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Thomas Hobbes' Theory of Obligation: A Modern Interpretation

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THOMAS HOBBES' THEORY OF OBLIGATION:
A MODERN INTERPRETATION

by

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of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
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VITA

The author, Ralph P. Forsberg, is the son of Sulo Forsberg and Gertrude (Mattson) Forsberg. He was born August 28, 1948, in Chicago, Illinois.

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NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used throughout this dissertation:

Hobbes


Other abbreviations of Hobbes' work appear as a result of my intention to preserve the integrity of citations by other authors: I have not altered references that appear following paraphrasing of Hobbes' words by other authors where the precise quotation was unclear.

Wittgenstein

O.C. On Certainty.
P.G. Philosophical Grammar.
P.I. Philosophical Investigations.
P.R. Philosophical Remarks.
Z Zettel.

All references are to numbered paragraphs, unless otherwise noted; the references to B.B. are to page numbers.
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INTRODUCTION

Different pictures of Hobbes can emerge from different judgments as to what is central and what is peripheral in his work, and in cases of apparent contradiction or superfluous multiple explanations, from different judgments as to what reflects his real intent. No single, final, and unequivocal account of the meaning and significance of Hobbes's political theory is therefore likely to arise. (Spragens, p.21)

At present the truth of this claim seems undeniable. Even more now than in the past, it seems that no settled interpretation of Hobbes' political theory is possible. Three competing views concerning Hobbes' theory of obligation are receiving the bulk of attention today. These views are what I will call: (1) the mechanistic/egoistic or traditional interpretation, (2) the natural law or moral interpretation, and (3) the individual rights interpretation. Each view seeks to explain Hobbes' true intentions regarding the derivation of obligation, and do so independently of each other.

Briefly stated, these views hold: (1) The traditional view: Hobbes is a materialist sparked by the ideas of the new, emerging science of motion begun by Galileo. Hobbes methodically applies its themes and procedures to the establishing of civil and ethical theories whose issues are understood from within the same
perspective. His account of obligation is derived from an egoistic psychology which ultimately rests upon the materialistic presuppositions. Duty is a matter of prudence, i.e. of the rational pursuit of self-interest, which is in turn determined by the motions of appetite and aversion. This position will be examined in detail in Chapter I.

(2) The natural law view: This position rests upon two propositions: (a) the apparently scientific cast and mechanical basis of the first view is misleading if taken to represent the true character of Hobbes' mature thought, and (b) the true nature of his ethical and political thinking is derived primarily from the Christian natural law tradition. Slightly different versions of this position are offered by A.E. Taylor, F.C. Hood, and Howard Warrender. This position, the various versions of it, and their differences will be examined in Chapter II.

(3) The individual rights interpretation: Hobbes is seen as an analyst of individual man, singling out two passions as crucial to morality: vanity and fear of a violent death. Hobbes' starting point is taken to be natural right, not natural law nor materialism. His theory of obligation is seen to rest upon a notion of individual right, which in turn rests upon an understanding of human passions gained from self-examination. Again there are slightly different versions of this approach given by Leo
Strauss and Michael Oakeshott, both of which will be examined in Chapter III.

Each view claims to be the true interpretation of Hobbes' theory of obligation. Each, in turn, is supported by numerous particular passages from Hobbes' writings and by various thematic threads traced through the whole of Hobbes' work. Consequently each makes a case for the exclusion of the other interpretations based on their errors of interpretation, misunderstanding of texts, and faulty reasoning. Each view assumes or explicitly argues that the other views are based on passages taken out of context, misstated by the interpreters, or actually mistated by Hobbes himself. "Once we clear away the biasses and interjected assumptions of those other views," each says, "we will then see that Hobbes is really saying...", just what that view interprets Hobbes to be saying.

The obvious problem is, however, that three mutually exclusive interpretations of a single theory of obligation, drawn from a single set of written works by a single author, cannot all be correct at once. How is it possible that such conflicting positions can be attributed to one author? The unspoken assumption adopted by all three sets of interpreters is that Hobbes was in fact confused about his own beliefs or else not capable of stating them clearly. Once this assumption is made, whether it is stated or not, it is hard to see how we could ever determine which, if any,
or of all three or some other is the "true" account of Hobbes' derivation of obligation.

There is, of course, another possible resolution of this puzzle, one based upon a different underlying assumption. Suppose we assume, quite simply, that Hobbes plainly stated his position, that the position embodies a coherent theory of obligation incorporating all three of the divergent elements noted above into a single unified whole, and that he had valid reasons for the seeming contradictions in his works. This hypothesis seems particularly warranted in Hobbes' case (though it seems rational, until proven otherwise, to assume that all philosophers are trying to clearly communicate a coherent position to their readers). For, as W.T. Jones notes, "Although in outlook Hobbes was almost wholly a man of the new mold, he inherited from the Middle Ages a disposition to think systematically and to view the function of philosophy as the construction of a unified world view, in which all the special sciences are derived from one supreme science, and in which the answers to all questions that can be asked are ultimately statable in terms of a single formula" (Jones, p.120). It seems quite reasonable to assume, then, that such a systematic thinker, seeking such a unified theory, would be able to recognize self-contradiction and be able to exclude competing or contradictory rationales within his theory of obligation. Should all three alternative justifications for
one element in his theory be justifiable textually, it is my belief that all three are there because Hobbes offered all three without finding them inconsistent or contradictory, rather than offering them as an inadvertent error on his part or out of some inadequacy. Were Hobbes some obviously muddled thinker I might take the opposite view. But he was recognized in his own time as a most intelligent and able thinker, even if a highly controversial one, and many philosophers since his time have been impressed with the power and order of his thought.

The three interpretations I have described can, I believe, be shown to be consistent parts of a larger whole within Hobbes' work. To show this, however, we must be aware of Hobbes' place in the history of western thought. In Hobbes' time, new and revolutionary ideas were competing with older, established views. Hobbes did not, however, simply reject the older views (in particular, the doctrine of natural law based on Christian principles) in favor of revolutionary discoveries in natural science (materialism/mechanism). Nor did he cling dogmatically to the older beliefs and thus exclude from consideration the new evidence supporting a materialist explanation of the universe and the human enterprise. It seems, rather, that Hobbes was trying to delicately balance these various alternative points of view in his theory of obligation. He was enchanted by the new mechanistic science, was yet a
believer in a God who rules through natural law, and was also aware of the individualistic aspects of human nature and the developing notion of individual rights. For Hobbes, I shall argue, all three approaches had a place in justifying people's obligation to the sovereign. The argument for this interpretation of Hobbes' position is the substantive contribution of his dissertation to Hobbes scholarship and will be developed in chapters IV and V5, following detailed summaries of the three competing theories already mentioned.

The central insight of this interpretation is that Hobbes came to see man as a unity of three differently focused elements: human beings are obviously physical beings governed by mechanistic laws as are all other physical objects; human beings are children of God, who communicates His will to them by natural law; finally, human beings are individuals with individual rights who are rules as much by vanity and fear as by reason. Hobbes, I hope to show, wove these three disparate elements into a single, tri-partite argument for his theory of obligation wherein persons are obliged to obey their sovereign.

This interpretation also fits Hobbes' own anthropomorphic characterization of the Leviathan (the state). In the past, this analogy was taken as a purely explanatory analogy (or as a hypothetical device). But under my view it may be taken as involving a more literal
parallel between the state and a person. That is, human beings outside the state, in the State of Nature, are physical beings bound to do things by mechanistic causal chains, rational beings able to discover (even in the State of Nature) certain natural laws which prescribe certain actions, and individuals who act out of basic passions such as vanity or fear. By moving into civil society human beings do not change their basic motivations, but rather perform different actions for the common good. These actions flow from the same three sources within society as outside it. Hobbes' analogy seeks to show that whether within or outside of a state, obligation derives, for human beings, from the same three sources.

The main job ahead is to show that all three sources of obligation are, indeed, consistent and complimentary within Hobbes' particular project of proving one's obligation to the sovereign. Since they apply to different aspects of human beings and society, the possibility remains open that, when spliced together they create a conclusive argument for obligation to the sovereign. Moreover, it is clear that Hobbes was aware of the multiple influences operating on his readers and that to convince all segments of his audience of his conclusions he would do well to tailor his arguments to that segmented audience. That is, the mechanistic arguments appeal to those versed in the new science, whereas the moral arguments would appeal to the
more traditionally minded, and the individual rights argument would be aimed at those who saw the individual as the most important factor in any political theory. Hobbes' arguments offer three frameworks of justification that all support his major conclusion that citizens have almost absolute obligations to their sovereign and the laws he designs. The three approaches to obligation are Hobbes' attempt to convince different segments of his audience of his conclusions using arguments framed in the language and conceptual background best able to generate their assent. It is my aim in the pages to follow to show that Hobbes, indeed, intended all three to be a part of his argument for the obligation to the sovereign. First, however, I must explain the contents of the three individual elements of my synthesis.
CHAPTER I

THE MATERIALIST THESIS

A. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

Two considerations led Hobbes to formulate his unique theory of political obligation. The first was the political turbulence of his times, which saw Cromwell preparing to lead his men in a savage civil war. This experience of violence growing out of deep disagreements between men on political matters contrasted sharply in Hobbes's mind with the relatively quick agreements men achieved in mathematical and scientific matters. Secondly, Hobbes looked at political philosophy as a variation of the science of physics. He assumed that from a thoroughly materialistic view of human nature, in which human behavior could be explained simply in terms of bodies in motion, he could formulate an accurate political philosophy. (Stumpf, p.239)

While the historical factors mentioned by Stumpf supply the overall impetus behind Hobbes' search for a firm foundation for obligation, it is the second consideration that forms the basis for the traditional materialistic/psychological egoistic interpretation of Hobbes' theory of obligation.* That is, the MP is based upon the belief that the primary (if not the total) basis of

*I will abbreviate "the materialistic/psychological egoistic case" as MP.
Hobbes' theory is the new mechanism and the methods derived from and pioneered by Galileo.

In his *Dialogues* Galileo, while working on the problem of accelerated motions, developed the view that there is a specific explanation for the behavior of bodies and that the method of explanation could be modeled after geometry. Geometry, being a deductive discipline when applied to the analysis of the motion of physical bodies, could turn physics into an exact science. Galileo held that there was a correspondence between the axioms of geometry and the observable properties of empirical, moving bodies. Further, Galileo held that the theorems deduced from these axioms would apply to the empirical facts of motion. Starting from this point and adding Galileo's subsequent refinement of the "resoluto-compositive" method (to be explained in the following section), the new science of motion was to become an important factor in Hobbes' theories of politics and obligation. Hobbes came to see in Galileo's model of motion as the conformity of a falling body to mechanical laws a model for all behavior.

Galileo had opened the gates of "natural philosophy universal", while the Englishman, Harvey, had pioneered a causal science of motion in the human body, describing the motion of the blood and other fluids in his books, *Motions of the Blood* and *Generation of Living Creatures*. Hobbes was to attempt a similar description of human psychology and
politics, partly to augment these advances but also to explicate human motivation and its social consequences (Laird, p.90). Hobbes believed that Galileo's principles were the governing concepts in the human as well as the inanimate realm. His philosophy can therefore be seen as an attempt to push Galileo's dynamics and methods to their explanatory limits. (Copleston, p.33). Ultimately, as we shall see, Hobbes concluded that obligation is a matter of the rational pursuit of self-interest guided by the motions of appetite and aversion. Spragens explains Hobbes' view: "The drama of political life...is the product of the interplay between contending fundamental motivations which govern the actions of all men. These motivations are universal, natural drives... as much as the natural facts of his corporality and mortality." (Spragens, p.163).

It is only when human motivation and its causes are seen as actions or motion in the purely physical world that politics becomes a matter for the new science. In fact, of course, according to the MP, this was Hobbes' belief. For him there was one fundamental characteristic that all bodies share and that alone makes it possible to analyze and understand their actions, namely motion. Hobbes' universe, for MP, is a closed material system. It is a set of bodies whose whole activity is motion. In this universe are only two elements: matter and motion. All real entities are material, all real actions or events are explicable as the
motions of matter. Since human beings are a part of the closed system, they are governed by the same laws as any other parts of the system. Spragens says, "There is no escape hatch from the world of nature, no protected area or special status which man could have to exempt him from the forces and realities which govern the rest of the cosmos." (Spragens, p. 130). In all their complexity and no matter how men would like to think they are different from the other elements of the universe, for Hobbes they are not.

At the core of Hobbes' view of human nature, according to the MP, is that human psychology is egoistic. Convinced that human beings could be analyzed using the same methods and principles used by the new science, Hobbes extrapolated the concepts of body, motion, and cause to the realm of human affairs, including politics. Beginning with an analysis of human motivation, Hobbes would unrelentingly extend Galileo's assumptions into the innermost regions of human thought and deliberation. This he saw as his original contribution to civil philosophy (Peters and Tajfel, p.164). Human nature is the same as any other part of the universe: sensation is motion, reason is the motion of bodies within the closed system of Nature, and human beings' motive faculties, which move them toward the end of their own well being, are the motions of the mind causing physical effects. The result of this perspective was an egoistic psychology.

The path which took Hobbes to the egoistic account
of obligation can be briefly outlined. Hobbes saw that every living thing seeks to maintain its life, i.e. sustain its own motion; so, too, must human beings. Diverse external motions (actions of bodies from outside) produce diverse motions in us. Internal motions caused by the actions of these objects on one's senses ultimately cause a reaction to the external world. The two key sensations produced by external motions are pleasure and pain. Pleasure is "nothing really but motion about the heart, as conception is nothing but motion in the head" and pain is such a motion that "weakeneth or hindereth the vital motion" (E.W. IV, 31). Since a person's reactions are tendencies toward that which preserves the individual or tendencies away from the opposite, pain and pleasure are vital factors in understanding human motivation. It is pleasure that pushes human beings toward what sustains them, while pain pushes them away from what is harmful. The results are the motion of desire for pleasant things and the motion of aversion from unpleasant things. These involuntary motions then cause "animal motions", i.e. voluntary motions such as speaking, walking, and moving the limbs that are always "first fancied in our minds" (E.W. III, 38); the "imagination always being the first beginning of voluntary motion" (Peters, p.130), causes us to seek that which sustains life.

Now we can complete the overview of the MP version
of Hobbes' theory. Having analyzed human motivation in this way, Hobbes turned from natural philosophy to political philosophy. Here the concept of the State of Nature is an important link in Hobbes' chain of reasoning toward obligation. Hobbes utilizes the State of Nature as an explanatory device to show how human nature ultimately brings people to form alliances for the sake of personal survival (the egoistic motivation).

The 'State of Nature' refers to a condition of persons in which there are no rules governing desires and in which, as is the case in nature, all human beings are relatively equal in strength, cunning, and force. For gain, for safety, etc., people desire what will preserve or enrich their lives as the natures dictate. In addition, since there are no rules or outside authority limiting their actions, people have a right to all things which aid their nature this is the 'right of nature' to all that promotes self-preservation, which we shall examine more fully shortly. Eventually human beings are led into conflict with each other, with no rules available to check their inevitable decline into violent conflict, what they have come to, by a direct causal chain, is the state of war. Hobbes argues that as long as this state of war endures everyone is miserable.

Being averse to misery, human beings, as egoists, seek to remove themselves from the State of Nature. Here,
finally, Hobbes reaches the concept of the social contract: human beings lay down their right to all things in order to gain security, obligating themselves to a sovereign and obeying and the laws the sovereign designs. This is all the result of the chain of motions leading to a desire to avoid the misery which the motions of their natures would otherwise inevitably lead them. Thus, the obligation they place themselves under is the end point of a natural chain of causal motions. That is, moved by the motives (motions) of prudence, fear, and reason people contract with others for the sake of their own security. The formation of civil society is, therefore, the outcome of each person's desire for their own survival, and obligation is the direct effect of their psychological egoism. Their duty is dictated by prudence and is the rational pursuit of self-interest or the motions of appetite and aversion.

Hobbes' aim, then, according to MP, was the systematize the various elements just outlined into a total philosophical system. Sterling Lamprecht, in his introduction to Hobbes' De Cive, explains the basic structure of Hobbes' system for the MP approach in these words:

It is indeed true, and it has often been pointed out...that Hobbes conceived these principles as part of a grandiose schematism for a total theory of the universe. According to his schematism, the only ultimate facts are matter and motion, all else is but some special case of the basic realities of matter and motion. The schematism would, Hobbes thought, have three main parts: a theory of body in general, a theory
of living body (particularly of man), and a theory of special body (that is, of the state). (Lamprecht, pp. xvi-xvii)

In the following sections of this chapter I will explicate in detail MP's detailed description of Hobbes' theory, and how this theory can be seen as the direct result of Hobbes' use of Galileo's principles and method.

B. METHOD AND SYSTEM

At the age of forty, in 1629, Hobbes had by chance come across Euclid's Elements laying open in the library of a gentleman he was visiting. Upon reading one of the demonstrations he reacted with alarm, saying such an analysis was impossible. But after rereading the proof and following its logical step-by-step progress to the inevitable conclusion, he immediately 'became in love with geometry'. He passionately explored it as a method for arriving at indubitable conclusions, finally conceiving the hope that he could use it to demonstrate his own political convictions and bring order to the political chaos in England by showing the evils of democracy and the superiority of an absolute monarchy. He hoped that these conclusions would be accepted by his countrymen if convincingly proven in geometrical fashion, if derived step by step from first principles. The problem was that he had no conceptual framework available to allow him to convert
his observations of contemporary society, his introspective insights into his own nature, and his knowledge of history into terms amenable to geometrical analysis. In what terms could he present this knowledge as a set of axioms from which theorems about the correct conditions for a civil society could be deduced? The problem was how to translate empirical and introspective observations into more mathematical terms.

Hobbes' interests were not purely political, however, and led him to consider the problem of sensation at this time. In developing an answer to the question, "What causes sensation?", Hobbes employed the geometrical method of reasoning together with the concepts of the new science of motion, with which he was familiar. The result was his first philosophical work, the Little Treatise of 1637, in which he developed the idea that all manner of perceptions (apparition, imagination, as well as sensation) could be explained as the meeting of bodies in motion. The Little Treatise can be seen as the outcome of Hobbes' interest in geometry, his admiration of Galileo (dating back to 1610), and his theory of motion. He had met Galileo in 1636 and became obsessed with his suggestion that motion was the natural state of bodies. He, further, was impressed by Galileo's law of inertia which said such motion would continue to infinity unless impeded by some other body, a claim that forcefully contradicted the Aristotelian notion
that rest was a body's natural state. Hobbes combined the interest in motion, Galileo's suggestion, and his own passion for geometry to explain sensation. (The explanation of sensation will be explored a bit later in this chapter.)

Hobbes came to conceive of science as deductive and non-empirical, and he scorned the use of experience or history in science as unreliable. Hobbes thought that wisdom demanded the use of reason, as distinct from experience which often leads one into illusion and does not yield the sorts of universalizable laws that reason does. Hobbes defines 'reasoning' in this way:

When a man reasoneth he does nothing else but conceive a sum total, from additional of parcels: or conceive a remainder, from subtraction of one sum from another; which if done by words, is conceiving of the consequences of the names of all parts, to the name of another part...For 'reason', in this sense, is nothing but reckoning, that is adding and subtracting, of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and signifying of our thoughts. (E.W. III, 29-30)

Science, as reasoning, is to proceed by deducing consequences from initial definitions, as geometry so successfully does. Science is "knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand" (E.W. III, 35). For we know only be definition (E.W. II, 35). As such, science reaches conclusions not about things, but about what we think about things. Science yields hypothetical, though certain knowledge, expressed in words.

In addition to characterizing science as the product of reasoning, Hobbes saw it as hypothetical knowledge, that
is, universal knowledge. It is hypothetical in the sense that any talk about a circle in geometry is not talk about a particular circle but is the expression of universal truths about any circle, about any figure that conforms to the initial definitions (Peters, p.61). Such statements are hypothetical propositions of the sort, "if a figure is a circle, then its area can be computed using the formula $\pi r^2$". What we are saying is that certain propositions will be true about any figure having certain properties. The truths of science, then, are universal, and so hypothetical, and eternal (in that they have the timelessness of logical implication). Thus, as Peters says, "The main business of scientists is to establish laws which are universal and hypothetical statements like 'Everywhere and always if iron is heated, then it expands'" (Peters, p.61).

The major method available to scientists trying to understand the underlying structure of nature, according to Hobbes, is Galileo's resoluto-compositive method. It is this method, developed in Galileo's mechanics, that will allow scientists to understand motion, the universal cause, knowledge of which is fundamental to any basic theory of nature. The resoluto-compositive method exactly fits Hobbes' needs in that it quantifies phenomena wherever possible and in mathematical fashion analyzes the relations of the variables (quantified elements of phenomena) into a rational structure. More particularly, the method uses the
postulation of unobservables to advance the geometrical method into the science of motion. Peters explains:

Galileo worked out his theory by imagining perfect spheres moving on frictionless planes in perfectly straight lines. He was able to conduct such imaginary experiments because his mind had been set free from the earth-bound Aristotelian system by the method of geometry which accustoms its students to conduct such experiments with parallel lines that are perfectly straight and stretch out to infinity, with angles that are really equal, and with perfect circles...It was only because Galileo and his contemporaries...were versed in geometrical modes of thought that they were able to make the momentous advance of imagining motion as the norm; for it is not through observation that we become convinced that bodies continue their motion unless something impedes them. It was through imagining the perfect case of a body moving without impediment as the norm that Galileo was set free to work out a new system of mechanics. (Peters, p.63)

The method itself was employed in explaining a particular phenomenon, say the fall of an object to the ground, by taking a typical case like a ball rolling down an inclined plane and abstracting it. That is, the first step would be to think away any non-quantifiable characteristics of the ball (such as color, smell, or any "secondary qualities" in the classical sense). What would be left would be quantifiable simple elements such as the ball's weight and size, the angle of the plane, or the time it takes the ball to traverse the length of the plane. Now we would manipulate the mathematical relations and think about them until we isolate some formula which expressed one variable as the function of others: in our example, we might reduce the velocity of the ball to a function of the time it has rolled starting from rest. (Hobbes called this aspect of
the method 'analysis' rather than resolution.) Following this, we would then 'compose' or 'synthesize' the situation by reconstructing it in mathematical terms and then deducing the consequences from the laws discovered; in other words, starting from the known causes, we deduce the effects from them using previously discovered laws (Peters, p.64).

In this manner, then, we would have a rational mathematical resolution of causal relations. Essentially the method combines mathematics, hypothesis, and "thought-experiments" into an explanation of the causes and effects of bodies in motion. It was, in other words, exactly what Hobbes was looking for at this time.

Hobbes' paradigm of the search for causes, which he called 'philosophy', is Galileo's resoluto-compositive method. His definition and explication of philosophy shows it to be an analysis of causal relations just as mechanics was for Galileo:

Philosophy is such knowledge of effects or appearances, as we acquire by true ratiocination from the knowledge we have first of their causes or generation: An again, of such causes or generations as may be from knowing first their effects... (E.W. I, 3)

The subject of Philosophy, or the matter it treats of, is every body of which we can conceive any generation, and which we may, by any consideration thereof, compare with other bodies, or which is capable of composition and resolution; that is to say, every body of whose generation of properties we can have any knowledge... (E.W. I, 10)

The principle parts of philosophy are two. For two chief kinds of bodies, and very different from one another, offer themselves, to such a search after their generation and properties; one...being the work of
nature...a natural body, the other is called a commonwealth, and is made by the wills and agreement of men. (E.W. I, 11)

Philosophy, like mechanics, deals with the causes and effects of matter (bodies) in motion. For Hobbes, the universe is a closed physical system consisting of matter in motion, that is, bodies whose motions produce effects, and bodies whose motions manifest these effects. By 'body' Hobbes simply means that "which having no dependence upon our thought, is coincident or co-extended with some part of space" (E.W. I, 94). Every actual body has a determinate magnitude (quantity) and is either at rest or moving at some determinate velocity (Jones, p.122). In Hobbes' universe bodies alone have real existence: "...because it depends not upon our thought, we say body is a thing subsisting in itself; as also existing, because without us..." (E.W. I, 102). Bodies change only with respect to their motions, i.e. their "accidents", defined as: "the manner of a body, according to which it is conceived; this is the same as saying: an accident is the power of a body by which it impresses a conception of itself upon us" (De Corpore, Ch.8, translated from Latin by David Ozar in an unpublished paper entitled "A Study of the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes"). Thus we come to know bodies through their accidents, as our motions (sensations) are influenced by the motions of the bodies which influence us. The study of the ultimate reality, "determinate body", is natural (or first)
philosophy, which is limited to a study of the quantifiable aspects of bodies and their motion:

Every object is either a part of the whole world, or an aggregate of parts. The greatest of all bodies, or sensible objects, is the world itself... Of the whole world we may inquire what is its magnitude, what is its duration, and how many there be, but nothing else... (*E.W.* I, 410-411)

Sensation is itself a meeting place of motions. Our sense organs are "pressed upon" by external movements of bodies either directly (as in touch or taste) or through some medium (as in sight, smell, or hearing). These motions then are transmitted by the nerves and membranes of the body to the brain and heart, which react to the pressure with an outward counter-pressure or resistance, causing the sensations to have the appearance of externality since the internal motion in us is directed outward (*E.W.* III, 2). That is, although they are nothing more than internal motions in some internal substance of the head, they have the character of being external to use (Peters, p.97). Hobbes defines a sensation itself as "a phantasm, made by the reaction and endeavour outwards in the organ of sense, caused by an endeavour inwards from the object, remaining for some time more or less" (*E.W.* I, 391). Not only is sensation the end product of external motions, it is the efficient cause of the actions of the sentient beings themselves. Actions are, for Hobbes, the reactions to external stimuli received through the sense organs; sensation is a bridge between movement in the external world
and the behavior of human beings.

Philosophy, as the study of sensible bodies in motion, seeks an understanding of the causes of all motion and thereby the nature of events and behavior in the world. All causation is antecedent motion.

A body is said to work upon or act, that is to say, do something to another body, when it either generates or destroys some accident in it: and the body in which an accident is generated or destroyed is said to suffer, that is, to have something done to it by another body; as when one body by putting forwards another body generates motion in it, it is called the AGENT; and the body in which motion is so generated is called the PATIENT...

...A CAUSE simply, or an entire cause, is the aggregate of all the accidents both of the agents how many soever they be, and of the patient, put together; which when they are all supposed to be present, it cannot be understood but that the effect is produced at the same instant; and if any of them be wanting, it cannot be understood but that the effect is not produced...

An entire cause is always sufficient for the production of its effect, if the effect be at all possible...

And seeing a necessary cause is defined to be that, which being supposes, the effect cannot but follow, this also may be collected, that whatsoever effect is produced at any time, the same is produced by a necessary cause...(E.W. I, 120-123)

Thus, Hobbes argues that all causes are necessary and all actions necessitated. Therefore, there are no random events, no contingencies. Those events we believe to be contingent are simply those events whose necessary causes we do not yet perceive (E.W. I, 130). The task of philosophy is the uncovering of the necessary causes of all motion in bodies, and the formulation of general, universal laws that govern that motion (which will be mechanical laws)
by the use of which we can understand and predict that
motion, and thereby understand the world.

Philosophy is composed of the two parts previously
mentioned, namely the study of natural bodies (natural
philosophy) and artificial or man-made bodies (civil
philosophy). But philosophy, too, is part of an overall
system or hierarchy of the sciences envisioned by Hobbes.
If the universe is entirely matter in motion, then all the
sciences treat the same things and utilize the same method
of investigation, i.e. that of geometry and Galileo's
resoluto-compositive method. The hierarchy of sciences
treats three particular topics: body, man, and citizen, and
results from Hobbes' extension of the Galilean system in two
directions, into geometry at one end, and into psychology
and politics at the other. The hierarchy itself is: 1)
Geometry, 2) Philosophy of motion (Galileo's system), 3)
Physics (also a part of Galileo's system), 4) Morals, and 5)
Politics. The common feature for all is that they are
studies of motion, though this is a very loose binding
principle and one Hobbes never really develops so as to join
the five sciences into a strong, unitary system. In fact,
the advocates of the MP approach (especially Peters and
Laird) willingly admit that the transitions from one
discipline to the next are not rigorously made (especially
from physics to psychology or moral philosophy).
Nonetheless, it is clear that Hobbes considered this
hierarchy to be a single system for the study of the nature of the universe; and the science of motion forms the heart of that larger system.

Briefly, the five disciplines, as treatments of motion, can be characterized as follows. To Hobbes, geometry was the science of simple motions that demonstrate how figures are generated by varieties of motions (such as the line, described as the motion of a point in a perfectly straight path), as Galileo had imagined it. The philosophy of motion, presumably Galileo's as well, considers the effects of the motions of bodies upon each other. Physics, the third of the sciences, is an investigation of the internal and invisible motions which would account for "such effects as are made by the motion of the parts of any body, as, how it comes to pass, that things when they are the same, yet seem not to be the same, but changed" (E.W. I, 72). Here Hobbes notes that we search for the sensible qualities such as light, color, heat, and cold, and the causes of sense itself (the secondary qualities not being real, but appearances, give false impressions of change). After physics we proceed to psychology or moral philosophy, i.e. the study of the motions of the mind such as appetite and aversion, or love (E.W. I, 72-73). Finally, we reach civil philosophy, the study of the motions generating artificial man-made bodies called States or Commonwealths. Here we study how the State is generated from the qualities
of human nature and the cause of "what is natural right, and what are civil duties; and in every kind of government, what are the rights of the commonwealth... the principle of the politics consist in the knowledge of these motions from the knowledge of sense and imagination..." (E.W. I, 74). The total system is a complete approach to the study of motion in all its manifestations, and Hobbes thought it important to stress the unity of the various elements of the system: "And, therefore, they that study natural philosophy, study in vain, except they begin at geometry; and such writers or disputes thereof, as are ignorant of geometry, do but make their readers and hearers lose their time" (E.W. I, 73).

In fixing the nature of political obligation the advocates of MP claim that it will be the direct outcome of Hobbes' system and method. Obligation must be explained as the motions of bodies, in this case of the human beings that generate the Commonwealth. Such an explanation requires an understanding of Hobbes' psychology and ethics, i.e. of his psychological egoism. The next section deals with these subjects.

C. PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS

Hobbes' psychology is the outcome of extending the Galilean methodology into the realm of human behavior. It is mechanical in the sense of being a causal, materialistic
explanation of human motivation, action, and deliberation. But it also includes introspection as source of information about human nature. This is not surprising given Hobbes' concern with his own character and his introspective analysis of himself; what psychology would do would be to generalize his insights about himself and express them as descriptions of human nature itself.

What he had observed in himself, of course, were motions conforming to Galilean principles, namely sensations and thoughts explicable as internal motions of the brain or heart. This conformed, moreover, to the fact that all phenomena are explicable as bodies in motion. What we might call 'mental events,' Hobbes called functions of the living body. Human beings are composite systems of physical particles subject to numerous influences from the external world mediated by the sense organs, which then set up internal reactions of the mind or passions according to the appropriate laws, the most important being the drive for self-preservation. Human beings, then, like the rest of universe function according to the laws of mechanics, the laws of motion. Psychology is the study of the laws of motion particular to human beings; it is the description of our reactions to external stimuli either positive (appetite/desire) or negative (aversion).

The transition from physics to psychology is accomplished through the bridging concept or term
'endeavor'. Hobbes defines 'endeavor' as, "...motion made in less space and time than can be given; that is, less than can be determined or assigned by exposition or number; that is, motion made through the length of a point, and in an instant or point of time..." (E.W. I, 206). This concept harkens back to the Galilean methodology in that it is an "unobservable" (since it occupies less space and time than can be given) used to help explain that which is observable (human behavior); but nonetheless it is posited in purely physical terms as a particle of matter in motion, albeit unobservable. As Reik explains the concept: "Endeavor is conceived as an infinitely small, instantaneous motion or tendency toward motion...(it) is 'appetite' or 'aversion' inmen, depending on whether the motion is toward or away from an object" (Reik, p.74). We need to note that 'endeavor' is a motion, not merely a tendency to motion, and that motion is always the motion of matter of some sort.

Hobbes uses endeavor in two ways: 1) as the connecting term in the chain of reasoning that joins his mechanics or physics to his psychology, and 2) to help formulate his description of the role of pleasure and pain in guiding human behavior. The causal chain producing human actions is not observable throughout, so that Hobbes needed to posit some physical entity or motion to complete the chain. Peters and Tajfel explain Hobbes' solution:

...whenever there was a gap in observable motion--e.g. between the object and the sense organ or
between the stimulation of the sense organ and the movements of the muscles in appetite or aversion, Hobbes postulated 'endeavors' which transmitted the motion. For, according to his theory, motions from the external world not only move to the brain and produce images; they also affect the vital motions of the body which are manifest in the circulation of the blood, breathing, excretion, nutrition, and other such processes. (Peters and Tajfel, p.169)

To explain the various elements and relations between the elements of Hobbes' theory introduced above, let me begin by distinguishing the two sorts of motion in the body that Hobbes posits. The first is 'vital motion'; as Peters and Tajfel note, it is observable as the circulation of the blood, excretion, and other involuntary actions. Vital motions begin with life itself and continue without ceasing throughout the life of the person (or animal), doing so without the conscious direction of the person (E.W. III, 38). The second type of motion is 'animal motion', or voluntary motion, and is exemplified by walking, talking, or the moving of one's limbs. This motion is mediated by the imagination; it is conscious behavior, "first fancied in our minds" (E.W. III, 38). For Hobbes all voluntary motion has its first beginnings in the imagination. 'Imagination' is "decaying sense" (E.W. III, 4), the 'decay' being the function of remoteness in time or the overriding of other sense impressions; it is not unlike memory, although there may be more involved in acts of "creative" imagination (when we compound images such as that of a horse with that of a man to form the image of a centaur; for purely creative
imagination--images created out of nothing, having no connection to previous experience--are impossible given Hobbes' theory). Imagination is motion in the brain stimulated by sensation and mediated by phantasms, i.e. motions produced by other motions and producing motions in other bodies (Peters, p.85). Images are not clearly explained by Hobbes and seem to be motions of physical particles in the brain, but also to have a mentalistic interpretation. Hobbes apparently had no interest in working out the epistemological status of images and it (image) is an ambiguous concept at best (Peters, p.78).

Motion from the external world not only reaches the brain to produce phantasms and images; it also affects the vital motions of the heart, giving rise to the sensations of pleasure and pain. External motion reaching the heart (via the sensory organs, nerves, and 'other cords and strings' in the body) may help or hinder the vital motions. That which helps the vital motion is experienced as pleasure; that which hinders it is felt as pain. What helps the vital motion we call 'good', what we shun as an impediment to vital motion we call 'evil', thus we call pleasure good and pain evil (E.W. III, 41). The body, further, will be guided so as to preserve the motion which aids its own vital motion, and be guided to avoid that which hinders its own vital motion. For Hobbes these motions to preserve or avoid are the first endeavors of animal motion; the first endeavor
tending toward what we experience as pleasure is called 'appetite' (or 'desire'), and the first endeavor that 'shuns what is troublesome' or what is experienced as painful is called 'aversion' (E.W. III, 39; E.W. I, 407). That is, "appetite or aversion are simply small bodily motions within us, and pleasure is merely an 'appearance' produced by the endeavor" (McNeilly, "article", p.194). It is Hobbes' postulation of these unobservable endeavors that completes the material causal chain in human behavior and allows Hobbes to make the claim that human actions can be explained in mechanical terms just as the motions of falling bodies are explained.

Hobbes considered thought of any kind to be motion as well; in particular, thought is motion in the brain. There are two kinds of thought mentioned by Hobbes: regulated and unregulated, what we might call roughly 'rational' and 'irrational' thinking.* There were two types of regulated thought, Hobbes believed. The first was deliberation in the classic Aristotellean sense: a desire posits an end, and means to attaining the end are traced backward from the end until something within the agent's power to perform is reached. At this point the agent acts

*Unregulated thinking follows no rational order or plan and was of little interest to Hobbes. As a result he formulated no principles for explaining or describing this type of thought.
to set the causal sequence toward the end in motion. Hobbes believed that animals and humans both possessed this 'inventive' faculty.

The second, and more important, sort of regulated thinking Hobbes called 'prudence'. Only humans could exercise prudential thought. In this type of deliberation the starting point is the action that is within the person's power to perform combined with their store of past experiences. That is, memory and past experience of pleasure and pain are used to analyze the probable effects of the contemplated action and to speculate as to whether the effects might be pleasurable or painful. If the agent foresees pleasurable effects, desire results; if painful effects 'fear'. Prudential reasoning would be useful or fruitful, Hobbes believed, in direct proportion to the amount of past experience the agent had to draw upon: "As he that foresees what will become of a criminal, reasons what he hath seen follows on the like crime before; having this order of thoughts, the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows" (E.W. III, 14-15).

The deliberative process itself Hobbes described as follows

When in the mind of men, appetites, and aversions, hopes, and fears, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good and evil consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an appetite to it; sometimes an aversion from it; ...the whole sume of desires, aversions, hopes and fears, continued till the thing be
either done, or thought impossible, is what we call DELIBERATION...(E.W. III, 47-48)

In deliberation, the last appetite or aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the WILL; the act, not the faculty of willing...Will therefore is the last appetite in deliberating. (E.W. III, 48-49)

Will may be further clarified as Peters explains:

Will is not simply the last appetite in deliberating; for often we would be inclined to say of a man who eventually decided to stay in bed that he did not exert his will. Rather it is deliberation carried on under the aegis of self-regard, in which self-regard reinforces what Hobbes called an appetite and enables it to be the last one in the field. (Peters, p.134)

The remaining factor in Hobbes' psychology of motivation is his analysis of the role of the passions. Roughly, the major passions are love and hate, being the same as appetite and aversion except that the object of the passion is present (the object of appetite or aversion being absent), and joy and grief, which involve anticipation of future ends rather than just an immediately perceived object (Peters, p.134). The remaining passions, such as hope or despair, are compounded from the first four (e.g. hope is appetite along with an opinion that we will attain the end). The most important of these other passions as far as Hobbes' ethics and politics are concerned is fear, which he defines as aversion joined to the opinion that the object will harm the person. Fear of death is the strongest fear of all, says Hobbes, and of course figures prominently in his political philosophy, as we shall see.

As far as the social aspects of human psychology,
Hobbes saw social life as a race for precedence which ended only with death. Foresight and the ability to anticipate and plan for the future are necessary for success in this race. Here joy and grief are specific forms of pleasures and pain that encourage or hinder people in the race for precedence; they are mental pleasures and pains which "arise from the expectation that proceeds from foresight of the end or consequence of things; for whether those things in the sense please or displease" (E.W. III, 43). The key notion now becomes power, i.e. the anticipation a person has that they can produce or attain the end which they anticipate. "Wherefore all conception of future, is conception of power able to produce something. Whosoever therefore expecteth pleasure to come, must conceive withal some power in himself by which the same may be attained" (E.W. IV, 37). In short, if we expect joy, our anticipation drives us forward toward our goal; but if we expect grief, our aversion shunts us from our course. What we expect, of course, depends upon our conception of the power we have over the events involved.

The concept of power included not just the usual notion of powers as faculties (e.g. the mental power or nutritive power as functions of our mental or physical faculties). It included the power gained through the acquisition of things such as riches, favor, or a place of authority. Such things are attained in the first place
through the exercise of our mental, physical, and other powers (as faculties). Moreover, as "the power of one man restricteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another, power simply is no more but the excess of the power of one above another; for equal powers opposed destroy one another; and such their opposition is called contention" (E.W. IV, 38). Here the desire for the power to control our own lives and ensure our own goals drives us to compete with others for goods and favor, as well as for the simple means to survival.

Here the notion of power is functioning in a manner like that of the notion of endeavor, that is, as a bridging concept; where 'endeavor' bridges the gap between physics and psychology, 'power' bridges the gap between psychology and politics. Consider Hobbes' famous phrase, "...I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless striving of power after power, that ceaseth only in death" (E.W. III, 85-76). Here the desire for power refers to our need to acquire the power to control and dominate others who might interfere with our pursuit of our own best interest. We (and others) must compete with each other for the acquisition of such additional power if we are to be successful in the race for precedence; for, as Peters reminds us, to fail to compete is to die (Peters, p.139). It is this psychological predeliction for a massing power that Hobbes' political theory seeks to overcome. The
political structures Hobbes postulates are designed to overcome and end the competitive drive for power, to end the struggle for power over one another that terminates in death (with the loser dying in the struggle and the winner continuing the struggle with others until his own death).

Hobbes' concept of human psychology is perfectly consistent with his own view of the universe as composed of matter and motion. All human thought and action is reducible to the motion of certain internal organs and particles of matter in response to external stimuli (i.e. motions) according to causal laws. As Samuel Mintz observes, "Hobbes never considered the possibility that the product of mental activity--thought--is different in kind from the physical processes which given rise to it" (Mintz, pp.65-66). To say human beings are free within this strict causal schema is only to say that they are not hindered in acting upon their choices by external impediments; all animal motion, choices or actions, is voluntary but causally determined. Deliberation leading to a choice or action is a succession of phantasms passing across the mind (all explained as matter and motion), terminating in an act of will which causes the body to act or not act. Further, there is no truly creative imagination, except the "creative" compounding of previous images, since imagination itself is described as internal motion in the brain and is determined in the same ways as any other motion. The desire
to acquire what is pleasurable and to avoid what is painful are the governing motivations for all human behavior (manifested as fear of death, or desire to acquire power, etc.); and both are explicable in material, mechanical terms.

Social interaction, as well, is explicable in mechanical terms, the most important being power. Thus, the total picture Hobbes gives of human nature is mechanistic and egoistic: human beings are psychological egoists (hedonists) seeking their own good. As J.W.N. Watkins characterizes Hobbes' description of human nature

This man, according to Hobbes's picture of him, is a sort of engine governed by its mainspring or heart. This picture yields various psychological principles, some testable, some untestable. Among the latter is the principle that men are essentially egocentric. What a man desires is determined by what encourages his vital motion; and he can pursue only what he desires...

(Watkins, pp. 110-111)

From this mechanistic picture of human nature Hobbes drew out the two principles he would use to demonstrate the necessity of contracts or covenants and the basis of moral and civil prudence:

...the one arising from the concupiscible part, which desires to appropriate to itself the use of those things in which all others have a joint interest; the other proceeding from the rational which teaches every man to fly a contra-natural dissolution, as the greatest mischief that can arrive from nature. (E.W. II, vii)

Thus, everything human beings do, they do out of the desire for power or from the fear of an untimely death, as Peters explains:
The fear of death, especially violent death, which encompasses all the aversions, alone can damp down the jet of appetite. The appearances, our pretentions to generosity or to disinterestedness, are but cloaks to hide the struggle between egoistic motives; the reality beneath is the thrust and recoil of a pleasure-pain calculating machine. (Peters, p.143)

Earlier we noted that what is 'good' or 'evil' is relative to the individual agent for Hobbes, good being the object of the agent's desire, evil being the object of the agent's aversion (E.W. III, 41). There is no metaphysical or objective content to either term, such that we could derive any common rule of good and evil from the nature of the objects themselves (E.W. III, 41). What the term 'good' is applied to is a defined relatively "to the emotions, desires, or interests of the person using it" (Peters, p.151). Thus, goodness, for Hobbes, was the capacity of an object to attract us (E.W. V, 192). There is, however, a certain generality to the terms, as Laird says

Evil was actually molestum (E.W. III, 42), an objective damage or hurt, and pleasure...was a physical occurrence that corroborated vital motion. Again, Hobbes habitually regarded death as the greatest of all evils, not only because dying was painful, but also and chiefly because death implied 'the loss of all power' (E.W. IV, 83). (Laird, p.170)

Thus, Hobbes' conception of good and evil are not totally subjective, it is not the case that any statement about goodness or evil will be a purely psychological statement about the agent. Rather, Hobbes simply anticipates many modern philosophers by noting that it is not any definite
quality in the object itself that we refer to when we speak of goodness or evil, although we call the object good or evil in virtue of some property it possesses. The qualities we identify vary from person to person and from circumstance to circumstance. The only "common rule", then, is the understanding of the speaker and the audience as to what the term means. Each person's desires ultimately determine what qualities they seek or avoid.

Hobbes further refined his analysis by connecting goodness to reason, which allowed him to distinguish short- and long-term goods. "Reason declaring peace to be good, it follows by the same reason, that all the necessary means to peace be good also" (E.W. II, 48). This contrasts to our irrational appetite for the most immediate present good, even at the cost of forgoing what is good in the long run (peace, in this case). Hobbes, however, believing that he understood human nature, and human beings are by nature rational, declared that peace was what any rational person would desire if they correctly understood their permanent, long-term interests. Peters elaborates

A man may not in fact desire peace at a particular moment; but he would desire it if he reflected calmly on what would give him pleasure on the whole and in the long run. Sobered by fear of death he would see the desirability of peace and of the means necessary to attain it...And all men were in part rational because of their fear of death. This analysis preserves the reference to desire as part of the meaning of 'good', but 'object of desire' is expanded to include what a man would desire if he were rational. (Peters, p.154)
This fuller analysis paves the way directly for Hobbes' use of his psychological principles to demonstrate the necessity of contracts and the fundamentals of moral and civil prudence.

The demonstration of moral principles, for Hobbes, was a matter of deriving them from his postulates describing human nature. The set of principles or laws to be derived would apply not simply to the individual agent, but to the governing of social relations between individuals, generally. Morality is the extension of the principles of individual good to what is good in relation to others. That these moral principles were to be derived from an analysis of human nature, from psychological postulates, was dictated by the nature of Hobbes' methodology. According to Watkins

His resoluto-compositive method precluded any appeal to external norms, any importing of extraneous considerations into his civil philosophy. It confined him to the analysis of existing society into its individual parts; to the establishing of the principles which govern their behaviour; and to derivations from these. If this yields prescriptions or imperatives, these can only have been derived from these psychological principles. (Watkins, p.77)

In addition to the influence of the constraints of his methodology, Hobbes' derivation of social rules was also influenced by certain aspects of classical natural law theory. The idea that morality concerned the derivation of the rules that must be accepted to limit the pursuit of good when others are affected and that there was a small number
of such rules called laws of nature goes back to the Stoics (Peters, p.155). The Stoics regarded this body of rules as universally binding and in no way conventional in the way the laws of particular governments were conventional. With the coming of Christianity, "The system of natural law came gradually to be regarded as a selection from God's rules for man which could be rationally discerned as distinct from being supernaturally revealed" (Peters, p.156). During the Renaissance, interest was focused on man as an individual, and so the law of nature came to be regarded as rooted in man-the-individual, who nevertheless resembled all other individuals in various respects. But natural law was not derivative from man's civic or ecclesiastical status (Peters, p.156).

During the era of religious controversy immediately prior to and during Hobbes' lifetime, natural law theory was popular in its latest form which put binding restraints on kings as well as subjects, thereby limiting absolutism. Finally, the Dutchman Grotius tried to translate natural law into a scientifically established set of rules on which a system of international law could be erected. Grotius attempted to demonstrate that law had an "axiomatic foundation in self-evident principles which were clear and distinct to any rational being" (Peters, p.157). Thus Grotius had attempted a Galilean resolution of the nature of law, one that certainly would have appealed to Hobbes.
Natural law theory, then, was something readily available to Hobbes, as he sought a way to articulate his account of political life and obligation.

What resulted from Hobbes' assimilation of these two threads of thought was a natural law theory that was grounded in the psychological principles of human nature. More specifically, Hobbes believed that he could derive roughly the same set of laws as Grotius from his own view of humans as beings who are both rational and afraid of death. That is, and here is Hobbes' original interpretation of natural law theory, he reduced natural laws to maxims of prudence. This is a major aspect of MP interpretation. Since there can be no transcendent principles of morality on Hobbes' materialistic view of the universe, and since human psychology is the only source available for deriving moral rules, and since human nature is egoistic, the laws of nature must be those that serve individual self-interest within a social setting. Or, as Watkins states it, "the so-called 'moral' law, or law of nature, consists of precepts or general rules found out by rational derivation from principles which all individuals, given their passionate make-up, will assent...the law that tells us how to live with other men--is securely anchored in our deepest wants" (Watkins, p.84). The laws of nature are maxims of prudence insofar as 'prudence' is limited to considerations affecting only the individual agent.
A LAW OF NATURE, lex naturalis, is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away that means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved... (E.W. III, 116-117)

Finally, it is clear, according to MP, that Hobbes' laws of nature are not moral laws in the traditional sense which separates morality from prudence. Hobbes, as Watkins asserts, should be seen as a reductionist who reduced all moral laws to prudential, non-moral, hypothetical imperatives. For it would be a mistake to interpret Hobbes' talk of natural laws as 'moral' laws distinct from a prudential character in the same way it would be a mistake to cite Copernicus' use of the term 'sunrise' as evidence that he had abandoned his heliocentric thesis (Watkins, p.83). In other words, Hobbes had collapsed "the ought/want dualism into a single system of basic wants and proven hypothetical imperatives" (Watkins, p.85).

Hobbes maintained more or less the same set of rules that Grotius had derived, but Hobbes held that they were axioms that any person who was rational and afraid of death had to accept. Basic egoistic human nature is such that humans shun death "by a certain impulsion of nature" and "there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies" (E.W. III, 117). It is this aspect of our nature that saves us, for as Hobbes says, if it were only our irrational or 'concupiscible' side that governed our actions there would
be no society and life would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (E.W. III, 113). Without restraint on such irrational, self-serving actions humans would find themselves in constant war with each other for those things that best satisfy their own desires; they would, that is, find themselves in that state of constant warfare of all against all that Hobbes calls the State of Nature. If only our irrational side ruled us we would die in the struggle in the State of Nature, especially given the relative equality between people in body and mind, such that even the weakest is capable of destroying the strongest. Hobbes describes the evils of such a state as follows:

In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. (E.W. III, 113)

However, the fear of death does cause people to stop their pursuit of personal interest to reflect upon the conditions around them and the predicament they are in as a result of following their drives for power and precedence. Fear causes people to search for a way out of their predicament. It is reason that provides the way itself. That is, it is the passions of human beings that have created the aversive conditions they find themselves in; and
it must be reason that alters the passions' control of human action to allow them to escape the State of Nature. Reason, for Hobbes, is in itself without force or power to influence the actions of people. Rather it is simply a tool, either used or rejected, of the passions, i.e., the pleasures and displeasures, of people (Gotesky, p.419). Historically, Hobbes writes, "as oft as reason is against, so oft will a man be against reason" (E.W. IV, xiii). Reason can guide people toward peace (the opposite condition of war) and justice "only when it is employed in the discovery of those principles by means of which the passions can be controlled and utilized; and only as man grows in understanding of his passions can he effectively use them to live the life of reason, of precept" (Gotesky, p.419).

What reason shows is that peace is the truly natural condition for human beings, because peace and security are the condition of those who live in terms of their whole natures (passions and reason), of their whole rational being within the order of nature. The Laws of Nature are derived by reason from reflection upon the passions; prudence alone cannot accomplish this. The actions guided solely by prudence or passion are often violent or contradictory, as in the State of Nature, and set people against each other. The Laws of Nature, on the other hand, never put people in such opposition if they are followed. Therefore, the Passions (or prudence) alone cannot point to the ways of
peace (E.W. IV, 87). Reason is required to clarify the nature of the passions and to show how they can best be satisfied without catastrophic results. Reason probes for the essential objects of the passions and, having discovered them, frames the Laws of Nature such that following them will allow a person to attain these objects without being destroyed.

Every man by natural passion, calleth that good which pleaseth him for the present, or so far forth as he can foresee; and in like manner, that which displeaseth him, evil. And therefore he that foreseeth the whole way to his preservation, which is the end that every one by nature aimeth at, must also call it good, and the contrary evil. And this is that good and evil, which not every man in passion calleth so, but all men by reason. And therefore the fulfilling of all these laws is good in reason, and the breaking of them evil. (E.W. IV, 109)

For Hobbes, then, prudence alone cannot, or does not cause vital motions sufficient to guide appetite and animal motion toward peace. Hobbes' explanation of the psychology of human action had more than a passing agreement with his materialism, as Laird says, "since he was at pains to show that men's appetites were literally physical motions, and habitually assumed that appetite had to be tutored by sense, imagination, and reason" (Laird, p.162). Since reason is nothing other than a particular set of motions in the brain and since these motions, like others called prudence, cause motions in the regions around the heart, and thus affect the vital motions, it follows that reason differs from prudence only in its capacity to handle many more aspects of
experience than prudence through the use of manipulation of language.

Prudence cannot form a conception of long-range goods such as peace and security that will affect the vital motions such that peace will be chosen over the immediate satisfaction of lesser desires (the attaining of immediate but lesser goods). But reason can conceive peace and security, can grasp the causes of people's misery in the state of war caused by the guidance of prudence alone, and thereby can form a conception of how to avoid this condition. It is the limitation of prudence's ability that leads human beings to a state of unhappiness, not a flaw in prudence itself. Reason, by virtue of its ability to conceptualize, constructs a scenario wherein people assign their equal powers to one person who acts as the coercive agent necessary to ensure total peace. That is, reason formulates the conception of peace and security by recognizing that the conditions of a life guided solely by passion or prudence are self-destructive in the long run, and also imagines or visualizes the way around such a life.

