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THE ONE'S KNOWLEDGE IN PLOTINUS
VOLUME I

by
Atsushi Sumi

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

COPYRIGHT NOTICE ........................................................................................................ ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................. iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................... iv
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1

VOLUME I. PLATO, ARISTOTLE, AND PLOTINUS ON INTELLECTION:
THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PLOTINUS' 
DOCTRINE OF THE ONE'S KNOWLEDGE

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 9

Chapter

I. INTELLECTION IN PLATO ..................................................................................... 11
   Introduction ............................................................................................................. 11
   Intellection in the Allegory of the Sun (Republic 508e-509b) ......................... 12
   Intellection in the Allegory of the Divided Line (Republic 509c-511e) .......... 17
   Intellection in the Problem of Being (Sophist 245e-249d) ......................... 24
   Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 35

II. INTELLECTION IN ARISTOTLE .......................................................................... 69

III. INTELLECTION IN PLOTINUS ........................................................................... 97
   Introduction ............................................................................................................. 97
   The Presence of the Intelligible Objects within Intellect ......................... 99
   Plotinus' Interpretation of Sophist 248d-249a ........................................... 113
Intellection as \( \Sigma \nu \alpha \iota \sigma \theta \eta \sigma \varsigma \) .......................................................... 119

The Intellect-Intelligible Identity and the Doctrine of the Forms as God’s Thoughts .......................................................... 124

Intellectual Activity and the Immutability of Being ............................................................................. 127

The Hyper-Noetic Activity of Intellect .................................................................................. 129

The One as \( \mathrm{T}_\circ \mathrm{O} \mathrm{N}_\circ \mathrm{I}_\circ \mathrm{T}_\circ \circ \mathrm{O} \) ............................................................................... 137

Self-Intellection and the One’s Knowledge ............................................................................. 141

VOLUME II. THE ONE’S KNOWLEDGE IN PLOTINUS

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 192

Chapter

I. V 4 [7],2,13-19: THE ONE’S KNOWLEDGE AND CONSCIOUSNESS .......................................................... 196

II. VI 9 [9],9,13-22: THE HYPER-NOETIC INTELLECTION OF THE SOUL UNITED WITH THE ONE .................................................................................. 211

III. V 1 [10],7,4-17: THE ONE’S QUASI-CONSCIOUSNESS? .................................................................................. 224

IV. THE DENIAL OF INTELLECTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS TO THE ONE IN VI 9 [9], III 9 [13], AND V 6 [24] .................................................................................. 257

Introduction .................................................................................................. 257

The Denial of Intellection to the One .................................................................................. 258

The Arguments from the Absolute Simplicity of the One .................................................................................. 259

The Arguments from the Self-Sufficiency of the Good .................................................................................. 262

The Denial of Consciousness to the One .................................................................................. 265

V. VI 7 [38],39,1-4: THE ONE’S INTUITION .................................................................................. 273

Introduction .................................................................................................. 273

The One’s Intuition .................................................................................. 274
INTRODUCTION

In the eighth and the ninth chapters of his treatise "On the Three Primary Hypostases" (V 1 [10]), Plotinus compiles the doxography of ancient philosophers with regard to their attitudes towards the transcendent One. After remarking that those who sided with Pythagoras and Pherecydes knew most about the One (9,27-30),1 he concludes his doxographical presentation:

But some of them worked out the idea fully in their own writings (ἐξειργάσαντο ἐν αὐτοῖς αὐτῶν λόγοις), others did not do so in written works but in unwritten group discussions, or left it altogether alone (9,30-32, tr. A. H. Armstrong).2

Plotinus is here making a distinction between those of the ancients who have given a full written account of the doctrine of the One and those who have not done so. The latter group is further subdivided into those who mentioned the subject in unrecorded seminar and those who have not mentioned it at all. Who would Plotinus think belong to the first group? He indeed states that Plato's own writings (τοῖς αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πλάτωνος γράμμασιν) can be the evidence for the ancient origin of his view of three hypostases (8,13-14). Then, did Plato "fully work out" the idea of the transcendent One in his dialogues? Plotinus assesses that his doctrine of three hypostases is not explicitly (μὴ ἀναπεπταμένως) stated in Plato's writings (8,11-12). In fact, the modification μὴ ἀναπεπταμένως would not go with the verb ἔξεργάζεσθαι. We know, as a historical fact, that Plato deals with the transcendent Good in the metaphor of the sun in the Republic. But even if the metaphor of the sun, in the Plotinian fashion, is taken closely with the deduction from the first hypothesis in the so-called second part of the Parmenides and with Diotima's talk about the Idea of the Beauty in the Symposium, we will be reluctant
to admit that Plato did work out (ἔξεργάζεσθαι) the transcendent One or Good in his own dialogues. We are left totally perplexed about which philosophers Plotinus may categorize into the first group.

In spite of our perplexity, the above cited passage really adumbrates the basic attitude of Plotinus towards his doctrine of the One; he assumes, as his own philosophical task, to give a fully elaborate account of the highest principle in his treatises. In order to work out (ἔξεργάζεσθαι) his doctrine of the One in his written works, Plotinus is forced to go through all the problems concerning the nature and the activity of the One with indomitable philosophical spirit. He, against Aristotle, posits the One beyond the self-thinking Intellect. Then, the question naturally arises whether the One has intellection or not. If it does not, how can intellection be justifiably denied to it? If the One has some hyper-noetic activity, what may it be called? In which respect does it differ from intellection? These are the basic problems, regarding the One's knowledge, which Plotinus must unavoidably encounter in his endeavor to "work out" his doctrine of the One fully.

Several critics have already undertaken the study of Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge. Rist's study in his book published in 1967 is the first major effort to treat the issue. But he almost exclusively focuses upon the chronological development of terminology that Plotinus employs in describing the One's hyper-noetic activity. Deck's study in his book published in the same year is simply intended to remark that super-knowledge is not absent from the One. Being quite brief, it cannot be regarded as a full study of the issue. Finally, Bussanich undertakes more extensive study of the problem in his recent book and article. He pays enough attention to the context in which a given crucial term occurs to delineate the exact difference between the One and Intellect. Bussanich succeeds in clarifying how Plotinus carefully calibrates his positive statements about the One's inner life. But he does not fully analyze Plotinus' arguments for the absence of
intellection from the One, so that his study does not sufficiently point out how the positive and the negative descriptions of the One's knowledge are consistent with one another within the comprehensive doctrine of the One. The problem, whether the One has intellection or not, has grave significance since the answer to it determines the basic character of the philosophy of Plotinus. Plotinus hence devotes one treatise V 6 [24] and five chapters (chs. 37-41) of another treatise VI 7 [38] to the elaborate consideration of this problem. For the full study of the doctrine of the One's knowledge, we cannot avoid carefully considering Plotinus' arguments for the absence of intellection from the One.

In this dissertation, we shall analyze not only the affirmations about the One's knowledge but the arguments for the absence of intellection and intellectual consciousness from the One. With this analysis, we shall further inquire into the following problems. First, is there any chronological development in Plotinus' affirmations about the One's knowledge? Does he try to distinguish, by employing technical terms and qualifications, the unique activity of the One from the cognitive activities of Intellect and the soul? Second, what ontological status of the One might serve as the ground for its cognitive activity? How is that ontological status related to other doctrines of Plotinus? Third, how is the denial of intellection to the One rooted in the fundamental thesis of Plotinus' philosophy, the absolute unity of the One? Is there any chronological development in his arguments for this denial? Fourth, how does Plotinus attempt to undermine the probable distortion of his own doctrine, that is, the jump from the negation of intellection to the One to the ascription of some pejorative terms to it? Does any affirmation about the One's hyper-noetic activity satisfactorily dismiss this kind of misconstruction? Fifth, how can the negation of intellection and the ascription of the hyper-noetic knowledge to the One be coherent with each other? Again, how is the negation of intellection coherent with the ontological status of the One which serves as the foundation for
the affirmations about its hyper-noetic knowledge? Finally, how does the chronological change, if any, in Plotinus' terminology describing the One's knowledge influence the mode of coherence between the negation of intellection and the ascription of the hyper-noetic knowledge to the One? For our inquiry to be the full study of the One's knowledge, we must consider all these problems from diverse angles.

What method should we take in order to work out the aforementioned problems? It is clear that we must read Plotinus' texts very carefully from two viewpoints, chronological and systematic. We can read the relevant passages from the *Enneads* in the chronological order, referring to Porphyry's chronological list of Plotinus' treatises (*Vita Plotini*, chs. 4-6), which the majority of scholars regard as correct. But it does not suffice to read the key texts from the chronological point of view alone. Since Plotinus' treatises are composed during his last seventeen years, they show no substantial development in his system. His system seems to have already emerged before he began his writing, so that he, in each treatise, seem to presuppose the already emerged system. As Armstrong remarks, the treatises of the *Enneads* give us "an extremely unsystematic presentation of a systematic philosophy." Hence we always need to bear the entire system of Plotinus' philosophy in mind. Concretely speaking, for our issue, the consideration from the systematic viewpoint reveals not only the theses which are consistently maintained regarding the One's knowledge throughout all the periods of his writing but their systematic relation to other theses constituting the doctrine of the One. From two viewpoints, furthermore, we can even see the chronological development to the extent that Plotinus has systematized his doctrine of the One.

Another point to be noticed in interpreting Plotinus' texts is that the real object of our inquiry is his formal doctrine of the One's knowledge. The treatise VI 8 [39] comprises extremely positive and revealing descriptions of the One's inner
activity. But, since Plotinus' descriptions in this treatise, as he himself mentions, somewhat diverge from his formal doctrine, we must treat them with sufficient circumspection and sensitivity. Our modus interpretandi of VI 8 [39] will be carefully worked out in Chapter VI of Part II.

In order to undertake the full study of the One's knowledge, we cannot avoid inquiring into the nature of intellection. Needless to say, the denial of intellection to the One will be unfounded unless the nature of intellection is sufficiently explored. Intellection represents the cognitive relation between thinking subject and object thought. Plotinus' theory of the triple identity of Intellect, intellection, and the intelligible objects is indebted, on the one hand, to Aristotle's theory of divine intellection, but his doctrine of Intellect as a whole can be seen, on the other hand, as the solution to the serious problem left in Plato's philosophy, how it is possible to systematize harmoniously the cognitive relation between intellect and the Forms, so that it does not infringe the Forms' immutability and complete intelligibility, and the role of the Idea of the Good as the cause not only of intellect's knowing and the Forms' being known but of the Forms' substantiability. In Plotinus' philosophy, therefore, the nature of intellection is considered from diverse angles, that is, the immutability and the complete intelligibility of the Forms, the incorrigibility of Intellect, the possibility of true self-knowledge, and the relation of Intellect to the One. Hence we may consider Plato' and Aristotle's theories of intellection as the philosophical and historical background of Plotinus' doctrine of Intellect. Through our consideration of Plotinus' view of intellection, moreover, the reason why the One must be internally active will be revealed; the conception of the One as essentially active directly leads to an affirmation about its knowledge. In other words, the very reason why the One must possess some kind of knowledge will be understood from the systematic point of view. The clarification of this reason certainly indicates that Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge does not occupy a
peripheral position in his philosophy, but is closely related to his doctrine of
Intellect. Before inquiring into the One's knowledge in Part II, we must thus
make a necessary detour, the exploration of Plato's, Aristotle's, and Plotinus'
doctrines of intellection in Part I.

What contribution should our inquiry make to philosophy in general? Our
inquiry would suggest what a theistic philosophical system should be, more
specifically, that any theistic philosophy must satisfactorily ground its philosophical
theology on its metaphysics. Take, for example, Aristotle's theology. Aristotle
indeed sufficiently grounds the existence and the substantiality of the unmoved
mover on his metaphysics. But the mystical self-contemplation of God and several
perfections attributed to him do not seem to be well founded on Aristotle's own
speculative philosophy. In turn, Plotinus' accounts of the inner life and activity of
the One, as our inquiry will show, are firmly based on the ontological status of the
One, which coheres with other theses in his metaphysics. Plotinus gives us a lesson
regarding how a description of divine inner life can be metaphysically founded, for
the inquiry into the structure of the great philosophical system unmistakably serves
as a necessary training towards the establishing of one's own philosophical position.
NOTES


3 Plotinus usually calls his treatise a λόγος (II 3 [52],1,4; III 1 [3],10,1; IV 4 [28],23,48).

4 In this dissertation, we will use the locution "the One's knowledge" in a rather extended sense; "the One's knowledge" means its cognitive activity or state in general. The locution hence also covers a sort of consciousness to be attributed to the One.


8 A few doubts remain regarding the chronological position of III 9 [13], which is in fact a collection of brief notes. As we shall see in Chapter IV of Part II, the uncertainty of the chronological locus of III 9 [13] is not a serious difficulty in our inquiry.

10Needless to say, the problem remains regarding the authenticity of Plotinus’ writings. The passage in II 3 [52],12,12-32 has been suspected to be spurious. Since this passage has nothing to do with our present issue, the problem is virtually cleared.

11As we shall notice later, Plotinus formally gives a positive account of the One’s knowledge in only nine lines (V 4 [7],2,15-19; VI 7 [38],39,1-4). This fact would be prone to make us neglect considering the exact position of the doctrine of the One’s knowledge in his entire system of philosophy.

12This point is readily seen from the fact that many contemporary critics (Burnet, Gohlke, Jaeger, Murrey, Nygren, Régis, Robin, and Ross), except for Mansion and van Ivanka, suppose that some un-Aristotelian elements are mixed into Aristotle’s accounts of divine inner life. Of course, the incompleteness noticed in Aristotle’s accounts would be considerably due to the compositional causes of the *Metaphysics*. 


VOLUME I: PLATO, ARISTOTLE, AND PLOTINUS ON INTELLECTION: 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PLOTINUS' 
DOCTRINE OF THE ONE'S KNOWLEDGE

INTRODUCTION

In terms of the long history of Greek philosophy, Plotinus' doctrine of the One is placed in the general current of a quest of the ἠφέλινή of all things, which precisely goes back to Thales or Anaximander. His doctrine of the One's knowledge answers the question of what kind of inner activity the ἠφέλινή of all things has. In the philosophical background of the doctrine, moreover, there is a problem concerning the nature of intellectual knowledge or the cognitive relation between thinking subject and object thought. Needless to say, Plotinus' denial of intellectual knowledge to the One, which represents the negative aspect of his doctrine of the One's knowledge, first becomes intelligible when the nature of intellectual knowledge is fully clarified. Furthermore, Plotinus' affirmation about the One's knowledge specifies its internal activity, which, as we shall see later, is called for by his view of the relation between thinking subject and object thought, namely the intellect-intelligible identity. Therefore the consideration of his notion of intellectual knowledge and its historical sources constitutes a necessary prelude to our inquiry into his doctrine of the One's knowledge.

In the first chapter, we shall discover the crucial problem in Plato's conception of intellection. On the one hand, he claims the necessity of that which transcends being for intellection directed to being to occur. On the other, he does not give a definite account of the relation between intellect and the Form, which is fully consistent with his theory of Forms.
In the second chapter, we shall investigate the basic traits of Aristotle’s notion of intellection as the identification of the knowing subject and the object known.

In the third chapter, we purport to inquire into Plotinus’ philosophical enterprise. First, Plotinus’ doctrine of the intellect-intelligible unity, with a complete mastery of the philosophical advantages of Aristotle’s view, can satisfactorily answer the problem left unanswered in Plato’s dialogues; his doctrine not only insures the infallibility of Intellect but also goes well with the fundamental theses of Plato’s theory of Forms. Second, Plotinus attempts to synthesize the intellect-intelligible identity with the role of the hyper-ontic Good as the cause of the Forms’ substantiality, the role which the Platonic Form of the Good is assigned in addition to its role as the cause of the Forms’ intelligibility. In Plotinus’ own philosophy, this synthesis is achieved by means of the systematization of the doctrines of the intellect-intelligible identity and of Intellect’s relation to the One. When the intellect-intelligible identity is fully unfolded to complete the notion of self-intellection, the intelligible objects or Forms are to be regarded as themselves being active, thinking, and living. If so, the One, as the cause of their substantiality, must be active in itself. The One’s knowledge is nothing less than the cognitive specification of its inner activity. In short, the problem of the One’s knowledge unavoidably arises from the systematization of the doctrines of the intellect-intelligible unity and of Intellect’s relation to the One. The philosophical and historical background of these well systematized doctrines of Plotinus, of course, will be revealed by our inquiry in the first and the second chapters.
CHAPTER I
INTELLECTION IN PLATO

Introduction

What we shall explore in the following is not the full delineation of Plato’s doctrine, of νοῦς and νόησις, based on the exhaustive reading of his dialogues, but the clarification of the prominent features in his doctrine; (i) his position that the account for νόησις which properly concerns οὐσία must call for something beyond οὐσία, namely the Idea of the Good and (ii) his endeavor to reconcile his conception of νόησις with the immutability of the Form that is the fundamental thesis of his theory of Forms. For this purpose we shall focus on the following passages; (i) the allegory of the sun (Rep. 508a-509b), (ii) the allegory of the divided line (Rep. 509c-511e), and (iii) the problem concerning being (Soph. 245e-249d).

Someone might consider our exploration to be an effort to get the systematic picture of Plato’s doctrine from these two dialogues and thereby accuse us of overlooking the chronological development of the theory of Forms in those dialogues. For certain, the theory of Forms has developed in such a way that the intercommunication among the Forms is first fully explicated in the Sophist. As we shall see later, however, the fundamental position of the theory of Forms that is represented by the unchangeability of Forms is neither abandoned nor transformed in such dialogues like the Parmenides and the Sophist, but is persistently and consistently maintained. Our inquiry does not attempt at obtaining the full systematic picture of Plato’s doctrine of νόησις, but at thinking with Plato how he has to treat νοῦς and νόησις for the immutability of Forms to be defended and the οὐσία-γένεσις distinction to remain a viable insight.
1. Intellection in the Allegory of the Sun (Republic 508a-509b)

Before going into details about the education requisite for the philosopher-kings in the Republic, Plato mentions the supreme necessity for them to know the essential nature of the good (505a2-b2, 506a4-7). The Platonic Socrates, however, is afraid of telling an opinion without knowledge (506c2-3) and tries to avoid giving an account of the good itself. Instead of clarifying "what the good itself is" (506d8-e1), he intends to meet the request of Adeimantus and Glaucon by offering "the interest and child of the good itself" (507a3). "To pay the interest" means to present, without directly arguing about the good itself, three allegories about it, the allegories of the sun, of the divided line, and of the cave. In spite of the fact that the metaphors of the sun and of the divided line are not devoted to the explication of the nature of νόησις, we can see in them how νόησις is related to οὐσία.

Why is the sun introduced into the account for the Form of the Good? It is first introduced with the remark that the presence of a third thing or light is necessary for sight to occur (507d11-e2); and light comes from the sun (508a4-8). The relationship between sight and the sun is explicated as follows:

(1) The sense of sight and the power of being visible are linked together by the sun (507e6-508a2).

(2) Sight itself is not the sun (508a11).

(3) The eye is not the sun. But it gets the power of seeing as a sort of overflow from the sun's treasury (508a11-b7).

(4) The sun itself is not sight (508b9).

(5) The sun is the cause (αἴτως) of sight (508b9-10).

(6) The sun is seen (ὁρᾶται) by sight itself (508b10).

There are a couple of points to be noticed. First, the complete disjunction of the sun and sight is stressed by (2) and (4). The sun is then regarded as the cause
of sight in (5). Hence (2), (4), and (5) seem to imply the separateness of the cause from its effect, which is also one of the most prominent ontological principles shared by the Neoplatonists.⁴ The transcendence of the Good over ouσία (509b9-10) must be seen primarily in terms of the cause-effect separateness implied here. Second, the status of the sun as the cause of sight is properly explained by (3). But we must notice that the sun is not the cause solely of sight. Sunlight "makes our sight see in the finest way and the seen things seen" (508a5-6),⁵ and "the sun provides the seen things with the power of being seen" (509b2-3). In a word, the sun is causally related not only to sight but also to the visible objects (508c1-2). Hence it is also responsible for the visibility of those objects. In this sense, the sun or light can be said to be "honorable yoke" (508a1)⁶ uniting the sense of sight and the power of being seen. Third, we are told that sunlight as the cause of sight makes our sight see in the finest way (ὁτι κάλλιστα) and the seen things seen (508a5-6). By "the finest way" Plato would mean the mode in which the things are clearly (σαφώς) seen and in which the pure vision (καθαρὰ ὄψις) is present in the eyes (508d1-2). The fineness is found in the clarity of sight which is due to the sun. The sun is thus said to be "an offspring of the Good" (508b12-13) whose value is "more precious (τιμωτέρῳ)" (508a1). Therefore it must be seen that the sun joins the eyes and the visible objects so as to cause the eyes to see clearly and the objects to be clearly seen. The sun is surely responsible for the best condition for sight. Finally, although the sun is compared to the "yoke" (508a1) that unites the sense of sight and the power of being seen, it is seen (ὁρᾶται, 508b10) by sight itself. In other words, the sun is placed on the side of the object seen.

Plato attempts to give an account of the relationship among the Form of the Good, intellect, and the intelligible objects on the strict analogy of the aforementioned relationship among the sun, the eye, and the visible objects (508b13-c2). Strictly speaking, the eye (ὁμμα) would correspond to intellect (νοῦς)
and sight (δύσις) to intellection (νόησις). Let us enumerate what Plato says about the relationship among the Idea of the Good, intellect, and the intelligible objects:

1. The Form of the Good provides the things known with truth (ἀλήθεια) and gives the power (δύναμις) to the knower (508e1-3).

2. The Form of the Good is the cause of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and of truth-as-the-known (508e3-4).

3. As light and sight are not the sun itself but sunlike, knowledge and truth are not the Good itself but like it (ἀγαθοειδῆς) (508e6-509a4).

Although the word νόησις does not occur in the description of the intelligible realm, we may certainly take intellection as the actual exercise of intellect, which is caused by the Form of the Good.

Plato's characterization of intellection in the metaphor of the sun can be summarized as follows. First, intellection is directed to the Form; it is thought, but not seen (νοεῖσθαι μὲν, ὀρᾶσθαι δ' οὐ, 507b10). From such a status of the Form, intellection, first of all, is seen as a purely intellectual activity making no use of information supplied by the senses. In other words, intellection does not concern the sensible entities as its objects. From this, moreover, we can understand that intellection has the highest degree of clarity just as sight is said to be clear and pure by virtue of the sun (508d1-2). On the one hand, the Form intuitively known is clearer (σαφέστερον) than the object discursively known (511c4-6). On the other, when the soul fixes herself on the transient, sensible thing mixed with darkness (τὸ τῶν σκότων κεκραμένον), she opines and is dimmed (δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει) (508d6-9). Second, the object of intellection is the Form that is expressed as "that which is (ὁ ἐστιν)" (507b7) or "that which is illumined by truth and that which is (οὗ κατολόμπει ἀλήθεια τε καὶ τὸ ὄν)" (508d4-5). In the Phaedo, we read that the Form is by us put the seal αὐτὸ ὁ ἐστιν (75d1-2). The expression αὐτὸ ὁ ἐστιν is interchangeable with οὐσία and τὸ ὄν (78d1-5). Also in the Republic, Plato refers to
the Form using the word οὐσία. Hence the object of intellection is nothing other than οὐσία. From our present passage, however, it is not clear whether νοῦς is categorized as οὐσία or not. Third, no causal role in the occurrence of intellection is assigned to the Form. As already seen, the Idea of the Good, but not the Form in general, is the cause of knowledge. But this does not mean that the content of intellection is not determined by the Form to which that intellection is directed. When Plato defines the Good as the cause of knowledge, he does not mean that the content of knowledge is determined by the Good, but that the Good unites the knower and the known and thereby is responsible for the occurrence of intellection. The truth as the known is situated in the Form, but not in the Idea of the Good. Fourth, whether intellection can have the Form of the Good as its object, in other words, whether the Idea of the Good can be known by intellection, is not clear enough from the present passage. We must avoid, at least, concluding the knowability of the Good from the visibility of the sun (508b9-10) to which it is compared. As to the relationship between the Good and intellection, we can say nothing more than that the former is the cause of the latter and that the latter resembles the former. Finally, intellection is characterized as the δύναμις (508c2) of knowing. By δύναμις Plato seems to mean that "by which (ἂν) we are capable of what we are capable, and also everything is capable of whatever it is capable" (477c1-2). As the causal dative ἂν indicates, actual agency is involved in Plato's notion of δύναμις. Hence Adam would be right in noting that since the power to exercise the faculty of knowledge is "hardly different . . . from the actual exercise of Reason," "Plato's τὴν δύναμιν, in fact, is nearly equivalent to Aristotle's τὴν ἐνέργειαν." In addition, intellection is the very power of knowing οὐσία. As Adam notes, "the faculty of νοῦς is suddenly actualized into νόησις by being turned upon its proper object." In other words, intellection occurs when intellect and its proper object are related to one another by their being respectively given the
powers of knowing and of being known, so that it represents the actualized conjugation between intellect and the Form by virtue of the Good. Then, how should we understand this relation? Does the Form stand outside intellect? Or, as Aristotle and Plotinus entertain, is the intelligible object identical with intellect when the latter thinks the former? Since Plato, in the metaphor of the sun, intends to show the value (μετίζωνς τιμητέον, 509d4-5) of the Good in terms of its causal function to unite intellect and its object, the separation between them prior to the occurrence of intellection appears to be tacitly presupposed. From the present passage alone, however, we cannot decide whether intellect thinks the object outside itself or not, in other words, whether intellection is a sort of extroverted activity like sight or not.

Through the above consideration, the connection between νόησις and οὐσία becomes clear; οὐσία is the proper object of νόησις, and νόησις, precisely as the δύναμις of knowing, is caused by the Form of the Good, which is beyond οὐσία and itself not οὐσία (509b8-10). Whether that which is beyond οὐσία can be the object of intellection is not sufficiently settled in the present passage. Moreover, intellection which is the actual exercise of intellect, if Aristotelian terminology were invoked, could be characterized as an ἐνέργεια. In fact, Plotinus, following this line, defines intellection as pure ἐνέργεια. In order to explore other prominent features in Plato's notion of intellection, let us move to the metaphor of the divided line.
2. Intellection in the Allegory of the Divided Line (Republic 509c-511e)

Cornford analyzes several senses of νόησις used in the sixth and the seventh books of the Republic. It means:

(1) the cognition of any objects or truths in the intelligible realm,
(2) the intuitive act of apprehending an Idea or a prior truth implicit in conclusion, and
(3) the state of mind of one who sees with perfect clearness a completed structure of truth illuminated by the unquestionable principle.

Some of these prominent features can be seen also in the section usually called "the allegory of the divided line." Intellection is correlative to the upper division of the intelligible realm (511d6-8). It is intuitive in that the soul inquires into that realm by using no sensible images (510b7-8, 511c1). The clarity of intellection mentioned in the metaphor of the sun is here reiterated (511e3-4) and linked with the clarity of the objects it apprehends.

Our aim is not to examine Cornford's view critically. Before considering several problems in our scope focused upon the relationship between νοησις and ουσια, we need to see what Plato intends to do in the present passage. Socrates, recognizing a lot of things left unexplained in the metaphor of the sun (509c7), proceeds to expound the metaphor of the divided line. He, first of all, reiterates the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible realms (509d1-4) which has already been made in 507b9-10. After going through two subdivisions of the visible world (509e1-510a10), Socrates begins to explain how the intelligible realm should be bifurcated (510b2-9). But Glaucon cannot understand Socrates' explanation (510b10), so that Socrates is compelled to account for the dividing of the intelligible realm again at full length (510c1-511c2). Hence the substantial portion of the metaphor is devoted to the dividing of the intelligible realm, of the objective side of
the line, rather than the demarcating of νόησις from διάνοια, on the cognitional side of the line. Nevertheless, since cognitive powers are distinguished from one another in terms of their correlative objects (477c9-d2), the distinction between νόησις and διάνοια must be based upon the division of the intelligible realm. Moreover, we must here keep in mind that "the dividing of the intelligible realm," as we shall see, does not necessarily mean the hypostatizing of "intermediates" whose ontological status is distinct from the Forms.

The first problem relevant to our inquiry concerns the referent of οὐσία that νοῦς apprehends. More specifically, does intellect properly apprehend not only the Forms, either adjectival (e.g., the Beautiful itself, 507b5) or substantival (e.g., Couch and Table, 596b3-4), but also the mathematical objects (e.g., the Square itself and the Diagonal itself, 510d7-8) to which διάνοια is related? The question is answered by clarifying the ontological status of those mathematical objects. The problem concerning their ontological status arises, precisely because they, though seen by διάνοια (511a1), are nowhere described as διανοητά, while νοητόν is exactly correlative to νοῦς or νόησις. Nevertheless, ever since Aristotle,23 many doxographers and commentators have regarded the mathematical objects as the distinct link between the Forms and the sensibles. This line is followed by Adam.24 His view seems to be based on his own observation that Plato speaks of a multiplicity of mathematical units in 526a2-4, the multiplicity alien to the unity of the Idea.25 To this observation, in fact, the plural αὐτὰ τὰ ἤσα in the recollection argument of the Phaedo (74c1) runs counter.26 More importantly, a careful reader of Plato would easily acknowledge that he, in the Seventh Letter,27 exemplifies ὁ δὴ γνωστόν τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ἐστίν ὁν (342b1) by αὐτὸς ὃ κύκλος (c2-3). We are here told that νοῦς is most akin to the Circle itself (d1-3) and that the Circle itself is apprehended by νοῦς and, after their cognitive contact, engenders its concept in the soul (τὰ νευσημενα, 343a2). May we conclude from these points that in their
ontological status the mathematical objects are regarded as separate Forms also in the allegory of the divided line? Ross, against Adam, tries to show that "the objects of διάνοιξις are not the 'intermediates' but are simply the mathematical Ideas."\(^{28}\) His claim is based on three points. First, the mathematical objects are in qualified by οὐτό, which is the hall-mark of a separate Form.\(^{29}\) Second, whereas Plato describes the subsections of the lower section of the line by reference to their own nature, he divides the subsections of the intelligible by distinguishing them as two classes of objects respectively corresponding to two different mental states, without referring to their own nature.\(^{30}\) Finally, there is a textual evidence supporting the possibility of mathematical objects being apprehended by νόησις:

... you do not regard them (sc. those who behold with διάνοιξις) as possessing intellect about those (mathematical) objects, although the objects, when connected with the principle, are intelligible (νοsizei οὐκ ἵσχειν περὶ αὐτᾶ δοκοῦσι σει, καίτων νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἄρχης) (511d1-1).\(^{31}\)

Here it is explicitly stated that the mathematical objects can be νοητά when a certain condition holds.\(^{32}\) What does this condition μετὰ ἄρχης indicate? According to Ross, the passage in question implies that "the whole world of Ideas is capable of being illuminated by the Idea of good, and studied by the method of dialectic."\(^{33}\) First of all, we must keep in mind that μετὰ ἄρχης indicates ἐπ᾽ ἄρχην ιοῦσαν (511a5) or ἐπ᾽ ἄρχην ἀνελθόντες (c8-d1).\(^{34}\) The ascent to the first principle constitutes the part of dialectical process:

Well, then, go on to understand that by the other segment of the intelligible I mean that which argument itself grasps (ἀπτεταί) with the power of dialectic ... in order to reach what is free from hypothesis in the beginning of the whole (ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παυτῶς ἄρχην). When it grasped (αφαμένος) this, argument now depends on that which depends on the beginning and in such fashion goes back down again to an end; making no use of anything sensed in any way, but using forms themselves, going through forms to forms, it ends in forms too (511b3-c2, tr. A. Bloom).
Now the meaning of \( \mu \varepsilon \tau \alpha \ \alpha \rho \chi \eta \zeta \) is clear; it refers to the ascent to and the contact with the Form of the Good. Since the Good is said to be free from hypothesis (510b7, 511b6), the phrase implies making no use of hypothesis, the use of which might inevitably entail \( \nu \varpi \nu \ \omicron \upnu \ \omicron \chi \varepsilon \varepsilon \nu \).\(^{35}\) In conclusion, the mathematical objects can be apprehended by intellec tion, when we inquire into them without recourse to their sensible images and the hypotheses about them. In other words, the \( \omicron \omicron \sigma \alpha \) as the proper object of \( \nu \omicron \sigma \omicron \omicron \xi \) embraces not only the Ideas already mentioned in the dialogue but the mathematical Ideas.\(^{36}\) It is not intermediates but mathematical Ideas that are known by intellec tion when they are connected with the first principle.

The above consideration leads us to the assurance that intellec tion is directed solely to \( \omicron \omicron \sigma \alpha \) or an Idea. In the simile of the divided line, we encounter another prominent characterization of intellec tion as one of "states arising in the soul (\( \pi \alpha \theta \eta \mu \alpha \tau \alpha \ \epsilon \nu \ \tau \iota \ \psi \chi \eta \ \gamma \iota \gamma \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \alpha \))" (511d7-8).\(^{37}\) Unfortunately the Republic affords us no more information about this characterization, so that we need to turn to the kinship argument in the Phaedo, where the word \( \pi \alpha \theta \eta \mu \alpha \) is used for describing the soul’s cognitive contact with the Form. After recalling the soul’s distraction and confusion by transient things which she apprehends through sense-perception (79c2-8),\(^{38}\) Socrates describes her liberation from wandering by virtue of her contact with immutable reality:

Whereas whenever it (sc. the soul) studies by itself, it departs yonder towards that which is pure and always existent and immortal and unvarying, and in virtue of its kinship with it, enters always into its company (\( \alpha \epsilon \iota \ \mu \varepsilon \tau \ \epsilon \kappa \epsilon \iota \nu \omicron \ \tau \varepsilon \ \gamma \iota \gamma \nu \epsilon \tau \alpha \)) whenever it has come to be alone itself, and whenever it may do so; then it has ceased from its wandering and, when it is about those objects, it is always constant and unvarying, because of its contact (\( \epsilon \phi \omega \pi \tau \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \)) with things of a similar kind; and this condition (\( \tau \omicron \ \pi \alpha \theta \eta \mu \alpha \)) of it is called "wisdom (\( \phi \rho \omicron \nu \sigma \omicron \omicron \omicron \))," is it not? (79d1-7, tr. D. Gallop).
Here we do not need to trouble ourselves about Plato’s use of ἐπίσκεψις instead of νόησις. Also in the above passage it is repeated that the use of senses hinders the soul from the contemplation of the immutable Ideas; she must be alone by herself (αὐτῇ καθ’ αὐτὴν, d1, 4). Again, what is called ἐπίσκεψις is nothing but the soul’s contact with unvarying reality (τοιοῦτον ἐσπασμένη, d6), just as dialectic in the Republic is distinguished from mathematical sciences with regard to the soul’s contact with the first principle (ἀναλογειοῦσα αὐτῇς, 511b7). The above passage mentions two other aspects of intellection as the state arising in the soul. First, the soul becomes free from her wandering (πέπαινα ἡ . . . τοῦ πλάνου, 79d4-5) in her envisagement of the Forms. When the soul is concerned with transient things, on the contrary, she herself wanders (καὶ αὐτὶ πλανᾶται, 79c7). A similar idea is reiterated in the fifth book of the Republic; since the phenomena are ambiguous (ἐπαρμοσκέπτεισίν), we cannot form any stable (παγίως) conception of them (479c3-5). So the many beliefs of the sensible many (τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα), insofar as they are about the ambiguous, transient phenomena, roll around (κυλινδεῖται) between not-being and pure being (d3-5). Intellection is thus conceived to be the fixed apprehension of the Forms which are always the same as themselves and free from any ambiguity whatsoever. Second, the πάθημα called ἐπίσκεψις is such a mental state that is always constant and unvarying around the immutable Ideas (καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὦσσαύτως ἔχει, 79d5). The soul, in her contact with the always self-identical Forms, no longer wanders. Thus the above passage from the Phaedo reveals fixedness and immutability as the essential characters of the πάθημα in the soul that she attains in her contact with the Forms. In this state, she is no longer perplexed and confused by the transiency of the phenomena.

The aforementioned passage from the Phaedo suggests that we may take the characterization of intellection as the πάθημα with the soul’s cognitive contact
with the Forms also in the simile of the divided line; intellection is the πάθημα that arises in the soul during her contact with the Forms. Since Plato often expresses this as a vision of the Form, an ocular image, the above consideration suggests that a tactile image, which marks intimacy between apprehending subject and object apprehended, may be more appropriate to intellection. In fact, the verb ἐφαπτομέναι, in the above mentioned passage from the Phaedo, represents the soul's kinship to the Ideas (79d3). On the soul's cognitive contact with the Ideas, moreover, what is not said in the Phaedo is said in the Republic. In the latter, it is αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος that grasps (ἀπτεται) the higher division of the intelligible realm (511b3-4). As already mentioned, λόγος is the instrument whereby νοῦς works. Cross points out that the emphasis here lies on hard argument rather than immediate knowledge or knowledge by acquaintance. In the metaphor of the divided line, therefore, intellection is more specifically regarded as the πάθημα arising in the soul when she grasps the Forms by means of the λόγος of dialectic.

Through our reading of the metaphor of the divided line, several new aspects of νοῦς have been revealed. First, not only the moral and aesthetic Forms but the mathematical Forms are known by νοῦς. Second, intellection is characterized as the πάθημα that arises in the soul through her cognitive contact with the Forms by means of the λόγος of dialectic. Moreover, this characterization involves the tactile metaphor of intellection, which expresses the intimacy of the soul's apprehension of the Forms to which she is said to have affinity in the Phaedo. Nevertheless, the crucial point of the relationship between intellect and the Form is not fully clear in the present passage. Does intellection occur when the soul acts on the Form? Or, does it occur when she is acted on by it? Although the word πάθημα exactly means "state" or "experience" in Rep. 511d7, it is the antonym to ποίημα or ἔργον and usually connotes passivity. But we may not jump rashly from this connotation to the conclusion that intellection is the state in the soul acted on by the
Form. In this conception of intellection, needless to say, inheres such a difficulty that we are forced to implant some agency in the Form. Plato, however, nowhere speaks of the Idea's possessing agency. Now we must turn to another dialogue, the *Sophist*. 
3. Intellection in the Problem of Being (Sophist 245e-249d)

The problem of the characterization of νόησις as a πάθημα is, in fact, inseparable from the problem of Plato's frequent description of the Form as τὸ νοητόν. What does this description mean? Is the Form related to intellect in such a manner that the former is acted on by the latter? Or, as the ocular metaphor of vision of the Form insinuates, is intellect acted on by the Form? Gottfried Martin tackles this problem in his work on Plato's theory of Forms.47 Martin contrasts two opposing views, the conception of intellection as pure reception that takes seriously the ocular metaphorization of the vision of the Form and the idealistic interpretation that appeals to the spontaneity of intellect. But his criticism is exclusively focused on the extreme form of the latter, Natorp's position. Natorp maintains that the λόγοι as thought-setting activity ground the truth of ὁντα. Martin points out that Natorp's view is based on Phd. 99e and criticizes him for illegitimately bringing the modern hypothetical interpretation of science into Plato's quest for the cause by the method of hypothesis.48 After criticizing Natorp, Martin turns to the passage from the Sophist, where "the friends of Forms" are forced to accept that reality includes some movement (248d-249c), but he can find no satisfactory answer. Again, he tries to find a solution in Rep. 597b-c, but is perplexed by such uniqueness of the passage that the Idea is described as if it were created by god. Eventually, Martin concludes his discussion by simply remarking, without any textual support, that λόγος for Plato is active as well as passive.

Needless to say, Martin's tentative conclusion is not satisfactory enough, because it does not fully clarify the relationship between intellect and Form. Is there no solution to our present problem? Is there no clue in the passage of the Sophist referred to by Martin? Let us carefully read that passage again.
The argument in the *Sophist* first confronts the aporia of non-being (238d1-2); without presupposing non-being, the actual occurrence of falsehood cannot be explained (237a3-4) and thereby the definition of a sophist as an illusion-maker becomes unfounded. The Eleatic Stranger then remarks that we are confused about being as well as about non-being (243c2-5) and directs the dialogue to the problem of being. As soon as the criticism of dualistic philosophers of nature and of Parmenides the monist (243c-245e) is concluded, we are entangled in "something like a battle of gods and giants between them over their quarrel about reality" (246a4-5), the dispute between materialists and idealists. Whereas the materialists believe that tangible body is the sole reality (246b1), the idealists hold that the incorporeal Forms are real:

Yes, and accordingly their adversaries (sc. idealists) are very wary in defending their position somewhere in the heights of the unseen maintaining with all their force that true reality (τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν) consists in certain intelligible and bodiless Forms (νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδος). In the clash of argument they shatter and pulverize those bodies which their opponent wield, and what those others allege to be true reality they call, not real being, but a sort of moving process of becoming (γένεσις . . . φερομένην τιμα) (246b6-c2, tr. F. M. Cornford).

Here two points about the fundamental position of the idealists are to be kept in mind. First, οὐσία is strictly distinguished from γένεσις. Second, the Forms identified as οὐσία are the kinds of things known by intellect (νοητὰ ἄττα, b7). After criticizing the materialists (246e-247d), the Stranger tries to express a mark (ὅρος, 247e3, 248c4) of being in order to induce them to accept that even a small portion of reality is incorporeal. The proposed mark is "anything that is so constituted as to possess any sort of power either to affect anything else or to be affected (τὸ καὶ ὄποιανοῦ κεκτημένου δύναμιν εἶτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἔτερον ὀτιῶν πεφυκὸς εἶτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν)" (247d8-e1). Let us call this mark "the δύναμις criterion of being" for convenience. The Stranger then begins to examine whether
the idealists may also accept this criterion of being. Unless they admit it, it will be impossible for them to defeat the materialists in their battle about reality.51

The idealists who are now denominated "the friends of Forms (τούς τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους)" (248a4),52 however, are forced to make desperate efforts to defend their own position by adamantly refusing to apply the δύναμις criterion of being to true being. The Stranger and Theaetetus as a spokesman of the idealists reconfirm the fundamental position of the idealists, namely the distinction between οὐσία and γένεσις (248a7-9), and then proceed to consider their view of cognitive contact with each of being and becoming:

And you say that we have intercourse (κοινωνεῖν) with Becoming by means of the body through sense (δι' αἰσθήσεως), whereas we have intercourse with Real being by means of the soul through reflection (διὰ λογισμοῦ). And Real being, you say, is always in the same unchanging state (ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὁμοτως ἔχειν), whereas Becoming is variable (248a10-13, tr. F. M. Cornford).

As Cornford points out,53 Plato uses the verb κοινωνεῖν which is neutral enough to cover all forms of cognition; the use of the verb here has no bearing on its use later to describe the "intercommunication" of Forms. The idea of two contrasted kinds of cognition, matching the οὐσία-γένεσις distinction, is not newly introduced here. Already in the kinship argument of the Phaedo, we are told that the soul considers transient objects by means of the body or sense (διὰ τοῦ σώματος . . . δι' αἰσθήσεως, 79c5), whereas she investigates constant Forms by herself alone (αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτήν, 79d1, 4). This idea is also found in the dialogue after the Sophist; in the Timaeus, οὐσία and γένεσις are contrasted with one another just as τὸ . . . νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτὸν and τὸ . . . δόξη μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν are (28a1-3). Another point to be noticed is the use of the word λογισμὸς for describing the soul's cognitive contact with the Forms. This use has a precedent in Phd. 79a3, where the Forms are said to be apprehended by the
reasoning of thought (τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμοῦ). Furthermore, the immutability of Forms is also here emphatically asserted with the very reminiscence of Phd. 79d5 and 80b2-3. Upon the idealists' position thus being more fully unfolded, the Eleatic Stranger, taking cognitive intercourse with becoming and being in terms of the δύναμις criterion of being, asks "the friends of Forms" whether they accept this criterion:

But now what are we to take you as meaning by this expression 'intercourse (κοινωνείν)' which you apply to both [sc. becoming and being]. Don't you mean what we described a moment ago? . . . The experiencing an effect or the production of one, arising, as the result of some power (πάθημα ἡ ποίημα ἐκ δυνάμεώς τινος), from things that encounter one another (248b2-6, tr. F. M. Cornford).

Seeing Theaetetus' inability to answer satisfactorily this query on behalf of "the friends of Forms" (248b6-7), the Stranger pronounces their supposed reply:

Well, to that they reply that a power of acting and being acted upon belongs to Becoming, but a power which is neither of these powers (τούτων οὐδέτερον τῆν δύναμιν) is compatible with Real being (248c7-9, tr. F. M. Cornford, adapted by A. Sumi).55

"The friends of Forms" admit the δύναμις criterion of being as applying only to becoming,56 but not to true being. But the Stranger points out that the relationship of γιγνώσκεων and γιγνώσκεσθαι is found between the soul and true being (248c11-d2) and further that this relationship exactly embodies that of activity and passivity (248d4-7). The knowability of the Forms, as already seen, belongs to the fundamental position of the idealists (νοητὰ ἀττα, 246b7). But they also here refuse to view the soul's cognitive contact with true being in terms of the active-passive relationship:

If knowing is to be acting on something, it follows that what is known must be acted upon by it; and so, on this showing, Reality when it is known by the act of knowledge must, in so far as it is known, be moved (κυρεῖσθαι) owing to being so acted upon; and that, we say, cannot happen to the motionless (τὸ ἅρμοδων) (248d10-e4, tr. F. M. Cornford, adapted by A. Sumi).
To regard the relationship of knowing and being known in terms of that of acting and being acted on is incompatible with the immutability of true being known by the soul. As already seen, the immutability of true being constitutes the fundamental position of the idealists (248a12). Hence they defend their own camp by firmly refusing to view knowing in terms of activity and passivity. But we must not jump rashly from this refusal to the conclusion of our problem. There seem to remain at least two problems for further consideration. First, who are "the friends of Forms"? If they are not Plato himself, the present passage has no bearing on our present problem which has been raised in our discussion of the metaphor of the divided line in the Republic, and so the problem is left unanswered. Second, when "the friends of Forms" are identified as Plato himself, may we draw a conclusion directly from the above considered passage? Is the ignored possibility that the soul is acted upon by the Form compatible with the constancy of real being? Or, if the soul's knowing of the Form is totally divorced from activity and passivity, what kind of cognitive contact must be appropriately conceived between them?

The theory of "the friends of Forms" in discussion, as many critics observe, seems to represent Plato's own theory in the middle dialogues. Cornford defends this view as follows. First, true being is spoken as separate (χωρίς, 248a7) from becoming. Also in the Parmenides, the theory of Forms that young Socrates presents stresses the separateness of the Form from its participant thing (130b2, 3, c1, d1) and from its immanent character (τὰς ἴμμεσὸς ὀμοιότητας ἕχομεν) (130b4). Still in the Timaeus, we are told that being and becoming must be distinguished from one another (διαφέρετεν, 27d5). The separateness of Forms from phenomena is thus persistent as the core of the theory of Forms through the middle and the late dialogues; it can be said to be the core of the theory precisely because the immutability of the Forms can be insured only insofar as they are sharply distinguished from transient phenomena. Second, "the friends of Forms" speak of
two contrasted kinds of cognition, intercourse with becoming through sense and that with real being through reflection. As already seen, this contrast, with the distinction between two realms of objects, is persistent through the middle and the late dialogues. Finally, "the friends of Forms" emphasize immutability as the mark of real being and variability as the mark of becoming. The unchangeableness of the Forms is asserted in the middle dialogues, especially in the *Phaedo*, with full emphasis. This thesis is also never absent from the late dialogues; we are told in *Tim.* 28c5-29a8 that the Demiurge's formation of the good universe must rely on his contemplation of the eternal, immutable paradigm. Thus seen, the position of "the friends of Forms" turns out exactly to represent the fundamental theses of the theory of Forms which persist through the dialogues before and after the *Sophist*. Besides these remarks by Cornford, the proposed identification is supported by the fact that "the friends of Forms" succeed in defending, at least eristically, their own position by adamantly refusing to think of cognitive intercourse with true being in terms of activity and passivity. The Form, which is said to be τὸ ἰδεῖν (248e4), is never acted on in being known. The denial of passivity to the Form is explicitly stated not only in one of the middle dialogues (*Symp.* 211b4-5 μηδὲ πᾶσχειν μηδέν) but also in the *Seventh Letter* written in the last period of Plato's life (342c3 οὐδέν πᾶσχει). The immutability of Forms, which is the very kernel of Plato's theory of Forms, is here, however only eristically, successfully defended by the desperate efforts of the idealists.

"The friends of Forms" being identified as Plato himself in the middle dialogues, especially in the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, and the *Symposium*, we can conclude that Plato himself refuses to think of cognitive intercourse with true being in terms of activity and passivity. Traditionally, however, the present course of argument has been variously interpreted. As Cornford points out, the possibility is ignored that knowing is an affection of the soul, acted on by the Form. From this
some critics infer that this ignored possibility is Plato's own doctrine. Overlooking the point that the refusal to envisage cognitive intercourse with the Form in terms of activity and passivity safeguards the impassability of the Form as stated in Symp. 211b4-5 with emphasis, other critics still believe that it can be accepted for Plato himself to regard knowing as a form of acting and being known as a form of being acted on. In the following argument (248e6-249b4), the idealists admit that το παντελώς ὄν (248e7-249a1) must include some movement. Does this force the idealists or Plato to consider cognitive contact with the Form in terms of activity and passivity? We need to go ahead to read the rest of the dialogue.

After "the friends of Forms" has defended the immutability of Forms by insisting that the Form as τὸ ἱρεμοῦν does not undergo any change in being known (248d10-e4), the argument takes a different turn. Now the Stranger speaks out what he thinks about the idealists' position:

But tell me, in heaven's name: are we really to be so easily convinced that movement, life, soul, understanding have no place in that which is completely real (τὸ παντελῶς ὄντι) -- that it has neither life nor thought, but stands immovable in solemn aloofness (σεμνῶν καὶ ἄγιον), dovvoid of intelligence (νοῦν οὐκ ἔχου)? (248e6-249a2, tr. F. M. Cornford, adapted by A. Sumi).

How does the refusal to introduce activity and passivity into the realm of σοφία entail the absence of intellect from the realm of τὸ παντελῶς ὄν? Is τὸ παντελῶς ὄν identical with σοφία entertained by the idealists? The Stranger's response, prima facie, can be said to be a sort of δημογορία or clap-trap. But to answer the Stranger's question affirmatively, supposes Theaetetus, would force us to accept a terrible doctrine (249a3). Now the dialogue abruptly moves from the examination of the idealists to the argument for the reality of movement. In the argument that aims at recognizing soul, intelligence and life in complete being (249a4-b2), movement comes to be placed within complete being: "In that case we must admit that what moves and movement are real things" (249b2-3, tr. F. M.
Cornford, adapted by A. Sumi). Then the Stranger criticizes the Eleatic and the Heraclitean positions separately (249b5-c9) and concludes the argument:

On these grounds, then, it seems that only one course is open to the philosopher who values knowledge and the rest [sc. φρόνησις and νοῦς] above all else. He must refuse to accept from the champions either of the One or of the many Forms the doctrine that all Reality (τὸ πᾶν) is motionless; and he must turn a deaf ear to the other party who represent Reality (τὸ ὅν) as everywhere moved. Like a child begging for 'both,' he must declare that Reality or the sum of things (τὸ ὅν καὶ τὸ πᾶν) is both at once—all that is unmovable and all that is in movement (249c10-d4, tr. F. M. Cornford, adapted by A. Sumi).

The dialogue hereafter remarks the distinctness of being from both movement and rest and moves to the argument about intercommunication among Forms.

What has been established in the above mentioned course of the dialogue, as Cornford notes, is that we ought not any longer to speak as if the Form were the whole of reality and that the idealists are required to admit spiritual motion into τὸ πάντελῶς ὅν. But the introduction of spiritual motion into that which is completely real, of course, does not lead to the representation of the Form as some moving and thinking entity. Again, it does not mean that the Form may be moved in being known. This introduction is never inconsistent with the idealists' refusal to consider the soul's cognitive intercourse with the Forms in terms of activity and passivity. The idealists would not be reluctant to accept spiritual motion in τὸ πάντελῶς ὅν. They, being different from the Eleatic philosophers who deny any movement whatsoever, have only to reject such movement that might compromise the immutability and immobility of Forms.

Before concluding our inquiry into the Sophist, we need to ascertain Plato's own position in the above considered passage. First of all, it is certain that "the friends of Forms" represent Plato's theory in his middle dialogues, inter alia, the Phaedo, the Republic, and the Symposium. The Stranger's claim that τὸ πάντελῶς


ocrates must include spiritual and noetic movement does not oppose the theory of Forms, unless that movement is conceived to infringe the unchangeability of Forms. To be sure, his claim prepares for the argument regarding intercommunication among the Forms by stressing the reality of movement. Nevertheless, the Stranger's reaction to the idealists seems to reflect Plato's self-examination of his theory in his middle dialogues. Plato here examines such tendencies of his υσία-γένεσις distinction that often represents the νοητόν-ὅρατον distinction alone and so is prone to leave the ontological status of cognitive subject, soul and intellect, unexplained. If that distinction is confined solely to the distinction of cognitive objects, the idealists who hold it cannot put up a good fight against the materialists. Insofar as the reformed materialists have been forced to admit the absurdity of regarding invisible virtues as either having no place among real things or being all corporeal (247b7-c2), the idealists are not allowed to exclude soul and intellect from the realm either of υσία or of γένεσις. Soul and intellect must have their place among either υσία or γένεσις. But to categorize them into γένεσις is inconsistent with their own theory of two kinds of cognition (248a10-11). Hence they must by all means be placed among the realm of υσία. Here Plato exactly comes to be confronted with the problem how we can integrate immobile Forms, soul, and intellect into the unified whole. It is Plato's own awareness of this problem that we can ascertain in the Stranger's reaction to the idealists. Although this problem is left unanswered, the thesis that the whole world of real being must include spiritual and noetic movement, unless that movement infringes the Forms' immutability, seems to belong to Plato's own position.

In conclusion, we may read passivity neither into the characterization of intellection as πάθημα ἐν τῇ ζυγή γιγνόμενα in Rep. 511d7-8 nor into the frequent characterization of the Form as τῷ νοητῷν. Although we are in the metaphor of the sun told that the Idea of the Good provides the soul with the power of knowing and
the Form with the power of being known, we may not take these powers as the
powers, of acting and of being acted on, that are suggested in the Sophist as the
criterion of being. When the soul knows the Form, she neither acts on it nor is
acted on by it. We may not understand the soul's apprehension of the Form in
terms of the sharp bifurcation of subject and object. We are told that the soul, in
contemplating alone by herself, is always with the Form (αἰτὶ μὲν ἐκείνου τε
γίγνεται, Phd. 79d3) and in contact with it (τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη, d6). Their
cognitive intercourse is of immediacy, intimacy, and some loose unity rather than of
subject-object oppositeness and sharp duality. To this extent, intellection cannot be
appropriately compared to sight which presupposes the sharp distinction between
eye and visible object. We must notice that the reason why intellection is compared
to sight in the metaphor of the sun is to stress the value and dignity of the Form of
the Good that is responsible for intellection by showing the analogy between the
intelligible realm and the visible in which the sun or light conjoins the eye and the
object seen. Strictly speaking, the analogy here shown is not of the emergent
process of sight to that of intellection but of the relationship among eyes, visible
object and the sun to that among intellect, the Form and the Idea of the Good. The
theme in the metaphor of the sun is not intellect's apprehension of the Form, but
the value of the Idea of the Good responsible for that apprehension. In the Sophist,
then, we can see another characterization of intellection. Intellection is here
explicitly associated with movement. But intellection as movement does not occur
by itself. As without any immobile entity there is no intelligence (249b8-10),
intellection is the movement that is always directed towards the immobile Forms.
Or we can render it as such movement that involves the ἐρωτ to aspire the
immutability and immobility of the Form which the soul lacks in herself. In
addition, this movement is supposed to be free from activity and passivity, because
both the Form's being moved by the soul and the soul's being moved by the Form
would necessarily infringe the fundamental thesis in the theory of Forms, namely the Forms' immutability. But there remains a problem. If we are not allowed to think of cognitive intercourse between the soul and the Form in terms of activity and passivity, what kind of cognitive relationship can we conceive between them? It can be seen from the above mentioned passage from the *Phaedo* (79d3) that this relationship is essentially of intimacy and affinity, but not of sharp oppositeness of subject and object. Plato simply indicates that intellection involves neither acting nor being acted on in order to defend the unchangeability of Forms and leaves intellect's relatedness to the Forms not fully clarified.
4. Conclusion

Let us summarize our inquiry into the relationship of νόησις to οὐσία and other key notions in Plato's philosophy.

1. On the one hand, νόησις is always νόησις of οὐσία which is the Form and thereby must presuppose οὐσία for its occurrence. On the other, insofar as the Form is not a νόημα, it does not depend on νόησις for its existence. Hence οὐσία is ontologically and gnoseologically prior to νόησις in that the latter is dependent on the former for its occurrence.

2. Although the content of νόησις is determined by the Form which νόησις concerns, Plato does not ascribe a causal role to the Form. The Form of the Good that is not οὐσία but beyond οὐσία is regarded as the cause of intellect's knowing and of the Form's being known. Hence the cause of νόησις itself lies beyond οὐσία.

3. Νόησις properly concerns οὐσία. The Idea of the Good is beyond οὐσία. Plato does not explicitly answer whether the Idea of the Good can be apprehended by νόησις or not. 79

4. Although νόησις is the δύναμις of knowing οὐσία (Rep. 508e2), it is that δύναμις which is neither of acting on οὐσία nor of being acted on by οὐσία (τούτων οὐδετέρου τήν δύναμιν, Soph. 248c9).

5. Without κίνησις, on the one hand, we cannot possess νοῦς (Soph. 249b5-6). Without stability, on the other, νοῦς is eliminated from the realm of true being (249b8-10). Whereas νόησις is characterized as a sort of κίνησις, it is precisely that κίνησις which is always directed towards the immobile Form. The Form, on the contrary, can exist and subsist apart from any spiritual and noetic movement. Thus the ontological priority of οὐσία to νοῦς or νόησις is also here obvious. Again, the Form is not moved by
νοῦς in being known, though νόησις is considered to be the upward κίνησις towards the Form.

6. Needless to say, Plato has not entertained Aristotle’s *terminus technicus* ἐνέργεια. He does not define νόησις as the ἐνέργεια of νοῦς.80 Nonetheless, such commentators like Adam and Apelt are not reluctant to characterize νόησις as the ἐνέργεια.81

What is worthy of special mention in Plato’s view of νόησις is that that which is not οὐσία but beyond οὐσία, rather than οὐσία, itself is regarded as the cause of νόησις. The Form of the Good is indispensable for the account for νόησις to occur. Moreover, the cognitive relation of νοῦς to οὐσία is not fully explained. It has only been suggested that this relation must not be seen in terms of activity and passivity. Then, how does νοῦς apprehend οὐσία and that which is beyond οὐσία? What kind of spiritual movement may we think between νοῦς and οὐσία? If the Form of the Good can be somehow apprehended, how does that privileged apprehension differ from νόησις proper? Plato has left these crucial questions unanswered. They are exactly what Plotinus tries to solve in his doctrines of the νοῦς-νοητόν identity and of the relationship of Intellect to the One.
NOTES

1 We may not confine the referent of "the interest of the good" solely to the metaphor of the sun. In 517a8ff., Socrates connects the allegories of the sun and of the divided line with that of the cave and then says:
"... then you will be in possession of what I surmise (ελπίδος) since that is what you wish to be told" (517b5-6, tr. F. M. Cornford).
Adam remarks that the difference of tone produced by ελπίδος (b6) recalls 506e, where the child of the good is mentioned. See The Republic of Plato, edited with Critical Notes, Commentary and Appendices by J. Adam, 2 vols., 2nd ed., with an Introduction by D. A. Rees (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 2:96. Jowett and Campbell also take b6 ἐπετοῦ... ἀκούει as referring to 506d2-3 where Glaucon asks Socrates to go through the good. See Plato's Republic, the Greek Text with Notes and Essays by B. Jowett and L. Campbell, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894; reprint ed., New York, London: Garland, 1987), 3:320. Hence it is seen that three allegories, supplementing one another, constitute "the interest of the good."

2 In the metaphor of the divided line, nevertheless, it is easily seen that the passage primarily focuses on the distinction between νοήσεως and διάνοια. Although Socrates' remark on the inadequacy of the allegory of the sun (509c5-d6) indicates that the passage about the divided line is continuous with that about the Form of the Good (see W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951; reprint ed. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976), p. 45), this continuity itself does not explain how the allegory of the divided line is pointed to the account of the Idea of the Good. The allegory begins with the distinction between the intelligible and the visible realms (509d1-4), the distinction which has already been introduced in the metaphor of the sun (508b12-c2; see also 507b9-10). The allegory of the divided line is devoted to the consideration of the distinction of two realms ruled (βασιλεύων, 509d2) respectively by the Form of the Good and the sun, without referring to them. The allegory seems to complete the metaphor of the sun not only by elaborating on the visible and the intelligible realms but, more importantly, by defining the relationship between those realms in terms of paradeigmatism; unless the realm which the sun as "the image (εικόνα) of the Good" (509a9) governs is regarded as the copy of the realm in which the Good dominates, the latter metaphor is not adequate. In other words, the metaphor has connected the Good and the sun by the archetype-image relationship without defining the sensible realm as the shadow of the intelligible. For the simile of the divided line as containing the "paradeigma" idioms with regard to the relationship between Forms and phenomena, see N. Fujisawa, "Εἰκών, Μετέκει, and Idioms of 'Paradeigmatism'

3See also 508a4 αἰτώσασθαι.

4Plotinus, VI 9 [9],6,54-55; Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica*, prop. 75.

5See also 507d11-e2. We here, following Adam (*The Republic of Plato*, 2:57), propose to retain the manuscript ἐν αὐτοῖς (d12), understanding αὐτοῖς as τοῖς ὁρωμένοις. Although the inherence of color in the visible object is clear from 508c5, the fact that the colors themselves are treated as the objects of sight, without alluding to the visible objects in which they inhere, shows that the distinction between the color and the object in which it inhere is not essential to the theme in the metaphor of the sun.

6Heidegger, referring to this phrase, expresses the shift of the locus of truth in Plato's philosophy: "Die ἀλήθεια kommt unter das Joch der ἴδεα" in *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*, 3rd ed. (Bern, Munich: Francke Verlag, 1975), p. 136. Friedländer, in his controversy with Heidegger, rightly proposes to alter "the ἴδεα" to "the highest ἴδεα" and points out the illegitimacy of Heidegger's transforming the yoke of conjunction to a yoke of subjection. See *Platon*, 3 vols., 3rd ed. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1964), 1:241-242. With Friedländer, we take the present comparison as expressing conjunction.

7See J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, 2:60. We cannot agree at Adam's equation of truth with light. Truth rather seems to correspond to "the power of being seen" (507e6-508a1), since the sun and light are not fully distinguished from one another in the allegory.

8See also 517c4 αὐτή κυρία ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένη.

9Here ἐπιστήμη is equivalent to the exercise of intellect, νόησις or γνώσις (J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, 2:60). Compare 508e2 καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδείξει with 509a6-7 ἐπιστήμην . . . παρέχει.

10We here read the codex A ὡς γιγνώσκομένης, follow its punctuation, and thereby do not adopt Adam's emendation ὡς γιγνώσκομένην.

Adam presents three reasons for his emendation (*The Republic of Plato*, 2:61). First, he attempts at showing that ὡς γιγνώσκομένη is in predicative agreement with αἰτίαν after διανοοῦ by alluding to Pol. 258c6-7 πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας ὡς ὀύσας δύο εἶδο διανοηθήναι. But, if this allusion is legitimate, διανοοῦ is related to two participles, ὀύσαν and γιγνώσκομένην, and the former participle sounds redundant. The reading based on the manuscript seems to be certainly more straightforward; διανοοῦ is related to αἰτίαν . . . ὀύσαν and ἀλήθειας.
to ως γιγνωσκομένης alone. (Chambry wrongly takes ως γιγνωσκομένης also with ἐπιστήμης: "dis-toi qu’elle est la cause de la science et de la vérité, en tant qu’elles sont connues.") Second, Adam claims that his emendation provides the counterpart of the visibility of the sun mentioned in 508b9-10. Although we have been told that the visible and the intelligible realms are strictly analogical to one another (508b12-c2), it seems rash to derive the knowability of the Form of the Good from their mutual correspondence and the visibility of the sun which is the offspring of the Good. Such a crucial problem like the knowability of the Form of the Good must not be considered solely on the analogy of the visibility of its offspring, but needs independent discussion. Moreover, Adam does not notice the fact that the instrument of knowing the Good is not mentioned in the present passage, whereas that of seeing the sun is mentioned in 508b10. If he were to take the present passage as the real counterpart of 508b9-10, he should subscribe to Ficino’s reading διά νοῦν ("per intellectum") for διανοοῦν. This would surely undercut the first reason presented by Adam himself. Finally, Adam observes that γιγνωσκομένην μὲν balances οὐτω δὲ. He explains the implication governed by the binary particles as follows: "though apprehended by Knowledge, and therefore in some sense subject thereto, the Idea of Good is (as being the cause of both) more beautiful than Knowledge and Truth." The binary particles, μὲν and δὲ, do not always mean concession. It would be more natural to take the particles as contrasting αἰτίαν . . . ἐπιστήμης . . . καὶ ἀληθείας (508e3-4) and ἀμφοτέρων . . . γνώσεως τε καὶ ἀληθείας (e4-5). Furthermore, we cannot see why it is consistent with the status of the Good as the cause of knowledge to say that the Good apprehended by knowledge is subject to it. Again, we cannot see whether the object of knowledge is necessarily subject to knowledge or not.

In the appendix to his commentary on 508e3ff., Adam further argues against ως γιγνωσκομένης (ibid., 2:83-84) and raises three objections. First, Adam claims that the force of the particles μὲν and δὲ is not clear enough in the Oxford editors’ explanation that "the idea of good ‘is indeed (μὲν) the cause of knowledge and truth, but (δὲ) it is other and fairer than they’" (B. Jowett and L. Campbell, Plato’s Republic, 3:306). But, since those particles are not necessarily taken as marking concession, this objection is not well founded. Second, Adam maintains that διανοεῖσθαι can hardly be used with a participle when it is unaccompanied with ως. Whereas this grammatical rule can apply to Theaet. 158b3-4 ως πετόμενοι . . . διανοεῦται, Pol. 261a11-b2 πάντας ὑπόσους ἀν ἄρχοντας διανοηθῆμεν ἐπιτάξει προσχωμένους runs against it. This objection thus turns out to be based on Adam’s own fabrication of the grammatical rule. Finally, Adam, criticizing the Oxford editors’ translation, regards as unnecessary the limitation that "the cause of knowledge and of truth so far as the latter is known" (B. Jowett and L. Campbell, Plato’s Republic, 3:306). This passage, however, exactly reiterates 508e1-2 τὸ τὴν ἀληθείαν παρέχου τοῖς γιγνωσκομένους and thereby is hardly meaningless.
Against the limitation in discussion, Adam holds that "the Idea of the Good is the cause of all Truth, known and unknown" (The Republic of Plato, 2:83). This view is unconvincing. In the description of the sun, as already mentioned, the value is recognized in the function of light that unites the eyes and the things as to make the objects clearly seen. On the analogy of this value, if truth is not apprehended by intellect, where can we find the value and honor of the Good? The value of the Good must be found in its sustaining the relationship between intellect and the Form by giving knowledge to the former and truth to the latter. Only insofar as truth is apprehended by knowledge, hence, is the Idea of the Good worthy of being called the cause of truth. To say that the Good is the cause of even truth unknown would annihilate the very goodness of the Good.

To dismiss Adam's emendation, of course, does not imply the negation of the intelligibility of the Idea of the Good. Even if his emendation is justified, we cannot conclude the knowability of the Good directly from the emended text. The problem of the intelligibility of the Good calls for serious argumentation for its sufficient treatment.

11See note 9.


13In 478c10-15, we are told that γνώσεις surpasses δόξα in clarity (σοφιστεία) and that the latter is darker (σκοτωδέστερον) than the former.

14485b2, 523a3, 524e1, 525b5, c6.

15Schwyzer observes that Plato's νοῦς in the allegory of the sun is neither reality nor substance, but process or attribute. See "'Bewußt' und 'Unbewußt' bei Plotin," in Les Sources de Plotin (Geneva, Vandoeves: Fondation Hardt, 1957), p. 346. Schwyzer's observation would be correct insofar as it concerns Republic VI; intellection, as we shall see, is one of παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γνωσμένα (511d7-8). In Philb. 22c, however, Plato sharply distinguishes "the true, divine intellect" and "my intellect." Hackforth takes the latter as the self-projection of the former and comments on Philb. 30c9-10: "It is qua projected that νοῦς must be οὐκ ἄνευ ψυχῆς . . . ." See Plato's Examination of Pleasure, translated, with an Introduction and Commentary, by R. Hackforth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945), p. 57, note 10. The possibility of transcendent intellect existing apart from the soul is nowhere denied by Plato himself.

16In Rep. 517c1, we are told that the Good is barely seen (μόνις ὁρᾶσθαι).
Because of the use of the somewhat metaphorical ὅρωσθαι, we may not read the knowability of the Good by intellection from this passage. In the passage dealing with the final task of guardians (540a7-9), on the other hand, the Good is said to be seen (ἰδόντας) by the beam of the soul (τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐγνήν). From this mystic expression and the qualification μογῖς in the former passage, it is seen that some special effort is needed for the contemplation of the Good, an effort which is not necessary for the contemplation of the Form in general. Moreover, the Good is elsewhere described as if it can be known by intellection (ὁμών αὐτῷ ὅ ἐστιν ἀγαθόν αὐτῇ νοησει λάβη, 532a7-b1). Hence it seems almost impossible to settle the problem of the knowability of the Idea of the Good by intellection. For the connection of this problem with the problem of the text emendation in 508e4, see note 10.


18J. Adam, The Republic of Plato, 2:60.

19We would like to read this passage literally. Adam tries to establish that the Good is in a higher sense "the only true οὐσία, for all οὐσία are only specific determination of the Good" (The Republic of Plato, 2:62). By "specific determination of the Good" he would mean the derivation of οὐσία from the Good (509b7-8). On Adam's view, οὐσία is to be taken equivocally, meaning derived and underived οὐσία. But such equivocation can nowhere be found in Plato's dialogues. Adam's attempt at explaining the Good's being underived οὐσία by ἀρχὴν ἀναπόθετον in 510b7 (loc. cit.) is not convincing, because the unhypothetical first principle identified there with the Good is primarily viewed as the ultimate goal that, itself standing beyond all the hypotheses, guides the ascent from and beyond them, and is not considered in terms of its relationship to οὐσία. The Good's being ἀρχὴ does not necessarily allow itself to be οὐσία in a certain sense.


21In the metaphor of the divided line, as to the objective side of the line, degree of clarity (509d9, 511a7-8, e4-6) is interchangeable with degree of truth (510a8-9, 511e2-3). As in the metaphor of the sun, the value associated with clarity is also here obvious; the mathematical Forms, writes Plato, are "glorified and given honor as being clear (ὡς ἐναργέσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετμημένοις)" (511a7-8) in comparison with their images. (Bloom mistranslates δεδοξασμένοις: "they are opined to be clear." For the apt reading, see J. Adam, The Republic of Plato, 2:69.)
It is the likeness between the Good and the sun that Glaucon asks Socrates to spell out (509c5-6). The likeness, however, is not mentioned in the metaphor of the divided line, but is explicated in the allegory of the cave (515e6ff.). But, since the metaphor of the cave and the passage dealing with the education of the guardians presuppose the distinctions between the intelligible and the sensible realms and between dialectic and mathematical science in the metaphor of the divided line, Socrates, in the metaphor of the divided line, seems to take a detour in order to meet Glaucon's request.


J. Adam, The Republic of Plato, 2:159-162.


Ross (Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 60), Hackforth in Plato's Phaedo, translated with an Introduction and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), p. 69, note 2, and Bluck in Plato's Phaedo, translated with Introduction, Notes, and Appendices (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955), p. 67, note 3 regard αὐτὰ τὰ ἵσα as the mathematical equals distinct from the Form of the Equal. But it is obvious that the mathematical objects are not relevant to the recollection argument. With Gallop in Plato's Phaedo, translated with Notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 123-124, we may see αὐτὰ τὰ ἵσα as an alternative designation of the Form of the Equal which is bipartite or multipartite. Although this interpretation is not completely free from difficulty, it can avoid at least entangling the context of the recollection argument by incorporating entities distinct from the Form. Further, the unity of the Form is first established in Rep. 597c1-10, but is not seriously discussed in the Phaedo. Hence we do not need to be so perplexed by the plural αὐτὰ τὰ ἵσα.

We do not touch upon the problem of the authenticity of this epistle. Ross also refers to Epist. VII 342a7-c4 as a passage against the doctrine of intermediates (Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 62).

W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 65. See also F. M. Cornford, Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, p. 62: "I agree with critics who hold that nothing here points to a class of mathematical numbers and figures intermediate between Ideas and sensible things."

W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 60.

This passage is mentioned in W. D. Ross, *Plato’s Theory of Ideas*, p. 60.

Adam takes the above mentioned passage to mean that the mathematician does not exercise νοῦς on his subject, but has his subject which is νοητὸν as distinguished from ὅρατὸν and his hypothesis as an ἀρχή (*The Republic of Plato*, 2:72). This construction, however, overlooks the force of καίτω that sharply contrasts νοῦν oὐκ ἵσχεν and νοητῶν δύτων. To be worse, his interpretation obscures this contrast by taking νοητὸν to denote the division of the line corresponding not only to νοησίς but also to δίάνοια. Moreover, if we were to follow Adam’s construction of μετὰ ἀρχῆς, (i) νοῦν oὐκ ἵσχεν entailed by σκοπεῖν . . . ἐξ ὑποθέσεων (dl) should be synonymous with νοητῶν δύτων, and (ii) τὸ μὴ ἐπ’ ἀρχὴν ἀνελθόντες (c8-d1) should mean that the mathematician does not go up to his hypothesis. From these consequences, the inadequacy of Adam’s reading is evident.

The passage in discussion is clearly Glaucon’s restatement of Socrates’ account for the lower division of the intelligible realm: τοῦτο τοῖς νοητοῖς μὲν τὸ εἶδος ἔλεγον, ὑποθέσεσι δ’ ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρῆσθαι περὶ τὴν ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀρχὴν ἑούσαν (511a3-5). Here the binary particles μὲν and δὲ contrast νοητὸν and ὑποθέσει . . . ἀναγκαζομένη . . . χρῆσθαι. Again, ὑποθέσεις is here clearly distinguished from ἀρχὴ. The passage in question, in light of 511a3-5, does not allow Adam’s reading. In addition, Martin’s reference to 511a3 is confusing as a textual evidence for Plato’s description of the Form as νοητόν. See Platons Ideenlehre (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), p. 233.

W. D. Ross, *Plato’s Theory of Ideas*, p. 64. See also *ibid.*, pp. 64-65: "When philosophy has done its work, the Ideas which hitherto were only διανοητα have become νοητα by derivation from the unhypothetical first principle."

See also 510b5-6 ἐπ’ ἀρχὴν πορευομένη; b6-7 ἐπ’ ἀρχὴν αὐτοθέτου . . . ἑούσα.


There still remain several problems.

First, whereas we are told in one place (510b5) that the soul makes her way to the first principle, it is said elsewhere (511b4) that αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος grasps the
principle. Now νόησις is one of the παθήματα ἐν τῇ φυσί-γιγνόμενα (511d7-8). Then, how is νόησις related to λόγος? We agree with Adam who, following Krohn, regards λόγος as "the instrument by which νοῦς works" (The Republic of Plato, 2:70). In 534b4-6, Plato speaks of dialectic using the terms λόγος and νοῦς:

"And, as for the man who is not able to do so [sc. to grasp the reason for the being of each thing], to the extent he is not able to give an account (λόγου) of a thing to himself and another, will you not deny that he has intelligence (νοῦν) with respect to it?" (tr. A. Bloom).

According to R. S. Bluck, "Logos and Form in Plato: A Reply to Professor Cross," in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E. Allen (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 41, λόγος here represents "an explanatory account of the Form in question that should indicate its relation to other Forms." This view spells out the nature of dialectic mentioned in 510b8-9 and 511b7-c2. Moreover, in Tim. 28a1-2, the Form is described as τὸ ... δὴ νοῆσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτεόν. For the close connection between λόγος and νοῦς (or ἐπιστήμη), see R. C. Cross, "Logos and Forms in Plato," in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E. Allen (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 22-25. We here do not go into detail of the controversy between Cross and Bluck on the relationship between λόγος and Forms.

Second, according to Ross (Plato's Theory of Ideas, pp. 60-62), Rep. 526a1ff. and Phlb. 56d4-e3, making exactly the same point as one another, implicitly bring out the distinction between the Ideas, the mathematical objects, and the sensibles (see also R. Hackforth, Plato's Examination of Pleasure, p. 114; and J. Adam, The Republic of Plato, 2:115). For these sections to give sufficient evidence of Plato's formulation of the doctrine of intermediates, the distinctness of mathematical objects from the Forms rather than from the sensibles must be found in them. Ross maintains that units recognized by mathematicians exist in the plural and are different form the Idea of Unity. As already mentioned in note 26, however, the plural number does not always point to the distinctness from the Form. Hence Ross does not succeed in showing that Plato had long been on the point of formulating the doctrine of intermediates. (Incidentally, ἀυτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά in Theaet. 196a2, though said to be free from practical mensuration, do not indicate the Forms Five and Seven, but simply records printed in our mind compared to a wax-tablet at a2-3.)

Third, Cornford maintains that the images of moral Ideas, different from those of mathematical Ideas, are invisible. From this he concludes:

"Hence it is harder to see the difference between the justice of a particular action or character and Justice itself than to distinguish Two apples from number 2, also represented by other visible pairs. Accordingly, mathematics serves as the easiest bridge from the sense world to the intelligible, and should precede the study of moral Ideas" (Studies in
This view, however, is not sufficiently grounded. On the metaphysical distinction between the Form and its image, first of all, Cornford's comparison is not appropriate. The distinction between the practically counted number two and the Form Two, rather than that between two apples and the number two, must be compared with the difference between the justice of a particular action or disposition and Justice itself. From the invisibility of the images of moral Ideas, the difficulty of seeing the distinction between those images and Ideas themselves does not arise. The recollection argument in the *Phaedo*, in which the difference between a Form and its immanent character is marked by the latter's deficiency (74d9-e4, 75a11-b8), equally applies to the apprehension of Forms of quantitative relation and of Forms of moral and aesthetic values (75c10-d3). What is crucial for recognizing the difference between a certain Form and its image is not the visibility of the latter, but the very inferiority of the latter to the former which has already been apprehended. Moreover, even if Cornford's view is considered to be legitimate, the ease in seeing the difference between the mathematical Form and its image does not insure the ease in seeing mathematics as a bridge from the sensible world to the intelligible. The role of mathematics that easily (φαστώντος, Rep. 525c5) turns the soul around from becoming to true reality lies in its studying of numbers in order to discriminate each of them, the numbers with which other numbers are mixed up together (συγκεκριμένα, 524c7) and which are presented by the sense (524d9ff.). In other words, the reason why mathematics is called the easy bridge from the sensible realm to the intelligible is that the case of perceiving one and the same thing as one, or of such and such a number, and infinitely many at the same time (525a3-7) is so probable that intellection is frequently aroused in order to discriminate those opposites. Therefore the difference between moral Ideas and mathematical Ideas with regard to visibility and invisibility of their images does not fully explain the proposed order of education for the guardians. On the mutually opposite characters to arouse intellection, Dancy writes: "... the distinction between the two realms [i.e. the intelligible and the sensible] rests on the puzzles over provocative predicates." See R. M. Dancy, "The One, the Many, and the Form: *Philebus* 15b1-8," *Ancient Philosophy* 4 (1984):177.

Fourth, Ross infers the structure of the world of Forms from the difference of movement of νόησις from that of διάνοια:

"... it seems not unlikely that Plato thought of these two ways of dividing the ideal world as actually producing the same division, between mathematical Ideas as coming low in the hierarchy and ethical Ideas as coming high. For ethical Ideas are much more closely and obviously connected with the Idea of good than mathematical Ideas are" (*Plato's Theory of Ideas*, p. 64 (Italics mine.)).

First of all, we must keep in mind that Plato's talk of the procedure of
dialectic (510b6-9, 511b7-c2) presupposes the hierarchical structure of the world of Forms. But the difference in the direction of the movement of thought does not always point to the hierarchy of the Forms. Ross observes that we must resign our attempt to connect the mathematical Forms with the Idea of the Good when we start with them (loc. cit.). This view seems to imply that dialectic cannot treat those Forms unless we start with the moral Forms, ascend to the Form of the Good, and finally descend to the mathematical Forms, in other words, that intellection of moral Ideas must precede that of mathematical Ideas. This implication is no doubt untenable. It is not dialecticians or philosophers but mathematicians or scientists that "have no intellect about the mathematical objects" (511d1-2). (Notice αίς (511c6) related to τῶν τεχνῶν καλομένων (511c6).) Plato nowhere suggests that dialectic must begin with a certain moral Idea. Moreover, it is nowhere said that ethical Forms are more closely connected with the Idea of the Good than mathematical Ideas are. (We cannot see what Ross exactly means by "more closely and obviously connected with the Idea of good." According to Soph. 252e1-2, the Forms are simply either connected or unconnected with one another. If mathematical Forms are less obviously connected with the Good than ethical Forms are, insofar as the Good is responsible for the clarity of intellection, such absurd consequence will follow that intellection of the former is somewhat dimmer than that of the latter.) In a word, it seems that the metaphor of the divided line does not provide us with sufficient clues to the structure of the world of Forms.

Finally, we must notice that it is in mathematical sciences (τῶν τεχνῶν καλομένων, αίς . . . , 511c6) that the inquirers have no intelligence about mathematical objects, though they, when connected with the first principle, are νοητα (d1-2). This certainly implies such continuity from mathematical sciences to dialectic that mathematicians, when they arrive at the final stage of the educational program for guardians, can come to acquire intuitive knowledge of the Forms. If dialectic does not reveal true being to those who have mastered mathematical sciences, in other words, if the intelligibility of mathematical Forms is not insured for them, they leave their hypotheses unexplained and so cannot see reality fully awake, but simply dream about it (533b8-c1). This means that, insofar as they are ignorant of the first principle of their inquiry, their consistent deductive system cannot constitute science (c3-6). (Also in 476c2-8, we read that the person who does not hold the existence of the Beautiful itself besides many beautiful things is in a dreaming state.) Natorp contrasts Plato’s method of dialectic that secures science by virtue of the contact with the principle or the Form with nominalistic approach to science (Platos Ideenlehre, p. 216). If mathematical objects are not Forms but simply intermediates distinct from them, it will be impossible to secure mathematical sciences by dialectic.

37Cornford takes παθήματα applied to intellection as νοην ἔχειν in light
of 511d1 νοῦν ἴσχεν (Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics, p. 76).

38 The section πάλαι ἐλέγομεν recalls Socrates’ earlier criticism of senses in 65a-b.

39 This word with negation is employed for expressing the instability of the continuous flux of phenomena in Tim. 49d2. See also Theaet. 157a3-4.

40 Marten sees ἀπτέσθαι in 511b4 in terms of the affinity between the soul and the Form. See Platon’s Theorie der Idee (Freiburg, Munich: Karl Alber, 1975), p. 22.

41 See note 36.


43 Cornford (Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics, pp. 72, 76) considers intellection in terms of the method of analysis and takes the metaphor of ἀνάπαθή (511b7) to mean the intuitive apprehension of a prior truth implicit in a conclusion in the soul’s upward movement of thought from geometrical analysis. But, since Cornford’s discussion is not based on sufficient textual evidence from Plato’s own work, we feel somewhat reluctant to follow his view.

44 If the problem “what can be apprehended by intellection” is legitimately replaced by or reduced to the problem “what can be posited as the Idea,” then our present inquiry will be first complete when the latter question is sufficiently answered. We here do not go into the details of this problem, but tentatively rely on Plato’s almost exhaustive list of the Forms in Epist. VII 342d3-8:

"The same doctrine holds good in regard to shapes and surfaces, both straight and curved, in regard to the good and the beautiful and the just, in regard to all bodies artificial and natural, in regard to fire and water and the like, and in regard to every animal, and in regard to every character in the souls, and in respect to all states active and passive" (tr. L. A. Post, adapted by A. Sumi).

In spite of the young Socrates’ hesitance to accept the Forms of Man, Fire, and Water in Parm. 130c1-4, Plato, at least in his late dialogues, seems to feel comfortable to posit the so-called substantival or substantial Forms. Also in Philb. 15a4-7, the monads of ox and man are mentioned on the same footing as those of the good and the beautiful. See also Fujisawa’s comment on the Timaeus’ doctrine of the images of the Forms coming into the Receptacle: "It is important to notice . . . that the so-called qualitative or adjectival Forms . . . and their images are on the same footing as the substantial or substantival ones . . ." (Phronesis 19 (1974):54, note 64). Even in the middle dialogues, the substantial Forms are not dormant. In
Rep. 596a-597c, for example, Plato endeavors to establish the unity or numerical singularity of the Idea by referring to the Forms of artificial objects, couch and chair. In Phd. 75c10-d3, we read that we have innate knowledge of everything marked by αὐτὸ ὁ ἔστι. But we, with Hackforth (Plato's Phaedo, p. 71, note 3), would like to leave the question open, whether or not we may infer from this passage that Plato had already entertained the view of Rep. 596a, the view that an Idea corresponds to every group of things we choose to make.

45See Rep. 437b4; Phdr. 271b2; Soph. 248b5, d5; Leges 859e4-5, 894c5-6; Epist. VII 342d7-8.

46In the hypothesis argument of the Phaedo, the Form plays the part as the cause of a thing's becoming (γνώμενον, 101c3; γενέσθαι, c5), say, beautiful (see R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo, p. 144). In spite of Plato's use of such military metaphor like κατέχειν (104d1, 6, 105d3), we do not understand the Form-cause theory such that the Form acts on a participant in itself. Hackforth (Plato's Phaedo, p. 145) correctly regards the absence of efficient cause from the Form as the problem in the acquisition of characters rather than in the possession of them. Of course, the fact that the Form plays no part as moving cause in the participational situation does not necessarily mean that it does not act on the soul in the occurrence of intellection.

47The following sketch of his discussion is based on G. Martin, Platons Ideenlehre (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), pp. 233-239.

48Natorp tries to see the support for his idealistic interpretation of the theory of Forms in the explanation of the "second voyage" (Phd. 99c9-d1) as follows: "Denn in den Denksetzungen (λόγου) ist, nach dem (99E) bestimmt ausgesprochen Grundsatz der Idealismus, die Wahrheit dessen, was ist (der δόντα) . . . allein zu ersehen." See P. Natorp, Platos Ideenlehre, p. 133. There arise two problems on this presentation. First, Martin quotes this passage in order to clarify Natorp's position in which intellection is considered to be purely active. But we must notice that Natorp does not subscribe to the passive knowability of the Form. The Platonic Form which he regards as a law or method, but not as a thing, is also itself active: "... denn es ist allgemein das Gesetz, welches in der Erkenntnis und für sie den Gegenstand schafft. Das ist der letzte Sinn der 'Idee' ..." (Platos Ideenlehre, p. 29).

