Education in France during World War II

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EDUCATION IN FRANCE DURING WORLD WAR II

by

Anie Sergis

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INTRODUCTION

In June, 1940 defeated France faced Hitler's Germany. After the armistice, the Government took refuge in the non-Occupied zone at Vichy, a city on the banks of the Allier River. This France governed from Vichy, represented the legal country from July, 1940 to 1944. The northern part of the country (north of the Loire River) was occupied and administered by the German military government: it was the Occupied Zone. France had been cut into pieces and in the metropolitan territory, the French people were forbidden to enter certain zones (East and Atlantic Coast); or zones annexed from France such as Alsace-Lorraine, Savoie and the Department of the Nord.

The new Vichy leaders, such as Pétain and Laval, took the country in hand. From the end of Summer, 1940, the aryranization movement was legitimized. This movement made it possible for leaders to exclude opposing political factions (communists, trade unionists, free masons and Jews) from most of the jobs, professions, and education in particular. At this time, education was so important that the responsibility for the defeat of 1940 was attributed to its shortcomings.

1 The fall of the Vichy regime occurred in Oct., 1944, although Vichy was occupied by German forces in 1942.
If Napoleon had structured the French educational system, it was not until Jules Ferry that school instruction became part of the French society and a necessity for the Republicans. Until this time, education was for the elite and upper class—the Bourgeoisie and the clergy. Under the Third Republic, education in the primary school became compulsory, free and secular for all youths.

During this time, teachers at all levels of education, including primary, secondary and university professors were accused of having introduced their students to pacifist ideas. Therefore, by modification of the educational system that Vichy leaders wished to lead the country in a "national revolution." They thought they could assure the future of France with Marshal Petain, Chief of the French State, as its head. Education was to be an immediate and powerful weapon of propaganda which would aid and justify legitimate new orientations of the country (patriotism, the family, education).

Members of Pétain's cabinet, such as Pierre Laval, wanted to apply the German system of education to French education. Part of their desire was to placate the Germans. Education had to be rapidly aryranized in both

the public and private schools. In France, anti-Semitism was built in a "legislative program established by jurists and promulgated by an authority duly qualified."\(^3\)

The anti-Semitism of Vichy was therefore an anti-Semitism of the state which was based on police regulations. The roots of these regulations were in the French legal system. The number of Jewish students in schools were recorded and limited, and Jewish professors were dismissed.

From July, 1940 to November, 1942, the government of Vichy promoted the famous "National Revolution." The National Revolution was symbolized by this New Regime and by this new ideology. The country was no longer spoken of as France, but as the French State. The motto of Pétain, Chief of the new government of Vichy, was "Work, Family, Country." When Pétain took hold of the Vichy government, he wished to restore order—a reaction to what he saw as the social condition of that era. Pétain proclaimed this new slogan, which was reactionary for the twentieth century. After sixty years of lay rule in France, the New Regime offered a cultural, social and political challenge to the French people. Pétain's ideas were to defend the country, rebuild and lift France and maintain peace. For this, the French

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people were expected to be ready to serve the government. They were to be ready for discipline and collaboration with the National Revolution. In short, they were to be a New Order.

This Vichy idea was found among Catholics who proposed dignity and happiness, order in work, and the return to the earth and its natural values. Individuals were expected to reject the perversity of cities. The Catholics equally preached a sense of discipline and the authority of a new Chief of the French State. It was necessary to restore the notion of family based on education. The ideology of the National Revolution was more than a collection of terms and languages taken from the Catholic Church—it was the language of moralists. As Pétain said on June 25, 1940, "the spirit of enjoyment has destroyed what the spirit of sacrifice has built."

The Third Republic was criticized and often called the "Old Regime." The people of Vichy condemned and rejected the faults of the defeat of the previous regime. For Pétain the French Army had paid for the enormous mistakes of the previous regime: incapacity of the personnel of the Third Republic and the corruption which was so prevalent in Parliament. The role of education was of prime importance for Pétain. He wanted to be Minister of Public Education when he was appointed Minister of War of the Third Republic.
According to him, the school should be required to inculcate the sentiment of grandeur, the continuity of the country, and respect for moral and religious beliefs by the child (in particular, the ones professed by France). At school, books were to be well selected. Lectures were to be historical and moral so they were able to support the new ideology of Pétain. For him, moral values had to be taught in the schools. Directly tied to the education at the beginning of 1940, certain theoretical measures hit teachers and Jewish pupils—that was the aryranization of education. This racism was not entirely the work of the legislation under Pétain. The peak of racism occurred under the Third Republic. Playwright Jean Giraudoux in his book, Plein Pouvoir, exposed his republic anti-Semitism by saying, "[...] wishes a ministry of race." 4 As early as 1930, Christian students asked for the departure of foreigners judged too numerous, too bright and therefore too dangerous. In 1938 in L'Action Française, Léon Daudet wrote an article stating: "A statute on the Jews in France should be established as early as possible."

Concretely, however, the first racist laws appeared in France in July and August, 1940. It was under the powerful influence of Algeria that the origin of racist legislation started because in Algeria Muslims were hostile to Jews. (Of 1.2 million Europeans in Algeria, 110,000 were Jews—about 10 percent; while in France, the percentage was less than 1 percent—350,000 Jews to over 42 million French.)

From the Dreyfus Affair to Léon Blum, France was ready for a new era and Marcel Peyrouton, (ex-governor of Algeria, appointed Minister of the Interior of Vichy in September, 1940) was the head of these changes. On October 7, 1940, a law was passed which recognized the abrogation of the Cremieux Law, which dated from 1870 and gave French citizenship to the Jews.

In French education, one witnessed a collective resistance which suddenly had taken root in the double shock of defeat and the indictment organized by the beginning Vichy Regime. The 15,000 primary teachers were surprised to find that they were considered responsible for the defeat of 1940. Was it to fight against this vague accusation that some of them enlisted in the Resistance? Did they feel the Vichy menace, while others faithfully supported the political changes of Summer, 1940 and were faithful to Marshal Petain—this public school director, layman and World War I veteran? Petain was impregnated by the civic spirit and was
following the great founders of the lay school and Vichy moralism. Those people wanted the return to a "pure republicanism." Other educators (conscious or not of the seriousness of their involvement) were completely manipulated by the Office of Propaganda. This office sent ardent panegyric letters to the personnel of the Chief of the French State: "You carry like a cross, the enormous weight of our destiny ... you are a real king of France... one of our greatest kings." This style of literature disappeared little by little. However, the Office of Propaganda gradually stopped sending these letters because of the inefficiency of the new government.

At the time of the Liberation, few educators were active in groups such as "Friends of the Marshal" and "Collaboration." For the most part, teachers were not anti-Semitic. They came from the working class and followed the social and political ideas of the times. By nature, they were nationalistic and republican with communistic tendencies. In contrast to the anti-Semitic movement at this time, Catholics grasped the opportunity for a religious revival, especially in the teaching field.


6 L'Espoir Français, Nov., 1942.

7 Le Mémorial Universitaire lists approximately 400 names of groups. Documented at the Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent in Paris.
On the other side of the political game, according to historian W. D. Halls, there were more than 2,000 communist primary teachers in 1940-41. However, the great majority of the professors were not politically involved until at least 1942. This does not signify that they had remained completely passive and indifferent to external events or the school politics of Vichy. But since Summer, 1940 they could not speak out. It was in this artificially provoked silence that they finally found refuge. Laval and Bonnard tried to bring them back to give a second life to the dying National Revolution in the Spring of 1942.

This study proposes to evaluate the educational policy of the Vichy government and its impact on French primary and secondary education, including the subject of aryranization. It will define and evaluate the diverse roles of the Ministers of National Education during the Vichy period. Certain influential members of their staff as well as the role of the General Commission of the Jewish Question (CGQJ) will also be discussed. This study is based on texts and legislation which determined the education of this controversial period in modern French history. New programs, schoolbooks and instructions given to students and teachers of primary and secondary schools in the public and private sector will also be analyzed.

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Halls discusses the same period in his book, *The Youth of Vichy France*, but in a much broader sense. Although this work was extremely helpful in the preparation of this study, Halls himself stated in the preface that he dealt only briefly with the principal educational changes. In *Vichy et les Juifs*, an interesting and influential work, Paxton and Marrus give a general overview of the same subject, however, research for this study was concentrated solely on the impact of Vichy's educational policy on French primary and secondary education during the German Occupation of France.

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9 W. D. Halls, ibid.

10 Robert O. Paxton and Michael R. Marrus, ibid.
CHAPTER I

ANTI-SEMITISM

Anti-Jewish Legislation Under Vichy

In France, the hunt for the Jews started quickly under the Constitutional Act No. 7 of July 17, 1940. This act gave full governmental power to Marshal Pétain, which permitted him to summarily dismiss those judged "undesirable."

In July, 1940, the Journal Officiel published a list of 1,328 teachers opposing the new Regime. The goal of this publication was to publicly dishonor these thousands of functionaries, republicans, communists, trade unionists, free masons and Jews.

Among the intellectuals, anti-Semitism was fashionable, but they were not the only ones to hold this view; the man on the street was anti-Semitic as well. Thus the adoption of the anti-Jewish legislation by Vichy, which will be discussed later, was not the result of true German pressure. On the contrary, anti-Semitism dated back to the thirties when France saw an increase of xenophobia coming from the Right.

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1 Journal Officiel, July 18, 1940.
(Catholic and nationalist groups). This was reinforced by a Leftist group which was anarchist, anti-capitalist and at times attracted Jews like Leon Blum. The pre-war press witnessed the virulence and the exacerbation of this French anti-Semitism.

In the first issue of the newspaper, Journal Anti-Juif, published June 3, 1937, Darquier exposed his objectives: "...a quota for Jews in higher education..." Four years later his wishes became reality thanks to the new law. In 1938, an article signed by Léon Daudet in L'Action Française affirmed: "A special statute for Jews in France is imperative." In this atmosphere, 1939 marked the height of anti-Semitism in France.

Just before the war, France was indeed the center of an intense anti-Semitism. The University students in Paris were the most clamorous and unanimous group of anti-Semites. These pressures, which had already existed for three years, influenced the government of Vichy and resulted in the first

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3 Journal Anti-Juif, June 3, 1937.
racist laws of July and August, 1940. As stated by the well-known historians, Paxton and Marrus, none of these laws concerning Jews had been imposed by the Occupying Authorities:

It is certain that Vichy has inaugurated its own anti-Semitic politics before the publication of the first German text, and without having received the direct order of the Germans.4

Vichy held all the authority to take these measures and used German law as a model for the new French laws. This French anti-Jewish legislation on teaching appeared at first to be very surprising to the Germans, but they soon wished this legislation to become more and more restrictive. The role of the Germans was, in fact, limited to making these laws a model for all of France.5 Early on, the Occupation Authorities were very interested in publishing pro-German propaganda. As early as September, 1940 the first famous OTTO list was printed in Paris.6 It banned certain

4 Paxton and Marrus, p. 130.

5 A.N. A.J. 38119, Dossier 5 S/C 28. Concerning the state of German pressures Apr. 4, 1942. German authorities asked for a modification of the French law of July 21, 1941 (asking that immatriculation be assimilated in France the same way as in Algeria, with registration in the faculties). They wished to see fines and imprisonment added to the law in cases of false declarations at the time of registration.

6 Named for Otto Abetz, German Ambassador to France and Head of the Propaganda Office in Paris. The OTTO List at the International Library of Contemporary Documentation (BDIC) contained in Appendix I.
authors such as, Henri Michel, Louis Aragon, André Maurois, Charles Maurras, Charles de Gaulle, Léon Blum, Léon Daudet, and surprisingly, Adolf Hitler. (No explanation was given regarding Hitler's works.) Also in 1940, French authorities expressed their desire to go ahead with an annual revision of schoolbooks. In his circular of December 7, 1940, Pierre Chenevrier, President of the Commission of Revision, announced the overhaul of the school libraries.

The textbooks of Jules Isaac, a famous editor of French educational books, had been blacklisted since September, 1940 (as would be mentioned two years later by the French Minister of Education in an interview). "It is unacceptable that the history of France is taught to young French by an Isaac." The interdiction of Isaac's manuals did not immediately eliminate all the copies in circulation, but they rapidly became limited because bookshelves were inspected by the police. Hachette, the publishing house, had outdated history books removed from circulation since the defeat of France in 1940. In addition to some books and authors being

7 Decree of Aug. 21, 1940. Journal Officiel, Aug. 23, 1940.

8 A. Bonnard, Nov. 13, 1942 in Gringoire. A.N. A.J. 3870, Dossier M 797. "We should not have France represented by a Jew, especially to teach our language." Letter of Boutmy, at the CGQJ, sent to Miss Maurel of the State Secretary of Education.

9 Paxton and Marrus, p. 273, note 51. Jules Isaac, as were others, was retired Dec. 20, 1940 in application of the statute of Oct. 3, 1940.
forbidden under the Occupation, schoolbooks were also revised and corrected in the interest of Petain's "National Revolution." The Occupation Authorities became demanding vis-a-vis the teachers and Jewish children. These pressures were geared toward French children to improve the image of Germany in relation to the outcome of World War I.

The Occupation Authorities first announced their project of education for the Jews in October, 1941. Xavier Vallat, who was part of the CGQJ, told of his meeting on September 19, 1941 with the German Dr. Storz. Both discussed future distributions of the UGIF.

German authorities put pressure on national education in order to concentrate the Jews in private schools. Vallat had resisted this project and for this reason was replaced by Darquier on May 6, 1942.

The Germans also assumed the role of supervision over French laws. To do so, they used the CGQJ, which was created by Vichy at the suggestion of the Germans. With the arrival of Darquier at the CGQJ, the Germans thought "the time had come to put pressure on the government in order to obtain exclusion of Jewish teachers from private schools."  

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12 Cited by Carcopino in Souvenirs, p. 371.
The Germans also deplored the fact that numerous Jewish professors taught in the private schools. Particularly shameful for them was the situation at the Berlitz school in Paris, where Jews taught German!

Concerning the education of Jewish children, there was equally strong pressure from the authorities, at least in four cases. In the archives, a file of the military administration of May 18, 1942 noted, "that the moment has come to pressure the government in order to obtain a) separation of Jewish pupils and b) a quota in secondary education..."\(^\text{13}\)

This pressure was not successful. The Germans tried again on February 16, 1943:

They tell me that the Isaac pupils of the Jules Ferry Lycee in Paris are regularly taken to gymnastic lessons at the same time as the Aryan pupils. It appears to be the same for pupils of the Lycee Racine. I ask you to control these actions, stop this disastrous situation of things, and report to me about measures taken by you.\(^\text{14}\)

The procedure was clever because the Germans directed themselves to the CGQJ instead of obtaining restrictive legislation from the government of Vichy. Focusing on the lycées in particular, the Germans hoped to impose their will in the schools, but here they met with another failure due to the firmness of the schools' directors. It seemed that no order was given in metropolitan France to exclude the Jews

\(^{13}\) Letter signed by S.S. Officer Ahnert (Untersturmführer), CX II-34. Translated and kept in the Archives, XLI-34.

\(^{14}\) ibid.
from teaching in higher education where the number of Jewish professors was minimal. These professors were badly needed at the university level. This does not signify that the pressure of the Occupation Authorities was ineffective in primary and secondary education, where the number of attacks on teachers were more frequent and aimed at more diverse groups (communists, free masons and Jews as well).

Nevertheless, as a consequence of multiple administra-
tive requests by Vichy and German pressure on this subject, the CGQJ gave orders to compile a census of pupils and Jewish students. This census started in February, 1943; first in Paris, then in the provinces during the last weeks of 1944.

The possibility of a complete separation of students was not excluded. Most likely, if the course of the war had not changed, Jewish children would have been separated from their non-Jewish companions in kindergarten, primary and secondary schools just as they were in Algeria.

This role, which the Occupation Authorities expected to play in the aryranization of education, was verified in a specific study by the National Conservatory of Music and Dramatic Art of Paris (CNMAD) during the Occupation.15

Furthermore, under the influence of Otto Abetz, the German authorities gave direct instruction to Henri Robard, a member of the Institute and Director of the Conservatory.

They found out that Miss Dehelly, who was half-Jewish, had been awarded First Prize in acting in a competitive examination. They deplored this and insisted that prizes should not be distributed to Jewish students and asked that they be excluded from competitions.

These exigencies were not supported by any French law. Therefore, the Director of the Conservatory referred this incident to his superiors. Georges Ripert, who was Minister of Education at the time, was informed. Following this incident, Ripert wrote to Fernand de Brinon, Delegate of the French Government to German Administration in France, in order to expose the fact that the Director of the Conservatory had to admit students to competitive examinations without segregation by race. Refusal to allow students to test and thus deny them the benefit of rewards uniquely on the basis of their origin constituted a case of cancellation of the competitive examination.

The Minister's tone was firm, but Fernand de Brinon was an ultra-collaborationist and had more of a tendency to represent Germany in France than France in Germany. As a journalist, he had the privilege to interview the Fuhrer Adolf Hitler as early as November 16, 1933. The newsreels showed him all over France as Ambassador under the Occupation. However, being very ambitious, he denounced his own colleagues to the Germans.

16 Le Matin, Nov. 19, 1933.
Ripert also wrote to Louis Hautecoeur, the General Secretary in charge of the Arts. He advised diplomacy in regard to the Occupation Authorities: "...in the actual circumstances it is advisable to avoid putting Jewish and half-Jewish students on public display." The directives of Minister Ripert were transmitted to Albert Rivaud: "Although in principle Jewish students are accountable under French law, they are obliged to take into account the German administration in occupied France." In answer, Rivaud complained to Hautecoeur that the Occupation Authorities were more and more intransigent, and he had to inform the concerned students that they could not take part in examinations and competitions at the end of the year. As a consequence, the students found themselves on leave for one year. This year, of course, was not taken into account as one of their years of study. The maximum number of years for study was established by regulations. On March 28, 1941, Hautecoeur inquired about this question again and suggested to de Brinon the establishment of a system of non-matriculated students just as it was done in universities. Fernand de Brinon was against this idea and was in favor of a more conservative approach.

17 Ex-Curator of the Museum of Luxembourg, who was named High Commissioner of Fine Arts in Aug., 1940.

18 Letter from Ripert to Hautecoeur, Nov. 30, 1940.
The new director of the CNMAD, Claude Delvincourt, again submitted a request to the Secretary of the Arts on May 14, 1941 that measures against half-Jews "contrarily to the law" be rescinded. The complaint of a parent, who was the father of a harp student, (half-Jewish because of two grandparents who were Jewish) to Hautecoeur on May 19, 1941 was successful; and five days later, the CGQJ informed the National Education that half-Jewish students could again present themselves to the competitive examination of the Conservatory. What was the meaning of this relaxation of the rules when only one month before the Germans had attempted to impose their will?

Perhaps things became more complicated with the French law of June 21, 1941 which established a quota for the Jewish students. The Conservatory of Paris again became a kind of pilot school in France regarding the anti-Jewish measures. Were those the result of new pressures from the Germans?

19 "I was received this morning by the Underfuhrers Prisig and Bauman, who formally declared to me that they are in agreement with this interpretation." (The French statute of Oct. 3, 1940 did not include the half-Jews.)

20 Letter of CGQJ, Vichy, Mar. 16, 1943 to the Regional Directors of the CGQJ of Lyon/Toulouse. CX CII-75 and XVIIa-41 (198).
A conference on October 31, 1941 had determined specific regulations for Jewish students at the School of Music and Dramatic Arts in Paris. What was very strange was that this same document stipulated that "no similar regulation has been considered for the conservatories of the provinces to which access is, therefore, free for Jewish students." This was not the end of the matter. On April 2, 1942, the new French Minister, Carcopino decided that the National Conservatory of Music and Dramatic Arts of Paris was not part of higher education. Therefore, this school was not required to apply the regulatory requirement of 3 percent quota of Jews. A letter written on May 18, 1942 informed the Dean that the Director of the National Conservatory of Music and Dramatic Arts Projects was to have the Jewish students compete in the year-end examination in closed-door sessions, but without giving them rewards or diplomas. Another letter of June 3, 1942 revealed how the Director of the CNMAD had lamented the lack of directives from the Ministry of Education: "Even though I have asked repeatedly for more than one year for precise instructions, I cannot get them."

21 Letter of CGQJ to Vichy, Mar. 16, 1943.
This started a press campaign by *Le Petit Parisien* and other newspapers. All the laws relating to education were brought back into question. Because of Carcopino's indecision, the new Minister of Education, Abel Bonnard forbade participation of Jewish students in competitions and examinations. Three months later, (September 21) Bonnard ordered Delvincourt to take radical and effective measures. He replied:

I have notified all Jewish students of the Conservatory that I was under obligation to dismiss them, effective October 1, 1942; and in addition, I request from new applicants who come for admission a declaration of arypanity supported by presentation of the identity card for candidates of 15 years of age...\(^22\)

On March 4, 1943, measures were put into effect. The CGQJ informed the Ministry of Education that by virtue of the law of June 6, 1942, Jews were banned from artistic professions:

No Jew can be accepted or allowed to continue in the Conservatory. It would be more than strange to see Jewish students wearing the yellow star in the Occupied Zone participating in public examinations and competitions.\(^23\)

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\(^{22}\) Letter of Delvincourt to Bonnard, Oct. 7, 1942.

Special permits could be issued, however, if Jews had the proper contacts. A letter of July 7, 1944\(^{24}\) (a few weeks before the liberation of Paris) was sent by the CGQJ to the Conservatory with information that an inquiry on the 'racial quality' of 12 students at the school had occurred.

The Occupation Authorities attempted to impose their will on schools by multiple pressures. They attacked not only the CNMAD, but the School of Commerce as well.\(^{25}\) One wonders if the German Authorities wanted to make those schools a model for their ideology. As we have seen, many of the numerous projects for the aryranization of education did not succeed. The true aryranization of education was the result of French laws. The Germans had French extremists under their control who were ready to do anything. The Germans did not hesitate to distribute funds generously to individuals and anti-Semitic groups. For the Germans, the virulence of these collaborators constituted an effective means to implement Vichy politics in reference to the Jewish question. Politically speaking, the choice was right.

\(^{24}\) ibid.

\(^{25}\) Rothke, a member of the SS, learned by the newspaper, Jeunesse, on May 3, 1942 that 15 percent of the pupils at the School of Commerce on the Avenue de la République, were Jewish (letter of July 11, 1942); on Feb. 1, 1943, Ahnert, another member of the SS, deplored the too-high number of Jewish pupils in the School of Commerce.
After July 22, 1940, the law permitted the revision of naturalization. This changed the status of thousands of people. Among those, 6,307 Jews who were naturalized French citizens in the twenties and thirties, brutally became foreigners in France. Those laws of naturalization were promulgated at an accelerated rhythm and were aimed specifically at the Jewish educators.26

The law of October 3, 194027 was the base of the legal persecution signed by Petain, Laval (First Minister), and Alibert (Minister of Justice). This law forbade the Jews to hold public office. In the Occupied Zone, the German Ordinance attached merely a religious significance to the Jews; while the French law utilized the word "race." This law was much more restrictive and severe than the German ordinance and defined Jews as those with three grandparents of the "Jewish race." Article I is specific as to who would be classified as a Jew (having a spouse

26 Aug. 13, 1940: Dissolution of secret societies. July 30, 1940: The law permitted the "Frenchification" of the administration. Journal Officiel, Aug. 1, 1940. Already the law of Nov. 12, 1938 had opened the way to a revision of naturalization.

27 The French law of Oct. 3, 1940 had resounding similarities to the German Ordinance of Sept. 27, 1940, which had defined "Jew" for the Occupied Zone. Journal Officiel, Oct. 18, 1940. This law became effective on Dec. 26, 1940 and was signed by the following ministers: Huntzinger, Darlan, Peyrouton, Bouthillier, Boudoin, Caziot and Belin.
considered Jewish), or a "half-Jew;" that is to say, someone with only two Jewish grandparents. Article 2 of the French law forbade the Jews access to and exercise of public functions. The fourth point of this article concerned education in particular. It specified that Jews could no longer be "members of the teaching corps." Thus, Jewish teachers and professors were included by this law.28

In Article 8, contrary to German legislation, Vichy France considered exceptions based on "exceptional services rendered to the French State", such as veterans from World War I. This was subject to varying interpretations.29 The Jewish educators, hoping to benefit from Article 8 (which considered exceptions), understood very well the expression, "exceptional services rendered to the French State." This same law of October 3, 1940 granted an indemnity for licensed functionaries who could justify fifteen years seniority.30

28 Exceptions consisted of the veterans of 1914-1918 or those of 1939-40 cited by military medals and those of the Legion of Honor--they could keep their teaching posts. (Article 3, Paragraphs a, b, c.)

29 Article 8 defined that "by individual decree taken on the advice of the State and in the literary, scientific and artistic domains have rendered exceptional services to the French State" could be exempt from prior interdictions by the persecutory law.

30 Law signed Dec. 2, 1940 by Pétain, Bouthillier and Baudin, published in Journal Officiel, Feb. 7, 1941. Special indemnity was in theory only. It was very difficult for the licensed Jewish teachers to reach the indemnity category or to retire. Even more difficult to apply was Law 1499 of Apr. 3, 1941, which previewed indemnities for widows of functionaries put into retirement by the law of Oct. 3, 1940.
Article 9 specified that this law addressed itself to all French territory, which included Algeria, the colonies, countries under the protectorate, and territories under mandate. These different articles projected a will of revenge of the French Republic detested by the new government of Vichy. With approval to apply racist politics, which created a General Commission of the Jewish Question, a purely French organization, thousands of Jewish teachers were condemned to forced unemployment by the Commission. This added a new attack against the Jewish teachers.

Article 1 of the law of June 21, 1941 stipulated "... 3 percent of the Jewish students enrolled during the preceding school year can be enrolled per year for one year" and therefore were not authorized to enroll themselves in the schools where 3 percent of the students were Jewish. Exceptions were considered, but it was even more difficult for the students to benefit from these exceptions than for the teachers. Article 2 of this law showed a preferential

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31 *Journal Officiel*, Mar. 31, 1941. With the law of Mar. 29, 1941 a budget of more than 2 million francs was given to the GCQJ. The State Secretary was Xavier Vallat (appointed Apr. 4, 1941) and Darquier of Pellepoix, (who replaced him on May 6, 1942 because Vallat was judged too anti-German for the Occupying Authorities) as Commissioner General.

32 *Journal Officiel*, June 24, 1941. Law 2570, dated June 21, 1941, signed by Petain, Darlan and Carcopino is applicable before Oct. 31, 1941.

33 *Journal Officiel*, Jan. 21, 1942. Law 5275 (Dec. 19, 1941) required Jewish students to prove that five generations had lived in France, and that "exceptional services" had been rendered by the family.
order against admission of Jewish students and confirmed the policies of the Vichy government, which gave preference to "a good Frenchman" more than to a good student.

The third Article of this law specified the procedure to follow in selecting Jewish students. A commission of five designated professors had to accede to the following demands before September 15: A list was to be completed before October 31 and posted in establishments of higher education. The students not admitted had one month to petition against this exclusion. A board, which consisted of the faculty of the school or the institute, would decide each case. In reality, this "Phase II Operation" was more theory than practice. It was not ignored, but received little attention.

In liaison with the CGQJ and the national police, a separate force called the Police of the Jewish Question was created on October 19, 1941. It lasted until July 5, 1942, and Durieux served as its Director. A month later, these police were placed in the "Section of Problems and Controls" (SEC) which was attached to the CGQJ. These anti-Jewish police were very efficient and zealous. They verified the status and statements of Jewish professors and

34 Orphans of the military (sons or daughters) dying for France (first category) had more of a chance to follow their studies than "particularly deserving students" (sixth category).

35 Rene Bousquet, Secretary General of Police for the Ministry of the Interior. Under his orders, the Director of Administration Francois, and the General Police directed the Jewish Section to the prefecture from Oct., 1940.
students. New stipulations in the Decree of November 19, 1941\textsuperscript{36} countersigned by Carcopino, Minister of National Education, substituted the very explicit expression of "having to cease their functions, or to occupy their jobs after December 20, 1940."\textsuperscript{37} Carcopino, relieved to have countersigned this stipulation, added cynically that he had not been "the most responsible for issuing the laws."

The French law of November 29, 1941 created the General Union of the Israelites of France (UGIF)\textsuperscript{38} which united all the Jewish organizations. This new association, sponsored by Vichy, was directly controlled by the CGQJ and completely supervised by the Occupying Authorities. The role of this association was ambiguous. One month after the creation of the UGIF, the last law of 1941 concerning the Jews was signed on December 31.\textsuperscript{39} This law concerned the authorization of Jewish private education in Algeria.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Journal Officiel}, Dec. 2, 1941, Decree 5062.


\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Journal Officiel}, Jan., 1942. Law 5535 (Dec. 31, 1941) signed by Pétain, Carcopino and Pucheu. The law of Oct. 19, 1942 was made for Algeria, concerning the conditions for admissions for Jewish students in private establishments. The anti-Jewish laws were not abolished with the embarkment of the Allies in North Africa on Nov. 8, 1942. For example, in the primary schools, it would have been necessary to attend since Jan. 21, 1944 for the State to void the quota.
to exclude all higher education. At any moment, Jewish educational establishments and schools could be closed by governmental directives.

A German ordinance in the Occupied Zone dated May 29, 1942 required Jews over the age of six to wear a yellow star whenever they left their home. (The Vichy government refused to hear of this measure in the non-Occupied Zone.) This ordinance had many repercussions in the schools. Jewish students were harassed by their classmates and teachers. On July 8, 1942 another ordinance was promulgated by the Germans which forbade Jews of the Occupied Zone to frequent public places.

Different laws and decrees directly or indirectly concerned the aryranization of education. It is important to remember that some of these laws were drafted to conform with the pre-war French laws. Since 1938, French laws severely limited the number of foreigners in France. Therefore, the Vichy government rejected republican tradition by designating those French judged unworthy of the title of "French citizen." This attempt was not innovative, but had gone further than republican tradition. It would be convenient to place the only responsibility for these laws on the Vichy government. But history has shown diverse pressures were faced by the Vichy government to which the Republic was not subjected: war, invasion, exodus, death, loss of territory, low morale, military collapse, and
economic disorder. In fact, a number of documents dating from the Occupation clearly demonstrate that during the Vichy era the French attributed Vichy's anti-Semitic attitude to the Occupying Nazi authorities. Few French were acquainted with the existence of the anti-Jewish legislation, being concerned with activities of daily life. Even the victims thought that this legislation was a German dictate. How could one think that real anti-Semitic legislation could be uniquely French? In a letter to Pétain, the Grand Rabbi of France affirmed at the start of his message that he could not adhere to the principle of racial legislation.

