A Foundational Synthesis of Heraclitus

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A FOUNDATIONAL SYNTHESIS
OF HERACLITUS

BY

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INTRODUCTION

Reflection upon the procedure followed by anyone who is trying to determine the meaning of some author's words reveals that the first step is necessarily an analysis of what has been written or spoken, so that the individual elements of the whole are clear in themselves, combined with a first effort to draw these elements together into a unified whole. Even in the first reading of a text, these two procedures are being performed, the collection of data from the text and its interrelation and synthesis. If the student of the text concerned wishes to work more carefully with his text, he will go over it again, several times, searching out elements which he might have overlooked in the first reading, and looking for interrelationships of these elements, and patterns of relationships, and repeated use of significant terms, and terms which mean similar things. These first efforts of the student of a text, moreover, provide the groundwork for every scholarly effort which might come after; for no investigation of the language used in the text, no study of its historical background, no evaluation of secondary sources concerning the text, no study of the effort beyond the first steps of analysis and synthesis is even possible without the first steps.
What is being said here is, of course, nothing revolutionary; it could hardly be more evident that every study of any text by any author must begin with the simplest first reading and first efforts to put what has been read together. It is clear that the results of later scholarly efforts concerning the text will be of significance only insofar as they fulfill two conditions: they must be founded upon and grow out of an accurate and detailed analysis of the texts and a carefully drawn and properly qualified synthesis based upon that analysis; and secondly, they must in every case be referred back to the text itself as the ultimate criterion of their value, which means that they must not conflict with the evidence of the text itself, or if they do, they must be held as of doubtful value in regard to the text concerned.

Because of this fundamental importance of analysis and synthesis of the original text in understanding any author's thought, it is reasonable to establish the goal of a paper such as this as: the analysis and synthesis of the works of an author, concerned only with the evidence of the texts themselves; an analysis standing prior to and therefore not contingent on detailed scholarship in philology, history of thought and culture, doxography, ancient commentators, textual criticism, paleography, and so on.

In this paper, the author concerned is Heraclitus of Ephesus, the Ionian Greek philosopher of the late sixth century
before Christ. The text concerned is the corpus of Heraclitus's fragments accepted as genuine in the sixth and subsequent editions of Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker by H. Diels and W. Kranz (Berlin, 1951-1952).

It is clear, of course, that this paper does depend upon the scholarly work of Diehls-Kranz, whose determination of the corpus of fragments to be examined here limits the ultimate possibilities of this paper. While this is true, and is a valid qualification of the results of the fundamental analysis and synthesis which will be given here, it is also true that nearly every modern scholar of Heraclitus's thought begins his work with the texts found in Diehls-Kranz. Some of these men proceed to question and criticize the work of Diehls-Kranz, in an effort to better the first analysis of the texts, upon which all later study must depend; but it is clear that the first analysis performed by Diehls-Kranz through the criteria of philology, paleography, and textual criticism is an adequate starting point for an analysis and synthesis using the tools of the student described above: the search for repeated terms and expressions, the search for themes and patterns of thought, for relationships of terms and themes which repeat or which are related to each other, and so on. For the goal of the textual critic is different from that of the student of the texts, and the latter must always be dependent upon the former; the simplest first reading is impossible without a book.
Yet it may be argued that the student seeking to understand the author's thought will be misled unless he has the proper texts on hand. This objection is certainly valid; it contains the qualification which must be attached to this entire paper, which will be dependent upon the textual work of Diehls-Kranz and does not at all call their work into question. But textual criticism itself reaches a point at which it must understand the impact of additions and deletions upon an established body of texts; and the evidence of recent critical efforts within overall studies of Heraclitus by such scholars as Kirk and Guthrie indicates that textual criticism of Heraclitus has reached this stage, and the established body of texts which is being evaluated is the corpus accepted as genuine by the sixth and subsequent editions of Diehls-Kranz.

Other scholars might well offer the same objections to the sort of study proposed here: How can it hope to deal with Heraclitus's thought without accounting for all the philological, cultural, and other factors which are significant? How can it simply ignore what ancient commentators have told us? Yet again, how shall these sources of evidence be judged to be of value to us unless we have on hand a carefully prepared and understood study of Heraclitus's thought based on the texts themselves? The only alternative is a haphazard combination of data from many realms which is really unable to be evaluated because the texts themselves are not understood. What is needed is an explicit and detailed analysis and synthesis.
of one established text of Heraclitus's writings, which will not be called into question until the analysis and synthesis are done; and no other evidence must be allowed to influence this analysis and synthesis save what can be gleaned from the fragments themselves either by explicit statement or by varying degrees of implication, whose degrees of removal from explicit confirmation by the texts must be made clear. Only in this way will further scholarly work be able to be performed, once the area of question and doubt is clarified, and evaluated, once the fundamental content of the texts themselves has been established and properly detailed and qualified.

While this paper claims to perform this function and thus be an addition to scholarship on Heraclitus, it does not intend to deny the value of scholarly efforts which have preceded it. Many great scholars over the last hundred years have contributed to our understanding of Heraclitus, and their guidance and assistance in the achievement of the foundational synthesis presented here is significant. Nevertheless it remains true that, while each of these men formulated his own foundational synthesis before moving on to study the fragments in depth from one or another or several points of view, none of these men has presented for examination the foundational synthesis with which he began. In every case, we have received from the scholars who have studied Heraclitus the later results of their work, never the first steps upon
which the rest was founded, and in terms of which the later work must ultimately be judged.

Numerous shorter studies of particular fragments, terms, and themes are available by such noted scholars as Vlastos and Frankel and many others; but none of them seeks to offer a detailed study of more than one or two terms or lines of thought from the fragments. Nor can any of the shorter syntheses of Heraclitus's thought—such as the chapters on Heraclitus in: Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1964); Copleston, History of Philosophy, Vol. I (Westminster, Md., 1963); Owens, A History of Ancient Western Philosophy (New York, 1959); and so on—engage in a detailed analysis and synthesis of Heraclitus's thought. As for the longer treatments of Heraclitus's thought—such as the chapter in Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy Vol. I (Cambridge, 1962); the chapter in Gigon, Der Ursprung der Griechischen Philosophie (Basel, 1945); Kirk, Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments (Cambridge, 1959); Wheelwright, Heraclitus (Princeton, 1959); and so on—none of them actually attempts to present the foundational synthesis which is needed, based upon an established corpus which remains unquestioned until the foundational work is done and basing its conclusions solely upon the evidence to be found in the fragments themselves. None of these engages in the exhaustive analysis of inter-relationships of terms and themes which is the primary method of the desired foundational synthesis. Several of these works
deal with only one group of Heraclitus's fragments; one deals with the fragments only a handful at a time; and all of them draw significant evidence for their syntheses from outside the analysis of the fragments themselves.

The work of these and other scholars is of great significance, as has been said; but until a foundational synthesis of Heraclitus's thought is available, one based upon an unquestioned corpus of fragments and achieved by painstaking analysis of every significant term, theme, and interrelationship of terms and themes, it will be difficult to estimate accurately the value of such men's work. This important gap in available studies of Heraclitus's thought will be filled, it is hoped, by this paper.

The whole detailed analysis of all the terms, themes, and relationships of the fragments could be simply presented, without following any definite order; such a procedure would be tedious in the extreme, highly repetitive, and serve no great purpose. Therefore, in this paper, the analytic material on a particular term, theme, or relationship will be presented as the term, theme, or relationship comes up within the development of the synthesis. That is, although the foundational analysis had to precede the foundational synthesis in the original work, the two will be presented here intermixed. As the ideas develop in the orderly manner of the synthesis, the detailed analysis which permitted the synthesis to be formed in the first place will be presented. It is important
to realize and keep in the forefront of attention, however, the important fact that the analysis of the evidence of the fragments themselves, not any preconceived notion of what would make a nice synthesis, has guided this paper to its conclusions, whatever the degree of certainty attributed to them. The fact that a conclusion is mentioned before the evidence for it does not reflect the manner in which the conclusion and evidence are actually related; the analysis came first.

Ideally, the reader could have on hand simply a master index containing all the results of the analysis, with no conclusions drawn at all, and form his own synthesis. But the purpose of this paper has been to provide both the foundational analysis and the foundational synthesis; for without the latter, the work of others based on evidence from outside the fragments cannot be evaluated. Yet, so that the reader can put together for himself if he wishes the materials which have been collected and put together here, an index of all the significant terms and themes will be found at the end of this paper; by searching out what is said about them in the paper, he will have a complete knowledge of the relationships of terms and themes which have led to the synthesis presented here.

Three appendices are also provided, chiefly to permit footnotes to remain contextual, and to keep their number down. The first appendix contains the complete Greek text of the fragments as found in the sixth and subsequent editions of
Diehls-Kranz Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. The second appendix contains the complete text of the fragments in the translations of them used in the paper; these translations are based on the work of Freeman and Guthrie, as is indicated in the introductory comments of the appendix; each fragment's translation is accompanied by an indication of the source of the translation and what changes, if any, have been made for its use in this paper, and why. The third appendix contains the texts of the fragments of the Diehls-Kranz corpus which stand outside the synthesis presented in this paper, generally because their excessive brevity prevented the discovery of significant links with the fragments of the present synthesis on the basis of internal evidence alone.

The footnotes will avoid materials covered in these appendices, and will leave all cross-referencing to the index; the statements of interrelationships, of course, will be found predominately in the text of the paper itself, or in the footnotes if the matter is of questionable significance or for some reason notably uncertain. Moreover, every evaluation of the meaning of a Greek term independent of its particular function within its fragment will be based upon Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford; 1940); there will be no footnote references in such matters unless they are of special significance. As was explained already, the meaning of terms within their fragments is examined in Appendix II, under the guidance of Guthrie and Freeman. The fragments will be
identified in the text of this paper and in the footnotes by the numbers assigned them in the sixth and subsequent editions of Diehls-Kranz; the number will appear in parentheses which follow the citation or reference which it identifies.
CHAPTER I

KNOWING AND THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE

One of the most recurrent and self-evident themes in the fragments of Heraclitus is the theme of knowing. The numerous references to knowing in the fragments, to its object, to its absence, and to other closely-related topics make this a convenient and most efficient starting point for an analysis of Heraclitus's thought.

There are other starting points which could have been chosen just as well, of course. For if there is any unity to Heraclitus's thought as we have it in the fragments, we ought to be able to discover it by examining the interrelationships of meaning in the terms and themes of the fragments; and any truly thorough analysis of any theme or important term of the fragments ought to give access to the whole body of themes and terms, as well as indicate such themes and terms as are not interrelated within this body of themes and terms. Nevertheless, some starting points are bound to be more convenient and efficient and of greater significance within philosophical thought in general; the theme of knowing is such a one.

This theme has not been chosen as the starting point of this analysis and the hoped-for synthesis because it is
Heraclitus's starting point: nowhere in the fragments does he indicate the logical starting point of his thought, nor is there any statement indicating how he came in time to hold the views expressed in the fragments. Nor has this starting point been selected out of any predilection for epistemological and critical questions, but simply because the whole body of the fragments, with all its themes and important terms is readily accessible from this point of inception.

Heraclitus's views on human knowing will be grouped here under four headings. In the first section, the most strongly evidenced of all the themes in the fragments, the not-knowing of men in general, will be examined, together with the related theme of men's ability to reach genuine knowledge at all. The second section will examine Heraclitus's positive statements about knowing, which occur in the form of statements about himself as knower, guidelines for genuine knowing, and several characterizations of wisdom. The object of the knowledge which men lack and of genuine knowing will be studied in the third section, with a view to clarifying the type of knowing which Heraclitus has in mind in the statements on knowing and not-knowing. In the fourth section, the relation of this distinctive type of knowing to the data of ordinary, everyday experience will be examined.
Not-knowing and men's ability to know

Heraclitus's statements about knowing in the fragments deal more frequently with not-knowing, men's ignorance and their general failure to understand, than with knowledge possessed and understanding actually achieved. Men in general, he says repeatedly, do not know and are void of understanding; they are capable of genuine knowing, but fail to achieve it. This is a theme of far greater importance in the fragments than Heraclitus's much-written-of criticism of his predecessors' ignorance.

The statements of men's not-knowing

Twenty-one times in the fragments, Heraclitus points directly to some lack in men's knowing, understanding, or awareness of the way things are. There is no set form of these expressions, however; the one expression which appears the most frequently—seven times—is a negation of some form or derivative of γινώσκω, "to know" with the nuance of "by observation" (5, 17, 56, 57, 86, 106, 108). The verb εἰδω, "to know by reflection" appears in a statement of men's not-knowing only once (104). Only one other expression appears twice, ἀξίωμα, "void of understanding" (1, 34).

Negated once each in various ways are these different terms: ξύνημι, "to bring data together in understanding" (51); ἐπισταμαι, "to know how" (19); φρονέω, "to be aware" (7); φρήν, "heart or mind as the seat of mental faculties,"
perception, and thought" (104); νόσος, "mind" (104); ἐξευρήσαμον, "to find" (45). To men, he says in place, certain things "seem strange ( ἔνα φαινεται)" (72); in another place, human nature has no γνώµας, "means of knowing" (78); once each he employs these term of not-knowing: ἀμαθής, "ignorance" (95); ἀπειρός, "unacquainted with" (1); and ἀνθέανω, "escape the notice of" (1). 2

On seven other occasions, Heraclitus comments on men's lack of knowing and understanding somewhat less directly. The point is generally that men are mistaken in thinking that they have genuine knowledge, rather than a straightforward statement that they do not have such genuine knowledge. Thus "one must follow that which is common ( τὸ χωρὸν), but . . . most men live as if they had a private understanding ( ἰδίων φρόνησιν) of their own" (2). Although men do not understand or know, "to themselves they seem (to understand)"

1The meaning of this term, which appears once in the singular (41) and once in the plural (78) in the fragments, is not certain. For the purposes of the moment, the basic meaning of "means of knowing" is sufficient. The two fragments will be treated in several different places below.

2Several other fragments also seem related to this theme of not-knowing. In one fragment, a man is "not aware ( οὐκ ἑπαξάνων)" where he is going (117); in another, Heraclitus speaks of "the man who forgets which way the road leads" (71), where the "way" may have the relationship with genuine knowing that it has elsewhere (45, 59, 60). In two places, men seem not to know "justice" properly, although they have some knowledge of it: "they would not know the name of justice, if these things did not exist"(23), where "these things" is left unexplained; also in the statement that "to the god all things are just . . . but men have assumed some things to be unjust, others just" (102). Finally, there is the mistake of Homer over the boys' riddle in one statement (56).
"the knowledge (\( \gamma \nu \delta \sigma \kappa \varepsilon \iota \)) of the most famous man is but opinion" (28). Although he did not know even day and night, "most men's teacher is Hesiod—they are sure (\( \varepsilon \pi \zeta \sigma \tau \alpha \tau \alpha \iota \alpha \)) he knew most things" (57); not knowing that most men are bad and the good are few, "they put their trust in popular bards and take the mob for their teacher" (104). Once, the less direct reference to men's not-knowing takes the form of a general statement with no definite subject expressed: "much learning (\( \pi \omicron \lambda \upsilon \mu \alpha \theta \epsilon \eta \)) does not teach one to have intelligence (\( \nu \delta \omicron \upsilon \))" (40). Once Heraclitus states, "though men associate with the logos most closely, yet they are separated (\( \delta \iota \alpha \varphi \varepsilon \rho \omicron \omicron \tau \omicron \omega \)) from it" (72).3

The subject of not-knowing: men in general

Who is it who does not know? Who is the subject of not-knowing as Heraclitus speaks of it in the fragments? For the most part, the answer to this question is men, men in general.

Four times in the fragments, "men (\( \alpha \nu \theta \rho \omega \pi \omicron \omicron \))" is specified as the subject of not-knowing (three times in 1, 56). Once the subject named is "human nature (\( \zeta \theta \omicron \omicron \varsigma \alpha \nu \theta \rho \omega \pi \epsilon \iota \omicron \omicron \))" (78).

3Several terms have been left untranslated in this paper because translating them would inevitably be a pre-judgment on certain themes and relationships in the fragments, and because the terms have considerable breadth of meaning which no English term or expression carries very well. The most important of the terms handled this way is logos (\( \lambda \delta \gamma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \)). The other terms treated in this way are cosmos (\( \kappa \omicron \sigma \omicron \mu \omicron \omicron \omicron \)) and daimon (\( \delta \alpha \varsigma \mu \omicron \omicron \nu \)). The fragments concerned are examined in Appendix II.
Five times the subject is left indefinite, "one" or "they" (5, 19, 51, 72 twice). Once the subject is second person singular, "you" (45). Three of the statements are general statements without any definite subject, but the context suggests that they are intended to apply universally to all men (40, 86, 95). Five times the subject is given as πολλοί, οἱ πολλοί, or πλείστοι, "many men, the many, most men" (17 three times, 2, 57). Four times the subject is "those men (αὐτοὶ)," used without a definite antecedent (all in 104).

In several places, Heraclitus specifies the subject a little more, referring once to "those whose discourse (λόγους) I have heard" (108), and also in another place where ἄξυνετοι, "those who are void of understanding," may be used substantively rather than as a modifier of an unexpressed "they" (34).

Once the subject of not-knowing is δοκιμώτατος, "the most famous" (28); twice Hesiod is named as the subject of not-knowing (57, 106).

Clearly then, the subject of not-knowing is usually a general one, almost without exception in fact. Heraclitus speaks of men in general as being deficient in knowing; further analysis of the fragments will enable us to further characterize the knowing which they lack and the nature of its object.

Men's ability to know

Before examining men's not-knowing in greater detail, however, an important question needs to be answered, namely
whether Heraclitus believed men incapable of genuine knowing.

Only three statements from the fragments offer explicit answers to this question in any way. One fragment states, "the thinking faculty (τὸ φρονεῖν) is common to all," where "all" most certainly means "all men" (113). In another fragment, Heraclitus states, "all men have the capacity (μέτεστι) of knowing (γνώσει) themselves" (116); here, however, the knowing is only explicitly extended to "knowing themselves," but the faculty of knowing is affirmed at least to that degree. In a third place, he says that: "to those who are awake, there is one common cosmos," but when asleep each man turns away to "a private one (ὁδίον)," (89), which at least implies that men could be "awake"; "waking" here seems rather clearly to be a figure for genuine knowing, especially in view of the related statement that "the rest of mankind (that is, men besides himself) are unaware of what they do while awake just as they forget what they do while asleep" (1). While the question is by no means answered in straightforward terms, these three statements suggest that men in general are able to know genuinely as far as Heraclitus is concerned.4

Much stronger evidence on this question is the negative evidence; nowhere in any of the numerous statements of men's

4Similarly, Heraclitus compares those who are void of understanding to the deaf (34), describes them as "present yet absent," according to some proverb (34), and speaks of them as "arriving at understanding" (108).
not-knowing does Heraclitus deny their ability to know genuinely; nor anywhere else in the fragments. For one so concerned with the absence of genuine knowing, this lack of comment about the absence of the ability to know seems significant.

Still more important than the three vague statements in favor of men's ability to know genuinely, and really more important than the absence of negations of this ability, there is the fact that Heraclitus spoke out, tried to communicate his understanding of things to other men. It is surely reasonable to conclude that he hoped that they would understand his words, that he believed that they were able to attain to genuine knowing. Moreover, it is clear that he believed that he had achieved some degree of genuine understanding; yet he nowhere indicates that he possessed special gifts or was in any other way different from ordinary men, save in his having achieved some genuine understanding of things.

From these various sources of evidence from within the fragments, it seems clear that men in general are, for Heraclitus, able to achieve genuine knowing, but are failing in the actual accomplishment of this possibility.

Heraclitus on his predecessors

Heraclitus has often been set down as primarily concerned with attacking his various predecessors for their errors and general ignorance, and the opinion that Heraclitus is supposed to have denied men's ability to know genuinely can
probably be traced in part to this presentation of him. As a matter of fact, within the corpus of fragments at our disposal, the negative statements about his predecessors are not very numerous—seven fragments are concerned—and are balanced by several apparently complimentary statements about others of his predecessors or even about those he criticizes—three fragments are complimentary.

Heraclitus criticizes six of his predecessors in the fragments: Hesiod three times, Homer three times, Pythagoras twice, and once each Archilochus, Hecataeus, and Xenophanes (40, 42, 56, 57, 81, 105, 106). He speaks in complimentary terms of specific men in three places: once of Bias of Priene (39); once of Homer (56), whom he also criticizes elsewhere; and once in praise of Hermodorus (121), on whose behalf he takes the Ephesians to task.

The volume of evidence clearly favors the conclusion that Heraclitus was much more concerned with men's failure to achieve the genuine knowing of which they were capable than he was about the errors or ignorance of his various predecessors. As for those predecessors, it also seems that Heraclitus's famed critical attitude towards them has been somewhat overstated, at least insofar as the fragments at our disposal serve to indicate.

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5Heraclitus also says in one place: "the knowledge of the most famous men is but opinion" (28); and in another place: "they believe the popular bards" (104). Both of these statements may be related to Heraclitus's comments on his predecessors.
Knowing

Heraclitus's positive statements about knowing actually achieved by men can be grouped conveniently under three headings: the statements about himself as knower; the statements in which he indicates certain "guidelines" for genuine knowing; and the statements in which he characterizes wisdom and "that which is wise (τὸ σοφόν)." All three groups taken together form a set of fragments not half as large as the body of materials on not-knowing in the fragments; but they indicate nevertheless certain characteristics of genuine knowing when it is actually achieved.

Heraclitus on himself as knower

Heraclitus most certainly considered himself to be knowing genuinely, "distinguishing each thing according to nature and telling how it is" (1). He may well have seen himself as unique among men in the achievement of genuine knowing; for he speaks of "the rest of mankind" who are as if asleep (1), and in another place he says that "none of those whose discourse (λόγους) I have heard has arrived at" an understanding of wisdom (108). But, on the other hand, he does speak in apparently complimentary terms of some of his predecessors; and in one place he refers to "men who love wisdom (φιλοσόφους ἀνδρας)--philosophers." (35), but doesn't make it clear if there are such men besides himself.

What is clear is that Heraclitus considered himself to
be a genuine knower, unique or one of a few among men. But he also implies quite clearly that ultimately he too is only a listener; for he states that wisdom belongs to those "listening not to me, but to the logos (τοῦ λόγου)" (50). And he also indicates that his own knowing was related to perception and ordinary experience, a topic that will be examined in detail in the fourth section of this chapter: "things of which there is sight, hearing, learning--these are what I prefer" (55).

Heraclitus presents himself as a knower, but one who knows by listening to the logos as to some sort of source or principle of wisdom, and by preferring the things of ordinary experience in some way.6

Some guidelines for genuine knowing

In five places in the fragments, Heraclitus seems to be offering guidelines to men to help them know genuinely; some of these statements are not very striking, while others offer important hints about the nature of the knowing which Heraclitus is concerned about; all of them deserve at least a mention.

"Let us not conjecture at random (μὴ εἰκῇ συμβαλλέμεθα) about the greatest things (τῶν μεγίστων)," he says in one fragment (47), but without further specifying the phrase "the greatest things."

6One other statement may be taken as explaining something about Heraclitus the knower: "I searched myself" (101); but the fragment says no more, and the only parallel in terminology is the statement about searching for gold (22). He does state in one place that men can know themselves and act with moderation; this statement will be examined in chapter three (116).
"Men who love wisdom (φιλοσόφους ἀνώρας) must be inquirers (ὑπόρας) into very many things indeed" (35). This breadth of inquiry will be seen to be a characteristic of the type of knowing which Heraclitus is concerned about.

"If we speak with intelligence (ἐν νόμῳ λέγοντας), we must (χρή) base our strength on that which is common to all (τῷ ἔννοιᾳ πᾶντων)" (114) The relationship of genuine knowing to "that which is common" also appears in another statement: "therefore one must follow (δεῖ ἐπεσθεί) that which is common (τῷ ἔννοιᾳ)" (2). In a third statement, the same pattern appears in a slightly different form: "one must know (εἰ δεῦναι δὲ χρή) that war is common (ἔννοια)" (80). Then the last quoted statement continues: "and [one must know that] justice [is] strife and that all things come about (γίνομενα πάντα) by way of strife and necessity," where the breadth of the knowing ("all things") again appears as a characteristic (80).

In four of these statements, Heraclitus is insistent about the characteristics of knowing set down: "it is necessary (χρή)" and "one must (δεῖ)." Knowing is open to "all things" and must be in touch with what is 'common" if it is to be genuine knowing. It will be necessary to examine the themes of "all things" and "that which is common" in the fragments in order to understand the knowing which Heraclitus has in mind. This will be the aim of the third section of this chapter when it deals with the object of knowing and not-knowing.7

7"Justice is also presented as related to genuine
The characteristics of wisdom

Heraclitus speaks of wisdom or that which is wise in seven places in the fragments. He refers to wisdom by the abstract noun σοφία, "wisdom," only once, however; and therefore there may seem to be a certain assumption being made when we take the other expressions (σοφωτατος, "the wisest"; τὸ σοφὸν "that which is wise"; σοφὸν "the wise [thing] ") to refer to the same thing. This is not simply an assumption, however, but rather a conclusion based on the use of the various expressions within the fragments.

Heraclitus does not make it explicit anywhere in the fragments that wisdom is the state or condition of actually possessing genuine knowledge. The terms used to refer to wisdom in the fragments are, however, substantive; and thus they suggest a state or condition rather than a power or activity; the one exception is the adjective, "wise" which appears twice (56, 118). The statements on wisdom frequently knowing, as the criterion or judge of knowing: "justice will convict those who fabricate and testify to lies" (28); justice will be considered in detail in chapter two, but its relationship to genuine knowing and themes such as "all things" and unity is noteworthy.

8 Most of the expressions by which Heraclitus refers to knowing and not-knowing are active or infinitive forms; the exceptions are νόσος and φην (104), νόν and πολυμαθη (40), γνωσίς (56), γνωμή (41), γνώμας (78), ἀπίστη (86), ἀμαθη (95). Though these exceptions may appear quite numerous, they are certainly not a quarter of all the reference to knowing or not-knowing in the fragments; the suggestion is that Heraclitus generally viewed knowing as relatively dynamic, as an action of man rather than a state.
link it with other cognitive activities—knowing (41), agreeing (50), speaking (112)—but only once in a more ethically oriented context (112, the second part). In sum, the basic meaning of wisdom refers chiefly to genuine knowing, although it carries with it a certain ethical connotation. Thus, although the evidence is indirect and inexplicit, there is reason to take Heraclitus’s statements characterizing wisdom as related to his guidelines on genuine knowing insofar as they indicate the same or related characteristics of genuine knowing in some way. The place of wisdom in Heraclitus’s comments on man’s ethical life will be studied in chapter three of this paper.

There is a third problem about the statements on wisdom which deserves brief mention here, but will be examined in detail later. For in one statement Heraclitus says that "that which alone is wise . . . is willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus" (32); and the question arises whether wisdom, as substantive knowing, is possessed by or to be identified with only some divine being. The other statements about wisdom indicate that it is a human characteristic, however; and we may therefore proceed to study its characteristics as they relate to genuine knowing, but with the cautions and reservations suggested by the foregoing comments.

"It is wise to agree (δομολογεῖν σοφόν ἔστιν) that all things are one (ἐν πάντα ἐστιν)" (50). In another place: "That which is wise (τὸ σοφὸν) is one (ἐν): to know
the thought (ἐπίστασθαι; γνώμην) by which all things are steered through all things" (41). In both of these statements, wisdom reaches out to all things, just as genuine knowing was said to do. Both statements also deal with something which is in some way common, namely with the unity of all things in the first statement, and with the "thought (γνώμην)" which steers all things somehow in the second.

Both of these statements speak of unity in connection with wisdom, but do so in different senses. In the first case, the unity spoken of is the unity of all things; in the second statement, it is the unity of wisdom itself as it reaches out to all things and the "thought" which steers them. In another statement, Heraclitus says: "That alone which is wise is one (ἐν τῷ σοφῷ μοῦνον)" (32); here wisdom's unity is one of uniqueness, that there is only one "which is wise"; this is the statement which is concluded by "it is willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus" (32). Wisdom, in the manner it is spoken of here, as a unique and special unity which is directed to all things, does not seem to be identified with man's knowing, although this is partly an interpretation based upon our usual refusal to grant such a unique and separated character to man's knowing of things. In fact, the separation of "what is wise" is made explicit in another fragment: "what is wise (σοφὸν) is set apart from all things (πάντων κεχωρισμένον)" (108).

