An Analysis of the Relationship of Merit Pay Programs, Organizational Climate and Other Selected Administrative Variables in Du Page County, Illinois Elementary School Districts

Bernard J. Jumbeck
Loyola University Chicago

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF MERIT PAY PROGRAMS,
ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE AND OTHER SELECTED
ADMINISTRATIVE VARIABLES IN DU PAGE
COUNTY, ILLINOIS ELEMENTARY
SCHOOL DISTRICTS

by

Bernard J. Jumbeck

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate
School of Education of Loyola University of
Chicago in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Education

May
1989
Bernard J. Jumbeck  
Loyola University of Chicago  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF MERIT PAY PROGRAMS, ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE AND OTHER SELECTED ADMINISTRATIVE VARIABLES IN DU PAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS

This study deals with the relationship between merit pay, organizational climate, and other variables in elementary schools. The research in this study involves eight research questions that fall into two categories. The first category, deals with faculty behavior and elements of organizational climate attributable to faculty interactions. The second category, deals with elements of organizational climate attributable to principal behavior.

The literature review focused on merit pay and the issues, both pro and con, that continue to make incentive pay systems a controversial topic in education. Also reviewed, is the literature dealing with the organizational climate of schools, as well as the literature dealing with climate related issues.

The methodology for this study involved the collection of data using the Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire – RE and a demographic response form. Sixty-six teachers from four Du Page County, Illinois elementary schools responded to both research tools. Two of the schools were from merit pay elementary districts, the other two schools were from non-merit pay school districts.
A t test was performed to test the differences between groups and to aid in answering the research questions.

In the area of faculty relations, the research indicated that the two merit pay schools had slightly more open climates than did the two non-merit pay schools. Significant differences in collegiality were found to exist between teachers with 0-5 years of experience and those with 20 plus years of experience. The more senior teachers being more collegial. The non-merit pay schools were found to have more engaged faculty members. The merit pay schools were found to have a significantly more intimate organizational climate.

In the area of principal behavior, the non-merit pay schools had principals who were more open than their merit pay counterparts. As a group, the merit pay schools had stronger directive scores. Stronger supportive qualities were found to exist in the two non-merit pay schools. Teachers with more than 20 years of experience perceived more support from principals than did teachers with 0-5 years of experience. Restrictive behavior scores were strongest in the merit pay schools when schools were grouped by type. A significant difference in scores for restrictiveness existed between union and non-union teachers.

Included in this study are implications for use of the information gleaned from the study, as well as recommendations for further research.
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The help and assistance rendered by many in the completion of this dissertation is gratefully acknowledged. Of particular note, are the contributions of Dr. Philip Carlin, dissertation director and advisor. His scholarly advice, expertise, encouragement, and time and effort devoted to the completion of this project are gratefully appreciated. Sincere thanks is also extended to committee members Dr. Max Bailey and Dr. Edward Rancic for their efforts and contributions towards the completion of this research.

The help, contributions and understanding of family, friends, and associates is also gratefully acknowledged. In particular, a special thank you is extended to my children, Jennifer and Gregory, whose understanding, sacrifice, and support provided inspiration when needed. Finally, I am eternally grateful for the many contributions of my wife Sandra. Always willing to help with any task involving this project, her constant love, support, encouragement, and understanding provided the necessary inspiration to see this project to its completion.
VITA

The author, Bernard Joseph Jumbeck, is the son of Bernard Anthony and Minnie (Holndoner) Jumbeck. He was born October 3, 1946, in Chicago, Illinois.

His elementary education was obtained in the Chicago Public Schools. He completed his secondary education in 1964 at Lane Technical High School, Chicago, Illinois.

In September, 1966, Mr. Jumbeck entered Eastern Illinois University, receiving the degree of Bachelor of Science in Education with a major in physical education in May, 1969. In August, 1972 he received the degree of Master of Science in Education from Eastern Illinois University.

In September, 1969 Mr. Jumbeck accepted a position as a physical education teacher in the Oak Lawn-Hometown Public Schools, District 123, Oak Lawn, Illinois. In August, 1975 he accepted the position of assistant principal of Calumet School in the Calumet Public Schools, District 132, Calumet Park, Illinois. Currently, he is principal of Calumet School
and assistant superintendent in the Calumet Public Schools, District 132, Calumet Park, Illinois.

Mr. Jumbeck is a member of several professional organizations, including the Illinois Principal's Association, Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development and Phi Delta Kappa, Loyola University Chapter.
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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The decade of the 1980's has seen strident efforts undertaken towards reforming the structure of education. At the heart of these reform efforts has been the search for excellence. Included in that search for excellence has been the overwhelming feeling that with an improvement in the quality of teaching afforded America's students, a corresponding increase in the quantity and quality of student learning will be brought about. What fueled this belief held by so many Americans? A spate of national reports dealing with education reform were published beginning in 1983. The premier document entitled A Nation At Risk\(^1\) was released to the American public in April, 1983. The report was the end result of the work of the National Commission on Excellence in Education appointed in August, 1981 by then Secretary of Education

Terrell Bell. Among the Commission's recommendations was, "Salaries for the teaching profession should be professionally competitive, market sensitive, and performance based."\(^2\)

Led by the power and prestige of the federal government and the chief administrative officer of government, President Ronald Reagan, the debate over merit pay began. While the President and other figures in and out of government and/or education became proponents of merit pay programs, the opponents of such plans were not difficult to ferret out. Both the National Education Association, the nation's largest teachers union, and the American Federation of Teachers early in the decade came out squarely against merit pay.

Historically, merit pay is in essence the first form of teacher compensation. The images of Ichabod Crane or the school marm of the old west, are of teachers who were paid for the quality of their instruction, based upon the perception of the town elders. However, America in the twentieth century is a

vastly different place, as are its schools. No longer do the townspeople decide if, for whatever reasons, faculty members retain their positions or receive a salary increase.

In September of 1983, the *Phi Delta Kappan*³ published its annual Gallup Poll Survey of the public's attitudes towards education. In that issue, the Poll revealed that the general populace favored merit pay for teachers by a margin of two-to-one (61% to 31%). In a similar poll taken in 1970, 58% of those polled felt that teachers should be paid on the basis of merit. Significantly, when those who were familiar with the President's Commission report were asked about their opinion of paying teachers on the basis of merit, 71% favored the idea as opposed to 25% who did not favor merit pay.

Once again in 1984 the *Phi Delta Kappan*⁴ sought the public's view of merit pay. For the total


⁴*Phi Delta Kappa, "Our Annual Poll," Phi Delta Kappan* (September, 1984), p. 34.
sample of those polled, 65% of respondents favored merit pay, while 22% opposed, and 13% had no opinion. However, when confined to those individuals who were aware of merit pay proposals, 76% favored paying teachers on merit, while 19% of the respondents opposed the idea, and 5% had no opinion. It could be said, that generally the public favored paying teachers on the basis of merit.

A month after publishing its annual poll of the public's attitude toward education in 1984, the *Phi Delta Kappan* published the results of a Gallup Poll of the nation's teachers. Merit pay questions of differing varieties were asked in that survey. Not surprisingly, America's teachers were not enamoured with the idea of merit pay. Sixty-four percent of teachers opposed merit pay, 32% endorsed the idea and another 4% had no opinion. Chief among the reasons for opposing merit pay was the idea that it would be difficult to give a fair evaluation (23%). Also cited, was the fact that merit pay would create morale problems (15%); administrators can't evaluate fairly (12%), and teaching can't be objectively measured (12%). Of those who supported merit pay, 25% favored

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the idea because they felt that through merit pay good teachers would be rewarded. Only one per cent of all teachers queried felt that children would benefit as a result of teachers being paid through a merit pay program.

When asked whether or not teachers felt that their colleagues were deserving of merit pay despite their feelings towards such plans, 76% of all teachers felt that, indeed teachers in their schools deserved such a reward. Sixteen per cent of those responding to the survey felt that no teacher in their school warranted merit pay, and eight per cent of the teacher respondents had no opinion. When asked what percentage of teachers deserved merit pay, those teachers who favor such plans responded that, on average, 33% of all teachers deserved merit pay. The range of responses however, showed that 13% of teachers felt that under 10% of teachers warranted merit salaries, 23% of teachers felt 10% to 19% of teachers deserved merit pay; 17% of teachers were of the opinion that 20% to 29% of teachers warranted merit pay; another 23% felt 30% to 59% of all teachers performed meritoriously; and 17% of teacher respondents agreed that 60% to 98% of all teachers warranted merit salary increases.

Who should determine merit pay? According to the October, 1984 Gallup Poll, 63% of U.S. teachers
felt that a committee of teachers should make that determination. The next most frequent response was the school principal (59%), followed by a committee of outside educators (42%). The poll showed that only 20% of the teacher respondents felt that parents or students should be involved in that decision. The Gallup Poll of 1984 showed a dramatic difference of opinion on merit pay between teachers and the consumer public. By a four to one margin the public favored teacher merit pay. Sixty-eight per cent of the public held the opinion that academic achievement or the improvement of student performance, measured by standardized tests, should be the single criteria used to determine merit. Only 39% of American teachers agreed with that viewpoint. Sixty-six per cent of teachers felt that their colleagues should determine merit, only 48% of the American public agreed with that viewpoint.

In summation the September, 1984 Gallup Poll of the American public and the October, 1984 Gallup Poll of American teachers showed some widely disparate views of merit pay. Thirty-two per cent of American teachers favored merit pay, while 76% of the public saw such plans as favorable. Sixty-four per cent of teachers opposed merit pay, only 19% of the American public agreed with them. When it came to criteria for
determining merit, the single largest gap between teacher opinions and those of the U.S. public was apparent in the area of academic achievement or improvement of students as measured by standardized tests. Thirty-nine per cent of teacher respondents felt that student achievement was a valid criteria for determining merit. Sixty-eight per cent of the American public agreed with them. The second largest gap came in the area of peer evaluation, wherein 66% of teachers felt that to be a valid measurement of merit. On the other hand, 48% of the American public agreed with that view.

The seventeenth Annual Gallup Poll results were published in the September, 1985 Phi Delta Kappan. In that issue the Poll showed that six of ten Americans continued to favor merit pay for teachers, about the same numbers as the 1984 Poll. Specifically, 60% of Americans favored merit pay, 24% opposed the idea and 16% had no opinion. For the most part, it is clear that while most Americans favor merit pay for teachers, those who do the teaching in the nation's

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schools hold the opposite view, thereby reflecting the official positions of the two major teacher's unions in the United States, the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers. Both organizations have historically opposed the notion of merit pay for the country's teachers, with the NEA taking the most vociferous anti-merit pay stance.

In the context of education, organizational climate may be viewed as a school's personality. There has not been a great deal of study in the area of organizational climate of schools. The first work was that of Andrew W. Halpin and Don B. Croft whose research\(^7\) in this area was published in 1962. In more recent times, the work of Wayne K. Hoy of Rutgers University in the area of organizational climate has led to the development of a more contemporary version of Halpin and Croft's, Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire. Hoy's work\(^8\), published in 1986, is the basis of the development of his Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire-RE


(Revised, Elementary). While not viewed in much the same way as Halpin and Croft's work and that of Hoy, others have dealt with the issues surrounding and involving organizational climate. Various works and treatises, to be reviewed in Chapter Two of this dissertation will deal in detail with these works. What is important however, is the major focus of this research study. Primarily, this study hoped to determine if any differences exist in the organizational climates of merit pay schools as opposed to non-merit pay schools. A major component of organizational climate is staff morale. As reported earlier, the October, 1984 Phi Delta Kappan 9 reported that 12% of the nation's teachers were opposed to merit pay because they felt such programs would create morale problems in schools. A part of this study dealt with such issues as staff morale in both merit pay and non-merit pay schools.

The purpose of this dissertation was to determine if significant differences exist in the school climates of merit pay and non-merit pay schools. The procedures utilized in this study attempted to seek

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answers to a series of research questions. Among these research questions, which are based on the sub-categories of the OCDQ-RE, were the following:

1. Is the organizational climate in merit pay schools less open than that of non-merit pay schools?
2. Are principals in merit pay schools less open than principals in non-merit pay schools?
3. Are teachers in non-merit pay schools more collegial than teachers in merit pay schools?
4. Are principals in merit pay schools more directive that those in non-merit pay schools?
5. Are principals in merit pay schools less supportive than those in non-merit pay schools?
6. Are principals in merit pay schools more restrictive than non-merit pay principals?
7. Are teachers in merit pay schools more disengaged than non-merit pay teachers?
8. Do teachers in merit pay schools exhibit more intimate behavior than teachers in non-merit pay schools?

Clearly, school climate is a result of the relationships that teachers experience with their colleagues and their principals. These day to day relationships help to form the school's personality and set the tone of the school. Because merit pay may be seen as a method of rewarding some more than others, based upon the perceptions of the school principal, do such plans have an impact in forming the school's organizational climate? Do merit pay programs have an impact upon the relationships that teachers have with
one another and with their principal, who is charged with the improvement of instruction?

In addition to a study of school climate in a sample of merit pay and non-merit pay schools, this study also reviewed literature dealing with merit pay and organizational climate. Through a review of literature, a definition of merit pay and other terms will be established for use in this study. While organizational climate has not been the sole focus of major treatises in education, a number of relatively recent works that deal with collegiality, teaching conditions, teacher/principal relations and other school climate-like issues will be reviewed in Chapter Two of this dissertation.

Also covered in this dissertation will be the methodology used in gathering data. A discussion of the instruments used as well as the processing and statistical analysis of data will be discussed in Chapter Three. Presentation of the data gathered for this dissertation will be made in Chapter Four.

Chapter Five of this dissertation will focus on a summary of the collected data. This chapter will also include the findings and conclusions of the researcher in addition to recommendations for further study dealing with the issues of the organizational
climate of schools and/or performance-based salary systems.
CHAPTER II
Review of Literature

The related literature is replete with articles, surveys, a limited number of unpublished dissertations, opinion papers and government documents that deal with the topic of merit pay. There is also evidence of related literature, albeit somewhat limited when compared to merit pay, that deals with organizational climate. However, this researcher could not locate related literature that deals with the dual study of the impact merit pay may or may not have on the organizational climate of elementary schools. Therefore, this chapter will deal with some of the related literature of merit pay, as well as that of organizational climate of schools, and, at the same time, attempt to develop a perspective as to how the two topics may affect one another as forces operating within the elementary school setting.

Merit pay became a major issue in contemporary American education with the publication and release of the National Commission of Excellence in Education's report, A Nation At Risk\textsuperscript{10} in April, 1983. The opening

paragraph of that now famous report warned that, "...the educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people." The report also went on to state that,"...we must dedicate ourselves to the reform of our educational system for the benefit of all-- old and young alike, affluent and poor, majority and minority." A Nation At Risk then proceeded to map out a series of recommendations for five aspects of American education: A. Content B. Standards and Expectations C. Time D. Teaching E. Leadership and Fiscal. Recommendation D. Teaching, consisted of seven parts. Part two of that recommendation simply stated,

Salaries for the teaching profession should be increased and should be professionally competitive, market-sensitive and performance-based. Salary, promotion, tenure and retention decisions should be tied to an effective evaluation system that includes peer review so that superior teachers can be rewarded, average ones encouraged, and poor ones either improved or terminated.  