In November, 1940, Gustave Monod, Inspector of Education at the Academy of Paris, wondered who had originated the anti-Jewish laws. Jules Isaac, a historian (and friend of Monod) was conscious of the entire Vichy responsibility in the legislation but affirmed again in July, 1941 that the status of the Jews was "not of French inspiration." 

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40 Tract dating Oct., 1940. BDIC. Statement made by French Jews: "Our country will not carry the shame of the measures where our heart did not take part; we know he has done everything for us which was in his power..."


"...If we reacted to German constraints, we (French) had (to take) part in common humiliation; if we reacted to the contrary, to a French order, it would have been acceptable..." 43

This showed the ambiguity of the situation, but things became clear for the most lucid—and it was surprising to see that during the German Occupation the majority of the French (and even French Jews) would wrongly continue to attribute French anti-Semitic legislation to Nazi pressure. Nowadays, this legislation haunts the collective conscience of the French. It is certain that the French prefer to remain mute or to forget the true role of the men of the Vichy government. It is certainly more favorable to present oneself a posteriori as a hostage more so than an executioner.

In his memoirs, Carcopino did not hesitate to lie. He attributed all the laws passed under Vichy to the Germans, although in reality, he had signed them himself. If Vichy adopted them, it was always, (according to him) to "protect" the Jews: "...The law dishonored only the Germans. Not an instant did I think of placing such a responsibility on Pétain." 44 Once again, he had been looking for the lesser

44 ibid., p. 245.
of two evils. He spoke of "these brutal laws imposed to the Marshal by the Nazis..."45 As Minister of National Education, Carcopino should have known that the quota in Algerian schools was not a German project, but in fact recommended by the Algerian government, which was, after all, French.46


46 Ibid., p. 371.
Internal Pressures

Better Hitler Than Blum

At the end of May, 1942 a group of anti-Semitic collaborators from the Institute for the Study of the Jewish Question (IEQJ) had congratulated Captain Dannecker, who had introduced the yellow star in the Occupied Zone. This group of anti-Jewish writers and intellectuals took the position that the measures against Jews must be strictly enforced. It included Brasillach, Déat and Rebate, all of whom were in some measure influenced by L’Action Française and other anti-Semitic movements. The Germans were not the only ones to request completely separate education for the Jews. French collaborators and other groups of anti-Semites also passionately desired this segregation in education. These small groups were encouraged and sustained by the Germans. They also served to frighten the men of Vichy, whose weaknesses they daily denounced. For example, the IEQJ was not entirely satisfied because their claims and projects were not always as successful as they wished.

47 Expression which circulated from the beginning of the popular front and quoted by a journalist Jan. 1, 1937 in the newspaper, Vendredi.
friends also expressed their desire that measures be complemented by total separation in primary and secondary schools between Jewish and non-Jewish children. The Lycée Condorcet (secondary school) which had always been a Jewish lycée, and the Lycée Jules Ferry, should be completely affected by these separations. 48

At the forefront of the anti-Jewish battle in France were numerous and diverse associations of militant individuals who were very often rivals. The IEQJ, the UFDR (French Union for the Defense of the Race), a collaboration group, and the IEQJER (Institute for the Study of the Jewish and Ethno-Racial Question) probably contributed greatly to the aggravation of the Jews' condition in France. 49

In addition, numerous accusations and denunciations rained on the CGQJ. The collaborators and retired teachers vied to give information which would help aryranization. As a practical matter, their lack of constraints (diplomatic, administrative and moral) gave them great influence. The Germans were extremely tolerant and never complained about these extremist outcries because it allowed them to put pressure on Vichy.

48 IEQJ, May, 1942.

49 The University Memorial (1940-44), Paris, Nov. 11, 1950, the Committee of History of the Second World War, contains 200 names of professors who were members of collaborationist groups. A memorial was also made listing 150 names of those faithful to Petain.
At the time, the hunt for the Jews was taken up by several thousand amateurs. Letters of denunciation, not always anonymous, were sent daily by the dozens to German and French authorities. André Fugier, who worked as Director of the Cabinet of the Minister of Education, declared after the war that the Minister of National Education ordered him to throw "a very large file of denunciations against numerous university professors in the garbage." These were very often anonymous and not directed only at Jewish professors. If we believe Fugier,

there was a flood of letters at that time, anonymous or not. Many people had judged that the time had come to get rid of the primary teacher who had bothered them, and it was a rain of denunciations.50

After being denounced, professors of Jewish origin were excluded from teaching, even though totally detached from the Judaic religion. Some letters of denunciation demanded new measures. They deplored not only gaps in legislation, but also the bad application of legislation.

For example, on July 30, 1941, Paul Curie, who had been named, thanks to Vallat, Secretary of the National Center of General and Sport Education, Adjunct Secretary of the Academy of Paris, and Secretary of the Committees

50 Testimony at trial of Chevalier, Mar., 1946 session, Vol. 1, p. 62, CHSGM.
for the Aid of Students at the University of Clermont, wrote a letter to his old friend Vallat at the CGQJ in which he complained that the laws of July 21, 1941 were:

mute on what concerns the female students. Is it intentional? If so, should I conclude that if a female kike applies at a university, school or institute, we must accept her without other formality?...51

Curie continued to request that the French law be more restrictive:

because we close a door in the nose of Jews (oh, Drumont, how you would have laughed), is that sufficient? But we leave several other doors half open...and you know very well that those specimens know how to enter by all the openings; they would find a bias very easily and infiltrate themselves by another door which is open.52

He finishes his letter wishing great courage for the "hard work which was started.53

Another interesting letter was one written to Commissioner Vallat by M. L. Giribone of Marseille sent on August 21, 1941. Giribone suggested completely eliminating grants in secondary teaching for Jewish students. This idea would be restated by Vallat on September 2, 1941 in another letter sent to the Minister of National Education, Carcopino, who had responded negatively in his letter of September 5, 1941.

53 A.N. A.J. 38 1144.
Another letter sent by an ex-professor of Literature at the Lyceé of Salonique (1920-21) to the CGQJ denounced the Jewish professors of the Lyceée of Salonique, which constituted "a focus of propaganda and recruitment." The CGQJ had known of this situation since August, 1941 because it communicated to the Minister of Education an extract of the letter: "The French Lycée of the lay mission of Salonique is a Jewish lycée. We can say that it does Jewish recruitment for France."

From Nice, M. F. Berthier complained to Darquier about the scandal which constituted the authorization for Jewish teachers to continue to teach in private schools:

...in relation to the law on Jewish activity, I dare to mention what I think is a loophole of the greatest importance: the education of our youth by Jewish professors...I know here in Nice, Jews who do not hesitate to open private schools, in which daily, young men and women go to receive their education. One wonders if it is in the national interest that this state of things continue?

Robert Brasillach, the most active collaborator, was a convinced Germanophile who did not hesitate to write in Cahiers Franco-Allemands. As were many intellectuals of

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54 Letter of May 13, 1942 to CGQJ.

55 A.N. A.J. 38 70, Dossier: "Foreign Jews."

the time, he was influenced by L'Action Française. A literary journalist at L'Action Française from 1931-39, and editor-in-chief of the anti-Semitic Je Suis Partout in 1938-39, he explicitly asked for a clear statute regarding the Jews as early as April 15, 1938, when he signed an article in Je Suis Partout. ("It protects them as well as it protects us.")

One of Brasillach's most important activities, apart from writing and socializing, was the denunciation of the Jews. For example, one month after his return from Germany, he signed a very explicit article in L'Appel on May 25, 1941: "...For us the Jewish problem is a world-wide problem. We are posed face to face with a race and not simply a religion..." He was, under the Vichy regime, with all his style, the young, spiritual and intellectual father of Parisian anti-Semitism. He was executed after judgment on February 6, 1945 at the Fort of Montrouge.

Another famous collaborator was Lucien Rebatet, alias François Vinneuil, who also wrote in L'Action Française, Je Suis Partout, and Cahiers Franco-Allemands. He also demanded a Jewish statute even before the French defeat and the German Occupation. Rebatet revealed in Je Suis Partout in February, 1939 his "reasonable" project of the statute of the Jews: "Our definition must be racial..."

Rebatet was a member of the Cercle Européen and directed the press section for the publishing of the IEQJ side by side with Robert Denoël, a well-known journalist.
at that time. He was also political director of the very anti-Semitic *Petit Parisian* until 1941, in which he never failed to denounce the Jews' control over France. Rebatet spent his time denouncing Jews—in his books, articles, broadcasts and conferences.

In *Le Cri du Peuple*, Rebatet's anti-Semitism was clearly expressed when having heard of the death of a famous Jewish philosopher, he wrote: "It would have been better that Bergson never had the right to write and teach French." In the same newspaper, he deplored the skills of the Jewish professors and all those who found themselves to be "indispensable to science and French culture..."

Rebatet's professional conscience as a patent denunciator was such that he was pushed to continue "his work" during his travels or his vacations. For example, on August 19, 1942, he wrote from Moral in Valloire to Couissin, Chief of the Cabinet in the National Education of Vichy, to ask him very simply to fire Drouot, Head of the Ecole des Cadres of Sorlin in Valloire. He accused Drouot of being hostile to Vichy, in favor of De Gaulle, Great Britain, Russia, and worse, (which was unforgivable) of being a

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58 *Le Cri du Peuple*, Dec. 6, 1941.
Rebatet, as a member of the Institute for the Study of the Jewish Question (IEQJ), had great influence and responsibility regarding the hunt for the Jews. This French organization was private. The most important and most active of the numerous anti-Semitic groups during the Occupation, it numbered around 11,000 "friends." The IEQJ developed anti-Jewish propaganda and between May, 1941 and June, 1942 had denounced hundreds of individuals. This Nazi center in France received money from a Nazi Officer, Captain Dannecker, in payment for its precious aid. This organization published "yellow notebooks," in which Pierre Antoine Cousteau, Henri Labroue, Henri Coston, Jean Herold Paquis and numerous others signed virulent anti-Semitic articles. The staff of the IEQJ, was directed by Captain Sezille, an ex-companion of arms of Darquier, who liked quarrels and was completely uncultured. According to him, Laval was Jewish!

Along with Sezille, Charles Laville, anthropologist and racial ethnologist, contributed to the organization and success of an exposition at the Palace Berlitz titled, "The

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61 Billig, IEQJ, Ed. CDJC; the IEQJ was French, but the budget was German. The Gestapo allowed maintaining permanent contact between the IEQJ with the Anti-Jewish Institute of Rosenberg in Frankfort.
Jew in France." In order to promote this exposition, the cinematographic news showed some representative images on the screens of France. The exposition had received some 383,000 visitors in Paris. In sequences which rendered homage to Drumont, Laville explained with photographs how to differentiate a Jew from a French person: "...the Jew is the result of a mixture of aryans, mongols and negroes...the Jew has a face, body, gestures and attitudes which are his own..."63

From 1941 to 1944, Laville wrote in the tenth edition of the articles in the ethnoracial Journal de Montandon. A racial ethnologist, Montandon was born in 1879 at Canton of Neufchatel in Switzerland. He was a great explorer (Ethiopia during 1909-11, then Russia and Japan). He was a bolshevik during the twenties and then established himself in France in 1925 and worked in the laboratories of anthropology at the Museum of Natural History. He was appointed to the School of Anthropology in 1933, and just before the war became a militant anti-Semite. He wrote numerous articles to explain to the French "how to recognize Jews...," including "France at Work," written in

64 ibid.
July, 1940. He also directed the IEQJER (the IEQJ was inaugurated on February 23, 1943 by the CGQJ, since Darquier was liquidated by the Germans).

In addition, Montandon delivered the indispensable "certificates of aryanity." In fact, he sold these "certificates of safety" to rich Jews. It was for him that Bonnard, the Minister of Education, created a "Professorship of Racial Studies" at the Sorbonne. The professorship remained unfilled, probably due to the lack of success of Henri Labroue, named November 12, 1942 by the Minister to the professorship of "History of Contemporary Judaism."

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65 Journal Officiel, Decree of Nov. 6, 1942.
Reactions to the Laws

Reactions on the subject of Jews in education were found among the victims accompanied by the silence of non-Jews. "...Always the same thing, nobody said anything..." The religious Jews were the first to react, and as early as October 18, 1940, when the first French statute was published in the *Journal Officiel*. Some days later, the Grand Rabbi of France, Isaie Schwartz, addressed a declaration to the Chief of State in the name of the French Israelites. This interesting letter mentioned the official position of the Jewish institutions: it was, at the same time, significant because the terms, the style, and the approach used in the exposition of the arguments demonstrated a certain Petainism. The protest of the Grand Rabbi was undeniable, but also solemn and dignified: "We affirm that we are neither a racial minority nor a political minority, but a religious community..."*

These Jews wished to be treated just like the other French. As they were French, very often from several generations back, they were "faithful servants of the country," and prayed for the "grandeur of France." This pleading,

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66 M. Dionnet, teacher quizzed in the documentary film, "The Sorrow and the Pity" by Marcel Ophuls.
emanating from the highest Jewish religious authority in France, demonstrated a certain political naivete. It did not even suggest the responsibility of the men of Vichy, who had created the laws, because the victims were as Petainist as the other French, in spite of the racist laws. They underlined "the new order, which having been proposed to the French by the Chief of State, must be based on work, family and country. No other proposal could be dearer to us."68

The lay Jews also found the status heart-rending. In relation to the Jewish teachers, it seemed that they reacted differently than the religious Jews. That is to say, in a non-collective fashion. Also, it was not until April, 1941 that some university professors sent a text69 signed collectively to Petain in fear of new measures being taken against Jewish teachers. It was, therefore, the fear of a Jewish ghetto being created in France which impelled their move.

It is noted that in their communication, the Jewish professors seemed to believe that the Germans were responsible for the new statute. The French government was considered innocent: "We appeal without hesitation to the

68 Laws of July 27 and August 27, 1940 aimed at French Jews and foreign Jewish residents in France.
69 Doc. CDJC. CC XIX-104.
venerated Chief, in whom is incarnated today, the idea of country, one and indivisible, and with broken hearts, we ask him to intervene." These intellectuals did not hesitate to "confide" their anguish to Petain, their savior to whom they showed their "profound respect." They insisted all along in their pathetic letters that they were Israelites in religion, but that they were all from very old French families; that they were French not by adoption but from "always"; that they were born French and would always remain French, and they formed neither a race nor a people, but an integral part of the nation.

The reaction to the statutes was different according to each individual. Some reacted in a desperate fashion--deprived of work and resources, wounded in their honor, they committed suicide. Jules Isaac noted with sadness in his journal the deaths of two of his teaching friends.70 Other teachers, conscious of the impact of the statutes, were not surprised by their dismissal from national education. They knew that the arrival of Petain to power would leave no illusions about the orientation of the New Regime.

70 Lasare Landeau's study on Jules Isaac, from "L'Assimilation du Combat pour l'Israel, 1940-1943," in Les Nouveaux Cahiers, No. 59, p. 37. R. Cohen and R. Loew were the professors mentioned.
Note also another important difference between the people and the Jewish intellectuals. The latter group understood perfectly the responsibility of the men of Vichy. Even so, they affirmed for Jews (religious or not) that the second statute was not by itself of French inspiration. Jules Isaac referred to Pétain as the "apostle of the lay school, having applied his principles with religious fervor", (work, family, country).71 The same ideas as the religious Jews held are found here. But on the other hand, Isaac reproached Pétain from the beginning of 1940 for the anti-Jewish laws which were very useful to crystallize on the Jew, the eternal black sheep, the rancors provoked by the defeat.

Among the non-Jewish teachers, the reactions were as discreet as they were rare; some had seen nothing, heard nothing. Others wanted to see nothing—to hear nothing. In 1955, Maurice Gait, General Secretary of Youth under Pétain, did not hesitate to state that nothing at all happened in teaching during the Occupation:

The seventeen French universities functioned normally. The 150,000 primary teachers, 30,000 secondary teachers, and 6,000 professors of higher education remained at their post; as well as the personnel of technical and vocational education created by the Vichy government.72


The truth was markedly different. Gustave Monod, a protestant, pacifist of the Left, and a friend of Isaac, became Inspector of the Academy of Paris in November, 1940. In his report of November 5, 1940\textsuperscript{73}, he made a point of mentioning the statute of the Jews and the problems produced by its application to education. Monod declared he was upset when confronted with the limitation of liberalism in education and courageously asked that the report be transmitted to Minister Ripert; but Ripert was neither sensitive to distress nor impressed by the timid protest; he asked only one question: "Is he Jewish?"

It was with a new understanding of the nature of the New Regime, that Inspector Monod subsequently wrote to the new Dean, Carcopino.\textsuperscript{74} The statute itself was rarely criticized. The law was never questioned. No school went on strike when faced with the Occupying Authorities.

Marcel Ophuls has interrogated, with a great finesse, two teachers on their behavior during the Occupation for his movie, "The Sorrow and The Pity." He questioned them on

\textsuperscript{73} Report at the CHSGM (annex).

\textsuperscript{74} Letter of Monod to Carcopino, Nov. 5, 1940, cited by Carcopino, \textit{Souvenirs}, p. 248, and contained in Appendix J.
this law and the exclusions:

"...when you say: 'What could you do'...in fact, 'What could you do'...meant, what? Because at most, we can imagine a collective resignation of all the teachers at the Lycee of Clermont." Danton and Dionnet start to laugh. Dionnet: "Oh, no...it was not a question of that...you don't understand the mentality...(he laughs) ...a collective resignation...(both of them laugh)."75

It was, therefore, evident that in general the French society was indifferent. In their great majority, the French teachers did not react. They behaved just like the rest of the population--tacit approbation of the measures geared, in their eyes, essentially to the foreigners. The reason for this seeming indifference was that most of the French, preoccupied with the problems as obsessional as daily life (to eat, to heat their homes, to write to the prisoners, and in a word--survival), were rendered completely insensitive to the suffering of others; they manifested a complete indifference. In the absence of a political party, public declarations of men politically engaged remained very rare until 1942. The socialists said nothing. In the Communist Party, hostility to Pétain and his Regime was consistent--racist legislation constituted only one of the essential themes of clandestine editorials. On occasion, the Resistance also subscribed to the avowed...

anti-Semitism of the men against whom they fought. On the Gaullist side, the silences were also eloquent. Not once did General De Gaulle publicly proclaim his disapproval of the racial legislation previously mentioned in this study. The first to rebel were the religious French (Catholic and Protestant). But not all of them, as in general their reaction would be late and limited. Paul Claudel, well-known for his religious fervor, wrote on July 6, 1940, "After 60 years France is delivered from the weight of the radical and anti-Catholic party (professors, lawyers, Jews and free masons)." 76 The following shows the interesting and quite significant reactions of Giraud on April 28, 1944 in writing to one of his emissaries in Spain:

"...At this time, the situation is clear, General De Gaulle is the dictator of tomorrow with a general staff of communists, socialists and Jews...General Giraud is very sincerely republican, but with a republic based on clean people and without Jewry..." 77

It is important to remember that the only law which produced frequent and spontaneous pro-Semitic reactions in the midst of the French population was not a French law. It

was the German ordinance of May 29, 1942 prescribing the wearing of the yellow star in the Occupied Zone as early as the beginning of June, 1942. This is what was written by Abetz on July 2 and 7, 1942:

If the French population is "in general...absolutely in agreement with the introduction of the distinctive sign for the Jews," they revealed their resentment and vengefulness by observing foreign Jews dispensed by some German measures.

The wearing of the star made the French Jews martyrs of the war, and some teachers of the Occupied Zone advised their students to manifest their solidarity with their Jewish comrades by wearing an insignia. This was confirmed by a German report dated June 5, 1942:

...According to the report of an informer, the teachers of the communal school of the 18th District have asked their students to come next Monday, June 8, 1942 wearing any insignia. We suppose that this is in relation to the introduction of the Jewish star and that it corresponds to a manifestation of sympathy...

This anti-Semitic measure demonstrated the lack of sympathy and solidarity of non-Jewish teachers. As for the victims, their shocked reactions to the measures revealed their political naivete and Petainism.

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79 Paxton and Marrus, p. 221, Note. 62.

This study has shown how the racial laws affected education. It is evident that the responsibility was entirely on the French, and that many men in power were responsible for the application of those laws. Among these were all of the successful Ministers of Education who had participated in the aryranization of education in different degrees with their application of the laws and their initiatives. The role of Carcopino as discussed later in this study, is without any doubt the most important because it shows his influence in the Ministry of Education. This racism, institutionalized by laws, seems to be the best prism through which to observe the behavior of the leaders and the men in education. This racism became the cornerstone of the Vichy government.

This study stated measures which were too harsh and which victimized Jewish teachers, professors, pupils and students. The study of these measures is very useful because it allows us to understand the environment in which the French population lived and worked. As a result of the laws, the rejected teachers had great difficulty in finding new employment. In addition, the children were marked for life by the indifference of the remaining teachers, who, in general, did not dare to do anything for fear of reprisals. This is a fascinating and sad subject for historians and the French people as well.
CHAPTER II

THE MINISTERS OF EDUCATION

Vichy had marked a turning point in the history of contemporary France, introducing in the different ministries, technocrats, who would impose their reforms since no parliamentary opposition could impeach them.

In the Ministry of Education, practically all of the successive ministers were professors or administrators. Except for Abel Bonnard, none of them could be labeled as a political Minister. Under the Third Republic, all Ministers had come from the ranks of politicians. The accomplishments of these men were not always negative for education as a whole. Technical education began to replace the vocational schools which had been created in 1939. Under the Occupation, many vocational schools opened, primarily for the young unemployed. In 1941, the first technical colleges were founded. Secondary education, still elitist, began losing ground when faced with mass education. The number of students grew very rapidly and significant changes occurred: a) Jewish teachers were dismissed; b) Jewish students were admitted in limited numbers; and c) almost all Jewish school children in Algeria were excluded from the public schools. In all these matters, the different Ministers of Education often played a decisive role that will now be analyzed.
Albert Rivaud, First Secretary of Public Instruction under Pétain, only served from June 16 to July 12, 1940. He was unaware of the measures which had been adopted in regard to the quota system. At the liberation, this conservative professor of philosophy at the University of Strasbourg easily obtained a verdict of not guilty after his indictment. He was even cited for the order of the Resistance. To better understand some of his ideas, one can refer to a book which he published in 1942, *Education and Culture*.1

Emile Mireaux was appointed by Pétain as State Secretary for Public Instruction and Arts on July 12, 1940. Also a professor, Mireaux was Senator of the Hautes Pyrénées and co-director of *Temps*, whose leading article of July 25, 1940 was titled, "France to the French." He became the first Minister of Education of the New Regime under Pétain, "the French State" (July 12, 1940 – September 6, 1940). During his stewardship, some measures were adopted:

a) The law of August 2, 1940, which ended recruitment by competitive examination for inspectors of primary schools and imposed Ministerial appointment.

b) The re-establishment of religious education.

c) The annual revision of schoolbooks (by a decree dated August 21, 1940).

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Furthermore, Mireaux did not hesitate to participate in an initial purge of educators. As early as August 16, 1940, this Minister warned deans of different university districts of the pernicious influence of political doctrines which, in his opinion, influenced "too many of the members" of the educational profession. The teachers were judged responsible for the "misfortunes of the community." As early as July, 1940, dozens of teachers were excluded. Almost all were accused of being trade-unionists, Republican communists, free masons, Jews or foreigners. Mireaux's departure from the Ministry (Quai de Grenelle) in September, 1940 prevented him from participating further in the purges, but the guilty were already clearly designated. At the Liberation, the High Court of Justice gave him a verdict of not guilty.
Georges Ripert succeeded Mireaux as the Minister of Education from September 6 to December 13, 1940. The Ministry was then placed under the authority of the Ministry of Justice, of which Raphael Alibert was Minister. Ripert was a member of the Institut de France, and Dean of the faculty of the Law School of the University of Paris. He continued to "purify" the French educational system. Jewish functionaries and foreigners were his first targets. On November 27, 1940, Ripert declared: "We want to remake the race, remake an education. This is not the work of a day and others will have to continue after us..."^2

We can ask ourselves how such an eminent jurist could have accepted these discriminatory measures retroactively, without protest which violated the most elementary principles of French law. The answer to this question can be found in part in a book published in 1943 on Nazi law. In it, Ripert pretended to study "objectively" all these questions. Specifically, he brutally affirmed his amorality: "...the man of science has the right to be unconcerned by the political consequences of his studies..."^3

^2 A.N. A.J. 16 2895, Dossier ENS. Official declaration of the Minister.

All of the reforms undertaken by Ripert in national education expressed the reactionary direction of the New Regime. Ripert did not hesitate to sign:

a) the decree of September 15, 1940, which suppressed the concept of free education in the lycees and colleges.

b) the law of September 18, 1940, which caused the disappearance of the Ecoles Normales, which existed specifically to train teachers.

c) the law of October 23, 1940, which allowed government funding of religious teaching in lay schools as well.

d) the decree of November 21, 1940, which introduced the concept of God in the teaching of morals.

On December 5 of the same year, Ripert went to the extreme of restoring "the duties toward God" in the schools. In addition, the elections of the deans of faculties and of the members of the councils of the university were temporarily suspended. The aryranization of education, which was the first law to be applied, would specifically retain Ripert’s executive order of October 21, 1940. This order, countersigned by Dean Roussy, Superintendent of the Academy of Paris was directed to all superintendents and academic supervisors of the French academic establishments. The law of October 3, published in the Journal Officiel on October 18, 1940 became effective on December 18, 1940. Thanks to the efficiency of Ripert, who sent his executive order on October 21, the law became effective at the Academy of Paris as early as mid-November, 1940.

Text of circular is kept at the CDJC. CC XVI-13.
The order of Ripert was very precise. The census of the Jewish functionaries was to be methodical. Three files were to be constituted; then a general listing of functionaries who were considered Jewish was to be established consisting of: "...men and women, who from public notoriety or from your personal acquaintance must be regarded as Jewish."5

The door was open to denunciation. Ripert interpreted the law of October 3, 1940 in a restrictive and severe manner. He believed that in order to obtain the members of the teaching corps it was necessary to add educators such as proctors, assistants, administrators, superintendents and heads of educational establishments. All Jews who, by their professional activity, were in contact with the pupils or students, were dismissed because Ripert was afraid of their influence on the children.6 All Jewish teachers were required (except in exceptional cases) to stop their professional activity "in application of Article 7 of the law" within two months.7

5 Footnote on Ripert's Executive Order taken from the text of circular CC XVI-13 at the CDJC.
6 Article I, A (4th point, section on members of the teaching corps), law of October 3, 1940.
7 Journal Officiel, Oct., 18, 1940.
The Jewish functionaries who asked to benefit from the exceptions previewed by the law (Articles 3 and 8) were obliged to follow the orders of Ripert and:

supply an authentic document showing that they were war veterans, their family background (sometimes even for two generations), date of birth and date of their naturalization.\(^8\)

Ripert was only too happy to initiate the aryанизation of the French teaching profession. His policies also scrutinized the status of the Jewish students. At the beginning of his career, Ripert revealed a moderate policy by opposing the Authorities at the end of November, 1940. He even wrote to de Brinon\(^9\) refusing to eliminate Jewish and half-Jewish students of the School of the Conservatoire. He believed the German directives concerning elimination of Jewish students of the Conservatoire constituted an infringement of French sovereignty. In his opinion, the French statute of October 3, 1940 did not prohibit higher education for Jews.\(^10\)

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\(^8\) Law of Oct. 3, 1940, Article 3, Article 8.

\(^9\) CX-4. Letter of Nov. 30, 1940 signed by Ripert, to Fernand de Brinon, delegate of the French government, and friendly with the German administration in France.

\(^10\) Ripert's opinion diametrically opposed that of the future Minister Carcopino. At this time, Carcopino was Director of l'École Normale Supérieure and had the views of his Minister.
Ripert "estimates that the pupils of the Israelite schools not being members of the teaching corps are not targeted by the instructions of October 21, 1940." \footnote{11 Letter of Nov. 24, 1940 signed for Ripert by the Director of Superior Education, State Counsel, Roussy. This letter was a response to questions formulated by the Dean of the Academy of Paris (Carcopino) Nov. 7 and 11, 1940. A.N. A.J. 16 2895, Dossier ENS.}

Ripert although moderate in relation to the question of Jewish students, was by no means unaware of it. On October 28, 1940, an explicit note was sent from Vichy to the Supervisors of the Academy. This note, sent by Adolphe Terracher (who was Director of Secondary Education under Ripert) was to be transmitted to directors in order to underline the will of the Ministry to mark the difference; schoolchildren and Jewish students were to be regarded as foreigners, designated from this date as second class citizens. The terms of this note signed by Terracher left no doubts:

In the absence of all regulations forbidding access to lycees, colleges and secondary schools to foreigners and Israelites, I beg you to take care that their admission has not, as a consequence, kept away the French pupils and non-Israelites from our establishments, who would have satisfied entrance examinations and/or passage into the different courses of these establishments. \footnote{12 Letter of Adolphe Terracher, Oct. 28, 1940.}

The ministry of Ripert lasted only fifteen weeks. On December 13, 1940 Ripert and Laval were the only ministers to leave the government. From January 23, 1941, Ripert
occupied a new important post as Member of the National Council and returned to his position as Dean of the School of Law in Paris, from which he was dismissed at the Liberation. Arrested and accused of national disgrace by the High Court of Justice for having collaborated with the government of Vichy, he was accorded provisional liberty on February 15, 1945 and then acquitted.13

On September 11, 1940, Jacques Chevalier was officially named Secretary General of Public Instruction. He kept his post until the departure of Ripert, then was named Secretary of Public Instruction, Arts and Youth under the authority of the Minister of Justice. It was during the Flandin interlude (December 13, 1940 to February, 1941), a three-month period of educational reform, that Chevalier directed the Ministry of Education.

As a godson of Pétain, he also believed in private school education. Having become Secretary of Public Instruction, he clearly showed his desire to favor private education (providing subsidies and grants) even if public education had to suffer cutbacks in funding.

In his philosophy, Chevalier was influenced by the Jewish philosopher, Henri Bergson. Bergson received the Nobel Prize in 1927, which bothered certain individuals, such as Rebatet, who was indignant to see a Jew claiming to represent French thought. The sudden death of Bergson, who died a Christian, at the beginning of 1941 ended the polemics.

