to a game in inches, and although the anti-McAdoo men were giving ground, they were still dug in and the rope was low. Most important of all, the agonizing struggle was sapping vital energy from the forces of Mr. McAdoo.

After the thirty-second ballot a delegate from Maryland moved to recess until 8:00 P.M. but was voted down. Ballot thirty-three, the McAdoo advance stalled, although Cox himself fell back another $10\frac{1}{2}$. Number thirty-four and McAdoo dropped a

⁸⁹Official Report, p. 380; Richard C. Bain, Convention Decisions and Voting Records, The Brookings Institute (Washington, D.C., c. 1960), p. 213; Evans, Tribune, July 6, 1920, p. 3.

⁹⁰Official Report, pp. 388-89.

half-vote.⁹¹

Meanwhile the Palmer men, who alone had witnessed slight gains on the last four ballots, started a demonstration for their leader, but after seven minutes it also fizzled.⁹² Nevertheless the Palmer followers came to life again on the next ballot when Tennessee gave all its 24 votes to the Attorney General. Additional votes from other states swelled the total gain to 38, the best they had seen in a long time.⁹³ On the thirty-sixth ballot another 19 votes sent Palmer's total up to 241, and the long-awaited trial run for Palmer was on. But then Fred Lynch of Minnesota asked for a recess until 8:30 P.M., and the assembly heartily agreed. It was five o'clock; the convention had been in continuous balloting session for almost seven hours.⁹⁴ The delegates were hungry.

Nothing more catastrophic could have happened to Mr. Palmer's hopes. His long-awaited chance, a trial run for the laurels, had been interrupted even before it had a good head of steam, and the Attorney General himself knew that the recess would probably be the ignominious end of all his hopes for 1920. During the break, the Palmer and McAdoo groups conversed, but

⁹¹Ibid., 389, 392-94.

⁹²Evans, Tribune, July 6, 1920, p. 3.

⁹³Official Report, pp. 395-96.

⁹⁴Ibid., 398.

neither would give in first to the other. The Cox boomers were saying that McAdoo could not hold his delegation much longer, but on the other hand the Cox movement was showing weak spots, too. Senator Pat Harrison, for one, was admitting that he could not hold Mississippi for Cox very long. Palmer himself was now saying that none of the top three would get the nomination.⁹⁵

After the recess Illinois almost completely deserted Palmer, and Tennessee returned to the Davis fold.⁹⁶ The smattering of votes Palmer regained on the next ballot only emphasized the futility of his continuance in the race. After the thirty-eighth ballot was counted, Palmer's campaign manager, Mr. Charles C. Carlin of Virginia, ascended the speaker's stand amid murmurs of expectation and read an announcement to the convention. "I am authorized," he said, "by him [Palmer] to unconditionally, absolutely, and finally release his delegates. Mr. Chairman, I move a recess of thirty minutes."⁹⁷

Hardly had the motion been carried when the delegates rushed to their respective caucus rooms to determine their next moves. It was like a new convention all over again.

As the delegates returned to their places at 10:15 P.M. to resume balloting, William G. McAdoo, with 405½ votes, held a twenty-two-vote lead over Cox; but after thirty-eight ballots,

⁹⁵Times, July 6, 1920, p. 3.

⁹⁶Official Report, pp. 400-03.

⁹⁷Ibid., 405

neither candidate could even claim a simple majority of the votes yet.⁹⁸ Although the 211 votes now about to be released from the Palmer delegation would still not be enough to give any candidate the necessary two-thirds majority, a sizeable bloc in any one direction could definitely be the start of the victory surge for either McAdoo, Cox, or a darkhorse. With renewed expectation, the delegates began again to vote and watch.

Alabama opened by switching fifteen votes to John W. Davis, thus giving the lie to any preconceived conclusions that the convention had resolved itself to a two-man race. All down the line the former Palmer states divided themselves among the remaining candidates. Georgia cast its 28 to McAdoo, but Massachusetts countered with 19 for Cox. Taggart reflected the prevailing indecisiveness of the convention (and especially of himself) by returning 19 votes to Cox, keeping 11 for McAdoo. A big hush settled over the auditorium when Pennsylvania's turn came, but Palmer's state decided to pay a last tribute to its favorite son by keeping 73 votes for him. Nevertheless James M. Cox picked up 85 new votes to regain the lead from McAdoo going into round forty.⁹⁹

However, the big break that everyone had expected when Palmer withdrew from the race failed to materialize, for both

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Ibid., 406-07; Tribune, July 6, 1920, p. 1.

the McAdoo and Cox forces continued to hold their lines intact. The Pennsylvania delegation began to break up on the fortieth ballot, but the delegates went in three directions. The fact that McAdoo picked up the bulk of the Keystone votes only tended to balance the strength of the two remaining front runners and prolong the agony. It was almost midnight, and both the Cox and McAdoo managers were admitting that no break would come that night. The two leading contenders were matched in hopeless deadlock and no one had yet come up with a darkhorse with sufficient backing to break the convention open.¹⁰⁰ Even so, the balloting went on.

Cox gained a trifling $7\frac{1}{2}$ votes on the next ballot, but McAdoo fell back 7, his first loss since before Palmer's withdrawal. When a delegate from Oklahoma moved for adjournment until ten o'clock the next morning, a New York delegate quickly demanded a roll-call vote. The big-city leaders, now sensing that the McAdoo drive was slowing down, saw their chance to bring it to a complete stop. The McAdoo forces could muster only 406 ayes to match the 637 voices against adjournment; therefore, the balloting continued.¹⁰¹

On the forty-second ballot Georgia deserted McAdoo to join the Cox wagon, causing McAdoo to slump 33 more votes while Cox

¹⁰⁰ Henning, Tribune, July 7, 1920, p. 2; Willis J. Abbott, "The Democratic Convention at San Francisco," p. 566.