"... Platos Ideen von Anfang an bis zuletzt, und wenn je, dann im Phaedrus, Methoden besagen und nicht Dinge; Denkenheiten, reine Setzungen des Denkens und nicht äussere, wenn auch übersinnliche 'Gegenstände'" (ibid., pp. 74-75).

"Was ist also . . . die 'Idee'? . . . Nein, sondern schlechthin aktiv,

In Natorp’s view of the Form as a law or method, as shown above, the Form is not passively known by intellect, but actively and spontaneously constitutes scientific objects. Martin’s reference to Natorp’s position therefore seems to be somewhat out of focus. Second, Natorp’s reading of Phd. 99e must be examined. His idealistic exegesis, needless to say, is based on his construction of εἰς τὸν λόγον as "in den Denksetzungen." But it is unnatural to read the spontaneity of the knowing subject into this passage, because it is simply the method of searching for the cause that is here elucidated. Moreover, Natorp takes τὰ ὀντά in 99d5 and εὖ as scientific objects. It is at least certain that the word here does not refer exclusively to the Forms (see R. Hackforth, Plato’s Phaedo, p. 136; D. Gallop, Plato’s Phaedo, p. 177), though to specify the exact referent of that word is not always easy.

This distinction becomes prominent after the middle dialogues (Rep. 525b5-6, c4-6, 526e6-7, 534a2-3; Tim. 29c2; Phlb. 54a5). Before these dialogues, the contrast between immutable Forms and transient objects in Phd. 79c2-d7 and 80b1-5 is not described as that between ὄσια and γένεσις. Again, despite the fact that the Form of the Beautiful is in Symp. 211a1 said to be ἀεὶ δὲν καὶ οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον, ὄσια and γένεσις are themselves not contrasted with one another.


Sayre, against many commentators, maintains that this characterization of being is Plato’s own (Plato’s Late Ontology: A Riddle Solved (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 226-227). He presents three points for his observation. First, "the friends of Forms" are in 248d-e forced to admit that the Forms are acted on in being known. Second, this characterization nicely fits the ontology of becoming in the Theaetetus. Finally, the Eleatic Stranger in the Sophist proceeds to examine the δύναμις (251e8, 252d2, passim) of Forms to combine with one
another. These three considerations, however, do not seem to support satisfactorily Sayre's view. The first point is based on Sayre's misconstruction of 248d-e. As we shall see later, "the friends of Forms" in 248c8-9 clearly deny the compatibility of active and passive powers with true being. They are nowhere compelled to accept that the Ideas are acted on in being known. The second point will turn out to have very little force as soon as we see that the doctrine of flux in the *Theaetetus* is not Plato's own. This doctrine, allowing the transition of perceptual qualities themselves, eliminates the possibility of identifying any kind of perception (182d1-e6), and therefore no intelligible assertion about sensible phenomena is possible (183a4-b5). In Plato's own theory of phenomenal flux, on the contrary, some degree of certainty in the description of phenomena is insured by the retention or reiteration of self-identical images of the Forms in the sensible realm (*Tim.* 29c1-2, 50b5-6). The upshot of such world-picture as presented by the flux theory in the *Theaetetus* is nothing else than the misology that Plato most resents (*Phd.* 89d1ff.). The final point discloses Sayre's confusion about the meaning of οὐκείμενον. The meaning of the οὐκείμενον of Forms to combine with each other is entirely distinct from that of the δύναμις employed for the characterization of being; the former simply means "capacity" or "possibility" and lacks the implication of "power" or "force."

51Taylor writes: "The point is simply that the 'materialists' who use the notion of a 'force' has already surrendered his materialism" (*Plato: The Man and His Work*, p. 385; see also H. -E. Pester, *Platons Bewegte Usia* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1971), p. 14). Notice that the criterion is brought by the Stranger, but not by Theaetetus who is the spokesman of the idealists. If it were brought out by the idealists and not entertained by themselves, their argument against the materialists would be simply *ad hominem*.

52The problem concerning the exact referent of "the friends of Forms," of course, is raised here. We have already pointed out that their fundamental position, namely the distinction between οὐσία and γένεσις, is purely Platonic (see note 49). But the problem is also inseparable from another problem, whether the immutability of the Ideas is denied in the *Sophist* or not. Hence we shall await the identification of "the friends of Forms" until their position is fully examined and its consequence is revealed.


54See F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 244, note 1; H. -E. Pester, *Platons Bewegte Usia*, p. 42. Dies spells out the implication of 248a10-11 as follows:

"La négation de la réalité du mouvement est impliqué dans cette thèse
[sc. 248a10-11]; car il n'y a mobilité que dans la γενέσις et de cette mobilité on ne peut conclure à une existence réelle du mouvement, puisque cette mobilité n'est attribut que d'une pseudo-réalité" (A. Diès, *La Définition de l'Etre et la Nature des Idées*, p. 42).

This observation seems to be misleading. Indeed mobility is attributed to the realm of becoming alone. As we shall see, however, the idealists in 248c7-9 try to exclude "movedness" from the realm of Forms by insisting upon the incompatibility of powers of acting and of being acted upon with true being, but never hold that "movement" is present solely in the realm of becoming. They do not refuse to introduce to τὸ παντελῶς ὄν (248e7-249a1) some kind of movement that may not compromise the immutability of the Forms. The above cited observation no doubt compels Diès to identify τὸ παντελῶς ὄν as the sensible world by divorcing it from οὐσία and τὸ ὄν (op. cit., pp. 65-88). Diès' interpretation of τὸ παντελῶς ὄν will be examined later.

Campbell suggests that τὴν δύναμιν in line 9 is used in a slightly different sense from δυνάμεως in line 8 and akin to the common one of "nature," "import," and "meaning" (*The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato*, pp. 127-128). This reading indeed has merit in avoiding the redundancy which is felt when the word is taken in the same sense in both places. On this reading, however, the reason is not explained why Plato repeats the same word with a different sense that is very likely to cause some confusion. Moreover, to say that the "meaning" or "word" of the powers of acting and of being acted upon is inapplicable to true being, seen with the binary particles μὲν and δὲ (lines 7-8), is not well balanced with γενέσις... μέτεστι τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως (lines 7-8), and also sounds incurably redundant. Another reading is suggested by Pester: "... zu der Usia passe die Dynamis keines dieser beiden" (*Platons Bewegte Usia*, p. 17). Here οὐδετέρου in line 9 is read as an explicative genitive, and τὴν δύναμιν is taken as a "power" distinct from the powers of acting and of being acted on. This construction would imply that the idealists, though refusing to apply the δύναμις criterion of being to the realm of οὐσία, do not deny the compatibility with that realm of such δύναμις as free from activity and passivity. This implication perhaps points to the soul's power of knowing the Forms rather than to the Forms' capacity to combine with one another, since the presence of movement in τὸ παντελῶς ὄν soon comes to be stressed in 248e6ff. Thus construed, τοῦτων οὐδετέρου τὴν δύναμιν, indicating "the power that is neither the power of acting nor that of being acted on," is felt free from redundancy.

Several commentators observe the exact agreement of this section with the analysis of sensation in the *Theaetetus* (F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 245; W. D. Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, p. 111; L. Campbell, *The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato*, p. 127). But our dialogue does not seem to be well
connected with the flux theory of perception in the *Theaetetus*. In the *Theaetetus*, on the one hand, a perception and a perceived object are said to be twins from the intercourse and friction of the powers of acting and of being acted on (156a7-b2). In the *Sophist*, on the other, κοινωνεῖν or cognitive contact presupposes the subject and the object that encounter one another (τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλα συνεύρετων, 248b5-6). Here the sensible objects are not regarded as the offsprings of the powers. Pester also presents two reasons for rejecting the analysis of perception in the *Theaetetus* with the present passage (*Platons Bewegte Usia*, p. 135, note 15). First, Plato stands apart from the flux doctrine of perception (see also note 50). Second, the active and the passive powers, in the *Theaetetus*, are mentioned solely in the realm of perception. The second reason, however, does not seem to be convincing enough, because the idealists, also in the present passage, restrict the δύναμις criterion of being to the realm of becoming alone. (Behind the presentation of the second reason is Pester's view of the applicability of the δύναμις criterion to the realm of true being (op. cit., p. 169), the view supported by his demarcation of the immobile Form and the νόημα moved by and in the soul (pp. 133, 139).


59Cornford correctly observes that the Form's separateness mentioned in the *Parmenides* originates in the *Phaedo* (*Plato and Parmenides* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1937), pp. 74-80; see also his *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 7-8).

60From this separateness, several critics otherwise identify "the friends of Forms." Taylor regards them as Italian Pythagoreans (*Plato: The Man and His Work*, pp. 385-386; *Plato, The Sophist & the Statesman*, pp. 43-45) and Natorp as Plato's students who might distort the methodic meaning of the Form by separating it from phenomena (*Platos Ideenlehre*, pp. 292-293). Taylor tries to defend his view by pointing out the absence from the *Sophist* of the doctrine of the thing's participation in the Form that breaks down the absolute severance between true being and becoming. But this defense is not plausible enough, since the doctrine of
participation and the causal doctrine of Form contribute nothing to the course of argument moving towards the necessity of including movement in complete being. Again, Natorp seems to miss the point that Plato has to postulate the Form’s separateness from becoming to insure the former’s immutability. His claim of the Form’s immanence without distinguishing the transcendent Form and its immanent character is simply forced by his thesis of the Form as a rule or method.

Taylor observes that sensation, absolutely severed from reflection, has no cognitive value in the doctrine of "the friends of Forms," in other words, that the theory of recollection in the middle dialogues, according to which sensation calls into our minds the apprehension of the Forms, is absent from their doctrine (Plato: The Man and His Work, p. 385; The Sophist & the Statesman, p. 42). But this observation also does not sufficiently support his identification of "the friends of Forms" as Italian Pythagoreans (see note 60), because the theory of recollection has no force in the course of the present argument. We must remember that the theory of recollection in the Phaedo purports to establish the existence of the Forms and the pre-existence of the soul, whereas the existence of the Forms is maintained from the outset (246b6-c2) and the immortality of the soul is not discussed at all in the Sophist. Moreover, the word λογισμός is in Phdr. 249b7-c1 associated with a generalizing process involved in recollection from a plurality of perceptions to a unity. The word in Soph. 248a11 has no bearing on recollection.

Apelt correctly takes the idealists' refusal with Symp. 211b4-5 (Platonis Sophista, pp. 151-152). We cannot see why many contemporary critics, in showing the debt of "the friends of Forms" to the theory of Forms in the middle dialogues, usually ignore this important section.

The fundamental hypothesis of the theory of Forms is that "there is a beautiful alone by itself (τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό), and a good, and a great, and so on with the rest of them" (Phd. 100b5-7). As ἐκείνα τὰ πολλὰρεῦλημα in b4-5 refers back to the Forms mentioned in the recollection argument and the kinship argument, the locution τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό quite certainly implies the unchangeability of that hypothetical entity (see 78d1-7). Hence the immutability of the Forms can be said to constitute the aforementioned fundamental hypothesis of the theory of Forms. Even in the Parmenides, Parmenides accepts this hypothesis after his relentless elenchus of Socrates:

"But on the other hand, . . . if, in view of all these, difficulties and others like them, a man refuses to admit that Forms of thing exist or to distinguish a definite Form in every case, he will have nothing on which to fix his thought, so long as he will not allow that each thing has a character which is always the same (τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι); and in so doing he will completely destroy the significance of all discourse" (135b5-c2, tr. F. M.
The denial of the existence of the always constant Forms entails the destruction of the possibility, not only of philosophy, but of all discourse, and finally leads to the misology Plato most resents (see note 50). Hence Cornford is right in pointing out that it is "the fundamental thesis of Plato's theory" that Parmenides here accepts (Plato and Parmenides, p. 100). To be sure, the Forms' immutability has never been abandoned up to the Seventh Letter (342c2-4).

Also in the transition from the first question to the second about the unvarying monads in Philb. 15b1-4, we can see that to conceive such monads like man, ox, the beautiful, and the good exactly means to posit them as "always one and the same and subject neither to generation nor to destruction" (b2-4). By "the second question" is here meant εἶτα πῶς...μίαν ταύτην (b2-4). On this matter we disagree with Hackforth who maintains that only two questions are raised in Philb. 15b1-8 (Plato's Examination of Pleasure, p. 20, note 1). In order to defend his construction that the second question occupies all of b2-8, Hackforth reads in b4, ὅμως εἶναι βεβαιότατα a (= πρῶτον) μὲν ταύτην and considers μετὰ δὲ τούτ' in b4-5 not to belong to the series πρῶτον μὲν...εἶτα... but to answer the second πρῶτον μὲν in b4. Other commentators propose replacing ὅμως with ὅλως (Diès) or with ὅντως (Susemihl). Moreover, Natorp transposes all of ὅμως...ταύτην after χωρίς in b7 (Platos Ideenlehre, p. 314, note 1). Thus the crux of the problem of the number of questions raised in Philb. 15b1-8 lies in how to construct ὅμως εἶναι βεβαιότατα μίαν ταύτην in b4, if possible, without calling for any emendation. If the preceding context is seriously considered, it will be noticed that ὅμως in b4 is never out of place. In 15a1-7 we read that one must be concerned with dispute in contemplating divisions of such monads like man, ox, the beautiful, and the good, whereas he has no need to thrash the matter out in speaking of monads that come into being and perish. Hence ὅμως must be taken with the possible difficulties in the case of dealing with divisions of monads that neither come into being nor perish. Thus construed, εἶτα πῶς...μίαν ταύτην (b2-4) can be an independent problem; it asks how the unvarying monad, though its division is always seriously disputed, is still most assuredly this monad, that is, one of the monads that genuinely are (μονάδας...ἀληθῶς οὕσας, b1-2). In other words, this is the problem, how to divide one Form into many without compromising the unity not only of that one generic monad but of each of many divided monads. The satisfactory solution to this problem would perhaps reveal us what is called the discernment of dialectician in Soph. 253d5-9. The direction of our exegesis of Philb. 15b2-4 is fully explicated in R. M. Dancy, Ancient Philosophy 4 (1984):165-176. The full analyses of Philb. 15b1-8 and of Soph. 253d5-9, being totally beyond the scope of our present inquiry, will be reserved for another occasion.

64 F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 240, note 3. See also P.

Ross writes as follows:

"And if Plato means to stick to his suggestion that only that which has the power either of acting or of being acted on is real, he must be supposed to adopt the other alternative, that in knowledge the object acts on the mind; which would be at least more reasonable than the view that the mind acts on the object, and would correspond better with the account he gives of sensation in the *Theaetetus*" (*Plato's Theory of Ideas*, p. 111).

This view is untenable. First, the premise of the argument is not the case. In 248c8-9, as already seen, the δυνάμεις criterion of being is definitely rejected with regard to ὑσία; neither the power of acting nor that of being acted on is congruent with real being. Second, prima facie, the other alternative might sound reasonable, because it appears to safeguard the immobility of the Forms by ascribing passivity to the soul. But we can still here ask how the Form acts on the soul. We have only two alternatives; the Form acts on the soul either (i) by first moving itself or (ii) by remaining itself totally unmoved. The first alternative involves at least two difficulties. Insofar as the Form moves itself, it is moved by itself and so its immobility is compromised. Again, if the Form moves itself, the Form thus conceived is prone to be indistinguishable from the soul elsewhere defined as the self-mover (*Phdr. 245e7-246a1*). On the other hand, the second alternative can avoid compromising the immobility of the Form. But it seems to be hopelessly difficult to explain how the unmoved object can act on the mind. Finally, the correspondence with the account for sensation in the *Theaetetus* does not insure the plausibility of the suggested alternative, since it is not always necessary that sensation and thought are explained under the same scheme. Furthermore, Ross' delineation of the flux theory of perception in the *Theaetetus* is quite inaccurate. He observes that Plato, under the guise of the κοιμήστερος, maintains that theory (*op. cit.*, p. 102). As already seen in note 50, however, this is not the case. He comments on the theory: "He [sc. Plato] does not specify whether the object acts on the sense-organ or vice versa, but it is natural to suppose that he means the former" (italics mine). So "the account he gives of sensation in the *Theaetetus*" is nothing but Ross' supposition. Hence his reliance on the correspondence between the alternative in question and the account for sensation in the *Theaetetus* is totally unfounded.

We shall separately examine the views of Bluck, Pester, and Diès.

Bluck works out an interpretation by which "knowledge may be allowed to involve some change in its objects without infringing the sanctity of the actual nature of Forms" (*Plato's Sophist*, p. 97). He first remarks that the expression "to be affected by" means nothing more than "to possess the quality of" in the argument against the monists (245a1-3) (p. 97). From this he concludes that the statement "the Form may be changed in being known" does not need to mean more than that it
may undergo change solely in respect of its inessential attribute, namely being-known, though not in respect of its nature (pp. 98-99). On this interpretation that purports to harmonize the δύναμις criterion of being with the immutability of Forms, however, there, as Bluck himself recognizes (p. 99), must remain the problem why the δύναμις criterion should not have been applied to the Forms, the problem which we have answered by presenting the textual evidence for Plato's claim of the Form's impassability (Symp. 211b4-5). In conclusion, Bluck's interpretation seems to be inadequate. First, the possession of a quality meant by the word πάθος in the argument against the monists (245a1) does not necessarily apply to πάθημα (248b5) entailed by the encounter of the powers of acting and of being acted on. While the latter word explains cognitive intercourse, the former in that argument is not associated with cognition at all. In addition, the latter is contrasted with ποίημα, whereas the former is not. As Seligman points out (Being and Non-Being, pp. 33-34), their senses are distinct from one another. Second, Plato nowhere says that a Form has an attribute, either essential or inessential. The introduction of the entity-attribute distinction into the Form goes back to Aristotle. On the basis of his claim that if Forms are participated in, there must be Forms only of entities (Met. 990b28-29), Aristotle distinguishes participation in Forms of entities themselves (e.g. "Double itself") and incidental participation in those attributes which are predicated of those Forms (e.g. "eternal") (990b29-33). In this case, the Form of the Double is said to possess the attribute of being eternal (990b33-34). With this line of reasoning, if such an objection is raised that the application of the entity-attribute distinction to the Forms might eliminate the so-called qualitative or adjectival Forms, how can Bluck meet it? It is the adjectival Forms rather than the substantival ones that young Socrates in the Parmenides can admit with less hesitancy (130b7-c4). Thus to conceive the Form to possess some quality would evidently involve great difficulty in positing adjectival Forms on the same footing as substantival ones. (For the criticism of such entity-attribute distinction within the Form as alien to Plato's own theory, see N. Fujisawa, Phronesis 19 (1974):34-39). Third, does Plato admit that being-known is inessential to a Form? Of course, he does not affirm the Form to be hypostatized by the soul's activity of thinking. The Form is not a νόημα (Parm. 132b3-c12). In the present passage, nonetheless, the Form's intelligibility (Soph. 246b7) is explicitly mentioned in the fundamental position of "the friends of Forms" and, with its incorporeality (b8), makes its ontological status distinct from that of becoming. Moreover, the Form's knowability by intellect is often remarked when its ontological status needs to be clearly distinguished from that of sensible phenomena (Rep. 507b9-10; Tim. 28a1-2, 48e6). Bluck, overlooking these points, does not satisfactorily explain the reason why being-known is inessential to the Form. Finally, even if we are justified in saying that the Form possesses some inessential attribute, we will be still perplexed by the difficulty concerning the eternity of the world of Forms. If being-known is regarded
as an inessential attribute of the Form, the transition from one state that soul does not know the Form to another state that she knows it exactly implies the replacement of one attribute by another, namely not-being-known by being-known, on the side of the Form. This replacement does not injure the immutability of the very essence of the Form but involves some temporality. If this is the case, the Form will be eternal in the substantial order and temporal in the accidental order. Such bifurcation of the realm of Forms, needless to say, is inconceivable in Plato’s own theory. In sum, Bluck’s solution by invoking the Aristotelian entity-attribute metaphysics brings forth several difficulties rather than harmonizes the Form’s immutability with the alleged conception of knowing as acting on the Form.

Two continental commentators, Diès and Pester, believe that the δύναμις criterion of being does not disappear from the dialogue. Diès takes τὸ παντελῶς ὅν (248e7-249a1) as the sensible world distinct from οὐσία (see note 54) and ascribes only passivity to the Form. The subject of knowing is the soul or intellect of τὸ παντελῶς ὅν in which there is active movement, while the object is οὐσία in which there is passive movement alone (A. Diès, La Définition de l’Être et la Nature des Ideés, pp. 47-48). This view is based on Diès’ observation that the substitution of the notion of movement by the notions of action and of passion is necessary for the sequence of the argument (p. 48), because one can conceive neither κινεῖν nor κινεῖσθαι without introducing ποιεῖν and πάσχειν (p. 41, note 121). But Diès maintains that "the friends of Forms" represent neither Plato himself nor the Platonic philosophy (p. 129) and thereby that Plato’s own theory of Forms is not transformed at all in the Sophist (p. 133). So we here do not need to examine seriously Diès’ interpretation, because our present inquiry precisely concerns Plato’s own position. (His identification of τὸ παντελῶς ὅν with the sensible world will be considered later.)

Pester regards "the friends of Forms" as representing stubborn dogmatism (see note 57) and tries to solve the problem left unanswered in the Sophist, how to relate the movements of the Form and of the soul to one another, by distinguishing two kinds of οὐσία, the immobile Idea outside the soul and the passively moved νόημα inside her (see note 56). Again, insofar as this solution is not Plato’s own, we do not need to be anxious about Pester’s demarcation between the unmoved Form and the moved νόημα. But we may notice that this solution, which Pester himself regards as a revision of the theory of Forms, is supported by his observation that the δύναμις criterion of being is introduced to the notion of movement of knowledge (Platons Bewegte Usia, pp. 19-21). Hence, if this observation is satisfactorily refuted, his revision of the theory of Forms will be undermined.

The Platonic Form is not a νόημα. In the Seventh Letter, it is stressed that those which have been thought (τὰ νεονομένα) cannot be committed to writing (343a1-4). Edelstein takes the affinity of νοῦς to the Forms (342d1-3) as that of τὰ νεονομένα to them and supposes that the author of the Seventh Letter might not be
Plato himself and might regard the Ideas themselves as thoughts in the soul. See L. Edelstein, *Plato’s Seventh Letter* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966), pp. 98-99. His argument proceeds as follows. The only possible explanation of the kinship between the concepts and the Forms is that the Forms themselves are thoughts. But the suggestion that the Ideas are concepts is explicitly given up in *Parm.* 132b3-c11. Hence the *Seventh Letter* cannot be genuine. Although he correctly views that Plato himself does not consider the Forms to be concepts in the soul, Edelstein’s argument is not convincing. In 342d1-3, Plato stresses the affinity of νοῦς to the Forms, but not that of concepts to the Forms. As clearly seen from the kinship argument in the *Phaedo*, this affinity is genuinely Platonic. Intellect is akin to the Form, insofar as immediate contact is possible between them, and thereby the former is immutable state of mind as the latter is immutable entity. A concept is always the concept of a given Form so that the formation of the concept presupposes the soul’s cognitive contact with the Form of which it is the concept. We must notice that Plato here employs the perfect νεονομένα instead of the present νοσομένα. This certainly implies that τὰ νεονομένα arise in the soul after νοεῖν or νόησις has already occurred, that is, after the soul has apprehended the Forms. When τὰ νεονομένα have been formed, the soul is no longer in immediate cognitive contact with the Forms. If so, how can we move from the νοῦς-Forms kinship to the νεονομένα-Forms kinship? Even if those which have been thought are said to be nearest to the Forms, it is not necessary for the Form to be a νόημα. In the *Seventh Letter* the Form is nowhere regarded as a concept in the soul. Moreover, we may not think that the word νεονομένα implies the Forms’ acting on the soul during her contemplation, because τὰ νεονομένα emerge on the side of the soul after her cognitive contact with those Forms. In order to identify the ontological status of geometrical objects in our discussion of the metaphor of the divided line, we referred to the Form of the Circle in the *Seventh Letter*. The above consideration may defend the consistency of our position: (i) the *Seventh Letter* is genuine, (ii) the Form is not a νόημα, and (iii) intellection cannot be seen in terms of activity and passivity.

67Here Cornford’s translation is substantially emended. First, his rendering of κίνησις as "change" and of ἀκίνητον as "immutable" is prone to be misleading. While the word "change" implies some passivity of that which is changed, the statement that κίνησις must be placed in the realm of complete being unmistakably means that the Stranger might claim the δύναμις criterion of being to be applied to the realm of complete being. But it has not been established yet that the Stranger might do so. Second, τὸ παντελῶς ὀντί is rendered "that which is completely real" instead of Cornford’s "that which is absolutely real." As we shall see later, the adverb παντελῶς here connotes all-inclusiveness. In order to express this connotation, "completely" seems preferable to "absolutely."
68 F. M. Cornford, *Plato’s Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 246-247. Ross also maintains a similar view:

"What Plato is saying is that . . . we should find it difficult to believe that what is perfectly real cannot have movement, life, and the rest. He does not say that *whatever is perfectly real* must have these things; he simply denies that it cannot. His real meaning becomes clear in 249b5-10, where he says, in effect, that knowledge implies minds that are real and subject to change and objects (the Ideas) that are real and not subject to change. He has not given up his belief in unchanging Ideas . . . but he adds that minds subject to change must also be accepted as *completely real*" (*Plato’s Theory of Ideas*, p. 110, (Italics mine.)).

This observation is quite reasonable to the extent that it holds that the immutability of Forms is still defended in the present passage. Nevertheless Ross seems to distort the meaning of τὸ παντελῶς ὄν. As Cornford takes (*Plato’s Theory of Knowledge*, p. 245), τὸ παντελῶς ὄν, equivalent to τὸ ὄν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν in 249d3-4, refers to the whole world of real being that does not consist solely of Forms, but does not refer to each of the individual members of that world.

69 See F. M. Cornford, *Plato’s Theory of Knowledge*, p. 245. On the contrary, Martin believes that movement is ascribed to the Form and that this ascription, modelled on Hellenic gods in motion, may be hard to be reconciled with the fundamental thesis of the theory of Forms presented in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, namely the immutability of Forms (*Platons Ideenlehre*, pp. 42-43). This misconstruction seems to be due to Martin’s rendering of τὸ παντελῶς ὄντι (248e7-249a1) as "dem wahrhaft Seienden" (*ibid.*, p. 236), which would unmistakably indicate the Form.

70 Seligman writes as follows: "A (sc. 249b2-3) does not affirm that being in its own nature moves or is moved, or that forms, as vehicles of being, are moved, i.e. affected in being known" (*Being and Non-Being*, p. 36). Bluck observes that there is in the present passage no sufficient evidence for the rejection of the view that being known implies change (*Plato’s Sophist*, p. 100). This observation is correct to the extent that we can here find no "sufficient evidence" for that view to be rejected. As already seen, however, "the friends of Forms" in 248d10-e4 insist that the Form, though known by the soul, is never moved in being known. Whether this insistence can be a "sufficient evidence" for the rejection of the view that being known implies change depends on the point of view. From the viewpoint of the Eleatic Stranger, on the one hand, the claim in 248d10-e4 would perhaps not be sufficient evidence for the refusal of that view. (See F. M. Cornford, *Plato’s Theory of Knowledge*, p. 245: "It appears at first sight as if the Stranger himself must think that what is known is changed by being known.") From the viewpoint of the idealists or Plato himself, on the other, this claim would be sufficient evidence for the
rejection of being-known to imply change, because the refusal, however eristically, is necessary for the defense of their fundamental thesis, namely the immutability of true being. This very necessity sufficiently justifies the idealists' rejection of being-known to imply change or movedness.

71 This view is surely supported by the observation that the δύναμις criterion of being disappears from the dialogue at the point of 248d10-e4. See P. Seligman, Being and Non-Being, p. 34. The Eleatic Stranger appears to have conceived that movement and thought always involve the polarity of activity and passivity. This point can be seen from (i) his reaction (248e6-249a2) against the idealists' refusal of the idea that the Form's being known implies change (248d10-e4), that they may eventually represent complete being as totally devoid of movement and intelligence and (ii) his understanding that the idealists, as well as the Eleatics, think of τὸ πᾶν to be absolutely at rest (249c11-d1). Again, the Stranger, as already mentioned in note 70, appears to have thought that the object known is changed in being known. But the idealists evidently have lost interest in the δύναμις criterion of being at the point of 248d10-e4. If they were to admit spiritual or noetic, not physical, movement into that which is completely real, they, in order to be fully consistent, should think that this sort of movement involves neither activity nor passivity. In other words, from the idealists' own point of view, the δύναμις criterion must not be linked with the notion of spiritual or noetic movement. In this connection, Pester's revision of the theory of Forms (see note 66), based on the wrong assumption, seems to be unsuccessful, even though he endeavors to defend the immobility of the Form by distinguishing the unmoved Form and the νοσμα moved by the soul.

Cornford then writes as follows: "The question whether knowing and being known do not involve something analogous to the physical intercourse of perception seems to be left unanswered. The Stranger neither asserts this nor denies it" (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 247). As Cornford points out, the Stranger leaves this question unanswered. But the idealists negatively answer this question by insisting upon the inapplicability of the δύναμις criterion to real being. For Plato himself, the noetic intercourse is not analogous to the physical intercourse of perception as regards their association with or dissociation from activity and passivity. Apelt explicitly maintains that the soul's knowing and the Form's being known are for Plato free from activity and passivity (Platonis Sophista, p. 152). Moreover, he refers to Plotinus' view that such ἐνεργεία as νοεῖν is neither ποιεῖν nor ποιήσις (VI 1 [42],22,26-28) and writes: "Τὸ γιγνώσκειν autem ex severiore illo loquendi usu est ἐνεργείν, non ποιεῖν" (loc. cit.). But the above consideration, prima facie, would clash with the metaphor of the sun in the Republic, where intelllection, as already seen, is compared to sight. Which is Plato's own view? The metaphor of the sun aims at revealing the value of the Idea of the Good responsible
for the intelligibility of the Forms by means of comparing it to the sun responsible for the visibility of the sensibles. It does not purport to give a full account of intellection. We must notice that even here νοεῖν and νοεῖσθαι are not associated with activity and passivity, though each of them is said to be a δύναμις provided by the Form of the Good (508e2). It is the δύναμις neither of acting nor of being acted on, but simply the δύναμις. Thus seen, the idealists' defense of their position in the *Sophist* is never incongruous with the metaphor of the sun in the *Republic*. In conclusion, intellection and perception, on the one hand, are not analogous to one another, when we consider whether the polarity of activity and passivity is applicable to each of them or not; they, on the other, are analogous to one another to the extent that the Form of the Good is responsible for intellect's knowing and the Form's being known just as the sun is responsible for the eye's seeing and the object's being seen.

Taylor observes that the idealists, to be consistent, will have to deny not only that knowing is acting and being known is being acted on but also that true being is known by the mind (*Plato: The Man and His Work*, p. 385). On our construction, however, they have only to deny the former. If and only if the former is rejected, then the latter is consistent with the immutability of the Form.

Moreover, Pester claims that the question whether knowing in general is action or passion or both of them is not answered (*Platons Bewegte Usia*, p. 61). On our construction, however, this question is definitely answered; Theaetetus replies that the idealists, to be consistent, would hold that knowing and being known are neither acting nor being acted on (248d8-9) and then the Stranger elaborately explains this (d10-e4).

There still remains a problem about the referent of τὸ παντελῶς ὃν, which is too big to be fully treated in our present inquiry. In the preceding discussion, we have tentatively followed the line of Cornford's interpretation; τὸ παντελῶς ὃν, which is later referred to as τὸ ὃν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν (249d3-4), indicates the whole world of real being that includes not only the unchanging Forms but life, soul, intelligence, and such movement as they imply (*op. cit.*, p. 245). On this interpretation, the adverb παντελῶς, just as seen in Philb. 19a7 and 21a12, would imply all-inclusiveness or plenitude. To this extent Taylor's rendering "the plenitude of being" may not be altogether wrong. Again, τὸ . . . παντελῶς ὃν in *Rep.* 477a3 is of no help for considering the present problem. Cornford's interpretation seems to be more plausible than other views that regard τὸ παντελῶς ὃν solely as the sensible world by taking it as distinct from οὐσία and τὸ ὃν (A. Diès, *La Définition de l'Etre et la Nature des Ideés*, pp. 73-83) and that add the sensible world to τὸ παντελῶς ὃν (H. -E. Pester, *Platons Bewegte Usia*, p. 110). The Stranger's criticism (248e6-249a2) is exactly thrown upon the idealists' final defense (248d10-e4), where the realm of becoming is not mentioned at all. By using the expression τὸ παντελῶς ὃν the Stranger here seems to attack the idealists' conception of οὐσία
devoid of spiritual movement. He claims that the οὐσία entertained by the idealists
must be τὸ παντελῶς ὑπ' embracing soul, intellect and life, if their οὐσία-γένεσις
distinction is to have full explanatory force in virtue of οὐσία's exhaustively
containing all those which are not included in the realm of becoming. For our
possession of intelligence and constant knowledge to be possible, moreover, τὸ ὅν
tε καὶ τὸ πᾶν is said to include necessarily all that is unmoved and all that is in
motion (249d3-4). Apelt, alluding to Eusebius (Preparatio Evangélica XIV, 737b),
regards ὅσα ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκινημένα (249d3) as some common form of expression
almost equivalent to the Latin expression sacra profana (Platonis Sophista, p. 155;
see also L. Campbell, The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, p. 132). So it would be
somewhat rash to ascribe passive movement to soul or intellect by reading some
passivity in the perfect κεκινημένα. Thus seen, with Cornford, we may not add the
sensible world to τὸ παντελῶς ὑπ' or τὸ ὅν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν.

The Stranger's critical response is indeed a kind of clap-trap. In this reply,
nevertheless, we can find Plato's awareness of the possibility of an accusation
provoked by his own position. In the idealists' position, the soul as the knower is
sharply distinguished from οὐσία as the known (248d1-2). Again, if we feel
comfortable in regarding as belonging to γένεσις the body by means of which we
have intercourse with γένεσις, we will be confronted with the question whether the
soul by mean of which we have intercourse with οὐσία can be included in οὐσία or
not. In short, the position of "the friends of Forms" in the Sophist has weakness;
although the οὐσία-γένεσις distinction needs to be exhaustive from the outset for
the idealists to be competent adversaries against the materialists, they actually speak
only of the Forms as οὐσία and leave the ontological status of soul and intellect
unexplained. We may also say that some equivocation of the term οὐσία is tacitly
involved in the position of the idealists who confine the referent of the term to the
objects known in speaking of the soul's cognitive contact with those objects. It is
indeed true that the οὐσία-γένεσις distinction in the Republic represents the
νοητόν-ὄρατόν distinction (534a2-3), the main distinction of the objective side in
the metaphor of the divided line. If the οὐσία-γένεσις distinction were to be
confined to the νοητόν-ὄρατόν distinction, it, excluding soul and intellect from
οὐσία, would not be exhaustive. But Plato would be reluctant to restrict the
distinction to the side of cognitive objects. Cornford, though not referring to any
specific passage, observes that earlier dialogues than the Sophist frequently suggest
that the world of real being does not consist solely of the Forms (Plato's Theory of
Knowledge, p. 245). This conception of the world of real being seems to be implied
at least in two passages. First, in the kinship argument of the Phaedo, the invisible
being distinguished from the visible includes the Forms and the soul akin to
(συγγενής, 79d3) them. The whole world of invisible entities is here denominated
τοιοῦτον τὸπον ἔτερον ... γενναίον καὶ καθαρόν καὶ ἀδή (80d5-6). Second, at
the metaphor of the sun in the Republic, intellect and the Forms are together
included in ὦ νοητὸς τόπος (508c1; see also 509d2, 517b5). Thus seen, the prototype of τὸ παντελῶς ὦν entertained by the Eleatic Stranger has already been found in the middle dialogues. In the Stranger's talk of τὸ παντελῶς ὦν and τὸ ὦν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν instead of ὦσία, we can see Plato's tackling the problem, how it is possible to integrate the Forms, intellect, and soul into a unified whole. This problem certainly reflects Plato's self-examination, whether the ὦσία-γένεσις distinction in the middle dialogues might be prone to cause such accusation that ὦσία as distinguished from γένεσις, referring solely to the intelligible objects, might be devoid of soul and intellect. Insofar as ὦσία remains τὰ νοητὰ devoid of soul and intellect and so their ontological status is left unexplained by the ὦσία-γένεσις distinction, the idealists cannot compete with the materialists in their battle about being.

Owens, in "The Relation of God to World in the Metaphysics," in Études sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, ed. P. Aubenque (Paris: J. Vrin, 1979), p. 212, note 7, compares the move from the presence of intellect in complete being to the presence of life in 248e6-249d5 with Aristotle's attribution of intellection and life to the unmoved mover. He then continues: "But no reason for the necessary presence of thought is stated by Plato, except an emotional reaction against its absence" (loc. cit.). It is true that Plato himself does not explicitly present any reason here. Nevertheless, as considered above, it is possible to see his self-examination of the ὦσία-γένεσις distinction in the present passage. The presence of intellect in complete being is necessary for the idealists to compete with the materialists. The reaction against its absence from complete being is not merely emotional, but precisely based on the definite reason that the absence makes the ontological status of intellect left unexplained and thereby is to lead the idealists to defeat in the battle against the materialists about reality.

72Cornford sees this introduction as a concession which the Stranger demands from the idealists, the extremists who want to make the whole of reality immutable (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 244). His view is no doubt based on the Stranger's image of the idealists in 249c11-d1. We have taken the idealists as representing Plato's own position in his middle dialogues. But the Stranger in 249c11-d1, as we shall see in note 73, does not accurately describe their position. As already seen in note 71, Plato himself, in the middle dialogues, implicitly suggests that the realm distinguished from the phenomena does not consist solely of the Forms. Hence, although it is true, at least as regards the actual course of the dialogue, that the Stranger would like the idealists to admit the introduction of spiritual and noetic movement to the realm of real being, Plato himself may not regard this introduction as his concession to the view which has not yet been entertained in his own position.

73The text in 249c11-d1, prima facie, runs counter this. The Stranger there
entertained in his own position.

The text in 249c11-d1, *prima facie*, runs counter this. The Stranger there views not only the Eleatics but the idealists as insisting that all reality stands still (ἐστικός). But this section suggests neither that Plato's own position excludes spiritual and noetic movement from the world of real being nor that "the friends of Forms" does not represent Plato's position in which the immaterial realm does not consist solely of the immobile Ideas. As ἐστικός in 249d1 reminds us of ἔστος in 249a2, the Stranger's adjudication of the idealists in 249c11-d1 is based on his criticism of them in 248e6-249a2, which is a kind of *argumentum ad hominem* to take advantage of such possible equivocation of ὑστερικα as mentioned in note 71. The idealists or Plato himself would find this criticism nothing more than a false charge against them, even though they would perhaps admit some possibility of the use of ὑστερικα to involve equivocation. Hence it is not successful in undermining our identification of "the friends of Forms" as Plato in the middle dialogues by appealing to 249c11-d1.

There still remains a problem whether some spiritual movement, even if it is free from activity and passivity, can be totally free from vicissitude. As to the relationship of κίνησις to μεταβολή or ὀλλοίματις, the following three passages may be touched upon. First, in *Parn.* 162b-163b, Parmenides tries to establish that the non-existent One has no other motion than transition (μεταβολή) from being to non-being and vice versa. Here κίνησις is exhausted by (i) generation and corruption, or transition from being and non-being and vice versa (μεταβολή δὲ κίνησις, 162c2), (ii) locomotion (οὐκ ἄριστός τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν κινοῖτ' ἄν, 162c8-d1), and (iii) alteration (εἰ δὲ μὴ τ' ὀλλοίμαται... ἄρ', ἄν πη ἔτι κινοῖτο, 162d8-e1).

(This notion of movement takes over the classification of movement into locomotion and alteration in 138b8-cl and *Theaet.* 181d5-6.) In spite of the unclarity of the ontological status of the non-existent One in the fifth hypothesis, three kinds of motion mentioned here are physical, as distinct from spiritual, motions. We thus do not need to consider our present problem with the notion of movement to be connected to the second part of the *Parmenides*. Second, in *Cratyl.* 439e3-5, we are told that the self-identical and constant entities, not departing from their own form, can neither change nor be moved (εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ὁσαντως ἐχει καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστιν, ἢν τότῳ γε μεταβαλλοι κινοῖτο, μηδὲν ἐξιστάμενον τῆς αὐτοῦ ἱδέως): In spite of the contrast between constant entities and incessant process of becoming and the use of the term ἱδέα, however, it would be rash to think that Plato here speaks of the separate Forms. Even if we are justified in thinking so, it is difficult to see the relationship between κίνησις and μεταβολή from this passage.

(Nevertheless it would not be totally wrong to say that the above passage prefigures the Forms. The section μηδὲν ἐξιστάμενον τῆς αὐτοῦ ἱδέως reminds us of *Tim.* 52a3-4 οὔτε αὐτὸ εἷς ἀλλο ποι ἵνα.) Finally, in *Leges* 896b1, the soul is said to be
Plato here talks about the soul as the principle of cosmic movement. The self-motion of the soul is regarded as μεταβολή (895a2-3) and associated with life (895c7-8). If we were to conceive that the whole world of real being contains soul and life, then we should admit in it the μεταβολή implied by the soul’s motion. But this introduction may not necessarily infringe the immutability of Forms, since the soul’s self-motion is not such change as occurs when Forms are acted on by the soul.

It has been seen that the introduction into τὸ παντελῶς ὄν of the soul’s self-motion as a μεταβολή is not inconsistent with the immutability of Forms, insofar as that self-motion is not cognitive contact with them. Moreover, we must notice that the soul’s self-motion not only is regarded as a kind of change but implies her immortality, that is, her being free at least from generation and corruption. In the argument for the soul’s immortality in the Phaedrus, the soul defined as a self-mover is said to be ἄγέντης (245d1, 3, 246a1), ἀδιάφθορος (245d4), and thereby ἀθάνατος (245c5, e2, 246a1). Likewise, the Form is ἀθάνατος (Phd. 79d2, 80b1; see also Symp. 211e2-3 μὴ ἀνάπλασιν . . . ὀλήξε σωλτικής φλυσίφας θυρίτης). Thus, whereas the soul’s self-motion is said to be a μεταβολή, it insures her affinity to the Form with respect to immortality. (Hackforth, in Plato’s Phaedrus, translated with an Introduction and Commentary by R. Hackforth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), p. 68, observes that the Phaedrus proof of immortality is closely connected with the hypothesis argument of the Phaedo. The Phaedrus proof can be viewed as supporting also the kinship argument of the Phaedo in such a manner that the former explains the soul’s immortality without any reference to the Forms, since what the latter purports to establish is the affinity between the soul and Forms with respect to their immortality.) Thus seen, spiritual movement, though characterized as a kind of change, may be welcomed to the world of real being rather than needing to be excluded from it.

How about intellect’s movement? Does it involve change? Plato finds it difficult to give an account of intellect’s movement (Leges 897d8-e2) and compares it to the circular motion that is regular and uniform in one compass about one center, and in the same relationship, according to one single law and plan (895a8-b1). (For the kinship of the circular motion of the universe to intellect, see also Tim. 34a1-6.) Although we can find in this comparison Plato’s effort to describe the constancy of intellect’s movement, its relationship to the Forms still remains unclear. Hence the problem is left unanswered how we can integrate intellect and the Forms into τὸ παντελῶς ὄν by reconciling intellection or intellect’s motion with the immutability of Forms. We may also say that there remains the problem how to reconcile the notions of intellection as movement and as the immutable state of mind as described in Phd. 79d4-7. Phd. 79d4-5 καὶ πέπαυται τε τοῦ πλάνου seems to suggest one of the reasons why intellect’s movement may be appropriately compared to the circular motion of the cosmos, from which six wandering motions
are subtracted when the body of the universe is created (Tim. 34a5-6).

75 See note 71.

76 Cornford observes that this question can only be answered in the figurative language of the Timaeus (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 248). To draw the clear picture of the world of real being from Plato's figurative description in the Timaeus, however, is beyond the scope of our present inquiry.

77 Our modus interpretandi may be accused of treating the Republic and the Sophist in the manner of what G. E. L. Owen has called "unitarians" who regard the dialogues as various windows opening on to a single finished construction. Of course, it is beyond the scope of our inquiry to discuss the modus interpretandi of Plato by tracing the development of his thought. Nevertheless, our interpretative attitude can be defended in terms of the immutability of Forms, which is persistently maintained as the fundamental thesis of the theory of Forms from the middle dialogues to the late ones (see note 63). Although Plato does not explicitly say so, the relationship between intellect and the Form in the metaphor of the sun, for the unchangeability of Forms to be safeguarded, may not be envisaged in terms of activity and passivity. Indeed we must admit that the Sophist substantially differs from the Republic in that the Form of the Good, which serves as the cause of intellection in the latter, is not mentioned at all in the former for explaining cognitive intercourse of the soul with Form. In spite of this difference, intellection must be conceived apart from activity and passivity also in the metaphor of the sun, if we purport to avoid compromising the fundamental thesis in the theory of Forms, namely the Forms' immutability.

The soul's knowledge of the Form in Plato has been variously discussed. The ocular and tactile metaphors for intellection and the etymology of the word ἡφαίστησις have been seriously considered. Indeed they must not be overlooked when we discuss the soul's apprehension of the Form. But to rely heavily on Plato's metaphors may sometimes lead to the neglect of the crucial point in the theory of Forms. Plato's philosophy, to be sure, cannot be exhausted by the theory of Forms alone. Nonetheless, we may not be mistaken in saying that the theory of Forms occupies the kernel of Plato's philosophy. We have considered the relationship between intellect and the Form from the viewpoint of the Forms' unchangeability, that is, the fundamental viewpoint of Plato's philosophy in his middle and late dialogues. Hence the possible accusation of our being "unitarians" in interpreting Plato is wide of the mark. We do not see a single finished construction through the Republic and the Sophist, but read these dialogues in terms of the single hypothesis of the Forms' immutability, which does not represent any construction, but underlies some construction, already finished or still under way.
In note 65, we saw that when we endeavor to explain the soul's being moved by means of ascribing activity to the Form and passivity to the soul, we cannot escape from conceiving the Form as a self-mover. As seen in note 74, the soul's self-motion is characterized as μεταβολή. So those interpreters who define intellection as the soul's being acted on by the Form must first of all consider how this conception can avoid compromising the immobility and unchangeability of the Form. We can indeed suppose a solution by invoking the Augustinian theory of illumination; the soul is illuminated by the radiance that shines from the Idea of the Good through the Forms below it. This solution is not only supported by no textual evidence but is prone to infringe the conjoining function of the Form of the Good stressed in the metaphor of the sun.

Let us consider the famous passage ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας... δυνάμει ύπερέχουσος in Rep. 509b9-10. In light of the context, this passage can mean either (i) that the Idea of the Good has the δύναμις to provide truth and knowledge or cognitively to join the Form and intellect, the δύναμις that οὐσία does not possess, or (ii) that the Idea of the Good has the δύναμις to engender οὐσία, or (iii) that the Good's δύναμις of being known is totally distinct from the δύναμις of the Form's being known. We must recall that two kinds of δύναμις in the intelligible realm, the powers of knowing and of being known, are mentioned in the metaphor of the sun. Unlike the Plotinian One, the Platonic Good remains a Form or ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἱδέα (505a2, 508e2-3, 517b8-c1) and so does not possess some hyper-intellective activity. The status of the Good as the Form allows (iii). In this case, the power of knowing the Good that is correlative to the Good's power of being known is called into question. Whether this power of knowing the Good can be denominated νόησις or not is meant by the problem "whether the Idea of the Good can be apprehended by νόησις or not." (Rep. 509b9-10 has been variously interpreted. The key to the apt interpretation seems to lie in the identifying of the referent of νόησις in line 9. (iii) is based on the construction to take δυνάμει as analogous to τῆν τοῦ ὀράσθαι δύναμιν in 509b2-3.)

In Met. 1074b18-22, Aristotle contrasts νοῦς qua δύναμις with νόησις qua ἐνέργεια. In Plato, however, νόησις is not always sharply distinguished from νοῦς. When we compare Rep. 508e1-3 where the Good is said to provide the knower with the δύναμις of knowing with 517c3-4 where it is said to provide him with νοῦς, we can easily see the flexibility of Plato's terminology. We must recall that δύναμις in Rep. 518c2, as seen in note 17, is equivalent to Aristotle's ἐνέργεια and indicates the actual exercise of intellect, namely νόησις. In addition, Harward, in The Platonic Epistle, translated with Introduction and Notes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), p. 215, views that νοῦς, which belongs to the fourth kind in the Seventh Letter (342c4-d3), is the active principle whereby ἐπιστήμη is reached. Morrow, in Plato's Epistles, a Translation, with Critical Essays
and Notes (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), p. 73, also points out the parallel between νόησις in the metaphor of the divided line in the Republic and νοῦς in the Seventh Letter.

81See notes 17 and 71.
CHAPTER II
INTELLECTION IN ARISTOTLE

Aristotle's notions of \( \text{o} \) and \( \text{v} \) play an important role in his various works, not only in the *Metaphysics*, but in *De Anima*, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and the *Posterior Analytics*. In the following, of course, we do not purport to present a systematic study of his doctrine of \( \text{o} \) by analyzing all the relevant passages from his works, but to clarify the relationship among \( \text{o} \), \( \text{v} \), and \( \text{e} \) in the *Metaphysics*. The inquiry into this relationship is possible only in the *Metaphysics*. Whereas the Platonic Form is referred to interchangeably by the words \( \text{o} \) and \( \text{t} \), Aristotle claims that \( \text{t} \) is variously expressed in relation to one thing (*Met.* 1003a33-34), that is, in relation to \( \text{o} \). What we shall explore is not the connection of that which is called \( \text{t} \) in reference to \( \text{o} \) with \( \text{v} \) and \( \text{e} \), but that of \( \text{o} \) itself with them. According to Aristotle, it is the task of first philosophy to consider being *qua* being or the causes and principles of beings, *inter alia*, an immovable entity (\( \text{t} \) \( \text{o} \) \( \text{t} \) \( \text{o} \)) (1026a27-32). Hence our inquiry must be focused on the *Metaphysics*, especially A 7 and 9.

First of all, we need to specify the instance of the \( \text{d} \)-\( \text{e} \) relationship in the case of God's intellection. It is urged that we cannot define potentiality and actuality, but must be content to grasp the analogical relationship of their instances (*Met.* 1048a35-34). As regards the cognitive activity of the unmoved mover, the potentiality-actuality relationship is embodied by that between the faculty of intellection (\( \text{v} \)) and the act of intellection (\( \text{v} \)), or between intellect capable of receiving the intelligible object and entity (\( \text{t} \) \( \text{o} \) \( \text{t} \) \( \text{o} \) \( \text{o} \)) and intellect possessing (\( \text{e} \) \( \text{w} \)) it (1072b22-
3 In a word, the potentiality-actuality relationship is found between intellect that has not received its object yet and so remains a mere capability of intellection and the exercise of intellect that has already possessed its object and so is thinking it. But Aristotle admits neither divine intellect’s ever being in potentiality nor its transition from actuality to potentiality. Divine intellect is always in actuality. Aristotle refers to the mere capacity of intellection simply in order to describe intellect in actuality by showing the analogy of actuality and potentiality in the case of divine intellect.

As for the cognitive activity of the Aristotelian God, the δύναμις-ἐνέργεια relationship is instantiated by νοῦς and νόησις. But we must notice that the term νόησις in Met. A 7 and 9 is subtly employed to mean not only (i) the actual exercise of intellect but (ii) intellect that is actually thinking. The word in its original sense of (i) is used in a couple of places. In 1072b17-18, νόησις of divine intellect, as well as its ἐγρήγορσις and ἀφθονία, is said to be most pleasant. In 1072b18-19, divine intellection, rendered as η... νόησις... καθ' αὐτήν, is distinguished from human thinking which depends on sense or imagination. In 1074b31, moreover, νοεῖν and νόησις are juxtaposed. The potentiality represented by νοῦς, however, is not exhausted by the ability of intellection. Νοῦς is really τо... δεκτικόν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας (1072b22). In other words, νοῦς is potentially το νοητόν or the pure form without matter. Aristotle applies to divine thinking his psychological formula that intellect in activity is identical with the object of intellection (1072b21). Since the activity of intellect is nothing else than νόησις and intellect is actualized only when it possesses its object (1072b22-23), the identity of the actualized intellect with its object is also expressed as that of intellection with its object:

Since, then, intellect (τοῦ νοῦ) and the object of thought (τοῦ νοομένου) are not different in the case of things that have no matter, they will be the
same, that is, intellection (ἡ νόησις) will be one with the object of thought (τῷ νουμένῳ) (Met. 1075a3-5).

Thus the word νόησις indicates the identification of intellect and its object and thereby intellect that actually thinks the object identical with itself. This sense of the word is found in the consideration of the difficulties concerning divine intellect in Λ 9. In 1074b18-20, we are told that the οὐσία of divine intellect, in order to be the best entity, must be νόησις, but not νοῦς or the mere ability of thinking. Since the word νόησις here precisely refers to that which is the essence of divine intellect (τοῦτο ὃ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία, 1074b19-20), it refers to the actualized intellect itself rather than the exercise of intellect. In other words, the pure form identical with intellection is implicit in this sense of the term. Thus the potentiality-actuality relation instantiated by νοῦς and νόησις can be defined in two ways, so that νόησις is endowed with two senses.11 The νόησις which we shall explore in the following is that in the first sense, the cognitive exercise itself as seen in separation from its agent and object.

The passage from Λ 7, where Aristotle deals with the inner life of the unmoved mover, is considered for the purpose of our inquiry. The Stagirite writes:

And (its) life is such as the best which we can enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be), since its actuality (ἡ ἐνέργεια) is also pleasure. (And for this reason are waking (ἐγρήγορσις), perception (αἴσθησις), and intellection (νόησις) most pleasant, and hopes and memories are so on account of these.) And (its) intellection (ἡ . . . νόησις) is intellection in itself (ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν) that deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. And intellect thinks itself according to its communion with the object of thought (αὐτοῦ δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ); for it becomes the object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking (θυγγάνων καὶ νοῶν) its object, so that intellect and the object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought and entity (τὸ . . . δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας) is intellect. But it is active when it possesses this object (ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἐκχων). Therefore the possession rather than the receptivity is the divine disposition which intellect seems to maintain, and
(its) envisagement (ἡ θεωρία) is what is most pleasant and best . . . And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of intellect (ἡ . . . νοῦ ἐνέργεια) is life, and God is that actuality; and God’s actuality in itself (ἐνέργεια . . . ἡ καθ’ αὐτὴν ἐκείνου) is life most good and eternal (1072b14-28, tr. W. D. Ross, adapted by A. Sumi).

Wedin observes that in this passage the theses which he calls "the sameness thesis" and "the causal thesis" are brought into a single account: "the causal thesis" is that the mind is brought to activity by the object of thought and "the sameness thesis" that the mind in activity is the same as that object. The relationship of νόησις qua ἐνέργεια to οὐσία qua τὸ νοητὸν must be viewed precisely as the causal relation between the intelligible object and the intellective capacity.

The primacy of οὐσία over νόησις qua ἐνέργεια can be easily seen in the above cited passage. First of all, intellection of the prime mover is νόησις . . . καθ’ αὐτὴν (1072b18), namely intellection that does not depend on sense and imagination. So the intelligible form which intellection concerns does not exist in abstraction from physical things, but always subsists without matter. Aristotle here explains the inner structure of divine self-intellection through the fact that when intellect knows it becomes identical with what it knows. What intellect knows or τὸ νοητὸν is the pure form and in this sense the οὐσία (line 22). Aristotle, in giving an account of the cognitive relation of divine intellect to the intelligible form, invokes the formula which he frequently employs in De Anima, the causal thesis that the cognitive ability is brought to actuality by the cognitive object. In the present case, the pure intelligible form brings to activity intellect which has been per se a mere capacity of receiving that form (τὸ . . . δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας, line 22). In other words, intellect exercises intellective activity only when it has the intelligible object (ἐνέργειᾳ δὲ ἔχων, lines 22-23). The knowable object plays the causal role in the actualization of divine intellection and to this extent the οὐσία is prior to the ἐνέργεια qua νόησις. Needless to say, "the actualization of divine
intellection" does not imply that divine intellection has ever been caused by its object. Aristotle here simply analyzes the internal structure of self-thinking of the prime mover. Different from human intellect which does not always think, divine intellect thinks itself eternally and continuously.

Aristotle's conception of divine intellect's relation to its object is further illuminated by two sections in the aforementioned passage. First, the participles θηγγάνων and νοῶν (1072b21) characterize intellect's becoming identical with the intelligible object in the actual exercise of intellection. As Ross comments on θηγείν in 1051b24, the tactile metaphor in the description of simple apprehension implies (i) the absence of any possibility of error and (ii) the absence of a medium. In both implications, Aristotle's conception of divine intellection agrees with Plato's.

Plato distinguishes ἐπιστήμη and δόξα as that which does not make mistakes and that which does (Rep. 477e6-7) and describes the immediacy of the soul's cognitive contact with the Idea (ἀεὶ μετ’ ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, Phd. 79d3) by the verb ἐφάπτεσθαι. But Aristotle's tactile metaphor of intellection represents a more unified relation of subject and object; intellect in actuality becomes identical with the intelligible object for Aristotle (Met. 1072b20-21), while the soul with intellection becomes at best adjacent to the Form (μετ’ ἐκείνου) for Plato.

Second, μετάληψις in 1072b20 implies (i) the receptivity of intellect prior to its actualization just as θη ... δεκτικὸν in line 22 does and (ii) the community between intellect and the intelligible form as the prefix μετα- does. As said in De Anima 429a20-22, the receptivity or potentiality of intellect based on its characterless nature allows itself to take the character of whatever it knows. So divine intellect is able to receive the goodness of the intelligible form without hindering or obstructing it. As θηγγάνειν in 1072b21 implies the absence of any possibility of error from intellect, the "hylic" nature meant by the term μετάληψις points to the absence of any possibility of distorting the nature of the knowable
object from divine intellect. Moreover, intellect’s community with the intelligible object, if we can construct it in light of *De Anima* 429b29-31, exactly implies that the former is potentially the latter rather than that the former is thought to be acted on and the latter to act.\(^{26}\) It must surely be avoided to consider the relation of intellect to its object in terms of activity and passivity, for the immutability of divine intellect to be defended. Rather, we may say that the unbroken sameness of divine intellection already abrogates the possibility to view intellection in terms of activity and passivity, because activity and passivity presuppose the distinctness between that which acts and that which is acted on.\(^{27}\) Although Aristotle does not explicitly say so, the immutability and unaffectedness of the prime mover seems to be due to such internal structure of divine intellection that involves neither activity and passivity nor any movement whatsoever.\(^{28}\)

Moreover, ἐγρήγορσις in 1072b17 is a source of Plotinus’ description of the One’s hyper-consciousness in VI 8 [39],16,30-34.\(^{29}\) As the waking is the actualization of the sleeping (1048b1-2), the waking that represents the activity of divine intellect can be contrasted with the sleeper that refers to intellect which thinks of nothing (1074b17-18). So the word seems to denote the actualization of the capacity of intellection. In *De Anima* 412a25-26, further, we are told that waking is analogous to contemplation or the exercise of knowledge *qua* ἐνέργεια and sleep to the possession of knowledge *qua* ἔξωσ. The word ἐγρήγορσις thus turns out to be the appropriate characterization of the cognitive activity of divine intellect.\(^{30}\) Unfortunately, we cannot know more about the ἐγρήγορσις of the prime mover. It shall be explored later how Plotinus makes this word apt to describe the unique awareness of the One.

As already mentioned, Aristotle exploits several psychological formulae developed in *De Anima* Γ 4 in order to give an account of the noetic structure of the inner life of the prime mover in *Met. Λ* 7 and 9. To refer to the passages from *De
Anima \( \Gamma 4 \), in fact, has much helped us interpret the passages in the Metaphysics. But it is not correct to say that the account given of the emergent process of human intellection is exhaustive in De Anima \( \Gamma 4 \). The occurrence of human intellection cannot be completely elucidated by means of the receptive intellect and the intelligible object. The object of thought is not capable of actualizing the passive intellect for itself alone. It is not the object but the so-called agent intellect that is the cause (De Anima 430a12) of the actualization of the passive intellect. In the respect of being entirely actual, as Hamlyn puts,\(^3\) the agent intellect is like the prime mover in the Metaphysics at large. But, since Aristotle’s description in De Anima \( \Gamma 5 \) is extremely concise and so its exegesis is highly disputed, it is always difficult to consider the passages in the Metaphysics with De Anima \( \Gamma 5 \) in view. In the actual course of the history of philosophy, the tradition from Alexander of Aphrodisias to Averroës regards the agent intellect as a transcendent entity, identical with the divine intellect in the Metaphysics. But it does not seem easy to find the definite link between the description of the agent intellect in De Anima \( \Gamma 5 \) and the account for the inner structure of the unmoved mover’s self-knowledge in Met. \( \Lambda 7 \) and 9. Let us mention two reasons why we have not referred to De Anima \( \Gamma 5 \) in our preceding discussion.

First, the fact that Aristotle does not clarify the internal structure of the activity of the agent intellect makes it difficult to compare it with divine intellect. There are two competing views about the agent intellect’s knowledge. On the one hand, Ross attributes some pre-existing knowledge to the agent intellect. The agent intellect, he writes, is “something in us that actually knows already, some element that is cut off from our ordinary consciousness so that we are not aware of this knowledge.”\(^3\) Ross, however, here does not mean that the agent intellect possesses all the intelligible objects within itself, as Avicenna holds. He considers the analogy of light in De Anima 430a15 and characterizes the agent intellect as "a third thing,
besides passive reason and object." But, if the knowing of the passive intellect and the knowing of the agent intellect were taken univocally, the agent intellect would be no longer the "agent" or "active" intellect, but at best the always "actualized" intellect, precisely because intellectual knowledge for Aristotle is nothing but the reception of intelligible forms. In other words, if intellection were generally viewed in terms of the reception of and identification with the intelligible forms, one would wonder how an intellect that makes all things (430a12, 15) can be said to be always thinking. As a matter of fact, there appears to be no generic account for intellection that would be able to encompass the descriptions of both the agent and the passive intellects. Therefore, unless an adequate account is given of the unique knowledge of the agent intellect that is clearly distinguished from the knowing of the passive intellect, Ross' interpretation is untenable. On the other hand, Rist criticizes Ross' view by denying the pre-existing knowledge of the agent intellect and observes that the agent intellect does not possess knowledge of the external world, but knowledge of itself that is akin to the self-knowledge of the prime mover. Let us remind that Aristotle elucidates the possibility of intellect's knowing itself in terms of the identity of the receptive intellect with the object known (430a2-5). As already seen, the self-knowledge of divine intellect is not exempt from this. Now Rist denies to the agent intellect ordinary knowledge, namely the identification with the intelligible object. Hence Rist's view of the self-knowledge of the agent intellect first becomes satisfactory by giving an account of that self-knowledge without recourse to the identity of intellect with its object. But he actually gives no account of it. Again, even if he succeeds in doing so, he is compelled to defend the alleged kinship of the agent intellect to divine intellect whose self-intellection is defined in terms of the very identity of divine receptive intellect with the intelligible form. In a word, if we try to keep consistent the definition of intellectual knowledge in terms of the reception of and identification with the forms of the objects known and the
nature of the agent intellect that produces all the intelligible objects, any attempt to ascribe some knowledge to the agent intellect will fail. If we obstinately attempt to do so, we are forced to find out the generic account for intellection that would be able to encompass the descriptions of both the agent and the passive intellects. Even if it is found out, the problem still arises whether it can encompass the description of divine intellect. In conclusion, the internal structure of the noetic activity of the agent intellect is totally unclear, so that it is difficult to discover the link between divine intellect and the agent intellect in respect of their cognitive states and activities.

Second, the internal structure of divine thinking in Met. 7 is congruent with the process of human intellection to take place in De Anima 4-5 in part, but not completely. The latter invokes the agent intellect as "a metaphysical ground for the actualization of the potentialities which make up the soul." In the former, however, it is the intelligible form that plays the causal role of bringing the receptive intellect to activity. The reason why Aristotle does not refer to anything equivalent to the agent intellect in his description of divine intellection becomes clear as soon as we see the consequence of the supposed case that he does so. This supposed case precisely implies that the intelligible object is not capable of actualizing the receptive intellect for itself. If so, we cannot see why Aristotle endeavors to identify the form with the οὐσία in Met. 17 and with the ἐνεργεία in 8, given the supposition of the compositional unity of the Metaphysics. Even within the context of 7 alone, the supposed case brings about the problem concerning the ontological status of something equivalent to the agent intellect. Furthermore, if divine intellect that consists of the receptive intellect and the intelligible form were to depend on that which is comparable to the agent intellect for its actualization, it would not be completely free from potentiality and therefore could no longer remain the final cause of the eternal, continuous motion of the outermost heaven.
(But it is indeed true that Aristotle does not fully elucidate how the full actuality in divine inner life can induce the first moved to locomotion.) As Ross suggests, indeed, the description of the agent intellect in *De Anima* Γ 5 is compatible with that of God in *Met.* Α in such a way that the agent intellect is a member of the hierarchy of actuality that reaches continuously from the lowest entities to God. As regards the account for the process of intellection to occur, however, the description in *De Anima* Γ 4-5 is not fully compatible with that in *Met.* Α 7. Hence to refer to *De Anima* Γ 5 does not always help us interpret *Met.* Α 7.40

In conclusion, οὐσία, also for Aristotle, is ontologically prior to νόησις as the ἐνέργεια of νοῦς. It is only when the receptive intellect possesses the pure intelligible form or οὐσία that it is brought to activity and exercises intellection. It is nothing else than the intelligible object that makes divine intellect the οὐσία by providing it with definiteness and that plays the causal role in the occurrence of intellection. Aristotle, however, does not agree with Plato in that he sees intellection without any implication of movement. In Plato, as already seen, intellection is associated with some kind of movement, insofar as that movement does not compromise the immutability of the Forms. In Aristotle, on the other hand, the proposed avoidance of the infinite regress in the series of movement necessarily postulates the absence of movement whatsoever from the inner activity of the prime mover. Again, since every movement is incomplete (*Met.* 1048b29), it is not appropriate to intellection; when someone is thinking, he has already thought (1048b24). Intellection is thus *a fortiori* ἐνέργεια, but not κίνησις.41 Furthermore, intellection as the activity of divine intellect is identified as God’s life (1072b26-27). This identification becomes more conspicuous in Plotinus. More important would be Aristotle’s formula of the identity of intellect in activity with the intelligible object it thinks. It is certain that this idea constitutes the background of Plotinus’ doctrine that Intellect thinks the intelligible objects within itself. Roughly speaking,
this doctrine can be said to represent the combination of the Platonic theory of Forms with the Aristotelian doctrine of intellect. Armstrong further historically specifies this combination as follows:

... the principal stimulus to the train of thought which led Plotinus to formulate his own doctrine was his study of the Peripatetic doctrine of the identity of divine intellect and its object in the light of Albinus' identification of the Peripatetic divine νοητόν with the νοητός of the "thoughts of God" interpretation of Platonism, the Forms of Ideas.

Although Armstrong does "not wish to deny that Plotinus may have found the Peripatetic doctrine in Aristotle himself," he views that Plotinus' "most likely principal source is the very full and clear exposition in the psychological writings of his great near-contemporary, Alexander of Aphrodisias." Whether the direct source of Plotinus' doctrine is Alexander or Aristotle himself, it is certain that the notion of the identity of intellect in activity and its object has been inherited by Plotinus. Considered apart from the actual course of the history of philosophy, the notion of this identity already abrogates the option of seeing intellection in terms of activity and passivity, the very option that has perplexed Plato in the Sophist; as already seen, the activity-passivity relationship, insofar as it presupposes the duality of that which acts and that which is acted on, is impossible in the case of intellect and the intelligible object that are inseparably unified in a single real entity. The notion can thus safeguard the immutability not only of the intelligible object but of the intellective agent. Moreover, the νοῦς-νοητόν identity insures the highest degree of orientation of intellect by and towards the intelligible objects and makes intellection completely free from any falsehood or distortion. It is not always easy to investigate whether and how the problem concerning the relationship of intellect and its object, the problem with which Plato is seriously confronted in the Sophist, has been inherited through several thinkers to Plotinus. As already mentioned, Plotinus' doctrine of the νοῦς-νοητόν sameness would have been stimulated by
Alexander of Aphrodisias and the middle Platonists, and he himself has sought the *locus classicus* for that doctrine in Parmenides and Plato. Then, what kind of problem does he try to answer by appealing to that doctrine? The problem Plotinus tackles is what kind of relationship of νοῦς and νοητὸν can at the same time (i) insure the immutability not only of the intelligible object but of Intellect, (ii) make Intellect free from any falsehood or distortion, and finally (iii) conceptually underlie the presence of the intelligible objects within Intellect. In a word, it is the problem concerning the relationship of the knowing subject and the object known, with which Plato and Aristotle have dealt respectively in the *Sophist* and *De Anima* Γ 4. This very fundamental problem of ancient Greek philosophy seems to constitute the "aporetic" background of Plotinus' doctrine. If the knowable object is outside the knowing subject and their cognitive relationship is viewed in terms of activity and passivity, many *aporiae* will arise. For instance, intellectual knowledge will be changeable so that the soul will lose the criterion for her reasoning, Intellect will be prone to be deceived in its knowing the object so that the goodness of the demiurge will be compromised, and so on. Plotinus would have been urged to escape from the *cul-de-sac* of these *aporiae*. Now we shall move to Plotinus' conception of intellection.
NOTES

1In the subsequent discussion, following Owens (The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian 'Metaphysics,' 3rd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978), pp. 137-154), we shall render the Aristotelian οὐσία "entity" rather than "substance."

Reale sees in the present passage the coincidence of Aristotle's ontology, ousiology, and theology (Aristotele, La Metafisica, Traduzione, Introduzione e Commento, 2 vols. (Naple: Luigi Loffredo, 1968), 1:505-506, note 18). Since it is enough to recall that the study of οὐσία is imposed on nothing else than the first philosophy, we do not consider the problem of the unity of thought in the Metaphysics.

2As Ross notes, νοῦς in line 21 answers to δύναμις in line 20 (Aristotle's Metaphysics, a Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 2:398). See also 1074b28 εἰ μὴ νοσίς ἔστιν ἄλλα δύναμις. This terminological distinction, however, is not in play throughout Met. Α 7 and 9. Before the distinction is made, τὸν νοῦν in 1074b15 refers to the actually self-thinking principle.


4It is necessary for our inquiry to ascertain the specific instance of the actuality-potentiality relationship in the case of divine intellect, because the word ἐνέργεια, in fact, refers to many notions in Met. Α. In 1071b19-20, for instance, the immobile entity is characterized as the ἀρχή whose οὐσία is ἐνέργεια. As construed with ἄνευ ὑλῆς in line 21, ἐνέργεια here denotes a pure form without matter. (For the form as actuality, see 1043a25-28 and 1050b2-3.) Since we cannot adequately explore the bearing of ἐνέργεια-qua-νόσις upon οὐσία in such passages, we need to ascertain the appropriate instance of the actuality-potentiality relationship prior to our inquiry.
In Alexander’s expression, (i) would correspond to κίνησις... νοῦ (In Met. 694.10), while (ii) to ὁ νοῦς κατ’ ἐνέργειαν (697.16-17, 698.14-15) or ὁ νοῦς ἐνέργεια (698.26, 39-40). But it will be discussed later whether Aristotle himself is willing to admit that intellec[tion is] movement of intellect or not.

For this interpretation, see W. D. Ross, op. cit., 2:379.

Also in 1072a30 ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἦ νόησις, the word is used in the original sense. As Schwegler notes, ἀρχὴ here is ἀρχὴ τοῦ ὀρέγοντα (Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles, 4:260). Reale’s translation follows a similar line: "infatti è il pensiero il principio della volontà razionale." Then, the force of γὰρ indicates that the present sentence explains line 29 ὀρεγόμεθα δὲ διότι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ ὀρεγόμεθα. So νόησις here is forced to mean also δοκεῖν and so cannot refer to the activity of divine intellect. As the first person plural ὀρεγόμεθα suggests, it is to us that the immobile entity seems to be beautiful.

See also De Anima 429a15-17 δεκτικὸν... τοὺς εἰδους. Ravaisson, in his comment on this section, does not attribute the intellect-intelligible identity to human intellec[tion: "L’entendement n’est pas identique, mais semblable à son object" (Essai sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote, 1:580, note 4). In V 1 [10],3,23-24, Plotinus compares the relationship of the soul and Intellect to that of δεχόμενον and εἴδος. Gandillac considers the parallel between Aristotle’s δεκτικὸν and Plotinus’ δεχόμενον to suggest a sort of analogical application of Aristotle’s formula concerning pure intellective activity to the relationship between the second and the third hypostases. See M. de Gandillac, "Plotin et la ‘Méta[physique’] d’Aristote," in Études sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote, ed. P. Aubenque (Paris: J. Vrin, 1979), p. 252.

See De Anima 429a16, 29.

See De Anima 430a2-5, 19-20, 431b17. Ross, on the one hand, tries to clarify the implication of the identity of the actualized intellect and the actualized object of intellec[tion in terms of the identity of actualized sensation and the actualized sensible object (Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 2:379-380). Hamlyn, on the other hand, observes that the former identity, since intellect has no organ, is not exactly parallel to the latter and so remains extremely obscure. See D. W. Hamly, Aristotle’s De Anima, Books II and III, translated with Introduction and Notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 139-140. Although we do not go into details about what this formula of the identity means precisely and how intellect receives the intelligible form, it can be seen at least that the status of νοῦς as that which is capable of receiving the object is implied in the formula.
The notorious passage describing the self-thinking of divine intellect, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοησεως νόησις (1074b34-35), must be taken in light of these two meanings of νόησις; it is meant that the intellecutive activity of God is the intellecutive exercise whose object is the actualized intellect, namely God himself. The passage in question reiterates αὐτόν . . . νοεῖ (1074b33-34). In 1074b29-30, then, we are told that if divine intellect were νοος or mere ability of intellection, τὸ νοούμενον would be evidently something else (ἀλλο τι) more precious than itself. Hence αὐτόν in line 33 refers to νοος that has become identical with νοούμενον or νοητόν, that is, the actualized intellect or νόησις. Therefore the genitive νοησεως in line 34 must be taken as intellect in actuality rather than the intellecutive exercise.


12 The causal thesis and the sameness thesis are exactly operative in the above cited passage. But the extent to which the causal thesis is operative in the present context concerning the inner life of God must be clearly ascertained. Wedin refers to De Anima 429a14, 17-18, and Met. 1072a30 as the texts warranting the causal thesis (op. cit.:72-73). In these passages and Met. 1072b22-23 (ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἐξων), indeed, the causal role of the intelligible object is clearly seen. On the causal role of the intelligible object, see also D. K. Modrak, "Aristotle on Thinking," Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1987):223. But this fact does not necessarily allow us to take Met. 1072b22-23 in terms of these other passages.

First, we must notice that Met. 1072a30 and 1072b22-23 differ contextually; Aristotle thematically speaks of the way in which the unmoved mover moves the first heaven in the former, while of the inner life of divine intellect in the latter. Hence the causal thesis applies to the relationship between human intellect and divine intellect qua the primary intelligible object in the former, whereas, if we may call it "relationship," to the relationship between divine capacity of intellection and divine intelligible form in the latter. See Schwegler's note on 1072a26-27: "Im Verhältnis zum Bewegten ist Gott ein ὀρέκτον und νοητόν, und zwar das πρῶτον νοητόν και ὀρέκτον, das absolute Idea menschlichen Denkens und Strebens" (op. cit., 4:259, (Italics mine.)). Again, intellect is said to be moved (κινεῖται) by the intelligible object in 1072a30. So the causal thesis is here linked with the movedness of intellect by its object. But the introduction of any κινησις into the internal structure of divine intellection would inevitably compromise the immobility of divine intellect and make it something proximate to the Platonic soul or self-moving mover rather than the unmoved mover. Therefore, the causal thesis, when applied to the process of divine intellection taking place, must be severed from the movedness of intellect by the intelligible object.

Second, there arises the problem whether the causal thesis could imply the
mind's being acted on by the object of thought or not. In De Anima 429a13-15, from which Wedin draws the causal thesis, Aristotle writes:

"Now, if thinking is akin to perceiving, it would be either being affected in some way by the object of thought (ἡ πάσχειν τί ἐν ἐνί ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ) or something else of this kind (ἡ τινοῦτον ἔτετετο)" (tr. D. W. Hamlyn).

Many critics are unanimous in that Aristotle here accepts the second alternative. But it is quite obscure what the second alternative ἡ τινοῦτον ἔτετετο indicates exactly. Norman links passivity with intellect's receptivity: "Aristotle ... suggests that the manner in which intellect is acted on by the objects of thought is in being 'capable of receiving the form,'" in "Aristotle's Philosopher-God," Phronesis 14 (1969):64. But we must notice that Aristotle stresses intellect's unaffectedness (ἐπαθεῖς ὁρεῖ δὲι εἶναι, line 15). Ross hence correctly thinks that Aristotle rejects the first alternative (Aristotle, De Anima, edited with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 291). According to Hamlyn, the reason why the second alternative is accepted is that the formulae applied to perception in consequence of Aristotle's original idea are applied to intellect; Aristotle proceeds to put refinements and qualifications on his original thesis that perception is a form of being affected, in a way which leads eventually to the rejection of that thesis in 429a29-31 and 431a5 (op. cit., p. 136). If Aristotle's insistence on the unaffectedness of intellect is seriously taken into consideration and the line of interpretation by Ross and Hamlyn is followed, the causal thesis does not point to such a conception of intellection as the mind's being acted on by the object of thought. Wedin maintains that the mind's being moved by the object of thought is enough for attribution of the causal thesis and regards the process of thinking as a non-standard case of being-affected (Ancient Philosophy 9 (1989):73). Insofar as Wedin does not clarify how this non-standard case of being-affected is congruent with intellect's unaffectedness, we cannot follow his view. Towards the end of De Anima Γ 4, however, we are confronted with the following problematic passage:

"Now (ἡ), being affected in virtue of something common has been discussed before--to the effect that the intellect is in a way potentially the objects of thought, although it is actually nothing before it thinks" (429b29-31, tr. D. W. Hamlyn).

As πρότετον in line 30 indicates, Aristotle here recalls the distinction of two kinds of πάσχειν already made in 417b2-7; (i) the transition from one state to its opposite and (ii) the actualization of what is already potentially such. In the above cited section, he replies to the difficulty raised in 429b23-26 by appealing to the second sense of being-affected; although intellect has something in common with its object in the sense that it is potentially its object rather than that it is altered by its object in being affected, insofar as it is actually nothing before it thinks, its unaffectedness is safeguarded. (429b25-26 ἡ γὰρ τι κοινὸν ἀμφῶν ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν reminds us of Soph. 248b5-6, where the Eleatic Stranger
proposes to construe \( \kappa \omega \nu \nu e \nu \iota \nu \) as entailing \( \pi \alpha \theta \eta \mu \alpha \) and \( \pi \omega \iota \mu \alpha \). Here two points must be noticed. First, the difficulty to which Aristotle replies in 429b29-31 is not raised by himself but by an imaginative interlocutor (τις, line 23). Second, as Ross points out (Aristotle, De Anima, p. 294), \( \dot{n} \) in line 29 indicates the beginning of a tentative solution of the problem raised in lines 23-26. Hence we cannot conclude that Aristotle here explicitly admits intellect's being affected by the intelligible objects in being actualized by them. Rather, Aristotle later comes to feel reluctant to use \( \pi \omega \sigma \chi \varepsilon \iota \nu \) in the sense of the actualization of what is already potentially such:

"It is clear that the object of perception makes that which can perceive actively so instead of potentially so; for it is not affected (ο\'υ...\( \pi \omega \sigma \chi \varepsilon \iota \)) or altered" (431a4-5, tr. D. W. Hamlyn).

On this passage Hamlyn comments as follows:

"Here Aristotle finally denies explicitly, despite much of what he had said earlier, that perception, being an activity or actualization, is a form of being affected or of movement generally" (Aristotle's De Anima, p. 145, (Italics mine.)).

Insofar as perception is not conceived to be a form of being affected, the alleged kinship of intellection to perception (429a13-14) may not entail intellection to be some affection by the intelligible objects. Hence the passage \( \dot{n} \tau i \tau o i \omega \varphi \tau o n \ \dot{e} \tau e \rho o n \) in 429a14-15 must be construed to denote Aristotle's rejection of the conception of intellection as a form of being acted on. Intellection thus conceived is consistent with the unaffectedness of intellect. In conclusion, the causal thesis, when applied to divine intellect, must be taken to mean nothing more than that intellect is brought to activity by the object of intellection. In other words, it simply refers to the causal relation between intellect and its object, but not to how the former is actualized by the latter. The aforementioned final conception of perception by Aristotle suggests that \( \dot{e} \nu \varepsilon \tau e \chi e a \) or \( \dot{e} \nu \varepsilon \tau e \chi e i \nu \) does not need to be either \( \pi \omega \varepsilon i \) or \( \pi \omega \sigma \chi \varepsilon i \). To this extent, Apelt, who regards the soul's γυγυ\( \omega \omega \sigma \kappa e w \) of the Forms in Plato as \( \dot{e} \nu \varepsilon \tau e \chi e i \nu \) rather than \( \pi \omega \varepsilon i \) (see note 71 in the first chapter), would agree with Aristotle. But the reason why intellection must not be viewed in terms of activity and passivity distinctly differs in Plato and Aristotle; in the former for the immutability of the intelligible objects or Forms, while in the latter for the unaffectedness of the intellective agent.

14The implication of the sameness thesis differs when it is applied to divine thinking and when applied to human thinking. In the former, the mind in activity is the same as the object of thought that is never other than the mind itself, whereas in the latter the actualized mind is the same as the knowable object that is other than the mind when the mind is not in activity. Norman, then, regards divine self-intellection as "the same activity that human minds perform when they engage in abstract thought" (Phronesis 14 (1969):67). Owens criticizes this view as follows:
"Norman merely assures that separate substance can have and has knowable objects other than itself," though "it is difficult to see how for Aristotle its [i.e. the prime mover's] pure actuality could allow it any other knowable forms than itself" (Études sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, p. 214, note 13). See also W. D. Ross, Aristotle, (London: Methuen, 1923; reprint ed., London: Methuen, 1964), p. 183: "... what Aristotle ascribes to God is knowledge which has only itself for its object."; G. Reale, Aristotele, La Metafisica, 2:289, note 29: "... e impossibile che l'oggetto dell'intelligenza divina sia altro rispetto all'intelligenza medesima."; F. Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, 1:585. On the sameness of divine thinking as ordinary human abstract thinking, further, Norman differentiates the prime mover's self-thinking from self-contemplation and regards the object of the former as only incidentally intellect itself (op. cit.:72). To this interpretation runs counter Aristotle's own text. Immediately after concluding that divine intellect knows itself in Met. A 9, he writes:

"But evidently knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding have always something else as their object, and themselves only by the way (ἐν παρέργῳ)" (1074b35-36, tr. W. D. Ross).

Aristotle here contrasts divine thinking with other cognitive activities. As Ross construes it, the above passage suggests that "the divine νόσος knows itself not ἐν παρέργῳ, but as its only object (Aristotle's Metaphysics, 2:398). Moreover, Alexander takes ἐν παρέργῳ in the sense of κατὰ συμβεβηκός (In Met. 713.5). Thus construed, the thesis is rejected by Aristotle himself that the prime mover knows itself only concomitantly.

15See note 6.

16For τῆς οὐσίας in 1072b22 in the sense of essence or pure form, see W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, 2:380; and H. Bonitz, Aristotelis Metaphysica, 2:501.

17The receptive character of intellect is also marked by κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ in line 20. Reale's translation suggests that τὸ ... δεκτικῶν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας is to be closely taken with κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ; he renders the former "capace di cogliere l'intelligibile e la sostanza" and the latter "cogliendosi come intelligibile." Aristotle appears to imply receptivity of intellect and community between intellect and intelligible object by the word μετάληψις. Ross reads into this term the presence of the intelligible object in intellect by referring to De Anima 430a8-9 ἐκείνῳ (sc. νῷ) τὸ νοητὸν ὑπάρξει (Aristotle's Metaphysics, 2:379).

The receptive implication of the word μετάληψις would have bearing on the fact that Aristotle regards τὸ μεταληπτικὸν as apt for identifying the Receptacle in Plato's Timaeus (Phys. 209b12-14; see also 209b35 τὸ μεθεκτικὸν). Several critics view this identification as fair. See G. S. Claghorn, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Timaeus (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), p. 6. It is to some

18For the interpretation of this passage, see note 3.

19In the present discussion, the word οὐσία has double meaning: (i) the intelligible form as considered in separation from receptive intellect and (ii) intellect that has become identical with that intelligible form and exercises intellection. It is the οὐσία qua (i) that is now said to be prior to ἐνέργεια qua νόησις. Indeed, (i) itself can be called ἐνέργεια as it is a pure form (see *Met.* 1050b2-3). But we have already defined ἐνέργεια in our inquiry as νόησις for our comparison of Aristotle with Plato and Plotinus. Hence the primacy of οὐσία stressed here is not the priority of an agent to activity it exercises, but that of an object to activity it causes. Of course, although it is possible to establish the priority of οὐσία to ἐνέργεια in terms of the Aristotelian metaphysical principle that *operari sequitur esse*, we do not pursue that line here.

There seem to be two criteria whereby (ii) is said to be in actuality; the employment of the intellective ability (see 1050a21-25) and the definiteness given by the possession of the intelligible object within intellect (see Aristotle's identification
of πέρας with εἶδος, τέλος, and τὸ τι ἄνω εἰναί in Met. Δ 17). Since (ii) can be said to be in actuality because of definiteness besides the facts that the noetic exercise of (ii) is caused by (i) and that the definiteness of (ii) is provided by (i), definiteness seems to be the crucial criterion of actuality for Aristotle. Rorty then endeavors to spell out Aristotle’s failure in identification of definiteness with actuality. See "Matter and Event," in Explorations in Whitehead’s Philosophy, ed. L. S. Ford and G. L. Kline, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1983), pp. 68-103. He first pays attention to two roles of matter. On the one hand, matter, in the account for substantial change, must be cuddly, malleable, and receptive. On the other, it, in the account for accident, individuation, and monstrosities, must be resistant, obstreperous, and stubborn. According to Rorty, the second role is to entangle Aristotle’s own identification of definiteness with actuality:

"Now when one focuses on this second role, one sees that matter is not resistant because of its indefiniteness, but precisely because of its definiteness. It is not because a lump of marble is ‘formless’ that it resists the sculptor, but because it has the wrong form" (ibid., p. 87).

