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The purpose of this study was to give a historical review of four challenges that were faced by James F. Redmond during his tenure as General Superintendent of Schools in Chicago. The study presents a brief review of challenges met during prior superintendencies in Chicago in the first chapter.

Chapter II discusses the rising discontent for Redmond's predecessor, Benjamin Willis, and the community's demand for a more empathetic leader. Redmond's previous tenure in Chicago and his superintendencies in New Orleans and Syosset are also reviewed.

Chapter III reviews the first challenge that Redmond encountered as superintendent. Upon his arrival in Chicago, Redmond immediately began to take part in Chicago's first collective bargaining with a recognized bargaining agent, the Chicago Teachers Union. The development of the Teachers Union as a powerful bargaining agent is reviewed. The chapter then summarizes the difficulties encountered in the negotiating process through Redmond's years as superintendent.

Chapter IV gives a historical perspective of the development of the segregated school system that existed upon Redmond's arrival. The remedy designed by the Redmond
administration and the gains that were made in integrating the schools are discussed.

Chapter V reviews the decentralization, both administratively and politically of the Chicago Public Schools. The Booz, Allen, & Hamilton Study is discussed with its implications for the administration of the school system.

Chapter VI discusses the Shared-Time Experiment that existed during the Willis and Redmond administrations. This program offered private/parochial students the opportunity to attend certain classes in the public school.

Chapter VII gives an assessment of the leadership style of Redmond as noted by his subordinates, an adversary, his Board of Education members, three leadership theorist, and Redmond himself. Chapter VII discusses how Redmond's ideas and decisions have fared with the test of time. Chapter VIII is a summary and conclusions.
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VITA

The author, John P. Reilly, is the son of the late Charles and Mary (Daly) Reilly. He was born in Chicago on May 1, 1946.

His elementary education was obtained at the St. Mel-Holy Ghost School in Chicago. He received his secondary education at St. Ignatius College Prep in Chicago. In June 1968, he was granted a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from Loyola University of Chicago. He received a Master of Education in School Administration and Supervision in February 1972 from Loyola University of Chicago. He received a Master of Arts in Special Education in August 1978 from Northeastern Illinois University.

The author began his teaching career at the Cooley Upper Grade Center in the Chicago Public Schools in 1968. He transferred to Ray Graham Training Center in 1974 where he served as Cooperative Work Training teacher and assistant principal until June 1990. In July 1990, he was appointed assistant superintendent/associate principal in the Rhodes Elementary School District 84.5 in River Grove, Illinois.

In May 1989, he was inducted into Alpha Sigma Nu, the National Jesuit Honor Society. In October 1989, he was awarded the Loyola University of Chicago President's Medal for the School of Education.
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CHAPTER I

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE CHICAGO SUPERINTENDENCY

The purpose of this study is to explore the tenure of James F. Redmond as General Superintendent of Schools in Chicago. We will study four challenges Redmond faced during his years in office and investigate his solutions to the four challenges. In order to better understand the difficulties that arose for the Redmond and his predecessors we shall take a brief look at the administrations of previous superintendents. In the history of the Chicago public school system, the individuals who served as superintendent have had to face educational, social, and political problems. To provide examples of the problems they faced, Chapter I reviews the superintendencies in earlier administrations. Actually controversy arose in the school system prior to the appointment of the first superintendent of schools. In 1841, two years after the creation of their office, the seven school inspectors hired a music teacher at $16.00 per month, "because the children like to sing." But in 1842 some parents suggested that this was an unnecessary extravagance and the teacher was dismissed. It was not until 1854 that the school inspectors determined that it was necessary to hire a superintendent of

schools "who would act as a kind of secretary to the school inspectors and bring order and unity to the school districts." ² The first superintendent, John Dore, served for only two years (1854-1856). With his appointment as superintendent, he found no system of record keeping. His accomplishments included the introduction of school records and a daily attendance record for each child. He introduced common textbooks and asked the school inspectors to establish a high school. Dore remarked that if the public now had a duty to provide public schools, then certainly parents had a responsibility to see that their children attend. Dore left the school system to enter business but later returned to public service as a state senator and as president of the fifteen-man Board of Education which had replaced the seven inspectors.

Dore was succeeded by William Harvey Wells. Wells is referred to as "one of the most effective administrators in the early history of public education." ³ Upon his appointment Wells found ill prepared teachers in an ungraded system. His administration (1856-1864) enhanced the training of teachers by offering Saturday morning classes in teaching methods. He noted the important job assigned to primary teachers and insisted that they be paid equally with teachers of upper grades. Under his leadership a graded

system of elementary and high schools was initiated and a complete graded curriculum was established. According to Herrick, "Wells' book, *A Graded Course of Instruction with Instructions to Teachers*, gave detailed instruction on materials to be covered in each grade."*4* Wells was forced to resign his position as superintendent because of failing health. His service to schools was acknowledged by a warm reception given in his honor by George Howland, principal of the high school, who read a resolution stating "that his uniform kindness and encouragement have contributed very greatly to the pleasure as well as the success of the teachers in the public schools."*5* Wells, like Dore, later returned to serve as president of the Board of Education between 1872 and 1874.

Wells was succeeded in the office of superintendent by Josiah Pickard (1864-1877). Pickard's tenure was difficult in that he had to try to manage a school system through the end of the Civil War, a post-war depression, and a fire that nearly destroyed the city. Pickard's successor was Duane Doty (1877-1880). Doty had difficulty establishing rapport with his teachers because of a murder case related to his appointment as superintendent. He did, however, manage to gain approval for a plan to simplify the records that teachers were required to keep.

George Howland’s tenure as superintendent (1880-1891) was noted for the increased demands for vocational education and for ethnic control. Each immigrant group wanted concessions for their children. The political leadership counted on these ethnic groups for support so their power had to be reckoned with. Howland gave examinations to teachers to qualify them and recommended that they be appointed by the Board of Education. Howland, also a political realist, suggested that teachers also get letters of recommendation from their ward committeemen.

Superintendent Albert G. Lane (1891-1898) had a history as an effective school administrator from his service as county superintendent of schools in Cook County. Lane welcomed input from outside agencies like the Chicago Woman’s Club, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, School Children’s Aid Society, and Hull House. Lane increased the teaching of manual arts in the elementary schools, incorporated kindergartens, and extended night school classes. His administration required training sessions for teacher cadets in the elementary schools. Later the problem of teacher training was solved when the Board of Education acquired the Cook County Normal School in 1896 and appointed Colonel Francis W. Parker as its head. Lane’s most dramatic conflict over schools was completely outside his authority of control. It dealt with the disposition of

the increasingly valuable remaining section sixteen school lands. The sale and leasing of school lands at favorable rates to politically connected people or companies was common but the public was just becoming aware of it.

Following the superintendencies of E. Benjamin Andrews and Edwin G. Cooley, came a woman in a profession traditionally dominated by men, Ella Flagg Young (1909-1915). Young began her career in Chicago in 1865. She was educated in the Chicago public schools and later studied under John Dewey and received her doctorate at the University of Chicago. As a district superintendent, she established a teachers' council to give teachers a voice in what happened in the schools. Herrick in The Chicago Schools: A Social and Political History gives current school administrators a chance to laugh when she mentions that Ella Flagg Young "is the only recorded principal in Chicago schools who ever dismissed an incompetent school engineer, and was able to keep him dismissed." Herrick continues:

Mrs. Young's greatest contributions to the Chicago schools lay in her efforts to give teachers pride in participation and improvement of the schools of which they were a part. There is no evidence that she supported - or that she approved - all of the Federation activities. But there is no doubt that she sought to establish a close and sympathetic relationship with the teaching staff and to impart a sense of involvement in school decisions."

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*Herrick, loc.cit., p.115.
*Ibid., p.120.
During Young's tenure as superintendent, high school attendance grew and in 1910 reached 25,000. One reason for the rise was the opening of commercial courses in the high school so that the students learned skills that made them employable. She also offered "prevocational courses" to seventh and eighth graders to keep children from leaving school after the sixth grade. One of the programs that she initiated, sex education for high school and normal school students, was later deleted by the Board of Education after several groups protested the program. 

Young's career as superintendent ended with her resignation in December 1915. Her last year was marked by a series of conflicts with local politicians, especially newly elected mayor William Hale Thompson. A story circulated that Thompson's dislike of Ella Flagg Young began when he, as a seventh grader, was sent home to his parents from the Skinner School where Young served as school principal. Thompson never returned to the school with his parents and never forgave her.

Superintendent John D. Shoop succeeded Ella Flagg Young and held his office for three years (1915-1918). He held no influence over the Board of Education and was generally overlooked by them. He was succeeded by Charles E. Chadsey who had the shortest tenure of any

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superintendent. He was hired by the Board of Education in March 1919, and due to problems with the new Board appointed by William Hale Thompson, he resigned on 26 November 1919. Peter A. Mortenson (1919-1924) succeeded Chadsey and tried to placate teachers by suggesting that the Board reinstate the Teachers’ Councils previously established by Ella Flagg Young. Corruption continued to flourish in the Thompson appointed Board until State’s Attorney Robert Crowe exposed the scandalous behavior and brought forth indictments on the main characters.

The corruption of the Thompson administration of city government led to a call for reform and Thompson announced that he would not run for mayor in 1923. The candidate of the Democratic party was William E. Dever, a judge with an impeccable reputation. Dever felt that it would be best for the Board of Education to be free from political interference, so he appointed seven competent and concerned citizens to the school board. The new Board was split on its’ vote for the new superintendent between William Owen of the Normal School and William Bogan of Lane High School. As a compromise the Board settled on William A. McAndrew who was at the time an assistant superintendent in New York City. McAndrew had served as principal of Hyde Park High School in Chicago earlier in his career but was dismissed.

12Ibid.
13Ibid., p.142.
14Ibid., p.143.
when he refused to pass a politician’s son. With his big city experience and independence from political pressure, McAndrew seemed to be an excellent candidate. McAndrew was warmly received by the Chicago Teachers Federation (CTF) but quickly turned their welcome into conflict with his plan to create junior high schools. As McAndrew’s plans for the junior high school became known, the leadership of the Chicago Teachers Federation began to realize the threat that junior high schools would have on their organization. Younger members of the CTF took the certification test for junior high and upon certification left the CTF and joined one of the high school unions. McAndrew ignored the questions regarding the junior high schools which had been brought up by teacher councils. He stated that he saw no need for teachers’ meetings on school time and that they had no business telling the superintendent what to do. The Elementary General Council asked the Board to consider further study and discussion of the junior high school plan but the Board ignored their request and recommended the adoption of the plan. Rumors were spread that McAndrew had been brought to the city to subdue teachers, and to support the domination of the schools by business interests. Both the Federation of Women High School Teachers and the Federation of Men Teachers favored the establishment of

16 Ibid., p.145.
16 Ibid., p.146.
junior high schools, but with restrictions that they be monitored closely for abuses and be on an experimental basis only. Margaret Haley and the Chicago Teachers Federation opposed the plan from the beginning to the end and this opposition had an effect on McAndrew's career as superintendent. The junior high school system was born in Chicago in 1924 and ceased operation in 1933.

McAndrew also introduced the "platoon system" for the elementary schools. This system proposed to use the school plant for a long day, with a half-day of classroom instruction and a half-day of supervised play and other non-academic activities, so that a building could be used to accommodate a larger number of students at one time. The "platoon system" had been tried earlier during Ella Flagg Young's administration but only as a stop-gap measure. McAndrew's "platooning" was to be permanent and would reduce overhead costs, require fewer buildings, and less equipment. The "platooning" became the target of criticism from national and local labor movements as a way of short changing children and pleasing tax cutters. On 8 April 1925 the Board approved McAndrew's plan for a council of organizations who would act as his advisors when he needed their help. The new council included four

\[\text{\textsuperscript{17}}\text{Ibid. , p.148.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{18}}\text{Ibid. , p.149.}\]
principals and a superintendent who could outvote the three large teacher groups. McAndrew’s disregard for teachers served to unify their efforts against him.\textsuperscript{20} In 1927 McAndrew and the Board lost control over non-teaching employees, that is, clerks, firemen, janitors, etc.; when the courts ruled that stationary firemen should become civil service positions under the city government. McAndrew became an issue in the election for mayor in 1927. William Hale Thompson accused McAndrew of using textbooks that were overly sympathetic to the British and did not paint the true picture of the American Revolution.\textsuperscript{21} After the election of Thompson in 1927, this controversy cost McAndrew his job. The pro-British textbook controversy was later refuted and this, combined with the civil service problems and evidence of underworld control of his administration, ended up costing Thompson his power and he lost the 1931 election.\textsuperscript{22}

William J. Bogan took office as acting superintendent in August 1927, and was formally selected superintendent in June 1928. Bogan had served as a teacher and a principal in Chicago for years. He had become principal of Lane High School and developed it into an institution whose reputation for high standards in vocational and general education are still recognized nationwide.\textsuperscript{23} As superintendent, he

\textsuperscript{20}Herrick, \textit{loc.cit.}, p.165.
\textsuperscript{22}Herrick, \textit{loc.cit.}, p.172.
\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p.226.
created an advisory council that included experts in health, welfare, psychology, and social problems. These experts could help devise plans to assist the schools in meeting the needs of their students. With this advisory council, Bogan divided the city into forty-one areas and established local community-school advisory committees in each area. Bogan continued to battle the Thompson appointed board and attempted to defend the educational department. Bogan, who was an expert in school finance, knew that figures presented to the Board were rigged. He was sure that the businessman who refused to distinguish between expenditures for education and for patronage was quite willing to reduce his own taxes at the expense of youth. Bogan was considered a friend to all of the education related union groups and to community groups like the Citizens Schools Committee (1933). Bogan refused to permit the schools to be used to disseminate Thompson’s political propaganda. The influence of the underworld over the Thompson regime again was evident when Bogan and several parent groups tried to get the police to close down speakeasies that sprang up around the high schools but received no support. The influence of political patronage was not new to the school system but what was alarming was the growth in control of jobs by known criminal elements. The only change that took place with the

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p.227.
26 Ibid., p.175.
election of a democratic mayor in 1931 was that the patronage army had become Cermak Democrats rather than Thompson Republicans.²⁷

The next superintendent was William H. Johnson (1935-1946). Johnson's career prior to Chicago included government work in Washington, D.C., a college instructor, dean of a junior college, and finally a teacher at Lane High School. While at Lane, he received his doctorate from the University of Chicago in Educational Administration. He taught briefly at the Chicago Normal School until he passed the principal's examination. He served as an elementary principal in three schools prior to his appointment as an assistant superintendent.²⁸ This appointment was made by the Board of Education over the objections of Superintendent Bogan who considered Johnson "an opportunist without much concern for the children he taught."²⁹

Studies of the administration of the Chicago Public Schools during this time period (1935-1946) generally refer to the "McCahey-Johnson" administration because of the close ties between the superintendent and the president of the school board. James B. McCahey was elected president of the Board of Education in 1933 and served until May 1947.

²⁸Herrick, loc.cit., p.224.
²⁹Ibid.
During this administration, there were many charges that the leadership of the Chicago public schools was subservient to the partisan will of the city administration. Specifically, the McCahey-Johnson administration was charged with personnel practices based upon political or personal favoritism, the unethical administration and grading of the principals' examination of 1936-1937, the failure to restore rapidly the salary cuts made during the depression of the 1930's and the use of public office by Board members and the superintendent for private financial gain. 30

During the McCahey-Johnson administration several civic groups confronted the Board of Education for their unjust practices. One of the most vocal of these groups, that eventually led to the resignations of McCahey and Johnson, was the Citizens Schools Committee. The committee was founded in 1933 to protest a drastic cutback in school programs which McCahey insisted was a result of the depression. The Citizens Schools Committee became a watchdog group for the city schools and tried to unsuccessfully influence the selection of Bogan's successor. The Citizens School Committee included members of other groups such as the Woman's City Club, the League of Women Voters, the Parent Teacher Association, certain University

of Chicago faculty members, and Chicago public school teachers.\textsuperscript{31} The committee was fortunate to have as advisors school Board Members Helen Hefferan and James Mullenbach as well as University of Chicago Professor Charles E. Merriam.\textsuperscript{32} The Citizens Schools Committee continued to monitor appointments, expenditures, and business activities of the Board of Education and the superintendent and strongly opposed William H. Johnson's reappointment in 1940 and 1944.\textsuperscript{33}

Superintendent Johnson caused so much anguish among the various teacher union groups that a movement began to unite the separate bodies into one group. On 28 October 1937 a new organization was formed. The four teacher unions surrendered their charters and received a new charter from the American Federation of Teachers as Local One. The major issues confronting the union were adequacy of funding for the schools and the appointing of unqualified temporary teachers while 800 qualified teachers waited for appointments.\textsuperscript{34} Lower level administrators and school principals were also treated unfairly. Many were transferred or demoted for offering opinions different from those of the superintendent or the school board.\textsuperscript{35}

In 1943 Edward E. Keener, president of the Illinois

\textsuperscript{31}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{32}Herrick, \textit{loc.cit.}, p. 235.
\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 237.
\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}, p.246.
\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Ibid.}, p.250.
State Teachers Association, urged the National Education Association to investigate the activities of the Chicago Board of Education and Superintendent Johnson. The results of the N.E.A. investigation suggested:

1) That the superintendent control all employees and activities of the school system, not just instruction.  
2) The Board of Examiners should be disbanded as it exists presently, and a new Board created with a person knowledgeable in school personnel problems.  
3) The superintendent should not have the examining system as his personal province, with the right to disregard the examiners he appointed and controlled if he so chose.  
4) Before any teacher or principal demotions, he/she should be given a hearing and a statement of the reasons for the action.  
5) Teaching positions should be opened to any qualified instructor, not just graduates of the Normal College.  
6) The superintendent should provide channels of communication so that teacher’s ideas could be given his careful consideration.  

The event that caused the overthrow of the McCahey-Johnson administration was the threat from the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools to withdraw the accreditation of the city’s public high schools unless specific reforms were made. This denial of accreditation would stigmatize the city’s public high schools as being sub-standard and would make it difficult for graduating seniors to be accepted into regularly accredited colleges. On 1 April 1946, Mayor Kelly appointed a school advisory committee composed of the presidents of area universities and asked them for their recommendation to avoid the interdiction of the North

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36 ibid., p.272.  
37 Kamin, loc. cit., p.4-5.
Central Association. The committee's recommendations, announced on 18 June 1946, were difficult for the mayor to accept. It flatly stated that the superintendent and the entire Board of Education should resign and a completely new Board be selected on the advice of civic agencies. Johnson and one board member resigned immediately and by September three more board members had resigned, leaving six vacancies on the Board. Kelly had no real recourse but to accept the recommendation of the committee and appoint an advisory commission to screen Board nominees. The mayoral election of 1947 was won by Martin J. Kennelly who had promised the Citizens Schools Committee that he would reform school governance.

In late 1946 the school board began to search for a new superintendent. The Board found that many candidates were refusing to be interviewed because the Board had retained its direct management over a large part of the school system. The Board controlled contracts as well as personnel and budget making, excluding the superintendent from any control in these areas. The Heald committee was joined by the Chicago Teachers Union, the Chicago Division of the Illinois Department of Education, the Regional PTA, and the Citizens School Committee in lobbying for legislation to

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38 Herrick, loc.cit., p.274.
39 Ibid., p.275.
40 Ibid.
create the office of General Superintendent of Schools.\footnote{Ibid., p.278.} After much lobbying, a bill was passed that created the office of General Superintendent but exempted the office of Board Attorney from the control of the superintendent. Once the bill was signed by the governor, the Superintendent of Schools in Kansas City, Herold C. Hunt, was chosen to replace William Johnson. Hunt accepted the appointment as General Superintendent and assumed his office in August 1947.\footnote{Ibid.}

Hunt was welcomed to his new superintendency like none other before him or since. The Citizens Schools Committee Publication, 	extit{Chicago Schools}, praised Hunt's appointment. Former Committee President William C. Reavis of the University of Chicago and its current President Dr. John A. Lapp, wrote:

You have been summoned to heavy duty. It is probable that no educator in America ever faced problems more intricate. All who know the difficulty of your task will give sympathetic understanding to your efforts. The Citizens Schools Committee and associated groups will stand guard over the gains which have been made and will be in readiness to support progressive advances....We pledge our cordial support in redeeming Chicago's schools and placing them in the forefront.\footnote{Ibid., p.279.}

Hunt was given several welcoming receptions, including one by the Citizens Schools Committee where he met representatives from over one hundred organizations, several Board of Education members, ten aldermen, and Mayor
Kennelly. He spoke at a meeting of the union teachers at Orchestra Hall and met with the new Regional Parent Teachers Association. Hunt assumed his position but to the surprise of some was not vindictive toward Johnson's staff. Two of Johnson's assistant superintendents were retained but new faces did arrive on the scene. The new Department of Personnel was headed by Edward E. Keener, whose department included both instructional staff and non-teaching civil service employees. When George Cassell retired from his position as assistant to the superintendent, his successor was James F. Redmond, who had been on Hunt's staff in Kansas City. Hunt took further steps to insure the integrity of the principals' examination which was to be administered in November 1947. Hunt hired the American Council of Education to grade the written examinations and conduct oral examinations. The Board also extended the opportunity to take teacher certification examinations and other examinations to all citizens of the United States. To resolve problems in the purchasing department, Hunt reorganized and placed it under the direction of Redmond. Textbooks would now be selected by committees of principals and teachers in each area and no book company could approach a committee member individually.

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44 Ibid., p.280.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
Hunt stated that he wanted advisory councils so that the public and teachers could participate in planning improvements for the schools. He wanted to establish workshops for teachers and conferences with principals and administrators. In helping to develop a philosophy for the public schools, Hunt identified nine functions of living that should be reflected throughout the curriculum. He continually asked for public support to obtain social, psychological, and health services for the school system. Hunt's public statements consistently stressed the basic American philosophy of equality of educational opportunity. Paul H. Douglas, later an U.S. Senator, noted in 1951 that "there was a kinship between Ella Flagg Young and Superintendent Hunt in the wideness of their vision of the place of public education in a democratic society."

Hunt's relationship with the teachers union was generally good. In 1948 Superintendent Hunt, Board President Charles Whipple, and Union President John Fewkes appeared before the city council to demand an increase in the school levy. The council had no legal control over the levy voted by the Board of Education but had refused to approve the levy. Confronted by the Superintendent, Board President, and the Union, the council reluctantly approved the levy. Hunt and the union disagreed in two areas:

48 Ibid., p.283.
49 Ibid., p.285.
50 Ibid., p.291.
salaries and the relationship between the superintendent and teacher organizations. Hunt’s attempt to revive the Teachers’ Council met with some opposition from the union. When election for the councils were held, the majority of members elected were active members of the teachers union. The council served no real purpose not already met by the union, but gave the superintendent a neutral stance among the teacher organizations. In 1953 no election was held for the council and it disappeared.\textsuperscript{51} The salary issue might have been avoided if more money were available but it was not. A single salary schedule was introduced with elementary teachers getting five-sixths of a high school teacher’s salary because elementary teachers worked five hours per day to the high school teachers six hours. The union had its say on these two issues and was not antagonistic toward Dr. Hunt. They congratulated him on his second contract in 1951.\textsuperscript{52} Hunt announced in the spring of 1953 that he was accepting the post of Eliot Professor in the Harvard Graduate School of Education. The Chicago Teachers Union newspaper carried a front page farewell and thank you to Hunt for his leadership and said that his report card grades were A for effort, A for accomplishment, and A for sincerity and fair play.\textsuperscript{53}

Hunt’s unexpected resignation concerned the Citizens

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{52}Ibid., p.292.
\textsuperscript{53}Ibid., p.299.
Schools Committee. In a telegram to the Board of Education, the Committee urged that no one in the system be chosen to replace him, unless Dr. James F. Redmond could be released from his commitment to become superintendent of the New Orleans schools. It further urged that, if necessary, a canvass of the entire country be made for Hunt's successor.\footnote{Ibid., p.300.} Redmond kept his word to the Orleans Parish Board of Education and moved onto his first superintendency. The nationwide search for a new superintendent resulted in the selection of Dr. Benjamin Coppage Willis who was then the Superintendent of Schools in Buffalo, New York. The administration of Dr. Willis will be discussed later in this dissertation.

As we have seen in our presentation of past superintendencies, each superintendent faced problems, some unique and some similar. The administration of the public schools in Chicago has been a challenge throughout our city's history. It is the purpose of this dissertation to discuss some of the major problems and their solutions that faced James F. Redmond during his tenure as superintendent from 1966-1975.

During an interview with Dr. Redmond, it was noted that Herold Hunt was both a mentor and a personal friend. Since Redmond considered Hunt a mentor,\footnote{Personal interview with Dr. James Redmond, Benton Harbor, Michigan, 28 July 1989.} I will use Hunt's eight
functions of administrative responsibility of a school administrator as an indication of Redmond's ability to meet his responsibilities in solving the problems discussed.

According to Hunt, these functions include:

1. Cooperative development and direction of a program that is custom-made for the community and its children.
2. Organization of an administrative framework to implement and facilitate the program.
3. Service as the adviser, as well as the executive officer, of the Board of Education.
4. Democratic leadership of the activities of all school personnel.
5. Observation of legal educational and administrative requirements.
6. Development of working relations with homes and other community agencies.
7. Adequate instruction and guidance in the values and practices of loyal American citizenship.
8. Regard to healthful, humanized and satisfying living for pupils and teachers in the course of school work.\footnote{Kamin, \textit{loc.cit.}, p.11.}

This study will discuss James F. Redmond's approach to the following challenges he met during his administration: desegregation of the schools, decentralization of the school system, collective bargaining with a recognized bargaining unit, and the concept of dual enrollment or as it was known in Chicago, "shared time." It is a goal of this study to provide a historical narrative of a previously unexplored period of the Chicago Public Schools' administrative history. It is hoped that this study will provide readers with information about possible solutions to problems that occurred and in some cases are still occurring in urban
CHAPTER II
WILLIS LEAVES AND REDMOND RETURNS

In order to fully understand the atmosphere within the school system that James F. Redmond encountered upon his appointment as superintendent, we will discuss the volatile situation which occurred during the last years of the Willis administration. One of the first problems that Redmond faced was the need to end the poor relationship that had developed between the African-American community and the superintendency. Redmond needed to respond to demands of the African-American community and at the same time attempt to convince the white community that integrated education could work. Redmond returned to Chicago with an image as "the conciliator". Redmond, unlike his predecessor, welcomed the input from community action groups on both sides of an issue. He would talk to the groups and solicit their views. By studying the different approaches to the superintendency exhibited by Willis and Redmond, we can gain further insight into Redmond's style of leadership and his approaches to the four challenges chosen for discussion in this study.

Dr. Benjamin Coppage Willis succeeded Harold Hunt after a nationwide search. Willis, who had been superintendent in

Buffalo, New York, arrived to a warm welcome in September 1953. In his first year Dr. Willis and the Teachers Union worked out a new salary schedule that created a six-hour day for all teachers, and salary increments for additional degree work beyond a bachelor's degree. Willis attempted to increase the number of seats and the number of teachers and thereby reduce the average elementary class size.\(^2\) Willis' administration expanded services in vocational education, programs for trainable mentally handicapped children and socially maladjusted children, and recognized gifted children as a group to be given special education. Special help was also given to children in low income areas through after-school speech and reading clinics, and through after-school remedial reading classes for some students.\(^3\)

Willis became known as "Ben the Builder" because of the great number of schools that were built during his administration. Wnek, in her study of the Willis administration, credits Willis with building one hundred thirty-two new schools, making eighty-one new additions, and acquiring sixteen buildings.\(^4\) Willis met his first controversy in June 1955, when residents of the North Lawndale area complained of badly overcrowded conditions in their schools. People of the area voiced the opinion that

\(^2\)Herrick, loc.cit., p.308.
\(^3\)Ibid.
preference was being shown to Hyde Park with new schools, building additions, and new teachers. 5

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Citizens Schools Committee became vocal against Willis when he was offered his second contract. In January 1961 the Chicago Committee on Racial Equality (CORE) released a statement sent to the Illinois School Problems Commission, asking their help in solving problems that existed in Chicago. CORE questioned half-day sessions, maximum class size in elementary schools, bus transportation, the use of experienced teaching staff, and inferior education and racial segregation in schools that were predominantly Black. 6 In March 1961 the NAACP issued a statement to both the Board of Education and Mayor Daley that present board policies resulted in separate and unequal schools for most Black pupils in the city. They charged that it was the responsibility of the school board to equalize all schools, and they urged that school districting be used to achieve integration and equal opportunities. 7 By August, CORE and the NAACP had joined forces to demonstrate their position. In October the Chicago Urban League and its executive director, Edwin C. Berry, issued a statement regarding the "unequal education in Chicago's public

5Ibid., p.99.
6Ibid., p.158.
7Ibid., p.157.
schools." It now seemed that every Black organization was opposed to Willis and the Board of Education.

In January 1962 the first mobile classroom units were set up in Chicago. Units were assembled at both Black and White schools. At first the units were acceptable, but by May 1962 protests began to arise in regard to the use of mobile units in certain sections of the city. Protests began to multiply and the units were referred to as "Willis Wagons." Although many teachers and children found the units to be comfortable and by necessity class size was limited to thirty, community groups like the Woodlawn Organization refused to see anything good about the classrooms.

On 22 October 1963 the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations (CCCO), an umbrella organization of seventeen civil rights groups under the leadership of Al Raby, called for a boycott of the Chicago Public Schools. Raby was a thirty-two year old teacher from the Hess Upper Grade Center on the West side. He was the CCCO delegate from Teachers for Integrated Education. He later gained more prominence in the area of civil rights when he joined the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in marches through the Southwest side, Austin, and Cicero. The boycott was

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"Who is this man Raby?" *Chicago Daily News*, 6 June 1965.
successful to the extent that forty-seven percent of Chicago's students were absent. CCCO presented a list of thirteen demands to the school board, first was a demand for Willis' resignation.\(^1\)\(^2\) CCCO sought the removal of Sterling McMurrin and Lester Nelson from the Hauser Panel and suggested they be replaced by Kenneth Clark who had testified in the Brown v. Board of Education case and Dan Dodson who was director of the Center for Human Relations and Community Studies at New York University. They further sought information about the racial make up of each school and their achievement levels. CCCO demanded that Robert Havighurst be given complete control, rather than shared with Willis, of the report he was conducting for the board. Other demands called for changes in personnel policies and a reconstitution of the board that would include appointment of members who "were publicly on the record for overcoming de facto segregation in Chicago."\(^1\)\(^3\)

In September 1961 the Board of Education authorized the first survey of the public schools in thirty years. Board member Fairfax Cone and his committee were to narrow the focus of the survey and to choose a director. Dr. Willis was in full support of the need of a survey.\(^1\)\(^4\) The board searched for a director for over a year and a half and


was rejected by such well known educators as James Conant, Herman B. Wells, and Francis Keppel. In January 1963 Dean Eldridge R. McSwain of Northwestern University's School of Education agreed to lead the survey. He later withdrew. 

On April 22 Cone announced that he had persuaded Professor Robert J. Havighurst of the University of Chicago to head the survey. Havighurst took a leave from his duties at the University to conduct the study. He is the author of more than three dozen books on the sociology of education and particularly urban education. He is noted for his study of all the components that affect education in metropolitan areas. This appointment did not sit well with Willis. He objected to Havighurst because he felt that this indicated a switch in the Board's policy of the neighborhood school. Willis did not like the fact that Havighurst had supported integration and the creation of regional high schools rather than district high schools. 