¹⁰¹ Official Report, pp. 411-412.

was gaining 43 and inching within 7 votes of the majority marker.¹⁰² The Ohioans could feel a major breakthrough coming, and the stalwarts of the McAdoo contingent were hardpressed to continue any holding action, for now that Palmer was gone from the contest, the McAdoo camp was without its chief defensive ally. In addition, the removal of Palmer put them in the embarrassing and contradictory position of prlonging the deadlock to try to win the nomination for a candidate who himself was openly declining to run.¹⁰³

Nevertheless, McAdoo's supporters continued in the fight to the bitter end, refusing to release their delegations to any other candidate. Quite the contrary, George Lunn of New York challenged his state's vote after the forty-second ballot in a last-ditch attempt to derail the Cox express.¹⁰⁴ Over the week end, about forty-seven New York delegates and alternates, most of them Cox supporters, had departed for home; but before they left, Charles Murphy had received a promise from Franklin D. Roosevelt and George Lunn (both McAdoo men) not to interfere with their proxy votes.¹⁰⁵ Throughout all the balloting on Monday, New York had voted a straight seventy-twenty ballot in

¹⁰²Ibid., 414.

¹⁰³Hanks, pp. 277-78

¹⁰⁴Official Report, p. 417.

¹⁰⁵Tribune, July 4, 1920, p. 1; Times, July 7, 1920, p. 2; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 64.

favor of Cox according to the gentlemen's agreement, but Lunn evidently felt by the forty-second ballot that the situation had become too prolonged and too desperate for the McAdoo cause. He therefore challenged the New York vote. Had he followed through with his threat, he would have won his point easily, since the convention rules did not allow a proxy vote when both the delegate and his alternate were missing. However, the Tammany people raised such a cry of anger that Lunn was forced to withdraw his challenge. "When you wake up in a hospital," one Tammanyite had threatened, "you will hear that Cox has been nominated."¹⁰⁵

Even so, it seems that Lunn backed down only after Murphy pledged again to support Franklin D. Roosevelt for whatever office he wanted.¹⁰⁷ As a result, the name of Mr. Roosevelt became even more prominent in the list of Vice-Presidential aspirants, in spite of the fact that he was anti-Tammany. Since Lunn's challenge of the New York delegation would cost Mr. Cox a majority of his New York support and would certainly ruin his nomination-bound wagon, a pledge of support for Mr. Roosevelt was a small price to pay for averting a sure tragedy. And for Mr. Lunn, the promotion of his associate Mr. Roosevelt upstairs to the Vice-Presidential spot would leave the

¹⁰⁶Hanks, p. 231.

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

senatorial candidacy open to himself!

When the excitement in the New York delegation had died down, the convention anxiously went on to the forty-third ballot, feeling now that the end was close at hand. Alabama opened by taking four votes from Cox, giving them to McAdoo and Davis, but through the rest of the balloting, McAdoo's losses outweighed his gains, even though most delegations continued to hold their lines as they had been doing previously. The little changes here and there nevertheless amounted to a $27\frac{1}{2}$ vote increase for Governor Cox, boosting him over the simple-majority mark for the first time in the convention.¹⁰⁸

Immediately George Lunn moved for an adjournment until the next day, but his motion was quickly defeated by the convention.¹⁰⁹ As Tammany quieted Lunn by re-affirming its support of Roosevelt, the one lingering fear that remained for the Cox forces was the possibility that William Jennings Bryan might take the stand and speak against the Ohio governor. It had been rumored that Bryan would throw his support to McAdoo if he saw Cox was winning, but up to the forty-third ballot he continued to shepherd his nine votes toward Senator Owen.¹¹⁰ Even at this late stage the big-city bosses entertained the thought of calling

¹⁰⁸ Official Report, pp. 415-416

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 417.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 415-16; Times, Extra, July 6, 1920, p. 2; July 7, p. 2.

a recess to check their forces because of the fear that the Cox boom might falter just short of the necessary two-thirds mark and ruin Cox's final chances. However, they received assurances from the Pennsylvania delegation and decided to plunge on into ballot forty-four. If perchance Cox should be ten or twenty votes short of the nomination, then Charles F. Murphy might declare all ninety New York votes for Cox. A McAdoo uprising would ensue, they realized, but they felt reasonably confident they could overcome it.¹¹¹

Alabama started the critical forty-fourth ballot by returning two votes from McAdoo to Cox; Arizona remained the same; Arkansas gave all eighteen to Cox, a gain of three; California switched one from McAdoo to Cox; and so the balloting went. Tom Taggart, now thoroughly convinced, took ten from McAdoo and cast all thirty Indiana votes to Cox. Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, and Massachusetts all deserted McAdoo completely, while other delegations switched votes to Cox in varying degrees. Michigan, which had been casting fourteen of its thirty votes for McAdoo, passed in order to poll its members again; but Pennsylvania, holding true to its assurances, brought on wild cheers when it cast sixty-eight votes for Governor Cox. The unofficial tally gave McAdoo only 270 votes, a loss of 258, while Cox skyrocketed to 699 $\frac{1}{2}$, even without any Michigan

¹¹¹Hanks, p. 280; Times, July 7, 1920, p. 2.

vote.¹¹² Before Michigan could record its tally the chairman of the Colorado delegation arose and requested that Colorado's vote be cast unanimously for Governor Cox. A delegate from Connecticut also arose, but was interrupted by Samuel B. Amidon of Kansas (the manager for William G. McAdoo), who moved that the rules be suspended and Mr. Cox be declared the nominee unanimously. With a rafter-rattling "Aye" that reflected both triumph and relief, the delegates quickly put their stamp of approval on the main business of the convention and moved to adjourn for the night.¹¹³ Cox would be their man.

¹¹²Official Report, p. 418.

¹¹³Official Report, pp. 419-420; Times, July 6, 1920, Extra, p. 1; July 7, p. 2.

CHAPTER IX

WHY COX?

In analyzing the reasons why Governor James M. Cox won the Democratic nomination in 1920, two steps must be considered: first of all, the reasons why he was able to get sufficient backing to become a leading challenger, and secondly, the factors at the convention itself which were instrumental in his emergence as the eventual winner. In both categories a combination of circumstances was at the root of his success.

The three most important arguments for Cox's rise to a contender's position were his disassociation with the Wilson Administration, his geographic position, and his qualifications as a good compromise man. Had Mr. Wilson been able to keep the popularity that was his at the end of the World War, the nomination would easily have gone either to himself or to his successful son-in-law, the "crown prince" William G. McAdoo. However, 1920 was a low point in Wilson popularity, and many people in the Democratic Party sensed the political efficacy of washing their hands of as much Wilsonianism as possible. William G. McAdoo was by far the most popular and the most well-known of all the Democratic aspirants, but his affinity to the President prevented him from running away with the Democratic nomination.