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12 Ibid. p. 3.

13 Ibid. p. 11.
Certainly, the most controversial issue relating to teachers in *A Nation At Risk* was over the renewed call for merit pay. That aspect of the report alone consumed a great deal of national interest and fueled a new national debate. Teacher's unions, most notably the National Education Association, the country's largest, did not look favorably upon merit pay. However, those in state and federal governments as well as such organizations as the National School Boards Association took positions supporting the notion of merit pay. Five months after the release of *A Nation at Risk*, the National School Boards Association's, *The American School Board Journal*, published the results of their nationwide poll. Entitled, "Our nationwide poll: most teachers endorse the merit pay concept," the article reported that nearly two-thirds of America's teachers (62.7%) favored merit pay. The survey was taken of a randomly selected sample of 7300 teachers across the United States in May, 1983. Of the 7300 teachers surveyed 1261 were tabulated. To determine teacher favorability towards merit pay, those surveyed were asked to agree or disagree with the statement,

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"Teachers who are more effective in the classroom should receive larger salary increases than teachers who are less effective." The survey revealed that 61.5% of National Education Association members favored merit pay, as did 62.1% of American Federation of Teachers members while 76.4% of non-union teachers also supported merit pay. The *Journal* article claimed to be the only survey ever to ask teachers what they felt about merit pay. Proportional numbers of responses were received of teachers nationally in such categories as sex, tenure status, school level, marital status, union membership and community setting. The definition used as a basis for merit pay was, "merit pay is a monetary stipend or salary increase paid for superior performance, as determined by a classroom performance evaluation."¹⁵

The *American School Board Journal* also asked teachers who they felt should determine merit. Thirty-nine per cent of the respondents made the principal their first choice. The rankings after the principal were as follows: teacher peers 25.4%; department heads 15%; a combination of administrators and teachers 12.1%; curriculum specialist 5.5%; others 3%. Teachers were also asked to check how merit salary

¹⁵Ibid. p.23.
increases should be determined. Choices given were:
1) by classroom effectiveness alone, 2) by seniority/academic credits alone, 3) by a combination of factors one and two with greater weight given to seniority/academic credits, and 5) by a combination weighting each factor equally.

Forty-one per cent of the teacher respondents to the Journal survey felt that classroom effectiveness coupled with seniority/academic credits equally weighted should be used to determine merit pay salary increases. A total of 26.8% of respondents believed that both factors should be considered, with greater weight given to effectiveness. The traditional union stance, that the sole criteria should be seniority, was supported by 17.6%. An additional 11.5% favored both performance and seniority with greater weight placed upon seniority and credits. Startlingly, only 3.1% of the respondents felt that classroom performance should be the sole criteria for determining merit. Such a plan, the Journal warned its readers, would pit the teachers against school board members.

The National School Boards Association study had other revealing facts about merit pay. Younger teachers were more apt to favor merit pay than older teachers. The study showed that 85.3% of those who have taught less than three years favored merit pay,
while 59.1% of those who have taught longer than fifteen years gave a favorable rating to the idea. Non-tenured teachers also tend to agree with the concept of merit pay more than tenured teachers. Although both agree with the idea of performance-based pay, 70.2% of non-tenured teachers favor merit pay while 61.2% of their tenured colleagues agreed with them. Male teachers (66.3%) favored merit pay more than female teachers (59.9%). The study also revealed that married teachers (64.1%) approved of merit pay while 56.6% of divorced teachers and 52.2% of widowed teachers supported the merit pay concept.

The NSBA research also showed that elementary school teachers (55.3%) favored merit pay the least. Middle school teachers (64.7%) followed, with junior high teachers (65.7%) and high school teachers (69.2%) favoring performance-based salary programs. Community type had the slightest difference of opinion. The study revealed that 59.4% of urban teachers supported merit pay; 63.7% of suburban teachers agreed with them and 64% of rural teachers agreed with the idea of merit pay.

Although a plurality of thirty-nine per cent of teachers said that principals should be responsible for evaluation, some differences of opinion based upon school type and union membership was evidenced in the
National School Board's Association survey. Non-union members (52%) chose the principal as the prime evaluator more often than NEA members (39.2%) and AFT members (39.1%). Union members tend to favor their peers as the prime evaluators. The survey revealed that 25.4% of the NEA members and 27.5% of the AFT members preferred peer review as the method of evaluation for determining merit pay.

Elementary school teachers (59.3%) favored the principal as primary the evaluator of classroom performance. Their colleagues at other levels of schooling agreed with them as follows: middle school teachers (38.9%), junior high school teachers (28.8%), and high school teachers (21.4%). If not the principal, then who should determine the level of classroom performance? Twenty-two per cent of teachers at the middle school level chose their peers, another 16.3% of their middle school colleagues chose department heads. Of the junior high school teachers responding to the survey, 28.8% felt that their peers should be the prime evaluators, while 21.2% of their fellow teachers felt that their department heads should be the prime evaluator. Thirty-one percent of high school teachers favored peer evaluation, while another 28.1% of their colleagues chose their department heads as the primary evaluator of classroom performance.
The National School Boards Association survey clearly demonstrated that teachers were at least open to the idea of making salary increases at least partially contingent upon the level of classroom performance.

In the Summer, 1984 issue of Planning and Changing, Gail Thierbach Schneider, reports on her attitudinal study of 126 school board members, 435 administrators, and 381 teachers. Schneider's study was completed as a follow-up to the National School Boards Association merit pay study. The intent of Schneider's work was to identify levels of agreement between school board members, administrators and teachers on merit pay, and whether or not significant areas of disagreement existed between the groups.

Schneider's research found that considerable disagreement existed among the three groups on all aspects of merit pay. School board members tended to be in greater agreement than both administrators and teachers that merit pay would improve the quality of education, identify ineffective teachers and increase

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community support for education. Teachers overwhelmingly disagreed and administrators only marginally agreed with those issues. Schneider points out that in view of the fact that the implementation and success of any merit pay plan would depend upon administrator and teacher support, careful consideration should be given to the findings of her research before any merit plan is initiated. Also of concern is, given the opinions revealed in this study, that the time, effort, and additional money needed to implement a merit pay system would raise questions of the value of such a program. Schneider's secondary concern is whether or not an evaluation process can be identified that will be perceived as valid and reliable in making objective merit decisions.

Coffman and Manarino-Leggett\textsuperscript{17} found several concerns about the implementation of merit pay plans in their survey of approximately 200 teachers. Chief among those were: 1.) Creation of morale problems. 2.) Prejudices, biases, and personality conflicts will enter into merit decisions. 3.) Student class assignments will become problematic, with parents

asking that their children be assigned to the most meritorious teachers. 4.) Not all teachers who deserve merit will receive it. 5.) Teacher patronage of administrators who make merit decisions.

Reasons advanced in support of merit pay in the Coffman and Manarino-Legget study were: 1.) Improved and better performance. 2.) Reward for excellence. 3.) Motivation for good teaching and elimination of bad teachers. 4.) Increase in the quality of teaching. 5.) Reward for those who make extra efforts.

In addition to expressing past objections to performance-based salary systems, such as a lack of cooperation in districts that focus on merit, and humiliation of those teachers who are non-recipients, Coffman and Manarino-Legget reported that almost all of their survey respondents expressed concern about the lack of ability of those assigned the task of assessment, to make fair and adequate performance appraisals for merit pay purposes.

An analysis of the Coffman, Manarino-Legget study revealed that those with a masters degree favored merit pay more than those with a bachelors degree. Those with more experience in teaching looked less favorably upon merit pay. Although age had no apparent affect upon responses, males were against merit pay by
a three to one ratio, while females vetoed the concept by a two to one margin.

On June 17, 1983 Carl Perkins, Chairman of the Education and Labor Committee of the United States House of Representatives, appointed a task force on merit pay. The task force, both independent and bi-partisan, consisted of twenty-one members, seventeen from the private sector. The charge to the group was to study the issue of merit pay and to develop and report on merit programs in education.

The Merit Pay Task Force heard witnesses from three major commissions that had recently issued educational reports dealing with reform. Governors, state legislators, deans of schools of education, students, teachers, principals and school board members also provided testimony. The Task Force also reviewed existing and proposed systems of performance-based salary systems. The group recognized that two forms of programs existed that recognized exemplary performance. Merit pay was defined by the Task force as a system that, "attempts to base salary on performance." 18

The Task Force also made note of the fact that, "Under merit pay there often is no sustained pay increase, although teachers may be eligible every year."\(^{19}\)

The career ladder system was also recognized by the Task Force as a system of rewarding teachers for exemplary performance. Career ladder systems, "create tiers from entry level through master teacher with varying pay and responsibilities at each level."\(^{20}\) The Task Force then set out to describe such a plan by outlining the responsibilities, requirements and remuneration accorded teachers at various levels described as: Apprentice Teacher, Professional Teacher, Senior Teacher and Master Teacher.

In making its recommendation, the Merit Pay Task Force clearly questioned the efficacy of merit pay when it warned that, "Those who view merit pay as some easy, inexpensive, painless method of solving the nation's education problems are not realistic."\(^{21}\) Instead, merit pay was seen as a part of a puzzle in an effort to elevate the level of esteem and public perceptions of the teaching profession. The Task Force did not

\(^{19}\) Ibid. p.5.
\(^{20}\) Ibid. p.5.
\(^{21}\) Ibid. p.6.
confine itself solely to recommendations about merit pay. It recognized that the salary levels of teaching, in addition to its public esteem, needed improvement. However, it did make five distinct features to be included in what the group called experiments in performance-based pay. Some of these features included involvement of teachers, administrators and the community in the establishment of benefits and criteria of merit plans. The Task Force also warned of the potential abuse of merit systems that reward teachers for other than outstanding performance. Incentives should be established so that teacher self-improvement would be continued. Once established, the group called for continued upgrade and improvement of merit systems. Finally, the Task Force stressed that, in most systems, a potential danger existed if a school district failed to recognize teachers who failed to fall into the superior category. These teachers were referred to in the Task Force report as the, "lifeblood of the school system."22

In 1983 the American Association of School Administrators published, Some Points to Consider When

22Ibid. p.7.
You Discuss Merit Pay. In attempting to define what merit pay is, the AASA document found it easier to define what merit pay is not. The booklet stressed that first and foremost merit pay is not a costcutting measure. The AASA also noted that salary increases in merit pay systems should not be withheld from teachers to penalize less than exemplary teaching.

The AASA publication also reviewed why merit pay programs have failed. Citing teacher opposition as a major cause of the failure of merit pay, the booklet stated that, "Teachers have also contended that merit pay lowers morale." Other reasons for the failure of merit pay cited by the AASA were: inadequate financing, difficulty in administering merit pay plans, insufficiently prepared evaluators and, inconsistency among evaluators. Unilateral evaluations and quota systems that create artificial cutoffs eliminating less experienced teachers from receiving merit increases.

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24 Ibid. p.16.
and the expense of such systems were also cited.

In recognizing that the reason merit pay is supported is out of a perceived need to improve instruction, the AASA publication points out that schools can no longer attract the "best and the brightest" to the ranks of teaching. The Association also establishes in the booklet seven steps to include in the design of merit pay programs. They include: 1.) Involve the right people. 2.) Conduct the right research. 3.) Decide what you want. 4.) Design a program that gives you what you want. 5.) Document the program. 6.) Put your plan in action. 7.) Find out if the program is working; refine it. 25

Finally, stressing that improved productivity is the key element in assessing a merit pay program, AASA defines productivity as:

Producing more knowledge (content) at agreed-on levels of quality. Producing more skills. Providing education for more students. Improving conditions that lead to more funds or more effective use of existing funds for effective education. 26

Keeping the productivity element foremost, AASA lists possible elements of a teacher plan for increasing productivity above standard performance. Included in

25 Ibid. p.36.
26 Ibid. p.36.
those elements are goals and objectives, action plan, results expected, method of measurement, method of verification, measurement and additional compensation.  

In 1984, the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development published, *Incentives for Excellence in America's Schools*. A report of ASCD's Task Force on merit pay and career ladders, the publication was aimed at assisting the Association's members in understanding the issues surrounding merit pay and career ladders. What the report clearly stated in its very beginning was,

Another very important goal is to place the issue of merit pay in the broader context of human resource development because comprehensive changes that promote effective management of schools and professional growth of teachers will prove more likely to positively influence teaching performance than any merit pay programs that might succeed.

The ASCD Task Force made a concerted effort in its Report to make a reasoned, careful analysis of the

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27 Ibid. p.38.


29 Ibid. p.1.
sometimes emotionally charged issues of merit pay and career ladders. In laying forth the issues surrounding merit pay, the ASCD publication first dealt with the public perceptions about teaching. The Task Force identified six popularly held public perceptions:

1. Teaching is an unsophisticated and relatively simple job.
2. Since teaching is simple, evaluation of teaching must be simple.
3. The public schools are staffed by lazy (and/or incompetent) teachers.
4. Money will motivate highly qualified people to select teaching and persuade them to stay in teaching once there.
5. The teaching profession cannot attract and hold first-rate personnel because it lacks performance-based financial incentives.
6. Merit pay is linked to raising standards in education.

The ASCD Task Force delves into the public perceptions of teaching and attempts to refute, while at the same time establish, a basis for the public views. The Task Force Report explains that while many in the general public may see teaching difficult at times, those same individuals do not see teaching as very complicated. The Task Force does, however, see the process as a complex act and the school room as the rightful place of the professional. The group also

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30 Ibid. pp.3-6.
points out that the reason evaluation is seen as simple is that most of the public knows who the good teachers are. They acknowledge that a whole host of evaluation problems exist with teaching and to simply use pupil test scores on standardized tests is not a wise or valid method for determining teacher competence.

Simply stated, ASCD found no evidence to support the public belief that public school teachers are incompetent and/or lazy. The Association also took exception to the sometimes duplicitous view the public takes about money and teaching. The public wants teachers who select the profession not for the money, but the calling, as in the ministry. Parents might be suspicious of those who entered teaching for financial reasons. However, the same individuals who want dedicated professionals working with their children reason that teachers would do a more effective job and would not leave the profession if paid a little more money. The Task Force saw no relationship between money and improved performance.