Reason, then, shows us that peace is necessary for our survival and that there are certain articles of peace, or what Hobbes calls laws of nature, upon which we can base our agreement to abide by their provisions. Even in the State of Nature human beings can know the laws which are consistent with the egoistic drive for survival; for Hobbes,
we can explicate the rationale for any civil society by deriving these rules using Galilean resolution from the underlying motivations of the members of a society. The point here is "to show what sort of rules and conventions for civil society man as a natural machine must necessarily assent to and need to have supported by the sword of the sovereign" (Peters, p.160). Thus, the derivation of the laws of nature demonstrates that peace is necessary and that a covenant must be formed to ensure that the articles of peace are followed. In other words, the covenant is necessary to ensure moral and civil prudence. Accordingly, Hobbes' derivation and articulation of the key laws of nature focuses on these points:

And because the condition of man...is a condition of war of every one against every one...in such a condition, every man has a right to every thing...therefore as long as this natural right...endureth, there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time, which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently, it is a precept, or general rule of reason, that every man, ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war. The first branch of which rule, containeth the first, and fundamental law of nature; which is, to seek peace, and follow it. The second, the sum of the right of nature; which is, by all means we can, to defend ourselves.

From this...is derived this second law; that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth as for peace, and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and he contended with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself...

Right is laid aside, either by simply renouncing it; or by transferring it to another....And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his right; then it is he said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not
to hinder those, to whom such right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he ought, and it is his DUTY, not to make void that voluntary act of his own...

The mutual transferring of right is that which men call CONTRACT...

From that law of nature, by which, we are obliged to transfer to another, such rights, as being retained hinder the peace of mankind, there followeth a third; which is this, that men perform their covenants made: without which, covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and the right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of war. (E.W. III, 117-130)

Thus, Hobbes demonstrates the necessity of the covenant and the obligation to keep it from the laws of nature which are, in turn, derived from the analysis of human nature and psychology. Here Hobbes' natural law of contracts simply reflects his perception of what is necessary for a person to do to preserve their life, assuming the desire to preserve it exists. The "ought" is derived from a simple causal analysis: "Given the nature of human drives, a particular effect (preservation of life) will result from a particular cause (keeping contracts)" (Jones, p.147), and, Hobbes holds, from it alone.

Hobbes' demonstration seems most valid if we view it as an example of a Galilean "thought-experiment" rather than as an empirical or factual description. What Hobbes has done is to isolate the irrational and rational aspects of human nature as he saw it, and then in Galilean to fashion explore each independently to uncover the consequences of following one or the other's dictates exclusively. The war of the State of Nature is necessary given only human self-
assertiveness and egoistic motivation. But given the overwhelming fear of death humans will accept the conditions necessary to avoid death. As Peters describes Hobbes' moves here:

He was conducting a Galilean experiment of the imaginary sort—a resolution of society into its clear and distinct parts so as to reconstruct the whole in order of logical dependence rather than of historical genesis. He could thus treat men 'as if but now sprung out of the earth and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity' (E.W. II, 109). Having isolated the underlying movements of men towards each other—their desire for power—he deduced the consequences that followed from this postulate alone. This was the state of war...

Having shown the logical consequences of man's desire for power, Hobbes passed to the other clear and distinct component, the fear of death....In the calmness occasioned by this overwhelming fear man's reason informs him that peace is a necessity for survival and it also 'suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement'... (Peters, pp.158-159)

From here the compositive step begins:

If these two components were now put together...men would be demonstrated as poised precariously between civil society, which was the ultimate consequence of accepting the laws of nature and enforcing them by the sword of the sovereign, and the state of nature. (Peters, p.161)

And, of course, the necessity of avoiding the State of Nature causes men to accept natural law and the rules of the sovereign.

The rationale behind Hobbes' derivation of the necessity of the covenant and the acceptance of the sovereign is the chaotic state of English politics in Hobbes' time. Hobbes' analysis is a Galilean resolution of this situation into the simple components of human nature
that are ultimately the basis of it. So far as humans are egoistic and rational, they must recognize human nature for what it is and see that there are certain necessary means to be accepted to obtain the peace and security they desire. Acceptance of these social rules is based on the fear of death and the desire for self-preservation; and it is only the fear of death that can ensure that the rules are obeyed, as Peters points out: "Fear of punishment is the cause of political obedience; were it no for the fact that the sword dangles over the head of every member of a state, not motive would be strong enough to counteract the disruptive passions of men" (Peters, p.194). Or, as Sabine puts it, "Strictly speaking he is saying merely that in order to cooperate men must do what they dislike to do, on pain of consequences which they dislike still more. In no other sense is there logically any obligation in Hobbes's system" (Sabine, p.469). The last element of Hobbes' system, his political theory, according to MP, simply applies these conclusions to the structuring of the State.

D. POLITICAL THEORY

The transition from political history to political science came when Hobbes asserted that the state could be regarded as a wholly artificial body, analogous to a geometrical figure. We, the citizens, are surely the constituent matter of the state, and surely our adherence to the laws is the cause of the state's generation and existence, as our adherence to geometrical rules generates figures. Was not the state
in this sense an artificial body created by our art? And since we ourselves construct the state, could we not understand the properties and implications of civic institutions simply by deducing the consequences of our own voluntary motions? (Reik, p.64)

The analysis of the nature of the State followed the same methodology as the analysis of human psychology; for the State is nothing more than an artificial body constructed by humans. The same causal laws that govern all bodies will therefore govern the actions of the constituent parts and causes of the State and will be explicable using the same mechanistic method of analysis that had been used throughout Hobbes' work.

Hobbes' aim was to demonstrate the necessity of accepting an absolute sovereign (a monarch, preferably, but he left the choices open) in order to prevent, through the coercion of laws, the return of the anarchy of the State of Nature, which would otherwise eventually overcome the rational agreement to the terms of the covenant, given the nature of human passion and egoistic desire. There must be a State empowered to enforce the terms of the covenant, Hobbes believed; otherwise the covenant could not endure and chaos and anarchy would continue.

As we saw earlier, however, there was a model at hand by means of which Hobbes could present his Galilean analysis of the rationale for civil society, namely social contract theory, which Hobbes already knew of through the works of Grotius and others. The social contract model fit
Hobbes' needs almost perfectly, in that he needed a rationale for free and equal individuals, which people were in the State of Nature, to admit themselves to be bound or obliged at the same time that they could remain free to pursue their paramount interests as individuals (Peters, p.187). The contract provided a way to handle just this sort of a problem. Peters explains:

For in a contract free and equal individuals voluntarily enter into a relationship which imposes obligations on them. And the conditions on which they are obliged can be written into the contract. So the contract provides a model for justifying the acceptance of social control in a way which is compatible with human dignity and individual liberty. ...It was a logical device for stating certain typical demands for liberty, limited government by consent, and the end of traditional forms of authority...The device was widespread and popular because of its usefulness to the rising forces of individualism, commercialism, and Protestantism. Hobbes' great ingenuity consisted in taking over this logical weapon and slewing it round so that its broadsides were directed against those who had fashioned it. He used it to show that absolutism was the logical outcome of consistent individualism. (Peters, p.188)

Thus, Hobbes' prior analyses of human nature as egoistic and of the overriding concern for security allowed him to ground absolutism in axioms of mechanistic human nature and to present it as the only rationally defensible form of government, much to the chagrin of those who believed in government by consent rather than absolutism. "The dispositions of mean are such that except they be restrained through fear of some coercive power, every man will distrust and dread each other" (E.W. II, xiv, xv). An absolute sovereign would best exercise the necessary coercive force.
Thus, the cause of political obedience is the fear of punishment since without such force no motive would be sufficient to outweigh the drives of human appetite. Since humans are driven irresistibly by fear, like stones rolling downhill, Hobbes deduced the necessity of the rule of the sword. Peters explains, "like men under the influence of an irresistible impulse, the only reasons that they would accept would be those indicating means to objectives dictated by their fear. Thus, given the de facto existence of civil society, Hobbes' analysis revealed fear as its only possible constitutive cause and self-preservation as the only possible reason for its institution" (Peters, p.194). Hobbes, anticipating the objection that fear alone would not be sufficient to generate civil society, writes:

It is objected: it is so improbable that men should grow into civil societies out of fear, that if they had been afraid, they would not have endured each other's looks. They presume, I believe, that to fear is nothing else than to be affrighted. I comprehend in this word fear, a certain foresight of future evil; neither do I conceive flight the sole property of fear, but to distrust, suspect, take heed, provide so that they may not fear, is also incident to the fearful. They would go to sleep, shut their doors; they who travel, carry their swords with them, because they fear theives. Kingdoms guard their coasts, and frontiers with forts and castles; cities are compact with walls; and all for fear of neighboring kingdoms and towns. Even the strongest armies, and the most accomplished for fight, yet sometimes parley for peace, as fearing each other's power, and lest they be overcome. It is through fear that men secure themselves by flight, indeed, and in corners, if they think they cannot escape otherwise; but for the most part by arms and defensive weapons; whence it happens that daring to come forth they know each other's spirits. But then if they fight, civil society ariseth from the victory; if they agree, from the agreement. (E.W. II, 6n)
Hobbes did not take this to be an empirical or historical analysis of fact, however, as did some contract theorists. It is rather an element in a Galilean resolutio of civil society into its simple elements, namely individuals and the traits of human nature they display. The State of Nature functions as a hypothetical explanation, a "thought-experiment", for the existing state of affairs. Hobbes imagines that in the State of Nature each person is right to protect their life and to use all means necessary to do so (E.W. II, 8). They also are right to obtain what they want and to use whatever force is necessary to get it (E.W. II, 10). The right to self-preservation is a right that one cannot be obliged to give up in the State of Nature simply because it is psychologically impossible for one to do so (Reik, p.91). For MP that is not a legal entitlement, nor a matter of tradition or morality: it is simply a psychological necessity.

However, as we have seen, fear drives us to accept certain laws of nature, including the second which prescribes that every person should lay down their right to all things and be content with liberty equal to that which everyone has against him. This is accomplished by the agreement of everyone to the terms of the covenant already outlined, and is a matter of transferring one's rights to another so that the transferrer is obliged not to hinder the recipient. This, Hobbes says
...is the generation of the great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe under the immortal God, our peace and defense. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred upon him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to perform the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad...

And he that carrieth this person, is called SOVEREIGN, and said to have sovereign power; and every one besides, his subject. (E.W. III, 158).

So, is fear by which the sovereign ensures that it is never to anyone's advantage to violate the terms of the covenant even when it seems to be to their advantage to do so (usually from the perspective of short-term interest as perceived by the person's passions rather than by reason).

The contract functions as if each person has authority the State to have and use their two rights of nature, thereby making "artificial chains, called civil laws, which they themselves by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end to the lips of that man, or assembly, to whom they have given the sovereign power; and at the other end to their own ears" (E.W. III, 198). In obeying the sovereign and the civil laws each person is submitting to laws they had taken part in instituting and was therefore exercising their liberty in obeying laws that were conducive to obtaining the ends of internal peace and security (Peters, p.207). The State or Commonwealth thus is created by the voluntary agreement that unites a group of individuals into a whole, into one artificial "person". The ruler that results is called the sovereign and is created by
the contract, through not a party to it.

Hobbes, using the Galilean resoluto-compositive method, has shown that the creation of the State results from the motive of fear of death as the only motive sufficient to counteract individuals' self-assertion, and finally deduces that the State must be strong enough to enforce its will through fear as well. To maintain security and preserve life the State must be able to force obedience to unsavory commands. Punishment or threat of punishment is the force behind the state's ability to do so. The necessity of having the power to punish and of having the ability to best secure peace dictates a certain structure for the sovereignty, according to Hobbes. That is, Hobbes believes that the sovereign must be such as to be able to accomplish these ends. Moreover, the sovereign best able to do so, Hobbes says, is one that is perpetual, absolute, and unitary.

For to divide or limit sovereignty would be illogical. There would be a constant danger of the sovereign speaking with a divided voice and being unable to enforce his commands; and since safety is the sole reason for the institution of a sovereign, and since these limitations on sovereignty would endanger the safety of the subject, individuals could not logically institute a sovereign who would perhaps be unable to perform effectively the functions for which he had been instituted. ...And complete safety entails complete submission to a sovereign. Absolutism is the logical consequence of government by popular consent once the real interests of any man in consenting to government are properly realized. (Peters, p.194)

Thus, complete safety entails complete submission and an absolute sovereign is the logical end of Hobbes' analysis.
This conclusion ends Hobbes' scientific resolution of the nature of the political obligations of the citizens of any state, and the best political structure for that State.

To summarize MP, we can trace the steps Hobbes has taken as the advocates of this view posit them:

1) Hobbes begins with a method and view of the universe as matter and motion, taken from the new science of Galileo.

2) The model of all behavior is the falling body's conformity to mechanical law.

3) Acceptance of the method rules out any non-physical explanations of anything—especially obligation.

4) All things have one universal cause—motion.

5) External motions produce thought, reactions to external motions are drives toward self-preservation (aversion/attraction to pain or pleasure).

6) The State of Nature is war, causally derived from a material causal chain.

7) Prudence, desire for survival, and reason spur human beings to seek an end to this state of war; the cause of the solution is the contractual formation of civil society.

8) The need to ensure that no one will break the contract to the detriment of the others shows that some way of keeping contracts is necessary. This is fear of punishment which, as the ground of political obligation now
becomes a central element in civil society.
WORKS CITED

INTRODUCTION AND CHAPTER I


CHAPTER II

THE NATURAL LAW THESIS

A. INTRODUCTION

The crucial point of departure for the various interpretations of Hobbes' theory of obligation is the question of the meaning, status, and content of natural laws. The question of the status of natural law is important due to its intimate connection with the whole problem of the grounds of political obligation. Where the traditionalist thesis requires viewing natural laws as maxims of prudence, the moral interpretation views them as deontological or as moral imperatives. Despite various differences, A.E. Taylor, Howard Warrender, and F.C. Hood, the major exponents of the natural law view, share the belief that the basic source of Hobbes' political thought is not to be found in his natural philosophy. Rather, they believe, it is to be found in some interpretation of his use of a natural law morality.

Beginning with the traditional interpretation, it was usually held that Hobbes does not have a genuine theory of moral obligation since he admits only prudential motives
of self-interest for human actions. However, the proponents of the moral interpretation claim that

...not only does this charge beg the question of whether the moral quality of an obligation is a function of the motives men have for complying with it; it is also very difficult to reconcile with the universal validity which Hobbes attributes to the laws of nature and the requirement contained in his doctrine of obligations of conscience that all men make a sincere estimate of the dangers involved in covenanating with others (Olafson, p.24).

The issue becomes one of establishing the claim that the laws of nature are divine moral commands within Hobbes' theory of obligation.

In general, the natural law interpretation construes self-interest in terms of compliance with the natural law and makes the individual's well-being causally dependent upon a sincere effort to obey these laws. The only way this can be done successfully is if the laws themselves are commands addressed to all human beings by an obliger who is capable of punishing those who do not obey. Within Hobbes' system God functions as that authority. Given the role of God in Hobbes' system, the connection between self-interest and compliance with the laws of nature becomes direct and necessary, in contrast with the more traditional view of obligation as the predictable natural consequences of acting in one way or another.

The moral interpretation is predicated upon the belief that Hobbes was more or less following in the path of classic natural law theory. The central contentions of
classic natural law theory were adopted and used by Hobbes as the basis of his theory of obligation. What are these contentions?

(1) The ruler or legislator is under a moral obligation to create positive laws that conform to a higher or natural law which is the law insofar as the latter becomes accessible to human comprehension.

(2) The subject is under a moral obligation to obey the laws set for him by the ruler so long as these are consistent with the natural law which is superior to both the sovereign and the people. When they are compatible, the subject has a moral duty to obey the positive law; when not, he is dispensed of the duty of obligation.

(3) Underlying this whole conception of political obligation there is the belief that the positive law, in order to qualify as law, must be derivable from the natural law by processes of deduction and specification and that such derivability can be established by purely rational means. (Olafson, p.16)

These basic features of natural law theory seem to substantiate the belief that obligation, for Hobbes, is a moral duty. "Appeal-to-God" and "appeal-to-duty" arguments are given by both Taylor and Warrender, while Hood bases his case almost exclusively on a Scripturally-based appeal-to-God. There is little or no use of Hobbes' natural philosophy to ground obligation, though it is true that Hobbes couched his natural law theory in the language of the new science. The following chapter will outline the arguments used by Taylor, Warrender, and Hood to substantiate this interpretation. Since both Warrender's and Hood's books contain vast numbers of details, fine linguistic distinctions, and material not limited to Hobbes'
theory of obligation, I will not attempt full detailed summaries of their entire books. I will present the central elements of their respective interpretations of obligation, as well as some points of comparison.

B. THE TAYLOR THESIS

1. Taylor's Divergence from the Traditional View

Taylor, Warrender, and Hood all reject the traditional interpretation presented in Chapter I. There seem to be three reasons underlying the distinction they maintain between Hobbes' ethical theory and his egoistic psychology (Brown, pp.33-34):

1) As Taylor points out, there are passages in which Hobbes discusses obligation using language that cannot be explained on the egoistic/mechanistic model: the most familiar example being Hobbes' assertion that human beings are obliged \textit{in foro interno} to keep covenants even in the State of Nature. Others include his treatment of obligation in terms of covenants and submission, and his lists of duties of sovereigns to their subjects. Given these passages, one must either assume that Hobbes is systematically inconsistent or that the traditional view is in error and need of revision.

2) If the traditional view is correct, Hobbes'
ethical theory will be false or untenable if psychological egoism is false. But Hobbes' psychological egoism, as a descriptive theory of motivation, now seems quite crude and plainly false. Therefore, if we are to take Hobbes seriously and read him sympathetically with a view to determining the plausibility of his ethical theory, we must look with suspicion at the traditional view. We must assume that his ethical theory could turn out to be logically independent of his psychology.

3) Even if Hobbes himself failed to distinguish clearly between questions in moral philosophy and empirical psychology, we do make such distinctions and must determine whether Hobbes could, in principle, have done so without damage to his theory.

Taylor, in his article, "The Ethical Doctrine of Thomas Hobbes", separates himself from the traditional interpretation first by noting that the false perspective on Hobbes maintained in this view is due largely to a concentration upon the *Leviathan*. He bases his view more upon *De Cive*. From the *Leviathan* comes the mistaken impression that the 'ought' of political obligation comes from personal interest, i.e., from psychological egoism. By concentrating upon the *Leviathan* the average reader gets the impression that a good man ought to (has a duty to) obey the political sovereign without question and that the reason why he ought to do this is equally simple: he stands personally
to lose by doing anything else, and the object of every man's desire is 'always some good to himself'. To say "this is to my interest" is equivalent to saying that it is my duty; my duty, in fact, means my personal interest calmly understood (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.36).

Taylor believes that this is not all there is to Hobbes. There are really two distinct questions before Hobbes: "why ought I behave as a good citizen" and "what inducement can be given to me to do so if my knowledge of the obligation to do so is not in itself sufficiently effective?" According to Taylor, Hobbes thought that, psychologically, a person would violate the law if it was in his own interest. Thus, he had to argue that doing so would not be in their best interest. The analysis of the State of Nature does this, but this is really secondary. The answer to the first question is quite different, and precedes that analysis of the State of Nature: to break a covenant is an iniquity. For Taylor, "Hobbes's ethical doctrine proper, disengaged from an egoistic psychology with which it has no logically necessary connection, is a very strict deontology, curiously suggestive, though with interesting differences, of some of the characteristic theses of Kant (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.37).

To substantiate this, Taylor points to a passage in De Cive wherein Hobbes explains:

When the words are applied to persons, to be just signifies to be delighted in just dealing, to study
how to do righteousness, or to endeavor in all things to do that which is just; and to be unjust is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract, but some present benefit.... That man is to be accounted just, who doth just things because the law commands it, unjust things only by reason of his infirmity; and he is properly said to be unjust, who doth righteousness for fear of the punishment annexed unto the law, and unrighteousness by reason of the iniquity of his mind. (E.W. II, 32-33)

Taylor concludes:

This is precisely Kant's distinction between action done merely in accord with law and action done from law, with the characteristic difference that Hobbes is trying to reduce the law from which the virtuous man acts to the single law that a promise once duly fulfilled must be kept...The thought here is at bottom the same as Kant's, but for the differences that (1) Hobbes...reduces all injury to the violation of an express or implied promise; (2) and he has not, like Kant, thought of the 'universalizing of a maxim' as a criterion of its freedom from contradiction. But the really important point is that Hobbes agrees with Kant on the 'imperative' character of the moral law, exactly as he agrees with him in the assertion that it is the law of 'right reason'. (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.39)

This, Taylor argues, is obscured from the casual reader by the fact that Hobbes also repeatedly describes the contents of that law as 'theorems' discovered by our reason (like those of mathematics), and even goes so far as to say that these theorems only become laws proper in civil society. Once we note the character of Hobbes' argument above, we see, says Taylor, that his theory of obligation is a moral deontology.

2. The Laws of Nature

a. Laws As Dictates
The fundamental disagreement between the moral view and the traditional view is the treatment of the characterization of the Laws of Nature. Taylor notes that in the *Leviathan* they are called precepts of prudence, but in *De Cive* and *The Elements of Law* they are described as "divine laws in respect of the author thereof, God Almighty" (E.W. II, 50; Laws I, 18, sec.1). He says that the traditional view interprets the contradictory passages such that outside society (in the State of Nature) the basis of law is taken to be prudence (it pays a person better to keep his word than to break it), while in society they are converted into imperatives by the sovereign who imports the 'thou shalt' into them by making covenant-breaking actionable in his courts.

Taylor feels this view is fraught with insufferable difficulties. The first problem is that Hobbes always refers to natural laws as *dictates*, not as pieces of advice, even when referring to the State of Nature; the very use of this language implies their imperative character. Even given the use of the term 'theorem' in Hobbes, one can see that the imperative character of the law is inseparable from it. That is, "Hobbes regularly says of his natural law that it is a 'theorem' which forbids certain actions, and uses imperative or quasi-imperative language in his formulation of them (De Cive II, 1; Leviathan, XIV) (Taylor, "Doctrine", P.41)."
The recognition of this point is the key to Taylor's thesis. While Hobbes does argue that laws of nature are articles of peace and does state that violating the Laws of Nature produces negative personal consequences, Taylor holds strongly that this is not all that Hobbes argues. The concept that Laws of Nature forbid certain actions is central to Taylor's position which he explicates as follows:

...if this is all there is to be said against breach of covenant, right and wrong, as distinguished from mere prudence and imprudence, will have no more existence in the civil society than they had in the supposed 'state of nature'. If all that Hobbes really means by calling rebellion wrong is that the chances are usually against the rebel, he would have done better to base his case against disobedience simply on the de facto strength of the 'sovereign', without the very artificial attempt to justify his authority by a supposed consent of his subjects. Clearly Hobbes means something more, and that he does so is shown by the very suggestive language of his definition of a law of nature; such a law is said to be a 'precept or general Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive to his life...'. The important word here is 'forbidden'. Reason, it seems, not merely discovers that a certain course of conduct will destroy my life; it prohibits that conduct. The law is, after all, not simply a theorem to be expressed in the indicative mood; it is a command, an imperative. (Taylor, "Apology", p.137)

In strict accordance with this recognition of the imperativeness of the law, Hobbes always states that obligation is not created by the sovereign when he gives orders fortified by threats of penalties. Taylor interprets Hobbes as saying that the moral obligation to obey natural laws is prior to civil society and sovereignty. The Laws of Nature, even in the State of Nature, oblige in foro interno.
Here, Taylor thinks, Hobbes has let ambiguity creep in, and says, "Hobbes could have conveyed his meaning more unambiguously perhaps, if he had laid more stress on the point that the fundamental law of nature and morals, as he conceives it, is a law of reciprocal obligation: what it commands is peace with him who is willing also to be at peace with me, 'that peace is to be sought after, where it may be found', 'that everyman ought to endeavor Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it'" (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.41). Elsewhere Taylor makes the same point by saying that in the State of Nature people have to judge for themselves what precautions for self-protection need to be taken and have to rely upon their own abilities to make such precautions effective, but that this is not a desirable state of things, so one must pay the price of subjection for the benefits of settled peace, known law, and even justice (Taylor, "Apology", p.135). The key factor is that Hobbes does not rest on the idea that a domination originally founded on mere violence is sufficiently justified ex post facto if it provides these benefits. Hobbes "cannot be content until he has legitimated the position of 'sovereign' by arguing that I am in a tacit agreement with my fellow subjects to take his commands as the rule of life so that to disobey is to be guilty of violating a solemn engagement, an act which is clearly immoral" (Taylor, "Apology", p.135).

There is, also, a fuller implication of Hobbes'
position that his "unfriends" often overlook: "whereas the civil law can only be infringed by overt acts or or words, the moral law is violated by an improper thought or purpose" (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.41). Taylor refers to two passages in Hobbes to support this position:

But the laws which oblige conscience, may be broken by an act not only contrary to them, but also agreeable with them; if so be that he who does it, be of another opinion. For though the act itself be answerable to the laws, yet his conscience is against them. (E.W. II, 46)

Whatever Laws bind in foro interno may be broken, not only by a fact contrary to the Law, but also by a fact according to it, in case men think it contrary. For though the Action in this case, be according to the Law; yet his Purpose was against the Law, which where the Obligation is in foro interno is a breach. (E.W. III, 145)

This leads him to assert that Hobbes can consistently maintain that natural law--unlike civil law--is immutable and eternal; what natural law forbids can never be lawful, what it commands can never be unlawful (E.W. II, 46).

Here, however, Hobbes has a problem since he cannot (by reason of his nominalism) appeal to a knowledge of God's nature or desires as the basis of obligation; he cannot base the duty of obeying a moral law on the knowledge that to do otherwise would be to disobey a divine command. But as Taylor notes, for Hobbes, who had an unusually keen sense of duty, "it was impossible not to regard right and wrong-doing as, essentially, obedience and disobedience to command. Therefore...he takes the only course left open to him. The
moral law is before everything a thing commanded" (Taylor, "Apology", p.133). But given the inability to appeal directly to God, we must say that it is the command of a visible and present authority, our political superior, the sovereign. Hence, Hobbes identified moral law with the law of the land.

Taylor goes on to say that the sovereign does nothing to create the obligation to keep a covenant; his will does not create the iniquity of refusing him the obedience we have promised. The sovereign merely decrees that performing certain covenants is illegal, and prescribes the exact form our covenants must take to count as constituting a contract. The submission to the sovereign is a moral duty, not merely a formula for securing personal safety. The moral obligation is imparted from the eternal natural law, which is prior to the formation of civil society. If Hobbes is granted this view on covenants and their nature, then the duty of obeying the civil law is, for Taylor, part of a consistent deontology--we do not require the psychological egoism of the traditional view to be obligated (we may require it to be motivated though--here the stress on this contract may be usefully restated) since we are strictly bound by prior obligation to comply with the commands of the sovereign (Taylor, "Doctrine", pp.44-45).

b. The Sovereign and Moral Obligation
Beyond the fact that psychological egoism seems inadequate and logically unnecessary to Hobbes' account of obligation, a second problem arises for the traditional view on Taylor's theory. It is the fact that, for Hobbes, the sovereign is just as much under the rigid law of moral obligation as any of his subjects. The laws of nature oblige all men, the ruler as well as the ruled, independently of any commands by any human being. As Ramon Lemos explains,

"...for the fulfillment of this obligation the sovereign is accountable only to God, the authority of the law of nature... Although the sovereign cannot act unjustly toward his subjects, he can sin against the laws of nature and therefore against God; and this he does by iniquitously failing to fulfill his fundamental natural obligation to promote the safety of his subjects." (Lemos, p.67)

This is precisely Taylor's view as well. Although not subject to mortal courts the sovereign "always has to reckon with the account he will yet have to render to God, who is no exceptor of persons" (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.45). For this reason, Taylor notes, the misconduct of the sovereign is constantly described as iniquity or sin.

Now, in the original contract between subject and sovereign no conditions are imposed upon the sovereign's actions. How can he be guilty of iniquity if he chooses to rule savagely or badly, or not at all, when he breaks no covenants, and if iniquity and breach of covenant are the same thing (as Hobbes claims they are, as noted earlier)? Taylor's answer is simply that Hobbes is careful to insist
that in ruling with the single aim of the public good, the sovereign is doing what he is obliged to do by the natural law (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.46).

As Taylor argues in "Apology":

...there is clearly some law of right and wrong antecedent to the civil law of the 'sovereign', which has been declared to be the standard of justice; and if, as Hobbes asserts, this antecedent moral law is 'the natural law', how is this to be reconciled with the earlier explicit declaration that 'the notions of Right and Wrong' have no place in the state of nature? If all law is a command laid down by one will for the obedience of another, and the 'natural law' is binding on the 'sovereign' who creates the civil law, whose will does the natural law express? (Taylor, "Apology", pp.140-141)

Taylor's answer is, "it follows immediately from his conception of wrongdoing as transgression of a command that the natural law by which iniquity is forbidden must be a code due to the Creator" (Taylor, "Apology", p.141).

All this finally leads Taylor to say that, although Hobbes makes little mention of it, there is a bargain to which the sovereign is a party in the formation of civil society. Although he is not a party to the subjects' agreement to give up their natural rights to all things, he is a beneficiary of it as the person to whom these rights are transferred; he accepts the transfer such that the powers transferred are to be exercised for the preservation and benefit of everyone (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.48). Given this analysis we have enough to explain why, even if all iniquity can be reduced to a breach of contract, the sovereign is capable of iniquity and bound by the natural
law (which includes having a number of exacting duties toward the subjects).

c. The Sovereign's Duty

It is the fact that sovereigns have duties that is the final reason Taylor favors the moral view over the traditional view. The duty of the sovereign is 'following what is prescribed by law', and a law is 'the command of the person...whose precept contains it in the reason of obedience.' If the duty of the sovereign is to follow the law of nature and law is a command, it follows that there must be a 'person' with the right to command. On the traditional view there should be no such person, therefore Taylor says, "I can only make Hobbes's statements consistent with one another by supposing that he meant quite seriously what he so often says, that the 'natural law' is the command of God, and to be obeyed because it is God's command (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.49). Moreover, Hobbes was willing to admit that God's commandments can be collected out of the Scriptures, though they could not have been discovered without them (Taylor, "Apology", p.143). For Hobbes, on Taylor's view, humans including the sovereign do not fulfill the demands of equity unless they obey the divine command simply because it is a divine command.

To make this theory work, of course, a certain kind
of theism is presumed. Taylor argues that Hobbes has, in De Cive (see E.W. II, 206-207), provided just such a theism. Here Hobbes explains that one of the kingdoms of God is the natural kingdom which He rules by the dictates of right reason. Within this kingdom God's right to rule is founded entirely on His irresistible power. From this it follows that the natural law is a law (and not merely a collection of theorems) for all men (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.50). We must obey God simply because we are in God's power: "God's right to rule is founded solely on his irresistible power (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.50).

Taylor's conclusion, then, is that Hobbes simply meant what he said about the natural law as a command of God and that he was led to this conviction primarily by the unusual depth of his own sense of moral obligation (and not so much by the numerous Scriptural passages he offers) (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.50).

3. Conclusion of Taylor's Thesis

Prior to Taylor's work, the moral aspects of Hobbes' writings, especially the use of traditional natural law, had received little serious attention. The state of Hobbes scholarship at the time had left a seemingly unsoluble dilemma, described by Laird:

The general sense of this statement appears to be that there was an eternal moral obligation to keep
promises, but that, when men had promised obedience to a
government, they made themselves liable, in addition, to
the punitive machinery of political power. And so we
come to a perplexing (but very fundamental) part of
Hobbian theory.

As we have seen, Hobbes frequently held that
moral laws might be anterior to civil laws. In deed
some of them obliged 'in a state of nature'. In other
passages, however (and for the most part), he spoke,
particularly regarding 'justice', as if human morality
were essentially political, not pre-political. (Laird,
p.184)

Taylor's conclusion is that if we accept his thesis
and lay less (or no) emphasis on the traditional view, which
rests on a misreading of Hobbes, the dilemma vanishes.
Rather than a theory built on psychological egoism, Hobbes
constructed a strict deontological theory of moral
obligation. Hobbes made a clear distinction between
obligation (moral law) and compulsion (fear of civil
punishment) in which the laws of nature oblige morally prior
to civil society, in foro interno. In civil society the
laws of nature oblige whenever civil law issues no
injunctions or is silent, and they oblige the sovereign
himself, who is above obligation to civil law (Taylor,
"Doctrine", p.55).

Furthermore, as Taylor says, the force of civil law
is derived wholly from that of the natural law. If we are
always to abide by civil law, even when we believe it to be
inequitable, that is because we are already obliged by
virtue of the natural law to honor our 'previous engagement'
to obey the sovereign's commands (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.55).
Thus, Hobbes should be taken to be, not a psychological
egoist (to believe him to be leads to the problems discussed above), but a philosopher of natural law who used the phraseology of commanding and forbidding and meant what he said. Given all this, then, the only conclusion seems to be that obligation in Hobbes' theory is a moral duty and his theory is strictly deontological.

C. WARRENDER'S THESIS

1. Introduction

Warrender defines 'natural law' as "a body of prescriptive (as opposed to descriptive) rules, concerning human conduct, capable of being discovered by all men of right reason, and superior to the positive law of individual states" (Warrender, "Phil. Art.", p.2). He shows that, in Hobbes, our fundamental obligation is to obey the laws of nature, that all other obligations may be deduced from this one, and that no new sorts of obligations arise in civil society which do not exist in nature. Finally, this obligation is moral obligation (as opposed to physical obligation--mechanistically based) traceable to the obligation to obey God in his natural kingdom, based upon a fear of divine power. (This is the normal meaning in Hobbes, he says, although the previously mentioned two alternate interpretations are possible.)
In general Warrender agrees with Taylor that Hobbes' egoistic psychology and mechanism are not the keys to his theory of obligation, and that Hobbes can be seen as a natural law philosopher. However, there are essential differences between Warrender's position and Taylor's. He does not think Taylor's leap to a duty-for-duty's sake interpretation is justified. Rather, he is more impressed by the role of laws of nature in Hobbes' political theory and by Hobbes' view that laws of nature are grounded in the word of God, who has a right to command. He treats Hobbes as a natural law theorist, though he does not see Hobbes' theory as deontological. Nor does he see Hobbes' theory as a theory of rational egoism.

Warrender was led, instead, to posit two systems in Hobbes: a system of motives, and a system of obligations. The motivational side explains how a man can do his duty (preservation), while the system of obligations explains why he ought to do his duty (it is the will of God). God's will 'grounds' obligation, self-preservation is a 'validating condition' of it. But then Warrender ultimately concludes that the reason why a man ought to obey the will of God is a prudential one, as I will explain later. A final point is that where Taylor starts from the covenant and a concept of duty, Warrender sees the concept of natural rights as the underpinning of Hobbes' interpretation of natural laws as morally binding.
In this summary I will concentrate primarily on tracing the argument in Parts I and II of Warrender's book, first to the effect that Hobbes' theory is a natural law theory traceable back to natural rights, and secondly that there are good reasons for rejecting self-interest as the ground of obligation. I will then briefly outline Warrender's consequentialistic thesis that it is divine reward and punishment that is the force behind political obligation. Much of the vast detail of Warrender's book and argument will be omitted due to limits of space.

2. Three Aspects of Obligation

Warrender argues that the Laws of Nature must create valid obligations prior to civil society, if Hobbes' theory of obligation is to work:

But, in general, we can say that if a reasonable cause of fear invalidates covenants retrospectively, and each man may judge the reasonableness of his own fears, there is no particular covenant that necessarily stands. Commentators have tended, however, to slide from the proposition, (1) that there are no valid covenants in the State of Nature...to the proposition (2) that there is no obligation to keep valid covenants in the State of Nature, and hence to regard the State of Nature as a moral vacuum and the sovereign as the creator of obligation to keep valid covenants, which is a complete mistake. If there is no obligation to keep valid covenants prior to the institution of the State, Hobbes's whole theory of political obligation is nonsensical. Even if we assume that there were no valid covenants whatsoever in the State of Nature, it would still be true that in the state the individual would be obliged to perform his part if there were any valid covenants. In other words, the sovereign does not provide an obligation to keep valid covenants; he makes...
possible circumstances in which there can exist valid covenants to keep. (Warrender, p.41)

To show how Hobbes can consistently maintain that there is obligation in the State of Nature and that covenants create the only valid obligations in civil society, Warrender distinguishes three aspects of obligation. There are: (i) the grounds of obligation, (ii) the validating conditions of obligation and (iii) the instruments of obligation. His position is that the sovereign and his civil authority are the validating conditions, laws (civil) and covenants are the instruments, but natural law is the ground of all obligation. The three aspects noted constitute the framework of moral obligation which, for Warrender, are simply the conditions that must be satisfied, or the factors that must be present, before a person can be obliged. But what, exactly, does Warrender mean by each factor?

a. Grounds of Obligation

Warrender writes, "some conditions constitute obligations in that an action is obligatory because it fulfills this or these conditions, and its obligatoriness derives from this source" (Warrender, p.14). Such conditions Warrender labels the grounds of obligation. He explains that if something is the ground of obligation, and if some particular action is obligatory, then it is so
because of that which is the ground of obligation.

In Hobbes' theory, this ground is Natural Law. This is revealed when one tries to answer the question of why the civil law obliges, or, going a step further, to answer the question of why natural law obliges. In short, an individual is obliged to obey the Laws of Nature.

b. Validating Conditions

Not all the conditions of obligation are grounds. Some function in ways other than as constituting obligation. There are conditions which must be satisfied if a ground of obligation is to even be operative. Warrender says of these, "Apart from their conjunction with such a ground, however, they are not related to obligation at all" (Warrender, p.14). He calls these conditions validating conditions, or if expressed negatively, invalidating principles, which state the absence of some validating condition whose absence renders the ground inoperative. In other ethical theories, such validating conditions would, for example, include the assertion that obligations do not apply to lunatics or children. The key distinction here is that such a condition does not mean that sane adults are obligated because they are sane and adults. Rather, the ground of obligation is whatever the particular ethical system may propose (God's will, yielding the greatest
happiness, etc....). What the validating conditions do is to specify under what conditions the grounds are inoperative or the extent to which they operate. For example, any ethical theory that utilizes sanity and maturity, and specifies the ground of obligation 'X', will take the form of 'X type acts are obligatory for sane and mature persons.' Warrender holds that all obligations involve a pattern of this form such that

Grounds of obligation specify 'a', the type of action. Validating conditions specify 'p', the class of persons. (Warrender, p.16)

Yet, unless there is some ground of obligation it is clear that such validating conditions will have no necessary connection with obligation and that nothing concerning duties can be deduced simply from saying one has satisfied them. Thus, according to Warrender, "validating conditions, taken strictly by themselves, supply no key, not even a formal key, to the content of duties, and leave the possible content of duty as wide and unspecified as it was before" (Warrender, p.15).

Hobbes' theory, says Warrender, is such that the general ground of obligation is the Law of Nature as a command of someone that one is already obliged to obey. Warrender bases this on Hobbes' concept of a law as a command that provides a sufficient reason for moving a person to obey (E.W. IV, p.75). As Hobbes says:

And not every command is a law, but only... when the command is the reason we have of doing the action
commanded. And then only is the reason of our actions in the command, when the omitting is therefore hurtful, because the action was commanded, not because it was hurtful of itself; and doing contrary to a command, were not at all hurtful, if there were not a right in him that commandeth to punish him that so doth. He or they that have all punishments in their own disposing, cannot be so commanded, as to receive hurt for disobeying, and consequently no command can be a law unto them. (E.W. IV, 205)

The Laws of Nature, as will be shown later, are laws per se only when regarded as God's commands; it is this alone that accounts for their obligatory character. The validating conditions are the necessary restraints on the concept of obligation, just so many tests for the logical and psychological possibility of obligation. Among the validating conditions in Hobbes' theory Warrender lists the following:

1. An individual must be able to know the law and its author.

2. In regard to covenants, what they specify must be possible; we cannot be obliged to do the impossible.

3. There must be sufficient motive to obey the law or perform the covenant. Here fear and self-interest function. It is logically impossible that a Hobbesian agent be obliged to perform something for which he has unsufficient motive. (Warrender, p.94)

Although we may accidentally perform an act we were unmotivated to perform, or conform to an unknown law authored by an unknown party, Warrender holds that it is logically impossible to conjoin the term 'obligation' to
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Although we may accidentally perform an act we were unmotivated to perform, or conform to an unknown law authored by an unknown party, Warrender holds that it is logically impossible to conjoin the term 'obligation' to
such actions. Thus, validating conditions function as logical tests for the possibility of obligation as such and specify the class of persons who incur obligations, namely those who know the law and its author, and are able to have sufficient motive to obey.

c. Instruments of Obligation

Warrender's "instruments of obligation" are the standard means by which an obligation is incurred. The instruments are the answer to the question: how we are obliged, rather than why we are obliged. In Hobbes' system, Warrender says, the sole instruments of obligation are laws and covenants. Law imposes obligation upon a person; covenants are the instruments by which a person takes obligations upon himself/herself.

Since these are the only two instruments of obligation in Hobbes' theory, Warrender argues, it follows that the necessary traits of valid law and the conditions of valid covenants are the conditions of obligation in general, and these thereby provide a valuable key to both the grounds and validating conditions of obligation. The sections to follow outline how Warrender applies this model to analyze the specifics in Hobbes' theory of obligation.

Warrender believes that Hobbes could now assert that the Laws of Nature oblige in the State of Nature since, even
there, they fulfill the requirements necessary to be regarded as laws and to be obligatory. That is, God, as the commander, grounds natural law; people in the State of Nature, using reason, can perceive them as God's commands, while fear of their own deaths in the everlasting warfare of the State of Nature provides additional reason to abide by their provisions; and finally, the Laws of Nature are instruments of obligations since they meet Hobbes' requirements for valid law. Thus, Laws of Nature are obligatory prior to the covenant and formation of civil society. The covenant is obligatory as a result of the moral force of Natural Law, which prescribes the keeping of covenants; and civil law obliges as a result of the obligatory force of the covenant itself. The overall conclusion, then, is that it is in no way inconsistent for Hobbes to maintain that there are valid obligations in the State of Nature and that covenants create the only valid obligations in civil society since civil obligation is derived from natural law (natural obligation).

3. Rejection of Egoism

Since Warrender believes that only natural law and covenants ground obligation in Hobbes' system, it follows that the egoistic doctrine of obligation must be mistaken. That is, obligation is grounded in self-interest motivated
by fear; while self-interest/fear do provide motives for obedience, the obligation to obey is itself a moral duty stemming from God. The fact that this has not been the standard interpretation of Hobbes is due, according to Warrender, to the insistence by Hobbes that covenants without the sword are empty words and that law without sanction is futile. From this follows the conclusion that all obligation is grounded on the egoistic desire to avoid penalties attached to law-breaking by the sovereign in a civil society. Warrender denies that this is the correct account.

Warrender's argument is based on Hobbes' distinction between law/command and counsel; the first of these is that part of the law which commands or prohibits an action and is addressed to all citizens, the latter lays down penalties for breach of the law and is addressed to magistrates alone. Hobbes defines 'law' and 'counsel' as follows:

To follow what is prescribed by law, is duty; what be counsel, is free will. Counsel is directed to his end, that receives it; law to his that gives it; Counsel is given to none but the willing; law even to the unwilling.... (E.W. II, 183)

Such a distinction shows that the obligatory force of law is not the same as the recognition of penalties. If the force of law and the recognition of its penalties were identical, the distinction would be pointless. Warrender explains,

Considered in this light, laws would be essentially rules for gaining rewards or avoid penalties, and hence sufficiently similar to principles of counsel as hardly to justify a theory which stresses
the obligatory character of the one and the option character of the other. (Warrender, p.204)

The distinction, according to Warrender, points up Hobbes' intention to see contractual obligation as the ground of duty. Civil laws and its punishments simply provide a motive for doing one's duties; they are the conditions of the possibility of actually doing one's duty.

This, however, leaves unexplained what importance Hobbes actually placed on civil sanctions. Warrender believes that Hobbes needed the civil authority/sanctions to satisfy a setting up of the circumstances under which one of the validating conditions of obligation may obtain. Self-interest becomes important as a result of civil sanctions since Hobbes believes that 'ought' implies 'can'. This in turn, for Warrender, contains a necessary inference that the agent have sufficient motive to do what he is obliged to do and that this is a validating condition of obligation. Self-interest, represented by the command 'preserve thyself' plays the part of the supreme motive for the citizen while 'seek peace' is the citizen's supreme duty.

Fear and benefit function as motives in Hobbes' theory, not as grounds for obligation as they do in the egoistic case, according to Warrender. Hobbes used this procedure simply because he was aware that human beings will differ as to what they view as evil or good with the exception that all persons will see their own death as evil. Thus, fear and the desire for physical preservation become
the supreme motives for everyone so far as they are not affected by thoughts of God and salvation. The 'ought' of obligation, however, derives solely from God's command as the ground of obligation while civil sanctions provide the necessary conditions and security under which the individual is capable of having a sufficient motive for doing his/her duty. Given the psychological makeup of human nature, it is necessary that each individual be capable of seeing any obligatory action as in their own best interest; without this the individual cannot be said to be obliged.

The formation of civil society, according to Warrender, affects obligation in three ways:

1. The provision of security, which is deemed 'sufficient security', renders valid some obligations to natural law and to covenants falling under this law, which were previously invalidated upon this account...some suspended obligations are converted into obligations.

2. The laws of nature are given a determinate, public interpretation by the sovereign authority.

3. Obligations are extended and particularized under a framework of obligation, validated and interpreted as under previous heads...they are extended by the political covenant and the civil law consequent upon it. (Warrender, p.141)

Thus, civil society provides the necessary conditions for the existence of and obedience to obligations derived from the law of nature but hindered by the lack of such conditions. The moral force to obligation is, in other words, given a chance to operate upon and within each individual citizen only within the context of civil society. The sovereign's power makes civil society a 'secure
condition', thus satisfying this validating condition of obligation. As Warrender concludes:

...the sovereign provides conditions which render operative obligations, which previously are but imperfectly effective, or as we have described...he is responsible for some suspended obligations being turned into full obligations through his manipulation of circumstances. This fact often leads Hobbes to write as though the sovereign were himself responsible for the creation of obligations, where there were none before. (Warrender, p.144)

4. Natural Law and Natural Rights

Warrender notes that, for Hobbes, natural law logically precedes covenant and civil law as a source of obligation in the State of Nature. Therefore, natural law is what makes covenants and civil laws binding. Obligation would be purely a matter of self-interest and expediency were it not also the case that, as a member of God's "natural kingdom", the person were governed by a natural law capable of being discovered by their own rational faculty. Lacking this, any argument for political or Christian duty would fail. Natural law is the source of obligation as discovered and interpreted by each individual. Natural law also prescribes the duties of the sovereign: "His entire duty...like the basic duties of the subject, is imposed by the law which applies to all men who acknowledge an omnipotent God whether they live in civil society or in the State of Nature" (Warrender, p.251).
However, there is a distinction between what appear to be two systems operating in Hobbes' theory. The first is a system of specific obligations requiring, as ground, obedience to natural law qua command of God; the second, a system of motives based on judgments by the individual as to what constitutes his/her self-preservation.

The difference is represented by the contrast Hobbes develops, between obligation in foro interno and obligation in foro externo, as the distinction between a disposition of the mind toward the law and specific action in accordance with the law. There is always an obligation to maintain a favorable disposition towards obedience to the dictates of God's natural law, whereas the obligation to act according to the law is validated by the degree of security enjoyed by the agent concerned. This leads to a further distinction:

1. A second-best and approximate way, where men try to be as peaceful as they safely can. They will fight where they feel it is necessary, but avoid gratuitous provocation and insult, and will look for favourable opportunities for peace. This is the style of obligation in foro interno or 'endeavouring' peace.

2. Specific performance of the law, where what the law prescribes is carried out precisely in action. This is the style of obligation in foro externo. (Warrender, p.68)

The laws of nature oblige in foro interno always, without the proviso of sufficient security 'in the court of conscience'; they oblige in foro externo, in the realm of external action, contingent upon the security of the agent. Warrrender describes the resultant distinction and its importance for Hobbes' theory as follows:
Obligation in foro interno are all those obligations for which the individual conscience is the guide, and for the performance of which the agent is responsible to God, who judges intentions as well as actions. Here the contrast lies with a system of civil law, where specific performance alone always satisfies the law, whatever the design of the agent; for the civil magistrate cannot adequately scrutinize the thoughts, but only the external actions (and words) of men, and it is typical of Hobbes that he does not grant to the civil sovereign the capacity to impose obligations which he cannot enforce. This does not mean that the citizen has necessarily discharged all his obligations when he has merely conformed to the civil law, but he has discharged all his obligations to the civil law qua civil law. If anything remains, it will be a matter for conscience and not the civil magistrate, and there intentions will be pertinent. (Warrender, p.72)

Thus what we have is a validating condition, of sufficient security which provides a sufficient motive to act according to the letter of the law (in foro externo). This aspect distinguishes Warrender's theory from Taylor's. What is necessary first, is the agent be bound in conscience (see natural law as God's command) and second, that the agent have sufficient motive to act according to the dictates of the law (provided by assurance of sufficient security). Thus, the difference between Taylor and Warrender is that, although both see Hobbes as a natural law theorist, Warrender does not see the law as binding solely based on its moral character or ground but also as dependent upon the satisfaction of the "security principle", which provides the psychological motive to obey the law. Without providing a sufficient motive, no moral authority, even God, could hold a citizen obliged.

Natural right is important here as a limiting
concept which shows when the law is not binding, as well as highlighting the use and importance of self-preservation as a motive. Although the citizen must accept the sovereign's "official version" of the natural law and Scripture and has no direct entitlement rights over the sovereign (that put duties on the sovereign), the citizen does have some freedoms from obligation that are never renounced, which stem from their natural rights.

Warrender sees Hobbes using 'right' in a specific sense:

It may be observed here that Hobbes uses the term 'right' with the same meaning as he employs in the expressions 'the right to all things' and 'rights of nature'. It is a usage which requires that such a phrase as 'a right to "x"' shall be translated as 'a freedom from obligation to renounce "x"', whereby rights do not imply corresponding duties in other people. Thus, by laying down a right, the individual resigns a freedom from obligation in some particular respect; he does not transfer a right in the modern sense of making over to others an entitlement to some object or service to which he himself was entitled previously. (Warrender, p.150)

Thus, Warrender takes Hobbes to be saying that while the subject is obliged by the sovereign's commands, this obligation is not indiscriminate. There are factors limiting what the sovereign may command; namely the citizen's natural rights. There are certain things which cannot be limited by the law. The things which can never be limited by law Hobbes calls the 'true liberties' of the subject. The most important of these include the right of self-defense, the right not to be obliged to do something that invalidates covenants, and the right not to be obliged
to do that which cannot be covenanted. These are such that if the citizen were to give them up the result would be to violate Warrender's validating conditions of obligation. The sense of 'right' intended is not simply 'freedom from obligation', but a 'freedom from the possibility of obligation'.

The validating conditions here correspond to what Warrender calls in the Philosophy article, the "only two natural rights": a) a man cannot be obliged to obey a law he cannot know, b) nor can he do an act without sufficient motive (here is where self-preservation as a motive functions) (Warrender, Phil. Art., p.356). As Hobbes says:

It is necessary to the essence of a law, that the subjects be acquainted with two things: first, what man or court hath the supreme power, that is to say, the right of making laws; secondly, what the law itself says. For he that neither knew either to whom or what he is tied to, cannot obey; and by consequence is in such a condition as if he were not tied at all. (E.W. II, 191) (See also E.W. III, 259, 260, 280)

Taken together these conditions, derived from natural rights, limit the sovereign's choice of laws and distinguish law from the personal will of the sovereign. A law cannot impose an obligation upon a subject unless the two validating conditions are met. No obligation falls upon the subject from any law which violates either or both of the subject's natural rights.

The first of these conditions is easily met since in every State it is presumed that the sovereign, consequent to a covenant, is the authorized source of the law and that
each citizen knows the sovereign—ignorance of the sovereign is no excuse for any citizen. Further, the law itself is known when written, is seen to proceed from the will of the sovereign and is verified as such through the testimony of the appropriate officials and examination of the public record or statutes. Once these conditions obtain the citizen is bound/obliged by such a law unless the second condition is not met.

