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The Measurement and Prediction of Individual Differences in Unbounded Persuasibility

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THE MEASUREMENT AND PREDICTION OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN UNBOUNDED PERSUASIBILITY

by

John Petraitis

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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1990
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It may be a cliche to thank "significant others" for their support, but sincere thanks were never more honestly deserved than the thanks I owe to my wife, Claudia. We started our dissertations together and finished them together. This was no coincidence. She kept me going. When I struggled with a methodological problem, she helped find the solution. When I needed to get work done, she gave me the time. And, when my spirits were down, she kept them up.
VITA

The author, John Petraitis, is the son of John Adam Petraitis and Dorothy Barbara Petraitis. Born in Chicago, Illinois on June 23, 1959, he obtained his elementary and secondary education in the public schools of Illinois, Minnesota, and Virginia. In September, 1979 he entered the University of Minnesota (Minneapolis) where he received a Bachelor of Arts degree in psychology and journalism in June, 1983.

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Mr. Petraitis is a co-author of articles on the effects of television viewing, and the use of theory to design drug-abuse prevention programs.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PERSUASIBILITY

Overview

Social psychologists have been studying the persuasion process for decades by dissecting persuasive situations into the basic components of the source, the message, the audience, the medium, and the effect (Lasswell, 1948), and by placing each of these components under the research microscope. Hundreds of studies have brought into sharper focus our understanding of how different sources, different messages, and different media affect the development and change of attitudes.

Our understanding of one component, however, remains largely blurred. That component is the audience, and what remains out of focus is our understanding of individual differences in attitude formation and change. Relative to their research interest in the source and the content of the message, social psychologists have shown little interest in what makes individuals respond differently to a given message. This is unfortunate because as long as our understanding of the audience remains out of focus, social psychologists may never get a clear picture of attitudes and attitude change.

One of the earliest attempts to integrate the many different components of persuasion was put forward Janis and Hovland (1959). Using Lasswell’s (1948) framework, Janis and Hovland painted a model of persuasion in which changes in
attitudes are affected by 1) communication stimuli (such as the characteristics of the communicator or the content of the message), 2) predispositional factors of the individual audience member (such as an entrenched attitude or a wavering personality), and 3) internal mediating processes (such as the listener's attention, comprehension and acceptance of the message).

A major element of the Janis and Hovland (1959) model, and the focus of this paper, is the notion that some people, regardless of what is being argued, are consistently more open to persuasion than others. Janis and Hovland labeled this tendency to agree with most persuasive messages "unbounded persuasibility," and suggested that persuasibility is a stable personality characteristic that causes some people to be easily persuaded across a variety of situations, and others to remain highly resistant to most attempts at persuasion. In formulating the notion of persuasibility Janis, (1954) claimed that studies

"...apparently contradict the assumption that individuals exhibit completely unrelated degrees of susceptibility that are unique to each opinion topic or to each communication situation. Consequently, there is reason to suspect that some more or less general factors of persuasibility will be eventually isolated upon which accurate predictions can be made as to how different individuals will respond to various discrete communications on different topics" (p. 506).

This quote points to two areas where our understanding of persuasibility is still cloudy. Janis (1954) envisioned that psychologists eventually would isolate a general trait of persuasibility, and then be able to predict who is open to persuasion and who is resistant to persuasion. Yet, decades later only a handful of researchers have tried to isolate a persuasibility trait, and only occasionally have they been able to make
accurate predictions about who will and who will not be persuaded by a variety of messages. Therefore, the current study will examine (a) the existence of an unbounded persuasibility trait, (b) whether individual differences in unbounded persuasibility can be predicted accurately from several social psychological measures, and (c) whether paper-and-pencil scales that were designed to measure unbounded persuasibility can accurately predict individual differences in persuasibility.

**Distinctions Among Different Types of Persuasibility**

In discussing how persuasibility might affect the persuasion process, Janis and Hovland (1959) made an important distinction between "bounded" and "unbounded" persuasibility factors. According to Janis and Hovland, bounded persuasibility factors are personality traits that leave a message recipient susceptible a limited range of persuasive messages. Unbounded factors, on the other hand, are personality factors that leave a recipient susceptible to an unlimited variety of messages.

**Bounded Persuasibility.** Janis and Hovland (1959) proposed several subdivisions of bounded persuasibility. For instance, they speculate that some personality types may be more persuaded on a particular topic than others. In line with this topic-bound factor, Cacioppo and Petty (1980) report that men are more persuaded than women on stereotypically feminine topics (namely, female fashions) while women are more persuaded than men on stereotypically masculine topics (namely, football issues). Janis and Hovland also suggest that some personality types might be more influenced by a particular style of message, regardless of the topic. Recent
examples of such content-bound factors include studies showing that high self- 
monitors are particularly susceptible to messages that stress "image" over "substance"
(Snyder & DeBono, 1987), and other studies that find people low in "need for 
cognition" are unpersuaded by messages that require large amounts of mental 
processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).

The notion that certain people may be susceptible to certain types of 
communication is not unique to Janis and Hovland's (1959) vision of bounded 
persuasibility. Another early attempt to link personality variables to a limited range 
of persuasive messages was put forth in the "functional theories" of attitude change
(see Katz, 1960; Smith, Bruner & White, 1956). Common to all functional theories 
is the assumption that people maintain their attitudes because their attitudes fulfill 
some psychological needs. According to Katz, attitudes can serve four basic functions 
-- instrumental, ego-defensive, value-expressive, and knowledge functions. Attitudes 
that serve the instrumental function are maintained because holding the attitude 
produces some external benefits. For instance, voters may support a liberal 
presidential candidate only because of the praise they can receive from like-minded 
friends. Attitudes that serve the ego-defensive function, on the other hand, exist 
because the outward expression of the attitude might protect a person from unpleasant 
inner-truths. For instance, other voters may support the same liberal candidate in 
order to repress inner fears that they lack compassion for other people. Value-
expressive attitudes are maintained in order to advertise personal values. Thus, a 
third block of voters may support the liberal candidate as a way of expressing their
personal ideologies. Finally, attitudes that serve the knowledge function are held in order to simplify a complex array of information into a single, efficient mental structure. Toward this end, some voters may support the same candidate after distilling everything they know about the candidate into a single supportive attitude.

Although the functional theories have not generated much research (for a good example, see Snyder & DeBono, 1987), they have reminded researchers that a persuasive message will only be effective if its content is targeted toward the specific function being served by an attitude. Stated another way, a message that presents cogent, factual information may help change knowledge-based attitudes but would not change instrumental, ego-defensive, or value-expressive attitudes. An implication of this for persuasibility is that people will only be open to messages to the extent that the messages address the functional bases of their attitudes.

Along with the functional theories, the more recent "Person x Situation interaction" approach (see Kahle, 1984) has been another direct extension of bounded persuasibility. According to this approach, a given personality variable might only affect persuasibility in a narrow range of communication situations. For instance, the finding that men are easily persuaded on fashion issues but are not easily persuaded on football issues is consistent with the Person X Situation interaction approach. Similarly, the finding that high authoritarians are more persuaded by high authority sources (Berkowitz & Lundy, 1957; Centers, Shomer, & Rodrigues, 1970; Johnson & Izzett, 1969) is also consistent with the predictions of both the Janis-Hovland model and the Person X Situation interaction model.
The Person X Situation interaction model has generated a closer look at the role of personality in persuasion. And, while some prominent theorists (McGuire, 1985; Sorrentino & Hancock, 1987) have welcomed the renewed focus on personality variables, the focus has been limited to bounded persuasibility. Researchers have focused almost exclusively on how a given personality variable (e.g., self-monitoring or authoritarianism) affects persuasion within a particular situation or for a certain kind of message. There has been far less research on the second half of Janis and Hovland's (1959) persuasibility model -- unbounded persuasibility.

Unbounded Persuasibility. Consistent with the adage that suggests "you can convince some of the people all of the time," Janis and Hovland (1959) use the concept of unbounded persuasibility to suggest that there may be some personality variables that leave a person more (or less) open to persuasion across all situations, or across all types of messages. Surprisingly, however, the notion of general or unbounded persuasibility has stayed in the shadows of research on attitude change for over 30 years with only a small number of researchers venturing a closer look. These past research efforts have typically approached unbounded persuasibility from one of three different angles. The first angle has been to explore the strength of unbounded persuasibility as a personality trait, to see how strongly attitude change on one topic is related to attitude change on other topics. The second angle has sought personality variables that can predict unbounded persuasibility across topics. Finally, the third angle has aimed at devising, and validating relatively simple paper-and-pencil measures of persuasibility that could be used in place of more cumbersome ways of
assessing openness to persuasion. Each approach to studying unbounded persuasibility is discussed below.

B. PERSONALITY AND UNBOUNDED PERSUASIBILITY

All of the studies of unbounded persuasibility share a common research strategy that sets them apart from the more frequent studies of bounded persuasibility. Studies that investigate how personality variables relate to bounded persuasibility measure participants' attitudes after exposure to a single message on a single topic. (See Line A of Figure 1.) Studies that investigate how personality variables relate to unbounded persuasibility, however, measure attitudes after exposure to messages on several topics. "Unbounded persuasibility" is then defined as the amount of persuasion produced across all of the messages. (To avoid confusion between bounded and unbounded persuasibility, the terms "bounded persuasion" and "unbounded persuasibility" will be used throughout the remainder of this paper. "Bounded persuasion" or simply "persuasion" will be reserved for the effects of a single message on one attitude. "Unbounded persuasibility" or simply "persuasibility" will be reserved for the effects of several messages on several attitudes.)

The Strength of the Unbounded Persuasibility Trait

Unbounded persuasibility could only be considered a strong trait if there were consistently strong correlations between the amount of persuasion produced by one message and the amount of persuasion produced by other messages (see Line B of
Figure 1: Characteristics of Persuasibility Studies

Note: Line A represents studies that relate individual difference variables to attitude change; B represents studies that relate levels of persuasion among multiple topics; C represents studies that relate individual difference variables to unbounded persuasibility; and D represents studies that assess the criterion-related validity of persuasibility measures.
Figure 1). Janis and his colleagues provided the earliest evidence of an unbounded persuasibility trait. In his first study, Janis (1954) exposed undergraduates to messages on three different topics and found that participants who were persuaded by one message were moderately more likely to be persuaded by the other two messages. In a second study, Janis (1955) presented undergraduates with editorials on five topics and again found a small, but consistent tendency for participants either to change opinions on all topics or to change none of their opinions. In a third study (Janis & Field, 1959), high school students read ten editorials, thereby allowing Janis to correlate ten measures of attitude change. Eighty-seven percent of these correlations were positive (although not all reached traditional levels of statistical significance), indicating that the amount of persuasion produced by one editorial was generally related to the amount of persuasion produced by another editorial.

In the studies that followed, other researchers (Ally, 1980; Cronkhite & Goetz, 1971; Epting, 1967; Glass et al., 1969; Jenks, 1965; Jones, 1976; Lee, 1977; Silverman, Ford & Morganti, 1970; Touhey, 1973; Whittaker, 1965; Whittaker & Meade, 1967) often found that the best predictor of persuasion on one topic was the amount of persuasion on other topics. These studies suggest that some people are generally more open to persuasion than others, and that a disposition toward unbounded persuasibility plays an important role in determining who does and does not accept a message. However, past research also suggests that unbounded persuasibility does not play a dominant role in the acceptance of a message. When they are reported, correlations among persuasion scores across topics tend to be
modest, at best.²

Overall, past research on unbounded persuasibility as a personality disposition does suggest that some people are moderately more open to persuasive messages whereas other people are moderately more resistant to persuasive messages. Although unbounded persuasibility appears to be a modest trait³, the existence of even a modest trait is surprising. Given that the effect of any one persuasive message depends on the complex interaction of source, message, style, and bounded recipient factors, it is surprising that any unbounded persuasibility can be detected.

Individual Difference Correlates of Unbounded Persuasibility

Since Janis first isolated a modest disposition toward unbounded persuasibility, many researchers have studied how personality variables relate to persuasion. However, most researchers have studied the effect of personality variables on bounded persuasion by exposing participants to a single message on a single topic (for recent reviews, see Kahle, 1984; McGuire, 1968, 1985; Wood & Stangor, in press). Only relatively rarely have researchers studied the effect of personality variables on unbounded persuasibility by exposing participants to messages on multiple topics (Ally, 1980; Cronkhite & Goetz, 1971; Epting, 1967; Glass et al., 1969; Janis, 1954, 1955; Janis & Field, 1959; Jenks, 1965; Jones, 1976; Lee, 1976; Pietscher, 1981; Silverman, Ford & Morganti, 1965; Whittaker, 1965; Whittaker & Meade, 1967). (See Line C of Figure 1.) The individual difference correlates that have generated the most research are dogmatism, gender, social desirability, self-esteem, and anxiety.
Dogmatism (Closed-mindedness). In his seminal work on the topic, Rokeach (1960) defined dogmatism in a manner that, at first glance, seems counter-intuitive. Intuitively, most people think of dogmatism as the tendency to be self-opinionated and to reject all ideas that are not consistent with established beliefs. Counter-intuitively however, Rokeach defined dogmatism as the tendency to "compartmentalize" one's beliefs. By this Rokeach meant that dogmatic (or closed-minded) people rarely attempt to integrate intrinsically related beliefs about a topic into a single overall impression. Rather, dogmatic people tend to maintain closely related and often contradictory beliefs in isolation of each other. Less dogmatic people, on the other hand, tend to integrate their beliefs.

Based on this definition, highly dogmatic people should be more likely to agree with a message that runs counter to their past beliefs because they will not attempt to integrate their past beliefs with the message they are hearing. Less dogmatic people, on the other hand, should be less likely to agree with a counter-attitudinal message because they will try to integrate past beliefs with a discrepant message. Although it may seem counter-intuitive to hypothesize that dogmatism and unbounded persuasibility should be positively related, two studies support this contention. Cronkhite and Goetz (1971) reported that dogmatism correlated .40 with persuasibility, and Jenks (1965) reported a smaller (but still significant) correlation of .20 between these two variables.

Gender. Results from gender studies are not as clear cut. Based on bounded persuasion studies that exposed men and women to a single message (for a review see
Eagly & Carli, 1981), some researchers have hypothesized that women might be more persuasible when exposed to a variety of messages. However, the research evidence is somewhat inconclusive for two reasons. Foremost, the findings are often contradictory. Although several studies have found that females were more persuasible than males (Epting, 1967; Glass et al. 1969; Janis & Field, 1959b; Jones, 1976; King, 1959; Silverman et al. 1970, Study 3; Whittaker, 1965), other studies found either no differences between men and women (Abelson & Lesser, 1959; Cacioppo & Petty, 1980; Lee, 1976; Pietscher, 1984; Silverman et al., 1970, Study 1; Whittaker & Meade, 1967) or found that men were actually more, not less, persuasible than women (Silverman et al., 1970, Study 2). Second, Eagly and Carli (1981) have argued convincingly that men may only appear less persuasible because men have been more interested and more invested in the particular messages that researchers have used in the past. Additional research is needed to see if men and women differ in unbounded persuasibility after differences in interest in the messages are factored out.

Social Desirability (Approval Motivation). Silverman et al. (1970) predicted that people who are more motivated to attain social approval would be more persuasible than people who are less motivated by social approval. The results from three studies (Silverman et al., 1970, studies 1, 2, and 3), however, do not support this hypothesis. Two of those studies (Study 1 and Study 3) found that social desirability was not related to unbounded persuasibility, and another study (Study 2) found that social desirability was negatively related to unbounded persuasibility, not
positively as predicted. This last finding suggests that resisting persuasion may be more socially desirable than agreeing with a message.

**Self-Esteem.** As with gender, past research on self-esteem and unbounded persuasibility is inconclusive. Janis (1954) first suggested that people who think highly of themselves might also think highly of their attitudes. Accordingly, people of high self-esteem might be very resistant to most persuasive messages, whereas people of low esteem might be more open to persuasive messages. Although most studies have predicted and found that self-esteem is negatively correlated with unbounded persuasibility (Janis, 1954, 1955; Janis & Field, 1959, Silverman et al., 1970, Study 2), other studies have found no linear relationship between self-esteem and unbounded persuasibility (Glass et al., 1969; Silverman et al., 1970, Study 1).

This inconsistency of findings could exist because self-esteem might share a curvilinear relationship with unbounded persuasibility. Supporting this notion, Silverman et al. (1970, Study 3) did report that participants with low and high self-esteem were less persuasible than participants with moderate self-esteem. A curvilinear relationship between self-esteem and unbounded persuasibility is consistent with McGuire’s (1969, 1985) information processing model of personality and persuasibility. McGuire pointed out that persuasion is the result of two-stage process. Before being persuaded, a message recipient must (a) pay enough attention to a message to comprehend its meaning, and (b) accept or yield to the message’s conclusions. He also noted that a curvilinear relationship would occur between a personality variable and unbounded persuasibility if the personality variable related
positively to attention, but related negatively to acceptance, or vice versa.

To clarify McGuire’s (1969, 1985) model, Figure 2 displays the theoretical relationship between self-esteem and unbounded persuasibility. According to McGuire’s theory, as self-esteem moves from low to high levels, message recipients are more likely to attend to a variety of messages, thereby increasing their opportunity to be persuaded. However, as esteem moves from low to high levels, recipients are less likely to accept messages, and are therefore less likely to be persuaded. In effect, as self-esteem grows people compensate for their increased attention by decreasing their acceptance of messages. The result of these two competing processes is an inverted U-shaped or quadratic relationship between self-esteem and unbounded persuasibility where the greatest amount of persuasibility should occur at moderate levels of self-esteem.

Anxiety. Curvilinearity might also explain the relationship between unbounded persuasibility and anxiety. Reasoning that anxiety would interfere with attention to a message, Janis (1954) originally hypothesized that anxiety should correlate negatively with persuasibility. Supporting this notion, he found that participants who were more neurotically anxious were less persuasible than participants who were not neurotically anxious (Janis, 1954; 1955). However, he also found that measures of test anxiety showed a marginally positive correlation with persuasibility (Janis & Field, 1959).

The negative correlations in one study and positive correlations in another study might suggest a curvilinear relationship across studies. Using McGuire’s framework,
Figure 2: McGuire's Hypothesized Curvilinear Relationship Between Self-Esteem and Unbounded Persuasibility
one could predict that a small amount of anxiety might promote acceptance (thereby increasing persuasibility), but large amount of anxiety might interfere with attention (thereby decreasing persuasibility). People with moderate levels of anxiety might be the most persuasible because they are both attentive and motivated to accept a message.

**Other Personality Variables.** Two other personality variables might be related to persuasibility. The first is need-for-cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Persons who have a strong need-for-cognition enjoy cognitive activity and may be more likely to enjoy the intellectual stimulation that comes from pondering counter-attitudinal editorials. Persons who have a weak need-for-cognition are cognitive-misers who may try to avoid any serious consideration of a counter-attitudinal message. Using McGuire's (1968; 1985) theory, we can expect a curvilinear relationship between unbounded persuasibility and need-for-cognition. As need-for-cognition moves from low to high levels, message recipients ought to be more willing to ponder counter-attitudinal editorials, and therefore be more generally persuasible. However, as need-for-cognition moves from low to high levels, message recipients might consider arguments against each editorial, and therefore be less persuasible. The end result is that people who are at moderate levels of need-for-cognition should be the most persuasible. To date no study has investigated either the linear or curvilinear relationship between need-for-cognition and unbounded persuasibility across a variety of messages.

Another personality variable that might be related to unbounded persuasibility
is ambiguity intolerance. Phillips (1981) suggested that some people have trouble tolerating inconsistencies among their beliefs that come from complicated and ambiguous issues. According to Phillips, people who can tolerate ambiguities will not feel compelled to change their attitudes when faced with counter-attitudinal messages. On the other hand, people who cannot tolerate ambiguities will be compelled to change their attitudes. Unfortunately, Phillips did not test this hypothesis directly, and no other studies have addressed the relationship between unbounded persuasibility and ambiguity intolerance.