Thus wisdom is both the same as genuine knowing in its
orientation towards all things and what is common to all things. But it seems to differ from genuine knowing in its intrinsic unity, its uniqueness, and its separateness from all things, even to the point of accepting in some sense ("willing and unwilling") the title of the divinity. One might conclude that Heraclitus means that genuine knowing, as a state in man, is in fact so integrating and penetrating of the unity of all things that it can be itself termed intrinsically one and unique; it is not to be identified with the intelligibility of all things, however, because wisdom is clearly stated to be a knowing of the "thought" which steers all things. On the other hand, the uniqueness, separateness, and association of wisdom with the unity and government of all things could be stressed, with emphasis laid upon the association of wisdom with the title of divinity. In this latter view, wisdom would be a sort of divine wisdom, governing all things as the source of intelligibility and truth for all things and for all knowers: in such a view, it would be significant that "wise" and "wisdom" when clearly applied to human acts and human souls are spoken of by the forms of the term σοφή and its adjective σοφὸς (112, 50, 118, 56), while the neuter σοφὸς is used substantively when referring to the divine wisdom (41, 32, 108); this matter is not as clear as would seem from this last comment, however, since "what is wise" (108) has no article to indicate its substantive character clearly, and thus does not differ in form from "wise (σοφὸς )" in the statement "it is wise to agree that all things
If we accept the different expressions of wisdom as referring to basically the same reality, the reality referred to seems to be the state or condition of genuine knowing in man; but the case is not clear in this regard as yet, and further analysis of the unity of all things and what is common will not clarify it altogether. Further analysis of Heraclitus's views on divinity, however, will suggest that a separate divine intelligibility of all things was probably not held by him; these matters will be taken up in the second chapter of this paper.

Three of Heraclitus's statements clearly do refer to man, regardless of the problems with the other four. In one of these, Heraclitus explains that "a dry soul is wisest and best" (118), a statement whose significance will become evident only later when the soul and wetness can be examined in detail. He states: "Homer was wiser (σοφότερος) than all the Greeks" (56). Finally, he says of wisdom: "Wisdom (σοφία) is to speak the truth (ἀληθέα λέγειν) and to act according to nature (ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν), paying heed (ἐπειδὴντας)" (112). Wisdom here combines knowing truly with acting in a certain way; the criterion of action given here, however, is the same as Heraclitus's description of his own knowing, "distinguishing each thing according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν)" (1). Thus the wisdom spoken of here is clearly related to genuine knowing, and would seem to be the link between knowing genuinely and acting
upon that knowledge. A further link between this wisdom and genuine knowing appears in the word "paying heed (ἐπὶ οὐ γυναῖ)," for it indicates, as Heraclitus indicates of himself as knower, a relationship between knowing and ordinary experience and perception. Homer's wisdom is also spoken of in a context concerned with human knowing.

If wisdom and "that which is wise" are the same basic reality, they refer to the state or condition of genuine knowing in man, especially as it directs his action, on the one hand, and penetrates to the unity and governing "thought" of all things, on the other. If these two forms of expression are taken to refer to two distinct realities, then "wisdom" must still be taken to refer to man's genuine knowing as it guides his actions (and is somehow a perfection of his soul). "That which is wise" must then be granted to be rather vague both in what it refers to and in its grammatical variations in the fragments. Further analysis, particularly of the theme of the divine, the governor of all things, the unity of all things, that which is common, and the logos, will help to clarify the matter; but the most internally consistent position seems to prefer wisdom to be one thing, the state or condition of genuine knowing in man, characterized by its grasp of all things and that which is common to all things, but going beyond to the depth of unity and order, and carrying the fruits of genuine knowing into action.
The Object of Knowing and Not-Knowing

What is it that Heraclitus says men are capable of knowing but in fact fail to know? What is it that men know when their knowing is genuine and they have attained to wisdom? A thorough analysis of the objects of not-knowing and genuine knowing will permit us to further characterize in greater detail the type of knowing which Heraclitus has in mind in these two sets of statements, and to determine whether what has here been termed "genuine knowing" and characterized is several ways from pertinent statements in the fragments is to be identified with the knowing which Heraclitus says men are failing at. This identification seems likely, of course; but substantiation of this conclusion from the fragments is a necessary step in accepting it as a valid interpretation of Heraclitus's thought.

The objects of not-knowing

In eight of the not-knowing statements, no object of not-knowing is specified (2, 34, 40, 78, 86, 95, 104 twice). Analysis of the rest of the not-knowing statements brings to light several already familiar themes again as objects of not-knowing or as intimately linked with the stated objects, and introduces several new themes.

1. All things

The theme of "all things" is explicitly linked with the object of not-knowing only once: "though all things come to pass (γινομένων γὰρ πάντων ) in accordance with this logos,"
men seem as if ignorant" (1). The expression γινόμενα πάντα, "all things coming to pass," has been variously interpreted, however, as referring simply to "everything that happens" or as indicating that all things are involved in a process of coming-to-be. While both interpretations indicate the breadth of the knowing which men lack, and this is adequate for our present purposes, it will nevertheless be necessary to examine and compare this phrase with other instances of "all things" and other forms of γινόμενα, "come to be" or "happen," in the fragments. For the moment, it is sufficient to point out the universality of the object of not-knowing in this fragment; the other question will be examined in chapter two.

2. That which is common

The reference to "this logos" in the statement just quoted is the only reference in the fragments in which the object of not-knowing is clearly related to "all things" (or "all things that happen" or whatever) as somehow "common." "This logos" is not the expressed object of not-knowing, however— rather, "this logos" is the common aspect of a total situation which is not-known: "though all things come to pass in accordance with this logos, men seem as if ignorant" (1). "That which is common" is not the express object of not-knowing, but is intimately related to it.

3. Unity and oneness

Unity and oneness appears as the explicit objects of
not-knowing in several statements. "Hesiod was unaware that the nature of every day is one (φύσιν ἡμέρας ἀπὸς μίαν ὀόςαν)" (106); here the unity-theme is linked with the theme of the universality of not-knowing, its relation to "all things," at least in the unity of the nature of every day. "Nature (φύσις)" is the expressed basis of this unity of all days, and stands therefore as something which is common to them all.

"Hesiod did not understand night and day: for they are one (ἐστι γὰρ ἐν ὃν )" (57). Here the unity is not based on something which is common to all, but rather is the unity of elements which are ordinarily opposed to each other, ordinarily considered to be opposites which exclude each other and are not united.

Another fragment expresses this second type of unity as an object of not-knowing: "they do not grasp how that which differs from itself is in agreement (ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἐστὶν ἰμολογεῖ)" (51).

Thus two types of unity are presented as objects of men's not-knowing, the unity based upon something common to all the elements concerned, and the unity of elements ordinarily considered to be opposed to each other in some way. This theme of unity, in its first-mentioned form, relates to the themes of "all things" and "that which is common" to some extent as well.

4. The near at hand

The object of not-knowing is described as being "near-at-hand" in several places. "Those things which they encounter
daily (οἵς καθ' ἡμέραν ἐγκυροῦσι) seem to them strange" (72). "Many do not understand such things, indeed all who come upon them (ὅκσοι ἐγκυρεῦσιν)" (17). Men fail to understand even though the object is near-at-hand and met with even daily. This closeness of the object of not-knowing further suggests its universality and commonness as well.

In two other places, the object of not-knowing is near-at-hand and linked with logos, although one statement refers to "this logos" and the other to "the logos," which will have to be compared and studied later on. "Though they associate with the logos most closely (ὁι μᾶλλον διηνεκῆς ὁμιλοῦσι λόγῳ τῷ ἅγιῳ), yet they are separated from it," an expression taken to figuratively indicate not-knowing (72). "Although this logos exists forever (τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐόντος ἀεὶ)," with a temporal "near-at-hand-ness," yet men continue to fail to understand it (1).

Finally, in another statement, Heraclitus suggests that what men fail to understand is near-at-hand in a certain sense by saying, "not understanding, although they have heard, they are like the deaf. The proverb bears witness to them: present yet absent (παρεσύνας ἀπεῖναι)" (34).

Thus, although men encounter the not-known and are present to it and associate with it, yet they do not know it, are separated from it and are as if deaf and absent. The object of not-knowing seems clearly to touch the whole of man's experience in this near-at-hand-ness, even perhaps
being timeless ("exists forever"). The universality of the object of not-knowing is again affirmed, and its presence as somehow common to everything is some way. It will be necessary to ask later on why it is that something which is so near-at-hand is not evident and easily known by men.

5. The hidden

A few of the fragments indicate that the object of not-knowing is hidden. This would seem to be an obvious statement, in view of the numerous statements about men's not-knowing this object. It is worth indicating, moreover, that what is hidden is not necessarily therefore no longer near-at-hand. Its hiddenness, in fact, helps us understand why men fail to know what is so near-at-hand.

"Nature likes to hide (φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ)” (123). Nature has already been referred to as the basis of unity of every day by being somehow common to every day (106); however, it may be that "the nature of every day" and "nature" as a general, abstract noun refer to two different aspects of reality, as is the case in English with the word "nature"; this matter will be examined later in this paper.

"The limits of the soul (ψυχῆς πείρατα ) would you not find (ἐξεύροιο ) though you should travel every road: so deep a logos has it (οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει )” (45). Here again there is a reference to logos, this time to "the logos of the soul," which is described as "deep" and whose depth seems to be the reason for the hiddenness of the "limits of the soul."
The theme of "soul" will be studied in detail in the second chapter of this paper.9

"The hidden harmony is stronger than the evident (ἀρμονία ἄφαντος φανερῶς κρείττων)" (54). The object of not-knowing is hidden; here seems to be a hierarchy of objects, in which the hidden not-known is preferred to the more evident and known; hence men are not totally ignorant, it would seem, but simply lacking in more important knowing, whose object is hidden.

6. Logos

As has already become evident, the term logos is frequently associated with the object of not-knowing. Twice the reference is to "this logos": "Although this logos exists forever, men fail to understand it" (1); "though all things come to pass (γινομένων γὰρ πάντων) in accordance with this logos (κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον), men seem as if ignorant" (1). Once the reference is to "the logos": "though they associate with the logos most closely, yet they are separated from it" (72). Finally, the soul's logos is mentioned once in connection with the object of not-knowing: "the limits of the soul would you not

9 The only other use of "limit (περάς)" is in a fragment which explains that "beginning and end (περάς) are common in the circumference of a circle" (103). The concept seems related to the term "measures" in the statement: "the sun will not transgress his measures (μέτρα)" (94); another possibly related term is translated "limits" in the statement: "the limits (κατά τὸν λόγον τοῦτον) of morning and evening are the Bear and, opposite the Bear, the boundary-mark (ὅρος) of Zeus, god of the clear sky" (120). These fragments will receive consideration again later; see especially footnote 24 of chapter two.
find though you should travel every road: so deep a logos has it (οὗτω βαθὺν λόγον ἐχεῖ;)" (45). The relationship of these different uses of this term will be examined later. The connection of the term with the themes of "all things" and universality, that which is common, unity and oneness, the near-at-hand, and the hidden here in the not-knowing statements is already clear.

7. Other objects of not-knowing

The relationship between men's not-knowing and the ordinary actions of their lives appears in several fragments and through several images, especially the comparison of not-knowing to sleep (1, 73, 89); this matter will be examined in detail in chapter three of this paper.

In one statement, Heraclitus speaks of the man who worships statues as "not understanding what gods and heroes really are (οὐνεκές εἰσι;)" (5). This theme of the gods and what is divine will be treated in detail in chapters two and three.

Finally, in two places, Heraclitus indicates that men do not understand genuine knowing itself: "none arrives at the realization that what is wise (σοφόν) is set apart from all things" (108), and, although they do not understand, "to themselves, they seem (to understand)" (17). They are ignorant of what wisdom is like--a difficult matter in the fragments, as has already been noted--and they are unaware
that they lack genuine knowing.\textsuperscript{10}

8. Summary

The knowing which men lack is knowing directed to "all things" and to what is common and universal, to unity and oneness both of seemingly opposed elements and of elements which have something in common, to nature in some sense, and to \textit{logos} in three different senses which still need to be examined. The objects of not-knowing are near-at-hand within man's experience, yet hidden, and affect his ordinary actions and life. Men's ignorance extends to what is divine in some way; and men in general are ignorant of the sort of knowing which they are lacking.

Now these characteristics of the knowing which men lack must be compared with the statements about genuine knowing and its objects.

The object of genuine knowing

Only a few of the statements about Heraclitus's own knowing, his guidelines for genuine knowing, and his characterizations of wisdom are definite in their reference to an object, but consideration of these will be helpful.

\textsuperscript{10}As was noted above, several other statements seem related to these; they are concerned with not knowing the "way" (71), not being aware where one is going (117), and lacking a proper understanding of justice (23, 102). This last object of not-knowing, justice, is a theme which will become important in chapter two; its relationship to all things, to unity, to "that which is common" and so on will become clearer when it is examined in detail.
1. The object of Heraclitus's knowing

Heraclitus explains that in his knowing he is "distinguishing each thing (ἐκαστῶν) according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν) and telling how it is (ὡς ἔχει)" (1). The reference to "each thing" parallels the orientation of not-knowing to "all things" in some sense. "Nature (φύσις)" has already appeared as the object of not-knowing in a context in which it was linked with the theme of oneness and unity. The phrase "how it (each thing) is" does not appear anywhere else in the fragments; here it indicates that Heraclitus believed that he was explaining the actual characteristics of the real world, a notion which fits well with his comparisons of ignorance to what a man does in his sleep or in a world of "private" reality (1, 2, 73, 89).

Elsewhere he states that wisdom belongs to those "listening not to me, but to the logos (τοῦ λόγου)" (50); here the logos seems to be the source of wisdom, and by implication the source of Heraclitus's wisdom; it is not the object of his knowing, at least not explicitly. The metaphor of "listening to the logos" could be interpreted as meaning "knowing the logos," but the sense of it is more in the direction of a source of genuine knowledge; in any case, the logos is clearly related to the object of genuine knowing.

In another place, Heraclitus opts for "things of which there is sight, hearing, learning--these are what I prefer (προτιμῶ)" (55). The relationship of ordinary experience to
genuine knowing will be examined in the last section of this chapter; but its significance in Heraclitus's mind is clear from this strongly worded comment.

2. The object in the guideline statements

Several familiar themes appear in the descriptions of what Heraclitus says knowing must be. "One must know that war is common, and justice [is] strife, and that all things come about (γινόμενα πάντα ) by way of strife and necessity" (80). Here, "all things" appears as part of what men must know, again in the phrase whose interpretation needs attention in chapter two, γινόμενα πάντα, "everything that happens" or "all comings of things." Knowing must reach "that which is common," just as not-knowing was related to it. Additional themes which are clearly closely related to "all things" and what is common are war, strife, justice, and necessity, all of which will be examined later in detail.

"Men who love wisdom (φιλοσόφους, ἅνδος) must be inquirers into very many things indeed (εὖ μὴ λα νολλάν)" (35); here is another oblique but, as far as it goes, pertinent comment upon the universality of genuine knowing and its openness to "all things" in some way.

Finally, in one place, Heraclitus bids us not to "conjecture at random about the greatest things" (47), but without further specifying these "greatest things"; clearly, however, the knowing concerned is not to be adjudged trivial
or shallow in its compass and depth.\textsuperscript{11}

3. The object of wisdom

Only two of the statements about wisdom indicate the object of wisdom and the genuine knowing associated with it. "It is wise to agree that all things are one (ἐν πᾶντα εἴναι;)" (50); here "all things" appears without further attributes as part of the object of knowing, and unity and oneness as well. The unity in this case is general, limited neither to unity by reason of a common nature nor to unity of apparent opposites; here the unity which knowing grasps is universal unity of all things without qualification.

"That which is wise is one thing: to know the thought (γνώμη) by which all things are steered through all things" (41). Again the object of wisdom includes all things without further qualification. The unity here spoken of is attributed to wisdom, however, rather than to wisdom's object. But that object clearly includes a common aspect of all things, namely their common "steerer," referred to by the term γνώμη, which has been variously interpreted and will be examined in detail later.

The statements on wisdom are the clearest among the statements of Heraclitus about positive knowing when it comes

\textsuperscript{11}It has already been noted that "justice" is also presented as a judge of those lacking genuine knowing, as a critic and criterion of genuine knowing (28). The significance of justice's place in relationship to genuine knowing will become clear in chapter two when the theme is examined in some detail.
to examining the object. Wisdom's object clearly relates to all things, to what is common, to unity and oneness. Also associated with these themes is the unity of wisdom itself, although this is not present as an object as such, and the theme of the governing or "steering" of all things. Similarly, the most often expressed objects of genuine knowing in the other two sets of positive knowing statements are "all things," oneness and unity, and "that which is common"; and the various other themes which occur as objects of genuine knowing or as closely linked with these objects are all closely related to these three themes.

Genuine knowing as philosophical

Is the knowing which men fail to be identified with the knowing which Heraclitus speaks of positively and offers guidelines for? The evidence from the analysis of the objects expressed in the two sets of statements indicates that Heraclitus was concerned about one realm of knowing, that he felt men were failing to achieve this form of knowledge, and that he could speak positively of it in terms of his own knowing, of certain guidelines for its achievement, and of certain characteristics of its presence as part of wisdom. The knowing which has been termed "genuine" in these pages and the knowing which men are failing at are the same; this is the conclusion indicated by the frequent identity of the objects in the two sets of statements, and the undeniable similarity and interrelationship of all the objects discovered.
Another question now comes to mind. We must ask whether this genuine knowing which men are lacking includes all of man's knowing activities, for Heraclitus has been often thought of as a sceptic of one sort or another. This question can be answered in two ways: How is genuine knowing to be characterized? Does it include all knowing; and, if it does not include all knowing—if genuine knowing is somehow a specialized form of knowing—how is it related to the rest of human knowing? The characterization of genuine knowing, by examining its objects, is the task of this subsection. The second question will be answered in the section that follows.

Genuine knowing is characterized most frequently in the two sets of statements about it as a knowing directed to all things, to that which is common, and to oneness and unity. Nature, and especially logos under various specifications are linked with the object of thing knowing, as are war, strife, justice, and necessity. The gods and what is divine and the wisdom that is "separated from all things" are also related to this object, as is the "thought (γνώμη) which steers all things through all things." The object of this knowing is near-at-hand, and is characterized by common-ness in all things, but it is nevertheless hidden. In the effort to reach this object, "the greatest things" are at stake, as are wisdom itself and truth.

Thus genuine knowing is specified by its objects to be a relatively abstract, universal, synthetic knowing. Its objects
and the themes related to them suggest that this genuine knowing which Heraclitus is speaking of is not all human knowing, but is the realm of knowing ordinarily spoken of as "philosophical." Without any effort to use this term technically, the knowing which Heraclitus is dealing with in the statements which we have been examining seems aptly described by it; Heraclitus himself used the term once (35). But regardless of the term used to describe this realm of knowing, it is clear from the objects of this knowing that Heraclitus is not referring to ordinary everyday experiential and perceptual knowledge; his concern is with the unity and common aspects of all things and with the structures and processes in which this unity is to be found.

If genuine knowing then is a specialized, "philosophical" realm of knowing, what is its relationship to what is perceived and understood in ordinary experience? This question is the topic of the next section.

### Genuine Knowing and the Data of Ordinary Experience

Heraclitus has often been presented as a sceptic, as a man radically distrustful of human pretentions to genuine knowledge. This scepticism has been interpreted as Heraclitean in several different forms, each of which needs to be examined here at least briefly.

The Sophists produced a doctrine that there are truths, but no truth; every man is the measure of his own truth at
any particular moment, because all sense data are radically different from all other sense data. Heraclitus's view that all things are in flux and his statements about men's ignorance were received by the Sophists as evidence for their position; and many commentators since the Sophists have treated Heraclitus similarly, even attributing the Sophist position as a whole to him. It should already be manifest, however, that a radically different view of Heraclitus is taking shape in these pages, based upon what Heraclitus himself says in the fragments at our disposal. The evidence of the fragments available to us points strongly to the conclusion that Heraclitus believed in a genuine object of human knowledge and in man's ability to achieve knowledge of that object.

Plato believed that there is a genuine object of man's knowing and that it is knowable by man; but he judged that ordinary experience is radically incapable of helping man in his efforts to attain genuine knowledge, except to provide reminders of the Ideas which he may come to know again. Plato justified his views on ordinary human experience, in part, by presenting Heraclitus's doctrines about the changing world which he received, more than likely, through the Sophists. Plato sometimes seems to hold that the senses are actually lying to man, supplying him with data of apparent stability in a world of flux, data which are fundamentally false therefore; Plato seems to attribute this position to Heraclitus as well. It is therefore important to determine from the fragments which we
have what Heraclitus does in fact say about the place of the senses and ordinary experience in men's efforts to attain genuine, "philosophical," knowing.

The senses as liars

Only two of the fragments even suggest that the senses are false to man; and in both cases, it is some factor other than the senses themselves which is the cause of ignorance or error. In one fragment, Heraclitus refers to "men who do not know how to listen or how to speak" (19), but "listening (ἀκοῦσα;)" is not the cause of the ignorance; "listening" is rather the positive power about which these men are ignorant. In the second statement, Heraclitus says: "The eyes and ears of those having barbarous souls (βαρβαροὺς ψυχὰς) are bad witnesses" (107); again the error is not attributed to the senses, but here rather to the condition of the soul.

In a third statement that is pertinent, Heraclitus states: "much learning (πολὺμαθὴ) does not teach one to have intelligence; for it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again, Xenophanes and Hecataeus" (40). "Much learning" seems likely to refer here to learning beyond ordinary experience, otherwise the choice of four famous teachers and wise men as exemplars would be a little strange. There is a problem with this word, however; for πολὺμαθὴ might also be interpreted as "much ordinary experiential learning," just as ἄμαθος seems to refer to the ordinary "learning" of ordinary experience (55)
and μαθώνες as well (17).\textsuperscript{12} If "much learning (πολυμαθὴς )" is taken to mean a lot of ordinary experiential learning, then the conclusion would follow from Heraclitus's statement that ordinary experience does not give rise to intelligence, or at least not immediately; in either case, the senses are not necessarily liars, but simply inadequate to produce intelligence unaided—which is not a particularly striking conclusion, nor a particularly sceptical one.

The relationship of ordinary perceptual experience and "learning" to genuine, "philosophical" knowing has not yet been determined, of course, from the examination of these three statements. It can be concluded, however, that Heraclitus nowhere in the fragments denies the validity of sense knowledge as such, nor attributes ignorance or error to them as chief causes in any sceptical sense. The senses are not to be judged liars, although they are not able to produce genuine, "philosophical," knowing on their own.

"Hearing" and genuine, philosophical knowing

The sense-knowledge which Heraclitus most frequently associates with "philosophical" knowing or its absence is hearing (ἀκούοντα: ). In the statements concerned, however, he is most assuredly speaking of hearing figuratively. Thus he says:

\textsuperscript{12}In addition to the three already noted here (17, 45, 55), there is a fourth derivative of μαθέοντα which appears once in the fragments; but it is not clear from this fourth usage which realm of learning is in question: "it is better to hide ignorance (ἀμαθὴς )" (95).
"Listening not to me but to the \textit{logos}, it is wise to agree that all things are one" (50). Again, in another fragment he speaks of "men void of understanding both before they hear this \textit{logos} and when they have heard it for the first time \textit{(καὶ πρὸς θεόν ἡ ἀκοόσαι καὶ ἀκουσάντες τὸ πρῶτον)}" (1), and in another place of men "void of understanding although they have heard" (34); these, he says, are "like the deaf \textit{(κωφοῖσιν ἔοικας)}" (34).

This figurative interpretation of "hearing" in these fragments seems the preferable one, particularly since Heraclitus explicitly gives priority to hearing the \textit{logos} rather than listening to a man, even himself. Thus the interpretations of "this \textit{logos}" and "the \textit{logos}" as referring to Heraclitus's own doctrine (or book if there was one) seem less than likely; the references to \textit{logos} in the fragments will receive detailed study in the next chapter. The treatment of "hearing" as a figure for man's contact with genuine knowing or its object, while it might be taken to suggest a dependence of genuine knowing upon ordinary experience because Heraclitus chose so common an experience for his figure, does not really help our examination of the relationship between genuine, "philosophical" knowing and ordinary perceptual experience very significantly.

\textbf{Ordinary knowing and genuine philosophical knowing}\

Ordinary experiential knowledge is set down as the context of philosophical knowing in several places in the
fragments without any hint of the statements being figures.

In one place, Heraclitus speaks of experience in general: "men seem as if ignorant when they experience (πειραμενοι) such words and things (καὶ ἐπέσων καὶ ἐργαν)" (1). In another place, he refers to ordinary learning (μαθησις) "they do not grasp them after they have learnt (μαθησις)" (17). Elsewhere, "perceiving, being aware (ἐπαθοντας)" is set down as a characteristic of those who practice wisdom, speaking the truth and acting according to nature (112).13

On the other hand, there is one statement which could be translated: "men are deceived in the knowledge of visible things (τῶν φαινερῶν)" (56). But the key term in this statement, φαινερῶν, is probably intended in a more figurative sense of "manifest, evident." This sense of the term is more suited to the example of deception which is given in the fragment concerned,14 as well as to the general conclusion being formed from the fragments that the senses do not deceive man and do contribute positively to genuine knowing. The other use of the term in the fragments, moreover, makes far better sense when interpreted in the figurative sense (54). Thus, although the

13 The term ἐπαθοντας, translated here as "perceiving, being aware" is translated as "paying heed" by Freeman; this latter is retained when the whole fragment is presented, since it fits the sentence structure more aptly; the term appears in one other place (117) where it also refers to awareness: "unaware of where he is going."

14 The fragment reads: "for he too was deceived by boys killing lice, who said" 'what we saw and caught, that we left behind; but what we did not see and did not catch, that we bring"' (56).
the matter is debatable and the evidence not irrepressible on either side, the preferable reading would be: "men are deceived in the knowledge of things which are evident" (56).

The evidence from the fragments, even taking the last-studied statement in its less probable interpretation, favors the conclusion that ordinary experience does have a place in the acquisition of genuine knowing. Heraclitus seems to say that men, "having experienced" and "having learnt" (and "having heard" in the figurative sense), ought not be ignorant, and that those who act wisely are those who are aware. In a related statement of considerable directness, Heraclitus opts not only for "ordinary learning (μυθησθὲς )" but for "sight and hearing (ὁψις, ἀκοή)" as well; he does not make explicit mention of genuine, "philosophical" knowing in this statement, however: "things of which there is sight, hearing, learning--these are what I prefer (προτιμέω)" (55).

Thus, while the place of ordinary perceptual experience in the process of genuine knowing is not carefully delineated by Heraclitus, it is clear that it had a place as far as he was concerned. There can be little doubt that Heraclitus was neither a sceptic in the Sophist sense, nor an idealist in the Platonic sense. He respected, "preferred," the senses of man and saw their activity as the context of, and perhaps even the way to genuine philosophic knowing.

The senses among themselves

The senses which Heraclitus mentions most often are
sight and hearing. Two fragments, in which they are mentioned together and without comparison have already been examined above (55, 107). A third statement which mentions them both prefers sight to hearing, although the real intent of the comment may well be simply a preference for first-hand knowledge over mere hearsay: "eyes (δεικονιζει) are more exact witness than ears (ωτων)" (101a). This preference for sight, if such is the intent of this fragment, is not repeated anywhere in the fragments.

Single references to sight occur in two fragments (21, 26); but neither of them adds anything or complicates anything which has not already been examined. There are also single references to hearing in two fragments; in one case the object of "I heard" is λόγους, "men's words" (108); in the other case, a form of ἱκους is used in a sense that is passive in English with the meaning "he is called" (79); neither contributes anything new to what we have already concluded.

Smell is mentioned twice in the fragments. In one place, Heraclitus says: "souls have the sense of smell (δομοια) in Hades" (98). In another place, "if all existing things turned to smoke (μαπνος), the nose would distinguish (δινες διν διαγνοιεν)" (7); the nose, rather than the eyes and ears which do the distinguishing at present, apparently, would then take over this task. (The nose's ability to discriminate smoke may account for the soul's having the sense of smell in Hades, rather than sight and hearing; this matter will be
examined in more detail in chapter three of this paper.)

Summary

Heraclitus views the senses much as any man would after reflecting upon his ordinary experience. The primary senses for him are sight and hearing, as for most men, and he speaks of them in quite ordinary ways. There is a preference, more than likely, for first-hand sight over hear-say, which is not particularly profound. The signs of scepticism and general distrust of the senses are few in the fragments at our disposal. Heraclitus seems rather to accept ordinary experience and sense-knowledge as accurate and useful, and as preliminary to the philosophical knowing which was his main concern.