The second condition depends upon self-preservation as a motive (and a right). Both in the State of Nature and civil society a person cannot be obliged to submit to being killed nor be obliged to self-destruction. Warrender calls this the "ultimate right of self-preservation" which cannot be covenanted away. As he characterizes this right, "...the individual can never be obliged to act in such way as to forfeit eternal salvation, and further that he cannot be obliged to kill himself...unless the unlikely circumstance should arise that he has to do so, or permit others to do so, in order to secure eternal salvation (Warrender, p.263). No valid law can be such as to compel the citizen to violate the natural necessity of self-preservation. Should a law require self-destruction, the citizen would have no motive to obey the law, rendering the law invalid or inoperative; for it would ask the citizen to give up, by the terms of an invalid convenant, a natural right that cannot be given up and to perform an act without the sufficient motive to do
Except for the rare need to preserve eternal salvation, no one can validly be obliged to act against their own self-preservation. Thus, a valid law cannot command self-destruction. So long as this and the first condition are met the subject is obliged to obey the will of the sovereign. As Warrender states, this analysis holds for both the State of Nature and civil society:

 Granted always a right to sheer self-defence, the laws of nature oblige the individual in the State of Nature. But they oblige him subject to the satisfaction of validating conditions. He is always obliged to endeavour peace as this is always safe, but in the case of specific external action in accordance with the law, hypothetical danger may be pleaded, and the agent is not obliged if he honestly considers that the action prescribed by the law would prejudice his life or means of living. (Warrender, p.78)

 Warrender's conclusion follows from his belief that these validating conditions are a necessary part of Hobbes' complete theory of obligation:

 It is the thesis of the present inquiry that there is a single and consistent theory of obligation which runs through the whole of Hobbes's doctrine, and it is a part of that thesis that the validating conditions of law in the State of Nature or elsewhere, are the validating conditions of all law in Hobbes's system. Thus, in this case, if any law is to be valid law, or in other words to be law and oblige, it must operate in a context in which the validating condition of 'sufficient security' may be said to be fulfilled. It will follow also, on this view, that the features which distinguish obligation in foro externo in the State of Nature, when it is compared with obligation in foro interno in that state, or with obligation in civil society, will not be matters of principle, but of circumstance. (Warrender, p.58)

 For Warrender, then, a person's natural rights are
constituted by a knowledge of and motive to obey the law. They stand by themselves as "deductions from the proposition that 'ought implies can'" (Warrender, p.264). While God might alter the nature of man, the effects of things in the world, or the place of knowledge and self-preservation, He could not "use as a means of moral obligations upon men to perform actions for which they could have no adequate motive, not to observe laws which they could not know" (Warrender, p.264).

It is important to stress that it is not the two conditions that create obligation, but rather, obligation stems from the natural law provided that the two conditions are satisfied. The reason is that, Warrender argues, for the covenant to be valid, there must be obligation in Hobbes' State of Nature. The covenant and the sovereign's power under it do not create moral principles but merely fulfill the need for an authority sufficient to enforce and interpret law necessary for civil society to exist and function. Civil law and covenants oblige because the author has the power to compel obedience, and because there is a prior obligation to abide by covenants and obey the sovereign's commands. As Warrender says, "...so the general obligation to obey the sovereign's command is an obligation to a different level of law, namely the law of nature as interpreted by the individual conscience" (Warrender, pp.147 and 149). Unless there are moral obligations in the State
of Nature, it is difficult to explain how the civil sovereign has any duties at all or how a covenant could oblige obedience.

Political obedience, on Warrender's view of Hobbes, depends in the final analysis upon the laws of nature which are known to all men by the use of reason; "In their essential function of providing the basis for political obligation, moreover, these laws are in no respect dependent upon the Bible or any other work" (Warrender, "Reply", p.98). Both the covenant and civil law are extensions of the natural law. Thus Hobbes believes that it is natural law per se that creates political obligation, not the covenant or the sovereign's power.

Once we see this point the question becomes, what is the force or power behind natural law? Warrender says there are three possible interpretations of Hobbes on this matter, though he favors one of these over the others. Warrender's view is not deontological but based on a "divine rewards and punishments clause". It is a consequentialist theory of natural law, which finally and fully separates his view from Taylor's.

5. The Grounds of Obligation

a. Introduction
The question at hand is "What is the ground of obligation in Hobbes' theory?" For Warrender there are three possible answers grouped around two principles:

1.) Men ought to obey natural law because obedience is a means to salvation, which is in their highest interest; or contrariwise, neglect of these laws leads to divine punishment, which represents their greatest evil.

2.) Natural law is the will of God, and ought to be obeyed for that reason. (Warrender, p. 279)

From these two principles follow three possible interpretations of the ground of obligation which Warrender feels fit the remainder of Hobbes' doctrine:

1.) That obligation is based upon divine rewards and punishments.

2.) That obligation is based upon the will of God alone.

3.) That obligation is based upon a body of natural law having intrinsic authority. (Warrender, "Phil. Art.", p. 352)

Warrender believes that Hobbes regards obeying God's will as axiomatic, but nonetheless goes on to develop a further set of arguments to justify obedience. In seeking the source of obligation, Hobbes turns his attention to what he calls the Natural Kingdom of God. Within this Natural Kingdom there is a system of obligations based upon knowledge of the law and of God, derived by the use of reason alone. Given Warrender's interpretation of Hobbes' need for a ground of obligation apart from the validating conditions, it is necessary for Hobbes to establish an obligatory force in the State of Nature which grounds the initial contract and "artificial" civil obligation. Without
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natural obligation, no obligation within civil society would
carry any obligatory force.
"Natural" obligation stems from

God,

according

to

warrender:
If it is denied that God plays an essential role
in Hobbes's doctrine, the laws of nature in the State of
Nature cannot be taken to be more than prudential maxims
for those who desire their own preservation. Those
commentators, therefore, who have seen the place of God
in Hobbes's theory as the product of confusion or
pretence on Hobbes's part, have taken this view .... to
the effect that the laws of nature as they proceed fron
nature are not commands....
If such a view were
sustained, political obligation would turn out like
natural law to be no more than another prudential maxim,
as there is nothing which the civil sovereign could do
that would retrieve this position.
(Warrender, pp.99100)

To be binding, laws must, for Hobbes, be the command
of some author whom the citizen
obey.

The

is

previously

obliged

to

moral character of obligation is not a result of

anything about the law per se but is transferred to the
by its author.

The key question,

law

then, is why one ought to

obey the author of the law.

Hobbes' position is that unless

the Laws of

ground

Nature,

which

the

covenant

and

the

sovereign's power/authority, are regarded as the commands of
God

they

cannot

properly

be regarded as law.

Now,

what

exactly, beyond the axiomatic belief that God deserves to be
obeyed, would oblige one to obey God's will?
Within Hobbes' Natural Kingdom (which is one of
three

Kingdoms

of

God,

but

the

only

one

the

connected to

Political activities) God, by rational means, can be seen to
be the ill-powerful authority who governs the world.

It

is


God's irresistible power that justifies, indeed necessitates, obedience to natural law (God's commands). Thus, for Warrender, "natural" obligation is grounded in the laws of nature as the commands of an irresistible God, whose authority derives from His Power. The obligatory character of natural law does not depend, ultimately, upon any act of man or upon any covenant, but rather on our recognition of God's ability to mete out divine rewards and punishments.

b. Divine Rewards and Punishments

The first of the three possible interpretations (noted in the Introduction) is Warrender's favored, i.e. he judges it most consistent with Hobbes' political theory. Obligation is grounded upon God's power and ability to administer the ultimate divine rewards and punishments:

...the power of God alone without others help is sufficient justification of any action he doth. That which men make amongst themselves here by pacts and covenants, and call by the name of justice, and according where unto men are accounted and termed rightly just or unjust, is not that by which God Almighty's actions are to be measured or called just, no more than his counsels are to be measured by human wisdom. That which he does, is made just by his doing it; just, I say, in him, though not always just is us....

Power irresistible justifies all actions, really and properly, in whomsoever it be found; less power does not, and because such power is in God only, he must needs be just in all actions, and we, that not comprehending his counsels, call him to the bar, commit injustice in it. (E.W., IV, 249-250)

With this being the case obligation is more concretely tied
to the sanctions behind the laws than to the fact that God, specifically, has done the commanding. Warrender explains, "From this point of view...duties may be regarded as a special class of prudent actions--those that tend to salvation; the laws of nature ought to be obeyed because they are the commands of God, but in turn, the commands of God ought to be obeyed because his rewards and punishments bring it about that obedience is in the highest interest of the individual" (Warrender, p.282).

Warrender holds that, given Hobbes' psychology of human motivation, his own interpretation is the most plausible account. Three classes of action are possible if a person seeks his/her own apparent good:

1.) The action the individual will do--that action which, given his/her existing state of knowledge and deliberation they take to be productive of the most personal good.

2.) The most prudent act under the circumstances--the action, in fact, would be to the person's best interest given his/her particular values (the action they would do if they had complete knowledge and exercised adequate thought).

3.) The obligatory act--a special sub-class of prudent acts where eternal salvation is involved (the act which a person who sees salvation as the greatest good, and had complete knowledge and adequately deliberated would chose). (Warrender, pp.282-283)

Obligation is a function of those acts in which salvation is at issue, and which God (as the power rewarding--giving salvation--or punishing--denying salvation) has dominion over. Only acts within class #2 above fit this description. Acts within classes #1 and #1 do not necessarily involve salvation as a consideration.
A problem arises for Hobbes' moral theory in that what is in the individual's best interest is not necessarily in the interest of all human beings or the interest of society in general. Warrender believes Hobbes solves this problem using the concept of divine rewards and punishments. In fact, without the sanction of salvation, Hobbes' theory would be incomplete. But Hobbes views the Laws of Nature with their divine rewards and punishments as pertaining to civil society. The Laws of Nature are the general principles for the preservation of humanity. If Hobbes had not viewed them in this way there would be considerable problems for civil society in that, claiming personal interest, the individual could claim that it was in his/her own best interest to break civil and natural law. As Warrender notes, the fact is that the power of the sovereign is not always adequate to enforce the law—rebellion is somethimes successful—therefore, "Only the punishments of God, whose wrath cannot be escaped, are capable of providing an adequate sanction, and of effecting a reconciliation between duty and interest" (Warrender, p.276). On Warrender's interpretation, breaking the Laws of Nature is imprudent as a violation of the means to salvation and, for any person who sees salvation as his/her greatest good, a breach of moral duty.

Warrender believes that Hobbes showed that, given adequate deliberation, all persons would see salvation as
their greatest evil and protection/peace as the greatest good. From this, depending on whether or not they consider or ignore divine rewards and punishments (reason adequately or not), each person who believes in the sanctions of God will see eternal good (salvation) as preferable to temporal good and will come thus to regard salvation as the greatest good (Warrender, p.273). Those persons who believe in God, as the administrator of divine rewards and punishments, will not simply take these sanctions into account, but will necessarily obey God's laws if they deliberate adequately. Thus, obedience is not merely prudential (though for non-believers it will, in fact, be prudential qua the earthly sovereign's power—but this is just to realistically note that all persons do not deliberate adequately). This is what Warrender calls Hobbes' doctrine of special prudence: "Where ordinary self-interest breaks down...the citizen has a duty to obey, and, if the present interpretation of the ground of obligation is taken, this will mean that special prudence dictates obedience" (Warrender, "Phil. Art.", p.353).

The result here is a denial of the claim that duty is identical with self-interest in Hobbes. Rather, duty is based on self-interest such that the reason for the force of the 'ought' of duty is tied to the system of divine rewards and punishments. Given God's realm and power, the sanctions are inescapable and no other earthly considerations of self-
interest can lead a person to set them aside. It is because of this doctrine, furthermore, that the covenant can oblige one person to another person. The act of covenanting introduces divine sanctions against the failure to abide by the terms of the covenant; it is the force of God's sanctions, not the power of the sovereign nor the covenant itself, that obliges and dictates the duties of citizenship (grounds political obligation) (Warrender, p.289). Without the divine sanctions civil obligation is a temporary illusion to be dissipated whenever an individual perceives it to be in his/her best interest to disobey (or whenever it looks like they can get away with it).

Warrender does not believe that the fact that persons have a duty to obey when ordinary self-interest breaks down implies that Hobbes' doctrine is deontological. Hobbes is not advocating the performance of duty out of regard or reverence for the moral law in itself, thereby shoving self-interest entirely out of the picture. Warrender rejects such a view, saying, "Against this view, we have held that although men are obliged to act with the intention of fulfilling the law where judgment lies to their own conscience and to God, Hobbes does not require then to act with the motive of observing the law for its own sake, and self-interest is therefore still available as a motive for the performance of duties" (Warrender, p.290). Warrender concludes:
1.) On Hobbes' theory of motivation, the individual always acts to secure his apparent good, and a disinterested reverence for the law would not be a possible motive for voluntary action in Hobbes's ethical system, unless part of his doctrine were discarded.

2.) ...those parts of Hobbes's text which are most favorable to the view that the individual is obliged to act for the sake of the law, are those in which he draws a distinction between the justice of actions...and the justice of persons...although fear of the penalty imposed by the civil law may not be the motive of the just man in obeying that law, this does not necessarily mean that fear of God's wrath is to be similarly condemned.

3.) Although there is an obligation to do just actions...there is no obligation to be a just person, for the justice of persons is a matter of God's grace or gift. That is, justice is a matter of faith and the will to obedience, and faith is a gift of God (E.W. II, 314). (Warrender, pp.290-291)

The overall conclusion is that even if some interpretations of Hobbes' various passages speak of fear as a motive (not as an intention), and of even fear of divine wrath as a base motive, it does not mean that obligation becomes a matter of "deontological-type" reverence for the law. Warrender feels the confusion is partly Hobbes' fault in being unclear about his distinction between counsel and command. To be very brief, Warrender feels that these interpretations confuse theological doctrine (advice/counsel) with moral doctrine (law/command) and fail to note that punishment is due only for breach of the law, not for lapses in faith or for failing to heed divine counsel. It is only God's commands, stated in the Laws of Nature, which oblige, but the obligatory force derives from the punishments God attached to breach of the law. We may have reverence for both God's law and his counsel, but only
law has obligatory force. Thus, it is not reverence for God's word or for the law that creates obligation, but the rewards and punishments which define a person's moral duty to obey.

Hobbes, for Warrender, is still a natural law moralist. However, his moral doctrine is not deontological but consequentialist in nature. Self-interest, taking into account the consequences (punishment, loss of salvation or gaining of it) is the motive for obeying the law (including civil law as the extension of the natural law through covenant) yet is still a duty, a moral obligation. Political obligation is moral obligation; it is just not deontological in nature.

Although Warrender feels this is the most plausible interpretation of Hobbes' doctrine of obligation, he does note that there are some problems which make it pertinent to consider other possible interpretations. The major problem is that Hobbes' doctrine implies that somehow divine rewards and punishments are merited for observance or breach of the law; however, "it is not explained why obedience merits salvation, and there is implied a contingency between obligation and law that hardly justifies the extent to which Hobbes emphasizes their essential connexion (sic)" (Warrender, p.298). Because of these problems, Warrender allows that the other two alternative interpretations have some plausibility. However, he rejects them in favor of his
own interpretation. I will not outline these alternative views, though they are interesting, since Warrender does reject them and since they can be found in his book.

6. Conclusion

The conclusions reached by Warrender may be outlined as follows:

1. Hobbes belongs to the general natural law tradition. Obligation (on whichever of three possible interpretations) is grounded upon Natural Law.

2. The obligation derived from Natural Law is moral obligation. 'Moral' obligation occurs when: a.) either there is a law, valid for a person, which prescribes an act; or the person has made a valid covenant to perform the act; which means also b.) (RE: grounds) God has commanded the act or it follows from what God has commanded: and further (RE: validating conditions) what God commands is a command logically and psychologically possible for the person to know and obey. This account holds for the State of Nature and applies to Hobbes' entire theory of moral obligation.

3. We may reject the following accounts of obligation in Hobbes: a.) the traditional materialist/egoistic, account since it fails to produce moral obligation and functions as part of the validating conditions of true moral obligation; b.) the view, stemming
from the above, that obligation is created by covenant and the command of the sovereign since both function also as validating conditions and neither can create obligation where it did not exist before; c.) Taylor's deontological view since, although Hobbes' theory is a theory of duty, the obligatory force of the Laws of Nature is a matter of consequences, namely, divine reward and punishment; they are not the deontological absolutes that Taylor describes and are not prescribed as duties to be done out of respect for the law. Also, they are derived from Hobbes' notion of natural rights and not, as Taylor thinks, from the notion of covenant and duty per se.

4. That, although it may be possible to view Natural Law as self-justifying, it is most plausible to posit divine rewards and punishments as the ground of Natural Law and ultimately as the ground of obligation--thus giving God a key role in Hobbes' theory of moral/political obligation.

D. HOOD'S THESIS

1. Hood's Rejection of Mechanism and of the Taylor/Warrender Thesis

Although there are elements of both Taylor's and Warrender's views that Hood accepts, there are a number of crucial differences that separate Hood's version of the
natural law thesis from theirs. In a sense, Hood's basic position is the result of taking Taylor and Warrender one step beyond either a purely deontological or traditional natural law interpretation. That is, Hood agrees that the basis of obligation in Hobbes is moral in the sense of this term being used here, i.e. grounded on natural law; but he then grounds natural law directly on specifically Christian (or Scriptural) beliefs. Where neither Taylor nor Warrender emphasize the Scriptural elements in Hobbes' writings, Hood believes that Scripture plays a central role in Hobbes' theory in order to compensate for the certain linguistic and epistemological limitations imposed on Hobbes' argument by the scientific method he had adopted. In particular, Hood believes that Scripture takes the place of God as the force behind natural law, given the fact that Hobbes' scientific methodology prohibits any knowledge claims about God or God's actions. Hood believes that Hobbes circumvented this limitation by positing the function of obliger less laws of nature and then arguing that Scripture, as God's word, provides our only knowledge of these laws. Thus, for Hood the scriptural elements in Hobbes' writings are of central importance to Hobbes' theory of obligation. Neither Taylor nor Warrender use Scripture to any degree in their explication of Hobbes' theory; and this according to Hood is their error.

Hood does agree with Taylor and Warrender that
Hobbes' mechanism and egoism can be disregarded as being essentially irrelevant to Hobbes' actual theory of obligation. All three interpreters agree that Hobbes began with a mechanistic framework and an egoistic justification of obligation, but that his "true" theory of obligation is ultimately moral rather than mechanistic/egoistic in nature. Hood claims that:

Hobbes's morality is traditional and Christian. His Scriptural doctrine of civil obedience is a traditional Christian doctrine, stripped of the medieval safeguard of an independent spiritual authority. In acting as an obedient subject of his civil sovereign, a Christian observes and never transgresses the Moral Law. (Hood, p.13)

As such, Hobbes' theory of obligation does not follow from a materialistic framework as implied by the traditional interpretation. While Hood does accept the view that Hobbes held a mechanistic view of the workings of the universe, he rejects the implied epistemological materialism in favor of the view that Hobbes' mechanism was an amplification of a religious view of the universe, within which mechanistic/causal explanations are indications of a divine plan or else the workings of divine reason, though we cannot know God's nature or will directly. This system is not contradictory, Hood claims, since "science is restricted to the study of secondary causes. In displaying the operation of such causes, science is displaying the ordinary work of God, the Author of Nature. Nature itself is simply the aggregate of created things" (Hood, p.14). Thus, there
is no inherent contradiction in Hobbes' belief that epistemological materialism is consistent with Christianity since the natural laws of science are logical laws and logical laws are discoverable by reason. In effect, science is simply explicating the rationality of a universe created by a rational God.

The error of the mechanists, however, is to see the laws of science as identical to the laws of morality or politics, according to Hood. The laws of science are in a separate category from those of morality or politics. Hood believes that Hobbes' Christian politics does not depend upon either his mechanism or his determinism, though taken together they constitute the fullest description we are capable of of God's action in and upon the universe. Since all laws discoverable by reason are mutually compatible, there can be no contradiction involved here. But for Hood mechanistic explanations and causal analyses play only a partial and subordinate role in determining obligation within Hobbes' system. For a mechanistic analysis can only reveal causal, material necessities, therefore excluding any derivation of our moral duties as such since moral duties are not material entities. A study of causal relations cannot explain nor can it justify moral obligation or moral duty; for moral obligations or obligations of conscience are obligations by the grace of God rather than by material necessity. Thus there can be no knowledge of moral
obligation in the scientific sense of having been discovered by an analysis of experience; scientific knowledge is limited to the empirical investigation of material events (Hood, p.26).

Hood's position is based on his analysis of the following passage from Hobbes' *Behemoth*:

True politics should be such as are fit to make men know, that it is their duty to obey all laws whatsoever that shall be the authority of the King be enacted, till by the same authority they shall be repealed; such as are fit to make men understand, that the civil laws are God's laws, as they that make them are by God appointed to make them; and to make men know, that the people and the Church are one thing, and have but one head, the King; and that no man has title to govern under him, that has it not from him; that the King owes his crown to God only, and to no man, ecclesiastic or other; and that the religion they teach them, be a quiet waiting for the coming again of our blessed Saviour, and in the meantime a resolution to obey the King's laws, which also are God's laws; to injure no man, to be in charity with all men, to cherish the poor and sick, and to live soberly and free from scandal; without mingling our religion with points of natural philosophy, as freedom of will, incorporeal substance, everlasting nows, ubiquities, hypostases, which the people understand not, nor will ever care for. (E.W. VI, 236-237)

There is nothing in this passage that Hood believes depends upon mechanistic materialism or upon Euclid's methods. Nowhere did Hobbes suggest that his scientific studies altered any of his political convictions, Hood argues, so that "it is reasonable to believe that his basic political convictions were temporally prior to his philosophic political theory" (Hood, p.22). Hobbes' political doctrine does not depend upon a scientific or egoistic foundation at all.
The doctrine was for him the doctrine of the Divine politics which are a part of the true religion of Christ and his Apostles, revealed in Scripture. The purpose of his argument from Scripture was to bring to light the old and true doctrine of Christian politics, long obscured by erroneous interpretations introduced by the children of darkness. He would have dismissed as impious any claim to establish a new morality. His political convictions were for him religious convictions. (Hood, pp.22-23)

Accordingly, Hood believes that an interpretation of obligation in terms of either egoism or materialism is not relevant. Although Hobbes can be called a determinist so far as physical actions are concerned, his theory of obligation is moral and rests upon religious foundations.

Another mistake of the traditional mechanistic interpretation is to see self-preservation as the highest end within Hobbes' system. Hood writes

Preservation is a real natural good, desired as such by all men. This does not mean that preservation in this world was for Hobbes the summum bonum; he adhered to the Christian view that life in this world is a peregrination in which no final and enduring felicity is attainable; no natural good, no object of natural appetite, can be the summum bonum. (Hood, p.64)

In truth, the summum bonum is salvation. What is deceptive about Hobbes' psychology is that it appears complete, and so it leads the interpreters to say that civil philosophy must limit itself to a discussion of those deliberate actions for which a natural explanation can be given. The traditional interpretation thus erroneously limits its discussion of obligation to deliberate actions for which naturalistic explanations can be found. What is excluded, Hood says, is precisely what is central to Hobbes' actual theory of
obligation, namely, the will to obedience or obligations of conscience. It is a mistake to conclude that, since deliberate actions can be necessitated by fear and that since Hobbes' psychology deals with this topic, we have described Hobbes' complete theory of obligation. At best we have partially described his psychology of deliberation, but without touching his actual theory of obligation which is based on moral obligations of conscience; that is, on a love of moral goodness that cannot be contained in an argument from the causal principles of physical nature alone.

A materialistic or mechanistic/egoist account of obligation in Hobbes is therefore an insufficient explanation of the duties of the citizen to his/her sovereign, according to Hood. What is needed is a moral analysis of obligation and the recognition that Hobbes' science and its materialistic analyses are irrelevant to his actual theory of obligation. Though Hood does not deny the existence of materialism and the psychology of self-interest in Hobbes' writings, he separates it from the theory of obligation just as Taylor and Warrender do.

Hood's position does not simply accept either Taylor's or Warrender's views however, concerning the nature of Hobbes' natural law morality. Hood sees serious problems with both of these natural law interpretations. I will indicate here only the crucial factors involved in Hood's arguments, which depend on minute details of argumentation.
The details can be found in Hood's book, and are better left as presented there; for a short summary of so many fine distinctions would surely do an injustice to Hood's scholarship. Instead, I will explain his rejection of Taylor's and Warrender's positions in broad terms.

There are some close similarities between Hood's and Taylor's theories in that both stress a duty-for-duty's-sake concept of natural law and obligation. Hood calls these obligations of conscience, duties to be discharged with the will to obedience. But Hood believes that Taylor has omitted the central moral element of Hobbes' theory by not stressing the direct role of Scripture. That is, for Taylor, we can reason to the content of Natural Law, though God is the lawgiver and ground of its authority; but for Hood, we need to rely upon Scripture for our knowledge of the content of Natural Law. Furthermore, Warrender's thesis is predicated on a version of consequentialism rather than on a deontological perspective. Obligations retain their force simply because we have the duty to follow natural law as God's command for its own sake. Taylor affirms the link between an appeal to duty and the appeal to God; but he downplays this connection, so that our obligations to obey natural law can also stand on their own, apart from scriptural support. It is this difference that separates Taylor's deontological thesis from Hood's; that is, Hood indentifies the role of Scripture and religion as central to
Hobbes' method and theory, while Taylor chooses to stress the role of God as the force behind natural law. Other differences exist, as well, and will be mentioned in Chapter IV, but the crucial distinction between Taylor and Hood is their treatment of the role of Scripture.

Furthermore, Hood rejects Warrender's belief that natural right defines obligation. For Hood it is natural law alone that defines one's obligations; and it is what is not prescribed by natural law that defines one's natural right or liberty; that is, natural right is the liberty that remains outside the prescriptions of natural laws. Thus Hood holds that Hobbes' starting point is duty rather than natural right.

Right (jus) is a meaningful term only in relation to law. Right consists in liberty to do or forbear; law determines and binds (obligat) to one of them; 'so that law and right, differ as much as obligation and liberty, which is one and the same matter are inconsistent'. (Hood, p.90)

In a passage that Hood deems significant Hobbes speaks of the natural right of self-preservation: "I also say it is a privilege which God hath given them, but we differ in the manner how; which to me seems this, that God doth not account such killing sin" (E.W. V, 187). From this Hood concludes that law "cannot constitute right, but law leaves, and so allows liberty by its silence. Right is allowed liberty" (Hood, p.91). As such, natural right cannot create obligation as Warrender claims. Or, as Hood puts it, natural law brings right in its train, not the
reverse. In effect what Hood is arguing is that Warrender has the two terms in relation, which is what Hobbes intended, but he has the relationship reversed so as to contradict Hobbes' true analysis. Hood concludes this point:

In Hobbes's moral thought it is not right, but obligation, which is moral. Right is negative, a mere absence of obligation, just as corporal liberty is a negative, a mere absence of physical impediment. Hobbes's morality is a morality of law, not of right; it is law, not right, which makes the difference between the moral and the natural goodness. (Hood, p.94)

In addition to denying Warrender's rights-based explanation of obligation, Hood denies that Hobbes' theory is consequentialist in nature as Warrender asserts. Hood rejects Warrender's claims that it is the fear of God's wrath that provides the force behind moral obligation and the claim that the desire for preservation is simply a validating condition of obligation. For Hood obligation is a duty that is deonotological in nature; that is, it is a matter of obeying natural law, not just in fact but with the right spirit or will to obedience: "Action on the will to obedience is possible, and in the cases governed by God's law is obligatory. In Hobbes's thought man is obliged, as a subject of God, to have such a will" (Hood, pp.114-115). It is in virtue of being subject to God's Natural Law that a person has an obligation to the sovereign, rather than out of fear of God's wrath as Warrender believes. law theory he held.
In summary, Hood's thesis is deonotological like Taylor's but goes beyond Taylor's by stressing the importance of Scripture as a central element in Hobbes' theory. Hood rejects Warrender's consequentialism and natural rights-based analysis of Hobbes' theory of obligation, interpreting Hobbes' theory as more strictly following from the concept of natural law itself. Thus, Hood sees Hobbes as a natural law theorist who relies heavily on Scripture and religion to define the duty of obedience. In the following sections I will briefly outline the role of Scripture and the general nature of Hood's interpretation of Hobbes' theory.

2. The Role of Scripture

Hood's interpretation of Hobbes is unique in the degree of importance it assigns to the use of Scripture by Hobbes. Where other interpreters acknowledge that Hobbes quoted liberally from Scripture but then ignore the scriptural arguments themselves, Hood accords these arguments a central role in Hobbes' theory. Where some commentators assert that the only reason Hobbes utilized Scripture was to avoid persecution as an atheist, Hood believes that Hobbes sincerely believed in the truth of Scripture and the existence of God (Hood, p.5). For Hood the scriptural component of Hobbes' work plays the role that
Warrender assigned to God and that Taylor assigned to duty: it is the source of the force behind natural law and the duty to obey natural laws. That is, once we recognize that Hobbes has adopted a mechanistic, scientific methodology, we will see that he cannot refer to God directly as a causal agent or an explanatory entity within that framework. The best he can do is to refer to God as the First Cause, about whom we have no other knowledge. He cannot posit God as the force behind natural law because this requires particular knowledge of God's nature that falls outside the limits of the scientific method Hobbes chose. What we would be left with, as we shall see in the next section is a set of laws (the Laws of Nature) without an obliger (though an obligation is a necessary feature of any law for Hobbes). That is, a set of obliger-less "laws" that are either empty or else not laws at all. Hood argues at this point that Scripture, known by faith to be the word of God, acts as the source of the obligatory force of the Laws of Nature (Hood, p.4). Our duty to obey Natural Law is prescribed in Scripture: "the laws of nature oblige in fact, and not merely by definition, only as delivered in Scripture as the commands of God" (Hood, p.4).

Thus, Hood's interpretation begins with the assumption that Hobbes was perfectly sincere in his use of Scripture, especially in Leviathan, where the scriptural arguments comprise fully one half of the text:
Scripture was the only source of Hobbes's moral convictions. He never attempted a systematic exposition of his Scriptural doctrine of moral duty. The scope of Leviathan is limited to the entire doctrine of civil duty; moral duty is treated only in relation to civil duty. And what Hobbes wrote of obligation by laws of nature is intelligible only in light of his Scriptural conception of obligation by the Moral Law of God. (Hood, pp.4-5)

Unless we are willing to assert that Hobbes wrote or professed much that he thought was false, Hood argues, we must take him at his word when he claims that Scripture was the sole unquestionable authority over his mind (Hood, p.1). That Hobbes would deceive his readers as to his true beliefs concerning the central elements of his political theory is also contradicted by the high value he placed on a teacher's sincerity (and Hobbes saw himself as a teacher), amongst other virtues: "The web begins at the first element of power, which are wisdom, humility, sincerity, and other virtues of the Apostles..." (E.W. III, 695). Hood concludes that "his scorn of deceit, except as a weapon of defensive war, has every appearance of being genuine. He himself was not engaged in defensive war" (Hood, p.2). To dismiss Hobbes' use of Scripture as incidental, as a bow to convention, or as a measure for his own protection alone is therefore unwarranted in Hood's opinion:

My...position is that the presumption that Hobbes was sincere in his Christian profession can be supported by arguments at least as strong as any that have been advanced in favor of the contrary presumption. (Hood, p.5)

Once we grant Scripture and religion their proper
places in Hobbes' political theory, we can no longer separate his Christianity from his politics. In fact, Hood claims, Hobbes adheres to a Christian sanctification of politics rather than to some sort of pagan secularization of religion:

The Old Testament contains the Law; the New Testament contains no new laws of God but the Gospel. The first table of the Decalogue, the law of sovereignty, can be reduced to the one commandment to love God. The second table, the Moral Law, can be reduced to the one commandment of mutual charity (E.W. III, 330, 513-14, 586). (Hood, p.5)

Hood identifies Hobbes' fundamental moral conviction as the belief that

It is the law from whence proceeds the difference between the moral and the natural goodness...the actions of subjects, if they be conformable to the law, are morally good, and yet cease not to be naturally good; and the praise of them passeth to the Author of Nature as well as of any other good whatsoever...All the real good, which we call honest and morally virtuous, is that which is not repugnant to the law, civil or natural, for the law is all the right reason we have and...is the infallible rule of moral goodness. (E.W. V, 193-194)

In other words, civil and moral law cannot be divorced from each other because civil law is grounded in Moral Law. Hobbes is simply offering "an affirmation of the Christian conviction that the moral laws of God are moral ultimates beyond which man cannot go" (Hood, p.6).

Moreover, the Moral Law commands a right conscience, the performance of one's duties with both the will to fulfill them as well as the physical performance of the deed (E.W. II, 60-62). For Hobbes, as Hood paraphrases him:
The man who strives with all possible endeavour to fulfil the laws of God is just. The just man does not in fact fulfil the Law; there is none who has not transgressed, but God accepts the insufficient plea of the just who believe in Christ. God accepts the insufficient plea of the just who believe in Christ. God accepts the will for the work as well in good as in evil men (E.W. III, 599). (Hood, p.6)

Thus, there can be no exception to the duty to strive to fulfill the Law. But the Law is never fulfilled by actions alone, it must be fulfilled by the will since it is not "only unjust deeds, but the designs and intentions to do them, though hindered by accident, (that) are injustice" (Hood, p.6). Or, as Hobbes says, injustice consists "in the pravity of the will, as well as in the irregularity of the act" (E.W. III, 330).

Hood believes that the origins of these aspects of Hobbes' position are found in his reading of Scripture and in the scriptural concepts of virtue, justice and the nature of the will to obedience in the virtuous person. Hobbes is simply connecting his Christianity to his politics, or as Hood says, offering a Christian sanctification of politics. Obedience to civil law is grounded on the Moral Law of God which commands a right conscience. Civil law follows from the Moral Law and is therefore concerned with the morality of the just person's actions in obeying God's commands (Hood, p.10). Politics is as concerned with the morality of obedience and the Scriptural notions of virtue, justice, and a right conscience as the Moral Law is. The principal Moral Law is that of covenant, Hood says, and people are commanded
to keep faith with whomever they contract by God through the Moral Law. Accordingly, civil law becomes the measure of moral justice in civil society, and the commonwealth may be seen as a divinely appointed remedy for sinfulness (the transgressing of God's commands) through its exercise of lawmaking and enforcement. Hood concludes that Hobbes held that the formation of the commonwealth is possible only because there are such things as obligations of conscience; and obligations of conscience allow for a real unity of the members of the commonwealth only because obligation is moral, that is, religious (Hood, p.13).

For these reasons Hood sees Hobbes' theory of obligation and the formation of the commonwealth as grounded in traditional Christian morality as declared and elucidated in Scripture (Hood, p.13). Without the scriptural elements, Hobbes' theory would rest upon unstatable or unknowable moral concepts. Scripture provides the knowledge of God's commands that Hobbes' science cannot because of its inherent materialist limitations. Thus the knowledge of God's will lies beyond the limits of science and cannot be a topic of philosophy, not because Hobbes rejected God, but because God is above science (Hood, p.31). Human understanding of God's nature and God's commands requires religious faith and the correct understanding of Scripture; there is on Hood's interpretation no other source for this knowledge within Hobbes' system. Consequently, Hobbes' use of Scripture is
far from incidental; it is essential to his theory of political obligation; for without it the Laws of Nature could not be laws, and humans would have no obligations.

3. Two Kinds of Obligation

The substance of Hobbes' moral thought could be expressed in the Scriptural terms of debt (debitum), service (officium), and accountability. But the metaphor of obligation passed easily from Roman Law into Christian thought. This old metaphor may have been specially congenial to Hobbes because it suggests an analogy between the moral and the physical. To him obligation implied an obliger, an obliged, and a bond, an instrument by or with which the binder binds the bound. Every law is a bond. God binds men by His moral laws. (Hood, p.114)

Here we see again that the central elements of Hood's interpretation are those derived from Scripture. That is, the substance of the theory comes from Scripture, it is moral in nature, God is ultimately the obliger of each person, though there are physical or empirical elements to be accounted for in addition to the moral elements found in Christian natural law theory. While Hood denies that Hobbes' materialism and resultant egoistic psychology ground his theory of obligation, he does allow that Hobbes' theory includes an artificial or psychological aspect. But the important element of the theory is the moral element which prescribes action on the will to obey. How does Hobbes balance these various elements in a consistent way?

Hood's answer is that Hobbes had two types of
obligation in mind rather than just one, namely moral obligation (natural obligation) and artificial obligation (humanly created obligations). Moral obligation "was a supernatural obligation of man by God, an obligation which does not arise out of any voluntary act of man, but is incumbent upon him" (Hood, p.115). Artificial obligation arises out of a covenant, it is "obligation of man by man...(arising) only out of man's voluntary act in covenanting" (Hood, p.115); as such artificial obligation is subject to whatever physical or psychological factors affect a person's senses, memory, understanding, reason, and opinion, all of which affect human choice and actions. Hood's thesis is that Hobbes' theory is moral, but is also an attempt to state moral principles in the language of the new science. As a result there is a metaphorical relation between the concept of physical binding and the concept of moral obligation: the two types of obligation are analogous but not identical (Hood, p.121). The traditional interpreters erred in focusing on only Hobbes' materialistic language, thus missing the actual moral nature of his theory; or else they identified physical and moral obligation in such a way as to overlook the fact that Hobbes say them as analogous, not identical. In fact, Hood asserts, "obligation is a binding which is incompatible with physical binding" in Hobbes' system (Hood, p.120). It is obligations of conscience, or actions done out of the will
to obedience, that Hobbes was actually concerned with, and these are moral obligations.

Moral obligations are supernatural obligations of human beings by God but, having adopted a naturalistic methodology and linguistic framework, Hobbes "forced this supernatural obligation into his naturalist theory as a fictious natural obligation without an obliger" (Hood, p.115). Law, to be law for Hobbes, must be the command of someone with the authority to both issue the command and effect the binding of the person obliged to obey the command. The Laws of Nature are the commands of God, the obliger; but this is a problem for Hobbes precisely because his methodology had the effect of excluding God from philosophy. That is, the scientific method excluded the only moral obliger Hobbes believed in, "and yet (Hobbes) had to ground all civil obligations upon the natural obligation to perform covenants" (Hood, p.87). How could Hobbes get around this? Hood answers:

He did this, by defining a law of nature as a precept by which a man is forbidden. Obligation without an obliger is a consequence of command without a commander. A command without a commander seems an absurdity; but the method of Euclid, as understood by Hobbes, shows that this is an uncandid assumption. (Hood, p.87)

The use of principles of construction is perfectly acceptable in the Euclidean methodology, and some definitions are principles of construction rather than of demonstration. The goal in using such principles is to
initiate a demonstration or deductive proof of the major postulates or axioms of the system. The principles precede the postulates and are made before any demonstration begins or can begin. Hood argues that Hobbes took advantage of this technique:

Euclid had to define a point before he could postulate that he could draw a straight line between two points. Hobbes's definition of a law of nature is a principle of construction. The laws of nature are not deduced from the definition of a law of nature but as necessary articles of peace. (Hood, p. 88)

Natural laws, as articles of peace, are laws without an obliger that nonetheless bind in conscience; and from the outset of his discussion of law, Hobbes emphasized that the laws of nature can be known by reason and seen to be binding (E.W. IV, 109). The purpose of introducing this principle of construction is simply to allow Hobbes to begin his derivation of the origin and nature of the commonwealth. The Laws of Nature ground the obligations of conscience, which in turn are the moral and natural obligations that are necessary to facilitate Hobbes' construction of the commonwealth.

Hood argues that Hobbes has discarded the ordinary and traditional meaning of 'law of nature' by proposing a new meaning for it as a term of civil philosophy. As such it functions as a term of art. Once the meaning of the term is restricted in this manner, Hood says we can see Hobbes' intentions more clearly:

Hobbes framed a fictitious concept which results
in obligation of conscience without an obliger so that he could construct the commonwealth without recourse to man's subjection to God. Though obligation is not named in the definition of the commonwealth, covenants are, and the performance of covenants is an obligation of conscience imposed by the third law of nature. His definition of a law of nature is not a definition of a law of God, nor of a dictate of reason, but of a fictitious terium quid which is more than dictate of reason but less than law of God. (Hood, pp.88-89)

Hobbes applies this concept of natural obligation by the Laws of Nature to the explanation of the origins of the commonwealth through the fiction of natural man and the State of Nature. Without some obligatory force that exists in the State of Nature there is no way for human beings to escape the state of war by the artificial construction of the commonwealth since nothing would guarantee that each would keep their promise to obey the terms of the covenant. There must therefore be a law that restricts violating promises or breaking faith that holds prior to the formation of the commonwealth. moral obligations of conscience impose just this necessary restriction; the Laws of Nature are just these laws.

Hobbes treated the Laws of Nature essentially as if they were laws of virtue, according to Hood, even though virtues are only conducive to peace, not necessary for it (Hood, p.100). Hobbes himself says:

For the laws of nature, which consist in Equity, Justice, Gratitude, and other moral virtues on these depending, in the condition of mere nature...are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and to obedience. (E.W. III, 253)

Because Hobbes was above all a religious moralist he was
interested in the moral virtues and in incorporating them into his theory of obligation. Were he not a religious moralist, Hood notes, "he could have confined his civil philosophy to actions necessary for peace" (Hood, p.100). But since he was, in fact, a religious moralist he adhered to the classic view of moral philosophy as the science of virtue and vice. The problem for interpreters is that Hobbes couched his talk of moral virtue in naturalistic terms, calling preservation in this world the natural good to which morality was the means, causing various interpreters to misconstrue his actual intentions.

In truth, Hood believes, Hobbes held that virtue was a higher good than earthly self-preservation (Hood is agreeing with Warrender here):

Preservation in this world is not necessarily the moral end of the Moral Law. In relation to salvation virtue is more important than action. There can be no moral absolute in Hobbes's moral science. He never speaks of a moral absolute; but there are clear indications that in his thought God is the Moral Absolute. The commands of God are not only commands but right reason; and these commands are laws of virtue. The virtues are eternal and are morally good. Even as dictates of reason the laws of nature are immutable. To ask whether the laws of nature, as laws of virtue, could be changed is philosophically as inept as to ask whether a true geometrical theorem may be altered. (Hood, p.101)

The problem, however, is, given that civil philosophy is more concerned with conduct than with virtue, Hobbes had to find a way of bridging the gap between civil and moral philosophy. The difficulty is that his naturalistic language implies that virtue, so far as it is related to
attaining peace, is impossible apart from the commonwealth (Hood, p.101).

Hood believes the concept of justice is the bridge Hobbes used to extricate himself from this sticky, self-created problem. Hobbes posits justice as the cardinal virtue of any good citizen, derivable from the third law of nature, the law of contracts, "commanding the performance of covenants" (E.W. III, 130, 134). Injustice is, on the other hand, the breaking of a covenant (E.W. III, 190). Hood calls this "the special sense (of justice) ...(which is) a settled disposition of the mind to keep faith with other men" (Hood, p.103). The virtue of any citizen "consists solely in a settled disposition of mind to obey the civil law. Such obedience is prescribed by the law of nature, and is justice and equity" (Hood, p.105).

Hobbes derived his concept of justice naturalistically by arguing that justice is not contrary to reason in that the observance of certain rules conducive to self-preservation in this world is required of all those who seek salvation or 'felicity after death'. Though Hobbes settled for a naturalistic formulation of his doctrine in the English text of Leviathan, Hood points out that in the Latin text, which Hood feels more correctly represents Hobbes' true position, he adds the reference to supernatural law. Hood paraphrases Hobbes' position:

The laws of nature are, as of nature, dictates of reason. There can be no natural knowledge of man's
estate after death; this is a matter not of knowledge, but of supernatural faith. Therefore, breach of covenant cannot be called a precept of reason, or nature. In the Latin text at the end of his naturalist rejoinder, Hobbes recognized more realistically that his opponents were concerned with supernatural law. But we have no supernatural law beyond Holy Scripture; and it everywhere prescribes obedience to kings and observance of covenants. (Hood, p.110)

The concept of justice is therefore naturalistically derived yet retains its status as a moral term. The naturalistic aspects of the derivation allow Hobbes to use the term in the context of civil philosophy at the same time holding that political obligation is fundamentally moral obligation. The righteous person follows the dictates of natural justice, being careful to act justly (giving every person his/her due, honoring contracts, etc.) out of the will to be just and nothing more; personal benefit does not figure into the equation for the righteous person who obeys the law out of a constant will to do what is right. The virtues within the commonwealth are naturalistic translations of the virtues found and prescribed in Scripture.

The justice of men is justice in relation to natural law. Justice, as a natural obligation, is an obligation on man as a natural person. This obligation is prior to civil law, and cannot be enforced by civil law, for it is obligation of conscience. The third law of nature merely states that men perform their covenants made. The performance of covenants is always an act, and this seems a reasonably specific law of action. Yet it also is for Hobbes essentially a law of virtue, obliging in conscience. The man who performs his covenants through fear of punishment is unjust: he transgresses the law of nature, because he does not act in conformity with reason, but from passion; he has acted not under obligation, but freely in accordance
with his own natural aversion, and his own reckoning of natural good and evil. (Hood, p.112)

Thus, moral obligation is antecedent to the making of any particular covenant since the general obligation to obey covenants follows from the eternal Moral Law of God as revealed in Scripture, all of which precedes all societies and commonwealths.

The real key to Hobbes' theory then is that natural obligation cannot be fulfilled without the moral virtue of justice and the operation of God, "of grace operating either naturally or supernaturally" (Hood, p.123). Hobbes could not, nor did he need to, provide a psychology of the fulfillment of natural obligation. Moral law is fulfilled only when it is itself the cause of the act of conforming, that is, when it follows from the will to obedience. "True" obligation is fulfilled only when one follows the scriptural law of God as God's word. If one acts out the fear of punishment or fear of Hell, the act is that of an unrighteous person. The obedience requires here is necessary for salvation and calls for more than obedient actions: one must act out of the correct motivations, namely out of respect for the Law.

Having carefully examined the nature of natural obligation, Hood's analysis of civil or artificial obligation is easily explicated. Hood believes that civil obligation is a human contrivance modeled on natural obligation. Artificial obligations arise out of the act of
covenanting, which is a voluntary act resulting in the establishment of the commonwealth and the system of civil laws within the commonwealth. The ultimate obligatory force behind these obligations, nonetheless, remains moral; artificial obligations rely upon the moral obligation to perform covenants that Hood refers to as moral in the 'special sense' of being duties of natural justice, i.e., as prescribed by the eternal Moral Law of God that is prior to the making of any specific covenant (Hood, p.115). Where natural obligations are obligations of debt (to God, to give God His due), artificial obligations by covenant are obligations of promise (of person to person). The only real obligation, however, is moral; civil or artificial obligation is simply a copying or imitation of the real: "Covenants are artificial bonds. Natural obligation is real obligation; artificial obligation is an imitation of the real. All that is artificial must be grounded on what is natural.... Artificial obligation is obligation only in virtue of the natural obligation to perform covenants (E.W. III, 324)" (Hood, p.116).

But why would Hobbes have need of a second type of obligation, especially one grounded on the first type? If moral obligation is real obligation, what purpose is served by adding an artificial imitation? Hood's answer reveals what he takes to be Hobbes' pragmatic awareness of human psychology:
The man who breaks his covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason to do so', can be received into, or retained in, a commonwealth only through the errors of others, and it is against reason for him to rely on such error for his preservation.... No man who does not acknowledge obligation of conscience, including the obligation to perform covenants, can be a member of his commonwealth; but every commonwealth includes an unjust majority. Every breach of civil law is a breach of covenant, but Hobbes's commonwealth provides punishments for such breaches other than extrusion. (Hood, p.109)

Thus, artificial obligations to obey the sovereign are necessary to establish the right of the sovereign to restrain and punish the 'unjust majority''. This right will allow the sovereign the justification of the use of whatever force is necessary to instill fear in the unjust, unrighteous members of society who would be unmoved by moral duty or have the will to obey God's Laws (atheists being among the latter). Civil obligation legitimates compelling the obedience of the unjust majority. The passion of fear is the key to the erection of the commonwealth in fact, which requires simply getting everyone to act as if following their moral duty. But the justification for creating this fear in the unjust is the natural law grasped in Scripture.

Fear may necessitate the doing of just actions by unjust men; within the commonwealth fear of the punishments appointed by civil laws may necessitate the obedience that is required for mutual peace and common defence.

Fear is also the passion on which Hobbes reckons for the erection of the commonwealth. It is therefore essential that covenants entered into in the state of nature from fear should oblige.... Covenants entered into from fear in the state of nature are obligatory; a man may lawfully covenant through fear to do anything
which he may lawfully do without obligation. All this is intended to safeguard covenants made in the state of nature for the erection of the commonwealth. (Hood, p.120)

Civil obligation, then, is obligation by contract. Its form or structure is clearly modeled almost exactly on Hobbes' analysis of moral obligation. We can see this clearly by briefly diagramming the parallel structures of each type of obligation:

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<td>NATURAL OBLIATION</td>
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Hood believes both forms of obligation are necessary simply because Hobbes recognized that not all persons are moved by moral arguments, so he was willing to settle for conformity to natural obligation in actions performed out of fear (in foro externo). The commonwealth must be based on natural obligation, on obligations of conscience, "but a compelled fulfilment of artificial obligations is sufficient for mutual peace and common defence. Artificial obligations can be fulfilled by unjust men, unmindful of natural obligation" (Hood, p.122).

Finally, for Hood, the duality of Hobbes' theory resulted from his use of naturalistic, scientific language and methods:

Whenever obligation, natural or artificial, is fulfilled, fulfilment is extrinsically necessitated. The sovereign can necessitate sufficient fulfilment of
artifical obligations by compulsion; and Hobbes can explain such fulfilment in terms of his naturalistic psychology. The fulfilment of natural obligation cannot be explained in terms of a naturalist psychology for it is God who necessitates such fulfilment. There is no good inclination that is not of the operation of God (E.W. III, 421); and this operation is not always natural.... The fulfilment of natural obligation is not of nature, but of grace operating either naturally, or supernaturally. It was impossible for Hobbes to provide a psychology of the fulfilment of natural obligation on principles of nature only; and for the accomplishment of his design he had no need to provide any psychology of the fulfilment of natural obligation. (Hood, pp.122-123)

The mistake of earlier interpreters was to become too impressed by Hobbes' scientific method and language. This caused them to bypass the Scriptural origins of Hobbes' moral theory of obligation. For Hood, the will to obedience follows from belief, or faith; it is a gift of God. Hobbes relied upon a belief in eternal life, also, to persuade his readers to accept their moral obligation to act virtuously: "The obedience necessary to salvation includes the virtues. The virtues give rise to virtuous actions easily and without struggle..." (Hood, p.126). Hobbes' theory is thus deontological, a version of Christian natural law theory. The materialism and egoism contained in Hobbes' work is essentially irrelevant, though it serves practical purposes.

In conclusion, Hood characterizes Hobbes' theory as basically the outcome of two statements:

Obligation by the Moral Law is fulfilled only when the Law is itself the cause of the action in conformity with it. The Moral Law is not fulfilled by actions necessitated by natural passions.... These two statements lead to the will to obedience, but do not go behind that will. Moral obligation is a mystery, of which Hobbes wrote in Leviathan only in terms of
theistic belief, or of philosophic fiction. (Hood, p.126)


Warrender, Howard, "Obligations and Rights in Hobbes", Philosophy, 37 (Oct. 1962), 352-357. (Cited as Warrender, Phil. art.)


CHAPTER III

THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS CASE

A. INTRODUCTION

The third major thesis to be examined in this work is the individual rights thesis. Its major claim is that Hobbes begins with the concept of individual right as the basis for obligation and through an analysis of this concept locates the source of obligation in the individual person as the possessor of certain inalienable rights. Obligation follows from certain elements of human nature, not from mechanistic nor from purely traditional natural law sources. The individualist thesis clearly rejects both of the previously examined interpretations and focuses on the notion of the natural right, a component of human nature according to Hobbes, as the ground of his notion of political obligation.

Historically, there is some reason to think that Hobbes, as a man of his times, would have been influenced by the strong current of individualism making itself felt during his lifetime. Richard Peters' book outlines two historical factors that the individualistic interpreters of
of Hobbes take seriously as evidence for their thesis:

1) "The 17th C. in England was the great period of various forms of individualism"; from the many parties that abandoned the Established Church a strong Non-conformist movement developed. (Peters, p.225)

2) The understanding of even a traditional concept such as natural law was altered at this time by the focus on man as an individual begun during the Renaissance: "The law of nature was thought to be rooted in man as an individual, who was in certain respects like all other individuals, rather than derivative from his civil or ecclesiastical status." (Peters, p.156)

These historical elements point to the conclusion that neither mechanism nor natural law theory may fully explain Hobbes' theory. Rather, being a philosopher influenced by the individualism of his day, Hobbes saw an individual rights explanation of political obligation based on the right of nature that each person inherently possesses as an essential trait of humanness itself.

That such an interpretation flies in the face of both the traditional materialistic/scientific and the more recent moral/deontological readings of Hobbes was recognized by its authors. The individualists (specifically Strauss, Oakeshott, Glover, Goldsmith, and Watkins) did not deny outright that the more traditional threads are present in Hobbes, but rather that they do not account for Hobbes' conception of obligation. Instead, and the various individualists agree in principle here, their claim that Hobbes developed his notion of obligation in the time before his conversion to the scientific approach. They also hold that the natural law interpreters do not account
satisfactorily for Hobbes' theory of obligation either. W.H. Greenleaf explains their position:

There is agreement with the natural law revisionists that the modern naturalistic appearance of Hobbes's thought is deceptive and that his political and moral theory was not dependent on his materialism or developed mainly by the use of scientific method. At the same time, however, exponents of this third sort of understanding do not accept the positive side of the natural law case, that Hobbes's political and ethical thought is only properly seen in the great natural law tradition; indeed, they regard Hobbes as having explicitly and firmly repudiated that tradition. (Greenleaf, pp.17-18).

