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MARX' THEORY OF SOCIAL CLASSES IN VIEW OF THE
POLISH WORKERS' MOVEMENT AFTER WORLD WAR II

by

Wladyslaw Majkowski

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

May

1982

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VITA

The author, Wladyslaw Majkowski, is the son of Stanislaw Majkowski and Josephine (Raszewski). He was born on May 9, 1944 in Kasinka Mala, Poland.

His elementary education was obtained in the public school of Kasinka Mala and secondary education at the First High School of General Education in Tarnow. He received his high school diploma from the Ninth School of General Education in Karkow (Nowa Huta) after having passed a high school test in 1962.

In October, 1962, he entered the Sacred Heart Seminary in Krakow. In 1968, he was ordained a Catholic priest. During the next four years (1968-1972) he worked as an assistant pastor at the Sacred Heart Parish in Krakow. During that time he also taught Ethics to high school youth.

In the fall of 1972, he entered the Gregorian University in Rome. Three years later he received a Master's Degree of Philosophy with a major in Sociology. In the same year he entered the Urbanian University in Rome. He graduated one year later receiving a Master's Degree in Philosophy with a major in Philosophical Anthropology.

In September 1976, he undertook a course in English at the University of Denver. One year later he entered the Graduate School of Loyola University in Chicago seeking a Doctorate Degree in Sociology.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- "Capital" - C
- "The Civil War in France" - CWF
- "Class Struggles in France" - CSF
- "The Communist Manifesto" - CM
- "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law" - CCHPHL
- "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" - CCPE
- "Critique of the Gotha Program" - CGP
- "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts" - EPHM
- "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" - EBLB
- "The German Ideology" - GI
- "Grundrisse" - G
- "The Holy Family" - HF
- "On the Jewish Question" - JQ
- "Poverty of Philosophy" - PPH

INTRODUCTION

The main intent of Marx' writings was to explain social change throughout the centuries and to discover its laws. Particularly, Marx was interested in explaining nineteenth century British capitalist society. Based on his findings, Marx made several predictions regarding the future development of societies.

Marx built his theory of class and social change with the following assumptions:

(1) The modes of production or the ways in which the people produce and distribute the means of sustaining their lives account for class formation in a society.

(2) The mode of production is not only an independent variable, but in the last instance it asserts by itself.

(3) There is a continuous change in the forces of production; forces of production are constituted by people and their instruments of work.

The social structure of a society has its source in the way in which the society produces goods to satisfy the basic human needs of food, clothing and shelter. There are two main ways in which economic production can be carried out: (1) through an economic system in which the means of production are private, and (2) through the nationalized means of production. In a society where the means of production are private and especially where the production takes the form of commodity production for profit (this is the case in advanced societies), one can

can distinguish between those who are the owners of the means of production (capitalists) and those who do not own it (proletarians).

Possession of or exclusion from the ownership of the means of production are the two opposite poles in relation to the means of production.

In order to produce, the owners of the means of production buy human labor from those who do not possess the means of production. The process of buying human labor by capitalists brings about a conflict of interests between these two classes of people. While the owners of the means of production are interested in paying as little as possible to the workers for their jobs, the workers on the contrary are interested in getting as much as possible. The irreconciliability of the economic interests lies in the fact that the value of the final product is constant, and so the more profit the owner of the means of production makes, the lower the workers' wages. Vice versa, if the workers' wages are higher, the owner's profits are lower. So, the surplus value which is created exclusively by the human labor during the production process, is thus split between the capitalist and the worker. In other words, the working day of a worker is divided into two parts: one part goes to a worker as a necessary means of his subsistence, the other is taken by a capitalist. The proportion of the surplus value taken by a capitalist to the entire surplus created by a worker is a measure of the exploitation of the workers by capitalists or a measure of the exploitation of human labor by capital.

The owners of the means of production are always a minority in society but they constitute a ruling class because the control of the

means of production brings about political control in society. The ruling class of a given society also controls the spiritual life of that society.

Social change occurs where there is a conflict of the opposites: cold and hot, darkness and light, reactionary and revolutionary . . . In more general terms, an established reality (called by Marx "thesis") is opposed by a new reality ("antithesis"). Conflict of the opposites is a consequence of the negation of a thesis by its antithesis and the result of this conflict is a new reality ("synthesis"). In terms of social reality, Marx saw the capitalist class as a reactionary class (thesis) to which a new revolutionary class, the proletariat (anti-thesis) was opposed. There was an inevitable conflict between these two classes of which the revolution is a climax. The new postrevolutionary reality is a new social system in which the proletariat now plays the role of the ruling class (synthesis).

In Marx' view, the societies pass through several necessary stages of social development which are nothing but different levels of development of the forces of production (Marx, 1975, I: 612-774; Marx-Engels, 1978: 42-57; Marx-Engels, 1979: 21). The first stage is Primitive Communism, characterized by the absence of the private means of production and the lack of the division of labor. The second is Asiatic Society, in which the State assumes some important roles and property is not privately owned. Marx called the third stage the Antique Community. Its main characteristic is the rise of private property and the institution of slavery. The Feudal Society, which is the next step in the development of the societies gave rise to the system of feudal vassals

in a country and of handicraft in the cities. Modern technology and a further division of labor accounted for the rise of the capitalist society. A fully developed capitalism implies a complete separation of the direct producers from their instruments of work. The increasing conflict between the proletariat and the capitalist class will end in the revolution which will bring about the last stage in social development which is an advanced communism. The main characteristic of communist society is its classless character, the lack of class conflict, and the end of the division of labor.

These are essential stages in social change and the societies can hardly escape them. The process itself, however, can be accelerated by using the means which foster a maturation of class consciousness. This is especially important during the transition from capitalism to socialism. It is, therefore, by no means accidental that Marxism inspired the main stream of the nineteenth century Left in the Western Europe. But Marx not only created a theoretical basis for these movements, he was also personally involved in the great events of the workers' organization in Western Europe during the second half of the last century.

On the basis of his theory, Marx made several predictions regarding the future of societies. First, he foresaw a social revolution in economically advanced England. According to him, the revolution can take place only when the capitalism reaches its climax. Second, the nationalization of the means of production would bring about a classless society because everybody would be in the same relation to the means of production. Third, the communist society, as envisioned by Marx, would be a non-conflictual society because there would be no basis for class

conflict. Finally, the private means of production would disappear together with the division of labor. The division of labor is inseparably linked to private property.

History has contradicted Marx' first prediction regarding the place of the proletarian revolution which took place not in economically advanced England, but in backward Russia. The purpose of this paper is to test Marx' theory of class, and connected with that, class conflict. There are, however, two reasons why it is extremely difficult to empirically prove or disprove Marx' theory of class. The first is its vagueness and generality. In fact, Marx used a notion of class which was widely employed by historians and social theorists at the middle of the nineteenth century. Marx himself was mostly concerned to fit this notion into the wider framework of his theory of social change in the analysis of the social development of societies in general and the rise of capitalism in particular. The second reason is the lack of a systematic account for his theory of class. Although it may be reasonably said that everything Marx wrote was in some way connected with the problem of class, his writings do not elaborate a coherent exposition of class theory.

During Marx' lifetime no country had abolished the right to possess large private property or had nationalized private means of production. This only happened in Russia thirty-four years after Marx' death, and six decades after his death in the Eastern European countries. This new socio-economic reality could constitute a test for Marx' class theory. Are these societies classless after having nationalized the means of production? If they are, in what sense? Or maybe a new power

structure has brought about a new, previously unknown class system?

There have been many sociologists who have tried to answer these questions. They range from those who deny the existence of the class system in state socialist societies to those who maintain that the Peoples' Democracies are class societies. The so-called orthodox Marxists of Russia and of the Eastern European countries, where Marxism is an official state ideology, follow Marx' class theory of class and class conflict rather literally. In consequence they take for granted the disappearance of classes and class conflict after the nationalization of the means of production. Even if these sociologists do not deny the existence of different "strata," they, however, insist that these differences are rooted in "nongenerating" class factors such as the difference between the lifestyle in the city and village; between physical and mental work, and in historically rooted differences.

There are also some Western sociologists who came to the same conclusion that the state-run societies are classless. Aron (1950; 1969) and Feldmesser (1961) are among the best known. Even if they believe that the state-run society is classless, they came to that conclusion using totally different arguments from those of the orthodox Marxists. For Aron the state-run societies are classless because the powerful elite prevents any organized opposition and therefore the formation of other classes. Thus this type of society is a one-class society. Feldmesser's argument is similar. But while Aron stresses the role of the power elite in preventing the formation of classes, Feldmesser links this role to a police-state which prevents the individuals and groups from forming opposition.

Djilas (1957; 1969), with his theory of "new class," represents the opposite pole of these theories. According to him, after the nationalization of the means of production, the "new class," power elite has been created which controls the nationalized means of production and the distribution of GNP. State-run societies are thus two-class societies with the "new class" as a ruling class constituted by the Party people, and the vast majority of non-Party people.

Parkin (1969; 1971) and Giddens (1975) take an intermediate position. In their views, it is the point of view of analyzing class structure in these societies that is important. Close to these authors is Ossowski (1963) who comes with the concept of "nonegalitarian classlessness" in the State-run societies.

Finally, Dahrendorf (1959) elaborates the theory of class in the "post-industrial" societies which is based on authority relations in the "imperatively coordinated associations." Possession of or exclusion from authority brings about a dichotomous class structure of those who "command" and those who are "subordinated." The theory may equally apply to both capitalist or socialist societies unless they enter the post-industrial stage of development.

This paper also undertakes the problem of class in the Soviet-type societies. The emphasis is posed on the utility of Marx' class theory for the analysis of class structure and class conflict in the State-run societies.

The case study of this paper is the Polish postwar social, political, and economic reality with a special attention paid to the structural conflict in Poland. The analysis will concentrate mainly on four Polish

workers' upheavals, namely in July, 1956, in Poznan; in December, 1970, in the northern cities of the Baltic Sea coast; in June, 1976, in Radom and Ursus; and in August, 1980, first in Gdansk and later on, practically in the entire country. Special attention is given to the factors which brought about the insurrections. To do this, Smelser's value-added method of the analysis of the social movements will be used. The data will consist of the State's official data reported by GUS (Poland's Main Statistical Office), by the Polish sociologists and economists. To procure a critical view of these data, they will be compared with more impartial data reported by foreign books, periodicals, and newspapers. Additionally, there are included six interviews with several Polish personalities who in some way or other were involved in the opposition to the State, including an interview with Lech Walesa, the chairman of the Workers' Strike Committee and the Chairman of the Free Trade Union, founded after the 1980 strikes. The purpose of these interviews is illustrative. The analysis itself is based mainly on the official State's statistical data and the data reported by socio-economic empirical studies. The method employed by this study is imposed by the character of the research itself which is an historical case study. There will be analyzed the circumstances surrounding the insurrections, their causes, protagonists, and the ways in which the power elite came about controlling them. Attention will be given also to the comparative position of the blue-collar workers and other classes in terms of their respective roles in the insurrections and their position in terms of social structure.

The paper is composed of four parts. Part One presents an exten-

sive discussion of Marx' theory of class and class conflict and a much briefer exposition of post-Marx' theories of social class and class conflict regarding mainly the Soviet-type socialist societies, namely views of Milovan Djilas, Ralph Dahrendorf, Frank Parkin, Raymond Aron, and Robert Feldmesser.

Part Two discusses the main aspects of social, political and economic changes in Poland after World War II. In that context the role the Communist Party plays in the communist regimes will be discussed.

Part Three will analyze the Polish workers' upheavals which took place under the communist regime. The insurrections will be considered as the manifestations of the structural conflict in Poland.

Finally, out of these, Part Four will propose alternative class and class conflict theories in the Soviet-type socialist societies. The analysis will identify the key variables accounting for class structure in so-called People's Democracies and the basis for class conflict in these societies.

P A R T O N E

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

CHAPTER I

MARX' VIEW OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

As during the First International of the Communist Parties there were several disagreements among the representatives of different Leftist schools (reformists, revolutionary anarchists, Proudhonists, Blanquist-ists, Marxists . . .), similarly there are several schools of Marxism today: French, German, Russian, and others. Even though each of these schools originated from Marx' teaching, they have deviated visibly from their ancestor. While the French school never freed itself from the utopian socialism of Fourier and Proudhon, Russians shifted toward the voluntarism of Lenin, and Germans started to elaborate Marx' theory to strengthen it with more explanatory power. All these schools came from Marx' social theory and all constitute, in some way or other, Marxian heritage; none of them, however, can claim to have preserved its purity. Marx himself was supposed to say: "One thing is certain: I am not a Marxist."¹ To avoid such a misunderstanding, this study of Marx is primarily based on his writings. It intends to test Marx' theory of class in view of the post-World War II Polish socio-economic reality with a special emphasis on the Polish workers' insurrections during that period.

Historical Materialism

To adequately grasp the concept of class in the Marxian sense, one

¹Reported by Milovan Djilas, The New Class (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1957), p. 4

must keep in mind the following essentials of that scheme: (1) the class system is rooted in the economic system or modes of production in any given society; (2) control over the instruments of production makes possible control over the people; (3) economic power brings about political power in a society; (4) the relationship between capitalists and wage-laborers always have an antagonistic character. This conceptual scheme might be diagrammed as follows:




Figure 1

Marx' Model of Social Classes

Basic Concepts

The "modes of production," as Marx uses the term, comprise the various ways in which people produce and distribute the means needed to sustain their lives. Primum vivere deinde philosophari, says the Roman adage. To think man has to live; to live he has to eat; but to eat man

must produce. The satisfaction of the people's vital needs does not of itself determine the structure of society, but is merely a presupposition of such a structure.

The mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of expressing their lives, a definite form of life on their part. As individuals express their lives, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce.²

So it is not merely people's appropriation of nature to satisfy their needs which determines social structure and social change, but the economic system or the manner of such an appropriation and the manner of production which Marx called the forces of production.

Forces of production are constituted by instruments and people. "How far the productive forces of a nation are developed is shown most manifestly by the degree to which the division of labor has been carried. Each new productive force already known . . . , causes a further development of the division of labor."³ In the productive process man links all his energies (physical and spiritual) to his tools and natural energies. By changing his tools man not only subordinates nature, develops his society, but also creates history.

History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which exploits the materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in com-

² Karl Marx, German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1978), p. 42.

³ Ibid., p. 43.

pletely changed circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a completely changed activity.⁴

Any change in man's productive activity has its repercussions in his social relations, as well as in himself. In this way the development of production constitutes the primary and determining source of the development of the entire society.⁵

Also people's spiritual life increases and develops through the

⁴Karl Marx, *GI*, p. 57. Contrary to the idealistic philosophers, for whom "history like truth becomes a person apart, a metaphysical subject of which actual human individuals are merely bearers," for Marx, "history does nothing; it 'possesses no colossal riches', it 'fights no battles'! Rather it is man, actual and living, who does all this, who possesses and fights; 'history' does not use man as a means for its purposes as though it were a person apart; it is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his ends." Karl Marx, "The Holy Family," Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society by L. D. Easton and K. H. Guddat (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 375 and 385 respectively.

⁵Marx' economic interpretation of history has often been called, even by Marx himself, the materialistic interpretation. But--as Schumpeter points out--this is entirely meaningless because any empirical attempt to account for the historical process is equally "materialistic," and is compatible with metaphysical or even religious views. Marx' economic interpretation of history (according to Schumpeter) means two things: (1) "The forms or conditions of production are the fundamental determinant of social structures which in turn breed attitudes, actions and civilization," (2) "The forms of production themselves have a logic of their own: that is to say, they change according to necessities inherent in them so as to produce their successors merely by their own working." Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1975), p. 12.

Marx used the example of a mill to illustrate his position: a handmill creates a feudal society that is an economic and social reality in which this method of milling is absolutely necessary; a steam-mill, vice versa, gives rise to a totally new reality which is called capitalist society. "The windmill gives you a society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with industrial capitalist." Karl Marx, "The Poverty of Philosophy," Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1976), Vol. 6, p. 166.

process of material production in which they alter the objects to gratify their needs and so learn about the things and the laws governing them. By changing their material production, people also change their mentality which, in consequence, accounts for change in the product of their thinking.

Finally, through their material and spiritual production men create new conditions and new possibilities for the world of nature. They humanize nature, create a new world which would be impossible without their activities in nature. "He (man) opposes himself to nature as one of her own forces setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants."⁶ In the process of man's material activity, material and spiritual appropriation of nature takes place which puts nature in service of man.⁷

⁶Karl Marx, Capital (New York: International Publishers, 1979), Vol. 1, p. 177. Marx' orientation is highly anthropocentric. His humanism in comparison with the old humanisms overcomes the philosophical concept of "good life" of Aristotle and dichotomy of reason and sensibility of classical humanism. Instead, he put man with his productive activity in the center of interest. Cf. Donald C. Hodges, "Marx's Contribution to Humanism," Science and Society 29 (1965), pp. 173-191. See also George Markus, "Marxist Humanism," Science and Society 30 (1965), pp. 275-287; Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (New York: F. Ungar, 1961). According to Chamberlain, even "atheism for Marx is theoretical humanism." Gary L. Chamberlain, "The Man Marx Made," Science and Society 27 (1963), p. 310.

⁷Ljubomir Zivkovic, "The Structure of Marxist Sociology," Marxism and Sociology by P. Berger (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1965), p. 110.

The relation of priority of the sphere of material production over the mental production is expressed by the categories of the base and superstructure. The forms of production, and consequently appropriation of the fruits of human labor, determine the political, religious and

Forces of production are constituted by the means of production and by the people who take part in the productive process. The means of

spiritual life. In other words, politics, religious morality, ideology, customs, every-day life--even if they are objective and real--they, like other social activities, are determined by the economic structure of society. This is because a social being does not exist in an abstract, philosophical form, but in concrete social form.

The direction of influence between base and superstructure hardly can escape to be characterized as materialistic determinism. Marx subordinated the whole mental, religious, moral, and spiritual life to the sphere of material production. "The mode of production in material life determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness." Karl Marx, "A contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," The Marx-Engles Reader by R. C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1972), p. 4 (Introduction). This is much more than to say that material production has a "logic of its own" to use Schumpeter's expression. The form of production accounts not only for the changes in the superstructure, but even for the rise or death of some aspects of the superstructure, e.g., religion. This deterministic position Bober calls "substitution of plausible simplicity for complex totalities." M. M. Bober, Karl Marx's Interpretation of History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 319. Feuer criticizes Marx for the tendency "to underestimate the psychological complexities of human beings." Lewis Feuer, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy: Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels (New York: Garden City, 1959), p. XIV (Introduction). Hook talks about inadequacy of historical materialism because of ". . . disregard of the enormous influence which political, national and moral forces have exerted on the development of capitalism as an economic system." Sidney Hook, Marx and the Marxists: The Ambiguous Legacy (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1958). Kolakowski admits that relative independence of the superstructure, reciprocal influence between base and superstructure, the role of tradition can be fitted in the historical materialism, but only because "the doctrine is so imprecise that no historical investigation and no imaginable facts can refute it." Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), Vol. 1, p. 367.

M. Needleman and C. Needleman advocate Marx's multicausal solutions. According to these authors, Marx was misinterpreted mainly because of his style. Martin Needleman and Carolyn Needleman. "Marx and the Problem of Causation," Science and Society 33 (1969), pp. 322-339. This, however, can hardly be maintained because Marx was more than clever in writing to express himself in an understandable way. Additionally, the authors base their arguments on the sources of secondary importance.

production are not merely the instruments used in the production but also the work plant, raw materials, land . . . that is, all elements which enter into the manufacture of the final product.

Man, however, does not produce separately from other men. He collaborates with them. Doing so, he enters into two-dimensional relations of production. First, he is related to the instruments or tools he uses in the productive process. Second, he is related to others who participate in the same productive process. The relations of production constitute then, the organization of the division of labor through which people participate in the material production in a particular historical time.

The relations of production depend upon the way it is controlled, i.e., by ownership of production. Collective ownership of the means of production brings about a classless society in which each person's relations to the means of production are similar. Private control (ownership) of the means of production gives rise to a class society in which a small minority of owners appropriate the fruits of production and doing so, they exploit the large majority deprived of such a control.

For Kelle historical materialism is not only acceptable, but the author sees in it the solution of all social problems and a panacea for virtually any theoretical difficulty. Historical materialism enables a scientist to detect all stages of the historical development of societies, to perceive casual and chronological interconnections of the elements, to perform a scientific analysis of social processes, social change and culture. Cf. Wladyslaw Kelle "Marks i wspolczesne problemy teorii procesu historycznego," Czlowiek i Swiatopoglad 10 (1976), p. 38. This nothing but a summary of the official position on Marx' teaching in Russia and her satellites.

In this way "society is divided into rich and poor."⁸ It cannot be otherwise, because this is a necessary consequence of the private control of the means of production.

The worker's propertylessness, and the ownership of living labor by objectified labor, or the appropriation of alien labor by capital--both merely expressions of the same relation from opposite poles--are fundamental conditions of the bourgeois mode of production, in no way accidents irrelevant to it. These modes of distribution are the relations of production themselves, but sub-specie distributionis.⁹

Increased private ownership of the means of production has always been accompanied by the division of labor.¹⁰ Especially in "complex societies the relations of production take the form of a division of labor which places people into categories or groups according to their

⁸Maurice Cornforth, Historical Materialism (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 59.

⁹Karl Marx, Grundrisse (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 832.

¹⁰For Durkheim, division of labor along with increase of population density, are the causes of the transition from the mechanical to the organic solidarity. It is dynamic density which increases the struggle for existence to produce a complex division of labor. In Durkheim's sociology, division of labor is rather a natural process with no moral connotation. Cf. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: The Free Press, 1964).

In Marx' view, division of labor has always been connected with private property (private ownership of the means of production) and exploitation process. It brings about "the unequal distribution, both quantitative and qualitative, of labor products, hence property." Karl Marx, *GI*, p. 52. The reason is that "as soon as the distribution of labor comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood." Karl Marx, *GI*, p. 53.

Finally, division of labor brings about the contradiction between individual and community and between city and village. Only communist society, that is, a society where there is only a public control of the

role in the productive enterprise."¹¹ These categories are called social classes. Structured society tends to have a dichotomous character: a class which possesses the means of production and a class excluded from the ownership of the means of production. Freeman and slaves, patricians and plebeians, lords and serfs, guild-masters and journeymen are the examples of the contending classes in different historical epochs.¹²

Stages in the Development of the Forces of Production

Every society passes through the same historical process of development which consists of many different levels of the division of labor, and corresponding to these levels, many different forms of ownership. In Marx' view, these stages are necessary, that is, inescapable steps in the process of the development.

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from

means of production, is a classless society which obliterates division of labor, wipes away social classes and overcomes all contradictions. "In a communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have in mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic." Karl Marx, *GI*, p. 53.

¹¹ Calvin J. Larson, Major Themes in Sociological Theory (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1954), p. 44.

¹² Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto (New York: International Publishers, 1979), p. 9.

the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.¹³

Primitive Community

The first stage of society's historical development is the primitive community. In this type of society there is no private property, no division of labor and, consequently, no classes. People live in extended families where the division of labor does not exceed natural biological differences. Nature itself provides for man the necessary means of subsistence. People of a primitive society live in an idyllic relation to earth; they consider themselves as its common owners.

Asiatic Society

This type of society is characterized by rising of the sedentary agriculture and by common ownership of land. At that level of development, the villagers are not yet the proprietors of the land; its ultimate owner is the State. The State provides for public works, especially irrigation and road construction. The communities are self sufficient with a high level of integration of agriculture and manufacture. There is no division into towns and villages, nor class conflict. According to Marx, "India offers us a sample chart of the most diverse forms of such economic communities, more or less dissolved, but still completely recognizable."¹⁴ Asiatic societies are "stagnant,

¹³ Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," The Marx-Engels Reader by R. C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1972), p. 437.

¹⁴ Karl Marx, G.P. 882.

unchanging, nondialectical, particularistic, and devoid of societal mechanism for change."¹⁵

Since the Asiatic society lacks private property, therefore it is deprived of change.¹⁶ We find there is no pressure for the emergency of a civil society.¹⁷ A stagnant asiatic society needs an external force to overcome the impasse. That force came through European colonialist expansion which brought about the dialectical conditions necessary for any social change.¹⁸

Ancient Community

Two important characteristics of this period should be stressed: the emergence of individual ownership of private property and the institution of slavery. The first characteristic resulted from historical and environmental factors. The more a natural tribal grouping is

¹⁵Sholmo Avineri, "Marx and Modernization," The Review of Politics 31 (1969), p. 181.

¹⁶Social change in Marx' view, is always connected with conflict and private property.

¹⁷For Marx "only under the reign of Christianity, which makes all national, natural, moral, and theoretical relationships external to man, was civil society able to separate itself completely from political life, sever all man's species, substitute egoism and selfish need for those ties, and dissolve the human world into a world of atomistic, mutually hostile individuals." Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society by L.C. Easton and K. H. Guddat (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967), p. 247.

¹⁸Even though colonialism was viewed by Marx as a precondition of modernization in the asiatic societies, he found no moral justification for it. Both capitalism and colonialism are necessities which, however, must be overcome. It will be accomplished through creation of the communist society.

affected by geographic migration, the more that tribe is exposed to new conditions which usually enhance an individual's power and creativity and reduce the collective character of the tribe. Thus conditions become more favorable for an individual to create private land ownership, that is, to acquire exclusive control of land to be cultivated only by him and his family. "With the development of private property, we find here for the first time the same conditions which we shall find again, only on a more extensive scale, with modern private property."¹⁹

Another new element of the ancient period was the emergence of slavery which disrupted the egalitarian system of the asiatic community. The use of slaves as labor power procured enormous wealth to a small minority of the ancient society. In consequence, the small land owners were forced to augment the number of the proletarians because they were not able to compete with wealthy patricians exploiting their slaves.

Finally, the invention of money as a means of exchange was very essential to that period. It sharply accelerated the exchange rate. The impasse and stagnation of the preceding period was overcome. The foundation of the class society has been laid.

Feudal Society

An important circumstance which made possible the transition from the ancient to the feudal society was the downfall of the Roman Empire. Exploited slaves expecting to become land owners welcomed the barbarians

¹⁹Karl Marx, *GI*, p. 44. The former asiatic social structure based on the communal ownership with the high degree of people's power "decays in the same measure as, in particular, immovable private property evolves." *Ibid.*, p. 44.

as their liberators. But the growth of the new era required some other factors which did not exist in the previous stages in general and the ancient society in particular. The first was a starting point of the new stage. While the ancient society started out from a small territory (a town), the feudal system of the Middle Ages started out from a large territory (a country). The population once living in small towns was scattered over the large area. The second factor was the change of ownership. During the feudal epoch there were established two chief forms of property ownership: the ownership of land with serfs as the direct producers chained to it and craft labor organized into guilds in towns. Each of these forms of ownership brought about different hierarchical structures. One structure established the feudal hierarchy of vassals with the king at the top; the urban structure contained a three-step hierarchy: master, journeyman and apprentice. The amount of production in both villages and towns was restricted. Feudals were not interested in investing any surplus produce, but spent it in making wars and in building castles and cathedrals. Similarly, in the cities, the slight division of labor could hardly give rise to a large-scale production. "Apart from the differentiation of princes, nobility, clergy and peasants in the country and masters, journeymen, apprentices and soon also rabble of casual laborers in the towns, no division of importance took place."²⁰ So, in Marx's view, "from these conditions, and the mode of organization

²⁰Karl Marx, GI, p. 46

of the conquest determined by them feudal property developed."²¹

Capitalist Society

The emergence of capitalist society was possible under two conditions: the first was the dissolution of the feudal structures, that is, the manorial system with its core of serfs and corresponding to it the craft labor of artisans in towns;²² the second was the loosening of energy caused by an increase of demand for commodities.²³ A new and more efficient form of production was necessary to meet this demand.

Only the capitalist production of commodities has become an epoch-making mode of exploitation, which, in the course of its historical development, revolutionizes, through the organization of the labor process and the enormous improvement of technique, the entire economic structure of society in a manner eclipsing all former epochs.²⁴

Referring to that, Shaw observes:

This type of production encourages the advance of the productive forces and provides a basis for simple commodity production and change. Although it is by no means geared primarily for exchange, the division of labor between town and city, and within both, requires it to a certain extent.²⁵

These changes, according to Marx, brought about what he calls

²¹Karl Marx, GI, p. 45.

²²Both of them were based on small-scale work relations.

²³"Meantime the market kept ever growing, the demand ever rising. Even manufacture no longer sufficed. Thereupon, steam and machinery revolutionized industrial production." Karl Marx, CM, p. 10.

²⁴Karl Marx, C, Vol. 2, p. 35.

²⁵W. H. Shaw, Marx's Theory of History (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1978), p. 143.

"primitive accumulation."²⁶ The word "primitive" does not mean less important but indicates only "the prehistoric stage of capital and of the mode of production corresponding to it."²⁷ The process itself is not simple or unilinear; it looks like a vicious circle. "The accumulation of capital presupposes surplus value; surplus value presupposes capitalistic production; capitalistic production presupposes the pre-existence of considerable masses of capital and of labor-power in the hands of producers of commodities."²⁸ This is why the primitive accumulation is "nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production."²⁹ The process started with the expropriation of the direct agricultural producers from their soil, and took different forms and intensity in different countries.³⁰

Capitalist Accumulation

Once the expropriation of rural population has been accomplished, the newly created proletarians were forced to look for new means of subsistence, but no longer in the rural areas. Peasants who had been

²⁶"The primitive accumulation plays in Political Economy about the same part as original sin in theology." Karl Marx, C. Vol. 1, p. 713.

²⁷Ibid., p. 715.

²⁸Ibid., p. 113.

²⁹Ibid., p. 714.

³⁰Marx limited himself to the studies of the expropriation process in England. He distinguished three phases of that process: the first took place in the fifteenth century when new nobility was expropriating the peasants from their lands to have more lands to convert them into pastures to produce more wool for the growing manufacture; in the sixth-

set free migrated to towns where the growth of manufacturing offered numerous job opportunities. With that, a new process of transforming the rural proletariat into an urban one was put into motion. Willingly or unwillingly people began to participate in the new productive system. "They were now transformed into material elements of variable capital."³¹ The peasants were previously producing the means of their own subsistence which they consumed by themselves, now everything became commodity: raw material, capital, labor power . . . New shops were built: some of them grew rapidly. Commerce and usury served as a means to enlarge the capital.

Another factor which accelerated capitalist development was the discovery of new lands, especially America.

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for commercial hunting of black skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production.³²

Similarly, the new banking system helped capitalist entrepreneurs in obtaining money and created a new class of finance aristocracy.

Additionally, the employment of children in factories lowered the cost of production and therefore augmented the profit of the capitalist.

teenth century Reformation expropriated the Catholic Church and converted its inmates into the proletariat, and finally, in the nineteenth century, the expropriation took the form of the so-called "clearing of cottages," that is, the expropriation of the peasants from their small lots. Cf. Karl Marx, C, Vol. 1, pp. 717-745.

³¹Karl Marx, C. Vol. 1, p. 745.

³²Ibid., p. 751.

"Many, many thousands of these little creatures were sent down into the north, being from the age of 7 to the age of 13 or 14 years old."³³

Also, by this time work in shifts has become a normal practice.³⁴

Finally, exploitation of weaker countries through the colonial system enormously fostered capitalistic accumulation. "Colonial system, public debts, heavy taxes, protection from commercial wars, these children of the true manufacturing period, increased gigantically during the infancy of Modern Industry. The birth of the latter is heralded by a great slaughter of the innocents,"³⁵

Fully developed capitalism implies complete separation of the direct producers from their means of production. "Capitalist production . . . reproduces . . . the class of wage laborers, into whom it transforms the vast majority of the direct producers."³⁶ It also requires a high level of concentration of capital. The first is a consequence of the second. "(The) expropriation is accomplished by the action of the

³³Karl Marx, C. Vol. 1, p. 758.

³⁴Marx refers to that fact in Capital: "It is a common tradition in Lancashire, that the beds never get cold." Ibid.

³⁵Karl Marx, C. Vol. 1, p. 757. Even the state has that purpose. The state for Marx is simply "the form of organization which the bourgeoisie necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests." Karl Marx, GI, p. 80. Cf. A. F. McGovern, "The Young Marx on the State," Science and Society 34 (1970), pp. 430-466.

³⁶Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 32.

immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the concentration of capital."³⁷

Toward Proletarian Dictatorship

Capitalism, according to Marx, is not a last stage in the development of the societies. . . A growing conflict of interests which brings about class struggle and the concentration of capital will destroy the capitalist system.

Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation: but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself.³⁸

This means that the seeds of communism are always present in the capitalist society.³⁹ In order to make possible a revolution it is necessary to wait a period of time for the maturation of the revolutionary consciousness.

In times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and

³⁷Karl Marx, C, Vol. 1, p. 763. Fully developed capitalistic production implies "concentration of the means of production in few hands, whereby they cease to appear as the property of the immediate laborers and turn into social production capacities . . .; organization of labor itself into social labor: through cooperation, division of labor, and the uniting of labor with the natural sciences . . ., and creation of the world market . . ." Karl Marx, C, Vol. 3, p. 266.

³⁸Karl Marx, C, Vol. 1, p. 763.

³⁹Conflict of interests and class struggle are not accidental to the capitalist society, rather, they lie at the very heart of the capi-

joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands.⁴⁰

Even though revolutions are not going to take place at the same time in different countries, this depends upon the level of the development of the forces of production and consequently, upon the level of class consciousness of the proletariat, communism is still an international affair. Abolition of capitalism will give rise to a classless society "in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."⁴¹

Figure 2 represents the historical process of the development of societies according to Marx, further elaborated by Melotti.⁴²

Forces of Production, Social Classes

If the concept of class is an essential component of every sociological theory, it is especially central in Marx' social theory, since everything Marx wrote was in some way related to the question of class. Curiously, however, Marx never elaborated a systematic theory of class. He never provided a formal definition of class. Moreover, Marx' termi-

talist system. Capitalism will not vanish because of its success, as Schumpeter says. It will do so because of its innermost defects.

⁴⁰Karl Marx, CM, p. 19.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 31.

⁴²V. Melotti, "Marx e il terzo mondo," Terzo mondo, September (1971), p. 27.




Figure 2

Historical Stages in the Development of the Societies
According to Marx

nology is ambiguous. He used such terms as "class," "stratum," "estate" as if they were interchangeable. Additionally, he applied the general concept of class to subclasses like "lumpenproletariat," "ideological class," i.e., to the groups of people which meet only some of the criteria of a class. However, Marx' writings contain many scattered fragments which may help readers to grasp what he meant by class.⁴³ Implicitly, Marx analyzed the problem of class in connection with his analysis of production, creation of surplus value, social change, division of labor, social conflict, exploitation, and alienation.

Basic Components of the Marxian Class Concept

Any social grouping must meet at least four criteria to constitute a social class in the Marxian sense: (1) individuals must be in the same relation to the means of production; (2) they must share the same life conditions; (3) they must have and define consciously their interests, and (4) they have to be politically organized.⁴⁴

Relation to the Means of Production

To Marx, the most important factor of social life is human work. To live, man must work. But to work he collaborates with others in

⁴³We find in Marx' writings, as Calvez points out, aspects of racial class theory (especially in his analysis of colonialism), its psychological aspect (when Marx makes analysis of class consciousness), the cultural aspect (when he was connecting ruling ideas with the ruling class, and finally, the most important--the economic aspect of social class. Cf. Jean-Yves Calves, La pensée de Karl Marx (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1956), pp. 197-203.

⁴⁴Cf. Michel Peillon, "Une stratégie sociologique pour l'étude de la structure de classe," Theory and Society 10 (1980), p. 7.

making his living. "The mode of production, once it is assumed to be general, carries in its wake an ever increasing division of social labor . . ."45 This collaboration assigns people to different positions in the productive process. Class, then, is constituted by "the function its members perform in the process of production."46 It is composed of the individuals who perform the same function in the organization of production or their respective functions in the economy. Class in the Marxian sense is not a cluster of occupations: "class and occupation occupy basically different theoretical spaces."47 Nor is it the source of income in the division of labor that accounts for class, but the relationship of grouping of individuals to the means of production. Other indices of class such as consumption, educational level, life-style, etc., are but consequences of the main criterion. Marx outlines two different types of relationship to the means of production: ownership of the means of production, and exclusion from the property ownership. Patricians, lords, bourgeois were characterized by the first type of the relationship; slaves, plebeians, journeymen and proletarians by the second.

In every type of class society, and especially in capitalism,

⁴⁵Karl Marx, C. Vol. 2, p. 33.

⁴⁶Reinhart Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, "Karl Marx's Theory of Social Classes," Class, Status, and Power by Reinhart Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 7.

⁴⁷Erik O. Wright, "Classes and Occupation," Theory and Society 9 (1980), p. 178.

there are two fundamental classes: a minority of the owners of the means of production and the others who do not own the means of production.⁴⁸ Control over the means of production brings about the control of distribution over the good produced: "The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and range."⁴⁹ It also brings about the control of the mental production of the society: "The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationship . . ."⁵⁰

The Sharing a Similar Lifestyle


Even though the amount of one's income is important, it does not automatically assign individuals to a given class. It is possible, at least theoretically, for two individuals to have similar incomes, even the same profession, and yet not belong to the same class. But again, this is only a negative requirement in the sense that all individuals of the same class share a similar lifestyle which does not yet account for a full class formation.⁵¹ If a group of people meets the requirement of

⁴⁸ Marx talks about the tendency of the "concentration of capital and land in a few hands." Karl Marx, CM, p. 34. The proletarians with no property constitute the misery pole. "The proletarian is without property." Ibid., p. 20.

⁴⁹ Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts," The Marx-Engels Reader by R. C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1972), p. 57.

⁵⁰ Karl Marx, GI. p. 64.

⁵¹ This is stressed by Marx on different occasions but especially when he talks about Lumpenproletariat and French peasants.



similar lifestyle it forms "a class in itself," but its members are still not aware of the antagonism towards the ruling class.

Large scale industry concentrates in one place a crowd of people unknown to one another . . . (but) the dominion of capital has created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class as against capital but not yet for itself. In the struggle ⁵² this mass becomes united, constitutes itself a class for itself.

Common Interests, Class Consciousness

Class becomes a class "for itself" only when its members become aware of their objectives, that is, their interests and their common enemies. This assertion answers two basic questions: who is the enemy, and why are they the enemy?

Class interests are not merely a sum of an individual's or even many people's interests.

And as in private life one distinguishes between what a man thinks and says of itself and what he really is and does, still more in historical struggles must one distinguish the phrases and fancies of the parties from their real organism and their real interests, their conception of themselves with their reality.⁵³

The object of class interests for two different classes is opposite. In capitalism, the immediate interest of the proletariat is the wage, that of the bourgeoisie, profit. While each class "needs" another to produce commodities, they are at the same time exclusive because of their conflictual interests. The opposite character of class interests stems from the capitalist production itself. "In a society where all products assume the form of commodities, these commodities must be

⁵² Karl Marx, "Poverty of Philosophy," Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1976), Vol. 6, pp. 210-211.

⁵³ Karl Marx, EBLB, p. 460.

sold after they have been produced, it is only after their sale that they can serve in satisfying the requirements of their producer."⁵⁴ The higher the wage paid to the worker, the lower the profit of the capitalist, i.e., the difference between the sale price of a commodity and the cost of its production.⁵⁵ Using Marx' terms then, we can say: production of a commodity is a process of increasing the surplus value in that commodity. This increase might be accomplished in two ways: by the prolongation of the working day or by decreasing the labor time necessary for the reproduction and maintaining of the labor power. Surplus value produced by prolonging the working day Marx calls "an absolute surplus value" while the second type of surplus value is called "a relative surplus value."⁵⁶

The working day of a direct producer is always divided into two parts: one part goes for the reproduction (physical and mental) of the labor power;⁵⁷ the second takes the capitalist.⁵⁸ The proportion of

⁵⁴Karl Marx, C, Vol. 1, p. 169.

⁵⁵The minimum of wages is determined by the value of those means of subsistence that are physically indispensable for maintaining of a laborer. Ibid., p. 173.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 315.

⁵⁷Marx calls it "a necessary labor time." Ibid., p. 217.

⁵⁸This portion of the working day is called by Marx "A surplus labor." Ibid., p. 217.

surplus labor to necessary labor is a measure of exploitation of labor power by capital.⁵⁹

When capital dominates labor power (when the direct producer is separated from his tools), his work becomes "a forced activity" which instead of fulfilling him induces him to exhaustion, despair, misery. . . . Homo faber externalizing himself in nature through his work finds the object of his activity as alien and oppressive power. It is this process of objectification that appears ". . . as a process of alienation from the standpoint of labor, and as appropriation of alien labor the standpoint of capital."⁶⁰

Thus, the conflictual interests (economic) of capitalists and the working class are the main source of all other opposite interests, especially political power. It has already been pointed out how the economic relations (control of the means of production) bring about unequal distribution of wealth in a society. Unequal distribution of political power is another important consequence of the authority relations in the sphere of production.

Opposite class interests cause class conflict. "The history of

59

Karl Marx, C, Vol. 1, p. 218.

60

Karl Marx, G, p. 831. Contrary to Hegel, who conceived alienation in terms of spirit, Marx "by linking alienation with economic and social structure," as Swingewood stresses, "grasped its historical character and argued that abolition of its cause, private property, within capitalism, will finally, liberate man in communism." Alan Swingewood, Marx and Modern Social Theory (Essex: The Anchor Press, Ltd., 1975), p. 91.

all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."⁶¹
 The protagonists of class conflict have varied through centuries, but the contending parts have always been oppressors and oppressed. "The contending classes are locked in a situation of domination and subjection from which there is no escape except through the total transformation of the mode of production."⁶² This is because "no social order ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it to have been developed and new higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society?"⁶³

Class conflict is not simply accidental to the capitalist system. It expresses the very innermost character of the system itself. Because of its contradictory character capitalism allows only a limited realization of the potential creativity which industrialization procured and capitalism made possible.

Class conflict is possible only if each of the opposing classes is aware of the interests and goals which conflict with those of the other class, i.e., when its individuals possess a sufficient degree of class consciousness. For that reason, Marx argued, the French peasants of the nineteenth century were not established as a class "for itself," nonetheless they shared similar life conditions:

⁶¹Karl Marx, CM, p. 9.

⁶²Ralph Miliband, Marxism and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 18.

⁶³Karl Marx, "A contribution to the Critique of the Political

In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that divide their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile contrast to the latter, they form class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no unity, no national and political organization, they do not form a class. They are completely incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention.⁶⁴

Class consciousness is not given but it develops, and grows. Consciousness as a social product also grows as proletariat increases in number and organizes itself as a political class. Among other important variables which would foster the maturation of class consciousness are the growing discrepancy between the wealthy and the poor, improvement in intercommunication between the individuals of the same class so that the new ideas can easily be disseminated, better understanding of the historic role of the class, and finally, an adequate leadership. The working class will emerge victorious because only the proletarian movement is really self-conscious.

Class Political Organization

Dividing the society into two struggling camps cannot be accomplished unless the contending parts have been politically organized. "The struggle of class against class is a political struggle."⁶⁵ If class struggle is a political struggle, the contending classes must be organized as the political parties. Marx taught in the same vein during

Economy," The Marx-Engels Reader by R.C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton and company, 1972), p. 51.

⁶⁴Karl Marx, EBLB, pp. 515-516.

⁶⁵Karl Marx, PPH, p. 211. On the next page Marx wrote: "Do not say

developing into a struggle for political power, was an inseparable part of the fight against economic exploitation."⁶⁶ Political organization of the proletariat is, therefore, not a matter of option, but the necessity to acquire desired discipline, unity and effectiveness, all the more that "the organization of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is continually being upset . . . by the competition between the workers themselves."⁶⁷ Despite all these difficulties, the proletariat will emerge as a victorious class.

Finally, in times when class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands.⁶⁸

It is not simply a matter of chance that neither Marx nor his followers have elaborated a formal definition of class in the Marxian sense. The difficulty arises from the Marxian theory itself; more specifically, from the generality and the ambiguity of its basic criterion of class formation (the ownership of the means of production or exclusion from it). Perhaps the best known definition of class in the Marxian sense is Lenin's. In Lenin's words,

that social movement excludes political movements." Ibid., p. 212.

⁶⁶ Julius Braunthal, History of the International (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), Vol. 1, p. 130.

⁶⁷ Karl Marx, CM, p. 18; cf. Karl Marx, C, Col. I, p. 763.

⁶⁸ Karl Marx, CM, p. 19.

. . . social classes are large groups of people which differ from each other by the place they occupy in a historically definite system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in laws) to the means of production, by their role in the social organization of labor, and consequently, by the dimensions of the wealth that they obtain and their method of acquiring their share of it.⁶⁹

This definition has two crucial components: the first stresses the fact that relations of production do not end in the relations to things, but also represent an exterior expression of relations among men in an economic productive process. The second component asserts that the difference in relation to the means of production causes the difference in the division of wealth and the national product.

Lenin's definition of class, however, does not include some other fundamental aspects of class in the Marxian sense; for example, the common lifestyle of the individuals who form a given class, their minimum necessary political organization, and most importantly, the class consciousness. For these reasons, Lenin's definition, even though somewhat useful cannot be fully valid. Instead of this, I propose another definition of class in the Marxian sense: class is a large group of individuals who are in the same historically established relation to the means of production, who share a similar lifestyle, possess common interests, spell them out consciously in opposition to the interests of the other contending class, and work for their realization through political organization.

⁶⁹Vladimir I. Lenin, "Wielka inicjatywa," Dziela Wspolne (Warszawa: PWN, 1956), Vol. 19, p. 415.

Classes in the Nineteenth
Century British Society

Only at the end of the third volume of Capital does Marx treat the problem of class more systematically. But the analysis has never been completed. The manuscripts were ended without being finished. The few passages we find there are surely the most important for this topic. From the third volume of Capital we learn that there were three classes in the nineteenth-century British society: landowners, wage laborers, and capitalists. A discovery of these three classes was in line with the first Marx criterion of class: the relation to the means of production--property and propertyless. Property has two different forms: land, which gives rise to the class of aristocracy; and capital, which creates the class of capitalists. Exclusion from property accounts for the rising of the proletariat.

Aristocracy was, in Marx' view, the most easily identifiable class. Its history reached back to the Medieval feudal period or even to the time of the Roman Empire. This class has been changing during the centuries but not to the point of losing its identity.

The proletarian class was as old as the ancient ruling classes. No other class has changed so often and so profoundly; initially ancient slaves, later plebeians, serfs, journeymen, and finally, the working class of the modern capitalism in hope of becoming a ruling class in the classless society of communism.

In trying to do more specific analysis of social classes, Marx faced insurmountable difficulties due to his theoretical model of class. Property after all, can assume different forms. We saw above, that this

was a reason for distinguishing between the capitalists and the aristocracy. But capital can also assume different forms: e.g., ownership of the factories or money. Marx refers to the first stratum as "milliocracy;" the second he calls "moneyocracy" or "finance aristocracy."⁷⁰

Even with this distinction the problem has not been solved. Marx had to assign a place in the structure to a rather large stratum of the British society--the intellectuals or intelligentsia. The dilemma was this: were the intellectuals capitalists (and if so, in what sense?), or did they belong to the proletarian class? To solve this problem we need to look at other writings of Marx. Intelligentsia: writers, journalists, professors, doctors, lawyers and priests are all "the ideological representatives and spokesmen of the bourgeoisie."⁷¹ As "the centralized State power, with its ubiquitous organs of a standing army, police, bureaucracy, clergy, and judicature-organs wrought after the plan of a systematic and hierarchic division of labor, originates from the days of absolute monarchy, serving nascent middle-class society as a mighty weapon in its struggles against feudalism,"⁷² so the intellectuals, whole intelligentsia and bourgeoisie stand forth as brothers, united by the same interests but specializing themselves on the field

⁷⁰ Karl Marx, "Class Struggle in France," Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1976), Vol. 10, p. 48. Talking about capitalist class Marx is often rough-spoken; he calls them "class of barbarians," Karl Marx, C, Vol. 3, p. 813. "class of parasites," *ibid.*, p. 545; murders: "One capitalist always kills many," *ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 763.

⁷¹ Karl Marx, CSF, p. 49.

⁷² Karl Marx, "Civil War in France," The Marx-Engels Reader by

work. The intelligentsia is an ideological class which is at capitalists service.⁷³

Marx also faced difficulties in analyzing the proletarian class. As the intelligentsia, this class was not homogeneous either. It was a part of "lumpenproletariat" that Marx called "a dangerous class," "a social scum," "passively rotting mass" composed of the lowest layers of old society.⁷⁴ Lumpenproletariat was a dangerous class because "its conditions of life prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue."⁷⁵ Lumpenproletariat did not hesitate to sell their services to the capitalists, who made use of them as strikebreakers and antirevolutionists. Elsewhere lumpenproletariat is considered "a recruiting ground for thieves and criminals of all kinds, living on the crumbs of society, people without a definite trade, gens sans feu et sans aveu."⁷⁶

Finally, Marx had somehow to deal with a large part of the nineteenth century society which hardly could fit into his scheme--the

R. C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 552.

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Such a solution is unjustified. It is historically incorrect to link intellectuals and intelligentsia with capitalist class as its supporters. French philosophers of the eighteenth century had inspired French revolutionists; Russian intelligentsia whole-heartedly opposed to the Tsarat and developed revolutionary attitudes of Mensheviks or even Bolsheviks; Polish intelligentsia protected and preserved Polish culture during 125 years last partition of Poland.

⁷⁴Karl Marx, CM, p. 20.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 20.

⁷⁶Karl Marx, CSF, p. 62.

middle and lower middle class, such as small manufacturers, shopkeepers, artisans.⁷⁷ In Marx' view, they were neither reactionary nor revolutionary.⁷⁸ Even though they were oriented towards the future, this class has no future. It was predestined to disappear. Like "the feudal lords were replaced by urban usurers . . . , and aristocratic landed property was replaced by bourgeois capital,"⁷⁹ so the middle class will be converted into proletariat to create a perfectly dichotomous society of capitalists and proletarians. But the social evolution does not stop there. After that polarizations, the turn will come for the capitalist class to be overcome by means of the proletarian revolution; when the classless society will be built, the proletariat itself will undergo a radical transformation into a community.

The vagueness of Marx's use of the concept of class constitutes the "crux" of Marxian class theory. Olleman calls it the "disorder" or Marxian class analysis. Marx, he observes, "cannot escape . . . the accusation of having a litter of standards for class membership and of changing them without prior warning."⁸⁰ Kozyr-Kowalski finds at least

⁷⁷ Marx calls them "petty bourgeoisie." Karl Marx, CSF, p. 49.

⁷⁸ "Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat; they thus defend not their present, but their future interests; they desert their own standpoint to adopt that of the proletariat. . ." Karl Marx, CM, p. 19.

⁷⁹ Karl Marx, EBLB, p. 518.

⁸⁰ Bertell Olleman, "Marx Use of 'Class'," American Journal of

eight criteria used by Marx on different occasions in his analysis of class.⁸¹ To avoid such difficulties, Blalyszewski suggests stressing the following characteristics of the Marxian model of class: direct connection between production--distribution and class, class as real groups and not only analytical categories, ideological and political differences as the consequence of the property relations differences, class conflict as a source of social change, and finally, the historical aspect of social classes.⁸² Wiatr wants to stress first the ideological inspirations which played an important role in Marx' analysis of class.⁸³

Whatever might be the differences among Marxists, it seems that on the basis of Marx' whole writings, we can depict the image of the capitalist society as it is diagramed on page 46.


Marx claimed that his theory of social change, with the theory of social class as its integral part, was universally valid in space and time. Explaining social change, and particularly changes in class structure during the centuries, as we have seen, he came to the conclusion that the private ownership of the means of production accounts for social class formation. The type of the private means of production is itself a

⁸¹Stanisław Kozyr-Kowalski, "Marksistowska teoria Klas i Warstw społecznych w świetle 'Kapitału' - Próba rekonstrukcji," Studia Socjologiczne 2 (1969), pp. 5-42.

⁸²Henryk Blalyszewski, "Funkcjonalny model struktury społecznej i jego krytyka," Problemy współczesnej socjologii by S. Widerszpil (Warszawa: PWN, 1970), p. 55.

⁸³Jerzy Wiatr, "Uwarstwienie społeczne a tendencje egalitarne," Kultura i Społeczeństwo 2 (1962), p. 34.

This position can hardly be maintained because it pushes analysis of



a source of different dichotomous class structures in different historical periods.

On the basis of this theory, Marx envisioned communist society arising after the nationalization of the means of production. The main characteristic of that society would be its classless character. Marx, however, did not have a chance to see his theory of class disappearance verified in his lifetime. No country had the means of production "socialized" prior to 1917. That happened for the first time in Russia in 1917, and in Eastern European countries, now called "the Peoples' Democracies" thirty years later. All these countries have their means of production nationalized, and even if there exists a small amount of class to the point where everything and nothing can be a social class.

private property, socialist countries differ significantly from capitalist countries where the private initiative and the possibility of inheriting property play an important role in class structure. Thus the nationalization of the means of production in these countries brings about a reality Marx envisioned: the abolition of private means of production. In the framework of the Marxian theory of class, one can logically assume the disappearance of a class system in the People's Democracies and with that the rise of societies free of structural conflict.

But a sociologist cannot take for granted that social stratification will automatically disappear following the abolition of the private means of production. This has to be proved. Similarly, it is not enough to say that in the socialist societies there "are no classes" in the Marxian sense because private ownership of the means of production has been abolished. One must see if there is any other patterned inequality perpetuating itself. If this is the case, one must identify the factors which account for such an inequality.

Several sociologists tried to answer these questions. There are among them so-called "orthodox" Marxist sociologists, who follow Marx' view rather literally. These are mainly the sociologists of the Eastern European countries where Marxism is an official state ideology. There are also several Western sociologists who addressed the matter of classes in State-run socialist societies. Their views will be presented in the following chapter.

CHAPTER II

PEOPLES' DEMOCRACIES CLASS OR CLASSLESS SOCIETIES? DIFFERENT VIEWS

Orthodox View of Class Structure in The State-run Socialist Societies

The abolition of the private means of production was for Marx a necessary condition for the solution of all economic and social problems and for the creation of a new, classless society. The proletarian revolution was intended as a turning point in the history of humanity, the laying of a foundation for a completely new social system. This, however, could happen only where the forces of production reached a necessary level of development. A highly developed capitalism creates such conditions.¹ Once this turning point has taken place, a new process is put into motion. Its end is a highly developed communist society, where there is no more "division of labor," where "labor is no longer merely a means of life but becomes life's principal need," when reigns the rule: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."²

¹It was the Russian revolution itself that contradicted this theory. In Marx' view, proletarian revolution was possible only in the stage of an advanced capitalism. For that reason Marx predicted revolution in economically developed England. But the revolution took place in backward Russia where capitalism was in its infancy.

²Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme (New York: International Publishers, 1938), p. 10.

Marx predicted the advent of the future classless society on the basis of his theory. Private ownership of the means of production or being denied such ownership account for the dichotomous structure in a class society. Advanced capitalism is the best example of such structure. Abolition of the private means of production would bring about a society without social classes. But Marx died before any society had nationalized private means of production. Russian and other orthodox Marxist sociologists of the Eastern European countries have to face very different problems. While Marx was predicting the main features of the society without private means of production, the contemporary Russian and orthodox Marxist sociologists have to deal with a reality. On the one hand, Marxism has been an official ideology in Russia and Eastern European countries and so constitute an inviolable framework of analysis; on the other hand, the so-called Peoples' Democracies can hardly be considered classless societies because in them are very evident inequality of opportunity, income, education, prestige, and power. The orthodox Marxists must find an answer to this problem. The solution they bring is this: while the abolition of private means of production rids society of its classes, it does not eliminate all inequalities. This will take place only with the advent of the final stage of communism.

Russian orthodox sociologist, Kosolapov, distinguishes three periods on the way to the full development of communism: the first is a transitional period during which socioeconomic relations are transformed, the cultural revolution takes place, and individuals become accustomed

to the socialist form of economy and the corresponding political power of the proletariat (proletarian dictatorship). The last factor is of special importance, and a conditio sine qua non of understanding of social changes during the socialist transformation of a country. Any abstraction from that role of the State power on that level of social change could totally distort the perception of the socialist reality. The state of proletarian dictatorship persists because class contradiction continues to exist as it does opposition and it become necessary to protect the interests of the working class by sheer force of the State. The second period is characterized by the consolidation of the new system, the development of the force of production, and actual socialization of the economic life. At that stage, the dictatorial functions of the State are superfluous because of the disappearance of the exploiting classes and their political organizations. The third period implies elimination of all relics of the preceding system, and a reign of social democracy. The development of the socialist democracy will bring about the death of the State itself and transform the society into a self-governing community. This community, however, is not possible as long as there exists a division of the world into different economic and political systems and while there is a real possibility of and international conflict.³

³R. Kosolapov, "Metodologiczne problemy teorii rozwiniętego socjalizmu," O rozwiniętym społeczeństwie socjalistycznym by H. Cholaĵ and F. Ociepka (Warszawa: 1979), Vol. 1, pp. 47-48. Cf. J. Czecharin, "System polityczny w warunkach rozwiniętego socjalizmu," *ibid.*, pp. 268-284; A. P. Butenko, "Istota i problemy rozwiniętego społeczeństwa socjalistycznego," *ibid.*, pp. 52-84; Aleksander Owieczko, "Demokracje socjal-

To put it another way, there are several criteria which indicate to what extent the socialist system has advanced on the road to communism. They are: the degree of a real socialization of the means of production and the universality of the new relations of production, the level of the social efficiency of human work; the degree of equalization of life and work conditions of the different social classes (strata); the level of the development of socialist democracy and the efficiency of the state's organs in serving people; the degree of establishment of the socialist ideology in the consciousness of the individuals, and finally, the character and degree of the satisfaction of all human needs. As soon as the advanced socialist society becomes a reality, the prevailing motivation of the people is a conviction that what is socially right and useful, coincides with the personal interests of the individuals.⁴

The advanced socialist country is ruled by the principle of socialist democracy, where there has been established not only a legal but real equality through the abolition of the private means of production. Several channels have been opened through which people can and do participate in social organizations and institutions of power.

istyczne i udział mas w zarządzaniu gospodarką narodową," Ideologia i Polityka 10 (1975).

⁴Jerzy Wiatr, Spoleczenstwo (Warszawa: PWN, 1973), pp. 368-376. Cf. Adam Pieniazek, Panstwo na etapie budowy rozwiniętego społeczeństwa socjalistycznego (Warszawa: KiW, 1980). Jan Bluszkowski, "Przemiany struktury klasowo-warstwowej w okresie budowy socjalizmu," Ideologia i Polityka 12 (1976); Stanisław Widerszpil, "Przesłanki budowy rozwiniętego społeczeństwa socjalistycznego," Ideologia i Polityka 2 (1976); Stanisław Zawadzki, "Kryteria rozwoju demokracji socjalistycznej," Nowe Drogi 4 (1974).

In the advanced socialist societies there are no classes nor privileged social strata. The most numerous class (stratum), the working class, is a subject of political power, but the other strata also participate in that power through their representatives in the political bodies. This is possible because, contrary to the capitalist societies where the interest of different classes are opposed to each other, the class interests in the socialist societies are not conflictual. They are the same interests.

The individuals of the advanced socialist societies universally accept scientific Marxist-Leninist ideology, that is, a materialistic theory of the world, man, and social life. As socialism matures, there also grows the social solidarity manifesting itself in the growing conviction that whatever is socially good is at the same time individually desirable.⁵

Orthodox Marxist sociologists and Party propaganda deny the existence of social classes in the socialist societies. The reason for the non-existence of social classes is that in these societies the private means of production have been abolished. By that fact, the very basis for class formation has been eliminated and with it there has been eliminated any possibility for a class society.

