A State at War: The Home Front in Illinois during the Second World War

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A STATE AT WAR: THE HOME FRONT IN ILLINOIS
DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

by

John F. Zwicky

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate
School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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VITA

The author, John Zwicky, is the son of Fred Zwicky and Loretta (Schneider) Zwicky. He was born November 22, 1946 in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin.

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On April 15, 1978, he married Donna Goetz in Chicago and on August 10, 1987, their daughter, Elizabeth, was born.
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CHAPTER I

THE EVE OF WAR

In the years 1939 to 1941, Illinois stood poised to undergo significant changes in its economic, political and social landscape. In 1939, the state was coming out of a long depression. Many of its citizens were out of work. Many others, especially blacks, were employed in work relief projects of the Works Progress Administration (WPA). However, the state's mills and factories were increasing production as the threat and then the onset of war in Europe led foreign governments and later the United States itself to purchase military supplies. Though many Illinoisans profited from the arms buildup, few wanted the nation to join the conflict in 1939. The Midwest was a citadel of isolationism and the chief mouthpiece for non-intervention was the Chicago Tribune. Politically, the state was in the middle of a transition from vigorous competition by both parties for all offices to a bipartisan division of power between Democratic Chicago and the Republican downstate as the Chicago Democratic machine and the Republicans in the city and state reached an accommodation with each other. One source of the machine's strength was its alliance with the Administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, an
arrangement which provided jobs and money when both Chicago and the city Democratic organization badly needed them.

In 1939, Illinois was a complex state with a heterogenous population. Chicago itself was ethnic, black, urban, Catholic, Jewish and increasingly Democratic. In 1930, first and second generation white immigrants comprised 64.3 percent of the population. Blacks made up another 6.9 percent. Only 27.9 percent were native-born whites with native-born white parents. Most of these ethnics came increasingly to vote Democratic. Downstate Illinois, however, was largely white, rural, small-town, Protestant, conservative and Republican. Downstaters viewed the big city of Chicago as a place of crime, corruption and sin, a place to visit but not to live. For their part, Chicagoans looked upon downstaters as hicks. Downstaters looked to the Republican party to uphold traditional small-town American values. Ethnic and black Chicagoans looked to the Democratic party to help them realize their aspirations. While downstate Republicans relied on charity and private initiative to solve problems, Chicago Democrats looked to government for assistance.¹

During the thirties, the Democratic machine gained control of city government in Chicago. During the twenties, the Irish controlled the organization, but in 1928, Anton J. Cermak organized a coalition of Bohemians, Poles, Jews and other non-Irish along with a few dissident Irish, including Edward J. Kelly, Thomas J. Courtney and Patrick Nash, and
ousted Michael Igoe and his Irish allies from control of the local machine. Cermak installed Nash as Cook County Democratic chairman. The Depression and the prohibition issue helped bring Democratic victories in the early thirties. In 1931, Cermak defeated Republican Mayor William Hale Thompson, who was running for reelection and in 1932, Judge Henry Horner was elected governor. At this point, Horner was a loyal ally of the machine.²

Ed Kelly started in Democratic politics while working for the Chicago Sanitary District and in 1905 ran for trustee of the District, but lost in a Republican landslide. The new Republican officials did not appreciate his campaigning at worksites. While working on the North Shore Channel, he ended a dispute with the son of a local Republican official by flattening him with a single punch. When called before Sanitary District President Robert Rutherford McCormick, a staunch Republican, Kelly expected to be fired. McCormick, however, admired his bravado and raised his salary. Thus started a lifelong friendship between Kelly and the aristocratic scion of the Chicago Tribune family. Kelly rose through the ranks at the District, eventually becoming chief engineer in 1920. His lack of formal training prompted charges that he had gained his position due to his political connections and McCormick's friendship. He also was indicted with several others on various charges of political corruption, but a friendly Democratic judge quashed the in-
dictments. When the State's Attorney reassembled a case before a new grand jury, it reindicted everyone but Kelly, who alone escaped unscathed.³

Irish Democrats, including Ed Kelly, despised Mayor Cermak's leadership, but while others threatened rebellion, Kelly remained silent. Mayor Cermak supported Al Smith for the presidency in 1932, and failed to jump on the Roosevelt bandwagon at the Democratic convention until the tide swung to Roosevelt on the fourth ballot. In February, 1933, Cermak went to Miami to make peace with the President-elect, but was fatally wounded by an assassin.⁴

Even before Cermak died on March 6, the struggle for succession began. On February 24, Democratic leaders discussed candidates, including Alderman Jacob Arvey. However, Nash thought a Jewish mayor and a Jewish governor, Henry Horner, would be rubbing it in for the Irish who were trying to regain their traditional leadership in the party. Arvey and other Jews agreed and party leaders considered other candidates, including Nash himself. Nash did not want the job, however, and on March 8, Democratic leaders voted to keep him as party leader, and later chose him to succeed Cermak as national committeeman. On March 10, the City Council, after rejecting rival candidates, chose Alderman Francis J. Corr as acting mayor.⁵

Meanwhile, in Springfield, the General Assembly passed legislation allowing the City Council to choose a mayor from
outside its own ranks. On April 10, Nash suggested Ed Kelly. Other party leaders concurred and on April 14, the Council elected Kelly. There was much bitterness among rival candidates and their friends, some of whom suspected that Colonel McCormick had assisted in Kelly's election, hoping to secure a friendly Democrat in City Hall. Certainly, McCormick did not resist. 6

The Depression hit Chicago at a time when it was already suffering financial difficulties. Mayor Cermak, unable to get more than limited relief from the state, turned to the federal government. By March, 1933, Illinois had received its statutory limit of $45 million in loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. When Mayor Kelly took over, he used a variety of expedients to solve the more pressing financial difficulties, but he too turned to Washington for assistance and got it. New Deal agencies, especially the Works Progress Administration, provided financial assistance and work relief projects to Chicago and other cities. Chicago gained many civic improvements, including a modernized airport, the State Street subway, additional parkland, expressways and various street and sewerage improvements. 7

In addition to taking credit for such projects, Mayor Kelly and other Chicago politicians took advantage of the infusion of money and jobs to reward themselves and their followers much as they later did during the war with the home
front war agencies. From time to time, the local press uncovered instances of extortion and other corrupt practices. Though federal agencies made some changes to prevent such abuses, they had to maintain constant vigilance to keep the graft within reasonable bounds. Even then, despite the efforts of federal administrators to hire without regard to political affiliation, many Kelly-Nash politicians told job-seekers that they could get jobs if they had the support of the machine. So, it was not unusual for Chicago Congressman Arthur W. Mitchell to advise a constituent seeking a federal job to first get a letter from his ward committeeman.8

In practice, the machine did not have the influence it claimed to have in securing jobs for supporters, but the belief that it did brought additional votes for machine candidates, especially if machine supporters did get jobs. It also brought criticism from Republicans and independents, who claimed that the success of the machine rested on the captive votes of those on relief. This, too, helped the machine since Republican criticism of relief participants as parasites and WPA projects as costly boondoggles allowed the Democrats to portray themselves as the friends of the common people. This won votes at the expense of the apparently callous Republicans. Mayor Kelly's support of the New Deal was not solely based on political benefits. He believed in Roosevelt and the New Deal and was committed to helping the underprivileged. Though he never repudiated the tactics of
bossism, they gradually became less conspicuous under Roosevelt's influence. The alliance between the Democratic machine and the Roosevelt Administration was not one-sided, for the Administration relied on the machine to deliver Democratic votes in a region where it had many enemies.  

One powerful opponent of the Administration was Mayor Kelly's friend, Colonel Robert Rutherford McCormick, owner and publisher of the Chicago Tribune and leader of the Republican party in Illinois. At first, he was friendly toward his old schoolmate, President Roosevelt, but soon broke with him as the New Deal introduced extensive government regulation into the economy. McCormick regarded this as fascist or socialistic, and Tribune editorials often portrayed New Dealers as communists. McCormick blamed the Depression on government spending and felt that budget cuts would bring recovery. Hence, the Tribune ferreted out and attacked waste in New Deal agencies, while suppressing news favorable to the Administration. State and local Democratic officials also came under attack, with the exception of Mayor Kelly.  

Colonel McCormick also opposed the Administration's increasingly interventionist foreign policy. McCormick was an isolationist, opposing American intervention outside the Western Hemisphere. He had no use for the Nazis, but felt that Europe should settle its own problems without American intervention. Then too, he considered Russian communism to be a far greater threat than German or Italian fascism, and
hence favored a policy of appeasement of the Germans and Italians to ward off the Soviet Union. After war broke out, he did support England and France against Germany and Italy, but still opposed American involvement. McCormick also opposed American and European efforts to block Japanese expansion in the Far East. He urged a buildup of American defenses in the Pacific, but favored abandoning the Philippines to the Japanese as not worth saving. McCormick distrusted the Europeans, especially since they did not pay their war debts, and he disliked the English class system and English socialism.¹¹

The Chicago Tribune was popular throughout much of the Midwest. During the thirties, about a third of its Sunday circulation went to cities outside the Chicago area. In 1931, 83 percent of families in Champaign read the Sunday Chicago Tribune. The paper appealed to individualistic values of small-town free enterprise Americans in downstate Illinois, who looked with disfavor at Chicago's cosmopolitanism, its heterogenous population and its wickedness. In Chicago, the Tribune was most popular in the wealthy neighborhoods, while others either read a different newspaper, or as in the case of many ethnic neighborhoods, the foreign-language press. While downstaters and many of the wealthier Chicagoans tended to vote Republican, most other Chicagoans became increasingly Democratic, especially after 1931. Even though the Tribune continued to be popular, its editorial
stand earned it many enemies, especially in Chicago after 1939.\textsuperscript{12}

One of the biggest accomplishments of the Kelly-Nash machine was convincing Chicago's black community to shift its political allegiance from the Republican to the Democratic party. Mayor Cermak tried police raids on policy games in black neighborhoods to force blacks to support Democrats. Mayor Kelly dropped such tactics and allowed vice to flourish unchecked. He also offered more patronage jobs to blacks than had the Republicans, and appointed blacks to high positions in city government. The New Deal helped a good deal with its work projects. In June, 1937, 53 percent of the city's blacks were involved with New Deal work relief projects. Kelly had to contend with segregationist policies in the school board and national public housing agencies as well as his white supporters. Though this limited the success of his policies, his support of integration in housing, education and public accommodations generated support for the machine in the black community.\textsuperscript{13}

During the thirties, the Kelly-Nash machine strengthened its hold on Chicago. Machine candidates won large victories, often with a huge Cook County vote offsetting a heavy Republican vote downstate. Many Democratic voters were relief recipients bearing cards identifying themselves as illiterates who wished to vote a straight Democratic ticket. Ward politicians distributed them, warning recipients to vote
Democratic or lose relief funds. Such tactics angered some officials in the Roosevelt Administration, but in 1935, the president reluctantly endorsed the Mayor for reelection after Jim Farley advised him that the Mayor had the nomination locked up and that it would be foolish to oppose him. In that election, the Republicans made a deal with the machine and put up a weak candidate, Emil Wetten, who waged a lackluster campaign. Mayor Kelly won easily, carrying all fifty wards. Massive vote fraud merely embellished the result. Soon afterward, when the Roosevelt Administration wanted the Illinois General Assembly to pass a tax increase to pay for relief funds, Mayor Kelly helped to push a bill through after Governor Horner was unable to do so. This increased the Mayor's prestige with the Roosevelt Administration at the expense of the Governor. 14

Mayor Kelly and Governor Horner did not get along well. Kelly felt that Horner should take orders from the machine on matters of patronage, while the Governor insisted on maintaining his independence. In 1935, the Mayor broke with the Governor after Horner refused to appoint a friend of the mayor to a state commission and vetoed a controversial bill sponsored by the machine to license and tax gambling in Chicago. Kelly slated Dr. Herman Bundesen, the city's health commissioner, for governor, and John Stelle, of McLeansboro, for lieutenant-governor. The President tried to persuade Horner to drop out of the race, but he refused.
Instead, he struck back, firing Kelly-Nash supporters from state jobs. Campaigning against Kelly and bossism, he soundly defeated Bundesen and went on to win easily in the Democratic landslide of 1936. Following the election, Horner gathered a team of politicians allied with him against Kelly, including Cook County State's Attorney Thomas J. Courtney. In 1938, their candidate for the Senate, Congressman Scott Lucas, defeated Mayor Kelly's choice and went on to win in November despite growing hostility toward President Roosevelt in isolationist Illinois as international tensions worsened. During the campaign, Mayor Kelly, at the insistence of his allies, finally made peace with Governor Horner to preserve party harmony. However, the Mayor ultimately decided that he wanted no more Democratic governors, and after Horner's death in the fall of 1940, Kelly worked to defeat the Democratic gubernatorial candidate. Eventually, he formed a working relationship with the Republicans in Springfield.  

During the thirties, the Army and Navy Munitions Board revised its industrial mobilization plan several times. In August, 1939, the War Department established the War Resources Board, headed by steel company executive Edward J. Stettinius, Jr. The Board only lasted a short time, but did make recommendations. In May, 1940, the President appointed an advisory commission to the Council of National Defense. Actually, the Council, an old World War I agency, remained
dormant while the Advisory Council advised the President and gradually began to coordinate the defense effort. Each advisor on the Commission represented a different aspect of the defense program and each built up a small staff, which eventually formed the basis for war agencies established later. Its Industrial Production Division eventually became the Office of Production Management, which itself was replaced in 1942 by the War Production Board. These production agencies steadily assumed a more active role in supervising and coordinating the conversion of the nation's industrial resources from the manufacture of civilian products such as railway equipment and farm implements to production of tanks, artillery and other military supplies. Eventually, war brought government involvement in every aspect of the economy on an unprecedented scale. 16

Defense production began as early as 1938 when some Illinois firms received educational orders from military procurement agencies. These orders were designed to test the ability of private companies to adapt themselves overnight to production of war supplies. In 1939, the outbreak of war in Europe brought an influx of orders for military supplies from the Allies, especially Britain, and in 1940, the American armed forces increased their purchases. During the years 1939 to 1941, much of Illinois industry converted from civilian to defense production with some assistance from the nation defense production agencies and from Governor Dwight
Green and Mayor Kelly, who sought defense contracts for state industries.\(^\text{17}\)

Conversion to defense production brought some shortages of civilian goods at a time when consumers were eager to buy. Prices rose rapidly, spurring demands by labor for increased wages, which in turn led to further price hikes. To stem the resultant inflation, the National Defense Advisory Commission adopted informal voluntary price controls. In April, 1941, its price stabilization section became the Office of Price Stabilization and Civilian Supply, later changed to the Office of Price Administration when civilian supply was shifted to the Office of Production Management. Controls remained voluntary at first, and were restricted to industrial prices. In 1942, however, the agency adopted mandatory controls and extended them to the retail level as it sought to keep prices at a reasonable level. Rationing was utilized to allocate food and scarce consumer goods on an equitable basis. Even so, demand outstripped supply and black markets developed. Ultimately, despite protests from farmers and labor, farm prices and wages were also restricted in effort to hold down inflation.\(^\text{18}\)

A major reason for the difficulty in holding down inflation was farm prices. Illinois agriculture was in a depression throughout the twenties and thirties and prices declined. Farmers responded by seeking parity prices for crops to give them the same purchasing power that they had between
1910 and 1914. The Roosevelt Administration championed their cause and tried various means of getting farm prices up to parity during the depression of the thirties. New Deal agencies such as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) and the Soil Conservation Service worked to restrict farm production through payments to farmers for not planting all of their cropland. In 1939, price adjustment payments were made to offset low market prices. Gradually, farm prices, which had bottomed out at 63 percent of parity in 1932, rose to 79 percent of parity by 1939. Because of their experience with low prices and heavy crop carryover during the twenties and thirties, farmers and New Deal agricultural agencies were slow to adjust to the increased demand for food following the outbreak of war in Europe, fearing that overproduction would bring large surpluses and low prices. In 1941, the Department of Agriculture established special price supports on hogs and other commodities to stimulate production. Later, the Department also established agricultural war boards at the local level to promote increased planting. However, there was no agricultural defense agency until the War Food Administration was established in 1943. Instead, existing agencies simply handled new tasks. Even then, farmers, farm organizations and agricultural agencies resisted efforts to subject farm commodities to price controls and indeed forced the Office of Price Administration to accept a ceiling on farm prices of 110 percent of parity.
for a time.\footnote{19}

Though agriculture in Illinois was highly diversified, corn was the chief crop. Corn was fed to hogs and other livestock, or sold to refineries for use in a variety of products. Wheat was another major crop, but surpluses in the early forties led to a substantial reduction in wheat planting in 1942. Soybeans were becoming an important crop. By the eve of war, soybean planting was one-fourth that of corn. Soybeans were sent to processors like A. E. Staley Company in Decatur, the soybean processing capital of the region, to be crushed and converted to vegetable oils and animal feed. Many farmers raised livestock, usually hogs, though cattle were a significant crop. Mechanization of farms was checked somewhat in the early thirties, but revived in the late thirties as farmers reequipped their farms. In 1920, Illinois farmers owned 23,102 tractors. By 1940, they had 126,067, and in 1940 and 1941, they made record purchases of additional implements. Illinois also led other states in the use of limestone to sweeten the soil.\footnote{20}

Many Illinois farms lacked the amenities of urban life on the eve of the war. Running water was often a luxury. Outhouses served sanitary needs. Most farms in the northern counties had electricity due to pioneering efforts by public utilities in that area in extending electricity to farms and rural homes. In the central and southern counties, it was a different story. Public utility companies were reluctant to
extend electric lines into rural areas for fear that they would be unprofitable. In 1935, the Rural Electrification Administration was established to offer low-interest loans to cooperatives for extension of power lines to rural areas. Still, during the war, only about half of Illinois farms had any electricity and even fewer were fully electrified. The situation was worst in the southern counties where only about 10 percent of farms had electricity. Indeed, many farms in the southern counties were small subsistence farms, whose owners barely eked out a living. Still, many Illinois farms did have radios and telephones and farmers drove automobiles to town on new hard roads.²¹

Many farmers were owners or part-owners, but others, including some large-scale commercial farmers, were tenants. By 1940, ownership was gaining over tenancy. In 1935, there were 86,862 full owners, 39,698 part owners (who owned part of their land and rented the rest) and 102,856 tenants. By 1940, there were 87,004 full owners, 32,826 part-owners and 91,982 tenants. This trend continued during the war. The number of farms was also declining. In 1920, there were 237,181 farms. In 1940, there were only 213,439. Of these, 105,857 were medium-sized farms of 50 to 180 acres. Land values fell during the twenties, but bottomed out in the early thirties and rose somewhat by 1940. During the war, they were to rise sharply. Many farmers were members of the Illinois Agricultural Association, the state affiliate of
the American Farm Bureau and the largest and wealthiest state farm organization in the country. In 1941, 33.8 percent of Illinois farmers belonged to the organization. Membership included large and small farmers and tenants as well. However, by and large, the organization served the interests of the successful commercial farmer and was apathetic toward disadvantaged farmers. The Illinois Agricultural Association was a staunch supporter of New Deal programs. In 1934, when only 36 percent of Illinois farms of under 100 acres were under the AAA program, 71 percent of those ranging from 260 to 500 acres were under it.\textsuperscript{22}

Many farmers sent their children to one-room schools staffed by poorly-paid and poorly-trained teachers, who had only a few students to teach. The schools themselves often lacked water or even outhouses and the educational quality was inferior to that of city schools. Though the number of one-room schools was slowly declining in the early forties, there were still over 12,000 school districts in Illinois in 1942, of which about 10,000 were one-room schools. Illinois had more one-room schools than any other state in the country.\textsuperscript{23}

Farm workers were plentiful on the eve of war. Many were young men from nearby farms, who could not be employed profitably at home. They worked on other farms, gained experience, saved up a little money and bought their own farms or went into non-farm work. Other hired hands were permanent
farm laborers. Wages were low. In April, 1939, the average monthly wage for an Illinois farm laborer was $32.25 with room and board and $43.25 without it. Living quarters for hired hands and tenants were often undesirable. As late as April, 1942, hired hands in Jo Daviess County often lived in houses lacking running water and electricity. There also were migrant workers following seasonal crops. In 1941, seasonal workers in Southern Illinois lived in tents or slept in sheds on the farms while harvesting fruits and vegetables. Pay ranged from $1.20 to $1.60 for a 10-hour day. This was soon to change as the draft and defense plants drained off farm laborers. By the summer of 1941, many farmers around the state had a difficult time securing hired hands and migrant workers.  

Illinois has long been a major crossroads for the transportation arteries of the nation. Within the state, several cities, especially Chicago, were long-standing points for transhipment and interchange of people and cargoes and junctions between carriers serving different parts of the country. On the eve of the Second World War, the railroads dominated common-carrier transportation, handling over 60 percent of all freight and carrying over 64 percent of all passengers traveling on public carriers. Illinois had 11,949 miles of line, more than any state in the Union except Texas. Chicago, which was served by twenty-two trunk-line railroads and several terminal roads, was the hub of the national
railway system. East St. Louis, Peoria and several other Illinois cities were also important railway terminals with connections between numerous carriers. 25

The railroads greeted the outbreak of war in Europe with some trepidation. During the First World War, a series of blunders by both the companies and the government led to government takeover and operation of the railways. It was a costly experience which neither party wished to repeat. One of its legacies was an agreement between the government and the railroad brotherhoods on work-rules. The carriers soon embarked on a lengthy battle with the unions to change these work-rules, which were out-dated, inefficient and costly. During the twenties, the railroads invested heavily in new equipment only to find themselves saddled with excess capacity when the Depression hit in the thirties. Traffic fell off and many railroads entered receivership. Although the outbreak of war in 1939 brought increased traffic, the carriers were reluctant to purchase new rolling stock except to replace existing equipment lest they be stuck with excess capacity after the war. This reluctance led to serious equipment shortages during the war. 26

By the end of the thirties, railroads faced serious competition from other means of transportation, especially the automobile. In 1922, automobile passenger-miles were one-fourth that of passenger trains. By 1927, the figure was reversed, and by 1940, only 8.71 intercity passengers
went by rail, though trains did carry most of those who did not go by car. The automobile emptied locals and made serious inroads on long-distance travel. Bus competition also increased so that by 1940, almost 30 percent of travelers using common carriers went by bus. Auto and bus travelers benefitted from steadily increasing government investment in highways. In 1916, in response to demands by motorists for good roads, Congress established the first federal highway program. By the twenties, every state was building new roads with federal matching funds. By 1940, Illinois had 14,000 miles of paved hard roads, which were soon crowded with automobiles, buses and trucks.27

Airlines also captured a small but growing portion of intercity passenger traffic, especially long-distance travel. In 1940, airlines carried 2.7 percent of all passengers traveling on common-carriers. Illinois had 54 airports in 1941. The first ones were mainly private ventures, but in the thirties, the Civil Works Administration, the Works Progress Administration and the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission financed municipal airport projects in Chicago, Bloomington, Danville, Springfield, Peoria and other cities. Chicago built its Municipal Airport, now Midway Airport, on the city's Southwest Side. In 1941, the airport was improved and enlarged after a railroad line running through it was relocated. At the same time, with air traffic outgrowing the airport, Chicagoans sought a site for another air-
field. Many, including Merrill C. Meigs, a newspaper publisher and aviation advocate, urged a lakefront airport since it would give Chicago air facilities close to the city's business district. There also was some discussion of a site on the city's Southeast Side in the Lake Calumet District. Ultimately, the city had to wait until after the war to fulfill its dreams. Meanwhile, eight major airlines served the city, including United Air Lines, which maintained its central offices in a new building at the airport.  

Railroads responded to the loss of passenger traffic to the auto, the bus and the airplane by introducing new streamlined passenger trains in the mid-thirties. Streamliners recaptured much lost passenger traffic with their speed and modernity. Railroads added more every year until after Pearl Harbor. Most were pulled by diesel-electric locomotives. Some railroads experimented with diesels in the twenties for switching, but it was in the thirties that railroads started ordering diesels in ever-larger numbers for passenger service, switching and finally in the early forties, for line-haul freight service. Though they continued to buy steam locomotives, by 1939, railroads bought more diesels than steamers.  

As with passenger service, railroads faced increasing competition in freight traffic. In the late twenties, railroads handled 75 percent of all freight. In 1940, they still carried almost 62 percent, but trucks handled over 8 percent,
waterways almost 20 percent and pipelines over 10 percent. The number of trucks on the road grew rapidly in the twenties and by the end of the decade carried almost 4 percent of total intercity freight ton-mileage, most of it light loads moving short distances. During the thirties, truck transport expanded rapidly as unemployed truck drivers bought their own trucks on credit in order to establish their own small intercity trucking businesses. Though many soon folded, others arose to take their place. Trucking was unregulated until 1935 and like the automobile and the bus, benefitted from new highways reaching all parts of every state.  

Shortly before the turn of the century, the City of Chicago built the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal, mainly to improve drainage and sanitation. However, the canal also was useful for transportation. In 1908, Illinois initiated improvements to the Illinois and Des Plaines Rivers and the Chicago waterways. When completed in 1933, the resulting Illinois Waterway connected Lake Michigan with the Mississippi River. Chicago also straightened a portion of the Chicago River during the twenties. In 1918, in order to relieve pressure on the railroads, the federal government created a division of Inland Waterways in the United States Railway Administration, which oversaw the government operation of the railways. The Division continued operation of its barges after the railroads were returned to private hands in 1920, and in 1924, Congress created the Inland Wa-
terways Corporation to operate the Federal Barge Lines. By the late thirties, about 500 private operators were on the waterways. During the twenties and thirties, the government also built a series of locks and dams on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers to improve navigation on those waterways. Water traffic rose rapidly due to cheap rates. Tonnage on the Illinois Waterway went from half a million in 1934 to 7 million in 1940. Barges carried coal, grain, sulphur, sugar, oil, scrap iron, sand and gravel, and other bulk products. Great Lakes traffic also increased in the late thirties and early forties as a recovering economy and the defense boom brought big gains in lake movements of coal, iron ore, grain and limestone.  

All carriers, rail, highway, air and water, were competitors in 1940. Wartime conditions were to force them into a temporary cooperation and retard the shift in traffic from some carriers to others. However, the general direction of these trends was already set and they would resume in the postwar years.

The labor movement in Illinois was also changing on the eve of the Second World War. In 1930, most of Illinois labor was unorganized and many companies were militantly anti-union. The Fox River Valley Manufacturers Association maintained a blacklist for many years. Some companies, such as International Harvester, established company unions, which they dominated in an effort to stave off outside organizers.
Company unions did provide some benefits for their members, but generally failed to engage in real collective bargaining. They were outlawed by the Wagner Act of 1935 and after the Supreme Court upheld the law's constitutionality in 1937, most company unions were gradually dismantled, though this did not end efforts to avoid unionization. The American Federation of Labor (AFL) and its state affiliate, the Illinois State Federation of Labor (ISFL), dominated organized labor in Illinois. The latter was hard hit by the Depression as its membership dropped from 189,000 in 1927 to about 76,000 in 1933, though it rebounded to 237,000 by 1941. Most AFL unions were based on specific crafts. In 1933 and 1934, the Federation tried to organize new locals in various industries, but with little success, partly because of its insistence that workers join craft unions. Many workers wanted industrial unions. Although some member organizations, led by John L. Lewis and his United Mine Workers, urged that the AFL organize new unions on an industrial basis, the more conservative craft unions objected to this. The United Mine Workers and others soon bolted the Federation and set up the Congress of Industrial Organizations and set out to organize the unorganized industries on an industrial basis.32

One of the first targets was the steel industry. The United Mine Workers helped establish the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, which set out in 1936 to conquer the mills.
The new union had limited success that year, but early in 1937, the United States Steel Corporation gave in without a fight. Other victories soon followed. However, several smaller "Little Steel" producers, led by Republic Steel, organized to fight the Steel Workers union. On Memorial Day, 1937, Chicago police fired on a crowd of strikers and their families, killing ten and wounding others. "Little Steel" beat the union temporarily. However, within a few years, the union resumed its organizing activity under more favorable circumstances during the defense boom of 1940-1941. With the heavy defense business, the companies were in less of a position to resist unionization.33

In the late thirties, the Farm Equipment Workers Organizing Committee, an offshoot of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, set out to organize the farm equipment industry. It faced a formidable obstacle in International Harvester, which set up a company union in 1919 in a successful effort to avert unionization by the American Federation of Labor. The company union, the Harvester Industrial Council, had a Works Council in each plant. Management dominated each local, though they did have employee representatives. The company managed to fight organization by AFL unions for some time. In 1937, the Farm Equipment Workers union gained control of the Works Council at the Tractor Works in Chicago. A year later, the union won recognition at the plant. One of the Works Council employee representa-
tives who joined the new union was Gerald Fiede, later to become one of the most talented leaders of the union. Meanwhile, following a Supreme Court decision outlawing company unions, International Harvester replaced its Works Councils with independent unions in each plant, each with the old Works Council leadership, many of whom were soon promoted to managerial positions. There were no elections. The company simply signed contracts with the locals after they were organized. The Farm Equipment Workers union protested to the National Labor Relations Board that the independents were company unions. After investigation, the Board agreed and in February, 1941, ordered their disestablishment. This paved the way for a drive to unionize International Harvester. During the late thirties, the Farm Equipment Workers union and others also complained to the National Labor Relations Board about John Deere and Company's reliance on an individual contract with each worker. The contract contained a clause forbidding the employee to join in a concerted action to change wages, hours or other conditions of the contract. Though the Board forbade the company to enforce the clause, unions generally had only limited success in organizing John Deere in the late thirties. Though a Patternmakers union affiliated with the AFL won contracts at some Moline plants in 1939, unions scored no major gains at John Deere until 1942 and 1943.34

The Congress of Industrial Organizations grew rapidly
in the thirties as it organized industrial unions in meat packing, electrical equipment and other industries. At that time, it allowed competition between member unions in organizing companies. This eventually led to a bitter feud between the Farm Equipment Workers union and the United Auto Workers, which wished to organize the farm equipment industry itself. Ultimately, the latter union triumphed in the postwar world and the Farm Equipment Workers union folded.³⁵

During the thirties, Illinois was also the scene of a battle within the United Mine Workers union, which led to secession of many Illinois members and formation of a rival union. John L. Lewis ruled his union with an iron hand. His dictatorial policies and interference in union politics and wage disputes in Illinois led dissidents to form a schismatic group, the Reorganized United Mine Workers of Illinois, in March, 1930, claiming that they were rescuing the union from Lewis. The movement faltered as its leaders fell out among themselves. The original leadership included selfless and incorruptable union officials, but they soon deserted the movement when the membership demanded acceptance of several locally popular but notoriously corrupt leaders. Some of these leaders accepted Communist support, thus allowing Lewis to engage in red-baiting, though he himself had no scruples about hiring leftists if it suited his purpose. Lewis took the opportunity to strengthen his hold on his union's District 12, which controlled the Illinois
coalfields. Violence broke out as Lewis supporters engaged in gun battles with dissidents. In March, 1931, the movement collapsed after a local court ruled that the Lewis faction was the legal union and that the rival faction had to disband. Although it soon did, Lewis provoked a second and more successful revolt when he forced Illinois miners to accept a wage cut in August, 1932. They responded by forming the Progressive Mine Workers of America. Lewis ended up with the shell of a union in Illinois as most miners deserted to the Progressives. The new union encountered difficulties in securing recognition. Bitter civil war broke out as the two unions dueled over jurisdiction of the miners. Scores lost their lives in bombings of homes and other violence. In 1938, after the United Mine Workers left the American Federation of Labor, the Progressives obtained a Federation charter, only to withdraw in 1946 when the United Mine Workers rejoined for a short time. They would not remain in the same organization with John L. Lewis, though they sometimes participated in strikes called by the United Mine Workers.36

The increase in business for Illinois firms following the outbreak of war in Europe created new job opportunities for many on relief. Unemployment, which hit 1,215,000 in 1932, over 42 percent of the state's work force, declined to 511,000 by 1937, then rose to 892,000 in 1938, then dropped to 251,000 by the end of 1941. By December, 1940, the Works
progress Administration was employing mostly older men, who had difficulty finding jobs in the new defense industries. Most were untrained and unskilled, while industry sought skilled, younger men. Within a few years, however, most companies would be glad to hire even the unskilled. In some cases, new defense industries led to the rise of boomtowns such as Wilmington, a Northern Illinois community, which was crowded with workers employed at the nearby ordnance plants. Elwood, another nearby town doubled its population by May, 1941.37

Due to pervasive discrimination, blacks were slower to benefit from the reviving economy. Many employers refused to hire blacks at all or restricted them to service positions. Some unions, all of them either independent or affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, discriminated against blacks, either by banning them outright or by segregating them in auxiliary locals, which limited their job opportunities. A commission appointed by Governor Horner in 1939 to investigate the condition of urban blacks in Illinois found extensive discrimination by defense industries and unions. In 1941, the commission sent a questionnaire on black employment to 473 firms holding defense contracts. Of the 146 who replied, 95 employed no blacks, while the remainder employed very few. Some companies simply refused to hire blacks, while others cited union or community opposition. There were exceptions. International Harvester
employed hundreds of blacks, many in skilled positions. So did Chicago meat packers. However, a Chicago military truck plant employed only a single black janitor, while a Peoria tractor plant employed no blacks among its 12,000 workers. Even blacks trained in defense work had difficulty getting jobs. Many were rejected in favor of whites with lower grades. Often, blacks were instructors in training classes for jobs which they could not get simply because of racial barriers. Some employers also restricted hiring to Gentiles. All of this was soon to change as the draft and resultant labor shortages forced employers to hire blacks and other minorities.38

In 1940, there were 854,276 women in the state's labor force. Most were in poorly-paid office work, service industries and industrial jobs. Many other women did not work outside the home. Some employers refused to hire married women. The school board in Rockford required woman teachers to retire at the end of the semester in which they married. Other employers were reluctant to hire women for traditionally male jobs. The defense boom brought women into defense industries luring them away from jobs as domestics, though even then comparatively few women were hired because employers had large pools of unemployed men to draw upon. Not until 1942 was there a big increase in employment of women in defense industries.39

On the eve of the Second World War, Illinois was al-
ready undergoing some changes in its political and economic fabric. A resurgent Republican party was engaged in its ultimately successful campaign to recapture the statehouse while the Chicago Democratic machine was strengthening its hold on the city. Much of the machine's support came from working-class ethnics and blacks who were seeking a larger share of the city's resources. Many workers were organizing themselves into unions to secure better wages and working conditions in the state's industries which were emerging from a severe Depression. Other workers, however, were unemployed or underemployed. Farm workers were plentiful and farmers themselves restricted production in the hope of securing higher farm prices. At the same time, they were mechanizing their farms to improve their efficiency and increase profits.

Many of these trends continued during the war and some were actually strengthened by it. The division of political power between Democratic Chicago and Republican downstate eventually led to a measure of bipartisan cooperation in the General Assembly. Throughout the defense buildup and the war emergency, all levels of government cooperated in civilian defense and in efforts to secure war contracts for the state's manufacturers. Expansion of industry relieved unemployment and strengthened the hands of union organizers since the heavy defense business made companies reluctant to fire skilled workers for union activity. Eventually, many
firms had to accept unionization.

Other changes were somewhat retarded by the war, only to resume soon after the war, often at an accelerated pace. Farmers could not obtain new agricultural implements during the war and railroads were forced to curtail dieselization. More significantly, the war delayed but did not stop the shift of most common carrier passenger travel and much intercity freight traffic from railroads to other forms of transportation.

The war also stimulated new currents which ultimately resulted in profound social changes. In 1939, most married women stayed home and tended to household duties. Those who did work were usually employed at low-paying jobs in clerical and service industries. Blacks were largely confined to low-paid menial and unpleasant occupations. Many were on work relief projects. Trade unions often barred them or segregated them into auxiliary locals controlled by white locals. The war, however, created new employment opportunities for women, blacks and other minorities and ultimately raised their status in society.

Illinois on the eve of war was strongly isolationist, somewhat provincial and divided in its political allegiance and its reaction to New Deal farm, labor and relief policies. The war that broke out in Europe ultimately led to significant changes in the state's political and economic life and left a different world in the postwar era.


Biles, *Big City Boss*, pp. 74-84.


Biles, *Big City Boss*, pp. 74-84.


13 Chicago Tribune, June 15, 1939, p. 2; Biles, Big City Boss, pp. 89-96.

14 Biles, Big City Boss, pp. 35-42.


Watters, Operation Home Front, pp. 388-390.


39*Chicago Daily News*, November 4, 1941, p. 1; *Chicago Tribune*, November 30, 1941, pt. 2, p. 9; Rockford Register-
CHAPTER II

ILLINOIS POLITICS IN WARTIME

Illinois politics during the late thirties and forties blended concerns over national domestic and foreign policy issues with those of state and local interest. The Chicago Democratic machine established close ties with the Administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and supported its domestic and foreign policies, while Illinois Republicans fought these same policies and the Democratic machine as well. In addition, a long-standing rivalry between the city of Chicago and downstate Illinois led to friction within the Democratic party as Governor Henry Horner arose as a political rival to Chicago Mayor Edward Joseph Kelly. This split within the Democratic party eventually benefitted Illinois Republicans, who capitalized on voter discontent with the New Deal, scandals in the Horner Administration, machine politics in Chicago and the Roosevelt Administration's foreign policy to regain control of state government. This brought a new division of political power between Democratic Chicago and Republican downstate with some assistance from Colonel Robert Rutherford McCormick, archconservative owner of the powerful Chicago Tribune and a good
friend of Mayor Kelly. Illinois Republican politics began to shift during the forties from the isolationism of Colonel McCormick to the internationalism of Colonel Frank Knox, owner of the Chicago Daily News. Though Governor Dwight Green steered a middle course, some of his allies associated themselves with the movement. The Old Guard continued to dominate the party, but with decreasing electoral success. This led to bipartisan cooperation between Governor Green and Mayor Kelly in 1945.

In 1939, Illinois politics was dominated by the Democrats who controlled the statehouse as well as the City of Chicago. In Chicago, the Democratic organization maintained an alliance with the Roosevelt Administration, helping to get out the vote on election day. The Administration, in turn allocated funds and work relief projects for the city. These projects resulted in many civic improvements for the city and provided jobs for machine supporters and its constituents at a time when jobs were scarce. However, during the thirties, Governor Horner, once a loyal supporter of the machine, became a political rival to Mayor Kelly when he refused to obey the dictates of the machine on patronage and vetoed legislation supported by the machine to allow gambling in Chicago. After Kelly failed in an attempt to unseat Horner in 1936, the Governor gathered a team of politicians allied with him against Kelly, including Cook County State's Attorney Thomas J. Courtney. During the 1938 campaign, Mayor
Kelly, at the insistence of his allies, finally made his peace with Governor Horner to preserve party harmony. However, some of Horner's allies continued to oppose Kelly and backed State's Attorney Courtney for mayor in 1939. Courtney, who portrayed himself as a crime-fighting reformer, campaigned against machine politics and boss rule and accused the machine of protecting criminals. Horner was in seclusion in Florida recovering from a serious illness and took no part in the campaign. His aides and allies were divided, with some supporting Courtney and others, including Lieutenant Governor John Stelle, backing Kelly. In the end, Kelly beat Courtney by a substantial margin. 1

Mayor Kelly faced a formidable Republican opponent in Dwight H. Green, a successful attorney who had assisted in the prosecution of Alphonse Capone and Samuel Insull. In 1938, local Republican leaders approached Green and persuaded him to run for mayor. Illinois Republicans believed that to elect a Republican president, the party would have to carry Illinois, and to do this, they would have to destroy the Democratic machine. If they could elect a Republican mayor, they stood a good chance of electing a Republican president. Green campaigned against the Kelly-Nash machine, accusing it of political domination of municipal services. He also charged that it was allied with the Capone gang and promised, if elected, to destroy the political influence of criminal elements in City Hall. There was a good deal of
truth to his charges. Gambling flourished in Chicago as police looked the other way and the underworld made payoffs to the machine. Each ward committeeman was in charge of supervising gambling revenue in his ward. Green also raised the issue of foreign policy, promising, if elected, to aid the Republican party in its policy of keeping the country out of foreign entanglements. In the end, Green lost to Mayor Kelly by about 183,000 votes, but this was still a much better showing than in 1935, and the party saw prospects for further victories in 1940.²

Illinois Democrats soon made things easier by providing them with an issue. In the spring of 1939, committees in the Illinois General Assembly found considerable evidence of graft and minor corruption in the Horner Administration. Though Democrats managed to stop the investigations, the issue would not die. A new crisis arose over a Democratic campaign slush fund to which state employees and contractors doing business with the state had to contribute. Director of Public Works F. Lyndon Smith was in charge of the fund, but in the fall of 1939, State Finance Director Sam Nudelman demanded more control over the fund. Both contended for Horner's favor. When Smith lost out, he became emotionally unbalanced and in February, 1940, went on a long vacation in Florida, allowing Nudelman to take control of the slush fund and state jobs. Later that month, a state policeman filed suit in a Sangamon County Circuit Court demanding an account-
The court ordered Smith to appear and deliver such an accounting. Smith returned to Springfield, burned his papers, and after an unsuccessful suicide attempt, was admitted to a hospital for observation and treatment. On March 9, the day he was to appear in court, he committed suicide. His death intensified demands for an investigation of the fund, and on April 30, when the General Assembly met in a special session, it appointed a committee to investigate the fund and other abuses by officials of the Horner Administration. Although many records of the slush fund were missing, the committee did uncover evidence of other corrupt practices, all of which provided ammunition in the political campaign which was underway.³

At first, Governor Horner wanted to run for reelection, but his poor health forced him to withdraw from the race. In February, 1940, Mayor Kelly and some of his allies met with some of the Governor's aides to determine possible candidates. Kelly wanted Stelle for governor, but Horner did not even want him for lieutenant-governor, fearing that Stelle would plunder the state if he ever became governor. The conferees finally chose State Democratic Chairman Harry Hershey for governor and slated Lieutenant-Governor Stelle and Senator James Slattery for reelection. Stelle, however, broke with the harmony slate and ran for governor himself with his own slate of candidates. He also charged that Horner was too sick to run the state and was letting his aides
perform his duties. At one point, Stelle stormed into the Governor's office and declared himself governor in a vain attempt to seize power. He was ignored by secretaries and ridiculed by Horner. Soon afterward, he and his allies were swamped by the Kelly-Nash-Horner forces in the primary. 

Illinois Republicans looked forward to the 1940 campaign with great expectations. Dwight Green's strong showing in the 1939 Chicago mayoral election suggested that Illinois was swinging back to the Republican party. During the primary campaign, the candidates mixed concerns over machine politics and scandals in the Horner Administration with hostility to the New Deal, the Roosevelt Administration's interventionist foreign policy and the President's own quest for an unprecedented third term. Green himself won the nomination for governor, while C. Wayland Brooks, a protege of Colonel McCormick and a perennial candidate for office during the thirties, won the nomination for senator.