That this genuine, philosophical knowing is of prime importance in Heraclitus's view of things is already clear, and it will become still clearer as we turn to examine its object in detail, the realm of all things, of that which is common to all, of unity and oneness, of the structures and processes which have thus far only been mentioned insofar as knowing could be better characterized and understood through them. Man's ordinary experience is the basis of genuine knowing of a special sort, directed to a special, universal, somewhat abstracted, deeply synthetic knowing of the world of all things. We now turn to that world in order to examine how Heraclitus saw it and believed all men ought to be able to see it.
CHAPTER II

THE UNITY OF ALL THINGS

The world of which Heraclitus writes is the world of everyday and ordinary experience which men of insight are able to understand in all its profundity. Their genuine knowing of the world reaches out beyond their own individual lives to all things, and seeks to understand the unity of all things, the most profound characteristics of the unity, and the ways in which men can speak of it. The purpose of this chapter is to examine Heraclitus's views on these matters as we have them expressed for us in the fragments.

The first section will deal with Heraclitus's statements about all things; it will seek to understand the breadth of his concern, and the importance of coming-to-be as it relates to all things. In the second section, the theme of unity will be examined in detail, not only the explicit references to unity, but also the related theme of "that which is common," and two other aspects of unity which are important in the fragments, nature and cosmos. In the third section, the most basic aspects of the unity of all things will be examined; they are two: the unity of all things in the process called the "turnings of fire," and the aspect of unity called, in one place, "the joinings" of opposites. The final section of the
chapter will deal with the principles to which Heraclitus attributes the unity of all things, examining their substantiality and what is meant by each of the principles named—"the god," the thunderbolt, the thought (γνώμη), "the logos," war, strife, and justice.

All Things

The references to "all things" in the statements on knowing have already made it clear that this is a theme of the greatest importance in the fragments, and a theme to which almost every other major theme is tied. But Heraclitus speaks in several different ways of "all things" in the fragments, and refers twice to γνώμενα πάντα, a phrase involving all things but able to be interpreted in several different ways; this phrase, and then the theme of "all things" itself will be examined in this section.

γνώμενα πάντα

Although the phrase γνώμενα πάντα appears only twice (1, 80) in the fragments, both of its appearances are of considerable importance in the formation of a fundamental synthesis of Heraclitus's thought from the fragments, as well as in the interpretation of various other themes and terms within that synthesis.

The problem of interpretation of this phrase rests first with the verb γνώμαι, for this word can be translated into various English words, "happen, come about, come to pass, come
to be, become, come into being," and even "be born," as well as "change into."

Heraclitus uses a form of the verb γίνομαι: in one place in the fragments with the evident meaning of "be born" (39). He also uses the verb once with the clear meaning of "happen, come to pass" (110). In one fragment, the context leaves the meaning of τὰ γίνομεν uncertain because its gender is uncertain (75). In one fragment, the form γένοιτο clearly means "change into" (7). In two appearances of the verb, the infinitive γενέσθαι is contrasted with "death (Θάνατος)" and seems rather clearly to mean "coming to be, coming into being" as contrasted with "passing away, passing out of being" (36, 77). In one fragment, the infinitive could either mean "change into" or "come into being," but there is not any contrasting mention of death or passing out of being (31). Finally, in one place, the infinitive is used with the sense of "be (in the future), become" (20).

In examining and comparing these various usages in search of some common, basic meaning, it becomes clear that the verb always refers to some form of "actualizing what was formerly potential, within a process." The change or becoming or coming into being which is spoken of in these fragments is not an absolute beginning of being, which the extreme inter-

1Since the meaning of the fragment is that those who sleep are cooperators in τῶν γίνομεν, the preferable interpretation would seem to take this phrase as "things happening, coming to pass"; the statement that men who sleep are among "those being born" in the world makes less sense.
pretation of "coming into being" would suggest; it is rather a becoming that is part of a process, and therefore is the actualization of what was possible and, in a sense, prepared for, led up to, in the process, rather than an arbitrary actualization of something without precedent direction towards it within the process.

Heraclitus has been presented as teaching that things are so unstable and that things come into being and pass out of being with such lack of direction and unity that, within the world he describes, it is possible to speak only of change itself enduring; for such interpreters of Heraclitus's views, the only reality is change. 2

While a thorough critique of this interpretation of Heraclitus's thought cannot depend solely upon the analysis of one verb, the evidence from the fragments is that the important verb under consideration here does not mean "change" in the way in which these commentators have taken it. The analysis of such themes as logos, war, unity, strife, and justice, moreover, will confirm the present interpretation of this verb as well as strengthen the evidence against interpreting Heraclitus's world to be a world of absolute change.

In summary, the basic meaning of γινομαι which underlies each of the individual uses of the verb in the fragments

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2A position like the one mentioned here is proposed by Nietzsche in his Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks: Nietzsche makes much of the arbitrariness of the becoming of all things, placing great significance in the statement: "time is a child playing a game of draughts; the kingship is a child's." (52)
indicates that new being occurs in the path of old, that what comes to be comes from something, that all things which come to be are parts of a process; the process is not more real than the things which, in their coming to be, are the process; but the process is not arbitrary, it has unity and direction and continuity. "Coming into being" was not arbitrary emergence of something utterly new for Heraclitus, but the actualization of something which the process holds in readiness. This is the meaning of the verb γίγνομαι which underlies every particular use of it in the fragments. 3

But there is a second difficulty with the phrase γίγνομαι πάντα, namely the question of which term is being used substantively and which as predicate. The phrase could mean "all coming-to-be-things," that is, all the things which come to be; or it could mean "all-things coming-to-be," that is, everything that is is coming-to-be. The former interpretation would limit the reference to whichever things are actually part of the process without indicating the inclusiveness of the process; the latter interpretation is clear in including all things in the process of coming to be.

A careful study of the fragments at our disposal indicates that Heraclitus permits a participle being used as a noun to be modified directly by another participle or by an adjective only

It is possible that the use of γένοιτο in the hypothetic context of the statement, "if all existing things turned (γένοιτο) to smoke" (?) carries a note of arbitrariness about it; but that note is provided by the overall hypothetical character of the statement, it does not reside in the form of γίγνομαι alone.
once. This occurs in the statement that "while living (a man) approximates to a dead man during sleep" (26): ἡν δὲ ὕπνεια τεθνεώτος εὐδῶν; here the participle εὐδῶν, "sleeping," modifies the participle ἡν, "living one." Even in this example, however, there is a prior antecedent noun earlier in the sentence, ἀνθρώπος, "man." In one phrase, Heraclitus speaks of "all existing things" (7): πάντα τὰ ὄντα; but here the participle which is modified is combined with an article. There is no such article in the phrase γινόμενα πάντα. Finally, in another place, Heraclitus combines the passive participles "connected" and "separate" (10): συνφερόμενον διαφερόμενον; but the rest of the fragment suggests that there is an "and ( καῖ)" implied connecting them.

The evidence from Heraclitus's use of participles throughout the fragments points to "all things" as the substantive and "coming to be" as the predicate in the phrase γινόμενα πάντα. Thus, as a first step in our study of all things, we may conclude that all things are involved in process, in a continuing unfolding of new being that has, at least by implication from the basic meaning of γίγνομαι, some sort of direction or continuity. Further examination of the theme of unity and the themes related to it, as well as Heraclitus's statements about various aspects of the process of all things itself, will confirm this incipient conclusion and clarify it in many details.
All things

Forms of the adjective πᾶς, πᾶν, "all," appear in the fragments twenty-six times. Two of these have already been examined in the analysis of γινόμενα πάντα. Six other times, "all" is used to modify some substantive (7, 45, 56, 87, 106, 116); but only one of these, "all existing things (πάντα τὰ ὄντα)" (7), needs to be considered in more detail here.

This statement is the only one in the fragments in which Heraclitus specifies "all things" as being "all existing things." But the numerous other references to "all things" suggest that the term ὄντα, "existing," in this fragment is used to contrast reality with the hypothetical content of the statement rather than to indicate different statuses of reality of "all things": "if all existing things turned to smoke, the nose would distinguish" (7). 4

Twice in the fragments, Heraclitus speaks of "all things" by using the article with the neuter plural of the adjective: τὰ πάντα (64, 90). Thus he says: "the thunder-bolt steers all things" (64); and "there is an exchange: all things (τὰ πάντα) for fire and fire for all things (ἀπάντων)" (90).

The remaining sixteen appearances of forms of πᾶς, πᾶν are all substantives without articles. Six of these are of the

4Forms of ἐγένετο, "to be," serve this function of predicting real existence in at least three other places in the fragments, where the verb is more than simply a copula; there are two statements dealing with time (1, 30); one other use of the term may also be of this sort (89); one other surely is (23).
form πάντα, which could be either accusative masculine singular, "every man," or nominative or accusative neuter plural, "all things." But four of them are clearly neuter plural, "all things," for the context allows of no other interpretation. Thus Heraclitus speaks of: "joinings: ... from all things one (ἐκ πάντων ἐν ) and from one all things (ἐκ ἐνὸς πάντα )" (10); and of "the thought ( γνώμη) which steers all things through all things (πάντα διὰ πάντων )" (41). Elsewhere Heraclitus says that it is wise to agree that: "all things are one (ἐν πάντα εἷναι )" (50); and that "to the god (τῷ θεῷ ) all things (πάντα ) are beautiful and good and just" (102).

In two places, the form πάντα could possibly mean "every man" without destroying the sense of the fragment. Thus Heraclitus could be saying that fire will come and judge and convict "all things" or "every man" (66), and that the "hours ( ὁραῖ)" bring "all things" or "every man" (100). But Heraclitus rarely allows a singular adjective to stand alone as a substantive—only three times in the fragments: ἐκαστος (1); εὐδοκος (26); ἐνὸς (33). Moreover, both statements make better sense and fit the overall context of the whole body of fragments better if the forms are taken to be neuter plural, and Heraclitus is referring to "all things."

Eight times in the fragments, the genitive plural stands alone as a substantive. Three of these have already been noted in the consideration of πάντα and τὰ πάντα (10, 41, 90). Two other instances of this form occur in conjunction with
"that which is common" (114 first part) and a related use of "the same" (30); their meaning depends upon the sense of "common" in these fragments and they will be examined when the theme of "that which is common" is studied below.

In one fragment, πάντων appears twice: "war is the father of all and the king of all" (53). The fragment could make sense whether πάντων meant "all men" or "all things." But later in the fragment, war's jurisdiction is specified to cover both gods and men, making the interpretation of πάντων as "all men" unlikely; furthermore, in another fragment (80), war is described as "common," a term which will be seen to refer generally to "all things" rather than "all men." In this fragment, πάντων means "all things."

The context of another fragment also indicates that the form πάντων is neuter: "the best men choose one thing rather than all else ( ἐν ἄντι ἀπάντων)" (29). For the neuter form ἐν, "one thing," stands parallel to ἀπάντων, suggesting that the latter is most likely neuter as well, "all things."

Finally there is the πάντων in the statement that "that which is wise is set apart from all" (108). As has already been indicated in the previous chapter, the meaning of this statement and the whole problem of "that which is wise" cannot be clarified until more data can be uncovered in the fragments. Yet the position proposed in chapter one, that "that which is wise" refers in part to "genuine knowing," and that "genuine knowing" is in fact possible for men in general, suggests that "all men"
is the less likely interpretation of this πάντων, particularly in view of Heraclitus's own possession of genuine knowing. Nevertheless, even within the limits of the position proposed in chapter one, "that which is wise" could here be the goal which all men strive towards in knowledge but which none attain completely, even though they travel the whole way (45).

Twice in the fragments, the dative plural, πᾶσι, appears alone as a substantive. One of these appears in conjunction with what is "common" and will be considered when that theme is taken up (113); but it most likely means "all men," unless "the thinking faculty" can somehow be predicated of "all things." 5

In the last use of "all" to be examined here, πᾶσι could mean "all things" or "all men" or "all human laws" without turning the fragment to nonsense (114 second part): "if we speak with intelligence, we must base our strength on that which is common to all (πάντων), as the city on the law and even more strongly. For all human laws are nourished by one which is divine. For it governs as far as (τοσοῦτον ὅμοιον) it will, and is sufficient for all (ἐξαρμένη πᾶσι) and more than enough" (114). Again, however, the more likely meaning seems to be "all things"; for the verbs "is sufficient and more than enough," as well as the neuter adverbial in the preceding clause, "as far as it wills," suggest that πᾶσι is non-personal, that is,

5It is possible that, by referring to "all things," the statement would mean that "all things are intelligible"; but this interpretation of the fragment seems most unlikely. On the intelligibility of all things, see below in the section on the principles of unity.
refers to "things" rather than men. Moreover, as later study of themes related to this law's jurisdiction and that which is divine will show, the jurisdiction is over all things, not only over men, and the theme of divine law is here linked with "that which is common" which ultimately refers to all things. 6 Nevertheless, the whole statement could be an extended metaphor, with "all human laws" being the preferable interpretation of πάσα; or the word could mean "all men." It is because of the fragment's place within the whole body of the fragments, then, rather than by reason of the evidence contained solely in the fragment itself, that "all things" is considered the most likely meaning of πάσα in this fragment.

Were the uses of "all" which have been generally interpreted here to mean "all things" quite variant and their contexts quite different, then the place of each fragment in relationship to the whole body of fragments and the evidence from within the fragment itself would be all that the student of the fragment has to go on. But Heraclitus uses and repeats these similar forms again and again in similar contexts; and this in itself is evidence for the unified interpretation given to these uses in this section. The fragments individually might bear different interpretations of the form of πάσα than the ones given here if only the isolated fragment itself is

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6 This theme is linked in this fragment with "all things" explicitly through the word πάντων in the first part of the fragment. It is of no great help to consult other uses of the term νόμος, "law," in this matter, however; while the term ordinarily refers to the political law of men, its other appearances do not exclude broader interpretation (114); see chapter III.
considered; but in every case presented in this section where "all things" has been preferred, that interpretation was admissible by internal criteria and confirmed by the interrelationships with other terms and themes, and by the overall similarity of this group of fragments about "all things" as well.

Before turning to the theme of unity in the fragments, it will be worthwhile to note briefly the various themes with which "all things" has been repeatedly associated in the fragments just examined. In four of the fragments mentioned, "all things" was linked with the themes of unity, "that which is common," and "the same." In five of the fragments, "all things" was connected with the themes of fire, exchange, and joinings; themes which will be seen to be related to the process of all things; the two statements on "all things coming to be" should also be mentioned in this connection. Six times in this group of fragments, "all things" was associated with a power having jurisdiction, giving direction, governing, or steering. In three of these fragments, "all things" are linked with war, strife, and justice. Each of these themes will be studied in detail in the sections which follow.

Unity

The importance of the theme of unity in the fragments has already been pointed out both in relation to knowing and its object in chapter one and in relation to the theme of "all things" in the first section of this chapter. It is
one of the most important themes to be found in the fragments. Yet it remains true that explicit reference to unity, by way of various forms of the term εἷς, μία, ἕν, "one," is not all that frequent. Rather, certain key themes are clearly related to the theme of unity without the word "one" being used, or with only one or two actual uses of the term. Thus especially the statements concerning "that which is common," the exchanges of all things for fire and fire for all things, and the unity of opposites are clearly related to the theme of unity and clearly imply unity of one sort or another, but do not often speak of it in so many words.

Thorough treatment of this theme, therefore, demands that all of these related themes be examined along with the explicit statements about oneness in the fragments.

Oneness

Heraclitus characterizes a number of different things as "one." Wisdom, "that which is wise," is twice characterized as "one," as has already been pointed out above (32, 41). Several of the fragments make it clear that oneness is part of the object of genuine knowing and men's not-knowing (50, 57, 106); these have also been examined in chapter one. In three statements, oneness is associated with the "best men," a theme which will be examined in the third chapter of this paper; another statement, in which the gender of ἕνδος is not certain, is probably best interpreted together with these three: "to obey the will of one (ἑνδος) is also law (νόμος)") (33).
Oneness is explicitly associated with "that which is common" in two places: "... we must base our strength on that which is common to all (τῶι ξυν(Colliderν), as the city on the law and even more strongly. For all human laws are nourished by one which is divine (ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θείου)" (114); "to those who are awake there is one common _cosmos (ἐνα καὶ κοινῶν κόσμων)" (89), where waking is a figure for genuine knowing. "Common" and oneness are also linked, by implication, in the statement that "the nature of every day is one (φύσιν μίαν οόςαν)" (106), where "nature" is a common aspect of every day. The analysis of "that which is common" will further confirm the relationship between these two themes.

In three places in the fragments, the oneness of apparently opposing things is mentioned explicitly: "for the fuller's screw, the way, straight and crooked, is one and the same (μία... καὶ η αὐτή)" (59); "the way up and down is one and the same (μία καὶ ἀνωτή)" (60); "day and night... are one (ὠστὶ γὰρ ἔν)" (57). In a significant number of other statements, Heraclitus takes up this same theme without explicit

7To judge from the other appearances of the term "nature," nature is also characterized by unity itself. But this use of the term differs from the others, and the relating of the one use of the term to the other uses seems questionable. See the treatment of nature in the third subsection of this section.

8The expression "the same" appears in several other statements related to the joinings of opposites; these will be considered when that topic is examined in detail below (49a, 58, 84b, 88, 91, 12). Other uses of "the same" are related to the theme of "that which is common" and will be examined when that topic is being considered (17, 30, 31, 72).
reference to oneness, simply identifying the apparently opposite elements with each other by means of the copula "is" itself, either stated or implied. This theme will be examined in detail below.

In the statement noted in the second paragraph above, oneness is attributed to the "divine law," which has jurisdiction over all things: "for it governs as far as it will, and is sufficient for all and more than enough" (114). The question of that which is divine will be examined later. It is important to note here, however, that every steerer or governing principle mentioned in the fragments is referred to in the singular. This is what we might expect, of course, that the ultimate governing principle be one; but it is worthwhile to mention this explicit characterization of one of the governing principles as "one" and the general treatment of all of them that are mentioned as, in each case, being one. The question then becomes: why are several such principles named, and what is their relation? Or are there really several principles; that is, are all things rather ultimately related to one basic principle of some sort? A study of the various principles named in the fragments will be found later in this

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9As has already been indicated in chapter one, it is possible that "that which is wise" is related to what is divine; in that case, there would be a link between the explicit characterizations of "that which is wise" as "one" and the unity of what is divine; for "that which alone is wise is . . . willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus" (32). This relationship will be examined below in section four and again in chapter three.
It is clear however, even without a detailed examination of the governing principles expressly named in the fragments, that all things are somehow one. Heraclitus makes this point in so many words in one fragment: "it is wise to agree that all things are one ( ἐν πάντω ἀναί)" (50). In another fragment, in the midst of a list of "joinings" of apparent opposites, he states: "from all things one and from one all things ( ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐκ ἐνὸς πάντα)" (10); the exact meaning of the statement may not be clear--the parallel with another statement about the exchange of all things for fire and fire for all things seems significant--but the oneness of all things seems clear. The same conclusion is implied in the statement noted above that "to those who are awake, there is one common cosmos." (89).

Thus the theme of unity touches upon every important general theme in the fragments; its importance is great, not only because of its explicit appearances, but also because it is a theme which is at the heart of other important themes and is, in some sense, the underlying direction of Heraclitus's thought in general. Heraclitus's examination of all things is directed above all to their unity and oneness in its various aspects; and it is already clear that this understanding of the unity of all things in its various aspects is the very knowing which he held to be genuine and the fulfilling object of his own and all men's efforts to know. The various aspects of
this oneness of all things need now to be examined in detail.

That which is common

Heraclitus uses the term "common (ζυός or κοινός )" seven times in the fragments. Two of these are references to "that which is common (τὸ ζύόν )" (2, 114), and the other five are characterizations of various things as common (2, 80, 89, 103, 113). Four uses of "same" are also closely related to "that which is common" in meaning (17, 30, 31, 72).

Both of the references to "that which is common (τὸ ζύόν )" present it as the object of genuine knowing: "one must follow that which is common" (2); "if we speak with intelligence, we must base our strength on that which is common to all ( τῶι ζυόνι πάντων )" (114). This association of "that which is common" with genuine knowing is enforced as "the logos" is said to be "common" a little later in the first of these fragments, and then contrasted with each man's "private understanding": "the logos (τοῦ λόγου ) is common, but most men live as if they had a private understanding of their own ( ὡς ἴδον ἔχοντες φρόνησιν )" (2). Moreover, "the logos" is the near-at-hand logos (72) which is not-known by men and "the logos" which is to be listened to rather than Heraclitus as the source of wisdom (50).

10 It is worth pointing out that the form used here is generative; if the objective referent of "common" were "men" we would expect the dative indirect object; the use of the genitive suggests an impersonal referent, at least insofar as the more personal dative has not been employed.
It is clear that "that which is common" is one way in which Heraclitus expresses the object of genuine knowing. Thus it follows that "the logos" which is the object of genuine knowing in several other statements is here referred to as "common." Thus too in another fragment, Heraclitus says that: "to those who are awake, there is one common cosmos ( ἑνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον )" (89), where waking and sleeping are taken as figures for knowing and not-knowing. Similarly, in another place, Heraclitus refers to "this cosmos, the same for all ( κόσμον τὸνα, τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντησιν )" (30).

It is important to determine whether "common" means "common to all men," as the common object of all men's efforts to achieve genuine knowledge, or "common to all things," as a common principle governing all things or in some other way related to all things. The two explicit links between "all" and "common" or "same" noted thus far (114, 30) do not immediately resolve the problem since, as has already been pointed out, both uses of "all" are without expressed antecedents or substantives to indicate their gender. The same is true of the third (113).

Some help can be obtained by examining the various

11The use of sleep as a figure for not-knowing and the characterization of those possessing genuine knowing as waking appears several times (1, 89); related to this figure is the comment about a private understanding of one's own (ἴδιαν φρόνησιν ) (2), and the reference to ἵοιον, "one's own," in contrast with waking and the common cosmos (89). This matter is treated in a number of places in this study.
things referred to as common: the logos (2), cosmos (89), war (80), the thinking faculty (113); and as the same: the near-at-hand (17, 72), cosmos (30), and logos as a principle of measure (31). Cosmos, for example, is directly identified with fire in fire's coming-to-be and passing-away (30), which in turn is elsewhere closely associated with all things (66, 90). Logos as a principle of measure is operative in this process (31) and therefore linked with all things; and "this logos," a principle or pattern "according to which all things come-to-be" (1), is identified as the object of not-knowing and thus most likely linked with "the logos." The theme of "the near-at-hand" is certainly linked by logical implication with all things; and in one place, as was pointed out in chapter one, this link seems somewhat explicit (1). Finally war, which is characterized as common (80), is spoken of in that statement in a context dealing with all things in their coming-to-be, and seems related in thought to the theme of "strife" according to which all things come to be (80); moreover, in its other appearance in the fragments, war seems most likely related to and having jurisdiction over all things, as was pointed out above (53).

The only one of these "common" things, in fact, which does not bear a fairly direct relationship with all things is "the thinking faculty": "the thinking faculty is common to all (ξυνόν ἐστιν πάσι τῷ φρονεῖν") (113). It is vaguely possible that some passive sense of the verb might be intended, and the statement mean "all things are able to be understood";
but this seems highly unlikely, and the πᾶσα seems better taken as "all men."  

In summary, the analysis of all those things characterized as common, or as "same" in the sense of common, suggests that whatever is common is related to all things, is in some sense "common to all things." On the other hand, "that which is common," as well as several of the things which are characterized as common, are very closely related to the object of genuine knowing, and in that sense are "common to all men." But since "all men" are not, in fact, genuine knowers, since most men do not-know, "that which is common" is not in fact common to all men as possessed but only as accessible. Hence, "common to all men" is an accurate description of the object of genuine knowing in only a qualified sense. Our conclusion is that "that which is common" is not common to all men in fact, but is rather the common goal of their striving for genuine knowledge, a knowledge which encompasses all things in their various aspects of their unity. "That which is common" is common to all things, then, and to all men, but in different senses; it is a general way of speaking of the underlying unity.

There is a fifth reference to something which is "common" in the fragments: "the beginning and end are common in the circumference of a circle" (103). The sense may be that any point can be beginning and end; or it may be that the point which is the beginning is also the end, so that "common" means "one and the same." In the latter case, the fragment is related to the joinings of opposites; in the former case, it refers to the topic of the present section. The fragment itself does not make the matter clear; but if the term is being used consistently, the former interpretation is to be preferred.
of all things which is the one, common object of all men's striving for genuine knowledge. "That which is common" is, in sum, a bridge between unity and all things; it is one, very general way of speaking of the unity of all things with particular reference to men's knowing that unity; we must now turn to other and more concrete statements about that unity of all things in its various aspects.

Nature and cosmos

Nature (φύσις) and cosmos (κόσμος) are terms which stand, in a sense, on the fringe of the nexus of interrelationships of terms and themes within the fragments. Each of them carries a content which we would expect to be of considerable significance in the overall view of the world found in the fragments, and each of them is in fact related to most of the most important and unifying themes. But neither appears more than four times, and their place within the thought of Heraclitus simply does not seem as significant as many of the other terms. What they do have to offer, of course, is worth determining.

Nature appears in four statements which all deal in some way with knowing. In one place, Heraclitus describes himself as knower, "distinguishing each thing according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν διαίρεων ἐκαστὸν) and telling how it is" (1). In another place, he says: "Hesiod was unaware that the nature of every day is one" (106). These two statements point to nature as a common aspect, the basis of unity grasped in genuine knowing. A third statement fits with these two on knowing: "nature likes
to hide" (123); for the hiddenness of the object of genuine knowing has already been noted. Finally, Heraclitus states that: "wisdom (σοφίη) is to speak the truth and to act according to nature (ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν), paying heed" (112); here knowing and acting are brought together in wisdom, and what is elsewhere treated as an object of genuine knowing now is presented as the criterion of wise action, as seems reasonable. Nature is thus related to the theme of unity in the fragments, it is never directly cited with the theme of "all things," but the reference is somewhat implied both in the reference to "distinguishing each thing (ἐκαστον) according to nature (φύσιν)" (1) and in the reference to the "nature of every (ἡμέρας) day" (106). In sum, nature seems to refer to the unity of basic characteristics of a thing, and perhaps of all things, which is the object of genuine knowing; it can be contrasted with "that which is common" by noting the latter's emphasis on the aspect of unity, while nature stresses in its concept the basicness of the unity of characteristics to the things being considered; ultimately, however, the concept simply is not elaborated in detail by Heraclitus, and not of the greatest importance in the fragments. Insofar as it applies to actions as a norm, however, it will be examined again in chapter three of this paper.

Cosmos is a concept which is closer to the nexus of interrelationships of terms and themes in the fragments than nature. The term itself carries the basic meaning of "order within a multiplicity"; this characteristic of order, it will
be seen here, applies to the unity of all things in one statement and is associated with that unity as the object of men’s genuine knowing, namely "that which is common," in another. Two other statements emphasize the theme of order within a multiplicity.

"This cosmos," says Heraclitus, "... was always, and is, and will be ever-living fire, kindled in measure and quenched in measure (ἀποσβενυμένον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβενυμένον μέτρα )" (30). The fire in its coming-to-be and passing-away is the order, cosmos, of the multiplicity; thus elsewhere Heraclitus states: "there is an exchange: all things for fire and fire for all things" (90). So also in the examination of the twice-used phrase γινόμενα πάντα, "all things come-to-be within a process," the unity and directedness of the coming to be was emphasized; thus too in both appearances of this phrase, some principle governing the coming-to-be is named explicitly: "all things come to pass (γινομένων πάντων ) in accordance with this logos (κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε )" (1); and "all things come about (γινόμενα πάντα ) according to strife and necessity ( κατὰ ἔριν καὶ χρεών )" (80).

In another employment of cosmos, Heraclitus speaks perhaps of "the things happening (τῶν γινομένων ) in the cosmos (ἐν τῶι κόσμωι )" (75); but even if τῶν γινομένων means "men being born," the sense of cosmos as the ordered unity of events taking place remains much the same. Thus elsewhere he speaks of "a dust-heap piled up at random" as "the most beautiful cosmos" (ὁ καλλιστός κόσμος)" (124). That is the extent of the
fragment, but it is clear that *cosmos* refers to the order of the multiplicity described—it may also be significant that "beautiful" is elsewhere associated with the important theme of "justice" (102), which is involved in ordering of all things according to strife and necessity (80).

Finally, Heraclitus explicitly associated *cosmos* with unity and "that which is common" in one fragment: "to those who are awake," those possessing genuine knowledge, "there is one, common *cosmos* (ἐνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον)" (89). Thus, as an aspect of the unity of all things which is the goal of human knowing, *cosmos* is part of what is common. *Cosmos* adds to our understanding of the unity of all things the important note of order, already implied strongly by the basic sense of *γινόμενα πάντα*studied earlier in this chapter, but here made explicit.