Jacques Chevalier was born in 1882 in the department of Allier at Cerilly to a family of landowners and soldiers. His father served under the command of Petain as an officer. It was in this way that Petain became his godfather.
Chevalier was really saddened by the loss of his mentor, but could not openly oppose this racist ideology of the Vichy Regime. That is why he sent Louis Lavelle, another Bergsonian philosopher, who was director of the Rivaud Cabinet and member of the Cabinet of Mireaux, to the funeral. Although a philosopher, Chevalier was not a humanist.

When we speak of a man who had the respect of the human people and who implicitly, in the depth of his heart, should have refused to accept the racial law, I see this man consenting to enter into a government which is already engaging Nazism, makes a policy of division between the citizens, which marks a red cross on those who belong to one race or another, one cannot say that this man is a humanist in every sense of the word.15

His moral responsibilities were clear at the time of his trial, when his "benevolence" toward the Jewish teachers was stressed even under German pressure. In fact, a dozen Jewish teachers were, by individual decree, (in application of the law of October 3, 1940, Article 8) to have "rendered exceptional services to the French State, and are freed from interdictions foreseen by the present law."16

15 Sitting of March 11, 1946 at the time of his trial. Fasc. 2, p. 12, preserved at the CHSGM.

16 At the time of his trial (March 11, 1946) before the High Court of Justice, Chevalier cited the names of Marcel Bloch and Gustave Cohen, who were leaving for the United States, as well as Rivet, who went to Columbia.
Chevalier, however, forgot to say the law was French and that during his brief position at the Ministry of National Education, some Jewish teachers were dismissed. Although he did not sign the statute of October 3, he had it applied. On the day of his installation, December 13, 1940, Chevalier signed a decree which mandated the dismissal of numerous professors and functionaries of the Schools of Medicine, Law, Science, and Literature. Hundreds of teachers, who were allegedly free masons, union leaders, communists and others opposed to the government, were dismissed from the primary schools. Chevalier, however, was not an extremist as he was not influenced by letters of denunciation.

On December 20, 1940 he refused to create a "Chair of Racist Doctrines" for Vacher de Lapouge, Jr.17 at the College of France. He did, however, apply French laws and began carefully to examine textbooks used in the schools. Some books were forbidden to be used in the schools or to be placed in libraries.18 A circular of February 10, 194119 confirmed that the doors of the Ecoles Normales and doctoral studies were closed to Jewish students.

17 Trial of Chevalier, High Court of Justice, CHSGM, Fasc. 2, p. 62.
19 Ministry of Education Circular, Feb. 10, 1941.
Chevalier's interpretation of the law of October 3, 1940 was more severe than that of his predecessor, Ripert. As for Chevalier's successor, Carcopino, he would review the interpretation of this statute, and judge it to be too narrow.

Chevalier left his post on February 23, 1941. Several months later he returned to his Chair of Philosophy and his position as Dean at the University of Grenoble. In this position he was less intransigent and in 1943 permitted certain Jewish students to enroll in the university in spite of the legal quota of 3 percent. It appeared that Chevalier was neither anti-Semitic nor racist, but more of an anglophile and germanophobe, which was evidenced by his respect for his master, Bergson, as well as his love for English literature. He does not appear to have been fervent or even adept at collaborating with the Germans. Everything in his behavior, however, indicated a fervent anti-communism and adhesion to the Regime of Pétain. In 1943 at Grenoble, he defended some Jewish students while he denounced communists and Gaullists. At the end of 1943, he wrote to Pétain to propose the creation of an anti-Bolshevik and counter-Maquis idea.20 He would retain his opinion until 1944.21

20 The Maquis was the geographical area in southwest France where the French Resistance fought the Germans.

21 Letter dated June 12, 1944 reiterates his position, CHSGM, Fasc. 2, Chevalier Trial Dossier, p. 62.
On June 25, 1944, Chevalier was arrested at Cerilly and imprisoned for fourteen months. Chevalier was the first person indicted by the High Court of Justice in March, 1946, which was presided over by Henri Noguères. Chevalier was condemned to twenty years of hard labor, to national indignity for life, and to the confiscation of half his property. His condemnation was due more to his action against the Maquis during his short time as Minister of Education than to his dismissal of Jewish teachers. He later benefited from a presidential pardon in 1945.
Jérôme Carcopino

Jérôme Carcopino succeeded Jacques Chevalier in Petain's government. He served as Secretary of National Education and Youth from February 23, 1941 to April 18, 1942. His ministry was under the Secretary of War, Huntziger. Carcopino was a professor of ancient history at the Sorbonne and distinguished member of the Institut. In 1937 he became Director of the French school in Rome, a position he would keep until 1940. He is chiefly noted today as the author of Daily Life in Ancient Rome.

As early as 1938, Carcopino witnessed the ravages caused by the first anti-Jewish measures in the education system in Fascist Italy. Two hundred Jewish teachers were dismissed; the majority were teachers from higher education. That same year, foreign Jews and Jewish students were totally excluded from public teaching. Later, Jewish-Italian school children would also be excluded. In his writings, Carcopino maintained a falsely compassionate tone and said he deplored massive exclusions of school children.

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in Italy and also regretted that none of the prestigious Jewish-Italian professors benefited from a derogation as in Vichy France; hence they were forced to emigrate.²³

Back in France, Carcopino did not hide his political opinions which were very favorable to the Regime installed by Petain. In July, 1940, he congratulated Mireaux, Minister of Education and transferred his entire devotion to Petain and his entire loyalty to the New Order.²⁴ This step assured him a rapid rise in the Vichy government.

Mireaux entrusted him with the direction of the Ecole Normale Supérieure (Rue d’Ulm), from July, 1940, a post which he would officially receive in September under Ripert.

Carcopino was appointed Dean of the Paris Academy on November 13, 1940 by Ripert. In his memoirs, Carcopino congratulated himself in having been able to protect the university from the German menace. He added that he would have also defended the university against attacks by politicians or the French military, whom he held responsible for the defeat.²⁵

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²³ This was not the case for France.

²⁴ ibid., pp. 74-154.

²⁵ ibid., p. 154. This is very subjective. He stressed that he would have been more firm than Roussy and would have evaded the troubles.
Nevertheless, the statute concerning Jewish teachers was promulgated October 18, 1940: they could not teach in Paris. Similar to Chevalier, to whom no one can attribute public anti-Semitic declarations, Carcopino spoke of his Jewish friends: "...Among the Israelite menaces, I counted numerous friends. I was grieved and appalled by the iniquity which swooped down upon them."  

Without ever putting in doubt the French racist legislation, Carcopino, as the Dean, seemed to manifest particular care for certain colleagues. In spite of his personal feelings, Carcopino never forgot his responsibility. In the University of Paris, the most important in the country, he had to apply the French law of October 3, 1940. He centralized the declarations and asked for the rehabilitation of Jewish teachers. Those who were not fortunate enough to be famous or who were not one of his friends, did not benefit from his support. Carcopino explained that if

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26 Carcopino, p. 244. In his memoirs, Carcopino commented on this law. "I have suffered in 1940 over the laws which suppressed the right of teaching to my students, colleagues, or other doctors because they were Jews...I have never been anti-Semitic and was not to become one under the Schläge" (whip).

27 He interests himself in Marc Bloch, Levy Provencal, Levy-Valensi, Lisbonne and Professor Guastalla. Testimony of M. Clarac, professor at the time at the Lycée Louis le Grand, preserved in the archives of CHSGM. Carcopino had written a very flattering letter to Guastalla offering to keep him in his position--an exception; however, the latter refused.
he stayed in "his place" it was to have the power "to shift
the blows or weaken them."\textsuperscript{28} It seems that this was not
his only interest because Carcopino was an ambitious man,
and for him "to shift the blows" was also to accuse the
Germans to be the originators of the racist legislation.\textsuperscript{29}
He wrote: "the law dishonored no one but the Germans...not
for an instant did I dream to throw back on the Marshal the
blame..."\textsuperscript{30} Once more he had looked for the least evil.
For Carcopino, the Marshal "was not acquainted with the
actions which were plotted against the Jews."\textsuperscript{31} The
historian tried to give a positive image of his government.
He showed political diplomacy in his writing:

\begin{quote}
the truth is that in its entirety, the government of
which I was part looked to swerve the brutal application
of laws that the Nazis had imposed on the Marshal.\textsuperscript{32}
\end{quote}

Carcopino contradicted himself when he wrote:

\begin{quote}
Petain's law had not ceased under the cover of his anath-
emas, to protect life, civil liberty, and even the social
condition of the Jews in France.\textsuperscript{33}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{28} Carcopino, ibid., p. 248.

\textsuperscript{29} Mr. Beslais at the lycée. Rollin was summoned by
Carcopino because of a letter of protestation against three
Jewish professors of the lycée. Testimony received Dec. 6,
1961 by M. Calmetter preserved at the CHSGM.

\textsuperscript{30} Carcopino, ibid. p. 245.

\textsuperscript{31} ibid. p. 254.

\textsuperscript{32} ibid. p. 358.

\textsuperscript{33} ibid. p. 246.
In an interview Carcopino had with Pétain in Vichy on November 24, 1940, the racial law was mentioned. But nothing was changed since Carcopino, Dean at the time, sent as early as December 5, to all the establishments placed under his orders, a note confirming to the directors of these institutes that the law of October 3, 1940 was applicable to the Jewish teachers who were prisoners in Germany. Carcopino specified:

You do not have to fire from their classes professors who have already left because of war; therefore, in my opinion, the application of the law of October 18 can only be suspended in regard to the prisoners of whom nobody in their absence would know how to establish by presumption, their personal status.

Carcopino, Dean, as successor of Ripert at the Chevalier Ministry, accepted this deferred condemnation. He would act in the same fashion regarding the law of April 11, 1941, which complemented the one of October 3, 1940 (Article 7), and specified that “functionaries who are prisoners of war or who serve abroad will cease to exercise their functions two months after the date of their arrival in non-Occupied France.”

34 A.N. A.J. 16 2895. In the archives, letters from heads of high schools evidenced the government’s indifference about this question.

35 Carcopino, p. 257-258.
On November 7, 1940, Carcopino wrote to Dean Roussy concerning the Jewish students:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your ministerial instructions concerning the foreigners and your own instructions concerning the Jews. Regarding the latter, it is easy for me to apply them; none of the civil servants of the School Administration is Jewish; the professors are those of the faculty of literature and sciences of the University of Paris, of which the statute and their destiny will be determined by their respective deans. In relation to the students, it comes from your circular, that not being members of the teaching corps, they do not have to be taken into account. I have, therefore, nothing to do...36

His remarks revealed his moderation on the Jewish question. He exhibited a certain joy in this domain; "to have nothing to do with it." At the Ecole Normale Supérieure, in a letter dated November 11, 1940, Roussy requested instructions from his Minister, Ripert. This last letter confirms that he "thinks that the pupils of the school, not yet being members of the teaching corps, are not targeted by the instructions of October 21, 1940."37

Meanwhile, Carcopino replaced Roussy as Dean and remained moderate toward his Jewish students. However, the circular from Minister Chevalier of February 10, 1941 placed everything in question as it forbade the Jewish students to

36 A.N. A.J. 16 2895. Letter to Dean Roussy, Nov. 7, 1940.
frequent the Ecole Normale or present themselves for the doctorate. Carcopino, becoming Minister "in his place" would forget his own reticence.

Jérôme Carcopino would confirm the circular of his predecessor by a decree, which he signed July 11, 1941 with Marshal Petain and by the circular transmitted in July, 1941 by his Director of Superior Education, Galletier. It is important to note the rapid rise of Carcopino. He affirmed at the Liberation that he neither plotted nor even asked to obtain favors or positions. However, the members of his Cabinet, such as Plante, spoke evasively of "the innocence" of Carcopino. This adjunct director of the office of the Minister's Cabinet emphasized public support of the Regime, Carcopino's visits to Vichy, his repeated conversations with Petain, and his declarations and articles published periodically in University Information, even before February, 1941. Carcopino was not the candid image of the man he attempted to project in his memoirs, but was that of an ambitious man --his Cabinet considered itself "apolitical" as he did. If we believe him, the men who formed it "wanted only to serve France." As Minister of Education, Carcopino did not hesitate to contact the Occupation Authorities in order

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38 Carcopino, p. 275.

39 Noting some names: Gilbert Gidel, Dean of the Law School became Dean in Paris, a position he would keep in the following ministry of Bonnard. He was arrested on Sept. 10, 1941. Maurice Roy was officially named General Inspector to the Ministry of Relations with the Occupation Authorities.
to negotiate with them. After the events of November 11, 1940, he conversed with General Best at the Hotel Majestic. He even congratulated himself on the results of this interview. "...As of now the elite of our students is saved...the best blood of the French students has not run, as the Czechoslovakian students in Prague." 40

Carcopino judged the reforms of his predecessors as too extremist. He chiefly tried to avoid any tension and had declared himself "defender of neutralism at school." It was therefore natural that the Minister tried to suppress certain dispositions of Chevalier and attempted to impose his own reforms. Religious education disappeared from the public schools. If Carcopino did not suppress the very large subsidy accorded by the State to public education, 41 he nevertheless reinforced the former position of separation between lay and religious schools. He followed the politics of his predecessors. On March 13 and April 22, 1941 he signed the decrees which forbade certain books in the schools. Under his ministry, for example, the Malet-Isaac manual had been replaced; meanwhile, other history books written by non-Jews continued to be used in the schools. 42

40 Carcopino, p. 215-220. Minister of Pétain and Darlan, he established good personal rapport.

41 Carcopino, p. 327, and the law of Nov. 11, 1941. The annual subsidy accorded to private schools was raised to 400,500 million francs per year.

42 For the historic period 1848-1914, the manual of A. Bossuat and E. Bruley was chosen.
Less than two months after the installation of Carcopino at the Ministry of Education, Vallat was named head of the newly formed CGQJ. The two men would officially cease their functions in April, 1942 with the return of Laval to the affairs of State. There had been numerous letters exchanged between the two men, as their functions were complementary. Speaking of the law of June 21, 1941, which instituted the quota for the Jewish students, Vallat specified that it had been conceived in "accord with the Minister of National Education and the Secretary of Health." Carcopino, however, wishing to separate himself from the CGQJ in order to preserve his authority and independence, sent this circular to the Deans:

It has been brought to my attention that you have received directly, whether from the Commissar, the CGQJ, or from the regional directors of the economic service of aryranization, requests for information and even instructions relative to application of the law of June, 1941 regulating the conditions of admission of the Israelite students in the institutions of higher education. I have the honor to advise you that in no case must you correspond directly with the central or regional services of the CGQJ. As a consequence, all responses to requests for prescribed information must reach their destination by my intermediary. In relation to the instructions you have already received or which you will come to receive, I beg you to transmit them to me immediately. I would be very obliged if you would follow the strict application of these dispositions.

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44 Doc. CX-42, Letter of Vallat to General Weygand, May 24, 1941.

45 Carcopino, p. 358 (spoke of the law imposed by Nazis), and p. 368 (dissimulation of the government of Vichy).
This circular must not make Carcopino appear to be the protector of the Jews. He cited it with complacency in his memoirs to confirm his moderating role when faced with the "fury" of the CGQJ. He desired to show his independence and his prerogatives. Never did he put French racist laws in question; he even countersigned certain laws, and on occasion took the initiative in signing them. For example, in August, 1941 he demanded that the CGQJ extend professional interdiction to Jewish members of the lycee committees. In the same manner, Carcopino opposed the reintegration of certain Jewish teachers at a meeting on July 23, 1941 in Vichy. Concerning the special aryranization of teaching, the behavior of Carcopino was revealed chronologically by the exclusion of Jewish professors. As Director of the Ecole Normale, he claimed to have helped, with Dean Roussy, to pass through "the intentional loopholes of the law (of October 3, 1940) ...in official fraudulent fashion, the highest number of Israelite functionaries." Carcopino claimed to have acted in the same fashion when he was Minister. Modestly he recalled his fight against anti-Jewish laws: "...I fought as much as I could to deflect the blows..." He was never opposed, however, to the firing of Jewish teachers; even knowing the total numbers of them,

46 Carcopino, p. 246.
47 ibid., p. 368.
because he was the one who had them transferred to the CGQJ in May, 1941.48 Under Vichy, 3500 Jewish civil servants were dismissed in France, of which 1100 were part of National Education. The largest number of exclusions occurred during this ministry even though Jews represented a small minority (5 percent).49 The statute of June 2, 1941 applied by Carcopino increased slightly the number of firings. He continued the work of his predecessors in applying racist laws.

In his memoirs, the Minister claimed to have taken great care during the reclassifications. The reintegration purely and simply remained exceptional.50 Still he agreed to specify that the decision to rehire eleven dismissed Jewish teachers had already been approved by Chevalier. The selection was difficult; Carcopino as Dean centralized the first requests.51 He wondered if he should give a favorable opinion on each dossier. He refused to transmit the demands of those who could not support their positions before the State Council. In his memoirs, Carcopino spoke

48 A.N. A.J. 3865. Dossier M. 797. Letter of May 12, 1941 to the CGQJ.

49 The 1100 Jewish teachers were fired from the National Education as follows: higher education - 12-13%; primary education - 61-63%; secondary education - 20-22%; technical education - 2-3%; in the Occupied Zone - 38%; Non-Occupied Zone (including Algeria) - 62%.

50 Carcopino, p. 363. "Well understood, I had been incapable of reinstating the teachers."

51 Carcopino, p. 249.
almost entirely of higher education. He cheerfully claimed to have refused only two requests\textsuperscript{52} for higher education. However, his support was far from being as widespread as he claims.\textsuperscript{53} Still, we should specify to whom he gave his support. Carcopino was more interested in his colleagues at the university level than in primary or secondary teachers. He approved only about one demand out of four.\textsuperscript{54}

Soon, it was 1942, 1943 and the times had changed--men became more hardened. Carcopino perfectly tailored his Ministry to the team in power, which defended wealth more than individuals. The Minister was not a simple executor as he would have one believe. He did more than merely apply certain laws of exception. He also did more than to simply obey and execute--he fully participated in the creation of certain laws. In his capacity as Minister of National Education, he did not need to countersign the French law of

\textsuperscript{52} Carcopino, p. 249. One of the professors of law with "foreign" origins and that of Raymond Weill, a professor of the School of Literature who had reached retirement age in 1941. Among reinstated Jews, note that Robert Debre of the School of Medicine benefited from Article 8 (service rendered to the State) after agreement of the State Attorney.

\textsuperscript{53} ibid., p. 250.

\textsuperscript{54} A.N. A.J. 3865, M 797. On July 5, 1941 a dossier was transmitted to the Ministry which contained the demands of reinstatement of 21 Jewish professors of the Secondaire. After agreement of Vallat (July 16, 1941), Carcopino favored all but five professors on July 22; two of the five benefiting from Article 8.
June 2, 1941 as he had signed the decree of November 5, 1941 and the circular of August 28, 1941,\textsuperscript{55} which constituted the same thing. Also, it was Carcopino who communicated to the CGQJ information concerning the Jewish professors, and not the reverse. The CGQJ only verified and supervised the whole and stimulated his zeal. It was collaboration—sometimes not without certain reticence—but collaboration even so. Carcopino added to the decree of December 26, 1940 (Journal Officiel, July 2, 1941) signed by Petain, a new law\textsuperscript{56} which forced the retirement of Jewish professors. This law changed only a few things. For dismissed Jewish professors who could not prove having at least fifteen years of seniority, it was still difficult to receive at least retirement pay or indemnity. Things were not easy for others either. It was true that for the Minister, questions of the men's resources were not as important as saving collections of books, archives or documents. Carcopino exerted immense energy to protect libraries menaced by German greed. He also suggested that interested persons such as Louis Halphen, Marc Bloch and Jacques Ancel donate their libraries to the State (l'Université de l'Ecole de

\textsuperscript{55} This circular concerned the secret societies...an interdiction was made to all the dignitaries of these societies to hold public functions: Article 2 of the law of June 2, 1941.

Literature in Paris). He assured them that their books would remain in France. In his memoirs, Carcopino congratulated himself on this action since the collections remained intact and were returned to the families after the Liberation.57

In May, 1941, the Cabinet of the Minister of Education raised another administrative problem to the CGQJ. A law of December 27, 1927, (Article 91) accorded to children, grandchildren or heirs of functionaries of public education, retired or deceased, the exemption of the cost of day school in the secondary schools and colleges (university benefit). "...Should we continue to provide Israeli professors with the benefits of accessory rights as the previously mentioned university benefits?..." 58 The direction of education does not question the negative response of the CGQJ, evidencing the submission or indifference of the Ministry of Education directed by Carcopino.

As we have already observed, Carcopino did not always tell the truth in his memoirs. His principal omission concerned his role and true responsibility for the creation of the French law of June 21, 1941, which limited the number of Jewish students at the university to 3 percent.

57 Carcopino, p. 364-365.
In addition, the initiative of the inter-ministerial commission in preparing the university quota was due to the pugnacity of Carcopino. He had not been imposed by anyone. It was Carcopino himself who, after knowing about the first incidents at the University of Algiers,\textsuperscript{59} which hurriedly proposed their adoption. As early as May 19, 1941, Ourlièc signed a letter for the Minister addressed to Vallat at the CGQJ, which said: "The attention of the Minister has been drawn to the urgency to institute a quota for Jewish students in the universities..."\textsuperscript{60} In their study, \textit{Vichy and the Jews},\textsuperscript{61} Paxton and Marrus qualified Carcopino as a "liberal." They underlined his liberalism, his aid to Jewish professors of the Occupied Zone, his support of Bergson, his refusal to make the Deans cooperate in the persecutions in the Non-Occupied Zone.\textsuperscript{62} They also wondered who had initiated the inter-ministerial commission's preparation of the university quota.\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{59} Letter of Weygand, May 15, 1941. CX-37.

\textsuperscript{60} A.N. A.J. 3865. Dossier M 797, May 19, 1941.


\textsuperscript{62} ibid., p. 195.

\textsuperscript{63} ibid., p. 121.
On May 24, 1941 Carcopino wrote to the CGQJ from Paris to propose the application of a quota:

1. It is desirable that the quota be applied as soon as possible, at least in the Schools of Medicine.

2. The number of Jewish students admitted to take courses could only be 3 percent.64

However, certain Jewish students (sons of war veterans) could go in front of a jury of five professors to benefit from the exemptions. On May 29, 1941, Terracher, General Secretary of the Institution, sent a letter to the CGQJ. He emphasized a necessity to "appease certain concerns regarding the high number of Jewish students."65 But some days after, Darlan and Carcopino presented to Marshal Petain their project of quota; they tried to demonstrate the rationality of this measure.66 In his memoirs, the Minister made no allusions to this letter. He limited himself to repeating only that the quota was implicitly contained in the Jewish statute (Article 4), in which Jewish access to liberal professions was limited.67

64 A.N. A.J. 38 1144, Letter of May 24, 1941. Paxton and Marrus, p. 121. The letter of Carcopino states that in his Cabinet, Larnaud is the specialist for Algeria.

65 Ibid., p. 121.


67 Carcopino, p. 369. A.N. A.J. 38 1144. Letter from Carcopino to Vallat Sept. 5, 1941 confirmed his ideas that a quota in higher education is "a correlary necessary" for the limitation of future Israelite professors, physicians or lawyers.
Ripert did not interpret the statute in the same way. Carcopino congratulated himself in having been able to admit to the Occupation Authorities "the extreme severity of our calculation." He described the patience of the Inspector General of Germany, Maurice Roy, in approving the law mentioned in the Journal Officiel as early as June 24 without German censorship. His opinion of this law and the texts was that: "...they were necessary to spare the Jews of the Occupied Zone from more rigorous measures." In his memoirs, he cited a letter from Marc Bloch in which Bloch mocks himself about "his lame quota." He even pretended that he dismissed Jewish students. This interpretation was very broad; it was the law for all universities, grandes écoles and technical schools. In addition, Vallat complained to the Minister of Education about the poor application of the law and about the laxity of his colleagues. In his mail to Vallat, Carcopino revealed a certain irritability: "I took care of the strict application to the law of June 21, 1941; but I can only be surprised that this law relates only to the schools of my Ministry."  

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68 Carcopino, p. 690-91.
69 ibid., p. 369-370. "...we did not risk too much to exclude in practice these that, theoretically, we were eliminating."
70 A.N. A.J. 3865, Dossier: Education Nationale, Doc. CDJC CXCIII-40. Since the beginning of 1941, a number of Jewish students were excluded from schools of the grandes écoles.
71 Carcopino to Vallat, Oct. 24, 1941, CXCIII-55.
Carcopino's responsibility for the application of this law was undeniable and his circular of October 7, 1941 confirms it: "It is essential in all cases that at any time the number of Jewish students in the same university not exceed the total of 3 percent of non-Jewish students." According to him, his circulars had been re-enacted only to pacify the Germans who were worried. The first circular dated October 7, 1941 addressed to the Deans was more moderate. The Minister was precise in it, however, and stated clearly that only enrollment was limited by the quota and that Jewish students could not participate in the examinations. These students could, however, attend "courses of another university than where they are regularly enrolled." This double enrollment was an efficient way for Jewish students to escape the rigors of the law. Referring to the directives of the CGQJ, a note of the Minister recalls at the bottom of the circular, that foreign Jewish students could not enroll themselves except in the "case where the number of Jewish French students had not filled the proportion set by law." Carcopino stated he quickly received a complaint from the Occupying Authorities concerning the

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73 Carcopino, p. 372.

74 Dated Oct. 1, 1941 and reproduced in "University Information" on Oct. 8, 1941. Collection of CHSGM.
multiple enrollments of Jewish students—therefore, it became forbidden to enroll in two universities. Only in two schools of the same university did double enrollment remain possible because the Minister proposed that certain students in the Occupied Zone take refuge in the Non-Occupied Zone where the quota was not 3 percent. On March 14, 1942, however, Carcopino was forced by Vallat to sign another circular categorically forbidding multiple enrollments. He, therefore, had to obey the orders of the CGQJ and the Occupying Authorities. Carcopino was able to demonstrate an inflexible resistance to the introduction of any quota in the secondary schools, however. In his memoirs, he submitted that that was what the Germans wanted—to institute the quota in the lycées and colleges.

Carcopino also mentioned the ability of Maurice Roy, who sent false statistics to the Occupying Authorities and convinced his interlocuteurs that it would be absurd as well as useless to adopt a quota in the lycées because this would provoke a certain agitation. It is known that there were never any limitations on Jewish students in primary or secondary education.

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75 Carcopino, p. 372-73.
77 Documents CXCI-55, CXCV-1700 and CCXXXVIII-44, showed repeated pressures exerted on the Ministry.
78 Carcopino, p. 371.
Carcopino resisted. This resistance was efficacious but the proportion of Jewish pupils in the schools and lycées was only 1 or 2 percent.\textsuperscript{79} If a quota was applied in 1941 in the schools and lycees, this measure would not rest on any other official legislation. Carcopino was always opposed to it.\textsuperscript{80} His successor, Abel Bonnard, signed the law applicable to Algeria on October 19, 1942.

In summary, if Carcopino had wished to hold a firmer attitude towards the CGQJ and the Occupying Authorities, he probably would have avoided this segregation in education. But, did he sincerely want to resist? We recall that he signed a decree on July 11, 1941 forbidding Jewish students to compete in the examination for the doctorate or to enter the Ecole Normale Supérieure. Equally, in 1942, he approved the decision of the CGQJ to forbid Jews access to the competitive examination for the Prix de Rome.\textsuperscript{81} In his memoirs, Carcopino omitted all these points because he was trying to appear innocent. He wished both to justify his actions and minimize his responsibilities. Due to his

\textsuperscript{79} Carcopino, p. 371.

\textsuperscript{80} A.N. A.J. 38 11445 JA 6, Document of the CGQJ, CCCLXXI-44, June 3, 1942 confirmed the opposition of Carcopino: "the general government of Algeria had, two months ago, prepared a project of law intending to establish a quota for Jews entering institutes of primary and secondary education. This project confronted hostility in the Ministry of Education under Carcopino."

\textsuperscript{81} Carcopino was Director of the Ecole Normale Supérieure and the Ecole Française of Rome.
longevity in the government, however, his responsibilities were obvious and his influence was lasting. He was Dean for four months, Minister for 14 months and Director of the Ecole Normale Supérieure until 1944. In addition, his ministerial functions corresponded to the most important phase of the Vichy government. During the spring and summer of 1941 was when the Jewish question was examined with the greatest interest; but Carcopino's ambition triumphed over his moderation and kept him in the reactionary government of Vichy. He appears to have been less extremist and disagreeable than his predecessor (Chevalier) or his successor (Bonnard).

Arrested at the Liberation, he was accused of national indignity by the High Court of Justice for having been the Minister of Petain. As early as February 15, 1945, he was provisionally given liberty. Later he was acquitted and restored to his position of professor. The court decided that he had protected the pupils of the Ecole Normale Supérieure from leaving France for the STO (Service of Obligatory Work), and because he "stood in opposition to racist propaganda" in the universities. In 1951, he was named honorary director of the Ecole Française of Rome, where he pursued his career and did research on ancient Rome. Later, he became historical advisor to Fellini and died in 1970.

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82 Le Monde, Feb. 16, 1945.
Abel Bonnard

With a brilliant education, having graduated from the Lycée Henri IV and l’Ecole du Louvre, Abel Bonnard was appointed Secretary of National Education at the age of 60 by Laval, who was in power April 18, 1942 to August 24, 1944. Unlike other Ministers, Bonnard was not a university man, but rather a writer of Maurrasian literature. He was anti-German, anti-communist, and a monarchist. From the twenties onward he was part of the Parisian literary milieu, where he was known as a poet who often wrote of love.

In 1924, in his book, En Chine, he exalted the colonial realization of Great Britain, which according to him, preserved the white race: "The races have to recognize themselves; not mix themselves." In 1925, he collaborated with the daily Fascist newspaper of Georges Valois, Nouveau Siècle. At that time, he participated in banquets which assembled teachers and well-known men, such as Albert Rivaud and General Weygand, to promote Maurrasian ideas among intellectuals and students.