Illinois Republicans fought vigorously to influence the party platform on defense and foreign policy. Meeting in Springfield in mid-June, they drafted a platform urging a strong defense effort, but opposing intervention in foreign wars. There were some interventionists led by Colonel Frank Knox, owner of the Chicago Daily News and former vice-presidential candidate in 1936. They opposed the foreign policy plank, arguing that Illinois was not isolationist. Some county leaders noted that rigid isolationism was not so
popular and there was growing support for aid to the allies. Soon afterward, President Roosevelt appointed Colonel Knox secretary of the navy, a post he held until his death in April, 1944. Illinois Republicans carried their anti-intervention campaign to the national convention later in June. Colonel McCormick appeared before the platform committee urging a plank opposing a peacetime draft, while his friend, C. Wayland Brooks, Illinois member of the committee, fought unsuccessfully, first to have the Illinois convention's anti-war plank adopted, and then to include the Illinois stand against sending American troops into foreign wars as part of the final platform. However, former Vice-President Charles Gates Dawes, a Chicago banker, negotiated a watered-down compromise plank opposing American intervention in foreign wars. The Illinois delegation generally supported Thomas E. Dewey, the winner of the Illinois primary, but he was overwhelmed by Wendell L. Willkie.6

Meanwhile, Mayor Kelly orchestrated efforts to persuade President Roosevelt to run for a third term. On February 3, 1940, despite the President's refusal to commit himself, Cook County Democratic leaders put Roosevelt's name on the primary ballot. Technically, this was illegal since the President had not filed a certificate of candidacy as required by Illinois law. Secretary of State Edward J. Hughes chose to overlook this infraction. Mayor Kelly and Pat Nash also convinced the Democratic National Committee to
have the convention in Chicago. Roosevelt easily overwhelmed his rivals in the primary. At the state convention in June, Illinois Democrats endorsed the President for a third term and adopted resolutions pledging war only to defend the nation, but evading the issue of intervention. 7

On the first day of the national convention in June, Mayor Kelly packed the galleries of the Chicago Stadium with machine supporters, who shouted down a speech by Virginia Senator Carter Glass on the pitfalls of a third term. On the following day, Kelly stationed Thomas Garry, Chicago superintendent of sewers, in the basement with a microphone hooked up to the hall's public address system. When Kentucky Senator Alben Barkley read a letter from President Roosevelt denying his desire for a third term, Garry's voice boomed from loudspeakers urging Roosevelt's renomination. A parade started which lasted almost an hour until the voice subsided. Finally, Jim Farley, who presided over the proceedings, regained control of the floor and defeated efforts to nominate Roosevelt by acclamation. However, on the next day, the President won on the first ballot, easily overwhelming his rivals. Though Illinois Democrats backed Senator Scott W. Lucas for vice-president, he withdrew from the race early and Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace was nominated, though Lucas later ran the campaign in Illinois. Many Democrats were unhappy at the President's apparent duplicity in accepting a synthetic draft and the machinations of the
Chicago machine, but Roosevelt wrote to Kelly expressing his appreciation for the machine's efforts.\(^8\)

During the campaign, Illinois Republicans focused on corruption in Chicago city government and the Horner Administration, the third term issue, the New Deal, farm policies and neutrality. Farmers generally returned to the Republican party now that farm conditions were better. This brought a sharp drop in the Democratic vote. Neutrality was a sticky issue. Willkie favored aid to the Allies, which many Illinois Republicans feared would lead to war. Dwight Green and C. Wayland Brooks voiced support for neutrality and opposition to American involvement in the European war, though denying any differences with Willkie. The *Chicago Tribune* tried to convert Willkie to isolationism but with little success. Democrats, however, accused Republicans of seeking to appease the Axis Powers and criticized Brooks and Colonel McCormick for their role in shaping the Illinois Republican party platform.\(^9\)

Late in the campaign, there were rumors that the Kelly-Nash forces were committed to Roosevelt, but less optimistic about the state races, while the reverse was true of the Republicans. There were rumors of a deal which would spare Secretary of State Hughes as a reward for putting Roosevelt on the primary ballot despite a technical violation of state law. Though both parties denied it, the results suggest that a deal was made. President Roosevelt won
the state, though his vote was down sharply from previous years. The Republicans swept the state offices except for Hughes. Harry Hershey lost to Dwight Green after winning Chicago by only a slight margin. Mayor Kelly ordered his precinct captains to trim Hershey's votes partly because Hershey had promised, if elected, to suppress gambling, an important source of revenue for the machine. Kelly also wanted no more Democratic governors who could seriously challenge his leadership within the party. Senator Slattery was leading until a sudden upsurge of votes from Cook County precincts gave Brooks a narrow victory. Slattery was suspicious and called for an investigation, but Brooks was seated in the Senate. Bipartisan deals were not unusual in Illinois politics, especially in Chicago where many Republican committeemen cooperated with the machine. Mayor Kelly benefitted from this by getting weak Republican opposition and gradually eliminating rivals within his own party, while the Republicans elected candidates on the state level after 1938. Not until 1948 did the Democrats recapture the statehouse and defeat Brooks.10

After Governor Horner died on October 6, 1940, Lieutenant-Governor Stelle confirmed all of Horner's worst fears about his extravagance. Shortly after taking office, Governor Stelle fired his political enemies, replacing them with his supporters and rewarding them with extra pay. He also rewarded allies with contracts for heavy purchases of coal,
building repairs, road construction and repairs and services used by the state. Stelle redecorated the governor's mansion, threw lavish parties and pardoned hundreds of inmates in state prisons. His spending spree, coming at a time when the state was facing a budget crunch, forced incoming Governor Green to embark on a program of economy. One of his first acts was to fire over a thousand state employees, including Stelle's cronies. 11

Illinois politics between 1939 and 1941 was highly influenced by the debate over American involvement in the war in Europe. The big battle over isolationism was in the Midwest and Chicago was the capital of the Midwest. Although opinions on the issue cut across party lines, most isolationists were conservative anti-New Deal Republicans like Colonel McCormick. They generally distrusted England, though they preferred to see her defeat the Nazis. Some were also anti-Semitic. Interventionists were usually liberal Democrats like Mayor Kelly, Paul Douglas and Adlai Stevenson. There were internationalist Republicans like Colonel Knox and isolationist liberals like R. Douglas Stuart, Jr., a founder of the America First movement, who foresaw that war would curtail New Deal programs he wanted expanded. 12

The debate over intervention spawned organizations on both sides of the issue. Several small groups were active in the fight over Cash and Carry in the fall of 1939. Senator Lucas alone received over 60,000 letters, telegrams and
postcards on the issue. In 1940, the battle over neutrality was carried on in the campaign and election, which the Tribune declared was a victory for isolationism and suggested that Willkie would have won if he had accepted neutrality. Later, it read him out of the party for endorsing Lend-Lease. The most significant non-interventionist organization, America First, was founded in 1940, but was not very active until the battle over Lend-Lease early in 1941. Its chief mouthpiece, the Chicago Tribune, gave extensive publicity to the fight and to the organization, which was based in Chicago. Though the group had chapters in most areas of the country, most of its membership was concentrated within a 300-mile radius of Chicago, an area in which the Tribune enjoyed a sizable circulation. The paper did its best to downplay the activities of interventionist groups, often sending photographers to take pictures of any empty seats at their rallies. The Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies was not based in the Midwest, but did have chapters in several Illinois cities and a newspaper voice in the Chicago Daily News. Many interventionists fought as hard in favor of Lend-Lease as isolationists against it. Adlai Stevenson, head of the Chicago chapter, often represented the group in debates with his friend, Clay Judson, of the America First movement.  

Isolationism steadily lost ground, especially after the passage of Lend-Lease. By the summer of 1941, attendance
at rallies sponsored by the Committee to Defend America far surpassed that at America First events. America First and other groups continued the fight. The Tribune conducted anti-war polls. America First tried to keep out Bundists, anti-Semites and other extremists, but some managed to participate in its activities. Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh's anti-Semitic speech in September in Des Moines, Iowa, in which he claimed that Jews and others were pushing the nation into war, embarrassed the organization and cost it some support. During 1941, some isolationists grew increasingly discouraged and by the fall, some, including Congressman Everett Dirksen of Pekin, felt that the country was already at war and either ceased their opposition to intervention or actually supported Administration policies. Even those who continued to oppose intervention were divided on some defense measures. Still, in November, America First prepared to participate in the 1942 elections and endorsed Senator Brooks for reelection. Pearl Harbor, however, ended this brief venture into electoral politics, and led to the movement's disbandment. Though its officers preferred to continue, they felt that the organization's opposition to the war would render it suspect. The Committee to Defend America also disbanded after Pearl Harbor.14

Other local groups, however, did not disband. The Chicago-based Citizens Keep Out of War Committee, headed by Avery Brundage and William J. Grace, a Republican attorney
and unsuccessful office-seeker, reorganized as the Citizens USA Committee, a defeatist organization. It backed Congressman-at-large Stephen A. Day, a McCormick protege, for reelection in 1942 and promoted the Colonel himself for the presidency in 1943 and 1944 until McCormick killed the booklet. Grace himself represented dissident unionists in legal action against allegedly Communist union officials. Mrs. Elizabeth Dilling's isolationist organization, We, the Mothers Mobilize for America, gained new leadership and joined Grace's organization in promoting a peace conference early in 1942 and also backed conservative Republicans in 1942 and 1944. Mrs. Dilling herself was tried with several others on charges of sedition, but the case was dropped in March, 1945 after the judge died in the course of a lengthy trial. All of these organizations, as well as several others, later came under fire from Mayor Kelly's Committee on Race Relations for their racist, anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic propaganda.¹⁵

The Chicago Tribune's editorial bias resulted in attacks by interventionists at rallies during the summer of 1941, and in December brought the birth of a rival newspaper, the Chicago Sun. Marshall Field III and other liberals wanted a pro-New Deal morning newspaper to offset the biased reporting of the Tribune. The Administration encouraged the project and the Sun appeared on December 4, 1941. The Sun never did well financially, though the Tribune's circulation
dropped by 100,000 during the forties. In 1948, Field bought the Chicago Times, an afternoon tabloid daily, and merged it with the Sun. The Tribune fought the Sun's efforts to join the Associated Press until a government lawsuit forced admission of the Sun in 1945.

After Pearl Harbor, the Tribune loudly proclaimed its patriotism, but continued its attacks on the Roosevelt Administration's foreign and domestic policies and the conduct of the war. The paper was quick to publicize blunders by war agencies, though it sometimes distorted an incident so much that it drew protests from both sides. Colonel McCormick offered his own commentaries on military tactics. The Daily News responded with a series of cartoons caricaturing the Colonel as "Colonel McCosmic." When a friend wrote to McCormick in February, 1942, suggesting that he temper his views on Administration foreign policy, the Colonel replied with a letter in which he claimed credit for introducing the machine gun, mechanization and other reforms in the armed forces. The Daily News published it under the caption, "Whatta Man!" and the Colonel became the subject of ridicule. Later that year, the Justice Department sought to indict the Tribune for printing a story suggesting that the Navy knew the Japanese plan of attack at Midway. The Navy did know, but was anxious to keep the Japanese from learning that the United States had broken their naval code. The proceedings were dropped after the reporter explained that he had written
the story based on his knowledge of naval affairs and assumed that the Navy had guessed the Japanese plans.\textsuperscript{17}

While Colonel McCormick and his allies fought to keep the nation out of war, Mayor Kelly, Governor Green and others worked to prepare the state for its role in the upcoming conflict. While Green paid lip service to isolationism, he also called for unity in defense. Mayor Kelly accepted the nation's involvement in the war as inevitable. On December 20, 1940, the Chicago City Council established a new city agency, the Chicago Commission on National Defense with Kelly as its chairman. In the spring of 1941, it set up a city defense council. Governor Stelle appointed an Illinois Emergency Defense Council, which was replaced in April, 1941 by the Illinois State Council of Defense, later renamed the Illinois War Council. Each member of the Council headed a particular division such as agriculture, industrial production and the like. Members were business and civic leaders from around the state. Governor Green also appointed political leaders from both parties as ex-officio members. In May, President Roosevelt created the Office of Civilian Defense, which established a regional headquarters in Chicago and later designated the Chicago area as a separate defense district from the rest of Illinois, with Mayor Kelly as its director. At first, the Chicago District included Lake County, Indiana, but the county was consolidated with the rest of Indiana in August, 1942. Though the Illi-
nois War Council was unhappy with Chicago's status as a separate district, its relations with the Chicago organization were friendly. There also were 640 local defense councils, mostly at the county, municipal and township level. County and township councils served rural areas. Cities, especially Chicago, set up block organizations. Many communities adopted ordinances enforcing directives of municipal defense councils. Other local defense councils and the state council had to rely on voluntary cooperation.¹⁸

In 1941, the state and local civilian defense organizations were mostly concerned with attracting defense business to the state, though they also sponsored scrap drives and other defense projects. During the war years, they held scrap drives, promoted victory gardens and car pools, set up day care centers, recruited war workers and trained air raid wardens, first aid workers, demolition teams and auxiliary police and fire units. In Chicago and other cities, a central control station alerted local units in case of air attack. There were blackouts and "bombings" to test the effectiveness of the system throughout the state. Though the Midwest was never bombed, civilian defense units proved invaluable in handling floods, fires, train wrecks and other disasters. State police and militia units played a role in such disasters and also in guarding important bridges, airports and other possible targets of sabotage. Many communities also established serviceman's centers. Chicago had the
biggest with every amenity desired by a soldier on leave.\textsuperscript{19}

Inevitably, politics crept into civilian defense as it had with the New Deal. Mayor Kelly used the program, and to some extent other war agencies as a source of patronage. Democratic politicians secured jobs with various war agencies. Ex-Congressman Raymond S. McKeough, who lost a Senate race in 1942, headed the regional price control office in 1943. There also were reports of favoritism in gas rationing toward people with political connections. In 1942, the Auburn Park community civilian defense commander tried unsuccessfully to bar a local Republican congressional candidate from appearing at patriotic gatherings, and also tried to fire block captains who were Republican precinct captains. In the spring of 1945, when President Harry S. Truman closed down the civilian defense program, Mayor Kelly insisted that it was still needed and did not close the Chicago office until the war ended in August.\textsuperscript{20}

During the thirties, the Kelly-Nash machine converted the black community in Chicago to the Democratic party. Mayor Kelly offered patronage jobs and appointed blacks to high positions in city government and to prestigious commissions. The machine also claimed credit for helping blacks secure jobs on New Deal work relief projects, an important source of employment for blacks. The machine also established a Democratic organization in the black South Side wards, which eventually led to construction of a submachine run by William
L. Dawson, a black politician who joined the shift of his constituents from the Republican to the Democratic party. While alderman from the Second Ward, Dawson started backing the machine in the City Council. He lost his bid for reelection in the 1939 primary, but then backed Earl B. Dickerson, a Democrat, against a Republican. He soon switched parties and became Second Ward Committeeman. Dawson was soon at odds with Dickerson, who also irritated the Mayor with his militance on civil rights and outspoken criticism of the machine in the Council. He also angered the machine by refusing to support some of its candidates, including Congressman Mitchell, and supporting Fifth Ward Alderman Paul Douglas, an anti-machine Democrat, against the machine candidate for Senator. When Mitchell retired from Congress in 1942, Dickerson tried to take his place, but was beaten in the primary by Dawson, who went on to win in November. In 1943, Dickerson lost his council seat to a Dawson ally. Dawson went on to extend his control over other wards as they changed from white to black. By 1950, his submachine controlled over a quarter of a million votes.

The war raised racial tensions as Southern blacks moved into already overcrowded housing and schools in the ghetto. Shortages forced many industries to start hiring blacks in 1942 and 1943. This led to friction with whites who resented the economic gains of blacks which threatened their status. In 1943, race riots broke out in Detroit and
other cities, but not Chicago. Mayor Kelly responded to the Detroit riot by appointing the biracial Mayor's Committee on Race Relations, later renamed the Mayor's Committee on Human Relations, to identify and alleviate sources of racial friction, especially housing. The Committee worked with the police department to keep racial incidents from getting any bigger. This led to better police and community relations and a drop in juvenile delinquency in some cases. The Committee also persuaded the school board to add classrooms in black areas and cease its practice of transferring white students in the district to white school districts. Most of the Committee's achievements were limited, but it did provide a forum for discussion of the problems of blacks and other minorities. The Mayor's firmness in suppressing racial disturbances and his commitment to solving the problems of the ghetto helped Chicago escape the riots that hit other cities during the war years. Other cities, including Springfield, appointed similar committees and Governor Green established a state-wide commission to study the problem. They too achieved some limited success, though the basic problems continued. Mayor Kelly also backed Elizabeth Wood, head of the Chicago Housing Authority, in her efforts to integrate public housing, and refused to support white students who struck against integration of public high schools in Morgan Park in 1934 and Calumet Park, Englewood and Morgan Park in 1945. In supporting integration, Kelly ran up
against segregationist policies in the school board and national public housing authorities as well as his own white followers. Ultimately, this was to prove a factor in forcing his retirement from office in 1947.²²

During the forties, Governor Green built an efficient Republican machine, which dominated downstate Illinois politics, especially in the statehouse. There were dissidents, however. Some Green supporters, who objected to Colonel McCormick's control of the party, complained that the Governor was too generous in giving patronage to leaders in that faction, while neglecting his own supporters. They also worried that renomination of Senator Brooks and Congressman-at-large Stephen A. Day, both isolationists and allies of Colonel McCormick, would wreck the party and return the Senate to the Democrats. They also criticized the extreme isolationist platform of the Illinois Republican party. Hill Blackett, former national committeeman from Illinois, was leader of these dissidents who sought a Senate candidate who was committed to an interventionist foreign policy before Pearl Harbor. They found him in State Treasurer Warren Wright, who announced his support for the President's foreign policy shortly before Pearl Harbor. Though the Tribune promptly read him out of the party, Wright announced in January, 1942, that he would run against Brooks.²³

Green stayed out of the battle over neutrality, Though he often spoke out in favor of preparedness and unity in
national defense, he also praised Senator Brooks at the Governor's Day conclave at the 1941 State Fair in Springfield. Green eventually endorsed Brooks and his slate in a meeting with the Senator in February. Brooks was embarrassed and angry when copies of an anti-war speech he made on October 31 and mailed to constituents before Pearl Harbor, arrived in Illinois after the attack. His running mate, Congressman Day, was even more embarrassed when it was disclosed that an anti-war book he wrote in 1941 had been published by a Nazi-subsidized company in New Jersey. Day denied any knowledge of the Nazi affiliation. Later in the campaign, he was accused of having sent a telegram to Adolf Hitler in 1933 congratulating him on his rise to power. Wright and Denison Hull, who ran against Day, played up their opponents' isolationism. They and their allies also criticized Tribune domination of the party and depicted Brooks as a puppet of the Colonel. Brooks himself campaigned on his record and the conduct of the war, while Day attacked the New Deal. 24

A battle also developed in the Democratic primary when Mayor Kelly slated Congressman Raymond S. McKeough to run against Senator Brooks. Kelly briefly considered running himself, but opposition within the party, lack of support from Roosevelt and the problems of tackling a resurgent Republican party in an off-year election led him to forego any senatorial ambitions. McKeough was a little-known ma-
chine supporter, who expressed pride in his connection with the organization. Dissident Democrats and Republicans accused Kelly of making a deal with Colonel McCormick to slate a weak candidate to oppose Brooks in exchange for a weak Republican opponent in the 1943 mayoral race. The machine made similar questionable nominations when it slated Dr. Herman Bundesen to oppose Brooks for governor in 1936 and Senator Slattery in 1940. Chicago Democrats were more concerned about control of municipal and county offices than state and national races. During the fall of 1941, anti-machine Alderman Paul H. Douglas toured the state urging all-out support for the President's foreign policy. In January, Douglas entered the race to oppose Brooks. Douglas campaigned vigorously against the Kelly-Nash machine and the isolationist record of Senator Brooks. McKeough also attacked Brooks and the Tribune, even accusing the Colonel of treason for a Tribune editorial describing Administration leaders as draft dodgers. Downstaters, especially allies of the late Governor Horner, wanted State's Attorney Courtney to join the race, but he withdrew when the machine slated another Hornerite, Benjamin Adamowski, to oppose Day and help McKeough downstate. The state party accepted the machine candidates, but the downstate eventually went for Douglas.25

A light vote in the primary brought victory for both machines. The Republicans selected Brooks and Day, who crushed their rivals while the Democrats chose McKeough and
Adamowski. Even so, the vote totals reflected an anti-machine sentiment for Adamowski did better than McKeough, who won because of a big lead in Chicago. Douglas soundly beat him downstate. Soon after the primary, the fifty-year old Alderman enlisted as a private in the Marine Corps where he served with distinction, eventually rising to lieutenant colonel.26

The Tribune, meanwhile, labeled McKeough as "small potatoes." This backfired when the Democrats proclaimed their candidate as the representative of the common man, who was small potatoes to the wealthy. Rural Democrats brought baskets of spuds to the fall party convention in Springfield (they were later given to charity). The Tribune then began calling McKeough a rubber stamp New Dealer. Republicans also continued their attacks on McKeough's ties to the Kelly-Nash machine while the Democrats attacked Brooks and Day and Colonel McCormick for their isolationist record. Voting was light and the results reflected voter discontent with the conduct of the war and with the discomforts of rationing and shortages. Brooks and Day won reelection, but the latter's margin of victory was well below that of the Senator. Republicans also did well in state contests. The Republican resurgence of 1940-1942 bred a Democratic fatalism and indifference which probably influenced the results. Reelection of Senator Brooks and Congressman Day was distasteful, but palatable since Kelly himself was not running.27
In December, Colonel McCormick selected Roger M. Faherty, a wealthy lawyer and political unknown, to run against Mayor Kelly in 1943. After he boasted of his close ties to Kelly and disclaimed any knowledge of issues on which to campaign, Republicans protested and refused to back his candidacy. Faherty withdrew and the party chose George W. McKibbon, the state director of finance, to oppose Kelly. McKibbon was little better-known and his father-in-law headed one of the street-car companies, thus making it easy for the Democrats to label him a tool of the unpopular transit companies. The Republican choice of a mayoral candidate made it a good deal easier for Kelly at a time when problems with the city's schools and police corruption might have threatened his re-election. Indeed, dissidents in both parties charged that Faherty and McKibbon were chosen to guarantee Kelly's reelection in exchange for election of Senator Brooks and Governor Green. Both Kelly and McKibbin faced rivals in the primary, but the anti-machine Democrats were divided and ineffective as were the opponents of McKibbon, who was backed by Governor Green. The Mayor's opponents criticized the city's schools and blasted the machine for its ties to the underworld. Several gangland slayings and a gangster's suicide helped remind voters of the connection. McKibbon also played on popular discontent with rationing by claiming that the rationing system was controlled by the machine, which was using it as a source of patronage. Mayor
Kelly campaigned very little, choosing to run on his record of civic improvements, including the newly-finished State street subway. Shortly before the election, the Democrats also accused McKibbon and his wife of signing a restrictive covenant barring blacks from their Hyde Park neighborhood. McKibbon denied it, but then the Republicans sent some Republican workers, including a white real estate agent known for his advocacy of segregated housing, to deliver leaflets accusing Kelly of signing such a covenant. When they tried to deliver them to the home of a black Republican Alderman, Oscar DePriest, they were jumped by several black Democrats and arrested on charges of inciting to riot. The whole incident backfired for the Republicans. Soon afterward, Kelly beat McKibbon, though with a smaller margin than in 1939. McKibbon returned to his state post soon afterward. 28

Meanwhile, a fight was brewing within the Republican party over isolationism. During the 1942 campaign, Congressman McKeough proposed a world organization for peace. Some Illinois Republicans echoed these sentiments and tried unsuccessfully to influence their party platform along those lines. When the isolationists managed to defeat their efforts, some of the internationalists switched their support to McKeough and Adamowski. In February, 1943, the internationalists, led by Deneen Watson, chairman of the Governor's advisory committee on taxation (and for a time, representative of the Illinois War Council in Washington seeking de-
fense contracts for the state), started a doorbell campaign financed by Denison Hull, Congressman Day's opponent in the 1942 primary, to convert the rank and file of the party to international cooperation. They organized the Republican Postwar Policy Association, headed by Watson, to carry on the campaign, which soon spread from Illinois to the rest of the country. In May, the group held a convention in Chicago attended by 100 delegates, including Congressman Everett Dirksen. Governor Green did not attend, but did give a speech to downstate papers urging postwar planning. The Tribune denounced the organization as a group of Willkieites bent on betraying the country's best interests.\(^{29}\)

However, in December, 1942, the more moderate Harrison E. Spangler replaced Werner W. Schroeder, an Illinois committeeman backed by Colonel McCormick, as Republican National Chairman. In May, 1943, with the Republican Postwar Planning Association at the height of its influence, Spangler appointed a Republican Postwar Advisory Council of 49 members to consider domestic and foreign policies for the 1944 campaign. Though Wendell Willkie was not invited, neither was Senator Brooks, while Governor Green and Congressman Dirksen were included. Watson challenged Spangler to put his group's proposals before the Advisory Council, which met on Mackinac Island. Though there were several isolationists on the Council, it also included a number of internationalists. Governor Green played a major role in
drafting the convention's declaration of support for reasonable participation of the United States in a postwar cooperative organization among the sovereign states. The proposal was sufficiently vague as to satisfy both the Tribune and the Daily News, but it also was a significant step away from the isolationism of Colonel McCormick. Governor Green emerged with enhanced regional prestige. During the conference, the Tribune read New York Governor Thomas Dewey out of the party for advocating a postwar Anglo-American alliance, though the Colonel himself proposed a world union of sorts—by annexing England, Scotland, Wales, Canada, New Zealand and Australia to the United States as individual states, but excluding the British Empire. The other nations declined the offer, preferring to remain independent. 30

The battle between isolationists and internationalists continued. William J. Grace organized the Illinois Nationalist Revival Committee to draft Colonel McCormick for president. During 1943, the group held meetings in Chicago attended by old America Firsters and various extremists. Despite the Colonel's protests, the group entered his name in the Illinois primary. Wendell Willkie eagerly challenged the Colonel, but withdrew when the Colonel refused to run. Instead, Willkie entered the Wisconsin primary and dropped out of the presidential race after his defeat. Illinois Republicans chose General Douglas MacArthur, the only major candidate entered in the primary, but he also withdrew from
the race. 31

Meanwhile, a battle developed over the state party slate, dominated by the McCormick-Brooks faction, which called for reelection of Governor Green and Congressman-at-large Day and chose Richard J. Lyons, a diehard isolationist, to oppose the incumbent Democrat, Senator Lucas. Opponents objected to Lyons on geographical as well as ideological grounds since both Lyons and Senator Brooks were Chicagoans. Several candidates threatened to run against Lyons, including Congressman Dirksen, who also flirted with a run for the presidency. However, most withdrew, leaving Deneen Watson to challenge Lyons and Colonel Edward Davis to run against Day. There also was opposition for other posts, but the slated candidates easily crushed their rivals in the April primary. The national convention, held in Chicago, nominated New York Governor Thomas Dewey for president and Ohio Governor John W. Bricker for vice-president. 32

Illinois Democrats were united in their support of the President's quest for a fourth term and the slating of candidates for other offices. After the death of party leader Patrick Nash in October, 1943, Mayor Kelly took control of the party. He also made a truce with State's Attorney Courtney and slated him for governor. Senator Lucas ran for reelection while Emily Taft Douglas, wife of former Alderman Paul Douglas, challenged Congressman Day. Other candidates were slated for state races, including Edward J.
Barrett, a sargeant in the marines, who was running for secretary of state. At the national convention in Chicago, the Mayor helped line up support for Harry S. Truman, the President's choice for vice-president. Some Illinois delegates wanted to retain Vice-President Henry A. Wallace, but Kelly argued that the President should have a running mate he wanted, and persuaded the delegates to support Senator Lucas until switching to Truman. Some labor supporters of Wallace tried to stampede the convention into renominating him, but Kelly had the convention adjourned for the day, claiming violation of city fire regulations. On the next day, Kelly closed the galleries to the public and Truman was nominated on the second ballot.33

During the campaign, Illinois Democrats supported the Administration's foreign and domestic policies. They backed its plans for a world organization to settle disputes while Republicans Lyons, Day and Brooks were wary of American ties to such an organization. Republicans also demanded that the nation retain captured islands for bases and blasted the Kelly-Nash machine for its ties to the underworld, problems with Chicago schools and machine efforts to win the votes of soldiers overseas. Mayor Kelly even wanted to count the votes of soldiers who had died after voting but before the election. Republicans attacked the New Deal and home front programs, especially rationing, and charged that the fourth term would lead to a dictatorship. Democrats replied with
attacks on Governor Green for his spending and patronage policies. Though some labor leaders, mainly from the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and its member unions, backed the Republicans, most supported the Democrats. The AFL's state affiliate, the Illinois State Federation of Labor, unanimously endorsed Roosevelt. The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) set up a Political Action Committee, headed in Illinois by ex-Congressman McKeough, to assist the Democrats. Since some member unions included significant numbers of Communists in their membership and even in leadership posts, the Republicans blasted the Democrats for Communist support. In November, the voters spoke. The President won reelection, carrying Illinois by a larger plurality than in 1940. Senator Lucas and Mrs. Douglas also won. Republicans won most state offices (except for secretary of state, won by Edward J. Barrett), but by very small margins. Even Governor Green, who was much stronger than the rest of the ticket, won by only 72,000 votes, compared to 256,000 in 1940.34

The results showed the efficiency of the Kelly-Nash machine and organized labor in getting out the vote, but also reflected continued voter support for Democratic policies and growing opposition to isolationism. Both Lyons and Day went down to defeat. Some Republican newspapers around the state saw the vote as a personal triumph for the Governor, but a repudiation of his running mates, and urged him to
surround himself with forward-looking Republicans. The governor reached the same conclusions and sought to broaden his base beyond Colonel McCormick and the Tribune. He also wanted to leave office with a record of progressivism. To help achieve this goal, he met with Mayor Kelly, with whom he had been feuding, and the two antagonists agreed on a program of mutual cooperation in the General Assembly. Chicago gained some limited aid to public housing and legislation permitting unification of the city's transit lines under the Chicago Transit Authority. Chicago Democrats supported Governor Green's ill-fated efforts to reform the state constitution as well as his more successful reapportionment of the state's congressional districts. Green also secured some benefits for veterans, including new hospital facilities and rehabilitation centers. Overall, the unprecedented bipartisan coalition benefitted both, though it disturbed members of both parties, who found it more difficult to resist legislation they disliked.35

During the late thirties and forties, political parties in Illinois developed a new division of power, which carried on into the postwar era. Once Republican, but Democratic in the thirties, Illinois became a swing state whose allegiance could not be taken for granted by either party. The powerful Democratic organization in Chicago, which gained control of Chicago in 1931, helped President Roosevelt and his successor, President Truman, carry the state in every
election during the two decades. The Democratic Administration, in turn, financed civic improvements during the depression and homefront programs during the war, which provided jobs for machine supporters. Mayor Kelly enhanced his organization's effectiveness by converting blacks to the democratic party. His black allies then built a submachine in their wards. During the thirties and forties, the Mayor and his allies had to contend with rivals within the party. They resolved this difficulty by cooperating with a resurgent Republican party led by Colonel McCormick in eliminating the more dangerous rivals. It was an odd alliance between a liberal New Dealer and the arch-conservative anti-New Deal publisher, but it benefitted both. The Mayor eliminated his more serious rivals and secured relatively weak Republican mayoral opponents, while the Colonel gained the election of his candidates on the state level. During the early and mid-forties, Republicans dominated the state offices while the Democrats won the national and the Chicago and Cook County races. The war brought further changes, strengthening the power and prestige of Mayor Kelly and gradually eroding the influence of Colonel McCormick in his own party, especially after 1944 when Democratic victories eliminated some of his proteges. This in turn led Governor Green to a bipartisan arrangement with Mayor Kelly in an effort to escape the domination of the Colonel. The new division of power continued with little interruption into the postwar era.


Chicago Daily News, January 9, 1940, p. 12, January 18, 1940, p. 4, February 5, 1940, p. 4, February 27, 1940, p. 1, April 10, 1940, p. 1; Chicago Tribune, June 22, 1939,
Fifth Ward Alderman Paul H. Douglas, a constant critic of the machine in the City Council, visited precincts within his ward urging workers to finish counting the ballots. They made repeated excuses for their delays. Finally, he had to go home to get ready for class. At the time he left, Slattery was leading. However, after Douglas left, the 400 precincts still out, half of which were in the city, suddenly finished counting votes and gave Brooks a narrow victory by 20,000 votes. Paul H. Douglas, In the Fullness of Time, The Memoirs of Paul H. Douglas (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1971), pp. 99-100.
ary 13, 1941, p. 4; Chicago Tribune, October 6, 1940, pt. 1, p. 1, October 7, 1940, pp. 1, 11, October 10, 1940, p. 2, October 11, 1940, p. 18, November 8, 1940, p. 1, November 10, 1940, pt. 1, pp. 1, 8, November 11, 1940, p. 9, November 17, 1940, pt. 1, p. 1, November 28, 1940, p. 1, December 1, 1940, pp. 1, 12, December 12, 1940, p. 18, January 25, 1941, p. 1; Illinois State Register, October 6, 1940, pt. 1, pp. 1, 6, October 7, 1940, pp. 1, 3, October 9, 1940, pp. 1, 10, January 25, 1941, p. 1; Littlewood, Horner of Illinois, pp. 231-234; Watters, The Production Front, pp. 469-472.


21 Chicago Daily News, March 4, 1942, p. 11; Biles, Big City Boss, pp. 90-100.


26 Chicago Daily News, April 25, 1942, pt. 1, p. 1; Chicago Tribune, April 15, 1942, pp. 1, 5; Biles, Big City Boss, p. 121; Douglas, In the Fullness of Time, pp. 109-123; Watters, The Production Front, pp. 483-484.

November 4, 1942, pp. 1, 2, 4, 5; Illinois State Register, September 10, 1942, pp. 1, 4, September 18, 1942, September 30, 1942, p. 3, October 6, 1942, p. 4, October 7, 1942, p. 4, October 15, 1942, pp. 1, 10; Biles, Big City Boss, pp. 121-122; Watters, The Production Front, pp. 486-487.


31 Chicago Daily News, July 2, 1943, p. 9, July 30, 1943, pp. 1, 8, December 2, 1943, pp. 1, 3, December 28, 1943, p. 3, February 5, 1944, pt. 1, p. 3; Chicago Tribune, July 10,


CHAPTER III

PLOWSHARES INTO SWORDS:

ILLINOIS WARTIME INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

During the Second World War, Illinois industrial production converted from freight cars, farm implements, stoves and other civilian goods to artillery, tanks, airplane parts and other military supplies, while the state's mines and utilities directed their resources toward supplying the war industries. Production was coordinated by a variety of national defense agencies to satisfy the changing requirements of the armed forces. These agencies allocated raw materials based on the relative importance of each company's product to the war effort. State and local defense planners supplemented the work of national agencies, while local businessmen set up pools to bid on contracts and coordinated efforts for protection of industrial plants.

Although initially, many companies secured defense contracts with minimal government supervision, the national defense planning establishment gradually assumed a more active role. In May, 1940, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed the National Defense Advisory Commission, whose Industrial Production Division cleared contracts for military supplies and construction of bases and defense plants. In
January, 1941, the Division became the Office of Production Management, which handled military production and later civilian production as well. In addition to clearing contracts, the new agency established a priority system to allocate materials to defense industries, and eventually restrict the output of civilian goods through such allocations.¹

In November, 1940, the Advisory Commission designated Federal Reserve Banks as regional offices where manufacturers could secure information about government requirements and credit to finance defense production. Illinois was divided between the Chicago and St. Louis Federal Reserve Banks. Branch banks served as district offices and certain bank officials operated the service. This arrangement proved inadequate and in the spring of 1941, the Office of Production Management set up its own field service utilizing the Federal Reserve Banks as headquarters and their personnel as part of its field organization. The Washington office ran the field service, including special groups such as a delegation of machine tool expediters in Rockford. In June, the agency's Priorities Division set up its own field organization. The War Production Board, which replaced the Office of Production Management in January, 1942, reorganized the field service and set up a regional organization, with Region VI, which included most of Illinois, headquartered in Chicago. The East St. Louis-Alton area later became part of the St. Louis
region. The Chicago regional office included sections on production, priorities and appeals, technical services, labor, salvage, materials redistribution, compliance and finance. District offices located in various Illinois cities, assigned priority ratings in minor amounts of materials, but their main functions were technical and advisory. They located idle plants, tools, materials and labor, brought prime contractors together with potential subcontractors, interpreted regulations to businessmen, secured technical and financial aid for companies, recommended relief from restrictions and monitored violations of priority orders. All military services had procurement offices in Chicago. The Chicago Ordinance District, one of the biggest buyers, increased its staff from 1400 before Pearl Harbor to over 5000 at its peak. Headed by prominent businessmen, it could let contracts up to $1 million in value. Larger ones were handled by Washington. The Division also had advisory committees of Illinois industrialists.  

Conversion to defense production began as early as 1938 when some Illinois firms received educational orders from military procurement agencies, especially in subcontracts from the Rock Island arsenal. The purpose of these orders was to test the ability of private industrial firms to adapt themselves overnight to production of war supplies. Hence, the Chicago plant of the American Forge Division of American Brake Shoe and Foundry Company received an educational order for
25,000 shell forgings in June, 1939. By April, 1941, its daily production was half that number. The outbreak of war in Europe brought contracts for Illinois industries from the British and French governments. Steel companies sold steel to Britain. Two railroad car manufacturers, Pullman-Standard Car Company and Pressed Steel Car Company, built tanks for the British at Chicago-area plants. Smaller firms also secured contracts with the Allies, especially after the introduction of Lend-Lease in the spring of 1941. Williams Oil-O-Matic, a Bloomington manufacturer of oil heaters, produced gears for anti-aircraft guns used in the Battle of Britain in 1940-1941. Whiting Corporation, a builder of cranes and railroad and industrial equipment, produced cranes for Russia. Other firms made war supplies for England under contract with the United States government. As the nation's own rearmament program got underway, Illinois companies concentrated more and more on defense production.³

Illinois industries produced a variety of products for the armed forces. In some cases, they simply adapted existing product lines to military uses. Caterpillar, Austin-Western, Barber-Greene and others built construction equipment for use in constructing roads and airfields. Pullman-Standard built railroad equipment for the armed forces overseas. Ingersoll Milling Machine Company won the coveted Army-Navy "E" award in the fall of 1941 for building a machine to mill battleship armor. Many Illinois plants made the same things for the
armed forces as they did for civilian use: tractors, diesel engines, gloves, wire, nuts, bolts, screws and the like. Others made some adjustments to adapt peacetime products for military use. Zenith Radio had to retool since military specifications required closer tolerances than civilian radio equipment. Whiting Corporation, the crane manufacturer in Harvey, made hoists for loading bombs into airplanes. Elgin Watch Company produced fuses and navigational instruments. Western Electric made gun directors, field telephones, switchboards, cable and radiotelephone sets for tanks, planes and ships. By 1944, 83 percent of its output went to the military. Diamond T. Motor Company, a Chicago truck manufacturer, produced military trucks and also built a half-track troop carrier, a new type of hybrid vehicle with wheels in front and tracks in the rear. Springfield-based Sangamo Electric, a manufacturer of meters, made signal equipment for the Signal Corps, fire control equipment and aircraft instruments.

Many companies, however, made items for the military, which were far different than what they produced in peacetime. Pullman-Standard plants built tanks, howitzers, trench mortars, aircraft assemblies and shells. In 1942, the Company erected a shipyard on Lake Calumet which constructed small escort ships and landing ships, medium (LSM's) for the United States and British navies. International Harvester produced tanks, military trucks and tractors, and also made
torpedoes and shells, though it also continued to make farm equipment. Pettibone-Mulliken, a Chicago-area manufacturer of railway track equipment, turned out carriages for heavy 155 millimeter cannon. In its Springfield plant, Allis-Chalmers built the M-18 tractor for towing heavy artillery. Western Cartridge, of East Alton, made small-arms ammunition as did a large number of small firms. Stove manufacturers in Belleville made shells, bombs, ammunition boxes and tank parts. A group of thirty-three plants in six states cooperated in a program to produce armor plate for tanks and other combat vehicles. Kroehler Manufacturing Company, a Naperville furnituremaker, converted to production of plywood airplane parts. A Chicago firm, Victor Adding Machine Company, became a major producer of bombsights. An electrical products plant in Bloomington made proximity fuses for anti-aircraft shells. A Decatur steel fabricator built prefabricated bridges for use overseas. Another Decatur plant, the Garfield Division of the Houdaille-Hershey Corporation, worked on a top secret project involving production of parts for the first atomic bombs. Wallpaper firms made munitions.  

Production soared. The Chicago area almost tripled its industrial output between 1939 and 1944. Many firms were rewarded for their productivity by being awarded the Army-Navy "E" award. Such awards depended on high production and quality, but also low absenteeism, avoidance of work stoppages, fair labor standards, labor-management cooperation in
production, conservation of critical materials, progress in overcoming obstacles and a good health and safety record. One Illinois firm even lost its award due to labor difficulties, while an award to another firm was delayed until a labor dispute was settled.6

Although many firms secured defense contracts in 1940 and 1941, Illinois did not gain nearly as much at first as other states. Much of this was due to geography and war conditions. Early in the war, the armed forces of the United States and the Allied nations demanded ships and planes, which were usually built on the East and West Coasts. Still, some Illinois political leaders felt that the state was being slighted in the granting of contracts. They raised the issue in the 1940 election and renewed the charges after the election.7

Some efforts were made to alleviate the situation. On May 1, 1941, Governor Dwight Green directed the Illinois State Council of Defense to consider means of getting armament work for Illinois firms with unused plant capacity and machinery. Although Illinois industry was recovering from the Depression, there still were many idled factories and unemployed workers. Illinois Director of Labor Martin P. Durkin, who surveyed 1423 plants in the state, each employing less than 500 workers, reported that 166 firms capable of turning out armaments were operating less than one shift when they could run two or three. Meanwhile, the Illinois
Manufacturer's Association turned over to the Office of production Management a list of 720 Illinois manufacturers with unused plant capacity and machinery adaptable to defense production. The Office of Production Management also worked with the National Association of Manufacturers in seeking out usable plants and machinery, and in May, 1941, held a clinic in Chicago to promote defense business. At the clinic, the agency discovered that many companies did not know how to get orders. It quickly set out to remedy the situation and match contractors with potential subcontractors with unused capacity. The agency's Defense Contract Service had the firms fill out exhaustive questionnaires describing their plant facilities and specifying the type and model of machines in the plant. When a contractor needed a subcontractor to assist in filling an order, the agency could check its files of manufacturers with the plant capacity and machinery needed for the job and suggest potential subcontractors, especially those with idle facilities and low priorities for their normal production.  