In order to pacify an irate Willis, Board President Claire Roddewig appointed a troika of Willis, Havighurst, and Dean Alonzo Grace of the University of Illinois, to oversee the survey. It was not until 27 November 1963 that the Board formally approved the areas to be surveyed and its $190,000.00 budget. The vote was unanimous (8-0) with board member

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15Ibid., p.23.
Adams, who also supported the survey, being unable to vote due to an illness. A year later in November 1964 the five hundred page report was released. The report called for action from the Board of Education in the face of its current crisis. Havighurst called upon schoolmen to take "an active participation in making and practicing of policy for social urban renewal." Fifteen of the twenty-two recommendations could be put into effect within months through board action without any cost to the system. Havighurst recommended that teachers should receive additional in-service training and that specialists should be available to faculties to help them adapt the curriculum to the local school. Additional resource and auxiliary staff members should be added so that all the services needed at a school are available. He also suggested the expansion of programs to meet the special needs of the poor and disabled. The areas of vocational and adult education needed to be upgraded and expanded. Finally Havighurst noted the need for a decentralization of the administration of the schools into three regions, each with its own curriculum specialist who could help local staffs adapt the curriculum to meet their needs. These regions could also be organized in a way that would assist in a community-wide

16Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 27 November 1963, Chicago, Il., p.746.
policy of stable integration and community development. Havighurst considered three issues "most important": one involved different ways to further integration in the elementary schools, a second involved improving education of the poor, and the third was to reorganize administration so that more decisions could be in the hands of principals and teachers. We shall see later that most of Havighurst recommendations are part of Redmond's programs to desegregate and to decentralize the schools. They are two of the four challenges discussed in this study.

The second survey, authorized by the Board on 28 August 1963, was originally known as the Five Man Panel of Educators but later became known as the Hauser Report. This report was chaired by Dr. Philip Hauser of the University of Chicago. The Board unanimously (9-0) approved the budget of $50,000.00 to fund the new survey. The report was the outgrowth of a judge-negotiated out of court settlement of the Webb v. Board of Education (Civ. No. 61C1569 D.C., N.D. Ill.) reached in August 1963. The suit charged the Board of Education with the operation of a de facto segregated school system. The report discussed
the impact of segregation on the quality of education in the Chicago schools. The report summarized the court decisions as to the responsibility of the Board on school segregation caused by residential segregation and stated:

The neighborhood elementary school, which has served this nation well historically, operates now to retard the acculturation and integration of the in-migrant Negro in Chicago and in metropolitan United States as a whole. Earlier in the century, the neighborhood school actually helped to bring persons of diverse ethnicity and culture together, because foreign immigration was on a smaller and more gradual scale than in recent in-migration of Negroes... The public school must do its share in breaking down the walls of segregation and paving the way for the exercise of free choice on the part of the Negro, as for all citizens, in respect to his life pursuits.25

The report suggested methods to enhance the integration of elementary and high schools. Suggestions were made for the integration of faculties of all schools, and a more equitable distribution of experienced teachers. Other suggestions included in-service training and further educational opportunities for teachers so that they could better understand the students with whom they were working.26 The recommendations of this panel were similar to those of the Havighurst study but were limited to the integration of the schools and improvement of in-service for teachers. Redmond's response to the challenge of desegregation of the schools made many of the same

26Herrick, loc. cit., p.325.
recommendations that were raised by these reports.

The summer of 1963 brought a series of sit-ins and protests at the Board headquarters as well as local high schools. After the Board approved boundary changes on 7 July 1963, members of CORE began a ten day sit-in that ended with the arrest of protestors. Two weeks later CORE began to picket construction sites where mobile classrooms were to be installed. Picketing at school sites began to turn ugly when protestors began to throw rocks at workers and at police officers. More than 170 pickets were arrested. Later in the month protestors began to march around the homes of Board President Roddewig, Mayor Daley, and Superintendent Willis.²⁷

In September 1963 Superintendent Willis resigned over a conflict with the Board over duties of his office and the Board. Many groups rejoiced over his resignation but the more influential groups, businessmen, home-owners associations, teacher and principal groups, and the state chairman of the North Central Association demanded that the Board not accept his resignation.²⁸ The Board refused to accept his resignation and at its October meeting established a committee to negotiate with the superintendent. This committee met with the superintendent and set up ground rules for future board-administration

²⁷Cuban, loc.cit., p.15.
²⁸Cuban, loc.cit., p.19.
In April 1964 a three page resolution was introduced and passed by the Board that stated the principles and procedures for cooperation between the Board and the General Superintendent. The resolution defined the role of the Board as policy maker and the superintendent as the implementor or executor of Board policy. The resolution reminded the Board that they should refrain from intruding into the administration of policy by the superintendent. The Board also reaffirmed its legal responsibility to reject or accept any recommendations of the superintendent and the right to revise its policies, rules and regulations to meet changing conditions.30

Willis's contract came up for renewal in the spring of 1965. Community groups led by the CCCO marched on city hall urging Mayor Daley to pressure the Board not to re-hire Willis. However, the Board, after a heated debate, voted 7-4 to renew Willis's contract at a meeting on May 28. The Board agreed on the package only with an oral stipulation that Willis would retire at age 65, a year later.31 Board President Frank Whiston shortly thereafter commented to the press that the Board had asked seven college presidents to serve as a screening committee to produce a list of candidates for the superintendency and that such a list

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30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p.28.
should be ready by October 1965. These comments created much concern for the American Association of School Administrators (AASA) who responded with a letter of protest to Whiston and the Board. The AASA also objected to the hiring of a successor to Willis as his executive assistant until the successor could legally be hired as superintendent. The association noted that "these actions would be a serious breach of ethical procedures for a board in its dealing with its chief administrator." The association urged the Board to reconsider its actions at its next meeting and defer such action to a more appropriate time. Beginning in May 1966 the Chicago newspapers began to speculate on a successor for Willis. The Chicago Tribune on 11 May 1966 reported that Redmond was the choice of a six-man Board committee. The article mentions that a committee of three educators, John J. Corson of Princeton, Roald F. Campbell of the University of Chicago, and Herold C. Hunt of Harvard, had screened candidates and had arrived at a list of six finalists. The list included: Sidney P. Marland of Pittsburgh, Gregory C. Coffin of Darien, Connecticut, Robert Jenkins of Pasadena, Paul W. Briggs of

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32 Letter from Forrest E. Conner, Executive Secretary of the American Association of School Administrators to Frank M. Whiston, President, Chicago Board of Education, 21 June 1965. From personal collection of David Heffernan, Assistant Superintendent of Schools.

33 Ibid.
Editorials emphasized the fact that James Redmond was a public relations expert, and stated that:

...some think it is more important for the superintendent to be a public relations expert that a gifted educator. Certainly a superintendent needs the patience to suffer fools gladly, along with the courage to oppose them when he thinks they are wrong. This is an area in which Supt. Willis faltered...

At the meeting of the Board of Education in May 1966, Dr. Willis announced his resignation effective 31 August 1966. At this same meeting the Board voted to ask James F. Redmond to be his successor.

REDMOND - A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

James Francis Redmond was born on 13 September 1915 in Kansas City, Missouri to James Timothy and Gertrude Shwarz Redmond. He was educated in the Kansas City Public Schools. His first career choice was that of law but due to the financial burdens on his family resulting from the Great Depression he was unable to pursue law school. His educational pursuits were then channeled into teacher training, a field for which he was able to receive financial assistance in the form of a Federal Education Relief Act grant. The grant covered the entire cost of his tuition

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36 Herrick, loc. cit., p.338.
which amounted to $18.75 per quarter. He studied at the Kansas City Teachers College for two years and in 1935 accepted an appointment as an elementary school teacher. In the previous three Teachers College classes no teaching appointments were made so he considered himself fortunate to get a position. He continued his studies for the Bachelor of Arts degree in the evenings and on Saturdays and was awarded his B.A. from Teachers College in 1937. His teaching experiences in the public school system of Kansas City and his observation that there were opportunities for men in elementary school administration helped persuade him to change his career plan to that of public school administration.

On 3 June 1939 Redmond married Mary Edith Adams. The Redmonds have one child, James Leonard. The Redmonds decided that their child would be educated in the public schools wherever Dr. Redmond served, rather than in Catholic or private schools. The Redmonds are extremely proud of their son who received an appointment to the United States Military Academy at West Point. James Leonard is now an executive with Commonwealth Edison.

Early in their marriage the Redmonds agreed that James would pursue his graduate degrees as soon as possible. Redmond attended Teachers College of Columbia University in

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37 Personal interview with Dr. James F. Redmond, St. Joseph, Michigan, 28 July 1989.
38 Ibid.
New York during the summers of 1939-1940. He received a Master of Arts degree from Columbia in 1940. The Redmonds returned to Kansas City where Redmond left his elementary teaching position to assume the duties of Assistant to the Superintendent. This first position in school administration was the result of his recommendation by the Superintendent of the Kansas City Schools, Herold Hunt. Hunt had known Redmond since his interview for his first teaching position. Hunt was both a mentor and a close friend of Redmond and encouraged his pursuit of further education.\(^3\)

The Redmonds had discussed pursuit of a doctorate and decided that it would be achieved before Redmond reached thirty. However, this plan was interrupted by World War II. Redmond served four years in the United States Army and rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Adjutant General's Department at Camp Wolters, Texas. His duties included supervision of the testing of soldiers, the assignment of these men to specialty training based on their tested abilities, and the assignment of these men according to unit needs.\(^4\)

After the war Redmond returned to his post as Assistant to the Superintendent in Kansas City. He continued in this position for only six months before taking a leave to return

\(^3\)Ibid.  
\(^4\)Ibid.
to Columbia University to pursue his doctorate. During this stay in New York, Redmond was chosen to serve his only tenure as a school building principal. In 1947 Redmond served as the director of the experimental/demonstration school, Horace Mann Lincoln School, on Columbia University's campus. This assignment had added challenges because Columbia had decided that the school would close after Redmond's term as director. Columbia had decided that they would become involved with school districts throughout the country rather than just in their own experimental school. Redmond's job was to insure that the closing of the school would be done in a manner that would be least disruptive to the students and faculty, and assist the students and faculty in finding future placement. Upon completion of the school year Redmond was awarded his Doctor of Education (Ed.D.) degree from Columbia University in 1948.41 Redmond's dissertation was entitled "Administrative Factors Affecting Teacher Strikes", a topic which he would learn even more about during his tenure as Superintendent in Chicago. His dissertation committee included Daniel R. Davies, Willard S. Elsbree, John K. Morton, and the renowned George S. Counts. His study focused on teacher strikes in three East Coast towns and the administrative factors that

41Ibid.
led to a strike rather than an agreement. 42

FIRST TENURE IN CHICAGO

The relationship that existed between Redmond and Herold Hunt came into play again in 1948. Hunt had accepted the superintendency in Chicago in 1947 and had made an agreement with the Chicago Board of Education that he would be able to hire Redmond as an Assistant to the Superintendent when Redmond had completed his doctoral studies. Hunt therefore enabled Redmond to move around the building principalship (except for his year at Horace Mann Lincoln) to the level of superintendent. As Assistant to the General Superintendent Redmond administered the Bureau of School Clerks, Bureau of Lunchrooms, and the Public Relations Department. Later when problems arose in the Purchasing Department, Hunt appointed Redmond as Director of Purchasing and asked him to put things in order in the department. Redmond returned to school at Northwestern University to learn more about purchasing. As a result of his work at Northwestern, Redmond was able to meet and hire competent assistants who helped reorganize the purchasing department. Redmond continued to be a confidant to Hunt during his four years as Director of Purchasing. It was from this position that Redmond later moved to the

superintendency of New Orleans in 1953.  

THE FIRST SUPERINTENDENCY - A BAPTISM OF FIRE  

Although there is much speculation that Redmond could have stayed in Chicago and become superintendent upon Hunt's resignation, Redmond remained a man who kept his word. Prior to Hunt's decision to accept a position at Harvard, Redmond had accepted a contract offer from the Orleans Parish School Board. The parish boundaries are identical to the boundaries of the city of New Orleans. The distinction must be made, however, that the parish school board is responsible directly to the state, not to the city.  

Upon his arrival in New Orleans, Redmond was faced with the problem shared with many other superintendents at the time. As a result of Brown v. Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954) the United States Supreme Court ordered school districts to end racially segregated schools and nullified the doctrine of separate but equal. The local case filed in the United States District Court in New Orleans was known as Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board 138 F Supp. 337, 342 (1956). Of the many decisions in the case the first was delivered on 15 February 1956 by Judge J. Skelly Wright of the Federal District Court in New Orleans. Among other

43 Ibid.  
things his decision enjoined the Orleans school board from requiring and permitting racial segregation and directed the board to "make arrangements for admission of children... on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed..." Judge Wright used as a reference both Supreme Court Brown cases, however, as we will learn, the Orleans Parish School Board seemed to have a very liberal interpretation of the term "with all deliberate speed."

Inger tells us about a New Orleans in the 1950's that was expected to be a leader in peaceful desegregation in the south. "Although there were inequalities, whites and Negroes had lived in apparent harmony for decades, and New Orleans had perhaps less residential segregation that any large American city, North or South."

The city had peacefully added African Americans to its police force, and had desegregated its public libraries, buses, and recreational facilities. An article in the New Republic in February 1959 was perhaps the first report to bring the surprising news that no leadership for peaceful school desegregation had yet emerged in New Orleans.

There is no organized effort - as in Atlanta - to encourage people to think in advance of what the loss of the public schools would mean to them and to make their views known... There is no organized defense of the public schools by Protestant clergy or professional men and women, and most Negro leaders in New Orleans seem more interested in their personal political organizations than in matters of principle. The press

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- an anemic force in New Orleans life - gives its readers no hint that there is cause for concern about the future of the schools.47

One of the largest groups of citizens in New Orleans was the Catholic Church. Nearly two-thirds of the population of the city was Roman Catholic. The diocese had the reputation of being liberal on race relations and at one time the diocese seemed to be leading the way for acceptance of desegregation. The church leader, Archbishop Joseph Francis Rummel, had earlier ordered the "white" and "colored" signs removed from church pews. On the Sunday following Judge Wright's ruling, the Archbishop issued a pastoral letter stating that racial segregation was "morally wrong and sinful because it is a denial of the unity and solidarity of the human race as conceived by God in the creation of man in Adam and Eve."48

Support for Archbishop Rummel waned after his pastoral letter and some priests refused to read it to their congregations. Five months later Rummel announced that he had planned to have the parochial schools integrated on a grade by grade basis beginning in September 1957. Contributions to the church declined seriously and pledges to capital projects were not honored. When September 1957

arrived Rummel, who had not referred to his school desegregation statement since it was made, was unable to desegregate the parochial schools. In July 1959, Rummel announced that the parochial schools would integrate at the earliest possible opportunity and definitely no later than the public schools.⁴⁴

Redmond refers to cooperation between the Catholic school system, its Superintendent/Monsignor Henry Bezou, and the public schools. The archdiocese had reached an agreement with Redmond and the Orleans Parish School Board to desegregate both systems at the same time. Unfortunately, before it could take place, the archbishop became ill and the plan never came to fruition. Without Archbishop Rummel's leadership, the group of priests who were making decisions for the diocese decided that they would postpone the desegregation of the Catholic schools until after the public schools had successfully integrated their schools.⁴⁵

The leaders of New Orleans made no attempt to prepare the community for desegregation of the schools. They all believed that their schools would not be forced to desegregate, even after the federal courts ordered it. It must be remembered that New Orleans is not a small Bible-belt town but is the nation's second largest port.

⁴⁴Inger, loc.cit., p.23.
⁴⁵Redmond interview, loc.cit.
the home of liberal French Catholicism, and one of America's most cosmopolitan cities.

In 1959 a group called Save Our Schools, Inc. (SOS) was organized. The group was composed of social workers, Tulane professors and their wives, some lawyers and businessmen, many Jews, and pro-integration Catholics. None of the members of SOS were in the elite; they were New Orleans liberals and could not attract the moderates of the city. SOS emphasized open schools rather than integrated schools. The city’s elite, the influential bankers, attorneys, and businessmen did not become involved in the decisions that led to the desegregation of the schools. They remained silent through the days of violence and boycotts. The elite eventually spoke out for a peaceful solution, but only after the city’s reputation had been tarnished.

In an interview, Superintendent Redmond recalled his view of the situation in New Orleans. Like other southern cities, the neighborhoods of New Orleans were not segregated. African-Americans and whites lived in the same area and even on the same block. The segregated neighborhoods that existed in Chicago did not exist there, with the exception of the lakefront area which was developed in the post-World War II era. These housing patterns did not have an effect on the schools, however, because by law

Inger, loc.cit., p.25.
the races could not attend school together. You may walk further to your school than your neighbor because he was of a different racial group.\textsuperscript{52}

Redmond felt and his feelings are generally supported in the literature that he was hired by "a reform board, a very progressive board." He felt an advantage in that he and the entire Board were within five years of age of each other, and this added to their cohesiveness.\textsuperscript{53} He felt that even though the board was elected by popular vote, they did not necessarily represent the popular attitude on the race issue. Redmond stated that the board, their attorney, Sam Rosenberg, and he decided as a group that it was necessary to fight the court order to desegregate in every legal way possible, and push every legal angle of law that was available and honorable. These actions spanned the years 1956 to 1959. The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court both of which affirmed Judge Wright's decision in district court. On 15 July 1959 Judge Wright ordered the board to file a desegregation plan by 1 March 1960. He later changed the date to 16 May 1960 at the board's request.\textsuperscript{54} Prior to the next court appearance the board surveyed the parents of children in the schools and asked whether they would rather see the schools open with some integration or not open at

\textsuperscript{52}Redmond Interview, \textit{loc.cit.}

\textsuperscript{53}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{54}Inger, \textit{loc.cit.}, p.18.
all. To the board's amazement over 80 percent of the white parents responded that they would rather see the schools not open at all. On 16 May, the board told the court that it had no desegregation plan, and Judge Wright responded by supplying his own plan, ordering the desegregation of all first grades at the opening of school in September. On 17 August 1960, additional support for desegregation was gained when a suit (Williams v. Davis 187 F. Supp. 42 (1960)) was filed by thirty white parents asking the court to issue and injunction restraining the governor and other state officials from obeying the state court injunction and the state statutes with respect to segregation. It is speculated that the four moderates on the school board gave encouragement and support in the filing of this suit. There is even some evidence that Board Attorney Rosenberg and Judge Wright may have been instrumental in the preparation of the suit. On 31 August 1960 the four moderates on the board asked Judge Wright for another delay to allow the staff time to prepare a desegregation plan. He granted their request and set 14 November as the day desegregation would start.

Redmond then prepared a plan and presented it to Judge Wright. Wright approved the plan and ordered Redmond and the Board to carry out the plan. The plan developed was

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55 Ibid., p.19.
56 Ibid., p.32.
57 Ibid., p.33.
designed to place some African-American children in white schools. The board refused to consider such political considerations as: who would support what plan, where would support most likely arise, and where would the opposition be. The board established a four-step administrative procedure for considering applications for permits to transfer. The board wanted a "scientific selection" that would be completely objective, thus freeing the board and the superintendent from personal responsibility. The first step was a review of the application by four assistant superintendents. The second step was the review of the applicants scholastic aptitude and intelligence by psychologists and the acting director of guidance and testing. The next review was performed by the assistant superintendent for instruction and other staff members who tried to consider what effect the new program would have on the transferred child and what effect the transferred child would have on the existing program. The final review was held by the superintendent, his first assistant, the medical director, and other staff members. Their job was to evaluate the information previously collected and present the results to the board who would direct the superintendent to issue or not to issue a transfer to the student.

Redmond refers to the process as "not scientific, the

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Ibid., p.34.
Ibid., p.36.
screening was based on hunches. This kid can make it. This kid has what it takes to go into a rough situation and make it.\textsuperscript{60}

On 26 September 1960 the board formally announced the integration plan described above. In the weeks after the plan was announced, a total of 137 African-Americans applied for permits to transfer.\textsuperscript{61} While awaiting the transfer applications members of the board actively sought out support for the integration plan from the community's elite. Although it appeared that some headway was being made, some of the elite said that they could support only a plan that kept first graders separated by sex and that the toilets would remain segregated. Board attorneys felt that Judge Skelly Wright would accept separation by sex because it had a board policy at one time but there was little doubt that segregated washrooms would be permitted.\textsuperscript{62}

At the same meeting the board also established as a guideline that any student whose application was accepted must have test scores equal to or above the median of the school to which they are applying.\textsuperscript{63} This decision made it more difficult to place the transferring students because it was necessary to find a school that had first grade median scores low enough to admit the African-American children.

\textsuperscript{60}Redmond interview, loc.cit.
\textsuperscript{61}Inger, loc.cit., p.36.
\textsuperscript{62}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63}Ibid.
People within and outside of the board tried to convince Redmond and the board members, as a first step, to find schools where white parents and their children would be more accepting of the African-American children and then find students who could fit in those schools. Redmond and the board rejected this suggestion because they felt that selection would then be too subjective. The result of the board using its "scientific" method was that it chose to desegregate the schools that gave every appearance of being the worst possible ones. 64

Only two schools were chosen to participate in the plan, William Frantz and McDonogh No.19, both in the same neighborhood. Located in the most neglected part of the city, the ninth ward, the proximity of the two schools to each other made it relatively easy for segregationists to cause disturbances at each school. The ninth ward bordered St. Bernard's Parish, the county controlled by archsegregationist, Leander Perez, from which it was easy to send pickets to protest at the school sites. 65

On 27 October the school board announced that it had granted transfer permits to five African-American pupils, all girls. 66 The board refused to identify either the children or the schools into which they would transfer. This action convinced Governor Jimmy Davis that the Orleans

64Ibid., p.38.
65Ibid.
66Ibid., p.41.
Parish Board was going to follow through on its desegregation plan and he called for a special session of the legislature to discuss the state's next move. The special session was used by Governor Davis to try to stop the school board from complying with the federal court order to desegregate. The governors' allies in the state legislature voted to suspend the rules and introduced twenty-seven bills that called for various state actions that would happen if a local school board tried to integrate their schools in opposition to state law. The entire legislative package depended on Bill Number Two, which purported to interpose the sovereignty of the state between the federal government and the school board.

On 14 November 1960 four frightened African-American girls (the fifth had withdrawn her application), three at McDonogh No. 19 and one at Frantz, became the first of their race in the Deep South since the end of Reconstruction to attend classes with whites below the college level. Since the board's plan had been kept a secret there were no demonstrations upon the students' arrival at school. However, as word spread in the morning, many white parents came to school and took their children home. By the end of the week every white child had withdrawn from McDonogh No. 19, and all but two white children withdrew from Frantz.

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**Ibid.**, p.44.

White parents boycotted class at McDonogh 19, for the entire school year, except for a short period of time in January 1961. The parent who broke the boycott was fired from his job at Walgreen's and was forced to leave town because no one would hire him. Two families at Frantz kept their children in school and later other families also returned their children to school and the boycott was never total.\textsuperscript{70}

The state legislature again met for a special session on 15 November 1960. This time the lawmakers declared illegal all acts of the "now defunct New Orleans School Board" and warned all banks and businesses not to do business with or honor checks of or make loans to the "old" school board.\textsuperscript{71} Other actions by the legislature included: directing the transfer of the Orleans School Board funds to the legislature; provision for education expense grants to parents of children attending non-profit, nonsectarian, non-public schools; and the firing of Superintendent Redmond and board attorney Rosenberg.\textsuperscript{72} Turmoil continued in the school system. On 22 November Redmond announced that the school board would be unable to meet its teacher payroll because it was unable to secure a loan. The next day the legislature authorized pay for all Orleans Parish school employees except for the administrative staff and the teachers at the desegregated schools.

\textsuperscript{70}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., p.53.
\textsuperscript{72}Ibid.
The boycott became more intense as time went on. The number of white children attending class at Frantz had increased to twenty-three by early December but a new wave of threats, stonings, and other harassments reduced the number of white students to eight. Eventually, federal marshals were brought in to transport the white children who wanted to attend Frantz. The continued boycott hurt businessmen and reports around the country noted that New Orleans was feeling financial repercussions. Tourism was definitely down and even the Mardi Gras was threatened. Finally on 14 December a group of 105 business and professional men ran a three-quarter page ad in the newspaper appealing for an end to threats and street demonstrations and for support for the school board.

The financial crisis continued and the teachers were again victim to the legislature's attempts to defeat integration. The legislature adjourned on 22 December without releasing funds for the salaries of the teachers and other employees of the Orleans school system. Some of the funds were released in January but again the administrative staff and teachers at the desegregated schools were not included.

The turning point in the attempt to gain public support for the school board came in January 1961. Several women's

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73 Ibid., p.57.
74 Ibid., p.62.
75 Ibid., p.63.
groups sponsored a testimonial dinner to honor the four board members and Superintendent Redmond. On 30 January 1961 a dinner was attended by 1650 citizens who came to pay tribute to the board members and superintendent for the sacrifices they had made to preserve public education in New Orleans. At the dinner, the attendees were reminded of the need for them to provide public displays of confidence and support. From that point on, although the boycott continued and financial problems still existed, the Board and the superintendent knew that their problems would become more manageable. Public support began to grow and the crisis was on a downswing. On 31 August, a full-page advertisement listing 315 civic and business leaders ran in the Times-Picayune that called for a peaceful desegregation of the schools. The ad demanded that "public education... must be preserved;...and the dignity of our city upheld...." In addition to the public statements, there were private assurances to the school board of the support of some of the top civic leaders.

Redmond recalled the period of time after the announcement of the plans to desegregate as a time "when the legislature and part of the population of New Orleans lost their rationality." During this period of time Redmond notes that he was fired fourteen times by the state

Ibid., p.64.
Ibid., p.68.
Redmond interview, loc.cit.
legislature only to be reinstated by Judge Skelly Wright. The faculties of the two schools that were the object of the boycott remained at their schools and "they developed in-service type programs, instructors came in to work with them, we kept those schools going." Redmond noted that 70-80 percent of his budget revenues came from the state, so that when the state began to withhold funds from the schools, it had a great impact on the operations of the system. Redmond was gratified that during this time of financial crisis some groups offered assistance. "One union official from Chicago offered to put four million dollars in the bank so that we could meet our payroll. Another rich individual offered a million dollars for the same purpose." Redmond remembered the New Orleans experience and said:

we didn't teach school that year, we were living the desegregation problem. We did desegregate the schools. We did have problems but we didn't have soldiers in the street. We didn't have riots, we did have demonstrations. Hindsight tells us that the schools selected were in the worst section of town. Hindsight tells you that you should not have put it on a voluntary basis. You should have selected parts of town you knew would have accepted it better. OK, but that would have been maneuvering but at least at that point in time we were purist. It probably would be better in a more liberal part of town. We probably could have swung it with less problems.

Redmond related that as the school year was ending his

79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
contract was expiring. The board was willing to offer him another contract but he was also offered a contract by a consulting firm at a small increase in salary. Redmond stated:

I was thinking, it sounds altruistic, but I was thinking it's time for me to move out and take a lot of the heat and hate away with me. As I look back now, sure, Bishop Cody had lowered the boom on the White Citizens Council Catholics. A good number of the people of New Orleans came to their senses and things settled down real quick. I don't think my moving did much good. I think that if I would have stayed, it would have been the same. New Orleans is not redneck or reactionary, it has a liberal undertone to it.\textsuperscript{62}

A MOVE TO THE EAST COAST

After leaving New Orleans, Redmond moved his family to New York. He was hired as director of school administration services by Booz, Allen, and Hamilton Management Consultants. He stayed in this position for two years but left because he did not enjoy the selling aspects of the job that a consultant must do in order to get work. He enjoyed the consulting because he was able to work with smart people who wanted to study their schools to be sure that they were functioning to the best of their ability. In addition to the selling, Redmond did not appreciate the travel that was necessary in the business.\textsuperscript{63}

Redmond left the consultant business in 1963 to return to the superintendency of the Syosset Public Schools on Long Island, New York. Redmond refers to the Syosset

\textsuperscript{62}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{63}Ibid.
superintendency as "probably an ideal situation. There were 10,000 students, you prepared your budget and it was accepted by popular vote after a New England-type town meeting." The Syosset area developed mostly after World War II and was settled by young families who did not mind paying higher property taxes to provide a good education for their children. The per pupil expenditures in Syosset were three times as much as in New Orleans and twice as much as in Chicago." The district paid its teachers well. There were ten elementary schools, two junior highs and one senior high school in the district. Redmond jokingly referred to it as "a job you could do from ten to four." Redmond enjoyed his stay in Syosset but left to return to Chicago in August 1966. "I'd had other offers while in Syosset, it was ideal, but Chicago was something special so I returned." The president of the Chicago Board of Education, Frank Whiston, called and he arranged to talk about the superintendency in Chicago. Redmond recalled:

I'd known Frank because he was on the board for about a year before I left for New Orleans. I met with a board committee at a hotel for an informal meeting. I was not offered the job at that time but I returned to Syosset with a very good feeling about it. Months went by and I did not hear anything until I was invited back to talk things over and I was offered the job. I came aboard in a very favorable situation. The vote was 10-1 to offer me a contract. The only "no" vote was Mrs. Green who later told me she voted "no" only

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*ibid.*


because she had never met me before the voting took place.\footnote{Ibid.}

We have reviewed the experiences that helped make James F. Redmond the choice of the Chicago Board of Education to succeed Benjamin Willis. We have followed the development of his career from its' beginnings in Kansas City, through his big city experience in Chicago and New Orleans, his "ideal situation" in Syosset, and to his return to Chicago. We have gained an understanding of the situation that existed in Chicago's schools in 1966 and the need for a superintendent that could relieve the antagonism that existed in many communities. Redmond projected a fatherly image and had a calm demeanor about him. His previous tenure in Chicago was a definite advantage to his superintendency because he knew many of the personnel under his supervision and was familiar with the decision makers in the city. He was able to begin assessing the challenges that existed and offer solutions to them. Upon his arrival in Chicago in October 1966 Redmond faced the long standing challenges of desegregation of the schools and a response to the demands of the civil rights movement. He would also need to carry out a decentralization plan developed by the Booz, Allen, and Hamilton Report. Later, he would decide the fate of a shared time program with parochial schools. However, a more immediate challenge quickly became his first

\footnote{Ibid.}
priority, he was to be the first superintendent to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with the Chicago Teachers Union.
CHAPTER III

A FIRST: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WITH THE TEACHERS UNION

James F. Redmond began his first term as General Superintendent of the Chicago Public Schools on 3 October 1966. He was not availed the "honeymoon period" that many administrators meet when they enter a new position. Instead he walked into a situation that would effect employer-employee relationships within the school system for years to come. Although the challenge of finding a solution to the problem of desegregating the schools was a priority, it had to be deferred until Redmond and the school board could negotiate the first collective bargaining agreement with the Chicago Teachers Union as the sole bargainer for Chicago's teachers. The only action that the Board had taken was to appoint a negotiating committee. Redmond offered to work with this committee and spent many days doing so. Redmond realized that teachers would be demanding a salary increase which he believed they deserved. His job, however, was not only to administer the educational program and create a good working environment for the teachers, he had to be fiscally responsible to the Board and the taxpayers and not spend more money than the Board had.

In this chapter we shall discuss the contract negotiations which took place during the Redmond
administration. We shall discuss contracts negotiated for the years 1967 through 1974. The reader will learn about problems that arose in early negotiations with an emphasis on the negotiations for the 1969 contract. This particular contract created several scenarios that were not encountered before, including the first strike. We shall discuss the four phases of the negotiations examined by Francis M. Landwerermeyer, S.J., in his dissertation "Teacher Unionism, Chicago Style: A History of the Chicago Teachers Union, 1937-72". We conclude with summaries of the negotiations through the 1974 contract.

But first, in order to get a better understanding of the development of the Teachers Union to the point that they were able to win an election to become sole bargaining agent for the teachers, we shall take a brief look at the history of teacher organizations in Chicago.

TEACHERS ORGANIZE TO SEEK COMMON GOALS

The first teachers to organize in Chicago were the elementary school teachers, mostly women, who met to take action against their common grievances: low salaries, no tenure protection, and a pension system that was falling apart. A small group of teachers met on 16 March 1897 at the Central Music Hall and began an organization that became

known as the Chicago Teachers Federation (CTF). By December 1897 the CTF had grown to a membership of 2,567, more than one-half of all the teachers in the public schools. In its' earlier years, the CTF had as its major objective the securing of a stable pension fund. Under the leadership of Catharine Goggin and Margaret Haley, attempts to secure the help of the Board of Education in lobbying for better pensions were considered successful. In 1907, Illinois enacted legislation that contained a compulsory pension contribution clause and established a pension board of trustees. The board of trustees consisted of two school board members, the board secretary as an ex officio member, and six elected teacher representatives.