Two reasons were cited by the ASCD group as to why the profession cannot attract and hold the best and the brightest to the profession. The first was an end to sex discrimination. Professions previously closed to women are now attracting women in large numbers.
Teaching and nursing, two roles formerly thought to be the only professional choice for women, consequently lose a capable pool of bright, able individuals. Secondly, the group saw the fact that teacher's salaries were grossly lower than those in private industry as a reason why the more talented were not attracted to teaching. ASCD therefore proposes that base salaries for teaching be raised and, at the same time, questions whether or not the public would be willing to pay bonuses of $20,000 or more to keep good teachers from fleeing to the private sector in efforts to match the earning potential they would find in private industry.

Finally, the ASCD group points out that the link between merit pay and higher standards is an absurdity. In discussing that link, they point out that merit may be seen by some to be a solution in itself. To now recognize those who all along have been doing the same quality work as suddenly meritorious indicates that the performance has improved.

In planning for merit pay systems, the ASCD Report suggests that three groups of questions about merit pay need to be addressed. These include questions about goals and planning, design and implementation, and context and choices. The first group of questions deals with solutions to problems
that merit pay may resolve, how different constituencies feel about merit pay and short and long term results. The second group of questions deals with differentiated pay allocation, the evaluation process, evaluators, access to higher paying positions, demotion and continued support from proponents of merit pay. Critical to questions of context and choices is the question of an adequate assessment of costs and the question of continued financial support over time.

The Task Force determined that certain management practices discouraged excellence in schools. Chief among them was the fact that, "Schools lack the kind of peer support systems that encourage excellence in other professions and that are independent of compensation systems." 31

In September, 1987 the National School Boards Association and the Illinois Association of School Boards, jointly published *Rewarding Excellence: Teacher Compensation and Incentive Plans.* 32 The publication is a part of what might be termed the result of the second wave of reform in education that

31 Ibid. p.12.

began in 1985. It discussed some of the advantages and disadvantages to "monetary incentive programs." The NSBA found the following advantages of incentive pay programs:

1.) They frequently emphasized evaluation. 2.) They offer school districts a way of rewarding outstanding teachers. 3.) They offer teachers career advancement without leaving the classroom. 4.) They are a way to motivate the performance of all teachers. 5.) They offer one way of building public support for education.

The NSBA points out that research has identified two major disadvantages to monetary incentive programs: 1.) They may not work under current teacher salary conditions. 2.) They may create dissatisfaction. The Association feels that in order to be successful, every merit pay program must be based upon a valid, reliable, objective performance appraisal method that is carried out by trained, qualified evaluators.

The 1987 NSBA publication concludes with a quote from the House of Representatives report on merit pay stating that, "The question the Nation must face is not simply how to implement performance-based pay for
educators, but how we can lift the standards of instruction in the Nation."

As part of its 1983-84 hot topics series, the Phi Delta Kappa Center on Evaluation, Development and Research published, *Merit Pay and Evaluation.* In a reprinted article from *Personnel Administrator,* James T. Brinks, an expert in compensation, benefit plans and design and performance measurement systems, cites several arguments against merit increases. Amongst Brinks' list are: 1.) A general lack of objective work performance systems, especially for salaried employees. 2.) Merit pay systems are difficult and costly to operate. 3.) Most people are not motivated by money, but rather by things such as advancement opportunity, nature of the work itself, etc. 4.) Most supervisors cannot make objective, valid distinctions in performance. 5.) A merit system emphasizes that the supervisor is "God." 6.) The vast majority of people see themselves as well above-average. Therefore,

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average merit increases destroy self-esteem and thus de-motivate the employee. 7.) Differing merit increases for the same work seem to go against the government's push for "equal pay for equal work." 8.) When inflation is six per cent or more, so much of the annual increase is due to range change that the merit portion is minimal. 9.) Merit pay increase budgets assume a bell-shaped performance population. In many organizations eighty per cent of the employees are in fact above-average performers. 10.) Most supervisors play it safe and give everyone close to average increases. Thus the best employees leave, the worst remain and are overcompensated. 11.) Most performance ratings are based upon personality characteristics, rather than objective results achieved.

Using Frederick Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theory as a basis, Larry Frase, Robert Hetzel and Robert Grant discuss an instructional excellence and reward system implemented in their school district. Citing Herzberg's theory that satisfaction (motivation) and dissatisfaction (hygiene) are two separate factors

that impact job performance, Frase, et al., outline a program that they found successful. Recognizing that opposition to merit pay included such reasons as:

1.) Merit rating cannot fairly evaluate the true effectiveness of teachers. 2.) Merit rating rewards conformity. 3.) Merit rating places a premium on teachers who conduct their classrooms with a minimum of problems for administration. 4.) Merit rating fosters a competitive rather than cooperative spirit. 5.) Merit rating threatens the security of teachers. 6.) Merit rating disregards the type of environment in which a teacher teaches. 7.) Merit rating cannot improve the quality of teaching. A plan based upon Herzberg's theory was designed to provide recompense to teachers for excellent performance in the classroom.

The plan was developed with the purpose of motivating individuals to continue excellent practices in the classroom in working with students. The most significant aspect of the recompense plan, was the capability of competent administrators at identifying excellence in the classroom. Principals recommended teachers to the superintendent for recognition. Funds were distributed proportionately amongst the district's schools. Rewards included, attendance at out-of-state professional conferences, cash, and instructional materials. Value of the rewards ranged from eighty to
several hundred dollars. Following implementation of the program teachers were interviewed and completed a questionnaire. Frase, et al, found that the rewards most highly valued by teachers was attendance at conferences, the reward least valued was money. Teachers felt that recognition in the form of money was unprofessional. While the recognition program appears to be successful, dissension within the teaching ranks continues to be a problem with some teachers expressing the desire to maintain secrecy over their recognition, while others wish to have their notoriety published in local newspapers. The author's concluded, however, that the program is successful in that both motivation and hygiene needs, as cited by Herzberg's theory, are met and have a positive effect upon instructional performance in the classroom.

Writing in the April, 1983 Personnel Journal, Silverman\(^3\) cites ten reasons why the performance pay system failed in the federal government. As part of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the performance pay system became fully implemented in 1981. However, Silverman maintains that the system, whose objective

was to make reward and recognition more commensurate with productivity, became a "shambles" and actually disrupted the bureaucracy with complex procedures and an overwhelming amount of paperwork. Silverman contends that the performance pay system had a devastating effect on cooperation and stimulated competition within units of government. Additionally, Silverman says that merit pay failed because of unintended statutory provisions, open-ended regulations, novice technical assistance, drifting implementation policies, flagrant administrative errors, ludicrously complicated systems, inconsistent employee treatment, motivational factors, managerial pay compression, and simultaneous budget restrictions.

Finally, Silverman contends that the merit pay system in the federal government did the same thing the old system of compensation did, except that the additional cost to taxpayers was a billion more dollars. In essence, according to Silverman, politics destroyed merit pay.

In a 1983 study Pruitt found strong support for merit pay programs among school systems that were currently using performance-based salary programs. The

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groups also strongly held the belief that merit pay plans could be successful. The study also concluded that merit pay should improve the quality of instruction and would retain good teachers in the nation's classrooms.

The Pruitt study surveyed the superintendent and teacher union presidents in 139 merit pay school districts and found that the basis of merit pay decisions should be the quality of classroom instruction. Professional growth, extra service and creative activities should be secondary activities and not become part of the consideration in making merit pay decisions. The study also revealed that evaluations should be made by principals, assistant principals and department chairmen. Teacher self-evaluation was also seen as an important element in the evaluation process. Respondents favored professional educators as being the primary participants in the development of incentive pay plans. Finally, Pruitt's study concluded that merit pay plans should serve to motivate teachers to improve their classroom instructional practices.
In a 1983 study, Rike surveyed Illinois principals and teachers in an effort to determine the perceptions each group held about the methods and criteria that should be utilized to evaluate teacher performance in order to differentiate teaching status or for merit pay purposes. The study also sought to determine what criteria teachers deemed appropriate for principals to evaluate their performance. The research also attempted to assess what criteria principals felt they could utilize in measuring teacher performance for differentiated staffing positions or performance pay. Finally, the study sought to determine if there were major differences between the perceptions held by teachers and principals concerning the criteria, methods, and the principals' ability to assess teacher performance.

Rike's research study of 120 elementary school teachers and 64 elementary school principals clearly revealed that both groups favored classroom observation as the primary method for evaluating teachers (teachers, 67%; principals, 70%). The second choice for teachers was interviews (30%), followed by goal

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setting (17%). The principals' second choice was goal setting (30%), followed by student achievement (23%).

The data from the Rike study was instrumental in developing the following conclusions: 1.) Both teachers and principals prefer neither a master teacher or merit pay plan, but a combination of both. 2.) The most appropriate evaluator according to both groups is the principal. Teachers however, would accept a team of evaluators that would include other teachers. 3.) Classroom observation is the preferred method of evaluation for both groups, with goal setting an appropriate second. 4.) Of the 115 criteria listed by the researcher, principals viewed all criteria as acceptable measures of evaluation; teachers accepted all but two, ("is viewed as an attractive personality by students and colleagues," and "willingly and effectively sponsors extra-curricular activities"). 5.) Teachers had a lower level of confidence in the principals' ability to rate all criteria listed in the study. Major differences of opinion existed between teachers and principals over such items as use of instructional time, selection of methodology, assessment procedures, assignment techniques and pupil control. 6.) Both principals and teachers were concerned over the lack of formal training principals receive in evaluating teacher performance. 7.) Both
teachers, principals and educational research illustrated a concern over the amount of time deemed appropriate to teacher performance appraisal and the amount of time actually devoted to the enterprise. This point, according to the researcher, would seem to indicate that a principals' job description should state teacher evaluation as a priority.

8.) Teachers, principals and research revealed a concern over principal objectivity in evaluating teachers.

9.) Principals indicated that a personal lack of teaching experience at the elementary school level was a hindrance in effectively evaluating teachers.

Planck's 1985 study of sixteen rural Indiana teachers' perceptions of merit pay revealed that teachers had a fear of merit pay. The study was based upon focused, in-depth interviews with the sixteen elementary and secondary school teachers. Teachers interviewed revealed that as a group teachers fear the merit pay concept. Each teacher doubted that merit pay would help the district meet its goals. The major concern teachers held with regard to merit pay was those who would be charged with evaluating. Teachers

interviewed, generally believed that no evaluation tool existed that would truly evaluate a superior teacher. A majority of teachers felt that a committee of evaluators would produce the "fairest" results. Teachers did not favor the principal as the sole evaluator. Primary concerns over merit pay were that it would create an atmosphere of rivalry throughout the school building. Teachers express concern that the present atmosphere of sharing of ideas and materials and air of cooperation might fade if merit pay existed in the school.

In a 1985 study of District of Columbia teachers, Gafney found that a majority of the teachers surveyed: 1.) did not favor an incentive salary system, nor did they feel that such a system would aid teachers financially, 2.) favored teacher involvement in the development of a merit pay plan, but felt that such a plan would not enhance teaching professionally, 3.) believed that evaluations are too subjective and that an incentive salary system would not be administered fairly, 4.) believed that the best and brightest individuals are not attracted to teaching, however, 41

they agreed that teachers in certain academic areas should not receive higher salaries in an attempt at eliminating shortages in those areas, 5.) believed that an incentive salary would not be useful in keeping better teachers in the profession or would be useful in terminating poor teachers, 6.) did not believe that an incentive salary system would aid students, society, or achieve excellence in education.

Gafney 42 did find two significant differences in response to two questions in her survey. Teachers with less than ten years experience believed that an incentive salary system would attract brighter minds to the profession, while those with more than ten years experience disagreed. Gafney also found that those teachers who held a master's degree or higher held the belief that their administrator/supervisor would not fairly administer an incentive salary system. Those teachers surveyed who have earned less than the master's degree believed that their present administrator/supervisor would fairly administer an incentive salary system.

Conclusions from Gafney's research indicate that the less experienced teacher will view an incentive salary system more favorably, while a more highly

42 Ibid. p.81.
educated teacher will view incentive salary systems less favorably.

LITERATURE RELATING TO ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE

The pioneering study of the organizational climate of schools was completed by Andrew W. Halpin and Don B. Croft in 1962. Their approach to organizational climate, was to map teacher-teacher and teacher-principal relationships through the use of a descriptive questionnaire that would aid in the identification of those relationships. Halpin and Croft's observations were that schools differed in their feel. The idea of morale did not provide an index of a school's feel. In schools where improvement was needed, assignment of the "right" principal for the job often resulted in the immobilization of the principal by the faculty. Through the work of Halpin and Croft the Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire was developed. Originally consisting of sixty-four items, teachers were asked to respond to the

question: To what extent is this true of your school?
Responses were scaled along a four point continuum:
1- rarely occurs, 2- sometimes occurs, 3- often occurs, and 4- very frequently occurs. Halpin and Croft's instrument was used to identify eight characteristics of a school's faculty, what Halpin and Croft called the OCDQ subscales. Four of the subscales referred to teacher to teacher relations and are defined as:

**Hindrance**, teacher feelings that the principal burdens them with routine duties and other responsibilities that are seen as "busywork". **Intimacy**, teacher enjoyment of warm, friendly personal relationships with one another. **Disengagement**, the likelihood that teachers merely, "go through the motions", lacking commitment to the job. **Esprit**, growth of morale due to a sense of task accomplishment and social satisfaction.

The other four subscales of the OCDQ referred to teacher-principal relationships and are defined as:

**Productivity emphasis**, a highly directive principal who supervises closely and is insensitive to faculty feedback. **Aloofness**, a go-by-the-book principal, characterized by formal, impersonal behavior. **Consideration**, warm and friendly principal behavior that features a principal who is helpful and does extra things for the faculty. **Thrust**, a leadership style
that features a principal who sets an example for the faculty.

Using scores from the subscales of the OCDQ, it is then possible to identify a school's climate along a continuum from open to closed. Halpin and Croft's research identified six types of school climate: open, autonomous, controlled, familiar, paternal, and closed. Schools with an open climate would feature a high level of esprit, high thrust, high consideration, high intimacy, low production emphasis, low aloofness, low disengagement and low hindrance. Teachers work well together and are committed. Leadership is appropriate and emerges as needed. In the closed climate school, esprit and thrust are low and disengagement high, as are production emphasis and aloofness. Frequently teacher apathy and frustration results. In determining a school's openness index Halpin and Croft used the following:

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\text{OPENNESS INDEX} = \text{Thrust score} + \text{Esprit score} - \text{Disengagement score}
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The higher the index score, the more open the school's climate.