The big-city bosses in particular were opposed to Wilson and everything connected with Wilson (in particular, McAdoo) because their own constituents were anti-Wilson for a multitude of reasons and also because they themselves were still smarting from a long series of patronage rebuffs even dating back to the days when Wilson was governor of New Jersey.¹ The machine bosses did not always agree upon whom they wanted as a candidate, but they did agree that it had to be someone not connected in any way with Woodrow Wilson, and Governor Cox fit that description adequately.

No doubt one of the biggest boosts to the personal candidacy of James M. Cox was the nomination of Warren G. Harding as the Republican candidate. Since many politicians felt that Ohio would be the key to the election itself, the most logical move for the Democrats to make, if they wanted to wrest Ohio away from Harding, would be to nominate another favorite son of their own.² Although Cox personally announced that he would not accept the Vice-Presidential nomination,³ his managers might have settled

¹Hanks, pp. 46, 48, 53-54, 142-43; Freidel, p. 59; see also Tribune, July 8, 1920, p. 8.

²Evidence seems to indicate that Harding himself was chosen by the Republicans partly because they felt that the Democrats would nominate Cox. The Republicans therefore felt the selection of Harding would insure Ohio for the GOP. --See Frederic Wile, News, June 7, 1920, p. 2; also M. R. Werner, Privileged Characters (New York, c.1935), p. 14.

³Times, May 21, 1920, p. 17; Tribune, June 20, 1920, p. 1.

for second place on a McAdoo-Cox ticket before the Republican Convention, and Mr. Cox would have undoubtedly accepted their decision. However, when the Republicans chose Harding, the Cox managers saw their prospects brighten considerably, and they set their sights on first prize or nothing. The fact that Mr. Cox had a good record as governor of Ohio and successful vote-getter in his previous campaigns was all the more reason for choosing him.

The third factor in Governor Cox's prominence as a candidate was his position as a good compromise man. Both McAdoo and Palmer had their avid supporters, but being men of national prominence, they also had built up a hard core of opposition. Cox, a newcomer to the national scene, was therefore little known to most people. If he had few personal disciples outside Ohio, even more important, he had few political enemies. He was a compromise on the League of Nations issue since he was in favor of it, although not in the unbending fashion of Woodrow Wilson; but of greater significance, Cox was a middle-of-the-roader on the prohibition question. The big-city men liked him because he was at least in favor of light wines and beer, and although bone-dry Democrats like Bryan opposed him, Cox found acceptance with those of a more moderate view.

It was advantageous for the Ohioans to keep the liquor plank out of the platform completely, for any mention of alcohol would have taken some of the argument out of Cox's position as a

compromise man. If the platform had advocated alcoholic beverages of any type, his wet backers would have felt victorious and might have been content to give in a little more toward a dry candidate, while a platform defending prohibition would obviously have been contradictory to Cox's moderately wet stand. When the Resolutions Committee decided to say nothing at all about prohibition, the Cox managers were happy, for their candidate still remained the man who could present the widest appeal to the delegates.

In the balloting at the convention a deadlock was a good thing for Cox, for so long as McAdoo and Palmer remained tangled and kept the Administration forces divided, and so long as the McAdoo and the anti-McAdoo delegates battled each other, the better were the chances that they would eventually turn to Cox, out of sheer exasperation if for no other reason. The chance of a darkhorse stampeding the convention was always a latent threat, but none of the darkhorse possibilities was agreeable to all factions, and equally important, none of those frequently mentioned came from pivotal states. Furthermore, a poll of delegates voting for the top three candidates revealed that most preferred as their second choice one of the other leading contenders. Since Governor Cox was not only a good compromise man behind whom most factions at the convention could unite but also a strong candidate in his own right, the essence of Edmond H. Moore's strategy was simply to keep the Governor's core of

supporters intact, hold off all darkhorse threats, let the opposition groups wear themselves down, and wait.

But to win the nomination, Cox first had to stop McAdoo and Palmer. The first asset in his favor was the old two-thirds rule employed by the Democratic Convention. Because only 34 per cent of all the votes were needed to stop any given candidate, a minority opposition group had a much greater opportunity to stop a favorite candidate from pushing quickly toward a nomination. If William G. McAdoo had needed only a simple majority to capture the Democratic standard, the big-city bosses might not have entertained such confidence in derailing him, and many uncommitted delegates would undoubtedly have joined him simply because he had all the markings of a winner. But since McAdoo had to round up over 66 per cent of all the delegate votes, no one but his true-blue followers was willing to stick out his neck for McAdoo so long as his opposition held the key to his success or failure. Naturally the very fact that a well-knit minority could stop any candidate was an invitation for a long dragged-out convention and a distinct advantage to a compromise candidate of the Buckeye type.

The presence of three leading contenders in the race was also an eventual benefit to Cox, for each time one candidate began to show signs of running away from the field, the other two would combine to pull him back again. Even though the Palmer and McAdoo forces used this method to stop Cox during the

balloting, it was used most effectively against McAdoo. When Palmer finally withdrew from the race, most of the steam in McAdoo's drive, as it turned out, was already expended, and combination tactics were no longer necessary to stop him. Once McAdoo was halted, his opposition forces were more than willing to add their support to almost anyone else, Bryan and Wilson excepted.

One historian has claimed recently that McAdoo's managers in San Francisco were seriously handicapped by the absence of Daniel C. Roper as campaign manager and the fact that they lacked real authority to bargain in McAdoo's name,⁴ but the point seems to be overemphasized. Actually the evidence shows that Roper was doing a considerable amount of managing and dealing from his Chicago headquarters, but there simply were not that many deals to be made. It would have been political suicide for the machine bosses to make any kind of concessions to McAdoo except at prices which would have been too dear for the McAdoo managers to pay.⁵ The McAdoo forces in San Francisco had a well-organized cadre of workers reaching into every state delegation, dangling Vice-Presidential hints just as furiously as their

⁴Bagby, pp. 113, 117.

⁵Ibid., 112; Daniel C. Roper in collaboration with Frank H. Lovette, Fifty Years of Public Life (Durham, North Carolina, 1941), 209.

opposition;⁶ but the Democratic Convention being the tangled mix-up that it was, no one was biting. Even such "border-line" states as Mississippi, Kansas, and South Carolina remained firm to the last ballot. In cases where rival states could be invaded, the delegates all too often divided their votes among several of the front runners, so that dealmaking just did not pay.