The desire to increase the salary of the average school teacher led to the next crusade for Goggin and Haley. Haley had overheard a conversation concerning the fact that certain large corporations had failed to pay property taxes. Since the property tax was the basis for funding the schools, any additional funds collected could possibly be used for pay increases. Haley sought and received the support of Board President Graham H. Harris to pursue the collection of these taxes through the courts. The dogged persistence of the CTF and their attorneys finally won the suit and the taxes were eventually paid to the Board of

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2Herrick, loc.cit., p.96.
3Joan K. Smith, loc.cit., p.137.
4Ibid., p.127.
Education. The Board, however, decided to use the money collected to pay bills and perform building maintenance. Finally, in June 1906, the new mayor, Edward Dunne, appointed new board members who voted to use the delinquent tax money for teachers back salaries.  

The election of William Hale Thompson as Mayor in April 1915 led to the disintegration of the relationship between the Board of Education and the Chicago Teachers Federation. Thompson's desire to bring more politics into the Board angered the Federation. On 1 September 1915, the Thompson-appointed Board of Education added more friction to the bad feelings between the two groups. Board member Jacob Loeb introduced a board policy that forbade "Membership by teachers in organizations affiliated with a trade union, or a federation or association of trade unions, as well as teacher organizations which have officers, business agents, or other representatives who are not members of the teaching force." After much criticism regarding the "Loeb Rule," the Board limited the restrictions to membership in the Federation. The Chicago Teachers Federation appealed the rule to the court and it was eventually found to be illegal but the Board found a way to circumvent the rule. At the Board meeting of 27 June 1916, the Board refused to renew the contracts of sixty-eight teachers all of whom were


either past or present members of the Federation. The Board refused to give a reason for the firings. The Federation appealed the firings but the court ruled that the Board had the absolute right to deny employment to anyone for any reason whatsoever or for no reason.

In April 1916 the Chicago Teachers Federation, having previously in 1902 joined the Chicago Federation of Labor, decided that it would further increase its ties to organized labor. The Federation joined with the Men's Teachers Union, the Federation of Women High School Teachers, and four smaller unions and petitioned the American Federation of Labor (AFL) to charter a new national labor organization, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). As the oldest and largest local of the AFT, the Federation became Local One.

The efforts of the CTF to obtain a protected teacher pension fund and higher salaries had been successful. Their next goal was to obtain the protection of tenure. In 1917 a combined effort by the civic groups, board members, and the Federation resulted in sufficient pressure on the legislature to pass legislation known as the Otis Law which reorganized the school system and granted tenure to teachers after a three year probationary period. Membership on the Board of Education was decreased to eleven members and their

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Herrick, loc.cit., p.128.
Ibid., p.129.
Ibid., p.127.
appointment was for five year terms. The Board was given additional taxing and borrowing powers, and the right of eminent domain.¹⁰

In the spring of 1917 the Federation began to lose its power. On 21 May 1917 the Federation withdrew its affiliation with the American Federation of Teachers and the Chicago Federation of Labor. Many reasons for the disaffiliation were speculated including the rumor that Haley had made a deal with Loeb that he would make peace with the Federation if they left the labor affiliations. Other reasons for the move were a depleted treasury due to the cost of suits and salaries of the suspended teachers, and the loss of half of its membership during the 1915-16 period.¹¹

THE CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION IS FORMED

The economic depression of the 1930's brought new problems to the teachers in Chicago. In April 1931 the Board of Education's financial resources were depleted. The April salary came in late May. The July and August salaries were paid in scrip or tax warrants. These warrants could be used to pay taxes at their face value but would only bring a percentage of their face value when teachers tried to sell them or pay a debt with them. From March 1930, to September

¹⁰Ibid., p.134.
¹¹Ibid., p.135.
1934, there were only eight paydays on time, and seven in the four years were paper, not cash.\(^{12}\) In 1933 the Volunteer Emergency Committee was formed and headed by John Fewkes. The purpose of the Committee was to unite several organizations in a protest until pay days were restored properly. On 21 March 1933 the Committee planned a march on city hall to protest the lack of regular paydays. The Committee also researched and found businesses that were delinquent in payment of taxes and suggested that no one do business with them.\(^{13}\)

In May 1936, the Men Teachers Union elected John Fewkes of the Volunteer Emergency Committee to the office of president. His election platform called for the immediate amalgamation of the teachers unions.\(^{14}\) Letters were sent to every teacher organization to meet and discuss the possibility of uniting into one organization. After months of discussion, a meeting was held on 28 October 1937 and the four teacher unions (Men Teachers Union, Federation of Women High School Teachers, Playground Teachers Union, and the Elementary School Teachers Union) surrendered their charters to the AFT and John Fewkes as their president received a charter for their new union. The new organization was called the Chicago Teachers Union and was

\(^{12}\)Ibid., p.190.  
\(^{13}\)Ibid., p.239.  
\(^{14}\)Ibid., p.241.
issued the charter as Local One. The Union grew steadily and by April 1938 totalled 8,200 teachers—more than two-thirds of the entire teaching staff.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS

It is difficult to separate the process of collective bargaining from the development of unions. Prior to the formation of the AFT in 1917, other labor organizations had tried to gain wages and benefits for their members. We know the legal status of collective bargaining was established in 1935 with the National Labor Relations Act which set down conditions and requirements for employer-employee bargaining in the private sector.

According to the United States Constitution teachers have a right to join labor organizations as part of the right of association. However, legal control of labor organizations is reserved for the states through the tenth amendment. The issue of collective bargaining in the public schools was not addressed before 1959, when Wisconsin passed the first bargaining law for the public sector. The first collective bargaining contract for public school teachers was an agreement between the American Federation of Teachers.

"History of the Chicago Teachers Union," Chicago Teachers Union Collection, Chicago Historical Society, Box 51.

Herrick, loc. cit., p.243.


Ibid., p.20.
Local of Cicero, Illinois and the Cicero Board of Education in 1944.¹

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COMES TO CHICAGO

In an article in the Chicago American on 22 January 1965, Marty O' Connor reported that "organized labor will ask the legislature to permit government employees to bargain collectively."²⁰ The Sun Times later reported that Governor Otto Kerner promised organized labor that he would fight for the collective bargaining bill.²¹ Kerner later withdrew his support for the bill. The Chicago Board of Education decided to collectively bargain in 1966 even though there were no state laws regarding collective bargaining for public employees.

On 30 October 1963 President Claire Roddewig reported that the General Committee of the Board of Education had considered the matter of a collective bargaining agreement with representatives of teacher organizations and that the Committee recommended that the Board not enter into such an agreement.²² On 8 January 1964 Board member (and labor union official) Thomas J. Murray introduced a resolution that would have allowed the Chicago Teachers Union to become

¹Ibid., p.21.  
²²Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 30 October 1963, Chicago, Ill., p.605.
a collective bargaining agency for the teachers and educational personnel who had indicated a desire to have the Teachers Union represent them. The vote on the motion was deferred to 26 February 1964 whereupon it passed by a vote of seven to one. At this same meeting Board member Raymond Pasnick asked for a deferment, until the meeting of 11 March 1964, of a resolution that would grant collective bargaining rights to the Chicago Education Association (CEA), a division of the Illinois Education Association. Pasnick noted that if the Board recognized the union as a bargainer for its members, it was only sensible that other groups be allowed to bargain for their members. This resolution passed by a six to two vote with two passing.

At the very next Board meeting President Roddewig notified the Board that he had received a letter from John M. Fewkes, the President of the Chicago Teachers Union, asking the Board to conduct an election among the teacher organizations to determine whom they would want to represent them as an exclusive bargaining agent. The Board deferred discussion of the issue at this meeting and at subsequent meetings until 23 September 1965. At the Board meeting on 23 September 1965, after three hours of discussion, the Board

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passed by a vote of six to two a resolution that called for an election by the members of the various teachers organizations to select a sole collective bargaining agent. Union President John M. Fewkes wrote to Board President Frank Whiston and suggested that the election be held on 28 or 29 October and offered the Teachers Union help in determining who should vote and who should conduct the election. While considering the possibility of an election for the right to serve as sole collective bargaining agent, the Board entered into Memorandums of Understanding with both the Chicago Teachers Union and the Chicago Education Association.

The Chicago Education Association (CEA) filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County on 18 October 1965 seeking a temporary injunction against the collective bargaining election. The CEA filed on the grounds that the election resolution breached the Board's agreement with the CEA and gave preferential treatment to the Chicago Teachers Union. Judge Cornelius Harrington requested that the CEA pursue such administrative remedies as were provided in the Memorandum of Understanding and continued the case until 28

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26 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting of 23 September 1965, Chicago, Ill., p. 725-746.
27 Letter from President John M. Fewkes of the Chicago Teachers Union to Board President Frank Whiston, Chicago Teachers Union Collection, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, Ill., Box 51, File 5.
October 1965. The Board met in General Committee on 4 November 1965 to hear the complaint of the CEA regarding the election. After listening to the presentation by the CEA, the Board denied the complaint and reaffirmed its resolution regarding the election. The Board did amend the resolution to make it clear that they did not intend to discriminate in any way between the organizations. In a letter from John Fewkes to President Frank Whiston, Fewkes told Whiston that the Union would welcome the CEA's participation in the election for collective bargaining. On 23 February 1966 Judge Harrington ruled that the Chicago Board of Education had the right to authorize a referendum for a sole collective bargaining agent, but that no new bargaining agreement could be entered into until after 12 November 1966 when the current agreements expired. He further ordered that any items in a new agreement applied to both union and non-union members, and that the agreement include a no strike and no picket clause.

The committee established to oversee the collective

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29 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 4 November 1965, Chicago, Il., p.939.
30 Letter from John Fewkes, President of the Chicago Teachers Union, to Board President Frank Whiston, 20 October 1965, Chicago Teachers Union Collection, Chicago Historical Society, Box 51, File 5.
bargaining election selected 27 May 1966 as election day. The guidelines for the election were accepted by the Board on 18 May 1966. They included: eligibility for voting (assistant principals, elementary and high school teachers, and truant officers), notice of voting and eligibility in schools and offices, method of casting ballots (mailed), ballot form, supervision of the election by the Statistical Tabulating Corporation, and that the winner would need a simple majority of the votes cast. The election was held on 27 May 1966 and Statistical Tabulating Corporation reported the results to the Board shown in figure 3.1.

RESULTS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ELECTION

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<td>1,267</td>
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<tr>
<td>Postmarked late, not counted</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago Education Association</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</table>

Figure 3.1

Since the Chicago Teachers Union won more than fifty percent of the votes cast, they were declared the winner of the election. At the Board meeting of 13 July 1966 Thomas Murray moved that the Board of Education officially

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³²Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 April 1966, Chicago, Ill., p.3078.
³⁴Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 22 June 1966, Chicago, Ill., p.3534.
recognize the Chicago Teachers Union as the sole bargaining agent for assistant principals, teachers, and truant officers. The motion carried by a seven to two vote with one abstention.  

THE FIRST CONTRACT - BOTH SIDES LEARN ABOUT NEGOTIATING

The stage was now set for the first collective bargaining sessions between the Board of Education and the Chicago Teachers Union. Chicago, following New York, became the second large city to collectively negotiate. At the first negotiation session on 4 October 1966, the Board was represented by Superintendent James F. Redmond and his staff, Board members Judge Edward S. Scheffler, Mrs. Lydon Wild, and Mr. Thomas Murray; while the Union was represented by President John E. Desmond, Ms. Vivian Gallagher, Robert Healey, and other union staff members. At this first session the Union refused to negotiate because there were members of the press in attendance. Board member and acting chairman of the Employee Relations Committee, Thomas Murray, acknowledged at a later Board meeting that the Union's position was indeed correct and that a negotiations meeting did not constitute a public meeting because no legal actions would be taking place. Mr. Murray referred to his

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Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 13 July 1966, Chicago, Ill., p.593-594.

experience as a labor leader who had been through negotiations before. At the fourth meeting the Union presented to the committee the preliminary wording of their preferred labor contract. The document was presented in several parts containing proposals concerning wages, working conditions, fringe benefits, and a grievance procedure. The Board committee suggested that discussion of all union demands be carried out in a systematic and orderly manner, subject by subject. In a letter to Union members on 14 October 1966 President Desmond notes that there had been no progress in negotiations but that the Union was continuing to negotiate for them in good faith.

On 30 November 1966, the Board of Education presented a list of its demands to the Union leadership. The Board demanded that the negotiated agreement include a clause that called for no strikes or picketing. The Board also demanded that any item negotiated for one employee be negotiated for all employees. The Board also insisted that they have the authority to assign any teacher to any position as they see fit as long as it is based on aptitude, talents, and expertise. Additionally, the Board noted that non-union members must be granted the same grievance procedure as

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38 Ibid., 593.
union members. The Board noted that if they feel that the Chicago Teachers Union does not represent the majority of the members of the teaching force they, the Board, can call for a collective bargaining election.¹¹ Negotiations continued throughout December without much progress. Teachers were sent home for a Christmas vacation with little hope for a settlement.

On 5 January 1967, Union President John E. Desmond called for a strike to begin on Monday, 9 January 1967. This announcement and its approval by union delegates sent the Board into closed door sessions to discuss its options. Negotiations even took place over the phone with Board President Whiston and Union President Desmond discussing the possibility of diverting money from educational programs to meet union demands for salary and benefit increases. The Board rejected Desmond's proposal.¹² The Board also considered seeking a court injunction to halt the strike but the majority decided that they would wait until the strike actually took place before seeking help through the courts.¹³

The Citizens School Committee asked the Board of Education and the Teachers Union to join forces with them to ask the state legislature for emergency financial

⁴¹Ibid.
⁴³Ibid.
assistance. Mayor Daley also noted "that there can be help and assistance from the legislature, and that eventually is the place I suppose they will go." Robert J. Ahrens of the Citizens Schools Committee suggested that the Union postpone the strike and support a proposed referendum of 28 February 1967 for a fifteen cent property tax increase. Superintendent Redmond had earlier noted that the schools would remain open under the supervision of non-striking teachers, principals, and other supervisory personnel. Redmond also urged parents to volunteer to help care for the children. The Illinois Congress of Parents and Teachers refused to take an official role in keeping the schools open in the event of a teachers strike. Mrs. Arnold Streigh, Chicago Region president of the PTA, noted "it is up to the individual PTA's, the individual parents, whether they will help to keep the schools open." The Chicago Education Association denounced the strike and announced that their 3,000 members would report to work on Monday.

The Chicago Tribune in an editorial on 7 January 1967 chastised all parties in the predicted strike. Although the editorial noted sympathy for teachers as individuals and agreed that there was a need for better pay and working conditions, it criticized the union and the strike as unnecessary.

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*44* Ibid., p.2.
*45* Ibid.
*46* "PTA Avoids Stand on Strike," Chicago Tribune, 7 January 1967, p.4.
conditions, it denied that the teachers union had as much a
tight to strike as did teamsters, janitors, or
steelworkers. It criticized the Board of Education for
not following the advice of their attorney, James W. Coffey,
who told the Board that it would be illegal to grant
exclusive bargaining rights to one teachers' group. The
editorial noted that the legislature had refused to approve
bargaining rights to unions representing public employees.
The editorial repeated the words of the Illinois Supreme
Court that "there is no inherent right in municipal
employees to strike against their governmental employers.. and that a strike of municipal employees for any purpose is illegal."

As the eleventh hour approached, both sides said that
they were still open to further negotiations but they each
huddled in their own meeting places. Finally on Saturday,
7 January 1967, Mayor Richard J. Daley called for a meeting
of school and union officials in his city hall office for
Sunday at 1:00 p.m. Mayor Daley invited Superintendent
Redmond, President of the Board Frank Whiston, Board
attorney James W. Coffey, and Harold Ash of the AFT, CTU
financial secretary Vivian Gallagher, CTU attorney Martin
Burns, and CTU President John Desmond. At 5:30 p.m.,

"Striking the Public Schools," Chicago Tribune, 7 January
Ibid.
Daley summoned reporters to announce that the Board and the Union had "reached a meeting of the minds." Daley refused to be specific but noted that the Board and the Union would meet separately to discuss the proposed settlement.\footnote{Ibid., p.2.} Ten and one-half hours after Daley had called the meeting, the strike was over. CTU President Desmond made the first statement announcing an agreement and said there would be no strike on Monday. In his announcement, President Frank Whiston noted that the agreement had been approved by a five to four vote with new Board member John D. Carey driving in from out of town to cast his vote for the package. Whiston stated, "We have agreed to increase our budgetary estimates of income from state and federal aid in the amount of twenty million dollars in 1967."\footnote{Ibid., p.1.}

This first agreement between the Chicago Board of Education and the Chicago Teachers Union contained the following provisions:

1. A raise of $500.00 for all teachers.
3. Two personal business days for each teacher.
4. A re-opener to the contract if excess funds exist after the fiscal year, with the Union having input on how these excess monies are spent.
5. A transfer and assignment policy for teachers was established.
6. A grievance procedure was established.\footnote{"List of Union Gains," Union Teacher (Special Issue), March 1967, p.1-2.}

At 10:40 p.m., the Board voted to accept the agreement by a
five-four vote. Voting for the agreement were: John D. Carey, Mrs. Wendell Green, Thomas J. Murray, Mrs. Lydon Wild, and Frank Whiston. Voting against the pact were: Bernard S. Friedman, Warren H. Bacon, Cyrus Adams, and Mrs. Louis Malis. Once the vote was passed, the executive board of the Union adopted a resolution that "all teachers report to their schools tomorrow and conduct class in a normal manner." 54

The contract was formally accepted by the Board of Education on 10 May 1967 by a nine to one vote. 55 The re-opener clause of the contract was put into effect in August 1967. The only new monies that surfaced were generated from the fifteen cent local levy approved on 28 February 1967. The Employee Relations Committee and the Union agreed to use the money to hire 375 new teachers, 1200 teacher aides, pay teachers for extra-curricular activities, and pay for a five day Christmas vacation for all full time teachers and personnel. 56

In November 1967, school clerks, school library clerks, vision testers and hearing testers asked the Board for the right to select a collective bargaining agent. Their request was granted. 57 The election for bargaining agent

54 "Board-Union Pact", p.2.
55 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 10 May 1967, Chicago, Ill., p.2985.
57 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 8 November 1967, Chicago, Ill., p.831.
for school clerks was held on 30 January 1968. The Board was notified of the results which showed the Chicago Teachers Union winning by a two-one margin over the Educational Secretaries of Chicago, Inc. The Board accepted a motion by a nine-one vote that Chicago Teachers Union would become the bargaining agent for school clerks. By the time the 1968 contract was signed, the Chicago Teachers Union was the representative for teachers, full-time truant officers, assistant principals, school library clerks, hearing testers, vision testers, and school clerks.

ROUND TWO - NEGOTIATIONS 1968

The first negotiations for the 1968 contract took place on 13 November 1967. At this meeting the Board presented a list of sixty demands, including modifying or deleting articles already in the contract. When serious negotiations began in late December, the Union demanded a $150.00 per month increase in salary, a ten-step salary schedule, a paid spring vacation, and three personal business days. The Board responded with a two percent increase in salary, a weakening of the grievance procedures, and elimination of transfer rights. After John Desmond

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58 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 14 February 1968, Chicago, Il., p.1481.
59 "Agreement Between the Board of Education of the City of Chicago and the Chicago Teachers Union," Article 1.1, 1968.
60 "Negotiations Begin", Chicago Union Teacher, November 1967, p.1
referred to the Board’s counter proposal as an insult, he
downgraded the salary increase request to $125.00 per month
but the Board refused to change.\footnote{The Board and the Union
continued to make proposals and counter proposals into
January 1968. Finally on 4 January 1968 the Union’s House
of Representatives set a strike date of 9 January 1968. The
representatives directed the president to announce the
strike date to the membership at a meeting at the Opera
House on 6 January 1968.}{\`2}

The scenario is similar to the previous year. The
Board and the Union appeared on a course of no compromise
until Mayor Richard J. Daley again entered the picture.
With negotiations going on at Board headquarters only two
blocks from City Hall, the Mayor was notified by the Board
that no progress was being made. Both parties had agreed to
use the Mayor as a court of last resort, so the Mayor called
both sides to meet with him. The Mayor was informed by both
groups of the status of the negotiations and then sent the
union officials to another room.\footnote{Daley promised the Board
that he would muster his political forces to seek a fifteen
cent increase per $100.00 of assessed valuation and that the
}{\`3}
Board could count these new monies. He also promised to seek more local school aid from the state legislature that would meet in March. He then went to the Union and told them he would work to get the money that they deserved and the assistance to cope with the needs of inner-city students. He stated to both groups that his primary concern was for the school children of Chicago. It was another case of Mayor Daley making promises that both groups felt he could fulfill. After six hours of negotiations with Daley as mediator, the Mayor, Board President Whiston and Union President Desmond announced that with the Mayor's help a strike had been averted.

The settlement of these negotiations included:

1. A salary increase of $40.00 per month immediately for teachers, and an additional increase of $60.00 in September.
2. Civil Service personnel received an immediate raise of five per cent.
3. An additional week of paid vacation.
4. One additional personal business day.
5. Severance pay equal to one-third of accumulated sick leave.
6. Hiring of 600 teacher aides for elementary schools.
7. Hiring of additional teachers in September 1968 in order to provide elementary teachers with two preparation periods per week.
8. The Union agreed to discuss changes in transfer policy with the Board so that there would be an equalized assignment of certified teachers throughout the city.

The Mayor had a perfect record. His two attempts to

Ibid., p.6.
Ibid.
"Here's How Teachers Fare in New Contract", Chicago Daily News, 8 January 1968, p.5.
mediate disputes between the Board and the Union resulted in settlements without losing one school day due to teacher strikes. Daley had shown his skills as a mediator, his power to influence the Board of Education, and his ability to influence the state legislature.

NEGOTIATIONS 1969 - A DIFFERENT SCENARIO

PHASE ONE:

Negotiations for the 1969 contract did not reflect the previous two negotiations. There was no last minute settlement orchestrated by city hall. Francis M. Landwerermeyer, S.J., discussed the four phases of the 1969 contract negotiations.\(^7\) He notes that the first steps in preparation for negotiations began on 10 August 1968 with the Union Steering Committee meeting and ended with the Union House of Representatives accepting the final package on 2 September 1969.\(^6\) The Union presented it's "package" of demands to the Board negotiators on 8 October 1968 but did include it's salary proposals, fringe benefits, or certification demands. These later proposals were finally presented on 4 November 1968. At the beginning of the negotiations, Union president John Desmond commented that in order to get a good contract for his membership it would be necessary for the legislature to increase state aid to the

\(^6^7\) Landwerermeyer, \textit{loc.cit.}, p. 361.
\(^6^8\) Ibid., p.454.
Chicago schools. He also noted that "future contract settlements will no longer be reached in the mayor's office." These comments and others by both sides of the bargaining table led reporters and the public to believe that the possibility of a strike was great.

Desmond's leadership within the Union was opposed by the Teachers Action Committee (TAC). TAC president John Kotsakis voiced the organization's priority demands for a maximum class size of twenty-five, a duty free preparation period, full implementation of the 1968 agreements about in-service programs, and revision of the teacher certification policy. TAC would support Desmond if he negotiated these items as priorities but vowed a organized opposition if he did not. In a speech to the Citizens Schools Committee CTU president Desmond mentioned all of TAC's demands except revision of the certification policy. He also mentioned an effort to move the starting salary of teachers to $8500.00.

In the early stages of negotiations both the Board and the Union received favorable comments from the newspapers. All four daily papers noted the needs of the teachers and the financial problems of the Board. Each paper urged the

Union to concentrate on educational improvements rather than salary increases. Each of the four papers editorialized that the solution to the problems of the Board and the Union could only be found with help from the state legislature.

The first negotiation session between the Board and the Union took place on 22 November 1968. The Board's negotiating team was headed by Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, with Thomas Murray and John Carey, both union leaders, serving as team members. The Board team were joined by Superintendent Redmond, Deputy Superintendent Manford Byrd, Jr., Board Attorney James Coffey, and several members of Redmond's staff. John Desmond headed the Union team with Vice-president Vivian Gallagher, Attorney Joseph Jacobs, Recording Secretary Jacqueline Wright (later Vaughn), Financial Secretary Robert Healey, and Treasurer Glendis Hambrick.72 Desmond opened this first session with a statement that the first topic on the table would be the full implementation of the 1968 contract. Mrs. Wild responded by asking the Union to consider the financial problems of the school system and to review and prioritize their demands. Desmond's response to Mrs. Wild's request was that he could prioritize but that he owed it to his membership that all items be discussed.73 The last item of business for discussion in the first session was Mrs. Wild's

72Landwerermeyer, loc.cit., p. 372.
73Ibid., p. 373.
request that Redmond's place at the negotiation table could be taken by his deputy, Manford Byrd, and that Board members would not have to attend every negotiating session. Desmond agreed to permit Byrd to sit at the table but he insisted that the Union would not negotiate without at least one Board member present.74

One of the agreements reached at this first session was that President Desmond and Deputy Superintendent Byrd would meet in order to clarify the Union's demands. The Board needed this clarification so that they could develop an estimate of the cost of the Union's package and to prepare its response to the proposal.75 As a result of these meetings, the Board was to prepare written responses to the Union demands and establish a set of demands of their own.

During this period of negotiations, it was necessary for the Superintendent to present his budget statement to the Board of Education. In his presentation, Redmond prepared three alternative plans he had for submitting the budget. One was to prepare a balanced budget that included reduced programs to absorb a $33 million shortfall. The second was to anticipate monies that would come from state and federal governments and prepare a budget on that basis. The third approach, and the one adopted, was to cut the present educational programs beginning in September 1969.

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., p. 373.
This last plan would make the public aware of the need for additional assistance from the legislature and he could solicit their assistance in getting the help. In his statement to the Board, Redmond was trying to galvanize support for additional school funding from the legislature. Redmond noted "we are presenting this Tentative Budget in a manner which we trust will be bring home to the citizens of this city the stark reality of the fiscal problems facing the Chicago Board of Education in 1969." Redmond continued in his address to announce class size increases to 45, less paid vacation and personal business days, and a cut in extra-curricular compensation.

On 27 November 1968, the Board submitted proposals and comments to the Union negotiators. This was a first for the Board's negotiators who had never before submitted proposals for inclusion in the contract. In a sense this innovation showed that the Board was beginning to understand that contract negotiations involved a give-and-take process, with compromises and concessions on both sides relative to the needs of both parties. The new Board proposals contained thirty-three new items and forty proposed changes in the contract. Most of the proposals tried to lessen the influence of the CTU in school affairs. This new

\*\*Ibid., p. 376.
\*\*Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, November 27, 1968, Chicago, Ill., p.11.
\*\*Ibid., p.23.
\*\*Landwerermeyer, _loc.cit_. , p.378.
understanding of the negotiation process was in part due to hiring of a consultant, Dr. Wesley Wildman. Wildman was the Director of Labor-Management Studies at the Industrial Relations Center of the University of Chicago.  

At the next negotiation session on 29 November 1968, Union President Desmond and his attorney, Joseph Jacobs, both expressed surprise over the number and types of changes that the Board was seeking. These leaders complained that the Board was trying to re-write the whole contract and no issues were agreed upon. Issues discussed included representation by the Union of certain teacher certified positions that the Board considered administration, scheduling of professional problems committee meetings, and a requirement that the Union president inform the school principal when he intended to visit a school.  

During the morning session of 29 November, Desmond became frustrated by Dr. Byrd's handling of negotiations and asked the Deputy Superintendent, "Can you make decisions at this table today or are we just talking?" This question of whether Dr. Byrd had authority to negotiate would complicate the negotiation sessions. The afternoon session continued to be very adversarial and the CTU protested the Board's attempt to re-write the grievance procedure that had already existed for two years. Talks lasted nine hours on 29

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Ibid.
Ibid., p.380.
Ibid.
November and the only item agreed upon was one that limited the materials that could be placed in teacher's mailboxes in the schools to official Union materials. Negotiations continued but no serious discussions took place until mid-December.

The Union announced its demands to the public on 12 December. Peter Negronida of the Tribune noted that the Union demands included "substantial progress toward a goal of a salary schedule beginning at $8500.00, reduced class size, reduced teaching loads for high school teachers, more teacher aides, FTB certification, and no reduction in the teaching force."

The major difference between the Board and the Union was not that they disagreed on how much revenue was available from current sources, but the Union wanted the Board to consider budgeting with revenue gains that were anticipated. The idea of considering anticipated revenues from an increase in the school formula was encouraged by state legislators. The Union was notified by the Chairman of House Committee on Education that the formula would be raised by $100.00. Both the Board and the Union encouraged parents to contact their legislators regarding the suggested increase. A Chicago American editorial suggested that

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the Board put the responsibility for the budget right where it belonged, in the hands of the state legislature. Board member Marge Wild reminded the public that "Illinois ranks forty-sixth in the nation in the amount of state aid to schools while being ranked as the third wealthiest state."

As the bargaining sessions continued into December, very little of substance was considered. Most items proposed by the Board were rejected by the Union because the Board failed to prove that the proposal responded to a real problem. In responding to the Union's proposals the Board rejected most because their implementation would cost money. The Board also objected to some proposals on principle and to others as "non-negotiable." These "non-negotiable" items included the Union's attempt to write job descriptions (which the Board had to keep flexible), tried to change certification status (the responsibility of the Board of Examiners), and suggested modifications of the civil service regulations (the prerogative of the Civil Service Commission).

There were only seven negotiation sessions held on five different days ending on 16 December. Each side accused the other of refusing to bargain. One of the major roadblocks for the Union was the fact that on two of the negotiation sessions
days, December 10 and 16, no Board member was present as had been agreed upon previously. The Union interpreted the absence of Board members as a sign that true collective bargaining was not taking place. A second complaint regarding the negotiating team involved the Union's feeling that Manford Byrd Jr. did not have the statutory authority to negotiate. Union leader Desmond continually referred to fact that he felt that in the end the Union would have to negotiate with Redmond.

By mid-December the Union leaders notified their membership that "the organization faced a crisis in its collective bargaining negotiations with the Board of Education." Desmond appealed for unity among the various factions in the union. Desmond was able to abort an attempted split by the members of TAC when he reminded them that the Union had listed all of their concerns as part of the demands in the December issue of the Chicago Union Teacher.

This first phase of the 1969 contract negotiations ended on 19 December with both sides realizing that little progress had taken place. As of this date, only three items had been agreed upon: 1) use of teacher's school mailboxes for official material only, 2) the need for swimming coaches to obtain Red Cross life-saving certification, and 3) phones

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*C"Chicago Teachers Union, "Press Release, , 23 December 1968, Box 55, Chicago Historical Society Archives.*
would be made available to elementary school adjustment teachers. On 19 December, the Board requested a priority list of the Union's demands. Union President Desmond immediately responded with a statement. Desmond stated: "I will be very happy to respond to you. I intend to do that on December 26, but I intend to do it with the Superintendent of Schools, Mr. Murray, Mr. Carey, and the Chairman of their committee."

**PHASE TWO:**

The second phase of the 1969 negotiations began with the return of Redmond to the bargaining table on 27 December 1968. Desmond still faced opposition from within the Union with TAC's leader, John Kotsakis, saying that the bargaining did not do enough to improve the schools, and McWhirter of the FTB's demanding more changes in teacher certification. With the beginning of this second phase of negotiations, Desmond presented a list of "vital issues" and explained each of them to the bargaining teams. The list of issues included full implementation of the 1968 contract, an increase of 794 teacher aides, in-service training for inner-city teachers, two weekly preparation periods, a program for maladjusted children, and implementation of class-load recommendations. Other priority items included: revision of certification procedures, upgrading of school

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91 Landwerermeyer, loc.cit., p. 390.
clerks, provision for substitute playground teachers, implementation of severance pay, and compensation for extra-curricular activities."