Marxist sociologists do not deny the existence of some differences

⁵"Kształtowanie się i rola postaw moralnych w społeczeństwie socjalistycznym," Biblioteka lektora i wykładowcy 1 (1979), p. 3. Cf. Jerzy Wiatr, "Uwarstwienie społeczne a tendencje egalitarne," Kultura i Społeczeństwo 2 (1962); Jarosław Ładosz, "Geneza i istota wielopartyjności w społeczeństwie socjalistycznym," Ideologia i Polityka 11 (1976).

between different social strata, but they do not consider them class generating. Social strata are allowed to originate on the basis of difference between lifestyle in the cities and villages, on differences between physical and mental work. The persistence of these differences indicates that the Peoples' Democracies have not yet reached the stage of communism where everyone will be rewarded according to his needs but that the rule is still valid, at the present stage, "to everyone according to his work." Because this rule is still in force, there can be some differences in rewarding. By the same token such differences might be even desirable to serve as incentives for stronger social commitment.⁶ Referring to that problem, Chlopecki wrote: "In the present socioeconomic situation one cannot push egalitarian aspirations to the point of contradicting the principle: 'to everyone according to his work', . . . because this would have negative effects on the rate of socioeconomic development."⁷

Depicted in such a way, society is a smoothly functioning one, where there is no room for conflict, where the interests of the individuals are subordinated to or even coincide with those of whole society, where one's justified needs are completely satisfied, and where everyone, inspired by high moral imperatives, collaborates spontaneously for the common good. Polish socialist society is free of conflict because

⁶Jerzy Wiatr, "Uwarstwienie społeczne . . ." op. cit., p. 37.

⁷Jerzy Chlopecki, "Nadanie za apetytem," Kierunki 24 (1969), p. 3. Cf. Adam Lopatka, "Rozwoj podstawowych praw i obowiazkow obywateli Polski Ludowej," Ideologia i Polityka 7-8 (1976).

it is bound by the common tradition (a result of national and socialist integration of the Polish society); common organization (around the Party's program); common moral identity (as the people develop their socialist personalities), and common materialistic ideology.⁸ All these efforts are led and coordinated by the "respectable" Communist Party, "freely elected and supported by the whole society." The Party itself constantly applies the principles of democratic centralism "strengthening its links with the working class and other working people and directing economic pressure in accordance with the social objectives of socialism."⁹

In view of the orthodox Polish Marxists and Party's rulers, the peoples' democracy in Poland in the 1970s was in the stage of building an advanced socialist society.

The Polish People's Republic is entering a period in which the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat will gradually develop into a state of the whole people led by the working class. The state and its every function will be strengthened and perfected on the principle of unity of civil rights and duties, of subordinating the activity of the state apparatus to the people's interests and encouraging socialist democracy and public self-government.¹⁰

The Party newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, referred to that state of social reality when it said: "On this level of the development the Party's primary goal and its main line of policy is a creation of the material

⁸"Jednosc spoleczenstwa budujacego socjalizm," Biblioteka Lektora i Wykladowcy 7 (1979).

⁹Jan Szydlak, "Strategy of Accelerated Progress," World Marxist Review 19 (1976), p. 11

¹⁰

Ibid., p. 12.

and spiritual conditions for personal development and gratification of all needs of the individuals."¹¹ The social classes of People's Poland "create a social structure free of antagonistic contradictions, based on collaboration and solidarity of all strata under the leadership of the working class and its Party."

If one accepts literally Marx' theory of class, he must, in consequence, come to a conclusion that the socialist societies are classless. Through the abolition of the private means of production in those societies there has been wiped out the very basis for class formation: private ownership of the means of production. Similarly, the abolition of the private means of production is supposed to create nonantagonistic "class" relations. Since conflict originates in this kind of ownership, it seems logical to assume its disappearance, once this condition ceases to be present. At this point, however, a scientific logic might be disturbed. Is the theory to modulate the facts, or rather is a theory's usefulness measured by its explanatory power in a strict relation to the facts? "A basic weakness of the Eastern European Marxism," write Tellenback, "is that it takes the non-existence of exploitation and antagonistic classes for granted and does not sincerely discuss the possibility of alternative class criteria, such as collective ownership of the means of production or control over them."¹³

¹¹Trybuna Ludu, January 3, 1976.

¹²Marian Spychalski, "Rola Partii w ukształtowaniu i rozwoju Ludowego Państwa Polskiego," Nowe Drogi 7 (1969), p. 12. Cf. Antoni Szczypiorowski, "Fundamenty Integracji," Argumenty 38 (1968).

¹³Sten Tellenback, "Patterns of Stratification in Socialist Poland,"

One might agree with the thesis that in the socialist societies classes in the Marxian sense do not exist because the relations to the means of production are uniform. This, however, does not imply that these societies are ipso facto, characterized by the similar other attributes also of great social importance, such as historically inherited differences, social roles, and differences in income, etc. Marxists argue that these differences account for the rise of the different strata in the socialist classless society. In other words, in a developed socialist society, classes disappear, but social stratification still remains. But at this point one is arguing about the words. Are values such as income, education, the social prestige of an occupation, and lifestyle important to an individual or not? Do these variables account for an inequality of opportunity in a given society? If they are not important, why are they highly valued? If they are important, they must account for the rise of different social groups

Acta Sociologica 17 (1974). p. 28.

The author criticizes three underlying principles regarded as valid by the Polish orthodox sociologists, namely: (1) historically inherited differences, (2) division of labor (physical and mental work), and (3) economic incentives. In Tellenback's view, "it is not the matter of some historical remnants that are fading away together with the evolution of socialist society, but of the constant reproduction of the 'classical' social attributes of different classes or strata . . . It is undeniable that a complex industrial society necessitates a far-reaching division of labor, but according to which law of principle does this division of labor have to create patterned social inequality? . . . It is (also) self-evident and pure common sense that the use of economic incentives leads to a hierarchical income structure; but why are economic incentives necessary? It is not sufficient to refer to economic efficiency, as is usually the case. Economic efficiency is, of course, the reason why economic incentives are applied, but it does not explain why similar incentives are used as in capitalist societies and not alternative ones." Sten Tellenback, op. cit., p. 29.

(classes), and the phenomenon should be theoretically explained. Tellenback says:

Whereas patterned social inequality is observed, as it is a case in the socialist Poland, this matter of fact has to be explained by some continually working mechanism or determinant, which, in turn, is used in such theory as a criterion for sorting out relevant social entities characterized by the different social attributes.¹⁴

Marxist theory of class has lost its epistemological usefulness especially regarding the socialist societies.¹⁵ Ossowski write with reference to this:

Institutions where changes of social structure are to a greater or lesser extent governed by the decision of the political authorities, we are a long way from social classes as interpreted by Marx, Veblen and Weber, from classes conceived of as groups determined by their relations to the means of production or, as others would say, by their relations to the market. We are a long way from classes conceived of as groups arising out of the spontaneously created class organizations. In situations where the political authorities can overtly and effectively change the class structure; where the privileges that are most essential for social status, including that of higher share in the national income, are conferred by a decision of the political authorities; where a large part or even the majority of the population is included in a stratification of the type to be found in a bureaucratic hierarchy--the nineteenth century concept of class becomes more or less an anachronism, and class conflicts give way to other forms of social antagonism.¹⁶

Considering one socially important criterion of class formation, it preserves only a function of affirmation or negation of class existence once this criterion is present or absent. In consequence, Marxian

¹⁴Sten Tellenback, op. cit. p. 29.

¹⁵As an example of such studies may be used Zroznicowanie społeczne, by W. Wosolowski (Warszawa: Ossolineum, 1974).

¹⁶Stanislaw Ossowski, Class Structure in the Social Consciousness (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Incorporated, 1963), p. 184.

theory of class regarding socialist societies loses theoretical attributes. It becomes sociography with very limited aspirations. The dilemma is this: "Social classes in socialist society continue to exist empirically with all their class attributes in spite of the fact that the classical Marxist class criteria, the ownership of the means of production, has ceased to exist."¹⁷ It cannot be otherwise until there exist the differences in income, prestige, lifestyle, and inequality of opportunity. "What one's job is, how handsomely one dresses, how much one knows, how well one plays games . . ., how one practices religion, . . ."¹⁸ all these may become the basis of evaluation of the members in a society; in other words, they may determine the relative position in the class system.¹⁹ "Social stratification," Parsons says, "is . . .

¹⁷ Sten Tellenback, op. cit., p. 28.

¹⁸ Bernard Barber, Social Stratification (Harcourt, Brace and World, Incorporated, 1957), p. 19.

¹⁹ One must distinguish between "status" and "class." Different authors approach this problem from different perspectives. According to Weber, "Social honor (status) can adhere directly to a class situation and it is also, indeed most of the time, determined by the average class situation of the status group members. This, however, is not necessarily the case. Status membership, in turn, influences the class situation in that the style of life required by status groups makes them prefer special kinds of property or gainful pursuits and reject others." Max Weber, Religion of India (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958), p. 39.

Close to Marxists, Dahrendorf, distinguishes between "class" and "stratum," but for a different reason. While "stratum" represents for him the descriptive aspect of the social reality, the "class" has its analytical purpose. Dahrendorf writes: "Class is always a category for purpose of the analysis of the dynamics of social conflict and its structural roots, and as such it has to be separated strictly from stratum as a category for purpose of describing hierarchical systems at

the differential ranking of the human individuals who compose a given social system and their treatment as superior or inferior relative to one another in certain socially important respects,"²⁰ And these "socially important respects" have to be determined empirically. Failing to do that, sociology ceases to be a science and becomes mere faith.

This is what happened to the Polish Marxist sociology. On the one hand, it recognizes the differences of social groupings in socially important respects, but on the other hand it denies the existence of classes in Poland, because the private means of production has been socialized and so everybody is in the same relation to the means of production. So, according to the Polish Marxist sociologists, in the socialist Poland, there are no social classes because there is no private ownership of the means of production, whereas there are important

a given point of time." Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 76. That surely is a relic of the Marxian distinction between class "in itself" and class "for itself" which Dahrendorf considers superfluous. especially in the framework of the conflict theory, where conflict is considered to be ubiquitous. Following this distinction, Krauss defines stratus as "any aggregate of persons who are similar in the possessions of, or access to, social goods." Irving Krauss, Stratification, Class and Cliflict (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 13. "Classes," instead, "are formed when an aggregate of persons defines their interests as similar to those of the others in their aggregate, and as different from and opposed to the interests of another aggregate of persons" *ibid.*, p. 15. The author concludes: "The key difference between social stratification and social class is communalization: therefore class formation requires some kind of structuring which may lead to informal groups of formal organization. Otherwise the aggregates of persons continue to be strata, and discontent does not lead to organized attempts to change conditions," *ibid.*, p. 15.

²⁰Talcott Parsons, "An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social

differences in opportunity, income, prestige, lifestyle. These differences account for different strata which are the relics of the capitalist class structure.

This theory is taken for granted, but not proved. "To refer to inherited historical differences," says Tellenback, "is not sufficient, because social inequality is constantly reproduced in socialist Poland."²¹

One may agree to some extent with Szczepanski, who writes that in the Western societies "the property accumulated by the family can be inherited, and there are not institutionally fixed limits of property accumulation,"²² and that in the Polish society the family has lost such an attribute, but this does not eliminate other socially important respects such as income, education, and prestige which account for differences in opportunity. It does not matter how one calls these groupings. They constitute a social reality which should be labelled as social classes.²³ These differences correspond to the psychological

Stratification," Essays in Sociological Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1954), p. 69.

²¹Sten Tellenback, op. cit., p. 29.

²²Jan J. Szczepanski, Polish Society, op. cit., p. 145.

²³Weber refers to a class as "when (1) a number of people have in common a specific casual component of their life chances, in so far as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of good and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor markets . . . The term 'class' refers to any group of people that is found in the same situation." From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology by H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 181.

Parsons defines class "as a plurality of kinship units which, in those respects where status is a hierarchical context is shared by their members, have approximately equal status." Talcott Parsons, "Social

aspect of the classes. Ossowski points it out as follows: "A society is a 'class' society . . . if there exists within it distinct barriers to social intercourse and if class boundaries can be drawn by means of an analysis of interpersonal relations . . ." ²⁴ Repeated statements by the Marxist Polish sociologists that in Poland there are not classes in the Marxian sense say nothing about the differences in other important respects of the different social groups in the Polish society. Such formulations serve more the ideological purposes of the ruling class than constitute the findings of a genuine science. The source of this tremendous confusion is Marx' theory of class itself and as applied to serve the ruling class ideology. Therefore, Barber is correct when he says: "As a theory of stratification Marxism requires essential qualification as well as refinement." ²⁵

Class Structure in the State-run Socialist
Societies: Different Views

According to the orthodox Marxist view of class structure, class division rooted in the different sources of income cease to exist once the means of production have been socialized. The social differentia-

Classes and Class Conflict in the Light of Recent Sociological Theory,"
Essays in Sociological Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 328.

Giddens conceives class as "a large-scale aggregate of individuals, comprised of impersonally defined relationships, and nominally open in form." Anthony Giddens, the Class Structure . . . op. cit., p. 100.

²⁴Stanislaw Ossowski, op. cit., p. 136.

²⁵Bernard Barber, Social Stratification, op. cit., p. 54.

tion of individuals or groups persists, as does the system of reward, but they are not "class generating" factors. By the same token, Marxists argue, the existing strata, relics of a capitalist society or generated by the differences between physical and mental work or between city and village, are not in the antagonistic relationship with one another, because from the Marxian perspective as a means of production are socialized, the class system disappears. These are the pivotal theses of the Marxian view of social classes and class conflict. They have never been proved, yet they are maintained in spite of powerful arguments and evidence which discredit such theory.

Aron and Feldmesser are among the best known Western sociologists who come to the same conclusion that State socialist societies are classless by using, however, different arguments. According to Aron, soviet-type societies are "classless" nonetheless, there exist within these societies differences in lifestyle, power, and the incomes of different groups. The author writes:

We are agreed that all societies, Soviet as well as western, are heterogeneous--a heterogeneity of individuals and of groups. There exists a hierarchy of authority, a hierarchy of incomes. There is a difference between the way of life of those at the foot and those at the top of the social scale.²⁶

The reason why in the socialist societies there are not social classes is that in these societies a minority (elite), has control of a powerless majority. Political and economic power, concentrated in the rulers of a State-run society, gives them totalitarian control over the rest of

²⁶ Raymond Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1969), p. 8.

the society. Therefore, the totalitarian (monistic) socio-political system excludes the formation of social classes:

Politicians, Trade Union leaders, generals and managers all belong to one party and are part of an authoritarian organization. All intermediate bodies, all individual groups, and particularly professional groups are in fact controlled by delegates of the elite . . . The Trade Unions are not more expressing the claims of the workers, they are an instrument of the state intended to bring the workers into line. A classless society leaves the mass of the population without any possible means of defense against the elite.²⁷

For Aron, the dilemma is this: "How can we understand that in one type of society classes assert themselves as they are and in the other appear not to exist."²⁸ The author hurries to give the answer: "It is the political regime, that is the constitution of power and the idea that those who govern have of their authority which decides the existence or nonexistence of classes and above all their self-awareness."²⁹

²⁷ Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," British Journal of Sociology 1 (1950), Part II, p. 131.

Also Giddens comes to a contradictory conclusion: on the one hand he says: "The state Socialist societies, . . . have genuinely succeeded in moving towards a classless order . . . only at the cost of creating a system of political domination which altered the character of social exploitation rather than necessarily diminishing it." Anthony Giddens, The Class Structure in the Advanced Societies (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 294.

One can hardly accept such a contradiction between, on the one hand, "genuinely succeeded in creating a classless society," and on the other, "still intensified the exploitation." What seems acceptable is that in socialist societies there has been laid a new foundation of class structure. Cf. David Lane, "Marxist Class, Conflict Analysis of State Socialist Societies," Industrial Society. Class, Cleavage and Control by R. Scase (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1977), p. 180.

²⁸ Raymond Aron, Democracy . . ., op. cit., p. 9.

²⁹ Ibid.

People studying socialist societies would, in general, agree with this description of the Soviet-type society. Aron's conclusions, however, cannot be sustained. If it is true that the State-run society is clearly divided into the powerful elite and the powerless rest, there must then be at least two classes. And in this case Djilas is right when he says: "The capitalist and other classes of ancient origin had in fact been destroyed, but a new class, previously unknown to history, had been formed."³⁰ The new class has its counter-part in the exploited majority.

Secondly, Aron seems to include political organization of a class as a condition for class formation. In Marx' view, such a political organization was required by any class "in itself" to become a class for "itself." Today, the conflict-theory supporters suppose some kind of organization of class to defend their interests. Additionally, no one would deny that "the problem of class cannot be treated in the abstract reality of the political regime."³¹ But classes are not political parties and if they were, one would have to conclude that in the U.S.A. there are as many political parties as there are social classes in contemporary American society. This does not mean that members of a particular class may not have certain political preferences, but this is not the point at issue.³²

³⁰Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, op. cit., pp. 37-48.

³¹Raymond Aron, *Democracy . . .*, op. cit., p. 9.

³²Cf. Richard F. Hamilton, Class and Politics in the United States

Thirdly, Aron's apocalyptic view of the powerless majority is not acceptable either. This is not to deny that in the Soviet-type socialist systems "a single party, enjoying the monopoly of political activity, dominates the state and imposes its own ideology on all the other organizations."³³ These "powerless" majorities, however, destroyed the Tsarist system in Russia in 1917, and in 1980, Polish workers forged a free Trade Union out of the State-controlled Union.

Support for the thesis of the classlessness of socialist societies comes also from Feldmesser.³⁴ As in Aron's view the elite, the Party apparatus together with the secret police, for Feldmesser, prevent the class formation.

Yet in the totalitarian scheme of things, it is essential to the preservation of party supremacy that no group become so entrenched in positions of strength as to become insulated against further demands from the party, . . . Hence the party must insist--in the long run--that every man be individually and continuously on trial . . .³⁵

The gulf between the political minority and the large majority of non-Party people inhibits class rising. Especially monitored are the people who exercise managerial responsibilities, who might from that position, pose a threat to the authority of the Party.³⁶ Consequently, fear of

(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1972).

³³ Raymond Aron, *Democracy* . . . , op. cit., p. 185.

³⁴ Robert A. Feldmesser, "Toward the Classless Society?," Class, Status, and Power by R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset (New York: The Free Press, 1966).

³⁵ Ibid., p. 533.

³⁶ Also Pareto occupies himself with the problem of elite, but his

being arrested or loss of property and uncertain future among the controlled managers, paralyze any attempt to challenge the status quo. Police-state oppression is an every-day reality for all nonsupporters of the existing system.

If this then is the case, there would be at least two classes: powerful elite and a powerless majority. Secondly, one may agree that during the period of the revolution called by Brinton the "reign of terror and virtue," a society might acquire a classless character; as time goes on, the rigid class structure is changing to bring about at least a dichotomous division of a society.³⁷ This is a point Parkin makes. In his opinion one has to distinguish between two different stages of the development of these societies; the first, a relative early stage, rather egalitarian, in which the society might be considered classless, and the more advanced stage in which the need for stratification grows out of economic rationality and technological efficiency. Parkin writes:

The system of rewards in the socialist society during this formative relatively classless phase stems largely from the need of the ruling elite to consolidate its power and to resist opposition from the potential 'class'. That is to say, because the immediate goal of the order is one of political stabilization and control, the rewards structure is especially responsive to ideological demands . . . (but) once the new regimes have succeeded in establishing a measure of political legitimacy and stability, and when industrial efficiency becomes a major preoccupation, the socialist stratification order

approach is much different. He elaborates the theory of elite circulation mainly referring to governing elite. Cf. Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935).

³⁷ Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), p. 176.

appears to come under increasing strains. This occurs largely because of the tension between the system of rewards prescribed by the formal ideology and association with economic rationality and technological efficiency. . . . The emergent emphasis upon economic rationality and the allocation of men to elite positions on the basis of meritocratic criteria leads to the erosion of traditional socialist ideology and paves the way to a form of class stratification that has much more in common with that of Western capitalism.³⁸

Elsewhere, however, Parkin contradicts himself.³⁹ He sees socialist societies "class" to the point that there exists in them the "system of rewards" in the hands of the political elite, which is simply opposite to what he said above, and "classless" as if one stresses the highly permeable boundaries between classes:

If we take a synchronic view of the present socialist reward system we can detect a distinct social boundary between the 'new class' and the rest of society. We should thus be justified in regarding it as a class system in this restricted sense If we take a diachronic view of the same system (with highly permeable boundary between a 'new class' and others, The 'classlessness' thesis has greater plausibility.⁴⁰

If the first of these views is acceptable to some extent (technocracy can never substitute the role of ideology in the socialist system because the ideological principles have always a priority in the case of conflict between economy and politics otherwise the system would not be able to survive)--the other Parkin's solution is not a solution. The author takes for granted the permeable boundary between the elite and

³⁸Frank Parkin, "Class Stratification in Socialist Societies," British Journal of Sociology 20 (1969), pp. 360-361.

³⁹Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1971).

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 158.

others. One must be aware that elite's ideology of the Soviet-type society, Marxist ideology, is different from the ideology of the ruling class in the Western-type society. The former includes not only a politico-social view, but also a perspective on the world and on man's destiny. Besides many other possible factors, the materialistic ideology alone is sufficient to make such a class highly exclusive.

The most prominent protagonists of the view that the Soviet-type society is a class society are Djilas and Dahrendorf. While the first deals directly with this type of society, the second talks about advanced or post-industrial societies, whether they be capitalist or socialist. Both of them distinguish between property ownership in a broad and narrow sense. Property in a narrow sense is a legal right of ownership; property in the broad sense is conceived as real control of the means of production with no further specification as to the manner in which this control is exercised. Djilas and Dahrendorf agree that property-ownership in the second and broad sense gives rise to a new class. "Ownership," Djilas says, "is nothing other than the right of profit and control."⁴¹ He concludes: "if one defines class benefits by this right, the communist states have seen, in the final analysis, the origin of a new form of ownership or a new ruling exploiting class."⁴²

But at this point these two authors disagree. Djilas sees this new class as based on political power, Dahrendorf sees it formed on authority relations. Djilas says: ". . . the bureaucracy, or more

⁴¹Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, op. cit., p. 35.

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 35.

exactly the political bureaucracy, has all the characteristics of earlier ones as well as some new characteristics of its own."⁴³ As such exercises its control over the collective ownership of means of production it "is reflected in a larger income in material goods and privileges."⁴⁴ Political power that the new class exercises gives it a privileged position in the socioeconomic life and in the collective ownership. "Power is both the means and the goal of communists, in order that they may maintain their privileges and ownership, . . . it is only through power itself that ownership can be exercised."⁴⁵

Djilas' theory differs from the Marxian in that he shifts the emphasis from the ownership relations or property to power. "While Marx," writes Dahrendorf, ". . . subordinates relations of authority to those of property, Djilas seems inclined to subordinate ownership to power."⁴⁶

Djilas' theory is a partial theory, but it is correct in its partiality. If one takes into consideration the division of the Soviet-type society into political elite, "new class," and the "powerless majority," the theory is useful and accord with the reality. The theory, however, is incomplete. The division into "new class" and "others" does not reflect the Party and non-Party cleavage. Not all the Party members belong to the political elite. Additionally, both Party

⁴³Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, op. cit., p. 38.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 44.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 169.

⁴⁶Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict . . .*, op. cit., p. 83.

and non-Party individuals are stratified in similar ways in some other important respects.

Even if Dahrendorf distinguishes between property in the broad and narrow senses, he defines classes in terms of authority relations within "imperatively coordinated associations."⁴⁷ It is possession of or exclusion from authority which accounts for class formation.

Dahrendorf starts his analysis with Mills and Parsons' concept of authority as a "zero-sum."⁴⁸ In his view, it is always possible to draw a clear distinction between those who possess and exercise authority and those who are subjected to the commands of others. The first possess authority to the extent that the others are deprived of it. In consequence, authority relations constitute a basis for a social structure characterized by its dichotomous division into super and subordination. The superordinates legitimately control by orders, warnings, and prohibitions the behavior of the clearly specified subordinates

⁴⁷ Dahrendorf uses the Weberian definition of power and authority. "Power is the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action." Max Weber, Essay in Sociology by H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 180. Authority in Weber's view is a rule over men "whether predominantly external or predominantly internal, to which the governed submit because of their belief in the extraordinary quality of a specific person," *ibid.*, p. 295. An important difference between power and authority is that the power is associated with the personality of the individuals, the authority is connected with the social position.

⁴⁸ C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 268. Cf. C. Wright Mills, "The Social Role of the Intellectual," Power, Politics and People by I.R. Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Political Power," Class, Status and Power by R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 255.

using, if necessary, legitimate sanctions.⁴⁹ In other words, authority relations are social roles which become the objective interests within the imperatively coordinated associations. Role interests, when taken independently of the conscious orientations of their players, are "latent interests," when they become conscious goals, they become the "manifest interests." Latent interests give rise to the conflictual "quasi-groups" and the manifest interests to the "conflictual groups."⁵⁰ the graph on the next page diagrams Dahrendorf's scheme.

Viewed in this way class structure may equally apply to the socialist and capitalist societies unless they enter into what Dahrendorf calls the "post-industrial" stage of the development, characterized by decomposition of capital, decomposition of labor (diversification of the working class), growth of the middle class (connected with the increase of the bureaucracy and the sector of services), growth of social mobility, and finally, institutionalization of class conflict.

Dahrendorf's class theory is criticized for the following reasons. First, one can hardly accept that authority relations make possible a dichotomy of division: dominant and superordinate. Different levels of

⁴⁹Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict . . .*, op. cit., 0. 83.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 176. Dahrendorf remains faithful to the conflictual social theories according to which every society is based on the coercion of some groups by others. Social conflict and its consequent social change, are ubiquitous and finally, every element of the society contributes to this disintegration and consequently to its change. Cf. Ralf Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict," Sociological Theory: An Introduction by W. L. Wallace (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 213-226; Pierre L. Van Dan Berghe, "Dialectic and Functionalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis." American Sociological




Figure 3

Dahrendorf's Model of Social Classes,
Conflict and Social Change

authority imply several intermediate classes. Second, and Dahrendorf recognizes this, the theory is limited to the "imperatively coordinated organizations" or more specifically, to the state and industrial enterprises.⁵¹ Third, if authority constitutes the basis for class structure, a classless society is inconceivable. One cannot even envision a society without authority relations. Some kind of patterned authority relations are conditio sine qua non of every society.⁵²

Also Ossowski maintains that there has been a tendency to conceive hierarchical divisions of society in dichotomous terms throughout cultural history. He identifies three basic aspects of these dichotomies: (1) "the rulers and the ruled," (2) "the rich and the poor," and (3) "those for whom others work and those who work."⁵³ These principles were often linked by sociologists with the exploitation. The third principle might refer to what Stalin calls "nonantagonistic classes."⁵⁴ In Ossowski's view, "the abolition of class system can be understood as wiping-out only of those inequalities which result from class divisions."⁵⁵ He elaborates a concept of "nonegalitarian classlessness"

Review, October (1963), pp. 695-705.

⁵¹Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict* . . ., op. cit., p. 248.

⁵²Anthony Giddens, *The Class Structure* . . ., op. cit., pp. 72-73.

⁵³Stanislaw Ossowski, *Class Structure* . . ., op. cit., p. 23.

⁵⁴Joseph Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947), p. 621.

⁵⁵Stanislaw Ossowski, *Class Structure* . . ., op. cit., p. 97.

which means that the "abolition of social classes does not necessarily involve the destruction of the social ladder."⁵⁶

Every one of the just discussed opinions of the different authors stresses some aspects of the structural reality in the Society-type socialist system. But the authors, except Dahrendorf, do not sufficiently point out very simple features of these societies. If they are not yet in the "post-industrial" stage of the development, they are approaching it quite fast. This seems to be a converging point of both advanced capitalist and socialist societies, regardless of how they arrived at this point. In such advanced societies, the basic stratifying factor is the occupational system with its prestige and income. Parkin writes:

The backbone of the class structure, and indeed of the entire reward system of modern Western Society, is the occupational order. Other sources of economic and symbolic advantage do not coexist alongside the occupational order, but for the vast majority of the population these tend, at best, to be secondary to those deriving from the division of labor.⁵⁷

Bell speaks in the same vein: "The second way of defining a post-industrial society is through the change in occupational distribution, i.e., not only where people work, but the kind of work they do. In large measure, occupation is the most important determinant of class and

⁵⁶Stanislaw Ossowski, *Class Structure . . .*, op. cit., p. 97. He elicits four characteristics of social classes: (1) "The existence of superior and inferior categories of social statuses, which are superior and inferior in respect of some system of privileges and discrimination," (2) "The distinctness of permanent class interests," (3) "Class consciousness," (4) "Social isolation," which provides a basis for belief that a given society is a "class" society. Ibid., pp. 135-136.

⁵⁷Frank Parkin, *Class Inequality . . .*, op. cit., p. 18

stratification in the society."⁵⁸ Blau Duncan go even further:

The hierarchy of prestige strata and the hierarchy of economic class have their roots in the occupational system; so does the hierarchy of political power and authority, . . . The occupational structure also is the link between the economy and family, . . .⁵⁹

Soviet-type societies in general, and the polish society in particular, are not exceptions. What is different in them is the general framework of the socio-political and economic situation of these countries. Thus any detailed analysis of class structure in these societies must take into consideration the peculiarities of the socialist system.

The following overall working hypotheses will guide the present study to bring the issue of class in Poland into sharper focus:

1. Once the Communist Party assumed power in Poland it tended to limit activities of other parties and to control them totally. The Party did not eliminate other parties completely since it wanted to have ready proof of the "democratic coexistence" of different political views. The Communist Party, however, considered itself an exclusive subject of power and the representative of the whole nation.
2. Through nationalization of whole industries and large farms, the enormous discrepancies of wealth between the richest and the poorest in Polish society are eliminated.
3. "Equality of opportunity" is distorted by the fact that Party membership ensures privileges in Polish society.
4. In Poland, where the means of production are nationalized, political power becomes the most important factor of stratification because of its control over the distribution of roles and rewards.

⁵⁸Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-industrial Society (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1976), p. 15 (Introduction).

⁵⁹Peter M. Blau and Otis D. Duncan, The American Occupational Structure (New York: John Wiley, 1967), p. 7.

5. The main cleavage in Polish society, between those who are members of the Communist Party and those who are not, is visible at all levels of the social stratification. The top social positions are totally reserved for the members of the Communist Party.
6. Nationalization of the means of production in Poland has not eliminated social classes, but has merely shifted importance from real ownership of the means of production to control of the distribution of the national product.
7. The occupational system is, after political power, the second most influential factor accounting for the class system in Poland, and in State-run socialist societies.
8. Four variables, namely, political power, income, education and social prestige, give rise to a six-fold class structure in Poland: power elite, intelligentsia, skilled manual workers, white-collar workers, farmers, and unskilled manual workers.
9. There is in Poland a high degree of status inconsistency as well as a positive correlation between high social positions and Party membership.
10. In the socialist system in general, and in Poland in particular, the power elite is a necessary part of the structural conflict.
11. Structural conflict in Poland is intensified by the ideological conflict between State and Church, and by an historically rooted antagonism toward Russia.
12. In the socialist systems and in Poland particularly, propaganda is a necessary means of social control, and its use is the exclusive privilege of the Communist Party.

Class structure in Poland was visibly changed after World War II.

That was the consequence of the other changes; political, economic, and social in the country. So, it is logical that this detailed analysis of class structure, with the analysis of conflict in Poland, has to be preceded by a consideration of the most important trends and changes in the Polish postwar socio-political reality. This will be the subject of the following part.

P A R T T W O

POLAND IN ITS POSTWAR PERIOD

CHAPTER III

MAIN FEATURES OF CHANGES IN POSTWAR POLAND

Postwar Poland has emerged from the German occupation with a totally new political system. The initial and decisive change circumscribed Poland to a determined sphere of the international influence of Russia and her Eastern European satellites. In the area of domestic policy the Communist Party conquered an absolute power. A similar change in the political system in Russia twenty-seven years earlier brought about other changes: economic, social, and structural. Poland followed the same pattern: nationalization of industry, agrarian reform, and changes in the educational system. These reforms influenced decisively the change in class structure from the prewar Polish society. Two classes, the bourgeoisie and the land aristocracy, disappeared completely. The industrialization of the country rapidly expanded the working class and the "new" intelligentsia. The free school system opened new channels (knowledge and skills) for upward social mobility.

Political Change in Poland after World War II

The future of postwar Poland was practically decided many months before the Yalta Conference took place in February, 1945. In December, 1943, during a clandestine meeting in Warsaw, a new Polish, pro-Soviet political authority was established. It was called the National Council of the Homeland (Krajowa Rada Narodowa - KRN). The KRN was intended as

a provisional parliament. Nonetheless, this new political body claimed to have multi-party character, "it was," as Groth says, "overwhelmingly dominated by the Communists, although it included a few others, like the subsequent Premier and left-wing socialist Edward Osobka-Morawski."¹

¹ Aleksander J. Groth, People's Poland: Government and Politics (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1972), p. 15. At that time the official name of the Communist Party was the Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza - PPR). The history of the Communist Party in Poland goes back to the end of the nineteenth century, when it existed as the Left-Wing of the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna - Lewica - PPS-Lewica) against the Right-Wing of that party. The PPS-Lewica has always been Russian-oriented. Its most prominent leader was R. Luxemburg. In 1905 that party opposed the idea of the independent Poland as shameful to the international social revolution. For the same reason that party boycotted the January, 1919, elections to the Polish Parliament (Sejm). At that time the party existed under the name of the Polish Communist Workers' Party (Komunistyczna Polska Partia Robotnicza - KPPR). In 1920, the KPPR "supported the Soviet offensive against their country by every possible means." Nicholas Bethell, Gomulka: His Poland, His Communism (Chicago: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 19. Its leaders, J. Marchlewski, F. Dzierzynski, F. Kon, J. Unschicht, and J. Leszczynski set the Revolutionary Committee (REVKOM) in Bialystok to be ready to take power in the Polish Russian Republic. Their dreams vanished because of the unexpected, total Polish victory, over the Red Army. To the KPPR referred M. Niedzialkowski saying: "With you, gentlemen, one never knows if you are genuine political workers, or agents of the Russian government. In the past, as the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, you bitterly denounced the aspirations for independence. After Poland regained independence you opposed it ruthlessly. You led Cossack regiments against your own country." Cited by Jan K. Kwiatkowski, Komunistyci w Polsce: Rodowod-Taktyka-Ludzie (Brussels: Polski Instytut Wydawniczy, 1964), p. 14. Consequently, in the 1930s, Pilsudski undertook several measures to limit the Communist Party's activities. Also Stalin distrusted them and abruptly dissolved the party in 1938, during so-called Great Purge. Many of the communists leaders who had sought refuge in Russia, or who had already been there, were executed, or sent to various concentration camps. Even some of those who were out of Russia were insidiously lured to be liquidated. Among the most prominent who lost their lives were: Adolf Warski-Warszawski, Maria Koszucka (pseudonym: Vera Kostrzewa), Bruno Jasienski, Julian Lenski-Leszczynski, and others. Cf. Vaclav L. Benes and Norman J. Wanowski, The Communist Party of Poland: An Outline of History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 149. After the outbreak of the German-Russian conflict, the

At the end of July, 1944, the Eastern part of the Polish territory was already free of Germans, and under Russian occupation. On the 21st of July, 1944, the executive body of the KRN was brought into being --the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego--PKWN) which issues the next day its Manifesto to the Polish nation claiming to be an exclusive legal and political authority.² A few months later the PKWN proclaimed itself the Provisional Government of Poland.

Every step of advancing power of the Russian sponsored Polish Communist Government was carefully watched by the Polish Government in exile. Any collaboration with the PKWN, even if officially proposed, was very problematic. The government in exile learned about several cases of the disarmament of the Home Army by Russian troops. Many

Polish communists who had fled to Russia reorganized the Communist Party under the name: Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza--PPR). Its Russian affiliation and dependence from Soviets quickly brought about the reinterpretation of its initials: Placeni Przez Rosje--Paid by Russia. The Communist Party figured under that name in Poland until 1948, when the PPR imposed fusion upon the Polish Socialist Party. "The ground for merger," as Dziewanowski says, "was prepared by skillful use of slogan 'unity of action,' which was to be a step toward 'organic unity' of the entire working class of Poland." M. K. Dziewanowski. The Communist Party of Poland, op. cit., p. 215. The new body has been named the Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza--PZPR), and it still exists under this name.

²At that time there existed in London a Polish government in exile headed by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk. The London Polish Government was recognized by the West European countries and the U.S.A. as a legal Polish government. To counterbalance it, Russia hurried to recognize the Provisional Government (January 5, 1956). Referring to the Polish Government in London, the Lublin Manifesto said: "The emigré Government in London is illegal and self-styled authority, based on the illegal Fascist Constitution of April, 1935. That government has hampered the struggle against Hitleric invaders by its policy of political opportu-

soldiers of that unit disappeared.³ This only deepened the distrust of Stalin, still vivid because of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of the fourth partition of Poland in August, 1939, its execution sixteen days later after the German invasion of Poland, deportation of 1.5 million Poles to Siberia, and the extermination of more than ten thousand Polish officers in the forest of Katyn.⁴

ism and is driving Poland to a new disaster." Appendix C, p. 408.

³The Home Army was affiliated to the government in London.

⁴Cf. Zbrodnia Katynska (Dokumenty) (London: Gryft, 1962); see also Jan K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest: The Katyn Forest Massacre (South Bend: Notre Dame University Press, 1962).

After the fall of Poland, Molotov boasted in October, 1939: "Nothing is left of Poland, this ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty." Cf. M. K. Dziewanowski, The Communist Party of Poland, op. cit., p. 158.

As soon as the Red Army had occupied the Eastern part of Poland in 1939, there took place a massive forced deportation of Poles into deep Siberia. Russian policy regarding deported Poles was very simple: we are not going to shoot you, you will die all the same of famine, misery, and cold.

German-Russian conflict created better perspective for an eventual collaboration between the Polish Government in London and Stalin. The Commander in Chief of the Polish forces in the West, and at the same time Prime Minister of the government in exile, General Wladyslaw Sikorski, undertook strong diplomatic action to persuade Stalin to release Poles from Russian concentration camps. The action was partly successful. On July 13, 1941, there was signed the so-called July Pact between the Polish Government in London and Stalin regarding an eventual future collaboration. Consequently, on August 14 of the same year, an agreement was signed and diplomatic relations between these two sides was established. Two days before (on August 12), the Presidium of the Supreme Soviets proclaimed an amnesty for all Polish citizens remaining on the territory of Soviet Russia. Cf. Franciszek Tyczkowski, Wspomnienia z Pierwszej i Drugiej Wojny Swiatowej (New York: Czas Publishing Company, 1972), p. 99. Practially, only a small number of the Poles could leave Russia (about 90 thousand). It was General Wladyslaw Anders who led them out of Russia. Through Persia they came to the Middle East, then they joined the American and British armed forces to fight against Germans in Africa and Italy. The majority of the Polish

In August, 1944, the Red Army and with it the First Kosciuszko Army, formed in Russia, were approaching Warsaw. The Home Army (Armia Krajowa--AK) affiliated with the government in exile, initiated an insurrection against Germans in Warsaw. The Home Army and the government in London aimed at gaining by the insurrection a better position for possible future negotiations with Stalin. There was, however, a miscalculation of forces. After initial success, the ill-armed AK was driven back. Germans were able to bring rapidly two divisions from the West front to crush the insurrection. The dramatic appeals for help from the passively stationed Red Army on the East banks of Vistula River vanished. The city was razed to the ground. Some 250,000 people lost their lives in a terrible gehenna.⁵

Besides the regular army (Kosciuszko Army), there was a small section of the guerillas inside Poland controlled by the communists: the People's Guard (Gwardia Ludowa--GL), subsequently renamed People's Army (Armia Ludowa--AL).⁶ Since the beginning, communist propaganda attempted to discredit the Home Army, accusing it of hostility towards

soldiers were not allowed to leave the Soviet territory. They formed the First Kosciuszko Army which fought at the Red Army's side in the Eastern fronts.

⁵ Stalin not only refused to help the Warsaw insurrection, but he even helped to crush it. When the British and Polish pilots tried to drop supplies for Warsaw, they were not allowed to land on the territory occupied by Russia, and they had to fly back to Italy to refuel. Cf. Bernard Newman, Portrait of Poland (London: Robert H. Limited, 1959), p. 85.

⁶ In 1943, the Union of the Polish Patriots (Zwiazek Patriotow Polskich--ZPP) was also founded in Russia. Its founder was Wanda

the Soviet Union and of passiveness in fighting Nazi enemy.⁷

The first days of 1945, brought about new events in Poland. The PKWN proclaimed itself a Provisional Government of the Polish Republic with Boleslaw Bierut self-nominated as President, Edward Osobka-Morawski as Prime Minister, and Wladyslaw Gomulka as Deputy Premier.⁸

Wasilewska, Polish journalist. Later on she married A. Korneychuk, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union.

⁷ There was a difference in tactics. Groth puts it in this way: "Where the Home Army was anxious to minimize German executions and repressions against Poles civilians for guerilla acts of sabotage the Communists did not have such scruples. They attempted to capitalize on the population's hatred of the Nazi rulers without worrying about consequences . . ." Aleksander J. Groth, op. cit., p. 14.

⁸ B. Bierut's real name was Boleslaw Krasnodebski. As the communist activist in the underground before World War II and during the German occupation of Poland, he had to use several aliases. There were among them two names: Bienkowski and Rutkowski. The name Bierut came from the combination of the first three letters of both just mentioned names. Bierut spent at least two indoctrination periods in Moscow: one in the early 1920, shortly after the defeat of the Red Army by Marshal Pilsudski in August, 1920, and second, in the period from 1933 to 1936. For that reason, Bierut, more than anybody else, was trusted by Stalin and so he was appointed for the task of the reorganization of the Polish Communist Party.

E. Osobka-Morawski was a socialist. He had no strong political personality. His participation in the government served the purpose of creating the fiction of a genuine governmental coalition. Once he had served this purpose, he was promptly fired.

W. Gomulka was born in 1905. As a seventeen year-old locksmith, he founded a Trade Union. He joined the KPPR and in the 1920s was arrested three times. By the time of the German invasion of Poland in 1939, he was in prison. After escaping from prison, he went to Warsaw to participate in the defense of the capitol. Since the capitulation of Warsaw on September 27, 1939, he actively participated in organizing anti-Nazi guerillas.

Gomulka belonged to the Polish school of the left-wing. His determinism and nationalism were largely known. Gollancz wrote of him: "He is a fervent Communist without fear or favor--a man of ruthless energy and drive . . . He showed his courage in underground activity during the war . . . For all his Communism, Gomulka is careful to

There was still a lot of confusion in Poland when Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met in Yalta in February, 1945, to discuss the future of Europe. The problem of Poland was a key-issue. The question of Poland's borders was discussed during six of seven meetings. All three politicians agreed in principles: (1) Poland must be an independent country; (2) there should be held free elections in Poland as soon as possible;⁹ (3) Roosevelt and Churchill succumbed to Stalin's claim regarding some Eastern Polish territories with a partial recompense in the West.¹⁰ Some reconciliatory signs between the Government of Lublin and that in exile (like a nomination of Stanislaw Mikolajczyk a Vice-Premier and Minister of Agriculture) brought about the official recognition of the new Polish regime by Great Britain and the U.S.A. and simultaneous withdrawing of their recognition to the exile government in

emphasize that he is a Pole and not a Russian puppet." Reported by Bernard Newman, op. cit., p. 95. During the controversy between Tito and Stalin, Gomulka refused to condemn Tito. In a struggle for power with Bierut he was defeated. In 1949, he was expelled from the Party as a deviant and, two years later, he was imprisoned. He spent three years in prison. In October, 1956, he regained power as the First Secretary of the Communist Party. Gomulka was in power until December, 1970. After the riot in Gdansk, he was forced to leave that office to Gierek.

⁹ Churchill and Roosevelt were pleased with Stalin when he declared himself in favor of free election in Poland. But it was a matter of ingenuity to take it seriously when they were well informed about the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of partition of Poland, compulsory deportation of Poles in Siberia, their extermination in Russian concentration camps, and most importantly, the personal responsibility of Stalin for murdering more than 10,000 Polish officers in the Katyn Forest. Roosevelt especially was confident in his personal success in negotiating with Stalin, but by the end of the War, Roosevelt was no longer alive.

¹⁰ Poland lost such traditional centers like: Vilno, Lvov. In

London. In fact, the political situation in Poland, even if it already had been predetermined, was very tense. The Communist regime, backed by the Soviets, began merciless purges whose main target became the Home Army and other Polish anti-communists.¹¹ The opposition had not much chance, even if it existed until 1948. Time worked for the regime. Sporadic bloody conflicts between opposition and the new regime were completely useless.¹² There was no way to divert the events. The Communist regime, by fair means or foul, was consolidating its power very fast.

There was, however, one more thing that the new regime desperately needed: a "placet" of the people. That was totally in vein with the Yalta agreement and the Potsdam conference in 1945, which intended free election as a basis for a permanent Polish government. The elections were held on January 19, 1947. The result surprised no one, not only

return it received Gdansk (Danzig), Wroclaw (Breslau), and Szczecin (Stettin). Russia has retained 47 per cent of the prewar Polish territory. In total, Poland has been reduced from 388.6 to 311.7 thousand square kilometers.

¹¹Even a simple affiliation to the Home Army was sufficient to be imprisoned, to be sent to Siberia, or to get a death sentence. Great numbers of people have disappeared. See William J. Rose, op. cit., p. 276; cf. Aleksander Groth, op. cit., p. 19.

Gomulka openly recognized the importance of the presence of the Red Army for the political change in Poland after World War II. See Wladyslaw Gomulka, W walce o demokracje ludowe (Warszawa: PWN, 1947), Vol. 1, p. 303.

Syzdek calls the presence of the Red Army "the favorable conditions for the creation of the revolutionary authority" in Poland. Bronislaw Syzdek, "Strategia PPR w walce o zdobycie i utrwalenie wladzy ludowej," Ideologia i Polityka 1 (1970), p. 78.

¹²In 1947, pro-Soviet General Karol Swierczewski was executed by Ukrainian Nationalist guerillas.

because of different kinds of intimidations and repressions carried out by the Ministry of Public Security and the secret police, but simply because the counting of votes was an exclusive privilege of the Communist Party.¹³ So, the election resulted in an overwhelming "victory" of the Communist Party: 382 seats for so-called "Democratic Bloc" totally controlled by the Communists, 17 seats for the Labor Party, 14 for Dissident Peasants, 27 for Peasant Party of Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, 1 for Independent Socialist, and 3 for Catholics.¹⁴

A few months later, it was already clear, that the so-called "Governmental Coalition" was simply a fiction. The Communist Party controlled the government completely. The only party which had some influence was the Peasant Party headed by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk.¹⁵ It was,

¹³Already in 1946, the PPR forced the PPS to campaign together for the election. The Party propaganda referred to that as to "an agreement" of common electoral campaign. See Bronislaw Syzdek, op. cit., p. 83. Z. Zulawski, the only independent socialist elected, made a comment: "It was not a free election, it was not an election at all, but organized violence over the electorate and his conscience . . . It was not allowed to publish even one single electoral appeal . . ." Cited by Clifford R. Barnett and others, Poland (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1958), p. 96. Mikolajczyk's party faced similar difficulties. "The Communists made determined efforts to break up all our meetings. In Katowice they ordered the workers . . . to gather in their own meetings at the time of our scheduled meetings and to demonstrate against us . . . At Radom . . . the band of thugs . . . (was) sent against us . . . At Opole the Communists crowded into our meeting hall and interrupted our speakers . . . Stanislaw Mikolajczyk The Rape of Poland; Pattern of Soviet Aggression (Wesport Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 158 159. After the election, the the Peasant Party's newspaper, Gazeta Ludowa, was forced to publish the electoral result, ibid., p. 200.

¹⁴Clifford R. Barnett, et al., op. cit., p. 96.

¹⁵At that time the PPS was extremely weak because it lacked an adequate leadership. The Socialist Party lost its prominent leaders: Germans executed Niedzialkowski and Dubois; Puziak died in Soviet

however, quickly accused of being "a party of capitalists and reactionaries, composed of landlords and factory owners . . ."¹⁶ At the meeting of PPR in Bydgoszcz, Tadeusz Krzysniak, attacked personally Mikolajczyk, calling him "a thief and bandit . . . Mikolajczyk will be arrested," he said, "and executed."¹⁷ At that point it was clear that Mikolajczyk's day were numbered. He saved his life by taking refuge abroad. The secret police (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa--UB) commended by Russian trained Stanislaw Radkiewicz and so-called Voluntary Citizens Militia, undertook an uninterrupted series of acts of violence directed against all potential opposing forces. Also the Polish Army, with its high number of Russian officers, was aimed in backing the Communist Party.

Communist propaganda doubled its efforts to enlarge the Party membership, and it succeeded. The party membership increased from 135,728 in 1945 to 1,200,000 by 1949, to 1,297,000 by 1954.¹⁸

Until 1947, perhaps because of its own problems, Russia did not interfere much in the Eastern European countries policy, with one exception--Czechoslovakia. In all other countries there was a visible consolidation of power of the communist parties. Russian-trained leaders were sufficiently trusted by Stalin. But since 1947, Stalin

Prison, Erlich and Alter were exterminated by the NKVD.

¹⁶ Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, op. cit., p. 153.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jednosc czy konflikty (London: Odnova, 1964), p. 72.

decided to form a new international communist movement called COMINFORM. The inaugurating meeting serving this purpose took place on September 21, 1947, in Szklarska Poreba in Poland. It was that issue, however, that brought about dissension in the Communist bloc. The first person to oppose that idea was Gomulka, claiming the right of the Polish road to socialism. For the same reason Gomulka defended slow collectivization of the private farms in Poland. This little bit of diversity requested by Gomulka was called "Gomulkaism," later described as heresy. The meeting in Szklarska Poreba did not solve the problem. But the opposition to Gomulka was growing from month to month. During the Party Plenum in August, 1948, he was openly attacked by Bierut, Berman and the Russian ambassador to Warsaw, Lebediev.¹⁹ Gomulka admitted some mistakes, but he had enough courage to counter-attack. This did not help him much. In 1951, Gomulka was arrested and spent three years in jail.²⁰ Arrested with Gomulka were his associates: Zenon Kliszko and Marian Spychalski.²¹ Stalinism experienced its hey-day in Poland.

¹⁹Nowe Drogi, January, 1947, p. 40.

²⁰Gomulka was never brought to trial. There are several possible explanations of that fact. The most probable is that Bierut knew very well that Gomulka was a genuine communist, even if not highly educated, and that Gomulka was incredibly stubborn. No persuasions or tortures would bring him to confess crimes he has never committed. Gomulka's trial might very easily turn into Bierut's trial. Cf. Nicholas Bethell, op. cit., p. 190; Vaclav L. Benes and Norman J. Pounds, op. cit., pp. 282-824; Aleksander J. Groth, op. cit., p. 61; Jan B. de Weydenthal, Communists of Poland (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. 64-65.

²¹First Spychalski, later on Gomulka, were arrested by an UB colonel, J. Swiatlo, who, a few months later, defected to the West and broadcast his memories through Radio Free Europe.

Postwar Economic Change in Poland

Political change in Poland after World War II brought about change in the economic system. Poland, between the wars, was a backward country with a highly stagnant economy. The country was overwhelmingly agricultural. This situation was due partially to the 125 years of lasting partition, the exploitation of Poland by foreign capital, and partly to poor between-war economic policies. The index of the industrial production per capita in 1939, in Poland. e.g., did not reach the quota of 200 zlotys. When the same world's index was 300 zlotys; Italy's industrial index was close to 600 zlotys, that of France, 1250; of Great Britain, 1400, and of the United States, 2300.²²

The pre-World War II Polish economy was stagnant. For example, although the population increased by five million during the period of ten years (1921-1930), the industrial employment rate rose only by 100,000 people.²³ The villages were poor and overpopulated.

World War II could only aggravate the already difficult economic situation. During the War Poland lost 22 per cent of its population and 38 per cent of its total resources. The losses in different sectors varied: they reached 33 per cent in industry, 35 per cent in agriculture, 28 per cent in forests, 83 per cent in transportation, 62 per cent in communication, and 60 per cent in schools and scientific institu-

²²Guilio Gelibter, Polonia oggi e domani (Bologna: Capelli, 1975), p. 57.

²³Aleksander J. Groth, op. cit., p. 99.

tions.²⁴ Some big cities like Warsaw, Szczecin, Gdansk, Wroclaw, and many more towns and villages were turned into heaps of ruins.

Every Marxist handbook of political economy points out the necessity of the material basis for the development of socialism. This material bases consists of socialized production, that is, the creation of a society without private ownership of the means of production, and in consequence, the creation of a society without exploitation. "Abolition of the private property," writes Gilejko, "creates an economic basis for the development of democracy, i.e., the fundamental condition to overcome the narrowness of bourgeois laws."²⁵

By shaping human needs, aspirations and satisfactions, the economic system shapes also the system of beliefs, values and career patterns. The economic system, therefore, has social repercussions. Creation of such material basis for socialism in Poland, required several changes in the prewar economic system. The most important were agrarian reform, nationalization of banks and reform of the whole industrial and educational systems.

Agrarian Reform

It was on January 6, 1944, eight months before the end of World War II, that the PKWN issued the decree on the agrarian reform.²⁶ The

²⁴ Andrzej Bodnar, "Economie" in Pologne: réalités et problèmes, by J. Leszno (Krakow: PWN, 1966), p. 123.

²⁵ Leszek Gilejko, "Ekonomiczne podstawy demokracji socjalistycznej," Ideologia i Polityka 2 (1976), p. 33.

²⁶ Dziennik Ustaw, No. 4, 1944.

agrarian reform consisted of three different, at least juridically, acts: confiscation, nationalization, and "reglament." The first consisted of seizure of private property which belonged to the individuals or to the groups because of some criminal activities of these individuals or groups. Confiscation gives no right to appeal in court.

The confiscation of 1944, in Poland, included the private property of the following physical or corporate bodies: property of German citizens and of the Polish citizens of German background; property of all individuals convicted of a collaboration with Nazis during the period of German occupation of Poland; private property of land in which the whole area exceeded 100 hectares or 50 hectares of arable land.²⁷

The State control over the forests took the form of nationalization.²⁸ Juridically, nationalization consists on conversion from private to State ownership and control. Nationalized property was normally intended to be compensated (not always). By the force of the decree of the PKWN of 1944, all forests whose areas exceeded 25 hectares have been nationalized along with all other facilities which make possible forest management such as meadows, waters, and so forth.²⁹

The third legal act of economic reform, "reglament," aimed at a

²⁷ 1 ha = 2.371 acres. The clause of 50 ha of arable land did not apply equally to the whole country.

²⁸ A similar decree was issued in 1945, which specified the purpose the confiscated land was destined. The decree mentioned: creation of private farms, creation of specific farms, reservations, industrial or residential urban centers. The decree did not mention the State farms.

²⁹ Dziennik Ustaw, No. 15, 1944.

complete control by the State over the resources, products and the process of production in purpose to limit, and later on, eliminate the private sector of the economy and consequently eliminate any competition. This type of juridical act regarding agriculture was enforced only in the 1940s and early 1950s, during Stalinism as an intensive campaign against kulaks. The policy followed the Russian method of struggle against rich farmers, but it has never reached, in Poland, the point of physical destruction of individuals. The State tried to destroy them by heavy taxes (in money and nature), by refusing to sell them fertilizers or machines. The State propaganda machine used its power to portray them as an exploiting class. During this time of attempted collectivization Polish agriculture experienced its lowest productivity.³⁰

Nationalization of Banks and Industry

Nationalization of the banks and the fundamental branches of the national economy came fifteen months after the agrarian reform had taken place. A decree of January 3, 1946, introduced these changes.³¹ In accordance with that decree the following branches of the national economy became confiscated: factories, banks, mining, communication, insurance, and commerce if they belonged to Germany or to the free city of Gdansk, to German citizens or citizens of Gdansk, to the corporate body

³⁰ There is no data available on the real earnings in the State farms until 1955; this is probably because the data would be discrediting to the system. Cf. Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. XL.

³¹ Dziennik Ustaw, No. 3, 1946.

of Gdansk, or Germany, and finally, to political refugees in Germany. All other industries such as steelworks, coking plants, the textile industry, printing firms, etc. (the decree specified 17 of them), were nationalized. Nationalization of these branches of industry was to be accompanied by compensation which, however, never occurred. Additionally, all establishments not mentioned elsewhere but capable of employing more than 50 employees per shift were nationalized. The confiscation and nationalization of industry practically eliminated foreign capital from Poland and gave the government complete control over the economy of the country.³²

The radical changes in the Polish economy, just described, did not determine, by themselves, the international market for Poland. Russian policy accomplished that. As early as the late 1940s, it became clear that Russia intended to link the Polish economy with the Soviet economy and consequently to completely subordinate it. Poland, under Russian pressure, could not participate in the Marshall Plan even if initially it intended to do so.³³ Instead, Poland was forced to participate in the Russian sponsored CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). In the words of the official propaganda, the CMEA served the purpose of consolidation of the economies of its members by the means of technical assistance. "Mutual aid in the form of raw materials, food, machinery,

³²This was true nevertheless the fact that the decree of 1949 mentioned three sectors of the Polish economy: public, private, and cooperative.

³³Cf. James F. Morrison, The Polish People's Republic (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 5.

and equipment was supposed to be made available to all six initial CMEA members."³⁴

Meantime, Poland received in UNRRA aid nearly half a billion dollars.³⁵ This evidently helped Poland shorten the period of reconstruction of the country according to the Three Year Plan (1946-149).³⁶ Following the Soviet model, with most investments poured into heavy industry, Poland sacrificed the investment in consumer goods and agriculture. The curves on page 95 indicate clearly the discrepancy between the growth of industry and agriculture in Poland. Agriculture has always been a neglected sector of the Communist economy as is light industry. These are the main reasons why the standard of living in the Communist countries is very low, and virtually all of them import grain from the capitalist countries. This policy brought about considerable growth and a variety of industrial production in Poland.³⁷ Poland

³⁴Richard Staar, Poland 1944-1962 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975), p. 123.

³⁵UNRRA, Report of the Director General to the Council for the Period July 1, 1947 to December 31, 1947 (Washington, D.C., 1948), p. 204.

³⁶Cf. Thad P. Alton, Polish Postwar Economy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955); Nicolas Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe (New York: Technology Press and Wiley, 1957); Alfred Zauberman, Industrial Progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, 1937-1962 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).

³⁷There were three periods in the postwar policy of the economic development of the country: (1) reconstruction period up to 1949; (2) basic industrialization with emphasis on heavy industry from 1950-1960, and (3) complementary industrialization of the country with more stress on the consumer goods 1961-1970.




Figure 4

Industrial and Agricultural Progress in Poland

¹Adapted from Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980, pp. xxxvi-xxxvii and xv-xvi.

started to produce new machines, ships and even jet fighters, radar (and other sophisticated) equipment.³⁸

The Reform of the Education
and Socialization System

The introduction of free schooling (including college) has been essential for social, economic, and structural change in Poland.³⁹ The system itself could not be cured instantly because of losses during the years of German occupation in personnel, school building, school supplies, etc. During the War, Poland lost 700 college professors and assistant professors, 1,000 high school teachers and 4,000 grammar and elementary school teachers.⁴⁰

During the reconstruction period, private schools (especially high schools), were tolerated because of the limited resources of the government. However, once the regime stood on its feet, the policy was radically changed. In consequence private school were eliminated, religion classes were banished, and Marxist ideology was taught in every school.⁴¹

³⁸Cf. James F. Morrison, op. cit., p. 76.

³⁹During the prewar period about 10 per cent of school age children, mainly in villages, did not attend school at all. Given the fact that a few scholarships were available, the majority of youth could not afford to continue their studies in high school and college. College and even high school education was practically reserved to higher classes.

⁴⁰Western Press Agency, Bul. No. 3, 1957; Cf. Jan T. Gross, Polish Society Under German Occupation (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 74, 235.

⁴¹There have been brought into being two organizations which were

The changes in the educational system had three objectives: eradication of illiteracy, democratization of the composition of schools, and Marxist-Leninist indoctrination of pupils. The programs in schools were modeled on the Russian style and school curriculums were made uniform.

Compulsory primary education and several programs for adult education served to eradicate illiteracy. This was virtually achieved by the end of the 1960s.

As a means to balance school pupil composition, a democratization policy was initiated. It favored pupils from working and peasant classes. This was accomplished by giving such students additional entry points because of their social background and by fixing a quota on the proportion of students from different social classes.