Summary. Given the inconsistencies in research findings and the possibility of non-linear relationships, more research is needed before psychologists can draw any straightforward conclusions about how personality variables relate to unbounded persuasibility.

Paper-and-Pencil Measures of Unbounded Persuasibility

The last, and least explored angle to studying unbounded persuasibility has been through the use of self-report measures of persuasibility. In order to study persuasibility, most previous researchers adopted the laborious strategy of measuring participants' attitudes toward several topics both before and after reading counter-attitudinal messages on those topics (see Line B, Figure 1). This strategy allowed researchers to define, post hoc, each participant's degree of unbounded persuasibility by summing across the amount of persuasion produced by each message.

The main advantage of this pretest-posttest strategy is that unbounded
persuasibility scores can serve as a criterion that researchers can try to predict using other variables (e.g., self-esteem). Two disadvantages of this strategy, however, make unbounded persuasibility a very difficult area to study. First, because participants must be exposed to pretests, posttests, and messages on several topics, this strategy is cumbersome and impractical for most research settings. Second, the pretest-posttest strategy only provides a post hoc method of defining persuasibility after exposing participants to several messages. The pretest-posttest strategy was never intended to produce a priori predictions of how susceptible a person is to a variety of messages. In effect, the pretest-posttest strategy allows researchers to define the criterion of persuasibility, but does not provide researchers with an independent, a priori measure of unbounded persuasibility.

Janis and Field Persuasibility Questionnaire (JFPQ). To facilitate more research on persuasibility, researchers have tried to replace the inefficient pretest-posttest strategy with relatively short paper-and-pencil rating scales that could measure unbounded persuasibility efficiently and successfully. (See Line D, Figure 1.) Toward this goal, Janis and Field (1959) devised an 11-item paper-and-pencil scale that asked subjects for self-ratings of susceptibility to influence by mass communication and friends. However, when attempting to validate the Janis-Field Persuasibility Questionnaire (JFPQ), Janis and Field found that scores on their paper-and-pencil scale could not predict a criterion score of unbounded persuasibility, and therefore could not be used as a measure of persuasibility.

In retrospect, the JFPQ may have failed for two reasons. First, the JFPQ was
based on only 11 items. Perhaps, a test with more items would have been more predictive. Second, Janis and Field (1959) did not subject these items to any form of item analysis. Instead, they simply combined all 11 items into a single score without first eliminating items that weakened either the internal consistency or predictive validity of the total score. An item analysis strategy might have produced a short self-rating scale that was both a reliable and valid measure of persuasibility.

Phillips Persuasibility Inventory (PPI). The next and most recent attempt to develop a paper-and-pencil measure of unbounded persuasibility was made by Phillips (1981) who relied on three hypotheses to guide his development of a persuasibility scale. Phillips reasoned that highly persuasive people are probably highly dogmatic, generally intolerant of ambiguity in their beliefs, and more likely to conform to social pressure. Following Rokeach’s (1960) notion of dogmatism and closed belief-systems, Phillips reasoned that highly dogmatic people less often try to integrate persuasive messages with existing beliefs. As a result, highly dogmatic people ought to be less likely to argue against, and more likely to accept a wide range of persuasive messages than should less dogmatic people. Adopting Norton’s (1976) notion of ambiguity intolerance, Phillips then suggested that some people have trouble integrating inconsistent beliefs into an existing attitude structure without changing their attitudes. As a result, people who are intolerant of ambiguity are more likely to change their attitudes when exposed to counter-attitudinal messages than are people who are tolerant of ambiguity. Finally, Phillips reasoned that highly persuasible people probably rely on other people to define their own attitudes, rather than relying
on their own beliefs or experiences. Such other-directed people, therefore, ought to comply more readily with persuasive messages.

Based on these hypotheses, Phillips devised a paper-and-pencil scale of unbounded persuasibility that included the twenty item Short-Form Dogmatism Scale (Trodahl & Powell, 1965), nine items from the Measure of Ambiguity Intolerance (MAT-50, Norton, 1975), seven items from the Personal Orientation Inventory (POI, Shostrom, 1964) as a measure of social compliance, and six bogus items to evaluate potential response biases. To test the validity of the Phillips Persuasibility Inventory (PPI), Phillips (1981) administered his inventory to participants just before they were placed in group discussions. As a group, participants then discussed four risk-taking situations, and came to a consensus about how to best solve the issues raised in each situation. Participants had to decide whether a fictitious person should take a new job, whether another fictitious person should take a gamble in a game, whether a young couple should risk marriage, and whether a company should build a factory in a foreign country. Results revealed that those participants who changed more of their opinions scored significantly higher on the PPI, suggesting that the PPI may be a valid paper-and-pencil measure of unbounded persuasibility.

There are, however, strong reasons to question the validity of the PPI as a measure of unbounded persuasibility. One reason centers on how Phillips (1981) developed his measure of persuasibility (the PPI). By including the Personal Orientation Inventory (POI) into the PPI, Phillips (1981) intentionally included a conformity scale as a central component of his persuasibility scale. However, when
defining unbounded persuasibility, Hovland and Janis (1959), and later McGuire (1968) were careful to distinguish between conformity from persuasibility. According to these and other theorists (Kelman, 1958), conformity involves publicly stated agreement with a message, whereas persuasibility involves privately felt agreement. People may publicly conform to the ideas being presented by other people without privately agreeing with those ideas. Given this important distinction, Phillips should have factored conformity out of the PPI, rather than include it as a central component. By including the POI, the Phillips measure of persuasibility blurs the distinction between persuasibility and conformity.

Another related criticism is that Phillips' criterion of persuasibility also blurs the distinction between persuasibility and conformity. In order to get a criterion measure of persuasibility, participants in Phillips' study were put into small groups and told that each group had to come to a common consensus on several issues. Before debating each issue, participants privately stated their own opinions. Group members then publicly debated each issue until all members agreed upon one common position. Using this strategy, Phillips defined his criterion of unbounded persuasibility by how often participants abandoned their private opinions and publicly conceded to a consensus opinion. This strategy, however, may have produced a criterion measure of generalized conformity rather than a criterion of unbounded persuasibility.

Because both his paper-and-pencil measure and his criterion of unbounded persuasibility included components of conformity, these two criticisms suggest that
Phillips might have developed a valid measure of conformity, rather than a valid measure of persuasibility. In line with this argument, Pietscher (1984) found that scores on the PPI were unrelated to criterion scores of unbounded persuasibility when persuasibility was defined using a more traditional persuasion design. Rather than putting participants into small groups and requiring them publicly to come to a common opinion on several issues, Pietscher had participants complete the PPI and then read persuasive messages on three topics (the military draft, the Equal Rights Amendment, and capital punishment). To get a criterion score of persuasibility, she then allowed participants to state privately their agreement with the messages. Using this more traditional persuasion design, Pietscher found, as expected, no relationship between unbounded persuasibility and PPI scores, suggesting that the PPI is not a pure measure of persuasibility.

C. UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS IN PERSUASIBILITY RESEARCH

The issues raised in the above discussion suggest three unresolved questions in persuasibility research. The first concerns the strength of unbounded persuasibility as a personality disposition, and asks how strongly the amount of persuasion produced by one message relates to the amount of persuasion produced by other messages. Although some studies suggest that a person who is persuaded by a message on one topic is moderately more likely to be persuaded by messages on other topics, research on this question is rare. For this reason, another study on the strength of persuasibility can increase substantially our knowledge of unbounded persuasibility.
A second question asks how strongly various personality variables relate to unbounded persuasibility. Given the largely inconsistent findings in this area, no straightforward conclusions can be drawn about any particular personality variable. Furthermore, given the possibility of non-linear relationships between personality variables and unbounded persuasibility, additional research that tests specifically for non-linear relationships is needed.

The third unresolved question is whether a valid paper-and-pencil measure of unbounded persuasibility can be devised. At this point there is no measure that can predict a priori who will most likely and who will least likely change their attitudes across a variety of topics. Such a measure would have both important theoretical and practical uses. For instance, such a measure would be helpful in testing theories that predict individual differences in attitude change. It could also be helpful, among other possible applications, in determining who might benefit most from cognitively based therapy programs that rely in large part on persuasion and attitude change.

D. GOALS OF THE CURRENT STUDY

The current study was conducted with the above three issues in mind. The first goal was to assess the strength of unbounded persuasibility as a personality disposition. This was assessed by computing the average correlation between the levels of persuasion produced by four different messages.

The second goal was to see how several personality variables relate to unbounded persuasibility. The answers to the following questions were sought.
1. Does gender relate to unbounded persuasibility? Specifically, are women more open to a variety of persuasive messages than men (cf. Eagly & Carli, 1981)? Moreover, if there are gender differences, can these differences be attributed to male-female differences in interest in the topic of the message?

2. How does dogmatism relate to unbounded persuasibility? As others (Cronkhite & Goetz, 1971; Jenks, 1965; Phillips, 1981) have predicted, is there a positive relationship such that highly dogmatic people are more susceptible to a wide range of persuasive messages than less dogmatic people?

3. How does social desirability relate to persuasibility? Common sense would suggest that people who are highly motivated to attain social approval should be more likely to adopt the attitudes of other people. However, past findings suggest the opposite is true and that people who are motivated to attain approval generally resist persuasion.

4. How does self-esteem relate to persuasibility? Are people low self-esteem more open to general persuasion than people with high self-esteem? Or, is there a curvilinear relationship between esteem and persuasibility?

5. How does anxiety relate to persuasibility? Is the relationship negative as Janis (1954, 1955) predicted, or curvilinear as McGuire's theory (1968, 1985) would predict?

6. How do individual differences in need-for-cognition relate to persuasibility? If there is a relationship between need-for-cognition and persuasibility, is the relationship curvilinear as would be predicted by McGuire's theory (1968, 1985)?

7. How does ambiguity intolerance relate to persuasibility? Are people who less tolerant of ambiguity more likely to agree with a range of counter-attitudinal messages (cf. Phillips, 1981)?

The third goal of this study was to develop and evaluate psychometrically a new paper-and-pencil measure of unbounded persuasibility. Toward this last goal, the current study sought the following:
1. To derive a new paper-and-pencil measure of unbounded persuasibility. This new scale was not based on a series of personality tests that were initially designed to measure other personality traits. Instead, a new scale was derived from a large pool of items that were specifically written to measure persuasibility. Stated differently, this study did not follow the multiple-construct approach used by Phillips (1981), but instead, attempted to build a more homogeneous, more straightforward, and more direct measure of persuasibility. (This test is hereafter referred to as the P-Scale.)

2. To compare the predictive validity of three paper-and-pencil measures of persuasibility tests. Scores on the JFPQ, PPI, and the newer P-Scale test were correlated against a criterion of persuasibility in order to learn which of these measures was most predictive of attitude change across topics.
II. METHOD

A. PILOT RESEARCH.

Before these goals could be met, four pilot studies were conducted. The first of these studies identified four attitude issues on which undergraduates were ambivalent and could be persuaded to change their attitudes. These issues involved the practice of euthanasia, the traditions regarding marriage for Catholic priests, the use of selective admissions policies at publicly funded universities, and the imposition of mandatory drug testing for employees of private companies. The second pilot study identified the salient and cogent beliefs that served as the foundation of attitudes toward these four issues. The third pilot study helped create attitude scales and editorials that could effectively persuade undergraduates to adopt new attitudes toward euthanasia, married priests, university admissions policies, and drug testing. Finally, the fourth pilot study assessed the internal consistency of the P-Scale and its initial pool of items that were written as a paper-and-pencil measure of persuasibility. (See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the exact goals, procedures and findings from these studies.)

Having produced reliable attitude measures, persuasive "pro" and "con" editorials on four issues, and an internally consistent pool of paper-and-pencil items for a persuasibility measure, all of the necessary stimulus materials were assembled to test hypotheses regarding the degree, the correlates, and the measurement of
B. THE FINAL STUDY

Subjects

Three-hundred and twenty-seven students from Loyola University of Chicago were recruited for a study on how people’s personalities relate to their attitudes. Students in five introductory psychology courses and two statistics courses were given credit toward their course grades for participating in two experimental sessions that were separated by at least one week. Participants were predominantly female (68%) and averaged 18.7 years of age (S = 1.80). Because 13 (or 4%) of participants who attended the first experimental session failed to attend the second session, the following analyses were conducted using data from 314 participants who attended both sessions.

Materials

Attitude Scales. Participants were asked to complete scales that assessed their attitudes toward four issues: euthanasia, married priests, university admissions, and drug testing. Two different response formats were used to assess each attitude. First, participants used a seven-point Likert-style format to indicate how strongly they agreed with or disagreed with various statements about a particular issue. For instance, participants used a scale that ranged from 1 (disagree very strongly) to 7 (agree very strongly) to indicate whether they thought "there are good reasons to
support euthanasia. Second, participants used a 7-point semantic-differential format to describe their feelings about each issue. For example, respondents used a 7-point scale to indicate whether euthanasia was closer to being "good" or closer to being "bad," in their personal opinion. Ten Likert-style statements and 14 semantic-differential pairs were used to assess attitudes toward each of the four issues.

Furthermore, participants were asked how much they had heard (1 = none, 4 = very much) previously about euthanasia, married priests, university admissions policies, and drug testing, and how important each issue was to them (1 = very unimportant, 5 = very important). (See Appendix B for copies of all attitude scales.)

Counter-attitudinal Editorials. Each participant was asked to read, in all, a set of four editorials dealing with euthanasia, married priests, university admissions, and drug testing. Because each of these editorials had to run counter to a participant's attitudes, eight different editorials were used in this study. For each of the four issues, both "pro" and "con" editorials were used. In all, there was one editorial that supported the use of euthanasia, and one that opposed euthanasia; one that supported, and one that opposed marriage for priests; one that supported, and one that opposed open admissions to universities; and, one that supported, and one that opposed mandatory drug testing. Each editorial was written specifically for this study, and ranged between 630 and 740 words. Pilot research found that each editorial was effective in changing the opinions of its readers. (See Appendix C for copies of the eight editorials.)

Personality Scales. Participants were also asked to complete several
personality scales that measured dogmatism, social desirability, self-esteem, anxiety, ambiguity intolerance, and need-for-cognition. Specifically, participants completed the Marlowe-Crowne Social-Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1967), the Feeling of Inadequacy Scale (Eagly, 1967), the Trait Anxiety Inventory (Speilberger et al., 1983), and the Need-For-Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). (See Appendix D for copies of these personality scales.)

Participants also completed the Phillips (1981) Persuasibility Inventory (PPI). (See Appendix E.) This last inventory was built with subscales that allowed us to measure dogmatism and ambiguity intolerance. The first subscale consisted of 20 items (numbers 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 16, 18, 21, 24, 27, 28, 31, 33, 36, 37, 40, 41, and 42) from a short-form of the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (Trodahl & Powell, 1965). The second subscale consisted of nine items (6, 10, 15, 19, 22, 25, 30, 34, and 39) from the Ambiguity Intolerance Scale (Norton, 1975).

**Paper-and-Pencil Measures of Persuasibility.** Finally, three paper-and-pencil measures of persuasibility were used in this study. These self-rating scales included the Phillips Persuasibility Inventory (PPI, 1981), the Janis and Field Persuasibility Questionnaire (JFPQ, 1959), and a newly devised persuasibility scale (P-Scale). It should be kept in mind that the PPI itself was used as a measure of persuasibility, and its subscales were used as measures of personality variables. (See Appendix E for copies of each persuasibility scale.)

The newly devised P-Scale contained initially 62 items that were written specifically to measure persuasibility. Various personality traits and attitude change
processes served as a basis for devising these items. The items were written to reflect the working assumptions that highly persuasible people are:

1. more certainty-oriented than uncertainty-oriented;
2. less confident of themselves and their attitudes;
3. more likely to compare their attitudes to the attitudes of other people;
4. more able to see issues from different perspective;
5. less reactive in the protection of current attitudes; and
6. less apt to see attitude change as a negative event.

Two personality traits -- certainty orientation and self-esteem -- were included in these assumptions, and served as a foundation for some of the initial items. First, certainty orientation (Sorrentino & Hancock, 1987) represents a person's motivation to process carefully any messages that might complicate or contradict established attitudes. Uncertainty-oriented people are motivated to process messages thoroughly, and tend to be very critical in their acceptance of a message. Certainty-oriented people, however, simply want to be given the "correct" attitude, and try to avoid careful processing of messages, tending to accept messages uncritically. Thus, several items were written that addressed how carefully participants process messages, and how often they accept messages uncritically. Second, self-confidence and self-esteem were used as a basis for some questions. Because some past research on persuasibility suggests that people who suffer from low self-esteem are more open to persuasion, several items were included that addressed how confidently participants hold their opinions and how often they believe their opinions are correct.

Along with these two personality traits, three attitude change processes were included in the working definition of a highly persuasible person. First, the notion of social comparison (Allen & Wilder, 1977) was used. We reasoned that highly
persuasible people more often compare their attitudes to the attitudes of other people. Second, the notion of a perceptual shift or a qualitative change in how a person views an attitude issue was used. Based on the theorizing of Upshaw and Ostrom (1984) we reasoned that people who more frequently report being able to see an issue from a "new point of view" would be more likely to change their opinions than those who rarely shift their perspective. Finally, the notion of psychological reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981) served as a basis for some items. It was assumed that people who are not highly protective of their attitudes will be easier to persuade. Based on these three attitude change processes, several items were written that addressed how often participants compare their attitudes to the attitudes of others, how easily they can see an issue from another point of view, and how protective they are of their own attitudes.

In addition, several questions were written to assess participants' feelings about attitude change. It was assumed that participants who thought attitude change was a negative event and indicative of personal weakness would be resistant to messages, and that participants who thought attitude change was a positive event and indicative of self-improvement would be more open to persuasive messages.

Procedures

Session I. Participants were given a packet of questionnaires to complete when they arrived for the first experimental session. In the beginning of the packet, participants were asked to describe some recent occasions during which another person
tried to influence their opinions. This was done under the assumption that participants could more accurately complete persuasibility measures if they first spent some time remembering their reactions to recent attitude change situations.

After describing these situations, participants were instructed to work their way through the rest of the packet which began with the P-Scale, followed with the PPI, the JFPQ, and the MCSD scale, and ended with the scales that assessed participants' attitudes toward euthanasia, married priests, university admissions policies, and drug testing. After completing these scales, participants made arrangements to attend a second experimental session. Most participants (58.4%) returned within 10 to 14 days after their first session (average number of days between sessions = 10.9, S = 5.0), and none were allowed to return before at least three days had passed.

**Interim Period.** Before attending a second session, a series of counter-attitudinal editorials were selected individually for each participant. To determine which editorials to select, the four attitude scales were scored by research assistants. After (a) averaging together responses to individual Likert-style and semantic-differential scales, and (b) determining whether the average scores were greater than or less than the midway point of 4.0 on the scales that ranged from 1 to 7, research assistants determined which attitude positions a participant favored (i.e., those with average scores greater than 4.0) and which positions a participant opposed (i.e., those with average scores less than 4.0). Based on these determinations, four counter-attitudinal editorials were then selected for individual participants. In those rare cases where the average score on the attitude items was exactly 4.0, research assistants
selected editorials based on the flip of a coin.

Session II. During the second session, participants were given another packet of materials. This second packet contained the four counter-attitudinal editorials, each followed by its corresponding attitude scale. This packet also contained three personality scales, including the Feeling of Inadequacy Scale (Eagly, 1967), the Trait Anxiety Inventory (Speilberger et al., 1983), and the Need-For-Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). After completing the post-editorial attitude scales, and filling out the personality scales, participants were debriefed. (The ordering of materials and potential order-effects are discussed further in Endnote 5.)