Once A. Mitchell Palmer had been eliminated from the race, it took the convention only six more ballots to decide upon Governor Cox as their unanimous choice for the nomination; but contrary to the opinion commonly held, the machine bosses do not deserve all the credit for Cox's victory.⁷ Although he certainly could not have won without their support, the role of the machine bosses was primarily that of stopping the McAdoo drive and helping to keep enough steam in the Cox engine to get it to the critical turning point, for the actual impetus which started the final victory drive came from other sources. Some of the anti-McAdoo leaders, in fact, were even considering a switch to Bainbridge Colby after Palmer left the field.

A study of the voting patterns of the New York, Illinois,

⁶Hanks, p. 246.

⁷See Charles Willis Thompson, Times, July 7, 1920, pt. 3, p. 3; "The New Democracy and Its Banner-Bearers," Current Opinion, LXIX (August 1920), 140; "Cox in Wilson's Shoes," The New Republic, XXIII (July 21, 1920), 216; Bruce Bliven, "San Francisco," The New Republic, XXIII (July 14, 1920), 196.

Massachusetts, Indiana, and New Jersey delegations, the five states most often classified as "machine" states, shows that on the critical ballots near the end of the convention, the machine states actually went against the prevailing trend to jump onto the Cox wagon.⁸ On the thirty-eighth ballot these five states were casting 151 votes for Cox, 66 for McAdoo, and 21 for Palmer, in general about the same ratio they had been following since earlier in the afternoon. By the fortieth ballot the scale had shifted to 190 for Cox and 48 for McAdoo, due to the withdrawal of Palmer and the switch in the Massachusetts and Indiana delegations to Cox; but on the forty-first and forty-second ballots, the most critical ballots of the entire convention, when the rest of the convention was beginning the swing to Cox and retreating from McAdoo, the machine states gave McAdoo two additional votes while decreasing the Cox total by three. Even on the forty-third ballot, when the trend to Cox was becoming quite obvious, the machine states switched only one vote (in the Indiana delegation) from McAdoo to Cox. In the four ballots from the fortieth to the forty-third the convention as a whole gave Cox an additional 78 votes, taking 55 away from McAdoo; but in the machine states during the same interval, Governor Cox lost two votes while McAdoo picked up one. Therefore it can hardly be said that the machine states commandeered the nomination of Cox.

⁸See Appendix II. Compare with Appendix IV.

If the wet factions were the principal cause of the Governor's ultimate success, it would seem that the delegations that voted for a wet platform would be the ones who were most instrumental in putting Cox over the top during the critical balloting; but again an analysis of the vote reveals an altogether different picture. When Bourke Cochran of New York proposed that the convention add a provision to the platform allowing light wines and beer, twelve delegations voted predominantly in favor of the amendment. Although some other delegations voted a majority one way or the other by a slim margin, these twelve states and territories would at least be considered as the wettest of all the delegations.⁹

On the thirty-eighth ballot these wet states were casting 228½ votes for Cox, 108 for Palmer, and 51½ for McAdoo, again similar to the pattern they had been following for some time. By the fortieth ballot, when all but 18 loyal Pennsylvanians had deserted Palmer, Cox had increased his tally by 43 votes, but McAdoo kept pace with 43 additional votes of his own. Then on the forty-first and forty-second ballots the wet states also went contrary to the general trends of the convention, for Cox fell back one vote among the wet-state delegations while McAdoo, the dry, was picking up nine. Again from the fortieth to the forty-third ballots, while Cox was gaining 78 votes and McAdoo

⁹See Appendix III.

was falling back 55 in the convention as a whole, the wet states actually increased McAdoo's strength by seven, but gave only three new votes to Cox. It is evident, then, that the wet states, like the machine bloc, also were not responsible for the final impetus that spelled out victory for Cox.¹⁰

Governor Cox could never have won the nomination without the support of the wet contingents and the political bosses, for it was they who kept him in contention through the long struggle to the fortieth ballot. However, when the final break for Cox began, the impetus did not come from the machine or the wet states, but from a totally unexpected sector of the convention--the South.

It can reasonably be assumed that the most important voting took place after A. Mitchell Palmer withdrew from the race following the thirty-eighth ballot, thus breaking up the

¹⁰Ohio voted 68 per cent in favor of the wet plank, but its inclusion in the wet delegation is really insignificant since Ohio was pledged unswervingly to favorite-son Cox under any circumstances. Pennsylvania, however, which also voted 58 per cent in favor of the wet plank, is of much greater significance because the Pennsylvania delegation scattered its votes to new candidates after Palmer withdrew. Although 32 Pennsylvania delegates voted against the wet plank, of greater importance is the fact that as many as 49 delegates voted for McAdoo on the forty-first and forty-second ballots. Even assuming that all 32 dry delegates switched to McAdoo after the thirty-ninth ballot, this would still mean that 14 or more of the 44 delegates who voted for a wet plank cast their votes for McAdoo on the forty-first and forty-second ballots. Cox received at most 14 of the 44 wet votes on these two ballots; therefore, the wet delegates of Pennsylvania were obviously not flocking to Governor Cox. --See Appendices III and IV.

three-way log jam; but of all the votes cast, the thirty-ninth, forty-first, and forty-second ballots stand out as the most crucial of the entire convention. The thirty-ninth ballot was obviously important, for at this point Cox gained 85 votes, the greatest boost any candidate had received since New York and New Jersey switched to him on the seventh ballot. But of even greater significance, the new surge for Cox enabled him to overtake McAdoo and gain a definite psychological advantage by capturing the lead at such a late stage in the contest. Nevertheless, the fortieth ballot put the damper on Cox's drive, because McAdoo again was showing a resurgence of strength and once more was challenging for the lead. At the end of forty votes both McAdoo and Cox were enjoying their greatest vote totals of the convention; both were on the upward swing, with McAdoo only 23 votes behind Cox and closing fast.

The forty-first ballot proved to be the most important vote of the entire convention, for it was at this point that McAdoo suffered his first loss since Palmer's withdrawal. Ironically the chief delegation responsible for McAdoo's loss was Virginia, the state of Carter Glass.