During the spring and summer of 1941, a new situation developed which made it imperative for the state's mills and factories to convert to defense production. The rising tempo of rearmament created shortages of materials and led the Office of Production Management to develop a system of priorities to shift materials from civilian to defense production. Under the system, producers of raw materials had to
give preference to defense orders. The system was gradually refined and strengthened so that all manufactured goods, civilian and defense-related, had a priority weighted in accordance with its usefulness to the defense effort and its relative scarcity at any given time. Priorities were revised from time to time to reflect changing military and homefront requirements. For a time, the Office of Production Management concentrated on defense-related production, while the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply handled civilian goods. However, while the latter had no authority to direct producers of raw materials to distribute them in accordance with its demands, it did have the power to tell the Office of Production Management to carry out its recommendations after defense needs had been met. The Office of Production Management resented having to follow programs formulated by the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply. This was resolved by transferring civilian supply functions to the former agency. The President also created the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board to formulate policies on priorities which the Office of Production Management put into effect. The new agency was abolished when the War Production Board replaced the Office of Production Management in 1942. 9

Meanwhile, the priority situation and shortages of raw materials created problems for the state's manufacturers. Many responded by stepping up purchases of supplies.
By April, 1941, 57 percent of Chicago-area firms were ordering materials for six months ahead or longer. On January 1, only 30 percent were buying that far in advance, while 50 percent were ordering for periods of three months ahead or less. Even with the increased purchases, deliveries were uncertain. Some companies hoarded materials, leading the Office of Production Management to threaten punitive action. By June, many firms, especially the smaller ones, were having difficulty getting supplies and were losing business. Many cut production and employment, while others shutdown entirely. Many communities in the state were faced with "priority unemployment" as firms without priority rights were idled for lack of materials. In July, two-thirds of the state's small industries reported in a survey by the Illinois Small Business Men's Association that they would have to go out of business unless they received war contracts or got materials for normal production of civilian goods. The situation worsened throughout the summer as controls on the various metals intensified.¹⁰

The climax occurred in September when the Office of Production Management subjected all steel to priority controls. On September 12, mayors, small businessmen, labor executives, trade association officials and civic leaders from several midwestern states met in Chicago to discuss the situation. There was special concern over the plight of smaller industries, which faced the greatest difficulties
with shortages and getting defense business since procure-
ment agencies generally sought out the largest and best-
equipped producers to fill their producers to fill their re-
quirements. The conference decided to seek a division of
defense work among hard-hit industries, especially in one-
industry towns, increased subcontracts, allocation of mate-
rials on a plant-by-plant basis rather than by companies,
increased use of substitute materials and pooling of a com-
munity's resources so that it could bid as a unit for con-
tracts. Many of the state's political and business leaders
journeyed to Washington to press their case. Delegations of
trade and industrial associations, company representatives
and members of the Illinois State Council of Defense descen-
ded on the capital and met with the state's congressional
delegation. Governor Green and Chicago Mayor Kelly also
traveled to Washington several times to lobby the Office of
Production Management for more defense business for the
state. Their efforts did win promises by the agency of more
contracts for Illinois firms. The Illinois State Council of
Defense also established an office in Washington to lobby
for more defense business. 11

In addition to lobbying for more defense business
for the state firms, business and political leaders developed
systems for helping industries secure contracts. In Septem-
ber, Chicago Mayor Kelly appointed the Chicago Commission on
National Defense, an industrial commission, to stimulate
formation of pools for obtaining defense contracts, to gather information on available plant facilities and manpower and to use its influence in obtaining a proper distribution of surplus materials. The commission acted as a clearinghouse for manufacturers' problems, recommended solutions and served as a liason between Chicago manufacturers and the federal government. The city was divided into seven areas, each with a divisional headquarters supervised by a representative of the industrial commission and aided by engineers. Advisory committees of 15 manufacturers and 15 labor leaders were also chosen. The Chicago Plan Commission supplied canvassers to gather information for the commission. Governor Green and the state defense council also developed plans for pooling of federal contracts. The Illinois Division of the National Small Business Men's Association sponsored a conference in Chicago of businessmen and officials of the Chicago Ordnance District. The officers and representatives of large companies such as Stewart-Warner and General Electric conferred with smaller manufacturers to arrange subcontracts. 12

The Office of Production Management established a Division of Contract Distribution to assist small companies in gaining defense contracts. The agency held defense clinics in various cities to facilitate subcontracting and in October, 1941, held a big regional clinic in Chicago in which purchasing agents and production engineers from 150 corporations holding major contracts conferred with representa-
tives of over 3500 small firms to determine if any had facilities available for subcontracts. Some did. Pullman-standard found six plants with heavy machinery to make parts for tanks which the company was building at its Hammond, Indiana plant. Within a month, the company completed arrangements for the smaller firms to produce the needed parts. The Office of Production Management also sent out defense trains to tour cities across the nation with exhibits showing samples of rearmament items which could be produced by smaller companies. In some cases, the agency allocated contracts to small companies to relieve local unemployment resulting from lack of materials. In April, 1942, the War Production Board tested the Stanley Plan of letting subcontracts to Chicago-area plants. Under the plan, contractors and potential subcontractors used a mutual clearinghouse which matched contractors with potential subcontractors having the machinery to do the job. Subcontractors attended a special class to learn how to list their machines in a directory using a special code. Those who participated were put on a mailing list for a special weekly listing of contract opportunities. The plan proved sufficiently successful that in June, 1942, it was extended throughout the Chicago region of the War Production Board.¹³

Small companies used a variety of means to gain contracts. Some advertised their availability in major newspapers. Early in 1941, Lyon Metal Products, an Aurora-based
manufacturer of metal shelving and business furniture, sent its salesmen out to visit other companies and field offices for procurement agencies in search of contracts and subcontracts. The company neglected its own successful business to concentrate on defense business. Its aggressiveness paid off. By the spring of 1942, it was farming out orders when it had more than it could handle. Many companies formed pools in which they bid as a group on defense contracts. Pooling was most popular late in 1941 and early in 1942. In August, 1941, Peoria's Association of Commerce Industrial Committee organized the Mother Hen Pool of Group Resources. Fifty-four local firms pooled facilities and equipment, with two serving as Mother Hens and assuming responsibility for any contracts secured. The pool printed catalogues of facilities. Late in the summer of 1941, Decatur formed a pool of fifteen metalworking firms following a conference between Governor Green and a local businessman. The presidents of the companies gathered information on their facilities, which was placed on file with defense production offices. One of the company presidents headed the group and another made all contacts with government offices. The Decatur pool arose in response to shortages of materials. Metalworking of one sort or another accounted for 50 percent of the city's industry and payroll. The Office of Production Management and state and local political and business leaders encouraged pooling as a means by which smaller firms could get defense business. There were
over twenty in Chicago alone. Most involved metal fabricators, though there were some composed of furnituremakers. Burgess-Norton developed a pool to make tank parts, which ultimately supplied tank bodies for 85 percent of all American-built tanks. Pools were granted immunity from antitrust laws provided that they could demonstrate a link between increased efficiency and war needs. Although some pools were successful, others failed to gain any business and eventually fell apart. Many were mismanaged and others were poorly organized. By February, 1942, twenty-two pools had been organized in the Chicago Ordnance District but none had obtained a contract. With such mixed results, pooling declined generally in the spring of 1942.¹⁴

Pearl Harbor brought more problems for smaller industries. The armed forces stepped up their purchasing, but continued their traditional reliance on larger companies. Small industries could only get business when larger ones could not handle any more. Even then, many of the jobs were ones that other companies simply did not want. In March, 1942, the War Production Board issued a directive granting contracts to small companies through negotiation without requiring them to bid against big manufacturers. One of its first fruits in the Chicago area developed in April, 1942 when one hundred firms secured contracts to make bomb parts. In June, 1942, the Smaller War Plants Division, later the Smaller War Plants Corporation, was established to help small business...
participate in the war effort. Although the new agency enjoyed some success, small business continued to have difficulty in getting war contracts throughout the war and they often suffered the most from contract cancellations later in the war.¹⁵

Meanwhile, controls on materials tightened as the United States entered the war. This intensified shortages of supplies and also equipment. Some companies traded or sold materials to others in exchange for supplies they needed. In the summer of 1943, the War Production Board and several Chicago area war plants launched a drive to share steel, which resulted in cancellation of orders for 700,000 tons of steel. Some companies resorted to illegal means of getting the supplies they needed. In the fall of 1941, the Office of Production Management barred a Chicago firm from using aluminum for six months after the company violated priority regulations by diverting aluminum from rearmament projects to companies making jukeboxes, slot machines and other nonessentials. In February, 1942, the War Production Board amended the order to allow the firm to fill war orders, but continued to penalize other violators, who hoarded scarce metals or diverted them to nonessential uses. In April, the agency penalized Mills Novelty Company, a Chicago manufacturer of jukeboxes and gambling equipment, for diversion of materials to such machines. The company, which later turned to war production, sold its products to local
gangsters as well as country clubs evading anti-gambling laws, though the latter had to divide their profits with the Capone gang. The company appears to have had some connection with local politicians.¹⁶

One source of raw materials was scrap and refuse of various kinds. Throughout the war, various war agencies, state and local defense councils and local organizations sponsored scrap drives to collect metals, wastepaper, rubber and even kitchen grease, which was used to make glycerine, an ingredient in munitions. Scrap drives started in the summer of 1941, when the general public contributed cooking utensils and other items to help relieve a shortage of aluminum. Scrap drives soon encompassed other metals, particularly iron and steel. Manufacturers turned in obsolete unusable machinery for scrap. Farmers provided a rich harvest of wornout machinery for scrap drives. Railroads were an especially rich source of scrap from unused spur lines. Railroads abandoned many miles of branch lines during the war, though in some cases, the need for scrap conflicted with the need of local communities for transportation. Many proposed abandonments aroused strong protests. One of the most controversial involved a segment of the Illinois Terminal system running from Peoria through Bloomington and Decatur to Champaign-Urbana and Danville. The War Production Board supported the abandonment in order to get
the rails, but backed down amid vigorous protests from the communities and the line continued in operation. No such protests greeted the disappearance of Civil War cannon and other community war memorials into the nation's scrap pile. Much of the sacrifice was probably needless, but there were shortages. Scrap dealers took advantage of the situation and a black market developed in steel scrap. Many scrap dealers resorted to a practice known as "top dressing," under which they loaded railroad cars with inferior grade material, then put a load of higher quality scrap metal on top and billed the steel companies at the higher rate. One Chicago dealer even put in a load of dirt. Such practices were a headache for steel producers and undoubtedly hurt production.

There also were shortages of machine tools and some resorted to the black market to fill their needs. Some companies were able to reuse old obsolete equipment. However, while some machines were readily adaptable to defense production, others were not. Many companies were forced to retool when they switched from civilian to military production. Machines also wore out, especially with wartime work schedules. Machines were used round the clock and broke down from overwork. Sometimes, even if machines were available, they were unused due to a lack of workers with skills to use them. The War Production Board and the Chicago Ordnance District also purchased or leased idle machines and made them available to manufacturers in need of machinery. In February,
1944, the Army Air Force established a warehouse in Chicago to dispose of machines rendered surplus when contracts were cancelled. Many companies already made their own tools, but still found it necessary to increase their production of tools and add to their tool-making staff. Plant protection was also a problem. In Chicago, Mayor Kelly appointed Patrick H. Joyce to the post of Industrial Coordinator in March, 1942. Joyce, who was president of the Chicago Great Western Railroad, met with local business leaders and developed a code for plant protection which was eventually picked up by other communities. Joyce and his associates also helped plants organize for protection against enemy attack, organized an inspection of plants by the Fire Department, and worked on plans for transportation of war workers. Later, in 1943, the War Department and other agencies took over security and plant protection and inspection, and in March, 1944, the Army discontinued its Advance Warning System as there no longer was any danger of air attack. There were some efforts at sabotage and war plants did establish guards to prevent this.  

The conversion from civilian to war production created many shortages of civilian goods. Even what was available was often of poorer quality. Manufacturers, who stayed in civilian production, had to make do with substitute materials and even these were often hard to get. Retailers stocked their shelves with ersatz merchandise and were glad to get even that. Sears, Roebuck and Company, which de-
signed much of its own merchandise, scavenged in stock rooms and dumps of various manufacturers in search of materials that could be used in hard goods. Even so, durable goods became scarcer during the war and retailers and mail order firms had to devote more space to soft goods such as clothing. They also had to restrict their sales to maintain their inventory.

Consumer attitudes varied during the war. In December, 1942, holiday sales were brisk, but returns were few. People kept what they had due to shortages. In 1943, several "Victory" models of clothing items of spartan design were introduced. However, as news from the battlefront became more optimistic, people anticipated the easing of shortages and became more reluctant to accept substitute goods. Victory models disappeared in 1944 and shoppers turned to luxury goods and higher-priced items. Scarce items, however, such as appliances and furniture, remained popular regardless of quality. Sears sold iceboxes, which could be converted to electric refrigerators after the war. Secondhand merchandise sold well. Finally, to aid war workers and reduce absenteeism, utilities such as Commonwealth Edison promoted a program for repair and resale of old appliances. People could bring in appliances to electric appliance stores for repair and resale to war workers. Overall, despite shortages of goods, retailers had record sales in the war years. Monthly retail sales in Illinois, which totaled $14,435,854.00 in June, 1941, reached $17,363,949.00 in June, 1944. Chicago
retail sales rose from $1,650 million in 1940 to an estimated $2,800 million in 1945.\(^{19}\)

Many war industries had to expand their facilities to fulfill their contracts. Idled plants were reopened. In March, 1942, American Locomotive Company reopened its Chicago Heights steel-making plant, most of which had been closed for ten years. Smaller firms made use of whatever space was available as they expanded to meet war orders. In Rockford, an old high school girls gymnasium housed a local war industry. Though some acquired idle plants of other manufacturers, others had to make do with stores, garages, old livery stables and other makeshift facilities. Many companies grew rapidly as a result of the war. A Freeport producer of electric switches with only 138 employees in 1940, had over 1000 by 1944. To help finance this expansion, private banks and some government agencies, especially the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, extended loans to companies in need of them. In the Chicago region, 31.7 percent of the loans went to businesses with assets totalling over $5 million or more, 33.2 percent to those with assets of $500,000 to $5 million, 28.2 percent to firms with assets between $50,000 and $500,000, and 6.9 percent to those with less than $50,000 in assets. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation also established a subsidiary, the Defense Plant Corporation, to finance construction of war plants for specific purposes.
Usually, the agency owned the plants, but leased them to private companies for operation. In the Chicago area, it financed aircraft engine plants, an aluminum rolling mill and a plant to produce brass and other metal parts for aircraft and munitions. Not all such ventures were successful. In 1943, the Defense Plant Corporation financed construction of hemp mills in Illinois and several other states to process hemp for use in making rope. Axis victories in 1942 cut off or reduced foreign supplies of Manila hemp, sisal and jute and threatened a shortage of rope. Although some hemp was planted in 1943, production was reduced in 1944 and none was planted after that year. Allied victories in 1943 and 1944 reduced the need for the hemp mills as foreign supplies again became available.20

A more successful Defense Plant Corporation venture was the construction of airplane engine plants in the Chicago area. In the spring of 1941, the Studebaker Corporation started construction of a factory on the city's southwest side to manufacture components for engines to be assembled at a plant in South Bend, Indiana. Early in 1942, the factory started production of components for engines for B-17 bombers. The Buick Division of General Motors Corporation built a plant in Melrose Park, which ultimately supplied most of the engines for B-24 bombers. Later, Chrysler Corporation's Dodge Division built a huge engine plant on Chi-
cago's southwest side, which at that time was the world's largest airplane engine plant. It produced a total of 18,413 engines for B-29 and B-32 bombers, including the planes which dropped the first atomic bombs. Douglas Aircraft Company constructed an Army-owned plant in Park Ridge to build C-54 transports, many of which were powered by engines from the nearby Buick plant in Melrose Park. The Douglas plant was especially noteworthy for its use of wood as a substitute for steel in its construction. On Chicago's near west side, Bendix Aviation, built the nation's largest factory for airplane carburetors. Other firms around the state produced airplane parts and subassemblies and even light planes and gliders. All of this led some Chicago and state business leaders to anticipate that the city and state would become the center of an aviation industry after the war. This did not materialize as the aircraft and engine plants shut down after the war.21

Ordnance plants were constructed by the Army and usually operated by private operators. There were several built in Illinois, including the large Wilmington-Elwood complex, which started production in 1941, the Crab Orchard Lake plant near Herrin, the Green River plant near Dixon, and the Illiopolis plant between Decatur and Springfield. All except the Wilmington-Elwood plants started production in 1942. Some of the sites aroused some controversy since the land was good farmland and the farmers did not wish to sell. Farmers in the
Wilmington area were especially angry since hundreds of acres of wasteland created by strip coal mines were available nearby. Eventually, however, the Army won out and the farmers were relocated to other areas of the state. Contractors then built the Kankakee Ordnance Works to manufacture TNT, tetryl and lead azide, and its twin, the Elwood Ordnance Works, which loaded these explosives into shells and bombs. The other own ordnance plants were shell and bomb-loading plants. The Army's own ordnance plants at Rock Island and Savanna also increased production. Construction of the new plants stimulated boomtown conditions in nearby communities. Housing was scarce and trailer camps sprang up to meet the demand. Though the plants went to great lengths to ensure safety and security, there were accidents. The most serious took place at the Elwood Ordnance Works in June, 1942, when an explosion destroyed a building, killing 51 and injuring 41 others. 22

Boomtown conditions prevailed in Seneca where the Chicago Bridge and Iron Company built and operated a shipyard under a contract with the Navy to build landing ships tank (LST's). Since all coastal yards were working full-time on other types of ships, new yards were necessary and the Navy decided to build some on inland waterways with sufficient depth to float the vessels down to the sea. The Illinois River was part of the Great Lakes-Gulf Waterway with a nine-foot channel down the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers. From June, 1942 to June, 1945, the Seneca shipyard built 157
of the large landing ships and launched them sideways into the Illinois River. The first ship took to the water on December 14, 1942. Others followed at ever-increasing intervals as the work force gained experience and efficiency. Since housing was scarce, Federal housing agencies erected temporary housing for the workers, many of which were from other parts of the country. Seneca went from a population of 1235 in 1942 to 6600 by 1944. The community had to expand its schools and other services to accommodate the newcomers. Many residents resented this and made the migrants feel unwelcome. Some shipyard workers joined local schools, but even then, many were made to feel unwelcome. The community itself benefitted from the influx of shipyard workers. New churches were built, while older ones gained new members and income. Empty store buildings were remodeled and opened to new business establishments. Food stores doubled or tripled their business. Other retailers enjoyed a similar expansion. Some locals even claimed that the boom rescued several businessmen from bankruptcy. The community itself gained a new school building, a new drainage and sewage system and additional fire fighting equipment.

Several other Illinois shipyards also built naval vessels of various kinds. Pullman-Standard constructed and operated a shipyard on Lake Calumet, which erected small escort vessels and landing ships medium (LSM's) for the United
states and British navies. Other Chicago-area yards built small minesweepers, minelayers, tugboats, small cargo vessels, small oil tankers and invasion barges. An East Peoria firm turned out assault boats. Quincy Barge Builders constructed landing craft tanks (LCT's). The construction of naval vessels in Illinois and other Great Lakes states presented some major difficulties. In the first place, the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817 prohibited such activity until March, 1941 when the United States and Canada made a new agreement lifting the ban provided the vessels were not used on the Great Lakes. A much greater difficulty lay in getting the vessels out of the Lakes and other waterways to seaports. Most naval vessels that came out of yards on the Lakes and various rivers had a sufficiently shallow draft to go down the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers, the Erie Canal, the Welland Canal and other waterways. However, when a yard at Manitowoc, Wisconsin built submarines, they were floated down the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers in special cradles constructed for the purpose, which lifted them free of shoals. Chicago yards on the north branch of the Chicago River had their own problems with shallow water. Low bridges were another obstacle and eventually some communities had to raise them or make them movable. 26

The demand for steel from such industries as ship-building forced the steel industry to increase capacity in order to increase production. As early as June, 1940, the
industry in Chicago was operating at 93.3 percent of capacity and soon United States Steel Company's Carnegie-Illinois Division added two electric furnaces at the South Works in Chicago. Early in 1941, another United States Steel subsidiary expanded its facilities in Joliet. Most additions to capacity resulted from improvements to existing facilities to make them efficient. The industry was reluctant to build new facilities to meet the demands of defense, and later, war production as this would add to steel-making capacity, thus leaving them with excess capacity in peacetime and driving up costs. They wanted federal financing of the new facilities and got it from the Defense Plant Corporation. Late in 1941, Inland Steel Company started construction of three blast furnaces, two of them financed by the government. Early in January, 1942, Republic Steel Corporation started construction of six electric furnaces at its Chicago plant, all financed by the government. The furnaces were part of the first all-electric steel mill in the nation. It went into partial operation in 1943 producing electric alloy steel. In January, 1944, the War Production Board recommended that work be stopped on construction of a bar mill at the plant. This was soon reversed and the mill was completed. Ultimately, the plant consisted of nine electric furnaces, four batteries of coke ovens, a blast furnace, four open hearths, a blooming mill, a bar mill, a
breakdown mill and three ore unloading bridges. It went into production late in 1944. Some companies did construct additional facilities at their own expense, but the most significant facilities were financed by the Defense Plant Corporation. The improvements raised total steel production capacity in the Chicago area from 15,429,600 tons on December 31, 1939 to 18,600,300 tons as of January 1, 1945. The Defense Plant Corporation also financed expansion of other Illinois steel-making facilities such as Granite City Steel Company's plant in Granite City. All of these improvements helped to increase steel production to record levels. Chicago area steel ingot production rose from 17,665,000 tons in 1942 to peak at 18,090,000 tons in 1944 before dropping to 16,494,000 tons in 1945. Pig iron production at Chicago-area mills went from 6,536,098 tons in 1939 to 13,115,268 tons in 1944 and 11,510,810 tons in 1945.25

Feeding the state's mills, factories and utilities were its highly mechanized coal mines. Illinois coal production went from 51,033,319 tons in 1941 to 77,400,031 tons in 1944. Production dropped somewhat in 1945 due to labor shortages. Since coal was more plentiful than fuel oil, users of the latter were encouraged to convert back to coal. Even then, however, consumers were urged to buy early. Dealers secured loans to help them build up stocks during the summer. Late in the fall of 1943, the Solid Fuels Administration restricted consumer purchases of coal due to shor-
tages caused in part by labor difficulties and labor shortages and mounting demands from industry. Early in 1945, a slump in coal supplies led to a brownout, which curtailed some usage of electricity. During 1943 and 1944, strikes led the Solid Fuels Administration to take over the mines and operate them for a time. Sales of Illinois coal met another obstacle in St. Louis, whose smoke abatement ordnance barred Southern Illinois coal from the city due to its excessive smoke, and required coal to be shipped in from other states. This led to protests from Southern Illinois coal interests and local communities and also from the Midwest Shipper's Association, which charged that the shipping of coal from other states to St. Louis was a wasteful use of railroad cars in wartime. Illinois mines also contributed lead, zinc, fluorspar and other minerals to the war effort. Galena's long-dormant lead and zinc mines revived. Southern Illinois mines produced almost half the nation's supply of fluorspar, which was used in making steel, hydrofluoric acid and cryolite, a mineral used in making aluminum. Illinois fluorspar production increased from 117,465 tons in 1939 to 161,949 tons in 1942.\textsuperscript{26}

One industry which was highly dependent on the output of Illinois coal mines was the electric power system. The growth of war industries led to a heavy demand for electric power and also natural gas. Indeed, the Seneca shipyard and several major war industries in the Chicago area were loca-
ted in Northern Illinois partly because of the abundant supply of electricity. Still, some utilities had to add generating units at power plants and even built new power plants to meet the need for power. Power production increased sharply. The Commonwealth Edison system, which generated 7,550,378,224 kilowatthours in 1939, peaked at 11,583,894,760 kilowatthours in 1944 before dropping to 11,349,117,347 kilowatthours in 1945. Utilities also added interconnecting lines to allow for pooling of power to serve specific war plants or as an emergency reserve. The Commonwealth Edison system and the Wisconsin Electric Power built an emergency power line between Waukegan and Kenosha to connect the two systems and serve as an emergency reserve source of power for either system. New extensions were limited due to shortages of materials. Rural electrification projects were curtailed, though some restrictions were eased in 1943 to permit some extensions to improve farm production. To conserve the use of electricity, the nation went on Daylight Saving Time or Wartime year-round. One result was to change the time of peakload from the late afternoon to the morning. It changed back when Central Standard Time returned after the war. Early in 1945, a coal shortage led to a brownout, which curtailed outside lighting and forced night clubs, taverns, and other places of entertainment to close at midnight, thus depriving them of much of their business. Natural gas usage met with similar restrictions. Extensions
to new homes were limited by shortages of materials. Some gas companies resorted to plastic pipe. Gas deliveries were cut to businesses, which could use other fuels. There was a heavy emphasis on conservation, though some new pipelines were built and old gas manufacturing plants reopened.\textsuperscript{27}

Unlike most commodities, production of oil from Illinois wells declined during the war. After peaking at 147,647,000 barrels in 1940, production dropped to 82,260,000 barrels by 1943. There were several reasons for this, including the loss of experienced labor to the armed forces, shortages of equipment and price restrictions for crude oil. One of the biggest causes for the decline was restrictions on drilling by the War Production Board and the Office of Petroleum Coordinator, later renamed the Petroleum Administration for War, headed by Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes. The War Production Board wanted to limit steel, while the other agencies wanted to conserve oil, so they limited drilling to one well for every forty acres. Under pressure from Illinois operators and their congressional allies, Ickes eased the restriction somewhat, but never removed all restraints until after the war. The General Assembly passed a mild oil conservation measure in 1941, but failed to enact stronger legislation despite pressure from Ickes. The oil industry also expanded refineries and other facilities during the war.\textsuperscript{28}
Most companies prospered during the war, but profits were often lower than before Pearl Harbor due to rising taxes, especially the excess profits tax, and renegotiation of war contracts. Renegotiation grew out of a congressional fear of war profiteering. Under the law passed April 28, 1942, the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board could renegotiate contracts if a firm's profits seemed excessive. The company would then refund any excess to the government. Even then, while many firms had higher profits in 1941 than during the rest of the war years, they still did much better than during the Depression years of the thirties. Many firms, especially smaller ones, grew to an unusual size under the impetus of war contracts. While some small manufacturers suffered, others did quite well. During the war years, the nature of manufacturing in Illinois also shifted somewhat. Heavy industry grew in proportion to food and clothing. In 1939, iron and steel industries comprised 21.2 percent of total employment in the Chicago area, while food industries employed 14 percent of the workforce, printing and publishing, 10.2 percent, textiles, 9 percent and machinery, 16.5 percent. In 1948, iron and steel was down to 20.5 percent of total employment in the Chicago area, but machinery was up to 24.1 percent, food processing was down to 11.2 percent, printing and publishing, 8.3 percent and textiles only 6.4 percent. Also, even though iron and steel had decreased its share of the workforce, the industry grew in capacity during the war.
Illinois emerged from the war as the center of diesel engine manufacture. New industries sprang up in light metals, plastics and the like, while existing firms introduced new product lines based on their wartime experiences. Though Chicago failed to become an aircraft manufacturing center as she had hoped, she increased in stature as a financial center during the war.29

Illinois industries produced a variety of products during the war ranging from small parts to warships. Since materials were insufficient to allow manufacture of all civilian product and military supplies, the national defense agencies charged with coordination of industrial production found it necessary to devise a system of priorities for allocation of scarce commodities. Production of some civilian products had to utilize substitute materials. Even war plants themselves sometimes made extensive use of wood as a substitute for steel in their construction. Since companies without a priority could not get raw materials, it was imperative for them to convert to manufacture needed military supplies instead of civilian goods. To assist them in conversion to defense and then war production, the Office of Production Management and later the War Production Board sponsored clinics and other programs. State and local political and business leaders also held clinics and lobbied procurement agencies for contracts for firms located in the state. Industries also formed pools to solicit defense
business or checked out contracts themselves to see if there were products they could make. In some cases, the Defense plant Corporation financed new industrial facilities in order to get military equipment or materials for which there was a critical need such as aircraft engines. Through their own efforts as well as those of political and business leaders and federal agencies, most of the state's mills, mines and factories managed to play some sort of role on the production front. The experience involved a good deal of cooperation between different levels of government and between businessmen themselves in dealing with problems of priorities, solicitation of business, acquisition of tools and plant protection. It also required some versatility since most industries produced military items that were at least somewhat different and often a good deal different from what they made in peacetime. By and large, Illinois industry profitted from the war. Though many companies did not do as well financially as they would in peacetime, the tremendous growth in the size of their establishments and the volume of business and experience they had acquired during the war left them well positioned to participate in the postwar world.


7 Chicago Tribune, October 1, 1940, pp. 27, 29, October 19, 1940, p. 13, December 13, 1940, p. 8; Watters, The Production Front, pp. 20, 38-39.


9 Bureau of the Budget, The United States at War, pp. 60-63, 73-79, 105.


CHAPTER IV

LABOR RELATIONS AND MANPOWER MANAGEMENT IN WARTIME ILLINOIS

The Second World War brought a change in labor-management and inter-union relations from confrontation to cooperation. During the thirties and early forties, labor unions fought industrial concerns of all sizes seeking recognition and better wages and benefits for their members. Some labor disputes involved rival unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) as well as independents, some of them company-dominated, all competing for the allegiance of the workforce. The struggle disrupted defense production as strikes hit steel, farm equipment and other vital industries. Pearl Harbor changed all this. Unions strove to cooperate with management and with each other in pushing production. Rival unions laid aside their jurisdictional disputes and for the most part ceased their competitive efforts. Most companies and unions settled their disputes through collective bargaining or if this proved unsuccessful, submitted them to the War Labor Board and agreed to abide by its decisions. Some strikes did occur, but most were the result of intransigence on the part of one or both parties in a dispute. In a few instances, strikes were se-
rious enough to bring government takeover of the affected industries. For the most part, however, labor leaders tried to prevent strikes and squelch those that did occur. The war brought a measure of labor peace and productivity. In some cases, defense and wartime conditions helped induce a reluctant management to accept unions. The war also brought an unprecedented degree of government control over the workforce as the War Manpower Commission sought to manage the labor supply so as to place workers where they were most needed while the War Labor Board settled disputes to maintain production and restricted wages in an effort to hold down inflation. Wartime labor shortages also created employment opportunities for women and blacks and other minorities.

Union membership grew rapidly in the thirties and forties as the American Federation of Labor organized new craft union locals while its offshoot and rival, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, established new industrial unions in mass production industries. The first convention of the State Industrial Union Council in Springfield in September, 1941 had representatives from 29 international unions and 272 local industrial unions. In 1943, the state organization had a membership of 270,995 though it lost the United Mine Workers in 1942 and expelled several unions in the late forties on grounds of Communist domination. Alarmed by the rapid growth of its rival, the American Federation of
Labor eventually reversed its traditional opposition to industrial unions and organized federal locals in mass production industries. Membership in the Federation's state affiliate, the Illinois State Federation of Labor rose from 76,000 in 1933 to 273,000 in 1941 and over 800,000 by 1950. Outside labor unions of any kind had to contend with the hostility of employers, many of whom went to great lengths to avoid dealing with outside unions, sometimes forming company unions disguised as independent unions. However, if a company found that it had to deal with an outside union, it sometimes favored those affiliated with the American Federation of Labor as they were generally more conservative and less militant, though an anti-union management could provoke as much militance in an AFL local as in a CIO union.

Organized labor benefitted greatly from the defense boom. Not only were its members employed in high-paying jobs, but companies were less reluctant to accept unionization. The Steel Workers Organizing Committee rebounded from its defeat by "Little Steel" in a 1937 strike and resumed organizing activity. Short walkouts occurred whenever local grievances developed. The strikes aggravated the "Little Steel" companies, but they could do little to stop them. Defense production gave them plenty of business and they were anxious to keep experienced workers rather than fire them for union activity. The union also picketed the mills and forced incoming workers to sign up with the union and pay union dues.
or be barred from the plant. The National Labor Relations Board helped matters by ordering the companies to disestablish company unions. The companies finally gave in and signed contracts with the Steel Workers Organizing Committee in 1941. The heavy defense business and disestablishment of its company unions finally forced the companies to accept unionization. The union also conducted dues-picketing at U. S. Steel's Gary Works in the spring and fall of that year in order to force a union shop. In the summer of 1942, the union, now renamed the United Steelworkers of America, won exclusive bargaining rights for all workers at U. S. Steel.²

In 1936, the Farm Equipment Workers Organizing Committee, an offshoot of the Steelworkers union, set out to conquer the farm equipment industry, only to run into determined opposition from International Harvester. After its company unions were outlawed, the company simply converted them to independent unions which it still dominated. The Farm Equipment Workers union complained to the National Labor Relations Board, which found that the independents were really company unions and in February, 1941, ordered them disbanded. In January of that year, the Farm Equipment Workers started organizing International Harvester. It faced competition from the United Auto Workers. At that time, the Congress of Industrial Organizations allowed competition between member unions in organizing industries. This resulted in a bitter feud between the Farm Equipment Workers
and the United Auto Workers. The Congress of Industrial organizations tried to persuade them to merge, but the Farm Equipment Workers resisted. The United Auto Workers resorted to raiding its rival, especially in the postwar era, and ultimately, with the assistance of International Harvester, destroyed the Farm Equipment Workers in the mid-fifties.\(^3\)

In 1941, both unions faced another competitor in the American Federation of Labor. When the independents were disestablished at International Harvester, the Federation started converting them into federal locals with the support of management, which was anxious to keep out the CIO, especially the Farm Equipment Workers, which they considered Communist-led. The latter, which struck two plants in January, 1941 as part of its drive for union recognition, responded to the threat from the AFL by extending the strike to other plants in March. The federal locals then led a back to work movement which broke the strike. The company also granted wage hikes to reduce the attractiveness of the CIO. However, when the National Labor Relations Board held elections, the CIO won most of the plants. The Farm Equipment Workers took four, including the main plants in Chicago, while the United Auto Workers captured plants in other states. Only two plants chose federal locals, and one of them switched to the Farm Equipment Workers in 1944. Independents hung on at a few plants, but by the end of the war, most had been voted out by the workers in favor of outside
unions. By 1945, the Farm Equipment Workers held eleven plants, and the United Auto Workers six, while the American Federation of Labor had the Milwaukee plant and craft unions in other plants. The National Defense Mediation Board and its successor, the War Labor Board, eventually settled the contract between the company and the Farm Equipment Workers in 1942. The union also organized Caterpillar in Peoria, defeating an independent union and an AFL federal local. John Deere was able to fend off unionization of most of its plants until 1943 when the United Auto Workers won four plants, while the Farm Equipment Workers took one.4

While International Harvester was opposed to outside unions in principle, it especially objected to the militant Farm Equipment Workers union, which reputedly was Communist-led. At that time, the Congress of Industrial Organizations willingly hired Communists and their sympathizers as organizers. Some reputed reds rose through the ranks to dominate locals and even entire unions such as the Farm Equipment Workers and the United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America, with which it merged in the late forties after both were expelled from the Congress of Industrial Organizations for their Communist leanings. The CIO was concerned about the Communist issue, but was quite happy to use Marxists to organize and build its affiliated unions until after the war when the reds were expelled. The Communist issue did hurt the organization's public image, and the American
Federation of Labor as well as many industry leaders were quick to take advantage of this. A congressional committee investigating domestic subversives came to Chicago in the fall of 1939 and accused several local CIO officials of being communists. The committee, headed by Texas Congressman Martin Dies, made further accusations throughout the war years as did the *Chicago Tribune* and local business and labor leaders. Frequently, the paper played up dissident union members' charges of Communists in union leadership positions.⁵

The American Federation of Labor, however, suffered from bad publicity due to the influence of racketeers in some of its affiliated unions. In Chicago, local gangsters gained control of several locals in service industries. Later, alleged labor leaders sold jobs and union cards at inflated prices. In 1941 and 1942, George Ziller, a reputed Democratic leader, forced potential laborers and truckers to pay exorbitant fees to get work at several ordnance plants. Truckers had to join the Teamsters union and laborers the hod carriers union. Ziller collected the dues. After many delays, including changes of venue, he pleaded guilty in April, 1945 and was fined. Other AFL unions drew criticism for charging exorbitant initiation fees to join the union and get jobs at ordnance plants, though several cut their fees following the exposure of the Ziller scandal.⁶

Besides facing opposition from company management, many unions had to deal with worker apathy and sometimes
outright hostility. Some workers felt they should not have to join a union to get a job. Others questioned what the union could do for them. The security of a good job seemed more important than any possible gains from unionization. Even union members were apathetic. They had no comprehension of the expense of running a union and could see no need to keep up with their dues. Unions resorted to dues picketing simply to collect enough funds to keep going. Ultimately, they issued reports on audits of their funds to their members and collected dues through deduction from paychecks.

As the nation started to rearm, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his advisors saw a need for settling industrial disputes that threatened defense production. In March, 1941, the President appointed the National Defense Mediation Board to negotiate settlements for strikes in defense industries. The Board was composed of representatives of industry, labor and the public, and it handled only disputes which could not be settled by the parties themselves or by the United States Conciliation Service. Individual cases were handled by tripartite panels selected by the Board from its members while the entire group worked out policy. It relied on public opinion to enforce its recommendations. Disputants who refused to accept them might find public opinion going against them. The Board also required strikers to go back to work while mediation was in progress. It usually was more successful in ending strikes than in
resolving the issues and many of its cases, including that of International Harvester, were passed on to the War Labor Board.³

One of the Mediation Board's successes was settlement of a dispute at Western Cartridge Company in East Alton. The company, which had defense contracts with the United States and Great Britain, utilized individual contracts with its employees and an inside union to stave off outside unions. In January, 1941, however, the Chemical Workers Union, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, began organizing the smokeless powder workers, who comprised about 550 employees out of a total workforce of 6500. The union asked for recognition, but the company refused to bargain on the grounds that the smokeless powder division was not a proper bargaining unit and that recognition would interfere with individual contracts. The union appealed to the National Labor Relations Board, which certified the unit as a bargaining unit and held an election, which the union won. The company refused to negotiate and the union threatened to strike. The company also set up a subsidiary plant, the East Alton Manufacturing Company, and announced plans to transfer the smokeless powder workers to that plant. The union feared that the change might be detrimental to the workers, and when the dispute went to the National Defense Mediation Board, sought protection for its members as well as union recognition and a union shop. The company, meanwhile,
granted a wage increase to all employees except those in the smokeless powder division. After discussions with the Mediation Board, the company finally agreed to bargain with the union. Negotiations soon broke down, however, and the Board got the case. The two sides continued negotiations before the Board and separately with little progress.9

On July 24, the Mediation Board recommended a wage increase, abolition of individual contracts and recognition of the union. Although it refused to endorse a closed shop, it did recommend maintenance of membership, a provision under which an employee belonging to a union would have to remain in it for the duration of a contract in order to keep his job. The Board saw a need for some form of union security in view of company efforts to eliminate union members. Nevertheless, maintenance of membership was a controversial issue which finally came to a head with the War Labor Board. Western Cartridge and the union accepted the Mediation Board's findings and signed a contract on August 2, though some issues were left for later bargaining or arbitration. This did not end disputes at Western Cartridge. The company's anti-labor policies eventually led to two strikes in the fall of 1942.10

Although the National Defense Mediation Board was successful in ending several strikes, it foundered and broke up over a series of coal strikes in 1941. John L. Lewis, a Republican who supported Roosevelt in 1936, broke with him
when he refused to assist the Steel Workers Organizing Committee in its strike against "Little Steel" in 1937. As an isolationist, Lewis also objected to the President's foreign policies, fearing that war would bring restrictions on union rights and collective bargaining. Lewis opposed any restrictions even in wartime. In 1940, he backed Republican Wendell Willkie and advised union members to do likewise. When most CIO unions refused to go along with him, he stepped down as head of the organization after the election, and in 1942, took his United Mine Workers out of the CIO.  

In the spring of 1941, the United Mine Workers negotiated with the Appalachian Conference of bituminous coal operators on a series of proposals including elimination of a difference in wage rates between northern and southern mines. Southern mines paid lower wages on grounds of lower living costs. The union and northern operators feared that if this continued, competitive advantages would shift coal production to southern fields. The South refused to yield and the miners struck after the contract expired on March 31. In Illinois, the Progressive Mine Workers, who had left the United Mine Workers in 1932, joined the walkout. Roosevelt urged both sides to end the strike and resume negotiations. The northern operators soon reached a tentative agreement with the United Mine Workers, but the southerners, who withdrew from the Appalachian Conference on April 11, continued to resist. The union and the northern operators
continued the strike in an effort to force the South to yield. On April 24, as coal shortages threatened, the National Defense Mediation Board took up the dispute and on April 30, the strike ended, though most Illinois miners remained out until May 3 in a dispute over local issues. In June, the Mediation Board recommended elimination of the wage differential for daytime shifts. After the southerners finally agreed to this, Lewis pressured them into signing a contract identical to the one which he negotiated with the northern operators. The new contract, signed July 6, raised wages and abolished the wage differential. 12

Soon afterward, Lewis sought to extend the terms of the agreement to the captive coal mines owned by steel companies. The operators generally agreed except for a demand for a union shop. The union already had 95 percent of the miners in the captive mines and thought it only logical that it should have the rest. The companies, however, feared that if they accepted a union shop in the mines, they would have to accept it in the steel mills, where the Steelworkers union demanded the same terms. If the government imposed a union shop, they could argue in negotiations with the Steelworkers that it did not constitute a precedent. On September 15, the miners walked out. The National Defense Mediation Board promptly took up the case and within a few days, Lewis ordered the miners back to work for a month while the Board considered the dispute. A Board panel tried to avoid the
union shop issue because of its repercussions in the steel and shipbuilding industries and tried to turn the matter over to the full board while the mines continued working. Lewis declined and called the miners out on October 26. After a personal plea by the President, Lewis agreed to a temporary reopening of the mines while the Mediation Board took up the dispute. However, on November 10, the Board voted nine-to-two against a union shop in the mines. The two CIO members resigned in protest, thereby leading to the Board's collapse. Roosevelt summoned both sides to the White House on November 14 and requested them to continue coal production and negotiations, but warned that he would not impose a closed shop. On November 17, the miners struck again. On November 22, Lewis accepted a proposal by President Roosevelt for arbitration and ordered the miners back to work. The panel, which included Lewis, Benjamin Fairless of U. S. Steel and John Steelman of the Conciliation Service, voted two to one for a union shop. Though Lewis won his victory, his tactics angered the public and led to numerous anti-strike bills in Congress though none passed.¹³

Soon after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt convened business and labor leaders in Washington to establish some basis for wartime cooperation. The conferees agreed on a program banning strikes and lockouts for the duration, peaceful settlement of disputes and creation of a War Labor Board to handle disputes which could not be solved through
normal procedures. In effect, labor agreed not to strike, but to trust its fortunes to the Board. In January, 1942, Roosevelt appointed the National War Labor Board with representatives of business, labor and the public. The Board, which replaced the National Defense Mediation Board, handled disputes which threatened the war effort. Later, its duties were expanded to include wage stabilization. Sometimes, it also handled cases of union recognition and other issues normally dealt with by the National Labor Relations Board. When employees struck, the War Labor Board had to get them back to work. Both sides were expected to abide by its decisions, though they were advisory and not enforceable in the courts. Late in 1942, ten regional boards, including one in Chicago, were established to handle local wage stabilization and local disputes subject to review by the National Board. The War Labor Board succeeded partly because the country was unified and partly because both management and labor were represented on the Board and took an active role in policy-making.