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In 1936, Bonnard revealed his anti-Semitism in the pages of his pamphlet, *Les Modérés*. The year 1937 marked a change in attitude in Bonnard. His Maurrasian hostility toward Germany disappeared when in that same year he met Hitler and Otto Abetz, future Ambassador of Occupied Paris. Shortly before the declaration of war, Bonnard sympathized with *L’Action Française* and Xavier Vallat. During the Occupation his influence grew. He was part of Parisian literary elite and published in various collaborationist newspapers and magazines. He also expressed himself on the radio, and as early as September, 1940 Bonnard stated his new motto: Family, Race, Nation. He was very concerned about students. According to him, they should be immediately "taken back under control" in order to "discipline them."

In January, 1941 Flandin named Bonnard to the Council of State. Bonnard was ready because he desired the position of Minister in the Ministry of Education to replace Chevalier as early as February 22, 1941. Unhappily, the Marshal's opposition seemed to originate with the arrival of Carcopino at the Ministry.

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87 ibid.
88 State Council, instituted by Flandin Jan. 22, 1941, established itself in the absence of all parliamentary representation, as representative of the nation.
friends of Bonnard (e.g. Rebatet and Brasillach) and their newspapers, such as Le Petit Parisien, multiplied their attacks by alleging that Carcopino was too timid. In May of 1941, Bonnard exposed his complete loyalty to the New Regime in his writings, including his firm resolve to collaborate with Hitler's Germany and his anti-Semitism. The Jews were, according to him, "foreign intruders who naturalize themselves most conveniently in order to plunder France."

Further, he affirmed again that in the thirties, a "Jewish spirit destroyed ours..." 88

Bonnard appeared different from other Parisian collaborationists such as Rebatet, and Brasillach, or from other writers such as Celine, who did not hesitate to laugh at the Pétain Regime. Bonnard did not attack the New Regime. He also did not hesitate to present himself as the defender of a rural and traditional France. If Bonnard had broken with his old Maurrasian friends, he did not yet declare himself Fascist. In the world of Occupied Paris, he occupied a very specific place: between the Maurrasiens and the Fascists. On April 18, 1942, he succeeded Carcopino, whom he had known and admired since 1905. Bonnard kept his position at the Ministry of Education until the end of the German Occupation. An avowed anti-Semite, he was more reactionary and extremist than his predecessors.

Bonnard was the Minister who remained in this position the longest and managed to pursue his paraministerial activities undisturbed. Adoring the social life, Bonnard felt a limitless fascination for Hitler, the new man that the Third Reich sought to exalt.

In addition to his other functions as Minister, Bonnard, who detested Bolshevism, was part of an anti-communist committee. He was also president of a group named Collaboration, and was active since 1940 in its literary section. He gave his support to the Institute of Anthroposociology of Vacher de la Pouge. This institute had an ephemeral existence, but its ideas and racist theories of sociology are still alive and spread by the new Right. The article of Duguet in *Le Matin* showed the orientations of the Institute:

The Institute of Anthroposociology, guardian of racial purity, will be inaugurated at 4:30 p.m. under the Presidency of Monsieur Abel Bonnard and Darquier de Pellepoix. The goal is to study, determine and protect the scientific basis of racial selection...

The Minister's relative ignorance concerning university questions conferred great importance on the men of his entourage. It is the reason that his nearest assistants

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81 See Appendix D.
are mentioned here—they were practically all university professors and often the same men who had served in preceding administrations. Thus, one cannot really speak of political rupture.

In the direction of secondary teaching, there were no changes. Chenevier kept his post of Director; Doldier remained his Adjunct and Mr. Mas remained Secretary for Administration. There were no changes in primary education either. The General Inspector of Vichy, Jolly, remained Director of Primary Education, and Lafitte, his Adjunct, was seconded by the Inspector of the Academy of Paris, Hepp. Among others who kept their positions (in addition to Inspector Roy), was Miss Blanche Maurel. She was the person who took care of the "Jewish question;" and she therefore corresponded frequently with the CGQJ. After the Ministers and the members of the government (January 27, 1941), it was the turn of magistrates, the military and high functionaries to swear fidelity to the Marshal and his Regime. Most of the functionaries of education (directors, deans, inspectors, and delegates) also had to swear allegiance on November 3, 1942. All these men promised to be

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92 On Dec. 7, 1940, Chenevier signed the circular which prescribed the revision of school libraries. He became, with Roy, Couissin and some others, a member of a Commission for the revision of schoolbooks.

93 CDJC, XXIII-35, 36.
faithful to the Regime while pronouncing the fateful little phrase: "I swear fidelity to the Chief of the State and engage myself to exercise my functions for the good of the State according to the laws of honor and integrity."94

Not all the men who swore allegiance were completely and vigorously in favor of the legislation, but anti-Semites were the most active.95 Although generalizations remain overly simple and even dangerous, we can affirm that the arrival of Bonnard, who did not come from within the university, to the Ministry accelerated the resistance of the academics. He had very few relations with French academics. The personality of Bonnard had two specific characteristics which differentiated him from other Parisian collaborationists: he never negated his adhesion to the Regime, and he never attacked it. If Bonnard broke away from his old Maurrasian friends, he did not pose himself as a Fascist. Politically, he occupied a very unique place.

Opposition appeared even in the midst of his Cabinet. The indifference of a Minister faced with the fate of a Jewish professor was apparent—at times it was even replaced

94 University Memorial 1940-44. Paris, Nov. 11, 1950. CHSGM, Dossier on General Education Measures.
95 A.N. A.J. 38 III, Dossier 5 S/C 2. Letter addressed to the CGQJ by the SEEN, Nov. 16, 1942. See Appendix E.
with mild sympathy. It seemed that the racist measure was brought into question. We arrive in this way to a quite paradoxical situation: Bonnard, Minister of Education, the most extremist and anti-Semitic member of the Vichy Regime, had, due to the resistance of some members of the Ministry and a part of the teachers, a very secondary role in the arymanization of education. Although he had control of education for twenty-eight months, he merely followed the pattern of his predecessors—no new initiative was taken. As it was common, Bonnard began to question the reform of his predecessors. He was determined to continue and deepen the epuration in the university domain. On the Jewish question, he does not compound it.

The Chief of his Cabinet, Louis Plante', wrote: "A letter of denunciation alarms him. If it is from the CGQJ, he is intimidated..." Therefore, Bonnard continued to exclude Jewish functionaries from education. He benefited from this work of purification, which was an advantage as well as a handicap. His friendship, which tied him to his

96 In the Hoover Institute, Laval writes, remarking of Bonnard, "He is sometimes more German than the Germans." He recalled the opposition of the Marshal to his nomination in Oct., 1943. He would have even expressed the wish to get rid of a man judged too pro-German. It is clearly opposition from the Occupying Authorities (according to Laval) which permitted Bonnard to keep his control until the liberation.

companion of struggle, Darquier, constituted an evident advantage as well as the good rapport which he tried to establish with the CGQJ. Darquier would help him in this task. His handicap came because his rapport was too good.

The resistance of certain members of his Ministry appeared to grow with time; so much so that the CGQJ, informed of the non-dismissal of some Jewish teachers, came to Bonnard to ask the sanction, not against those teachers, but against the personnel of his Ministry:

...in conformity with the disposition of this law, (June 2, 1941) I have the honor to pray that you proceed with their immediate dismissal. Considering the time passed since the promulgation of the law, it appears that disciplinary sanction against the director of personnel, responsible for the maintenance and function of the Jews, B. and M. would be justly deserved...98

Bonnard continued the work of his predecessors, Carcopino and Chevalier. He succeeded in excluding only a few Jewish teachers forgotten by his predecessors. Those were dismissed immediately. It is certain that this process was accompanied by a great vigilance on the part of the CGQJ --itself being constantly alerted by the Occupying Authorities. The Minister of Education was implicitly accused of

98 Letter from the CGQJ to SEEN, where the director of personnel at the Ministry of Education was accused, Sept. 15, 1942. XIII-33.
laxity in his mail with the Occupying Authorities: "...the pro-Jewish of certain Ministries still allows Jews to exercise important professions..." Bennard did not question the derogations accorded by his predecessors. He did not disapprove of advice formulated by his predecessors, and did not appear to be touched by numerous demands of rectification of dismissals which were sent to him at the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943. The reclassification of Jewish professors became more and more difficult with time. The increasing severity of the Ministry of Education became sensitively apparent. The Ministry, however, remained most often, even with Bennard at its head, behind the feeble desires and vague intentions of the CGQJ and the Occupation Authorities. During Bonnard's tenure at the ministry, a Chair on Judaism was created at the Sorbonne for the purpose of diffusing racist theories within the university.

For the purge of the Jewish teachers, Bennard was too late, but it was not the same for the question of the Jewish pupils and students. His extremist and primary anti-Semitic

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99 Letter of Roethke to the CGQJ of Paris, Mar. 8, 1943.

100 CDJC, CXVIII-20 and 29; the case of Mrs. Simone Levy, educator of children; favorable notice.

101 Henri Labroue, a university graduate who was a specialist on racism and known for his book, *Voltaire, Anti-Semite*, was given the Chair of Jewish Studies. Discussion of the subject took place at the time of the trial of Bonnard in 1960. A.N. A. J. 38 119, Dossier 6 S/C 29 and 40.
character appeared, and thanks to him the aryanization made clear progress. Very early, Bonnard asked the deans and the men of his Ministry to establish direct contact in a narrow relationship with the CGQJ and the Inspector of the SEC.102 It was not always the case between Vallat and the previous Minister, Carcopino. Under Bonnard, the SEEN and the CGQJ tried to eliminate Jews from the university, but French tradition was difficult to violate.

The result of the narrow collaboration had some repercussions in 1943: a) the quasi-disappearance of the Jewish students from schools; and b) the heavy sanctions which menaced Jewish students if they were discovered in the schools. Upon the arrival of Bonnard to the Ministry in April, 1942 the Occupying Authorities re-exposed their intention to modify the law of June 21, 1941.103 The two essential points of this project were geared toward:

a) the assimilation of immatriculation to enrollment in school, which limited the enrolled to a total of 3 percent;

b) the installation of precise sanctions in case of false declarations of Jewish students (such as a fine from 500 to 50,000 francs and one month to one year in prison).

When we refer uniquely to the political ethics of Bonnard, his absence of scruples, the excellent rapport with the CGQJ and the Occupying Authorities, one could think that

102 A.N. A.J. 38 224, Dossier on National Education.
his role in the aryranization of education was important. But this was not the case—his predecessors having enacted and supervised the work before him—as the moderate role of these men surrounding Bonnard at the Ministry is noted. Without them, the action of the Ministry would have been worse.

At the Liberation, Bonnard escaped to Germany and took refuge in Spain in 1945. On July 4, 1945 the High Court of Justice condemned him to death in absentia. He was the only Minister of Education to have been sentenced to death. In 1960, he returned to France and the High Court of Justice, presided over by Jean de Broglie, granted him temporary freedom. He died in 1968.
Caution is necessary when one considers the behavior and the evolution of the French Roman Catholic world. The Catholics thought they could gain control of public education when Léon Bérard, Minister of Public Instruction of the Bloc National, had succeeded in establishing the notion of "duties toward God" in the school program in June, 1923. This offensive by the clergy had been facilitated thanks to the opposition to the Minister and his Director of Primary Education, Paul Lapie, an intransigent layman who had tried to suppress the provisions of the 1881 Ferry laws on February 23, 1923. This intent to review the status of the schools in a manner favorable to Catholics was later cancelled in the twenties by Raphaël Alibert, Minister of Public Instruction of the Cartel of the Left.

Since the passage of the Ferry laws in the 1880s, Catholic public opinion and members of the French clergy vigorously attacked the laic public school, which in their

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1 This chapter owes a lot to W. D. Halls.
view, "deceived the intelligence of children, perverted their will, and derailed their conscience." Ten years later at the time when political conflicts ended in violence, the clergy showed a willingness to appease and ignored the old claim of the proportional school quota, which allowed the private confessional schools to receive funds in proportion to the number of children registered. The clergy also initiated a dialogue with those in political power by engaging in negotiations with the Daladier government in 1933 concerning subsidies for Catholic schools.

All these efforts illustrated a notable evolution of French Catholicism expressed in the desire to reintegrate with the national community as external danger increased. If Catholics participated in the "drôle de guerre," of 1939-40, it was reluctantly: they had not obtained satisfaction over the thorny school question, which remained an issue between 1938 and 1940. The evolution of the Catholic world was based on the influence of the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* of 1892, on the condemnation of *L'Action Française* in 1926, and on the will of appeasement expressed by its non-Catholic adversaries. This criticism was stronger in the forties than in the twenties. In 1937, Léon Blum multiplied appeals for a dialogue to negotiate subsidies for private education. In addition, the Catholic world was

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not united in thought. There were regional disparities wherein many Catholics lagged behind general Catholic opinion. The Church of France did try to participate in politics in the Spring of 1940. Its leader, the new Archbishop of Paris, Cardinal Suhard, was a prudent negotiator.

Under Vichy, the great initiatives of the Church in school matters came from Cardinal Liénart, Bishop of Lille, who had initiated negotiations with the last governments of the Third Republic regarding State subsidies to Catholic education. The Cardinal maintained good relations with the Regime of Petain as did Monseigneur Chappoulie, who was the official Church of France representative to the government of Vichy; Monseigneur Beaussart, official representative to the Ministry of National Education in the Occupied Zone; and Monseigneur Aubry, who represented the National Committee of Free Education.

In 1940, French Catholicism was marked by two other personalities: Cardinals Gerlier of Lyon and Baudrillard, Rector of l'Institut Catholique of Paris, who appear to have been more politically active than other French prelates. The former fervently supported Petain, "the saviour of the nation." Gerlier, who was opposed to Vichy's anti-Semitism, tried to unite all Catholics. "He considers France a
country of mission, a territory to be reconquered by faith. Baudrillard engaged in anti-communist statements. In 1941 he had participated in creating the Legion of French Volunteers, and in anti-Bolshevist crusades which justified Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union.

The France of 1940 was largely de-Christianized. Furthermore, the Third Republic’s school system with its militant laicism, had played an active role in the process of Catholicism’s decline. In spite of rapprochement between the Church and the Republic, the two institutions were never completely reconciled. The school question in particular constituted the cornerstone of the divorce between the Catholic Church and the State.

The military defeat of June, 1940 also resulted in an unexpected opportunity for the ecclesiastical aim of re-Christianizing France. This occurred when Marshal Pétain unequivocally signed the death certificate of the Third Republic. Also, since the law of separation (December 9, 1905), Petain was the first Chief of State to acknowledge the Church by kneeling during a religious ceremony. In addition, the Church was very distrustful of parliamentary democracy, freemasonry, nationalism and the L’Action Française. The clergy interpreted defeat as a sign of authentic “divine punishment” for 60 years of lay ideas.

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and a few months of social agitation. In the clergy's view, the defeat resulted from a process of moral degradation and national degeneration. More surprising, even the disaster of the Summer, 1940 was viewed by Heads of the Church as the means of a national redemption from errors of the past (both Le Front Populaire as well as the French Communist government of 1936). The Church was not unhappy to follow the Army in assigning responsibilities for the defeat. Since lay people were indicted in the school milieu, it was easy to allege that the military and moral crumbling of the country was directly provoked by the school "without God" and the teachers. General Weygand said to whoever would listen, that the country deserved its defeat because it had excluded God from the schools for the past 50 years. His opinion was shared by Jacques Chevalier, the Minister of Education.

The Church wanted to take advantage of the situation because the New Regime offered the prospect of a triple revenge: political, social and cultural. The opportunity was not missed, and Cardinals Gerlier of Lyon and Suhard of Paris met in Paris to talk about financial aid for Catholic schools.

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5 Halls, p. 89.
6 Halls, p. 425.
Pétain in turn stated in the Catholic newspaper, *La Croix*, that the Church must play a pre-eminent role in a France liberated from materialism and rebuilt by spiritual forces. In this way, during the forties Catholics and Maurassians shared political power.

The school question must be posed in all clarity and all justice. The public school must give scrupulous attention to the soul of the child. The Catholic school must be readily available for those Christian families who wish it, thanks to an equitable partition of subsidies from the State.\(^7\)

In this way Catholics did not use pressure or influence in school matters. In Vichy, the consensus on the school question was total, and Catholic claims were judged to be perfectly legitimate. They were:

1. that the interdiction of teaching by religious congregations be lifted;
2. that access to public schools be given to parish priests;
3. that Catholic teaching in the regular curriculum of public schools be re-established.
4. that organizations hostile to religious education be suppressed.

Marshal Pétain completely agreed to these requests, not so much to obtain political support, but because of his ideological agreement and personal views. On July 17, 1940,

\(^7\) W. D. Halls, *The Youth in Vichy France*, p. 68.
Paul Baudin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, deplored in his diary the activism of the clericals who worked to obtain abolition of the lay laws as follows:8

1. Law of September 3, 1940, which repealed the law of July 7, 1904 which had suppressed teaching by members of congregations.

2. Law of January 6, 1941 forbidding priests to teach religion in the schools.


4. Article 8 of the law of October 15, 1940, which dissolved the National Union of Primary Teachers.9

The religious politics of the Vichy Regime were the work of Jacques Chevalier, the godson of Petain. Chevalier was Dean of the School of Literature at the University of Grenoble and held the post of General Secretary of Public Instruction from September 6 to December 13, 1940. During this short period, he had succeeded in re-introducing the notion of "duties toward God" in the curriculum of public education.10

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In 1900, Chevalier, as well as Carcopino, entered into the Ecole Normale Supérieure. After having obtained a doctorate in philosophy, Chevalier went to Oxford and published a study on the religious sentiments of Wales. Attracted by Britain and Spain, two very religious countries, Chevalier was the doctrinal theoretician of the traditionalist conception of Catholicism based on conservation of the social order. He had been, since 1926, President of the National Union of Members of Public Education. In 1939, Chevalier was contacted by Franco to establish the reorganization of teaching in Spain, which he refused. On the other hand, as a devout Catholic, Chevalier tried to revive the Catholic Church.

In his educational views, Chevalier appeared to be more like a political minister than a secular educator. He was more interested in having French Catholicism regain the position it lost in 1905 with the passage of the separation of Church and State. Chevalier was conscious of the political opportunity and learned how to benefit from the legal ambiguity which established the school system and the Republic. He made a frontal attack against the lay establishment. In this way, he continued the policy of his predecessor, Ripert, who had given subsidies to pupils of free private schools (law of October 15, 1940) in a circular
dated January 3, 1941, which stipulated "that communities are allowed to discreetly help private schools by acts permitted within the law." On January 6, 1941, Chevalier promulgated another law which authorized municipalities to directly subsidize private schools by giving financial aid specifically designated for poor pupils in private schools.

Chevalier's attack against the laity was followed by the law of November 23, 1940, which re-inserted the notion of "duties toward God" in public school programs. The primary teachers in public schools had to permit religious instruction given 90 minutes each week by the parish priest.

For W. D. Halls, this provocative measure was directed against "the assault on the lay primary teachers in particular," and therefore to reignite the school war for the profit of the clerical camp. Chevalier had never tried to justify his intentions and his ideas on the "duties toward God," himself being a devout Catholic. He used a subterfuge to finish his work, and profited from the lapse of time between the retirement of Pierre-Etienne Flandin and the coming to power of Admiral Darlan. Chevalier passed the ministerial decree of February 22, 1941. This decree


stipulated in effect, that pupils of private schools could benefit from a grant given by the State. The law of March 10, 1941 stipulated that religious instruction could be given outside of public schools, thereby avoiding the criticisms of anti-clericalism.

The policy of religious fervor directed by Chevalier in the seventy-two days of his Ministry for the sole benefit of Catholic restoration reached great heights (in particular, the rebirth of Chaplaincies in secondary teaching). His successor, Carcopino, was much more moderate and respectful of university tradition and tried to restrain this movement. On December 12, 1940, the newspaper, La Croix, wrote: "School has survived without God." It was certain that the Catholic world could celebrate teaching dogmas of the faith thanks to the Pétain Regime (the Church had been ignored politically since before the war). The responsibility for the defeat, attributed to the French army, allowed the Catholic Church to develop a theology of expiation, contrition, and redemption of the French people. Education found itself in the first ranks of the accused,

for having booted patriotism out of school, for having supported a weak literature, for the degrading promiscuity of workshops, offices and factories, Lord, we ask your forgiveness. What use have we made of the victory of 1918? What would we have done with an easy victory in 1940?15

15 La Croix, June 28, 1940.
The church appeared less skillful in the promotion of an imminent national resurrection thanks to the intervention of Petain. This redemption was renounced by the French youth. Because of the corruption of the former regime, the Catholic hierarchy invested all its ideological capital in the complete takeover and control of youth, their education and their formation. For the Church, this reconquest of the young had essentially passed by the reactivation of mass professional organization, which survived the defeat. Since September 7, L'Action Catholique des Jeunes Français asked its members to collaborate with the Vichy Regime. Though the influence of the clergy was principally directed toward the mobilization of adolescents, younger Catholics were not neglected. Catholicism had conquered secular France, and its culture hid eminently political desires.

This was perfectly expressed by Antoine Prost: "When they feel the strongest, Catholics consolidate their own schools and infiltrate the public school."16 It is evident that the defeat of June, 1940 miraculously reversed the course of the school war to the advantage of Catholics after a half century of lay-hegemony. This was because the Vichy Regime gave active support to the enterprise of Catholic restoration. Strengthened by institutional support and

ambient crises which anesthetized traditional resistance, Catholics started a school crusade assured of success by re-conquest. All was changed from the social structure half a century old and already traditional. Not only did Catholics take the initiative in the school fight, but the public school world was ostracized and retracted by virtue of its silence and paralysis, thus giving a free hand to a Catholic offensive. W. D. Halls noted this anti-laic segregation starting from September, 1940:

In addition, pressure groups such as the Association of Parents of Students from the Public School (APEL) and Secours National, supported by members of the clergy, had pressed for the establishment of a special statute for public schools and for school subsidies. In the Fall of 1941, APEL was sufficiently influenced by the Vichy Regime to contest the effects of the laws of November 2 promulgated by Carcopino. The president of APEL rejected the laws of November, which constituted a definitive statute of private

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17 W. D. Halls, p. 80.
teaching. He also condemned Carcopino's re-evaluation of the initial measures taken by Chevalier in January, 1941, (law of January 6, 1941) which had produced great enthusiasm among Catholics.¹⁸

The lay primary teachers of national education showed their fear of becoming completely "confessionalized" in Spring, 1942. A teacher of the department of Oise wrote to Marcel Déat, who was particularly aware of the danger, to obtain the release of her husband, a primary teacher and prisoner of war:

In the city of 1,100 inhabitants in which (her husband) has made public schools win the majority of students, private schools have already made a strong recovery.¹⁹

This judgment, pronounced in the midst of the event, is confirmed by W. D. Halls.²⁰ In 1941, approximately 5,000 children left the public school for confessional schools, which at the beginning of 1944 had increased its primary education students by close to 5 percent. It was, however, secondary education, (the traditional bastion of Catholic presence in education) which showed the most spectacular

¹⁸ Halls, p. 89-90.
¹⁹ Halls, p. 89 and A.N. F 17 13342.
²⁰ Halls, p. 89.
progress with a gain of 13 percent in 1942 when compared to
1939. In 1942, private secondary schools had the majority
of pupils (53%).

The French Catholic school system definitely grew
during and in spite of the German Occupation. The Catholic
world benefited not only from the French State, but also
because of a movement of general opinion, favorable to its
growth as a result of the disarray of the Summer of 1942.
This diffused environment, filled with moralism and religi­
osity permeated the entire national territory (occupied or
not), although the southern zone seemed more disposed to
receive a "mystical renewal." In its November 30, 1941
edition, La Croix noted a return of religious sentiment
which would give the Church the unexpected result of a re­
Christianization of France. The Catholic world believed it
had witnessed authentic reconciliation of altar and throne.

Until the return of Laval to power in April, 1942, the
Catholic world probably constituted the most advanced part
of militant Petainism. Laval, by employing the ideas of the
National Revolution, definitively dissipated the Petainist
image and replaced it with total engagement to Nazi Germany.

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21 Halls, p. 425.
Both clerics and laity were incensed with a political regime, which for the first time since the fall of the moral order not only promoted the traditional values of political Catholicism, but also promoted social values, such as family and professional corporations. These values eliminated the republican political life and promoted veneration of the charismatic Pétain.
Reactions

The reaction of the Catholic world, and moreover the Christian world remained undeniably mixed: Catholic collaborators, such as Monseigneur Mayol de Lupe, PhilippeHenriot, and at the other extreme, progressionist Christians, such as Emmanuel Mounier and Georges Bidault, lived in an antagonistic political atmosphere in 1940. This was hidden for a while from the active Petainists.

At the beginning of 1941, the school reform started by Chevalier was received with enthusiasm by the majority of the French people, especially in regions with Catholic majorities. Thus, Le Mémorial, the conservative newspaper of Saint Etienne in the Non-Occupied Zone, faithfully engaged itself in the propagation of Vichy propaganda and expressed its support of the Regime.

...that Jacques Chevalier be substituted for Jean Zay in functions of our superior education is more than a sign of the times...it is proof that the National Revolution will not be an unknown idea in the school domain.22

In its entirety, the clerical measures enacted in 1941 satisfied the majority of the French, in spite of the fact that school reform played only a minor role in their lives;

22 Le Mémorial, Jan. 15, 1941.
but Vichy's ideas were not imposed on all the French. A prudent reserve and even a virulent protestation emanated from some French people. In fact, the Protestants were reserved regarding the first school measures enacted in the Vichy Regime.

Pastor Marc Boegner, who held many leadership positions in the Reformed Church and the Protestant Federation, was the first Protestant clergyman to show an ambiguous attitude. Between 1940 and 1942, French Protestantism exercised a major influence in Vichy with its numeric force of one million adherents. This was due in part to the fact that Protestantism was already implanted in the Free Zone (Cévennes, Midi, Toulouse). From the start of the first anti-Semitic deportations in 1942, Protestants separated themselves from Vichy and then broke almost completely with the Regime of Petain. The courageous determination of the Cévenole, who harbored Jewish refugees is well known.

It is also very probable that the Catholic influence on Vichy had notably accelerated the process of Protestant rejection because the liberal and republican Protestants at the end of the 19th Century had been the founding fathers of the lay school (Ferdinand Buisson, Pastor G. Casalis and Felix Pecaut).
Undeniably, the possibility of the destruction of the lay school had contributed to unify Protestants in their refusal to support the Vichy policy. A small group of Catholics who constituted the Christian university unions opposed the Vichy clericalism. Even so, it was affiliated with the CFTC from its creation in 1937. The General Union of National Education (SGEN), under Paul Vignaux's direction, expressed its attachment to the lay character of public teaching manifested by its principle opposition to the negotiations directed by Cardinal Suhard with the Daladier government on the question of subsidies to private confessionnal education.

In Paris and New York, (where Paul Vignaux was a refugee in 1943) men fought the anti-lay propaganda of Vichy with audacity and maintained the theoretical position of unionist organization. The union and intellectual milieu cooperated in the fight against the anti-laic propaganda of Vichy. Its true anti-clerical propaganda was organized around Emmanuel Mounier, a brilliant Doctor of Philosophy, and director of the newspaper, l'Esprit. Mounier knew Chevalier, the General Secretary of Public Instruction. At the time of the Spanish Civil War, Mounier had been Chevalier's disciple at the University of Grenoble and equally his political adversary. Chevalier for his part, had not forgotten the anti-Franco views of Mounier, and when Mounier announced to Chevalier his intention to republish
his newspaper after the interruption of the Summer of 1940, Chevalier reminded him of his past.\textsuperscript{23} Three days after the promulgation of the provocative laws, Mounier made public his rupture with his mentor and ended his friendship with the Christian philosopher.

Emmanuel Mounier started a true intellectual offensive against the policies of Chevalier and courageously editorialized against this exaggerated interest in religious matters. He demonstrated and re-established with exactitude the petty sectarianism of the illusory Catholic restoration. As early as February, 1941, \textit{L'Esprit} carried an inquiry on God at the school. This had repercussions among the intellectuals who were seduced by theories of Christianity or were not ready to completely break away from the Regime. They appreciated an account or criticism of its religious orientation. The courageous opposition of Mounier, however, had exercised influence over certain Vichy elites, as well as the directors of Uriage, who even supported Maurice Schumann, the Catholic Gaullist, against Chevalier's decrees. In addition, the Mounierist remarks undeniably belonged under the flag of humanism and Christian progressivism in the movement of lay reaction against the clerical provocations of Chevalier.

\textsuperscript{23} Mounier was received by Chevalier Sept. 26, 1940.
The anti-clerical collaborationist, Michel Winock, succinctly described his era when he noted, "legions of Catholics with staff in front, appear to savor the felicities of a stupid revenge."24

French opinion (both Christian and non-Christian) was not the unanimous Petainist enthusiasm of Catholic and conservative forces of the country. Once the shock of disaster was overcome, (especially after the meeting with Hitler at Montoire on October 24, 1940) the working class tightened its ranks. They were afraid of German reactions, especially in the north of France. Intellectuals and even some military reacted and considered going underground. In the educational domain, the true religious push of the winter of 1941 relied upon the reticence of certain factions of public opinion, in which the cultural schemes were derived explicitly from the republican tradition. First, it seemed that the policy of Chevalier had found very little sympathy among the superior executives of the high administration of national education who remained attached to the liberalism and neutralism of the university.25 The idea that priests could infiltrate inside a public school to give religious instructions (as one of two laws of January 6, 1941 allowed) particularly shocked the public primary teachers, who were still laic at heart.

24 Winock, p. 229.
25 Halls, p. 77.
For W. D. Halls,\textsuperscript{28} even with the lack of information in archival sources, it was the North of France which constituted the heart of resistance to clerical progression in the school domain. It is certain that a great number of teachers resisted this clerical progression and the skepticism of the North (including the Catholics) in regard to the accomplishments of Marshal Petain.

Overall, it can be said that this reticence of many sectors of opinion, which were traditionally anti-clerical, were essentially implanted in the Free Zone, betraying the legend of a complete adhesion to the Regime of Vichy that propaganda tried to diffuse but that collective memory continued to spread. In fact, it is an authentic reminder of republican tradition (which had been blown apart by the storm of the Summer of 1940) that succeeded in expressing itself in the collective consciousness.

Other indications contributed to confirm the historic belief according to which "40 million Petainists" inhabited the France of 1941. A movement of protest was initiated, and the high ecclesiastic hierarchy\textsuperscript{27} soon expressed the desire to stop the development of anti-clericalism. In March, 1942, Pierre Pucheu, Minister of the Interior of the

\textsuperscript{28} Halls, p. 77.