After Palmer withdrew, Virginia in two ballots had switched eight and a half new votes to Cox, while giving only a half-vote to McAdoo. On the forty-first ballot, however, Virginia again went back to casting all twenty-four votes for favorite-son Glass, presumably at the behest of Glass himself. As a result

eight votes were taken from McAdoo and nine and a half from Cox. Some might argue that Glass was trying to wreck the McAdoo boom for the sake of his personal ambition, but more than likely he was making a last-minute attempt to halt Cox's sudden rise. By drawing his Virginia delegation back to himself, he would take votes away from Cox at a very crucial time and, he probably hoped, might possibly be able to stop Cox's advance. Admittedly by entering the race again he would also deprive McAdoo of critical votes, but he probably felt that the most important task of the moment was to stop Cox. Until that was done, McAdoo was doomed; but once it was done, the task of pushing McAdoo might again be resumed.

As fate would have it, however, Glass's strategy backfired, for the loss of the Virginia vote hurt McAdoo much more than it hurt Cox. On the same forty-first ballot another southern state, Alabama, came to Cox's rescue by switching fifteen valuable votes to him, thus compensating for the loss suffered at the hands of Virginia. McAdoo, on the other hand, was not able to find enough substitutes for the lost Virginia support, and as a result he took a seven-vote setback, from which he never recovered.

Even though McAdoo lost only 7 votes while Cox gained a mere $7\frac{1}{2}$, the effect was like a deep gash over the eye of a boxer. The convention delegates, now sensing that McAdoo might be faltering, began to lose confidence in him at the very moment

when confidence was vitally needed by every candidate still remaining in the fight. Before the thirty-ninth ballot the three front-running candidates were fighting primarily a defensive battle; but Palmer's withdrawal gave the delegates the feeling, rightly or wrongly, that a solution to the deadlock was imminent and increased their desires to nominate a candidate as soon as possible. Thus any loss of votes by a leading contender after the thirty-ninth ballot was multiplied a hundredfold in importance because the delegates were getting anxious to conclude the deliberations and go home. The delegates wanted a winner, and McAdoo's setback on the forty-first ballot, even though slight, caused many to begin thinking that another candidate might stand a better chance of winning the nomination and bring the dragged-out proceedings to an end. It is true that Cox gained only a fraction on the forty-first ballot, but at least he was able to show that he could hold his own in the nervous shifting of votes. Most important of all, he was in the lead, and he was by far the closest of all the remaining candidates to the goal.

On the forty-second ballot McAdoo's own native state of Georgia sealed his fate by switching from McAdoo to Cox, making the task of catching the Ohio governor even greater. From the fortieth to the forty-second ballot Cox had gained a total of $50\frac{1}{2}$ votes while McAdoo was falling back 40; but contrary to what might have been expected, none of Cox's newly-acquired strength

came from wet or boss-controlled states. Nearly all of it was from the South.

The only other threat between Cox and the prize was the possibility that a darkhorse might rise after Palmer's withdrawal and, taking advantage of a McAdoo-Cox deadlock, effect a victory. A graph of the combined votes of all the darkhorses, however, reveals an almost perfect arch from the thirty-eighth to the forty-fourth ballots with the keystone at the forty-first.¹¹ A moderate drive for a darkhorse did materialize when Palmer withdrew, but once again the forty-first and forty-second ballots were the turning point. John W. Davis, the most prominent of the darkhorses, suffered a critical set-back on the forty-first roll call. Like McAdoo, he, too, was jolted when Glass took his delegation's votes back to himself and Alabama made the switch to Cox. These two changes alone cost Davis 21½ votes. The combined vote of all the darkhorses had continued to inch ahead, but on the following ballot the total darkhorse vote also began to recede in the face of the growing trend to Governor Cox. By the forty-fourth ballot it had returned almost exactly to the same vote total as on the thirty-eighth.

Cox inched over the important simple-majority mark on the forty-third ballot, once again chiefly because of Southern support. Louisiana added seven more votes to the Cox total,

¹¹See graph, Appendix V.

followed by Virginia, which returned to the open convention with ten and a half votes for Cox. Whether Carter Glass saw the futility of holding his delegation any longer, or whether he simply could not hold them further, the final break of the Virginia delegation brought more votes to Cox than the first had brought. The rush to Cox had become so obvious at the end of forty-three ballots that any attempt to halt it would have been met with the greatest displeasure by the rest of the convention. When Pennsylvania jumped onto the Cox bandwagon on the last ballot, it was merely putting its stamp of approval onto an action that was already inevitable.

James M. Cox became the Democratic nominee in 1920 as a result of a complex mixture of circumstances and the adroitness of his campaign manager to capitalize on the divided atmosphere in the Democratic Party. As a moderately wet, relatively unknown governor from Ohio with a good record and a knack for winning elections, he possessed the advantage of geography plus the ideal credentials for a compromise candidate not hampered by the Wilson stigma. Equally as important, he had the help of the two-thirds rule and two other prominent contenders to wear the delegates' patience down. In the voting itself, the determination of the wet bosses to stop McAdoo worked directly to the advantage of Cox by dragging out the convention until the delegates were finally willing to settle for a compromise. The big-city bosses were able to pull the McAdoo train to a stop;

however, when the final surge for Cox began, it was not the wet or the boss states that provided the power, but the dry states of the South, in particular, Virginia, Alabama, and Georgia, with the vital help of Louisiana.

"If we have an ace concealed, we win. . . ." No single card was sufficient for the Democratic jackpot in 1920, for quite a few players were bidding on the prize, and some were displaying strong hands already; but when Cox's turn came, he had on the table in front of him an ace of a campaign manager, plus a trio of kings from Chicago, New York, and New Jersey. And from the hole he pulled an ace labeled "Southern Dry."