One of the first issues the War Labor Board had to deal with was union security, the same issue which tore apart the National Defense Mediation Board. Unions generally wanted a union shop or closed shop while management wanted an open shop. Union maintenance of membership was a compromise. No one was forced to join a union, but those who belonged to a union when a contract was signed had to remain
in it while the contract was in force or lose their jobs. Unions wanted some form of security as protection against hostile employers, especially in the absence of a strike threat. Public members of the War Labor Board supported union security for this reason and also because they felt that a stable union would insure better plant discipline and observance of the no-strike pledge and discourage inter-union rivalry and raiding, which sometimes disrupted industrial peace before the war. 15

Union security was a major issue in the dispute between International Harvester and the Farm Equipment Workers union dating back to the spring of 1941, which the Mediation Board passed on to the War Labor Board. In the spring of 1942, the Farm Equipment Workers and the American Federation of Labor joined in submitting the dispute to the Board. In April, the Board voted eight to four to recommend maintenance of membership in the contract subject to a referendum of the membership of the unions involved. Though industry members dissented, they indicated a willingness to accept maintenance of membership with an escape period during which an employee could resign from a union without losing his job. The Board soon adopted this provision and made it a standard feature of maintenance of membership agreements. International Harvester, though still opposing union security, especially with the Farm Equipment Workers union, finally accepted it in order to avoid any disruption of war produc-
A referendum of union members approved maintenance of membership by a wide margin and the company had little labor trouble for the rest of the war.\textsuperscript{16}

Although the War Labor Board saw maintenance of membership as desirable to obtain union security, it sometimes refused to grant it or even withdrew it if a union violated the no-strike pledge. The Chemical Workers Union struck Western Cartridge in September, 1942 for refusing to reinstate its president. He was fired in June for entering a restricted area without permission, but the union attributed the firing to his union activities. Even though the company had a contract with the union, it continued trying to get rid of the union and keep out other unions. American Federation of Labor President William Green ordered the strikers back to work, but blamed the strike on the company's anti-labor policies. In November, the War Labor Board ruled that the company's policies provoked the strike and ordered it to reinstate some workers and deal with the union; but it also criticized the union for calling a strike over minor issues and refused to continue maintenance of membership in a new contract. Meanwhile, a second AFL union struck the casting and brass mill shops in October, accusing the company of refusing to deal with it to settle grievances. Again, Green ordered the men back to work. The National Labor Relations Board, meanwhile, ruled that the company had interfered with union organization, discriminated against workers and domi-
nated an independent union. The Board ordered the independent union disestablished and directed the company to cease its anti-union policies. The company appealed to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, but the court ruled against it in May, 1943 and ordered enforcement of the Board's ruling. 17

At first, the War Labor Board had no set policies and proceeded on a case by case basis settling disputes on their merits as they arose. Over time, the Board developed some policies based on similar cases. Some settlements provided for automatic deduction of union dues from paychecks when the physical difficulty of collecting dues interfered with war production. The Board also dealt with wages, vacation plans and other issues. In June, 1944, following a strike by a United Auto Workers local at a John Deere plant in Moline, the Board penalized the strikers and ordered withdrawal of the company's vacation plan, replacing it with one less liberal. 18

One of the War Labor Board's most troublesome issues was wages. On April 27, 1942, President Roosevelt announced a program for holding down inflation, including controls on wages as well as prices. The Board had to stabilize wages by restricting wage hikes. At the time, the Steelworkers union was negotiating a contract with the Little Steel companies. The chief issues in dispute were union security and wages. The companies objected mostly to union security,
though some felt that wages should be frozen in wartime. In July, the War Labor Board concluded that since the cost of living had gone up 15 percent since January 1, 1941, wages should be adjusted accordingly. The Board awarded a pay hike of 44 cents a day, far less than the $1 a day increase the steelworkers wanted, but more than the companies wished to pay. The union accepted it glumly, while the industry accepted it under protest. The Board also raised wages for U. S. Steel and generally used the Little Steel formula as a yardstick for future wage settlements. Hence if a company's wages were already high enough, they could go no higher. 19

The Little Steel formula did not solve the problem since the War Labor Board could only handle disputes. It could do nothing about wage agreements arrived at through collective bargaining. Many companies raised wages to keep their workers and attract others. This naturally forced other to raise wages. On October 2, 1942, Congress passed the Economic Stabilization Act and on the following day, the President ordered new wage and price controls. Now the War Labor Board had to develop and administer a wage-stabilization program. Employers could not raise wages without approval of the War Labor Board. The President forbade wage hikes except to eliminate inequalities and substandard wages. Even then the Board had to maintain wages at the level of September 15, 1942. In April, 1943, the President issued a "hold the line" order further restricting wages and pri-
One immediate result was denial of thousands of wage hike petitions in the Chicago Regional War Labor Board office. Pay restrictions caused problems for employers wishing to satisfy their workforce. Early in 1943, the Studebaker Aircraft Engine plant in Chicago agreed to a request by a United Auto Workers local to raise wages to the level of General Motors plants, only to suffer some embarrassment when the Regional War Labor Board denied its request to raise wages. Another Chicago firm was fined for raising wages. Employers continued to think up ways of raising wages without violating the stabilization program, usually through fringe adjustments such as job reclassifications, paid holidays and the like. Meanwhile, prices continued to rise, though at a slower rate due to price control, and by 1943, labor unions were demanding relaxation of the Little Steel formula. Though some cracks did occur, the formula held for the most part. Between January, 1941 and October, 1942, basic wage rates in manufacturing rose 15 percent. Between October, 1942 and July, 1945, however, the increase was only 9 percent. Meanwhile, the cost of living rose about 33.3 percent between January, 1941 and July, 1945, hence the labor unrest. Sometimes, the War Labor Board approved a wage hike if it were necessary to attract workers into a critically important industry. In 1944, the radio manufacturing industry in Chicago found it difficult to attract workers due to low wages. Representatives of the armed forces, union
leaders and company officials persuaded the War Labor Board to approve a wage hike for the industry.\textsuperscript{20}

Though most business and labor leaders went along with wartime restrictions, there were some who dissented and defied the government. Usually, the government responded by seizing the strikebound industry. At one point, from December 28, 1943 to January 18, 1944, the entire railroad industry was taken over to end a strike, but the takeover was short-lived and the companies continued to operate the roads.\textsuperscript{21}

The situation was different with the Toledo, Peoria and Western Railroad, an Illinois carrier whose owner, George P. McNear, refused to deal with unions and who considered standard railroad work rules obsolete and inefficient. When he issued new ones, the unions struck on December 28, 1941. McNear refused to accept arbitration, and after all efforts to end the strike failed, the government took over the line in March, 1942 and operated it for the rest of the war.\textsuperscript{22}

Sewell Avery also disliked unions, but his main purpose in resisting the War Labor Board was to dramatize his opposition to the growth of presidential powers under the New Deal and War Powers legislation. Conservatives felt he was fighting their fight. As president of Montgomery Ward, Avery fought unionization in the thirties and early forties. Even after a CIO union won and election at the Chicago store and warehouse in January, 1942, Avery refused to deal with
the union. In October, the War Labor Board ordered the company to sign a contract providing for maintenance of membership, voluntary dues checkoff, arbitration of grievances and seniority rights. Avery refused until finally in December, after several orders by the President, he agreed to sign a contract, but under protest. However, the company continued to fight the union and in November, 1943, notified the union that it would not negotiate a renewal of the contract because it doubted that the union still had a majority of the workforce. When the War Labor Board ordered a temporary extension of the contract, the company refused. On April 12, after another refusal, the union struck. Other unions supported the strike by refusing to cross picket lines. Truckers refused to pick up or deliver packages at Ward properties. On April 23, Roosevelt ordered the strikers back to work and the company to comply with the War Labor Board's decision. The union called off the strike, but the company denied the authority of the War Labor Board and challenged the President's right to seize a civilian business. The government responded by taking over the company's Chicago offices. With photographers clicking away, Sewell Avery was carried from his office by Army troops. The occupation was short-lived. On May 9, after the union won an election by a large margin, the company was returned to its management.23

During the summer, the union tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a contract, and the War Labor Board again ordered
renewal of the contract and some wage hikes. The company again refused to comply and on December 27, its employees struck. At the same time, disputes arose in Ward stores in some other cities due to the company's rejection of War Labor Board orders. The situation was especially serious in Detroit where other unions pledged support to Ward employees. On December 28, the government took over Ward properties in Chicago and six other cities. This time, the Army operated the business, using men experienced in retail trade. The government also filed a suit in district court for a judgment on its right to seize the properties under executive order. On January 27, 1945, Federal District Judge Philip L. Sullivan ruled against the government on grounds that the War Labor Disputes Act authorized seizure of facilities used in production of items used in the war effort, but he did not feel this included distribution. However, the government won on appeal on June 8, when the Circuit Court of Appeals held that production included distribution and also cited the company's own applications for priorities, which claimed that its materials and services were essential to the war effort. The Supreme Court refused to consider an appeal because the properties had been returned by then. Though the Army ran the stores until October, 1945, the union finally lost its fight.24

Defiance of wartime restrictions was not confined to management. John L. Lewis led a series of strikes in the
coal fields in 1943. In March, negotiations began on a new contract. The United Mine Workers sought a wage hike of $2 a day, which would break the Little Steel formula, and portal-to-portal pay (travel time from mine entrance to workplace and return). In late March, with the deadline approaching, the President asked both sides to continue production while working on a new contract. The union agreed to continue to May 1. On April 22, the case went to the War Labor Board, which ordered work to continue until a new contract was signed. However, late in April, miners started walking out and the strike soon became general. The President ordered seizure of the mines by Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes as head of the Solid Fuels Administration for War, and the miners returned to work. Lewis hoped to negotiate through Ickes, but the War Labor Board insisted that Ickes was to administer the mines while it settled the dispute. Lewis refused to negotiate with the Board, feeling that it had violated the no-strike agreement with the Little Steel formula which Lewis was out to break. To achieve his goals, he sought to divide and confuse his opponents among the operators and provoke inter-agency rivalry. Since Lewis refused to deal with the Board, it appointed a staff member to present the miners' case. On May 25, it denied the wage hike as contrary to the Little Steel rule and also denied portal-to-portal pay. The miners struck again soon afterward. Many members of the Progressive Mine Workers joined
the strikes, though officially, their union opposed them. Again, the President ordered the miners back to work and a truce was called until June 20. On June 18, the War Labor Board ordered amendments to the previous contract, but still turned down portal-to-portal pay. On June 21, the miners struck again. Lewis called it off on June 23 and extended the truce to October 31 on condition that the government run the mines. He preferred Ickes to the Board. Meanwhile, the strikes provoked public outrage sufficient to enable conservative forces in Congress to push through the Smith-Connally Act requiring advance notice of strikes and a strike vote. It also allowed the War Labor Board to subpeona witnesses. Lewis could no longer avoid appearing before the Board.  

Meanwhile, through the efforts of Governor Dwight Green, Illinois coal miners reached an agreement with the Illinois Coal Operators' Association providing for portal-to-pay and other benefits. Lewis appeared before the War Labor Board and urged them to use it as the basis for a national settlement, but eastern operators objected to its cost and the Board rejected it. Later, the Illinois operators and the United Mine Workers submitted a revision, but the Board rejected it on October 26. The miners struck again and again the President ordered them back to work. Soon afterward, the War Labor Board modified the second Illinois agreement and ordered it into effect. It gave the miners a wage hike, including portal-to-portal pay, but a longer work
Lewis had beaten, but not crushed the War Labor Board, and he had not cracked the Little Steel formula. His efforts and those of his militant followers gained them the enmity of much of the public and even of American labor, who blamed him for the passage of anti-strike legislation. In 1945, there were some coal strikes, but they never became general, and on April 11, 1945, a contract was signed.\footnote{26}

Wartime strikes were not uncommon. Many companies continued anti-union policies throughout the war. In 1944, the War Labor Board noted a growing tendency among Chicago-area employers to question the majority status of a union each time a contract came up for renewal. Mills Novelty Company, which normally made gambling equipment for sale to gangsters, helped organize and signed a contract with an AFL union after a CIO union won an election. Another firm refused to bargain with the United Auto Workers for two years after the union won an election. Both firms were represented by a Chicago law firm with several clients, all of whom followed the same policies, often resulting in strikes. Other strikes were caused by young and militant unions, whose members and often the leaders as well were unused to the discipline associated with such organizations. The huge Dodge-Chicago plant, with eleven different unions representing its diverse workforce, had over two hundred strikes, most of them short-lived. The overwhelming majority of wartime strikes were unauthorized work stoppages lasting a few
hours or at most a few days. In Illinois, strikes rose from 279 in 1942 to 492 in 1944 with a total of 1114 for 1942 to 1944. With 7.5 percent of the nation's non-agricultural workforce, Illinois had 9.5 percent of the nation's strikes in that period. Still, for the most part, the no-strike policy generally held. Though more Illinois workers were involved in strikes than in any year since 1927, the loss of time was only one-tenth that of 1927. Union leaders worked to avert strikes and to stop those that did occur. In 1944, the Amertorp torpedo plant in Forest Park had a great deal of labor unrest partly because of a request for a wage hike which the War Labor Board denied, though officials of the Steelworkers union complained of a bad element that had come into the plant. Some of these officials had to spend much of their time at the plant trying to stamp out strikes.27

Unions generally cooperated with each other in curbing disputes. The American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations called a truce and for the most part ceased jurisdictional raiding, though some firms continued to invite AFL unions into their plants to keep out the CIO. However, in 1943, workers at the International Harvester Farmall plant in Rock Island grew dissatisfied with their AFL Federal local and urged the United Farm Equipment Workers to organize their plant. The union started doing so, but backed off at the insistence of the War Labor Board and the CIO, which feared that this would dis-
rupt labor relations. In 1944, however, the union went ahead despite protests from the War Labor Board and the American Federation Labor and in June, 1944, easily won an election at the plant. However, a year later, the union itself was subjected to raiding by the United Auto Workers. There also were some unsuccessful attempts to merge the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The chief dissident from labor unity was John L. Lewis, who had grown disenchanted with the CIO and taken the United Mine Workers out in 1942. Lewis flirted with the American Federation of Labor from time to time, but always withdrew his union within a short time. Meanwhile, his union's District 50, created to organize Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers, set out to organize other fields and even raided existing AFL and CIO locals.  

Unions also worked with management in promoting production. In 1942, at the suggestion of the War Production Board and some labor leaders, many companies set up labor-management committees. The committee at U. S. Steel's South Works in Chicago had fourteen members evenly divided between management and labor. There were six subcommittees similarly divided dealing with personnel and safety, publicity, employee transportation, materials and products, practices and methods, and machinery and equipment. The committee and subcommittees devised a suggestion system, found ways of improving quality and conserving materials, conducted scrap
drives, developed ways of improving the operation of equipment, preventing delays and generally improving efficiency. The committee also promoted car pools, fought absenteeism and improved plant food service. Committees in other companies often had similar organizations and functions. Sometimes, friction developed over the composition of such companies as some companies sought labor representatives who did not belong to the union with bargaining rights and thus were unrepresentative of the workforce. Many companies feared that labor would try to get into management. For the most part, though labor-management committees worked well. Besides the committees, many companies developed suggestion systems. Many workers also contributed in other ways by giving up holidays so the plants could continue production. 29

One of the most serious problems in war production was the shortage of manpower. The draft took many of the younger men, thus forcing employers to look outside traditional labor pools to fill their needs. To assist them and utilize labor supplies more efficiently, President Roosevelt established the War Manpower Commission on April 18, 1942. It was organized into twelve regions corresponding to existing regions of the United States Employment Service. The Sixth Region, headquartered in Chicago, included Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin. Regions were broken into labor market areas, each with a director. Illinois's ten areas were headed by a state administrator. Also, in December, 1941,
all state employment services were brought under federal control in the United States Employment Service and the latter integrated with the War Manpower Commission. 30

One source of labor was the black community. On June 25, 1941, under pressure from black leaders, President Roosevelt issued an executive order banning discrimination in companies having defense contracts and also setting up a Fair Employment Practice Committee to investigate complaints of discrimination. The agency started as part of the Office of Production Management, then went to the War Manpower Commission and finally became an independent agency in 1943. It worked closely with the War Manpower Commission and the United States Employment Service in seeking jobs for blacks. Some companies such as International Harvester and Pullman-Standard already had significant numbers of black employees. Buick, Studebaker and others, however, discriminated against blacks and also Jews. A few firms also barred Catholics and aliens. The Fair Employment Practice Committee managed to end such discrimination in some cases. The United States Employment Service sought to recruit without discrimination and often got results. In January, 1942, one firm fired its employment manager and a superintendent for hiring two whites, but refusing to hire their black instructor in a defense training class. In August, 1942, a Chicago Union League survey found a 300 percent increase in the number of contractors employing blacks since January, 1941. The air-
craft and engine plants and mass transit lines in Chicago hired blacks while the meat packers, farm and railroad equipment companies increased their employment of blacks.  

Many companies, however, refused to hire blacks, usually claiming they had no segregated facilities to accommodate them. Some argued that other workers would not accept blacks. This was sometimes true since many AFL unions, especially railroad unions, barred blacks or segregated them into auxiliary locals dominated by all-white locals. CIO unions, however, welcomed blacks into their ranks and many were active in union affairs. Sometimes, local communities objected to employment of blacks at local industries, especially if they were imported to the community. A shortage of foundry workers in Rockford prompted the United States Employment Service to seek black laborers from other cities. Local residents objected, but still would not fill the positions themselves. The United States Employment Service tried for years to get Western Cartridge in East Alton to hire blacks, but community opposition made this impossible. Sometimes, employment or promotion of blacks prompted walkouts, even in CIO unions. In December, 1942, white toolmakers struck when a black was promoted to toolmaker at the Studebaker engine plant. In December, 1944, several hundred workers at the Pullman shipyard struck in protest against promotion of a black employee, but returned after a week without securing his demotion. Whites struck because they
feared loss of status and job security when blacks were employed and promoted. Usually, however, such strikes were short-lived and blacks stayed in their newly-won positions.32

Women were another important source of labor. Many were already employed in poorly-paid office work, service industries and industrial jobs. Many companies were reluctant to hire women for traditionally male jobs, but pressure from the United States Employment Service and the loss of men to the armed forces forced them to accept women. By the end of the war, there were few industries that did not employ women in production jobs. In Chicago, Republic Drill and Tool Company adapted its machinery and production processes to women and soon over 80 percent of its workforce were women. At the Bendix Aviation carburetor plant in Chicago, 80 percent of the workforce were women. Women drove taxis, directed traffic, worked at filling stations, drove buses in Rockford and highway trucks between Chicago and Iowa and operated interurban trains on the Chicago, North Shore and Milwaukee Railroad. Railroads employed women in shops and yards, stations, ticket offices and commuter trains. Women worked in Chicago steel mills, aircraft engine plants and shipyards, oil refineries in Wood River and Whiting, Indiana, fluorspar mines in Rosiclare and ordnance plants around the state. As they acquired experience, some moved into the ranks of supervisors. One woman, who left a supervisory position at a bank after a nervous breakdown,
worked at the Savanna ordnance plant supervising hundreds of employees loading TNT into shells. The attraction of high-paying jobs in war plants lured women from lower-paid jobs in laundries, beauty shops and other service industries. Even there, however, opportunities for women increased. By the end of the war, women managed over 500 Woolworth stores.33

Employment of women raised other issues. Many women were paid at a lower rate than men for the same work. The War Labor Board and the United States Employment Service urged equal pay for equal work and sometimes got results. In March, 1943, machinists at Hummer Manufacturing Company in Springfield struck to protest wage differentials between men and women. The company raised wages for women to those of men. Illinois passed legislation in the spring of 1943 requiring equal pay, but limited it to manufacturing. An attempt to strengthen it failed in 1945. In June, 1945, weekly earnings of women in Illinois industries averaged $32.86 as compared to $54.99 for men. In 1943, the General Assembly also passed a bill relaxing laws limiting women to eight hours a day amid increasing violations. There also was considerable debate about whether women would want to continue in wartime occupations. Conservatives, including some AFL unions, urged that women return home after the war. Even those who recognized that women would want to work expected them to choose more "feminine" employment. Actually, a United Auto Workers survey in 1944 revealed that almost 50
percent wanted to stay in factory work. Others wanted other jobs, but very few wanted to return home.34

Employment of women with children created a need for day-care facilities. In Chicago, the Office of Civilian Defense set up nurseries to care for children of war workers. In other communities, private groups and individuals established child care facilities for children of war workers. Many parents, however, were unable to secure day-care services or simply chose not to place their children in the care of others. Unattended children often got into trouble. This was especially true of older children and teen-agers. Juvenile delinquency became a serious problem all over the state. Boys ran in gangs, stole cars and engaged in vandalism, arson and petty theft. Young "Victory girls" or "patriotutes" seduced or were seduced by servicemen. In Springfield, arrests of young girls for prostitution increased 64 percent in 1942 while arrests for other sex offenses soared 104 percent. Because of such activity, venereal disease increased dramatically, thus posing a threat to servicemen as well as their dates. Political and civic leaders blamed parents, especially working mothers for the situation. However, with the need for labor growing, society could not simply demand that mothers stay home. Many communities responded with youth centers to serve the recreational needs of teenagers under adult supervision. Civilian defense organizations also put children of various ages to
work at tasks suited to their age groups.³⁵

Many teenagers went to work in war plants or worked on farms during the summer. The Illinois Central Railroad hired teenage boys as station agents and train crewmen. In November, 1942, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins lowered the age limit for employment of girls in war plants to sixteen. Employment of teenagers sparked controversy. While industry needed workers and even some educators urged part-time jobs for students, others felt that children should stay in school. Some compromised by urging students to work part-time or in the summer instead of quitting school to work full-time. This relieved the shortage of labor while keeping students in high school. Still, many dropped out to work in war plants, often illegally. By 1943, Illinois led the nation in child labor violations.³⁶

Illinois industries went to great lengths to secure an adequate labor force. Aside from hiring women, minorities and children, many recalled retirees and when possible hired the handicapped. Some used prisoners of war, though labor unions sometimes objected to this. Jamaicans and Barbadians were imported into Illinois, mainly to work on farms, but some worked in factories. Full employment dramatically reduced relief rolls. Even drifters disappeared into jobs.³⁷

Service industries had difficulty keeping people because of the attraction of higher wages in war plants and also because of the draft. Employees in industries consi-
dered essential were less likely to be drafted than those in nonessential industries. At first, service industries such as laundries were considered nonessential, but eventually the War Manpower Commission decided to classify them as locally essential when this was the case.\(^{38}\)

Workers also migrated to other cities because of higher wages. Freeport lost workers to Rockford where wages were low enough, but still 25 to 30 percent higher than Freeport. Labor shortages were aggravated by hoarding of labor and labor piracy. The problem appeared in Chicago in 1941 when companies hiked wages and engaged in extensive recruiting activities in an effort to attract workers. Out of town firms set up recruiting offices to hire workers with promises of exorbitant wages. In 1943, a farm equipment company pirated workers from LaSalle to work at its Rockford plant. A Litchfield shoe company engaged in labor piracy until it lost some of its own workers. The War Manpower Commission worked out labor stabilization agreements with war plants to curb the problem in specific communities.\(^{39}\)

As labor shortages intensified in the course of the war, the War Manpower Commission classified several communities as areas with critical labor shortages. By February, 1944, over 80 percent of the labor force in Illinois was in areas with a critical shortage of labor. For the last two years of the war, the state had the worst labor shortage in the nation. Most cities protested their classification as
areas with critical labor shortages since their industries had difficulty gaining new war contracts while the problem lasted. Some were more effective in dealing with the situation than others. When the Springfield-Decatur area was classified as having a severe labor shortage early in 1944, Springfield protested, but its industry and labor leaders also set to work to increase the labor supply and better manage manpower with employment ceilings, labor allowances and efforts to combat labor turnover and absenteeism by keeping stores and banks open on certain nights. Decatur was much slower to react, partly because smaller plants feared that Caterpillar, a major employer, would enjoy preferred treatment. The company was unpopular due to its recruiting policies, so much so that in 1943, the United States Employment Service office called in company officials to impress upon them the need for cooperation with the area labor stabilization program. Decatur did eventually adopt many of the measures that Springfield used in its program. Workers in areas of labor shortages had to work a 48-hour week. This stirred protests since many jobs did not require such a schedule. The goal was to release workers to jobs where they were needed. Unfortunately, long hours brought a decline in productivity and an increase in accidents and absenteeism. Another controversial measure was the job freeze for workers in essential jobs adopted by the War Manpower Commission in February, 1943. Labor leaders protested, especially Victor
Olander, secretary-treasurer of the Illinois State Federation of Labor, who likened it to slavery. Actually, workers could switch jobs in order to work at the highest level of skill in a war industry. They could not switch simply to make more money.  

During the course of the war, labor and management sought to settle disputes peacefully through negotiation, or if agreement could not be reached, through settlement by the War Labor Board. Although there were some strikes, many were due to intransigence on the part of one or both parties such as Sewell Avery, George P. McNear or John L. Lewis. Many others were short-lived walkouts arising out of minor grievances in a workforce unused to factory and union discipline. Most union leaders sought to cooperate with management in pushing production. Even companies with militant unions often experienced little trouble with them once contracts had been settled. In order to achieve labor peace, labor agreed not to strike, while management reluctantly accepted maintenance of membership, a form of union security. The War Labor board made this a standard feature of contract settlements, accepting labor's argument that this would help bring labor peace by creating stability and preventing jurisdictional raids by rival unions and other labor difficulties. The Board also was quick to discipline both labor and management if either violated agreements or simply refused to accept them. Most disputes, however, were set-
tled with a minimum of difficulty.

Another function of the War Labor Board was wage stabilization to help hold down inflation. Its tool was the Little Steel formula which limited pay hikes to keep pace with price increases. Management still sought various means of increasing wages to attract and keep workers, while unions pointed out that prices were rising faster than wages and demanded pay hikes. Although cracks developed in Little Steel, the policy generally held until the end of the war. Even with wages stabilized, most workers prospered during the war and improved their economic status. Many who had been unemployed before the war, now worked at high-paying jobs in war plants. Ultimately, this contributed to the postwar economic expansion.

Labor unions generally benefitted from the war as the crush of business in the defense emergency and during the war forced companies such as International Harvester and the Little Steel corporations to accept unionization and union security. This changed the nature of postwar industrial disputes. With the battle for union recognition largely won, most were disputes over wages and benefits.

The war brought an unprecedented degree of government control over the movement of labor even to the point where war workers were restricted in their freedom to change jobs. The War Manpower Commission sought to place workers in positions where their skills would be utilized most efficiently.
It also ordered longer workweeks in areas of serious labor shortages. To further relieve labor shortages, the agency coaxed employers into hiring women and minorities in ever increasing numbers in highly-paid and highly-skilled jobs previously closed to them. Wartime gains ultimately led to the Civil Rights Movement and the Women's Liberation Movement of the fifties, sixties and seventies.


7 Chicago Tribune, March 20, 1941, p. 6, March 21, 1941, pp. 1, 13, March 23, 1941, pt. 1, p. 10, March 26, 1941, p. 3, October 10, 1941, p. 2; McDonald, Union Man, pp. 120-125.


10 Alton Evening Telegraph, July 25, 1941, pp. 1, 2, July 26, 1941, p. 1, August 5, 1941, p. 1, August 9, 1941, p. 1; "Mediation Board," Defense, 2 (July 29, 1941), 7; "Mediation Board," Defense, 2 (August 5, 1941), 5; Watters, The Production Front, pp. 348-349.


21 Watters, The Production Front, p. 158.


CHAPTER V

TRANSPORTATION IN A STATE AT WAR

The Second World War imposed a massive burden on the nation's transportation system, especially the railroads. To handle the load, carriers were forced to coordinate their services and adapt to changes in traffic volume and direction. Before and after the war, all carriers of freight and passengers competed with each other to some degree. Competition was intermodal and intramodal. Wartime conditions led government at the federal and state level to impose restrictions to eliminate competitive practices which impeded the flow of traffic. Government also ordered the curtailment of duplicate services in order to free equipment for use elsewhere and approved the establishment of new carriers and new routes to handle an increasing traffic load. Carriers also had to handle a much heavier traffic load, but could not get enough equipment to handle it since suppliers were building armaments instead of locomotives, freight cars, trucks, planes and ships. The War Production Board strictly limited the amount of equipment that could be produced and dictated the kind of equipment to be built. Carriers and shippers responded by making more intensive use of existing equipment. Government soon imposed similar restrictions of
its own. Although the government did not repeat its First World War takeover of the railroads, it did regulate the movements of the railroads and other carriers, dictate routings of shipments and how they should be loaded and even shifted some commodities such as oil from one means of transportation to another.

Illinois has long been a major crossroads and terminal for the transportation arteries of the nation, and as such played a significant role in the carrying of the nation's troops and war supplies. In 1940, Illinois had 11,949 miles of railroads, more mileage than any state except Texas. Chicago was a major transhipment center for east-west traffic and terminal for north-south movements with over twenty trunk-line railroads and several terminal roads serving the metropolitan area. Other Illinois cities also were major gateways, especially East St. Louis, Peoria and the Rock Island-Moline District. In 1940, railroad employment in the state totaled 104,044 or about 10 percent of the total national railroad workforce. Total state employment in transportation and communication industries was 259,776, which was also about 10 percent of the national total. About 9 percent of the state's workforce were employed in such industries. Illinois had over 14,000 miles of paved highways and 54 airports, including a major one in Chicago. Barges traveled from Chicago's port facilities on the Great Lakes down the Illinois and Mississippi rivers to
The war did not really create any new trends in transportation, but did affect some existing ones. In the twenties, railroads carried 75 percent of all freight traffic and dominated intercity passenger service. However, even then they faced increasing competition from other modes of transportation. By 1940, their share of the nation's freight traffic shrank to just under 62 percent, while less than 9 percent of intercity travelers went by train. The automobile dominated passenger transportation. Railroads still carried over 64 percent of those who did not go by car, but buses took almost 30 percent while airlines handled a small but growing percentage of the market. Railroads also faced growing competition for freight from trucks, barges and pipelines. The Second World War reversed the trend temporarily. Railroads handled 90 percent of all defense freight and 97 percent of armed forces personnel moving in organized groups. Gas and tire rationing forced motorists out of their cars and into trains and buses. In 1944, automobiles still accounted for slightly over 54 percent of intercity passenger travel, but railroads handled almost 35 percent and buses over 9 percent. Freight business also skyrocketed and the railroad share of the traffic went up to almost 72 percent by 1943 before dropping slightly in the remaining war years. The war also retarded the growth of airline business though that was increasing by the end of the war. In 1940, airlines
carried only 1,041 million passengers or .37 percent of all intercity passengers. By 1945, they handled 3,507 million travelers or 1.51 percent of intercity passenger traffic.²

The war also inhibited implementation of a major technological innovation in the railroad industry. During the thirties, railroads introduced streamlined passenger trains in a successful bid to recapture some of the passenger business which they had lost to the automobile and the bus. Though some trains were pulled by streamlined steam locomotives, most streamliners were handled by diesels. A few railroads were already using a few diesels for some switching chores, but in the thirties, many railroads started dieselizing passenger service and switching, and in 1940 and 1941, diesels were introduced in line-haul freight service. Diesels handled freight tonnage at a faster and steadier pace than steam and at a much lower cost. They had less difficulty in starting a train. Unlike steam, diesels did not have to stop for water. Diesels were more available. After finishing one trip, they could be used on another run, unlike steam engines which often required some shop attention at the end of a run. Diesels were much more flexible and cost effective than steam since several diesel units could be operated together as one locomotive under the control of one crew with the number of units on a train dependent solely on the amount of tonnage to be hauled and the terrain. Every steam locomotive, however, had its crew. The implications
were not lost on the railroad unions, who fought unsuccessfully to put extra crewmen on diesels, and did manage to put firemen on diesels though they had no fires to tend. Though many railroads, especially those with a good deal of coal traffic, continued to buy or build steam locomotives, most began to dieselize their operations. By 1939, railroads were buying more diesels than steam locomotives.\(^3\)

During the defense period of 1939 to 1941, railroads enjoyed a substantial increase in traffic. Freight tonnage increased from over 292 billion ton-miles (ton of freight carried a mile) in 1938 to over 481 billion in 1941, while passenger traffic went from over 22 billion passenger miles (passenger carried a mile) in 1938 to over 30 billion in 1941. There was some debate over whether the railroads were preparing adequately to handle the increased load by buying extra equipment. Every year from 1929 to 1939, they retired more freight cars than they added. In September, 1939, *Railway Age*, an industry journal, argued that 2400 locomotives and over 300,000 freight cars would have to be added to current rosters to handle the additional load. The railroads felt differently. Ralph Budd, head of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad and head of the Transportation Division of the National Defense Advisory Commission, assumed that existing transportation facilities could handle the load since there was a surplus of capacity. Railroads were reluctant to purchase large amounts of costly new equipment.
as they had done in the twenties, only to suffer heavy losses of traffic in the Depression. By 1941, it was hard to get materials and builders were making armaments. As a result, the railroads never did get as much equipment as they needed. The Commission did make recommendations for better utilization of cars and worked with the Interstate Commerce Commission's Bureau of Service, the Association of American Railroads Car Service Division and vigilance committees of the Shippers' Advisory Committee in developing a policing system to see that cars kept moving.

In December, 1941, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt created the Office of Defense Transportation and named Interstate Commerce Commission Chairman Joseph B. Eastman to direct it. Budd returned to his railroad in January. The new agency had seven carrier divisions: railways, motor, water, local, petroleum, Hawaiian and Puerto Rican. Some, including railways, motor transport and petroleum, had regional offices in Chicago. The agency also had district offices in Chicago and other Illinois cities. The Office of Defense Transportation worked closely with the Interstate Commerce Commission in coordinating transportation. Both the railroads and the government wished to avoid the government takeover experience of the First World War. At that time, rail service had broken down due to inadequate equipment and poor planning by government procurement agencies. Whole trains of cars backed up in terminals due to lack of facili-
ties for unloading. Though the Railroad Administration, which operated the roads from December, 1917 to March, 1920, eliminated terminal delays, improved operations and introduced new equipment of standard design, it also incurred heavy expenses, including a substantial wage hike and controversial "featherbedding" work rules. As a result, it was forced to raise freight rates and passenger fares.  

The Office of Defense Transportation sought to leave the carriers in private hands, but to coordinate their services and utilize equipment to the fullest extent possible. The Justice Department facilitated the task by suspending anti-trust activity for the duration, thus allowing pooling of traffic, coordination of services, elimination of duplicating services and other efficiencies. The Office of Defense Transportation banned the use of freight cars for movement of cargo within cities when trucks were available and also prescribed minimum limits for loading merchandise cars. The Interstate Commerce Commission approved incentive rates to encourage heavier loading. The Midwest Shippers Advisory Board, a regional group representing shippers in several states including Illinois, established 63 vigilante groups with 995 traffic executive members to call on shippers in their communities who were holding cars on sidings too long. In peacetime, many shippers held cars on sidings for loading or unloading for an extensive length of time. Some used them as virtual rolling warehouses. During the
war, however, such behavior would elicit a call from a member of a shippers vigilante committee. The committees sought to load cars as heavily as possible and as quickly as possible and unload them at their destination quickly. In 1943, the Office of Defense Transportation made these measures mandatory. Shippers mounted Perfect Shipping Campaigns stressing more careful packing and loading to reduce loss and damage. Unfortunately, some efforts to load cars more heavily resulted in damage to car structures, especially when cranes were used to flatten loads in open top cars. For the most part, though, heavier loading of cars and quick turnaround made them more available. The Association of American Railroads and later the Office of Defense Transportation and the Interstate Commerce Commission rerouted cars to avoid congestion and move by the most direct route to their destination. During peacetime, most carriers sought to haul cars on their own lines as long and as far as possible to maximize profits. This sometimes meant that a shipment had to travel by a roundabout route to its destination. Wartime measures eliminated much unnecessary backhauling. The Office of Defense Transportation Railway Division's Regional Director in Chicago, W. F. Kirk, was particularly successful in spotting areas of threatened congestion and routing cars away from those areas. In all, during the life of his office, from March, 1943 to October, 1945, Kirk diverted 335,000 carloads, ignoring priorities which had caused a
great deal of trouble in World War I. Shippers also made use of alternative types of cars if the type they wanted were not available. In some cases, they pooled cars. In the fall of 1942, the Office of Defense Transportation, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Association of American Railroads set up a pool of refrigerator cars for hauling fruits and vegetables. Railroads themselves learned to cooperate with each other in moving traffic efficiently, whereas normally, they competed vigorously with each other.6

Even with such restrictions, car shortages developed as freight traffic skyrocketed. Freight ton-miles, which totalled 481,766 million in 1941, shot up to 747,168 million by 1944. The Illinois Central, which carried under 39 million tons of revenue freight in 1938, handled over 80 million in 1943. Other carriers experienced similar increases. To handle this traffic, railroads ran longer and more frequent trains. On the Illinois Central, the average freight train handled around 44 or 45 cars in 1938. In 1944, its average freight train had about 62 cars. In 1945, the line operated 24.3 percent more freight trains than it had in 1940. Although the railroads had less equipment than they had in the First World War, they handled a heavier traffic load. With freight ton-miles 81 percent over those of 1918, the railroads had 600,000 fewer cars to handle it. Fortunately, equipment itself got bigger between the wars. Freight car capacity increased over 22 percent between 1918
and 1944 while steam locomotive tractive effort increased 50 percent. Even so, more equipment was needed. 7

During the defense period, the increase in traffic prompted some carriers to acquire more cars and use existing ones more intensively. Construction of freight cars for American railroads in 1939 increased 42 percent over 1938. The supply of freight cars, which had been declining, started rising again in 1940. The Illinois Central acquired over 9700 freight cars in 1939, 1940 and 1941, but as with most railroads, most simply replaced old, worn-out cars. Moreover, by 1941, material shortages delayed new car deliveries by 50 percent and many railroads eventually had to cancel their orders. Although the Office of Defense Transportation pressed for more equipment, the War Production Board insisted that armaments required most of the steel and the railroads would have to get along with what they had. In the end, though the Office of Defense Transportation asked the War Production Board for 311,000 freight cars, 4,159 locomotives and 5,150 passenger cars, the railroads got only 130,826 freight cars, 2,500 locomotives and 1,977 passenger cars (Mostly troop sleepers and kitchen cars). Between 1942 and 1945, the Illinois Central received only 1,681 new freight cars. In 1943, as the crisis neared its peak, it received none. Railroads responded by rehabilitating and reusing and modifying existing cars. Late in 1942, the Santa Fe converted some old box cars into cabooses until regular
cabooses were available again. With steel in short supply and the need for cars critical, the War Production Board authorized railroads to build composite freight cars with steel framework and wooden plank side sections, which could readily be replaced with steel after the war. In 1944, the Illinois Central built 600 composite hopper cars in its Centralia, Illinois shops for coal traffic. The company also converted old gondola cars to pulpwood carriers, while the Santa Fe used steel ends from junked box cars to make sides and ends for gondola cars. In 1944 and 1945, railroads starting experimenting with lightweight plywood cars and some aluminum boxcars were built in Mount Vernon, Illinois for three Illinois railroads. Deliveries of freight cars bottomed out in 1943 and picked up in 1944 and 1945. The material situation eased, and by the fall of 1945, the Illinois Central was building all steel hopper cars in its Centralia shops. 8

Even with these efforts, there were car shortages, particularly for agricultural products. In the spring of 1941, a crisis developed when grain elevators were still filled with the previous harvest as a new harvest was starting. Railroads scrambled to find cars while the Commodity Credit Corporation, which owned the grain, frantically tried to get it out of the elevators. Ultimately, the grain was shipped in grain trains to Chicago and then to the East Coast. Similar problems cropped up during the war years, but
by 1943, there were no extra cars available to handle the wheat load, thus forcing farmers to store grain on their farms, and elevators to store it on the ground. The problem also hit soybeans, corn and other crops. The situation was aggravated in January, 1944 when the Office of Defense Transportation, the War Production Board and the War Food Administration diverted 200 cars a day to Canada to import 40 million bushels of feed grain bought by the Commodity Credit Corporation. Grain Belt congressional leaders were outraged. The diversion was reduced to 100 cars a day in February and eliminated in May. Even then, car supply remained tight. Snowstorms in the East caused car shortages in Illinois and other states early in 1945. Then in the spring, war traffic demands diverted grain cars. By June, coal cars were being used to carry wheat. The situation persisted until the end of the year. The spring of 1945 brought a heavy traffic shift from the East Coast to the West Coast as the war in Europe ended and the nation focused on the Pacific theater. In May, the Office of Defense Transportation rerouted 1000 eastbound freight cars and sent them to Pacific ports. The traffic shift imposed peak loads on Illinois railroads, especially in Chicago, which bore the brunt of the movement. Traffic peaked in May and June and did not drop much until the end of the war.9

Besides cars, the railroads needed locomotives to pull them. In 1939, the railroads were plagued with motive power
obsolescence. Only four and a half percent of the locomotives of major railroads were less than 9 years old, while 70 percent were at least 19 years old. Almost a third were 29 years old or older. By the end of 1940, 69 percent were 21 years old or older. Older locomotives were inadequate to meet modern service requirements and cost more to maintain as they got older. As in the case of freight cars, defense production and a recovering economy spurred motive power purchases. Locomotive production went from 272 engines in 1938 to 338 in 1939, 435 in 1940 and 1047 in 1941. War Production Board restrictions cut the output to 936 locomotives in 1942, but then production peaked at 1171 engines in 1944 before dropping to 935 in 1945.\textsuperscript{10}

The War Production Board was more willing to authorize locomotives than freight cars, theorizing that enough motive power would make additional cars unnecessary by permitting quicker hauls and more intensive handling of existing cars. Still, the agency did require authorization of motive power. Since diesels were built for stock to standard designs, the War Production Board issued blanket restrictions to builders covering the number of locomotives needed, while steamers required specific authorizations by the Board since they were built to order for individual carriers. The agency also restricted builders to construction of certain types of diesels. American Locomotive Company and Baldwin Locomotive Company produced only 600 or 1000 horsepower switchers, while
the Electro-Motive Division of General Motors, which had pioneered passenger and freight diesels, built 5400 horsepower four-unit freight diesels. Even then, the latter had a difficult time filling orders due to its own war production for the Navy. Not until late in the war was the company able to increase production of diesel locomotives. By July, 1945, it was turning out 63 units a month. Because of these restrictions, most diesels built during the war were used for switching, a task at which they were much faster and more efficient than steam. When Fairbanks-Morse, a builder of submarine engines, started producing diesel locomotives in 1944, its first unit was a switcher, which went to the Milwaukee Road. Steamers released by diesels were reassigned to other duties. Most steam locomotives built during the war were high-performance freight engines such as the twenty 4-8-2 or mountain type engines built by the Illinois Central at its Paducah, Kentucky shops in 1942 and 1943 and the ten 4-8-4 or northern type engines built in 1944 for the Rock Island.11

In addition to new construction, railroads also leased or rebuilt locomotives to fill their needs. The Chicago and North Western disposed of 100 locomotives, partly through sale to Mexico, but mostly through leasing to other lines. In January, 1943, the War Production Board banned the scrapping of surplus locomotives without authorization, but required them to be repaired and made available for service
on other lines. The Baltimore and Ohio rehabilitated 2-8-2 or Mikado type (called MacArthur type during the war as a patriotic gesture) engines for service on its Chicago Division, including some pre-World War I engines. The Alton Railroad modernized 32-year-old 4-6-2 or Pacific type locomotives to increase their horsepower from 2200 to 2800, enabling them to haul longer passenger trains. Fuel saving campaigns also helped to improve the efficiency of motive power.¹²

During the course of the war, many railroads upgraded track and signaling. In 1943 and 1944, the Pennsylvania Railroad upgraded and double-tracked much of its line to St. Louis, including one eight-mile segment, which was relocated and straightened. The improvements, which were done without interfering with heavy wartime traffic, substantially increased the capacity of the line. The Baltimore and Ohio also improved its lines in Illinois between 1941 and 1946, installing heavier rail, strengthening bridges and constructing additional yard tracks and other facilities. Other lines installed new rails and ties, eliminated grade crossings, added spurs to serve defense plants and improved yards. The Burlington expanded its Galesburg yard to cut delays in movement of cars through the yard. When labor shortages hit track gangs, several railroads introduced new machinery to reduce manpower needs. Signaling improvements, such as Centralized Traffic Control (CTC), allowed a single-
track line to carry the load of a double-track road. An operator at a CTC control station handled all signals and mainline switches on the line. By automatically transmitting information about train movements to dispatchers, CTC eliminated the need to stop and throw switches by hand, thus speeding operations. Fast freights could pass each other using passing sidings without slowing down. In 1942, the Burlington installed CTC on its line from Chicago to St. Paul and in 1943, the Rock Island installed CTC, cab signals and radio control on its busy main line between Chicago and Rock Island. These innovations cut the running time of fast freights by reducing delays.\textsuperscript{13}

In the spring of 1941, a crisis arose in the transport of crude oil from Texas to the East Coast. Tankers, which carried most of it, were diverted to carrying oil to Britain. Although existing pipelines, which handled part of the load, managed to take on more, they could not replace the tankers. The Office of Petroleum Coordinator, later the Petroleum Administration for War, turned to the railroads, which had lost most of the traffic to pipelines and tankers, mainly because of high freight rates. Only two percent of petroleum deliveries to the East Coast went by rail. The Office of Petroleum Coordinator persuaded the oil companies to ship by tank car and the companies coaxed the railroads to slash freight rates. Trainloads of oil were soon running from pipeline terminals in Ohio, Kentucky and Illinois to the East
The railroads, which had been carrying only 5000 barrels of oil to the East Coast daily before the crisis, were up to 141,300 barrels daily by the week of October 18. Although the British returned most of the tankers in October and November, a new crisis arose after Pearl Harbor when military needs again diverted tankers to other routes and German submarines sank those venturing along the Coast. Again, tank cars filled the gap and by August, 1942, trainloads of tank cars were delivering over 800,000 barrels a day to the East Coast, usually through Illinois due to connections between carriers. Soon, 70 percent of oil bound for the East Coast went by rail. In August, the Office of Petroleum Coordinator banned the use of tank cars to haul gasoline in 20 states, including Illinois, in order to divert them to the oil trains. In March, 1942, the agency also banned the use of tank cars to deliver fuel oil to points within 100 miles (later 200 miles) of pipeline terminals. This permanently shifted much of this traffic to tank trucks. Other cars also carried oil and other fuels in containers. There was a heavy movement of kerosene in oil drums in box cars to New England. Barges also carried a good deal of oil on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers while Great Lakes tankers delivered oil to lake ports. 14

Meanwhile, Harold Ickes, head of the Office of Petroleum Coordinator, had been trying since the fall of 1941 to get a large pipeline built from Texas to Salem, Illinois and
then to the East Coast. Although vetoed at first by the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, Pearl Harbor and tanker sinkings gave the project new importance. In June, 1942, the War Production Board approved construction of the Big Inch, a 24-inch pipeline. When completed late that year, the line extended from Longview, Texas to Norris City, Illinois, where a railyard was built for tank car trains, which carried the oil on to the East Coast. Branches were built to Enfield, Illinois, where a pipeline was built for tank car trains, which carried the oil on to the East Coast. Branches were built to Ensfield, Illinois to connect with existing pipelines and to Mount Vernon, Indiana to feed oil to barges on the Ohio River. In the summer of 1943, the Big Inch was extended to the East Coast, and later that year, a 20-inch Little Big Inch was constructed along the same route to carry petroleum products. It was completed in February, 1944. Meanwhile, by July, 1943, tank car trains aided by the Big Inch terminal at Norris City, were delivering over a million barrels a day to the East Coast with a pool of 10,000 tank cars. After June, 1943, tank cars were increasingly diverted to carry oil to the West Coast for the Pacific War, but as late as April, 1945, 30 percent of deliveries to the East Coast went by rail as opposed to 40 percent by pipeline.15

Water traffic, which grew rapidly during the Depression due to cheap rates, rose still more under the influence
of defense business. Tonnage on the Illinois Waterway, which went from half a million in 1934 to 7 million in 1940, dropped slightly in 1942 and 1943, but then peaked in 1944 at 7,250,000 tons. Ice cutters kept the waterway open during the winter months. The war eliminated some sources of traffic such as automobiles and shifted steel to the rails since companies faced with priorities wanted steel in a hurry, and railroads could deliver it much faster than barge lines, though at a much higher cost. Barge traffic also shifted direction. Before the war, most of it went downstream to the Gulf of Mexico. During the war, most of it went upstream. Petroleum products from Texas went up the Ohio River to Pittsburgh and also up the Illinois Waterway to industrial plants in the Chicago area. For a time, restrictions on materials threatened to force operators to use wooden barges, which they considered inflammable, but in 1943, the War Production Board freed enough steel to build 108 steel barges for petroleum traffic. Some wooden barges were used, but mainly by the armed forces. Other bulk cargoes included agricultural products, sulphur, scrap iron and mine products. Restrictions by the Office of Defense Transportation on some types of traffic prevented full use of the waterways and actually reduced tonnage carried on some routes. In the Spring of 1943, the agency barred establishment of a rail-water route for movement of iron ore from Northern Minesota to Southern Illinois, which would have
diverted traffic from all-rail routes. The agency reasoned that the route would have hurt coal traffic going by barge on the Illinois River. Barges shipped coal from Southern Illinois to the Twin cities and to Commonwealth Edison power plants in Chicago.16

The Great Lakes also handled a good deal of traffic, much of it coal shipped by rail to Chicago where it was transferred to lake boats at a new Rail-to-Water Transfer Terminal on Chicago's South Side. During its first year of operation in 1943, the terminal shipped over a million tons of coal to Canada. Some lake carriers, such as Chicago Tribune newsprint carriers, took on loads of coal for the return trip to Canada. The growth in steel production placed heavy demands on Great Lakes oreboats. In 1939, U. S. Steel's Pittsburgh Steamship Company had only 80 percent of its fleet in operation. By July, 1940, the entire fleet of 74 steamers and barges was in service. Other carriers had similar increases in business. By August, 1941, shortages threatened and the Office of Production Management recommended that 25 oreboats be built. By the end of 1942, 16 were under construction. In addition, the Office of Defense Transportation curtailed the use of lake carriers for domestic coal traffic in order to free them for ore traffic. Grain carriers were also diverted to ore traffic. Finally, in October, 1942, the Office of Defense Transportation assumed control of commercial vessels operating on the Lakes
in order to secure enough cargo space to carry iron ore and other war materials. In 1942, the Army constructed a new lock at the Soo Locks at Sault Ste Marie, Michigan and also built a new ore dock at Escanaba to feed oreboats in the event that the Soo Locks were sabotaged. This did not transpire and the dock was dismantled after the war.