There seems to be serious confusion in this observation. We must notice that the sculptor is the efficient cause in the substantial change of the lump of marble. So Rorty confuses the first and the second roles of matter. What might resist the efficient cause in a given substantial change, if anything, would be the definiteness present in the privation of a given form which is the very "contrary" to that form (Met. 1069b33-34, 1070b31-32; see also 1018a20-21, 1054a23-24, 1055a33ff., 1057a36; Phys. 193b20-21; Cat. 11b17-19). Aristotle characterizes as ἀτοξίω privation rather than matter (Met. 1070b28). It would be a union of privation with matter that has the "wrong" form, such a union that is instantiated by κάμνων in 1071a10 (see W. D. Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 2:363). The composite of privation and matter is endowed with definiteness, precisely because privation is εἶδος πῶς (Phys. 193b19-20). Hence, Rorty, besides his confusion between the first and the second roles of matter, seems to confuse matter and the composite of privation and matter. It is indeed true that Aristotle regards matter as the cause of the accidental (Met. 1027a13-15). But Ross observes that Aristotle fails in ascribing the occurrence of the exceptional to the capacity of matter:

"But obviously matter when acted on by the same forces will receive the same determination; its indeterminateness does not involve contingency. There will be exceptions to rules, but these exceptions will be according to rule" (Aristotle, p. 77, (Italics mine.)).

From Aristotle’s failure in ascribing contingency to indefiniteness, however, we cannot conclude that exceptional events are caused by the alleged definiteness of matter, since these events, as Ross sees, can be viewed as "simply a name for the unforeseen meeting of two chains of rigorous causation" (ibid., p. 78).
20See De Anima 430a5.

21It must be noticed that συνεχές in 1072b29 is taken over by τὸ συνεχὲς ... τῆς νοησεως in 1074b29. Alexander takes the continuity of divine life mentioned here in relation to the contemplative activity of God (In Met. 699.22-23). It is evident that the sempiternity and continuity of the prime mover's life must be established as that on which everlastingness and continuity of the circular movement of the outermost heaven depends. However, needless to say, the continuity of divine life must be taken non-spatially to indicate the incessancy or unbrokenness of contemplative activity, as Alexander suggests (In Met. 699.23, ἐι γὰρ διαλιμπάνει, οὐκ ἀέτου).

The continuity of divine contemplation certainly illuminates Aristotle's conception of divine eternity. As continuity in general implies endurance, it is hard to suppose that Aristotle has formulated the non-durational conception of eternity. Whittaker, referring to Met. 1072b14-16, 24-30, and 1073a7, observes that the prime mover, enduring but not being subject to change, is "not exempt from duration" in "The 'Eternity' of the Platonic Forms," Phronesis 13 (1968):142. He summarizes the historical locus of the Platonic and the Aristotelian notion of eternity as follows:

"Neither Plato nor Aristotle felt any need to formulate a non-durational conception of eternity, but each contributed towards preparing the grounds for the new notion, the actual origin of which should be sought in the religious philosophizing of the following centuries" (ibid.:143).

In his annotation on Met. 1072b29 Alexander construes divine eternity as essentially durational (In Met. 699.24, αἰών γὰρ ἔστιν ἢ ἐκάστῳ συνεπαρκεισωμένη ζωή). Plotinus' non-durational notion of eternity is precisely based on the denial of continuity and "stretch" to eternity (III 7 [45],11,52-54, ἀντὶ δὲ ἀδιάστάτου καὶ ἐνὸς εἰδωλοῦ τού ἐνος τὸ ἐν συνεχεῖ τῇ ἐν: I 5 [36],7,26-27, οὐδὲ παρεκτατέον τὸ ἀδιάστατου).

22W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, 2:277. See also Ravaisson's comment on 1072b20-21: "Mais, dans la pensée pure, l'objet et le sujet qui le touche son également indivisible: ce sont donc comme deux points qui ne peuvent se toucher sans se confondre, et sans s'identifier intégralement" (op. cit., 1:580).

Berti dismisses such a possible interpretation that the immobile entities could be apprehended by human mind with the help of ὑγείᾳ, by regarding it as a form of mysticism totally incompatible with the philosophy of Aristotle and by pointing out that Met. 1072b21 allows the prime mover alone the cognitive contact of this sort. See Études sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, ed. P. Aubenque (Paris: J. Vrin, 1979), p. 85.

23Plato's position thus clarified seems to have some bearing on the fact that he qualifies ὁμοίωσις θεῷ by κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν (Theaet. 176b1-2), whereas this
qualification drops in Plotinus. See also J. M. Rist, "Forms of Individuals in
Plotinus," Classical Quarterly 13 (1963):230; and G. J. P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy

24See note 17.

25Also in Plato's theory of Forms, μέθεξις, either a sensible particular's
participation in the Form or the participation of one Form in another within the
systematic complex of the Forms, is closely allied with κοινωνία (Phd. 100d6; Soph.
256b1-2). Again, we may recall Plato's description of intellection as κοινωνείν
between the soul and the Form (Soph. 248a10-11).

26For the interpretation of De Anima 429b29-31, see note 13.

27See Met. 1046a22-28, especially lines 22-26 ἢ μὲν ἐν τῷ πᾶσχοντι... ἢ
δ' ἐν τῷ πουσθεί and line 24 καὶ ἄλλο ύπ' ἄλλον.

28For the a-kinetic nature of divine intellection, see notes 13 and 41.

29See P. Hadot, "Etre, Vie, Pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin, " in Les

30We must notice that διὰ τοῦτο in 1072b17 refers to the fact that the
prime mover's ἐγρήγορος, as well as his αἴσθησις and νόησις, is the ἐνέργεια
that is pleasant (see W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, 2:379). In addition, ἐλπίδες
... καὶ μνήματι in lines 17-18 would point to such conception of divine eternity by
Aristotle as pointed out in note 21.

31D. W. Hamlyn, Aristotle's De Anima, p. 140.

32W. D. Ross, Aristotle, pp. 149-150. See also ibid., p. 150: "Similarly, the
fact that active reason already knows all intelligible objects makes it possible for the
passive reason, in itself a potentiality, actually know, and for the knowable actually
to be known."

33W. D. Ross, Aristotle, p. 150, italics mine.

34J. M. Rist, "Notes on Aristotle De Anima 3.5," Classical Philology 61


than ἐπιστήμη as more appropriate to the agent intellect (op. cit.:15). This view is
based on 430a22 ὀλλ' ὤχ ὀτὲ μὲν νοεῖ ὀτὲ δ' ὀὐ νοεῖ, which would imply that the agent intellect always νοεῖ. Hamlyn admits this implication: "The active intellect must always think because it is actual..." ([Aristotle's De Anima, p. 141]). Insofar as the agent intellect is precisely οὐτος ὁ νοος (430a17), it is impossible to conceive that it does not exercise intellection. Aristotle is thus forced to conceive such νόησις that is distinct from the identification of intellect and its object. But it is highly dubious that he is willing to entertain such νόησις that concerns no intelligible object; for object-less intellection is said to be just like sleeping (Met. 1074b17-18) and would not be appropriate to the agent intellect. The necessity that some intellection must be ascribed to the agent intellect is incompatible with the conception of intellection as the identification of the receptive intellect and the knowable object. This incompatibility would hence be due to the fact that there is no generic account for intellection in Aristotle that can encompass the descriptions of both the agent and the passive intelligences.

37St. Thomas' doctrine of the agent intellect seems to have the philosophical, but not exegetical, advantage that can harmonize the definition of knowledge as the reception of the intelligible forms with the function of the agent intellect that makes all the intelligible objects. That is, he attributes abstraction or illumination to the agent intellect and knowing or comprehension to the passive intellect alone and construes πάντα ποιεῖν as "making all the species intelligible."

Modrak also denies the apprehension of the objects to the agent intellect (see note 34). She further pushes this view and characterizes divine intellection as object-less activity:

"Therefore I shall argue for an alternative interpretation of νόησις νοησεως: it is not a genuine cognitive activity for its object is not a genuine cognition. It is a mental activity directed upon itself; since the original activity had no object, it has no character and hence the reflexive activity has no object. This 'thinking' resembles the active νοος" ([Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1987):232].

We are reluctant to accept Modrak's view. On her view, the account for divine intellection can do away with the sameness thesis and the causal thesis (see note 12). If divine intellection has no object, we wonder how it is possible to defend the substantiality and the definiteness of the prime mover. Modrak's view, in fact, is based on her observation that Aristotle wished to say that God was both an object and the activity of thinking, but unsuccesssfully tried in his definition to have it both ways. But it would not be justifiable to move from the alleged failure of Aristotle to the conclusion that divine activity of thinking has no object. Modrak does not sufficiently consider whether the sameness and the causal theses can at the same time insure the substantiality and the eternal actuality of God.
40 We may here touch upon the problem, how Aristotle's phrase ὁ παθητικὸς νοοῦς in De Anima 430a24-25 is consistent with its being ἀπαθής (429a15, 29, b23). As Ross maintains by rejecting Alexander's interpretation (Aristotle's De Anima, pp. 42-43), we may not conceive that the agent intellect acts on the passive intellect. So the phrase does not imply that the relation between the agent and the passive intellects points to that between that which acts and that which is acted on.

41 This point surely reminds us of Ethica Nicomachea 1154b27-28, where God's pleasure in rest (ἡδονή ... ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ) is identified with ἐνέργεια ... ἀκινητικός. See also Skemp's observation: "Here in Λ 9 the positive value of the ἐνέργεια ἀκινητικός is taken from ethics, and here the ἀκινητικός does not consist in the absence of being acted upon" ("The Activity of Immobility," in Études sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, ed. P. Aubenque (Paris: J. Vrin, 1979), p. 231). According to Skemp, the "positive value" of the ἐνέργεια ἀκινητικός is the merit attached to the object of ὁρεῖς "which in fact provides for God joy which is single and pure" (op. cit., p. 240). Moreover, Skemp seems to indicate the non-reciprocal relation of the prime mover and the first moved by "the absence of being acted upon." Indeed the prime mover is not acted on by any other entity. Then, does the prime mover's immobility have no bearing on its internal structure of self-thinking that is regarded as free from activity and passivity?

The a-kinetic nature of intellection would need further consideration. Remarking that the prime mover's moving as the ἐρώμενος could hardly induce the heaven to locomotion, Skemp points out that "ambiguity between the 'psychical' and physical senses of κινεῖσθαι can hardly be eliminated from Metaphysics Α." (op. cit., p. 240). So there seems to arise such possible objection that the alleged kinetic character of intellection may not infringe God's immobility, since his immobility is mentioned in relation to the everlasting movement of the heaven (1072a25, b7, 1073a23ff.). For this objection to be sound, the alleged "psychic" sense of movement must be distinguished from its physical or locomotive sense. Upon this conceptual distinction, one could claim that intellection movement does not compromise the prime mover's immobility in its physical sense. But this claim is obviously awkward; for the unmovedness of the prime mover, as already mentioned, does not consist in the absence of being acted on by another entity and so must not be taken in the physical sense. The ambiguity is found in the movedness of the first moved, but not in the unmovedness of the prime mover. Hence, one is forced to answer how the alleged intellective movement can be compatible with the "spiritual" immobility of God. But it would be hopelessly difficult to solve this problem.

Our claim of intellection to be a-kinetic is based on the following two
textual warrants. First, Aristotle, in distinguishing ἐνέργεια from κίνησις, mentions νοεῖν as an instance of the former (Met. 1048b24, 34). In the case of divine inner life the intellective exercise is continuous, so that it can be said to attain always its τέλος. In this case, any process towards the actualization is inconceivable.

According to Skemp, the definition of κίνησις as ἐνέργεια ἀτελής means that "where there is κίνησις there is a process towards ἐνέργεια" rather than that "κίνησις is a kind of ἐνέργεια but the kind which is ἀτελής" (op. cit., p. 245).

Second, in De Anima 431a4-7, Aristotle finally rejects his original idea expressed in 416b33-34, that perception is a form of movement. The reason why Aristotle admits the second alternative in 429a14-15, as Hamlyn observes, is that "the formulae applied to perception in consequence of his original idea are here applied to the intellect" (Aristotle's De Anima, p. 136); intellection is not a form of being acted on or of movement. See also note 13.


43A. H. Armstrong, "The Background of the Doctrine "That the Intelligibles are not outside the Intellect,'" in Les Sources de Plotin (Geneva, Vandoevres: Fondation Hardt, 1957), p. 54. Owens expresses the all-pervasive influence of Aristotle's metaphysics on Plotinus as follows: "Imagine the Plotinian doctrine without the Aristotelian starting point of the presence of the intelligibles within the intelligence . . . " (Études sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, p. 261). But we must notice that the presence of the plural νοητά within divine Intellect is not purely Aristotelian. The historical locus of Aristotle's doctrine is rather accurately rendered by Theiler:

"Sollte eigentlich die νόησις νοησεως die Zusammenfassung aller εἴδη der Natur im göttlichen Geiste bedeuten? Es gab also in der späteren Philosophie ein Weiterdenken und Vollenden dessen, was Aristoteles nicht ausgeführt hatte" (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 415).


45Plotinus himself thinks that the identity of Intellect and its object has the historical origin in Parmenides' fragment το γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶ τε καὶ εἶναι (DK B3). He takes this fragment to indicate the substantial (οὐσία) identity of Intellect and the intelligible object (III 8 [30],8,7-8). Armstrong comments on this section as follows: "Plotinus . . . uses (Parmenides' fragment) explicitly, as he does here implicitly, in support of his doctrine that the intelligible objects are not outside intellect." See A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus, Text with an English Translation, 7 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966-1988; London: William Heinemann, 1966-1988), 3:384, note 1. Again, Plotinus juxtaposes this fragment
with *De Anima* 430a3-4 and 431a1-2 in V 9 [5],5,29-31. He also here claims the identity of the intelligible objects with and the presence of them within Intellect (lines 26-27). Armstrong then views that Plotinus "knew, and wished to respect at least verbally, the tradition which made the Forms in the *Timaeus* the plan in the mind of the divine architect" (*Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 411). Beyond this observation, however, Plotinus, in III 9 [13],1 where he thematically deals with the exegesis of *Tim*. 39e7-9, interprets the presence of the intelligible object within Intellect to be said by Plato himself: ὅ γὰρ καθορέ ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐν ἐτέρῳ πάντως, ἄλλῳ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ νοητὸν ἔχειν (lines 14-15). Plotinus here construes *Tim*. 30c7-8 to warrant the presence of the intelligible object within Intellect, though that passage, in fact, simply refers to the all-inclusiveness of the world of Forms. So Armstrong is right in regarding this passage as a misinterpretation, or careless reading, of *Tim*. 30c7-8 (*Plotinus*, 3:408, note 1). In VI 6 [34],7,16-17, however, Plotinus takes that passage to indicate the all-inclusiveness of the noetic universe. Therefore, although Plotinus' exegesis of Parmenides and Plato is quite arbitrary, it is certain that he would himself have considered his doctrine of the νόης-νοητον identity to be traced back through Plato to Parmenides. Needless to say, this fact is fully compatible with Armstrong's view as stated in note 43; for what Armstrong points out is the historical background that has stimulated Plotinus' philosophizing, whereas what we indicate is the *locus classicus* which Plotinus has sought in support of his doctrine.

Pépin, independently of Plotinus' exegesis of Plato, tries to show that the νόης-νοητον identity was presented, though in obscure and dispersed fashion, by Plato himself in his "Éléments pour une Histoire de la Relation entre l'Intelligence et l'Intelligible chez Platon et dans le Néoplatonisme," *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* 146 (1956):40-44. The dialogues' passages to which Pépin refers are categorized into two groups; the passages concerning the soul's relation to the Forms and those concerning the Demiurge's relation to the Forms. We have no objection to the soul's kinship to the Forms or her intelligible nature in the former group of passages (*Phd.* 77dff.; *Rep.* 490b3-5, 500c2-5; *Tim*. 35a1-2; *Leges* 898e2) as having some bearing on the doctrine of the νόης-νοητον identity. But Pépin's observation that the νόης-νοητον identity is entertained by Plato, based on the latter group of passages, seems to be unconvincing. First, we cannot see why Pépin appeals to such an exceptional passage like *Rep*. 597d2, where the Form is described as if it were created by the Demiurge. Second, Pépin concludes not only the Form's presence in the Demiurge's mind but its being a νόημα from the verb expressing the reasoning of the Demiurge (ἡγησατο γὰρ . . . ὁ συνθείς, *Tim*. 33d2): "Non que cet intelligible produit par le démiurge s'en détache comme une forme séparée subsistant à part; il demeure en lui, dont il est la pensée" (op. cit.:43). But this conclusion is obviously incongruent with Plato's insistence that the Idea is not the νόημα. We cannot but wonder how such construction is possible from the simple
verb ἥγεισθαι. Finally, Pépin refers to Tim. 37a1 τῶν νοητῶν ἀεὶ τε ὄντων, where the Demiurge is counted among the intelligible entities. To be sure, this phrase is construed by Archer-Hind to identify the Demiurge or νοῦς with the Idea or νοητόν (The Timeaus of Plato, p. 115). But it seems difficult to read the νοῦς-νοητόν identity in this phrase. See also A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato’s Timeaus, p. 176: "It is a mistake to attempt to get some kind of modern ‘idealism’ out of this simple phrase." As Cornford indicates (Plato’s Theory of Knowledge, p. 248), how intellect is related to the Forms is "a question that can only be answered in the figurative language of the Timeaus."

In fact, it would not be difficult to imagine that Plato had more than once envisaged the identity of intellect and the Forms or the presence of the latter in the former. The identity, on the one hand, has the advantage of establishing the relationship, of intellect to the Forms, which is free from activity and passivity, as already suggested in Aristotle’s case. On the other hand, however, the presence of the Ideas in intellect is likely to invite such a fatal charge that they might be nothing else than νοῆματα. The νόημα arises οὐδομένον . . . ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς (Parm. 132b4-5). The νοῦς-νοητόν identity thus seems to have appeared a two-edged sword to Plato himself. Unfortunately, Pépin does not envisage any possible consequence that the νοῦς-νοητόν identity might entail to be obnoxious in Plato’s philosophy.

46See note 27.

47See notes 43, 44, and 45.

48See A. H. Armstrong, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 401:
"Plotinus in formulating his doctrine that the Intelligibles are in Intellect seems to me to be concerned with a question of a different sort ‘What is the relationship of eternal intuitive thought to its object (or objects) and how is that object to be conceived?’" (Italics mine.).

Armstrong here maintains that Plotinus’ doctrine of the νοῦς-νοητά identity is not really "demiurgic" and that the problem with which that doctrine is concerned is different from the problem concerning the relationship between the demiurge and the pattern he uses (Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 400-401). The problem in question is precisely one of the fundamental problems of speculative philosophy that both Plato and Aristotle have seriously tackled. Viewed from such a thinker like Plotinus who acknowledges himself as the true successor of the vetera of Plato’s philosophy, it is the problem of the cognitive κοινωνία between the soul or intellect and the Ideas that has much troubled Plato in the Sophist, a matter of life or death in the theory of Forms; it is the serious problem of harmonizing the status of the Idea as τὸ νοητὸν with its immutability, the fundamental thesis in the theory of Forms. Hence we can say that Plotinus, in this respect, patiently tackles the
Before moving from Plato and Aristotle to Plotinus, we may briefly touch upon the problem concerning the fundamental character of their doctrines of intellect. Schwyzer regards the Plotinian Intellect as Aristotelian rather than Platonic in respect of its substantiality; the Platonic intellect, on the other hand, remains a "faculty" or "property," in "Bewußt' und 'Unbewußt' bei Plotin," in Les Sources de Plotin (Geneva, Vandoeuvres: Fondation Hardt, 1957), p. 346. As mentioned in note 15 in the first chapter, however, this view is not cogent enough; for Plato nowhere rejects the possibility of the transcendent intellect to subsist apart from the soul.

Barnes maintains that Aristotle's conception of intellect in De Anima is non-physical and non-substantial in "Aristotle's Concept of Mind," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (1971-72):101-114. Since our focus is on divine intellect in the Metaphysics, we may here have no need to examine Barnes' position seriously.
CHAPTER III
INTELLECTION IN PLOTINUS

Introduction

In this chapter we do not attempt to present the systematic picture of Plotinus’ doctrine of Intellect. As Armstrong observes, Plotinus "tries to pack too much and too varied a content of tradition and experience into his account of his Second Hypostasis for consistency." It is totally beyond the scope of our inquiry to analyze fully the content of his doctrine of Intellect. We intend to establish the following three points in this chapter:

(1) Plotinus’ doctrines of the intellect-intelligible identity, stimulated by Aristotle’s psychological formula, can satisfactorily answer the problem, raised in the Sophist, concerning the cognitive relation between intellect and the invariable Forms (Sections I, II and V).

(2) Intellection for Plotinus is the ἐνέργεια inseparable from οὐσία (Section VI).

(3) In Plotinus’ system, the doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity or self-intellection is closely connected with the doctrine of Intellect’s relation to the One, from which the problem of the One’s knowledge may arise (Sections VI-VIII).

We shall also consider Intellect’s self-consciousness in Section III and ascertain Plotinus’ departure from the Middle Platonic view of the Form as God’s νόημα in Section IV. The last chapter was closed with the brief remark on the historical locus of the Peripatetic doctrine of the intellect-intelligible unity. Hence
we may resume our inquiry with Plotinus' doctrine of the intellect-intelligible
identity.
1. The Presence of the Intelligible Objects within Intellect

Plotinus applies to the relation between Intellect and the intelligible object the Aristotelian formula of their identity rather than the Platonic view of the soul as adjacent to the Form in her contemplation. But this formula thus adopted undergoes substantial transformation. As Armstrong points out, Plotinus, in his argument for Intellect's self-thinking in V 3 [49], seems to assume without discussion the identity of the Aristotelian νοητόν with the Platonic νοητά. In Plotinus, hence, intellection concerns the multiplicity of the Forms and represents the identification of Intellect and the intelligible objects. Intellection cannot be absolutely simple:

Therefore the thinker (τὸ νοοῦν) must apprehend one thing different from another and the object of thought (τὸ νοούμενον) in being thought (κατανοουμένον) must contain variety; or there will not be a thought (νόησις) of it ... (V 3 [49],10,40-42, tr. A. H. Armstrong).

Because of such manifold nature, as we shall see later, intellection is definitely denied to the One.

The connection between intellection and multiplicity is not exhausted by a multitude of the intelligible objects. On the one hand, Intellect and its object are substantially (τῆς οὐσίας) one (V 6 [24],1,4-5). On the other hand, they are conceptually (λόγῳ) distinguished (VI 7 [38],40,17). Hence Intellect is at the same time said to be one because it thinks itself and to be two because it thinks itself as the intelligible object (V 6 [24],1,23). With O'Daly, we can say that "intellection is described as proceeding from an initial unity which dualizes itself intellectually." If Intellect is two, it must be necessarily many (V 3 [49],15,39). Because of this duality Plotinus refuses to regard Aristotle's self-thinking Intellect as the primary principle (V 1 [10],9,7-9). When Plotinus argues for the absence of intellection from the One, he generally invokes not only the unbroken connection between intellection
and the multiplicity of intelligible objects but also the duality inevitably implied in self-intellection.

Needless to say, the conception of intellection as the identification of the intellective agent and the knowable object originates from Aristotle's psychology and metaphysics. As already seen, however, Plotinus himself believes that Parmenides and Plato have already held this conception. Hence it is no wonder that he endeavors to relate several elements in Plato's philosophy to his own doctrine of the presence of the Forms in Intellect. For instance, Plotinus applies to the structure of self-intellection the scheme of five genera in the Sophist. Again, more importantly, the basic motive for his doctrine of the presence of the intelligible objects in Intellect is very close to the necessity by which Plato must defend the immutability of Forms, the fundamental hypothesis in his theory of Ideas. In the following, we shall explore these two similarities between Plato and Plotinus in detail.

In V 1 [10].4, Plotinus ranges Intellect with the thinking agent or activity and Being with the intelligible object (lines 26-33) and proceeds to the elucidation of the duality-in-unity structure of self-intellection with recourse to the Platonic genera:

If there were neither otherness nor sameness, thinking would not arise. Accordingly, the primaries are Intellect, Being, otherness and sameness; and one must also include motion and rest. There must be movement if Intellect thinks, and rest so that it may think the same thing [as itself]. There must be otherness so that there may be a thinker and that which is thought; if you take away otherness, Intellect and Being will be one and become silent (lines 33-39).

Otherness here functions as the principle of distinction between the intellective agent and the intelligible object, whereas sameness is the principle of unity between Intellect and Being. Without otherness, there would be no subject-
object duality and thereby no intellection. Otherness, moreover, has another role. Plotinus continues:

But the objects of thought must be different in relation to each other (lines 39-40).

Otherness is also the principle of distinction among the intelligible objects. Since each object is defined by its own form, otherness in this role precisely represents the difference (διαφορά) (line 41). The connection between intellection and otherness in this second role is more clearly described in VI 7 [38],13. Otherness is said to have awakened Intellect into life and activity (lines 11-12). So Intellect went forward with otherness (line 20). Without the otherness that pluralizes the intelligible world, Intellect stands still so that neither intellection nor intellective movement will occur, and no Intellect will be hypostatized (lines 37-40). Also in this sense, otherness is necessary for intellection to take place. Consequently, the incompatibility of otherness with the absolute simplicity of the One naturally leads to the denial of intellection to it (VI 9 [9],6,42).

The introduction of Aristotle’s doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity results in the presence of multiplicity in Intellect as well as its simplicity. Let us move to the problem concerning the basic motive of Plotinus’ doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity. What does he endeavor to defend by this doctrine? More simply, why does he maintain that all the intelligible objects are inside Intellect? Plotinus’ arguments for the doctrine are developed mainly in V 9 [5],5, V 5 [32],1, and V 3 [49],5. We may first review his arguments in their chronological order.

The object of V 9 [5] as a whole is to display the true nature of Intellect. As Armstrong points out, this treatise gives the impression of having been hurriedly written. So Plotinus’ argument for the intellect-intelligible identity in the fifth chapter is quite brief. The premise of his argument is the pure actuality and
eternity of Intellect; Intellect in the true sense neither is in potentiality nor passes from stupidity to intelligence (5,1-4). If the essence of Intellect and those objects which it thinks were different from one another, the essence of Intellect would itself be unintellectual (ἀνόητος) and in potentiality (5,7-9). Insofar as Intellect is totally in actuality and so is not actualized by anything else, it does not have its thinking from outside (μη ἐπακτὸν), but thinks and possesses its objects from itself (παρ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ); in other words, Intellect is itself the intelligible objects (5,4-7). This is the argument from the ever-presence of some actualizing principle within Intellect. This argument, however, will not be fully clear, unless the causal connection between Intellect’s activity and the intelligible objects is clarified. In 5,12-13, Plotinus writes:

It is clear that, since it is Intellect in its true sense, it thinks beings and establishes them in existence (ὑποστησιν).

This passage means that intellection hypostatizes the intelligible objects. If this is the case, those objects will be nothing other than νοηματα. But Plotinus definitely rejects the conception of the Forms as νοηματα later in 7,12-17 and 8,8-11. Even if the intelligible objects are hypostatized by Intellect’s activity, unless the reason is explained why those objects thus hypostatized must lie within Intellect itself, the presence of the actualizing principle in Intellect will not lead to the proposed conclusion. On the contrary, Plotinus claims the priority of the objects to Intellect:

But since we think of being as preceding Intellect, we must assume that beings are placed in the thinking subject, and activity and intellection over the real beings, just as the activity of fire over fire already existing; so that the real beings may have one Intellect over themselves as their activity (8,11-15).

In this passage, the actualizing principle is placed on the side of the intelligible objects. The actualization of the intellective subject, designated as the
essence of Intellect, by the activity of the intelligible objects seems to be tacit in the argument under discussion. In this argument, therefore, the thesis that Intellect is always in actuality implicitly means the perpetual actualization of the thinking subject by its objects. From this perpetual actualization is concluded the identity of Intellect and its objects. As regards the present argument thus articulated, we need to notice two points. First, except for the difference between the singular νοητόν and the plural νοητόκ, Plotinus follows the line of Aristotle’s account for the actuality of the prime mover by its possession of the divine intelligible object in *Met.* 1072b19-23 and adopts his inference, in 1074b29-30, of the presence of the intelligible object outside Intellect from the suggestion that divine Intellect remains a mere capacity for thinking. Also philologically viewed, the designation of the thinking subject as η οὐσία αὐτοῦ [sc. νοῦ] (5,8-9) reminds us of the one by Aristotle in *Met.* 1074b19-22. Second, the contrast between Plotinus’ recurrent use of αὐτός and the intensive αὐτός in 5,5-7 and the phrase ἀλλα... ἕτερα... in 5,7-8 shows that he does not fully distinguish self-intellection from the intellect-intelligible sameness; he makes the distinction of these two notions in the late treatise (V 3 [49],5,28-31). In other words, Plotinus accepts Aristotle’s account for self-intellection, human or divine, by means of the intellect-intelligible identity without fully distinguishing them. To this extent, the argument in V 9 [5],5 can be said to be much indebted to Aristotle’s conception of self-intellection.

In V 5 [32],1, Plotinus devotes the entire chapter to the defense of the νοῦς-νοητόν identity. Different from the argument in V 9 [5],5, his argument is here a negative one against the claim that the intelligible objects lie outside Intellect. It proceeds by disclosing several absurdities entailed by the view opposed to Plotinus’ own. The question he raises at the beginning of the chapter is as follows:
Could anyone say that Intellect, the true and real Intellect, will ever be in error and believe the unreal (μή τὰ ὄντα δοξάσειν)? (1,1-2, tr. A. H. Armstrong). 22

The definitely negative reply (1,2) to this question naturally points to the infallibility of Intellect. Plotinus hence tries to show the necessity of the presence of the intelligible objects inside Intellect for the defense of its infallibility by means of arguing that the presence of them outside Intellect must unavoidably invite Intellect's fallibility, its exercise of discursive thinking, and, to be worse, its ignorance.

There are seven arguments in this chapter. Plotinus' own position about intellectual knowledge is briefly presented before these arguments:

For how could it still be Intellect when it was being unintelligent (ἀνοητοίως)? It must, then, always know and not ever forget anything, and its knowing must not be that of a guesser, or ambiguous, or like that of someone who has heard what he knows from someone else (1,3-6, tr. A. H. Armstrong).

The first argument (1,6-19) immediately follows this. Although Intellect's knowing does not depend on demonstration, even if anyone did say that some of the things known were by demonstration, some should still be self-evident to Intellect (1,6-8). 23 Of course, this argument appeals to the Aristotelian view that demonstration always starts from a self-evident premise. But Plotinus himself holds that all things are self-evident to Intellect (1,8). If this is not the case, the problem arises how we can distinguish those which are self-evident to Intellect from those which are not (1,8-9). Again, another problem occurs concerning what insures Intellect's knowledge to be self-evident and confident (1,9-12). Plotinus here refers to the case of sense-perception; although the sensible objects seem to inspire the strongest confidence in their self-evidence, insofar as they remain outside the sense organ, sense-perception cannot grasp the objects themselves (1,12-19). 24 The tacit
conclusion would be that the self-evidence of Intellect's knowledge cannot be insured if the intelligible objects are placed outside Intellect.25

The second argument (1,19-23) is quite simple. If Intellect knows its objects as being other than itself, it will be conceivable that Intellect has no contact with (συντυγχάνειν) them.26 In other words, the premise in question will not only entail the possibility of Intellect's being ignorant but also compromise the perpetuity of intellection.

The third argument (1,23-28) is a variant of the second. Plotinus critically examines the suggestion that Intellect and its objects are linked together (συζευγνύναι). Different from συντυγχάνειν, the verb συζευγνύναι can describe the unbroken connection of Intellect and its objects, so that the perpetuity of intellection is defended and Intellect is saved from the possibilities of being ignorant and of forgetting its objects. But if the verb is not taken to mean the intellect-intelligible identity,27 intellection will concern the external objects, just as sense-perception does so, and be mere impressions (τύποι) or impacts (πληγαί). In other words, insofar as Intellect does not grasp the intelligible objects themselves, it cannot be completely free from the possibility of being deceived.28 The infallibility of Intellect cannot be satisfactorily insured except by the unbrokenness of the intellect-intelligible connection.

The fourth argument (1,28-32) seems to supplement the third; it points out Intellect's lack of confidence in its apprehension of truth, while the third implicitly discloses the possibility of Intellect's being deceived. If the intelligible objects lie outside Intellect, Intellect will not be concerned with those objects themselves nor be able to know that the Form, say, of Justice that it apprehends is exactly Justice. It will not possess within itself the principles of judgment (αἱ τῆς κρίσεως ἀρχαὶ) whereby it can ascertain what the object grasped is exactly.29
The fifth argument (1,32-41) introduces a new viewpoint. Whereas the preceding arguments have pointed out the absurdities that might occur for the intellective agent or intellection, this argument concerns the intelligible objects. If the intelligible objects are "senseless and without share of life and intelligence (ἀναίσθηται καὶ ἀμοιφα ζωῆς καὶ νοῦ)" (1,32-33) or "without intelligence or life (ἀνόητα καὶ ἀνευ ζωῆς)" (1,37-38), we cannot see what they are. On the other hand, if those objects are conceived to possess the intellective agent, they are the primary Intellect that apprehends truth. Hence the total separation of the thinking principle from the intelligible objects is prone to obscure the ontological status of those objects.

The sixth argument (1,41-50) attempts to point out that the presence of the intelligible objects outside Intellect causes intellection to be discursive. Given the discreteness of each of the objects, their presence outside Intellect makes them dispersed (διεσπαρμένων ἐκαστον) because of the absence of the unifying subject in which they may reside. In this case, Intellect will run around (περιθέων) looking for them and therefore not be able to remain in itself. Again, insofar as the intelligible objects are dispersed outside Intellect, intellection will be just like sense-perception that apprehends the impression of an object made of matter of some sort. Another difficulty still arises why such material object can be, say, Justice.

The final argument (1,50-61), with full emphasis, attempts to disclose that the placing of the intelligible objects outside Intellect inescapably causes Intellect to be deceived. Plotinus feels this to be the greatest absurdity of all (μέγιστον . . . πάντων, 1,50). If it is admitted that Intellect contemplates its objects outside itself, it will not know the objects themselves or the truth (τὸ ἀληθὲς) of them, but simply their images (εἰδωλοῖς), so that it will be necessarily deceived. Moreover, whether Intellect is aware of its being deceived or not, it will be far from the possession of
truth. For Intellect's infallibility to be sufficiently defended, therefore, the intelligible objects must be placed inside Intellect.\(^{37}\)

The argument is concluded in the second chapter. For Intellect to be completely infallible, it must "live with and be fused with (συνόντας καὶ συγκραθέντας)" its objects (2,8); it is "the foundation of all real beings (ἐδρα . . . τοῖς οὐσί)" (2,11).\(^{38}\) In the first chapter of the immediately following treatise, II 9 [33], Plotinus develops this identity of intellect and intelligible object in relation to self-intellection which is formulated as follows:

\[\ldots\text{and when it [i.e. Intellect] sees itself, it does so not as without intelligence but as thinking (οὐκ ἀνοητάδυνοντα, ὀλλὰ νοοῦντα) (1,49-50).}\(^{39}\)

This conception of self-intellection is exactly based upon the fifth argument that has urged us to think of the intelligible objects as thinking and living.\(^{40}\)

Plotinus’ object in V 3 [49] is to define self-knowledge and further to demonstrate the need to go beyond Intellect for the search for the first principle of reality and the soul’s true end. In the fourth chapter, he distinguishes two types of self-knowledge; (i) the soul’s awareness of the nature of her reflective power with recourse to standards given from Intellect and (ii) her immediate contemplation of herself qua Intellect by becoming identical with it. In order to give a sufficient account of the latter type of self-knowledge or self-intellection in the proper sense (τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κυρίως νοεῖν, 6,1-2), Plotinus in the fifth chapter tackles the problem how Intellect knows itself. In this context the doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity is fully exploited. He rejects the suggestion that one part of Intellect sees another, whether they are homogeneous or not; because it means at best the knowledge of that which is contemplated by that which is contemplating and does not guarantee self-knowledge in its proper sense (5,1-15). Under the
supposed division of the contemplator and those which are contemplated, unless we conceive that the contemplator sees and possesses its objects prior to the supposed division, Intellect will simply have an impression of its objects and not attain truth; hence Intellect is the same as the intelligible objects (5,16-28). The argument up to this point is much indebted to II 9 [33],1 and V 5 [32],1-2 in two respects. First, Plotinus here invokes the proper notion of self-knowledge that Intellect contemplates itself as thinking. Second, he recalls the thesis that Intellect's infallibility is satisfactorily insured by its identity with the intelligible objects.

In this chapter, however, Plotinus is not satisfied with the concluding of the intellect-intelligible identity. He is fully aware of the conceptual distinctness between this sameness and self-intellection (5,28-31). His object in the rest of the chapter is to give an account of the possibility of the latter. Plotinus believes that self-intellection can be derived from the intellect-intelligible identity without substantial difficulty. He returns to the viewpoint of the fifth argument in V 5 [32],1. If intellection is the same as its object, that object is neither in potentiality nor unintellectual (ἀνόητον) nor lifeless, but, since it is always being thought and thinking, ἐνέργεια τις, more specifically οὐσιωδὴς νόησις (5,31-37). Insofar as such intellection is activity and substantial intellection, it is not different from the intellective subject; otherwise the intellective subject will be Intellect in potentiality (5,38-41). The above consideration thus yields the triple identity of the intellective subject, intellection, and the intelligible object (5,41-44). Intellect's self-knowledge is immediately derived from this triple identity; Intellect knows itself in that both intellection and the intelligible object are Intellect itself (5,44-48).

In V 3 [49],5 Plotinus brings the arguments in V 9 [5],5 and V 5 [32],1-2 into a higher synthesis. The necessary connection between Intellect's infallibility and its identity with the intelligible object is recalled also in this chapter as is in V 5
In V 9 [5], Plotinus already infers from its actuality that Intellect itself is the intelligible object. But there are three novel points in the present chapter. First, Plotinus attempts to establish that the intelligible object is living and thinking. Second, he defines both the intellective subject and the intelligible object as the primary ἑυρήκεια to entail the triple identity of νοῦς, νόησις, and νοητόν. Finally, Plotinus relates the first and the second points to Intellect's self-knowledge. In this chapter, therefore, a sort of logical nexus is recognized consisting of (i) Intellect's infallibility, (ii) its full actuality, (iii) the living and thinking conception of the intelligible object, (iv) the identity of νοῦς, νόησις, and νοητόν, and (v) Intellect's self-knowledge.

The above review of Plotinus' arguments reveals his motive for the doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity. Pépin is right in saying that the identity concerns (i) the exigencies of intellectual knowledge compared with the character of sense knowledge and (ii) the existence and the modalities of self-knowledge, rather than being motivated by Plotinus' reflection upon the Timaeus. It is exactly these two problems that Plotinus works out in the texts above reviewed. But the motive for his doctrine would not be exhausted by the reasons that have emerged in his own philosophical system. Viewed in the broad context of the history of Greek philosophy, the intellect-intelligible identity represents Plotinus' answer to the problem concerning the relation of intellect and its objects, which had been present since Plato and Aristotle. It is one of the most fundamental problems of philosophy, so that insofar as Plotinus tries to be a self-assured philosopher, he cannot avoid considering it. In Plato, as already seen, this problem cannot be avoided in order to define the Idea precisely as νοητόν and to maintain its intelligibility. In addition, "the friends of Forms" are urged to answer this problem without infringing the Forms' immutability, which is the basic thesis in the theory of Forms. We can say that Plotinus' doctrine of the intellect-intelligible unity is based on his philosophical
effort to reply to one of the fundamental problems in Plato’s philosophy, even though it is not motivated by his exegetical reflection upon the *Timaeus* or some other dialogues. In one place, Plotinus explicitly mentions the definite position that the intellect-intelligible unity must defend:

> But, since one must bring in knowledge and truth and watchfully preserve real beings (τὰ ὑπόκτα) and the knowledge of what each thing is (γνῶσιν τοῦ τί ἐκαστὸν ἔστιν) but not the knowledge of what it is like (ποιόν τι ἐκαστὸν), since we should have an image and a trace of real beings, and not possess and live with and be fused with the real beings themselves... (V 5 [32],2,4-8, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).

Plotinus here employs Plato’s distinction between τὸ ὄν or τὸ τί and τὸ ποιὸν τι (Epist. VI 342e7-343a1). This distinction is made within five kinds in such a way that the former corresponds to the Form itself as ὅ δὲ γνωστὸν τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ὄν (342b1) and the latter to a name, a definition, an image, and a knowledge of that Form. "To preserve real beings and the knowledge of what each thing is" thus surely means to defend the existence and the complete intelligibility of the Forms. In Plato, as already seen, the denial of the existence of immutable Forms results in the destruction of the possibility, not only of philosophy, but of all discourse (*Parm.* 135b5-c2), so that the immutability of Forms must be regarded as the fundamental thesis in his theory of Forms. The possibility of philosophy and other significant discourse, however, cannot be safeguarded solely by the positing of immutable Ideas. Plato himself seems to have been aware of this point:

> The result is that the hearer is perplexed and inclined either to question their [i.e. the Forms'] existence, or contend that, even if they do exist, they must certainly be unknowable (ἀγνωστὰ) by our human nature (*Parm.* 135a3-5, tr. F. M. Cornford, adapted by A. Sumi).

> Even if the existence of the immutable Ideas is admitted, the denial of their knowability will destroy the possibility of philosophy and other discourse. Hence we can say that the existence of the invariable Forms is the fundamental thesis and their intelligibility the second-fundamental thesis in the theory of Forms.
In fact, the position of "the friends of Forms" in the *Sophist* comprises these two theses (246b7-8, 248a11-12). For both theses to be satisfactorily defended, "the friends of Forms" are forced to define the cognitive κοινωνία between intellect and Forms without compromising the Forms' unchangeability. Thus those philosophers who attempt to defend the very fundamental position of the theory of Forms cannot avoid presenting the clear picture of the intellect-intelligible relation that not only is harmonious with the Forms' immutability but insures their complete intelligibility. In this connection, Plotinus seems to say that we need to maintain the intellect-intelligible unity to preserve not only real beings themselves but the knowledge of what each of the real entities is.

But Plotinus might think that the intellect-intelligible identity is still insufficient for defending the possibility of discourse. For our statements in general to be possible, the identity must be coherently related to some epistemological and psychological doctrines. As already seen, in order to make a judgment about sensible particulars, our διάνοια needs not only to react to the sense-data of a physical object but to refer to the κανόνες or standards as the impressions of the relevant Forms. For these standards to be available to the soul, there must be within us Intellect always possessing the Forms (ἀει ἐχοντα τὸ δίκαιον νοῦν ἐν ἡμῖν, V 1 [10],11,6) or Intellect providing the reasoning (ὁ [sc. νοῦς] λογίζεσθαι παρέχων, 10,13). Thus related not only to the doctrine of the intellect-intelligible unity but to other relevant epistemological and psychological doctrines, the fundamental thesis in the theory of Forms can be satisfactorily defended that the positing of the immutable Ideas is necessary for making a judgment about sensible particulars and performing subsequent discourse. As Plato suggests, the whole-hearted defense of the theory of Forms requires going through "a long and remote train of argument" (*Parm.* 133b8-9). Plotinus patiently goes through it.
As already seen, Plotinus argues for the intellect-intelligible identity by appealing to the linking concepts of νοῦς and ἑνέργεια. This naturally leads us to the consideration of the connection between the definition of intellection as pure activity and the immutability of the intelligible objects. Before beginning this consideration, we need to go through the following three problems related to our present discussion. First, how does Plotinus interpret Soph. 248d-249a? Second, how is the characterization of intellection as συναίσθησις related to the presence of the multiplicity of intelligible objects in Intellect? Finally, in which points does Plotinus doctrine of the intellect-intelligible unity differ from the Middle Platonic view of the Forms as God's νοηματα, the view which likewise maintains the presence of the Forms in divine mind? Or, how does he try to defend Plato's rejection of seeing the Forms as νοηματα?53
2. Plotinus' Interpretation of Sophist 248d-249a

In the *Enneads* there are several explicit references to *Soph.* 248d-249a. These references, however, do not tell us the true story about Plotinus' approach to the problem with which Plato was seriously confronted in that dialogue. In IV 4 [28],35,61-64, for example, Plotinus contends that τὸ ὄν possesses the δύναμις either of acting or of being acted on. But this passage cannot be taken as evidence for his acceptance of the δύναμις criterion of being in the *Sophist*, because here he simply speaks of the forces of the figures seen in the universe. This passage does not allow us to say that Plotinus applies the δύναμις criterion of being to the intelligible world. In VI 7 [38],39,28-34, again, Plotinus, interpreting the Eleatic Stranger's statement in 248e6-a2, remarks that the One, which transcends intellecction, would stand in solemnness (τοῦ δὲ μὴ νοοῦντος σεμνοῦ ἐστηξομένου), while the οὐσία νοοῦσα would not do so.54 From these references, however, we cannot read Plotinus' effort to defend the theory of Forms by satisfactorily meeting the challenge of the Stranger or a similar opponent.

As a matter of fact, Plotinus seriously endeavors to work out the problem raised in *Soph.* 248d-249a, insofar as he is concerned with the defense of the theory of Forms and the scheme of his metaphysics accords with that of Plato's position. His endeavor is clearly recognized in the following three attempts. First, Plotinus willingly admits the introduction of intellecction, life, and movement into the intelligible world, to remark that this introduction rather insures Intellect's majesty. In order to reconcile that introduction with the immutability of the Forms, he is further compelled to establish two points. Second, Plotinus remarks that intellectual movement does not infringe the Forms' invariability. Finally, in order to justify the second point, he rejects seeing intellecction and noetic movement as a form either of
acting or of being acted upon and argues for his rejection. Let us look into these points in detail.

As Hadot points out, the historical origin of Plotinus' vital conception of the intelligible world goes back to *Soph.* 248e6-249a2, where the Eleatic Stranger claims the presence of movement, intellect, and life in τὸ παντελῶς ὄν. Plotinus not only accepts this claim but further systematizes and transforms it. It is systematized in such a manner that intellection is defined as movement towards the Forms or the One and identified with life. Again, the Stranger's claim can be said to be transformed by Plotinus' view of the intelligible objects as purely living and thinking. The Stranger's reaction thus systematized and transformed can be formulated by Plotinus as follows:

For that which is called real being (οὐσία) in the primary sense must not be a shadow of being, but have the fullness of being (πλήρες τὸ εἶναι).  And being is fulfilled when it has the form of thinking and living. So thinking (τὸ νοεῖν), living (τὸ ζήν), and being (τὸ εἶναι) are all together in what is real (τὸ ὄντι) (V 6 [24],6,18-23, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).

The intelligible world thus conceived is exactly "boiling with life" (VI 5 [23],12,9; VI 7 [38],12,22-23). Intellect or the noetic universe is majestic (σεμνός) because of its always exercising intellection. The majesty must not be ascribed to the absence of intellect, life, and movement from the intelligible universe.

The immutability of the intelligible world is not infringed by noetic movement. In VI 2 [43],7 Plotinus introduces two Platonic genera, being and movement, and maintains their inseparability by defining movement as the ἐνέργεια of being (lines 18-20). He gives an account of this inseparability as follows:

But since movement appears in the sphere of being, not as changing the nature of being, but rather in being as if making it perfect, if one does not introduce rest as well one would be even more perverse than one who did not grant that there was movement; for the notion, and intellectual
perception, of rest comes readier to hand where being is concerned than that of movement; for that which "exists in the same state and the same way" and has one formative principle \((\tau \ldots \kata \tauau \kata \omega \sigma \sigma \tau \omega \varsigma \kai \epsilon \nu \alpha \lambda \gamma \omicron \nu \epsilon \chi \omicron \upsilon)\) is there in being (lines 24-31, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).  

First of all, it must be noted that Plotinus here explicitly refers to *Soph.* 248a12 κατά ταύτα ωσαύτως ἔχει, the phrase which marks the very fundamental position of "the friends of Forms," the Forms' immutability. The immutability of being is not only defended but is supported by the conception of movement as the ἐνέργεια, more specifically, the ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἄτελής (21,25) of being. On the other hand, the immutability of being is first insured by the introduction of rest in addition to movement. When "the nature of being" is considered in itself, its own unchangeability or immobility is understood as rest. We can hence summarize that rest represents the invariability of being itself and that movement as the complete activity of being is compatible with the invariability of being by virtue of the activity's being free from any potentiality which may imply change and transition. Thus the compatibility between the immutability of being and intellectual movement can also be described as that between rest and movement in the noetic realm. This compatibility seems to enable Plotinus to speak of the *prima facie* paradoxical "static intellectual activity" which precisely means the self-intellection of Intellect. Thus seen, the connection is clearly recognized between self-intellection or the intellect-intelligible unity and the coherence between the immutability of being and noetic movement.

Finally, the compatibility between the immutability of being and noetic movement is justified by Plotinus' rejection of defining intellection in terms of action and passion. He replaces the Aristotelian categories of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν by the Platonic genus of κίνησις. The reason why he refuses to regard intellection as either action or passion must be explored in his critical examination of those
Aristotelian categories. The relevant chapter is VI 1 [42],22. The argument begins with the distinction between ποιεῖν and πάσχειν (lines 1-10); while action is unaffected (ἀπαθὲς), passive affection consists in being disposed otherwise than it was before (τὸ δὲ πάσχειν ἐν τῷ διατίθεσθαι ἑτέρῳ ἥ πρότερον εἶχε). Since neither that which acts or gives motion nor that which is affected or receives motion is viewed by itself (καθ’ αὐτό), the category of relation (πρὸς τί), namely taking (ληψις) and giving (δόσις), is seen between them (lines 10-19). In sum, the action-passion relation necessarily implies some change, substantial or accidental, in that which is affected. After mentioning the cases in which action and passion may involve the category of possession (ἐχεῖν) (lines 20-22), Plotinus considers whether thinking is action or not:

But one must consider whether forethought (τὸ προνοεῖν) is action, if being the object of forethought (τὸ προνοίας τυγχάνειν) is being affected; since forethought is directed to something else and is about something else. Now forethought is not action, even if the thought (τὸ νοεῖν) is about something else, nor is being its object being affected. And thought (τὸ νοεῖν) is not action either—it is not directed to the object itself, but is about itself: it is not any kind of doing or making (ποιήσις). And one should not call all activities (ἐνέργειας) doings or makings, or say that they do something. Doing is incidental (lines 22-29, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).

Plotinus here is not speaking exclusively of the intellection of the second hypostasis but of thinking in general. The thought is not directed to any external object but concerns the thinking agent itself as its object. Hence it is free from the category of relation and thereby from those of action and passion. Since it is neither ποιήσις nor ποιεῖν, the thought has no passivity (τὸ πάσχον) (18,9-10) and so does not imply any change in that which it concerns. Thought is thus regarded as the ἐνέργεια which is neither action nor passion; he calls such activity the κίνησις ἀπόλυτος, which is distinct from ποιήσεις and πείσεις (VI 3 [44],28,2-3). As already seen, Apelt, referring to the above cited passage, remarks that the soul’s
knowledge of the Form in the *Sophist* does not need to be taken as ποιεῖν or ποίησις. In order to see whether the conclusion in the above passage can be applied also to intellection proper, we must look at another passage, where Plotinus defines ἐπιστήμη in terms of the Platonic genera:

And knowledge is self-movement (αὐτοκίνησις), since it is a sight of being (ὁψίς . . . τοῦ ὄντος)\(^72\) and an active actuality, not a state (ἐξίς), so that it also comes under movement— but, if you like, under rest, or under both (VI 2 [43],18,8-10, tr. A. H. Armstrong).

Here it is not explicitly mentioned that intellectual knowledge is a form neither of action nor of passive affection. But the point that knowledge is subsumed under rest indicates that its object must be immutable. Insofar as knowledge is the sight of being, it must come under rest which implies the unchangeability and constancy of being. If this knowledge is seen in terms of the action-passion relation, insofar as this relation unavoidably implies some change in that which is affected, the invariability of being will be infringed. Therefore we may conceive that the point made in VI 1 [42],22,22-29 is *a fortiori* applied to intellectual knowledge. In other words, Plotinus abides by the refusal, of "the friends of Forms," to apply the δύναμις criterion of being to the cognitive intercourse between the soul or intellect and the Form.\(^73\)

In conclusion, Plotinus seriously deals with the problem, raised in *Soph.* 248d-249a, concerning the fundamental position of the theory of Forms, though his references to this passage do not fully show his attitude towards the problem. He remarks that noetic movement does not infringe the immutability of being and attempts to justify this remark by indicating that intellection is neither action nor passive affection, because it is not directed to any external object but always concerns the thinking agent itself. The intellect-intelligible identity not only leads to the definition of intellection as the primary ἐνέργεια, by which the immutability of being is sustained, but leaves no room for the conception of intellection as either
action or passion. This identity, as already mentioned,⁷⁴ is not motivated by Plotinus' interpretation of Plato's dialogues. Nevertheless it unmistakably represents Plotinus' efforts to defend fundamental theses in the theory of Forms, the immutability and the complete intelligibility of the Ideas, and to reply to the problem of the cognitive relation of intellect and its objects, one of the fundamental problems of philosophy, raised in the *Sophist*.⁷⁵ Plotinus' insight can be said to lie in his full explication and exploitation of the Aristotelian formula of the intellect-intelligible unity in his above mentioned efforts.
3. Intellection as Συναίσθησις

As already mentioned, intellection represents the presence of the multiplicity of intelligible objects in Intellect itself. The mode of self-intellection as the apprehension of multiplicity in unity is prominently observed in the definition of intellection as intimate self-consciousness. In fact, Plotinus' notion of consciousness on diverse levels needs to be considered from various perspectives. In relation to our present inquiry, however, it will suffice to investigate the connection between Intellect's self-awareness and self-intellection.

Plotinus evokes the definition of intellection as the consciousness of the internally complex whole in the context which thematically deals with the absence of intellection from the One:

For in general thought (τὸ νοεῖν) seems to be an intimate consciousness (συναίσθησις) of the whole when many parts come together (συνελθόντων) in the same thing; [this is so] when a thing knows itself, which is knowing in the proper sense (κυρίως) (V 3 [49],13,12-14, tr. A. H. Armstrong).

The definition is a fortiori applicable to self-intellection because self-intellection in the proper sense exactly refers to the case in which Intellect thinks as a whole with the whole of itself, not one part of itself with another (6,7-8).77 As Gurtler points out,78 συναίσθησις here stresses the internal unity of intellection, marked by the aorist participle συνελθόντων (13,13).79 In addition, the conception of the self as the whole also seems to be operative here. In the same chapter, Plotinus uses the word to emphasize also Intellect's being manifold:

For intimate self-consciousness (ἡ συναίσθησις) is a consciousness of something which is many: even the name bears witness to this. And thinking (ἡ νόσις), which is prior, turns inward to Intellect (εἰσω ἐκ διὸν ἐπιστρέφει) which is obviously many (13,21-24, tr. A. H. Armstrong).
As already noticed, \( \text{πρωτέρα} \) in line 23 indicates that the \( \text{συναίσθησις} \) mentioned here is that of soul in its root meaning of unifying sensations and so cannot apply to Intellect's consciousness of the internal unity of its own. But Plotinus here remarks the multiplicity implied by the prefix \( \text{συν-} \) of \( \text{συναίσθησις} \), since he, in this chapter, attempts to elucidate the involvement of multiplicity in intellection for establishing the absence of intellection from the One (13,34-36). In the present passage, hence, Plotinus suggests that the earlier definition of intellection as the \( \text{συναίσθησις του έλον} \) can also imply the internal multiplicity of Intellect. Furthermore, he reiterates the nature of self-intellection as self-reversion (6,5; 6,40), so that Intellect's \( \text{συναίσθησις} \) is characterized as the \( \text{ἐπιστροφή} \) towards itself. In summary, the \( \text{συναίσθησις} \) of Intellect can be characterized as turning inward unifying Intellect's own interior multiplicity and as noetic perception of a plurality in a unity.

The hypostatization of Intellect through the articulation and pluralization of its vision is effectively described in terms of the possession of \( \text{συναίσθησις} \) by the fully actualized Intellect. Whereas the inchoate Intellect looked at the Good unintellectually (\( \text{ἐβλέπειν ἀνοήτως} \)) (VI 7 [38],16,14), the fully formed Intellect has the vision full of the clearly articulated contents:

\[
\ldots \text{next it [i.e. Intellect] became all things and knew this in its self-
consciousness (ἐν συναισθησει αὑτοῦ) and was now Intellect, filled up in
order that it might possess what it would see, and looking at them with
light, receiving this light also from that which it gives them (16, 19-22, tr. J.
Bussanich, adapted by A. Sumi).}
\]

In its self-consciousness Intellect does not know simply all things but the fact that it itself has become all things. The \( \text{συναίσθησις} \) here is the knowledge of the internally complex self.\(^{88}\) This role of Intellect's \( \text{συναίσθησις} \) is repeated later in the same treatise:
For in seeing the Good, Intellect had the products and was conscious (συνήσθετο) of them as having come to be and being within it (ἐνότων); when it sees them, it is said to think (νοεῖν) . . . (35,30-32).

In this passage the connection between Intellect’s consciousness and its interior multiplicity is seen more prominently. In VI 7 [38],35,30-32, on the one hand, Intellect is said to have συναισθησίας in seeing the Good. In V 3 [49],13,21-24, on the other, Intellect’s συναισθησίας is characterized as self-reversion. The question will naturally arise how the nature of συναισθησίας as self-reversion is related to Intellect’s contemplation of the Good. Thus we must move to V 6 [24],5. Plotinus writes in the very beginning of the chapter as follows:

And again, the multiple might seek itself and wish to incline to and be conscious of itself (συνυέυειν καὶ συναισθάνεσθαι αὑτοῦ) (5,1-2, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).

From this Plotinus immediately concludes that the absolute simple One is beyond συναισθησίας and νόησίας (5,2-5). The juxtaposition of self-inclination and self-consciousness seems to suggest that Plotinus here speaks of Intellect’s self-knowledge. But he does not explicitly define συναισθησίας in the present chapter. Gurtler, with the proviso that his interpretation needs further confirmation, takes the συναισθησίας as a power moving from multiplicity to unity, in conjunction with the definition of intellection as the movement towards the Good (5,8-9). Unfortunately, we are not able to confirm fully this interpretation. But the consideration of Plotinus’ definition of intellection in this chapter will reveal the connection between Intellect’s self-consciousness and its contemplation of the Good. In this exploration we need to refer to passages from other treatises. The connection in question will be shown through the following train of thought:

(1) Intellect seeks the Good by and through seeking self-convergence and self-consciousness as self-intellection, because the desire of the Good generates the original intellection directed to the Good by
virtue of which Intellect becomes complete (5,1-2 and 5,9-10 in conjunction with III 8 [30],11,41-44, III 9 [13],7,4-6, 9,10-12, 9, 18-22, VI 7 [38],37,19-20, VI 9 [9],6,18-20, and 6,35-37).

(2) (1) is explained such that Intellect perpetually desires the Good and always attains in intellection the pluralized images of the Good which makes Intellect like the Good (5,12-16 in conjunction with III 8 [30],11,16-19 and 11,22-24).93

(3) Since self-intellection logically depends on the original intellection directed to the Good, Intellect is said to think itself incidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) in thinking the Good (5,16-17).

Self-intellection is incidental to and causally dependent on the original intellection towards the Good in its desire of that Good.94 May we infer from this that self-convergence and self-consciousness of Intellect is also causally dependent on the original intellection directed to the Good? Here we must return to the passage previously mentioned:

But does that Intellect see things piecemeal, now some things and now others? No, for the rational account didactically makes them appear as [two] events, but Intellect always has intellection and always non-intellection, rather seeing the Good in another way. For in seeing the Good, Intellect had the products and was conscious (συνήσθετο) of them as having come to be and as being within it; when it sees them, on the one hand (μὲν), it is said to think (νοεῖν); on the other (δὲ), it sees that Good by the power by which it was going to think (ἐμελλε νοεῖν) (VI 7 [38],35,27-33, tr. J. Bussanich, adapted by A. Sumi).

This passage is extremely important for the consideration of Intellect's relation to the One and will be fully considered later. At the present stage, it suffices to notice that Intellect's συνήσθετος of its interior contents, equivalent to the νοεῖν of them, causally depends on its pre-noetic contemplation of the Good which is eternally operating in Intellect itself. The verb ἐμελλε in line 33, just as κατὰ συμβεβηκός in V 6 [24],5,16, indicates self-intellection as following the
contemplation of the Good. Thus seen, the reason will become clear why Plotinus says in V 6 [24],5,1-2 that the multiple seeks self-convergence and self-consciousness, insofar as this self-consciousness means self-intellection; the multiple Intellect, to be completed and made good by the pluralized images of the Good, must have self-consciousness, which always follows the pre-noetic desire or envisagement of the Good and always attains those images of the Good within itself. Moreover, the phrase ἡ δυνάμει ἐμελλε νοεῖν in VI 7 [38],35,33 would confirm Gurtler’s interpretation of the συναίσθησις as a power.95

The definition of self-intellection as the συναίσθησις unifying the multiplicity of intelligible objects is really inseparable from the intellect-intelligible identity in abrogating the conception of intelligible objects as ἀναίσθητα (V 5 [32],1,32). On the one hand, likewise, Plotinus ascribes οἴον συναίσθησις to the One which is not οἴον ἀναίσθητων (V 4 [7],2,15-18). On the other hand, συναίσθησις is excluded from the One because of its implication of multiplicity (V 6 [24],5,3-5; VI 7 [38],41,25-27). These passages will be fully analyzed later in our consideration of the One’s knowledge.96
4. The Intellect-Intelligible Identity and the Doctrine of the Forms as God's Thoughts

The intellect-intelligible identity, on the one hand, has the philosophical advantage of defending the Platonic theory of Forms. Plotinus, on the other, is forced to prevent the identity from leading to the view of the intelligible object as a νόημα, the view which Plato definitely rejects.97 In order to dismiss the so-called Third Man Argument, the young Socrates in the *Parmenides* suggests the following:

May it not be that each of these Forms is a thought (νόημα), which cannot properly exist anywhere but in mind (οὐδὲν ὡς . . ἀλλοθινὴ ἐν ψυχαῖς) (132b3-5, tr. F. M. Cornford).

This statement may adumbrate that the presence of the intelligible objects in Intellect is likely to be interpreted as representing the Form as a divine νόημα. In the subsequent discussion, we shall inquire into how Plotinus undermines such a possible implication of his doctrine of the intellect-intelligible unity.

Before beginning our inquiry, we need to put the proviso that the Form-νόημα theory implies that the Form is hypostatized by intellection. This proviso is necessary because Plotinus sometimes describes the intelligible object as νόημα.98 By so describing it, however, he does not purport that the intelligible object is a concept hypostatized by intellection. The word νόημα originally means that which is thought so that the description of the Form as the νόημα can represent it as being always thought, whereas the word νοητός, meaning intelligible, may imply a case where the Form always subsists but is not always thought. Plotinus seems to apply the word to the Form especially in the context where he stresses the Form's being always contemplated and the contentual plenitude of the Form. We must notice that he, in the passages where he refers to the Form as the νόημα, does not maintain that the existence of the Form causally depends on intellective act.99
Plotinus definitely rejects the view that the intelligible object is hypostatized by intellection (V 9 [5],7,12-17; VI 6 [34],6,5-14). He points out the difficulty in this view as follows:

If Justice is the same as such intellection [that hypostatizes the Form], it is absurd that Justice is nothing else than something like its definition (ὁρισμὸν); for what else does it mean than the apprehension of their definition (τί ἐστι) to have thought Justice or Movement? This is the same as the apprehension of the concept (λόγον) of the thing which has not existed, which is impossible (VI 6 [34],6,14-19).

The acceptance of the view in discussion entails the Forms to be "arbitrary concepts without any substantial content of their own." On the Form-νόημα theory, Intellect is forced to hypostatize the Forms by grasping the concept which is not yet existent. To avoid such absurdity, we have to posit the intelligible object prior to the hypostatizing intellection (V 9 [5],7,16-17). But the Form-νόημα theory is not sufficiently undermined solely by the ontological priority of being to intellection. The reasoning from the intellect-intelligible identity to the Form-νόημα theory is first prevented by the view that the activity of the intelligible object actualizes the essence of the intellecutive subject and that activity is one with the activity of the intellecutive subject thus actualized (V 9 [5],5,4-10; 8,11-19). Plotinus elsewhere tries to undermine this reasoning by mentioning that the intelligible object, which is itself Intellect and Knowledge, makes knowledge true only if it is identical with the object itself (VI 6 [34],6,19-20). In a word, the possible reasoning is undercut by the view of the intelligible object as possessing ἐνέργεια for itself. If it is admitted that the Form itself thinks, it will be impossible to say that the Form is hypostatized by intellection. In summary, the intellect-intelligible identity or the presence of the Forms within Intellect is prone to be interpreted in terms of the Form-νόημα theory. To exclude such a tendency, it must be explicitly remarked that the intellect-intelligible sameness necessarily makes the Form a thinking and living
entity. To this extent, the intellect-intelligible identity as explicated by Plotinus is really incompatible with the Form-νόημα theory. In this perspective, it must be stressed that the Ideas are Intellect rather than that Intellect is the Ideas. The intellect-intelligible unity can be said not only to defend the fundamental theses in Plato’s theory of Forms but also, if sufficiently explicaded, to eliminate the Form-νόημα theory which Plato rejects.102

In VI 7 [38],40,10-19, we are told that the νόησις generates being; the νόησις here designates the inchoate Intellect which is eternal in Intellect proper as its hyper-noetic phase.103 But this logical priority of the pre- or hyper-noetic intellection to being does not contradict the aforementioned priority of being to intellection.104 The former priority also does not lead to the Form-νόημα theory, because the pre-noetic intellection cannot generate the Forms for itself but needs the One as their cause; the One’s causality is emphasized even in the context dealing with the hypostatization of the Forms by the reversion of the inchoate Intellect (16,22-31).105 The ontic ground of the Forms lies in the One, but not in the pre-noetic intellection. Moreover, whereas beings are generated by the pre-noetic intellection, the transition from the pre-noetic intellection to fully intellectual activity does not occur unless the inchoate vision of Intellect is filled with and saturated by beings as the pluralized images of the One. To this extent, Intellect and the Form are closely inter-dependent (V 1 [10],4,27-31).106 Such inter-dependency is obviously incompatible with the Form-νόημα theory. In Plotinus’ doctrine of Intellect, therefore, there is no room for the Form-νόημα theory.
5. Intellectual Activity and the Immutability of Being

In Section I it was seen that Plotinus employs the linking concepts of νόησις and ἐνέργεια in his argument for the intellect-intelligible identity, which safeguards the complete intelligibility of the Form, the second-fundamental thesis in Plato's theory of Forms. How are these linking concepts coherent with the immutability of the Ideas, the first-fundamental thesis in that theory? In Section II it was pointed out that the κίνησις as the complete activity of being does not infringe the invariability of being. In the following discussion we shall explore how intellectual activity more positively coheres with the immutability of being in Plotinus' system.107

Noetic activity systematically coheres with the unchangeability of being. Plotinus holds that the former requires the latter:

Intellect always has the same passage (διέξοδον) through those which are not the same, because it does not change. The existence in the same way and in the same state (τὸ ὠσούτως καὶ κατὰ ταύτα) is with the others. Because, if the existence in the same way and in the same state is not by the others, Intellect is completely inactive (ἀφυγεί), and that which is in actuality (τὸ ἐνεργεία) and the activity (ἡ ἐνέργεια) exist nowhere (VI 7 [38], 13,47-51).

Also here Plotinus adduces Soph. 248a12 κατὰ ταύτα ὠσοúτως. From this passage alone, however, we cannot fully see why intellectual activity requires the unchangeability of being. In the earlier part of the same chapter, Plotinus writes:

For unless Intellect has difference and some kind of otherness (ἐτερότης) awakens it to life, it will not be activity (ἐνέργεια); because such state will not differ from non-activity (μὴ ἐνεργείας) (13,11-13).

This passage would suggest the connection between the immutability of being and otherness, which is also adumbrated by the phrase διὰ τῶν οὐκ αὐτῶν in line 48. In order to understand fully this connection, we must look at the following passage from another treatise:
If this is a correct statement, it [i.e. being] must necessarily be in life, and in perfect life; or, if it falls short of this, it will be no more existent than non-existent. But this means that it must be intellect, and wisdom in its fullness. And it must therefore (ὁρα) be defined and limited (ἡρμημένου . . . καὶ πεπερασμένου), and there must be nothing to which its power does not extend, nor must its power be quantitatively limited; otherwise it would be defective. And so (διό), too, it must be eternal and always the same (τὸ ὡσαύτως), and unreceptive of anything (τὸ ἀδεκτικὸν πάντος) and nothing must come into it (III 6 [26],6,14-20, tr. A. H. Armstrong).¹⁰⁹

The connection between intellectual life and the limitedness of being will become more clear when we further look at II 4 [12],5,15-16, where intelligible matter is said to possess limited and intellectual life (ζωὴν ἡρμημένην καὶ νοερὰν) when it is defined by the forms.¹¹⁰ The limitedness of being exactly means the eidetic definiteness which stabilizes being.¹¹¹ The eidetic definiteness thus insures not only the immutability of being but the limitedness of intellectual life. It is inseparably related to otherness which is said to awake Intellect to life and activity, since otherness, as already seen,¹¹² represents the distinction of one intelligible shape, which defines each object, from another. Mediated by the eidetic definiteness, therefore, the immutability of being and Intellect's ἐνέργεια as limited and intellectual life can be systematically coherent.¹¹³
6. The Hyper-Noetic Activity of Intellect

As shown in the last section, Intellect’s activity is fully coherent with the immutability of being. This point can be seen also in terms of Plotinus’ view of the unity of three Platonic genera, being, rest, and movement, in VI 2 [43],8. Rest, placed on the side of the Idea (line 23), represents the stability of being (lines 18-20) and the definiteness of Intellect (πέρας . . . νοῦ) (lines 23-24). On the other hand, the intellective agent or intellection is linked with κίνησις (line 24). By associating κίνησις with intellection Plotinus does not regard intellection as a sort of incomplete ἐνέργεια, but as the ἐνέργεια of being (7,18; 8,11-12; 13,3-4), or more specifically, as the ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἀτελῆς (21,25).114 Intellection is at the same time ἐνέργεια and κίνησις. The activity of Intellect or self-intellection115 is exactly self-referential (η . . . ἐνέργεια η ἐίς αὐτὸν, 8,14).116

In Section III we saw that Intellect’s συναίσθησις or self-intellection is incidental to its original intellection of the Good. We did not fully consider the fact that in V 6 [24],5,16 Intellect is said to think the Good (ἐν τῇ νοήσει αὐτοῦ [sc. τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ]).117 In Section I it was clearly remarked that intellection always concerns the multiplicity of intelligible objects. How does the intellection of the transcendent One differ from intellection proper? How do these two levels of intellection related to one another?

If Intellect’s activity is solely self-referential, Intellect will be the first principle. Plotinus indicates the dual nature of Intellect’s activity in claiming the existence of the One over Intellect:

It is necessary that Intellect is in thinking (νοεῖν), and the best Intellect, not looking to that which is external, thinks (νοεῖ) that which is prior to it: for in turning to itself it turns to its principle (εἰς αὐτὸν γὰρ ἐπιστρέφων εἰς ἀρχὴν ἐπιστρέφει). And, on the one hand (μὲν), if Intellect itself is that which thinks and that which is thought, it will be double and neither simple nor the one. On the other hand (δὲ), if it looks
to another (€τερον), it will certainly look to that which is better than and prior to itself. But if it looks both to itself and to that which is better than itself, it will be the second also in this way. And one must suppose that Intellect is of such a kind that, on the one hand (μὲν), it is present to (παρεῖναι) the Good and the First and looks to him, and, on the other (δὲ), is present with (συνεῖναι) itself and thinks itself and thinks itself as being all things (VI 9 [9],2,33-43).

Intellect not only thinks itself but looks to the One. Its cognitive presence to the One is also called νοεῖν and characterized as the ἐπιστροφή to the higher principle.118 This type of νοεῖν involves otherness as intellection proper does; but otherness here is not that between the intellective subject and the intelligible object but that between the first and the second hypostases.119 Hence this sort of intellection, different from self-intellection, concerns that which is other than and prior to Intellect itself.

The higher type of intellection is later ascribed to what is called the primary part of the pure Intellect (καθορὶ τῷ νῷ... καὶ τοῦ νοῆ τῷ πρῶτῳ, VI 9 [9],3,26-27), which contemplates that which is prior to Intellect (3,36). This "primary part of pure Intellect," as many critics point out, refers to the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect variously denominated "that of Intellect which is not Intellect (τῷ ἐαυτοῦ μὴ νῷ)" (V 5 [32],8,22-23), "Intellect loving (νοῦς ἐρών)" (VI 7 [38],35,24), and "the inner Intellect (ὁ ἐνδον νοῦς)" (V 3 [49],14,14-15).120 Plotinus stresses that Intellect at the same time exercises self-intellection and contemplates the One (VI 7 [38],35,28-30).121 He further remarks the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect is equivalent to the pre-noetic or inchoate state of Intellect, which is often mentioned in his account for the hypostatization of Intellect:

Intellect then has one power (τῇ... δύναμιν) for intellection, by which it sees its own contents, and one by which it sees what is beyond it by an intuitive awareness and reception (ἐπιστροφῇ τινὶ καὶ παραδοχῇ), by which also at a prior moment it only saw (καθ' ἰν καὶ πρότερον ἑώρα μόνον), and later by seeing possessed Intellect and is one (35,19-23, tr. J. Bussanich).122
From this passage it is concluded that the pre-noetic phase of Intellect, identical with the hyper-intellective phase of the fully formed Intellect, coexists eternally with its self-thinking phase. Plotinus here speaks of two phases of Intellect as if they are two distinct powers. But these phases are actually derived from one original power (ἐκείνῳ δὲ ἢ δύναμει ἐμελλε νοεῖν, 35,22-23). The verb ἐμελλε would imply that the original power of Intellect is primarily for the seeing of the One, which is logically followed by self-intellection.

In V 6 [24],5 the logical relation of the contemplation of the One and self-intellection is more fully articulated. First, we need to look at the definition of intellection as "a movement towards the Good in its desire of that Good (κίνησις πρὸς ἀγαθὸν ἐφιέμενον ἐκείνου)" (5,8-9). Although Plotinus does not explicitly mention two phases of Intellect in this chapter, the addition of κίνησις and ἐφεσις to the definition of intellection, as Bussanich notes, suggests that this definition refers to the striving of the eternally pre-noetic phase of Intellect. The definition is not unnatural because Plotinus sometimes speaks of the νοεῖν directed towards the One and calls the inchoate Intellect νόησις. The causal connection between the intellection of the Good and self-intellection is now revealed; self-intellection, which is the contemplation of the multiple images of the Good within Intellect itself, is incidental (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) and necessarily follows the intellection of the Good (5,16-17). Taking the present passage and VI 7 [38],35,22-23 together, we can conclude that the original power of Intellect is properly directed towards the One and only incidentally and secondarily towards itself as the complex of the Forms.

Another prominent mark of the aforementioned definition of intellection is that the pre- or hyper-noetic intellection towards the One, as well as self-intellection, is characterized as a κίνησις. We can more fully understand this definition by looking at the passage immediately preceding that definition:
... when the Good [already] existed (ὑπέστη) and (i) moved what had come into being to itself, and (ii) it was moved and saw (V 6 [24],5,6-8, tr. A. H. Armstrong).

Plotinus here does not mention the inchoate Intellect prior to its reversion to the One. But we can see that the definition of intellection exactly refers to (i) the processive state in Intellect’s reversion before (ii) its full actualization.

Considered with Plotinus’ detailed account for the actualization of Intellect in VI 7 [38],16,16-19, the stage of (i) would correspond to the intermediate, processive stage, described as τῷ ἐκεί κινεῖσθαι καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνο, after the inchoate Intellect not yet involved in reversion as ἡ . . . κίνησις αὐτῇ or κίνησις . . . μόνου and before the fully actualized Intellect as κίνησις διακορής καὶ πλήρης. Furthermore, the definition of intellection in question also contains the desire for the Good. The already established thesis that the pre-noetic state of Intellect eternally coexists with its self-intellective phase can be rendered such that the indefinite desire for the Good always persists in the self-thinking Intellect. Plotinus writes:

The Good, therefore has given the trace of itself on Intellect to Intellect to have by seeing, so that in Intellect there is desire (ἡ ἐφεσίς), and it is always desiring and always attaining (ἐφιέμονος ἂεὶ καὶ ἂεὶ τυγχάνων) (III 8 [30],11,22-24, tr. A. H. Armstrong).

This passage would illuminate the modality of the movement in the definition of intellection under discussion. Notice the second-half of the passage is parallel with 11,25-26 ἐφεσίς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ (sc. νῦ) καὶ σύννευσις πρὸς τὸ εἴδος αὐτοῦ. In light of this convergence with the form and 11,16-17 τυγχάνων τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθοειδῆς γίνεται, the phrase ἂεὶ τυγχάνων in 11,24 turns out to be appropriate to the self-thinking phase of Intellect. Again, the passage in 11,16-17 is explained by 11,17-19 τοῦ μὲν εἴδους τοῦ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἡκουτος ἀγαθοειδῆ ποιοῦντος. Moreover, ἂεὶ τυγχάνων in 11,24, as ὡστε in 11,23 marks, is related to τὸ . . . ἵχνος αὐτοῦ [sc. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ] . . . ἔχειν in 11,22-23. Self-
intellection or the contemplation of the Forms can thus be expressed as having possessed and being always attaining the intelligible objects as the pluralized copies of the Good. It is always in ἡ πλήρωσις . . . καὶ ἡ οἶον τελείωσις (11,6-7). This modality of self-intellection well conforms to its nature as the not incomplete activity. On the other hand, the aforementioned definition of intellection, referring to the processive state in the reversion of the inchoate Intellect, well fits the phrase ἐφιέμενος ἄει in 11,23. This processive state, especially characterized by indefinite desire, is logically prior to the completion and fulfillment of Intellect. In this connection Bussanich holds that Aristotle's notion of movement as ἀόριστος and ἀτελής (Phys. 201b27-35) is applicable to the reversion of the inchoate Intellect. In summary, the κίνησις or αὐτοκίνησις (VI 2 [43],18,8) as self-intellection and the pre- or hyper-noetic κίνησις towards the One are clearly distinguished by their modalities. The former is characterized by satiety, the latter by desire. With the combination of movement and desire in the definition of intellection and the identification of movement and desire (III 9 [13],9,4), the definition of intellection as a movement indicates the defectiveness of Intellect in relation to the Good. This definition has an efficacy in the context where it occurs; Plotinus, in V 6 [24],4-5, argues for the absence of intellection from the One which is said to be "not in want (ἀνενδεέες)" (4,1). The pre-noetic intellection is also characterized as the ἔνεργεια. In VI 7 [38],40 devoted to the "persuasion (πειθῶ)" (line 4) that the One has no intellection, Plotinus elucidates two levels of intellection. He first mentions fully actual intellection:

One must, then, know and understand that all intellection (νόησις) comes from something and is of something. And one kind of intellection (ἡ μὲν), which keeps close to that from which it comes, has as its substrate (ὑποκείμενον) that of which it is the intellection and becomes a kind of that which rests upon (οἶον . . . ἐπικείμενον), being its substrate's activity (ἔνεργεια) and fulfilling (πληροφοροῦσα) that substrate's potentiality without
generating anything itself: for it is a kind of completion (οὖν τελείωσις) of that of which it is (40,5-10, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).

As often repeated,\textsuperscript{140} intellection proper as the activity of being completes and fulfills the being from which it arises. Plotinus now deals with another kind of intellection that generates being:

But the intellection which accompanies real being (ἡ δὲ οὖσα νόησις μετ' οὐσίας) and has brought real being into existence could not be in that from which it came to be: for it would not have generated anything if it was in that. But since it was a power of generation by itself (δύναμις τοῦ γεννοῦν ἔφ' ἐκυτής), it generated, and its active actuality (ἡ ἐνέργεια οὐτής) is real being, and also in real being it is there with it (καὶ σύνεστι καὶ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ), and the intellection and this real being are not different things, and, again, in that the nature thinks itself, they are not different except in definition, what is thought and what thinks, that is a plurality, as has often been demonstrated. And this is the first activity (πρῶτη ἐνέργεια), which has generated an existent which came to be real being . . . (40,10-19, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).

The second νόησις is the power of generating οὐσία, the power given from the Good (15,18-20).\textsuperscript{141} As Bussanich states,\textsuperscript{142} this point is made less explicitly in V 1 [10],7,11-17 and V 6 [24],5,12-15. In the present chapter Plotinus more explicitly mentions the generative aspect of the pre-noetic intellection. That the second intellection in VI 7 [38],40 is the pre-noetic one becomes clear in 40,46-51, especially in 40,51 ἐκ τῆς ἄλλου θεας. The pre-noetic intellection, which is ascribed to the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect, is now called the πρῶτη ἐνέργεια (40,18-19; 40,22-23).\textsuperscript{143} This characterization is exactly contrasted with the denial of ἐνέργεια and νόησις to the One (40,23-24). The reasons why this activity is called primary, prima facie, would be that there is no activity before it (40,22-24) and perhaps that it is higher than the first intellection.\textsuperscript{144} But the earlier occurrence of πρῶτη ἐνέργεια in 18,12 and 18,41 tells us that it is the expression of the inchoate life prior to its limitation. The contrast between the second intellection and the One in the present chapter can be considered to supplement the earlier contrast between
intellection as ἐνέργεια (37,16-17) and the denial of ἔργον to the One (37,28-29) by analyzing intellection into two levels.

Why is the second intellection regarded as the ἐνέργεια? From the statement about the One, οὐ γὰρ ἐνέργησας πρῶτοι ἐγένεισεν ἐνέργεια (40,29-30), we understand that the second intellection generates real being as its actualization by being itself active. Then, by which criterion can it be defined as the ἐνέργεια? Now we must return to V 6 [24],5. In the following passage Plotinus develops the aforementioned definition of intellection as a movement towards the Good (5,8-9):

For when what is other than the Good thinks it, it does so by being "like the Good" and having a resemblance to the Good, it thinks it by becoming as Good and desirable to itself and by having a kind of appearance of the Good. And if it is like this for ever, it thinks the Good for ever (εἰ δ' ἄει οὐτως, ἄει τούτο). For in fact (καὶ γὰρ), moreover, in thinking the Good it thinks itself incidentally: for (γὰρ) it is looking to the Good it thinks itself; for (γὰρ) itself in actual activity (ἐνέργουντα; and the actual activity (ἡ . . . ἐνέργεια) of all things is directed to the Good (5,12-19, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).

The brief passage εἰ δ' ἄει οὐτως, ἄει τούτο (5,15-16) indicates that Intellect's eternal attainment of the multiple images of the Good is logically dependent on its eternal intellection of the Good itself. This passage can certainly be illuminated by III 8 [30],11,23-24 ἐφιέμενος ἄει καὶ ἄει τυγχάνων, since in the present chapter the intellecive movement towards the Good is combined with the desire for it (5,8-9). Now the criterion, by which the pre-noetic intellection of the Good is characterized as the ἐνέργεια towards it, turns out to be the very continuity and perpetuity of that intellection. Taking V 6 [24],5 and VI 7 [38],40 together, we can summarize that the pre-noetic νόησις eternally generates οὐσία by always receiving the pluralized images of the Good in its eternal ἐνέργεια towards the Good. Needless to say, this point perfectly coheres not only with the eternity of
the pre-noetic phase of Intellect but with the perpetuity of the procession from the One.

Finally, it must be noted that the second intellection in VI 7 [38],40 is not separable from οὐσία, but coexists with and in it (καὶ σύνεστι καὶ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, 40,15; also 40,11 μετ' οὐσίας). Again, this intellection is said to be not different from οὐσία (40,15-16). This inseparability is precisely pointed to the repeatedly mentioned eternal coexistence of the hyper- or pre-noetic and the self-thinking phases of Intellect. Our analysis of the phrase κατὰ συμβεβηκός in V 6 [24],5,16 shows that self-intellection as the contemplation of the multiple images of the One is the necessary consequence from or epiphenomenon of the intellection of the One itself. In light of this thesis, the inseparability of the second intellection from οὐσία is explained such that the reversion of that intellection towards the One unavoidably entails the genesis of real being within itself. The pre- or hyper-noetic intellection is therefore the ἐνέργεια inseparable from the οὐσία it generates. This point is extremely important, because the contrast between it and the One's status as the primary activity without being (ἐνέργειαν τὴν πρώτην . . . ἀνευ οὐσίας, VI 8 [39],20,9-10) not only makes the One’s hyper-intellectual activity quite unique and absolutely transcendent but is definitely coherent with the frequent negation of intellection to the One.

In the above discussion, we have clarified the causal connection between the original intellection of the One and the consequent self-intellection as the contemplation of the intelligible objects. Plotinus' doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity is closely connected with his doctrine of the relation of Intellect to the One. We have considered the Intellect's relation to the One in terms of the pre- or hyper-intellective activity of Intellect in the present chapter. In the next chapter we shall explore it in terms of the description of the One as τὸ νοητόν.
7. The One as τὸ νοητὸν

In the last section we observed that the word νόηςις is sometimes used for describing the relation of the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect to the One. One would naturally suppose that the One may be denominated τὸ νοητὸν in relation to the hyper-intellectual νόηςις. In showing that Intellect, in order to exist, necessitates its object (V 6 [24],2,7-12), Plotinus refers to the One as τὸ νοητὸν. But the One as τὸ νοητὸν does not have a thinking agent and intellection within itself (2,4-5). It is τὸ νοητὸν solely to Intellect (πρὸς . . . τὸν νοῦν), but not in itself (καθ’ ἐαυτὸ) (2,8-9). Then, how can Plotinus justifiably preclude intellection from the One described as τὸ νοητὸν? In V 6 [24],2, no reason is given why every object of intellection does not necessarily think. In VI 9 [9],6,52-55, in which intellection is denied to the One, the One is said to be "the cause of intellection for the other (αἰτία τοῦ νοείν ὀλλῳ)" (6,54). The idea here in play is the principle that the cause is not the same as that which is caused (6,54-55). Also in V 6 [24],2, the One assumes the role as the cause of Intellect’s exercising intellection. Therefore intellection can be precluded from the One as τὸ νοητὸν by virtue of the principle of the transcendence of the cause over that which is caused. The absence of intellection from the One leads to the absence of the νόηςις-νοητὸν or νοῦς-νοητὸν duality from it, which is indicated by the remark that the One is not τὸ νοητὸν "in itself" (2,9). That the One is τὸ νοητὸν "to Intellect" means that otherness lies between them.