Apart from agreement on these fundamental points, a split occurs within the individualists' camp. On the one hand, Professor Leo Strauss holds that there is a link between Hobbes' pre-scientific developmental stage and what Strauss calls Hobbes' new moral attitude, a result of his anthropological studies of human nature, which identified the good with the individual's desires or needs, and takes as the basis of political theory the belief that natural law "is, or tends to be, primarily and mainly a series of 'rights', of subjective claims, originating in the human will" (Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, p.viii.) In following this path Hobbes broke cleanly with the traditional natural law theory; that is the claim that effects the split among defenders of the individualists' position. Oakeshott, Goldsmith, Glover, and Watkins take issue with Strauss' claim that Hobbes had broken cleanly with traditional natural law and wish to link the individualist theory more closely to the traditional ways of
thinking honored by philosophers before Hobbes (e.g. Aristotle, Augustine, Scotus, Occam, etc.) and, particularly, to link it to classical natural law theory, which holds that there is a rule of binding law, independent of human will. But they do agree with Strauss that Hobbes' anthropological studies are the touchstone of his political theory of obligation and that these studies extend, though they do not totally repudiate, the classical natural law tradition. Thus, Strauss and the others part company on the point of whether or not Hobbes adheres to a classical natural law point of view or whether he breaks with tradition to form a new revised, modern, version of natural law theory.

B. STRAUSS' INDIVIDUALISM

1. Outline of Strauss' Theses and Conclusions

In a passage near the end of the introduction to his book, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss writes:

The moral attitude which underlies Hobbes's political philosophy is independent of the foundation of modern science, and at least in that sense 'pre-scientific'. It is at the same time specifically modern...Hobbes...philosophized in the fertile moment when the classical and theological tradition was already shaken, and a tradition of modern science not yet formed and established. (PPH, p.5)

Within the body of this passage are a number of Strauss' most important points: First, in saying that there is a
fundamental distinction between Hobbes' moral attitude and the more traditional attitudes, Strauss implies that neither the Christian interpretations (such as Hood's) nor the traditional or classical interpretations (such as the natural law theories of Taylor and Warrender) are actually Hobbes' own theory. Second, Strauss clearly denies a purely scientific interpretation of Hobbes' theory, thus denying the materialists' interpretation. Third, what Strauss maintains is that Hobbes' true position is colored by the historical era within which Hobbes wrote so as to be a "modern" version of the moral view, though not yet the scientific view commonly attributed to Hobbes.

This move to a modern, non-scientific, version of natural law, one within which the individual is the focal point for obligation, is comprised of five separate processes according to Strauss:

1. A movement away from seeing monarchy as the most natural form of State to seeing it as the most perfect artificial State.
2. The movement away from seeing natural law as the basis of legal, moral, and political obligation, to seeing natural claim rights as the ground of those three forms of obligation.
3. A movement away from superhuman authority (of whatever kind) toward human authority as the basis of the authority of the State.
4. A movement away from the study of the past histories of States toward the construction of a new future State.
5. A movement away from honor as a moral principle, toward fear of a violent death as a moral principle. (PPH, p.129).

These moves, Strauss, notes, are all away from a view of obligation as a natural duty toward seeing it as an
artificial one. Such a movement characterizes Hobbes' entire procedure in his political theory. To make this point even stronger, Strauss claims not only that this moral attitude is temporally prior to Hobbes' scientific methods, it is logically prior to them. That is, the crux of Hobbes' theory of obligation does not actually depend upon the scientific view at all—it is logically complete without reference to these claims. Nothing rides upon the scientific claims in terms of the substance of Hobbes' moral theory.

Why did Hobbes make this shift from arguments focusing on natural processes toward a focus on artificial processes? Strauss' answer is that the change is based upon the emphasis Hobbes placed upon fear as an important moral factor in political philosophy. More specifically, the fear of death is what makes humans clear-sighted as opposed to vanity which blinds them. It is, for Hobbes, the antithesis between vanity and fear that is fundamentally important for morality.

Having recognized this antithesis between vanity and fear, Hobbes analyzed it against the background of the classical natural law tradition and concluded that a modification of the tradition was needed in order to restore morality to politics where passion currently reigned over reason.

Strauss explains Hobbes' perception of this task as
that of seeking the complete basis of natural law in man's beginnings. Hobbes found that passion, not reason was the most powerful force on most people of his time. As a result, natural law will not be effectual if its principles are distrusted by passion or are not agreeable to passions (Elements, Ep.Ded.) (Strauss, Natural Right and History, p.180). Natural law must be deduced from fear, the most powerful of all passions. Thus, Strauss says, Hobbes' method would be to attempt a rigorous deduction of natural and moral law from the principle of fear (especially of a violent death), the most powerful passion, while divorcing natural law from the idea of the perfection of human nature since natural law can only be of practical value if it is deduced from how people actually live (NRH, p.180).

For Strauss the important thing to note about the above analysis is that Hobbes' moral attitude and the need to restore morality to political philosophy precedes the conclusion that a rigorous, scientific, deduction of natural law is necessary. That is, Hobbes' "science of politics" follows from the new moral attitude as the methodology best suited to proving the moral conclusions already apparent to Hobbes. The method does not come first as the mechanistic view of Hobbes' claims, nor was it a belief in traditional natural law theory that led Hobbes to the moral conclusions he reached. The conclusions were formed before the former and after the latter had been set aside. It is only later,
when Hobbes adopts the scientific method that he is able to offer a proof of his individualistic thesis: "self-preservation is the sole root of all justice and morality, the fundamental moral fact is not a duty but a right; all duties are derivative from the fundamental and inalienable right of self-preservation" (NRH, p.181).

At this point it is clear to Strauss that what Hobbes had done was to effect a fundamental change in the direction of natural law theory. The switch from natural duty to individual right as the source of obligation is the basis of modern natural law theory; all later political philosophy is based on the break with tradition that Hobbes achieved by replacing natural law with natural right as the starting point of political theory. Although Strauss' contention that all modern political philosophy follows from Hobbes' re-direction is merely a minor and unimportant thesis for our purposes, the claim that Hobbes switched to a natural rights from the earlier natural rights approach is the key to Strauss' interpretation of Hobbes. For Hobbes, Strauss contends, sees individual rights as the expression of what everyone actually desires and Hobbes believes that people, to protect or obtain what they desire already, will fight for their rights more easily than they will strive to fulfill their duties (NRH, pp.182-183). Thus the appeal to right makes natural law more effective, exactly what Hobbes wished to achieve. But it also places the individual at the
focal point of any theory of political obligation, and thus moves beyond "perfection-oriented" theories. As Strauss says, "One could not assert the primacy of natural rights without asserting that the individual is in every respect prior to civil society: all rights of civil society are derivative from rights which originally belonged to the individual (De Cive, VI, 5-7, and Leviathan, chaps. xviii and xxviii)" (NRH, p.183). Moreover, if the preceding analysis is accepted, then obligation can only arise from contract. For if the only unconditioned moral fact is the individual's right to self-preservation, then all obligations to others are conditional and what they are conditional upon is a contract between individuals, "and therefore inpractice from the will of the sovereign" (Elements, I, 17, #1; De Cive, Ep. Ded.; III, 3-6, 29, 32; VI, 16; XII, 1; XIV, 9-10, 17; XVII, 3; De Homine, XIII, 9; Leviathan, chaps. xiv, xv, xxvi) (NRH, p.188). This last point follows from the fact that the contract that validates all other contracts is the social contract, the contract of subjection to the sovereign. But, again, the ultimate starting point of all this is the switch from duty to right and the resultant individual rights theory.

2. The Historical Aspect in Strauss' Defense of the Individual Rights Interpretation
The basic reason for Strauss' rejection of the previous interpretations is that Hobbes' theory of obligation could not derive from either the scientific or traditional natural law view simply because the conclusions and basics of the theory were established and accepted by Hobbes before his conversion to the scientific method and his revision of traditional natural law theory. The argument Strauss uses to support his major theses, then, grows out of an historical analysis of Hobbes' life and the belief that Hobbes had reached his final conclusions prior to his publication of the major "scientific" works most scholars concentrate upon for Hobbes' moral philosophy: \textit{Leviathan}, \textit{Elements of Law}, and \textit{Elementa Philosophiae}, section II "De Homine" and section III "De Cive", all released after 1640. It is Strauss' contention that we can find all the major conclusions of Hobbes' theory in works prior to 1640 and that therefore they must be derived from other than scientific sources and/or traditional theories that he already rejected and revised. These later works, Strauss says, are a product of the third and last stage of Hobbes' life, and while the moral theory and its conclusions are most forcefully stated and argued in the later works, they are formulated in and depend upon principles already held during the first two stages of his life. Therefore, they are both chronologically, and also logically, prior to the scientific period, the implication being that these
principles and beliefs cannot be supported by the principles available in mechanistic or the natural law interpretations.

Study of the stages of Hobbes' life, then, is the key to Strauss' historically and philosophically more correct interpretation of the theory of obligation. These stages are: the Early Aristotelian stage, the Humanistic stage, and the Scientific stage.

According to Strauss the beginnings of Hobbes' political philosophy are found in his pre-scientific, informal observations of human behavior and his consequently 'new moral attitude'. "The experience, underlying Hobbes's view of human life, must be traced back to a specific moral attitude which compels its holder to experience and see man in Hobbes's particular way" (NRH, p.x). Michael Oakeshott explains Strauss' conclusion,

This "moral attitude" is "Hobbes's original view" and it is "independent both of traditional and modern science": it was present in his mind before he became acquainted with "modern science", and it is in conflict with the moral attitude or set of norms provided by traditional moral and political philosophy...it is new because it is "untraditional", because it is a break with Aristotelian tradition, and it is new because it appears in Hobbes's writings as a successor to an original acceptance of the old or traditional moral attitude; that is, it is new in the history of moral philosophy and it is new in the history of Hobbes's own intellectual development. (Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, p.136).

a. Early Aristotelian Stage

Hobbes had been educated in and had accepted the
teachings of Aristotle and the notion of aristocratic virtue, as well as having studied classical poets and historians such as Homer, Demosthenes, and Thucydides (E.W. VIII, vii). Strauss notes that even at the end of his humanistic period Hobbes had no objections to Aristotle being labeled THE classical philosopher. It is only in his later period that Hobbes replaced Aristotle with Plato in his hierarchy of philosophers, which Strauss sees as further evidence that at the time of Hobbes' translating of Thucydides he held Aristotle in high regard, "...it is only of importance that Hobbes, who later considered Plato to be the best philosopher...of antiquity, at the end of his humanist period repeats without raising any objection the ruling opinion according to which Aristotle is the highest authority in philosophy" (PPH, p.33). In fact the break with Aristotle which marks the end of the Early Aristotelian stage, extends initially only to the mathematical and scientific studies, and even as late as his writing of the Elements (1640) Hobbes still relies upon and uses many of Aristotle's analyses and distinctions (PPH, p.33).

What remained during the Humanistic stage from Hobbes' early respect for Aristotle is of extreme importance in grasping the true intentions of Hobbes' moral philosophy, according to Strauss. The important left-over was methodological: specifically, Hobbes followed the methodology of Aristotle's Rhetoric while formulating and
writing his own political treatises, especially in the area of the analysis of the passions. *De Homine*, *Elements*, and *Leviathan* all contain passages closely paralleled in the *Rhetoric* in style and substance. Strauss develops a long list of correlations in these four works that is the foundation of Strauss' claim that, if Aristotle is the basis of Hobbes' political theorizing, it cannot be the case that Hobbes' political philosophy is truly a product of his post-Euclidean period alone (PPH, pp.36-41).

The conclusion of this analysis is that since most scholars devote their attention almost exclusively to the later works, the recognition that Hobbes' political philosophy is NOT a result of either a mechanistic approach nor a traditionalistic approach has been overlooked. Hobbes has been miscast in terms of a mechanical-scientific or naturalistic interpretation because his reliance on Aristotle's methodology is not apparent if one attends solely to his later works and forgets his earlier developmental periods altogether. Once we take a more complete overview of Hobbes' life and work we can see the contrasts between what follows and his earlier moral attitude and methodology.

By explicating Hobbes' earlier Aristotelianism, Strauss can argue that the conclusions of Hobbes' mature moral philosophy conflict with the norms provided by the traditional theories. The contrast is in the different
kinds of arguments of the earlier works as against those of the scientific period. In particular, the emphasis on fear is derived through the Aristotelian influence and reliance upon the *Rhetoric*; it is this emphasis that finally defines Hobbes' new moral attitude and, then, separates him from Aristotle, for Hobbes' analysis of fear ultimately is different from Aristotle's. As Strauss says,

A large part of the changes which Hobbes makes in his model is to be explained by his fundamental opinion that fear or more accurately fear of death, is the force which makes men clear-sighted, and vanity the force which makes men blind. The change in the estimate of fear is shown by the fact that Hobbes in his enumeration of good things (*De Homine*, ch. 6-10, 12) mentions life as the first good in the first place, whereas Aristotle mentions happiness in the first place and life only in the penultimate place. (PPH, p.132)

This change is the basis of Hobbes' turning from Aristotle and entering the second stage of his philosophical life, the Humanistic period.

To summarize, Strauss holds that it is in this early period (and the next) that Hobbes arrived at the content of his political theory of obligation. The early formulations of the theory pre-date Hobbes' discovery of Euclid and Galileo and leads him away from the traditional natural law theory based on Aristotle. The result is the 'new moral attitude' and modern formulation of natural theory having fear as its central element. Thus, in the second philosophic period in his life, Hobbes developed these early beliefs into his mature (and "true") theory of obligation based on individual natural rights.
b. The Humanistic Stage

The humanistic period of Hobbes' life is important because of two things: first, Hobbes rejected Aristotelian natural law theory and second, he undertook to study history in a humanistic manner. Strauss believes that these two things account for the structure of Hobbes' complete political philosophy as manifested in company with detailed demonstrations in the works of the third period. Strauss notes Hobbes' continual movement away from natural to artificial processes and explanations to form the basis of his theory of politics and obligation during this second period. As a result of this second period of humanism and historiography, Hobbes returns to philosophy, adopting the scientific method as his primary philosophical tool. However, Strauss believes that Hobbes reached his final conclusions during the second period.

The second period begins with Hobbes' rejection of Aristotle and the traditional moral philosophy of classic natural law theory that was derived from the first two. In outline, the traditional theory of Hobbes' time was a development from Plato, through Aristotle, Hooker, Suarez, and Grotius of the notion that natural law is an objective rule or measure independent of and prior to any human will, such that moral goodness is equated with obedience to natural law so far as discoverable by reason (PPH, pp.xvii-
Moral goodness, virtue, must be a product of wisdom. It was this that Hobbes was rejecting, according to Strauss, because he felt that the traditional moral theory had failed to develop moral science beyond its theoretical sphere into a force having practical influence upon human conduct. Thus, Hobbes was forced to abandon Aristotle, natural law theory, and, ultimately, any moral theory that held virtue to be a product of wisdom. Such theories had no concrete connection to actual human affairs since it was removed from the way people actually lived and acted.

Therefore Hobbes took the obvious step of beginning an anthropological and historical study of how people, in fact, behave and what influences their conduct. The reason for the shift is described by Strauss as deriving from, "...the conviction of the impotence of reason, added to the enhanced interest in man" (PPH, p.93). The source of these motives Strauss identifies as Bacon's thesis of the importance of history and the inductive study of historical examples as the way to establish norms of human conduct (PPH, p.93). That Hobbes was familiar with and influenced by Bacon's views is certain since he had served as Bacon's secretary and had recorded much of Bacon's thought as dictated to him. Having thus questioned pure reason and turned to inductive empirical analysis Hobbes had shifted his view of moral goodness from the traditional view associating it with wisdom and aristocratic virtue. That he
did so, Strauss says, is clear from his subsequent identification of moral goodness with success and virtue with prudence, a truly Baconian move (PPH, p.94).

Hobbes' turn to history is more coherent once we recognize that, in addition to Bacon's influence, the attitude of his times toward history was that its study widened one's stock of experiences and examples, thought to be so necessary to the development of prudence in a person. The lessons of history were the lessons learned from observing what happens when one fails to follow the dictates of prudence. History does not teach precepts, which the unvirtuous would ignore anyway, but broadens experience through a search for the conditions and results of the realization and application of the precepts. (PPH, pp.85-86). The object of history is "to instruct and enable men, to bear themselves prudently in the present and providently toward the future" (E.W. VIII, vii). Thus Hobbes, says Strauss, sees history as a source for normative guidance, while replacing a morality of obedience with the morality of prudence.

While studying history, Hobbes came to recognize the psychological effects of fear and pride on human action and came to see that all meaning is rooted in human need. By a study of individuals and their actions in history, Hobbes discovered that the organizing principle of any science of Philosophy of politics will be supplied by identifying human
good (Strauss, "On the Spirit of Hobbes's Political philosophy", p.9). Here the Aristotelian roots of Hobbes the historian are evident. But for the Hobbes of the second period the identification of this good is to be accomplished by the study of people's actual lives in history, not by merely theoretical accounts of natural law.

In the attempt to reach such an identification of human good Hobbes found the phenomena of actual human life to be central: the passions, characters, temperaments, intentions, and motives of individual people became a central interest for Hobbes. Strauss explains:

Knowledge of these phenomena is provided not by traditional philosophy, but by history, and among all historians according to Hobbes's view by none more than by Thucydides...because, instead of dogmatically setting out precepts, he helps the reader to gain thorough and independent insight into the precepts as into the teachings which are gained from experience, and in the second place, because he is aware of the peculiar difficulties of this kind of knowledge...he teaches the reader much more thoroughly than any philosopher could (E.W., Vol. VIII, viii and xxi f.). Thucydides is concerned primarily with motives. The most powerful motives are the passions.... Hobbes, taught by Thucydides about those passions which 'carry the greatest sway with men in their public conversation', reveals his characteristic moral attitude for the first time in the terse statements of the introduction to his translation of Thucydides, which treats of those passions. (PPH, pp.109-110).

Strauss believes, then, that Hobbes' recognition of the importance of the passions led him to history, which in turn brought him to Thucydides, who finally influenced his moral attitudes enough to complete the break with Aristotle and classic natural law theory. Again, Strauss ties this
break and formulation of the new moral attitude to the time of Hobbes' translation of Thucydides, prior to his conversion to "mechanical philosophy". It is also important that this new position is stated, not in terms of nature, but in terms of a new morality, a product of the study of history and informal observation of human beings and their manners. Ultimately it is fear and vanity that become the two postulates of human nature that ground the State, not either a "naturalistic antithesis of morally indifferent animal appetite...on the one hand, and morally indifferent striving after self-preservation on the other, but the moral and humanist antithesis of fundamentally unjust vanity and fundamentally just fear of violent death" (PPH, p.27).

Having reached these radically new moral values, Hobbes was forced by his own position, first, to reject once and for all Aristotle's concept of aristocratic virtue, "As fear is thus considered the sufficient motive for all right behaviour...it is impossible to approve any virtues which do not arise from fear, fear of violent death, and whose essence consists in the conquest or denial of fear. Once Hobbes has fully elucidated his conception of fear he cannot but reject aristocratic virtue" (PPH, p.113). The aristocratic virtues are those of war, the State of Nature in Hobbes' later terminology; fear, on the other hand, is the virtue of peace and the State, as well as the best motive for right execution and planning (De Cive, chap. I,
Then, secondly, Hobbes was compelled to abandon reliance upon history that characterized his humanist period because of the very conclusions to which it led him. For "the need for history, which had arisen thanks to an alleged or real defect in traditional philosophy, is fulfilled by the new political philosophy. Thus from the time of the formation of the new political philosophy, history sinks back into its old philosophic insignificance--with the important difference, that in the new political philosophy, in contrast to the traditional, history is 'taken up' and conserved" (PPH, p.96). In short, the new conclusions created the necessity of abandoning historically oriented humanism and seeking a methodology more suited to the philosophic argument and the justification his new views required. It was at this point, Strauss notes, that Hobbes was drawn back to philosophy itself, though with an altered set of motives and values which prompted his adopting an untraditional philosophic method.

c. The Scientific/Philosophical Stage

Hobbes returned to philosophy, by his own admission, to overturn the long tradition of classical philosophy's reliance upon the Aristotelian approach to moral and political theory. The tenets of that tradition Hobbes set
out to replace were: 1) the noble and the just are fundamentally distinguished from the pleasant, and are preferable to it; 2) that there is a *rectum naturale* that is wholly *independent* of any human will, compact, or convention; that this was false was made clear to Hobbes once he came to believe that it is by the right of nature that people save *themselves* when peace is not available; 3) that there is one "best" political order rendered best by nature alone; of this traditional political philosophy, Hobbes says it is to be identified with a particular position that was public spirited and too *idealistic* (*NRH*, p.167). Hobbes' return to philosophy in the third period is marked by his rejection of this idealistic strain in political theory, particularly the view that the essence of human nature is to be political. For Hobbes, says Strauss, we are not, by nature, political animals. Hobbes has stepped away from the Aristotelian tradition and into a more Epicurean one, says Strauss, which holds that we are naturally a-political and identify our good with what is pleasant (*De Cive* I, 2; *Leviathan* chap. vi (33)).

It is now, Strauss contends, that Hobbes' natural philosophy becomes important. His physics blends Platonic mathematical theory with Epicurean materialism into a synthesis accomplished by moving them from one arena, physics, to another arena, politics. What Hobbes needed to do, consequently, was to show that this scientific
materialism was possible by refuting the claim that science could not be protected from the skepticism associated with materialism (NRH, p.172). In doing this, Hobbes reached the conclusion that what was needed was to mark out an "island of science" safe from the skeptics' attacks; the only such "island" that Hobbes could discern was one of our own conscious constructs that would be wholly unambiguous and certain because wholly created by ourselves as sole cause.

As Strauss paraphrases Hobbes (De Homine X, 4-5; De Cive XVIII, 4 and XVII, 28; De Corpore xxv, 1; Elements, ed. Tonnies, p.168),

The cause of the world of our constructs does not have a further cause, a cause that is not, or not fully, within our power; the world of our constructs has an absolute beginning or is a creation in the strict sense. The world of our constructs is therefore the desired island that is exempt from the flux of blind and aimless causation. (NRH, p.173).

The State, then, is an artificial construct, not a natural entity, or else we could not understand it; that we can understand it once we see its ends (located in human needs), shows that it is an artifical entity.

In Hobbes' system, Strauss holds, epistemology replaces traditional cosmology rather than a new mechanistic cosmology replacing the old teleological cosmology, as claimed by the mechanistic interpreters (NRH, pp.176-177). However, knowledge cannot remain the end if the whole is unintelligible (De Corpore I, 6). All intelligibility is rooted in the fulfillment of human need, so the most
compelling and posited by human desire will be the highest principle. With this realization political philosophy, as Aristotle had predicted, becomes the most important sort of knowledge. But, Strauss notes, Hobbes does not just agree with the classic tradition in this respect, he also expects much more. What he expects is a restoration of moral principles and a rigorous deduction of natural and moral law based, not on classic metaphysics, but on a political science independent of every other science, one grounded upon the empirical observation of human beings as they exist. Hobbes, thus, has moved away from the naturalism of classic natural law by turning to natural science and abandoning abstract metaphysics; he is denying that there are any natural standards of goodness in the Platonic and traditional natural law senses (PPH, pp.165-166).

The task of Hobbes' new science of politics is to identify exactly what the most compelling human desire is by careful empirical observation and analysis. The factor that is of primary importance for Strauss' case here is the claim that Hobbes had already identified, through precisely such empirical methods, just this need or desire during the two earlier phases of his life: it is the desire to avoid a violent death. Strauss writes:

The most powerful of all passions is the fear of death, and, more particularly, the fear of violent death at the hands of others: not nature but 'that terrible enemy of nature, death', yet death insofar as man can do something about it, i.e., death insofar as it can be avoided or avenged, supplies the ultimate guidance
(Elements I, 14, sec. 6; De Cive, Ep. ded., I, 7 and III, 31; Leviathan chaps. xiv (92) and xxvi (197)).

Death takes the place of the telos. Or to preserve the ambiguity of Hobbes's thought, let us say that the fear of a violent death expresses most forcefully the most powerful and the most fundamental of all natural desires, the initial desire, the desire for self-preservation. (NRH, pp.180-181)

This belief, arrived at during the humanistic period, is a moral belief. It characterizes Hobbes' new moral attitude and thus carries over into the final period of his life to function as the starting point of his scientific deduction of the laws of morality and politics. Moral law then becomes all the rules that must be obeyed if self-preservation is to be guaranteed. Virtue has been reduced to the particular social virtue of peaceableness, vice to pride and vanity, which are the causes of the desire for power over others ("SH", p.18). It is the fact that all this depends upon the moral belief that all right action is guided by fear, which Hobbes held from his humanistic period onward, that is missed by most scholars' overemphasis on the later works.

From this point on Hobbes' theory of obligation is developed in detail and given its scientific character. Indeed, Strauss maintains that the prior acceptance of fear as the principle of the new moral attitude combined with Hobbes' turn to a non-metaphisical political philosophy and concept of human nature, dictates his turning to Euclid and the new science of the day. It is not the case, Strauss emphasizes, that Hobbes' political science is the result of
only his natural science; one must examine the question of why Hobbes decided in favor of materialism in the first place. Strauss admits that only rough indications can be given, but his explanation, which he holds is suitable, can be constructed along the following lines:

Hobbes' turn to natural science is to be explained by his interest not so much in nature as in man, in self-knowledge of man as he really is, i.e. by the interest which characterized him even in his humanist period. The humanist or moral origin of his scientific question is revealed even in his answer to the question. The fundamental concept of his theory of motion, the concept of conatus, appears first in his analysis of appetite. Nor is this all. His scientific explanation of sense perception is characterized by the fact that it interprets perception of the higher senses by the sense of touch; and the preference for the sense of touch which this presupposes is already implied in Hobbes's original view of the fundamental significance of the antithesis between vanity and fear...If Hobbes's natural science in its questions and answers is thus dependent upon his 'humanist', that is moral, interests and convictions, on the other hand a particular conception of nature is the implicit basis of his views in moral and political philosophy...He could not have maintained his thesis that death is the greatest and supreme evil but for the conviction vouched for by his natural science that the soul is not immortal. (PPH, pp.166-167)

The problem that has prevented most scholars from perceiving this moral basis to Hobbes' science and political theory is:

...that the moral basis of his political philosophy becomes more and more disguised, the farther the evolution of his natural science progresses...In other words, with the progressive elaboration of his natural science, vanity, which must of necessity be treated from the moral standpoint, is more and more replaced by the striving for power, which is neutral and therefore more amenable to scientific interpretation. (PPH, pp.168-169)

What the scientific treatment is, ultimately, is the
use of the best method of exposition, that which can be most easily rectified with a materialist bend but still be connected to a moral genesis; what it is not, as previously maintained, is the decisive feature of Hobbes' political philosophy.

3. The New Theory of Obligation

From this moral and scientific synthesis Hobbes arrived at his new theory of political obligation which Strauss calls the modern version of natural law theory. What makes it modern is its switch from duty to individual right as the basis of theory. The result of Hobbes' particular methodology combined with a certain Platonic flavor, was a deduction not of materialistic moral law or obligation but the deduction of a claim: The basis of obligation is the right of nature. Strauss explains the essence of this new concept of 'right':

This right is the minimum claim which as such is fundamentally just and the origin of any other just claim; more exactly, it is unconditionally just because it can be answered for in face of all men in all circumstances. A claim of this kind is only the claim to defend life and limb. Its opposite is the maximum claim, which is fundamentally unjust, for it cannot be answered for in the face of any other man. The maximum claim...is the claim to triumph over all other men. This 'natural' claim is checked by fear of violent death and becomes man's rational minimum claim, and thus 'right of nature' comes into being, or at least comes to light. That is to say, the 'right of nature' is the first juridical or moral fact which arises if one starts from man's nature, i.e. from man's natural appetite. (PPH, p.155 fn)
The so-called laws of nature owe any importance they have to being the necessary consequence of the right to self-preservation, the right of nature. Here is the key move in Strauss' development of his individualistic thesis: Hobbes is not a classical natural law moralist but a modern theorist who puts individual right at the focal point of a theory of political obligation, he subordinates law to right with consequences that alter all subsequent political philosophy. For Hobbes, "Since the fundamental and absolute moral fact is a right and not a duty, the function as well as the limits of civil society must be defined in terms of man's natural right and not in terms of his natural duty" ("SH", p.13).

Why did Hobbes believe this switch was necessary? The answer, for Strauss, is found in the earlier periods when Hobbes studied human nature. For Hobbes, rights are simply the expression of what everyone desires anyway. Human beings are by nature willing to fight to protect or gain what they desire more readily than they can be made willing to fulfill duties; this natural readiness to fight is the basis of their rights. The premises of the deduction of their rights are located, therefore, in passions, and what is needed to make these modern rights effective is therefore seen to be 'enlightenment or propaganda', not a moral appeal.

For Hobbes, this 'enlightenment' is a matter of
clearly expliciting the role of fear, especially fear of a violent death at the hands of others: "yet death insofar as man can do something about it, i.e., death insofar as it can be avoided or avenged, supplies the ultimate guidance (Elements, I, 14, sec. 6; De Cive, Ep. Ded., I, 7, and III, 31; Leviathan XIV, 92, and xxvii, 197)" ("SH", p.12). Natural law must be deduced from the desire for self-preservation which, then, becomes the "sole root of all justice and morality, the fundamental moral fact is not a duty but a right" ("SH", p.13). As a result, Strauss says:

...duties are binding only to the extent to which their performance does not endanger our self-preservation. Only the right of self-preservation is unconditional or absolute. By nature, there exists only a perfect right and no perfect duty. The law of nature, which formulates man's natural duties, is not a law, properly speaking. ("SH", p.13)

Following from this, Hobbes characterizes the function of the State as that of safeguarding each individual's natural right. The State does not produce or promote a virtuous life, as premodern natural law doctrines taught. Here, Strauss says, we may speak of Hobbes shifting the emphasis of political philosophy from natural duties to the natural rights of individuals ("SH", p.14). In other words:

[Hobbes]...begins his political philosophy not with the question as to the essence of virtue, or with the question...as to the 'nature' of man in the sense of the idea of man, but with the question as to the 'nature' of man in the sense of that which falls to all men before education.... Hobbes traces the existing State back to its principles in human nature--limitless self-love on the one hand, and fear of a violent death
Hobbes characterizes the two principles... as the principle of natural appetite and the principle of natural reason, i.e. as the principle of the wrong and the principle of the right.... All interpreters of Hobbes... have not noticed that the principle of natural reason... or, what comes to the same thing, the principle of the 'right of nature' which he seems only to presuppose, is in reality justified by him... (De Cive, cap. 1, art. 7). The 'law of nature' owes all its dignity simply to the circumstance that it is the necessary consequence of the 'right of nature'. (PPH, pp. 153-155)

Strauss concludes that because of Hobbes' emphasis on natural right, and his subsequent precise distinction between 'right' and 'law' that showed the State to be primarily founded on 'right', of which 'law' is a mere consequence, we may characterize Hobbes' political philosophy as an extreme form of individualism (PPH, p.157). It is this uncompromising individualism that makes Hobbes, in Strauss's opinion, the founder of modern political philosophy (PPH, p.157).

Where classical theory assumed society to be superior to the individual, thus subject to a prior morality, Hobbes' theory reverses this:

One could not assert the primacy of natural rights without asserting that the individual is in every respect prior to civil society: all rights of civil society or of the sovereign are derivative from rights which originally belonged to the individual (De Cive VI, 5-7; Leviathan chaps. xviii (113) and xxviii (203-3)). The individual as such, the individual regardless of his qualities—and no merely, as Aristotle had contended, the man who surpasses humanity—had to be conceived of as essentially complete independently of civil society. This conception is a state of nature which antedates civil society. (NRH, p.183)

Thus, once Hobbes had altered the emphasis from duty to
right, individualism followed and stands as a rejection of the 'perfection-oriented' traditional theories. The State of Nature is described such that it is a state with perfect rights (De Cive, praef.); by nature, everyone has the right to preserve themselves and each individual is best suited to determine the means of achieving their own preservation. The individual, now, becomes the basis of the organizing principle of society. Each person's perception of the right means to self-preservation is the impetus behind the formation of civil society: any civil authority, says Strauss, must be an extension of the natural right of the individual in Hobbes' theory.

Ultimately human beings are the makers of society and can control the society they make by understanding and controlling their passions. This makes power a key part of civil society, the power to control the passions and actions governed by them. Trading on the ambiguity between physical and legal power (potentia vs. potestas) (E.W., IV, p.298), and taking it to show the two belong together, Hobbes sees the State as both the greatest human force and highest human authority. 'Legal power is irresistible force'. There is a necessary conjunction of the most powerful passion (fear of a violent death) and the most sacred right (self-preservation) directly ("SH", p.23-24). Basing his analysis on the extreme case of the State of Nature (civil war) Hobbes reduces, says Strauss, the various parts of the
social fabric to the one which remains following such dramatic events: fear of a violent death. This, normally, is the most powerful force and is supposed to supply the universal applicability for Hobbes' theory. Strauss' individualistic thesis is quite apparent in all this since passion is from and of the individual, as is the right to self-preservation an individual right, thus showing that all civil obligation is traceable to the individual contractors and their natures, including the natural right to self-preservation.

The content and nature of moral law is drastically affected by the move from duty to right, as well. "The moral law...was to be greatly simplified by being deduced from the natural right of self-preservation. Self-preservation requires peace. The moral law became, therefore, the sum of the rules which have to be obeyed if there is to be peace (NRH, p.187). Obligation under this conception arises from a contract between individuals and justice is identical with obeying one's contracts. Obligation and justice, then, are not factors defined independently of human will; there is a substitution of will for duty or law, and this is the heart of Hobbes' individualism in Strauss' view. It is the will of the contractors that creates obligation, which, in effect, resolves down to, in civil society, the will of the sovereign since the contract making all other contracts valid in civil society is the contract of subjection to the
sovereign ("SH", p.18). The culmination is the doctrine of sovereignty as a legal doctrine derived from the new natural law and leading to natural public law, the core of "modern natural law theory", as Strauss calls it.

4. Conclusion

The final paragraph of Strauss', The Political philosophy of Hobbes, is a fine recapitulation of the thread of Strauss' argument and his individualistic conclusion:

The foundation of Hobbes's political philosophy, that is the moral attitude to which it owes its existence and its unity, are objectively as well as biographically 'prior' to the mathematical scientific founding and presentation of that philosophy. The turning to Euclid as well as to naturalism is certainly motivated in Hobbes's original moral-political view, and thus these two intellectual forces were able to exert a positive influence, which is not to be underestimated, on the evolution of his political philosophy, on the elucidation of the whole nexus of presuppositions and conclusions of the original moral attitude. On the other hand, the mathematical method and materialistic metaphysics each in its own way contributed to disguise the original motivation-nexus and thus to undermine Hobbes's political philosophy. From these findings is drawn the methodic conclusion for the study of Hobbes's political philosophy that the most mature presentation of that philosophy, that is the Leviathan, is by no means an adequate source for an understanding of Hobbes's moral and political ideas. It is true that the presuppositions and conclusions of the fundamental moral attitude are more clearly manifest in the Leviathan than in the earlier presentations, but, on the other hand, in earlier presentations the original motives of Hobbes's political philosophy are generally more clearly shown. (PPH, p.170)

C. OAKESHOTT'S THESIS
1. Thesis and Variations

Michael Oakeshott's version of individualism denies Strauss' claim that Hobbes had turned away from traditional natural law theory and founded a modern version of it. Rather, Oakeshott believes that Hobbes stayed within the boundaries of traditional Aristotelian/Augustinian natural law theory. Numerous other commentators share Oakeshott's rejection of Strauss: included are Goldsmith, Glover, Spragens, Von Leyden, and Watkins. Goldsmith and Glover also share Oakeshott's belief that Hobbes stayed within the classical natural law tradition, while the others develop a number of variations on Oakeshott's thesis beyond this belief. A common thread joining all these commentators, in addition to their rejection of Strauss, is the belief that while Hobbes stayed within the traditional camp, still his scientific interests did, contrary to Strauss' claims, greatly color his theory of obligation and its moral framework, a factor that would explain Strauss' impression that Hobbes had abandoned the classical theory entirely. Finally, the strongest thread linking all of these commentators remains their belief that the basis of Hobbes' idea of obligation is individualism, based on natural right and its transfer; in this respect, like Strauss, they reject both the materialistic and the moral interpretations.
Oakeshott does accept many of Strauss' initial premises. First, he agrees that Hobbes is quite clearly an individualist who holds that "human beings are recognized...as separate and sovereign individuals, associated with one another, not in the pursuit of a single common enterprise, but in an enterprise of give and take, and accommodating themselves to one another as best they can: it is the morality of self and others (Oakeshott, "Moral Life", p.249 - to be cited as ML). The key concepts here are will and artifice: the will of human beings generates civil society or more correctly, the combined will of individual selves joined by agreement generates civil society for Hobbes (Oakeshott, "Introduction to Leviathan", pp.27-28 - to be cited as IL). 'Will' is the important term, Oakeshott thinks, because of Hobbes' belief that every individual is his/her own sovereign ruler in the State of Nature, where the prevailing morality is that of mutual accommodation, but where, also, one must decide voluntarily for oneself if one is to join in these accommodations and agreements. The influencing factors that pushed Hobbes to this view, according to Oakeshott, stem from the growing pressure on the individual, enterprising person reaching out to control his/her own destiny, a pressure which emerged in the 17th century and is expressed in 17th century European
thought (ML, pp.250-51). Thus, Hobbes begins with unique human individuality, just as Strauss said.

Oakeshott further agrees with Strauss that Hobbes' analysis of human nature identified natural passion and natural reason as the two most certain human traits. Both of these are responsive to the direct influences of pleasure and pain, which are internal stimuli to which human appetite responds in inventive, self-conscious, controlled, and voluntary ways (ML, p.253). Such responses of natural passion are not merely mechanical reactions or reflexes, but include also acts of will and deliberation. The natural passions most directly involved at this level of response are pride, "the greatest pleasure of a human being...the consciousness of his own power...his desire for precedence, his longing to be first, for glory to be recognized and honored by other men as pre-eminent" (E.W. IV, 257), and fear, "not merely being anxious lest the next pleasure escape him, but dread of falling behind and thus being denied felicity...the ultimate fear in man is the dread of violent death at the hand of another man; for this is dishonor, the emblem of all human failure (Elements I, ix; Lev. 44, 77)" (ML, p.254).

Natural reason, represented by the ability to form agreements and to generate both fear of the future and the motive to protect oneself against future disasters, is the second important human trait recognized by Hobbes. Reason
recognizes the fear of violent death and satisfies the desire to provide future protection against it by leading people to form covenants, artificial agreements, designed to release them from these fears. The underlying desire here is for peace, a natural appetite generated by fear that is channelled through reason. The social contract is the man-made vehicle for satisfying this desire (ML, pp.253, 258-59). Covenants, as a result, become a central feature of Hobbes' theory of obligation for Oakeshott as for Strauss.

Oakeshott's analysis of covenants does not vary significantly from Strauss', any more than his analysis of the central traits of human nature varies. For Oakeshott, a covenant is a transfer of right through an artificial contract motivated by fear and reason; it is a rational, voluntarily agreed upon modification of the race for supremacy (ML, pp.257-57; IL, p.44). The right transferred is the natural right of self-governance, extending so far as the ability to perform actions that are necessary for self-preservation after natural internal and external impediments that restrict one's ability to act in one's own best interests are factored out (Von Leyden, p.12). As Goyard-Fabre describes it, "...in its own nature, covenant results from a pragmatic and rational computation. In its own structure, it is a transfer of rights and a delegation of powers" (Goyard-Fabre, p.24). In these important respects
Oakeshott's and Strauss' interpretations of Hobbes' theory of human nature and covenant coincide, viewing them as individualistic and centered around the transfer of natural right.

The split between Strauss and Oakeshott (and others who agree with Oakeshott) grows out of an initial disagreement about the moral aspects of individualism. Where Strauss focuses on fear as the basis of moral concepts, Oakeshott retains honor and justice, in the traditional Augustinian senses, as the key moral factors. Oakeshott grants that the basis of the moral nature of Hobbes' theory is that moral conduct is the equivalent of prudent conduct; good is identified with pleasure, evil with pain, and to act prudently is seeking the good while avoiding the evil. In social relations this drives people to recognize peace as desirable rather than to continue to engage in competitive struggle with one another, as in the State of Nature: peace is the avoidance of a painful death that may arise from such competitive struggles.

But Oakeshott believes that Hobbes did not intend to regard the condition of peace only as a conclusion of natural reason based on fear. He argues that Hobbesian reason also suggests the means to attaining peace and explicates its structure. The nineteen articles of peace described carefully by Hobbes reduce to: "Do not to another, which thou wouldst not have done to oneself" (E.W. IV,
Oakeshott contends that Hobbes believes we have a moral obligation to have consideration for others and avoid selfish partiality and not only out of fear:

The conditions of peace, first offered to us as rational theorems concerning the nature of shameful-death-avoiding conduct (that is, as a piece of prudential wisdom), now appear as moral obligation. Clearly (on Hobbes's assumptions) it would be foolish, in the circumstances, not to declare for peace and not to establish in it the only manner in which it can be established; but somehow, it has become a dereliction of duty not to do so... Nor is this change of idiom inadvertent. For Hobbes leaves us in no doubt that he properly understood the nature of moral conduct and the difference between it and merely prudent or necessary conduct. (ML, p.261)

On the other hand, Oakeshott goes on to argue, this preservation of traditional notions of honor and justice is not the same as the traditional, deontological moral theory (found in Hobbes by Taylor, Warrender, or Hood). For to Hobbes, 'good' merely stands for 'desirable,' and 'evil' for 'object of aversion.' The laws of nature enjoining the seeking of good and avoidance of evil are thus not deontological moral commands. Every one of these precepts, Oakeshott states, clearly shows itself to be an hypothetical precept rather than a categorized declaration of duty (ML, p.262). Any force that such a rule might have will be conventional, the result of a human agreement to regard these as rules within a known jurisdiction, subscribed to by all who fall into that jurisdiction. This transforms these rules from theorems of deontology into maxims of human conduct (IL, p.37). To return to the contrast with Strauss,
however, at the core of the morality of Hobbes' theory is the concept of justice. 'Justice' is a moral, not merely a prudential term in Hobbes, as is 'duty', a synonym for 'acting justly'. Von Leyden points out the various reasons for interpreting 'justice' in this way in Hobbes: First, we must note that nothing is unjust in the State of Nature because no covenants exist. Secondly, Hobbes defines 'injustice' as 'the not performance of Covenant.' Third, Hobbes says clearly that where no covenant has been formed and no right has been transferred, this leaves everyone with a right to all things and precludes any just action (Von Leyden, p.7). Von Leyden continues:

Two corollaries follow from this argument. First, part of Hobbes's definition of a natural right (jus) is that it is just...natural right, too, is reasonable...and life in accordance with it just. Secondly,...'the men perform their Covenants made' is a law in which 'consisteth the Fountain and Original of justice'. Justness, therefore, qualifies different sorts of action and different sets of circumstances in which actions are performed...Once he covenants of his own free will, the carrying out of his covenant is as just as non-performance would be unjust. (Von Leyden, pp.7-8)

For Oakeshott, too, "...the word 'justice' has a moral connotation, and it was the word Hobbes most often used when he was writing in the moral idiom: to behave morally is to do just actions, and to be a virtuous man is to have a just disposition...A man's duty is to have 'an unfeigned and constant endeavor' to behave justly" (ML, P.262). Or, as J. Kemp; another individualist theorist, puts it,
A man may have a motive for making a covenant which consists solely in the advantage he expects to get out of the transaction; but having made it, he has an obligation to keep it which cannot consist simply in the fact...that it will be to his advantage to do so--breaking a covenant is the essence of injustice, and this is not simply another word for self-interest. (Kemp, p.21)

This interpretation of the obligation to keep one's contracts is the heart of Hobbes' theory for Oakeshott; and the issue of the obligation is the source of the debate between the various individualist interpreters and the other two major interpretive traditions as well. The issue, as Oakeshott describes it, is "How did Hobbes bridge the gap between men's natural inclinations and what ought to be done about them?" (ML, p.263) The importance of the issue lies in the fact that, having described moral law, or the law of nature, as a set of precepts that rational, passionate, self-interested beings would assent to, Hobbes still recognized that such a law, though anchored in our deepest wants, must also be concretely supported with motives if it is to be effective. For if people did not need to abide by the moral law, then given Hobbes' psychological theories of human nature they would not. To meet these problems of motive and obedience, Hobbes had to "collapse the ought/want dualism into a single system of basic wants and proven hypothetical imperatives" (Watkins, pp.84-85). Oakeshott's thesis is that Hobbes accomplished this by implementing his own version of traditional Augustinian natural law theory. The next section will outline Oakeshott's justification of
According to Oakeshott, what has led to the rather confusing state of Hobbes scholarship, the large number of diverse accounts of obligation in Hobbes, is a failure to clearly delineate the tasks facing an interpreter.

The situation we have on our hands...is, then, a set of philosophical writings in which there appear (not side by side, but almost inextricably mixed) a theory of moral obligation at once original and consistent with the other philosophical novelties to be found in them, and another account of moral obligation the vocabulary and general principles of which are conventional...Our question, in general, is: Why did Hobbes, in an enterprise designed to elucidate the ground and character of the obligations entailed in living in a civitas, run together two strikingly different accounts of moral obligation? (ML, p.284)

Oakeshott specifies the problem by listing ten basic discrepancies that need to be rectified or explained by any coherent interpretation. They are all apparently contradictory usages of key terms, conflicting applications of basic distinctions, or conflicting claims about the mechanisms of obligation. In brief, they are:

1. In nature we have a right to all things. But we also have a natural obligation to endeavor peace via the Natural Law imposed by God.

2. Hobbes claims both that natural laws are hypothetical causal propositions, and that they are laws in the strict sense.
3. Hobbes says that reason can show us God as the author of moral law, but also that reason can only show us God as First Cause.

4. Hobbes says that obligation to civil obedience is universal and prior to civil society, yet elsewhere he denies universality, specifies specific classes of people to whom it applies, and makes this obligation contingent on covenant.

5. Hobbes asserts the independent authority of both Natural Law and Scripture, though he also argues that the authority of both derives from the civil sovereign's declaration and interpretation.

6. Hobbes uses 'precept' as a 'general rule of reason' to describe the first Law of Nature, but goes on to deny that its prescriptive character derives from reasonableness at all.

7. Hobbes uses 'Natural Law' both to mean hypothetical conclusions of reason and to denote obligations imposed by God on believers and also those imposed by God upon all people save atheists, lunatics, and children.

8. Hobbes claims that the sovereign's obligation under Natural Law is to procure the safety of the people and that he is accountable to God alone for this duty; but then he says that this is true, at best, only of sovereigns who believe in a God concerned with human action.

9. Hobbes makes strong claims, using a play on
words, based on the distinction between 'God's natural kingdom' and his 'natural subjects', but then calls all this metaphorical.

10. Hobbes uses the term 'God' both to denote a being who establishes the civil state by covenant and as a term of imagination that is meaningless. (ML, pp.284-85)

Oakeshott rejects the suggestion that any previous, single theory has rectified all these problems in Hobbes. To do so requires seeing Hobbes' theory as dualistic, having a two-fold purpose: to display a theory of obligation that is consistent with Hobbes' own concept of human nature, and to assimilate this to the idiom of the time he is writing, so as to show his contemporaries the extent and nature of their civil duties by clearing up confusions and misunderstandings prevalent at the time (ML, pp.286-87). For Oakeshott the foundation of Hobbes' theory of obligation rests upon his conviction that no duties exist except by an act of the agent that creates obligation (a covenant). This conviction excludes all natural duties in the strict sense since no choice exists there. It also requires that anyone interested in proposing a theory of civil obligation must take account of the fact that they must convince their audience not only to agree to their account, but also to act on it; and this requires not only making sure the readers have understood the theory, but providing the motivation for them to follow its precepts. This in turn requires, says
Oakeshott, that the theory "could not be successful unless it were framed in the idiom and vocabulary of current political theory and thus [the author must] present a doctrine whose novelties (if any) were assimilated to current prejudices about moral conduct" (ML, p.287).

The way Hobbes applies himself to these tasks, Oakeshott argues, is by developing a theory and style of exposition that combines artful equivocation with a theory of obligation consistent with his general philosophical beliefs. What results is a dualistic appeal for assent to Hobbes' doctrines: one aimed at the uninitiated ordinary person (one who has not adopted Hobbes' scientific approach nor his skepticism), couched in the vocabulary and idiom they are accustomed to; a second for the initiated, the person not deterred by skepticism nor baffled by the language of modern science (ML, pp.287-88). Elsewhere, Oakeshott notes, "His controversial purpose is large on every page; he wrote to convince and refute" (IL, p.14). Thus Hobbes' purpose was not the establishment of a science of politics; and the claim that it was such is a false reading of Hobbes' intentions, says Oakeshott. Hobbes' method is that of experience, of examining history and learning prudence, rather than a scientific mechanism. This is shown especially, according to Oakeshott, in the second half of Leviathan:

The project, then, ...is by correcting an error in principle, to show more clearly the local and
transitory mischief in which the universal predicament of mankind appeared in the seventeenth century. And both in conception and in the execution of this project, Hobbes reveals, not only his sensitiveness to the exigencies of his time, but also the medieval ancestry of his way of thinking. (IL, p.48)

Thus, though Oakeshott and Strauss are both individualists committed to the concept of natural right and its transfer as the source of obligation in Hobbes, yet Oakeshott's characterization of a modified image of Hobbesian Man points him in the direction of the classic natural law tradition of Aristotle and Augustine that Strauss says Hobbes rejected. In fact, Oakeshott argues that there has been a failure to correctly identify the tradition to which Hobbes belongs, which has led to the further misconception that Hobbes must not belong to any tradition at all, so that his theory is new and without lineage or progeny. The critics blundered in paying too much attention to superficial similarities appearing to join Hobbes to writers with whom he has little or nothing in common (IL, p.56). Moreover, says Oakeshott, what Hobbes is doing is not dropping the traditional natural law approach, but rather expanding it. The line of argument taken by most commentators focuses on the concept of a "tame man", a person in whom fear and reason override the dangerous passion of pride, even at the price of dimming the brilliance of life. But Oakeshott recognizes a neglected thread in Hobbes' writings, one which he admits goes against traditional scholarship, that pictures not a tame man
seeking emancipation from shameful fear and death, but a proud man seeking emancipation by the moralization of pride itself (ML, p.289). The basis of obligation is the act of will by which alone covenants are created and rights are transferred.

Such reasoning, while unconventional, coincides with Hobbes' psychology and relies on a picture of "the proud man" easily found in Hobbes. Oakeshott gives a detailed description of his version of Hobbesian Man, which critically refocuses the emphasis in his theory of Hobbesian obligation:

...a man unavoidably his own best friend and...subject to the fear of finding himself shamed and dishonoured and even killed. But let us also suppose that the preponderant passion of this man remains pride rather than fear; that he is a man who would find greater shame in the meanness of settling for mere survival than in suffering the dishonour of being recognized a failure; a man whose disposition is to overcome fear not by reason...but by his own courage; a man not at all without imperfections and not deceived about himself, but who is proud enough to be spared the sorrow of his imperfections and the illusion of his achievements; not exactly a hero, too negligent for that, but perhaps with a touch of careless heroism about him; a man, in short, who...'knows how to belong to himself'...he is in a high degree self-moving. His endeavor is for peace...there is nothing hostile in his conduct, nothing in it to provoke hostility, nothing censorious. What he achieves for himself and what he contributes to common life is a complete alternative to what others may achieve by means of agreement inspired by fear and dictated by reason; for, if the unavoidable endeavor of every man is for self-preservation, and if self-preservation is interpreted...not as immunity from death but from the fear of a shameful death, then this man achieves in one manner (by courage) what others may achieve in another (by rational calculation). (ML, pp.289-90)

Oakeshott further notes Hobbes' use of specific definitions
of 'Nobleness or Gallantness' as 'justice of Manners' (E.W. III, 114) and of 'magnanimity' as preceeding from 'contempt of injustice' (E.W. II, 38) and Hobbes' claim that people may keep their word due to pride in not breaking it rather than from fear of the consequences of breaking it (E.W. III, 108). These texts directly support his picture of Hobbes' "proud man".

Goldsmith strongly agrees with Oakeshott's claim that we are dealing with a moral notion of the "gallant man", the "man of pride" in Hobbes. Such pride, Goldsmith says, is achieved in two ways within Hobbes' description of human behavior:

The morality of gallantry is possible if a man has accepted some code of moral values in which keeping one's word, being generous, and acting according to the virtue of justice are placed higher in the scale of values than life...His pleasure in living depends on his self-image, or upon his reputation...eventual fame...or upon some higher code of sanctions that he believes in...(It) is also possible upon the ordinary principles of second-order power-seeking provided that this way of acting is believed to be the most effective way of acquiring power. (Goldsmith, p.81)

Thus it would seem plain that Hobbes' concept of the "proud man" provides a description not of one who acts out of fear but of one whose intentions are just and righteous in the keeping of his contracts.