Meanwhile, Great Lakes traffic boomed. By 1941, tonnage passed the 1929 prewar peak of 138 million tons, and ship operators sought to keep their vessels in service later in the season and start earlier in the Spring. This was risky due to storms in the Fall and heavy ice packs in the Spring. Ice-breakers were used to open shipping lanes. Ultimately, tonnage peaked at over 184 million tons in 1944 with Chicago handling over 51 million tons.¹⁷

Trucks did a heavy volume of business during the war years, though their share of intercity freight business actually declined. In 1938, motor carriers handled 37 billion ton-miles or 8.03 percent of the total intercity traffic, while in 1944, they carried over 49 billion ton-miles, but only 4.57 percent of the total volume. Most of the freight was high-value cargo. Most livestock and a large part of other agricultural products was shipped to Chicago by truck. Most local traffic went by truck. Some Illinois railroads used trucks for pick up and delivery and local traffic. Such coordinated rail and truck traffic expanded during the war. During the war, the Office of Defense Transportation worked
with truckers and the states to eliminate inefficiencies. Illinois and other states lifted restrictions on truck weight and length though this did not come easily. Unlike most states, Wisconsin required out of state trucks to buy extra licenses. Finally, in April, 1943, Illinois and Wisconsin agreed to end restrictive legislation covering each other's trucks for the duration. A thirty-five mile an hour wartime speed limit was modified in 1943 for heavy trucks carrying war freight. The Office of Defense Transportation also insisted on full loading of trucks and curtailment of unessential mileage. Daily deliveries were discontinued. In July, 1942, the agency ordered over-the-road truckers to cut their mileage 25 percent. Truckers also had to carry loads on return trips unless this was impossible. In July, 1943, the Office of Defense Transportation and the Interstate Commerce Commission approved a plan drawn up by 33 Chicago-area common carriers for pooling highway freight in the Chicago suburban area. Under the plan, truckers reported to a central dispatching office the loads they booked and destinations. The office then assigned the actual hauling to the carrier best suited to handle it. Empty miles were eliminated and trucks were loaded inbound and outbound, with unneeded equipment sitting it out. Trailers were interchanged, while tractors worked 24 hours a day. Later, the pool set up a new terminal for interchange of freight among participants. Over-the-road truckers also pooled cargoes.
In August, 1942, Chicago-based truckers set up a Joint Information Service which acted as a clearinghouse for freight. Truckers without a return load had to phone the office for information on possible cargoes, and if necessary, wait a few hours until one materialized. Even farm trucks participated in this program. The Army Transportation Corps' Chicago Agency routed military freight through the Joint Information Service. In 1943, the Army leased a Chicago truck terminal and consolidated and rerouted military freight. In March, 1944, the Office of Defense Transportation took over the Joint Information offices and required over-the-road truckers to register in the agency's district offices, which in turn ordered empty or partially loaded trucks to handle cargo.18

Rationing also hit truckers. The Office of Defense Transportation issued certificates of war necessity enabling truckers to buy gasoline, tires and other essential materials. The agency relied on local war price and rationing panels to handle gas rationing and in 1944 turned over the whole program of issuing certificates to the Office of Price Administration. Still, shortages of tires and parts persisted throughout the war. Trucks themselves were also rationed, starting in March, 1942. Manufacture of big trucks was suspended in the Spring of 1942 and trailer production ended in November. By March, 1943, the stockpile of new trucks, which totaled 185,000 in March, 1942, had dwindled
to 82,328. In May, the War Production Board authorized production of 7350 trucks for sale to operators with certificates of necessity issued by the Office of Defense Transportation. Even then, production never met needs and shortages persisted. Highways also suffered from wartime restrictions. Construction was cut sharply and even materials were difficult to obtain. By 1943, some roads were becoming unsafe for travel. 19

Gasoline rationing affected automobiles more than any other means of transportation. In 1937, automobiles accounted for 228,364 million passenger-miles or 85.08 percent of the total. Wartime restrictions on gas and tires cut into highway traffic. In January, 1943, the first full month of gasoline rationing, travel on Illinois highways fell off 60 percent and the number of cars 39 percent. Travelers continued to use their cars for local transportation and for short intercity trips, but for longer journeys, many turned to public transportation. In 1944, private autos handled only 151,251 million passenger-miles or 54.03 percent of the total. Many had to give up their cars entirely. In Illinois, auto registrations dropped from 1,825,142 in 1941 to 1,508,222 in 1945. 20

As with freight, the biggest share of the burden fell on the railways, who saw their passenger load soar from 448 million passengers in 1935 to 916 million in 1944, before dropping to 897 million in 1945. Passengers traveled far-
ther, too. In 1935, the average journey was between 41 and 42 miles. In 1944, it was over 104 miles. Trains got longer and more frequent. In 1939, 85,202 trains operated in and out of Chicago Union Station with an average of 233 a day. The station handled a total of 546,393 cars and trains averaged about 6 or 7 cars. In 1944, the station saw 98,217 trains at an average of 268 a day. The station handled a total of 769,671 cars and trains averaged between 7 and 8 cars. The Illinois Central saw its average passenger train grow from seven cars in 1939 to more than nine by the end of the war. The Pullman Company, which served 15,539,849 passengers in 5124 cars in 1938, handled 35,837,908 in 7485 cars in 1944.21

Much of Pullman's traffic was military. During the war, 97 percent of armed forces personnel moving in organized groups traveled in special troop trains. In August, 1940, railroads moved over 150,000 troops for special army maneuvers. Similar movements occurred in 1941. Within seven weeks after Pearl Harbor, railroads moved over 600,000 troops to new posts. By December, 1942, they were moving two million soldiers a month and by June, 1943, were operating 2500 troop trains a month. To handle the increasing load, Pullman-Standard built troop sleepers and kitchen cars and by 1945 was operating 1667 such cars, some railroad-owned and others government-owned. By then, over two-thirds of all Pullman sleepers were continuously assigned to troop move-
ments. Such military commitments cut into the number of cars available for civilian use.\textsuperscript{22}

To handle the crush of civilian and military travel, the Office of Defense Transportation imposed restrictions on rail and bus traffic. On the eve of the war, railroads were still adding streamliners. In 1941, the Illinois Central added the Land O' Corn between Chicago and Waterloo, Iowa. In May, 1942, in an effort to meet wartime traffic demands, the line reinstated the Panama Limited, a luxury train from Chicago to New Orleans, which it had dropped in 1932. Soon afterward, the Office of Defense Transportation proposed abolition of all luxury trains like the Panama Limited, but nothing came of this. However, some luxury cars, such as parlor cars, were dropped from trains to add to their passenger-carrying capacity. The Chicago and North Western converted about half of its parlor and cafe-lounge cars into coaches. Old Pullmans were also converted to coaches. Special trains for excursions, conventions and other events were cancelled, and in many cases, the conventions themselves. In 1942, Governor Dwight Green cancelled the Illinois State Fair for the duration. Schedules were lengthened to provide more stops, thus providing an alternative to the automobile. Many roads required reservations and some raised fares to discourage vacationers. On October 1, 1942, the Office of Defense Transportation froze passenger schedules and prohibited extra trains. This hit travel to
Florida especially hard and Florida was quick to protest, but to no avail. Several lines coordinated their trains between Chicago and Florida. In Illinois, the Alton and the Illinois central coordinated sleeper service between Chicago and Springfield. Very little equipment was added in 1942 and much of it was ordered in 1941. Difficulties with priorities and the emphasis on freight traffic and war goods prevented construction of new passenger equipment. In April, 1942, all new construction was banned, leaving some cars still uncompleted. No new cars were ordered after that date until 1944 when the railroads ordered 540 new cars. Meanwhile, the Office of Defense Transportation and the railroads sought to discourage would-be passengers from traveling, especially during holidays, all to no avail. Trains were packed with civilians and soldiers on leave. People stood in the aisles, vestibules and anywhere else there was space. Diners ran out of food despite rationing. In the spring of 1944, the Federal Bureau of Investigation made numerous arrests for black markets in Pullman accommodations. Ultimately, this hurt efforts by the railroads to increase their passenger business after the war as passenger recalled their wartime experiences and deserted the rails for other means of travel.23

One of the more controversial means of accommodating passengers was cancellation of existing trains. In July, 1941, the Illinois Commerce Commission allowed the Southern
Railway to drop a pair of trains in Southern Illinois to free equipment for use in serving military posts and other defense transportation needs. The Illinois Central dropped several mixed trains and local passenger trains on several branch lines in Illinois and also made other changes to free cars for the armed forces. Other Illinois railroads also dropped money-losing locals during the war. In February, 1942, they asked the Illinois Commerce Commission for permission to drop any trains they wished without notice as a war measure, but were denied it, though they did gain this permission in other states. In July, however, the Office of Defense Transportation coaxed the Illinois Commerce Commission into calling a meeting of railroad and bus officials to identify duplicate and unessential runs which could be eliminated. They identified 70, some of which were discontinued. However, others continued to run due to protests from local communities, who wanted transportation, especially since tires were rationed. 

One of the most controversial disputes pitted local communities and the Illinois Commerce Commission against the War Production Board and the Office of Defense Transportation. The Illinois Terminal System, an electric interurban railway, operated passenger and freight service on over 400 miles of lines from Peoria via Springfield to St. Louis, Springfield via Decatur to Danville and Decatur through Bloomington to Peoria. In July, 1942, the Illinois Commerce Commission approved bus competition along its routes from
Peoria to Decatur and Champaign, largely due to dissatisfaction with the interurban's service. The company responded by petitioning to abandon the affected lines, arguing that it was losing money on the routes and business would not support both bus and rail service. The proposal met with howls of protest. The interurban operated 26 daily passenger trains on these lines as well as freight service, mostly in grain, coal, oil and some manufactured goods. Local communities depended on the Illinois Terminal for mail and other necessities as well as passenger service, while farmers, grain elevators and some industries relied on it to ship their products. Shortages of trucks, buses, tires and gasoline gave added weight to their protests. In October, the Commerce Commission denied permission to abandon, but also revoked its approval of bus competition. Meanwhile, however, the War Production Board requisitioned the lines in September in the hope of realizing 18,000 tons of scrap metal from rails and bridges. The Commerce Commission, however, ordered the Illinois Terminal to keep the lines running and was later upheld in the courts. Politicians, including both of the state's Senators, became involved and Congress started investigating War Production Board seizures of railroad branch lines. The Office of Defense Transportation, wishing to eliminate duplicate service, investigated and found the lines unneeded, but the Commerce Commission felt differently and in December ordered the Illinois Terminal to
continue operating the lines and to improve service. The company said it wanted to use the cars from the lines to carry workers to the Illiopolis ordnance plant. (Actually, it soon started using rejuvenated elevated cars from New York for the purpose.) Finally, in March, 1943, with the scrap metal situation easing, the War Production Board gave up the fight and later returned the lines to the Illinois Terminal, who continued to operate them until the fifties. The Office of Defense Transportation also caved in under the barrage of protests and concluded that the lines were needed. The bus lines, meanwhile, charged that they were being sacrificed to keep the Illinois Terminal alive and went to court to get permission to offer bus service. In July, 1945, the Illinois Commerce Commission found Illinois Terminal service inadequate and allowed some, but not all, of the bus companies to compete with the interurban. 25

Other proposals to abandon rail lines were more successful. The Illinois Central did not protest when the War Production Board requisitioned the rails of its branch from Freeport, Illinois to Dodgeville, Wisconsin. The line was a money-loser. The Illinois Commerce Commission denied permission for the Chicago and North Western to abandon a line from Caledonia to Cortland despite an Interstate Commerce Commission order allowing it, but was overruled in a federal court. Although several branch lines were abandoned in 1942, the War Production Board no longer needed rail for scrap
after 1942, while wartime rationing conditions necessitated retention of many branches which might otherwise be abandoned. Indeed, many of the rails from abandoned lines were reused at war plants. Abandonments dropped after 1942 and there were none in Illinois in 1943 and 1944 and only a short segment in 1945 despite efforts of some roads to get rid of lightly-used branches.\(^2\)

Early in 1945, with railroads straining under heavy passenger loads, the Office of Defense Transportation again tried to eliminate unnecessary services and ordered railroads to drop 50 trains operating with less than 35 percent capacity. This provoked a confrontation with the Illinois Commerce Commission when the Office of Defense Transportation ordered the Chicago and Illinois Midland to drop a pair of trains between Peoria and Springfield. The Commission directed the railroad to ignore the order and the trains continued to run until the late forties. The travel situation worsened as the nation shifted its armed forces from the European Theater to the Pacific. In June, President Harry S. Truman asked Americans not to travel in order to free cars for troops. In July, the Office of Defense Transportation ordered sleepers off passenger runs of under 450 miles to free 900 sleeping cars for troops. Illinois railroads promptly took off sleepers on runs from Chicago to Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, St. Louis, the Twin Cities and other cities in Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Wisconsin and
Michigan. Even then, soldiers had to sleep in shifts. The Office of Defense Transportation also ordered coaches pooled for use by the Army. On July 11, the nation's railroads handled a record 54,814 soldiers in one day. As in the case of civilians, the soldiers were dissatisfied with the service and many swore off rail travel after the war. 27

Like rail service, bus lines were subject to wartime restrictions. Buses had to carry full loads and could not travel over thirty-five miles an hour even though designed for higher speeds. New buses were unavailable in 1942 and 1943 and parts were hard to get. Greyhound established a plant in Chicago to repair existing parts. The Office of Defense Transportation and the Illinois Commerce Commission sought to eliminate duplicate routes, but still maintain adequate service. One solution was pooling of routes. Several bus companies pooled routes between Chicago, Peoria, Springfield and other communities for the duration of the war. There also was a great demand for additional service, especially to serve war plants. The Office of Defense Transportation and the Illinois Commerce Commission worked out a policy under which a potential bus operator had to first gain approval from the Office of Defense Transportation and then the Commerce Commission and then request gas, tires and equipment from the Office of Defense Transportation. Many applicants were existing carriers, which simply secured additional routes, but many were private individuals such as
truckers and farmers operating overage or makeshift buses. Wildcat operators charged what they pleased and ran where they pleased. Hundreds sprang up to carry workers to war plants, including 41 serving Western Cartridge at East Alton. The Illinois Commerce Commission forced those at Western Cartridge to conform to state requirements on insurance and safety, but relaxed its requirement for incorporation in view of the need for the service, and only required approval of the Office of Defense Transportation. The company itself resolved disputes over routes and schedules. Aside from serving war plants, some carriers added other routes where a need arose, sometimes only for the duration. Many companies expanded during the war. Black Hawk Motor Transit Company grew from 13 buses running over 522 route-miles in 1941 to 27 buses in July, 1942 operating 998 miles.  

City and suburban transit systems were subject to some of the same restrictions as intercity bus lines as well as some geared to local transit. Like intercity carriers, city and suburban systems had to contend with equipment shortages. The Chicago Surface Lines installed some buses in 1942, but could not get any more until 1944 due to a freeze on new equipment by the Office of Defense Transportation. No new streetcars or trolley buses arrived during the war, though opening of the city's first subway in 1943 helped relieve congestion. Work on a second subway was suspended for the duration. To save gas and tires, the Surface Lines opened
a new bus garage and other storage yards. The Chicago Motor Company introduced a "Victory" bus with high narrow seats, which could handle more passengers and also tested synthetic tires on some buses. The Quad cities bus system lengthened 68 buses and renovated others it had planned to junk. Transit systems in Chicago and other Illinois cities added or extended routes to accommodate war plants and military posts and areas hard hit by tire and gas rationing. However, the Office of Defense Transportation, in a controversial move to save tires, forced the Surface Lines to cut three routes, one of which was used by workers at the Dodge-Chicago plant. Despite vehement protests by city officials, they were not restored until after the war. Chicago Motor Coach had to cut its mileage to 85 percent of its prewar level. Sunday and holiday and non-rush hour buses were cut. Chicago was better off than some cities since it still had streetcar lines. The Office of Defense Transportation urged greater use of the carlines to save gas and tires. Still, these restrictions hit the transit lines as they were handling a big increase in traffic, which was intensified by tire and gas rationing. Ridership on the Surface Lines rose from 676,258,744 in 1939 to 884,704,135 in 1945 while the Chicago Rapid Transit Company handled 202,988,763 passengers on the elevated lines in 1945 as compared to 145,394,382 in 1939. This did not include servicemen who rode free on the city's transit lines. To handle this increased load, Chicago and other cities
resorted to staggered hours for stores, schools and factories. Shoppers were urged to shop at noon and avoid the rush hour. Even so, many riders, forced out of cars by gas rationing, froze at wintry bus stops as jammed buses went by. Surface carriers also skipped stops to speed service. The bus system in Bloomington cut a fifth of its stops for the duration, while Chicago Motor Coach cut a fourth of its stops. There was no protest at this. However, when the office of Defense Transportation coaxed the Chicago, Aurora and Elgin Railroad, an electric railway serving the western suburbs, into eliminating 16 flagstops, riders screamed in protest and the Illinois Commerce Commission ruled against the cuts. One wartime innovation in Chicago transit was a river transit service between the Chicago and North Western station and Michigan Avenue instituted in June, 1943.  

All forms of transportation were restricted to some extent during the war, but only airline passengers had to get a priority to travel. Priorities were issued by the Army's Air Transport Command in Chicago in several classes. Non-priority and low-priority passengers had to deplane in favor of higher priority passengers and cargo, often at refueling stops. Airlines lost many of their planes to the armed forces. The rest flew longer on more restricted schedules. Airlines coordinated services to eliminate duplicate flights and cancelled some short-distance runs from Chicago and St. Louis to nearby states. Airlines started adding
flights in 1943, and 1944 as the Army started returning planes. By July, 1945, Chicago's Municipal Airport (Midway Airport) had 238 daily flights. By the end of the war, the airlines were increasing their share of the inter-city travel market. In the Spring of 1941, Chicago improved its Municipal Airport by relocating a railway bisecting its runways. Airport construction lagged during the war, but after the war, Chicago used the Douglas aircraft plant airfield for O'Hare field and several Illinois cities built municipal airports.

One of the biggest problems of transportation systems in wartime was the shortage of labor. Many of their employees went into the armed forces at the same time that traffic was rising. Greyhound lost a large percentage of its drivers. Trucks were idled for lack of drivers and a shortage of mechanics to repair them. Railroads had severe shortages of labor in train crews, track gangs, roundhouse and shop forces and other jobs. To help solve manpower shortages, roundhouses recalled older employees who were still able to work. Railroads and truckers hired vagrants for jobs at freight docks and track gangs. The Illinois Central hired sixteen and seventeen-year-old boys to work as switchmen, firemen and brakemen and set up a school in Carbondale to train them. The company also hired younger teenage boys to work as telegraphers at country stations. The Wabash hired high school boys to work on track gangs in
A major source of labor was women. By March, 1943, one railroad, which was losing men at the rate of 2000 a month was replacing them with 1500 women and 500 men. Women soon comprised eight percent of its employees. The Illinois Central hired women for office jobs, station and ticket agents, messengers car cleaners, electrical and machinist helpers, engine wipers and flagmen on commuter trains. By October, 1943, the company employed 69 women at its Centralia shops. Women changed freight car wheels for the Illinois Central, loaded freight cars for the Burlington, wiped engines and cleaned coaches for the Milwaukee Road, worked as yard office clerks in the Belt Railway of Chicago's Clearing Yard and worked on track gangs on various railroads. Women also operated interurban trains on the Chicago, North Shore and Milwaukee Railroad, drove buses in Rockford and trucks between Chicago and Iowa. Employment of women in transportation jobs met with some opposition from railroad unions, which felt them unsuited for rail jobs. The head of the switchmen's union said he hoped that he would never see a woman switchman. He was soon to be disappointed. By April, 1945, there were 57 woman switchtenders, 1.82 percent of the total nationwide. The unions also felt that any employment of women should be limited to the duration of the war, but as late as 1948, railroads continued to employ women in many traditionally male jobs, including switchmen,
although only in small numbers.\textsuperscript{32}

Blacks were another source of labor, but one which met with union hostility. Railroad unions generally barred blacks from membership or enrolled them in auxiliary locals dominated by conventional all-white locals. A notable exception was the largely-black Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, headed by blacks. Its president, A. Philip Randolph, fought a long battle in the twenties and thirties for union recognition, not only with the Pullman Company, but with other railroad unions. In the late thirties, redcaps formed their own union, which became the United Transport Service Employees in 1940 and affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1942. It went on to organize black dining car workers. Some blacks were employed as locomotive firemen in the South since this was hot dirty work. However, they could not join a union or be promoted to engineer. In 1941, railroad unions reached an agreement with railroads operating in the South to ban blacks from serving on diesels and to reduce the number of black firemen. The Fair Employment Practice Committee held hearings on the issue and on discrimination by other railroads and unions against blacks. In 1943, it ordered the railroads and the unions to cease discriminatory practices, but they refused since the agency had no powers of enforcement. The President then appointed a committee to meet with the agency, the carriers and the unions, but without success. Meanwhile,
two black firemen pursued the case through the courts and in December, 1944, the Supreme Court ruled that a union representing a craft of railroad workers could not negotiate an agreement preferential to its members and discriminate against other employees because of race. However, the ruling did not affect discrimination barring blacks from employment in the first place.33

Even in the North, railroads offered many jobs to blacks, but only lower-level positions. Blacks could serve on trains only as porters, waiters and maids. Blacks served as coach cleaners, but were barred from the Carmen's Union. This sometimes led to delays. On one occasion, a train of soldiers and sailors on the Chicago and North Western was delayed for over seven hours for lack of white carmen to service the train, though there were plenty of blacks who could do so. The Pennsylvania Railroad employed over 17,000 blacks, but restricted them to jobs on track gangs, dining car crews, coach cleaning, loading cars and the like. The New York Central hired two blacks as carmen's helpers at its yard in Chicago, but refused to employ more for other jobs, claiming that the public and the unions would not accept this. The Illinois Central and the Pennsylvania hired black women for track gangs, and the former employed some at its Centralia shops. By and large, blacks made few gains in railroad employment during the war. Airlines did no better, employing blacks mainly in service jobs. Blacks did gain
jobs on Chicago's transit lines in 1943 as streetcar motor-
men and conductors, elevated trainmen and conductors and bus
drivers. By December, 1944, there were over 500 blacks
employed on the city's transit lines with few complaints from
the public or other employees.36

In addition to hiring women and blacks, railroads im-
ported Mexicans, mainly for work on track gangs. Track
maintenance jobs were very difficult to fill and by November,
1942, the Office of Defense Transportation was urging
recruitment of Mexicans. After the United States made ar-
rangements with the Mexican government, 6000 Mexicans were
imported to work on western railroads. More followed and
some Illinois carriers made use of them. In 1945, over
68,500 Mexicans were in service on the nation's railways as
track workers.35

A more controversial means of addressing labor shor-
tages involved relaxation of work rules. Railroad unions
responded to the threat of unemployment due to dieselization
by insisting that firemen be employed on diesels even though
they had no fires to tend. The unions even tried to get a
full crew for each diesel unit in multi-unit locomotives.
Many states, including Illinois, had full-crew laws requi-
riring employment of a set number of crewmen on a train and
unions insisted on their enforcement. Such full crew laws
often forced railroads to employ more crewmen than they
really needed. Railroads also had to pay a full day's work
for a train crew traveling only 100 miles, which could be done in a few hours. Unions, however, charged that the railroads were wasting manpower due to unnecessary delays and argued that better wages and working conditions would solve the labor shortage. The Office of Defense Transportation pressed for a relaxation of work rules with limited success. Not until well into the postwar era was there any meaningful progress on work rules.  

In 1941, the work rules issue caused a strike and government takeover of the Toledo, Peoria and Western Railroad, a 239-mile road running straight across Illinois from Effner, Indiana to Keokuk, Iowa. George P. McNear, its puritanical owner, built the line into an important bridge route between eastern and western railroads and by-pass around Chicago, saving up to 28 hours on a cross-county run. He also scrapped with important shippers, alienated prominent Peorians and even other railroad executives by his outspoken opinions, though the latter supported him in his fight over work rules. McNear, who refused to deal with unions even after they won an election in November, 1940, considered the standard work rules obsolete and inefficient. In the fall of 1941, he issued new ones under which 55 men would do work previously done by 83, though at higher pay. The unions, fearing loss of jobs and reduced wages for their members, struck on December 28, 1941, the date the rules were to take effect. The National Mediation Board, the United
states Conciliation Service and the War Labor Board tried to settle the strike without success. McNear rejected all suggestions for arbitration even as the unions accepted them. Meanwhile, he hired replacements, mostly rejects from other railroads, and tried to run trains under the new rules. This led to violence. Strikers stoned trains, tried to burn locomotives and company buildings, shot at trains, railyards and homes of company officials. Court orders banning violence and mass picketing were ignored. Three men were convicted of plotting to blow up a bridge. McNear sought additional protection from local police and state militia, but was unsuccessful. Other railroads complained of unsafe practices by the strikebreakers employed by McNear. Since the strike held up war supplies, the President urged McNear to arbitrate and when he refused, ordered the Office of Defense Transportation to take over the road on March 22, 1942. The agency settled with the unions and operated the road for the rest of the war. Even so, the settlement was not far different from McNear's own work rules. The agency found that standard work rules insisted on by the unions would triple labor costs. Arbitration resulted in an agreement more costly than under McNear's rules, but far less than the unions wanted under standard work rules. Railroad and business leaders generally backed McNear's efforts to change work rules, but the public had mixed feelings. Some felt he was an obstructionist, others blamed the unions,
Nationwide railroad labor disputes also arose during the war years. In 1940, fourteen non-operating unions sought paid vacations. The National Mediation Board took up the dispute, but could not resolve it. In June, 1941, these unions were joined by five operating unions in seeking wage hikes. Essentially, railroaders wished to retain the advantages in pay and prestige they had enjoyed compared to industrial workers and which were now threatened by increases in industrial wages. Operating unions also wanted to put extra crewmen on diesel locomotives. The railroads, however, wanted changes in work rules which the unions refused to accept. Again, the Mediation Board tried to mediate the dispute but without success. In October, the Board offered arbitration, but the unions refused to accept and called a strike. However, the President appointed an Emergency Board, which approved a temporary wage hike and paid vacation. The unions rejected this as insufficient and again threatened to strike. On November 27, the President, anxious to avoid a strike, reconvened the National Mediation Board. The carriers made concessions and on December 2, an agreement was reached giving the unions essentially what they wanted in pay and vacations. Other issues were left unresolved.

In the fall of 1942, the non-operating unions sought additional wage increases and a union shop. The Mediation Board took up the dispute in January, 1943, but could not
resolve it and suggested arbitration, which the unions refused. The National Railway Labor Panel, created by the president on May 21, 1942 to handle wartime railway labor disputes, appointed an Emergency Board. It was unable to mediate the dispute, but did recommend a wage increase, but no union shop. The wage increase would have become law, but the Economic Stabilization Director found it in violation of wage restrictions. The unions protested and threatened a strike. The Director suggested that the unions and the carriers negotiate a settlement, but when they did on August 7, it was the same as the rejected one and he disapproved it. Meanwhile, in January, 1943, the operating unions also asked wage increases. The Mediation Board also failed to mediate this dispute and in May the National Railway Labor Panel appointed an Emergency Board, which recommended a wage hike within the constraints of the Little Steel formula. The Economic Stabilization Director approved it and it became law on October 26. However, the unions rejected it and threatened to strike. Meanwhile, on October 16, the President appointed a Special Emergency Board to reconsider the case of the non-operating unions and recommend wage hikes conforming with the stabilization policy. The Board made a recommendation which the Stabilization Director approved, but the unions dissatisfied, asked the Mediation Board to investigate and prepared to strike. They also had resolutions introduced in Congress to validate their agreement of
August 7. The Senate passed it on December 9, but the House deferred action. Later in December, both the operating and nonoperating unions announced a strike to begin December 30, 1943. When three operating unions refused the President's offer to arbitrate, he ordered the War Department to take over the nation's railroads. The unions then called off the strike and talks continued while the Army ran the roads. Seven railroad executives were commissioned as colonels to supervise operations. The President also rendered his decision as arbitrator, which in effect, gave the unions the wage hikes they wanted. The Stabilization Director accepted the agreements on January 18, 1944 and the roads were returned to their owners. During 1943, the operating unions also tried to get extra crewmen on diesel locomotives, but were unsuccessful except in passenger trains, though they did get pay increases for engineers on diesel locomotives.39

Strikes were not confined to the railroad industry. On May 16, 1945, truck drivers in Chicago struck in protest over a War Labor Board award of a pay increase that fell short of their demands. The Army moved some supplies in military trucks, while the carriers asked for a federal takeover. The Office of Defense Transportation took over operations on May 23 and the strike ended on May 25 while the War Labor Board took up the dispute. A second strike came on June 16. Again, the Office of Defense Transportation took over the carriers, and when truckers refused to
work, the Army moved in and troops drove and guarded trucks. The truckers finally conceded defeat and the strike ended June 27. In November, 1944, train crews struck the Chicago, Aurora and Elgin and the Chicago, North Shore and Milwaukee, disrupting commuter service and causing substantial absenteeism in local war plants. The unions had petitioned for a wage increase, but when an Emergency Board appointed by the president approved a wage hike, they rejected it as insufficient. Unlike other disputes, the President refused to intervene in the 17-day strike despite requests that he do so, and the two sides finally settled on the increase awarded by the Emergency Board.  

The railroads and other carriers generally profited from the war. Many Illinois railroads emerged from a Depression-induced bankruptcy and reorganized during the war. In the fall of 1942, the New York Central paid its first dividend since 1931. Many carriers also used profits to reduce debt. The Illinois Central paid off over $100 million in debt.  

The railroads also persuaded the government to eliminate land-grant rates, which the government had imposed on the railroads in return for land grants for railroad construction. The Illinois Central land grant, one of the first, provided for free transportation for government goods and personnel, but this was soon modified to a discount of fifty percent. Non-land-grant roads adopted equalization rates to
meet competition from land-grant roads. During the thirties, the railroads, hit with Depression losses and a large increase in government traffic at low rates, tried to get this provision eliminated. The Transportation Act of 1940 eliminated land-grant rates for non-defense traffic, but kept it for military transportation. In exchange, railroads gave up any unpatented lands. The defense program and the war brought a huge increase in military traffic, all of it carried at a fifty percent discount. Again, the railroads sought repeal, but the Army objected and Congress did not repeal the land-grant rates during the war, thus saving the government an estimated $20 million a month. The railroads did not do so well on land sales. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe earned a total of $25 million from all sales up to June 30, 1947, but granted the government a total of $215 million in reduced rates.42

Wartime traffic loads placed heavy burdens on the state and national transportation system. The vast quantities of military supplies and armies of soldiers and sailors were of no use unless they could be transported to where they were needed. The biggest share of the burden of transporting military equipment and personnel as well as civilian freight and passenger traffic fell on the railroads, which groaned under huge increases in freight and passenger traffic. Other modes of transport also experienced a significant rise in traffic. To handle this burden, commercial carriers
had to cease their normal competitive practices and cooperate with each other.

Government played a significant role in this. Although the government did not repeat its World War I takeover of the railroads, it worked with the carriers and shippers to regulate the flow of traffic and direct shipments to their destination by the most efficient means of transport and by the most direct route. Federal and state agencies worked to eliminate duplicate services and establish new services where needed. The Office of Defense Transportation, the Interstate Commerce Commission and other agencies worked with shippers and with the carriers themselves to insure the efficient use of equipment and in some cases, divert it to the military or to special projects such as the carriage of oil to the East Coast. The War Production Board allocated equipment to the carriers as scarce resources became available. Although equipment was always in short supply, government worked with the carriers to make maximum use of existing equipment.

Labor was also scarce during the war as the armed forces drained off train crewmen, truck and bus drivers and other personnel. To replace them, commercial carriers, like other employers, had to turn to new sources of labor. As with other industries, railroads, truckers and local transit companies hired women and blacks. Railroads employed women in many traditionally male jobs and increased their employment of blacks, often despite union resistance.
The war did not introduce any major changes in transportation, though women and blacks gained increased job opportunities. The main effect of the war was on existing trends. Prior to the war, the railroads faced growing competition, especially from the automobile in passenger travel, but also from trucks and barges in freight transportation. The war reversed the trend temporarily. Auto usage declined sharply as auto production ceased and existing autos, gasoline and tires were rationed. Motorists crowded mass transit systems for local transportation and trains for long-distance travel. After the war, however, they deserted the rails to return to their cars. Airline travel did retain its wartime gains and expand on them after the war, but it too was growing before the war, and the chief effect of the war, at least initially was to retard this growth. The postwar era brought the elimination of most rail passenger service and the loss of much rail freight traffic. The war also delayed the full impact of one technological change. Railroads had to wait until peacetime to dieselize their operations, though their wartime experience further convinced them of the advantages of the diesel locomotive. Illinois continued to be a major transportation crossroads after the war, but in highway, air and water transport as well as rail.


4"Are the Railroads Prepared?" *Railway Age* 108 (June 22, 1940), 1090-1094; Ralph Budd, "Is Transport Plant Adequate?" *Railway Age* 110 (March 1, 1941), 385-388; Ralph Budd, "Railroads Face Grave Emergency," *Railway Age* 110 (May 10, 1941), 800-802; "Railroads Not Ready for War Even if U. S.


9 Bloomington Pantagraph, October 2, 1942, p. 19, October 8, 1943, October 11, 1943, p. 8, October 19, 1943,
"High Obsolescence Features the Motive-Power Inventory," Railway Age 106 (January 7, 1939), 14-15; Arthur J. McGinnis, "Locomotives Orders in 1941 Greatest Since 1923," Railway Age 112 (January 3, 1942), 113-123; Arthur J. McGinnis, "Locomotives Ordered and Built in 1945," Railway Age 120 (January 5, 1946), 88; "Reduced Locomotive inventory is Affecting Capacity," Railway Age 110 (January 4, 1941), 16-17.


19Bloomington Pantagraph, July 17, 1942, p. 6; Chicago Tribune, January 9, 1942, p. 31, January 24, 1942, p. 23, June 5, 1942, p. 19, March 20, 1943, p. 11, October 21, 1943,
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22 Chicago Tribune, January 24, 1942, p. 3, September 5, 1943, pt. 2, p. 7, November 3, 1943, p. 30; "Handling the Boys in Khaki," Railway Age 111 (November 22, 1941), 862-865; "Railroads Are Moving Two Million Soldiers A Month," Railway Age 113 (December 12, 1942), 972; "Railroads Moving 150,000 for Army Maneuvers," Railway Age 109 (August 17, 1940), 243-245; "Railroads Operate 2500 Troop Trains A Month," Railway Age 114 (June 5, 1943), 1153; "Triple-Deck Troop Sleeping Cars," Railway Age 115 (September 18, 1943), 449-451; "Troop Movements Take Precedence," Railway Age 113 (November 21,
1942), 841-843; Pullman Incorporated, Annual Report, 1945, pp. 5-6, 24; Itzkoff, Off the Track, p. 21.


McNear and two other officials were also tried on charges of violating the National Railway Labor Act by forcing employees to join a company union and threatening those who joined outside unions with loss of their jobs. They were acquitted, however. The Office of Defense Transportation found it necessary to make repairs and upgrade track due to heavy traffic demands. McNear protested that he had planned to upgrade the line more extensively and hence the agency expenditures were wasteful. His protests were overriden by the exigencies of the war. In 1947, the government settled all claims with the company. The railroad did fairly well under federal control, earning sizeable profits. Chicago Tribune, April 8, 1942, p. 3; October 12, 1942, p. 27; April 24, 1943, p. 7; June 24, 1944, p. 17; Peoria Journal-Transcript, April 23, 1942, pp. 1, 3; "Books Closed On Government Operation of T. P. & W." Railway Age 123 (August 2, 1947), 212-213; U. S., District Court, Southern District of Illinois, Northern Division, Criminal Case Files, United States v. Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Enterprise Lodge No. 27, et al., Farmers Grain Corporation, et al., v. Toledo, Peoria and Western Railroad, et al., Records Center, National Archives and Records Administration, Chicago, Illinois; Watters, The Production Front, pp. 157-161.


CHAPTER VI

HOGS, SOYBEANS AND HEMP: ILLINOIS AGRICULTURE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

Illinois farm production during the second world war was a complex problem. Farmers had to produce more, but did not have enough equipment and manpower to do the job. At the same time, their incomes were somewhat restricted by price controls on farm products, controls which they resented in the light of rising industrial wages. Government played a major role, orchestrating production goals while regulating prices and the supply of labor and equipment. The war also brought changes in the types of crops planted. While traditional crops, especially corn, continued to dominate, soybeans, a relative newcomer, gained rapidly in acreage after Pearl Harbor. Illinois farmers experimented with new war crops such as hemp while reducing the planting of less essential crops.

Illinois agriculture was highly diversified. Corn was the chief crop, especially in the central and northern counties. Other crops planted in these counties included soybeans, oats and other grains, asparagus and other vegetables. Farmers in the southern counties grew winter wheat, peaches, apples, pears and other fruits and also cotton and
tobacco. Many Illinois farmers raised livestock for meat or dairy products. In 1945, Illinois ranked fifth among the states in total acreage of crops harvested. At that time, 88.3 percent of the total area of the state was farmland. The state also was first in soybeans, second in corn, hogs and cheese, fourth in chickens, fifth in milk production and sixth in eggs. Food processing industries ranged from Chicago meat packinghouses to soybean and corn processing plants in Decatur, vegetable canneries, dairies and egg processors.¹

Agriculture was slow to prepare for war, having been in a depression since the early twenties. During the thirties, New Deal agencies such as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) and the Soil Conservation Service worked to restrict farm production. As late as the fall of 1940, few of them were adapting to changed conditions. Agriculture did not plan for war because farmers and agricultural agencies feared that increased production would bring surplus crops and depressed farm income. There was no independent war agency set up to handle agriculture. Though the National Defense Advisory Commission had an agricultural division, it was abolished in May, 1941 and its functions transferred to an office of Agricultural Defense Relations within the Department of Agriculture. Other agencies of the Department such as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the Extension Service handled much of the task of promoting increased production, although in March, 1943, the
War Food Administration was established within the Department to handle food production and distribution.²

Some of the agricultural agencies established during the thirties relied a great deal on local farmers to run their programs. Administration of crop reduction and soil conservation programs rested on state, county and township committees composed of farmers. Local committees were elected annually by cooperating farmers. Not all farmers participated in agricultural programs. Even those who signed up sometimes had misgivings. The committees themselves were sometimes criticized as mere rubber stamps for higher officials. Big farmers accepted the AAA program more readily than small farmers. They were better informed of its benefits, and as commercial farmers were able to profit from its provisions more effectively than small farmers. The latter were assisted by the Farm Security Administration, which provided low-cost loans enabling them to buy land and improve their farms.³

Farm organizations played a major role in shaping agricultural programs. The most powerful was the American Farm Bureau Federation, whose Illinois affiliate, the Illinois Agricultural Association, was headed by Earl C. Smith, a Pike County farmer. The Illinois organization was the most powerful state farm organization in the country, representing about two-thirds of Illinois farmers by the end of the war. Though accused of representing only big farmers,
it included small farmers and tenants as well. It did represent successful commercial farmers as opposed to subsistence farmers. In 1947, with a membership of 145,851, the Illinois Agricultural Association easily outranked the National Grange which had only about 9200 members in Illinois and the National Farmer's Union. In 1942, John L. Lewis tried to organize dairy farmers in the United Mine Workers union's District 50, but with little success. Though some locals were organized, the United Farmers of Illinois disaffiliated from District 50 in 1944. The Illinois Agricultural Association generally supported the Agricultural Adjustment Administration programs and even helped to write the 1938 law. Indeed it was criticized by the United Farmers of Illinois for its support of the New Deal. However, the Farm Bureau and its Illinois affiliate objected to the Farm Security Administration and during the war, backed the efforts of Illinois Congressmen Everett Dirksen and others in seeking to curtail the agency's activities despite its popularity even with anti-New Deal critics, who praised its efforts to help small farmers. When criticized for this by the Bloomington Pantagraph, the Illinois Agricultural Association replied that it had no objection to how the program was administered in Illinois. In fact, many members of the Farm Security Administration county committees were also leaders in the Farm Bureau. Still, the Bureau and its state affiliate were generally apathetic toward small farmers.
One reason for the Farm Bureau's strength was its affiliation with the federal-state agricultural extension service. County Farm Bureaus organized and funded by farmers themselves and affiliated with the national Farm Bureau hired county agricultural agents from a list of applicants approved by the extension service and paid in part by the Farm Bureau. The extension service cooperated with the Farm Bureau and the Illinois Agricultural Association in promoting farm programs and new farming methods. The farm organizations themselves lobbied the General Assembly to keep the extension service well-funded. In 1938, under an agreement between the Department of Agriculture and land grant colleges such as the University of Illinois, state, county and neighborhood land-use planning committees were created. The land grant colleges and the extension service were responsible for implementing the plan. The director of the extension service was the state chairman of the state committee with authority to appoint farmer members. Farmers representing different types of agriculture in the area composed the majority of members of the state and county committees. State or county offices of agricultural agencies also were represented. The committees dealt not only with land-use planning, but any local problem concerning farmers and their families. The University of Illinois started organizing the committees in 1939. The defense emergency hastened organization. The University's advisors presided over county committees, which
consisted of representatives of each agricultural agency operating in the county, teachers of vocational agriculture and home economics and eight to fifteen farm men and women named by farm and home advisors and farm and home bureau presidents. The farm advisor was chairman and the home advisor co-chairman. The advisors and bureau presidents appointed township chairmen who in turn nominated and the county committee approved neighborhood leaders—a farmer and a farm woman for each school district. Some were suspicious of the committees since the Farm Bureau had a hand in the selection of county committees and township chairmen, though the program included all farmers and not just members of the Farm Bureau. During the war, the committees discussed general production problems, rural fire protection, wartime food preservation and other problems. They also made plans for cooperative use of farm machinery, canning equipment, transportation and labor. The University's College of Agriculture issued bulletins on war crops, fertilizers and other wartime farm production problems. Governor Dwight Green named the members of the State Land-Use Planning Council as an advisory committee to the Illinois War Council's Committee on Agricultural Resources and Production. The Council set up a program for relaying information on wartime agricultural requirements to every farm family in the state. It also directed recruiting and training of farm labor.5
On July 5, 1941, Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard ordered the establishment of state and county defense boards, later war boards, under the AAA committee chairmen. The state agricultural war board, headed by Lee Gentry, state AAA director, was composed of the principal field officers of the various agencies of the Department of Agriculture operating in the state, while county agricultural war boards were composed of representatives of the agencies operating in the county. As head of the extension service, the chairman of the State Land-Use Planning Council was a member of the state U. S. Department of Agriculture War Board and also a member of the Illinois War Council. The state and county agricultural war boards administered federal war programs, broke down state production goals into county and farm units and canvassed farmers to secure pledges of production. On January 12, 1943, Farm Mobilization day, farmers meeting in AAA committees heard a radio address by James Byrnes, Director of Economic Stabilization, delivering a message from the President urging increased farm production to meet the 1943 crop goals. The farmers then discussed means of meeting these goals. From 1942 to 1944, the war boards handled the rationing of farm equipment. They also presented farmers' requests for materials or labor and reported bottlenecks in storage and transportation to the proper authorities.