The stage was now set for the Board's response to the Union's list of "vital issues." On 30 December, the Board announced that it estimated the cost of the Union's request to be $194 million. The Board had previously requested improvements that totaled only $15.5 million, considerably less than the Union's request. The Board also opposed any salary increase for the 1969 contract. The Board's main complaint was that the Union did "not really focus on the problem at hand " and was clearly "unrealistic considering the financial circumstances of the Board." The Union responded that the estimated cost of the new programs would be $127 million, but this did not include the cost of implementing the 1968 contract.

In the afternoon, the Union submitted a written response to the Board's counterproposal. The response was basically the same position the Union had given earlier. The two parties continued to maintain their position throughout the day. The discussions changed later when Union attorney Jacobs raised the possibility of a

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supplemental budget. At first Wild and Redmond refused to discuss the possibility, but later Board member Murray asked "if the Union would settle for no wage increase for now ... but in the supplementary budget defer the possibility of a wage increase." Desmond chose to ignore the question and announced that the Union would revise its counterproposal.

Negotiations continued on 31 December with the Union presenting a second counterproposal. The Union estimated the cost of the new package at $32 million by the Union, but it again did not consider the cost of fully implementing the 1968 contract. During this session, Board member Murray and Union attorney Jacobs began to discuss the difference between labor negotiations in business and in public agencies. Murray, a union leader as well as Board member, saw the difference in the fact that in the private sector both sides know the ability of businesses to secure the money needed to finalize contract negotiations; but in the public sector, getting the additional monies was a real problem.

The afternoon session was marked by a heated discussion between President Desmond, Superintendent Redmond and Chairman Wild. Mrs. Wild told Desmond that the Board negotiators would have to go to the full Board to discuss the current status of the negotiations. Redmond claimed that going to the Board was merely for guidance and was

Ibid., p.399.
necessary since the Board is "the source of our authority." He continued: "I think that we are in a position to do no more until we have touched base with our Board." This infuriated the Union negotiating team. Union attorney Jacobs replied, "The Board of Education is not prepared to bargain collectively because it will not give its committee the power to bargain with our Union." This was affirmed by a remark made by Board member Thomas Murray, "We haven’t got the full power to negotiate, Joe, you know that." Redmond concluded this session with both sides agreeing not to comment to the press on other than non-informative observations. He remarked to the parties that "we are finally within an area where we can go to our Board and say we are within throwing distance of each other."

On 2 January 1969, negotiations continued after the Board met to discuss the status of negotiations. Mrs. Wild presented the Board’s latest counterproposals. The Board presented four points for discussion: 1) implementation of the school improvement programs of the 1968 contract, 2) restoration of cuts in the educational program, 3) deferral of salary and new educational programs until July, and 4)
continuance of negotiations on non-monetary items.\textsuperscript{101}

Desmond's immediate reaction to this proposal was one of disappointment and he viewed it as a complete rejection of the Union's requests. Redmond noted that the new proposals offered two changes in the Board's position: the Board was now willing to discuss salary increases after the state legislature had acted on increased school aid; and the Board was now willing to negotiate all non-monetary items.\textsuperscript{102}

Desmond was irritated at the Board's offering because the cost of the package was already considered in the Board's November budget, and the new budget included an increase of $6.5 million for increased administrative costs. Desmond felt that the increased funds should be allocated to Union priority items.

Desmond presented the Union's counterproposal on the evening of 2 January 1969. His new offer included: 1) the complete implementation of the 1968 contract, 2) acceptance of the Union's certification demands, 3) an immediate $40 per month increase in salary to cover the cost of living, and 4) all items specified "effective September 1, 1969" to be discussed later in the summer.\textsuperscript{103}

The Board's new counter offer on 3 January was rejected because it provided additional monies for Board not Union programs. The negotiation session on 3 January lasted only

\textsuperscript{101}\textit{Chicago Board of Education, "Counter-Proposal,"} 2 January 1969

\textsuperscript{102}\textit{Landwerermeyer, \textsc{loc.cit.}}, p. 404.

\textsuperscript{103}\textit{Ibid.}
twenty minutes. Later in the afternoon Desmond went before the CTU's House of Representatives and asking for a rejection of the Board's proposal and recommended a strike vote. Earlier in the day Desmond had persuaded the members of TAC to support his request for a strike vote. TAC had attempted to set a date in April for the start of the strike but this was defeated when it was argued that such a move would destroy the Union's flexibility during negotiations.104

The next negotiating session began on 4 January at 3:35 p.m. and adjourned at 11:45 p.m. This session followed a three and a half hour executive session of the Board of Education in which the negotiating team's recommendations were discussed. The majority of the negotiating session was spent in off-the-record discussions and caucuses.105 The thirteen points mandated by the Union's House of Representatives were discussed but only four had been agreed upon before adjournment. However, the Board did offer the CTU discretionary power over $17.4 million previously included as a committed sum. Although the Union felt some progress had been made, they still were disappointed. There were three reasons that the Union was still irritated by the negotiations at this time. The Board's offer of discretionary power over part of the budget was not a Union

104 Ibid., p. 408.
105 Ibid., p. 409.
demand. Second, the Board was still refusing to consider a cost of living increase. Third, the Board was still insisting on a full year contract.\textsuperscript{106}

Negotiations resumed the next day, Sunday, 5 January 1969. Discussions lasted nearly thirteen hours, nine of which were off-the-record. Desmond was upset that after eight hours of off-the-record discussions, the Board was still proposing a twelve-month contract without any immediate pay raise for teachers. Additionally, the Board had included ten proposals that the Union had never accepted. Desmond reminded the Board that the Union Representatives had recommended a strike at their last meeting. He reminded the Board that they had agreed to "fashion a sufficiently satisfactory package with respect to the vital issues"\textsuperscript{107} that would be acceptable to the Union membership. Board member Murray countered with his own criticism of the Union's refusal to negotiate on the ten proposals submitted previously by the Board. Heated discussions continued both on and off-the-record. Both Desmond and attorney Jacobs, arguing for a six-month agreement, promised there would be no strike for the six-month period.

As the session continued, there were several points at which it appeared an agreement would be reached, but due to

\textsuperscript{106}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107}Ibid., p. 410.
the Board's insistence on their ten non-monetary proposals the negotiations stopped. Finally, the Board agreed to put their proposals aside and discuss the two monetary demands that had not been agreed upon. This discussion centered around the Union's demand for a $40 cost of living increase, effective 1 January. Both sides spoke to the issue and gave sound reasons for their stance. Finally, Redmond asked the Union leaders if they would accept a $40 increase effective 1 September. The Union's answer was no. This session continued with Jacob's plea to the Board team to return to the Board to request a salary increase because it was necessary for the Union leadership to be able to say that they had again asked for an increase. Jacob told the Board team that it was in their best interest as well to keep the present Union leadership in control. The final argument of the session revolved around Redmond's announced intention to communicate with the teachers prior to the Union meeting of 6 January. The Union so strongly opposed this suggestion that Redmond decided not to do so.

The Union had felt that their request for a $40 cost of living request was reasonable, especially since a quote from Board member Murray in the Sun-Times the day before stated that he felt the Board could compromise, perhaps offering a $40 a month cost-of-living increase. In the early

\textsuperscript{105}Ibid., p. 412.
\textsuperscript{106}Joel Havemann, "Teacher Strike Vote Today," Chicago Sun-Times, 6 January 1969, sec. 1, p. 3.
morning of 6 January, the Board’s negotiating team used a telephone poll to solicit support to include the salary increase. The poll resulted in a 5-5 tie since one member could not be reached. One reporter, Hope Justus, speculated that if he had been reached, the vote would have probably been 6-5 in favor of the pay increase. Later on the same day when the full Board met, the members returned to their hard-line stand and rejected the proposal. The Board, however, offered to increase educational program funds by $1.7 million.

Phone negotiations on 6 January were carried on between Board headquarters and the Union. Desmond agreed to take the Board’s amended offer to the membership. The amended offer included: freezing class size as of September 1, 1968; a planning project for federal funding of three inner-city schools, and hiring of additional substitute teachers. In addition, the Board would consider certification procedure changes, further salary advancement for FTBs, and implementation of the 1968 contract clauses regarding teacher aides, teacher workshops, and a pilot program for socially maladjusted students.

Arguing for accepting the proposal "as the best we could get from the Board of Education," Desmond recommended

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acceptance of the contract for the good of the children."

Opposition to the Board's proposal was strong and vocal. Kotsakis and TAC, reminding the membership that the House of Representatives had recommended a strike unless substantial progress had been made, he claimed that there had been little progress. Roy Stell and seventy-five members of Operation Breadbasket walked out of the meeting to protest the absence of automatic certification of FTBs. As a result of these factions within the Union, the membership rejected the Board's offer and authorized the House of Representatives to set a strike vote. The vote count was 1368 to reject the Board's offer to 1148 to accept it.¹¹²

Several reporters gave their opinion as to why the proposal was rejected. All of the opinions seem to have some merit. Havemann suggested that poor attendance at the meeting (less than 15 percent of the membership) and the presence of a disproportionate number of Union militants caused the defeat.¹¹³ Dorfmann noted that those members who voted against the contract did not all vote to reject the proposal for the same reason.¹¹⁴ Hope Justus claimed that Desmond's belief that the contract as presented was the best the Union could do, was supported by several factors. She

¹¹²Landwerermeyer, loc.cit., p.416.
¹¹⁴Dorfmann, loc.cit.
noted that: 1) two new Board members were "reformers" rather than pro-union; 2) the Board had hired a professional negotiator in Wildman; 3) some Board members felt that a pay raise would not sit well with the legislature when the Board asked for more funding; and 4) the solidarity that Desmond had pleaded for did not materialize.\(^{115}\) A fourth reason could have been Desmond's inability to conduct an effective meeting.

Upon the Union's rejection of the proposed contract, Superintendent Redmond addressed a letter to the teachers. The letter noted that prior to its rejection by the membership, the contract proposal had been accepted by the negotiation committees and met all of the Union's priorities except a salary increase. The Board members were joined by members of the media who suggested that a Union-wide plebiscite on the contract would result in the contract's acceptance.

On 8 January, the Board, in executive session tried to rework their offer, but failed when they were informed by Desmond that any new offer would have to include some sort of pay raise. The Board voted 9-2 against such action and voted against resuming negotiations. Later in the day, Desmond made it clear that he wanted another chance to discuss the contract with the Board's negotiating team.

\(^{115}\)Landwerermeyer, loc.cit., p.417.
Negotiations would take place on the next day.¹¹⁶

Negotiations resumed on 9 January, but no progress was made because the Union continued to insist on a raise. Mrs. Wild rejected the idea immediately and called the move "an impasse to a settlement". Superintendent Redmond intervened and promised to report the situation to the full board. This move by the Superintendent enabled Desmond an opportunity to disallow the strike matter to come up at the House of Representatives meeting that afternoon and give Union negotiators more time to reach an agreement.¹¹⁷

The Union returned to negotiations on 11 January with a counterproposal that included a package of educational improvement items and nine additional items not included in the previously accepted package. The new offer did not contain a salary request. The Board countered by accepting only three of the Union's new items and asked the CTU leadership to arrange a referendum to approve the entire package and authorize a six-month continuance of the present contract.¹¹⁸

The Union leadership was angered and noted that if their new package was not accepted the leadership would have to call for a strike vote. Redmond insisted that the Board could not afford the additional $2 million in its budget and that he felt the addition of the three items to the package was

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 419.
¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 422.
¹¹⁸Ibid.
enough to call for a referendum. Before adjourning this session, Desmond offered another counterproposal which fell upon deaf ears. Desmond then asked for and was grudgingly granted a caucus. Upon their return, the Union made a formal statement to the Board negotiators requesting that they present the Union's counterproposal to the entire Board. Redmond agreed to submit the proposal to the Board.\textsuperscript{118}

The full Board met on the afternoon of 11 January. At this meeting, the Board approved its 1969 budget of $472 million by a vote of 9-1. After passing the budget, they developed a new counterproposal to submit to the Union.\textsuperscript{120} The new offer included: 1) a six month extension of the fully implemented 1968 contract; 2) in September 1969 an additional fifty adjustment teachers would be hired; 3) in-service training for physical education teachers; 4) compensatory time for publications sponsors; 5) special counseling services for students suspended from school; and 6) a contract re-opening clause for salaries and educational improvements when the supplemental budget was submitted in August 1969.\textsuperscript{121}

On 12 January, the Union's Executive Board met and decided to recommend acceptance of the interim agreement.

Desmond noted that acceptance of the agreement would protect

\textsuperscript{118}Ibid., p. 423.
\textsuperscript{120}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{121}Ibid., p. 424.
the Union by a written contract. Desmond also noted that the CTU would have the right to strike after the agreement ended on 13 June if the Board did not negotiate in good faith or failed to implement fully the items agreed upon. Kotsakis and members of TAC worked for the defeat of the referendum on 20 January. The vote to accept the contract was 9622 to 5206. The Union quickly made it known that they would seek greater salary increases effective, September 1969. The Chicago Union Teacher made the point bluntly when an editorial noted, "CTU members have given a mandate to President John Desmond and the negotiating team to continue negotiations for educational improvements and a substantial salary increase for September."  

PHASE THREE:  

In the time between the signing of the interim contract and the resumption of serious negotiations in mid-May, there were many new participants who would affect the Board-Union negotiations. After the signing, we see a spirit of cooperation between the Union and the Board in their attempt to influence the state legislature. Shortly after the interim agreement was affirmed, on 24 January 1969, Superintendent Redmond appeared before the Illinois School Problems Commission (SPC) and asked the legislators to double the state aid formula and that the formula basis be

\[ ^{125} \text{Ibid.}, \text{p.} 426. \]
\[ ^{126} \text{Editorial, Chicago Union Teacher, January 1969.} \]
changed from average daily attendance (ADA) to average daily
enrollment (ADE). Redmond also noted that he felt that
teachers did deserve a salary increase. Desmond also
appeared before the SPC and echoed Redmond's requests.
These requests were generally well received.124

It was not until 24 March that the SPC made its
recommendation to the legislature when it requested an
increase in the foundation level to $550 and that average
daily enrollment should be used as the basis for computing
the aid. Both Desmond and Redmond criticized the increases
as a "token" and described the action as "significant but
not enough."125 On 2 April, Governor Ogilvie recommended
raising the foundation level to $500, still short of the SPC
recommendations.126 On this same evening, WBBM-TV
editorialized that it disagreed with Governor Ogilvie's
recommendation. The station noted that one of the reasons
Ogilvie had been elected was his statement that education
would be his administration's first priority. Yet, his
funding proposal to the legislature was at least $50 short
of the School Problems Commission's recommendation.127

The funding crisis facing the Chicago public schools
caused the Union leadership to threaten a strike if the
legislature did not appropriate enough money to enable the

124 Landwerermeyer, loc.cit., p. 428.
126 Herrick, loc.cit., p. 374.
127 Landwerermeyer, loc.cit., p. 430.
Board to give teachers a pay raise. The CTU's House of Delegates voted to vacate classes on 22 April to travel to Springfield as a group to try to influence the legislature. The Board of Education denounced the plan as depriving the school children of Chicago of a day of education. CTU President Desmond asked the Board to close school on 22 April so that teachers could march on Springfield. He added, "If the Board refuses to shut the schools the teachers will close them themselves."\(^{128}\) The Board of Education refused to close the schools and Redmond noted, "I think that anything that deprives children of even one day of school is unfortunate."\(^{129}\) The plan for a protest march to Springfield was altered at the CTU House of Representatives meeting on 11 April, when it postponed the march from 22 April to 29 April. Additionally, they voted to set a strike date for 2 June. Desmond opposed setting a strike date because he feared the legislature might be angered by the action. This feeling was also noted in a Chicago Tribune editorial on 16 April.

The march on Springfield on 29 April had no immediate impact. Teachers returned to Chicago and openly prepared for a strike. They felt that they had been ignored by the legislators and used by the governor who used their march to appeal for support for the four percent income tax program.


\(^{129}\)Ibid.
that was to result in higher state aid to schools. On 7 May, Ogilvie recommended a raise in the foundation level to $520, an increase of $20, but still less than what the House Education Committee, the CTU, and the Board of Education insisted they needed.¹³⁰

Since there was little progress to report, Desmond announced that he would recommend at the 9 May meeting that the House of Representatives call for a strike vote by the teachers. Prior to the meeting the Board and Union negotiating teams met on 7 May to discuss the Union's "final offer". The CTU presented a package that included provisions for Union approval of any layoffs, no cutbacks in educational programs, and a $150 monthly increase in salary effective September 1969. The Board team rejected these demands.¹³¹ The Union leadership was well prepared for its meeting on 9 May and the House of Representatives voted 297-3 for a strike by the Union membership. The House did not accept the leadership's suggested strike date but opted for 22 May, the date proposed by the militant factions.¹³² The stage was now set for a strike.

After the vote, the reaction of the various actors was predictable. Desmond noted that the teachers had threatened to use a strike before but this time it was apparent that the threat must be followed through. Governor Ogilvie told

¹³⁰Ibid., p. 435.
¹³¹Ibid., p. 436.
¹³²Ibid., p.437.
the press that "If they walk out, they're going to stay out because I am not going to give them any help." Mayor Daley let it be known that he was anxious to mediate a settlement and prevent a strike. He openly declared that he favored a pay raise. An appeal was made on 13 May by Operation Breadbasket, the Black Teacher Caucus, and the United Educational Employees to keep Black schools open in spite of the vote by the House of Representatives. Despite this opposition, the strike vote on 16 May passed by a two-one margin (10,944-5,438). The CTU was now committed to strike on 22 May.

Reaction to the strike vote included editorials by the daily papers asking the parties to get together. Governor Ogilvie asked Desmond to meet with him in Springfield. The Union requested a meeting with the full Board of Education on 19 May to present its case. As in the past, Mayor Daley offered to serve as a mediator.

Support of the strike within the Union varied greatly. TAC and John Kotsakis supported the strike and asked their members to stay out until significant gains had been made. Hard-line Black teachers, following the leadership of Operation Breadbasket, promised to keep Black schools open. Redmond noted that with the support of Black teachers many

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133 David Young, "Desmond Defies Governor/ He Urges City Teachers to Back Strike/ Union to Vote in Schools Friday," Chicago Tribune, 12 May 1969, sec. 1, p. 12.

134 Herrick, loc.cit., p. 375.
classrooms could remain open. The Union's reaction to this strike boycott was not to schedule picketing at any school where Black teachers had not promised the Union their support.  

Two attempts to avoid the strike were made. On 19 May, the full Board of Education met with the Union negotiators. After the session, Board President Whiston reported that the Board had made a substantial offer to the Union. However, two major omissions in the offer were pay raises and certification of FTBs. Desmond and the Union rejected the offer.  

The second attempt was made when Mayor Daley called both parties to his office at 10:00 a.m. on 21 May. The Board and the Union both said they appreciated the Mayor's assistance but no new offers were made. After the meeting, Superintendent Redmond announced that the schools would be closed during the strike.

The first teacher strike in Chicago's history began on 22 May 1969. Almost 18,600 teachers honored the strike and did not cross the picket line. More than seventy-five percent of the elementary and high school teachers honored the strike. However, the boycott of the strike by Black teachers was more successful when forty-five percent of the teachers showed up for school.

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136 Landwerermeyer, loc.cit., p. 442.
137 Ibid., p. 443.
Again Mayor Daley offered his services as mediator and sought the governor's support in solving the school problem. Negotiation sessions were lengthy and after two days of negotiating, a settlement was reached. At 10:00 p.m. on Friday, 23 May, the Board voted 6-5 to accept most of the demands of the Union, including a $100 monthly raise, guarantees against cutbacks and layoffs, some educational improvements, and certification of FTBs after three years of satisfactory ratings. The Mayor had assured Board members that he would get the money to implement the settlement. It is thought that the breakthrough occurred during a conversation between the Mayor and the Governor when the Mayor offered Ogilvie support for his tax plan.\textsuperscript{138}

On Saturday, 24 May, the Union House of Representatives voted 285-30 to end the strike and accept the settlement. Union membership was asked to vote in area schools on Sunday, 25 May, and they overwhelming approved it by a vote of over 9,000 to 585.\textsuperscript{139} Classes resumed on Monday, 26 May. Two days later the Board formally approved the contract by a 6-4 vote. Although it appeared that the salary issue was the main item discussed, probably the most significant advance made by the Union was the new certification procedure for FTBs. This new system placed a new burden on principals when rating their FTBs. A third

\textsuperscript{138}Ibid., p. 444.
\textsuperscript{139}Herrick, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 376.
favorable rating could mean the certification of a FTB teacher who previously would not have been able to meet the Board's requirements.

PHASE FOUR:

The settlement of the contract in May did not end the problems for the Board and the teachers. In a show of unity, Board President Whiston, Union President Desmond, and Superintendent Redmond all agreed not to get involved in the fight for the income tax bill. It is speculated that the Mayor suggested to the three leaders that they allow his supporters to carry on the battle in Springfield. Chicago Today reported that the agreement between Daley and Ogilvie included the following: 1) Daley would furnish support for the Governor's income tax plan, 2) the Republicans would help the Democrats increase Chicago's share of the sales tax, 3) the school aid formula would be increased to $550 and based on enrollment, and 4) Republican bills aimed at dismantling the Chicago machine would be defeated. The spirit of cooperation between Democrats and Republicans began to erode when Ogilvie complained that the Democrats had failed to support his flat-rate income tax. The legislature passed a dual-rate income tax (2.5 percent personal and 4.0 percent corporate) just two days before it adjourned. Further problems developed when the Senate

"Bi-Partisan Furor over Ogilvie-Daley Tax Bill Unequalled," Chicago Today, 15 June 1969, sec.1, p. 3.
changed the school aid base to enrollment rather than attendance as suggested by the House. With these and other conflicts continuing in Springfield, the Chicago Board had good reason to wonder if state monies would become available to meet their May settlement.

By mid-summer it was evident that the Board would have financial difficulties in meeting its contract requirements. On 10 July 1969, Mayor Daley informed the Board that revenues that the city had planned to give to the Board had not materialized and that the city's share of the sales tax would not be available until the following year. Daley advised the Board that they should still honor the terms of their contract. On 5 August Redmond offered the Board five possible budget plans at a special meeting called to resolve the school system's financial crisis. The Board was $30 million short of funds needed to support all of its committed programs. The Board approved a plan that included cutting the salary increase in half, cutting vacation pay, and reducing transfer rights.

The Board realized that any cuts would raise the ire of the Union. The next day Redmond invited the Union leadership to discuss the crisis. The Union protested the cuts and argued that changes in the agreement must be agreed upon by both parties. Vivian Gallagher, Vice-president of

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the CTU, wrote to the membership to explain the situation and solicit wide-spread Union support for a rejection of the Board's action. When Desmond returned from a short vacation, the Board and Union negotiating teams met for a two hour session on 13 August. The two sides remained apart with Redmond and the Board insisting that cuts must be made so that a supplemental budget could be passed by 15 August. After the budget was passed, the Union House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly to begin a strike beginning 3 September.\textsuperscript{143}

The newspapers in Chicago supported the teachers and asked the Board to honor its contract. Daley again offered to mediate but it became unnecessary. On 28 August, the negotiation teams met and as a result of new monies made available, the Board agreed to implement the 1969 contract to the Union's satisfaction. Some items of the original agreement were postponed until 1 January 1970 but these changes were minor and acceptable to the Union. On 29 August, the Board passed a resolution of intent to fulfill the agreement reached by the negotiations committee. The Union membership voted on 2 September to postpone the strike to give the Board time to incorporate the settlement in its official budget.\textsuperscript{144} With this action, the schools were able to open without the immediate threat of a strike.

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., p. 453.
\textsuperscript{144} Chicago Teachers Union Collection, Chicago Historical Society, Box 56.
NEGOTIATIONS 1970 - SETTLEMENT BEFORE A STRIKE VOTE

After the previous year's negotiations, those of 1970 were much less stressful. Since 1969 negotiations actually lasted until September, there was little time to set priorities for the 1970 contract. The Union negotiation team remained the same. The Board team included Dr. Wesley Wildman (a professional negotiator), Guy Brunetti, Dr. Eileen Stack, and Thomas Murray of the Law Department. The Board members of the Employee Relations Committee included Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, Mrs. Carey Preston, and Mr. Thomas Murray. Negotiations were cordial throughout the month of December. Their was one exception to this feeling of cooperation. The December issue of the Chicago Union Teacher had an editorial that called for no contract, no work. 145 The Union leadership felt that there was sufficient progress to return to work after the Christmas holiday without the threat of a strike. The Union's House of Representatives rejected a Board proposal on 7 January and called for a strike vote on 13 January with the strike beginning the following day. 146

In an effort to avoid a strike vote, both negotiating teams met on Saturday, 10 January, and negotiated throughout the night and arrived at an agreement twenty-three hours

later. Superintendent Redmond informed the press that proposed budget cuts would make the Union package possible. Items that were eliminated for the last half of the year included non-classroom personnel, summer school, supplies, and materials.\(^{147}\) Redmond assured the public and the Teachers Union that "this proposal does not envision the reduction of teachers who face children in the classroom."\(^{148}\) In order to finance the package agreed upon, it was necessary for the Board of Education to adopt a fiscal policy that financed the first half of the school year and depended upon seeking more funds from Springfield to finance the second half of the year.

The Union's House of Representatives approved the Board's package but only after a two and a half hour debate. Union President Desmond urged for contract acceptance and noted, "You told us you weren't interested in salary increases as much as you were in reducing class size, and we got what you wanted."\(^{149}\) The new package included salary increases ranging from nothing for new teachers to $1250 for teachers with fifteen years or more experience. Among the items negotiated by the Union were:

1. Reduction of class size in 150 schools in May, 100 more in October, and 50 more in November.
2. Employ 50 more EMH teachers.

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\(^{148}\) Ibid.

3. Provide summer school for EMH students.
4. Compress the salary schedule from 36 years to 15 years.
5. Increase salary lane differential by $15 a month beginning in September.
6. A 5% increase in salary for civil service personnel.
7. Payment of 1/2 of family hospitalization insurance.
8. Restore two weeks of paid vacation.
9. Restore lost adjustment teacher and teacher aide positions.
10. Extension of FTB certification by three years of satisfactory experience.
11. Allow the Chicago Teachers Union to participate in hearings to integrate school personnel.
12. Consideration by the Board to allow teacher aides to vote for a collective bargaining agent.\textsuperscript{150}

After the teachers voted to accept the new contract, the Board of Education approved the contract by 6-5 vote.

Members voting for the contract were: Carey, Preston, Friedman, Wild, Murray, and Whiston. Members voting against were: Malis, Witkowsky, Bacon, Boutte, and Cerda.\textsuperscript{151}

In order to comply with an agreement reached with the Chicago Teachers Union, it became necessary for the Board of Education to offer teacher aides the right to select the Chicago Teachers Union to act as their collective bargaining agent. On 14 October, the Board authorized such an election. The results of the election are shown in figure 3.2.

\textsuperscript{151}Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 January 1970, Chicago, Il., p.2857.
RESULTS OF TEACHER AIDE ELECTION

Table:

<table>
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<th>Ballots mailed</th>
<th>1863</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ballots cast</td>
<td>1339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballots returned as undeliverable</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results:

- Chicago Teachers Union: 1013
- No Representative desired: 92
- Spoiled or invalid ballots: 234
- Total: 1339

Figure 3.2

This election resulted in an increase of over one thousand new members for the Chicago Teachers Union.

PICKET LINES AGAIN AS 1971 NEGOTIATIONS FAIL

Contract negotiations began again in the fall for the contract year 1971. Initially the Board produced a budget that had eliminated teacher vacation pay, personal leave days, and "automatic" pay increments based on tenure. The Board later restored these items. This act would become controversial because the Board considered the restoration of the items as part of their new contract package while the Union considered these items as part of the master contract. Both the Board and Union negotiators continued talking throughout December and into January. The Union's House of Representative's had established 12 January 1971 as the strike date and a membership referendum authorized the date by a 16,706 to 1,493 vote. Long hours of negotiations

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152 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 18 November 1970, Chicago, Ill., p.830.
153 "Annual Strike Threat", Chicago Tribune, 11 January 1971, p.16
did not bring about an agreement. Union president Desmond presented the Board's latest offer to the House of Representatives at a 4:30 p.m. meeting on 11 January and it was "unanimously rejected". The strike began on Tuesday, 12 January, and depending upon whose statistics you select it was between 91.6 and 98 per cent effective. However, both sides continued to negotiate after the strike began. Mrs. Lydon Wild, Board negotiator, made a positive statement following a three and one-half hour negotiation session. Wild noted, "It's now safe to say that we are trying our level best to solve some of these problems." 154 Desmond followed a harder line after the session. He listed differences in educational improvements, fringe benefits, and class size. He pessimistically said that "The teachers will remain out until these issues are settled." 155

The Union estimated the cost of their demands at $42 million, while Redmond estimated the package at over $64 million. Redmond told reporters that "the Board sincerely regrets that the Union negotiating team continues to demand a financial package that the Board cannot meet." 154 He noted that the Board's latest package restored all previous reductions and included a 4 per cent cost of living pay increase.

155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.; p.2.
The first hint that the feuding parties might seek help from the mayor came on 12 January when Mrs. Wild said, "Mayor Daley may be the answer to this." Desmond responded by saying that negotiations were not yet at an impasse and he could not discuss whether the mayor would be asked to help. Mayor Daley declared that his office "would be open" to both sides if they wished his aid in solving the dispute. This offer was not appreciated by all. The Citizens Schools Committee urged the mayor "to refrain from participating in salary negotiations, and to allow the Board to exercise their legal right to make crucial salary decisions without outside interference." Although the Board presented a new offer to the Union on 13 January, it was rejected because it was "very inadequate" and "does not even meet the cost of living increase."

Mayor Daley again became involved with negotiations when he summoned both sides to his office at 2:00 p.m. on Thursday, 14 January. After twelve hours of shuttling between the two parties the mayor announced an agreement had been reached at 2:00 a.m. the following morning. Mayor Daley was joined by Superintendent Redmond, Board President Carey, and Union President Desmond to announce that a

1 Ibid.
settlement had been reached. Terms of the agreement were not announced until after the House of Representatives meeting later that day.

On Saturday, 16 January, the House of Representatives approved the package by a 2 to 1 margin and the general membership approved the contract the next day by a vote of 7,429 to 1,290.160 The package worked out in the mayor's office was truly unique in that it covered a period of two years. The Board of Education gave its preliminary approval with an 8-2 vote. The two year contract was officially approved on 17 February 1971 by a 7-2 vote. Member Sbarboro voted against the contract noting that he did so only because he questioned the legality of the length of the contract.161 Union Attorney Joe Jacobs told reporters that the legislature will be asked to make a simple amendment to the school code, and that the contract will be legally sustained.162 The package included the following provisions for 1971:

1. Salary increase of 8 per cent for teachers.
2. Salary increase of 7 per cent for civil service employees.
3. Salary increase of 10 per cent for teacher aides.
4. Full premium cost for individual and family health insurance.
5. Lower class size in 150 schools.
6. Expanded special education summer schools.

161 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 17 February 1971, Chicago, Ill., p.2742.
7. Additional supplies for practical arts classes.
8. Collective bargaining representative vote for ESEA teacher aides.¹⁴³

The second year of the package will be discussed separately because of the difficulties the Board of Education faced in late 1971. The Board-Union agreement had provided for the reopening of contract talks after 1 July if either side had items that they felt must be discussed.

A CONTRACT COLLAPSES - STRIKE IS THREATENED

A salary freeze, benefit cut-backs, early closings, class size increases, and teacher layoffs were among the suggestions offered by the Board of Education during contract discussions in the winter of 1971. Although the contract reached in January provided for additional salary increases of 8 per cent for teachers, and 7 per cent for other civil service employees, the Board found itself without the necessary resources to provide the increases and asked the Union to re-negotiate. After over a month of negotiations with the Board, Union president Desmond announced that he would ask the Union representatives to set a strike date against the Board. "The Union dispute with the Board is not over salary increases alone. The Board at this time is also proposing to lay off more than 1,800 classroom teachers and a large number of civil service and

Desmond also noted threatened cuts in teacher's fringe benefits.