But why has this view of man been overlooked or considered unorthodox by Hobbesian scholarship? Oakeshott's answer is, "the only hindrance to our recognizing this as a genuinely Hobbesian character is the general assertion that..."
Hobbes always used 'pride' in a derogatory sense" (ML, p.291). For Oakeshott and Goldsmith this was simply too hasty a generalization, and much too broad an assertion. Too ready an agreement with this interpretation of pride led Strauss away from the very tradition of natural law theory that Hobbes embraced and extended; by focusing upon the negative sense of 'pride' that Hobbes occasionally does use, Strauss missed the positive sense of his use of the term, wherein Hobbes identifies it with generosity, courage, nobleness, magnanimity, endeavor for glory, and avoidance of the vice of vain glory (illusions of true glory) (E.WU. III, 96, 44, 77). Once we are cognizant of this other sense of 'pride' in Hobbes' thought, Oakeshott believes, we must agree that Hobbes had not abandoned the Augustinian tradition of natural law, but had seen the identical dual meaning of 'pride' in it and was then simply extending the positive sense of 'pride', "the passion to be Godlike" (ML, p.291). This, then, is the notion of pride as a virtue, which Oakeshott traces back to various early Greek notions: Hybris; Aristotle's megalophychos; the wise man of the Stoics; and then the sancta superbia of medieval moral theology (ML, p.293). It is the Augustinian notion, that the passion of pride is a virtue, that Strauss missed and that Oakeshott says Hobbes relied on to generate in people the motives necessary to lead them to form civil societies. A proper understanding of Hobbesian Man solves the problem
of interpretation as well. The effect of pride is the state; the State is a human construction, the product of will and artifice in response to pride.

The significance of Hobbes' references to 'pride' as an evil, on the other hand, is a further link to the scholastic tradition. This use of 'pride' closely parallels Augustine's notion of original sin. Hobbes' doctrine approximates Augustine's view that the human predicament springs from a defect in human behavior that asserts itself when people are in each others' company (rather than as a natural defect in human nature per se) (IL, p.60). As Oakeshott writes,

...our conclusion must be that Hobbes' conception of the natural man (apart from his defects) is such that a predicament requiring a deliverance is created whenever man is in proximity to man, and that his doctrine of Pride and unpermissable [my emphasis] form of striving after power only increases the severity of the predicament. (IL, p.60)

Thus, Oakeshott sees Hobbes' ancestry in the Augustinian and Scholastic traditions through his accounts of 'pride' as both virtue and vice.

Oakeshott strengthens this claim by interpreting Hobbes' individualism as a direct outgrowth of the Scholastic tradition as well. As a reasoned theory of society, individualism's roots lie in the "so-called nominalism of late medieval scholasticism, with its doctrines that the nature of a thing is its individuality, that which makes it this thing, and that both in God and man
will is precedent to reason" (IL, p.60). Oakeshott points out that Hobbes' philosophy is quite concretely tied to the belief in the value of the individual, the sanctity of the individual person, and a picture of the world as composed of individual substances. The outcome of these views in Hobbes is a denial (or avoidance) of unqualified atomism and universalism alike, instead it is an individualism based on the activity of willing, rather than on self-consciousness, which leads to sociality via reason and choice.

It is the combination of individual wills agreeing to form an artificial entity—a government—that Oakeshott describes as the generation of civil society in Hobbes' writings:

> Civil history (as distinguished from natural history) is the register of events that have sprung from the voluntary actions of man in commonwealths (Lev., p.64). Civil authority is authority arising out of an agreement of wills, while natural authority (that of the father in a family) has no such generation and is consequently of a different character (Lev., p.153). And civil association is itself contrasted on this account with appearance if it in mere natural gregariousness (Lev., p.130). (IL, p.28)

Thus, it is the combination of individual wills, voluntarily joined, that is the mechanism that creates the State. But Oakeshott stresses that this agreement preserves rather than comprising the individuality of those who join in the agreement:

> ...the essence of agreement is, not a common will (for there can be no such thing), but a common object of will. And, since these individual wills are in natural opposition to one another, the agreement out of which civitas can spring must be an agreement not to oppose
one another, a will not to will... The agreement must be for each to transfer his right of willing in some specific respect, to a single artificial Representative, who is thenceforth authorized to will and to act in place of each individual. There is in this association no concord of wills, no common will, no common good; its unity lies solely in the singleness of the Representative, in the substitution of his one will for the many conflicting wills (Lev., pp. 126, 127). It is a collection of individuals united in one Sovereign Representative, and in generation and structure it is the only sort of association that does not compromise the individuality of its components. (IL, pp. 61-62)

Thus, Oakeshott's view is that the State is an artificially created human contrivance designed to protect individuals through their surrender of the natural right of willing, without lapsing into any sort of absolutist State. The State is simply "the minimum condition of any settled association among individuals" (IL, p. 62).

In summary, Oakeshott's characterization of Hobbes is that of an ardent individualist writing from the perspective of a traditional Augustinian natural law theorist. Hobbes was primarily interested in supplying the motives for obeying civil law and concerned very little with human life beyond the minimal conditions under which the endeavor for peace could be the model of conduct for even the least agreeable person. Pride and self-esteem, Hobbes held, supply the motive for seeking peace and provide the author with an 'aristocratic' morality that is "neither inappropriate nor unexpected to find...reflected in the writings of one who...himself understood human beings as creatures more properly concerned with honour than with
either survival or prosperity" (ML, pp.293-94).

The final element in Oakeshott's version of individualism is the rejection of Strauss' implicit claim that it is the covenant that is the cause of the commonwealth and of the obligation to obey its laws. This would be to assent to a legalistic interpretation of obligation, whereas Hobbes intended a moral theory. The basis of civil obligation is a genuine surrender of right by the individual. The precise act of covenant only serves to give authority to the formation of civil society; it is unable to deliver either the moral sanction or the actual power required to establish the condition of peace. That is, it is a necessary but not sufficient cause of civil society (ML, p.296). It is only the choice of each individual subject, to surrender their natural right, that can create moral obligation, and create a covenant at the same time:

Like all other obligations, it arises from a voluntary act. This act is a notional covenant between many in which the right of each to govern himself by his own reason is surrendered and a sovereign Actor...is authorized to exercise it on their behalf; that is, to declare, to interpret and to administer rules of conduct which the covenanters pledge themselves in advance to obey...Thus, civil obligation is a moral obligation, it arises from a genuine surrender of right. (IL, p.68)

The society so generated is entirely a human work of art, the product of individual will and deliberation combining and agreeing to abide by the covenant entered into voluntarily. For Oakeshott the covenant is not the actual
cause of civil society; though it is a necessary part of the process, it cannot guarantee obedience nor provide the power necessary to enforce obedience.

Goldsmith holds essentially the same view and describes the process in such a way as to make the procedure clearer. To be obliged to obedience to an authority, one must have first convenanted to obey. That covenant must be a covenant to allow the will of another party to be taken as one's own will (whether of a majority, a minority, or a single person—corresponding to democracy, aristocracy, or monarchy. That is, they oblige themselves to submit to an authority that only exists as an authority as a result of their submission (Goldsmith, pp.155-58).

Now let us return to the last important ingredient of the individualism of Oakeshott (and the other individualists), namely the motive for one to join in the covenant and to give up one's natural right. Goldsmith puts the problem succinctly when he says, "Magnanimous men, men of good will, are rare. The problem of human conduct must be solved for most men, and for them the passion to be reckoned on is fear" (Goldsmith, p.82). Now, at last, fear enters the picture as the spur to individuals of less than aristocratic virtue and magnanimous moral nature to put aside, voluntarily, their natural right to self-governance. But still this is not a theory of self-interest, of psychological egoism or mechanistic egoism, Oakeshott
stresses. Oakeshott starts from natural right, but notes that while each individual's natural right is equal, their power is not: "Might and Right are enver the same thing" (IL, pp.64-65). Hence, natural right may be absolute but since the power to enforce it is not, they cannot be the same. Now to be obliged is to be bound by some impediment imposed, directly or indirectly, by the agent who has judged the likely consequences to be harmful. Here the constraint is actually internal, the result of rational judgment and fear. For Oakeshott this is Hobbes' notion of obligation, the internal constraint, the individual constraining himself. External constraint alone is not true obligation since the agent is not deprived of anything, merely shown to have always lacked power in a particular area; the basis of obligation is always to be found in the individual. The conditions that must be met to be obliged for Oakeshott's version of the theory, are that one must oblige oneself, and so must acknowledge that the obligation is a constraint on one's unconditional natural right and that it is also limited and specific in certain ways (since one cannot surrender the right of nature totally without self-destruction, leaving no person there to be obligated) (IL, pp.65-66).

The necessary power to motivate individuals, then, is supplied directly by individuals (who voluntarily covenant) and is made actual at the precise time they obey
(also a voluntary act). The authority necessary derives from the transfer of the natural right and is made public in the covenant itself. But the power behind all of this can only come directly from the individual (ML, p.299). The result is a strongly individualistic theory of obligation throughout, where individual will is prominent at every step in the process. This strongly individualistic focus is the consequence, according to Oakeshott, of Hobbes' reliance on the moralistic virtues of the Augustinian/Scholastic tradition and the reliance, in turn, of these theories on individual traits of reason and pride, tempered by the displacement of reason in favor of will and the emancipation of passion, all of which had been accomplished long before Hobbes' era. Strauss, then, is wrong to claim that Hobbes has created a new, modern version of natural law theory; as Oakeshott says:

Political philosophy is the assimilation of political experience to an experience of the world in general, and the greatness of Hobbes is not that he began a new tradition in this respect but that he constructed a political philosophy that reflected the changes in the European intellectual consciousness which had been pioneered chiefly by the theologians of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. (IL, p.58)
WORKS CITED

CHAPTER III


CHAPTER IV

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS

A. THE CURRENT STATE OF HOBBES SCHOLARSHIP

1. Introduction

The preceding three chapters represent conflicting views of Hobbes' theory of obligation and reflect the general state of affairs in Hobbes scholarship. At the present time there is no settled view of Hobbes' theory and competing interpretations abound. Even within the general interpretive categories of mechanism, natural law, and individualism, there are sub-groups of interpretations, as has been shown and there are, of course some other theories and categories that have not been incorporated into chapters I-III. I have concentrated on these three categories of interpretation because they are the ones most generally recognized, alluded to and discussed in Hobbes scholarship, even though they are not exhaustive. But this is precisely the problem, of course, that there are so many theories. How can we deal with so many different theories of Hobbes' theory of obligation?
Before moving on to my answer to this question, one last preliminary point needs to be emphasized: namely, how the proponents of these theories view each others' theories. If they were to accept the validity of each others' views, or see them as complementary or compossible, my work would be done. But, this is not the case at all, although it is the thesis I will develop and defend. To varying degrees of insistence, each theory is held by its adherents to be THE correct interpretation of Hobbes' intentions and meaning. Each thesis is built, to a greater or lesser extent, upon a rejection of the other theses, especially the natural law and individualist theories which grew out of the renunciation of the traditional mechanistic/egoistic framework. Each thesis, moreover, seems to be built upon a slightly different interpretive perspective. Even though there are occasional points of agreement among them about the elements to be found in Hobbes, the importance and evaluation even of these is colored by the separate framework of the various authors. D.D. Raphael, in his book, Hobbes: Morals and Politics, a summary and analysis of the major current interpretive works, characterizes the existing situation thus:

Everyone would agree that Hobbes said some things that were new and derived others from tradition. The differences in the interpretations are differences of emphasis. Emphasis counts none the less. The thought of a philosopher may be properly classed as overall traditionalist or innovatory.

The traditional interpretation of Hobbes classes him as an innovator, and this view seems to be supported
by Hobbes himself, who said (in the Epistle Dedicatory of *De Corpore*) that the study of 'civil philosophy' was no older than his book *De Cive*. But that statement does not necessarily contradict the interpreters who see Hobbes as a traditionalist. When Hobbes claimed that he had placed the study of politics on a new footing, he was probably thinking of his method; he meant that he was the first to treat political theory scientifically, after the manner of natural philosophy. No interpreter would deny that particular claim, though some would question its importance. Differences of opinion among interpreters are focused on four other issues. The first is the relation between Hobbes's political and his ethical theory; the second is the relation of both of these to his psychology; the third is the relation of his ethics and politics to his general philosophy; and the fourth is the relation of his ethics and politics to theology. (Raphael, p.74)

In the first three chapters, the positive arguments each interpreter offers in support of his position have been detailed, clearly showing the obvious differences in their interpretive perspectives and emphases. But, it is almost important to at least get the flavor of, and carefully review in some cases, their reasons for rejecting the competing views in order to see clearly that for the most part, they all see their own views as exclusive of the others. This fact is the heart of the issue I am dealing with. In this section I shall highlight some of their negative arguments designed to show that other views are mistaken; in the second and third sections I will explain the methodology of my own analysis; in Chapter V I will argue that these negative arguments for exclusivity are ineffective outside their respective frameworks. The key to objectively understanding Hobbes, I will argue, lies in recognizing that this claim of exclusivity is the source of
a continuing and fruitless controversy and stalemate.

The purpose of the present section is not to study the counter-arguments in detail since this will ultimately be unimportant.* Much less is this section's purpose to decide the conflict on the basis of the merits of the various counter-arguments, nor examine them for correctness or incorrectness. The most important point in each case is simply the claim that each makes to being the sole correct interpretation, and the fact that doing so requires that each reject the claims and perspectives of the other interpretations. This problem of mutually excluding interpretations is the problem that I will try to solve in the remainder of this dissertation.

2. The Conflict Between Theories

Generally, the objections that arise fall into two categories: (1) philosophical objections based on the claim that opposing theorists have (a) misread Hobbes' philosophical intentions or language, (b) misinterpreted these elements, or (c) constructed invalid chains of reasoning from Hobbes' own conclusions to theirs; and (2)

*For the counter-arguments are all tied to the acceptance of one or other underlying framework or set of presuppositions; and I am going to argue for a new interpretive framework that allows all three of these frameworks to coexist and complement one another.
historical objections based on the claim that the misreadings or errors of opposing theories are the result of misperceiving either (a) the historical/biographical background of Hobbes' writings, or (b) the factors that motivated or affected him as he wrote.

Since the mechanistic/egoistic thesis is the oldest and is considered the traditional interpretation of Hobbes' theory of obligation, it receives the most critical scrutiny. The earliest of the modern re-interpretations, those of Taylor and Strauss, address the problems of the mechanistic view as their point of departure (as seen in chapters II and III). Taylor's critique led him to his deontological moral interpretation, which was in turn criticized by Warrender, Hood and others. But they accepted Taylor's critique of the egoistic thesis, and differed with him instead on the precise nature of the moral doctrine Hobbes in fact espoused. I would like to begin this review of counter-arguments with the critical rejection of mechanism by Taylor and the others who dismissed it.

Taylor's rejection of mechanistic egoism is based on his belief that Hobbes distinguished his egoistic psychology from his ethical theory rather than joining them in an ethical/psychological egoism. The basis of this claim is philosophical (as opposed to historical) in that Taylor believes Hobbes' language has been misinterpreted by the mechanists so as to miss the crucial separation. Taylor
It is to be observed that from the first, and even when he is speaking of the condition of things in his imaginary 'state of nature', Hobbes always describes the items of the natural law as *dictamina*, or dictates, never as *consilia*, or pieces of advice, and the very use of this language implies their imperative character. (Dictates...are something very different from counsels or recommendations.) So, too, Hobbes regularly says of his natural law that it is a 'theorem' which forbids certain actions, and uses imperative or quasi-imperative language in his formulation of them. Thus (De Cive, II, 1) the law of nature is defined as 'the dictate of right reason, conversant about those things are are either to be done or omitted...for the constant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies.' 'A Law of Nature (Leviathan, XIV) is a Precept, or general Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.'...The imperative character of the law is thus inseparable from it. (Taylor, "Doctrine", pp.40-41)

The error of the mechanistic interpretation is a logical one: logically, we cannot derive a moral 'ought' from an empirical thesis--unless we wish to label Hobbes inept in trying to make such an attempt. But, on the interpretation of Hobbes' language above, Taylor chooses to reject the thrust of mechanism rather than to question Hobbes' ability or allow for the attempt itself.

Two points led Taylor to his conclusions: 1) Hobbes had separated 'counsel' from 'command' and described the Laws of Nature as commands, which means that since prudential thinking can only result in counsel, and commands are not counsels, the basis of Natural Law must be non-prudential; that is, it must be moral; 2) there is a certain parallel in Hobbes' exposition and language to deontological
theorists such as Kant, especially when Hobbes speaks of a just man as one who acts justly 'because the law commands it' rather than because he fears punishment, or when Hobbes compares injustice or promise-breaking to being self-contradictory (Raphael, p.76). Such language is clearly not scientific/mechanical, and to construe it as if it were is to ignore the logic of the terms.

As shown in Chapter IIA, Taylor chose to reject egoism and denied that Hobbes was an ethical egoist, though he retained the belief that Hobbes was a psychological egoist. In holding that Hobbes was a psychological egoist, he argued that Hobbes, nevertheless, did not see self-interest as the basis of his theory of obligation. Instead, Taylor claimed Hobbes' theory was deontological and, having accepted Hobbes as a psychological egoist, he put forward the necessary claim that the psychology and ethics were logically unconnected. So the mechanistic thesis, while partially correct, had erred in equating Hobbes' psychology with his moral theory; for Hobbes was trying to answer separate questions with the two theories: (1) why people ought to obey the law, and (2) what inducements would compel them to obey the law if respect were not a strong enough motive. Thus, the mechanists had failed to observe the logic of Hobbes' distinctions and had conjoined logically separate theses into a single mechanistic account, which must now be rejected as incorrect.
A second philosophical objection made by Taylor centers on the claim that, for Hobbes, the sovereign is just as much under a rigid moral obligation as the subjects. The Laws of Nature oblige everyone, ruler as well as ruled; and Hobbes constantly refers to the misconduct of the sovereign as sin or iniquity (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.45). There can be no explanation, consistent with the mechanistic thesis, Taylor argues, that explains this element of Hobbes' theory since it requires a binding law prior to and above that laid down by the sovereign who creates civil law. The account for this aspect of Hobbes' writings, Taylor concludes that Natural Law is the command of God, which defines the sovereign's obligations. This would explain both Hobbes' notion of wrong-doing as the transgression of the Laws of Nature and the origin of the sovereign's duties, which could not exist without a 'person' who has the right to command even the sovereign. On the materialist view no such being or commander exists, and the Laws of Nature are mere 'pieces of advice' with no force at all beyond advising self-interest, but this leaves us with no explanation of Hobbes' explicit claims that the sovereign has obligations and strict duties. For Taylor, then, we must reject mechanistic accounts of obligation and accept the view that we do not fulfill the demands of equity unless we obey divine commands as divine commands, the sovereign included (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.49; "Apology", p.143).
In addition to these philosophical objections, Taylor offers a historical reason for the mistaken mechanistic view. The authors of the traditional view had spent too much time on **Leviathan**, while ignoring Hobbes' earlier works, especially **De Cive** (this was Strauss's major contention, too; he held that the earlier works had been discounted to an even greater degree than Taylor contends—see Chapter IIIA). It is concentrating on **Leviathan** too narrowly that one gets the false impression that self-interest is the basis of political obligation and that duty is equivalent to whatever is in one's best interests. Such a view comes from the wording of **Leviathan**, wherein 'Natural Law' is called 'precepts of prudence', as opposed to 'divine laws in respect of the author, thereof, God Almighty' as stated in **De Cive** and **The Elements of Law** (see Chapter IIB). The error is to ignore the earlier use of the term as if, historically, it did not exist, an understandable error if one has looked carefully only at **Leviathan**. But to do this is to commit what Collins calls the fallacy of "the great works syndrome", wherein an interpreter concentrates upon the most historically important work(s) of an author to the exclusion of the earlier or less important works. Taylor, as seen in Chapter IIA, rejects this historical error and what he considers a skewed, mechanistically slanted interpretation that it engendered. Thus, for historical as well as philosophical reasons Taylor dismisses the
traditional mechanistic view of obligation in Hobbes' works. Warrender follows Taylor in rejecting the traditional interpretation, though he also parts company from Taylor's deontological moral theory in favor of his own consequentialist moral thesis. Warrender also focuses on the Laws of Nature, but on the fact that, as Hobbes says, to properly be laws they must be the word of God, who has the right to command. Warrender, then, rejects mechanism and Taylor's approach as well and treats Hobbes as essentially a traditional natural law theorist (see Chapter IIB), leaving room for an element of prudence in Hobbes' conception of morality.

What is needed that cannot be found in the egoist version of Hobbes, Warrender holds, is an assertion of the presence of moral obligation prior to and beyond the instruction of the sovereign; that is, moral obligation must exist in the State of Nature. But the traditional theory allows for no obligations in the State of Nature. If this were true, Warrender argues, then there would be no way to guarantee the valid covenants necessary to bind sovereign and citizen. Warrender then constructs a two-tiered interpretation of Hobbes' theory, separating a system of motives from a system of obligations such that the will of God is the ground of obligation while self-interest is a validating condition of it. But Warrender's rejection of the traditional interpretation rests on his claim that it
contains no sufficient philosophical justification for the binding nature of the covenant in the State of Nature and, thus, must be rejected. As Raphael says of Warrender's conclusion, "Since moral obligation depends on natural law and on the fact that natural law is the command of God, Warrender rejects the view that moral obligation arises only in the State" (Raphael, p.92). That moral obligation arises only in the State is, of course, a basic tenet of the mechanistic/egoistic theory, which must now be rejected for lack of support, according to Warrender.

Warrender, in addition, comments on the historical importance of certain of Hobbes' own statements. The misinterpretation by the traditionalists results simply from laying too much stress on Hobbes' insistence that covenants without the sword are empty words and that law without sanction is futile. By overemphasizing these remarks, the traditionalists have concluded that it is only the egoistic desire to avoid penalties attached to law-breaking in civil society that produces obligation. But this emphasis is historically unjustified. That is, it ignores all that Hobbes has to say concerning God and Salvation, and Hobbes' doctrine of 'special prudence' (the injunction to obey natural laws to the point of suicide), all of which show that duty is based on self-interest rather than being identical to it (see Chapter IIB). Once this oversight is corrected, we can drop the egoism of the mechanistic view
and accept the moral nature of Hobbes' theory.

Warrender's dismissal of the traditional theory is not total, however, since prudence and self-interest play a substantial role in his theory as motivating factors. The basic point, though, is that on a purely mechanistic/egoistic framework we cannot build a theory of political obligation; and Hobbes had seen this. To think otherwise, once again, would commit us to seeing Hobbes as inconsistent or unaware of the problem and would ignore much textual evidence that Hobbes had, indeed, constructed a natural law theory of moral obligation.

Hood's rejection of the traditional interpretation follows Warrender's path insofar as he accepts certain elements of Hobbes' mechanistic psychology, but he does not accept the materialism implicit in it. Of the psychology he says:

The psychology which he expounds is not a deduction from metaphysical materialism, but a description derived from experience and chiefly from introspection...To describe his psychology as 'egoistic' is, however, pointless. A man cannot do any voluntary act unless he himself desires to do it. What causes him to do it is irrelevant. (Hood, pp.60-61)

Thus, as far as external actions are concerned, Hobbes is a determinist (an empirical thesis), not an egoist (a moral theory). But Hood holds that Hobbes' theory of obligation is a natural law theory, not egoistic. (See Chapter IIC). Self-preservation is simply not the most important end in Hobbes' theory; salvation is. Thus, the materialists have
focused too narrowly on Hobbes' psychology and have incorrectly interpreted the nature of it as well. Hobbes' psychological theory is limited only to the psychology of deliveration, while the basis of the State is obligation of conscience, obligation by God through the instrument of the Moral Law; such obligation cannot be understood through natural, empirical knowledge (Hood, pp.30-31). Hence, materialism is useless in describing the basis of obligation; according to Hood obligation is a religious concept for Hobbes. (see Chapter IIC).

Thus Hood's rejection of the traditional theory is philosophically based. As with both Taylor and Warrender, however, there is also an historical reason for dismissing the traditional interpretation, namely that the materialists had simply ignored everything Hobbes wrote concerning religion or based on Hobbes' reading of Scripture (see Chapter IIC). This is, for Hood, a major error, resulting from misunderstanding Hobbes' reasons for including so much Scriptural content in his writings. The traditionalists either overlook it entirely or else write it off as a "safety valve," inserted by Hobbes for his own protection. But, for Hood, we must taken the Scriptural element quite seriously, once we see that obligation is a matter of religious belief. To miss its importance is to fail to heed Hobbes' own warning "that Leviathan must present difficulty to those who have no understanding of Divine justice" (Hood,
The interpreters chose to downplay the religious side to Hobbes' work because they had decided, and Hobbes' own contemporaries had asserted, likewise, that he was an atheist. But Hobbes' attack on religion had been misunderstood, Hood says; It is not a rejection of God but rather an exposing of the limits of science in dealing with issues beyond the scope of science. Far from being a simple safety valve, the Scriptural content of Hobbes' writings is of utmost importance for Hood:

Nothing in this doctrine depends upon mechanist materialism or upon the method of Euclid. Hobbes never suggested that his scientific studies had brought any change in his political convictions; he valued Euclid for his method...The purpose of his argument from Scripture was to bring to light the old and true doctrine of Christian politics, long obscured by erroneous interpretations introduced by the children of darkness. He would have dismissed as impious any claim to establish a new morality. His political convictions were moral convictions; and moral convictions were for him religious convictions. (Hood, pp.22-23)

Thus, in the final analysis, it is the narrowly scientific materialist view which must be rejected for both philosophical and historical reasons.

In addition to the theorists I have covered in detail, critics of the traditional thesis also include F.S. McNeilly and Bernard Gert, who both favor some version of a natural law or moral interpretation. Their views are interesting here in that they offer philosophical support for the historical claim that Hobbes either abandoned his egoism and derived from mechanism (McNeilly) or that he never was an egoist to begin with (Gert). Both theorists
ask whether egoism is implied by or can be deduced from Hobbes' mechanism; and they answer that it is not so implied and cannot be so deduced. In addition, both give credit to Hobbes for recognizing this. For McNeilly, Hobbes had tried to deduce egoistic conclusions but found he could not, and dropped his egoism following De Cive and The Elements of Law and replaced it with a formal system of politics based on human nature and what is implied by rational deliberation on the human condition. For Gert, Hobbes never was an egoist, since egoism is a theory of motives (which must be self-interested), while mechanism is a materialist theses (an empirical theory) that leaves out beliefs and motives because they are non-physically analyzable. Thus the historical claim is that Hobbes recognized the problems with egoism and, though he was a materialist, he was not a thorough-going egoist, if one at all; this is based on the claim that, since there are obvious problems with connecting mechanism with egoism, and since Hobbes was a very competent philosopher, he would have seen these problems and moved beyond them in some way or another. Both accounts deserve a more careful look.

McNeilly's criticism is historical in that he claims that the proponents of the traditional view had not seen the shift in Hobbes' thinking following De Cive and The Elements of Law. Because egoism and mechanism could not give Hobbes the theory of obligation or politics he desired, he set
aside both of them in *Leviathan* as serious support for his system, though he did retain the mechanistic language of his earlier writings. McNeilly argues that difficulties with the notion of 'endeavor', when it is defined on a materialistic stimulus-response model, made it clear to Hobbes that endeavor, a key term in the mechanistic model, could not be used to explain complex passions such as ambition, curiosity, or the desires necessary to account for political actions (McNeilly, p.200). In *Leviathan*, then, though the mechanistic language remained, as McNeilly says:

> What Hobbes offers is a mechanical account of sorts, in so far as endeavor is defined as a bodily motion, and the thought which causes it is also said to be a motion inside the head. What matters, however, is not the mechanistic window-dressing, but the goods which are actually offered for sale. It is almost impossible to exaggerate the unimportance of mechanistic materialism in Hobbes's philosophy: it is the reddest of all the herrings that Hobbesian fisherman have caught in their nets. For the postulated bodily motion has no real part to play in the definition and use of 'endeavor'. Nothing in the analysis of the passions, and nothing in the political arguments which follow, depends on the assumption that an endeavor is an internal bodily motion. (McNeilly, pp.200-201)

McNeilly's final conclusion is that nothing of the egoistic doctrine remains in *Leviathan*, despite the language, and Hobbes' actual account of desire (and pleasure which satisfies it) is not egoistic in any way (McNeilly, p.201). Thus, the language of *Leviathan* shares mechanism's terminology taken from the earlier works, but the psychology of desire and the philosophy of politics is quite divorced from the mechanistic model itself which Hobbes had abandoned
by the time he wrote *Leviathan*.

Gert's critique goes even further in his historical claim, holding that Hobbes was never a psychological egoist. Philosophical reasoning again supports the historical claim: Hobbes saw the impossibility of deriving egoism from mechanism all along, even at the time of *De Cive*, and had actually been moved by moral concerns from the start (reminiscent of Strauss's claim). Gert says

To those who have regarded Hobbes as a complete egoist it was, of course, impossible to think of him appealing to men to do what is right. But without this prejudice one becomes aware that Hobbes thought that the opinion of the rightness or wrongness of an action had a great effect upon the actions of people. In the preface to the Reader, in *De Cive*, he laments the lack of a true moral philosophy and says that mistaken doctrines of what is right and wrong have been responsible for a great amount of bloodshed. And one of the reasons he offers for the necessity of a coercive power is that men may be misled in their opinion of good and evil, right and wrong. He even claims that it was in order to correct these mistakes that he wrote *De Cive* before writing the two books which should have come first. (Gert, p.517)

The philosophical argument for Gert's thesis can be outlined briefly (Gert, pp.504-509):

1. Psychological egoism requires that the only motive for any action be self-interest. But Hobbes' mechanism rules out consideration of appetite, aversion, hope, and fear examined introspectively, thus making it impossible to offer a mechanical account distinguishing hope from fear, etc.

2. Hobbes was aware of this and worked around it as is shown by the fact that he allows that 'most men would
rather lose their lives...than suffer slander', which is clearly to act against self-interest, thus showing Hobbes allowed other motives.

3. Further, motives can be tied to beliefs about how and what one achieves, not no mechanistic account of beliefs is possible. It is only tautological, given Hobbes' mechanistic terminology, to say that beliefs, will, and deliberation satisfy self-interest; in fact Hobbes never ruled out altruistic motives. It is only the confusingly complex schema and language of his psychology that drives one to see egoism there; careful analysis shows egoism is not implied at all.

4. Hobbes' analysis of pity, grief, compassion, fellow-feeling, etc., are all non-egoistic (in the later writings especially). Thus, Hobbes was aware of the need to go beyond mechanism, and did so.

5. Since mechanism cannot analyze conscious motives and beliefs or causes of actions, and Hobbes seems aware of this all along, Gert concludes that egoism is positively incompatible with Hobbes' political theory. Even though Hobbes did make an appeal to self-interest in it, his real appeal is to a different account of morality (Gert, p.516). The emphasis on mechanism is misplaced; it results from Hobbes' own confused and complex language, which confused Hobbes' commentators as well as sometimes Hobbes himself (Gert, pp.507-508).
Thus, both McNeilly and Gert reject the traditional thesis for historical and philosophical reasons. The tone and pattern of their critiques is illuminating insofar as both biographical and logical/linguistic elements that work together in them. As I will argue in the remainder of this dissertation, it is the combination of these sorts of analyses that can ultimately release us from the conflict between interpretations.

The individualist interpreters also reject the traditional egoistic view of Hobbes. Strauss's rejection of the traditional version of Hobbes' theory is almost entirely historical, as shown in Chapter IIIA. To summarize briefly, Hobbes could not have been a scientific materialist because his conclusions concerning politics and obligation had been formed earlier than his introduction to the scientific methodology and conceptual framework. How could Hobbes have used the scientific methodology before he knew of it? Since the major thesis of Hobbes' theory, as stated in his 'scientific' works (those released after 1640, including Leviathan, and The Elements, as well as key sections of De Cive and De Homine) are found in his earlier works and appear to be unchanged in the later works, the influence of science and mechanism must be simply discounted. All Hobbes had done, says Strauss, was to adopt a more "modern" terminology to express his earlier moral conclusions. Both the conclusions and the principles that support them are
both chronologically and logically prior to the use of the scientific method and language. This being the case, Strauss concludes, Hobbes was not a mechanistic egoist.

For Oakeshott and similar theorists, egoism is not consistent with the analysis of aristocratic virtue and natural right found in Hobbes, and the looser two-tiered system Hobbes adopted as a result. Self-interest and fear are simply spurs to those of less than virtuous disposition, encouraging them to act justly; these motives are not to be construed as the basis of obligation at all. Hobbes simply saw self-interest as one factor of human nature that had to be taken into account when bridging natural inclination and moral virtue in his appeal to ordinary people to submit to the sovereign's will. The mechanist interpretation, in other words, is based more on the expectations of the interpreters than on what is found in Hobbes' writings for no single, unified, top-to-bottom structure, mechanistic or otherwise exists in Hobbes' works (Oakeshott, IL, p.16).

There are other objections and refutations of the traditional thesis which reflect similar historical or philosophical points. All I have tried to convey is the flavor of the objections to the traditional thesis and some of the details of the arguments of the major interpreters. At this point you might think that the mechanistic interpretation is dead, thoroughly refuted. But that is not the case. For we have still to consider the objections to
the remaining two categories of interpretations, many of which come from defenders of the traditional view.

The natural law view has likewise received considerable critical scrutiny and the objections to it are numerous. Once again, the objections are either philosophical or historical. Thomas Spragens offers what may be seen as the first and most general objection to the moral view: namely, that it is too radical a shift in our perspective of Hobbes. As Spragens says

Although the Taylor-Warrender thesis has illuminated some significant aspects of Hobbes's political theory, it has a clear tendency to change the overall image which Hobbes seemed to have of his own work. In the first place, it makes absolutely central what Hobbes deemed to be relatively peripheral—e.g. that status of laws of nature as divine commands—and makes peripheral what Hobbes deemed important—e.g. the relationship of self-interest and duty. Moreover, the whole thesis involves a laborious separation of what Hobbes equally laboriously strove to reconcile, namely, his psychological postulates and his account of the origin of political obligation. This transformation may be justified on the grounds that it is necessary to save Hobbes from the 'logical blemish' of deriving an 'ought' from an 'is'. This justification, however, raises the question of how far one is entitled to interpret a person's thought after rejecting his premises. (Spragens, p.31)

This objection concentrates on the necessity of having to rearrange too many important elements in Hobbes' writings to support the moral thesis. The justification seems to require stretching Hobbes too far, so the natural law framework must be considered a distortion of Hobbes' actual intentions. The objection is both philosophical and historical. If we abstract Hobbes' work from its true
historical context Spragens objects we commit major philosophical errors of interpretation. We ought not try to fit Hobbes into something other than his own conceptual framework, namely, the traditional mechanistic one.

John Bowle also objects to the restructuring of the historical context of Hobbes' theory. To place Hobbes in either a natural law or religious context is wrong, since Hobbes' outlook was typical of his age, both in his empirical rationalism, and in his confidence in systematic method, though he was a much more thoroughgoing materialist than his contemporaries. He is a prophet of a cynical, deterministic, and utilitarian political theory, which discards the old sanctions of natural reason reflecting Divine order, and which replaces it by the imposition of arbitrary power as the price of security. He repudiates the alternative—the standard by which government, as distinct from society, is to be judged. He attempts to destroy the concepts of both a constitutional frame of society superior to executive government and of a cosmic order superior to manmade institutions. (Bowle, p.55)

Bowle's claim is that the methodology Hobbes chose was clearly the scientific approach of his time, which allowed him to drop those "old sanctions" left over from unenlightened times. In his work, Hobbes and His Critics, Bowle makes use of much historical evidence to show that almost all of Hobbes' contemporaries (both critics and
supporters) took the mechanistic/egoistic nature of his theory for granted, as well as the fact that Hobbes was an atheist. Hence, the various versions of the moral thesis, by extension, must be false.

A more specific and philosophical objection to the moral view turns on the language Hobbes used when speaking of 'natural law'. Miriam Reik cautions against seeing natural laws as moral laws in the strict sense of the term 'law':

Law, said Hobbes, is the command of the sovereign. It locates and bespeaks his authority. As for the 'fundamental law', it is the natural law which bids us keep the peace and our word by obeying the sovereign's civil laws. That is essentially the meaning of his famous dictum that the civil law and the natural law are of equal extent and contain one another. The theoretical significance of Hobbes' contention, however, is to point out that any theory resting the foundations of the state on natural law must inevitably run aground on the shoals of subjectivity if the interpretation of natural law is ultimately allowed to become a multitude of private judgments, for no civil code coincides entirely with everyone's notion of the content of natural law. (Reik, p.107)

Such anarchy is what Hobbes was trying to avoid, after all, argues Reik; so it would be a mistake to interpret Hobbes as basing political obligation on natural law as the moralists do.

Continuing the same theme, Samuel Mintz, another traditionalist, reasserts the primacy of seeing natural laws as pieces of advice or counsel rather than laws in the moral or individualist (Oakeshott' Augustinian natural law view especially) sense. Mintz argues
What then becomes of the doctrine of natural law, of an eternal and immutable morality antecedent to political institutions and implanted by God in the hearts of men? Hobbes retained the name of this doctrine and little else...for Hobbes the laws of nature are not really laws at all; rather they are theorems of conduct for the ordering of men's lives in a commonwealth so as to ensure civil peace...And so they are not really the traditional 'laws of nature', not really, that is to say, moral laws which exist prior to positive law and oblige even in the absence of positive laws, and which draw their authority from the will of God. What Hobbes has done is to secularize the traditional concept of natural law; he has removed it from the sphere of absolute morality; he has deduced it, not from the idea of man's perfection, not from what man ought to be, but from what man is, or at any rate from what Hobbes though man is. (Mintz, pp.26-27)

Thus, according to these objections, the moralists have simply misread the meaning of the term 'natural law' as Hobbes used it. Having done so, they erect a false chain of reasoning deducing the mistaken conclusion that 'obligation' is a moral term, too. This overlooks Hobbes' claim that morality exists only following the establishment of civil society and that Hobbes would be inconsistent to say that natural laws "enjoin certain kinds of action insofar as they are morally correct." (Ackerman, p.416). Again, the underlying supposition is that Hobbes was competent enough to have recognized and avoided such inconsistencies; we must reject the moral thesis or settle for a mistaken view of an inept Hobbes that runs contrary to historical evidence.

Apart from these general objections there are, of course, numerous specific objections to Taylor, Warrender, and Hood's theses. While I will look at some of them, we should note that they are the tip of the iceberg, but it is
unnecessary to consider each and every specific objection, given my purposes here, as noted earlier.

Stuart Brown, in his article, "The Taylor Thesis: Some Objections", points to a number of problems with Taylor's (and Warrender's) moral thesis, again both historical and philosophical in nature. In fact, Brown argues that by ignoring Hobbes' own statements (a historical factor) Taylor has erred philosophically (in attributing a moral theory to Hobbes). Brown notes that, if we pay attention to Hobbes' statements, "He explicitly denies, and on his own view of political theory cannot even in principle admit, that his ethical theory is independent of his psychology" (Brown, p.58). Thus, the Taylor thesis is false. By ignoring such evidence Taylor has made a grave error, ignoring the standards of 'theoretical adequacy and logical rigor' that Hobbes himself imposed, thus subjectively removing Hobbes' theory from its true philosophical context and 'emasculating' him by imposing doctrines logically independent of his own onto him. The moral thesis is not Hobbes' own, but is forced onto a set of arguments in his work that do not and cannot support it, given Hobbes' own standards of logical proof (Brown, p.58).

As Brown argues:

Those who accept the Taylor thesis must present on Hobbes's behalf a theory in which the concept of obligation is moral, as distinct from prudential or legal, and in which this moral concept is explicated without recourse to psychological considerations. But this task is impossible of fulfilment. For in Hobbes
the notion of covenant is employed as an indispensable logical link between political obligation on the one hand and psychological considerations on the other... The duties of citizenship, that is, presuppose an obligation made out in terms of covenant, and covenanting presupposes interests at stake. On the Taylor thesis this chain of presuppositions must be broken at a point where the moral considerations will lie together completely isolated from considerations of interest explicated in psychological terms. But the moral notions in Hobbes are so connected, logically, with psychological ones that they cannot be isolated and still make sense. Thus the concept of obligation actually isolated by Taylor and the others turns out to be legal rather than moral. But Taylor, Oakeshott, and Warrender wish to expound for Hobbes a distinctively moral theory of obligation. They therefore introduce moral considerations to which neither they nor Hobbes, on this view of him, are entitled; and the moral doctrine attributed to Hobbes is inconsistent. (Brown, pp.60-61)

In fact Warrender, Brown argues, ends up with 'a theory of obligation on which no one would be obliged at all.' For his account begins with the view that private interests are morally irrelevent, that covenants can be made with no obligations following from them, and that the status of the sovereign imposes no duties at all (Brown, p.63); and the argument for moral obligation that is proffered fails in its task. For these reasons and because of the absurdity of their conclusions, we are obliged to consider the Taylor/Warrender thesis false (and Oakeshott with them).

Warrender's thesis has received its share of criticism over and above from the link with Taylor's problems. In particular, the idea that obligations exist in the State of Nature is questioned by many Hobbes scholars. Ramon Lemos argues, "The existence of a society with a power
sufficient to compel obedience to the laws of nature is therefore a necessary precondition of the possibility of morality. For Hobbes it is the existence of society that makes morality possible, nor morality that makes the existence of society possible" (Lemos, p.31). To have obligations, especially moral obligations, in the State of Nature seems impossible on this assessment. This would destroy Warrender's thesis since he "rests the whole weight of Hobbes's argument on the prior obligation to obey God's law; and in particular his third law which commands the keeping of covenants" (Plamenatz, p.79). In addition, Oakeshott argues, following the laws of nature is not morally obligatory in the sense necessary to support Warrender's thesis; the reason is that no law can be binding if the subject cannot know the author of the law and the author's intentions in handing down the law, and the evidence suggests that Hobbes believed we cannot know God's intentions as the author of natural law (Oakeshott, ML, pp. 277-279). Taken together, as Plamenatz notes, these objections make Warrender's ingenious and elaborate system unjustifiable or self-contradictory (Plamenatz, p.80).

In addition to these philosophical objections are several based on more historical grounds. They arise from the belief that Warrender (and Taylor) interprets Hobbes' work completely out of context and so alters his intentions by representing him as a natural law moralist. Spragens
writes:

Because of this narrowing of what constitutes a genuine theory of obligation, Warrender's depiction of Hobbes is disturbingly eccentric in the literal sense of that word. In the first place, the vast energies which Hobbes devoted to demonstrating the appropriate political implications of an intelligent self-interest become virtually irrelevant. The essential Hobbes, in relation to natural law and political obligation becomes a fideist, who believed rational theological propositions impossible but nevertheless grounded a political theory on divine will; all the psychological propositions become logically unnecessary enterprises. If these propositions had any relevance to Hobbes's political theory, by Warrender's standards it was purely to sustain the possibility of compliance with natural law, possibility being a necessary validating condition of any obligation. It quickly becomes apparent, however, that almost everything of interest in Hobbes's theory comes under the heading of validating condition...What is left as the grounds of obligation are peculiarly empty and almost purely formal...the parallel of natural and political obligation in Hobbes becomes 'coincidental'; Warrender's logical categories require that the two remain chastely separate, and hence cannot be connected with each other. (Spragens, pp.119-120)

Here Warrender's errors, though philosophical, are the consequences of an incorrect assessment of Hobbes' intentions and the application of a badly suited interpretive framework as a result.

Finally, there are objections to Taylor, Warrender, and Hood voiced by those who retain the traditional interpretation and find the moralist arguments against it unconvincing. Examples are the objections developed by Thomas Nagel. In his refutation of Warrender Nagel holds that both Taylor and Warrender have sabotaged themselves by admitting the role of self-interest and then proceeding to a moralistic interpretation of obligation instead. They were
correct to begin with self-interest as the key moral motivation; but it is an egoistic moral motivation and one that is incompatible with any sort of non-egoistic moral feelings of the type Taylor and Warrender want to espouse (Nagel, pp.74-75). In effect, Nagel argues the natural law thesis is self-contradictory. In addition, Warrender's the use of validating conditions and the separation of the egoistic theory of will and the theory of obligation is merely an elaborate attempt by Warrender, Nagel claims, to avoid having to say that self-interest is in fact the ground of obligation (Nagel, pp.72-73). Even the seemingly altruistic discussion of social welfare found in Hobbes and the strict system of laws derived from it is derived from a careful consideration of self-interest (Nagel, p.72). Similarly Nagel interprets the laws of nature as God's commands as reducible to a prudential basis. God is not the ground of moral law as Warrender and Taylor claim; instead, Nagel argues:

Nowhere does Hobbes say that only the commands of an authority can obligatory. All he says is that only the commands of an authority can be laws. This is all that is maintained in any of the passages cited by Warrender to support his view, nor have I been able to find any more in Hobbes's writings. There is a difference between denying that they derive their status as laws because they proceed from God and denying that they derive their obligatory status because they proceed from God...I think it is quite consistent with Hobbes's system to say that the laws of nature can be considered the commands and laws of God, but I do not think that saying they have this sort of obligation is in contradiction to the notion that Hobbes's primary ground of obligation is prudential. I believe that he considers even our obligation to obey God a prudentially
Nagel's conclusion, then, is that Hobbes was in fact an egoist, and the natural law interpretation is false. As Lemos says, "Hobbes's entire political philosophy is as consistent and elaborate a presentation and development of a thoroughly egoistic approach as any that has ever been devised. He is both a psychological and an ethical egoist...He explicitly defines the expressions 'natural right' and 'natural law' in egoistic terms" (Lemos, p.12). These objections hold for Hood's thesis as well since if we accept the mechanistic view there is no room for a non-egoistic, religious interpretation either.

I should also mention that Hood's criticisms of the Taylor/Warrender version of the natural law view were noted in Chapter IIC. The tensions in interpretation are not just between the advocates of opposing categories of interpretation, but also between advocates within the same general category.

As a last remark on the natural law view, I think the most important historical question is whether Hobbes was, in fact, an atheist. The moralists as a group hold that he was not, and they use God as a central element in their accounts of obligation. But this is a hotly debated question. Quite obviously the materialists tend to hold that Hobbes had dismissed God at least from philosophy and that he did this, in all probability, because of his
atheism. Paul Johson, in "Hobbes's Anglican Doctrine", makes a purely historical point that, if true, effectively dismisses the natural law view, especially Hood's version:

If Hobbes was not an atheist then, one might very well wonder why his contemporaries so uniformly took him to be one. While this problem constitutes another study which cannot be undertaken here, the question demands at least a partial answer. ... those who would theologize Hobbes's politics are committed to a kind of historical absurdity, namely, that all Hobbes's contemporary commentators' entirely missed the point Hobbes was concerned to make, although it was a point they were highly attuned to see; all of them saw instead the opposite point, although none was attuned to do so, and although Hobbes was not in fact making such a point at all.' (Johnson, p.123)

Or as J.W.N. Watkins summarizes, "Hobbes's sovereign was man-made...Hobbes recognized no supernatural or theological standard by which men's desires might be judged" (Watkins, article, p.250). If these historical, biographical, and philosophical claims are true, then the natural law view is built upon a foundation of illusion or misrepresentation.

But are these claims true? In defense of the role of God and religion, the moralists argue in detail philosophically; and there is also the fact of Hobbes' writings to consider. After all, Hobbes gave a large portion of each of his major works to developing scriptural arguments and connections to his own theory of obligation (as Hood, especially, vigorously argues). So the other side of the 'atheism' question is also defined historically as well as philosophically. Typical of replies to the atheistic objection is this claim by Eldon Eisenach that
non-theists have misread the historical context of Hobbes' writings:

Contemporary scholarship has ignored the connection between Hobbes's three-chapter general theory of politics in history and the entire second and 'religious' half of Leviathan. The result has been a variety of alternative approaches, each containing prima facie weaknesses. The simplest and most widely used alternative is to write off the entire second half of Leviathan as 'nonphilosophy' and unworthy of serious attention. The result is to write off as well (or radically misread) the philosophical account of supernatural and natural religion under the general rubric of 'theism', thereby reducing the second half of Leviathan to an application (Christianity) of a more general principle (natural religion, the god of nature). This alternative not only confuses two notions of religion which Hobbes consistently distinguishes but ignores the fact that Hobbes denies all efficacy in the world to a religion based on what unaided reason can tell us. As Hobbes makes plain...no civil or moral philosophy in the past has made its way in the world without the aid of supernatural gods, real or imagined; in all of man's past, prophets and no philosophers have given intellectual birth to the opinions creating power among men. (Eisenach, p.14)

It is clear, then, that the natural law view is as subject to philosophical and historical debate as the mechanistic interpretation.

Finally, there is the individualist thesis to consider. It is obviously open to refutation on the grounds that if either the mechanist or natural law view is correct, then it is false. But beyond that the individualist interpretation has received remarkably little counterargument. The major objections to Strauss's thesis have come from those within the same interpretive framework (Oakeshott, Goldsmith, et al, see Chapter IIIB). While there is some critical attention given to the concept and
role of natural right by others outside the individualist camp, there is not nearly as much controversy here as there is surrounding the first two interpretations. There is also little specific criticism of individual authors' views.

The historical facts of Strauss's view have been criticized as inaccurate by Oakeshott and Goldsmith (Chapter IIIB), and by Raymond Polin, C.B. Macpherson, and Watkins, as well. Their criticisms follow upon each other and raise serious historical questions for Strauss. Polin's argument is that Hobbes cannot be correctly called an aristocrat or a bourgeois, nor a formulator of a bourgeois theory of virtue, as Strauss says he is. The Straussian response might be that all this is historically true, but from our historical vantage point we can now see Hobbes' views as the precursors of the modern bourgeois attitude (Raphael, p.82). C.B. Macpherson picked up this idea and argued that Hobbes' society was already bourgeois and that Hobbes indeed argued his picture of human nature from precisely that perspective; his values simply reflected those of his capitalistic mercantile era. In addition, where Strauss kept the theory of obligation separate from the mechanism, Macpherson's theory closely links Hobbes' ethics to his general philosophy, arguing that his bourgeois individualism is necessarily connected to mechanistic materialism (Raphael, p.83). This, of course, is quite a radical method of joining Hobbes' ethics to his general philosophy, Watkins'
final modification of this "bourgeois" thesis, on the other hand, claims that the character of Hobbes' political theory is determined above all by his conception of the scientific method; it cannot be deduced from his materialism. The result is Hobbes' use of the new method to resolve the State into its constitutive parts--namely, individuals--without the bonds of civil law or justice, followed by a reconstruction of the State from those parts through the analysis of the State of Nature and resultant social contract. Watkins regards all this as a criticism of Strauss, although it is not clear that Strauss would have seen it as such (Raphael, p.83).

These objections are primarily historical, questions about how the historical context of Hobbes' work affected his philosophy. There are also some philosophical objections to the individualist thesis that center on the precise role of natural right, the primary concept of individualism. Lemos, again defending the traditional interpretation, argues that the concepts of natural law and natural right are egoistic and cannot support any notion of natural injustice not even prima facie obligation to respect the natural rights of others unless self-interest dictates it (Lemos, p.12). The result is that to speak of obligations as grounded in the transfer of natural right is itself an error. Natural right does not create obligation, only direct promises do; justice is not a moral value in
itself, as Oakeshott maintains, but only a function of promise-keeping, which must be egoistically interpreted (Lemos, p.12). Obviously then, Hobbes' doctrine of natural right cannot be interpreted on the individualistic model. The question here is how Hobbes defined the terms 'natural right' and 'natural law', which Lemos maintaining that the definitions are egoistic and so are inconsistent with any other.

Hood, too, is critical of the connection between natural right and political obligation proposed by the individualist. His objection is that the individualists have identified the wrong starting point for Hobbes' derivation of obligation. Consistent with his own moral view, Hood denies that rights are the starting point for Hobbes, since "the rights of man find no place in his summary of true Christian politics. Civil philosophy is above all a theory of civil duty" (Hood, p.24). Furthermore, Hood argues, obligation cannot be grounded, as Strauss and Oakeshott suggest, on the moral force of natural rights:

In Hobbes's moral thought it is not right, but obligation, which is moral. Right is negative, a mere absence of obligation, just as corporal liberty is negative, a mere absence of physical impediment. Hobbes's morality is a morality of law, not of right; it is law, not right, which makes the difference between the moral and the natural goodness. (Hood, p.94)

If Hood is correct, then the individualist characterization of obligation as moral, but derived from
the ethical force of the concept of natural right, is false.

Miriam Reik, however, disputes Hood's analysis and defends an individualistic view concerning the term 'natural right':

Hobbes's prescriptive language in describing the first law (men ought to endeavor peace) and in a number of other passages has led some commentators to argue that natural laws impose moral obligations on us, and the search for peace is then construed as a duty. But, as others have pointed out, natural law also dictates self-defense, and the preservation of our nature is a natural right, and thus cannot be a duty. Besides, if natural laws were obligatory, failure to fulfill them would mark a man as unjust or bad, but in the state of nature, goodness is determined by each man's appetite and justice does not exist... (Reik, p.92)

Without the transfer of right as the source of covenant's obligatory nature, the individualist argues, there could be no obligation for Hobbes. Fear would motivate us, natural law (which Reik takes as no more than general maxims) would guide us; but neither could oblige us to abide by the social contract. Thus, Hood's arguments fail to account for obligation since they relieve upon natural law to create obligation, when in fact it is the contract itself as the vehicle of our exercise of natural right that binds us to the State.

3. An Evaluation of the Conflict

It is obvious that no one of the three general interpretations is accepted as definitive by Hobbes scholars. The traditional interpretation enjoyed the
longest uncritical acceptance but this changed abruptly following Strauss's and Taylor's new proposals (in 1936 and 1938, respectively). Since then the range of alternative interpretations has expanded dramatically. With each new view of Hobbesian obligation, new controversies have arisen, new objections and counter-objections have been proposed, and replies to each have followed.