Teaching of the Marxist ideology had been introduced in 1948. Intensification, however, of the indoctrination varied in different periods: strong during Stalinism, liberal after October, 1956, and moderate with a tendency to strong in 1960s and 1970s.⁴²

The scheme on page 98 represents the Polish school system which was introduced in 1967/68. The main novelty of this system was that the

supposed to serve this purpose directly: Society for Secular Schools (Towarzystwo Szkoły Świeckiej--TSS) and the Society of Atheists and Freethinkers (Stowarzyszenie Ateistów i Wolnomyslicieli--SAiW).

⁴² A new reform of teaching and learning was proposed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It consisted mainly in doing homework in schools under the supervision of teachers. With the ban on religious instruction in schools, this would practically eliminate any possibility of teaching religion after classes. For this reason, the Polish bishops openly questioned such a proposal.




Figure 5

School System in Poland

¹Adapted from Area Handbook for Poland (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 92.

was that the seven-year, mandatory elementary school was extended by one year. This additional year was supposed to be spent for broadening pure science and socio-political education.

Preschool education includes nurseries (1-3 year old children) and kindergartens (4-7 years old). In 1970/71, there were about 1,000 nurseries which were able to serve 4.7 per cent of the children.⁴³ The situation was not much better in 1978, since the capacity of nurseries increased only by 0.5 per cent.⁴⁴

In comparison with the nurseries, the kindergarten system was significantly improved.⁴⁵ In 1970/71, there existed about 8,900 kindergartens which served 49, 825 4-7 year old children. By 1978/79, the number of kindergartens rose to 14,669 and their pupils to 904,353.⁴⁶

In 1970/71, in Poland there were 26,126 elementary schools of which 5,000 were huge school complexes located in the urban areas. The total enrollment amount to 5,257,000 students almost equally divided between cities and villages.⁴⁷ The elementary school curriculum is standardized and includes Polish, basic mathematics, music, physical

⁴³Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 424.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Kindergartens are subjected to the Ministry of Education and Socialization, while the nurseries are under authority of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, which is visibly neglected and inefficient.

⁴⁶Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 378.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 379.

education, and practical work . . . The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth grades include other subjects such as history, biology, chemistry, physics, and Russian.

Approximately 90 per cent of the elementary school graduates continue their education. The majority of them, however, enter basic vocational schools which do not have the same prestige as high vocational schools. Only the diplomas of the schools of general education and the vocational high schools qualify graduates to enter college after having passed an entrance examination. In 1971/72, there were 909,700 students studying in the basic vocational schools, 401,900 in the high schools of general education, and 474,800 in the vocational high schools.⁴⁸

Finally, in 1970/71, there were 85 colleges and universities with 330,000 students of whom two thirds were degree candidates.⁴⁹ The others were evening, nondegree, and correspondence students.⁵⁰ In the same year there were more than 300 student hotels providing lodging and board. The majority of students are on full scholarships. Yet the number of college candidates considerably exceeds the number of places available. In 1971/72, the demand exceeded the supply by 42,000 places

⁴⁸Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 379.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 548-59.

⁵⁰In 1979/80, the number of students rose to 469,368. See Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980, p. 408.

and constituted 181 per cent of the supply.⁵¹

In spite of these restrictions, twenty years after the communist regime took power, some 73 per cent of the youth between the ages of fourteen and seventeen were attending schools in 1963/64 in comparison with 14 per cent in 1937/38.⁵²

Every totalitarian regime, more than any other type of system, has a genuine interest in controlling the socialization and education of youth. This held true for prewar Fascist regimes and it is still more evident in the case of communist parties policies. "It is upon the young that the hopes of the dictatorship are focused, and the totalitarian regime never tires of asserting that the future belongs to the youth."⁵³

⁵¹Area Handbook for Poland, op. cit., p. 99.

⁵²Bogdan Suchodolski and Feliks Bielecki, "Instruction et éducation," Pologne: réalités et problèmes by J. Leszno (Krakow: PWN, 1966, p. 230).

⁵³Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Authority (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 60.

Young people have not yet committed themselves definitely to one thing or another. This is why it is much easier to influence their choices than the choices of the adults. On the other hand, the exuberent demand for freedom of youth might work very well in opposite direction and bring about riots and protests. "Youth exuberance and idealism," as Cornell stresses, "are to be harnessed to regime-defined goals, and are not to be manifested in individual self-expression." Richard Cornell, Youth and Communism (New York: Walker and Company, 1965), p. 3 (Introduction).

"What is striking . . .," observe some sociologists, "is a high number of indifferent attitudes regarding all so-called mass organizations' popularity. But if we compare them (members) with the opinions we obtained directly from the members of these organizations, it becomes clear, that only to a very small degree their large memberships were an

In Poland, as in Russia, a considerable effort had been devoted to organizing, controlling, and indoctrinating youth. The immediate postwar Polish policy regarding youth followed closely the Soviet patterns characterized by their negative and positive aspects. The first aimed at elimination of the private school system and ban on opposite ideologies (especially religious views). The others were stressing the necessity of youth organization in the framework of the socialist system. The negative aspects have already been discussed. We need now to further explore the last ones.

By the end of World War II, there were in Poland four youth movements affiliated with the major political parties: The Young Peasants (WICI) was controlled by the Peasant Party; the Union of Youth for Struggle (Zwiazek Walki Mlodych---ZWM) was affiliated with the Polish Workers' Party; the Socialist Party had an auxiliary in the Socialist youth organization and finally, there was a middle class youth organized as "liberal democrats."

In 1948, a "unity congress" took place during which all these movements were ordered to merge into one--the Union of Polish Youth (Zwiazek Mlodziezy Polskiej--ZMP). With the pressure of the regime on youth to join the ZMP, the membership of this new body grew very fast.

outcome of the positive attitudes toward them," Halina Bialkowna Irena Majchrzakowa and Renata Tulli, "Postawy robotnikow fabryki samochodow osobowych wobec organizacji spolecznych roznego typu," Z badan klasy robotniczej i inteligencji by J. S. Szczepanski, (Lodz: PWN, 1958), p. 115.

In 1955, the ZMP numbered 2,019,000 members.⁵⁴ The ZMP became a monopolistic youth organization. Almost the whole career of a young person such as an entrance to college, getting an apartment or better job, faster promotion, etc., depended on that organizational membership. "In the period 1948-56, a youth had only one alternative: to join the ZMP or stay out of the youth organization."⁵⁵

Artificially created and ideologically divided, the ZMP broke down once the external pressure had been weakened. This happened after October, 1956. The ZMP had split into the Union of the Socialist Youth (Związek Młodzieży Socjalistycznej--ZMS) backed by the Communist Party and the Union of Peasants Youth (Związek Młodzieży Wiejskiej--ZMW).

The separate student organizations survived until August, 1950, when they were ordered to merge into one organization: the Polish Academic Youth Union (Związek Akademickiej Młodzieży Polskiej--ZAMP). Later on, this organization changed its name to the Polish Students' Union (Zrzeszenie Studentów Polskich--ZSP). Although the ZSP had incorporated more than 80 per cent of all students, it had little political significance because of lack of spontaneity and political involvement of its members. Many students considered their membership as a necessary condition to be admitted to college or to get a grant of scholarship. "In

⁵⁴Richard Cornell, op. cit., p. 161.

⁵⁵Maria Jarosinska and Halina Najduchowska, "Młodzież robotnicza wobec Związku Młodzieży Polskiej w okresie kryzysu," Z badań klasy robotniczej i inteligencji by J. J. Szczepanski (Lodz: PWN, 1958), p. 140.

consequence," as Benes and Pound stress, "many young people lost interest in public affairs and fell back on that internal emigration which can be found in all modern democratic societies."⁵⁶ Since 1970, the ZSP figured under the name of the Polish Students' Socialist Union (Socjalistyczny Związek Studentów Polskich--SZSP). The membership of the SZSP reached 228, 200.⁵⁷

The Scouts organization had always been considered the most important youth organization. Until 1948, however, the regime made no special efforts to infiltrate this organization. This "neglect" was probably connected with the uncertainty and instability in the country, and the urgency of solving other problems. But in 1948, the Scouts (Związek Harcerstwa Polskiego--ZHP) came under communist influence which has persisted to the present. Only for a short period of time, practically one year after October 1956, the ZHP was not under the regime's control. During that short period the organization grew enormously. Already in 1957, a controversy arose regarding the ZHP. One side wanted it apolitical, and the other (the regime) intended to use the ZHP for its purposes. As one might expect, the last group prevailed. The ZHP, as other youth organizations, has been totally controlled by the regime. In 1960, the ZHP had 728,600 members; in 1975,

⁵⁶Vaclav L. Benes and Norman J. Pound, op. cit., p. 53. The Party newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, observed in connection with that: "Only conformity of personal effort with national objectives" creates conditions in which talents and abilities can be developed. Trybuna Ludu, December 18, 1962.

⁵⁷Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980, p. 23.

2,680,300, and by 1979, it grew to 3,442,300.⁵⁸

Whatever one might say about the changes in the educational system in Poland after World War II, one thing cannot be denied: a new channel of upward mobility on the basis of skill and knowledge has been opened for many people. This decisively fostered the growth in size and diversity of the intelligentsia class. The classical intelligentsia has become a minority among the highly educated people. Instead, the technical intelligentsia has grown. This has resulted from the ever increasing demand for technical skills arising from the growth in size and sophistication of modern industry.

Ironically or not, but the three reforms just discussed (agrarian reform, nationalization of industry, and school system reform) brought about the growth of three main social classes which later on, in some way or other, were challenging the power elite (Communist Party) which had created favorable conditions for the rise of the new challengers. The agrarian reform of 1944 distributed millions of acres of land to the prewar rural proletariat. Created in this way a new class of small peasants was the first to oppose the nationalization of peasants' pieces of land already in the early 1950s. A new generation of intelligentsia moved up in the social hierarchy, thanks to school reform which permitted young people to enter college with free tuition, started to challenge the rule of the political elite in the late 1950s. They have been called "revisionists." Finally, there was the most numerous class, the working class, which were brought in large numbers from over-populated villages,

to become the most powerful challenger to the power elite which claims to represent the working class interests.

Although this research will analyze, to some extent, all three aspects of the conflict in Poland, the main attention will be paid to the workers' insurrections in the postwar period.

The take over by the Communist Party has brought about a new socio-political situation. The reforms mentioned above were one of the aspects of this new socio-political reality. But the reforms themselves could be achieved only because the Communist Party had an absolute control over social, economic, and political life. This aspect of the socialist societies in general, and the Polish society in particular, has to be pointed out very strongly because the totalitarian power of the communist parties accounts for the formation of the political elite, which is the key factor for understanding class structure and class conflict in the state socialist societies. That will be a subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM

It is impossible to analyze the class system in the socialist societies without taking into consideration the role the Communist Party plays in those regimes.¹ The Party, in the socialist systems, "is the backbone of the entire political, economic, and ideological activity. The entire public life is at a standstill or moves ahead, falls behind or turns around according to what happens in the Party forums."² High ranking military officers, public officials, politicians and even union leaders all belong to the same Party which has no counterpart. The Party elite controls all intermediate bodies. This is so true, that one can say that "the Communist government . . . is a party government, the

¹Using the term "socialist regime" I refer to the so-called People's Democracies, and not to the socialist regimes in the sense of the Western understanding of socialism.

Also the "party" in socialist regimes has a different meaning from what the Western people mean by the political party. Communist parties adapt the form of the political party, but they do not function as the Western political parties do. "They do not freely recruit their membership, as democratic parties do, but institute the sort of tests that are characteristic of clubs, orders . . . They correspondingly practice the technique of expulsion . . .; within the totalitarian party there is also no 'democracy'." Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 45; cf. Fred Schwarz, You Can Trust the Communist to be Communist (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1960), Chapters 2; 3; Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements (New York: Meridith Corp., 1951), Chapter 15; Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965).

²Milovan Djilas, The New Class, op. cit., p. 70.

the Communist army is a party army; and the state is a party state."³ For Marxists, as it was for Marx, the Party is necessary to the proletariat in order to transform it into a revolutionary class. "The party is conceived as the organization, incarnation, or institutionalization of class consciousness."⁴ The Party is the "vanguard of the proletariat" in the achievement of its final goals. As such, it is able to grasp far-reaching aims and course the society's development. "If 'the masses' happen to disagree with the course chosen by their rules, this bears evidence only to the 'immaturity' of the masses themselves, to their inability to grasp the far-sighted wisdom of the leadership Therefore the party, as the repository and the guardian of the ideal society to come, needs no endorsement from its contemporaries; much less can it allow itself to be diverted from its path by sluggish pace of the unenlightened and thereby retarded, majority."⁵

Party authority is established on every level of social, economic, and political organization. This is not only because all high social, economic, and political positions are held by the Party members, but additionally, because every level of such positions corresponds to the Party hierarchy. This creates two interlocking hierarchies: governmental hierarchy and, corresponding to it, a Party hierarchy (see the

³Milovan Djilas, *The New Cass*, op. cit., p. 72.

⁴Alfred Meyer, *Leninism* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), pp. 32-33.

⁵Zygmunt Bauman, "Officialdom and Class: Bases of Inequality in the Socialist Society," *The Social Analysis of Class Structure* by F.

scheme on page 117). The first coordinates social and economic life, while the Party hierarchy's role is to watch over the governmental activities of the corresponding level and endeavor to promote the execution of orders through the regular administrative channels. Party functionaries should not interfere with the work of governmental hierarchies, but their role is to help if any aid is necessary. But, as Bendix points out, "in every case the Party reserves for itself the right to judge and to distinguish 'aid' from 'interference'".⁶

The Party itself is organized in accordance with so-called "democratic centralism."⁷ The main feature of the democratic centralism is not only a personal loyalty of all members to the Party line, but also a total identification (mental and emotional) with the Party principles. This is a form of a growing process. "After long acquaintance with his role, a man grows into it so closely that he can no longer differentiate his true self from the self he simulates, so that even the most intimate of individuals speak to each other in the party slogans."⁸

Party hierarchy is shaped as a pyramid. The lowest level of the pyramid is organized in local groups whose representatives participate in the provincial meetings. Any decision on that level absolutely binds

Parkin (London: Tavistock Publications Limited, 1974), p. 137.

⁶ Reinhard Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry (New York, Harper and Row, 1963), p. 399.

⁷ Gordon H. Skilling, The Governments of Communist East Europe (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967), pp. 62-64.

⁸ Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), p. 52.

the local organizations. The provincial authorities are controlled, in turn, by the central committee which has its executive body in the Politburo. Additionally, in every establishment there is the so-called factory Party organization whose decisions exceed ideological issues. They are also binding in regard to purely economic matters.

The effectiveness of the Party requires unanimity of minds, will, and programs. No deviation can be tolerated because the central committee of the Party enjoys the privilege of issuing absolute truths. On the base of that assumption, for example, the spokesman for Gomulka, J. Morawski, said in 1958: "There is only one Marxism: the one that guides the Party . . ."⁹ This totalitarian character of the Party leads often to dilemmas and purges.¹⁰ In the case of necessity, the Party find enough victims to be sacrificed to save its reputation. The Party is never wrong; only individuals can make mistakes. This was strongly pointed out during Trotsky's trial and his confession. "Comrades, none of us wishes to be or can be right against his party. In the final reckoning the party is always right, because the party is the only historic instrument that the proletariat possesses for the solution of its fundamental problems . . . I know that to be right against the party is impossible. One can be right only with the party and through the party, since history has not created any other paths for the reali-

⁹ Polityka, December 13, 1958.

¹⁰

The purges apply to those who have already accepted the Party ideology or who were associated with the Party.

zation of one's rightness."¹¹ Similarly in 1948, Gomulka confessed his mistakes, but he had an incredible amount of courage to counterattack. He succeeded although he was later imprisoned. The same Gomulka had no chance to defend himself in 1970, when he was forced to leave the office to Gierek. Jaroszewicz, Gierek's Prime Minister, suffered Gomulka's lot in April, 1980.¹² A few months later, Gierek himself (at that time the First Secretary of the Communist Party) did not appear before the decisive Politburo meeting during which he was removed from the office, claiming to have serious heart problems.¹³ The extraordinary Party Congress in July, 1981, stripped Gierek from the Party membership and all medals and honors.¹⁴

The purges among the members of the PUWP were incomparably less severe than those among the Russian deviants, especially during Stalin-

¹¹Trinadtsatyi Sezd RKP (B), Stenograficheski Otchet, Moscow, 1924, pp. 166-67, cited by Thornton Anderson, Masters of Russian Marxism (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963), p. 134.

¹²Dziennik Zwiazkowy, April 3, 1980. Referring to this, Gierek said: "As it is known to you, comrades, Comrade P. Jaroszewicz, asked to postpone his candidacy for high party offices and to be exempted from the duty of Prime Minister. He intends--as he says--to retire." VIII Zjazd PZPR (Warszawa: KiW 1980), p. 235.

¹³Polish radio reported on September 5, 1980: "Polish United Workers' Party First Secretary Edward Gierek developed serious disturbances in the heart this morning . . . The patient is in a hospital . . ." Reported by Sun-Times (Chicago), September 6, 1980.

¹⁴Aron calls this practice "the logic of confessions." Its idea is based on the following presupposition: "whoever is not for the central committee of the communist party is an enemy of the sacred mission of the proletariat, . . ." Raymond Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism, op. cit., p. 189.

ism. For example, Trotsky was expelled from the party, exiled to Alma Ata, forced to leave the country, and finally, executed in Mexico in 1940.¹⁵ In 1934, Kirov; in 1937, Marshall Tukhachewsky, and in 1938, Yezhow were all liquidated.

Every system generally, and the totalitarian system in particular, makes use of ideology as a powerful weapon of the rulers.¹⁶ "A comrade is a comrade by virtue of his beliefs, which are perceived as his most significant qualities."¹⁷ Ideology constitutes a body of principles regarding vital aspects of human existence. Ideology arises from the fact that order, once created intellectually and put in practice, needs adequate explanation. This is a positive aspect of the ideological

¹⁵ Donald W. Treadgold, Twentieth-Century Russia (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1959), p. 283.

¹⁶ Brzezinski defines totalitarianism as "a system in which technologically advanced instruments of political power wielded without restraint by centralized leadership of an elite movement, for the purpose of effecting a total social revolution, including the conditioning of man on the basis of certain arbitrary ideological assumptions proclaimed by the leadership, in an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire population." Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 47-48. The ideology must be accepted, at least passively, by all members of a given society. For Baradat the totalitarian state is "a state in which government controls the economic, social, and cultural as well as political aspects of a society." Leon P. Baradat, Political Ideologies, Their Origins and Impacts (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1979), p. 306. Cf. Aryeh L. Unger, The Totalitarian Party (London: Cambridge University, 1974).

¹⁷ Edward Shils, "Ideology," The Intellectuals and the Powers and Other Essays (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 29. Cf. Robert V. Daniels, The Nature of Communism (New York: Random House, 1962), Chapter 8; Carl J. Friedrich, M. Curtis and B. R. Barber, Totalitarianism in Perspective, Three Views (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969).

views.¹⁸ Besides that, every ideology indicates the ideas which are exceptionally dangerous for its existence. Ideological unity is a necessary condition for the existence of the totalitarian system. This holds true for the Communist system as well. It is ideology which justifies Party policy in absolute terms; a common ideological view prevents the formation of other ideologies or movements. Ideology provides "universal rationale for each decision and activity so that members have a ready-made vocabulary of private motives and public reasons which differ radically from every common universe of discourse."¹⁹ Finally, the unity of ideology constitutes a fundamental condition of the personal dictatorship. Vice versa, the continuity of the ideology is an unmistakable sign of a dictatorship.²⁰

¹⁸Ideology, for Marx, had a derogative meaning. He linked ideology with the "false consciousness" of the bourgeoisie in the process of exploitation of the proletariat.

Mannheim refers to ideology as to "all those utterances the 'falsity' of which is due to an intentional or unintentional conscious, semi-conscious, or unconscious, deluding of one's self or others, taking place on a psychological level and structurally resembling lies." Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1950), pp. 265-66.

As Arendt points out "ideologies always assume that one idea is sufficient to explain everything in the development from the premise, and that no experience can teach anything because everything is comprehended in this consistent process of logical deduction . . . Three elements are peculiar to all ideological thinking: . . . their claim to total explanation . . ., (they are) emancipated from the reality . . ., (and) they achieve this emancipation of thought from experience through certain methods of demonstration . . ." Hannah Arendt, The Origin of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Ind., 1973), pp. 470-471.

¹⁹Reinhard Bendix, op. cit., p. 347.

²⁰"Totalitarian ruler," as Arendt says, "is confronted with a dual

According to the well known principles of orthodox Marxism, the Community Party in general and PUWP in particular express the doctrinal basis of the whole socialist system and enjoy all the attributes and privileges of an absolute monarch. The PUWP establishes the aims and goals of political, economic, and social life. It tends to give homogeneous direction to all socialist programs. It establishes principles and guidelines of State policy. It inspires, directs, and controls all aspects of society through the presence of its members on every level of social classes, Party. Finally, it exclusively prepares personnel for the most important social positions.²¹ The monopoly of political power is necessary if the entirely new society is to be created. "A homogeneous society cannot be forged and social classes suppressed if the rights of the opposition are respected."²²

The Party considers itself not only the unique party of the working class, but also the party of the whole nation. It is the working class party because it traces its origins back to the radical wing of the Polish workers' movements; it follows Marxism-Leninism which is an

task which at first appears contradictory to the point of absurdity; he must establish the fictitious world of the movement as a tangible working reality of every day life, and he must, on the other hand, prevent this new world from developing a new stability; for a stabilization of its laws and institutions would surely liquidate the movement itself and with it the hope for eventual world conquest." Hannah Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 391. The totalitarianism creates a state of permanent instability in which it operates and through which it survives.

²¹ Ludwik Krasucki, "Vie politique," Pologne: réalités et problèmes by J. Leszno (Krakow: PWN, 1966), p. 106.

²² Raymond Aron, *Democracy and Totalitarianism*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

ideology of a matured proletariat, and it is a unique representative of the working class.²³ It is a whole nation party because its policy aims at the interests of all classes: workers, peasants, and intelligentsia, as their representative body; the PUWP tends towards harmonious solution of all problems.²⁴ "Today," says Wojna, ". . . the Party expresses the right of the whole nation, the party and non-party people, the believers and non-believers, to decide about our common fate."²⁵ In Martov and Lenin's words ". . . the Party is the conscious spokesman of an unconscious process."²⁶

An absolute control by the Communist Party over the government, economy, and social and political life is possible through the establishment of the Party hierarchy on every level of the government. Even the Sejm (Parliament), which is intended as the nation's legislative body, is totally controlled by the Party, whose members form a vast majority of the Sejm. Gierek, former First Secretary of the PUWP, said in reference to that:

Wherever proceeds life, wherever people work, wherever important or secondary issues are to be solved--there is our Party. The Party thinks about the people and we, the leaders of that Party . . . have but one goal: to serve the Party, to serve socialism and Poland,

²³Jerzy Wiatr, "Kształtowanie się i rola systemu partyjnego w Polsce," Struktura i dynamika społeczeństwa polskiego by W. Wesolowski, (Warszawa: PWN, 1970), p. 60.

²⁴Ibid., p. 61.

²⁵Zycie Warszawy, September 11, 1971. (Article of Jan Wojna.)

²⁶Vladimir I. Lenin, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," Selected

because Poland and socialism are the same thing.²⁷

The diagram on page 117 represents the power structure in Poland and the establishment of the Party line on every level of social organization.

Unity with masses, in the Party's view, is not a static, but a dynamic unity. Once it has taken place it is growing, broadening, strengthened by the unity of ideology, the quality of socio-political solutions of the important issues and by the socialization and education of the youth.²⁸ The noble goal (creation of the classless society) is the best and unfailing guarantee of a total success.

Class structure, in Marx' view, is inseparably linked with class conflict in a society. Vice versa, the presence of structural conflict is an unmistakable sign that a given society is stratified. "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."²⁹

From the Marxian point of view it is not only possible, but even more plausible, to start the structural analysis of a given society with an analysis of conflict in that society. That will make possible

Works (International Publishers, 1967), Vol. 1, p. 319.

²⁷VII Zjazd PZPR (Warszawa: KiW, 1980), p. 91.

²⁸Cf. Adam Lopatka, "Na czym polega kierownicza rola PZPR w Polsce," Partia-panstwo-spoleczenstwo by R. Dudek and Z. Siembrowicz (Warszawa: KiW, 1978), p. 75; A. Jegorov, "Partia komunistyczna w warunkach rozwiniętego socjalizmu," O rozwiniętym społeczeństwie socjalistycznym by H. Cholaj and F. Ociepka (Warszawa: KiW, 1979), Vol. 1.

²⁹Karl Marx, CM, op. cit., p. 9.




Figure 6

1

Party Hierarchy and the Governmental Power Structure

¹ Adapted from Jan. J. Szczepanski, Polish Society (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 61.

the identification of the parties in conflict and their conflictual interests.

From many different approaches this research chooses the latter: Marxian logic. It starts with an extensive discussion on the existing conflicts in Poland giving special attention to two main protagonists in those conflicts: power elite, and working class (mainly blue-collar workers). It further stresses the circumstances which visibly fostered such conflicts. The impossibility of explaining these conflicts on the basis of Marx' theory of class and class conflict, will bring from this analysis a redefinition of classes in State-run socialist societies.

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P A R T T H R E E

POSTWAR POLISH WORKERS' UPHEAVALS

CHAPTER V

MAIN SOURCES OF STRAIN IN THE POSTWAR POLISH SOCIETY

The central thesis of Marx' theory of class is that the classes cannot coexist without entering into class conflict or class struggle. In order to eliminate class conflict, it is necessary to abolish social classes. Hence, social classes arise on the basis of different relations to the means of production, therefore, with the abolition of the private means of production, the class conflict will also disappear. On the contrary, by proving the existence of a structural conflict in a given society, one ipso facto proves the existence of at least two classes which participate in the conflict.

With the proletarian revolution the social structure of the capitalist society undergoes radical changes. The class of the bourgeoisie and the class of the land-owners are expropriated and the socialist reconstruction of the society takes place. While in Marx' view the process of total separation of the direct producers from their means of production was relatively long, the proletarian revolution brings about rather rapidly the far reaching changes in class system and class struggle. Capitalist exploiters once deprived of their weapons, are not able to divert the events. Bureaucracy as well as state are eliminated.¹

¹ See Franco Ferraresi and Alberto Spreafico, "Il dibattito sulla burocrazia nella tradizione weberiana ed in quella marxista," Quaderni

Lenin, however, observed that the reality is more complex. He wrote: "During the transition from capitalism to communism . . . (a) special machinery for suppression, the 'state' is still necessary."² Only with the development of communism, the State as a suppressing mechanism will disappear. "Communism renders the state absolutely unnecessary, for there is no one to be suppressed, 'no one' in the sense of class. . ."³

Problem of class disappearance after the nationalization of the means of production appeared to be complicated as well. To explain the differences in social strata (classes) Stalin invented the concept of "nonantagonistic classes." Facing the same difficulty, the contemporary orthodox Marxist sociologists maintain that with the abolition of the "parasitic classes," there also should disappear the antagonistic class relationship, which is rooted in the private ownership of the means of production. Some differences among classes, which originate from the social division of work, differences in wages and power remain, but they do not contribute to conflict; they have no antagonistic character, so

di Sociologia 13 (1975), p. 217; Giuseppe Bucaro, "L'uomo libero in Carlo Marx," Orientamenti Sociali 33 (1977), pp. 73-93.

The reality of the Peoples' Democracies, however, appears to prove the contrary to be true. It is commonly known that the Russian bureaucracy exceeds even that of the capitalist states with an immense build of law enforcement. The situation is similar in other socialist countries. For example, the para-police organization in Poland, ORMO (Voluntary Reserve of the Civic Militia) numbered 99,600 people in 1960, and grew to 379,400 in 1970, and to 428,200 in 1978. Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 22.

²Vladimir I. Lenin, State and Revolution (New York: International Publishers, 1969), p. 74.

³Ibid., p. 75.

they do not endanger the socialist system. The new system itself creates the basis for class integration within a given nation, but the class integration again is not an automatic result of the objective laws of socialism. It can be fostered and accelerated by special means like propaganda.⁴

Even if the socialist system is free of class conflict, it is not yet free of all other possible conflicts, e.g., long-range social interests which require sacrifices from the people, and ad hoc interests--individual's or groups' need to be satisfied. Szczepanski, who is close to being a Marxist sociologist, goes even further. He admits the possibility of worker strikes in the socialist system. He, however, denies their structural character. These types of strikes are not the "class conflicts;" their source is to be located in "economic mismanagement."⁵

Writing in this vein, Polish Marxist sociologists Dobieszewski and Owieczko say: "Contemporary social relations in Poland are characterized by an advanced degree of integration of the basic nation's classes and strata's common interests."⁶ Trybuna Ludu in reporting the agenda of

⁴ Adolf Dobieszewski and Aleksander Owieczko, "Zadania Partii w integracji społeczeństwa," Partia, Państwo, Społeczeństwo by T. Dudek and Z. Siembrowicz (Warszawa: KiW, 1978), p. 87.

⁵ Jan J. Szczepanski, "Zjawiska i procesy dezorganizacji społecznego przedsiębiorstwa," Przemysł i społeczeństwo w Polsce Ludowej by J. J. Szczepanski (Warszawa: Osoolineum, 1969), p. 310.

⁶ Adolf Dobieszewski and Aleksander Owieczko, op. cit., pp. 84-101.

the VII Congress of the Polish United Workers Party said: "It is certain that we constitute a society with a fully developed socialist character . . . Contemporary Poland belongs to those countries in which socialism has rooted very deeply."⁷ Gierek, the first secretary of the PUWP, spoke similarly:

People's Poland, fulfilling the last will of the Polish democrats and revolutionaries has finished with class exploitation and social degradation. For the first time in the history of our nation, there have been created social and material conditions for genuine realization of human right, for real democracy.⁸

This statement was made five years after the Gdansk riot and only a few months before the strike in Radom and Ursus took place in 1976. This is why such a statement has to be brought in question by any serious student of the Polish postwar society. The 1980 strikes may disqualify it completely, and reject it as a simple propaganda slogan. People of the postwar Poland live under a permanent strain which, with some precipitating factors, turns into an open conflict.

In the early 1950s, there were peasants who became the main target of attacks of the new regime which intended to collectivize the private farms. The conflict lost much of its acuteness after 1956, when the regime, under the new leadership of Gomulka, gave a green light to the small private farms. Not all the peasants' problems were solved, but that year marked the end of an open conflict between peasants and the power elite.

⁷Trybuna Ludu, January 8, 1976.

⁸Przemowienie Pierwszego Sekretarza KC PZPR E. Gierka (Warszawa: KiW, 1977), p. 6.

Decimated during the German and Russian occupation and terrorized by the anti-humanitarian methods of the new regime, the Polish intelligentsia was unable to enter into an open conflict with the Party, at least in the early 1950s. It strengthened itself visibly in the late 1950s. Since that time its role in conflict with the regime has become more important.

The most important protagonists of the conflict in Poland after World War II, however, were the working class and power elite. The Polish workers' upheavals are but the most visible signs of the structural conflict never recognized by the regime and not institutionalized through some adequate channels.

As has already been pointed out, there were at least four major strikes and upheavals of Polish workers during the past 36 years of the Communist regime in Poland. The first happened in June 1956 in Poznan. It originated in the Cegielski plant and it soon spread over the whole city.⁹ The second took place in December 1970, and was mainly confined to the northern cities on the Baltic coast: Gdansk, Gdynia, Sopot and Szczecin. The theater of the events of June 1976, was the cities of Radom and Ursus. Finally, the 1980 strike originated in Gdansk and then spread to the other cities of the Baltic and, later on, over the whole country.

These four Polish workers' insurrections can be analyzed as cases

⁹ The workers strike in June 1956 must not be confused with the political events in Poland in October of the same year. There was no direct connection between those two events.

of collective behavior.¹⁰ Collective behavior is viewed as the outcome of the people's will to change the situation which is considered unjust or oppressive. As in any other attempt to solve the problem, collective behavior has to be considered as a process which arises in some conditions, grows, reaches its climax, and is solved. Every stage of that process is necessary in order that the next stage might occur. All classes of factors are combined in a so-called value-added process which is simply the process of limiting and narrowing the end-product range.¹¹

I will adopt this logic in the analysis of the four Polish workers' upheavals in the postwar period. The main reason for adopting this method is its usefulness in dealing with the specificity of the conflict in the totalitarian communist systems. Class conflict in these societies is not recognized and therefore not institutionalized through some adequate channels. The power elite denies its existence and consequently prevents its manifestation, because that would prove that the power elite does not represent the workers and peasants interests, but rather its own. In these circumstances the conflict of interests

¹⁰ Smelser defines collective behavior as "mobilization on the basis of a belief which redefines social action." Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 8. The collective behavior is non-conventional because the participants in it are behaving contrary to the norms generally accepted; it is direct because the actors attack directly the source of evil. Cf. George C. Homans, "Collective Behavior," American Political Science Review 57 (1963).

¹¹ "Value-added" logic is commonly used in the study of economics. The value of the final product is composed of the added values of every stage in the process aimed at the production of the final product. Similarly, in logic one can infer one proposition from another by limit-

creates a permanent strain in these societies. This strain turns into open and violent conflict under some precipitating factors. The political elite solves the conflict by means of physical coercion.

In the framework of Smelser's theory of collective behavior one can summarize the stages in the Polish workers riots as follows:

1. The Structural Conduciveness

The existing structures drive people to behave in a determined way

Noninstitutionalized social conflict in Polish society manifests itself in periodical outbursts

2. The Emergency of Structural Strain

Departure from equilibrium

a. poverty of the large majority of population

b. State - Church conflict

c. Russian rule in Poland

3. The Growth of Generalized Belief

It indicates the nature of the problem and the inability of the institutional operations to solve the problem

Lack of institutionalized means to solve the problem

4. The Role of the Precipitating Factors

Immediate causes of the collective outbursts

Large increase in prices of food and others consumer goods

5. The Mobilization of the Collectivity

Agitation for action

Creation of the strike committees and of a net of communication; role of the messengers

ing the predicate which is a case of value-added process.

6. The Collective Action and Official Control

It depends upon the stage at which control is instituted

- a. attack of the rioters on the Party facilities
- b. isolation of the place of riot by the authorities
- c. disinformation by the official mass media
- d. use of force to control the riots
- e. recognition by the authorities that the riots were caused by objective difficulties
- f. personnel changes of some Party officials
- g. partial or total withdrawal of the proposed food prices

Given the character of the socialist societies where the power elite denies the existence of social classes and structural conflict and consequently does not intend to institutionalize conflict through adequate channels, this research will stress the following stages in the process of the Polish workers insurrections: the situation of strain in the post-war Polish society, the rise of some precipitating factors as the immediate causes of the riots, collective action taken, the solution of the conflict, and the conquests of the upheavals.

There have been at least three basic sources of the permanent strain in the Polish society after World War II. The first, and the most important, was the poverty of the large part of the population occurring simultaneously with the visible wealth of the minority who might be identified as Party people. The second source of the strain was an open conflict between State and Church. This was mainly, but not

exclusively, an ideological conflict. Finally, the third source of the strain in Poland was its dependence on Russia (economic and political).

Economy of Scarcities as a Source
of Strain in Poland

The alarming situation of the Polish economy and connected with that, the poverty of the majority of the population including the working class, was not disclosed publicly before 1956. It became publicly discussed only after the October renewal, which lasted only two years. The political elite was interested not only in keeping it undisclosed, but even in falsifying the real statistical data on the Polish economic reality. Until 1956 no Statistical Year Book (Rocznik Statystyczny) reported data on the minimum wage, cost of living, or the real wages in Poland. Gomulka said in 1956: "The government was creating a fiction about the country's economic prosperity in the past period."¹² In fact, the country's economy was in bad shape, and the working class lived in misery. Warner Klatt outlines the data on the standard of living during the first postwar decade (see Table 1).

It was this situation to which Wazyk was referring in his "Poem for Adults" saying:

¹²Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierza (London), October 20, 1956. The same fiction was created, however, during Gomulka's and Gierek's leaderships. "Statistics (in the communist countries," Kuczynski says, "have not only an informative function but also serves as a means for propaganda. Through 'correction' of the indices, the economic units present themselves in a better light before their superordinating units, and those before the people. When this practice becomes normal, there increases a probability of serious mistakes in the economic statistics of the country . . . There is a strong and motivated conviction that the data on the Polish economy is distorted by such mistakes." Waldemar

TABLE 1

STANDARD OF LIVING DURING THE FIRST DECADE OF THE
COMMUNIST REGIME IN POLAND

Year	Nominal Value of Wages	Cost of Living	Real Value of Wages
1939	100	100	100
1951	428	658	65
1953	693	1025	64
1955	764	1150	67 ^a

^aIndustrial Labor Policy and Living Standards in the Soviet Orbit,
London, 1957, Vol. 1.

. . . There are people from Nowa Huta
who have never been to a theater,
there are Polish apples which Polish children cannot reach.¹³

Gomulka, in his speech in 1957, compared the purchasing power of the 1953 average working class salary with that of 1949. He found the following results: the 1953 working class wage bought 3.8 per cent more wheat, 5 per cent more flour, 13.8 per cent more milk, but 38 per cent less pork fat, 19.4 per cent less pork, 23 per cent less sausage, 26.6 per cent less ham, 37 per cent less veal, 40.3 per cent less beef, 26.6 per cent less butter, 26 per cent less sugar and 35.4 per cent less potatoes.¹⁴ Civiltà Cattolica made a comment on the Polish reality: "Before the War, Poland was exporting agricultural products. Today, after ten years in a communist regime, Poles are hungry. Their standard of living is very low, due mostly to the disproportionate effort of industrialization."¹⁵

No one can deny that the effort of reconstruction and industrialization had a strong impact on the standard of living of the people. "We contracted important investment credits for the expansion of industry,"

¹³ Adam Wazyk, "Poem for Adults," National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe by P. E. Zinner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), p. 47.

¹⁴ "Gomulka's Keynote Speech," World Communism: Key Documentary Material by S. Hook (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1962), p. 233. Cf. La situation dans le Parti et le pays. Rapport de W. Gomulka présenté à la Xme session plénière du Comité central du Parti ouvrier unifié polonais, 24-26 octobre 1957, Bureau d'Informations Polonaises, Paris. Reported by Paul Barton, Misère et révolte de l'ouvrier Polonais (Paris: Confédération Force Ouvrier, 1971). p. 12.

¹⁵ Civiltà Cattolica, Vol. 4 (1957), p. 222.

Gomulka said, "and when the time came for the payment on the first installments, we found ourselves in the situation of insolvent bankruptcy."¹⁶ This is an indirect admission of the mistakes made in the central planning. This time one might even accept that explanation. The same situation, however, will be repeated and the same explanation will be offered again: wrong central planning in the past period. Gomulka blamed Bierut's regime, to be then blamed for the same mistakes by Gierek in 1970, and this to be condemned by Kania's leadership. But as Kurowski observes, the patterned economic crises in Poland have their source in primacy of politics over economy and the priority of political over economic criteria.

When a dictator openly proclaims his preference for farm collectivization in spite of the fact that this causes hunger and malnutrition for generations of people . . . when the head of the local administration of a commune council nags the private farmer . . . when another official imposes an extremely centralized system of management on a company and on a business—all of them . . . act according to the principle of priority of politics over economy.¹⁷

Gomulka's speech of October 21, 1956, offers convincing data on that issue. The data refers to the agricultural output of three different types of agriculture existing at that time in Poland. Table 2 summarizes the statistics (on page 132).

Gomulka concluded his speech: "This is . . . the economic picture

¹⁶Gomulka's Keynote Speech, op. cit., pp. 233-234. Also the Episcopate expressed its critics, e.g., during the 171 Meeting of the Polish Bishops. Cf. Dokumenty (Instytut Literacki, Paryż), 313, (1980), p. 220.

¹⁷Stefan Kurowski's speech during the meeting of the Polish Sociological Association, Warsaw, May 12, 1979.

TABLE 2^a

FARMS IN POLAND: THEIR AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT

1955	Per Cent of The Total Area	Per Cent of Agricultural Output	Value of the Output per Hectar at Constant Prices
Individual Private Farms	78.8	83.9	621.1 zlotys
Kolkhozes	8.6	7.7	517.3 zlotys
State Farms	12.6	8.4	393.7 zlotys

^a Gomulka's Keynote Speech, op. cit., pp. 233-243.

picture of the collective farms. It is a sad picture."¹⁸

In spite of this evident data indicating the higher output of the private farms, the policy toward private farms has never changed, with the exception of a two-year period after October 1956. During the war, levies were imposed on agricultural products (milk, grain, potatoes and meat) produced by private farmers and they were in force until 1946. In 1952, they were reimposed under a new form of so-called "obligatory sale of these products to the State." The burden of that sale consisted in the fact that the price of the sale was established by the government and it was 50 per cent lower than that on the market. Many small farmers found themselves in an absurd situation. Because they were unable to produce for themselves and for the obligatory sale, they had to buy these products at the market and then resell them to the State at a much lower price. In his interview Professor Czuma said:

In the socialized farms, the State invests about 20,000 zloties for one hectar of arable land annually. An average farmer invests ten times less, i.e., 2,000 zloties. And what are the results? In the socialized farms, the production from one hectar is lower than in private holdings.¹⁹

Another problem not solved in the first decade of the communist regime in Poland, was that of housing. In 1950, 150,000 rooms were built. During the Six Years Plan (1950-1956), only 370,000 of the 900,000 rooms outlined by the plan were ever built. In Gomulka's report it was said that "the situation was not much better in the field of

¹⁸Gomulka's Keynote Speech, op. cit., pp. 233-243.

¹⁹Appendix A, Interview 1, p. 374.

public services, health and sanatoria . . ."²⁰

The Party's long term policy was not changed after the 1956 insurrection in Pozan. Besides some increase in wages, two other government concessions, workers' councils and the Trade Union reform, appeared to be very limited in time. Workers' councils, which were intended as the bodies through which the workers could participate in the companies decisions, and which were supposed to mediate between staff and workers in a situation of conflict, were virtually unable to influence the central planners decisions.

Trade Union reform never came through because the Union would not free itself from the tutelage of the Party. The Party did not intend to leave much room for Union activists, lest they lose control over it. In 1958, Gomulka said:

Every non-authorized strike is contrary to the idea of order and Socialist law-abidingness. The strikes which we observe in different places are the signs of anarchy and are not in keeping with socialist liberties. There are, in Poland, symptoms of activities of the people's enemies. We see no room for the protagonists of this type of strike in our factories. Neither state authorities nor the Union can tolerate their subversive activities.²¹

The 1959 Congress of the Communist Party expressed its opinion on the role of the Union and its possible actions of protest, limiting them to "justified" interests and "just" grievances, terms which allowed the Party much space for divergent interpretations, according to the specific circumstances. "Giving in to unjustified vindictive actions and promising impossible things, has nothing to do with efforts

²⁰Gomulka's Keynote Speech, op. cit., p. 234.

²¹Glos Pracy, April 15, 1958.

to reinforce liaisons with the people," said Trybuna Ludu.²² According to the doctrinal guidelines of the same congress, the Union's efforts should be directed toward the following areas of action: increase of job discipline, improvement of the workers professional qualifications, limitations of job changing by the workers, and commitment to the heightening of class consciousness.²³

In 1960, there had been formulated a doctrine of "the unity of the roles" of the Party authorities and of the Trade Union.²⁴ Seven years later Union boss Loga-Sovinski spoke in the same vein: "We (Union) agree with the ideological direction of the PUWP, because this Party's program and its sphere of activities express the legitimate aspirations and interests of the working class and the whole nation."²⁵ In Wesolowski's view, the Union's role consists of bringing to crystalization among the factories' crews "the motivated attitudes toward work, toward proper combining of common interests with those of individuals."²⁶

Among the four tasks of the Union were concern about the increase

²²Trybuna Ludu, March 11, 1959.

²³*Ibid.*, Congress said nothing about the protection of the workers' interests by the Union.

Class consciousness must be understood here as a conformity with the Party.

²⁴Glos Pracy, July 2, 1960.

²⁵*Ibid.*, July 21, 1967.

²⁶Włodzimierz Wesolowski, Klasa robotnicza w Polsce Ludowej (Warszawa: KiW, 1969), p. 37.

of the GNP, guarantee of socialist law-abidingness, care about hygienic work conditions, and greater access of the workers to cultural goods, a direct defense of the interests of the workers was not mentioned. Similar opinions were reported by the newspapers and periodicals: "The Union," wrote Przegląd Związkowy, "has many opportunities to influence the increase of production, and to influence the establishment of prices in accordance with the economic plans of the country."²⁷ A few months before the worker's upheaval in 1976, Trybuna Ludu said, "The Union . . . is a school of civic activities and commitment to the building of the socialist society."²⁸ During the 1980 strike the State Union started to advocate workers' interests, but the workers did not expect any support from the Union which neglected their cause for so many years and which was controlled completely by the State.²⁹ It was the Union's newspaper which, in 1970, bitterly condemned the workers' insurrection: "Adventurism took over the necessary operations during the situation of strain and covered under the name of working class trouble-makers, committed excesses, common crimes and violated rules of social order."³⁰

²⁷Przegląd Związkowy 6 (1969), p. 19.

²⁸Trybuna Ludu, January 26, 1976.

²⁹According to Trybuna Ludu, forty different presidia of State Trade Unions were exclusively occupied by the members of the Communist Party. Cf. Trybuna Ludu, April 23, 1981. Therefore, "the Union was losing face and authority among non-party people . . ." Ibid.

³⁰Głos Pracy, December 19, 1970. The State Trade Union (Centralna Rada Związków Zawodowych) wrote Solidarność "was like a bureaucratized ministry for the Trade Union. Its chief had a status and salary of vice-premier, and its secretaries wages of the under-secretary of

In September 1976, at the initiative of fourteen Polish intellectuals there was founded the Committee for Defense of the Workers (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow--KOR) which influenced significantly the Free Trade Union foundation. In its appeal to the President of the Polish Sejm it described the role of the State Union as "deplorable."³¹

Nonetheless, in spite of some increase in the wages of the Polish workers after the 1956 riot in Poznan, and also of some temporarily limited reforms, the standard of living of the working class remained almost at the same level as before or even deteriorated. This was mainly due to the governmental policy of subordinating wages to the economic plans. In terms of practicality the wage increase was limited to symbolic supplements and rewarding efficiency. As we have already seen it was the Union which in its partnership with the Party, took upon itself the role of assuring that wages would not surpass the ceiling that was imposed by the economic plans.

From that policy of incentives for efficiency and limitation of the state bureaucracy there resulted a necessary reduction in the number of the employees. But nothing is isolated in the economic system. The reduction of the employee personnel was often necessary to increase wages requested by the workers. Consequently, the unemployment process

State." See Solidarnosc (Gdansk), March 6, 1981. Its real task was to represent the Polish Union abroad. Ibid.

³¹Cf. ANEKS, 13-14 (1976), p. 78. During the First Congress of "Solidarity" in Gdansk, 1981, it was announced that the KOR "had completed its job and was disbanding to all the 9 million member Solidarity to carry on the struggle for freedom and democracy in Poland." Chicago Tribune, September 29, 1981.

began to affect seriously the less protected: women, unskilled older workers and the newly graduated.³² In 1964, the unemployed surpassed 550,000 and was expected to reach 1.5 million in 1970.³³ Not until the end of 1968, did the Health Department and Social Security Program begin to care for the unemployed. On December 6, conditions were established under which an officially recognized unemployed person would be entitled to receive lodging for two weeks. But as Barton points out, "the conditions imposed were so restrictive that the majority of the unemployed could not take advantage of that privilege."³⁴

The policy guidelines to have factories limit employment and so have a margin for eventual wage increase, while maintaining the same level of production were incompatible. Implementations of these directives resulted in a failure to reach the volume of production established by the economic plans.³⁵ In spite of growing unemployment, the law regulating overtime hours was seldom observed.³⁶ Arbitrarily imposed quotas of production for the factories by the central planners had their repercussions in the quality of the produced goods. Determined by the

³²Paul Barton, op. cit., p. 79.

³³Basler Nachrichten, April 13, 1965.

³⁴Paul Barton, op. cit., p. 80

³⁵Dziennik Lodzki, January 25-26, 1970.

³⁶The law forbade more than 120 overtime hours per year, but many workers were taking as many as 100 overtime hours per month in some factories of Lodz; similarly in shipyard in Szczecin, where the working day was normally not eight hours but ten, twelve or even fourteen.

central plan and not by market demand resulted in production of good not required by the domestic market while there was a shortage of goods in demand. "Thus," writes Bryant, "there are (in Poland) shortages, waiting lists, black markets, dual and triple prices for goods changing hands privately at more than their purchase price."³⁷ Besides that, the law regarding job security was rarely observed because that would have raised the cost of production and so delay the execution of the plans. In consequence, the number of civil disabled rose in five years (1965-1970) to 1,000,000.³⁸ The attempt to limit the demand for consumer goods took two somewhat different forms. The first was an undisclosed rising of prices by changing the name of the goods, diminishing the quantity of the goods or simply by bringing them to the market in new

Cf. Zycie Warszawy, April 25-26, 1962.

³⁷Christopher G. A. Bryant, "Worker Advancement and Political Order in a State Socialist Society," Sociological Review 28 (1980), p. 115. At the same time the Party's propaganda was saying: "Through the socialization of the means of production there has disappeared the duality of goals of producer and consumer which creates a real possibility of adopting production to the satisfying of the needs of the great majority and not only of the more or less limited elite." Wladyslaw Gabryl, "Rynek konsumenta: suwerennosc modelu konsumpcji," Miesiecznik Literacki 20 (1968), p. 86. The situation was not better ten years later when one German newspaper entitled its article "Endless Lines for Every Day's Bread," Brettner Nachrichten, July 15, 1980.

³⁸As an example of the seriousness of the situation, can be given the plants in Skawina which used obsolete Russian technology and which caused immeasurable harm to the environment and to the people. These plants were closed in 1980 under the pressure of Solidarity environmentalists. Cracow itself was not in much better situation. "In Krakow," writes Novak, "the most medieval and most beautiful of Poland's cities, its Oxford, its Cambridge, socialism has created the worst air pollution I have ever encountered . . . particles are visible in the air, gather quickly on one's shirt, congest one's nose." Chicago Tribune, December 20, 1979 (article of Michael Novak).

boxes, different from those formerly used. The other way was a periodical raising of prices. Its average mark-up was 50 to 60 per cent. It was this type of rising prices that in 1970, 1976 and in 1980 served as a spark to cause the workers' upheavals.

After 1970, the food prices were frozen for five years. Even if the supply was never brought to the level of demand there was a fair availability of goods. There was a privileged minority which was never touched by any kind of goods shortage. They were entitled to buy provision in the special shops called "behind the golden drapes."³⁹ This was already a normal practice in the 1950s and has become a part of the normal life in the 1970s because the range of the privileged extended to police and professional soldiers. Gomulka's statement of 1956, "A great deal of evil, injustice, and many painful disappointments have accumulated in the life of Poland during the past years . . ."⁴⁰ applied very well to every regime's leadership in post-war Poland with perhaps one difference: the injustice and disappointments were even increasing as time went on. Referring to the period of Gomulka's regime, an American periodical said: "It isn't hard to understand why the average Polish worker is unhappy. He makes less than 3,000 zlotys a month—about \$125—and he needs approximately 5,000 zlotys to support a

³⁹ News From Behind the Iron Curtain, October, 1956, p. 42.

⁴⁰ Gomulka's Keynote Speech, op. cit., p. 271.

family."⁴¹ The whole policy was called by the author a "stultifying atmosphere."⁴²

Besides the food shortages, housing was another acute problem of the postwar Poland. World War II left one-third of all shelters destroyed; another one-third was damaged. Such losses affected the Polish economy. But while other countries, like West Germany, made up for this by constructing apartments, the housing problem in Poland continued to be problem number two after the War. We saw how the Six Year Plan failed to keep the building industry at the level of 1950. Neither were the goals of the other plans ever reached. That was due partly to poor synchronization of work in different collaborating companies, partly to the building up of material shortages. The building of private homes was especially affected by the second cause. Consequently, delays in the housing industry prolonged the time of waiting for an apartment by people who paid the amount of money entitling them to live in it. While in the 1960s that condition lasted for five years; in 1980, it rose to eight to ten years. Meanwhile, the owners had to put up with cramped, overcrowded, and substandard shelters. There have been families of four or five people constrained to live in one room, in poor hygienic conditions. According to Wesolowski and Slomczynski, in mid-1960s, only 34 per cent of unskilled and semiskilled workers and 40 per cent of skilled workers in Lodz, Koszalin and Szczecin lived in apartments with plumbing

⁴¹U. S. News and World Report, December 18, 1970, p. 23.

⁴²Ibid.

and flush toilet facilities.⁴³ The situation was worsening because many apartment constructed in the postwar period did not survive the thirty years and were falling into disrepair. In 1970, more than 640,000 apartments did not fit the basic requirements for shelters due to the lack of safety and hygienic conditions.⁴⁴

In addition to the shortages of accommodations, there was a poor quality in the new apartments. They were small and uncomfortable. In 1974, in Poland, 39 per cent of the apartments in the cities had only one to two rooms, 54 per cent had three to four rooms and only 6.9 per cent had five or more rooms.⁴⁵ At the same time, in the U.S.A., the numbers were respectively: 5.6 , 32.1, and 62.3 per cent.⁴⁶ The area of the room per thousand people in Poland was 485 square meters, 758 square meters in France, and 1329 in Belgium.⁴⁷

Shortage of food and shelters affected most bitterly the poorest ranks of the Polish society, and relatively its vast range. As basic goods, they are necessary for survival. And while one cannot say that in the postwar Polish society the shortage of food came to the point of hunger, surely there was no abundance of goods. This was not the same

⁴³Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, "Zroznicowanie spoleczne: podstawowe warunki," Zroznicowanie spoleczne by W. Wesolowski (Warszawa: Ossolineum, 1974), p. 109, Table 8.

⁴⁴Chicago Tribune, March 6, 1978.

⁴⁵Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 548.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 549

with the shortage of the apartments. One can hardly say that at this point the situation was tragic, but it was certainly very serious.

Housing and food shortages are the most important, but not unique indices of the standard of living in a country. If we take into consideration the other indices, they will only support what we observed about the shortages of food supply and housing. In 1977, e.g., there were in Poland forty-four passenger cars per thousand people (in 1960, only four per thousand) which was less than in Greece--fifty six, Spain --162, and 507 in the U.S.A.⁴⁸ A tiny "126 Fiat" (two cylinder car) was sold for 110,000 zloties, which was twenty-five times more than an average monthly wage. Similar situations are found in the field of communication. While in Italy, for example, in 1976, there were 271 telephone receivers per thousand people, in Spain, 239, and 721 in the U.S.A., in Poland, there were only eighty.⁴⁹ There was also a visible deterioration in health services and hospitalization. In 1975, there were seventy-five hospital beds in Poland for 10,000 people; in 1977, there were two less.⁵⁰

⁴⁸Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 537.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 539.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 554. In spite of the visible deterioration of health care (rate of mortality of newly born is 24.5 per thousand in Poland). Gierek said in 1977: "National funds for health protection effectively influence the health care and foster its improvement." Edward Gierek's speech in Sejm, June 30, 1977. Jan Szydlak, Politburo member, wrote similarly: "We have laid the material basis for solving a number of problems by assuring dynamic progress in the next five years." Jan Szydlak, "Strategy of Accelerated Progress," World Marxist Review 19 (1976), p. 11.

As we can see in Figure 3 (p. 145), the real income in Poland was growing at very slow rates during the period between 1959-1970. It even decreased in 1959-1960. It grew at higher rates in the years between 1971 and 1975 to decline in 1976 and to score negatively in 1978 (-3 per cent) as compared with that of 1977.⁵¹


Similar patterns are observable on the curve indicating the dynamic of the GNP with only one exception: the year 1967-1968, when the GNP grew faster than during the other years of the preceding period. The plan for 1969-1970 foresaw an increase of 5.8 per cent in GNP, 2.9 per cent in agricultural output, 1 per cent in animal production.⁵² The quota appeared to be too high. Increased production was respectively: 5.2 per cent, 2.2 per cent, and the animal production not only failed to increase, but was 3.3 per cent lower than intended.⁵³ Only the period between 1970 and 1975, marked a relatively dynamic growth of the GNP and the real personal income. But the 1976-1980 plan which was intended to keep a continuous increase in real wages, improvement of the market supply, increase in housing output, higher subsidies for medicare, remained on paper.⁵⁴ The total agricultural production in 1976, was 2.1

⁵¹A relatively high rate of growth of the real income from 1970 to 1975 was not due to a dynamic growth of the Polish economy in that period, but to borrowing money from abroad. In 1980, Poland's debt to the West had reached \$26 billion.

⁵²Stanisław Markowski, "Podstawowe Zagadnienia NPG na 1970," Przegląd Związkowy 12 (1969), p. 4.

⁵³Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, pp. XLI-XLIII.

⁵⁴Lech Zacher, "Kierunki rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego Polski



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Figure 7

The Growth of GNP and Income (Real) in Poland 1955-1978

^aAdapted from Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980, pp. XXXVI-XXXVII and XXXIV-XXXV respectively.

per cent less than that in 1975.⁵⁵ GNP grew only 2.7 per cent in 1978.⁵⁶ The situation in 1979-1980 was still worse. During the first quarter of 1980, only 73.7 per cent of the apartments were built as was the case in the same period of 1979. There was 5.3 per cent less sugar on the market and 2.7 per cent less meat.⁵⁷ The year 1980 was disastrous for Polish agriculture. Meat production declined by 25 per cent from 1979, the potato crop was one of the worst in the postwar Polish history and sugar beet output was 60 per cent below the target.⁵⁸ In 1978, Poland bought (on credit) four times more grain than in 1971.

Figure 8 on page 147 compares the economic situation of West Germany with that of Poland. While the GNPs of both these countries were increasing at similar rates from 1962 to 1965, the year 1966 appeared to be exceptionally good for German economy. Its GNP grew by 15 per cent. It declined in 1967, to return to its normal growth. But again, the year 1969-1970 brought about new, even more dynamic growth. Meanwhile, the GNP in Poland was growing moderately and declined sharply in 1969-1970.⁵⁹

1976-1980," Człowiek i Światopogląd 3 (1976), p. 16.

⁵⁵Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. XLI.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. XXXV.

⁵⁷Trybuna Ludu, August 7, 1980.

⁵⁸Time, December 29, 1980, p. 23.

⁵⁹Given the difference in the economic development between West Germany and Poland, it is necessary to keep in mind that the meaning of the percentage of increase of GNP in these two countries is quite different. One must realize that the percentage of growth of GNP in an advanced country has a much different meaning from that in less advanced




Figure 8

Standard of Living in Poland and in West Germany After World War II.

^aAdapted from Der Spiegel (53), December 1970, p. 64.

The cost of living in West Germany was rising at about 5 per cent annually with a decline in 1966-1968. The period of 1968-1970 brought back to its patterned rise. The curve of the cost of living in Poland differed significantly. It declined in 1962-1963 to rise about 10 per cent in the period of the next two years. The year 1966 showed some decline in the cost of living, but the next two years brought about almost 10 per cent increase: it rose by 15 per cent in 1968-1969, and about 25 per cent in 1969-1970.

The year 1980 brought about a worsening of the already difficult situation of the Polish economy. Productivity was reaching negative records. Poland's debt to the West reached \$26 billion.⁶⁰ Gierek's regime could not find any remedy. Ten years of mismanagement in the economy had caused an unprecedented crisis. "Poland," wrote Kisielewski, "is a country of an immense centrally caused thriftlessness and disorganization."⁶¹

State-Church Conflict During the Postwar Period in Poland

The second course of strain in the postwar Poland has been conflict

country. An increase in car production, e.g., in the U.S.A. of 1 per cent cannot be compared with 1 per cent increase in the same area in Indonesia. While an increase of the GNP of 15 per cent in the developing country is not unusual, such an increase in the developed country would be considered an economic boom.

⁶⁰European Economic Community rescheduled 12 billion dollars debt for 1980 by extending its repayment over eight years with four years of healing period, free of repayment.