\textsuperscript{27} Halls, p. 73.
Darlan government, estimated that Jerôme Carcopino "has already rectified the monstrous error of his predecessor... which menaced the country with a terrible wave of anti-clericalism."\(^{28}\)

It can finally be established that a series of concurrent events inspired by the partisans of the Catholic Restoration had largely contributed at least to the exacerbation of the anti-clerical reaction starting from what has been called "the affair of the crucifix." In the Catholic west, the crucifix continued to be present in town halls and public schools well after the separation of church and state. This practice, (common during the defeat of Summer, 1940) was the expression of a desire to find refuge in religious mysticism. In March, 1942, the prefect of the Pas-de-Calais requested precise instructions from the Vichy government because crucifixes in schools of the department had been re-introduced in large quantities "in an ostentatious manner against public primary teachers."\(^{29}\) This problem of "the crucifix in public schools" was amplified because of the vengeful attitude of Catholics. It succeeded because Pétain decided it was not useful or desirable to listen to teacher opinion.\(^{30}\)

\(^{28}\) A.N. A.G. II 650. Halls, p. 73.

\(^{29}\) A.N. F 17 13376. Halls, p. 69.

A note was sent to Minister Bonnard in Spring, 1943 indicating that in some schools the crucifix was still in place.\textsuperscript{31} This affair, quite minor in itself, showed the political vengeance animating the Catholic elites. The response of Vichy to activism coming from the National Revolution, confirmed the force of the lay opposition to the Catholic conquest.

In July, 1941 Admiral Darlan, Vice President of Council, ended the matter by giving municipalities a free choice on crucifixes in the schools. This measure apparently corresponded to the majority sentiments of the local population. For W. D. Halls, this poorly-hidden reversal of a Catholic restoration in public schools had definitely failed as early as 1941.\textsuperscript{32} This was the result of neglect of lay tradition and the resolute resistance of the majority of the French population. It would not, however, have taken the dimension of a historical disavowal without the ferocious help of Parisian collaborationism, which under a Deatist banner, fought the clerical options of Jacques Chevalier with violence. Different political parties had their own reactions. For example, the newspaper, \textit{Le Cri du Peuple}, (in articles on January 7 and 9, 1941) expressed a protest on principle as a result of the law of January 6, 1941.

\textsuperscript{31} A.N. F 17 13364, note of May 2, 1943.

\textsuperscript{32} Halls, p. 79.
Another newspaper, *L'Anticipation Nationale*, allowed Cardinal Baudrillart to express his appeal to the people and his especially pro-Fascist views. Jacques Doriot, who was easily influenced, was not a virulent anti-clerical. The fascist wing of collaborationism, however, including Marcel Bucard and Pierre Pucheu, with its "unique youth" was more interested in the process of the militarization of youth in the national-socialist sense than the school problem. Only Lucien Rebetet, in the newspaper, *Je Suis Partout*, appeared to integrate himself into the clerical movement. In revenge, Jean Luchair, in *Les Nouveaux Temps* threw himself into a violent diatribe against Chevalier, accused of being the man of the Jesuits:

> Chevalier is out of his role; the confidence of the French, a great number who are non-believers, have not asked the Marshal and his team to modify what was just and indisputable in the lay laws.33

But it was Marcel Déat and "Deatism" which represented the greatest menace for Vichy clericalism. Déat himself was a teacher, a doctor in philosophy, an ex-student from l'École Normale Supérieure, a socialist (as teachers usually were), originally from the Left, and a lay intellectual (with whom he shared through neo-socialism, the Briandist and Munichist label of union and pacifist teacher). Déat always expressed (even after his support to the New Order) a

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passionate attachment to republican values, of which laicity was the cornerstone. After the defeat, Déat, strengthened by the support of Otto Abetz, took control of the radical newspaper, L'Oeuvre, in September, 1940. After having written the famous phrase, "Should we die for Danzig?" in May, 1939, Déat failed in his project for a single party at the end of Summer, 1940. He fought against his principal political enemy and rival, Jacques Doriot.

Pétain had Déat arrested in Paris on December 13, 1940 at the same time as Laval in Vichy. With the blessing of Abetz, (who reproached Chevalier for his clerical and anglophilic sentiments) Déat started an offensive of a rare political violence as early as January 9, 1941 in L'Oeuvre. This supported the lay position as well as prepared the creation of a new party--the RNP (Rassemblement National Populaire)--which recruited an important part of its militant base among unionist teachers and pacifists.

Contrary to other collaborationist groups, the Déatist movement expressed throughout the Occupation by its recruitment and its publications, a constant interest in the school question. The pragmatism of Abel Bonnard was interesting. Before he became Minister of Education in April, 1942,

Bonnard sympathized with the Maurasians, then with the Doriotists. He never stopped trying to develop anti-clerical arguments, which were often tempered when he came to the Cercle Fustel-de-Coulange (a club). But in newspapers such as Le Petit Parisien and Je Suis Partout, Bonnard prudently preferred to exalt the virtues of the Franco-German collaboration. He was, however, sufficiently opposed to the clerical advantages given by Chevalier. Bonnard even believed at the end of February, 1941 that he should have succeeded Chevalier in spite of his personal hostility toward Pétain and the Carcopino politics of financial aid to private teaching which produced distrust of the Catholic hierarchy. In June, 1942, after Carcopino's arrival at the Ministry of Education, the Cabinet of Pétain wondered about the repercussions of Bonnard's anti-clerical statements. To appease Pétain and his government, Bonnard reassured them in June, 1943 by helping public education and giving financial aid (10,000 francs). He destroyed the control measures instituted by Carcopino to monitor redistribution and use of public funds for subsidies given by the French State to private teaching. Carcopino

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35 Followers of Maurras philosophy, see Chapter IV.
37 A.N. F 17 13341 (Piece 340).
stated, however, that procedures established by the subsidies to help private institutions had ended since his departure, and in addition, the requests for subsidies were not processed after Bonnard took over the Ministry.38

Beginning in 1941 there was a climate of tension among the Catholics despite the euphoria of the preceding months. This was the undeniable result of a "resistance" of the lay population which had been largely underestimated by the clerical offensive. The Catholic world was ready to fight again by Fall, 1941 and Spring, 1942. For the first time, however, large financial subsidies were obtained for its system of education. Even so, it did not achieve the power to control public schools morally. As head of the education system during that time, Bonnard expected the appeasement between clericals and anti-clericals which were again fighting for education and youth.

Confronted with the real risk of an anti-clerical approach following the Chevalier decrees of January 6, 1941, as soon as he became the Secretary of State at the end of February, Carcopino opted for immediate appeasement of the law of March 10, 1941. This law modified Article 2 of the law of January 6 and sent priests back to their rectories.

38 Halls, p. 97.
Later, Article 2 of this law was cancelled and replaced by the following disposition:

Religious education given outside of the school building is considered only as voluntary education within the school schedule, according to the conditions which will be established by the Academy Inspectors after discussion with religious authorities in their areas. (Signed by Petain and Carcopino). 39

On April 7, 1941 Adolphe Terracher, General Secretary of Public Instruction, published a circular which suggested the complete introduction of religious teaching in the school schedule. On March 10 of the same year, Jerome Carcopino substituted "the spiritual values of the country, Christian civilization and the notion of duties toward God" in the school program. 40

Times were periodically unstable because at first the public school partially financed Catholic private schools, but later the ideas of God were rejected in public schools. And this despite the law of 1882, when the Senate defeated a legislative amendment which proscribed that professors had to teach children "duties toward God." It was Jules Simon, who had succeeded in introducing this concept in the lay laws of 1881-1886 by a parliamentary movement. 41

39 Journal Officiel, Mar. 12, 1941.
40 A.N. F 17 13319. Circular, Apr. 9, 1941.
All current conservative and clerical political forces could use the Ferry laws to have this concept applied in public schools. In Vichy, the old controversy resurfaced on the issue of whether the public primary teachers devoted to laicism and positivist scientism were able to dispense with objective teaching. Carcopino, who wanted to banish theology from the primary school, succeeded at the Council of Ministers. This explained the violent reaction of the clerical party as early as March, 1941. Numerous letters of complaint arrived in Vichy condemning the Minister of National Education. Some of them were significant: "Carcopino gives me the impression of being something like Pontius Pilate." And, "What is this fashion to invite God into school in the Fall, only to throw Him out of the door in Winter?"

In spite of the unseasonable declaration of Lyon's Cardinal Gerlier, who disapproved of the new attitude of Carcopino, W. D. Halls distinguished three types of reactions among the Catholics. The first few (such as Mounier) felt relief at the announcement of the State's return to neutrality; but the second group, (the integrists or extreme conservatives) were furious over the re-examination of the


43 A.N. A.G. 11 607, Dossier CM 21E.
clerical advances given by his predecessor, Chevalier.
The third or moderate group, which was the most numerous, accepted this tacit re-establishment of the status quo with bad graces.

Carcopino's politics had bothered Catholics at least at the level of school legislation. Not only had Carcopino annulled the favorable measures of his predecessor, but again he tried to defer the national desire for a definitive status of free education (another great Catholic claim). During this period in 1941, the Regime itself was being put into question. It appeared to be shaken by the anti-clerical awakening of the largest group of the population, which had reverberated in the northern zone due to the occurrence of Paris collaborationism. The Carcopino measure had succeeded in defusing the rebirth of anti-clericalism. In spite of the fact that his Ministry had known difficult circumstances, Carcopino succeeded with honor. He appeased their spirits, even among Catholics. His work was positive because he was the first to re-open the treasury of the State for subsidies to public teaching.

If Chevalier was unable to do more to increase benefits to schools and students of private teaching, it was due to a lack of time.
However, Adolphe Terracher, General Secretary of Public Instruction (appointed by Carcopino) issued an eloquent circular on May 24, 1941:

Beginning this year, the law will not make any distinction between children, no matter which institution they will be destined to...so as not to establish differences among the number of grants which will be allowed to them in private institutions as well as in public institutions.44

With official and definitive recognition of private education, the question of financial subsidies was the basis for all the debate around the Catholic school sector. Catholics fought to obtain a proportional repartition in the schools as early as the Winter of 1941.

In reference to the attitude of Petain, Carcopino said in private that he wanted to "re-Christianize France" by creating new Catholics.45 He favored subsidies to private teaching by the French State. He had already received Cardinal Lienart's emissary, Mr. Toulemond, who was an engineer from Roubaix and a "spokesman of the great bourgeoisie."46

The problem of private education was complex and far from being resolved. It was also far from satisfying the French people as a group. Obtaining proportional funding (funding per student equal to what the public school

44 A.N. F 17 13319.
45 Carcopino, p. 38.
46 Halls, p. 85.
received) in the schools had always represented (in the eyes of Catholics) the universal panacea for the evils of private teaching. Financial compensation was also present, but more moderately due to the prudence of Cardinal Lienart after the anti-clerical "fire" of the Spring of 1941. Mr. Toulemond would have liked to resurrect the old 1872 idea of school vouchers which would give 50 francs per month to each Catholic pupil. Pétain was not against this, but he collided with Carcopino, the Minister who had other ideas about finance. His idea was that a subsidy would be given if the private institution provided education for at least 20 percent of the local school population. Each Catholic pupil would receive up to 700 francs per year. The Ministry considered a right of control over funds given by the State.

In July, 1941 Pétain asked Carcopino to find an equitable way to subsidize Catholic teaching. The Minister opted for special aid to private institutions which had difficulties. He considered that the circumstances of the Occupation did not provide the best conditions to continue the school war.

Pierre Pucheu, Minister of the Interior, who favored fusion of the two systems of education, accepted this provisional arrangement and left the final resolution of the school problem until after the war. With the help of Carcopino, Pucheu started new negotiations with the

47 A.N. A.G. II 459.
Archbishop of Paris, Cardinal Suhard. They could not negotiate directly with Cardinal Lienart as even Ministers of the Vichy government were not authorized by the Germans to enter the forbidden zone at Lille where Cardinal Lienart was the Bishop.

Carcopino agreed with Suhard on providing a subsidy of 400 million francs to be divided according to the needs of each Diocese. For a long time, Suhard had been a participant of compromise. The Diocesan boundaries corresponded exactly to the administrative ones, and as a result bishops had to negotiate given credits with the prefects. This was divided on a proportional basis according to the density of Catholic population in each department. Consequently, two laws dated November 2, 1941 were promulgated. The first one legalized "exceptional aid adapted to circumstances" and was dispensed by the Minister of the Interior--not the Minister of National Education. The second law instituted severe control of funds allotted by the State and inaugurated a process of didactic integration to Catholic teaching assimilating it to the public school sector. Private schools could still work out their own programs and schedules, but all pupils of subsidized private institutions had to pass the certificate of primary studies. Young teachers had to have a baccalaureate to teach just as the teachers of l'Ecole Normale had been doing since September 18, 1940.

This sudden eruption of the State in the management and
philosophy of the private schools provoked a strong unhappiness in certain intransigent Catholics. This occurred especially in the west of France where the private schools of each community counted on the active good will of the municipality. In addition, delays of the subsidy payments were long, which produced some grumbling. This situation continued until April, 1943.

In general, Catholics appeared satisfied with Carcopino and lauded him on December 6, 1941 in their Parisian newspaper, La Semaine Religieuse. Not only had a large subsidy been given to Catholic teaching, but special dispositions had been made in order that religious instructions could be given "exceptionally" in public schools in the hamlets.\(^{48}\)

It appears that the agreement between Carcopino and Suhard in 1941 which underlined annual assistance of 700 francs per Catholic pupil varied from one department to the other by as much as double the amount.\(^{49}\)

The rhythm of the progression of subsidies between 1941 and 1944 which were given to private education\(^{50}\) facilitates understanding the pronounced attachment of the Church

\(^{48}\) A.N. F 17 13390 and F 17 13380.

\(^{49}\) Halls, ibid., p. 93-94 and A.N. F 17 13365.

\(^{50}\) A.N. F 17 13390.

1941-42: 400,436,594F (Carcopino gave other figures: 386,248,968F)

1942-43: 471,093,321F (increase of 18%)

1943-44: 380,739,493F (includes only 55 departments).
and the Catholic world to Petain's Regime. The 18 percent augmentation from one year to the other shocked people at the liberation. If these subventions had been continued and not cancelled by the consultative assembly of March 28, 1945, they would have constituted an expense of 716 million francs for the provisional government.

It is justifiable to assert that the Vichy Regime had not only opened the doors of the El Dorado to Catholic Education, (the principal beneficiary of Vichy's subsidies) but it had literally inaugurated a policy of generosity by the Regime in support of Catholic education. This policy had not been denied by the Fourth Republic, which was the result of the Resistance (Laws of Marie and Barange, 1951); nor by the Fifth Republic of DeGaulle (Laws of Debre, 1959 and Guermeur, 1977).
The Symbolic Purge

The three Ministers of Education under the government of Pierre Laval until December 13, 1940 succeeded one another rapidly. Albert Rivaud remained for one month during the armistice and vote of full power (June 17 - July 12, 1940). Emile Mireaux, director of Le Temps, was Minister during seven weeks (July 12 - September 6, 1940); then it was the turn of Georges Ripert, Dean of the Law School of Paris (September 6 - December 13, 1940). Ripert was forced to leave because of the dismissal of Laval.

If these Ministers did not have the time to establish the base of a national school, they had, in another domain, the responsibility of an intention or a decision (the last including Chevalier, Carcopinio, and Bonnard) for the purge of the teaching corps.

Rivaud\(^{51}\) thought to punish primary teachers because of their responsibility for the defeat of France. He was Minister of the last Cabinet legally constituted by the Third Republic under the presidency of Philippe Pétain.

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Emile Mireaux, Senator, was the First State Secretary of Public Instruction in the French State. On June 8, and then on August 16, 1940, he published two circulars which were geared to the sanction of abandonment of work. But when Pétain took the power (July 17, 1940) he had authorized, purely and simply, the dismissal of undesirable functionaries. Mireaux was dismissed when Pétain dismissed his Parliamentary Ministers.

With the arrival of Georges Ripert at the head of the Secretary of State for Public Instruction, Fine Arts and Youth in September, 1940, the decisive step was taken for the passage and establishment of a repression in education. The Minister wanted explicitly to "clean" primary education by punishing without mercy, those primary teachers who had been politically engaged in the Left. This was done under the pretext of protecting the other teachers against subversive propaganda. He wished to hit school opinion in a decisive and spectacular manner. According to W. D. Halls, he "projected a persuasive and exemplary action more than simple retribution." This explained the severity of Ripert's speeches and his coercive measures on the basis of the law of July 17, 1940, in which a certain aggressivity appeared.

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52 *Le Temps*, Dec. 1, 1940.
53 Halls, p. 106.
54 Circular of Nov. 15, 1940, A.N. F 17 13318.
These innovations differed, however, from French university traditions, and were the expression of a desire to authentically purge the teaching corps in its entirety. For example, in higher education, René Cassin, a Jewish professor of the law faculty at the University of Paris, was exiled in London near De Gaulle. Secondary education was equally purged, but it was especially the primary teachers who were affected by this massive purge at the beginning of the school year in September, 1940; and this, in spite of administrative disorganization due to the defeat.

Faced with the reality of a will of purgation from the New Regime installed in Vichy, the historian is surprised to find few or no statistics on the subject—even if the administrative structure of the time explained in part this lacuna. André Delmas affirmed, in relation to the infiltration of militant primary teachers, that "it was always the result of local vengeance undertaken by dubious reactionary elements happy to be able to exploit in their respective fiefdoms" the divine surprise "of a return of the Right to power." These teachers were victims of members of Parliament which they had fought in the past, and who now took advantage of the situation to settle personal quarrels.

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56 A. Delmas, ibid., p. 453.
These repressive movements can be articulated along two principal goals between 1940 and 1942: 1) to repress the political and union activity which started between the two wars attacking specifically the Popular Front. It was a form of political revenge. The victims were not very numerous, but expurgation was firm in order to hurt the image of teachers in the eyes of the public; and 2) the policies of Pétain attacked those who were favorable to the Allies. These sanctions were less severe because a great number of persons were only demoted or transferred. Two specific categories of the primary teaching corps had completely escaped from this selective political prophylaxis: Jewish and free-mason Masters were excluded a priori from schools. The former were never particularly numerous in primary teaching, although they constituted a strong traditional presence in secondary teaching as well as in higher education. Vichy applied these laws without mercy to the few Jewish teachers in primary education.\(^5^7\) Pétain was engaged the most in relation to this purge because he wanted the Jews to leave their position within a two-month period following the promulgation in the *Journal Officiel* of the first statute of the Jews in the French State from December 18, 1940.

\(^{57}\) Law on the statute of the Jews, Oct. 3, 1940 and June 26, 1941. These mentioned access to and exercise of public functions by members of the teaching corps which were forbidden to the Jews.
Pierre Ory skillfully described this process of anti-Semitic persecution in public teaching:

As of October 21, the collaboration of the school and university system discrimination is started: ...the Minister of Justice, Raphaël Alibert, at this date the hierarchical superior State Secretary for Public Instruction had asked that attention be given to consonants or sounds of first and last names...58

In the Autumn of 1940, Georges Ripert chose an apparent liberal method to track down Jewish and freemasonic teachers because National Education had opted for a procedure of individual declarations or oaths of non-membership. Abel Bonnard demonstrated the anti-Semitic achievement of Vichy in education, which was confirmed by historians, Paxton and Marrus:

I have the honor to transmit the enclosed decision commissioned by the General Commissariat to the Jewish Question on the situation in relation to the law of June 2, 1941 for the functionaries having a first name of hebraic consonants or having ascendants presumed Israelite.59

It is difficult to quantify the social purification that occurred because sources appeared to hide behind the pressure of a collective inhibition. Only Algeria, a non-occupied zone far from Vichy, (where General Maxime Weygand, 58 P. Ory, "L'Université Française face à la Persecution Anti-Semite (1940-44)," in La France et la Question Juive (1940-44). (Paris: Actes du Colloque, Messinger, ed., 1981), p. 79-80.

the General Delegate of Marshal government for French Africa, presented himself as a fervent apostle of a "de-Judaization" of education in Algeria) took an unmerciful approach to superior education because the quota had not surpassed the "maximum 2.5 percent" in the university. Anti-Semitic filtration of Jewish teachers in Algeria had been probably the most massive in all French regions, (Occupied or not) with the exception of Alsace, which had been annexed to the Third Reich.

In addition, it was the Jewish children who were the greatest victims, starting from the beginning of the school year in Autumn, 1942: "Over 18,500 Jewish children were expelled from primary education out of a total of around 25,000."\(^{60}\) After the Allied landings in November, 1942, this purge became somewhat lighter.\(^{61}\)

All the barbaric measures of this ostracism which affected teachers and children can be understood when we know that the free choice of the Vichy Regime was not the result of any particular German exigence. Algeria had constituted a special territory of Vichy anti-Semitism. But in metropolitan France, it must be taken into account with the acquiescence of a large part of the teaching corps, (traditionally attached to a certain liberalism) which succeeded

\(^{60}\) Paxton and Marrus, Chap. IV, p. 120 and No. 4, p. 354: Letter of Weygand to Petain, May 15, 1941 (A.N. A.J. 38 4).

\(^{61}\) Ory, p. 81.
in expressing itself until November 11, 1940. The most spectacular symbol of what appears to be a passive resistance to the anti-Semitic measures of Vichy were expressed in the report of Gustave Monod, Inspector of the Academy of Paris. In this report, he transmitted to Dean Roussy a directive for application of the first statute of the Jews in teaching. The conclusion being: "...What is put into question today is the whole university liberalism..." Following this report, Minister Ripert asked Monod if he was a Jew himself. After his dismissal, Monod was put into retirement; and at the Liberation became the Director of Secondary Teaching. The anti-Semitic persecution was probably exhaustive, with the exception of cases where the university administration was very often compassionate and the solidarity of colleagues succeeded in avoiding the peril of exclusion.

Another category of teachers also suffered under the Vichy persecution. Unlike their Jewish colleagues, which always constituted "an event" in primary teaching, the freemason teachers were numerous enough to form an active minority. They were part of the pillar of social homogeneity of the primary teaching group between the two wars. Paradoxically, few were dismissed. As early as July, 1942,

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62 IHTP 72, A.J. 251, cited by P. Ory.
63 Ory, p. 87.
64 Halls, p. 115.
masonic masters who were dismissed were re-integrated into their positions by Bonnard. He emphasized their good work, devotion and patriotic valor\(^65\) (as many were decorated with the "croix de guerre").

The anti-masonic persecution was more resolute than the anti-Semitic one, but proportionately less effective. Too many teachers were touched by the application of the law of August 13, 1940 on the secret society, and the ministry could not be deprived of these teachers in primary education without a dramatic decrease in the number of teachers. Almost 13,000 teachers (10\%) were war prisoners in Germany, and the ministry had to engage in a massive hiring of auxiliary teaching personnel on the advice of prefects and academic inspectors during the 1940-41 school year. This group was essentially composed of women who did not have diplomas from the Ecole Normale.

If the information gathered on the subject of the purge among teachers is limited, however, should there be doubt as to its effect? The British historian W. D. Halls proposed to approach this subject chronologically: From August, 1940 to February, 1941 the first purge occurred under the Ministry of Mireaux, Ripert and Chevalier whose motivation was anti-Semitic and anti-unionist. It was followed by a period

\(^{65}\) A.N. F 17 13364.
of relaxation due to a certain stability from March, 1941 to April, 1942 under the Ministry of Carcopino. Finally, from May, 1942 to August, 1944, France saw a second purge against communists and the resistance under the Ministry of Bonnard.

Carcopino had offered an enormous respite to the primary teachers after the harsh method of his predecessors. Ripert had (especially in primary teaching) put together a system of purgation in agreement with the Christian philosopher, Jacques Chevalier, who had in turn not hesitated to accelerate the pace of the dismissals. When Carcopino arrived in power, he noticed the trauma of the teaching corps and decided to finish the university purgation first.\textsuperscript{66} Undeniably Petainist but profoundly supportive of university liberties, Carcopino seemed to have sincerely wanted to stop the mass "persecutions," "reprisals" and "letters of detention."\textsuperscript{67} In fact, Carcopino wished to de-politicize the school institution, which had primarily veered toward the Left before the war and since the defeat had become the site of revenge which profited only reactionaries led by Ripert and Chevalier with the blessing of Marshal Pétain.

\textsuperscript{66} Carcopino, Chap. IV, Part III, p. 342.

\textsuperscript{67} Carcopino, p. 345.
With the eviction of Laval in 1941, political and diplomatic situations were modified. While attempting to re-establish contact with Germany in hope of obtaining honorable peace from the victor, Admiral Darlan needed to increase the guarantee of internal political stabilization in defeated France. To insure success of this policy with the Germans, it was necessary to increase internal order by emphasis on the National Revolution. Vichy multiplied the signs of internal appeasement and attempted to seduce public opinion with prospects of a rapid peace treaty with Germany.

In the teaching corps, the desire to stop the purge by Carcopino corresponded to the national will of political neutralization of the country. This occurred only after the approval of Pétain, who under the pressure of Darlan had significantly softened his initial orientation. Carcopino was sincere when he wrote in his memoirs: "The total number of my sanctions in secondary teaching, which were the hardest hit, came to 46." 68

The personality of the Minister-historian was not on trial because he was acquitted at the Liberation and continued his classes at the Sorbonne. It can be said that he had decreased purgation and stopped political dismissals and persecution. In general, however, Jewish and masonic

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68 Carcopino, p. 116.
teachers did not benefit very much from Carcopino's actions because their exclusion was the consequence of a policy which was not limited to national education.

Thanks to the contemporaneous section of the National Archives, some statistics appear. It can be said that in all French Departments (non-annexed such as Alsace and Moselle) had changed Academy Inspectors on an average of once per year during this period (with the exception of Paris). In fact, 326 academic inspectors had circulated between the different zones of defeated France to manage successfully "the departmental service of education." Of this number, almost half of them (150 or 46%) had been sanctioned by the Vichy Regime. Of those, one quarter were transferred. This demonstrated the instability and confirmed the lack of confidence placed by Vichy in its functionaries in education. It was the expeditive method of Ripert which was contrary to all the traditions of republican liberalism.

As early as Autumn, 1940 conflicts started between the Ministry and its subordinates in the name of the school politics of "the National Revolution." Numerous teachers and Academic Inspectors were dismissed or replaced because of "communism" or "professional insufficiency." It seemed that prefects had greater responsibility than the academic

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A.N. F 17 13364.
authorities concerning the purge of militant teachers. This was because they were granted administrative power in their departments and executed the orders of the Vichy government with zeal at least until 1942. It was the responsibility of government men who made political decisions. Their responsibility was high-lighted by Inspector General Chattelun:

There were few dismissals of primary teachers because of the prefectural authority which decided these matters and the government of Vichy, in view of political evictions, had immediately instituted the "dismissal of functionaries", reserved for ministerial authority. This was done without any procedure.\textsuperscript{70}

In fact, the dismissal of functionaries was not even considered by the law of December 21, 1940 signed by Pétain, Chevalier and Alibert, the Minister of Justice. At that time, Alibert exercised his interim in National Education, and determined disciplinary measures applicable in primary teaching.\textsuperscript{71}

It is difficult to reach conclusions on the subject of disciplinary measures among primary teachers due to the lack of documentation on this subject at the National Archives. What appears to be certain, was that the first purge

\textsuperscript{70} A.J. 72 251. Testimony of Maurice Chattelun, History Committee of the Second World War, Mar. 18, 1963.

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Journal Officiel}, Jan. 17, 1941. See Appendix F.
W.D. Halls wrote, "It is improbable that the number (900 victims) was complete or definitive." It is, therefore, reasonable to think that approximately 1,000 teachers were purged by the Vichy Regime for motives strictly political and anterior to the National Revolution until the middle of 1942. To this extension, another 1,000 victims were added as a consequence of the interdiction of secret societies and Judaism. These victims received the abject denial of the protective tradition of Republican France from the Regime of Vichy. Approximately 2,500 other functionaries had to leave their jobs for other reasons. This purge involved 2 percent of the 130,000 functionaries. These evictions did not reach the proportions of teachers punished by Edouard Daladier as a result of the strike of November 30, 1938.

Paxton demonstrated in The France of Vichy that the entire failure of the National Revolution was a result of the poor diagnosis made in 1940 by Vichy leaders on the future evolution of France, due in part to the blind hope of an honorable peace offered by Hitler to a wiser France. Unpredictable British stubborness and extension of work hostilities obliged Vichy to a revision of its initial options as well as the interior diplomatic level. This was the reason why the Regime could not sever all the primary

teachers involved in a union or political struggle—they were too numerous (10% of 26,000). In addition, of those who were prisoners of war in Germany (13,139 out of 26,000), few were freed (only 2,245 as of January 7, 1943). There were still 4 million pupils who needed teaching during this war, and the German Occupation had gravely deteriorated the quality of school life.

If Vichy ever did trust the teaching world, which was the subject of particular surveillance, it was after the martyrdom of 1940 and 1941. The political incidents which continued the repressive action rendered Vichy only too happy to symbolically eliminate only the most active of the leaders and local militants and to put pressure on the mass of their colleagues. But all the cases of police methods were abused extensively by the military dictatorship of Vichy. The teaching corps, which had occupied the first ranks of the political and social scene between the two wars, was provisionally condemned to silence. During several months, primary teachers concentrated on themselves with distrust, anxiety and anguish—and this when in the past they had been so completely open to the world for a quarter of a century.
CHAPTER IV

EDUCATION AND POLITICS

The primary public school was "a departmental public service which functioned in municipal locales with functionaries of the State,"¹ and constituted a republican symbol par excellence around which crystallized all the questions of the school under the Third Republic. The Regime of Vichy had re-examined this symbol of the public elementary school and had benefited from having a relative autonomy of decision-making in school matters. Vichy had used its autonomy to undertake an enterprise of political revenge which used the republican school as a touchstone. These decisions will be analyzed in three phases:

First, the degree of Vichy autonomy will be determined in relation to the Germans and the first decisions of the Regime in the school domain will be measured.

Second, the importance of the primary achievement in the public sector with the new political personnel and the privileged rapport with public education will be noted.

Finally, the objective conditions (the school during the War), and the subjective conditions (the schools' behavior), which determined the impact of school politics on the French Society of the forties will also be considered.

It is indispensable to specify some of the methodological obstacles that each historian of the Twentieth Century finds along the path of his research and which limits that research. It is also difficult to grasp the purging of the Jews as some militant primary teachers were victimized in the course of the Vichy school years. In addition, the movement is perceived only by indirect means. As a whole, the information is scarce and difficult to gather. Departmental archives and those from the academic inspectors are meager. Also, some documents were destroyed at the time of the Allied landings, as well as during the bombings.