Hoy and Miskel⁴⁴ report several criticisms of

the OCDQ. Chief among the criticisms was the weaknesses in what might be termed the middle types of school climates.\textsuperscript{45} Halpin and Croft themselves, Hoy and Miskel report, were more confident about the two types of climates on the opposite ends of the spectrum than those in the middle.\textsuperscript{46} Hoy and Clover,\textsuperscript{47} in making their case for a new or revised OCDQ, report that attempts to replicate the six types of school climates identified by Halpin and Croft (open, autonomous, controlled, familiar, paternal, and closed), often failed.\textsuperscript{48}

Another problem that frequently arises with the OCDQ is the unit of analysis. Halpin and Croft's original research focused on individuals. Analysis of their data was based upon 1151 individuals, not the seventy-one schools in which those teachers were employed. Hoy and Clover\textsuperscript{49} feel that a conceptual

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid. p.228.
\textsuperscript{46}Ibid. p.228.
\textsuperscript{48}Ibid. p. 95.
\textsuperscript{49}Ibid. p. 96.
behavior, the remaining three dimensions describe teacher behavior.

Hoy and Clover's three principal dimensions may be summarized as: **Supportive**, the principal listens and is supportive of teachers. Praise is frequent and genuine, criticism constructive. Principal displays both a personal and professional interest in teachers. **Directive**, the principal maintains close, constant control and supervision over teachers and school activities. **Restrictive**, principal behavior hinders rather than facilitates teacher work. The principal imposes burdensome paperwork, routine duties, and other mundane responsibilities that interfere with teaching duties.

The three dimensions of teacher behavior of the OCDQ-RE may be described as: **Collegial**, supportive, open and professional interactions exist among teachers. Faculty members enjoy working with one another; enthusiasm, acceptance and mutual respect of professional competence of colleagues exists. **Disengaged**, a lack of meaning and focus to professional activities exists. Faculty is non-productive in group or team-building activities. No common goals exist amongst teaching staff. Faculty behavior is often negative and they are critical of their colleagues and the organization. **Intimate**, a cohesive strong network
Directive, the principal maintains close, constant control and supervision over teachers and school activities. Restrictive, principal behavior hinders rather than facilitates teacher work. The principal imposes burdensome paperwork, routine duties, and other mundane responsibilities that interfere with teaching duties.

The three dimensions of teacher behavior of the OCDQ-RE may be described as: Collegial, supportive, open and professional interactions exist among teachers. Faculty members enjoy working with one another; enthusiasm, acceptance and mutual respect of professional competence of colleagues exists. Disengaged, a lack of meaning and focus to professional activities exists. Faculty is non-productive in group or team-building activities. No common goals exist amongst teaching staff. Faculty behavior is often negative and they are critical of their colleagues and the organization. Intimate, a cohesive strong network of social support exists among faculty. Teachers know each other well, become personal friends, and socialize frequently.

The result of Hoy and Clover's work is a forty-two item instrument that consists of six subtests that describe the behavior of elementary school principals and teachers. One element of the original
OCDQ devised by Halpin and Croft is eliminated (aloofness). The esprit subtest of Halpin and Croft's original is replaced by collegial teacher behavior. The hindrance dimension of the original OCDQ is eliminated, but is included in restrictive principal behavior.

The new OCDQ features two factors. One factor measures the openness of teacher-principal relations, the other is a measure of openness of teacher interactions. In the OCDQ-RE, it is possible to have open teacher interactions and closed teacher-principal interactions and vice versa. Therefore, four types of school organizational climate are possible: 1.) Both factors may be closed. 2.) Both factors may be open. 3.) The principal may be open, but the faculty closed with one another (disengaged). 4.) The principal may be closed, but the faculty interactions may be open (engaged).

The six subtests of Hoy and Clover's OCDQ-RE have high reliability coefficients. More importantly, the unit of analysis of the OCDQ-RE is the school, not the individuals. Aspects of school climate are organizational properties, not individual properties. Each set of behaviors is defined by the construct of openness and provide for a four-celled typology of
school organizational climate: open, closed, engaged and disengaged.

In his 1983 work, *A Place Called School*, John Goodlad devotes considerable discussion to elements of organizational climate in which teachers work. In his chapter entitled, "Teachers and the Circumstances of Teaching," Goodlad relates bits of information that are important in understanding the workings of what goes on in schools. At the same time he provides insights into the organizational climates of the schools that served as the background of his book.

John Goodlad recognizes that several factors make up what he calls, "the quality of school life." Among those factors are teacher behavior, the principal and collaboration. Clearly, as we have seen through the work of Halpin and Croft, and Hoy and Clover teacher behavior and the principal are important, if not mandatory, factors that contribute to the organizational climate of a school. In a very real sense so does the element of collaboration. For

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52 Ibid. p.167.

53 Ibid. p.160.
through collaboration with colleagues and principals, as well as students and parents, collegial working relationships can be established that aid in the development of an open organizational climate.

In his book, Goodlad relates that most school environments fall short in enabling teachers to establish personal relationships with one another. He characterizes teaching as a lonely profession and expresses concern for, "what effects this might have on teacher behaviors, self-renewal, and relations with students." Of great importance is the fact that Goodlad reports that most teachers, (80% at the elementary level) expressed a high degree of career fulfillment. What prompts people to leave teaching, according to Goodlad, are not interpersonal conflicts between teachers and administrators, or for that matter problems with students. Teachers are bothered most by personal frustrations and dissatisfaction in the teaching situation.

Goodlad's concern is that the profession is able to secure and maintain an able corps of professionals. He calls for improvement in salary conditions and, more importantly, the need to enhance the profession by

54 Ibid. p.171.
improving its working conditions. He points out that improved conditions would increase both satisfaction and productivity. Among these improved conditions he calls for supportive and sensitive principal leadership, greater enthusiasm, career fulfillment, teacher assistance programs and professionalism.

Goodlad's data on school climate was derived from a list of 120 questions posed to teachers. These questions dealt with teacher autonomy, friendships with other teachers, personal satisfaction, resources, students, parents, personal safety, facilities and so on. What emerged from Goodlad's study was support for the hypothesis that schools that possess teachers who are satisfied with their careers and teaching circumstances are perceived to provide students with a good education. This Goodlad contends leads to the proposition that the, "quality of education provided by a school, depends on the interaction between teachers--more or less competent, more or less satisfied, and the circumstances of schooling." Other aspects that affect organizational climate that come from Goodlad's study include a relationship

55 Ibid. p.176.

56 Ibid. p.178.
between teacher satisfaction and strong leadership on the part of the principal. Also, the data showed that staff cohesiveness and the way in which problems were solved as well as aspects of the decision making process were elements that are highly related to teacher satisfaction. At more satisfying schools, the data indicated that fewer teachers saw the administration or staff relations as problems. That was not the case at what Goodlad termed the "less satisfying schools."

In 1986, the United States Department of Education published, What Works: Research About Teaching and Learning. The sixty-five page booklet consisted of forty-one research findings in education. Included in the publication were allusions to research findings that dealt with organizational climate. With regard to principals What Works made it clear that effective principals are supportive of effective instruction. The publication also clearly stated that the students are the benefactors of professional collegiality among faculty members. It was pointed out that it is important for teachers to

share ideas, cooperate in activities, and assist one another in intellectual growth. Finally, What Works made note of the fact that teachers welcome professional suggestions about improving the quality of their work, but rarely did they receive them.

Expanding on their work in the area of cooperative learning, David and Robert Johnson discussed their research on collegial learning groups in the November, 1987 Educational Leadership. They stress that cooperation with other teachers is important because much of what teachers need to know is procedural in nature. They contend that collegial support groups offer a formalized structure to assist teachers in improving their on-the-job performance. Such a program, they argue, is needed because in citing Blake and Mouton's work, "teachers have not been skilled in working with their peers." Teachers and administrators have for too long worked independently as opposed to interdependently. About merit pay, the Johnson's claim that such programs have a harmful effect upon teaching environments because they are


59 Ibid. p.27.
built upon competition. Teachers maximize personal gain at the expense of their colleagues. Instead, the Johnson's support a merit pay system that bases awards upon how well all members of the group performed. In such a system, teachers accept the responsibility to improve not only their own productivity, but that of the entire group as well. The Johnson's contend that a cooperative structure to school faculties develops social support, professional self-esteem, positive interpersonal relationships and achievement. An analysis of their study bears out this claim.60

In the March, 1988 Phi Delta Kappan, Gene Maeroff writes that, "As long as teachers are not adequately valued by themselves and by others, they are not apt to perform with the necessary assurance and authority to do the job as well as they can."61 Maeroff points out that teaching, more than any other profession, is practiced in isolation. Collegiality for most teachers is nonexistent. This lack of collegiality, coupled with low salaries causes teachers to lack respect for themselves as well as their fellow faculty members.

60 Ibid. p.29.
Maeroff proposes a system of empowering teachers to play a more active role in decision making. He does not propose the elimination of the principal's role, but instead he supports a collaborative relationship between teachers and principals. Such a system not only raises the esteem level of teachers but creates a more enthusiastic professional environment. Teachers support one another and collegiality develops between administrators and teachers who work together as partners and share the power to improve the school environment.

Writing in the May, 1988 Phi Delta Kappan, Lieberman62 points out that researchers have found that collegiality must exist in schools before a more professional cultural environment can be developed. She states that, "...when principals encourage and facilitate collegial work, the resultant interactions among teachers build norms of collaboration."63 Lieberman also reports that in collaborative schools teachers perceive their principals as supportive. Teachers view problems as opportunities for collective


63 Ibid. p.650.
learning. In isolated schools, however, teachers tend to be alienated from their principals and view their requests as threats to the principal's self-esteem.

In the February, 1988 *Educational Leadership*, Lieberman writes, "In schools characterized by collaborative relationships teachers seek out each other for help; and principals support the idea that any problem of any teacher can be worked out collectively." By developing schools that are collaborative in nature it is possible, according to Lieberman, to restructure the profession. The possibilities of a restructured profession include: 1.) building collegiality, 2.) providing greater recognition and status for teachers, 3.) enlarging the reward structure, 4.) building a school structure that permits autonomy, flexibility and responsibility, 5.) reshaping teaching as an occupation that encourages young people to become teachers and at the same time encourages experienced teachers to share their work, 6.) building a professional culture in schools that

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broadens the way they function and become more sensitive to their communities. 65

To summarize, the related literature regarding merit pay continually drives home the point that performance pay systems are an attempt to achieve and recognize excellence, and at the same time garner public support for education. The proponents of incentive systems support these programs in an effort to improve the public's perceptions of the teaching profession. Merit pay programs are viewed as methods of recognizing excellence in teaching and as a way of luring the best and the brightest into a profession that is no longer attractive. It is the belief of many, that through the development and implementation of merit pay, public confidence in education will once again be restored and the productivity of the institution assured.

Detractors of merit pay are wont to point out that such programs have a disastrous effect upon staff morale. Additionally, they point out that performance-based salary programs are costly, not only in dollars but in the additional time needed to appropriately evaluate teaching. Opponents of

65 Ibid. p.8.
incentive pay systems question whether the public would support financially the increased costs such programs would bear. Those who do not look favorably on merit pay, question the existence of objective evaluation systems and the training programs needed to adequately train those who will make merit award decisions.

The related literature dealing with organizational climate clearly makes the point that the organizational climate of schools can be measured. It is possible to determine the typology of a school's climate. The appropriate unit of analysis is the school. Such measures are based upon the perceptions faculty members have about teacher interactions and teacher-principal relations.

The related literature points out that more open schools tend to be perceived as more successful schools. The literature indicates that certain qualities and characteristics of human dynamics may improve a school's organizational climate. Working conditions also play an important role in improving the level of job satisfaction that teachers hold.

To some extent, unlike the proponents of merit pay, those with an interest in organizational theory believe that the drive toward excellence and improved productivity can be reached through a better environment in the workplace. A better climate may be
achieved through collaboration. It has been said that teaching is a profession carried out in isolation. Schools need to improve upon the level of collegiality that exists in them. The related literature points out that this is possible by involving people in problem solving and decision making practices. Through involvement, individuals gain a sense of dignity, respect and partnership that leads to gains in productivity in the search for excellence.
CHAPTER III

Methodology

The "Year of Education," in Illinois was 1985. In June of that year, the Illinois General assembly enacted Senate Bill 730 and House Bill 1070. Jointly, these two pieces of legislation brought about, or proposed to bring about, sweeping changes in education throughout the State. The package of educational reform bills was enacted into law on July 18, 1985 when both bills were signed by Governor James Thompson.

Among the provisions of Senate Bill 730 was a compensation study and the establishment of the Center for Excellence in Teaching. The legislation appropriated $3,500,000 in grants for the development of pilot studies of career compensation programs in five to seven Illinois school districts. The Bill further called upon such programs to, "provide compensation for extraordinary teaching, innovation, leadership or assumption of additional responsibilities. They may include extended teacher contracts, career ladder or performance based pay." 66 The Act further called upon the Center for

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Excellence in Teaching to report upon the success of such programs to the Joint Education Committee of the Legislature, the governor, and the General Assembly by December 31, 1986. The State Board of Education was to further recommend to the General Assembly the need to revise sections of the legislation or if any of the pilot programs should be extended to all Illinois schools districts. On December 9, 1985 the Illinois State Board of Education issued a request for proposals to all Illinois school districts for submission of proposals in compliance with Senate Bill 730. School districts had until January 22, 1986 to submit proposals for compensation plans.

In April of 1987, the forty member "Blue Ribbon Committee on the Improvement of Teaching as a Profession" released its preliminary conclusions and recommendations. The Committee was comprised of members from both the education community and the general public. Established jointly by the Illinois State Board of Education and the Board of Higher Education, the Committee's task was to make recommendations, appropriate to Illinois, that would improve the nature of teaching. Recommendation twenty-five read,

The State Board of Education should seek funding for continuation of the study of teacher career compensation issues, with special emphasis on
programs which respond to public concerns about acknowledging excellence and rewarding results or productivity in teaching. The continued study of compensation issues should build on activities now in place in Illinois and should consider how to do at least the following:

a.) Identify and reward superior teaching
b.) Reward teachers, either individually or on a school-by-school basis for the learning performance of their students.67

Recommendation twenty-six stated, "The State Board of Education should initiate the establishment, through public or private funds, a unique means for recognizing and rewarding extraordinary teachers."68

In the Summer of 1987, the Illinois State Board of Education was contacted in order to identify Illinois school districts that employed merit pay systems for teachers. A list of twenty-one Illinois school districts using merit pay systems was obtained from the State Board of Education. Of those twenty-one districts, seventeen were K-8 districts, three were 9-12 districts and one was a unit district. In an attempt to limit the study to the Chicago metropolitan area, it was found that most plans were in actuality career ladder plans or were no longer operational.

68 Ibid. p.11.
Only two of the K-8 districts contacted that had operational merit pay plans agreed to participate in this study. The final selection of the merit pay schools in this study was made by the superintendents of the two merit pay school districts that agreed to participate. The selection of the non-merit pay schools was also made by the superintendents of the non-merit pay districts. Of the four schools in the study, school populations ranged between 300 and 480 students. Three of the schools were K-5 schools and one non-merit pay school was a K-6 school. The number of teachers at each school varied. The largest number of teachers were found at the merit pay schools, with the principals reporting teaching populations of approximately thirty teachers at each school. The non-merit pay principals reported teaching populations between twenty and twenty-five teachers. All of the schools in the study were within ten miles of each other, three of the schools were in neighboring, contiguous school districts.