In Chapters I-III I outlined in detail the major arguments and conclusions of the most prominent interpreters under the three general headings of those chapters. In the preceding section I sketched some of the reasons each has for rejecting the various counter-theses, as well as objections offered from several other sources. The purpose of this last task was to highlight the current state of scholarship, a seeming stalemate, in the field of Hobbes research, particularly concerning his theory of obligation. No attempt has been made to try to settle the dispute in favor of one alternative or the other; for the goal has been simply to describe the debate.

What is clear from this survey of the current conflict is the fact that two sorts of objections and counter-objections are most common. First are objections based on philosophical factors. Included here are objections based on linguistic disagreements: for example the claims of Reik that the individualists have misunderstood the meanings of 'natural right' and 'natural
law', or the traditionalists' definition of 'natural laws' as 'maxims of prudence' and the moralists' redefinition of the term as deontological or as God's commands. There are also philosophical objections that claim that particular interpretations are invalid readings of Hobbes' own arguments: for example, the objections to Warrender's use of various of Hobbes' concepts as validating conditions but not grounds of obligation or the claims that the separation of Hobbes' psychology from his general. These claims and others rely upon logical, metaphysical, or scientific arguments, all of which constitute types of philosophical objections.

The second type of objection is historical, based on the grounds that the interpretations in question erred in assessing the factual or biographical context of Hobbes' theory or statements, or else simply ignored relevant historical data in reaching its conclusions. Examples of this kind of objection are Strauss's claims that the traditional view overlooks the facts of Hobbes' life, Hood's claim that almost everyone has mistakenly ruled out the scriptural content of Hobbes' theory on the erroneous belief that he was an atheist, and the counterclaims that he could not have been anything but an atheist. These objections stress historical factors and perspectives rather than technical philosophical arguments.

The one claim which every one of the theorists
makes, however, is that only one view can be correct. In Chapter V I will argue that, to a great extent, the precise points made in the counter-arguments can be ignored because a general conceptual framework can be constructed which circumvents the intricate and thorny question of "who is right?" by providing a coherent context from which to view Hobbes' theory, one which has a place for all three kinds of interpretation.

What is lacking currently is just this sort of coherence. The interpretations each argue for the most part mutually exclusive positions that allow for no overlapping of points, or else reinterpret key terms and claims in an attempt to blend the various points of view; what happens in the latter case is that the major aspects of one theory get demoted to minor features of the unified theory (for example, the lip service paid to mechanistic language in the natural law interpretation). What is needed is a way out of this impasse. W.H. Greenleaf notes that the usual appeal to the "facts" by the various interpreters overlooks the nature of the factual evidence itself:

The coherence sought must be a coherence which we are obliged to believe by the nature of the evidence. Yet this evidence is not something given, autonomous, objective. There is no such thing as an historical 'fact' in and of itself independent of 'interpretation', and used to judge an interpretation. A fact presupposes a world of ideas, an existing interpretation, something achieved in such a context and not something merely given. Any historian begins not with brute, objective facts about the past but with a body of present material seen in a certain light but which, thus seen, seems to lack coherence. And what he tries to do is to give his
material a greater relative degree of coherence by looking at it in a different way, a process which will necessarily involve altering the manner in which the so-called facts have hitherto been regarded. The only historical facts are the interpretations (Greenleaf, p.27).

By focusing on the interpretations rather than on Hobbes alone, I hope to achieve the coherence called for. But this requires taking into account the diverse contexts of the interpretations and finding a way of allowing for the diversity in Hobbes himself. It is interesting, Greenleaf says, that Hobbes did seem to be aware of this precise point and tied it to an awareness of the role of language in the expression of opinions:

"He (Hobbes)...says that, though words are the signs we have of other people's opinions and intentions, it is, nevertheless, often difficult to interpret them correctly because of what he calls 'diversity of contexture, and of the company wherewith they go' (Elements of Law, ed. Tonnies, pp.52-53) (Greenleaf, p.29).

This task will be both philosophical and historical; since the major points of contention are both, as was shown above, both have to be a part of any coherent overview of the issue of obligation in Hobbes. But as I shall argue, the historical factors offer a way of rectifying many of the philosophical controversies. As Greenleaf says:

The appropriate understanding of the role of biographical factors may often be a way in which system can be introduced into varied expressions of thought. It may be that in a man's work a series of inconsistencies or even contradictions exist which appear unresolvable at the intellectual level, but it is sometimes possible to reach a lower degree of coherence by taking account of the author's personality or situation. (Greenleaf, p.30)
That such a reinterpretation is necessary seems apparent. However, I will briefly examine the need in the next section prior to developing the elements of the conceptual framework and methodology necessary to reach the desired rectification of diverse theories. The important thing to remember here is, as Raphael observes,

I am not suggesting that incompatible accounts can all be equally true, or that we can legitimately let our imaginations run riot in reading into works of the past whatever our own background suggests to us. Hypotheses of significance can and should be restrained by canons of historical truth. They must be readings that the original author would probably have been willing to accept if they had been put to him. ... Some of the differing interpretations of Hobbes can be definitely rejected as false. This does not mean that only one can be true. (Raphael, pp.99-100)

B. THE METHOD OF HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION

1. The Need for a New Perspective

What are we to make of the current state of the debate concerning Hobbes' theory of obligation? We have three conflicting sets of interpretations, each claiming to be the most, or the only, correct account of Hobbes' intentions and theory, each with a significant body of textual and critical support in its favor, and each with carefully reasoned arguments based on the respective textual evidence. Almost immediately the intuitive response is to fall into line with the interpreters themselves and say,
"Well, two of these views have to be wrong, either that or they're all wrong!" But what this does is to raise a difficult question about Hobbes. Is it possible that Hobbes was persistently self-contradictory? Could he have been such a careless reasoner as to miss the fact that he was being inconsistent or contradictory? Have the interpreters created a picture of a bungling, loose, rather careless philosopher who can't be given credit for knowing what he was up to or how to do it even if he did know? Or alternatively, have the interpreters misread Hobbes so badly as to read into his work what is actually not there? Or have these interpreters imposed an unjustifiably narrow reading on Hobbes, causing them to exclude other views or miss other threads that are to be found in his work?

Now, an affirmative answer to all but the last of these questions would imply a serious lack of ability on the part of either Hobbes or the interpreters that is belied by the general philosophical excellence of the people and the works involved. Hobbes simply does not strike us as someone who could persistently contradict himself or consistently fail to do what he intended to do when constructing his theory of political obligation. Nor, on the other hand, do the analyses and arguments offered by the various interpreters seem radically unjustified, or loosely constructed, or merely subjective renderings of Hobbes' writings. Thus, the problem. But if we conclude that each
interpreter has read Hobbes too narrowly, how are we to contest this? That is not yet clear.

The preceding section pointed out the problems of trying to fit the theories together into a logically coherent unit by indicating in what ways the interpreters see them as mutually exclusive or inconsistent with each other. To try to overcome this incompatibility directly would require the kind of philosophical slight of hand, the stretching of points, and subtle alterations of the meanings of terms (or of Hobbes' intentions) that, when done, would produce a theory needlessly convoluted or overly complex, and not persuasive. This is the fate of the theory of Von Leyden, which tries to subsume moral and individualistic terms and points under the linguistic and conceptual framework of mechanism. Such an attempt faces the problem of demonstrating the consistency of rather obvious inconsistent views. Contortions of interpretation are needed to apply a single consistent meaning to terms that seem clearly to be used in more than one sense, and to respond to the claim that the textual evidence offered by those who argue for the exclusiveness of the three interpretations. This brings us back, once again, to the earlier problem of having to assume some lack of ability in Hobbes or some subjective misreading of Hobbes by all the interpreters, save one. It seems to me wrong to say this of Hobbes, and intuitively risky to hold that every interpreter
is mistaken, though I might certainly be able to say some were.

What this leaves finally is the possibility that all three interpretations are to be found in Hobbes, but that they were not meant to fit together into one logically consistent theory. Here we have an option that has a number of virtues: first, we need not imply any lack of logical acumen on the part of either Hobbes or the various interpreters; for the views were not meant to be logically joined. Second, we need not undertake the difficult task of showing that all the interpretations and the textual evidence for each of them are flawed; they may all be correct and valid. Third, we do not need to try to fit disparate theories, complete with their own terms, contexts, and conceptual frameworks, into a larger, logically unified, but unpersuasive framework; three separate frameworks exist and were, in fact, intended by Hobbes. Thus we would avoid many of the problems previously stated. However, we do face the strangeness of arguing that Hobbes created and intended three separate mutually exclusive theories of obligation. Obviously, we face the problem of finding a coherent theoretical model from within which to make and justify such an assertion without maintaining that Hobbes was inconsistent, contradictory, or simply inept. I believe that this can be done and the remainder of this dissertation will develop and argue for my claim.
Exactly what is needed here is a methodology or theoretical model that does two things: 1) argues historically that Hobbes saw and intended to present three distinct theories of obligation, a method of historical interpretation; 2) argues philosophically that it is plausible to interpret Hobbes' three seemingly incompatible theories in accord with this historical interpretation, a new philosophical perspective on Hobbes' theory of obligation. My task in the remainder of this dissertation is to show the validity of the historical approach and to provide a philosophical framework which preserves both the historical claim and the various claims of the interpreters so as to show the triple nature of Hobbes' writings without reducing Hobbes to the level of a philosophical mediocrity. In this way we can preserve the three interpretations generally, while avoiding the pitfalls associated with the other options outlined previously.

2. The Historical Aspect

It is clear that a new perspective is necessary since the alternative perspective presupposes that when more than one interpretation of a set of writings exists, either only one is correct or they can all be subsumed under a more general, logically unified, theory, has left us with the conflicts about Hobbes' theory of obligation that we have
seen. What is needed is a fresh conceptual framework. The work of James Collins, *Interpreting Modern Philosophy*, offers us the beginnings of such framework. It is Collins' recognition of the importance of history, both in the sense of the intellectual history of a philosophical problem, and in the sense of historical context per se (biography, dates, events, the tenor of the times, etc.), that enabled me to see the problem of obligation in Hobbes in a new light and to go beyond the basic premises of the traditional interpretations and conflicts. Further, Collins advocates re-interpretation of persistent historical problems in light of contemporary methodologies that could not previously have been used in examining the issues; modern historical interpretation involves new perspectives derived from current frameworks. Here, given the triple nature of Hobbes' theory and the belief that all three might somehow be composable, I believe a combination of Collins' approach and a Wittgensteinian approach, provides a unique framework for re-evaluating the current standoff.

The first important common aspect of Collins' theory and the Wittgensteinian methodology I will employ is the recognition that conflict, as in the case of the Hobbes interpreters, is a natural and perhaps essential part of philosophical analysis. Collins stresses the point that conflicting interpretations are not disastrous but normal, necessary conditions for progress in discovering meaning and
truth. Further, he says, "diversity and methodic strife among philosophers is fruitful because it is an important mode of the diversity and strife required everywhere for mankind's development and wisdom" (Collins, p.414). Wittgenstein also points out that conflicting perspectives are to be expected and accepted given the diversity of language and its uses. (The Wittgensteinian aspect of my methodology will be explicated in detail in the next section of this chapter.) In fact, it has been the failure to understand and allow for such conflict and diversity that has stifled philosophy, according to Wittgenstein. Once we accept conflict we may be able to work toward a more sympathetic and accurate reading of a given historical figure's intentions. In the case of Hobbes, this would allow us to avoid the assumption that where there is a conflict between three interpretations, there must be at least two incorrect views. Rather, it may be possible that the conflict is acceptable or natural to Hobbes' way of thinking. When we allow conflict and tolerate it, we may be able to keep ourselves from making false assumptions about Hobbes' intentions, about the meaning or use of terms within his work, and about the validity of the interpreters' readings of them.

Part of the problem, too, is that the intolerance for conflict and the ensuing rejection of opposing theories may result from psychological factors rather than from the
textual material. As Collins recognizes,

...historians find that certain psychological attitudes (whether deliberately or unthinkingly entertained) do raise obstacles against a more effective examination of the source philosophers. Some re-orientation of mind is required, not precisely to constitute the act of historical understanding but to modify the working suppositions of readers sufficiently to permit such a developing acquaintance to occur. (Collins, p.38)

It is my contention that this has been part of the problem in finding a way of utilizing all three perspectives to arrive at a version that would remain true to Hobbes' own intentions without impuning his ability or having to dismiss other views with significant textual evidence behind them. The goal is to rectify the competing theories and do justice to Hobbes in a way that, although it will not end the job of interpretation once and for all, will allow for a more sympathetic reading of Hobbes and of the interpreters themselves. We need to accept conflict as normal, however, before we can rest easy with an interpretation of Hobbes that allows him seemingly contradictory threads of reasoning and accepts the validity of conflicting interpretations concurrently. The psychological block to be overcome is the precommitment to a monistic view of interpretation in philosophy which will allow only one correct view and seeks to end conflict by dismissing competitors. We might call this "the definitive interpretation block". Both Collins and Wittgenstein counsel against such preformed molds into which to pour historical or philosophical interpretations.

The way around such blocks is to utilize
contemporary philosophies and newly developed theories as tools for re-evaluating historical figures and controversies. Collins stresses the need to see that classical texts are not monolithic and do not present themselves to us in any immutable way. Rather, they must always be rendered intelligible anew in the idioms of our present philosophical theories and concerns. It is the job of modern interpreters to blend the current methods with the historical background in an attempt to render classical texts, such as Hobbes', deciferable:

...the kinds of interpretive questioning do not constitute a separate standard apparatus, for they stand in fundamental need of being reminted and newly equipped with the specific means for bringing the sources to bear upon the problems we are facing. The confluent principles of source and interpretation cannot join together automatically, immediately, and under their own impetus alone. There is always need for fresh acts of judging just how best to relate the modes of textual insistency with ever more pertinent and servicable modes of interrogation. (Collins, p.189)

Further, Collins views this re-interpretation as vital to the philosophic task:

What keeps history of philosophy a living discipline is precisely its assimilation of new ways of reading, interpreting, and redeploying the basic writings. The initial narrowing effect of a correlation between these writings and a contemporary methodology is to be expected. It provides the inciting spur toward improving a new path in historical interpretation, one which quite properly unsettles the traditional view and generates novel relationships among all the components of historical meaning...One function of the interpreting present is to discipline the historian's judgment of these long-range expectations concerning contemporary innovation. Therefore, it is a good working rule that the historical spirit be encouraged to take many surprising forms, all of which are to be provisionally welcomed and tested by their actual interpretive
fruits. (Collins, p. 210)

My proposed interpretation of Hobbes, using a Wittgensteinian method of analysis to supplement Collins' historical approach, is precisely an attempt to realize Collins' goals. In addition, there is textual and historical evidence that makes it plausible to claim that Hobbes had something of a Wittgensteinian approach in mind when he addressed his various audiences through his writings. If it is plausible to maintain that Hobbes directed different arguments toward different segments of the English public in order to convince them that they would be well-advised to grant the sovereign with almost absolute obedience, then there is good reason for allowing all three theories to stand together as related, but separate, frameworks of justification.

Historical analysis eventually reaches, Collins says, a plateau where further sources, undiscovered or untranslated texts, and profitable strategic overemphasis of early, late, or seminal ("great works") texts ceases, and the philosopher's job becomes one of giving a balanced assessment of the primary sources from all phases of the author's work and all the various interpretations accumulated up to the present time. The job "is to correlate all the phases in his development, determining as definitely as possible how they work together to achieve the continuity of a living philosophy" (Collins, p. 145). In the
case of Hobbes, I would add that the same must be done for the interpretations. What is needed is a renewed reading of Hobbes, but one that proceeds from a new point of view that allows both historical context and current trends in philosophical methodology a place. Interpretive questions, Collins notes, "are both addressed to a personal center of creativity and centered upon those leads which will help us make better theoretical sense out of the philosopher's writings, taken as a whole" (Collins, p.124).

Therefore, I do not believe that we should rest content upon the presupposition that only one of the three views of Hobbes' theory of obligation is correct, nor upon the further assumption that they are mutually exclusive. To do so would be conceding that we are as far as we can go in understanding Hobbes and that all that is left to do is take our pick of one of the existent theories. Collins makes the same point in more eloquent terms:

When we agree to study a philosophy in the historical spirit and not as a collage of abstract theses, we find it to be already deeply involved in the process of being mediated, qualified, and reoriented in one respect or another. For this is the living process which furnishes the historical grounds for taking the from-to approach to that philosophy. Its capacity to educate us in an understanding of its problems and ours does not suddenly manifest itself to the present generation of students. The judgment about a source's latent capacity of meanings and its accessibility for subsequent minds rests upon that source's gradual achievement of continuing historical presence, that is, upon its involvement already for some time in the kind of interpretive relationships which underlie the from-to interrogation of a historian. (Collins, p.355)

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scholarship expands the boundaries beyond the traditional perspectives and offers what seems to me to be a fresh way around the controversy that is consistent with aspects of Hobbes' personality, writings, and the traditional perspectives themselves. Even if the attempt would ultimately fail, the process remains valuable as a tool that opens the past to the modern mind in terms more compatible with current philosophical attitudes. The attempt keeps Hobbes scholarship alive and may open the way to still more creative interpretations by causing us to see in new ways and apply the new ways of seeing to the old problems. All of this is desirable once we accept Collins' characterization of the nature of the discipline of the history of philosophy. But, beyond this, I shall argue, this approach makes the best sense of Hobbes' theory of obligation of any interpretation to date.

3. The Purpose of Historical/Contemporary Re-analysis

Quite obviously, the point of any historical analysis is to understand the author's central textual purposes and intentions, shorn of any interpretive bias or preconceptions. The initial focus must be on the texts themselves, as Collins emphasizes:

The intention with which the historian is concerned is that conveyed in the philosophical texts themselves. This is the intention actually achieving itself, with varying degrees of adequate expression, in
the sources available for study. When the actuating intention is rendered determinate in function of the source writings, it constitutes an accessible foundation for historical inquiries from many directions and a decisive testing ground for statements about the mind of the philosopher or his fundamental intention. What the historian strives to render always more comprehensive and precise is an understanding of the philosopher's central textual intent. (Collins, p.47)

However, in cases like that of Hobbes' theory of obligation, the waters may be muddied by a plethora of existing and perhaps conflicting interpretations which render the tasks of remaining faithful to the author's true and original intentions difficult. Here the philosophical historian must take the various interpretations into account in a non-partisan attempt to correlate and judge them so as to resolve the controversy. This may, as it seems to in the present case, involve using a new perspective that allows the historian to do justice to both the original and secondary texts. Collins sees the task as one of declining to sit as a supreme judge above the principals in a court proceeding, wherein the purpose of the process is to declare one side victorious and dismiss the others. Rather, the intent is to do justice to all the parties by using "all the interpretive judgments bearing upon the designated subject of inquiry", in this case Hobbes' theory of obligation, using both the source material and any "modes of interrogation and correlation" operative in current philosophizing. All of these various components must be included since, as Collins explains, they all "contain" an
aspect of requiredness, a demand that he use and relate them as precisely, discernedly, and artfully as he can" (Collins, p.382). My use of Wittgenstein serves to incorporate current modes of interrogation and correlation, and, as I hope to show, connects all the relevant sources fairly and objectively while preserving Hobbes' original intentions.

A second feature of Collins' theory that is of particular importance to my methodology and to the Wittgensteinian perspective itself is his denial, essentially, of the presupposition that only one of a number of competing interpretations can match an author's true intentions. Collins and Wittgenstein both stress the complexity of intentions, the plurality of influences on an individual, on his/her work, and the language of his/her writings, as well as on any interpreter of the original sources. Collins states this point when he writes:

...this theory explicitly includes the condition of there being plural forms of actional influence of signs upon the interpreter. Even a highly general semiotic must study the varieties of sign-actions and hence the various modes of interpretant determinations. This rings true to the more concrete situation presented by historical studies of modern philosophy. There is no singularly privileged, one-channel path of interpretation linking a source philosophy with a historical inquirer. At every turn in our analysis, we have found the modes of signification to be various and deliberately varied, whether they come from the source thinker's fertile use of arguments and modes of expression or from the historian's ways of questioning and interrelating. (Collins, p.363)

The current state of affairs in Hobbes scholarship is almost a perfect example of the need for this type of reminder,
especially since the textual evidence suggests a plural intent by Hobbes. Following Collins' suggestions I will try to establish a "teleologically well instructed historical judgment" relating the sources of contemporary philosophies so that the "integrity of each is respected, at the same time as their mutual bearing is established" (Collins, p.353).

We need not discard any of the three conflicting interpretive frameworks entirely (though particular aspects of each, or specific sub-interpretations may be rejected) if we join Collins' attitude with Wittgensteinian methods of analysis. That these two approaches are compatible beyond the allowance of plurality is shown by a third feature that Collins explicates:

It is quite possible to make accurate summaries of the individual arguments in a philosopher's writings, and nevertheless fail to do historical justice to their content and function within that philosopher's own development and comprehensive vision of life. These latter considerations serve to modify and unify all his statements, so that their proper presentation belongs among the chief aims of the responsive interpreter. Historical re-envisioning of a philosophy requires that the purposive unity of meanings be respected, along with their separate argumentative structure. (Collins, pp.398-399)

Just as Wittgenstein stressed context so, too, does Collins hold both the individual and social context to be important in understanding a philosopher's language, meanings, and vision. The attempt to comprehend the complexity of Hobbes' thinking as to the nature of obligation is furthered, rather than hindered, by the diversity of interpretations under
consideration. That is, part of our interpretive task is already complete: able interpreters have already uncovered various important aspects in Hobbes' thoughts about obligation and provided strong textual support for their various claims. What is lacking, however, is a way of rectifying, without rejecting, these well supported insights. The application of the Wittgensteinian approach provides a way of doing this that is both compatible with Collins' methodology and plausible given specific textual evidence concerning Hobbes' personality and perception of his own times and task.

Finally, Collins offers, by way of a quotation from a letter by William James, a caution not to go too far from an author's central core when interpreting the author's work:

You take utterances of mine written at different dates for different audiences belonging to different universes of discourse, and string them together as the abstract elements of a total philosophy which you then show to be inwardly incoherent. This is splendid philology, but is it live criticism of anyone's Weltanschaung? Your use of the method only strengthens the impression I have got from reading criticisms of my 'pragmatic' account of 'truth,' that the whole Ph.D. industry of building up an author's meaning out of separate texts leads nowhere, unless you have first grasped his center of vision, by an act of imagination. That, it seems to me, you lack in my case... Not by proving their inward incoherence does one refute philosophies—every human being is incoherent—but only by superseding them by other philosophies more satisfactory.... (Collins, p.401)

This warning is especially relevant to the task of sorting out the various interpretations of Hobbes' theory of
obligation. Two questions need to be considered: 1) Do the various existent interpretations suffer from having done just what James warns against? and 2) Does my present attempt to rectify the existent interpretations suffer for violating James' warning? With respect to the second, the final answer will have to wait until I have concluded my efforts, but I do not believe I have constructed a "new" Hobbes out of thin air, nor taken his writings out of context.

As to the first question, I do not believe the various interpretations are the results of unjustified lifting of quotes from Hobbes out of their context and re-aligning them to produce an artificial view of obligation (though, again, I am referring to the overall thrust of each interpretation and not to each and every individual sub-interpretation). Instead, I maintain that the general thrust of each interpretation is justified by the texts, but that each presupposes a context or framework of its own within which the justification holds. The error is to fail to recognize the contextual shift and to apply one standard of interpretation exclusively, thereby excluding the other views. Essentially, in Wittgensteinian terms, the error is to apply standards from one linguistic framework to another linguistic framework. It is my contention that Hobbes himself did construct what amounts to three separate language-games, based on his awareness of a difference in
the audiences that might read his work. I hope to substantiate this claim and then show how the three interpretations co-exist in Hobbes' writings, without being contradictory, as separate language-games; it is this, I believe, that previous interpretations have missed.

The purpose, then, of what I propose is to take a step back from the traditional assumptions and explore a new interpretive option. Such a step seems particularly necessary where Hobbes' theory of obligation is concerned, but necessary for the history of philosophy generally as well. As Collins says:

First, the growth of a logical interpretant begins in the mode of suggestion and conjecture. This is a formal statement of a trait already observed in the practice of historians. The art of historical questioning is fructified by a constant influx of new interpretive hypotheses, new suggestions about how to explore the fundament and trace the interdependencies among philosophers. Without this mine of conjectural logical interpretants, there could be no fresh orientations of research and revision.

Second, the logical interpretant incorporates the values of the emotional and energetic factors, since general meanings emerge only from exploring imaginative situations and steadily modifying all the accepted historical judgments. (Collins, p.370)

4. Methodological Particulars

One attractive feature of Collins' method that seems tailor-made to an investigation of the conflicting interpretations of Hobbes is the resolve to respect the development of the author's thought, while adapting modern
perspectives to past interpretations of that thought. When faced with multiple theories, Collins urges us not to abide by a precommitment to any one logical model, primary or central intuition, or a monistic schema that reduced every aspect of the theory to a single developmental image. (Collins, p.140). In the case of Hobbes, this allows us to avoid a precommitment to any one of the traditional interpretations and further admits new interpretive mechanisms as necessary additions to the task of doing justice to Hobbes' thoughts about obligation. More specifically, given the kind of linguistic conflicts found within the context of the competing interpretations, the re-appraisal of Hobbes from a Wittgensteinian slant seems natural given Wittgenstein's stress on understanding language through understanding contexts, intentions, and conventions. Particularly appropriate is Wittgenstein's emphasis on describing how a framework of rules develops and functions, rather than in imposing our own preconceptions upon the framework and its users' intentions. To resolve the stalemate in Hobbes scholarship we do not want or need a "new" theory of obligation, but rather a more plausible description of Hobbes' intentions in light of the extant primary texts and interpretive models already proposed.

In constructing this description, biographical features are important since, as Collins says,

One index of a student's maturing readiness to move beyond predigested outlines of modern periods and
isms lies in his willingness to learn what he can about the life and setting of the individual philosopher. To recognize the worth of a biographical study and its contribution to philosophical understanding is to grasp the role of fundament-oriented questioning. (Collins, p.110)

This is of the utmost importance to Wittgenstein as well, as is evidenced by his stress on conventions, contexts, and so forth. One cannot understand an author's meaning without describing the context in which he wrote, nor without describing as accurately as possible the author's intentions. In the case of Hobbes this is what seems to be lacking. Even though many interpreters have described the biographical/historical background in detail, their interpretations seem limited by the imposition of the monistic framework onto Hobbes' intentions. By adopting Wittgenstein's pluralistic framework, I believe considerable light can be shed on Hobbes' intentions in a way that will not discount the valid work of previous scholars nor distort Hobbes' own goals.

Collins holds that two sorts of historical contingencies are important, though often ignored: the extrinsic contrast between an author's ideas and the author's often mismatched life, and the intrinsic considerations which qualify the author's methods, arguments, and vision, and which demand an evaluation of the author's perceptions of his own age and how the historical age itself may have colored his vision (Collins, p.115). Hobbes, fortunately for his interpreters, led a life
consistent with his theories, to the point of boasting that fear was continually the primary motivating factor of all he did, although he also had deep respect for science and a belief in Christianity filtered through his own particular perspective. Thus my attention will be focused on the second contingency, Hobbes' perceptions of his age and the effects of his perceptions on the goals and style of his work. W.H. Greenleaf observes:

> a contradiction of some sort in a man's writings...then the reader is properly to assume that the opinion signified most clearly and directly by the author is the one intended and that any apparently contradictory view arises either from an error of interpretation on the reader's part or from the writer's not seeing any reason to suppose a contradiction at all. (E.W.,IV,75).

(Greenleaf, p.29)

It is this warning that various interpreters have ignored when they have dismissed Hobbes' theory of obligation as the incoherent product of an inept, contradictory mind. As I've said before, there is no evidence that Hobbes had such a mind. Two alternatives remain, either the readers have constructed contradictory, artificial "Hobbeses", or there exists no contradiction once we adopt Hobbes' own perspective. I do not believe, again, that the three "Hobbeses" are figments of the interpreters' minds; the textual support for all three views is strong. However, the contradictions or inconsistencies seem to remain. The way out of the morass that I propose relies on accepting the last portion of Hobbes' warning as an indication of how he would like us to see his work: Hobbes
did not see any reason to suppose his various pronouncements on obligation were really contradictory at all.

Collins suggests that "the most illuminating focus will be to observe the themes of genesis and system in their mutual transaction rather than in separation" (Collins, p.127). Here is where all the interpreters have been shortsighted: each approaches the controversy exclusively from an "inside-out" perspective, that is, by trying to fathom Hobbes' intentions in isolation rather than in conjunction with the external element of any author's work—the audience being addressed. There is a mutual transaction in Hobbes between the character of the separate audiences he aims at reaching and his intentions at any particular time. Hobbes, as I will show in Chapter V, was acutely aware of his audience and, as he constantly reiterated, a writer who hopes to influence behavior must correctly assess the nature of his audience and use whatever language or method of argument that will best succeed in bringing that specific audience over to his side. This is the basic theme of the whole of Hobbes' *Rhetoric* and one that he reminds us of throughout his writings. The omission of any regard for Hobbes' perceptions of his readers lies at the heart of the claims of contradiction and mutual exclusion.

My thesis is that Hobbes perceived that different arguments and methods of arguing were appropriate for the various segments of the intellectual community he was
addressing. His specific choice of language, meaning, and methods of arguing take the full context for form of life of the readers into account. Rather than taking an "inside-out" perspective, we need to take an "outside-in" point of view to see Hobbes' intentions correctly: each separate theory describes a separate framework of justification adopted by Hobbes in response to his perception of what had to be done to convince different segments of his audience of his main conclusion that each citizen has an almost absolute obligation to obey the sovereign. Hobbes' arguments are not contradictory any more than different uses of language are contradictory for Wittgenstein; they are separate arguments utilizing common terms in different contexts which preclude logical contradiction.

The methodology Collins recommends consists of a re-evaluation of an issue designed to change our way of seeing the issue itself (a process Wittgenstein repeatedly said he was engaged in--getting philosophers to see similarities and differences in new ways, and to see philosophical problems in new ways). The outline of the process is given by Collins as follows:

An initial move is to arouse critical dissatisfaction with the preconceived schemas under which the sources are already organized.

A second step in our historical self-education consists in becoming critical of the monistic usage we customarily employ in discussing the work of the individual philosopher. Thus we speak confidently about 'the' philosophy of Leibniz and 'his' position on this or that issue in later seventeenth-century philosophy. Such references are at best ambiguous, and at worst are
a hinderance to engaging in historical study of a philosopher so mentioned.

The illusory supposition is that the philosophical sources are inert objects, laid out there for our immediate intuition and waiting to be totally dominated by the aggressive reader. We can disabuse ourselves of this notion only by making the actual effort to work historically into the texts....

We must learn to comport ourselves toward the source men and their works as we would toward a company of critical inquirers, with whom we are in personal relationship. This rule of historical comportment can be followed without reducing historical study of texts to a psychologizing operation, a claim of special empathy, or an esoteric type of cognition. (Collins, pp.38-43)

A successful re-interpretation will be one that survives the test of being read always within its context, being consistent with parallel passages within the author's works, and being true to the author's general statements about method and systematic connection, a test the traditional interpretations avoid or overlook in one way or another (Collins, p.45).

My finished product, as noted, is not meant to be a "final solution" in the usual sense, but a proposal of a new way of seeing the old problems of Hobbes' theory of obligation. Collins recognizes such a limitation, too, to the nature of "final solutions" of historical problems, and his method presses us to see things differently while trying to do justice to an author's point of view:

The creative historian tries out several imaginative approaches, varies the proportions of analysis and synthesis, and thus always presses toward those slightly altering and slightly more illuminating conceptions which keep his interpretation of the textual source futurally alive and incremental for historical understanding. (Collins, p.371)
And again:

To follow a problem through its treatment by many thinkers—who may belong to quite different philosophical traditions and schools, national climates and time periods—is a way to see relationships and threads of meaning which would otherwise escape our notice. It also gives a functional basis, in the practice of historians of philosophy, for coming to recognize that modern philosophy is neither solipsistic nor loosely episodic in its foundations, but rather that it enjoys a real persistence and community of meanings....Even where there is no strict interdependence based on genetic descent, there are determinate likenesses and differences available for comparison. (Collins, p.177)

The very tone of the above passages is Wittgensteinian, but Collins, too, is sympathetic to the use of current, but perhaps unorthodox approaches to traditional problems that have led to an interpretive impasse, thus adding justification to my use of the Wittgensteinian context for my "re-visioning" of Hobbes. The unorthodox attempts are important as a way of breaking such impasses, as Collins notes:

It is not entirely idle or impertinent, then, to ask whether a current methodology is able to make sense out of the classic modern texts. In this reversal of perspective, the interpreting mind tests a contemporary philosophy by the measure of its relevance for illuminating the abiding themes developed in the modern tradition. The direction of challenge is thus shifted from the questionable study of past theories to the questionable sufficiency of present ones, instancing once more the process of their becoming simultaneously problematic for the historically educated mind. (Collins, p.211)

The next section will explicate the precise nature of the Wittgenstein perspective, while Chapter V is the application of the new perspective to the problem of the
C. WITTEGENSTEIN

1. Introduction

In the previous section the first element of a new interpretive framework from which to view Hobbes was outlined. In addition to stressing historical factors, Collins' methodology emphasizes new perspectives, new ways of seeing old philosophical problems, and the use of contemporary philosophical tools in the re-analysis of these problems. Where Collins' theory provides the historical elements, some aspects of the later Wittgenstein's work provide the necessary philosophical element for my own interpretive model. This combination is not arbitrary. The nature of the problem of obligation is such that the contemporary Hobbes scholar is faced with numerous competing theories and frameworks, each coming from a slightly different perspective, but employing various common terms in ways that lead to the interpretive stalemate described earlier. Part of the problem is historical and lends itself to an application of Collins' methods; part of the problem is linguistic/philosophical, arising from the conflict of perspectives and the various different uses of common terms.
This is precisely the sort of problem Wittgenstein labels as peculiar to philosophy. Moreover, a Wittgensteinian model closely parallels Collins' in many ways. Finally, as I will show in Chapter V, Hobbes himself was keenly aware of history and of language in ways that are very similar to those of Collins and Wittgenstein, thus making the use of this combined approach here natural rather than arbitrary.

The present section will concentrate on two tasks: to clarify one version of the later Wittgensteinian methodology, and to establish the compatibility of it with Collins' historical model. In respect to the second of these tasks, a number of common elements, beliefs, and attitudes have been noted in section B. Both Collins and the later Wittgenstein accept the fact that there is no one set way to look at philosophical problems. Both are critical of the monistic view that presupposes that only one view or method is correct for any given philosophical problem. Both accept, on the other hand, that conflict between views is normal and necessary to the doing of philosophy: and both acknowledge that the plurality of influences on any philosopher must be recognized and used in our attempts to understand him/her.

There are a number of shared methodological factors as well. Both alter the old notion that there are final solutions in philosophy by stressing the continuing need for new ways of seeing the old problems, ways of shifting our
perspective to focus on the various elements of any given problem so as to fully describe the nature of the problem; and both regard the context or historical background out of which a philosopher wrote or a philosophical conflict arose as basic to correctly understanding the issues. The present section will outline other common elements in addition to these from the previous section, thereby strengthening the tie between Collins and Wittgenstein and justifying the combination of these methodologies in the proposed interpretation of Hobbes.

The other goal of this section is to outline and clarify the specifics of the Wittgensteinian side of my methodology. I will clarify Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and the nature of philosophical problems. There will be separate treatments of the concept of meaning and the importance of grammatical analysis.

2. The Nature of Philosophical Problems and Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy

For Wittgenstein most philosophical problems are not factual problems. Rather, they are linguistic, conceptual problems of some sort or the other, but most often misinterpretations of the forms or uses of language. But they are not superficial because they are linguistic; they "...have the character of depth. They are deep
disquietudes; their roots are as deep as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language" (PI, 111). Wittgenstein stresses, too, that it is the grammar of the language we use that accounts for many of philosophy's problems:

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.--Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexion' (sic). Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases.

The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (PI, 122)

Without clarity of view and perspicuity in our grammar, we lose sight of the nature of philosophical problems such that factual data and observations are useless--the problem will remain unsolved simply because what the problem's cause is remains hidden, obscured by our misuse of the language. The problem demands that the philosopher find the correct context or framework for the facts he already has, so they do not appear to conflict with one another and can be fit together into some kind of coherent whole. It is a matter of removing the cloud caused by limits in our grammar or our ways of using language; it is a matter of seeing through the cloud to the heart of the problem, not a matter of gathering new facts. It strikes me that this is exactly the problem in Hobbes scholarship. There are no new facts to be gathered. Hobbes is producing
no new texts. What is needed is some new way of re-evaluating the texts that we have in light of the research and interpretation already existent. But it is in relation to these interpretations that we reached the stalemate.

But for Wittgenstein this is also part of the nature of philosophical problems. The facts conflict; there are multitudes of interpretations that do not fit together coherently. What are we to do with all the data? What interpretation is the correct one? As Wittgenstein put it, the problem has the form: "I don't know my way about" (PI, 123). It is, as it were, a 'mental cramp' or a 'knot in our thinking' to be untied (Z, 452).

The problem of obligation in Hobbes has this character also, as a result of the various presuppositions made by interpreters about the nature of philosophical interpretation, the belief in monistic frameworks, and the inability to see the problem in a different light. It takes the form of deciding between competing interpretations, discarding the incorrect ones and retaining the correct one. But, as I said earlier, these preconceptions need to be circumvented; Wittgenstein might say we need to "battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (PI, 109). We need to "show the fly the way out of the bottle" (PI, 309). I believe the form of the question, "Which is the correct interpretation of obligation in Hobbes?" or "What is Hobbes' true position?", has cramped
our view of the problem. The form of the question imposes a traditional, monistic framework onto any attempt to answer it. But, as Collins and Wittgenstein agree, there is no reason to suppose there is only one correct answer to a philosophical question of interpretation.

Philosophical problems, then, are often puzzles, vexations, that defy easy solutions not because factual data is needed, but because the philosopher's vision is obscured. He recognizes that something is profoundly wrong, something is deeply unsatisfactory, and that something lies at the heart of the way one thinks about the problems. Wittgenstein's suggestion is that we must see the problem itself as somehow misconceived, as resting upon mistaken foundations, upon incorrect assumptions. The difficulty is that such errors are so deep, so basic, that we do not understand how to get at them--especially if we do not get outside the conceptual framework from within which the problem comes. We need new ways of looking, of seeing, of thinking about the problems. This is one of the major points of Collins' approach as well.

Wittgenstein often calls these deep problems "grammatical problems", which arise because the depth of our grammar does not reach far enough to comprehend the depth of the problem itself. We are, grammatically, in over our heads. (The nature of the grammatical element is the topic of section v.) Because of the limitations of grammar,
philosophical problems must be treated with care: "In a certain sense one cannot take too much care in handling philosophical mistakes, they contain so much truth" (Z, 460). To handle such problems requires that, as Timothy Binkley says, "...one must pay more attention to the surfaces of things within their natural environs in order to observe what goes on. To be sure, one must see the depth of the landscape, but this depth is the simple reality of the many dimensions of the countryside, and not any hidden structure which constitutes the foundation of it all." (Binkley, p.158)

In dealing with Hobbes' theory of obligation, the three groups of interpreters have focused upon the same basic terms: 'laws of nature', 'God', 'science', 'psychology', 'contract', 'obligation', and 'materialism'. These, and others, are common to all three views; but their definitions and emphasis are different. We are puzzled as to how Hobbes could have meant so many and seemingly contradictory things when he used these common terms himself. The puzzlement arises, again, out of a certain lack of grammatical refinement, out of a certain lack of attention to the contexts behind the surface of the terms being used.

The nature of such problems turns out to be primarily linguistic since we are trying to interpret the meaning of Hobbes' terminology in order to explicate his
theory of obligation, and "It is only in a language that I can mean something by something...For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday" (PI, 38). It is the confusion of surface and depth grammar that accounts for much philosophical perplexity, the trying to express by our use of words what should be embodied in a grammar. Wittgenstein describes what often happens in much the same way as I would describe how the current stalemate in interpretations arose as a result of the presuppositions of traditional history of philosophy:

The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules.

This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of). (PI, 125)

Often, too, another error occurs. This sort of error involves taking the rules we have prescribed for one specific framework and either misapplying them to another, or generalizing in such a way as to come to believe that our specific rules cover all issues, frameworks, or uses of language. To take an example from Hobbes' interpretation: why should we necessarily conclude that 'law of nature' means the same thing in a scientific context as it does in a religious one? Because Wittgenstein is so attuned to these sorts of errors and his solutions are geared to avoiding them, his methodology seems a valuable way of shedding light on the conflict. The point is that often we apply
grammatical rules out of their proper context due to the fact that the surface grammar appears similar in several contexts. Thus Hobbes used 'law of nature' in both contexts, i.e. scientific and religious; and the term appears the same on the surface. Because the deep structures of the grammar are dissimilar, we become ensnared in the trap of language and try to free ourselves by resorting to standard methods, i.e., if two theories conflict, at least one is wrong. Many philosophical problems have the same etiology as that of interpreting Hobbes' theory of obligation; it is not a unique error.

Contributing to the tendency to err in this way is the current atmosphere and context of historical study. The philosopher today is bound by the rules of the past. He is doing historical research, and since there are traditional ways of doing this, with certain common presuppositions, he works inside their limits. The difficulty here, as elsewhere in philosophy, is dispossessing ourselves of these preconceptions. Binkley explains Wittgenstein's conception of the problem in these terms:

Context is one of the key words for the Investigations, and it is the clue to many confusions. In some instances, we take a word or expression out of context and farme it as a picture of reality; then, after staring at this one picture for a long time we become possessed with a vertigo in which nothing can be seen clearly. Such an abstraction may go unnoticed but it is nevertheless stifling. (Binkley, p.123)

The key to escaping this situation is to correctly perceive the context, the background, and style that we are
working within (that of the author, and of ourselves). But this is a difficult task for one so bound up in these practices. We need a depth of investigation that brings out the practices and traditions and shows us how to see and assimilate them since they are rarely reducible to simple formulae. It is this, too, that Collins urges us to do when looking at historical figures. That is, we must perceive our own biases and perspectives, try to step outside them, and assimilate the contexts of the historical figure we are examining. The approach of Strauss and Oakeshott, especially, tries to do this with Hobbes, though not with complete success: their problem is that, to some extent, they are prescribing how we must look at Hobbes rather than describing what Hobbes himself said within its context. They both seem to see their analysis as a final solution to the question of obligation, and this is part of the error.

For Collins and Wittgenstein this runs contrary to the nature of philosophy as descriptive. The nature of philosophical problems being as it is, Wittgenstein conceives of philosophy as descriptive: we describe the problem and its context/grammar to illuminate it, not 'solve' it in any traditional sense.

Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical investigation: the difficulty—I might say—is not that of finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. 'We have already said everything.'
Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is
the solution!'

This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly
expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the
difficulty is a description, if we give it the right
place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and
do not try to get beyond it.

The difficulty here is: to stop. (Z, 314)

Elsewhere Wittgenstein puts it differently

We are not interested in any empirical facts
about language, considered as empirical facts. We are
only concerned with the description of what happens and
it is not the truth but the form of the description that
interests us. What happens considered as a game.

I am only describing language, not explaining
it.

For my purposes I could replace the sensation
the word is said to express by the intonation and
gestures with which the word is used. (PG, 30)

The job of philosophy is descriptive: we must fully
describe the contexts and uses of language and all the
surrounding phenomena. Further, we must do this by altering
the ways, the angles from which we view the confusion, not
by imposing final solutions or prescribing definitive
interpretations.

Once we fully grasp the nature of the
issue we are finished with the philosophical task, in so far
as it is ever finished. This is why a Wittgensteinian
solution may seem like only a preliminary to a solution—the
second use of 'solution' is fraught with the old traditional
preconceptions that philosophy dictates the truth or finds
the correct interpretation—while a Wittgensteinian solution
is simply a redescription or way of getting the philosopher
to see the problem anew, not a revelation or new truth—
simply the "old truth" seen in a new way. Philosophy *leaves everything as it was*; it does not declare this or that theory true, the others false. "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give in any foundations either. It leaves eerything as it is" (PI, 124).

Binkley describes Wittgenstein's view of traditional theories:

Philosophers are like people with primitive prejudices or superstitions (PI, 110); and the appropriate response to them seems to be an enlightened return to innocence, or rather a return to an innocence now enlightened. Like savages, philosophers become caught up in their own superstitions and stilted ways of viewing things (which are nevertheless deeply revelatory of customs and natural history), and everything is interpreted in terms of their theories and schemes which are supposed to apply to reality a priori and thus make astute observation superfluous—at least with respect to certain issues. The superstitions are eliminated only at their origins, so the philosophers (who are also members of the civilized community) are taken back to the primitive sources of their own customs and protocol as well as back to those of the civilized community at large. (Binkley, p.101)

The job of philosophy is to "untie knots in our thinking; hence its result must be simple, but philosophizing has to be as complicated as the knots it unties" (Z, 452). Wittgenstein's philosophic method coincides with his conception of philosophy—we must describe the origins of the problems, the preconceptions and confusions by means of describing the various frameworks, contexts, and conventions. We are not producing 'a real understanding for the first time', but clarifying the 'use
of our language, the existing language' (PG, 72). The roots of philosophical problems lie in language, the way around them is to describe the language and the misuse that created the problem.

It is important not to misunderstand Wittgenstein here. The descriptive method is not a single way of doing philosophy. Description is not a set procedure done in the same way but applied to different tasks. Wittgenstein views the method as analogous to therapy in psychology. The word 'therapy' covers a wide range of activities and addresses a wide range of illnesses to which it must be adapted according to the nature of the illness. Philosophy is like therapy in this and other ways: "There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies" (PI, 133). The choice of therapy is relative to the illness and the person suffering from it, but like therapy, the first step for the philosopher is to look for the source of the puzzlement (BB, p.59). "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness" (PI, 255).

Thus, how we see philosophical problems will vary from case to case, though, overall, we seek to describe the source of the confusion so as to set it out clearly in view, which is quite unlike using a definite method to prescribe a definite solution. As Wittgenstein carefully explains:

But some of the greatest achievements in philosophy could only be compared with taking up some
books which seemed to belong together, and putting them on different shelves; nothing more being final about their positions than that they no longer lie side by side. The onlooker who doesn't know the difficulty of the task might well think in such a case that nothing at all had been achieved.--The difficulty in philosophy is to say no more than we know. E.g., to see that when we have put two books together in their right order we have not thereby put them into their final places. (BB, pp. 44-45)

Wittgenstein's method for achieving such reordering of our thinking is not the tight linguistic analysis of his earlier period, but an analysis based on uncovering the underlying rules that govern linguistic usages. "We are interested in a language as procedure according to explicit rules, because philosophical problems are misunderstandings which must be removed by clarification of the rules according to which we are inclined to use words" (PG, 32). We are seeking an understanding of exactly what has gone wrong with our use of the language and our application of the rules of a particular context or linguistic framework. "(The) solution of the problem lies in discovering how and why the logic of the language has been misunderstood" (Hartnack, p.66). We must find the solution in a deeper understanding of the real function of the words and sentences involved in the dispute or problem by a close analysis of the context in which they actually occur.

Since the ways we use words are so numerous and various, there is no one set method for uncovering the hidden rules and functions of every sentence or term in a particular context. Wittgenstein's own style of writing
illustrates a number of different approaches to the analysis of language. "There is", as K.T. Fann explains, "nothing in the Investigations which we should ordinarily call reasoning, argument, or proof. It is a book of reminders. Wittgenstein draws our attention to some very obvious facts which we forget while philosophizing" (Fann, p.107). Like different therapies, Wittgenstein employs imagining or inventing LGs as objects of comparison, finding and making up intermediate cases, reminding us that certain questions cannot arise, joking, giving rules of thumb, and investigating the full nature of a (particular linguistic framework) by exposing its context, and its place in language. The aim of his diverse techniques is enlightenment as to the problem or usages involved: "Our investigation does not try to find the real, exact meaning of words; though we do often give words exact meanings in the course of our investigation" (Z, 467).

It is this sort of re-visioning that is needed to clarify the conflict between interpretations of Hobbes' theory. It may seem obvious on first glance that only one theory can be correct, but by adopting a Wittgensteinian perspective I hope to show that this is not the case and that Hobbes may have had something in mind which allows multiple interpretations to exist.

3. Joining Wittgenstein and Collins
Before clarifying the major elements of Wittgenstein's analysis of language, as they are relevant to the present project, it seems appropriate to justify the combination of Wittgenstein's method with Collins'. The combination is by no means arbitrary and is justified by noting the similarities between Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and Collins' characterization of the method for interpreting modern philosophy historically. The common elements include the emphasis both authors place on context-being aware of the setting of the original work and the works of the interpreters as part of an ongoing or differing cultural milieu, the awareness that history and biography play a role in all philosophical statements, and the stress on the importance of seeing old problems in new ways. All of this adds up to the fact that what Collins calls historical interpretation essentially fits what Wittgenstein includes in grammatical investigation.

Wittgenstein approached of philosophy and philosophizing as a natural phenomenon, "made intelligible by showing how they arise from human behaviour anchored in its material, biological, and cultural setting" (Bloor, p.2). As such, it is a living, changing, variable process rather than a fixed, totally determinate "thing". Philosophical theories are not chiseled in stone, waiting to be uncovered in their original and final form; theories are living and changing because they are human products. There
is no way to grab hold, in a particular interpretation, of the correct representation of a philosopher's beliefs; beliefs are fluid, too. This is Collins' view as well. Historical figures and their works cannot be labeled as fully and finally known or explicated; they defy the definitive interpretation that traditional history of philosophy aimed at. The new historian must avoid the temptation to freeze a theory and declare the search for the author's meaning done.

How a thing divides up, what its components are, how we are to understand it, and what we are to do with it are not determined uniquely by one account; so one account is never the only correct one. Each separate account fills a different purpose, a different role in the life of the author, his times, and his purposes; each is better for some purpose and probably less so for another. We should not stereotype a single perspective as the only way to look at a theory, nor stereotype a theory by restricting our view of it to one interpretive framework. Yet this is the tendency of philosophy say Wittgenstein and Collins. The philosopher for Wittgenstein, and the historian of philosophy for Collins, have to avoid falling into some standardized way of seeing the problems, be they historical or not.

The solution is to "try out" different perspectives, to invent new ways of seeing the old theories, to "fiddle" with what the modern interpreters such as Taylor, Strauss,
Warrender, etc., have done with the traditional approaches to Hobbes' theory of obligation. Wittgenstein stresses this flexibility continuously when speaking of language and philosophy:

The scrutiny of the grammar of a word weakens the position of certain fixed standards of our expression which had prevented us from seeing facts with unbiassed eyes. Our investigation tried to remove this bias, which forces us to think that the facts must conform to certain pictures enbedded in our language (BB, p.43).

And again,

Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about (PI, 203).

But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice verse (OC, 336).

Very much like Wittgenstein, Collins stresses the use of multiple interpretations and the breaking of the hold of the stereotypical or standard views of a historical figure's works. In particular, this seems absolutely necessary when confronted with the maze of interpretations of Hobbes and the standard approach which says only one can be correct, the one Hobbes intended. Once we buy into the monistic thesis we are forced to view the problem of obligation in the stereotyped way. To avoid this sort of error Collins and Wittgenstein recommend rearranging and re-evaluating the perspective we have and the various elements of the problem itself (I mean here the existent versions or
interpreations). Wittgenstein's point, Binkley says, is that:

The two key concepts here are 'arrangement' and 'connection'. Philosophical descriptions, like aesthetic descriptions, show us different arrangements of what is before us in order to point out connections which we may have missed because of certain stereotyped ways of looking. We can thereby 'find ourselves' in the landscape by getting in touch with the surroundings through more perspicuous ways of seeing, i.e. through recognition of revelatory connections between concepts and between instances of a single concept. (Binkley, p.54)

Collins' re-visioning of problems is almost exactly the same procedure; and I believe Collins would adhere to Wittgenstein's recommendation that: "We shall also try to construct new notations, in order to break the spell of those which we are accustomed to" (BB, p.23). Rather than notations, of course, in the present use we must construct new interpretive frameworks from which to view Hobbes' theory and the accepted interpretations of it.

The imagintive construction of new points of view or interpretations is not, for either Collins or Wittgenstein, to be done haphazardly, of course; it must keep the end in mind--which is an enlightening of the old problems. But the necessity for such altered points of view remains so long as the problem remains from the existing point of view. We must remain open to the use of this technique so as to avoid stereotyping and avoid becoming locked into a stalemate, as is presently the case with Hobbes. We must, do the re-visioning and the imagining before we write it off or call
it unintelligible; we must take the new perspective to see what can be gained. Wittgenstein says:

I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different people would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). But: if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize—then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him (PI, p.230).

We have to limit ourselves, however, to the facts before us, or to the author’s works and intentions. That is, we should not create "new facts" or new readings out of whole cloth, since this is simply to fit the case to our prejudices, and this is precisely what Collins and Wittgenstein are trying to avoid here. We have to look at what is going on, describe it, not prescribe how to see it. That is, we are going to test the hypothesis that, given the belief that each interpretation is textually well supported, the three views might all be correct. The question is whether Hobbes' writings can abide such a revision.

These are the similarities that justify the use of Collins and Wittgenstein together. To use a Wittgensteinian analysis with Collins' historical methods seems natural, and given the particular nature of the issue itself, necessary.