The most important feature of this method was that four bounded persuasion scores (one produced by each counter-attitudinal editorial) could be computed for each participant. These scores, in turn, allowed us (a) to assess the strength of unbounded persuasibility as a personality trait by analyzing the relationships among the four bounded persuasion scores, (b) to test hypotheses regarding the relationships among personality variables and unbounded persuasibility scores, defined by summing across the four bounded persuasion scores, and (c) to evaluate the validity of three paper-and-pencil measures of persuasibility. Results will be discussed in light of these three goals.
III. RESULTS

A. STRENGTH OF UNBOUNDED PERSUASIBILITY

If unbounded persuasibility is a personality trait that plays a dominant role in determining someone's acceptance or rejection of a message, then there should be a positive correlation between the amount of persuasion produced by a message on one issue and the amount of persuasion produced by different messages on different issues. That is, people who are unpersuaded (or highly persuaded) by messages about euthanasia should also be unpersuaded (or highly persuaded) by messages about married priests, university admissions, or drug testing. If, on the other hand, persuasibility plays an unimportant role in the acceptance or rejection of a message, there should be a non-significant correlation between the amount of persuasion produced by different messages.

Before the strength of unbounded persuasibility could be assessed, the amount of persuasion produced by each editorial (i.e., bounded persuasion scores) had to be computed for each participant. This was done in two stages. First, item change scores were computed for each of the Likert-style and semantic-differential items that measured attitudes toward each of the four issues (euthanasia, married priests, university admissions, and drug testing). Item change scores were based on the difference between pre-editorial (Session I) and post-editorial (Session II) responses on each item. It is important to note that not all change between pre- and post-
Editorial responses indicated persuasion, and that some change in responses actually indicated reactance, the very opposite of persuasion. If a response changed reactively in the direction opposed by an editorial, then the item change score (i.e., Session I - Session II) obtained a negative value. If, however, a response was coaxed in the direction advocated by an editorial, then the item change score obtained a positive value.

After change scores were computed for each item, bounded persuasion scores were computed separately for each of the four editorial topics by averaging together the 24 item change scores that were derived from the Likert and semantic differential items. The bounded persuasion scores produced by the editorials on euthanasia, married priests, university admission policies, and drug testing all reached acceptable levels of internal consistency (Standardized Alphas = .89, .93, .91, and .93, respectively). As can be seen by the high number of positive bounded persuasion scores in Table 1, most participants were persuaded by the different editorials. Depending on the topic, between 72 and 75 percent of the participants changed their attitudes in the directions advocated by the editorials they read. However, a substantial minority (between 28 and 25 percent) of participants did change their attitudes in the direction opposed by an editorial.

After the four bounded persuasion scores were computed, it was possible to assess the strength of unbounded persuasibility by inter-correlating the four bounded persuasion scores. As can be seen in Table 2, all of the correlations between persuasion scores were significantly greater than zero. The average correlation among
Table 1

Frequencies and Descriptive Statistics for Bounded Persuasion and Unbounded Persuasibility Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANGE OF SCORES</th>
<th>EUTHANASIA²</th>
<th>MARRIED PRIESTS²</th>
<th>UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS²</th>
<th>DRUG TESTING²</th>
<th>UNBOUNDED SCORES³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&gt;4.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+3.5 - +4.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+3.0 - +3.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+2.5 - +2.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+2.0 - +2.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1.5 - +1.9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1.0 - +1.4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+0.5 - +0.9</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0 - +0.4</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.4 - -0.0</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.9 - -0.5</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1.4 - -1.0</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1.9 - -1.5</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| MEAN            | .445        | .445            | .573                   | .579          | .510              |
| ST. DEV.        | .775        | .887            | .930                   | .999          | .578              |
| SKEW            | 1.075       | .881            | .251                   | .832          | .832              |
| N               | 290         | 287             | 280                    | 283           | 286               |
| RANGE           | 5.739       | 5.458           | 6.727                  | 6.521         | 3.625             |

¹ Both bounded and unbounded scores had a potential range of 14 points.

² Bounded persuasion scores represent the average of 24 item change scores. Positive (Negative) scores represent a change in attitudes in the direction advocated (opposed) by an editorial. For example, a persuasion score of +2.0 (-2.0) indicated a participant changed his/her responses by two points in the direction advocated (opposed) by an editorial.

³ Unbounded persuasibility scores were computed for each participant by averaging together the four bounded persuasion scores. Higher unbounded persuasibility scores represent greater agreement across the four editorials.
Table 2

**Correlations Among Bounded Persuasion Scores.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Married Priests Persuasion Scores</th>
<th>University Admiss. Persuasion Scores</th>
<th>Drug Testing Persuasion Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Euthanasia</strong></td>
<td>.1699 (285) &lt; .001</td>
<td>.1469 (277) &lt; .005</td>
<td>.1401 (281) &lt; .005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Married Priests</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>.1840 (276) &lt; .001</td>
<td>.3318 (279) &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Persuasion Scores</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Univ. Admiss.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.2484 (273) &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Persuasion Scores</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Notes:</strong></td>
<td>Correlations are in bold-faced type, one-tailed probabilities are in light-faced type and N's are in parentheses.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
among the four bounded persuasion scores (using Fisher’s transformations) was .21 \( (df=271, \text{ one-tailed } p < .025) \), indicating that the level of persuasion produced by one editorial was positively associated with the level of persuasion produced by different editorials on different topics.

However, the modest size of this correlation also indicates that unbounded persuasibility was not a dominant factor in persuasion. Levels of persuasion produced by one editorial were not closely related to the levels of persuasion produced by other editorials. Furthermore, the average correlation increased to only .22 after we adjusted the correlations among bounded persuasion scores for the lack of reliability inherent in each of the four persuasion scores. As a result, an average of only 4.8% of variance in one persuasion score could be predicted from variance in the remaining persuasion scores. 7

B. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE CORRELATES OF PERSUASIBILITY

Next we investigated the linear and non-linear (quadratic) relationships between persuasibility and several individual difference variables. Before investigating these relationships, unbounded persuasibility scores were computed by averaging together the four bounded persuasion scores. (See Table 1 for the distribution of unbounded persuasibility scores.) As could be expected of any scale that was based on only four items that are modestly related, the resulting unbounded persuasibility scores had only modest internal consistency (Standardized Alpha = .50).

The first set of analyses tested the hypothesis that women are, on the average,
more persuasible than men. There was only qualified support for this hypothesis. Independent samples t-tests on unbounded persuasibility scores revealed that women were only marginally more persuasible across topics than men. (See Table 3 for results of this analysis.) Subsequent analyses of bounded persuasion scores revealed that women were only more persuaded than men after reading editorials about mandatory drug testing. Women, however, were not more persuaded than men by editorials dealing with euthanasia, marriage for Catholic priests, and university admission policies. (See Table 3 for results of these analyses.)

To see if gender differences in the acceptance of drug testing messages could be attributed to gender difference in interest in that issue, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was performed on bounded persuasion scores using gender as a grouping variable and participants' interest in drug testing as a covariate. "Interest" was defined as how important drug testing was to each participant (1 = very unimportant, 5 = very important). Using "interest," however, did not appreciably change the difference between men and women in response to messages on drug testing. Women remained marginally more open to messages on drug testing than did men \( F(1,279)=3.168, p=.075 \).

The second set of analyses assessed the linear relationship between unbounded persuasibility scores and scores on the various personality scales (i.e., dogmatism, social desirability, self-esteem, anxiety, need-for-cognition, and ambiguity intolerance). Analyses revealed that unbounded persuasibility scores were not linearly related to either higher levels of dogmatism, stronger motivation for social approval,
Table 3

Mean Unbounded Persuasibility Scores and Bounded Persuasion Scores by Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unbounded Persuasibility Scores</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.5475</td>
<td>.4481</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(193)</td>
<td>(92)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Euthanasia Persuasion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.4434</td>
<td>.4510</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(196)</td>
<td>(93)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Married Priests Persuasion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.4633</td>
<td>.4219</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(193)</td>
<td>(93)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>University Admissions Persuasion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.6065</td>
<td>.5132</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(190)</td>
<td>(89)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Drug Testing Persuasion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.6642</td>
<td>.4356</td>
<td>1.84*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(189)</td>
<td>(93)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Means are in bold-faced type and N's are in parentheses. * p<.05, one-tailed.
higher anxiety, higher needs for cognition, or lower self-esteem. (See Table 4 for correlations between generalized persuasibility scores and each personality scale. For completeness, both the inter-correlations among the various personality scales and descriptive statistics for each scale are also provided in Table 4.) Only ambiguity intolerance showed a significant, albeit modest, relationship with unbounded persuasibility. As expected, participants who were less tolerant of ambiguity in their lives were generally more persuaded by a variety of messages.

Given that only ambiguity intolerance showed a linear relationship with unbounded persuasibility scores, linear relationships between the various personality scales and the four bounded persuasion scores were examined. That is, each personality scale was correlated with the amount of persuasion produced on each issue separately, rather than on all issues simultaneously. As can be seen in Table 5, dogmatism, social desirability, anxiety, and need-for-cognition could not be used accurately to predict any of the bounded persuasion scores. Only ambiguity intolerance and self-esteem were, at best, modestly related to any of the bounded persuasion scores.

As an exploratory follow-up, we used polynomial regression techniques to test for non-linear (quadratic) relationships between personality variables and unbounded persuasibility scores. In all of these analyses, we used non-linear equations to predict unbounded persuasibility scores from scores on the personality scales. Analyses were done separately for each personality scale, and each analysis was done hierarchically by entering second-order polynomials to test for quadratic relationships after entering
Table 4

Correlations Among Unbounded Persuasibility Scores and Personality Scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CORRELATIONS</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>TA</th>
<th>AI</th>
<th>NFC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unbounded Persuasibility</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) Dogmatism</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>-0.137</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>-0.162</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SD) Social Desir.</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>-0.297</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SE) Self-Esteem</td>
<td>-0.766</td>
<td>-0.075</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TA) Trait Anxiety</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AI) Ambig. Intol.</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>TA</th>
<th>AI</th>
<th>NFC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>3.230</td>
<td>1.438</td>
<td>3.469</td>
<td>2.130</td>
<td>3.903</td>
<td>6.331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>0.598</td>
<td>0.475</td>
<td>0.669</td>
<td>1.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtained Range</td>
<td>3.350</td>
<td>0.818</td>
<td>3.600</td>
<td>2.550</td>
<td>3.778</td>
<td>7.625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Range</td>
<td>5.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>4.000</td>
<td>3.000</td>
<td>5.000</td>
<td>8.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skew</td>
<td>-0.271</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>-0.233</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>-0.180</td>
<td>-0.373</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Correlations are in bold-faced type, probability levels are in light-faced type and N's are in parentheses. * Denotes Need-For-Cognition.
Table 5

Correlations Among Bounded Persuasion Scores and Personality Scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Euthanasia Persuasion Score</th>
<th>Married Priests Persuasion Score</th>
<th>University Admissions Persuasion Score</th>
<th>Drug Testing Persuasion Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
<td>.003 (287)</td>
<td>.025 (284)</td>
<td>.032 (277)</td>
<td>-.047 (280)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;.50</td>
<td>&lt;.50</td>
<td>&lt;.50</td>
<td>&lt;.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Desirability</td>
<td>.027 (282)</td>
<td>-.040 (279)</td>
<td>-.043 (272)</td>
<td>-.043 (275)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;.50</td>
<td>&lt;.25</td>
<td>&lt;.25</td>
<td>&lt;.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Esteem</td>
<td>-.049 (285)</td>
<td>.031 (284)</td>
<td>-.106 (278)</td>
<td>.064 (282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;.25</td>
<td>&lt;.50</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
<td>&lt;.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trait Anxiety</td>
<td>.026 (288)</td>
<td>-.016 (285)</td>
<td>.068 (279)</td>
<td>-.078 (283)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;.50</td>
<td>&lt;.50</td>
<td>&lt;.15</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguity Intolerance</td>
<td>.032 (288)</td>
<td>.089 (284)</td>
<td>.172 (277)</td>
<td>.062 (280)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;.50</td>
<td>&lt;.10</td>
<td>&lt;.005</td>
<td>&lt;.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need-For-</td>
<td>.042 (283)</td>
<td>-.028 (280)</td>
<td>-.018 (274)</td>
<td>.095 (278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognition</td>
<td>&lt;.25</td>
<td>&lt;.50</td>
<td>&lt;.50</td>
<td>&lt;.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Correlations are in bold-faced type, probability levels are in light-faced type, and N's are in parentheses.
first-order polynomials. As can be seen Table 6, there were no significant quadratic relationships between generalized persuasibility and any of the personality scales. There was, however, a marginally significant curvilinear relationship between social desirability and unbounded persuasibility such that people with moderate MCSD scores were more open to persuasion than people with either high or low MCSD scores.

C. VALIDITY OF PAPER-AND-PENCIL MEASURES OF PERSUASIBILITY

The last objective of this study was to evaluate the validity of three paper-and-pencil scales that were designed as measures of unbounded persuasibility. Specifically, the goal was to see how accurately the Phillips Persuasibility Inventory (PPI, 1981), the Janis and Field Persuasibility Questionnaire (JFPQ, 1959), and the newly devised P-scale could predict unbounded persuasibility scores. However, before reporting on these last results, the procedures used to select items from the P-scale will be described.

Item Selection for the P-Scale

Rather than measure persuasibility with the entire pool of 62 items (see Appendix D for copies of these items), an attempt was made to reduce the number of individual items into a more manageable set of common factors. For this reason, a factor analytic approach was used to select and reject items from the initial item pool. The factor analysis was done in eight stages.
Table 6

Summary of Findings from Quadratic Regressions of Unbounded Persuasibility Scores on Personality Scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Slope</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(D) Dogmatism</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SD) Social Desir.</td>
<td>-1.74</td>
<td>-1.46</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SE) Self-Esteem</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TA) Trait Anxiety</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AI) Ambig. Intol.</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(NFC) Need-For-Cognit.</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the first stage, the total sample of 314 participants was divided randomly into two sub-samples: an initial or exploratory sample (n=157), and a hold-out or validation sample (n=157). Dividing the total sample into sub-samples made it possible to cross-validate the findings in the eighth and final stage of the item analysis.

In the second stage, a principal components analysis was performed on the first sample to estimate the number of factors within the initial item pool. The number of factors was initially estimated by the number of components that (a) had eigenvalues greater than 1.00, (b) explained at least 5% of the total variance in the correlation matrix, and (c) contained at least three items with loadings of absolute value greater than .40. As seen in Table 7, only three components met these criteria in the first sample. Moreover, an inspection of the scree plot (see Figure 3) from the first sample gave further support to a three-factor solution.

The third stage in selecting items was to rotate the components. To determine if the three components were oblique or orthogonal, a principal component analysis with oblique (oblimin) rotation was performed on the first sample. The resulting correlations among components revealed that the three components were, in fact, orthogonal. Scores on the first component correlated only .025 and .079 with scores on the second and third components, respectively, and scores on the second component showed virtually no correlation (r=-.006) with scores on the third component (all p's=n.s.).

Having determined that the 62 items in the initial item pool could be reduced
Table 7

Eigenvalues and Percent of Variance Explained by a Principal Component Analysis of the Initial Pool of 62 Items (Sample 1: N=156)

| COMPONENT | EIGENVALUES | PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE EXPLAINED | NUMBER OF ITEMS WITH LOADINGS > |.4000|
|-----------|-------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1         | 6.84        | 11.0                                | 16                             |
| 2         | 5.36        | 8.6                                 | 12                             |
| 3         | 3.73        | 6.0                                 | 6                              |
| 4         | 2.55        | 4.1                                 | 6                              |
| 5         | 2.38        | 3.8                                 | 2                              |
| 6         | 1.88        | 3.0                                 | 0                              |
| 7         | 1.80        | 2.9                                 | 1                              |
| 8         | 1.70        | 2.7                                 | 0                              |
| 9         | 1.60        | 2.6                                 | 1                              |
| 10        | 1.51        | 2.4                                 | 0                              |
| 11        | 1.47        | 2.4                                 | 0                              |
| 12        | 1.33        | 2.1                                 | 0                              |
| 13        | 1.29        | 2.1                                 | 1                              |
| 14        | 1.26        | 2.0                                 | 0                              |
| 15        | 1.24        | 2.0                                 | 0                              |
| 16        | 1.18        | 1.9                                 | 0                              |
| 17        | 1.16        | 1.9                                 | 0                              |
| 18        | 1.10        | 1.8                                 | 0                              |
| 19        | 1.08        | 1.8                                 | 0                              |
| 20        | 1.05        | 1.7                                 | 0                              |
| 21        | 1.00        | 1.6                                 | 0                              |

Note: Components with eigenvalues less than 1.0 are not shown.
Figure 3: Scree Plot from a Principal Component Analysis of the Initial Pool of 62 Items (Sample 1: N=157)
to three orthogonal components, the **fourth** step was to reject the items that did not load strongly on any component. To accomplish this, a factor analysis (as opposed to a principal component analysis) was performed, using a three-factor solution with an orthogonal (varimax) rotation. The size of the orthogonally rotated loadings for each item were then inspected. A decision was made to reject those items that did not have loadings with absolute values greater than .40 on any of the three factors, and to retain for further analyses those items that did have loadings with absolute values greater than .40. Using this criterion, 13 items (numbers 2, 11, 12, 13, 15, 22, 23, 25, 33, 37, 42, 53, and 58) were retained for the first factor, and 11 items (numbers 1, 3, 6, 9, 10, 16, 18, 19, 32, 49, and 52) were retained for the second factor. The third factor was dropped entirely because only two items (numbers 40 and 42) had loadings with absolute values greater than .40 in the first sample. This procedure reduced the initial item pool from 62 to 24 items.

The **fifth** step was to repeat the above procedures (again, for just the first sample) using only the 24 items that were retained from the initial pool. To re-estimate the number of factors among the 24 items, another principal components analysis (rather than a factor analysis) was conducted. Results revealed that the first two components accounted for 19.4% and 16.0% of the total variance in the reduced correlation matrix, respectively, and that no other component accounted for more than 6% of the total variance, or had more than two items with loadings of absolute value greater than .40 (see Table 8).

After determining that the reduced pool of 24 items contained two components,
Table 8

Eigenvalues and Percent of Variance Explained by a Principal Component Analysis of the Reduced Pool of 24 Items for Both Samples

| Component | Eigenvalue | Percent of Total Variance Explained | Number of Items Loading $>|.400|$ | Component | Eigenvalue | Percent of Total Variance Explained | Number of Items Loading $>|.400|$ |
|-----------|------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------|------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1         | 4.66       | 19.4                               | 13                                | 1         | 4.47       | 18.6                               | 13                                |
| 2         | 3.85       | 16.0                               | 11                                | 2         | 3.62       | 15.1                               | 8                                 |
| 3         | 1.40       | 5.8                                | 1                                 | 3         | 1.49       | 6.2                                | 2                                 |
| 4         | 1.29       | 5.4                                | 1                                 | 4         | 1.46       | 6.1                                | 2                                 |
| 5         | 1.08       | 4.5                                | 1                                 | 5         | 1.34       | 5.6                                | 2                                 |
| 6         | 1.03       | 4.3                                | 2                                 | 6         | 1.13       | 4.7                                | 2                                 |
| 7         |            |                                    |                                   | 7         | 1.08       | 4.5                                | 1                                 |
the sixth step was to derive factor loadings for each of the items. To accomplish this, a second factor analysis was performed, using a two-factor solution with an oblique (oblimin) rotation. However, because this analysis revealed that the two factors were again orthogonal (factor correlation = .070, p = n.s.), the two-component solution was rotated orthogonally (using a varimax rotation) to produce factor loadings.

The two-factor solution and the resulting rotated factor loadings (from the sixth stage) were derived from the initial (or exploratory) sample only, and needed to be cross-validated. Therefore, in the seventh stage of item selection, a principal component analysis was repeated on the reduced item pool using the hold-out (or validation) sample. Compared to the components in the initial sample (described in the fifth stage), the components in the hold-out sample explained similar proportions of total variance (see Table 8) and produced similar scree plots (see Figures 4 and 5).