In what sense is the One said to be τὸ νοητὸν? To this question, we must refer to other passages in which the One is so called. In a doxographical passage mentioning Heraclitus (V 1 [10],9,3-4), the One is said to be νοητὸν. But this passage is not relevant to the present problem. Also in V 4 [7],2,4ff., where Plotinus thematically speaks of the genesis of Intellect, the One is so called. Here τὸ νοητὸν is correlative to νόηςις as the inchoate Intellect (2,4), and represents that which
completes and defines it in its reversion to the One. To this extent, Rist would be correct in his attempt to see the meaning of τὸ νοητὸν applied to the One in light of III 8 [30],11, where Plotinus again elucidates the emergence of the second hypostasis through the reversion of the inchoate Intellect towards the One. He writes:

One would suppose that, since he [i.e. Plotinus] has previously been discussing the relationship between the Divine Mind and the Forms, he would here say that for the act of intellection to take place satisfactorily, the Forms are required as objects of Intellection. But instead of speaking of the Forms, he says that it is the Good (i.e. the One) that is needed. This should remind us that the One is the real object of the Divine Mind's Intellection and that the Forms are only a second best. Νοῦς sees the One as the Forms, but the intelligibility of those Forms is supplied by the One.150

Then, can we call the One τὸ νοητὸν only to the inchoate Intellect? It seems that Plotinus, in V 6 [24],2, does not thematically discuss the hypostatization of Intellect. The subjunctive συσταίη (2,7) would not sufficiently confirm that the inchoate Intellect is in play in this context. But Plotinus also refers to the pre-noetic intellection by νόησις in the same treatise. As seen in the last section, the definition of intellection as "a movement towards the Good in its desire of that Good" (5,8-9) is appropriate to the hyper-noetic activity of Intellect. Again, our construction of 5,16-17 καὶ γὰρ αὐ ἐν τῇ νοῆσει αὐτοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτὸ νοεῖ is that self-intellection is the necessary consequence from the original intellection of the Good.151 This point indicates the eternal coexistence of the pre-noetic phase with the self-thinking phase of Intellect. Insofar as the pre-noetic phase is eternal within the fully formed Intellect, the One can be called τὸ νοητὸν in relation to the fully actualized Intellect. In this case, τὸ νοητὸν is precisely correlative to the hyper- or pre-noetic νόησις. The One always fulfills Intellect's desire, which perpetually originates from its eternally pre-noetic phase, by affording the images of the One itself (III 8 [30],11,22-24). To this extent, Intellect's possession of an intelligible object is due to the very existence of the One prior to it (VI 7 [38],40,49-50). The
One is hence τὸ νοητὸν as the transcendent content-determining cause of intellection. It can also be rendered the emanative cause of the Forms. In the context concerning the inchoate Intellect's reversion, the One is said to be the cause of οὐσία (16,22-24).

Henry, though he does not mention the reason, believes that Plotinus' description of the One as τὸ νοητὸν is a sort of simple-mindedly strange expression. Indeed this expression seems to have several assailable points. First, the term τὸ νοητὸν itself has such ambiguity that can be applied both to the One and to the Form. But this ambiguity can be dismissed by Plotinus' careful remark that the One is not τὸ νοητὸν in itself but only in relation to Intellect (V 6 [24],2,8-9), whereas Intellect possesses τὸ νοητὸν in itself (2,4). Second, we must remind that the One is τὸ νοητὸν precisely in relation to the eternally pre-noetic νόησις. In the middle and late treatises, however, Plotinus is somewhat reluctant to describe the eternally pre-noetic activity as νόησις or νοεῖν (V 5 [32],8,22-23; VI 7 [38],35,32; V 3 [49],10,40-44). In this case, the expression of the One as τὸ νοητὸν is no longer sustainable. Moreover, when this expression is mistakenly construed so that the One is grasped by intellection in the sense of the intuitive apprehension of the Forms, it appears to contradict Plotinus' frequent statement about the unintelligibility of the One. In a word, the expression is legitimate solely within the scope of the description of the eternally pre-noetic activity as νόησις or νοεῖν. Finally, the transcendent νοητὸν is outside Intellect so that it has neither a thinking agent nor intellection within itself (V 6 [24],2,4-5). In one of the arguments for the intellect-intelligible unity, as already seen, Plotinus critically regards the intelligible objects outside Intellect as ἀναίσθητα καὶ ἀμοιβα ζωῆς καὶ νοῦ (V 5 [32],1,32-33). From these points one would certainly suppose that the inner life of the transcendent νοητὸν may be inactive and vacuous. Thus Plotinus is compelled not only to dismiss such supposition by presenting some detailed
conception of the internal cognitive activity of the One but also to reconcile this conception with the necessary absence of intellection from the One. *Here arises the problem of the One's knowledge.* This problem is inseparably related to the problem concerning the description of the One as τὸ νοητὸν in the doctrine of Intellect's relation to the One.\(^{157}\)

As for the thesis that that which is beyond being is the cause of intellection, Plotinus faithfully abides by Plato's position as developed in the metaphor of the sun in the *Republic*. But Plotinus' scheme that Intellect receives the Forms in its eternal reversion to the One clearly deviates from Plato's scheme that the Good cognitionally conjoins intellect and the Forms by providing the former with knowledge or the power of knowing and the latter with truth or the power of being known. Plato, in the metaphor of the sun, nowhere states that intellect looks to the Good. In that scheme Plato speaks of the Good as the cause of knowledge and truth (508e3-4). But the *further* (μᾶλλον . . . ἔτι) consideration of the sun (509a9-10) comes to introduce the derivation of being from the Good into the scope:

Therefore it must be said that not only (μὴ μόνον) being-known is present from the Good in those which are known, but also existence and being belong to them from the Good (ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι) (509b6-8).

Another question would naturally follow this statement. How is intellect *ontologically* related to the Good? Plato presents the causal relation of the Good and intellection, but tells nothing about the causal relation of the Good and the very existence of intellect. In the metaphor of the sun, he gives an account of the *cognition*al relation among the Good, the Forms, and intellect, but is totally silent about their *ontological* relation. The aforementioned scheme embodies the former relation, but is not necessarily applicable to the latter relation. We are hence allowed freely to conceive another scheme in working out the problem left by Plato.
Plotinus’ doctrine of Intellect’s relation to the One is his attempt to answer this problem.

As already examined, Plotinus’ doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity is the insight, stimulated by Aristotle’s psychological formula, that can satisfactorily answer the problem, raised and left unanswered in the *Sophist*, concerning the cognitive relation of intellect and the Forms, without compromising the Forms’ immutability. The doctrine of the intellection of the Forms or self-intellection, as already seen, is inseparably tied to the doctrine of Intellect’s relation to the One. Plotinus’ deviation from Plato’s scheme of the cognitional relation among the Good, the Forms, and intellect seems to be unavoidable for the coherence between these two doctrines, because Plato’s scheme apparently places the Forms outside intellect.158
8. Self-Intellection and the One's Knowledge

In the last section, it was pointed out that the problem of the One's knowledge unavoidably occurs when the relation of Intellect to the One is established to be consistent with the doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity. The charge naturally occurs that the transcendent νοητόν outside Intellect may be inactive and lifeless. For this possible charge Plotinus prepares his own reply that the intellect-intelligible unity rather necessarily calls for the transcendent νοητόν possessing a rich inner life:

There is, then, something beyond Intellect. For (γὰρ) being is not a dead thing, nor is it not life or not thinking: Intellect and being are then (δὴ) one and the same thing (V 4 [7],2,42-44, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).

As shown in Section I, the conception of being or intelligible object as living and thinking is the copstone of Plotinus' doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity. As pointed out in Section IV, again, this conception can sufficiently prevent that doctrine from being interpreted in terms of the Middle Platonic view of the Form as divine νόημα. Plotinus expresses the relation between the One and Intellect in terms of archetype and image in 2,25-26. The archetype of real being which is truly living and thinking must not be lifeless, senseless, and unthinking. That which is prior to Intellect must have the very plenitude of life that can engender rich intellectual life. Otherwise Intellect would think a lifeless and unthinking object so that self-intellection in its proper sense would be impossible. The doctrine of self-intellection therefore calls for the detailed description of the inner life and cognitive activity of the One. Deck observes that Plotinus' doctrine of the One is supported by "the continuity of knowledge":

Thus knowledge, which appears in a way in nature, more fully in soul, perfectly in the Nous, is not absent from the highest "nature," the One: the
continuity of knowledge is not abruptly broken in the ascent from the Nous to the One.\^{161}

Unfortunately, the notion of the continuity of knowledge is nowhere explicitly developed in the Enneads. Instead Plotinus exquisitely expresses the continuity of life:

All things are then like a long life stretched out at length; each part is different from that which comes next in order, but the whole is continuous with itself, but with one part differentiated from another, and the earlier does not perish in the latter (V 2 [11],2,26-29, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).\^{162}

The One, sustaining such continuity of life, must be the "spring of life (πηγή...ζωής)" (VI 9 [9],9,1).\^{163} The doctrine of the One's knowledge is not the description of the secluded life of the isolated Absolute. From the One's life hangs the catena aurea of life. The doctrine really occupies the principal position in Plotinus' own system.
NOTES


2A. H. Armstrong, "The Background of the Doctrine 'That the Intelligibles are not outside the Intellect,'" in *Les Sources de Plotin* (Geneva, Vandoevres: Fondation Hardt, 1957), p. 408. We may here recall Armstrong's observation that the principal stimulus to Plotinus' doctrine is his study of the Peripatetic doctrine of the identity of divine intellect and its object in light of Albinus' identification of the Peripatetic divine νοητόν with the νοητά as "God's thoughts" in this interpretation of Platonism, the identification through which alone the doctrine of the self-thinking intellect can be brought into a Platonic system *(ibid., pp. 411-412)*.

3See also the following passage: "... each intellection (νόησις), if it is to be intellection, must be something manifold ..." (VI 7 [38],39,17-18). In what sense is intellection here said to be manifold? We must notice that ἐν ὄλλους in line 17 refers back to VI 9 [9],2,40-44, where Intellect's manifold (ποικίλον, line 44) is explained by its being τὰ πάντα (line 43). In the above quoted passage, as well as in V 3 [49],10,40-42, intellection's manifold is due to the multiplicity of its objects. For the necessary connection of intellection and the multiplicity of intelligible objects, see also V 3 [49],10,29-31, 11,25-27, and VI 7 [38],13,40-42. Again, Intellect is often said to possess all things in itself. Its possession is in fact "as in intellection" (VI 2 [43],21,28).

That intellection apprehends the multiplicity of intelligible forms can be seen also from the definition of intellection as συναίσθησις τοῦ ὄλου (V 3 [49],13,13), the consciousness of the integrated whole. Insofar as Intellect attains self-sufficiency by being the whole consisting of all things (lines 19-20), intellection turns inward to Intellect itself and reveals that it is multiple (lines 22-24). But we must notice that προτέρα in line 23 indicates ἡ συναίσθησις in line 21 to be attributed to the soul rather than to Intellect. Gurtler aptly distinguishes συναίσθησις in lines 13 and 21; the latter occurrence expresses the term's root meaning, on the level of soul, of unifying sensations, which cannot apply to Intellect's consciousness because of the internal unity of its own. See G. M. Gurtler, *Plotinus: The Experience of Unity* (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), pp. 79-80. Notice that the self-unity of Intellect is suggested by the aorist participle συνελθόντων in line 13. For the bearing of multiplicity on the definition of intellection in terms of συναίσθησις, see G. M. Gurtler, *op. cit.*, p. 80: "Intellection ... turns inward unifying its own interior multiplicity."; and R. Arnou, *Le Désir de Dieu dans la
Beutler and Theiler compare ἡ νόησις προτέρα in V 3 [49],13,22-23 with μετὰ τῆς προτέρας γνώσεως in I 4 [46],10,15-16. See Plotins Schriften, übersetzt von R. Harder, Neubearbeitung mit griechischem Lesetext und Anmerkungen von R. Beutler und W. Theiler, 6 vols. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1960-67), 5b:384. In I 4 [46],10, indeed, Plotinus places νοῦς and διάνοια above the center of empirical consciousness. See A. Smith, "Unconsciousness and Quasiconsciousness in Plotinus," *Phronesis* 23 (1978):299. According to Schibli, it is the middle soul where this consciousness or ἀντιληψις exercises its pivotal function and the images of διάνοια and νοῦς are mirrored. See H. S. Schibli, "Apprehending Our Happiness: Antilepsis and the Middle Soul in Plotinus, Ennead I 4.10," *Phronesis* 34 (1989):209-215. The phrase μετὰ τῆς προτέρας γνώσεως thus indicates that the knowledge that νοῦς and διάνοια are active is received from the state ontologically prior to ἀντιληψις (see H. S. Schibli, *Phronesis* 34 (1989):211-215; and G. M. Gurtler, *Plotinus: The Experience of Unity*, p. 177). In I 4 [46],10, this ontological priority is established from the outset (lines 3-6). But, first of all, is the comparison by Beutler and Theiler appropriate? It is certain that the συναισθησις in V 3 [49],13,21 refers to that of the soul in 2,4, which is described also as the ἀντιληψις in 2,5. But we should not be misled by the co-occurrence of συναισθησις and ἀντιληψις in this passage. Plotinus here speaks of τὸ αἰσθητικὸν of the soul (2,2-3). As already seen, on the other hand, the ἀντιληψις in I 4 [46],10 is attributed to the middle soul and functions as "a link between sense perception and the soul's intellectual activity" (H. S. Schibli, *Phronesis* 34 (1989):214). Hence the level of the soul's consciousness differs in V 3 [49],2 and I 4 [46],10, so that προτέρα in V 3 [49],10 has no bearing on that in I 4 [46],10,16. In addition, Warren, referring to V 3 [49],2, considers συναισθησις to involve perception of a plurality. See E. W. Warren, "Consciousness in Plotinus," *Phronesis* 9 (1964):91. But this remark is not clear until we see its relation to the plural genitive γνωμένων in line 4.

We may briefly touch upon the soul's intellection. When the soul is present in the intelligible world, she does not apprehend the multiplicity of intelligible objects by a single intellection (καὶ οὐ κατὰ μίαν νόησιν πάντα, IV 4 [28],1,34). Although the soul comprehends all the intelligible objects at once by her single power, her power is divided and individualized in those objects (lines 33-36). (With Armstrong, we read Theiler's σχιζομένη for H-S2 γνωμέμενων in line 36.) Hence the soul's contemplative activity is said to be as if all intelligences, with their many objects, were all together (ὡς πολλῶν ὀμοί πάσας νόησις, line 21).

The above mentioned pluralized intellections of the soul seem to be parallel to the pluralized powers in the fully formed Intellect. If we are allowed to take VI 7 [38],15,18-22 and 35,32-33 together, we can state that Intellect's original
power whereby it sees the One is pluralized in its thinking itself. It seems to be due to this pluralization that the plural νοησεις is sometimes used of the fully actualized Intellect (V 3 [49],11,16; V 9 [5],8,18; see also II 9 [33],1,49-50 ὀρῶν δ’ ἑαυτὸν . . . νοοῦντα ὀρῇ; V 6 [24],5,17-18 ἐνεργοῦντα γὰρ αὐ ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ).

4See also III 8 [30],8,6-8, ἐν ἄμφῳ οὐκ οικεῖωσει, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀριστης, ἄλλ’ οὐσία . . . εἰναι. On the unity of the soul and the λόγος within her in the manner of οἰκείωσις, see 6,20-22. The soul, different from Intellect, contemplates the λόγος as something else than herself, even when she is united with it (6,24-25). Plotinus describes such character of the soul’s discursive thinking as οἰον νοῦς . . . ὀρῶν ἀλλό (6,25-26).

5See also III 9 [13],1,13 διαφορούμενα δὲ τῇ νοησεί.

According to Plotinus, the conceptual distinction of Intellect and its object is due to our habit derived from sensation and its object (V 9 [5],5,10-11). This remark makes sharp contrast with Aristotle’s analogy from the sense’s reception of and identification with sensible objects to intellect’s reception of and identification with intelligible objects (De Anima 429a17-18).

In II 9 [33],1,51-52, we are told that it is impossible, even in thought (τῇ ἐπιστοῖα), to find duality in the intelligible world. But the duality mentioned here is that between Intellect which thinks and Intellect which thinks that it thinks (lines 33-34). There is surely the subject-object duality in the self-thinking Intellect (III 8 [30],9,7-11; III 9 [13],7,4-5; V 1 [10],4,31-33; V 3 [49],10,23; 10,45-46; 15,39; V 4 [7],2,11; V 6 [24],1,15-16; VI 9 [9],2,36-37). On the intellect-intellection duality, see V 6 [24],6,12-13 and 6,26-27.

In terms of the multiplicity of the intelligible objects, Intellect is called substantially many. The limitation of the intelligible objects by their own forms exactly brings the plural οὐσία (V 1 [10],7,23-24).

6G. J. P. O’Daly, Plotinus’ Philosophy of the Self (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 64. We cannot see why O’Daly expresses self-intellection as "the paradox of unity-in-duality" (loc. cit.). If we keep in mind Plotinus’ careful distinction between unity in οὐσία and duality in λόγος or νοησις, unity-in-duality will no longer be the paradoxical expression.

This distinction applies also to the intellect-intellection duality. Two genera, Being and Movement which is the activity of Being, namely intellection, are said to be two only in our conception (ἐπιστοῖα) (VI 2 [43],7,18-20).

7On Plotinus’ full criticism of the Aristotelian or Peripatetic self-thinking divine mind, see VI 7 [38],37,1-23. Plotinus here mentions the intellect-intellection duality implied by the complete actuality of the divine mind (lines 10-13). Beutler and Theiler explicate the force of ὀμας in line 12 "although οὐσία νοοῦσα seems to
be one" (Plotins Schriften, 3b:513; see also the apparatus ad loc. in H-S2). But it is not intuitively clear that the οὐσία νοσία appears to be one. We must notice that μὲν in line 11 is coupled with δέ in line 15. As Beutler and Theiler note (loc. cit.), ἔνεργεια λέγουσι in line 15, parallel with ἔνεργειαν λέγουσι in lines 11-12, presupposes that the ἔνεργεια is simple as it has no other ἔνεργεια. In fact, οὐκ ἀν οὐσία νόσις νοσί (lines 15-16) reminds us of V 6 [24], 6,4-5 ὄλως μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμία ἐνεργεῖα ἔχει σῷ πάλιν ἐνεργεῖων and 6,9-10 οὐδ' ἢ νόσις νοεῖ. Therefore the force of ὅμως should rather be explicated "although ἐνεργεία seems to be one." Mizuchi follows this interpretation.

Rist maintains that the thinkers who Plotinus attacks in VI 7 [38],37 can hardly be orthodox Aristotelians, since they subscribe to some kind of emanation theory indicated by τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ in line 2. See J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 39. But we cannot but wonder how it is possible to get out of this phrase the fact that these thinkers themselves entertain an emanation theory of some sort. Rather, the emanation theory here seems to refer to Plotinus' own, which has been explained towards the end of the last chapter (36,23-27). Plotinus here develops the law of undiminished giving, the principal law in his theory of procession (see III 8 [30], 8,46-48; 10,18-19; V 8 [31], 9,18-19; VI 9 [9], 5,36-37; 9,1-6). On the historical background of this ontological principle, see M. Baltes, Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976-78), 1:200; R. E. Witt, "Plotinus and Posidonius," Classical Quarterly 24 (1930):206-207; A. H. Armstrong, "'Emanation' in Plotinus," Mind 46 (1937):62-63.

8See note 45 in Chapter II of Part I.

9There seems to be also the exegetical problem of the Timaeus concerning the relation of the Demiurge to his exemplar in the scope of Plotinus' doctrine of the νοῦς-νοητὸν identity. This connection can easily be seen in his memo about the interpretation of Tim. 39e7-9 (III 9 [13],1). Pépin, however, observes that the exegetical problem of the Timaeus cannot be a principal stimulus to Plotinus' doctrine:

"Mais il ne semble pas que cette identification . . . provienne d'une réflexion sur le Timée; Plotin l’a utilisée pour dirimer les controverses suscitées par ce dialogue; mais il ne la devait qu’à lui-même; plus exactement, il y avait été conduit par des méditations sans aucun caractère cosmologique" ("Éléments pour une Histoire de la Relation entre l’Intelligence et l’Intelligible chez Platon et dans le Néoplatonisme," Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger 146 (1956):48).

This view would be correct. In III 9 [13],1, as well as in other chapters, the identity of Intellect and the intelligible object is maintained for the infallibility of Intellect (lines 8-10), which is, as we shall see later, the fundamental motive of his
doctrine. Plotinus might perhaps believe that the clues to the problem concerning the cognitive intercommunication between soul or intellect and the Forms, which has been raised and left unsolved in the Sophist, can be discovered in the figurative language of the Timaeus. But it is difficult to imagine that the exigency of the Timaeus interpretation is the motive of his doctrine. Hence we do not go into details about how Plotinus tries to get the νοῦς-νοητόν identity out of this dialogue. In addition, Armstrong also presents a view similar to Pépin’s last point: "... Plotinus’ doctrine of the unity of Intellect and Intelligibles is not really ‘demiurgic’" (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 400).


The ontological status of the Platonic genera in Plotinus’ thought is controversial. On the one hand, Atkinson (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, a Commentary with Translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 95-96) maintains that they are not the intelligible objects or Platonic Forms:

"The Platonic genera... are not Forms in the sense that they are included among Intellect’s objects; they rather illuminate the way in which Intellect engages in its activity. They describe νόσοις, not τὸ νοητόν."

According to Evangeliou, on the other hand, Plotinus considers the five genera to be both predicatable and generative principles of being; by virtue of their predicability of other Forms, they are real being qua Forms:

"There must be sameness, since Intellect is one with itself, and since something common is one (κοινὸν... τὶ ἑν) among all the intelligible objects" (V 1 [10],4,40).

Sameness insures not only the identity of Intellect and Being but the unity among the intelligible objects. The second roles of sameness and otherness thus describe Intellect as one-many: "If Being is many, it is also otherness, and if it is one-many, it is also sameness" (VI 2 [43],15,14-15).

In the above quoted passage (V 1 [10],4,40), we, with Atkinson (Plotinus:
Ennead V.1, p. 98), take κοινών ... τι as the subject of the second-half of the ἐπει-
clause. But we do not read Kirchhoff’s ἐν for the second ἐν. Schwyzer defends the
manuscript reading as follows: "das κοινών δέ τι ἐν praizisiert das voher gennante
ἐν." See H. -R. Schwyzer, "Die pseudoaristotelische Theologie und die Plotin-
this construction, some sort of κοινώνωσι is brought into the notion of self-
intellection. The conception of intellection as cognitive intercourse which has been
seen in Plato and Aristotle, however, is absent from Plotinus’ thought. Schwyzer’s
defense is not convincing enough. Atkinson, who reads Kirchhoff’s ἐν, presents the
two advantages of this construction (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, pp. 98-99). First, the
reading of the second ἐν seems to be pleonastic, though it leaves the sense of the
passage unchanged. Second, κοινών τι ἐν πᾶσι can be aptly compared with II 4
[12],4,2-3 εἰ συν πολλά τὰ εἴδη, κοινών τι ἐν ἀυτοῖς ἀνάγκη εἶναι. (On this
comparison, see also R. Harder, Plotins Schriften, 1b:499.) In turn, let us explain
why our reading is not in the least pleonastic. First of all, intelligible matter
denominated as the κοινών τι among the Ideas in II 4 [12],4,3 is later called ἐν in
lines 15-16. So κοινών ... τι ἐν πᾶσι indicates not only the role of intelligible
matter as the common element in the intelligible world but the presence of many
forms in one intelligible matter, so that it can also be aptly compared with τὰ πολλά
ἐν ἐν ἄνυτα ἐν ὑλὴ in II 4 [12],4,15. In other words, the grounding of Intellect’s
being one-in-many through the limitation of one intelligible matter by plural forms
can be read into the present passage. But this is not the full force of the predicative
ἐν in our passage. In V 1 [10], indeed, the simplicity of Intellect’s matter (3,23) and
the oneness of the inchoate Intellect (7,9) are mentioned. But we must notice that
the theme in the present context is not the simplicity of intelligible matter but the
explication of the structure of self-intellection by means of the Platonic genera.
As said in VI 2 [43],15,14-15, Intellect or Being can be one-many, not simply many, by
virtue of sameness, because unity entailed by sameness is complemented by
multiplicity entailed by otherness. Even if the common factors in the noetic
universe are said to be two or three, insofar as those two or three factors are exactly
common to all the intelligible objects, the role of sameness will hardly be
compromised. In this case, however, Intellect will be a two-many or a three-many
rather than a one-many. Plotinus, in V 1 [10], really wishes to describe Intellect as a
one-many (8,25-26). Thus the indication of the immanent unity in the intelligible
world by saying that the common element is one among all the intelligible objects
precisely supports the characterization of Intellect as one-many and so is hardly
pleonastic. Our reading not only prefigures this characterization but makes it
possible to read into the present passage the bearing of Intellect’s being one-many
on the presence of many forms in one common intelligible matter. To this extent,
our reading seems to be more advantageous than Atkinson’s.
12 On the connection between the multiplicity of intelligible objects and διαφορά, see also II 4 [12],4,2-4; VI 2 [43],21,47-49; VI 7 [38],17,29-31. In VI 9 [9],8,32, ἐτερότης and διαφορά are juxtaposed. In II 4 [12],4,4-5, the shape proper to each intelligible object is described as the διαφορά ... χωρίζουσα (see also VI 7 [38],10,11-12; 33,5-7).

While the intelligible objects are clearly distinguished from one another by virtue of otherness, they are also described in Anaxagorean fashion as ὁμοιοπάντα (III 6 [26],6,23; V 3 [49],15,21; 17,10; V 8 [31],9,3; V 9 [5],6,3; 6,8; 7,11-12; VI 4 [22],14,4; 14,6; VI 5 [23],5,3-4; 6,3; VI 6 [34],7,4; VI 7 [38],33,8). In VI 5 [23],6,2-3, this Anaxagorean phrase is associated with the multiplicity-in-unity and unity-in-multiplicity structure of Intellect. Rist thus points out that the problem here is how we can counterbalance the individuality or discreteness of intelligible objects and their togetherness:

"What he [i.e. Plotinus] seems to mean by this is that it is only possible to grasp each intelligible object by placing it in an intelligible context. But since we can name a particular Form, for example, the Form of Justice, and, if we are philosophers, we shall always understand that Form as it is without confusing it with the intelligible world at large, we must be able to account for the fact that, although the Form of Justice implies the other Forms, it is intelligible as and only as the Form of Justice, and is thus appropriately described as just, presumably on some sort of principle of predominance" (Le Néoplatonisme, p. 81, (Italics mine.)).

By "some sort of principle of predominance" Rist seems to mean probably what is said in V 8 [31],4,11 (ἐξέχει δ' ἐν ἕκαστῳ ἄλλῳ). Rist here refers to P. Hadot, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 127 (ibid., p. 81, note 3). But Hadot there deals with the notion of predominance in Marius Victorinus' triad of being, life, and intelligence. Is the prominence of a certain character in the intelligible whole conceptually formulated enough to be called "the principle of predominance"? Again, how is this notion related to dialectic by virtue of which we can understand the Form without confusing it with the others? In VI 7 [38] Plotinus stresses the role of διαφορά in describing each intelligible object. Intellect has φύσιν ... ἐπὶ πάν ἐτεροιοπάντα (13,25), so that one generic Form is divided into many specific Forms and finally to the εἶδος ἄτομον (14,15-18). Thus, for example, the Form of Justice can be understood as exactly different from the Form of Temperance in virtue of its own shape or διαφορά (οἷον καὶ τὴν [sc. μορφήν] ἐν λόγῳ ἡ διαφέρειν ἄλλῳ ἄλλου λέγομεν, ὡς δικαιοσύνην καὶ σφροσύνην ἄλληλων ἐτερα, 33,5-7). To be sure, the διαφέρεις is clearly exhibited in the noetic world (14,18-19). It is such a world with which dialectic must be concerned. Dialectic is the science (ἐξίς) which can say about everything what it is and how it differs (διαφέρει) from other things and what is the character in common (ἡ κοινῆ) with them (I 3 [20],4,2-4). Using Plato's method of division, it distinguishes the specific Forms and determines what
each thing is (4,12-13). Plotinus maintains that it is possible to say to what class each Form belongs and where it stands in that class. Also as regards the Form of Justice, its clear description is possible because each virtue is defined by τὸ κοινὸν or the genus and τὸ ὄνομα or the difference (VI 7 [38],10,16). Virtues in general are ὑπ'τέρα γένος καὶ εἴδη (VI 2 [43],18,17). Rist would indeed be right in saying that Plotinus has to sketch out a map of the world of Forms in order to describe uniqueness of each of the Forms (Le Néoplatonisme, p. 81). But this uniqueness can be appropriately understood by the dialectical endeavor to clarify the structure of the intelligible world rather than by "some sort of principle of predominance." This description of the uniqueness of the Form can be appropriate, precisely because the Form thus defined is placed in the exact locus of its class and to this extent implies other Forms within the intelligible whole from which it cannot be absent.

On the discreteness of the contents of Intellect, see also I 8 [51],2,19; III 8 [30],9,35-37; V 9 [5],6,3-9; VI 6 [34],7,7-10; VI 9 [9],5,16-20.

There still remains a problem. How should we explain the fact that the Platonic characterization of the Idea as μονοειδές διὸ ὅτα, καθ' αὐτῷ (Phd. 78d5-6, 80b2; Symp. 211b1) is absent from the Enneads? The word μονοειδές is the ἐπάξ λεγόμενον hesitatingly applied to the One in VI 9 [9],3,43. Does this fact indicate that Plotinus is reluctant to maintain the uniqueness of each Form? Maybe not. Here we can attempt a counterargument. Does the uniformity of the Form immediately point to its uniqueness? However carefully we may look at the discreteness and invariability of the Form, we will not see why it is unique. It must be noticed that uniqueness in general is always in a certain context. A given Form is seen uniquely only within the structural complex of the intelligible world. For instance, we can fully understand the uniqueness of the Form of Justice, only when we compare it with other Forms belonging to the same genus, but not when we concentrate on that Form alone. We can get a glimpse of Plotinus' conception of the Form's uniqueness from Rist's remark that the description of the Form's uniqueness may necessitate the inquiry into the structure of the world of Forms. Moreover, the reason why Plotinus does not apply the word μονοειδές to the Form would be that the Form, even individually (καὶ ἑκάστῃ), is not one (VI 9 [9],2,27-28), because each Form consists of many things and thereby is composite (εἶδος τε γὰρ ἑκάστον ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ σύνθετον, 2,30-31). The Platonic Form, on the contrary, is categorized into τὰ ἀσύνθετα in the context where it is characterized as μονοειδές (Phd. 78c7).

Armstrong views the visionary description of the life of Intellect in this chapter, closely related to V 8 [31],3-4, as introducing the idea of intellectual travel and exploration, which does not seem to be consistent with the non-durational nature of Intellect (Le Néoplatonisme, pp. 72-73). He also supposes that Plotinus is here inspired by the Phaedrus myth (Le Néoplatonisme, p. 73, note 1). So the
reference to this chapter requires some circumspection. As regards the close connection between intellection and otherness, however, Plotinus' emphasis upon the role of otherness in this chapter does not deviate from his recurrent account for the hypostatization of Intellect or the actualization of intellection by the pluralization and articulation of its inchoate vision.

14On the absence of otherness from the One, see also VI 9 [9],8,33-34.

15Aristotle does not claim the simplicity of the prime mover in terms of the intellect-intelligible identity. As already seen in note 14 in Chapter II, the prime mover has no other knowable object than itself so that it can be free at least from the multiplicity of intelligible objects.


17We cannot see why Armstrong regards this passage as "an important early indication of the sense in which Plotinus accepts the common Middle Platonist doctrine that the forms are the 'thoughts of God'" (*Plotinus*, 5:305, note 1, (Italics mine.)).

18See also VI 6 [34],8,17-20. Deck (Nature, Contemplation, and the One: A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), p. 27) writes: "His [i.e. Plotinus'] doctrine in many places is that, in the Nous, being is prior to the knower." See also J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus," Classical Quarterly 12 (1962):102.

Of course, Intellect can also be said to precede beings in the sense that it produces them in its contemplation of the One (see G. M. Gurtler, *Plotinus: The Experience of Unity*, p. 262; and J. M. Rist, "The Indefinite Dyad and Intelligible Matter in Plotinus," Classical Quarterly 12 (1962):102).

19See also the following passage: "... but the nature of the intellect (τὴν ... τοῦ νοῦ φύσιν) which sees that intellect which remains within itself is an activity proceeding from it (ἐνεργείων τινα ἀπ' ἕκεινου), which sees that [static] intellect" (III 9 [13],1,17-18, tr. A. H. Armstrong). This passage suggests taking παρ' αὑτοῦ καὶ ἐξ αὑτοῦ νοεῖ in V 9 [5],5,6 as meaning the actualization of the thinking agent by its object. But III 9 [13],1,20-21 καὶ νοητῶν ἄλλως εἶναι τῷ μεμμηνοθαι can be aberrant, when μεμμηνοθαι is taken as the medial; because to say that the intellective agent imitates its object abrogates the aforementioned unity of them (lines 13-14).

20In Aristotle, self-intellection is not conceptually distinct from the
intellect-intelligible identity. See *Met.* 1072b19-21 αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ ... ὡστε ταύτῳ νοῦς καὶ νοητόν; and *De Anima* 429b26-430a4 ἐτί δὴ ἐν νοητῷ καὶ αὐτῷ: ... ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὑλῆς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον.


Plotinus here seems to bear a definite adversary in mind. First of all, we must keep in mind that III 8 [30], V 8 [31], V 5 [32], and II 9 [33] originally constituted a long, single work before Porphyry's arrangement. See R. Harder, "Eine neue Schrift Plotins," *Hermes* 71 (1936):5-8. In II 9 [33],1,25-30, Plotinus attacks the Gnostic conception of one intellect at repose and another in motion. This duplication or "telescoping" of the hierarchy of intellects is based on their exegesis of *Tim.* 39e7-9 (6,16-24). In fact, it goes back to Numenius whose thought has some affinity with Gnosticism. See E. R. Dodds, "Numenius and Ammonius," in *Les Sources de Plotin* (Geneva, Vandoeuvres: Fondation Hardt, 1957), p. 20; A. H. Armstrong, *Plotinus*, 2:226-227, note 1. For the more detailed history of this doctrine, see J. Dillon, "The Concept of Two Intellects: A Footnote to the History of Platonism," *Phronesis* 18 (1973):176-185. In III 9 [13],1,6-8, Plotinus spells out two implications of the Numenian interpretation of *Tim.* 39e7-9: (i) the Living Being is not intellect but simply an intelligible object, and (ii) intellect may have its object outside itself. On the duplication or triplication of intellect that Plotinus criticizes in II 9 [33],1,25ff. and 6,16-24, intellect at rest is identified as the Living Being of the *Timaeus* and has the ontological status as τὸ νοητὸν devoid of any intellective agent. See E. R. Dodds, *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 19; P. Hadot, *Les Sources de Plotin*, pp. 143-149; G. M. Gurtler, *Plotinus: The Experience of Unity*, p. 241, note 8.

The fact that Plotinus considers intellect at repose to exercise no intellection can be seen from 1,28, where he mentions its ἄφριχα. This precisely means that the intelligible object lies outside intellect in motion or intellect contemplating (τὸν δὲ νοῦν ἔτερον παρ' αὐτόν [sc. τὸν ... ἐν ἀσυχίᾳ ἔχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὰ ὄντα] θεωροῦντα, 6,20-21). Hence it is highly probable that Plotinus' argument in V 5 [32],1 is directed at the Gnostic bifurcation of intellect.

Nevertheless it would not be right to say that V 5 [32],1 is exclusively devoted to the criticism of the Gnostic position. In Plotinus' own word, this chapter marks the beginning of his attempt "to lead to a clear understanding of the intelligible region by another way (ἐλις ἐναργῇ σύνεσιν ἀναγείν τοῦ νοητοῦ τόπου ... κατ' ἀλλῆλην ὀδόν)" (V 8 [31],13,23-24). But the clear understanding of the intelligible world is not his final purpose in the anti-Gnostic treatises. The contemplation of the intelligible beauty is said further to open up the way to the One (III 8 [30],11,36-38; V 8 [31],1,1-4). In V 5 [32], the One is abruptly introduced in 3,4 after the account for "the intelligible region" by "another way," namely in
terms of Intellect’s infallibility in the first two chapters. It is not certain whether Plotinus includes the One in "the intelligible region" or not, while it comprises the Good in Plato (Rep. 508b13-c1). The necessity of the ascent to the One is explained slightly later in 4,1-8; we long to know what the pure unity is. The point in and from which the apprehension of the pure unity is eagerly aspired to is nothing else than Intellect which is more one than all other things, most proximate to the One, but not purely one (4,4-6). Such a one-many nature of Intellect is exactly indicated by the fusion of Intellect with real beings (συγκραθέντας αὐτοίς [sc. τοῖς οὐσί], 2,8) and its description as the foundation of real beings (ἐδρα ... τοῖς οὐσί, 2,11). The latter expression is taken over to the characterization of the One as ὑπερκάθηται καὶ ὑπερίδρυται ἐπὶ καλῆς οὐτῶς οἴου κρητιδος in 3,4-5. These two descriptions of Intellect are based on the presence of the intelligible objects inside Intellect. Thus we can see that Plotinus’ defense of the intellect-intelligible identity in the first chapter is a necessary step towards the search for and the ascent to the One. But the fact that he here develops solely a negative argument for the defense of his doctrine might perhaps reflect the polemic nature of the present treatise against the Gnostics.

On the ascent from the comprehension of the intelligible world to the One, Armstrong writes as follows:

"When we have completed our understanding of reality, we have to leave it all behind in order to find what turns out to be the only thing we want, the source of all values and the goal of all desire, which alone makes it worth the effort to attain to Νοῦς on the way, as it is the only reason why Νοῦς is there at all. I find the phrase ... το ἐπέκεινα αὐτοῖ Διαπέρ χάριν καὶ οἱ πρὸσθεν λόγοι which marks the transition from Νοῦς to the One in Chapter 9 of the treatise On Contemplation (iii 8 [30]) rather significant. Certainly in what the Germans now call the Grosssschrift and in the closely related treatise written a year or two later, On How the Multitude of the Forms came into being and One the Good, the great elaborate descriptions of the intelligible world seem to be designed to lead us to a point from which the indescribable One can be indicated" ("Elements in the Thought of Plotinus at Variance with Classical Intellectualism," The Journal of Hellenic Studies 93 (1973):13).

Also in III 8 [30], after the full account for the intellect-intelligible identity and the plurality of intelligible objects in the eighth chapter, the duality of self-intellection is pointed out (9,5-11), and the discussion, appealing to the priority of unity to plurality (9,3), moves to the apprehension of the One as the originative principle of Intellect and its object (ἐξ ὧν ὁ νοῦς καὶ τὸ σὺν αὐτῷ νοητόν, 9,12-13).

22In the present treatise, Plotinus, following Plato’s attempt in the Sophist, thinks of the possibility of falsehood in terms of otherness and negativity. By μὴ τὰ
Plotinus would mean images (ἐνδομα, 1,55-56) of the intelligible objects, which are not the truth of them (μὴτε τὸ ἀληθὲς αὐτῶν, 1,52-53), rather than τὸ μὴ δαμὼν ὁν in Soph. 237b7-8 or τὸ μὴ ὁν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό in 238c9, which cannot be even "believed."

23See also II 9 [33],8,14, V 3 [49],8,28-29, 16,29, V 5 [32],2,15, VI 7 [38],7,31, and 30,39.

24Armstrong observes that Plotinus' argument against total confidence in sense-perception here is Platonic rather than Sceptic (Plotinus, 5:156-157, note 1). Although the sense in which he calls it "Platonic" is not clear, the argument will turn out to be rather "un-Platonic" as soon as we compare it with the following remark made by Socrates on Protagoras' identification of sense-perception and knowledge: "But with regard to what the individual experiences at the moment--the source of his sensations and the beliefs in accordance with them (τὸ παρὰν ἐκάστῳ πάθος, ἔξ ὦν αἱ αἰσθησεὶς καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γανουνταὶ) it is harder to assail the truth of these. Perhaps it is wrong to say 'harder'; maybe they are unassailable, and those who assert that they are transparently clear (ἐναργεῖς) and are instances of knowledge may be in the right, and Theaetetus was not beside the mark when he said that perception and knowledge were the same thing" (Theaet. 179c2-d1, tr. F. M. Cornford, adapted by A. Sumi).

Compare the first sentence with ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι ἔχει τὴν δοκοῦσαν ὑπόστασιν (1,14-15). See also Cornford's comment: "But within this narrower field he [i.e. Plato] himself accepted the position (of Protagoras), and built it into his own account for the nature of perception" (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 92). Plato's lack of confidence in perception is not due to the relation of perceptive subject and sensible object, but mainly due to the transiency of a sensible object (Phd. 79c2-8).

25The connection between the intellect-intelligible identity and the self-evidence of Intellect's knowledge is indicated by σοφῶς in 2,14.

Gurtler, following Bazán, observes that Plotinus in the first argument attacks two Epicurean positions, the derivation of truth only from demonstration (1,6-8) and the self-evidence of sense knowledge (1,12-19) (Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 167). This would be true. But we may notice that the argument is not kept to the criticism of these positions. Plotinus' main target is a conception of the intellect-intelligible relation that might compromise the self-evidence of intellectual knowledge.

26The verb συντυχάων is not appropriate to the cognitive relation of Intellect and its objects. In V 9 [5],7,17-18, we are told that Intellect does not grasp its object by chance (οὐ . . . κατὰ συντυχίαν . . . ἐπέβαλεν).
In this argument, the exact meaning of συζευγνύναι is also open to question. Plotinus himself describes the intellect-intelligible connection employing this verb (III 8 [30],9,7; 9,11), by which their identity (9,5) is meant. The use of συζευγνύναι reminds us of the yoke metaphor in the allegory of the sun (Rep. 508a1).

This consequence is only implicit in this argument. The connection between the knowing of images of objects and the possibility of being deceived becomes explicit in the final argument.

In this argument Plotinus seems to notice a problem implicit in Plato's theory of Forms. The Platonic Form serves the role of standard by which ethical or sensible characters are recognized (Euthy. 6e3-6; Phd. 74e1-3). According to Plotinus, however, for a judgment about particulars to be possible, διόνοσ must not only react to the sense-data of a physical object but refer to the impressions (τύποι) of the relevant Forms that she has received from Intellect (V 3 [49],2,7-11). These impressions that the soul retains within herself are referred to as κανόνες (3,8; 4,17). For the criteria, which discursive reason uses in its judgments, to arise within the soul, first of all, and for those judgments to be possible, there must be Intellect always possessing the Forms which those judgments concern (V 1 [10],11,1-7). This suggests Plotinus' insight that the role of the Forms as the paradigmatic criteria is not satisfactorily insured solely by their invariability, but necessarily calls for some thinking agent that is always grasping them without any distortion. In other words, we cannot avoid considering the cognitive relation of Intellect and Forms in order to defend the role of Forms. In the Sophist, as already seen, the mode of the soul's cognitive contact with the Forms is argued mainly in terms of the idealists' thesis of the Forms' immutability. But Plotinus might suggest that the problem concerning the relation of Intellect and its objects is inseparably related not only to the Forms' immutability but to their role as the criteria of judgments about particulars.

The intelligible objects, without intellection and life, are neither premises nor axioms nor expressions (1,38-39). Armstrong comments that here "Plotinus is arguing against those who see the knowledge of Intellect in terms of discursive logic" (Plotinus, 5:158, note 1). In the present argument, however, it is not pointed out that the placing of the intelligible objects outside Intellect entails that intellection is discursive. As we shall see, this critical move appears in the next argument. In the present argument, Plotinus is not "arguing" against those who identify the intelligible objects as premises or axioms or expressions. He is simply rejecting such a conception. The position against which he is precisely arguing is nothing other than the view that the intelligible objects subsist outside Intellect.

Plotinus' own reply to the question, what the intelligible objects are, has already been provided in III 8 [30],8. Insofar as Intellect's contemplation is "living
contemplation (θεωρία ζωσα)" (8,11), the intelligible object must "live in its own right (αυτοιζων)" (8,13). On the presence of life in the intelligible objects, see also III 6 [26],6,15; IV 7 [2],9,23-25; V 1 [10],4,7; V 4 [7],2,43-44; V 9 [5],10,10-12; VI 9 [9],2,24.

Let us try to explicate Plotinus' argument further. The supposition that the intelligible objects are lifeless would entail three formidable consequences.

First, on this supposition, intellection could not take place. In V 9 [5],5,4-10, as already seen, Plotinus gives an account of the intellect-intelligible identity by invoking the thesis that the intellective subject is brought to activity by the intelligible object. Then, to say that the intelligible objects are devoid of intellectual life precisely implies the absence of €νεργεία in them. If they possess no €νεργεία, they are not able to actualize the intellective subject, so that intellection does not occur.

Second, on this supposition, self-intellection in its proper sense is impossible, because self-intellection refers to the case where Intellect sees the self that thinks, but not the self that does not think (όρων δ` €νωτον ουκ €νωπαινοντα, ολλα νοοΰντα ορφ, II 9 [33],1,49-50). When Intellect contemplates lifeless and unthinking objects, it does not see them as contemplating but as merely contemplated, not itself but another (V 3 [49],5,14-15).

Finally, on this supposition, the existence of the One is not necessary beyond Intellect. Plotinus writes: "That is, also beyond Intellect; there is, then, something beyond Intellect. For (γιαρ) being is not a dead thing, nor is it not life or not thinking; Intellect and being are then (δη) the same thing (V 4 [7],2,42-44, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adopted by A. Sumi). This passage is so significant as to tell that the thesis that the intelligible objects are endowed with intellectual life points not only to the intellect-intelligible identity but also to the existence of the One beyond Intellect. As we shall see later, the intelligible objects are the pluralized images of the One. If they are lifeless just like a corpse, such a question as, what is the cause of the life and the activity of these objects, is meaningless. If the One is the cause of lifeless entities, it will be called "the meanest of all realities" (Vita Plotini 17,23). But the One is "the power responsible for thoughtful, intelligent life (ζωης...€μφρωνις και νοερας αετως δυναμις)" (V 5 [32],10,12).

Let us here recall that "the friends of Forms" are compelled to admit the introduction of some spiritual movement to το παντελως ου in the Sophist. This introduction, as already pointed out in note 69 in Chapter I, does not lead to the representation of the Platonic Forms as living and thinking entities. Usually Plato does not characterize the Ideas as living entities when he mentions them. Only in the Timaeus does he speak of the world of Forms under the guise of the eternal Living Being. Plotinus, however, adopts this latter characterization (see VI 6 [34],7,14-17). But we must notice that the description of the world of Forms as the
eternal Living Being is viable in the *Timaeus* only because of the dialogue's cosmological nature. So we may question why the Form, say, of the Equal is an individual intelligible living being. To this extent, Plotinus seems to deviate from Plato's usual representation of the Forms. His deviation, however, seems to be philosophically unavoidable for the three aforementioned consequences to be avoided. Plotinus is more than willing to diverge from Plato in order to safeguard the satisfactory account for self-intellection and the point from which the transcendent One is indicated. Again, he would perhaps envisage a similar case in Plato's philosophy; for without (i) the possibility of intellection that at the same time necessarily implies the knowability of the Forms, (ii) the Delphic command of self-knowledge, and (iii) the existence of the Idea of the Good as the cause of real beings, Plato's philosophy would be almost coreless. But does Plotinus' conception of the intelligible objects as living entities completely diverge from Plato's conception of the Forms? Indeed, the Platonic Forms are not moving and thinking entities. However, even if we are not allowed to refer to the *Timaeus*, is it really impossible to conceive the Forms as living entities? Let us recall that immortality, the hallmark of Greek deity, is ascribed to the Forms (see note 74 in Chapter I). It is certainly not unreasonable to conclude from the Forms' immortality that they have life. To this extent, we may say that Plato's usual position is that the Forms live, though they neither move nor think. If so, "the friends of Forms" in the *Sophist* could claim life or immortality as the criterion of being. But this possibility, unfortunately, is not explored in that dialogue. In the *Sophist*, as already seen, Plato is confronted with the problem how it is possible to integrate Forms, soul, and intellect into the unified whole or τὸ πνευματικὸν τὸν. We can surely integrate them into the unified whole in terms of the possession of life as the mark of being. The philosophical merit of this is exactly present in Plotinus' conception of the intelligible objects as living. In this respect, his position does not seem to be very far from Plato's own conception of the Forms. Rather, the Plotinian thesis that the intelligible objects have noetic life and thereby think will be a natural consequence from the suggestion that the Platonic Forms are immortal and thereby live. In fact, Plotinus' endeavor to read the intellect-intelligible identity in Plato's dialogues precisely follows this reasoning. As mentioned in note 45 in Chapter II, Plotinus, in III 9 [13], 1, 14-15, takes the all-inclusiveness of the Living Being mentioned in *Tim*. 30c7-8 as referring to the presence of the intelligible objects in Intellect. On Plotinus' conception of the intelligible objects as living, hence, that each Form is an individual living being means that it necessarily thinks and so has some intellectual agency in itself (VI 7 [38], 11, 48; 12, 10). On the *Timaeus* ' influence upon Plotinus' doctrine, see M. Atkinson, *Plotinus: Ennead V.1*, p. 76: "Plotinus was no doubt further influenced by what he read in the *Timaeus* where the ποροδετήγμα is described as a living being . . . naturally associated with life and thought." On Plotinus' association of immortality with life and awareness of the intelligible
objects, see V 1 [10],4,6-12: ... κάθεί πάντα ἰδέτω νοητὰ καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτῷ αίδια ἐν οἴκειᾳ συνεστὶ καὶ ζωῇ ... πάντα γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ ἄθανατα περιέχει [subjectum Κρόνος], νοῦν πάντα, θεὸν πάντα, ψυχὴν πάσαν, ἐστῶτα ἀεὶ. This passage not only clearly rejects the suggestion that the intelligible objects might be ἀναίσθητα καὶ ἀμοιρά ζωῆς καὶ νοῦ (V 5 [32],1,32-33), but also seems to prepare Plotinus' own answer to the problem concerning the criterion of being in the Sophist by indicating that every Form, every Intellect, and every soul are immortal.

In VI 4 [22],10,28-30 and VI 9 [9],9,3-6, the immortality of Intellect, Being, and soul is founded in the undiminished nature of the One’s power. Thus we can say that the problem which perplexed Plato in the Sophist, how it is possible to integrate Form, intellect, and soul into a unified whole, is answered by Plotinus’ probable suggestion of immortality as the criterion of being; furthermore, the immortality of Intellect, Being, and soul is insured by the incessant emanation from the undiminished power of the One. The battle between idealists and materialists in the Sophist precisely represents the conflict of two fundamental Weltanschauungen in the Western philosophy. The basic position of the idealists, as already seen, is the distinction between being and becoming. In order to defend this camp, however, idealists are urged to present the criterion whereby all the entities that do not belong to the realm of becoming can be consistently categorized into the realm of being. The realm of being must not consist solely of the Ideas, but include all souls and intellects to be τὸ παντελῶς ὄν rather than οὐσία. Hence the undiminished power of the Plotinian One makes it possible to indicate the exact extent of the realm of being, as distinguished from becoming, by ontologically insuring the immortality of the members of that realm and thereby to defend the basic position of idealists or Platonists. Here seems to be the real significance of Plotinus' doctrine of the One's infinity in power, which is unmistakably based on the most fundamental thesis of his philosophy, that is, the One's absolute simplicity (V 5 [32],10,20-11,5). See also L. Sweeney, "Infinity in Plotinus," Gregorianum 38 (1957):723, note 100.

32Plotinus would partially admit the premise of the argument εἰ δ' ἀπλά ... δικαίων χωρίς καὶ καλὸν (1,41-42). This premise consists of two claims; (i) each Form is distinct from the others and (ii) each Form is simple. If the word χωρίς had no spatial implication, Plotinus would not be reluctant to accept (i). As seen in note 12, he subscribes to the distinctness of the contents of Intellect. I cannot see how Alfino can regard the passage in 1,46-49 as confirming that "Plotinus does not believe that Intellect apprehends discrete forms" (Ancient Philosophy 8 (1988):278). In the present argument, however, it is seen from κατὰ τίνας ... τόπους in 1,44 that χωρίς is taken spatially.

Plotinus would not accept (ii) since the Form, even individually, is not one (VI 9 [9],2,27-28). The conception of the Form as simple may certainly be based not
only on the discreteness of each Form but on its total isolation from the others, so that a given Form cannot imply any other Form. Thus the conception of the Forms as simple, discrete, and totally unrelated implies that they do not constitute the unified whole and are not situated in a unity (V 5 [32],1,42-43). In turn, for the Forms to be mutually connected and thereby to imply one another, they should be situated in one intelligible matter that has the primordial force of contemplation. Although Plotinus does not explicitly describe it, intelligible matter may naturally be considered to have the role of supporting the togetherness and intercommunication of the intelligible objects. This suggested conception of intelligible matter is somehow similar to Whitehead's interpretation of the Platonic Receptacle as the matrix of intercommunication of actual occasions.

33See also the following passage:
"... because Intellect is within, which is the actual primary realities, and always keeps company with itself and exists in actuality and does not seek to apprehend its objects as if it did not have them or was trying to obtain them, or was going through them discursively as if they were not ready to hand before any discursive process (ἡ διεξοδεύσων προκεχειρισμένα)--these are experiences (πάθη) of soul--but it stands firm in itself, being all things together..." (V 9 [5],7,8-12, tr. A. H. Armstrong).

Here discursive reasoning is contrasted with the presence and togetherness of the intelligible objects in Intellect and Intellect's being in actuality. On the denial of διεξοδος to Intellect, see IV 4 [28],1,15; V 8 [31],6,7; VI 2 [43],21,28. Compare also ὁμοῦ πάντα in V 9 [5],7,11-12 with ἀθροῶν in V 8 [31], 6,9. In VI 7 [38],13,47-48, however, διεξοδος is associated with Intellect's movement. On the uniqueness of this chapter, see note 13.

Thomas Aquinas differentiates two senses of discursivity of thinking; (i) involving reasoning from premises to conclusions and (ii) involving transition from one object to another (Summa Theologiae 1a,14,7). The present argument and V 9 [5],7,8-12 definitely deny discursive thinking to Intellect in the second sense. Discursive thinking in the first sense is denied to Intellect in V 5 [32],1,38-39. Alfino explains the denial of discursivity in the second sense in terms of Plotinus' anxieties over language:

"The whole point of investigating Intellect was to find something which guaranteed the reference of images in the discursive reasoning of the soul. Language and discursive reasoning give the appearance that limitation is ontologically basic, but language cannot guarantee the reference of its own terms. The limitation of concepts cannot be ontically prior to their intelligibility because then the model for Intellect will collapse into the model for sense-perception. The solution therefore, is to place the intelligible inside Intellect and to exclude any form of linguistic or logical
discursivity from Intellect" (Ancient Philosophy 8 (1988):278).

This elucidation sounds somewhat modern. First of all, Plotinus’ point of investigating Intellect in the present context is not to insure the reference of images in the soul’s discursive reasoning. Indeed Plotinus elsewhere calls for the intellect-intelligible identity to guarantee the possibility of the soul’s reasoning (V 1 [10],11,1-7). In V 5 [32],1, however, he seems to deal almost exclusively with the defense of the infallibility of Intellect. He here mentions only one limit of language, the point that language refers to something else (1,39). Hence the reason is more simple why he dismisses the conception of intellectual knowledge in terms of discursive logic. Premises, axioms, and expressions only refer to other things and are not the real beings themselves (1,39-40). On the contrary, truth says nothing other than itself (2,18-20). Again, if Intellect believes μὴ τὰ ὀντα, it is deceived (1,1-2). For Intellect to be infallible and always to attain truth, therefore, τὰ ὀντα themselves, rather than language as οὐκ αὕτα τὰ ὀντα (1,40), must be inside Intellect. The above consideration, of course, reveals Plotinus’ departure from Plato who regards λόγος as the instrument of νοῦς (see note 36 in Chapter I).

34The passage in lines 46-49 is difficult, since the subject of ἐξετ in line 46 is not clear enough. Beutler and Theiler suggest a dispersed intelligible object (τὸ νοητὸν . . . διεσπασμένον ἐκαστόν, line 43) as the subject (Plotins Schriften, 3b:403). This reading has a weakness in involving the subject shift from ὁ νοῦς (line 45) which is the subject of μενεῖ in line 46. In 2,1-2, we read οὐ τοῖνυν δεῖ. . . οὐτε τύπους ἐν τῷ νῷ τῶν ὀντων λέγειν εἶναι. Here τοῖνυν marks the summarizing of the arguments in the preceding chapter. Therefore we may take ὁ νοῦς as the subject of ἐξετ. If this reading is adopted, how can we explain the force of ὁλως in line 46? The adverb seems to refer to the presupposition of the claim of the separateness and simplicity of each intelligible object, that those objects are external to Intellect. In lines 46-49, Plotinus reiterates the point already made in lines 24-27: ἔπειτα καὶ αἱ νόησεις τύποι ἐσονται. . . πῶς δὲ καὶ τυφώσεται, ἡ τίς τῶν τοιούτων ή μορφή; καὶ ἡ νόησις τοῦ ἐξω ἕσπερ ἡ αἰσθησις. If Intellect knows its objects dispersed outside itself, intellection will be simply impression, so that someone will ask whether the shape of that impression differs from the object itself. In this case, again, intellection will be just like sense-perception. In lines 24-27 Plotinus does not deal with the τύπος or μορφή the intelligible object has. Also in terms of the connection between lines 46-49 and 24-27, the reading of line 46 suggested by Beutler and Theiler is disadvantageous.

35In this argument, according to Armstrong, Plotinus "seems to have in mind particularly a very literal interpretation of the vision of the Forms in his favorite Phaedrus myth (Plotinus, 5:159, note 2). This observation is so suggestive as to make us notice that περίθεων in line 45 might reflect the περάγεων of the heavenly περιφορά (Phdr. 247c1, d4-5, 248a3-4) and its περίοδος (247d5). Plotinus’
own visionary description of Intellect's movement or "odyssey" in VI 7 [38],13 is also inspired by the Phaedrus myth (see note 13). Here, however, Intellect is said to travel within itself (ἐν αὐτῷ) (line 30), so that it is itself ubiquitous and its travel is remaining (μένουσαν) (lines 33-34).

According to Plotinus' own exegesis, the Phaedrus myth rather implicitly suggests the intellect-intelligible identity. He writes: "... but about the knowledge there--which Plato observed and said "that which is a knowledge different from that in which it is (οὐδ᾽ ἡτίς ἐστίν ἀληθεῖς ἐν ἀλλῷ)," but how this is so, he left us to investigate and discover" (V 8 [31],4,52-54, tr. A. H. Armstrong). It is clear that oὐδ᾽ ἡτίς ἐστίν ἀλήθεια ἐν ἀλλῷ is the paraphrase of ἐπιστήμην ... οὐδ᾽ ἡ ἐστίν που ἐτέρα ἐν ἐτέρῳ ὅσοι ὅν ἠμείς υἱὸν ὄντων καλοῦμεν (Phdr. 247d7-e1). We must notice that ἐτέρα ἐν ἐτερω (d7-e1) explains ἤ γένεσις πρόσεστιν (d7) and is contrasted with ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστιν δύν (e1-2) which characterizes Knowledge itself. (Hackforth's translation of d7-e1 "knowledge that ... varies with the various objects" overlooks the first ἐν in e1.) Whereas there is some confrontation and heterogeneity between sense knowledge and becoming, Knowledge itself, which is itself ὄντως (e2), is totally harmonious with real Being. Within the context of this myth, we can read in the phrase ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστιν δυν at most the homogeneity and concord between Knowledge itself and real Being, but not the presence of the Ideas in Knowledge itself; for true Knowledge is simply about (περὶ) real Being (c6-8). Plotinus further reads the unity of Knowledge or Wisdom and real Being (4,47-48; 5,15-16) into the phrase οὐδ᾽ ... ἐτέρα ἐν ἐτερω. In 4,3-4, moreover, he contrasts ἐπιστήμην, οὐχ ἤ γένεσις πρόσεστιν (d7) with ὁρῶσι τὰ πάντα ... οἷς οὐσία, καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἐν ἀλλω. Here he takes οὐδ᾽ ... ἐτέρα ἐν ἐτερω οὐδ᾽ ... ἀλήθεια ἐν ἀλλῳ ὡς ἑαυτοὺς ἐν ἀλλω.

In addition, Plotinus, after the vital description of Intellect's life in VI 7 [38],13, definitely denies the dispersedness of the intelligible objects by alluding to the Empedoclean φίλω (14,18-22), with which he seems to ally implicitly the Anaxagorean ὁμοιό πάντα. On Plotinus' interpretation of the Empedoclean φίλω as the unifying principle of the intelligible world, see III 2 [47],2,1-4 and V 1 [10],9,6 (also Aristotle, Met. 1001a12-15).

36Needless to say, Plotinus here follows the line of Plato's endeavor, in the Sophist, to account for the possibility of deception by the notion of image and further by negativity and otherness. As already seen, however, Plotinus himself admits otherness within the self-thinking Intellect as the principle of distinction which separates Intellect from its object. The reason why the Plotinian Intellect is not fallible is due to the fact that the sameness of Intellect and its object complements their otherness. Hence we may render, in terms of the scheme of the Platonic genera, Plotinus' thesis of the intellect-intelligible identity as the position which claims the mutual complementarity of sameness and otherness, while its
antithesis criticized in the present chapter can be characterized as the position which entertains solely the otherness of Intellect and its object. In fact otherness seems to be a two-edged sword for Plotinus; it not only explains the possibility of falsehood but awakens Intellect to life and activity. When he speaks of the otherness of Intellect and its object, Plotinus needs to couple it with the sameness that insures truth for Intellect, in order to prevent it from having the former explanatory role.

37This argument is prefigured in III 9 [13],1,6-9. So Plotinus seems to consider this argument to provide the strongest reason against the doctrine of duplicating or triplicating Intellect as mentioned in III 9 [13],1, II 9 [33],1,25ff. and 6,16-24. On the detail of this doctrine, see note 21.

38Plotinus moreover ascribes Intellect's honor and majesty (τὸ τίμιον καὶ σεμνόν, 2,13) to its possession of all the intelligible objects. In this respect he follows Aristotle's association of honor and majesty with the actuality of divine intellect (Met. 1074b17-21; see also P. Hadot, Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 114-115). On Intellect's being τίμιος, see V 6 [24],5,5-6 and VI 7 [38],29,26-27. On its being σεμνός, see III 8 [30],9,15-16, III 9 [13],9,10-12, V 3 [49],13,2-4, VI 7 [38],13,10-12, and 35,27.

39See also III 9 [13],6,1-3.

40In II 9 [33],1,29-30, the perpetuity of Intellect's activity is briefly mentioned (ἀεὶ ὡσοντως ἐνεργείᾳ κείμενος ἐστώση). We will understand what the paradoxical expression "static activity" means as soon as we look at the following passage: "But peace and quiet (ἡσυχία) for Intellect is not going out (ἐκστάσις) of Intellect, but the peace and quiet of Intellect is an activity taking its rest from all other activities (σχολήν ἁγούσα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλων ἐνέργεια)" (V 3 [49],7,13-15, tr. A. H. Armstrong). Such activity is surely self-intellection. Plotinus continues: "The Being of Intellect, therefore, is activity, and there is nothing to which the activity is directed; so it is self-directed (πρὸς αὐτῷ). Thinking itself, it is thus with itself and holds its activity directed to itself (εἰς ἑαυτὸν)" (7,18-20, tr. A. H. Armstrong). Thus the "static activity" of Intellect in II 9 [33],1,30 turns out to indicate self-intellection which is not "ecstatic" but self-reversive (see also V 3 [49],6,5 ἐπιστρέφου ἐις αὐτόν). O'Daly views this complete interiority as the guarantee of the characteristic stability of Intellect (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, p. 108, note 63). As Beutler and Theiler, following Müller, comment (Plotins Schriften, 5b:378), of course, this stability is not quiescence without intellection but energetic activity. On the "static activity" of Intellect, see also III 9 [13],6,4 νόσις ὁ οἶνον ἡσυχος and VI 9 [9],5,14-15 ἡσυχον καὶ ἀτρεμὴ κίνησιν.

The description of self-intellection as the static activity reminds us of
God’s activity of immobility in Aristotle (see note 41 in Chapter II). If we are justified in applying the Parmenidian passage (V 1 [10],8,18-20) to Plotinus’ own system, the immobility of real being, though incompatible with physical motion, accords with τὸ νοεῖν. Hence the contents of Intellect are described as the ἵππομοῦντα ἐν ἐνὶ νῷ (V 9 [5],9,1-2). This description might suggest Plotinus’ possible exegesis of the Sophist that the characterization of the Idea or οὐσία as τὸ ἵππομοῦν (248e4) would not be compromised by νοῦς which τὸ παντελῶς ὅν must possess (249a4).

41Armstrong views that Plotinus in this chapter seems to assume without discussion the identity of the Aristotelian νοητῶν with the Platonic νοητά and that this identity further suggests the identification of the self which Intellect thinks with the Platonic Forms (Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 408-409). This identification is surely related to Plotinus’ conception of the true self of the human person as πρότερον ἡθα πάς (VI 5 [23],12,19). Needless to say, the identification of oneself and all Being does not show the influence of oriental thought upon Plotinus, but is to some extent prefigured by Plato in his description of the philosopher-king’s endeavor to assimilate himself to the ordered world of Forms. See Rep. 500c4-5 κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, τοῦτο μιμεῖσθαι τε καὶ ὅτι μόλις ἁμομοιώσθαι. Campbell, in The Theaetetus of Plato, a Revised Text and English Notes (Oxford: The University Press, 1861; reprint ed., New York: Arno Press, 1973), p. 112, compares this passage with φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν in Theaet. 176b1-2.

42The word ἀνόητον in line 33 may be taken in its active sense just as is in III 8 [30],9,14-15, V 5 [32],1,37, V 9 [5],5,8, and VI 7 [38],9,26-28.

43The similar argument is also developed in VI 7 [38],9,24-29, where Plotinus explicitly mentions the necessity of the conception of the intelligible object as thinking and living for self-knowledge to be possible.

O’Daly observes that V 3 [49],5 provides us with a proof of the thesis that the object of intellection is knowing, the thesis that Plotinus does not seek to prove in II 9 [33],1 (Plotinus’ Philosophy of the Self, p. 76).

44As the intellective subject is designated ἡ οὐσία νοῦ in V 9 [5],5,7-8, τὸ οὐσώδες αὐτοῦ (sc. νοῦ) in lines 40-41 refers to the intellective subject. The expression ἡ οὐσία νοῦ recurs in line 41.

45O’Daly’s remark would be right that “the key to the argument lies in the linking concepts of ἐνέργεια and νόησις” (Plotinus’ Philosophy of the Self, p. 77; see also G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 279).

Someone might notice that the argument for the self-knowledge of
Intellect begins with the premise of the intelllection-intelligible identity (5,31-32), while his preceding argument results in the intellect-intelligible identity (5,26-28). The present argument rather seems to take over the identity, of contemplative activity and its object, concluded in 5,21-22.

46In this argument, Plotinus presupposes such a conceptual link between sameness and being-onceself that "If A is the same as B, then B is A itself." This link seems to be indebted to Plato's conception that sameness as one of five genera is always that with reference to itself (πρὸς ἑαυτῆν) (Soph. 256a12-b1; see also 254d15). It would also suggest the connection between sameness as representing unity among the intelligible objects (see note 11) and the conception of the true self of the human person as the intelligible whole (see note 41).

47Bussanich specifies three reasons why Plotinus considers the intellect-intelligible unity to be necessary in V 3 [49],5 (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 91-92). First, the identity can overcome the duality and imprecision of sensation, imagination, and discursive reasoning. Second, it is necessary for true thought to be self-intelllection. Third, it is required by complete intellectual actuality.


49Plotinus rather seems to use the passages from Plato's dialogues in support of his own doctrine. We may here identify the passages where Plotinus believes that Plato, explicitly or implicitly, mentions the intellect-intelligible identity. They are Tim. 30c7-8 (see Chapter II) and Phdr. 247d7-e2 (see note 35).

50See also note 63 in Chapter I.

51See note 29.

52O'Daly comments on V 1 [10],11,1-7 as follows: "... we might say ... a faculty (i.e. of reasoning) [is] based ... no less on the Theory of Forms than on the unicity of soul which is potentially all things" (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, p. 42).

We may here notice the unique nature of the treatise V 1 [10]. This treatise has the character of the ἔξισις (8,12) of Plato's philosophy, while each of other treatises is simply called the λόγος (II 3 [52],1,4; III 1 [3],10,1; IV 4 [28],23,48) or the πράγματεία (VI 3 [44],1,26). As Atkinson writes, the role of exegete is "to recover the hidden meaning from Plato's philosophy" (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 191). But this "hidden meaning" could not be exhausted by Plotinus' attempt, in the eighth chapter, to show the doctrine of three hypostases to have already been entertained by Plato. As mentioned in note 31, V 1 [10],4,6-12 can be viewed as Plotinus' own
reply to the problem with which Plato was confronted in the *Sophist*, what the criterion of being is whereby we can integrate Forms, intellect, and souls into the unified whole. Again, 11,1-7 mentions the principal force of the theory of Forms that the existence of the immutable Forms and their knowability, insured by their always being possessed by Intellect, make possible a judgment about particulars and subsequent discourse. As a matter of fact, these problems are not explicitly and sufficiently worked out in Plato's dialogues. Insofar as Plotinus' metaphysical scheme accords with Plato's own, he must deal with the problems, which Plato has left unsolved, concerning the fundamental principles of the theory of Forms. Thus seen, Plotinus' "exegesis" of Plato's philosophy would be not only to disclose the meaning of Plato's doctrine, expressed in riddles, but to solve the problems left unsolved in his dialogues in a purely philosophical manner. Of course, the objection could be made that it is not fully clear whether or not τούς... λόγους in 8,12 refers to 4,6-12 and 11,1-7. But it is certain at least that 8,12 refers to 8,8-9 πολλαχοῦ δὲ τὸ ὁν καὶ τοῦ νοῦν τὴν ἰδέαν λέγεται [subjectum Πλάτων]. While Plotinus believes that the identity of Intellect and the Forms is implicit in Plato's dialogues, the identity must be taken as his solution to the problem which has arisen in Plato's works, more specifically, the *Republic* and the *Sophist*.

53 On Plato's rejection, see note 66 in Chapter I.

54 See also III 8 [30],9,15-16. The present passage is the opposite to Plotinus' ascription of honor and majesty to Intellect (see note 38). But Hadot views the present passage as simply indicating Plotinus' transformation of Aristotle's association of majesty with complete intellectual activity in *Met.* 1074b17-21 but not his rejection of Aristotle's formula (*Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 115).

The present passage suggests that Plotinus might understand τὸ παντελῶς ὄν of the *Sophist* as ἡ ὑσταν νοσώσα. This interpretation would have a definite bearing on his conception of the intelligible objects as living and thinking entities (see note 30).

56See V 1 [10],4,36-37; V 6 [24],5,8-9; VI 1 [42],18,21-22; VI 2 [43],8,11-12; VI 6 [34],6,30-33; VI 7 [38],13,40-41; 35,2-3.

57See III 8 [30],8,17-21 and VI 2 [43],8,8-9. On the identification of intellectual life and noetic movement, see III 7 [45],3,9-10 and VI 2 [43],7,5.

58See note 30.

59See Puech's remark: "... le πνευματικός ὄν de Plotin, c'est évidemment ... le πνεύμα" (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 150).

60See also V 3 [49],16,28-30, V 9 [5],10,10-12, and VI 9 [9],2,24.

61See note 38.

There remains a problem. Does Plotinus call the noetic world τὸ πνευματικός ὄν? He rather describes it as the ζωόν πνευματικός referring to Tim. 31b1 (VI 2 [43],21,57; 22,2; VI 6 [34],7,16; 15,8-9; 17,39; VI 7 [38],8,31; 12,3; 36,12), because this phrase can at the same time express the presence of life in and the all-inclusiveness of the intelligible world. If any, τὸ ὅλον ὁν πάντο ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχον, which is said to possess life and intellect in itself (VI 9 [9],2,22-24), would be most proximate to τὸ πνευματικός ὄν. Another informative passage is VI 7 [38],36,12, where the ζωόν πνευματικός is juxtaposed with οὐσία and νοῦς. This juxtaposition tells us Plotinus' conception that οὐσία does not consist solely of the Platonic Forms, but must include life and intellection in itself. In other words, the οὐσία must always be the οὐσία νοοῦσα (see note 54). The above consideration thus shows the fact that Plotinus understood the implication of the move from the οὐσία of "the friends of Forms" to τὸ πνευματικός ὄν of the Stranger, though he did not use the latter expression.

62Armstrong translates ἕνα λόγον in line 30 "a single definition." But λόγος here would mean a rational formative principle. See Lexicon Plotinianum, ed. J. H. Sleeman and G. Pollet (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980), p. 606. In this passage the phrase κατὰ ταύτα καὶ ἀσαίτως represents the static phase of being, while ἕνα λόγον the kinetic phase. On being as the single λόγος, see also VI 2 [43],21,29-30 and VI 4 [22],11,16.

63The immutability of being is established in the outset of the treatise with the sharp distinction between being and becoming. It is formulated as μηδέποτε ψεύδεσθαι τὴν τοῦ ὅντος φύσιν (1,29-30).

64See Volkmann-Schluck's remark on the present passage: "... so bedeutet die Bewegung nicht die Aufhebung der Unveränderlichkeit, sondern gerade das Verharren in der Gegenwärtigkeit des Da-seins, Bleiben in dem Vollzug
der Selbstverwirklichung" (Plotin als Interpret der Ontologie Platos, p. 109). Put into Plotinus' own words, movement is rendered ζωήν μένουσαν καὶ νόησαν ... ἐνεργοῦσαν ... εἰς τὸ ἡδή, μᾶλλον δὲ "ἡδή καὶ ἀεὶ ἡδή", καὶ τὸ παρόν ἀεὶ (8,9-10).

65In the intelligible world, rest cannot be regarded as the privation or abolition of movement (VI 3 [44],27,28-29). Hence we can say that when movement exists rest also exists.

Volkmann-Schluck elucidates the compatibility between rest and movement, which is alleged to have been intended by Plato and to be systematically interpreted by Plotinus, as follows:


But what Volkmann-Schluck means by "Plato's true intention" is not clear enough from the above quotation. According to him, "Plato's true intention" is the clarification of the presence of the mutually constitutive moments in rest and movement as follows:

"Die Ständigkeit bezeichnet primär nicht den Grundcharakter des Gleichbleibens des im Logos faßbaren Gehaltes, sondern das Bleiben im Denken seiner selbst als eines Bleibenden. Die Ständigkeit wird eine Form der Bewegtheit: die erfüllte Bewegtheit des Geistes" (ibid., pp. 111-112).

Volkmann-Schluck's view is not cogent enough, despite his grasping of the link between rest and self-intellection. First, in the Sophist, rest embodies constancy and immutability in general (249b11-c1). Also in the position of "the friends of Forms," the Form's being τὸ ἰρεμοῦν (248e4) precisely means its unchangeability (248a12). Even if we are allowed to say that Plato simply associates immutability or rest with the Idea but does not claim their identity, we cannot say that he can either associate or identify movement with the Idea. As already seen in note 69 in Chapter I, the introduction of spiritual movement into τὸ παντελῶς ὁν does not lead to the conception of the Form as moving. Second, of course, the notion of rest as movedness of intellect is found neither in Plato nor in Plotinus. This conception of rest as movedness is based on the alleged unity of rest and movement, which Volkmann-Schluck views as already implied in Soph. 256b6-7. But this interpretation is not careful enough, because Heindorf's suspicion of a lacuna after 256b7 is accepted by many critics. Heindorf, in filling the lacuna, remarks that
movement does not participate in rest (νῦν δὲ οὐ μεταλαμβάνει). Indeed several critics explore a sense in which movement partakes of rest. But such an interpretation, as Cornford points out (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 287, note 3), is excluded by Plato's earlier rejection of the connectability between movement and rest in 252d6-10 and 254d7-8. Volkmann-Schluck speaks of the "unity" of movement and rest in so a rigid sense as to enable him to say that "die Ständigkeit der Idee . . . wieder ist die Bewegung der Idee" (Plotin als Interpret der Ontologie Platos, p. 116). Now he conceives rest as movedness. On Volkmann-Schluck's view, hence, we are allowed to say that the rest of the Idea is the movedness of the Idea. The alleged movedness of the Form, however, is obviously incompatible with the phrase ἀκίνητον ἐστὸς εἶναι (249a2) which the Stranger renders by τὸ ἣρεμοῦν of "the friends of Forms." I cannot see how Volkmann-Schluck can defend from this incompatibility his claim that the notion of rest as movedness is "Plato's true intention" that Plotinus retrieved.

66See note 40.

67On this coherence, see also VI 6 [34],19,32-33 ἀκίνητον εἰς μεταβολήν . . . τὴν ζωήν.

68Armstrong translates lines 25-26 οὐ γὰρ εἰς αὐτό τὸ νοούμενον, ἀλλὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ as follows: "it [i.e. thought] does not operate in the object of thought itself, but is about it." But αὐτοῦ in line 27 must be taken as the reflexive, because περὶ αὐτοῦ here is contrasted with περὶ ἄλλου, in line 24-25, which implies the aforementioned category of relation.

69In 21,9-10, τὸ νοεῖν, being juxtaposed with τὸ δοξᾶζειν, is regarded as the ἐνέργεια which comes from oneself but is not directed to another.

70See also VI 1 [42],18,5-8, 22,3, and 22,21.

71See note 71 in Chapter I.

72On the comparison of νόησις to ὁψις, see III 8 [30],11,1-2, V 1 [10],5,18, V 3 [49],11,10, and V 4 [7],2,6.

73We must distinguish the thesis that intellection or noetic activity must not be taken in terms of action and passion from the thesis that there are action and passion in some sense in the intelligible world. Plotinus admits that πονῆσεν τε καὶ πείσεις αἱ κατὰ φύσιν are present in the noetic realm (V 9 [5],10,7-8). In other places, he hesitates to hold such a view:

"But 'acting' and 'being affected' are in movement--if being affected is really in the intelligible world at all (εἰ ἰφα ἐκεῖ τὸ πάσχειν)" (VI 2
"... and it is disputed whether there is passive affection in the intelligible and if it is there (καὶ τὸ πάσχειν εἶ ἐκεῖ ἀμφισβητεῖται, καὶ εἶ κάκεῖ), passivity there is something different [from passivity in the sensible]" (VI 3 [44],5,6-7, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adopted by A. Sumi).

We must pay attention to the context of each of these passages. In V 9 [5], Plotinus stresses that everything which exists in the world of sense, insofar as it is not contrary to nature, exists in the intelligible world. He examines in VI 2 [43],16 whether action and passion can constitute the genera of being and explores in VI 3 [44],5 the analogy of being between the intelligible and the sensible. Hence these passages by no means disclaim that intellection is free from action and passion. But there remains a problem. The above considered passages show the slightly unsettled attitude of Plotinus towards the presence of action and passion in the intelligible realm. The discrepancy between his affirmative attitude in V 9 [5] and his hesitation in VI 2-3 [43-44] seems to be mainly due to the difference of his conception of relation in those treatises. In V 9 [5], on the one hand, Plotinus places σχέσεις in the intelligible world (10,7). In VI 2 [43], on the other, relation is regarded as something like a sideshoot (παραφύσις ἐκουσίως) attached to being (16,1). Insofar as they always remain relational, action and passion are not in the intelligible world and, even if they are there, still remain incidental to the noetic being. To this extent, Plotinus seems to be dubious about the presence of passive affection in the intelligible world in VI 3 [44],5,6. Again, the force of ἔργον in VI 2 [43],16,10 would be explicated such that although action and affection, insofar as they always involve relation, are at most incidental to real being, even if they are alleged to exist properly in the intelligible world, they will be subsumed under movement. As already seen, moreover, ποίησις is considered to be incidental to ἐνέργεια in VI 1 [42],22,29. But Plotinus' unsettled attitude would not be exhausted by the difference in his conception of relation. In VI 3 [44] Plotinus maintains that what is said about that which is called ὁσιω in here below can be analogously applied to the intelligible entity (5,1-3); action and passion occur around that which is called ὁσιω in the sensible realm (4,36-37). If the analogy of being holds, there will be in the intelligible world a type of passive affection that differs from that in the world of sense (5,6-7). From the above consideration, we can say at most that Plotinus in VI 2-3 [43-44] is somewhat reluctant to accept his earlier uncritical position in V 9 [5],10. If the notion of relation and the analogy of being must cohere, his position in later treatises will be that action and passion of some sort exist in real being but remain incidental to it.

Considered in another context, however, the suggested incidentality of the action-passion relation seems to have grave significance. In a word, without this relation, the causal dependence of the sensible world on real being is no longer explained. (By real being is meant Intellect and soul collectively in the subsequent

[43],16,10-11, tr. A. H. Armstrong).
Plotinus often gives an account of the production of lower entities by higher ones by means of the double activity theory; the internal activity constitutes the \( \text{o} \text{ùs} \text{i} \alpha \) of the higher entity, and the external activity which derives from that entity entails the lower entity by becoming its internal activity. The external activity, precisely as the one directed towards something else, unavoidably involves the external relation to the generated entity (II 9 [33],8,23 τὴν [sc. ἐνέργειαν] εἰς ὄλλο; IV 3 [27],10,31-32 τὸ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς εἰς ὄλλο; V 1 [10],3,12 τὴν δὲ ὄλλην ψυχαμένην; V 3 [49],7,22 έίτα καὶ εἰς ὄλλο; V 4 [7],1,28 έτερον ποιοῦν). As seen in V 4 [7],1,28, the external activity of real being is characterized as ποιεῖν (see also IV 3 [27],10,29-30 τὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν; IV 8 [6],6, 8 τὸ μετ᾽ αὐτὴν ποιεῖν; V 3 [49],7,24-25 έίναρ εὖ τὸν ἀντίκα δυνηθήναι ποιήσαι εὖ ὄλλῳ). In speaking of the omnipresence of real being in the physical world, Plotinus maintains that the external activity remains incidental to real being itself:

"There is nothing, therefore, surprising in its being in all things in this way, because it is also in nature of them in such a way as to belong to them. For this reason it is not perhaps inappropriate to say that the soul as well runs along incidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) with the body in this way, if she is said to be herself on her own (αὐτῆς ... ἐφ' ἐκατης ... ἐξαι), not belonging to matter or body, but all body throughout the whole of itself is in a way illuminated by her" (VI 4 [22],3,17-23, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).

Here the soul's remaining in herself is contrasted with the incidental exercise of her power towards matter and body. The production and sustenance of the sensible world by the external activity of real being is of necessity as well as incidental (II 9 [33],3,7-12; 8,20-21; IV 8 [6],6,1-18; V 1 [10],7,37-38; V 4 [7],1,37-39; 2,27-30). In this respect Plotinus seems to be indebted to Aristotle's notion of καθ' αὐτὸ συμβεβηκός with which eternity and necessity are associated (Met. 1025a30-34). Because of the incidentality of the external activity, which involves the action-passion relation, to real being itself, the following remark by Rist on the necessity of the procession from the One would be applicable also to the case of real being: ". . . the necessity that the possibilities will be realized is not an extrinsic necessity bringing pressure on the One" (Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 75). In sum, this incidentality, being congruent with the double activity theory, illuminates the causal dependency of the phenomenal world on real being.

74See note 48.

75See also note 48 in Chapter II of Part I.

76With Armstrong, the MSS αὗτῳ is read for Harder's τῷαυτῷ in line 13.
Warren, following Chaignet, elucidates the intimate connotation of the term συναίσθησις as follows: "Sunaisthesis, however, is a relation of part to whole, whole to part, and part to part. One might say that the particular "sunaisthetizing" agent is a kind of unity that is consciousness or awareness always of that unity itself" (Phronesis 9 (1964):90). The term in the present occurrence rather denotes the identity, not relation, of indivisible whole with indivisible whole.

G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, pp. 79-80.

See also note 3.

See note 41.

See note 3.


On Intellect's self-reversion, see also VI 8 [39],6,33-34 and VI 9 [9],2,35. Schwyzer observes that the συναίσθησις in V 8 [31],11,23 implies the deepest internalization (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 376). (On the inaccuracy of his interpretation of this passage, see note 95.) This implication of the word would rather be seen more prominently in the present passage.

See G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 80.


See also V 3 [49],10,42-44 ὀλλὰ θιές καὶ οἶον ἐπαφὴ μόνον ἀρρητος καὶ ἀνόητος. προνοοῦσα οὕσω νοῦ γεγονότος καὶ τοῦ θειγάνουτος οὐ νοοῦτος. Compare Plotinus' tactile metaphor with Aristotle's (see note 22 in Chapter II of Part I).

As Gurtler points out (Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 75), δέ in line 19, answering μέν in line 15, marks the present passage to concern the fully actualized Intellect, whereas the passage in lines 15-19 deals with the transition from the inchoate Intellect to the fully formed one, from κίνησις μόνον το κίνησις διακορής καὶ πλήρης (lines 18-19). The result of this transition is signaled by ἔξης in line 19.

Schwyzer views the consciousness in the present passage as "das erste dunkle Gefühl von sich selbst" (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 377). Bussanich appropriately dismisses this view by pointing out that it "unnecessarily introduces an
imperfect state of knowledge prior to fully actual intellection" (*The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, p. 158). Notice that Intellect contemplates all the objects μετὰ φωτός (line 21).

89 In 41,19-20, Plotinus briefly mentions that Intellect must always possess σύνεσις αὐτοῦ. On the synonymity of σύνεσις and συναίσθησις, see J. Bussanich, *The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, p. 158.

90 Bussanich maintains that Plotinus here speaks of the inchoate Intellect (*The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, pp. 56-57). But this interpretation is untenable. First, he points out that Plotinus defines that which proceeds from the One as τὸ πολὺ or τὸ πλῆθος in III 8 [30],8,33, V 1 [10],6,7, V 3 [49],11,19, and 12,1-10. In these passages, however, the multiplicity is hardly associated with the inchoate Intellect. On the contrary, the inchoate Intellect is ἐν (III 8 [30],8,32; V 1 [10],7,9), just as intelligible matter is so called (see note 11). Second, Bussanich, referring to V 1 [10],7,12 and VI 7 [38],16,19-20, notes that συναίσθησις seems to be typical of the inchoate Intellect. But οἷον συναίσθησις in V 1 [10],7,12 does not designate self-consciousness in its proper sense. As we shall see in the Chapter III of Part II, the quasi-consciousness in V 1 [10],7,12 is attributed to the fully actualized Intellect. Again, Bussanich’s reference to VI 7 [38],16,19-20 contradicts his own interpretation of that passage as seen in note 88. Even though one can say that the inchoate Intellect seeks self-consciousness, but does not possess it, it is said in the present passage that that which is multiple seeks self-consciousness.

Indeed, Plotinus’ use of the verbs ζύτοι and ἔθελοι in line 1 suggests the indefinite impulse of the inchoate Intellect. In V 3 [49],6,39-40, Intellect’s self-reversion is closely associated with its self-sufficiency rather that with its aspiration. In V 6 [24],5, on the contrary, Plotinus attempts to establish the absence of intellection from the self-sufficient One, so that some deficiency in Intellect must be revealed. It is not unusual that the deficiency of Intellect is emphasized in the argument for the denial of intellection to the One (see III 9 [13],7,5; 9,21). The present passage must be read in light of the following section: "So that which thinks is double, even if it thinks itself, and defective, because it has its good in thinking, not in its being" (III 9 [13],7,4-6, tr. A.H. Armstrong). On the defectiveness of the multiple, see also VI 9 [9],6,18-20.