Finally, it should be noted that such a re-analysis will not constitute a final solution for either Collins or Wittgenstein. Historians, Collins advises, should resist the temptation to see what they do as aiming at such an
absolute end. This, too, fits well with what we have seen of Wittgenstein's analysis: we provide reminders, devices, aids to the philosopher rather than a system of rules that can be followed mechanically to the final, definitive conclusion.

4. Wittgenstein on Meaning in Context

For Wittgenstein, words, propositions, and concepts have meaning only within a language-game or linguistic framework; a starting point leads to a general rule for doing philosophy: "to understand a concept, a word, put the word in its linguistic context and whole utterance in its social context and then describe, without preconceptions, what you find; remembering that each word, each utterance, may figure in many contexts" (Strawson, p.62). Understanding a word or concept involves observing the role of the word or concept in the various language games or frameworks in which it functions, the behavior surrounding its use, and the reactions speakers and hearers have to its use. We must take the whole of the context into account; we must see the role the word or concept plays in the actual usage of the language; and we must be careful to avoid focusing on just a specific context or phrase rather than the whole language-game or framework since this tends to obscure our understanding of the word (BB, p.108).
Seeing how a term functions in its linguistic context includes a comparison of the word's functions in different contexts, different frameworks, different language-games, so as to observe the similarities and dissimilarities, its various rules and functions in this or that framework i.e., its various meanings:

It is easy, on the other hand, to point our experiences characteristic of remembering, expecting, etc., accompanying the images and further differences in the immediate or more remote surrounding of them. Thus we certainly say different things in the different cases, e.g., 'I remember his coming into my room', 'I expect his coming into my room', 'I imagine his coming into my room'.--"But surely this can't be all the difference there is!" It isn't all: There are three different games played with these three words surrounding these statements (BB, p.183).

Understanding is facilitated by this process of observing the various contexts, social backgrounds, etc. "'Understanding' is not the name of a single process accompanying reading or hearing, but of more or less interrelated processes against a background, or in a contest, of facts of a particular kind, viz. the actual use of a learnt language or languages" (PG, 35).

This point is consistent with Collins' historical method as well. Where Collins stresses interpreting modern philosophy within the whole context of the time it is written, both social and philosophical, Wittgenstein emphasizes the identical factors for language use in general. Both Collins and Wittgenstein, also rely on actually looking and seeing how terms function, what the
author/speaker intends, and the avoiding of preconceived explanatory frameworks. Taken together the two methods tell us to be aware not only of the author's framework but our own, as interpreters; the reader's way of seeing is tied to his/her time, social background, and philosophical perspective. Wittgenstein, especially, uses this as an important factor to keep in mind when examining a philosophical concept (like 'obligation'):

Concepts with fixed limits would demand a uniformity of behaviour. But where I am certain, someone else is uncertain. And that is a fact of nature. (Z, 374)

These are the fixed rails along which all our thinking runs, and so our judgment and action goes according to them too. (Z, 375)

In Chapter V I will argue that Hobbes held a similar belief in that he cautions anyone addressing an audience to take the perspective and contextual background of the audience into account. In his Rhetoric Hobbes states very clearly that to convince someone of your position requires tailoring your arguments to the temper and perspective of that person. This warning appears at various places throughout Hobbes' other works as well. For this reason, the methodology of Collins and Wittgenstein seems ideal for investigating the controversy surrounding Hobbes' intended theory of obligation. As Wittgenstein recommends, we have to see how Hobbes uses the key terms of his theory of obligation against the full background, which I believe includes his perceptions of his audience:
The sign (the sentence) gets its significance from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs. Roughly: understanding a sentence means understanding a language.

As part of the system of language, one may say, the sentence has life. (BB, p.5)

We must carefully observe how someone actually uses terms against the full background and pay close attention to very small differences if we wish to correctly grasp the meaning of the terms:

A meaning of a word is a kind of employment of it. For it is what we can learn when the word is incorporated into our language. (OC, 61)

If we imagine facts otherwise than as they are, certain language-games lose some of their importance, while others become important. And in this way there is an alteration—a gradual one—in the use of the vocabulary of a language. (OC, 63)

Meaning is not just a matter of linguistics and contexts per se, it is an expression of shared experiences, of adopting conventions or rules, and a matter of training. Language has meaning not in isolation or privately, but as part of a complicated network of behavior, of practices (BB, p.69). For a word or phrase to belong to a common language, it is necessary "that the occasions on which it is right to apply it should provide shared experiences of a certain kind, the existence of which is connected with the rightness of applying the word" (Strawson, p.63). The shared experiences evolve into regular practices, uses, customs, or institutions which presuppose in turn a society or form of life (PI, 199). Further, the practices are transmitted by means of rules that govern word usage and
criteria for correctly following the rules. Removing the background of the practice or custom removes the rules as well. Since language-games are rule governed, to understand any language-game requires understanding its rules and how they are imbedded in their social context.

What we are doing is simply observing human behavior, human agreement to observe certain practices (Z, 428, 430). The agreement on rules is transmitted through training; it is not enough to know the rules, one must be trained in the conventions that constitute correctly and incorrectly following the rules. We learn through repeated trial and error within the family of users of a language or language-game; it is not something we do alone, or once, and then say we have mastered it (PI, 199, 202; BB, p. 96). The process, again, is not arbitrary; the conventions taught cannot be just any set of conventions if language is to communicate: they must be grounded on 'the uniformities of nature' (PI, 240).

5. Wittgenstein on Grammar and Context

Meaning (of words, phrases, etc.) within a context or linguistic framework is tied to the rules governing the game, the grammatical rules in Wittgenstein's sense of the term. For example, Wittgenstein, speaking of the various uses of the term 'now', says: "And in this case the word
'now' means: 'in this calculus' or 'if the words are used according to these grammatical rules'" (PG, 71). The rules govern the uses of the terms in a particular context, and the different uses point to different meanings or the terms. How a term is used depends upon the context.

Therefore the expression 'The picture hasn't changed' is used in a different way when we talk of a material picture on the other hand, and of a mental one on the other. Just as the statement 'These ticks follow at equal intervals' has got one grammar if the ticks are ticks of a pendulum and the criterion for their regularity is the result of measurements which we have made on our apparatus, and another grammar if the ticks are ticks which we imagine. (BB, p.171)

It is because of this that we must pay careful attention to the distinction between surface and depth grammars:

In the use of words one might distinguish 'surface grammar' from 'depth grammar'. What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its use--one might say--that can be taken in by the ear.--And now compare the depth grammar, say of the word 'to mean', with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect. No wonder we find it difficult to know our way about. (PI, 664)

Imagine someone pointing to his cheek with an expression of pain and saying 'abracadabra!'--We ask "What do you mean?" And he answers, "I meant toothache".--You at once think to yourself: How can one 'mean toothache' by that word? Or what did it mean to mean pain by that word? And yet, in a different context, you would have asserted that the mental activity of meaning such-and-such was just what was most important in using language.

But--can't I say 'By abracadabra' I mean toothache'? Of course I can; but this is a definition; not a description of what goes on in me when I utter the word. (PI, 665)

We must not be misled by the surface grammar of a
term's use--it may show up as a noun or subject in two very different sentences and we may be tempted, since it plays the same role in the structure of the sentences, to conclude that it means the same thing (after all, it fills the same role in each sentence). But this would be an error if the close analysis of the term's use disclosed a very different depth grammar at work, as is the case with Wittgenstein's example in the previous citation (PI, 665). Part of the depth grammar is the context: in the first use of 'abracadabra' the term fails to express pain because the context is that of normal, everyday use. Against this background we are puzzled as to how it can express 'toothache' or 'mean pain'. In the second case alluded to, to mean 'toothache' all we need is a redefinition specifying the new meaning; the non-normal context is drawn around the term by the definition, while it is obvious that depth grammar is that of an entirely different context. In both cases, however, notice that the term's surface grammar would be the same: it appears in the same places in the sentences, appears to be a noun, etc. Yet it fails to be meaningful before the redefinition and adjustment of the depth grammar as a result of the new context are explained.

It is a certain lack of attention to the differences between the surface and depth grammars of the key terms and phrases in Hobbes that I believe causes a large part of the problem of interpretation. Terms such as 'natural law',
'natural right', and 'contract' appear to occupy the same roles in the sentences across very different contexts within Hobbes' body of works. The various interpreters have taken the terms, thus, to mean the same thing in each context: if 'natural law' means 'piece of advice' in a certain context, and appears to fulfill the same syntactical role and to be used for the same purposes, the natural conclusion would seem to be that it must mean 'piece of advice' in the second instance as well. But if the context has radically altered, say from the scientific materialistic context to a moral context, the error would be that of mistaking the surface grammar of the sentences for the depth grammar of the entire framework.

For Wittgenstein, then, there is a relativity or "arbitrariness" to grammar that does not affect other bodies of rules in the same ways:

Why don't I call cookery rules arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of grammar arbitrary? Because 'cookery' is defined by its end, whereas 'speaking' is not. That is why the use of language is in a certain sense autonomous, as cooking and washing are not. You cook badly if you are guided in your cooking by rules other than the right ones; but if you follow other rules than those of chess you are playing another game [Note: Wittgenstein often likened the playing of LGs to the playing of chess] if you follow grammatical rules other than such-and-such ones, that does not mean you say something wrong, no, you are speaking of something else. (Z, 320)

It is not as if we set up a grammatical system first which determined the uses and purposes of language; to set up the rules in this way necessarily presupposes a language
we can use to reach the agreement, and this language will have to have its grammatical system antecedently. Seeing this, we see that we have merely pushed the investigation back a step, and we may fall into an infinite regress. At some point, we just have a language whose grammar we can describe and then, by comparison, go on to construct new frameworks or language-games and accompanying grammars in contrast to it. It is against the background of ordinary language that grammar is recognized and new frameworks constructed to fit different purposes which require different grammatical systems (depth grammars).

I want to say: It is primarily the apparatus of our ordinary language, of our word-language, that we call language; and then other things by analogy or comparability by this. (PI, 494)

Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfill its purpose, in order to have such-and-such an effect on human beings. It only describes and in no way explains the use of signs. (PI, 496)

The rules of grammar may be called 'arbitrary', if that is to mean that the aim of the grammar is nothing but that of the language.

If someone says 'If our language had not this grammar, it could not express these facts'--it should be asked what 'could' means here. (PI, 497)

Grammatical factors (and investigations) are a matter, then, of pragmatic interests for Wittgenstein. A grammatical analysis is a pragmatic investigation of linguistic functions. As Fann describes this sort of analysis, it is a drawing of a boundary of sense around the criteria of 'use', 'purpose', 'employment' and the like
What is needed when considering Hobbes' theory of obligation is to set just such boundaries. Hobbes' use of the various key terms, such as 'natural law', 'natural right', or 'obligation', vary from framework to framework. Our task is to carefully draw the boundaries around the different frameworks based on the awareness of Hobbes' intentions to address different audiences and how his use of such key terms differs accordingly.

What seems to me to be needed to make sense of the Hobbes stalemate is a better understanding of the three frameworks of Hobbes' account of obligation, including an argument that they were all intended by Hobbes. These are the topics of Chapter V.


A. INTRODUCTION

The thesis that I will defend is reconciliatory: it is that all three of the major interpretations of Hobbes' theory of obligation are contained in his writings, and that they co-exist without contradiction, inconsistency, or conflict as separate frameworks of justification. Further, I will argue that this thesis is consistent with Hobbes' intentions and the general aim of his political philosophy. More specifically, I wish to argue that the three interpretations represent different approaches by Hobbes to the same final goal--to convince his fellow citizens that they should seek peace and that the most effective guarantee of a permanent peace is a strong sovereign to whom the people own almost absolute obedience. The three frameworks are Hobbes' attempts to reach different segments of his general audience by means of arguments or demonstrations framed in the language best able to generate their assent to his basic conclusions.

What I do not wish to argue is important to note,
too. First, I do not wish to argue that Hobbes' arguments are successful, either in the sense of having actually convinced his audience or in the sense of being philosophically sound. History shows us that there was no general rush to embrace Hobbes' conclusions nor to put them into practice, and philosophically, there exist numerous serious problems with the arguments themselves. All I am trying to establish is that separate theories of obligation do co-exist in Hobbes' writings and that this was intentional on his part. Whether the arguments of the theories are successful or not is outside the scope of this dissertation. Second, in light of the previous disclaimer, it should be obvious that I do not wish to argue the comparative merits of each interpretation or sub-interpretation; nor do I wish to draw any conclusions about whether one or the other of the interpretations is superior, should have been seen to be by Hobbes, and so should have been developed in full detail while the others were dropped. It may be the case that one or another of the three theories is superior to the rest in its philosophical power or its power to convince, and that Hobbes erred in not recognizing this. But this is a separate question entirely. All I am trying to show is that Hobbes advanced three separate theories, each designed to reach different audiences, and that they are able to co-exist without contradiction once we see them from an appropriate perspective. I am not claiming
that this is the only thing Hobbes was doing, but that it was this aspect of what he was doing that led him to the formulation of the three frameworks in question. Finally, and most obviously, I do not wish to argue that there is any correct way to interpret Hobbes' theory of obligation. I do not even wish to maintain that my thesis is a final solution to the interpretive problem. I only hope to stimulate a re-analysis of the various theories of obligation, and the theoretical stalemate itself as it exists in Hobbes scholarship, by positing a novel approach that offers a new way of seeing both Hobbes himself and the interpretations. This aim is consistent with the Collins/Wittgensteinian method that I have adopted.

My argument, then, is (1) that strong textual and historical evidence exists for each of the three major interpretations and (2) that this makes it plausible to suggest that we adopt the perspective held by Collins and Wittgenstein that allows multiple interpretations and (3) that the historical and textual evidence supports our new point of view. From this perspective we will recognize three frameworks of justification falling into two basic categories in Hobbes' works. Broadly speaking, we have a mechanistic framework and two varieties of moral frameworks: the traditional interpretation being mechanistic, while one moral perspective focuses on deontological or natural law theory (Taylor, Warrender, and Hood), and the other focuses
on individual rights (Strauss and Oakeshott), that is, roughly a duty-oriented approach to morality as contrasted with a rights-oriented approach.

That three divergent theories can co-exist in the same author's works without being contradictory is explained once we see them as manifesting different contexts or frameworks of justification and recall the Wittgensteinian description of such frameworks. The compatible co-existence of the three theories is allowed by the belief that, as separate frameworks, they are governed by separate sets of logical/grammatical rules. They would be contradictory only if governed by the same set of rules; since Wittgenstein cautions us against judging one framework by the rules of another, or one LG's by those of another, it is inappropriate to say that our separate frameworks contradict each other or are inconsistent. They are neither contradictory nor non-contradictory, consistent nor inconsistent. Contradictoriness is a function of statements within the same context or framework for Wittgenstein; it is governed by the logical-grammatical rules of that context. Or, to put it differently, contradictions only occur within a single context, not across numerous contexts. For example, it would be an error to claim that theological statements contradict scientific statements since the context and logic of theology is different from that of science; the issue of contradictoriness never arises if we
see this from the Wittgensteinian perspective. To argue that the three frameworks in Hobbes are contradictory (or inconsistent) would require seeing them as a part of one, unitary, larger context—in effect, to adopt the monistic framework that has created the stalemate to begin with and that is precisely what I am arguing against.

The evidence that I will offer for my thesis is both historical and textual. The textual evidence falls into two categories: that which establishes and describes the structures of the three frameworks, and that which shows that Hobbes' intentions were to use three separate lines or argument geared to three different audiences in order to convince them to accept his conclusions. The historical aspects of my arguments overlap with these since part of the evidence will come from the primary texts and part will come from more general sources and relate to the surrounding circumstances and conditions which could reasonably be said to have influenced Hobbes. Both bodies of historical evidence, however, serve to establish Hobbes' intentions and make plausible the claim that he had a particular aim in mind requiring different, audience-relative, approaches (constituting three frameworks of justification). Taken together, the evidence strongly suggests that Hobbes' goal is to convince his audience of the value of peace and the need for rather stringent obligations to the State to ensure peace, and that his arguments are suasive in nature (as well
as being philosophical) and would be guided by his perception of rhetorical or "hortatory" methods of persuasion, which dictate tailoring one's arguments pragmatically to best reach each particular audience. The conclusion would then be that we must recognize that Hobbes' overall framework is largely governed by rhetorical concerns and his philosophical arguments are constructed relative to his need to address different audiences using different LGs of justification. Hobbes' conclusion is the same regardless of the justification, however; it is the meaning of his terminology and particular linguistic framework that varies. We must reformulate our understanding of Hobbes' theory of obligation in light of this re-visionsing of Hobbes' intentions and methods.

The steps in my argument will follow from the requirements of the Collins/Wittgensteinian methodology previously outlined. I will begin by describing various important aspects of the general historical setting of Hobbes' time to establish the larger context of his work. Roughly, we will see how the historical contingencies explain Hobbes' motives behind both his general aims and his use of separate frameworks, while the overall analysis will show us the source of, nature of, and solution to the interpretive dispute.

I will then demonstrate that my view of Hobbes remains true to what is known of Hobbes' character,
intentions, and methods. This requires seeing his aim to be to convince the general English public of his conclusions, as well as to establish them philosophically. To this end I will examine the rhetorical elements of his style to show that each framework of justification was a response to the conventions and perspective of a particular audience. Here I will concentrate on the Rhetoric and other comments Hobbes makes as to the language and styles of arguments, including a brief demonstration that even the scientific method contains strongly rhetorical elements. Essentially, I will argue that the mechanistic framework is directed at those learned in the language and methods of the new science, that the natural law/moral framework is aimed at the scholastically minded and at the Christian community, and that the individual rights framework is aimed at those who embrace the new individualism of the time, or those who might be called 'legalistically' minded.

Finally, I will conclude by summarizing how my proposal preserves the various interpretations while avoiding the pitfalls of contradiction, inconsistency, and of questioning Hobbes' abilities or those of the authors of each interpretation. I will refer here to the ten questions Oakeshott says must be answered by any interpretation of Hobbes' theory of obligation (see Chapter III, B).

B. HISTORICAL ATMOSPHERE
1. The Historical Period of Hobbes' Life

Basil Willey, in his book, *The Seventeenth Century Background*, joins a writer's work to the climate of the time the writer lives:

What we have to look out for, in reading the philosophers of Western Europe, is the emotional or social determinant which makes their work what it is, and this is usually implicit rather than explicit. As I have attempted to suggest above, what will seem 'true' or 'explanatory' to any age or individual is what satisfies current demands and interests. What has this writer most urgently demanded from life? is the question we must constantly ask ourselves. The original impulse, towards, say 'materialism', or 'idealism', is usually something sublogical; not, that is, a 'conviction' resulting from an intellectual process, but a quite simple set of the whole being towards a particular way of life. (Willey, pp.93-94)

That this is true of Hobbes will be made obvious, since beyond others of his day Hobbes absorbed and was affected by the cultural and political atmosphere and made full use of the most modern methods to analyze it and to justify his opinions about it. In fact, Hobbes was more often than not explicit about the significant impact current events had on him and on his theories. To fully comprehend the motives behind Hobbes' theory of obligation and his method of presenting its conclusions, we need to understand something of the major historical events that affected his perceptions of philosophy and politics.

A complete historical sketch of Hobbes' time is unfeasible here, but certain significant events and ideas of overriding importance must be outlined if we are to place
Hobbes' character and theory into proper perspective. Immediately we must be struck by the pervasive chaos and hostility that characterize the period immediately preceding and including Hobbes' life. The period spanning the years 1520-1660 has been called the age of the Wars of Religion, though dynastic wars were no less frequent or brutal. In conjunction with the continual warfare there were many experiments in governmental restructuring. In England alone at least four different forms of government came and went in one forty-year period during Hobbes' life; and the general intellectual and cultural climate underwent equally numerous changes, though of a more positive and progressive character. Of this Ross, Schneider, and Waldman say

During Hobbes' life the theories of divine right, of feudal birthrights, and of hereditary sovereignty were becoming antiquated. With the rapid rise of commercial capital and power, the ideas of the landed aristocracy appeared artificial to the bourgeoisie. Status was giving way to contract; one's fixed position in society was being replaced by agreement and exchange of goods and services. The quarrels of rival lords were being subordinated to international rivalry. Within the churches there was an increasing emphasis among congregations and parishes on 'covenants', both 'under God' and in the communion of saints. (Ross, Schneider, and Waldman, p.4)

The spirit of the age, too, was moving away from the comforting spiritual institutions of the past. There was a general abandoning of strict adherence to all the beliefs of the medieval church and its other-worldly asceticism in favor of the more materialistic concerns of mechanical
science, business, and the accumulation of wealth (Ferguson, p.374). The concerns of this world were taking precedence over the concerns of the spiritual realm in the minds of the intellectuals and general population. This transition was made almost a necessity by the turmoil of the day and the destruction that impinged on the lives of almost every member of European society: to ignore the material world was becoming increasingly difficult. The effect on the average person is apparent in the description given by Rubin Gotesky:

Hobbes's description of himself as a child of fear applies just as aptly to his contemporaries. They, too, were children of fear, for they lived in the shadow of crumbling walls, in the midst of burning fields set ablaze by advancing armies or bands of brigands. They knew hunger, thirst, and famine. They saw the demolition of great cities, the devastation of entire countrysides, and the massacre of hundreds of thousands of burghers, artisans, peasants, women, and children. Their fathers had seen the destruction of a prosperous Germany, the crippling of France, the impoverishment of Italy, the partial ruination of England. They themselves bore upon their backs the frightful consequences of the Thirty Years' War in Germany and the two civil wars in England. During the period from 1525 to 1676...during a period...which encompasses practically the entire life of Hobbes and the sixty-three years before his birth--more than eighty major wars were fought, not counting the countless minor rebellions and battles between feudal lords, cities, and towns. The striking fact about these wars is this: most of them are civil wars. (Gotesky, p.405)

We should not, however, conclude that every aspect of life in Hobbes' day was a matter of nothing but staying alive in the midst of the rubble. The humanist movement burgeoned during the period prior to Hobbes' birth, with its emphasis on the human being and the study of and literal re-
interpretation of the Bible (Ferguson, p.376). This also lessened the interest in the dogma and the ritualistic aspects of medieval society. This is not to say there was a total abandonment of the concern with salvation or morality. In fact, these topics were receiving the attention of large numbers of the followers (and opponents) of John Calvin. Calvinism, given its doctrine of predestination, seemed to render morality moot, logically unnecessary, since one could do nothing to alter one's place in the afterlife. But nevertheless there remained a psychological need for strict morality: no serious, rational, virtuous person could see God's awesome power without being concerned with his/her personal salvation. Coupled to the idea that God's chosen were those most likely to live a thoroughly moral life, this made it prudent, if not necessary, to follow the dictates of the moral law (Ferguson, p.384). (Note that this doctrine is quite similar in tone and psychology to Hobbes' treatment of determinism and free will. Though we are determined, Hobbes said, we also psychologically need to feel as if we were free to choose a form of government.) Thus, concern with salvation remained a very real aspect of life despite the general ascension of materialism. One could, even should, be aware of both elements without contradiction.

In general, though, the tension between the chaos of the real world and the spiritual world brought about fundamental shifts in the world views of thinking people:
But if civil war was a daily calamity, an omnipresent and pandemic evil, then social cohesion, the life of peace, could not be looked upon, as it was throughout the Middle Ages, as a simple, self-evident fact requiring no explanation. It was no longer possible to assume naively that God had made man in his own image rather than that of Satan or Mephisto. The sins of Adam could no longer, as hitherto, be uncritically affirmed as the cause of strife. It was social peace, not war, which needed to be explained; and it was a principle of social peace, of 'civil life', which needed to be discovered. (Gotesky, p.407)

Nowhere was this more the case than in England. Following the last of the Tudors, Elizabeth I, the first of the Stuarts, James I, came to the throne in 1603. James brought with him from Scotland the legacy of a tradition of absolute rule and the ingenuity to cloak his absolutism in a constitutional legality. What followed might be termed legal absolutism; the English Parliament was weak, and James was able to exert the sort of authority he sought (Ferguson, p.432). There was a spirit in England, too, that seemed to need an absolutist government; after all, Henry VIII and Elizabeth had taken care of England in a truly paternalistic fashion, and amid the chaotic climate the people felt a genuine need for being taken care of. But this need was greatly lessened following the defeat of Spain in 1588, since there was no longer a common enemy against which monarch and people could unite. It was around this time that the English political atmosphere became more unstable and unpredictable. Civil wars and religious reforms were to become common during the period from 1605 to 1660.

By 1605, the third year of his reign, James I had
alienated both the Puritans and Catholics alike through a series of religious reforms; and the Gunpowder Plot of 1605, an assassination attempt linked to Catholic planners, expressed the Catholics' antipathy and resurrected strong anti-Catholic sentiments amongst the Protestants. Such feelings had deep roots, as Sir Leslie Stephen explains:

cause or the pretext of the warfare which culminated in the Spanish Armada. The patriotic Englishman regarded the pope as the instigator or accomplice of the assailants of our national independence...Throughout the seventeenth century the protestant Englishman suffered from 'papacy' on the brain,...[during this time]. James I himself and his most learned divines, such as Andrewes and Donne, were arguing against the great Catholic divines, Suarez and Bellarmine. The controversy turned especially upon the imposition of the oath renouncing the doctrine of the right of the pope to depose kings. To that right was opposed the 'divine right of kings': thereby being meant, not that kings had a 'right divine to govern wrong', but that the king's right was as directly derived from Heaven as the rights of the Church. (Stephen, pp.178-179)

Hobbes concerned himself with these questions, too, Stephen points out, even after the power of the Catholic Church to enforce its claims had all but dissolved. "Men are often most interested," Stephens notes, "in discussing the means of escaping the dangers of the day before yesterday" (p.179). Throughout Hobbes' life, in any case, these conditions certainly created political issues that seemed to turn on the interrelations of secular and spiritual authority; purely political questions became intricately intermingled with ecclesiastical questions, as is clear in James' own formula, 'no bishop, no king' (Stephen, p.179).

As a consequence there were disputes between
religious factions siding for and against royal authority, with the Church of England closely allied to the king; passive obedience became an "almost essential doctrine" for even liberal Anglican divines (Stephen, p.179). When Charles I came to power (in 1625) he continued to propound the doctrine of divine right, as well as the opposition to the Puritans; and he possessed little or no real understanding of the English people and their customs or traditions. It has been suggested that he may not have even realized they had any (Ferguson, p.436). During his reign there were wars with Spain and France, and the infamous dismissal of Parliament when it voiced opposition to his policies. In the political scramble surrounding Charles and Parliament, religious and political doctrines continued to be propounded, curiously intermixed, by almost every person and faction involved in the disputes.

There were those who proclaimed the British Constitution to be the highest example of perfect wisdom and urged the preservation of the ancient parliamentary traditions. There were those who dedicated to the decay of that tradition, hoping to replace it with a new State organization along European lines. There were those, like Hobbes, who condemned the parliamentarians and their principles because they saw the claims of the parliamentary party as an obstacle to the achievement of a vigorous national government (Stephen, p.180). Their hope was for a
monarch with full authority in matter of national policy and independent of the advice or consent of Parliament. For to allow Parliament any superintendent power would allow it to throw the whole system of authority for law and order out of gear. Though the parliamentarians eventually established the supremacy of Parliament, in the late 1500's and early 1600's this was almost unimaginable; for it to become reality would require its overcoming deep class antagonisms as well as religious and political differences.

The conflicts of the time produced a general paralysis of the State's central authority; as Stephen says:

The State, on one side, was struggling with the Church—whether the Church of Rome or the Church of Scotland—and, on the other hand, the supreme power was claimed for king alone, parliament alone, and for some combination of the two. (Stephen, pp. 179-180)

There simply was no way to exercise effective power under such conditions.

The theoretical problem of the political philosophers, as a result, was to determine the nature of sovereignty and to determine who should be the sovereign. These were Hobbes' issues, of course. They grew naturally out of the conflicts raging around him.

In 1640 the Long Parliament met, following a series of religious, political, and monetary crises; and Cromwell's seizure of power followed and continued for twenty years. This twenty-year period was again to be characterized by general chaos, warfare, and turmoil, including the wrenching
civil war of 1642-1646 that fixed Cromwell's place as ruler of England. Then, after Charles I was executed in 1649, Cromwell and England experimented with a variety of forms of government from 1649 to 1660, almost all but the last of the experiments being designed to allow Cromwell to retain his power. There was the Commonwealth, a council-governed republic; the Protectorate, with Cromwell as Lord Protector complete with a subservient Parliament; and finally a series of constitutional and political changes that ultimately reduced Cromwell to a ruler in name only (Ferguson, p.440). There was the continual series of wars running concurrently with these events, of course: rebellions in Ireland and Scotland and wars with the Netherlands and Spain. The period of Cromwell's supremacy ended with his death in 1658 and the Stuart Restoration of 1660.

The first of the "new restoration" monarchs, and the last of importance during Hobbes' life, was Charles II. Like his two predecessors, he believed in the divine right of kings; but he was also more discrete and conciliatory to Parliament. Having been proclaimed king "by God's grace," Charles nevertheless agreed to limit his power and to summon Parliament regularly. His limited powers of taxation and religious reform required parliamentary approval before being implemented. Underneath all this, too, was his own Catholicism and his desire to restore England to the true faith; but this remained a secret, unspoken wish that
Charles held on to but took no overt steps to enact. Indeed, during the first ten years of his reign he had to deal with a loyal, but headstrong "Cavalier" Parliament dominated by country gentlemen and the supporters of Anglicanism. To undertake a Catholic revival at the time was simply out of the question. In fact, Parliament asserted its power and restored the Church of England to its full privileges, including its power to punish dissent. A series of legislative acts during 1661-1664 put the Anglicans firmly in control of the state machinery of repression, used now for new persecution of dissenters and Catholics.

Charles was firmly opposed to the persecutions, eventually issuing pardons to dissenters and Catholics alike in 1670. This did nothing, however, to lessen the anti-Catholic paranoia, manifested by continual fear of "popish" plots, that ebbed and flowed but never subsided during the whole of Charles' reign until his death in 1685, six years after Hobbes' death. The time was filled with anti-Catholicism and various acts, legislative and otherwise, that fanned the flames of the negative sentiment even after 1685. In sum, Hobbes lived through politically and religiously turbulent times, times that saw little of peace and much of war and death.

In the intellectual/cultural world, where the same issues burned on a more theoretical level, the changes that took place proved to be more constructive, even though those
who were responsible for them were sometimes forced to acknowledge serious limits in the pace of progress because of the political and religious views of the time (e.g. Galileo). From our present perspective, however, we can surely say that the arts, sciences, and philosophy of the period made steady and sometimes rapid progress.

Though there was a general decline of Humanism immediately prior to Hobbes' birth, the study of the classics that the humanist movement initiated remained profoundly influential throughout Hobbes' lifetime (as is evident in Hobbes' own training (recall Strauss' outlined of it). The intellectual curriculum was based on the classic texts, as was the Scientific Revolution itself, which traced its roots back to Greek mathematics and science. Scholasticism, which had prospered under the influence and study of the Greek masters in the 1200's, began to decline in the fourteenth century. (Ferguson, p.474). It was replaced by the restoration of classical humanism that was, in turn, in decline by the end of the 1500's. But the humanists had, sometimes even inadvertently, fostered the cause of science because of their interest in the documents of antiquity, which included all the works of the ancient sciences that could be found. The science of Hobbes' time, then, rested on a firm classical heritage though it had also gone beyond it in many ways.

The sciences of Hobbes' age had been affected by the
work of the Renaissance artists, engineers, and architects who conducted large numbers of practical experiments in the course of solving their professional problems. Optics, map-making, linear perspective, mathematics, and other fields were advanced or begun under the influence of this eclectic band of intellectuals and practitioners. The growth and spread of knowledge had accelerated exponentially due to the invention and use of the printing press; texts of all sorts—art, science, philosophy, and the classics—could be printed cheaply, uniformly, and most important, quickly. Educational opportunities, thus, spread to the laymen, most of whom previously could not afford an education. Information and the exchange of ideas grew never before, and bookmakers and pamphleteers prospered. Naturally the debate raging in the political arena carried over into the intellectual sphere and engaged the minds of the philosophers and theologians, Hobbes included.

With the increasing availability of texts and the attendant questioning of the ideas contained in them, Aristotle's authority at its height during the Scholastic period was questioned and there ensued a general revolt against the tenets of "The Philosopher". The thinkers of the new day had come to consider matter as purely material, devoid of abstract essences and potentialities; and the rejection of medieval theology and its Aristotelian underpinnings was widespread (Ferguson, pp.474-475). At the
same time there was rapid growth in mathematics and its impact on other sciences. Mathematics itself progressed through arithmetic and geometry, to algebra, trigonometry, decimals, logarithms, the calculus of probabilities, and analytic geometry. The effects of these developments in mathematics reached into astronomy and physics almost immediately. The Copernican system challenged the older Ptolemaic notions in theory, while Galileo's telescope revealed concrete evidence for the Copernican account. This, as we know, eventually led to Galileo's "persecution" and the suppression of his works. Nonetheless, Galileo remained a seminal figure in physics, having devised a methodology that joined experimentation with mental analysis to make valid generalizations from both experimental and theoretical beginnings. This, of course, was the resoluto-composite method that so influenced Hobbes (see Chapter I) and about which I will have more to say in the upcoming sections. Galileo's views renewed the secular/spiritual debate, which was to be mirrored in the political debate once again.

Thus, in both the political and intellectual worlds a major topic of debate was between secular and various distinct ecclesiastical doctrines. Gotesky describes the original ecclesiastical doctrine: "The ecclesiastical doctrine, a profound adaptation of the Greek and Roman conception of natural law to the requirements of feudal
society, was clearly thought out; and it still had tradition and authority behind it" (Gotesky, p.408). In the political realm it held that God had crated human beings as social, revealed the rules of life through the teachings of Jesus and the Ten Commandments--the divine laws--and provided reason to be used to discover and understand the rules for a peaceful life (Gotesky, p.408). But an alternative doctrine began as alternative, anti-ecclesiastical conclusions were drawn from the same starting point in divine law. This doctrine was essentially that the church was responsible for the corrupt social condition of humankind because it was supposedly the guardian of that spirit of divine law on earth, but had failed, and attempts to reform the church deom within had resulted in savage resistance, civil war, devastation, and massacres like that of St. Bartholomew's Day (Gotesky, p.410).

On the other side, a growing secular doctrine filled a void created for many by a loss of faith in the spiritual dogmas. It also offered a solution to the political unrest that made social life chaotic. As a practical matter the secular doctrine was a methodology, rather than, as yet, an answer to any particular questions. Its basic foundation was the belief that historical fact should form the framework of philosophy and science (Gotesky, p.411). What resulted when this method was applied was the rise of naturalism in political theory and the turn to a study of
the actual social conditions. This is not to say that there were no limitations to the naturalistic historical methodology, as Hobbes himself was to find out; but its development did mark a radical change in the intellectual world-views of the day.

But of course it would not do to imply that the secular doctrine's supremacy was recognized as fact or that the original ecclesiastical doctrine or its critique had no influence whatsoever. This was by no means the case. Religion and religious doctrine was enormously influential and remained so long after this period, as Willey clearly notes:

It was one of the characteristics of the seventeenth century that no English writer of the time, whatever his philosophical views might be, could explicitly abandon the assumption that the universe rested upon a basis of divine meaning. Further, all thinkers of that century, with but one or two exceptions, assumed the truth in some sense of the specifically Christian doctrines, and the supernatural status of the Bible (Willey, p.111).

In conclusion, then, we may say that both social/political life and intellectual development during the historical period encompassing Hobbes' life were in the throes of conflict, turmoil, and continual change. That Hobbes' thoughts and opinions were formulated in reaction to this tumultuous atmosphere is hardly surprising. How his work was influenced by these factors will be explicated in subsequent sections of this chapter. But first we need to take a look at Hobbes' own personality and character. For
not only will the historical context of his theorizing be important to fixing the nature of his frameworks of justification but so will his own personal intentions, which we can understand best against the background of his personal history. That is, we must get a feel for the man in order to understand the interpretive thesis proposed here about his work. That thesis rests, at least partially, on important beliefs about Hobbes' personal motives and aims when he was constructing his theory (or theories) or obligation.

2. Hobbes' Personal History

In many ways Hobbes went through the same turmoil and conflicts as his society. He was a man caught up in the issues and passions of the social, political, philosophical, and religious debates flaming around him and, indeed, took an active role in many of them. He was outspoken on political issues especially, though hardly less so on the topic of religion, particularly on what we would today call 'organized religion'. While a staunch royalist and believer in absolute monarchy, he aroused the ire of the royalists of his day by offering a defense of monarchy not based on Divine right. Meanwhile, the antiroyalists were already alienated by his commitment to absolutism; and it mattered not at all that he rejected Divine right theories. On
purely philosophical topics he was no less controversial, as
the free will-determinism debate with Bramhall shows.
Hobbes' arguments for determinism led Bramhall to brand him
an atheist and thereby an enemy of the state. At the same
time, he was extremely progressive in his views about
science and scientific methodology. Whether arguing a
progressive or reactionary cause, however, he was known for
his zeal and aggressiveness. The controversy in which he
was embroiled, the personal vilification, and the necessity
of a sort of self-exile for Hobbes seemed to mirror the
turmoil of the larger world in which he lived.

What might we expect the character traits of such a
man to be? Whatever our answer, we are likely to find that
Hobbes possessed some traits we expected and others that we
did not. He was indeed an ambitious, proud, self-
congratulatory, and assertive person, especially when his
opinions were involved or questioned. That he had a high
opinion of his ability and influence is not surprising for
someone so willing to engage in heated debates with figures
as renowned as Descartes' or with those of superior training
in specific fields. For example, his debates with various
geometrical and mathematicians show him unable to perceive
the faults of his own proofs and the superiority of theirs.
On the other hand we might be surprised to learn that Hobbes
was as pleasant and sanguinary a person, and as timid,
fearful, and concerned for his own personal safety in the
midst of turmoil as any ordinary person would be. This does not square so well with the side of his character that put him out in the forefront of raging, dangerous controversies; yet it is nonetheless the case (Rogow, p.12). In fact, Hobbes surely took from his own introspective analysis his view that everyone experiences similar timidity, fear, and at the same time ambition. For him these were the basic components of human nature, along with greed, envy, and pride, whose evils could only be avoided in an all-powerful state (Rogow, p.12).

Stephen characterizes Hobbes as logical but also one-sided:

Of course, like most men in whom the logical faculty is predominant, he was splendidly one-sided. When things seemed clear to him, he could not understand that any difficulty existed for any one... That difficulties did in fact exist is plain enough to his readers, if only from the curious devices by which he is sometimes driven to meet them. But though to others he may appear to be evading the point, or adopting inconsistent solutions, to himself he always seems to be following the straightforward path of inexorable logic. (Stephen, p.71)

In intellectual matters Hobbes was the sort of thinker who did not work except at the highest level of concentration. Fitting his perceptions to his theories required the marshalling of his whole personality before he considered himself able to think clearly. He engaged all of himself in the process of writing philosophy, which he saw not as an affair of quick wits, but the use and focusing of one's entire mind (James, p.10). Rogow claims that, by
temperament and habits of mind, Hobbes preferred intellectual thought-experiments and deductive reasoning to empirical observation or trial and error experimentation; and he was not adept at detailed mathematical calculation either (p.101).

This is not out of line with the fact that, though Hobbes generally agreed with Bacon, he never became a disciple of Bacon's experimental method, choosing instead the resoluto-compositive approach of Galileo. Hobbes also seems to have benefitted, however late in life, from the acquired orderliness of thought required by his love affair with geometry, though he never really became a first-rate geometrician despite the fact that he fancied himself as one. (His repeated claims to have squared the circle were repeatedly demonstrated to be false. But where he should have been embarrassed by the failures, Hobbes concluded that his critics had erred and his calculations were so far superior to theirs that they could not see the plain truth in front of them.)

Rogow hypothesizes "that one root of Hobbes's interest in mathematics was a need, traceable to the insecurities and uncertainties of his childhood, to establish a scientific politics of authority and stability" (Rogow, p.102). His interests in order, security, authority, and stability would further account for his determination to prove his political principles with
certainty and preserve them from the destructive ravings of the various opposing factions of the time.

That Hobbes was trained in Aristotle's methods and philosophy and in the classic at Oxford was noted, though perhaps overemphasized, by Strauss and is simply a matter of record. Rogow describes the climate and course of study at Oxford during Hobbes' stay:

At Oxford there were a few courses in mathematics, astronomy, geography, and 'Physics'—geometry, including Euclid, was taught at Brasenose College, and French and Italian may also have been taught—but they were elementary in nature, and most students in the arts curriculum, including Hobbes, graduated knowing little or nothing about these subjects. In logic, philosophy, and other courses, the supreme source of wisdom was Aristotle and his interpreters; indeed, as late as 1636, 'the Laudian statues of Oxford required that determining bachelors of arts argue their propositions in logic, rhetoric, politics, and moral philosophy according to the teachings of Aristotle, whose authority is paramount.' Where Aristotle had been silent, the students turned to Plato, Ptolemy, Cicero, Strabo, and other luminaries of the Greek and Roman world. (Rogow, p.49)

Hobbes, thus, had been exposed to the traditions and methods of the classics and the schoolmen, although he was not favorably disposed toward them, nor fully able to grasp the deficiencies of the scholastic doctrines, so that, as Robertson says, we should not conclude he had turned away from the traditional doctrine with a conscious purpose in mind—it seems more an emotional recoiling from everything traditionally associated with Rome and the Papacy of the Middle Ages (Robertson, pp.4, 8-9). Rather, Hobbes came to see the attack by his contemporaries on every philosophical
doctrine he had learned at the university as fully justified, including the accompanying revival of interest in nature and the development of new sciences or natural philosophies (Robertson, pp.14-15).

Hobbes' association with Bacon strengthened his anti-scholasticism and fueled his desires for scientific knowledge and a new secular synthesis (Gooch, pp.4-5). What Bacon and Hobbes shared should not be overemphasized, nor disregarded given Hobbes' own preference for the deductive method rather than Bacon's experimental induction. Peters stresses two significant effects of Hobbes' acquaintance with Bacon's *Novum Organum* of 1620:

The book, too, would enable him to improve his newly found paradise by using Nature's secrets for his own ends...knowledge meant power--power to use Nature for human purposes. This conviction, shared by so many of the new men of the seventeenth century and evidence by the rapid developments of experimentation and technology, is one of the keys to understanding Hobbes' thought. Like Bacon, he was to coin some of his most pungent epigrams for the discomfiture of the Aristotelians; like Bacon, he replaced reverence for tradition by belief in method, albeit a different method; and, like Bacon, he believed that knowledge was power. His hope was to devise a civil philosophy which would provide a rational ground-plan for the reconstruction of civil society by those who could penetrate the secrets of human nature.

There is, too, another significant similarity...Both men used language to say things clearly, pungently, and in order to convert. ...Hobbes thought that society could almost be saved by definitions and tracked down the various types of ambiguity and vacuousness in scholastic terminology which he regarded as potential sources of danger to the peace. (Peters, pp.16-17)

Other similarities include a dislike of theological arguments, the role of religion in government, a claimed
avoidance of the books of others, the belief that nature was more or less mechanical, and their dismissal of final causes (Rogow, pp.65-66). But despite this all of Hobbes' biographers stress that Hobbes cannot be regarded as Bacon's disciple, nor can we say he had any enthusiasm for Bacon's general aims or methods (see Rogow, pp.66-67; Stephen, p.13; Gooch, p.5; Robertson, pp.19-20; Peters, p.16). Surely, though, Hobbes' own beliefs were strengthened by the agreements with Bacon, and though their methods varied each was profoundly impressed by the new science.

His belief that he was a first-rate thinker carried over into his assertions about the superiority of his analysis of sound government. After asserting that Aristotle's knowledge of government was unsurpassed, Hobbes observed that contemporary political theorists seemed to believe that they had superior knowledge though, in fact, they had little study or recourse beyond natural wit. Hobbes labelled these errant theorists 'dogmatici' and contrasted them to the 'mathematici' who knew figures, numbers, and proportions and from whose studies came all the advances in the arts and sciences, astronomy, geometry, geography, and politics, which were the result of their scrupulous reasoning, starting from the most evident and "lowly" principles. "Included in this group, of course, was Hobbes himself" (Rogow, p.128). In fact Hobbes' overinflated sense of his own importance prompted his flight
from England prior to the first deposition of the Stuarts. Hobbes fled believing that the 'rebels' would come after him due to his opinions (from *The Elements of Law*), even though it seems they had little knowledge of his books or opinions at the time. But, as Peters says, "Hobbes' fear was that of a self-made man whose feeling of insecurity and desire for esteem expressed itself in the flattering delusion that men were taking note of him and planning his decease; it was not an unreasoning panic" (Peters, p.26).

Hobbes' father was a failed clergyman, violent and often embroiled in religious controversies, both of which Hobbes repeatedly warns against and abhorred. His complex views on religion seem hardly surprising against this background—that he sees religion more in terms of a problem than a solution is more understandable once we consider his father's failures, controversies, and example. His warnings against religious conflict, the rule of clerics, his ambivalence toward organized religion, and perhaps his reputation for atheism might be traced back to his youth (Rogow, p.44). In addition, Hobbes' hometown of Malmesbury was a place where limited or constitutional monarchy was openly discussed; we might be tempted to see much of Hobbes' later religious and political theories as a psychological repudiation of Malmesbury and the disagreeable associations it may have had for him (Rogow, p.44).

Hobbes also had the tendency to carry grudges
against those who had "wronged" him. Rogow points out that Hobbes, when interpreting Scripture in ways contrary to his adversaries, could not just stop there—he had "scores to settle dating back to Malmesbury and Oxford." Consequently _Leviathan_, part IV, contains references to the pope as the "King of the Fairies" or the "Ghost of the Roman Empire", the ecclesiastics being the "Fairies", and their followers are called "Elves" who are sent out to pinch the sovereign by preaching sedition (Rogow, p.164). How well does this fit the shy, fearful, and timid side of Hobbes? Imperfectly, at best, unless as Peters says, this is a manifestation of insecurity, expressing itself in an angry, aggressive style of stating a life-long fear and hatred of religious organizations that had usurped governmental authority and caused civil wars (Peters, pp.28-29).

Hobbes also saw himself as an important teacher, and looked on his writings as lessons for princes and for the common people to study as well. He had "always for his last and highest aim to become a political teacher, he could not shut his eyes to the need, growing every day more pressing, that a teacher should appear" (Robertson, pp.49-50). This desire is a very important aspect of Hobbes' self-perception and an important contextual element for my interpretation of his theory (or theories) of obligation. For Hobbes was doing more than just developing theories; his aim was to instruct, to affect actions, to alter behavior.
Finally we can see Hobbes as a pragmatic in his attitudes toward actual monarchs and changes in political power. He sees religious practices or beliefs, i.e. of organized religion, as being subordinate to the government, to the extent of hiding that, if a Catholic were king, then the subjects should embrace "Romish idolatry", if a Jew were general of an army in which Hobbes served, he would have had himself circumcised if so ordered, and if a Turk were ruler, he would have embraced Mecca, and so on (Rogow, p.238).

That the sovereign should have this power Hobbes readily concedes, and that the subject should obey is simply a matter of practicality. The pragmatism has a theoretical side as well, in so far as once a sovereign no longer has the power to enforce particular practices or protect the subject, then the subject may regard the ruler as no ruler at all. That is, sovereignty is grounded not just by custom, law, or tradition, but by fact as well (Rogow, pp.171-172). Hobbes' critic, Clarendon, even suggested that Hobbes had added the sections on sovereignty by conquest to his work in order to give favor to Cromwell, a purely pragmatic addition if Clarendon is correct (although Hobbes denied having done this since he had published Leviathan prior to Cromwell's becoming sovereign in 1653). In any case it seems clear that Hobbes was pragmatic enough not to be particular about whose support he obtained, so long as he was supported or aided in realizing his long-cherished goal
of teaching the prince and the people and was sheltered by those in power, no matter how reckless or disgraceful they might be (Robertson, pp.190-191).

We see, then, that Hobbes was not a simple character. But through all of the complexity of the man, there is still a "certain logical consistency" that Hobbes claimed for himself. I believe that a good deal of the seeming inconsistency and contradictoriness of the man and his work is a function of the historical period in which Hobbes lived. For we have seen that political changes, social changes, and religious changes were coming fast and furious. We have seen that scholasticism was still the order of the day in the schools, that classicism was still revered, but that the new sciences and methodologies were also being established, developed, and used to question every other tradition as well. Given Hobbes' pragmatic bent (almost necessary as a defense against the time itself), it is not unlikely that he would weigh each disparate influence on him to see what value each viewpoint might have in relation to his own purposes. It does not seem unnatural, given the times and the man, that Hobbes would argue in more than one way for the same conclusions, especially if he judged the conclusions to be of the highest importance, and if he saw himself as a teacher trying to educate many different kinds of students about the true and correct form of government in the hope of getting them to then act
according to his reasoning. The use of multiple approaches in the classroom is a common enough practice. One does not need to embrace scholasticism to be aware that there are those who do embrace it and who are going to be best convinced by arguments in the scholastic manner or based in the scholastic tradition. The same would be true of someone teaching students convinced of the methods of the new science or students taking other points of view. I shall argue shortly that Hobbes did in fact see this and did indeed tailor his arguments accordingly. The point here is simply to show that, given the multiple influences on Hobbes' thoughts throughout his youth and early training and given the character of the world he lived in, it is plausible that the complexity of his work and the diversity of positions and arguments attributed to him could be traced back to precisely these factors.

The effect of all these factors was to generate in Hobbes the idea of teaching his countrymen the rudiments of a sound society, using the new principles of demonstration, the aim being to accomplish a great political gesture or action in the world (Wolin, p.8). He hoped to have his doctrine taught and disseminated by the universities, and have it spread until all ranks of the populace would understand their duty, establishing peace, security, and 'commodious living' (Watkins, p.17). The aim of establishing an absolutist monarchy and of demonstrating the
evils of democratic principles, including an exhibition of his intolerance of even moderate challenges to authority and his pessimistic view of human nature, appears already in Hobbes' treatment of Thucydides, well before 1629. At this time, however, his aim had not been joined to a specific method of demonstration (Rogow, p.83, 91). In 1634, while in Paris, Hobbes became persuaded that all behavior was caused by types or varieties of motion, and that the key to understanding actions correctly would be connected to the analysis of motion (Rogow, p.103; Robertson, p.33). (Note how this seems to contradict Strauss's claims that Hobbes had no inkling of the mechanical thesis or method prior to 1639.)

Hobbes' aim in all this is derived from his preoccupation with peace and how best to establish it. With the discovery of the methods of the new science of motion, Hobbes was finally able to attempt a demonstration of his belief that the best way to secure peace was to establish an anti-democratic, absolute monarchy. It is this overriding aim that seems to govern all of Hobbes' political writings, regardless of which of the interpretive perspectives we adopt. As Peters says

In brief, Hobbes believed that the only hope for the permanent preservation of peace was an absolute sovereign, whose commands were laws enforced by judges, bishops, and the military...Obedience to such a sovereign was always obligatory unless he should prove an ineffective autocrat. This was the geometer's panacea for peace, the clear-cut, rational construction of a ruthless theoretician who thought the definitions
and demonstrations could reveal solutions to problems which had blunted the wits and swords of practical men...

It seems probable that Hobbes wrote *Leviathan* much more in order to instruct his countrymen how best to reconstruct English civil society so that it was a fit place for sensible people like himself... (Peters, pp.33-35)

Peace and political order, then, is Hobbes' major interest; monarchy is the instrumental good securing this intrinsic good. More specifically, Watkins describes Hobbes' aims as being: "(1)...[to] show the need for a political sovereign, undivided and unrestricted, obedience to whom is the citizen's overriding duty. (2)...[in order to] clinch this he should show that it is impossible to have a duty to disobey one's sovereign. (3)...[and then to] demonstrate all this" (Watkins, p.16). His method Watkins likens to that of a chess instructor who does not try to instil in the students' minds alien material since they already possess the necessary raw materials, but rather, appeals to what they already know if only their attention can be drawn to it (Watkins, p.79). Thus, once more we see Hobbes presented as a teacher with a guiding aim, willing to instruct his pupils in a manner suited to their present knowledge and convictions in whatever way will work best. Although it was the deductive method that Hobbes was initially enamoured with, once he had settled on a method, still we should not conclude either that the goals of the task or the sole method are deductive or scientific. The goals of Hobbes' work are traceable to his background, while
his role as teacher would require the pragmatic adjustment of the teaching style from pupil to pupil, audience to audience. Peters, who rightly sees Hobbes' relation to history as a factor in Hobbes' approach to the task of instructing mankind, says of Hobbes' concept of the historian's job: "The historian, while remaining truthful, should select and record events which seem most significant for instructing mankind" (Peters, p.19). Thus, there was a fixed aim and a preferred method, although the method is ultimately viewed pragmatically and is adjusted to the audience in whatever way is best to accomplish the aim, including a selectivity in exactly what subjects or facts to present and how to present them.