In the eighth and final stage, orthogonally rotated factor loadings were derived from the second sample. As can be seen in Table 9, there was a close correspondence between the rotated factor loadings in both samples [Cattell's $S$ (Factor 1) = .883, Cattell's $S$ (factor 2) = .832]. (See Table 9 for factor loadings.) Based on the cross-validation, only one additional item (number 19) was dropped because it loaded more highly on different factors in the two samples.
Figure 4: Scree Plot from a Principal Component Analysis of the Reduced Pool of 24 Items (Sample 1: N=157)
Figure 5: Scree Plot from a Principal Component Analysis of the Reduced Pool of 24 Items (Sample 2: N=157)
### Table 9

Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings for the Reduced Pool of 24 Items by Factor and Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SAMPLE 1 (N=156)</th>
<th></th>
<th>SAMPLE 2 (N=156)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Factor 1</td>
<td>Factor 2</td>
<td>Factor 1</td>
<td>Factor 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>-.637</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-.600</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>.581</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.631</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>.581</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.522</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>-.541</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-.528</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.539</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>.526</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.629</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>.495</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.585</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-.479</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-.453</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>.476</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.480</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>.450</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.426</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>.433</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>.421</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.501</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.619</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.603</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.583</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.581</td>
<td></td>
<td>.668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.577</td>
<td></td>
<td>.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.563</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.544</td>
<td></td>
<td>.570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.452</td>
<td></td>
<td>.771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.446</td>
<td></td>
<td>.509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.400</td>
<td>.481</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>.416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Asterisks represent factor loadings with absolute values less than .40.
Interpretation of P-Scale Factors

Given the close correspondence between factor loadings in each sample, the samples were recombined and a single set of factor loadings was derived (see Table 10). An inspection of the items that load on each factor suggested that Factor 1 of the P-scale represented participants' doubt or confidence in their own opinions (e.g., "I sometimes do not trust my own judgments," "I usually give into people because I eventually realize they are right.") and that Factor 2 represented the negative or positive reactions participants have during attitude change (e.g., "I feel uncomfortable if someone convinces me to adopt a new opinion," "It bothers me to change my opinion.").

The interpretations given to these two factors echo two of the assumptions made earlier when defining a highly persuasible person. It should be recalled that highly persuasible people were assumed to be (a) more certainty-oriented, (b) more likely to compare their attitudes to the attitudes of other people, (c) more apt to see issues from different perspectives, (d) less confident of themselves and their attitudes, (e) less apt to see attitude change as negative and (f) less reactive in the protection of current attitudes. The last three of these assumptions -- low self-confidence, the tendency to see some benefits to attitude change, and the lack of defensive resistance to attitude change -- are consistent with the interpretations that Factor 1 represented self-doubt and that Factor 2 represented reactions to attitude change.

The above interpretations, however, are only subjective. To get a more
Table 10

Final Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings for the Full Sample (N=312)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>FACTOR 1</th>
<th>FACTOR 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>People win me over to their point of view.</td>
<td>-0.616</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>I usually hold onto my opinions even when other people hold the opposite opinions.</td>
<td>0.592</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>I usually feel confident about my beliefs.</td>
<td>0.564</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>I usually trust that my own opinions are right, even when people try to change my mind.</td>
<td>0.555</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>In a discussion I probably change my mind more easily than most people.</td>
<td>-0.531</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>During discussions with people, I hold onto my opinions more strongly than most other people.</td>
<td>0.525</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>I've found that I am usually correct if I trust my own judgment.</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>I put more trust in my judgment than in the judgment of other people.</td>
<td>0.471</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>I sometimes do not trust my own judgment.</td>
<td>-0.470</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>I usually &quot;give in&quot; to people because I eventually realize they are right.</td>
<td>-0.457</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Compared to most people, I'm an independent, free thinker.</td>
<td>0.451</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Many times I am more convinced that my opinions are correct after someone tries to change my mind.</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>I almost always believe that my opinions are correct.</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued on the next page.
Table 10 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>FACTOR 1</th>
<th>FACTOR 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>I feel uncomfortable if someone convinces me to adopt a new opinion.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Changing my opinions make me doubt by integrity.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>I get defensive when people try to change my opinions.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Usually I've felt uncomfortable when people try to convince me of their ideas.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>It bothers me to change my opinions.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>It is more important that people see my point of view than it is for me to see things from their point of view.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>When people try to change my mind, I try hard to prevent them from accomplishing it.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Rather than listening while people are talking to me, I am usually thinking of things to rebut what they are saying.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Usually I've wanted to do the opposite of what people try to convince me to do.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>I think people who change their opinions are usually weak.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Asterisks represent factor loadings with absolute values less than .40.
objective interpretation of each factor, we computed scores on two scales. P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) was created by averaging together responses to the 13 items (numbers 2, 11, 12, 13, 15, 22, 23, 25, 33, 37, 42, 53, and 58) that had loadings with absolute values greater than .40 on Factor 1 in the combined sample. All items were coded such that higher scores on this scale represented greater doubt in one’s own attitudes. P-Scale 2 (Reactions to Attitude Change) was created by averaging responses to the 10 items (numbers 1, 3, 6, 9, 10, 16, 18, 32, 49, and 53) that had loadings with absolute values greater than .40 on Factor 2. All items were coded such that high scores represented positive reactions to attitude change, and low scores represented negative reactions to attitude change.

After computing scores for P-Scale 1 and P-Scale 2, each scale was correlated with the various personality scales (see Table 11). Consistent with subjective interpretations, P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) showed a strong negative relationship with self-esteem such that people who doubted their attitudes reported lower self-esteem. Furthermore, people who doubted their attitudes tended to be more anxious and to get less satisfaction from cognitive activity.

Consistent with the interpretation of P-Scale 2 (Reactions to Attitude Change), people who scored high on this scale tended to be less dogmatic and more open to attitude change, less anxious, and better able to tolerate ambiguity. People who scored low on this scale appeared anxious, intolerant of ambiguity and perceived attitude change as more negative. These findings suggest the P-Scale 2 represents the emotional reactions participants had to changing their opinions. Higher scores on this
Table 11

P-Scale 1 and P-Scale 2 Correlations with Personality Variables in the Full Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>P-Scale 1: SELF-DOUBT</th>
<th>P-Scale 2: REACTIONS TO ATTITUDE CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
<td>-.062 (309) &lt;.15</td>
<td>-.342 (306) &lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Des.</td>
<td>-.182 (304) &lt;.001</td>
<td>.231 (301) &lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Esteem</td>
<td>.422 (308) &lt;.001</td>
<td>.222 (305) &lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trait Anxiety</td>
<td>.299 (309) &lt;.001</td>
<td>-.301 (306) &lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguity Intolerance</td>
<td>-.076 (309) &lt;.10</td>
<td>-.240 (306) &lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need-For-Cognition</td>
<td>-.303 (303) &lt;.001</td>
<td>.114 (300) &lt;.025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Correlations are in bold-faced type and probability levels are in light-faced type.
scale appear to represent more acceptance of attitude change, whereas lower scores represent the cognitive, emotional and behavioral rejection of attitude change.

**Criterion-Related Validity of Paper-and-Pencil Measures**

The last objective of this study was to evaluate the validity of the different paper-and-pencil measures of persuasibility. Specifically, analyses were performed to see how accurately unbounded persuasibility scores could be predicted from the Phillips Persuasibility Inventory (PPI, 1981), the Janis and Field Persuasibility Questionnaire (JFPQ, 1959), P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) and P-Scale 2 (Reactions to Attitude Change). To accomplish this, scores on the PPI were computed by averaging together scores on its three subscales (Ambiguity Intolerance, Dogmatism, and Conformance), scores on the JFPQ were computed by averaging together responses to its 11 items, and scores on each factor scale (Self-Doubt, and Reactions to Attitude Change) were computed by averaging together responses to those items with loadings greater than .40 in absolute value.

Although all of these measures produced acceptable levels of reliability (alphas: PPI = .729, JFPQ = .737, P-Scale 1 = .817, and P-Scale 2 = .778), none of them produced significant validity coefficients. (See Table 12 for correlations between paper-and-pencil persuasibility measures and unbounded persuasibility scores.) Doubt in one's attitudes (P-Scale 1), and negative reactions to attitude change (P-Scale 2) tended to be associated with low persuasibility, but the correlations did not approach acceptable levels of statistical significance. High scores on the PPI tended to be
Table 12

Correlations Among Paper-and-Pencil Measures of Persuasibility and Unbounded Persuasibility Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CORRELATIONS</th>
<th>P-Scale 1</th>
<th>P-Scale 2</th>
<th>PPI</th>
<th>JFPQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNBOUNDED PERSUASIBILITY</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(284)</td>
<td>(282)</td>
<td>(283)</td>
<td>(286)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;.30</td>
<td>&lt;.25</td>
<td>&lt;.25</td>
<td>&lt;.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-SCALE 1: Self-Doubt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-SCALE 2: Reactions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS</td>
<td>P-Scale 1</td>
<td>P-Scale 2</td>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>JFPQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2.356</td>
<td>3.383</td>
<td>3.637</td>
<td>2.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>.509</td>
<td>.632</td>
<td>.526</td>
<td>.521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtained Range</td>
<td>2.923</td>
<td>3.600</td>
<td>2.808</td>
<td>2.636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Range</td>
<td>4.000</td>
<td>4.000</td>
<td>5.000</td>
<td>6.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skew</td>
<td>.235</td>
<td>-.374</td>
<td>-.311</td>
<td>-.188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Correlations are in bold-faced type and probability levels are in light-faced type.
associated with higher levels of unbounded persuasibility but, like P-Scale 1 and P-Scale 2, failed to correlate significantly with the criterion. It is interesting to note that the JFPQ was negatively related (at a marginal level) to unbounded persuasibility despite the fact that items were scored such that the JFPQ should have correlated positively with the criterion.¹⁰

The correlations among the four paper-and-pencil measures of persuasibility (see Table 12) represent the convergent validities of each measure. It is worth noting that, with one exception, these scales seemed to measure largely independent constructs. Only the P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) and the JFPQ were strongly correlated. All other correlations suggested that P-Scale 1, P-Scale 2, the PPI, and the JFPQ were not measuring the same construct. These findings call into question the convergent validity of all paper-and-pencil measure of unbounded persuasibility.

Although the paper-and-pencil measures failed to correlate significantly with unbounded persuasibility scores, there was a possibility that these measures could predict each of the four bounded persuasion scores, separately. To test for this possibility, we computed the correlations between the four paper-and-pencil measures and four bounded persuasion scores. Results revealed, however, that P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) and P-Scale 2 (Affective Value of Attitude Change) failed to correlate with any of the bounded persuasion scores. Furthermore, both the PPI and the JFPQ were only slightly better predictors of bounded persuasion, correlating with only one of the bounded persuasion scores. (See Table 13 for correlations between each paper-and-pencil measure and each bounded persuasion scores.)
Table 13

Correlations Among Paper-and-Pencil Measures of Persuasibility and Bounded Persuasion Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>P-Scale1: Self-Doubt</th>
<th>P-Scale2: Reactions to Attitude Change</th>
<th>PPI</th>
<th>JFPQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Euthanasia</strong></td>
<td>-.062 (288)</td>
<td>-.020 (276)</td>
<td>-.017 (287)</td>
<td>-.038 (290)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Married Priests</strong></td>
<td>.021 (285)</td>
<td>.081 (273)</td>
<td>.030 (284)</td>
<td>-.009 (287)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>University Admissions</strong></td>
<td>.040 (278)</td>
<td>.038 (266)</td>
<td>.114 (277)</td>
<td>-.034 (280)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Drug Testing</strong></td>
<td>-.051 (281)</td>
<td>.050 (269)</td>
<td>-.008 (280)</td>
<td>-.144 (283)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Correlations are in bold-faced type and probability levels are in light-faced type.
As a follow up analysis, separate validity coefficients were computed for women and men. Although these analyses revealed that the correlations between unbounded persuasibility, P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) and P-Scale 2 (Reactions to Attitude Change) did not differ for women and men, the analyses also revealed that scores on both the PPI and JFPQ were more predictive for women than for men. (See Table 14 for validity coefficients by gender.) Unlike men, women who scored higher on the PPI were more open to persuasion than women who scored lower on the PPI. Moreover, women who scored higher on the JFPQ were less open to persuasion than women who scored lower on the JFPQ. This last finding is surprising because JFPQ scores were expected to correlate positively with persuasion.

D. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

The findings suggest that unbounded persuasibility is a modest personality trait; people who are persuaded by one message are more likely to be persuaded by different messages on different issues. As evidence of this, there was a significant correlation ($r = .21, p < .025$) between the amount of persuasion produced by one message and the amount of persuasion produced by other messages. However, the size of the relationship was modest and explained less than 5% of the variance in bounded persuasion scores.

The findings also suggest that predicting who will be open to messages and who will be resistant is remarkably difficult. Although women were more open to persuasion than men on one topic (drug testing), unbounded persuasibility could not
Table 14

Correlations Among Paper-and-Pencil Measures of Persuasibility and Unbounded Persuasibility Scores by Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNBOUNDED PERSUASIBILITY SCORES</th>
<th>P-SCALE1 Self-Doubt</th>
<th>P-SCALE2 Reactions to Attitude Change</th>
<th>PPI</th>
<th>JFPQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WOMEN</td>
<td>-.026 (.191)</td>
<td>.058 (.190)</td>
<td>.111 (.190)</td>
<td>-.123 (.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;.35</td>
<td>&lt;.21</td>
<td>&lt;.10</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEN</td>
<td>-.034 (.92)</td>
<td>.012 (.91)</td>
<td>.085 (.92)</td>
<td>.013 (.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;.40</td>
<td>&lt;.45</td>
<td>&lt;.21</td>
<td>&lt;.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Correlations are in bold-faced type, and probabilities are in light-faced type.
be predicted accurately from gender, even when controlling for individual differences in interest in the topic. In addition, using either linear or curvilinear equations, individual differences in unbounded persuasibility could not be predicted from participants' dogmatism, social desirability, self-esteem, anxiety, or need-for-cognition. Finally, unbounded persuasibility could not be predicted accurately from four paper-and-pencil scales that were designed to measure persuasibility. Scores on P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) and P-Scale 2 (Reactions to Attitude Change) were not at all related to unbounded persuasibility; scores on the JFPQ were (surprisingly) negatively related to persuasibility, but only for women; and, scores on the PPI were positively related to persuasibility, but again only for women.

In the entire study, only ambiguity intolerance showed a consistent relationship with unbounded persuasibility: both men and women who were intolerant of contradictions among their beliefs were more open to persuasion than people who were unbothered by contradictions. Based on these findings, we can safely conclude that, at this point, there are no consistently valid paper-and-pencil measures of persuasibility. Although people do differ in their general openness to persuasion, no measures seem capable of predicting these individual differences for both men and women.
IV. DISCUSSION

Research on individual differences in unbounded persuasibility is surprisingly rare in social psychology. Only a small number of researchers in the last 30 years have studied whether people differ in openness to persuasion, and what factors might relate to such differences. Research in persuasibility is like research in any other sparsely studied area: the research questions are not well integrated and the findings are inconclusive.

The current study tried to add integration and conclusiveness to research on unbounded persuasibility by addressing three issues. First, the current study addressed the strength of unbounded persuasibility as a personality disposition. Second, the relationships between persuasibility and numerous personality variables were addressed. Last, the current study addressed the validity of three paper-and-pencil scales that were designed to measure individual differences in persuasibility. Several conclusions can be drawn from this study.

A. UNBOUNDED PERSUASIBILITY AS A TRAIT

Is unbounded persuasibility strong enough to merit serious attention by attitude change researchers? Clearly, the evidence from this and earlier studies weighs against looking closer at unbounded persuasibility. Given the modest correlations among bounded persuasion scores in this and other studies, unbounded persuasibility might
not deserve serious attention. If, as this study found, approximately 5% of the variance in persuasion produced by one message is related to persuasion produced by other messages, then researchers might be justified in ignoring persuasibility as a research area.

However, there are two reasons why ignoring persuasibility might be premature. First, all studies of persuasibility (including this one) have found that people who are persuaded by one message are more likely to be persuaded by another message. Although the relationship is small, it has enormous implications for the understanding of attitude change. Even the most basic principals of persuasion might need to be re-evaluated in light of individual differences in persuasibility. For instance, a long-standing principal holds that expert sources on a topic are more persuasive than novice sources (cf., Aronson, Turner & Carlsmith, 1963; Hovland & Weiss, 1952). Individual differences in persuasibility, however, might force a new look at this principal to see if speakers who are novices on a topic might be as persuasive as expert sources when the message recipient is highly persuasible. If persuasibility affects even the most basic principals of persuasion, then turning our eyes away from unbounded persuasibility would be accepting a blind spot in our view of the persuasion process.

Second, the small size of the correlation among bounded persuasion scores in this study might be an artifact that is peculiar to laboratory studies in general, and to this study in particular. The current study used a fairly homogeneous sample (i.e, 18 and 19 year old undergraduates), and presented participants with four counter-
attitudinal editorials. By using such a homogeneous sample, we may have reduced the variability of bounded persuasion scores, thereby restricting the range of the correlations among these scores. Moreover, and more likely, by using only counter-attitudinal editorials, we may have restricted the range of variability among unbounded persuasibility scores. As shown in Table 1, the variance of unbounded persuasibility scores was almost 50% smaller than the variance of any of the bounded persuasion scores. Perhaps participants who were normally open to persuasion in their daily lives became unusually resistant to persuasion in an experimental setting that presented them exclusively with counter-attitudinal editorials. Basing our impressions of unbounded persuasibility on studies conducted in highly reactive laboratory settings may distort our view of unbounded persuasibility.

B. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE CORRELATES OF PERSUASIBILITY

Implicit in many theories that link personality variables to attitude change is the notion the personality variables will also relate to persuasibility. For example, Cacioppo and Petty (1982) suggest that individual differences in need-for-cognition should relate to individual differences in the responses (i.e., yielding) to a given message. However, to generalize their theory to a wide range of messages, one has to assume that need-for-cognition will also relate to people’s responses to a variety of messages. The same is true of any other individual difference variable. There is a small, but inevitable leap from attitude change theories to persuasibility theories.

This study found that several individual difference variables were not related
to unbounded persuasibility. Neither gender, dogmatism, social desirability, self-esteem, anxiety, or need-for-cognition were related to unbounded persuasibility. Furthermore, these variables were only rarely related to levels of bounded persuasion. As shown in Table 5, only ambiguity intolerance and self-esteem were related to bounded persuasibility scores.

This gloomy conclusion, however, must be tempered. Although this study found that many individual difference variables were unrelated to unbounded persuasibility (or even bounded persuasion), earlier studies have uncovered some pronounced relationships. For example, Cronkhite and Goetz (1971) reported that dogmatism correlated .40 with persuasibility, whereas the current study found that dogmatism correlated .00 with persuasibility. The source of this discrepancy might lie in methodological differences in how the two studies operationalized persuasibility. Cronkhite and Goetz operationalized persuasibility by exposing participants to five counter-attitudinal editorials and five pro-attitudinal editorials, whereas the current study used only four counter-attitudinal editorials. If the latter method of operationalizing persuasibility induced unusual levels of reactance and range restriction, we cannot accept the blanket conclusion that individual difference variables rarely relate to persuasibility.

C. PAPER-AND-PENCIL MEASURES OF PERSUASIBILITY

In the history of social psychology, only three attempts (Janis & Field, 1959; Phillips, 1981; and the current study) have been made to develop paper-and-pencil
measures of persuasibility, and none of those attempts have succeeded. In the current study, only one measure -- the PPI -- showed even a modest relationship with persuasibility. Moreover, that relationship held only for women and was not large enough for us to make reasonably accurate predictions as to who was open to a variety of persuasive messages and who was resistant to such messages.

The modest success of the PPI and the failure of the JFPQ, P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) and P-Scale 2 (Reactions to Attitude Change) point to some future directions in the development of a valid paper-and-pencil measure of persuasibility. The PPI was built from items whose intent (to measure persuasibility) was not transparently obvious to participants. Using item #1 from the PPI as an example, only the most sophisticated participants would realize that the PPI was intended to measure persuasibility by asking if "the ideas which get printed nowadays are worth the paper they are printed on."