⁶¹Stefan Kisielewski, *Czy geopolityka . . .* op. cit., p. 62.

between State and Church. It is by no means accidental that the Marxism of Marx is atheist. Marx found two main reasons to reject religion: philosophical and socio-political. As far as the first is concerned, religion contradicts the essence of man. "Since man has become for man as the being of nature, and nature for man as the being of man--the question about an alien being above nature and man--a question which implies the admission of the inessentiality of nature and of man--has become impossible in practice."⁶²

This simply means that atheism constitutes an integral part of Marxian anthropology. "Atheism, as the denial of this inessentiality, has no longer any meaning, for atheism is a negation of God, and postulates the existence of man through his negation."⁶³ Admitting the God-creator is admitting man's dependence on God and this is alienation from self. No one who lives by the grace of another being can regard himself fully human. This independent status is essential to both human being and nature. Thus "an alien essence, an essence beyond man and nature, is practically impossible. This would be a negation of the independence of man and nature . . . Atheism for Marx is theoretical humanism."⁶⁴

⁶²Karl Marx, "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1975), Vol. 3, p. 174. (Introduction).

⁶³Karl Marx, EPhM, p. 78.

⁶⁴Gary L. Chamberlain, "The Man Marx Made," Science and Society 27 (1963), p. 310; cf. Donald C. Hodges, "Marx's Contribution to Humanism," Science and Society 29 (1965), pp. 173-191.

Another reason why Marx rejects religion is the character and role it plays in a society. To grasp that, one must realize the circumstances and the reasons religion originates. Religion, like state, law, morality, etc., comes to life in specific circumstances, i.e., through the alienation process whose immediate source is estranged human life during man's economic activity and especially his alienating work. Religious estrangement does not limit itself to man's consciousness because human activity expresses itself in the people's economic activity which is their real life. Consequently, "its transcendence embraces both aspects."⁶⁵ Elsewhere Marx called religion "the opium of the people."⁶⁶ Its role in the hands of the exploiting class is to prevent the revolution of the exploited people against their exploiters. Religion remains "man's self-consciousness so long as he has not found himself nor lost himself again."⁶⁷

The handbook for Military Academy students in Poland points out the problem of religion in the following way: "the Party attempts to eliminate religion from the social life because of its negative influence on

⁶⁵Karl Marx, EPhM, op. cit., p. 71.

⁶⁶Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, op. cit., p. 174.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 174. Marx was aware of the religious influence on the social life. He wrote: "Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, its general basis of consolation and justification." Karl Marx, CCHPHR, p. 174.

social consciousness."⁶⁸ The action of the most conscious sphere of the society has to acquire concrete forms and determination because religion will disappear in proportion to the transformation of the social relations and the replacement of the religious outlook on life with the scientific one. In that context the Party has the full right "to propagate offensively the Marxian outlook on life."⁶⁹ The progressive forces of the society must be aware that political clericalism intends "to substitute the division of society based on class criteria by division based on the relation to religion . . . and to seize political power."⁷⁰

In postwar Poland the ideological conflict between the way religion looks at the world as opposed to Marx' view has not remained at the level of believer and nonbeliever, but has shifted to the level of the institutions: State versus Church (Catholic Church).⁷¹ The intensity of the conflict has changed significantly from time to time: moderate between 1944-1947 and 1956-1958, very tense in early 1950s and moderate with a tendency to be acute during all other periods of postwar Polish history.

⁶⁸"Religia jako forma swiadomosci spolecznej," Podstawy swiatopoglądu marksistowskiego (Warszawa: KiW, 1978), p. 50.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 49.

⁷¹One has to be aware of the specificity of conflict in the totalitarian Communist systems. In those systems the State has totalitarian power. It controls not only politics but economy and all aspects of social life. Also the judiciary system, even if in theory independent, in practice it becomes one more means of serving the power elite. Any group or class in conflict with the power elite is primarily struggling for survival, always being on the defensive, unless some precipitating factors cause an explosion of violent conflict.

The State had two objectives in entering into conflict with the Church. First, it intended to control the Church economically and make it dependent on the State. The confiscation of the Church's property and the interference into pure Church matters aimed at this. Second, it deprived the Church the possibility of influencing youth through the ban on private schools and the ban on religious instruction in the public schools.

To reach these goals, the power elite could choose between the two tactics: to openly attack the institutional Church (Catholic), or to discredit it in the opinion of the believers. Practically, both those tactics have been used.

The attempts to control the Church started in the middle of the 1940s. On September 12, 1945, the Cabinet broke the Concordat of 1925 between the Polish State and the Catholic Church.⁷² The official statement of the Polish government said: "The Concordat between the Polish Republic and the Holy See ceases to be in force. The rupture was caused exclusively by the Holy See which during the German occupation of Poland signed documents contrary to the clauses of the Concordat."⁷³

⁷²The 1925 Concordat between the Polish Republic and the Catholic Church conferred some privileges on the Church in return for support against communism. That was in accord with the antibolshevik attitudes of Pilsudski.

⁷³Reported by E. Santarelli, "Stato e Chiesa," Quaderni di Conoscersi, December 5, 1959.

The pretext to which the government's statement was referring, was the nomination of the German bishop Buitinger, the archbishop of Gniezno and Poznan with jurisdiction over the German people living in that diocese. Cf. Civiltà Cattolica, Vol. 3, 1946, p. 223.

With the law of March 20, 1950 in force, the property of the Church and of religious orders, including many buildings was confiscated.⁷⁴ Some of the orders' buildings were restored after October 1956; but others have been held until now. The regime used force to turn the priests and the religious adrift in actions which were massive and often violent.

Another step aimed at further control of the Catholic Church by the State, was the decree of February 9, 1953, which required consent of the governmental authorities for the appointment of bishops and pastors. Additionally, the candidates for such positions were obliged "to swear allegiance to People's Poland" and in the event of their "supporting of anti-state activity" they could be removed from their posts.⁷⁵ This move was, in the opinion of the Church, a visible attempt to annihilate it.⁷⁶

Additionally, the regime requested that the bishops change the temporary status of the hierarchy in the regained Western Polish territories into a permanent status.⁷⁷

Besides that, the regime initiated show-trials of the priests and

⁷⁴Dziennik Ustaw, No. 9, 1950, par. 87.

⁷⁵Dziennik Ustaw, No. 10, 1953. Cf. New York Times, February 12, 1953.

⁷⁶That was a point Cardinal Wyszyński made during his sermon on the feast of Corpus Christi the same year. He called it: "an intolerable attempt" to suppress religion.

⁷⁷It is up to the Holy See to nominate the ordinary bishops as well

bishops. Many of them were arrested. In 1951, Msgr. Kaczmarek from Kielce was arrested and subsequently accused of collaboration with anti-Soviet Ukrainian insurgents during the War, and of having contacts with British-American agents afterwards. Later on Cardinal Wyszynski was arrested because he publicly refused to condemn Msgr. Kaczmarek.⁷⁸ The French magazine, Le Monde, was referring to that situation of an open struggle when it said: "The Polish Church has never been persecuted as much as it is now, not even during the German occupation of Poland."⁷⁹

It was during that period of manifest persecution of the Church and of incredible tension in the country, that an agreement was reached between the regime and the Church on April 14, 1950. The agreement was composed of nineteen paragraphs.⁸⁰ The Episcopate agreed to support the government's efforts in the reconstruction of the country and the integration of the recaptured Western territories to Poland. Moreover, the Polish bishops committed themselves to use their authority to restrict priests' activities to pastoral ones (par. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 18). The government, for its part, promised to guarantee freedom to pastoral as their auxiliaries.

⁷⁸The official note of the government (September 28, 1953) declared that the Primate was arrested because he abused pastoral activities to violate the April 1950 agreement between the State and Church. This referred to the above mentioned Cardinal's Corpus Christi sermon.

⁷⁹Le Monde, December 15, 1953. Cf. Frank Dinka, "Sources of Conflict Between Church and State in Poland," Review of Politics 28 (1966), pp. 332-349.

⁸⁰Slowo Powszeche, April 14, 1950. Cf. New York Times, September 23, 1953.

activities (par. 1) and freedom of religious education in schools of religious practices, and to guarantee equal rights for private schools as well as public ones (par. 10), to tolerate the Catholic University in Lublin (par. 14). The government committed itself also to guarantee the possibility of religious assistance to people in military service, in prisons (par. 16, 17), and hospitals (par. 18). Finally, the regime exempted seminarians from military service.

October 1956 brought about a temporary relief for the Polish Church. Some property sequestered during Stalinism was restored to the owners. The Cardinal was released from imprisonment, and religious instruction was permitted in the public schools. Gomulka's regime seemed to have turned radically from the previous policy of the Party regarding the Church.⁸¹

But the new regime's liberal policy lasted less than two years. Already at the beginning of the 1960s, the Polish Church found itself in the same situation it experienced in the early 1950s. Gomulka's regime accused the hierarchy which endeavors demagogically "to abuse religion and the Church for the struggle against socialism."⁸² The government imposed taxes on the Church, restored the draft of seminarians, and imposed a limit on students attending the Catholic University in Lublin.⁸³ In the field of social policy there was visible discrimi-

⁸¹It was that policy and the attempt to modify Polish-Russian relations as well as that won for Gomulka an enthusiastic support of the whole society.

⁸²Radio Warsaw, February 5, 1960.

⁸³The Catholic University in Lublin is not supported by the State,

nation against Catholics in social promotion.

The new regime, under the leadership of Gierek, proclaimed itself to be for a full normalization of the relations between the government and the Church. In his first speech, as the first secretary of the Communist Party, Gierek appealed equally to all, the Communists and Catholics. Jaroszewicz, Premier, declared a few days later: "the government will now try to bring about a full normalization of relations with the Catholic Church."⁸⁴ As a sign of "good will," the new regime intended to restore ownership of about 7,000 sequestered religious buildings: churches, chapels, monasteries in the returned Western Polish territories. Some (about 130) new churches were allowed to be built.

Everyday life, however, did not agree with what the State Propaganda was proclaiming. The Church during Gierek's stay in power not only did not enjoy full freedom, but it was openly persecuted. Jan Szydlak wrote in 1974: "The experience of the recent years has clearly showed that the main, organized anti-socialist force in this country . . . is the reactionary part of the episcopate . . ."⁸⁵ The regime appointed B. Piasecki (the head of PAX) a member of the Council of State. This act was considered as a slap in the Episcopate's face because of Piasecki's subversive role regarding the Church. Practically not much of anything was changed in State-Church relations in the 1970s.

but the Catholic people. The Sunday collection of every first Sunday of the month goes for that purpose.

⁸⁴Trybuna Ludu, December 24, 1970.

⁸⁵Nowe Drogi, May, 1974.

Since 1973, as part of its Ostpolitik, the Vatican has begun a dialog with the Polish government. In November 1973, Stefan Olszowski, Polish foreign Minister, was received at the Vatican. A few months later (February 1974), Archbishop Cassaroli paid a formal visit to the Polish government. The direct contact of the Vatican with the government was understood by some as a proof that it was the Polish Episcopate that was an obstacle to Church-State rapport.⁸⁶ This certainly served to give credence to the official propaganda in Poland. Also Polish Church hierarchy felt hurt by that policy of the Vatican. The Episcopate's position regarding that issue was steadfast: there can be no Polish-Vatican normalization without Church-State normalization. Monsignor Poggi's mission in 1975, was much more careful and besides the contacts with the government's officials, he was also in touch with the hierarchy of the Polish Church. The Vatican diplomat pointed out clearly that it was the Polish hierarchy which was a party to State-Church normalization of relations.⁸⁷

Gierek's regime did very little in the field of social justice. Social discrimination against Catholics was visible in every day life. This was why, in 1973, the vicechairman of "Znak" (the Catholic deputies in Parliament), Janusz Zablocki, protested in his parliamentary speech

⁸⁶ When Pope Paul VI appointed Archbishop Wojtyla cardinal in 1967, some speculated that the Vatican was preparing new, more acceptable channels of communication with the regime. The state controlled mass media picture Wojtyla as progressive, open-minded in contrast with the reactionary Cardinal Wyszynski.

⁸⁷ Cf. La Croix, March 26, 1975.

against the regime's discrimination against Catholics. One of the interviewed put it this way: "Every higher post (in the society) is given to Party members; even a foreman has to be a Party member since the working team is a social group, and such a group should be directed only by a Party member."⁸⁸

The second aim (preventing Church's influence on youth) was even more important to the regime. Even if the Temporary Government of the National Unity declared that as "it has never limited the activities of the Catholic Church, so it would retain its full freedom of action within the limits of the law in force,"⁸⁹ the events of the foreseeable future would prove that the guarantees expressed in that declaration would be contradicted by the policy of the regime toward the Catholic Church. Already in 1948, the schools started to teach Marxian ethics as opposed to Catholic morality and the religious outlook of the world. To that anti-Church policy the pastoral letter of the Polish bishops referred stating: "New problems imposed by the reconstruction of the country and necessary reforms which have to be undertaken by the party in the field of economy, converge, unfortunately, with an intense propaganda of the materialistic ideology."⁹⁰ Already in 1951, religious instruction was banished from the public schools. In Warsaw the Institute for Education of Scientific Personnel was founded for the purpose

⁸⁸ Appendix A, Interview 5, p. 397.

⁸⁹ E. Santarelli, Stato, . . . op. cit.

⁹⁰ Pastoral Letter of the Polish Bishops, April 15, 1948.

of training the high Party officials which later on was known as the Institute of Social Science.⁹¹

Gomulka's post-October "ideological truce" between State and Church already ended in the late 1950s. A ban on religious instruction in the schools was reimposed.⁹² The law of July, 1961, openly proclaimed that "the schools and other institutions of education and socialization are secular," and that "the whole education and socialization process has a secular character." The decree said even more: "Schools and other institutions of education and socialization educate according to the spirit of socialist morality and the principles of social coexistence."⁹³ This negative policy toward the Church characterized Gomulka's regime until his final days in power. The Bishops' pastoral letter of 1969, made an enumeration of the problems to be solved; government refusal to permit building of new churches, different obstacles in the religious education of children, difficulties Catholics meet in their places of work, State ban on Church access to the mass media and religious associations, prohibition against creating new parochial communities, limitations in publications, excessive censorship, and several restrictions on pastoral activities.⁹⁴

⁹¹This is the main Party school which almost every higher Party official attended. The institute has nothing whatever to do with social sciences in the Western sense. It is simply a school of Marxism and Leninism.

⁹²Ustawa o Swieckosci Szkoły, July 15, 1961. Dziennik Ustaw, No. 32, par. 160.

⁹³Dziennik Ustaw, No. 32, 1961, par. 160, art. 2 and 1 respectively.

⁹⁴Pastoral Letter of the Polish Bishops, June 8, 1969. All this

Gomulka's regime refused an entrance visa to Pope Paul VI who intended to participate in the Polish Millenium of Christianity in 1966. A few months before that, an antiepiscope action was initiated. The letter of the Polish bishops to the German Catholic hierarchy seeking a reconciliation among the two nations on the occasion of the celebration of the Millenium of Christianity in Poland was taken as a pretext.⁹⁵

Premier Cyrankiewicz accused the hierarchy of betraying Poland and being involved in politics. "We do not demand anything more from the Church hierarchy than loyalty towards People's Poland, respect for the Constitution and for the laws of the Polish People's Republic."⁹⁶

The Front of the National Unity in its electoral campaign declared in 1976: "We base our program on the constitutional principle which guarantees freedom of conscience, religious beliefs, tolerance of the divergent outlooks on life, and separation of the State from the

was happening in spite of the fact that the Polish Constitution of 1952, guaranteed religious freedom to every citizen and proclaimed the separation of the State from the Church. Official propaganda was proclaiming "a coexistence" of believers and non-believers. See Poland's Constitution of 1952, Appendix B, p. 406, art. 70. Cf. A. Krasinski, "Coexistence des croyants et non croyants," Pologne: réalités et problèmes by J. Leszno (Krakow: PWN, 1968), p. 116. In fact, the opposite was true.

⁹⁵Cf. "Letter of the Polish Bishops Inviting the German Prelates to the Millenium Festivities in Poland," Poland Since 1956 by T. Cieplak (New York: Twayne Publisher, Inc., 1972), pp. 150-158.

⁹⁶"Letter of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Poland to the Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church," Poland Since 1956 by T. Cieplak (New York: Twayne Publisher, Inc., 1972), p. 181.

Church."⁹⁷ Gierek in his speech to Parliament in 1977 said: "The State scrupulously observes constitutional principle of freedom of conscience."⁹⁸ An educational reform of 1963, however, intended to employ a large number of well-qualified personnel with a socialist outlook on life. In practice, that was nothing but doubled efforts of Marxist propaganda. The Episcopate reacted immediately and strongly. "Parents," the bishops said, "have the right and the duty to educate their children in accordance with their own religious beliefs."⁹⁹ Cardinal Wyszyński repeated that protest in his sermon to the youth of the country on April 9, 1974: "The time has come for you to tell your educators and professors: teach us the truth and do not destroy us."¹⁰⁰

In 1976, the editors in-chief received a secret instruction which was intended as a guideline for the censorship. The twelve-point instruction obliged censors to cut out all information about Church activities, its role in Poland and in the other parts of the world, except that in the Polish Press Agency version, and any philosophical distinction between ideology and the outlook in life.¹⁰¹ How far the

⁹⁷ Deklaracja Wyborcza Frontu Jedności Narodu (Warszawa: KiW, 1980), p. 13.

⁹⁸ Edward Gierek, Socjalistyczna Polska stworzyła warunki rzeczywistej realizacji człowieka (Warszawa: KiW, 1977), p. 5.

⁹⁹ George Schoplin, "Poland: Troubled Relations Between Church and State," Religion in Communist Lands, Vol. 2, July-October, 1974, p. 5.

¹⁰⁰ "The False and the True Church," Mirror, July, 1974.

¹⁰¹ Gazeta Niedzielną (London), July 11, 1976.

situation was from "normal" is shown by the Pope's appeal to Gierek when he visited the Vatican one year later. In his final speech the Pope said that the Church in Poland "does not ask for privileges, but only the right to be herself and the possibility to carry out her special work without obstacles."¹⁰²

A very sensitive issue of State-Church ideological conflict was the Catholic press. Poland has surely been an exception among the socialist countries. In 1972, there were in Poland, 52 religious periodicals and newspapers with a circulation of 549,000 copies.¹⁰³ Among the most important were: Przewodnik Katolicki, Gosc Niedzielny, Tygodnik Powszechny, Apostolstwo Chorych; monthly: Znak, Wież, Homo Dei, Ruch Biblijny i Liturgiczny.

Weekly cultural Tygodnik Powszechny was watched particularly by the State authorities. Every significant deterioration of relation between the Government and the Episcopate was reflected in the censorship of that periodical and for new restrictions on the amount of copies allowed. In 1961, for example, Tygodnik Powszechny was cut by 10,000 copies for its criticism of the law on the State's educational policy and of the government's refusal to return confiscated churches in the

¹⁰²The Catholic Post, December 18, 1977.

¹⁰³This included periodicals and newspapers which, for some reason or other, could not be considered fully Catholic, such as: Slowo Powszechne, Zorza, Za i Przeciw. Some of them were even conceived as a means to infiltrate Catholic doctrine with atheist propaganda. That figure included also the scientific publications of the Catholic University in Lublin and the Academy of Theology in Warsaw.

Western Polish territories.¹⁰⁴ Again, in 1964, it was cut by 10,000 to revenge the "Letter of Thirty Four"¹⁰⁵ to Premier Cyrankiewicz which protested the restrictions in cultural activities.¹⁰⁶ The letter was signed by Kisielwski and Turowicz, both associated with Tygodnik Powszechny.

Besides that tactic of open confrontation with the Polish Catholic Church, the government was using from the beginning another tactic-- infiltration of the Church to discredit it in the eyes of the believers and to raise within the Church itself internal dissensions. The PAX (the pro Communist Catholic Society) was founded primarily for that purpose. PAX' redefinition of Catholicism stressed the duty of supporting the advance of the Soviet-type communism throughout the world. To understand the real character of PAX one must go back to its origin and to its founder.¹⁰⁷ The association was founded in 1945 by Boleslaw Piasecki, a prewar Polish fascist and leader of a paramilitary organization FALANGA. It was intended also as a Nazi party in Poland. "Systematic violence against Jews," says Groth, "physical and verbal, and the aspiration to an iron-clad nationalist dictatorship . . . were its most

¹⁰⁴ Stefania Szlek Miller, "The 'Znak' Group: 'Priests' or 'Jesters'?" (1956-1970," The Polish Review 21 (1976), p. 71.

¹⁰⁵ See, Poland Since 1956, op. cit., pp. 130-133.

¹⁰⁶ The official note of the government said that the reason for such restriction was a shortage of paper. Meantime, hundreds of publications on Marxist ideology were printed which filled up the shelves in the bookstores. Cf. Stefania Szlek Miller, op. cit., p. 71.

¹⁰⁷ See, Adam Bromke, "From 'Falanga' to 'Pax,'" Poland Since 1956

distinctive feature."¹⁰⁸ During the German occupation of Poland, Piasecki collaborated with the Nazis. At the end of the War his FALANGA fought both Germans and Russians. Captured by Russians in 1945, he was convicted and condemned to death. He, however, save his life and stayed only a short time in prison. Such a happy end for the FALANGA's leader could have only one explanation. Piasecki had convinced the Russians and the Polish regime that he would be much more useful for them alive than dead. In any case, Piasecki had become a significant personality in the postwar Polish history. For many, he was simply a Russian agent.

In his "Our Guiding Principles" in 1950, Piasecki, presented PAX' objectives: liberation of the Catholic community "from the bonds by which it had been linked with the perished world," "safeguard the Polish nation from subversion," and "the creation of the theoretical and practical form of participation by faithful Catholics . . ."¹⁰⁹ in the new system.

PAX virtually supported the entire foreign and domestic policy of the Party. Its critics spared no one: Vatican, Polish Episcopate, intellectuals, Catholic deputies . . . The latter became a target for attack by PAX in 1968, when they made an interpellation in the Sejm concerning the police brutality during the students' riots. Piasecki

by T. Cieplak (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1972), pp. 183-197.

¹⁰⁸ Adam G. Groth, op. cit., p. 90.

¹⁰⁹ Dzis i Jutro, November 26, 1950. Reported by Richard F. Staar, op. cit., pp. 264-265.

declared: "Znak (Catholic deputies) have consciously chose popularity among the people who inspired riots."¹¹⁰

Even if the State-Church conflict does not coincide with that of class in Poland, it has visibly fostered the class struggle in postwar Polish society. Professor Stanowski put it in these words:

During the December events the workers marched along the streets . . . and sang by turns the 'International' and religious Polish anthem 'Boze cos Polske'. . . . By singing the 'International' they pointed to the structural conflict, because it meant that the present Polish situation has little to do with the promises of the text of the 'International'; (but) they expressed also the ideological . . . conflict because of the meaning of this religious anthem.¹¹¹

Russian Rule in Poland

The third source of strain in Poland after World War II, was Poland's political and economic dependence upon Russia. But there is something more to that than mere dependence. Polish-Russian relations during ten centuries of history have been rather conflictual than peaceful. Certainly, in the distant past, the 125 years of the partition of Poland must be laid at the door of Tsarist imperialism. However, the responsibility for the events of recent history must be given to the Soviet Communist regime.

After the 1920 Polish-Russian conflict was ended by the Treaty of Riga, the relations between Poland and Russia were visibly antagonistic.

¹¹⁰Boleslaw Piasecki, "O tworczej kontynuacji ustroju i wladzy," Zycie i Mysl 4 (1968), p. 9.

PAX has a publishing company which is tax exempted. Together with its subsidiary, 'Veritas', producing more than 40 per cent of all religious articles in Poland, makes enormous profit. It also owns a newspaper Slowo Powszechne.

¹¹¹Appendix A, Interview 2, p. 379.

Russia was aware of Pilsudski's anti-communism and, vice versa, Poland was looking at the Red Neighbor with preoccupation. In spite of the treaty of nonaggression between Poland and Russia, the invasion of Poland in 1939, came from both sides West and East. By reason of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of August 1939, Poland was partitioned for the fourth time.¹¹² The Red Army invaded Poland 16 days after the German invasion of September 1, 1939. Russia deported 1.5 million Poles to Siberia and Kazakh province. Then came other events which fostered additional anti-Russian feeling among the Polish people: the massacre in Katyn forest, idle waiting of the Red Army at the right banks of the Vistula River while the people of Warsaw were dying in a terrible gehenna after the failure of the 1944 insurrection against the Germans, annexation of 160,000 square kilometers of the Polish territory, imposition of the Communist regime . . .

Even the Communists themselves had enough reason to be suspicious

¹¹²Khrushchev mentions that treaty in connection with his visit to Poland in 1945. "The treaty of 1939 had deeply wounded the Poles, and the wound was still fresh." Khrushchev Remembers (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1970, p. 361. German "Dienst aus Deutschland," September 23, 1939, called the pact between Ribbentrop and Molotov "Treaty of Mutual Friendship and Agreement on Frontiers." Wolfe makes a comment: "The precision with which the Red Army and Wehrmacht moved to their appointed demarcation line showed how carefully this joint operation had been worked out in advance." Bertman D. Wolfe, Communist Totalitarianism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), pp. 191-192.

Khrushchev does not mention the massacre at Katyn. There is no evidence as to what degree he himself was involved in it. Until now, in spite of the report of the international Red Cross investigation which clearly stated Russian responsibility for that crime, Russia denies its role in the Katyn massacre. On a poor monument in honor of the Polish officers murdered in Katyn, one can read: "In Honor of the Polish Officers Shot by Nazis in 1941."

of the Russian rule in Poland. In 1938, Stalin dissolved the Polish Communist Party. Many of its leaders were exterminated. "The only reason," Khrushchev said, "that Bierut and Gomulka stayed alive, was that they were relatively unknown in party circles."¹¹³

We have already seen in Chapter III to what extent Stalin's policy intended to tie the Eastern European countries to Russia. Similarly, and even more visibly, was the political dependence of these satellites on Russia. Poland was no exception. The most visible sign, almost a symbol, of Poland's dependence on Russia during the period 1949-1956, was the presence of Marshal Rokossovsky together with the all-powerful Russian ambassador to Warsaw, Berman. Rokossovsky, hero of Stalingrad, was sent to Poland in 1949, to become Poland's Defense Minister. With some 400 high ranking Russian officers, he was able to control completely the Polish Army.¹¹⁴

That status persisted until October 1956, when the seizure of power by Gomulka gave rise to a destalinization and derussification process. The first leader who had to leave Poland was Marshal Rokossovsky whose

¹¹³Cf. Khrushchev Remembers, op. cit., p. 107. That might be true regarding Gomulka because he had never been to Russia before 1938, but certainly it was not true regarding Bierut, who was well known in Party circles in Poland and in Russia. His two previous indoctrination periods in Russia could hardly escape Stalin's attention. Bierut's death in Russia, during his visit to Moscow (March 12, 1956), aroused suspicions about the cause of his death (apparently he died of a heart attack). If he was murdered, who did it? Surely, it was not Stalin because he had been dead for three years. Khrushchev mentioned that fact saying: "There was great turmoil after his (Bierut's) death." Khrushchev Remembers, op. cit., p. 351.

¹¹⁴Newsweek, October 29, 1956, p. 42.

idleness in attacking Warsaw in 1944, to support the Warsaw insurrection was never forgotten nor forgiven. Gomulka also requested the removal of other Russian officers from the Polish Army. An unexpected visit by the Russian leaders and by the top military commanders in Warsaw, headed by Khrushchev himself, intended to stop the derussification process. During the historical meeting in the Belvedere Palace, the Russian leader delivered an ultimatum that the former Politburo be restored intact. Rokossovsky's troops surrounded Warsaw, and two other divisions were ordered to march from Silesia to the capital. Gomulka, however, did not give in.¹¹⁵ Radio Warsaw delivered his speech: "Each people has a right to . . . independence . . . This is how it always should have been--and now it is beginning to become that way."¹¹⁶

"Start," an appendix to bi-weekly Skrzydla Wolnosci wrote in 1956:

It is about time to openly acknowledge a generally known fact: there are anti-Russian feelings in our society . . . Deportations of Poles into deep Russia, activities of Beria's KGB . . . One can hardly expect much enthusiasm from thousands of the Polish families returning after several years of slavish labor in the Russian mines or from forced labor camps in the Soviet Union, from thousands of families whose relatives were never freed from Beria's prisons.¹¹⁷

It was still in the 1950s that Russian history handbooks for high school students were presenting Poland's partition as a positive fact because through that action Russia freed the White-Russians and Ukrainians from the discrimination of the Polish majority. "Thirty years

¹¹⁵East Europe, January 1957, pp. 4-15.

¹¹⁶Newsweek, October 29, 1956, p. 44.

¹¹⁷Skrzydla Wolnosci (Appendix), November 4-5, 1956.

after Lenin had nullified the partition treaty of Poland," says Krzemienski, "the Russian youth were still taught in schools that Poland's partition was not bad at all"118

When Khrushchev and other Russian dignitaries had learned that only a war with Gomulka's Poland could stop the reforms, they suddenly changed their tactics. They called Gomulka to Moscow, to persuade him of the necessity of keeping strong ties with them. Two visits by Gomulka to Moscow were sufficient to avert what by many was considered irrevocable.¹¹⁹ The near future demonstrated that Russia was able to reconcile Gomulka with itself. He not only accepted the Brezhnev doctrine of Russia's right to intervene even militarily if communism was endangered in any of the friendly neighbors, but he was also considered a strong supporter of Czechoslovakia's invasion by Warsaw Pact troops in 1968.

Gomulka's servility to Russia went so far that, after the intervention of the Russian ambassador to Warsaw in 1968, he banished the play "Dziady" (Ancestors), authored by Mickiewicz, nineteenth-century Polish poet, because the audience was enthusiastically applauding anti-Russian lines, e.g., "The only things Moscow sent to Poland were jackasses, idiots, and spies;" Russian policy was marked by "cold-blooded cruelty

¹¹⁸ Uczen Polski (Niezalezne Pismo Mlodziezy Szkolnej), 4 (1979), art. of L. Krzemienski), p. 10.

¹¹⁹ We consider the changes which have recently been accomplished as irrevocable" said the resolution of the Party members of the Jagiellonian University. Cf. Radio Warsaw, October 21, 1956. (Reported by East Europe, January 1957, p. 4.)

and cunning, by denunciations and deportations of Polish patriots to Siberia" which referred to Tsarist Russia.

Since 1956, there was no open conflict between Poland and Russia. Gierek's regime was faithfully following the directives coming from Moscow. His submission to Russia went far beyond any necessary limits to the clear detriment to the Polish cause.¹²⁰ "Formally we have our own country," says Kisielewski, "then were are practically Russian province."¹²¹ Censors received detailed guidelines to be followed in cutting out any criticism of Polish-Russian relationships.¹²² At the same time a ban was imposed on data which might reveal Russian exploi-

¹²⁰After his bitter criticism of that policy, Kisielewski suggested so-called "geopolitics" or double thinking. In his opinion Russia should be Poland's number one partner but not its master. "Finlandization" would be possible for Poland, if the politicians made an appropriate policy. But, if anyone was not able to do that, surely Gierek's regime was not. Gierek's hunger for personal riches, his megalomania, corruption, paternalism . . . , prevented him from any positive service to the national cause. At the beginning of the 1980 strike in Gdansk, he declared: "We will not tolerate a strike. We will not tolerate work stoppages! We will not tolerate attempts at political changes." Sun Times (Chicago), August 19, 1980. Still, a few days before his deposition from office he said: "Socialist system is inseparably tied to the Polish national interest . . . We (Polish People) have always been united by the bonds of understanding, of common concern and the future of our country. I appeal to your patriotism, to your awareness of responsibility." Trybuna Ludu, August 19, 1980. Anna Walentynowicz, a member of the strike committee, criticized Gierek's paternalism: "He acts as if we were children . . ." Sun Times (Chicago), August 19, 1980.

¹²¹Stefan Kisielewski, "Czy geopolityka stracila znaczenie?," Res Publica 1 (1979).

¹²²One of the detailed guidelines specified that any criticism of the Russian drilling instruments used in Poland for searching the

tation of Poland.¹²³

Michnik in his "Nowy ewolucjonizm" touched the problem. He remembered that in 1956, Gomulka won his great popularity, thanks to his appropriate formulation of "the Russian question." The author suggested that "Polish-Russian relationships should be as a good tea: strong, hot, but not too sweet."¹²⁴

In 1976, two amendments were proposed to the 1952 Polish Constitution. One concerned a constitutional recognition of the leading role of the Communist Party, and the other intended to include in the Constitution Polish-Russian friendship. Especially the second amendment aroused public opinion. There were hundreds of letters sent by different groups of the the Polish intelligentsia and signed by well-known personalities expressing protest and indignation. Young scientists of the Catholic University in Lublin wrote: "Introduction into the Polish Constitution otherwise unquestioned friendship with the people of the Soviet Union . . . we consider as . . . a further limitation of our own sovereignty and resignation from its further extension."¹²⁵ Lipinski wrote an open

natural gas must be censored. Nor could any suggestion for buying drilling instruments in Western countries be publicized. Cf. Solidarnosc Gorzowska 21 (1981), p. 8.

¹²³This was why, for example, any information was cut out about the quantity of import and consumption of the natural coffee to prevent any calculation of its re-export; similarly any publication of the Polish export of meat to Russia must be censored. Solidarnosc Gorzowska 21 (1981), p. 8.

¹²⁴Adam Michnik, "Nowy ewolucjonizm," ANEKS 13-14 (1977), p. 43.

¹²⁵Kultura (Paris) 13 (1976), p. 32.

letter to Gierek criticising such an amendment and his whole Party as well:

We are forced to support unconditionally Russian foreign policy . . . This is incompatible with Poland's own interests. We have actively participated in the military invasion of Czechoslovakia . . . We have violated (their) sovereignty in the name of the imperialistic interests of the Soviet Union and by that we have consolidated our dependency.¹²⁶

All this happened when "in the whole world, even among the communists, there were growing negative attitudes toward the Soviet Union."¹²⁷

This foreign policy of Gierek, his russophilism, his disastrous mismanagement of the economy, the building of the police-state, besides his personal corruption, merit a highly negative mark.¹²⁸ During the parliamentary debate he was so evaluated by one of the deputies, Edward Osmańczyk: "He buried so many hopes," the deputy said, "he understood nothing, he became an obstacle to change of any kind."¹²⁹

In 1980, the Polish workers upheaval and the foundation of the Free Trade Union brought about a new crisis in Polish-Russian "friendship." That was related to the losing of credibility by the Communist Party. The following factors contributed to a manifest crisis of authority in the country: Party's dependence on the directive from Moscow, incompetency of many Party people occupying high social positions, their corruption, lack of law-abidingness, and social injustice. The Party was

¹²⁶Edward Lipinski, "List otwarty do Tow. E. Gierka," Kultura (Paris), 6 (1976), p. 7.

¹²⁷Ibid., p. 7.

¹²⁸About Gierek's corruption, see Slowo Powszechne, May 13, 1981.

¹²⁹Gazeta Krakowska, April 13, 1981.

losing the little bit of credibility it still had. Some 240,000 people turned in their party IDs. Another 181,000 were expelled because their orthodoxy was questioned or because they were accused of opportunism.¹³⁰ The Times, referring to that situation said: "In Poland . . . there is nothing the party can boast of at present."¹³¹

Loss of power by the PUWP backed by Soviets, endangered Russian rule in Poland. Soviet reaction went in two directions, both known from the recent past history. The first was an accusation that the new Trade Union was an instrument of Western Imperialism; the second was an intimidation of all adversaries by threatening Poland with military intervention. As far as the first tactic was concerned, this was an old method used by Russian leaders to find its formal expression in the so-called Brezhnev's doctrine.¹³² According to that doctrine, Russia, as the most experienced and the most advanced country in the realm of Communism, has a right and even a duty, to defend communist forces in socialist countries against reaction within and external imperialism.¹³³

¹³⁰ Dziennik Zwiazkowy "Zgoda" (Chicago), December 4-5, 1981.

¹³¹ The Times, July 13, 1981. The Party's Emergency Congress of 1981 was intended as a means of regaining the people's confidence. Rakowski said: "We have to elect a leadership which will be courageous and able to regain the trust of the people." The Washington Post, July 16, 1981.

¹³² Cf. Judson R. Mitchell, "The Brezhnev Doctrine and Communist Ideology," Review of Politics 34 (1972), pp. 190-209.

¹³³ In the name of that doctrine Russia intervened militarily in Hungary in 1956, and the Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Russian control of the Eastern European countries takes place through the directives coming from Moscow to the communist parties of those countries. Consequently, any challenge to the communist parties in the satellite countries, is conceived as an indirect challenge to the Russian rule in those states. For that reason, Russia is exceptionally sensitive to any possible counter-revolution in its satellites, and is eager to accuse "Western imperialism" of the infiltration of the communist world.

During the strike in Gdansk in 1980, TASS accused Polish workers of being an instrument of "anti-socialist elements."¹³⁴ Such an accusation has already become routine. In June 1981, the accusation took the form of a warning of the Polish Communist leaders. The supreme Soviet sent a warning letter to the leaders of the Western neighbor to take appropriate measure to restore order in the country and to prevent the hostile forces from "striking a decisive blow against Marxist-Leninist forces."¹³⁵

But as last year's events showed, Russia did not limit itself to the mere verbal warnings addressed to Polish workers and later on to the Polish leadership. Russia put its military forces on alert and gathered

Kania, the first secretary of the PUWP, spoke in the same vein during the Soviet Communist Party Congress in February 1981: "The situation in Poland is intimately linked to the security of all socialist states. Its defense is the task not only of those other states, but also of every Socialist party." Cf. Chicago Tribune, February 25, 1981.

¹³⁴ Newsweek, September 8, 1980.

¹³⁵ Newsweek, June 22, 1981.

them around the Polish borders. In December 1980, more than one million Russian troops were ready to invade Poland. The White House spokesman said that the Soviets appear to have completed preparations for possible intervention in Poland.¹³⁶ Newsweek published an article: "How Moscow Would Invade (Poland)?"¹³⁷ Carter's administration warned Russia to stay out of Poland. "The attitudes and future policies of the United States toward the Soviet Union," the note said, "would be directly and very adversely affected by any Soviet use of force in Poland."¹³⁸

Another form of intimidation of Poland was the prolonged maneuvers "Sojus 1981." Even if the maneuvers were scheduled, they were purposely prolonged and had one definite end in view: intimidation of the Polish people. Le Soir made the following comment: "C'est une ingérence politique inadmissible mais pas surprenante. Elle a été précédée et accompagnée d'une préparation psychologique minutieuse."¹³⁹ Still on a larger scale maneuvers took place in September 1981. They included large numbers of warships which played their war games around the Gdansk gulf less than 100 miles from the city where the Solidarity Congress was held. It was during that Congress that Solidarity called for independent unions in all Eastern European countries. "We support those of you

¹³⁶CBS, December 6, 1980.

¹³⁷Newsweek, December 15, 1980.

¹³⁸President Carter's Speech. Newsweek, December 15, 1980.

¹³⁹Le Soir, March 25, 1981.

who have decided to enter the difficult road of struggle for free and independent unions."¹⁴⁰

The Russian military alert had mainly a psychological purpose. In this way the Soviets wanted to impress the Polish Communist Party that it should crack down on the new Trade Union, and also to limit the birth of Polish expectations regarding their status among Eastern European countries. Actually Russia could hardly afford a war with Poland. The Soviets are aware of the moods toward them in Polish society. There was too much antagonism in the recent history of these two countries to be easily forgotten. The old slogan that "As long as the world exists, the German will never be a brother to the Pole," may now be paraphrased: "As long as Soviet Russia exists, Russians cannot be brothers to the Poles." But even if the Societs decide to invade Poland, "they may find that taking the country is easier than keeping it."¹⁴¹

Immediate Causes of the Polish Workers Upheavals

According to the value-added theory of collective behavior, the strain situation does not end by itself in an outburst. There must be one or more factors which cause the explosion--the precipitating factors. Those factors give to "the generalized beliefs concrete,

¹⁴⁰ The New York Times, September 9, 1981.

¹⁴¹ Newsweek, December 15, 1980. According to Solovyov, Russia will not invade Poland because of the limited number of troops which could be sent to Poland (every second Russian soldier is kept on the Chinese border); secondly, the war with Poland would be to the disadvantage of the Russians on Polish territory; thirdly, Russians have a traditional fear of Poles. It already has a war with the Afghans. It has the Chinese on a hostile border, and internal strains--discord between the

immediate substance."¹⁴² They serve as a spark to cause an outburst.

In three of four analyzed cases, the role of the precipitating incidents was played by a sharp, one-day increase in consumer goods, mainly in food. This cannot be considered as overreaction in a country where the average family spends half of its income on food. An increase of 70 per cent on meat and 30 per cent on other food burdens the family budget significantly.

The only insurrection which was not an immediate consequence of a drastic hike in the price of food was that of Poznan in 1956, but it still had an economic basis. The riot originated in "Cegielski" plants, where 30,000 people were working in the production of different kinds of engines and other machines. Until the time preceding the event, they were receiving approximately 30 per cent more in wages than other workers because of the special destination of their products. Suddenly, the benefits were cut off and at the same time there was a revision of norms in the factory causing additional tension. The negotiations with the Minister of Industry did not bring about any positive solutions. When the workers' delegates were imprisoned, the outburst started.

civil and the military sectors, industrial inadequacy, the failure even now of Soviet agriculture to feed the nation." Chicago Tribune, June 21, 1981 (article by William Pfaff). The new Russian tactic toward Poland consists on pressing the Polish Communist Party to crack down on the workers.

¹⁴² Neil Smelser, op. cit., p. 17. Generalized beliefs refer to the strain, its sources. They explain the problem, identify the responsible for the strain, and indicate some possible solution under new conditions.

The 1970, 1976, and 1980 Polish workers' upheavals had as their immediate cause the sharp increase in prices in food.

It was on December 12, 1970 that the Cabinet decided to modify retail prices of a large number of products beginning the next day. The Cabinet reduced prices in some industrial, and rather luxurious goods, while it drastically increased the prices of food and other goods. As an average, the retail prices increase: 20 per cent for meat, 24 per cent for bread, 23 per cent for sugar products and the same for shoes. Additionally, there was an increase of about 50 per cent for building materials.¹⁴³

Two circumstances have to be stressed at this point. The first is that the average Polish family was spending, at that time, 58.3 per cent of its budget for food, beverages, and cigarettes. The December hike in prices brought this portion of the family budget to 65-70 per cent.¹⁴⁴ Second, the price hike of 1970 had its special psychological effect, because it came only 12 days before Christmas, when every Polish family intended to buy some better food, which they could not afford during the other times of the year. Increase in prices of food at that particular moment was understood as a challenge to the poorest and a disregard of the elite for the people. "It gives us nothing," says Professor Stanowski, "when the price of a color TV set is lowered, while the prices of butter and meat go up by 80 per cent."¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³L'express (Paris) December 21-27, 1970.

¹⁴⁴Paris Match, January, 1971, p. 16.

¹⁴⁵Appendix A, Interview 2, p. 382.

In consequence of the riot following the decision to raise prices in 1970, the new regime under Gierek's leadership froze the food prices initially for two years, and later on the period was extended to 1976.¹⁴⁶ At the same time (1971-1975) real wages were increasing on the average at the rate of 7.18 per cent annually. This was possible thanks to the influx of money borrowed from the West which did not correspond with the internal dynamics of the economy. Gierek's regime learned the lesson from Gomulka's fall and it was very careful about the increase in food prices. Additionally, two poor agricultural outputs (1974, 1975) of the Polish farms only aggravated the food situation in Poland.¹⁴⁷ The apparent stability of the Polish economy was far from normal. Domestic consumption of meat increased considerably, i.e., by 6.6 kg per capita in five years.¹⁴⁸ Polish agriculture could not meet that demand.

Sooner or later, the regime had to face the problem of the new food prices to regain control over the visible chaos in the economy. Even if the official propaganda continued to proclaim economic success: "Poland is growing in strength and the people are prosperous,"¹⁴⁹ the Party was

¹⁴⁶

There was a latent increase in prices through the diminishing of the quantity of goods, or simply changing the name of the same goods and selling them at new, higher prices.

¹⁴⁷Poland imported grain from abroad in the amount of \$2.5 billion in three years (1973-1976). Wall Street Journal, November 15, 1976.

¹⁴⁸

Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. XXXV.

¹⁴⁹

Trybuna Ludu, January 19, 1976.

forming public opinion for new drastic measures, which were under consideration to heal the economy. During the VII Peasant Party Congress (ZSL) Gierek said: "We have to produce more and better . . . (this) refers to the entire economy, but especially to agriculture."¹⁵⁰ Polityka talked about the discrepancy between the supply and demand on the Polish market. "We cannot hide the discrepancy between what we expect from the market . . . and its real possibility . . ."¹⁵¹ To reduce the demand for some goods, especially meat, there was suggested a restriction of consumer goods regulated not only by the market, but also by social motives.¹⁵²

Gierek's regime was aware of the possible reaction to a hike in food prices. For that reason the period for the increase in food prices was carefully studied and predetermined by the end of June. By that time university students are busy with their finals, high school students are already out of school, and many people have made their plans for summer vacations. To secure full success to the plan, the regime went so far as to make an extraordinary draft. Even those who, for some reason or other, were excluded from military service, were drafted, if they fell into one of the following categories: NPR--Negatywny przewodnicz (Illegal ring-leader), NAP--Negatywny aktywista polityczny (Subversive political activist), and K--Kryminalista

¹⁵⁰Trybuna Ludu, January 19, 1976.

¹⁵¹Polityka, June 19, 1976 (article by Z. Szeliga).

¹⁵²Zdzislaw Fedorowicz, "Aktywna polityka cen i place realne," leologia i Polityka, 5-6 (1976), p. 42.

(Criminalist).¹⁵³ The same day the regime chose to raise food prices, it granted a considerable raise in wages for professional military personnel and especially for police.¹⁵⁴

On June 25, Prime Minister Jaroszewicz disclosed the price increase in basic food items which had been predicted and expected. But what took the people and especially workers by surprise was the magnitude of the price hike: 50 per cent for butter and cheese, 30 per cent for vegetables and poultry, 100 per cent for sugar, and an average increase of 69 per cent in meat, with 90 per cent hike for better cuts.¹⁵⁵ As a compensation for the price increase in food, there were foreseen supplements in wages and pensions of 240 to 600 zloties. The higher subsidies would go to those who were making more money or had higher pensions. In spite of government precautions, the next day workers' riots began in Ursus and Radom.

The increase in food prices came after the 1976 riot, but it was gradual and much more moderate than that proposed by Jaroszewicz. The food supply was not increasing but rather deteriorating. That fostered the already growing discontent among the working class.¹⁵⁶ Corrupted

¹⁵³KOR Bulletin No. 2, ANEKS, 13-14 (1977), p. 89. Jacek Kuron, e.g., was drafted and spent about three month (July 19-October 9, 1976) in military training. In 1976, Kuron was already 42 years old.

¹⁵⁴While the average increase in wages to compensate for the increase in food prices was 200 zlotys for workers, for military professional personnel 600 zlotys, for the police it amounted to 1,600 zlotys. Cf. ANEKS 12 (1976), p. 31.

¹⁵⁵Dziennik Polski, June 25, 1976.

¹⁵⁶Gierek's regime was able to find only one remedy: borrowing the

and incapable of any serious action Gierek's regime instead came out with an indoctrination program which was undertaken in the entire country. In one Voivodship, Nowy Sacz, 1248 instructors were employed to handle the indoctrination of 40,000 people in 1,123 groups.¹⁵⁷

School teachers at all levels of education were obliged to disseminate the Party's Marxist ideology. The task of the teachers was clearly stated in a 1973 decree: "A teacher embodies the socialist ideals pursued by the leading force of the nation--the PUPP in the domain of the ideological formation of the consciousness of the young generation, its patriotic and international attitudes."¹⁵⁸

Many people involved in opposition were fired from their jobs, stopped by the police, beaten by "unknown bandits," called "hooligans" . . . , and their apartments were periodically search. Walesa himself was fired from three jobs for his activities, and in 12 years he was stopped 150 times by the police.¹⁵⁹ Another member of the 1980 strike committee in Gdansk, Walentynowicz, was also fired from her job. Some others could not work in places determined by the regime.¹⁶⁰ On Decem-

money abroad. So, Poland's debt of hard currency rose from \$741 million in 1970 to \$10.6 billion in 1976, to 20 billion in 1979. Cf. Fortune, September 27, 1980, p. 126.

¹⁵⁷Jan Pilarczyk, "Doskonalenie pracy wykladowczej - z doswiadczen Wojewodzkiego Osrodka Kształcenia Ideologicznego," Ideologia i Polityka, 7-8, 1977, p. 142.

¹⁵⁸Dziennik Ustaw, No. 12, 1973.

¹⁵⁹Appendix A, Interview 3, p. 384; cf. Interview 4, p. 386; Interview 5, p. 395.

¹⁶⁰Appendix A, Interview 6, p. 400.

ber 23, 1976, the "unknown" hooligans beat attorney Sila-Nowicki and Drawicz. Seven days later, another member of KOR was beaten. On January 10, 1977, attorney Sila-Nowicki and eight other members of KOR were assaulted in the hall of the Court. The "unknown" hooligans were able to evade again.¹⁶¹ Still in 1980, on the 24th anniversary of the riot in Poznan, the police searched the apartments of many of the opposition, such as J. Bazydlo, A. Borel, W. Samolinski, Z. Koniecki . . . P. Tomczak's apartment was searched for eight hours. The underground newspapers were confiscated and he himself was arrested.¹⁶²

In 1980, the strain in Poland was reaching its climax. Two months before the strike in 1980 began, Walesa said in the interview: "That situation cannot last much longer."¹⁶³ As before, also this time it needed only a spark to explode. It came again from the new prices proposal. The strike started in the huge Lenin Shipyards to spread over the whole country. Strikers' demand exceeded simple bread and butter demands. When asked why the workers went on strike, Walentynowicz

¹⁶¹Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierz (London), January 9, 1977.

¹⁶²Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierz (London), July 3, 1980. By 1980, there were several underground papers in Poland. Among them the most important were: Krytyka (Critique), Res Publica (connected with KOR), Glos (Voice), Opinia (Opinion), Droga (Road), Gospodarz (Steward), Robotnik (Worker), Bratniak (Brother). Cf. Aleksander Smolar, "Pologne: la lutte contre l'oubli," Culture et Pouvoir Communists by N. Dionjeva and T. Wolton (Parid: Recherches, 1979), p. 88.

¹⁶³Appendix A, Interview 3, p. 385.

answered: "The regime lies and cheats: the people want to know the truth."¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ Gwiazda Polarna (Milwaukee), September 20, 1980.

CHAPTER VI

POLISH WORKERS' INSURRECTIONS

Polish Workers' Riots and Their Control

In Smelser's value-added theory of collective behavior, the mobilization for action includes three factors: the leadership (formal or informal), organization of the hostile outburst, and the rise of the hostility curve.

In two (1956, 1970) of four Polish workers' riots, the role of the leaders was rather limited and was totally informal. This was simply because in the totalitarian system the power elite prevents any organized opposition. Such an opposition could challenge the dictator's rule. There were, however, several unidentified leaders who formulated the grievances and sent messengers to other plants to bring people to the streets. In 1970, a three-man committee headed by L. Walesa, was formed. Its task was to negotiate with the officials. The strike committee could not control the events because of lack of the intermediary organizational levels. Before the strike committee and Party officials could come to any agreement, the events escaped their control. The August 1980 strike was completely different from all preceding upheavals. It was prepared, organized, and controlled by the strike committee composed of L. Walesa, A. Kolodziej, B. Lis, and fifteen other members. Such an organization was possible thanks to the organized oppositionist groups in the circles of the workers, students, and intelligentsia.

When, in collective behavior, tension reaches its climax, action takes place. The crowd directs its attacks toward previously identified persons or institutions considered as evil or as a source of evil. In any totalitarian system, and in the socialist regime in particular, it is relatively easy to identify responsible individuals or groups for the present situation. The power elite, which exclusively controls every aspect of social, political, and economic life, is considered by the vast majority of people to be responsible for the evils of society. Its personnel, its buildings became the targets of the workers' attacks. That was true in three of four Polish workers' insurrections (1956, 1970, and 1976). The 1980 strike was an exception. Its specificity, however, was not a matter of a split responsibility, but a matter of diversity of the protest itself. It did not take a violent form.

The insurrection in Poznan began on June 28, 1956. There were three main targets of the worker's attack: City Hall with its officials, the prison in which the workers' delegation was imprisoned and the jamming station which jammed Radio Free Europe's broadcasting in the Polish language. An eye-witness recalls the action.

Workers were coming from the direction of the 'Stalin' plants.¹ They were in work clothes . . . At nine o'clock they started (to go) to the City Hall. They wanted to see Sroka and ask him where the second delegation (of the workers) was . . . People began shouting and and chanting 'We want bread', 'We want better pay', 'Get the Russian

¹Cegielski's Plant was renamed "Stalin."

occupiers out', 'Give Poland freedom', . . . Someone shouted 'pull down the enemy's flag'.²

The second target of the workers' attack was the city prison where the workers' delegation was imprisoned. "The guards did not defend the prison . . . They gave up their guns and people found other guns in the office, perhaps fifty or more, including some machine guns. The prisoners came into the main office and everybody started throwing papers and files out the windows . . ."3

Finally, the rioters attacked the jamming station. It had started to operate in 1954. The station was successful in making it difficult to listen to Radio Free Europe broadcasting. That station was located on the top of a four-floor insurance building in the center of the city. The whole assault was accomplished in a few minutes: "The social insurance building was open, but the radio station was locked. Someone broke the door in. There was on man there but he could do nothing. We pulled tubes and machinery from the roof and cut the antenna. Every time a piece fell in the street the crowd cheered!"4

When the workers were storming the Public Security (UB) headquarters, the Polish army tanks came up. They did not fire. Soon, however, other tanks came up. As the same eye-witness states, they were Russians in Polish uniforms:

²News From Behind the Iron Curtain, October 1956, p. 37.

³Ibid., p. 38. At that time there was an International Fair in Poznan, and therefore there were flags of all the countries which participated in the exhibition.

⁴News From Behind the Iron Curtain, October 1956, p. 38.

They started firing machine guns and cannons. Many were killed and wounded . . . I know that they were Soviet soldiers. I saw someone throwing a gasoline bottle at a tank and it caught fire. The officer climbed out. People asked: 'why do you shoot at Poles?' I heard him say "I do not understand Polish!" They were in Polish uniforms but they spoke Russian and we all knew they were Russians . . . Then the Polish troops came and surrounded the down-town district.⁵

According to the General Prosecutor, Marian Rybicki, by the middle of July 1956, there were 323 persons in custody.⁶ By the end of September 1956, there were only 154 still in prison. Three people: J. Foltynowicz, K. Zurek, and J. Sroka were accused of murdering corporal Z. Izdebny. The others were accused of looting and vandalism. But by October 23 of the same year, only the group of Foltynowicz was still in prison.⁷

The 1970 events in Gdansk began Monday, December 14, with the strike of the first shift in the Lenin Shipyards. A three-person strike committee was formed. Five hours later the workers (3,000) came to the Party building with slogans: "We want bread!," "The press lies." The crowd hurled stones through the windows of the press house, and when they arrived at the Party headquarters, they tried to set fire to the palace. Police, however, were able to disperse the crowd using bombs.

⁵News From Behind the Iron Curtain, October 1956, p. 39.

⁶Trybuna Ludu, September 22, 1956. According to the Polish Press Agency, 48 people were killed and 270 more were injured during the riots. See Herder Korespondence, 1955/56, p. 502.

⁷Ibid., October 23, 1956. There were 71 casualties during the Poznan riot, 900 were injured. 1976 were seriously injured. Five of the dead were police and soldiers. Slowo Powszechne, March 6, 1981.

with tear-gas. Next day the strike was proclaimed. The workers marched toward the central station and the Party building. The crowd shouted: "Hang Gomulka!, Gomulka out!, Cyrankiewicz out!, Kliszko, Kociolek, Moczar out! Out! Out!"⁸ The crowd threw rocks and set fires to destroy the Party's buildings. Inside the police were extinguishing the fire. There was shooting at first. At ten o'clock the Party building was in flames. First battles between security police and workers took place. When a new column of workers had formed to march to the Party building they were fired upon by militia from hiding places. A few hours later a large group of the workers returned to the shipyards. The atmosphere of combat grew when in the afternoon the army units were ordered to enter into action. One person was crushed by a vehicle. By 6:00 p.m., the troops were controlling the streets and the shipyards to protect them from any sabotage. But as a French newspaper pointed out, the shipyard was not a target of any attack.⁹ At the meeting of the provincial authorities, Kliszko was infuriated that the workers were boasting of taking part in burning down the Party building. Kociolek, the deputy Prime Minister, said, on Gdansk television: "The demonstrations and riots have been exploited by hooligans and social scum . . . The authorities are determined to do everything within their power to restore order."¹⁰

⁸George Blazynski, Flashpoint Poland (New York: Pergamon Press, Inc., 1979), p. 10.

⁹Le Figaro, January 16-17, 1971.

¹⁰BBC Monitoring, December 15, 1970.

The next day, about 5,000 workers were gathered in the shipyards to formulate their grievances. The staff of the shipyard did not make any promises but warned the crowd not to go to the streets. The workers did not obey. When they tried to get out, the troops fired on them. There were many dead and injured. The strike committee proclaimed a 24 hour strike, asked for punishment of those responsible for the catastrophic situation of the Polish economy, the raising of wages, abolishing of systems of reward and removing troops from the city.

Almost at the same time disorders took place in Gdynia. The crowd gathered at the Paris Commune Shipyard to ask for the liberation of three imprisoned workers. When the Party secretary, Pokrzycki, refused to do that, the strike was proclaimed. The first secretary of Gdansk Voivodship, Kociolek, made an appeal to the workers to go back to their normal work.¹¹ Meantime the troops occupied the shipyards. The strikers asked for a broadcast of their grievances. The authorities refused. The next day the troops blocked the entrance to the shipyards. The loudspeakers announced to the people coming to work not to approach the tanks. When the crowd grew, the workers were ordered to leave the spot. They refused. The troops fired on the ground. The bullets ricocheted and hurt many. The helicopters sprayed tear-gas. Random shots killed several people. One eye-witness, Steven Ricks, said that he saw policemen who purposely aimed at the crowd and shoot.¹² The crowd moved

¹¹ Zycie Literackie, February 21, 1971.

¹² The Guardian, December 22, 1970.

to the Czerwonych Kosynierow street with slogans: "Murderers!" "Ges-tapo!"

Then people attacked the buildings in which there were prosecutors offices and tried to set fire to the Party building protected by police and army units. Only in the afternoon, police and troops dispersed the crowd. Many were killed on the spot and many injured. The action was coordinated by the helicopters. According to Bajalski, a Yugoslav journalist, it was Kliszko who ordered the attack to fire on the workers.¹³ As soon as the riot began, he went to Gdansk and established his operational headquarters in the provincial Trade Union building. In his memorandum, Gomulka says that he never gave the order to fire on the people, but only to react efficiently to ensure order. Admittedly he said: "My basic error was that I, myself, did not go to the coast."¹⁴

The Szczecin riot began on December 17. A strike in the Warski Shipyard was proclaimed. At about 12:00, several thousands of workers began a march toward the Party building. Police tried to stop them. They could not. Even though reinforcements were brought, the Party building was burned down. The official report said that there was 16 casualties and 117 people were seriously injured.¹⁵ In the evening a curfew was ordered. The strike committee presented 22 grievances. There were among others dismissal of the president of the State Trade

¹³Polityka (Belgrade), February 23, 1971 (article by Risto Bajalski).

¹⁴George Blazynski, op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁵Ibid., op. cit., p. 19.

Union, 30 per cent raise in wages, postponement of any repression of the strikers, publication of the real data on the economic situation of the country . . .¹⁶

The next day, after the increase in prices in 1976, there were widespread strikes announced across the whole country. This happened in spite of all the precautionary measures the regime undertook. The most serious events, however, took place in Ursus, ten miles from Warsaw, and in Radom, 80 miles south of Warsaw. In Ursus the workers of the large tractor factory ripped up rails and derailed the Paris-Moscow express. A 10-mile long line of trains was formed. There was not a direct confrontation of the workers with the police, but many workers were arrested.