The Chicago Teachers Union House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly (314-14) to begin a strike on Tuesday, 18 January 1972. A strike vote was held in the schools on 11 January and the strike date accepted by the general membership. On the same day, Board member and negotiator Wild announced that a new offer was going to be made to the Union. Although this attempt to appease the Union failed, negotiations continued. The Board postponed the passing of the 1972 budget while bargaining sessions were taking place.

On 14 January a compromise was reached and the Union House of Representatives recommended acceptance by a 158-133 vote. The compromise restored all benefits to the teachers but lessened the salary increase to 5.5 percent. The offer was financed by cutting the school year by eleven days, depending upon at least $29.5 million in additional aid from the legislature, and cutting 1,036 positions. Union president Desmond said that the Union would seek arbitration for restoration of the salary increase and would seek additional help in the legislature for funds to keep the schools open in June. Union membership voted to

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1 Edith Herman, "Union President to Recommend City Teachers Vote for Strike," Chicago Tribune, 9 January 1972, sec.1, p.1.
4 Ibid.
accept the contract settlement by a vote of 11,416-7,394.\textsuperscript{16} Desmond defended the relatively close vote by saying there was a high teacher absentee rate and that members did not understand the Board's budgetary practices. The vote allowed schools to remain open, at least for the time being.

Another surprise was given to the teachers by the Board of Education when on 1 February it announced its intention to demote 668 special service teachers and return them to the classroom in a cost cutting move. These demotions resulted in the firing of 600 classroom teachers. The Union and a group of those demoted filed for an injunction in Circuit Court but were denied. The Union declined to call for a strike over the matter but noted that they would file an appeal of the court's decision.

At the 14 April meeting of the Union's House of Representatives, an overwhelming vote was taken to issue a warning resolution to the Board of Education regarding the proposed eleven day school closing. The Union announced that they would take "any action necessary, including a strike, to prevent these and any other contract violations."\textsuperscript{159} These words were carried into action in mid-May when the Union Executive Board and the House of Representative recommended that the membership hold a strike.

\textsuperscript{149} Edith Herman, "Teachers Union Threatens Strike," \textit{Chicago Tribune}, 15 April 1972, sec.1, p.1.
vote on 22 May and set a date for the strike of 25 May.

As the referendum day approached, Superintendent Redmond wrote a letter to teachers asking for their support and understanding of the Board's current financial position. The strike vote was approved by the closest margin in the history of Teachers Union voting - 10,391 to 10,193.\textsuperscript{170}

Negotiations were resumed the morning after the referendum. The Board offered to cut the eleven day school closure to six days in June and five in December. This would give the Board some more time to seek new funds. Additionally, they offered to restore some of the cut positions if money became available. Contract negotiations continued and resulted in an agreement reached late in the evening on 24 May. The agreement contained the following items:

1. Cutting the 11-day closing to 5 days and paying the teachers for six extra days.
2. Restoration of proposed September cuts in music, art, and physical education.
3. Restoration of all fringe benefits.
4. Restoration of special teachers who were displaced in January.\textsuperscript{171}

The agreement was narrowly approved by the Board with a 6-5 vote. Board member Warren Bacon warned that "the language was not clear in its intent," and indicated that he "feared the Union would demand all restorations whether or

Redmond said that he was pleased with the offer because it was a victory for the school board which basically gave up nothing but made everything contingent on the possibility of additional state aid. The school year ended five days early and both sides awaited help from the legislature.

NEGOTIATIONS 1973- A NOVELTY AND ANOTHER STRIKE

In one sense, the Board-Union negotiations for 1973 began on 26 January 1972. It was on this day that Warren H. Bacon first introduced the idea of conducting contract negotiations in public. A committee was established to meet with Superintendent Redmond and his staff, as well as with President Healey and his Union staff, to discuss guidelines for conducting public negotiating sessions. Members of the committee included Warren H. Bacon as chairman, Thomas Nayder and Catherine Rohter as members.

At a meeting on 11 September 1972, President Healey indicated that he opposed public negotiations because of what he considered the potential of a circus atmosphere and the difficulty of changing bargaining positions once taken in public. He felt that both parties should be better informed about the progress of negotiations and this could

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173 Ibid.
be achieved by timely news releases and press conferences.\footnote{175} At this same meeting, a committee member moved that public negotiations not be considered by the Board. The motion carried 2-1. The chairman noted that the committee would bring the question of public negotiations to the full Board for its official action.\footnote{176} Hope Justus, a \textit{Tribune} columnist, reported that Wesley A. Wildman, the Board's labor relations consultant, also advised against public negotiations.\footnote{177} At the Board meeting of 11 October 1972, the full Board voted to hold open negotiations by a vote of 7-3.\footnote{178}

At later meetings guidelines were established for the public negotiations. Among the items included in the guidelines were specific deadlines for Board proposals, prohibition of electronic equipment, provision for private meeting rooms for caucuses, and reserved seats for eight city-wide organizations. Negotiations were to begin on 4 December 1972.\footnote{179}

As noted earlier, the Union, the Board's labor relations consultant and at least three Board members were opposed to public negotiations. Superintendent Redmond also

\footnote{175}{Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 27 September 1972, Chicago, Il., p.828.}
\footnote{176}{Ibid.}
\footnote{177}{Hope Justus, "Contract Talks Going Public", \textit{Chicago Tribune}, 20 October 1972, sec.1, p.20.}
\footnote{178}{Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 11 October 1972, Chicago, Il., p.835.}
\footnote{179}{Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 29 November 1972, Chicago, Il., p.1357-58.}
opposed "negotiations in a fishbowl". In an interview with Superintendent Redmond on 28 July 1989, he recalled that "I objected to the public negotiations and to the Board's participation in them rather than staff members. When they did decide to conduct public negotiations, I gave them Guy Brunetti to advise them. When the Board began these negotiations all that they did was to take a stance and make speeches. They never got down to negotiate."  

Redmond continued to recall the negotiations when he noted, "you can't yell and get down to real negotiations when the public was present. Bob Healey agreed and he told me he was going to use the meetings to make speeches to support his proposals."  

Redmond stayed away from the public negotiations and left the Board and Brunetti handle them. As negotiations continued with little progress, Redmond was eventually able to convince the Board that it would be more constructive to negotiate in an executive session which they did. Redmond noted that he remained with the Board members while Brunetti and the Union negotiated.  

As mentioned earlier, negotiations began on 4 December 1972 but there was no critical moment until 2 January 1973 when the Union leadership offered to scale down its salary demands from ten to two and one-half per cent. The Union leadership also called on the Union House of Representatives

\(^{180}\) Redmond Interview, loc.cit.  
\(^{181}\) Ibid.
to recommend a strike date of 10 January and for a strike vote in the schools on 5 January. Progress prior to the strike vote was limited to an offer to extend the present contract to the end of the school year. Healey flatly rejected the offer and called for teachers to support a strike vote. Teachers listened to their leadership and approved the strike date by the largest margin ever in a CTU vote, 16,565 - 2,997.

Both Union and Board leaders asked to meet with Governor-Elect Dan Walker to discuss the possibility of state assistance in overcoming the negotiations deadlock. The governor-elect was not available for discussion until the day before the strike date. President Healey asked chief Board negotiator, Mrs. Wild, to assemble the full Board for discussions on the weekend prior to the strike to consider a new offer from the Union. Mrs. Wild refused to call the full Board together before the meeting with Governor-elect Walker.

After meeting with the governor-elect, the two sides had somewhat differing opinions as to what took place. Mrs. Wild noted that "nothing the governor said today will allow us to give one more dollar to the teachers tomorrow."
Healey disagreed with the Board about the outcome of the meeting. "The governor obviously is committed to leading the way for more aid to the schools," he said, "that should be enough to get the Board back to the bargaining table and make an agreement with us." As a result of their continuing disagreements, the strike began as planned on 10 January 1973.

Negotiations over the next twelve days continued with no real progress being made. Some minor issues were resolved but as of 22 January the major issues of reduced class size, teacher preparation time, and a shortened school year remained. The inevitable happened, Mayor Daley called the sides together to see if he could help find a settlement. Although no solution was found immediately, some new inroads were made. The final issues, shortening the school year and the hiring of additional teachers, were solved in the early hours of 25 January 1973.

The Union membership was asked to vote on the contract that increased their salary by two and one-half percent, shortened the school year to 39 weeks, extended class size limits to all 600 schools, gave an additional preparation period in elementary schools, and provided seven make up days to offset salary lost during the strike. The membership vote of 8,145 to 1,012 ended the longest school strike in the history of the Chicago schools after sixteen

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
days.\textsuperscript{185}

The brief experiment with Board members serving as negotiators left much to be desired. The Board realized that fact and on 28 March 1973 introduced a motion authorizing the staff to investigate alternatives for future negotiations. The motion was adopted by a 10-0 vote.\textsuperscript{187}

The Board had obviously learned from this experience because at its 25 April 1973 meeting it accepted the following recommendation from Superintendent Redmond:

It is recommended that the day-to-day collective negotiations be the direct responsibility of the General Superintendent of Schools, utilizing an administrative staff team, a Board of Education attorney, and a negotiations consultant. (Mr. Wesley A. Wildman, who is also an attorney is currently serving in this capacity.)

The General Superintendent of Schools and appropriate members of staff involved in the negotiations will meet with the Board of Education to establish prior positions. During the course of negotiations, the General Superintendent and appropriate staff will meet with the Board to keep the Board advised of the progress of negotiations and to secure additional input from the Board. The Board shall be involved in the final agreement.\textsuperscript{188}

As a result of the collective bargaining agreement of 1973, the Board held an election to determine if ESEA teacher aides would be represented by a collective bargaining agent. The election held on 18 April resulted in


\textsuperscript{187}Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 March 1973, Chicago, Ill., p.2377.

\textsuperscript{188}Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 April 1973, Chicago, Ill., p.2506.
the Chicago Teachers Union being named the agent for over 800 teacher aides.\textsuperscript{138} The Teachers Union gained further strength to be used in future negotiations.

\textbf{EIGHT MONTH CONTRACT REACHED WITHOUT STRIKE THREAT}

Negotiations for 1974 began in October and continued through the end of the year without any strike threat. Union President Robert Healey noted that "The Board has been negotiating in good faith, and there's no need to threaten a strike to get action at the table."\textsuperscript{139} By January, both sides had agreed on a reduction in maximum class sizes and the hiring of 400 new teachers.

The term of the contract was set at eight months because the Board of Education was changing its fiscal year to coincide with the school year. Contracts would begin to coincide with the school year rather than the calendar year. The negotiating teams for the Union and the Board reached an agreement for the period 1 January 1974 to 31 August 1974 on 17 January 1974. The new contract called for a salary increase of 6.3 per cent for most teachers and Union civil service workers. Also included in the settlement was an additional preparation period per week in January and a second period beginning in June. Union members also

\textsuperscript{138} Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 23 May 1973, Chicago, Il., p.2980.
received increased medical and life insurance benefits.\textsuperscript{191} A period of relative calmness had arrived in the Chicago Public Schools.

NEGO\textbf{T}I\textbf{A}TIONS 1974-75 - UNION WILL WORK RATHER THAN STRIKE

In late August Union President Healey announced that the Chicago Teachers Union would continue to work on a day to day basis as long as current contract talks continue. He announced that Union demands would include salary increases, improved fringe benefits, and reduced class size.

Negotiations continued into mid-September without any strike threat. However, the Union House of Representatives voted (302-2) on 14 September to set a 19 September referendum to begin a strike on 23 September.\textsuperscript{192} After the House vote, both Healey and Superintendent Redmond issued press releases that indicated that both sides were still optimistic towards avoiding a strike. Redmond said, "I think a strike vote is absolutely unnecessary. I recognize it as part of a technique of the bargaining process. I am confident that there will be no need for a strike."\textsuperscript{193}

Negotiations continued through the 19 September referendum. Superintendent Redmond spoke to the press on Thursday morning and said that tentative agreements had been

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{191}Connie Lauerman, "Teachers, Board OK Tenative Pact," \textit{Chicago Tribune}, 18 January 1974, sec.1, p.5.
  \item \textsuperscript{192}Casey Banas, "Teacher Strike Vote Ok'd," \textit{Chicago Tribune}, 15 September 1974, sec.1, p.1.
  \item \textsuperscript{193}\textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
reached on all issues except salaries. He noted that the
Union's "salary demands are indeed excessive" but he
remained hopeful that negotiations would continue and a
settlement reached.194

The final negotiation session began at 4:00 pm Saturday
and ended with an agreement at 7:30 am Sunday. President
Healey spoke to reporters after the agreement and said, "It
was a tribute to the collective bargaining process that we
reasoned out our differences without a strike."195 Among
the items in the settlement were:

1. The hiring of 200 elementary school and 100 high
school teachers to cover additional preparation
time.
2. An increase in major medical benefits to $40,000.
4. Salary increases ranging from 4 to 11 per cent.196

The Union membership overwhelming voted to accept the
contract by a 18,037 to 1,676 margin.197

THE REDMOND APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Redmond's interest in collective bargaining was
witnessed in the topic of his dissertation, Administrative
Factors Affecting Teacher Strikes, written in 1947. In
studying Redmond's approach to collective bargaining during

194Dave Schneidman, "School Strike Vote Today; Redmond Asks
195Casey Banas, "Avert Strike; School Today," Chicago Tribune,
23 September 1974, Sec.1, p.1.
197"Chicago Teachers Union Members Vote to Accept New
his tenure as Superintendent in Chicago, we can compare his findings in 1947 to the situations he encountered during his negotiations with the Teachers Union. Redmond listed seven factors that contributed to teacher strikes in his study.

They are:

1. The lack of channels of communication between teachers and administrators, and between the boards of education and the citizens of the community.

2. The lack of an opportunity for teachers to participate in the determination of policies which affected them.

3. The imprudent discharge of obligations on the part of status leaders, both the leaders within the school system and the leaders of the teacher organizations.

4. The lack of fiscal independence of the boards of education.

5. The injudicious methods of bargaining practiced by both the boards of education and the teacher organizations.

6. The lack of understanding of how to use the power of organizations.

7. The lack of provision for effective lay participation in educational planning.106

Communication between the Union and the Board of Education was well established after the initial collective bargaining agreement. Grievance procedures were spelled out in the contract and refined by both sides during future negotiations. The Board had established an Office of

Employee Relations which was used for general as well as contractual discussions. The public’s access to Board of Education meetings provided a means for citizens to voice their concerns to the Board of Education. The press and electronic media kept the public informed about actions being considered by the Board.

The advent of collective bargaining provided teachers, through their union, an avenue to participate in determining some of the policies that affected them. Teachers were able to negotiate sick leave, personal leave, transfer policy, and many other policies that affected them.

Although at times Redmond and his counterparts in the Union were not discreet in their actions or criticism, negotiations generally were carried out in a professional manner. Each side tried to appear as the prudent leader who wanted only what was best for the children. Redmond admitted during his interview that negotiations sometimes became personal and bitter but that these blow-ups were quickly forgotten.

The lack of fiscal independence of the Chicago Board of Education was evident during each negotiation under Redmond’s leadership. Since Chicago never seemed to have enough money to appease the Teacher’s Union and avoid a strike, the Board was continually asking for more support from the state. Redmond noted that he did not mind negotiating with the Union, but he greatly disliked the
interference created by Mayor Daley who felt that the Board could give the Union whatever it asked for financially as long as a strike was avoided. Daley always promised that he would help the Board get additional funding but was not always able to fulfill his promises. Redmond noted that he would rather settle with the Union on a compromise rather than go to the Mayor's office for a settlement because he knew that he would lose there. Redmond noted that the only times Mayor Daley interfered with his administration were during contract negotiations and the implementation of the Redmond Plan to integrate the schools.

The maturing of both the Union and the Board during Redmond's administration was quite evident. Both sides learned to use the press and public sentiment to their advantage whenever possible. Both sides learned the give and take of negotiations, that is, they developed an idea of what to offer and what to withhold. Redmond noted that he felt that as negotiations continued in the early to mid-seventies that he had the better negotiator in Guy Brunetti. Redmond felt that Brunetti could control his anger better than Desmond or Healey. Redmond, however, did praise the Union's attorney, Joseph Jacobs as being the best negotiator for the Union.

Again both organizations, the Union and the Board, developed a better understanding on how to use their particular strengths to enhance their positions in
collective bargaining. Through each of the negotiations, both organizations learned more about themselves and their adversary and were able to develop better negotiating skills for the next contract.

We have seen how James Redmond reacted to the immediate problem of negotiating a teacher contract for the first time. After his administrative team had been through the process once they were able to learn and develop their skills so that later negotiations were a more familiar experience.

Just as he finished the first collective bargaining agreement with the Chicago Teachers Union, Redmond was notified by the Office of Health, Education and Welfare that Chicago must begin to desegregate their schools. With no time to sit back and enjoy his successful negotiations, Redmond now had to attack the problem of a segregated school system and try to develop programs that would enhance integration.
CHAPTER IV

REDMOND AND THE CHALLENGE OF DESEGREGATION

After spending his first two months negotiating a collective bargaining agreement with the union and preparing a budget for 1967 Redmond was finally able to return to his pursuit of solutions to the challenge of desegregation of the schools. Redmond received a letter from the Office of Health, Education and Welfare in January 1967. He reported that the letter was "polite yet firm, reminding me that the civil rights controversy was far from over." Redmond was now under the questioning eye of the federal government and he and his staff had to create a plan that would help solve the problem of desegregation in the Chicago Public Schools. Redmond requested an appointment with Secretary Howe of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to discuss the problem.

This chapter will discuss the development of segregation in the school system and how it reached the crisis situation that existed when Redmond arrived in Chicago. The reader will also learn about the plan developed by Redmond and his staff to alleviate some of the segregation in the schools and intensify educational efforts

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1James F. Redmond, "Efforts to Desegregate and Decentralize the Administration of a Large City School System," Speech at Columbia University, New York, June 10, 1968.
in those schools that could not be desegregated.

BACKGROUND OF SEGREGATION - 1860-1950

The first documented occurrence of a segregated school system in Chicago took place during the Civil War. There was conflict in the city between the Lincoln Unionist Republicans and the Democrats, particularly the Irish, who were at the bottom of the economic strata and felt threatened by the possible economic competition of African-Americans. ² The Irish rioted against a few African-American dock workers who had "taken the jobs of their brothers." The most serious result of this tension between these groups resulted in the city council passing the Black School Law of 1863. This law required that all African-American children attend a segregated school. ³ The parents of the African-American children in already established schools refused to send their children to another school and kept them where they were. Pressure from African-American citizens on the mayor and the Board of Education brought about the repeal of the measure in 1865. ⁴ A study by the Chicago Urban League suggests that the elimination of legal segregation in Chicago public schools after the Civil War resulted in schools that were integrated. African-Americans were at the time residing in

² Herrick, loc. cit., p. 52.
³ Ibid., p. 53.
⁴ Ibid.
many areas of the city. The formation of the homogeneous South Side community after World War I introduced de facto segregation, but even in 1920 there is evidence that from one-third to one-half of the African-American pupils attended integrated elementary schools. After 1920, racially mixed neighborhoods seemed to contract, partly as a consequence of restrictions upon the sale of housing to African-Americans and partly due to the influx of southern African-Americans who settled in the mixed areas. The migration of African-Americans from the South mirrored in many ways the migration of European ethnic groups in the nineteenth century. Both groups of immigrants moved to areas of the city where relatives and friends lived. These newcomers could adjust to life in the city easier when they were with "their own kind." An observer at either Union Station or the Illinois Central Station could give an educated guess as to where newly arriving African-Americans were coming from and into which neighborhood they would first settle. With this kind of migration it is easy to see why segregated neighborhoods developed and why the neighborhood school was also a segregated school.

During the 1930's and early 1940's, it is probable that


\*\*Ibid.
administrative policy played a significant role in preserving the segregated character of Chicago schools. School zone lines were made to conform to the configuration of the African-American communities and, as these communities grew in population, the administration placed new schools within their boundaries rather than transfer African-American children to available space in white schools. It was also fairly certain that white students assigned to African-American schools could easily obtain transfers to other schools. In 1947, Superintendent Herold Hunt planned and executed the redistricting of 102 schools in an effort to end overcrowding. The Urban League characterized his efforts as "essentially an impartial application of the neighborhood school policy." Hunt also eliminated most of the neutral areas. Neutral areas were selected areas in which a student was given an option to attend one of two schools in his area. This was generally used as a way to keep the schools segregated.

PARENTS QUESTION SEGREGATED SCHOOLS

The first signs of discontent with the school situation in Chicago occurred in June 1955. The United States Supreme Court had already ruled that segregated schools were inherently unequal and must be desegregated "with all

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{p.186.}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
deliberate speed." In an article in the Chicago American, citizens from the North Lawndale area complained of badly overcrowded schools. Superintendent Willis responded to the group by pointing out that there were worse areas in the city. The parent group referred to a survey that noted that 22 percent of their schools were on double shift and that 43 percent of their teachers were substitutes. The group asked why it appeared that Hyde Park was being given preference with new schools, building additions, and new teachers. Willis' response to their request was that he must look at the needs of the entire city not just one neighborhood.¹⁰

In September 1961, the first legal action was taken by parents of African-American children attending various public schools in Chicago. In Webb v. The Board of Education¹¹ parents alleged deliberate racial segregation by the school authorities through gerrymandering of school boundaries, in choosing school location, by refusing to utilize space in white schools, and in applying a neighborhood school policy. The parents stated that their children attended double shift or overcrowded schools; that in some cases classes were as large as 60 students, instruction was inferior, and that space that was unfit and

unsafe was used for classroom purposes. After many pre-trial motions the case was disposed of in August 1962, upon a motion by the defendant to dismiss. The court held that the plaintiffs did not exhaust the administrative remedy available under the Illinois School Code. The remedy in the School Code provided that the complainant must file with the State Superintendent of Schools allegations of exclusion or segregation of any pupil because of race or religion. But the federal judge dismissed the suit saying, "Chicago can not deny the existence of 'de facto' segregation or excuse it on the pretext of benign indiifference. ... Separation can not be defended on the ground that it is the result of a high concentration of Negroes in a school district." After rendering his decision, Judge Julius Hoffman noted that he had great confidence in Willis and that he was sure that Willis would see to it that the Chicago schools would be fully integrated and equal.

On 19 January 1962, a group of parents of African-American students at the Burnside School filed suit against the Board of Education. In Burroughs v. The Board of Education the parents charged the Board with deliberate racial segregation, and assignment of their children to

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12 Coons, loc.cit., p.209.
13 Herrick, loc.cit., p.313.
14 Ibid., p.211.
inferior schools. A request for an injunction was made that would end the all-white status of nearby Perry School. The plaintiffs presented evidence which measured the distances to the all-white Perry and the all-African-American Gillespie from the plaintiffs' homes. They also focused on the degree of utilization of facilities, and the boundary changes in the attendance areas made by the Board of Education. On 31 January, Judge Richard Austin denied the plaintiff's application for a temporary restraining order.

BOARD OF EDUCATION POLICY ON INTEGRATION

After the Brown decisions, civic organizations began to ask the Board of Education what it's policy on integrated schools was? The Board appointed a committee to prepare it's statement and this committee heard from many organizations who offered input for the Board's consideration. The statement did not even mention integration or any other positive goal. Adopted by the Board on 14 January 1959 it began:

Better human understanding among all peoples, based upon deeper mutual understanding, is a primary objective of the entire educational program in Chicago's public schools. All activities under the jurisdiction of the Chicago Board of Education shall be so organized and all persons so directed as to bring this desirable objective to closer fulfillment, promptly and prudently.¹

The organizations were greatly disappointed when the

¹"Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, January 14, 1959, Chicago, Il., p.830."
official policy statement was presented and approved.

Several civic organizations began to issue statements regarding their support for integration. In 1961 the Chicago Teachers Union, by action of its House of Representatives, had pledged itself to work for integration within the system so as to equalize educational opportunity. The following year they presented specific proposals with the statement that the neighborhood school policy should not be used as an excuse for segregating children. The Citizens Schools Committee continued to press for advisory committees, as well as an independent survey of the system. They advocated a policy of continuous redistricting and special aid for all economically underprivileged children through reduction in class size, securing extra materials and auxiliary services, and for the assumption of integration as a positive and explicit goal. The Chicago Region of the P.T.A. took similar positions. The Urban League issued a series of studies, and held a Schools Seminar in March 1962. The South East Community Organization, largely white, asked for a regional exchange for South East Side high schools to promote integration and to stabilize the already integrated schools.

Board members themselves held varying views on integration. As early as 1956, Dr. Joseph Pois had spoken

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17 Herrick, loc.cit., p.315.
18 Ibid.
to the Citizens Schools Committee on the importance of the schools in the necessary effort to make the city an integrated community. In the early 1960's Board members Bacon and Friedman had clearly, courteously, and consistently urged action to integrate the schools. During his tenure as Board President (1962-64), Clair Roddewig met with several African-American groups to try to gain support for furthering the cause of integrated education.19

As mentioned in the previous chapter, in April 1963, the Board of Education enlisted the assistance of Professor Robert J. Havighurst to conduct a survey of the school system. The appointment of Havighurst did not sit well with Superintendent Willis because he was aware of Havighurst's rejection of the neighborhood school plan in favor of integrated education and regional high schools. The report called on the Board to take an active part in social urban renewal. The results of the survey reflected Havighurst's philosophy of education and called for further integration of the schools and compensatory education for disadvantaged children.20

The Board of Education also responded to pressure put upon it by the courts when on 28 August 1963 it agreed to establish a Five Man Panel of Educators to study the school system. The Board resolution read as follows:

19Ibid.
Be It Resolved: that this Board hereby reaffirms its policy to provide the best possible educational opportunity for all the pupils in the school system so that every child may achieve his maximum development, and to recognize and work toward the maximum resolution of every problem or inequity that may exist in the system, including ... schools in the system being attended entirely or predominantly by Negroes ... .

This panel later became known as the Hauser Panel. Their suggestions included an integration of all faculties, a more equitable distribution of experienced teachers, in-service training for teachers and educational opportunities for teachers to learn more about the students with whom they were working. The panel developed a clustering plan that enlarged attendance areas in contiguous neighborhoods so that the Black and White children would attend integrated schools. It further suggested open enrollment in general high schools within high school districts, and open enrollment in all vocational and special schools. As the conflict between the Board and Superintendent Willis continued, several Board members under the leadership of President Roddewig drafted and adopted on 13 February 1964 a new policy statement on integration. The new policy read in part:

The members of the Chicago Board of Education believe that this city and this country would be healthier economically, educationally, and morally if Chicago, Illinois, and all sections of the country, reflected the kind of racial and ethnic diversity characteristic of the nation as a whole.

We have already made clear our opposition to segregation or discrimination in planning attendance areas and educational programs. We believe the children of Chicago would be better prepared for today's world if their classrooms and school staffs reflect a racial and ethnic diversity. . . .

We shall continue to seek, and promptly take, any practical steps by which, in conformity with sound educational procedures, racial and ethnic diversity in schools and classrooms can be promoted. . . .

Therefore, we affirm and publicly declare a policy of racial integration. We shall endeavor to effect the development of a continuous program to achieve this goal.\footnote{Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, February 13, 1964, Chicago, Ill., p.1945.}

This new policy could not be mistaken for the previous policy that failed to mention integration. In reading this new policy, one should certainly understand that it was now the Board's policy to take a positive approach to integrating the schools. But as we shall see, a stated policy is not always immediately acted upon.

To further complicate the Board's policy on racial integration, an additional policy statement regarding the Board's commitment to neighborhood stabilization was issued on 12 November 1964. The policy read:

While the Board continues to search for ways to increase the interracial association of students, it also has a responsibility to help preserve, as far as possible, such associations in areas where they now exist.

Therefore, as one of our important objectives in the field of integration, the Board of Education hereby asserts that it is the policy to seek and take any possible steps which may help to preserve and stabilize
the integration of schools in neighborhoods which already have an interracial composition. 24

In the 1960's, as well as today, these policies on integration and neighborhood stabilization have come into conflict. History of the Chicago school system has shown us that as schools integrate (following Board policy) they have tended to unstabilize the neighborhood (contrary to Board policy). There have been few exceptions to this trend.

A NEW TRANSFER POLICY

John E. Coons writes in his study for the United States Commission on Civil Rights:

An official policy prohibiting transfers from assigned schools has been in effect for a number of years. The no-transfer rule has had two consequences. In a racially homogeneous area, coupled with the neighborhood school policy, it has tended to preserve the segregated character of the school. In integrated areas it has tended to preserve integration by preventing the transfer of white children. 25

Finally, on 27 December 1961, the superintendent introduced the administration's plan to alter the transfer rules beginning in the fall of 1962. The new plan would be "permissive" or voluntary on the part of students and aimed at the better use of classroom space. The plan was limited to the issuance of temporary permits to students on double shifts to enroll in elementary schools with available space.

24 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, November 12, 1964, Chicago, Ill., p.542.
within their general area. Pupils who were granted transfers were responsible for their own transportation at no expense to the Board. If their home school reached average class size of less than forty then the child’s transfer was revoked and he must return to his home school. The plan also limited the number of transfers to any receiving school so that the average class size did not reach above thirty pupils. The Chicago Urban League, a long-time advocate of a transfer policy, sharply criticized the superintendent’s plan. The League pointed out that the plan discriminated in that it set a higher enrollment number (forty) for the overcrowded schools (generally African-American) and a lower enrollment (thirty) for the less crowded schools (generally White). Although the old rule of no transfers did not permit further integration, at least it did not discriminate against students, mostly African-American, in the overcrowded schools.

The permissive transfer plan took effect in the 1962 school year. The purpose of the plan was to relieve overcrowding and utilize available space. In the first year 28 elementary school students were transferred at their own request from overcrowded schools. There was no program for the high schools during this school year. In the 1963 school year elementary permissive transfers increased to 35

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26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
students. The permissive transfer program was extended to the high school during the same school year but included the proviso that students seeking to leave an overcrowded high school must be academically in the top 25 percent of their city-wide class. This proviso limited the number of transfers to 58 students in 1963. Hirsch became the first high school to take part in the permissive transfer after a parent group from the school began to seek help to alleviate overcrowding by appealing to the courts.

In August 1963 Superintendent Willis presented to the Board and received approval on a new "permissive transfer" plan that would allow honor students in crowded high schools to transfer to twenty-four less crowded high schools. Subsequently, Willis reduced the number of receiving schools to nine. At the 25 September Board meeting, President Roddewig suggested reinstating two schools that had been dropped. Willis made no objection and the two schools were reinstated. Willis balked at transferring 24 students who had requested placement in the two reinstated schools but finally conceded after a court order was issued for him to do so. This overturning of Willis' actions by the Board resulted in his resignation "over his principles and sense of professional integrity." After a short time an agreement

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30Herrick, loc.cit., p.316.
was reached between the Board and the Superintendent "to delineate areas for action" and Willis rescinded his resignation.\(^{\text{31}}\)

Willis delivered a report on the permissive transfer to the Board on 8 June 1966. Willis noted that the program had relieved overcrowding in some schools to a significant degree. It had encouraged integration in some schools where African-American students were attending the school for the first time. Finally he noted that most students who had transferred had adjusted to their new schools.\(^{\text{32}}\) At this same meeting Board member Cyrus Adams introduced a resolution that stated:

A student who transfers from one school to another under cluster or permissive transfer plans must have earned and must continue to deserve the privilege of transfer, in terms of effort, achievement, and conduct.\(^{\text{33}}\)

This resolution was modified and expanded in May 1963 with the following revision so as to be less restrictive in determining student participation in the permissive transfer program:

Students seeking to transfer to one of the receiving schools should be accepted with the following being the only exception. No child presently placed or recommended by a child study report for placement in a mentally handicapped division or social adjustment division should participate.

Once a student is accepted by a receiving school he is

\(^{\text{31}}\)Ibid., p.318.

\(^{\text{32}}\)Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, June 8, 1966, Chicago, Ill., p.3302.