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2 In the Collection of Ministerial Circulars of the era, preserved at the A.N., Series F 17 (13318 to 13324). Interesting dossiers (ex. "Communistes dans l'enseignement,") hold the manuscript note: "Trouvé vide en 1956."

3 A.N. F 17 13364. Because Bonnard at his arrival to the Ministry in April, 1942 revised some sanctions to appease people, and by declarations of some functionaries, such as Rene Capitant, Commissioner of l'Ecole Normale, F 17 13335.

4 Until the Liberation, primary teachers were under the control of the Prefect. W.D. Halls: The Youth in Vichy France, (Oxford, 1981), p. 414. (Quantitative poll of some French Departments.)
To those administrative obstacles, was added the reticence of the witnesses, which is a phenomenon very well known to the practitioner of oral history. When one evokes the troubled period of the Occupation, this often becomes the surprising picture of a retraction. The study of this work approaches several tendencies of the new history: the political and cultural history dear to Pascal Ory.\(^5\) It is necessary to be concerned with social history through the study of the 15,000 primary teachers and 4 million pupils. The study of the mentalities, dear to Vovelle,\(^6\) is necessary in order to grasp the evolution of public opinion and at the same time remain objective.


Political Meddling

Historians will never insist enough on the violence with which the French felt the shock of the military defeat of June, 1940. All the genesis of contemporary France comes from this historical tragedy. Apparently no one could predict this national catastrophe, starting with the behavior of the French themselves, blindly confident in "the first army of the world" (since the pompous victory parade of July 14, 1919) and the occupation of the Ruhr. The New York Times of May 7, 1938 reported that Ludwig Beck, Chief of the General Staff of the Reich, recommended prudence to Hitler when he stated that the French Army still remained the "strongest in Europe." The scientific historiography of Vichy being French (H. Michel), American (R. O. Paxton), or German (E. Jackel) demonstrated brilliantly "the mechanisms of defeat," and demonstrated equally the forerunning signs. From the "cowardly relief" shared the day after Munich by a very large section of the French public opinion, to the "cowardly relief" felt by the quasi-totality of

7 R. O. Paxton, p. 15.
9 Expression of Léon Blum before the signing of the Munich agreements, Le Populaire, Sept. 20, 1938.
10 R. O. Paxton writes, "the joy and relief which unfurled" in The France of Vichy, p. 20.
the French after the military armistice of June 22, 1940, numerous premises announced the mental unpreparedness of the French people and its elite to confront a modern war.

From the reverse tradition of the radical faction of the parliamentary majority to the initiative of Edouard Daladier, two years after the euphoric Spring of 1936, the support of a mixed public opinion finally continued reinforcement favorable to peace. This included the triumphant reception of Edouard Daladier at the Bourget when he came back from Munich, and the joyous deactivation of some reservists of 1938—all this in spite of the second Czechoslovakian crisis. The famous article of Marcel Déat: "Should we die for Danzig?" marked the height of the "Munich spirit" among the other "champions."

In July, 1940, in spite of the brutality of the warning, the French as a whole believed that the war was over. The war rapidly became known in the official milieu of Vichy, as well as in the population, as the "War of 1939-40." Contrary to the War of 1914-18, it had lasted only ten months with two or three military campaigns, of which the last one was dramatic for France. It was thought

11 May 4, 1939. ..."the French peasants have no desire to die for the Polish."

12 Jean Giono wrote, "I prefer to be a live German than a dead French."
that only a few weeks of reprieve were given before England would also suffer defeat. In this atmosphere, the time was considered as one of reconstruction after the war.\textsuperscript{13}

Although necessarily considered by the new French leaders from the economic and social point of view, they did not neglect the moral and ideological aspect: the hope of a purified French nation. The French youth embodied the hope for redemption of a defeated nation. This initial investment in the youth of France, a youth that would produce a new France in 15 to 20 years explains, in part, the great interest of the Vichy Regime in education.

In relation to Hitler, little of what happened in the French schools was important as long as the schools did not become foyers of nationalistic agitation. During a meeting held in Berlin chaired by Hermann Goering on November 9, 1940 with those responsible for the war economy of the Reich, Pierre Laval thanked the French-German cooperation, which he pleaded "would be offered to the French youth—a different idea than the idea of revenge."\textsuperscript{14}


The only goal of all these German policies in regard to French education was to prevent by all means the resurgence and the division of a spirit of revanche; that is, revenge favored by a national revolution. It can be considered, therefore, that the university authority of the Vichy Regime was defined by French management under German control but, that the French regime retained the primacy of administrative decision. Germany seems to have been uninterested by the education question in unoccupied France. This was contrary to the very strict ideological control weighing heavily on all aspects of education in national socialist Germany. Education was, therefore, one of the rare domains in which one can speak of Vichy politics, largely autonomous in relation to the Germans, at least until Laval's return to power in 1942.

A margin of maneuvers relatively more important in the educational domain was left to the French government, which in the hope of an early peace committed itself to maintain internal order. This does not exclude for the moment the existence of German political pressure very often exerted behind the scenes at the national level and more direct locally.

15 Article in Le Petit Parisien, Aug. 28, 1940 (a triple decision taken by the Minister of Education). "The return to classes will be September 2 in primary schools, September 15 in lycées and colleges, and October 1 in the universities..." --but some parents say "the return to school was earlier than usual." It was precise.
Otto Abetz

In Paris, Otto Abetz, German Ambassador to France, controlled every aspect of education during the Vichy Regime despite the intentions of Ernest Achenbach, his political counsel. According to the declaration, "the German government did not want to get involved in the 'university' question." Paradoxically, Otto Abetz, appointed at the time of the armistice, was not a new figure in French politics. He headed an office of Nazi education in France called the France-Germany Committee until his expulsion by Daladier in July, 1939. The official goal of the committee was to promote cultural cooperation between France and Germany thanks to a concourse of "great leaders" such as Jean Luchaire, Fernand de Brinon, and Abel Bonnard. They are found in the best collaborationist society later. This man of propaganda, Abetz, had good reason to interest himself in popular education because this branch constituted one of the points of fixation of the Hitlerian mystique in National Socialist Germany. In addition, Abetz was an avant-garde teacher. He would always keep a pedagogical view of propaganda. In

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fact, he organized "in August, 1937, conferences of Pichot (a professor) in German, in front of the public meeting of Veterans estimated at 200,000 persons."17

Abetz also organized "discourses in 1938" of "German youth and happiness." Any method which could maintain the political rivalries of defeated France was considered good. Abetz quipped on August 8, 1940: "Our goal is to seed the division in France."18

In 1942 Marcel Déat created a union of education, to which Jean Giono brought his participation; a pale copy of the national socialist league of professors and teaching branch of the Rassemblement National Populaire (RNP) created by Déat two years before. Déat could, therefore, count on the active support of Abetz, German Ambassador, who was a fervent participant in one single group of primary teachers. Abetz would facilitate the groups' control and allow the diffusion of propaganda on Franco-German collaboration.

Abetz, who can be considered suspicious of a certain "leftism" within National Socialism, shared with Marcel Déat and Abel Bonnard, options clearly anti-clerical which weighed heavily on the devout Jacques Chevalier's escape (February, 1941). Even more directly than in his politics,

the goal of Abetz's action was to control the men who participated in politics. The Ambassador of Germany multiplied the political pressures on the Cabinet of Petain to keep away or to impose men whom he liked, that is, Laval and Bonnard, who were loyal to him. For one, the return to power; for the other, the arrival to power.

Georges Ripert and Jacques Chevalier, third and fourth secretaries of National Education of Petain owed their dismissal to him. Ripert suffered German displeasure for having been unable to prevent or repress the Gaullist demonstration of Parisian students on November 11, 1940. (The Germans also obtained at this time dismissal and replacement of the Dean of the Academy of Paris, G. Roussy, who was, in addition, married to a Jew. He was replaced by the Director of l'Ecole Normale Superieure of rue d'Ulm, Carcopino.) Ripert joined Laval in disgrace to the great satisfaction of the collaborationist press, which was not very happy about the dismissal of Laval, but which considered Ripert much too reactionary.

Abetz intervened even more strongly against Chevalier, professor of philosophy at the School of Literature at the University of Grenoble, who had Henri Bergson for a Master

19 Besides "Gestapette" ("Gestapo homosexual"), "Abetz-Bonnard" was one of the scoffing surnames of the academic, which showed that Bonnard was close to the doctrines of Abetz and Petain.
and Emmanuel Mounier as a student. This godson of Marshal Pétain exasperated Abetz by his militant clericalism; and in addition, by the telegram of condolence which he sent to the widow of Bergson. (In 72 ministerial days, Chevalier established "duties toward God" in the program of public schools and introduced the teaching of Catechism.) On February 25, 1941, Admiral Darlan, successor of Laval and Flandin at the head of government, designated dauphin (successor) of Pétain was summoned by Abetz, who reproached the pro-Semitism of his State Secretary.  

In spite of the political weight of Otto Abetz, a trace of the university autonomy in the Vichy government is found. The Ambassador of the Reich, very annoyed by the dismissal of Laval, wanted to impose Bonnard on National Education in the Government of Darlan, formed at the end of February, 1941. But it was a compromise choice of a ministerial candidate who received the nomination of the Director of the Ecole Normale Supérieure (equally, Dean of the Academy of Paris), Jérôme Carcopino. This was another sign of the intense resistance of the Petainist lobby of Vichy: the result of which was "the disappointment of Abetz."  

In addition, the German military authority in France (Militarbefehlshaber Frankreich) did not resist the temptation to

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overstep the reserved domain (propaganda) of the bright and subtle Otto Abetz. Therefore, in the course of a meeting with Carcopino, General Von Stulpnagel did not hesitate to caution the Secretary of National Education against the spirit of the school community, too influenced and favorable to the Gaullist dissidents:

The General repeated the language which he used with the Minister Carcopino in relation to the youth and which can be summarized in this way: Gaullism cannot be for young French wary of the future of the expression of patriotism because Gaullism tends to discard the French Colonial Empire and reduce the role of France in Europe. He must realize, however, that Gaullism continues to gain adepts in the schools and in the institutions of education, principally because its propaganda is neither seriously fought nor seriously punished.22

If this direct intervention of the Germans illustrated the bureaucratic competition, it also clearly marked that the education domain was not perceived by the Germans as a threat to themselves. In reality, the school institution was transcended by a permanent political preoccupation. This consisted of the docility of the French public opinion guaranteed by Vichy Regime. It was, more than anything, this constant concern to maintain order which incited the

Germans to watch, with other sectors, the school world in particular. In the school domain, the commission "Kultur und Schule" (Culture and School), directed by Drs. Rilke, Reiprich and Dahnke from the Majestic Hotel, maintained a narrow control in National Education by scrutinizing each university law published in the Journal Officiel of the French state and by examining the schoolbooks, university reviews, and education journals. But the constant attention of the Occupier was geared essentially to the members of the community school who were incapable of organizing any type of political agitation. This was especially the case after the student manifestation of November 11, 1940. Communist education, as well as lycées and students, were the object of police surveillance. In revenge, Jews and free masons were publicly denounced as such, irrespective of their abilities as educators.
German Interest

Paradoxically, the Germans did not hide a certain sympathy for the ex-leaders of the union of National Primary Teachers, which was dissolved by Vichy in August, 1940 along with all its professional and union organizations. Men such as Ludovic Zoretti (ex-General Secretary of the General Federation of Education tied to the GGT), and André Delmas (ex-General Secretary of the Syndicat National des Instituteurs), unionists of the Left, were credited by the Germans for their anti-communist, anti-clerical, and pacifist positions before the war. This was taken into account when the unionists tried to create a professional association of primary teachers in 1941.

It is interesting to see that German opinions were the opposite of Petainist Vichy, which in the Fall of 1940 had employed sanctions against the leaders of the National Union of Primary Teachers based on their past political positions. The promotion of those unionists under Bonnard seemed to

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23 A.N. A.J. 40556; note of Dr. Dahnke to the German military authority (Militarbefehlshaber) of Nov. 7, 1941.

24 ibid. and A.N. F 17 13364. Lavenir, Blain and Emery, who activated the rhodianienne section of the SNI in the thirties. As for Ludovic Zoretti and André Delmas, Bonnard, on becoming Minister, facilitated their promotion in July, 1942.
appear as an intent to obstruct school politics judged too "reactionary and clerical," especially under the short ministry of Chevalier.

The MBH-F had better relations with Fernand de Brinon, the direct interlocutor in Paris, who also was the general delegation of the French government in the Occupied Zone. de Brinon was an old friend of Otto Abetz, whose ideas were nearer to Laval than the Vichy government, which he was supposed to represent in the Occupied Zone. In charge of school and university affairs at the DGGF, was J. Verrier, (General Inspector of Historical Monuments, Maurice Roy, and Grandclaude, (professor at the Law School of Paris). They successfully represented Carcopino from 1941-1942.

René Georgin and P. Couissin, (ex-member of the Fustel de Coulanges circle) became the representatives of Bonnard in the Spring of 1942. They were "more German than the Germans" according to Laval. In fact, it was especially at the local level in the Occupied Zone that German pressure was exercised efficiently on the schools. In Rennes, the propaganda Abteilung demanded that the Dean of the Academy of Paris furnish a list of all movements of personnel up to January 1, 1941. On occasion, soldiers came

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25 A.N. F 17 13379.
to control and inspect school institutions. This was much more disagreeable than it was effective. Sometimes they patrolled the school libraries to see if books forbidden by the German censorship were present.

Until November, 1942, the line between Occupied and Non-Occupied France was divided into two different worlds. The latter did not see German uniforms, Abteilung propaganda or the German system of organization. Its pressure on French political opinion was minimal.

The Vichy Regime appeared to have a certain freedom of action. For example, the schoolchildren were allowed to carry the insignia of the francisque. Meetings of the boy scouts were authorized as well as the singing of the Marseillaise, the weekly ceremony of the "Salute to the Colors," and the daily singing of "Marshal, Nous Voilà." All this was present in all primary and secondary schools of the Free Zone as early as the 1940-41 schoolyear.

26 The Loire River.

27 A.N. F 17 13319. Note dated May, 1941.
Ideological Interest of the Germans

The child did not constitute a protected category for the Germans. Progeny of an enemy people, youths and children were "themselves submitted to the same constraints as the adults." This explained the severe repression of the demonstration of the students on November 11, 1940, as well as the strikes of the miners of the North in 1941.

The Germans wished to promote their ideology in the schools as well as in the culture. Demonstrations of German influence became very frequent. "Pedagogic projects" flourished from Spring, 1940, and a French-German lycee was created. A series of monthly conferences were given, with titles such as, "France and Germany Throughout the Centuries: Are They Really Hereditary Enemies?"

In the schools, the Germans seemed to prefer the exercise of ideological coercion to the practice of intellectual seduction. Primary teachers in the large cities of the Occupied Zone were firmly initiated and directed to guide their pupils in the expositions of propaganda. In Paris, as early as the beginning of the schoolyear of 1940, the teachers went to the Berlitz Palace to attend an exposition on the rituals of free masonry.

29 A.N. F 17 13341. Paper No. 188.
30 A.N. F 17 13342.
In September, 1941, there was an exposition on "The Jew in France," and the following year the subject was "Bolshevism Against Europe." The Germans concentrated their effort in the educational system on trying to introduce propaganda Abteitung posters in the classrooms. Invariably, their preoccupation remained within a strategic as well as a political order. Their vigorous reaction to the pro-clerical measures of Chevalier at the beginning of 1941 was as much against Nazi philosophy as it was against the belligerence of any type of public agitation, which would on this occasion be clearly anti-clerical. In the same fashion, the "Otto Abetz List" of September, 1940 did not produce a "Nazification" of programs and French schoolbooks. It was geared more definitely to censor all or parts of the history books of the Third Republic, which presented an aggressive image of Germany in their explanations of the Wars of 1870 and 1914-18. They also wished to banish books and literature of Jewish and Judeo-German writers, such as Heinrich Heine and also British and Polish writers in general. Entire schoolbooks or certain chapters were banned from publication or eliminated from the field of study. Professionals enforced these actions with the goal of influencing school opinion.

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32 The two editions of the Otto Abetz List are classified in the papers of A.N. F 17 13369 and F 17 13378. See also Appendix I.
Some professors were forbidden to teach by the German authorities because they had given books to students from the school library "containing attacks against Germany." The Germans especially distrusted English professors, because they allowed their students to sing "God Save the King." ³³

From the ideologic point of view, it appeared to be more effective to eradicate the nationalist remnants which may have been present in the school domain. W. D. Halls, the British historian, affirms "the Germans discourage or sabotage the efforts for the sake of the National Revolution," for fear that they would encourage a spirit of revenge. ³⁴

It is difficult to say that the Germans had totally neglected the French school system, especially in the Occupied Zone. Even with the relative ideological disinterest, it seems legitimate to wonder if the Germans had not tried to impose on the defeated nation their own cultural model and on the children the perspective of "the new European order." Men such as Marcel Déat or Jacques Doriot controlled the conversion of French youth to German national socialism or to a "national socialism in the French way." In this hypothesis, the Vichy Regime would be reduced to applying a school politic strongly influenced by Germans.

³³ A.N. F 17 13377. Note dated Apr., 1941 from the Field Commander regarding a professor in the primary school of Fougère.
³⁴ Halls, p. 52-54.
One cannot overlook remarking on some analogies between some of the school options of the Vichy Regime and the educational system in Germany and Italy. In Germany, the Minister of Education, Rust, purged the teaching corp of Jewish and Marxist professors thanks to the constitution of a sole teaching organization, the National Socialist Lehrerbund. In addition, education for young female students had to satisfy the motto of "Kinder, Kuche, Kirche" (Children, Kitchen, Church).

As for Fascist Italy, it benefited from a school charter of 1939 established by the Minister of National Education, Ballillo, which continued the gentile reform of 1923. This charter unified l'Ecole Secondaire Inférieure and introduced manual work among education activities. From 1928, the production of state books was controlled by a specialized commission. Education systems adopted by the dictatorship favored essentially gymnastic or manual work which accentuated virile behavior in contradiction to intellectual knowledge and book erudition which favored critical sense. This fundamental option was reinforced by control of the teachers and the enlistment of youth in paramilitary formations (the German Hitlerjugend and the Italian Balilla).

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From this point of view, the Vichy Regime authorized uncontestable conceptions and pedagogical practices close to the educational orientations of dictatorships, but more from Italy than Germany (development of youth movements, censorship of school programs, surveillance of teachers, promotion of a "general and sports education," disdain for teaching women...).

This apparent representation was more due to general tendencies of totalitarian regimes, which searched for greater control of the state on the individual, than due to a deliberate will to follow the victors. Totalitarian education was, in fact, geared toward the politization and militarization of youth. This was globally forbidden to the Vichy Regime by the reality of the German Occupation. In this way, the promotion of a dynamic French youth by the National Revolution was particularly feared by the Germans, who saw in it, at least until 1942, a prospective will of revenge. Some weak indices seemed to confirm that the Vichy Regime had not been obliged to follow a foreign educational model. This was underlined: "It is not a question of making a servile copy of what has been done abroad." 38

In addition, the organizational initiatives of education were equally antagonistic on each side of the Rhine. At the time when Carcopino tried to integrate les Ecoles

38 A.N. F.N. 13364.
Primaires Supérieures to the modern college of secondary teaching in 1941, Minister Rust started "primary schools with a terminal level reinforced, "--the Hauptschulen (highschool).\textsuperscript{37}

It is to go too far to state that the school policies of Vichy would have been the site of an attempt at the "Nazification" of French teaching. It appeared that Vichy was really responsible for its policy--so much so that Pétain wished he was the Minister of Education to be able to impose his ideas of "Family, Work, Country."

The ideological pressure exerted by the Germans on the educative system weighed very little in comparison with the dictate of material orders which were imposed on schools. Requisitioning primary teachers and professors or using school buildings for their own needs was not uncommon. In March, 1944, 2,806 primary teachers had been the victims of "the service of obligatory work" (STO) in Germany with 16,200 other French functionaries. To this number, we must add 1,800 master students sent to Germany who came out of the ex-l'École Normale dissolved by Vichy.\textsuperscript{38} The Germans also requested a contribution more adapted to its function from the teaching corps. In order to remove some of their military activities, the Occupation Authorities


\textsuperscript{38} A.N. F 17 13348. Letter from the Secretary General of STO to Bonnard, Mar. 20, 1944, and Halls, p. 120.
decided to organize French language courses. Transgressing the administrative hierarchies, they pressured the French academic authorities to comply.

The following was noted by an Academy Inspector in his report to the Minister of National Education:

The Germans had asked the Deans, and very often directly to the Chief of the Institution or professors, to put locales and professors at their disposition. The locales were to be utilized only after the class day of the regular pupils, from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m., generally. The remuneration offered to the professors was 100 francs per hour in Paris.39

Therefore, French classes by German professors were given to German officers and non-commissioned officers. The Director of Superior Education, while warning Minister Carcopino of the intention of the Germans added that "this measure" was to be "generalized by the German authority, and in case of refusal would requisition professors after their hours of regular service."40

It was public institutions which especially interested the Germans (schools, armories, and hospitals). But the educational institutions in the Occupied Zone were particularly appreciated by the Germans because of the large school yards where groups could be reunited. The yard gave space

39 A.N. F 17 13377. Report of Apr., 1941. Note that the retribution of 100 francs per hour is raised for an average salary of 30.000F (old francs).

40 A.N. F 17 13377.
to their vehicles, and classrooms served as lodging for soldiers; also one should not forget their refrigerators and kitchens. In November, 1942, the Germans occupied "30 percent of the university locales, 40 percent of the secondary schools, and 6 percent of the primary schools."\(^{41}\)

In his *Souvenirs de Sept Ans*, Jerome Carcopino spoke of the occupation of l’Ecole Normale Superieure of rue d’Ulm, to which he was appointed by Emile Mireaux, the Secretary of State on September, 1940:

...on September 18, officers of the Luftwaffe came from the Palace of Luxembourg to look at the locales from underground to the attic with the pleasantly expressed intention to move in and rapidly establish 300 of their aviators in an encampment which would encompass a central building in its entirety, and even without exception, our library.\(^{42}\)

This entry into the Ecole Normale in rue d’Ulm in 1940 would occur only with a compromise from each party. In a general fashion, the occupation of school locales in the Occupied Zone was very often the expression of a difficult negotiation between the German military authorities and the French academic ones. If the German troops left one place, it was to go to another one. For the Germans, schools were an excellent point of reunion, and therefore passages.

\(^{41}\) A.N. F 17 13379. Halls, p. 49.

On occasion, only one part of the building was occupied by the soldiers, meanwhile the teachers continued to teach in another part. In some cases, it was a very precarious arrangement, especially in the rural areas. When a school was requisitioned, it was taken over completely, and teachers were obliged to teach in the barns or outbuildings. On occasion, the German occupiers of the locales caused property damages, especially when the soldiers trained with grenades.

The schools of the northeast had first suffered considerable damage during the battles of May and June, 1940, when many schools were destroyed. According to W. D. Halls, "one of the favorite games of the German troops was to evacuate a school, await its renovation by the French for school use, then return." In addition, subsidies were given for the repairs. It was, therefore, understood that "a wall of hostility had been rapidly raised between masters and their pupils on one side and the Germans on the other."

43. A.N. A.G. II 654.
44. A.N. F 17 13376.
45. Halls, p. 49.
46. A.N. F 17 13319.
47. Halls, p. 52.
The university and its environment had always been more recognized for its ideas against the governments in power, and this goes back to the early 19th Century. It was, therefore, this same French class who asked questions about the German Occupation and the servility of the Vichy Regime. In this way, Parisian students full of temerity manifested their patriotism on November 11, 1940 and July 14, 1941. This irritated the Germans. The educators indubitably constituted the objects of German repression. Many primary teachers and professors were arrested. This was mentioned in the academic notes and reports of the prefects.\textsuperscript{48} It was especially after the occupation of the entire country (November 11, 1942) that German repression became stronger, reaching its apogee in 1944. The Ministry of Education made a file listing the arrest of educators who were the first victims of obligatory work (STO).\textsuperscript{49} Children and students did not escape German repression because they were considered responsible persons. For the Germans, the school world was directly responsible for the state of the spirit of the French, decidedly Anglophile and favorable to Gaullism. On

\textsuperscript{48} A.N. F 17 13377.

\textsuperscript{49} A.N. F 17 13386. Arrests and Reports (1940-44).
the whole, the territories of the school communities had suffered in an uncontestable manner from the German Occupation because it reassembled a category of French particularly dangerous and susceptible to lead public opinion. During the Summer of 1943, numerous arrests were made, including 23 pupils, 4 students, 20 primary teachers, 7 secondary professors, 5 university professors, and 2 others.50

The entire French youth was hurt by Nazism during this very painful period of history, particularly the Jewish children. On June 10, 1944 a horrible holocaust took place at Oradour-sur-Glane,51 whose entire population (of which 180 were children) was exterminated by the SS. This massacre showed well that children did not benefit from a privileged status under the German Occupation. On the contrary, they have been, with their masters, the object of a very special surveillance because the Germans feared the influence of teachers on children and on French public opinion. It is, therefore, evident that the Germans directly imposed political pressure to create a new ideology of the time: "the new order" of the Petain Regime.

50 A.N. F 17 13346, and Halls, p. 53.
A new but heterogeneous political staff was created with the arrival of the Cercle Fustel-de-Coulanges to power. The Cercle Fustel was founded in 1926 by two secondary teachers, G. Cantecor and H. Boegner, in order to promote integral nationalist ideas in the university, using the name of Charles Maurras, a nineteenth Century positivist historian, who wrote "History of the Political Institutions of the Old Regime in France."^{52}

Instead of winning the enthusiasm of teachers for the National Revolution, the Vichy Regime undertook to win over the educators of the Third Republic through bribery in order to infuse them with a more "national" spirit. This ideological maneuvering was made possible by a new political staff, which had not participated in the decision making during the Third Republic. This new staff was no less diverse than under the Third Republic and merits study. The politics of Maurrasian inspiration were close to Parisian collaborators and technicians who preached political neutrality. They thwarted one another, succeeded one another, and even conducted a battle for influence behind the scenes.

^{52} Charles Maurras, *La Seule France - Chronique des Jours d'Epreuves*, (Lyon: 1941).
The study of the educational politics of the National Revolution also corroborates the general historiography of Vichy illustrated in the widely accepted thesis of Stanley Hoffman, according to which, "Vichy is as diverse at any moment of its existence as formerly." Since these frictions disturbed the functioning of leaders of other groups, new functions were created, new positions given out (such as Secretary General for Youth and Commissioner for General Education and Athletics) in the central and regional administration of the Ministry of Education. To Marshal Pétain, who immediately after his investiture on July 10, 1940 undertook to lighten the administrative burden of the Republican Regime, the circumstances and reality of an increased bureaucracy was an anomaly.

Briefly, the French educational system contained two antagonistic groups in the school debates until mid-1930: the partisans of a traditional laic school system and those who exposed a unified school system. These divisions caused tensions and disagreements in the educational politics of the Front Populaire. These partisans found militant ideological support among Leftists, and this exasperated the Front Populaire. In essence, the Left chose the primary school over the secondary school. This meant that because

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of the Cartel, teachers went to elementary classes in the high schools and colleges.\textsuperscript{54} The Cartel des Gauches favored a democratization in education\textsuperscript{55} allowing the Société Nationale des Instituteurs (SNI), to designate inspectors in elementary education.

As mentioned in Chapter III (Vichy), it was during the Bloc National in 1923 that Léon Bérard succeeded in rein-stating the notion of "duty toward God" in academic programs despite the conflict with Paul Lapie, his Director of Primary Education. Thanks to the Cartel des Gauches, primary teachers could teach in elementary classes of lycées and colleges according to the Decree of December 9, 1925. This decree later gave birth to a new program for primary schools. The reforms of 1932,\textsuperscript{56} which extended the authority of the primary school inspectors, required a Brevet Supérieure (special diploma) to teach. This marked the Leftists return to power—a detail whose importance would be understood at a later date.

Radical Jean Zay, supported by his Director of Secondary Teaching Chatelet, attempted to unify a pluralistic primary educational system, but he quickly dedicated himself

\textsuperscript{54} Journal Officiel, Sept. 12, 1925.


\textsuperscript{56} Journal Officiel, Dec. 30, 1932.
to the dismanteling of the Front Populaire. Although he failed to impose the baccalaureate on future primary school teachers, his most significant success was, nevertheless, impressive—French students had to remain in school until 14 years of age. 57

Neither the Right nor the Left in Parliament tried to alter the status quo in education. They were, however, interested in the selection of the elites; and it was the Republican Right which wanted to reform secondary education. Moderates assured the beginning of free instruction at the secondary level, 58 which satisfied the demands of demographic pressure and facilitated education for the common classes (reserved for the secondary cycle of primary teaching). An entrance examination at the sixth level, 59 however, did try to contain the number of young students. This development in academic life was compromised by the victory of the Front Populaire and the general strike movement in the Spring of 1936, which fundamentally changed the French political landscape by exacerbating social conflicts.

After the sacred union's triumph in World War I and the relative calm of the twenties, the school was again in the foreground of the political scene as a catalyst of a wider

57 *Journal Officiel*, Aug. 9, 1936.
ideological debate—the political administration. The male teachers who, between 1940 and 1942, encouraged a "new and National" school came from conservative circles that were concerned with education and teaching organizations that wanted to confront the SNI. The UNMEP (Union Nationale des Membres de l'Enseignement Public) was strongly anti-communist and insisted on protecting teachers against all harassment of their religious and expressive freedoms. The fundamental ideological base of the French primary teacher was morality, patriotism and civics. It was necessary to have these characteristics in the schools and eliminate political unionism and masonic influence. In Vichy, the school policy of the National Revolution was not decided by the primary teacher but by men who found their inspiration in the ideas of Maurras.

The Cercle Fustel-de-Coulanges published bi-monthly bulletins taken over from provincial university groups. It was poorly distributed apart from availability around Paris and in a few of the larger cities. The Cercle also organized a primary branch under the direction of a Maurrasian teacher, Serge Jeanneret, but it failed owing to the disinterest of its readers.