In April, 1941, the Department of Agriculture embarked
on a program increasing food production to meet the needs of Britain and others fighting the Axis powers. Soon afterward, the Illinois extension leaders urged a 20 percent increase in hog production for 1941, but also advised farmers to maintain their acreage of corn, wheat and oats at current levels. There was no shortage of grain at the time. Indeed a surplus developed by July. Though federal agricultural agencies were no longer trying to cut farm production, they still wished to restrict it. On September 11, Lee Gentry advised Sangamon County farmers to put 80 percent of their cropland in whatever crops they were planting, but conserve 20 percent as grassland to avoid soil depletion. Even though the nation was preparing to feed 10 million people under Lend-Lease, it planned to do so by restricting surplus crops such as wheat in favor of others such as soybeans, though the Department of Agriculture did make plans to canvass all farmers to ascertain their 1942 production goals. After Pearl Harbor, however, the Department of Agriculture eased restrictions and told farmers to plant every acre. Production goals were revised in the light of the new situation. 

Though Illinois farmers grew a variety of crops, their main contribution to wartime food production lay in corn, soybeans, dairy products, hogs, cattle, chickens and eggs. The actual acreage harvested during 1942 to 1945 grew less than five percent over the prewar years. Production increased because farmers managed to increase production per
Farmers made heavy use of fertilizers. Illinois led all states at the beginning of the war in the use of limestone to sweeten the soil. Despite shortages, the use of limestone increased during the war. Chemical fertilizer use also increased. Soil conservation was a problem. Soil conservation districts increased during the war from 25 in June, 1942 to 66 by the end of the war. They covered over four-fifths of the state's cropland. Some soil was lost, however, due to heavy wartime planting. Soil loss in the Corn Belt states of Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Ohio and Missouri increased 12 percent in 1943-1944 over 1935-1939. Even marginal land was put into production. Hilly pasture land was plowed for cropland, though contour planting minimized soil erosion. Farmers utilized contour plowing and the planting of grasses and clover on fallow lands to conserve and improve the soil and produce higher yields. In 1943, the Department of Agriculture urged farmers to reduce the planting of crops deemed unessential such as watermelons and cantaloupes. In Illinois, growers reduced their acreage in watermelons from 4300 acres in 1940 to 2600 in 1943 and for cantaloupes from 1900 acres in 1940 to 1050 in 1943. However, there were no price ceilings on these fruits and growers soon found that watermelons were the most profitable crop. Prices quadrupled between 1939 and 1943 with the biggest increases in 1942 and 1943. Watermelon acreage increased in 1944 though not to the prewar level. Cotton
production also dropped, though flax increased from 6000 acres in 1941 to 29,000 acres, then declined to 972 acres in 1945 as demand eased. 8

The chief crop in Illinois was corn, which had a variety of uses. Sweet corn fed consumers while field corn was used to feed livestock. Corn was also refined to produce starches, syrups, vegetable oils, alcohol and other products. The A. E. Staley Company in Decatur developed a new type of corn starch for use in making waterproof boxes to carry supplies on to beaches. The boxes were thrown off the ships and floated into shore. Corn starch also replaced imported tapioca in a number of products. Even corn cobs were ground up to make animal feed, engine cleaners for naval aircraft, furfural, a refining agent used in making butadiene, and other products. Several Illinois companies produced hybrid corn seed. Usually, Illinois planted an average of around nine million acres in corn. In 1942 to 1945, average annual acreage was 8,624,277, slightly under the average for 1935 to 1939 of 8,869,250. Planting increased after 1943 so that acreage went from 7,721,000 in 1941 to 9,056,000 in 1945. The average annual yield, however, went from 331,000,000 bushels in 1935 to 1939 to over 405,000,000 bushels in 1942 to 1945. 9

Illinois wheat declined during the war years. Early in 1941, a large stockpile of wheat from the previous harvest glutted storage space as the 1941 winter wheat crop
started filling elevators. The situation worsened and by July, a government appointed grain storage committee warned wheat shippers not to send carloads of wheat to Chicago due to lack of storage space. By August, American farmers were harvesting the largest wheat crop in 22 years. The huge wheat stockpile led the Department of Agriculture to recommend that farmers reduce their acreage in wheat in 1942 and grow soybeans, flax and other crops that were needed. Storage space was in short supply and many farmers were seeking bins to store their wheat to prevent spoilage. The Commodity Credit Corporation eased some of its own storage problems by selling some of the wheat stockpile for livestock feed at 85 percent of the parity price. This aroused protests from farm bloc congressmen, who tried unsuccessfully to ban the sale of commodities below the parity price. On May 2, 1942, wheat growers voted in AAA elections to accept the Department of Agriculture's recommended quotas. Under the quotas, farmers could make loans on their wheat crop, but they were penalized if they seeded over their allotment unless they held the excess on their farms until the quota was lifted. In Illinois, the acreage harvested in 1942 was about half that of 1941 and the 12,623,000 bushels produced was the lowest since 1912. In December, 1942, the acreage planted in winter wheat was the lowest in 78 years. However, in February, 1943, the marketing quota was ended since the need for wheat was rising. By March, 1944, there was a serious
shortage of wheat and Illinois farmers planted more wheat in 1944 and 1945, though production did not reach the prewar level.  

Soybean production expanded rapidly during the war with Illinois the leading producer in the nation. In 1939, the state's farms produced half the national output. In 1942, the Department of Agriculture sought an increase in oil-bearing crops to make up for the loss of vegetable oils from the Far East. It sought a national increase in soybean production of 54 percent but only 27 percent for Illinois since the state already produced over half the national total. Before the war, soybean acreage was about a fourth that of corn. By 1943, it was almost half. Soybean production increased every year to peak at 75,200,000 bushels in 1945. Production declined after the war, but still topped the prewar level. Decatur was the center of a soybean processing industry with its A. E. Staley Company as the industry leader. In 1949, 30 processing plants in the state handled 46 percent of the nation's output. The Illinois Agricultural Experiment Station developed new varieties of the soybean. One which was produced during the war was more productive and richer in oil content. The Department of Agriculture's Northern Regional Research Laboratory in Peoria and a special soybean regional laboratory at the University of Illinois discovered new uses for soybeans, which were usually crushed to produce soybean oil and other products
including animal feed. Most soybean oil went into food products, but some went into glycerine, a component in munitions. Vast quantities of soy flour went to England through Lend-Lease for use in sausage. The Staley Company built a new soy flour plant which went into production in 1942. By the end of 1944, however, there was a surplus of soy flour and the new plant was shut down. The company did build a new solvent extraction soybean mill in 1944 and started production in 1945.¹¹

During the war, the state's soybean processing plants proved inadequate to handle the increased wartime crop. To avoid building new plants, soybeans were shipped south and west to cottonseed and copra mills. Unfortunately, this produced shortages of soybean meal in the fall of 1942 and early 1943. Soybean meal was used to supply proteins to livestock. Farmers protested vehemently and threatened to withhold their crops from the market to feed their own livestock. Another controversy arose over margarine, a substitute for butter. Margarine, which used soybean oil, was cheaper than butter and thus threatened dairy farmers, who responded by seeking to have it banned or taxed heavily to make it noncompetitive. Farm publications backed them up only to discover that many farmers and even dairymen bought margarine.¹²

One controversial issue affecting most farm products was farm prices. Over the years, farmers sought to obtain
parity prices for their crops. Parity prices would give them the same purchasing power they had between 1910 and 1914. The Administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt championed their cause and tried various means of getting farm prices up to parity during the Depression. The outbreak of war brought an increased demand and higher prices for farm products. It also brought fears of inflation, which led to price control. However, the initial price control legislation included provisions setting farm prices at 110 percent of parity. Consumer prices continued to rise and in April, 1942, President Roosevelt asked Congress to reduce the ceiling on farm products. Congress balked, however, until the President asked for legislation lowering the ceiling to 100 percent of parity and threatening to take action on his own. Many congressmen and farm leaders were angered by what they considered an unfair deal for farmers, but they finally gave in and the legislation passed on October 2, 1942. The Department of Agriculture also used support payments, incentive payments and subsidies to encourage farmers to plant more essential crops such as soybeans and increase production of hogs, chickens, eggs and dairy products. The Department also used subsidies to reduce consumer prices. Farmers had mixed feelings over such payments. As a rule, they preferred that the free market rule farm prices and that the government refrain from fixing prices. They saw subsidies as a sort of stigma and feared an unfavorable reaction
from consumers. However, they opposed the abolition of subsidies if it meant lower farm prices. While they objected to ceilings on farm prices, they were willing to accept government intervention to keep prices at parity or above. They also felt that consumers should be willing to pay higher prices in view of their higher wages. Farm leaders demanded that wages and other prices be controlled if farm prices were restricted. During 1943 and early 1944, the Farm Bureau and its congressional allies made repeated efforts to ban subsidies, but consumers and labor unions wanted subsidies to hold down food costs. Whenever Congress passed bans on subsidies, the President vetoed them and the vetoes were sustained. 13

Ceiling prices on meat and corn helped produce shortages of both in 1943 and 1944. Illinois was a major producer of livestock, especially hogs, cattle and chickens, all of which ate corn. Feeder cattle were often shipped in from western states to be fattened in feedlots in Illinois before going to market. Farmers and feedlot owners benefitted from the outbreak of war in Europe and the national rearmament program which followed. German invasions of Poland and other countries cut off the supply of Polish hams and other products, while Lend-Lease, the war effort and higher domestic consumption increased demand. 14

In Illinois, hog production made the biggest gains. In December, 1940, the Secretary of Agriculture asked for
more pigs and announced a program of price supports (mostly through government purchase) for hogs, chickens, eggs and dairy products to encourage production. Illinois farmers responded with 8,500,800 pigs in 1941, over half a million above the 1940 total. The pig crop grew rapidly, finally peaking at 11,009,000 in 1943, twice the 1935 to 1939 average. The Department of Agriculture helped encourage production by increasing support prices for live hogs from $9.00 per hundredweight in April, 1942 to $13.25 per hundredweight in the fall. Meanwhile, in February, 1942, live hog prices hit 110 percent of parity, which was about $13.00 per hundredweight. The Office of Price Administration then froze wholesale pork prices at a level for early March. However, hog prices continued to rise, thus forcing many small packers to operate at a loss. Large packers had integrated processing sidelines to offset this. In the spring of 1943, with live hog prices hitting $16.00 a hundredweight, the Office of Price Administration recommended ceilings on live hogs to relieve the pressure on small packers. The War Food Administration agreed and announced that prices would have to drop or ceilings would be imposed, but then increased the support price to $13.75 per hundredweight to encourage continued high production. The Office of Price Administration further encouraged hog production when it imposed a ceiling on corn. The objective was to encourage farmers to feed their corn to their hogs, thus producing more meat.
This was exactly what happened. Farmers found it more profitable to feed their corn to their hogs than sell it on the market. In June, 1943, a Department of Agriculture survey of the pig crop discovered that farmers had exceeded the Department's requests by 50 percent and were planning for more pigs in the fall. 15

Meanwhile, despite record crops in 1942, the promotion of hog production led to a crisis in corn. The hogs soon ate all the surplus from 1942. By the spring of 1943, farmers were using seven bushels of the 1942 crop for every five they grew in 1943. In six months, they used two-thirds of the corn supply, leaving only a third to last them through the rest of the year. This led to a shortage of corn which made farmers even more reluctant to sell their corn. Those who did not need corn for feeding held it in the hope that the ceiling would be lifted. The Commodity Credit Corporation called in loans on corn crops, only to find that farmers had the money to pay off the loans and could continue to hold their corn. Soon, a black market developed in corn. Truckers bought corn from farmers at up to $1.50 a bushel, well above the ceiling of $1.07 a bushel, then sold it in areas where corn was scarce. They avoided elevators where the ceiling would be enforced, though some elevators bought and sold corn above the ceiling in order to save livestock from starvation. Some industries, such as distilleries, also bought on the black market. Others, such as the Corn
products Refining Company's Pekin plant, shut down for a time in June due to a lack of corn. On June 25, with other plants in Decatur and Argo threatening to close, the War Food Administration seized corn in 96 midwestern terminal elevators and allocated it to industries using corn. A shortage of soybean meal further complicated the feed situation. The prairie Farmer advised its readers to stretch out protein feed and rely more on hay, small grains and pasture. 16

The shortage of feed, especially corn, finally led hog growers to send their animals to market. The huge crop glutted the market and overcrowded processing, storage and transportation facilities. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration and other agencies asked farmers to market their hogs more evenly, but the glut continued. The peak came in December, 1943 and January, 1944. Packers were swamped with hogs and truckloads roamed the Midwest looking for a market. The National Stockyards in East St. Louis embargoed further shipments for a time. Some farmers even sold their breeding stock and unfattened hogs. Prices fell to the government support level and this was lowered in October, 1944. The Office of Price Administration stopped rationing most pork products for a time. However, feed shortages reappeared in 1944 and, together with the market experience of 1943 and another glutted market in the spring of 1944, led to a sharp drop in hog production in 1944. In 1945, there was a pork shortage. 17
The decline in the pig population did not end the corn shortage. Other livestock also ate corn and various industries used huge amounts of corn. In July, 1943, the War Food Administration authorized country elevators to buy corn for the Commodity Credit Corporation and urged farmers to sell, promising supplemental payments if the ceiling price were raised and if they sold by August 10. This brought a big movement of corn to market. In December, the ceiling was raised to reflect an increase in parity prices. Nevertheless, shortages returned as farmers held corn to feed their hogs or sold it on the black market. In March, 1944, the War Food Administration ordered country grain elevators in 125 counties in parts of Illinois and other states to allocate 35 percent of corn to industries making products essential to the war effort. Soon afterward, the allocation was changed to 60 percent. On April 24, the War Food Administration froze all sales of corn in those counties except to the Commodity Credit Corporation and along with the War Department and the War Production Board, appealed to farmers to sell their corn at country elevators with a small allowance for shelling and trucking if they sold within a certain time. Stockmen who needed corn to feed livestock had to get a permit from the county AAA office to buy it and even then were limited to a 30-day supply. This brought more corn to market, but not before Corn Refining Plants at Pekin and Argo shut down for lack of corn. They reopened in May, but
shortages persisted. There simply was not enough corn to supply industry and feed livestock. In June, county Agricultural Adjustment Administration officials started contracting with farmers for the sale of corn to the Commodity Credit Corporation. Later that month, the freeze on corn sales was lifted. Shortages reappeared in 1945 and 1946 and even led to tie-in sales by some country grain dealers in which farmers had to buy barley to get corn. Terminal dealers offered premiums to get corn, including nylons, whiskey, automobiles and tractors.  

Shortages also developed in beef cattle during the war, mainly due to price regulations. In March, 1942, the Office of Price Administration imposed wholesale and retail price ceilings reflecting 110 percent of parity prices to producers. However, prices on live cattle continued to rise as the government made large purchases of beef. Retail prices also rose, leading the Office of Price Administration to impose dollar and cents ceilings late in 1942. Meanwhile, by July, 1942, feeders started reducing the number of cattle they were buying to fatten for slaughter. Feeder cattle cost too much and ceilings on beef made the price on fattened cattle too low to make a profit. Small packers were also hurt by price ceilings, which left only a small margin between the cost of live cattle and the price of beef. They asked for ceilings on live cattle, but the Department of Agriculture opposed this. Instead, it established subsidies
for small packers and slaughterers starting in 1943. One result was a general advance in cattle prices and an increased spread between lower and higher quality beef until price control eased in July, 1946. Cattlemen regulated the flow of cattle to force packers to pay steadily higher prices for cattle. 19

Meanwhile, late in 1942, cattle went to market well before they were fattened, thus leading to a drop in beef by December. Cattle sales to packers slackened and farmers sold on the black market. Small slaughterers butchered livestock that normally would have gone to Chicago packers. Cattle rustlers killed cattle in fields, dressed them and hauled away the meat, much of which went to eastern markets. Criminal elements gained control of small packers. In March, 1943, the Department of Agriculture set up a system of permits for slaughterers and livestock dealers, but some were issued in error and had to be withdrawn. Rationing of meat started March 29. Later that summer, beef became more plentiful as grass-fed cattle went to market and in the summer of 1944, there was a glut of beef cattle. Rationing was sharply curtailed until the end of the year when meat shortages returned and lasted into 1945. The price of feeder cattle dropped and feedlot owners started buying again in the summer of 1944. Later that year, they were given a subsidy on higher quality beef, thus permitting a wider spread between fattened and unfinished cattle. 20
Poultry, unlike other meat, was unrationed and thus in high demand. However, it was also subject to price ceilings and when feed shortages developed and costs went up, black markets arose in poultry. Truckers visited poultry farms and paid prices well over the ceiling and sold directly to consumers willing to pay higher prices. Many consumers bought directly from farmers, who claimed ignorance of regulations or simply ignored them. Poultry dealers also ignored regulations and despite vigorous attempts by the Office of Price Administration to enforce them, poultry price controls eventually broke down. Although chickens were the main item, many farmers raised turkeys. Turkey production grew from 98,000 birds in 1929 to 818,000 in 1944 and almost doubled between 1939 and 1944.²¹

Unlike other farm products, egg supplies generally exceeded demand during the war. Eggs were in short supply late in 1942 when price ceilings were first imposed on them, but by January, the supply increased and prices dropped below the ceiling. By March, when dollar and cents ceilings replaced the previous prices, the output of eggs was soaring. During the summer, demand again exceeded supply and prices went up again, but then maximum wholesale prices were established and prices dropped below the ceiling and remained there with few interruptions into 1945. The War Food Administration bought eggs simply to support the price in addition to buying some to be dried for military use and
Lend-Lease. Egg drying plants turned out egg powder as fast as they could with a limited labor supply. A Harvard, Illinois egg drying plant produced 10,000 pounds a day. Instead of shortages, the War Food Administration had a surplus of eggs and had to scramble to find markets and storage space. Some eggs were given away in Chicago schools. Others were sold as animal feed. Many eggs could not be sold and sat in warehouses or were shipped across the country until they spoiled and became unfit even for animal feed. Even then, the War Food Administration continued to buy eggs due to congressional pressure to support the price.22

In 1941, the Secretary of Agriculture asked for increased milk production. Illinois farmers responded with an increase of eight percent between 1940 and 1942. Local communities pushed milk production. On June 18, 1942, Harvard held its first annual milk festival, an event originally conceived to honor dairy farmers, but also used to push milk production as part of the local contribution to the war effort. At the 1943 festival, a Chicago radio director from WLS, the Prairie Farmer's station, led 1500 farmers in a pledge to increase milk production until victory was won. Nationwide milk production faltered in the summer of 1943 and the War Food Administration responded with a feed subsidy. Illinois farmers in 34 northern counties received the minimum subsidy. In 1944, Illinois produced five and a half billion pounds of milk as well as large amounts of other
dairy products. By May, 1945, milk production was at a record level. Although some dairymen sold their cows due to labor shortages, others expanded their herds. By 1945, the number of cows on Illinois farms was 150,000 above that in 1939. As a result of relatively high milk production, milk remained unrationed though sales were restricted for a time in the fall of 1943. The Office of Price Administration imposed price ceilings on milk at the retail level in March, 1942 and for producers in February, 1943. Although the agency established some price differentials for different communities and subsidies to lift supply, the price of milk remained relatively stable throughout the war. Other dairy products, such as butter, cheese and evaporated milk, were used by the armed forces and thus were much scarcer. Lend Lease and military requirements pushed up the output of evaporated milk by 70 percent in 1942 and also increased the use of dried milk. New plants were built in several Illinois communities. Military purchases led to shortages of butter by the fall of 1942 and soon all dairy products other than fluid milk were rationed. 23

Some farmers grew crops unusual to Illinois during the war. In 1943, farmers in four counties switched from melons and cantaloupes to castor beans, which were used to produce castor oil. Aside from being an unpopular medicine, the oil was used in lubricating airplane motors and to replace tung oil in paints. Though the farmers produced about
600,000 pounds of beans in 1943, none were planted after that year. Hemp also emerged as a war crop in 1943 due to the cutoff of supplies of sisal and Manila hemp due to Axis victories in the Far East and the Mediterranean and submarines in the Caribbean. Hemp was used to make rope for ships and army tents and twine for other uses. The Defense Plant Corporation, a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, financed construction of hemp mills in several midwestern states. The Commodity Credit Corporation established a subsidiary, War Hemp Industries, to build and operate the mills and provide seed and equipment to farmers. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration lined up farmers. Hemp growers had to pay a special tax and keep records for the Bureau of Narcotics of the Treasury Department since the leaves and flowers of the hemp plant were used in making marijuana. The stalk contained the fibers used in making rope. Illinois farmers planted 36,000 acres in 1943 and produced 33,120,000 pounds of hemp fiber. Profits varied from nothing to as high as $200 an acre. Most fell somewhere in between. This led to some difficulty in getting farmers to sign up in 1944. Due to Allied victories, which freed other sources of supply, the need for hemp was reduced in 1944. Planting was reduced, though the ten mills built in various communities in Illinois opened to process the 1943 crop. Only four remained in 1945 to handle the 1944 crop. No hemp was planted in 1945 and the mills closed. There were
some efforts to establish a peacetime industry making hemp cloth, but this did not materialize. War Hemp Industries also sponsored efforts to gather milkweed floss which was used as a substitute for kapok in lifejackets. Normally destroyed by farmers and railroad maintenance crews as a pest, it was allowed to grow. School children harvested the floss.\textsuperscript{24}

Although they achieved record food production during the war, Illinois farmers experienced many difficulties, of which the worst was the shortage of labor. While many of the state's farm workers were unemployed or underemployed in 1940, shortages appeared by the spring of 1941 as the draft and defense plants drained off workers. Will County farmers lost hired hands to army ordnance plants, thus forcing them to rely on themselves and their families. One woman worked an 80-acre farm with the aid of a 12-year-old grandson. As young men entered the armed forces during war, farmers had to rely on their wives, daughters and younger sons to handle chores previously done by older sons of draft-age. Farmers also worked long hours, often 80 or 90 a week. Seven-day weeks were quite common. Neighbors helped each other with certain chores such as harvesting. Farmers joined together to assist those who were ill. Still, many farmers found it impossible to secure the help they needed and had to quit farming. Newspapers in rural areas were filled with ads during the war years announcing the sale of farm equipment
and livestock due to the shortage of farm laborers. Dairy-men were especially hard hit and some had to sell their cows. The quality of farm laborers also declined during the war years. Many of those available were inexperienced, untrained or incompetent. One such farmhand made the mistake of pouring cold water into a very hot tractor motor, thus putting the tractor out of commission when it was needed most. Many farmers had to supervise workers more closely. One result of the loss of men to the armed forces and to war industries was a decline in the farm population of Illinois from 978,907 in 1940 to 759,429 in 1945, a decrease of over 28 percent. This was a nationwide development, but Illinois lost more than other states.25

There were efforts to raise farm wages and thereby attract and retain farm workers. In October, 1939, the average monthly wage for farm workers in Illinois was $32.25 with room and board and $43.25 without it. By October, 1943, the average was up to $65.25 with room and board, $82.50 without. By April, 1945, hired hands were earning $81.75 with room and board or $106 without it. In 1945, farm wages in Illinois were 248 percent of what they were in 1939. Nationally, the increase was even higher at 274 percent. Some farmers were more willing than others to raise wages to attract workers. The United States Employment Service found it difficult to recruit workers to pick cotton in Alexander and Pulaski counties since farmers in Missouri offered better
wages than did Illinois farmers. Missouri growers also rented sacks to cotton pickers while Illinois farmers expected workers to bring their own. Missouri growers had agents in Cairo to recruit pickers and transport them to Missouri each day to work. When Decatur area farmers complained of a labor shortage, the Employment Service found that almost all complainers paid poor wages and provided housing unfit for human habitation. Several denied needing any help or were reluctant to pay more or furnish better living quarters. Several farmhands did leave to take better farm jobs further north.26

One of the more controversial aspects of the farm labor situation was the draft status of farm workers. When Selective Service was first established, farmers and farmhands were inducted regardless of the impact on farm production, though few were taken until after Pearl Harbor. Not until March 16, 1942, did the system develop a system of essential industries, which included agriculture. In October, 1942, the War Manpower Commission drew up a list of agricultural occupations qualifying for deferment. Even then, the General Selective Service Questionnaire was inadequate to properly classify agricultural registrants. In December, 1941, the Logan County draft board developed a special questionnaire for such registrants and in January, 1942, the Illinois State Director of the Selective Service System called a meeting of agricultural leaders which resulted in a
questionnaire for state-wide use. It was later adopted by other states. In February, the National Director urged local draft boards to seek information from the Department of Agriculture county war boards on the farm labor situation and farm production, though not on individual registrants. Beginning in March, 1943, the county war boards could appeal cases of individual registrants, though they rarely did so. They generally cooperated with local draft boards.27

Meanwhile, the growing shortage of farm labor raised fears that it would hurt farm production. In the fall of 1942, Congress passed the Tydings Amendment to the Selective Service Act, which provided for deferral of farm workers as long as they remained in that occupation. However, if they left farm work, local boards had to reclassify them to make them eligible for the draft. By this time, local boards in Illinois generally were deferring agricultural laborers who were needed in their particular jobs. To secure deferment of a hired hand, a farmer had to show that the man was necessary and could not be replaced without reducing the yield of the farm. A local board also had to consider the worker's skill and experience. The importance of the farm and its products and the shortage of farm labor in the area. Farm workers could move from farm to farm without losing their deferments if the draft board felt that this would increase production, but if they simply left farm work, they were generally drafted. Also that fall, the Department of
Agriculture prepared a list of war units or work requirement standards. Each class of livestock and crop was given a factor based on the work required in its production. Thus, the care of one milk cow was considered one war unit. Since beef cattle took less time to care for, three beef cattle or five yearling steers or heifers were required for one war unit. With all livestock and crops assigned war units, it was easy to determine if a farm worker was making an important contribution to farm production and the Selective Service System quickly adopted the plan. Standards varied from county to county, however. At first, a worker had to handle only 8 war units to be deferred, but this was gradually raised to 16 late in 1943 due to increasing demands from the armed forces. Some Illinois counties adopted higher standards. Of 97 counties which reviewed the situation, only 16 stuck with 16 war units and 5 with local variations of lesser amounts, while 19 went to 18 units, 44 to 20 units and 13 to over 20 units ranging up to 25 units per worker. The southern counties had the lowest requirement due to the rough topography which made agricultural conditions less favorable.

One result of the Tydings Amendment was to halt the cityward movement of farm workers. Many returned to farm work. As the farm labor situation worsened in the spring of 1943, draft officials and others urged people with farm experience who were working in other jobs to return to farm
work, especially if they were in non-essential work. The selective Service referred registrants with farm experience to the United States Employment Service and gave the agency 30 days to place them in farm jobs before inducting them. Later, farm workers took war jobs in the winter when farm work was slack, returning to farm work in the spring. Many took jobs with Chicago meat packers in the winter. 29

Throughout the war, the United States Employment Service and the War Manpower Commission sought to recruit farm laborers, either to assist individual farmers or to handle specific crops in the field or in canneries. There were some efforts to utilize workers on Works Progress Administration projects, but some workers refused farm work due to low wages, lack of transportation and inadequate housing. Many were married and thus less attractive to farmers who could not provide adequate housing for families, though some did accept married men. In 1943, the United States Employment Service and the Farm Security Administration recruited farmers and farm laborers from poor soil regions for work in more productive areas. Many came from southern Illinois where unemployment was high and farmers barely made a living. After two weeks training in tractor operation and dairy methods at the University of Illinois in Champaign or the Illinois State Normal University in Normal, they were placed on farms in central and northern Illinois. The Farm Bureau and some Illinois congressional critics of the Farm
security Administration attacked the program as impractical and costly, but backed down under fire from the downstate newspapers and local farmers. Migrant workers, often reviled in the past, were a welcome source of labor, though not as common as before the war due to gas and tire rationing and improved job opportunities near their homes. Working for individual farmers or processors, they followed the crops. Some workers from Missouri planted and chopped cotton in the spring, then went north in June to work for a vegetable cannery in Rochelle, Illinois, returning to Missouri in October to pick cotton.30

The Farm Bureau, American Legion posts, civic groups and the press also helped recruit farm and cannery workers, especially for special projects. In September, 1942, several women's groups went to work at tomato canneries in Bloomington-Normal to handle a bumper crop. In other communities such as Harvard and Sycamore, groups of businessmen or "farm commandos" volunteered to assist farmers short of help. Farmers near Sycamore simply called the local Chamber of Commerce to secure the men they needed. In January, 1943, the Secretary of Agriculture announced creation of a land army of Victory Farm Volunteers to assist in farm production. The War Food Administration eventually took over the program and the agricultural extension service organized it at the local level. Each county had a farm labor committee to recruit local businessmen, women, senior citizens and
students for farm work. Adults received training at nearby colleges while high school students were trained at school. Farmers had varying opinions about utilizing city people in farm work. Many felt that city people would be unable to handle farm work while others were quite happy to use them. Victory Farm Volunteers often worked on large projects such as detasseling corn to produce hybrid seed. Local community groups and newspapers such as The Bloomington Pantagraph conducted extensive campaigns to enlist Boy Scouts, civic groups and ordinary citizens to detassel corn in 1943, 1944 and 1945. Servicemen from Camp Grant, Chanute Field and other military posts also helped harvest crops, but only if the armed services deemed the agricultural emergency of greater danger to the nation than the military situation.31

A major source of farm labor during the war years was students. In the spring of 1942, the United States Employment Service and other agencies started recruiting city teenagers, including many from Chicago, for work on farms. Boys did field work and other chores while girls helped farm women in household duties. Many farmers were reluctant to use them at first, but by the summer of 1943 they were anxious to hire them. High schools themselves offered courses in vocational agriculture to train boys for farm work. In Galesburg, several agencies cooperated in a program to train high school boys to operate farm equipment. While teenagers working for individual farmers lived on the farms,
camps were set up to house those working on special projects. When corn was detasseled in central Illinois, a seed company housed men and boys at its warehouse and women and girls at a local high school. Groups of students working on commercial vegetable farms in Cook County lived in camps run by the Boy Scouts and religious organizations. Sometimes, schools made special arrangements to enable students to harvest crops. During the asparagus harvest in the spring of 1943, students attending schools in the Hoopeston area worked in the fields cutting asparagus in the morning, then attended school until late in the afternoon. Otherwise, 70 percent of the crop would have been lost. In some cases, other crops were lost due to inadequate labor to harvest them.³₂

Starting in 1943, the War Food Administration augmented domestic labor resources by importing Mexicans, Jamaicans and Barbadians to work in the fields and canneries. Mexicans usually worked in the Southwest though some worked as field hands on vegetable farms in Will County and near Rochelle. Jamaicans and Barbadians, however, detasseled corn, harvested peaches and other crops, and worked in canneries. They were employed under a contract specifying the dates of their employment. However, when the imminent departure of all Jamaicans threatened to cause a labor shortage in northern Illinois during the corn and lima bean canning season in 1943, arrangements were made to have some continue working an extra week until replacements could be secured. Employers
provided food and housing and subsidized transportation between their homelands and their jobs in the United States. Residents of one community were aroused at first when the black Jamaicans were housed in a school gymnasium, but the War Food Administration stood its ground and the Jamaicans stayed. Wages were the same as paid to American workers, but a portion was sent to their home governments and deposited to their credit in local banks. Sometimes, local labor supplies proved sufficient, especially when drought cut farm production. The West Indians then found other jobs in foundries, ordnance plants, steel mills and other factories. Importation of West Indians continued into 1945. Employers generally found them good workers. Some worked 60 to 80 hours a week. 

Prisoners of war also worked on farms and in canneries, soya plants, corn products refineries and other processing plants starting in 1943 and continuing until after the war. There were some Italians at first, but most were Germans. They always worked under guard. Most were housed at military posts such as Camp Grant, and trucked daily to their workplace. As a result, the number who could work was limited by the number of guards available and also by the distance from the camp. Prisoners could not be taken any farther than would permit them to be returned daily to the prisoner of war camp. As the use of prisoners of war increased, special camps were set up at or near their place of
work. Prisoners were paid at the same rate as Americans but received only a small portion of their wages and that was in script to be used at camp canteens. The rest went to the United States Treasury. Prisoners could not have American money. They received the same rations as American soldiers. They generally performed satisfactory work, though sometimes problems occurred. On one occasion, German-speaking farmers hired as foremen drove the prisoners at a pace they could not maintain in cutting asparagus near Rochelle, and the men refused to work. Even after this was resolved by taking management out of the fields, the prisoners were still resentful and did not do as well as others near Hoopeston. In some cases, prisoners refused to do field work, which they considered below their standards and were reassigned to unskilled jobs in canneries. Occasionally, local communities objected to the presence of prisoners of war, but this was uncommon. Some residents were actually more opposed to the employment of Japanese-Americans. Arrangements were made with unions regarding employment of prisoners of war, but only when domestic labor was insufficient. The unions agreed not to enroll the prisoners as members.34

One means of alleviating labor shortages was mechanization. During the war years, Illinois farmers increased their use of farm equipment despite shortages. The trend toward mechanization started before the war. Some farms had tractors during World War I. By 1940, they were quite com-
During the thirties, Illinois farmers reequipped their farms and when prosperity returned in 1940, they increased their purchases. Despite restrictions on materials, 1941 topped previous records in sales of farm machinery. Many bought tractors for the first time, while others bought corn pickers and hay tools. The war increased the demand for food production and in 1942, farmers estimated their new equipment requirements as 107 percent of 1940 purchases. However, with steel in short supply, they could only obtain 40 percent of 1940 production and even then they encountered long delays in delivery. Ultimately, this led to some crop losses for lack of harvesting equipment. In the fall of 1942, the Department of Agriculture ordered rationing of farm machinery by county committees headed by the chairmen of agricultural war boards. There were three classifications of equipment. The committees approved the sale of scarce and much needed equipment in Group A such as tractors, corn pickers, combines and the like if the farmer could not meet production goals by repairing, purchasing, renting or exchanging equipment. Machinery in Group B could be sold if the farmer certified to the dealer that it was necessary to meet farming needs. Group C implements included smaller hand operated or horse drawn equipment and could be sold without restrictions. Later, county quotas were established. Some farmers were turned down because their farms were too small to justify the equipment. Small farmers could either get bigger farms
or join with other small farmers to buy machinery for shared use. Many farmers shared their equipment. They also haunted auctions and paid premium prices for used or repairable implements or even junk that could be used to repair other equipment. When ceiling prices were reached in the bidding, they drew lots. Some farmers even made their own machinery. Federal and state agencies also sponsored classes in repair of equipment. More implements began to appear in 1944 as the War Production Board eased restrictions. Rationing ended in the fall of that year. In spite of restrictions, mechanization increased during the war years. Tractors on Illinois farms went from 126,069 in 1940 to 174,270 in 1945. One result was that by 1944, horses sold cheap and farm hands with obsolete skills could not get jobs.35

Besides shortages of labor and equipment, farmers had to contend with rationing of gasoline, tires, building materials, fencing, tools and other supplies. Permits were required to buy lumber to build bins and cribs for storage of crops. Lack of storage capacity proved a serious problem when freight car shortages caused delays in shipping farm products to processing plants. Elevators quickly filled to capacity, thus forcing farmers to store their crops on their farms until it could be marketed. The Commodity Credit Corporation had steel bins at elevators to store surplus commodities, mostly corn and soybeans, and in 1942 sold 50,000 wooden bins to farmers. Still, storage problems persisted
throughout the war.  

Rural electrification was interrupted by the war. Most of northern Illinois was already electrified before the war, largely due to pioneering efforts by Commonwealth Edison's Public Service Company of Northern Illinois. Downstate utilities were more reluctant to build power lines in rural areas which they feared would be unprofitable. In some southern Illinois counties, less than 10 percent of the farms had electricity. The Rural Electrification Administration offered low-interest loans to cooperatives to build power lines. By July, 1942, Illinois electric cooperatives built 19,274 miles of line serving 48,247 customers. Electric-powered equipment performed a variety of farm chores such as shelling corn, grinding feed, milking cows and churning butter. The defense buildup reduced the supply of copper, thus leading to cutbacks in new construction after Pearl Harbor. For a time, there were no new extensions, but in 1943, the War Production Board eased restrictions to allow extensions when a farm was near a power line and electrification would aid food production. This led to several extensions. By July, 1946, electric cooperatives in the state served 67,000 customers and 59 percent of farms had electricity.

Agriculture has always been at the mercy of the weather and natural pests and the war years were no exception. Floods struck in 1943 slowing planting and forcing the re-
planting of some fields after the waters had receded. The following year brought drought in some areas of the state. Insect pests such as corn borers and chinch bugs also caused crop losses.  

In spite of difficulties with weather, farm prices and shortages of labor and equipment, Illinois farmers generally prospered during the war. They built up bank deposits and paid off mortgages. Between 1940 and 1945, farm mortgage debt in the state fell over 20 percent and by 1949, it was almost halved. Many farmers also bought land. They could farm more land with a tractor than they could with a horse. Though the number of farms in Illinois fell from 213,439 in 1940 to 204,239 in 1945, the average size of the farm increased from 145 acres to 154 acres. The number of large farms also increased while medium-sized farms decreased. There were fewer farmers in 1945, but more were owners or part owners. There were fewer tenants since many tenants became owners. Even farmers who rented all or part of their lands increased their holdings. There also was an increase of small farms of 10 acres or less. City people bought small farms as country homes and for small-scale farming to supplement income from their jobs and as an inflation hedge. Some city dwellers also bought larger farms as and investment in hopes of benefitting from farm prosperity. By 1943, a land boom was underway which continued into the postwar years. Land values, which rose gradually from
1933 to 1941, jumped almost 50 percent between 1942 and 1945. City dwellers bid up the price of land, often paying more than it was worth. This raised fears that land values would follow the pattern of World War I when they jumped sharply between 1912 and 1920, then plunged below the 1912 level before finally bottoming out in 1933. The rise in prices also made it more difficult for many farmers, both owners and tenants, to buy land at reasonable prices. There were no price ceilings on land values. Though some farmers saw the land boom as a good thing, others disliked the speculation and some wanted restrictions on sales to non-farmers. None materialized, possibly because most of the land sold still went to farmers.  

Illinois agriculture during World War II was a mixture of old and new. Agricultural agencies established under the New Deal set a precedent for the expansion of government power and planning and the manner in which policies were implemented. Their decentralized structure, which was echoed in special wartime agricultural agencies, placed much of the responsibility for carrying out policies in the hands of farmers and their local representatives. The war brought an expansion of their role and that of farm organizations, and a shift from restriction of production to expansion. Farmers were encouraged to grow crops essential to the war effort and reduce those considered unnecessary. New crops were introduced for the duration while certain existing ones, notably
soybeans, gained a new and lasting importance. Some efforts to stimulate production of specific crops led to scarcities in others that were also needed. Ceilings on farm prices combined with shortages of some farm products to produce black markets. Meanwhile, farmers had to contend with shortages of labor and equipment. In spite of these difficulties, they managed to feed the nation, the armed forces and many of the allied nations. Though the war did not produce any major technological breakthroughs, it did reinforce trends such as farm mechanization that were already underway. It also brought farmers out of the long Depression, which had started after World War I, into a period of prosperity which continued into the postwar era.


The Production Front, pp. 274-275, 421; Wilcox, The Farmer in the Second World War, p. 95.


CHAPTER VII

PRICE CONTROL, RATIONING AND THE BLACK MARKET

During the Second World War, the Federal Government imposed price and rent control and rationing in an attempt to hold down inflation in the wartime economy while achieving an equitable allocation of scarce commodities. While these restrictions met with a good deal of success, they were unpopular with much of the public. Rising wartime incomes increased consumer purchasing power just as cutbacks in civilian production created shortages of goods to buy. The business community wished to take advantage of the increased demand and wartime shortages and was angered by the government's efforts to restrict their profits, while some of the public was willing to pay whatever price was demanded in order to get what they wanted. Hence, compliance, which was fairly good at first, declined as the war went on so that violations were skyrocketing by the end of the war. Price control and rationing grew out of the Administration's efforts to mobilize the economy to support the defense buildup.