Moreover, σύννευσις seems to be apt to self-intellection (see III 8 [30],11,26 σύννευσις πρὸς τὸ εἴδος αὐτοῦ).


92 As we shall see later, the inchoate Intellect’s desire of the Good never vanishes after the occurrence of fully actual intellection, but eternally subsists. In the context dealing with Intellect’s wholeness and self-sufficiency, ἔφεσις is denied
to Intellect (III 7 [45],4,31-37).

93On the perpetuity of intellection, see also V 8 [31],4,33-34 and VI 7 [38],35,29. This notion goes back to Aristotle (Met. 1074b29 τὸ συννεχὲς ... τῆς νοήσεως). See also note 21 in Chapter II of Part I.

94What does the phrase κατὰ συμβεβηκός here mean? It would remind us of incidental perception in Aristotle. Just as we do not perceive the son of Diapers unless we perceive the white thing (De Anima 418a21-24), self-intellection is causally dependent on Intellect's desire of the Good. The incidence attributed to intellection, different from that attributed to perception, is rather the notion of καθ᾽ αὐτὸ συμβεβηκός (see note 73); self-intellection necessarily and eternally follows the desire of the Good. In sum, the phrase implies that self-intellection is secondary to the primordial desire of the Good and that the causal dependency of the former on the latter is necessary and eternal. This implication, of course, accords with the necessity and eternity of the emanation from the One (see notes 31 and 73) and the perpetuity of intellection (see note 93).

The thesis in the present passage is reiterated in VI 7 [38],40,50-51: καὶ ὅταν αὐτὴ αὐτὴν, οἷον καταμανθάνει α ἐσχεν ἐκ τῆς ἄλλου θέας ἐν αὐτῇ. The phrase ἐκ τῆς ἄλλου θέας explicitly denotes the origination of self-intellection from the contemplation of the One.

95See note 91. See also V 6 [24],4,20 τὴν δύναμιν ... τοῦ εἶναι ὁ ἐστὶ.

We may here briefly touch also upon the soul’s consciousness in her union with Intellect. The soul in her union with Intellect possesses τὴν συναίσθησιν αὐτῆς concurrent with her intellection of intelligible objects (IV 4 [28],2,30-32). The soul’s συναίσθησις here is not only based on the identity of soul and Intellect but introduced to explain that this identity does not mean the abolition of the existence of soul qua soul (lines 28-29) (see also G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, pp. 63-64; H. -R. Schwyzer, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 376). In the similar context dealing with the union of soul with Intellect (V 8 [31],11,23), however, her σύνεσις and συναίσθησις are qualified by οἷον. (Schwyzer’s interpretation that this passage describes the union with the One (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 376) is not accurate, because the θεός in this chapter is the intelligible world of the previous chapter (see G. J. P. O’Daly, Plotinus’ Philosophy of the Self, p. 78; A. Smith, Phronesis 23 (1978):296; G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 74.). Smith observes that this qualification enables Plotinus to "explain both empirical non-awareness and our intellectual awareness-in-total-unity" (Phronesis 23 (1978):297). This view is correct, since the intelligible beauty, which is truly of ourselves, is not apprehended by our empirical consciousness (lines 11-12, 31, and 34-36). Plotinus in the present chapter explains the reason why we are not empirically aware of our union with Intellect. When we are not one with Intellect,
we are empirically conscious of ourselves (ἀφχόμενος αισθάνεται αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἔτερός ἔστι, line 10). Therefore, to describe the union with Intellect by συναισθησίς without the qualifying οὗν suggests that our intellectual self-awareness may be empirical. As Smith remarks (op. cit.:296), in the present chapter, "the area of self-consciousness par excellence is in nous." Hence Plotinus, in describing the mode of intellectual self-awareness, employs σύνεσις (line 28) and συνετός (line 32) rather than συναισθησίς or συναισθάνεσθαι.

96In III 9 [13],9,12ff., Plotinus argues for the absence of παρακολούθησις from the One. Here Intellect's παρακολούθησις is linked with self-intellection, ἐνέργεια, συνιέναι, and κατανοεῖν (lines 18-22). This passage will also be fully considered in Chapter IV of Part II.

97See note 66 in Chapter I of Part I.

98See II 4 [12],4,14, III 8 [30],8,13, VI 7 [38],2,47, and 2,51.

99Porphyry's initial claim ὅτι ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ ψέστηκε τὸ νοημα (Vita Plotini 18,11) suggests that the word νοημα can be used even of the Form outside Intellect. In light of the original meaning of the word as that which is thought, his claim may be taken to mean that the Form, though not in Intellect, is always thought by Intellect, the case criticized in the third argument of V 5 [32],1. Although two groups of codex (w and x) have τὰ νοητὰ instead of τὸ νοημα, the original meaning of νοημα would allow us to understand this section without trouble.

The Sicilian Alcimus, referring to the Platonic Forms, says that ἔστι δὲ τῶν εἴδων ἐν ἑκαστον αἴδιον τε καὶ νοημα (Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Phil. III,13). This statement, however, does not mean that the Form is a concept, either human or divine. As Armstrong notes, "Alcimus may have meant no more by calling the Form a νοημα than that it was immaterial, an object of thought" (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 399).

100See also A. H. Armstrong, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 395: "But I think that Plotinian scholars would generally agree that it would be an inadequate and unsatisfactory description of this relation [i.e. of Intelligibles to Intellect] to say that for Plotinus the Ideas are the thoughts of Intellect."

101R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism, p. 54.

102By saying this I do not totally refuse the traditional view that the Middle Platonic conception of the Forms lies in the historical background of Plotinus' doctrine of Intellect. But I cannot agree with Wallis who characterizes Plotinus' doctrine as the reinterpretation of the Middle Platonic theory in light of Aristotle's doctrine of the identity of intellection and its object (Neoplatonism, p.
for Plotinus' attitude towards the Form-νόημα theory is critical rather than reinterpretative. Rather, Armstrong's observation of Plotinus' departure from Middle Platonism would be accurate:

"These two characteristics [i.e. (i) vitality and activity and (ii) unity-indiversity] are obviously closely connected in his [i.e. Plotinus'] mind, and nothing like them appears, as far as we know, in the speculations of his Middle-Platonist predecessor for whom the Platonic Forms were 'thoughts of God'" ("Plotinus," in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H. Armstrong, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 245).

In which aspect is Plotinus indebted to Middle Platonists? Merlan observes that from the viewpoint of the presence of the Forms inside Intellect, Antiochus, who might have initiated the doctrine of Ideas as God's thoughts, "seems to provide us with an appropriate background." See Ph. Merlan, "Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus," in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H. Armstrong, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 56-57. We must notice that Plotinus subscribes to Plato's rejection of the Form as a νόημα, which is opposed to the Middle Platonic doctrine. Hence the Plotinian thesis that the Ideas are Intellect as well as Intellect is the Ideas seems to be his own insight that can steer the clear course between the Scylla of Intellect's fallibility or the incomplete intelligibility of the Forms and the Charybdis of the Idea-νόημα theory. Armstrong specifies that Plotinus' doctrine is stimulated by Albinus' identification of the Peripatetic divine νοητόν with the νοητά of the "God's thoughts" interpretation of Platonism (see note 43 in Chapter II of Part I). If this view is right, we will be able to say that Plotinus is indebted to Middle Platonism at least in this identification, that is, the view that the self-thinking divine Intellect concerns the multiplicity of objects. But we cannot see how the doctrine of the Forms as God's thoughts as such positively contributes to the formation and the formulation of Plotinus' doctrine of Intellect. As regards his rejection of the Form-νόημα theory, Plotinus may be called purely Platonic, but not Middle-Platonic.

103See also V 1[10],7,13-17 and VI 7[38],15,17-24.

104The full consideration of the problem concerning the logical priority of being and intellection will be left for another occasion. The problem is mentioned in J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 229-230, J. N. Deck, Nature, Contemplation, and the One, p. 27, note 9, and R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism, p. 67.

105We must also notice that Plotinus' account for Intellect's original reversion in III 8[30],11 is devoted to the explication of the One as the δύναμις τῶν πάντων, presented in the previous chapter (10,1). Also in the eleventh chapter the
One's creativity is elucidated (11,33-36). Bussanich takes ἕτι δὲ καὶ ὅδε (11,1) as marking the "transition from discussion of hyper-noetic awareness of the One to Intellect's original reversion," which he regards as being "extremely abrupt" (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 116). But we do not need to feel it abrupt, because the four words in 11,1 mark the transition, in the way of clarifying what the One is, from the account of the One as the emanative source of all things in the tenth chapter to the account of it as that which fulfills the inchoate vision of Intellect (11,7-8) by providing its pluralized images. As Armstrong remarks, Plotinus' real intention in III 8 [30] lies in the disclosure of the One's existence and power (see note 21).


107 Buchner points out that the term ἐνέργεια in Plotinus has a double sense, actuality (Wirklichkeit) and active power (Wirkkraft). See H. Buchner, Plotins Möglichkeitlehre (Munich, Salzburg: Verlag Anton Pustet, 1970), p. 56. What we mean by "intellectual activity" corresponds to the ἐνέργεια in the second sense. We shall explore the compatibility between the immutability of being and Intellect's ἐνέργεια in this sense. The conceptual distinction of the two senses of ἐνέργεια is clearly seen in the interrogative sentence, ἀλλ' ἐνέργεια μὲν πάντα καὶ οὕτως, ἐνέργεια δὲ πάντα (II 5 [25],3,34-35).

The pure actuality of Intellect is completely free from the Aristotelian potency and so allows no vicissitude in the intelligible world. On the connection between the immutability of being and Intellect's pure actuality, see II 5 [25],3,22-31. On Intellect's pure actuality, see also V 9 [5],4,6-10, and 5,1-4.

108 Plotinus normally denies διέξοδος to Intellect (see note 33). The visionary description of Intellect's movement in this chapter, deeply influenced by the Phaedrus myth, is quite unique (see note 13).

109 In this passage Hadot sees Plotinus' understanding of τὸ παντελῶς ὄν of the Sophist (Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 109-110).

110 See also VI 7 [38],17,14-16. Compare ζωὴ ἀφριστὸς ὡς in V 4 [7],2,6.

111 See V 1 [10],7,23-26, where ὀρισμός is closely associated with μορφή and στάσις, and VI 2 [43],8,23-24, where στάσις and the πέρας νοῦ are linked together. On the close connection between definition and οὐσία, see V 5 [32],6,5-6.

The unreceptivity of being mentioned in the above quoted passage may be taken with Plotinus' refusal to see intelligible matter as the principle of change in II
The form does not come to intelligible matter afterwards (lines 15-16) and each entity already received the form (line 24). The intelligible world, which has been already completely structured, does not receive anything from outside.

The coherence between the immutability of being and intellectual activity can be explained in another way. The immutability of being is closely linked with its non-ecstatic mode (οὐκ ἐξίσταται αὐτῷ ἑαυτῷ) in VI 5 [23],3,1-2 (see also 2,12-16). The non-ecstatic mode of Intellect in V 3 [49],7,13-20 is identified with Intellect's ἰσοξία and explained by its self-referential ἐνέργεια or self-intellection.

Plotinian scholars agree that Plotinus in VI 4-5 [22-23] works out the problem concerning the things' participation in the Form, presented in Parm. 131a4-c11. See G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, pp. 14-23; J. S. Lee, "Omnipresence, Participation, and Eidetic Causation in Plotinus," in The Structure of Being: A Neoplatonic Approach, ed. R. B. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), pp. 90-95. Although we have to leave the full consideration of Plotinus' conception of participation for another occasion, it must be noticed that his description of the non-ecstatic mode of being, οὐδ' αὐτῷ εἰσίν εἰς ὅτι ὃν (VI 5 [23],2,15) is the reminiscence of Tim. 52a3-4 οὕτε αὐτὸ εἰς ὅλον ποι ἰόν. Archer-Hind not only takes this passage as "a perfectly unmistakable assertion of the solely transcendent [sic] existence of ideas," but makes a cross-reference to "the difficulties raised against the doctrine of immanent ideas in Parmenides 131A" (The Timaeus of Plato, p. 182). The non-ecstatic mode of being in Plotinus, however, does not solely indicate the transcendence of the Forms, but is inseparably linked with the non-ecstatic, self-referential activity of Intellect. In the allegorical passage referring to the myth of Cronus' devouring of his children (V 1 [10],7,30-32), the presence of all the intelligible objects in Intellect is said to prevent them from falling into matter (μὴ δὲ ἐκπεσεῖν εἰς ὕλην) and from being brought up with Rhea (μὴ δὲ τραφῆναι παρὰ τῇ 'Ρέα), that is, impermanent flux.

Plotinus takes ἐνέργεια ἀτελῆς as ἐνέργεια μὲν πάντως, ἐχεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ πάλιν καὶ πάλιν, οὐχ ὑπὸ ἀφίκηται εἰς ἑνέργειαν (VI 1 [42],16,6-7). Compare this interpretation with Skemp's interpretation (see note 41 in Chapter II of Part I).

In VI 2 [43],8, intellectual activity is credited with the role of connecting seeing and being or of identifying itself with being (lines 17-18). O'Daly views this role of bridging the subject-object duality as insuring "logical coherence of a more precise sort" than the argument for Intellect's self-knowledge in V 3 [49],5,31-48 does (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, p. 77).

See also V 3 [49],7,20 εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἑνέργειαν ἵσχει. On Intellect's
self-reversion, see Section III and note 83. See also P. Hadot, *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 132: "Autrement, dit, l'Intelligence plotinienne est douée d'un mouvement intérieur qui n'est autre que la vie."

117See also III 9 [13], 9,11-12 ἡ [sc. νόησις] τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

118Harder observes that 2,35 νοεῖν τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ tacitly claims the correction of the thesis in 7,8-10 that the souls, possessing the image of the One, cannot think it (ὡς οὐκ ἔστων ἄλλου ἔχουσα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τύπον ἐκεῖνο νόησαι ἐνεργοῦντος τοῦ τύπου) (*Plotins Schriften*, 1b:470). We must notice that Plotinus describes the contact of Intellect or soul with the One, using νοεῖν or its cognates in the present treatise (8,26-27 πεφυκε τὸ νοοῦν πρὸς τὸ κατανοούμενον συνάπτειν; 9,14-15 καὶ νοεῖ ἐνταῦθα). This type of νοεῖν does not involve any image of the One (11,20-21). Hence we must say that Plotinus differentiates two levels of νοεῖν in VI 9 [9] rather than that 2,35 is the *ad hoc* correction of 7,8-10. But Harder appropriately takes νοεῖν in 2,35 with ἐπιστρέφει (2,36) and παρείναι (2,41) (*Plotins Schriften*, 1b:470).

119See 8,31-33 οὖν ἀφειτῆκε τοῖς ἄλληλων τόπων, ἐτερότητι δὲ καὶ διαφορᾷ· ὅταν οὖν ἡ ἐτερότης μὴ παρῇ, ἄλληλοις τὰ μὴ ἔτερα πάρεστιν. See also V 1 [10], 6,53, V 8 [31], 13,8-9, and VI 4 [22], 11,9-10. On ontherness between the second and the third hypostases, see V 1 [10], 3,21-22.


In III 8 [30], 9,31, Intellect is said to have two sides (ἀμφίστωτομον). This complicated passage will be seriously considered later in Chapter V of Part II.

121In this passage the verb νοεῖν is denied to Intellect's contemplation of the One (lines 29-30). The verb is restricted to the contemplation of the Forms within Intellect (line 32). On the dual activity of Intellect, see also P. Hadot, "Neoplatonist Spirituality: Plotinus and Porphyry," in *Classical Mediterranean Spirituality*, ed. A. H. Armstrong (New York: Crossroad, 1986), pp. 242-244.
This passage is traditionally taken to mean the equivalence of the pre-noetic phase of Intellect to its hyper-intellective phase (see A. H. Armstrong, *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 262-263). Bussanich attempts to dismiss such interpretations by pointing out that the ἐρως is not associated with the ἔφεσις of the inchoate Intellect whereas the ἔφεσις, with rare exceptions, is absent from the ἐρως of the hyper-noetic phase (*The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, pp. 176-179). But it must be noticed that "the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect" has a double meaning: (i) the hyper-noetic phase which always coexists with the self-intellective phase and (ii) the hyper-noetic phase which operates alone in its union with the One by having surrendered the self-intellective phase. As 35,7 πάντα ἡ ἀφίησις and 35,24-25 ὅταν ἀφρων γένηται indicate, Intellect, in order to become one with the One, must cease to think itself and the Forms by giving up its self-thinking phase (see also III 8 [30], 9, 29-32). Hence Bussanich’s attempt is acceptable if he says that the pre-noetic phase is not identical with the hyper-noetic phase in the sense of (ii). But it is the equivalence of the inchoate Intellect to the hyper-noetic phase in the sense of (i) that we are maintaining. Our claim is fully consistent with Bussanich’s own view that the inchoate factor eternally operates in the fully actualized Intellect (*ibid.*., pp. 125-126, 179-180).

In the present context, the self-intellective and the hyper-noetic phases of Intellect are designated respectively νοῦς ἐμφρονῶν and νοῦς ἐρῶν (35,24). Bussanich tries to establish that the inchoate Intellect cannot be described as νοῦς ἐρῶν because of the above mentioned reason (*The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, pp. 178-179). But there still remains a problem whether the eternally pre-noetic phase of the fully actualized Intellect, which is the hyper-noetic phase in the sense of (i), can be denominated so or not. The answer is affirmative. First, as Bussanich himself remarks (*ibid.*, p. 178), ἐρως, as well as ἔφεσις, πόθος, and ὥρας, is applicable to the internal activity of the fully actualized Intellect or to general statements of the desire to return to the One. Second, we must carefully read 35,24-25 νοῦς ἐρῶν, ὅταν ἀφρων γένηται μεθυσθεὶς τοῦ νέκταρος. The crucial point is the subjunctive clause ὅταν ἀφρων γένηται, which adumbrates that Intellect in love is not always ἀφρων. As Theiler and Beutler point out, ἐμφρονος and ἀφρων are opposed to one another (*Plotins Schriften*, 3b:509). To become witless means to give up the νοῦς ἐμφρονῶν or self-thinking phase which has coexisted with νοῦς ἐρῶν. Notice that ἐρῶν is not opposed to ἐμφρονῶν. Hence Bussanich’s identification of νοῦς ἐρῶν and νοῦς ἀφρῶν (*ibid.*, p. 174) is not fully accurate; since νοῦς ἐρῶν can designate the hyper-intellective phase of Intellect in the senses of both (i) and (ii), whereas νοῦς ἀφρῶν the hyper-noetic phase in the sense of (ii) alone. Thus hyper-noetic phase in the sense of (i) would be described as νοῦς ἐρῶν and the one in the sense of (ii) as νοῦς ἐρῶν καὶ ἀφρῶν.

See also the following passage: "But if anyone is going to admit that Intellect knows God [i.e. the One], he will be forced to agree that it also knows itself" (V 3 [49],7,1-3).

J. Bussanich, *The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, pp. 59-60. On the association of movement with the pre-noetic phase of Intellect, see VI 7 [38],16,18 κίνσης . . . μόνου. On the association of desire with the pre-noetic phase, see III 8 [30],11,23 and V 3 [49],11,12. In the present passage the inchoate Intellect is referred to as τὸ γενόμενον (5,7). On the description as such, see V 2 [11],1,9.

See note 117.

See V 1 [10],7,11, V 4 [7],2,4, and VI 7 [38],40,10-11.

We read τῷ ἀγαθοειδὲς εἶναι . . . καὶ ὁμοίωμα ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν (lines 13-14) as the modal dative. On the application of ἀγαθοειδής (*Rep.* 509a3) to Intellect, see III 8 [30],11,16-18; V 3 [49],16,18-19; V 6 [24],4,5; VI 2 [43],17,28; VI 7 [38],15,23 (see also VI 9 [9],5,26 ἐνοετὸν).

The implication of the phrase κατὰ συμβεβηκός here is analyzed in note 94. With H-S, Armstrong, Beutler-Theiler, and Bussanich, we take αὐτοῦ (line 16) and αὑτὸ (line 17) respectively as referring to the Good and to Intellect and κατὰ συμβεβηκός as going with the following rather than the preceding pronoun.

O'Daly renders Plotinus' stress in the present passage as "the relative nature of self-knowledge" (*Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self*, p. 79).

Our view that self-intellection is the unavoidable and eternal epiphenomenon of the original intellection concerning the One, of course, conforms to the widely expressed view that Intellect looks at the One, which results in self-thinking, or that Intellect, in its endeavor to see the One, sees the One as many since it is unable to grasp the One in its absolute unity.

Rist elucidates the above mentioned widely expressed view in terms of the connection between intellection and otherness: "The peculiar mark of intuitive thought is that it is an attempt to think the One, but a failure to grasp the One
without otherness; and otherness implies recognizable ‘parts”’ (Le Néoplatonisme, p. 83). We also remarked about the necessary connection between intellection and otherness in note 13. It must be noticed that the intellection towards the One also involves otherness (VI 9 [9],2,37-38 εἰ δὲ πρὸς ἑτέρου βλέπει). In VI 9 [9],5,26-29, Intellect’s multiplicity (οὐκ ὄντος . . . ἐν) is ascribed to its separateness from the One (ἀποστῆναι δὲ πως τοῦ ἐνὸς τολμήσας). Bussanich takes this passage closely with III 8 [30],8,30-36, where Plotinus deals with the genesis of Intellect as the consequence of its desire for self-expansion on a lower plane (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 82; see also A. H. Armstrong, Le Néoplatonisme, p. 71). Thus otherness, which characterizes the multiplicity of the Forms and is involved in intellection, presupposes otherness which indicates the separateness of Intellect from the absolute simplicity. For the τὸλμα as the desire for separation, see M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 4; A. H. Armstrong, The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, p. 242; E. R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 24-25).

130We do not read Gollwitzer’s emendation ὑπέστησε adopted by Cilento and Mizuchi, but retain the MSS reading. The reason is that the One’s subsistence implied by the MSS reading, with the definition of intellection as a movement, entails the absence of intellection from the One (5,10-11). Without the explicit remark on the One’s subsistence which implies its immobility, we cannot see the force of οὖν in 5,10.

131Compare 5,7-8 ἐκινήθη τε καὶ εἰδὲ with V 1 [10],7,5-6 ἦ ὅτι τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ πρὸς αὐτό (sc. τὸ ἐν) ἑώρα. ἦ δὲ ὦραςις αὐτὴ νοῦς. In the latter passage, ὦραςις means fully actual intellection. In the former, εἰδὲ is picked up by ὦραςις in 5,10.

132We cannot see why Bussanich, referring to 10,32-33 τυχῶν ἐντὸς ἀναπαυσάμενος συμμόνει, can regard τυχάνων here as denoting also Intellect’s hyper-noetic contact with the Good (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 125-126). The transitive τυχάνειν in 11,16 and 11,24-25 is obviously distinct from its Attic usage in 10,32 as an auxiliary verb joined with the participle of another verb (ἀναπαυσάμενος).

133In 11,43-44, πλήρωσιν . . . ἀληθινὴν and νόησιν are juxtaposed.

134On Plotinus’ own definition of incomplete activity, see note 114. As the passage ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ πάλιν καὶ πάλιν in VI 1 [42],16,6 indicates, incomplete activity is successive. On the contrary, the phrase ἄεὶ τυχάνων in the present passage unmistakably implies the continuity of intellection. On the continuity of
intellectual activity, see VI 2 [43],21,13-14 μετὰ δὲ τοῦ συνεχούς τῆς ἐνεργείας and VI 7 [38],35,13-14 ὁράμα βλέποι τῷ συνεχεί τῆς θέας. Plotinus calls such activity without intermittence ἄσπυρος (I 4 [46],9,18-23; VI 2 [43],8,7) and ἀγρυπνος (II 5 [25],3,36). See also note 93.

135Bussanich also takes these two passages together (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 125).

136J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 157. On Plotinus’ own conception of incomplete activity (see notes 114 and 134), however, the actualization of the inchoate Intellect is not incomplete activity. While incomplete activity is successive, the phrase ἐφέμενος ἀεὶ explicitly indicates the continuity and perpetuity of that actualization, which embodies the thesis of the eternity of the inchoate Intellect (see note 123). On the continuity of Intellect’s desire for the One, see also A. H. Armstrong, Le Néoplatonisme, p. 72: "... a finite mind endlessly exploring the riches of the infinite with a desire ever stimulated by new revelations of the unbounded good into which it penetrates ever more deeply."

Bussanich, on the other hand, would be right in noting that the Platonic κίνησις, closely associated with life, finds a place in Plotinus’ actualized Intellect.

137For the satiety of Intellect, see III 5 [50],9,18; III 8 [30],11,39; V 1 [10],4,9-10; 7,35; V 8 [31],13,4; V 9 [5],8,8; VI 7 [38],35,26.

Intellect’s life, when considered without reference to its relation to the One, is described as involving no desire because of its own satiety (III 7 [45],4,33-37; V 3 [49],6,39-40).

138See also III 8 [30],11,42, VI 7 [38],23,7-8 and VI 9 [9],6,18.

139Some critics take ἔξ οὗ ἐστίν (40,7) as “from the One” and regards intellection in discussion as attached to or coming from the One. See G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, pp. 275-276; A. C. Lloyd, "Plotinus on the Genesis of Thought and Existence," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 5 (1987):172. On this interpretation, however, the passage ἥ μὲν συνοῦσα τῷ ἔξ οὗ ἐστίν unavoidably leads to the ascription of intellection to the One. Taking the connection of συνοῦσα (40,6) and ἐκείν (40,7) into consideration, we may understand τὸ ἔξ οὗ ἐστίν as referring to the ὑποκείμενον (40,7). This construction entails the identity of τὸ ἔξ οὗ ἐστίν and τὸ οὗ ἐστὶ νόησις (40,7), that is, the intellect-intelligible identity.

From the counter-factual protasis εἰ δ’ ἤν ... μὴ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου (40,21) it can be inferred that the second intellection mentioned in 40,10-19 is from (ἀπό) the One. The preposition ἀπό, coupled with ἐφ’ ἐαυτῆς (40,22), implies the intellection’s independence of and separateness from the One. But the preposition
ék in the present passage does not have such an implication.

140 See II 6 [17], 1,55-57, V 6 [24], 6,17-23, and VI 2 [43], 7,25-26. See also III 8 [30], 11,6-8 and 11,43-44.

In the present passage, intellection is characterized as resting upon the Form which is the substrate. This characterization is appropriate to intellection proper. Compare 40,8 οὐν δὲ ἐπικείμενον ἀυτή γίνεται ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ οὐσα with V 9 [5], 8,13-14 οὐν ἐπὶ πόρ ἡδι τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς ἐνέργειαν.

But the phrase πληροῦσα τὸ δύναμει ἑκεῖνο (40,9) would sound unusual, because Plotinus, in defining intellectual movement as the activity of real being, does not represent being as in potentiality (VI 2 [43], 7,20; 8,16-19). Perhaps being here may be considered in total abstraction from its activity.

141 We must keep in mind that the phrase ἐφ’ ἐαυτῆς (40,14) does not exclude the role of the One’s causation from the genesis of real being. The very cause of real being is the One, but not the inchoate Intellect (16,22-24). This point will be further discussed in note 142. The phrase rather seems to be employed to indicate the separateness of the second intellection from the One, which is really pointing to the thesis to be defended in the present chapter.

142 J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 229. On this interpretation, the passage οὐσα δύναμις τοῦ γεννᾶν ἐφ’ ἐαυτῆς ἐγέννα (40,13-14) is explained by V 1 [10], 7,13-14 ὀρίζει τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ τῇ παρ’ ἑκείνου δύναμει and 7,15-17 ῥώμυνεται παρ’ ἑκείνου καὶ τελειοῦται εἰς οὐσίαν παρ’ ἑκείνου καὶ ἐξ ἑκείνου. It is thus concluded that Plotinus thinks of both the One’s causation and the autonomy of the generative power given to the inchoate Intellect from the One in the genesis of real being.

In addition, we cannot see why Buchner interprets Plotinus as contrasting productive intellection with human non-productive thinking in the present passage (Plotins Möglichkeitlehre, p. 57).

143 We must not confuse this primary activity and ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς (sc. δύναμεως) (40,14) which is οὐσία. The latter ἐνέργεια means actualization or realization rather than activity. It must also be noted that the passage ἀλλ’ οὐσα δύναμις τοῦ γεννᾶν ἐφ’ ἐαυτῆς ἐγέννα, καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς ἐστιν οὐσία (40,13-15) is sharply contrasted with the passage about the first intellection ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ οὐσα καὶ πληροῦσα τὸ δύναμει ἑκεῖνο (40,8-9). The former passage can certainly be taken with the description of two phases of Intellect, δύναμις... εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθοῦσα (III 8 [30], 11,2).

144 See Beutler’ and Theiler’s comment on 40,6ff. (Plotins Schriften, 3b:516).
In I 7 [54],1,13, the desire for the Good and the activity towards it are juxtaposed (ἐφεσίς καὶ ἐνέργεια πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον).

The passage ἐνεργοῦσα γὰρ αὐτὸν νοεῖ (V 6 [24],5,17-18) represents self-intellection as the intellection of the self that thinks the Good. This passage expands the notion of self-intellection as formulated in II 9 [33],1,49-50 and III 9 [13],6,1-3 by relating it to the doctrine of Intellect's relation to the One.

On the continuity of intellectual activity, see note 134.

We may also consider the following passage:

"So this Intellect had an immediate apprehension of the One, but by grasping it became the Intellect, perpetually in need [of the One] (ἀεὶ δὲ ἐνδεόμενος) and having become at once Intellect and real being and intellection when it thought" (V 3 [49],11,12-15, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).

With Armstrong and Bussanich, Igal's ἐνδεόμενος is read for ἐνδώμενος in line 13. In this section, the perpetual desire joined with the eternally pre-noetic apprehension is closely related to the genesis of οὐσία.

See note 94. The incidentality of self-intellection seems to be implicitly stated also in VI 7 [38],40,15-18, especially in 40,16 καὶ αὐτὴν νοεῖ η ἡ φύσις.

Corrigan comments on V 6 [24],2 as follows:

"Starting therefore, from a world of intellectuality ... Plotinus reaches his own Transcendent principle, and the need for an hypothesis of an ultimate νοητόν disappears in the course of the argument itself. Here too, then, it is clear that the One is not, in any simple sense, an object of thought" ("Plotinus, 'Enneads' 5,4 [7],2 and Related Passages," Hermes 114 (1986):199, (Italics mine.)).

This observation is inadequate. First, Plotinus' argument does not end in the disclosure of the transcendent principle. Rather, it consistently concerns the necessity of the One for intellection to arise satisfactorily. Hence it is not accurate to say, with Corrigan, that "the argument is concerned with ascent" (Hermes 114 (1986):199). This basic observation seems to underlie the inadequacy of Corrigan's view. Second, it is not clear in what sense Corrigan calls the description of the One as τὸ νοητὸν an "hypothesis." It becomes manifest that the role of the One as the transcendent object of intellection never disappears in the present treatise as soon as we read that Intellect is said to think itself incidentally in thinking the Good (V 6 [24],5,16-17). It is clear that the status of the One as τὸ νοητὸν is not hypothetical. Finally, as we shall see later, the One as τὸ νοητὸν is correlative to the pre-noetic activity of Intellect described as νόησις. The One is called the intelligible object in this simple sense. In V 6 [24], νόησις has two senses, the intellection towards the One and self-intellection. Corrigan's view, unless he is fully aware of these two
senses of intellection, is prone to blur the necessary distinction of two senses of νοητόν, one applied to the One and another to the complex of the Forms.

Given two senses of intellection, both the One and the complex of the Forms can properly be called τὸ νοητόν. Nevertheless we can distinguish them in terms of the first sense of intellection, by calling the One the "pure" (2,8) object of intellection and the Forms the "incidental" (5,16) object.

149See V 6 [24],2,10 τὸ τε γὰρ νοητὸν ἐτέρῳ and VI 9 [9],6,54 αἰτίᾳ τοῦ νοεῖν ἄλλῳ.


151This passage may be taken with the description of the One as οὐσίας καθαρῶς νοητοῦ (2,8), which would be contrasted with the phrase κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

152In VI 7 [38],16,29-30 the Good is regarded as the cause of both νοῦς and ὕπνα. By this expression, however, Plotinus means that the Good is the cause of the intelligibility of the οὐσία (16,23-24), which is compared to sunlight providing thinking to Intellect and being-thought to beings (16,30-31). The One plays such a role also in V 5 [32],7,16-18. Needless to say, this role of the One is the same as the role of the Good in the analogy of the sun in the Republic. When the One is given this role, it cannot be the transcendent object of intellection. In this case, the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect does not come to the fore and the meaning of intellection is confined to self-intellection.

That the One is the "transcendent" cause of intellection is explained by the fact that Intellect sees the "trace" of the One, but not the One itself and the aforementioned causal principle that the cause is not the same as that which is caused. Henry stresses that the One as τὸ νοητὸν, though it means the One grasped by Intellect, remains transcendent (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 421).

153P. Henry, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 421.

154In light of 2,5-6 we can also demarcate the One as μόνον νοητόν from Intellect as νοητόν καὶ νοοῦ.

The fact that Plotinus was aware of the ambiguity can be recognized from the following passage:

"Intellect, on the one hand (μὲν), is surely also an intelligible (καὶ αὐτὸς νοητόν), but it thinks as well: so it is already two. It, on the other, is also
a different intelligible by being posterior to the One itself (ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὀλλο τῷ μετ' αὐτὸ νοητόν)" (V 4 [7], 2, 10-12, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).

The final sentence has been variously construed. Armstrong’s translation, based on the H-S text, follows the same line as Igal’s: "est etiam intellegibile diversum ab Illo, quia post Illud" ("Adnotatiunculae in Plotinum," Mnemosyne 22 (1969):363). Bussanich also accepts the H-S text but translates: "And it is also an intelligible object to something else, that which comes after it." He takes αὐτὸ in line 12 as referring to Intellect qua νοητόν (J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 18).

Bussanich stresses the merit of his construction as eliminating the redundancy of other translations (loc. cit.). But Armstrong’s translation is not redundant. The clue to the interpretation of the passage is the binary particles μὲν (2,10) and δὲ (2,11). The first sentence signaled by the former particle (2,10-11) simply mentions the duality of Intellect, but not its difference from the One. Insofar as the One is also referred to as τῷ νοητόν in 2,4, it is highly possible in the present passage that τῷ νοητόν as the One and τῷ νοητόν as Intellect are confused. The section καὶ ὀλλο ... νοητόν in the third sentence signaled by δὲ (2,11-12) definitely dismisses the possibility of confusion. Without the remark on the difference in the level of intelligible object, τοῦ νοητοῦ in the immediately following interrogative sentence (2,12) will be taken as the same as νοητόν in 2,11, namely as Intellect. The point made in 2,11-12 is exactly reiterated in 2,25 ὀλλο οὗν νοητόν. By the remark that Intellect is a different νοητόν, moreover, the One as τῷ νοητόν (2,13) which is ἐν ... νοήσει ἑτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν (2,18-19) can be fully distinct from Intellect as νοητόν and νοῶν (2,11). Hence the third sentence, only when it is construed in the manner of Armstrong’s translation, makes the necessary remark for the thesis that the transcendent νοητόν has the hyper-noetic intellection.

155The aforementioned νόησις in VI 7 [38], 40, 10-11 is an exception to this.

156See V 3 [49], 10, 42-44, VI 7 [38], 35, 44-45, and VI 9 [9], 4, 2.

Bussanich observes that Plotinus, in V 6 [24], 2, 7-9, suggests the denial of intelligibility to the One: "... Plotinus does not mean ... that Intellect in its processive state, any more than its fully actualized state, understands the reality of the One." See J. Bussanich, Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):165. But it seems to difficult to read the One’s unintelligibility from this passage. The binary particles μὲν and δὲ go with the contrast between πρὸς ... τοῦ νοῶν and καθ’ ἐσώτε. If Plotinus were to suggest the One’s unintelligibility, he should say that it is not νοητόν κυρίως in relation to Intellect. It is καθ’ ἐσώτε that the One is said to be not νοητόν κυρίως. The One, in turn, is in relation to Intellect "a reality which is purely an object of intellection" (2,8). The second-half of the δ-clause simply reiterates the
point made in 2,4-5 to deny the duality to the One. Hence the passage in V 6 [24],2,7-9 cannot be regarded as a textual warrant for the One's unintelligibility. From the statement that the One is in itself neither a thinker nor an object of thought in the proper sense, someone might infer that it is the thinker and its object in some transcendent sense. Although this reasoning, unless it compromises the One's simplicity, would never be unreasonable, it seems unnatural to read the unique cognitive state of the One into the context of V 6 [24],2.

157Rist, construing V 4 [7],2 in light of III 9 [13],1, observes as follows: "What can be deduced from this except that in the early period of his life, quite probably under Numenian influence, Plotinus toyed with the idea of a double νοστόν, one active and the other static, the static and the higher also being a νοστόν, but that he later came to reject such ideas? There is evidence then that at some time Plotinus might speak of a νοστόν which itself, though inactive, had some kind of intellection. This is almost what we have in 5.4.2" (Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 42).

This view is inaccurate. First, as Bussanich points out (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 20), "the intelligible object at rest" in III 9 [13],1,15-17, in spite of the verbal similarity, bears little relation to the transcendent νοστόν "at eternal rest" in V 4 [7],2,18. Second, more importantly, the transcendent νοστόν in V 4 [7],2, though it is said to be at eternal rest, is not inactive. It possesses life in itself (2,16-17) and is not ὀνον ἀναίσθητον (2,15). If it were designated as being inactive, the problem of the One's knowledge would not occur.

158In Rep. 507e6-508a1 the relation between the sense of sight and the power of being seen is described in yoke language (τιμωτέρω ξυγω ἔζυγησαν). But Plotinus would be reluctant to apply yoke language to the relation of the powers of thinking and of being thought, because, as already seen, he regards the verb συνεξεύχθαι as incompatible with the intellect-intelligible identity in V 5 [32],1,23-28.

159See note 30.

Bussanich, in his comment on the above cited passage, refers to II 4 [12],5,15-18 as "the splendid description of intelligible matter as a 'decorated corpse' before it is defined by turning back to the One" (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 32). But his interpretation of that passage is inaccurate. Plotinus there contrasts intelligible matter with sensible matter; the contrast is marked by the binary particles μὲν (5,15) and δὲ (5,16). The binary particles occur again in 5,17-18, and, from 5,18 καὶ μορφὴ δὲ εἰδωλοῦν, it turns out that the passage in 5,17-18 (οὐ μὴν ζῶν οὐδὲ νοοῦν, ὀλλὰ νεκρῶν κεκοσμημένον) refers to sensible matter, but not to intelligible matter. (In III 6 [26],7,24-25, the sensible shapes in sensible matter is called εἰδωλὰ ἐν εἰδώλιοι ἀτεχνώς. Sensible matter can be appropriately
compared to a corpse because it is ἐρημία πάντων (15,26; see also II 4 [12],8,14, III 6 [26],9,37, and 14,12). Atkinson rightly interprets that Plotinus, in II 4 [12],5,15-18, speaks of sensible matter as a decorated corpse (op. cit., p. 35). Intelligible matter prior to its limitation is rather called ἡ ζωὴ ἀόριστος (VI 7 [38],17,13-15) or ἡ ζωὴ ... ψυλὴ θεωρουμένη καὶ ἀπογεγυμνωμένη (18,16-17). On the indefiniteness of intelligible matter, see II 4 [12],4,19-20, 15,17-18, and VI 7 [38],17,20.

160See also μμεσθαί in 1,26 and ἀπομμούμενα in 1,33.


162Henry takes this passage with VI 8 [39],15,28-29 ὑπόστασις δὲ πρώτη οὐκ ἐν ᾨπύχῳ οὐδ' ἐν ζωῇ ἀλόγῳ (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 142). As Anton notes, however, we may not conclude from that passage that the first hypostasis "is to be found in something animate and in instances of rational life ("Some Logical Aspects of the Concept of Hypostasis in Plotinus," in The Structure of Being: A Neoplatonic Approach, ed. R. B. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), p. 28)."

163See also III 8 [30],9,38-39; 10,2-3; 10,10-13; VI 7 [38],23,19-24; 32,1-2; VI 8 [39],15,34-35.

Wallis briefly mentions the locus of the Plotinian One in the history of ideas: "A consequence of the One's infinite power is that emanation exemplifies what Arthur Lovejoy, in The Great Chain of Being, calls the 'Principle of Plenitude'" (Neoplatonism, p. 64). The close connection between the super-abundance of the One's power and the continuity of procession from it is clearly recognized in IV 8 [6],6,10-18.
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THE ONE'S KNOWLEDGE IN PLOTINUS
VOLUME II

by

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It was pointed out in Part I that Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge is closely related to his doctrines of self-intellection and of Intellect's relation to the One; the conception of the intelligible objects as living and thinking, which serves as the copestone of the doctrine of self-intellection, necessarily demands the existence of the originative source, of those objects, which itself has inner activity and life. The One's knowledge exactly represents the cognitive specification of its inner activity and life. The One's inner activity can really be specified in two ways, positively and negatively. Plotinus, on the one hand, inquires what kind of knowledge and consciousness the One possesses positively. He attempts, on the other, to clarify why the One must not or need not have intellection. As Bussanich summarizes, there are three views of Plotinus' positive and negative specifications of the One's inner activity. The first view admits such chronological change that Plotinus ascribes noetic or quasi-noetic activities to the One in earlier treatises, but denies these activities to it in later treatises. The second view simply claims that Plotinus contradicts himself. According to the final view, Plotinus is very careful in making his affirmations about the One's knowledge, so that we must consider his use of language with sufficient sensitivity. The first view turns out to be intuitively untenable as soon as we look at the fact that Plotinus attributes some sort of cognitive activity to the One in such later treatises as VI 7 [38] and VI 8 [39]. The second view, as Bussanich estimates it, is nothing more than an evasion of the
problem. Even if it were seen as an attack on Plotinus himself, the second view would be at best question-begging.

There will still remain several problems, even though it may be clarified that Plotinus successfully distinguishes, by employing highly technical terms and qualifications, the unique knowledge of the One from the cognitive activity of Intellect. In what way can the negation of intellection and the ascription of hyper-intellective activity to the One be coherent with one another? If they are coherent, what doctrine mediates them? What ontological status of the One really serves as the ground for an affirmation about the One's knowledge? Is that ontological status coherent with the absence of intellection from the One? How does Plotinus attempt to undercut any possible distortion of his own doctrine, that is, the jump from the denial of intellection to the One to the ascription of some pejorative terms to it? In addition to these questions regarding the systematic structure of Plotinus’ doctrine of the One’s knowledge, we must inquire whether the chronological change, if any, in his terminology to describe the One’s cognitive activity has great significance in terms of its systematic relation to the doctrines of self-intellection and of Intellect’s relation to the One or in terms of the chronological change, if any, in his use of the word νόησις.

For our inquiry to be the full study of Plotinus’ doctrine of the One’s knowledge, we must consider not only the internal structure of his doctrine of the One’s knowledge but also the systematic relation of that doctrine to other doctrines belonging to his system and the interplay between the terminology for the One’s knowledge and his use of the term νόησις in their chronological change. Although the relevant texts from the Enneads will be read in Porphyry’s chronological order for Plotinus’ treatises, it is necessary to pay enough attention to the context in which a given text falls. Since his metaphysical system emerged before the early period of his writing and does not undergo substantial transformation, it is certain that
Plotinus, in each section of his treatises, always presupposes his already emerged system. Hence the contextual reading of the relevant passages reveals the systematic relation of the doctrine of the One's knowledge to other doctrines. Without considering this systematic relation, we can only look on the simply superficial, chronological change in Plotinus' terminology for the One's knowledge and cannot understand why such changes, if any, have really occurred. As mentioned in the Introduction, therefore, the relevant texts must be analyzed from two viewpoints, chronological and systematic.
NOTES

1Rist regards these problems as the basic ones concerning the One's knowledge in *Plotinus: The Road to Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 38.


6J. Bussanich, *The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, p. 58.
CHAPTER I

V 4 [7],2,13-19: THE ONE'S KNOWLEDGE AND CONSCIOUSNESS

The second chapter of V 4 [7], as many commentators remark, stands alone in the entire Enneads in the clarity with which Plotinus ascribes a kind of intellection and consciousness to the One. Some critics, considering the position of the treatise in Porphyry's chronological list, acknowledge Plotinus’ reflection on Numenius. The influence by Numenius, however, does not explain the systematic reason why Plotinus himself is here forced to attribute a sort of consciousness and intellection to the One. We first attempt to spell out this very reason by carefully analyzing his own text. This attempt will further articulate how the doctrine of the One's consciousness and knowledge is related to his other doctrines. Then, we shall consider another problem, to which extent Plotinus succeeds in demarcating the unique hyper-intellection and consciousness of the One from the cognitive activity of Intellect.

The main issue considered in V 4 [7] is definitely how Intellect, which is the one-many (1,21), comes from the absolutely simple One. In the first chapter Plotinus tries to explain the procession of Intellect from the One in terms of an analogy from an empirical fact that that which is perfect--e.g. fire, snow, and drugs--cannot but produce something other than itself. He then employs several superlative adjectives to describe the perfection of the One; it is the αὐτοκέστατον (1,12), the τελεώτατον (1,24; 1,34), and the δυνατώτατον of all entities (1,25). The One cannot but engender something else. It is thus called the productive power of all things (ἡ πάντων δύναμις, 1,36).

The second chapter begins with the elucidation of the reason why the generator of Intellect must be beyond Intellect itself, by means of stressing the
multiplicity of Intellect (2,1-12). In 2,4ff., the One is referred to as τὸ νοητόν.⁵

Then, our text in discussion follows. It is a portion of Plotinus’ reply to the question raised in 2,12: "But how does this Intellect come from the Intelligible [i.e. the One]?" He writes:

The Intelligible remains by itself and is not deficient, like that which sees and thinks—I call that which thinks deficient as compared with the Intelligible, but it is not like something senseless (οὐκ . . . οὖν ἀναίσθητον); all things belong to it and are in it and with it (ἔστιν αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ). It is completely able to discern itself (πάντη διακριτικὸν ἐαυτοῦ); it has life in itself and all things in itself, and its thinking of itself is itself by a kind of immediate self-consciousness and is in everlasting rest and in manner of intellection different from the thinking of Intellect (καὶ ἡ κατανόησις αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ ὀλοκληρώσει συναισθήσει οὕσα ἐν στάσει άδικῶ καὶ νοησεὶ ἔτερῶς ἡ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν) (2,13-19, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).⁶

In the ensuing passage, Plotinus mentions the One’s repose in itself and elucidates the emergence of Intellect in terms of the contemplation of the One by intellection, namely by the inchoate Intellect (2,19-26).⁷ In order to defend the One’s immobility in its production of Intellect, Plotinus invokes the double-ἐνέργεια doctrine, in which the relationship between the One and Intellect is viewed as that between the inner and complete activity and the external activity proceeding from it and acquiring substantial existence (2,26-37).⁸

First of all, we must notice that the One is described as τὸ νοητόν. As already pointed out,⁹ the problem of the One’s knowledge unavoidably arises when the One is referred to as τὸ νοητόν correlative to the pre-noetic νόησις. As already seen,¹⁰ again, unless the transcendent νοητόν, which is the cause and archetype of being, possesses life and activity, the intelligible being will be lifeless and unthinking so that the intellect-intelligible identity will be compromised. Hence Plotinus ascribes life to the One in 2,16-17. Moreover, the positive account for the One’s inner life in 2,13-19 is unmistakably linked with its internal ἐνέργεια of the double-
activity theory developed in 2,26-37. When its systematic coherence with the doctrines of Intellect's relation to the One and of self-intellection is carefully considered, Plotinus' positive description of the One's cognitive activity is by no means aberrant.

Plotinus explicitly ascribes κατανόησις to the One in 2,17. In III 9 [13],9,22, on the contrary, τὸ κατανοεῖν is denied to the One. But this does not bear real inconsistency with V 4 [7],2. In III 9 [13],9, on the one hand, it is evident, from the force of ἀρα in line 22, that κατανοεῖν is used synonymously with νόησις or νοεῖν. In V 4 [7],2, on the other, Plotinus carefully mentions the difference of the One's super-intellection from the intellection of Intellect in lines 18-19. The use of κατανόησις seems to be intended to make this demarcation prominent. As Rist remarks, hence, it is clear that Plotinus "might understand κατανόησις differently in 5.4.2. and 3.9.9."

Moreover, the distinction intended in V 4 [7],2, as Bussanich notes, defeats the claims that Plotinus has here made the One some sort of Intellect and that the One's κατανόησις may compromise its unity. He rather ascribes to the One the hyper-intellection which is totally distinct from intellection proper or the activity of Intellect.

The One's super-intellection is also said to be in eternal rest (ἡ κατανόησις αὐτοῦ...σοῦ ἐν στάσει ἀδίω, 2,17-18). As already seen in Chapter III of Part I, intellection is always associated with movement. Hence the phrase ἐν στάσει ἀδίω indicates Plotinus' careful dissociation of the One's κατανόησις from any movement. This dissociation unmistakably confirms his following remark that the One's κατανόησις is ἐν νόησει ἐτέρως ἡ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν (2,18-19).

Moreover, the phrase seems to be closely related to 2,13 ἐφ' ἐαυτοῖ μένον. Hence the One's κατανόησις can be taken to specify its self-abiding ἐνέργεια in the double-activity theory developed in 2,26-37. The phrase ἐν στάσει ἀδίω thus
denotes that the One's self-remaining ἐνέργεια specified by its κατανόησις has no implication of noetic movement.\textsuperscript{16}

It is evident that the One's possession of συναίσθησις explains that it is never senseless. Notice that both συναίσθησις and ἀναίσθησις are qualified by οἶον. The force of οἶον might be taken to mean that the ascription of a unique kind of consciousness affects the intended distinction between being-conscious and being-unconscious to be not usual. As already seen, the term συναίσθησις normally pertains to unity as well as to multiplicity. Warren writes: "the particular 'sunaisthetizing' agent is a kind of unity such that its consciousness or awareness is always of that unity itself."\textsuperscript{17} So the συναίσθησις of Intellect is always of itself being gathered into unity (V 3 [49],13,13; VI 7 [38],16,19-20; 35,30-32).\textsuperscript{18} Plotinus in the present passage seems to stress the bearing of the term upon unity.\textsuperscript{19} The qualifying οἶον in the present text precisely distinguishes the One's self-awareness from Intellect's.\textsuperscript{20} The unique consciousness of the One, thus demarcated from Intellect's self-awareness, surpasses the self-reflexivity proper to Intellect\textsuperscript{21} and thereby exhibits the highest degree of concentration into absolute unity, which Bussanich renders as "the undifferentiated self-awareness which is the One itself."\textsuperscript{22}

How is the One's συναίσθησις related to its κατανόησις? Is the One's awareness concomitant to its hyper-intellection? The answer is negative. Then, is the One's super-intellection based on its consciousness? This question, first of all, presupposes the distinction between the One's self-consciousness and self-knowledge. Henry insists on the necessity of this distinction.\textsuperscript{23} The main line of his claim is as follows. While self-knowledge is proper to Intellect, self-consciousness is applied to diverse levels of life. While συναίσθησις in V 4 [7],2,18 and ἐγρήγορσις in VI 8 [39],16,31 are both qualified by οἶον, κατανόησις in V 4 [7],2,17 and ὑπερνόησις in VI 8 [39],16,32 are not. Hence it seems to be more plausible to attribute to the One the terms designating consciousness rather than the terms
designating knowledge. Let us return to V 4 [7],2. In 2,17-18, we are told that the One's thinking of itself is itself by its self-awareness (ἡ κατανόησις αύτοῦ αύτῷ οἶονεὶ συναισθήσει). The dative οἶονεὶ συναισθήσει denotes that the identity of the One itself and its hyper-intellection is in virtue of its unique consciousness. In V 6 [24],5,4-5, where Plotinus speaks of the One's transcendence over self-consciousness and intellection, we are told that that which is better than συναίσθησις is also better than νόησις. Insofar as he does not mention the unique cognitive state of the One in V 6 [24], we may not conclude inadvertently from this statement that that which has a self-consciousness different from Intellect's has a hyper-intellection. V 6 [24],5,4-5 cannot be a relevant clue to the interpretation of the present passage. On the relationship between the One's κατανόησις and συναίσθησις, therefore, we can say no more than that the identity of the One itself and its hyper-intellection is in virtue of its unique self-awareness which is so concentrated into unity as to annihilate the distinction, even conceptual, between the One itself and its συναίσθησις, and also between the One itself and its κατανόησις.

Furthermore, we are told that the One completely discerns itself (πάντη διακριτικὸν ἑαυτοῦ, 2,16). In light of V 3 [49],15,27-31, Rist observes that this passage is "little more than an absolute affirmation of the One's simplicity." But his view is not convincing, because he mistakenly believes that Plotinus in V 3 [49],15 rejects the thesis that all intelligible objects are indistinctly included in the One. Even if the present passage is considered separately from V 3 [49],15, as Bussanich views, it does not confirm the One's simplicity. Bussanich, contrary to Rist, holds that two relevant texts, VI 9 [9],10,14-15 and VI 7 [38],34,14, suggest that Plotinus' use of διακριτικὸν in the present passage is "inappropriate for his purpose." Although he does not explain what Plotinus' purpose here is, Bussanich appears to mean the elucidation of the One's simplicity by it. Plotinus' purpose,
however, seems to be rather the explication of the One's self-sufficiency, more specifically, of its being not οἶνον ἀναίσθητον. The phrase πάντη διακριτικὸν ἑαυτοῦ exactly explains the One's being οὐκ οἶνον ἀναίσθητον. Hence Plotinus' use of the term is not inappropriate for his purpose of revealing that the One is not senseless, though it does not really confirm its simplicity.

The section πάντη διακριτικὸν ἑαυτοῦ neither confirms nor denies the One's absolute simplicity. Plotinus' use of such terms like κατανόησις, συναίσθησις, and νόησις indicates that his conception of the One's knowledge is somewhat analogous to Intellect's. Nevertheless, he elaborately precludes any implication of duality from his characterization of the One's knowledge. The passage ἡ κατανόησις αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ seems to be very appropriate to the One's hyper-intellection for two reasons. First, we must notice that the copula ἦστιν, probably on purpose, is omitted. Second, as soon as we compare this passage with his expression of the intellect-intelligible identity in 2,43-44, νοῦς δὴ καὶ ὅν ταὐτόν, it turns out that the One's hyper-intellection is characterized by more intensified unity than Intellect's self-intellection is. The One's self, which is undifferentiated from its κατανόησις, is neither subject nor object. Whereas Intellect is the same as the Form, the κατανόησις of the One does not represent the sameness of κατανοοῦν and κατανοούμενον. We are simply allowed to say that the One's κατανόησις is the One itself, but not that the One is the κατανοοῦν identical with the κατανοούμενον.

Although the One's hyper-intellection is exactly directed to the One itself, it is clearly distinguished from Intellect's self-intellection by virtue of its being beyond the subject-object duality.

In summary, the following three points must be noticed. First, we can roughly say that the reason why Plotinus is compelled to ascribe a sort of consciousness and intellection to the One in V 4 [7],2 is as follows. Plotinus, in V 4 [7], attempts to give an account of the necessity of the procession of Intellect from
the One in terms of the One's self-sufficiency. In order to be not deficient in any respect, the One must not be senseless. In order to be not senseless, hence, the One is naturally conceived to have a kind of awareness and knowledge. In a word, the attribution of hyper-consciousness and hyper-intellection to the One is more appropriate for the One's self-sufficiency, which is thematically discussed here, than Plotinus' usual denial of intellection to the One is. As repeatedly mentioned, moreover, the conception of the intelligible objects as living and thinking is the very copestone of Plotinus' doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity or self-intellection. In V 4 [7],2, the One is recurrently referred to as τὸ νοητὸν. In so far as the One is the archetype of Intellect qua τὸ νοητὸν, it is absurd to consider the One to be lifeless or inactive. Hence Plotinus is forced to specify the internal life and activity of the One by hyper-consciousness and hyper-intellection. It would be no exaggeration to say that his description of the One here is a sort of via eminentia in spite of his reference to Parm. 142a3-4 in 1,9.31 Second, the hyper-consciousness and hyper-intellection of the One specify its self-abiding ἐνέργεια. Since the One is ἔπεκειαν οὐσίας (2,38), its self-remaining activity does not coexist with οὐσία. Such transcendent activity is distinct from intellection which is the ἐνέργεια necessarily accompanied with οὐσία. Hence the hyper-consciousness and hyper-intellection are viewed as specifications of this unique ἐνέργεια beyond οὐσία. Finally, although Plotinus, in describing the One's cognitive activity, employs such terms like νόησις, κατανόησις, and συναίσθησις, he distinguishes it from Intellect's activity and dissociates any implication of duality, multiplicity and movement from the One's knowledge with enough sensitivity.

The core of the problem of the One's knowledge has thus been revealed from our analysis of V 4 [7],2, which belongs to the group of early treatises. The problem imposed on Plotinus is precisely how it is possible to describe positively such unique ἐνέργεια that is beyond οὐσία, without bringing to that description any
implication of duality, multiplicity and movement, which characterize intellection proper. We shall see later how Plotinus tackles this problem again in his middle treatises, VI 7 [38],39 and VI 8 [39],16.
NOTES

\[\text{έν στάσει αίδιω} \] with two Numenian passages, III 9 [13], 1, 16-17 νο\[\text{ύν} \] και ἑνότητι καὶ ἡσυχίακαὶ II 9 [33], 1, 26-27 τις νο\[\text{ύν} \] ἑν ἡσυχία τιμὶ (e.g., J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 42). The appeal to the Numenian influence in V 4 [7], 2 by comparing it with the allegedly Numenian exegesis of Tim. 39e in III 9 [13], 1, prima facie, faces the difficulty manifested in the inconsistency between the ascription of κατανόησις to the One at V 4 [7], 2, 17 and the denial of τὸ κατανοεῖν to it at III 9 [13], 9, 22. Rist attempts to solve this problem by saying that Plotinus "might understand κατανόησις differently in 5.4.2 and 3.9.9" (Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 43). Even though, as we shall see later, the meaning of κατανόησις differs in V 4 [7], 2 and III 9 [13], 9, this remark cannot be a cogent solution, for the difficulty in question seems to arise from an inaccurate observation that III 9 [13] as a whole is "the Ennead with the most obviously Numenian interpretation of the Timaeus" (Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 43). As several critics note (e.g., A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus, 3:404), III 9 [13] is not a single treatise but a collection of Plotinus' notes gathered by Porphyry. Hence the superficial incongruity between V 4 [7], 2, 17 and III 9 [13], 9, 22 has no bearing on the terminological resemblance between V 4 [7], 2, 18 and III 9 [13], 1, 16-17. For a further critique of Rist's position, see J. Bussanich, "Plotinus on the Inner Life of the One," Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987): 164-165; The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, A Commentary on Selected Texts, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), p. 20; G. J. P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 108-109, note 63 to ch. 3.

2In V 4 [7], the multiplicity of Intellect is revealed in two ways. First, there is a duality in the self-intellection of Intellect (2, 10). Second, Plotinus contrasts Intellect which "manifests a composition (\[\text{συνθεσίν τε ἐμφαίνων} \)" (2, 9) with the One which is ἄξω ... συνθεσίως (1, 11). On Intellect’s compositeness, see also VI 7 [38], 10, 9-10 and VI 9 [9], 2, 31. The passage καὶ πολλὰ ὀρῶν Ἥθη (2, 10) also indicates the compositeness of Intellect. As Atkinson, following Theiler, remarks, in Plotinus: Ennead V.1, a Commentary with Translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 166, νόησις (2, 4) refers to the inchoate Intellect as does V 1 [10], 7, 11 and VI 7 [38], 40, 10-11: the inchoate Intellect sees (ὄρωσα, 2, 4) the One as τὸ νοητὸν. The use of Ἥθη in 2, 10 clearly indicates that that which manifests a composition is a
fully formed Intellect rather than the inchoate one. For the similar use of ἰδιν, see V 3 [49],11,11. The internal compositeness of Intellect points to its internal complexity. In the treatise written before V 4 [7], Plotinus has already entertained the all-inclusiveness and mutual-inclusiveness of Intellect (V 9 [5],6,7-10; 10,9-10), which is fully developed in later treatises (III 8 [30],8,40-48; V 8 [31],4,3-11; 9,14-18).

The compositeness of Intellect, prima facie, seems to mark Plotinus' departure from Plato for whom the separate Form, a counterpart of the Plotinian Intellect, is categorized into τὰ ἀσύνθετα (Phd. 78c7). Plotinus' proviso νοητήν μὲντοι in V 4 [7],2,10 would be well illuminated by VI 7 [38],10,10-11 καὶ σωζομένων ἐκάστων, οἷς καὶ αἱ μορφαὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι. Plotinus definitely distinguishes the intelligible compositeness from the sensible one which admits destruction. Hence his departure from Plato does not mean that he applies the sensible compositeness to the intelligible world. As Cornford notes in Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1935; reprint ed., Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), pp. 268-273, the internal complexity of the generic and the specific Forms is implicit in Soph. 253d5-9. But, since this remains one of the possible interpretations of that difficult passage, we cannot conclude that Plotinus' view of the intelligible compositeness is prefigured by Plato. For an argument for the internal multiplicity of the Platonic Form, see R. M. Dancy, "The One, the Many, and the Forms: Philebus 15b1-8," Ancient Philosophy 4 (1984):179-183.

3See also V 1 [10],6,36-37. For the necessity of procession in general, see note 73 in Chapter III of Part I.

4See also III 8 [30],10,1; V 1 [10],7,9-10; V 3 [49],15,33; V 4 [7],2,38. For the meaning of this characterization, see M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 165.

Armstrong comments on the occurrence of this term at III 8 [30],10,1 and refers to IV 8 [6],6,11 and VI 9 [9],5,36 (Plotinus, 3:394, note 1). But it is difficult to regard δυνάμεως ὁφάτου, ὡς ἐν ἐκείνους in IV 8 [6],6,11-12 as referring solely to the One, because of the plural dative ἐκείνους. Vitringa's ἑκείνω, accepted by Bréhier, makes it possible to ascribe this ineffable power to the One. But Armstrong, with Henry and Schwyzzer, does not accept Vitringa's emendation. Although Rist attributes this power to the One (Plotinus: The Road to Reality, pp. 74-75), whether he accepts Vitringa's emendation is not fully clear. Indeed the reading of the original text ἐκείνους does not necessarily exclude the One from the referents of the ineffable power. It is at least evident that the power in question is not attributed solely to the One.

In VI 7 [38],17,32-34, Plotinus speaks of three stages of the emergent process of the manifoldly articulated Intellect; (1) the indefinite life, namely the inchoate Intellect, as the whole ability (ἡν οὐν ἣ μὲν ζωὴ δύναμις πᾶσα), (2) the vision, namely the Intellect in the midst of the process of self-formation, as the ability of becoming all things (ἡ δὲ ὀρασις ἢ ἐκείθεν δύναμις πάντων), (3) the fully
formed Intellect manifested in all things (ὅ δὲ γενόμενος νοῦς αὐτὰ ἀνεφάνη τὰ πάντα). What does the δύναμις πάντων here mean? In order to answer this, we need to clarify the referent of ἐκεῖθεν in line 33. According to *Lexicon Plotinianum*, ed. J. H. Sleeman and G. Pollet (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1980), p. 350, the referent is the One. In terms of the continuity between the inchoate Intellect and the fully actualized Intellect in the emergent process, rather, we may take ἐκεῖθεν to mean "from the indefinite life." Thus ἡ ἐκεῖθεν δύναμις πάντων designates the ability which arises from the indefinite life as δύναμις πᾶσα and tends towards the hypostatization of the all-inclusive, fully formed Intellect; it is already involved in the process of articulation of multiple forms. The inchoate Intellect is the δύναμις πᾶσα which lies before that process. The contrast between δύναμις πᾶσα and ἡ ἐκεῖθεν δύναμις πάντων, with the binary particles μὲν and δὲ, seems to describe effectively the nature of the process in question, that is, the articulation of multiple forms. For the application of the word δύναμις to the inchoate Intellect, see also III 8 [30],11,2. In V 1 [10],5,18-19, intellection of the fully formed Intellect, rather than the aspiration of the Intellect in its emergent process, is compared to ὁρῶς ὁρῶσα (see also V 3 [49],10,12).

VI 7 [38],17 will be considered again in the third chapter.

In addition, Beierwaltes sees the δύναμις πάντων in terms of the One's presence in and transcendence over all things with his reference to VI 4 [22],11,20-21. See W. Beierwaltes, "Metaphysik des Lichtes in der Philosophie Plotins," *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* 15 (1961):354. This view can be further explicated in terms of the One's perfect stability in Intellect's procession from it (see V 1 [10],6,25-27). In VI 4 [22],11,20-21, however, the One's creativity is not mentioned.

5Corrigan believes that the discourse in V 4 [7],2,4-19 is confined to an intellectual or pre-intellectual sphere. So he claims that to regard τὸ νοητὸν in 2,4 as the One is

"a mistaken identification for the simple reason that the question Plotinus asks already supposes a fully formed νοῦς. The question, then, concerns Intellect, not the One, and this makes a difference to the universe of discourse" ("Plotinus, 'Enneads' 5,4 [7],2 and Related Passages," *Hermes* 114 (1986):196).

This view is totally untenable. The question Plotinus raises in 2,3-4 definitely concerns the One. Armstrong and Bréhier accurately render it:

"But why is the generator not Intellect, whose active actuality is thinking?" (Armstrong).

"Mais pourquoi le générateur n'est-il pas l'Intelligence?" (Bréhier).

Mizuchi also follows the same line. Corrigan's interpretation is based on MacKenna's translation, which he cites: "But why is the Intellectual-Principle not
the generating source?" Harder follows the same line: "Aber warum ist nicht der Geist das Zeugende?" The sentence directly preceding the question (2,2-3) mentions the transcendence of the generator of Intellect over Intellect itself and the necessity that the product of that generator is Intellect (ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπέκειναι νοῦν τὸ γεννῆναι, νοῦν εἶναι ἀνάγκη). The generator’s transcendence can imply that it is not Intellect itself. Here the ontological status of the generator, rather than that of Intellect, is questioned. Hence Armstrong’s, Bréhier’s, and Mizuchi’s translations better fit the context. The question in 2,3-4 exactly deals with the nature of the One. Even though MacKenna’s translation is accepted by Corrigan, it is rash to consider the sphere of Plotinus’ question in his translation to be restricted solely to Intellect. For a further critique of Corrigan’s position, see J. Bussanich, Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):184, notes 9, 11, and 12; idem, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 12-13.

6Corrigan maintains that συναίσθησις and κατανόησις here refer to "the internal genesis of intellectual plurality" rather than to the cognitive activity of the One (Hermes 114 (1986):199, note 8). But we cannot follow his view for the reason mentioned in note 5.

7The phrase ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἡθεῖ in 2,21 is from Tim. 42e5-6. Here, as well as in V 3 [49],12,33-34, it is applied to the One, while to the immaterial generators in general in IV 8 [6],6,10 and V 2 [11],2,2. Baltes observes that this passage is employed to deny that the generation of Intellect is based upon the One’s desire of production in Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpretten, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), 1:200.

8For the double-activity theory in general, see II 9 [33],8,22-23; IV 3 [27],10,30-37; IV 5 [27],7,17-20; V 1 [10],3,7-12; V 2 [11],1,16-18; V 3 [49],7,21-26. Bussanich maintains that the double-activity theory must be seen in conjunction with the notion of the One as the δύναμις πάντων (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 30). His view would be warranted by the phrase ἐκ τῆς παρούσης δυνάμεως in V 1 [10],6,32, where Atkinson views that the double-activity theory is in play (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 145).

9See Section VII of Chapter III in Part I.

10See Section VIII of Chapter III in Part I.

11Bussanich also follows the same line of interpretation: "The double-ἐνέργεια theory has important implications for the proper understanding of lines 15-19 where Plotinus speaks of the One in such positive terms. Generally, the One’s self-consciousness and super-
intellection are specifications of the One's inner life and activity" (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 31).

See also G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), p. 53. Rist regards the One as the inactive νοητόν (see note 157 in Chapter III of Part I). We cannot see how the alleged inactivity of the One can go well with its life, self-consciousness, and hyper-intellection.

12 For this synonymy, see J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 26-27; idem, Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):167.

13 J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 43.

14 J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 27; Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):167. See also G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 58. Bussanich maintains also that this distinction defeats the view that regards Plotinus' account for the One in V 4 [7],2 as his early aberration.

15 Armstrong correctly holds that Plotinus, in the present text, stresses the inadequacy of expressing the absolute simplicity of the One by means of the identity of divine thought with its object (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 410). Schwyzer likewise takes ὑπερνόησις in VI 8 [39],16,32 as locking out the thinking of the object (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 389). Many critics consider ὑπερνόησις there to be equivalent to κατανόησις in our present passage (see J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 49; J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect, p. 27; Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):182; P. Henry, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 59).

Some might object that the phrase ἑτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν marks the distinction between the One's hyper-intellection and the pre-noetic intellection of the inchoate Intellect, since νόησις in 2,4 refers to the inchoate Intellect (see note 2) and its correlative object, τὸ νοητόν, still refers to the One in the present passage. This construction is not convincing, because the genitive νοῦ in 2,19 definitely refers to the fully formed Intellect as explicitly as it does in 2,3 and 2,12.


18 On the connection between Intellect's συναίσθησις and its interior multiplicity gathered into its own unity, see note 3 in Chapter III of Part I.

19 See G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 58.

In V 8 [31],11,23, the συναίσθησις of the soul who is one with Intellect is also qualified by Ὠν. The reason of this qualification is discussed in note 95 in Chapter III of Part I.


24 J. M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, p. 44.

25 As Bussanich supposes in *The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, pp. 22-23 and *Ancient Philosophy* 7 (1987):185-186, note 25, Rist's misconstruction seems to be due to his reading ὶρος accepted by Kirchhoff and Bréhier instead of the MSS ὶρος. Bussanich rightly remarks that V 4 [7],2,16 and V 3 [49],15,31 do not run counter to one another in *The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, p. 22 and *Ancient Philosophy* 7 (1987):169.


28 Bussanich's reference to VI 9 [9],10,14-15 and VI 7 [38],34,14 does not seem to be cogent enough. He explains the reason why these texts are relevant to the present text: "... the soul's awareness in the mystical union is not distinguished from the One's." See J. Bussanich, *Ancient Philosophy* 7 (1987):169. In both passages, however, Plotinus speaks of nothing more than the disappearance of the distinction between the contemplator and the contemplated One in the soul's
awareness at the time of the mystical union, and the One's awareness itself is nowhere mentioned. Therefore these passages are not as relevant as Bussanich supposes.

29 See J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 51: "It [i.e. the manner of the One's knowing] is analogous to νοῦς if νοῦς is not conceived in the Aristotelian fashion."

30 We cannot see what Rist, in his comment on the self-directed nature of the One's knowledge, means by saying that "the self is seen not as object but as subject" (op. cit., p. 52).

31 Henry remarks that V 4 [7],2 is equivalent to VI 8 [39],16 and that in the latter chapter, there is a recovery from the classical theme of the via negativa and of the absolute transcendence (Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 59-60).
CHAPTER II
VI 9 [9],9,13-22: THE HYPER-NOETIC INTELLECTION OF THE SOUL UNITED WITH THE ONE

Plotinus often stresses that the sphere of intelligible realities cannot be known by conjecture or syllogistic reasoning, but solely by intuitive intellection. Now the One is beyond the noetic universe and so cannot be apprehended even by intellection. In fact, Intellect's inability to apprehend the One is reiterated throughout the Enneads. A parallel is thus supposed to lie between the One and the soul in union with the One in regard to their being free from intellection. In VI 9 [9],9,14-17, however, Plotinus appears to ascribe intellection to the soul united with the One. Here we come across several problems. Is the intellection attributed to her intellection proper, namely that activity which is oriented to the multiplicity of intelligible objects? If not, how does it differ from intellection proper? May we regard this ascription to be in parallel with the attribution of κατανόησις to the One in V 4 [7],2? If so, is the parallel between the One and the soul united with the One with respect to their having some cognitive activity different from intellection coherent with the parallel between them with respect to their being free from intellection? These queries precisely have definite bearings on the problem of the One's knowledge. Hence we must not avoid taking VI 9 [9],9 into account.

The ninth chapter of VI 9 [9] begins with the elucidation of the One's undiminishedness in creativity and the indestructibility of its products (9,1-7); since the One, even when something else emanates from it, remains the same, those entities which come from it are eternal. This doctrine would be formulated such that the One's undiminishedness in creativity is necessary for the indestructibility of all other immaterial entities. In other words, those entities, in order to be
indestructible or immortal, must be preserved by the outflow from the One.

Plotinus applies this general principle to the relationship of the soul to the One (9,7-11), and then associates degrees of the soul’s well-being (τὸ εὖ) with degrees of her orientation towards the One (9,11-13). Now we come to the text in question, where Plotinus, however descriptively, talks about the soul’s well-being found solely in her orientation to the One:

There a soul takes a rest and, returning to the place immune from the evil, is free from the evil. She also thinks there (καὶ νοεῖ ἑνταῦθα), and is there also free from suffering. The true life is also there. Because the present life and the life without God are a trace of life imitating that true life, while the life there is an activity of Intellect (ἐνέργεια . . . νοῦ). With this activity, the true life, in the calm contact with That [i.e. the One], bears gods, beauty, justice, and virtue. Because the soul, when filled with God, conceives them, it [i.e. the One] is the beginning and end for her. It is the beginning because she comes from there, and the end because the Good is there (9,13-22).

In the rest of chapter, Plotinus gives an account of the soul’s love for the One.

In the above passage, Plotinus explicitly ascribes νοεῖν to the soul, though we, at this stage, cannot see whether it is intellection proper or not. If it is intellection proper, the present text will be evidently at variance with Plotinus’ frequent assertion that the One is beyond the reach of intellection. In order to answer this question, first of all, we need to reaffirm that the present context deals exactly with the soul’s union with the One.

The opposing view that the νοεῖν of the soul here mentioned is intellection proper, in order to be textually warranted, must be based upon the construction that the present context concerns the soul united with Intellect rather than with the One. This construction, prima facie, appears to be tenable, because there are at least three sections suggesting it. First, as Harder points out, the passage, καὶ νοεῖ ἑνταῦθα, καὶ ἀπαθὴς ἑνταῦθα (9,14-15), approximates I 2
[19],3,20, νοεί τε καὶ ἀπαθῆς οὕτως ἐστίν. The latter text definitely deals with the likening to god, that is, to Intellect. Second, the passage τὸ δὲ ἐκεῖ ζην ἐνεργεῖα μὲν νοῦ (9,17), as several critics note, refers to Aristotle’s doctrine of Intellect.

Finally, as for πτεροπρόνησις in 9,24, Plotinus usually employs this term for describing the soul’s divergence from the noetic world or the hypostasis Soul, rather than from the One. It would not be unreasonable to conclude, from these sections, that Plotinus here speaks of the soul which has ascended to the level of Intellect rather than the soul which has attained the One in the apex of the mystical ascent. According to this view, of course, we are forced to take ἐνταῦθα in 9,15 as “in the noetic realm” and the soul’s νοεῖν as intellection proper.

Nevertheless it would be more natural and convincing to regard the present text as dealing with the soul’s union with the One. As already seen, the present text presupposes the undiminishedness of the One’s productivity mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. So ἐνταῦθα in 9,15 might be taken to refer to ἐν ταὐτῇ τῇ χορείᾳ in 9,1. This reading is not unfounded because χορηγοῦντος in 9,10 suggests that Plotinus, in the present passage, still keeps the metaphor of the chorus in mind. The metaphor of the chorus at the end of the preceding chapter, as the phrase τέλος καὶ ἀνάπαυσα (8,43-44) indicates, is of the soul’s union with the One. If we further consider the phrase ἐν ἡσύχῳ τῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἐπαφή (9,18-19), it will be clear that the present passage unmistakably deals with the soul’s union with the One. But we must bear in mind that this fact does not necessarily entail the purge of Intellect from the universe of discourse.

We should like to return to the problem of νοεῖν ascribed to the soul united with the One. How does it differ from intellection proper? There seem to be two instructive passages in VI 9 [9]. The first passage is VI 9 [9],3,26-27: "... the purest [i.e. the One] is seen with the pure Intellect, and with its primary part (καθαρῷ τῷ νῷ... καὶ τοῦ νοῦ τῷ πρώτῳ)." This "primary part of pure Intellect"
refers to the hyper-noetic state of Intellect, which is variously denominated "that of Intellect which is not Intellect (τῷ ἔαυτος μὴ νῦ)" (V 5 [32],8,22-23), "Intellect loving (νοῦς ἐρωτ)" (VI 7 [38],35,24), and "the inner Intellect (ὁ ἐνδον νοῦς)" (V 3 [49],14,14-15). Intellect in the hyper-noetic phase, as Bussanich notes, "in its normal sense, ceases to exist and think." It is possible to see the present text in terms of the hyper-noetic activity of Intellect. The "activity of Intellect' (VI 9 [9],9,17) as the life of the soul united with the One would indicate this state since it involves contact with the One (9,18-19), and so intellection is here not ascribed to the soul in its normal sense. Hence her νοεῖν is surely hyper-noetic. If this is the case, the present text is not at variance with the denial of intellection to the soul united with the One or that of the possibility of attaining the One with intellection in other passages. Moreover, the ἐνέργεια νοῦ in 9,17 is not an inappropriate reference to the hyper-intellective activity. As mentioned at Section VI of Chapter III in Part I, the original intellection directed towards the Good is called the ἐνέργεια (V 6 [24],5,18-19; VI 7 [38],40,18-19).

How may we call this hyper-intellective activity? The second passage provides some information. In VI 9 [9],8,25-27, after reaffirming the One's transcendence over Intellect, Plotinus writes that the soul's union with the One is "due to other powers by which that which thinks [i.e. the soul] by nature unites with that which is thought [i.e. the One] (δυνάμεσιν ὀλλαίς, ἢ πέφυκε τὸ νοούν πρὸς τὸ κατανοούμενον συνάπτειν)." Here we must notice the correlation between τὸ νοοὺν and τὸ κατανοούμενον. The One, grasped by the soul through the hyper-noetic activity of Intellect, is τὸ κατανοούμενον. In other words, τὸ νοοὺν is here τὸ κατανοοῦν. This unique and intimate relationship between the soul and the One is totally distinct from that between τὸ νοοὺν and τὸ νοούμενον, which represents intellection proper. Nothing may prevent us from calling this hyper-noetic activity κατανόησις or κατανοεῖν. Considering these passages, we can thus conclude about
νοεῖν ascribed to the soul united with the One as follows. First, it refers to the soul’s engagement in the hyper-noetic state of Intellect and so is essentially distinct from intellection in its normal sense. Second, it may be *supposedly* called κατανοήσις or κατανοεῖν. If the above consideration is correct, it is possible to establish the striking similarity between the hyper-intellective κατανοήσις of the soul united with the One in VI 9 [9],9 and the One’s κατανοήσις that is said to differ from intellection proper in V 4 [7],2.

Bussanich, as already mentioned, remarks the parallel between the One and the soul united with the One with regard to their being free from intellection. Is the above assumed parallel between them with respect to their having hyper-noetic κατανοήσις coherent with this parallel? For them to be coherent with one another, Plotinus’ position concerning the One’s cognitive activity in VI 9 [9], first of all, needs to be consistent with his position in V 4 [7]. Before examining the coherence of two parallels, we must, therefore, explore Plotinus’ view of the One’s cognitive activity in VI 9 [9].

In VI 9 [9], as well as in other treatises, intellection in its normal sense is denied of the One (6,42; 6,49-51). Although Plotinus does not speak of the One’s hyper-intellective activity itself in this treatise, two passages should not be overlooked. The first passage reads:

> Although the Good neither knows nor thinks itself, nonetheless, ignorance will not be around it. Because ignorance arises when there is another thing, or whenever one is ignorant of another. That which stands alone neither knows nor has anything of which it is ignorant. Since it, as one is united with itself, does not need to think itself (6,46-50).

The argument here proceeds as follows. Ignorance presupposes duality. But there is no duality in the One, so that it does not need to think itself and has nothing of which it may be ignorant. Hence it is not justified to move from the One’s having no self-intellection to its being ignorant of itself. Can we further infer
from the denial of the One's being surrounded by ignorance its possession of some hyper-intellective activity? Since the present context is totally immersed in the via negativa, this inference would not be recommended here. But the present passage is not inconsistent with the One's hyper-noetic κατανόησις in V 4 [7],2, where Plotinus, as already seen, develops a sort of via eminentia. Rather, the denial of ignorance to the One has some proximity to the definite statement that the One is not οἶνον ἀναίωθητον in V 4 [7],2,15.

The second passage, immediately following the first, reads:

For in order to observe carefully the One you should not add the being-united-with-itself, but take away intellection and being-united and intellection of its elf and of the others. Because (γὰρ) the One must not be placed on the side of the thinking subject (τὸν νοοῦντα), but rather on the side of intellection (τὴν νόησιν). Intellection does not think, but is the cause of thinking for the other. The cause is not the same as the caused (6,52-55).

This passage is slightly subtle. The statement that the One must be placed on the side of intellection (6,52-53), prima facie, is not easy to reconcile with the explicit denial of intellection to the One in 6,51-52. Harder remarks the transition in the sense of νόησις from intellective activity to the νοοῦμενον or νοητὸν in 6,53 and renders κατὰ τὴν νόησιν (6,53) "mit dem Denkinhalt." Harder's interpretation, indeed, has the merit of conforming to V 4 [7],2,4-7 and V 6 [24],2,7-12, where Plotinus speaks of the transcendent νοητὸν or the One as the cause of intellection. But it is unnatural and difficult to read the meaning of the intelligible object into the word νόησις. Hence we cannot but feel reluctant to follow Harder's interpretation. When we pay attention to γὰρ in 6,52, it will be seen that to place the One on the side of intellection which itself does not think (6,53-54) really explains the preceding denial of intellection of any sort to it (6,51-52). It is appropriate to place the One on the side of νόησις which does not think rather than on the side of ὁ νοῶν which does think. In a word, Plotinus explains the absence of
intellection from the One in terms of the fact that intellection, considered in abstraction from substantiality, does not think. Since the tenor in the present passage is persistently the absence of intellection from the One, νόησις in 6,53 cannot be taken to refer to the hyper-noetic activity of the One. If Plotinus here were to describe the One’s inner life positively by noetic terminology, he should carefully put some qualification as he did actually in V 4 [7],2,18-19 ἐν νόησει ἐτέρως ἤ κατὰ τὴν νοῶ νόησιν. In the present passage, therefore, we find no positive characterization of the One’s inner life. The two passages above considered do not violate Plotinus’ positive description of the One’s knowledge in V 4 [7],2.

Plotinus’ view of the One’s transcendence of intellection in VI 9 [9] is coherent with his view of the One’s knowledge in V 4 [7]. This consistency, as already mentioned, is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the consistency of the parallel between the One and the soul united with the One with regard to their being free from intellection proper with another parallel between them with regard to their possessing some hyper-noetic activity. Then, are these parallels themselves coherent with one another? First of all, when they are viewed systematically in terms of the entire Enneads, we can see that the hyper-noetic activity of Intellect by virtue of which the soul can attain the One is clearly demarcated from intellection proper and so conclude that those parallels are consistent with one another. Then, let us consider them solely within the doctrines in VI 9 [9] and its preceding treatises. Although, in this case, we cannot rely on several relevant, instructive passages in the middle and late treatises, we can see, by carefully analyzing the text, that intellection proper is not attributed to the soul united with the One. To this extent, those parallels are coherent with one another. Plotinus, however, applies the verb νοεῖν to that soul and does not fully spell out the difference of her hyper-noetic intellection from intellection proper in VI 9 [9]. Moreover, he does not actually
specify what we may call the activity of the primary part of Intellect with which alone the soul can contemplate the One. So the hyper-noetic intellection of the soul united with the One is prone to be terminologically indistinguishable from intellection proper. Because of this tendency, the two parallels above mentioned are consequently prone to be regarded as inconsistent with one another. In other words, such terminological immaturity, when the text of VI 9 [9] is read without enough circumspection and sensitivity, is inclined to bring into question the systematic consistency of those parallels.

Taking V 4 [7] and VI 9 [9] conjunctively, we can see not only that Plotinus attributes the hyper-noetic activity to both the One and the soul united with it, but also that the terms νόησις and νοεῖν, though in V 4 [7],2 he adds the proviso that the One’s νόησις differs from intellection proper, are applied to their cognitive states. The inchoate Intellect, furthermore, is also referred to as νόησις in the early treatises.25 In the middle and late treatises, however, Plotinus, in describing the hyper-noetic or pre-noetic activities of the One, the higher phase of Intellect, the inchoate Intellect, and the soul united with the One, shifts from the tendency to employ νόησις and κατανόησις to the tendency to employ ἐπιθολὴ and its cognates. This shift and its effect on the coherence between the above considered parallels, and the coherence of Plotinus’ metaphysical scheme will be gradually disclosed in our analysis of the middle and late treatises.
NOTES

1See IV 4 [28], 5, 5-6. On the sharp distinction between intuitive intellection and discursive reasoning, see V 1 [10], 10, 12-13.

2See VI 7 [38], 35, 2-3; 35, 44-45; VI 9 [9], 4, 2; 11, 11.


4Harder (Plotins Schriften, übersetzt von R. Harder, Neubearbeitung mit griechischem Lesetext und Anmerkungen for geführt von R. Beutler und W. Theiler, 6 vols. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1960-1971), lb:484) holds that the referent of οὖ γὰρ ὁγκος (9, 3-4) is not the One, but those entities which proceed from it. But this reading does not fit the context, where Plotinus thematically deals with the One's undiminishedness in the procession of its products. If Harder's reading were accepted, not only the next counterfactual apodosis η θεατὰ ἄν ηυ τὰ γεννώμενα (9, 4) would sound somewhat redundant, but also the sequence of these two sentences would obscure the present theme, the dependence of the eternal entities on the One remaining the same. To take the One as the referent of οὖ γὰρ ὁγκος thus seems to fit the present context better. Moreover, our reading is supported by the phrase οὖ μεμερισμένη εἰς αὐτά (9, 5-6) reaffirming οὖ γὰρ ὁγκος.

5Kirchhoff's emendation ἐνεργεῖν, which is accepted by Harder, Bréhier, and Tanaka, is read for H-S2 ἐνέργεια.

6See note 2.

7R. Harder, Plotins Schriften, 1b:484.


9See Phdr. 246c2, 248c9.