Another more favorable area was then selected where an important ideological offensive was initiated where the academic policy of the future National Revolution planted its
roots. Vichy, in fact, applied the credo and educational programs that the Cercle adopted in 1933.60 All the ingredients of a "national" academic policy were in place—elitism, patriotism and the strengthening of education—to stop the influence of the Leftists in education. These ideas tried to overthrow the Third Republic and to move away from the authority of the French institutions to the benefit of the conservative forces of the country.

The Cercle Fusiel channeled the nationalist and reactionary tendencies of a few hundred educators toward a Maurrasian point of view with General Maxime Weygand (who was the "compagnon de route" of the Cercle) and the Germanist Albert Rivaud.61 Rivaud, philosopher, Head of the Cercle and first Minister of Education under Vichy from June 17 to July 12, 1940, remained in the Vichy government through 1944. In 1936 he participated in editing a work on education and the idea of patriotism.

Because the ideas of the Cercle Fusiel triumphed at Vichy, this group became the principal contributor of the "Cahier du Cercle," which had largely influenced the most major appointments in the Vichy government. Occasionally,


61 A.N. F 17 13364.
contributors, sympathizers or members sought the support of high-ranking army officers for the activities of the Cercle Fustel: Marshal Lyautey (the social role of the conservative officer concept); General Weygand (how to raise sons, 1937); Colonel de Gaulle (who fashioned the educative model of the National Revolution); Léon Bérard and Serge Jeanneret former clerical minister of the Bloc National (and a primary school teacher) who had a position at the Ministry of Education in 1942.

Maurras, who inspired the entire National Revolution until 1942, had to rival other Petainist constituents. The reality of such a competition furthered its true impact on France's academic policy. The arrival of Rivaud (July, 1940 to April, 1942) symbolized this ascent to power, which was not formally solidified, however, until about 20 months later with the appearance of Abel Bonnard, another member of the Cercle, but passionately Germanophile.

Many Maurrasians slowly disappeared showing the rapid advancement of yet another category of men long since excluded from the decision-making power in the Republican Regime: certain university professors and high-ranking functionaries of National education arrived by order of the Minister of Education. New students from l'Ecole Normale Supérieure and other ministry officials officially inherited an intellectual commonality.
Emile Mireaux, a political conservative, went to the famous Ecole Normale in Paris and became a "normalien.\textsuperscript{62} He became co-director of \textit{Le Temps} with Jacques Chastenet, who began a parliamentary career because of this appointment. Mireaux was the first Minister of Education in France and set the machine of purification in motion. He questioned the loyalty of the teaching personnel, began the discreet recruitment of inspectors and granted concessions to the clergy, who had been forbidden to teach since 1904.

Pétain dismissed his parliamentary minister on September 6, 1940. This date truly inaugurated the era of the technician: the dean of the law school in Paris, Georges Ripert, brought the support of his reactionary ideas to the measures of purification--l'\textit{Ecole Normale} was closed, the teachers' union organization was dying and Catholic schools were favored. Ripert himself was brought down with Laval on December 13, 1940. He had time, however, to put the academic policy of the National Revolution in motion.

Jacques Chevalier, Ripert's Secretary General of Public Instruction, succeeded him in another purely nationalistic government directed by Flandin. A traditional Christian philosopher, Chevalier made religious changes without considering the cultural realities of contemporary France.

\textsuperscript{62} The term applies to Ministers of Education who inherited common intellectual ideas from the \textit{Ecole Normale Superieure, Rue d'Ulm} (Mireaux, Chevalier, Carcopino). Men who had similar positions in the Ministry included, Jolly, Terracher, and Chenevrier. Other famous names from the same school include Deat, Brasillach, Pucheu and Zoretti.
Jerome Carcopino, Chevalier's successor in Darlan's Cabinet, did not share his predecessor's sectarianism. He was deeply rooted to the traditional liberalism of the arts and resisted force from the administration of l'Ecole Française de Rome. His governmental style was less rigid than that of his predecessors, and he was also more open to using direct contact such as short-wave radio broadcast speeches. He moderated the political purging in 1940 and eased requirements of religious teaching in public schools. He was a symbol of calm and respite in educational policy during the Vichy era.

Symbolically, the Vichy Regime fought the academic institutions that were representative of the Republic—the symbol being primary education. After September, 1940, the instructors of les Ecoles Normales (those "lay anti-Semites") were dismissed. The National Revolution had hoped to be like the intellectual and moral reforms extolled by Ernest Renan after the defeat of 1870. Vichy wished to bring down the intellectual leaders of the Third Republic in order to assure control as well as to achieve the goal of

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84 Carcopino, p. 308.
conversion. The Rightists had reproached the primary schools for being centers of anti-clerical ideas. Teachers were oriented toward secondary schools and had to prepare the baccalaureate the following year because les Ecoles Normales were transformed into Instituts de Formation Professionnelles (IFP) where student teachers went for ten months of training. The Regime also vehemently challenged professional organizations accused of putting the hierarchal authority of the university in jeopardy. Equally, it wished to root out academic textbooks of republican ideology. In 1940, a reviewing committee met at the Plaza Hotel in the town of Vichy to examine textbooks in which the editor, Sudel, was the principal victim of this "refinement and purification."

Contrary to the Republican victory of 1875-80, Vichy (in 1940) envisioned its evolution on a political nationalistic basis and no longer a democratic one; it was the foundation of a New Regime (authoritarian, corporatist, and Christian) and the "de-Republicanization" of primary school teaching. The government had to rebuild new programs for the educators and the concern was morality. Students were

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66 A.N. F 17 13369, 13377, 13378. The list of textbooks banned in public primary schools in 1940 is in Appendix I.
expected to honor the motto of "work, family, country."
This idea of nationalism in the world of education was
possible by the new political power—a thesis of the Cercle
Fustel: "the restoration of France is possible only by the
cchild." Along the same line of thought as Ernest Renan
in 1870, young people were to be the means of securing the
reconstruction of the country. Renan wrote that since the
older generation had lost the war to the Prussians in 1870
blaming education, it was time to train the younger genera-
tion for the reconstruction of France as a Republic (1875–
80). Vichy, in 1940 envisioned the reconstruction of France
by the younger generation, but on a political and national-
istic foundation and not a democratic regime. The Vichy
Regime was to be built on authority, cooperation and
Christian principles.

67 A.N. F 17 13364. "L’Ecole et la Famille."
CHAPTER V

THE SCHOLASTIC MILIEU

Realities of Daily School Life

Even though "chestnuts are not eaten in the streets of Paris" as Paul Eluard wrote with bitterness, it is surprising to observe that the school institution continued to function during these hard years of war. But it functioned poorly as a result of a series of factors (the rigeurs of the German military occupation for the teachers and pupils, and hunger). This explained in part the failure of the Vichy Regime to develop mass education for the benefit of the National Revolution. The complete administrative disorganization of the Summer of 1940 and the development of a totalitarian and police bureaucracy had contributed to the dysfunction of the school system. Two circulars of the Ministry of Education underlined the repartition of administrative tasks between the zones: academic authorities must be directed to Paris for questions of general administration and to Vichy for problems of politics or discipline.¹

This confusion was recognized at the beginning of 1943 by Abel Bonnard who stated during a meeting of Ministers, "there is too much confusion between Paris and Vichy."²

¹ A.N. F 17 13322. C No. 1401 (July 6, 1942) and C No. 1989 (Nov. 11, 1942).
² A.N. F 17 13364. Meeting of Jan. 25, 1943.
The exodus from Paris in June, 1940 also added disorder to the administration of the French educational system. The transfer of thousands of children from one place to another had resulted in massive confusion. In August 1940, the Red Cross and families were searching for 90,000 children lost on the roads during the defeat.  

In some ways, the children of refugees actually increased the effectiveness of the schools. For example, the lycée of Rennes, which had 225 pupils on the June 26 had doubled the number of pupils three weeks later. Until November, 1942, it was schools in the Free Zone which received most of the refugee children. In general, from 1943 until the Liberation, the schools of the rural areas were those which absorbed the flood of children evacuated from the urban centers because of the bombings.

To understand correctly the reality of the daily school life from 1940 to 1944, it is important to note the number of schools destroyed or occupied by the Germans. In spite of the lack of accurate statistics, we know that the number is massive. Material damage, especially near the battle-grounds (the north and the east in 1940 and Normandy in 1944) was enormous.

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3 Halls, p. 3. Newspapers such as L’Effort, published lists of lost children. See also the film entitled, "Jeux Interdits."

Since the Summer of 1940 in the Occupied Zone, the German troops increasingly occupied school buildings. The occupation of schools and their destruction had constituted an effect on school life almost daily during this period in France's history.

In some rural regions, there was a return to the Guizot Law of 1833, because it happened that the municipality or a rich inhabitant's land, house or barn had received exiled children from the communal school occupied by Germans. In the Paris suburb of Argenteuil, the Jules Ferry school was occupied by the Germans, who had installed their radar and tactical base of operations. Teachers and pupils had to establish themselves in the hangar of a small factory nearby.

In addition to these material inconveniences, one must also evoke the bombings endured—especially in the cities. Even if the children transformed the alerts which so often interrupted the continuity of the classes into a game, the teachers were not fooled. Most of them exercised their pedagogic apostolate with dedication and continued their classes as if in the trenches.

Even though numerous pupils of the forties shared these souvenirs, all schoolchildren were not protected from the bombing. In Argenteuil, there was no air raid shelter. In

5 A.N. F 17 13349.
case of an alert, everyone was required to take refuge in the basements of the schools. This tragic situation amused the Academic Inspector of Seine-et-Oise, a philo-Petainist who developed a morbid pedagogy which alluded to the fact that he loved his personnel being in danger.

In addition, the daily school life existed in a world of rationing. In the Fall of 1942, Minister Bonnard sent a circular which reaffirmed that the financial support of schools was the responsibility of the municipalities. Between 1940 and 1944, the schools of France lacked everything. Amid the conditions of hunger, other aspects of school life (heat, lighting, furniture, utensils, and equipment) became more scarce everyday, and from 1943 were quite severe. In 1944, the administration recognized that schools were allocated only one-third of their needs.

The lack of fuel and furniture suffice to illustrate the difficulties endured by the schools during the years of war and Occupation. The lack of paper was the most serious shortage. In class, primary teachers used slates and tried to preserve their supplies of chalk. In September, a ministerial circular confirmed this shortage and declared that

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6 A.N. F 17 13322. Circular, Sept. 5, 1942.

7 A.N. F 17 13364. A weak augmentation from 100 to 250 francs per month.
administrative instructions were not followed and that there was a considerable reduction in paper production, which in 1942 was only one-third that of 1939.8

On September 2, 1942, the Commission of Repartition of Paper and Cardboard established levels of points necessary for the acquisition of school materials.9 The Minister judged the opportune moment to publish a National Bulletin of Primary Teaching, which was intended to replace departmental bulletins. These literary pieces of pure propaganda were the benefit of a special derogation of the Commission of Repartition of Paper and Cardboard, which issued tens of tons of paper. Despite the scarcity of paper, at the beginning of the school year in 1942, Adolf Terracher, General Secretary of Public Instruction, ordered a contest for decorating the classes by drawings of pupils on the theme, "France Which We Love."10

For the school year 1942-43, the Director of Primary Education also considered the instoration of a monthly exercise of free drawing on the following themes:11


9 A.N. F 17 13322. C No. 373. Oct. 29, 1942 and C No. 403. Nov. 14, 1942. For example, one booklet of 24 pages was equal to 3 points; rough copy notebooks of 96 pages were equal to 5 points; and drawing notebooks of 16 pages were equal to 1 point.

10 ibid.

11 ibid., Circular No. 164, Sept. 23, 1942.
(1) Marshal of France, Chief of the State; (2) the French Colonial Empire; (3) Sport activities of French Youth; (4) Field work and the return to the soil; (5) Artisan and local activities.

It did not matter that paper was lacking if the Regime of Vichy was the beneficiary. Fuel was another type of rare material which was indispensable. Henri Michel had appropriately titled it "the anguishing lack of coal in Paris." Before the war, this coal was sent from the north of France and the Pas de Calais. However, this region was now situated in the forbidden zone, and coal was sent for the economic profit of the Third Reich. Authorities in Paris were ordered to reduce the needs of coal in schools by 25 percent and in administration by 15 percent.¹² The problems of heat which were already critical everywhere got worse day by day. To this alarming shortage, of which famine was the most anguishing of menaces, Vichy responded by an economic mobilization of schoolchildren far and above the scholastic needs of the school.

France's labor force was crippled due to the fact that two million workers were prisoners of war. Working conditions had deteriorated since 1939, erasing many social

¹² Henri Michel, p. 43.
advantages acquired during the Popular Front. Vichy, especially after the return of Laval, had favored the deportation of workers to Germany under the mandatory work program (STO). The school population of four million students constituted an appreciable work force in the economy of the country. It was not Vichy, however, which had negotiated the process of school children contributing to the war economy. The "National Defense" government of Daladier and Reynaud had previously opened the way before the defeat. In a circular in 1940, Maximilien Serre, the Director of Primary Teaching under Jean Zay, requested primary teachers to ask students "to aid the National defense."

On June 1, Albert Sarraut, Minister of National Education in the government of Paul Reynaud wrote "an appeal to the youth of France" outlining their "vacation for the Fatherland." What Vichy had invented was the systematic economic requisition of children and youth based on the moral authority of Marshal Petain: "...pupils... (you will give) your Sundays..."14

Two circulars dated June 28 and August 25, 1941 had instituted the "participation of primary school children" to National Aid, the French Red Cross, and the Committees of Assistance to War Prisoners. The exploitation of a juvenile

13 A.N. F 17 13318. Circular, May 4, 1940.
14 A.N. F 17 13320.
workforce was prevented, however, by a relatively moderate program. It was effective, and Carcopino congratulated the academy inspectors. Apart from students, teachers were also mobilized in the economic requisition. In addition, the extracurricular activities which were traditionally allowed to them were multiplied tenfold by circumstances of war and the Occupation: daycare and vacation colonies were increased by necessity, and children were menaced by homelessness and the risk of abandonment. This omnipresence and the devotion of teachers went unrewarded by the Vichy government. In fact, until Spring, 1942, a teacher's salary after the senior level was between 10,500 and 23,500 francs per year (approximately 1,375 francs per month). During the same period, a typist earned 2,000 francs per month and bank employees 3,500 francs per month when one kilogram of butter cost 350 francs and coffee 2,000 Francs (January, 1943). The situation was worse than in the nineteenth century.

An investigation performed at the request of the Ministry at the end of 1942 revealed the true social despair of primary teachers in the villages, some of whom were living in near poverty. At the end of April, 1942, the

15 A.N. F 13319. Vichy, Apr. 28, 1941.
16 G. Willard and R. Bourderon, eds., Histoire de la France Contemporaine - (1940-47), Vol. 6, 1980, p. 130. In 1940, one dollar was equal to approximately 2 francs.
17 A.N. F 17 13364. Inquiry on the monetary situation of the teachers.
Petainist and collaborationist press (for once united under the unavoidable aegis of the task) were moved by this tragic and alarming regression of the standard of living of primary teachers. They requested a significant improvement of the situation at a time when Pierre Laval had returned to the power and tried to restart (in a more germanophile sense) a National Revolution, which was "distinctly moribund in 1942." \(^\text{18}\)

On March 26, 1942, Carcopino, Secretary of State, promulgated a decree which authorized a salary revaluation in the teaching corps. \(^\text{19}\) The brutal deterioration of school life had produced a reaction of combativeness among the teachers. Previously there had been (at least between the two wars) a certain solidarity and homogeneity. The National Revolution became ridiculous when "the primary teachers who were dismissed by the application of the law on secret societies had immediately found more lucrative employment." This was a consequence of the devaluation of the teaching profession.

At last, and for the first time since the years of public school foundation, the departure of numerous primary teachers was affected by a severe decrease in the number of student teachers. The escape of the primary teachers in

\(^\text{18}\) Halls, p. 130.

\(^\text{19}\) A.N. F 17 13364. A weak augmentation from 100 to 250 francs per month.
1942 to more lucrative professions and the difficulty of requesting new professors proved a true crisis in the didactic and pedagogic conditions of the schoolchildren. In the Occupied Zone the academic authorities were even obliged to close a number of classes. They had to resort to auxiliary teachers and enlist 12,000 primary substitute teachers (of which 9,000 were from the Occupied Zone). This corresponded partly to the proportion of primary teachers who were prisoners of war in Germany. Despite the initial intensity of the determination of Vichy, the purge of the militant teachers in 1940-41 could not have been carried to success solely by the pressure of circumstances, because the exodus of the primary teachers started very early. As early as the end of 1941, the Vichy Regime was crippled by this lack of effective educators in the school world. Stephane Jolly, the Director of Primary Teaching, had to decide not only to recall primary teachers who had retired in 1940,20 but also to call for the reemployment of female primary teachers in their fifties as substitutes. These were Jewish functionaries dismissed by the law of October 11, 1940.21

20 A.N. F 13320.
21 ibid. Circular, Dec. 11, 1941.
In 1942, when Abel Bonnard became Minister, it was considered necessary to re-evaluate the closing of the Ecole Normale for primary teachers. "The Ecoles Normales have proved seminaries are necessary for the formation of future educators...they were truly schools for executives..." This need for the Ecole Normale was felt more and more due to the feminization of primary teaching, which was a consequence of the circumstances. After having voted against teachers following the defeat of 1940, the men of Vichy wished to become their allies in 1942. However, they had contributed to the ruin of the vocation for clerical benefit. Therefore, primary teachers owed the devalorization of their profession to the government of Vichy.

It was not only teachers who were persecuted by Vichy—children were also hurt (both mentally and physically) by those events. During the entire German Occupation, alimentation was the daily and most important preoccupation of the French population. Neither adults or children escaped the torments of hunger. The rationing and ticket system existed until 1947. Children from urban areas suffered the most. The irony is that the children learned how to conjugate the verb "to eat" in all tenses, learned how to count, and learned the value of food coupons as well.

22 A.N. F 17 13364.
These tragic events marked the children's consciousness forever as they learned how to survive. Each school tried to subsidize the food availability and had its own cafeteria as early as 1940 when food procurement was difficult. Organizations tried to alleviate the nutritional deficiencies of children either by private means or by aid and solidarity between parents who had contacts in the countryside. There was also some assistance from the government or National Aid foundations such as the Red Cross until January, 1941.

Petain then played the American card and negotiated with the Quakers of the American Friends Service Committee. This American association procured alimentary aid for 30,000 children living in the Free Zone.23 However, food shortages continued to exist and the bureaucratic paperwork between the Academy, municipalities and school directors did not help in obtaining food.

The rural areas were more fortunate than the urban areas and the government tried in vain to equalize this problem until 1941. Stephane Jolly, Director of Primary Teaching, mandated the organization of snacks in which the goal was "to fight against effects of malnutrition."24

24 A.N. F 17 13320.
However, teachers and students still did not have enough food. As Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie writes: "The food...seems to be atrocious in relation to my tastes, which were futilely refined." Between 1940 and 1944 there was an average deficiency of 800 calories a day in children 6 to 14 years old. In January, 1943 a report was submitted to Bonnard stating that 85 percent of the children in school had dental cavities.

In addition to physical problems, psychological problems surfaced. The games children played in school reflected this as the boys played war and the girls played store. The time in which they lived was represented very well by both sexes. Most of the children, however, appeared to adapt to the circumstances of this terrible time, perhaps because the school tried to assure their protection and comfort. As early as the exodus until the Liberation, schools fought against absenteeism, especially in Paris. Absenteeism (voluntary or involuntary) was a consequence of the lack of teachers since 1941. Later, in 1942 and 1943 some of the teachers left their jobs to join the Maquis in order to escape the mandatory work order (STO).

26 A.N. F 17 13341, No. 235. Report of Jan 26, 1943. The Service of Dental Hygiene was created in Sept., 1941 by Carcopino following a medical inspection of the school in June, 1941.
27 A.N. F 17 13364.
Another reason for school absenteeism was tied to the lack of shoes. In spite of a declaration of the government, which tried to stop absenteeism and improve school life, no direct measures were taken. Political priorities had pushed school problems to another agenda.

The failure of Vichy to revitalize education was tied to the poor start of the Regime, which diagnosed a short and redemptory war with the installation of a New Order. Until 1941, Vichy had projected an athletic program as part of education. Since 1941, Jérôme Carcopino issued many instructions to lengthen programs of general and sport education. This idea had to be abandoned because many children were underfed.

How could Vichy believe that it could win over the youth while continually attacking the teachers? Laval and Bonnard had understood this and promoted appeasement in April, 1942, but it was already too late.

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28 Law of Aug. 26, 1942, entrusting to Laval "the protection of childhood" mentioned in Marrus' *Vichy and the Jewish Children*, p. 22.
Internal Problems of the Education System

The Diplôme d’Éducation Primaire Préparatoire (DEPP) unified the conditions of recruitment in the lycées and colleges and enlarged the clientele by including rural children. It greatly favored private free teaching in which one entered without conditions—even if it was necessary to withdraw in the fifth grade public school. The DEPP constituted before all else a strict selection process aimed at freeing the elite. In the Alpes-Maritimes, the average success rate for entry into the sixth level in 1937 was 82 percent. In 1943, however, the success rate at the DEPP fell to 19.6 percent.\(^{29}\) This scholastic revision ended in failure. The Vichy dictatorship required the French State to reform the primary level of education immediately.

The effects of Carcopino's reforms in teaching were hardly profitable for the National Revolution. They were a product of the ideological preoccupation that burst forth due to the pressures of the time. The reforms surpassed the usual limits of institutional reform and imposed a plan which was an unmitigated dichotomy between upbringing and formal education.\(^{30}\) The National Revolution delivered

\(^{29}\) A.N. F 17 13364.

\(^{30}\) P. Laborie, pp. 224-225.
the stereotype of an ideal nationalized education. State education and scholarly life were brought to the point of near military habits and short ceremonies in schools. This school mobilization shows its most accomplished expressions in the speeches of Pétain, which bestowed the honors of a great educator upon him:

In these sad moments when the heart of the Marshal, Head of State, is so deeply hurt by acts of treason or by the hypocrisy of a handful of unfaithful Frenchmen, he very sincerely feels fatherly concern for youth and searches for a teaching method that will be shielded from error and will be sensitive to preserving it from doctrines that lead society to anarchy and cause it to revert to paganism.\textsuperscript{31}

Here, again, the declaration of intentions hide the manifestation of "marshaliat" folklore which was geared toward children. Most of the educators followed the guidelines, but with a certain skepticism. For Guehenno, for example, the portrait of Pétain was printed in horrendous colors ("...this man with seven stars...").\textsuperscript{32} It seems that the Occupied Zone had been preserved from such an excessive picturalism. Schools in the northern zone likewise carried out their obligation by singing "Marshal, we are here,"\textsuperscript{33} while in the Free Zone, children were not obliged to sing the song. Mostly the Regime engaged in


\textsuperscript{32} Halls, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{33} A.N. F 17 13319.
the ideological mobilization of children, catering to the National Revolution's objectives (whose motives should have been the rebirth of the country after its military defeat. Family propaganda and promotion of the birth rate by the National Revolution was advocated throughout the school system.\(^{34}\)

Chevalier, Carcopino and Bonnard jointly insisted on the pernicious and subversive character of encyclopedic instruction to which they opposed the merits of knowledge of practical or useful matters in education. Between 1941 and 1944, ministerial instructions glorified the merits of manual work. Drawing was promoted to the head of salvationist activities. From 1940 to 1942, school children were systematically solicited to produce drawings or small artfully-crafted objects and to compose promises of allegiance and testimony of gratefulness. According to Chevalier, more than 2 million drawings were sent to Vichy for Christmas, 1940.\(^{35}\) The 10,000 best drawings were on display, and the newspapers of the time supported this publicity operation which touched many children (at least in the Free Zone).\(^{36}\) Halls described it as the cult of the national

\(^{34}\) A.N. F 17 13314 Circular for Mother's Day.

\(^{35}\) A.N. F 17 13319.

\(^{36}\) *La Croix*, Feb 2 and 5, 1941; *Le Temps*, Feb 25, 1941.
hero given to the children in the form of a history tale: "It was a nice old man, solid and straight; just like the tree of the druids."37

Thus, all those stories about the Marshal were not entirely untrue. He did possess a natural penchant for children and demonstrated a fatherly image while visiting schools. He liked to be around the children of his secretary, Dr. Menetrel. Pétain even used to give short radio broadcast speeches to the young people.38 His messages were usually edited and posted as a plaque or a brochure and were destined to replace civil and moral teaching manuals. Furthermore, many school supplies were issued bearing the likeness of the Marshal; and even a portrait of him decorated classroom walls. In November, 1941, sales of the Marshal's portraits, postcards and calendars amounted to 17 million French francs.39

As a reward for good behavior, certain schoolchildren were received by Pétain in Vichy on New Year's Day, 1941.40 These festivities featured both honors and food. In great pomp, students were given copious lunches.

38 A.N. F 17 13319.
40 Halls, p. 418.
This generosity was imprinted on the memories of underfed children and also impressed parents with undeniable feelings of gratefulness.

On January 13, 1941, the Marshal’s tea party for needy children took place in the presence of important officials: the prefect, an academic inspector and a representative of the special delegation. They praised the Marshal’s concern for the unfortunates, but the headmaster outdid them by proclaiming lyrically: "let the little children come to me," words of the Master of the world (God) and received for his part by the Master of France, grandfather of all little children. 41

The power of the organizational means used showed the ideological importance of the game on public opinion. In April, 1942, Fernand de Brinon, a delegate of the Vichy government in the Occupied territories, sponsored a publicity campaign in Paris at the Galeries Lafayette. 42 Even the adults succumbed to this seduction. These political spectacles also facilitated the remolding of the republican educational system into a more nationalistic one.

The ideological conditioning of school children had another dimension which came from Pétain’s demand for the nationalism of education. As early as the Ripert’s Ministry in 1940, two new offices were integrated into the heavy bureaucratic machine of National Education: one, under the control of an engineer, Georges Lamirand, who took direction

of the Secretary General for Youth; and the second, under the tennis player, Jean Borotra, who in 1940 became Superintendent for General and Athletic Education. At the end of 1940, Borotra proclaimed:

Educating youth holds a considerable place in the concerns of government. The creation of the post of Superintendent for General and Athletic Education marks this intent by making a tremendous effort toward the training of healthy youth with the goal of giving them a harmonious and strong body and character.43

General and athletic education was essentially founded on the principle of outdoor activities. Five hours per week of such instruction for boys and four hours for girls were required at the start of the 1941 school year. Carcopino considerably shortened the General Superintendent's program, and the children subsequently had no more than one hour of physical education weekly. Less strenuous "pedagogical walks" replaced physical education.

In fact, national and sport education did not succeed in the school world. First, because the primary teachers saw the intrusion in certain schools by "professors of general education" in a bad light. The Ministry of Education had young civil servants, whose duties were poorly defined. Adherents of the Pétain ideology, they interfered at times in traditional educational matters of the primary teachers.

43 A.N. F 17 13318.
The competition increased and the friction multiplied—especially when primary teachers were obliged to spend a training period in the regional installation of the Commissioner General of Education. Primary teachers and professors of general education were divided by their mentalities and their training.

The following schedule shows the appointment and training procedure for teachers in the Occupied Zone in 1942:

1. Teachers are appointed for each training period by the Academy's Inspectors.

2. In principle, a regional inspector would attend the last week of teacher training. Appointment to what is then made by Inspectors of the Academy;

3. The faculty of private schools can participate in the training of the teachers in public schools. A special training period is reserved for them during September.

The majority of teachers developed a kind of passive resistance emerging from the atmosphere and the cultural traditions present in their world: republicanism, secularism, and the social and ideological progress.

During the Summer of 1940, French public opinion was concerned with questions regarding school among other worries—the Occupying German troops, food shortages, the men away in German prisons—in short—daily survival during the

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44 A.N. F 13322. Program contained in Appendix H.
war. While propelling teachers to the forefront, however, the Army, the Church, the new Vichy Regime, and the press furnished a perfect scapegoat to the wounded, bewildered and confused population.

The tremendous defeat of June, 1940 furthered the eruption of a formidable collective resentment. This resentment was fostered, kept alive, and then exploited by vengeful associates in Petain's ascent to power. Locally, one breathed here and there, "an odor of dregs, an odor of sludge." 45

Of course, teachers were far from being the only victims of sickening prose (letters of denunciation), moreover, "...they were high among the themes of a prolific literature that borrowed from xenophobes and anti-Semites in the name of moral purification of a nation." 46

If the denouncers all over France had little impact, they did, however, contribute to the poisoning of the atmosphere of the classroom. Teachers were denounced for "communist political activities" or for "comments of a doubtful loyalism." 47 In order to force the teachers into conformity with Vichy's policies, the police could

45 P. Laborie, p. 197.
46 ibid., p. 100.
47 A.N. F 17 13376.
count on a small number of informers. Still, some informers were professional in their denunciations such as the Fascist, Rebatet. While on vacation, he tracked down Gaullists and communists. He also addressed a letter to Bonnard's Cabinet Chief, Pierre Couissin, in which he betrayed a conversation he had with the youth center's director as "a faithful and complete echo of an English radio broadcast." 48

The corps of informants had trusted men who accused many people—like Marcel Deat's friends who wrote to the Minister accusing a teacher's association of not sending their teachers to the STO. 49 This atmosphere, however, was repugnant to most French people. In rural communities, teachers had increased stature since 1880, even if they had occupied a place in local society other than that of the village intellectual. As secretary to the Mayor, a teacher also became part of the local governing fabric. This privileged position, in the village or even the urban community, did not seem to have been so available after the defeat and during the second half of 1940. On the contrary, it even appeared to be limited to the time when the teacher became

48 IHTP, 72 A.J. 251.

49 Halls, p. 125.
a discreet member of the Resistance or the Underground. In
general, one made it publicly known if one's educators were
not well appreciated or vice versa (unlike the denunciations
in the anonymous letters).\textsuperscript{50}

The school needed its propaganda specialists because
propaganda for internal use in the schools endeavored to
uphold the Regime's major educational aims and to reinforce
its influence over infants and youth. This propaganda
borrowed important thematic ideas from the previous gov-
ernment. The five sections devoted to propaganda were:
1) patrimonial, 2) elitist; 3) nationalist; 4) economic; and
5) anti-Semitic. The patrimonial section enabled Chevalier
(in February, 1941) to engage in general and popular ideas
in pedagogy in order "to return to the people an order of
forgotten virtues."\textsuperscript{51} The history of France, including
knights, saints, workers, provincials and traditional songs
constituted the basis for the iconography. The propaganda
services department of the Ministry of Information carefully
worked out a photographic strategy that constantly presented
children surrounding Pétain.