\(^{\text{33}}\)Ibid.
to be considered as a member of that school's regular body and therefore not unilaterally transferable.

However, under extenuating circumstances, a parent may apply for a transfer for a child back to the school in the attendance district which the parent resides.

Parents of children at the primary level or in grade four who can provide transportation and are available in case of an emergency should be notified that their children may participate in the permissive transfer program.34

Further privileges were extended to elementary school students who participated in the permissive transfer programs including permitting the transferees the option to attend a high school in their home district or one in the district to which they were transferred.35

Below are listed the totals for student participation in the permissive transfer program for the period 1962-1974.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NO. IN ELEMENTARY</th>
<th>NO. IN HIGH SCHOOL</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>102</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>1500</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>957</td>
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<td>1968</td>
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<td>1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>329</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, April 26, 1967, Chicago, Ill., p.2840.
36Data collected from various Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meetings during the years 1962-1974.
The reader can see that participation in the permissive transfer program reached its high points in the mid to late sixties. The number of participants may appear to be sufficient until one realizes that during this time there were over 550,000 students enrolled in the Chicago schools.

Upon further investigation it should also be noted that although over 8,000 students had utilized the program during these years, there were several times as many students eligible to participate. As an example in 1967, there were 7,380 high school students and 2,374 elementary students eligible under the permissive transfer program but, as noted above, only 957 high school students (12.9%) and 164 elementary students (6.9%) took part in the program.\(^3\) This year was typical of other years listed. The great majority of the student population remained in his/her home school even though some were extremely overcrowded.

The permissive transfer program started by Willis was continued throughout the Redmond administration but reached its peak in 1966 and began to decline for the rest of Redmond's administration.

**THE REDMOND PLAN: A RESPONSE TO WASHINGTON, D.C.**

James F. Redmond assumed the Superintendency of the

\(^3\)Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 27 December 1967, Chicago, Il., p.1037.
Chicago Public Schools in October 1966. He immediately faced problems in preparing a budget for the 1967 school year. Moreover, he had to find ways in which to cover an existing five million dollar deficit in the 1966 budget. In addition he had to prepare a legislative package for the General Assembly which would help the Chicago schools. In an address at Teachers College of Columbia University he recalled his first months in office and in particular a letter he received in January, 1967. He noted, "As if waiting for me to take a deep breath, the Office of Health, Education, and Welfare sent a nice, polite but firm letter to me early in the month reminding me that the civil rights controversy was far from over. I was asked to immediately reply to their queries about desegregation."38 The letter referred to a United States Office of Education report entitled Report on Office of Education Analysis of Certain Aspects of Chicago Public Schools under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The report included a statement of findings and recommendations concerning the Chicago Public Schools.39

Redmond requested a meeting with officials from the

Office of Education and members of his staff to discuss writing a grant that would study the areas of desegregation. In April the grant was approved and Redmond recruited some very able consultants to assist in the study. The consultants included university professors, school district officials, and public relations experts. One of the consultants was John E. Coons of Northwestern University who led the 1962 study of the Chicago Public Schools for the United States Civil Rights Commission. These consultants joined staff members of the Redmond administration and resource personnel from various local organizations to seek solutions to the problems facing the Chicago Public schools. Committees were formed to study four areas of concern mentioned in the Office of Education Report. The areas were: Faculty Assignment Patterns, Boundaries and Student Assignment Policies, the Apprenticeship Training Program, and Open Enrollment for Vocational and Trade Schools. In addition to these areas identified by the Office of Education, Redmond's staff added two additional areas to be studied: one was Research and the other was Public Understanding.

On 23 August 1967 the Board accepted "in principle" the document entitled Increasing Desegregation of Faculties.

40 Ibid.
41 Redmond, "Efforts to Desegregate and Decentralize the Administration of a Large City School System", p.2.
Students, and Vocational Education Programs. This document is generally referred to as "The Redmond Plan."
The Board accepted the report in principle so that it could maintain control over it by insisting that any recommendations would be brought back to the Board in separate reports. The introduction stated the basic assumption on which the report's recommendations were based:

We see as a primary and urgent need the establishment and maintenance of the conditions in the Chicago schools that open up for all young people meaningful life chances and that speed them on their way to acceptance and accomplishment.

Particularly are we concerned about the racial and economic deprivation in our midst. When a condition so pervasive in our city bears in upon the schools, the schools can not hope to solve the problem except in commitment and action shared by the community - a genuine shared commitment with all groups who can make common cause with the Board of Education for quality education for all. We see an obligation to undertake a comprehensive educational program aimed at reversing a pervasive social condition that has become deeply rooted in our society. and seek educational pathways to a better society.

The report discusses each of the six topics addressed in the report and offers recommendations that should be implemented in order to make the plan a success. The writer will list some of the major recommendations for each area addressed.

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43 Redmond, "Efforts to Desegregate and Decentralize the Administration of a Large City School System", p.3.
FACULTY ASSIGNMENT PATTERNS

The committee on Faculty Assignment Patterns found a serious staffing imbalance in Chicago. Teachers in African-American schools and schools in low socioeconomic neighborhoods were younger and had less experience and formal training and were subject to more turnover. It was recommended that a new system of staffing be implemented. The instructional group would include highly qualified master teacher group leaders, less experienced teachers and aides, interns, and practice teachers. These teams would be offered a strong in-service program. The team members would work in attractive conditions and be offered incentives that would make for more effective and stable staffing. An in-service training program would be offered to principals about to assume positions in the inner city. The principal would be given the responsibility to reduce staff turnover, and develop an esprit de corp among the staff. It was further recommended that it become a requisite that a candidate for the principalship examination have at least two years service in a low socioeconomic area. Expansion of services for children who presented serious discipline or learning problems would be expanded. A city-wide advisory

Ibid.
Ibid.
committee representing community organizations and the school system would be established for the purpose of proposing ways in which inner city school communities and the staff of the schools would help each other in achieving and maintaining equitable staffing.  The Board of Education should adopt policies and procedures on assignment and transfer which would result in having in each school the same percentage of regularly certified teachers as the percentage in the system as a whole. The collective bargaining agreement signed by the Chicago Teachers Union has pledged that the union and the Board will "work cooperatively to develop and implement policies with respect to the assignment of teachers in such a manner as to lead to the achievement of representative social composition of school faculties and of a more equitable distribution of "regularly assigned teachers." A research study should be undertaken to determine financial and quasi-financial incentives which might be effective in securing and retaining experienced teachers in inner city schools.

BOUNDARIES AND STUDENT ASSIGNMENT POLICIES

The student population of the Chicago Public Schools increased an average of almost 14,000 pupils per year from

Ibid.
Herrick, loc.cit., p.345.
1951 until the time of the report. The increase in pupils was not spread throughout the city but in only 50 percent of the schools. In order to more equitably distribute the burden of the increase the Board of Education used normal procedures such as: adjusting attendance areas, changing grade patterns in schools, renting community facilities, using mobile units, and, lastly, building new schools and additions to existing buildings.

Efforts had been made to further integration through attendance area adjustments, voluntary permissive transfer programs, open enrollment in vocational and technical high schools, and in the planning and building of new school facilities. City-wide programs had brought together students of all races and cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds around a common area of interest and competence. The all-city chorus, all-city band, and the all-city orchestra met regularly throughout the year.\textsuperscript{53}

Prior to discussing the recommendations, the committee that studied student assignment policies compiled a list of assumptions upon which they based their recommendations. They assumed that integration was desirable for both white and African-American children.\textsuperscript{54} Every effort should be made to retain the white population and promote stabilization in integrated school situations. The

\textsuperscript{54}\textit{Ibid.}, p.B-6.
responsibility for integration should be shared by all of the white community by maintaining fixed racial proportions in the schools. The transportation of students by the school system would be necessary to achieve racial integration. Since the existing housing segregation pattern in this city would continue for some time, it would be necessary for the Board of Education to continue to improve the quality of education in all schools and particularly in the ghetto schools. Finally, the committee noted that funds to implement the recommendations should be available from state and federal sources as well as local sources.

Recommendations for student assignment policies were made in three categories. Short term recommendations included the recommendation that fringe area schools (those integrated schools located between African-American segregated and white segregated schools) should have a limited percentage of minority students. In outer area schools additional educational staff and services would be provided to meet the needs of the pupils who had been transferred in and this staff would be in-serviced in human relations. A voluntary permissive transfer would continue to relieve overcrowding, achieve stabilization, and promote

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56Ibid.
57Ibid.
integration. Selection of sites and the building of new
schools would be carried out in a way that would promote
integration whenever possible. 50

Intermediate plans suggested the establishment of
magnet schools at the high school and elementary level, each
to offer exemplary programs in specialized fields. These
magnet schools would have attendance areas large enough
to insure that they would be integrated. 50 The magnet
schools would have course offerings and instruction so
outstanding that they could not be matched anywhere in
the city. Transportation would be provided to students who
live excessive distances from the school. Some
consideration should be given to establishing magnet schools
in a shared-time arrangement with parochial and private
schools. 51

The only long range recommendation regarding student
assignment policies was to conduct a feasibility study on
the possibilities of establishing educational parks or
cultural-education centers. 52

THE APPRENTICE PROGRAM

The committee studying the apprenticeship program
included both local and national leaders in education, labor

53 Ibid.
organizations, and civil rights. The committee established three objectives for their study. These objectives were:

1. To cooperate with the U. S. Office of Education and the U. S. Department of Labor in a review of the Mayor’s program to increase enrollment of students from Negro and other minority groups in apprenticeship programs.

2. To develop plans for working on a continuing basis with the Joint Apprenticeship Committees to assist in increasing minority representation in apprenticeship programs and to develop public confidence in the procedures of the committees.

3. To develop an effective program of disseminating pertinent information to students from minority groups about apprenticeship opportunities and to plan additional programs to prepare minority group students to achieve eligibility.\(^{63}\)

The committee of experts studied the apprenticeship program at Washburne Trade School and made recommendations to improve the program. They suggested that at least two levels of advisory committees or councils should be organized in order to get advice and counsel as to how Washburne could best serve the needs of industry and the needs of the community. The first level of the advisory committee would deal with policy matters as they relate to the school and to the community. The second level would be an advisory committee for each of the trades being taught at the school.\(^{64}\) They also noted that the Board of Education should encourage the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training, the Illinois State Employment Service, and other interested

\(^{63}\) *Increasing Desegregation of Faculties*, p. C4-5.

community groups to make a study of job openings in each
trade with a view of determining how many apprentices may be
employed per year for the foreseeable future. Because of
the charge that arose that certain ethnic groups dominate
certain trades while others were excluded, the committee
suggested that sponsoring agencies should be encouraged to
accept a disinterested third party, such as the Illinois
State Employment Service, into their screening and standards
committee." They also noted that the Board of Education,
with the cooperation of the advisory committees, should
institute a study as to the effectiveness of the vocational
programs in the vocational schools in regard to the placing
of its graduates as apprentices in the trades." The need
for an increase in personnel at Washburne was also noted,
especially for counseling purposes, for a liaison with the
high schools, and for curriculum development. Finally, a
recommendation for increased public relations and
communication so that more people would become aware of the
opportunities available at Washburne." "

OPEN ENROLLMENT IN VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS

The fourth area of concern reported upon in "The
Redmond Plan" was that of open enrollment in Chicago's
vocational high schools. The official Board of Education

"Ibid., p.C-22.
policy regarding vocational schools was that these schools had open enrollment, that is, any student who lived in the city could attend any vocational high school in the city. Although this policy existed, students generally attended the vocational school closest to their home. This pattern of attendance led to segregation in these schools. Of the ten vocational high schools listed in this section of the report, only Chicago Vocational had an integrated student body. Each of the other nine schools had racial majorities that made up between 80 and 98 percent of the student enrollment.<sup>8</sup>

The committee on open enrollment in vocational education made twenty-four recommendations. I will mention some of them. The committee found that there was a great need to publicize the open enrollment policy and to become aggressive in recruitment for program. They recommended that general admittance requirements for vocational schools be abolished and replaced by a list of prerequisites for admittance to the various programs.<sup>69</sup> The committee felt that students should be encouraged to attend their general high school for the first two years and then transfer to a vocational school at the eleventh grade.<sup>70</sup> They also felt that a survey should be conducted whereby job opportunities for vocational school graduates could be identified, thereby

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p.C-24.  
<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p.C-27.  
<sup>70</sup>Ibid.
making it possible to institute appropriate preparation programs.\textsuperscript{71}

It was further recommended that advisory committees be established to help staff develop a philosophy for vocational education in Chicago. Additional advisory committees should also be established in each of the career fields being taught in vocational education.\textsuperscript{72} Immediate attention should be given to the construction and renovation of vocational facilities which will make them more attractive and up to date, and in turn will draw more students.\textsuperscript{73} The committee also suggested a dropout prevention program for fifteen year olds and the need for city-wide recruitment to increase integration in vocational skills.\textsuperscript{74}

PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING

In submitting their report to the Committee on Public Understanding, the consultants made the following statement:

Our study revealed that, among the urban school districts in the nation, perhaps no other one at the present time is confronted with greater communication challenges than those which face the Chicago Board of Education in pursuing its objectives of integration of students and faculties, adequate financing, well-informed community attitudes, decentralized administrative services, high employee morale, and instructional improvement.

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., p.C-28.
\textsuperscript{73}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74}"Here's Text of Redmond's School Plan," p.8.
We believe the Board and its new leadership can devise a system of communications and relationships with the community which will establish the essential understanding and support to bring success to Chicago's important enterprise of public education.\textsuperscript{76}

The committee studied the community relations and information services of other large cities and found Chicago greatly lacking. Other large cities had central office staffs of more than thirty people while Chicago operated with only four full time staff members. They also noted that the \textit{Booz, Allen, and Hamilton Report} indicated clearly that a strong communication capability, internal and external, must be planned, developed, and made a reality in order to carry out the major recommendations of the report.\textsuperscript{77}

The committee made suggestions that various positions be created under the leadership of an assistant superintendent for communications and community relations. The new positions included an associate director, an editor-writer, a community relations consultant, a writer, a radio-television liaison, a special events staff person, a photographer, a public inquiries service desk, and staff secretaries.\textsuperscript{78}

The committee further suggested that the General Superintendent immediately conduct a public opinion survey.

\textsuperscript{75}Letter from the Consultants to the Committee Chairman, August 16, 1967, cited in \textit{Increasing Desegregation of Faculties}, p.D-3.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Increasing Desegregation of Faculties}, p.D-8.

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Ibid.}; p.D-10 - D-16.
to secure a profile of public attitudes toward the schools and toward integration, the level of information known about the schools, and areas of misinformation in the community. A brief alert bulletin should be sent weekly to all news media outlets advising of coming events. Central office staff and the local schools should be informed weekly about the things happening in the schools as well as new policies, programs, and personnel changes.

RESEARCH

The last item to be studied in Increasing Desegregation of Faculties, Students, and Vocational Education Programs was the determination of areas that needed research. This section of the report discusses the methods of research used to develop researchable questions in each of the major areas of the study. Methodology consisted first of the scrutiny of working papers and committee minutes with some participation in committee discussions and then of the extraction of these documents of researchable questions - the answers to which contributed to a) the assumptions, b) the program requirements, or c) the purposes of explicit recommendations.

80 Ibid., p.E-3.
REACTION TO THE REDMOND PLAN

As mentioned earlier the Redmond Plan was accepted by 10 to 0 vote with one abstention. Even strong neighborhood school policy supporters like Boardmember Thomas J. Murray voted in favor of the issue. On his vote he stated, "I have always supported the neighborhood school policy but I am not one who cannot change my mind. . . . I join with the rest. The recommendations are proper and right and should be implemented as soon as possible." 81

The four major daily newspapers (Sun-Times, Tribune, Daily News, and American) all carried banner headlines announcing the Redmond Plan. Each paper provided a synopsis of the plan on the first page. Each paper noted items such as educational parks, magnet schools, bussing of students to increase integration, teacher integration, and the expansion and improvement of vocational education. The topic of racial integration on a metropolitan basis was discussed in the American. The article told of the plan to have a metropolitan area educational council composed of educators, civic leaders, and student leaders that would help develop plans for teacher and pupil exchange programs between the city and suburban areas. 82 The editorial section of the two morning papers ran opposing editorials. The Tribune

rejected the ideas of the plan on 24 August and 27 August 1967. The *Sun Times* praised the plan and called it "an educational Burnham Plan for Chicago, a proposal for experimentation and innovation in keeping with the needs of modern urban living."83 The *Daily News*, in its "Blue Dart" editions, ran a daily page on happenings in local schools in the Chicago area. In mid-September this edition ran a series of articles on the "Redmond Report" and explained the meanings of its various proposals.84

Public reaction was mixed. Edwin C. Berry, executive director of the Chicago Urban League, was quoted in the *Sun Times* as saying, "It's a good first step. It's the kind of thing I have been expecting from Redmond. I do think that he is taking some significant steps toward quality and equality in Chicago."85 Berry was quoted earlier though as having some reservations when he said, "But I'm not endorsing the quota system. As a beginning, to gain integration in the schools, this is all right to start with. In order to implement the educational system and get better education for our kids I have to go along with the plan at this point."86 Meyer Weinberg, head of the Teachers for Integrated Schools, was considerably more critical.

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Weinberg concluded that "its tone is much more constructive than anything that came out from the office under Willis. The recommendations accept the goal of integration in a much more detailed way than under Willis, but the main question is whether the intentions will be carried out." Weinberg continued, "No steps were outlined, nor was a timetable presented by Redmond for carrying out four chief recommendations of the U. S. Office of Education." Weinberg, who also served as head of the educational committee of the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations, said "the recommendations offer no basis for CCCO, or anyone, to be assured that anything will change now."  

S. Thomas Sutton, an Elmhurst attorney who headed "Operation Crescent," an organization opposed to school and neighborhood integration, said that "the Redmond Plan may force the group to press Operation Withdrawal." Operation Withdrawal calls for whites to move en masse from their communities if public officials ignore pleas against integration. State Senator Joseph Krasowski said, "This plan will force white families out of Chicago and will mean a loss of teachers. The school board has shown a total

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\(97\) Ibid., p. 8.  
\(98\) Ibid.  
\(99\) Ibid.  
\(90\) Ibid.  
\(99\) Ibid.
disregard for community sentiment." Mattie Hopkins, president of Teachers for Integrated Schools, called the plan "full of pie-in-the-sky generalities. Real improvement probably won't come for a generation." John Desmond, president of the teachers union protested any change in the teacher transfer policy. "Now is not the time to deny teachers the right to transfer. The critical shortage of teachers would be more acute if teachers were frozen in the schools where they did not wish to remain."

The two University of Chicago professors who had earlier studied the Chicago school system both had favorable reactions. Philip Hauser said of the program: "It's a wonderful step in the right direction." Robert Havighurst added, "the basic ideal of the Redmond Plan was very impressive and very desirable. I think the proposals are workable."

The reaction to the plan from suburban educators reflects the reception received in general. Park Forest Superintendent Seymour Bixhorn said that a city-suburban exchange would be "a positive way of changing the educational opportunities of Negro youngsters. I think it would be a real advantage having teachers from the

"A Big Step Forward", *loc.cit.*
advantaged schools teaching in the inner city for awhile." Everrett Kerr, Blue Island Superintendent, thought the plan was worthwhile. "I think anything that gets on with integration is good. There's no question we have the problem of achieving integration. This question is of degree and how fast." An opposing view was received by Berwyn Superintendent Robert Gentry who "doubted that an exchange is of sufficient advantage to children involved to warrant the administrative work. There are many areas of the city that students from the ghetto could be transferred to and not involve the suburbs in administrative headaches."

PROTEST AND PROGRESS

Redmond met with the press on Tuesday, 29 August 1967 to review his first steps in his integration plan. He reiterated that the first steps would be to improve the staffing of inner-city schools, and develop a model educational program for a "magnet" school. When asked what he would do if there were serious opposition to some phase of the plan, he responded: "I'm not so strong-headed that I can't compromise, as long as it isn't a compromise with principle. No one facet of the plan is important that the

Ibid.
Ibid.
whole program will fail because of opposition to some aspect of it."**

Within three weeks of its announcement, the Redmond Plan was placed in jeopardy when the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations (CCCO), led by Al Raby, wrote a letter condemning the plan to U.S. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare John Gardner. Raby's letter to Gardner said, "We demand that you invoke the fullest resources of the law and immediately begin formal proceedings to cut off federal funds to the public schools."** The seventeen page CCCO report called the Redmond Plan "racist" and a "non-plan that is in no sense a plan for action."**

The response to CCCO objections was delivered by U.S. Education Commissioner Harold Howe. On 24 October 1967 Howe endorsed the Redmond Plan for integration as a "major step toward correcting possible Civil Rights Act violations in Chicago schools."** The correspondence from the U.S. Office of Education and the Office of Civil Rights told Superintendent Redmond that federal assistance would be made available to implement the plan. The federal officials noted however, that "solutions or recommendations were not


**Ibid.

proposed for several areas and these problems must ultimately be grappled with." 103 Howe continued by saying that "you and the Board of Education have recognized a serious problem facing the Chicago schools and have come to grips with it. We commend you and your board for the positive leadership positions you have taken." 104

EDUCATIONAL PARKS - A MEANS TO INTEGRATION

Developing out of the Redmond Plan, a group of educational consultants under the direction of Professor Donald Leu of Michigan State University presented a report to the Board of Education urging the construction of a series of "cultural-educational parks" for Chicago. 105 The plan called for immediate action on a "prototype" complex that would serve up to 20,000 public, private, and parochial school students ranging in age from pre-school to college. Leu said that the parks "would cluster in one area large groups of students of wide age differences, and varying socio-economic, ethnic, and religious backgrounds." 106 The parks would include campuses for several kinds of schools, including pre-school centers called schomes, magnet and middle schools, and two or three high schools along with a college facility. Each park would be unique in reflecting

103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
the needs of its surrounding area and there would be no "model" to follow. Sites would be located at points easily accessible by highways or boulevards.

Although the concept of the "cultural-educational park" was not fully implemented, several of its ideas were put into effect. The clustering of schemes and elementary schools was made in several areas of the city. The development of the magnet school and the middle school also owe their beginnings to ideas brought out in the Candoli-Leu study.

BUSING PLANS FOR AUSTIN & SOUTH SHORE

The Board of Education voted on 27 December 1967 to provide $150,000.00 during the next year to bus 5,000 elementary school students in South Shore and Austin in order to try to foster racial stability in those neighborhoods. At the meeting Superintendent Redmond promised to hold public hearings on the plan. He said that the rapidly changing areas were selected because they asked for help to anchor the remaining white people. The vote carried by a eight to two margin with Frank Whiston and

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108 Ibid., p.5.
110 Ibid.
Thomas Murray casting the negative votes. In supporting the appropriation for the busing plan, Boardmember Warren H. Bacon noted that "busing is one of many, many tools in Redmond's plans for quality education and integration." He warned that the Redmond Plan would be a sham if the board tied the superintendent's hands by not allocating the busing funds.111

The initial plan called for African-American students in the Austin area who already attended integrated but overcrowded schools to be transported to schools with empty seats in outlying - stable- white areas. In the South Shore area both African-American and white students were bussed to equalize racial percentage.112 At the Board meeting on 10 January 1968, fifteen hundred people protested the Board's action on busing. As a result of pressure from these protestors the Board voted to defer action on the busing plan until after public hearings.113 At the Board meeting on 28 February 1968, the Board failed to pass the Austin transfer plan when vote ended with a five-five split. The Board also voted nine-one for a revision in the South Shore plan.114 On 4 March 1968 the Board again voted on a revised Austin plan that allowed African-American parents the choice as to whether their children should be

111Ibid., p.2.
112Herrick, loc.cit., p.350.
113Ibid.
114Ibid., p.351.
transferred instead of marking off areas from which children would be transferred automatically. The revised plan was approved eight to one.\textsuperscript{115} On 10 July 1968, the Board approved a revised plan for South Shore in which some 300 children would attend two new small "magnet schools," with smaller classes than other schools and special services and opportunities.\textsuperscript{116}

SUCCESSFUL MODELS FOR INTEGRATED EDUCATION

Project "Wingspread" was first discussed by the Board of Education at the meeting on 8 June 1966 during the Willis superintendency. Willis warned his board that he felt that the program involved too many risks and involved the delegating of Chicago Board powers to suburban boards. He could not recommend participation.\textsuperscript{117}

The "Wingspread" was revived by the Redmond administration and began during the summer of 1968 with five schools from the central city and five "North Shore" suburban districts. The program was funded under an E.S.E.A. Title III grant.\textsuperscript{118} The program involved city and suburban students, teachers, administrators, and parents combining their resources and talents in an exploration of

\textsuperscript{115}Ibid., p.353.
\textsuperscript{116}Ibid., p.353.
\textsuperscript{117}Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, June 8, 1966, Chicago, Il., p.3303.
metropolitan living. The program was designed to promote mutual understandings among students of different socio-economic and racial backgrounds, it helped students develop new perspectives about the total metropolitan community. The program had three basic divisions: Direct School Exchange Programs, The Magnet or Central Site, and the Once-a-Week Interest Group. Through June 1971, more than 4500 students and teachers from 46 Chicago and suburban schools had taken part in the "Wingspread" program.\textsuperscript{1,19}

In the fall of 1970 Metro, the Chicago Public High School for Metropolitan Studies, opened its doors. Metro was an attempt to establish a "School Without Walls" patterned after Philadelphia's parkway program.\textsuperscript{120} The program multiplied the educational options available to the student and provided a much greater opportunity for the development of individual aptitudes and interests. It provided educational activities that were related to the student's personal and vocational goals. Enrollment in the program was open to all high school aged students in the city. The program selected students in a manner which insured diversity. The program generated considerable support and enthusiasm among its students and in the city as a whole.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{1,19}Ibid., p.99.
\textsuperscript{120}Ibid., p.32.
\textsuperscript{121}Ibid., p.37.
The concept of magnet schools as developed at the Disney Elementary, Hyde Park Career Academy, and Whitney Young High School has assisted in the integration of some of Chicago's schools. These schools attempted to implement some of the objectives of the Redmond plan and gave students of different cultures and ethnic groups the opportunity to share with each other the educational experience. The racially controlled enrollments of these schools made it possible for the citizens of Chicago to see integrated education work.

The fatal flaw in the Redmond Plan was that the Board of Education accepted it "in principle" but never really supported it financially or theoretically. Redmond was able to show that the ideas in the plan could help provide the school system with integrated schools with the success of the magnet schools established during his tenure as superintendent. His plan for faculty assignment was similar to a plan that was later ordered by the federal courts and is still being followed today. The suggestions of open enrollment for vocational education and the apprentice program expansion were eventually carried out but vocational high schools today can still be categorized in racial terms. Although the plan was generally accepted it was never fully implemented and Redmond feels that the plan was not as successful as he would have liked because the mayor and the machine politicians felt that it would lessen their
influence over various voting blocks.

Redmond's challenge of desegregating the schools continued throughout his tenure. Redmond also realized that the Chicago system was too large to be managed by only one person so he developed a plan to decentralize the schools and make them more accessible to local communities. The next challenge discussed by this study with be the decentralization of the public schools.
As discussed in the previous chapters, some members of Redmond's staff were preparing their response to the federal government's request for a desegregation plan and others were negotiating with the Teachers Union. A third group of staff members were providing input into a study of the organization of the Board of Education conducted by the management firm of Booz, Allen, & Hamilton, Inc.. Although this study began at the end of the tenure of Superintendent Benjamin Willis in May 1966, James Redmond's administration would be responsible for finalizing the study and implementing the recommendations of the firm.

But first, we must note that the term "decentralization" is sometimes ambiguous. We are introduced to two of its meanings in Fantini and Gittel's Decentralization: Achieving Reform. These authors tell us that decentralization can be an administrative device that shifts administrative power from central administrative offices (like the Board of Education) to the field (local districts or schools). In this type of decentralization, the bureaucracy is reorganized to permit field administrators greater authority and power to act. Another definition asserts that decentralization plans embody a
design for meaningful shifts in power from central agencies to local communities. In the former definition, the central administration distributes its power to local administrators who carry out the directives from above. In the later, the power base resides in the local community rather than from above. The local community is able to make decisions that effect them without getting prior approval from the central authority.

This chapter discusses the decentralization of the Chicago schools that took place under the leadership of Superintendent Redmond. We will see that Redmond used a management consultant's report to administratively decentralize. He later expanded the idea of district and local school advisory boards to provide an example of what could be considered political decentralization. But first, we will briefly discuss the history of school district decentralization in general and note some instances of Chicago's prior experience with decentralization.

**A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF DECENTRALIZATION**

According to Professor Jeffrey Mirel of Northern Illinois University, decentralization is one of the recurring elements of educational reform. Mirel notes that in the 1890's there were over 100,000 school districts in

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the United States each governed by a separate board of education.² Parents and citizens had enormous control over these schools. They not only had the right to hire teachers and principals but they also selected textbooks, set salaries, and made curriculum decisions. The schools were truly decentralized. The problem with education in these schools was that teachers were limited in their teaching. Schools had to reflect community attitudes and values, and this made education insular rather than cosmopolitan. A teacher had to be sure that what he or she taught and how he or she taught it were not contrary to the community's idea of curriculum. If he or she was not careful to respect the community's ideals, the teacher would be dismissed. These schools reflected the narrow range of ideas particular to a given community and the ideas of outsiders were not welcomed. An example of the community's outrage was the infamous Scope's Monkey Trial in Tennessee, when a biology teacher was jailed for teaching Darwin's Theory of Evolution.

Rural areas were not the only locations for decentralized school systems. Many of the urban areas of the 1890's had a ward based school board. Each ward of the city would elect one or two board members for the board of education. These board members had almost complete control

²Jeffrey Mirel, What History Can Teach Us About School Decentralization, Presented to the Chicago Principals Association Conference, 23 March 1990. (Duplicated)
over educational matters within the ward. They could
control the hiring and firing of educational personnel,
select textbooks and decide curriculum, and even decide
where schools should be built. 3

Contemporary advocates of decentralization refer back
to the 90's as a time when local communities were
responsible for the education of their own children. They
fail to note, however, that the reason the system became
more centralized later on was because of the great amount of
patronage and corruption that were found in the ward based
school boards. In 1894, Detroit's reform mayor Hazen
Pingree went to a school board meeting with a squad of
policemen and announced, "Quite a number of members of this
board are going to jail tonight." Four members of the board
were later arrested on charges of taking bribes for building
contracts. 4 Twenty years later, after continued corruption,
the people of Detroit voted to abolish the ward based school
board in favor of an elected at large school board. The
movement to centralization was designed to give more power
to educational professionals.