Nature is the aspect of unity which emphasizes the basicness of the characteristics grasped as one, and forms, along with wisdom, a link between the object of knowing and man's other actions. *Cosmos* is the aspect of the unity of all things which emphasizes the order of all things as they change, come-to-be, pass-away within a process yet to be examined here. "That which is common" deals with the basis of unity as it is grasped by the genuine knower. Each of these aspects helps us understand how the oneness of all things is the ultimate goal of human knowing. But this oneness does not exist only in the abstract; for Heraclitus, all things are one in the concrete, as
part of a process in which the central role is played by fire, and as constituted into concrete unities by the "joinings" of opposites, an important aspect of Heraclitus's world hardly touched on here up to this point. These two topics will be the matter of the next section.

The Basic Unities

Heraclitus's statements on fire form probably the most compact group of statements in the fragments; and the group of statements on the "joinings" of opposites is one of the largest groups of statements. But this can be misleading, particularly because these two themes have been among the most widely commented on and interpreted from Heraclitus, both among the ancient commentators and especially in recent times. We need to determine what exactly the fragments themselves say about these two topics, and then to ask whether they are related to each other by the internal evidence of the fragments themselves.

The present stage of explication of Heraclitus's view of the world is that all things are one in a unity of orderly process, which unity is in turn the object of men's search for genuine knowing. This process has already been found to be described as the orderly coming-to-be of all things, and as the orderly coming-to-be and passing-away of fire; we wish to understand these two descriptions and their relationship more clearly. This unity has also been described in a few places as a unity, in part at least, not only of a common process involving one chief element, but also as a unity of apparent
opposites; this aspect of the unity of all things also needs examination. As these themes are examined, it will become significant to investigate the relationship between these two aspects of the unity of all things; this will be the third goal of this section.

The turnings of fire

"This cosmos," says Heraclitus, "the same for all (τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων), none of the gods and none of men has made, but it was ever and is and shall be ever-living fire, kindled in measure and quenched in measure (ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννυμένον μέτρα)" (30). This fragment not only carries the important thought noted above that the coming-to-be and passing-away of fire is ordered, but indicates that some sort of "measure" is the basis of that order; it is also clear that the process is all-inclusive in a temporal sense, "was ever and is and shall be." This all-inclusiveness in terms of all things is made clear in another statement: "there is an exchange: all things for fire and fire for all things (πυρὸς τῇ ἀνταμοιβῇ τὰ πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἀπάντων), like goods for gold and gold for goods" (90). All things are involved in the process of fire.

It is important to determine whether the "exchange" of all things for fire and fire for all things is to be identified with the fire's being "kindled in measure and quenched in measure." The answer to this question is not given in so many words; but it seems quite clear nevertheless. For Heraclitus explains in one place: "the turnings (τροπαί) of fire: first
sea; and of sea, half is earth and half fiery water-spout (πρηστήρ). Earth is liquified into sea, and has its measure (μετρέω) in the same logos (εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον) as existed before it became earth" (31). Here Heraclitus presents a picture of fire's "turnings," a term which suggests change over and back again, much as the "exchange of all things for fire and fire for all things" suggests. In this process of change over and back again, fire turns into "sea (θάλασσα)," which is really half earth and half fiery water spout, midway in the process and perhaps, in some sense, unstable. Earth's part in the process is to become sea. The measure which guides and orders the process, already mentioned in the first fragment noted above where the process was called cosmos, resides in a logos which is common to the various stages of the process, "the same

13The term πρηστήρ has long been a source of comment among interpretors of Heraclitus. A summary of such comment will be found in Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 463, n. 1. Guthrie points out that whatever term means exactly, it clearly indicates that water is midway between fire and earth in the process, and that the process is not one of static positions, but one of dynamic change; water is always partly fire, always in process towards fire and away from it.

14The term ἄνταμοι, "exchange," is not repeated in the fragments; nor is any other term meaning "change" except the term τροπαί, translated here as "turnings," which has an important correlate in the term παλιντροπός, translated as "opposing tension" (51); this similarity will be examined below. Other terms expressing "change" appear in several fragments which are examined in appropriate parts of this paper (67, 88). One statement follows the pattern of the others only indirectly: "in changing, it is at rest (μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται)" (84a); it could mean that the stages of process which appear to be static (e.g. the state of water) are still part of the process, while parts of the process seem to stand still; but there is no other fragment which explicitly confirms this interpretation.
as existed before it (sea) became earth." Thus there is a linking of the ever-living fire, always existing, and the logos wherein the fire's ordering measure resides also existing before and after every part of the process, the logos of the measure of fire's coming-to-be and passing-away seems from these statements to have been, to be, and to be about to be always the same; the fire changes, is exchanged, and the measure orders the changes, but the logos which founds the measure is "the same as existed before."

It is also significant that the term γενέσθαι is used in this fragment about the turnings of fire: "It has its measure in the same logos as existed before it (sea) became (γενέσθαι) earth." For the ordered process spoken of when the basic meaning of γινομένα πάντα was being examined and spoken of again in the analysis of cosmos and its relation to all things is here explicitly related to the turnings of fire, which is the one concrete ordered process which Heraclitus associates with all things; (the relationship of the process of fire's turnings to the joinings of opposites will be examined below).

Summarizing to this point, we may say that the ordered process of coming-to-be of all things is the ordered coming-to-be and passing-away of fire; this process is called fire's "turnings," as it becomes water and then earth, and then earth becomes water and goes back into fire again; it is a process of exchange involving all things, changing over and back again. It is an ordered process, a cosmos of measured coming-to-be and
passing-away, whose measure resides in a logos which is as enduring as the process itself—which ever was and is and will be ever-living—and is the same throughout the process.¹⁵

These conclusions are based upon the assumption that the three fragments concerned belong together; this is not a blind assumption, but not one which is self-evident either. Yet clearly all three refer to "fire (πύρος)" in the same way. Two of the three speak of "all things" in relation to fire: "this cosmos, the same for all" (30); and "there is an exchange: all things for fire and fire for all things" (90). Two of them speak of the measure of the process (30, 31). Finally, all three statements fit in similar ways into the nexus of interrelated terms and themes which has been developed already, especially concerning coming-to-be (γενέσθαι), all things, cosmos and unity generally, and which will grow in complexity of mutually involved and mutually implied relationships as this study continues. It therefore seems quite reasonable to deal with the three fragments together, and to trust their remarkable unity of content regardless of what might be deemed a rather slim overlap of terminology.

There are several other fragments which deal with fire:

¹⁵The term μέτρα, "measures," appears in one other fragment: "the sun will not transgress his measures (μέτρα); otherwise the Furies, ministers of justice, will find him out" (94). It is possible that there is a relationship between "sun" and "fire" intended by Heraclitus; but the fragments at our disposal never confirm this relationship, but only raise the possibility. The possibility of a relationship between "measures" and "justice" will be examined below.
one of these will be examined when the mystery rites are studied in chapter three (14), and another when that chapter turns to Heraclitus's ethical comments (43). One other has already been mentioned in a footnote and will receive attention when the "joinings" of opposites are examined (67). Finally, there is a fragment which reads as follows: "for fire (τὸ πῦρ) will come and judge and convict all things (πᾶντα)" (66).\(^{16}\)

This last fragment has been offered as evidence that Heraclitus believed in ecpyrosis, the ultimate destruction of the universe in fire, despite the contradictory evidence of "was ever and is and shall be ever-living fire" in the fragment noted above (30). While it is not impossible to take "come, judge, and convict" as a metaphor for fire's primacy as it is exchanged for all things and all things for it, the exact intent of the fragment is not clear; nor is the relationship of this fragment to the other fragments on fire and those on all things very clear. The reiteration of fire's primacy over all things is worth noting, of course; but fire is nowhere else in the fragments given jurisdiction or governing power over all things; and it has already become clear that fire itself is subject to the ordering of the measure based upon a logos of some sort. Thus it does not seem consistent with what has

\(^{16}\) It is worth noting that this is the only reference in the fragments to τὸ πῦρ; every other reference is to πῦρ without the article; while there may be some significance in this difference, it is difficult to say what it might be. Concerning ecpyrosis, an examination of various positions on this matter will be found in Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy* Vol. I, p. 455.
already been discovered to attribute some ultimate jurisdiction
to fire; fire is rather the primary element in the process
of all things, and in that sense it metaphorically "convicts"
all things as it becomes all things and all things ultimately
become fire once again, and so on for all time (without an
ultimate ending of the process in which at some time all things
would finally revert to fire).

Is fire the basic element of the process of all things
by being the basic element out of which the other elements
come-to-be? This seems to be accurate as far as it goes;
sea and earth come-to-be in the turnings of fire, and change
back again. But there is more that must be said; for none of
these are considered static elements from which the world is
constructed; the process is unending for all time, was ever and
is and will be ever-living. Heraclitus treats fire as the
basic element, and in that sense follows the path of other
Presocratics; but the basis of unity of all things is not this
common element, but the process, the coming-to-be of all things,
which is the ordered coming-to-be and passing-away of fire.
The process is the all important basis of unity; fire is simply
the primary element in the process, and thus one aspect of
the process's unity. But fire is not the only, or even the most
basic aspect of the unity of the process; for fire's turnings are
subject to a measure founded upon a logos; and in other fragments
various other principles of jurisdiction and governance and
steering are named whose authority extends to all things. Thus
the process of all things in the coming-to-be and passing-away of fire will not be adequately explained until logos, in its various appearances in the fragments, and other principles of unity have been examined.

There are still a few fragments dealing with concrete aspects of the process of fire's turnings which need to be examined. These are the statements in which "soul (ψυχή)" seems to take the place of fire in the turnings involving water and earth: "To souls it is death (θάνατος) to become water (ὕδωρ γενέσθαι); to water, it is death to become earth (γῆ γενέσθαι). From earth comes (γίνεται) water, and from water, soul" (36); and "for souls it is enjoyment, or rather death (τερψίν ὃ θάνατον), to become (γενέσθαι) wet" (77).17

In both fragments, the passing-away is presented as "death," a term used in this way only of "soul." In both fragments, both coming-to-be and passing away are predicated by the same term, some form of γίνομαι; it seems reasonable to conclude that there is one process which is under consideration in these fragments, which involves change over and back again,

17It is assumed in this and other studies of the soul becoming wet or coming to be water, both here and in chapter three when the matter is examined in ethical terms and questions about the soul's pleasure and death are studied, the terms water (ὕδωρ) and wet (Ψυρός) are parallel in meaning. In the statement about the "turnings" of fire, the term ὁδλασσα, which literally means "sea," is used; another fragment makes it clear, however, that the sea (ὁδλασσα) consists of water (ὕδωρ) (61). If water and sea are to be distinguished, with fire's turning to sea and soul's turning to water thus also distinguished, the fragments are not clear on the matter. In the translations used here, fire is said to become water (31).
both coming-to-be and passing-away; all of this confirms the conclusions reached earlier on this subject. What is most peculiar about these fragments is the place occupied by "soul." For soul stands in relation to earth and water in the same way as fire in the statements examined above. There is a third statement in which the same thing happens: "souls are exhaled from moist things (ἀπὸ τῶν ἐγρύν ἀναθυμηνταί)" (12);¹⁸ this fragment's wording is somewhat doubtful however.

What is the relation of soul to fire? Is soul the element called "air" which is missing from Heraclitus's other statements about fire's turnings, and which would stand between water and fire presumably? This is a possible explanation, but not supported by any of the texts accepted as genuine by Diels-Kranz. The association of soul with fire itself seems more likely from the fragments at our disposal; this is especially true because in two places soul is associated with a logos, although the logos concerned seems to belong properly to soul itself, rather than to have a certain jurisdiction over soul as the logos referred to fire has over fire: "the logos of the soul is increasing itself" (115); "the limits of the soul you will not find . . . so deep a logos has it (οὐτω βαιθυν λόγον ἕξει)" (45). The logos clearly belongs to soul in both

¹⁸There is some question as to the accuracy of reading ἀναθυμηνταί in the Greek text, as indicated by Diehls-Kranz in the critical notes; the sense of the statement however fits with what has already been explained if "are exhaled" is retained; that is, this interpretation accords with the evidence of the other fragments. But the uncertainty about the reading is deserving of mention.
cases; but in both cases there is a certain similarity to the
logos associated with the measure of fire's process, for the
soul's logos is related to the soul's "limits (περιμετρον)" and
to "increasing itself (αύξονται)." In sum, while the indications
are that soul is related to fire, and that it reacts within
the process of all things in the same way as fire is said to
react, Heraclitus never makes soul the basic element, never
associates it with all things, and deals with its logos in a
way which distinguishes it from the logos associated with fire.
The questions of soul in relation to death, enjoyment, getting
wet, and similar matters will be examined in the third chapter
of this paper.

The order of all things in their process of coming-to-be
and passing-away is one aspect of the basic unity of all things.
Within this process, the primary element is fire, whose turnings
are ordered by a measure founded upon a logos which is as
enduring as the process and the same after every change back as
before the change-over began.

The joinings of opposites

In chapter one, when the objects of not-knowing were
under consideration, it was already evident that Heraclitus
makes mention several times of a unity of elements which are
apparently opposed. In this chapter, in the section on unity,
more examples of this phenomenon were recorded; and later the
term "joinings," which appears in one of the fragments, was
applied. Now it is important to examine these "joinings" of
opposites and determine their relation to the rest of Heraclitus's thought as explicated thus far.

"That which is in opposition (τὸ ἀντίξοιον) is in concert (συμφέρον) and from things that differ (τῶν διαφερόντων) comes the most beautiful harmony (καλλίστην ἀρμονίαν)" (8). In another place, "that which differs with itself (διαφερόμενον ἐσώτερο) is in agreement (ὁμολογεῖ;); harmony (ἀρμονίη) consists of opposing tension (παλλήτροπος) like that of the bow and the lyre" (51). Opposites form unities, harmonies, beautiful harmonies—the theme of beauty is significant for its relation to "justice," which will be examined later. The unity and harmony is the result of "opposing tension," which is exemplified by the bow and lyre; apparently the very opposition is the basis of unity in some way. Heraclitus also speaks of: "joinings. (συνάψεις): wholes and not wholes (ολὰ καὶ οὐκ ολὰ), connected-separate. (συνφερόμενον διαφερόμενον), consonant-dissonant (συνήδον διανήδον), and from all things one and from one all things (ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἐνὸς πάντα)" (10).

This last statement could well have been intended as a classification of types of unities of opposing elements, or at least as a listing of the most general types; on the other hand, the connected-separate category would seem to include almost every other type, which is the joining of "united" and "disunited," which is the sense the same terms carry in the first two fragments on the unity of opposites noted above (συνφερόμενον and διαφερόμενον) (8, 51). In any case, four more examples
of Heraclitus's concern with this theme are provided here.

Other examples of joined opposites are more concrete: "for the fuller's screw, the way, straight and crooked, is one and the same" (59); "the way up and down is one and the same" (60); "day and night . . . are one" (57).

In another group of fragments, Heraclitus not only speaks of joined opposites, but expands some on how they are joined. The comments parallel significantly the few words on the harmony of opposing tension as in the bow and lyre noted above (51). Thus: "the god (δ θεός ) is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger; but he changes (ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ ), just as fire, when it is mingled with perfumes, is named according to the scent of each" (67). The question of what is divine will be examined later; but what is clear is that the opposites are joined "but (this is the sense of δὲ in the fragment) he changes." The sense of this seems to be that the unity of opposites, "he," "the god," is not static; the unity is changing, a position somewhat akin to "opposing tension" and "harmony."

In another place, Heraclitus says that: "the same thing in us (τούτο τε ἔν ) is living and dead, and waking and sleeping, and young and old" (88). The reference to "the same thing in us" could be to "soul," a matter which will be considered in chapter three; but it is clear again that the opposites concerned are joined together in some sort of unity. In this case, the unity is founded, according to the fragment, upon
change, a change over and back again not unlike the turning
of fire: "for these things (dead, waking, old) when they have
changed (μεταπεσόντα) are (ἐστι) those, and those (living,
sleeping, young) when they have changed back again (πάλιν
μεταπεσόντα) are these" (88). The use of πάλιν, "back,"
parallels its appearance ἵππος ἵππος, the term translated
"opposing tension" above (51).

The same term, πάλιν, makes its only other appearance in
another statement about joined opposites: "... they scatter and
combine again (σκίδνησι καὶ πάλιν συνάγει) ... and approach
and separate (καὶ πρόσεισι καὶ ἀπεισι)" (91); the subject
of these verbs is uncertain, but again opposing actions are
joined together and the process is one of "over and back again."

There are also concrete examples of opposites joined
in some sort of over-and-back interchange: "sickness makes
health pleasant and good, hunger [does so to] satisfaction,
weariness [does so to] rest" (111); "cold things grow hot,
hot things grow cold, the wet dries, the parched is moistened"
(126).

There are also a number of examples of opposites joined
in which either the opposition or the joining is really, as
far as we are concerned at least, only a matter of one's point
of view. In a certain logical sense, however, they are joinings
of opposites, and as such serve as examples of the unity of
opposites Heraclitus is concerned about. "Sea water is the
purest and the most polluted: for fish it is drinkable and
life-giving; for men, not drinkable and destructive" (61);
"the name of the bow is 'life,' but its work is death" (48);
"physicians, who cut and burn, demand payment of a fee though undeserving, since they produce the same [that is, pain]" (58);
"pigs wash themselves in mud, birds [wash themselves] in dust or ashes" (37).19

In several places in the fragments, Heraclitus contrasts sleeping and waking (1, 21, 26, 88, and perhaps also 73, 89); in one fragment he explains: "Sleepers are workers and cooperators in the things happening in the cosmos (ἐργάτας... καὶ συνεργούς τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γινομένων)" (75); again the sense is that, though opposed to those actively awake, the sleepers are one in the events of the cosmos. Similarly, in several places, Heraclitus speaks of human life and death in contrast (20, 21, 26, 48, 88, 63, and perhaps 27); in one fragment he speaks of mortal immortals, immortal mortals, living their life and dying their death" (62), a statement which is somewhat ambiguous, but seems to refer to man who is both immortal (living) and mortal (dying); death and life, like coming-to-be and passing-away, are somehow one. Hence Heraclitus says, in a fragment already noted above: "the same thing in us is living

19 There may be a similar reference intended in the short fragment: "donkeys would choose sweepings rather than gold" (9). Here sweepings and gold, opposites in some sense, are the same, for they are both chosen as good; this compares with the sameness of mud with dust and ashes, both used for washing (37). The ethical significance of these statements which compare men and brutes will be examined in chapter three.
and dying, and waking and sleeping" (88).\footnote{There are several other fragments which might belong to this group in at least some remote way: "it is weariness to toil and obey for the same [men?]" (84b), which is vague but may refer to working for and listening to the same man at once, or some such thing (which might be compared to simultaneously being at rest and changing; see 84a); another fragment mentions "need and satiety" (65); it is possible that the reference to the beginning and end of a circle as "common" means that they are the same (see footnote 12 of this chapter for an examination of this fragment) (103); finally, in one place, Heraclitus states: "We live their death, and they live our death" (77), where "they" is uncertain, but may refer to souls; that possibility will be examined in chapter three.}

Finally, in perhaps the most famous set of fragments on this theme of joined opposites, Heraclitus speaks of a river: "those going into the same river have different waters (\(\varepsilon\tau\varepsilon\rho\alpha \\kappa\alpha\iota\varepsilon\tau\varepsilon\rho\alpha \\upsilon\delta\alpha\tau\alpha\) flowing ever upon them" (12); "for it is not possible to step into the same river twice" (91); "we step and do not step in the same rivers" (49a). Heraclitus concludes this last statement with a striking comment which recalls his words on sleep and death in the fragments noted in the previous paragraph: "we both are and are not (\(\varepsilon\iota\mu\varepsilon\nu \tau\varepsilon \kappa\alpha\iota \\omicron\upsilon \varepsilon\iota\mu\varepsilon\nu\))" (49a). There is one river of different waters; one river which is, in a sense, two rivers, one stepping that is two steppings; even two of us as we step into different rivers; perhaps Heraclitus even intends the full weight of the final comment, that we are and are not the same persons who step.

Again and again, Heraclitus points to the numerous unitites of our experience that are really joinings of opposites--twenty-one places in the fragments; in fact, this theme is numerically second only to the theme of not-knowing. Yet
strangely this theme of the joinings of opposites is explicitly linked with very few of the other terms and themes of the fragments. The unity of opposites is, of course, an object of not-knowing and therefore also part of the object of genuine knowing. This unity is one of the two chief aspects of the unity of things which concerned Heraclitus, and stands parallel therefore with the ordered oneness of the process of all things. But many themes which have already been found important are not explicitly related to the joinings of opposites; not logos in any of its various forms, nor cosmos, nor "that which is common," nor war, nor strife. "All things" is explicitly connected with the theme in only one place (10), where unity and all things are presented as opposites joined together. Fire is explicitly related to it only as a metaphor (67).

What then is the relationship of this theme of the joining of opposites, so frequently repeated in the fragments, to the rest of the themes and terms in the fragments? Only further examination of these themes and terms, especially the theme of "opposing tension" and the theme of "beautiful harmony" associated with the joinings, will provide an answer to this question.

21 This is especially clear from the statement: "The hidden harmony is stronger than that which is evident" (54); the hidden harmony, the one which men fail to understand, is the one associated, it would seem, with all things in their unity, which is the object of genuine knowing. The evident harmony might be that of the bow and the lyre, since these are the only other sources of harmony which Heraclitus refers to in the fragments. In any case, the primacy of harmony and that which is hidden is clear from the statement.
Interrelation of the joinings and the turnings

The term which was translated "opposing tension," παλιντροπός appears as an explanation of the harmony of opposites (51). It is exemplified, when first presented, by the bow and lyre, which are functional only when the two opposite ends produce a situation of tension in the string. In another place, "the god (δ θεός )" was a joining of opposites in some way, and was said to change as well; the joining is not static (67). In another place, "the same thing in us" is a joining of opposites, and the opposites concerned change over and back (πάλιν ) again; the joining is not static (88). Again in another place, "they scatter and combine again (πάλιν ) . . . and approach and separate" (91).

Both Heraclitus's general explanation of the unity of opposites and a number of his particular examples point to the fact that the dynamic opposition is what preserves the unity.

It is significant to note that in the study of the turnings of fire (τροπαί , the term recalls παλιντροπός, "opposing tension," noted above), it was the process which was found to be the basic unity which concerned Heraclitus; the ordered process is treated by him as the basic unity of all things, not the common element, fire. Similarly in this examination of the joinings of opposites, it is not the fact that the opposing or different elements have something in common which is most basic; the basis of unity is in the dynamic tension.
In both realms of unity, the unity which concerns Heraclitus, is not the static fact of a common element or a mutual relationship; the unity which concerns him is the basis of this static unity, the dynamic ordered process of exchange on the one hand, and the dynamic cooperation of the opposites, the tension of the joining, on the other.

From several points of view it is possible to say that the turnings of fire, the ordered process of all things in their coming-to-be and passing-away, is simply one of the many kinds of joinings of opposites. Thus his joining of "from all things one and from one all things" (10) might be taken to place the process of all things into a category of joinings. Yet the universality of the process, involving the coming-to-be of all things, is never predicated of the joining of opposites. How is it that the unity whose universality is made very clear can be subsumed in thought under a unifying principle whose universality does not seem to be a matter of real concern to Heraclitus (assuming the absence of predication of universality in twenty-three statements to be significant evidence)? The matter must be examined further.

Reflection upon the two themes suggests that the theme of the process of all things is the more concrete of the two, the theme of joinings of opposites the more abstract. For the conclusion that all things are one in their ordered process of coming-to-be remains in touch with the things of experience in a much more explicit way than the conclusion that whatever is
joined into a unity is joined in a dynamic tension of opposites; the former is a reflection upon all things which concludes to their unity; the latter is a reflection upon unities which seeks to understand the ultimate nature of unity itself. It is not surprising, then, that the universality of the joinings is not a matter of concern; the reflection upon joining is a reflection upon the nature of unity itself, whether the unity concerned be the unity of all things or the oneness of the way up and the way down.

Heraclitus, as has been seen, offered his views to men who were, in general, failing to attain to genuine knowing. Their failure is evidenced, for Heraclitus, above all in their failure to grasp what is presented to them in all things, namely the unity of all things. This unity, he observed, is the unity of an ordered process, guided by a measure and a logos which we have still to examine. But his examination carried him to something even more basic, to the nature of unity itself, as it is presented to man in the things of his experience and in the process of all things as well. Every joining of elements which are different in any way, which includes the unity of every multiplicity, is a dynamic joining, a harmony, founded upon the tension between the opposites; unity means opposing tension, and "static unity" is an empty concept: "That which is in opposition is in concert and from things that differ comes the most beautiful harmony." (8).

The two themes neither totally include nor totally imply
one another; they are on different levels of reflection. Heraclitus saw that all things are one in their ordered process of coming-to-be, and he saw that their unity and every unity was a harmony of opposites in tension, was a dynamic unity. The former insight tells men that there is nothing static in the world, nor anything arbitrary or isolated, but all things are one in dynamic process. The latter insight tells men that unity itself is such as the unity of all things which he is explaining: to be one means to be in tension; unity itself is dynamic.

The Principles of Unity

Heraclitus indicates that the process of all things in the turnings of fire is directed by a measure and a logos (31); he speaks of all things coming-to-be according to "this logos" (1) and according to strife and necessity (80); war is common (80), the father and king of all things (53); the divine law is sufficient for all things and more than enough (114); the thunder-bolt steers all things (64), and also the thought (γνώμη) steers all things through all things (41). Yet "this Cosmos the same for all, none of the gods and none of men has made" (30). How are these governors and sources of structures and jurisdiction related and what is their relation to the process of all things and the joinings of opposites, which are the two fundamental types of unity which are Heraclitus's concern? These are the questions which will be examined in this section.

Before treating war, strife, and justice and the various
forms of logos, which are the most important themes of this section, "that which is divine" and the various other sources of jurisdiction mentioned in the fragments will be examined.

That which is divine

As far as concerns "the gods," Heraclitus speaks of them on a par with men in the two statements which are pertinent here: "this cosmos, the same for all, none of the gods (θεὸν) and none of men has made; but it was ever and is and shall be ever-living fire" (30); and "war is the father of all and the king of all, and some he reveals as gods (θεοῖς) and some as men, some he makes slaves, others free" (53). The relationship between "the gods" and men will be studied in chapter three in detail; what is significant here is that "the gods" are clearly not ultimate sources of unity or jurisdiction in Heraclitus's world.

In several places, however, Heraclitus speaks of "the god (ὁ θεός)" with an evidently different content in mind for this singular use of the term: "the god (ὁ θεός) is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger; but he changes, just as fire, when it is mingled with perfumes, is named according to the scent of each" (67); and in another place, "to the god (τῷ θεῷ) all things (πάντα) are beautiful and good and just; but men have assumed some things to be unjust, others just" (102).

Whatever the god is--there is no difficulty in concluding
that Heraclitus is not simply referring to one of the traditional
gods whom he has rejected as a group in the statements noted
in the previous paragraph—"the god" is clearly connected
with the unity of things. In the second statement, "the god"
is contrasted with men, who deal with things as opposed
in such a way as to exclude unity with each other; for "the
god," who is identified with the unity of opposites in the
first fragment, all things are one in their goodness, beauty,
and justice. Since there is nothing in the text of the second
fragment which demands that "the god" be taken as personal, it
remains possible to identify the unity with "the god" in that
statement as well, taking it more to mean "in the god all things
are beautiful and good and just." Nevertheless, the matter
of "the god" is not clear, either in the relation of "the god"
to men (who could be said to fail to know properly in the
first statement too because they name fire—and "the god"?—
differently in each manifestation when all the manifestations
are really one), or in the place of "the god" within the process
of all things and the joinings of opposites. 22

22 There is one other reference to "the god (ὁ θεὸς)" in
which Heraclitus refers to "the sibyl, with raving mouth, uttering
her unlaughing, unadorned, unincensed words under the inspiration
of the god (ὁ θεὸς γυμνός διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ)" (92). The reference may
fit "the gods" better than what has been said concerning "the god,"
but it is not necessary that the sibyl be guided by a personal
being. Yet there is a similar reference in the statement:
"the lord (ὁ ἄγας), whose oracle is at Delphi, neither speaks
nor conceals, but indicates" (93). The relation of these
statements to the gods and the mysteries will be examined
below. The comment that the divine nature has the power of
understanding (γνώμονα) might also be of significance with
regard to these two statements (78).
Heraclitus speaks of the divine in other fragments as well, however, which may shed light on "the god." In one place he says: "human nature (ἦθος ἀνθρώπειον) has no power of understanding (γνώμας), but divine (nature) has (θεῖον δὲ ἔχει)" (78). It is not clear, unfortunately, whether "divine" is intended to refer to "the gods" or "the god." In another place Heraclitus has written: "that which alone is wise is one (ἐν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον); it is willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus" (32). It is possible that what is divine in Heraclitus's eyes is a supreme knower of some sort, to be identified with "that which is wise." The other statements concerning "that which is wise" and "what is wise" do not contradict this view immediately: "that which is wise is one: to know (or perhaps: the understanding of, ἐπιστασθε) the thought (γνώμην) which steers all things" (41); "what is wise is set apart from all things" (108). It is also of possible significance that the term γνώμη, "thought which steers all things" (41), appears in only one other fragment, namely the one noted above: "human nature has no power of understanding (γνώμας), but the divine nature has" (78); but in the former case it is singular, and in the latter plural, and the connection is obscure. Finally, it may be of significance

23 It is noteworthy that the term ἐπιστασθε is used in both of its other appearances in the fragments of human knowing in the concrete (19, 57); this suggests that it is an unlikely term to apply to some abstracted source of intelligibility, as contrasted, for example, with "that which is wise" which is referred to human wisdom but has other connotations clearly expressed in the fragments.
that it is with Zeus that the thunder-bolt was associated, and Heraclitus says in one place: "the thunder-bolt steers all things" (64).