In the fall of 1987, Professor Wayne K. Hoy of Rutgers University was contacted with regard to securing permission to utilize the Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire - RE for the purposes of this study. Professor Hoy granted permission to use
the OCDQ-RE with the stipulation that his article regarding the development of the instrument be referenced, in addition to sharing the research results of the study with him.

In early May, 1988 the copies of the OCDQ-RE as well as demographic data sheets were delivered to each of the participating schools in the study. Surveys were distributed to the faculties of each school by the principals. Eleven days after the OCDQ-RE was delivered to each school they were picked up by the researcher. Two weeks after the initial collection of research data, in an effort to increase the response rate, additional copies of the instrument and demographic data sheet were delivered to the schools. Included in the follow-up were return postage envelopes that would enable teachers not completing the initial survey to mail their response directly to the researcher.

The data from the OCDQ-RE responses and the demographic data sheets were tabulated for the purposes of eliciting mean numerical scores for each item. The mean scores for each item were then summed to produce a school score for each subtest of the OCDQ-RE. The higher the score for each subtest, the stronger the element in the school, whether it be teacher collegiality, teacher intimacy, teacher disengagement,
and principal support, principal directiveness, or principal restrictiveness.

The sample for this study consisted of four elementary schools from Du Page County, Illinois. Du Page County is a suburban county lying directly west of the city of Chicago. Of the four schools included in the sample, two schools were merit pay schools and two were non-merit pay schools. A demographic sketch of each of the schools in the study is as follows:

School A

School A is a merit pay school employing 32 teachers. Student population is approximately 300 students in grades kindergarten through five. A total of thirteen teachers completed responses for the purposes of this study.

School B

School B is also a merit pay school and employs 30 teachers. Student population is approximately 470 students in grades kindergarten through five. A total of twenty-two teachers completed responses for this research.

School C

School C is a non-merit pay school that employs 25 teachers. Student population in this kindergarten through sixth grade school is approximately 470
students. A total of sixteen teachers completed both the OCDQ-RE and demographic survey used in this study.

School D

School D is also a non-merit pay school. Student population in this kindergarten through fifth grade school is approximately 380 students. The faculty consists of 23 teachers. Fifteen teachers completed the two research instruments utilized in this study.

In keeping with the design of Hoy's OCDQ-RE, the appropriate unit of analysis in the study of organizational climate is the school, not the individual. Therefore, individual scores for each subtest of the OCDQ-RE were computed, individual scores were totaled and divided by the total number of school building responses to produce mean scores for each subtest of the OCDQ-RE. Also in keeping with the design of the instrument, comparisons were made between groups in the sample since norms for the OCDQ-RE have not been established. A t test was performed to test the differences between groups and to assist in seeking the answers to the following research questions:

1. Is the organizational climate in merit pay schools less open than that in non-merit pay schools?

2. Are principals in merit pay schools less
open than principals in non-merit pay schools?

3. Are teachers in non-merit pay schools more collegial than teachers in merit pay schools?

4. Are principals in merit pay schools more directive?

5. Are principals in merit pay schools less supportive?

6. Are merit pay principals more restrictive than non-merit pay principals?

7. Are merit pay teachers more disengaged than non-merit pay teachers?

8. Do teachers in merit pay schools exhibit more intimate behavior than teachers in non-merit pay schools?
CHAPTER IV

PRESENTATION OF DATA

As previously discussed, a total of sixty-six teachers responded to the two instruments used in this study. At School A, a merit pay school, thirteen of thirty-two teachers completed the instruments. All respondents were female. Six teachers held a Master's degree, all others held a Bachelor's degree. All but two of the teachers were members of the National Education Association. Three teachers had 0-5 years teaching experience; three had 6-10 years experience; two teachers had 11-15 years of experience; three had between 16-20 years experience, and two teachers had more than 20 years of experience. Ten of the respondents were married, two were single and one was divorced.

At School B, the second merit pay school, twenty-two of the school's thirty teachers completed the OCDQ-RE and demographic surveys. Three teachers had 0-5 years experience; ten had 6-10 years teaching experience; four had 11-16 years experience; another three had 16-20 years experience, and two had taught for more than 20 years. All respondents were female. Sixteen teachers were members of the American
Federation of Teachers, six had no union affiliation. Fifteen respondents were married, six were single, one was divorced. Thirteen teachers held a Bachelor's degree, and nine had Master's degrees.

Of the sixteen teachers completing surveys at School C, a non-merit pay school, one had 0-5 years teaching experience; two had 6-10 years of experience; eight had taught for 11-15 years; three had 16-20 years teaching experience, and two had taught for more than twenty years. All respondents were female, twelve of whom were married, the remaining four were single. Thirteen of the sixteen School C respondents were members of the National Education Association. Five teachers held Bachelor's degrees, ten held a Master's degree, and one teacher had a PhD.

At School D, fifteen of the twenty-three faculty members completed the surveys used in this study. Two teachers had 0-5 years teaching experience; seven had taught between 6-10 years; four teachers had 11-15 years of experience, and two had taught for more than 20 years. Fourteen teachers were National Association of Education members. Ten teachers were married, four were single, and one was divorced. Five teachers had Master's degrees, all others held Bachelor's degrees. One of the School D respondents was male.
TABLE 1
RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHIC DATA BY SCHOOL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEMOGRAPHIC ITEM</th>
<th>SCHOOL A</th>
<th>SCHOOL B</th>
<th>SCHOOL C</th>
<th>SCHOOL D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0- 5 YRS. EXPERIENCE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 YRS. EXPERIENCE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15 YRS. EXPERIENCE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20 YRS. EXPERIENCE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20+ YRS. EXPERIENCE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALE TEACHERS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMALE TEACHERS</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACHELOR'S DEGREE</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASTER'S DEGREE</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOCTOR'S DEGREE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNION MEMBERS</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-UNION MEMBERS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARRIED TEACHERS</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMARRIED TEACHERS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIVORCED TEACHERS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL RESPONSES</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the purpose of this study, a total of eight research questions were developed dealing with the
organizational climate of merit pay and non-merit pay schools. One of the primary functions of the study was to determine the openness of the organizational climates of both types of schools. Secondly, a t test was performed on the composite scores for each subtest of the OCDQ-RE for various groups in the study. A significance level of .05 was determined as appropriate for acceptance. The first research question posed, "Is the organizational climate in merit pay schools less open than that of non-merit pay schools?", seeks to determine if differences in openness levels exists in the two types of schools studied. Using the Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire - RE, an openness index for faculty relations, in each school in the study was computed. The openness index for each school is computed for faculty relations by summing the standard scores for the collegial and intimate subtests of the OCDQ-RE and subtracting from the total the score for the disengaged subtest. The openness indices for each of the four schools are shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2
OPENNESS INDICES FOR FACULTY RELATIONS BY SCHOOL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL AND SCHOOL TYPE</th>
<th>SCHOOL SCORE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School A (merit pay)</td>
<td>-1.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As illustrated in Table 2, the openness indices for both of the merit pay schools were slightly higher than those of the two non-merit pay schools. The two merit pay schools had openness indices of -1.16 (School A) and -1.17 (School B); while the two non-merit pay schools had indices of -1.37 (School C) and -1.29 (School D) respectively.

In addition to creating openness indices for each individual school for faculty relations, the schools were grouped by types and an openness index was developed for faculty relations accordingly. Table 3 shows the openness indices for faculty relations for merit pay and non-merit pay schools by school type.

TABLE 3
OPENNESS INDICES FOR FACULTY RELATIONS BY SCHOOL TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL TYPES</th>
<th>SCORE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MERIT PAY SCHOOLS</td>
<td>-1.165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Once again the standard scores indicate a slightly higher degree of openness in the area of faculty relations in the merit pay schools as opposed to the non-merit pay schools.

In addition to establishing an openness index for faculty relations in each school, an openness index was also computed for principal behavior as perceived by teachers in keeping with the second research question, "Are principals in merit pay schools less open than principals in non-merit pay schools?"

Openness indices for principal behavior for each of the schools studied are shown in Table 4.

**TABLE 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL AND TYPE</th>
<th>SCHOOL SCORE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School A (Merit Pay)</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School B (Merit Pay)</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School C (Non-Merit Pay)</td>
<td>4.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School D (Non-Merit Pay)</td>
<td>3.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As depicted in Table 4, the standardized scores for openness of principal behavior illustrates that the most open principal behavior is found in one of the two non-merit pay schools (School C) with a standardized score of 4.38. However, the next highest score for principal behavior, 3.49, was found in School A, a merit pay school. A standard score of 3.23 was found in School D a non-merit pay school. The second merit pay school, School B, had the lowest standardized score of 1.59.

As with faculty relations, the schools were grouped by type, merit pay and non-merit pay, and standardized scores were computed for principal behavior and are shown in Table 5.

**TABLE 5**

OPENNESS INDICES FOR PRINCIPAL BEHAVIOR BY SCHOOL TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL TYPE</th>
<th>SCORE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MERIT PAY SCHOOLS</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS</td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The grouped scores indicate that the non-merit pay schools had a combined higher degree of openness in principal behavior than did the merit pay schools.
What factors help to determine the degree of openness in each school? The OCDQ-RE is structured around six dimensions. Together, these six dimensions help to determine the openness of a school's organizational climate. Three dimensions, collegial, intimate and disengagement aid in determining the openness of faculty relations. The three dimensions that help to determine the openness of principal behavior are supportive, directive and restrictive. Accordingly, research questions were generated for each of the six dimensions of the OCDQ-RE.

**Faculty Collegial Behavior**

The third research question of this study deals with collegial behavior of faculty members, it asks, "Are teachers in non-merit pay schools more collegial than teachers in merit pay schools?" The OCDQ-RE consists of eight items that deal with the collegial dimension, which may be defined as consisting of behavior among staff members that is supportive and professional. Generally, teachers elicit pride in their schools and enjoy working with their peers, they feel fulfilled and display enthusiasm and a positive attitude toward the school, their colleagues and profession. The eight items of the OCDQ-RE that help to determine collegial behavior of faculty members are shown in Table 6.
TABLE 6

COLLEGIAL ITEMS OF THE OCDQ-RE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NUMBER</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The teachers accomplish their work with vim, vigor and pleasure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6*</td>
<td>Teachers leave school immediately after school is over.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Most of the teachers here accept the faults of their colleagues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Teachers help and support each other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Teachers are proud of their school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>New teachers are readily accepted by their colleagues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37*</td>
<td>Teachers socialize together in small, select groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Teachers respect the professional competence of their colleagues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* scored negatively

Composite mean scores for the collegial dimension of the OCDQ-RE are shown in Table 7 by school types.
TABLE 7
COMPOSITE COLLEGIAL SCORES BY SCHOOL TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL TYPE</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>SUM*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MERIT PAY SCHOOLS</td>
<td>25.75</td>
<td>901.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS</td>
<td>25.71</td>
<td>797.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sum= total of individual responses

Examination of the composite collegial scores indicates that, when grouped, the strength of the collegial property in both types of schools is similar. Table 8 further breaks down the composite collegial scores by individual schools.

TABLE 8
COLLEGIAL COMPOSITE SCORES BY INDIVIDUAL SCHOOL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>RESPONSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School A (merit pay)</td>
<td>24.84</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School B (merit pay)</td>
<td>26.04</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School C (non-merit pay)</td>
<td>25.87</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School D (non-merit pay)</td>
<td>24.60</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25.43</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the purposes of this study, the statistical treatment involved the computation of mean scores for each of the six subtests of the OCDQ-RE produced by the various groups participating in the study. A t test was applied to the data to determine differences between the scores produced by each group. It was determined that through the t test, a level of .05 or beyond would be reported as significant.

Analysis of the data between school types on the collegial dimension of the OCDQ-RE revealed no significant differences in collegiality between merit pay and non-merit pay schools. Analysis between individual schools did not reveal a statistically significant difference in collegiality between any of the schools participating in the study. While there appear to be differences in the collegial composite scores of the OCDQ-RE between individual schools, when the schools are grouped by type no significant differences in the strengths of the collegial properties can be detected. It is important to note however, that School B, a merit pay school, produced the strongest collegial score of all the schools in the study.

In addition to analyzing the data between schools and school types, the data were also analyzed by teaching experience levels and union affiliation.
Examination of the data for the collegial dimension of the OCDQ-RE revealed no significant differences between teachers at the varying strata of teaching experience or between those teachers who held union membership and their colleagues who were not members of teacher's unions.

However, analysis of the data between teachers with varying levels of teaching experience did reveal some significant differences between teachers with 0-5 years of experience and their colleagues with 20 plus years of experience. The results revealed that the teachers with 20 plus years classroom experience maintained a higher level of collegiality than their less experienced peers. Teachers with 0-5 years experience produced a composite mean score of 23.22 on the collegial subtest, while their colleagues with more than twenty years of teaching experience had a composite mean of 27.50. A significant difference was found to exist between the two groups.

Principal Directive Behavior

The fourth research question in this study deals with the directive dimension of principal behavior and asks, "Are principals in merit pay schools more directive than principals in non-merit pay schools?" The question has relevance in that it seeks to determine the rigidity and distance that principals
keep between themselves and their teaching personnel. Principals who are directive seek to maintain a high degree of control over teachers and the activities of the school. Directive principals may be seen as autocratic and monitor even the most minute aspects of the school environment. They tend not to be concerned with the interpersonal relationships they have with their teachers.

The directive dimension of principal behavior of the OCDQ–RE is determined through the utilization of nine items in the instrument. These items are delineated in Table 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NUMBER</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The principal rules with an iron fist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The principal checks the sign-in sheet every morning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>The principal schedules the work for the teachers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>The principal corrects teachers' mistakes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>The principal closely checks classroom (teacher) activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
35 The principal checks lesson plans.
39 The principal is autocratic.
40 The principal monitors everything teachers do.

Scoring of the OCDQ-RE on the directive dimension of principal behavior by school types is illustrated in Table 10. The two merit pay schools produced a mean score of 25.48, while the mean score for the two non-merit pay schools was 15.87. The results of data analysis through the application of a t test revealed a significant difference between the two types of schools.

### TABLE 10

**COMPOSITE DIRECTIVE DIMENSION SCORES BY SCHOOL TYPE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL TYPE</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>SUM*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MERIT PAY SCHOOLS</td>
<td>25.48**</td>
<td>928.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS</td>
<td>15.87**</td>
<td>507.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sum = total of individual responses

**Statistically significant
As shown in Table 11, a breakdown by individual schools indicates that School B, a merit pay school scored a great deal higher than the other three schools in the study including School A the other merit pay school. This score indicates that the highest level of principal directive behavior was found in a merit pay school.