The events in Radom were much more dramatic.¹⁷ On June 25, the workers of the "Walter" factory marched toward the Party building. They asked for the first secretary. He did not appear, but instead sent the second secretary. The crowd insulted him and burned the Party building. On the walls of the houses there were slogans: "Down with the Party of the traitors."¹⁸ Street fights began in which two policemen were killed and 75 were injured; eight of them were seriously injured. The casualties on the side of the workers were much higher especially when police reinforcements were brought in the so-called "Goledziniaki"

¹⁶AFL-CIO, Nouvelles du mouvement syndical libre, April, 1971.

¹⁷Cf. "Bunt robotnikow Radomia" (Eye-witness report), ANEKS, 12 (1976), pp. 28-30.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 29.

(boys from Goledzinow).¹⁹ By evening the hospitals were not accepting any more of the injured.²⁰ Meanwhile the excited crowd broke the windows of the shops and looted several of them. As that was taking place, the police were taking pictures from the helicopters to make it easy to identify and convict the rioters who would be brought to trial. After 11:00 p.m. the streets were calm, the workers went home, but many were arrested later that same night. The sentences in Ursus were much lighter than those in Radom where several workers were sentenced up to ten years in prison or slightly less. Several thousand people were fined 3000-5000 zlotys.²¹

The 1980 strike in Gdansk and later on in the whole of Poland did not follow the previous patterns. That time, the workers did not go to the streets, there was no breaking of windows nor burning of the Party's buildings. The workers were organized and controlled completely by the strike committee. They were determined more than ever before to struggle for their cause, but they wished negotiations rather than violence. We will see later on how that strike brought about an unprecedented change in the socialist system.

¹⁹In the people's opinion they are recruited from criminals of every kind and they received special training for that kind of action.

²⁰Many suspected that this was purposely ordered by the State authorities.

²¹"Bunt Robotnikow Radomia," ANEKS, 12 (1976), p. 30. The trial was held contrary to the existing laws in Poland. Accused workers could not have their own attorneys, but were entitled only to public defenders. Only the closest family members could be present in court during the

Besides the use of force to control the riots following the four Polish workers' upheavals, the regime adopted similar tactics in all four insurrections but added something different in 1980.

The first thing the regime tried to do was to isolate the place of riot to prevent its spread to other cities. It was done by cutting communication and transportation to those places. The newspapers, radio, and television did not report the events. Only when the regime was forced to publish the workers' grievances did the mass media report the incidents. In December 1970, e.g., Trybuna Ludu reported the events in Gdansk after a three day delay. Also in 1976 and in 1980, there were delays in reporting the riots. When in June 1976, the riot in Radom forced the regime to postpone the price hike, the Prime Minister, Piotr Jaroszewicz said: "Many propositions came up which were worth consideration (and therefore) the Cabinet ordered that the food prices remain unchanged."²²

Secondly, the regime tried to present the events as the excesses of hooligans or the activities of the enemies of the working class. In 1956, the accusations were mainly directed toward foreign agents.

The Poznan provocation was organized by the enemies of our fatherland at a time when the Party and Government are greatly concerned with eliminating the shortcomings in the life of the workers and making our country more democratic. Every patriot and every honest person in Poland must realize this . . . The people's enemies, foreign agents, chose that moment (International Fair) to discredit the working class and the Party whose main effort is the improvement of the

trials. "Apel do swiatowej opinii publicznej, ANEKS 12 (1976), p. 41.

²²
Trybuna Ludu, June 27, 1976.

standard of living of each of us.²³

The Prime Minister, J. Cyrankiewicz, spoke in the same vein:

Imperialistic centers and the reactionary underground hostile to Poland are directly responsible for the incidents . . . The working class . . . will consciously live up to its responsibilities. (Therefore) every provocateur or maniac who will dare raise his hand against the people's rule may be sure that in the interest of the working class, in the interest of the working peasantry and of the intelligentsia . . . the authorities will chop off his hand.²⁴

In 1970, the propaganda hurried to provide foreign journalists with the pictures of vandalism and looting to prove that the people who caused riots were hooligans and not the workers. The imposed curfew was aimed at protecting private and public property from vandalism.²⁵ After the 1976 riots in Ursus and Radom, the workers were accused of looting and vandalism and were convicted and sentenced to prison terms. Therefore, the appeal of the Polish intellectuals to the world's public opinion in behalf of the workers stated: "We consider it our duty to express our disagreement with labeling the workers' protest, which contested unjust social policy and authoritarian power, as 'hooliganism'."²⁶

The use of propaganda in 1980, was much more restricted. On August 28, 1980, the spokesman for the government accused the strikers

²³Trybuna Ludu, June 29, 1956.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵As Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierza (London, December 24, 1970) reported the authorities purposely freed from the correctional centers young criminals who actively participated in looting and vandal actions.

²⁶Cf. ANEKS, 12 (1976), p. 41.

of being inspired by "anti-socialist" ideas and warned them that "the situation as it is now, cannot last any longer. It is becoming serious and it is endangering the very substance of the country."²⁷ The intimidation, however, did not work.

At that point, two different tactics were used in riot control. During the upheavals when there was an immediate change in the leadership (1956, 1970, and 1980) the new leaders promptly admitted the mistakes and mismanagement of the preceding administration and acknowledged that the riots were not caused by foreign agents or hooligans but by the workers, whose serious grievances forced them to protest. In 1956, Gomulka said:

The Poznan workers did not protest against the People's Poland, against socialism when they went out into the streets of the city. They protested against the evil which was widespread in our social system and which was painfully felt by them . . . The working class recently gave a painful lesson to the Party, the leadership and the government . . . they shouted in a power voice: 'Enough'. This cannot go on any longer! 'Turn back from the false road'.²⁸

In 1970, Gierek in his radio speech (December 20) withdrew the Party's condemnation of the riot and openly admitted that it was caused by the legitimate grievances of the working class. That was an indirect condemnation of Gomulka's policy. A few days later he and his Prime Minister, P. Jaroszewicz, pledged to improve housing, payments, food supplies, and others . . .

²⁷Time, September 8, 1980, p. 31.

²⁸Trybuna Ludu, October 21, 1956. See also Andrzej Werblan, "Przyczynek do genezy konfliktu," Miesiecznik Literacki 26 (1968), pp. 61-67.

In 1980, Gierek's regime on the verge of falling, recognized the mismanagement and inefficiency of his government. The State Union declared: "The present crisis has its source in economic mismanagement and in regression in the development of a Socialist democracy."²⁹ But no argument worked. His tactic of appealing to people's emotions failed. The workers derided his speech. At that point he brought the last and the strongest argument: the sovereignty of the nation is endangered because the Soviet Union is preoccupied with the idea that the socialist rule in Poland is in danger. This argument did not work, nonetheless, Russia did show its concerns about the fact that its political influence in Poland might be lessened.

After Gierek's fall, there came an open condemnation of his policy: mismanagement, setbacks in socialist democracy, inefficiency, corruption . . . Finally, he himself was stripped of all medals and Party membership.³⁰

In 1976, another tactic was used. Because no immediate change was foreseen, State authorities organized an immense propaganda in support of the regimes's policy. The workers were forced to participate in rallies which were presented as the spontaneous reaction of the working class against the hooligans from Radom and Ursus. The Party newspaper

²⁹PAP (Polish Press Agency), Bulletin No. 1017, August 27, 1980.

³⁰In 1970, Gierek bitterly condemned Gomulka for his policy even if he himself was a member of Gomulka's politburo. Similarly did Kania in 1980, in spite of his membership in Gierek's politburo. This surely, reflects the struggle for power in different politburo factions and indicates the way the system works to survive.

reported new resolutions every day: "We protest against the disturbances of the dialogue of the Party with the nation."³¹ "Full acceptance of the Party policy by the working class." "Working people are with you, comrade Gierek!" "We condemn those who despise work."³² "Dear comrade Gierek, we are with you. We will help you, we will enforce law-abiding and working class efforts."³³ It was the chief of the Polish Radio and Television, Maciej Szczepanski, who in violent words condemned workers as "the subverters of the public order."³⁴

In 1980, Gierek's regime used all available alternatives to survive. While the workers of Gdansk were still on strike, the police struck the KOR. Jacek Kuron and the other people, especially those from the Confederation for the Independent Poland (KPN) with its founder, Leszek Moczulski, were arrested. That not only did not stop the strike in Gdansk, but served to spread it to Lodz, to Silesia region, and Warsaw. Now Gierek made a conciliatory gesture. He fired Tadeusz Pyka, a chief negotiator with the strike committee, because the workers refused to meet with him, accusing him of corruption. Puppet Premier, Edward Babiuch, cast in Pyka's lot. Jan Szydlak, the President of the

³¹Trybuna Ludu, June 27, 1976.

³²Ibid., June 28, 1976.

³³Ibid., June 29, 1976.

³⁴Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierza (London, June 30, 1976. In the fall, after the 1980 strike, Szczepanski was accused of amassing a personal fortune in embezzled state funds to build a luxurious country house and of having 900 pornographic video films. Cf. Sun Times (Chicago), September 6, 1980.

Trade Union, was replaced by R. Jankowski. Even the proposal of the reform of the State Union was refused. The joint strike committee representing some 300,000 workers declared: "We will go back to work the day after tomorrow if the government will agree on point one: Free Trade Union."³⁵ E. Honecker, the East German Party's first secretary, warned the anti-socialist forces in Poland: "Poland is and will remain a socialist country . . . we, and our friends will make sure of that."³⁶ Husak's regime condemned "Solidarity" since the beginning but the condemnation took the most solemn form during the Czechoslovakian Communist Party Congress in April 1981.

All who are attempting to misuse the events in Poland for instigating anti-socialist campaigns must be reminded of our clear standpoint that the protection of the socialist system is not only the concern of each socialist state, but also the joint concern of the states of the socialist community, which are determined to defend their interests and the socialist achievements of our people.³⁷

Even N. Ceausescu came out in agreement with his critics. In his speech he asked the rhetorical question: What was it (New Trade Union) independent of? "Of the struggle against oppression and social injustice?" Liberal as he was considered, he went to the point no one else did: "Independent Unions," he said, "have always served the

³⁵ Rocky Mountain News, August 29, 1980.

³⁶ Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), October 6, 1980.

³⁷ The Times, April 7, 1981. In protest at Hussak's speech, the Dutch Communist Party recalled its delegates.

interests of the bourgeoisie and imperialism."³⁸

The reactions of Russia and its Eastern European allies to the Polish "anti-socialist" revolution were not limited to verbal disapproval. East Germany sealed its borders with Poland. Russia and Czechoslovakia restricted travels to and from Poland. The Warsaw Pact had gathered about one million troops around the Polish borders. Several unusual maneuvers took place on Polish territory. By December 8, 1980, the invasion plan of Poland was set. The American magazine, Newsweek, reported "the invasion scenario."³⁹ A Swiss newspaper disclosed that only a hot-line call from President Carter to Moscow prevented the invasion.

In April 1980, the situation was aggravated again because of the beating of the Unionists by the police and UB agents. In consequence, "Solidarity" proclaimed a nation-wide strike to protest this action.⁴⁰ Russia prolonged its maneuvers in Poland. When the emergency Party Congress was about to take place in July 1981, the Russian Politburo hurried to send a minatory letter to the Polish comrades, who in the opinion of the Soviets, were giving up too easily to the Union's

³⁸Romanian Press Agency (Agerpress), October 16, 1980.

³⁹Newsweek, December 15, 1980, p. 40.

⁴⁰The action took place during the provincial assembly in Bydgoszcz, March 19, 1981. The government expressed its regrets (see Le Monde, April 1, 1981) and promised the investigation. The investigation conducted by the state attorney was postponed from week to week so that by the end of May, no progress had been made. (Cf. The Times, June 5, 1981.) On August 31, 1981, the government decided to drop the

requests. A few days before the emergency Congress took place, Gromyko arrived in Warsaw with the necessary instructions for the Polish Communist Party. In the middle of August 1981, Kania and Premier Jaruzelski were summoned to Moscow for new directives. At the same time several new maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact troops were announced for the fall. They coincided with the Solidarity Congress in Gdansk and had an explicit aim: an intimidation of the "Solidarity."

Conquests of the Polish Workers' Upheavals

As I have already pointed out, the postwar Polish workers' riots took place in a situation of continual strain which was sharply aggravated by some precipitating factors. Similar but not exactly the same grievances caused the explosions in the four cases analyzed above. In all four riots the main cause of the explosion was lowering of the real income through significant price increases, especially in food. This was a key issue. The second were the complaints against some Party officials considered as corrupted. In two of the strikes (1956 and 1980), the problem of free workers' organization played an important role. As for the specific grievances, the 1970 and 1976 strikes did not formulate any significant importance, contrary to the 1980 strike which did make many of them. They will be discussed in connection with the final agreement between "Solidarity" and the Party officials.

case. (See The New York Times, September 8, 1981.) This was nothing but an official institutionalization of crime committed by police.

In 1956, the main grievances were: (1) abolition of the recently introduced norms and regulations for job and job discipline; (2) renunciation of the authoritarian conditions of employment; (3) an authentic workers' representative body within the factories; (4) an independent from the tutelage of the Party Trade Union; and (5) a parliamentary representation of the workers through an independent Union.⁴¹

Any positive answer to these problems would require a substantial change in the existing structure of management and of the State-run Union. The Union, as it existed, was not considered by the workers as their representative, but an instrument of State control. Glos Pracy wrote: "In one year the gap between the working class and the Union widened significantly."⁴²

The Poznan riot influenced the atmosphere of the VII Plenum of the Central Committee which took place on July 18-28, 1956. Plenum came to a decision to repair the injustice caused by infringement of democratic law-abidingness and undertook several reforms aimed at healing the crippled Polish economy.⁴³

The Central Committee bulletin of August 5, 1956, cleared W. Gomulka, M. Spychalski, and Z. Kliszko of charges formulated against

⁴¹Cf. Paul Barton, op. cit., p. 14.

⁴²Glos Pracy, November 26, 1956.

⁴³Cf. 100 lat ruchu robotniczego: kronika wydarzen (Warszawa: KiW, 1978), p. 311.

them in November 1949.⁴⁴ One day before that, the levy of milk imposed on private farmers was abolished. But the most important concessions to the workers were to come two months later. They were: Workers' Council, Union Reform, and an increase in wages.

Workers' Councils

The foundation of the Workers' Councils was considered by the workers as an important structural change in the system and as a sign of a long-range democratization process. They were thought of as a part of the so-called self-management or autonomy of the factories' policy embodied in the Yugoslavian model which implied the right to establish the direction of the factory's specialization, direct control over the staff and administration in the plants, improve the factory's efficiency, and the right to decisions regarding funds, organizations, plans . . .⁴⁵

Workers' Councils had, generally speaking, two functions: a greater participation of the workers in the decisions of the companies and the role of mediation between staff and workers in case of conflict. That was, as Morawski pointed out, some kind of two-fold system of management: the administrative coming down from the central planners

⁴⁴ Gomulka's heresy was called "Gomulkaism" which claimed the right to the Polish road to socialism.

⁴⁵ Leszek Gilejko, "Formulowanie sie i rola samorządu robotniczego," Struktura i dynamika społeczeństwa polskiego by W. Wesolowski (Warszawa: PWN, 1970), p. 183.

and that of workers based mainly on their initiative.⁴⁶

The idea of the autonomy of the factory was propagated mainly by the younger generation and seemed to be easily accepted by the new leadership of the Party. Besides that, the political circumstances of the post-October policy stressing the right to the Polish road to communism, promised a rather lasting character of change in factory administration. Similarly, the young intelligentsia had actively participated in the process of renewal supporting the elimination of incompetent managers, but Party men.⁴⁷ Striking was the fact of the unprecedented small number of Party members in the first Workers' Councils to the point that the following slogan circulated among workers: "Workers' Councils without Communists."

The new body, however, did not have enough time to become naturalized in its primitive form by the time it began to be an object of manipulation under pressure coming from the top. The Workers' Councils were gradually transformed from the representative bodies into institutions whose main goal was to increase the efficiency of the factories. By 1958, when a new law concerning the Workers' Councils was enacted, legally restricting their role, it had already been in practice for

⁴⁶ Cf. Witold Morawski, "Funkcje samorządu robotniczego w przemysłowym systemie zarządzania," Przemysł i społeczeństwo w Polsce Ludowej by J. J. Szczepanski (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1969), p. 246.

⁴⁷ The new ideas were mainly propagated by "Po prostu" and "Przegląd Kulturalny."

some time.⁴⁸ The new law clearly stated that all organizations within the factory form a system of organization whose leading role was given to the Party organization at the factory level. That was not only a step back, but a total annihilation of what was intended by the Workers' Councils.⁴⁹

Union Reform

An effort to reform the discredited Union had begun immediately after the insurrection in Poznan, as requested by the workers. At the end of October 1956, the militants of the new Union movement met in Warsaw to study the objectives of the Trade Union in the new circumstances of the country. Challenged by that initiative, the State Trade Union immediately ordered an extraordinary meeting (October 25) and invited the new Unionists to participate in it. During that meeting, the State Union's chief, Klosiewicz, admitted that the workers had reason for their distrust toward the Union's officials.⁵⁰ Conciliated by that, militants did not insist on a convocation of an extraordinary Congress of the Union, but conceded that the reform should be left to the State Union's General Council. Gomulka's regime availed itself of the opportunity and removed Klosiewicz from the office of president of

⁴⁸ Dziennik Ustaw, No. 77, 1958.

⁴⁹ Witold Morawski, op. cit., p. 258. Cf. George Kolankiewicz, "The Polish Industrial Manual Class," in Social Groups in Polish Society by D. Lane and G. Kolankiewicz (eds.) (London: The MacMillan Company, 1973), p. 18.

⁵⁰ Glos Pracy, October 26, 1956.

the Union and replaced him by Loga-Sowinski, a new politburo member. One could hardly expect a more absurd situation, at least in the Western understanding of the Union's role. So, before any positive reform took place, the Party had reassured itself of full control of the reform. When, for example, the Unionists asked for dismissal of vice president J. Kulesza, criticized for his role in the preceding Union's administration, it was postponed for an indefinite future. Workers' delegates to the Union's General Council bitterly criticized the situation. "No one asks us what are our grievances, what we want, what we think . . . Union's General Council is but a group of the anonymous people who never were able to . . . express interests of the masses . . .,"⁵¹

In spite of these evident limitations, some positive acts of the Union's reform took place. The first was a decentralization of the Union's power in making decisions. On this basis, the right to make decisions on the level of different types of industry was conferred on the federations. The second positive step concerned the necessity of limiting red tape and lessening the over-bureaucratic nature of the Union. Finally, it was stressed that it was the role of the Union to defend working class interests.⁵²

As counter-reform of the Union was taking over, the Union's General Council started to talk about "justified interests," "just griev-

⁵¹Glos Pracy, November 17, 1956.

⁵²Paul Barton, op. cit., pp. 33-35.

ances," and "balancing" of the nation's interests with those of the working class, terms which allowed much space for substantial differences in interpretations, according to specific circumstances. The Union had found itself in a deadlock. At one side, it insisted upon independence as a conditio sine qua non of its activity; on the other, it could not stay in opposition to the Party, because the Party itself was the "working class Party, which protects the working class interests." When in 1959, the first secretary of the Party, W. Gomulka, listed the fields of the Union's activities, there was not among them the protection of the workers' interests.⁵³

Increase in Wages

As we can see in Table 1, the real income in Poland in the early 1950s was declining. The deterioration of the economic situation of the workers caused the 1956 riot in Poznan. The increase in wages was another grievance of Poznan's protesters. Table 3 (p. 208) shows the increase in wages after the riot in Poznan.⁵⁴

While the regime boasted that in 1949, the GNP surpassed the level of 1938,⁵⁵ the real wages in 1956 were only at 74 per cent of those

⁵³Trybuna Ludu, March 11, 1959. In Gomulka's view, the role of the Union consisted in: struggle for job discipline, improving workers' qualifications, stabilization of the factory personnel and commitment to the heightening of the workers' socialist consciousness.

⁵⁴BIT, Annuaire de Statistique du travail. Reported by Paul Barton, op. cit., p. 50.

⁵⁵Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 40.

TABLE 3
INCREASE IN WAGES AFTER 1956
RIOT IN POZNAN

Year	Quarter	Per Cent of Increase
1956	I	-1.7
	II	5.2
	III	9.4
	IV	4.0
1957	I	3.9
	II	1.9
	III	4.5
	IV	-0.7
1958	I	-0.7

before the World War II level.⁵⁶

The 1970 workers insurrection in the Northern cities of Poland (Gdansk, Gdynia, Szczecin) did not bring any institutional changes in the Polish society. That happened because of the weak organization of the workers, and lack of experience. We will see, later on, that the same happened in the 1976 upheaval.

First of all, the workers had no formal organization. The State-run Union was not considered a workers' body, but as one more State institution to control them. In the socialist system, the regime reserves for itself the right of controlling every aspect of social life and therefore it prohibits any organization beyond its control. Even if the ability of the workers to organize themselves surprised some of the officials, it was not sufficient to challenge the power of the Party.⁵⁷ Secondly, the Party officials appealed to the workers' emotions. During the very tense meeting of Gierek and his associates with the workers' strike committee in Gdansk, Szlachcic cried, counting on the workers' patriotism, and in addition promising that from now on "a Pole will not shoot at a Pole."⁵⁸ Walesa himself said: "Frankly speaking, I believed in this at that time . . . Today I understand

⁵⁶Industrial Labor Policy and Living Standards in the Soviet Orbit, London, 1957, Table 1.

⁵⁷A top Party official, Szlachcic said: "We were surprised at the ability of the working class for rapid activities improvised in the course of events." Cf. Appendix A, Interview 2, p. 377.

⁵⁸Appendix A, Interview 3, p. 384.

that it was a trap. It happened because our people, although devoted to the workers' cause, had soft hearts."⁵⁹

The December 1970 riot brought about several changes including the position of the first secretary of the Community Party. In consequence, W. Gomulka was replaced by Edward Gierek and four other Politburo members, B. Jaszczuk, Z. Kliszko, R. Strzelecki and M. Spychalski, left their positions and were replaced by P. Jaroszewicz, M. Moczar, J. Szydlak, S. Olszowski and E. Babiuch.⁶⁰ In addition, J. Cyrankiewicz gave his position as Premier to P. Jaroszewicz; he took M. Spychalski's position as chairman of the Council of State. Besides that, some changes took place in regional (Voivodship) top positions. One not too familiar with practices in the communist states, might be surprised by their number. In reality, they were only the scapegoats to save the Party's reputation. Most of the promotions and demotions were done at a close circle "family forum." Some were sacrificed pro Party publicum bonum. A new edition of the same regime tried once more to manage the country, to bring it, after ten years, to the edge of complete bankruptcy.

If considered from the point of view of personnel changes and scapegoats, the 1976 riots in Ursus and Radom might be categorized as less important.⁶¹ The riot forced the regime to postpone price hikes,

⁵⁹Appendix A, Interview 3, p. 348.

⁶⁰The number of the Politburo members remained the same; the fifth new member replaced Gierek, who became the first secretary.

⁶¹Piotr Jaroszewicz survived the riot, but he was fired four years later.

but no one was immediately sacrificed. Prime Minister Jaroszewicz said the next day: "We proposed the change of prices . . . (but) we received several concrete propositions (concerning the matter) . . . (so) . . . the Cabinet decided to stay with the preceding retail prices of food."⁶² That was a victory for the workers, even if limited in time, because prices were raised later on only moderately.

A much more important consequence of the June riot was the foundation by fourteen prominent Polish intellectuals of the Committee to defend persecuted workers (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow -- KOR), which later on was transformed into the Self Defense Committee KOR. The fourteen intellectuals in their declaration of June 1976, expressed solidarity with the workers and initiated the collecting of funds to support families of imprisoned or fired workers.⁶³ Another group of intellectuals protested against the illegal practices during the workers' trials and appealed to world opinion to intervene in favor of the Polish workers.⁶⁴ Jacek Kuron wrote a letter to Enrico Berlinguer, the first secretary of the Italian Communist Party, asking for

⁶²Dziennik Polski, June 26, 1976.

⁶³Even Lech Walesa was supported by that organization. Cf. Appendix A, Interview 3, p. 382. By December 21, 1976, KOR supported 109 families, spending 474,510 zlotys in Ursus and about the same number of families in Radom with 494,650 zlotys. KOR, Bulletin No. 5, ANEKS, 13-14 (1976), pp. 417-418.

⁶⁴"Apel do swiatowej opinii publicznej," ANEKS, 12 (1976), pp. 41-42.

intervention in favor of the Polish workers.⁶⁵

Professor Edward Lipinski asked publicly for the possibility of creating an opposition group according to the guarantee of the constitutional principle of freedom to form associations and hold meetings.⁶⁶ A protest came also from the Polish hierarchy with the appeal for clemency for the imprisoned.⁶⁷ Under that pressure from within and from abroad the government proclaimed an amnesty for the rioters on February 5, 1977.⁶⁸

The August 1980 strike in Poland brought about far-reaching personnel changes of Party officials but also a significant institutional change. It was a long standing practice in the policy of the Communist parties in the Soviet orbit to use changes in Party position members as scapegoats. The same happened in Poland in 1980. The first to be sacrificed was Gierek, whose incompetence, aristocratic lifestyle, paternalism, and corruption were manifested more and more. His apparent initial liberalism changed into an oppressive, overwhelming control. Gierek's right hand, Piotr Jaroszewicz, was fired a few months before

⁶⁵See ANEKS, 12 (1976), pp. 37-40. The Italian Community Party's newspaper "L'Unita" published the letter on July 20, 1976. The Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party sent a letter to the Polish comrades protesting against the imprisonment of the workers in Poland. A similar protest came from the biggest Italian Trade Unions.

⁶⁶Edward Lipinski, op. cit., p. 10.

⁶⁷Reuter and DPA from Warsaw, November 20, 1976.

⁶⁸George Blazynski, op. cit., p. 290. Clemency did not include those who did not admit their guilt or who were beaten up and degraded.

the strike began, and was replaced by a puppet, Edward Babiuch, a close Gierek associate. E. Babiuch, J. Szydlak, propaganda chief, J. Lukaszewicz, economic planning chief, T. Wrzaszczyk, politburo members T. Pyka and Z. Zandrowski were fired with Gierek.⁶⁹ The newly established Politburo was composed of the following persons: S. Kania, K. Barcikowski, T. Grabski, H. Jablonski, M. Jagielski, W. Jaruzelski, M. Moczar, S. Olszowski, J. Pinkowski, and A. Zabinski.

Some changes were forced by Solidarity, e.g., in Bielsko Biala, where the governor was forced to leave his office because of his corruption.⁷⁰ In spite of evident cases, Warsaw refused to remove the governor and his associates. Only after 11 days of regional strikes which cost \$100,000,000 did the regime give up. By the end of 1980, more than 20 of the 49 Voivodship Party officials were substituted.

Institutional change, i.e., the foundation of the Free Trade Union, first its industrial and later on its rural branch, was the most important result of the workers' strike in 1980, guaranteed by the agreement between the Government and the Strikers' Committee reached on August 31, 1980. Since the beginning of the strike, the Free Trade Union was the

⁶⁹Cf. Rocky Mountain News, October 7, 1980. In December 1980, four other politburo members were fired: W. Kruczek, A. Karkoszka, S. Kowalczyk and A. Werblan, the hard-line Party ideologist. See Sun Times (Chicago), December 3, 1980. In April 1981, T. Wrzaszczyk was stripped of Party membership for "mismanagement of central planning administration, and for reaping personal profit from his social position." Gazeta Krakowska, April 27, 1981. For the same reason the former minister of Industry and Mining, F. Kaim, was expelled from the Party. Ibid.

⁷⁰ See Sun Times (Chicago), February 7, 1981.

most important demand of the workers. "We will not settle for anything short of a Free Trade Union . . . and we will get it,"⁷¹ Walesa declared. One month later, November 10, 1980, the Polish Supreme Court ruled in favor of the new Union and registered its charter. The Union recognized the leading role of the Communist Party in the Government, but not in the Union itself. Together with the right to form a Free Trade Union, almost all of the 21 demands of the workers were satisfied.⁷² Once the agreement had been reached, Kania said:

A new situation arose in the country. There is a need for a new approach to the Party's task, to socio-economic policy, the development of a Socialist democracy, to the role of the Trade Union movement, and to work among youth. It is no longer possible to use old methods, and the need for renovation arises from a critical analysis of (past) mistakes, from a confrontation with the ideas of socialism . . . In the Party, in its units, there is a need to search persistently for a new and better approach."⁷³

The final approval of Rural Solidarity faced some legal problems. The most difficult was that the farmers were not employees, but worked for themselves. Therefore, the Supreme Court, even if it technically recognized Rural Solidarity during its session on February 10, 1980, it denied Rural Solidarity the juridical status of the Union. That came

⁷¹Newsweek, September 8, 1980, p. 30.

⁷²The regime guaranteed the right to strike and the security of the strikers and anyone aiding them; it promised to limit censorship, to give more information about the country's economic situation, to increase wages, to ration meat, to lower the retirement age, to improve health services, and prolong maternity leaves; the regime promised also more five-day weeks. Cf. Dokumenty: Protokoly porozumien Gdansk, Szczecin, Jastrzebie; Statut NSZZ "Solidarnosc" (Warszawa: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1980), pp. 2-9.

⁷³Trybuna Ludu, October 5, 1980.

two months later, after having prepared a legal basis for such recognition.⁷⁴

Another indirect consequence of the 1980 workers' strikes was the foundation on February 17, 1981 of the Student Union. This new Union helped the students to win several concessions, such as dropping of the mandatory Russian language and also obligatory courses in Marxism. In addition, permission to travel abroad was eased.⁷⁵ Under the pressure of the Student Union, the Higher Education Minister, Janusz Gorski, was fired because of his incompetency.

The Free Trade Union in the Socialist system is an oddity to the Marxian theory of class. According to that theory and Marx' theory of conflict, the Communist Party itself is the embodiment of the workers' interests. The Party is a unique and genuine representative of the working class. The Communist system is a workers' (proletarian) dictatorship, the Communist Party is the "vanguard" of the working class. It is the proletariat which delegates its authority to the Party, and this delegation is permanent and final. Thus any attempt to challenge the rule of the Party is a challenge to all social classes (strata) but especially to the working class. This challenge cannot have genuine

⁷⁴The Times, April 18, 1981. On April 17, 1981, the government and the farmers signed an agreement. The farmers recognized the leading role of the Communist Party in return for legal recognition of Rural Solidarity. Even if Rural Solidarity is intended to be open to all farmers, regardless of their political beliefs, its statutes openly recognized the role of the Church in farmers' life.

⁷⁵Sun Times (Chicago), February 18, 1981.

proletarian inspiration but it has to come from peoples enemies, domestic or foreign, as well.

At this point, the Party is contradicting itself. If this is the case, what is the role of the State-run Trade Union in the Socialist system? The working class has already its representative, namely the Party itself. Similar theoretical difficulties arise when one talks about the "Free Trade Union." One must logically ask the next question: what should the Trade Union be free from?

Such a theoretical difficulty can have only one reasonable solution: the Party (new class) does not represent the real proletarian class, but constitutes, in itself, a political elite. Accepting that, however, one is shifting away from the Marxian theory of class and class conflict. The next part of this paper will try to present another, more feasible theory of class and class conflict in the socialist societies in general and in the Polish society in particular.

P A R T F O U R

CLASSES AND CLASS CONFLICT IN THE SOCIALIST SOCIETIES

CHAPTER VII

CLASS STRUCTURE IN THE POLISH POSTWAR SOCIETY

Introductory Considerations

Any theory of class structure in a given society must include the solution of the fundamental problem namely, formulation of class definition or identification of the basis on which class structure in that society arises. This is practically a task of identifying hic et nunc (here and now) class generating factors which are of special consequences. By meeting this requirement one avoids the possibility of shifting analysis from a real problem to a false one. The hic implies an empirical identification of what is highly appreciated in a given society. The nunc has its temporal dimension. This is why it makes no sense to formulate class theory in the Polish society based on the color of the eyes of the people. Nor does it make sense today to categorize Polish people according to their nobility at birth even if it would make sense to do that 200 or even 100 years ago. One cannot build an abstract definition of class and then say that such and such a society has classes or is classless, but one must empirically identify the important indices which account for the hierarchy which is present in a particular society at a particular time.

Additionally, class analysis has to identify the size of the groups and different minorities which possess specific characteristics and values.

Finally, a sociologist studying class structure must look at how these different parts of a society interact. Is that a harmonious or conflictual interaction? If the groups are conflictual, he must identify what constitutes the basis on which the conflict arises. In other words, any theory of class structure in a particular society has to take into consideration three dimensions of human life: social, economic, and political.¹ Differences among individuals regarding those aspects will account for the rise of social groups which might be considered higher or lower in that society. Chapter I noted the difficulties Marxian theory met in explaining class structure in capitalist society and its uselessness in explaining class structure in the Soviet-type socialist societies. Marxian theory of class is limited because it tries to explain class arising on a one dimensional basis (i.e., economic), the relation to the means of production. The Marxian model of class structure is visibly unilinear. The independent economic variable accounts for political power, which in turn, gives the right to control the spiritual life of a particular society. Control over the means of production gives political power which makes possible control of the spiritual life (superstructure) as well.

Such a sequence is even contrary to the notion of revolution as Marx envisioned it which intended to abolish private ownership of the means of production. The old capitalist order was protected by the

¹W. G. Runciman, "Towards a Theory of Social Stratification," The Social Analysis of Classes by F. Parkin (London: Tavistock Publications Limited, 1974), p. 56.

State which, in Marx' view, was nothing but the guardian of the system itself, constituting its integral part. So, it is inconceivable that one could change the economic system (socialize the means of production) before one seized political power. Therefore, in 1917, in Russia, the Bolsheviki first seize an absolute political power, whereupon the nationalization of the means of production followed. A similar sequence of events occurred in Eastern European countries. Russia occupied these countries to install communists in power. Such a change in the sphere of political power was followed by the change in economy.

Logically, one might envision the future system as totalitarian, where the powerful elite acquires absolute control over politics, economy, and social life, which de facto, has occurred in Russia and her sattelites. But this was not Marx' vision. In his view, the evil of capitalism is rooted in its heart namely, i.e., private property. Abolishment of that type of property would be a unique and sufficient remedy. Reality, however, is much more complex. The so-called "vanguard of the proletariat," instead of serving the "new classless society," has formed a new political elite (power elite) thereby creating a gulf between themselves and the vast majority of the population. The new proletariat not only did not lose its "chains" but has lost even the little bit of control it exercised through a free electorate.²

²In the Soviet style of socialist society as Simirenko points out: "The Party exercises the right to select its worthy persons and bring them to attention of the people, because the clients are not regarded as sufficiently competent to judge them . . . Elections are a form of plebiscite, in which the clients are asked to deliver a vote of confidence in their professionals . . ." Alex Simirenko, "Professionaliza-

"If we substitute," writes Djilas, "'Party' for 'capital', then we can see before our eyes a vision of Communism's destiny, the one Marx had assigned to capitalism; monopoly capital (Party monopoly) become fetters on the mode of production which flourished with it and under it."³

An analysis of the Soviet-type of society has therefore to take into consideration the Party membership which constitutes the basis for the power elite recruitment. Party membership is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for reaching the top of the socialist society pyramid (See diagram on page 222). Party membership procures privileges which grow as one moves up in the class pyramid. Advancement into the power elite is conditioned by one's active involvement in the Party's affairs and a positive acceptance of the Marxist ideology.⁴

Discrimination against non-Party people in Poland was indirectly but officially recognized by the regime in the Party's theses for an emergency Congress in July 1981. Speaking about managerial positions it was said: "The access of non-Party people to managerial posts in the country and in the economy should be a basic principle of policy."⁵

tion of Politics and Tension Management: The Case of the Soviet Union," Sociological Quarterly 15 (1974), p. 24.

³Milovan Djilas, The Unperfect Society (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1969), p. 187.

⁴In Poland, probably more than in other socialist countries, people enter the Party files only to be able to hold better positions in the society. However, they are not trusted enough to advance eventually to power elite. One must positively prove his support for Party ideology.

⁵Gazeta Krakowska, May 8-10, 1981. The postulate does not say "an equal access" but an "access." That simply meant two things: (1) that until now, no other people had access to those positions, and (2) that




Figure 9

Social Stratification in Poland: Key Variables

While in 1949, non-Party people occupied 17 per cent of the managerial positions, in 1951, only 4.2 per cent and in 1953, 2.2 per cent and they were completely removed from those positions by 1956.⁶ All this happened nevertheless that in 1957, only 16 per cent of 84,000 managerial posts were held by the people with a college education, 49 per cent had high school diplomas, and 32 per cent had not reached even this level of formal education.⁷ At the same time more educated people were not allowed to occupy those posts because they were not Party members. This social and political discriminatory policy against non-Party people has been the normal rule in postwar Poland.

History knows four ideal types of social stratification systems. Each one of these systems stresses in a special way one of four aspects of one's qualities: power, wealth, work and knowledge. The first may be called "cratism," the second "plutoism," the third "ergoism," and finally, the last one "epistemism."⁸

These ideal types do not exist in their pure forms. What is real

some changes in this policy were necessary (for propaganda purposes), but an equal access has never been an issue.

⁶Halina Najduchowska, "Dyrektorzy przedsiębiorstw przemysłowych," Przemyśl i społeczeństwo w Polsce Ludowej by J. J. Szczepanski (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1969), p. 86.

⁷Polityka, September 24, 1957.

⁸The terms are neologisms taken from Greek: "kratein," "ploutos," "ergon," and "episteme" which mean respectively: to rule, wealth, work, and knowledge. Cf. Stefan Kurowski, Struktura społeczna, a rewolucja naukowotechniczna (Wrocław: Instytut Nauk Społecznych Politechniki Wrocławskiej, 1971), p. 18.

is that while in one society power may be considered the main stratifying factor, in others, the same role may play wealth or knowledge. One indicator does not exclude the other, but is only considered more important than the others in a particular society. And so, every totalitarian system is labeled as "crateism" because it give priority to power. The secret knowledge of the priestly cast in Ancient Egypt gave rise to "epistemism."

Four variables account for class formation in contemporary Poland: Party membership, education, occupation, and income. The first represents the political dimension of the social classes in Poland, the next two (highly correlated) represent the social aspect, and the last one accounts for the economic aspect of class.⁹ The model on page 222 presents a graphic representation of the variables and their sequence in the class generating process. Party membership variable has a positive correlation with the levels of income and education influencing both of them directly or indirectly. The political power variable influences prestige but only indirectly via income and education or only education. It also influences "life chances" directly or through income. The level of income influences one's life chances, status and level of education being itself influenced by the education variable. Education depends on one's political membership (Party membership) but,

⁹ Italian sociologist, Pagani, suggests the same variables as valid for class analysis in Italy. He does not include Party membership cleavage. This is understandable because the Italian regime is democratic like other Western systems. Cf. Angelo Pagani, "L'immagine

independently influences the level of income and social prestige.¹⁰ Individuals with a similar social status have a similar lifestyle. Slomczynski's research of 1966 shows the following degree of correlation between the just mentioned variables: 0.35 between education and prestige of the occupations; 0.36 between income and prestige, and 0.40 between education and income.¹¹

Party Membership

Every society has a system of differentiated political roles to make possible its functioning and the legitimate use of necessary devices. Such a structure, built on the political power, creates a foundation for evaluation of the individuals. The higher one's responsibility in the governmental structure, the higher is his position in that society.

In the Soviet-type Specialist societies, the Communist Party has absolute power and through its ideology and members controls every aspect of economic, social and political life.¹² "Politics," writes

della struttura di classi nella popolazione Italiana," Quaderni di Sociologia 19 (1970), p. 161.

¹⁰Politically committed receive some additional entry points to enter the colleges.

¹¹Kazimierz Slomczynski, Socio-occupational Differentiation and Education, Authority, Income and Prestige, presented to World Congress of Sociology in Varna, 1970, p. 18.

¹²This absolute power consists of the control of "the means of production, distribution and exchange," of "the control over the means of physical coercion," and over "the means of the status attribution." See Karl Hoering, "Power and Social Stratification," Sociological Quarterly 12 (1971), pp. 10-11.

Tellenback, "is a central social force in it (socialist society) and political power is concentrated to the Party."¹³ A sufficient legitimation of that absolute Party power is the building of a future Socialist society "which excuses the rulers from submitting their policy to the judgment of the 'masses'."¹⁴ The Party recruits its members on the basis of ideological loyalty and it is through that ideology that it controls them. In Hoering's view,

. . . the exertion of power can . . . be understood as a structurally dependent selection process among given alternative resources, and acceptance of this selection by others in view of more unpleasant or expensive possibilities--physical force, withdrawal from cooperation, loss of membership, excessive complexity, uncertainty, or responsibility.¹⁵

The five characteristics of an ideal bureaucracy are absent here as they are in a patrimonial system. Bauman puts it this way:

'In place of a well-defined impersonal sphere of competence, there is a shifting series of tasks and powers commissioned and granted' by the party through more or less arbitrary decisions. 'In contrast to rational hierarchy of authority in the bureaucratic system, the question who shall decide a matter' can be subject to arbitrary decision of the party. 'Whenever (the Party) intervenes, all others give way' to its will. Any checks 'from below' aimed at effectively reducing the arbitrariness of these decisions would be emphatically dismissed as an attempt by the ideologically retarded to shape the imperatives of the future of which the party is the sole interpreter.¹⁶

Power is strictly related to privilege: of getting better jobs, or

¹³Sten Tellenback, op. cit., p. 41.

¹⁴Zygmunt Bauman, *Officialdom* . . ., op. cit., p. 137.

¹⁵Karl Hoering, op. cit., p. 10.

¹⁶Zygmunt Bauman, *Officialdom* . . ., op. cit., p. 138.

having access to any scarce goods, and finally, the privilege of having power. Any privilege presupposes power. Subsequently, we will see the ways in which the political elite in Poland take advantage of their positions of power.

Income--Wealth

Wealth is a stratifying factor in relatively bigger and to some point developed societies. If deprived of prestige and education, wealth is a secondary criterion of class division. Weber writes: "Property as such is not always recognized as a status qualification, but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity."¹⁷ This is because the lack of wealth makes it difficult to reach a high position in a society and obligates one "to work, and to work hard, in order to live."¹⁸ Additionally, as Parsons stresses, "money . . . is a particularly convenient criterion to designate various steps in . . . a gradual pyramidal structure, particularly where other common measures such as direct technical criteria or hierarchy of office in directly comparable organizations are not readily available."¹⁹

In the People's Democracies of the Soviet-type, the means of production have been nationalized. This undoubtedly has its strong

¹⁷Max Weber, "Class, Status, Party," The Impact of Social Class by P. Blumberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1972), p. 27.

¹⁸T. H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Classes," The Impact of Social Class by P. Blumberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1972), p. 40. Cf. Talcott Parsons, *An Analytical Approach . . .*, op. cit., p. 83.

¹⁹Talcott Parsons, *An Analytical Approach . . .*, op. cit., p. 85.

impact on the class structure. At least two main classes of the former capitalist system disappeared completely: the bourgeoisie and land-owners. That reform has homogenized the source of income of almost the entire population. Contrary to the capitalist societies where there are several different sources of income in Poland, practically all people are State employees who live on their salaries.²⁰ This uniform source of income is the most visible consequence of the totalitarian control of economy, politics and social life by a monopolistic Party. The next chapter will stress the system of wages which does not follow the meritorious lines. The power elite decides arbitrarily the remuneration levels of different occupational categories. Official State statistics admit that the range of wages in Poland, in the late 1970s, was 1500-1600 zlotys.²¹

Education

Education and occupation are two variables closely related one to another especially in modern society. Technological change requires highly qualified personnel. The progress in the sciences brings about technological change to provide society with necessary food, clothing, shelter, and recreation. These are "technological skill(s) in the manipulation of the ideas and physical instrument necessary to produc-

²⁰ Only a moderate number of richer farmers are self-employees. The others who do not have enough land to support their families are also State employees.

²¹ Rote Fabne, September 13, 1979 (interview with B. Borusewicz).

tion."²² Knowledge is a basic variable for class theory of a modern society.

The very process of technological change to which many of our 'materialists' assign so fundamental a role are in part a function of knowledge, i.e., of ideas, in exactly the same sense in which economic processes are. And there, far more than in the narrowly economic realm, knowledge has become a variable which we think of as a high degree of autonomy.²³

Another necessary skill for the functioning of a modern society is the skill in human relations, that is, "the ability to set goals for and effectively exercise authority over those who are jointly engaged in productive organization."²⁴ This obviously places people in a privileged position, and the system (especially capitalism) rewards them by means of income and prestige.²⁵

Modern technology employs a large number of highly trained specialists because of the growing division of labor. It was exactly this issue that escaped the attention of Marx. The author of Capital did not pay enough attention to possible complexity of industrial development and, arising with that, the new stratifying factor of an occupational system based on the complex division of labor, i.e., work

²²Bernard Barber, *Social Stratification*, op. cit., p. 37.

²³Talcott Parsons, "Role of Ideas in Social Action," Essays in Sociological Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 23.

While Marx placed technology in the sphere of "basis," Parsons located it in the "superstructure," to use Marxian terms. This is logical. It is not a tool which creates man, but man creates and uses his tools.

²⁴Bernard Barber, *Social Strification*, op. cit., p. 37.

²⁵George Ross, "Marxism and the New Middle Class: French

roles and proliferation of the authority relations.²⁶

The school reform in Poland with a democratization of high school and college education has opened new channels of upward mobility for intelligent youth. Despite the limited possibilities the State can offer to young people and despite the State's favouring activist youth who are seen as the future Party people, the most intelligent students are able to enter college.

Occupational Prestige

By prestige we mean "a hierarchical ordering in terms of esteem."²⁷ In the industrial societies such an ordering in prestige has its essential basis in occupational roles or in one's performances. In non-

Critique," Theory and Society 5 (1978), p. 187.

²⁶In Giddens' view that was due to Marx' theory of value, distinction between productive and unproductive labor and insufficient explanation of the exploitation. For Marx, only productive labor creates value: the "unproductive minority" lives by appropriation of the surplus created by the "productive majority." But as we know, efficiency of the modern industrial production is based on bureaucracy where the unproductive minority is necessary for efficient production. Giddens says: "Any form of society . . . which depends upon the large scale of production and exchange of goods, must necessarily involve, according to the terms of Marx's economic theory, the extraction of surplus value from the producing majority." Anthony Giddens, The Class Structure . . . , op. cit., pp. 96-97. Marxian theory of class is suspected because it links exploitation with the appropriation of surplus value created by another class, and because they who do not "produce" are automatically considered exploiters.

²⁷Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 132. Cf. Paul K. Hatt and Cecil G. North, Occupations and Social Status (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961); Robert W. Hodge, Paul M. Siegel, and Peter H. Rossi, "Occupational Prestige in the United States, 1925-63," The Impact of Social Classes by P. Blumberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Company, 1972), pp. 233-254.

modernized societies a differential esteem is mainly ascribed by nobility at birth and kinship. What is, however, common to both of these societies, is that ordering of esteem has a relatively stable character and may be influenced by some cultural values of a society. For that reason, a hierarchy of prestige of occupations in two different countries with a similar degree of development might differ significantly. (See diagram on page 222, where prestige variable is influenced by cultural values.) Prestige, as Thomas and Znaniecki say, is "the complex product of a half-intellectual, half-emotional attitude of each member of the group toward the leader as seen by other members; the subject of prestige is not the individual as an active personality but the picture of this individual drawn by public opinion."²⁸ So, an occupational prestige forces those who possess it "to keep the traditions and to uphold the 'esprit de corps' by which this profession (occupation) of class tries to maintain its prestige . . ."²⁹

Even if prestige is related to power, these are two different variables. "Prestige," write Bierstedt, "is frequently accompanied by power and when the two occur together power is usually the basis and ground of prestige rather than the reverse. Prestige would seem to be a consequence of power rather than a determinant of it or a necessary

²⁸ William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1958), Vol. II, p. 1333.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 1332.

component of it."³⁰ There are mainly the totalitarian systems which bring about a situation where prestige and power diverge significantly. This is also true in Poland. For example, a Government Minister, who is supposed to have much power, occupies only the fifth position on the scale of prestige.³¹ So, one can say that the hierarchy of esteem is assumed and ascribed.³² Professional prestige, however, always confers some power over other people's behavior.³³

We find similar situations when we analyze the relationship between prestige and wealth. Prestige does not necessarily increase with the increase of wealth. For example, a private locksmith in Poland scores third place on the benefit scale, but only twelfth on the prestige scale. Vice versa, a high school teacher ranks third in prestige (after university professor and physician), but he is only fourteenth on the scale of benefits.³⁴

According to Sarapata, 5 factors influence the level of prestige of an occupation in Poland: (1) the degree of interestingness, (2) the

³⁰Robert Bierstedt, "An Analysis of Social Power," American Sociological Review 15 (1950), p. 731.

³¹Adam Sarapata, "Iustum Pretium," Studia Socjologiczne 3 (1962), p. 106.

³²This is contrary to power; one must prove power continually.

³³Cf. Leonard Riessman, "Life Careers, Power and Professions: The Retired Army General," American Sociological Review 21 (1956), pp. 215-221.

³⁴Adam Sarapata, *Iustum pretium . . .*, op. cit., p. 106.

level of education required, (3) the degree of responsibility, (4) the job's security, and (5) the personal initiative permitted.³⁵

The following two rules regarding the prestige of an occupation in advanced societies are regarded as valid. First, the more skill a manual occupation requires, the higher prestige it enjoys. Second, regardless of skills, manual work has less prestige than non-manual work because of a stigma attached to physical work.

While the first rule is totally valid in the case of Poland, the second has to be questioned. It is true that non-manual work has an established prestige, but actually in Poland its prestige is diminishing. This is a direct consequence of the governmental policy. A non-manual job pays much less than the skilled manual job or even the unskilled manual job. Such a policy has far reaching consequences, often expressed in the negative attitudes of the youth toward advanced studies: "It doesn't pay to study." The phenomenon becomes so manifest that Sarapata calls it "a barrier" to the upward social mobility.³⁶ As far as education, both non-manual and physical skilled job, require an equal period of time for training.³⁷

Using these criteria, i.e., Party membership (political power),

³⁵Adam Sarapata, Studia nad uwarstwieniem i ruchliwoscia spoleczna w Polsce (Warszawa: PWN, 1965), p. 241.

³⁶Ibid., p. 76.

³⁷I am referring here to the white-collar workers on my scale and not to the intelligentsia class.

education, occupation (prestige), and income (wealth), I define social class as a large aggregate of people conscious of possessing a similar lifestyle as a consequence of homogeneity of interests based on their similar political views, wealth, and culturally conditioned values. On the base of this definition, we find six social classes in contemporary Polish society. The figure number 10 on page 235 summarizes how these four criteria account for class formation in Poland. Thus the stratification system of Polish society might be diagrammed as pyramidal layers of individuals (families) who possess similar qualities (statuses). Every class identified in such a way, differs in some important respect from the other classes (layers). The pyramid on page 237 shows graphically the social classes in the Polish society and their respective positions which they occupy.

The pyramid is composed of six layers with the political elite at the top and unskilled physical workers at the bottom. Next to the unskilled workers are the farmers, followed by the white-collar workers. The pyramid is cut vertically into two parts by the Party membership cleavage. Its left side represents Party members at different horizontal layers and its right side is constituted by non-Party people also at the respective horizontal levels.

The assymetricality or skewness of the pyramid indicates the proportion of the Party members to non-Party people at different layers of the social pyramid. While the political elite is entirely constituted by the Party members, the proportion of Party to non-Party people in

Variables Social Classes				
	Party Membership	Education	Income (Wealth)	Prestige (Occupation)
Political Elite	100%	High Medium Low	Very High	Medium Low
Intelli- gentsia	High	Very High	High	Very High
Skilled Manual Workers	Low	Medium	High	Medium
White- collar Workers	Medium Low	Medium	Low	Medium
Farmers	Very Low	Low	Medium High	Low
Unskilled Manual Workers	Medium High	Low	Low	Very Low

Figure 10

Key Variables; Social Classes in Poland

other levels changes visibly.³⁸ It is high at the level of the intelligentsia, lower at skilled physical workers and very low at the farmers level. The white-collar workers and unskilled physical workers have a medium level of the party members. But while the first are at the bottom of that category, the latter are at its top.

The division of the socialist society along the Party membership cleavage is an important aspect of social stratification in these societies. Even if Party membership alone does not assign people to the upper class, it constitutes a necessary requirement and, more importantly, gives to that individual (family) a privileged position in relation to the other individuals (families) of the same class. This point needs emphasis for at least two reasons. First, the forces of production, to use Marxian terminology, in State-run societies are still far behind the Western productive capacities. Especially visible is the scarcity of consumer products. In the economy of scarcities, it is very important to be first in access to non-plentiful goods such as an apartment in the city, a car, a tractor, entrance to college, etc., because the demand significantly exceeds supply and therefore the last will not be served at all.

The system of privileges is built in such a way that it grows as

³⁸ In 1978, the PUWP numbered 2,930,448 members (candidates included) of which 12 per cent had a college education (there were among them those who had Party's college diploma with very low prestige); 3.4 per cent had not completed college, 29.1 per cent had high school diplomas, 22.1 per cent had vocational school diplomas or uncompleted high school, 29.5 per cent had only grammar school diplomas, and 3.9 per cent had not completed grammar school. See Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 24.




Figure 11

Class Pyramid in Poland

one moves from the bottom to the top of the pyramid. Less significant concessions at the lowest layers of the society are more significant at the higher levels and most important at the top of the pyramid. The Party elite practically enjoy an immunity privilege. There is nothing the high officials cannot get: villas, cars, and even college diplomas (with little or no studies at all).³⁹ The only thing which can deprive them of these privileges is a necessary purge to save the Party reputation in the case of crisis which, as we saw, happens quite regularly.

As far as the prestige is concerned, the power elite in Poland does not enjoy a high ranking for three important reasons. Firstly, the power elite has never been legally elected. They are self-nominated politicians with no popular mandate.⁴⁰ Secondly, the political career of the upper class is totally tied to the Party files. And the Party itself is considered by a large majority of the population a Party of Russian

³⁹ Among other disclosed abuses there was a case of Gierek and Grudzien who received their master's degrees in an unusual way. The second made his college and the graduate school in fifteen months. See Gazeta Krakowska, February 24, 1981.

⁴⁰ It was pointed out in the preceding chapter under what circumstances the election of 1947, in Poland, took place. "The result of the Polish election had simply been invented by some office in Warsaw, or handed down from Moscow beforehand . . ." R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 139. The election in which the Communist Party "obtained" majority, has open a series of pseudo-elections, or mockery-elections. Cf. Appendix A, Interview 4, p. 391. Referring to this problem Aron says "The elections in which the Communist Party would obtain a majority would be the last free election." Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and Ruling Class," British Journal of Sociology 1 (1959), Part II, p. 129.

puppets.⁴¹ Thirdly, the power elite is the most privilege class (or, better, caste) whose highest privilege is to be above the law.⁴² That easily leads to corruption. During one year only in 1981, a high number of cases of corruption were disclosed at every level of the Party organization.⁴³

The level of prestige of this class is, however, increased by power and wealth. Power is always the desirable quality because it gives the right of making decisions. In societies where collective ownership is the dominant type of ownership, political power also procures the power over the arbitrary distribution of national income. It is the political elite which can, and de facto makes arbitrary decisions about the country's division of the GNP.

Social Classes in Poland

Political Elite--Upper Class

Marx' social class theory asserts that control over the national production of a society by one class makes it a ruling class controlling the social and spiritual life of that society. This is to say that con-

⁴¹Cf. history of the PUWP, Ch. II, p. 63, f. 1. Also during every riot, the Party was denounced as a Party of "traitors."

⁴²Appendix A, Interview 3, p. 383.

⁴³After the strike of 1980, 3,364 people were accused of corruption. 1050 of them were occupying high social positions and therefore must have been Party members. Four ministers, seven vice-ministers and five former provincial Party secretaries were convicted of corruption. See Echo Krakowa, April 28, 1981. In Gorlice, people renamed Pulaski Street "the Seven Thieves Street," because seven luxurious villas of high Party dignitaries were built there. Cf. Gazeta Krakowska, May 22-24, 1981.

trol of the economic sphere has its counterpart in ideological domination which is intended as a means of shaping the beliefs of the majority of citizens. This new type of ownership of the means of production ends with exploitation and places the new society on the road to communism.

The sociopolitical reality of the People's Democracies can hardly support this doctrine. The Communists have abolished private property but, as Djilas says:

With the victory of the Communist revolution in a country a new class come into power and into control. It is unwilling to surrender its own hard-gained privileges, even though it subordinates its interests to a similar class in another country, solely in the cause of ideological solidarity.⁴⁴

This new class, in that author's opinion, has its origin in the "stratum of professional revolutionaries who made up its core even before it attained power."⁴⁵ Djilas is also correct when he maintains that the new class (the power elite) "uses the party as its basis"⁴⁶ with the legal control of production and distribution. At this point, difficulties arise for Djilas' theory. He unequivocally maintains that "the Party makes that class (new class)."⁴⁷ One must agree with the assertion

⁴⁴Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, op. cit., p. 175.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 40. An orthodox Marxist Polish sociologist, Widerszpil, attacked Djilas' theory of new class accusing the author of not perceiving or being unwilling to take notice of "a difficult process which transformed working class into the real managers . . ." Stanislaw Widerszpil, "Czy zmierzch klasy robotniczej," Miesiecznik Literacki 3 (1968), p. 70.

that the power elite is composed of the members of the Party. This is a necessary condition for every individual to reach that class (see page 237), but not all members of the Party belong to the power elite. This simply means that Party membership is a necessary but not sufficient condition to enter the political elite in the socialist society. There is still another requirement one must meet in advance to that group: a strong commitment to the Party's affairs. Only when this condition is met, does one have a chance to move up to the top of the pyramid. Some skills (not necessarily formal education) are always required of a candidate, but they never exceed low-average capacities. Formal education, therefore, has never been a necessary condition of upward mobility through Party channels. So, after 35 years of the communist regime in Poland, there are still thousands of important social positions occupied by poorly educated Party members, while at the same time, there are many highly educated people who cannot get these positions because they do not belong to the Party. While there is a growing number of college-educated Party members (in 1970, 7.9 per cent, and in 1980, 12.0 per cent), this number is still insufficient to substitute for the poorly educated old power elite.⁴⁸ The old power elite has a very low formal education, but was trained for administrative

The 1980 events in Poland, showed, however, that Wlodziarczyk and not Djilas was wrong. Still in 1981, the First Congress of "Solidarity," the Polish Free Trade Union, proposed a national referendum on factories workers' self-management. That was an implicit denial of any workers influence on the factories policy.

⁴⁸ Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 24.

positions because of its ideological virtues.

Having gradually adapted to the requirements of their power function members of the old elite achieved a certain level of organizational and administrative skill, quite sufficient in the conditions of a stable and traditional, non-expensive local community; this amount of skill appeared, however, quite inadequate when adaptation to the conditions of a rapidly expanding industrial community because the immediate necessity for all who wished to keep or acquire power positions.⁴⁹

The old elite, professionally unprepared, looked at the higher educated new elite as a threat and challenge to their careers. The old political elite in Poland had conspiratory experiences while working in the underground, the newcomers lack such skill. Instead, they have higher formal education and differentiated important skills. However, one can hardly agree with the following assertion of Bauman: "They (the new elite) are expedient, efficient industrious, full of initiative, and rather ruthless in pushing forward what is to be done."⁵⁰ The recent events in Poland disclosed an incredible degree of corruption and opportunism among the members of the power elite, which unequivocally suggests that the Polish power elite has already passed its period of "terror and virtue." They become more and more opportunists and they serve the Party because their whole career depends upon the Party's prosperity. They have moved up through the Party channels and the Party's security is a guarantee of a continuation of their future security.

⁴⁹Zygmunt Bauman, "Economic Growth, Social Structure, Elite Formation," Class Status, and Power by R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 540.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 540.

The power elite is a sui generis "caste." It is ideology which makes this group extremely exclusive, not much different from a caste. Even apparent changes in leadership do not bring in much fresh air. The changes remain in the "family circle." Communist ideology plays the role of religion. Non-acceptance of this ideology is an unmistakably sign of non-membership in the Party elite. For that reason, even if we distinguish between the old and new power elite (on the basis of their education), the power elite is composed of one type of people. "The fundamental difference between a society of the Soviet-type and one of the Western type is that the former has a unified elite and the latter a divided elite."⁵¹ In Poland, like in the other People's Democracies, all generals, Party secretaries, managers, and all higher officials belong to the Communist Party. If they do not belong, they remain isolated technicians with no influence on political events.