Nevertheless, Heraclitus has excluded "the gods" from an ultimate place in the governing of things, and refers to Zeus in only one other fragment about the stars and the weather (120); the statement read here as "what is wise is set apart from all things" could read just as well "what is set apart from all things is wise" (108) since the phrase contains no article (σοφὸν ἐστὶ πάντων κεχωρισμένον). The relationship between the thunder-bolt and Zeus, and then through Zeus to what

24 The limits (τέρματα) of morning and evening are the Bear and, opposite the Bear, the boundary-mark of Zeus, god of the clear sky" (120). This reference to limits may suggest a connection with sun, which does not transgress his measures (μέτρα) (94), and which stands as the difference between night and day: "if there were no sun, so far as depended on the other stars, it would be night" (99). A case could be made which links sun with fire; sun and the joining of day and night with the joining of opposites; the limits of morning and evening and the measures of sun with the measures of fire (30, 31), and perhaps with the "limits (τέρματα)" of the soul which are associated with its logos (45). Such a linking of materials might also explain the statement about "the hours (μέρας) that bring all things (αἱ πάντα φέρουσι)" (100), for both Guthrie and Freeman explain "hours" as "the seasons." It is possible that "god of the clear sky" refers to the sun. The closest link between the process and unities of all things and the pattern suggested here is in the statement: the sun is new every day, "(6) provided that Heraclitus is referring to the sun, as Aristotle indicates. (Diehls-Kranz do not accept the word "sun" as part of the genuine fragment) If this is so, then the sun is in process, changes over and back again, and in this changing binds together day and night, which are one (57), and which are identified with "the god" (67), and also relating every day with every other day, each one new yet having the same nature (106). There is also a statement: "how could anyone hide from that which never sets?" (16), which suggests extensive jurisdiction attributed perhaps to the sun, even with reference to men. Still, however, the connections between and among all these fragments are not completely clear or explicit.
is divine is most tenuous; the meaning of "willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus" (32) is hardly clear, although it bears some parallel with the naming of "the god" according to each opposite in which he is manifested (if in fact this is the meaning of the metaphor about fire and perfume) (67). Finally, and most important, wisdom and being wise are spoken of by Heraclitus in ways clearly indicative of human wisdom, both wisdom in speaking and acting (112), and wisdom in judgment (50); these statements, as was pointed out in chapter one, bear strong resemblance to Heraclitus's statements on his own knowing and his guidelines for genuine knowing, and most of them make sense interpreted solely in terms of human efforts to attain to genuine knowing. In fact, the only real exception to this position is the statement involving the name of Zeus, which does bear some resemblance, as was indicated, to one of the statements about "the god."

The only definite conclusion that can be reached is that the matter is not clear. Heraclitus's statements do not settle it definitely. It is certain that what he has to say about human knowing is reflected in statements on wisdom and what is wise; it is also certain that the fragments concerned are not completely explained within that context, and that a number of the statements could support a position favoring the existence of some divine knower, or at least some divine knowing. In any case it is clear that Heraclitus does in fact refer to something as "the god" and associate it, however vaguely from
our vantage point, with knowing and with the ultimate principles of unity of all things. The best thing seems to be to leave the conclusions reached concerning human wisdom in chapter one intact, but to add that Heraclitus speaks of the ultimate unifying principles, which are abstract principles indicating the ultimate and profound unity of things rather than personal governors, in terms associated with divinity; moreover, because of his own concern to reach these principles as a knower, he deals with them within a context of being known, as he has been seen to deal with many other topics. This position is supported by the evidence of the fragments, and nowhere contradicted by that evidence. Any effort to formulate a stronger position concerning what is divine, whether in favor of it or against it, must face evidence from the fragments which is inconsistent with such a position. Again, in summary, we can only accept both of the things which Heraclitus says, although we cannot understand how they were connected in his mind.

This position is particularly confirmed by the evident relationship between "the god" and the joinings of opposites, in which "the god" seems to be the joining, the unity itself. Analysis of the terms "beautiful" and "just" in later sections will make this point still clearer. Another fragment dealing in fairly clear terms with the divine also confirms that position proposed here: "if we wish to speak with intelligence, we must base our strength on that which is common to all, as the city on the law and even more strongly. For all human laws
are nourished by one which is divine. For it governs as far as it will, and is sufficient for all and more than enough" (114). For once again the divine aspect is contrasted with the human, and the realm of genuine knowing is part of the context; but "the divine law" spoken of is not personal; there is no particular divinity indicated. What is indicated is that there is a law, a principle, which is valid for all things, and that it seems to be related to "that which is common," the basic unity of things as grasped in knowledge.

The question of the divine in Heraclitus's thought is obscure. Many fragments seem significant, but none of them and no group of them sets down a single, unimpeded line of thought. Heraclitus's comments on wisdom in man, studied in chapter one, are confirmed by the whole body of statements on knowing; yet he clearly speaks about "the god" and a "divine law". The best position, it is judged here, is to accept as much as is clear and affirm that he says more which we do not understand. Thus he clearly associates the ultimate principles of unity, the basic principles associated with the unity of all things in their process of coming-to-be and the unity of opposites which pertains to the nature of unity itself, with what is divine; but he does not seem to posit a divinity so much as to affirm, by his manner of speaking, the ultimateness of the principles of unity with which he is dealing.

His comments on the traditional gods of Greece and on the various rites associated with them will be examined in
The thought and thunder-bolt that steer all things

"The thunder-bolt steers all things (τὰ δὲ πᾶντα οἷα ἐστὶν
κεραυνὸς)" (64). This thunder-bolt is not identified anywhere else in the fragments. It is possible, as has been pointed out, that it refers to the thunder-bolt of Zeus; but no such connection is even hinted at in the fragments. It is possible that the thunder-bolt is seen as a manifestation of fire; in this case the fragment examined previously on fire which "will come and judge and convict all things" (66) might be related and significant. But in the examination of that fragment it was made clear that the fragments clearly indicate that fire is under the jurisdiction of measure and a *logos*, and is significant because of the ordered process rather than in itself. Moreover, there is no particular reason to associate the thunder-bolt with fire—no more reason than to deny this association; for the fragments give no hint either way on the matter.

This fragment is linked with the other terms and themes of the fragments in only two ways. First of all, it deals with all things and is predicated as a governing power over them. But falling outside the nexus of interrelated terms and themes of the fragments, the thunder-bolt does not help us understand the unity of all things in process or in the joining of opposites which underlies all unity; the clear statement that the thunder-bolt steers all things tells us really very little. Secondly,
however, the use of the term οἰκείζης, "steer," in the fragment parallels the use of a similar term, ἐκυβέρνησις, "steer," in another fragment; comparison of them may be helpful.

Heraclitus speaks of "the thought (γνώμη) which steers all things through all things (οτὲν ἐκυβέρνησις πάντα διὰ πάντων)" (41). The basic meaning of γνώμη is "means or instrument of knowing": hence it was translated above (in the plural) "power of understanding (γνώμας)" (78), but these are its only appearances in the fragments and its exact meaning is not clear—even in the fragments in which it does appear.

If Heraclitus does in fact tend to associate the unity of things, which is the object of men's genuine knowing, with a source of intelligibility, a supreme knower (which he sometimes speaks of as divine), then this "thought (γνώμη)" surely refers to that knower. Once again the question arises whether such a knower exists in Heraclitus's view of things, and once again we must say that the matter is not clear, but that it seems unlikely. The intelligible unity of all things and intelligible nature of unity itself are Heraclitus's chief concern—as is consonant with his concern for men's knowing and his general lack of concern with their relations with any divine being; it is not surprising that he should speak of the principle (or principles) of ultimate unity as though they were the intelligent governors of all things in his efforts to show that they are the fundamental bases of the unity which man can know in things. He would not be the only thinker who has substantialized his
principles in order to speak of them and attributed to them, as to sources of unity through governance and jurisdiction, the unity which they found as the bases of its intelligibility.

The matter is not clear from the fragments at our disposal; but it is clear that Heraclitus does not speak consistently or in any unified way about a substantial source of unity which is distinct from the unity of which it is a source—whether the unity concerned be the oneness of all things in ordered process or the basis of unity itself in a tension of opposites.25 Heraclitus repeatedly speaks in ways which indicate that the unity is within the process, is the order of the process itself, and that the basis of joining is tension of opposites which is the joining itself. His manner of speaking indicates that there is no distinct maker of unity.

The "thought which steers all things," then, is the intelligibility of all things itself, which man the knower grasps in understanding all things to be one; its "steering" is not the imposition of direction upon an otherwise unruly or arbitrary process, but is rather the inner direction of the process which man the knower grasps and speaks of as if it were distinct.26

25 It is worth noting here, as a reminder, however, that Heraclitus does speak about "that which is wise" as "set apart from all things" (108). It is not clear, as has been pointed out, that this statement refers to the distance men must travel to attain genuine knowledge, or whether it does in fact refer to some separated knower of all things; the question will be raised again in chapter three when the gods are examined.

26 While the exact meaning of the expression "all things through all things" is not clear, it seems to carry a
Thus the thunderbolt, the "thought (γνώμη)," the divine law, and even "the god" seem best understood as ways in which Heraclitus sought to express the inner nature of the unity of all things in process and the profound nature of unity itself, which are the ultimate bases of the unity which man grasps because they are the ultimate content of what he understands when he understands that all things are one. Heraclitus speaks of these principles in the abstract, as will be seen when the themes of logos and war, strife, and justice are examined; but he also speaks of them as though they were concrete and distinct, existing realities—as we still tend to do today—perhaps simply to explain them to those who did not understand, perhaps because he did not see as clearly as the position here may imply that the unity he had understood and was trying to teach resides in all things, is truly the unity of all things, is not imposed upon things from without.

Again, in summary, the matter is not certain. But Heraclitus does not clearly speak of a distinct source of unity throughout the whole body of fragments, although a few isolated fragments of obscure relationship to the whole do suggest it. He certainly does say and imply through the whole nexus of interrelated terms and themes of the whole body of the fragments connotation of dynamism, that things are changing, in process, that nothing is static. The term "steers" also suggests that what is being steered is moving, that the directing of all things is the direction of something dynamic. These connotations are suitable in view of what has been stated expressly about all things, as has been seen.
that all things are themselves one; that the oneness is radical and basic to all things, and that oneness means harmony of opposites in tension. Now we must determine whether Heraclitus does in fact deal with these two basic aspects of unity through abstract principles to which the unity of all things in process and the basis of unity in opposing tension is attributed.  

Logos

Heraclitus uses the term logos (λόγος) in five different ways in the fragments: "this logos (ὁ λόγος ὁδε)" (1 twice); "the logos (ὁ λόγος)" (2, 50, 72); the logos of soul (45, 115); "the same logos (τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον)" (31); and logos in the sense of "word, opinion, report" (39, 87, 108). Before anything else it is important to determine the relationship of these varying uses of the term.

In three places, Heraclitus uses logos in a context which suggests that the word simply means "word," or some closely related concept: "A foolish man is apt to be in a flutter at every word (ἐπὶ πάντι λόγῳ)" (87); and he speaks of "Bias, whose fame (λόγος) is greater than all the rest" (39); and of "those whose discourse (λόγους, the plural form) I have heard" (108). None of these phrases indicates any connection with the themes of unity, all things, that which 

27 The statement referring to "the hours which bring all things (ὥρας αἱ πάντα φέρουσι)" (100) has already been mentioned above in footnote 24 of chapter two; it stands in some sense parallel to the two statements examined in this section, but as a "bringer" rather than a "steerer" of all things.
is common, the process of all things, the joining of opposites; it is reasonable to conclude that the term is being used in quite an ordinary way in these fragments.

In two places in the same fragment, Heraclitus speaks of "this logos": "Although this logos exists forever (τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ' ἔστιν ἀεὶ), men are void of understanding" (1); and "Though all things come to pass in accordance with this logos (γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῶν ἀεί), men seem as if ignorant" (1). "This logos" is thus linked with the coming-to-be of all things; it exists forever; and above all it is an object of not-knowing.

In three places Heraclitus speaks of "the logos." It is important to determine its relationship to "this logos."

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28The expression translated "exists forever, men are void of understanding" can bear a different interpretation because of the position of the term ἀεὶ, "always," in the Greek text. It could be translated "exists, men are always void of understanding." The latter interpretation makes Heraclitus into something of a pessimist about men's achieving genuine knowing while the rest of the evidence from the fragments suggests his conviction that men could achieve genuine understanding. The former interpretation is preferable for several other reasons as well. For Heraclitus uses the term ἀεὶ only one other time. In that fragment the term appears in conjunction with a form of εἶμι, stands in exactly the same position to that form of εἶμι as in this case (ἐστὶν ἀεὶ -1; ἢν ἀεὶ -30), and can hardly be translated in any other way than as modifying the form of εἶμι. Moreover, Heraclitus does not employ a form of εἶμι, "to be," as a predicate verb with the sense of "exists"—that is, as more than a simple copula—save in statements in which an adverb of time is involved (1, 30, 31), which suggests that the adverb modifies the form of εἶμι. On the other hand, an infinitive form of εἶμι is used in one place to mean "exists" in indirect discourse (89) and twice there are forms in prodoxes of contrary-to-fact conditions (7, 23) which mean "exists" without the adverb of time being present—all of which indicates a preferable reading, but that the matter is not closed.
He says: "Listening not to me, but to the logos (τοῦ λόγου), it is wise to agree that all things are one" (50); "although the logos (τοῦ λόγου) is common, most men live as if they had a private understanding of their own" (2); "the logos (ὁ λόγος) with which they associate most closely, from it they are separated; and those things which they encounter daily seem to them strange" (72). "The logos" is clearly an object of not-knowing and associated with genuine knowing, with "that which is common," with the unity of all things, with the near-at-hand which is present to men every day, with wisdom.

Both "the logos" and "this logos" are clearly dealt with as objects of not-knowing and as related to the unity of all things which is the ultimate object of genuine knowing. Both endure through time in some sense, and are dealt with as continually present to men. Neither is spoken of in connection with the joinings of opposites. These similarities, and the interrelationships of the terms and themes to which each is related as well, suggest that the logos referred to in these two expressions is one and the same logos. It is the object of men's genuine knowing (and thus of their not-knowing). It is that according to which all things come-to-be (1) and is therefore present to men at all times in every thing which is part of the process of all things. It is the unity of all things in process viewed precisely as the object of human knowing; and hence, after the manner of speaking
explained in the previous section, *logos* is spoken of once as the source of that knowledge of unity (50). From the point of view of things which are one, the principle to which their unity is attributed is called "that which is common" to all the things; from the point of view of man knowing that unity of all things, the principle to which that unity is attributed is called "the *logos*" or, in certain contexts, "this *logos*."  

As was pointed out, "the logos" is not anywhere associated with the joinings of opposites. This fact suggests that it was used by Heraclitus to attribute to a principle only the unity of all things in process. This conclusion is further suggested by another of the fragments: "the turnings of fire: first, sea; and of sea, half is earth and half fiery. Earth is liquified into sea, and has its measure in the same *logos* as existed before it became earth (καὶ μετέρεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὅκιος πρόσθεν ἢν ἢ γενέσθαι γῆ ) (31)."

The same *logos* endures throughout the process of all things in the turnings of fire and is the basis of the measuring whereby the process as a whole is ordered (30).  

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29 Several authors, including Guthrie, have suggested that the fragment presently placed first in the corpus, in which both references to "this *logos*" occur, was the first statement in a book or series of statements and was preceded by a title such as "On the Logos." This hypothesis needs to be validated after the foundational synthesis has been finished; but as will be seen, the *logos* is not the only principle of unity, nor is the unity of all things in process, to which it refers, the most profound unity which Heraclitus speaks of. In any case, this is not a question for a foundational synthesis.

30 The mention of "measures" in the statement concerning the sun and justice, which was noted above (94) is worth
"logos" is the basis of order in the process of all things; and this ordered process itself has already been seen to be the unity which Heraclitus saw as primarily significant (rather than a unity based on the single element of fire). The basis of the order of the ordered process is a logos which endures through time; the implication is clear that "the same logos" of this fragment (31) is the same principle of unity of the process of all things that has been under discussion.

"The logos" then, is the principle of order and thus of the unity of the process of all things, and thus of all things themselves, since their unity is the unity of the ordered process; it is this unity as grasped by man the knower and attributed by him to a principle of which he can speak. As has already been explained, this unity is not bestowed upon the process by some substantial source of unity exterior to it; the unity Heraclitus is speaking of is the unity of the process itself, attributed for the sake of being spoken of to various principles--of which "the logos" ("this logos" and

reiterating here, particularly because of the linking of logos and justice through "measures" which seems to be possible in view of the link between logos and "measures" which has already been examined. Another possible reference to "measures" and logos appears in the statement: "The soul of man (anima hominis), with the injury of any part of the body, travels to that part quickly, as if impatient with the injury of the body, to which it is joined (juncta) firmly and in measure (proportionaliter)" (67a). Unfortunately, we have no Greek text for this fragment, only Latin, and it is impossible to determine whether "soul" refers to ψυχή and whether "in measure (proportionaliter)" refers to "measures," as we have dealt with them, or logos; and it is not clear whether the "joining" referred to relates to the joinings which we have dealt with.
"the same **logos**" refer to the same principle) is the chief and most frequently spoken of.

Why should Heraclitus have chosen **logos** as his way of referring to the basic unity of all things in process? Two reasons suggest themselves immediately. First of all, this term immediately relates the unity concerned to man the knower, for in ordinary speech **logos** is an object of knowing; whenever anyone speaks, both his words themselves and the sense of what he says can be termed his **logos**. Secondly, because **logos** also carried, in certain contexts, particularly contexts where measurement and quantities might be involved, the meaning of "proportion." Both of these meanings fit the principle of unity of all things in an ordered process which is spoken of precisely as the object of knowing; **logos** refers to the intelligible unity of things within a process whose unity is of coming-to-be and passing-away, exchange, process.31

There are two other fragments which deal with a **logos**, the **logos** of soul: "The **logos** of the soul ( **ψυχῆς λόγος** ) is increasing itself" (115); and "the limits of the soul would you not find though you should travel every road: so deep a **logos** has it ( **οὖν βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει** )" (45) This **logos**

31Guthrie provides a catalogue of eleven ways in which the term **logos** was used in Heraclitus's day; one of these is to mean "proportion," which suggests a connection with the fragment involving the Latin term **proportionaliter** (67a); others relate to various translations of the term when not used in a technical context in these pages (39, 87, 108). A detailed philological analysis of the term, however, can only be performed and evaluated upon completion of a foundational synthesis of Heraclitus's thought.
bears some connection with notions of measure and quantity, for it relates to "the limits (περίμετρον) of the soul" and is said to be "increasing itself (αὐξάνει). Yet the logos spoken of here does not relate to "the logos" dealt with above in any other of the latter's correlations with all things, unity, process and interchange; nor is there any explicit connection with fire, although soul bears some connection with fire, as was pointed out in the analysis of the fragments dealing with that theme.

Since there are some parallels between the logos of soul and "the logos," which is the principle of the unity of all things in process, and some parallel between soul and fire in its turnings in the process of all things, it is reasonable to conclude that the logos of soul serves as some sort of principle of unity of soul. But again the relationship between soul and fire is not clear, and the relation between soul's logos and "the logos" of the process of all things must therefore remain unclear as well. Light may be shed on both of these questions, however, when soul is examined in chapter three in its relationship to man's life, death, actions, and morality.

"The logos," referred to also as "this logos" and "the same logos" in certain contexts, is a theme of considerable importance within the fragments; through it Heraclitus speaks of the unity of all things in process precisely as the objects of human knowing, as intelligibility. But there is another
aspect of the ultimate unity which is the object of genuine knowing which Heraclitus develops, the theme of the joinings of opposites which touches upon the ultimate nature of unity itself. "The logos" deals only with the unity of all things in process; it is important to ask whether Heraclitus attributes the ultimate nature of unity itself, as founded in tension of opposites, to an abstract principle. This is the subject of the next section.

War, strife, and justice

"War," says Heraclitus, "is the father of all and the king of all, and some he reveals as gods, others as men, some he makes slaves, others free" (53). Elsewhere he says: "One must know that war is common (τὸν πόλεμον ἐόντα ξυνόν), and justice is strife, and that all things come about by way of strife and necessity" (80).

War (πόλεμος) is given jurisdiction over all things, and has the power to create opposites out of things—some as gods, others as men; some as slaves, others as free. While it may not be significant that war is called "father," whence generation (γενεσθαί) would take its origin, it is clear that war's jurisdiction is over the generation of opposites, that war is in some sense a basis of opposition. War is related to all things; war is also said to be common, and war's common-ness

32 The only other reference to a king is in the statement mentioned above which says: "time is a child playing a game of draughts; the kingship (βασιλεία) is a "game of a child's" (52).
is a matter for genuine knowing. War thus seems to be related to the ultimate unity of things by being common, by its relation to all things, by its relation to genuine knowing, and as king and father and foundation, in some sense, of things which are opposed. 33

"All things come about by way of strife and necessity (γινόμενα πάντα κατ' ἔριν καὶ χρεῶν)" (80). Strife and necessity have jurisdiction over the coming-to-be of all things, just as "the logos" is said to have such jurisdiction in the almost identical statement examined above (1). What is the relationship between strife and necessity and "the logos"? And what is their relationship between strife and necessity and all things?

As for necessity (χρεῶν), there is little that can be said, for the term does not appear anywhere else in the fragments. 34 It is not unlikely that Heraclitus would say that the

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33War is spoken of in one other place, where it is joined with peace, and the joining identified with "the god" (67). As all things are just, although men separate them into just and unjust (102), so war and peace are one. The joining of opposites does not destroy the opposition, nor does the fact of opposition destroy the union; but the nature of unity is opposites in tension; hence war and peace, justice and strife, just and unjust, connected and separate, all things are one.

34The verb "it is necessary (χρῆ") appears several times in the fragments (35, 43, 44, 80, 114); but it does not add to our understanding of the noun "necessity," except perhaps in the fact that it invariably is used with reference to what is necessary for man, either in the attainment of genuine knowing (35, 80, 114) or in ethical matters (43, 44); this might suggest that the necessity of all things coming about is necessity only from the point of view of man; that is, only because he is a knower; this would relate to what has been said concerning the source of unity--there is no substantial power which imposes
principles to which the ultimate structure of all things, in their unity of process and in the nature of unity itself, is attributed are to be considered "necessary" because their jurisdiction is unqualified. But it is important to recall again that these principles are not distinct substantial governors or sources of unity, but rather principles to which the actual unity of all things and the actual nature of unity are being attributed in order to be spoken of at all. In this context, "necessity" refers not to imposition of a certain structure by some unqualifiedly powerful outside force, but rather to the unqualified actuality of what man observes and affirms about unity when he speaks of such principles and his knowing is genuine. But, unfortunately, Heraclitus does not elaborate in the fragments about the meaning of this once-used term, "necessity" (80).

Concerning strife (ἔρις), according to which "all things come about (γινόμενα πάντα)" (80), Heraclitus has only one further comment to add: "Justice [is] strife (δικήν ἔρις ἔρις)" (80). This fact is presented as a necessary object of genuine knowing and may be suspected to have something to do with the ultimate unity of things, to which the statement of strife's universal jurisdiction clearly refers.35 Justice is unity necessarily; rather unity is there, is actual, is so real as to seem even necessary in the eyes of men.

35 As has been pointed out, it is justice which keeps the sun within its measures: "The sun will not transgress his measures; otherwise the Furies, ministers of justice, will find him out" (94). Besides this possible relation to the logos,
also related to all things in one place: "To the god, all things are beautiful and good and just (δικαιοσύνη); but men have assumed some things to be unjust, others just" (102). Thus both strife and justice are related to all things, and justice is somehow related to unity of apparent opposites with regard to all things.

In point of fact, the very notion of "strife" suggests opposition in the first place; and if justice is related to the unity of opposites, it is not surprising to read that "justice is strife" (80). Moreover, justice is linked with beauty in the fragment cited in the previous paragraph: "To the god, all things are beautiful (καλὰ) and good and just" (102). This theme of beauty has already been seen to be linked with the theme of joining of opposites: "That which is in opposition is in concert and from things that differ comes the most beautiful harmony (καλλιστὴν ὀρμονίαν)" (8). Beauty is the sign of the harmony of opposites in tension, as in the bow and the lyre (51). Thus, as has already been pointed out, "the god" associated with the unity of opposites in which is the basis of the measure of the turnings of fire, justice is related to genuine knowing and thus to the unity of all things in some say: "Justice will convict those who fabricate and testify to lies" (28). Justice is also spoken of in relation to knowing in the statement noted in chapter one: "They would not know the name of justice if these things did not exist" (23), where it is not stated what "these things" are; it seems clear that men do know the name of justice--hence they assume some things are just and others unjust (102); but they do not know justice itself, it seems, as is stated and implied in several statements (80, 102) and by the whole theme of not-knowing to which justice has been seen to be related.
conjunction with beauty and justice (102), is elsewhere identified with joined opposites (67) and is spoken of there also perhaps as a unity which men fail to grasp. Finally, in another place, beauty is associated with "a dust-heap piled up at random (εἰκῖν)" which is "the most beautiful ἐοσμός (ὁ καλλιστος κόσμος)," the most beautiful ordered unity (124).

Justice and beauty are thus explicitly linked with the unity of opposites in several places in the fragments, and are linked with each other explicitly in one place as well. Justice in turn is linked with the theme of strife, and makes explicit the implication of the term's basic meaning that it refers to the opposition of things; but "justice is strife (80)," opposition is union of opposites; and strife, the opposition which is union, has jurisdiction over all things: "All things come to pass by way of strife and necessity" (80).36

It is possible that the terms and themes being examined here were not intended to be related to each other this closely. That possibility remains in every effort of ours to discover

36 It is noteworthy that the Greeks' notion of justice has traditionally been linked with a concept of right order, a concept which fits well the place of justice within the nexus of interrelated themes of Heraclitus's thought; for justice stands as the principle of joined opposites, the union of opposites in tension, which is itself the basis for the unity of all things in ordered process. It may be significant that it is justice which is named as having jurisdiction over the changes of the sun, the measures of its process. Again it is a matter of a connotation proving apt upon being examined in the light of the way the term is used in the fragments. The link between ἐοσμός and justice through the theme of beauty is further confirmed by this connotation as well.
the lines of Heraclitus's thought from a limited number of fragments. But it has already been made clear that the theme of the joinings of opposites, which deals with an insight into the nature of unity itself, is one of the most significant themes in the fragments. When terms such as "war" and "strife" are found, which seem to relate by their very meaning to this theme, and when investigation of their uses and of the terms and themes used in connection with them reveals that the unity of opposites is in fact explicitly dealt with through them, then we must proceed to try to determine more exactly the content of these terms in relation to that theme.