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APPENDIX I

SIGNIFICANT BALLOTS OF THE 1920 DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION

FIRST BALLOT

State	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	Davis	Cummings	Edwards	Gerard	Smith	Owen
Ala.	9	6	3	-	-	3	-	2	1
Ariz.	4	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
Ark.	3	2	7	-	2	-	-	-	4
Calif.	10	3	4	2	2	1	1	1	-
Colo.	3	8	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Conn.	-	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	-
Del.	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fla.	1	8	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Ga.	-	28	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Idaho	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ill.	9	35	9	-	-	-	-	5	-
Ind.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iowa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kansas	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ky.	3	-	23	-	-	-	-	-	-
La.	5	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
Maine	5	5	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Md.	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	3	-	1	-	-	-
Mass.	4	17	4	-	-	-	-	7	2
Mich.	15	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Minn.	10	7	2	-	-	4	-	-	-
Miss.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mo.	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	10	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	-	5	1	-	1
Mont.	1	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	-
Nebr.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nev.	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-
N. H.	4	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
N. J.	-	-	-	-	-	28	-	-	-
N. M.	2	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	2
N. Y.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	90	-
N. C.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
N. D.	6	2	1	-	-	1	-	-	-
Ohio	-	-	48	-	-	-	-	-	-
Okla.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20

State McAdoo Palmer Cox Davis Cummings Edwards Gerard Smith Owen

Ore.	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pa.	2	73	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R. I.	2	5	-	1	-	-	-	2	-
S. C.	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
S. D.	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-
Tenn.	2	9	8	2	1	-	-	-	1
Texas	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Utah	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vt.	4	1	2	-	-	-	-	1	-
Va.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wash.	10	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	1
W. Va.	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	-
Wisc.	11	3	5	1	1	-	1	1	-
Wyo.	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Alaska	2	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
D. C.	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hawaii	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Philip.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
P. Rico	1	2	-	1	1	1	-	-	-
C. Zone	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	266	254	134	32	25	42	21	109	33

Scattered votes:

Glass: Calif. 1, Md. $\frac{1}{2}$, Va. 24, P. Rico 1.

Hitchcock: Nebr. 16, Wisc. 2.

Meredith: Iowa 26, Wisc. 1.

Colby: Calif. 1.

Marshall: Del. 2, Fla. 1, Ind. 30, Mich. 1, Pa. 1.

Daniels: Fla. 1.

Clark: La. 9.

Underwood: Md. $\frac{1}{2}$.

Wood, Alfred: Mass. 1, N. H. 3.

Hearst: Mass. 1.

Brian: Mich. 1.

Williams: Miss. 20.

Simmons: N. C. 24.

Harrison: Philip. 6.

FORTIETH BALLOT

State	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	Davis	State	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	Davis
Ala.	8	-	-	16	N. J.	-	-	28	-
Ariz.	3	-	3	-	N. M.	6	-	-	-
Ark.	3	-	15	-	N. Y.	20	-	70	-
Calif.	14	-	12	-	N. C.	24	-	-	-
Colo.	4	-	7	-	N. D.	8	-	2	-
Conn.	2	-	11	-	Ohio	-	-	48	-
Del.	4	-	2	-	Okla.	-	-	-	-
Fla.	3	-	9	-	Ore.	10	-	-	-
Ga.	28	-	-	-	Pa.	42	18	12	3
Idaho	8	-	-	-	R. I.	1	-	8	1
Ill.	16	-	41	1	S. C.	18	-	-	-
Ind.	11	-	19	-	S. D.	6	-	3	-
Iowa	-	-	26	-	Tenn.	-	-	-	24
Kansas	20	-	-	-	Texas	40	-	-	-
Ky.	5	-	20	1	Utah	8	-	-	-
La.	6	1	13	1	Vt.	4	-	4	-
Maine	12	-	-	-	Va.	8	-	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$
Md.	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	Wash.	8	-	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	16
Mass.	1	-	32	-	W. Va.	-	-	-	-
Mich.	14	-	12	4	Wis.	19	-	7	-
Minn.	17	-	6	-	Wyo.	6	-	-	-
Miss.	-	-	20	-	Alaska	2	-	4	-
Mo.	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	D. C.	-	-	6	-
Mont.	8	-	-	-	Hawaii	1	-	5	-
Nebr.	7	-	-	-	Philip.	3	-	2	-
Nev.	-	-	6	-	P. Rico	6	-	-	-
N. H.	5	-	2	1	C. Zone	2	-	-	-
					TOTAL	467	19	490	76

Scattered votes:

Cummings: Colo. 1, Conn. 1.

Owen: Mass. 2, Mo. 1, Nebr. 9, Okla. 20, Philip. 1.

Colby: Mass. 1.

Clark: Mo. 2.

FORTY-FIRST BALLOT

State	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	Davis	State	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	Davis
Ala.	8	-	15	1	N. J.	-	-	28	-
Ariz.	3	-	3	-	N. M.	6	-	-	-
Ark.	3	-	15	-	N. Y.	20	-	70	-
Calif.	14	-	12	-	N. C.	24	-	-	-
Colo.	4	-	7	-	N. D.	8	-	2	-
Conn.	2	-	11	-	Ohio	-	-	48	-
Del.	4	-	2	-	Okla.	-	-	-	-
Fla.	3	-	9	-	Ore.	10	-	-	-
Ga.	28	-	-	-	Pa.	46	11	14	3
Idaho	8	-	-	-	R. I.	1	-	8	1
Ill.	17	-	40	1	S. C.	18	-	-	-
Ind.	11	-	19	-	S. D.	4	-	4	-
Iowa	-	-	26	-	Tenn.	-	-	-	24
Kansas	20	-	-	-	Texas	40	-	-	-
Ky.	4	-	21	1	Utah	8	-	-	-
La.	6	1	13	-	Vt.	4	-	4	-
Maine	12	-	-	-	Va.	-	-	-	-
Md.	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	Wash.	8	-	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
Mass.	1	-	30	1	W. Va.	-	-	-	16
Mich.	14	-	12	4	Wisc.	19	-	7	-
Minn.	16	-	7	-	Wyo.	6	-	-	-
Miss.	-	-	20	-	Alaska	2	-	4	-
Mo.	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	D. C.	-	-	6	-
Mont.	8	-	-	-	Hawaii	1	-	5	-
Nebr.	7	-	-	-	Philip.	3	-	2	-
Nev.	-	-	6	-	P. Rico	6	-	-	-
N. H.	5	-	2	1	C. Zone	2	-	-	-
					TOTAL	460	12	497 $\frac{1}{2}$	55 $\frac{1}{2}$

Scattered votes:

Owen: Mass. 3, Mo. 1, Nebr. 9, Okla. 20, S. D. 1, Philip. 1.
 Colby: Mass. 1.
 Clark: Mo. 2.
 Glass: Va. 24.
 Cummings: Colo. 1, Conn. 1.