10See IV 8 [6], 1, 37 and 4, 32. It might be claimed that Plotinus' talk about the soul's escape from evils (9, 13-14) confirms this opposing interpretation since the intelligible world, as Plotinus reiterates, is immune from evils (I 8 [51], 2, 26-27; V 9 [5], 10, 17-18; VI 7 [38], 19, 15-16). In VI 9 [9], rather, the release from evils is associated with the soul's ascent to the One (3, 19-20).

11See Rep. 532e3. For the One as the goal, see V 3 [49], 17, 34, V 5.
[32], 12, 20, and VI 9 [9], 11, 45. In I 4 [46], however, the well-being or life according to Intellect is regarded as the goal (6, 10-11; 6, 32; 7, 5; 7, 13; 16, 13).

12 For the soul's επαφή with the One, see V 1 [10], 11, 14; V 3 [49], 17, 25-26; 17, 34-35; V 6 [24], 6, 35; VI 7 [38], 30, 3; 36, 4; VI 9 [9], 7, 25, 9, 55. Atkinson mentions VI 5 [23], 10, 41 ἐφαπτόμεθα αὐτοῦ (sc. τόγαθο) as an instance of ἔφαπτοςθαι used of "touching the One" (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 238). But it is quite difficult and unnatural to read the hyper-ontic Good into the context of VI 5 [23], 10.

13 Plotinus usually differentiates the ascent from the sensible world to the intelligible and that from the noetic realm to the One as "two stages of the journey (ἡ πορεία διττή") (I 3 [20], 1, 12). In VI 9 [9], however, they are not fully differentiated, but appear to be treated as one unbroken journey. This fact is quite natural in terms of the theme in VI [9], that is, the metaphysical exposition of the One and the soul's union with it. The ascent from the sensible world to the intelligible is characterized by the release from materiality, while the ascent from the intelligible world to the One is marked by the abandonment of all the intelligible objects and so has nothing to do with the release from materiality except for presupposing it as a necessary pre-stage. In VI 9 [9], Plotinus, on the contrary, contrasts the soul's union with the One and her decline to materiality (3, 6-10; 3, 18-20; 10, 1-3). A similar contrast is observed in one of the early treatises (I 6 [1], 7, 36-39). Such a contrast, though it appears to be slightly awkward, would be acceptable in terms of the fact that the two stages of the soul's ascent are not fully demarcated from one another in VI 9 [9].

14 For the inter-dependence of these texts, see note 12 in Chapter III of Part I. Notice that ὁ ἐνδον νοῦς in V 3 [49], 14, 14-15 is otherwise called νοῦν καθόρων (line 14). This would confirm the inter-dependence at least between VI 9 [9], 3, 26-27 and V 3 [49], 14, 14-15.

15 J. Bussanich, Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):172, italics mine. What Bussanich means by saying this is not fully clear. But there seem to be some clues. In VI 7 [38], 35, 21-22, we read that Intellect, with a kind of intuition and reception (ἐπιθυμή τινι καὶ παραδοχῇ) which belong to Intellect loving, "simply saw also before (καὶ πρότερον ἑώρα μόνον)." This passage, in terms of the adverbiai καὶ πρότερον and the imperfect ἑώρα, seems to refer to the inchoate Intellect, to which the adverb μόνον, which signifies the pre-cognitive state destitute of definite objects, is sometimes applied (V 3 [49], 11, 12 ἐφεσίς μόνον; VI 7 [38], 16, 18 κίνησις ... μόνον). Further, Plotinus' attribution of ἐπιθυμή to the inchoate Intellect (V 3 [49], 11, 12-13 οὕτως οὖν ὁ νοῦς ἐπέβαλε μὲν ἐκείνῳ) would confirm this. Notice that ἐπιθάλλειν is ascribed also to the fully formed Intellect in V 3 [49], 11, 2. For the One as τὸ ἐπιθάλλον, see V 6 [24], 2, 10. Now the soul, in order to unite with the
One through the activity of the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect, must herself become formless (VI 7 [38], 34, 1-4; VI 9 [9], 7, 14-16). See also VI 7 [38], 32, 24-29, where Plotinus describes the unlimitedness of the soul's love for the One. Likewise, the inchoate Intellect, being sheer intelligible matter, is formless. Hence that Intellect in its hyper-noetic state ceases to exist in its normal sense would mean that it becomes formless for the apprehension of the One. As mentioned in note 122 in Chapter III of Part I, Intellect must become formless when its hyper-noetic phase ceases to coexist with its self-thinking phase which inevitably concerns the multiplicity of the Forms. By surrendering its self-thinking phase Intellect's original intellection of the One is liberated from its necessary consequence, self-intellection or contemplation of the pluralized images of the One. The above consideration would reveal the dynamism of intelligible matter and its crucial role in the soul's union with the One. By the dynamism of intelligible matter is meant its possession of some sort of contemplative force. See J. M. Rist, "The Indefinite Dyad and Intelligible Matter in Plotinus," Classical Quarterly 12 (1962): 101-102. This issue, however, is also beyond the scope of our present discussion.

Bussanich, moreover, observes the correspondence of the hyper-noetic Intellect to "something like Intellect in the One which is not Intellect" in VI 8 [39], 18, 21-22 (Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987): 172). But we cannot see why the former corresponds to the latter.

16 In VI 9 [9], "intellection in its normal sense" is expressed as the apprehension (σύνεσις) of the intelligible objects (4, 2-3).

17 As already mentioned in Chapter I, τὸ κατανοεῖν in III 9 [13], 9, 22 is synonymous with νόησις in its normal sense. As its meaning differs is V 4 [7], 2 and III 9 [13], 9 (see J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 43), it does so in VI 9 [9], 8 and III 9 [13], 9.

Our discussion would confirm the following remark by Bussanich: "In any case we can be certain that the sort of vision [i.e. the vision of the One] he [i.e. Plotinus] has in mind transcends intellection (Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987): 171, (Italics mine.)).

18 Bussanich is not aware of this proposed parallel, though he articulates the similarity between the soul's and Intellect's hyper-noetic states and the unique cognitive state of the One in terms of ἐπιθυμή-terminology (Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987): 169-170).

Again, περιουσίας πρὸς ἡφασμογήν (VI 9 [9], 11, 24) would also be regarded as suggesting the hyper-noetic state of the soul. But the prefix περι-, as well as the prefix κατα-, would at best imply the intensity of her cognitive effort. See J. M. Rist, "The One of Plotinus and the God of Aristotle," Review of Metaphysics 27 (1963): 81.
19 See note 3. For the similarity between the One and the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect, see J. Bussanich, *Ancient Philosophy* 7 (1987): 170.

20 Rist takes V 3 [49],13,6-9 to mean that one must not jump from the view that the One "has no νόησις to the conclusion that it is ἀνόητον" (*Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, p. 41). If this exegesis were correct, this passage would be clearly consistent with the present text. But V 3 [49],13,6-9, as we shall see in the seventh chapter, is more complicated than Rist imagines.

In III 8 [30],9,15, Plotinus considers the consequences of two disjunctive hypostases that the One is either thinking or unthinking: "Well, if it is thinking it will be an intellect, but if it is unthinking, it will be ignorant even of itself (ἀνόητον δὲ ἀγνοοῦσε καὶ ἐγνώτο)" (tr. A. H. Armstrong). He later explicitly denies intellection to the One (11,13-14). Does Plotinus here affirmatively infer the One’s ignorance from its unthinking and so violate his own statement in the present text? III 8 [30],9,15 will also be seriously considered later.


22 Also in V 6 [24],6,3-10 and VI 7 [38],37,15-16, the absence of intellection from the One is elucidated in such manner that νόησις and ἐνέργεια, tentatively identified with the One, possess neither νόησις nor ἐνέργεια. The distinction between ὁ νοῦς and νόησις in the present passage may be equivalent to that between τὸ ἔχων τὴν νόησιν and ἡ νόησις in V 6 [24],6,9-10. Wallis takes the present passage with VI 7 [38],37,15-16 and comments: "... we may describe the One ... as a pure Intellectual Act prior to the emergence of subject and object" in *Neoplatonism* (London: Duckworth, 1972), p. 59. It is clear, at least in the present passage, that Plotinus employs the word νόησις in the sense of pure activity in abstraction from its subject and object. But this fact would not immediately allow us to describe the One as the pure intellectual act, because Plotinus aims at giving no positive characterization of the One’s inner life in the present passage. With Bussanich, we can say at best that the One is analogous to νόησις as ἐνέργεια (*The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, p. 69).

23 Corrigan, comparing the present passage with V 4 [7],2,18-19, observes that Plotinus is here "more careful to avoid speaking of a νόησις which surpasses the νόησις of νοῦς" (*Hermes* 114 (1986):201). Although this view is correct as regards the present passage, we cannot see his intention to take κατὰ τὴν νόησιν in line 53 with περιμόνησις πρὸς ἐφαρμογήν in 11,24-25 (*ibid.*:201, note 16). This appears to be partially due to his rendering κατὰ τὴν νόησιν as "in accordance with intellection." But, insofar as Plotinus here stresses the role of the One as the cause of intellection, we may take κατὰ as meaning place rather than fitness.

It would not, however, be totally correct to say that Plotinus tries to avoid
speaking of a νόησις which surpasses the νόησις of Intellect throughout VI 9 [9]. Noείν ascribed to the soul united with the One (9,14-15), as already seen, definitely surpasses intellection proper.

24We subscribe to Bussanich’s observation that to place the One on the side of intellection does not mean that the One is νόησις, but suggests that it is an ἐνέργεια (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 69).

25See V 4 [7],2,4 and V 1 [10],7,11. The similar reference to the inchoate Intellect occurs still in the middle treatises (VI 7 [38],40,10-11). Here, however, the binary particles μὲν (line 7) and δὲ (line 10) distinguish ἡ νόησις (lines 10-11) as the inchoate Intellect from νόησις (line 7) as intellection proper.
CHAPTER III
V 1 [10],7,4-17: THE ONE’S QUASI-CONSCIOUSNESS?

The words οὗν συναίσθησιν occur in V 1 [10],7,12. Whether the subject of ἔχει in 7,12, the object of which is οὗν συναίσθησιν, is the One or Intellect is highly disputed. If it is the One, the present passage will afford us some information about the One’s self-consciousness. But another serious controversy about the subject of ἐῳρα in 7,6, in addition to the probable lacuna in 7,7-8, further complicates this problem, and therefore the section in question as a whole is usually considered to be one of the most difficult passages in the Enneads. Thus, even though our main concern is the identification of the subject of ἔχει in 7,12, we cannot avoid the elaborate analysis of the entire passage.

We may begin our analysis with 7,4-6. The text reads:

ἄλλας οὐ νοῦς ἐκεῖνος. πῶς οὖν νοῦν γεννᾷ; ἢ ὅτι τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐῳρα. ἢ δὲ ὀρασίς αὕτη νοῦς.

The beginning part of the seventh chapter of V 1 [10] takes over the discussion of the relationship between Intellect and the One at the sixth chapter; Intellect is an image of the One and the former is similar to the latter (7,1-4). The conjunction of ἄλλας and ἢ, as several commentators point out, indicates the objection by an imaginative interlocutor and Plotinus’ own response. The point of the objection is as follows: even though Intellect is in many respects like the One, the image is not that of which it is the image, so that Plotinus is forced to explain the way in which the One begets Intellect and provides it with some similarity with the One while it is distinct from the One. This objection captures the separateness of Intellect from the One by otherness (6,53) and adumbrates the weak point in the explanation of the genesis of Intellect by the doctrine of emanation, which cannot
fully articulate the very otherness between Intellect and the One (6,30-40).4 In a word, the imaginary interlocutor asks Plotinus to spell out the derivation of the multiplicity of Intellect from the absolutely simple One by counterbalancing their similarity and their explicit otherness.

Now in the interrogative sentence (7,5), the word νοῦν lies in the emphatic position. O'Daly notes that this emphatic position radically changes the meaning of the question; it deals with the fact that what is created is Intellect rather than with the creative act of the One itself.5 Then those commentators who regard the subject of ἐώρα as the One usually raise an objection that the opposing reading entails the abrupt shift in the subject of the verb. But the objection-response structure of the present passage, together with O'Daly's remark, would justify the subject change.6 We, however, do not wish to conclude hastily that Intellect is the subject of ἐώρα.

It seems possible to defend the view that the subject of ἐώρα is the One by the alleged parallel between 7,5-6 and 6,17-19. But the exegesis of 6,17-19 is also highly disputed with regard to the referents of ἐκείνου and αὐτό in 6,18. Two ways of reading are possible; either (i) ἐκείνου refers to the One and αὐτό is reflexive, or (ii) ἐκείνου refers to τὸ μετὰ τὸ ἐν and αὐτό non-reflexively to the One.7 Igal presents two reasons for (i). First, the pronoun ἐκεῖνο and its cognates consistently refer to the One in that context. Second, the meaning of ἔποιετο διά differs in 6,18 and 7,5; it is closely associated with the denial of movement to the One and refers to the One's introversion in the former section, whereas it denotes the conversion of the inchoate Intellect towards the One in the latter. Igal thus points out the contextual difference between 6,17-19 and 7,5-6; the former concerns the procession of Intellect without damaging the self-repose of the One, while the latter the pluralization of the vision of Intellect as the result of its conversion towards the One.8 Igal's first point is cogent enough. But his second reason presupposes not
only (i) but also the view that the subject of ἑώρα in 7,6 is Intellect. Hadot moreover raises two objections to (ii). First, the context of 6,17-19 deals with the One’s immobility so that mention of Intellect’s reversion would be otiose. Second, (ii) presupposes the absurdity that Intellect must be engendered before its emergence. The first objection is indeed sound. Atkinson attempts to dismiss the second objection by showing that what turns towards the One is the inchoate Intellect rather than the fully actualized one. But Atkinson’s counter-objection involves the abrupt appearance of the inchoate Intellect in the present context. In conclusion, it would be unanimously affirmed that 6,17-19 thematically deals with the One’s unmovedness. Hadot treats the alleged self-reversion of the One here as synonymous with its self-repose as mentioned in V 4 [7],2,19 (μένοντος αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ). Atkinson considers the alleged synonymy to be paradoxical. Aubin, against Hadot, claims that the self-reversion is denied of the One, in light of V 3 [49],1,3-4. Aubin’s claim is totally untenable. As Atkinson points out, τοῦ ἀπλοῦ in V 3 [49],1,3 is associated with Intellect rather than with the One, and thereby Aubin’s argument is based on a supposition that what is said of Intellect should be denied of the One. This supposition would indeed be right. But V 3 [49],1,3-4 is an interrogative sentence and so does not establish the denial of the self-reversion to Intellect. In V 3 [49],6,5, rather, self-reversion is explicitly ascribed to Intellect (καὶ ἐπιστρέφον εἰς αὐτόν). Thus we have now reached the crux of the problem; whether ἐπιστροφὴ can be used with no implication of motion, so that self-reversion can be consistently ascribed to the One. Throughout the Enneads there is no passage in which the One’s ἐπιστροφὴ towards itself is associated with its self-repose. But there is a relevant passage (VI 8 [39],16,24-25), where the self-inclination of the One towards itself is identified with its self-repose (ἡ τοιχύτη μεσος πρὸς αὐτὸν ... ὁμοία ... μονῇ ἐν αὐτῷ). The use of the word μεσος here is quite unusual, since the term is sometimes used to describe the Gnostic doctrine
of the creation of the universe by the cosmic soul. Here the One’s inclination towards itself, contrasted with the inclination towards what is outside of itself (πρὸς τὸ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ, 16,26-27), is said to keep its own ontological status. In V 1 [10], likewise, an extroverted inclination is denied of the One (οὐ προσευκαρτος, 6,26). If both ἐκείνου and αὐτό in 6,18 were to refer to the One, V 1 [10], 6,17-18 and VI 8 [39], 16,24-28 would be to some extent parallel to each other, though they differ contextually in that the genesis of Intellect is not thematically discussed in the latter. Needless to say, unless the referents of ἐκείνου and αὐτό are exactly identified, we cannot count this supposed parallel as a reason for the proposed reading. Nevertheless, it seems textually warranted that to think of the One’s self-reversion or self-inclination and its self-repose as synonymous is not paradoxical.

To recapitulate, it would be more reasonable to regard ἐκείνου and αὐτό in 6,18 as both referring to the One because of the three following reasons. First, the pronoun ἐκείνο, as Igal points out, consistently refers to the One in the present context. Second, to think of the reversion of the inchoate Intellect towards the One in this passage would involve the abrupt mention of it. Finally, Plotinus admits the motionless self-reversion of the One. Then, is 6,17-19 relevant to 7,5-6? Their contexts do not definitely differ, since both concern the genesis of Intellect. But this fact does not necessarily allow us to take 7,5-6 in light of 6,17-19. We may not take τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ in 7,5 as the One’s self-reversion, because it has not yet been established that the meaning of ἐπιστροφῇ is the same in 6,18 and 7,5. Hence we must consider 7,5-6 separately from 6,17-19, until the meaning of 7,5-6 is fully discussed and articulated.

Let us return to 7,5-6. We have no other means of identifying the subject of ἐφαρμοδιοκετῶς than to compare the consequences of the suppositions either that the subject is the One or that it is Intellect. First, let us suppose that the subject is the One. This supposition requires the reading of either the reflexive αὐτό or
Kirchhoff's emendation αὐτό. The reading of the non-reflexive αὐτό and associating it with τὸ γενόμενον in 7,3 are at variance with the One's ἐπιστροφή. This supposition, first of all, refers to the One's self-vision. Although it is qualified by οἷον and not linked with the genesis of Intellect in VI 8 [39], 16,19-21, the One's self-vision is conceivable. Given that the demonstrative αὐτῇ in 7,6 picks up the subject of ἔωρα,22 then, the present supposition is to identify Intellect with nothing else than the self-envisioning of the One and so to make it internal to the One. If this be the case, the entailed consequence violates the formula that each of three hypostases is distinct from its cause or offspring,23 blurs the necessary distinction between the activity constitutive of the One and the activity from it,24 and infiltrates a multiplicity into the absolutely simple One.25 Several absurdities are thus involved in this supposition.26

What about the other supposition that the subject of ἔωρα is Intellect? This supposition forces us to read αὐτό as non-reflexive, because the reading of either the reflexive αὐτό or Kirchhoff's αὐτό eliminates the role of the One in the genesis of Intellect. The problem of the abrupt change of subject, as already shown, is solved in terms of the present passage's structure as objection and response. The adherents to this supposition remark that the contrast between the imperfect ἔωρα and the word ὁραστὶς indicates the transition from the inchoate Intellect to the fully actualized one, from the indefinite and vague vision to the articulated and pluralized one.27 They maintain that this interpretation has the advantage of conforming to Plotinus' frequent account for the hypostatization of Intellect by the reversion of the inchoate Intellect towards the One.28 On this reading, moreover, τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ in 7,5 means precisely the reversion of the inchoate Intellect towards the One. The meaning of ἐπιστροφῇ is hence different in 6,18 and 7,5.29

Bussanich points out two difficulties in this construction.30 First, the proposed reading requires a shift in the meaning of τὸ γενόμενον; it refers to the
fully actualized Intellect in 7,3, whereas it must mean the inchoate Intellect in 7,5.31
Second, ὀρῶσα attributed to the inchoate Intellect in V 4 [7],2,4-5 undermines Atkinson's assertion that ὀρᾶσις must be attributed to the actualized Intellect. Bussanich's charge, however, does not prove a fatal blow to the proposed reading.

First, the subject of ἐώρα is not the inchoate Intellect but the fully actualized Intellect. The laconic sentence (i) τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ (ii) ἐώρα is exactly parallel with V 2 [11],1,9-10 τὸ δὲ γενόμενον (i) εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπεστράφη . . . καὶ (ii) ἐγένετο πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπον and V 6 [24],5,7-8 τὸ γενόμενον (i) ἐκίνησε πρὸς αὐτό, τὸ δ' ἐκινήθη τε καὶ (ii) εἶδε. Just as αὐτῇ picks up the subject of ἐώρα in V 1 [10],7,6, οὖτος picks up πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπον in V 2 [11],1,10-11, where νοῦς unmistakably means the fully actualized Intellect. When it "saw" the One, Intellect was no longer in the inchoate state. The inchoate Intellect "never saw the One (οὔδὲ ἐώρα πῶποτε)" (VI 7 [38],16,14), but "simply saw (ἐώρα μόνου)" (35,22). As already seen, the fully actualized Intellect has its activity directed towards the One,32 the activity to which self-intellection is incidental. Plotinus, in the present passage, refers solely to the original contemplating activity of Intellect without mentioning self-intellection as the pluralized vision. On the other hand, the phrase τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ πρὸς αὐτό, being in parallel with εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπεστράφη in V 2 [11],1,9-10 and ἐκίνησε πρὸς αὐτό in V 6 [24],5,7, refers to the reversion of the inchoate Intellect. The phrase, exactly as a causal dative, indicates that the hypostatization of Intellect as that which sees the One is logically dependent on the inchoate Intellect's reversion. Thus construed, the sentence τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐώρα turns out to be the extremely concise statement about the hypostatization of Intellect by the reversion of the inchoate Intellect towards the One. The two stages of Intellect are noticed in this sentence rather than in the suggested contrast between ἐώρα and ὀρᾶσις. Therefore νοῦν in V 1 [10],7,5 as τὸ γενόμενον refers to the fully formed
Intellect, which is the subject of ἐὼρα in 7,6. There is a shift neither in the sense of τὸ γενόμενον nor in the sense of νοῦς. Both words consistently mean the actualized Intellect. Atkinson, referring to V 3 [49],11,12-13, tries to show that νοῦς can refer not only to the fully actualized Intellect but to the inchoate one. Our proposed interpretation, however, does not need such justification. In addition, to take V 1 [10],7,5-6 with V 6 [24],5,7-8 leads to the association of movement with the inchoate Intellect's reversion. This association would be sharply contrasted with the aforementioned a-kinetic nature of the One's self-reversion.

Second, as Bussanich points out, indeed, we need not follow Atkinson's view that ὄρασις is a code for the actualized Intellect. But, insofar as the fully formed Intellect is regarded as the subject of ἐὼρα, which is picked up by αὕτη, ἥ ὄρασις must refer to the actualized Intellect. Notice that ὄρασις is not contrasted with ἐὼρα. Both words refer to the actualized Intellect. Our comparison of the present passage with V 2 [11],1,9-10 and V 6 [24],5,7-8 shows that the very code for the fully actualized Intellect is a verb which expresses Intellect's seeing of the One, rather than the specific word ὄρασις. Therefore, although Bussanich's attack on Atkinson's reliance on the word ὄρασις is reasonable, it does not undermine our proposed construction that ἥ ὄρασις refers to the actualized Intellect. The sentence ἥ δὲ ὄρασις αὕτη νοῦς, thus construed, emphasizes the dependency of Intellect's substantiality on its relation to the One. The ὄρασις here does not mean the pluralized vision of Intellect but simply Intellect's seeing of the One, so that the sentence says nothing about intellection of the Forms or self-intellection. Although Intellect's relation to the One calls for the explicit mention of the dual activity of Intellect or of its two phases, the present passage describes Intellect as if the fully actualized Intellect consists solely of its eternally pre-noetic or hyper-noetic phase, precisely because the sentence in discussion mentions neither self-intellection nor pluralized intellectual vision. This point would possibly justify Bussanich's
observation that Plotinus, throughout the present chapter, "oscillates back and forth between the two aspects of Intellect or is unclear as to which he is referring to."36

In sum, the comparison of two suppositions shows us that to regard the subject of ἐώρα as Intellect involves far less difficulties than to regard it as the One. But our construction that the subject is the fully actualized Intellect rather than the inchoate Intellect slightly deviates from the interpretation by Atkinson, Igal, and other critics. Nevertheless, our construction agrees with theirs in that Plotinus' response to the objection by the imaginary interlocutor briefly mentions the transition from the inchoate Intellect to the fully formed one by the former's reversion towards the One.

In 7,6-7, Plotinus proceeds to Intellect's apprehension. The text reads:

τὸ γὰρ κατολαμβάνον ἄλλο ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ νοῦς.

Except for Harder and Schroeder, all translators and commentators construe ἄλλο as accusative. That which apprehends something else is either sense-perception or intellect. Harder takes the referent of τὸ κατολαμβάνον as the One and construes ἄλλο as nominative.37 But, because this construction is based on the view that the subject of ἐώρα in 7,6 is the One,38 we cannot follow it. Schroeder proposes an alternative reading; the referent of τὸ κατολαμβάνον is the inchoate Intellect and ἄλλο is nominative.39 The passage thus construed means that the inchoate Intellect is other than sense-perception or intellect.

It is obvious that Schroeder's interpretation has the advantage of keeping the contextual continuity. The particle γὰρ expects a detailed account for the transition from the inchoate Intellect to the fully formed one, which is laconically mentioned in 7,5-6. And the kernel of this account is explicitly taken over in 7,10-11,40 where ἡ νόησις (7,11) refers to the inchoate Intellect.41 Hence to bring the inchoate Intellect into 7,6-7 would make the bridging between the preceding discussion and 7,10-11 easy and smooth.
Schroeder's construction, however, seems to involve several difficulties. In addition to the redundancy in saying that the inchoate Intellect is other than sense-perception, the entailed implication that it is other than Intellect appears to be at variance with the reference to it by the word νόησις in 7,11. Schroeder follows Igal's rendering of the putative sense of 7,7-8; sense-perception is a straight line, while intellect is a circle whose center is the One.42 On Schroeder's exegesis, insofar as the inchoate Intellect is regarded as other than νοῦς, it occupies no position in the metaphor employed in 7,7-8. This consequence rather injures the contextual continuity.

As the particle γάρ marks, the present sentence explains the immediately preceding sentence, so that νοῦς in 7,7 refers to the fully formed Intellect meant by νοῦς in 7,6. Moreover, ἡ ὦρασις, specified by τὸ καταλαμβάνον ἄλλο, means the contemplation of the One rather than self-intellection. This meaning perfectly coincides with the prefigured sense of ἡ ὦρασις in 6,42 that ὅρα ὦ νοῦς ἕκεινου. In the present sentence, as well as in its preceding sentence, Intellect is primarily conceived as that which sees and apprehends the One. In other words, the pluralization of Intellect's vision of the One is not yet on the scene. Although Schroeder finds the accusative ἄλλο redundant,43 it exactly functions as marking the difference of Intellect from the One. The comparison of τὸ καταλαμβάνον ἄλλο with πρὸς ἔτερον βλέπει in VI 9 [9],2,38 would indicate that the present sentence is highlighting only the hyper-noetic aspect of Intellect.

Then the short sentence follows in 7,7-8:
αἰσθησιν γραμμήν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα.

Among all commentators after Creuzer, only Harder and Igal maintain that the words may stand in the text without emendation. Harder claims that the words constitute a memo for Plotinus' own use.44 This view is sufficiently criticized by both Igal and Atkinson.45 Igal attempts to reconstruct the putative sense of the
words in light of VI 9 [9],8; sense-perception is compared to a line, intellection to the circle, and the One to the center of the circle. Atkinson and Schroeder, though they recognize a corruption here, follow Igal's reconstruction. Atkinson, however, observes that the line does not well fit either with the circle or with the center. Bussanich therefore suggests that the distinction is made in the present passage between sense-perception/line and intellection/circle and that the One as center should be excluded from Igal's reconstruction. But we can see no reason why the One as center must be excluded from the geometric imagery. To place the center in the geometric imagery enables the present passage to be closely related to the preceding sentence (7,6-7). The line or linear motion expresses the activity of sense-perception as to καταλαμβάνων ὄλλο in such a way that one terminus of the line represents sense-organ and another a sensible object which is "other" than that sense-organ. Likewise, if the apprehension of the other is to be expressed in geometric imagery, Intellect's seeing of the One must be inevitably compared to the relation between circle and center. If the center is excluded, the "other" that Intellect must apprehend will be absent from the imagery. Notice that Plotinus' theme in the present context is persistently the relation between the One and Intellect rather than the mere contrast between sense-perception and intellection.

The ambiguous passage ensues in 7,8-10:

\[
\text{ἀλλ' ὁ κύκλος τοιοῦτος οἷς μερὶς ἐσθαι: τούτο δὲ οὐχ οὕτως. ἦ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐν μέν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν δύναμις πάντων.}
\]

The conjunction of particles ἀλλά and ἦ indicates that the present passage consists of an objection by the imaginary opponent and the reply by Plotinus himself as in 7,4-5. Then what is the referent of τοῦτο? A couple of commentators note that it directly refers to the center of the circle and indirectly to the One so that the opponent implicitly raises the query about the derivation of plurality from the unity. This exegesis, prima facie, has the merit of conforming to the theme in the
present context, the hypostatization of Intellect by the pluralization of its inchoate vision. But it appears to involve several difficulties, too. On this reading, τοῦτο must refer to κέντρον in either the putative reconstruction of καὶ τὰ ἄλλα in 7,7-8 or the supposed lacuna. Since τοῦτο has no apparent reference in the text, this reading is compelled to presuppose that the text in 7,7-8 is corrupt. But this is not a genuine difficulty. The real difficulty is that even though the implication of the objection appears to conform to the present theme, that objection, on its surface level, deals with the allegory alone. Since its point becomes explicit only when its nuance is understood, it is not a well articulated objection. Moreover, this construction forces the geometric center to be the referent of ἐν. To call the geometric center one, however, sounds really redundant.

Schroeder proposes an alternative reading: τοῦτο refers to the inchoate Intellect. Bussanich, following the same line, takes τοῦτο as potential Intellect. This is grammatically possible; the neuter τοῦτο can refer to τὸ καταλαμβάνον in 7,6-7. Although we have rejected Schroeder's view that τὸ καταλαμβάνον is identified as the inchoate Intellect, τοῦτο can refer to the actualized Intellect because the mention of the geometric circle in 7,8 specifies the referent as τὸ καταλαμβάνον that is compared to the circle, namely the actualized Intellect. Slightly different from Schroeder's and Bussanich's interpretation, our construction that τοῦτο refers to τὸ καταλαμβάνον and thereby to the actualized Intellect is fully consistent with our understanding of νοῦς in 7,7 as the actualized Intellect. On this construction, the objection by the imaginary interlocutor mentions the indivisibility of Intellect, and then Plotinus' reply renders it as the unity of Intellect and contrasts this unity with the One's unity. The indivisibility or unity of Intellect mentioned in the present passage, *prima facie*, appears to be at variance with the description of Intellect as being οἷον μεριστό (7,17). But this description does not affirm Intellect's divisibility. In terms of contextual continuity, therefore, we, with
Armstrong, may take τοῦτο as intellectual apprehension and specify it as the fully actualized Intellect.

Our proposed interpretation of the sentence τοῦτο οὐχ οὔτως would allow two ways of construing the immediately ensuing καὶ ἑνταῦθα ἐν μὲν. One possibility is to take ἑνταῦθα as referring to τοῦτο or Intellect and ἐν with οὐχ οὔτως, namely Intellect's indivisibility. The sentence is rendered such that "also in the fully formed Intellect there is a unity." Another possibility is to read ἐν as the predicate of the hidden subject τοῦτο and ἑνταῦθα as referring to οὐχ οὔτως. On this construction, the sentence means that Intellect is one also in its being not divisible. The latter reading seems to be preferable because it makes the force of καὶ in 7,9 more definite. In the preceding chapters, we must notice, Plotinus speaks of the unity of the actualized Intellect; the unity of Intellect and its object (4,31-32; 4,40) and of Intellect and intellection (5,19). Since the unity of Intellect has already been repeatedly mentioned, the first reading makes the force of καὶ slightly ambiguous. Of course, it is possible to take καὶ ἑνταῦθα as "also in Intellect besides in the One." But this interpretation asks us to notice the implication by reading back from τὸ ἐν in 7,9. In the second reading, on the contrary, καὶ can definitely imply "also in Intellect's being indivisible as well as in the aforementioned sense of its unity." This implication allows us to notice that Intellect can be called one from diverse viewpoints. To this extent, the proposed reading has another advantage of stressing the similarity between the One and Intellect as τὸ γενόμενον.

Finally, since we have regarded the referent of the first ἐν in 7,9 as Intellect, but not as the geometric center, we cannot follow Igal's way of taking δύναμις πάντως in apposition to τὸ ἐν. As for the sentence ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν δύναμις πάντως, the following two points must be remarked.

First, Plotinus' reference to the One as τὸ ἐν rather than as ἐκεῖνο or τὸ ἀλλο is felt very abrupt. But this reference is inevitable. By remarking that the One
is the productive power of all things, Plotinus begins his serious consideration of the problem regarding the derivation of multiplicity from the absolute unity. It is certain that the present context takes over the account of Intellect's relation to the One from the sixth chapter. As Plotinus' presentation of problems in 6,1-8 indicates, however, the relation between the One and Intellect must be considered primarily in terms of the derivation of multiplicity from unity. In the sixth chapter, Plotinus gives an account of the genesis of Intellect, but does not seriously discuss the very derivation of multiplicity from unity, which is the question repeatedly discussed also by the ancient philosophers and which our soul really longs to know (6,3-4). The statement that the One is the productive power of all things reminds us of the earlier statement that ὁ ἀπλοῦς is ὁ αἴτως τοῦ πολύν εἶναι (5,4-5) and of the claim that the multiplicity must be referred back to the One (6,8). Hence it marks the very beginning of Plotinus' answer to the problem of the derivation of multiplicity from unity.

Second, the force of ἀλλά can be fully understood with our construction of the whole sentence in 7,9-10. The sentence καὶ ἑνταῦθα ἐν μέν would certainly evoke our expectation that the transcendent One is responsible for Intellect's unity as explicated in diverse ways. But the ensuing sentence τὸ ἐν δύναμις πάντων marks prominently the role of the One as the cause of multiplicity rather than as the cause of Intellect's unity. Hence ἀλλά in 7,9 seems to turn aside the reader's expectation that the One may be described as the cause of Intellect's unity and thereby to mark the introduction of the new aspect of the One as the cause of multiplicity. Thus construed, the entire passage in 7,9-10 is explicated as follows: Yes, also in respect of its indivisibility as well as in respect of the unity of Intellect and its object and of Intellect and intellection, Intellect as that which apprehends the One is one, but the One, besides being responsible for Intellect's unity, is the productive power of all things or the very cause of multiplicity.
lines (10-17), Plotinus gives a detailed account of the genesis of Intellect through the pluralization of its inchoate vision. The sentence ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν δύναμις πάντων not only definitely mentions the One’s causal role in this pluralization process but indicates that the ensuing account for the genesis of Intellect must be seen primarily as Plotinus’ own reply to the problem of the derivation of multiplicity from unity.

Plotinus never forgets the problem which he raised in the preceding chapter. Plotinus now explains how the inchoate Intellect is pluralized by its vision of the One. The text in 7,10-11 reads:


Here ἡ νόησις refers to the inchoate Intellect as it does in V 4 [7],2,4ff.. The plural ταῦτα referring to πάντα, given that καθορά denotes the actual vision, marks the pluralization of the vision of the inchoate Intellect; the inchoate Intellect, in attempting to see the One, cannot grasp the One in unity but pluralizes itself.

The question arises, whether the participle σχιζομένη is middle or passive. Atkinson, Igal, and Schroeder take it as middle. Atkinson’s view is based on the conformity of 7,10-11 to VI 7 [38],15,20-21, where the genesis of Intellect is said to take place by a splitting up of the One’s power. To the objection that the verb σχιζεῖν has no attested middle, Igal replies that ἀποσχιζεῖν has a middle and that σχιζομένη here is taken with the preceding ἀπὸ. Besides these remarks, there is a decisive reason for the middle σχιζομένη. As explicitly mentioned in 7,28-30, the hypostatization of Intellect exactly means the genesis of the multiplicity of beings. The reading of the participle as middle implies that the inchoate Intellect takes upon itself the consequence of its own act of separating out the plural items (ταῦτα) from the One. The reading of the participle as passive, however, does not fully describe the pluralization of the inchoate Intellect itself. The present passage, thus construed, means that the inchoate Intellect separates out its objects from the
One rather than that it is separated from the One when it sees its pluralizing objects. Then the objection could possibly be raised that our proposed construction presupposes the separation of Intellect from the One prior to the pluralization of its vision. We may reply: this is not a genuine difficulty, since Plotinus affirms the otherness of the inchoate Intellect from the One.\textsuperscript{70}

Moreover, νόησις and νοῦς in 7,11 are regarded respectively as the inchoate Intellect and the fully actualized one. It would be quite likely that Plotinus in the present context consciously differentiates two stages of Intellect by these terms. This supposition is fully compatible with our interpretation that νοῦς in 7,5-7 consistently means the fully hypostatized Intellect. The advantage of our construction of the preceding lines (6-10) lies in our faithfully abiding by Plotinus' intentional distinction between νοῦς and νόησις.\textsuperscript{71} The occurrence of νόησις in 7,11 indicates that the inchoate Intellect, which was still implicit in 7,5 τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ, is now explicitly on the scene.

Eventually, we arrive at the crucial passage that contains οἷον συναίσθησιν (7,12):

\begin{quote}
ἐπεὶ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἔχει ἡδη οἶον συναίσθησιν τῆς δυνάμεως, ὅτι δύναται οὕσιαν (7,11-13).
\end{quote}

This passage is extremely difficult. The first problem that we encounter is whether the subject of ἔχει in 7,12 is Intellect or the One. It is evident that the subject is not the One. First, given that ἐπεὶ in 7,11 is retrospective in its force and marks the start of Plotinus' account for his preceding statement, to regard the subject of ἔχει as the One is to commit the double abrupt shift in the subject; the subject of καθορᾷ in 7,11 is Intellect and αὐτός in 7,13 also refers to Intellect.\textsuperscript{72} Second, if the One were the subject, ἡδη in 7,12 would lose its force. Henry supposes that the addition of οἷον to συναίσθησιν allows the One to be the
subject. But this point is not decisive. For these reasons, therefore, we cannot regard the One as the subject.

If the One must not be the subject of ἔχει, another problem naturally occurs whether the subject is νόησις (7,11) as the inchoate Intellect or νοῦς (7,11) as the fully actualized Intellect. The reflexive αὐτοῦ in 7,12 does not allow the feminine νόησις to be the subject of the verb. Moreover, it would sound a little awkward to say that the non-substantial νόησις possesses οἶον συναισθήσις. In light of the perfect consistency in Plotinus' usage of νοῦς and νόησις in the present context, νοῦς, which is the subject of ἔχει, must be the fully actualized Intellect.

There still remains another problem whether the subject of δύναται in 7,13 is the One or Intellect. It is at least certain that τῆς δυνάμεως in 7,12 and δύναται in 7,13 refers to the same subject. Atkinson and Igal, on the one hand, think that they refer to the inchoate Intellect. Armstrong follows this line. Rist, Schroeder, and Bussanich, on the other, regard the One as their referent. The latter interpretation seems to be more plausible. The crucial point is that the article τῆς in 7,12 is demonstrative just as τῆς in 7,10 is. Hence it is appropriate to take τῆς δυνάμεως in 7,12, with τῆς δυνάμεως in 7,10, as referring to δύναμις πάντων in 7,9-10, namely the One's power. To regard Intellect as the referent of τῆς δυνάμεως in 7,12 inevitably involves an abrupt change of referent for δύναμις. Schroeder and Bussanich consider the present passage to be parallel to V 3 [49],7,3-5, where the actualized Intellect is said to know what the One can cause (γνώσσεται ... ὁ δύναται ἐκείνος). This parallel would confirm our proposed interpretations that the referent of τῆς δυνάμεως and the subject of δύναται are the One and that the subject of ἔχει is the fully actualized Intellect rather than the inchoate one.

Since νοῦς is regarded as the subject of ἔχει, οἶον συναισθήσις is to be ascribed to the fully formed Intellect. Several critics, who take the inchoate Intellect as the subject, maintain that the addition of οἶον is due to the fact that συναισθήσις...
is only properly ascribed to the fully actualized Intellect. The attribution of οὖν συναίσθησις to the inchoate Intellect, however, involves a serious difficulty. The hypostatization of οὐσία is logically posterior to the reversion of the inchoate Intellect. Hence the question naturally occurs how the inchoate Intellect in its processive state can possess some sort of awareness about the One's power that can engender the οὐσία which has not been fully hypostatized yet. This difficulty will evaporate when οὖν συναίσθησις is attributed to the fully formed Intellect. Of course, the objection will be raised that the qualifying οὖν may be unnecessary since συναίσθησις properly belongs to the actualized Intellect. This objection is not fatal to our interpretation. Even though συναίσθησις is proper to the actualized Intellect, the qualifying οὖν seems to be necessary in the present passage. As already seen, the συναίσθησις of the fully actualized Intellect normally represents the prominent aspect of self-intellection, namely the unifying of its own interior multiplicity. Intellect's συναίσθησις properly concerns the multiplicity of the intelligible objects, but not the causal power of the One. Insofar as the prefix συν- of συναίσθησις implies some multiplicity, the word is not fully appropriate to Intellect's consciousness of the One's power. Also in V 3 [49],7,3-5, which has been regarded as being parallel to the present passage, Plotinus employs the very general verb γιγνώσκειν for Intellect's knowledge of the One's power. This point would be due to the fact that Plotinus, even in his later treatises, did not find any appropriate term for Intellect's knowledge and awareness of the One's power. Therefore, the qualifying οὖν seems to mark that Intellect's awareness of the One's causal power is not its συναίσθησις proper. The addition of the qualification is not due to the attribution of συναίσθησις to the inchoate Intellect. Moreover, ἤδη refers to the moment when Intellect completely sees the pluralized items separated from the One's power, that is, the very moment of the hypostatization of Intellect. The adverb nicely fits the start of the actualized
Thus construed, ὁ οὖν συναίσθησις, attributed to the actualized Intellect, would not be a vague quasi-consciousness. In light of the parallel between the present passage and V 3 [49], 7,3-5, ὁ οὖν συναίσθησις must rather be clear γνώσις.

Two more points must be noticed. First, the phrase παρ' αὐτοῦ, of course, marks the independence of the fully actualized Intellect vis-à-vis the One. Second, ἐπεί is retrospective in force and extends to 7,10-11. The ἐπεί-clause as a whole explains that Intellect, when it fully sees the pluralized items from the One’s power, has a kind of awareness of the One’s power considered in terms of its effects, the awareness which explicitly marks the hypostatization and independence of Intellect. Thus seen, Intellect’s consciousness of the One’s power turns out to be closely related to its seeing of the pluralized objects (τοῦτα ... καθορθέ, 7,10-11). In V 3 [49], 7,1-6, Intellect’s self-knowledge is considered to be logically dependent on its knowledge of the One’s power. In the present context, however, how Intellect’s consciousness of the One’s power is related to its intellection of the intelligible objects is not fully clear.

By identifying Intellect as the subject of ἔχει and the One as the referent of τῆς δυνάμεως, roughly speaking, we follow the line of interpretation in Schroeder and Bussanich. But our view that ὁ οὖν συναίσθησις must be attributed to the fully actualized Intellect rather than to the inchoate one surely diverges from theirs. Our construction, of course, is based on the correspondence of the masculine reflexive αὑτοῦ to the subject of ἔχει and on the observation of the consistency in Plotinus’ use of νοῦς and νόησις in the present context. Moreover, it has the advantage of being parallel to V 3 [49], 7,3-5. In addition to these advantages, the proposed interpretation does not leave the qualification of συναίσθησις by οὖν unexplained.

The final passage to be considered (7,13-17) reads:
Here two points must be noticed. The first problem concerns the punctuation of the passage. Igal and Atkinson take the ὁτι-clause, respectively in 7,14-15 and in 7,14-17, as parallel to the ὁτι-clause in 7,13.86 In this reading, the second ὁτι-clause must describe the content of Intellect's awareness of the One's power. Bussanich presents two reasons against this construction.87 First, this reading "invests inchoate Intellect with a remarkable degree of awareness of how it derives from the One, which is unparalleled in both early and late discussions of the problem." Second, the interpretation of the ὁτι-clause in 7,14-15 as a result-clause instead of the causal-clause "assumes that the entire passage is much more elliptical than it seems to be." Since we attribute ὁἶον συναίσθησις to the fully actualized Intellect, we cannot appeal to the first reason. Ironically enough, Atkinson's reading, insuring the remarkable degree of awareness, would rather support our attribution of ὁἶον συναίσθησις to the fully formed Intellect. In addition to Bussanich's second reason, Atkinson's reading has such difficulty that we cannot see why the passage ὁἶον μέρος . . . ἡ οὐσία is the explanation of the One's power (τῆς δυνάμεως, 7,12) about which ὁἶον συναίσθησις is. Both Atkinson and Igal maintain that τῆς δυνάμεως in 7,12 refers to Intellect's power. Whichever construction is accepted as for the extent of the second ὁτι-clause, the passage ὁἶον μέρος . . . ἡ οὐσία does not seem to explain appropriately Intellect's power. First of all, to take τῆς δυνάμεως in 7,12 as Intellect's power neglects the demonstrative force of the article τῆς. Hence the second ὁτι-clause must not be understood with ὁἶον συναίσθησις.

Second, the self-constitution of Intellect expressed by δι' ὁμίτων ὁρίζει and the supervening causality of the One expressed by τῇ παρ' ἐκείνου δυνάμει are
well counterbalanced in the present passage.\textsuperscript{88} This point would further illuminate an aspect of \textit{οὐν συναισθησις}; as Schroeder puts, "\textit{νοῦς} is autonomous in that the consciousness which it has of the One’s power is self-constituting within the framework of its continuity with its source in the One."\textsuperscript{89}

To recapitulate, \textit{οὐν συναισθησις} in 7,12 is not attributed to the One but to the actualized Intellect. Nevertheless the above consideration has revealed two aspects of the One’s inner life. First, some self-reversion is ascribed to the One. The self-reversion of the One, being different from the kinetic reversion of Intellect towards the One, is totally motionless. The a-kinetic nature of the One’s self-reversion is fully congruent with the characterization of its hyper-noetic \textit{κατανοήσις} as being \textit{ἐν στάσει αἰώνι} in V 4 [7],2,18. Second, as Schroeder aptly compares, "the One might have a consciousness of its \textit{δύναμις} as the equivalent of its primary act, but hardly of this in terms of its effect," whereas \textit{οὐν συναισθησις} τῆς \textit{δυνάμεως} in 7,12 is Intellect’s consciousness of the One’s power considered in terms of its effects.\textsuperscript{90} If the One’s consciousness of itself as \textit{δύναμις πάντων} must be perfectly consistent with its simplicity,\textsuperscript{91} its \textit{δύναμις} must be understood without reference to any externs.\textsuperscript{92} In fact, the One’s awareness of its power without reference to its effects can be positively envisioned as its motionless self-reversion. In the context dealing with the One’s self-reversion, we are told that the One "neither inclined its attention nor exercised its will nor moved in any sense (\textit{οὐ προσνοεύσατος οὐδὲ βουληθέντος οὐδὲ ὀλως κυηθέντος})" (6,26-27). The involuntary nature of the One’s productive activity is adroitly spelled out in V 5 [32],12,40-45; the One would not have cared even if Intellect had not come to being, that is, even if its effect had not been entailed. As Schroeder notes, therefore, "the One need not address itself to any extern to produce \textit{νοῦς}."\textsuperscript{93} Thus the One’s supposed consciousness of its own power can be closely taken with its motionless self-reversion. In the late treatise, VI
as we shall see, the One’s self-inclination is exactly specified as its hyper-intellection and unique awareness.
NOTES

1. Although these two controversies are interrelated, those critics who take the subject of ἐυρήκα as Intellect do not necessarily maintain that it is also the subject of ἐχεῖ. Igal, who himself takes the subjects of both verbs as Intellect, collects various interpretations in "La Genesis de la Inteligencia en un Pasaje de las Eneadas de Plotino (V 1.7.4-35)," Emerita 39 (1971):131-132, 149-150. See also M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, a Commentary with Translation (Oxford, 1983), p. 167. To this list may be added G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), pp. 86-87, note 4, F. M. Schroeder, "Conversion and Consciousness in Plotinus, 'Enneads' 5.1 [10]," Hermes 114 (1986):187, 191, J. Bussanich, (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 34-35, and M. Tanaka, one of the Japanese co-translators of the Enneads. Gurtler and Schroeder maintain the same view as Igal's. Bussanich regards the One as the subject of ἐυρήκα and Intellect as that of ἐχεῖ. In Tanaka's translation, as usually in Japanese literature, the subject of ἐυρήκα is not explicitly mentioned, though the subject of ἐχεῖ is regarded as Intellect. From his reading of the reflexive αὐτῷ in 7,6, he would perhaps take the subject of ἐυρήκα as the One.


3. On this separateness, see V 8 [31],13,8-9 τῇ... ἔτερότητι τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄνω ἀποτομῆς. See also Bussanich's comment on the present passage: "The relation of the One and Intellect involves the dialectical oscillation between presence and absence, similarity and difference" (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 37).

4. This explanation consists of two parts; (i) the account by means of the double-activity theory (6,30-37), and (ii) the account by means of the spontaneous production by that which is supremely perfect (6,37-40).

For the double activity theory, see IV 3 [27],10,30-37; V 1 [10],3,7-12; V 3 [49],7,21-26; V 4 [7],1,31-36; 2,27-37. In IV 3 [27],10,30-37, Plotinus differentiates the activity constitutive of soul-less things from the one constitutive of the soul; the former "so to speak, lies asleep (ὁνν ὑπνεῖ)" (line 33), whereas the latter is "something awake (ἐγρήγορος τι)" (line 36). The One's ἐγρήγορος in VI 8 [39],16,31-34, which is definitely associated with its ἐνέργεια (line 31), might be illustrated also in terms of the above mentioned distinction in IV 3 [27],10,30-37.

For the superlative perfection of the One, see V 1 [10],6,39-40; V 4 [7],1,24.


7For the list of the adherents of those two views, see M. Atkinson, *Plotinus: Ennead V.1*, p. 135: and the *addenda ad textum* to V 1 [10],[6],18 in H-S1, vol. 3.


11Atkinson is himself aware of this difficulty: "What is surprising about our passage is that the ἐπιστροφή is mentioned before the undefined emanation" (*Plotinus: Ennead V.1*, p. 139). He tries to dismiss this difficulty by appealing to the involvement of the concept of motion in the concept of genesis (*loc. cit.*). But this remark definitely presupposes the view, not yet established, that any ἐπιστροφή whatsoever involves a movement.


16See also V 3 [49],6,40 ἡ ἐπιστροφή πρὸς αὐτὸν; 13,23 εἰς αὐτὸν ἐπιστρέφει; VI 8 [39],6,33-34 ἀλλὰ πᾶς ἑπέστραπται πρὸς αὐτὸν.

17See II 9 [33],4,6ff.

18It could be objected that VI 8 [39],15,24-26 is not relevant to V 1 [10],6,17-19 because Plotinus, in VI 8 [39],13,1-5, explicitly mentions his departure from the usual enforcement of negative theology in talking about the One and therefore VI 8 [39],13-21 does not contain Plotinus' explicit view. This objection is not convincing enough, since τι in VI 8 [39],13,4 implies that his departure is not all-out and that he tries to abide by his own position as much as possible in the
following chapters.

19 In V 3 [49],3,43, we read that Intellect is separate (χωριστός) because it does not incline (τῷ μὴ προσνεύειν) towards us. This section shows that the verb προσνεύειν is properly used of an outward movement. From this usage, it can be supposed that the use of the verb in V 1 [10],6,26 represents Plotinus' wish to describe the One's transcendence beyond and separation from Intellect. Atkinson writes: "Plotinus' use of προσνεύειν here may reflect a wish to avoid the application of the Gnostic theories to the One" (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 142).


21 Atkinson tries to solve the difficulty of the abrupt mention of the inchoate Intellect entailed by (ii) in terms of the involvement of the concept of motion in the concept of genesis (see note 11). Our discussion can defeat the view, presupposed by this remark, that any ἐπιστροφή whatsoever involves some motion. Atkinson, in fact, does not make a distinction between inward motion and outward motion. Of course, the One's self-reversion may not be taken even with inward motion. If, on the one hand, Atkinson were to say that the genesis involves inward motion, he would be compelled to introduce the inchoate Intellect into the present context so that his argument would be circular, since the notion of inward motion becomes first intelligible by the introduction of the inchoate Intellect. On the other hand, the view that the genesis involves outward motion does not go with (ii).


23 See M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 158. See also note 3.

By saying that the identification of the actual self-vision of the One with Intellect would imply that "Intellect is something internal to the One" (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 158), Atkinson would mean nothing more than that the present supposition abrogates the necessary demarcation of Intellect from the One. Bussanich maintains that the view that Intellect is internal to the One is supported by the Plotinian formula, as presented in V 2 [11],2,13, V 5 [32],9,5-7, and 9,33, that the lower entities are in their principle; this formula, he thinks, provides a possible foundation for his claim of the One's seeing (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 42). Bussanich's objection to Atkinson, however, is not convincing. First, as explicitly remarked in V 5 [32],9,1-4 and 9,31-32, the above-mentioned
Plotinian formula presupposes otherness between Intellect and the One. Hence Bussanich's reference to these passages, against his intention, takes the side of Atkinson. Atkinson’s statement that "Intellect is something internal to the One" has no bearing on the Plotinian formula regarding the presence of the cause in that which is caused. The Plotinian formula expresses nothing more than the presence of the cause in what is caused and the dependency of the latter on the former. It cannot be a possible foundation for the alleged identification of the One's self-vision with Intellect.

Moreover, Bussanich holds that the passages in VI 8 [39],18,21-22 and 18,32-34 are most relevant to the present passage (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 43). But these passages simply mention the causal dependency of Intellect on the One and do not support the identification of the One's self-vision with Intellect. Rather, the section τον αυτον εν ενι νοουν ου νοουν ὄντα (18,21-22) does not allow this identification.


26We have identified ἐπιστροφέντος in 6,18 as the One's self-reversion. But none of the above mentioned absurdities is involved in 6,17-19, insofar as τι μετ’ αὐτῷ, on the proposed construction, is not equated with the One’s self-reversion.

27See M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 158; J. Igal, Emerita 39 (1971):132-134; F. M. Schroeder, Hermes 114 (1986):187. For the ὀρασις as the fully actualized Intellect, see V 1 [10],5,18-19. Igal equates the fully actualized vision with the activity constitutive of the essence of Intellect (Emerita 39 (1971):132). In VI 7 [38],16,10-16, however, Plotinus hesitates to use the imperfect ἐώρα to describe the vision of the inchoate Intellect (see also F. M. Schroeder, Hermes 114 (1986):189-190).

Corrigan proposes that the subject of ἐώρα is ambiguous on the ground that the inchoate Intellect and the One are not properly distinct until Intellect is fully hypostatized; that is, the duality between the One and Intellect is still implicit in the sentence ἡ ὅτι... ἐώρα. See K. Corrigan, "Plotinus, 'Enneads' 5,4 [7],2 and Related Passages," Hermes 114 (1986):198. But this observation is not well founded. In V 2 [11],1,9, τὸ γενόμενον as the indefinite emanation from the One is said to be ἄλλο. For the identification of τὸ γενόμενον as the undefined overflow from the One, see M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 139. On the otherness between the inchoate Intellect and the One, see also J. F. Phillips, "Plotinus and the 'Eye' of Intellect," Dionysius 14 (1990):97. So the otherness between the One and Intellect is already explicit at the stage of the procession of the inchoate Intellect. This
distinctness would be more fully elucidated by the thesis that the intelligible
otherness and the primary movement are the principle of intelligible matter (II 4
[12],5,28-37). Rist points out that otherness is closely linked with motion, especially
motion away from the One. See J. M. Rist, "The Problem of ‘Otherness’ in the
Enneads," in *Le Néoplatonisme* (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique, 1971), pp. 81-82. The intelligible otherness here precisely represents
the separateness from the One rather than the distinctness between Intellect and its
object or between noetic objects. Hence Deck’s remark that intelligible matter is
the gauge of Intellect’s separation from the One is correct. See J. N. Deck, *Nature,
Contemplation, and the One* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), pp. 115-
116. Moreover, the distinctness of intelligible matter from the One is explicitly
mentioned also in II 4 [12],5,37.

28See III 8 [30],11,1ff.; V 2 [11],1,10-13; V 3 [49],11,1-6; V 4 [7],2,4-7; VI 7
[38],16,13ff.; 17,14-18. See also M. Atkinson, *Plotinus: Ennead V.1*, p. 158; G. M.

29This difference, as we shall see, would be clearly explained by the fact
that the One’s self-reversion is completely motionless, whereas the inchoate
Intellect’s reversion towards the One involves some movement.


31Atkinson frankly admits this difficulty (*Plotinus: Ennead V.1*, p. 159).

32Compare V 2 [11],1,10-11 πρός αὐτὸ βλέπον with VI 9 [9],2,38-39
βλέπει . . . πρός τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. Although the verb βλέπειν is
attributed to the inchoate Intellect prior to its reversion, the modification of the
attribution is clearly different in the inchoate Intellect and the actualized one. See
the description of the inchoate Intellect in VI 7 [38],16,14 ἐβλέπεν ἄνοιγμα.

Bussanich, referring to V 4 [7],2,4-5 and V 2 [11],1,9, claims that the
synonymy of the inchoate Intellect’s reversion with seeing is prominent in the early
treatises (*The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, p. 155). It is true that
ὁρῶσα in V 4 [7],2,4 is predicated of the inchoate Intellect. But βλέπον in V 2
[11],1,10, insofar as οὖτος in line 11 is taken into consideration, must be attributed
to the fully actualized Intellect. Bussanich overlooks the fact that οὖτος refers to
ἐγένετο πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπον.


34Bussanich also attacks the proposed construction itself as follows: "But
if the fully actualized Intellect is not on the scene, then why do lines 10-19 seem to
provide significant detail on different aspects of the transition from potential to actualized Intellect?" (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 40, (Italics mine.)). This objection can be readily dismissed. The passage in 7,5-6 simply remarks the occurrence of the transition itself, but does not give a detailed account of that transition. Hence the word "different" in Bussanich's critical query is confusing. As the foundation for the detailed account for several aspects of the transition from potential to actualized Intellect, the occurrence of that transition itself must be mentioned beforehand. The verb ἐώρα in 7,6 certainly prefigures καθορη in 7,11.

35The meaning of ὁρασις here is clearly prefigured in 6,42 ὁρη ὁ νοος ἐκείνου. Atkinson associates this section with the activity of νοος ἐρωτη in VI 7 [35],35,25 (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 149). The connection among the verbs ὑπέστη, γένομενον, and ὁρη in V 1 [10],6,1-2 would also suggest that seeing is the code word for the actualized Intellect.

36J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 40.

37R. Harder, Plotins Schriften, 1b:503.

38For the full critique of Harder's interpretation, see J. Igal, Emerita 39 (1971):138; and M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 160. Bussanich, though he regards the One as the subject of ἐώρα, rejects Harder's interpretation by referring to IV 7 [2],8,5, where κατολαμβάνειν is a variant for intellection, to show that Plotinus would be unlikely to refer to the One as τὸ κατολαμβάνον (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 43).

39F. M. Schroeder, Hermes 114 (1986):188.


42F. M. Schroeder, Hermes 114 (1986):188.

43F. M. Schroeder, Hermes 114 (1986):188.

44R. Harder, Plotins Schriften, 1b:503.


46J. Igal, Emerita 39 (1971):140-142. The circle usually represents the fully
formed Intellect (III 8 [30], 8, 36-37; IV 3 [27], 17, 13-14; IV 4 [28], 16, 24-25; VI 8 [39], 18 passim; see also II 2 [14], 1, 1 and III 2 [47], 3, 30).


49 J. Bussanich, *The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, p. 45.


54 See R. Harder, *Plotins Schriften*, 1b: 503.

55 Schroeder takes τούτο δὲ οὐχ οὕτως to denote the denial of divisibility and circularity to the inchoate Intellect (*Hermes* 114 (1986): 189). But Plotinus does not deny the circularity of the inchoate Intellect (see VI 7 [38], 16, 17 κινεῖσθαι . . . περὶ ἐκεῖνο). On our construction that τούτο refers to the actualized Intellect, we may take οὐχ οὕτως as simply denoting the denial of divisibility.

56 This section seems to be the same case as μεριστόν . . . ὀπωσόδου in II 4 [12], 4, 12 which actually means πολλὰ δὲ ἀμέριστον (line 14); the noetic universe is many but not divisible. For the indivisibility of the intelligible world, see I 1 [53], 8, 5; III 9 [13], 1, 32; IV 2 [4], 1 passim; 2, 49-52; IV 3 [27], 4, 11; 5, 11-12; IV 9 [8], 2, 28; V 7 [18], 1, 26; V 9 [5], 8, 26; VI 4 [22], 8, 19; 13, 19; VI 5 [23], 9, 6-7.

57 On the unity and indivisibility of the actualized Intellect, see V 3 [49], 5, 7-21, V 9 [5], 8, 21-9, 2 and 9, 14-16. Bussanich, though envisaging the possibility that €νταύθα refers to the actualized Intellect, maintains that it is more likely to refer to the inchoate Intellect (*The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, pp.
47-48). His view is based on two points. First, in 7,10-17, the potential Intellect is quite prominent. This point, however, is not fully convincing. As we shall see, Plotinus carefully refers to the actualized Intellect and to the inchoate one respectively by the words νοῦς and νόησις, and the inchoate Intellect is first explicitly introduced with ἡ νόησις in 7,11. For the contextual continuity to be retained, moreover, Bussanich's interpretation would force himself to take the circle in the geometric imagery as representing the inchoate Intellect rather than the actualized one. But he does not take it so. Second, Bussanich stresses that in 7,16-17 Intellect is divided while the One is undivided. Bussanich's interpretation, *prima facie*, seems to have the advantage of contrasting the unity and indivisibility of the inchoate Intellect with the plurality and divisibility of the actualized Intellect. As noticed in note 56, however, οἷον μεριστῶ in 7,17 must not be taken to mean the divisibility of the fully formed Intellect. Therefore, Bussanich does not succeed in defending his interpretation.

58] Igal reads the first ἐν in 7,9 as the predicate and regards τοῦτο as its subject (*Emerita* 39 (1971):146-147). In his construction, however, τοῦτο refers to the geometric circle.


60] In V 1 [10],2,37-38, Plotinus speaks of the similarity of the soul with Intellect in her unity and ubiquity (κατὰ τὸ ἐν καὶ κατὰ τὸ πάντῃ). The similarity in unity would also apply to the case of the One and Intellect.


62] In III 8 [30],10, the description of the One as δύναμις τῶν πάντων (line 1) has the definite bearing on its role as ἀρχή τῆς πολλῆς (line 14).

63] Another interpretation would be possible. The sentence καὶ ἐντὸθ ἐν μέν is also likely to lead us to the supposition that Intellect whose unity is explained from diverse viewpoints may itself be the source of multiplicity. On this construction, the ἀλλά-clause is paraphrased as follows: but it is not Intellect which is one but the One itself that is the productive power of all things. In this case, however, Plotinus intends to stress that the cause of multiplicity is something else than Intellect, so that he must naturally refer to the One as τὸ ἀλλό or ἐκεῖνο rather than τὸ ἐν. As regards the reason why Plotinus here abruptly refers to the One as τὸ ἐν, however, this interpretation is less plausible than our proposed interpretation is.

Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 48.


66The similar idea is reiterated elsewhere (III 8 [30], 8,32-36; V 3 [49], 11,1-8; VI 7 [38], 15,13-14; 16,13-22). Atkinson aptly compares the present passage with III 8 [30], 8,31ff. (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 167).

67M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, pp. 166-167; J. Igal, Emerita 39 (1971):147-148; F. M. Schroeder, Hermes 114 (1986):196. The bibliographical list of various translations is presented in J. Igal, op. cit.:147, note 3. To this list may be added Armstrong and Tanaka who both take σχιζομένη as passive. Bussanich takes the verb as middle (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 48). Notice that when it is construed as middle, ταύτα becomes the object of not only καθορι but also σχιζομένη.

68M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 167.


70On this otherness, see note 27.

71It is possible to read the inchoate Intellect into each sentence in 7,6-10, by regarding νοῦς in 7,7, the circle in the geometric imagery, τοῦτο in 7,8, and ἐνταύθα in 7,9 as all referring to the inchoate Intellect. But this interpretation, of course, has the difficulty in that it admits the change in the sense of νοῦς from the fully formed Intellect in 7,6 to the inchoate Intellect in 7,7. Although the word νοῦς elsewhere refers to the inchoate Intellect (V 3 [49], 11,12), the present context seems to show a perfect consistency in usage of νοῦς qua the actualized Intellect and νόησις qua the inchoate Intellect.

72Bussanich thinks that this point is decisive against the view that the One is the subject (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 50).


74We read Creuzer's emendation οὐτοῦ accepted by H-S2. Even if the mss. οὐτοῦ is read, the pronoun does not go with the feminine νόησις.


76J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, pp. 45-46; F. M. Schroeder,


80Since the ὅτι-clause describes the content of οἷον συμαίσθησις, δύναται must not be subjunctive, but indicative. Hence οἷον συμαίσθησις concerns the very fact, but not the expectation, that the One can cause οὕσια. This point certainly confirms our proposed attribution of the consciousness about the One’s power to the actualized Intellect.

81See Section III of Chapter III in Part I.

82The similar use of ἥδη is noticed in V 3 [49],11,10-11, where ἥδη νοῦς refers to the moment when the inchoate Intellect became actual vision (τότε ἐγένετο ἱδοὺς ὑψις). Also in V 4 [7],2,10-11, the adverb is used of the actualized Intellect (καὶ πολλὰ ὁρῶν ἥδη . . . διὸ δύο ἥδη).

Igal compares the present passage with III 8 [30],10,5-10, where the emanation of Intellect from the One is metaphorized into the flow of rivers from a spring and each of river is said to know already, in a way, the direction in which it is going to let its stream flow (ῥήματα); and he observes that the use of ἥδη and οἷον here signifies subconscious knowledge in the preliminary existence (*Emerita* 39 (1971):152, note 5). Bussanich, in his comment on this passage, views that the addition of οἶον is due to the peculiar view that "the pre-Intellect knows how it will develop into actualized Intellect, or how the latter will generate the soul" (*The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, p. 109). But it would be difficult to read the inchoate Intellect into this passage. First, the adverb ἥδη refers to πρὶν ὅλον ὅλῃ ρεῖν (line 8), that is, the state of the One prior to the start of the emanation from itself. In this passage, Plotinus does not speak of the reversion of the inchoate Intellect. Second, this context is essentially metaphorical. Hence we cannot specify οἷον εἰδότας as some subconscious knowledge of the inchoate Intellect or of the primary efflux from the One.

83Igal, attributing οἷον συμαίσθησις to the inchoate Intellect, regards it as a vague consciousness, quasi-consciousness or subconsciousness (*Emerita* 39
The conditional clause εἰ δὲ ἀδυνατήσει ἱδεῖν σαφῶς έκείνου (V 3 [49],7,9-10) does not characterize Intellect's knowledge of the One's power as unclear. This clause is distinct from lines 3-5.

Atkinson, who regards the inchoate Intellect as the subject of ἔχει, considers the phrase παρ' αὑτοῦ to emphasize the independence of νόησις vis-à-vis the One (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 168). But the feminine νόησις goes neither with the reflexive αὑτοῦ nor with the intensive αὑτοῦ. The construction that νοῦς, being the subject of ἔχει, means the inchoate Intellect must involve the change in the sense of νοῦς. But the word consistently means the actualized Intellect in 7,5-7 and 7,11.


J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 51-52.

Schroeder elucidates the coherence of Intellect's self-formation with the One's causality as follows:

"... the shaping of νοῦς by the One is accomplished by the One acting simply as power which contains the possibility of creating essence to be realized by νοῦς in its self-constituting act of vision. This is to say that the action of the One (which consists simply in its being what it is) is prior to the self-constitution of νοῦς" (Hermes 114 (1986):194-195).

The double-causality in the hypostatization of Intellect is expressed in 5,17-18; μορφοῦται δὲ ἄλλον μὲν τρόπου παρὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς, ἄλλον δὲ παρ' αὑτοῦ. Atkinson regards τοῦ νοῦ as the subject of μορφοῦται and accounts for the double-causality as follows: "The One is the formal cause of Intellect, its own undefined state, the Indefinite Dyad, the material cause" (Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 120). Combining Schroeder's and Atkinson's views, we can suppose that the priority of the One's causal power to Intellect's self-constitution may be seen in terms of the Aristotelian thesis of the priority of the formal cause to the material cause. But is it legitimate to consider Plotinus' metaphysics in terms of the Aristotelian scheme of four causes? It would be more appropriate to see the double-causality in discussion in terms of the Platonic distinction between the true cause and the accessory cause or sine qua non (Phd. 99b2-4; Tim. 46c7ff., 68e1-69a5). The accessory cause is employed by the Demiurge or divine cause as subservient in achieving the best possible result (Tim. 46c7-d1; see also Aristotle's association of the achievement of the good result with necessity in Met. 1015a22-24). We must recall that in Plotinus' account for the genesis of Intellect by means of the inchoate Intellect's reversion, the Good, but not
the inchoate Intellect, is called the cause of οὐσία (VI 7 [38],16,22-24) and that the
generation of Intellect exactly expresses the realization of the good in a lower plane
(III 8 [30],11,16-19; V 6 [24],5,12-15; VI 7 [38],15,23-24). Although Plotinus
nowhere calls the inchoate Intellect or intelligible matter σωφροσύνη, the relation
between the One’s causal power and Intellect’s self-constituting act and the priority
of the former to the latter seem to be more aptly viewed in terms of the Platonic
scheme of the divine, true cause and the accessory cause and of the claim of the
subordination of the latter to the former.


de Plotin*, p. 387.


CHAPTER IV

Introduction

In the treatise named "On the Fact that That Which is beyond Being does not think, and on What is the Primary and What the Secondary Thinking Principle" (V 6 [24]), Plotinus elaborately argues for the absence of intellection and consciousness from the One. This thesis, however, is not for the first time presented in V 6 [24], but, with various arguments supporting it, has already been claimed in earlier treatises, VI 9 [9] and III 9 [13].1 Almost all of the arguments in V 6 [24] have already been developed in VI 9 [9] and III 9 [13]. Hence we may concluded that the thesis has already been established in earlier treatises.

In the following, we shall explore Plotinus' arguments for the denial of (i) intellection and (ii) consciousness to the One by clarifying their logical connection. Since almost all of the arguments in V 6 [24] are also seen in VI 9 [9] and III 9 [13], we shall treat these three treatises en bloc. But our exploration will not simply result in the clarification of the grounds for Plotinus' negative conception of the One. One argument for the absence of intellection from the One, as we shall see, is based on the positive conception of the One as a unique ἐνέργεια. Our consideration will therefore eventually reveal the systematic coherence between the absence of intellection from the One and its ontological status as the unique activity, between the negative way of comprehending the One and the ontological ground for the positive descriptions of the One's inner life.
1. The Denial of Intellection to the One

The arguments supporting the denial of intellection to the One in VI 9 [9], III 9 [13], and V 6 [24], *prima facie*, can be classified into two groups; the arguments from the absolute simplicity of the One and those from its self-sufficiency. But the One's simplicity and its self-sufficiency are not isolated conceptually from one another. Plotinus writes: "By the self-sufficiency someone would also ponder its [i.e. the One's] one-ness" (VI 9 [9],6,16-17). Whereas every multiple entity aspires to be one (6,18-20), the One does not strive for itself (6,20). Again, while the multiple entity wants its constituent multiplicity (6,20-24), "if, therefore, something must be the most self-sufficient, the One must be the only such being that is deficient in relation neither to itself nor to other" (6,24-26). The One, being absolutely simple, aspires after neither the unity unifying the multiplicity nor the unity constituent of some entity. The One's self-sufficiency is grounded in its absolute simplicity. Therefore Plotinus' arguments for the absence of intellection from the One seem to be ultimately based on the absolute unity of the One.
2. The Arguments from the Absolute Simplicity of the One

Since the One is totally simple, it has no otherness with regard to itself (VI 7 [38],39,3; VI 9 [9],8,33-34). From the absence of otherness from the One derives the absence of intellection from it: "The One has no intellection because there is no otherness in it" (VI 9 [9],6,42). This claim first becomes intelligible when it is explained by the thesis that intellection presupposes otherness between the thinker and its object. As already seen at Section II of Chapter III in Part I, otherness has two roles as the principle of distinction between the thinking subject and the object thought and that of distinction among the Forms. To this extent, intellection is inseparable from otherness. Sameness, at the same time, represents the unity of thinking subject and object of thought. Intellect is then said to be one by virtue of sameness and two by virtue of otherness. In V 6 [24], therefore, Plotinus attempts to show that the primary thinking principle must be both one and two (1,6-7) instead of saying that it includes both sameness and otherness. If, on the one hand, Intellect were not one but simply two, it would not think itself (1,7-12). If, on the other, it were simply one but not two, it would have no object and thereby no thinking (1,12-13). That which is beyond the first thinking principle, Plotinus concludes, has no intellection (2,2).

The arguments from the duality in Intellect are not exhausted by those from the subject-object duality. Plotinus presents another type of argument. The primary entity is one and two because there are always that entity itself and the intellection that it exercises (V 6 [24],6 24-27). The One, however, is neither one of the primary beings nor the product of some primary entity and its intellection nor is it two at all, but beyond being, hence beyond intellection (6,28-30). Thus the arguments from Intellect's duality are classified into two groups; one from the νος-νοητόν duality and another from the νος-νόης duality.
As already mentioned, there are two levels of otherness within Intellect; not only otherness in virtue of which Intellect is distinct from its object, but also otherness which demarcates one intelligible object from another. By virtue of otherness multiplicity arises in the intelligible world. In V 6 [24],3, Plotinus endeavors to show the priority of the unity itself to the unity that underlies or constitutes the multiplicity, and then concludes that intellection, involving multiplicity, must be absent from the One. The presupposition of this argument is that "there is multiplicity in the thinking principle " (3,22-23). For this argument to be systematically coherent, it must be shown that the objects of intellection must not be one but many, in other words, that Intellect, in its effort to apprehend the One, cannot think the One in its simplicity but inevitably in the diverse, articulated content from the One. This point, however, is not fully explained in V 6 [24] except for the view that the One as τὸ νοητὸν is indispensable for intellection to take place satisfactorily (2,7-12). Nevertheless it is, though not exhaustively, already established in the early treatises (V 4 [7],2,4-12; V 1 [10],7,4-17). Hence this argument, even when viewed within the framework of Plotinus' philosophy as it has emerged up to V 6 [24], seems to be systematically coherent. But it would surely call for a more elaborate account for the self-pluralization of Intellect in its hypostatization as is later developed in III 8 [30],11, VI 7 [38],15-17, and V 3 [49],11.

The absolute simplicity of the One entails that it does not know even itself:

It is not then absurd that he [i.e. the One] does not know (μὴ οἶδεν) himself; for he has nothing by the side of himself which he learns (μάθη), because he is one (V 6 [24],6,31-32).

From this statement, however, we may not conclude that the One is ignorant of himself (VI 9 [9],6,46-50). The One's simplicity makes it impossible to speak not only of something which it knows but also of something of which it might
be ignorant, since ignorance in general presupposes otherness and duality. The self-thinking principle, contrary to the One, "must have been unacquainted with itself (ἀκαταμάθητον τετυχήκεναι εἶναι αὐτοῦ)" (III 9 [13],9,20-21). The present perfect τετυχήκεναι appears to suggest the case of the inchoate Intellect. The inchoate Intellect "saw (the One) in a manner different from intellection (ἐβλέπεν ἀνοιγμός)" (VI 7 [38],16,14). Since it has not yet received the pluralized content from the One into itself, it may be said to "have been unacquainted with itself." In the already mentioned passage where we are told not to consider the One to be ignorant of itself, the One is said to be "united with itself (συνεῖναι αὐτῷ)" (VI 9 [9],6,49). Even if the locution συνεῖναι αὐτῷ is synonymous with the locution ἔχειν ἑαυτό, according to Plotinus, the possession of the self does not fall under the conception of intellection (III 9 [13],9,6-7).

As is well known, the first hypothesis in the second part of Plato's *Parmenides* is a *locus classicus* of Plotinus' doctrine of the One. Whereas Plato tries to explicate the absolute unity exclusively in Eleatic terms, Plotinus' explication of it, as the above discussion shows, goes far beyond Plato's "laborious game" (*Parm.* 137b2).
3. The Arguments from the Self-Sufficiency of the Good

As already seen, the One's self-sufficiency is grounded in its simplicity. Whereas a unique sort of consciousness and hyper-intellection are attributed to the One because of its self-sufficiency in V 4 [7],2,13-19, its self-sufficiency is also the reason why intellection and consciousness must be denied to the One. But this fact would not be contradictory, insofar as Plotinus carefully qualifies the One's συμφύσησις by οὗ and remarks that its κατανόησις is different from intellection proper.

Plotinus sometimes directly infers the absence of intellection from the One from its self-sufficiency or perfection by simply saying that the ascription of intellection to the One might make it aspire for something else and so compromise its self-sufficiency (VI 9 [9],6,44-46; V 6 [24],2,13-16; 4,1-4). This reasoning first becomes sound when intellection is regarded as that which brings something deficient into completion and associated with some desire. In virtue of intellection that which has been deficient in its own nature is completed and has its good (III 9 [13],7,5-6; 9,20-22; V 6 [24],4,5; 5,12-15). In other words, the deficient entity aspires for and moves towards the One for its being completed or limited by exercising intellection. Thus intellection is defined as "a movement towards the Good in its desire of that Good" (V 6 [24],5,8-9). There seem to be two ways of reasoning from this definition of intellection to the denial of intellection to the One. First, as the self-sufficient One has no desire, it is not in movement and so has no intellection (VI 9 [9],6,42-44; III 9 [13],7,1-4; 9,1-5; V 6 [24],5,10-12). Second, since the One is that towards which intellection is directed, it is something different from the thinking principle (V 6 [24],6,1-3); the One is τὸ νοητὸν to that principle, but it is not necessary for every νοητὸν to have intellection (2,4-5).
In III 9 [13],9,6-12, Plotinus tries to show that the One does not even think itself, in terms of the conception of intellection as the primary activity. As well as in V 6 [24],5,8-9, intellection is here conceived as the looking at the First (line 7).

Since intellection is the primary activity, the One prior to and beyond it has no activity. But this argument is not fully convincing because Plotinus does not explain why intellection must be the first activity. The argument with recourse to the conception of ἐνέργεια in V 6 [24],6,3-9 is more elaborate. As the First is said to be that which provides the activity in III 9 [13],9,9, it is also here stated that the activity of all things is directed towards the Good (V 6 [24],5,18-19). Plotinus continues:

So the Good is without activity (ἀνενέργητον). And why should activity act? For in general, on the one hand (μὲν), no activity has yet another activity. Even if, on the other, they can at least attribute [something] to the other activities directed to something else (εἰ δὲ γε ταῖς ὀλλαίς ταῖς εἰς ὧλλο ἔχουσιν ἐπανενεγκεῖται), yet the primary activity of all, on which the other activities depend, we must let be what it is, adding nothing further to it. So such activity (ἡ . . . τοιοῦτη ἐνέργεια) is not intellection; for it has nothing that it will think: because it is itself the first (V 6 [24],6,3-9).

Plotinus here, invoking the notion of ἐνέργεια, attempts to make the One free from intellection in two ways. Notice that in each case it is tacitly presupposed that the One is itself an ἐνέργεια. First, just as intellection itself does not think (6,9-10), no activity in general has another activity. Second, Plotinus, on the basis of his aforementioned doctrine that the activity of all things is oriented towards the Good, appeals to the hierarchy of activities and clarifies what the One as an ἐνέργεια is like. The One, as the primary activity, depends on nothing and so has no orientation towards anything else. Since we are not allowed to add anything to the primary activity, that activity must be envisioned neither as the activity "towards something else" nor as the actualization "of some entity." In III 9 [13],9,8, on the contrary, intellection is called the primary activity. The discrepancy between two passages is merely verbal. The orientation towards the One (line 7, πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον
βλέπειν) is there associated with intellection, so that that passage is congruent with the present one. Since intellection, as a movement towards the Good, is directed towards something else, the primary activity that depends on nothing must not be called intellection. Hence the One is ἀνενέργητον precisely in two senses that it, as an ἑνέργεια, does not have another activity and that it is not the activity directed towards something else.19 The argument with recourse to the conception of ἑνέργεια in V 6 [24],6,3-9 reveals that the One is the highest ἑνέργεια devoid of any external relation (πρός τι) and orientation (εἰς τι).20 We may call it also an οὐσία-less ἑνέργεια.21 This characterization of the One entails even such a positive consequence that ὑπερνόησις and ἑγρήγορσις are attributed to the One on the basis of its being identified as the eternal ἑνέργεια (VI 8 [39],16,30ff.). The status of the One as the unique activity seems to be able to serve as a link between the positive description of the One’s inner life and the negation of intellection to it. This point will be further explored in the sixth chapter.
4. The Denial of Consciousness to the One

Plotinus claims that the absence of consciousness from the One is also due to its self-sufficiency and simplicity. In the treatises in discussion there are two relevant passages.

In III 9 [13],9,12ff., παρακολούθησις is denied to the One. Plotinus develops three arguments, the first two of which constitute a disjunction. First, if the Good is per se good and consciousness does not make it good, the Good is already prior to the consciousness (9,14-15). Second, if consciousness makes the Good good, the Good does not exist before it, so that the consciousness itself does not exist (9,15-17). Third, since by the consciousness the entity which has been unacquainted with itself understands itself, the consciousness assumes some deficiency (9,18-22). The first and the third arguments appeal to the One’s self-sufficiency and perfection, and the second to its being the first (9,1; 9,3; 9,7) and the highest (9,5). The denial of consciousness to the One seems to be also due to the implication of the term which Plotinus here consistently uses for the consciousness, παρακολούθησις. As Warren points out,22 this word is properly applied to human knowing, derives from the notion of "following along with," and stresses the subject-object duality. It is obvious that this term is inappropriate to describe the cognitive state of the One.23

In V 6 [24],5,1-5, the συναίσθησις is denied to the One. Plotinus writes:

Moreover, the multiple would seek itself and wish to converge on and be conscious of itself (συννεφειν και συναίσθησθαι αὐτοῖ). But in what manner will that which is completely one go to itself? At what point will it need self-consciousness? But it is the same thing which is better than self-consciousness and better than every intellecction.

Although Plotinus here appeals to the absolute simplicity of the One, it is not fully clear, from this passage alone, why συναίσθησις is not appropriate to the
One. First of all, what does it mean that the multiple wishes to converge on itself (συνυπεύειν . . . αὑτοῦ) for seeking itself? In V 3 [49],13,19-21, we are told that Intellect attains self-sufficiency by inclining to itself. Here to incline to itself (ἐις αὑτὸν νεύον, 13,21) and to become the sufficient entity consisting of all things (ικανὸν ἔξ ἀπάντων γενόμενον, 13,20), which further explains the causal dative τῷ ὄλῳ in 13,19, are juxtaposed. The crucial point lies in the ensuing lines (21-24):

εἶπει καὶ ἡ συναίσθησις πολλοῦ τινος αἴσθησις ἔστι· καὶ μαρτυρεῖ καὶ τούνομα. καὶ ἡ νόσης πρότερα οὕσα εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφει δηλονότι πολὺν οὐτα.

The particle ἐπεί is exactly retrospective in force. But we may not immediately associate Intellect’s self-inclination with the συναίσθησις as perception of something which is many. The interpretation of the above passage requires some caution. As πρότερα in 13,23 indicates, η συναίσθησις in 13,21 is not attributed to Intellect but to the soul. The root meaning of the word as unifying sensations is not appropriate to Intellect’s consciousness which concerns its own self-unity.24 But the definition of intellection as συναίσθησις τοῦ ὄλου (13,13) implies the interior complexity of Intellect. Hence Plotinus’ mention of συναίσθησις in 13,21 is not to apply the root meaning of the term to Intellect’s consciousness but to remark that Intellect’s interior multiplicity is adumbrated by its συναίσθησις.

Moreover, we must here remember that Plotinus thematically attempts to define self-knowledge in the first-half of V 3 [49] and that intellection as true self-knowledge is characterized as self-reversion (6,5; 6,40). In the context of V 3 [49],13, thus seen, two aspects of intellection, as self-reversion or self-inclination and as συναίσθησις unifying the interior multiplicity, meet in a focus. In III 8 [30],11,25-26, moreover, we read that the primordial desire of the inchoate Intellect towards the Good is eternally preserved in the fully actualized Intellect as desire and convergence with its form (ἐφεσις . . . καὶ σύνυπεσις πρὸς τὸ εἴδος αὑτοῦ),
which is the pluralized copy of the Good. Also in V 6 [24],5,1-2, two aspects of self-intellection as self-convergence and as self-consciousness are closely connected.25 These aspects precisely denote that self-intellection inevitably concerns the interior multiplicity of Intellect's own. Therefore the statement that the multiple wishes to be conscious of itself seems to imply that it seeks to be unified by its own act of συναίσθησις. Insofar as συναίσθησις necessarily concerns Intellect's inner multiplicity, it proves to be obviously incompatible with the simplicity of the One.

All the arguments for the absence of intellection and consciousness from the One are based on the incompatibility of either the multiplicity or deficiency found in those activities with either the simplicity or the self-sufficiency of the One. Of course, this denial is never incongruent with the view that the One has a unique sort of συναίσθησις and κατανόησις different from intellection in the proper sense at V 4 [7],2,17-19.26 Rather, we may say that this denial makes the cognitive state of the One more conspicuously unique. Again, to make the cognitive activity of the One more unique would necessitate more thoroughgoing denial of intellection and self-consciousness to the One. Plotinus' positive description of the One's inner life and his denial of intellection to it thus seem to support one another and to be systematically coherent with one another. As already seen, Plotinus' argument for the absence of intellection from the Good in V 6 [24],6,3-9 starts from the tacit view that the One is the primary ἐνέργεια. As repeatedly remarked, the ontological status of the One as the unique ἐνέργεια can serve as the foundation for the positive specification of the One's inner life. The systematic coherence between the positive and the negative descriptions of the One's cognitive state seems to be considerably due to the ontological status of the One as such.
NOTES

1 As many critics point out, the numbering of III 9 [13] in Porphyry’s chronological order is arbitrary. The problem concerning the knowledge and consciousness of the One is thematically treated only in the seventh and the ninth chapters of III 9 [13]. Insofar as III 9 [13],9 can be regarded as a gloss to V 4 [7],2, we would be justified in treating it as one of the early treatises. Moreover, the brief argument for the absence of intellection from the One in III 9 [13],7 does not go beyond the arguments in III 9 [13], VI 9 [9], and V 6 [24], so that we may refer to this chapter in exploring Plotinus’ doctrine in his early treatises. In addition, the absence of intellection from the One, without any supporting argument, is briefly mentioned also in I 2 [19],3,25.

2 On the connection between simplicity and self-sufficiency, see also I 1 [53],2,22, IV 4 [28],18,21-22, V 3 [49],13,16-17, and V 4 [7],1,12-13.

3 See also VI 9 [9],11,8-9.

4 For the duality of the thinker and its object within Intellect, see note 5 in Chapter III of Part I.

5 The passage ἄνθρωπος καὶ νόησις ἄνθρωποι κτλ. would not mention the duality of the intelligible entity and intellection whose object is that entity. Plotinus here speaks of the primary being that is said to have the form of thinking (6,20-21). It is associated with thinking or intellective exercise rather than with being-thought or intelligibility. Hence Plotinus continues: "If, therefore, it is being, it is also Intellect . . . " (6,21-22).