The most important biographical fact for interpreting Hobbes' theory (or theories) of obligation here is that this single aim is consistently Hobbes' central aim throughout all his political work:

...his paramount interest was in establishing absolute sovereignty, preferably through the institution of absolute monarchy, as the only alternative to chronic civil disorder, and in defending sovereign power against any and all challenges based on appeals to religion, natural law or natural rights, the social contract, or any other body of principles that was inimical to, or that could be interpreted by 'dogmatici' and 'orators' as inimical to, sovereign power. (Rogow, p.132)

The fidelity Hobbes showed toward this goal seemed to remain regardless of how it affected the particular governments that came to power. That is, Hobbes did not seem to try to fit his aims or beliefs to what would be most
politically advantageous to himself, though he did show concern to keep on the right side of the reigning powers. His views, though, were such that the parliamentarians or anti-monarchists would see him as a dangerous reactionary, while his anti-divine right stance would offend royal fundamentalists. His concern for peace was overriding, and "his essential message, that any government was better than no government, was at once too conservative for social-contract theorists and too radical for those who insisted the monarch held his appointment from God" (Rogow, p.139).

But Hobbes thought the collapse of government would be the greatest calamity that could befall humankind and that peace is the most important goal. Given this belief, he simply did what he judged necessary to establish and secure its realization. It is for this reason that he was willing to tailor his arguments to his audience and to risk offending parties in or out of power by stating the precise nature of the means best able to guarantee the goal, absolute, contractual monarchy.

To summarize, we can say that Hobbes was both timid (in his life) and bold (in his theories and beliefs), a complex man whose background and personal experience led him to believe in the overriding importance of peace. In addition, he wanted to be seen as a great philosopher and teacher who would guide his nation out of the political turmoil it was in by teaching the people the correct path to
peace. In this task he was enamored of the resolute-deductive methods of Galileo, but also pragmatic enough, I believe, to see that it had limits as a tool for instruction and so the teaching needed to be adapted to the knowledge and character of the audience addressed. Such a man, living in a chaotic historical period and subject to multiple intellectual currents, old and new, might very likely employ different approaches, or frameworks of justification, to demonstrate the necessity of a view of absolute monarchy that he hoped would effect a real change in the political conditions around him. Each of these approaches involves a distinctive account of obligation, namely the three kinds of accounts of obligation that have already been examined in detail. The next sections of this chapter will focus on the primary texts of Hobbes and will explicate the nature of each of these approaches, showing that each of the three was in fact something Hobbes himself had in mind to say, to a particular audience in each case.

C. THE THREE INTERPRETATIONS AS COEXISTENT

1. Hobbes' Aims and Intentions as Rhetorical

It would be difficult to deny that Hobbes was affected by his awareness of the multitude of influences on his audience. He was certainly concerned with rebutting the
intolerable effects of organized religion of the transitional Scholasticism, while at the same time being cognizant of the fact that each had set standards of thought, evidence, and justification to which large numbers of people still adhered. To reach this segment of his audience would require both tact and arguments that differed significantly from those he could offer to that portion of his audience versed, like himself, in the language and methods of Galilean science. Another set of arguments might be required to convince those who believed in individualism, that individual rights were the central elements of any defensible political theory. The question for Hobbes was how to approach such a diverse audience, how to lead them to accept his conclusions. Hobbes' answer was to use a rhetorical method which was consistent with different frameworks of justification. But his answer, when misunderstood or left unnoticed, creates the interpretive problems we have already outlined.

To complicate matters, Hobbes did not stress his use of a rhetorical method as clearly as nor with a fervor equal to that with which he stressed his geometric or scientific methodology (although, as we will see, such an emphasis is perfectly consistent with his rhetorical method). This led to a particular monistic view of Hobbes' work as egoistic/mechanistic and the subsequent knot in our thinking about Hobbes' theory of obligation. Kahn, a careful student
of Hobbes' rhetorical method, expresses the problem well:

    The majority of Hobbes's critics, at least in the twentieth century, have persisted in reading the Leviathan primarily as a logical argument. Two points need to be made about this approach. The first is that this reading seems to correspond, at least in part, to Hobbes's stated intention in the Leviathan, for...while rhetoric and logic were not as strictly separate in Hobbes's time as in our own, it is also clear that Hobbes wants to subordinate a rhetoric of probability and passion to a logic of certainty and reason. On the other hand, such a view of the Leviathan cannot come to terms with—and thus inevitably ignores—Hobbes's remarks about rhetoric and sovereignty; and his use of irony, paradox, contradiction, argument in ultramque partem. What these critics fail to see is that rhetoric can be used for the purposes of ideological closure as well as disclosure: that is, to support the claims of logic and theoretical reason as well as to undermine these claims. Moreover, it can create the fiction of these claims, and this is what Hobbes does in the Leviathan. Indeed, so effective is he in constructing his logical model of the argument that most readers have accepted it at face value. In an important sense, these rhetorically naive readers are the ideal subjects of the Hobbesian commonwealth: having been fully persuaded by Hobbes's logical model of state, they are incapable of seeing the contribution of rhetoric to his argument. They are the ones, in short, on whom Hobbes's rhetorical strategies have had the greatest effect. (Kahn, pp.157-158)

My proposal here is that this problem is not restricted to a view of Leviathan, but extends to the entire body of Hobbes' political writings; for the intention and structure of all of them are quite similar.

Once we recognize that Hobbes' method is rhetorical (the meaning of rhetorical will be discussed shortly) and not purely logical or scientific in the sense of Galilean deduction, we are on our way to untangling the knot in our understanding of Hobbes' theory of obligation. We must not be misled by the apparent connections between Hobbes'
various frameworks into believing that there must be a single framework or argument operative. Here we must observe Wittgenstein's caution against being fooled by the surface grammar or superficial appearance of the various uses of language. Though the terms of the different approaches are similar, they function in different contexts. In this way, for example, we should not assume that a term like 'natural law' means the same thing throughout Hobbes' work. If we fall prey to this "monistic illusion," Hobbes will appear contradictory or inconsistent in his theories. But if we learn the nature of his rhetorical approach, we can reconcile the apparent inconsistencies. As Wittgenstein says, "Our mental cramp is loosened when we are shown the notations which fulfil these needs" (BB, p.59). Hobbes' needs or intentions are not just dictated by logic but are also rhetorical: i.e. they are dictated by his desire to persuade or convince different audiences to accept his conclusion that everyone should obey the sovereign in order to secure lasting peace and their own safety.

"Describing an intention means describing what went on from a particular point of view, with a particular purpose", Wittgenstein explains (Z, 23). In the case of Hobbes, as we have seen, his overall purpose is that of establishing the necessity of obedience, of the duty of obligation to the sovereign. In addition, we have seen three different interpretations of how he went about doing
this. But we cannot conclude that in pursuit of his single goal Hobbes would necessarily have used only a single one of these three methods. Given the multiple influences in his life and the chaotic political events he witnessed, it is not unreasonable to imagine Hobbes acquiring a sense of urgency that would push him to use whatever means would best convince his readers to adopt the ways of peace. As Willis Glover observes,

Hobbes wrote his political philosophy with practical intent. He tells us himself that the threat of civil war in England caused him to publish De Cive before the two sections of his projected comprehensive philosophy that logically preceded it" (Glover, p.149).

Here we should heed Hobbes' own warning:

...it is not the bare words, but the scope of the writer, that giveth the true light, by which any writing is to be interpreted; and they that insist upon single texts, without considering the main design, can derive nothing from them clearly. (E.W. III, 436)

I will argue that Hobbes' goal is to convince and his design, or method, is rhetorical. The scope of Hobbes' training included large doses of rhetoric and there is no indication that he ever rejected the usefulness of even Aristotle's rhetorical methods. Indeed, his own Rhetoric is largely a condensed and amended translation, or brief, of Aristotle's Rhetoric. Rather, there is solid evidence that he held rhetoric in high esteem all his life. Further, the rhetorical method, as practiced during Hobbes' time, is perfectly suited to the job of convincing divergent audiences of a single conclusion, as well as being
consistent with the use of a logical methodology as a part of it. Before examining this method it is important to show that Hobbes perceived himself to be addressing different audiences with the intent to persuade them rather than simply establishing his conclusions by a monistic logical or philosophical method. We have already seen that his single overriding conclusion is that people own obedience to the sovereign.

Hobbes say his task as describing "the duties of men: first, as men; then as subjects; lastly as Christians" (E.W. II, ix). That he also saw himself as a teacher has been shown and as such he believed he could "train, educate, and discipline people into good citizens" (Gert, p.519). But the task was complicated by the fact that different people are moved to action by different causes and the fact that different people perceive the same things in different ways. There will be, then, no end to disagreements until Hobbes can teach them that it is each person's duty to submit to a sovereign power who will settle such disputes and have the power to enforce those settlements:

For in the differences of private men to declare what is equity, what is justice, and what is moral virtue, and to make them binding, there is need of the ordinances of sovereign power, and punishments to be ordained for such as shall break them. (Lev., 212)

He would have to produce a book that could be read by all segments of his audience and show to each of them the "true and only way of lasting civil peace, by constituting
the secular power absolute over every other in all departments of the active life of men" (Robertson, p.61). This book was the Leviathan, but as Robertson and others note, it is a direct outcome of the influences of Hobbes' earlier works and is in no major way different from them in either its methods or conclusions, so that we can view all of Hobbes' works as sharing the method and intent of Leviathan. Though interpreters such as Strauss perceive significant differences between De Cive and Leviathan, this generally seems to be a result of their own point of view rather than of an objective reading of Hobbes. That is, especially for Strauss, this claim seems to rest on interpretive errors such as 'the early works syndrome' or 'great works syndrome', or more generally, as a result of adopting a monistic framework which requires seeing Leviathan as THE statement of Hobbes' political theory. We have argued against these approaches and shown that Hobbes' overriding thesis remained the same throughout his life and works, though the presentation may vary. It is important, in order to avoid mistaken interpretations here, not to confuse the theory with the presentation.

Hobbes' goal is thus to show his audience the necessity of obedience to the sovereign but to do this in such a way as to achieve a practical effect, which political philosophy had been unable to do in Hobbes' time (Wolin, p.13). The joining of the philosophic goal, i.e. to
demonstrate the necessity of obedience to the sovereign, to the practical intention of actually doing something yields Hobbes' belief that he must address his readers in a way that will do both at once. That is, he must convince them to act upon his conclusions and to do so effectively; this, he saw, requires a rhetorical approach:

Like Aristotle's political orator, Hobbes realizes that 'counsel can only be given on matters about which people deliberate; matters, namely, that ultimately depend on ourselves, and which we have it in our power to set going'. So, 'in this time, that men call not only for Peace, but also for Truth,' Hobbes 'offers such Doctrines as (he)...think(s) True, and that manifestly tend to Peace and Loyalty, to the consideration of those that are yet in deliberation' (E.W., III, 726). He does not offer the truth, but what he thinks true. Yet, as with the humanist proponents of the vita activa who preceded him, Hobbes hopes not simply to prove a point, but to persuade his readers to prudent action (E.W. III, 408). He differs from the humanists only in hoping to do so more effectively in the person of a political scientist. (Kahn, p.177).

Hobbes considered himself to be a counselor to his readers rather than as the possessor of absolute truth who is handing it down to them in absolute form. This is, at least, the position he adopts throughout his writings even if he were personally inclined to believe his conclusion to be absolutely true. As a counselor Hobbes presents his beliefs in a manner consistent with his conception of a counselor's job, that is, in the persuasive form called 'exhortation':

EXHORTATION and DEHORTATION is counsel accompanied with signs in him that gives it of vehement desire to have it followed; or to say it more briefly, counsel vehemently pressed. For he that exhorts does not deduce the consequences of what he advises to be
done and tie himself therein to the rigor of true reasoning, but encourages him he counsels to action; as he that dehorts, deters him from it. And, therefore, they have in their speeches a regard to the common passions and opinions of men deducing their reasons, and make use of similitudes, metaphors, examples, and other tools of oratory to persuade their hearers of the utility, honor, or justice of following their advice.

From whence may be inferred, first, that exhortation and dehortation is directed to the good of him that gives the counsel, not of him that asks it, which is contrary to the duty of a counselor, who, by the definition of counsel, ought to regard not his own benefit but his whom he advises...

Secondly, that the use of exhortation and dehortation lies only where a man is to speak to a multitude; because when the speech is addressed to one, he may interrupt him and examine his reasons more rigorously than can be done in a multitude, which are too many to enter into dispute and dialogue with him that speaks indifferently to them all at once. (E.W. III, 242-243)

The good that Hobbes hopes to exhort his readers to accept is an abandoning or war for peace through the institute of the sovereign and the taking on of the obligation necessary to ensure the peace thereby achieved. He will have to educate them, too, in the causes of war and peace since without this knowledge few people can learn "those duties which unite and keep men in peace, that is to say...the rules of civil life..." (E.W. I, 8). Hobbes' belief was that because of the diversities of his audience he had to show his readers that it is necessary to the attaining of peace to institute an artificial absolute, i.e. the will of the sovereign. Here he is trying to persuade his readers to give up their private reason, give up their private interpretations of experience or truth, and submit to the judgment of the sovereign (E.W. III, 189). To do so
is to accept what Kahn calls the "rhetorical sovereign" (to be explained shortly) and to help "constitute the common sense of the sovereign and thereby preserve himself against the threat of contradiction, which is ultimately the threat of extinction" (Kahn, p.160). The most efficient form of sovereignty, in Hobbes' eyes, is an absolute monarchy since "where the public and private interest are most closely united, there is the public most advanced. Now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public" (E.W. III, 173-174). Thus, Hobbes seeks to convince his audience, by rhetorical means, to accept an absolute monarch for their own good. Hobbes hoped, also, that his doctrines would be taught in universities, thereby reaching more people who were void of prejudice and who would be easier to instruct in his principles (Rogow, pp.132-133). Hobbes' overall purpose, then, is to reach as large an audience as possible and as a good counselor and, teacher, to benefit the largest part of mankind (E.W. VII, 335).

Within this rhetorical framework, all three interpretations of Hobbes' theory of obligation have a place. As a skilled 'counselor' trained in the practice of rhetoric Hobbes was not only aware of the need to convince his audience, but was also aware of the fact that different segments of that audience, like different individuals, would respond best to different sorts of persuasive arguments. He would have to take the limits of each part of his audience
into account, i.e. their personal experience and training when presenting his counsel.

This approach is also consistent with Hobbes' analysis of causation. That is, he repeatedly stresses that to explain or achieve any given effect requires understanding or initiating the entire cause necessary to produce the effect (i.e. the sum total of all the causal influences taken together) (E.W. I, 67, 121-122; III, 92; IV, 246; VII, 78). If we accept Hobbes' goal as subject to the same causal analysis of any other effect, then we see that what Hobbes has to do is initiate a cause sufficient to produce the intended effect. Since the goal is to convince everyone to accept their obligations to an absolute sovereign, he will have to convince each segment of his audience using whatever arguments or exhortations necessary to motivate them to act in their own best interest. In short, he will have to produce a set of justifications tailored to the nature of each audience he addresses. What, in essence, Hobbes did was to construct a mechanistic framework of justification, a natural law framework of justification, and an individual rights framework of justification (analogous to body, man, and citizen, perhaps) within his overall rhetorical framework such that the "concourse of all causes make one simple chain...(of) an innumerable number of chains joined together" (E.W. V, 105). Or, as P.J. Johnson says
Hobbes, I think, felt that he needed vivid images to jar the minds of his readers awake....he was struggling to affect his contemporaries in an immediate, practical way. Hobbes's works are no mere academic exercises in political theorizing, but attempts to motivate willful men caught up in the broil and trouble of parties and factions to see the inestimable value of peace. (Johnson, p.37)

The persuasive, or rhetorical, side to Hobbes' method requires that he know his audience, know that different forms of persuasion will be necessary, and that to reach the largest portion of the audience will require speaking to them in the language they will best understand. In conveying his political truth, then, Hobbes saw that there could be no ambiguity in his language and that what might seem ambiguous or unintelligible for one person need not be so for another, therefore different ways of speaking were necessary (i.e. different linguistic or conceptual frameworks in Wittgenstein's terminology). Speech will produce understanding and to that end Hobbes says:

Forasmuch as whosoever speaketh to another, intendeth thereby to make him understand what he saith, if he speak unto him either in a language which he that heareth understandeth not, or use any word in other sense than he believeth is the sense of him that heareth, he intendeth also not to make him understand what he saith; which is a contradiction of himself. It is therefore always to be supposed, that he which intendeth not to deceive, alloweth the private interpretation of his speech to him to whom it is addressed. (E.W. III, 76)

Hobbes also speaks of the art of engendering belief as a matter of not only proofs, but of manners, which involves understanding the design and ends of whatever we hope to cause our hearers to believe in, as well as, by
implciation, what will please the audience so as to create the agreement (E.W. IV, 436). The end of Hobbes' theory is preservation through obedience, the way to reach his readers is to convince each that they ought to submit voluntarily to the rule of the sovereign as the best means to that end. The act will only be achieved, however, if the audience is convinced.

That Hobbes set out to do what was necessary is clear, according to Wolin, who says,

In formulating the program of 'public teaching,' Hobbes set out his notion of political education. One part of it was aimed at a popular audience and hence the teaching was adjusted accordingly. He proposed a program of 'public instruction both of doctrine and example,' designed to indoctrinate the populace with beliefs conducive to strict obedience (Wolin, p.47).

This is precisely the point of the rhetorical method Hobbes had assimilated at school and advance in his own Rhetoric. But it is Hobbes' rhetorical education, the specific sources and the use Hobbes makes of rhetoric that has seldom been taken into account by Hobbes' commentators, especially in connection to his theory of obligation. M.L. Short, in an unpublished dissertation, contends that rhetoric is the key element operative in Hobbes' work, especially Leviathan. If this is true, Short argues, then

...it is not absurd to suggest that Hobbes would sharply distinguish between the human faculties necessary to science...and to history, and also distinguish between the appropriate method of science, logic, from the appropriate method of history, rhetoric (Short, p.141).

My contention takes Short's analysis a step further
to include a recognition that, if Hobbes so distinguished methods, then he must have distinguished the appropriate audiences for each approach. Finally, I believe that we may be too strict in saying that the method of science, i.e. the method of the MP framework, is purely logical. If we correctly understand Galileo's method, as the next section will demonstrate, we can see a strongly rhetorical element operative in it, which allows the plausible claim that Hobbes' overall method, based as it was in Galileo's method, is rhetorical in every part, including the mechanistic. From this perspective each of the three interpretations we have examined are to be viewed as attempts to convince different audiences of Hobbes' beliefs.

All of this shows an awareness on Hobbes' part of certain points about the nature of the language of justification. Hobbes would, I believe, agree with Wittgenstein that "the sentences that we utter have a particular purpose, they are to produce certain effects. They are parts of a mechanism, perhaps a psychological mechanism, and the words of the sentences are also parts of the mechanism..." (PG, 33). This is not unlike Hobbes' observation that speech expresses and excites the passions (E.W. III, 49) and that we use speech to 'beget in others the same conceptions that we have ourselves' so as to express appetite, intention, and finally, will (E.W. IV, 71, 74). For will, as we saw in Chapter I, is the efficient
cause of any voluntary action.

Wittgenstein, too, stresses that what people accept as justification be relative to how they think and live (PI, 325). It is this same understanding on Hobbes' part that causes him to develop the three frameworks of justification that interpreters have noticed but mistaken for a single theory of obligation that must be exclusive of other possible interpretations. We might call the three interpretations language-games, here, and then show how they fulfill Hobbes' rhetorical aims only in unison.

This task will require, first, an understanding of the rhetorical method and of the rhetorical aspects of each of the three frameworks. We will need to pay attention to the historical setting of Hobbes' use of the method and the language of the method as well, as Collins maintains. Thus, we will have to show that historical factors help explain Hobbes' methods and help delineate his frameworks, paying particular attention to the needs, purposes, and nature of Hobbes' three audiences.

2. Hobbes' Rhetorical Method

Hobbes' conception and use of rhetorical proof is not original with him. The art and analysis of rhetoric, Hobbes himself notes, dates back to Aristotle whose rhetorical theories Hobbes believed had never been surpassed
Indeed, Hobbes studied and restudied Aristotle's methods throughout his life, and carefully excluded them from the negative criticisms he leveled at Aristotle and Aristotelean doctrine as used and explicated by the schoolmen. His longer treatise on rhetoric is a much shortened and amended translation of key elements of Aristotle's own *Rhetoric*.

Beyond the Aristotelean roots of Hobbes' knowledge of rhetoric, we can trace three major influences on him: Ramus, Bacon, and, of course, Galileo. Peter Ramus divides rhetoric into (1) the method of teaching, which is clearly a precursor of Galileo's and Hobbes' notion of the resolutocompositive method, and (2) the method of prudence as explained in Ramus' *Dialectique* (1555). Short briefly describes these divisions as follows:

The method of teaching is the dialectic of plain language and this method proceeds via definition, division, and repeated definition. Consequently, the 'method of teaching' involves invention and first judgment (i.e. syllogism), and the various syllogisms are ordered in descending manner from the more to less universal. The method of teaching is the appropriate to scientia or science.

Ramus asserts that 'the method of prudence' arranges the syllogisms constructed according the first judgment from the results of invention 'according to the condition of persons, things, times, and places'.

Both were methods of instruction for Ramus and his followers, and were mutually useful in that if one method failed to affect a particular audience then one would simply switch to the other. Which method one should use at what
time was entirely dependent on the nature of the audience, the circumstances, and the nature of the content of the instruction (Short, p.301). This aspect of the rhetorical method is obvious in Hobbes' writings and helps explain the rhetorical character of his theory of obligation. Ramus' method of teaching is very similar to Hobbes' idea of the resoluto-compositive method, while the method of prudence is mirrored in Hobbes' distinct appeals to morality, Scripture, and individual rights, all of which are audience-relative appeals.

Hobbes' relationship with Bacon and his familiarity with Bacon's work, much of which he wrote to Bacon's dictation as the latter's secretary, exerted a strong influence on Hobbes application of rhetoric. We have seen that Bacon's influence on Hobbes was not always as great as might be expected, but in the matter of rhetoric there seems no doubt that the two men shared a common ground. A few details of Bacon's conception of rhetoric will make this clear.

For Bacon, as D.G. Douglas says, "the end of rhetorical endeavor is persuasion, that is, the influencing of conduct..." (Douglas, p.26). Douglas cites Bacon's work, Advancement (1605) and De Argumentis (1623); from the first, "The duty and office of Rhetoric is to apply Reason in Imagination for the moving of the will," and from the second, "...the duty and office of Rhetoric...is no other
than to apply and recommend the dictates of reason to imagination, in order to excite the appetite and will" (Douglas, p.26). These principles are echoed in Hobbes' own *Rhetoric* and in numerous places in other works, (E.W. III, 11; IV, 14). For different audiences Bacon recommends different approaches: deliberative or political speech is aimed at establishing the good or evil of a course of action, which Hobbes takes up in exactly the same form (E.W. VI, 430). Forensic speech aimed at finding justice, which Hobbes calls judicial speech (E.W. VI, 425). Occasional speech determines praise or blame; Hobbes calls this demonstrative speech (E.W. VI, 425). In these categories both men are simply retaining old Aristotelean forms (Douglas, p.27). All these types of speech or discourse are aimed at exciting the will or moving the hearer to act as the speaker or writer wishes. Hobbes has simply accepted traditional doctrine here.

Bacon's idea of "Method" constitutes, Douglas notes, a principal part not only of communication but also of transmitting images of actions to an audience. For Bacon (and Hobbes) the method requires "a way or technique of organizing and expressing subject matter according to the end sought and audience addressed" (Douglas, p.31). Included here, Bacon believed, is the ability to adapt logical proof to the audience by stimulating the imagination; this depends upon a knowledge of human nature
and the ability to express ideas so as to appeal to the hearer's or reader's imagination (Douglas, p.35). Hobbes, again, extolls these same methods and abilities, and given his concept of human nature and the role of the imagination and speech in moving us to act (E.W. IV, 25), it is less than surprising that his theory of obligation and the arguments for it would lend themselves to a rhetorical method that appeals to various audiences in differing ways. Finally, given Hobbes' belief that it is necessary for the good of the people to accept his theory of obligation, we may plausibly claim that he was following Bacon in adopting a rhetorical method. For Bacon, "rhetoric...carries the social obligation of helping reason to prevail over passions, of establishing, on the level of popular knowledge, the just and good cause" (Douglas, p.46); and Hobbes' Rhetoric also stresses this same principle (E.W. VI, 428, 430-431, and passim).

The most interesting source of Hobbes' reliance upon rhetorical methods is Galileo and his writings. The advocates of MP make no mention of Galileo's use of rhetoric or his belief that rhetoric was an aid to science rather than being at odds with it. Maurice Finocchiaro, however, in his study of Galileo's method, emphasizes this other aspect of Galileo's conception of the scientific method. Finocchiaro focuses on the Dialogue, the purpose of which he sees as primarily methodological in that Galileo tries to
extract the proper lessons about science and scientific inquiry in it (Finocchiaro, p.95). In this work Galileo points to various acceptable ways of proceeding in a scientific inquiry, ways that are persuasive or rhetorical. So we can see Hobbes' use of rhetorical reasoning as consistent with the Galilean concept of science that he adopted. As Hobbes was familiar with Galileo's work, had met him and talked to him, and had been trained extensively in rhetoric at Oxford, it seems plausible to say that he would have noted and used the rhetorical aspects of Galileo's resoluto-compositive method. If we believe that Hobbes had to be restricted to a mechanistic notion of science because he accepted Galileo's methods, then we are misrepresenting the Galilean concept of science as being the same as our own.

The rhetorical content of the Dialogue is an integral part of Galileo's approach rather than being merely "cosmetic verbal expressions of desire and intentions" (Finocchiaro, p.46). Finocchiaro describes this element of the Dialogue as follows:

The substance actually present in the book from this rhetorical point of view is a type of intellectual content, but one that plays upon feelings and emotions, either directly or explicitly by verbal expressions that have the desired effect, or else indirectly and implicitly by emphatic identification with what is explicitly said or done. (Finocchiaro, p.46)

In fact, Finocchiaro argues, the force of Galileo's arguments is "found in its combined emotional appeal and
literary-aesthetic value...its rhetorical force" (Finocchiaro, p.65). Such rhetorical appeals are separate from, but in no way contradictory to, the logical structure of Galileo's arguments. The rhetorical elements add emotional appeal and persuasive effectiveness to the scientific evidence and conclusions, and were used precisely for this reason (Finocchiaro, p.65).

Finally, because of his mixed method, Galileo's arguments may appear to conflict and contradict each other, just as Hobbes' have appeared to do to many commentators. Speaking of the structure of the Dialogue, Finocchiaro says

The second general feature of its explicit methodological content is...judgment. That is, we find Galileo emphasizing on various occasions different and in some cases opposite things; for example, sometimes the need, and sometimes the superfluousness of experiments; sometimes quantitative considerations, sometimes qualitative considerations; sometimes antiverbalistic mathematical analysis, sometimes verbal-oriented logical analysis; sometimes causal explanation, other times phenomenological description. There is no inconsistency here, except when the methodological claim is improperly generalized... (Finocchiaro, p.150).

The use of such devices serve to convince the readers who are not apt to grasp or be persuaded by purely logical proofs, something Galileo, like Hobbes recognized and something which was perhaps inherent in the nature of the causal explanation as they saw it.

Taken together these influences strongly support the use of rhetoric in conjunction with scientific proof. Hobbes, as one being trained in rhetoric, enamored of Galileo's methods, directly familiar with Bacon's work, and
accutely interested in speech and its effects on action would surely have accepted rhetoric as not only useful in practice, but even as methodologically, a But precisely how did Hobbes' use his rhetorical method? We need to know how it functioned in order to correctly re-interpret the three views of his theory of obligation.

Hobbes defines 'rhetoric' simply as "that faculty, by which we understand what will serve our turn concerning any subject to win belief in the hearer" (E.W. VI, 424). The problem Hobbes saw was that rhetoric had been at work in the cause of civil war and chaos; that is, it had been ill used, used to bring about evil rather than good. Civil war, Hobbes explains in De Cive, is caused by "private men being called to councils of state, (where they hope)...to prostitute justice...to their own judgments and apprehensions" (E.W. II, xiii). These men use rhetoric to present a skewed view of what is good, (presumably, in Hobbes' eyes, the retaining of the King is what is good), so as to make it appear evil, and vice-verse so, that people can discontent and have their peace disrupted (E.W. III, 226). Hobbes' hope is to substitute for this use of rhetoric, based on merely gaining practical advantages, an objective, mathematical language or rhetoric

...commensurate with his new scientific notion of politics, a logic of invention that would do what the humanists' prudential rhetoric had failed to do: bridge the gap between intention and action, between cause and effect of persuasion. (Kahn, pp.153-154)
This goal is consistent with what we have seen of Bacon's and Galileo's conceptions of science. A "mathematici, if he seeks to demonstrate and teach the truth must proceed deductively from 'perfect and manifest knowledge', but if he sought to win belief of those truths he would have to proceed 'another way'" (Short, p.162). So Hobbes is leaving open the possibility, as Galileo and Bacon had, that the rhetorical mode could be as valuable to the mathematici as the logical mode and a firm basis in fact. If one is seeking truth, they would use the latter, if seeking to win belief, they would use the former. As we have seen, it is clear Hobbes was seeking both; thus it would be natural to find that rhetoric formed a major part of his framework of justification. "The belief that proceed from our invention, comes partly from the behaviour of the speaker, partly from the passions of the hearer; but especially from the proofs of what we allege" (E.W. VI, 424-425). So Logic and rhetoric are intertwined for Hobbes:

A sentence is an universal proposition concerning those things which are to be desired or avoided in the actions or passions of the common life...And is to be an enthymeme (a rhetorical syllogism) in rhetoric, as any proposition is to a syllogism in logic. And therefore a sentence, if the reason be rendered, becomes conclusive; and both together make an enthymeme. (E.W. VI, 475)

Thus, there is a logic quite similar to syllogistic logic operating in Hobbes' rhetorical framework. The point is that Hobbes' framework is an attempt to present a logic of rhetoric for the good, as opposed to the ill use of purely
practical rhetoric that caused the political chaos of the time.

Though Hobbes stressed the importance of logic in his description of his method, he needed the persuasive force of rhetoric to accomplish his purpose since he knew he could not account on his readers' abilities to see and understand the logical necessities of the technical methodology. For those readers who suffer "defects" in reasoning, Hobbes recommends something other than a plain and evident style alone (logic alone), but to supplement it with a manner of speaking more "full of grace" since this is more apt to instruct the reader or hearer (E.W., VI, 519). This style is characterized by the use of antitheses, metaphor, and animation, all of which is easily seen throughout Hobbes' writings. As Short characterizes Hobbes' beliefs:

Hobbes draws a distinction between the philosopher, the one who uses the 'open conveyance of precepts' to instruct, and the 'political historiographer', the one who 'secretly' instructs by 'clearly' setting before his reader the results of 'good and evil counsels'. Such secret instruction is part of what Hobbes means by a 'perspicuous' method. Hobbes is confident that the perspicuous method is better than the 'open conveyance of precept' because it is more apt to instruct. (Short, pp.144-145)

Hobbes is essentially recommending an appeal to the readers based first on sound logical proof, then, if necessary, on methods tailored to the limits of the readers' abilities which require elocution and, finally, disposition (E.W. VI, 487). Hobbes will draw on whatever he believes
the readers have already acquired by way of knowledge and experience, he does not wish to impart new factual knowledge, only reorder what is already there, and reorder it correctly to compensate for the damage already done by faulty use of rhetoric and reasoning. The best rhetorician, Hobbes asserts, would be a logician who was able to discern and exploit the differences between a logical syllogism and rhetorical enthymemes (E.W. VI, 423-424). Neither, however, allows for the misuse of persuasion and logic, as Hobbes claims had been done in his time. Correct reasoning requires an awareness of the common opinions of the audience, for these function in rhetoric, just as infallible truths do in logic, to delineate the scope of the proof (E.W. VI, 426). Hobbes writes:

The principles, colours, or common opinions upon which a man's belief is grounded concerning the manners of him that speaks, are to be had, partly out of that which hath before been said of virtue (Book I, chap. 9); partly out of those things which shall be said by-and-by concerning the passions. For a man is believed, either for his prudence or for his probity, which are virtues; or for good will, of which among the passions.

The principles concerning belief, arising from the passion of the hearer, are to be gathered from that which shall now be said of the several passions in order.

In every one of which, three things are to be considered.

1. First, how men are affected.
2. Secondly, towards whom.
3. Thirdly, for what. (E.W. VI, 451)

All of this, Hobbes believes, is necessary to prevent evil men possessed of natural ability "to carry an evil cause against a good" by appealing to the "ordinary" people who
"are neither patient, nor capable of long scientific proofs drawn from the principles through many syllogisms". Hobbes' arguments, then, will be rhetorical, and shorter, so as to correctly educate this audience in the ways of truth (E.W. VI, 424).

Rhetoric is also used to discredit the rivals of the king for the subjects' obedience. Here Hobbes means organized religion and individuals seeking to supplant the sovereign as the final judge or arbiter in matters of state. Hobbes' method, Kahn argues, is a rhetoric of logical invention that first, "presents us with a logical argument that...is in itself persuasive, and thus aims to be a substitute for and to foreclose all further rhetorical debate", and then reintroduces the rhetorical techniques to the realm of logic Hobbes believes he has mapped out in order to "purge the commonwealth of its most dangerous rivals for the subject's obedience" (Kahn, p.158). We can cite Hobbes' use of Scripture as an illustration of using "the enemy's weapons against the enemy". His use of Scripture in Leviathan is aimed at the undermining of Scripture's authority to raise and support the civil power of the Church (see E.W. III, 592, 635). Scripture is used to prove that the subject owes obedience to the civil sovereign and that there are no ethical conflicts between the civil and spiritual authorities (Kahn, p.158, 171). Thus Scripture is, in a sense, used against itself in the
cause of Hobbes' civil sovereign. The same can be said of Hobbes' use of individual rights as the basis of the obligation to the sovereign. Although persons possess the unlimited right of nature to self-preservation and all the means necessary to secure it, ultimately the right of nature cannot be effectively exercised for this end without a contractual limiting of it and the transfer of its liberties to the civil sovereign. Both of these examples illustrate the rhetorical argument in utramque partem, the turning of one's opponent's arguments against the opponent (Kahn, p.158).

Hobbes' theories of language, speech, and truth all support his belief that he had developed a logic of rhetoric that puts the persuasive argument on a firm rational footing. Truth, for Hobbes, is a matter of speech, of how we name objects, of how use and understanding the names, and how the names relate to each other (E.W. I, 36; III, 23). Truth and true propositions or sentences are equivalent to each other (E.W. I, 35; II, 303; IV, 24). Truth and falsity are matters of speech, not matters of fact or properties of things (E.W. III, 23); it is propositions and sentences that are true (E.W. I, 35, 38). Truth, then, is a function of language and of naming within language, both of which are artificial human constructs: "the first truths were arbitrarily made by those that imposed names upon things" (E.W. I, 36). Hobbes sees truth as that which
"consists in the right ordering of names in affirmatives" and says, "he that seeketh precise truth, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly, or else he will find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime twigs, the more he struggles the more belimed" (E.W. III, 22-23). Hobbes' attention to definition and the logic of rhetoric are thus attempts to control the misuse of language and the art of false definition and persuasion, which affects politics in a negative way.

The logic of persuasion rests upon the right ordering of names and definitions according to rules and the customs of the hearers and speakers of the language. In politics this is especially important for, as Mintz says, "as language is by 'arbitrary institution', and the meanings of words conventional and fixed by agreement, it follows that the names given to ethical judgments such as 'good', 'evil', 'just', 'wicked', are also conventional, their meanings fixed by arbitrary institution" (Mintz, p.25). As Hobbes writes

The names of such things as affect us--that is, which please and displease us--because all men be not alike affected with the same thing nor the same man at all times, are in common discourses of men inconstant signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signify our conceptions, and all our affections are but conceptions, when we conceive the same things differently we can hardly avoid different naming of them. For though the nature of what we conceive be the same, yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of
our different passions. And therefore in reasoning a man must take heed of words which, besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker: such as are the names of virtues and vices... (E.W. III, 28-29)

Even though arbitrary all these elements are of the utmost importance for Hobbes' science of politics since they all translate speech into action and it is action that Hobbes hopes to effect. It is as much truth as peace that Hobbes believes "men now call for" (E.W. III, 711), especially as truth is "that which opposeth no man's profit or pleasure" and "is to all men welcome" (E.W. III, 714). Truth, then is in an important way a matter of convention and agreement, and is subject to rhetorical methods as much as those of ratiocination (science). So Hobbes can say it is as much a matter of prudential conjecture as it is of absolute certainty (E.W. III, 97).

But, nonetheless, language allows us to transcend private reason to formulate the general or universal propositions characteristic of reason (E.W. III, 103-104): "there being nothing in the world Universall but Names" (E.W. III, 102). As Kahn says, "Language...seems in short to provide us with a common sense and thus with the possibility of a consensus and a commonwealth" (Kahn, p.162). We must be careful to define our terms and avoid all abuses; but, as all language needs interpretation and as all interpretation is debatable, "one can never be sure whether one's reasoning is correct" (Kahn, p.164). Here
Hobbes can, however, move from rhetorical concerns that involve an appeal to the passions, to logic which involves reasoning about the passions. Because we recognize that absolute agreement is not possible, we must decide upon an "arbitrary representative of reason", since "right reason is illegible in nature, so a fictional but persuasive standard of right reason must be decided upon, that is, there must be a sovereign" (Kahn, p.164). In Hobbes' own words

And therefore, as when there is a controvers in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversies must either come to blowes, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature; so it is also in all debates of what kind soever" (E.W. III, 111).

Thus the three frameworks of justification, the three interpretations of Hobbes' theory of obligation, that have been examined, may all be seen as providing persuasive, logical (in both the logical and rhetorical senses) reasons for the various segments of his audience to accept this conclusion and abide by it. His aim is for them to accept what Kahn calls the "rhetorical sovereign," who will preserve peace and life through the exercise of the artificial power to settle all controversies, differences of opinion, and matters of truth.

Getting the populace to accept and act upon this conclusion requires Hobbes to use both logic and rhetoric and an appeal to the passions of pleasure and pain (E.W. IV, 441), especially the passion of fear. The orator must use
fear, Hobbes says, letting the reader or hearer see it as obnoxious (E.W. VI, 457). In this way the reader will be motivated to act to alter the circumstances that cause the fear. Since what each person fears varies it is up to the speaker to appeal to different aspects of fear or in different ways suitable to the audience addressed. Indeed, we have seen in chapters I-III that Hobbes can be shown to offer appeals to the fear of one's own death, fear of disobeying God's will or divine punishment, and, in a slightly different guise, fear of violent death and loss of honor. Thus each interpretation carries persuasive force and seeks to convince different audiences to contract with each other to create and take on the obligation to obey a sovereign.

For in the act of our submission consists both our obligation and our liberty, which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from thence, there being no obligation or any man which arises not from some act of his own, for all men equally are by nature free. And because such arguments must either be drawn from the express words, I authorize all his actions, or from the intention of him that submits himself to his power, which intention is to be understood by the end for which he so submits, the obligation and liberty of the subjects is to be derived either from those words or others equivalent, or else from the end of the institution of sovereignty—namely, the peace of the subjects within themselves and their defense against a common enemy. (E.W. III, 203)

Hobbes' use of the rhetorical method is thus consistent with his own doctrine of causality, moving people to act by prompting the requisite internal motions.

Thus rhetoric is an integral element in Hobbes'
attempt to end the causes of political quarrels and the chaos of his time. His end was to show everyone that there was reason for them to accept an absolute sovereign to protect their own peace and survival (E.W. VI, 236), and he simply uses the best means available to do so according to his perception of his audience's abilities and passions. In the case of MP, Hobbes aimed his mechanistic arguments at those versed in and moved by the reasons of the science and methods of Galileo. In the case of the moral interpretation, Hobbes aimed his arguments at the Christians who were moved to action by fear of God's will or God's divine punishment. An in the individualistic framework, Hobbes appeals to those of his day who were moved by the concerns of individualism and individual rights as key factors in the science of politics.

The important point is that, given Hobbes' background, training, and conception of science and logic, this is perfectly consistent and in no way contradictory. The obligation of the subjects is established in all cases, and it is the same obligation. Though the motives different audiences will have for accepting and abiding by this obligation differs, all the justifications are, within their own framework, perfectly logical and consistent with the dictates of reason, and therefore consistent with each other since the dictates of true reason cannot conflict. The reader must simply exercise his own judgment in interpreting
the texts; but Hobbes has offered convincing rhetorical, persuasive arguments that lead each reader to the true conclusions. We may find that Hobbes' various appeals are problematic and inconsistent with our own notion of science or logic, but as Miriam Reik says:

The most noteworthy feature of this problem of Hobbes' transition from humanist to scientist or philosopher is that Hobbes himself nowhere indicates he found it in the least bit problematic, making one suspect that the difficulty is imposed on his biography by the modern mind. (Reik, p.21)
WORKS CITED

CHAPTER V


CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

We have seen that Hobbes refers to three elements as important to determining the correct rhetorical arguments or justifications to use to persuade a particular person or audience according to their interests and passions: 1) How the audience is affected, 2) Towards whom they direct their passions; and 3) For what the passion is shown (E.W. VI, 451). If we keep these questions in mind it is a simple, and by now anti-climactic, matter to characterize the three theories of obligation as separate but consistent frameworks of justification or persuasion that run through Hobbes' work.

The MP interpretation outlines a framework quite clearly materialistic and deductive, but also rhetorical in nature. That is, it is a logical and rhetorical framework that aims at the scientifically sophisticated audience that includes the mathematici. This group is composed of intelligent, educated, and trained intellectuals who hold certain common presuppositions, among them being the belief in a universe that is material, that is governed by mechanistic, causal laws, and which can be known by the
correct application of the resoluto-compositive method. For this group, transcendent, spiritual reasons are not persuasive. What is needed is causal, mechanistic justification. To Hobbes, then, it was necessary to reduce all explanation, justification, and persuasion to an appeal to the analysis of matter and motion. His first philosophy, psychology, ethics, and politics reflect this perspective, especially in the earlier works. The methodology, principles, and persuasive appeals are all couched in the materialistic language appropriate for addressing this audience. The conclusion, that the citizen must accept the obligation to obey an absolute monarch or sovereign, is proven by an egoistic and mechanistically framed argument in true resoluto-compositive fashion. The central features of the proof include the laws of nature, which must be seen as maxims of prudence; the motivation of the subjects, which must be egoistic given this approach's psychology; and the force behind the obligation, which must be based on physical power and fear. All of this is dictated by the limits of the framework.

But this argument, relying as it does on the knowledge of science and its methods, and on certain materialistic presuppositions cannot possibly be convincing to an audience not versed in these matters or unwilling to grant these presuppositions. Hobbes, with his knowledge of history, psychology, and rhetoric, and his observations of
social conditions could hardly have missed this fact. More especially, Hobbes was aware of the large Christian audience and intimately familiar with their conceptions of morality, natural law, and Scriptural proof. For this group it simply would not do to accept the laws of nature as merely maxims of prudence, to argue egoistic duties rather than moral duties, or to claim that the power of man and fear were the forces of obligation. In the context of Christian/moral justification, natural law embodied universal moral concepts that all people could apprehend as the commands of God. Duty was a matter of obedience to God and God's will, and the force of obligation was God's power or God's will alone. The moral interpretation outlines the context of Hobbes' appeal to this segment of his audience. Although Warrender's version stresses a consequentialist interpretation based on divine rewards and punishments, while Taylor and Hood stress deontological views, we must remember that both were common elements of Christian doctrine in Hobbes' time, and it would not be inconsistent with what we have seen of Hobbes to imagine him including appeals to those who believe one or the other or a combination of both views. For example, one could recognize a duty to God as God, yet be aware of the fact that breaking God's laws would entail divine punishment. In any case Hobbes' might simply appeal to Christians of all persuasions without violating any logical or theological rules.
as Reik says, the result is that

The obligations...(imposed) are moral only for Christians both in and out of the state of nature since breaches are punishable by God. Had Hobbes not considered natural laws binding on Christians, he would have had little use for them in his system. He could have been content, then, to discard the concept altogether as a superfluity and conceive of the state as founded on expedience and prudence alone.

Thus, the government and society are to be derived from both an enlightened self-interest and, on the other hand, from a Christian obedience to the commands of God... (Reik, p.97)

Finally, there was a wave individualism traceable back to the Renaissance and manifested in the interest in "man the individual" that is apparent in many of Hobbes' contemporaries. Its presence fostered the need to shape an appeal to that segment of his audience concerned with the topic of individualism and individual rights. As Peters says, Hobbes' age was one of individualism, competition, and social mobility (Peters, p.142), and Hobbes certainly had similar interests. Hobbes saw human nature as individualistic and his psychology and ethics reflect this; so it is natural that he would be aware of individualistic concerns and take them into account. His age was also one that was struggling with the idea that the rights of the individual outweigh (or are, at least, as important as) those of the state; and civil wars had been fought partly to establish these rights. Furthermore, as Strauss noted, Hobbes had developed his own brand of morality and his own concept of human rights early in life. Against this background Hobbes' analysis and use of the concept of the
individual's right of nature can be seen as a third framework of justification designed to persuade even ardent individualists to accept the obligation to the sovereign and transferring their natural right through the vehicle of the contract. Mechanistic arguments and moral arguments based on universal duties might persuade some, or perhaps most, individualists but it is plausible to suggest that Hobbes tailored the third approach to reach this group more directly.

Thus, Hobbes' theory of obligation is really a three-part theory that is centrally rhetorical in nature. Its goal is to gain assent from all segments of a larger audience to Hobbes' conclusion that an absolute sovereign is necessary to preserve everyone's best interest and life, and to hasten the end of the divisive series of civil wars and conflicts raging throughout Hobbes' lifetime. Hobbes is offering three persuasive arguments dependent on three different conceptual frameworks or contexts, all designed to move his various audiences to act as he deems fit and best for themselves. In reference to Hobbes' own understanding of the rhetorical appeal to an audience we can say that: 1) How persons are affected varies, some by scientific reasoning, some by moral reasoning, and some by appeal to individual rights; 2) Towards whom they are moved is Hobbes and his conclusions and ultimately towards the acceptance of the sovereign; 3) For what ends they are moved is their own
best interests whether they see that as temporal, material, or spiritual, moral.

The coherence and fruitfulness of adopting the view that Hobbes had three different frameworks within which he presented persuasive arguments for his theory of obligation can perhaps be best illustrated by answering the ten questions Oakeshott (Chapter III B) posed for any interpreter of Hobbes' theory. These are the ten basic discrepancies that are troublesome for any monistic theory, but given our rhetorical, pluralistic model they are more easily handled. I have not developed the details of each answer, but simply illustrated the path I believe can be taken to answer them. In each case the response stresses that Oakeshott's questions are troublesome only if we are working from within a monistic framework. In this sense the responses are reminiscent of Kant's solution to two of the antinomies where he points out that both alternatives are true but true within different contexts, one for noumena, one for phenomena. Oakeshott's ten discrepancies are:

1) Hobbes claims a right of nature to all things, but also admits a natural obligation to endeavor peace as part of God's Natural Law. Here the discrepancy exists only for a monistic interpretation: if we adopt the individual rights view alone, the role of God's Natural Law is an empty one, or at least problematic, but if we adopt only the moral framework the role of the right of nature is problematic.
But on my view both the claims operate separately as part of different frameworks while, at the same time, playing complementary roles within the overall rhetorical methodology Hobbes uses. Thus, they are consistent with each other in the sense that each is asserted only within its proper framework and outside these frameworks should not be compared to each other at all. To attempt this is to misapply the rules or context of one framework to the terminology of another. If we keep the contexts straight, there is no damaging discrepancy here.

2) Hobbes claims that natural laws are both hypothetical causal propositions and laws in the strict sense of being commands. Again, if we recognize the framework from within which Hobbes makes each assertion the discrepancy vanishes. In the framework of the MP Hobbes cannot call the laws of nature anything but hypothetical causal propositions; the language and context of the framework allows no other possibilities. However, the laws of nature can be called laws in the strict sense of commands within the language and framework of the natural law view or the individual rights view. The frameworks here allow for an explanation of the laws of nature that includes a law giver of one sort or the other. The different contexts must be kept apart. Once we separate the contents the conflict disappears. Given a pluralistic view the two uses are not contradictory.
3) Hobbes says reason can show us God as the author of moral law, but also that reason can only show us God as First Cause. Again, it is the limits of the framework that determine Hobbes' language. Within the mechanistic framework, reason is limited to a God that can only be described as the First Cause; for to go beyond this requires transcendent or spiritual language and knowledge. However, in the context of the moral view reason can determine that God is the author of the laws of nature, and additional knowledge can be gained through Scripture whose authority is valid in this framework, but invalid in the mechanistic approach.

4) Hobbes says obligation exists prior to society but also that it is contingent upon covenant. Here again within the moral framework we can argue that prior, universal obligation exists since the laws of nature are God's laws and are eternal, and thus are binding on all people (though only Christians or believers might actually accept this obligation). Within both the MP or individual rights views, we must form a covenant of some sort to create or support obligations but this is not to say that obligations of all sorts fail to exist prior to a contract: for on the MP we are physically or psychologically obligated by our egoistic natures, that is, causally determined to form the covenant, which is where political obligation begins. On an individual rights view we simply create
political obligation via the contract but can be said to be obliged by fear or reason prior to this, and since fear and reason are not particular traits of specific individuals but are universal traits of human nature, consequently we can see obligation as existing at least immediately prior to the existence of the state. So for both views it can exist prior to civil society, but also be dependent on covenant.

5) Hobbes asserts the independent authority of Natural Law and Scripture, but also argues that the authority of both derives from the sovereign. Here we must remember Kahn's concept of the "rhetorical sovereign". The sovereign settles disputes about correct interpretation of Natural Law and Scripture because otherwise reason and passion will drive people to disagree. Though Scripture and Natural Law are independent authorities within the moral framework, even here there will be disputes about correct interpretation among Christians which can only be resolved by the sovereign. Thus Hobbes is simply asserting the limits of reason and certain facts of human nature that run through all three frameworks. If we correctly interpret Scripture and Natural Law there is no problem within the moral context, but outside this context there are those who will not accept either as independent authorities. Hobbes has other appeals for this audience within which the sovereign's force and authority create the force behind both Scripture and Natural Law. Hobbes is merely covering all his bases
here with regard to Scripture and Natural Law for an audience that includes believers and atheists.

6) Hobbes uses 'precept' as a 'general rule of reason' to describe the first law of nature, but goes on to deny that is prescriptive force derives from reasonableness at all. Here the use of 'general rule of reason' is most appropriate to the MP context. Within that framework this is all Hobbes can call any natural law; in this context all prescriptive force is denied in the sense of a moral prescription other than in an egoistic sense. In the moral context reason discloses the laws of nature as God's commands, which are reasonable in themselves because God could not issue irrational commands. Again, if we keep the contexts in mind the problem disappears, or at least is mitigated.

7) Hobbes uses 'natural law' both to mean hypothetical conclusions of reason and to denote obligations imposed by God on believers. This is handled quite simply on our pluralistic view. Within the MP, 'natural law' can only be a set of hypothetical conclusions of reason, since reason does disclose them and since all scientific laws are hypothetical, as shown in Chapter I. In the context of the natural law framework, however, there is no such restriction and Hobbes is free to call natural laws God's commands and assert that their obligatory force derives from this fact. Again, Oakeshott's question presupposes a monistic framework
when, in fact, more than one framework is relevant.

8) Hobbes claims that the sovereign's obligation under Natural Law is to procure the safety of the people and that the sovereign is accountable to God alone for this duty; but then he says that, at best, this is true only of sovereigns who believe in a God concerned with human action. The answer here is also clear. For any sovereign who doubts a God exists or denies natural law as God's dictates there can be no obligation on these grounds. Hobbes merely recognizes the fact that belief is relative and personal, even for sovereigns. We could also say that a sovereign who believes in God and God's Law is operating within a context separate from that of a non-believer who may see duty in a way consistent with the MP or a non-religious IR framework such as Strauss' interpretation stresses. The sovereign's duty or obligation is describable in different terms dependent upon the framework one adopts, just as are the duties of the subjects.

9) Hobbes makes strong claims based on word play with a distinction between 'God's natural kingdom' and his 'natural subjects', but calls this all metaphorical. I simply concede that this is a rhetorical device, an argument by analogy or metaphor. Hobbes stresses such methods in his rhetoric as ways of reaching an audience unable to respond to direct logical argument. Within our concept of Hobbes' rhetorical methodology this is not at all a surprising or
debatable claim. Hobbes is simply acting as an orator here.

10) Hobbes uses the term 'God' both to denote a being who established the civil state by covenant and as a term of imagination that is meaningless. Again this is easily explained using our model. The meaningless use of the term 'God' is relative to the limitations of the MP framework and its strict denial of meaning to any term taken to denote non-physical objects; that is, the term is meaningless as a term of science. For believers, or those willing to admit such talk of transcendent beings, the use of the term is meaningful and perfectly acceptable in its traditional sense.

Thus, on our view of Hobbes' methods and intentions, the problems Oakeshott sees are easily handled. Most of the discrepancies are simply matters of misapplying the criteria of one framework to terms as they are used in another framework. Once the limits of the frameworks are seen the discrepancies disappear. This supports the plausibility and fruitfulness of adopting a pluralistic view of Hobbes as I have argued. The value of such an approach lies in its ability to break the stalemate in Hobbes scholarship, as well as to clarify the methodology behind Hobbes' theory of obligation.
CHAPTER VI


REFERENCES


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