FORTY-SECOND BALLOT

State	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	Davis	State	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	Davis
Ala.	8	-	15	1	N. J.	-	-	28	-
Ariz.	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	N. M.	6	-	-	-
Ark.	3	-	15	-	N. Y.	20	-	70	-
Calif.	14	-	12	-	N. C.	24	-	-	-
Colo.	4	-	7	-	N. D.	8	-	2	-
Conn.	2	-	11	-	Ohio	-	-	48	-
Del.	4	-	2	-	Okla.	-	-	-	-
Fla.	3	-	9	-	Ore.	10	-	-	-
Ga.	-	-	28	-	Pa.	49	8	14	3
Idaho	8	-	-	-	R. I.	1	-	8	1
Ill.	17	-	40	1	S. C.	18	-	-	-
Ind.	11	-	19	-	S. D.	3	-	5	-
Iowa	-	-	26	-	Tenn.	-	-	-	24
Kansas	20	-	-	-	Texas	40	-	-	-
Ky.	4	-	22	-	Utah	8	-	-	-
La.	6	-	13	-	Vt.	4	-	4	-
Maine	12	-	-	-	Va.	-	-	-	-
Md.	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	Wash.	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	8	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
Mass.	2	-	30	1	W. Va.	-	-	-	16
Mich.	14	-	16	-	Wisc.	17	-	9	-
Minn.	17	-	6	-	Wyo.	6	-	-	-
Miss.	-	-	20	-	Alaska	2	-	4	-
Mo.	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	D. C.	-	-	6	-
Mont.	6	-	2	-	Hawaii	1	-	5	-
Nebr.	7	-	-	-	Philip.	3	-	2	-
Nev.	-	-	6	-	P. Rico	3	-	3	-
N. H.	6	-	2	-	C. Zone	2	-	-	-
					TOTAL	427	8	540 $\frac{1}{2}$	49 $\frac{1}{2}$

Scattered votes:

Owen: Mass. 2, Mo. 1, Nebr. 9, Okla. 20, S. D. 1, Philip. 1.
 Colby: Mass. 1.
 Clark: Mo. 2.
 Glass: Va. 24.
 Cummings: Colo. 1, Conn. 1, La. 1.

FORTY-THIRD BALLOT

State	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	Davis	State	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	Davis
Ala.	10	-	11	3	N. J.	-	-	28	-
Ariz.	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	N. M.	6	-	-	-
Ark.	3	-	15	-	N. Y.	20	-	70	-
Calif.	14	-	12	-	N. C.	23	-	-	1
Colo.	4	-	7	-	N. D.	8	-	2	-
Conn.	2	-	11	-	Ohio	-	-	48	-
Del.	4	-	2	-	Okla.	-	-	-	-
Fla.	3	-	9	-	Ore.	10	-	-	-
Ga.	-	-	28	-	Pa.	47	7	17	3
Idaho	8	-	-	-	R. I.	1	-	9	-
Ill.	17	-	40	1	S. C.	18	-	-	-
Ind.	10	-	20	-	S. D.	3	-	5	-
Iowa	-	-	26	-	Tenn.	-	-	-	24
Kansas	20	-	-	-	Texas	40	-	-	-
Ky.	3	-	23	-	Utah	8	-	-	-
La.	-	-	20	-	Vt.	4	-	4	-
Maine	12	-	-	-	Va.	4	-	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	4
Md.	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	Wash.	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	7	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
Mass.	2	-	30	1	W. Va.	-	-	-	16
Mich.	14	-	16	-	Wisc.	19	-	7	-
Minn.	15	-	8	-	Wyo.	3	-	3	-
Miss.	-	-	20	-	Alaska	2	-	4	-
Mo.	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	D. C.	-	-	6	-
Mont.	5	-	3	-	Hawaii	1	-	5	-
Nebr.	3	-	4	-	Philip.	3	-	2	-
Nev.	-	-	6	-	P. Rico	1	-	3	2
N. H.	6	-	2	-	C. Zone	2	-	-	-
					TOTAL	412	7	568	57 $\frac{1}{2}$

Scattered votes:

Colby: Mass. 1.

Owen: Mass. 2, Mo. 1, Nebr. 9, Okla. 20, S. D. 1, Philip. 1.

Clark: Mo. 2

Glass: Va. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$.

Cummings: Colo. 1, Conn. 1.

FORTY-FOURTH BALLOT

State	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	Davis	State	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	Davis
Ala.	8	-	13	3	N. J.	-	-	28	-
Ariz.	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	N. M.	6	-	-	-
Ark.	-	-	18	-	N. Y.	20	-	70	-
Calif.	13	-	13	-	N. C.	24	-	-	-
Colo.	3	-	9	-	N. D.	4	-	2	-
Conn.	2	-	12	-	Ohio	-	-	48	-
Del.	3	-	3	-	Okla.	-	-	-	-
Fla.	-	-	12	-	Ore.	10	-	-	-
Ga.	-	-	28	-	Pa.	4	1	68	2
Idaho	8	-	-	-	R. I.	1	-	9	-
Ill.	13	-	44	1	S. C.	18	-	-	-
Ind.	-	-	30	-	S. D.	3	-	5	-
Iowa	-	-	26	-	Tenn.	-	-	-	24
Kansas	20	-	-	-	Texas	40	-	-	-
Ky.	-	-	26	-	Utah	7	-	1	-
La.	-	-	20	-	Vt.	-	-	8	-
Maine	5	-	5	-	Va.	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$
Md.	-	-	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	Wash.	-	-	13	1
Mass.	-	-	35	-	W. Va.	-	-	-	16
Mich.	-	-	-	-	Wisc.	3	-	23	-
Minn.	15	-	8	-	Wyo.	3	-	3	-
Miss.	-	-	20	-	Alaska	-	-	6	-
Mo.	17	-	18	-	D. C.	-	-	6	-
Mont.	2	-	6	-	Hawaii	-	-	6	-
Nebr.	2	-	5	-	Philip.	2	-	4	-
Nev.	-	-	6	-	P. Rico	1	-	5	-
N. H.	6	-	2	-	C. Zone	2	-	-	-
					TOTAL	270	1	699 $\frac{1}{2}$	52

Scattered votes:

Colby: Mass. 1.

Owen: Nebr. 9, N. D. 4, Okla. 20, S. D. 1.

Glass: Va. 1 $\frac{1}{2}$.