TABLE 11
DIRECTIVE COMPOSITE MEAN SCORES BY SCHOOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>RESPONSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School A (Merit Pay)</td>
<td>18.00**</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School B (Merit Pay)</td>
<td>29.91**</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School C (Non-Merit Pay)</td>
<td>12.37**</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School D (Non-Merit Pay)</td>
<td>19.60**</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20.97</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Statistically significant

The application of a t test, revealed a significant difference in the scores between the two merit pay schools, Schools A and B. Analysis of the individual school data also revealed a significant difference between School A and B, both merit pay schools and School C, a non-merit pay school. Also, a
statistically significant difference existed between School B and School D, the second non-merit pay school in the study. Finally, a significant difference was revealed in the scores between the two non-merit pay schools, Schools C and D.

Data analysis was also performed on the directive composite scores by union affiliation and length of teaching experience. No significant differences between teacher groups based upon union membership and non-union membership could be found. These results were consistent when the data was analyzed based upon length of teaching experience. On the directive subtest, union members produced a composite mean score of 21.11 while the composite mean score for non-union members was 20.38. Composite mean scores for the various strata of teaching experience revealed a score of 21.22 for those with 0-5 years experience; 23.36 for teachers having 6-10 years experience; 19.00 for those with 11-15 years of teaching experience; 20.22 for teachers with 16-20 years experience, and 19.37 for those teachers having taught more than twenty years.

Although a comment section was not included as part of the data collection, three of the twenty-two teachers responding to the survey from School B made handwritten comments under item ten of the Questionnaire. The item asked respondents to circle
the appropriate response to the statement, "The principal checks the sign-in sheet every morning."
It appears from a majority of the responses from School B, that the school did not utilize a sign-in sheet procedure for teacher attendance. However, one of the teacher respondents made the following comment to item ten,"...is extremely aware of who is late or on time." Another teacher replied to the statement by writing,"N/A" and then wrote,"But does manage to have a sense of whether staff are on time." A third School B teacher wrote, "No sign-in sheet but (name deleted) is aware of what time you arrive!"

The comments made by these three School B staff members may be considered indicators as to why the directive dimension at School B was stronger than at the other three schools in the study. Although there were no significant differences discovered through statistical analysis of the data, the composite score on the directive subtest for School B (29.91), clearly indicates a much stronger directive dimension for principal behavior at this school when compared to the other schools.

Principal Supportive Behavior

Another dimension of principal behavior is the basis of the fifth research question in this study. The question asks, "Are principals in merit pay schools
Principals who are supportive enjoy positive interpersonal relationships with their staffs. The rapport between teachers and principal is genuine. Both teachers and the principal work together as a team to establish goals and willingly accept suggestions and feedback from each other. Communication is two way and unhindered. Teachers are provided with genuine, frequent, yet authentic praise and all criticism is constructive in nature.

The Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire - RE, contains nine items that deal with the supportive dimension of principal behavior. The nine items appear in Table 12.

**TABLE 12**

**SUPPORTIVE DIMENSION ITEMS ON THE OCDQ-RE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NUMBER</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The principal goes out of his/her way to help teachers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The principal uses constructive criticism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>The principal explains his/her reason for criticism to teachers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>The principal listens to and accepts teachers' suggestions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 12 -- CONTINUED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>The principal looks out for the personal welfare of teachers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>The principal treats teachers as equals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>The principal compliments teachers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>The principal is easy to understand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>The principal goes out of his/her way to show appreciation to teachers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with the other dimensions of the OCDQ-RE, composite mean scores were computed for the supportive dimension of principal behavior by school type. The non-merit pay schools produced a stronger dimension of supportive principal behavior than did the merit pay schools. The non-merit pay school composite score was 16.80, while the merit pay school composite mean score was 12.71. Composite mean scores by school type are shown in Table 13.
When viewed separately by individual schools, the picture developed in Table 13 tends to hold true to form for the individual schools. The two non-merit pay schools were consistent in that their composite mean scores were stronger than either of the two merit pay schools. School C had the strongest supportive dimension of principal behavior with a composite mean score of 17.00. School D also a non-merit pay school, had a composite mean score of 16.60 for the supportive dimension.

The supportive composite mean scores for principal behavior on the OCDQ-RE for the merit pay schools was 14.84 for School A and 11.45 for School B. The individual composite mean scores for supportive
principal behavior for all schools participating in the study are illustrated in Table 14.

**TABLE 14**

**SUPPORTIVE COMPOSITE SCORE BY SCHOOL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>RESPONSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School A (Merit Pay)</td>
<td>14.84**</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School B (Merit Pay)</td>
<td>11.45**</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School C (Non-Merit Pay)</td>
<td>17.00**</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School D (Non-Merit Pay)</td>
<td>16.60**</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14.63</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Statistically significant**

Statistical analysis of the data revealed a significant difference in mean supportive dimension scores between types of schools beyond the acceptance level of .05. Likewise when a t test was applied to the individual school scores, some significant differences between various groups in the study were found. A significant difference was found to exist between the two merit pay schools. School A showing a stronger supportive dimension. Additionally, School A
differed significantly from School C. A significant difference was also detected between School B, a merit pay school, and School C, a non-merit pay school. Finally, a statistically significant difference was also found to exist between School B and School D, the second non-merit pay school in the study.

When analyzed by union affiliation, no significant differences were found to exist between teachers who were union members and their non-union counterparts. However, when a t test was performed on the data between groups at various levels of teaching experience, a statistically significant difference in scores was found to exist between teachers with 0-5 years experience and those with 20 plus years of experience. Those teachers possessing 20 plus years experience elicited the stronger score. Teachers with 0-5 years experience had a mean score of 12.77, those with more than twenty years experience produced a mean score of 16.50. Likewise, a significant difference existed between teachers with 11-15 years experience and those with 16-20 years experience, those having the fewer number of years experience producing the higher score. Those teachers having taught 11-15 years produced a mean of 15.38, those teachers in the 16-20 year group produced a mean of 12.88, a significant difference between the two groups was detected. Also,
those with 16-20 years experience and those with 20 plus years experience differed significantly, once again the 20 plus years group produced the higher score. Those teachers in the 16-20 year group had a mean score on the supportive dimension of 12.88, while those with twenty or more years experience had a mean score of 16.50.

As previously mentioned, a comment section to this study was not included in the data gathering. However, as with the directive dimension previously discussed, a teacher from School B made a comment that refers to elements of supportive principal behavior at the end of the survey. The comment related that the principal utilized various methods to show appreciation to staff members through such activities as birthday cards, breakfasts and luncheons for special occasions and "upbeat cards." But the respondent wrote, "Then sabotages these attempts with the way (name deleted) handles people day-to-day." This statement may serve to explain why the supportive dimension of organizational climate at School B was the weakest of the four schools in the study.

Principal Restrictive Behavior

The third dimension of principal behavior that the OCDQ-RE addresses is restrictive behavior. Principals who exhibit restrictive behavior have a high degree of
concern for following established policies and procedures. Administrative detail is of great concern to them. Principals who are restrictive seldom permit or encourage teacher participation in decision making and, as a consequence, stifle creativity in approaching ways to solve school problems. In conclusion, principals who display restrictive behavior, frequently burden other members of the school staff with a number of non-teaching related activities, such as committee responsibilities and burdensome paperwork.

In an effort to detect any differences in restrictive behavior on the part of merit pay and non-merit pay principals, the sixth research question in this study asked, "Are merit pay principals more restrictive than non-merit pay principals?" The structure of the Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire - RE is such that it consists of five items that deal with assessing restrictive principal behavior. Those items on the OCDQ-RE that deal with restrictive principal behavior are shown in Table 15.
## TABLE 15
RESTRICTIVE DIMENSION ITEMS OF PRINCIPAL BEHAVIOR ON THE OCDQ-RE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NUMBER</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Routine duties interfere with the job of teaching.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Teachers have too many committee requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Administrative paperwork is burdensome at this school.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31*</td>
<td>Clerical support reduces teachers' paperwork.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Teachers are burdened with paperwork.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*scored negatively

The composite mean scores for both the merit pay and non-merit pay schools were computed for restrictive principal behavior. The two merit pay schools in the study had a composite mean score of 12.54. The non-merit pay schools mean composite was 12.48. The composite mean scores indicate a slightly stronger restrictive behavior property for the two merit pay
schools. Table 16 shows the composite mean scores for both the merit pay and non-merit pay schools that participated in this study.

TABLE 16

RESTRICTIVE COMPOSITE MEAN SCORES BY SCHOOL TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL TYPE</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>SUM*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MERIT PAY SCHOOLS</td>
<td>12.54</td>
<td>463.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS</td>
<td>12.48</td>
<td>388.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sum = total of individual responses

Individual school scores for restrictive behavior of principals were also computed and are illustrated in Table 17.

TABLE 17

RESTRICTIVE COMPOSITE SCORES BY SCHOOL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>RESPONSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School A (Merit Pay)</td>
<td>11.23**</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School B (Merit Pay)</td>
<td>13.31**</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School C (Non-Merit Pay)</td>
<td>10.56**</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School D (Non-merit Pay)</td>
<td>14.53**</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The composite mean scores for individual schools illustrate that the most restrictive principal behavior was evident in School D, a non-merit pay school. The composite mean score for that school was 14.53. School B, a merit pay school, had the second strongest restrictive score, 13.31. A composite restrictive score of 11.23 was produced by School A, a merit pay school, the third strongest score. The lowest level of restrictive behavior was found to exist at School D whose mean score on the restrictive subtest was 10.56. School D is a non-merit pay school.

Statistical analysis of the data was performed by school types, merit pay vis-a-vis non-merit pay schools to compare mean scores. When grouped, the merit pay teachers produced a mean score of 12.54. The non-merit pay teachers produced a mean score of 12.48. Analysis of the data for the two groups revealed no significant differences. When schools were compared for differences between one another for restrictive principal behavior, there was found to be a
statistically significant difference in scores between School A and School B, both merit pay schools. Also, a significant difference was found to exist between School A and School D. School D, a non-merit pay school having a higher restrictive property for principal behavior. A significant difference was also found to exist between School B and School C. Finally, the scores of the two non-merit pay schools also differed significantly.

When further analysis was performed on the data, a significant difference beyond the .05 level of acceptance established for this study for restrictive principal behavior, was found to exist among teachers who were members of unions, as opposed to their non-union counterparts. Teachers having union affiliation produced a composite mean score of 12.90 compared with a score of 10.92 for non-union members. As stated, the stronger perceived restrictive property held by the union teachers differed significantly from their non-union counterparts. However, when comparing differences based upon varying levels of teaching experience, 0-5 years, 6-10 years, 11-15 years, 16-20 years and 20 plus years of experience, no significant differences were noted.
Teacher Disengagement

Teachers who display disengaged behavior are those who take little personal interest in their school, or in the personal lives of their colleagues. Disengaged teachers also display little professional interest. Such teachers merely mark time on the job and lend little support to effective team building. Consequently, they lack common goal orientation and have a negative effect upon their colleagues and the school. Hoy's Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire-RE contains four items designed to assess the level of disengagement within a school organization and addresses the seventh research question, "Are merit pay teachers more disengaged than non-merit pay teachers?" The four items designed to assess the disengagement dimension of faculty behavior are illustrated in Table 18.

TABLE 18

DISENGAGED ITEMS OF TEACHER BEHAVIOR ON THE OCDQ-RE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NUMBER</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Faculty meetings are useless.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>There is a minority group of teachers who always oppose the majority.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Composite mean scores for disengaged teacher behavior were computed by school types and are illustrated in Table 19.

**TABLE 19**

**COMPOSITE DISENGAGED SCORES BY SCHOOL TYPE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL TYPE</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>SUM*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MERIT PAY SCHOOLS</td>
<td>7.71**</td>
<td>269.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS</td>
<td>6.73**</td>
<td>208.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sum = total of individual responses

**Statistically significant

Disengaged behavior on the part of faculty members at the merit pay schools is stronger than at the non-merit pay schools. As Table 19 illustrates, the merit pay school teachers produced a composite mean
score of 7.71, while their non-merit pay school counterparts produced a mean score of 6.73 on the disengaged subtest. Application of a t test to the data, revealed a significant difference between the two groups.

In addition to computing scores by school types, individual school scores for faculty disengagement were also developed. The individual school scores are revealed in Table 20 and show that School B, a merit pay building, had the strongest disengagement score of 7.95.

**TABLE 20**

**COMPOSITE DISENGAGED SCORES BY SCHOOL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>RESPONSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School A (Merit Pay)</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School B (Merit Pay)</td>
<td>7.95**</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School C (Non-Merit Pay)</td>
<td>5.75**</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School D (Non-Merit Pay)</td>
<td>7.73**</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7.24</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Statistically significant**
Although a merit pay school produced the highest composite score of the four schools in the study, a non-merit pay school, School D, produced the second highest score for disengagement (7.73), just slightly stronger than the 7.30 composite score produced by School A, a merit pay school. The weakest score, or the most engaged faculty was found to exist in School C, a non-merit pay school, whose composite score was 5.75.

Through the utilization of a t test the composite scores of each school were compared for differences between individual schools. A level of significance beyond the .05 level was found to exist between School B, a merit pay school, and School C, a non-merit pay school, when comparing their scores. Likewise, a significant difference existed between the two non-merit pay schools for faculty disengagement. No significant differences in disengagement were detected however, between non-union teachers and their fellow teachers who were affiliated with either the National Education Association or the American Federation of Teachers. Union faculty in the study produced a disengagement mean score of 7.39. The thirteen non-union teachers who took part in the study had a composite mean score of 6.61. A t test applied to this data revealed no significant differences between the
two groups. When mean scores for disengagement were compared between teachers at various levels of teaching experience, some significance was detected in analysis of the data. Teachers with 0-5 years experience produced a mean score of 8.44 when compared to teachers with 11-15 years experience whose mean was 6.44, a significant difference between the scores of the two groups was noted. Analysis of the data between all other strata of teaching experience did not yield any significant differences between teachers at all other levels of experience analyzed in this study.

**Intimacy**

When teachers get to know one another well and socialize with each other, both in and out of the work place, their level of intimate behavior within the organization increases and has a corresponding impact on the organizational climate of the school. In many instances, teachers become personal friends. When intimate behavior on the part of teachers permeates the organizational climate of a school, the result can be the development of a social support network among faculty members. The eighth and final question asks, "Do teachers in non-merit pay schools exhibit more intimate behavior than teachers in merit pay schools?"

The **Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire-RE** contains seven items dealing with the
social interactions and relationships that teachers in a school may have with one another. Those items that appear in the OCDQ-RE that play a role in the assessment of intimate behavior of teachers are shown in Table 21.