Strife and its correlate, justice, bear a significant relationship to the theme of the joinings of opposites. It is important to ask, then, how "strife" can be said to have jurisdiction over the coming-to-be of all things; for the principle of the unity of the process of all things has already been identified as "the logos." In a similar way, the relationship between war and all things must be determined; for war is also given jurisdiction over all things, and has been found to be related to the joining of opposites and to be somehow related to the unity of all things by being "common." Finally, we must ask how justice is related to all things; for it is linked to the joinings of opposites both expressly and through the parallel theme of beauty; and it is linked to all things expressly and also through its correlate, strife, and perhaps also through beauty's relationship to cosmos (124).
It is proposed here that Heraclitus does not single out one expression to be used when speaking about the fundamental nature of unity, as he does speak generally of logos when speaking of the basic intelligible unity and order of all things from the point of view of man the knower, and uses the term "common" when dealing with the unity of all things from the point of view of all things, the term cosmos when his point of view is the order of all things in process. He uses three terms as roughly interchangeable—war, strife, and justice—for all three carry the significant content that unity is the tension of opposites; and his use of the term "beauty" is also related. But it is important to note that these terms bear a similarity to "the logos" which such expressions as cosmos and "that which is common" and other examples which could have been named do not; for Heraclitus speaks of "the logos" and of war, strife, justice sometimes as though they were substantial beings which have actual jurisdiction over all things as the basis of unity of all things and as the basis of unity itself in its fundamental nature. The evidence which indicates that Heraclitus did not actually conceive of such a distinct substantial source of jurisdiction has already been presented; but it is significant to note that Heraclitus treats "the logos" and war, strife, and justice in much the same way in this regard; he tends to speak of these above all others as principles and sources, and as though distinct and substantial. Once again the two realms of unity
to which these expressions refer stand out as Heraclitus's main concerns in his understanding of all things.

The world of Heraclitus is a world of profound unity, a unity of all things in one ordered process of coming-to-be, a unity whose basis is opposing tension; this unity, in both its aspects, is all around man as he lives and acts and thinks he understands his world; but nevertheless, in general, he remains ignorant. If he grasped these two basic truths about all things, the unity of their process and the unity of their every difference and opposition, then man could find his way out of his own personal world (2), could live as one awake and aware (73, 112), having achieved the genuine knowing which Heraclitus seeks to lead him to.
CHAPTER III

MAN IN A WORLD HE UNDERSTANDS

What is man's life like when he understands the world for what it is? And what is lacking to his life and actions when his understanding is dim? How does man stand in relation to death, to society, to the mystery rites and the gods? How does he compare with the brutes? Within the process of all things, where is man's place and what is the relationship between being a man and being in the world whose unity has been seen to be of such concern to Heraclitus? These questions are treated in varying detail in some of the fragments; and, although the statements available are not numerous, it is possible to discover some of Heraclitus's answers to them. This is the task of the present chapter.

The first section of this chapter will deal with man's efforts to attain genuine knowledge and the effect of these efforts on his life and action. The second section will deal with ethical man and examine the relationship of the unity of the world in which man lives with the order of his own ethical life, with the life and death of his soul, and with his own life after death. In the third section, finally, man's relationship to "the gods" will be examined, as well as the views of Heraclitus on the mystery rites.
The important theme of the not-knowing of men has already been examined at length in the first chapter. It has been determined that what men do not know is the unity of all things, a unity whose two basic aspects have been discovered and examined in chapter two. It is worth reiterating here, however, that this unity is first grasped by men in the concrete. Man grasps the unity of things through his ordinary experience, as has been pointed out in chapter one; and the unity which he grasps is the concrete unity of all things in their actual, ordered process, and the concrete unity of opposites in tension towards each other. Heraclitus does not see the object of genuine knowing or not-knowing as some abstracted source of unity, whether substantial or mental, but rather as the concrete unity of the world of all things.

It follows, then, that men's not-knowing itself will be concrete and related to men's actions. This conclusion is verified not only in a number of the statements concerning the near-at-hand-ness of the object of not-knowing, which has already been examined in chapter one, and the relation of all things to this object, together with certain references to time and the daily, continual presence of this unity to men, but also in several concrete statements about it: "The rest of mankind are unaware of what they do while awake, just as they forget what they do while asleep" (1); men's not-knowing
affects their actions:¹ "Most men live as if they had a private understanding of their own" (2), overlooking that which is common (2)—their not-knowing extends to their whole lives. This theme of living in one's own private world is also linked with the parallel theme of sleep in one place (89). "Wisdom is to speak the truth and to act according to nature" (112); but Heraclitus can refer to "men who do not know how to listen or how to speak" (19).

But if not-knowing is so concrete and real, not simply the absence of some abstract and irrelevant form of knowledge, then there ought to be a reason for men's failing so generally to achieve it. The reason is partly given in the theme of the hiddenness of the object of not-knowing, which was studied in chapter one. In several other statements, Heraclitus speaks about the effort one must make to attain his goals; these statements, while apparently intended to be generally applicable to all of men's activities, have place here: "Those who seek gold dig much earth and find little" (22); "if one does not hope, one will not find the unhoped-for, since there is no trail to it and no path" (18). In one other place, Heraclitus says that men are unaware that they are failing in the achievement of genuine knowing: "to themselves, they seem (to understand) (οὐδὲ μαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἐμφυτοῖσι δὲ

¹Heraclitus uses this comparison of not-knowing in action with sleep in several places; one fragment has been examined several times (89); another reads: "We must not act and speak like men asleep" (73). See also footnote 11 of chapter two.
men accept as wise are not always so: "The knowledge of the most famous man is but opinion (δοξέοντα)" (28); and "What intelligence or understanding have they? They put their trust in popular bards and take the mob for their teacher, not knowing that 'the majority are bad, and the good are few'" (104).

Heraclitus's criticisms of his predecessors, examined in chapter one, are also pertinent, as is the statement that: "A foolish man is apt to be in a flutter at every word (ἐπὶ πάντι λόγῳ)" (87).

How are men to achieve genuine knowing then? His guidelines for genuine knowing, statements of what is necessary and what one must do, have already been examined in chapter one (2, 35, 47, 80, 114); his statements about himself as knower have also been treated there (1, 35, 50, 55). In sum, men must begin with their ordinary experience, listen to "the logos," follow what is common rather than simply remain within the confines of their own world—which means that they must be open to all things and to the unity of all things; they must examine each and every thing and understand how it is. These matters have been examined in detail above.

Men's knowledge also includes themselves, a theme which is mentioned only twice in the fragments: "I searched myself" (101); "all men have the capacity of knowing themselves, and acting with moderation (ἄνθρωποι πᾶσι μέτεστι γνωσκεῖν ἑαυτούς καὶ σωφρονεῖν)" (116). This last fragment suggests that
the question of self-knowledge, as is to be expected, is related to the question of the norms of man's actions, with man as ethical. The concreteness of man's not-knowing also suggests that not-knowing in general should have ramifications in man's ethical life. The next section, then, will seek to understand the norms of man's conduct which Heraclitus mentions and their relationship to the unity of all things in the world in which man lives.

Living and Acting in the Ordered World

Man's knowledge of the unity and order of all things in the world has been seen to penetrate his concrete life through and through, just as it was seen before to be founded upon his ordinary, day-to-day, near-at-hand experience of all things. Now we need to examine his actions themselves in search of order and unity, and to ask whether the norms by which he is guided in his actions have any relation to the order and unity of all things. This task will be undertaken in two steps. First of all, the norms which are set down in the abstract will be examined, the best virtue, wisdom as a guide for action, law, and the actions of the men whom Heraclitus judges the best among men. Then the statements which indicate the best and wisest soul will be examined, and the relationship of the soul of man to his death and to afterlife will also be looked into.
Virtue, wisdom, law, and the best among men

"Moderation is the greatest virtue (σκόρονεὶς ἀρετὴ μεγίστη) and wisdom (σοφίη) is to speak the truth and to act according to nature, being aware (ἐπαίδοντας)" (112). The phrase "according to nature" has already been examined in its relation to genuine knowing and the unity of all things; and wisdom has been seen to be closely related to the unity of all things as well; "being aware (ἐπαίδοντας) has been examined in its relationship to ordinary experience, and will be seen below to characterize the wisest and best soul. Thus moderation seems to be related to the order and unity of all things; it is also linked with knowing in another fragment which was cited in the previous section (116). The very notion of moderation, moreover, implies the presence of opposites, in terms of which the moderate man is seeking a middle course; there is some similarity implied here between virtue and the tension of opposites which is the foundation of unity itself within Heraclitus's world, but Heraclitus does not mention this similarity between moderation and the joinings of opposites anywhere in the fragments. Only one set of opposites named, moreover, even suggests an ethical context: "hunger and satiety" (67). Nevertheless, there is a similarity in thought that is worth noting. He does, in one place, warn men to avoid one extremity of vice: "One should quench arrogance (ὑβρίς) rather than a conflagration" (43); this and the reference to moderation as the "best virtue" are the only references to
specific virtues or vices in the fragments.

Heraclitus does speak about "law (νόμος)" in several places. He is referring to man's life within political society -- the term νόμος ordinarily means "political law" -- this is especially clear in this fragment: "The people should fight for the law (νόμου) as if for their city-wall" (44). But, as was noted when questions about what is divine were being considered, Heraclitus refers in one of these fragments to both the political law and "the one divine law" as well (114). In another place he says that "to obey the will of one (βουλής πεσάοα: ἐννοίας) is also law (νόμος)" (33), a statement which was also examined above. The connection of political law with divine law, however, is not made clear in these fragments; it is not inconceivable that Heraclitus saw the concrete norms of right and order and justice within the political body as related to the order of all things and as an aspect of the universal order, but he never makes this any clearer than has already been noted in the comment: "for all human laws are nourished by one which is divine" (114).

Heraclitus's indictment of the Ephesians for expelling Hermodorus (121) is somewhat related to this matter of political and social order; it bears more relation, however, to the theme of "the best men." Thus he contrasts the action of the Ephesians with Hermodorus's excellence, and puts into their mouths the words: "Let us not have even one valuable (δύνατος) man; but if we do, let him go elsewhere and live among others" (121).
In another place he says: "to me, one man is ten thousand, if he is the best (εὖν ἄριστος ἦ; )" (49); and he agrees that "the majority (οἱ πολλοὶ ) are bad and the good are few" (104).²

"The best men (οἱ ἄριστοι )," he says, "choose one thing rather than all else: everlasting fame among mortal men. The majority (οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ) stuff themselves like cattle" (29).³

This view concerning honor is repeated in two other fragments: "gods and men honor those slain in war" (24); "greater deaths (μῦροι ) win greater portions (or: rewards; μοῖρας )" (25). The question of what happens after death will be examined below.

The comparison of men with brutes also has place elsewhere in the fragments: "if happiness lay in bodily pleasures, we would call oxen happy when they find vetch to eat" (4).⁴ Finally, this

²Also noteworthy with regard to the best men is the statement: "In Priene was born Bias son of Teutamos, whose fame is greater than that of the rest" (39). Heraclitus's other favorable comments about his predecessors are worth noting here (56, and perhaps 35).

³It is worth noting that the phrase translated "among mortal men" could also be translated "rather than things mortal." The latter interpretation would suggest that human death is final, without after-life; the former seems more likely, however, since what is being spoken of is fame, which is a mortal thing while being everlasting as well, and which is definitely had only "among men." Neither interpretation raises any significant difficulties.

⁴On the question of men's similarity to the brutes, Heraclitus's comment on men who have "barbarous souls" may be significant (107); the fragment states that such men's eyes and ears are bad witnesses, a fact which suggests a link with the fragment stating that the drunken man is not aware of where he is going, having a wet soul (117); the link between "being aware" and a dry soul is also suggested elsewhere (112, 118). Also of possible relation to the statements about brutes and men is the statement that "donkeys would choose sweepings rather than gold" (9); the reference to "enjoying oneself in mud" (13); and "every crawling thing is driven with a blow" if
theme of "the best men" is strongly complemented by a set of references to "the majority" or "the rest of men." Two such references have already come to light (104, 29); others appear in statements about not-knowing of various sorts: thus "the rest of mankind (τούς δὲ ἀλλούς)" act as if asleep (1); and "those whose discourse I have heard (δικόσων λόγους ἔκκουσα)" are lacking in understanding (108); both these references seem to contrast men in general with Heraclitus himself. Others speak of the "many (οἱ πολλοί)" who live as if they had a private understanding of things (2) and "many (πολλοί)" who do not know what is near-at-hand (17), and of "most (πλείστων)" who accept Hesiod as their teacher regardless of his errors (57). The best men are linked with right action and genuine knowing, and the rest of men with brutes and not-knowing; the implication is certainly strong that right living and genuine knowing are related.

The soul and death

The comparison of the majority of men with well-fed cattle (29) may have been in Heraclitus's mind when he said: "It is not better for men that whatever they wish (ἐλούσιν) come to pass (γίνεσθαι)" (110). If there is a difference the man who does not know and whose life is not in accord with genuine knowing, these various statements may refer to his condition, as do those given in the text; but the matter is far from clear. One statement might refer to men's not-knowing in this way: "dogs bark at those whom they do not recognize" (97); cf. (87). But it may well be that the statements are intended to tell us something about the animals concerned; the explicit link between men and brutes is made only twice (4, 29).
between men and brutes named in the fragments, besides the search for everlasting fame mentioned along with the reference to cattle (29), this difference is "soul." For Heraclitus speaks a number of times about "soul" in such a way that he seems most certainly to be talking about man's soul, and its relation to the right order of his actions.

"To fight desire (ἐμμω: )," he says, "is hard: whatever it wishes (θέλη: ), it buys at the price of soul" (85). This perhaps is the sense of the statement that "for souls it is enjoyment (τρηψιν: ), or rather death, to become wet" (77). The price which the soul pays for becoming wet (ὑρρηνώς: γενέσθαι;) seems to be death (θάνατον: ); this association of the soul's death and becoming water has already been noted above: "for souls it is death (θάνατος: ) to become water (ϋδώρ: γενέσθαι:)" (36); also related are statements that soul comes from water in the process of things, which were examined above in chapter two (12, 36).

The ethical significance of the soul's becoming wet appears in another fragment where Heraclitus remarks: "A dry soul is wisest and best (σῦν: ψυχῆ: σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀριστή: )" (118); here dryness of soul is associated with wisdom and being best, just as wetness was associated with desire. In another fragment, he says: "A man, when he gets drunk, is led stumbling along by an immature boy, not being aware (οὐκ: ἐπαινῶν) where he is going, having his soul wet (ὑρρην: τῆν: ψυχὴν: ἔχων: )" (117).5

5The term ἐπαινῶ, "being aware," appears in another
Here drunkenness (and perhaps pleasure as well) is associated with wetness of soul; it might even have been intended quite literally by Heraclitus that too much drinking resulted in a wet soul; of more consequence, however, is the association of wetness of soul and the disordered state of the man with his "not being aware (οὐκ ἐπαίων)"; for "being aware (ἐπαίωντας)" was the condition expressed in the statement explaining the nature of wisdom (σοφία) as "to speak the truth and to act according to nature, paying heed (or: being aware, ἐπαίωντας)."

Thus wetness of soul is associated with a condition of pleasure and lack of awareness, and dryness of soul is associated with wisdom and awareness. In the concrete, the wetness of the soul affects the moral order of the man, places him at a greater distance from wisdom and right action, and is related to pleasure and perhaps to being brutish and less than human (107).

It is possible that wetness of soul does this by dulling the senses, makes a man unaware of where he is going; but Heraclitus does not make this last point any more explicit; his conviction that foundation of wisdom and genuine knowing lies in ordinary experience, however, is not insignificant in this regard.

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fragment which has already been examined several times (112), in which "being aware" or "paying heed" is presented as a condition of wisdom (ἐπαίωντας). It is worth noting that the phrase "according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν)" in that fragment could be taken with "being aware" rather than with "act" (112). The object of "being aware" in the present fragment (117) has several parallels in "the road or way," a concept which appears in context with knowing and the unity of opposites several times (45, 59, 60, 71).
But becoming wet is also associated with the death of the soul. Does this death of the soul bear any relation to the death of the whole man? Is human death simply the dissolution of the man's soul into water within the process of all things?

Heraclitus does not explicitly answer these questions in the fragments. The statements in which soul stands parallel to fire in relation to water within the process of all things were examined in chapter two; the conclusion reached there was that soul is not to be identified with fire within the process of all things, although it bears certain similarities. It was also noted that passing-away is referred to as death (Θδνατος) only in the statements about soul's becoming water, but never when the element which becomes water is fire. Related to this, perhaps, is the statement: "The same thing in us (Τηνυτο τ' ἔνι) is living and dead, and waking and sleeping, and young and old; for these things when they have changed, are those, and those when they have changed back again are these" (88). If "the same thing in us" were soul, then the soul would be living and dead, depending upon the state of change within the process; but "the same thing within us" is not explained. Similarly, Heraclitus states: "mortal immortals, immortal mortals, living their life and dying their death" (62); the reference seems to be to those who are living and dying at the same time, such as men who are alive but moving always towards death; their principle of life could be said to be
It might seem that the association of a *logos* with soul would indicate that soul and fire are identical; but it has already been discovered that the references to the *logos* of soul distinguish it from "the *logos*," which is the principle of the unity of all things in the process of fire. Moreover, there is one statement in which Heraclitus speaks of the soul being in Hades, the place of life after death: "souls have the sense of smell in Hades" (98), which would suggest that the soul does not cease to exist at the death of a man. On the other hand, Heraclitus twice speaks about death as fate (μφροι) (20, 25), and in one of these places he says that in death men "come to rest (ἀναπαύσειςατ;)" (20); men, he says, "leave behind children to become victims of fate (literally: fates, deaths; μφροις;)" (20). In one place he says" "corpses are more worthy to be thrown out than dung" (96); and in another that "there await men, after they are dead, things which they
neither expect nor imagine" (27); but both of these statements can be read either way, indicating that death is the absolute end of man or indicating that there is a life after death.\(^7\)

Ultimately, it must be concluded that the evidence on these matters is inadequate. There is only one statement to indicate that the soul is active after death—"in Hades (98); but that statement itself is not clear, particularly in view of Heraclitus's views on the mystery religions, which shall be examined in the next section. It is not clear whether the soul is one aspect of fire, fire as it gives life either to all living beings or perhaps just man; it is not clear whether soul's death is the death of man; it is not clear whether the death of man is final. What can be concluded, however, is that the soul is definitely related to man's ethical activity, as he strives to rise above the brutes, and to his wisdom as he strives to move from the basic awareness of what is around him in experience to an understanding of the order of all things as it relates to his own moderation in action according to

\(^7\) Concerning the after-life, the statement: "The greater the fate (\( \mu \delta \rho \omega \zeta \)) , the greater the reward" (25) might seem significant; but it could simply refer to the "everlasting fame among mortal men" mentioned elsewhere (29), since Heraclitus speaks explicitly of honoring the war-dead (24) and others. On the other hand, death seems to be simply part of the process of coming—"when they are born, they wish to live and accept their fate (\( \mu \delta \rho \omega \zeta \)) , or rather come to rest; and they leave behind their children to become victims of fate (literally: fates, deaths: \( \mu \delta \rho \omega \zeta \)) " (20). This might also be the intent of the reference to "children of our parents" (74), although there is little that can be said about these two words. It is not unlikely that Heraclitus would view death as simply part of the process of all things; and he does speak of the passing away of soul into water as "death" several times (36, 77); he does not speak of fire in this manner however.
nature, his living like the best of men and not like the majority, his preservation of the wisest and best soul.

The Gods and the Mystery Rites

Statements in which "the gods (\(\Theta\varepsilon\omicron\omicron\iota\))" and men have stood in identical relationships to war (53), to the cosmos of all things (30), and to those slain in war (24) have already been cited; it has been pointed out that "the gods (\(\Theta\varepsilon\omicron\omicron\iota\))" are not sources of universal jurisdiction or control over the process of all things nor over the nature of unity within Heraclitus's world. What is men's relationship to "the gods" then? And, for that matter, do "the gods" exist at all in Heraclitus's view of things?

"They purify themselves by staining (\(\mu\varsigma\alpha\nu\nu\nu\omicron\omicron\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron\iota\)) themselves with other blood, as if one were to step into mud in order to wash off mud. But a man would be thought mad (\(\mu\alpha\nu\varepsilon\sigma\Theta\sigma\iota\)) if any of his fellow-men should perceive him acting thus. Moreover, they talk to these statues as if one were to hold conversation with houses, not understanding what gods and heroes really are (\(\Theta\varepsilon\omicron\omicron\varsigma\;\omicron\delta\omicron\nu\omicron\iota\omicron\mu\omicron\omega\varsigma\;\omicron\iota\tau\iota\nu\epsilon\varsigma\;\varepsilon\iota\sigma\iota\))" (5). Heraclitus makes fun of the mystery rites, even punning on "staining" and "be thought mad." In another place he speaks of: "night-ramblers, magicians, bacchants, maenads, mystics; what are regarded by men as mysteries are unholy rituals" (14).

Heraclitus does not make it explicit in these statements whether the rites are "unholy" and "mad" because there are no gods (\(\Theta\varepsilon\omicron\omicron\iota\)) or because the rites which men practice are
themselves shameful and foolish. In one place Heraclitus says: "if it were not in honor of Dionysius that they conducted the procession and sang the hymn to the male organ, their activity would be completely shameless" (15). But even here he might be excusing their shamelessness somewhat by reason of their failure to understand that Dionysius does not exist rather than by reason of their good intentions to do Dionysius service. This fragment continues: "But Hades is the same as Dionysius, in whose honor they rave and perform the bacchic rites" (15); and we have already seen the comment that "souls have the sense of smell in (κατὰ) Hades" (98), but have also noted that it is not clear that Heraclitus expects an after-life, which makes this latter statement of uncertain meaning as well.

The number of statements about the gods (θεοὶ) and their relationship to war, cosmos, and honored men, as well as the fact that Heraclitus seems to have some criterion of "holy" or not-shameless rites and speaks of "what gods and heroes really are" (5), suggest that he does consider his statements about "the gods (θεοὶ)" to be positively meaningful. He could be using the terms and expressions in some figurative way, perhaps with reference to the principles of unity examined in chapter two. But the evidence seems to point somewhat more strongly to a belief in "the gods (θεοὶ)" as subordinate to the process and unity of all things, just as men and every other element in the process is subordinate, that is, is part
of the unity of the whole, but as real beings nonetheless.

If there are gods (θεοὶ), then they seem to hold some superior rank over men; and if there are not gods really, whatever is being referred to in the statements about "the gods (θεοὶ)" stands as a principle of higher rank than man within the world: "man is called childish compared with a daimon (δαίμων), as a child compared with a man" (79), where daimon refers to some being of higher rank than man. Yet there is another statement which attributes daimon to man himself: "for man, nature (νόος) is daimon" (119). In another place, Heraclitus states, as has already been noted: "human nature (νόος) has no power of understanding, but divine [nature] has" (78); and the statements connecting wisdom and law to that which is divine may also be intended to indicate the subordination of man to "the gods," although those statements have seemed more related to the unity of all things in process and to the basis of unity itself in tension of opposites.

In summary, it must be said that the matter of "the gods (θεοὶ)" is not clear. The view which best handles both the statements about "the gods (θεοὶ)" and the statements about what is divine, which were examined in chapter two, is one which judges that "the gods (θεοὶ)" do actually exist for Heraclitus as beings who rank above men and possess the genuine knowing which is men's goal; thus they are associated with "that which is wise," which they possess (as that "that which is wise" is thus linked in some sense with the name of Zeus). Their
understanding of the unity of all things and the nature of that unity surpasses man's understanding; and through them, perhaps, man comes to achieve genuine knowing. This view would take the statements employing the term θεῖος, "divine," to refer to "the gods" (78, 114); it would take the phrase "that which is wise" to refer to the goal of genuine knowing, which is in fact possessed by "the gods" (32, 41, 108); it would take the expression "the god," (ὁ θεός), however, to refer to the ultimate principle of unity itself in the joining of opposites, as indicated in the discussion of the relevant statements in chapter two (67, 102). But it must be stated again that this view of these statements is a conjecture which happens to handle a number of loose ends fairly tidily, but must not be viewed as anything else. So far as the internal evidence of the fragments also goes to confirm, these matters must be considered uncertain.

In sum, as man lives within the ordered world, his not-knowing affects all his actions--affects not only his doing of the actions themselves, his "knowing how," but also affects his actions in a more significant way by affecting him as an ethical being, as one whose actions can be good or bad, virtuous and best or brutish and controlled by desire. His soul is related to his ethical actions; it is wisest and best when it is dry and is able to "be aware, pay heed" and he acts according to nature. Both his way of living and his soul are related to his death, to the question of life after death,
and to his relations with "the gods" through the mystery rites and, perhaps, as possessors and sources of what is wise. In many of these matters, there are many loose ends because the evidence from the fragments is not plentiful; but this much is clear: as man's life takes place within the order of all things, its order and well-being are related to the order of all things, and are dependent upon man's achieving, upon the foundations of his concrete experience, a genuine understanding of the unity of all things.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

It is important that all the assumptions or apparent assumptions which underlie what has been presented here be made as clear as possible so that the synthesis presented in these pages may be understood to be no more certain than it is, and be held to with no more qualifications than are justified.

The work found in these pages is dependent first of all upon the textual criticism of Diehls-Kranz, upon the materials to be found in Liddell and Scott's lexicon, upon the skill and ability to communicate of Freeman and Guthrie, and upon numerous other students of Heraclitus who have laid the groundwork within the author of this paper for understanding the Greek language and in particular the Greek and its English equivalents of the fragments of Heraclitus. These preliminaries are obvious, and are no more assumptions than our willingness to grant that all human efforts to know are limited.

There is an assumption, however, which is particularly important to the work of this foundational synthesis of Heraclitus's thought. For it has been necessary to assume that words with related meanings have some basic similarity in every use. Thus the various different terms for knowing have been dealt with generally on a par, as carrying the basic content of "knowing" which could be depended upon in every
case. Other theme ideas have been developed through the same sort of assumption. This assumption does not seem to be one which cannot be justified from the conditions of possibility of human communication and a study of the underlying facts of language; but it does mean that our conclusions in these pages should be approached with the proper qualifications being operative within our judgment. In some particular cases, as in the references to wisdom and "that which is wise," and other situations in which the Greek use of articles with substantive neuter (and other) adjectives leaves us uncertain in some cases even with the help of the context and the nexus of interrelationships of all the fragments, this qualification of the conclusions needs to be stressed; in such specially difficult cases, the conclusions reached in the pages of the synthesis were qualified as they were reached. It is hoped that the conclusions reached in these pages have been worded with sufficient care that unjustified conclusions, doubtful conclusions, conclusions which bear questioning, conclusions which are not absolutely clear, and conclusions which can hardly be doubted are distinct from one another. The certainty of a particular conclusion depends not only on the clarity of the texts, but also on the volume of material available on a particular question, upon the strength of the relationships of the particular theme with other terms, themes, and relationships within the fragments, and upon the aptness of the conclusion within the total synthesis itself.
This brings us to the most basic and most significant assumption of these pages, namely that Heraclitus was trying to make sense, that there is unity to his thought. If this position is rejected from the outset, then there is no possibility of understanding the man; for understanding, intelligibility, is what is being rejected. Should it be impossible to discover any unity within the man's thought, then we might justifiably conclude that he is not trying to make sense, or even is trying not to make sense. But the assumption of the student must be that Heraclitus is trying to make sense; that therefore, if in some respect he does make sense, if unity and intelligibility are discovered in what he has said, then this unity of thought is the goal of the study. The unities must be stated as clearly as possible, with all due qualification and careful indication of what evidence there is for each part of the result; but the unity of the man's thought is the goal. It is important to realize that this unity of thought is what is being sought after, not simply some better understanding of secondary materials of whatever sort; their function is ultimately only to contribute to the discovery of the sense of what the man said. And their dependence upon the foundational work of analysis and synthesis, as has been said, makes this foundational work the most important step in reaching the desired goal.

This most basic, necessary assumption is the ultimate justification for presenting a synthesis of Heraclitus's or
anyone's thought in the first place; and it founds every
interrelating of data that takes place in the formation of
such a synthesis. Thus every step of this paper has been
based upon the fundamental belief that Heraclitus intended
to make sense, that his thought is intelligible. Working from
this basic view of Heraclitus and this necessary position of
anyone trying to understand another man, we can now at the
end of our foundational work conclude that the evidence has
confirmed our assumption; unity is to be had within the fragments.
There are many patterns of thought which appear repeatedly in
the fragments, and which are consistent both internally and
with each other; some of these are more explicit than others,
some are much more clear in their details than others,
some have been mentioned here simply because they are present,
but have been distrusted because other statements in the fragments
seem to contradict them or because they are conjectures never
really confirmed by the words of the fragments in any definite
way. By presenting in this way every conclusion which the
fragments themselves suggest, it is hoped that this paper will
provide material for further study of uncertainties on the
basis of evidence from outside the fragments themselves; the
presentation of the less certain conclusions and the relatively
unconfirmed conjectures suggested in the fragments also serves
to indicate, by comparison and contrast, how clear and certain
some of the themes and patterns of Heraclitus's thought really
are.
With considerable certainty, based upon explicit statements, careful study of the use of terms, careful comparison of themes, similarities and differences in expression, and detailed examination of the interrelationships of all these materials from every fragment in every case, the following is offered as a brief summary of the basic teaching of Heraclitus:

Heraclitus believed that men in general, with few exceptions, were failing to achieve a type of knowing which he deemed possible for them and ultimately significant in their concrete lives of perception and awareness, of learning and accepting the teaching of others, and of acting and living according to various norms in an ordered way; this knowing has been termed here "genuine" or, loosely but aptly, "philosophical." This knowing is universal; it reaches out to all things. This knowing is a grasping of unity; its ultimate object is the unity of all things.