In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the cries for
decentralized school districts were again heard. New York
and Detroit both moved for greater community involvement in

3Ibid.
4M.G. Holli, Reform in Detroit: Hazen S. Pingree and Urban
Politics. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), cited
in Mirel presentation of 23 March 1990.
the schools. The new decentralized system in these two cities gave local citizens more control over their schools but also resulted in labor disputes and long teacher strikes. Conflicts over curriculum and teacher appointment in the local schools became a point of controversy. In 1976, the citizens of Detroit declared decentralization a failure and voted to recentralize the system. New York maintains its decentralized system but it continues to be the center of controversy with twelve of the thirty-two regional boards under investigation for alleged corruption in 1989.5

EARLY DECENTRALIZATION IN CHICAGO

The first instance of decentralization in the Chicago Public Schools was based upon a recommendation of the Harper Report of 1898. Among the recommendations of the Report was a call for decentralization and involvement of lay citizens in the community. The Board of Education was asked to divide the city into special inspection districts to include not more than ten schools. The mayor would appoint six "resident commissioners" for terms of three years to visit the schools and report on discipline, sanitation, and the work of the schools to the Board.6 The Report noted the "present tendency is to make the school system more and

5Mirel, loc.cit.
6Herrick, loc.cit., p.86.
more a matter of expert control." It continued, "If the system of public instruction is not readily affected by public opinion, a feeling of dissatisfaction naturally arises." The Report outlined the legitimate role of a Board of Education. And it was curiously modern in its emphasis on community "inspectors" and the need for "community schools." Slowly many of its recommendations went into effect. 7

The next attempt to decentralize the schools came in the late 1920's during the tenure of William J. Bogan. Superintendent Bogan divided the city into forty-one areas, and set about developing local community-school advisory committees in each area. These committees were active until they were disbanded in the financial turmoil that occurred in 1932. 8

In 1961, Superintendent Willis increased the number of sub-districts to twenty-four and established districts that included both elementary and high schools with geography and population being the determining factors in district boundaries. Willis also asked each sub-district superintendent to appoint an advisory committee from the community. 9

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7 Ibid., p.87.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p.227.
10 Ibid., p.309.
BOARD AUTHORIZES BOOZ, ALLEN & HAMILTON STUDY

At a meeting on 4 March 1966, the Board of Education voted to employ the management firm of Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc. to study its own operation and that of non-teaching services.\(^1\) Booz, Allen & Hamilton responded with a proposal that included the study of five areas: 1) an administrative organization study, 2) a survey of the financial operations, the budget, and the budgeting process, 3) a study of Board information requirements, 4) appraisal of the data processing activity, and 5) a review of purchasing practices and procedures.\(^2\) Discussions regarding the study took place in committee meetings, resulting in formal Board approval of the Booz, Allen & Hamilton Report on 24 August 1966 at a cost of $193,000.00. The motion was passed with an 8-1 vote.\(^3\)

It was fortunate in a way that the study was commissioned during the superintendency of Benjamin Willis. The use of an outside consultant made it clear that the resultant report was not something designed by Redmond to carry out his own administrative re-structuring. Redmond, his staff, and Board members were interviewed by the consultants and their ideas considered. Additionally, the Booz, Allen & Hamilton team visited school officials in New

\(^1\) Ibid., p.330.
\(^2\) Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 13 July 1966, Chicago, Ill., p.83.
\(^3\) Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 24 August 1966, Chicago, Ill., p.363.
York and Los Angeles to discuss their recent attempts at organizational reform. The team sought to learn of the organizational practices employed and the problems encountered in these large systems. The first study, and the one that helped to decentralize the administration of the school system, was the organizational study. This study was chosen first because it effected all other parts of the proposed areas of study.

The organizational survey itself was presented to the Board of Education on 24 May 1967 in a bound volume. The survey presented the Board with an evaluation of the present organization structure, noting areas of concern related to both function and structure. Next, it discussed the environment in which the school system existed, the demands placed on it, the resources it had available, and the constraints under which it operated. These factors established further requirements that had to be met in the new organizational structure. The third section of the survey presented the actual recommended plan of organization for the school system and a time line for its execution. The time line began with the approval of the Basic Organizational Plan on May 24, 1967 and continued through the 1969 Legislative Session (January) during which the Board would ask the legislature to change the statute to
allow the Board to delegate certain personnel actions.\textsuperscript{14}

The appendix contained job descriptions for each administrative position in the new structure and schematic drawings of the current (May 1967), an interim, and the proposed organizational structures (See schematic drawings identified as item 1, 2, and items 3 a, b, c, in the appendix).

The size of the Chicago school system dictated that a plan of organization be built around the work to be done—the functions to be performed. The system was far too large to be organized around the talents of specific individuals. By organizing around function rather than personality, there could be continuity when the people in power positions change. People could be fitted to the position rather than the position fitted to the person. The consultant team noted that since the Chicago system had many dedicated and skilled administrators, it would be easier to help these people adapt to new functions rather than to try to fit the function to the person. The consultants reported that the essence of the plan is: decentralization to an extent considered practical; the creation of tolerable work loads at all levels, from the Board down; and the grouping of staff activities which have a natural kinship to each other into organizational units.\textsuperscript{15}

The major elements of the recommended plan can be summed up


\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p.iii.
in five statements:

1. The role of the Board of Education as a policy-making and program approving body is underscored. Increased use of Board committees is proposed and the Board is provided with adequate staff support.

2. The function of the General Superintendent is defined as that of chief administrative officer of the school system, with basic emphasis on planning, developing programs, and evaluating results. He also is provided with adequate staff in support of this role.

3. Responsibility of the day-to-day management of the school system is delegated to a deputy superintendent who is, in effect, the chief operating officer.

4. The city is divided into areas of manageable size, each headed by an associate superintendent with a full staff of his own. Each area associate superintendent has under his direction the organization equivalent of a major school system.

5. Only those staff activities which are system-wide in nature or which can be most effectively performed at the headquarters level are carried at this level. These, and certain specialized operating functions, are retained in the central office.\(^1\)

The recommended plan of organization required that one change be made in state law governing the Chicago Board of Education. The School Code of Illinois stated that appointment, promotions, and transfers of teachers and other personnel must receive board of education approval. This law would have to be amended to allow the board to delegate most of these personnel appointments. The consultants suggested that the Board of Education retain the authority to review and approve appointments of personnel who report

\(^{1}\)Ibid.
to the Board, and heads of organizational units that report to the general superintendent or his deputy. The general superintendent should approve the appointment of district superintendents and key subordinates of staff directors. The deputy superintendent, as chief operating officer, should approve the appointment of principals, directors of field staff functions and their key subordinates. The area associate superintendent should approve appointment of personnel reporting to his staff directors and the assignment of teachers in his area. The consultants suggested that the reorganization take place over a period of eighteen months. They suggested that key personnel be selected to fill new or modified positions and that an interim organization structure be designed until the new organization becomes completely operational. The Interim Organization Plan was submitted to and approved by the Board of Education on 28 June 1967. At the same meeting, the Board approved the appointment of two assistants to the General Superintendent, Manford Byrd, Jr. and James Moffat. These positions were recommended by the Booz, Allen, & Hamilton Report to assist the general superintendent in the discharge of selected administrative activities as directed. They were to perform research assignments, help prepare materials and reports for the

17Ibid., p.lv.
general superintendent, and obtain data and information for special projects.\footnote{Ibid., p. Appendix A (17).} Both of these men continued to be high ranking Board administrators for twenty years. Redmond said that he was generally happy with the selection of these two men over time. He noted great disappointment with the events that lead to the ending of Moffat’s career.\footnote{Redmond interview, \textit{loc.cit.}}

The next phase of implementing the Interim Organization Plan was to divide the city into three administrative areas and select personnel to fill the position of Associate Superintendent in each of the areas. Redmond made the following recommendation for these positions: Dr. Curtis Melnick for Area A on the southside, Julien Drayton for Area B in the central city, and Dr. George Connelly for Area C on the northside. This new appointees were to help the General Superintendent develop the details for the decentralization of the school system while maintaining their current positions until the decentralization plan was ready to be put into effect.\footnote{"Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting", 13 September 1967, Chicago, Il., p.544.}

At the Board of Education meeting of 13 March 1968, Redmond recommended that the Board approve the revised administrative structure and approve changes in titles that reflected the reorganization as suggested by the management consultants. He added that he and his advisors recommended
the retention of the positions of Assistant Superintendent for Vocational and Practical Arts Education and the Assistant Superintendent for Federal-State Relations which were not included with the management survey. The Board approved both recommendations. 22

The last major change in the structure of the administrative organization of the school system was the appointment of a Deputy Superintendent. As mentioned earlier, the role of the General Superintendent would become the "chief administrative executive" and that a new office, the Deputy Superintendent, would be charged with the daily operations of the school as "chief operating officer." The Deputy Superintendent would have the responsibility for managing the system on a day-to-day basis with the heads of central staff departments and Area Associate Superintendents reporting to him. 23 At the Board meeting of 13 November 1968, Superintendent Redmond recommended the appointment of Manford Byrd, Jr. to the position of Deputy Superintendent. Byrd was approved by the Board and began his new position on 1 December 1968. 24 He served in that position throughout the remainder of Redmond's superintendency.

In an interview, Redmond said that he felt the organization was right but that he should have considered

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22 "Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 13 March 1968, Chicago, Il., p.1569-60.
23 "Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 13 November 1968, Chicago, Il., p.768.
24 Ibid., p.760.
making more than the three districts." In retrospect, he thought that generally the areas operated as they had been planned. He warned that decentralization had its good points but that districts like New York, have gone too far. He felt that educators should get input from all groups involved in the schools, but the input should be advisory only. The decisions must ultimately made by the school administration.

POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION IN CHICAGO

The idea of political decentralization of the Chicago Public Schools was first presented at a Board of Education meeting on 26 January 1966 when guidelines for the District Superintendents' Educational Councils were first discussed. Although guidelines were established the development of councils was lagging.

On 29 March 1969, a Board report described the impetus and organizational pattern for the Districts' Councils. After the report was issued, the Board made it clear that all District Superintendents should form a council and if necessary continue to solicit membership on the council from persons and groups interested in school affairs. A survey reported that only fifteen of the twenty-seven districts had

25 Redmond interview, loc.cit.
an advisory council of some kind. Many of the councils deviated from the original guidelines which mandated that one-third of the council should be appointed by the District Superintendent and that these appointed members select the other two-thirds from business and industrial personnel who live or work in the community, from parents of children in the schools, from professionals such as principals and teachers, and from representatives of local youth service or community agencies.

A report on the District Superintendents' Educational Councils presented at the Board of Education meeting on 10 September 1969 pointed out that the legal responsibility for all decisions pertaining to school matters rests with the General Superintendent of Schools with the approval of the Board of Education. However, it is noted that it is possible that District Educational Councils can make recommendations to the District Superintendent who can transmit their recommendations to the Area Superintendent, the Deputy Superintendent, the General Superintendent, and ultimately the Board of Education.

This report noted areas of concern in which Educational Councils might make recommendations to the District Superintendent: 1) order of priorities with the district for

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p.363.
30 Ibid.
allotment of funds for purchase of educational equipment, 2) order of priorities for improvement or repair of facilities within the district, 3) qualities desirable in persons who might be candidates for administrative positions, 4) sites and educational specifications for school facilities, and 5) attendance boundary adjustment. These powers of recommendation were granted to the councils by a 9-0 vote of the Board of Education.\footnote{Ibid.}

Prior to March 1970, the Board allowed Educational Councils to advise District Superintendents on the qualities they felt were desirable in candidates for administrative positions in the district. In March 1970, the Board adopted a report by the Calumet-Hess Committee that recommended District Superintendents make available to advisory groups the names of eligible candidates to fill the principal vacancy in their school. The committee also recommended that the advisory group be allowed to interview candidates for the vacancy and recommend their selection to the General Superintendent.\footnote{Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 March 1970, Chicago, Il., p.3192.}

Beginning at the Board meeting of 14 March 1973, the Board was presented with a set of Guidelines for Operation of District Education Councils. Further discussions of these guidelines were carried on at subsequent Board meetings of 28 March, 11 April, and 25 April 1973. The
guidelines were adopted under a omnibus roll call vote on 25 April 1973. These guidelines for operation included the following items:

1. Bylaws shall be established with the rules and policies of the Board of Education by each council which will set criteria for membership, organizing patterns for the council, including officers, terms of office, and methods for conducting business.

2. Methods of placing items on the agenda will also be regularized.

3. Minutes will be kept and distributed to members, Area Associate Superintendents, and District Superintendent.

4. Council meetings will be held monthly and additionally as needed. Meetings will be held in a convenient location.

5. District councils must have at least one member from each local school council. Sixty percent of the members must be parents of students in the district.

6. District Superintendents and District Human Relations Coordinators shall serve as resource consultants for the councils.

7. Meetings of the councils shall be open to the public and announced one week in advance. Councils may set limits of participation by members of the public who are not members of the council.

8. Agenda topics to be considered at meetings of the councils shall focus more on district concerns including priority of items for budget consideration at the District level.

9. The Chicago Region P.T.A. will see that a representative from one of its 18 P.T.A. Councils is named to each District Educational Council.

These District Educational Councils were precursors of the

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34Ibid.
next step in the political decentralization of the school system, the local school council.

The idea of local school councils was the second form of political decentralization that arose during the Redmond administration. The first discussions concerning the establishing of the local school councils began in October 1970. The Board of Education in general committee made several recommendations regarding the councils.

Their first recommendation was that each principal, whether administrator of one building or buildings with branches, should establish a Local School Council. Schools that had active and effective PTAS, Concerned Parents, or other school groups could be selected as Local School Council members. The decision of using a current organization should be made at community meetings.\(^3^5\)

The principal was asked to take the initiative in calling public, evening meetings with advance notice given by flyers sent home with students, and by publicity through local newspapers or radio stations. Those eligible to vote in the election were parents of the children in the school and the faculty of the school. The principal was to act as the chairman pro-tem of the meeting until a chair could be elected. After this election, the principal was to act in an advisory or resource capacity only. The principal or his

representative should attend all Council meetings.\textsuperscript{36}

The Board also listed what they felt the purposes of the Local School Council should be listed as follows:

1. To permit parents and school patrons to share in the process of arriving at decisions which affect local schools.

2. To inform District Education Councils of the needs of individual schools and to suggest how these needs can be met.\textsuperscript{37}

The Board also suggested that membership on the Local School Council should be broadly representative of the community within the school attendance district and members should be residents of the community and representative of its institutions. A minimum of sixty percent of the members should be parents of children in the school. School personnel, representatives of the community, religious, civic, social-service, business, and youth serving agencies should be included. Each Council should decide the number of members on its Council.\textsuperscript{38}

The Councils were also directed to elect officers, including a chairman or president, a vice-chairman or vice-president, and a secretary. By-laws were to be drawn up as soon as possible. These by-laws should include the provision that meetings be held at least monthly during the school year. The meetings were to be public meetings and

\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{37}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{38}\textit{Ibid.}
In order to encourage night meetings of the Local School Councils, the Board of Education provided $150,000.00 in operational funds so that each Council could have at least three evening meetings per year. This funding was necessary because the Stationary Engineers Union was extremely powerful and demanded that their union members get paid for the additional hours work.

Seven months after the initial adoption of the Local School Council guidelines, several revisions were made. These revisions included the provision that the principal or his designee must be present at all Council meetings. The principal was also given the right to serve as an officer if the Local Council wished. Additionally, representation of Local School Council to the District Education Council was to be equal, with each School Council having the same number of delegates.

Further revisions included the provision that each Council should have representatives from PTA, Concerned Parents, or other established school-wide parent organizations. Terms of officers were also limited to one year. It was also noted that the Council may not interfere in the day to day operations of the school, but may include

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Ibid.

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 10 March 1971, Chicago, IL, p. 2805.

Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 July 1971, Chicago, IL, p. 12.
any problems on its agenda. It also recognized that the principal should make every effort to comply with the Council's wishes but the Council members must recognize that the principal may not have all the administrative power to comply with all their resolutions.\textsuperscript{42}

Other revisions of the guidelines for Councils were made on 25 October 1972. These revisions included the requirement that officers in the Councils must be parents of students in the school.\textsuperscript{43} At this same meeting but deferred was a recommendation that the Board adopt guidelines for a Principal Nominating Committee of the Council. These guidelines were debated and deferred for over a year. The Board finally approved and amended these guidelines on 14 November 1973.\textsuperscript{44} The Principal Nominating Committee was charged by the Local School Council to help select candidates for school principal. The guidelines noted that the Nominating Committee must include representatives of the PTA and/or local Concerned Parents Organizations. The committee must reflect the ethnic diversity of the school. The Nominating Committee must have at least five members and must reflect at least a sixty percent participation by parents. The Nominating Committee shall be guided by the District Superintendent. The Nominating Committee may

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{43}Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 October 1972, Chicago, Ill., p.1044-45.

\textsuperscript{44}Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 14 November 1973, Chicago, Ill., p.1100-03.
nominate up to a maximum of three candidates from the eligibility list if they desire. The Nominating Committee must nominate at least two candidates for each vacancy. The committee must also realize that state law requires that the General Superintendent recommends and the Board gives final approval of all principal appointments.

These moves towards decentralization made it appear outwardly that it was Redmond's intention to spread out his authority and provide the public with a voice into the administration of the school system. In a way, these were both half-truths. Redmond's plans for administrative decentralization were sincere. It was his intention to leave the daily operations of the school system to the Deputy Superintendent and the Area Associates. This sharing of powers would allow him more time to be a planner and a lobbyist for program improvements in both Springfield and Washington, D.C.. In fact, the political decentralization that took place with both the District Education Council and the Local School Councils could be considered merely "window dressing." Both of these Councils were basically advisory. In James Cibulka's "Obstacles to School Decentralization: The Chicago Case," it is noted that these Councils reached only the fifth level on Arnstein's "Ladder of Citizen Participation." This means, according to Cibulka, that the

Ibid.
Ibid.
Councils were created only to placate the citizens, and give them only advisory power.\textsuperscript{47} The Board of Education did not delegate any real powers to these groups. The Councils did benefit in that they felt that they had input into some of the decisions of the schools. Since they felt that they had been empowered, they felt some responsibility toward their schools. In fact, they had little power and eventually would realize it.

Redmond's ability to make more people feel that they were involved in the running of the schools was a positive outcome. The increase in the power of local school groups to give input into the selection of their school leadership helped give these groups the feeling that they were able to have some control over their own schools. This distribution of power seems to coincide with Fantini and Gittel's definition of political decentralization of the schools. We must remember however, that the councils could only advise; the final decision rested in the hands of the General Superintendent or his designee. He also tried to get support from the parents of parochial school students by establishing a shared-time program that would allow students from parochial schools to attend classes in regular public high school for part of the day. This idea of shared time

will be discussed as the fourth challenge met by Superintendent Redmond.
CHAPTER VI

REDMOND AND THE SHARED-TIME EXPERIMENT

After meeting the challenges of Union negotiations, desegregation, and decentralization, Redmond encountered a fourth challenge, the shared-time program. Redmond finally met a challenge that was not ordered by the courts, demanded by his employees, nor recommended by his consultants. Like desegregation, this program was inherited from Superintendent Ben Willis. The program began in September 1965 at two Chicago public high schools. This was a program that was not extremely controversial and that in fact had some community support. Redmond's task was to insure that the experiment continue and then, with his staff, analyze its results and plan for the future. Before we discuss the Chicago shared-time schools, we will present the background of the idea of shared-time.

Shared-time is defined as an arrangement whereby nonpublic schools send their students to public schools for instruction in one or more subjects during the school day. The term was first heard in 1960 and the concept of shared-time has been called other names such as split time, reserved time, dual school enrollment, educational
co-operation, part-time enrollment, and dual registration.¹

The United States Senate Education Sub-committee discussed the concept and in 1973 defined it in the following manner:

...the term shared-time means an arrangement for pupils enrolled in nonpublic elementary or secondary schools to attend public schools for instruction in certain subjects... regarded as being mainly or entirely secular, such as laboratory science and home economics.²

Although shared-time programs may take place in leased or rented parts of parochial schools, the instruction is provided by public school personnel. Usually the program provides secular courses such as industrial arts, science, and mathematics with public school teachers, while subjects such as social studies, humanities, and literature are taught by private school teachers.

The sharing of students between public and private schools has been defended in several ways. One defense is that the parochial schools relieve the public school from a substantial portion of its burden to educate society. Assistance to the parochial school in providing secular classes by public school teachers repays the parochial school for the relief it provides a burdened public school system.

A second rationale for the use of the shared-time is

that it complies with regulations of federal categorical funding laws. Federal categorical programs usually provide for assistance to meet the needs of certain groups of children whether they attend public or parochial schools.

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that state-supported remedial and therapeutic programs do not implicate the establishment clause as long as they are provided at religiously neutral sites, even if parochial school students are served in particular programs. The use of federally funded auxiliary services has been endorsed even when the public school teacher is assigned to the parochial school to provide the needed services.

In a November 1963 survey conducted by the Research Division of the National Education Association, post cards were sent to 12,366 United States school districts that had minimum enrollments of 300 students. Responses were received from 7,410 superintendents, 280 of whom said that they had parochial school students come to the public school for instruction in one or more subjects. This response indicated that only 3.8 percent of those replying were implementing shared-time programs. Illinois superintendents responding showed that thirty-seven

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shared-time programs existed in Illinois at the time of the survey. The Chicago school district was not one of these thirty-seven respondents from Illinois.

BOARD OF EDUCATION AUTHORIZES SHARED-TIME EXPERIMENT

After being deferred three times by the Chicago Board of Education, the proposal for shared-time was discussed at the Board meeting of 23 April 1964. At this meeting, the first motion regarding shared-time was to further examine the issue and invite representatives from all religious and civic groups to present their views on the issue. This motion was defeated by a 3-7 vote. Following this vote, Superintendent Willis addressed the Board and reported on a study of the shared-time issue ordered by the Board on 13 November 1963. He noted that parents of the John F. Kennedy High School (previously Kinzie High School) wanted a shared-time program and were willing to accept any workable plan that might be presented. Willis reminded the Board that based on other similar programs throughout the country, parental support was essential for a successful program.

Willis suggested a five-year experimental shared-time program beginning in September 1964 with 300 freshmen from the Kennedy area and classes of 400 students in each of the

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Meeting of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 23 April 1964, Chicago, Ill., p.2163.

following years until 1969. It was proposed that the students spend one-half to two-thirds of their time at Kennedy and the remainder of their time at St. Paul High School. ¹

Willis referred to a legal opinion given by Mr. Hutson, legal counsel for the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, that indicated his belief in the legality of the shared-time concept. Willis also stated that the United States Commissioner of Education favored such experiments and that similar programs were being tried nationwide.

Willis reminded the Board that the program would be experimental only and that they would remain responsible for and keep control of the Kennedy High School. He reminded the Board that the students taking part in the shared-time program must live in the Kennedy school attendance area. He also assured the Board that if other communities wanted to investigate the establishment of experimental shared-time programs with other parochial schools they would assist them in doing so. ¹⁰

After Willis' comments, a resolution was presented that authorized an experimental shared-time program to begin in September, 1965 and not extend beyond the school year commencing in September, 1968. The resolution directed the General Superintendent to request private schools in the

¹Ibid.
¹⁰Ibid., p.2164-65.
Kinzie area, other than St. Paul's, to cooperate in the experiment and also stated that:

... while the Board of Education and the Attorney for the Board are of the opinion that the experimental program does not in any manner violate the statutes and the Constitution of the State of Illinois or the Constitution of the United States, nevertheless because there are people interested in the Chicago public schools who are fearful that the experimental program may be in violation of such statutes or constitutions, the Board will welcome the filing of a test case by such persons and in the event such a test case is filed, it will be the policy of the Board of Education to promptly respond thereto and to cooperate to the maximum extent for an early hearing, disposition and determination of any issues raised in such a test case.\textsuperscript{11}

A roll call vote was called and the resolution was adopted by a vote of 7-3.

As was expected, a challenge to the resolution took place within a month. A complaint was filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County which sought:

... to enjoin the Board of Education from maintaining the dual enrollment program on the grounds that the program violated statutory and constitutional provisions.\textsuperscript{12}

The complaint was dismissed in January, 1965, "with prejudice", and the court held that the dual enrollment program would not violate either statutory or constitutional provisions. The case was appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court on 18 February 1966, and the decree of the trial court was affirmed. It was stated in the opinion of the trial

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}, p.2165.

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Morton v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago}, 69 Ill. App. 2d 38, p.42.
court that:

We, cannot find any intention on the part of the legislature to limit the power of a school board to adopt and develop better methods of educating the children of this State, so long as the methods adopted are otherwise consistent with the provisions of the School Code. ¹³

The Appellate Court also held that:

The experimental dual enrollment plan adopted by the Chicago Board of Education is merely an attempt to find a better method for the education of the Chicago public school children at the option of the parents or legal guardians of those children. ¹⁴

In July 1964, the Board established the attendance area for the new Kennedy High School. Construction of the new building continued throughout the 1964-65 school year and Ms. Dorothy Sauer of the Kinzie Elementary School was named principal. As classrooms became available, the nearly 1400 students were gradually moved into the new building. ¹⁵

In the spring of 1964, plans were being developed for the new St. Paul High School located three blocks away from Kennedy High School. Under the direction of the Christian Brothers and staffed by Christian Brothers and Sisters of the Order of St. Joseph, the school began recruiting students for the shared-time program from the area's parochial schools. ¹⁶

In the spring of 1965, the principals of Kennedy and

¹³Ibid.
¹⁴Ibid.
¹⁶Ibid., p.16.
St. Paul's met frequently to discuss the programming of the shared-time students and other details of the program. In concert with the school principals, the General Superintendent presented to the Board of Education the following guidelines for the students in the shared-time program. Students in the shared-time program shall:

- be accepted only upon written request of a parent or legal guardian
- be in full compliance with the compulsory attendance laws
- shall be assigned to class schedules in accordance with the plan worked out by the principal of the school
- shall be assigned to a school division and school counselor on the same basis as pupils in full-time attendance
- shall meet the requirements for graduation and receive a diploma issued by the Board of Education
- shall be offered all subjects available to full time students except those mentioned below
- shall receive credit towards graduation in English, Social Studies, Music and Art in a non-public school accredited by the North Central Association and the Illinois Department of Public Instruction
- shall follow Chicago public school courses of study and utilize Chicago public school textbooks
- shall be considered members of the public school student body with respect to athletic eligibility.

In September 1965, the shared-time program for the students in the Kennedy-St. Paul area began. This was the first time in the history of the Chicago Public Schools that students were allowed to split their school day between public and parochial schools. In the first year of the program 255 students from St. Paul's participated in the

program.\textsuperscript{18} Only one minor change was requested in the original program. The faculty of St. Paul's realized that it could not offer art and music to their students and they requested that these classes be taught at Kennedy. The only classes that would be taught at St. Paul's would be English, social studies, and religion.\textsuperscript{19}

When James F. Redmond began his superintendency in October 1966, the shared-time program had been operating for over one year. The enrollment had increased to 398 students in freshman and sophomore year.\textsuperscript{20} Enrollment increased to 487 students in 1967-68 and to 535 students in 1968-69.\textsuperscript{21}

In a Board authorized study, \textit{An Evaluation of the Experiment in Shared-Time}, Dr. Joan M. Raymond discussed several aspects of the shared-time programs, particularly the Kennedy-St. Paul program.\textsuperscript{22} Raymond noted that students in the shared-time program met the same graduation requirements as the regular public high school student, were able to receive the support services available in the public school, and were placed in a homeroom at both schools.\textsuperscript{23} The grading system in both schools was the same, but grade reports were originally sent out at different times. Problems arose the first year with the

\textsuperscript{18}Raymond, \textit{Loc. cit.}, p.22.
\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., p.23.
\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., p.22.
\textsuperscript{21}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p.24-25.
timing of grade reports, so it became necessary for St. Paul's to adjust their marking periods to conform with those of Kennedy. Grades received by the shared-time students at St. Paul were transferred to Kennedy, except for religion, and entered as transferred credits on the students' permanent record cards. Students who failed English or social studies were required to make up the failures during summer school.\textsuperscript{24}

Another aspect of the Kennedy-St. Paul program was the discussion of serious discipline problems. Serious discipline problems were discussed informally between the staffs of the two schools. There were no official exchanges of information except when a student was suspended from Kennedy he was also suspended from St. Paul's. The reverse procedure was not true because St. Paul's did not use suspension as a disciplinary technique.\textsuperscript{25} As noted earlier, shared-time students were subject to the same rules as full-time Kennedy students and were allowed to participate in extra-curricular programs at both schools. However, there was one additional rule for shared-time students. They were prohibited from wearing any identification from St. Paul's.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p.26-27.
\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., p.28.
\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., p.30.
SHARED-TIME PROGRAM ADDS TWO SCHOOLS

On 29 April 1965, when Superintendent Willis was asking for acceptance of the final guidelines on the Kennedy-St. Paul's program, he also requested that the Board approve a second shared-time program involving William Howard Taft High School and Luther High School North. In the original proposal it was mentioned that other school groups would be invited to participate in the experimental program and one group, the Lutheran Council of Greater Chicago, decided to ask to be considered as a participant. 27

The proposal submitted by Luther North suggested that approximately thirty freshmen take social studies and religion at their campus and the remainder of their classes at Taft High School. The proposal for participation in the shared-time program was developed by the Chicago Lutheran Shared-Time Education Committee. This organization was formed by representatives of the American Lutheran Church, the Lutheran Church in America, and the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod in 1964 to "make it possible for public school students to be enrolled for certain courses in a non-public school." 28

The Taft-Luther North program was to start in

27Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 29 April 1965, Chicago, Ill., p.2488-89.
September, 1965, but scheduling difficulties delayed the program until September, 1966. The students who were to begin the program as freshmen in 1965 were selected to participate as sophomores in 1966. In comparison to the Kennedy-St. Paul program, the Taft-Luther North program was considerably smaller. The fourteen students who participated did so for only two years.

The major difference between the Kennedy-St. Paul and Taft-Luther North was that the students at Kennedy were recruited for the program before they entered high school and they entered the two high schools simultaneously. In the Taft-Luther North program, the students were already full-time public school students who agreed to participate in an experimental program in which they would take one of their major subjects at a nonpublic school along with religious instruction.29

Another difference in the Taft-Luther North program was the proximity of the schools. Because Luther North is some distance from Taft, it became necessary for the fourteen shared-time students to have their classes at Our Savior Elementary School, a Lutheran school much closer to Taft High School. Two teachers from Luther North taught the fourteen sophomores religion and social studies in one classroom at the elementary school. These fourteen students

29 Raymond, loc.cit., p.32.
continued in the program during their junior year. 30

The shared-time students took Modern World History
during the first year and Contemporary American History
during the second year. The course of study in these
programs was reviewed by the Taft social studies department
chairman. At Taft, these shared-time students were placed
in classes in the same manner as all public school students.
These students would take a full day's program minus one
major subject (social studies). The transfer of credit for
classes taken from Luther North were carried out in the same
manner as at Kennedy-St.Paul. An unique aspect of the
Taft-Luther North program was that the shared-time students
were transported from Our Savior Elementary School to Taft
High School on a bus provided by the Chicago Lutheran
Shared-Time Committee. 31

The third parochial school that contacted the
Superintendent and asked to participate in the shared-time
program was the Chicago Jewish Academy (now called the Ida
Crown Jewish Academy). The Girl's High School Branch of the
Academy had moved into temporary quarters near Von Steuben
High School. 32 In August 1965, the Academy requested that
eighteen girls be allowed to take some courses at Von
Steuben which were not available at their school. The
proposal was given tentative approval and guidelines for

30 Ibid., p.33.
31 Ibid., p.36.
32 Ibid., p.36.
participation were established.\textsuperscript{33}

The Chicago Jewish Academy program differed from the other shared-time programs in some ways. Unlike the two other shared-time programs where the students were actually enrolled in the public school for most of the day, the girls from the Jewish Academy attended Von Steuben for only one or two classes. These shared-time students' records were kept at the parochial school rather than the public school. The credits earned at Von Steuben were transmitted to the Chicago Jewish Academy and were used toward meeting graduation requirements. Student attendance records were also maintained at the parochial school with daily reports forwarded from the public school.\textsuperscript{34}

The Von Steuben-Chicago Jewish Academy program actually began two days before it was formally approved by the Board of Education. The Board stipulated, as it had done before in the other shared-time agreements, that students participating in the program must live in the attendance area of the public school they would attend. The students, with signed parental approval, were to be programmed into classes in chemistry, shorthand, and typing. The parents of the girls objected to the coeducational nature of instruction in the chemistry class and the Jewish Academy requested that the girls be withdrawn from that class. The

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., p.38.
\textsuperscript{34}Ibid.
girls did remain in the typing and shorthand classes for two
years.35

The Von Steuben-Jewish Academy shared-time program did
not have official exchange of information concerning either
the students or the curriculum. Student grades were sent to
the parochial school which notified the student's parents of
the student's work.36 The contact between the shared-time
student and the public school was minimal in this case
because the majority of time spent in school was in the
parochial school rather the public school.