Besides power, high wages and the system of privileges benefit this class. High officials' wages are supplemented by a system of bonuses. There are two different supplements: bonuses and rewards. Bonuses are much higher, but are rather limited in number; rewards are more numerous, but less valuable. Slomczynski and Szafnicki find the following correlation: the percentage of people to whom bonuses are granted is growing as we move from lower to higher wage groupings. The system of rewards is not related to the level of wages, but still the higher percentage of non-rewarded people is among those who are paid less.

⁵¹ Raymond Aron, Social Structure . . . , op. cit., Part I, p. 10.

The average of bonuses and rewards increases with the growth of wages, but the medium bonus increases much faster than the medium of the rewards. Bonuses given to people of the high class are, on the average, eighteen times (1800%) higher than bonuses given to the lowest class category bonuses.

The proportion of those rewarded with the bonuses grows as one moves from the bottom to the top on the ladder of wages. So, for the people who were making 4000 zlotys per month (very high salaries) the number of bonuses was twelve times higher than among people whose wages did not surpass 15000 zlotys.⁵²

Such a policy of the latent rewards of the higher classes (practically all Party people) unequivocally supports the thesis that "the distribution of rewards in a society is a function of the distribution of power, not of system needs."⁵³ In the Soviet-type society this is more visible than in any other society. But the social prestige of the power elite in Poland does not correspond to the high salaries of that class. First, a large number of people in this class is poorly educated, and in Poland, education is the primary factor for social prestige. Secondly, the careers of all the people in the upper class are totally connected with the Communist Party whose legitimacy is questioned because free

⁵²Kazimierz Slomczynski and Krzysztof Szafnicki, "Zroznicowanie dochodow z pracy," Zroznicowanie spoleczne by W. Wesolowski (Warszawa: Ossolineum, 1974), pp. 154-56.

⁵³Gerard E. Lenski, Power and Privilege (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 63.

elections do not exist in Poland.⁵⁴ Additionally, the totalitarian power elite in Poland is blamed for all the evils in Polish society: inability to solve the fundamental problems for the country, and nominating uneducated and corrupt Party people for many higher social positions.⁵⁵ Finally, the PUWP is considered by a large majority of people as a Party of national traitors because of its Russian affiliation.

The Intelligentsia Class

By the class of intelligentsia I understand here an aggregate of people who possess college diplomas and "toil with their minds instead of their hands, that is, the technical, liberal-professional, managerial, administrative . . . personnel of the state."⁵⁶ I do not include in that class people who occupy high social positions because they are the members of the Communist Party, but who do not have a college education, nor people with a college education, but whose careers are totally tied to Party channels. Neither do I include the technicians with a technical high school diploma. This type of people constitutes

⁵⁴It was the French magazine Paris Match which published a public opinion poll last year, taken inside the country. In free elections only 3 per cent of Poles would vote for the PUWP, 34 per cent for Christian Democrats, 27 per cent for Socialist Party, and 19 per cent for the Conservative (Republican) Party. Cf. Time, November 24, 1980, p. 49.

⁵⁵According to Time, 90 per cent of the Polish people blamed the Communist Party for the economic disaster in Poland. Time, November 24, 1980, p. 49.

⁵⁶Martin Malia, "What Is the Intelligentsia?," The Russian

constitutes another class called skilled manual workers.

While it is still uncertain where the term "intelligentsia" was coined, surely the word acquired its common usage in all modern languages.⁵⁷ It is also certain that the rise of this stratum (class) was connected with the Westernization process in Eastern Europe, especially in Russia and partitioned Poland. The new ideas rose in opposition to so-called pan-slav romanticism proclaimed mainly by two Russian writers, Herzen and Chaadaev, who believed in the great destiny of Russia. The ideas of the eighteenth century Enlightenment in the West, brought to Eastern Europe, had enough time to root and begin producing the first generation of Western-oriented people by the mid-nineteenth century. The ideals of the French Revolution, i.e., "liberté," "égalité" and "fraternité" appealed to the Russian Imperium, where tsarist socio-political oppression was reaching its climax. There grew up a generation of intellectuals alienated from the tsarist regime. The new intellectual felt obligated not only to accept progressive ideas, but "to place his knowledge at the service of the people, to devote his life to

Intelligentsia by R. Pipes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 3. In Poland, college usually terminates with the Master's degree.

⁵⁷Some authors maintain that the term "intelligentsia" was used for the first time in Russia. See Hugh Seaton-Watson, "The Russian Intelligentsia," The Intellectuals by G.B. de Huszar (Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), pp. 41-62; Richard Pipes, "The Historical Evolution of the Russian Intelligentsia," *ib id.*, pp. 47-62; Martin Malia, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-18.

Gella, however, argues that it was in Poland that the term "intelligentsia" was invented as a neologism coming from Latin "intelligentia"--"discernment." Cf. Aleksander Gella, "The Life and the Death of the Polish Intelligentsia," Slavic Review 30 (1971), pp. 1-27.

the task of liberating masses, to lead to the social revolution."⁵⁸ Even if it is historically wrong to identify the intelligentsia with the professional revolutionaries Lenin wanted, they were recruited from the intelligentsia files.⁵⁹ No one who supported the tsarist regime could be a member of that stratum, because the intelligentsia was the tsar's number one enemy, and opposing the tsarist system was intelligentsia's primary goal. Therefore, two things distinguished Russian intelligentsia: "a critical thinking," and an opposition to the regime.⁶⁰

The Polish intelligentsia of the nineteenth century shared the same ideals with Russian intellectuals. But a specific Polish milieu added one other goal for that stratum: the struggle for Poland's independence and preservation of the national identity of the partitioned Poles.⁶¹ So, "two main factors created the Polish intelligentsia. The first was socioeconomic in character and basically the same as the stimulus that brought to life the intelligentsia and modern enlightened middle class in other European countries in the nineteenth century. The second was strictly political: it appeared only in Polish territories and was

⁵⁸ Hugh Seaton-Watson, op. cit., p. 44.

⁵⁹ Vladimir I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done? (New York: International Publishers, 1969), pp. 48-53; p. 82

⁶⁰ Martin Malia, op. cit., p. 2.

⁶¹ During the 125 years that Poland was partitioned, all eight insurrections, which had taken place, were organized by the intelligentsia.

most instrumental in shaping the particular character of the Polish intelligentsia."⁶²

Until the failure of the January 1863 uprising in Poland against tsarist Russia, the Polish intelligentsia was convinced of the possibility of military success over Russia. This misguided political optimism was inherited from Romanticism which, in Poland, was mixed with national Messianism. Its founder and propagator was Towianski. Even such personalities as Mickiewicz, Slowacki, and Krasinski could not escape it. The new generation of intelligentsia who happened to live after 1863 realized that the independence of Poland could be carried out only with significant economic development and with a strengthening of national identity among all social classes in the country. Znaniecki forcefully pointed out this role of the Polish intelligentsia after the January 1863 tragedy.⁶³ The Polish intelli-

⁶²Aleksander Gella, *The Life . . .*, op. cit., p. 10. The Polish intelligentsia was composed mostly of writers, historians, poets . . . was extremely anti-pragmatic. A "technocrat" was not yet idealized at that time and "business" was regarded as an inferior profession.

⁶³Znaniecki made an important distinction between the "national culture society" and the "political society" or state. The first he defines as a culture "which has a common and distinct secular, literary culture and an independent organization functioning for the preservation, growth and expansion of this culture." Florian Znaniecki, Modern Nationalities (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952), p. 21. Political society instead, is one "which has a common legal system and an organized, independent government controlling all the people who inhabit territory." Ibid., p. 21.

gentsia preserved and propagated national culture among five generations of the partitioned Poles.⁶⁴

During the period between Wars, after regaining Polish independence, the Polish intelligentsia started to undergo a significant change. Primarily, it began to lose its "ghetto" character by becoming a more open social class. Secondly, its role of awakening and preserving the national identity had become superfluous since the establishment of the Polish political State. Thirdly, it started to split into three subgroups: intellectuals, professionals, and technical intelligentsia. But by 1939, the Polish intelligentsia was still considered a vital class for preserving and propagating national identity. Therefore, after the German invasion of Poland, the Nazis' main aim was to exterminate the intelligentsia completely and thus to destroy the nation as well.⁶⁵

The postwar period brought about the further disintegration of that class. A rapid industrialization of the country was responsible for the growing demand of "technical intelligentsia." State policy

⁶⁴In Professor Lopata's view, the role of developing and disseminating culture is universally valid for the intelligentsias of all countries. Cf. Helena Lopata, "Members of the Intelligentsia as Developers and Disseminators of Cosmopolitan Culture," Intelligentsia and Intellectuals by A. Gella (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications Inc., 1976), p. 59-78.

⁶⁵That was visibly reflected in the scientific output of the Polish intelligentsia after World War II. While in 1937, there were 7,974 scientific publications, 1,560 literary works, and 2,274 publications popularizing science in Poland; in 1947 these publications decreased to 426, 645 and 353 respectively. Cf. Jan J. Szczepanski, "The Polish Intelligentsia: Past and Present," World Politics 14 (1962), p. 414.

also pushed education in the same direction. New recruiting norms for college students favored the lower classes (peasants and physical workers' children) and diversified the origin of that rapidly growing class. This only fostered the existing process of disintegrating the Polish intelligentsia to such a point that some even asked if it made sense to talk about the intelligentsia as a stratum.⁶⁶ Although many would not go so far, two things regarding intelligentsia in postwar Poland are undeniable: (1) the old classical intelligentsia ceased to exist and (2) the new intelligentsia grew in number and diversified according to origin and specialization.⁶⁷

As far as the first variable (Party membership) is concerned, the proportion of Party members to non-Party people is high in the intelligentsia class. This fact is due to strong pressure by the political elite upon the intelligentsia to join the Party. The Party's whole policy is aimed at increasing its membership among this class of people. Practically, only Party members can have a managerial positions are highly paid. Thus many of the members of the intelligentsia join the Party to get more prestigious jobs. An engineer who does not belong to the Party cannot become a director, even if his

⁶⁶ Cf. Marcin Czerwinski, "Inteligencja polska wczoraj i dzis," Miesiecznik Literacki 5 (1969), pp. 114-125.

⁶⁷ The old intelligentsia, as Gella stresses, "formed a broad segment of society with a relatively homogeneous spiritual culture." Aleksander Gella, "Introduction to the Sociology of Intelligentsia," The Intelligentsia and the Intellectuals by A. Gella (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1976), p. 21. According to this author, the new intelligentsia is more open and less homogeneous.

qualifications meet the requirements of such a position. A college teacher cannot advance in his scientific career if he stays out of the Party files.⁶⁸ All military personnel (professional soldiers) are by principle Party members. This type of career is even inconceivable without Party support.

At this point one must be aware of the difference between the power elite and that part of the intelligentsia which belongs to the Party. The difference is a fundamental one. While the power elite, no matter what its educational level, uses Party channels for its upward mobility, the members of the intelligentsia who are Party members hold their positions mainly because they are educated and professionally prepared. The Party ID is a necessity but not sufficient condition for being able to occupy prestigious posts in the society. They treat their Party membership as a malum necessarium of which they often are ashamed. These people do not intend to become power elite because they are not interested in careers through Party channels. If they wanted that, they would have to change their attitudes toward the Party.⁶⁹

The intelligentsia constitutes the most educated class in Polish society. Their minimum education is four years of college; 70 per cent

⁶⁸Because of this open discrimination against non-Party people, the most qualified people do not necessarily occupy the most prestigious positions at the Polish universities, but rather those who are able to sacrifice even scientific objectivity to manifest enough conformity with the Party line.

⁶⁹It is impossible to give an exact number of the intelligentsia people who are simultaneously Party members. One can accept that two-

of college graduates also have a Master's degree. Before World War II, a Polish high school diploma was still highly esteemed--given the fact that secondary education was almost a privilege of higher social classes--actually, such a diploma no longer confers much prestige.⁷⁰ Instead, the college diploma is still connected with high prestige. Prestige increases as one moves up the ladder of the scientific career: "magister," "doctor," and finally, "docent."⁷¹ The diplomas are granted on the basis of a scientific contribution to the body of knowledge. While at the master's level the candidate must prove his ability to do research, the doctor's degree requires some original scientific contribution to the body of knowledge. Such a contribution must be greater still as one seeks a "docent's" degree.

In 1970, there were in Poland 655,000 people with a college educa-

thirds of the Party people who have a college education belong to this class.

⁷⁰Chalasinski argued "because of the easy access by the lower strata, i.e., peasants and workers, to secondary and college education, education ceases to be a basis for distinguishing a separate stratum of the intelligentsia." Jozef Chalasinski, "Zagadnienia nowej inteligencji," Zycie i Mysl, 7-8 (1969), p. 25.

This can hardly be maintained. First, college education in Poland is still highly prestigious and attracts many young people. Second, one cannot maintain "an easy access to college" when the demand exceeds the supply by 180 per cent.

⁷¹In Poland there is no bachelor's degree. The last two years of high school correspond to freshman and sophomore college in the American educational system. There is instead a postdoctoral degree termed "docent," which stresses a teaching role of the person. Cf. Florian Znaniecki, The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge (New York: Octagon Books, 1975), pp. 131-133.

tion.⁷² The number also included those who were labeled above as the power elite with a college diploma. At the same time, there were 182,185 college-educated Party members.⁷³ Even if one admits that one-third of them could be labeled as a power elite, the intelligentsia numbered approximately 600,000 people.

This group, homogeneous as far as education is concerned, can be divided into three sub-categories: cultural intelligentsia, with classical education; technical intelligentsia specializing in the science, and traditional professionals, i.e., doctors, lawyers, and economists.

In 1970, the cultural intelligentsia accounted for 16 per cent of that class; technical intelligentsia, 39 per cent, and the established professions, about 32 per cent.⁷⁴ The remaining 13 per cent include militia, military intelligentsia, and power elite. In the long term it is the technical intelligentsia which seems to be the most probable challenger to the Party. There is a safeguard in the policy of "the primacy of politics over economics and administration, thus holding in check a technical intelligentsia eager to increase its own power."⁷⁵ On the whole, the intelligentsia enjoys a rather high standard of

⁷²Bronisław Golebiowski, "Rola i miejsce inteligencji w budowie rozwiniętego społeczeństwa socjalistycznego," Partia-panstwo-społeczeństwo by R. Dudek and Z. Siembrowicz (Warszawa: KiW, 1978), p. 154.

⁷³Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 24.

⁷⁴Bronisław Golebiowski, op. cit., 154.

⁷⁵George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, The Intellectuals and the Road to Class Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1979), p. 179.

living. In 1965, the average salary in that class was 3321 zlotys, while the average salary of the white-collar workers was 2558 zlotys, and that of the unskilled workers 1717 zlotys.⁷⁶

The average intelligentsia apartments are also larger and less crowded than the apartments of any other class. In Lodz, Szczecin and Koszalin, flat of a member of the intelligentsia averaged 3.29 rooms against 2.76 of the unskilled workers.⁷⁷ Less than 20 per cent (19.7 per cent) of the intelligentsia's apartments were 1-2 room flats, while four or more room apartments accounted for 34.3 per cent, which was much higher than any other class. The same research indicated that the intelligentsia had 1.2 person per room, while the white-collar workers scored 1.47, and the unskilled workers 1.9 person per room.⁷⁸

If one takes into consideration the possession of some "luxury" items, the intelligentsia scores higher than other classes. More than 12 per cent of that class possessed a car (0.8 per cent white-collar workers, zero per cent semi-skilled workers); 11 per cent had a tape recorder against 0.0 per cent of unskilled workers and 2.2 per cent of the white-collar workers; 52.7 per cent of the intelligentsia class had a refrigerator and only 5.5 per cent of unskilled workers; 62.5 of the

⁷⁶Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, "Zroznicowanie spoleczne: podstawowe warunki," Zroznicowanie spoleczne by W. Wesolowski (Warszawa: Ossolineum, 1974), pp. 100-103.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 107.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 110.

intelligentsia's apartments had a telephone while only 1.1 per cent of the unskilled workers.⁷⁹

Finally, the intelligentsia differs from the other classes with regard to cultural consumption. People of this class read more periodicals and more books than any other class.⁸⁰ Also, the subjects of the books read by the intelligentsia differ from those of the other classes. While the intelligentsia reads more specialized books, the lower classes prefer novels and less specialized books.⁸¹

Among the three subgroups of intelligentsia, the technical intelligentsia is highly paid. While the cultural intelligentsia earning 3000 zlotys per month, the technical intelligentsia's wages reached 3,907 zlotys. Within the cultural intelligentsia there were two extremes: the highly paid writers and journalists and the very low paid teachers.⁸²

A college diploma is still rewarded in Poland with a high degree of prestige, no matter whether higher education correspond to a high salary. In the case where salary does correspond to a high level of education (e.g., a physician), this only adds more prestige to that position. But a highly paid social position, if not connected with a

⁷⁹Anita Kocus-Wojciechowska, "Warunki mieszkaniowe i wyposazenie domow," Zroznicowanie spoleczne by W. Wesolowski (Warszawa: Ossolineum, 1974), p. 221.

⁸⁰Ibid., pp. 237; 260.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 271.

⁸²Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, op. cit., p. 109.

higher education, adds little to the prestige of the position. We will see at the end of the present chapter the inconsistencies of status in contemporary Polish society.

Skilled Manual Workers

The third place in the hierarchy of social classes in Poland, is occupied by skilled manual workers. This class is constituted by the people with a technical high school education (technicians). In 1970, they accounted for 28 per cent of all people with high school diplomas (3.5 million) and constituted about 924,000 people.⁸³

Skilled physical workers, as understood here, are those who went through technical vocational high school (Technikum) and who worked as skilled physical workers. This type of school involves rather extensive training: five years after the compulsory eight-year elementary school. This is one year more than the general education high school. Also, the curriculum of this school differs significantly from that of the general education high school. It emphasizes sciences and vocational subjects.

While the class of intelligentsia is highly exposed to communist propaganda and pressured to join the Party, the manual technicians are much less. First, they are technicians whose skills are badly needed in modern industry. The Party's support in getting a job is for them superfluous. It surely is very helpful, but not necessary. Thus by

⁸³Stanisław Wideszpil, "Klasa robotnicza i inteligencja we współczesnym społeczeństwie socjalistycznym," Idee Lenina a międzynarodowy ruch robotniczy (Warszawa: KiW, 1975), p. 66.

staying out of the Party, they avoid the stigma attached to Party people: "the pushers." Secondly, the technicians are less advanced in the study of history and classical education than are the graduates of a high school of general education. Their technical skills are extremely needed in the economy but much less in the Party's aims.

This does not mean that these people are not vulnerable to the communist propaganda. There is one reason why this class is exposed to the pressure of joining the Party and this reason is in the class itself. The class of technicians is constituted by two groups of people. The first group is a group of rather intelligent people who would have been able to get a college degree, but they had to stop their formal education because of unfavorable circumstances (mainly poverty). The second group of this class is formed by people whose intellectual capacities would not permit them to go through college. For them there is no other way of upward mobility than that of Party channels. For both these types of people Party channels are a "bonanza." Other people do not know about their Party membership. But even if the Party "stigma" is openly attached to them, this is, at the same time, recompensed by privileges the others do not enjoy.

In 1970, there were 376,914 Party members with vocational high school diplomas.⁸⁴ If we subtract from that number all those who were not physical skilled workers, but white-collar workers, that would

⁸⁴Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 24.

bring the number to no more than 50,000 Party members in that class.

In 1965, the salaries of skilled manual workers were at the level of the classical intelligentsia and they were reaching, on average, 3095 zlotys per month.⁸⁵ Thirteen per cent of this class of people possessed a car (1.8 per cent less than the intelligentsia class); 58.6 per cent had cameras (71.5 per cent intelligentsia); 75.9 per cent had a television set (2.1 per cent less than intelligentsia), and 20.7 per cent had telephones as compared to 62.5 per cent of intelligentsia.⁸⁶

The apartments of the technicians are on the average composed of the same number of rooms as the apartments of the white-collar workers (2.91). However, they have fewer (0.2) one-room flats and more (1.7 per cent) large apartments (four or more rooms) than the white-collar workers. Skilled manual workers' apartments are also slightly less crowded (0.08) person per room, but they are not better equipped than are white-collar workers' apartments as far as the sanitary facilities are concerned.⁸⁷

Similar patterns of differences might be observed if we consider the use of cultural advantages. The class of technicians reads on the average less than does the intelligentsia class reading relatively

⁸⁵Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, op. cit., p. 100.

⁸⁶Anita Kobus-Wojciechowska, op. cit., p. 221

⁸⁷Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, op. cit., p. 107.

more popularized scientific and less sophisticated scientific books and periodicals.⁸⁸

The rather high prestige of the skilled physical workers (technicians) has its source in the following attributes: first, their training is relatively long and requires at least average intellectual capacities. Secondly, the demand for those kinds of skills in Poland is still higher than the supply and, therefore, it is easy for a skilled worker to get a job. Thirdly, there is also in this job a margin of creativity which additionally fosters the prestige. Finally, and this is probably the most important reason for the growing prestige of this class, the industrial society in general, and the Soviet-type socialist society in particular, enhances these skills. It is therefore not surprising that the old barrier between manual and non-manual jobs is now shifted to the demarcation line between skilled and unskilled positions. If this might still be questioned in the Western capitalist societies, it is evident in the Eastern European realities. And so the Polish sociologist, Sarapata, in his comparative studies of the occupational prestige of West Germany and Poland found similar patterns in those two countries with one important difference. While in West Germany the mental workers occupy a place next to intellectu-

⁸⁸ Anita Kobus-Wojcierchowska, *Zroznicowanie konsumpcji . . .*, op. cit., 268.

als, in Poland, the skilled manual workers enjoy higher prestige than the white-collar workers.⁸⁹

At present, nothing indicates that the near future will change the pattern of prestige of that class in Poland.

White-collar Workers

The class of the white-collar workers is constituted of people with high school diplomas other than technical. (High school of general education, vocational high schools of different types.) People of this class work in offices, shops, banks and so on.

In the views of Lipset and Bendix, five generalizations are valid regarding non-manual and manual position.

1. Most male nonmanual occupations have more prestige than most manual occupations, even skilled ones.
2. Among males, white collar positions generally lead to higher incomes than manual employment.
3. Non-manual positions, in general, require more education than manual positions.
4. Holders of non-manual positions . . . are more likely than manual workers to think of themselves as members of the middle class and to act out middle-class roles in their consumption patterns.
5. Low level of manual workers are more likely to have political attitudes which resemble those of the upper middle class than of the manual working class.⁹⁰

Of these five principles, the first three can hardly be regarded as valid in the present Polish society. For example, office managers,

⁸⁹Adam Sarapata, "Stratification and Social Mobility," Empirical Sociology in Poland by J. J. Szczepanski (Warszawa: PWN, 1966), p. 43.

Once more it has to be stressed that I do not include professionals here.

⁹⁰Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), pp. 14-16.

bookkeepers, high school teachers and even military officers score lower on the scale of benefits than a private locksmith or even a tailor.⁹¹ Nor are the white-collar positions in general better paid than those of the skilled manual workers. Finally, the training of the skilled physical workers is as long as is that of white-collar workers as understood here.⁹²

If we take into consideration the first variable, the class of white-collar people is rather under heavy Party propaganda and constitutes an important source for Party member recruitment. The reason for this is similar to that we find in the class of skilled manual workers with one distinction that this class is still more vulnerable to the Party pressure. Like the class of the skilled manual workers (technicians), this class is also composed of two types of people: those whose intellectual capacities would hardly permit them to go through college and those who would be able to get a college degree, but could not because of unfavorable life circumstances. However, there is a funda-

⁹¹Adam Sarapata, *Studia nad uwarstwieniem . . .*, op. cit., p. 223.

⁹²The meaning of the white-collar workers here is totally different from that introduced by Mills. Cf. C. Wright Mills, White Collar (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953). One must be aware of the differences between the American society and that of the Soviet-type socialist system. In the latter, the private ownership of the means of production practically does not exist. In consequence, everyone (except richer farmers) is a State employee "as a property-less dependent." C. Wright Mills, White Collar, op. cit., p. 75. Besides that, the so-called professional and other people of higher education are categorized here as the intelligentsia class. Finally, the people whose entire careers are tied to the Party and who occupy high administrative positions, are labelled as a power elite.

mental difference between this class and that of the technicians.

While technical physical workers could easily find rather high paid jobs, many of these people, especially with a high school of general education diploma, have difficulty in finding jobs. Additionally, their jobs are among the less well paid. Therefore, practically, the only way of upward mobility for the people of this class is through the Party channel. Thus they are sufficiently susceptible to Party indoctrination. Those dedicated and committed to Party affairs could even move as far as to the power elite. Consequently, in 1970, this class provided 6.9 per cent of all Party members which totalled 160,667 people.⁹³ If we consider that in 1970, there were 594,000 people with vocational high school diplomas, except those of technical high school, and 1,171,000 people with a high school of general education diplomas, we must conclude that almost every ninth white-collar worker belongs to the Party.⁹⁴

This does not mean that the class itself is as large. This is so, first, because some of this class moved through the Party channels to the power elite; secondly, the State statistics include in that class some people like policemen and military personnel who were here classified differently. A white-collar worker's education consists of four years of school after eight years of mandatory elementary school. The

⁹³ Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 24.

⁹⁴ Cf. Ryszard Dyoniziak and others, Współczesne społeczeństwo Polskie (Warszawa: PWN, 1978), p. 23.

general education high school does not prepare its students directly for any profession. This type of school is mainly conceived of as an intermediate step between primary school and college. Because of the limited number of posts in colleges, many of the students are not accepted.

Graduates of vocational high schools are generally in a much better position than those with general education or high school diploma. These schools prepare their students for skilled trades. Thus, even if only a small number of them try to continue their education in corresponding majors at the college level, they are not affected by unemployment.

According to Slomczynski and Wesolowski, the average salary of this category was 2558 zlotys with salaries of 2859 zlotys in administration and 2100 zlots in commerce.⁹⁵ This however, is misleading. As was pointed out above, some military personnel and the militia-men with rather high salaries were included in that class. This increases the average salary.

The relatively low income of this class is reflected in the small percentage of people who possessed some "luxury" items. While 12.1 per cent of the intelligentsia and 10.3 per cent of the skilled workers own cars, only 4.3 per cent of the white-collar workers own one. A similar pattern might be observed if we consider other objects: motor-cycles are owned by 16.5 per cent of the intelligentsia, 24.1 per cent

⁹⁵Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, op. cit., p.100.

of skilled physical workers, and 7.5 per cent of white-collar workers; a tape-recorded: 11.0 per cent of the intelligentsia, 6.8 per cent of technicians, and 2.2 per cent of the white-collar workers; a record player: 60.4 per cent of the intelligentsia, 41.4 per cent of the technicians, and 35.3 per cent of the white-collar workers.⁹⁶

In three categories the white-collar workers scored higher than the skilled physical workers, namely in having 0.8 per cent more telephones, 1.9 per cent more refrigerators, and 2.4 per cent more washing machines.⁹⁷

The apartments of the white-collar workers are in general much smaller than those of the intelligentsia and even smaller than those of skilled physical workers. According to Kobus-Wojciechowska, an average apartment of the intelligentsia has 2.9 and of technicians 2.28 rooms, the flats of the white-collar workers have an average of 2.17 rooms.⁹⁸ Similarly, while the percentage of the intelligentsia's small apartments (1-2 rooms) accounted for 26.4 per cent, that of technicians 51.7 per cent, this type of flat of the white-collar workers represented 65.6 per cent. The percentage of the medium sized apartments (three rooms) of the white-collar workers reached 27.9 per cent; a similar type of flat of the intelligentsia accounted for 53.8 per cent and of the technicians for 41.4 per cent.⁹⁹

⁹⁶Anita Kobus-Wojciechowska, *Warunki mieszkaniowe . . .*, op. cit., p. 221.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 221.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 200.

The difference between white-collar workers and the other class is reflected also in cultural pursuits. The preferences of this class is shown in the reading of popularized scientific literature and watching television. People of this class read fewer scientific books (9.9 per cent less than the intelligentsia class) and even less than technicians (3.4 per cent).¹⁰⁰

Before World II, people with a high school education enjoyed high prestige in Poland, this being almost a monopoly of the higher classes. Practically no one from the peasant class of manual workers could reach that level of education. The school reform after World War II created new possibilities for the children of peasants and workers for upward mobility through education. Thus the number of people with high school diplomas grew enormously causing an increase in that type of education. The regime's policy of favoring technical skills worked in the same direction. This is why the prestige of the white-collar workers, even if still significant, has visibly declined and is still diminishing.

The Peasant Class

One of the most visible characteristics of the between-wars of Polish society was its clear-cut division between the city and the village. The differences between the lifestyle in the city and village were reflected still more deeply in the mentality of these two groups. That psychological barrier whose source was the economic and social degradation of the peasant class had been growing for a long time,

¹⁰⁰Anita Kobus-Wojciechowska, *Zroznicowanie konsumpcji . . .*, op. cit., p. 281.

reaffirming the "stigma" of the interiority attached to that class. For the peasants that meant a "ghetto" of the least fortunate people to which they had become accustomed and had accepted it "as part of the natural order."¹⁰¹ The well-known enormous attachment of the Polish peasants to a scrap of land had more than an economic dimension. Land surely constituted a source of survival, but it was also a symbol of one's freedom. "The permanent unemployment of a great part of the population in the few industrial centers offered additional arguments . . . to (cling) . . . to . . . peasant way of life."¹⁰² This undoubtedly fostered the growing number of little villages.¹⁰³

The between-wars regime had done little to emancipate the peasant class.¹⁰⁴ This was true not only with regard to education, but also to

¹⁰¹Paul Lewis, "The Peasantry," Social Groups in Polish Society by D. Lane and G. Kolankiewicz (London: MacMillan Press, 1973), p. 30.

¹⁰²Zygmunt Bauman, Economic Growth . . . , op. cit., p. 236.

¹⁰³According to Redfield, the little village community is characterized by its (1) "distinctiveness," (2) "smallness," (3) "homogeneity," and (4) "self-sufficiency." The first characteristic stresses apparent limits of the community, the second its capacity of experiencing the community's totality, the third points out the similarity of minds and personalities, the fourth the way of gratifying the basic need to survive. Cf. R. Redfield, The Little Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 60.

¹⁰⁴Although Poland had the first Ministry of Education in the World, the Educational Commission, which assured free access of peasants to schools, granting them freedom if they learned to read and write, in 1773, in practical terms did not affect the life of that class during the entire next century. That was due mainly to the partition of Poland. Three powers (Austria, Prussia, and Russia) were more interested in their aims than in educating peasant children. In particular, Prussia and Russia used all available methods to germanize and russify Polish children. Only one hundred years later, a popular

the entire policy which directly or indirectly discriminated against villages.¹⁰⁵ Even if there were not legal barriers to the upward social mobility through education, practically only a small number of the peasants' children were able to continue their education because their parents could not afford to pay a high tuition. Additionally, the system of primary schools in villages was underdeveloped. Many villages did not have a school at all.

The 1946 agrarian reform initiated a radical change in the lives of the peasants in Poland. More than six million hectares of land were

enlightenment began as a result of the failure of the January 1963 revolution. It was that failure that made clear to the Polish intelligentsia that Poland's independence was absolutely impossible without the emancipation of the peasant class. Emancipation itself implied a radical change in the peasants' mentality regarding education which they had inherited from elders, that "whoever learns written stuff casts himself into hell." Cf. William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1337. So, "owing to the abnormal conditions of national life which had hampered the cultural development of Poland, popular education assumed a role which it hardly ever possessed elsewhere; it became a universal instrument of social reconstruction." Ibid., p. 1336.

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The between-war Polish society was an example of an underdeveloped society with a wide gap between prices of industrial products and those of farms. While the industrial products were extremely expensive, the farm products were cheap. This only deepened the discrepancy between life in city and village generating an open conflict between them. The peasants protests were often the result of despair. In 1937, e.g., in one of the small villages in Southern Poland, Kasinka Mala, the peasants blocked all routes to stop any delivery of farm products to the health resort Rabka, the place of the vacationing upper class. The protest ended in tragedy when the police opened fire on the peasants killing nine people and wounding many others.

On the international market, Poland found herself in an incredibly disadvantageous position. She was forced to export agricultural products at such low prices, that England was able to buy Polish sugar to feed it to hogs.

used to create 1,068,000 small farms.¹⁰⁶ The distribution of the large land property among the peasants and the school reform which introduced free schools, together with the policy of favoring peasant youth in admission to college, have radically changed the image of the Polish villages. "The so-called rural proletariat, the most mercilessly exploited section of the prewar Polish population, disappeared entirely."¹⁰⁷ Rapidly developing industry gave rise to an unprecedented exodus of peasants to the cities. This almost revolutionized the established social structure in Poland, and visibly fostered the change in the self-image of the Polish peasants.

At the time of the agrarian reform nothing indicated that the farmers themselves would be the first target of the new regime's attack as soon as the late 1940s and early 1950s. The directives which came from Moscow were explicit: end the private farms.¹⁰⁸ Gomulka's opposition to the nationalization of the private farms resulted with his imprisonment. To accelerate the process of farm nationalization, the Government discriminated against private farmers not allowing them to buy modern equipment, fertilizers, and finally, it imposed a levy on farmers: on milk, potatoes, grain, and meat.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶Zygmunt Bauman, *Economic Growth . . .*, op. cit. p. 534.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, p. 536.

¹⁰⁸The last chapter of this paper will bring some additional information on this issue.

¹⁰⁹The levy was imposed on the farmers in 1952.

Even if the pressure for nationalization of private farms diminished after the regaining of power by Gomulka in 1956, discrimination against private farms has not stopped. In 1963, the regime undertook radical measures to stop the process of further splitting existing farms among the children of the farmers. Only one child could inherit the farm and this child could not be a State employee.¹¹⁰

The exodus of people from villages to the cities inverted the proportion of residents of villages to those of the cities. In 1938, 70.1 per cent of the Polish population lived in villages and only 29.9 per cent in the cities. The percentages were 56.1 and 43.9 respectively in 1955., 50.3 and 49.7 in 1965, and 42.4 and 57.6 in 1978. Mainly the period of the reconstruction fostered the exodus from villages to cities.¹¹¹

The rural population in Poland is less vulnerable to Party propaganda than any other class. If we consider that in 1981 there were in Poland 3.5 million private farmers and that about 42 per cent of the population lived in the villages,¹¹² farmers constituted only 9.4 per cent of all Party members, that is 270,617 people.¹¹³ This immunity from the Party propaganda of the peasant class has its

¹¹⁰Cf. Report of the Politburo of XII Plenum KC PZPR: w sprawie zwiekszenia inwestycji w rolnictwie i zapewnienia dalszego wzrostu produkcji rolnej (Warszawa:PWN, 1963).

¹¹¹Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, pp. XXXII; XXXIII.

¹¹²The Times, April 18, 1981.

¹¹³Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 24. Data from 1978.

source in several factors. (1) In the Polish nationalized economy the farmers are the only self-employed persons and therefore, they do not depend economically on the state. This is especially important in the event one falls from favor with the dictator. (2) The class of farmers constitutes a traditional Catholic community and the Communists can expect little support from them. (3) No other class in the Soviet-type of society is more oppressed by the regime than the farmers. The peasant class as self-employed is an oddity in the practice of the Marxian theory. But one can hardly expect any significant change in the position of that class in Poland in the near future. If any change is going to take place, this change will serve to make this class even more independent of the regime.

The most common way of recruiting Party members from the ranks of the peasants is by granting them privileges other farmers do not enjoy: ease in buying tractors and other equipment, special profitable contracts with the State, the possibility of buying an unavailable variety of seeds and so on . . .

In spite of the fact that the peasant class is characterized by a similar lifestyle, the peasants in Poland are not equally rich.¹¹⁴ Three categories of farmers can be distinguished: (1) small holders (2-4 hectares); (2) moderate holders (5-15 hectares), and (3) rich

¹¹⁴According to Teplicht, during the period of one decade (1955-1964) the real average income of the Polish peasants grew by 36 per cent. Cf. Jerzy Teplicht, Marxisme et agriculture: Le paysant polonais (Paris: Arnold Colin, 1973), p. 100.

farmers (over 15 hectares). The owners of small holdings up to two hectares constitute a mixed category of farmer-workers, or more accurately, worker-farmers. A farm, for them, is not a unique source of living, nor is it a main source of income. They work full time in the cities, and the farm constitutes for them additional work. Owners of farms smaller than 0.5 hectare are called the polt-holding workers. Almost all of them work full time outside agriculture, and farming constitutes only a marginal part of their income. Farm income does not constitute the main source of revenue for the worker-peasants (occupants of farms 0.5-2 hectares). Sixty seven per cent of that population occupationally active has the jobs outside agriculture.¹¹⁵

Such categories of farms did not exist before World War II but they are so visible now that one cannot underestimate them. Still in 1970s, 1,300,000 people living inside the boundaries of the cities were categorized as worker-farmers. This means that every eleventh inhabitant of Polish cities was also a farmer.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ Ryszard Turski, "Przemysł a przemiany wsi," Przemysł i społeczeństwo w Polsce Ludowej by J. J. Szczepanski (Warszawa: Ossoli-neum, 1969), p. 355. Cf. Ryszard Turski, Miedzy miastem a wsia (Warszawa: PWN, 1965), pp. 207-213.

¹¹⁶ Zdzisław Iwanicki, Rolnicy w strukturze społecznej małych miast (Warszawa: PWN, 1973), p. 44. Cf. Maria Kaminska, "Czy chłopi stanowią klasę i jaką?," Nowe Drogi 9 (1955), pp. 119-125; Bogusław Galeski, "Przemiany społeczne wsi w Polsce Ludowej," Przemiany społeczne (Warszawa: PWN, 1965), pp. 276-304.

For Klos and Swietochłowska, two sources of income of the peasant worker had weakened the traditional peasants' attachment to the land. Cf. Czesław Klos and Maria Swietochłowska, Dochody i spożycie żywności w rodzinach chłopskich i robotniczo-chłopskich (Warszawa: PWN, 1976), p. 65.

The category of the small peasant is rather a large category in the peasant class. The majority of such people has another job because they would not be able to support their relatively large families. For this category of farmers, however, farming plays a significant part in the family budget.

The second type of farmer possesses two-thirds of the arable land and it constitutes the largest category of peasants. The size of such farms does not, by itself, label them wealthy or poor. It depends largely on the location of the farm as well as the fertility of the land. Proximity to a city is the most advantageous circumstance. Even a small farm may be highly remunerative in such cases. This small-scale Polish agriculture still employs 26 per cent of the whole labor force, due to low level of agricultural mechanization.¹¹⁷

The third category of farmers is constituted by the owners of large farms (over 15 hectares). While in 1950 this category of farmers accounted for 4 per cent of all farms, in 1960, they represented only 1 per cent of all farms (30,000 farms).¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷"Polityka społeczna partii wobec wsi," Biblioteka lektora i wykładowcy 4 (1979), p. 7.

¹¹⁸Cf. Stanisław Widerszpil, Przemiany struktury klasowej w Polsce Ludowej (Warszawa: PWN, 1971), pp. 24-25. See also Jan J. Szczepanski, "Les paysants dans la société socialiste," Cahiers internationaux de sociologie 42 (1976); Włodzimierz Wesolowski and Jadwiga Koralewicz-Zabik, "Przemiany struktury klasowej i warstwowej w Polsce," Przemysł i społeczeństwo w Polsce Ludowej by J. J. Szczepanski (Warszawa: Ossolineum, 1969), pp. 436-485.

The diminution of the number of the big farms was due to the anti-farmer policy, and the division of the farms by the farmers themselves among their children.

Farmers, on the average, are wealthier than other classes in Poland, with the exception of the power elite. They possess farms, houses, cattle, necessary farm equipment. Their lifestyle, however, is much different from the lifestyle of the other classes. They work very hard because of poor mechanization of the farms. They, on the average, are poorly educated, which prevents them from being fully emancipated. The exodus of the youth from villages to the cities during the postwar period has had both positive and negative consequences. Generally, the people who leave the villages are the most educated individuals and the people of initiative. So the less educated people remain in the villages. As a consequence, in 1960, only 2.8 per cent of all farmers had higher than a primary school education (seven grades), 22 per cent had primary school diplomas, and 62.2 had not even completed a primary education.¹¹⁹ In Lewis' view, "not only are social conditions actually worse in the countryside, but the conviction remains that the nation as a whole holds the peasant in low esteem."¹²⁰

For a long time in history and still during the between-wars period, the land was considered in Poland a guarantee of freedom and security. It was landed property that gave prestige and wealth to the Polish gentry. Ownership of the land insured also a right to move up

¹¹⁹Włodzimierz Wesolowski, "Przemiany struktury klasowej," Struktura i dynamika społeczeństwa polskiego by W. Wesolowski (Warszawa: PWN, 1970), p. 28.

¹²⁰Paul Lewis, op. cit., p. 81.

to the nobility class. Vice versa, the rural proletariat was, more than any other class, exploited because of lack of organization and poverty.

For centuries, Polish villages with their high birth rates were considered a reservoir of biological force for the nation, a means of preserving the nation in adverse circumstances. It was even said about peasants that they "feed and protect" but they have always been considered the lowest class in Polish society. Even after World War II, that class was carrying the heaviest burdens which were purposely imposed on the farmers to destroy them. For example, although the medicare program was in force for urban population virtually since the end of World War II, the peasants were included in it only in 1972.¹²¹

During the last two decades, the prestige of the farmer grew significantly. Village people are no longer called "peasants" (chłopi), but "farmers" (rolnicy). As one can see on the diagram (p. 285), the peasant scores as high on the prestige scale as on the scale of benefits (ninth place) which is higher than unskilled physical workers, shop assistants, policemen, and even bookkeepers.

In spite of this evident advancement of the peasants on the scale of prestige in Poland, any further move up toward the top of the pyramid is rather unlikely until this class scores significantly in education. Actually, in Poland, there is no other advantage which can procure more

¹²¹100 lat Polskiego ruchu robotniczego, op. cit., p. 362.

prestige than that of education.

Unskilled and Semi-skilled Manual Workers

The class of the unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers occupies the lowest position in the Polish social class hierarchy. The low social status of this class has its source in the fact that this class scores poorly in all important variables which account for the class hierarchy in contemporary Poland.¹²²

¹²²One must be aware of the difference between unskilled physical workers as understood here and the popular concept of the working class in Soviet-Marxist sociology. The difference is a fundamental one. While by unskilled physical workers I mean here the people with no important skills or with lesser skills, who, in consequence, can perform very simple manual jobs, the "working class" as understood in the Soviet-Marxist sociology comprises both manual and non-manual workers who participate directly in the productive process. Excluded are the private farmers, and those who are employed in the sector called by Marx "superstructure."

Widerszpil sees the following characteristics of the working class: (a) the people work with tools or means of production which are not private; the legal basis for this job is a contract; (b) they participate directly in the productive process, commerce, services); (c) the job itself has subordinated and non-superordinated character, and (d) the job constitutes to those who perform it the main source of income. Cf. Stanislaw Widerszpil, "Spor wokół pojęcia klasy robotniczej," Klasa robotnicza w społeczeństwie socjalistycznym (Warszawa: KiW, 1979), p. 47. See also Stanislaw Kozyr-Kowalski and Janusz Ladosz, Dialektyka (Warszawa: PWN, 1979), p. 26.

In this category are included, however, the workers who in Wesolowski's view are classified as skilled. This category is called here semi-skilled in contrast to the technicians who might be called skilled physical workers. The semi-skilled workers are those who meet one of the following conditions: they completed a basic vocational school, passed a test which permitted them to be employed as semi-skilled, or finally, they have been working in the same factory for at least five years, and received some training. Cf. Kazimierz Słomczyński and Włodzimierz Wesolowski, "Proby reprezentacyjne i kategorie społeczno-zawodowe," Zróżnicowanie społeczne by W. Wesolowski (Warszawa: Ossolineum, 1974), p. 78.

The unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers constitute the largest class in Poland. In 1968, they numbered almost 5,000,000 people of unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers.¹²³ Almost one-third of the entire population economically active belonged to that class. The class of the unskilled manual workers has been increasing more than any other class in Poland. This was partly due to the growth of industry, partly to the socio-economic policy of the Communist Party. While in 1938, in Poland, the unskilled manual workers accounted for 18 per cent of the entire economically active population,¹²⁴ this class increased by 700,000 in a four-year period 1950-1955.¹²⁵ The new regime's policy stressing the industrial development of the country has found abundant manpower which they employed to overcome the disadvantage of scarce capital.¹²⁶

¹²³That was calculated on the base of the data of the GUS (Central Office of Statistics), 1968, reported by Widerszpil. See Stanislaw Widerszpil, *Przemiany struktury klasowej . . .*, op. cit., p. 11.

¹²⁴Jan J. Szczepanski, "Les classes en Pologne," Cahiers internationaux de sociologie 39 (1965), pp. 198-209.

¹²⁵George Kolankiewicz, "The Polish Industrial Manual Working Class," Social Groups in Polish Society by D. Lane and G. Kolankiewicz (London: MacMillan Press, 1973), p. 94.

¹²⁶From the economic point of view such a policy in the long run had a negative effect on the Polish economy. The economists realized that "beyond a certain point the overemployment . . . had a retrogressive effect. It tended to disorganize work, and to demoralize both management and workers. The swollen numbers have had a negative marginal productivity." Alfred Zauberman, Industrial Progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany 1937-1962, (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 101.

The Marxist sociologists of the People's Democracies are tireless in stressing that the governments of those countries are "worker-peasants" governments and, therefore, by principle, represent the interests of those classes. The workers are considered specially important in the Party's propaganda view. This is totally in vein with Marx' teaching which openly asserted that only the workers of the industrial centers could reach a high level of class consciousness. The working conditions in industry and the social environment created a favorable climate for the maturation of class consciousness. In fact, these people are vulnerable to Party propaganda for two reasons. The first is common to those of other classes of the people not highly educated and dependent upon the Party economic and social promotion.

For unskilled manual workers there are absolutely no other channels of upward mobility than through the Party. Poorly educated and dependent economically on the exclusive employer (the State), they depend completely on it. Thus the Party constitutes, for them, a unique possibility of upward mobility. Additionally, for this less educated class, the Marxist ideology does not constitute any important barrier. They do not grasp the irreconcilability of the Marxian outlook on the world and that of the Christian. So, they become Party members, being at the same time believers. And while at the higher levels, the Party could hardly tolerate such practices in its members, it has no special objections to it on the level of the unskilled physical workers. These people are not prepared to fight the ideological fights on either side. Their membership counts in order to make a good impression. In 1978,

there were 1,339,547 Party members who belonged to that class.¹²⁷ If we accept that at the same time this class numbered 7,000,000 people, we have to deduce that almost every fifth worker belonged to the Party (19.1 per cent).

The class of unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers is the class of less well-paid people. In 1964, the average monthly salary of the semi-skilled manual workers was 1856 zlotys, and that of the unskilled manual workers, 1717 zlotys, which brought the medium salary of the class to 1786 zlotys.¹²⁸ Given the fact that this class makes less money than any other class and that the families of the unskilled manual workers are rather large, the average income of the unskilled workers' families was very low, almost a half of that of the intelligentsia class.

That difference in income can also be seen in the quality of the apartments of this class. The average number of rooms of this class is 2.77. The small apartments of the unskilled manual workers (1-2 rooms) accounted for 48.6 per cent of the apartments of this class (19.7 per cent of the intelligentsia and 29.6 per cent of the white-collar workers) and the large apartments (3-4 rooms) constituted only 10.25 per cent of all apartments of this class against 34.3 per cent

¹²⁷Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 24.

¹²⁸Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, *Zroznicowanie* . . ., op. cit., p. 102.

of the intelligentsia and 21.7 per cent of the white-collar workers.¹²⁹

As for the possession of "luxury" goods, only 1.27 per cent of the unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers possessed a car (11.0 per cent of the technicians); 8.8 per cent of this class had a refrigerator (30.1 per cent of the white-collar workers); 1.0 per cent of their apartments had telephones (65.2 per cent of the intelligentsia), and 53.3 per cent possessed a television set (75.9 per cent of the technicians).¹³⁰

As has already been mentioned, the unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers score poorly in education. This is valid especially in reference to the unskilled workers. The semi-skilled workers have some vocational training and therefore, they constitute a subclass of this large social class. If it is clearly visible that the average educational level of the unskilled manual workers is increasing, the number of the semi-skilled workers is growing at a still higher rate. While in 1964, there were 28.2 per cent of the unskilled physical workers who

¹²⁹ Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimiera Wesolowski, *Zroznicowanie . . .*, op. cit., 107.

¹³⁰ According to Kalecki, the real income per worker in 1960, in Poland, was 54 per cent higher than in 1937, when all workers were taken into consideration, and 75 per cent higher if we exclude those employed in the State farms. Cf. Michael Kalecki, "Porownanie dochodow robotnikow i pracownikow umyslowych z okresem przedwojennym," Kultura i Spoleczenstwo 1 (1964), p. 38. One can hardly agree with that. If, as it was pointed out on p.129, the real income in 1955 in Poland, was at the level of 67 per cent of the income of 1949, and that its increase in 1956-57 did not equal the real income in 1949, in consequence, one must come to the conclusion that the figures reported by Kalecki are mere fantasy. Also, the data reported by *Rocznik Statystyczny* contradict Kalecki's findings. The real income in 1958, increased only by

had not completed primary school (seven grades) and 55.4 per cent who have completed only primary education, 13.8 per cent possessed a basic vocational school diploma, in 1968, the corresponding figures were as follows: 20.5, 56.9 and 20.4 per cent. In only a four-year period (1965-1968) the percent of the semi-skilled workers increased by 6.6 per cent.¹³¹

Poorly educated semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers read mainly local newspapers and popular magazines.¹³² Many do not read at all or read only occasionally (63 per cent).¹³³ Similar patterns are visible regarding the reading of the books. The people of this class read little and what they do read is novels and popular books.¹³⁴

The unskilled manual workers score poorly in the scale of social prestige. This is a direct consequence of their low education and their dependence on the State. Even if there is a decreasing number of individuals with lower than primary education, and the number of people who completed the basic vocational schools is growing, this does not

3.3 per cent in comparison with 1957; in 1959, it grew by 5.1 per cent as compared with that of 1958, but it decreased by 1.5 per cent in 1960. Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, pp. XXXXIV-XXXV.

¹³¹Stanisław Widerszpil, *Przemiany struktury* . . . op. cit., p. 11.

¹³²Anita Kobus-Wojciechowska, *Zroznicowanie konsumpcji* . . . op. cit., p. 248.

¹³³*Ibid.*, p. 235.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 268.

change much the social position of this class because the average education is growing for every social class. Though the difference in wages between white-collar workers and the unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers is not great, the last occupy a much lower place in the class pyramid in Poland, mainly because of their low education.

In spite of the low social status of the unskilled manual workers, it was this class that was able to challenge the power elite in 1956, 1970, 1976, and especially in 1980. The success of the last upheaval must be, however, attributed mainly to the leadership of the workers who belonged to other, higher, social classes.

Status Inconsistency of the Social Classes in Poland

The social system of the Soviet-type of society in general, and of the Polish class system in particular, is a political system par excellence. In these societies everything is at the service of politics and the policies are made by one party. There is no price so high that the Party would hesitate to pay in order to preserve such an order. The Party is the key to all other resources. If some changes in class structure take place, they "occur without deliberate efforts and simply reflect the influence of changing social or technological conditions."¹³⁵

Marx predicted that after the socialization of the means of production the societies would be transformed into communities ruled by

¹³⁵ Gerhard E. Lenski, op. cit., p. 81.

principle, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."¹³⁶ This was the inevitable conclusion of having ascribed main evils of the society to the private ownership of the means of production. The extent to which this theory is contradicted by the facts can be seen in the case of Poland. Social classes not only did not disappear after the nationalization of the means of production, but a new class, the power elite, has arisen. Political organization has not vanished, but again the new society is characterized by a still more clearcut division into those who rule and those who are ruled.¹³⁷

Every society instills motivation in able individuals to occupy higher even rather difficult social positions. In doing so a society rewards these people more than they do others who do not play such important roles. In the Polish totalitarian system, the political elite assumes an exclusive role. The power elite not only makes decisions regarding the division of the GNP, but also decides about the system of rewards and wages for all social classes. Thus there has been established in Poland a system of inconsistency in the status of those in different social groups. The power elite itself is an

¹³⁶Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program (New York: International Publishers, 1938), p. 10.

¹³⁷Mosca attacked Marxism and accused it of being utopian and unrealistic. Every society needs for its functioning a political organization which, in turn, involves inequality of power. Cf. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939), pp. 281-286.

example. A minister-politician scores in the first place on the scale of benefits, but he occupies only the fifth position in the scale of prestige. The graph on p. 285 indicates the inconsistency of the statuses of the eighteen professions which might be assigned to different social classes. The horizontal line represents the dimension of income, while the vertical line indicates the social prestige of a given occupation. Only those occupations which score equally on both scales possess consistent statuses. In this case the joining point of the two dimensions falls on the regression lines (AB). The occupations which score below the regression line are overpaid in comparison with the prestige they have. Conversely, the occupations which score above the regression line are underpaid.

The same data are reported by the graph on p. 286. The coordinates X and Y represent respectively the scale of benefit and that of prestige of the same eighteen occupations. The coordinates cross at the medium point. Occupations which score on either scale 1-9 are on the plus side while those which score 10-18 have a negative value. As was shown in the preceeding graph, the occupations which score equally on both scales have their coordinates on the regression line and their statuses are consistent. Contrariwise, the occupations whose coordinates do not coincide with the regression line have inconsistent statuses. The larger the distance from the regression line, the more inconsistent the occupations' statuses.

All professions which score on the right side of the regression line (AB) are overpaid in comparison with their prestige. In other

words, they score lower on the scale of prestige than on the scale of benefit. We find here two extreme cases: a private locksmith who scores third on the scale of benefit but only twelfth on the scale of prestige and a minister-politican who occupies first place on the scale of benefit, but only fifth on the scale of prestige. Visibly inconsistent statuses are found in the case of the professional officer and the shop-assistant. The first scores ninth on the scale of benefit, but only thirteenth on the scale of prestige. The second occupies the twelfth and fifteenth positions respectively. Other occupations, namely qualified steel worker, priest, a factory metal worker, policement, unskilled building worker and state farm worker score slightly higher on the scale of benefit than they do on the scale of prestige.

The occupations which score on the left side of the regression line on the scale of prestige mark the discrepancy between higher prestige and lower than expected benefit. Here also there are two extreme cases: a teacher and a nurse. The first occupies only the fourteenth position on the scale of benefit, but scores third on the scale of prestige. A nurse occupies sixteenth and eighth positions respectively. The following occupations also show a discrepancy between their prestige (higher) and benefit (lower): university professor, first on the scale of prestige and fourth on the scale of benefit and engineer, fourth and seventh respectively.

The same graph also shows several clusters of occupations which might be ascribed to social classes as analyzed earlier. Cluster VI




Figure 12

Status Inconsistency in Poland¹³⁸

¹³⁸Adapted from Adam Sarapata, "Iustum Pretium," Studia Socjologiczne 3 (1962), p. 106.




Figure 13

Occupational Clusters in Poland

C = cleaner, SFW = state farm worker, N = nurse, UBW = unskilled building worker, T = teacher, PM = policeman, SA = shop-assistant, BK = bookkeeper, PF = private farmer, PO = professional officer, MWF = metal worker in factory, E = engineer, P = priest, QSW = qualified steel worker, UP = university professor, PL = private locksmith, D = doctor, M = minister (politician).

composed of cleaner, State farm worker and unskilled building worker represents the class of the unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers. Cluster V forms a peasant class. While its score on the scale of benefit is acceptable, its place on the scale of prestige is too high. The prestige of the private farmer in Poland is not higher yet than the prestige of the white-collar workers. Cluster IV is composed of the white-collar occupations as understood above. Their low score on the scale of benefit is not surprising and represents the real situation. Their low score on the scale of prestige is probably due to unfortunate (intentional or unintentional) selection of the occupations. In average this class would score much higher on the scale of prestige. Factory metal worker and private locksmith account for cluster III--skilled physical workers. Cluster II: university professor, physician, engineer, qualified steel worker, priest, and teacher represent the intelligentsia class. All these occupations, except teacher, form a rather easily distinguishable cluster. The case of a teacher was discussed above and it reflects on the one hand its established high prestige in Polish society, and on the other, a State policy of rewarding more the skills which are needed by the growing industry. Cluster I, composed of minister-politician and military officer, represents the power elite class. But within this cluster minister-politician ranks highest and military officer ranks lowest.

Status inconsistency is the most visible feature of the Polish postwar reality. While prestige has its source mainly in education, wealth is primarily related to political power, small private enter-

prise, and only then to education.

The insurrections of the Polish workers after World War II prove that the postwar Polish society is a conflictual society. But this is not what one would expect on the basis of the Marxist theory of class and class conflict. The last chapter of this paper will discuss the problem of conflict in the socialist societies.

CHAPTER VIII

CLASS CONFLICT IN THE SOCIALIST SOCIETIES

Post-Marxian Theories of Class Conflict

Chapter I of this paper presented, quite extensively, Marx' theory of class and class conflict. At this point we need only to summarize it. In Marx' view, class conflict is a conflict of interest between two main classes: the owners of the means of production and those who are deprived of that ownership (workers). Social conflict arises between these two classes on the basis of conflictual economic interests which in no way can be conciliated. The buyers of the labor force and its sellers meet in a market regulated by the law of demand and supply. The bargain is human labor. The capitalists buy human labor. Their interest is to pay as little as possible in wages, because the less they pay the workers, the more profit they make. Conflictual interests are more than economic. There also arise conflictual political interests. Being a ruling class of the society, the capitalist class is interested in maintaining the status quo in that society, while the working class (proletariat) is a revolutionary class, whose highest interest is to overthrow the capitalist system by seizure of political power and by control of the economy.

The first powerful critique of the Marx' class and class conflict theories came from Max Weber. As for Marx, also for Weber, class conflict was an endemic characteristic of the capitalist society. When

analyzing the decline of feudal relations between the workers and landowners in East Prussia upon the rise of capitalism, he saw the conflicting interests of workers and landowners in the successful harvest. The relations between those classes were restricted to the relations of the market. "The old community of interest was dissolved," writes Weber, "and the farm hands became proletarians. The operation of agriculture became a seasonal operation, restricted to a few months. The lord hired migratory laborers, since the maintenance of idle hands throughout the year would be too heavy a burden."¹ Thus the rationed economy of capitalism (a market economy) is price-oriented. The prices "are determined by the conflict of interests in bargaining and competition and the resolution of these conflicts."² But class conflict and class situation as well can "emerge only on the basis of communalization. The communal action that brings forth class situations, however, is not basically action between members of the identical class; it is an action between members of different classes."³ Because of the specificity of the capitalistic enterprise "each kind of class situation, and above all when it rests upon the power of property per se, will become more clearly efficacious when all other determinants of

¹Max Weber, "Capitalism and Rural Society in Germany," From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology by H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 382.

²Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957), p. 382.

³Max Weber, Class, Status, Party, op. cit., p. 26.

reciprocal relations are, as far as possible, eliminated in their significance. It is in this way that the utilization of the power of property in the market obtains its most sovereign importance."⁴ Thus, while Marx' view of class was unidimensional, based on the criterion of one's position with respect to the means of production, Weber's view of class is multiple and comprises property or market capacity, prestige, and authority. This is much different from what Marx understood by class. Also, the class conflict acquires a new, larger perspective.

Close to Weber is Giddens who stresses the importance of the society-value that is common to the actors of a given class and which they bring to the market. He distinguishes two types of class relationship: "mediate" and "proximate." By "mediate" Giddens conceives the "'overall' connecting links between the market on the one hand and structured systems of class relationships on the other."⁵ This type of relationship is governed by the "distribution of mobility chances which pertain within a given society."⁶ As for market capacity, there are three kinds: property, education-skills, and manual labor power. The "proximate" class relationship refers to "'localized' factors which condition or shape class formation."⁷ Any class formation and class conflict involve "class consciousness" which is something more than

⁴Max Weber, *Class, Status, Party*, op. cit., p. 26.

⁵Anthony Giddens, op. cit., p. 107.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

"simple" class awareness. The last involves only a recognition of a common belief and lifestyle; the former includes the class awareness and also a recognition of the fact that there are other classes which coexist and are characterized by different attitudes and lifestyles. Class conflict arises upon the conflictual interests.