This unity of all things is grasped by the genuinely knowing man under two aspects; he grasps the unity of all things in one ordered process of coming-to-be, in which fire is the primary element, and in which important parts are played by soul, and perhaps by human death and the changes of the sun as well in some way; and he grasps the unity of all things by understanding the very nature of unity itself: unity is tension of opposites, without opposition there is no unity; unity is ever unity out of multiplicity, unity out of and based upon opposition; unity and opposition are coterminous and, in the
concrete, identical in some sense.

These two aspects of the unity of all things are grasped by a man through his ordinary experience; they are not special revelations, nor infused or based upon transcendent insight, but come rather from being aware of the reality of all things dealt with every day; hence numerous examples of these aspects of unity can be discovered within the most concrete realms of experience.

Grasping the unity of all things under these two aspects, and seeking to communicate his understanding, a man speaks of principles of unity, tending in his language to attribute distinct and substantial being to these principles as to actual sources or causes of unity; he tends to refer the unity he understands to divine causes and transcendent sources of intelligence, but what his language reflects is rather the absolute actuality of the unity he grasps in every thing of his experience; the unity is not distinct from all things, rather "all things are one." In this manner, however, he comes to speak of a principle of unity with regard to each aspect of the real unity he grasps; he speaks of logos, the principle of order in the process of all things coming-to-be, and associates the measures and limits of that process in the concrete with the logos he speaks of; and speaks of war, strife, justice, harmony, which are ways of referring to the very nature of the principle of unity as tension of opposites; and he relates these two principles with each other in the abstract
and in the concrete because they are aspects of the one unity of all things in actuality.

Turning back to man again, Heraclitus reflects that the ordering of man's life relates to norms which suggest these principles. He understands that that ordering will only be achieved by men whose knowing approaches the understanding of all things and their unity; and he judges that man is above all a part of the process and finds his own unity through tension of opposites.

Heraclitus's insight is profound, though expressed in short form in every case and demanding great efforts to uncover the possible interrelationships of what he has to say in so many apparently isolated fragments. It is possible that some elements of the synthesis which has been presented here in his name were only implicit in his thought, that he did not understand the world and man so well, so explicitly; but this does not detract from the significance of what he has to say, nor from our attributing to him what was his, even though he may have lacked words to say it as clearly as we can. For nothing has been attributed to him here which is not founded upon and clearly confirmed, though admittedly not always in so many words, within the fragments at our disposal.

The picture of Heraclitus presented here clearly differs from the picture of him which has commonly been presented in the past. Heraclitus has long been treated as a sceptic, or at least as a man who radically distrusted sense knowledge. The
evidence of the fragments is that Heraclitus valued sense knowledge and ordinary experience as the basis upon which further understanding of things is built; it follows quite reasonably, moreover, that he should have turned repeatedly to ordinary experience for examples when he was examining the unity of all things in its various aspects.

Heraclitus has been presented as teaching that there is no stability or unity of any sort in the world, that the world is constituted utterly of arbitrary change. But it has become clear that the unity of all things and the basic nature of unity itself are Heraclitus's chief concerns. His world is a world in which everything is changing; but it is not an arbitrary, orderless world, a world without intelligibility in which only scepticism would be reasonable. Nothing could be clearer than the fact that Heraclitus was concerned with the unity of things and the understanding of this unity by men; the unity of all things and the failure of men to achieve genuine understanding of that unity are the most repeated themes of the fragments.

Heraclitus has been treated as a man basically without hope, as a pessimist and a deliberate riddler who had no confidence in men to achieve the genuine understanding of things which he saw them to be lacking. It has already been pointed out, however, that Heraclitus affirms men's ability to achieve genuine understanding not only explicitly in a few places, but more importantly by his clear conviction that he
himself had achieved some degree of this genuine understanding and by his efforts to teach men what he had come to know. The picture of Heraclitus as a riddler without hope is hard to accept when we are presented with his efforts to teach men of their own lack of understanding and to turn their attention to the unity of all things and its relationship to their daily lives which they are failing to grasp.

It is clear, of course, that the picture of Heraclitus as a despairing riddler or a sceptic follows from the picture of his world as one of arbitrary change, without meaning, order, or rationality. Similarly, the view of him proposed here, as a concerned teacher, leading men to an awareness of their own ignorance and striving to turn their attention to the unity of all things in its various aspects, is related to the picture of his world revealed in the fragments and presented in these pages, a world whose change is a total ordered process which is radically rational and is basically accessible to man's understanding.

In all of this, Heraclitus grasps both sides of the dichotomy which bases all metaphysics; there is change, multiplicity, difference; and yet there is also order, intelligibility, unity. He may be deemed an optimist for preserving, in his view of things, order and intelligibility; but he must also be deemed a realist for preserving, together with this conviction in intelligibility, a constant awareness of the world as it is presented to us in ordinary experience.
This response of his, grasping both sides of the dichotomy which are presented as genuine, is significantly paralleled, and perhaps founded upon—or perhaps serves as the ultimate foundation for—his understanding of the fundamental nature of unity itself. Unity, he teaches, is harmony; unity is tension of opposites.

In this doctrine of the basic nature of unity itself lies Heraclitus's most profound insight and his greatest contribution to philosophical thinking. It is an insight regained again and again throughout the history of philosophy, and considered with every rediscovery to be a return to reality. But what is most significant about this profound insight of Heraclitus is that, radical though it be, it does not stand alone as an isolated thought. This radically unifying insight into all things is itself a tension of opposites, a tension between the search for unity and intelligibility and the evident experience of change and multiplicity. Both by explicit statements about unity and understanding and by his whole manner of approach, Heraclitus teaches that thought must remain bound up with experience, that man the thinker is one with his world. Genuine knowing, the effort to achieve the unity of all things through thought, must preserve the tension whence it arises: man in transaction in the world.

Every facet of this man's work ought to be compared, of course, with what has been said about him in the past and with what has been observed and understood about all things
since he passed from our midst. The foundational synthesis presented in these pages, it is hoped, provides a thorough, detailed, and properly qualified basis of understanding of Heraclitus's thought upon which his contributions to our understanding of all things may grow more and more evident.
APPENDIX I

This appendix contains the texts of the fragments of Heraclitus as they are to be found in Diehls-Kranz, Die Fragmenten der Vorsokratiker (Berlin, 1951-1952), sixth and subsequent editions. Only the Greek text which Diehls-Kranz accept as genuine will be given here; the various statements of the authors who are quoting Heraclitus will not be included here, although they may be found in Diehls-Kranz; this policy will also be followed when the text of the fragment is in Latin. In their presentation of the fragments, Diehls-Kranz make this distinction between actual genuine text and comment by the source-author by placing the former in italic print. The fragments will be numbered here, as they are throughout this paper, according to the numbers given them by Diehls-Kranz.

1. τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἄξυνετοι γίνονται ἀνθρώποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκούσαι καὶ ἀκούσαστες τὸ πρῶτον; γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἄπεροισιν ἔοικασι, πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων, οὕτως ἡγόμενοι κατὰ φύσιν διατεθένων ἑκάστον καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὡς ἐγερθέντες ποιούσιν, ὡς ὠρασεὶς ὥσπερ ἐνυφότες ἐπιλανθάνονται.

2. διὸ δὲ ἐπεσθαὶ τῷ ἔξωθι. τοῦ λόγου δ’ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ἐξευθεῖαν οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ ἱδίαν ἔχοντες φρονήσιν.

3. ἦρως ποθὸς ἀνθρώπεως.

4. Si felicitas esset in delectationibus corporis, boves felices diceremus, cum inventent orobum ad comedendum.
5. καθαροται δ' ἄλλως αἵματι μιαίνομενοί ὄχθων εἰς τις εἰς
πλῆθν ἐμβάς πληωὶ ἀπονύνειτο. μαίνεσθαι δ' ἄν δοκοῖς εἰς
tις αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιφράσσειτο οὕτω πολεμοῦτα. καὶ τοῖς
ἀγάλμαις δὲ τουτεύοις εὐχοῦται, ὅκοιον εἰς τις βόρειοι:
λεσχηνεύοιτο, οὗ τις γινώσκων θεοὺς οὐδ' ἤρως ὀὖσιν εἰς.
6. νέος ἐφ' ἡμέρηι ἔστιν.
7. εἰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα κατνῦ ὑενοῖτο, διόν ό ἄν διαγνοῦτεν.
8. τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέροι: έκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλῦστην ἀρμονίαν.
9. ὅνους σύμματ' αὖ ἐλέεθαι μᾶλλον ἡ χρυσόν.
10. ὅλα καὶ δυχ ὁλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον, συναίδουν
διάδιδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἐνὸς πάντα.
11. πᾶν ἐρπετὸν πληγῇ νέμεται.
12. ποταμὸφοι τοῦσιν αὐτοῦσιν ἐμβαῖνουσιν ἄτερα καὶ ἄτερα
ὑδάτα ἐπιρρέει' καὶ ψυχαὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν υγρῶν ἀναθυμίωνται (?)
13. βορβόρωι χαίρειν.
14. νυκτιπόλοις, μάγοις, βάκχοις, λῆναις, μύσταις τᾳ γὰρ
νομιζόμενα κατ' ἀνθρώπους μυστηρία ἀνερωστὶ μευνται.
15. εἰ μὴ γὰρ Διονύσῳ πομπῆν ἐποιοῦντο καὶ ὕμνεον ἄισμα
αἰθοῖσιν, ἀναιδεστατα ἐγραμμ' ἀν' ὕμτος δὲ Ἀίδης καὶ
Διανύσος· οτεωὶ μαίνονται καὶ ληναίζουσιν.
16. τὸ μὴ δυνὸν ποτε πᾶς ἀν τὶς λάθοι;
17. οὐ γὰρ φρονεοῦσι τοιαῦτα πολλοὶ, ὁκόσοι ἐγκυρεύσιν, οὐδὲ
μαθῆτες γινώσκουσιν, ἐσποτοὶς δὲ δοκεοῦσι.
18. ἐὰν μὴ ἔλπηται, ἀνέλπιστον οὐκ ἐξευρήσει, ἀνεξερεύνητον
ἐνδ καὶ ἄροιον.
19. ἀκοῦσαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι οὐδ' εἶπεῖν.
20. γενόμενοι ἐξεῖν ἑκλούσι μόρους τ' ἑχεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ
ἀναπαύσεται, καὶ πάντας καταλεῖπουσι μόρους γενέσθαι.
21. θάνατός ἐστιν ὁκόσα ἑγερθέντες ὀρέσμεν, ὁκόσα δὲ
ἐυδοῦντες ὑπνοῖς.
22. χρυσὸν γὰρ οἴ διξήμενοι γὰν πολλὴν ὁρύσσουσι καὶ
ἐυρίσκουσιν ὀλίγον.
23. δύσης ὀνομα οὐκ ἂν ἢδεσαν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν.
24. ἀρησφάτους θεοὶ τιμῶσι καὶ ἀνθρώποι.
25. μήροι γὰρ μέξονες μέξονας μοίρας λαγχάνουσι.
26. ἀνθρώπως ἐν εὐφρόνητι φῶς ὢπτεται ἐαυτῷ ἀποσβηθεῖς θυεῖς, ἐὰν δὲ ἀπτεται τεθνεῶτος εὐθέων, ἑγρηγορῶς ἀπτεται εὐθεῖας.
27. ἀνθρώπους μένει ἀποθανόντας άσσα οὐκ ἔλπονται οὐδὲ δοκέοντι.
28. δοκέοντα γὰρ ὁ δοκιμώτατος γίνωσκει, φυλάσσει; καὶ μέντοι καὶ άίκη καταλήφεται ψευδών τεκτονάς καὶ μάρτυρας.
29. αἱρεύνται γὰρ ἐν ἀντί ἀπάντων οἱ άριστοι, κλέος ἀξίαν ἐννητῶν: οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκρημνύται ὄκωσπερ κτίσεω.
30. κώσμον τόγος, τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων, οὔτε τὶς θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἔποιησεν, ἀλλὰ ἢν ἄει καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείξων, ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβηνύμενον μέτρα.
31. πυρὸς τροπαὶ πρῶτον θάλασσα, θάλασσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἡμίσιν γῆ, τὸ δὲ ἡμίσι προστήρ. γῆ θάλασσα διαχεῖται, καὶ μετρεῖται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, οὐκοῖς πρόσθεν ἢ γενέσθαι γῆ.
32. ἐν τῷ σοφῶν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἔθελε καὶ ἔθελε Ζηνὸς ὅνομα.
33. νόμος καὶ βουλὴ: πεσθεῖσαι ἑνός.
34. ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωμοῖσιν ἑοίκασί: φάτις αὐτοῖσιν μαρτυρεῖν παρείναι ἀπειναῖ.
35. χρημαγὸς εἰς μᾶλα πολλῶν ἱστοράς φιλοσόφους άνδρας εἶναι.
36. ψυχῆιν θάνατος υἱὸρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι, ἐκ γῆς· δὲ υἱὸρ γίνεται, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχῆ.
37. Sues caeno, cohortales aves pulvere vel cinere lavari.
38. πρώτος ἀστρολογῆσαι.
39. Πριήνης Βίας ἔγενετο ὁ Τευτάμεω ὁδ πλεῖσίν λόγος ἢ τῶν ἀλλών.
40. πολυμαθὴς νῦν ἑξειν ὅδιασκει· ἡθοδος γὰρ ἄν ἐθδίαζε καὶ Πυθαγόρην αὐτὸς τε ἔννοφάν δε τε καὶ Ἐκκατόν.
41. ἐν τῷ σοφῶν, ἐπιστασθεὶς γνώμην, δεῖ ὅ τε ἐκβάρηση πάντα διὰ πάντων.
42. τὸν τῇ Ὀμηρον ἀξίον ἔκ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ραπτίζεται Ἀρχέλοχον.
43. οὐ βριν χρή σβεννύναι μᾶλλον ἢ πυρκαίην.
44. μάχεσθαι χρή τὸν δῆμον ὑπὲρ τοῦ νόμου ὁκωσερ τείχεος.
45. ὑψηλὸς περίτα ἵπποι οὐκ ἀγέωροιο, πᾶσαν ἐπιπορεύμενος ὁδὸν οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει.
46. οἴησιν ἑρᾶν νόσον.
47. μὴ εἰκῇ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων συμβαλλόμεθα.
48. τοῦ οὖν τόξων οἴνομα βίος, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος.
49. εἰς ἐμοὶ μύριοι, ἐὰν ἀριστος ἦ.
49α. ποταμοὶς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐμβαθνομένες καὶ οὕκ ἐμβαθνομένες, εἴμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἴμεν.
50. οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντες ὁμολογεῖν σοφὸν ἐστίν ἐν πάντα εἶναι.
51. οὐ ἔνωσιν ὀκψε διαφερόμενον ἐσωτερικό ὁμολογεῖν ταλαντροπος ἀρμονή ὅκωσερ τόξου καὶ λύρης.
52. αἰῶν παῖς ἐστὶ παῖζων, πεσουσίων παιδὸς ἡ βασιλική.
53. πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστὶ, πάντων δὲ βασιλεὺς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἐδειξε τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους.
54. ἀρμόνη ἀφανῆς φανερῆς κρείττων.
55. δῶμεν ὑπὸς ἀκοὴ μάθησις, ταῦτα ἐγὼ προτιμῶ.
56. ἐξηπατήσατιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὴν γνώσιν τῶν φανερῶν παραπλησίως ὁμώνημαι, ὡς ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφότερος πάντων. ἐκεῖνον τὸ γάρ παῖδος φθείρας κατακταίνγοις ἐξηπατήσαν εἰκόνες· ὡς εἴδομεν καὶ ἐλάβομεν, ταῦτα ἀπολείπομεν, ὡς δὲ οὐτὲ εἴδομεν οὕτ' ἐλάβομεν, ταῦτα φέρωμεν.
57. διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείοντων Ἡσυχῶς τούτων ἐκστάνται πλεῖστα εἰδέναι, ὡς τε ἡμέρην καὶ ἐφυράνθην οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν.
58. οἱ γοῦν ἅτροι τέμνοντες, κατοικεῖν, ἐπαίτησονται μηδὲν ἁξιοὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνειν, ταῦτα ἐργαζόμενοι.
59. γναφεύω ὁδὸς εὐθεία καὶ ἀκοχή μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ οὕτη.
60. δῶς ἀνω κατ' ὅς καὶ υδη.
61. ἡλάσσα ὑδαρ καθαράτητος καὶ μιαράτητος, ἱχθύς μὲν πότιμον καὶ σωτήριον, ἀνθρώποις δὲ ἀποτον καὶ ὀλέθριον.
62. ἀθάνατοι θνητοὶ, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι, ἱῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τὸν ὃς ἐκείνων βίον τεθνεῖτες.

63. ἔνθα δ' ἔστη ἐπανίστασθαι καὶ φυλακας γίνεσθαι ἔγερτὶ ἱῶντων καὶ νεκρῶν.

64. τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰκίζει γεραιός.

65. χρησμοσύνην καὶ κόρον.

66. πάντα γὰρ τὸ πῦρ ἐπελεύθην κρίνει καὶ καταλήψεται.

67. ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη γήφρον, χειμῶν θέρος, πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος λιμός, ἀλλοιοῦται: ἰδος οἰκωστὴ πῦρ, ὅπως εἴσαξα μυστήρια ὀνομάζεται καθ' ἕδονη ἔκαστο.

67a. Sicut aranea stans in medio telae sentit, quam cito musca aliquem filum suum corrumpit itaque illuc celeriter currit quasi de fili persectione dolens, sic hominis anima aliqua parte corporis laesa illuc festine meat quasi impatiens laesionis corporis, cui firme et proportionaliter juncta est.

68. ἀνέν.

69. (Diehls-Kranz do not accept any of this fragment as genuine.)

70. παιδών ἄθυρματα.

71. τοῦ ἐπιλανθανομένου ἢ ὁ δόδος ἄγει.

72. δι' ἑκάστα διηνεκῆς διμιουργὶς λόγῳ, τῶι, τὸ ἄκρα διαφέρονται, καὶ διὰ καθ' ἡμέραν ἐγκυροῦσι, ταῦτα αὐτοῖς ἔξαν φαίνεται.

73. οὐ δεῖ οὐσία παθεύουντας ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν.

74. παίδας τοκεῖσθαι.

75. τοὺς παθεύουντας ἐργάτας εἶναι καὶ συνεργῶν τῶν ἐν τῶι κόσμῳ γινομένων.

76. (Diehls-Kranz do not accept any of this fragment as genuine.)

77. ψυχῆις τέρψιν ἢ θάνατον ὑγρῆις γενέσθαι, ἢν ἡμᾶς τὸν ἑκείνων θάνατον καὶ ἢν ἑκείνας τὸν ἡμέτερον θάνατον.

78. ἄθος γὰρ ἄνθρωποι τὸν οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, θεῖον δὲ ἔχει.

79. ἀνὴρ θυπίος ἱκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος οἰκωστὴ παῖς πρὸς ἄνδρος.

80. εἰδέναι δὲ χρῆ τὸν πόλεμον ἔστη ἔμοι, καὶ δίκην ἔριν, καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ' ἔριν καὶ χρέων.

81. κοπίδων ἐστὶν ἄρχηγὸς...Πυθαγόραν...κοπίδων.
82. (Diehls-Kranz do not accept any of this fragment as genuine.)
83. (Diehls-Kranz do not accept any of this fragment as genuine.)
84a. μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται.
84b. κάμινος ἐστι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μοχθὲν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι.
85. θυμῶν μάχεσθαι χαλεπὸν' ὁ γὰρ ἃν θέλῃ, ψυχῆς ἄνειται.
86. ἀπίστης διαφυγᾶνε μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι.
87. βλαχε ἀνέρωπος ἐπὶ παντὶ λόγῳ ἐπιτοῖσθαι φιλεῖ.
88. ταῦτα τ’ ἔνι θῶν καὶ τεθνηκὼς καὶ ἐγκηρυόρδος καὶ καθεῦδον καὶ γέον καὶ γηραιῶν. τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσοῦντα ἢκεῖνα ἐστὶ κάκεινα πάλιν μεταπεσοῦντα ταῦτα.
89. τοῖς ἐγκηρυόρδοις ἔνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι... ἰδιον.
90. πυρὸς τε ἀνταμοιβή τὰ πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἀπάντων ὀκώστερ ξυρούχοι κρήματα καὶ κρηματων ξυροῖς.
91. ποταμῷ οὐκ ἐστίν ἐμβῆναι διὸς τῶι αὐτῶι. σκέδονθαι καὶ πάλιν συνάγει καὶ πρόσειοι καὶ ἀπεισοῖ.
92. ἡμελλα μαινομένωι στροματὶ ἀγέλαστα καὶ ἀκαλλάποστα καὶ ἀμφίρροστα φθεγγομένα διὰ τὸν θεόν.
93. ὁ ἄναξ. ὁδ τὸ μαντεῖον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς, ὀϋτε λέγει ὀϋτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ ὑπομαίνει.
94. Ἡλίος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβῆσται μέτρα· ἐλ δὲ μὴ, ἄβρινυς μὲν ὅπῃς ἐπίκουροι· ἐξευρήσουσιν.
95. ἀμαθὴν γὰρ ἀμέινον κρύπτειν... κρύπτειν ἀμαθὴν κρέσσον.
96. νέκυσαι κοπριῶν ἐκβλητότεροι.
97. κύνες γὰρ καταβαύξουσιν δὲν ἃν μὴ γινώσκοσι.
98. αἱ ψυχαὶ δομῶνται καθ' Ἀιών.
99. εἰ μὴ Ἡλίος ᾧν, ἐνεκα τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων εὐφρόνη ἃν ἢν.
100. ἀρας αἱ πάντα φέρουσιν.
101. ἐδήμησάμην ἐμευσότον.
101a. ὁφθαλμοὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀτόμων ἀκριβέστεροι μάρτυρες.
102. τῶι μὲν θεοὶ καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἁγαθὰ καὶ ὁμοια, ἀνθρωποὶ δὲ μὲν ἄδικα πειλήφασιν ἡ δὲ ὁμοια.
103. ξυνὼν γὰρ ἄρχη καὶ πέρας ἐπὶ κύκλου περιφερεταῖς.

104. τὶς γὰρ αὐτῶν νόσος ἢ φρήν; ὁπωσον διὰδοτις περιθονται καὶ

105. ἀστρολόγων τὸν Ὄμηρον.

106. ἡσύστω: ἀγνοοῦντι φύσιν ἡμέρας ἀπάσης μὲν αὐθαν.

107. κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρωποισιν ὑθαλμοὶ καὶ διὰ βαρβάρους

108. ὀκνὸν λόγους ἡκουσα, οὐδέποτε ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τοῦτο, ὅστε

109. (Same as fragment 95.)

110. ἀνθρώπως γίνεσθαι ὅκσα θέλουσιν οὐκ ἄμεινον.

111. νοῦσος ὑγιείης ἐποιήσαν ἤθου καὶ ἀγαθόν, λίμνης ὄρον,

112. σωφρονεῖν ἁρετή μεγίστη, καὶ σοφῆ ἀληθεὰ λέγειν καὶ

113. ξυνῶν ἔστι πάσι τὸ φρονέειν.

114. έν νόμι λέγοντας ἵσχυρεσθαι χρῆ τοῖς ξυνῶν πάντων,

115. ψυχῆς ἔστι λόγος ἐαυτόν αὐχων.

116. ἀνθρώπως πάσι μετέστη γινώσκειν ἐσωτερικας καὶ σωφρονεῖν.

117. ἄγηρ ὀκτὼν μεθυσθῆ, ἄγεται ὑπὸ παιδὸς ἄνήβου σφαλλόμενος,

118. αύὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἁριστή. (Diehls-Kranz also admit of

119. ήθος ἀνθρώπως δαιών.

120. ἡρὸς καὶ ἑσπέρας τέρματα ἢ ἁριστὸς καὶ ἄντεν τῆς ἁριστῆς

121. ξειον Ἐφεσίος ἢπηδὼν ἀπάγεσθαι πᾶς καὶ τοῖς ἀνήβοις τῆς

πάλιν καταλιπεῖν, οἰτίνες Ἐρμοδωρον ἄνδρα ἐσωτίων ὄνηστον

ἐξέλαθον φάντες· ὑμένων μηδὲ εἰς ὄνηστος ἔστω, εἰ δὲ μὴ.
άλλη τε καὶ μετ' ἄλλων.

122. ἀγχίβασθιν.

123. φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ.

124. ὥσπερ σάρμα εἱκή κεχυμένων ὁ καλλίστος κόσμος.

125. καὶ ὁ κυκεὼν δισσταται μὴ κινούμενος.

125a. μὴ ἐπιλύοι χάρις πλοῦτος, Ἐφεσιοί, ἵν' ἔξελεγχοισθε πονηρευσμενοί.

126. τὰ ψυχρὰ θέρεται, θέρμων ψύχεται, ὕπερν αὐαίνεται, καρφαλέον νοτίζεται.
APPENDIX II

THE TRANSLATIONS OF THE FRAGMENTS

Only two authors have attempted to give a fairly complete set of translations of the fragments of the Diehls-Kranz corpus. These are Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. I (Cambridge, 1962), and Freeman, Ancilla to the Presocratic Philosophers (Oxford, 1948). The translations of the fragments which have been used in this paper have been drawn from these two sources, although certain phrases or terms have been adapted in individual cases, based upon the work of Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford, 1940), if the relationship of a fragment to other fragments warranted it. One translation of a particular fragment was preferred to another on the basis of being closer to the literal meaning of the fragment and more suited to the fragment's place in the nexus of interrelationships of terms and themes.

The procedure in these pages will be to state the translation of the fragment which has been used in this paper and then to explain briefly the source of the translation and the reasons for any changes which might have been made.
Although this logos exists forever, men are void of understanding of it both before they hear it, and when they have heard it for the first time. For, though all things come to pass in accordance with this logos, men seem as if ignorant when they experience such words and things as I set forth, distinguishing each thing according to nature and telling how it is. The rest of mankind are unaware of what they do while awake just as they forget what they do while asleep.

The translation is entirely from Guthrie except for "both before they hear it, and when they have heard it for the first time," which is from Freeman and is closer to the literal sense of the Greek. Freeman and Guthrie both supply an "its" before "nature," which is not found in the literal Greek and is not suggested by the uses of "nature" elsewhere in the fragments. Therefore, it has been removed here. Both Freeman and Guthrie translate πρός τινα in the sense of "unable to understand"; Liddell and Scott also admit "void of understanding" as a translation of this term. Since the fragments indicate that men are capable of understanding, the latter expression has been used here. As has already been indicated in a footnote, the term logos has been left untranslated in this paper.

Therefore one must follow that which is common; but although the logos is common, most men live as if they had a private understanding of their own.

The translation is basically Guthrie's, except for
"therefore" which Guthrie does not include, although it appears in the Greek text and is translated by Freeman, and "that which is common": Guthrie translates this expression (τῶν ξυνξί) as "what is common"; Freeman's translation has been preferred here because it is more substantial, since this phrase will be used often in examining Heraclitus's thought, and seems to carry into words more adequately Heraclitus's generalization on "common."

3

See Appendix III

4

If happiness lay in bodily pleasures, we would call oxen happy when they find vetch to eat.

Guthrie's translation is identical, except for the word "pleasures" which he renders as "delights." The term in the fragment, whose text is Latin, is delectationibus.

5

They purify themselves by staining themselves with other blood, as if one were to step into mud in order to wash off mud. But a man would be thought mad if any of his fellowmen should perceive him acting thus. Moreover, they talk to these statues as if one were to hold conversation with houses, not understanding what gods and heroes really are.

This is Freeman's translation except for the phrase "not understanding what gods and heroes really are," which
is based on Guthrie. Guthrie, however, translates the participle γνώμησκων as "does understand," rather than participially as is done here. The rest of Guthrie's translation agrees with Freeman; Freeman's concluding phrase reads "in his ignorance of the nature of both gods and heroes," which is not as close to the Greek, especially in the use of the word "nature," as what has been used in this paper.