On the other hand, the JFPQ, P-Scale 1 and P-Scale 2 were built from items whose intents were far more transparent. These scales asked participants very directly about their susceptibility to attitude change. For example, the JFPQ included questions asking participants how influenced they are by their friends, P-Scale 1 included items that asked participants how often they are "won over" to the point of view of other people, and P-Scale 2 included items that asked participants how comfortable they feel when people try to persuade them.

All of these "transparent" measures of persuasibility failed. In fact, the JFPQ tended to "backfire." People who admitted to being open to persuasion were actually
resistant to messages, and people who denied being susceptible were actually susceptible to persuasive messages. Therefore, this study suggests that future attempts to measure persuasibility use less transparent items.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

In recent years, researchers have been casting new looks at individual differences in persuasion. Very few researchers, however, have looked at unbounded persuasibility to learn why some people are generally more open to a variety of messages. Given that this and earlier studies strongly suggest that unbounded persuasibility may be, at best, a modest contributor to individual differences in persuasion, unbounded persuasibility may remain in the shadows and generate very little future research.

Although understandable, this would be unfortunate because of the theoretical importance of persuasibility. Thus, unbounded persuasibility should not remain in the shadows forever. Future research is needed to clarify why some people are, in fact, more open to messages in general than are other people. At the same time, however, researchers should take great care when planning future studies. Future researchers are advised to take extraordinary precautions when planning studies of unbounded persuasibility. To ensure that there is enough variance in unbounded persuasibility scores, researchers should avoid using homogeneous populations (such as only college freshman) and should not use exclusively counter-attitudinal editorials. By using more diverse populations and including some pro-attitudinal editorials, future researchers
might increase the range of persuasibility scores.

Another recommendation for future researchers is to focus closer attention on bounded persuasibility. Rather than focus on unbounded persuasibility and whether some people can be persuaded all of the time, future researchers should focus on bounded persuasibility and the conditions under which some of the people can be persuaded some of the time. Toward that end, the functional theories can cast some light on why some people might be more susceptible to certain types of messages. Early functional theorists (Katz, 1960; Smith, Bruner & White, 1956) pointed out that messages will only be persuasive if they appeal to the psychological needs being served by particular attitudes. The more researchers know about the functions being served by an attitude, the more likely they will understand why some people can be persuaded with certain types of message whereas others are unpersuaded by those same messages.

Recent research by Snyder and Debono (1987) is a good example of how functional theories can be applied to individual differences in bounded persuasibility. These investigators found that high self-monitors (people who were especially concerned about attaining social approval) were more persuaded by advertisements that stressed the social attributes of a product (e.g., the popularity to be gained through its use) than by advertisements that stressed a product's physical attributes (e.g., quality and craftsmanship). Conversely, they also found that low self-monitors (people who were less concerned about attaining social approval) were less persuaded by advertisements that stressed the product's social attributes than by advertisements
that stressed the product’s physical attributes. These findings suggest that researchers should focus their attention on bounded persuasibility and the personality variables (such as self-monitoring) that leave people open to one kind of message, but resistant to other kinds of messages.

E. SUMMARY

After his earliest research on persuasibility, Janis (1954) envisioned that

"...some more or less general factors of persuasibility will be eventually isolated upon which accurate predictions can be made as to how different individuals will respond to various discrete communications on different topics" (p. 506).

To date only part of that vision has been fulfilled. This study, like the few that preceded it, did succeed in isolating a general factor of unbounded persuasibility, finding that people who were persuaded by a message on one topic tended to be persuaded by other messages on unrelated topics. However, the strength of the unbounded persuasibility factor appears weaker than perhaps Janis (and the current author) expected.

The second part of Janis’ vision has not yet come true. Previous studies have not uncovered factors on which to make accurate predictions about who will resist and who will accept messages on different topics. With the exception of ambiguity intolerance, the current study also failed to find any personality variables or any paper-and-pencil measures of persuasibility that could predict accurately individual differences in unbounded persuasibility.

The two parts of Janis’ vision are not unrelated. Researchers will never be able
to uncover accurate predictors and measures of persuasibility until they are able to identify a stronger persuasibility trait. This may never happen because unbounded persuasibility may not be a strong personality trait. On the other hand, accurate predictors and measures might be uncovered if more heterogeneous populations and potentially less reactive methods of operationalizing persuasibility are used. This study cannot untangle whether unbounded persuasibility has so few predictors because (a) there is, in fact, only a small and unreliable relationship between levels of attitude change across topics, or (b) current methods artificially restrict the range of persuasibility scores, thereby truncating all subsequent correlations with unbounded persuasibility.

As is usually the case, more research is needed. We need more careful research on unbounded persuasibility, particularly research that uses less reactive methods of operationalizing unbounded persuasibility. We also need more research on bounded persuasibility in order to identify the conditions that leave some people susceptible to some messages some of the time.
REFERENCES


1. Eagly (1981) provides another way of classifying research on individual differences in persuasion. She classified research as falling into one of three camps. First there are those who approach individual differences in persuasion armed with personality theories. As an example, Eagly includes in this camp researchers who have suggested that individual differences in persuasion are caused by personality differences in self-esteem. Second, there are those who approach persuasibility armed with attitude theories. For instance, Eagly cites Sherif and Hovland's (1961) social judgment theory as an example. According to social judgment theory, people who maintain an attitude with a wide latitude of acceptance will be easier to persuade than those who have narrower ranges of acceptance. Finally, there are those who combine both personality theories and attitude theories in an attempt to understand persuasibility. The best example from this camp is McGuire's (1985) theory which claims that a personality variable (such as self-esteem) may increase persuasion by increasing the amount of attention a person donates to a message, but simultaneously decrease persuasion by decreasing the chance that a person will accept a message.

2. The work of Janis and Field (1959) stimulated only a handful of studies that assessed attitude change across multiple topics. Although these studies invariably compute unbounded persuasibility scores by adding together persuasion scores.
produced by several different messages, two problems make it difficult to compare across studies the correlations among persuasion scores. The major problem is that, in general, correlations among persuasion scores have not been reported by most researchers (Ally, 1980; Cronkhite & Goetz, 1971; Glass et al., 1969; Jenks, 1965; Jones, 1976; Silverman et al., 1970; Whittaker, 1965; Whittaker & Meade, 1967). Another problem is that those researchers who have reported the correlations among persuasion scores (Epting, 1967; Lee, 1976; Touhey, 1973) have used such widely different techniques to induce persuasion that comparison among correlations is difficult. Touhey induced persuasion by having participants write two counter-attitudinal editorials. Using this self-persuasion technique, Touhey reported an unusually strong correlation of .47 between two persuasion scores. Epting used contrived results from two sets of opinion polls to induce persuasion. This technique produced a correlation between persuasion scores of .37. Only Lee induced persuasion by having participants read editorials on several topics. Using this more traditional approach, Lee found that persuasion scores were correlated only .14.

3. The size of the internal consistency of unbounded persuasibility scores is based on correlations between attitude change scores across several topics. Although the exact correlations are often not reported in past research, earlier researchers have described modest correlations among the persuasion scores produced by different messages. The modest correlations among persuasion scores is reminiscent of
Mischel’s (1984) contention that there is only modest correlations among behaviors that any one person produces in different situations.

4. Rather than use all 45 items from the Need For Cognition Scale, 16 items were selected to serve as an abbreviated version of this scale. The items (numbers 1, 10, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 29, 31, 32, 33, 39, 40, and 43 from the original scale) were selected based on the size of the item-total correlations reported in two studies by Cacioppo and Petty (1982, p. 123)

5. Some additional mention should be given to the ordering of materials in the first and second sessions. Given the amount of effort required of participants in this study it was impossible to include all persuasibility and personality measures in a single session. Therefore, a choice was made to include in the first session only the attitude scales, the paper-and-pencil measures of persuasibility (i.e., the PPI, JFPQ, and the P-Scale) and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale.

The paper-and-pencil measures were purposely excluded from the second session because we wanted to eliminate the possibility that respondents would infer their general level of persuasibility from how much they changed their attitudes in the experimental session. If the paper-and-pencil measures were included in the second session, a potential self-perception bias that might have artificially inflated the correlation between the paper-and-pencil measures and the criterion of unbounded persuasibility.
There was, however, a disadvantage with this ordering. By completing the persuasibility measures in the first session, participants might have been forewarned of impending attitude change attempts. This forewarning might have led participants to bolster their attitudes before they received counter-attitudinal messages, thereby making them less open to persuasion. The end result might have been (a) that the range among unbounded persuasibility scores was restricted and (b) that all subsequent correlations between bounded persuasibility scores and any other variable were attenuated by that restricted range.

Another point about the ordering of materials should be mentioned. With the exception of the P-Scale always being the first instrument in the first session, all other materials were randomly ordered within the sessions. That is, the PPI, JFPQ, and MCSD scales were randomly ordered for participants during the first session, and the various personality scales were randomly ordered for the second session.

6. Whenever multiple items (such as item-change scores) had to be combined, items were averaged together rather than summed together. This strategy was selected to minimize the effect of missing data. If several items were summed together, missing data would have spuriously lowered the respondent's total "sum score," making them appear less affected by the message than they might have been. Of course, missing data could have been handled by disqualifying participants who had missing data. However, this strategy would have disqualified from all
subsequent analyses anyone who had missing data on only one item. Averaging items together avoided these two problems, producing more accurate scores for participants and retaining participants who had missing data on some items. Nevertheless, a participant’s data was disqualified if more than 20% of the items being averaged were blank.

7. It remained possible that bounded persuasion scores would be more strongly correlated if the effect of "issue importance" were factored out of each persuasion scores. It was reasoned that the more important an issue was to a participant, the less open to persuasion that participant would be. By affecting the size of bounded persuasion scores, issue importance could have affected the size of the correlation among persuasion scores.

Because all subsequent analyses in this study were directly affected by the size of the correlation among bounded persuasion scores, preliminary analyses were conducted into the effects of "issue importance" on bounded persuasion scores. First, the importance of each issue (at the time of the first session) was correlated with the level of persuasion produced by each editorial. Surprisingly, only nonsignificant correlations between issue importance and bounded persuasion scores were found [average $r (283) = .034$, $p=\text{n.s.}$]. These correlations suggest that "issue importance" had virtually no effect on bounded persuasion scores and that "issue importance" would not affect the size of the correlations among bounded persuasion scores.
Second, the small effect of "issue importance" was factored out before correlating the four bounded persuasion scores. This was done by regressing each persuasion score on "issue importance" scores and then creating residualized persuasion scores. For example, each participant's "euthanasia persuasion score" was regressed on the importance placed on that issue, and a "residualized euthanasia persuasion score." After creating residualized persuasion scores for each issue, the correlations among these scores were then computed. Because the average correlation among residualized persuasion scores ($r = .20$) was no different than the average correlation among the non-residualized persuasion scores ($r = .21$), "issue importance" was not used as a covariate in any subsequent analyses.

8. Cattell's $S$ reflects the correspondence between factor loadings in different samples. The closer $S$ comes to 1.00, the closer the correspondence between factor loadings.

9. Although the PPI consisted of three subscales, these subscales were combined into a total PPI score because (a) Phillips (1981) designed the PPI to be used in this manner, and (b) previous uses of the PPI (Phillips, 1981; Pietscher, 1984) combined the PPI's three subscales into a single score.

10. The predictive validity of each item in the P-Scale, the PPI, and the JFPQ was
also examined. This was done by (a) randomly splitting the total sample into two halves, (b) computing separately for each half of the sample the correlations between each item and the criterion measure of unbounded persuasibility, and (c) comparing the item-criterion correlations from each sample in order to see which items had significant item-criterion correlations in both samples. This approach, however, was no more successful than examining the criterion validities of total scale scores for the pooled sample. Only four items from the P-Scale (numbers 24, 34, 38 and 60), one item from the PPI (number 26), and no items from the JFPQ had correlations greater than .10 in both samples.

11. The problems with the restricted range of unbounded persuasibility scores might explain this study’s overall inability to find accurate predictors of persuasibility. There are two potential causes of restricted range in this study; one methodological, and one theoretical. First, the combination of potentially reactive methods and a homogeneous sample may have truncated the range of unbounded persuasibility scores. This methodological problem might account for the lack of significant correlations. A second, and more theoretical possibility is that unbounded persuasibility scores might have regressed inward because persuasibility might, in fact, be only a modest personality trait. If, beyond the confines of the current study, the amount of persuasion produced by one message is not strongly related to amount of persuasion produced by other messages, a person’s average persuasion score (i.e., unbounded persuasibility) would regress
toward zero.

Given the restricted range in this study, there was some temptation to "correct" the correlations between unbounded persuasibility scores and other measures for range restriction, thereby increasing the number of significant predictors of persuasibility. However, correction formulas (see Alexander, Carson, Alliger & Carr, 1987) were not used given the important (and likely) theoretical possibility that unbounded persuasibility is, in fact, only a modest personality trait.
APPENDIX A:

GOALS, METHODS, AND

FINDINGS OF PILOT STUDIES
STUDY 1: IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE ISSUES

Wood and Stangor (in press) suggest that the more ambiguous the issue, the more likely one's personality will affect the acceptance or rejection of a message. Therefore, the goal of the first pilot study was to identify social issues about which undergraduates felt ambivalently and could just as easily support one view as support another. To accomplish this, 40 introductory psychology students read statements on 32 controversial topics. For example, participants were shown a statement claiming that hospital patients with AIDS should be isolated on a separate AIDS unit. Participants were then given 15 seconds to access their reasons, if any, for supporting each statement (e.g., to think of reasons to support isolating AIDS patients), and 15 seconds to access their reasons for opposing each statement. Participants were then asked to use a 5-point scale to indicate how easily (1 = difficultly, 5 = easily) supporting beliefs came to mind, and how easily opposing beliefs came to mind.

This procedure made it possible to identify issues for which undergraduates could access supporting beliefs as easily as opposing beliefs. Although equal access of both supporting and opposing beliefs could arise from a host of factors (such as familiarity with the issue), we reasoned that equal access to both supporting and opposing beliefs was one sign of ambivalence in attitudes.

Based on this logic, five out of the original 32 issues were selected for further use because participants could just as easily generate supporting and opposing beliefs. Specifically, for each of the five issues, the mean accessibility of supporting beliefs did not differ significantly from the mean accessibility of opposing beliefs, all two-
tailed t's < 1.63, p's > .10. The selected issues involved the use of active euthanasia, marriage for Catholic priests, mandatory drug testing, open admissions policies at public universities, and increased government support for the homeless. All other issues were rejected because the mean accessibility of supporting beliefs did differ significantly from the mean accessibility of opposing beliefs.

STUDY 2: IDENTIFYING SALIENT BELIEFS

The goal of the second study was to generate a pool of cogent arguments that could be used to change a person's attitudes toward euthanasia, married priests, open admissions, drug testing, housing shelters. To accomplish this, 29 introductory psychology students wrote down the various beliefs they had about each of the five experimental topics. Participants spent three minutes writing down beliefs that supported a particular position on an issue (e.g., beliefs that favor the use of euthanasia) and three minutes writing down beliefs that opposed that position (e.g., beliefs that argued against euthanasia). After generating a series of supporting and opposing beliefs toward each issue, participants evaluated the cogency of each belief by assigning it a grade from A (a very persuasive belief) to F (a very unpersuasive belief).

Although no quantitative analyses were performed on the responses, it was possible to identify the most common and cogent beliefs that undergraduates held about the five issues. After reading and sorting through the responses, many of the underlying beliefs were later incorporated into ten editorials. Some of these beliefs
were used in editorials that favored euthanasia, married priests, open admissions, drug testing, and housing shelters (referred to at "Pro" editorials), whereas other beliefs were incorporated into editorials that opposed these issues (referred to as "Con" editorials).

STUDY 3: PERSUASIVENESS OF EDITORIALS

After the second pilot study, several Likert-style statements and semantic-differential pairs were devised to measure attitudes toward euthanasia, married priests, open admissions, housing shelters, and drug testing. (See Appendix B for copies of all items.) To assess the reliability and validity of these measures, introductory psychology students responded to each item. Table 15 lists the internal consistencies of the Likert-style and the semantic differential items, as well as the correlation between the two scales for each of the experimental issues. As can be seen, all items were internally consistent and the Likert-style and semantic-differential scales were strongly related.

Another goal of this pilot study was to evaluate the editorials (see Appendix C). Specifically, we needed to ensure that the "pro" and "con" editorials for each issue successfully manipulated attitudes without using widely different styles. To evaluate the editorials, participants were randomly assigned to read either a "pro" or "con" editorial on each of the five topics. They then rated each editorial on 21 different stylistic dimensions and completed the Likert-style and semantic-differential scales. Table 16 lists the \( t \)-values for the differences between the "pro" and "con" editorials.
Table 15

Coefficient Alphas for, and Pearson Correlations Between Likert-style and Semantic-Differentials Attitude Measures on Five Experimental Topics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Likert-style Scale</th>
<th>Semantic Differential</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Euthanasia</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married Priests</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Admissions</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to the Homeless</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory Drug Tests</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 16

Values of \( t \) for Differences Between Five "Pro" and "Con" Editorial Along Two Attitude Measures and 21 Style Dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPERIMENTAL TOPICS</th>
<th>E1</th>
<th>E2</th>
<th>E3</th>
<th>E4</th>
<th>E5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Likert Scale</strong></td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>3.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Semantic Differ.</strong></td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EDITORIAL...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuasiveness</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>-1.63</td>
<td>2.49*</td>
<td>5.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerfulness</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>-.44</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>4.61**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convincingness</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>2.43*</td>
<td>-1.45</td>
<td>3.12**</td>
<td>4.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logicality</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>-1.04</td>
<td>3.37**</td>
<td>2.80*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotionalty</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>-1.52</td>
<td>3.71**</td>
<td>-1.09</td>
<td>2.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truthfulness</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>-.98</td>
<td>2.51*</td>
<td>3.98**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplicity</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>2.11*</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td>-.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarity</td>
<td>-.94</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>-1.45</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>3.06**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bias</td>
<td>-.76</td>
<td>-.59</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>-2.19*</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>2.21*</td>
<td>-.50</td>
<td>1.99*</td>
<td>2.49*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-sidedness</td>
<td>-.50</td>
<td>-1.67</td>
<td>-.59</td>
<td>-1.36</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humorosity</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>-.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interestingness</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>3.49**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of arguments</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONCLUSION...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarity</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>-1.21</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>3.61**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>-.45</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>4.45**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicitness</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>-.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WRITER...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-1.70</td>
<td>-1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trustworthiness</td>
<td>-.86</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>-.85</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerfulness</td>
<td>-1.23</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.65</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likability</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>-.61</td>
<td>-.44</td>
<td>2.16*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E1 represents the two editorials on active euthanasia.
E2 represents the two editorials on marriage for priests.
E3 represents the two editorials on open admissions policies.
E4 represents the two editorials on mandatory drug testing.
E5 represents the two editorials on more aid for the homeless.

**NOTE:** Items composing the Likert scales and semantic differentials were recoded so that higher values represent more support for the experimental topics.

Positive (negative) \( t \)-values indicate the "Pro" ("Con") editorial was rated higher than the "Con" ("Pro") editorial on a given dimension.

** \( p < .01 \), two-tailed
* \( p < .05 \), two-tailed
on the two attitude scales and the 21 different dimensions. As can be seen, the editorials on four of the five issues did manipulate attitudes in the intended direction, without differing along the majority of style dimensions. Only the editorials dealing with shelter for the homeless differed in style, and had to be dropped from further use. In all, this third pilot study ensured 1) that attitude measures for this proposal were internally consistent and highly correlated, and 2) that the editorials were, in fact, persuasive.

STUDY 4: PRELIMINARY ANALYSES OF THE P-SCALE.