Even if Giddens' theory refers primarily to the advanced capitalist societies, it can also fit (to some extent) the class structure of socialist societies. The main difficulty with this theory in reference to socialist societies is "market." In the totalitarian socialist societies everything, market included, is determined by the power elite. That fact must shift class structure and class conflict in new directions. We will see in the second part of this chapter that the structural conflict of Soviet-type socialist societies always implies the power elite as a party in the conflict.

More plausible, but still limited, is Dahrendorf's theory of class and class conflict (see diagram, p. 72). The author takes as a unit of his theoretical analysis the "imperatively co-ordinated association." The starting point of this analysis is the concept of a "zero-sum" of authority meaning that one possesses as much authority as another lacks it. The objects of analysis are the individuals who play social roles. In Dahrendorf's view, it is always possible to clearly distinguish between those who possess authority and those who are subordinated. The superordinating subjects legitimately control those who are subordinated through prohibitions and orders. The superordinating subjects have conflictual interest with these of the subordinated subjects. In

the initial stage the conflict of interest is "latent!" The latent conflictual interests give rise to "quasi-groups." When the conflictual interests become conscious goals of these "quasi-groups," conflict becomes manifest and its protagonists change into conflictual groups. Structural conflict by its turn accounts for social change.

Critics of this theory, regarding social classes based on the authority relations were reported on pp.71 and 73, are also valid in connection with the theory of structural conflict in Dahrendorf's view. There is no need to repeat them here. The only thing that should be stressed again is that if we accept authority relations as a basis for class conflicting interests, the classless society is practically impossible because one can hardly envision any society without authority relations. Thus structural conflict will always be present in a society.

Djilas' theory of conflict between the "new class" and the vast majority of the others is the closest to the theory of class and class conflict presented in this paper. It was already stressed before that the so-called "avant-garde" of the proletariat in Djilas' view has been transformed into a "new class." A precondition of the rise of the "new class" was a seizure of the political power. That was the first step in creating the "Party state" which did not occur instantly but rather during a long process. "The totalitarian dictatorship of the Communist Party oligarchy in the Communist system is not the result of momentary political relations, but a long and complex social progress."⁸ With

⁸Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, op. cit., pp. 78-79.

time, the process is accelerated and the new class strengthens itself. "The claim that it is a dictatorship of the proletariat becomes an empty slogan."⁹

It was through the nationalization of the means of production, or more exactly, through the rise of the new property rights and control of the distribution of the GNP that the new class has been established. Djilas writes:

. . . without their special role as administrators over society and as distributors of property, the Communists could not transform themselves into a new class, nor could a new class be formed and permanently established. Gradually material goods were nationalized, but in fact, through its right to use, enjoy, and distribute these goods, they became the property of a discernible stratum of the Party and the bureaucracy gathered around it.¹⁰

Thus an exclusive control of the property distribution makes this class a universal employer and subject of privilege.¹¹ "The new class felt insecure as long as there were any other owners except itself."¹²

The third important feature of the "new class" is its attempt to control society through the ideology. The new class cannot tolerate other ideologies because that might undermine its control of every aspect of human life.

⁹Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, op. cit., p. 79.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

¹¹"The new class is voracious and insatiable, just as the bourgeois was. But it does not have the virtues of frugality and economy that the bourgeoisie had. The new class is as exclusive as the aristocracy, but without aristocracy's refinement and proud chivalry." *Ibid.*, p. 60.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 56.

From birth to death a man is surrounded by the solicitude of the ruling party, a solicitude for his consciousness and conscience. Journalists, ideologists, paid writers, special schools, approved ruling ideas, and tremendous material means are all enlisted and engaged in this 'uplifting of socialism'.¹³

The so-called "scientific materialism" and Marx' theory of class and class conflict plays two different roles in chronologically different periods. "Before the Communists usurped power, this theory was necessary in order to recruit revolutionaries and revolutionary organs; now it justifies the totalitarian control of the new class . . . particular revolutionary forms were transformed into reactionary ones."¹⁴

In Djilas' view, "contemporary Communism . . . consists of three basic factors for controlling the people. The first is power; the second, ownership; the third, ideology."¹⁵ Class conflict has its roots in conflictual political, economic and ideological interests. The conflict is acute, even if it is latent. The new class prevents any manifestation of it because that would undermine the "authority" of the new class.

Becoming increasingly one-sided and exclusive, contemporary Communism more and more creates half-truths and tries to justify them . . . its half-truths are exaggerated and debased to the point of perversion; the more rigid and the more inspired it is with lies, the more it strengthens the monopolism of its leaders over society, and thus over Communist theory itself.¹⁶

¹³Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, op. cit., pp. 133.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 166.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 129.

Structural Conflict and the Orthodox
Marxist Theory of Class

In the orthodox Communist sociologists' view, the conflict which occurs in Poland is not a structural conflict because Polish society is a "classless society."¹⁷ The manifest conflict is explained in different ways which depend on the stage of the conflict and eventual future changes in the Party forum. At the initial stage the reason for conflict is found in the subversive activities of the Western (American, British, and German) imperialists, or the domestic hooligans who have nothing to do with the workers who love the Party because the Party loves them. The first version of the explanation is applied most frequently particularly in the case when an immediate change in the Party leadership is not foreseen, or when no victims are to be sacrificed pro Party bonum. In this case the responsibility for the crisis is to be located outside the Party itself. In June 1956, the accusations were made chiefly against the Western imperialist agents who exploited the circumstances of the International Fair in Poznan for their own purposes, contrary to the interests of the country represented by and embodied in the Party. Trybuna Ludu wrote: "On June 28th, enemy agents succeeded in provoking street disorders. Matters went so far that

¹⁷This paper has focused mainly on the working class upheavals, in large majority manual workers, but not exclusively. Their revolts presented the most challenge to the ruling elite but they were not the unique protagonist of the conflicts. The structural conflict, as we will see later, also involved peasants and intelligentsia.

several public buildings were attacked, with casualties resulting."¹⁸

The newspaper continued:

Let us think. Who, and for what purpose, could have wanted at precisely this moment and just in Poznan, where the 25th International Fair is taking place with many foreigners participating, to create these sorts of incidents? . . . The enemy and well-organized nests of agents chose precisely this moment, disregarding the intentions of the working people of Poznan, to incite riots for purely provocative purposes.¹⁹

Also in 1976, the immediate change in the Party leadership was not foreseen. So the reason for the conflict had to be found outside the Party files. This time, however, the enemy was domestic, the hooligans. These people of marginal social status had their interests in such a conflict but they had nothing to do with the real workers. Radio Warsaw, while announcing the withdrawal of the price rises, said that the disturbances in Ursus and Radom were caused by "irresponsible elements" and "adventurers masquerading as workers."²⁰ The mayor of the city of Radom spoke similarly. In his view, the events were caused by "parasitic, hooligan, criminal and anti-socialist elements."²¹ In consequence, the real working class is indignant at such activities which are contrary to working class interests and to the interests of the nation. To prove that, hundreds of workers' resolutions were fabricated and sent to the leaders to express full support of the leadership and

¹⁸Trybuna Ludu, July 29, 1956.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰BBC Monitoring, June 26, 1976.

²¹Trybuna Ludu, July 1, 1976.

and to condemn the "hooligans." Similarly, many "spontaneous" rallies took place in support of the Party.²²

The same patterns of explanations for the crises between the power elite and the intelligentsia (university students included) was adopted in 1968. The SAIW (Stowarzyszenie Ateistow i Wolnomyslicieli--Association of the Atheists and Freethinkers) bitterly condemned the intelligentsia and students. The Poznan SAIW wrote: "Regarding the factious street incidents caused by reactionary forces hostile to our fatherland, we univocally support the truth which was fully presented in the speech of comrade Wladyslaw Gomulka during the meetings with (Party) activists in the Capitol."²³ The Warsaw SAIW was still more servile. Its resolution said: "We decisively condemn the group of writers in the Warsaw district, who had the audacity to raise a hand against socialism, against Poland, and against our Party."²⁴ The alumni of the Party School in Warsaw openly supported the brutality of the police: "We morally support the actions of the workers' activists, of the ORM0, and of the militia. We agree with all administrative and personal decisions undertaken by the State authorities and the Party; we totally support them."²⁵

²²Especially after the June 1976 riots, the workers were forced to participate in the rallies. They were taken directly from the factories to the places of the rallies. The rallies were presented on radio and television as huge manifestations of the working class support of Party policy.

²³"Razem z Partia," Argumenty 15 (1968).

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

Only when events are under control, the official propaganda admits the real reasons for grievances which have caused the conflict. In July 1956, the Central Committee of the Party admitted:

It is a fact that demagogues and hostile rabble-rousing elements succeeded in exploiting the particular dissatisfactions of the ZISPO workers and workers of several other enterprises, caused by procrastination in dealing with their serious grievances and justified demands, thus bringing about strikes and street demonstrations.²⁶

The Emergency Congress of the Party in 1981 declared: "Overpowered by the leadership Party was losing confidence of the people. The growing discrepancy between the words and the actions of the people in power was causing chaos and an authority crisis."²⁷

Instead, when the change in the Politburo is on the way, the explanation of the conflict marks a new path. In order to conciliate the rioters the newly chosen leadership blames the former members of the ruling body for all the evils of the past period. One person or a group of the former Politburo is accused of mismanagement and lack of democracy in the Party itself. Referring to the events of June 1956, Gomulka said in October of the same year:

If agents and provokers were able to inspire the working class to action, the enemies of the People's Poland, the enemies of socialism would have a much easier task and could easily attain their goals. But the point is that this is not so . . . The causes of the Poznan tragedy and of the profound dissatisfaction of the entire working class are to be found in ourselves, in the leadership of the Party, in the Government. The inflammable materials have been accumulating for years.²⁸

²⁶Trybuna Ludu, July 31, 1956.

²⁷"Uchwała IX Nadzwyczajnego Zjazdu PZPR," Gazeta Krakowska, July 30, 1981.

²⁸Trybuna Ludu, October 21, 1956.

After the 1970 upheaval in Gdansk, Gierek stated "Comrade Gomulka, in whom we had unlimited confidence for so long, made wrong decisions."²⁹

Krasko, a member of the new Politburo spoke: "The brain of the Party suffered from serious disorders."³⁰ Another Politburo member, Moczar added: "The old leadership was thinking in terms of the methods of the nineteenth century, while there were continuing changes all around us . . . (it) did not realize that the people did not believe in the Party."³¹ Also in 1981, the Emergency Congress of the Party admitted that the 1980 strikes in Poland were caused by "the abuses of the system and the deviations from universal principles of socialism . . ."³²

These explanations of the conflict here discussed, are a necessary consequence of the negation of the structural conflict in socialist societies. Wesolowski's view expresses the official doctrine. It is not the amount of money different social groups receive which accounts for the rising of classes in society, but "the principle underlying this distribution."³³ While in capitalism one can extract profit on the basis of mere ownership (independently of labor), in socialism the dis-

²⁹L'Espresso (Rome), December 19, 1971.

³⁰Nowe Drogi, February, 1971.

³¹Ibid.

³²"Uchwała IX Nadzwyczajnego Zjazdu PZPR, Gazeta Krakowska, July 30, 1981.

³³Włodzimierz Wesolowski, Class, Strata and Power (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, Ltd., 1979), p. 124.

tribution of the rewards is proportionate to the quantity and quality of labor performed in the society according to the principle "to each according to his work." This does not lead to a class formation nor to the structural conflict because: "(i) distinction 'according to work' is recognized by the majority of the population as just; (ii) the long term evolution of society is directed towards the transformation of this principle into an 'even more just' one, namely distribution 'according to need'."³⁴

In other words, Wesolowski maintains that it is not inequality itself which brings about a class formation and conflict, but the reason for the inequality. The existence of the inequality in the name of socialism does not generate class conflict. If it exists under the guise of something else, it does. This absurd conclusion was somewhat corrected by the author when he added that sometimes an overpayment in some strata and underpayment in the others can transform the "non-antagonistic" contradiction into "antagonistic" ones in the socialist societies. This happens when objectively noncontradictory interests are perceived by some (socially retarded as objective).³⁵

The nonexistence of objective contradictory interests in the socialist societies are not proved by Wesolowski nor by any other Marxist sociologist. They are taken for granted on the simple basis

³⁴Włodzimierz Wesolowski, *Class. Strata*, . . . op. cit., p. 123.

³⁵By the conflict Wesolowski means "a perception of a certain state of affairs as somehow contrary to someone's ('mine' or 'our') interest," *ibid.*, p. 127.

that with the nationalization of the means of production there has ceased to exist the basis for conflictual interests. Reality, as Lane points out, is much different.

After the initial political process by which the capitalist owners of industry were expropriated, conflicts arise between the new elite . . . and the majority of manual workers . . . The empirical facts point up a contradiction between the 'official ideology', according to which the 'working class' is politically and socially unitary, and the fact that income is distributed differentially between various groups making up that class.³⁶

In 1956, Gomulka was not a member of the outgoing Politburo. He was even imprisoned. Therefore the accusations toward the former ruling body were understandable. But in 1970., Gomulka's policy was condemned by Gierek and others who shared Gomulka's responsibility for the crisis. Similarly in 1980, Gierek's leadership was sharply criticized by the comrades who were his Politburo's members. This was openly stated by the Emergency Party Congress: "The present crisis was caused by wrong functioning of the Party mechanism in the society and country and by the mistakes of the concrete persons in power."³⁷ This indicates the way the system functions and works to survive and the necessary ready-made explanations the Party brings to interpret the structural conflict and the conflict within the Party itself. In the next part of this chapter, more plausible theory of conflict in socialist societies will be proposed.

³⁶David Lane, The End of Inequality? (Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1971), pp. 105-106.

³⁷Gazeta Krakowska, July 30, 1981.

People's Democracies and the Structural Conflict

Only a pure functionalism may deny the existence of conflict in societies.³⁸ Other sociologists recognize the presence of one or another type of conflict in every society.³⁹ Even the orthodox Marxists who deny the existence of structural conflict in socialist societies which function smoothly under the guide of the respected communist parties admit some kind of tension among social groups (strata) in socialist systems. Similarly those who deny the existence of social classes in the Soviet-type socialist societies because of the one-party political system in those societies (Aron, Parkin), or because of the power elite's role which uses terror to eliminate any formation of other classes (Feldmesser), recognize the presence of strains in "People's Democracies."

Obviously, the principle (the Party-state) which keeps such a regime alive and flourishing cannot be respected for legality or for the spirit of compromise. In all probability, a monopolistic party regime would die if it were infected by the democratic spirit of compromise.⁴⁰

³⁸Dahrendorf summarizes the essential elements of functionalism in the following points: (1) "Every society is a relatively persisting configuration of elements; (2) Every society is a well integrated configuration of elements; (3) Every element in a society contributes to its functioning; (4) Every society rests on the consensus of its members." Ralf Dahrendorf, *Toward a Theory . . .*, op. cit., p. 217.

³⁹Conflict theories presuppose a position diametrically opposite to functionalism. (1) "Every society is subject at every moment to change . . . (2) Every society experiences at every moment social conflict . . . (3) Every element in the society contributes to its change, (4) Every society rests on constraint of some of its members by others." Ibid.

⁴⁰Raymond Aron, *Democracy . . .*, op. cit., 49.

Elsewhere the same author indicates the contradictory character of the State-run socialist systems which must cause social conflict. He says:

It (the system) has to allow the intelligentsia freedom of discussion and yet withhold the right to subject the State ideology to critical analysis. Economists must search for the most effective methods of planning the economy without infringing on Marxist dogma about historical development. Sociologists must study the workers' response to mechanization, automation, and even industrial discipline, but neither the sociologists nor economists are permitted to query the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism or the identification of the party with the proletariat.⁴¹

Similarly Feldmesser, admitting the "status of privilege within a basically classless framework," admits some kind of conflict.⁴² Privilege, by definition, excludes the meritorious basis for the distribution of scarce goods, otherwise it would be no privilege.

Conflict, as Borg points out, can be understood in a narrow or broad sense. The narrow concept of conflict refers to "open clashes or struggles, either violent or non-violent."⁴³ Conflict in the broad sense also includes "tensions, hostile attitudes, and antagonistic interests between groups, even if those phenomena have not resulted in open struggle."⁴⁴

At this point we have to specify that we are dealing with a

⁴¹Raymond Aron, The Industrial Society (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967), pp. 129-130.

⁴²Robert A. Feldmesser, op. cit., p. 533.

⁴³Marcus Borg, Conflict and Social Change (Minneapolis: Ungsburg Publishing House, 1971), p. 69.

⁴⁴Ibid.

structural conflict, i.e., conflict between at least two social classes. Thus, by definition, we exclude those authors who for any reason deny the existence of classes in a particular society. But the antagonism between the classes can assume different forms, levels, scopes, and intensities. Referring to that issue, Miliband writes:

It (conflict) often is strictly localized and focused on immediate, specific and 'economic' demands, and forms part of the 'normal' pattern of relations between employer and wageearners--with strike action as a familiar part of the pattern--fought at that level, in so far as there occurs a permanent struggle for the communication of alternative and contradictory ideas, values and perspectives. Or it may be fought at the 'political' level, and bring into question existing political arrangements, large or small.⁴⁵

Even if one can hardly delineate the boundaries between "economic," "political," and "ideological" class conflict because the structural conflict includes and expresses manifestations of conflict at all these levels, the distinction is not totally sine fundamento in re. As we will see later on, there is at least a difference in stressing the issues. While, e.g., the conflict between peasants and power elite, and workers and power elite in Poland was predominantly, but not exclusively, at the economic level, the conflict between the intelligentsia and the power elite was on the ideological and political level. This, again, is a matter of stress and not of qualitative differences between one conflict and another at class level.

The inadequacy of the Marxian theory of class in explaining social structure in the socialist societies has already been discussed, and an alternative class theory presented. Nor is the Marx' theory of conflict

⁴⁵Ralf Miliband, *Marxism and Politics*, op. cit., p. 28.

useful in explaining class conflict in these societies.

As for social conflict, one must be aware of the role which the State, or more accurately the power elite, plays in the Society-type socialist societies.⁴⁶ In the capitalist societies the mechanism of market law regulates the value of work and consequently its rewards and the State only indirectly regulates the wages, in the "People's Democracies" an unequal distribution of goods is made by the power elite (a political elite). The opposite interests of the two classes in these societies never meet directly unless the power elite is a party in the

⁴⁶Bauman sees six types of social conflict in the Society-type socialist societies. (1) Conflict connected with a migration of peasants to the cities. The peasant influx into the urban centers causes a disintegration of the urban population; (2) conflict whose main source is a "loss of status." It takes place during the immediate period after the revolution and its protagonists are the outgoing ruling class and the new one. A similar conflict appears two decades later. The ruling class composed of the professional revolutionaries finds a new generation of the ruling class more advantageous, more educated, and, therefore, they look at them as a threat; (3) a third type of conflict is a conflict between different factions of the ruling class. This type of conflict was manifest during all workers upheavals, but especially in 1956 and 1980. Bratkowski in his open letter to the Party saw two factions in conflict after the 1980 riot in Poland: a faction open for reforms and the so-called "hardliners." Of these last he wrote: "They offer no solution besides (that) of confrontation and misinformation. They promise no hope, but drama." Stefan Bratkowski, "List Otwarty do Moich Wspoltowarzyszy," Solidarnosc (Gdansk) 9 (1981). (4) Conflict between people of different occupations; (5) conflict caused by "inequality of opportunity, and (6) conflict which arises between the intelligentsia and the power elite regarding lack of freedom in the socialist societies. Zygmunt Bauman, "Konflikty społeczne we wschodnio-europejskim systemie politycznym," ANEKS 4 (1974) pp.37-48.

This is a mixture of different types of conflicts. Some even (like the first) are not manifested in Poland. There was not one workers' insurrection in Poland which showed a division between "established" and "immigrated" workers. The established workers did not manifest more maturity than the "newcomers." Of these six conflicts we are interested here mainly in the last two.

conflict. This is because, "in the Socialist system the State (power elite) assumes the role of direct regulator in the distribution of goods, thus losing its guise of "nonengaged, neutral arbiter" of controversies over pay and, more broadly, economic interests in general."⁴⁷ The power elite, as an intermediary, always enters directly into a conflict with other classes. While the other classes may change the power elite is always a necessary party in the conflict. When, for example, the peasants sell a farm product, they sell it to the State (power elite) and it is logical to assert that they enter in conflict with the power elite which establishes the prices of the product. But they do not enter in conflict of interests with the other classes. They do not meet on the market. It is again the power elite which assumes another intermediary role; it is the power elite which enters into a new conflict of interests (economic interests) with those who buy products: all other social classes. So the power elite is always a necessary party in the structural conflict in the socialist societies. The graph on page 308 shows the possibility of conflict in the Soviet-type society.

To what extent this theory is plausible can be seen in the analyzed cases of the conflict in Poland between workers and the power elite. The only people or objects attacked by the rioters were persons and facilities of the power elite. The looting of shops did happen but the shops were not the direct object of attack. Looting and vandalism

⁴⁷ Włodzimierz Wesolowski, *Class, Strata and Power*, op. cit., p. 129.




Figure 14

Conflictual and Nonconflictual Class Relations in Poland

are a part of almost any kind of riot. Similarly the conflicts between peasants and the power elite and between the intelligentsia and power elite support this theory. It was the intelligentsia which, after the 1976 riot in Radom and Ursus, energetically supported the workers. This class had founded the KOR for the purpose of defending the workers and collecting funds for their families. Similarly, the Workers' Free Trade Union, "Solidarity," openly supported peasants in their conflict with the power elite in 1980. Referring to KOR, Walesa said: "We will never permit anyone to destroy these people. I will support them because I am personally indebted to them for many things."⁴⁸ While

⁴⁸ Gazeta Krakowska, August 31, 1981. Also Szczepanski indirectly recognized such a conflict when he wrote: "Conflictual economic interests of the workers and intelligentsia and the peasants and intelligentsia have their roots in the division of the GNP and in the unequal economic development of the country . . ." Jan J. Szczepanski,

Wesolowski is almost compassionate to the power elite which has assumed such a thankless role, the reality is very different. It is the political elite which has become the universal exploiter of all other classes. The political elite arbitrarily establishes the system of wages and rewards and distributes the prestigious positions in society. The political elite is not a guardian of the interests of other classes, but it protects its own interests and privileges, of which the highest privilege is to be above the law. Lack of control and of any kind of opposition brings about the personal corruption of the members of the elite. To cover the corruption and protect their interests, they build a police-state. Bribing is the most common way to influence the people. Once one accepts a bribe, he is branded for all time, because the power elite will blackmail him.⁴⁹ Thus one will be punished not for political, non-orthodox views, but for bribing, stealing, or other crimes.

Besides the conflict between the power elite and the working class (mainly unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers), there were at least

"Przewidywany rozwój markostruktury społecznej," Spoleczny rozwój Polski w Pracach Prognostycznych by J. Danecki (Warszawa: KiW, 1974), p. 390. Intelligentsia has to be understood here as power elite. Official class theory does not distinguish between power elite and intelligentsia.

Even Widerszpil admits that in 1970, "conflict has manifested itself between Party leadership (on one side), and the working class and other classes (on the other)." Stanislaw Widerszpil, *Przemiany . . .*, op. cit., p. 19.

⁴⁹ Many people are convinced that the system purposely works in this way. The State establishes such low wages that one is forced to steal to survive. The State tolerates such practices until one is not involved in political opposition. In a case of political unorthodoxy this person is punished not for political views, but for crime. Cf. Appendix A, Interview 3, p. 384.

two visible conflicts in the postwar Polish society: the power elite versus peasants and the power elite versus intelligentsia.

The first type of conflict took place as early as in 1949, only four years after the end of the War, and less than five years after the agrarian reform was proclaimed by the PKWN in its Lublin Manifesto of 1944. The reasons for conflict were equally economic as well as political. Under pressure from Moscow the government initiated an open campaign against the rich farmers called derogatively "kulaks."⁵⁰ The official State propaganda presented them as a unique exploiting class. Another means used by the power elite against the kulaks was the pressure to join kolkhozes. Private farmers were not allowed to buy fertilizers and machinery. At the same time the levies on products were reimposed on farmers. All this was done in the name of the Marxian principle that the evil of the society is rooted in the private means of production. Gomulka's opposition to the forced collectivization of private farms did not divert the event, and he himself was imprisoned.

The farmers' struggle was passive but very determined. They did not give up even though the power elite brought them to a state where the private farm was a burden and not a means of adequate livelihood; Polish agriculture was reaching a negative quota. If the real income of the private farmers in 1960 was considered as 100, the real income

⁵⁰"Kulak" means a rich farmer. The word was coined in Russia and transplanted to Poland. It has a highly derogative meaning.

of the Polish farmers was 78.6 in 1955.⁵¹

Gomulka's regaining power in 1956 brought about some relief for private farming. At least two things changed: (1) State propaganda against the private farmers was stopped; (2) the pressure on the farmers to join the Kolkhozes was lessened significantly. For example, there were 10,500 kolkhozes in 1956; in March 1957, there remained only 1752. This diminution was due to the highly negative attitude of the large majority of the population toward kolkhozes and only partly to an intentional Party policy. Jedrychowski, a planning chief at that time, said: "Many people think that the retreat from the development of Kolkhozes and dissolving of many of them was the result of a Party policy. The truth is that this retreat was brought about by the pressure of anti-socialist elements at a time when the Party was not strong enough to resist."⁵²

At least two positive changes took place during Gomulka's leadership. The first was more ease in receiving credits by private farmers. In 1956, the credits for private farms reached 2,200,000 zlotys; in 1959, 5,400,000, and in 1961, 6,500,000.⁵³ The second positive step of Gomulka's agricultural policy was the selling or leasing of State land

⁵¹ Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980, p. XL.

⁵² World Marxist Review, 2 (1959).

⁵³ Rocznik Statystyczny, 1962; reported by Hansjakob Stehle, "Polish Communism," Communism in Europe by W. E. Griffith (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964), p. 159.

to the private farmers. In the short period of three years (1957-1960) the government sold or leased 1,018,000,000 hectars of land to private farmers.⁵⁴

Gomulka saw a solution of the prevalence of private farms in Poland in the so-called agricultural circles (kolka rolnicze). The farmers were supposed to join others in buying machinery and were then entitled to use it. To support these new agricultural bodies, the Agricultural Development Fund was established in 1959. The main advantage of the agricultural circles was the voluntary participation in time. Even withdrawal from them was only a matter of repayment of any uninvested profit. Their negative sides, however, were manifested very quickly. Conflict over priority in using machinery was the most difficult problem. Especially during an unfavorable season, when every day of good weather was very important, the agricultural cooperative started to be a bone of contention. The agricultural circles were surely "a compromise solution between practical and ideological necessities."⁵⁵ They, however, did not play the role they were supposed to. Mainly practical difficulties prevented them from fulfilling the task for which they were created.

The negative attitude by the power elite toward farmers was manifested also in other discriminatory policies toward peasants. For example, while the other social classes were included in medicare and social security programs since the beginning of the communist regime

⁵⁴Hansjakob Stehle, *Polish Communism . . .*, op. cit., p. 159.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p. 160.

in Poland, the farmers were included only in 1971 under Gierek's leadership.

Since 1976, the strain between the power elite and the farmers was visibly increasing. The State bought the farm products at such low prices that the farmers could make no profit. The situation began to be critical. Farmers stopped selling their products.⁵⁶ Only after significant increase in prices of farm products (mainly animal production) did farmers increase agricultural production. But the situation started to be ridiculous. One pound of meat or sausage (if found, because of a chronic shortage of meat) was bought at a lower price than the price the State was paying to the private farmers for the same amount of live weight. In the long run such a policy had to bring about the total bankruptcy of the State. Shortage of fodder and farm machinery did not permit the increase of meat production. Instead, it even visibly decreased from 194.5 in 1976 to 180.5 thousand tons in 1977. It decreased again by 7,000 tons in 1979, as compared with that of 1978.⁵⁷

This negative attitude of the power elite regarding the private farmers sometimes resulted in painful actions. In the late 1970s in the Voivodship of Nowy Sacz, a high percentage of the crops of the farmers

⁵⁶ The situation of the private farmer was not better in the 1960s. Kuron and Modzelewski wrote in their open letter to the Party: "The isolated peasant producer who enters into a 'voluntary' accord with the State is helpless when faced with the State's monopoly of the market." Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, "An Open Letter to the Party," Soviet Communism and the Socialist Vision by J. Jacobson (New Jersey: New Politics Publishing Company, 1972), p. 271.

⁵⁶Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980, p. XLI.

was destroyed by the wild hogs which were purposely brought to that region in large quantities for hunting. Damages reported by the farmers were only partly compensated for.

All these policies of the power elite regarding agriculture in the name of the Marxian principle of nationalization of all the means of production brought about an open conflict between the power elite and the farmers. Even the dramatic protests of the farmers were useless. A foundation of the Rural "Solidarity" somehow institutionalized the conflict. But if politically the establishment of the Rural Free Trade Union was surely a success, in practical terms not much change occurred. Shortage of fuel, machinery and industrial products had a negative effect on agricultural productivity. Lack of goods on the market visibly restricted the selling of farm products by the private farmers. Thus a shortage of food became more acute.

The third class openly involved in the conflict with the power elite in the postwar period in Poland was the intelligentsia class. But while the main issue which brought about the conflict between the working class and the power elite and the peasants and the power elite was the economic degradation of these classes, the conflict between the intelligentsia and the power elite has been rooted in the restriction of freedom. Restriction of freedom of scientific research and the obligatory official ideology imposed by the regime prevented Polish humanities from any real intellectual achievement in Communist Poland.

A turning point in the rather latent conflict between the power elite and the intelligentsia during Stalinism was the publication of

Wazyk's "Poem for Adults" in 1955.⁵⁸ It was this poem which forcefully expressed the disillusion of the Stalinist era of Communism. The author wrote:

They came and cried:
under socialism
a hurt finger does not hurt.
They hurt fingers.
They felt pain . . .
They drink sea-water crying 'lemonade!'⁵⁹

Even if there was some opposition by the intelligentsia to the power elite during Stalinism, Wazyk's poem marked the beginning of an open conflict between these two classes. Its tone, its perceptiveness, its degree of condemnation of the present reality, its disgust and rebellion made the poem the most outspoken cry against the Polish socialist reality. And the poem was understood in exactly this way by both its supporters and its adversaries. The new generation of the intelligentsia perceived it as its manifesto in opposition to the regime. Circles loyal to the Party considered it a blasphemy. Trybuna Wolnosci, organ of the Central Committee of the PZPR, wrote: "Wazyk weighs the lying phraseology, the ideological emptiness and hypocrisy, the empty declaration and old dogmas, which in reality is emptiness of heart and mind . . . This poem is a bad and cruel half-truth."⁶⁰

The non-orthodox sociopolitical ideas have found a fertile soil.

⁵⁸Adam Wazyk was a prewar Polish communist, a soldier in the Eastern front against the Germans and a Party member after the war.

⁵⁹Adam Wazyk, Poem for Adults, op. cit., p. 46.

⁶⁰Trybuna Wolnosci, September 21-27, 1955.

They rooted very quickly. The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU called them "revisionism" and their supporters "revisionists." Revisionists were attacking mainly dogmatism, the tyranny of politics over science and economy. Bienkowski published his "Moon Economy and Earthly Matters."⁶¹ J. Kott criticized the Party line regarding the cultural policy in Poland.⁶² Three periodicals have become the strongholds of the revisionist heresy: Nowa Kultura, Przegląd Kulturalny, and Po prostu. The young revisionists founded a social club "Krzywe Koło" (Crooked Circle) which served as a means of exchanging the new ideas. The club became very popular in a short time. Gomulka's return to power in 1956 with his condemnation of the Stalinist past and the promises for democratization and the redefinition of the Polish-Soviet relations on the basis of equality, received full support of the revisionists. This group, more than anyone else, was aware of what Gomulka publicly acknowledged: "In Poland . . . tragic events occurred when innocent people were sent to their death. Many others were imprisoned . . . although innocent . . . Terror and demoralization were spread."⁶³

However, as soon as Gomulka's regime consolidated its power, it turned against the intellectual revisionists. W. Bienkowski was dismissed as Minister of Education, J. Hochfeld lost his position as director of the Institute of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁴ Censorship was reim-

⁶¹Przegląd Kulturalny, September 28, 1956.

⁶²Nineteenth session of the Polist Writer and Artists, March, 1956.

⁶³Trybuna Ludu, October 21, 1956.

⁶⁴The New York Times, October 30, 1959.

posed. In 1957, it touched most bitterly Po prostu which had become almost a symbol of revisionism. By the middle of 1957, 50 per cent of its content was censored and the weekly was closed down by the end of the same year. Several members of its editorial staff were expelled from the Party. A. Werblan, Party ideologists, said that "in the future, neither time nor money would be wasted on the publication of demoralizing works which do not contribute to the Socialist reconstruction of the state."⁶⁵ During the Party Plenum in 1963, Gomulka himself proposed some guidelines for the intellectuals. "The Party most strongly supports the creativity of Socialist realism . . . Before anything else we support art realistic in form and Socialist in its content of ideas and its relationship to the world and to the fate of men . . ."⁶⁶ Schaff in his "Communism and Humanism" elaborated somewhat on Gomulka's idea. He wrote:

As long as there are enemies of freedom, as long as they are capable of effective fight, so long must various limitations of their freedom be accepted of necessity by Socialist humanism, because it is a fighting humanism. Unlimited freedom for the enemies of freedom as long as they are effectively capable of fighting means more than danger of deviation and excess--it means the certainty of the defeat of the cause of freedom.

Only against this background can one understand the Marxist theory of the state which must go to democracy through dictatorship.⁶⁷

⁶⁵Cited by Lewis Coser, Men of Ideas (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 202.

⁶⁶Nowa Kultura, mid-June, 1963.

⁶⁷Adam Schaff, "Communism and Humanism," World Communism by S. Hook (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1962), p. 240.

The policy of strict censorship increased an antagonism between the power elite and the intelligentsia. In January 1964, during the meeting of the members of the Union of Polish Writers, sharp criticism from the writers was addressed to the Party authority. Two months later, 34 prominent Polish writers and intellectuals sent a "memorandum" to Prime Minister J. Cyrankiewicz. The document criticized Party policy regarding freedom of publications and openly asked for a radical change in the cultural policy. Kuron and Modzelewski said in an open letter to the Party:

Engaged scholars, writers and artists are discriminated against by publishing houses and cultural policy makers. They are denied access to mass media, i.e., the chance to practice their professions: socioliterary periodicals which exhibit even a minimum degree of independence are replaced by publications which are then boycotted by the most eminent creative people; the intensification of censorship narrows down still further the already small margin of professional freedom among the creative intelligentsia. In this way, the ideological crisis becomes the source of a crisis in cultural creativity.⁶⁸

The relationship between the power elite and the intelligentsia has been very tense. As in the cases of the workers' upheavals only a spark was needed to cause an open conflict. That happened in March 1968, when Gomulka, under pressure from Moscow, banished Mickiewicz' play Dziady (Ancestors) because the spectators were applauding anti-Russian phrases. Thereafter students began street manifestation and protests. The police reacted immediately and energetically. Their actions exceeded all decent limits. Beatings, arrests, the stopping

⁶⁸ Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, An Open Letter . . . , op. cit., p. 254.

and searching of people in the streets were normal events. The Communist Party kept a list of students who were later expelled from the universities and many of whom were immediately drafted. Gomulka himself was furious. Poorly educated as he was, he publically criticized and condemned one of the most famous Polish historians, Pawel Jasienica.⁶⁹ Jacienica's books were banished and their author condemned to silence. A ban was also imposed on other prominent writers like Slonimski, Kisielewski, Andrzejewski . . .

As during the workers' upheavals the Party fabricated hundreds of workers' resolutions expressing the indignation of the working class at the student-hooligans and supporting Party policy. Gomulka was referring to those when he said: "It was not against the (real) students, but against the reactionary instigators that the workers were aiming their resolutions . . . It is absurd to maintain that our Party tries or intends to poison workers' minds against students."⁷⁰

The Fifth Congress of the Party also spent a great deal of time and energy on dealing with revisionism. Its final document proclaimed:

The revisionists are questioning the leading role of the workers' class and its basis in favor of the conflicting political forces; they maintain that the dictatorship of the proletariat in a society without the antagonistic classes is completely antiquated . . . They try to obliterate the differences between the bourgeois and Socialist democracies by supplementing socialist institutions with

⁶⁹Gomulka's occupation was that of locksmith. His education did not go beyond the vocational high school.

⁷⁰Argumenty 13 (1968).

bourgeois ones and proclaim an ideological coexistence of socialism and capitalism.⁷¹

The Party ideologist, Werblan, made a list of the names of the most dangerous revisionists: L. Kolakowski, W. Brus, K. Pomian, B. Buczek, Z. Bauman, J. Kott, P. Hertz, and others.⁷² He warned against the revisionists: "A victory of revisionism would bring about the suppressing of the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist Party and in consequence debar it from political power."

Another reason for the criticism of Gomulka's policy by the revisionists at that time was Poland's participation in the military invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact troops in 1968.⁷³ Gomulka was a strong supporter of such a move. So he considered the criticism coming from the revisionists as a slap in his face. He felt bitterly touched by the criticism of the oppositionists intellectuals.⁷⁴

The revisionist intellectuals were considered by Gomulka as his number one enemy. He was in conflict with them during the whole period of being in power. Paradoxically, it was not the revisionists who overthrew him, but the workers of Gdansk, who did it in December 1970. Gomulka's era was closed forever. His career can be characterized

⁷¹Nowe Drogi 12 (1968), p. 125.

⁷²Andrzej Werblan, "Przyczynek do genezy konfliktu," Miesiecznik Ljteracki 6 (1968), p. 63.

⁷³Ibid., p. 62.

⁷⁴Gomulka had an inferiority complex because of his low education. It manifested often in showing him to be an expert in almost everything:

briefly in the following way: Gomulka was one of those few people who started their political career with such greatness, but ended it so disgracefully.

Gierek has never condemned Golumka's 1968 repressive measures regarding the students and revisionists. The beginning of his leadership marked, however, some symptoms which were promising a change in the cultural policy of the power elite. A high party official, Krasko, said: "The Party has understood that the arts cannot be forced to do this or that and this opens possibilities for more intellectual freedom."⁷⁵ In the name of the so-called dialogue between the Party and the nation, some steps of liberalization were undertaken. Censorship still operated full time, but several authors were again allowed to publish. Kisielewski, referring to that Party policy said that the Party was more interested in finding support for its policy than in "providing a fertile milieu for the development of genuinely superior literature."⁷⁶

In the long run the Party did not intend to guarantee any essential concession. Historical and sociological researchers were watched carefully to keep them within the limits imposed by the regime. The Party's policy was clearly stated by the Politburo member, Szydlak, in 1973, who warned that there have been observed among the writers the tendencies of politics, industry, agriculture, husbandry, and even art and history.

⁷⁵Reuter (Warsaw), March 8, 1981.

⁷⁶Tygodnik Powszechny (Krakow), March 8, 1973.

socio-historical analysis "in the spirit of theories . . . ideologically alien to us."⁷⁷ So, practically, no change in the cultural policy of the ruling has occurred under Gierek's leadership. Every day life contradicted the official statement of a high official of the Party, Tejchma, that in Poland "there is room for both firm acceptance and critical restlessness in literature."⁷⁸

The period after 1976 marked a similar negative policy of the Party toward the intellectuals just as it was during the worst days of Gomulka's regime. Professor Lipinski wrote in his open letter to Gierek: "Censorship falsifies the historical researches when they touch the disgraceful policy of the tsarist Russia (regarding Poland) . . . it drastically deprives the citizens of (any honest) information . . . We have no one newspaper in the country which is worthy of this name, and the radio-television information is simply shameful."⁷⁹

During the Congress of the Polish Writers in 1978, Braun forcefully attacked the Party's policy regarding the cultural intelligentsia. He criticized the role of censorship. The speaker said:

Existing censorship shamefully violates the moral rights of a writer . . . It is censorship which not only determines who is to write in Poland, but also the subject of the writing, and its final version; censorship decides the time and the range of a writing's diffusion and reception, the response to it and the alleged opinion of the readers . . . There are official lists in publishing houses, radio and television stations of the persons deprived of the right to

⁷⁷Trybuna Ludu, January 19, 1973.

⁷⁸Ibid., February 23, 1975.

⁷⁹Edward Lipinski, List otwarty . . . op. cit., p. 10.

publish and so condemned to silence because they are deprived of the right to a professional job . . .⁸⁰

Braun also informed the participants of the search of private homes of writers by the police, the confiscation of papers and private books, the prohibition of contact with other people, arrests, political processes, etc. He finished his speech saying: "this is the social status of the Polish writer today . . ."⁸¹

A similar criticism of the Party's policy concerning cultural life dominated the Congress of the Polish Writers in 1980. Twenty speakers unanimously condemned the Party's policy regarding the rights of the writers in Poland.⁸²

The most acute conflict between the power elite and the intelligentsia took place in 1976, during the so-called debate regarding some amendments to the Polish constitution of 1952. Two amendments were discussed. The first regarded the constitutional recognition of the leading role of the Communist Party in Poland and the second referred to the introduction of the amendment expressing the friendship between the Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union. Mainly the second amendment raised protests and indignation among the large majority of the Polish intelligentsia. Professor Lipinski wrote: "The imposition (on

⁸⁰ Andrzej Braun's speech during the Congress of the Union of the Polish Writers in 1978. See Dziennik Zwiazkowy "Zgoda" (Chicago), July 28-29, 1978.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Dziennik Zwiazkowy "Zgoda", ibid., March 24, 1980.

Poland) of the Soviet system has had many highly negative consequences on our social and moral life, it has been a great misfortune in the history of our nation.⁸³ In the same author's view, the shamefulness of such an amendment was aggravated by the circumstance that it was taking place in a time when almost all Communist parties in the whole world "were detaching themselves from being the supporters of the imperialistic interests of the Soviet Union in favor of their own, national policies."⁸⁴ Bienkowski called this amendment an absurdity which "imposes duties on Poland and its citizens . . . regarding a (foreign) neighbor country."⁸⁵ He accused the Soviet Union of an interference in the Polish affairs so deeply that the "Soviet representative to Poland plays the role of supercensor."⁸⁶ Thus the Polish people look at those who agreed to pass such an amendment with a "repugnance and contempt."⁸⁷ Letters similar to their content were sent from different groups of the intelligentsia and individual persons.

The second amendment also provoked much indignation among the

⁸³Edward Lipinski, *List otwarty . . .*, op. cit., p. 9.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁸⁵Wladyslaw Bienkowski, "List otwarty do Wladz Polski Ludowej w sprawie normalizacji stosunkow ze Zwiazkien Radzieckim." Kultura (Paryz) 4 (1976), p. 103.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, p. 106.

Polish intelligentsia. The Club of the Intelligentsia in Wroclaw wrote that the amendment regarding the constitutional recognition of the leading role of the Communist Party (PZPR) intended "to confirm the priority of the Party over the nation" and therefore, if passed, it "would deny the little bit of democracy which still existed in the country (Poland)."⁸⁸ Andrzejewski sent a letter signed by 101 Polish writers expressing their concerns in connection with the proposed amendments.⁸⁹ The Catholic deputies ZNAK to Polish Parliament (Sejm) did likewise.⁹⁰ Apropos, thirty professors and students of the Catholic University in Lublin wrote:

Passing of the constitutional amendment recognizing the leading role of the Communist Party in the present critical situation would unequivocally identify the responsible force (the Party itself) for hitherto existing negligence in different areas of our social life and it would deepen already existing divisions.⁹¹

As one could foresee, both amendments passed in the Parliament (Sejm), but the amendment regarding the friendship between Poland and the Soviet Union was reworded and approved only in this mild form.

Even if the Polish intelligentsia challenged to some extent the power elite, it was relatively an easy enemy. The power elite could quite easily defeat the challenger by depriving it of its weapons--

⁸⁸"Reakcja Katolików Świeckich," Kultura (Paryż) 4 (1976), p. 108.

⁸⁹Kultura (Paryż) 3 (1976), pp. 28-30.

⁹⁰Ibid., pp. 30-31.

⁹¹List 30 młodszych pracowników naukowych . . ., op. cit., p. 32.

words and ideas--by isolating its members, imprisonment, expulsion from the universities, drafting, etc. The intelligentsia's challenge to the power elite was necessary but not sufficient to bring about some essential change in the country. It took almost 30 years for the intelligentsia to realize that, only a close collaboration with the working class could effectively challenge the powerful political elite in the socialist country. The workers alone did challenge the elite in 1956, 1970, and 1976, but the price the workers paid for the change was disproportionately high in comparison to the concessions they gained. Only after the 1976 insurrection, when the Polish intelligentsia entered into a close collaboration with the leaders of the workers, did they bring about the 1980 change in the Polish society. There is no force which can challenge the powerful political elite in the People's Democracies other than the working class but this class must be provided with the leadership of more enlightened people.

Structural conflict in the People's Democracies is unexplainable on the basis of the Marxian theory of class and class conflict. One must necessarily choose between a recognition of the presence of class and class conflict in the socialist societies and consequently reject Marx' theory, or conversely, one must deny the existence of structural conflict and provide a scapegoat theory of what is happening in these societies. Orthodox Marxists and the Polish Communist propaganda chose the second alternative. This, however, has far-reaching consequences in the policy of every day life. Negation of the structural conflict and lack of the institutionalization of conflict through the

appropriate channels lead to cyclical upheavals of the working class or other social classes. Polish workers' insurrections are the best example of such periodical riots.

A final recapitulation of the working hypotheses from Part One, Chapter II, pages 75-76, requires some revisions of the initial hypotheses. The main correction is needed in regard to the hypothesis number 2 which states that the nationalization of the means of production and large land property has eliminated extreme poverty and extreme wealth in Poland. As it was pointed out in several places of the research, this is true only to a certain extent. The ownership of the means of production only ceases to be the first variable to account for social structure in Poland. Seizure of an absolute political power by the Communist Party has changed only the form of control of the means of production. The power elite does not own the means of production, but it still controls it and controls the distribution of the GNP. Consequently, the power elite controls the entire political, economic, and social life.

In Poland "everything depends on whether you are in favor or out of favor with the Party. Your (social) position, possibilities of scientific work and any social rise depend on it. The Party's ID is the key to your career."⁹²

Additionally, hypothesis number 2 must necessarily be supplemented by other hypotheses which specify how the political power accounts for

⁹²Appendix A, Interview 6, p. 402.

the inequality in Poland, and what the other important variables are which account for class formation in the Polish society. Thus the stress should be laid on hypothesis number 3 which specifies the way in which Party people are better off and how they manage their status (hypotheses numbers 4, 5, and 6). Hypothesis number 7 indicates the other variables which are responsible for class structure in Poland, namely: education, wealth, and social prestige of the occupations. This is supplemented by hypotheses number 8 which stresses the fact that the nonmeritorial basis for class formation brings about the inconsistency of social statuses in Poland.

Specificity of the conflict in the socialist system is stated in hypothesis number 10. The reason why the power elite is a necessary party in every structural conflict in the Soviet-type socialist societies is the totalitarian character of the power elite. Consequently, the power elite imposes itself as an intermediary in the conflict. Doing so it prevents the meeting of the conflictual interests of other classes on the market.

Finally, hypotheses numbers 1, 11, and 12 need some additional emphasis. The first hypothesis needs the stress because in Poland the so-called coexistence of different political parties is simply a fiction created by the Communist Party for propaganda purposes. In Poland the power is not shared. It belongs to the Communist Party. There is no organized political opposition in the country.

Hypothesis 11 needs emphasis too because of the coincidence of the division between the power elite and non-Party people, between believers

and non-believers and between power elite (who are pro Russian) and those for whom the national interest has the highest value. Even if these coincidences might not always be true at the individual level, they are certainly true at the institutional level, i.e., State-Church.

In Poland propaganda serves as a means of social control. Propaganda is absolutely necessary for the system to survive.

As far as the future fate of the socialist societies is concerned, the following predictions could be made on the basis of this study:

1. Because the Soviet-type socialist societies do not know any way to undergo even unsubstantial changes (this has been blocked not only practically, but even constitutionally), cyclical insurrections will be necessary to bring about social change in those societies.
2. At the brink of losing power, the power elite will make all the necessary concessions (verbal and written) to prevent its collapse. Once it overcomes the crisis, the power elite will slowly or immediately withdraw the concessions to assure its stay in power.
3. In order to save its power, the political elite will not hesitate to invite even foreign troops.
4. Any time a crisis occurs, the political elite will need scapegoats to save the face of the system. It is almost a rule that the first secretaries are the first to be sacrificed pro Party bonum.
5. The power elite will not put its officials on trial, or if it does, this will only be a show-trial (another scapegoat), because the trial of one Party's official would have to become the trial of almost all high Party people.
6. The class structure in the socialist societies can never assume purely meritorial character. That would deprive the political elite of the tool of rewarding the unpopular Party membership. Similarly, the vast majority of the population must remain at the poverty level. Procuring daily bread absorbs people and keeps them out of politics. The Party must be an exclusive administrator of privileges to be able to reward Party membership.

7. Economic, political, and social emancipation of the lower classes would inevitably bring about the collapse of the political elite and the system itself.
8. A "Finlandization" of Poland would be possible, but this would imply a substantial change in the power structure in Poland or, at least, a political elite that would be more dedicated to the national cause.

CONCLUSION

Marx' theory of class represents undoubtedly a dichotomous model of social stratification. Possession or exclusion from the ownership of the means of production gives rise to that type of social structure. But even the nineteenth century British society which was used by Marx as a case study did not fit that picture. There were three segments of that society which were "complicating" such a model. First, it was the middle class which neither made a part of the capitalist class nor constituted a part of the proletariat. The individuals of that "class" did not belong to the capitalist class because they were not employing the other people and therefore they were not the capitalist exploiters. But they did not make a part of the proletariat either because, as self-employed, they were not the wage-laborers. Secondly, Marx found it difficult to categorize the "class" of the intellectuals on the basis of the means of production criterion. On the one hand, they were not capitalists because they did not own the means of production or capital, and on the other hand, they could hardly be labelled as proletarians being not involved directly in the productive process. Thirdly, the significant differences in wages could account for different subclasses in the huge proletarian class.

Marx "solved" these difficulties in a rather simplistic way. As for the first difficulty, he acknowledged the existence of the "middle class" but he predicted its disappearance with the maturation of the capitalist system itself. The second difficulty was "solved" by

applying a new criterion of class, i.e., ideology, instead of the ownership of the means of production. Marx categorized the intellectuals as a capitalist class calling them "an ideological class" supporting the capitalists. As far as the third difficulty was concerned, Marx was convinced that capitalist society was polarizing into two poles: a pole of wealth and a pole of misery. The individuals of the misery pole could not differ significantly in regard to wealth for two reasons: the skilled labor which was better paid would disappear with a technical advancement of society when a machine would perform the vast majority of the complicated operations. In consequence, the human labor would be reduced to the simple repetitive actions. Second, given the fact of the chronic unemployment in a capitalist society, the wages of the laborers could hardly be established at a higher level than the value of their labor: that is what is equal to the expense necessary to maintain workers' physical and mental capacity for work.

The predictions Marx made on the basis of this theory never came true. The so-called third class not only did not disappear with a further advancement of capitalism, but it had grown to such an extent that it had become the most numerous class of the modern capitalist society. Similarly Marx' prediction regarding the "emiseration" (Verelendung) of the advanced capitalist societies because of the polarization process toward the opposite poles: misery and wealth vanished. Finally, the skilled labor in the advanced capitalist societies appeared to be more important than ever before.

Marx predictions regarding the future society after the nationaliza-

tion of the means of production appeared equally futile. As it has been shown in the case of Poland, the patterned inequality is reproducing itself in Polish society in spite of the fact that the means of production had been nationalized in Poland. So, unless one literally applies Marx' theory of class, one has to come to a conclusion that the nationalization of the means of production does not necessarily wipe out patterned inequality in a society. This simply means that the nationalization of the means of production can and surely does, at least in the so-called People's Democracies, form another basis for class formation. In other words, as it was shown in the case of Poland, there are other variables than the possession or exclusion from ownership of the means of production which account for class arising in the socialist societies.

The social structure of the modern societies, either socialist or capitalist appeared to be complicated enough so as not to fit the simplistic class model of Marx. In the socialist societies everyone is characterized by the same relations to the means of production. Consequently there are not classes in the Marxian sense in those societies. This, however, does not mean that the social stratification is absent in those societies. Four main variables account for social inequality in the socialist societies, namely, (1) access to political power with new property relations, (2) the division of labor which is expressed mainly in the diversity of occupations, (3) a system of differentiated wages, and (4) the cultural values expressed mainly in a hierarchy of social prestige in occupations.

In Poland, as in other countries of the Peoples' Democracies, the political elite did not grow out of the group structure. Vice versa, it was the political power which significantly influenced the social structure. This fact manifested itself primarily in the policy of the planned economy which requested the changes in the size and numbers of occupational groupings. This is not the same as saying that all forms of social inequality in Poland were determined by political power. Secondly, the new system, while abolishing the legal right of possession of large amounts of private property, has not abolished the right of use this property which officially belongs to the State. Thus those who control the State property (those who possess political power) enjoy special privileges in the distribution of benefits even if they cannot be considered a capitalist class in the sense Marx understood it.

Industrial society, whether socialist or capitalist, is characterized by an advanced division of labor. But this is not what Marx held. In his view, three tenets of the socioeconomic system were inseparably linked: division of labor, private property and exploitation. The problem is, however, that one can hardly see a necessary connection between these three things. The idea of being free to hunt in the morning, to fish in the afternoon, and to raise cattle in the evening, while the means of production are nationalized, goes far beyond any realistic imagination. It is not private property which makes one necessarily a hunter, a shepherd, or a fisherman; contrariwise, being a hunter or a shepherd or a fisherman does not make an owner of private property. Neither is exploitation necessarily related to the private

means of production or the division of labor. Exploitation is easily conceivable where there is no private property. Division of labor does not necessarily include exploitation. It has been pointed out how the system of privileges operates in the socialist societies. This appears to be only another form of exploitation.

Division of labor, a highly developed technology, and the growing body of knowledge imply a highly advanced training, and this enhances the role of schooling in a modern society. Conversely, technological advancement brings about a further division of labor which has its positive impact on the increase of the knowledge itself. Because of their training, the highly skilled people acquire almost a monopoly of some jobs and the less skilled people can hardly compete with them. Similarly, those who have political power control the means of manipulating symbols and slogans, and build ideologies to justify their privileged positions.

Finally, there is the strong impact of the values on the social structure. The system of values changes visibly from one society to another. What, however, is common to the advanced societies is the fact that knowledge and skills are highly valued. Polish society is not an exception. What seems to be more particular to it is a gap between the social prestige of different occupations and the corresponding low wages. This is a consequence of the incentives given the wage manipulation by the power elite, combined with the impact of social values.

Thus the system of stratification in the socialist societies and those of the capitalist societies have some convergent and some diver-

gent points. In both types of societies the occupational system appears to be the backbone of the social stratification. Both societies enhance skills as indispensable factors in the functioning of their economic and social life. This is visibly reflected in the system of the unequal wages. Additionally, the values have their strong impact on the social prestige of the occupations. Social groups of the socialist societies differ from those of the capitalist societies with the legal right of control of the large amounts of private property. This legal right has been abolished in the socialist societies. Instead, the political elite of these societies controls the State property and thus takes advantage of using this property according to its own will. This creates a situation in which the power elite enjoys almost the same lifestyle the high capitalist class enjoys in the capitalist society, despite the fact that they are not legally the owners of the means of production. The impossibility to inherit this property is compensated for by other advantages the capitalists do not have, such as exemptions from taxes on the use of this property and from the expenses connected with the use of it.

The cleavage of political power is one of the most visible peculiarities of the stratification in the socialist countries. The power elite is exclusively constituted by the Party people. And even if there is a growing number of the educated people among the Party elite, education never was a necessary and sufficient condition to move up to this class. A conditio sine qua non of belonging to this class is a total conformity with the Party line. All other requirements are secondary

and unnecessary. The fundamental difference between the power elite and the Party people of the lower social classes consists in the fact that, while the other people occupy their social positions mainly because of their professional skills and education, and the Party channel is only a secondary source of their social advancement, the careers of the power elite are totally linked to the Party. The Party promotes them, takes care of them, protects them and gives them privileges in exchange for total conformity to the Party.

The second important aspect of the social structure in the socialist societies is a visible split between the professionals and the lower white-collar workers. It is a class of skilled manual workers which follows the intelligentsia class and the white-collar workers occupy the lower position. While in the Western societies the white-collar workers enjoy a higher status than skilled physical workers, in the socialist societies this position is occupied by the skilled manual workers. This is due to the system of wages and the entire policy of the power elite in the socialist system. The established professions, however, retain their high statuses.

The third important cleavage in the structure of the Polish society is a recent change in the prestige of private farmers. For a long time in history the peasants were considered the lowest class in the Polish society. Today, the unskilled manual workers occupy this position. This change was caused by two factors. First, there is a growing number of the educated people who remain in the villages. This helps to remove the stigma attached to the peasants as the less educated people.

Secondly, the acute food crisis in Poland in the last decade had its positive impact and fostered the growth of the farmers' prestige in the country.

As has been presented before, four variables, namely, political power, education, income and the social prestige of the occupations give rise to a six-fold class structure in the Polish postwar society. The classes are: political elite (power elite), intelligentsia, skilled manual workers, white-collar workers, farmers, and unskilled manual workers. The cleavage of the Party membership is present at every level of social classes but the proportion of the Party to non-Party people varies from very low at the level of the private farmers to 100 per cent at the level of the power elite. This means that all social positions which imply political power are occupied exclusively by the Party people.

As Marx' theory of class appeared to be useless in explaining the patterned inequality in the postwar Polish society, it is equally useless in explaining the structural conflict in the socialist societies. Having attributed the class conflict to the conflict of the economic interests of the capitalist class and those of the proletariat, Marx logically concluded that the abolition of the private means of production would bring about elimination of the structural conflict. But as it has been shown above, this is not what had happened in Poland. After the nationalization of the means of production, a new class (power elite) has been established. The new class controls all aspects of social, political and economic life in the society. Because of that

totalitarian power, the new class necessarily enters into conflict with other classes. While the other classes may change as a part in a conflict, the power elite is always one of the parties. It is inconceivable that a structural conflict between two classes in the Socialist societies would occur unless the power elite is involved as one party in that conflict. This does not mean that the other classes have no particular interests opposite to the interests of other classes. This is only to say that the conflictual interests of other classes do not meet directly because there is always the power elite which imposes itself as an intermediary in the conflict.

The Communist regimes of the Peoples' Democracies deny the existence of the structural conflict in the socialist societies. Non-recognized social conflict is not institutionalized through adequate channels and therefore in the eyes of the power elite need not be dealt with. This has far-reaching consequences in the social life. Denied conflict manifests itself in cyclical riots and upheavals among the lower social classes, which every so often are deprived of a part of what they had already possessed. This has to be stressed very strongly. Polish workers' upheavals did not hope to gain anything, but to preserve what they had already possessed and of which the power elite intended to deprive them.

The Polish workers' insurrections are surely challenges to the power elite. They have always been understood in this way by the political class. But they have also a positive influence on the ruling class. The socialist system does not know any other way to bring about

any, even an unsubstantial change. The workers' insurrections force the power elite to replace some of its personnel which would be absolutely impossible without this type of conflict. The 1980 strikes even brought about an institutional change with a foundation of the Free Trade Union. The Russian political elite is the best example of a lack of change where only natural death brings about minimal change in a Party personnel.

Polish postwar sociopolitical reality disproves Marx' theory of social classes and structural conflict. But it also shows the inability of the political elite to control the masses. If it is true that the

supreme and the most insidious exercise of power is to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial,¹

the Communist regime of the Soviet societies in general, and the Polish Communist regime in particular, do not possess such capacities. They surely are unable to completely control events and to be an exclusive force determining the future fate of these societies. It is important to stress, as Lane points out, that in Polish society different "groups are able to articulate more or less opposing views which rationalize their different interests, despite the unifying objective of the official ideology."²

¹S. Lukes, Power and Radical View (London: The McMillan Press, 1970), p. 24.

²David Lane, The End of Inequality?, op. cit., p. 106.