6

Is new each day.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's reads: "The sun is new every day." The sense of both is the same; "each" carries the Greek phrase ἐφ' ἡμέρη; better into English, however, and does not imply that a form of πᾶς, πᾶν, "all," has been used --"every" suggests that there is a form of πᾶς, πᾶν in the fragment. "The sun" does not appear in Diehls-Kranz's accepted text.

7

If all existing things turned to smoke, the nose would distinguish.

The prodosis is from Freeman, with Guthrie in agreement save in translating γένοιτο as "become." Freeman's apodosis reads: "the nose would be the discriminating organ"; Guthrie's translation reads: "the nostrils would distinguish them"; but there is no "them" in the Greek, much less any "organ." "Distinguish" is preferred although the Greek term ἀναρέων was also translated "distinguish" in fragment 1.
That which is in opposition is in concert; and from things that differ comes the most beautiful harmony.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not accept the fragment as genuine; Guthrie's translation, however, reads much like Freeman's except in replacing "in concert" with "helpful" for συνφρον.

Donkeys would choose sweepings rather than gold.

The translation given here is Guthrie's; Freeman does not disagree significantly, but is not as close to the literal text of the Greek.

Joinings: wholes and not-wholes, connected-separate, consonant-dissonant, and from all things one and from one all things.

Freeman translates συνδυές as "joints"; Guthrie does not translate it; "joinings" is based on Liddell-Scott. "Wholes and not wholes" is from Guthrie; Freeman puts both terms in the singular although the Greek is plural. The next two phrases are from Freeman; Guthrie doesn't translate them. The final phrase is for some reason excluded by Freeman and is taken from Guthrie.
11

Every crawling thing is driven with a blow.

Guthrie does not translate this fragment; Freeman translates ἐρπετὸν as "creature" and νέμεταί as "driven to pasture."

12

Exhalation . . . those going into the same river have different waters flowing ever upon them . . . souls are exhaled from moist things.

The middle statement is from Freeman; Guthrie does not actually translate it. The last statement is from Guthrie and similar to Freeman; the first word stands alone in the fragment and is the same as the verb in the last part, hence the present translation.

13

Enjoying oneself in mud.

Both Freeman and Guthrie translate more than is accepted as genuine by Diehls-Kranz; only the phrase ἑρπέτων ἔφερεν is accepted in the critical corpus.

14

Night-ramblers, magicians, bacchants, maenads, mystics; what are regarded by men as mysteries are unholy rites.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie translates only the first part, differing only in "magi" for "magicians" and "initiates" for "mystics."
If it were not in honor of Dionysius that they conducted the procession and sang the hymn to the male organ, their activity would be completely shameless. But Hades is the same as Dionysius, in whose honor they rave and perform the bacchic rites.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not differ significantly.

How could anyone hide from that which never sets?

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's is the same except for "escape the notice of" for "hide from."

Many do not understand such things, indeed all who come upon them; they do not grasp them after they have learnt; but to themselves, they seem (to understand).

The first clause is from Guthrie; the latter two are from Freeman. The two translators do not differ significantly on this fragment.

If one does not hope, one will not find the unhoped-for, since there is no trail to it and no path.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not offer a translation of this fragment.
Men who do not know how to listen or how to speak.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie differs only in translating the participle as a participle instead of as a relative clause, but he neglects to indicate the masculine plural subject which is implied.

When they are born, they wish to live and accept their fate, or rather come to rest; and they leave behind children to become victims of fate (literally: fates, deaths; μόροις).

Guthrie does not translate this fragment; this translation differs from Freeman's only in the word "wish," for Freeman translates ἔθελον less literally as "are willing." Freeman, however, has no translation for μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναπαύσεσθαι, or rather come to rest."

What we see when awake is death, what we see asleep is sleep.

This is Guthrie's translation. Freeman supplies an unwarranted "all" before each part of the fragment.

Those who seek gold dig much earth and find little.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not differ significantly.
They would not know the name of justice if these things did not exist.

This is Freeman's translation, which Guthrie follows exactly except for the tense of the verbs; the word "justice" has been preferred here to "right" which both Freeman and Guthrie employ in order to indicate the relationship between the noun δίκη used here and the adjective δίκαιος used elsewhere (102). See footnote 36 of chapter two and comment for fragment 28 below.

Gods and men honor those slain in war.

This translation is given by both Guthrie and Freeman.

Greater deaths win greater portions (or: rewards: μορφας).

This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman's does not differ significantly, but does not parallel the sentence structure of the Greek as closely; "reward" is Freeman's translation of μοσφας, "fate" of μόροι.

In the night, a man kindles a light because his sight is quenched; while living, he approximates to a dead man during sleep; while awake, he approximates to one who sleeps.

This is Freeman's translation based on Diehls-Kranz;
Guthrie considers the text of the fragment uncertain and offers no translation.

27

There await men after they are dead things which they neither expect nor imagine.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not differ significantly.

28

The knowledge of the most famous men is but opinion; justice will convict those who fabricate and testify to lies.

This is Guthrie's translation except that "man" has been substituted for the plural "men," following the Greek. Freeman agrees with most of this, but translates δοκίμωτα τος as "most wise-seeming"; Liddell-Scott suggests that "most famous" is preferable. Guthrie fails to translate the word φυλάσσει from the Greek; its subject is δοκίμωτα τος and the verb means "preserves." Hence, the following clause should be added after the first clause above: "(the most famous man) preserves (what is opinion)." The term "opinion" is plural in the Greek; and the word "but" does not appear in the Greek.

29

The best men choose one thing rather than all else: everlasting fame among mortal men; the majority stuff themselves like cattle.

The first clause is from Freeman; Guthrie does not
translate all of it, and is not significantly different; Freeman points out that ἄνθρωπος could mean "rather than things mortal," (see footnote 3 of chapter three). The second clause is taken here from Guthrie; Freeman does not differ significantly, but does not follow the Greek sentence structure as closely.

30

This cosmos, the same for all, none of the gods and none of men has made, but it was ever and is and shall be ever-living fire, kindled in measure and quenched in measure.

This is Guthrie's translation, which follows the Greek vocabulary more closely than Freeman's. The term cosmos has been left untranslated here, however (Freeman says "ordered universe;" Guthrie says "world-order"); and Freeman's "measure" has been used rather than Guthrie's "measures" in spite of the Greek use of the plural, µέτρα, as indicating the sense of the term better in English.

31

The turnings of fire: first, sea; and of sea, half is earth and half firey waterspout. Earth is liquified into sea, and has its measure in the same logos as existed before it became earth.

This is Guthrie's translation, except for "earth is liquified into sea," which is from Freeman and which Guthrie does not translate; Freeman's translation of the rest of the fragment is substantially the same as Guthrie's.
32

That which alone is wise is one; it is willing and unwilling to go by the name of Zeus.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not differ significantly, but does not follow the Greek text as closely.

33

To obey the will of one is also law.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not differ significantly.

34

Void of understanding, although they have heard, they are like the deaf. The proverb bears witness to them: "Present yet absent."

This is Freeman's translation except for the expression "void of understanding"; Freeman translates ἄξυνετοι as "not understanding"; see above on fragment 1 concerning this term. Guthrie translates this word "fools"; he translates the aorist participle "when they hear"; Freeman seems closer to the Greek.

35

Men who love wisdom must be inquirers into very many things indeed.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not differ significantly, though he does translate ἡλιοσφόους ἀνδραῖς as "men who are philosophers."
36

To souls, it is death to become water; to water it is death to become earth. From earth comes water; from water (comes) soul.

This is Freeman's translation. Guthrie does not differ save in supplying a "but" at "from earth comes"; the Greek has a ὅτα at this juncture, but it also has one in the second and fourth clauses which Guthrie does not translate, leading to the conclusion that all three are simply connectives, with no significant opposition implied.

37

Pigs wash themselves in mud, birds (wash themselves) in dust or ashes.

This is Freeman's translation of the Latin text; Guthrie does not offer a translation of this fragment.

38

See Appendix III.

39

In Priene was born Bias, son of Tautamos, whose fame (Bias') is greater than all the rest.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not differ significantly.

40

Much learning does not teach one to have intelligence; for it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hécataeus.
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not differ save in translating νόον as "sense" and the phrase αν' άφθεας "or again."

41

That which is wise is one: to know the thought (γνώμη ) by which all things are steered through all things.

The first part is from Freeman; Guthrie does not offer a translation of it. The second part, from "to know . . ." is Vlastos's translation, which is adopted by Guthrie. Freeman translates γνώμη as "purpose"; it has seemed better to use the English term "thought" here, with Vlastos and Guthrie, but to supply the Greek as well whenever the term is being examined. Freeman's active verb "which steers" reflects the Greek verb ἔκμυβσρνησσε more literally; but the passive construction of Vlastos carries the weight of the connective οτε as well. This fragment is examined in detail in the third section of chapter two of the paper.

42

Homer deserves to be flung out of the contests and given a beating; and also Archilochus.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie seems to take the fragment as a paraphrase of Heraclitus, but in any case does not differ significantly from Freeman in his translation.

43

One should quench arrogance more than a conflagration.
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not differ significantly.

44

The people should fight for the law as if for their city-wall.

This is Freeman's translation. Guthrie's does not differ significantly.

45

The limits of the soul would you not find though you should travel every road: so deep a logos has it.

Freeman's translation, while much the same, is still more clumsy than this one based on Guthrie. Guthrie supplies a "wouldst thou" and a "thou shouldst" with it as well, attempting to give it the sound of a religious pronouncement, which is his interpretation of it. Guthrie fails to translate the Greek term ἰδίων explicitly in the first clause, hence Freeman says: "you could not in your going find ... " Again logos has not been translated.

46

See Appendix III.

47

Let us not conjecture at random about the greatest things.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not differ significantly.
The name of the bow is "life"; but its work is death.

This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman's does not differ significantly.

To me, one man is ten thousand, if he is the best.

This is Freeman's translation with the "to me" moved from between "man" and "is" for the sake of clarity; Guthrie's translation does not differ significantly.

We step and do not step into the same rivers, we are and are not.

This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman's does not differ significantly.

Listening not to me, but to the logos, it is wise to agree that all things are one.

This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman's does not differ significantly. Again, logos is left untranslated.

They do not grasp how that which differs from itself is in agreement; harmony consists of opposing tension, like that of the bow and the lyre.

This is Freeman's translation; it is closer to the
52

Time is a child playing a game of draughts; the kingship is a child's.

Guthrie questions the translation of \( \alpha \lambda \omega \nu \) as "time," saying instead "aeon (time?)." Freeman simply says "time" as here; Liddell-Scott indicate \( \alpha \lambda \omega \nu \) as "a space or period of time." The rest of this translation is from Guthrie, except that he repeats the word "playing."

53

War is the father of all and the king of all; and some he reveals as gods and some as men, some he makes slaves, others free.

This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman's is similar, except for a "both" before "father" and the use of "it" instead of "he" and the translation of the aorist as "has revealed" and "has made."

54

The hidden harmony is stronger than that which is evident.

Freeman and Guthrie both translate \( \phi \alpha \nu \varepsilon \rho \eta \varsigma \) as "visible"; the present translation of the term as "evident" is based upon the term's other appearance in the fragments (56); the whole question is examined in the fourth section of chapter one of the paper.
Things of which were is sight, hearing, / learning--these are what I prefer.

This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman's differs only in supplying a "those" in front of "things" and in translating μηδήνοσις as "knowledge" and προτιμῶ as "honor most. An examination of the meaning of μηδήνοσις in the fragments will be found in the fourth section of chapter one of the paper; "honor most" loses the connotation of preference over other available choices which is basic to προτιμῶ.

Men are deceived in the knowledge of things which are evident, in the same way as Homer, who was wiser than all the Greeks; for he too was deceived by boys killing lice, who said: "What we saw and caught, that we left behind; but what we did not see and did not catch, that we bring."

The translation is taken mostly from Freeman, excepting the words "caught, left behind, and catch" which are from Guthrie, and the first clause which is based on Guthrie's comments about φανερῶν meaning "not hidden" and on the evidence of the fragments on these matters, which appears in the fourth section of chapter one of the paper.

Most men's teacher is Hesiod--they are sure he knew most things, he who did not understand night and day; for they are one. The first part of the fragment is from Guthrie's
translation, the second part, from "he who," is from Freeman; the two translations do not differ significantly.

58

For instance, physicians, who cut and burn, demand payment of a fee though undeserving, since they produce the same.

This is Freeman's translation of the fragment; Guthrie does not offer a translation of it.

59

For the fuller's screw, straight and crooked, is one and the same.

Guthrie translates the fragment from a different Greek text; this is Freeman's translation.

60

The way up and down is one and the same.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not differ significantly, but does not follow the Greek sentence structure as closely.

61

Sea-water is the purest and the most polluted; for fish it is drinkable, and life-giving; for men, not drinkable and destructive.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not differ significantly.
Mortal immortals, immortal mortals,
living their life and dying their death.

The first part here is from Guthrie's translation; Freeman supplies copulas "immortals are mortal, mortals are immortal," but the Greek does not have them expressed. Guthrie and Freeman both take the two instances of ἐκεῖνων to work together as "each ... others"; this is not a common usage of ἐκεῖνος however, which is usually simply demonstrative. Taking both instances of ἐκεῖνων as simply demonstrative, an intelligible fragment results, as presented here and explained in section three of chapter two of this paper, where the oneness of the opposites of life and death is examined.

When he (it?) is there, they arise and become watchful guardians of the living and the dead.

This is Freeman's translation, excepting the "(it?)"; Guthrie translates only from "they arise" on, because of the uncertain meaning of the Greek ἐνθα δ' ἔστιν.

The thunder-bolt steers all things.

This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman translates τὰ πάντα as "the universe."
Need and satiety.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie says "want and satiety."

For fire will come and judge and convict all things.

This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman translates έπελθοδόν according to its participial form "having come upon" but has to supply it then with an object not found in the Greek "having come upon them."

The god is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger; but he changes, just as fire, when it is mingled with perfumes, is named according to the scent of each.

This is Guthrie's translation. The expression "the god" has been used to distinguish the Greek phrase from Θεοί, "the gods." Guthrie employs the former expression on several occasions as well. Freeman renders δ Θεός simply "god"; she renders καθ' ἰδιότητα as "according to each man's pleasure," which does not seem to agree with the sense of the fragment but is certainly legitimate from the literal point of view.

Just as the spider, standing in the
middle of his web, senses immediately that a fly is disturbing even one fiber of his web and runs quickly to the place, as if pained by the cutting of that thread, so the soul of man, with the injury of any part of the body, travels to that part quickly as if impatient with the injury of the body, to which it is joined firmly and in measure.

This fragment, whose text is given in Latin in Diehls-Kranz, is not translated by either Freeman or Guthrie. It is discussed in greater detail in footnote 30 of chapter two of this paper.

68
See Appendix III.

69
See Appendix III.

70
See Appendix III.

71
The man who forgets which way the road leads.

This is Freeman's translation. Guthrie does not offer a translation of this fragment.

72
Though men associate with the logos most closely, yet they are separated from it; those things which they encounter daily seem to them strange.
The first clause is based on Freeman's translation, which reads "the logos: though men associate with it most closely . . .," but is closer to the sentence structure of the Greek; Guthrie does not translate the λόγος τῶν in the first clause, but the rest of his translation parallels Freeman's. Guthrie does not translate the second clause; the translation here is Freeman's.

73

We must not act and speak like men asleep.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie renders οὐ δεῖ as "it is bad," which goes beyond the basic sense of the Greek in suggesting that the statement is explicitly ethical.

74

Children of our parents.

This is Freeman's translation of the two Greek words involved; Guthrie translates more than the text accepted by Diehls-Kranz, but his translation of these two words is identical with Freeman's.

75

Sleepers are workers and cooperators in the things happening in the cosmos.

The first part of this translation is from Guthrie; Freeman says much the same thing. Guthrie translates the latter part as "what goes on in the world," and Freeman as "the activities going on"; in view of the discussion of
in the first section of chapter two in the paper, the present translation seems preferable. Guthrie does not accept the fragment as genuine.

76

See Appendix III.

77

For souls it is enjoyment, or rather death, to become wet. We live their death, and they live our death.

The first sentence is from Guthrie, excepting the phrase "or rather death," which Guthrie does not translate and which is taken here from Freeman; the second sentence is not translated by Guthrie and is also from Freeman.

78

Human nature has no power of understanding; but divine (nature) has.

This is Freeman's translation, with the "it" after "has" left out; Guthrie's translation is identical, save in its translation of γνώμη as "insight." This word is discussed several times in the paper; see γνώμη in the index.

79

Man is called childish compared with a daimon, as a child compared with a man.

This is Freeman's translation except for παις, which she renders "boy" instead of "child"; the latter is from Guthrie, who translates πρός as "in the eyes of." Both authors
translate ὁμοῦ, Freeman as "divinity" and Guthrie as "god"; but the meaning of the term is unclear and not resolved by the context or the fragment's relationships with the rest of the fragments.

80

One must know that war is common, and justice (is) strife and that all things come about by way of strife and necessity.

This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman's does not differ significantly; neither inserts "(is)" in the same clause as is done here for the sake of clarity.

81

The prince of cheats, Pythagoras.

This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman's does not differ significantly, although she does translate ἀρχηγός as "original chief."

82

See Appendix III.

83

See Appendix III.

84a

In changing, it is at rest.

This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman interprets the fragment considerably when she says "it rests from change."
It is weariness to toil and obey for the same (men?).

Freeman’s translation is identical to this save in supplying an article before weariness which does not appear in the Greek and placing "for the same" after "weariness"; she interprets "same" to refer to the elements of the human body. Guthrie does not translate the fragment, but does suggest that "the same" may refer to the indirect object of "toil and obey"; the present translation follows Guthrie’s suggestion.

To fight desire is hard: whatever it wishes it buys at the price of soul.

This is Guthrie’s translation; Freeman’s is not significantly different save in her supplying a "the" before "soul" which is not present in the Greek text.

Escapes recognition through unbelief.

This is Freeman’s translation; Guthrie translates more than Diehls-Kranz accept as genuine, but his translation of the four Greek words concerned is not significantly different.

A foolish man is apt to be in a flutter at every word.
This translation is Freeman's; Guthrie renders λόγῳ as "rumor, report" in this fragment.

88

The same thing in us is living and dead, and waking and sleeping, and young and old; for these things when they have changed are those, and those when they have changed back again are these.

This is Guthrie's translation except for a "the" which he has inserted before "waking" and "sleeping" and except for παλανων which Guthrie does not translate but which is here rendered as "back again." Freeman's translation confirms these changes in Guthrie's and does not differ significantly, but is not as close to the literal Greek text as the major part of Guthrie.

89

To those who are awake there is one common cosmos. A private one.

This translation is based on Freeman's translation; she, however, translates more than is accepted as genuine by Diehls-Kranz; she also translates cosmos as "ordered universe." The final phrase is from Guthrie's translation, which also includes texts not accepted as genuine.

90

There is an exchange: all things for fire and fire for all things, like goods for gold and gold for goods.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie renders the first
part as "All things are an exchange for fire and fire and fire for all things," whose sense is basically the same; the two authors do not differ significantly on the rest of the fragment.

91

For it is not possible to step into the same river twice. They scatter and combine again . . . and approach and separate.

This is Freeman's translation except that the "twice" and "again" have been moved from positions before their respective verbs; Guthrie does not differ significantly save in his translation of the four plural verbs as singular with "it" as the subject.

92

The sibyl, with raving mouth, uttering her unlaughing, unadorned, unincensed words under the inspiration of the god.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not offer a translation of this fragment; Freeman also adds a translation of texts not accepted as genuine by Diehls-Kranz.

93

The lord, whose oracle is at Delphi, neither speaks nor conceals, but indicates.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's translation does not differ significantly.
The sun will not transgress his measures; otherwise the Furies, the ministers of justice, will find him out.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not differ significantly.

It is better to hide ignorance.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not offer a translation of this fragment.

Corpses are more worthy to be thrown out than dung.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's translation does not differ significantly.

Dogs bark at those whom they do not recognize.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's translation is not significantly different, and does not follow the literal sense of the Greek text as closely.

Souls have the sense of smell in Hades.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie says "smell (i.e. the use of the sense of smell)" for ὅψεως, but the rest
of his translation is identical with Freeman's.

99

If there were no sun, so far as depended upon the other stars, it would be night.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie renders ἐνεκα as "with" rather than "so far as depended on"; the latter expresses the same notion more fully in English.

100

The hours that bring all things.

This is Freeman's translation; Freeman inserts "seasons" in parentheses after "hours." Guthrie renders the word Ὀρος as "seasons," and translates φέρουσι as "produces."

101

I searched myself.

This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman renders the fragment "I searched into myself," which does not follow the literal Greek text quite as closely.

101a

Eyes are more exact witness than ears.

This is Freeman's translation, except that the article "the" before "eyes" and "ears" has been dropped as in Guthrie, who does not differ significantly.
102

To the god all things are beautiful and good and just; but men have assumed some things to be unjust, others just.

This is Freeman's translation except that the ξαι between "beautiful" and "good" has also been translated as "and" and the phrase τῶι θεῶι has been translated as "the god" to distinguish it, as is done in the text of the paper, from "the gods." Guthrie does not differ significantly.

103

Beginning and end are common in the circumference of a circle.

This is Freeman's translation of the fragment, except that ξυνδω is rendered here as "common," as it is throughout the paper; Guthrie translates the word as "common" in this fragment; Freeman translates it as "general," as she does in a few other places. Guthrie does not translate the whole fragment, but does not differ significantly in what he does translate.

104

What intelligence or understanding have they? They put their trust in popular bards and take the mob for their teacher, not knowing that "the majority are bad and the good are few."

The first sentence is from Freeman; the rest is from Guthrie. The two authors do not differ significantly.
105

Homer was an astrologer.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not offer a translation of this fragment.

106

Hesiod was unaware that the nature of every day is one.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not offer a translation of this fragment.

107

Eyes and ears of those having barbarous souls are bad witnesses.

This is Freeman's translation except that the article "the" has been dropped from in front of "eyes"; Guthrie interprets the literal expression "those having barbarous souls" as "men if they have souls that understand not the language."

108

None of those whose discourse I have heard arrives at the realization that what is wise is set apart from all things.

This is Freeman's translation except that the "none" has been removed from after "heard" and placed at the head of the sentence and that σοφὸν is rendered here as "what is wise" rather than "that which is wise," which is reserved in these pages for the Greek phrase τὸ σοφὸν. Guthrie's translation
does not differ except in rendering the last phrase "separate from all things."

109

See Appendix III.

110

It is not better for men that whatever they wish come to pass.

The first part of this translation appears in both Freeman and Guthrie; Freeman ends the fragment "to obtain all that they wish" and Guthrie "to get all they want"; the literal Greek text, however, reads "that whatever they wish come to pass," employing a form of γυνομα which should appear in the translation.

111

Sickness makes health pleasant and good, hunger (does so to) satisfaction, weariness (does so to) rest.

This is Freeman's translation of the fragment, except that two parenthetical additions have been made for the sake of clarity; Guthrie's translation does not differ significantly.

112

Wisdom is to speak the truth and to act according to nature, paying heed (being aware).

This is Freeman's translation, with the addition of the second translation of ἐπαφωντας noted here in parentheses. Guthrie does not offer a translation of this fragment.
The thinking faculty is common to all.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not offer a translation of this fragment.

If we speak with intelligence, we must base our strength on that which is common to all, as the city on the law and even more strongly; for all human laws are nourished by one which is divine; for it governs as far as it will and is sufficient for all and more than enough.

This is Freeman's translation of this fragment; Guthrie does not differ significantly, save in linking the last clause to what precedes as a relative clause modifying the "one which is divine."

The logos of the soul is increasing itself.

This translation is based on Guthrie's comment about the fragment; Freeman's translation does not differ significantly.

All men have the capacity of knowing themselves and acting with moderation.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not offer a translation of this fragment.
117

A man, when he gets drunk, is led stumbling along by an immature boy, not being aware where he is going, having his soul wet.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not differ significantly, although he does translate the final participial phrase "for his soul is wet."

118

A dry soul is wisest and best.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's translation is identical.

119

For man, nature is daimon.

Freeman translates ἰθος as "character," Guthrie as "individuality." "Nature" is employed here simply to indicate that the same term is being used here as was used in fragment 78; Freeman translates δαίμων as "destiny," Guthrie simply transliterates it as here.

120

The limits of morning and evening are the Bear and, opposite the Bear, the boundary-mark of Zeus god of the clear sky.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not offer a translation of this fragment.
The Ephesians would do well to hang themselves, every adult man, and bequeath their city-state to adolescents, since they have expelled Hermodorus, the most valuable man among them, saying: "Let us not have even one valuable man; but if we do, let him go elsewhere and live among others."

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not offer a translation of this fragment.

See Appendix III.

Nature likes to hide.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not differ significantly, although he translates the infinitive χρύπτεσθαι as "concealment."

A dust heap piled up at random is the most beautiful κόσμος.

This is based on Freeman's translation; she translates κόσμος, however, as "universe" and καλλιστὸς as "fairest"; the terms used here are used throughout these pages; Freeman also inverts the word order from the Greek text, which is restored in this translation. Guthrie offers no translation of this fragment.
125
See Appendix III.

125a
See Appendix III.

126
Cold things grow hot, hot things grow cold; the wet dries, the parched is moistened.

This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's translation does not differ significantly.
APPENDIX III

In this appendix those fragments will be examined briefly which, for one reason or another, have not been part of the foundational synthesis presented in this paper. These fragments all appear within the corpus of fragments of Heraclitus to be found in the sixth and subsequent editions of Diehls-Kranz; but, for various reasons, they have not been able to be significantly related to the terms and themes of the synthesis of Heraclitus's thought presented here.

3

Breadth of a human foot.

This fragment is so short that, on the basis of internal evidence from the fragments themselves, little can be said of it. Secondary sources suggest that it is intended to indicate the size of the sun, but this is not substantiated anywhere in the fragments.

38

The first to study astronomy.

This fragment is also so short that little can be said of it from the fragments themselves. Diogenes says that Thales is being referred to, but there is no evidence in the fragments to verify this.
Oiasis, the sacred disease.

This fragment is also too short, and the meaning of the first word variously interpreted as blindness (Guthrie and others), conceit (Freeman), and so on. It does not relate to any of the fragments or themes examined, except perhaps to seeing, provided that ὀίασις means "blindness."

Remedies.

This one word is not repeated and does not relate to any of the themes examined in the synthesis in these pages.

Diehls-Kranz do not accept any part of this fragment as actually genuine.

Children's games.

This fragment is too short to be significantly related to any other term or theme in the fragments, except perhaps the reference to time's being a child playing draughts (fragment 52), or the description of men as childish when compared with a daimon (fragment 79).

Diehls-Kranz do not accept any part of this fragment as genuine.
Diehls-Kranz do not accept any part of this fragment as actually genuine.

Diehls-Kranz do not accept any part of this fragment as actually genuine.

This fragment is simply an exact copy of fragment 95.

Approximation.

This word does not show any significant relationships with any other term or theme in the fragments.

The kykeon also separates if it is not stirred.

This fragment speaks about a drink made with wine and grated-cheese or barley meal; it has been taken as a figure for various themes to be found in the fragments, but no clear and significant relationship between it and other terms and themes is in the fragments.

May wealth not fail you, men of Ephesus, so that you may be convicted of your wickedness."

Although it is possible that Heraclitus wishes ill upon
the Ephesians because of Hermodorus (see fragment 125), there is no mention of Hermodorus in this fragment. Heraclitus himself was an Ephesian; and that fact may be related to this fragment. In any case, the fragment bears no important content related to the terms and themes of the foundational synthesis of these pages.
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The following index consists of three parts; a concordinance of the Greek terms to be found in the fragments accepted as genuine by Diehls-Kranz; an index to the major themes treated in this paper; and an index to the fragments examined in this paper. With this index, the reader will be able to trace any fragment and any major theme through all its appearances in this paper, and will be able to follow any Greek term through all its appearances in the fragments. In this way, it is hoped, the reader will be able to grasp in more complete detail the fundamental, exhaustive work of analysis which had to precede the foundational synthesis presented here, and will be able to reconstruct more accurately and verify for himself the collating and interrelating of materials which has gone into each part of the synthesis.

Concordinance of Greek Terms

Every term which appears more than once will be found here; the only exceptions are persons' proper names and the article ὁ, ἡ, ἢ. Certain terms which appear only once but are built upon the same stems are also recorded here. If a term is missing from this concordinance, it appears only once in the corpus of fragments.

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