The last pilot study began the preliminary analysis of the P-Scale. In this last pilot study, 51 introductory psychology students were presented with a preliminary version of a newly devised persuasibility scale (see Appendix D). Results revealed that the P-Scale had sufficient internal consistency to merit additional research, coefficient alpha = .85.
APPENDIX B:
ATTITUDE SCALES
Attitudes Toward Euthanasia Scale

ACTIVE EUTHANASIA

Recently the medical profession and religious leaders have debated the use of active euthanasia -- where doctors actually help terminally ill patients die by counseling the patients and then giving them a lethal dose of medication. Many people support active euthanasia and see it as a necessary "mercy killing". Others, however, oppose active euthanasia, saying it is not merciful.

We are interested in discovering what people know about active euthanasia and how they feel about it. Please answer the questions on this and the following page.

1. Before today, how much had you heard about active euthanasia?
   1=none
   2=very little
   3=a fair amount
   4=very much

2. How important is this topic to you before today?
   1=very unimportant
   2=unimportant
   3=hard to decide
   4=important
   5=very important

We would like to know your opinion about active euthanasia, even if you have heard very little about it. Please read the statements on the following page and indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each. Please use the 7-point scale on the top of following page to answer each question.
There are good reasons to support active (physician-assisted) euthanasia.  
There are good reasons to oppose active (physician-assisted) euthanasia.  
All things considered, the reasons for opposing active euthanasia are stronger than the reasons for supporting it.  
Physicians should be banned from helping a terminally-ill patient die, even if the patient wants to die.  
If both the physician and patient agree, physicians should help a terminally ill patient die.  
It is a doctor’s duty to prevent death whenever possible.  
Active euthanasia goes against the goals of the medical profession.  
Terminally ill patients have the right to end their suffering.  
The patient’s wish to die should outweigh all other consideration.  
In many cases, active euthanasia is the only humane thing to do.

There are 14 pairs of adjectives below that can be used to describe your feelings about active euthanasia. For each of these 14 pairs, place an "X" in the space that best reflects your feelings about active euthanasia.

**ACTIVE EUTHANASIA IS...**

1. Good ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ Bad
2. Valuable ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ Worthless
3. Important ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ Unimportant
4. Helpful ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ Harmful
5. Needed ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ Not Needed
6. Fair ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ Unfair
7. Unethical ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ Ethical
8. Inhumane ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ Humane
9. Cruel ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ Merciful
10. Misguided ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ Well Thought Out
11. Foolish ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ Wise
12. A Problem ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ An Answer
13. HURTS ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ HELPS
    MEDICINE ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ MEDICINE.
14. Within a ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ Outside a
    patient’s ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ patient’s
    rights ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ rights
Attitudes Toward Married Priests Scale

MARRIED PRIESTS

Recently many Catholics have argued about whether priests should be allowed to get married and have children. Some believe that allowing priests to marry would be good for the Church. However others, believing that it will harm the Church, have argued that the Church should keep its long tradition of unmarried priests.

We are interested in discovering what people know about the debate over married priests and how people feel about married priests. Please answer the questions on this and the following page.

1. Before today, how much had you heard about allowing priests to marry? 1=none 2=very little 3=a fair amount 4=very much

2. How important is this topic to you, today? 1=very unimportant 2=unimportant 3=hard to decide 4=important 5=very important

We would like to know your opinion about marriage in the Catholic priesthood, even if you have heard very little about this issue. Please read the statements on the following page and indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each. Please use the 7-point scale on the top of the following page to answer each question.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISAGREE</th>
<th>DISAGREE</th>
<th>NEITHER</th>
<th>AGREE</th>
<th>AGREE</th>
<th>VERY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VERY</td>
<td>VERY</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly</td>
<td>Strongly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. There are good reasons to support marriage for Catholic priests. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. There are good reasons to oppose marriage for Catholic priests. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. All things considered, the reasons to support marriage for priests are stronger the reasons to oppose such marriages. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Marriage for priests probably goes against the teachings in the Bible. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. I can see very few reasons for allowing priests to marry. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. It would help the Catholic church if priests were allowed to marry. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. It would hurt Catholic church-goers if priests were allowed to marry. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. It would hurt the profession of the priesthood if priests could marry. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. The Church should not break a long-standing tradition of single priests. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. The tradition of single priests is outdated. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

THERE ARE 14 PAIRS OF ADJECTIVES BELOW THAT CAN BE USED TO DESCRIBE YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT MARRIAGE FOR CATHOLIC PRIESTS. FOR EACH OF THESE 14 PAIRS, PLACE AN "X" IN THE SPACE THAT BEST REFLECTS YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT MARRIAGE FOR CATHOLIC PRIESTS.

MARRIAGE FOR CATHOLIC PRIESTS IS...

| 1. Good | __:__:__:__:__:__:__:| Bad |
| 2. Valuable | __:__:__:__:__:__:__:| Worthless |
| 3. Important | __:__:__:__:__:__:__:| Unimportant |
| 4. Helpful | __:__:__:__:__:__:__:| Harmful |
| 5. Needed | __:__:__:__:__:__:__:| Not Needed |
| 6. Fair | __:__:__:__:__:__:__:| Unfair |
| 7. Unethical | __:__:__:__:__:__:__:| Ethical |
| 8. Inhumane | __:__:__:__:__:__:__:| Humane |
| 9. Cruel | __:__:__:__:__:__:__:| Merciful |
| 10. Misguided | __:__:__:__:__:__:__:| Well Thought Out |
| 11. Foolish | __:__:__:__:__:__:__:| Wise |
| 12. A Problem | __:__:__:__:__:__:__:| An Answer |
| 13. HURTS THE CHURCH | __:__:__:__:__:__:__:| HELPS THE CHURCH. |
| 14. Within a priest's rights | __:__:__:__:__:__:__:| Outside a priest's rights |
OPEN ADMISSIONS AT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES

One issue that is frequently debated by education experts is whether publicly funded universities, like the University of Illinois, should admit all Illinois residents who apply. This "open door policy" is controversial because there would be no requirements (such as acceptable high school grades or standard test scores) to enter public universities. Supporters of the policy argue that publicly funded schools should accept anyone in the public who wants to attend. Critics argue that state universities would become overcrowded and public education would suffer.

We are interested in discovering what people know about open admissions and how they feel about it. Please answer the questions on this and the following page.

1. Before today, how much had you heard about open admissions?
   1=none
   2=very little
   3=a fair amount
   4=very much

2. How important is this topic to you, today?
   1=very unimportant
   2=unimportant
   3=hard to decide
   4=important
   5=very important

We would like to know your opinion about open admissions at publicly funded universities, even if you know very little about it. Please read the statements on the following page and indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each. Please use the 7-point scale on the top of the following page to answer each question.
1. There are good reasons to support the "open admissions policy." 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. There are good reasons to oppose the "open admissions policy." 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. All things considered, the reasons for supporting "open admissions" are stronger than the reasons for opposing it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. State universities should adopt the "open admissions policy." 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. There is very little to gain by adopting the "open admissions policy." 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Many benefits would come if the "open admissions policy" was adopted. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Open admissions would make a mess of state universities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. State universities would suffer if open admissions is adopted. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. Public universities must keep some selective standards when deciding who to admit. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. The state owes each citizen a chance at higher education, even citizens who will probably fail. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

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**THE OPEN ADMISSIONS POLICY (IS)**

| 1. Good | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | Bad |
| 2. Valuable | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | Worthless |
| 3. Important | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | Unimportant |
| 4. Helpful | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | Harmful |
| 5. Needed | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | Not Needed |
| 6. Fair | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | Unfair |
| 7. Unethical | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | Ethical |
| 8. Inhumane | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | Humane |
| 9. Cruel | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | Merciful |
| 10. Misguided | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | Well Thought Out |
| 11. Foolish | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | Wise |
| 12. A Problem | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | An Answer |
| 13. HURTS THE SCHOOLS | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | HELPS THE SCHOOLS |
| 14. Within a citizen's rights | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | Outside a citizen's rights |
MANDATORY DRUG TESTING

In the past few years there has been much debate over the use of mandatory on-the-job drug tests for employees. Those who favor these tests argue that drug testing will help keep drugs and accidents out of the workplace. Those who oppose drug testing argue that the tests are inaccurate and an invasion of privacy.

We are interested in discovering what people know about mandatory drug testing and how they feel about it. Please answer the questions on this and the following page.

1. Before today, how much had you heard about mandatory drug tests?
   1=none
   2=very little
   3=a fair amount
   4=very much

2. How important is this topic to you, today?
   1=very unimportant
   2=unimportant
   3=hard to decide
   4=important
   5=very important

We would like to know your opinion about mandatory drug tests for employees of private companies, even if you have heard very little about this topic. Please read the statements on the following page and indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each. Please use the 7-point scale on the top of the following page to answer each question.
1. There are good reasons to oppose mandatory drug tests of private employees.  
2. There are good reasons to support mandatory drug tests of private employees.  
3. The reasons for opposing mandatory drug test are stronger than the reasons for supporting drug tests.  
4. Employees should be required to take regular on-the-job drug tests.  
5. An employee's private drug habits are NOT the business of the employer.  
6. Drugs are so dangerous that the company's right to a safe and drug-free environment outweighs the rights of the employee.  
7. Drug tests provide an accurate way to see if employees are taking illegal drugs.  
8. Drug tests provide ethical ways to see if employees are taking illegal drugs.  
9. Drug tests provide a good way to prevent drug abuse in the work place.  
10. There ought to be a law that protects employees from mandatory drug tests.

THERE ARE 13 PAIRS OF ADJECTIVES BELOW THAT CAN BE USED TO DESCRIBE YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT MANDATORY, ON-THE-JOB DRUG TESTING. FOR EACH OF THESE 13 PAIRS, PLACE AN "X" IN THE SPACE THAT BEST REFLECTS HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT DRUG TESTING.

MANDATORY DRUG TESTING IS...


DISAGREE AGREE

Very Strongly Strongly DISAGREE NEITHER AGREE Strongly Strongly

1---------2---------3---------4---------5---------6----------7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
APPENDIX C:
COUNTER-ATTITUDINAL EDITORIALS
WHOSE LIFE IS IT, ANYWAY?

A recent medical article made public an ethical dilemma faced by more and more doctors and their patients. The dilemma involved active euthanasia or the merciful killing of a terminally ill patient by her doctor. In the article, a cancer patient asked her young doctor to help her "end it, now," to stop her endless pain and hopeless suffering with a deadly injection. The physician agreed and the patient died within minutes.

Should doctors actively participate in euthanasia? Should we allow doctors and patients to plan and carry out mercy killings? Although active euthanasia is widely practiced in Holland, the American Medical Association (AMA) and most of its members stand firmly against physician-assisted euthanasia.

But support for active euthanasia is just as strong. The federal courts, American Bar Association, and two-thirds of the public feel the time has come for active euthanasia.

The nation's legal community has recently decided that patients have the right to control their lives and their deaths. In the past, the AMA has overlooked the rights of their patients, and claimed that a doctor's decision to keep patients alive — and sometimes in pain — outweigh patients' rights to control their lives. Fortunately, federal courts have recently ruled that the rights and wishes of dying patients outweigh the decisions of the medical profession.

The nation's law makers are now forming strict rules to control the use of active euthanasia. With strict legal controls, active euthanasia will be very different than either suicide or murder. A patient's request to die can only be granted when the patient is psychologically competent; when two qualified doctors agree the patient will die within six months; and when those doctors agree to help the patient die. The patient's wish is the critical factor. Family, doctors, and priests can advise the patient, but the patient must make the ultimate decision. And, that's the way it should be. Patient should be in control of their final days.

Even many doctors now recognize the need for active euthanasia. More and more, science is developing the technology to prolong life beyond our wildest dreams. However, the dreams of technology have become the nightmares of patients and their families. Machines may prolong life, but often it is a life of unrelenting pain and suffering. With all the best intentions, the medical profession has created a situation that it must now deal with.

As technology grows, the call for active euthanasia probably grow. Two-thirds of the public already supports active euthanasia because they are afraid that rather than die naturally they are going to be kept alive by well-meaning physicians to the point where they are no longer in control of their minds or bodies. This fear is real. More than 10,000 patients in this country are maintained in a permanent vegetative state at a yearly cost of $125,000 each. We live in an era when
patients mistrust the motive of physicians who order expensive, and hopeless life-support systems, and then send the bill to the patient's family. Trust in medicine can be restored if doctors help patients with difficult decisions, rather than ignore their final wishes.

Dealing with death will not be easy for doctors, and many doctors will say "we've never been in the business of killing." To that we must reply that "you've never been in the business of prolonging suffering, either." A doctor's business is to help patients. At times, the best way and only humane way to help a dying patient is to help that patient die.

Active euthanasia can also help the survivors, the family members who suffer with someone's terminal illness. A Los Angeles man shared his suffering with me. Three years ago his 41 year-old wife was dying of cancer. Her pain, he recalls, "was tremendous and the kids and I were hopeless. We discussed what to do if the pain became unbearable and we didn't come to any conclusions. But, if she had asked me to help her die, I most certainly would have helped. I would have done anything, regardless of the consequences. And the consequences were, of course, that I would have been guilty at the very least of aiding and abetting a suicide, if not worse. My family's suffering would have reached a new low."

We understand the well-meaning motive of those who oppose active euthanasia, but patients and their families should not be forced to suffer.
NEVER GIVE UP ON YOUR PATIENTS

A recent medical article made public an ethical dilemma faced by more and more doctors and their patients. The dilemma involved active euthanasia or the merciful killing of a terminally ill patient by her doctor. In the article, a cancer patient asked her young doctor to "end it, now," to stop her pain and suffering with a deadly injection. Her doctor agreed and the patient died within minutes.

Should doctors actively participate in euthanasia? Should governments and hospitals allow patients and doctors to plan and carry out mercy killings? The young physician and those who support active euthanasia obviously feel that a patient has the right to die and endure no more pain. Further, supporters claim that death is often the only merciful response and that a physician should respect a patient's desperate wish to die.

The arguments for active euthanasia, however, sound better the less they are examined. When the American Medical Association (AMA) closely examined active euthanasia it found some fatal flaws.

Doctors take an oath to heal and a vow to respect the wishes of their patients. If the patient wishes to take no medication, a doctor must respect that wish. If a patient does not want to be kept alive by respirators and intravenous feeding, the choice of the patient must prevail. Doctors can never legally or morally treat a patient who wants no treatment. If the patient asks, the hand of healing can be withdrawn.

But, the AMA said the hand of healing can never be replaced with the hand of death. No matter what the request, a doctor must never intentionally cause a patient to die. That is simply not a doctor's role. There is a world of difference between not treating someone who wants no treatment, and physically and deliberately ending the life a patient who wants to die. These two worlds should never be confused.

This does not mean that doctors should stand by and watch patients suffer. As such as doctors should prevent death, they should also prevent suffering. Dr. Steven Miles, a noted ethical specialist from the University of Chicago says that pain controlling drugs are too often overlooked during emotional times. Modern drugs are now so good that patients can literally sleep through their pain. Miles says that controlling pain in terminally ill patients is no problem; the problem is "one of physician ignorance." Because many physicians do not know how to control pain, they wrongly believe that pain cannot be controlled. Through ignorance, they see euthanasia as the only way out. This is a deadly mistake that can be avoided if active euthanasia is banned.

Allowing active euthanasia is likely to open a Pandora's Box of troubles that we may never be able to close. First, there are legal troubles. What will be the legal consequences of doctors who agree to help a person die? Will the doctor be an accomplice in a crime? What if the diagnosis was wrong and the...
patient could have really survived? Is the doctor responsible for a wrongful death?

Next, there are psychological problems. Even if a doctor faces no legal problems, knowingly injecting a patient with a lethal dose is bound to cause stress among already over-stressed doctors. Not all doctors will suffer, but many will.

Finally, there are social problems. If active euthanasia is allowed, it is safe to assume that many desperate patients will ask to die. In time, active euthanasia may become the norm. If that ever happens we may move from an atmosphere that recognizes the right to die to a dark climate in which a patient feels the obligation or duty to die. If that ever happens, active euthanasia will cause more suffering that it could ever cure.

There are no simple answers for the problems raised in medicine. The problem of active euthanasia is no different. Even prominent religious scholars disagree over the morality of euthanasia. However, until there is absolutely no debate over euthanasia, physicians must stay away from helping patients die.
A debate is rising again in the Catholic Church about the priesthood. The debate is rising because the number of young men entering seminaries is dropping, the number of priests is shrinking, and as a result the quality of pastoral service is testing too few men are spread too far.

There are, no doubt many causes for these problems. One cause is the Church's stand on marriage for priests. Doubts about marriage in the priesthood are not new. For centuries theologians have argued that requiring young men to refuse wives and families in service of God may push many devout men away from the service of God.

This argument is not without its critics. Those who oppose clerical marriages argue that the scriptures prevent it, the traditions of the Church oppose it, and that it will interfere with the bond between a priest and his parish.

However, marriage for Catholics does have support in the scriptures; it does have a long tradition in the Church; and it is a sensible way to improve the Church and improve the bond between a priest and his parish.

The evidence.

Many Catholics believe that the Apostles never married and that their celibacy set a precedent for an unmarried priesthood. This is not the case. Some apostles were married, others were not. Furthermore, one of the celibate apostles, Paul in the First Corinthians 7:2, defended marriages at large when stating that "each man should have his own wife and each woman her own husband." It is hard to reconcile celibate Paul's support of marriage with the Church's current doctrine of an unmarried priesthood.

Many Catholics also believe that the Catholic Church has never allowed priests to marry. Not so. To the surprise of many, the Church allowed clerical marriages for over 1000 years! The majority of priests were married until 1139 when the Church changed its policy, forbidding priests the same rights to marry that are offered to parishioners.

Why the change in 1139? Surprisingly, the change was not for scriptural reasons. Rather, the tradition changed to make the Church fit the spiritual needs of the day. In 1139 influential Catholics believed that poverty and self-suffering were symbols of devotion, and no acts symbolized devotion more than celibacy and isolation from marriage. Catholics, in 1139, demanded that priests not marry. The Church has followed that wish for over 800 years.

But today many Catholics and priests are asking the Church to change again and to make celibacy and marriage an option rather than a requirement. Why? There are two reasons.

The first is delicate but must be raised. Forced celibacy leads many priests into sexual sins like adultery. No man should be required to become celibate if he does not have the strength for it. If forced, he may struggle in vain, and he may scandalize the church. Celibacy and
marriage must both be options for priests, not requirements.

Second, marriage in the priesthood gets support from the wisdom of Paul who (in Timothy 3:1-12) encouraged priests to marry when he noted that "for if a man does not know how to manage his own household, how can he care for God's house?" A priest who can experience the love and problems of a family can better care for God's house. A priest who can marry can stand with his parishioners and their families rather than stand isolated from them.

If the Church updates its rules on marriage and allows a priest to choose between marriage and celibacy — an option that is offered to all other Catholics — then the priesthood will become more appealing to young Catholics and the Church will be free to respond to the spiritual needs of our age rather than the outdated needs of centuries past.
A debate is rising in the Catholic church about the priesthood. The debate is rising because the number of young men entering seminaries is dropping, the number of priests has been shrinking, and as a result the quality of pastoral service has been weakened as too few men are spread too far.

Some people believe that the Church's stand on marriage for priests is the cause of the problem. They argue that requiring young men to sacrifice marriage and family in service of God may push many devout men away from the priesthood. To solve this problem some people are asking that priests be allowed to marry. Allowing priests to marry, so the argument goes, will refill the seminaries with men devoted to do God's work, and will rejuvenate the Church.

This argument, however, has some problems. To begin with, it is too easy to point to the shrinking seminaries and conclude that the problem comes from the Church and the edicts on marriage. In fact, much of the decline in seminary enrollments happened simply because the "Baby Boom" generation has grown up. With fewer young men around today, there are fewer young men to enter the seminaries this year. A new ruling on marriage in the priesthood will not change this situation, and will not refill the seminaries.

Even if marriage in the priesthood could increase the number of priests, the Church should not change its historical position. The reasons are many.