6 See V 1 [10],4,39-40 and V 3 [49],10,26-28. In the latter passage, each intelligible object is called an internally multiple λόγος. For the multiplicity of λόγος, see III 2 [47],16,52-53.

7 See lines 1-2 ἐν . . . ὑποκείμενον. Intelligible matter has a role as a unity underlying a multiplicity in the intelligible world (II 4 [12],4,7; 4,14-16). Although the discussion in V 6 [24],3,1-10 is completely consonant with the idea developed in II 4 [12],4-5 and 15, it is not fully certain that Plotinus here thinks of intelligible matter.

8 This passage was already analyzed in the second chapter.

9 In the early treatises there is no passage in which the ignorant state of the inchoate Intellect is explicitly mentioned. Intelligible matter destitute of light from
the One (II 4 [12],5,34-37), if any, would insinuate it.

10 This expression is also applied to Intellect (V 6 [24],1,5; V 3 [49],13,20). See also III 8 [30],11,11 διὸ σύνεν ἐστὶν [sc. τὸ ἀγαθὸν] αὕτω ἡ ἀυτῷ.

11 If καὶ ἀλλὰ in V 6 [24],4,4 were to be rendered such that "and it thinks nothing, because nothing else is present with it," this passage would belong to the arguments from the One’s simplicity. As Henry and Schwyzer point out (H-S2, apparatus ad loc.), however, this section might be collapsed, thus it was not referred to in our consideration of the arguments from the One’s simplicity.

12 In the preceding passage (V 6 [24],5,6-8), Plotinus gives an account of the process of intellection to take place by invoking the reversion of the inchoate Intellect towards the One. Notice Plotinus’ consistent use of the aorist tense. For the reference to the inchoate Intellect as τὸ γενόμενον (line 7), see V 2 [11],1,9. But we may not confine this definition of intellection to the apprehension of the inchoate Intellect, since desire for the One is eternally operative in the fully formed Intellect (III 8 [30],11,25-26). As already seen at Section VI of Chapter III in Part I, the definition of intellection is appropriate to the eternally pre-noetic phase of Intellect.

In contrasting the self-sufficiency of the One with the deficiency in intellection, Plotinus appears to invoke Plato’s distinction between being and becoming as τὸ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό which is σεμνότατον and τὸ άεί ἐφεμένον ἄλλου which is ἐλλιπές (Phlb. 53d3-7). Plotinus employs the word ἐλλιπής to mark the inferiority of Intellect (III 9 [13],7,5; 9,21), whereas intellection is said to be σεμνόν only insofar as it is about the Good (9,10-12).

13 For the equation of desire with movement, see III 9 [13],9,4.

14 See also V 1 [10],6,27, V 4 [7],2,18, and V 3 [49],10,16-23. Bussanich writes: "It is precisely this kinetic aspect of Intellect which leads Plotinus to associate rest and non-thinking in the One ("Plotinus on the Inner Life of the One," Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):166).

15 See also I 7 [54],1,7-10 and III 8 [30],11,9-10.

16 This conditional clause is variously rendered. So our own construction needs to be explained.

First, Henry and Schwyzer render the text as follows: "quodsi actibus aliis in alium agentibus actum rursus possunt quidam attribuere." Armstrong and Mizuchi follow the same line. In this reading, τὰς ἄλλας τὰς εἰς ἄλλο is taken as the indirect object of ἐπανενεγκεῖν, whose direct object is the omitted ἐνέργειαν (agentibus actum). The weakness of this interpretation lies not only in the need of
supplying the word but also in its violating of the previously mentioned principle that no activity has another activity (6,4-5). The alternative readings are suggested by Theiler and Cilento. Their translations respectively read:

"... und wenn schon irgendwelche Philosophen die anderen [Wirkungskräfte] auf anderes zurückzuführen für möglich halten . . . ."

"... che se, a dir vero, le rimanenti attiva, che si lascian riferire ad alto, hanno una loro nuova azione . . . ."

Theiler proposes to emend ταίς ἄλλαις ταίς to τάς ἄλλας. In Cilento's translation, not only "a dir vero" is unnecessary, but "una loro nuova azione" does not make sense in the present context. Bussanich, following the line of Theiler's translation, specifies the meaning of the sentence: "they attribute the other actualities [i.e. Intellect's] to something else [i.e. the One]" (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 68). Our construction, roughly speaking, follows the line of Henry and Schwyzer. The point which Plotinus makes in the present passage is that nothing can be added to the primary activity (οὖθεν ἄντι ἔτι προστιθέντες, 6,7-8). Such primary activity is contrasted with the other activities directed to and dependent on something else. Hence it suffices to remark that we can at any rate (γε, 6,5) attribute something to those activities, so that it is not necessary to specify what can be exactly attributed to them. It is no wonder that Plotinus does not mention the direct object of ἐπανενεγκεῖν. Our construction can avoid not only supplying the word but also violating the principle that no activity has another activity. The alternative reading followed by Theiler and Bussanich is weak in proposing emending the text. In this reading, moreover, the force of γε becomes obscure. Second, as the majority of translators take it, the subject of ἔχουσιν (6,5) is the editorial "they." Armstrong renders the subject as "some philosophers" and points out the reference to the Aristotelian doctrine of the first and second actualities in De Anima 412a22ff. (Plotinus, 5:212, note 2). If this be the case, "some philosophers" will be specified as the Peripatetics. First of all, does Plotinus here mention the Aristotelian distinction of disposition and activity? Notice that the directionality (εἰς ἄλλο, 6,5) of the lower activities is here stressed, whereas Aristotle’s distinction has nothing to do with such directionality. For the further criticism of Armstrong’s observation, see J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 67. This passage may therefore be related to Plotinus’ previous statement that the activity of all things is directed towards the Good (5,18-19) rather than to the Aristotelian doctrine. Bussanich views that Plotinus in the present clause criticizes Aristotelian philosophers who regard the first principle as a thinking Intellect (ibid., p. 68). In his view, the attribution of the other actualities to something else precisely means that of Intellect's activities to the Good. This interpretation is totally impossible. First, ἔχουσιν will be unnecessary since we cannot see why the criticized philosophers are said to be able to attribute actualities to the One. It is almost impossible to read Plotinus' critical attitude into this short
sentence. Second, the protasis-apodosis connection will be totally unintelligible. Finally, Bussanich's specification of Theiler's τάς ἀλλας as "the other actualities of Intellect" seems to be rash. The plural τάς ἀλλας does not necessarily imply the difference of Intellect's activities from the One's activity, the singular τὴν πρῶτην (6,6). The plural τάς ἀλλας ταῖς seems to refer to the activities directed to something else in general, namely all the activities other than the primary activity or the One.

17See Bussanich's comment on the present passage: "Activity with respect to something besides itself, e.g. intellection, must be rejected in the case of the Good. This leaves the door open for Plotinus to characterize the Good as an ἐνέργεια that is not directed to other things" (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 66-67).

18See VI 7 [38],37,15-16 οὐκ ἀν οὐσα νόησις νου, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ κίνησις κινοῖτο ἄν and VI 9 [9],6,53-54 νόησις δὲ οὐ νοεῖ.

19This point is explicitly stated in V 3 [49],10,16-17 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ ἐν πάντη εἷς τι ἐνεργήσει. Needless to say, the One has no activity towards anything lower than itself (V 1 [10],6,26).

20Whether the One is an ἐνέργεια or not is really controversial. But we must notice that Plotinus, whenever he denies ἐνέργεια to the One, speaks of the activity as intellection or some noetic movement (I 7 [54],1,16-20; V 3 [49],10,16-18; 12 passim; VI 7 [38],37,10ff.; 40,29-30; see also VI 7 [38],17,9-10). This denial is totally compatible with the present passage. The attempt to deny that the One is an ἐνέργεια would destroy the ground for the explanation of the procession of Intellect by means of the double-activity theory which is persistently maintained through all the periods of Plotinus' writing (V 4 [7],1,31-36; 2,27-37; V 1 [10],3,7-12; V 2 [11],1,16-18; IV 3 [27],10,30-37; IV 5 [29],7,17-20; II 9 [33],8,22-23; V 3 [49],7,21-26). Bussanich also holds the consistency of the view that the One is activity (Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):178).

21See VI 8 [39],20,9-10 ἐνέργειαν τὴν πρῶτην ... ἀνευ οὐσίας. Bussanich elucidates the sense in which the One is identified as an ἐνέργεια as follows:

"Thus, the Good is clearly an actuality, but unlike Intellect its reality does not comprise an actualization of something else: it does not have a substrate, it is not an actualization of a prior potentiality, and, of course, its actuality involves no duality" (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 69).

He also suggests that the freedom and self-mastery of the Good "would be
compromised if the Good's ένέργεια were an actualization of its substance, as is the case with Intellect" (Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):178, (Italics mine.)).


23See G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 151: "The purpose of the contrast, . . . between the unity of the One and the duality of Intellect, is served perfectly by παρακολούθησις, which emphasizes the following along of one part by another." For the denial of παρακολούθησις to the One, see also V 3 [49],13,7. This difficult passage will be carefully analyzed in the seventh chapter.

24See G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 80.

25In V 6 [24],5, Plotinus differentiates two levels of intellection, the original intellection towards the Good and self-intellection incidental to the original one (lines 16-17). As pointed out at Section VI of Chapter III in Part I, these two levels of intellection correspond respectively to the activity towards the Good and that towards itself in VI 9 [9],2,33-43. Self-convergence and self-consciousness in the present passage seem to mean the latter activity.

26The discrepancy between the denial and the ascription of κατανόησις in V 4 [7],2,17 and III 9 [13],9,22 is merely verbal. As Rist points out in Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 42, the meaning of the term differs in both sections.
CHAPTER V
VI 7 [38],39,1-4: THE ONE’S INTUITION

Introduction

The gigantic treatise, VI 7 [38], deals with diverse issues. In its final part (chs. 37-42), Plotinus painstakingly tackles the problem concerning the cognitive state of the One. But the substantial portion of these chapters is in fact devoted to the extensive arguments for the absence of intellection from the One. The brief positive description of the One’s cognitive activity (39,1-4) appears in such a context. In this chapter we shall first carefully analyze the passage in question and compare it with Plotinus’ earlier position in V 4 [7],2. Second, we shall clarify the implication of the word ἐπιστήμη ascribed to the One in the present treatise by investigating Plotinus’ usage of the word in other passages.
1. The One's Intuition

Plotinus positively, but briefly, describes the One’s cognitive activity in the midst of the long train of arguments for the absence of intellecction from the One. It would be instructive to review the passage immediately preceding the affirmation about the One’s knowledge. Plotinus makes one supposition: if we have to admit that the One is not that which neither perceives nor knows itself, the content of its self-intellection will be "I am the Good" rather than "I am" (38,10-18). This supposition allows two possibilities. In the first possibility, in which intellection itself is identified with the Good, intellection does not need to have the One as its object so that the One is no longer the Good (38,18-20); because intellection, insofar as it is itself the Good, attains the knowledge that "I am the Good" without concerning the One. In the second possibility, where intellection directed to the Good is different from the Good itself, the Good is already prior to intellection and self-sufficient so that it has no need of intellection concerning itself (38,21-24). In short, the supposition of the Good’s self-intellection either makes the One valueless or entails the One’s transcendence beyond self-intellection. Thus the supposition itself turns out to be untenable: "hence That does not think itself as good" (38,24-25).

Here arises a problem. Even if it is demonstrated that the Good has no self-intellection, we are reluctant to admit that the One is something which is senseless and ignorant of itself. Plotinus is thus forced to describe positively the One’s cognitive state:

But as what? Nothing else is present to the Good, but a sort of simple intuition towards itself (ἀπλὴ τις ἐπιθέλη ... πρὸς αὐτῶν) will belong to it. But since there is neither a sort of extension nor difference towards itself, what would the intuition towards itself (τὸ ἐπιθέλλεω εἰσεῖτ) be other than itself? (39,1-4).
This is an unmistakably positive description of the One’s knowledge. We should like to comment on four aspects of this passage.

First, it must be noticed that the present passage adequately replies to the query in 38,10-11: "But who will admit the nature which is not in perception and knowledge of itself (όλα τίς παραδέξεται φύσιν οὐκ ὁώσαν ἐν αἰσθήσει καὶ γνώσει αὐτῆς)?" This point is prima facie parallel to the case in V 4 [7],2,15-19, where Plotinus spells out the fact that the One is never οἶον ἀναίσθητον, by ascribing κατανόησις and οἶον συναίσθησις to it. But these passages differ in context. In V 4 [7],2, on the one hand, Plotinus remarks that the One is not senseless in order to emphasize its self-sufficiency. In VI 7 [38],38, on the other, he seems to be fully aware that the denial of intellection to the One in the preceding chapter may lead to an interpretation that the One does not have any cognitive activity. The ascription of simple intuition to the One definitely undermines the misinterpretation. Moreover, as already seen, the One’s inner life, which is to be specified by its hyper-intellective knowledge and unique awareness, is in V 4 [7],2 indissolubly related to the living conception of the intelligible object, which is the very copestone of the doctrine of self-intellection. In VI 7 [38],38-39, on the other hand, the affirmation about the One’s simple intuition proves to be fully coherent with the denial of intellection to the One by abrogating the aforementioned misinterpretation which the denial is prone to cause. In other words, Plotinus in the present treatise notices not only that the positive and the negative descriptions of the One’s inner activity must be consistent with one another, but also that for this consistency to be safeguarded, it is necessary to eliminate some pejorative conception of the One, which the negative description is likely to entail, by nothing less than a positive description. In the present passage, therefore, we see that (i) the affirmation about the One’s knowledge, (ii) the absence of intellection from the One, and (iii) the exigency of dismissing some misconception that (ii) is prone to
entail first come within a single scope of inquiry. This fact would exactly indicate Plotinus’ endeavor to systematize his doctrine of the One.

Second, the One’s intuition is free from otherness, the very hallmark of intellection. The absence of intellection towards itself from the One precisely means that no subject-object duality is imposed on its intuition. The One’s intuition is hence sharply contrasted with intellection. As for the undifferentiatedness of the intuition from the One itself, the present passage is exactly parallel to V 4 [7],2,17, ἡ κατανόησις αὐτοῦ αὐτό. The thesis that the One itself and its cognitive activity cannot be differentiated, even conceptually, from one another is consistently maintained in the early and the late treatises. In addition, Plotinus mentions otherness as the principle of distinction among the Forms in 39,7-9. It is needless to say that the One is also free from otherness in this sense. In light of 39,11-12, the simplicity (ἀπλη, 39,1) of the One’s intuition proves the absence of any otherness whatsoever from it. Unlike intellection, which is awakened to life by otherness (13,11-12), the One’s intuition is completely simple in the sense that it is entirely indistinguishable from the One itself and that it is not a pluralized vision.

Third, although Plotinus in the present passage faithfully abides by the basic traits of the One’s hyper-noetic knowledge in V 4 [7],2 as regards the first and the second points, the tone of the present passage sharply differs from that of V 4 [7],2. Despite stressing the One’s self-sufficiency in 38,22-23, we are told that nothing is present to the One (οὐδὲν ἄλλο πάρεστιν αὐτῷ, 39,1). As we shall see later, however, this sentence does not imply that the One’s intuition is vacuous. The contrast in tone between these two passages will turn out to be obvious as soon as this sentence is compared with V 4 [7],2,15-16, ἔστιν αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ. It must be noticed that Plotinus here associates the One’s self-sufficiency with its having no intellection (38,22-24) rather than with its having intuition. The One’s intuition is related closely to its simplicity. In V 4 [7],2, on the contrary, it is
insinuated that the κατανόησις and οὖν συναίσθησις must not be absent from the self-sufficient One. In the present passage, furthermore, Plotinus entirely refuses to apply to the One such noetic terminology as is employed in V 4 [7],2,18-19 (ἐν . . . νοήσει ἐτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦν νόησιν), because the application of noetic terminology to the One may be unavoidably confusing in the present context, where the absence of intellection from the One is thematically discussed. As seen in the first chapter, indeed, we can see clearly Plotinus' endeavor, in V 4 [7],2, to exclude any implication of duality and multiplicity from the One's knowledge. But his effort in the present treatise is to conform the One's intuition to its unity.

Finally, ἀπλὴ τις ἐπιβολὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν seems to have already been prefigured in V 1 [10],6,18 ἐπιστροφέντος ἀλι ἔκείνου πρὸς αὐτό, the phrase which we attributed to the One in the third chapter. The kinship between the words ἐπιβολὴ and ἐπιστροφή is clear in that they originally mean "throwing-on" and "turning-towards" respectively. The phrase πρὸς αὐτὸν surely signifies that the One's ἐπιβολὴ turns inward. The One's intuition is thus viewed as the casting of attention inward upon itself. In other words, it represents the One's self-reversion. The word ἐπιβολὴ in the present passage is efficient enough to be able to specify the One's self-reversion as its intuitive knowledge. On the contrary, κατανόησις in V 4 [7],2,17 has no implication of reversion and expresses the intuitive nature of the One's knowledge less directly than ἐπιβολὴ. Thus seen, it turns out that Plotinus already envisioned the self-reversion of the One, but could not find any appropriate cognitional term to imply it in his early treatises. Now he employs the appropriate term.

In VI 7 [38],39-41, Plotinus briefly describes the One's cognitive state in at least four sections other than 39,1-4. The consideration of these sections further illuminates the modalities of the One's hyper-noetic intuition. In the first passage (39,18-20), where Plotinus stresses the absence of intellection from the One, the
One is expressed as τὸ ἀυτὸ πᾶν ὅλου κίνημα and τοιοῦτον ὅλου ἐπαφή. The One’s self-contact is unparalleled in the Enneads. From the fact that Plotinus frequently describes the soul’s union with the One in tactile metaphor, it can be supposed that the absolute unity and the incomparable immediacy of the One’s knowledge are meant by this expression. Moreover, τὸ ἀυτὸ πᾶν ὅλου κίνημα, comparing the One to a movement, expresses its simple wholeness, which is contrasted with the multiplicity of Intellect (39,18). This expression would invite the question whether the One’s intuition can be associated with some movement or not. This question is answered in the second relevant passage (39,28-34), where Plotinus considers Soph. 249a1-2 σεμνὸν ἐστός to be the only possible description of the One’s intuition. The verb ἵστασθαι (39,29-32) explicitly indicates that the One’s intuition must be rather viewed in terms of rest. As already seen in the first chapter, the One’s κατανόησις is said to be ἐν στάσει αἰδώ in V 4 [7],2,18. As considered in the third chapter, again, the self-directed reversion of the One in V 1 [10],6,18 is totally motionless. Accordingly, the static or a-kinetic nature of the One’s cognitive activity is consistently maintained in the early treatises and the present one. We must not be misled by κίνημα in 39,19.

In the third relevant section (39,24-26), Plotinus explains the reason why the Good would be multiple even if it were to think stable things:

For it is not the case that the latter things, on the one hand (μὲν), will also have real being with intellection, and the intellections of the Good, on the other (δὲ), will be only empty contemplations.

From this passage, however, we cannot conclude that the cognitive activity of the Good is vacuous. By saying that intellections of lower entities, allegedly attributed to the Good, Plotinus seems to adumbrate rather that the Good’s intuition is not vacuous, though it transcends the subject-object duality and thereby does not have οὐσία as its object. Although we are told that nothing is present to
the Good (39,1), its cognitive state must not be regarded as empty. As τοιοῦτον ὁ λόγος ἐπιφή (39,19) insinuates, rather unrivaled immediacy or intensity would be suitable for the One's intuition. In 41,3-4, finally, we read that the Good, compared to the eye which is light itself (ὁ ... ὁφθαλμὸς ... ὁφθαλμὸς ὁμός), would not need to see real being. The comparison of the Good to the eye is also unparalleled in the Enneads. But this comparison seems to be laden with less significance. In 41,31, self-vision is denied to the Good. The tactile metaphor, as already remarked, would be more appropriate to the incomparable immediacy of the One's intuition than the ocular metaphor. The emphasis is rather on the comparison to light; as light does not seek after light, the Good as ἡ Ὀλύπλη does not need intellection compared to light (41,5-7). In the present treatise, unfortunately, we cannot fully understand how this comparison is related to the Good's intuition. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to find a common characteristic between light and the One's knowledge, which is transparency. Light is transparent to light (V 8 [31],4,6). The light-metaphor would hence be appropriate to the characterization of the One's knowledge as πάντι θεοκριτικόν ἔσωτοῦ in V 4 [7],2,16. Furthermore, the One's light is elsewhere specified as simple light (ὁφθαλμὸς ... ἀπλοῦν, V 6 [24],4,19). This comparison clearly implies the One's simplicity.

In conclusion, Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge culminates in VI 7 [38]. Its culmination is mainly due to his effort to systematize the doctrine of the One. Now the affirmation about the One's knowledge and the denial of intellection to the One cohere in Plotinus' doctrine of the One; not only are the affirmation and the denial mediated by the One's simplicity and self-sufficiency, but also the affirmation can satisfactorily undermine some pejorative conception of the One that the denial is prone to cause. Here arise several problems. Plotinus also applies the word ἐπιθολή and its cognates to the hyper-noetic cognition of Intellect. In which aspects does the One's ἐπιθολή differ from Intellect's? In which aspects are they
parallel to one another? Hence we have to investigate Plotinus' usage of ἐπιβολή and its cognates applied to Intellect. This investigation may further reveal other aspects of the One's ἐπιβολή.
2. The One's Intuition and the Hyper-Noetic Phase of Intellect

Plotinus' use of ἐπιβολή and ἐπιβάλλειν for the One's knowledge in VI 7 [38],39,1-4, prima facie, appears to indicate his departure from his earlier position in V 4 [7],2,15-19, where the One's knowledge is described in noetic terminology. But the word ἐπιβολή and its cognates are not privileged to the One alone. Already in V 6 [24],2,10-11, where the One as τὸ νοητόν is said to be necessary for intellection to occur satisfactorily, the verb ἐπιβάλλειν is used synonymously with the hyper-noetic νοεῖν:

For the intelligible object [τὸ . . . νοητόν, i.e. the One] is for the other, and Intellect, without grasping and catching the intelligible object which it thinks, has a graspable object (τὸ ἐπιβάλλον) emptily by intellection.

The One is here described not only as τὸ νοητόν but as τὸ ἐπιβάλλον. Plotinus also elsewhere applies ἐπιβάλλειν and its cognates to the relation of Intellect to the One.

We may first look at III 8 [30],9. After the "imagination" about the nature of the One, Plotinus asks why the One is grand, the Good, and the most simple (9,16-19). Then, he raises a question about the mode of our apprehension of the One:

. . . by what sort of simple intuition (ἐπιβολῆ ἀθρόχ) could one grasp this which transcends the nature of Intellect? (9,21-22). The immediate answer is "by the likeness in ourselves" (9,22-23). What is the likeness in us? Plotinus slightly later elucidates the contemplation of the One in terms of the self-transcendence of Intellect:

Rather, Intellect must, as it were, return backwards, and, since it has two sides (ἀμφιστομον), it must give, as it were, itself up to what is behind it, and there,17 if it wishes to see the One, it must not be altogether Intellect (9,29-32).
As seen at Section VI of Chapter III in Part I, Intellect has the hyper-noetic and the self-intellective phases, the original intellection directed towards the One and self-intellection incidental to it. Hence Intellect must give up its self-intellective phase, if it wishes to contemplate the One. The "likeness in us" seems to mean the hyper-noetic side of Intellect that is stripped by surrendering its self-thinking phase; it is exactly "like" the One in the sense that it is free from multiplicity always involved in self-intellection. Without exercising self-thinking activity, it would not be properly called Intellect. In V 5 [32],8,23-24, we are thus told that Intellect sees the One "by the non-intellect of Intellect itself (τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μη νῷ)," which can be identified as the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect. Therefore it would be natural to ascribe the ἐπιθολή ἀθρόα, by virtue of which we can apprehend the Good, to the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect.

In another passage Plotinus gives an account of what happens when the soul grasps the One:

But if you grasp [the One] taking away being from it, you will be filled with wonder (θαυμα). And, throwing (βολῶν) yourself upon it and coming to repose within it, you meditate (συννόει) more intimately, knowing by intuition (τῇ προσβολή συνείς) and seeing (συνορῶν) its greatness by the things which exist after it and through it (III 8 [30],10,31-35).

The most striking aspect of this passage may be the use of συν-compounds which is devised for characterizing the intimate awareness of the presence of the One. Another prominent aspect is the occurrence of the instrumental dative τῇ προσβολή and its verbal cognate βολῶν. Both the words ἐπιθολή and προσβολή have the root meaning of "throwing." The use of προσβολή in the context concerning the apprehension of the One recurs in V 5 [32]. In V 5 [32],7,8, we read that the eye, when there is nothing but the medium or light, sees it by an immediate perception (ἀθρόα . . . προσβολή). Since the One is here metaphorized into light (ἄλλοι φωτός, 7,17), the προσβολή ἀθρόα can be applied also to the apprehension
of the One. Plotinus later actually does so: "But when you concentrate on the One, you will do so at a single stroke (ἀλλὰ προσβολεῖς μὲν ἀθρόως ὁ προσβάλλων") (10,7-8). From these passages it would be clear that ἐπιθολή and προσβολή are used synonymously in the context dealing with the apprehension of the One.

What modes of the apprehension of the One does Plotinus intend to picture by the ἐπιθολή ἀθρόως? That ἐπιθολή has the root meaning of "throwing" or "casting on" has already been remarked. Rist specifies two basic traits of the word; (i) a comprehensive view of the data provided by the senses of the mind and (ii) a casting back of the mind on itself and on whatever impressions it has.25 Does his observation fit the above considered passages dealing with the soul's grasp of the One? Can we not discover other connotations of the word? We should like to investigate Plotinus' use of ἐπιθολή, προσβολή, and their cognates more comprehensively.

Several critics26 refer to IV 4 [28],1,19-20, where Plotinus speaks of the soul's apprehension of the intelligible objects, as a parallel passage to II 8 [35],1,39-43: "What then prevents the soul too from having a unified intuition of all its objects in one (ταύτην τὴν ἐπιθολὴν ἀθρόων ἀθρόων)?"27 But this intuition clearly differs from Intellect's apprehension of the One in that the former is said to be just like an activity unifying all intellections that concern the multiplicity of the intelligible objects (IV 4 [28],1,21). Nevertheless, it is obvious that comprehensiveness is here associated with the soul's ἐπιθολή ἀθρόωα. In the immediately ensuing chapter, Plotinus employing the word in discussion, more fully describes the self-intellection of the soul uniting with Intellect:

Therefore such a person [that is himself in such a way as to be everything], on the one hand (μὲν), has all things included in himself by seeing himself by intuition and activity towards himself (τῇ ... ἐὰντὸν ... ἐπιθολή καὶ ἐνεργεῖα), and, on the other (δὲ), has himself included in all things by intuition and activity directed to all things (τῇ ... πρὸς τὰ πάντα) (2,12-14).
The association of comprehensiveness with the ἑπιστολή is also striking. But can we not glean more instruction concerning the connotation of the term from the above cited passage? Slightly after this passage, Plotinus considers the possibility of the soul’s intellection undergoing a change (2,14-20) and dismisses it:

We must not say that a change arises, when the soul moves from its constituents to itself, and from itself to the rest of its constituents; because he himself is all things, and both are one (2,20-22).

Plotinus here would still be thinking of the previously mentioned ἑπιστολή towards itself and towards all things. The word thus seems to imply not only the comprehensiveness of the intuition but the unity of that which comprehends and those which are comprehended. Plotinus further spells out the modes of this unity. The soul in the noetic realm (i) turns to (ἐπεστράφη, στραφεῖσα, 2,27) Intellect, (ii) has nothing between Intellect and herself (2,27-28), and (iii) comes into Intellect (ἐγὼ τε νοών ἐλθοῦσα, 2,28), and (iv) adapts (срμοσταται, ἀρμοσθείσα, 2,28) herself to Intellect. Hence the soul’s comprehension, ἑπιστολή, of the intelligible objects seems to be characterized by more implications: (i) the reversion to higher hypostasis, (ii) the immediacy between that which apprehends and that which is apprehended, (iii) the absorption of the apprehending subject into the object apprehended, and (iv) the assimilation of the subject to the object. These implications, except for the fact that the soul’s apprehension consists of the multiplicity of intellections, seem to apply also to Intellect’s comprehensive apprehension of the One.28

Let us move to the description of Intellect’s apprehension of the One in V 5 [32], 10 and see what this apprehension is exactly like. Plotinus writes:

But when you concentrate on the One, you will do so at a single stroke (ἄλλα προσβαλεῖς μὲν ὥθρον ὁ προσβάλλων), but you will not tell the whole: otherwise, you will be [only] Intellect thinking (νοοῦς νοών) . . . But when you see the One, look at him as a whole; but when you think (νοης) him, think that he is the Good, whatever [portion] of him you remember (μνημονεύσης) . . . (10,7-11).
Two points must be noticed. First, the apprehension of the One transcends language; we cannot declare the One as a whole. The One is essentially ineffable. This point is more clearly restated later in V 3 [49],10,31-32: "For if Intellect directed its gaze (προσβάλλοι) to the one and partless [i.e. the One], it would be without word (ηλυγήθη); for what could it say about it, or understand?" In the above passage, hence, the purely intuitive character of the apprehension is stressed. Second the comprehensive apprehension is contrasted with intellection, which is ascribed to the νοὐς νοῶν, being perhaps equivalent to νοὐς ἐμφρονῶν distinct from νοὐς ἐρῶν in VI 7 [38],35,24. That intellection is not purely comprehensive with respect to the grasp of the One is mentioned in another treatise:

On earth, when Intellect looked to the Good, did it think that the One as many, being itself one, think it as many by dividing it at hand since it cannot think it as a whole at once (ὅλου ὁμοῦ)? But when it looked at the One, it was not Intellect yet, but saw in a manner different from intellection (ἀνοητῶς) (VI 7 [38],16,10-14).

Whereas the inchoate Intellect at the very beginning of its reversion, has not divided the One into many yet, the fully actualized Intellect cannot retain the power from the One as it is and so breaks it into pieces; the latter is said to carry the power from the One successively (κατὰ μέρος) (15,20-22). Therefore the comprehensive apprehension of the One must be seen as the apprehension of unity in unity. To this extent it is as approximate to the One's intuition as the former is called "the likeness (to the One) in us" or "something of the One in us" in III 8 [30],9,22-23.

Rist remarks that "an ἐπιθολή can be . . . a casting of the mind on itself and on whatever impressions it has." According to the above investigation, however, this remark would not apply adequately to the comprehensive apprehension of the One. The apprehension is rather the casting back of the soul
on that which is beyond herself without involving any impression. In this case, the apprehended object lies beyond and outside the apprehending subject. Plotinus often employs ἐπιθολή and its cognates in order to describe the sensory intuition directed to the object outside the soul. Even when they are employed for the description of the soul's apprehension of the intelligible objects, it is stressed that those objects lie outside the soul herself. This point is clearly seen in V 9 [5],7,9-11, where the ἐπιθόλλευ, juxtaposed with the acquiring of, and discursive thinking about, that which has not yet been possessed, is regarded as the soul's affection (πάθη) and contrasted with the self-thinking of Intellect. Hence the ἐπιθολή is denied to Intellect (7,9; 7,18). In VI 6 [34],6,25, again, the ἐπιθολή towards the thing is contrasted with the non-discursive thinking of Intellect. The word ἐπιθολή and its cognates are sometimes employed for describing cognitive movement towards that which is outside or beyond the subject. In this respect, they are suitable for the self-transcending movement of Intellect or soul towards the assimilation of the self to the One.

In sum, on the comprehensive ἐπιθολή or προσβολή of the One in III 8 [30],9-10, V 5 [32],7, and 10, we may conclude roughly as follows. First, the comprehensive apprehension is the grasp of the One as a whole at a single stroke, but not a successive intellection of the One in multiplicity. Second, the word ἐπιθολή and its cognates are based on the root meaning of "throwing" and thereby imply the throwing back of the mind upon that which is transcendent. These terms have a sense very similar to ἐπιστροφή, the turning of the mind towards that which is transcendent. Third, the apprehension is oriented to the unity of that which apprehends and of that which is apprehended through the grasp of the One's unity in the unity of the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect. Thus its mode is purely immediate and intuitive and involves neither image of the apprehended object nor language about it. Finally, the apprehension is oriented to the grasp of the interior
content of the object, but not of its mere surface. Hence the apprehending subject must make an effort to assimilate himself to the object. Some of these basic traits of Intellect's ἐπιθυμία of the One would nicely apply to the One's intuition. First, as regards the comprehensiveness and immediacy implied by the word ἐπιθυμία and its cognates, we must recall that the expression τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶν οἷον κύσμα and the tactile metaphor τοιοῦτον οἷον ἐπαφή in VI 7 [39],39,19 echo the One's ἐπιθυμία in 39,1-4. 36 Second, the close connection between ἐπιθυμία and ἐπιστροφή is recognized not only in Intellect's apprehension of the One but in the One's cognitive activity. We have already seen that ἐπιθυμία τις ἐπιθυμία πρὸς αὐτὸν in 39,1-2 is a cognitive specification of the One's motionless self-reversion in V 1 [10],6,18.

Also in VI 7 [38], Plotinus attributes the power to see the One by some intuition and reception (ἐπιθυμία των καὶ παραδοχή, 35,21-22) to the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect, which is designated "Intellect loving (νοῦς ἐρωτ") (35,24). 37 As καὶ πρότερον in 35,22 suggests, this power is also ascribed to the inchoate Intellect. In V 3 [49],11, the reversion of the inchoate Intellect towards the One is described by the verb ἐπιθυμεῖν (11,2; 11,13). 38 From the terminological point of view, therefore, the One's ἐπιθυμία in VI 7 [38],39,1-4 and the hyper-noetic cognition of Intellect in 35,21-22 are very akin to one another. 39 We must recall that the ἐπιθυμία ἀθρόᾳ of the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect is called "the likeness (to the One) in us" and "something of the One in us" (III 8 [30],9,22-23). The close kinship between the One's and Intellect's ἐπιθυμία is really confirmed by this passage. 40 But close scrutiny reveals the sharp difference of the One's ἐπιθυμία from Intellect's. First, the One's ἐπιθυμία is directed to the One itself (πρὸς αὐτὸν, VI 7 [38],39,2), whereas Intellect's is directed to those things which are beyond itself (τὰ ἐπέκεινα αὐτοῦ, 35,21). The One and its intuition are entirely undifferentiated from one another, whereas the object to which Intellect's intuition is directed transcends Intellect. In a word, the One's intuition is completely free from otherness (39,2-3),
while Intellect’s intuition presupposes otherness as the principle of demarcation between hypostases. Second, Intellect at the same time thinks itself and contemplates the One (35,29-30). As repeatedly mentioned, self-intellection is incidental to the eternally pre-noetic contemplation of the One. Intellect’s ἐπιθολή entails self-intellection as its necessary consequence. To this extent, Intellect’s intuition cannot be entirely free from multiplicity. On the contrary, the One’s intuition entails no consequence that may involve multiplicity. Third, Intellect’s ἐπιθολή can be expressed as a kind of seeing (ἐώρα, 35,22). But any vision is denied to the One (41,31). It is the tactile metaphor (39,19) that would be more appropriate to the incomparable immediacy of the One’s intuition. Finally, the One’s ἐπιθολή, as already remarked, must be seen in terms of rest. On the contrary, Intellect’s ἐπιθολή, insofar as it is of νοῦς ἐρῶν, seems to be vehemently dynamic. Also in V 3 [49],11,4, the ἐπιθόλλειν of the inchoate Intellect towards the One is closely related to the ὀρμῶν. On the one hand, therefore, the One’s and Intellect’s ἐπιθολή share several common characteristics, and to this extent Plotinus’ use of the term for the One’s knowledge can be viewed as parallel to his use of it for the hyper-noetic cognition of Intellect. On the other hand, the uniqueness of the One’s intuition is apparent in its being clearly distinguished from the hyper-noetic intuition of Intellect in the above mentioned aspects. We must not be misled by the superficial similarity in terminology.

The above investigation reveals the terminological parallelism among the One’s knowledge, the pre-noetic and the hyper-noetic cognition of Intellect, and the soul’s apprehension of the One, in the middle and the late treatises. Plotinus ascribes ἐπιθολή and ἐπιθόλλειν to the One (VI 7 [38],39,1-4), ἐπιθολή to the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect (VI 7 [38],35,21), ἐπιθόλλειν to the inchoate Intellect (V 3 [49],11,2; 11,13), and employs ἐπιθολή (III 8 [30],9,21-22), προσβολή (III 8 [30],10,33; V 5 [32],7,8), and προσβόλλειν (V 5 [32],10,7-8; V 3 [49],10,31) in
the general contexts dealing with the apprehension of the One. In the early
treatises, the parallelism is dominated by noetic terminology. Plotinus attributes 
κατανόησις or higher νόησις to the One (V 4 [7],2,17-19), refers to the inchoate 
Intellect as νόησις (V 4 [7],2,4; V 1 [10],7,11), and describes the cognitive activity of 
the soul uniting with the One as νοεῖν (VI 9 [9],8,26; 9,14) and περινόησις (11,24).
The terminology which governs the parallelism has thus shifted from νόησις and its 
cognates in the early treatises to ἐπιθολή and its cognates in the middle and the late 
treatises. This tendency is confirmed by Plotinus’ application of a-noetic 
terminology to the inchoate Intellect (ἀνοητός, VI 7 [38],16,14) and to the hyper­
noetic contact with the One (ἀνόητος, V 3 [49],10,43) in the middle and the late 
treatises.44

Why has such terminological shift occurred? The above consideration 
suggests at least two reasons. First, the application of the word ἐπιθολή to the One 
has several advantages implying the One’s ἐπιστροφή to itself and demarcating the 
One’s knowledge from intellection especially in the context where the absence of 
intellection from the One is thematically argued. In such a context it would be 
unnecessarily confusing to employ noetic terminology for the One. Second, as 
already shown, ἐπιθολή and its cognates are very suitable for expressing 
intuitiveness and immediacy not only of the One’s knowledge but of the hyper­
noetic apprehension of the One. In addition to these reasons, we may consider 
some weakness in noetic terminology which is dominant in the early treatises. An 
obvious weakness is that νόησις and νοεῖν are equivocal by referring not only to 
self-intellection but to the hyper-noetic activity of Intellect towards the One. 
Corresponding to the double meaning of intellection, τὸ νοητόν is also equivocal; as 
already seen, it means not only the complex of the Forms but also the One. It 
would not be impossible to suppose that the shift in Plotinus’ terminology is partly 
due to his having become aware of this weakness in noetic terminology; because it
can be supported by the fact that the One is no longer described as τὸ νοητὸν after V 6 [24],2,6ff. and the original, hyper-noetic activity of Intellect towards the Good is no longer called νόησις after V 6 [24],5,16.46 If this supposition is correct, we can conclude that Plotinus’ doctrine of the One’s knowledge has reflected the terminological shift in his doctrine of Intellect’s relation to the One. To this extent the former doctrine, with the latter doctrine, has surely developed. As already remarked, moreover, the fact that Plotinus, in VI 7 [38],38-39, pays enough attention to the coherence between the One’s intuition and its having no intellection by refraining from the use of noetic terminology for the One, when compared with his description of the One’s knowledge in V 4 [7],2, turns out to indicate considerable development, sustained by his endeavor to systematize his doctrine of the One in more coherent fashion. Therefore Rist’s thesis that “Plotinus’ doctrine of the One’s ‘knowledge’ has not developed”47 is tenable solely in the sense that the characterization of the One’s knowledge in VI 7 [38],39 inherits several basic theses of the One’s knowledge, presented in V 4 [7],2.

Finally, we may touch upon the chronologically preceding instances of Plotinus’ use of ἐπιθολή and its cognates for the apprehension of the One in the middle treatises. His use of those terms in III 8 [30] and V 5 [32] seems to be almost in line with his use in the treatises right before them; the application of ἐπιθολή for the soul’s grasp of the intelligible objects in IV 4 [28],1-2 and the reference to the One as τὸ ἐπιθόλλον in V 6 [24],2,10. The fact that the One in V 6 [24],2 is described not only as τὸ νοητὸν but as τὸ ἐπιθόλλον would suggest that this treatise is written in the transitional period from one epoch when Plotinus applies noetic terminology to the One’s knowledge and to cognitive activities, of Intellect and the soul, directed to the One, to another epoch when he uses ἐπιθολή and its cognates for them. But we must note that the verb ἐπιθάλλειν is not for the first time employed in describing the soul’s apprehension of the One in the middle
treatises. It is already used of the contemplation of the ultimate Beauty in one of
the earliest treatises: "The person who sees, made akin to what is seen, must pay
attention (ἐπιθόλλεων) to the sight" (I 6 [1],9,29-30). The verb used here is
definitely based upon its root meaning of "throwing" and implies the contemplator's
endeavor to assimilate himself to the contemplated Beauty. Therefore, ἐπιθόλλη and
its cognates are not for the first time introduced in the middle treatises in order to
describe the soul's apprehension of the One, but seem to be prefigured by the non-
technical use of ἐπιθόλλεων in I 6 [1],9,29-30.

Plotinus no longer gives a formal account of the One's cognitive state in
the treatises after VI 7 [38]. But these treatises contain several significant passages
that we must not overlook for our inquiry into Plotinus' doctrine of the One's
knowledge. Unless these passages are seriously considered, our inquiry has not yet
come to an end.
NOTES

1 We do not follow the reading suggested in the apparatus of H-S2. We take ἀὑτὸ in 38,19 and ἀὑτός in 38,20 as indicating the subject to which ἀὑτός in 38,17 refers, namely the One. Moreover, ἀγαθοῦ in 38,20 means intellection itself as identified with the Good. In a word, Plotinus here points out that the identification of intellection with the ultimate Good is to rob the One of its status as the supreme Good. The identification surely leads to the idea that the One may be honorable because of intellection. As indicated in 37,8, however, this idea invests the One with either no or less value. Plotinus' own position is that the One makes intellection majestic (37,7). Hence the present sentence may be taken with 37,8.

As indicated in Chapter I in Part I, Plato, in the metaphor of the sun, claims not only that the sun itself is not sight (Rep. 508b9) but that the eye is not the sun (508a11-b1). The denial of intellection to the Good represents the first claim. The second claim must embody the refusal to regard intellection as the ultimate Good. Plotinus here seems to develop the second claim in the metaphor of the sun.

2Schwyzer takes this section as indicating the absence of self-consciousness from the One in "Bewußt und 'Unbewußt' bei Plotin," in Les Sources de Plotin (Geneva, Vandoevres: Fondation Hardt, 1957), p. 374. But it would be impossible to read from this interrogative sentence the absence of self-consciousness from the One. By employing such general terms like ἀφαίρετος and γνώσις, Plotinus here seems to remark that nobody would admit such a φύσις that has no cognitive activity. In other words, everyone naturally supposes that the highest "nature" or the One must possess some cognitive activity.

3In VI 9 [9],6,44-50, as seen in the second chapter, Plotinus is already aware of the possibility of the illicit move from the One's having no intellection to its ignorance. This possibility is mentioned also in III 8 [30],9,14-16. In these treatises, however, Plotinus does not try to dismiss the illegitimate inference by giving a positive account of the One's knowledge. The significance of the present passage would be in his purport to give that positive account.

4We must notice that Plotinus' affirmation about the One's knowledge in V 4 [7],2 does not assume the role of dismissing any pejorative conception that the absence of intellection to the One is prone to cause, but has simply the role of denying the deficiency, expressed by οἴον ἀναιθήτου (line 15), to the One. In V 4 [7] Plotinus nowhere mentions the absence of intellection from the One.

Even a modern critic can carelessly jump from the One's having no intellection to the pejorative conception that it is unintelligent. Ravaissone regards the Plotinian One "comme végète une plante inintelligente, insensible et inerte," in

O'Daly aptly points out the non-reflexive nature of the One's ἐπιβολή (*Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self*, p. 93). See also J. Moreau, *Plotin ou la Gloire de la Philosophie Antique*, p. 88. Intellection is of course self-reflexive.

Gandillac observes the One's ἐπιβολὴ without διαστήμα and διαφορά as follows: "Et cependant Plotin ne peut éviter lui-même de suggérer une forme de présence à soi qui ne doit pas être si éloignée de ce que le Stagirite avait voulu suggérer . . ." See M. de Gandillac, "Plotin et la Métaphysique d'Aristote," in *Études sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, ed. P. Aubenque (Paris: J. Vrin, 1979), p. 258. But we cannot see why the One's intuition is said to be not so far from what Aristotle wished to suggest. Indeed Aristotle himself would have claimed that no otherness is present in the self-intellection of the prime mover. But Plotinus views the Aristotelian God, though it has only one object, as not free from the otherness between subject and object. Intellect is distinguished from the intelligible object "by the relation of the other to itself (τῇ πρὸς αὐτό ἐτέρου σχέσει)" (39,7), while the One has no διαφορά towards itself (39,3).

See also VI 7 [38], 15, 19-20 γεννημάτων ἀ μὴ εἶχεν αὐτός and 17, 1-2 ταύτα . . . οὐκ ὄντων ἐκεῖ ἐν τῷ πληρώσαντι. Compare also 17, 10-11 ὡστε καὶ ἐπέκεινα ζωῆς with V 4 [7], 2, 16-17 ζωῆ ἐν αὐτῷ.

This point does not imply that the One's intuition is incongruent with its self-sufficiency. As seen in the second chapter, the One's self-sufficiency is grounded on its absolute unity. As seen also in the fourth chapter, the absence of intellection from the One is in several places ascribed to its self-sufficiency. The One's intuition, thus mediated by its simplicity and self-sufficiency, is systematically coherent with its having no intellection.

Bussanich translates ἀπλὴ τις ἐπιβολὴ . . . πρὸς αὐτὸν "a simple concentration of attention on itself" (*The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, p. 95).

As we shall see in the next chapter, Plotinus specifies the One's self-inclination as its hyper-intellection in VI 8 [39], 16. It would be certain that the
One's knowledge and its self-reversion entered into a single scope during the period when VI 7 [38] and VI 8 [39] were written.

10On the contrast between intellection and hyper-noetic contact with the One, see V 3 [49], 10, 42-44. On the immediacy of the One's knowledge, see A. H. Armstrong, "Plotinus," in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 238: "... it [i.e. the One] has a special kind of transcendent thinking of its own, more immediate even than that of Intellect, with no duality of subject and object."

As several critics point out, Plotinus subordinates vision to contact. See J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 222; J. Bussanich, Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987): 171. But Bussanich's observation that "contact-language is not used to define the One's relationship to itself" (ibid.: 172) overlooks the present section, which he wrongly takes as expressing the soul's union with the One (ibid.: 186, note 29).

11See J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 48: "... the apprehension (ἐπιθολή) of the One is somehow associated with absolute immobility." Rist views the present passage as confirming the phrase ἐν στάσει αἰσθή in V 4 [7], 2, 18 (ibid., p. 49).

In Plotinus' speculative reading, Soph. 249a1-2 ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἄγιον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀκίνητον ἐστὸς ἐναὶ proves to fit well the majesty and immobility of the One, from which intellection or noetic movement is absent. But this speculative reading would not undermine our observation, concluded in Chapter III of Part I, that Plotinus seems to find in this context of the Sophist the problem that the relation we must think between intellect and the Forms not only insures the presence of life and noetic movement in τὸ πνευμάτως ὄν but also safeguards the Forms' immutability. Interestingly enough, the passage ἔλεγε μὲν οὖν ὁ Πλάτων περὶ τῆς σωσίας λέγων, ὅτι νοήσει (39, 29-30) suggests that Plotinus believes that Plato himself ascribed intellection to the Ideas. For Plotinus, the σωσία must be τὸ πνευματικόν ὄν that comprises both movement and rest. In Chapter III of Part I it was seen how he tries to reconcile noetic movement with the unchangeability of real being.

As mentioned at note 38 in Chapter III of Part I, Plotinus, following Aristotle, characterizes actual intellection as majestic. Insofar as the One does not have intellection, the question is naturally raised whether the hyper-noetic One can be called majestic or not. The comparative σεμνότερον in 39, 33 insinuates that Plotinus would believe that his association, based on Soph. 249a1-2, of majesty with the One's non-thinking is consistent with the majesty of actual intellection. He also here seems to be afraid that the absence of intellection from the One may lead to some pejorative conception of the One, for example, the misconception that it lacks in majesty. In fact, Plotinus elsewhere envisages this sort of possibility:

"Well, if it [i.e. that which is beyond Intellect] is thinking it will be an
intellect, but if it is unthinking (ανόητον) it will be ignorant of itself; so what will be grand (σεμνόν) about it" (III 8 [30],9,15-16, tr. A. H. Armstrong).

Plotinus is here explicitly aware that the absence of intellection from the One is prone to cause a misconstruction that the One may be ignorant of itself and thereby to rob it of majesty. It is highly disputed whether the absence of intellection from the One can be expressed by the word ανόητον. As already seen, moreover, this absence does not entail the One's ignorance (VI 9 [9],6,46-50). The supposition that that which is beyond Intellect may not be grand is definitely rejected in the present passage. But the ascription of a higher majesty to the One would not be possible by virtue of the denial of intellection to the One but by virtue of some affirmation about the One's cognitive activity, namely its having simple intuition. The present passage can therefore be viewed as the formal reply to the query raised in III 8 [30],9,15-16.

12As noted in the apparatus of H-S2, τοῦτον in 39,26 refers to the Good. Unless we take αι... τοῦτον νοησεις as the intellections allegedly ascribed to the Good rather than as the intellections directed to the Good, the present section will not explain the sentence καν τα έστωτα δε νοην πολυς έστων (39,26). The plural αι νοησεις indicates that intellection allegedly attributed to the Good would be pluralized by its objects, τα έστωτα. The present passage is consequently explicated such that since each intellection of Intellect always has its object and so is not vacuous, so each intellection, allegedly attributed to the Good and directed to each of stable objects, must not be empty contemplations, thus unavoidably associating multiplicity with the Good. Thus construed, we can understand the force of γαρ in 39,24.

13The present passage is a part of the reply to the query, raised in 39,20-21, whether the Good will know neither other things nor itself. Hence the conditional sentence καν τα έστωτα δε νοην reflects the supposition that the Good will know other things. Of course, this supposition is definitely rejected in 39,26-27 (η δε προνουα άρκει εν τω αυτων ενυαν, παρ' ου τα παντα). On the denial of knowledge of other things to the One, see also V 6 [24],6,32-33, VI 7 [38],37,2-3, and VI 9 [9],6,51-52. It was pointed out in the third chapter that the One might have a consciousness of its own power, which has no relation to its effects. Moreover, the One's προνωα of other things is perhaps unparalleled in the Enneads. This section would be sharply contrasted with V 5 [32],12,40-45, where we are told that the One would not have cared even if Intellect had not come into being, though these passages are not really inconsistent.

The absence of self-knowledge from the One is briefly mentioned in 39,28 ει μη αυτων. On this absence, see V 6 [24],6,31-32, VI 7 [38],41,25-27, and VI 9 [9],6,52-52. As already seen, however, Plotinus associates rest and majesty, but
neither ignorance nor dishonor, with the absence of self-knowledge or intellection from the Good (39.29-34).

14 The similar argument is developed in V 6 [24],4,18-22. On the One as αὐγή, see VI 7 [38],36,22-24 and VI 8 [39],16,13.

15 See also VI 7 [38],16,24 αὐγή μόνον. Gandillac associates the φῶς ἀπλοῦν with the description of the One’s knowledge in V 4 [7],2,15-19 in La Sagesse de Plotin (Paris: Hachette, 1952), pp. 188-189.

16 In the analysis of the actualization of sight, light always serves as the medium, which is neither subject nor object. This neutrality seems to fit well the One’s knowledge which transcends the subject-object duality. But this point is not fully explicit in Plotinus’ metaphorization of the One into light.

17 With H-S1, Bréhier, Cilento, Armstrong, Tanogashira, and Bussanich, Kirchhoff’s emendation κάκει is read.

18 It is difficult to specify the referent of ἀμφίστομον with precision, since the word occurs solely here in the Enneads. We may first consider the views of Dodds and Bussanich.

Dodds, in light of ἐνέργεια... ἐν διεξόδῳ (9,33) identified with Intellect, takes ἀμφίστομον as Intellect’s two phases, one looking towards the cosmos and the other looking towards the One (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 21). The advantage of this interpretation lies in the force of γὰρ in 9,33 that marks the explanation of 9,29-32 by 9,32-34. But Dodds’ exegesis is inadequate in two points. First, the textual evidence for his view is found only in the obscure passage in VI 9 [9],3,33-34. The MSS text, which is printed by Bréhier and Harder, reads: δύναι τὰ πρὸ ὁμοῦ ἡ τὰ ἀντου ἡ τὰ ποε ὁμοῦ. In H-S2, ἡ τὰ πρὸ ὁμοῦ is deleted and ποε is replaced by πρὸ. It seems to me that the deletion and the emendation of the MSS text are not necessary, because Plotinus here simply talks about the conceivable cases of Intellect’s envisagement, but not about its actual contemplation. For this reason, we need not be perplexed by the plural τὰ πρὸ ὁμοῦ. Again, Intellect’s looking towards the cosmos is here treated as a mere possibility. From the MSS text, moreover, are derived three, rather than two, phases of Intellect. Dodds needs to explain why he omits the self-contemplating phase of Intellect. Second, to read Intellect’s looking towards the universe into the present passage seriously injures the important theme in III 8 [30] that the lower entity aspires to contemplate the higher one.

Bussanich suggests, as a likely interpretation, that ἀμφίστομον might refer to Intellect’s awareness of τὰ πρὸ ὁμοῦ ἡ τὰ ἀντου (VI 9 [9],3,34), that is, Intellect’s mystical vision of the One and its self-intellection (The One and Its
Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 101). Although this interpretation appears to be more likely than Dodds’ view, it is textually supported only by a passage that is slightly obscure.

Nevertheless Bussanich’s interpretation can be confirmed by the following consideration. Let us return to the passage in question. First, we must notice that ὁμφιστομον ὑντα (III 8 [30],9,31) explains καὶ οἷον ἑαυτὸν ὁφέντα τοῖς εἰς ὁμισθεν ἑυτοῦ (9,30-31). The first step towards the specification of the refers of ὁμφιστομον is to clarify the sense of Intellect’s surrender of itself. In light of V 5 [32],6,20 and 7,20, where the apprehension of the One is thematically described, the surrender of itself seems to mean the abandonment of the intelligible objects. But the surrender of the intelligible objects would not mean that of the objective side of Intellect. In this case, the subjective side still remains so that we cannot see why this is a case of giving up the self. We must here recall that self-intellection is for Plotinus the contemplation of the interior intelligible objects. Hence the surrender of the self-intellective phase can at the same time indicate the surrender of the intelligible objects and that of the self. As discussed in note 94 in Chapter III of Part I, the incidentality of self-intellection to the original intellection directed to the One means that the former is the necessary consequence of the latter. Therefore, if Intellect wishes to see the One without seeing its pluralized images, it must abandon its self-thinking phase and become the purely hyper-noetic phase alone, the phase which is free from the multiplicity of the intelligible objects. Consequently, the interpretation suggested by Bussanich is supported by VI 9 [9],2,33-43, where Plotinus deals with the dual nature of Intellect’s activity, directed to the Good and to Intellect itself. Intellect’s two-facedness is adumbrated especially by 2,41-42 οἷον παρεῖναι μὲν τῷ ἁγαθῷ καὶ τῷ πρώτῳ ... συνείναι δὲ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ. The present passage may be taken with VI 9 [9],2,41-42 rather than with 3,34. In conclusion, ὁμφιστομον seems to refer to the hyper-noetic and the self-intellective phases of Intellect. Kühn follows the line of our interpretation in "Le Désir Ambigu: Un Point de Départ de l’Axiologie Plotinienne," Dionysius 14 (1990):62.

19Phillips holds that the One’s simple intuition corresponds to what Plotinus regards, in V 3 [49],11,2-3, as the goal of Intellect’s desire "to apprehend the One as simple (ἐπιθράλλειν ὡς ἐπιλθ)" ("Plotinus and the ‘Eye’ of Intellect," Dionysius 14 (1990):100, note 39). This view would illuminate the archetype-likeness relationship of the One’s ἐπιθράλη and Intellect’s.

20See J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 100, 146; J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 267, note 43 to chapter 16. But Rist’s reference to V 3 [49],6,39 in this note is not appropriate. In 6,39-42, self-reversion and self-knowledge are attributed to "the pure Intellect (τῷ καθάρῳ νῷ)."

21For the One as a marvel, see V 5 [32],8,23-26, VI 7 [38],40,27, and VI 9
In light of the second person ἐξεῖς (10,32), συννόει (10,32), which is accompanied by no object, must be read as the middle. Compare ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ ... συννόει with καὶ νοεῖ ἐνταῦθα (VI 9 [9],9,14-15). The former not only emphasizes the intimacy or intensity of the soul's awareness of the One, but also adumbrates the difference of this awareness from νοεῖν.


In this chapter, the soul's ἐπισολή precisely indicates her grasp of some object by intellection (ἐπισολλεῖ ... τὴν νοῆσει, 9,6), which is equivalent to intellection and contemplation of that object (9,7).

Both the words ἐπισολή and προσβολή, in the tradition of Hellenistic philosophy, indicate the visual thrust of the eye outward towards the visible objects. Phillips points out that Plotinus' theory of sensual vision in II 8 [35],1,39-43 is indebted to Epicurus' distinction between a comprehensive view (ἀθρόα ἐπισολή) and partial apprehensions (ὑπάκε ἐπισολαί) (Dionysius 14 (1990):81-84). He views the parallel between II 8 [35],1,39-43 and IV 4 [28],1,20-25 in terms of Plotinus' employing of the Epicurean comprehensive apprehension as an analogue of intellection, which is the apprehension of all the intelligible objects as many, rather than one, at the same time (op. cit.:84).

For more uses of ἐπισολή, προσβολή, and their cognates about the apprehension of the intelligible objects, see I 2 [19],4,23; III 7 [45],5,1; 5,6; VI 2 [43],8,27; 21,14-15; VI 3 [44],18,11-12.

See V 3 [49],13,1-4; V 5 [32],6,1-15; VI 8 [39],9,39-44; VI 9 [9],4,11-12.

See also 10,42-43 οἶον ἐπαφή μόνον ἀρρητος.

In IV 3 [27],18,11-13, furthermore, we read that Intellect, in its simple intuition (ἐν ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἐπισολαίς ἀπαλαῖς), does not employ any language.
32 See J. F. Phillips' comment on V 5 [32], 10, 6-12: "... νόησις and ἀθρόων προσβολή are, respectively, Intellect's 'partial' and 'whole' views of the One" (Dionysius 14 (1990):88).

33 In V 5 [32], 10, 7-11, moreover, the comprehensive apprehension of the One is contrasted with the memory of the portion of the One. Although what this memory exactly indicates is not fully clear, this contrast may give us some instruction. In VI 9 [9], 11, 6-7, Plotinus talks about the soul's "memory" of the One in her mystical union: "If the seer had a memory (μεμυντό) about whom he had become when he had united with that [i.e. the One], he would have an image (εἰκόνα) of that by himself." Whereas there is such a discrepancy that Intellect's memory in the former text concerns the portion of the One (τὸ ... αὐτοῦ) and the soul's memory in the latter text concerns whom she had become, both passages deal with the grasp of the One. Thus seen, the comprehensive apprehension of the One would be considered to be characterized by such immediacy that it involves no image of that which is apprehended. In V 5 [32], 10, 1-2, therefore, Plotinus writes: "But do not, I beg you, look at it [i.e. the One] through other things: otherwise, you will see a trace (ὑπονοεῖ) of it, not itself." The contrast between the comprehensive apprehension of the One and the memory seems to make the former's immediacy more prominent.

34 J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 50.

35 ἐπιβολή, II 8 [35], 1, 40; IV 4 [28], 8, 6: ἐπιβάλλειν, IV 4 [28], 23, 14: προσβολή, II 8 [35], 2, 9; 2, 13; VI 6 [34], 18, 27: προσβάλλειν, IV 6 [41], 1, 16; V 9 [5], 1, 2.

36 On the close connection between these passages, see G. M. Gurtler, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, p. 274.

37 O'Daly observes that Plotinus' notion of νοὸς ἔρων is unsatisfactory because the power whereby the One is seen is no longer really Intellect (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, pp. 88-89). But this view seems a bit too rash. As mentioned at note 122 in Chapter III of Part I, νοὸς ἔρων can equivocally mean (i) the hyper-noetic phase which coexists with the self-thinking phase (simply νοὸς ἔρων) and (ii) the hyper-noetic phase which has ceased to coexist with the self-thinking phase (νοὸς ἔρων καὶ ἀφρων). In the ensuing lines (28-33), Plotinus remarks that νοὸς ἔρων eternally coexists with νοὸς ἐμφρονόων or the self-intellective phase. As repeatedly noticed, self-intellection persistently remains incidental to the original contemplation of the One, so that the hyper-noetic phase must be primordially Intellect. Since Plotinus' emphasis in this context is placed on the eternal coexistence of the hyper-noetic and self-thinking phases of Intellect, νοὸς ἔρων is
not inappropriate to the hyper-noetic phase. O’Daly seems to overlook Plotinus’ remark on the eternal coexistence of two phases of Intellect. Indeed the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect is elsewhere denominated "that of Intellect which is not Intellect (τῶ ἑαυτῷ μὴ νῦ)" (V 5 [32],8,22-23). Even in this section, the hyper-noetic phase, however called non-Intellect, belongs to Intellect itself (ἑαυτῷ).

38With the majority of editors, we read ἐπιθυμλεῖν in 11,2 instead of the better attested MSS reading ἐπιθυμλεῖν. See also A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus, 5:108-109; J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 223; J. F. Phillips, Dionysius 14 (1990):95, note 30.

39The indefinite pronoun τίς is added not only to the One’s ἐπιθυμλή (39,2) but to Intellect’s (35,21). Hence the addition does not seem to be intended for the demarcation of the One’s intuition from Intellect’s.

40See J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 95-96. Bussanich here also compared παραδοχή of Intellect loving in VI 7 [38],35,22 with δεχέσθαι in VI 9 [9],4,25, where Plotinus deals with the mystical apprehension of the One. But it would be difficult to associate any receptivity with the One’s intuition.

41For the otherness between the One and Intellect, see V 1 [10],6,53 and VI 9 [9],8,31-33. Atkinson views that Plotinus, in V 1 [10],6,51-53, deals with the activity of νοῶς ἑρῆν, defined with the expression σύνεστιν αὐτῷ (Plotinus: Ennead V.I, p. 153). On the otherness between the hyper-noetic ἐπιθυμλή and the One, see also J. F. Phillips, Dionysius 14 (1990):99.

42We must also notice that the verb βλέπει is omitted in the ἃ-clause (35,21-22).

43Rist attributes "something like the crest of wave of Intellect itself (τῶ αὐτῶ τοῦ νοῦ ὁνὸ κύματι)" (36,17-18) to Intellect loving (Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 267, note 43 to ch. 16). Bussanich observes that the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect is consistently characterized by "the upward driving force of mystical eros" (Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):172).

44See also 14,2-3 οὐδὲ γνῶσιν οὐδὲ νόησιν ἔχομεν αὐτοῦ. In 17,25, the mystical contact with the One is described νοσῆς ἐφάπαχσας. But this section does not establish that the One can be grasped by the activity denominated νόησις or νοεῖν.

45For the a-noetic nature of the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect, see V 5 [32],8,22-23 τῶ ἑαυτοῦ μὴ νῦ. In one of the middle treatises the inchoate Intellect
is only once referred to as ἡ νόησις (VI 7 [38],40,10-11). Plotinus here defines the pre-noetic intellection as the primary activity and concludes the absence of any intellectual activity from the One which is prior to the primary activity (40,22-32). As he mentions at the very beginning of the chapter, however, this passage is not a formal argument for the One’s having no intellection, but "a kind of encouragement" (παραμύθια ἀττα) (40,3) and "a persuasion" (πειθώ) (40,4). Hence this reference to the pre-noetic Intellect must be regarded as exceptional. On παραμύθια, see also VI 5 [23],11,6.

46See note 117 in Chapter III of Part I. In III 8 [30],9,11-12, Plotinus definitely rejects that the One can be τὸ νοητόν. Bussanich views that this section has no bearing on the description of the One as such in V 4 [7],2,4ff. and V 4 [24],2,6ff. See J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 92. But this view cannot be a strong point against our supposition that the One may no longer be referred to as τὸ νοητόν. In VI 7 [38],39,13-14, we are told that no intellection concerns the Good. In light of 39,14 εἰ ἄλλον αὐτὸν ἐθέλοι ἰδεῖν, we may take τούτου [sc. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ] as the objective genitive rather than as the possessive genitive. As already pointed out, τούτου in 39,26 is the possessive genitive. In 35,32, again, Plotinus restricts the sense of νοεῖν solely to the contemplation of the Forms within Intellect itself. Also in V 3 [49],10,40-42, it is stressed that intellection always concerns that which contains variety. In these treatises, therefore, there is no room for the One to be described as τὸ νοητόν. It seems to be highly probable that the reference to the One as such actually disappears not only from Plotinus’ writing but from his own system, which lies behind his treatises after V 6 [24].

But the section σὺχ ὅτι μὴ ἔστι νοησαί τὸ ἀγαθῶν--τούτο γὰρ ἔστω in VI 7 [38],40,34-35 would run counter to the above supposition. The intellection which is said to concern the Good is the pre-noetic activity designated as νόησις (see note 45). Since the context is exceptional, the knowability of the Good by intellection can be regarded as a kind of ad hoc stipulation.

47J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 49.
CHAPTER VI
VI 8 [39],16: THE ONE'S HYPER-INTELLECTION AND ACTIVE ACTUALITY

Introduction

In the treatise "On Free Will and the Will of the One" (VI 8 [39]), Plotinus gives the most positive and striking account of the One's cognitive activity. As we shall see later, his account for the One's inner life in this treatise is not formal. Nevertheless to pass by VI 8 [39] would be unprofitable to our inquiry because we can find out the systematic nexus consisting of the already mentioned modalities of the One's knowledge, behind Plotinus' informal account for the inner life of the One in this treatise. In order to read this treatise from the systematic point of view, it is necessary for us to take a different attitude from that of reading V 4 [7],2 and VI 7 [38],39. Before analyzing the relevant text, therefore, the way of interpreting VI 8 [39] must be carefully worked out.
1. The Modus Interpretandi of VI 8 [39]

The treatise VI 8 [39] can be roughly divided into three parts. The first part (chs. 1-6) deals with the definition of free will in terms of intellectual activity, the second part (chs. 7-12) with the One's being beyond compulsion and chance, and the final part (chs. 13-21) with the One's inner activity. In the second and the third parts, Plotinus persistently tries to refute "a kind of daring opinion (τὶς τολμηρὸς λόγος)" that the nature of the Good happens to be as it is and does not have any freedom (7,11-15).1 His attempt, against this opinion, to show that the Good is even beyond freedom forces himself to speak of its inner life in the most positive terms not employed for the Good in other treatises. Plotinus hence does not forget to give a caveat about his presentation:

But if one must bring in these names about that into which is inquired, let it be said again that they were not correctly used, because one must not make it two even for the sake of having an idea of it; but now we must depart a little from correct thinking (τὶ παρανοητέου) in our discourse for the sake of persuasion (13,1-5, tr. J. Bussanich, adapted by A. Sumi).

Plotinus' warning is repeated again in the same chapter:

But one must go along with the words, if one in speaking of that Good uses, of necessity to indicate it, expressions which we do not strictly allow to be used; but one should understand "as if (οἴου)" with each of them (13,47-50, tr. J. Bussanich, adapted by A. Sumi).

Plotinus' account of the One's inner life in the final part of the treatise is not a formal and strict presentation, but a "persuasion (πειθώ)" (13,4) and a "specific indication (ἐνδειξέω)" (13,48). As Bussanich views it, Plotinus here announces his intention to "depart from the usually strict enforcement of the negative theology in talking about the One."2 In fact, as we shall see, he attributes to the One intelligence, love, self-causation, and active actuality. Nevertheless we must not pass by the present treatise. As τι in 13,4 insinuates, Plotinus, even in VI 8 [39],

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eagerly tries to minimize the necessary divergence from his formal doctrine as much as possible. He endeavors to persuade those who present the "daring opinion" in order to defend his own doctrine of the One.

Therefore we can refer to passages of the present treatise as a key text for our inquiry. In order to do so, we must work out an appropriate procedure of interpretation. First, we shall ascertain Plotinus' divergence from his formal doctrine of the One's knowledge by comparing the relevant passages in VI 8 [39],16 with such texts as V 4 [7],2 and VI 7 [38],39. Then, we shall find out the specific terms, in other treatises, to which the terms employed in VI 8 [39],16 seem to be really approximate. Finally, we shall see how these terms and concepts are related to one another in VI 8 [39],16. This procedure enables us to comprehend the systematic structure of Plotinus' formal doctrine of the One's knowledge, which stands behind his description in the present treatise. The proposed way of interpretation will thus reveal the systematic picture of his doctrine of the One's knowledge, which emerged when the treatises VI 7 [39] and VI 8 [39] were written. The comparison of this systematic picture with the description in V 4 [7],2 will certainly answer the question whether Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge has developed or not.
2. The One's Inner Activity

In VI 8 [39],16, Plotinus attempts to consider the One's nature in terms of the thesis that the One is everywhere and nowhere (lines 1-4). That the One is nowhere denotes its absolute transcendence. The absolutely transcendent One does not aspire to contemplate other things that have derived from itself. Such a transcendent mode of the One's cognitive state is elucidated in 16,24-36. The passage in 16,24-30 reads:

But that such an inclination of him to himself (η τοιόντη νεόςις αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν), which is, as it were, his activity (οἶον ἐνέργεια . . . αὐτοῦ) and abiding in himself (μονῆ ἐν αὐτῷ), makes his being what he is, is evident if one supposes the opposite case; because if he inclined (νεόςευτα) to what is outside himself, he would utterly lose his being what he is; so his being what he is is his self-directed activity (η ἐνέργεια η πρὸς αὐτὸν), and these are one and himself. Therefore, he has brought himself into existence, while his activity is brought forth with himself (tr. J. Bussanich, adapted by A. Sumi).

The self-creation of the One, mentioned here, would be definitely rejected in other treatises of the Enneads. But this passage, if read with enough circumspection, will give some instruction about the One's inner activity.

We must first go into detail about the One's self-inclination. As Atkinson points out, the word νεόςις is used to describe the Gnostic doctrine of creation by the soul (II 9 [33],4,6ff.). Plotinus himself uses νεύευμ and νεόςις in the passage dealing with the descent of the individual soul or of φύσις as the image of the cosmic soul. Hence he denies προσνεύευμ to the One in V 1 [10],6,26. Although the word νεόςις seems to be quite inappropriate to the One, the self-inclination of the One in the present passage is perhaps equivalent to its self-reversion mentioned in V 1 [10],6,18. As τοιόντη in VI 8 [39],16,24 indicates, the One's inclination towards itself is to be taken with its penetration into its own interior (ό δ' εἰς τὸ εἶσον οἶον φέρεται αὐτοῦ, 16,12-13), its holding fast to itself (πρὸς αὐτὸν οἶον
and its self-vision (οἶνον πρός αὐτὸν βλέπειν, 16,19-20). The One is thus identified with its own interiority. Its interiority is again explicitly expressed in 18,3 ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐν πάθει. The One's interiority thus goes well with its eternal self-reversion. But what this interiority means exactly is not fully apparent.

The One's inclination to itself is associated with its self-vision and is dissociated from the seeing of other things. As seen in the last chapter, the seeing of other things is rejected of the One in VI 7 [38],39,21-27. In the third chapter, again, it was pointed out that whatever awareness the One may have of its own power, it cannot be aware of any extrinsic effect of that power. With regard to this dissociation, Plotinus faithfully abides by his formal doctrine. But the attribution of self-vision to the One is problematic. In VI 7 [38],41,31, as already seen, self-vision is definitely denied to the One (οὐδὲ βλέπει δὴ ἑαυτό). In the last chapter, moreover, we saw that the unique immediacy of the One's intuition is more effectively expressed by the tactile metaphor (39,19) than by any ocular-language. In this respect, hence, the present passage diverges from Plotinus' formal doctrine. The divergence is explicitly marked by the qualification of the One's self-vision by οἶνον (VI 8 [39],16,19-20).

Furthermore, the One's self-inclination is identified with its abiding in itself. This identification is exactly prefigured by the One's self-reversion (V 1 [10],6,18) which is completely motionless (6,26-27). As already seen, the One's κατανοήσεως is said to be in eternal rest (V 4 [7],2,17-18) and its ἐπιθολή, which has an implication of reversion, is taken with σεμνον ἐπισταθαί (VI 7 [38],39,31-32). Through the present passage, therefore, we can see that immobility is inseparably associated with the One's self-reversion in Plotinus' formal system.

The One's self-inclination is its ἐνέργεια directed to itself. His activity is also characterized as ἐνέργεια μένουσα (16,15). The One's ἐνέργεια, which is
even conceptually undifferentiated from the One itself, thus proves to be absolutely static and self-directed. The activity is cognitively specified in 16,30-36:

If, then, he did not come to be, but his activity (ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ) was eternal and like waking being not different from the awakener (οὗν ἐγρήγορος ὄμολος δύτος τοῦ ἐγρηγορότος), being an eternal awaking and hyper-intellection (ἐγρηγορος καὶ ὑπερνόησις), he is thus as he awakened. And his waking is beyond real being and Intellect and intelligent life: but these [awaking and hyper-intellection] are himself. Therefore he is an activity (ἐνέργεια) above Intellect and prudence and life (tr. J. Bussanich, adapted by A. Sumi).

New terms describe the One's knowledge and awareness. Henry points out the close parallel between the present passage and V 4 [7],2,17-19 as follows: (i) ὑπερνόησις corresponds to κατανόησις, (ii) the prefix ὑπέρ- of ὑπερνόησις to ἐν νοῆσει ἑτέρως ἡ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν, (iii) οἷον ἐγρήγορος το οἷον συναίσθησις, and (iv) οἷον ἐγρήγορος ὄμολος δύτος τοῦ ἐγρηγορότος ἡ κατανόησις αὐτοῦ αὐτό. In addition, (iv) would also correspond to τὸ ἐπιβάλλειν ἐαυτῷ τι ἂν εἴη ἡ αὐτό; in VI 7 [38],39,3-4. Also in the present passage, Plotinus does not forget to remark the consistency of the One's cognitive activity with its absolute unity. From these close parallels, however, we cannot conclude that Plotinus' position about the One's knowledge is the same in V 4 [7],2 and VI 8 [39],16. Guided by Henry's remark, we must search for Plotinus' formal position behind the present passage.

As mentioned in Chapter II of Part I, Aristotle identifies the ἐνέργεια of the prime mover with its ἐγρήγορος (Met. 1072b16-17). Plotinus' identification of the One's activity with its awaking is indebted to Aristotle. Although Plotinus does not characterize intellection as ἐγρήγορος, intellection is often characterized as sleepless because of its perpetuity. So the word ἐγρηγορος would be appropriate to intellection. The qualification of the word by οἷον would be due to this fact, as is the case in which the One's συναίσθησις is qualified by οἷον in V 4 [7],2,18.
Whereas the One's συναίσθησις, as seen in the first chapter, has an implication of the One's concentration into unity, its ἐγρήγορσις in the present passage is not credited with such implication. In light of the parallel of 16,33 ἐστιν οὐτως, ἐγρηγοροσευν with 16,38-39 ἀρα... ὡς ἡθέλησεν αὐτός ἐστιν, the ἐγρηγοροσις seems to mean simply the One's awareness underlying the will tentatively attributed to the One.

In the last chapter it was pointed out that Plotinus in the middle treatises usually employs ἐπιστήμη and its cognates rather than noetic terminology in order to describe the cognitive activities of the One, the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect, and the inchoate Intellect. The ὑπερνόησις in the present passage deviates from such a general tendency. Bussanich maintains that the description of the One as οἷον νοῦς (16,15-16) must be reckoned with the ὑπερνόησις. But the One's hyper-intellection would rather be understood as an ἐνέργεια ὑπέρ νοού (16,35). The prefix ὑπέρ- of ὑπερνόησις exactly denotes the transcendence of the One's cognitive activity beyond intellection, that is, its difference from intellection, just as remarked in V 4 [7],2,18-19. But the application of the word to the One would no longer be viable in Plotinus' formal doctrine of the middle period. If Intellect's ἐπιστήμη or προσοβολή must be the likeness to the One's ἐπιστήμη (III 8 [30],9,22-23), we are urged to use some similar terms for the One and the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect. It is impossible to employ ὑπερνόησις for both the One and Intellect; the hyper-noetic activity of Intellect cannot be called ὑπερνόησις, because the word exactly means the activity beyond Intellect, though that hyper-noetic activity belongs to Intellect itself.

How are ἐγρηγοροσις and ὑπερνόησις of the One related to one another? In V 4 [7],2,17-18, we are told that the One's κατανόησις is the One itself by virtue of its οἷον συναίσθησις. With this statement we pointed out in the first chapter that the One's awareness is so concentrated into unity as to abrogate the conceptual
distinction between the One's κατανόησις and the One itself. In the present treatise, however, ἐγρήγορσις and ὑπερνόησις are simply juxtaposed (16,32-33). In 16,35, these activities are totally identified with the One itself. The undifferentiatedness of the One's knowledge from the One itself has been repeatedly remarked. The total identity of the One's ἐγρήγορσις with the One would surely suggest that its οἶνον συναισθήσις is considered to be entirely undifferentiated from the One itself in Plotinus' formal system. In terms of the One's absolute simplicity, we ought to think that the One itself, its knowledge, and its consciousness are altogether one. The One's knowledge and consciousness seem to represent simply two aspects of one and the same inner activity of the One, considered from different points of view.

The above analysis reveals that Plotinus' formal doctrine of the One's knowledge, persistently in the early and the middle treatises, consists of the following basic theses. First, the One's knowledge and consciousness are totally indistinguishable from the One itself by virtue of the absence of any otherness whatsoever from the One. Second, the One's knowledge is always at rest. Finally, the One's knowledge is the specification of its self-directed reversion. These theses precisely express the uniqueness of the One's cognitive activity. Contrary to the first thesis, Intellect is always in the duality of the thinking agent and intellection. Contrary to the second thesis, as already seen, intellection is defined as a movement towards the One or towards the Form. Contrary to the third thesis, while self-intellection is self-directed, the eternally pre-noetic activity of Intellect is characterized as εἰς ὀρχὴν ἔπιστρέψειν (VI [9],2,36); the One, of course, does not turn to anything else than itself.

Furthermore, all the above mentioned theses are based on the ontological status of the One as an ἐνέργεια; the first and the third theses are based on ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ πρὸς αὐτὸν which is entirely identified with the One itself (16,28-29),
and the second thesis on ἐνέργεια μένουσα (16,15). The passage ἦ τοιούτη νεύσις ἀυτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν οἷον ἐνέργεια σῶσα ἀυτοῦ καὶ μονὴ ἐν αὐτῷ (16,24-25) apparently indicates the close connection between the second and the third theses, between ἐνέργεια μένουσα and ἐνέργεια πρὸς αὐτόν. Hence the One’s ontological status as the ἐνέργεια seems to serve as the ground for the affirmation about the One’s knowledge. We shall further inquire into the ontological status of the One as such.
3. The One as the 'Ενέργεια

We have now understood that the One itself is the self-directed and self-abiding ἐνέργεια. The One's ἐγρήγορος is ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας καὶ νοῦ καὶ ζωῆς ἐμφρονος (16,34) and its ἐνέργεια is ὑπὲρ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ζωῆν (16,35-36). This point unmistakably suggests that there can be an ἐνέργεια even apart from οὐσία. Plotinus writes:

We must not be afraid of positing the primary activity without real being (ἐνέργειαν τὴν πρώτην . . . ἀνευ οὐσίας), but must posit this itself as a kind of hypostasis. If someone were to posit a hypostasis without activity (ὑπόστασιν ἀνευ ἐνεργείας), the originative principle would be deficient and the most perfect of all would be imperfect. And if he added activity (to the hypostasis), he would not preserve unity. If, then (οὖν), activity (ἡ ἐνέργεια) is more perfect than real being (τῆς οὐσίας), and the First is the most perfect, he [i.e. the One] will be in the first place activity (ἐνέργεια) (20,9-15).

This passage comprises the significant principle of Plotinus' philosophy, the ontological primacy of ἐνέργεια over οὐσία. The ontological status of the One as the οὐσία-less ἐνέργεια is totally consistent with its absolute simplicity. For Plotinus, οὐσία is coextensive with νόησις and thereby is always οὐσία νοοῦσα (VI 7 [38], 37,11; 39,30-31). Again, intellection is inseparable from οὐσία. Self-intellection is the ἐνέργεια of the ὑποκείμενον, that is, of being (40,8). Even the pre-noetic activity coexists with and in real being (σύνεστι καὶ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, 40,15). Intellect is always οὐσία and νόησις so that it cannot be absolutely one (37,12).21 The One's status as the ἐνέργεια ἀνευ καὶ ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας and the ἐνέργεια ὑπὲρ νοῦν is therefore fully coherent not only with the absence of intellection from the One but with the absolute unity of the One, the fundamental thesis in Plotinus' philosophy.22

But here arises a problem. Plotinus in some places of VI 8 [39] adds οὖν to the ἐνέργεια which is the One and in other places not. So we must ascertain whether Plotinus identifies the One as the unique activity in his formal doctrine, if
we wish to defend our view that the One's ontological status as the $\sigma\upomega\sigma\iota\alpha$-less $\epsilon\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$ serves as the foundation for the affirmation about the One's knowledge. We have textual evidence for Plotinus' formal identification of the One as activity. In the argument for the absence of intellection from the One in V 6 [24],6,3-9, as seen in the fourth chapter, it is assured that the One is the primary $\epsilon\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$ that is completely free from any attribution and external relation ($\epsilon\iota\varsigma \alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron$). The urge not to add anything to the primary activity ($\sigma\nu\delta\epsilon\nu \alpha\upsilon\tau\eta \varepsilon\tau\iota \pi\rho\omicron\sigma\tau\iota\theta\epsilon\upsilon\nu\tau\alpha\varsigma$, lines 7-8) would definitely point to the identification of the One as the primary activity without being. But Plotinus elsewhere (V 5 [32],3,23-24) calls the One "a kind of activity which establishes real being ($\tau\eta\nu \ldots \sigma\iota\omicron\nu \epsilon\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha\nu \epsilon\iota\varsigma \upsilon\omega\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\nu \sigma\uomicron\sigma\iota\varsigma$)," which is imitated by Zeus or the cosmic soul. The addition of $\sigma\iota\omicron\nu$ to $\epsilon\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$ in this section seems to be unavoidable for the following reason. We must keep in mind that III 8 [30], V 8 [31], V 5 [32], and II 9 [33] originally constitute a long, single treatise. In III 8 [30],9,32-34, Intellect is regarded as the primary activity so that activity is denied to the One in 11,9-11. The qualifying $\sigma\iota\omicron\nu$ in V 5 [32],3,23 would reflect this fact. Therefore this section does not disprove the One's status as the primary activity without and beyond being.

The identification of the One as the primary activity without real being is not only consistent with the One's unity and immobility, but is closely related to Plotinus' doctrine of emanation. As seen in the first chapter, Plotinus, persistently in all the periods of his writing, gives an account of the genesis of the intelligible world from the One in terms of the double-$\epsilon\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$ theory, in which the One is defined as the primary and internal activity. If the One is not defined as the primary activity, the double-activity theory loses its ground. Hence Plotinus' system really calls for the identification of the One as the primary activity.

Finally, Plotinus' claim that $\epsilon\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$ is ontologically prior to $\sigma\uomicron\sigma\iota\alpha$ marks a remarkable revolution in ancient Greek metaphysics. The locution $\sigma\nu\delta\epsilon\ldots$
οφθητέων in VI 8 [39],20,9 would insinuate Plotinus' own awareness that his claim may be a bold challenge to the tradition of Greek philosophy, especially to the Aristotelian tradition. Perhaps nobody before him explicitly stated the ontological priority of ἐνέργεια to οὐσία. As seen in Chapter II of Part I, the internal structure of self-intellection of the Aristotelian prime mover is explained such that the divine capacity of thinking is brought to activity by the divine object of thought. In Aristotle, God's ἐνέργεια cannot be apart from οὐσία as the divine intelligible object. As already seen, definiteness serves as the criterion of actuality. But the Plotinian thesis that there can be ἐνέργεια without οὐσία eliminates the Aristotelian identification of definiteness with actuality; the One's ἐνέργεια must rather be associated with unlimitedness and formlessness. Moreover, the activity of the Aristotelian God is the ἐνέργεια ἀκλησίας. This notion is briefly mentioned in Eth. Nic. 1154b27-28, but is not fully unfolded by Aristotle himself. The activity of immobility, though not occurring in the Enneads, nicely describes the static activity of the One. According to Plotinus, however, the association of absolute immobility with activity would be possible only if that activity is not accompanied with οὐσία; for the Plotinian οὐσία, just like τὸ παντελῶς ὄν in the Sophist, must always have noetic movement. It would not be impossible to regard Plotinus' notion of the One's static activity as embodying his critical inheritance of Aristotle's notion of the activity of immobility. In sum, Plotinus has Aristotle as his predecessor with regard to the notion of the activity of immobility, in spite of his decisive divergence from Aristotle with regard to the ontological primacy of ἐνέργεια over οὐσία.

As already seen, several critics observes that Plotinus’ account for the One’s knowledge in V 4 [7],2 is influenced by Numenius. But Plotinus’ notion of the activity without being indicates the radical difference of his position from Numenius’. The First God of Numenius is intellect at rest which is identified with the Living Being of the Timaeus. The First God is simply the complex of the
Forms devoid of an intelletive agent and is called inactive (ἀφγόν) (Fr. 21, Leemans).33 From his inactivity, however, we cannot infer that the First God has no distinctive ἐνέργεια. It is not fully apparent whether he has some ἐνέργεια. Whether he has activity or not, the First God, unlike the Plotinian One, is Being.34 The First God of Numenius is definite Being that has the downward tendency to make use of the Second God to think, whereas the Plotinian One is the hyper-ontic activity always remaining in itself. Although the entire picture of Numenius’ philosophy is not available to us, Plotinus himself seems to be aware that the ontological status and activity of his ultimate principle are apparently different from those of Numenius’ highest deity. With the conclusion of our inquiry into the ontological status of the One and the modalities of its knowledge, we can now answer the problem mentioned in the first chapter. Plotinus’ doctrine of the One’s knowledge is scarcely influenced by Numenius.