Inflation was a serious problem during the First World War and one which the Administration hope to avoid if war came again. The National Defense Advisory Commission
established in the spring of 1940 included Leon Henderson as an advisor on price administration. Henderson built a small staff, which formed the basis for the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, established by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on April 11, 1941. In August, Civilian Supply shifted to the Office of Production Management, leaving the Office of Price Administration to focus on price control.¹

Meanwhile, the boom in defense spending stimulated wage hikes, which in turn tended to raise prices. Increased consumer spending resulting from higher earnings intensified inflationary pressures. The Office of Price Administration relied on persuasion to keep prices down since it had no authority. Many industrial leaders complied voluntarily for reasons of self-interest, patriotism and fear of bad publicity. By the fall of 1941, these informal controls were effectively restraining prices of about 40 percent of the wholesale price index components. Henderson and his staff pursued a policy of selective price control which was loose enough to allow some price increases where necessary. Most large industrial corporations had an inherent interest in price stability as existing prices were high enough to cover costs without creating new competition or adverse publicity. They also liked the agency's flexibility on price increases. Throughout the war, large industrial corporations and their allies in the trade press generally supported price control
to hold down inflation. It was the smaller businessman and the farmer, who opposed it and the laborer, who wanted prices held down, but wages increased.\(^2\)

In July, 1941, the Roosevelt Administration introduced a price control bill in Congress. Two controversial issues were the extent of controls and the standards to be applied. At first, the Administration wanted to limit controls to key commodities, but it soon decided to seek a general price freeze. This created numerous difficulties as groups dissatisfied with the representative base period sought one more favorable to their interests. Also, existing legislation prevented any general freeze of farm prices, which were based on a parity relationship and not pegged to any fixed figures. The parity price of farm commodities could rise or fall with the fluctuation of other prices, and the ceiling on farm prices was based on the parity price. Similarly, farm price increases would affect other costs so that parity helped stimulate inflation. Farm groups, however, opposed any standard other than parity, and in fact demanded that farm price ceilings under the proposed legislation be no lower than 110 percent of prevailing parity prices. Farm prices were approaching parity after a long depression and farmers and their congressional allies wished to see the trend continue. Organized labor was also leery of price control legislation, fearing that it would be used to restrict wages. Labor leaders advised the President that
they would support the bill only if it avoided any mention of wage control. After Pearl Harbor, Congress was more receptive to price control legislation. Labor agreed to a no-strike pledge and creation of a War Labor Board to settle wage disputes, but they still rejected wage controls and limits on wage hikes. Farm groups also continued to insist on 110 percent of parity. Hence, the final bill passed on January 28, 1942 had only weak restraints on wages and farm prices. Still, the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 did provide a base for price and rent control and rationing. 3

Inflation worsened with consumer prices rising at an annual rate of 14 percent. On April 27, the President responded with a program to combat inflation, including higher taxes, bond drives, wage controls, more rationing and the General Maximum Price Regulation, which froze the price of all consumer products as of March, 1942 and extended rent control to many areas. The Office of Price Administration promptly declared a price freeze on April 28. However, consumer prices continued to rise, mainly due to uncontrolled farm prices and wages. In July, the National War Labor Board limited wage increases under its Little Steel formula, but labor leaders agreed to accept wage ceilings only if they could be assured that the cost of living would not go up any further. Farm groups, however, insisted on 110 percent of parity protection because rising industrial wages made it difficult to attract farm labor and undervalued their own
efforts. Both groups feared that the Administration would hold down their own earnings while others' rose. With food prices rising and wage hikes threatening, Leon Henderson asked the President to seek legislation to stabilize wages and farm prices. Roosevelt, wishing to retain labor support, wanted to focus on farm prices and rely on an executive order. Henderson persuaded him that this would not be enough, and the Administration introduced a bill lowering farm price ceilings to 100 percent of parity and authorizing wage stabilization under the Little Steel formula. Congress angrily accused the President of dictatorial policies. Finally, after intense pressure from the White House, including a threat by the President to take action on his own, Congress passed the Stabilization Act of 1942 on October 2. Roosevelt also established the Office of Economic Stabilization to coordinate the policies of the Office of Price Administration, the War Labor Board and the Department of Agriculture. 4

Soon after passage of the Stabilization Bill, Henderson sought to hold down food prices through payment of subsidies to farmers to provide them with parity incomes without raising commodity prices to parity. Farmers condemned this policy as wasteful welfare, arguing that they could earn good prices in the market. When the Democrats suffered heavy losses in the 1942 congressional races, especially in rural areas, they blamed the Office of Price Administration and
its controversial Administrator. Henderson resigned on December 15 and was replaced by Prentiss Brown, a defeated Michigan Senator whose support of the Administration's price control policies had cost him his seat. Henderson's forced resignation encouraged renewed opposition to his agency's policies from congressional conservatives. Congressional committees investigated the agency. Small businessmen protested its replacement of a general freeze with specific product ceiling prices, which threatened profits. Labor leaders alarmed at rising consumer prices, threatened to seek higher wage increases. Consumers protested the growing inconvenience of rationing, which was extended to a variety of products by late 1943. They particularly objected to gasoline rationing imposed late in 1942. Rural congressmen sought legislation to ban subsidies, and in the spring of 1943, Congress passed such a bill. However, on April 2, President Roosevelt vetoed it, arguing that such subsidies were needed to maintain wage stabilization. After the veto was upheld on April 7, Roosevelt issued a "hold the line" executive order directing the Office of Price Administration and the War Labor Board not to permit any price or wage increases unless permitted by law. The order was implemented with new price regulations and rollbacks, subsidies, improved retail compliance efforts and wage restraints, all of which helped to stabilize prices.  

However, the Office of Price Administration's shift
to tight price controls instead of more flexible ones brought renewed criticism of the agency from conservative congressmen and small business groups for its "impractical" and "anti-business" policies. Many congressmen blamed the agency's policies on its economists and lawyers and passed legislation requiring that policy be set by people with business experience. Congressional guerrilla warfare against the agency took its toll on Prentiss Brown who resigned in August after only nine months on the job. His successor, Chester Bowles, was more politically astute and sensitive to public opinion and public relations. Bowles appointed businessmen to policy-making positions in the agency, established standards for adjusting price ceilings to conform to the hold-the-line policy, and directed the agency's economists to monitor conformity to those standards. He also met regularly with heads of farm, labor and business groups and increased the role of Office of Price Administration advisory committees for industry, labor, farmers and consumers. By early 1945, the agency had in its national and field offices, 536 industry advisory committees, 61 agricultural advisory committees, 40 consumer advisory committees and 102 labor advisory committees. Bowles also strengthened the 5500 War Price and Rationing Boards in local communities, which had been created in early 1942 to administer local rationing. The local boards took a larger role in ensuring compliance with the regulations. As a result of these changes in
procedure and policies, the Office of Price Administration became more popular for the duration of the war and opposition was largely confined to conservatives and business organizations.  

Immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, the War production Board asked the Office of Price Administration to set up a nation-wide system for rationing tires. The latter asked state governors to organize tire rationing boards through their councils of defense. Although the Office of Price Administration had a field organization, it had no state or local units, only regional ones. On December 14, Governor Dwight Green named Henry Pope, Jr. state tire rationing administrator. By January 5, Pope organized 101 tire boards. Since he had no staff or even an office, the Illinois War Council gave him office space and staff support for several weeks. In the spring of 1942, the federal government provided a paid clerical staff to assist in sugar rationing, and by summer, assumed full responsibility for paid personnel, though the state continued financial assistance whenever federal funds were slow in coming. Besides tires, other commodities ranging from automobiles and gasoline to various food items were also rationed. Pope directed the rationing program in Illinois until he retired in May. He was replaced by Carter Jenkins, who stayed with the Office of Price Administration until it closed its state office in 1946. Jenkins had previously served as state
coordinator of civilian defense and directed the organization of local defense councils. Even after joining the Office of Price Administration, he continued to attend meetings of the Illinois War Council and report on the progress of rationing and price control in Illinois. Relations between the two agencies were close and relatively free of conflicts that often arose between civilian defense organizations and other federal agencies. ⁷

As was the case with other war agencies, the Office of Price Administration made the Chicago metropolitan area a separate division within the region. The Chicago division was headed by John C. Weigel, and later by Raymond S. McKeough and finally Rae E. Walters. Michael F. Mulcahy, President of the Board of Local Improvements and assistant corporation counsel, administered the tire rationing program. Since the Chicago District was separated from the rest of the state, Mayor Edward J. Kelly had a good deal of influence over appointments to major administrative positions. Hence, while Weigel was previously an administrative assistant in the Illinois Department of Welfare, McKeough was a former Chicago congressman and unsuccessful senatorial candidate in 1942 who made no secret of his ties to the Kelly machine. ⁸

In the spring of 1943, the Office of Price Administration divided downstate Illinois into four districts with offices at Rockford, Peoria, Rock Island-Moline and Springfield. In August, 1943, the Rockford office closed and its
territory was divided among the Chicago, Rock Island and Peoria offices. Each district office organized its staff into departments on prices, rationing, information and local board operation. Each also had its own attorneys and investigators to assist in enforcement of price control and rationing regulations. Advisory committees consisting of members of agricultural, labor, consumer and business interests counseled the staff. Local boards, hastily organized early in 1942, had offices in city halls, post offices, local war council headquarters and a variety of other places. Members were local citizens serving as volunteers. Many boards started with only two or three members, but then grew to twenty or thirty. Members came from all sectors of the community. In the fall of 1942, certain downstate boards had a total of 800 members, including 56 women, 61 union representatives, 64 attorneys, 105 merchants and 145 farmers. There was some concern that all elements of the community be represented. Labor unions and blacks, in particular, pressed for representation on the boards. In East St. Louis, the board rejected requests from labor unions and blacks for representation, arguing that it wanted a community-wide rather than group representation. In Springfield, the board resisted Urban League pressures to appoint a black member. In Chicago, after blacks protested racial discrimination by the Office of Public Administration, Michael Mulcahy, the metropolitan rationing official,
announced in June, 1942 that blacks would be appointed to rationing boards and hired as clerical help. Although this was done, most were segregated in positions in all-black neighborhoods.9

The Rock Island board was typical of many in its organization and operation. Members were divided into price, rationing and community service panels with the rationing groups divided in turn into three panels—food and shoes, transportation, and fuel oil and stoves. The transportation panel had sub-panels on gasoline and tires. Members of the panel made decisions on the allocation of automobiles, gasoline and tires to members of the community. At a typical meeting in February, 1945, the transportation panel granted a certificate for a used-car to a public-school maintenance man; extra gasoline went to a marine on furlough, to a teacher whose first ration had been miscalculated, to a woman for trips to fire the furnace of her aged mother, to an elevator repairman for emergency night calls, to a farm owner to supervise repairs and to a family to move to Wisconsin. The panel denied several other requests because public transportation was available. Applications for extra gasoline in cases of illness or death of relatives were particularly troublesome due to community pressure. In March, 1943, several members of the Logan County War Price and Rationing Board resigned when the Office of Price Administration District Supervisor objected to the transpor-
ration panel's issuance of emergency gasoline rations to a local woman so that she could attend her mother's funeral. Most returned after a conference with Carter Jenkins of the state office of the Office of Price Administration, who stated that all such requests were to be denied. Sometimes, actions by boards could arouse protests for other reasons. The Highland Park Ration Board gave information to the village police department on motorists who had obtained gasoline ration cards and stamps from the board. The police department used the information to track down auto owners who had not bothered to obtain a village license for their cars. Motorists naturally were furious about the board's violation of their confidence. Later, it turned out that the board had erred; such information was confidential and not to be shared.¹⁰

A constant problem for the local boards was lost ration books, though delays in getting new ones and reductions in coupons in replacement books helped encourage people to be more careful. Some local boards were overly generous in granting replacements, thereby leading to a local black market in ration stamps. Early in 1943, the Office of Price Administration relieved the local boards of some of the paperwork connected with rationing by shifting it to local banks. Under this system, which was first tested in Albany, New York, merchants opened ration book accounts for each rationed commodity they sold, and deposited all ration
coupons collected from customers into these accounts. Merchants wishing to replenish their stocks wrote a check against their accounts drawing as many ration coupon units as they needed. They then delivered these checks to their suppliers who deposited them in their own rationing accounts to be cleared through the banks the same as money. The commercial banks acted as agents of the Office of Price Administration and exercised all control over suspected forgery, counterfeiting and other fraudulent activities.\textsuperscript{11}

Price panels did not appear in Illinois in great numbers until June, 1943, when 527 were set up in the seven-state Chicago region, though some were previously established on an experimental basis. At first, their main function was to distribute information on price regulations to retailers, though they also passed on consumer complaints of violations to the district office of the Office of Price Administration or tried to persuade the offending merchants to cease noncompliance. Volunteer price panel assistants visited stores, informed merchants of price control regulations, distributed price lists and checked prices to see that they conformed to price ceilings. In the fall of 1943, Chester Bowles pushed through a major decentralization of his agency, which shifted operational decisions and some staff down to the field offices and local boards. In the spring of 1944, he initiated a nation-wide check by the boards of retail compliance with price ceilings. Since this was well-re-
ceived, he made such surveys a regular part of the boards' duties. Later, he also delegated to them the authority to negotiate treble-damage civil suits so that they would be better able to deal with price violators. By mid-1944, local boards were regularly reviewing the compliance of almost every retailer in the country. Bowles felt that price control and rationing would function better if compliance could be secured at the community level. As local bodies, the boards were more aware of violations than the Office of Price Administration's regular enforcement staff and less likely to cause resentment in dealing with noncompliance. Also, the agency did not have the staff to check out every violation, especially since many were of minor importance. 12

In order to secure compliance, price panels held hearings in which they would try to settle disputes with local retailers. If unable to secure compliance, they referred the cases to the Office of Price Administration. In July, 1945, 261 retailers appeared before price panels in the Springfield district. Of these, 180 signed compliance agreements, 50 agreed to make full refunds to customers overcharged and 16 to settle the administrator's claim on behalf of the United States Treasury. The panels also recommended warnings to 5 retailers and referred 10 cases to the district office of the Office of Price Administration. Price panels generally were lenient with first offenders who were cooperative, but they were tougher on second and third-
time offenders and those who were defiant as some were. A Chicago fruit and vegetable dealer, when confronted with charges of ignoring ceiling prices in sales of fruit, launched into a tirade on the difficulties of business in wartime and finally threatened to quit business. Price panels represented a cross section of the community. A Chicago panel included an insurance agent, a businessman, a realtor, a district superintendent of schools and a housewife. Ration panels followed similar procedures. When a Chicago board found that a local couple had secured gasoline ration coupons from sources other than their ration board, they revoked the couple's rations and ordered them not to use their car. When the couple continued to drive, the board turned the case over to the Office of Price Administration, which prosecuted and won a court decision confirming the local ration board's order.13

There was considerable debate over whether price and ration panels and consumers should check up on retailers. The Illinois War Council refused to recommend that local war councils sponsor price-checking activities despite pleas of Administrator Carter Jenkins, who hoped that the Women's Activities Committees of the local councils would lead in price checking. The State War Council finally passed a resolution instructing local councils to do what they thought best. One member expressed the hope that retailers and consumers could cooperate to avert any policing. He sug-
gested an educational program, but opposed any efforts by the Office of Price Administration to get women to spy on retailers for fear it would split the community wide open.¹⁴

Some local war councils were controlled by local business interests, who opposed price control activities. Indeed, some local ration boards objected to price panel activities and especially to price panel assistants, usually housewives. In Chicago, several ration boards refused to accept their assistance in checking prices, claiming that the violations they uncovered were minor and the result of insufficient knowledge on the part of the merchants. Many housewives themselves objected to "snooping" even though they felt prices were too high. Conservative critics such as the Chicago Tribune spoke of Gestapo tactics. Still, others, including the editor of the staunchly conservative Bureau County Republican, supported these policies, arguing that it was necessary for civilians to police each other in wartime and for the community to express its disapproval when citizens got out of line in the war effort. Eventually, in the fall of 1943, the Office of Price Administration introduced the Home Front Pledge, under which housewives agreed to pay no more than ceiling prices and to exchange ration stamps for all commodities they bought. Even so, while millions of housewives took the pledge, many were more interested in securing scarce commodities than in paying lower prices. Gasoline rationing, however, was another
matter as consumers were quick to report violators, even friends and relatives, to the Office of Price Administration.\textsuperscript{15}

Violations of price control took several forms depending on the type of commodity. Businessmen often overcharged, forcing customers to pay overceiling prices. Others required payment of extra cash on the side, payment for goods not delivered or payment for a higher quality of goods than were actually delivered. They might also require customers to buy something for which they had no use. Many ignored regulations requiring them to keep records for inspection by the Office of Price Administration. Landlords ignored rent restrictions and regulations requiring them to register apartments with the agency. All of these violations constituted part of the black market, which also included cattle rustlers, racketeers and hijackers trafficking in rationed commodities, burglars who stole rationed foods and ration coupons to sell, and gangs who counterfeited such coupons. Organized crime was heavily involved in the black market, taking advantage of shortages of various products as it had done with liquor during Prohibition. Indeed, liquor became a black market commodity during the war years as higher taxes and shortages of some brands sent prices soaring. Chicago gangsters resorted to hijackings and thefts from taverns and warehouses.\textsuperscript{16}

Tire rationing began soon after the United States
entered the war. Japanese conquests in the Far East cut off much of the supply of crude rubber. Since rubber was needed to prosecute the war, civilian supplies had to be curtailed. Hence, the need for tire rationing. When rationing began in January, 1942, Illinois was given an allotment of 17,875 tires and 14,949 tubes to supply the needs of owners of 1,800,000 autos and 225,000 buses and trucks for that month. Later monthly allotments varied but never came close to meeting demand. Even before rationing began, there was an outbreak of tire thefts. The General Assembly responded by making tire theft a felony punishable by a prison term of up to ten years.¹⁷

Most motorists resorted to more legal means of obtaining tires. All motor vehicle owners registered with their local ration boards and had their vehicles inspected by tire rationing officials at inspection stations, usually tire distributors. Inspecting officials made recommendations to the local ration boards, which issued certificates for tires and tubes. Most of those who got tires were physicians, nurses and others whose work was essential to the public safety or to the prosecution of the war effort. Others had to make existing tires last. Many motorists resorted to retreads and recaps, but these too were soon rationed. Some motorists simply drove less and used car pools to get to work. On November 24, 1942, Peorians staged a "carless Tuesday" in which those with odd-numbered license
plates left their cars at home and depended on other means of getting to work. Many motorists bought bicycles until these too were rationed. Businesses dependent on trucks for deliveries, including the Chicago Tribune, turned to horse-drawn vehicles. A Waukegan creamery used wooden tires on its horse-drawn vehicles. Another means of conserving tires was to reduce speed. In March, 1942, the state imposed a forty-mile-an-hour speed limit. Meanwhile, scrap drives collected used rubber, which was then deposited at filling stations and sent to reclamation plants to help relieve the shortage of rubber.

Finally, in the fall of 1942, the Roosevelt Administration decided upon nationwide rationing of gasoline as a means of saving rubber. Gasoline rationing had started on the East Coast where there was a shortage of gasoline and fuel oil resulting from sinkings of coastal tankers by German submarines. The shortage was essentially a transportation problem, but gasoline rationing offered a means of saving tires and rubber by forcing people not to drive, therefore making tires last longer. The Administration also imposed a thirty-five-mile-an-hour speed limit and rationed fuel oil. In response to protests by trade organizations, the Office of Price Administration made allowance for traveling salesmen to receive gas to travel 8600 miles a year. Motorists responded to gas rationing by flocking to gas stations and filling their tanks. Some hoarded gasoline in drums stored
in their homes, only to see it flushed into sewers by local firemen, who took a dim view of the potential fire threat posed by the stored fuel. Gas rationing brought increased use of public transit and ride-sharing pools and a decrease in traffic deaths. It also brought hardship for gasoline station owners, many of whom closed their doors. This was especially true of the smaller stations, which did not offer as many services as did larger ones, which could repair cars and tires and sell lubricating oils and other accessories. 19

Gas rationing brought a wide variety of abuses. Motorists were supposed to turn in ration coupons when they bought gas, but many sped away without doing so. In July, 1943, the Office of Price Administration closed down one Chicago filling station for a year after its undercover agents bought gasoline at overceiling prices without exchanging coupons and also bought nylon hosiery, another black market staple, for a premium price. In the same month, it charged 200 other stations with similar violations. Meanwhile, black markets in gasoline and ration coupons developed as burglars broke into ration board offices and stole coupons. In Chicago, a policeman assigned to guard the coupons was caught peddling them. In southern Illinois, a dispute among thieves involved in stealing gasoline ration coupons led to a gangland-style slaying of two thugs. Bootleggers brought in gasoline from refineries, while other criminals siphoned gasoline from parked cars. Counterfeiters
Sometimes, efforts by the Office of Price Administration to enforce compliance with rationing became controversial. In June, 1943, its agents stopped Chicago motorists, who had driven to Wisconsin. On June 19, more than 50 automobiles with Illinois licenses were stopped in Fond du Lac, a city about 150 miles from Chicago, by city policemen working under the direction of the agency's field inspectors. The Fond du Lac War Price and Rationing Board sat in session all day to conduct an investigation and impose penalties. The motorists had to explain how they got enough gasoline to come that far. Most were able to show that they had done nothing illegal and were allowed to proceed, but seven were found guilty of illegal possession of gasoline and saw their gasoline and coupons confiscated and rationing privileges suspended for some time. The episode raised questions about the legality of the agency's actions. Critics accused the agency of conducting illegal searches and seizures. Undeterred, the Office of Price Administration made plans to stop more out-of-state motorists in Green Bay on the Fourth of July weekend, but dropped them when Wisconsin Governor Walter S. Goodland refused to allow police cooperation. The agency resorted to stationing agents near resorts to copy down license plates of out-of-state drivers and turn them over to the drivers' own ration boards. This brought more protests when 417 Chicago-area drivers were caught driving
in adjacent states. Most were either on business or on short vacations, and the latter included many war workers who had saved gas for weeks in order to take a vacation. The agency backed down amid renewed public criticism.²¹

Meat and other food items presented special problems in price control and rationing since food prices depended on farm prices, which were uncontrolled at first. Despite large increases in farm production, shortages appeared, partly due to substantial government purchases of foodstuffs to supply the armed forces and the Allies. At the same time, consumers who now had good paying jobs in war plants, were increasing purchases of food items, especially meat. All of these factors sent prices soaring and made rationing inevitable.²²

The most serious problems developed with meat and covered every step in meat production. In September, 1942, the Office of Price Administration put the entire meat industry under license and limited the amount that could be sold for civilian consumption. Later, it imposed ceiling prices on farm production. However, some farmers sold their livestock at overceiling prices to packers and slaughterers, who willingly paid these prices to get the meat. Packers passed on the overcharges to wholesalers and to retailers, who in turn passed them on to consumers. Wholesalers selling to retailers required their customers to make side payments of extra cash and to purchase items such as sausage, cleansers and other items the customers did not want. The Office
of Price Administration did make some progress in stopping the upgrading of inferior meat by packers, but the practice continued among retailers. Consumers themselves hoarded meat in locker plants while other consumers could not get meat at all. Eventually, federal officials found it necessary to seize meat in locker plants and distribute it. The Office of Price Administration required slaughterers to register with the agency and assigned quotas to each slaughterer. Many, however, ignored these regulations and slaughtered well above their quotas. Packers shifted meat to markets commanding the highest prices. Thus, meat intended for Chicago often went to the East Coast. One of the most serious problems existed in poultry. Consumers themselves often bought directly from the farmer and paid premium prices. Despite vigorous efforts by the Office of Price Administration, price controls on poultry soon broke down.23

Criminal elements, including the remnants of Al Capone's old gang, got involved in the black market in meat and other foodstuffs, buying livestock from farmers, slaughtering it and selling it to butchers. In some cases, they intimidated butchers into accepting it. Some criminals secured control of small packing houses in various Midwestern states. In April, 1943, the federal government indicted Peter Golas and several others in a conspiracy to move ten million pounds of black market meat from the Midwest to the East Coast. The scheme involved seven firms in the Midwest
and New Jersey. Until the fall of 1942, Golas was simply a small-time meat peddler in the Fulton Street Market on Chicago's West Side. Golas was eventually convicted and sentenced to prison. While the illegal operators usually bought livestock from the farmers, they also resorted to cattle rustling, stalking the animals they wanted, shooting them, dressing them on the spot and hauling them away in trucks. Sometimes, they were caught in the act and gunfights ensued. Black market slaughterhouse facilities were often unsanitary, thus posing a health hazard. 24

Rent control was a response to housing shortages, which developed as job-seekers crowded into areas where there were heavy concentrations of new defense industries. The same problems arose where new military posts were established and old ones were reactivated and expanded. In Rockford, a city with several defense industries as well as a major Army post (Camp Grant), migrants moved into trailers, old street-cars, garages and other structures. Similar conditions prevailed elsewhere. Meanwhile, rents soared as landlords took advantage of the situation. In some communities, including Chicago, local real estate interests sought to keep down rents through community pressure. Such efforts were generally inadequate. At first, the federal government could do little except keep tabs on the situation. However, the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 provided for rent control, and in April, the Office of Price Administration
established defense rental areas in certain counties in the state, including those in the Chicago area. Landlords could not raise rents above what they were on March 1, 1942.25

Landlords naturally objected to rent control and many tried various means of getting around it. One method was to require the tenant to buy furniture in an apartment. Other landlords charged for the use of appliances. Others cut off the heat or removed appliances if tenants refused to pay higher rents. Many, of course, willingly paid higher rents in order to get living quarters. Some landlords considered rent control illegal, and when an Indiana federal judge ruled it unconstitutional, Office of Price Administration offices in several communities were flooded with phone calls from landlords notifying the agency that they would no longer comply. Though the ruling was eventually overturned by the Supreme Court, the agency was hard pressed for a time to ensure compliance. Other landlords simply defied the government. A Rantoul landlady was locally notorious for her refusal to comply with rent control regulations. Her arrest and conviction, however, quickly prompted others to comply with the law. Many landlords also took advantage of the emergency to discriminate against some classes of tenants. Many refused to rent to soldiers and their families. Couples with children frequently found it difficult to obtain housing. One landlord forced a young couple living near Chanute Field to move a month before their baby was
Many tenants resorted to buying property in order to get living quarters free of eviction. However, this sometimes led to schemes in which homeseekers were tricked into buying empty lots. Real estate firms selling the lots promised to build homes on these lots even though housing construction required a government priority for building materials, which the firms did not have.\textsuperscript{26}

Although the war sharply curtailed most residential construction, some new homes were built. Private developers built new houses around aircraft engine factories and other defense plants. Many of the homes were small "defense" homes or "war" homes constructed primarily for employees of these defense plants. They were cheaply built, often prefabricated for quick construction. Some established neighborhoods objected to them for fear that they would lower property values. In March, 1942, the Chicago City Council reformed the city's building regulations to permit the construction of such homes, but limited them to outlying areas where they would not disturb existing property values. All housing construction required priorities from the War Production Board for building materials. In 1942, the agency established quotas limiting the number of new homes to be constructed. To further alleviate the need for housing, the Home Owners Loan Corporation leased private homes and even commercial structures and subdivided them into flats for war workers. Private owners also were granted priorities to make
similar conversions of attics and other spare rooms. In some communities, public housing supplemented private efforts. Prior to the war, the City of Chicago embarked on a program of slum clearance and construction of public housing. While wartime restrictions on residential construction curtailed the program, some projects were built to house war workers and military personnel. Naval noncommissioned officers lived in the Frances Cabrini Homes while stationed at Navy Pier. After the war, these projects became low-rent housing for low-income families. Similar housing was constructed in other Illinois cities. In some communities, such as Seneca, Illinois, war workers lived in temporary war housing projects and trailer camps. Unlike private housing, public housing was not subject to rent control. This led to some embarrassment for the Office of Price Administration when federal housing projects raised rents even as the agency was holding down rents charged by private landlords. In Joliet, this led to a long campaign by the mayor and others to cut rents at a federal housing project. Finally, the Office of Price Administration managed to negotiate substantial reductions in rents at the project.

Attitudes toward price and rent controls and rationing varied immensely even within the business community. The larger companies, especially industrial firms, generally supported these controls, fearing the effects of inflation on their own costs. A plant manager in a Woodstock factory
advised a rent control official that every manufacturer in McHenry County supported rent control. His company even offered to underwrite any advertising to get the message across in the county. Editorials in trade journals generally supported price controls to fight inflation, though criticizing some policies. Most of the opposition to controls came from retailers and landlords, though even then, the record was mixed. In Springfield, businessmen cooperated with local Office of Price Administration officials in setting up a model store to demonstrate the proper means of posting prices and also set up a window display at a local business to educate consumers on price control. Still, retailers complained of problems. Though they tried to keep prices down for fear of inflation, many found themselves caught between rising wholesale prices and the ceilings fixed by the Office of Price Administration and wished to pass on extra costs to their customers. Some owners of downstate cafes, who were denied price adjustments, threatened to quit serving meals. Many retailers also complained of excessive record-keeping required under price control and rationing. Rationing itself brought scarcities of some items and even forced some shops to close. Gas rationing, however, helped many merchants, especially those in smaller communities by forcing people to shop closer to home. Many small retailers regained business previously lost to chain stores. Most merchants generally cooperated with price control, but there
was a significant amount of cheating, particularly in certain trades. Meat merchants often violated price and rationing regulations. A 1946 study by the American Meat Institute found 91 percent of meat merchants in Chicago to be in violation. Similar problems prevailed in produce and other trades. Most of those who were caught had to pay fines. The Office of Price Administration generally was lenient with first offenders. For others, the agency generally sought treble damages, but usually had to settle for a lesser amount. Occasionally, a flagrant violator drew a prison sentence, but this was uncommon.²⁹

The public, of course, was another matter. Labor unions supported price controls and demanded greater enforcement. By 1943, they were citing price increases for foodstuffs to justify their demands for substantial wage increases. While many businessmen felt that the controls were excessive, labor leaders felt they were inadequate. Certainly, much of the public supported price control. Hence, the Office of Price Administration was able to enlist housewives to monitor prices. Many Illinoisans also resorted to raising Victory Gardens to supply their need for fresh fruit and vegetables. Communities encouraged these efforts with canning centers for the use of the gardeners. Victory Gardens increased the supply of foodstuffs and helped alleviate shortages caused by rationing. Still, not everyone could raise a garden, and some needs, such as meat, could not
easily be met through private efforts. At the same time, the rise in personal incomes generated increased consumer spending power, but there were fewer goods to buy. Many consumers resorted to the black market, usually by paying their retailer a little extra or by buying directly from farmers. Many also resorted to eating out at restaurants. Some, of course, had a more difficult time making up for deficiencies due to rationing. Hence, in the summer of 1945, 10,000 coal miners in southern Illinois struck in protest against inadequate meat rations.30

Overall, price control and rationing was moderately successful in holding down inflation and distributing scarce goods on an equitable basis. Official government statistics show that retail prices of living essentials rose 31.1 percent between August, 1939 and August, 1945 with most of the increase prior to the introduction of price control. Prices rose only 11.1 percent between May, 1942 and August, 1945 and only 3 percent after May, 1943. The chief difficulty with these statistics is that there is no good way of ascertaining how many consumers patronized the black market or how many retailers engaged in black market practices or the extent to which this activity affected prices that consumers actually paid. Those who traded on the black market were unlikely to confess their misdeeds to government statisticians. Still, given the fact that prices were restricted, any overcharges or extra payments had to start
with a restricted price base. Even on the black market, many consumers probably paid less than they would have if prices were left uncontrolled and inflation allowed to rise unchecked as it did after controls ended in 1946. Rationing provoked a good deal of grumbling, but it put everyone on the same level. A Woodford County woman recalled that during the First World War, her family had been unable to buy sugar at all because of the price, while neighbors had a bag for which they had paid a high price. During the Second World War, sugar was rationed and its price restricted, but every family got its share at an affordable price. So it was with other commodities. This was the chief success of price control and rationing.  


Bloomington Pantagraph, March 4, 1943, p. 5, March 5, 1943, p. 5, March 6, 1943, p. 5; Chicago Tribune, September 17, 1943, p. 2; Watters, Operation Home Front, p. 322.

Chicago Tribune, September 16, 1942, p. 29, September 25, 1942, p. 33, November 24, 1942, p. 25, December 23, 1942,


13 Chicago Daily News, July 16, 1943, pp. 1, 3, August 14, 1943, p. 3; Chicago Tribune, November 10, 1943, p. 36; U. S., District Court, Northern Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Case Files, Bowles v. Mellin, Records Center, National Archives and Records Administration, Chicago, Illinois. See also Bowles v. Marx and Bowles v. Martin's South Shore Catering Company in the same collection for examples of disputes between price panels and local restaurants and their resolution in the courts.

14 Watters, Operation Home Front, p. 329.


16 Chicago Tribune, May 19, 1943, p. 9; Clinard, The Black Market, pp. 13-27. See also U. S., District Court, Northern Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Case Files, Records Center, National Archives and Records Administration, Chicago, Illinois, for examples of violations of price control and rationing. There were thousands of such violations in this district alone.


1944), 98; "Editorial Comment," Department Store Economist 7 (April, 1944), 106; Frank M. Mayfield, "The Industry Will Cooperate on Price Regulation," Department Store Economist 5 (May 10, 1942), 1; U. S., Office of Housing Expediter, Monthly Narrative Report, Region VI, Rockford, Illinois, Arthur A. thorsell to Tom Tippett, Chief, Field Operations Branch, OPA, Benjamin Baltzer, Regional Rent Executive, and Nic LeGrand, District Rent Director, January 31, 1945, pp. 1-2, Record Group 252, Series 107, Box 189, Records Center, National Archives and Records Administration, Chicago, Illinois; Clinard, The Black Market, pp. 127-128, 238-254. For examples of penalties for violations of price control and rationing, see U. S., District Court, Northern Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Case Files, Records Center, National Archives and Records Administration, Chicago, Illinois.


CHAPTER VIII

RECONVERSION

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945 as the Allied armies swept across Europe. A month later, the war was over in Europe and on August 15, the end came for the Pacific conflict. As elsewhere in the nation, the end of the war brought wild rejoicing in communities all over Illinois. It also brought dramatic changes in the economy and society. War industries shut down or converted to civilian production. Price controls, rationing and other restrictions were eased and then lifted entirely. There were temporary dislocations as war workers sought peacetime jobs. Unions struck to secure wage increases and benefits denied them and their members during the war. It was a period of uncertainty as the economy and society adjusted to new conditions.  

The civilian defense program was the first casualty of reconversion. Early in 1944, the Army discontinued its early warning system. Soon afterward, on March 31, Chicago's Advance Air Raid Warning System ceased operations. In May, the Citizens's Defense Corps was placed in reserve and regional offices of the Office of Civilian Defense closed. In May, 1945, President Harry S. Truman, Roosevelt's succes-
sor, abolished the Office of Civilian Defense. Illinois Governor Dwight Green promptly put the Illinois War Council on a voluntary basis and ceased state appropriations for its operations. In June, the state council and local war councils disbanded. In Chicago, however, Mayor Edward Joseph Kelly argued that there was still a need for the program to regulate troop movements and handle salvage campaigns, bond drives and other activities. He also wanted to keep his supporters on the payroll. When the federal program ceased at the end of June, he continued the Chicago office as the Chicago War Service Corps until September.²

During the summer of 1945, war industries started shutting down. By the end of May, the shipyard at Seneca, which employed 10,900 at its peak, was down to 3400 employees and they were soon to leave. The last landing ship tank (LST) was launched on June 8. Two weeks later, the completed vessel left the outfitting dock and started downriver. The remaining workers soon left town and Seneca returned to a quieter pace, albeit with several improvements resulting from the war-boom. In August, the ordnance plants started shutting down. On August 31, the Green River Ordnance Plant near Amboy ceased operations. On the same day, the Dodge-Chicago factory turned out its last B-29 engine. The other aircraft and engine plants in the city also shut down, ending the city's dreams of becoming a major aircraft manufacturing center. Many of the closed factories were put to new uses.
International Harvester bought the Buick engine plant in Melrose Park to manufacture diesel engines and a new type of large crawler tractor, while Western Electric acquired the Studebaker engine plant in Chicago. The Dodge-Chicago complex was taken over by the Preston Tucker Corporation for an ill-fated attempt to manufacture automobiles. Later, it became Ford City, a combined industrial district and shopping center. The city of Chicago acquired the Douglas plant and used its airfield facilities as the basis of a new airport, O'Hare Field. Several companies moved into buildings used by the Crab Orchard Ordnance Plant. Reynolds Metals bought a government-built aluminum rolling mill in McCook operated during the war by the Aluminum Company of America. Many other companies bought government-financed mills and factories which they had operated during the war.\(^3\)

Conversion to civilian production started as priorities eased. In May, 1945, the War Production Board lifted 130,000 orders prohibiting the use of materials for civilian goods and permitted the manufacture of some scarce and urgently needed consumer products, including appliances. The lifting of restrictions did not lead to a sudden increase in civilian goods as materials were still in short supply, especially metals. Nevertheless, in June, the Electric Household Utilities Company started making electric ironers at a Chicago factory and in July, resumed the manufacture of washing machines at its Bloomington plant. Other industries
started partial reconversion. A Bloomington firm continued to fill war contracts while making oil heaters for civilian use. In August, the end of the war led the War Production Board to lift most of the remaining controls on industry. The Board itself was replaced by the Civilian Production Board in November. Other restrictions were also lifted in August, though others remained. The Office of Price Administration ended rationing of many consumer items, including gasoline, but price controls continued. The Office of Defense Transportation lifted some restrictions on commercial freight traffic while the War Manpower Commission removed all controls on the free movement of labor.  

Meanwhile, the armed forces cancelled billions of dollars in contracts. By August, only half as many people worked in war plants around the country as in May. Most remaining contracts were cancelled with the end of the war in the Pacific. On August 15, over $2 billion in contracts with Chicago-area plants were terminated. On the next day, the Air Force eliminated another $4 billion in contracts with Chicago-area industries. Thousands of workers were laid off on short notice. Still, Chicago and other Illinois communities probably suffered less than other parts of the country since the Middle West was in a better position to reconvert to peacetime production. Many Illinois industries were food processors, which had no conversion problems. They could simply sell to consumers instead of the armed forces.
The same situation prevailed with the steel mills. Other Illinois firms produced consumer products and capital goods, which were in high demand. Many companies, such as Pullman-Standard, already had large backlogs of orders and were soon in search of workers to help fill them. By October, International Harvester's Chicago Tractor Works was in full production making tractors for civilian use. The company soon introduced a new small Farmall tractor as well as a giant 18-ton 180 horsepower crawler tractor. The Electro-Motive division of General Motors converted from production of diesel engines for naval vessels to diesel locomotives. Ekco Products Company of Chicago resumed production of kitchen utensils. Shortages of materials and labor plagued many industries at first. Uncertainty over price ceilings hindered the supply of some commodities and parts, while many workers chose to draw unemployment checks rather than take jobs that paid less than they had been making. Strikes also held up production. By 1947, however, materials shortages and labor problems were alleviated and factories were able to fill their huge backlogs of orders.5

The war increased the size and number of industries operating in Illinois. In 1939, there were 11,983 manufacturing establishments in the state. By 1947, there were 15,988. Some plants closed during the war, but others rose to take their place. Many firms, large and small, increased in size during the war. Though some small and medium-sized
firm reverted to their prewar status after the war, others emerged as major participants in the postwar industrial world. There also was a significant shift in the relative status of different types of industries operating in the state as heavy industry grew in proportion to food, clothing and printing. In 1939, iron and steel and machinery represented 37.7 percent of employment in the Chicago area. In 1948, it comprised 44.6 percent. Reconversion was a new start for the state's industries. Many firms introduced new products and entered new markets. International Harvester and others promoted freer foreign trade. There were new industries in light metals, plastics and other commodities. Though at first, some feared a Depression, they soon found themselves hard pressed to keep up with the pent-up demand unleashed by the end of the war. Though there was a mild recession in the winter of 1948-1949, in general, the level of business activity in the state remained above the prewar level.6

Farmers prospered during the postwar years. Though price controls continued until late 1946, so did price supports. The latter proved unnecessary for a time as prices for corn, soybeans, wheat and other commodities soared in 1946 and 1947. Shortages of corn persisted in 1946, leading terminals to offer premiums to get it, including nylon, whiskey, automobiles and tractors. Many farmers responded to rising farm prices by increasing production, especially
in corn and soybeans, the chief postwar crops. Production levels for these crops in the late forties far surpassed wartime peaks. Falling prices in 1948 led to demands that 90 percent of parity price supports be continued beyond 1950. In 1949, Congress extended them to 1952. Acreage controls were restored in 1950. Meanwhile, the War Food Administration ended in 1945 and the Department of Agriculture consolidated some of its agencies, including the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, into the Production and Marketing Administration. The new agency had state and county committees much like the old Department of Agriculture state and county boards. These committees handled the acreage controls.¹

Rising farm prices contributed to a rise in land values during and after the war. Though the total number of farms decreased, the average size increased as farmers added to their acreage. There were fewer medium-sized farms and more large ones, most of them owned by the farmer. Mechanization, which continued in the postwar era, was a major factor in the increase in farm size. Farmers could work more land with a tractor than with a horse. Mechanization also reduced the need for farm labor, which continued in short supply during the postwar years. Returning servicemen refused to accept farm work, preferring higher paid industrial labor. Young men growing up on farms, who in the past would have taken jobs as hired hands, now preferred to drive their
cars over new farm-to-market roads to jobs in town. Farmers themselves preferred to replace men with machines.\(^8\)

One major change in rural life during the war and after was the rapid decline of the one-room schoolhouse. The movement for consolidation of school districts started many years earlier, but the war greatly accelerated it. One-room schoolhouses generally had poor facilities, poorly-paid teachers and low attendance. Many lacked water or even outhouses. During the war, the draft and war industries drained off teachers forcing schools to close at the rate of 1000 a year and leading the affected districts to send their students to larger schools in other districts. The trend continued after the war. In 1945, the General Assembly set minimum salary levels for teachers. Later, it authorized construction of new rural roads. Still, many farmers resisted the demise of one-room schools, partly because of higher taxes and partly out of fear of loss of local control. Some also objected for reasons of nostalgia, especially in the case of high schools. Country schools served as community centers and local high school bands were a source of community pride. Nonetheless, between 1942 and 1948, the number of school districts in Illinois was almost halved as consolidated schools replaced one-room schools and the smaller high schools.\(^9\)

Unlike most wartime restrictions, price controls continued after the cessation of hostilities. The Office of
Price Administration foresaw that the growth of consumer savings during the war and pent-up demand for goods would create serious inflationary pressure until industry could produce sufficient goods to satisfy demand. To facilitate reconversion, the agency developed special price ceilings for appliances and other durable goods that had been out of production during the war. However, the ceilings provided only modest increases over prewar prices. This brought protests from small companies, which found them too low. At the same time, the Truman Administration relaxed most other restrictions on the economy, including wage controls. This left the Office of Price Administration to carry the burden of fighting inflation.  

The Truman Administration tried to continue the War Labor Board, but both management and labor wished to escape wartime restrictions and take their chances with collective bargaining. The National Labor-Management Conference held in November failed to reach any agreement on a replacement for the War Labor Board, which ceased operations at the end of the year. Meanwhile, a wave of postwar strikes hit several industries, including steel, as workers sought wage hikes to offset the loss of overtime pay as well as adjust for wartime increases in the cost of living. The Office of Price Administration argued that industry could pay moderately higher wages without raising prices, but major corporations argued that they could not raise wages without increasing
prices. In February, 1946, President Truman, concerned about the lagging pace of reconversion, gave in to the steel companies and ended a steel strike by approving a substantial wage increase and a compensating increase in steel price ceilings. Chester Bowles, head of the Office of Price Administration, immediately resigned in protest. Some other wage disputes were settled along similar lines. The Office of Price Administration became increasingly unpopular as large corporations sought looser controls and smaller firms demanded an end to the program. Farmers also pushed decontrol. In June, Congress passed a bill substantially weakening price control. Though Truman vetoed the bill and coaxed Congress into passing a slightly better one, price control was doomed. Livestock ranchers withheld cattle and hogs when meat ceilings were reimposed in September. Meat disappeared from stores. The public blamed the shortage on the Office of Price Administration. Truman finally gave up and ended meat controls in October, then abolished the Office of Price Administration following the November election. Consumer prices shot up by 9.4 percent in the next twelve months and continued to rise until 1948. Rising prices, in turn, encouraged further strikes. 11

The postwar years also brought resolution of an issue that had troubled many labor leaders for years, especially in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). For some years, known or suspected Communists had participated in
union activities. They were hard workers, and some rose through the ranks to head locals and sometimes even entire unions. The militant CIO, in particular, attracted Communists and other radicals. CIO unions in several industries, including steel, farm equipment, automobiles and electrical equipment, welcomed the leftists into their ranks and utilized their services in building the union. During the thirties, the class warfare tactics of the Communist organizers proved effective, especially when dealing with conservative anti-union companies, which resorted to heavy-handed methods to keep out unions. By the late forties, however, it was a different world. Most companies accepted unions and were willing to bargain collectively. Many unions themselves, such as the United Steelworkers of America, wished to preserve their gains and build on them. The militant tactics of unions perceived to be Communist-led seemed to threaten these gains. The radical unions, such as the United Electrical and Radio and Machine Workers of America and the United Farm Equipment Workers of America, also maintained ties to the Communist Party and supported Soviet foreign policy in their union newspapers. The CIO, fearing that the radicals would try to takeover the whole union movement, determined to rid itself of all members and unions it considered Marxist.  

Before and during the war, there were periodic outbursts of red-baiting as union dissidents accused their ad-
versaries of being Communists when resisting union efforts to expel them. In 1944 and 1945, such dissidents in Chicago were often represented by William J. Grace, an attorney and head of The Citizens USA Committee, a right-wing extremist organization. Rival unions also made such charges. A far more serious challenge to labor radicals arose when a feud developed between the United Auto Workers and the Farm Equipment Workers. As early as 1939, the United Auto Workers protested the employment of an extreme left-winger by the Farm Equipment Workers union. In 1940, the CIO tried to merge the two, but the Farm Equipment Workers balked at a demand by the rival to fire two leftist organizers. The two unions made agreements from time to time about organizing plants, but they always broke down and the Auto Workers resorted to recurrent raids on Farm Equipment locals seeking to convince the members to defect to the United Auto Workers. Some leaders of farm equipment locals joined the rival union and tried to take their locals with them, but without success. Early in 1945, the CIO again tried to merge the two unions, but the Farm Equipment Workers demurred and were upheld by their members. The United Auto Workers then raided Farm Equipment locals, claiming that the union was doomed and that the Auto Workers were rescuing the members. The latter, however, did not wish to be rescued and fights broke out.  