SHARED-TIME PROGRAM ENDS AT TWO SITES

Two of the shared-time programs, Von Steuben and the
Taft, were participants for only two years. Although the
program at Von Steuben-Jewish Academy started at the same
time that Kennedy-St. Paul began, its program ended in June
1967.37 One of the reasons for the program's lack of
success at Von Steuben could have been the small number of
participants from the Jewish Academy. There were only
eighteen girls who participated in the program. The girls
also participated in an atmosphere that was quite foreign to
them. They had been attending school in the segregated
setting of an all Jewish girls school. Their parents even
requested that they not take class with males and this

36Ibid., p.40.
37Ibid., p.149.
request was honored even though it restricted the girls to only two classes.

The Taft-Luther North program had a similar problem in that only fourteen students decided to participate in the shared-time program. These students took part in the program and were even provided transportation to the public school after their shared-time classes ended. We must recall that these students were already enrolled full time at Taft when the program began in September 1966. This program lasted two years also and was terminated in June 1968.\(^3\)

Administrators at Taft, Von Steuben, and the Chicago Jewish Academy noted that the biggest disadvantage of the shared-time program was the difficulty it presented in programming students for classes. They also noted that in order to have a successful program the student body must show an interest in the program and cooperate with it. These administrators did note that since the program was able to function well for two years, it illustrated both the feasibility and the possibility of more shared-time programs. All of the administrators interviewed about the program noted that they did not experience any serious difficulties in the operation of their programs and did not observe any harmful effects to their schools

\(^3\)Ibid.
KENNEDY-ST. PAUL PROGRAM CONSIDERED SUCCESSFUL

In Joan Raymond's study, *An Evaluation of the Experiment in Shared-Time*, we can read a complete analysis of the academic achievements and extra-curricular participation of the graduates that attended the Kennedy-St.Paul program for four years. Raymond considered only students that attended Kennedy for four years. This included students that attended Kennedy only, students that participated in the shared-time program for some time but withdrew and became full-time at Kennedy, and students that were enrolled in the shared-time program for all four years. Raymond's study considered achievement tests scores, subject taken in school, grades in all major subjects, grades in each major subject, grade point averages, class rank, post high school plans, ACT scores, attendance patterns, participation in extra-curricular activities, and service jobs at Kennedy High School. On the basis of statistical analysis of the data related to the school performance of graduates who attended Kennedy High School for four years and those who attended Kennedy on a shared-time basis for four years, the following summary profile emerged. The

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shared-time graduates:
- possessed, on the average, greater general ability
- took more college preparatory courses
- received high grades
- were in fewer honors classes
- earned about the same grade point averages
- had similar class ranks
- were more college oriented
- received about the same scores on the ACT
- were absent less
- participated in fewer extra-curricular activities
- had fewer service jobs at Kennedy
- received fewer honors at Kennedy
- were elected to fewer offices at Kennedy.\textsuperscript{41}

Raymond reminds us that it matters little if the program is administratively feasible and has no harmful effect on the students if there was an adverse reaction to it by those who were directly involved in its operation. In fact, the opinion of the participants might be the most crucial factor in the evaluation of the shared-time program. We must therefore, consider the reactions of the parents, students, teachers, and administrators who participated in the program.\textsuperscript{42}

The opinions of the administrators involved in the shared-time program were favorable. The three programs involved six administrative teams, all having varied experiences with the program but all noting a favorable reaction to the program with no indication of any serious difficulties in the shared-time operations.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{41}Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 June 1969, Chicago, Ill., p.3151.
\textsuperscript{42}Raymond, Loc.cit., p.156.
\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., p.157.
The author of this dissertation had the opportunity to interview a former administrator of the St. Paul High School. Brother Konrad Diebold, F.S.C., is now the president of St. Patrick High School on the northwest side of the city. Brother Konrad served as both a teacher (1966-69) and principal (1970-74) at St. Paul's. He felt that the program was indeed a success. He noted that administrators and staff at both schools worked hard to make the program succeed. The enthusiasm of the students and the concern of their parents fostered the growth of the program.44

Brother Konrad related that although there was apparent support from the Board of Education's central office, most of the management decisions regarding the two schools were made locally by the principals involved. He noted the problems of scheduling classes and adopting a common school calendar were settled locally. He felt that the reason that St. Paul was able to remain open for twelve years was the fact that the shared-time program was functioning well and allowed the non-public school to operate on a minimum budget.45 The shared-time program ended in 1977 when St. Paul's made what their administration refers to as an educational rather financial decision. Brother Konrad noted that the opening of Curie High School in 1975 significantly

45Ibid.
reduced the area from which St. Paul could draw their students. We must recall that the Board of Education limited participation in the shared-time program to those students who lived the Kennedy High School attendance area. With the opening of Curie, the Kennedy attendance area was cut in half. Since the area from which St. Paul could recruit potential students was cut in half also, their incoming student population was greatly decreased. Since less students meant wider variance in student abilities within each class, the administration of St. Paul decided it would be better to close than to operate a program that did not meet the needs of each individual student.\(^{46}\)

The parents and students who participated for four years in the Kennedy-St. Paul program also reacted favorably to it. Some parents had minor complaints while other parents viewed the same issues as pluses (e.g. homework). The biggest problems indicated were that the school day was too long and that there were conflicts in some students' programs which limited participation in certain classes or extra-curricular activities. Most parents did note that they would recommend the shared-time program to friends and relatives.\(^{47}\)

The teachers assigned to Kennedy were in general agreement that the shared-time program did not create

\(^{46}\)Ibid.

\(^{47}\)Raymond, _Loc.cit._, p.157.
additional work or problems for them. Moreover, they did not observe any harmful effects either to the school or to the students because of the shared-time program. 48

In summary, Raymond noted that from the point of view of the Chicago public schools, the shared-time programs were administratively feasible and not detrimental to the program of education in the public schools. Raymond recommended to Superintendent Redmond and the Board of Education that the shared-time program at Kennedy-St. Paul continue as long as St. Paul authorities concur. She recommended that the Board consider additional programs with other non-public schools. These recommendations were accepted by the Board of Education with a 10-0 vote. 49

Redmond noted in an interview that he continued the program which was in place when his superintendency began but that his participation in the program was minimal. He felt that although he was a Catholic, he had a hard time developing a philosophical argument for shared-time but that he also found it hard to argue with parents who wanted to try shared-time for their children. He supported the parents in their desire for continuing the program and noted that part of his support was due to the legal opinions that supported the program. 50

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48 Ibid., p.158.
50 Redmond interview. loc.cit.
Redmond referred to the Raymond study of the shared-time program as a very accurate report of the shared-time program and as the basis for his recommendation that the shared-time program continue as a result of the success of the experimental program. Further inquiries into the possibility of expanding the shared-time program were received by the Board during Redmond's superintendency but none of the inquiries resulted in the establishment of new programs. Inquiries from Brother Rice and Quigley South High Schools were received as well as from some parochial elementary schools.

Although this issue was not critical, it showed the willingness of Superintendent Redmond to carry on experimental programs that seemed to be working. He also made it clear that he was supportive of new programs if parents wanted them.

We have discussed four challenges that Redmond dealt with while in office. Now we will take a brief look at James F. Redmond's administrative style as he perceived it and as he was perceived by others.

CHAPTER VII

AN ASSESSMENT OF REDMOND'S LEADERSHIP

James F. Redmond served as General Superintendent of the Chicago Public Schools for almost nine full years, from October 1966 until September 1975. His tenure as Superintendent brought the school system through some of the most complex problems that it had seen before or since. He has been complimented and criticized for the programs and the plans that he implemented during his superintendency. This chapter will discuss what others thought of Redmond as a leader and will try to give an idea of what Redmond thought of his own leadership. Some of the comments were made after Redmond notified the Board of his intention to retire in 1975. We will also discuss how Redmond measures up to the functions of a school leader as defined by Redmond's friend and mentor Herold Hunt.

We must recall that Redmond succeeded Benjamin Willis who at first had support from the Board and the community. In his later years, Willis alienated several communities and had some staff members worried about whether they would be the next to feel the superintendent's wrath. Redmond arrived with a reputation of being a "conciliator." He welcomed input from community groups on both sides of any issue. His "fatherly" image gave people the idea that he
wanted to hear their side of an issue and that he would help
them solve their problem. This public image of Redmond was
generally reinforced by those who worked for and with him.

In a article in the Chicago Tribune Sunday Magazine,
Ridgely Hunt noted that after only a year, Redmond "will get
his way a lot of the time, and get it so gently, so
persuasively, that those through whom he works may not even
know who brought the miracles to pass. He is not greatly
concerned with grabbing all the praise so long as the job
gets done. He must rely on other people and it does no harm
to let them take the credit."

Redmond was able to fulfill his first contract without
much criticism. The time frame of the contract (1966-70)
was filled with each of the challenges mentioned in this
dissertation. His second four-year contract was approved by
the Board of Education on 25 March 1970 by a vote of 10-0.²
Later in the year, the Board again voted to renew Redmond's
contract and again he received a 10-0 vote, including the
vote of new board member Gerald Sbarboro.³

The first public criticism of Redmond from the Board of
Education came at a Board meeting on 28 July 1971. Mrs.
William Rohter, a newly appointed Board member, addressed

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¹Ridgely Hunt, "The Conciliator," Chicago Tribune Sunday
²Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 25 March
³Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 26 August
herself to Redmond at the meeting and stated that she felt there had been an erosion of discipline within the schools. She criticized Redmond saying:

I feel that you do not know what is going on in the schools. Not that you're not concerned, but that you have over a period of time insulated and isolated yourself from our problems. Perhaps you have relied too much on your staff, when you might better have served our schools by replacing some of them. I do not overlook the fact that you inherited many of these problems, but that was some years ago. In my judgement not enough effort has been directed to correcting these ills and preventing others, from developing. Rather, the action has been to justify and defend.

Dr. Redmond, it is my considered opinion that this system needs a thorough shake-up from the top down, that will clear it up and clean it out and make it work. Only you can do that. I ask, even plead with you, to stop talking about accountability and start demanding it from those next to you, those under them, and the way down the line.4

After this verbal attack, the usually quiet Redmond was noticeably upset but did not react until the next Board meeting on 11 August 1971. At the meeting Dr. Redmond presented the following statement (in part):

I have re-read your statement carefully since the Board meeting of July 28, 1971 and repeat my comment on the floor of the Board that it is my belief that your comments were well motivated. However, they are subjective and very general in nature, and therefore difficult to answer specifically. It is difficult to speak of specifics when we are not aware of the specifics referred to. I trust that you will understand that generalizations offer little guidance to the General Superintendent. Specifics will be investigated, and answered whenever submitted to me.

...Decentralization, however has been a traumatic change in Chicago. It demands a complete rethinking of

4Minutes of the Board of Education Meeting, 28 July 1971, Chicago, Il., p.211.
roles for everyone on the staff and for the members of the Board of Education. We must remember that it is a great deal to expect an immediate change of attitude on the part of people steeped in the concept of central office control.

...So long as all decisions emanate from the General Superintendent of Schools, centralization is in effect, and paper structure to the contrary changes nothing. This I do not intend to let happen. The Deputy Superintendent and the three Area Associate Superintendents and the field staffs have been given authority and responsibility to look at the communities, the schools, the teachers, the children, and to evaluate and assess needs of these groups...

I expect the Deputy, the area associates, the district superintendents, and the principals to grow in confidence as each makes decisions and witnesses education coming alive for all the children in the schools. Leadership cannot be fostered or developed if decisions are being questioned constantly...

...I do believe that as you travel across this city, you will find leadership in schools where it never existed before...

To resolve problems, Mrs. Rohter, you suggest that I make sweeping changes of staff. Yet, when they were appointed these administrators met criteria essential for appointment; they have responded to what they were told at the time of appointment; and if the rules are changing, they must also be told and they must be helped in the changing...

Redmond's response indicated that he was concerned that Mrs. Rohter did not truly understand his administrative style and how it coalesced with the idea of decentralization. He noted that he felt it was essential for his subordinates to realize that they could be decision makers. He defended his subordinates and reminded Mrs. Rohter that he realized there were some problems but he also noted growth and a new

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willingness to make decisions and develop programs. Redmond's willingness to defend his subordinates was an indication of his leadership ability and of loyalty to them. The relationship between Redmond and Mrs. Rohter never changed during his tenure as Superintendent. In an interview with Redmond, he noted that he had great difficulty with her and felt that she had her own personal agenda for the Board of Education.

Most of the commentary on the leadership ability of Redmond came either at the time of his tenure as Acting Superintendent or after he removed his name from the list of candidates for the Superintendency in August 1975. Redmond received a one-year appointment as Acting Superintendent on 22 May 1974 by a vote of 7-2. It was apparent that Redmond had lost some of his support on the Board. There was speculation in the papers that Black Board members would not vote to retain Redmond for another four years. After the 22 May meeting, Board member Mrs. W. Lydon Wild, a Redmond supporter, said, "The superintendent has done as well, if not better, than any man could. I believed in him then and I believe in him now and I would include him in the search for the new superintendent."

On 12 October 1974, Redmond received a vote of

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confidence from one of his yearly adversaries, Robert Healey. Healey, who said he was speaking as an individual not as a Union representative, praised Redmond for his success in developing a balanced budget in the last two years and for various educational programs. Healey mentioned the child parent centers, the Disney Magnet School and the READ program at Goudy as positive examples of Redmond's administration. Healey said, "if he takes the blame for the bad, he should take credit for the good."

Redmond removed himself from consideration for the four year term as Superintendent on 25 April 1975. He announced his intentions at a press conference during which he took an unprecedented stance against the Board. Redmond said:

Despite the efforts of several sincere and dedicated members, I feel the present board membership is not compatible and not able to work together for the improvement of the schools. The constant bickering by the board membership among themselves, the personal attacks by some of the board members on members of my staff, the intrusion of some members of the board into administrative prerogatives of the staff at the school, district, area, and central office levels; the continuing refusal of some the board members to confine their activities to policy matters, despite the pleas and protestations of some few of the board members, all of these have led me to my decision.

After hearing of Redmond's decision, Mayor Richard J. Daley commented, "All the city of Chicago should be grateful for what Redmond did in seven dissentious and contentious years."

"Casey Banas, "Redmond Angered; Bows Out," Chicago Tribune, 26 April 1975, p.2."
After the history of the Board of Education is reviewed, I think he will go down as a great superintendent." Board President John D. Carey said, "I am saddened by his decision, although I can understand his feeling."  

In his last speech as superintendent, Redmond addressed the delegates of the Chicago Region Parent Teachers Association, his staunch ally over his nine year tenure. Redmond acknowledged his strong working relationship with the PTA during his tenure. PTA President Doris Leftakes presented Redmond with an honorary lifetime PTA membership, and praised him for "the long, hard hours of work that you have contributed on behalf of our youngsters." Leftakes then noted Redmond's accomplishments including his legislative program, publishing of the reading scores, the intensive reading program, and building rehabilitation programs. She continued saying that he made the schools more accessible for parents and made great strides in relation to teacher salaries.  

The strained feelings between Redmond and the Board were apparent during his last Board meeting as Superintendent on 28 May 1975. Redmond did not say a word at the meeting which included a communication from the Chicago Federation of Labor that thanked Redmond for his

14 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
support and participation in collective bargaining with the various labor groups representing employees of the Board of Education. This Board meeting concluded with President Carey thanking Redmond publicly for all that he had done for the children of Chicago. A resolution was immediately passed that reflected these same feelings from the entire Board. There was a brief standing ovation for the outgoing Superintendent and then a quick adjournment.

In an interview with Dr. Manford Byrd, former Superintendent of Schools in Chicago and Deputy Superintendent under Redmond, the topic of Redmond's leadership was discussed. Byrd noted that one of the characteristics that he most admired in Redmond was his integrity. Byrd said, "He was probably one of the most ethical persons I have ever known. He would not sacrifice others when pressures were great on him. He would never scapegoat staff to save his neck."

Byrd said that Redmond would delegate certain tasks to his staff, and once delegated he would try to keep himself clear of the task so that the staff member would feel that he had control of his own situation. Redmond had great confidence in his staff and would be very supportive of them even in the face of criticism from Board members. Byrd felt

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15 Minutes of the Chicago Board of Education Meeting, 28 May 1975, Chicago, Ill., p.2355.
16 Personal interview with Dr. Manford Byrd, Jr., Chicago, Ill., 13 December 1989.
that Redmond helped many staff members develop into leaders by giving them tasks and the free reign to follow the task through fruition.

Byrd noted that his successes as Deputy Superintendent and later General Superintendent were due in large part to the empowerment that Redmond gave him. He felt that Redmond wanted to develop leaders and was the person who helped him understand what it meant to be a leader. When asked if he saw any weakness in Redmond, Byrd replied that "if he had one it was that he tolerated staff longer that he had to. He did not like to give up on people, he felt that they could be reached." 17

When asked to define his own style of leadership, Redmond said that he felt that "if I think enough of a guy to recommend his appointment to a position of importance then I'm convinced that he is able to do the job and I want him to get it done. I don't believe in second guessing my subordinates but I would step in if I saw disaster coming." 18 He wanted to give people the chance to prove themselves and was not concerned with minor errors.

Redmond felt that it was the responsibility of the leader, whether he is a superintendent or a principal, to create an atmosphere for the enterprise to work. The leader must make available the tools that his subordinates

17 Ibid.
18 Redmond interview, Loc.cit.
need to do their job. He said that a leader must be a dreamer as well. He must be able to seek alternate solutions to problems that he encounters. He has to be able to make long term plans.1

As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, Redmond considered his friend and former boss, Herold Hunt, as his mentor. Referring to Herold Hunt's eight functions of administrative responsibility listed in chapter one, we will now analyze Redmond's leadership abilities in relation to Hunt's criteria. The first criterion, the cooperative development of a program that is custom made for a community, was exemplified by both the "Redmond Plan" for the desegregation of the schools, and by the development of district and local school advisory councils. The second criterion, organization of an administrative framework to implement and facilitate the program, was achieved through the implementation of the Booz, Allen, and Hamilton Report which decentralized the school system and gave more decision making capabilities to district superintendents. The third criterion, serving as an adviser and executive officer to the board of education, was also achieved through the Booz, Allen, and Hamilton Report which created the role of the Deputy Superintendent (as chief operating officer) and gave the Superintendent (chief administrative officer) time to develop educational, financial, and facility plans for board

1Ibid.
review and approval. The fourth criterion, providing a democratic leadership of school personnel, was also achieved through the administrative decentralization of the system. The fifth criterion, observation of legal educational and administrative requirements, was exemplified in the efforts that the Redmond administration showed in trying to comply with the federal government's order to desegregate the schools. During teacher negotiations, Redmond also tried to defend the right of the Board of Examiners to establish criterion for teacher certification. He warned both the Union and Board members that they could not legally negotiate changes in certification procedures. He insisted that changes had to be approved by the Board of Examiners. The sixth criterion called for the development of working relationships with home and community agencies. The guidelines for the composition of district and local school councils required the inclusion of parents, community members, and local community workers on the councils. The seventh criterion, adequate instruction and guidance in American citizenship, has always been a stated goal of the Chicago public school system and the Redmond administration embraced this goal. The final criterion, providing a healthful, humanized, and satisfying living for pupils and teachers, was strived for through negotiations with the Teachers Union. Redmond supported many of the educational improvements suggested by the Union but he found it
difficult at times to reach a prioritization of needs with the Union. His remarks after the first negotiated contract showed that he was in favor of providing a equitable salary for his teachers. After reflecting on Hunt's functions of administrative responsibility, we can see that according to his criteria, James F. Redmond showed the qualities of a good administrator and leader.

Finally, we will try to assess Redmond as a leader using three leadership theories. First, we will use Robert Tannebaum and Warren Schmidt's "Continuum of Leader Behavior." Tannebaum and Schmidt describe "forces" a leader should consider when deciding how to manage. Althought other theorist would place these forces into the category "situational," Tannebaum and Schmidt called them "forces in the manager," "forces in the subordinates," and "forces in the situation." We would evaluate Redmond as a "Relationships-Oriented Leader" who wanted to permit his subordinates as much freedom as possible. He expressed great confidence in their abilities. He assured those who had held positions of authority under Willis that he would not remove them if they were performing their duties appropriately. He would be considered a democratic leader as opposed to an authoritarian leader. Although he was a

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21 Ibd., p.67.
democratic leader, he also noted that ultimately he was the one who would be accountable to the Board in case of errors.

Secondly, we will consider Redmond's leadership style using the Hersey and Blanchard's situational leadership model. Using this model, we find that Redmond fell into the second quadrant which indicated a high task and high relationship style of leadership. Redmond shared many of his duties, a mark of a good administrator. He not only shared tasks but gave his subordinates the authority to carry out the tasks. We see that Redmond did exactly what Hersey and Blanchard said a leader of this type would do.

As his subordinates matured in their positions, Redmond would decrease task behavior and increase relationship behavior until the subordinate reached a moderate level of maturity. As the subordinate reached above average maturity in his position, Redmond decreased both task behavior and relationship behavior. The subordinate was given power to make his own decisions.

Finally, if we were to place Redmond on Blake and Mouton's "Managerial Grid", we would find him in the 9.9 Management area. Redmond had a high concern for his staff. He wanted them to feel ownership in his organization and encouraged them to offer their own opinion. He fostered

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a belief in the idea of providing the best possible education for the children of Chicago. He would appoint people whom he felt were committed to the schools. He wanted to build a leadership atmosphere of mutual trust and respect with the common goal a better educational system for Chicago. He tried to assure those who held power before he assumed the superintendency that he was not interested in replacing them, but wanted them to continue to contribute and support his efforts. He did not "clean out the cabinet" when he arrived but asked those in influential positions to continue to support his efforts for the schools.

In considering the assessment of Redmond's leadership, whether we choose the assessment of his subordinates, his adversary, leadership theorists, or Redmond himself, we must conclude that he was in fact, a leader. His quiet demeanor was only part of the make up the man who ably led the Chicago public schools for nine years. He received the support of his subordinates by giving them the opportunity to make decisions and providing them with support in their decisions. The effects of his leadership remain with the school system. Programs and ideas first discussed during his administration were carried out by future superintendents.
CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

James F. Redmond assumed the superintendency of the Chicago public school system in October 1966. He was selected for the position because he offered the Board of Education both a new type of leadership and a familiarity with the Chicago public school system. The Board of Education and community leaders had tired of the abrasive and dictatorial style of Benjamin Willis. James F. Redmond brought to the Board a quite different personality. He was known as a calm and democratic leader. Upon his arrival Redmond was immediately involved in critical decision making. In his first six months as General Superintendent, he was required to negotiate the first collective bargaining agreement with the Chicago Teachers Union and prepare a response to the federal government's demand to develop a plan to desegregate the schools. Within the first eighteen months he would be responsible for the decentralization of the school system. He had to manage all of these new responsibilities while at the same time assuring the citizens of the city that the current educational offerings, including programs like the shared-time experiments, would continue to meet the needs of their children.
The purpose of this final chapter is to discuss how Redmond's ideas and decisions have fared with the test of time. We will discuss his plan of action for each of the issues presented in this dissertation and how, over the fifteen years since Redmond left office, these plans have affected the Chicago school system.

The first issue discussed was the collective bargaining negotiations between the Board of Education and the Chicago Teachers Union. Redmond made it clear in the first negotiations that he was generally supportive of demands for a salary increase. Redmond negotiated nine contracts with the Union. During this period there were only three strikes and they accounted for twenty-two days of lost school time. In my interview with Redmond, he noted the growth in the abilities of the Board negotiators during his years as superintendent. He felt that a key to his success in negotiations was the development of a good bargaining team led by Guy Brunetti. He noted that his only regrets about the negotiation process was when the two sides were at an impasse and were forced to seek mediation from Mayor Daley's office. Redmond said that he would rather compromise with the Union on an issue than go to the Mayor's office, because once negotiations reached City Hall, he knew that his bargaining position had eroded. Redmond recognized that Mayor Daley depended upon being considered a friend of the unions and if negotiations reached the Mayor's office,
the Mayor would tell the Board members to give the Union what they wanted. Redmond’s attempts to keep the Board in a fiscally responsible position were continually thwarted when he was forced to create a large deficit because Board members were told to appease the Union.

Redmond’s experience in the Board’s negotiations reflect the conclusions he reached in his own dissertation. He advised school leaders to seek the support and input of teachers and develop within them a sense of power and responsibility. If teachers feel that they have power within the system, then they feel an ownership and are willing to share responsibility with the Board. Redmond warned school boards not to become fiscally dependent on other governmental bodies. Redmond knew the limited resources of the Board of Education and tried to maintain fiscal responsibility. Nonetheless he was often left powerless because of the Mayor’s influence over Board of Education members. Eventually, the influence of city hall over the Board of Education lead to the financial collapse of the Board and the resulting watchdog group called the School Finance Authority.

The Redmond Plan (Increasing Desegregation of Faculties, Students, and Vocational Education Programs) was Redmond’s solution to end the segregated school system in Chicago. This plan recommended a new faculty assignment plan that would assign experienced teachers to schools
throughout the city. The plan also called for changes in school boundaries to lessen the burden of overcrowding. The idea of open enrollment in vocational and technical high schools were further efforts to provide an integrated school system. Students of all races were encouraged to take part in extracurricular activities such as the all-city band and chorus.

Redmond’s recommendations were accepted in principle. He referred to the term "in principle" as the Board saying, "It's a good idea but it's not politically reasonable to carry it out." He said that Board members realized that the programs had to be educationally beneficial to all children and provide a way for the Board to show the federal government that we were trying to desegregate the school system. However, he also felt that they had been told that the plan could not be put into effect because it could threaten the political machine. Many ethnic groups voiced their disapproval of integrated schools, and since these groups made up part of the political machine, their voices were heard.

It seems that many aspects of the Redmond Plan were necessary in order to attempt to desegregate the schools. In the later 1970’s and 1980’s, many of the suggestions of the Plan were carried out by later administrations. The Consent Decree entered into by the Board of Education

'Redmond interview, Loc.cit.
restricted the teacher transfer policy of the Board of Education and assured that all school faculties would be integrated. This plan helped to keep some experienced teachers in schools where they could be used as a resource for new teachers.

The Redmond Plan's concept of magnet schools was later expanded. The "Access to Excellence" and "Options for Knowledge" programs of later superintendents are basically the same programs as suggested in the Plan.

One might reflect and wonder what changes would have taken place in the Chicago public schools if the Redmond Plan was accepted in fact rather than "in principle." It is possible that the "white flight" that took place in the late 1960's and 1970's could have been lessened. The creation of specialized schools might have kept some parents from leaving the city in order to get a quality education for their children.

The Booz, Allen, & Hamilton Report which became the basis for the administrative decentralization of the Chicago Public Schools was fully supported by Superintendent Redmond. Redmond was pleased with the report because he shared many of the management consultants' ideas. He felt that the General Superintendent should be the chief administrative officer and should be responsible for developing the educational, financial, and facilities plans for Board review. He should be the planner and the policy
implementer for the Board. The day-to-day operations of the schools would become the responsibility of the Deputy Superintendent.

The Booz, Allen, & Hamilton Report also suggested the creation of the office of Area Associate Superintendent. This new position would further decentralization because the new Associate Superintendents could make decisions previously made only in the central office. The Area Associate Superintendent administered the total spectrum of activities of the school system in his assigned area.

The political decentralization of the Chicago public schools began when the Redmond administration created the district advisory council and later the local school council. Both of these groups were composed of parents and community members who were interested in creating a better district or school. The council members could advise the district superintendent or principal on matters regarding the school.

Redmond's ideas of administrative and political decentralization have continued through the years with a few changes. The position of Area Associate Superintendent has been eliminated, but the position of Deputy Superintendent remains and still functions in the same areas that were delegated to the position by Redmond's reorganization plan. Until the recent school reform movement, local school councils continued to act as advisors to the principal. The
powers of the local school council were greatly increased in the recent school reform movement. Now the local school council has the power to make decisions, not just act as advisors.

As stated earlier, the shared-time experiment was just one example of programs that were already in existence when Redmond became General Superintendent. Redmond and his staff followed the progress of the experiment and suggested that it continue on a limited basis after the four year trial period. The Kennedy-St. Paul program was quite successful and lasted for an additional eight years. The reason the program ended was not because of lack of interest, but because the area from which St. Paul could draw its students was limited to the Kennedy attendance area.

The idea of shared-time programs could again become a reality. Many states are discussing the possible use of an educational voucher system to give parents an opportunity to select the school which their child will attend. It would be reasonable to assume that shared-time schools similar to the Kennedy-St. Paul program could develop again and provide parents with an additional option for their child's education.

James F. Redmond served as General Superintendent of the Chicago Public Schools for almost nine years. During his tenure in office there was a great deal of social
change. Redmond was able to assume the leadership of a troubled school system and provide a stable atmosphere until the last year of his tenure. Redmond met the four challenges discussed in this dissertation and many other challenges as well. He provided effective leadership to the school system and helped nurture future leaders of the system. I believe the school system would be better today if he would have had the power to carry out his proposed programs.
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BOARD COMMITTEES
- REAL ESTATE/FINANCE
- FISCAL POLICY
- SPECIAL COMMITTEES

BOARD OF EXAMINERS

BOARD OF EDUCATION

PRESENT SCHOOL SYSTEM REPORTING RELATIONSHIPS

Fig. 1
(Source: Organizational Study)
(Booz, Allen, & Hamilton)

LEGEND:
- Heavy lines depict a well-defined reporting relationship, that less
- For purposes of illustration, functions are grouped in slow moving reporting
- Level of lines reflect reporting relationship only, not organizational
- Equal symbol indicates a common organizational role
EXHIBIT III
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO
PROPOSED ORGANIZATION PLAN
(Board of Education and General Superintendent)

Fig. 3a
(Source: Organizational Study)
(Booz, Allen, & Hamilton)
LEGEND:
- Level of boxes indicates reporting relationship only, not organizational level of individual units or positions
- Organization and composition of line and staff groups varies among areas depending upon educational requirements and programs administered within the area

**PUPIL PERSONNEL SERVICES AND SPECIAL EDUCATION**
- Provide pupil personnel services to schools
- Guidance services
- Attendance services
- Social work
- Nurse services
- Psychological services
- Speech therapy
- Reading programs
- Provide functional direction to special education programs administered in the area
  - Mentally handicapped
  - Physically handicapped
  - Socially maladjusted

**AREA PROGRAMS**
- Operate summer schools
- Operate pre-school education programs
- Operate recreational programs
- Operate playground and stadium operations

**CURRICULUM SERVICES**
- Provide curriculum services to schools
  - Basic subject areas
  - Vocational education
  - Art
  - Music
  - Health, sex education, and physical education
  - Provide assistance to the use of instructional media and audio-visual aids
  - Provide in-service training for teachers

**COMMUNITY AND HUMAN RELATIONS**
- Administer human relations and integration programs
- Administer public relations programs
- Elicit community opinion on school plans and operations
- Explain school policies, plans and operations to the community
- Supervise parent and community relations coordinators based in the area office
- Provide functional direction to school community representatives and parent and human relations coordinators based in schools

**ADMINISTRATION**
- Administer substitute teacher pool
- Develop and control area budgets
- Develop recommendations, coordinated with Community and Human Relations, for attendance units and facilities
- Coordinate administrative procedures in area

**PLANT OPERATIONS**
- Supervise plant operating personnel
- Coordinate maintenance work

**DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENTS**
- Administer the educational program of the district
- Propose operating and capital budgets
- Recommend assignments of teachers and appointments of principals and assistant principals in the district
- Coordinate instructional programs among elementary and secondary schools in the district
- Supervise principals in the district
- Coordinate the use of area staff services, in the district
- Administer community relations programs for the district

**ASSOCIATE SUPERINTENDENT (AREA)**
- Administer the educational program of the area
- Evaluate and recommend attendance unit changes and construction of educational facilities
- Prepare operating and capital budgets for approval
- Recommend appointments, transfers and reassignments of principals, assistant principals and personal reporting to the associate superintendent
- Approve appointments, transfers and reassignments of personal reporting to area staff directors
- Control expenditures in accordance with the budget
- Supervise district superintendents and area staff directors
- Establish operating procedures for the area

**BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO**

**PROPOSED ORGANIZATION PLAN**
(Associate Superintendent - Area)

**Fig. 3c**
(Source: Organizational Study)
(Booz, Allen, & Hamilton)
APPROVAL SHEET

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