APPENDIX II

BALLOTS OF MACHINE OR BLOC STATES

	36			37			38		
	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox
N. Y.	20	-	70	20	-	70	20	-	70
Ill.	16	10	30	16	2	38	16	2	38
Mass.	1	19	13	1	19	15	1	19	14
Ind.	29	-	1	29	-	1	29	-	1
N. J.	-	-	28	-	-	28	-	-	28
	<u>66</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>142</u>	<u>66</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>152</u>	<u>66</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>151</u>
		39			40			41	
N. Y.	20	-	70	20	-	70	20	-	70
Ill.	18	-	38	16	-	44	17	-	40
Mass.	1	-	33	1	-	32	1	-	30
Ind.	11	-	19	11	-	19	11	-	10
N. J.	-	-	28	-	-	28	-	-	28
	<u>50</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>188</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>190</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>187</u>
		42			43			44	
N. Y.	20	-	70	20	-	70	20	-	70
Ill.	17	-	40	17	-	40	13	-	44
Mass.	2	-	30	2	-	30	-	-	35
Ind.	11	-	19	10	-	20	-	-	30
N. J.	-	-	28	-	-	28	-	-	28
	<u>50</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>187</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>188</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>207</u>

APPENDIX III

VOTE ON BOURKE COCHRAN'S PLATFORM AMENDMENT

FOR A WET PLANK¹

STATE	YEAS	NAYS	STATE	YEAS	NAYS
Alabama	-	24	New Jersey*	28	-
Arizona	2	4	New Mexico	-	6
Arkansas	-	18	New York*	78	12
California	5	21	North Carolina	-	24
Colorado	-	12	North Dakota	-	10
Connecticut*	13	1	Ohio*	28	20
Delaware	-	6	Oklahoma	-	20
Florida	1	11	Oregon	1	9
Georgia	-	28	Pennsylvania*	44	32
Idaho	-	8	Rhode Island*	7	3
Illinois*	37	21	South Carolina	-	18
Indiana	4	26	South Dakota	2	8
Iowa	3	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	Tennessee	-	24
Kansas	-	20	Texas	-	40
Kentucky	1	25	Utah	-	8
Louisiana	1	19	Vermont*	7	1
Maine	1	11	Virginia	1	23
Maryland*	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	Washington	-	14
Massachusetts*	33	3	West Virginia	3	13
Michigan	2	26	Wisconsin	7	19
Minnesota	3	20	Wyoming	-	6
Mississippi	-	20	Alaska*	4	2
Missouri	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	23 $\frac{1}{2}$	Dist. of Col.	3	2
Montana	3	5	Hawaii*	6	-
Nebraska	3	13	Philippines	-	6
Nevada	-	6	Puerto Rico	-	6
New Hampshire	-	8	Panama Canal Zo.	-	2
			TOTAL	356	726 $\frac{1}{2}$

¹Official Report, pp. 259-60. The asterisk (*) indicates states which voted predominantly in favor of the wet plank. See Appendix IV.

APPENDIX IV

BALLOTS OF STATES WHICH VOTED FOR WET PLANK

	Ballot 36			Ballot 37			Ballot 38		
	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox
Conn.	1	5	6	1	5	6	1	5	6
Ill.	16	10	30	16	2	38	16	2	38
Md.	5½	-	8½	5½	-	8½	5½	-	8½
Mass.	1	19	15	1	19	15	1	19	14
N. J.	-	-	28	-	-	28	-	-	28
N. Y.	20	-	70	20	-	70	20	-	70
Ohio	-	-	48	-	-	48	-	-	48
Pa.	2	73	1	1	74	-	2	74	-
R. I.	3	3	4	2	4	4	-	3	7
Vt.	3	2	3	3	2	3	3	2	3
Alaska	2	3	1	-	-	-	2	3	1
Hawaii	1	-	6	1	-	5	1	-	5
	<u>54½</u>	<u>115</u>	<u>217½</u>	<u>50½</u>	<u>106</u>	<u>225½</u>	<u>51½</u>	<u>108</u>	<u>228½</u>

	Ballot 39			Ballot 40			Ballot 41		
	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox
Conn.	3	-	10	2	-	11	2	-	11
Ill.	18	-	38	16	-	41	17	-	40
Md.	5½	-	8½	5½	-	8½	5½	-	8½
Mass.	1	-	33	1	-	32	1	-	30
N. J.	-	-	28	-	-	28	-	-	28
N. Y.	20	-	70	20	-	70	20	-	70
Ohio	-	-	48	-	-	48	-	-	48
Pa.	2	73	1	42	18	12	46	11	14
R. I.	1	-	7	1	-	8	1	-	8
Vt.	4	-	4	4	-	4	4	-	4
Alaska	4	-	2	2	-	4	2	-	4
Hawaii	-	-	5	1	-	5	1	-	5
	<u>59½</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>254½</u>	<u>94½</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>271½</u>	<u>99½</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>270½</u>

Ballot 42

Ballot 43

Ballot 44

	Ballot 42			Ballot 43			Ballot 44		
	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox	McAdoo	Palmer	Cox
Conn.	2	-	11	2	-	11	2	-	12
Ill.	17	-	40	17	1	40	13	-	44
Md.	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	-	13 $\frac{1}{2}$
Mass.	2	-	30	2	-	30	-	-	35
N. J.	-	-	28	-	-	28	-	-	28
N. Y.	20	-	70	20	-	70	20	-	70
Ohio	-	-	48	-	-	48	-	-	48
Pa.	49	8	14	47	7	17	4	1	68
R. I.	1	-	8	1	-	9	1	-	9
Vt.	4	-	4	4	-	4	-	-	8
Alaska	2	-	4	2	-	4	-	-	6
Hawaii	1	-	5	1	-	5	1	-	5
	<u>103$\frac{1}{2}$</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>270$\frac{1}{2}$</u>	<u>101$\frac{1}{2}$</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>274$\frac{1}{2}$</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>346$\frac{1}{2}$</u>


APPENDIX V

GRAPH INDICATING THE
VOTES CAST FOR THE FIVE PRINCIPLE^{AL}~~PLE~~ CANDIDATES

PLUS

THE COMBINED VOTE OF ALL DARKHORSES

BALLOT NUMBER



APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Charles J. Werling has been read and approved by three members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

6/17/65.

Date

Robert W. Mc Clugger

Signature of Adviser