Between 1945 and 1953, the Auto Workers made several rounds of raids on the Farm Equipment Workers locals, most
of them unsuccessful. In 1947, the Farm Equipment Workers reversed its anti-merger position in order to strengthen forces within the United Auto Workers who opposed Walter Reuther, a firm anti-Communist who had won control of the union, but still faced a hostile Executive Board. Reuther, however, opposed the merger and took it to the membership, who rejected it. Then after he strengthened his control of his union in 1948, Reuther again reversed his position and sought a merger. In 1949, the CIO expelled the Farm Equipment Workers union when it refused a CIO order to merge with the United Auto Workers union. The Farm Equipment Workers then merged with the United Electrical Workers union, which was expelled from the CIO on grounds of Communist domination. Several other unions and union leaders were also expelled in 1949 and 1950. All were given the right of appeal to a set of special panels, all of which were really kangaroo courts, whose decisions were preordained. The accused could then appeal to the CIO Executive Board, but those who did, lost that appeal, too. The CIO then launched rival unions to raid those it had expelled. 14

The feud between the Farm Equipment Workers and the United Auto Workers strongly influenced postwar strikes in the farm equipment industry, especially at International Harvester. Both organized new plants, but the feud prevented them from presenting a united front. Even when they tried to engage in joint negotiations with John Deere, the
company refused. Farm equipment companies played off both unions against each other. While one was on strike, the other generally was working. Each union tried to outdo the other in securing gains for its members. Both unions lost maintenance of membership for which they had fought hard during the war, but the Farm Equipment Workers generally gained more than the United Auto Workers in the early post-war years. 15

However, in 1950, International Harvester decided to rid itself of the hated Farm Equipment union, which it considered Communist-dominated. In August of that year, the company entered into a contract with the Farm Equipment union, but then withdrew it, citing wildcat strikes when the United Auto Workers went on strike. The Farm Equipment Workers promptly walked out in response to what they considered a brazen double-cross. They continued on strike until mid-September and won a wage hike and a two-year contract, but the United Auto Workers stayed out until November and scored even greater gains, including a five-year contract. The company sought to weaken the Farm Equipment Workers union in favor of the United Auto Workers. Leaders of the Farm Equipment union sought to win a better deal for their members in 1952. However, the strike, which broke out in August, came at a very bad time. The House Un-American Activities Committee was investigating Communist involvement in unions, including the Farm Equipment Workers and its parent,
the United Electrical Workers, which had sought to prevent the strike. With fears of Communism sweeping the nation, many members began to doubt their leadership and returned to work. By early September, 800 went back. The company then launched an all-out effort to break the strike, sending supervisory personnel to talk to strikers in their homes. By early October, 2000 were back on the job. The United Electrical Workers finally persuaded the Farm Equipment Workers to give up the strike in November. The settlement was a deathblow to the union. Not only did it bring concessions, which amounted to a substantial wage cut, but it required members to sign special stipulations for dues checkoff. Only 50 percent signed, eventually crippling the union financially. Stewards handling grievances no longer were paid, thus crippling the union's grievance procedure. The union leader, Gerald Fielde, soon lost heart and disappeared from the union's activities altogether.¹⁶

Between 1952 and 1955, all Farm Equipment locals defected to the United Auto Workers, and the Farm Equipment union disappeared. If International Harvester expected that this would end labor militance, it was soon disappointed. The Auto Workers pressured the company on grievances (a major reason for company hatred for the Farm Equipment Workers) and finally staged a bitter strike in 1958, which led to a long-term agreement on grievance procedures. The 1959 settlement brought the company a measure of labor peace, but
one which was costly. Its terms, which included abolition of mandatory overtime, ultimately made the company less competitive and led to the long strike and corporate reorganization of the eighties. In retrospect, the Farm Equipment Workers were probably not much more militant than their rival. Though the union staged more strikes, they were usually of short duration. The Auto Workers had fewer strikes, but longer ones. While the Farm Equipment Workers union was much more militant and uncompromising in its rhetoric, in practice, the union compromised like any other union. Indeed, both unions were militant primarily because of the policies of the companies they had to deal with, especially International Harvester. 17

Other long-term labor disputes were also resolved at the end of the war. Montgomery Ward was returned to its owners in October, 1945. The Hummer plant in Springfield was returned in July. As soon as the company regained control, it discontinued maintenance of membership and dues checkoff provisions of the War Labor Board-imposed union contract. The union protested and threatened a strike, but soon withdrew demands for retention of these provisions in a new contract. The company also rejected some other provisions of the old contract, but retained the Army-imposed pay increases. In the fall, the union did stage a demonstration strike, but with only spotty results, though the company did increase wages. Accounts differed as to the effectiveness
of the walkout, though some other unions did refuse to cross picket lines, thus hindering the company in shipment of merchandise. In general, though, Sewell Avery beat the union. The end of the Army takeover left the union in the same position as it was earlier, though its members profited from Army-imposed pay raises. Still, the whole affair of company defiance of the War Labor Board hurt its prestige since Sewell Avery received the same kind of public abuse thrown at John L. Lewis for his defiance of the War Labor Board and its predecessor.¹⁸

Though Sewell Avery won his battle with the union, he did not do so well against his competitors in business, and for this he himself was to blame. Sewell Avery, like many other businessmen, feared a postwar depression, but while others soon realized that the economy was expanding rather than contracting, Sewell Avery continued his policy of caution. While Sears made plans for postwar expansion of retail stores, Montgomery Ward hung on to its cash. The company did open some catalog outlets in communities lacking Ward stores, but other improvements were restricted and stores grew dowdy. Sales declined and many executives left rather than put up with Avery's dictatorial policies. Not until Avery resigned in 1955 did the company, under new leadership, start spending its huge cash horde. In 1957, the store built its first new store since 1941 to replace a burned out downtown store in Portsmouth, Ohio. Further new
stores were built in suburban shopping centers.\textsuperscript{19}

President Truman also ended the federal takeover and operation of the Toledo, Peoria and Western Railroad in the fall of 1945, despite union protests over its return to its owner, George P. McNear. McNear, himself, refused to deal with the brotherhoods and insisted on returning to the work rules and pay scales he had imposed in December, 1941, thus prompting the 1942 strike and federal takeover. He also pledged to rehire some of his old employees, except for 24 men who had engaged in violence during the 1942 strike, 17 of whom had been cleared of convictions on appeal. All thirteen unions responded with a strike on October 1, 1945. McNear made no effort to operate trains at first, but then changed his mind in response to protests by shippers. A group of shippers met with both sides, but no agreement was reached. McNear proposed arbitration by a three man panel, but the unions wanted arbitration under the Railway Labor Act, which McNear would not accept since he felt the arbitrators would be biased in favor of the unions. In January, 1946, McNear resumed some service using strikebreakers. Violence soon broke out and McNear posted armed guards on trains. This brought more violence as guards shot at pickets and strikers fought with train crews. Other railroads embargoed the line and refused to allow its trains into their yards if guards were on the trains. One switching road also complained that the crews McNear was using were unsafe.
One engineer was partially blind. The guards themselves threatened and shot at strikers. Some had criminal records. On February 6, guards on a train near Gridley shot and killed two pickets and wounded three others. The guards were tried for manslaughter, but were acquitted. Governor Green and the Illinois Commerce Commission then tried to settle the dispute, but failed.\textsuperscript{20}

Meanwhile, shippers along the line grew dissatisfied with the situation and raised funds for litigation to force a settlement. In February, fourteen shippers filed suit in federal court seeking to force both sides to end the suspension of operations and asking the court to appoint a receiver to operate the line. A few days later, the federal district court in Peoria appointed a receiver to operate the line, but the company appealed and the receivership was suspended and then revoked in September by the appeals court, which also ordered the district court to issue an injunction against the unions. In December, the district court issued the injunction and ordered the company to operate the entire line. McNear appeared to have won his battle though the strike remained unsettled. However, late in the evening of March 10, 1947, McNear was taking a walk near his home when he was shot and killed by an assassin. The murder was never solved, but it was generally attributed to the strike. The death of McNear removed any impediment to settling the dispute. The trustees who took over the road soon reached
an agreement under which all employees were recalled to work under pay scales and work rules in use during the federal operation of the line. Rail service resumed on April 21.21

McNear was right in his opposition to outdated work rules. However, his methods of resolving his disputes with labor made no friends for him or his company or the industry as a whole. There were several nationwide rail strikes in the postwar years. During the Truman years, several were settled by seizure of the railroads and arbitration of the disputes. The brotherhoods gained some wage increases, but were unable to force the railroads to accept additional unneeded crewmen. Not until the late fifties, sixties and seventies, however, did the railroads begin to make progress in eliminating unneeded crewmen. Even as of this writing, the matter is still unresolved.22

The postwar years saw John L. Lewis forced to back down during a strike. In April, 1946, Lewis led the bituminous miners out on strike in a dispute over a variety of issues, including wages and a health and welfare fund. The walkout led the government to seize the mines. On May 29, Secretary of the Interior J. A. Krug signed an agreement with Lewis giving the miners much of what he wanted. However, on October 21, Lewis demanded that the pact be reopened. Krug sent underlings to confer with union leaders at first. Then, on November 13, he met with Lewis and advised him that the government would not negotiate, but that the owners would.
Lewis was angry. He had signed an agreement with the government, not the owners, but Krug insisted on presenting a plan for negotiating between the union and the owners. Attorney General Tom Clark also presented an opinion upholding Krug's view that the agreement prevailed as long as the government held the mines. Lewis, however, said that it would terminate on November 20. The government then prepared to fight. It froze bituminous coal in transit and storage and ordered railroads to cut use of coal. On November 18, the Attorney General secured an injunction against the union and its officers ordering Lewis and his staff to cease termination of the agreement. However, when the union took no action, the miners struck on November 20. Public outcries prompted Lewis to look for a way out without surrendering to the government. He found none. On December 3, he and his union were found in contempt of court, and later they were fined. Lewis soon called off the strike. He later appealed to the Supreme Court, but lost. There were further strikes in the late forties with varying degrees of success, but in the fifties, the owners themselves changed policies, seeking labor peace in the interests of production in a changing market. 23

One major change in the postwar world was the relaxation of competition between the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and its offspring, the CIO. By the late forties, there were recurrent discussions of reunification. The old issue
of craft versus industrial unionism was dead since many AFL affiliates were industrial unions. Still, reunion was delayed until William Green, head of the AFL, and Phil Murray, head of the CIO, were both dead since neither was willing to defer to the other in leadership of a merged union. Reunification came in 1955.24

Postwar changes in transportation greatly intensified existing trends as government lavished vast sums of money on new highways, airports and waterway improvements, all of which served to shift traffic away from railways. The nation had always financed some highways and canals, but in the twentieth century, such programs took on added importance as a means of offering competition to the railroads. In 1916, in response to demands by motorists for good roads, Congress established the first federal highway program. By the twenties, every state was eagerly building new roads with matching federal funds. The roads were soon crowded with automobiles, trucks and buses, all of which cut into railroad freight and passenger traffic and destroyed the electric interurban railways built in the first years of the century. In the postwar era, highway spending was greatly expanded with new superhighways, turnpikes, expressways and finally the Interstate System as well as state and local roads. Chicago alone built several expressways, starting with the Edens, completed in 1951, and the Eisenhower, finished in 1956. Automobile usage also increased so that many families
came to own two or more cars. Automobiles, trucks and buses crowded the new highways in ever increasing numbers. The railways themselves established some bus systems to serve outlying areas and eliminate branch line trains. Later, the Pennsylvania Railroad assisted in the formation of the Greyhound network, and other railroads, including the Santa Fe and the Burlington, formed the National Trailways System. After World War II, they generally sold off these bus lines, which then expanded further. By 1962, buses exceeded railways in passenger-miles. Truck traffic also grew rapidly as more cargo shifted to the highway. Trucks dominated certain types of traffic, especially the more profitable cargoes. Truck production boomed in the postwar years and improvements increased the size and speed of over the road trucks.  

Air transport grew tenfold during the decade of the forties. New four-engined 50-passenger airliners replaced two-engined 21-passenger planes. Many states, including Illinois, embarked on a program of building airports. The number of airports in the state grew from 54 in 1941 to 162 in 1950. Chicago built O'Hare Airport and Meigs Field. Private companies bought planes, and some, like LeTourneau, a Peoria firm, built airstrips at their plants.

Railroads at first were optimistic about postwar prospects for passenger as well as freight traffic, both of which continued at a very high level well into the postwar
years. Homebound troops and traveling civilians crowded trains in the first few months of peace, and travel restrictions continued well into the postwar years. Due to the crush of freight and passenger traffic, the Office of Defense Transportation was not abolished until 1949. Many lines, encouraged by the heavy traffic, ordered new streamliners, anticipating that trains with modern equipment would do well in carrying large numbers of people over moderate distances. Late in the war, federal anti-trust litigation resulted in the breakup of the Pullman Company into a car-building firm, which remained independent, and a sleeping car operator, which was sold to a group of railroads. The new firm ordered new sleepers. Many railroads ordered the new vista-dome car, which was introduced in 1945. However, delivery of the new cars was delayed by shortages of parts caused by strikes and materials shortages. Meanwhile, the airlines secured new planes while autobuilders rolled new cars off the assembly lines. Though the new trains that were built made money at first, it was already too late to stem the loss of riders to competing modes. Many potential passengers recalled overcrowded conditions on wartime trains and swore off rail travel. The automobile, the bus and the airliner steadily siphoned off more travelers so that by the late fifties, the railroads were running up huge passenger deficits, which they subsidized with freight profits. Even these were inadequate by 1958 due to heavy truck and barge
competition. Some responded with cuts in the quality of service. This only encouraged more riders to desert the rails. The carriers responded by dropping trains at an ever-increasing rate until the advent of Amtrak saved about half of what was left of passenger service. Although Amtrak has reversed the decline, its chronic lack of adequate funding, coupled with the high popularity and heavy government support for competing modes of travel has limited its ability to expand its share of the intercity travel market. 27

Rail freight traffic did far better than passenger service in the postwar years, but even that declined steadily despite significant improvements such as piggyback service, unit trains and other technological innovations. As of this writing, the railroads, which carried over two-thirds of the nation's freight ton-miles in 1945, now handle a little over a third. The rest goes by truck, barge, air or pipeline. Railroads have been handicapped by excessive government regulation, obsolete work rules and by the need to build and maintain rail rights of way, while most competing modes use government-built rights of way at very little cost to themselves. Though much of the regulation has been abandoned and some changes have been made in work rules, this last disadvantage continues. One result of the loss of traffic has been mergers and abandonment of redundant and little-used trackage. Shortly after the war, the Gulf, Mobile and Ohio merged with the Alton Railroad to form a com-
petitor to the Illinois Central. However, in 1972, the latter merged with its rival and has since sold off or abandoned much of its track. Recently, the railroad's parent company spun off what was left of the Illinois Central itself. Even so, Chicago remains a major railroad center and Illinois a railroad crossroads with connections between carriers serving all parts of the nation, a function it also fulfills for highway, air and water carriers.28

Dieselization of railway operations was completed in the forties and fifties, eliminating not only steam, but some electrification. The Gulf, Mobile and Ohio was one of the first to retire its steamers in 1949. Other carriers soon followed suit, and by 1960, the process, which had started before the war, was complete except for a few short lines and industrial operations. Even the Illinois Terminal system, which was the subject of much controversy for its wartime attempt to abandon part of its line, eliminated its electric operation in favor of diesels in the mid-fifties. It also ended all passenger service at the same time. The line through Bloomington and part of the line into Danville, which the company had tried to abandon during the war, were finally abandoned in the fifties, mainly because of difficulties in operating freights over these routes.29

Early in 1945, Chicago Mayor Kelly and Governor Green agreed on a plan for public ownership of the city's transit lines. In the spring of that year, the General Assembly
authorized the organization of a transit district to be administered by a seven-man board, four appointed by the mayor and three by the governor, and created a municipal corporation, the Chicago Transit Authority, with power to buy and operate transit systems in the Chicago area. In June, Chicago voters approved the plans for an exclusive franchise for the authority. In 1947, the new transit authority took control of the city's streetcar and elevated lines. Later, it bought the Chicago Motor Coach bus lines, thereby gaining control over all of the city's transit lines.30

The Chicago Transit Authority was one of the fruits of the postwar cooperation between Mayor Kelly and Governor Green. However, while both men profitted from the alliance, it was not enough to save their political careers. In Chicago, several factors combined to force Mayor Kelly to retire from office in 1947 rather than run for reelection. Scandals plagued the public school system throughout the Kelly years, largely because he and his allies on the school board insisted on appointing political allies to positions in the schools. In 1945 and 1946, the situation finally reached a crisis when the National Education Association issued a report critical of the administration of the school system and the North Central Association threatened to withdraw its accreditation of the school system. The controversy forced Kelly to appoint an investigating committee of Chicago educators and abide by its recommendations. School
Superintendent William H. Johnson and several school board members resigned and were replaced from a list of candidates submitted by the investigating committee. 31

Another crisis which damaged Kelly's political control of the city was racial. Although other municipal services were used as sources of patronage, Mayor Kelly always protected the Chicago Housing Authority from political interference. This aroused a good deal of hostility from aldermen who were angered by its refusal to make political appointments. After the war, they found another reason to hate the agency. In 1945, with a serious housing shortage developing, the Housing Authority began utilizing Quonset huts, trailers, converted military barracks and prefabricated units to house returning veterans until they could find suitable homes. Much of the housing was located on vacant sites in outlying areas, usually in white neighborhoods. Initially, the Housing Authority adhered to a policy of segregation, but with blacks constituting 20 percent of veterans in need of housing, the agency began selecting tenants on the basis of need. Eleven of twenty-one housing sites were integrated without incident, but riots broke out at Airport Homes and other projects in 1946. Mayor Kelly and the Housing Authority backed down in the case of Airport Homes, but other veteran housing units remained integrated. The last of the temporary projects was not discontinued until the mid-fifties. The Housing Authority also met resistance
over its efforts to plant public housing in white neighborhoods. Meanwhile, riots broke out as blacks moved into white neighborhoods. In the fall of 1945, white students staged strikes to protest the presence of blacks in their schools, but soon gave in under pressure from the Kelly administration. Still, racial tensions, especially in housing, combined with scandals in the school board and other city services and dissension in the Democratic Party in Chicago to make Kelly's reelection uncertain.32

In 1946, Jacob. M. Arvey replaced Kelly as party chief. Soon after the fall elections in which the Republicans made several gains, Arvey surveyed the mayor's prospects for reelection. The results indicated that Kelly would have a difficult time winning reelection. Kelly finally agreed to withdraw and the machine slated Martin H. Kennelly, a businessman and reformer, who won two terms in City Hall, before losing to Richard J. Daley in the Democratic primary of 1955.33

After the Republican victories of 1946, Governor Green looked certain to win reelection in 1948. Early in the year, with President Truman running as an underdog for a second term, the Democratic slatemakers met to choose candidates in what they thought would be a losing election. Because of the party's poor prospects for victory, they decided to choose reform liberal candidates for governor and senator. Accordingly, they put up ex-Alderman Paul Douglas for senator
and Adlai E. Stevenson for governor. Douglas was originally slated for governor, but the machine soon realized that if he won, he would be difficult to control. The Senate was a safer place for a reformer. He would do little damage there and senators had few jobs to hand out anyway. Stevenson was a political unknown and seemed unlikely to win. Even if he did win, with his lack of experience, the Cook County organization felt it would be safe with Stevenson in Springfield.

However, the campaign and election proved to be a surprise. Truman, Douglas and Stevenson were all strong campaigners in Illinois. Stevenson concentrated on state issues, which were ready-made, including a mine disaster and corruption in the Green Administration and the downstate party. On the eve of the election, a new scandal broke in Peoria involving collusion between criminals and office-holders. Douglas, meanwhile, vigorously attacked both the extreme left and the extreme right, being opposed both by the incumbent Senator C. Wayland Brooks, and the Progressives allied with former Vice-President Henry Wallace. Truman himself denounced the Republicans in Congress for failure to pass a bill to provide storage for surplus corn. Inadequate storage, often a problem for Illinois farmers, threatened to force the dumping of surplus corn on the market at deflated prices. The results were victory for the Democrats. Truman squeezed by with a smaller margin than Roosevelt ever
received, but both Douglas and Stevenson won by substantial margins.\textsuperscript{35}

In office, Stevenson proved to be a capable fairly effective reform governor, who worked with the Democratic organization in Cook County, but did not always follow its wishes. The party responded by running him for president in 1952 in a race he could not win. After the 1952 election, the Democrats in Cook County generally reverted to a policy of cooperation with the Republicans. With few exceptions, the Democratic machine mounted no serious effort to capture the statehouse and often exerted little effort in the senate races, especially against Republican Senator Everett Dirksen, who got along well with Mayor Daley. In 1960, the machine slated County Judge Otto Kerner to oppose an incumbent Republican governor with an eight-year-record of corruption. Kerner won, but made no effort to build up his own machine or challenge Daley for control of the party. After Kerner left to become a federal judge, the machine went back to slating weak little-known candidates, who would not threaten the machine, and then gave them little support. The machine is primarily interested in the municipal and county elections, and concentrates on them to the exclusion of anything else except for unusual circumstances such as a presidential race in which a Democratic candidate such as John F. Kennedy could render some assistance to the city of Chicago.\textsuperscript{36}

At the same time, the Republicans mounted no serious
challenge to the Democratic party in Cook County. Most of its mayoral candidates since 1939 have been traditional, old-line Republican politicians who were not attractive candidates and who had little chance to win. Several times, the party nominated Democrats who left the party, such as Benjamin Adamowski, a maverick politician who usually feuded with the machine during his political career. None of the Republicans won. Indeed, Bernard Epton, the last one to come close to winning, did so only because of the unusual circumstances of the race, in which a black anti-machine Democrat, Harold Washington, mounted a successful challenge to the machine in a mayoral race. In the next mayoral election, the Republican candidate finished well behind even a more traditional machine challenger to the incumbent Mayor Washington. 37

This collusion between the two parties was a recognition of political realities. Chicago was ethnic, black, Catholic and Democratic, while the downstate was white, Protestant, small-town, Republican and conservative. Downstaters viewed Chicago as a city of sin and corruption. While the two areas of the state had conflicting interests, the two parties were able to satisfy their own interests and to some extent, those of their constituents. 38

Another change in the postwar political arena was the decline of Colonel Robert Rutherford McCormick's influence within the Republican party. Though the Chicago Tribune
remained a powerful force, it grew steadily out of touch with the rank and file, especially the younger Republicans. The colonel, who had backed Thomas Dewey in 1940 and opposed him in 1944, came out for Ohio Senator Robert Taft in 1948, saying that Dewey could not be elected. McCormick and his paper were bitter over the results of the convention, which it charged was dominated by "America Lasters" and international bankers. In November, the Tribune, urged voters to support Republicans, but did not mention Dewey. In 1952, McCormick again pushed Taft and refused to swallow General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was backed by Dewey. In August, he encouraged formation of a third party excluding Truman Democrats and "Me-too" Truman Republicans. Though the colonel approved of some of President Eisenhower's actions, his paper generally was cool toward the Administration. Though McCormick died on April 1, 1955, his paper reflected his influence for many years. Not until 1969, did the Tribune, under new leadership, move toward the political center. 39

The end of the war also brought changes in society. Blacks made significant gains in employment during the war. However, many lost their jobs when war plants shut down and found it difficult to find new ones. In 1948, the Illinois Interracial Commission held hearings around the state and found continued discrimination by employers and employment agencies, especially against blacks, but also against Mexicans, Japanese, Filipinos, Jews and Catholics. One firm
fired all Catholics after the war. Blacks were often limited to low-grade jobs. Newspaper ads specified racial and religious restrictions in employment. Even in unionized industries, blacks often suffered discrimination. Unions affiliated with the AFL were reluctant to accept blacks or organized them into all-black auxiliary locals. However, CIO unions were committed to a policy of nondiscrimination. This helped blacks secure employment and advancement in mass production industries such as meat packing and farm equipment. Some companies were also committed to equal employment opportunities. International Harvester, which had long employed blacks, found that CIO unions were a useful ally in stopping walkouts by whites protesting promotion of blacks. The United Auto Workers fought for integration of union facilities even in Southern locals which favored segregation. It was not until the sixties, however, that blacks scored significant gains. The civil rights movement gained the support of the Democratic Administrations of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson in ending discrimination in employment, public accommodations, housing, education and other areas.  

As with blacks, women were laid off in large numbers after the war. Everywhere, proportionately more women were laid off than men. In some cases, housewives wanted to return home. Others, however, wished to continue working. Many of those laid off from high-paying industrial jobs faced
the prospect of accepting lower-paying jobs. In some cases, they had been trained to do specific tasks, which were not needed in factories producing civilian goods. Hence, they had to be retrained at a lower wage. Many were unwilling to accept lower-paying jobs or wished to go back to their old jobs when the plant reconverted. Because of dissatisfaction over pay scales, many chose not to accept the initial job offers in the postwar period. In some cases, companies that relied heavily on women workers, faced labor shortages. Still, there were far more openings for men than for women. Also, the jobs available to women were generally in traditional women's occupations. A woman scanning help wanted ads in a Chicago newspaper in September, 1945 could find openings in stores and office work, but very few factory jobs. Eventually, most women were forced to return to white collar and service occupations open to them before the war. However, more women continued working than before the war. In 1940, only 26 percent of American women of working age were in the labor force. In 1970, 40 percent were in paid employment. More married women with families continued working after the war than before the war. The income from work has given women increased independence and status. It has also allowed them to escape undesirable marriages, thus leading to a rise in the divorce rate. Employment of women has also led to a decline in the birth rate since many women curtailed child-bearing in order to pursue careers or jobs.\footnote{41}
One of the most significant changes brought by the war was in the migration of people to war jobs and military posts in Illinois. War boom communities like Seneca experienced huge increases in population. Though many people resented the newcomers, others eventually came to accept them. The Seneca shipyard attracted workers from all over the country, thus exposing Senecans to different points of view. Townspeople picked up new ideas, which they put into effect in the postwar world. In the summer of 1945, they started a new Community Club, which promoted civic improvements, including a new bank, road improvements and new recreational facilities. The public library enjoyed increased circulation. New schools were built and new civic groups started. Seneca, a sleepy rundown town in 1940, was an enterprising community in 1950.42

Another result of the migration of workers and servicemen were marriages between migrants and local women. Society pages of Chicago newspapers reported an increasing number of such marriages as the war went on. Young servicemen were lonely and many women were eager to marry. The marriage boom also brought a baby boom. The first six months of 1942 saw an increase of 6,621 births in the state. Many of these marriages proved unstable and divorces soared. By December, 1943, divorces in Sangamon County were 65 percent of marriages. By July, 1945, Chicago saw more divorces than marriages. In the fall of 1945, one Chicago judge installed
a nursery just off his courtroom where children played while their parents got divorced. 

Reconversion brought substantial changes to Illinois. Freed of controls, the state's industries expanded to produce civilian goods to satisfy a burgeoning consumer market. Farmers enjoyed improved living standards fed by record crops which sold for record prices. As price controls and rationing eased, labor unions sought wage increases, first to make up for reductions in take-home pay due to the elimination of overtime, but later to offset the rising cost of living. The end of controls combined with a burgeoning consumer market and strike-won increased wages to set off an inflationary spiral which continued until supplies began to meet demand. Travel restrictions also were lifted, thus allowing the public to choose whatever means of conveyance it wanted to journey from one place to another. In growing numbers, it chose the automobile and the airplane and sometimes the bus, but not the train. As riders deserted the rails for other means of transportation, the railroads were forced by rapidly growing passenger deficits to abandon the business of carrying people and concentrate on freight, which was still profitable. Even then, they lost business to trucks and barges. Though railroads continued to be major players in the postwar transportation system, their role was considerably diminished even in Illinois.

The postwar era in Illinois was a period of prospe-
rity and some uncertainty. Fears of depression haunted the immediate postwar period, while a perceived threat from Communism led to the demise of several radical unions. Some groups, especially organized labor, women and blacks, struggled with varying degrees of success, to preserve and extend wartime gains. Politically, the postwar years in Illinois were a period of change and continuity. Although the major wartime political leaders were forced out of office in a wave of reform, the fifties brought a restoration of a working arrangement between the Chicago Democrats and downstate Republicans, which has continued with few interruptions to the present day. The political leadership of the postwar years also reflected the changed outlook of Illinoisans toward the role of government in society and the economy and the nation and their state in the rest of the world. Before the war, the New Deal was hotly debated. While Chicago Democrats strongly supported it, downstate Republicans denounced it and farmers were not sure of its merits, though they like the benefits they received from farm programs. In foreign affairs, the state was a bastion of isolationism. The war changed all this. As early as 1940, isolationism was becoming less popular among the electorate. The war destroyed it. The New Deal also gained acceptance, even among Republicans. The result was a substantial erosion of the power of Colonel McCormick as voters rejected his candidates in favor of more progressive leaders.


11 *Chicago Tribune*, August 25, 1945, p. 19; "Trouble at the Table," *Time*, November 19, 1945, p. 21; George A. Patterson Papers, Friday, August 17th, 1945, General Policy


26 Itzkoff, Off the Track, pp. 30-32; Stover, The Life and Decline of the American Railroad, pp. 146-147; Watters, The Production Front, pp. 193-196.


31 Biles, Big City Boss, pp. 137-142.


33 Biles, Big City Boss, pp. 145-150; Milton L. Rakove, Don't Make No Waves, Don't Make No Losers (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1975), pp. 56, 281; Watters, The Production Front, pp. 509-513.

34 Rakove, Don't Make No Waves, pp. 144-145; Watters, The Production Front, pp. 509, 513.
35 Rakove, Don't Make No Waves, pp. 145-146; Watters, The Production Front, pp. 514-515.

36 Rakove, Don't Make No Waves, pp. 146-149.

37 Ibid., pp. 149-151.

38 Ibid., pp. 152-155.


41 Chicago Tribune, August 23, 1945, p. 7, August 26, 1945, pt. 1, p. 19, September 24, 1945, p. 31; Illinois State Register, September 20, 1945, p. 14; "Reconversion Takes Up Slack," Business Week, October 13, 1945, p. 15; Ruth Milkman, "Women's Work and the Economic Crisis, Some Lessons From the Great Depression," A Heritage of Her Own, Toward a New Social History of American Women, ed. by Nancy F. Cott and Elizabeth H. Pleck (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), pp. 532-537; Watters, The Production Front, p. 127. Not all women left heavy industry. A friend of the writer, who worked at a Chicago steel mill in the early seventies found women in every department who had been there since the war. While many of their colleagues had returned home after the war, they stayed because of the high wages.


CONCLUSIONS

The war brought significant changes to Illinois. Once committed to one party, Illinois became a swing state whose allegiance could no longer be taken for granted by either party. During the twenties, the Republicans dominated politics in the state only to lose control to the Democrats in the thirties. The forties brought a Republican resurgence which recaptured the statehouse for the Grand Old Party, but the Chicago Democratic machine strengthened its hold on municipal politics. During the thirties and forties, Colonel Robert Rutherford McCormick, the archconservative owner and publisher of the Chicago Tribune and leader of the Illinois Republican Party, often cooperated with his friend, Chicago Mayor Edward J. Kelly, in the division of political power. While the Democrats focused on municipal and county races and exerted little effort toward winning state positions, Republicans concentrated on winning the statehouse while conceding Chicago to the Democrats. This arrangement benefitted Colonel McCormick, who secured the election of his proteges and also helped Mayor Kelly who gained weak Republican opposition in mayoral campaigns and also eliminated his most dangerous rivals within his own party by running them for state offices in races which they could not win. The war brought further changes which
strengthened the power and prestige of Mayor Kelly, while eroding the influence of Colonel McCormick within his own party. Before the war, Illinois was a stronghold of isolationism and many Illinoisans questioned the New Deal. After the war, this was no longer the case. Even Republicans accepted American involvement in world affairs and government intervention in the economy. Though Colonel McCormick dominated slatemaking in his party, his candidates were increasingly unsuccessful. As a result, Governor Dwight Green forged an alliance with Mayor Kelly in the General Assembly at least partly to escape the domination of the Colonel. The division of power between Democratic Chicago and the Republican downstate recognized political realities and benefited both parties as partisan rivalry gave way to a measure of bipartisan cooperation.

A key element in the electoral success of the Chicago Democratic machine was the black community, which converted to the Democratic Party during the thirties, at least partly due to Mayor Kelly's policies. Kelly provided jobs for blacks and supported desegregation initiatives. The New Deal provided work relief projects. After 1939, a black submachine arose in the black wards. The war brought increased job opportunities and status for blacks as labor shortages forced many industries to hire blacks for the first time. Though many blacks lost their jobs after the war, many others achieved lasting gains, especially in mass production
industries organized by affiliates of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. More importantly, the wartime gains helped set the stage for the civil rights movement of the postwar era.

Women also gained increased employment opportunities during the war. Though most lost their high-paying jobs in war plants after the war, many stayed in the work place. There had been some employed outside the home before the war, but never in such numbers. After the war, many more women continued working albeit in poorly-paid occupations traditionally open to women. Moreover, as with blacks, war-time experiences ultimately led to the women's liberation movement of the sixties and seventies.

Labor itself benefitted a great deal from the war as the crush of business made industries reluctant to fire experienced personnel for union activity. Hence, many companies were forced by wartime conditions to accept unionization. The war also brought a temporary measure of labor peace as both labor and management agreed to abide by decisions of the War Labor Board in those disputes which they could not resolve themselves. Labor also agreed to a no-strike pledge while management reluctantly accepted union security. Neither labor nor management was enthusiastic about wage stabilization. Labor wished to increase the wages of its membership, while management sought to attract and retain workers. However, they accepted wage stabilization
in exchange for price control as part of a general program for controlling inflation. Even with restrictions on income, most workers prospered during the war and improved their economic status. Ultimately, their earnings and their pent-up demand for consumer products unobtainable during the war contributed to the postwar economic expansion.

Illinois industry profitted from the defense buildup and the war emergency with the vastly increased volume of business. Not only did the war bring industry out of a Depression, but business activity in the postwar years continued at a higher level than before the war. Though small companies sometimes found it difficult to get contracts, almost every firm, large or small, made something for use by the armed forces of the United States and its allies. While many firms produced items similar to what they made in peacetime, others built tanks, artillery and small warships. Many manufacturers had to retool and adapt to stringent military specifications. Businessmen also cooperated with each other and with government agencies in dealing with problems of priorities, shortages of materials and tools, plant protection and solicitation of business. Wartime conditions forced Illinois industries to be more versatile and gave them experience which proved useful in the postwar period when many introduced new product lines and improved existing ones. The war increased the state's industrial base and the size of many individual firms. It also changed the character of
the state's industries. Machinery and heavy industry grew in proportion to food processing and other trades.

Although the war did not bring any major technological changes in agriculture, it greatly speeded up existing trends. Walter Wilcox, in his study of the effect of the war on agriculture, maintains that the war increased mechanization and farm size and made farmers more market-minded. The thirties and forties saw great progress in mechanizing farms throughout the nation. The increase was greatest in the West, but also outstanding in the Midwest. During the war, shortages of farm equipment retarded mechanization for a time, but as manufacturers resumed partial production of farm implements late in the war, it proceeded at a faster pace. Mechanization relieved labor shortages and made it possible to farm more land. This was especially important as many farmers were forced into retirement by the shortage of farm workers. Their lands were sold to other farmers, who increased the size of their own farms. Thus mechanization and the shortage of farm labor increased the tendency toward fewer and larger farms. Such farmers were more inclined toward market-based agriculture than subsistence farming. While such trends were already underway in Illinois before the war, they were greatly excellerated by wartime conditions. The war also speeded up the growth of the soybean industry as soybeans came to rival corn. Despite shortages of labor, equipment, feed, storage facilities and freight
cars for shipping their produce, Illinois farmers broke all-time production records on many crops. Though price ceilings held down profits, most farmers improved their economic status during the war. The war brought Illinois agriculture out of a long Depression and into a period of prosperity that continued in the postwar years.¹

As with agriculture, there were no major technological changes in the nation's transportation system during the war, but it did have to carry a much heavier load with fewer workers and insufficient equipment to do the job. To handle this burden, carriers had to cease competitive practices and cooperate with each other and with shippers and government agencies to speed shipments and travelers to their destinations.

Due to its geographical location and its importance as a major transportation crossroads, Illinois and its carriers bore a major share of the burden of transporting the traveling public and the output of the nation's mills, mines and farms. At that time, the railroads dominated freight transportation and intercity common-carrier passenger travel, but even before the war, highway, water and air carriers were capturing much business previously handled by rail. The war retarded and even reversed this trend, but the shift resumed as the war ended. Indeed airline traffic grew rapidly in the final years of the war. Illinois embarked on a program of airport construction after the war and Governor Green
established a Department of Aeronautics. Illinois continues as a major transportation crossroads today, but in highway, air and water transport as well as railroads.\(^2\)

Government at all levels played a major role in directing the mobilization of the economy and society to bring the war to a successful conclusion. This vast expansion of government power was temporary, however, and even then it depended on a good deal of cooperation between different levels of government as well as business, labor and the general public. Also, many programs such as the War Labor Board relied on voluntary compliance while local administration was handled by volunteers. There was no despotism. Though the nation accepted some temporary restrictions on its liberties, it remained a democracy.\(^3\)

Much of the experience of Illinois in the Second World War was replicated in other parts of the nation. And yet there was much that was different. The boomtown conditions of Seneca, Wilmington and other communities were echoed in Willow Run, Michigan and other towns around the country. Certainly, the inconvenience and deprivation produced by price control and rationing was universal. However, Illinois, as a farm state, was not only a consumer, but a supplier of black markets, especially in meat.

In agriculture, the growth of mechanization and farm size were a nationwide phenomenon as farmers sought to cope with severe labor shortages. However, the West relied much
more heavily on imported Mexican workers than did Illinois, which, like other Midwestern and Eastern states, utilized local labor, especially draft-exempt farm workers. Illinois also made extensive use of city-dwellers, especially school children, some troops from military posts, prisoners-of-war and imported workers from the West Indies. Illinois also differed in the nature of its crops. Illinois was a Corn Belt state, but soybeans became a significant crop. Even today, Decatur, Illinois remains the capital of the soybean industry. 4

Gerald D. Nash, in The American West Transformed, described the tremendous impact of the war in changing the West from a supplier of raw materials for use by industrial consumers back East to an industrial center in its own right. Alan Clive, however, in his study of the homefront in Michigan, found that the war did not bring Michigan out of its dependence on the auto industry. Illinois, did not undergo such a massive transformation as did the West, but it already had a much more diversified industrial base than did Michigan or other one-industry states. The war brought an increase in industries producing machinery, electrical equipment and other capital goods. Such industries came to represent a larger proportion of the state's industries as compared to food processing and other industries. The trend continues. Today, the Stockyards are virtually extinct, while Motorola, Sundstrand and other firms loom large in the
industrial economy of Illinois. Some political and business leaders expected that the aviation engine plants and the aircraft factory in Chicago would lead to the emergence of Chicago as a major aircraft manufacturing center in the postwar period. This did not transpire. The aircraft industry was already well established on the West Coast, some other states west of the Mississippi River and on the East Coast. During the war, the West gained additional aircraft plants financed by the federal government. With plenty of postwar capacity, the aircraft industry had no need for the Chicago engine plants, which were actually operated by automobile companies, or the Douglas Aircraft Company plant in Park Ridge, which was built of wood to conserve steel. Hence, the Chicago and Park Ridge plants closed after the war and converted to other uses as did ordnance plants and other war industries. 5

In transportation, however, Illinois was unique. Unlike most states, which were served by only a few major transportation arteries or were simply points of origin or terminals, Illinois was the crossroads of the nation. Due to the state's geographical location, most east-west and much of the north-south traffic of any kind went through Illinois. Hence, Illinois played a much bigger role than any other state in the Union in transporting the nation's goods and travelers during the war, and felt the burdens of wartime traffic and restrictions to a much greater degree.
Illinois was also unique in its labor relations. The unions themselves were part of national movements, which found fertile ground for organizing new locals in the state's mills, mines and factories. During the war, labor and management throughout the nation generally cooperated with the National War Labor in its efforts to resolve industrial disputes. However, Illinois furnished significant dissenters such as Sewell Avery and George P. McNear, who defied the government in their refusal to deal with unions. John L. Lewis battled with the government, the companies and rival unions in the coal fields of Illinois. It was an Illinois company, International Harvester, which promoted company unions as a means of thwarting traditional trade unions. Even after, they were outlawed, the company continued the works councils under various guises and even turned to the AFL to keep out the CIO. Other Illinois firms tried similar tactics on a smaller scale even during the war.

The introduction of blacks and women into occupations traditionally reserved for white males was also a nationwide development. In Detroit, Michigan, whites staged hate strikes to protest increased employment of blacks. Philadelphia transit workers struck to avoid employment of blacks on streetcars. White shipyard workers in Mobile, Alabama started a race riot to protest the upgrading of black workers. In Illinois, the record was mixed. In East Alton, community opposition prevented the integration of the Western
Cartridge plant. However, there were very few walkouts in war plants around the state over employment or upgrading of blacks and all that occurred were short-lived. 

Illinois also avoided the race riots that hit Detroit, Los Angeles, New York and other cities. In Chicago, Mayor Kelly's firm response in quelling any racial incidents kept them from developing into riots. Not until after the war, when Kelly's power was on the wane did Chicago experience the racial conflicts that afflicted other cities.

The war affected local communities in different ways. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the Chicago industrial area gained somewhat in population, but the labor force was much bigger than in peacetime. Employment gained significantly, especially in manufacturing. Expansion of industrial facilities was larger than in any other area of the country. The value of industrial production in 1945 was almost three times the 1939 amount.

Seneca, like other boomtowns, had a different experience. Seneca did gain a few lasting civic improvements, including new schools and sewer facilities. However, the biggest change was in the attitudes of local people. Migration of workers from other parts of the country to work in the shipyard exposed Senecans to different points of view. After the war, the community was much more energetic in solving local problems and its citizens were more open to the world around them.
Changes in attitudes were probably the most significant result of the war. Illinois's ethnicity and its position in the center of the country influenced its support for isolationism in the thirties and early forties. Chicago had a very large German, Irish and Italian population, which was hostile toward intervention in the European war, especially on the side of the British. Also, the state's distance from the sea gave it a sense of security. Illinois felt safe from attack no matter what happened along the coast. Indeed, Illinois business and civic leaders pointed to the state's distance from the coast when lobbying for defense industries, arguing that war plants in Illinois would be more safe from attack than those on the coast. After Pearl Harbor, Illinois, like many other states, took action to guard against air attack. However, there was little danger of such attacks due to the limited range or enemy aircraft, and the defensive measures were discontinued by early 1944, thereby reinforcing a sense of security.  

However, Illinois became less isolationist during the war. By 1945, most Illinoians accepted the need for some measure of international cooperation after the war. They also were of the role of their state in the nation and the world as a whole. Illinoians were more outward-looking. Mayor Kelly and other officials flew from Chicago to Europe late in 1945 to promote trade and direct transatlantic service from Chicago. Illinois firms such as International
Harvester and John Deere sought new markets and plants overseas.\textsuperscript{10}

The war brought a new consensus in foreign and domestic policy. In his study of the homefront during the Second World War, Richard Polenberg notes that the issues of American intervention in world affairs and government intervention in the economy were undecided in 1941. By 1945, even Republicans accepted them and merely quibbled about the dimensions of intervention in world affairs and the extent of the welfare state. Although some New Deal programs were killed by the war, others survived intact to play a role in the war effort. Indeed, war agencies themselves reflected a New Deal format. While the war ended the relief aspect of the New Deal, it strengthened the role of government in the economy. Colonel McCormick continued to voice a conservative nationalist opposition to these developments, but even within his own party, he came to be seen as the voice of the past. The future lay with more progressive leaders of both parties.\textsuperscript{11}


Chicago Tribune, October 4, 1945, p. 33.


Ironically, late in the war, the Germans did develop aircraft capable of bombing American cities. Early in 1944, a six-engined Junkers Ju 390 bomber flew from a Luftwaffe base in Mont de Marsan in France to a point about twelve miles from the coast of the United States north of New York, and then returned successfully to its base. Japan also expressed interest in the plane and acquired a licensing agreement in the fall of 1944, though it never built any planes. If Germany and Japan had developed such aircraft earlier in the war, the United States probably would have been bombed, including perhaps even some Illinois cities. William Green, *War Planes of the Second World War, V. 10, Bombers and Reconnaissance Aircraft* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1968), pp. 171-172.


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The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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