**TABLE 21**

**INTIMATE ITEMS OF THE OCDQ-RE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NUMBER</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Teachers' closest friends are other faculty members at this school.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Teachers invite other faculty members to visit them at home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Teachers know the family background of other faculty members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Teachers have fun socializing together during school time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Teachers have parties for each other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Teachers socialize with each other on a regular basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Teachers provide strong social support for colleagues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Computation of mean scores by school types revealed that the two merit pay schools had stronger levels of intimate behavior than did the non-merit pay schools. The composite scores by school type for intimate teacher behavior are shown in Table 22.

**TABLE 22**

**INTIMATE COMPOSITE SCORES BY SCHOOL TYPE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL TYPE</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>SUM*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MERIT PAY SCHOOLS</td>
<td>20.31**</td>
<td>710.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS</td>
<td>17.71**</td>
<td>549.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sum = total of individual responses

**Statistically significant

The 20.31 composite score produced by the merit pay faculty members, indicates that the overall social, intimacy network operating in those schools was stronger than that in the two non-merit pay schools whose mean score on the intimate behavior subtest was 17.71. When computed by individual schools, the results were consistent with those produced by school types. Table 23 shows the composite intimate scores for each individual school in the study.
TABLE 23
INTIMATE COMPOSITE SCORES BY SCHOOL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>RESPONSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School A (Merit Pay)</td>
<td>20.69**</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School B (Merit Pay)</td>
<td>20.09**</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School C (Non-Merit Pay)</td>
<td>15.81**</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School D (Non-Merit Pay)</td>
<td>18.40**</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18.78</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Statistically significant

The results of computing the individual school mean scores for intimate faculty behavior indicate that the merit pay schools had consistently higher, and thus stronger, intimate behavior. The results of this aspect of the study illustrate that with mean scores of 20.69 and 20.09 respectively, Schools A and B had developed a stronger social support network for faculty members. School D, a non-merit pay school, produced a mean score of 18.40, while School C produced the weakest score for intimate behavior at 15.81.

The data for intimate behavior by school type was statistically analyzed and revealed a significant difference between merit pay and non-merit pay schools.
In addition to analysis by school type, the data was analyzed by individual schools. The individual school analysis revealed that a difference existed between School A, a merit pay school, and School C, a non-merit pay school, beyond the .05 level of acceptance for significance for intimate behavior. School A also differed significantly from School D. School B, the second merit pay school, differed significantly from School C a non-merit pay school. Finally, the scores of the two non-merit pay schools differed from one another at a level of significance beyond the .05 level of acceptance for intimate behavior.

**TABLE 24**

**INTIMATE COMPOSITE SCORES BY EXPERIENCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS OF EXPERIENCE</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>18.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>18.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>19.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20</td>
<td>16.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20+</td>
<td>20.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statistical analysis was also performed on the data by years of teaching experience at various
stratas. When comparing teachers with varying levels of experience, no significant differences at or below the .05 level could be found. Teachers having 0-5 years teaching experience had a composite mean score for intimacy of 18.88. While those with 6-10 years experience produced a mean score of 18.72. More experienced teachers with 11-15 years of service had an intimacy score of 19.05; those with 16-20 years in the classroom produced a mean of 16.66, and those with more than twenty years experience had a mean score of 20.62. Although those with the most experience produced the highest intimacy property no significant differences between any of the groups was noted at or below the .05 level of significance. Finally, when the data was analyzed by union and non-union affiliation, no significant differences in the level of intimate behavior could be found between teachers of either group. The fifty-three teachers affiliated with a teacher's union produced an intimate composite mean score of 19.22. Their non-union counterparts had a mean score of 17.00.
Summary

The data examined in this chapter reveals that for the most part the organizational climates of merit pay and non-merit pay schools are similar in nature. Both the openness indices for faculty relations and principal behavior do not vary greatly. When viewed from an individual school perspective, greater variance in the scores was detected between one of the two merit pay schools in the study (School B), and the other three schools that included another merit pay facility.

When examining the data elicited by the six subtests of organizational climate, once again similar patterns emerge. Some differences in the level of collegial behavior between teachers with varying levels of classroom experience existed. Those teachers with 0-5 years teaching experience had mean score of 23.22. Their more experienced colleagues with twenty plus years of experience had a composite mean score of 27.50. The difference between the two groups was found to be significant. However, no differences were found between types of schools. Nor could any differences be found between teachers based upon union affiliation.

The data for directive principal behavior revealed a significant difference between the scores of the merit pay and non-merit pay schools. Significant differences were also found in the subtest scores for
restrictive principal behavior between the individual schools in this study.

Analysis of the data for supportive behavior illustrated stronger supportive behavior at the non-merit pay schools. Some consistency of the school type data (merit pay schools vis-a-vis non-merit pay schools), was found when the schools were viewed individually. Both merit pay schools maintained significantly lower scores on the supportive subtest than did School C, a non-merit pay school.

When the data for restrictive principal behavior was examined by school type, no difference was found to exist in the perception of merit pay teachers and their non-merit pay counterparts. Further analysis of that same data revealed that some differences existed between individual schools participating in the study.

Also, a difference in the level of disengagement beyond the .05 level of acceptance was found to exist between merit pay and non-merit pay schools. Further analysis also revealed that a difference in disengagement was present between Schools B and C and between teachers with 0-5 years teaching experience and their counterparts with 11-15 years of experience in the classroom.

Finally, when the data for intimate faculty behavior was analyzed a difference did exist between
the merit pay and non-merit pay schools. Significant differences were also detected between the two merit pay schools and School C, but no differences were detected between the merit pay schools and School D in their intimacy scores. Additionally, the scores for both non-merit pay schools differed significantly. No differences in the scores were found to exist when comparing scores of groups for union and non-union affiliation, or at the different strata of teaching experience.

TABLE 25

INTIMATE COMPOSITE SCORES BY UNION MEMBERSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNION MEMBERSHIP</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNION MEMBERS</td>
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<td>NON-UNION MEMBERS</td>
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As discussed in Chapters I and II, since the publication of a number of national reports calling for reforms in education, increased attention has been given to merit pay plans for teachers. In response to those calls for the institution of incentive-based pay programs a number of organizations, including the country's largest teachers union, have voiced opposition to such plans. The result has been the publication of various elements in the literature that detail reasons for opposition to such plans that include, among other things, the development of a competitive atmosphere among teachers that is generally viewed as not having a positive impact on school climate.

The philosophy behind merit pay is that it serves as a method for rewarding better teachers. Teachers who perform better than others should be paid more money. Because such conditions exist in merit pay schools, it would follow that concern would develop over the organizational climate that exists in merit pay schools as opposed to non-merit pay schools.
Organizational climate may be seen as the relationships that teachers experience with their colleagues and principals. These relationships help to form the personality that a school assumes and sets the educational tone in the school.

In view of the concerns cited above, this study had as its primary purpose to discern whether or not any differences existed between the organizational climates of merit pay and non-merit pay schools. In order to determine if such differences existed the following research questions were considered in the study:

1. Is the organizational climate in merit pay schools less open than that of non-merit pay schools?
2. Are principals in merit pay schools less open than principals in non-merit pay schools?
3. Are teachers in non-merit pay schools more collegial than merit pay school teachers?
4. Are principals in merit pay schools more directive?
5. Are principals in merit pay school less supportive?
6. Are merit pay school principals more restrictive than non-merit pay school principals?
7. Are merit pay teachers more disengaged than non-merit pay school teachers?
8. Do teachers in non-merit pay schools exhibit more intimate behavior than teachers in merit pay schools?

The population of this study consisted of sixty-six teachers of four elementary schools from four different elementary school districts in Du Page County, Illinois. In order to elicit data necessary to the completion of this study, all teachers in each of the four schools were asked to complete Wayne K. Hoy's, Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire-RE and a short demographic data sheet. Scores for openness of faculty and principal behavior were computed and scores for each of the six dimensions of the OCDQ-RE were also computed. The data was further analyzed and t tests were run to determine significant differences between groups. A significance level of .05 was determined to be appropriate for significance.

Findings

The research questions in this study fall into two distinct categories. The first category deals with faculty behavior and deals with those elements of organizational climate attributable to faculty interactions. The first, third, seventh, and eighth research questions focus on faculty aspects of organizational climate.
The second category of research questions deals with elements of organizational climate that may be attributable to principal behavior. The second, fourth, fifth, and sixth research questions focus on the principal behavior aspect of organizational climate. The findings in this study will be reported based upon the category of each type of research question.

Faculty Relations

1. The openness index for faculty relations indicated that as a group the merit pay schools had a slightly more open climate than did the non-merit pay schools.

2. When viewed as individual schools, the results were consistent with the first finding, the two merit schools maintained slightly more open organizational climates for faculty relations.

3. On the collegial dimension of organizational climate the mean scores between types of schools varied only slightly, with the merit pay schools exhibiting a slightly stronger collegial dimension.

4. When mean scores for individual schools were computed, the results were not totally consistent with the third finding. One merit pay school had the strongest collegial score, while the other merit pay
school ranked third. The two non-merit pay schools ranked second and fourth respectively in collegial strength.

5. No significant differences between school types or individual schools were found on the collegial dimension.

6. There were, however, significant differences between teachers with 0-5 years experience and those with 20 or more years experience for the collegial properties; the more senior teachers producing the stronger score.

7. On the subtest for disengagement, the non-merit pay schools had significantly more engaged faculty members than did the merit pay schools.

8. As individual schools, the results were not quite consistent with the school type results. The most disengaged faculty was found in one of the merit pay schools. However, a non-merit pay school produced the second strongest disengaged score (7.733 as opposed to 7.3077 for the second merit pay school in the study). The most engaged faculty was found in one of the merit pay schools.

9. A significant difference was found between the two non-merit pay schools; School C having the most engaged faculty.
10. Significance was also found between School B, a merit pay school, and School C.

11. Teachers with 11-15 years experience were found to be more engaged than those with 0-5 years experience at a level of significance beyond the established level of .05.

12. The merit pay schools as a group were found to have a significantly stronger intimate behavior property than did the non-merit pay schools. When broken down by individual schools, the results for intimate behavior were consistent. Both merit pay schools maintained higher scores for the intimate behavior subtest. Significant differences were found between School A and both of the non-merit pay schools. School B, a merit pay school, also differed significantly from School C.

13. The scores between the two non-merit pay schools had a significant difference beyond the acceptance level of .05. The School C faculty having the lower intimate behavior score.

Principal Behavior

1. The openness indices for principal behavior by school types showed that the non-merit pay principals were more open.
2. The results in the first finding for principal behavior were not consistent when the schools were viewed individually. The most open principal behavior was found at a non-merit pay school, the least open principal behavior was found at a merit pay school. However, a merit pay school did have the second highest openness score for principal behavior.

3. The stronger directive scores were found in the merit pay schools when grouped by school types.

4. As individual schools, a merit pay school had the most directive score, a non-merit pay school the lowest. However, a non-merit pay school had the second strongest score and a merit pay school had the second lowest directive principal behavior.

5. Significant differences existed between the two merit pay schools beyond the .05 level of acceptance on the directive subtest.

6. Also on the directive subtest, a significant difference was present between the School C score and the scores produced by both merit pay schools.

7. A significant difference was also noted between Schools B and D. School B having a higher directive score.

8. The stronger supportive properties were observed in the non-merit pay schools when schools were grouped by type, significant beyond the .05 level.
9. As individual schools the findings for supportive behavior were consistent. Both non-merit pay schools maintained stronger scores for the supportive dimension. Significance beyond the .05 acceptance level was found between the two merit pay schools, between Schools A and C, B and C, and between Schools B and D.

10. Teachers with 20 plus years experience perceived more supportive principal behavior than their colleagues with 0-5 years experience. The difference in scores between the two groups was significant. However, teachers with 11-15 years experience had a stronger supportive property differing significantly with their colleagues with 16-20 years experience.

11. There were no significant differences found between union and non-union teachers on the supportive subtest.

12. The scores for restrictive behavior for principals by school types were strongest at the merit pay schools when schools were grouped.

13. The results of the previous finding are not consistent when individual school scores are observed. Both the strongest and weakest scores for restrictive behavior were found at the non-merit pay schools.
14. There were no significant differences between the scores by school types on the restrictive subtest.

15. A level of significance beyond the .05 level of acceptance for significance existed between the two merit pay schools.

16. Schools A and D differed significantly from one another.

17. The merit pay school scores differed significantly on the restrictive behavior subtest.

18. A significant difference was found to exist between Schools B and C on the restrictive subtest; School C, a non-merit pay school, having the less restrictive score.

19. There was a significant difference in the restrictive scores beyond the .05 level between union and non-union members. Union members produced the stronger score for the property.

Conclusions

This study provides information that may have implications for those school boards and those administrators who may consider merit pay a viable salary system for implementation in a school district. Some of the conclusions that may be drawn from this study based upon data gathering and analysis are:
1. A review of the literature suggests that there are differing opinions as to the impact of merit pay plans on teacher interaction, that such systems create a more competitive school environment and they may create dissatisfaction. Because of the potential for impact on a school's organizational climate, school district decision makers may view this study as providing inferences that may be helpful in guiding decisions about merit pay.

2. The openness indices for both faculty relations and principal behavior did not differ greatly between the merit pay and non-merit pay schools when the schools were grouped by type. Therefore, it can be concluded that merit pay programs have little relationship to the degree of openness in a school. While many other variables may impact organizational climate, apparently a merit pay program is not one of them.

3. Based upon the scoring and assessment procedures for the Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire-RE there does not appear to be a great deal of difference in the strength of collegial relationships among faculty in merit pay and non-merit pay schools, although there are some differences between individual schools in this study. Again, it may be concluded that merit pay programs do not effect
the collegial relationships that occur within the organizational climate of a school.

4. There are similar levels of engagement at both the merit pay and non-merit pay schools. Teachers at the non-merit pay schools had slightly stronger engaged climate. Although non-merit pay teachers had a slightly stronger engaged climate than their merit pay counterparts, no significant differences were noted between the two groups. It can be concluded therefore, that performance based pay systems have no effect upon the level of engagement between school faculty members.

5. The merit pay schools had a consistently stronger intimate behavior property than did the non-merit pay schools. This was shown in the mean scores for school types as well as for individual schools. It may therefore be concluded that merit pay programs may play a role in establishing the level of intimacy in a school's organizational climate.

6. By school types, merit pay teachers viewed their principals to be more directive than did non-merit pay teachers. It may be concluded, therefore, that teachers in merit pay schools preceive their principals to be more directive than teachers in non-merit pay schools.

7. Based upon scores for the supportive subtest for OCDQ-RE supportive principal behavior is stronger
in the non-merit pay schools than in the non-merit pay schools. The data for school types on the supportive subtests was consistent with the data produced by individual schools; the non-merit pay schools both maintained stronger supportive principal dimensions. It can therefore be concluded that merit pay systems may act as a variable in establishing the perceived level of principal support that teachers in merit pay schools may hold.