Plotinus’ doctrine of the One’s hyper-noetic activity, as already seen, is systematically related to his doctrines of the One’s simplicity, of Intellect’s self-thinking and of emanation. The doctrine surely meets several exigencies arising from his own philosophical system. Nevertheless it can be seen as representing Plotinus’ reply to a problem left in Plato’s dialogue. In the passage dealing with the hyper-noetic and hyper-ontic activity of the One, Plotinus refers to Rep. 509b9 ἐπέκειαν οὐσίας (VI 8 [39], 16,34). Let us return to the locus classicus of Plotinus’ doctrine of the One: οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐπέκειαν τῆς οὐσίας τῆς προσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος (Rep. 509b8-9). In terms of the phraseology οὐκ . . . ἀλλά . . ., the second half of this section can be taken as the kataphatic statement about the Good. Nevertheless the phrase ἐπέκειαν τῆς οὐσίας reveals nothing positive about the ontological status of the Good. The phrase is apophatic to the extent that it remarks the separateness of the Good from the Forms. What is the ontological status of the Good exactly? Plotinus persistently and seriously
tackles this problem, regarding the transcendence of the Good, left unanswered in Plato's dialogues. He might regard the ἐνέργεια ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας as appropriate to the causal power of the Good from which the totality of the Forms are derived. The Idea of the Good transcends the οὐσία with regard to its δύναμις. The power in question is precisely that of providing the οὐσία with the ἐχθα. The δύναμις is represented by the ἐνέργεια, when it is viewed without reference to its effects.

In brief summary, Plotinus' affirmations about the One's knowledge are based on the ontological status of the One as the self-directed, static ἐνέργεια without and beyond οὐσία. By virtue of the mediation by this status of the One, the positive description of the One's cognitive activity can be coherent with the denial of intellection and ἐνέργεια-accompanied-with-οὐσία to the One.
NOTES


2 J. Bussanich, Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):173. As for VI 8 [39],16, Henry makes a similar observation: "... il y a la reprise du thème classique de la via negativa et de l'absolute transcendence" (Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 59-60).

3 On the view that the One is everywhere and nowhere, see III 9 [13],4,1-6 and V 5 [32],8,24.

4 M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V.1, p. 142.

5 See I 1 [54],12,23-27, I 6 [1],5,49, and I 8 [51],4,19.

6 For the attempt to read the One's self-reversion into the context of VI 8 [39],16, see J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 41-43; C. J. de Vogel, Études sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, ed. P. Aubenque (Paris: J. Vrin, 1979), p. 264. As seen in the third chapter, Bussanich takes the referent of τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ in V 1 [10],7,5 as the One. But since we take the referent as the inchoate Intellect, our textual warrant for the One's self-reversion must be solely 6,18.

7 Bussanich pays attention to the fact that the phrases εἰς τὸ εἶσω and πρὸς τὸ εἶσω are used in the passages dealing with the soul's mystical union with the One (V 5 [32],7,32; VI 9 [9],7,17-18) and remarks that the One's reversion into itself represents an absolutizing moment in the lives of Intellect and the soul. See J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 208; Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):176.

8 On the denial of the seeing of other things to the One, see 16,11-12 οὖ πρὸς αὐτὰ βλέπωντος αὐτοῦ. The alleged inclination of the One towards those which are external (16,26-27) would be taken with the seeing of other things.

9 Buchner (Plotins Möglichkeitslehre (Munich, Salzburg: Verlag Anton
Pustet, 1970), p. 101, note 8) sees the self-directed activity of the One in the present passage in terms of VI 7 [38],41,31 and remarks that such activity is free from the subject-object separation.

Bussanich tries to defend the viability of the One's self-vision by referring to the passages where Plotinus mentions the hyper-noetic vision of the soul and by stressing the close link between seeing and ἐρως which he regards as equivalent to the One's ἀγαπᾶω in 16,13-14. See J. Bussanich, *The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, pp. 214-215. Of course, he is fully aware that Plotinus on countless occasions claims that the One transcends any sort of vision. But, first of all, Bussanich's *modus interpretandi* of VI 8 [39] is not fully clear. Insofar as we intend to discover Plotinus' formal doctrine behind the present treatise, we cannot follow Bussanich's claim.

As mentioned in the third chapter, Bussanich regards the One as the subject of ἐῶρα in V 1 [10],7,6, while we regard Intellect as the subject. Hence we have no textual evidence for the One's self-vision.

In VI 8 [39],16, furthermore, the One itself is identified with pure radiance (ἐωτὸν . . . οὐγήν καθαρὰν, line 13; see also Phdr. 250c4). As seen in the last chapter, the One is described as ἕῳγη in VI 7 [38],41,6. This identification can be considered to belong to Plotinus' formal doctrine.

Hadot takes the self-directed inclination of the One in 16,24 with its self-directed reversion in V 1 [10],6,18, which he closely compares with its remaining in itself (μένουτος ἐκείνου ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἦθει) in V 3 [49],12,33-34 (*Porphyre et Victorinus*, 1:320-321, note 4). This interpretation suggests that Plotinus' identification of the One's νεύσεως πρὸς αὐτὸν and μονῆ ἐν αὐτῷ in 16,24-25 is firmly based on his systematic doctrine.

Buchner compares ἐνέργεια μένουσα with Intellect's ἐνέργεια ἐστῶσα in II 9 [33],1,30 (*Plotins Möglichkeitslehre*, p. 102, note 10). Unlike the One's rest, however, Intellect's rest goes with movement (see VI 9 [9],5,14-15 ἱσυχον καὶ ἀτρεμή κίνησιν).

In the apparatus of H-S2, ταῦτα in 16,25 is taken to refer to ἐπέκεινα υἱόων καὶ νοῦ καὶ ζωῆς ἐμφρόνους. But to take the referent of ταῦτα as ἐγρήγορως καὶ ὑπερνόησις in 16,32 makes the argument in the present passage more intelligible as follows:

1. The One's activity is awaking and hyper-intellection (16,31-33).
2. The awaking is beyond Intellect and life (16,33-34).
3. The awaking and hyper-intellection are the One itself (16,35).
4. Therefore (ἂνα) the One itself is an activity beyond Intellect and life (16,35-36).
The proposed reading has another advantage. The undifferentiatedness of awaking and hyper-intellection from the One itself can be taken with that of self-directed activity from the One itself (τοῦτο δὲ ἐν καὶ αὐτῶς, 16,28-29) and with that of waking from the awakener (16,31-32).

14P. Henry, Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 59-60, 386-387. For the equivalence of ὑπερνόησις to κατανόησις, see also J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 49; J. Bussanich, Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987):182.

15Plotinus applies to intellectual activity the words ἀυπνος (I 4 [46],9,22; VI 2 [43],8,7) and ἀγρυπνος (II 5 [25],3,36).

16See also Bussanich's comment on the present passage: "It is in fact perplexing why Plotinus persists in employing noetic terminology, albeit literally hyper-noetic, to describe the Good (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 218, (Italics mine.,)). In terms of the general tendency in the middle treatises, however, Plotinus does not persist in employing noetic terminology.

17J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 218. The One is elsewhere referred to as οἶνον νοῦς ἐν ἐνί (18,21; 18,27).

18See also 15, 19-21 ἀγαθοῦ ἐνεργεία καὶ μείζονος ἥ κατὰ νοῦν, οὐκ ἐπακτῶν τὸ ὑπέρ τὸ νοεῖν ἔχουσης.

19Rist comments on the present passage as follows: "Plotinus then really did envisage some kind of νόης as appropriate to the first principle" (Plotinus: The Road to Reality, p. 45). The One's ὑπερνόησις, insofar as it is beyond Intellect, is not any kind of intellection. In terms of Plotinus' formal doctrine in his middle treatises, it would be only some kind of ἐπιθολή that is truly appropriate to the One. Even in V 4 [7],2,17-19, Plotinus would think that any kind of intellection is not appropriate to the One. Rist seems to be unnecessarily swayed by Plotinus' noetic terminology. Beierwaltes accurately points out the interplay of negativity and positivity in the notion of the One's ὑπερνόησις:

Beierwaltes' observation would be most apparently embodied by ἐνεργεία ὑπὲρ νοῦν (16,35). The phrase consists of the kataphatic ἐνεργεία and the apophatic ὑπὲρ νοῦν. We shall see later what sort of all-transcending positivity is attributed to the One's activity. But we should like to make two critical comments on Beierwaltes' view of the One's knowledge. First, Beierwaltes regards the term ὑπερνόησις as viable in Plotinus' system. In the present passage, however, Plotinus does not give a formal account of the One's knowledge. The use of the term would certainly deviate from his general terminological tendency in the middle treatises. Dodds' attitude towards ὑπερνόησις is similar to Beierwaltes': "The nearest he [i.e. Plotinus] can get to describing it [i.e. the One's consciousness] is to call it ὑπερνόησις" (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 50). Beierwaltes' observation is fully compatible with our claim that the positive and the negative descriptions are coherent with one another in Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge. But the word ὑπερνόησις at best implies that the One's cognitive activity is beyond Intellect and so does not have any sufficiently positive meaning. It would rather be the One's ἐπιβολή that really comprises apophatic and kataphatic statements; for the One's ἐπιβολή not only is the positive specification of the One's internal activity, but also is sharply contrasted with intellection by virtue of the absence of otherness from it. Second, Beierwaltes associates self-reversion (ἐπιστροφὴ ἐς ἑαυτόν) solely with intellection and dissociates it from the One's knowledge (Zeitschrift für Philosophsiche Forschung 15 (1961):348). As repeatedly remarked in light of V 1 [10],6,18, however, the One's knowledge must be inseparably linked with its self-reversion.

20 See V 6 [24],6,9-13, 6,24-27, and VI 7 [38],37,10-14.

21 On the necessary connection between intellectual ἐνεργεία and σοûσια, see J. Moreau, Plotin ou la Gloire de la Philosophie Antique, pp. 85-86.


"The act (which is the One) is a quasi hypostasis because it does not have a subject or substratum in which it inheres, but is, as it were, its own subject
or substratum—or, better yet, 'gets by' without a substratum."

From the same passage, Anton draws the diametrically opposite view:

"What makes the concept of hypostasis intelligible and actual is the original activity of the One, which is presupposed by its ousia" ("Some Logical Aspects of the Concept of Hypostasis in Plotinus," in *The Structure of Being: A Neoplatonic Approach*, ed. R. B. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), p. 33). We here do not fully consider the dispute between Anton and Deck around the problem whether the One can be a hypostasis. But Deck seems to be on the right track at least as regards the interpretation of 20,9-15. We are totally reluctant to accept Anton's claim that the One is a hypostasis with an ἐνεργεία.

Can we regard the One as the hypostasis-less activity? Deck writes: "The One is above hypostasis and is best described, when the word 'hypostasis' is used at all, as quasi-hypostasis" (*The Structure of Being*, p. 39). His expression "quasi-hypostasis" is based on τὴν οὐν ύπόστασιν in 20,10-11. But Buchner observes that the sense of the term ύπόστασις in 20,10ff. is restricted to being (*Plotins Möglichkeitslehre*, p. 102, note 10). Buchner's observation proves to be correct as soon as we become aware of the contrast between ἐνεργεία τὴν πρῶτῃ ἄνευ οὐσίας (20,9-10) and ὑπόστασιν ἄνευ ἐνεργείας (20,11). The One can be called the activity without hypostasis at least within the context of 20,9-15. By appealing to Buchner's point, Deck could push further his thesis that the One is not properly a hypostasis.


Wallis, referring to VI 7 [38],37,15-16 and VI 9 [9],6,50-55, holds that "we may describe the One . . . as being a pure Intellectual Act prior to the emergence of subject and object in Neoplatonism, p. 59. It is indeed true that the argument for the absence of intellection from the One in VI 7 [38],37,10-16 is very proximate to that in V 6 [24],6,3-9. In the former argument, Plotinus attacks the Peripatetic claim that the first principle must think because it is activity (lines 10-11). This claim allows two disjunctive possibilities, respectively marked by μὲν (line 11) and ὃ ὃ (line 15), that the first principle is a real being always thinking (lines 11-12) and that it is itself an intellectual activity (line 15). Notice that the subject of λέγοντος in line 15 is οὐκ . . . νόσιν οὔτω δόντες τῷ λόγῳ in line 1, namely the Peripatetics. It is not Plotinus himself who identifies the Good as the pure intellectual activity in this passage. Therefore this passage can be a textual evidence for Plotinus' view, as stated also in V 6 [24],6,3-5, that any pure activity itself, conceptually differentiated from the activity or actualization of being, does not think, but not for his own identification of the One as the activity without any substantiality.

25On several occasions Plotinus denied any activity to the One (I 7 [54], 1, 17-20; III 9 [13], 9, 8-10; V 3 [49], 12, 23-24; VI 7 [38], 40, 29-30). In these sections, however, he either defines intellection as the primary activity or speaks of the general activity towards the Good. Hence this denial is not inconsistent with the identification of the One as activity without being. Bussanich states that the claims that the One is beyond activity "are usually made in contexts where the generation of Intellect is the primary focus" (The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 213).

The identification of the Good as the primary activity means that the Good is the activity, but not that it has the activity. Since the One is itself activity, it does not have another activity (V 6 [24], 6, 4-5). Therefore we are told that the One has nothing to which to direct its activity (V 3 [49], 10, 16-17) and that it has no ἐργον (VI 7 [38], 37, 28-29).

26On the close connection between the One's status as the primary activity and the double-activity theory, see J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 31, 213. The description of the One as ἐνεργεῖα μένουσα in VI 8 [39], 16, 15 seems to be based on the self-abiding of the primary activity in the double-activity theory (V 4 [7], 2, 13 ἐφ' ἐαυτοῦ μένου; 2, 33-34 μένουτος αὑτοῦ ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἔθει).

27We must also examine the claim that the One is not described as ἐνεργεῖα in the treatises except for VI 8 [39]. Buchner, overlooking V 6 [24], 6, 3-9, writes as follows:

"Die Verwirklichung bringt eine Aufspaltung in Subjekt und Objekt mit sich (wobei das Objekt das eigene Innere ist), schließt also eine vollkommene Einheitlichkeit des Wesens aus. Zudem bedeutet sie Abhängigkeit vom Erzeuger; denn nur durch das Betrachten des Oberen hat das Sein Bestand. Das Eine kann deswegen nicht Energeia sein. Denn nicht es wirkt auf Anderes, sondern dieses betätigt sich vielmehr in Richtung auf Es" (Plotins Möglichkeitslehre, p. 99 (Italics mine.)).

We should like to make two critical remarks on Buchner's claim. First, it would be true that the notion of actualization excludes the complete simplicity, since the actualization is always the actualization of something. But the One's ἐνεργεῖα is not the actualization of anything. Buchner confuses activity and actualization.

Second, it is indeed correct to say that the One does not work upon anything else. But that the One does not work does not necessarily mean that it is not an activity. The One's not working is rather based on its being the pure activity (V 6 [24], 6, 4-5). Buchner also confuses being-activity and having-activity.
28 See note 19 in Chapter II of Part I.

29 See note 41 in Chapter II of Part I.

30 See note 1 in the first chapter.


32 Intellection is for Numenius the distinctive activity of the Second God or intellect contemplating. The First God can be said to have no intellection, insofar as his doctrine of πρόσχρησις is not concerned (see E. R. Dodds, *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 14). See also H. -C. Puech, *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 51: "Il [i.e. le premier νοῦς] est purement intelligence, c'est un νοητόν et non un νοερόν." The doctrine of πρόσχρησις allows the transition of intellect at rest from non-thinking state to thinking state, so that intellect at rest can be said to have intellection in potentiality. In II 9 [33],1,23-25, Plotinus mentions the absurdity of multiplying natures by distinguishing actuality and potentiality in the realm without matter. He would here reject the Numenian-Gnostic doctrine as infringing upon the complete actuality and immutability of the intelligible world.

Needless to say, the idea of πρόσχρησις is totally incompatible with the Plotinian thesis that the One neither sees its products nor inclines to them. Wallis' observation is very instructive that "though Numenius anticipates Plotinus' doctrine of 'undiminished giving,' . . . he does not use it, unlike Plotinus, to exempt the gods from attention to their products" (*Neoplatonism*, p. 34).

The cognitive state of Numenius' First God itself remains a real enigma. Dodds maintains that the First God's "distinctive activity (or passivity) must be something other than νόησις proper" (*Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 14). But it cannot be the absolutized ἐνέργεια like the inner activity of the Plotinian One. See E. R. Dodds, *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 50: "... if he [i.e. First God] is a pure intelligence without object, how can he be περὶ τὰ νοητὰ?" Here arises another problem. The First God of Numenius is "intellect at rest" which is περὶ τὰ νοητὰ. So we wonder why his distinctive activity, as Dodds claims, is something other than intellection. Dodds takes the pronoun περὶ as exactly meaning "in relation to" (*Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 50). The relation of the static intellect to the intelligible objects can naturally be called νόησις. The real problem is how it is possible to reconcile the First God's being intellect at rest and its relation to the intelligible objects with the nature of intellection as the distinctive activity of the Second God only.

The highest deity's knowledge is real difficulty in the systems of both Plotinus and Numenius. But the fundamental nature of the problem differs in both thinkers. In Numenius, on the one hand, the First God's knowledge is the cognitive
relation of intellect at rest to the plural νοητά. In Plotinus, on the other, the One's knowledge is the specification of the unity of the One's cognitive activity and the One itself.

33This point is echoed in Plotinus' attack on the Gnostic bifurcation of intellect: "What would be the inactivity (ἀργία) (of intellect at rest), and what the work (ἐργού) of the other intellect?" (II 9 [33],1,28-29).

34Whereas First God is said to be αὐτὸν (Fr. 26, Leemans) and περὶ τὰ νοητά (Fr. 24, Leemans), it is prior to Being and Form (Fr. 25, Leemans). Dodds is annoyed by this contradiction (Les Sources de Plotin, p. 12). Wallis gives a solution to this problem: "The solution may be that Numenius, like some late Neoplatonists, regards the Forms as pre-existing in unmanifested form in the First Hypostasis, whence they are brought forth by Intelligence" (Neoplatonism, p. 34).


36Moreau observes that Plotinus' descriptions of the One's knowledge, as κατανόησις, ἐπιθελή, and ὑπερνοήσις, are the characterizations of its primitive activity without being (Plotin ou la Gloire de la Philosophie Antique, p. 88).
CHAPTER VII
THE DENIAL OF INTELLECTON AND CONSCIOUSNESS TO THE ONE IN VI 7 [38] AND V 3 [49]

Introduction

As explicated in the last two chapters, Plotinus' affirmation about the One's knowledge, which is based on its ontological status as the self-directed activity unaccompanied with being, is systematically coherent with its having no intellection. As viewed in the fourth chapter, he denies intellection to the One mainly because of its simplicity and self-sufficiency. This is also the case in the middle and the late treatises. As Armstrong notes,1 nevertheless, Plotinus' intensely active and critical mind makes him not easily satisfied with his own earlier formulations. While he has already painstakingly considered the problem concerning the absence of intellection from the One in V 6 [24], Plotinus tirelessly deals with the problem again in VI 7 [38] and V 3 [49]. In this chapter, we shall analyze his arguments in these treatises to trace the chronological development in his defense of the thesis that the One does not think.
1. The Denial of Intellection to the One in VI 7 [38], 37-39

In the final parts (chs. 37-42) of VI 7 [38], Plotinus gives a detailed account of the One's cognitive state. The substantial portion of these chapters, however, is devoted to the thoroughgoing arguments for the absence of intellection from the One, and the One's knowledge, as seen in the fifth chapter, is very briefly described in 39,1-4.

Plotinus begins his extensive discussion with the critique of the Peripatetic ascription of intellection to the first principle. He first attacks the thesis that the first principle has honor by virtue of its possessing intellection (37,3-7). This thesis robs the Good of the intrinsic value (37,8). If the first principle has the value from itself, on the contrary, it must be complete before intellection (37,9-10). This argument seems to appeal tacitly to the self-sufficiency of the Good.

In the immediately ensuing passage (37, 10-16), Plotinus criticizes the Aristotelian claim that the first principle must think because it is ἐνέργεια. The statement that the first principle is the activity allows two disjuncts. The first disjunct that the first principle is the οὐσία νοοῦσα, namely ἐνέργεια accompanied with οὐσία, infringes upon the simplicity of the first principle (37,11-14). The second disjunct that the first principle is itself pure activity and intellection entails its not thinking because intellection itself does not think (37,15-16). The Aristotelian claim is thus refuted.

This passage cannot be a textual warrant for Plotinus' own identification of the One as the activity without being. Nevertheless this argument instructs us that Plotinus really entertains two notion of ἐνέργεια; (i) the activity accompanied with being or the actualization of being, and (ii) the pure activity without or abstracted from being. These two notions are distinguished also in V 6 [24], 6,5-8; (i) corresponds to the activity directed to something else, the activity to which we can
attribute something, and (ii) corresponds to the pure activity as conceived without its substrate or the primary activity on which all other activities depend and to which nothing must be added. Intellection is denied to the Good which is categorized as the latter sort of activity. Also in this section, it is stressed that the activity itself in general does not have another activity (lines 4-5). In VI 8 [39],20,9-15, as seen in the last chapter, Plotinus remarks that the ἐνέργεια without οὐσία is consistent with the absolute simplicity, but that hypostasis with ἐνέργεια is not. Hence the present argument follows the line of the argument in V 6 [24],6,3-9 as regards the distinction of two notions of ἐνέργεια and the thesis that the activity itself does not have another activity.

But Plotinus admits that he himself places οὐσία and ἐνέργεια in the intelligible world and contrasts their multiplicity and difference with the simplicity of the Good (37,17-19). This passage includes an implicit argument for the One's having no intellection from the contrast between the One's unity and the νοῦς-νόησις duality. In the ensuing lines (37,19-24), Plotinus mentions the derivative nature of intellection and concludes to the transcendence of the One, as the cause of intellection, over Intellect. Also in VI 9 [9],6,53-55, as already seen in the second chapter, intellection is denied to the cause of intellection which is the One, on the basis of the Neoplatonic principle that the cause necessarily transcends its effect.

Also in the present treatise, Plotinus is fully aware that his persistent denial of intellection to the One would cause some pejorative conception of it:

For un-thinking Intellect, on the one hand, is unintelligent (ἀνόητος); because for that which has intellection as its nature, if it does not execute intellection, it is unintelligent (ἀνόητος). For that which has no work (ἔργον), what kind of work will someone bring to it and accuse it of the privation of work when it does not execute the work? It is as if someone says that it is not a physician (37,24-28).

Plotinus grounds the One's non-thinking on its self-sufficiency (37,28-31). The One's having no intellection surely means its having no work.6 The absence of
intellection from the One is prone to invite the accusation of its laziness. Plotinus dismisses this illicit accusation by appealing to the One's self-sufficiency and saying that the One has no need to think. In a word, the thesis that the One does not think is satisfactorily defended when it is developed into the thesis that the One has no need to think. According to the reasoning in the above passage, moreover, we cannot jump from the view that the One does not think to the conclusion that it must be ἀνόητον. The One has no nature of thinking; it transcends intellection not from outside (οὐκ ἔπακτον) (VI 8 [39],15,20-21), that is, in its own nature. For that which does not have intellection as its nature, its non-thinking does not mean its being ἀνόητον. Hence two disjunctive possibilities, about the characterization of the origative source of Intellect, mentioned in III 8 [30],9,14-15, either νοοῦν or ἀνόητον, are essentially inapplicable to the One.

The argument in 38,10-25 is a reduction from the tentative suggestion that the content of the Good's self-intellection may be "I am the Good." This supposition allows two possibilities. In the first possibility, in which intellection is itself the Good, intellection need not have the One as its object, so that the One is no longer the Good (38,18-20). In the second possibility, in which intellection directed to the Good is different from the Good itself, the Good is already prior to intellection and self-sufficient, so that it need not think itself (38,21-24). The supposition of the Good's self-intellection thus entails the absence of self-intellection from the Good.

In 39,1-4, as already seen, Plotinus elucidates the One's ἐπιθετή. After his laconic affirmation about the One's intuition, Plotinus argues for the One's having no intellection from its simplicity. Intellection always involves otherness (39,5-6). Otherness has two roles, difference which distinguishes the thinking subject and the intelligible object (39,6-7) and difference which causes all things to come to be by differentiating intelligible objects from one another (39,7-9). But otherness is
absent from the One (39,2-3), so that self-intellection is incompatible with the One's simplicity (39,11-16). Again, each intellection, insofar as it concerns the multiplicity of objects and so is manifold, is incompatible with the simple wholeness (τὸ αὐτὸ ἡνὸς) of the One (39,16-20).

We further need to scrutinize Plotinus' denial of self-intellection to the One. He writes as follows:

But we said that there is no intellection concerning him [i.e. the Good],

even if he wishes to see himself as different. But if he himself thinks, he becomes many: intelligible object, knower, mover, and whatever other things belong to Intellect (39,13-16).

The One's being unknown by intellection has the double meaning: (i) the One cannot be known by another's intellection, and (ii) intellection is not a kind of knowledge that the One may have of itself. The second sense can be explicated such that the One is not the object of intellection to itself. On the close connection between intellection and otherness, if the One is the object of its intellection, it will be dual, consisting of subject and object, and multiple, consisting of all the intelligible objects. In this connection, likewise, the One cannot be the subject of self-intellection; for in this case the One will be dual as having all the noetic objects in manifested form within itself. The conflict between the absence of otherness from the One and the involvement of otherness in intellection thus entails not only that the One cannot be the subject of intellection but that it cannot be the object of self-intellection. The latter point is not fully established in V 6 [24], where Plotinus elaborately argues for the One's having no intellection. The present argument confirms the absence of self-intellection from the One by establishing not only that the One does not think itself but that the One is not thought by itself.

The above investigation tells us that Plotinus in VI 7 [38] argues for the One's having no intellection from more diverse perspectives than in earlier treatises, though he grounds the absence of intellection from the One basically on its
simplicity and self-sufficiency. In the present treatise, as already mentioned in the fifth chapter, (i) the One's intuition, (ii) the absence of intellection from the One, and (iii) the possibility of (ii) as inviting some pejorative conception of the One enter into a single scope. The possible pejorative conception of the One is dismissed by the positive description of its cognitive state and its self-sufficiency. Such systematization of the doctrine of the One's knowledge would surely indicate the development in Plotinus' philosophy.

It must be further noticed that Plotinus also denies intellection to the soul united to the One in VI 7 [38]:

Therefore the soul does not move, then, because that Good does not move. She is, then, not even soul, because That does not live, but is beyond life. Nor is she even Intellect, because That does not think; for she must be made like that Good. It does not even think that Good, because That does not think (35,42-45, tr. J. Bussanich, adapted by A. Sumi).

In the second chapter, it was seen that Plotinus attributes νοεῖν and the ἐνεργεῖα νουῦ to the soul united with the One in VI 9 [9],9,14-17. In the present passage, on the contrary, we are explicitly told that the soul united with the One is made like the One as regards their both having no intellection. Since intellection is a kind of movement (VI 7 [38],35,1-4), the One and the soul united with it, being both free from intellection, do not move. As seen in the fifth chapter, the expression σέμουν ἱστασθαῖ is appropriate to the One's knowledge (39,28-34). Therefore the likeness of the soul in the mystic union with the One must be understood as stating that there is no intellection and complete immobility. As repeatedly mentioned, Plotinus speaks of the likeness of Intellect's hyper-noetic ἐπιστολή to the One's in III 8 [30],9,22-23. In the fifth chapter, we pointed out that the parallel is noticed among the One's knowledge, the hyper-noetic activity of Intellect, and the soul's apprehension of the One with regard to their being
described as either ἐπισχόλη or προσβολή. The parallel also holds among them with regard to their being free from intellection. Since the ἐπισχόλη or προσβολή in the former parallel is precisely hyper-noetic, the former kataphatic parallel is exactly coherent with the latter apophatic parallel.¹⁶

The corollary of the absence of intellection from the soul united with the One is the impossibility of apprehending the One by intellection. Plotinus thus remarks that no intellection concerns the One (VI 7 [38],39,13-14). In the present treatise, the meaning of νοεῖν is confined to the seeing of the Forms within Intellect (35,31-32). The thesis that intellection concerns the multiplicity of the intelligible objects and so is manifold justifies both the unknowability of the One by intellection and the absence of intellection from the One. The One’s being not the subject of intellection and its being not the object of intellection, whether to itself or to others, are thus systematically related to one another by the nature of intellection as always directed to the multiple wholeness.
2. The "Persuasive Argument" in VI 7 [38],40-41

After concluding his demonstrative arguments for the absence of intellection from the One, Plotinus finds it necessary to make sure that the One does not think and attempts to add some "encouragement (παραμυθία)" and to mix "persuasion (πειθώ)" with the logical necessity of the demonstrative arguments (42,2-5). In VI 7 [38],40-41, the absence of intellection from the One is not established through a demonstrative argument.

In 40,5-18, Plotinus distinguishes two kinds of intellection, the fully actual intellection as the actualization of the intelligible entity and the pre-noetic intellection as the power of generating being. His references to the latter as η νόησις (40,10-11) certainly deviates not only from his earlier definition of νοεῖν as the seeing of the intelligible objects (35,22) but from his general terminological tendency in the middle and the late treatises. The pre-noetic intellection is defined as the primary activity and the image of the Good (40,18-22). From the definition of the pre-noetic intellection as the primary activity and the primary intellection, it is concluded that neither intellection nor activity is present in the Good prior to the pre-noetic activity of Intellect (40,23-32).

In the second persuasive argument (40,32-43), Plotinus appeals to the inferiority of intellection concerning the Good to the Good itself. He also here deviates from his formal formulation in tentatively admitting the knowability of the Good by intellection (40,34-35).

In the third persuasive argument (40,43-56), it is stressed that two sorts of intellection mentioned in the first persuasive argument, the fully actual and the pre-noetic intellections, are caused by that which is prior to them. Any intellection must therefore be absent from the highest, uncaused One.
In 41,1-9, finally, Plotinus compares intellection to the eye and light given to inferior entities. The One as light itself needs no intellection, just as light does not seek light.

In 41,9-22, Plotinus ruminates that the absence of self-intellection and self-consciousness (σώμεσιν αὐτοῦ, 41,20) from the One is due to its absolute simplicity and self-sufficiency. Intellect must always possess self-consciousness in order to be one with intellection (41,19-21). But the One does not seek itself and thereby is self-sufficient to be greater than γνώσις, νοησις, and συναισθησις (41,25-27). Plotinus here repeats the argument in V 6 [24],5,1-5, where Intellect's συναισθησις of itself is linked with its seeking after itself and is thus denied to the One. In VI 7 [38], συναισθησις is employed for describing Intellect's consciousness of its being filled with all the Forms (16,19-20; 35,31-32) and clearly implies a multiplicity. It is hence evidently inappropriate to the One.19

Plotinus concludes his long consideration of the cognitive state of the One by alluding to Pann. 142a3-4; neither λόγος nor αἰσθησις nor ἐπιστήμη is present in the One (41,37-38). The allusion adumbrates the connection of the absence of intellection from the One with the One’s ineffability. This connection, as we shall see in the next section, becomes explicit in V 3 [49],13.
3. The Denial of Intellection and Consciousness to the One in V 3 [49]

The treatise "On the Knowing Hypostases and That Which Is Beyond" (V3 [49]) was written towards the end of the life of Plotinus. The treatise is roughly divided into two parts. In the first part (chs. 1-9), Plotinus deals with the true definition of self-knowledge; as seen in Chapter III of Part I, he, in the fifth chapter, elaborately argues for the possibility of self-intellection in terms of the intellect-intelligible identity and places true self-knowledge on the level of Intellect. The second part (chs. 10-17) is concerned with the need to go beyond Intellect to find the first principle as the soul's true end.

The absence of intellection from the One is thematically discussed in the thirteenth chapter. Before his extensive discussion, Plotinus briefly mentions the One's having no intellection in two places. In 10,46-50, the absolutely simple One is said to have no need to seek itself, so that γνῶσις, which is a kind of longing (πόθος τις) for the absent, is not present in the One. In 11,25-30, again, we are told that since Intellect is many, the One must be beyond Intellect.20 In both passage, Plotinus appeals to the absolute simplicity of the One as he usually does elsewhere.

In V 3 [49], 13, we come across the difficult passage to which several critics usually refer in treating the One's knowledge:

But when we raise the difficulty "Then it [i.e. the One] has no perception of itself (ἀναίσθητου ... ἐαυτοῦ) and is not even conscious of itself (οὐδὲ παρακολουθοῦν ἑαυτῷ) and does not even know itself (οὐδὲ οἴδειν αὑτό)," we should consider that by saying this we are turning ourselves round and going in the opposite direction (13,6-9, tr. A. H. Armstrong).

What is Plotinus saying here? Rist comments on this passage as follows:

What this appears to mean is that one must not jump from the view that the One has no συναίσθησις of itself to the conclusion that it must be ἀναίσθητον or from the view that it has no νόησις to the conclusion that it is ἀνόητον. If this is the sense of the passage, however, Plotinus has obscured his meaning in the rest of the chapter by insisting that the One
has no συναισθησις or νόησις but not examining the related question of whether it is therefore ἀναίσθητου or ἀνόητου.\textsuperscript{21}

Is Rist's interpretation convincing enough? It is indeed true that Plotinus denies intellection to the One also in 13,16-19 and 13,34-36. Since intellection is defined in terms of συναισθησις in 13,12-13, it is natural to think that συναισθησις is also denied to the One. In fact, Plotinus elsewhere rejects the move from the One's having no intellection to the conclusion that it is surrounded by ἄγνωσ (VI 9 [9],6,46-50) and to the conclusion that it is ἀνόητου (VI 7 [38],37,24-28). In the present passage, however, the word ἀνόητου does not occur. To call the One ἄνοητου is to conceive it as inactive, so that Plotinus definitely remarks that the One is not ἄνοητου (V 4 [7],2,15). But the sections οὐδὲ παρακολούθουν ἐαυτῷ and οὐδὲ οἴδειν αὐτό in the present passage can hardly be regarded as a pejorative conception of the One; for Plotinus holds that the One has no consciousness, οὐδὲ αὐτῇ [sc. παρακολούθησις] ἐσται, in III 9 [13],9,16, and that it does not know itself, μὴ οἴδειν ἐαυτόν, in V 6 [24],6,31. The meaning of the present passage does not seem to be as straightforward as Rist takes it.

In order to take the exact sense of the passage in question, we must pay attention to the context. In the opening part of V 3 [49],13, Plotinus speaks of the One's ineffability:

It [i.e. the One] is, therefore, truly ineffable: for whatever you say about it, you will always be speaking of "something." But "beyond all things and beyond the supreme majesty of Intellect" is the only one of all the ways of speaking of it which is true; it is not its name, but says that it is not one of all things and "has no name," because we can say nothing of it: we only try, as far as possible, to make signs to ourselves about it (13,1-6, tr. A. H. Armstrong).\textsuperscript{22}

From this passage, it becomes clear that οὖν in 13,7 marks the response to the expression of the One as ἐπέκεινα πάντων καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ σημνοτάτου νοοῦ (13,2-3). Hence the passage in question would be better taken to mean that we are
prone to be perplexed by the absence of self-knowledge and self-consciousness from the One, which necessarily results from the One's transcendence, over Intellect, representing its ineffability.

We must further read the passage immediately ensuing 13,6-9:

For (γὰρ) we are making it [i.e. the One] many when we make it object of knowledge (γνωστόν) and knowledge (γνώσις), and attributing intellection (νοείν) to it we make it need intellection: even if intellection is with it, intellection will be superfluous to it (13.9-12, tr. A. H. Armstrong).

In light of γὰρ in 13,9, the section έαυτοὺς περιτρέπομεν επὶ τάναντία (13,9-9) means πολὺ . . . αὐτὸ ποιοῦμεν (13,9) and δεῖσθαι τοῦ νοείν ποιοῦμεν (13,10-11). To make the absolutely simple and self-sufficient One many and deficient precisely indicates to turn ourselves towards the opposite direction, namely the wrong direction. The embarrassment that "the One has no perception of itself and is not even conscious of itself and does not even know itself" arises from the uncritical, tacit assumption that it must possess self-knowledge and self-consciousness. This assumption, based on the misunderstanding of the true nature of the One, unmistakably leads us to "the opposite direction" by ascribing γνώσις, νόησις, and συναίσθησις to the One.

In conclusion, the meaning of the passage in 13,6-9 is that we need not be perplexed by the absence of intellection, intellectual knowledge, and consciousness from the One, which is the necessary consequence of the description of the One, coherent with its ineffability, as beyond all things and Intellect. The reason why we need not be annoyed, as signaled by γὰρ in 13,12, is explained in 13,12-21; the definition of intellection as the συναίσθησις τοῦ ὁλου points to the inner multiplicity of Intellect (13,12-16), so that the altogether simple and self-sufficient One does not need intellection (13,16-21). In the present passage, as in VI 7 [38],41,37-38, the absence of intellection and consciousness from the One is closely
connected with the One’s ineffability. This connection is not fully developed in earlier treatises. Therefore, although Plotinus elsewhere dismisses the move from the One’s having no intellection to its being ἀνόητον or being surrounded by ἀγνωστα, the similar kind of reasoning is not mentioned in the present passage.\(^\text{24}\)

The examination of the problem whether the One is ἀναίσθητον or ἀνόητον is not the theme in V 3 [49],13. Rist’s observation that "Plotinus has obscured his meaning in the rest of the chapter" is inaccurate. On the contrary, Plotinus clarifies his meaning in the rest of the chapter by explaining the reason why we need not be perplexed by the absence of intellectual knowledge and consciousness from the One.

The definition of intellection as the συναισθησις τοῦ ὅλου leads not only to the One’s having no intellection but to its being unknown by intellection (οὔτ’ οὐν αὐτὸ νοεῖν οὔτ’ ἐστι νόησις αὐτοῦ, 13,36).\(^\text{25}\) In V 3 [49], the connection between intellection and multiplicity is repeatedly stressed, so that the sense of νόησις is confined solely to the contemplation of the Forms as is in VI 7 [38]. Hence νόησις no longer refers to the inchoate Intellect as it does in the early treatises:

Therefore the thinker must apprehend one thing different from another and the object of thought in being thought must contain variety; or there will not be an intellection of it [i.e. the One], but only a touch and a sort of contact without speech and intellection (θείες καὶ οἷον ἐπαφὴ μόνον ἀφητος καὶ ἀνόητος), pre-thinking (προνοούσα) because Intellect has not yet come into being and that which touches does not think (10,40-44, tr. A. H. Armstrong, adapted by A. Sumi).\(^\text{26}\)

The pre-noetic apprehension is characterized as ἐβλεπεν ἀνόητως in VI 7 [38],16,14. The unknowability of the One by intellection at the same time means that νόησις cannot be ascribed to the eternally pre-noetic phase of Intellect. In other words, νοεῖν is no longer an apt description of Intellect’s relation to the One in VI 7 [38] and V 3 [49],\(^\text{27}\) so that there is no room in these treatises for the expression of the One as τὸ νοητόν. The disappearance of the references to the
One as τὸ νοητὸν and to the inchoate Intellect as νόησις in later treatises seems to be due to the full development of the connection between intellection and multiplicity in these treatises. Therefore the conception of intellection as multiple proves to play an important role in Plotinus' doctrine of the One's cognitive state; it not only insures the absence of intellection from the One but makes it impossible to describe the One as τὸ νοητὸν. If the One can no more be referred to as τὸ νοητὸν, Plotinus has no need to put a proviso that it is not necessary for every νοητὸν to have intellection as he actually does in V 6 [24],2,4-5. The disappearance of the reference to the One as such, to this extent, really confirms the One's having no intellection. With regard to this disappearance, in addition to the variety of the viewpoints of arguments, Plotinus' denial of intellection to the One surely develops in his later treatises.

As pointed out in Chapter I of Part I, moreover, the question of whether the Idea of the Good can be known by νόησις is left unanswered in Plato's Republic. Plotinus' description of the inchoate Intellect and the eternal activity of Intellect towards the One as νόησις in V 6 [24] and earlier treatises would not enable him to give a definite answer to this question. With the univocal sense of intellection as necessarily concerning the multiplicity in VI 7 [38] and V 3 [49], Plotinus can now answer to the question; his answer must be definitely negative.

In his last treatise, Plotinus associates the One's self-remaining with its transcendence over Intellect and intellection (I 7 [54],1,19-20). The thesis that the One does not think, the thesis which may determine the fundamental structure of the philosophy of Plotinus, has been consistently maintained to the end.
NOTES


2This is Aristotle’s own claim in *Met.* 1074b20-21 (διὰ γὰρ τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει).


4See also VI 9 [9],6,53-54 νόησις δὲ οὐ νοεῖ.

5See note 23 in the sixth chapter.

6In the present passage, Plotinus does not reject the One’s *being* an ἐνέργεια, but its *having* any work. As repeatedly remarked, the One’s *having* neither activity nor work is sufficiently compatible with its *being* itself the activity.

7In VI 9 [9],6,46-50, as seen in the second chapter, Plotinus attempts to dismiss the move from the One’s having no intellection to its being ignorant by appealing to the One’s unity. The thesis that the One does not need self-intellection is here founded on the One’s simplicity (lines 49-50).

8Since this argument has already been considered in the fifth chapter, we shall review it only briefly in the present chapter.

9On these two roles of difference, see also V 1 [10],4,37-40.

10Since ἐλέγομεν in 39,13 refers back to 38,21-24, τούτοις in 39,14, in light of τῆς νοησεως τῆς περὶ αὐτοῦ in 38,24, is the objective genitive. See also 39,12 τὴν νόησιν τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ.

11This point is briefly mentioned in V 6 [24],2,9. In this treatise, however, the sense of intellection is not restricted to the contemplation of the Forms as in VI 7 [38].

12Also in III 8 [30],11,13-16, Plotinus argues for the One’s having no intellection from its self-sufficiency.

13With Bussanich and Cilento, we regard the subject of νοεῖ in 35,45 as
the One. Theiler deletes ὅτι οὐδὲ νοεῖ (35,44-45) on the ground that it is a variant of ὅτι μηδέ νοεῖ in 35,44 (see *Plotins Schriften*, 3b:510-511). But Plotinus here stresses that the soul must be like the Good in her union with it (35,44). Hence the statement that soul does not think the Good since it does not think reveals her likeness to the Good with respect to the absence of intellection and thereby is not redundant.

The sentence νοεῖ δὲ οὐδ' ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι οὐδὲ νοεῖ (35,44-45) is variously interpreted. The translation in H-S, followed by Armstrong, reads: "anima ne illud quidem cogitat se ne cogitare quidem." Preller emends νοεῖ in 35,45 to νοεῖται, adopted by Bréhier and MacKenna. These interpretations, however, do not sufficiently explicate the soul’s likeness to the Good.

Nevertheless νόησις is denied to the soul united with the One in VI 9 [9],11,11.

See also J. Bussanich, *The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, p. 185: "It [i.e. the soul] is also like the One in that it transcends κύισις and νόησις." For the immobility of the soul united with the One, see also VI 9 [9],11,13-14 ἡσυχα ἐν ἐρήμῳ καὶ καταστάσει γεγένηται άτρεμε& and 11,15-16 ἐστῶς πάντη καὶ οὖν στάσις γένομενος.

In the fifth chapter, we distinguished the vehemently dynamic ἐπιβολή of the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect from the static ἐπιβολή of the One. But this point does not denote the inconsistency of these parallels. The dynamicity is associated with the ἐπιβολή and its cognates attributed to Intellect, when they occur in the passages dealing with the transformative moment from the normal state to the mystic union (III 8 [30],9,21-22; V 5 [32],10,7-8; VI 7 [38],35,21). In the passage dealing with the soul’s mystic union, on the contrary, her προσβολή is related to ἀναπαύεσθαι (III 8 [30],10,32-34). The hyper-noetic ἐπιβολή of Intellect and the soul as the cognitive activity during the mystic union transcends movement. As regards the cognitive activities of the One, Intellect, and the soul in the mystic union, therefore, the kataphatic parallel is coherent with the apophatic parallel in respect of their transcending not only intellection but movement.

For the juxtaposition between παραμυθία and πειθώ, see also VI 5 [23],11,6-7. They are contrasted with the λόγος (line 3) and ἀποδείξεις (lines 4-5). For the contrast between ἀνάγκη and πειθώ, see V 3 [49],6,10-11 and VI 4 [22],4,4-6.

Intellection concerning the Good (ἡ νόησις . . . ἀγαθοῦ, 40,32) in the present persuasive argument is the pre-noetic intellection in the previous persuasive argument. Compare 40,37 ὡμοῦ ἡ νόησις ἔσται καὶ ἡ οὐσία with 40,15 σύνεστι καὶ
In the middle and the late treatises, Plotinus does not use συναίσθησις to describe the One’s awareness. We agree with Bussanich’s view that great importance must not be attached to this fact (*The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, p. 25). Nevertheless the attribution of a sort of συναίσθησις to the One does not seem to be viable in the middle and the late treatises. As pointed out in the fifth chapter, Plotinus’ application ἐπιβολή and its cognates to the One, the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect and the inchoate Intellect in the middle and the late treatises represents his intentions of stressing the likeness of the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect to the One and of distinguishing their cognitive activities from intellection proper. For achieving the former intention, it is necessary to apply the same terminology to the One and the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect. Plotinus ascribes οἶον συναίσθησις to the One in V 4 [7],2,18. As remarked in the first chapter, the implication of the term as the concentration into the self-unity comes to the fore when it is applied to the One. In this respect, οἶον συναίσθησις of the One seems to be compatible with its ἐπιβολή in VI 7 [38],39,1-4. Although Plotinus nowhere applies συναίσθησις to the hyper-noetic activity of Intellect, the word σύνεσις, which is synonymous with συναίσθησις, is used of the hyper-noetic apprehension of the One (VI 9 [9],4,2; VI 7 [38],31,33; 33,27; see also III 8 [30],10,34 συμεναί). In addition to the kinship between the One’s οἶον συναίσθησις and the hyper-intellective σύνεσις directed to the One, the One’s κατανόησις (V 4 [7],2,17) and the comparison of the soul’s union with the One to the relationship of τὸ νοοῦν to τὸ κατανοοῦμενον (VI 9 [9],8,26) would perhaps suggest that Plotinus has already entertained the terminological affinity between the One and the hyper-noetic activity of Intellect and the soul in his early treatises. But, insofar as συναίσθησις is proper to self-intellection, the application of the word to the One and to the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect is definitely against Plotinus’ intention of distinguishing their cognitive activities from intellection proper. In VI 7 [38], nevertheless, σύνεσις is employed to describe not only self-intellection (41,20) but the soul’s apprehension of the One (31,33; 33,27). But their modes are clearly distinct in that the former is self-reflexive and the latter is self-transcending. Moreover, σύνεσις is not to be attributed to "Intellect in love"; the sober implication of the word would certainly be repugnant to that Intellect’s being ἀφρων (35,24). Plotinus, in the present treatise, seems to be persistently conscious of his intention to distinguish the cognitive activities of the One and the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect terminologically from intellection proper.

Armstrong translates πληθύει (11,27) "which makes it many." He confuses πληθύει and πληθύνει; the latter occurs in 11,3 and 11,5. While the codices of the group x have θύει in 11,27, no codex has πληθύνει there.

22] On the One's ineffability, see also V 5 [32],6,1-15 and VI 9 [9],4,11-12.

23] The sense of ἐπὶ τὰναντία in the present text is proximate to the phrase in VI 5 [23],12,28 and is well contrasted with that in V 1 [10],1,24.

24] The section ἀναίσθητον οὖν . . . οὐδὲ οἶδεν οὐτό (13,6-8) expresses the content of our perplexity (ἀπορῶμεν, 13,6), but not Plotinus' own position. Therefore this section does not warrant that Plotinus employs ἀναίσθητον for the One and so is not inconsistent with the description of the One as οὐκ οἶδον ἀναίσθητον in V 4 [7],2,15.

25] On the unknowability of the One by intellection, see also 13,32-33 ἡ ἔρημον καὶ μόνον ἔσνεν ἑθελήσῃς λαβεῖν, οὐ νοήσεις.

26] Deck observes that Plotinus talks about the One's self-contact in this passage (*Nature, Contemplation, and the One: A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus*, p. 18). We cannot see how such an interpretation is possible.

As Theiler and Beutler point out (*Plotins Schriften*, 5b:381), Plotinus implies πρὸ νοῆς by προνοεῖν in 13,43. In ascribing προνοεῖν to the henads, Proclus also invokes the same implication of the verb (*Elementatio Theologica*, prop. 120, demonstration). The anonymous commentator on the *Parmenides*, whom Hadot identifies as Porphyry, follows the same line and attributes προεύνουα to the One (Fr. 2,20, Hadot). But the One's προεύνου, briefly mentioned in VI 7 [38],39,26-27, would not be credited with such implication.

27] Schwyzer maintains as follows: "Allerdings darf man diese Beziehung nicht mehr als ein νοης bezeichnen, sondern nur noch als ein ἐφάπτεσθαι, ein θηγγάνειν" (*Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 419).

28] The description of the pre-noetic activity as ἡ νόηςεις in VI 7 [38],40,10-11, as already mentioned, is an exception justifiable by the fact that the context is the παραμύθῳα and the πειθώ.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

Introduction

As proclaimed in the introduction to Part II, the passages relevant to the problem of the One's knowledge have been analyzed from two points of view, systematic and chronological. As for the systematic structure of and the chronological development in Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge, therefore, we must summarize our inquiry. Moreover, we shall see the exact locus of the doctrine in the history of Greek philosophy by summarizing our inquiry in Part I and Part II together.
1. The Systematic Structure of Plotinus' Doctrine of the One's Knowledge

Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge, consistently in earlier and later treatises, consists of three basic theses. First, the One's knowledge and consciousness are totally, even conceptually, indistinguishable from the One itself in virtue of its absolute simplicity or the absence of otherness from it (V 4 [7],2,17; VI 7 [38],39,2-4; VI 8 [39],16,31-32; 16,35). Second, the One's knowledge is always in rest (V 4 [7],2,18; VI 7 [38],39,28; VI 8 [39],16,25). Finally, the One's knowledge is the specification of its reversion towards itself (V 1 [10],6,18; VI 8 [39],16,24), so that the One may have the consciousness of its δύναμις, which is in no way related to its external effects. The ontological status of the One as the primary ἐνέργεια without οὐσία (VI 8 [39],20,9-10) serves as the foundation for the affirmations about the One's knowledge and consciousness. The aforementioned theses are based on this ontological status; the first and the third theses are based on the ἐνέργεια πρὸς αὐτόν which is entirely identified with the One itself (16,28-29), and the second thesis on the ἐνέργεια μένουσα (16,15). The ontological status of the One as the primary activity without being also serves as the ground for the account of the genesis of Intellect in terms of the double-activity theory, hence as the pivot in Plotinus' doctrine of procession.

Both the undifferentiatedness of the One's knowledge from the One itself and its ontological status as the hyper-ontic activity are fully consistent with the absolute simplicity of the One, which is the fundamental thesis in the philosophy of Plotinus. In V 4 [7],2,15-19, Plotinus ascribes knowledge and consciousness to the One by reason of its self-sufficiency. The self-sufficiency of the One is based on its absolute unity (VI 9 [9],6,16-26). His attribution of cognitive activity to the One is hence ultimately rooted in the One's simplicity. Intellection, sharply contrasted with the One's knowledge, is not purely simple, since it presupposes the duality of
thinking subject and object thought and always is directed to the multiplicity of the intelligible objects. In arguing for the absence of intellection from the One, Plotinus normally appeals to the One's simplicity and self-sufficiency. The ascription of some hyper-noetic activity and the denial of intellection to the One systematically cohere with one another in virtue of the mediation by its simplicity and self-sufficiency.

The ontological status of the One as the primary activity without being is also coherent with the absence of intellection from the One. Intellection is always the activity with being or the actualization of being. Intellect's activity is dual, directed both to itself and to the One. Even the eternally pre-noetic activity of Intellect, directed to the One, is in and with being (VI 7[38],40,15). Hence intellectual activity cannot be purely one. Furthermore, the self-directed intellectual activity is a movement which has the Form as its limit (VI 2[43],8,23-24) and the eternally pre-noetic activity is movement towards the Good (V 6[24],5,8-9), whereas the One's knowledge is eternally in rest. Finally, the pre-noetic activity is the reversion towards the originative principle of Intellect (VI 9[9],2,35-36) and thereby said to be directed to something else (εἰς ὄλλο, V 6[24],6,5), whereas the One always turns inward to nothing else than itself. The One's activity, thus distinguished from noetic activity, cannot be called intellection. Again, no pure activity has another activity. The ontological status of the One as the hyper-ontic, primary activity, consistent with the One's simplicity, therefore serves as the ground not only for the ascription of the hyper-noetic knowledge to the One but for the denial of intellection to it. The ascription and the denial are coherently mediated also by the ontological status of the One as such.

In addition to the systematic consistency between the ascription of the hyper-noetic activity and the denial of intellection to the One, Plotinus always employs careful qualifications or technical terms in attributing the hyper-noetic activity to the One. In V 4[7],2,17-19, he qualifies the One's κατανοήσις by the
Plotinus’ frequent denial of intellection to the One is very prone to invite some misinterpretation of his doctrine of the One. He is himself aware of this possibility. Plotinus is hence forced to undermine the illicit move from the claim that the One has neither νόησις nor συναίσθησις to the conclusion that it must be ἀνόητος and ἀναίσθητος. He dismisses this sort of reasoning by noting that the notion of ἀγνοεῖα is totally inapplicable to that which is entirely simple (VI 9 [9], 6, 46-50) and that the word ἀνόητος is irrelevant to that which has no intellection in its nature (VI 7 [38], 37, 24-28). The One’s self-sufficiency, which is the quintessential mark of the ultimate Good, enables one to say that the One not only does not think but also does not need intellection, and the inner plenitude of the One, which represents its self-sufficiency, really denotes that it is not ἀναίσθητος (V 4 [7], 2, 15). The positive description of the One’s cognitive state, all the more, can readily dismiss the misconstruction that the One must be ἀνόητος or ἀναίσθητος. Again, the ontological status of the One as the primary activity without being really eliminates any conception of it as inactive, the conception which may compromise the role of the One as the productive power of all things in the doctrine of procession. Therefore the systematic consistency between the ascription of the hyper-noetic activity and the denial of intellection and intellectual consciousness to the One must be understood in such a way that the former not only is logically and descriptively coherent with the latter but also satisfactorily undermines any pejorative conception of the One that the extreme negativity of the language used in the latter is prone to cause.

Finally, the doctrine of the One’s knowledge is inseparably connected not only with the doctrine of procession but with the doctrines of Intellect’s relation to
the One and of Intellect's self-thinking. For the notion of self-intellection to be complete, the intelligible objects, identical with the noetic agent, must be conceived as living and thinking. Intellect thinks within itself those objects which it receives from the One through its eternal reversion to it. Therefore the notion of self-intellection necessarily demands the conception of the originative source, of the intelligible objects, as living and being active. In Plotinus, the self-thinking principle cannot be the highest, but rather necessitates something which makes self-intellection possible by giving the active and living intelligible objects from itself, insofar as it thinks the multiplicity of those objects. The thesis that the multiplicity of the intelligible objects must be referred back to the simple origin, of course, is based on the Plotinian principle of the ontological priority of one to many.

The observation has traditionally been dominant that Plotinus' talk of the One's knowledge and consciousness in V 4 [7],2,15-19 represents his early uncritical attitude possibly influenced by Numenius. But our inquiry shows that his description in this text, however not highly technical in terminology, is fully coherent with his denial of intellection to the One and with his other doctrines. The view that Plotinus' positive description of the One's knowledge reflects his uncritical attitude or is at best an insignificant appendix seems to arise from the preconception that his doctrine of the One is characterized exclusively as negative theology.
2. The Chronological Development in Plotinus' Doctrine of the One's Knowledge

As a matter of fact, Plotinus positively and formally describes the One's cognitive state in only two places, V 4 [7],2,15-19 and VI 7 [38],39,1-4. Whereas the One's knowledge is associated with its self-sufficiency in the former context, the affirmation about the One's knowledge, the denial of intellection to the One, and the possibility of the denial's causing some misconception about the One enter into a single scope in the latter context. Such a difference in degree of systematization, however, would not be exhausted by the difference in their contexts. The terms describing the One's knowledge differ in both passages; Plotinus employs κατανόησις and νόησις with the qualification ἐτερῶς ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν in the former, and ἐπιφολή and ἐπιφάλλευ in the latter. The description of the One's knowledge by noetic terminology does not seem to be fully viable in the midst of the argument for the absence of intellection from the One.4

The chronological shift from noetic terminology to ἐπιφολή and its cognates occurs also for the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect, the inchoate Intellect, and the soul united with the One. In earlier treatises, on the one hand, Plotinus describes Intellect's relation to the One as νοεῖν (V 6 [24],5 passim), refers to the inchoate Intellect as νόησις (V 4 [7],2,4; V 1 [10],7,11), and ascribes νοεῖν or κατανοεῖπα to the soul united with the One (VI 9 [9],8,26-27; 9,14-15). In later treatises, on the other hand, he attributes ἐπιφολή to the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect (VI 7 [38],35,21), ἐπιφάλλευ to the inchoate Intellect (V 3 [49],11,2; 11,13), employs ἐπιφολή (III 8 [30],9,21-22), προσβολή (III 8 [30],10,33; V 5 [32],7,8) and προσβάλλευ (V 5 [32],10,7-8; V 3 [49],10,31) in the general contexts dealing with the apprehension of the One by Intellect or the soul. In later treatises, moreover, earlier terminology proves to be no longer viable when we consider the fact that the pre-noetic vision concerning the One and the hyper-noetic contact with
it are expressed as ἀνόητος (VI 7 [38],16,14; V 3 [49],10,43). In III 8 [30],9,22-23, Plotinus remarks about the affinity of Intellect’s ἐπιστολή to the One’s. The above mentioned fact would suggest that he entertains terminological similarity between the One’s knowledge and the hyper-noetic cognition of Intellect and the soul already in earlier treatises. The terminological shift in the One’s knowledge synchronizes with those in the pre-noetic and the hyper-noetic relation of Intellect to the One and in the cognition of the soul’s apprehension of the One. This synchronization certainly implies that the terminology for the One’s cognitive activity is not arbitrarily chosen, but always has a systematic bearing upon the terminology for the hyper-noetic and the pre-noetic cognitions of Intellect and the soul.

Why has the terminological change happened? There seem to be two reasons. One reason is due to the characteristics of the word ἐπιστολή and its cognates themselves. Since the term ἐπιστολή is based on its root meaning of "throwing on" and so has some proximity to the word ἐπιστροφή which originally means "turning towards," the One’s ἀπλή τις ἐπιστολή πρὸς αὐτόν (VI 7 [38],39,1-2) can cognitively specify its eternal reversion towards itself (ἐπιστροφήντος ἀεὶ ἕκείνου πρὸς αὐτό, V 1 [10],6,18), which represents its ἐνέργεια πρὸς αὐτόν (VI 8 [39],16,28) and is informally and untechnically rendered as ἡ νεύσις πρὸς αὐτόν (16,24). The application of the term to the One thus enables us to describe the incomprehensible interiority and depth of the One (16,12; 18,3). Second, as shown in the fifth chapter, ἐπιστολή and its cognates well describe the traits of the apprehension of the One by Intellect and the soul. Finally, since ἐπιστολή and its cognates have no etymological bearing on νόησις, the attribution of the word to the One goes well with the absence of intellection from it. Moreover, the ascription of these words to the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect and the inchoate Intellect clearly demarcates their activities from intellection proper.
Another reason is the chronological change in Plotinus' use of the word νόησις. The One is described as τὸ νοητόν to Intellect in earlier treatises (V 4 [7],2,4ff.; V 6 [24],2,4ff.), but no longer in later treatises. The early reference to the inchoate Intellect as νόησις (V 4 [7],2,4; V 1 [10],7,11) also disappears in later treatises. Their disappearances exactly synchronize with one another. In later treatises, Plotinus no longer employs νόησις or νοεῖν to describe Intellect’s relation to the One and stresses the necessary connection between intellection and multiplicity or otherness to restrict the sense of νόησις solely to the contemplation of the intelligible objects. Such restriction of the meaning of intellection does not allow for the expression of the One as τὸ νοητόν. As already mentioned, Intellect's hyper-noetic apprehension of the One is the likeness to the One's cognitive activity. If the word νόησις ceases to refer to the eternally pre-noetic activity of Intellect, the One’s knowledge is no longer described by noetic terminology. Consequently, the shift in the use of the term νόησις at the same time causes the disappearance of the description of the One as τὸ νοητόν and the shift in the terminology for the One’s knowledge. This major shift from the usage of earlier treatises to that of later treatises seems to have occurred during the period before V 6 [24] was written and after III 8 [30] was written. Moreover, the thesis that intellection is the pluralized vision concerning the Forms not only completes the absence of intellection from the One in such a way that the One cannot be the object of self-intellection nor even its subject, but also implies that intellection cannot apprehend the absolutely simple One in its simplicity. In later treatises, hence, the absence of intellection from the One and the unknowability of the One by intellection tend to be systematically related to one another through the univocal notion of intellection as always concerning multiplicity.

We will understand the significance of the disappearance of the reference to the One as τὸ νοητόν as soon as we see its philosophical advantages. First the
equivocalness of τὸ νοητὸν can be avoided when it solely refers to the complex of the Forms. At the same time, the equivocalness of νόησις can be avoided since it comes to mean solely self-intellection or the contemplation of the intelligible objects. Second, the unknowability of the One by intellection can be established without the slightest confusion. Although the One as τὸ νοητὸν is precisely correlative to the hyper-noetic or eternally pre-noetic νόησις, the description of the One as such is very prone to imply its knowability by intellection proper. In earlier treatises, however, Plotinus explicitly maintains the unknowability of the One by intellection proper (VI 9 [9],4,2-3; 11,11). Hence the expression of the One as τὸ νοητὸν is very likely to be felt contradictory with the insistence on its unknowability by intellection proper in earlier treatises. Finally, τὸ νοητὸν, which is beyond Intellect and has no intellectual agent within itself, is somehow prone to be conceived as inactive and lifeless. If τὸ νοητὸν ceases to mean the One, there remains no room for the conception of it as the inactive νοητὸν. In other words, the disappearance of the reference to the One as such also contributes to the dismissing of the pejorative conception of the One.

Plotinus does not abruptly begin the technical use of ἐπιβολή and its cognates in III 8 [30]. He already employs ἐπιβολή in the context dealing with the soul’s contemplation of the intelligible world in IV 4 [28],1,19-20 and 2,12-14. A more prominent bud of the terminological shift would be the reference to the One as τὸ ἐπιβολλοῦν in relation to Intellect at V 6 [24],2,10. The verb ἐπιβολάλλειν is, however, non-technically used for the description of the contemplation of the ultimate Beauty in the very early treatise (I 6 [1],9,29-30). In earlier treatises, these terms have been dormantly awaiting their technical employment in later treatises.
3. The Plotinian One and Greek Philosophy

In the historical background of Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge, there are two problems left unresolved in Plato's dialogues, the *Republic* and the *Sophist*. One problem is what kind of relation between intellect and the Form satisfies the fundamental theses of the theory of Forms, the Forms' immutability and complete intelligibility. Plotinus replies to this problem by the intellect-intelligible unity. He pushes the identity further and conceives the intelligible objects as themselves thinking and living. Such a conception of the Forms brings the notion of self-intellection to completion and dismisses the Middle Platonic view, of the Forms as divine νοηματα, which Plato himself would not admit. Another problem is then how we must characterize, positively and negatively, the Form of the Good from which the Forms thus conceived are derived. The Idea of the Good is laden not only with the role of cause of the Forms' knowability but with the role of cause of their substantiality. If the Forms were to be living and thinking, their originative principle should be neither inactive nor lifeless. Envisioning the Platonic Idea of the Good in this direction, Plotinus positively characterizes the One as the primary activity without being. The One's knowledge is nothing else than the cognitive specification of its ontological status as such. The Form of the Good is already in Plato said to transcend οὐσία (Rep. 509b9-10). The proposed conception of the Good must thus also involve the extremely negative language which denies of it all the perfection attached to being. Plotinus' persistent denial of intellection to the One represents the negative aspect of the Good's transcendence over being, and his affirmation about the One's knowledge the positive aspect.

Plotinus' endeavor to solve the aforementioned problems does not remain within the bounds of a simply interpretive attempt to resolve the problems of Plato's dialogues. The defense of the fundamental theses of the theory of Forms is
necessary for the safeguarding of the very possibility of philosophy and other significant discourse (Parm. 135b5-c3). Moreover, the account for the Idea of the Good in the metaphor of the Sun in the Republic, however metaphorical, embodies Plato's identification of the true cause as the good in the Phaedo (98e1-99b6). Hence the general quest of the true cause, which is one of the fundamental problems of philosophy, underlies the second problem. The two problems, which constitutes the background of Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge, are thus precisely the fundamental problems of philosophy.
NOTES

1In his epistle to Porphyry, Amelius reports that the people from Greece attack Plotinus by saying that his fundamental principles are the meanest of real beings (Vita Plotini 17,22-24). Armstrong regards this accusation as "the result of a misunderstanding . . . of the extreme negativity of the language which he sometimes uses about the One or Good" (Plotinus, 1:47, note 2).

2As seen in the first chapter, the explanation of the One's being οὐκ οἶνον ἀναίσθητον by its having οἶνον συναίσθησις in V 4 [7],2,15-19 is not intended to undermine the illegitimate move from the denial of intellection and consciousness to the One. Nevertheless, an affirmation about the One's unique knowledge and consciousness would satisfactorily undercut the illicit jump of this sort.

3In earlier treatises like V 4 [7] and V 6 [24], the One is described as τὸ νοητὸν in relation to Intellect. The transcendent νοητὸν has no thinking principle within itself (V 6 [24],2,4-5) and stands outside Intellect. In one of his arguments for the intellect-intelligible identity, Plotinus critically represents intelligible objects outside Intellect as ἀναίσθητα καὶ ἀμοιρὰ ζωῆς καὶ νοῦ (V 5 [32],1,32-33) or ἀνόητα καὶ ἀνευ ζωῆς (1,37-38). The reference to the One as τὸ νοητὸν is hence also prone to lead to the conception of the One as inactive and senseless. The claim that self-intellection rather demands the active, transcendent νοητὸν would eliminate such misconception of the One.

4See J. N. Deck, Nature, Contemplation, and the One: A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus, p. 18, note 25: "If ἐπιβολή has this meaning [i.e. thrust], we have an indication of cognition by the One in the midst of a long development (VI,7,37-41) of the argument that the One does not know."

5See note 3.

6The shift from noetic terminology to "epibolic" terminology happens at the time of Plotinus' confrontation with Gnosticism. But we cannot fully see how this confrontation provokes, if any, an external motive to the terminological shift. Nevertheless it would be quite certain, from III 8 [30],9-11, that the controversy between Plotinus and the Gnostics may turn on his doctrine of Intellect's relation to the One. It is not difficult to imagine that such circumstance may have forced him to reconsider his doctrine.

7Three causal theories are presented and left unsystematized in Plato's philosophy. First, the causal theory of the Good is claimed in the Phaedo and
metaphorically explicated in the Republic. Second, the causal theory of intellect is expected by Socrates in the Phaedo in Anaxagoras' account of nature and is completed by Plato himself in the Timaeus and the Philebus. Third, the causal theory of the Forms, as the δεύτερος πλούς in quest of the cause (Phd. 99c9-d1), is formulated in the hypothesis argument of the Phaedo. Plotinus seems to feel the systematization of these theories as his philosophical task. His doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity unifies the causal theories of intellect and of the Forms. The intellect-intelligible unity, as already shown, not only coheres with the Forms' immutability and insures their complete intelligibility, but makes Intellect free from any falsehood and discursivity to confirm its goodness and truthfulness which is stressed in the Timaeus. Intellect and the Forms are then subordinated to the causality of the One in the doctrine of Intellect's relation to the One. In this way, Plotinus endeavors to systematize Plato's unsystematized theories of causality.

8 We are surely maintaining that Plotinus' detailed account of the transcendent Good is consistent with his defense of the Forms' unchangeability and complete intelligibility. But his negative theology of the One is prone to entail the diametrically opposite consequences, which are clearly envisioned by Trouillard and Armstrong. Trouillard ("Le Néoplatonisme," in Encyclopédie de la Pléiade: Histoire de la Philosophie I (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), p. 896) draws the consequence of Plotinus' negative theology for our own thinking as follows:

"Si tout sujet pensant part nécessairement de l'Un en deçà de sa vie pensante, aucun n'est prisonnier de l'évidence et chacun, au contraire, se trouve foncièrement affranchi de l'ordre noétique entier."

Let us abstain from questioning whether this reasoning is valid or not. Trouillard explicates this consequence to the soul's radical freedom:

"L'antériorité mystique aboutit donc à faire de l'esprit une liberté radicale et à le rendre capable d'une critique que rien ne pourra limiter" (loc. cit.).

Armstrong ("The Escape of the One: An Investigation of Some Possibilities of Apophatic Theology Imperfectly Realised in the West," Studia Patristica13 (1975):84) calls such dénouement "the abolition of κόσμος νοητός" or "the end of two-world thinking," which he describes as follows:

"The only kosmos noëtos which will survive in this way of thinking is a Heraclitean one, the ever-changing succession of created thoughts about the ever-changing created world, in which we may hope and believe that we receive lights from the Good sufficient for our personal needs in our particular time and place, but not of a kind which we can appropriate and fix and demand that others should accept as unchanging universal truths."

Plotinus' doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity seems to prevent his philosophical system from being developed in this direction. The doctrine claims that all the Forms are not successively apprehended by Intellect, but are immutably
present in it, and establishes the infallibility of Intellect to evade a relativist theory of truth. As already noticed, that doctrine demands the conception of the One as active, the very conception that is to be embodied by the affirmation about the One's knowledge. In turn, we can say that Plotinus' negative theology of the One necessarily invokes the doctrine of the intellect-intelligible unity in order to avoid the mutable conception or the abolition of the intelligible world and some relativist theory of truth. In this sense, Plotinus' doctrines of the One and of Intellect necessitate one another.
EPILOGUE

As mentioned in the introduction to Part II, three distinct positions are discernible regarding Plotinus' doctrine of the One's knowledge. The most widely-held position is that Plotinus is very careful in making his affirmation about the One's cognitive activity, to avoid contradicting his frequent denial of intellection to the One. As Bussanich estimates, this position usually rests on a minimalist view of the many statements, both early and late, of the One's inner activities. Here I detect an excessive zeal to protect the absolute transcendence and unknowability of the One. The phrase "as it were," which occurs in so many accounts of the One's inner life, is too often used by some scholars to bracket what Plotinus says. However, the challenge, it seems to me, is not simply to maintain the full force of the negative theology and the absolute transcendence of the One, but to explore whether it is possible to fit these essential Plotinian doctrines into a more comprehensive theory of the One that also includes its self-directed activities.¹

Instead of such a minimalist view, Bussanich himself claims the maximum for Plotinus' statements:

... as he intensifies his meditations to the One, Plotinus expands the range of activities he thinks must be attributed to the absolute, broadening the focus on the One's quasi-intellection and self-consciousness in the earlier treatises to include eros, self-vision, self-will, and so on in later treatises.²

It is apparent that Bussanich's view heavily relies on Plotinus' statements in VI 8 [39]. At Chapter VI of Part II, however, we did not take literally his statements in that treatise, but explored the systematic structure of his formal doctrine of the One's knowledge by comparing carefully those positive and revealing statements with the relevant passages from other treatises. Our inquiry resulted in showing that Plotinus' doctrine of the One is so comprehensive as to allow the coherence of the One's self-directed activity with its absolute transcendence and

356
unknowability by intellection. We did not admit the One’s self-love, self-vision, and self-will, but its self-intuition and self-directed reversion. Our position, characterized by the serious, if not excessive, zeal to protect the One’s absolute transcendence and unknowability by intellection, can perhaps be called a moderate view placed between the minimalist and the maximalist views. The moderateness of our position directly indicates the extent to which the positive descriptions of the One’s self-directed activity can go well with the negative theology and the absolute transcendence of the One.³

In the above, we have treated collectively the negative theology and the absolute transcendence of the One and contrasted them with the positive description of the One’s inner life. But it would be necessary for us to distinguish them from one another. The absolute transcendence of the One, which goes back to the metaphor of the sun in Plato’s Republic, is not exclusively characterized by negativity. The transcendence indeed presupposes the separateness or otherness which is expressed in negative statements; the One is not those which are transcended by it. As for the absolute transcendence of the Platonic Good and the Plotinian One, however, that which transcends and those which are transcended are tied by the cause-effect and the archetype-image relations. The transcendence of the One must be primarily understood as that of the cause beyond the effects. To say that the One is the cause, however, does not describe what it is in itself. Plotinus writes:

For to say that the One is the cause is not to predicate some sort of attribute to it, but to us (οὐ... αὐτῷ, ᾧ ἴμιν),⁴ because we have something from it while the One is in itself (VI 9 [9],3,49-51).

The negative theology of the One aims at revealing what the One is not in itself and thereby is distinct from the absolute transcendence of the One, which indicates not only what it is not in itself but what it is to its effects. Different from
them, what we call the positive description of the One's inner life is an affirmation about what the One is in itself. The One, on the one hand, is the hyper-ontic, self-directed ἐνέργεια in itself. It, on the other, is the δύναμις πάντων to others. We must notice that the ontological status of the One as the self-directed and self-abiding activity is essentially viable in the causal theory of double-activity; the One is such activity not only in itself but to the activity from it. The ontological status of the One as such thus represents the systematic link between what the One is in itself and what it is to others. Since the δύναμις always implies the relation to its effects, it does not describe what the One is in itself. Instead, the ἐνέργεια does not have such implication and so is suitable for the description of what the One is in itself. We can perhaps say that the One's self-directed ἐνέργεια, when it is seen in terms of its effects, is rendered as the δύναμις πάντων. In Chapter VI of Part II, we maintained that if the One is not regarded as the primary activity, the double-activity theory loses its foundation. This claim may be understood to mean that the description of what the One is to others cannot do without that of what it is in itself. The One's κατανόησις or ἐπιβολὴ is nothing other than the cognitive specification of what it is in itself.

As a historical fact, the apophatic theology of Plotinus and the later Neoplatonists has not been accepted in the West. According to Armstrong, the aspect of this theology which is most difficult for Christian theologians, ancient or modern, to accept, is that the One neither is apprehended by intellection nor itself has intellection. On the other hand, Plotinus' doctrine of the One's hyper-noetic knowledge was polytheistically developed by Proclus in his view of the henads' hyper-intellective πρόνοια (Elementatio Theologica, props. 120-124, 134, 141). But the Christian theologians of the West, who have not accepted the Neoplatonic negative theology, have not been in need of exploring any hyper-noetic mode of
divine knowledge. In spite of such a historical fact, Armstrong holds that the Neoplatonic negative theology may have something very positive to contribute to theology in the intellectual climate of our own period. It should not be necessary to say much about the relativism and pluralism forced upon us by experience and history which has made it impossible for most people who think seriously in our world to believe that there are any incorrigible or infallible propositions or statements, established by philosophical reason or allegedly divine authority, which are in some way exempt from or unchangeable by that "criticism without limits" of which Trouillard speaks.7

Armstrong believes that the negative theology may be able to do something towards repairing the appalling harm that the maintenance of an absolutist and exclusive dogmatism, based on the concept of God as Intelligible Being, has done to our religion, especially in the last two centuries.8

The equal and equitable presence of the unthinkable and unspeakable Good, continues Armstrong, not only stimulates and eludes our minds as we discuss endlessly, but also eliminates some dishonest and arrogant devaluing to second-class status of the values shown in the heterodox or non-Christians.9 Armstrong summarizes the basic picture of the faith of this sort:

... the endless discussion which is our intellectual life, with the continual intuitions of value which cannot be organized into a fixed, unchanging universal system, can be seen as the everlasting dance of our minds in their splendid and uncircumscribable diversity, through the ever-changing glories of the creation, around the uncircumscribable Good.10

In a word, it is "the end of the claim to attain at any point to incorrigible intellectual certainty, philosophical or theological" that the negative theology may eventually bring forth.11

Armstrong's view, as he himself admits, is basically stimulated by the idea of Trouillard, who directly draws the abolition of absolute truth from the negative theology of the One:
On aboutit ainsi à une disjonction entre l’ordre noétique et l’absolu. Le Principe n’est pas Vérité, comme le croira saint Augustin. Il n’y pas de vérité absolue, puisque toute intelligibilité est dérivée et frappée de relativité.\textsuperscript{12}

Trouillard further describes the consequence of the abolition of the absolute truth for our thinking; a thinking subject which departs from the One is not a "prisoner of the evidence," but entirely free from the noetic order, so that "criticism without limits" is justifiably made possible for our thinking.\textsuperscript{13}

In Plotinus, indeed, truth properly belongs to the intelligible world so that the One is not the truth itself but the king of truth (V 5 [32],3,18). But we wonder why the abolition of the absolute truth can be concluded from the thesis that the Absolute is not truth. Trouillard seems to understand the truth as the intelligibility of the One. Plotinus, however, does not entertain the notion of truth as the intelligibility of the One, but as the complete intelligibility of the Forms. Moreover, what would Trouillard mean by the "relativity" of truth? The alleged relativity of truth cannot be sufficiently explained solely by the discontinuity between the One and the noetic order. Even if Trouillard’s statement is spelled out such that "every intelligibility of the One is derivative and stamped by relativity because of the discontinuity between the One and the noetic order," the statement cannot be a convincing reason for the claim that "there is no absolute truth."

Let us yield an inch to Trouillard and admit that a kind of relativity is imposed on the intelligibility of the One. As for the sense of the relativity of the intelligibility of the One, we have the only way to think that each intellectual agent contemplates the One from its own point of view. If so, we cannot see why the relativity leads to the view that our thinking is free from the noetic order so that we are not the "prisoner of the evidence." In addition to a leap noticed in his reasoning, we cannot understand why the relative intelligibility is more deserving of being
called truth than is the evidence, which is the most prominent character of the intellect-intelligible identity.

Even if it is admitted that every truth realized in the noetic realm is relative, the relativity of truth does not necessarily mean its changeability. If one wishes to conclude from the negative theology of the One "the end of the claim to attain any point to incorrigible intellectual certainty," he must completely neglect the Plotinian doctrine of the intellect-intelligible identity and the Platonic theory of Forms. To Plotinus' philosophy belongs not only the thesis that the One is not known by intellection but also the thesis that Being is completely and transparently knowable to us. If we, with Armstrong and Trouillard, wish to listen to the message from Plotinus' negative theology to our own era, we, nolens volens, are forced to sacrifice the very important aspect of his philosophy that represents his own reply to the fundamental problem of philosophy, that is, the problem regarding the relation between knowing subject and object known. With the immutable Forms abdicated and the noetic cosmos abolished, a Plotinus so invoked in our age would be at best Plotinus dimidiatus.14

It is certain that a negative theology is explicitly noticed in Plotinus' doctrine of the One. But he does not purport to establish the total unknowability of the One by means of the negative theology of his own. Plotinus mentions the apophatic way as follows:

The knowledge of or contact with the Good (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἴτε γνῶσις εἶτε ἐπιστήμη) is the greatest thing, and Plato calls it "the greatest study," meaning by study not the vision of the Good, but learning something about it beforehand. What teaches (διδάσκομεν) us, then, are analogies (ἀναλογίαι) and negations (ἀφαίρεσις) and knowledge of those which derive from it and specific degrees of the ascent (ἀναφασμοὶ τινες), but what advances (πορεύομεν) us towards it are purifications and virtues and adornments and securing footholds in the intelligible world and establishing ourselves in it and feasting on it (VI 7 [38],36,3-10, tr. J. Bussanich, adapted by A. Sumi).
Plotinus would surely mean *via analogiae*, *via negationis* and *via eminenciae*, which are formulated by the Middle Platonists, respectively by ἀναλογίαι, ἀφανέσεις and ἀναφασμοῖ. To study about the Good is distinguished actually from seeing it. Negations "teach" us about the Good and lead us to "the knowledge of the Good." The *via negationis* neither makes us silent about the Good nor thrusts the Good beyond the reach of our comprehension, but is devoted to nothing else than our "knowledge of the Good." For instance, the negation of intelligibility to the Good is to constitute our "knowledge" that the Good is something which is not apprehended by intellection. Although the Good is not known by intellection, it is possible for us to know about it. "The knowledge of the Good" may consist of the statements about what it is in itself, what it is not in itself, and what it is to others. Each statement, insofar as it belongs to "the knowledge of the Good," has a definite truth-value. Incidentally, Armstrong quotes a brief remark from a paper which a student at Manhattanville College wrote in the 1960's:

Plotinus really did help me. My favorite thing about him is that he did not organize his Good.  

According to our inquiry, on the contrary, Plotinus did organize his Good in highly systematic fashion. He does work out (ἐξεργάζεσθαι) the One. If the traditional conception of God as Intelligible Being is called a dogma, Plotinus' view that the One is the hyper-ontic activity and cannot be known by intellection will be at most another dogma. The apophatic theology à la Plotinus would not so nicely fit the intellectual climate of our period colored by relativism and pluralism.

As Armstrong notices, to be sure, the awareness that we do not know much about the Absolute makes our attitude towards other religions and cultures more open-minded, tolerant, honest and modest. Absolutism and dogmatism do not arise from the claims that there are unchanging, universal truths and that we can attain to incorrigible intellectual certainty, but from the perverse absolutization and
fixation of our relative viewpoint and the violent universalization of some parochial truths. Stubbornness and obstinacy in absolutism and dogmatism seem to be due to the lack of effort to understand thoroughly the complete fact in favor of narrow-minded adherence to the already established dogmae and the parochial truths. In order to overcome such absolutism and dogmatism, it is necessary not merely to make absolutists and dogmatists notice that their positions are simply relative but to exhort them to make an effort to understand the complete fact more thoroughly. But negative theology is not able to wake them up towards the further endeavor to understand, because unknowable God can by no means be understood. The urge to understand thoroughly must rather postulate the very possibility of understanding universal truths entirely in incorrigible intellectual certainty, in a word, complete intelligibility. We are urged to elevate our viewpoint strenuously, precisely because the goal of our intellectual quest is marked by complete intelligibility. Plato's theory of Forms and Plotinus' theory of the intellect-intelligible identity really open up the perspective of our intellectual and ethical quest rather than bind us with some stubborn dogmae. These philosophers are perennially sending not only to our own age but to all the eras the message that the perspective of our intellectual and ethical inquiry should not be closed. This message would be nothing but their προτρεπτικός λόγος.
NOTES


3. Bussanich regards Plotinus’ positive descriptions of the One’s inner life and negative theology of the One as complementary. But there are a couple of assailable points in his view. Bussanich points out an aspect which is often forgotten in discussion of the negative theology of the One:

   "It is, quite simply, that negation can become a mental crutch if it leads to an intellectual rigidity that sets limits on what the One can be. In other words, the infinity, and even the unity, of the One is ultimately compromised if we maintain that there is something the One is not. Plotinus speaks of the One’s omnipresence in part to eliminate this tendency" (*Ancient Philosophy* 7 (1987):183).

This observation is not convincing enough. Plotinus himself neither entertains the view of the One’s infinity as the unlimitedness in what it can be nor associates omnipresence with its infinity. The negative theology must be considered to lead to the liberation of the One from the limits imposed on lower entities; the statement that the One is not such and such must mean that the One is free from or transcends being-such-and-such rather than that it may be limited with respect to its not being such and such. In Plotinus, negation exactly functions as the dissociating of the factors, which imply multiplicity and finitude, from the One to insure its absolute unity and transcendence. If the One is limited by the limits denied to it, its transcendence will be totally meaningless. Moreover, Bussanich attempts to reconcile the negative theology with his maximalist view of the One’s inner life by claiming as follows:

   "To refer to what the One is in itself and how the soul might experience its reality Plotinus seems to employ, particularly in vi 8 [39], a method that is analogous to what the later Neoplatonists much more explicitly defined as the *negatio negationis*" (*loc. cit.*).

Bussanich presents the same view also in his comment on VI 8 [39], 16,33-39, in *The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus*, a Commentary on Selected Texts, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), p. 220. We cannot see how Plotinus’ positive and revealing descriptions of the One’s inner activity in VI 8 [39] are the cause of his implicit practice of the *negatio negationis*. Armstrong rightly points out that the *negatio negationis*, though clearly stated in VI 8 [39], 9,39-41, is not often explicit in Plotinus, in "The Negative Theology of Nous in Later Neoplatonism," in *Platonismus*
In sum, Bussanich does not fully succeed in showing the complementary nature of the positive and the negative descriptions of the One's knowledge. Instead we explored the logical connections among various descriptions of the One's nature and activity to ascertain the systematic consistency of the descriptions of two sorts. In other words, the systematic consistency is fully acknowledged only when we maintain the moderate view, whose advantages consist not only in its not compromising the absolute unity and transcendence of the One, but also in its being based on more careful and reasonable reading of the relevant texts.

4. We take αὐτῶ and ἡμῖν in line 50 as the dativus judicantis.

5. The One is described as δύναμις πάντων in the passages dealing with the double-activity theory (V 4 [7], 1,36; 2,38).


13. See note 8 in Chapter VIII of Part II.

14. When the absolute transcendence of the One is considered in terms of the metaphysics of light, the view diametrically opposed to Trouillard's comes out. Blumenberg comments on Plato's metaphor of the sun as follows:
"Licht wird nur an dem gesehen, was es sichtbar werden läßt; gerade das macht die 'Natürlichkeit' des Lichts aus, daß es erst mit der Sichtbarkeit der Dinge seinem Sinn nach 'aufgeht,' selbst also nicht von der Art dessen ist, was es hervorruft. Aber diese Differenz spielt schon bei Plato in Transzendenz hinüber; in Lichtmetapher ist die Lichtmetaphysik angelegt. Die Aussageweise für die Natürlichkeit der Wahrheit schlägt in ihr Gegenteil um: Wahrheit wird in der Transzendenz 'lokalisierter' ("Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit: Im Vorfeld der philosophischen Begriffsbildung," Studium Generale 10 (1957):434).

As already mentioned, the absolute transcendence of the One indicates what it is not in itself and what it is to others. As Trouillard holds, indeed, the One would not be truth in itself. This view is nevertheless compatible with the view that the One is the transcendent ground for the absolute truth to us. Therefore the conclusion that there is not absolute truth to us is not necessarily drawn from the thesis that the One is not the absolute truth in itself.


Mossé-Bastide thinks that three ways are consistently employed in the doctrine of the One's knowledge. She regards the One's κατανόησις and ἐπιθελή, respectively in V 4 [7],2,15-19 and VI 7 [38],39,1-2, as somehow akin to intellection and observes that Plotinus thereby completes the method of negations by that of analogies (La Pensee Philosophique de Plotin (Paris: Bordas, 1972), p. 134). She then concludes that the One's ὑπερνόησις in VI 8 [39],16,32 is based on the method of ascending gradations, which is to complete that of analogies (op. cit., p. 135).

16Hadot characterizes negative theology in Plotinus as "only a rational method of knowing" (Classical Mediterranean Spirituality, p. 247). Moreover, the following remark by Macquarrie would be accurate: "... but as happens in all negative theology, Plotinus allows himself to say a good deal more about the Absolute than the strict application of his own praise of silence would seem to admit," In Search of Deity: An Essay in Dialectical Theism (New York: Crossroad, 1985), p. 66.
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