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A P P E N D I C E S

Appendix A

INTERVIEWS

I. Interview with Dr. Lukasz Czuma (Economist)

(Lublin, May 30, 1980)

1. Question: I am interested in the conflict within the Polish society which is of various dimensions. You, as an economist, can see it in the economic dimension. Could you present some data on this subject?

Answer: Stressing that I speak only about the economic dimension of the conflict in the Polish society (it has its ideological, religious, and social dimensions as well), I would like to turn attention to what has been published in statistical yearbooks. I have here the Statistical Yearbook of 1979. Its first chapter contains data on the socio-economic development of the country. I would like to emphasize two sets of indices: the first of them deals with production, particularly the industrial one; the second set refers to the standard of living of the population.

As far as industrial production is concerned, Poland ranks tenth in the world. Using the 1950 index as a base of 100 (when the production was equal to that in 1938, i.e., in the last year before World War II), the 1970 national income was seven times higher. Steel production increased nine times; electrical energy--ten times; production of cement--eight times. Moreover, in 1978, coal production per head was 5.5 tons; this gave us the highest ranking in the world. At the same time in the USA the index was 2717 kg, and in RFN--1416 kg. A similar situation could be observed in the cement production per capita in 1978: in Poland--618 kg; in RFN--565 kg, and in the USA--329 kg. Production of electrical energy in Poland is equal to that in France.

Now, let us look at the dynamics of investment in the years 1950-

1978. When we take the index of accumulation in 1950 for 100, by 1978 it was twelve times higher. However, and this is very important point, while net investment in fixed capital accounted for 80% of all investment, only 20% of it was allocated to the sphere of consumption.

2. Question: Before we come to the standard of living indices, I would like to ask you one more question. On one hand, Poland is ranked very high in the world when the production of coal, cement, and electrical energy is concerned. Then, how can chronic shortages of these goods on our domestic market be explained?

Answer: We can only speculate on this subject since no official data is available; but the fact remains that, for instance, half of the population (rural population) faces serious troubles when it is necessary to buy coal which is the basic fuel.

3. Question: And what are the standard of living indices like?

Answer: When we take into account, for instance, the number of hospital beds (100,000 in 1950, which had risen to 195,000 by 1978), their number increased by about 90%, and not 200% or 300% as in many other countries. In the years 1950-1978, real wages increased by several dozen per cent. In this case the data can be easily manipulated, because the increase in cost of living is calculated by the State and not by independent institutions. Leaving aside this possibility, we can see that while in the years 1950-1978, nominal wages increased eight times, real wages increased only slightly, and in the years 1950-1955, they even dropped. Please note that no statistical yearbook reported data on the increase in real wages in the years 1951-1955. The reason is very simple. During that period real wages dropped by 5% annually. These data were published unintentionally in the book of Litkiewicz in 1970. Moreover, the scientific organ of the COMECON, "Mirovaja Ekonomika i Miedzunarodnoye Otnoszeniye" (World Economy and International Relation), stated in August 1972, that in the years 1950-1970, real wages in Poland increased only by 19%, while national income increased five times.

The dynamics of the increase of real wages after 1956, is also significant. In 1956, the increase of real wages was strong since it amounted to 11.6%, in 1957--8.3%, in 1958--3.3%, in 1959--5.1%, but in 1960, real wages decreased. If we take the index in 1950 for 100, the level of the index in 1960, was 98.5%. This economic situation was accompanied by social and political events in the country. The riots and the assumption of power by Gomulka in 1956, were followed by a significant increase in real wages; in 1957, the situation within the country was still unstable. In 1958, real wages increased only by 3.3%, and in 1960, the new regime felt safe enough to encourage the decrease of real wages by 1.5% as compared to 1959.

I want to stress that in the above mentioned years there was no economic stagnation, since national income increased by nearly 10% both in 1958 and 1959, no effect of great investments or international crisis. My thesis is very simple. An increase in real wages depends on to what degree the regime controls the events. When Gomulka took power in 1956, he increased real wages, but as soon as his regime felt secure, it allowed only a slight increase in real wages: 1960--1.5%, 1961--2.6%, 1962--0.4%, and so on until 1970. Practically it was no increase at all.

Again, when Gierek and Jaroszewicz came to power, real wages started to increase and their dynamics were similar to that in the late 1950s: 1971--6%, 1972--6.2%, 1973--8.7%, 1974--6.6%, 1975--8.5%. When society calmed down, the rate of growth of real wages was slowed down to such an extent that in 1978, real wages decreased by 0.7% as compared to the previous year. Thus we can see that there is a clear regularity in this respect.

4. Question: In the context of what you have said, what is the place of Poland in the world and Europe as regards the standard of living?

Answer: Before I make some comparisons of the standard of living between Poland and other countries, I would like to stress the discrepancy between the increase of national income and the standard of living

of the population. While the GNP was increasing at fair rates, the standard of living was not improving proportionally to that growth.

Let us now compare some indices of standard of living in Poland with those of other countries. Let us begin with the mortality rate of infants. In this sphere Poland (with a high mortality rate) ranks very low, lower even than Greece, which was a country less industrialized than Poland before the War (Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 480). Among the socialist countries, only the Soviet Union has an index of higher infant mortality.

Index of housing: The area of the apartments built in 1977 in Poland was 485 m^2 per 1000 people, while in Belgium the index was 1200 m^2 , i.e., 2.5 times that of Poland. At that time, the index in Spain was 755 m^2 , and in the USSR 416 m^2 . As far as the structure of the apartments is concerned, in the USA only 6% of flats constituted one and two-room apartments and five-room and larger flats accounted for 60%. In Poland, one and two-room flats account for 40%, three and four-room flats for 54.4%, and five-room and larger flats accounted only for 7% of all the apartments. Even in Portugal five-room and larger flats account for 21% of the total and one and two-room flats only for 24% of all. It is necessary to add that the standardized flats in Poland are composed of 'cages' of $5-7 \text{ m}^2$.

Passenger cars: In 1975 there were 500 cars per 1000 people in the USA and only 32 in Poland. This level in the USA was reached in 1916, and in the years 1950-1960 in Greece and Portugal.

Telephones: In 1975, there were in the USA nearly 700 receivers per 1000 people and in Poland the index was seventy five. This gave us one of the lowest ranks in Europe.

Aircraft production: In aircraft production we rank sixth in the world, but by an irony of fate, in air transport, we are on the same level as Nigeria. Nearly 90% of helicopters and 89% of airplanes is exported from Poland to the USSR.

Merchant vessels: Poland ranks tenth in the world in the production of merchant vessels, but only twentieth when the size of the fleet is concerned, since 70% of the vessels produced in Poland is exported

to the USSR.

Production of meat: In 1970, Poland produced 90 kg of meat per person which was more than in RFN, Italy, Spain, France, and Japan, but we suffered chronic shortages of meat.

5. Question: Professor, the socialist system boasts of the introduction of egalitarian wages. How does this vocational 'equality' look in Poland?

Answer: A majority of people has egalitarian incomes, i.e., the differences between the incomes of a factory worker and those of a university professor are not very large. This is true for about 65% of the citizens. There are, however, two margins: the margin of poverty and wealth. It is claimed that in socialism those who work make a sufficient amount of money to live on. When somebody has no resources, it means that he either wasted money or did not work to earn it. The problem of wasting money cannot be questioned. This is a committed poverty. However, besides those who waste their money, the social margin comprises also about 75% of pensioners. Their pensions are below the social minimum. Additionally, the families with two or more children also live on the brink of the social minimum. In Poland, the subsistence level (social minimum) is calculated at 2000 zlotys monthly (by social minimum I mean one coat for ten years, one suit for five years, one shirt for a year and a minimum of food). A family with an average income of 7000 zlotys a month (a husband--4000 zlotys, and a wife--3000 zlotys) does not reach that quota. When a family has two children, for example, then income per head in this family drops below the social minimum. In such a case, family allowance of 100 or 150 zlotys for a child is completely insignificant. The increase of family allowance from 95 zlotys to 100 zlotys a month for a child is nothing more than a symbol.

In Poland, as in other socialist countries, there is also the margin of wealth--people with incomes a dozen times higher than the egalitarian incomes of blue or white-collar workers. These incomes take the form of bonuses like villas or flats for a symbolic rent, coupons for cars, which can be sold at double price, attractive holi-

days for a trivial fee, monetary bonuses, coupons entitling one to very cheap means in a restaurant or mess-room and so on.

6. Question: It seems, from what you have said, that in the socialist countries the system of bonuses divides the society into the poor and the extremely rich people, and that the system is unjust.

Answer: Some time ago, I read in the Russian periodical Krokodil that somebody said during the meeting of the workers' committee: "Since we have already decided who is to be given the premium, let's now think about the reason for which he got it." This applies, I think, to all the so-called People's Democracies. The next joke, which circulated for a time, characterizes very well the system of bonuses, functioning in Poland: "Director," asked a reporter, "what did you buy with your last bonus?" "A Fiat 125," answered the director. "And what did you do with the rest of the bonus?" "I went with my wife to the Canary Islands." When a worker was asked the same questions, he answered to the first: "I bought tennis shoes for myself." "And what about the rest of the money?"--a reporter insisted. "Oh, my wife lent me the rest of it,"--was the worker's answer.

7. Question: The socialist system boasts of overcoming unemployment. Has unemployment been controlled in this system?

Answer: In the socialist system, unemployment is a pretty complicated problem. Its decrease is due largely to the replacement of capital with labor. Moreover, it assumes a different, disguised character.

8. Question: Some time ago, I read about a low level of sanitary conditions of work and non-compliance with security norms in many Polish factories. Is it true?

Answer: The data referring to this field is usually not published. That obscures the picture. Nevertheless, the problem exists. In my paper "Karl Marx on Personal Costs in the Period of Industrialization of the 19th Century England," I pointed out that in the period of heavy accumulation of capital in the 19th century, the industrial-

ization process, the consumption of many products, especially meat and goods satisfying basic needs, was being limited. At that time, women and children were being employed, and emigration was blocked... The conditions of work and job hygiene were horrible. Exactly the same problems can be observed in Poland today.

9. Question: The socialist system has had no achievements in agriculture. What is, in your opinion, the situation in Polish agriculture?

Answer: There are two types of farms in Poland: socialized and private. In the socialized farms, the State invests about 20,000 zlotys per hectare of arable land annually. An average individual farmer invests ten times less, i.e., 2000 zlotys. And what are the results? In the socialized farms, the production per one hectare is lower than that in private holdings. That proves, on one hand, the discrimination against the private farmers, and on the other hand, that the socialized farms have been incompetently and inefficiently run. Usually, tractors are not sold to private farmers. Those who have them, bought them with foreign currencies, but not all the farmers have their relatives in the capitalist countries.

10. Question: Obviously, the economic structure is an important factor in the division of society into social classes. Could you give me more precise data on the composition of these classes in Poland?

Answer: Such researches have not been carried out in our country. I tried to do this some time ago, but I faced insurmountable difficulties. I would like to note, however, that in my opinion, it is incorrect to talk about a group of well-prospering handicraftsmen. It is true that such people exist, but they constitute only a small fraction of the whole population. The privileged group of State functionaries, the professional military, militia functionaries, i.e., all those who occupy more important posts in the society, is much more numerous.

11. Question: The wage policy in Poland seems strange to me; especially visible are discrepancies between social prestige of a pro-

fession and the wages earned from it.

Answer: You are right. Teachers are a classical example. This profession still enjoys high social prestige. It seems to be historically conditioned, since they have always been considered the truth spokesmen. Now, look at this absurd fact. An eighteen-year-old graduate from a basic vocational school can earn more than his highly educated teacher with many years of professional practice.

12. Question: Do you think that economic differences between various social groups are decisive for class formation and conflict in Poland?

Answer: Yes, I do. Today, in Poland, these differences are known to everybody. However, structural conflict is not recognized and so not allowed to be discussed. This conflict, though not recognized officially, reveals itself occasionally in the form of bloody riots and uprisings.

Thank you, Professor!

II. Interview with Dr. Adam Stanowski (Sociologist)

(Lublin, May 31, 1980)

1. Question: Professor, you are a sociologist. As far as I know, you are also a social worker. What does your social activity consist of?

Answer: First, I am considered a Catholic social worker, although to tell the truth, I do not know what that means. Besides, I am a member of the Association of Learned Courses, i.e., an independent organization of an educational, academic character, and I participate occasionally in other social events.

2. Question: Has this type of activity drawn you, Professor, to opposition to the Party?

Answer: It seems to me that in our opposition we have to distin-

guish three trends represented by three different groups. The first trend represents the whole set of problems connected with the demands of democratization, liberalization of the system, citizen rights. The whole sphere of the activity of the Association of Learned Courses (ALC) is connected with these problems. The Democratic Left stresses the second trend which consists of the postulates of egalitarianism which in their opinion is not sufficiently realized, and of the workers-peasants' emancipation postulate. Finally, the third trend brings into the foreground the postulates related to the international situation of Poland, that is, full independence. I want to be precise at this point. When I talk about the three groups I take only the problem of emphasis into account. The whole opposition realizes very well that these three groups of postulates are inseparably linked together. The realization of any of them is conditio sine qua non for others.

3. Question: Are you, Professor, so to say, "a born social worker" or did you realize later in life that this was your vocation?

Answer: I was engaged in various forms of social, religious, and, during the War, military activities since my youth. In the years 1945-1950, I was involved in the student organizations for which I paid with imprisonment. I was sentenced to ... years, out of which I spent ... years and ... months in prison.

4. Question: Talking about your imprisonment, how long did your trial last?

Answer: Only a few days. The trial was open to the public. There were five people judged during this trial. My sentence was among the lowest. We were charged with the "attempt to overthrow the system by force through impairing its ideological foundations..." After the thaw of 1956, I was a member of the "Znak" or rather the "Old Znak" movement. I am also a member of the editorial staff of the Wież monthly. The evolution of my views and attitudes has put me among radical Catholic democrats.

5. Question: I am particularly interested in the workers demon-

strations in Poland after World War II. To what extent, in your opinion, can these demonstrations be described as a "movement"? Or, in other words, were they a "cry of despair" or was there an element of organization in them?

Answer: With one exception, they were an expression of despair. There were three or four greater demonstrations: two of them in Poznan, in 1956, June and October, one in 1970 in the seacoast towns, and one in 1976 in Ursus and Radom; individual and isolated strikes have become a normal phenomenon. The demonstrations in Poznan were the only organized demonstrations out of those mentioned above. In other cases, these were only reactions to a new situation which was found to be an attempt to burden the working class with the results of the economic crisis. The "movement" developed, practically, in the course of events. A friend of mine, who, at the time of the riots of 1970 was a deputy and a member of the diet commission for internal affairs and jurisdiction, told me that there was the following phrase in the speech of General Szlachcic, the man was responsible for this resort: "We were surprised at the ability of the working class for rapid activities improvised in the course of events." I consider it characteristic that the "movement" has quickly spread beyond the limits of the environment in which it was created. And thus, in 1970, the workers of Lodz went on strike in solidarity with the workers from the seacoast. The workers from Nowa Huta, who threatened to put out the fire under big blast-furnaces, are said to constitute the decisive factor for the capitulation of the authorities, the change of the ruling group and the attempt to find new solutions.

6. Question: Can you say that today, ten years after the December riots and four years after the demonstrations in Ursus and Radom, the workers can organize themselves better?

Answer: It is difficult to answer this question, or at least it is difficult for me. Perhaps other people are better informed than I am. I have no clear basis for saying that in this sphere there is an essential change in the form of new important structures. However, we

may ask what it looks like in the sphere of consciousness. It seems to me that there is an important change in this sphere. The essence of this change consists in the accumulated experience. The previous experiences, both negative and positive, domestic and those from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, are taken into account at every future riot. I am fully convinced that the demonstrations of 1970, could have led to a change in the structure of power if it were not for the fact that the workers did not want to push their demands too far. The latter was not due to their identification with the power, but to their fear of the Russian intervention. Besides, at least in the last four years, the workers have access to the independent publications such as Robotnik (The Worker), and Bratniak (The Brother). They influence the workers. Finally, we can observe the formation of new permanent structures. This is something new, which originated after 1976. I think about KOR--the Committee for the Workers' Defense, created after the events in Ursus and Radom.

Two types of oppositionist activities could be observed in the years 1948-1976. On one hand, there were underground activities, on the other, there were the activities within the existing structures created or, at least, accepted by the authorities. The new element introduced by the KOR is the open structure not accepted by the authorities. In my opinion, it is not an illegal institution because it is the norms which do not allow such an activity that are illegal. This is the reason why the authorities have not tried to destroy these forms of the opposition, and have not punished people for such activities. Repressions against the oppositionist activist were either of non-legal character or acquired the form of punishment for petty crimes. The authorities realize that the defense would accuse the State of breaking human rights. So, the workers and intelligentsia do not ask for the permission for this type of activity but lead this activity in an open way. The Independent Trade Unions, created two years ago, constitute one of the forms of such an activity. Repressions against such an organization would strike the authorities themselves, because they signed the Declarations of Human Rights, and because Poland is a member

of the International Labor Organization.

7. Question: The Polish Marxists deny the existence of a structural conflict in Polish society. May the events mentioned above, in your opinion, Professor, be considered the symptom of this type of a conflict?

Answer: If in the conflict there is the elite of power on one hand and on the other, the working class, then, ex definitione we should consider this conflict to be the structural one. It does not belie the fact that the structural conflict can be closely connected with another conflict, such as a political or ideological one. For instance, during the December events the workers marched along the streets of Gdynia and sang by turns the "International" and the religious Polish anthem "Boze cos Polske." On one hand, by singing the "International" they pointed to the structural conflict because it meant that the present Polish situation has little to do with the promises in the text of the "International"; on the other hand, they expressed the ideological and political conflict because of the meaning of this religious anthem. Besides, for many years people have been convinced that the workers problem can be solved only in free Poland. Thus, it is almost impossible to separate these two conflicts.

8. Question: Do you think that the methods employed by the authorities to solve the conflict were similar in every case, or did they take various forms?

Answer: Before answering this question I would like to stress that in 1956, the situation was much more complicated than in the other events. However, the way they solved the conflict was similar to other cases. It was done in three stages.

At the first stage, the authorities tried to compromise the demonstrations describing them as the "hooligans' riots." They said that what was going on had nothing to do with the working class which loves the Party, and that the Party loves the working class. The hooligans and the agents of imperialism made use of the events and organized the riots. The Party reacted to this with brutal repressions. In 1956, in

Poznan, this reaction lasted for a shorter time than in the other insurrection.

In the second phase of solving the conflict, the authorities admitted that there actually were reasons for discontent and for demonstrations by the working class because some individuals and a part of the ruling group had made mistakes. The whole blame is put on these people. In consequence, these people or this group is removed and, it is supposed, that the problem is solved. Incidentally, this solution was applied also during the last events. It was done, however, with a four-year delay. In Radom and Ursus, the capitulation of the authorities standing face to face with the postulates of the workers was instantaneous, but at the same time repressions were directed against the activists. The manner in which these people were repressed was different. In Ursus, the actual leaders were called to account for events and the falsification the authorities aimed at during the trial consisted in the fact that they tried to present those people as hooligans, while they actually were the best workers and the leaders. In Radom, everything was the opposite. The real hooligans were called to account, but they had little to do with the events. Of course, there was something they could be charged with, but these were only marginal things. So, the second phase is the one in which the authorities withdraw, try to soothe the political postulates by the removal of the ruling group, i.e., the people personally responsible for the errors, and, if necessary, they make some changes.

The third phase is one of doing away with the dangerous changes. In fact, it is the phase of turning back to the former state of affairs. (It is necessary to note that we are still at the stage of the events which took place in the West in the 19th century, i.e., the working class is fighting for its basic rights, and particularly for the right of better workers' organization). The problem in Poland is that workers are still deprived of Trade Unions. This is accompanied by repressions spread over a long time and thoroughly disguised, which consist in curtailing some people in positions in which they were or could be dangerous, and by withdrawing granted concessions. That could

be easily observed in 1976, since during the following four years the authorities managed to realize about 80% of the plans they tried to carry out in 1976. This withdrawal took the form of disguised price increases.

Here, we should add one more thing. All the demonstrations mentioned above did not aim at getting something more for the working class. These were only defensive reactions against the policy of depriving people of what they already possessed.

9. Question: It has become almost a rule that revolution "devours" its own children. Do you think, Professor, that these patterns will be repeated in the future?

Answer: When we talk about devouring one's own children, I would like to stress strongly that it is Khrushchev who made a great contribution to the system in humanitarian categories. It was he who introduced the mechanism of changing the ruling elite without any physical destruction of its members. While before Khrushchev, nobody who had been removed from the leadership stayed alive, after Khrushchev the individuals were not done away with after their removal from the power elite. (Here, I think only about the Soviet Union, and not about China or Cambodia). So, the system actually sacrifices the people. It happens so because the system does not know other methods of changing the leadership. In this case, a crisis is the conditio sine qua non of any change. For instance, in 1965, or 1966, everybody knew that Gomulka was unable to rule. However, there was no method, procedure or formula for changing the group without a crisis. The only solution was natural death, which led to a situation in which the power had been in the hands of a complete sclerotic for many years. Otherwise a shock was necessary. That is why crises became popular.

Finally, I would like to add that I do not question the price regulation at all. Especially, when it refers to the foodstuff in Poland. It is an inevitable process. But again, price increases must be compensated for in some way. In 1976, the only compensation for the increase of prices in articles satisfying basic needs was a decrease of

prices in some luxury items. This is no compensation for an average worker's family. It gives us nothing when the price of a color TV set is lowered, while the prices of butter and meat go up by 80%! These are fatal errors. It is the burdening of the working class and poorest people with the effects of the crisis. Unfortunately, that is what our reality looks like!

Thank you, Professor, for the interview.

III. Interview with Lech Walesa (Chairman of the strikers in 1970, and the President of the Independent Trade Union "Solidarity" since fall, 1980)

(Gdansk, June 20, 1980)

1. Question: Before entering into a formal conversation, could you tell me something about yourself?

Answer: My name is Lech Walesa. Professionally, I am a motorcar electromechanic. At present, I am unemployed because I have lost my job in Elelekromontaz after founding the workers' commission in this institution. It is the third time that I lost my job without any reason, since I had worked before in ZREMB and in the Shipbuilding Yard. Now, I decided not to take up another job until my present situation is cleared up.

2. Question: Do you get any unemployment benefit?

Answer: I do not get any state benefit, but my organization, the Church and my friends support me.

3. Question: How did it happen that you found yourself in the opposition? Was it an unexpected vocation or did it accumulate as time went on?

Answer: My oppositionist activity started in 1968, when I began to cooperate with students in their March demonstrations. However, it was a loose cooperation, for the workers did not join the students,

due to a lack of organization and cooperation between these two groups. I started to operate more actively in December, 1970, when the workers elected me to their strike committee. This committee was dissolved by the secret police within twenty-four hours. The secret police took us one by one and strongly forbade any activity, threatening us and our families with repressions. And thus, two friends of mine got terrified and stopped their oppositionist activity.

4. Question: What do you primarily contest in your opposition to the State?

Answer: For me, the most irritating facet of our society is our two-class legal system. In my opinion, in Poland, most people are bound by the legal norms and have to obey them. At the same time, there is a caste of people who are above the law. I fight that the law bind everyone equally, although the law is not perfect in many cases. Therefore, I am always in conflict with the existing system, and I lose even evident cases.

5. Question: You mean that existing Polish law might be acceptable if it applied to all people in the same way?

Answer: Yes. It is necessary to add, however, that there is an unwritten law applied by the secret police. The situation is such that even the mayor of a city may, sometimes, issue legal norms incompatible with the Constitution.

6. Question: Do you think that there are wage inequalities in Poland?

Answer: There is no doubt about that. One cannot hide it. I am not able to say from where some people get their money, but I know that there are inequalities. I cannot say that somebody has inherited or stolen his money. On the other hand, it is obvious that when a driver earns 9 zlotys an hour, it is not enough for him to live, no matter how little he spends. It is obvious for me that such a driver must steal. The authorities know about it, and they accept it as long as the man is submissive.

7. Question: Isn't that an intentional policy so that when there is a need, the man can be blackmailed?

Answer: It seems to me that the system fits this scheme. It is planned. I say so from my experience, since up to now they have been trying to find out if I committed any "crime." Fortunately, I did nothing wrong because my wages were satisfactory.

8. Question: Have you ever been taken into custody by the police?

Answer: Since 1968, I have been arrested 78 times for 48 hours, and in total I was arrested 150 times. I keep a record of my arrests.

9. Question: What do the interrogations by the police look like?

Answer: Until 1974, the interrogations were rather brutal. They did not reckon with us. It terrified me. So, I did not engage in any radical demonstrations in order to avoid possible troubles. Fortunately, I have not made any serious mistakes. However, I was deceived by smooth-tongued interrogators, their talk about objective troubles and unavoidable mistakes in the period of the formation of power. My task was only not to interfere. Frankly speaking, I believed in this at that time. Therefore, in 1970, I tried to avoid acute conflicts, although, as a member of the Workers' Committee, I had to deal with some problems brought to me by the workers. At the same time, my hands were tied with the phrase "We will help." We promised this help to the authorities during the memorable meeting with Gierak in 1971. Today, I understand, however, that it was a trap. It happened because our people, even if devoted to the workers' cause, had a too "soft heart." During that meeting the workers were aggressive, until the Minister of Internal Affairs, Szlachcic, appeared. At first, it looked as if he was not to get out of the meeting alive. When Szlachcic started to talk, he began to play on our feelings, then he started to cry. He cried as if he were an eleven-year-old child. Later he said: "As you know, I was nominated to the post of the Minister of Internal Affairs. From now on a Pole will not shoot at a Pole. Besides, do we have to

ask someone else to rule over us? Is anybody among you to rule? Tell me, who would be able to solve the conflict? Poland is at the brink of economic bankruptcy." When, as the third in turn, I was allowed to speak, I was ready for concessions. I simply felt pity for them. In my opinion, Gierek was the strongest candidate, everything pointed to him as the best choice. Others underwent a similar metamorphosis. So, when Gierek asked us "Will you help?"--we said at once "We will."

10. Question: Are you still helping?

Answer: I helped, or at least did not interfere, up to 1974, that is to the moment when I found that something was going wrong, that everything turned back to the old methods. Since that moment, I have engaged again in oppositionist activity. I must admit, however, that I faced many difficulties then, since people looked terrified and disheartened. I started to act very cautiously. I managed to get to the Divisional Trade Unions, and then found that we were coming back to the before-December methods, that we still lacked true Trade Unions, that everything we had been told earlier was only an empty promise. My speech was received with cheering by the workers. I was unanimously elected a delegate to the factory conference. After the meeting, I was called by the secret police and they told me either not to attend the conference, or not to rise to speak during the conference. They proposed to give me a considerable sum of money for this. I did not accept the proposal. I decided to attend the conference and I told them I would be even more radical than before. They threatened me with the loss of my job. They proposed to send me to another section of the factory. I did not agree to that. Then, on March 19, 1976, I lost my job, but at that time I said there would be another strike. I was right because the strike started two months later.

11. Question: Do you believe that you will win that battle?

Answer: Yes, I do believe. That situation cannot last much longer.

Thank you for your interview, and good luck!

IV. Interview with Franciszek Grabczyk (An engineer and oppositionist)

(Krakow, June 27, 1980)

1. Question: Before entering into a formal conversation, could you tell me something about yourself?

Answer: My name is Franciszek Grabczyk. I am a metallurgist engineer. I worked as an engineer for many years. My first job was in the "Batory" steelworks, since my scholarship was granted by that factory. Then, I worked in the "Lenin Steelworks," and three years ago I was laid off in consequence of the reduction in employment. For some time I was unemployed. At present I work in "Zaslawice" brick-yard as a manual worker. The work is very hard, but I am glad because my wages are rather good.

2. Question: You mentioned that you had lost your job. Was there any reason for that?

Answer: The official reason was, as I said, the reduction of employment. In fact, I was dismissed because I did not conform to the instruction of stopping any "pseudo-social" activity. My activity in the factory consisted in gathering those who expressed their dissatisfaction with the existing conditions. In good part it was connected with the so-called "cumbersome" truth about the events of 1976, in Poland. We sent a letter to the State authorities concerning this problem. The letter was signed by many engineers and technicians.

3. Question: How many persons were dismissed at that time within the mentioned "reduction" of employment?

Answer: I was the only person laid off. In fact, there was no reduction of employment in this factory. There were only changes of posts. In my case, they applied a "second reduction" and I was dismissed. I appealed against this decision to the District Council, the Mediator Committee whose chairman is a judge of the Provincial Court. I won my case there. My factory, however, appealed in turn to the Dis-

trict Court in Cracow where I lost. I have a grudge against the court because it refused to examine the witnesses for my case. The court confined itself to interrogating the witnesses presented by the factory. My other appeals to higher authorities and to the Diet did not help. And thus, for instance, the Supreme Court replied: "The extent to which the District Court broke the law is not great enough to qualify the case to be re-examined." Thus my attempts to review the case were dismissed. At present, I am helpless. It seems to me that many people find themselves in such a situation. At present, I have recovered, but there were critical moments in my life, which I could neither understand nor explain. It is easier for me to bring it to mind now, than it was to go through it.

4. Question: Has your oppositionist activity been the passion of your life, or was it a sudden discovery at some stage of your life?

Answer: First, it was not a sudden discovery. Second, it is not correct to say that I am in the opposition. I simply try to be myself in my life. Obviously, it is the process of accumulating, growing and collecting experience, and it started in my childhood.

5. Question: Can we call the events of 1956, those in the sea-coast region in 1970, and those in Radom and Ursus in 1976, to mention only the most important ones, the "workers' movement," if by the movement we understand something which is better organized and not only a "cry of despair" or the reaction of the crowd?

Answer: It is clear for me that the Polish society has undergone very essential changes as far as its socio-political consciousness is concerned. This consciousness became mature both within the intelligentsia and the working class: it matured among the educated people and those who are simple, but intelligent enough. This is the protest of the whole society, but the most effective protest against the system is that of the people employed in industry, i.e., the workers. Their protests brought about the greatest successes. This does not mean that they are isolated. The workers' movement is a part of the movement of the whole society.

6. Question: The greatest workers' demonstrations took place at dramatic moments (absurd price increases of the basic goods). Weren't they a cry of despair?

Answer: I think that both spontaneity and organization were included in these events. Dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs, being a result of tightening the belt, had been observed in the society for a long time. People had enough time to think about the possible solutions and this led to the beginning of organization. The course of events created new situations which evaded the control of the workers' leaders.

7. Question: What are the main weak points in the workers' demonstrations in your opinion?

Answer: The weak point of the opposition, and particularly of the events mentioned above, is the fact that they were reactions against economic injustice, shortages on the market, etc. Too little attention was paid to the falsification of the history of our nation, to the omission of our national achievements, such as the Constitution of May 3, and other commendable facts of our history. Therefore, the society gradually forgets such a crime as that of Katyn. I think that economic concessions gained during the riots cost the other side very little. Socio-political concessions would cost it much more, because they are much more decisive for the consciousness of the nation than the economic gains.

8. Question: Marxist class theory considers the societies of the so-called People's Democracies to be classless societies, although it does not deny the existence of some differences between social strata. Can the Polish society, in your opinion, be called a classless society?

Answer: I am sure that there are inequalities in the Polish society with clear divisions. These class divisions are rooted in the socio-political situation. I think that the effective ruling of the society forced the Party to provoke some class hostilities within the society, so as to divert the attention of these classes from the real

source of the problems and tensions. It is the old Roman principle--
Divide et impera.

9. Question: What is the most important variable which accounts which accounts for class arising within the Polish society?

Answer: I think that the property of goods is the most important factor, i.e., the differences in the level of affluence. Among such differentiating goods there are: houses, cars, suits and various other facilities. There is rather a strong competition for climbing up the ladder of affluence as high as possible. Often, this type of competition is decisive for the political and ideological engagement of many people. Practically, it happens that many people join the party only because they want to get some posts which are normally reserved for the party members. Nomina sunt odiosa otherwise I would give examples of some friends of mine. One of them, e.g. was a good Catholic--some time ago he participated in the retreat led by the archbishop of Cracow, the present Pope. When he began his professional work he admitted that he joined the party just because he wanted to get a prestigious position. Of course, I do not want to say that all people do that. I want only to signal the problem.

10. Question: What are the privileges accompanying the party membership?

Answer: When I worked in the "Lenin Steelworks," there was an instruction that the non-party workers cannot be given even the position of foreman. The whole professional and social career depends on the party membership. The party and its secretary decide about the distribution of posts, and these are given to a non-party worker only in exceptional cases. Such is the case when there is no party candidate for a post. I can give an example. Mr. Kosmider, a non-party engineer, has kept the post of supervisor of the blast-furnaces in Nowa Huta for many years only because his party predecessors could not control such responsible works.

Another privilege is an access to some scarce goods. The dis-

tribution of apartments is a typical example. I know the case of a man, the father of four children, who could not get a larger flat because he was not a party member, while other families with only one child, who were party members, could get larger flats. This aspect of class in our society is manifest. One may easily distinguish between "we" and "you," and it is easy to identify who are "we," and who are "they." This two-class system, in my opinion, is the main source of the tragedy of our nation. This is grist for the mill manned by forces unfriendly towards our State. For me, personally, it is the source of very deep anxiety about the future of our nation.

11. Question: The Communist Party considers itself the representative of the whole nation and the legally elected authority. What is your opinion on that issue?

Answer: My opinion is explicit. During the period between World War I and World War II, the most progressive thought was presented by the Communist Party. These two parties could have reason to exist in our nation. However, the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) is only a "foundling," a waif. We know its history. It was rigged up in the Soviet Union and brought to our country. The same foreign State gave power to the newly created party. The PZPR has never acted for the society although it has always tried to identify itself with the nation. It deludes the society into the belief that it is its leading force, but it does it in a negative way and harms the society. I consider it a party of political traitors and I think that some time in the future it will be judged for its crimes against the nation. Alcoholism is one of these crimes. Alcohol is the only commodity which is supplied in excess. Secondly, the policy of the Party led to the drastic set-back in birth-rate. One of the factors contributing to such a state of affairs is the slow development of housing which leads to the far-reaching consequences in the size of a family. The Party is responsible for deceiving the society and distorting its history. I want to point to the crime of Katyn, once again. It has denied that it is the Soviet Union that is responsible for it despite the fact that the bodies of

many Polish officers lie there; that fact should be known to every Polish child.

12. Question: What do you think about elections in Poland?

Answer: They are simply a farce. However, I am astonished at something else: the fact that so many people go to the polls. I do not know what they think about the elections, but they vote. It gives the Party some reason to consider itself the legally elected authority. I think that doing so, people make a big mistake. They lose a great opportunity to protest against the existing realities. In vindication of this fact I would like to say that during the last elections the attendance was rather poor (about 60%, even if it was officially claimed that the percentage reached 90). The committees in the places where the attendance was poor were forced to "recount" the votes. In the light of this mechanism, I learned that I went to the polls, which is absurd, since I did not. I went to the place to look at the voting, but I did not vote.

13. Question: Isn't there, in Poland, a strong pressure by the Party on people to vote?

Answer: That excuses no one! The essence of dictatorship consists in terrifying people. That is the Polish reality too.

14. Question: In the People's Democracy, it is not the false principles of the system itself, but particular individuals who are blamed for various crises. Is the present leadership facing the same fate?

Answer: Of course! It is more convenient to blame the former group for the errors resulting in economic shortages. These are false explanations. The roots of the error flow from the character of the system. It is the system that fails. The way in which the posts are assigned is one of these errors. More prestigious posts are conceived as premiums, bonuses for party activists independently of their professional qualifications. Thus we are ruled not by the most competent people, but by the mere hustlers. It can happen so, because there is

no freedom of speech, press or critics. When the effects of the errors accumulate, the easiest thing to do is to find a victim, an individual or group of individuals who might be blamed for that, but not the system itself. We observed it several times, even on the highest level; it became almost a rule. In my opinion, the present Government and Party functionaries face the same fate.

15. Question: What are, in your opinion, the sources of the shortage of many commodities on the Polish market?

Answer: Well, we know how much we are in debt. The whole technological progress has its source in foreign credits and not in the creative activities of our cadres; not in the creation of our own licenses, but in buying licenses abroad. And we must pay for them. The party attributed to itself all the merits of the technological progress, while the whole burden of debt, in the form of the market shortages, was laid on the workers and peasants. In addition, we have a vicious circle here. We buy licenses in the West on hard currency markets, while the products of these licenses we sell on the rouble market, which results in our great loss. Naturally, we must go bankrupt.

16. Question: Is the crisis observed in the Polish economic system the result of wrong economic planning or should it rather be localized in the heart of the system itself?

Answer: Some time ago, I was an enthusiast of the socialist system. I was defeated in my hopes. I think the system should stimulate people to enthusiastic work. Only such work can give to men satisfaction. The Marxist thesis stating that work ceases to be a source of alienation when production means are socialized, is a mere fancy. It is only enthusiasm resulting in work well done that bring satisfaction to a man. Since Marx' times, capitalism has undergone such changes that I dare to say, it is more socialist than our socialism! In our system, a worker is a slave! What work can you expect from a slave! He is exploited slavishly!

17. Question: Is there unemployment in the socialist system?

Answer: Statistical data is very poor in this respect. We can observe a demand for some professions, e.g. for professional drivers, connected with the development of car transport. In other professions, there is an excessive labor force. The best example is a chronic unemployment among women, which is not made public.

18. Question: I heard about horrible hygienic conditions of work in many industrial branches. Is it true?

Answer: I do not know about all factories. However, I know about the cases where it is true. And these are not isolated cases. The improvement of working conditions increases the cost of production and this, in turn, delays plan fulfillments. So, very often, nothing is done in this field. An example of such negligence is the aluminum smelting plant in Skawina where nothing was done practically until a short time ago.

See, all the problems we have just talked about are so complex that there would be no end if we wanted to discuss them further. However, our short conversation throws light on the social situation in Poland.

Thank you very much!

V. Interview with Franciszek Zorza (A worker)
(Gdansk, June 20, 1980)

1. Question: Can you introduce yourself?

Answer: My name is Franciszek Zorza, I work as a fitter.

2. Question: How did it happen that you became a member of an oppositionist group?

Answer: The beginning of my oppositionist activity dates from 1968, i.e., from the March strife between the students and the police. At that time, I went out into the streets of Gdansk, as many others did, to express my solidarity with the students. It was at that time that I

had an opportunity to hear what the police methods were and how the police treated oppositionist groups. We were driven from one place to another by tear-gas and police truncheons. In fact, that was a turning point for me. I became more aware of the sense of the students' postulates (freedom and abolishment of censorship). I also understood the workers' fault, who at that time did not support the students' demonstrations, although we were the only force which could give them such support. I do not understand why it happened so. By an irony of fate, two years later, the students in their turn, did not support our endeavors. Unfortunately, these were the negative features of our workers-intelligentsia movement in the sea-coast region. The passiveness of the students can be explained by the activities of the secret police which dispersed their groups.

In December 1970, I was among those who were actively engaged in the fight. When I had learned about the preparations for the strike and the demonstration in other sections of the factory, I called the Repair Shipyard workers for full support and solidarity with them. There were seven thousand of us working there. Along with other workers, we formed a group and went to the main office. We broke the gate with two electric carts and entered in. Then, we went into the streets of Gdansk altogether.

3. Question: What annoys you most in the Polish system?

Answer: An open breaking of law-abidingness. The most painful thing for me is the existing system. And thus, for instance, once the Constitution of Poland says that the Diet is the highest legislative authority in Poland, the law being laid down by the Diet should be obeyed by all the people, also by the secret police. Article 71 of the Constitution says that a citizen may freely express his opinion in an oral or written form; it guarantees him free access to the radio, television, and press. However, when the secret police finds out that someone goes to lectures (free lectures), they take him into custody to humiliate him. It is said that Article 71 of the Constitution is written only for our descendants. The militia is instructed through other channels. That is the way a policeman speaks during an interrogation of an

oppositionist. Isn't it an open infringement of the Constitution? Isn't it the situation of the state within the State? I have the right to stick the leaflet to a bill-post and a militia-man has no right to beat me, strip me of my clothes, knock me about and rummage my pockets for this, saying at the same time that I have gotten involved with scoundrels, drunkards, students thrown out from the universities, i.e., with the outcasts of the society. All this happened to me. I attended a lecture for intelligentsia (although I am a worker myself) since I wanted to get in touch with them, learn their attitudes and beliefs. I was caught by the secret police and then humiliated by them in various ways.

4. Question: So, you are saying that there is a lack of law-abidingness in Poland. Are you?

Answer: Yes, of course!

5. Question: The lack of law-abidingness is one of the aspects of injustice in Poland. Are there any other aspects of it?

Answer: To answer this question, I will give you the following example. Let us assume that I start to build a garage for myself. The next day, a ferret from the secret police comes and starts to sneak around to find out if I have had permission to build it. If I apply for such a permission, I will not get it. Then, they start to investigate where I got a rotten board, a piece of tar paper and nails.

But if you go to Gdansk to the Kashub Lake District, you can see apartment buildings near the lakes, surrounded with three-fold fences, watched by guards with dogs, where nurse-maids look after children, and where the "nobility" amuses itself inside. Why does the secret police not investigate that case? Why do they not check if these people are strangers from the outer space, or from some other places? Why do they not investigate where they obtained their money? Whom do they serve? Maybe they are the agents of Western imperialism? Does not the secret police notice residences which, in my opinion, are worth three and a half million zlotys? They do not see the fences and several cars parked in front of those residences? Is it so difficult to find out who has

built these houses, how much they cost and whose money was spent on them? Can this be called an economic egalitarianism? Is this a symptom of the classless society? Can we call the government tolerating such corrupt practices the government of the workers and peasants? Why do they accuse the between-war "sanacja" or the lords and nobility of disorder and confusion in the State? Is it not more important to investigate the lords wearing red ties to find out who they are? Where do they come from? From where do they get such big amounts of money? Where do they spend their holidays? It is a dream of my life, for instance, to spend my holidays in Leningrad, but I cannot go there because I cannot afford it. There are "friendship" trains which go to the USSR. However, it is a member of the Union of Socialist Youth, a Party member, an activist, a member of the people's Democratic Party that can go there, but not me--a worker! I am not worth the privilege of crossing this threshold!

6. Question: What do you think, where do some people, those you are talking about, get their money?

Answer: I will answer your question with the well-worn party slogan: "To everybody according to his needs." Their needs have gone very far and that is why they are being satisfied!

7. Question: To what extent could the events in Poland (especially in 1956, 1970, and 1976) be called a movement, if any organized planned action is understood by the word "movement"?

Answer: I am not sure if I can answer this question directly. However, even if the definition of such or other events as the "workers' movement" were questioned, it is necessary to stress the phenomenon of solidarity among the workers of different branches and regions of Poland. In solidarity with the workers of the sea-coast region, the textile workers of Lodz went on strike, the factories in Opole stopped working, the workers in many factories in Warsaw went on a sit-down strike, miners in some mines in Silesia did not go down to work for forty-eight hours, and ironmasters in Nowa Huta threatened to put out blast-furnaces. In 1970, Poland was on the brink of a general strike,

or even civil war. In this situation the government had to compromise.

I would like to add one more fact; this information comes from a dependable source. I heard it myself from the first secretary of the Party, E. Gierek, that in December, 1970, Zenon Kliszko came to the sea-coast region in a general's uniform, inspected different units and used them to calm Gdansk. Many officers of the Polish Army refused to obey the orders. Some of them even killed themselves because they did not want to shoot at the workers. The commanding staff of the Navy also refused to obey such orders. We cannot forget those people. They are true heroes. It is our society's duty to take care of their families. Finally, we have to excuse the soldiers. The authorities spread the gossip that the West-German surprise raid landed in Gdansk. In such a case the soldiers could not refuse to obey the orders. It is only the commander-in-chief that bears the whole blame. Besides, the authorities used troops from special schools in Slupsk and Elblag. The "students" of those schools are social outcasts. Thus can we be surprised at the massacre in Gdansk? I can understand those people, but we cannot excuse the commander-in-chief.

8. Question: Is the Polish society, in your opinion class or a classless society?

Answer: In my opinion the Polish society has a class character. I see it in this way: on one hand, there is the class of Government and Party people, and on the other hand, the rest of the society. Every higher post is given to a Party member. Even a foreman has to be a Party member since the working team is a social group, and such a group should be directed only by a Party member.

9. Question: How can you describe the Party members?

Answer: Excuse me, but I would like to introduce a comparison here. When a farmer has a skittish horse, he halts it, so as to limit its field of vision. The Party needs such people, people with an unlimited loyalty. It is not necessary for them to know how to write or read. Others can do this for them, but they have to be loyal and servile. Their loyalty is rewarded with different privileges and fa-

cilities.

10. Question: Were you in the sea-coast region at the time of the December events?

Answer: Yes, I was.

11. Question: Is the officially announced number of victims, forty-five correct?

Answer: First, this number of victims had been published before the events ended. Second, it is absolutely incorrect. It is said that the most probable number of the victims was 600 people killed.

12. Question: Do you believe in the rightness of the cause the opposition fights for?

Answer: Yes, I do. I believe also that we will win!

Thank you for the interview.

VI. Interview with Jan Samsonowicz and Adam Slonimski (Activists of Young Poland Movement)

(Gdansk, June 20, 1980)

1. Question: Before entering into a more formal interview, could you say something about yourselves?

Answer: My name is Jan Samsonowicz. Professionally, I am a Polish philologist, but I work as a provider.

My name is Adam Slonimski, and I am a physician. I work in my profession but not in the sea-coast towns. Why? I will explain this later.

2. Question: You both are engaged in the workers-intelligentsia youth movement. How did it happen that you became activists of this movement?

Answer (J.S.): The activists of the Young Poland Movement are united by a specific socio-religious formation which they acquired from

the university chaplains during their studies. We are united not only by the Christian outlook on the world, but also by a spiritual formation which we manifest in theory and practice of everyday life. Friendship and spiritual formation constitute the basis of our organization. These are supplemented with common political views, and due to this, our informal group took on a more formal organizational character. It happened after the events of 1976.

3. Question: Your views and activities have put you into opposition to the existing system. Is this true?

Answer (J.S.): It is said very mildly. We simply do not accept the system imposed on us in 1945. We do not accept it and we want to create its alternative. We reject the system and at the same time, we reject the Marxist ideology which constitutes its basis. We consider communism an experiment which failed. It is enough to remind us of the period of Stalinism. The present situation is not much different from that. There is no compromise which we could accept in this matter. I would like to stress also that we are not only the movement of the young intelligentsia, i.e., of those who graduated from the universities, but there are workers in our group as well. Education is not a factor which could make us a closed group.

Answer (A.S.): I would like to add that this attitude finds its expression in close contacts between the Young Poland Movement and the Independent Trade Union, which is very strong in Gdynia, Gdansk, and Sopot. This Trade Union is an authentic workers' organization, contrary to the official Trade Union completely controlled by the Party.

4. Question: What kind of contacts do you have with the workers at present?

Answer (A.S.): The field of our common activity is an independent periodical Robotnik (The Worker). Besides, we cooperate in solving many specific problems, such as support for those who lost their jobs because of their social activity. We help them legally and financially.

5. Question: You mentioned before that you are not allowed to work in the region of Gdansk. Is it true?

Answer (A.S.): Yes, it is. The roots of it reach as far as my studies in medical school. During the studies at the Medical Academy we tried to create an organization of students independent of the Polish Students' Association. After graduating from the school, those who were most active in this field, were not allowed to practice their profession in the Gdansk region. D. Kobzdej, who is imprisoned at present, was one of them. He is a young doctor, one of the best students at the Medical Academy, a finalist of the All-Polish Biological Contest, a member of the Students' Learned Society and of the Scientific Commission of the University Council of the Socialist Polish Students' Association. (D. Kobzdej was charged with an insult to the dignity of the Polish nation, because of questioning the alliance with the Soviet Union, and with breaking traffic regulations). Apart from D. Kobzdej, I and a friend of mine, are not allowed to work in the Gdansk region. Obviously, there is no formal ban directed against us, but everything is done informally. It is up to the provincial doctor to decide about our employment. And, I know, that many institutions wanted to employ us, but we could not get our jobs in this region because of the pressure from the Party cells on the provincial doctor who must sign the licenses for us to practice our profession. So, we work outside the Gdansk region.

6. Question: You mentioned the Independent Trade Unions. Could you tell me something more on this subject?

Answer (A.S.): It was B. Borusewicz who started to organize the Independent Trade Union. Since 1976, he has been a member of the Committee for the Workers' Defense which, actually is called the Committee for Social Self-Defense KOR. He deserves the credit, to a great extent, for the existence of this Trade Union. He has a great ability for organizing people. This does not mean that he is the only one who deserves the credit. This is our common achievement. At the initial stage, the KOR's task was to support the families of the workers who were imprisoned after the events of 1976. Later on, KOR changed itself into the Committee for Self-Defense, and thus it assumed much broader goals and range of activities. I want to be precise at this point.

There is no division among us into workers and intelligentsia. We are an oppositionist group and education or affiliation to a social stratum are of minor importance. We all helped the workers and in that our groups are united. The difference is only a functional one. We have one common opponent. That keeps us united. The fact that there were solidarity strikes in the sections of the factory whose workers had been arrested, can serve as an example of this solidarity. The evidence for the successfulness of strikes may be the fact that, when the authority tried to dismiss A. Walentynowicz from the shipbuilding yard, a four-hour strike in the section of the shipyard she worked, was proclaimed. That scared the authorities and they revoked the decision.

On another occasion, the secret police separated the leaders from the workers by force in order to defeat the strike. Although, at that time, there was not a strike, the Workers' Committee was formed which successfully serves the workers' cause.

7. Question: What injustice do you observe in the socialist system?

Answer (A.S.): The answer to this question is not an easy one. The system in which we live, is not a socialist system at all. It has nothing to do with socialism. It is a typical totalitarian system in which the State is an absolute lord of everything. It is the most modern form of serfdom, which, however, tries to keep up the appearances of legality and equality. And thus the working class is said to rule in Poland, although the workers have been deprived of their basic rights to strike, to form unions, to exercise free speech; they have been deprived of access to the radio, television and the press.

8. Question: The socialist system boasts of having created a classless society. Do you think that our society is genuinely classless?

Answer (A.S.): I see two classes, or rather castes, in the contemporary Polish society. One class is the ruling clique to which belong all those who serve the system. The second class comprises all other people. The differences between the workers and the intelligent-

sia do not account for significant differences as far as class division is concerned.

Answer (J.S.): I would distinguish also the class of swindlers in the Polish society. These are the people who know how to take "care" of themselves. But those people should be, in some way, classified hand in hand with the ruling caste. They gravitate towards this caste, although they do not form the core of it.

9. Question: What is the demarcation line between the privileged caste and the rest of the society?

Answer (A.S.): It is rather difficult to answer this question. It is known that the privileges at the low level of the Party membership are not equal to those at the higher levels. On the other hand, it would be difficult to distinguish the level at which privileges are so great that those who enjoy them belong to the privileged caste. In my opinion, the demarcation line is the Party membership. I also would include in this those people who, although not formal Party members, serve the system in a servile way and are paid for this.

10. Question: What profits, beside the financial ones, does the caste of the privileged people in Poland get?

Answer (A.S.): Today, in Poland, everything depends on whether you are in favour or out of favour with the Party. Your position, possibilities of scientific work and any social rise depend on it. The Party's ID is the key to your career. Those who do not have it formally, have to make up for its lack with double servility and with support for the official line.

11. Question: Were you in Gdansk during the events of 1970?

Answer (J.S.): Yes, I was there. I worked in the port at that time.

Answer (A.S.): I was there too. I was a student in high school. I learned the meaning of socialism in those days. It was Wednesday. We were told to go to school, so I did. Unfortunately, some time before, I had hurt my hand and I got it bandaged. Even today, I remember

that there were many tanks in the city. I was about 100 meters from the school, when the police car barred my way. Some policemen came out of it, drew me to the car and beat me with their truncheons. They kept beating me almost all the time on their way to the police station. The only break in beating was when they caught two other people and started to beat them.

12. Question: What is, according to you, the number of victims of the December events in the sea-coast cities?

Answer (A.S.): I cannot give you precise data. It is certain that the number of victims was much higher than officially admitted (45 killed). Similarly, the number of wounded persons was higher than that given officially. My conclusion follows from the fact that in the Gdansk region they ran short of first-aid supplies for wounded people in emergency rooms.

13. Question: Do you believe in the rightness and the victory of your cause?

Answer (J.S.): Of course, we do! In my opinion, it is only a matter of time.

Thank you very much for the conversation.

Appendix B

POLAND'S CONSTITUTION OF 1952

(An Extract)

Article 1-(I) The Polish People's Republic is a State of People's Democracy.

Article 2-(I) The working people wield State power through their representatives elected to the Sejm (Parliament) of the Polish People's Republic and to the People's Councils on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot.

Article 4-(I) The laws of the Polish People's Republic express the interests and the will of the working people.

Article 6 The armed forces of the Polish People's Republic safeguard the sovereignty and independence of the Polish nation and its security and peace.

Article 7-(I) The Polish People's Republic, on the basis of socialised means of production, trade, communications and credit, develops the economic and cultural life of the country in accordance with the National Economic Plan, and, in particular, through the expansion of Socialist State industry, which is the decisive factor in the transformation of social and economic relations.

Article 9-(I) The Polish People's Republic strengthens in a planned way the economic union between town and country, founded on brotherly cooperation between workers and peasants.

Article 10-(I) The Polish People's Republic protects the individual farms of working peasants and assists them in order to protect them against capitalist exploitation, to increase production, raise the technical level of agriculture, and improve their welfare.

(II) The Polish People's Republic gives special support and all-round aid to co-operative farms set up, on the principle of

voluntary membership, as forms of collective economy. By applying methods of efficient collective cultivation and mechanised work, collective farming enables the working peasants to reach a turning point in production and contributes to the complete elimination of exploitation in the countryside and to a rapid and considerable rise in its welfare and culture.

Article 11 The Polish People's Republic promotes the development of different forms of the co-operative movement in town and country and gives it every help in the fulfillment of its tasks. It also extends special care and protection to co-operative property as constituting social property.

Article 12 The Polish People's Republic recognises and protects, on the basis of existing legislation, individual property and the right to inherit land, buildings and other means of production belonging to peasants, craftsmen and persons engaged in domestic handicrafts.

Article 13 The Polish People's Republic guarantees to citizens full protection of personal property and the right to inherit it.

Article 15-(I) The highest organ of State authority is the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic.

Article 24-(I) At its first sitting, the Sejm elects a Council of State composed of the President of the Council of State, four Deputy Presidents, the Secretary of the Council of State, and nine Members.

Article 25-(I) The following functions are vested in the Council of State:

- (i) the ordering of elections to the Sejm;
- (ii) the convocation of sessions of the Sejm;
- (iii) the establishment of universally binding interpretation of laws;
- (iv) the issuing of decrees with the force of law;
- (v) the appointment and recall of plenipotentiary representatives of the Polish People's Republic in other States;
- (vi) the acceptance of letters of credence and of recall of dip-

lomatic representatives of other States accredited to the Council of State;

- (vii) the ratification and denouncing of international treaties;
- (viii) the appointment to civilian and military posts specified by law;
- (ix) the awarding of orders, decorations and titles of honour;
- (x) the exercise of the right to grant pardon;
- (xi) the exercise of other functions vested in the Council of State by the Constitution or assigned to it by special laws.

Article 29-(I) The Sejm appoints and recalls the Government of the Polish People's Republic--the Council of Ministers or its individual members.

Article 34-(I) The organs of State authority in rural districts, urban districts, towns, boroughs of larger towns, sub-county areas, and voivodships, are the People's Councils.

Article 46-(I) The administration of justice in the Polish People's Republic is carried out by the Supreme Court, Voivodship Courts, District Courts, and Special Courts.

Article 52 Judges are independent and subject only to the law.

Article 53

(II) The accused is guaranteed the right to a defence counsel, either of his own choice or appointed by the Court.

Article 65 The Polish People's Republic extends special protection to the creative intelligentsia--to those working in the fields of science, education, literature and art, as well as to pioneers of technical progress, to rationalisers and inventors.

Article 70-(I) The Polish People's Republic guarantees freedom of conscience and religion to its citizens. The Church and other religious bodies may freely exercise their religious functions. It is forbidden to prevent citizens from taking part in religious activities or rites. It is also forbidden to coerce anybody to participate in religious activities or rites.

(II) The Church is separated from the State. The principles of the relationship between Church and State as well as the legal and patrimonial position of religious bodies are determined by laws.

Article 71-(I) The Polish People's Republic guarantees its citizens freedom of speech, of the press, of meetings and assemblies, of processions and demonstrations.

(II) The granting to working people and their organisations of the use of printing shops, stocks of paper, public buildings and halls, means of communication, the radio, and other indispensable material means, serves to put this freedom into effect.

Article 72-(I) In order to promote the political, social, economic and cultural activity of the working people of town and country, the Polish People's Republic guarantees to its citizens the right to unite in public organisations.

(III) The setting up of and participation in associations whose aims or activities are directed against the political and social structure or against the legal order of the Polish People's Republic are forbidden.

Article 80 Elections to the Sejm and People's Councils are universal, equal, direct, and carried out by secret ballot.

Appendix C

THE LUBLIN MANIFESTO

The K.R.N. (Krajowa Rada Narodowa--National Council of the Homeland), called forth by the fighting nation, is the sole legal source of authority in Poland. The 'emigre' Government in London and its agency in Poland is an illegal and self-styled authority, based on the illegal Fascist Constitution of April, 1935. That Government has hampered the struggle against the Hitlerite invaders by its policy of political opportunism and is driving Poland to a new disaster.

The K.R.N. and the P.K.W.N. (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego--Polish Committee of National Liberation) are acting on the basis of the Constitution of March 17th, 1921, the sole Constitution, which is legally binding and which has been legally voted. The basic provisions of that Constitution shall remain valid until the meeting of the Constituent Diet (Sejm) elected by a general equal, indirect, secret, and proportional vote, which, as representative of the nation's will, will vote a new Constitution.

The P.K.W.N. calls upon the Polish population and upon all authorities subordinated to its power to collaborate most closely with the Red Army. Stand up and fight for the liberation of Poland, for the return to the Motherland of the ancient Polish territory of Pomerania and Silesia, for East Prussia, for a broad access to the sea, for Polish boundary marks on the Oder! History and the present war prove that Poland can be saved from the German menace only by the establishment of a great defensive alliance of Slav nations based on an agreement between Poland, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia.

The Polish frontiers should be settled by mutual agreement. Poland's eastern frontier should be a frontier of neighbourly friendship, not a barrier between ourselves and our friends. It should be settled in accordance with the principle of Polish territory for Poland, White Russian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian territory for Soviet White Russia,

Ukraine and Lithuania.

The P.K.W.N. will make a systematic inventory of the damage inflicted on the Polish nation by the Germans and will take steps to secure for Poland the reparations due to her.

None but a Polish administration can act, even for a single moment, on Polish territory liberated from German invasion. It will be the task of independent Polish courts to ensure the swift dispensation of justice. No German war criminal or traitor shall escape punishment.

In order to secure the reconstruction of our country and to satisfy the peasants' traditional longing for the soil, the P.K.W.N. will at once proceed with a broad agrarian reform in liberated Polish territory. Towards that end a land fund will be set up under the Department of Agriculture and Agricultural Reforms. This fund will include the livestock and equipment of estates hitherto held by Germans or by traitors to the nation, and also the estates of big landowners of more than 50 hectares, and in territories incorporated in the Reich, in principle, of more than 100 ha. The estates of Germans and of traitors to the nation will be confiscated. Large holdings of the above type will be taken over without any compensation, dependent on size, but a personal allowance will be increased in the case of landowners who have won merit in fighting against the Germans. With the exception of land set aside for collective farms, the soil taken over by the land fund will be distributed among small-holders, medium-sized farmers with large families to support, and farm labourers.

The P.K.W.N.'s aim will be the quickest possible return home of all emigres and it will take steps to organize this return. The gates of the Republic will be barred only to Hitlerite agents and those who betrayed their country in September 1939. We excommunicate the loutish agents of the reactionary movement who, by splitting internal unity and by their attempts to embroil Poles against each other, have been playing into the hands of Hitlerism.

APPROVAL SHEET

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The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

April 21, 1982

Date

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