8. It may be inferred that because merit pay teachers perceive their principals to be more restrictive and less supportive than non-merit pay teachers, a higher level of intimacy within the organizational climate may develop due to the perceived higher restrictiveness and lower supportiveness from principals.

9. For the restrictive dimension, union teachers produced a significantly higher score than their non-union counterparts. Therefore, it can be concluded that teachers who are affiliated with unions view their principals to be more restrictive. Consequently, union membership may be a variable that effects restrictiveness.

10. Teachers with 11-15 years experience are more engaged than faculty with 0-5 years experience. It may therefore be concluded that faculty members in
the middle range of experience are more school oriented.

11. Teachers with 20 plus years experience possess a stronger collegial property than teachers with 0-5 years experience. Therefore, the conclusion may be drawn that schools with more experienced faculty will have higher levels of staff collegiality.

12. Faculty members with 20 plus years experience perceive stronger principal support than teachers with 0-5 years experience. It can therefore be concluded from the data accumulated in this study that teaching experience is a variable that plays a role in the organizational climate of school. Those teachers with 20 plus years of experience had consistently higher scores in the collegial, as well as, principal supportive dimensions.

13. Teachers having taught 11-15 years produced a stronger supportive score than did teachers with 16-20 years experience.

14. Those teachers with more than 20 years experience indicated more supportive behavior by principals than those with 16-20 years experience.
Recommen dations

A review of the literature and the results of this study indicate that merit pay may continue to be a controversial subject. As efforts are made to increase the accountability of schools and improve the quality of instruction in hopes of raising student achievement, it is inevitable that improved salary structures for teachers become part of the dialogue. For those who make decisions about teacher salaries, merit pay may be seen as an attractive alternative to reward good teachers and rid the system of poorer faculty, especially at a time when the level of funding schools, particularly in Illinois, is low. Based upon this investigation the following recommendations are made:

1. A study similar to this investigation should be conducted on a wider basis. The focus of this study was narrowed to four schools in a suburban setting. The population was almost entirely female. A broader study, that would include teachers from rural as well as from larger metropolitan school districts would be beneficial in helping to assess the organizational climate of schools throughout the state or nation as a whole.
2. Prior to implementation of merit pay programs it is recommended that school district decision makers review the literature dealing with merit pay and organizational climate, and carefully consider the benefits as well as the costs of such programs.

3. Before making a decision to implement a merit pay program, school district decision makers may wish to consider assessment of the organizational climate of schools within the district.

4. Further studies such as this investigation should be completed to determine the consistency of results and data with regard to the subtests of the Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire-RE as well as in a high school setting using the Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire-RS (Revised Secondary).

5. Because teacher evaluation, evaluative techniques and skills of evaluators determine the size of merit pay grants, a study should be conducted that deals with assessment of organizational climate, teacher evaluation procedures, and the skills principals possess as evaluators. Such information may prove beneficial in Illinois wherein school administrators must be recertified and trained in evaluation practices and techniques through the
state-mandated Administrator's Academy. This information may be helpful to administrators in assisting them in developing evaluative techniques and procedures that have a positive effect on organizational climate. Also, because teaching experience appears to be a variable that plays a role in organizational climate, administrators should have information about various evaluative procedures that may work best in various types of schools based upon the make-up of the school's faculty.

6. A study similar to this research, should be conducted comparing the organizational climate of both merit pay and non-merit pay schools with student achievement, the end product of the process of schooling.
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Brinks, James T. "Is There Merit in Merit Increases?" Personnel Administrator, XXV (1980), 59-64.


Rist, Marlilee C. "Our nationwide poll: Most teachers endorse the merit pay concept." *American School Board Journal.* CLXX, No. 9 (September, 1983), 23-34.


Schneider, Frank. "Merit Pay for Teachers." Mobile County Public Schools, Division of General Services, Research and Evaluation, (June, 1983).


6839 Park Lane  
Palos Heights, Illinois 60463  
August 30, 1987

Professor Wayne K. Hoy  
Graduate School of Education  
Rutgers University  
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903

Dear Professor Hoy:

As Part of my research project for my doctoral dissertation at Loyola University of Chicago, I would like to administer the Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire-RE to groups of elementary school teachers in Illinois. The focus of my research will deal with school climate in merit pay and non-merit pay Illinois elementary schools. Please forward to me information relative to securing copies of the OCDQ-RE as well as scoring information and all other pertinent data regarding the Questionnaire.

Your prompt response to this request is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Bernard J. Jumbeck
September 4, 1987

Mr. Bernard J. Jumbeck
6839 Park Lane
Palos Heights, ILLINOIS 60463

Dear Mr. Jumbeck:

You have my permission to use the OCDQ-RE in your research. I have enclosed an article on the OCDQ-RE, a copy of the OCDQ-RE and a copy of the scoring instrument.

The only request I make of you is that you reference the article in any manuscript or publication which you write, and send me a copy of the results of the research.

Sincerely,

Wayne K. Hoy
Professor

WKH:csh
Encl:
To Score the OCDQ-RE

1. Group the items according to the six subtests (See enclosure).

2. RO=1  SO=2  OO=3  VO=4  Each item (except negative items*) should be scored according to the numerical code. The items with an * are scored in reverse--RO=4  SO=3  OO=2  VO=1. For the subjects in each school, the scores for each item are to be averaged across individuals (an average item school score is created); hence, each school will have a mean score for each of the items of the OCDQ-RE. Then the mean scores for each of the subtests should be summed to produce the school score on each of the subtests. NOTE: This procedure is used because the appropriate unit of analysis is the school, not the individual.

3. The higher the score on each dimension, the stronger that property for the school.

4. TWO openness indices can be created for each school as follows:
   a.) Standardize the school scores for each subtest. I suggest you make the mean 50 and the standard deviation 10.
   b.) Openness Index for faculty relations= [C+I-D] WHERE C = the standardized collegial subtest score, I= the standardized intimate score, and D is the standardized disengaged score.
   c.) Openness Index for principal behavior=[S-D-R] WHERE S= the standardized supportive subtest score, D is the standardized directive score, and S is the standardized restrictive score.

5. Norms have not been established;, hence, comparisons should be made within your sample.
Teacher Behavior: Collegial

Collegial behavior is indicated by supportive, professional relationships among staff. Teachers are proud of their school, enjoy working with their colleagues, and feel a sense of accomplishment and fulfillment in their jobs. They exhibit energy, enthusiasm, and positiveness.

Collegial Items

1. The teachers accomplish their work with vim, vigor and pleasure.

* 6. Teachers leave school immediately after school is over.

12. Most of the teachers here accept the faults of their colleagues.

19. Teachers help and support each other.

26. Teachers are proud of their school.

32. New teachers are readily accepted by their colleagues.

* 37. Teachers socialize together in small, select groups.

40. Teachers respect the professional competence of their colleagues.

* scored negatively
Teacher Behavior: Intimate

Intimate behavior reflects a pervasive social support network among staff. Teachers have gotten to know one another well enough to be personal friends, and they socialize regularly both in and out of the working environment.

Intimate Items

2. Teachers' closest friends are other faculty members at this school.

7. Teachers invite other faculty members to visit them at home.

13. Teachers know the family background of other faculty members.

20. Teachers have fun socializing together during school time.

27. Teachers have parties for each other.

33. Teachers socialize with each other on a regular basis.

38. Teachers provide strong social support for colleagues.

Teacher Behavior: Disengaged

Disengaged behavior is exhibited by teachers who have no personal stake in the school, their colleagues, or their profession. They are simply putting in their time and are non-productive in group efforts or team-building; they have no common goal orientation.
Their behavior is negative and critical toward colleagues and the organization.

Disengaged Items

3. Faculty meetings are useless.

18. There is a minority group of teachers who always oppose the majority.

14. Teachers exert group pressure on non-conforming faculty members.

21. Teachers ramble when they talk at faculty meetings.

Principal Behavior: Supportive

Supportive behavior by the principal is reflected in his/her genuine rapport with staff. Supportive principals respect the professional competence of their staff and also try to exhibit a personal interest in each teacher. They enjoy working with teachers to set goals and solve problems, and they are willing to accept teachers suggestions and feedback. Praise is given genuinely and frequently, and criticism is handled constructively.

Supportive Items

4. The principal goes out of his/her way to help teachers.

9. The principal uses constructive criticism.

15. The principal explains his/her reasons for criticism to teachers.
16. The principal listens to and accepts teachers' suggestions.

22. The principal looks out for the personal welfare of teachers.

23. The principal treats teachers as equals.

28. The principal compliments teachers.

29. The principal is easy to understand.

42. The principal goes out of his/her way to show appreciation to teachers.

Principal Behavior: Directive

Directive behavior is indicated by principals who are rigid and keep a distance between employer and employee. Such principals need to maintain constant control over all teacher and school activities, down to the smallest details. Directive principals are monitors and autocrats, who give no consideration to interpersonal relationships.

Directive Items

5. The principal rules with an iron fist.

10. The principal checks the sign-in sheet every morning.

17. The principal schedules the work for the teachers.

24. The principal corrects teachers' mistakes.

30. The principal closely checks classroom (teacher) activities.

34. The principal supervises teachers closely.
35. The principal checks lesson plans.
39. The principal is autocratic.
41. The principal monitors everything teachers do.

Principal Behavior: Restrictive

Restrictive behavior is exhibited by principals who discourage interaction and productivity because of their overwhelming concern for strict adherence to policies, procedures and administrative detail. Restrictive principals leave no room for teacher input or creative approaches to school concerns, and they burden others with non-educative activities.

Restrictive Items

11. Routine duties interfere with the job of teaching.
18. Teachers have too many committeee requirements.
25. Administrative paperwork is burdensome at this school.
* 31. Clerical support reduces teachers' paperwork.
36. Teachers are burdened with busywork.

*scored negatively
APPENDIX B
6839 Park Lane  
Palos Heights, Illinois 60463

May 3, 1988

Dear Teacher:

I am a graduate student at Loyola University of Chicago working on my doctoral dissertation. The study deals with different aspects of organizational climate and various administrative practices in different types of schools.

Your assistance is requested in assessing the organizational climate of your school. The Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire - R E, developed by Professor Wayne K. Hoy, has been selected as the assessment tool. Please respond to the Questionnaire and return it to your school principal using the enclosed envelope by Friday, May 13.

In addition to the O C D Q - R E, please complete the short demographic data sheet which is also included in this packet. The information gleaned from that data will assist me in developing a school profile for the O C D Q - R E responses. All information will be kept strictly confidential and will be utilized for academic and research purposes only.

Thank you for your kind assistance and attention to my request.

Sincerely,

Bernard J. Jumbeck
DIRECTIONS: The following statements are about your school. Please indicate the extent to which each statement characterizes your school by circling the appropriate response.

RO= RARELY OCCURS: SO= SOMETIMES OCCURS: O= OFTEN OCCURS: VF= VERY FREQUENTLY OCCURS

1. The teachers accomplish their work with vim, vigor and pleasure. ----- RO SO O VF
2. Teachers' closest friends are other faculty members at this school. --- RO SO O VF
3. Faculty meetings are useless ----- RO SO O VF
4. The principal goes out of his/her way to help teachers. ------------- RO SO O VF
5. The principal rules with an iron fist. --------------------------- RO SO O VF
6. Teachers leave school immediately after school is over. -------------- RO SO O VF
7. Teachers invite other faculty members to visit them at home. ---- RO SO O VF
8. There is a minority group of teachers who always oppose the majority. ------------------ RO SO O VF
9. The principal uses constructive criticism. ------------------------ RO SO O VF
10. The principal checks the sign-in sheet every morning. ------------ RO SO O VF
11. Routine duties interfere with the job of teaching. -------------- RO SO O VF
12. Most of the teachers here accept the faults of their colleagues. ---- RO SO O VF
13. Teachers know the family background of other faculty members. --- RO SO O VF
14. Teachers exert group pressure on non-conforming faculty members. ---- RO SO O VF

15. The principal explains his/her reasons for criticism to teachers.-- RO SO O VF

16. The principal listens to and accepts teachers' suggestions. ----- RO SO O VF

17. The principal schedules the work for the teachers. --------- RO SO O VF

18. Teachers have too many committee requirements. ------------- RO SO O VF

19. Teachers help and support each other. ----------------------- RO SO O VF

20. Teachers have fun socializing together during school time. ------ RO SO O VF

21. Teachers ramble when they talk at faculty meetings. ----------- RO SO O VF

22. The principal looks out for the personal welfare of teachers. ----- RO SO O VF

23. The principal treats teachers as equals. ---------------------- RO SO O VF

24. The principal corrects teachers' mistakes. ------------------- RO SO O VF

25. Administrative paperwork is burdensome at this school. ------- RO SO O VF

26. Teachers are proud of their school. ------------------------- RO SO O VF

27. Teachers have parties for each other. ----------------------- RO SO O VF

28. The principal compliments teachers. ------------------------ RO SO O VF

29. The principal is easy to understand. ------------------------ RO SO O VF

30. The principal closely checks classroom (teacher) activities. ---- RO SO O VF
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<td>Clerical support reduces teachers' paperwork.</td>
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<td>32.</td>
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<td>33.</td>
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<td>SO</td>
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<td>34.</td>
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<td>37.</td>
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<td>RO</td>
<td>SO</td>
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<td>38.</td>
<td>Teachers provide strong social support for colleagues.</td>
<td>RO</td>
<td>SO</td>
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<td>The principal goes out of his/her way to show appreciation to teachers.</td>
<td>RO</td>
<td>SO</td>
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PLEASE SUPPLY THE FOLLOWING BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

A. How many years have you been a teacher?
   ________ years

B. How long have you worked in your current school system?
   ________ years

C. How long have you worked in your current position?
   ________ years

D. Are you affiliated with a local teacher association?
   yes____  no____

E. With what national teacher association is your local association affiliated?
   N.E.A._____  A.F.T._____  None_____
   Other (please specify)__________________________

F. Are you tenured?  Yes____  No____

G. What is your major area of teaching specialization?
   Elementary education_____  Science_____  
   Mathematics_____  Art_____  
   Special Education_____  Physical education_____  
   Music_____  English_____  
   Social Studies_____  
   Other (please specify)__________________________

H. What grade level(s) do you teach?__________________________

I. What is your marital status?
   Married_____  Single_____  Divorced_____  
   Widowed_____  Separated_____  

J. What is your sex?
   Male_____  Female_____  

L. Degree Status (Bachelor's, Master's, Doctorate)__________________________
APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Bernard J. Jumbeck has been read and approved by the following committee:

Dr. Philip M. Carlin, Director
Associate Professor, Educational Leadership and Policy Studies, Loyola University of Chicago

Dr. Max A. Bailey
Associate Professor, Educational Leadership and Policy Studies, Loyola University of Chicago

Dr. Edward T. Rancic
Adjunct Faculty, Educational Leadership and Policy Studies, Loyola University of Chicago

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Education.

May 4, 1969
Date

[Signature]
Director's Signature