* BIBLICAL TEACHINGS *

First, Christ made it clear that the Apostles should not divide their devotion. At the Last Supper, Christ told the Apostles, "Come follow Me! Leave all things, and everyone who has left house, or brother, or sister, or father, or mother, or wife, or children for My sake shall receive a hundredfold." Following His command, priests have always been the messengers and representatives of God. For centuries, those who have spread God's Words have also lived by Those Words. Tens of thousands of priests, monks and nuns have married the Church and no one else. John the Baptist, Peter and Paul sacrificed marriage for God. In fact, all the Apostles, except one, sacrificed marriage in devotion to God. The only Apostle to marry was Judas.

* PART-TIME PRIESTS *

Being a priest means being first, last, and always a representative of God who serves all people, and serves all people equally. It is hard to deny that the demands of a wife and family would interfere with a priest's ability to serve his parish. In fact, if he is to be a good husband and parent, the demands of his family should interfere with his work. In the end, the Church and church-goers would suffer from the part-time priesthood.

* LOWERING THE STANDARDS *

If Catholic parishioners truly wanted priests to be like ministers in other faiths, Catholics would let it be known. But most Catholics are silent about marriage for priests because they want and expect more from their priests. Catholics want a priest to be
someone special, someone they
can trust, someone who by his
example guides and inspires
them.

Would the examples set by
married priests inspire Catho-
lics? Unfortunately not. A
married priest would be a
leader who announces that he
cannot devote himself to God,
that he is only partially
committed to his special job.
If we allow priests to marry,
we may get more priests, but
we will also get priests who
are less devoted. Just as the
airlines and hospital would not
lower their standards to
attract more pilots and doct-
ors, the Church cannot lower
its standards to attract more
priests.

The Church and its fol-
lowers have very little to
gain and very much to lose if
priests are allowed to marry.
OPENING THE DOORS AT STATE UNIVERSITIES

Some recent rumblings out of Springfield are coming from education experts who want reforms at the State Higher Education Board, the office that makes policy for Illinois' 13 publicly funded universities. Although few agree on how to solve the problems or which problems are most important, experts and interested spectators have much to say about the public universities. For instance, critics say that the budget for state universities is either too high or not high enough. Experts say the deans and presidents have either too much power or not enough power. Tax payers say that too many courses are offered or not enough are offered.

Through this noise we heard a complaint that caught our attention. For over a century the State Higher Education Board had a mission - to provide high quality and low cost education to the people of Illinois. The Board should be commended for their efforts. Illinois universities are among the best in the nation and provide a first class education for Illinois residents. Our state universities have also made higher education affordable. Even though students and their families usually save and borrow to pay for college, tax support from all Illinois residents helps keep the cost down.

Where the State Education Board has failed is in its admissions policy. Under the current "selective admissions" policy, acceptance into a state university is based on two criteria: a high school diploma, and the potential for success in college. "Potential" is usually based on success or failure in the past. Only when high school grades and standard test scores are above some minimum will the doors to the state universities open. Most of Illinois' high school students easily meet the minimum standards, but some do not. Under selective admissions, acceptance into Illinois universities remains a privilege that not all Illinois residents share.

Now the tradition of selective admissions into state funded universities is being challenged by many education experts in Springfield. They recommend that the Board replace the selective admission policy with an "open admissions" policy. Under open admissions, past grades and test score would be ignored. Acceptance into Illinois' state universities would require only a high school diploma and the desire to learn.

The challenges to selective admissions are simple. A university that is built and maintained with public money should be open to the public. Each person's tax dollars help support the schools. In return for this tax support, each person should have the right to attend. By closing the doors of the university we do two things. We deny people the right to use something that they help pay for. And, we send a message to people that while their money is good enough to go to the universities, they are not.

Selective admissions is also challenged because it's an unfair burden on low income
families. Tax payers from all income levels — high, middle, and low — help support the state schools. But, students from the low income families are admitted into state schools far less often, usually because they came from the worst public high schools and suffered the lowest test scores. We believe that the education system that failed them in the past should not ignore their dreams to enter college in the future. With private universities remaining too expensive, the publicly funded universities are the only hope for low income students.

Opening the doors to all high school graduates does not mean that unqualified students will remain enrolled when they are failing. The door that shows the way into the university must be used with a door that shows the way out. No one benefits from classrooms that are overcrowded, faculty that are overworked, and classmates that slow the pace of lessons.

There will be growing pains with open admissions, but with proper control and an out door that swings as easily as an in door, the pains will be replaces with gains. The issue of open admissions is an emotional one. Its foes believe in their hearts that education will suffer if everyone is offered it. Its friends, however, believe that with education, like health, everyone benefits if everyone has it.
USING THE STATE UNIVERSITIES WISELY

Some recent rumblings out of Springfield are coming from education experts who want reforms at the State Higher Education Board, the office that makes policy for Illinois' 13 publicly funded universities. Although few agree on how to solve the problems or which problems are most important, experts and interested spectators have much to say about the public universities. For instance, critics say that the budget for state universities is either too high or not high enough. Experts say the deans and presidents have either too much power or not enough power. Tax payers say that too many courses are offered or not enough are offered.

Through this noise we heard a complaint that caught our attention. For over a century the State Higher Education Board had a mission - to provide high quality and low cost education to the people of Illinois. The Board should be commended for their efforts. Illinois universities are among the best in the nation and provide a first class education for Illinois residents. Our state universities have also made higher education affordable. Even though students and their families usually save and borrow to pay for college, tax support from all Illinois residents helps keep the cost down.

Some experts are rumbling, however, that the State Higher Education Board has failed an important part of this mission. The complaint centers on the Board's admissions policy.

Under the current "selective admissions" policy, acceptance into a state university is based on two criteria: a high school diploma, and the potential for success in college. "Potential" for college is usually based on a history of past success in high school. When high school grades and standard test scores are above some minimum, the doors to the state universities open. When high school grades and test scores are low, the doors to state universities remain closed. Most of Illinois' high school students easily meet the minimum standards, but some do not. Under selective admissions, acceptance into Illinois universities remains a privilege that Illinois residents need to earn.

Now the tradition of selective admissions into state funded universities is being challenged by a few education experts. They recommend that the Board replace the selective admission policy with an "open admissions" policy. Under open admissions, past grades and test score would be ignored. Acceptance into Illinois' state schools would require only the wish to attend, but not the history of success or the potential to graduate.

Supporters of open admissions reason that taxpayers have earned the right to a college education by building and maintaining state universities with their tax dollars. Since their tax dollars help pay for it, they should get to use it. True, but only to a point. By the same logic, paying taxes to the federal government would entitle the wealthy to get food stamps, and
would entitle average citizens adventures on the space shuttle. Tax dollars do not give us carte blanche to all state service.

At some point, the state has to be realistic. The state can afford — but just barely — to educate all of its residents through high school. The cost of a college education is so high and in such short supply that the state must use its colleges wisely.

Open admissions is a well intended, but unwise use of public universities. The direct result of open admissions would be overcrowded classrooms and overworked faculty. The best students would find courses unchallenging and uninspiring because lectures would be slowed down by or brought down to less able students. In all likelihood, open admissions would weaken the universities. If the State Higher Education Board wants to succeed in the mission of providing high quality, low cost education to the people of Illinois, it should stay with the selective admissions policy that made Illinois' 13 state universities among the best in the country.
Editorial Supporting Mandatory Drug Testing

THE CASE FOR MANDATORY DRUG TESTING

When the commissioners of both the National Baseball League and the National Football League first announced that all players must regularly undergo mandatory tests to detect illegal drug use, many players—and most private employees—were caught without a solid legal defense and with few good arguments.

A federal court told players and non-government employees they don't have the legal defenses of the constitution that protect our privacy from unreasonable search and seizure "by the government." But, when private companies are doing the searching, employees do not have the constitution on their team. At present, companies are winning the contest over mandatory drug tests, especially for jobs that involve the safety of other people. The court rulings do not just apply to over-developed football players. For instance, the courts have included truck drivers, construction workers, factory workers, and others as open for drug testing.

The silence of the constitution takes away the major defense of private workers. There are other reasons, however, to favor drug testing. In fact, we think the case for mandatory tests in safety-sensitive jobs is strong. Opponents of mandatory tests make some arguments that simply don't stand up. Opponents argue that drug tests are not accurate and that many innocent people will be falsely accused of drug use. After all, mistakes do happen. While this fear had some grounding in the past, it has little grounding today. Recently the federal courts began ruling that companies must use drug tests with great care. Great care includes using a second, more accurate test for anyone that test positive for drug use. If the employee does not test positive on the second test, he is in the clear. If a second test is not used the company can expect to be dragged to court by employees and can expect to lose. By ensuring that no people are wrongly accused of drug use, the argument about test accuracy is more fear than fact.

Employees also argue that mandatory testing, while not technically illegal, ought to be illegal. We disagree. In fact, we see clear reason to believe that companies are morally obligated to use mandatory tests. In the 1930's the American labor movement helped the country recognize that every employer must maintain a workplace free from hazards that are likely to cause death and serious injury. In the 1980's we must recognize the hazards of drugs in the workplace. Statistics from the American Medical Association warn that 1 out of 20 co-workers has a drug problem, and 1 of 10 has an alcohol problem. Many of these problems are left at home, but some come to work. In safety-sensitive jobs, one person's drug problem can cost another person his life. If testing helps identify people who are using drugs, or if it helps prevents employees from trying drugs, then the company must use testing to protect innocent people.

Finally, opponents of
Mandatory testing argue that our private life is a private matter and is no business of our employer. We would agree, but only if what we do at home does not affect what we do at work. Smoking marijuana on Saturday should not concern our bosses if it does not affect us on Monday. Using cocaine in the evening is private if it leaves us clear minded in the morning. These are big "ifs" though, and with drug abuse, private life and work life do overlap. All too often, drugs at home become absenteeism and serious accidents at work. Employers have been forced to learn this lesson, and are forced to do something about it.

No company relishes the idea of regular drug testing. Testing is expensive and unpopular. But, if a company feels that drug abuse poses a serious and real threat to other workers, the company has the right — if not the obligation — to take this unpopular step. Sometimes the public interest must weigh heavier than private interests. When it comes to protecting innocent people, companies should be allowed to conduct mandatory drug testing.
Editorial Opposing Mandatory Drug Testing

THE CASE AGAINST MANDATORY DRUG TESTING

When the commissioners of both the National Baseball League and the National Football League first announced that all players must regularly undergo mandatory tests to detect illegal drug use, many players — and most private employees — were caught without an important legal defense but with many valid complaints.

A federal court told players and non-government employees they don't have the legal defenses of the constitution that protect our privacy from unreasonable search and seizure "by the government." But, when private companies are doing the searching, employees do not have the constitution on their team. At present, companies are winning the contest over mandatory drug tests, especially for jobs that involve the safety of other people. The court rulings do not just apply to over-developed football players. For instance, the courts have included truck drivers, construction workers, factory workers, and others as open for drug testing.

The silence of the constitution takes away only one defense of private employees. There are other reasons, however, to oppose drug testing. In fact, we think the case against mandatory tests in safety-sensitive jobs is still very strong because supporters of mandatory tests make some arguments that simply don't stand up.

Supporters argue that drug tests are accurate. The makers of these tests say their tests make only 3 errors for each 100 employees. Nice results. But, when the tests are re-checked by less profit-oriented scientists the results are alarmingly bad. The American Medical Association found that drug tests make not 5, but 25 mistakes in 100. Bad enough being around other people who are smoking marijuana may cause you to test positive for drug use, these "state-of-the-art tests" confuse cold medicines with amphetamines, oriental teas with marijuana, and the poppy seeds on your bagel with opium and heroine. Twenty-five mistakes in 100 represent 25 people who might lose their jobs, their futures, and their reputations because they are guilty of nothing more than working for a company that requires drug tests.

Companies using these tests also argue that mandatory testing falls with the boundaries of the law. We agree. These tests are technically legal, but we also feel they are a gross distortion of the legal system. Our legal system leans in favor of innocence where sometimes a guilty person goes free to ensure that innocent people are never convicted. Drug testing leans in the opposite direction and favors guilt — many innocent people get fired to ensure that the few people guilty of using drugs are caught. This notion of justice, we feel, is hard to defend.

Finally, defenders of mandatory tests argue that companies have the right to protect their company, their employees, and their customers from drug abuse. No argument, here. Drugs don't belong in the workplace. When drugs are
used, productivity stumbles, profits fall, and insurance premiums get as high as the number of accidents. But, there are better, more humane ways to control drug abuse than forcing workers to provide urine samples. When drugs become a problem there are clear signs — regular tardiness, absenteeism, job impairment, poor conduct and emotional troubles. If a company educates supervisors and co-workers about these signs there is no need for expensive and inaccurate tests. Drug abuse is a problem that is best spotted and treated by people, not by test tubes and laboratory tests.

One issue we feel that companies too often try to minimize is an employee's privacy. Just because the constitution does not prevent our bosses from snooping into our private lives doesn't mean that they should be snooping. If — and this is a big "if" — what we do at home has no effect on what we do at work, it should be respected as private. If we decide to use marijuana on Saturday night we should answer to the police, not to our bosses. It is none of their business, and outside of their rights. Mandatory drug testing ought to be banned.
APPENDIX D:
PERSONALITY SCALES USED IN THE STUDY
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale

MCSD

Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally. Then circle "T" if the statement is true for you, and "F" if the statement is false for you.

1) T F Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates.

2) T F I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.

3) T F It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.

4) T F I have never intensely disliked anyone.

5) T F On occasion I have doubts about my ability to succeed in life.

6) T F I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way.

7) T F I am always careful about my manner of dress.

8) T F My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant.

9) T F If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen, I would probably do it.

10) T F On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability.

11) T F I like to gossip at times.

12) T F There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they were right.

13) T F No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener.

14) T F I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something.

15) T F There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.

16) T F I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.

17) T F I always try to practice what I preach.
(18)  T  F  I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed, obnoxious people.

(19)  T  F  I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.

(20)  T  F  When I don't know something, I don't at all mind admitting it.

(21)  T  F  I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.

(22)  T  F  At times I have really insisted on having things my own way.

(23)  T  F  There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.

(24)  T  F  I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrongdoings.

(25)  T  F  I never resent being asked to return a favor.

(26)  T  F  I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.

(27)  T  F  I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car.

(28)  T  F  There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.

(29)  T  F  I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.

(30)  T  F  I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.

(31)  T  F  I have never felt that I was punished without cause.

(32)  T  F  I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved.

(33)  T  F  I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.
Feelings of Inadequacy Scale

Please answer each of the following questions by circling the answer that best describes you.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Score Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How often do you have the feeling that there is nothing you can do well?</td>
<td>1=Very Often 2=Fairly Often 3=Sometimes 4=Once in a Great While 5=Practically Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. When you have to talk in front of a class or group of people your own age, how often do you feel afraid or worried.</td>
<td>1=Very Often 2=Fairly Often 3=Sometimes 4=Once in a Great While 5=Practically Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How often do you worry about whether other people like to be with you?</td>
<td>1=Very Often 2=Fairly Often 3=Sometimes 4=Once in a Great While 5=Practically Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. How often do you feel self-conscious?</td>
<td>1=Very Often 2=Fairly Often 3=Sometimes 4=Once in a Great While 5=Practically Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. How often are you troubled with shyness?</td>
<td>1=Very Often 2=Fairly Often 3=Sometimes 4=Once in a Great While 5=Practically Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. How often do you feel that you handle yourself well at social gatherings?</td>
<td>1=Very Often 2=Fairly Often 3=Sometimes 4=Once in a Great While 5=Practically Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. How often do you have the feeling that you can do everything well?</td>
<td>1=Very Often 2=Fairly Often 3=Sometimes 4=Once in a Great While 5=Practically Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. When you talk in front of a class or group of people your own age, how often are you pleased with your performance?</td>
<td>1=Very Often 2=Fairly Often 3=Sometimes 4=Once in a Great While 5=Practically Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Response Options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. How often do you feel comfortable when starting a conversation with</td>
<td>1=Very Often, 2=Fairly Often, 3=Sometimes, 4=Once in a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people who you don't know?</td>
<td>Great While, 5=Practically Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. How often do you feel that you are a successful person?</td>
<td>1=Very Often, 2=Fairly Often, 3=Sometimes, 4=Once in a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Great While, 5=Practically Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. How often do you feel inferior to most of the people you know?</td>
<td>1=Very Often, 2=Fairly Often, 3=Sometimes, 4=Once in a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Great While, 5=Practically Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. How often have you felt that you are a worthless individual?</td>
<td>1=Very Often, 2=Fairly Often, 3=Sometimes, 4=Once in a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Great While, 5=Practically Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. How much do you worry about how well you get along with other people?</td>
<td>1=Very Often, 2=Fairly Often, 3=Sometimes, 4=Once in a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Great While, 5=Practically Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. How often have you felt that you dislike yourself?</td>
<td>1=Very Often, 2=Fairly Often, 3=Sometimes, 4=Once in a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Great While, 5=Practically Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. How often have you felt so discouraged with yourself that you</td>
<td>1=Very Often, 2=Fairly Often, 3=Sometimes, 4=Once in a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wondered whether anything is worthwhile?</td>
<td>Great While, 5=Practically Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. How often do you feel that you are a success at the things you do?</td>
<td>1=Very Often, 2=Fairly Often, 3=Sometimes, 4=Once in a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Great While, 5=Practically Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. How often have you felt that you will be a success in your future</td>
<td>1=Very Often, 2=Fairly Often, 3=Sometimes, 4=Once in a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>job or career?</td>
<td>Great While, 5=Practically Never</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18. How often have you felt sure of yourself when among strangers?
1=Very Often 
2=Fairly Often 
3=Sometimes 
4=Once in a Great While 
5=Practically Never

19. How often do you feel that some day people you know will look up to you and respect you?
1=Very Often 
2=Fairly Often 
3=Sometimes 
4=Once in a Great While 
5=Practically Never

20. In general, how often have you felt confident in your abilities?
1=Very Often 
2=Fairly Often 
3=Sometimes 
4=Once in a Great While 
5=Practically Never
Speilberger Trait Anxiety Scale

SELF-EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE
STAI Form Y-1

DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. Read each statement and then blacken in the appropriate circle to the right of the statement to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe how you generally feel.

21. I feel pleasant .................................................. 0 0 0 0
22. I feel nervous and restless .................................. 0 0 0 0
23. I feel satisfied with myself .................................. 0 0 0 0
24. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be .......... 0 0 0 0
25. I feel like a failure ........................................... 0 0 0 0
26. I feel rested .................................................... 0 0 0 0
27. I am “calm, cool, and collected” .......................... 0 0 0 0
28. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them 0 0 0 0
29. I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter .... 0 0 0 0
30. I am happy ..................................................... 0 0 0 0
31. I have disturbing thoughts ................................. 0 0 0 0
32. I lack self-confidence ....................................... 0 0 0 0
33. I feel secure ................................................... 0 0 0 0
34. I make decisions easily ..................................... 0 0 0 0
35. I feel inadequate ............................................. 0 0 0 0
36. I am content .................................................. 0 0 0 0
37. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers me 0 0 0 0
38. I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my mind .................................................. 0 0 0 0
39. I am a steady person ........................................ 0 0 0 0
40. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and interests ..................................... 0 0 0 0

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Need-For-Cognition Scale

NFC

We would like you to read the following statements and then indicate how strongly you agree or disagree each. There are no "correct" responses to these statements, only those responses that best describe you and your personal feelings.

You can indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement by using the following scale. Please circle the one number that best describes you and your personal feelings.

-4 = Very Strong Disagreement
-3 = Strong Disagreement
-2 = Moderate Disagreement
-1 = Slight Disagreement
0 = Neither Disagreement or Agreement
+1 = Slight Agreement
+2 = Moderate Agreement
+3 = Strong Agreement
+4 = Very Strong Agreement

1) I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
   
2) Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.

3) The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top does not appeal to me.

4) The idea of thinking abstractly is not appealing to me.