\textsuperscript{50} A.N. F 17 13364.

\textsuperscript{51} A.N. F 17 13319.
The elitist section sought to teach children the principle of academic inequality, because all children were not going to serve the country in the same way: "Dear children, you will not be called to serve the Fatherland in the same way. Heroism will only be for a few of you." \(^{52}\)

The nationalist section was directly linked to the preceeding section in that completion of homework was an element of the existence of the Fatherland.

The economic section constantly reminded children of the necessity of their mobilization. Classroom walls were covered with posters showing aid to prisoners and refugees. The anti-Semitic section remained a project and was never implemented. The extension of Pétain’s ideology in the academic world was the way in which the ministry wished to reach parents as students would transmit opinions to their parents.

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\(^{52}\) A.N. F 17 13322.
Thus, Vichy attempted to transform primary educational institutions into objects for propaganda. In 1940, the government required instructors to participate in this politicization. Vichy, however, miscalculated the depth of the teaching corps' involvement with these aims, as well as their unwillingness to be manipulated by a totalitarian state whose educational programs they opposed.

Consequently, the Vichy propaganda had difficulty in establishing and maintaining itself in the primary teaching setting because its philosophy of Family, Work, Country were not fundamentally in line with the republican traditions and aspirations of the academic world.

Teachers were so anti-Vichy during wartime, that between 1942 and 1943 they persuaded people to change their minds in favor of the Allies, de Gaulle and the Resistance. Those changes differed from region to region. Their conduct can be easily explained because of the key position of the teacher in French society, but this forceful attitude came indubitably from a culture often called the spirit of the primary educator.
In 1940, the primary school teacher upheld cultural values that Vichy seemed unable to weaken or even to shake. Neither the idea of dedication to peace, the unshakable faith in science and progress, nor the devotion to universal man could reconcile itself with the Vichy anti-Semitism. These methods only provoked teachers' disgust, as witnessed in this excerpt from a letter to Pétain from a teacher:

..."La Bête Noire" of the liberal Republic, radical and masonic...a teacher cannot preach such a radical policy. He does not want to bend academic principles any more for an authoritarian and reactionary regime that crushes the republican democracy that (it) has brought to students, citizens and voters.53

Another teacher wrote to René Capitant, Commissioner of National Education:

We have a primary vocation to a noble cause that combines love for France and for the Republic. Above all, teachers cannot accept this "mobilization of the laity" in its broadest sense into the government's teaching system. The instructor is deeply shocked by the efforts to restore the "clerical schools" during a national tragedy, and his conscience forbids him to allow and to serve this denaturalization of the republican academic system.54


54 A.N. F 17 13336.
From the instructors' point of view, Vichy sinned by violating the traditional neutrality of the academic community by introducing Pétain's Regime in the classroom. This cultural violation explained the primary teaching corps' opposition and its universal acceptance of the Resistance.

In June, 1941, Pierre Maucherat published the magazine, "The Lay School" in the Paris region. In the same year, Joseph Rollo and George LaPierre (in total opposition to the Minister of Works, René Belin), attempted to reconstruct the SNI in an effort to reestablish contact with the clandestine Confederation Général du Travail (CGT). Furthermore, in 1942, Rollo edited "A Call to France's Primary Teachers," which was exceedingly helpful to the spirit of the Resistance. Even though the enlisting of teachers into the National Liberation occurred rather late, they worked with perseverance, discretion, and great effect in undermining and discrediting the National Revolution in the eyes of the French. The collective memory maintained between 1940 and 1944 was an image largely stereotypical, but revealing nevertheless. In Louis Malle's film, Lacombe, Lucien, a young village poacher and future gestapo agent impatient to act, asks his teacher about joining the Resistance. This filmmaker's work undoubtedly showed the tribute the French people paid to their school masters.
CONCLUSION

The priorities of the Vichy Dictatorship, obliged the French State to control the school children in order to control society. This annexation did more than reform institutions, it was direct contact between the State and French society. The National Revolution first created the stereotype of an ideal national education by imposing a dichotomy between education and instruction and tried to make the former more important than the latter.

This study has discussed the diverse ministers between 1940 and 1941. Also discussed was the involvement of the community in education. For the forces that composed Vichy, the defeat of France confirmed the urgent necessity of a reorientation of teaching to inculcate nationalist ideas and which expressed a new form of citizenship. The content of academic programs included the teaching of morality to conform to France’s new motto: “Work, Family, Country.”

History was revised and interpreted in a new patriotic manner, which was centered not only on the great figures of the past, but also removed republican ideology from school curricula and textbooks.
"Failure often serves as a scapegoat in a country that endures failures," wrote R. O. Paxton. Soon after France's military was crushed in 1940, the schools of the Third Republic, which symbolized excellence, had to suffer onslaughts of rampant nationalism because the men who created Vichy believed in changing the foundations of the new society, that is, a "national" society. This plan to ruin the Third Republic's educational system by calling its schools into question was made even easier by the disinterest of the German Occupation Army to reform French education.

Until Pierre Laval's return to power in April, 1942, (during the time when the National Revolution developed a largely autonomous set of values) Vichy had free reign in educational matters. The dramatic circumstances of the defeat allowed the National Revolution's political and ideological forces to take spectacular revenge on the primary teaching personnel by accusing them of the major responsibility for the defeat in 1940.

The initial wish to purify and change was rapidly thwarted by the priorities imposed by the war, the Occupation, and the liberal tradition of universities. As far as

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private schools and ideology were concerned, any attempts toward clerical support and elitization of teaching encountered the same obstacles. In particular, Pétain's plan, which was based on recollections of the war of 1870 and its consequences, did not sufficiently count on the traditional resistance to change by the French teachers. Although the war of 1939-1940 was brief and followed by an armistice, its consequences proved a difficult confinement from the new French State.

Pétain's deeds of capturing students' attention and exploiting a confused public opinion led the Regime to decide in favor of an economic and ideological mobilization of children. Vichy had also underestimated the school's role as mediator. In the 1940's, it was through education that a child's social nature was formed and information networks were born.

Even if Vichy, all in all, had failed to take sides with the school and its driving forces (and thus, public opinion) the National Revolution's academic accomplishments still influenced considerably the educational policies of the post-war era. In this case, the Vichy episode did not constitute a digression since Vichy teachers continued to
prepare the baccalaureate under the Fourth Republic. In addition, Vichy inaugurated a systematic policy of state subsidies for denominational free education that continued during the Fourth Republic, born of the Resistance (Marie and Barange law of 1951) and the Fifth Republic, a child of Gaullism (Debré and Buermeur law 1959-1977). In conclusion, Vichy’s educational contributions were significant.

What is also interesting is the surprising historical interest in the Vichy Regime’s educational policy. Since 1980, this interest has increased and marks the centennial of the Ferry laws. In the Spring of 1982, the national union of l’Association des Parents des Ecoles Libres (APEL), as well as the National Committee for Lay Action gathered its supporters together in massive demonstrations.

Lastly, Vichy remains present in contemporary France’s daily cultural life: the political debate during the Summer and Autumn of 1982 is a constant reminder. This study presented the Vichy Regime as an expression of the revengeful politics of a minority in opposition to advocates of banality. It further attempts to honor the educators who invested their energy in protecting children from Nazism and the horrors of war.

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2 Le Monde, Sept., 1982
APPENDIX A

Abbreviations Used
APPENDIX A

Abreviations Used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Departmental Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>General Archives</td>
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<td>AJ</td>
<td>Archives on Youth</td>
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<td>AN</td>
<td>National Archives of France</td>
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<td>APEL</td>
<td>Association des Parents des Ecoles Libre</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDIC</td>
<td>International and Contemporary Library of Documentation,</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDJC</td>
<td>Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFTC</td>
<td>Confederation Francaise des Travailleurs Chretiens</td>
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<td>CGQJ</td>
<td>Commissar General of the Jewish Question</td>
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<td>CHSGM</td>
<td>History Committee of the Second World War</td>
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<td>CNMAD</td>
<td>Conservatoire Nationale de Musique et des Arts Dramatique</td>
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<td>DEPP</td>
<td>Diplome d’Education Primaire Préparatoire</td>
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<td>ENS</td>
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<td>IEQJ</td>
<td>Institute for the Study of the Jewish Question</td>
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<td>IFP</td>
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<td>IHTP</td>
<td>Instituts d’Histoire du Temps Present</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBF-H</td>
<td>Militarbefehlshaber Frankreich - the German military authority in France</td>
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<td>MNE</td>
<td>National Museum of Education</td>
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<td>PUF</td>
<td>Presse Universitaire Française</td>
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<td>RHDGM</td>
<td>History Review of the Second World War</td>
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<td>RNP</td>
<td>Popular National Assembly</td>
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<td>SEC</td>
<td>Section of Problems and Controls</td>
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<td>SNI</td>
<td>Société Nationale des Instructeurs</td>
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<td>STO</td>
<td>Service du Travaille Obligatoire</td>
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<td>UFDR</td>
<td>French Union for the Defense of the Race</td>
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<td>UGIF</td>
<td>General Union of the Israelites of France</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMEP</td>
<td>Union Nationale des Membres de l'Enseignement Publique</td>
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APPENDIX B

Ministers of Education

1940–1944
APPENDIX B

Ministers 1940-44

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
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<td>June 17, 1940 -</td>
<td>A. Rivaud; Minister of National Education; last government of the Third Republic presided over by Petain</td>
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<td>July 12, 1940</td>
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<td>E. Mireaux; State Secretary of Public Instruction and Fine Arts</td>
</tr>
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<td>December 13, 1940</td>
<td>G. Ripert; State Secretary of Public Instruction, Fine Arts and Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 23, 1941</td>
<td>J. Chevalier; General Secretary of Public Instruction and Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 18, 1942</td>
<td>J. Carcopino; General Secretary of National Education and Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 24, 1944</td>
<td>A. Bonnard; Minister of National Education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C

Ministers of Education & Their Cabinets
Ministers and Cabinets (1939-40)

**DELBOS**
Minister of National Education
September 14, 1939 - March 21, 1940

Composition of Cabinet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>H. Laugier (Chief of the Central Service of Scientific Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Chief</td>
<td>E. Bouvier (School of Literature, Montpelier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjunct Chief</td>
<td>Drouart (Tax Collector), R. Paty (Director of the Paris Academy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Secretary Chief</td>
<td>Lanoix (Bureau Chief, Dordogne Hqtrs.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charges Mission</td>
<td>C. Laval (Director, Credit Agricole)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Bontemps (Inspector General of Sport and Leisure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H. Capitaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G. Monod (Inspector General T.P.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mme. Templier (Director of the Academy of Paris)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Attache</td>
<td>Lamblin (Parliamentary Services)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A. SERRAUT  
Minister of National Education  
March 21, 1940 - June 17, 1940

Composition of Cabinet

Director: P. Crouzet  
Chief: C. Peloni  
Adjunct Chief: H. Legrand, R. Paty

Private Secretary Chief: Mlle. Breaut

Attaches: J. Fraysse, Mme. Templier, Lenoix  
(Parliament and Press)

A. RIVAUD  
Minister of National Education  
June 17, 1940 - July 12, 1940

Composition of Cabinet

Director: L. Lavelle (Professor, Henri IV)  
Bureau Chief: Lieutenant Commander Vasseau Marcha  
Cabinet Attache: Mlle. de Couvertin
E. MIREAUX
State Secretary Minister of Public Instruction and Fine Arts
July 12, 1940 - September 6, 1940

Composition of Cabinet

Secretary General: R. Gillouin (Public Instruction)
Secretary General: L. Hautecoeur (Fine Arts)
Director: L. Lavelle
Bureau Chief: J. Hourticque
Private Secretary Chief: Ballet
Charge Mission: Duvernoy (Honorary Prefect)

G. RIPERT
State Secretary of Public Instruction, Fine Arts and Youth
September 6, 1940 - December 13, 1940

Composition of Cabinet

Secretary General: J. Chevalier (Dean, School of Public Instruction, Grenoble)
Secretary General: G. Lamirand (Engineer)
Secretary General: L. Hautecoeur
Director: J. Hamel (Professor, Paris Law School)
Bureau Chief: A. Lefas (Youth and Sport)
Private Secretary Chief: J. Boulanger (Professor, Lille Law School)
Charge Mission: Duvernoy
J. CHEVALIER
State Secretary of Public Instruction (Justice)
December 13, 1940 - February 23, 1941
Renamed State Secretary for Public Instruction and Youth
January 8, 1941

Composition of Cabinet

Director: Fugier (Professor, Lyon Law Faculty)

Bureau Chief: Grandclaude (Professor, Paris Law School); then Vizioz (Jan. 1, 1941)

Section Chiefs of the Cabinet: Charmoillaux (Professor of Literature at Versailles); Husson (Professor of Literature, Montpelier)

Private Secretary Chief: Blanc (First Inspector)

J. CARCOPINO
State Secretary of National Education and Youth
February 23, 1941 - April 18, 1942

Composition of Cabinet

Director: J. Verrier (Inspector General of Historic Monuments)

Charges Mission: Grandclaude (Professor, Paris Law School) representative of the State Secretary at the level of General Delegate of the French Government in Occupied Territories

Roy (General Inspector of Public Instruction - Secondary)
A. BONNARD
State Secretary Minister of National Education
April 18, 1942 - August 24, 1944

Composition of Cabinet

General Commissioner of Sports: Colonel Pascot (in charge of General Education and Sports)
APPENDIX D

Administrative Succession of Bonnard Cabinet Members
Jacques Bousquet who was director of the Bonnard Cabinet, followed Rene Georgin, specialist in grammar. Couissin, member of the Superior Counsel of the Public Instruction was Adjunct Director until his replacement by Gait, the latterceding his place as Cabinet Chief to Mouraille.

Chief Private Secretariat of Bonnard was Jean Georges, Master in Law and then Lavenir, his attache. The Secretary General of Public Instruction was Terracher, a position he retained until 1944. The Private Secretary was the Primary Instruction Inspector, Lafille. Gallitier remained Director of Superior Education until his replacement by Prechac, the Inspector General; Lecouturier was Adjunct Director.
APPENDIX E

Educational Functionaries & Legislation

November, 1940
APPENDIX E

Gidel and Hardy were known for their anti-Semitism; however, Boussagol was very moderate. Gidel was Dean of the School of Law. He replaced Dean Maurain (who was arrested on September 10, 1941) to the deanship of the University of Paris. Gidel was extremely conscientious in whatever concerned the aryranization of education. He wrote to the CGQJ on March 28, 1942 to call attention to what appeared to be a loophole in the legislation: The Jews could still be directors, administrators or professors in private education "in complete freedom and without limitation of numbers." Gidel proposed to exclude the Jews from private education. His proposition of November 12, 1942 was vetoed by the Minister of Education.

Hardy, Dean in Algiers, easily forgot his responsibilities as Dean to promulgate the anti-Jewish propaganda in Algeria. The paternity of the quota is, at least in part, attributed to him. He proposed it to Weygand in June, 1941 as something very necessary. With the assent of Weygand, he had it applied immediately—well before the application of the law of October 19, 1942. His circulars of September 25 and October 17, 1941 prescribed a quota of 7 percent in primary and secondary education.
APPENDIX F

Disciplinary Measures Applicable in Primary Teaching
APPENDIX G

Training Program for General Education Teachers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>8:30</td>
<td>Welcome for trainees and introduction of training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 30</td>
<td>9:00</td>
<td>Demonstration with Commentary; Seasonal Lesson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>Practice Session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10:45</td>
<td>Candidate Registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12:00 - 5:30</td>
<td>Outdoor Afternoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>8:30 - 9:15</td>
<td>Demonstration with Commentary: Lesson in the School Courtyard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 31</td>
<td>9:30 - 10:15</td>
<td>Practice Session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10:30 - 12:00</td>
<td>Use of the Natural Method in the National Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2:00 - 5:30</td>
<td>Outdoor Afternoon, Stadium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>8:30 - 9:15</td>
<td>Demonstration with Commentary: Lesson on Developed Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1</td>
<td>9:30 - 10:15</td>
<td>Practice Session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10:30 - 12:00</td>
<td>Reports of General Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Schoolmaster with Director, Monitors of Physical/Athletic Education, Colleagues, Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12:00 - 5:30</td>
<td>Medical Check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Corrective Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Swimming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td>8:30 - 9:15</td>
<td>Demonstration with Commentary: Athletic Initiation</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 2</td>
<td>9:30 - 10:15</td>
<td>Practice Session</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10:30 - 12:00</td>
<td>Payment of Jews for Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2:00 - 5:30</td>
<td>Outdoor Afternoon: Park/School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Closing by the General Superintendent</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Role &amp; Mission of the Director General Education</td>
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APPENDIX H

Table of Training Periods in Regional Centers

1942
### Educational Supervision - General & Sport -

Occupied Zone

**TABLE OF TRAINING PERIODS IN THE REGIONAL CENTERS FOR THE YEAR 1942**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRAINING PERIODS</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEPT</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male/Female Instructors (1)</td>
<td>5-31</td>
<td>5-28</td>
<td>5-28</td>
<td>13--9</td>
<td>15--12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22--19</td>
<td>25--23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Inspectors (2)</td>
<td>26-31</td>
<td>23-28</td>
<td>23-28</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>4-9</td>
<td>1-6 **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male/Female Student Teachers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Members of Private Teaching (3)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3-26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

(1) - Teachers are appointed for each training period by the Academy's Inspectors.

(2) - In principle, a regional inspector would attend the last week of training. Appointment is then made by Academy Inspectors.

(3) - Faculty of private schools may participate in the training of teachers in public schools. A special training period is reserved for them during September.

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**Easter Vacation**

**Vacation - Personnel**

**Vacation - Personnel**

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APPENDIX I

OTTO Lists:  Banned Textbooks
Paris
September, 1940
Preamble

Wishing to contribute to the creation of a more healthy atmosphere and a desire to establish the necessary conditions for a more objective appreciation of European problems, the French editors have decided to withdraw from bookstores the sale of books which are on the following lists, and similar lists which could be published later. These are books which in their untruthful spirit and tendencies have systematically poisoned the French public opinion. The publications of political refugees and Jewish writers are particularly aimed at because they have betrayed the hospitality that France had granted them. They have, without any scruples, pushed France to a war from which they try to profit from their selfish goals.

Albin Michel
Alcan
Armand Colin
Asy-Verlag
Attinoer
Baudinière
Beresniak
Berour-Levrault
Bibliothèque D’Anvers
Bibliothèque du Musée Social
Bloud et Gay
Bureau d’Éditions
Cahiers de Cyrano
Calmann-Levy
Castermann
Comité Alsacien d’Études et d’Information
List of Books Removed from Sale by Hachette

October 11-25, 1940

Hachette

By the orders of German Authority, the following books must be immediately withdrawn from sale. The final decision taken on the matter will be communicated to bookstores. Meanwhile, the bookstore owners are notified that it is in their best interest to return copies which they hold in stock to the publisher before November 10, 1940. If they do not follow such orders, they may be liable or requisitioned by the German Authorities.

Béjean: Résumé aide mémoire d’histoire Brevet élémentaire
Bertaux et Lepointe: L’Allemagne par les textes
Bertaux: Versions et thèmes de l’Allemand au bac
Bouillot: Le Français par les textes cours supérieur
Cohen: La grande guerre 1914-1918, encyclopédie par l’image
Daljat: Gloire, histoire illustre de la guerre 1914-1918
Dumas: Livre unique de Français cours moyen et supérieur
Gallouedec, Maurette et Martin: L’Europe et l’Amérique Les Principales Puissances
Gauthier-Deschamps: Leçons complètes d’histoires
Gauthier-Deschamps et Aymard: Histoire de France en images
Holot: Deux cents questions d’histoire et de géographie
Isaac: Petite histoire de France 1789-1912
Isaac et Alba: Histoire, Fourth Grade
Lemonnier-Schrader et Dubois: Geographie, cours supérieur et complementaire

Malet: Histoire de France Depuis la Révolution, Tome III
Malet et Isaac: Cours abrégé d’histoire
Les Temps Modernes
Histoire Contemporaine
Le Moyen Age Jusqu’à la Guerre de Cent Ans

Paces: Histoire sommaire de la France

Schome: Cent compositions d’histoire et de geographie
Cent questions d’histoire et de geographie

Additional Textbooks Banned from Usage
in the Public Primary Schools

Male: Au Jardin des Images (Sudel, Editor)

Vildrac: Classe de Fin d’Etudes

Truillet & Berger: Le Coffre aux Joujou

Dubus: La Ronde des Métiers et des Jours

Rollard & Mallaurie: Series Jean Christophe

Adenis: La Lecture Vivante

Ballereau-Brangier: Les Textes Vivants

Weber & Gailly: Arithmetic

Bonne: France and Civilization

DuVillage: History of France Explained to Children

Clemendot: History

Brossolette: History of France

Bougle-LeFranc: History of Work and Civilization
Additional Textbooks Banned from Usage in the Public Primary Schools continued

Gachon-Seneze: Geography

Emery: Before Life

Primaire: Moral, Civic and Social Education Manual

Mercier: History of France and Algeria
APPENDIX J

Letter of Inspector Monod to Minister Ripert

November, 1940
Rapport de M. Monod, Inspecteur de l'Académie de Paris sur la réunion des Proviseurs et Directrices des Lycées parisiens, tenue à la Sorbonne le 4 Novembre, 1940.

5 Novembre 1940

Monsieur le Recteur,

J’ai l’honneur de vous rendre compte que, d’accord avec mes collègues et avec M. Guyot, Secrétaire Général de l’Université, nous avons réuni hier soir 4 Novembre à 17 heures dans la Salle des Commissions les Proviseurs et Directrices des lycées parisiens.

L’objet de cette réunion était d’attirer l’attention des Chefs d’Etablissements sur les mesures à prendre pour éviter dans nos lycées tout incident d’ordre politique. Ces mesures ne pouvaient pas faire l’objet de circulaires ou de messages téléphonés: nous avons cru nécessaire de les prescrire de vive voix. J’ai pris la parole en votre nom et au nom de mes collègues. L’échange de vues qui a suivi a révélé que la situation, sans être grave, méritait d’être considérée tant dans les lycées de garçons que dans les lycées de jeunes filles avec beaucoup de vigilance. Certains quartiers de Paris manifestent plus d’émotion que d’autres. Les Chefs d’Etablissements passeront eux mêmes dans les classes et donneront aux élèves des conseils de prudence, en soulignant les conséquences très graves qu’un acte isolé peut avoir sur l’activité tout entière de nos lycées.

Bien que la question ne fut pas à l’ordre du jour, les Chefs d’Etablissements ont profité de cette réunion pour signaler à l’Administration supérieure les difficultes qu’ils éprouvent à appliquer le statut des Juifs. Leurs observations ont porté sur les points suivants:
1/ La designation des fonctionnaires juifs "de notoriété publique" ou à la connaissance des Chefs d'Établissements paraît devoir entraîner arbitraire et injustice. Il est inutile de rappeler que jamais l'Administration universitaire française ne s'est inquiétée jusqu'à présent de la race ou de la religion de son personne. Les listes à établir vont donc reposer sur des témoignages indirects, nécessairement incertains. Tel fonctionnaire au nom aryen (je m'excuse d'avoir à employer dans ce rapport un vocabulaire à ce point étranger à une plume d'administrateur français) peut avoir le nombre d'ascendants juifs qui devrait l'exclure de nos râns. Inversement un professeur au nom juif peut échapper à la proscription du fait de ses ascendants maternels. Faudra-t-il demander des pièces d'état civil à ceux que désigne "la notoriété publique?" Mais les administrateurs que nous sommes sont bien peu compétents pour juger de la valeur de ces pièces, qui, en France, jusqu'à notre récente défaite, ne comportaient aucune mention de race ou de religion.

Au critère de la notoriété publique, il y aurait donc lieu de substituer la déclaration individuelle faite sur questionnaire par chaque membre de personnel enseignant: les Chefs d'Établissements nous ont demandé s'ils pouvaient procéder ainsi. Je n'ai pas voulu leur donner de réponse sans vous en référer, estimant que l'Administration supérieure avait sans doute eu ses raisons en ne prescrivant pas cette manière de faire.

2/ La question a été posée savoir si devaient être portés sur les listes les fonctionnaires juifs "de notoriété publique" qui, soldats de la dernière guerre sont actuellement absents parce que portés disparus - ou prisonniers en Allemagne - ou hospitalisés pour blessures.

J'ai du répondre que ni la loi ni la circulaire d'application ne créaient d'exception, dans le corps enseignant, en faveur des anciens combattants de cette guerre ou de la guerre de 1914. Cette réponse a soulevé les réserves et les regrets que vous devinez.
Je dois d’ailleurs vous rendre compte, Monsieur le Recteur,
de l’atmosphère d’émotion grave et douloureuse dans laquelle
s’est déroulé cet entretien. Manifestement les mesures que
la loi récente impose à nos Chefs d’Etablissement, non
seulement sont contraires à leurs habitudes, mais elles
blessent leurs consciences d’administrateurs aussi
soucieuses de l’intérêt de leurs élèves que de celui des
professeurs qu’ils ont à diriger. Le nombre des fonction­
naires juifs "de notoriété publique" doit être dans les
lycées parisiens d’environ 80 sur près de 3.000, soit moins
de 3%. Dans l’hypothèse où il y aurait un enseignement juif
particulièrement dangereux, comment admettre que s’exercant
dans de pareilles proportions son influence ne soit pas
largement neutralisée?

Mais il est évident qu’il ne s’agit pas ici de nombre.
L’émotion que j’ai sentie - et dont certains m’ont dit
qu’elle traduisait celle du corps enseignant tout entier -
venait de plus loin. Ce qui est aujourd’hui mis en ques­
tion, c’est le libéralisme universitaire, c’est toute une
conception d l’honneur intellectuel qui a été puisée par
nous tous au plus profond des traditions françaises human­
istes et chrétiennes, - et qu’il paraît impossible a un
universitaire de renier.

Je dois à la vérité de dire, Monsieur le Recteur, que je
n’ai pas été un bon avocat de la cause administrative, et
que bien loin de pouvoir la défendre, j’ai été obligé de
m’associer sinon en paroles, du moins dans le secret de ma
pensée à toutes les réserves formulées. Mon loyalisme de
fonctionnaire m’oblige à vous apporter ce témoignage que je
vous serais reconnaissant de transmettre à M. le Ministre.
Dear Dean:

I have the honor to report that in agreement with my colleagues and Mr. Guyot, General Secretary of the University, we had a meeting yesterday, November 4 at 5 p.m. in the Commission Room with the principals of the parisian high schools.

The object of this meeting was to attract the attention of the directors of the teaching institutions on measures to take to avoid any political incident in our schools. These instructions could not be written or telephoned. We thought it necessary to express them directly. I spoke in your name and the name of your colleagues. The following points of view have revealed that the situation without being serious, should be watched as much in the girls' schools as in the boys' schools. Certain areas of Paris express more emotion than others. The directors of schools will personally go into the classrooms and will give prudent advice to students underlining the very serious consequences that an isolated act may have over the activity of all our schools.

Even so, the question was not on the agenda, the directors of schools have expressed in the meeting the difficulty they have in applying the statute of the Jews. Their observations were as follows:

1. The designation of Jewish functionaries as "public notoriety" or joined to the director of the school seem to produce injustices and arbitrary decisions. It is not necessary to recall that French University administration never discriminated on the basis of race or religion.

Lists which will be established will therefore be based on indirect testimony. This testimony is unreliable. Those functionaries with an aryan name (forgive me to have to use vocabulary in this report so foreign to the pen of a French administrator) leave a certain number of Jewish ascendants which might exclude him from our ranks. Inversely, a professor with a Jewish name may escape the interdiction due to his maternal ascendants. Should we ask for a document from those who are designated "public notoriety? We administrators are poorly competent to judge the value of these documents which in France until our recent defeat did not mention race or religion.
To the criterion of "public notoriety", we should therefore substitute individual declarations written by each member of teaching personnel. The directors of schools have asked if they could proceed in such a way. I did want to give my response without referring to this question to you because I estimate that the secondary school administration has without doubt had its reasons to circumscribe this procedure.

2. The question has been asked if we should include on the list Jewish "public notoriety" functionaries those who are soldiers and are at present absent because they have disappeared--because they are prisoner in Germany or in hospital because of wounds.

I had to respond that neither the law nor the application circular credited exception in the teaching corps in favor of veterans in this war or in the war of 1914. This response has produced the reserve and regrets which you suspect. I mention also to you, Dean, that the atmosphere was full of serious, painful emotion. Obviously, the measures that the recent law imposes on our school directors are not only contrary to their habits, but wound their consciences as administrators because they are worried about the safety of their students and their professors. The number of Jewish functionaries of "public notoriety" in the secondary schools in Paris must be approximately 80 or a total of 3,000 pupils, therefore, less than 3 percent. In the hypothesis where there would be a Jewish teacher particularly dangerous, how can you admit that exercising his influence in similar proportions he would not be neutralized?

But it is clear that here it is not a question of number. The emotions which I felt, and of which some have told me from the whole teaching corps, came from further back. What is today put into question is university liberalism as a whole--a conception of intellectual honor which has been founded by us in the most profound French tradition of humanism and Christianity. And this is impossible for a university memory to forget.

I must say in truth, Dean, that I have not been a good lawyer of the administrative cause and that far from being able to defend its position, I have been obliged to associate myself, if not in words, at least in the secrecy of my thoughts, to all the reservations which were expressed. My loyalism as a functionary mandates that I report this testimony to you, and I would be grateful if you transmitted it to the Minister.
APPENDIX K

Departmentalized Map of France
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Le Matin (Paris), Nov., 1940 to Aug., 1944.


Revue des Deux Mondes, (Paris), 1940.


Other References Consulted

Comité d'Histoire de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale (CHSGM) BDIC (Library of Documentation
83 rue Lecourbe University of Nanterre, France
Paris 15
Files Consulted at the National Archives

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<thead>
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<tr>
<td>Bonnard Papers (School/Family)</td>
<td>F 17 13341-13364</td>
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<td>Schoolbooks</td>
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<td>AJ 16:27-95 and 38:243-244</td>
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<td>AJ 38:1144 (S J.A.1)</td>
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VITA

The author, Anie Sergis, is the daughter of Jeanine and Max Sergis. She was born May 22, 1947 in Breteuil, France.

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The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Dec. 6, 1990

Date

[Signature]
Director's Signature