5) I only think as hard as I have to.

6) I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.

7) I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.

8) I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities.

9) I find little satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
-4 = Very Strong Disagreement  
-3 = Strong Disagreement  
-2 = Moderate Disagreement  
-1 = Slight Disagreement  
0 = Neither Disagreement or Agreement  
+1 = Slight Agreement  
+2 = Moderate Agreement  
+3 = Strong Agreement  
+4 = Very Strong Agreement

10) I don't like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.  
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4

11) I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort.  
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4

12) Thinking is not my idea of fun.  
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4

13) I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think about something in depth.  
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4

14) I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.  
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4

15) I would prefer complex to simple problems.  
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4

16) It's enough for me that something gets the job done, I don't care how or why it works.  
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
APPENDIX E:

PAPER-AND-PENCIL

MEASURES OF PERSUASIBILITY
No doubt, there are many times in a day that people try to convince you of something. People you live with may suggest that a relative is dishonest because of something he or she did. After seeing a movie together, you and a friend may disagree about the movie, and that friend then tries to point out something about the movie that you had not considered. You may have read a newspaper or magazine article that concluded some government policy ought to be changed, or that one political candidate is better qualified than another candidate. Even authors of text books may try to convince you which theories are best.

For the next few minutes we would like you to think about three occasions in the last few days when someone tried to influence any of your opinions — important or unimportant. For example, think about some conversations you have had recently when you mildly or sharply disagreed with another person. Think about some articles in the papers or some theories in your texts you recently read. Think about any occasions when someone tried to persuade you.

IN THE SPACES BELOW, PLEASE WRITE A SHORT SENTENCE OR TWO TO DESCRIBE EACH OCCASION, AND DESCRIBE HOW YOU FELT AT THAT TIME.

OCCASION 1:

OCCASION 2:

OCCASION 3:

*************PLEASE WAIT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS*************
With these occasions in mind, we would like you to indicate how accurately a list of statements describes how you feel, in general, whenever someone tries to persuade you. We have included many different statements to cover the many feelings you might have when someone tries to persuade you. You may find that some of these statements describe how you feel very accurately, some only describe you somewhat accurately, and some do not give an accurate description of your feelings at all. Whether these statements describe you or not, you can be sure that many people feel the same as you.

You can indicate how accurately each statement describes you by using the following scale:

IN GENERAL, THIS STATEMENT DESCRIBES ME...

1=VERY Accurately
2=FAIRLY Accurately
3=HARD TO SAY
4=FAIRLY Inaccurately
5=VERY Inaccurately

Please draw a circle around the one number that best describes how accurately each statement describes you.
01. Usually I’ve wanted to do the opposite of what people try to convince me to do.

In general, this statement describes me:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1=Very Accurately</th>
<th>2=Fairly Accurately</th>
<th>3=Hard To Say</th>
<th>4=Fairly Inaccurately</th>
<th>5=Very Inaccurately</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

02. I sometimes do not trust my own judgment.

In general, this statement describes me:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1=Very Accurately</th>
<th>2=Fairly Accurately</th>
<th>3=Hard To Say</th>
<th>4=Fairly Inaccurately</th>
<th>5=Very Inaccurately</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

03. When people try to change my mind, I try hard to prevent them from accomplishing it.

In general, this statement describes me:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1=Very Accurately</th>
<th>2=Fairly Accurately</th>
<th>3=Hard To Say</th>
<th>4=Fairly Inaccurately</th>
<th>5=Very Inaccurately</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

04. After listening to someone, it is easy for me to see things "in a new light."

In general, this statement describes me:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1=Very Accurately</th>
<th>2=Fairly Accurately</th>
<th>3=Hard To Say</th>
<th>4=Fairly Inaccurately</th>
<th>5=Very Inaccurately</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

05. It is hard for me to see things from someone else’s point of view when they are trying to convince me of something.

In general, this statement describes me:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1=Very Accurately</th>
<th>2=Fairly Accurately</th>
<th>3=Hard To Say</th>
<th>4=Fairly Inaccurately</th>
<th>5=Very Inaccurately</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

06. Rather than listening while people are talking to me, I am usually thinking of things to rebut what they are saying.

In general, this statement describes me:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1=Very Accurately</th>
<th>2=Fairly Accurately</th>
<th>3=Hard To Say</th>
<th>4=Fairly Inaccurately</th>
<th>5=Very Inaccurately</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

07. When listening to someone, I usually realize that there can be more than one correct opinion.

In general, this statement describes me:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1=Very Accurately</th>
<th>2=Fairly Accurately</th>
<th>3=Hard To Say</th>
<th>4=Fairly Inaccurately</th>
<th>5=Very Inaccurately</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

08. I am often surprised at how convincing people can be.

In general, this statement describes me:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1=Very Accurately</th>
<th>2=Fairly Accurately</th>
<th>3=Hard To Say</th>
<th>4=Fairly Inaccurately</th>
<th>5=Very Inaccurately</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

09. It is more important that people see my point of view than it is for me to see things from their point of view.

In general, this statement describes me:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1=Very Accurately</th>
<th>2=Fairly Accurately</th>
<th>3=Hard To Say</th>
<th>4=Fairly Inaccurately</th>
<th>5=Very Inaccurately</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
10. Usually I've felt uncomfortable when people try to convince me of their ideas.

In general, this statement describes me:  
1=Very Accurately  
2=Fairly Accurately  
3=Hard To Say  
4=Fairly Inaccurately  
5=Very Inaccurately

11. People often win me over to their point of view.

In general, this statement describes me:  
1=Very Accurately  
2=Fairly Accurately  
3=Hard To Say  
4=Fairly Inaccurately  
5=Very Inaccurately

12. During discussions with people, I hold onto my opinions more strongly than most other people.

In general, this statement describes me:  
1=Very Accurately  
2=Fairly Accurately  
3=Hard To Say  
4=Fairly Inaccurately  
5=Very Inaccurately

13. I usually "give in" to people because I eventually realize they are right.

In general, this statement describes me:  
1=Very Accurately  
2=Fairly Accurately  
3=Hard To Say  
4=Fairly Inaccurately  
5=Very Inaccurately

14. In most cases, changing my opinions is better than hanging on to old opinions.

In general, this statement describes me:  
1=Very Accurately  
2=Fairly Accurately  
3=Hard To Say  
4=Fairly Inaccurately  
5=Very Inaccurately

15. I usually hold onto my opinions even when other people hold the opposite opinions.

In general, this statement describes me:  
1=Very Accurately  
2=Fairly Accurately  
3=Hard To Say  
4=Fairly Inaccurately  
5=Very Inaccurately

16. I feel uncomfortable if someone convinces me to adopt a new opinion.

In general, this statement describes me:  
1=Very Accurately  
2=Fairly Accurately  
3=Hard To Say  
4=Fairly Inaccurately  
5=Very Inaccurately

17. It is important for me to share opinions that are compatible with the opinions of my friends.

In general, this statement describes me:  
1=Very Accurately  
2=Fairly Accurately  
3=Hard To Say  
4=Fairly Inaccurately  
5=Very Inaccurately

18. Changing my opinions makes me doubt my integrity.

In general, this statement describes me:  
1=Very Accurately  
2=Fairly Accurately  
3=Hard To Say  
4=Fairly Inaccurately  
5=Very Inaccurately
19. I am usually uncomfortable when my opinions are at odds with the opinions of other people.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

20. Once I form an opinion, I frequently wonder if my decision was correct.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

21. I am a better listener than leader.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

22. Many times I am more convinced that my opinions are correct after someone tries to change my mind.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

23. I put more trust in my judgment than in the judgment of other people.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

24. I think that people who don’t change their opinions are usually stubborn.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

25. Compared to most people, I’m an independent, free-thinker.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

26. I think people who hold onto their opinions are admirable.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

27. I believe it takes a strong person to admit that their own opinions are wrong.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
28. When someone is trying to convince me of something, I try hard to listen to what they are saying.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

29. My opinions are very important to me.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

30. When people try to convince me of things, they usually have good ideas.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

31. My opinions rarely change because they are rarely wrong.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

32. I get defensive when people try to change my opinions.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

33. I’ve found that I am usually correct if I trust my own judgment.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

34. I believe that changing your opinions is a sign of maturity.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

35. I think it is better to be open-minded than it is to be strong-willed

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

36. When listening to someone, I often begin to rethink my position.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
37. I usually feel confident about my beliefs.

In general, this statement describes me:

1 = Very Accurately
2 = Fairly Accurately
3 = Hard To Say
4 = Fairly Inaccurately
5 = Very Inaccurately

38. When listening to people, I usually learn that an issue is not as simple or as "black and white" as I first thought.

In general, this statement describes me:

1 = Very Accurately
2 = Fairly Accurately
3 = Hard To Say
4 = Fairly Inaccurately
5 = Very Inaccurately

39. My opinions usually turn out to be right.

In general, this statement describes me:

1 = Very Accurately
2 = Fairly Accurately
3 = Hard To Say
4 = Fairly Inaccurately
5 = Very Inaccurately

40. After listening to someone, it is easier for me to see things "in a new light" than it is for most other people.

In general, this statement describes me:

1 = Very Accurately
2 = Fairly Accurately
3 = Hard To Say
4 = Fairly Inaccurately
5 = Very Inaccurately

41. It is important for me to hold onto my opinions.

In general, this statement describes me:

1 = Very Accurately
2 = Fairly Accurately
3 = Hard To Say
4 = Fairly Inaccurately
5 = Very Inaccurately

42. In a discussion, I probably change my mind more easily than most people.

In general, this statement describes me:

1 = Very Accurately
2 = Fairly Accurately
3 = Hard To Say
4 = Fairly Inaccurately
5 = Very Inaccurately

43. It is important for me not to let people persuade me.

In general, this statement describes me:

1 = Very Accurately
2 = Fairly Accurately
3 = Hard To Say
4 = Fairly Inaccurately
5 = Very Inaccurately

44. Many times my opinions may "bend but not break".

In general, this statement describes me:

1 = Very Accurately
2 = Fairly Accurately
3 = Hard To Say
4 = Fairly Inaccurately
5 = Very Inaccurately

45. I usually see if my opinions are reasonable by listening to what other people are saying.

In general, this statement describes me:

1 = Very Accurately
2 = Fairly Accurately
3 = Hard To Say
4 = Fairly Inaccurately
5 = Very Inaccurately
46. People think I am stubborn.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

47. I usually feel like I’ve improved myself if I form a new opinion, and get rid of an old one.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

48. I sometimes worry when my beliefs are different than the beliefs of most people.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

49. It bothers me to change my opinions.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

50. It is sometimes better to trust the judgment of other people than to rely on my own feelings.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

51. In a discussion, I am more open-minded than most people.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

52. I think that people who change their opinions are usually weak.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

53. I almost always believe that my opinions are correct.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately

54. I think people who hold onto their opinions have strong characters.

In general, this statement describes me:

1=Very Accurately
2=Fairly Accurately
3=Hard To Say
4=Fairly Inaccurately
5=Very Inaccurately
55. When I disagree with someone, I rarely change my mind because they are usually wrong.  
In general, this statement describes me: 

1=Very Accurately 
2=Fairly Accurately 
3=Hard To Say 
4=Fairly Inaccurately 
5=Very Inaccurately 

56. I usually listen to the opinions of people I like.  
In general, this statement describes me: 

1=Very Accurately 
2=Fairly Accurately 
3=Hard To Say 
4=Fairly Inaccurately 
5=Very Inaccurately 

57. I believe it takes a strong person to admit that someone else's opinions are right.  
In general, this statement describes me: 

1=Very Accurately 
2=Fairly Accurately 
3=Hard To Say 
4=Fairly Inaccurately 
5=Very Inaccurately 

58. I usually trust that my own opinions are right, even when people try to change my mind.  
In general, this statement describes me: 

1=Very Accurately 
2=Fairly Accurately 
3=Hard To Say 
4=Fairly Inaccurately 
5=Very Inaccurately 

59. In a discussion, I usually work hard to hold onto my beliefs.  
In general, this statement describes me: 

1=Very Accurately 
2=Fairly Accurately 
3=Hard To Say 
4=Fairly Inaccurately 
5=Very Inaccurately 

60. I think that changing your opinions is a sign of open-mindedness.  
In general, this statement describes me: 

1=Very Accurately 
2=Fairly Accurately 
3=Hard To Say 
4=Fairly Inaccurately 
5=Very Inaccurately 

61. I am usually an assertive person.  
In general, this statement describes me: 

1=Very Accurately 
2=Fairly Accurately 
3=Hard To Say 
4=Fairly Inaccurately 
5=Very Inaccurately 

62. Changing my opinions is no big deal.  
In general, this statement describes me: 

1=Very Accurately 
2=Fairly Accurately 
3=Hard To Say 
4=Fairly Inaccurately 
5=Very Inaccurately 

63. GENDER: (circle one)  
1. Male 
2. Female
Phillips Persuasibility Inventory

PPI

On the following pages are 42 statements. The best answer to each statement is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover many opposing and different points of view. You may find yourself strongly agreeing with some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly with some, and perhaps less certain about others. Whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many people feel the same as you do.

Draw a circle around the number in the left margin preceding each statement according to how you agree or disagree with it. Please circle one number for each statement.


1) 6 5 4 3 2 1 Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

2) 6 5 4 3 2 1 I do what others expect of me.

3) 6 5 4 3 2 1 My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he or she is wrong.

4) 6 5 4 3 2 1 There are two kinds of people in this world; those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

5) 6 5 4 3 2 1 I would like to see the inflation and energy problems solved soon.

6) 6 5 4 3 2 1 Once I start a task, I don't like to start another until I finish the first one.

7) 6 5 4 3 2 1 People just don't know what's good for them.

8) 6 5 4 3 2 1 I must justify my actions in the pursuit of my own interests.

9) 6 5 4 3 2 1 Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world, there is probably only one which is correct.

10) 6 5 4 3 2 1 Before any important job, I must know how long it will take.

11) 6 5 4 3 2 1 I would support a large city-income tax which placed a heavy burden on me.

12) 6 5 4 3 2 1 The highest form of government is a democracy, and the highest form of democracy is a government run by the most intelligent people.
13) 6 5 4 3 2 1 The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.
14) 6 5 4 3 2 1 I live by the rules and standards of society.
15) 6 5 4 3 2 1 In a problem-solving group it is always best to systematically attack the problem.
16) 6 5 4 3 2 1 I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.
17) 6 5 4 3 2 1 Proper rest is necessary for good health.
18) 6 5 4 3 2 1 In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.
19) 6 5 4 3 2 1 A problem has little attraction for me if I don't think it has a solution.
20) 6 5 4 3 2 1 Reasons are needed to justify my feelings.
21) 6 5 4 3 2 1 People on their own are helpless and miserable creatures.
22) 6 5 4 3 2 1 I do not like to get started in group projects unless I feel assured that the project will be successful.
23) 6 5 4 3 2 1 Education is a waste of time for children; they should be free to do as they want.
24) 6 5 4 3 2 1 It's only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.
25) 6 5 4 3 2 1 In a decision-making situation in which there is not enough information to process the problem, I feel very uncomfortable.
26) 6 5 4 3 2 1 I only feel free to express warm feelings to my friends.
27) 6 5 4 3 2 1 Most people just don't give a damn for others.
28) 6 5 4 3 2 1 To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.
29) 6 5 4 3 2 1 Moderation in most activities is not a perfect rule, but it's a good one.
6: I AGREE VERY MUCH  3: I DISAGREE A LITTLE
5: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE  2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE
4: I AGREE A LITTLE  1: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

30) 6 5 4 3 2 1 I don't like to work on a problem unless there is a possibility of coming out with a clear-cut and unambiguous answer.

31) 6 5 4 3 2 1 It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had the chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

32) 6 5 4 3 2 1 I will continue to grow only by setting my sights on a high-level, socially approved goal.

33) 6 5 4 3 2 1 The present is all too full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.

34) 6 5 4 3 2 1 Complex problems appeal to me only if I have a clear idea of the total scope of the problem.

35) 6 5 4 3 2 1 Highway speed limits should be raised to 100 miles per hour, even if 10 times as many people get killed.

36) 6 5 4 3 2 1 In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.

37) 6 5 4 3 2 1 While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great person like Einstein, Shakespeare, Beethoven, or Madam Curie, Eleanor Roosevelt, or Susan B. Anthony.

38) 6 5 4 3 2 1 People should always control their anger.

39) 6 5 4 3 2 1 A group meeting functions best with a definite agenda.

40) 6 5 4 3 2 1 Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

41) 6 5 4 3 2 1 It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.

42) 6 5 4 3 2 1 The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.
Janis & Field Persuasibility Questionnaire

JFPQ

Please answer the following questions in a way that best describes you.

1) How often do you change your opinion if you discover that most of the people you know do not share your point of view?

   0 = Less than 1 time in 5
   1 = About 1 time out of 5
   2 = About 2 times out of 5
   3 = About 3 times out of 5
   4 = About 4 times out of 5
   5 = More than 4 times in 5

2) When one of your friends wants to convince you of his point of view, does he usually have a hard time or an easy time?

   0 = An Extremely Hard time
   1 = A Moderately Hard time
   2 = A Slightly Hard time
   3 = A Slightly Easy time
   4 = A Moderately Easy time
   5 = An Extremely Easy time

3) As compared with the average person your own age, how much are you usually influenced by the ideas expressed by your friends?

   0 = Very Infrequently
   1 = Infrequently
   2 = Somewhat Infrequently
   3 = Somewhat Frequently
   4 = Frequently
   5 = Very Frequently

4) As compared with the average person your age, how strongly do you usually hang onto your own opinions at times when your friends are trying to get you to change your mind?

   0 = Very Strongly
   1 = Strongly
   2 = Somewhat Strongly
   3 = Somewhat Mildly
   4 = Mildly
   5 = Very Mildly

5) How easy is it for your friends to get you to do what they want you to do?

   0 = It's Very Difficult
   1 = It's Difficult
   2 = It's Somewhat Difficult
   3 = It's Somewhat Easy
   4 = It's Easy
   5 = It's Very Easy

6) When other people criticize your ideas or object to your opinion, how often do you end up feeling that they are right and you are wrong?

   0 = Very Infrequently
   1 = Infrequently
   2 = Somewhat Infrequently
   3 = Somewhat Frequently
   4 = Frequently
   5 = Very Frequently

7) How often do you become uneasy when the opinion of one of your friends is different from your own on some important topic?

   0 = Very Infrequently
   1 = Infrequently
   2 = Somewhat Infrequently
   3 = Somewhat Frequently
   4 = Frequently
   5 = Very Frequently
8) How often do you feel sure you know what is right or wrong about the ideas expressed by the people you know?

0 = Very Infrequently
1 = Infrequently
2 = Somewhat Infrequently
3 = Somewhat Frequently
4 = Frequently
5 = Very Frequently

9) How regularly do you agree or disagree with the articles that you read in newspapers and magazines?

1 = I Agree with practically everything I read.
2 = I Agree with most of the things I read.
3 = I Agree with about half and Disagree with about half.
4 = I Disagree with most of the things I read.
5 = I Disagree with practically everything I read.

10) Nowadays when people listen to the radio or watch TV, they hear a great deal of advertising, publicity, and information that attempts to influence their opinions. When compared to the average person your own age, how much are your own ideas influenced by the things you hear on the radio or TV?

1 = I am much more influenced than the average person.
2 = I am somewhat more influenced.
3 = I am slightly more influenced.
4 = I am influenced about as much as the average person.
5 = I am slightly less influenced.
6 = I am somewhat less influenced.
7 = I am much less influenced than the average person.

11) Consider all the magazine articles and newspaper columns presenting a specific point of view which you may have read during the past year. About how many of them may have influenced your opinions?

1 = Practically none of them.
2 = Very few of them.
3 = Some of them.
4 = A fairly large number
5 = Most of them.
6 = Practically all of them.
The dissertation submitted by John Petratis has been read and approved by the following committee:

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The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

April 16, 1990  
Date

John D. Edwards  
Director’s Signature