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Authoritarianism and Political Socialization in Voluntary Organizations: The Case of Koreans in the Chicago Area

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AUTHORITARIANISM AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
IN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS:
THE CASE OF KOREANS IN THE CHICAGO AREA

by
Yoon M. Lee

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

May

1987

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to his dissertation committee members who have taken the painstaking efforts in bringing this research into a final product. The author expresses his special gratitude to Dr. Ross P. Scherer, who introduced him to the concept of the Western voluntarism and also served twice as the chairman for the author's academic endeavors, once for his Master's thesis and now his Doctoral dissertation.

While participating in courses with Drs. Lauren Langman and Joseph Galaskiewicz, the author was enlightened with the concept of authoritarianism and pluralistic political perspectives. Since then he has struggled to find an academic formula for a democratic solution to his homeland suffering under authoritarian dictatorship. Dr. Alan Gitelson added his insights in political science and Dr. Kenneth Johnson advised with his methodological skills.

Fr. Thomas Gannon, S.J. and Dr. Jay P. Ryu who opened the doors to graduate studies in sociology for the author, Dr. Kathelen McCourt (who assisted with the author's Masters thesis), Dr. Kirsten Gronbjerg (who constantly encouraged the author to "get it over with") also deserve the author's deep gratitude.

The author is grateful to the Korea Times of Chicago and its subscribers for their support in data collection and to Mr. Gordon Moon (former NATO press officer) who helped proof-reading the whole text of this manuscript. Above all, the author is permanently indebted to Hwa S. Lee, his wife and two daughters, Sherline and Deborah for their painful endurance and support for the author.

VITA

The author, Yoon M. Lee is the son of Chang H. Lee and the late Hyun Sook(Cho) Lee. He was born June 15, 1939, in Korea.

His elementary and secondary schoolings were obtained in the public schools of Won-ju, Korea and was graduated from Paichai High school in Seoul, Korea in 1957.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. The Problem

Voluntary organizations are known as crucial requisites for democracy in Western societies, where economic and political liberalism prevailed in the post-Reformation era, ahead of the development of political pluralism. But there are other cultures in which the egalitarian human quality and voluntaristic impulses in human nature have not been fully recognized. In such cultures, the self-concept and human relations are more likely to be fashioned by an authoritarian outlook.

Authoritarianism is a set of cultural prescriptions for human relations and that may shape personality through socialization. As a personality syndrome it exhibits submissiveness to authority, aggressiveness, fatalism, low tolerance, and rigidity in ideas.

The bi-variate relationship between authoritarianism and low participation in voluntary organizations is well documented; its effect as an antecedent variable in pluralism models has not been fully tested. Extremely high participation in the electoral process (as exhibited in the Phillipines, or Korea) coupled with high protest activities are opposite phenomena of "diffuse support" which is an essential for the stable democracy. These behavioral phenomena could have their roots in authoritarian submissiveness and aggression. In

other words, with highly authoritarian people, political pluralism may be difficult to apply. However, if the theses of pluralism are universally valid, they should be operable among highly authoritarian people through mobilization or mediation by voluntary organizations.

Authoritarianism is also found even in some segments of democratic societies such as America. Such authoritarianism may have its roots in the childhood socialization or may reflect experiences from lower class position. Authoritarian persons are less likely to participate in voluntary organizations, but there are voluntary organizations that induce even authoritarians to get involved (such as religious or political extremist movements). Such nonvoluntary involvement in organizations is more likely to happen in societies where governments can forge such organizations and pressure the people to join them. Also, even in free societies, those who feel alienated and rootless (such as some racial minorities and new immigrants in America) are more likely to join the readily accessible organizations (N. Babchuck & R.B. Thompson, 1962).

When people's participation in voluntary organizations is less voluntaristic and when such people are highly authoritarian, the political socialization effects of the voluntary organizations may become questionable. If voluntary organizations do not function to modify highly authoritarian attitudes, which might be related to low political efficacy despite high participation in the electoral process, they can be easily mobilized by totalitarian political movements. Also, if the voluntary organizations do not function as countervailing devices against oppressive regimes, authoritarians might easily use them as

their protest channels to release their repressed aggression toward the regime or authority figures. This is happening in less developed countries. The two faces of authoritarian vulnerability have been well demonstrated especially in Iran under the Shah and later under Khomeni. It is also questionable how the new immigrants from such authoritarian backgrounds would do in a new voluntaristic social setting.

In order to explore this question further, the writer selected a specific ethnic group which is relatively new to this country and supposedly highly authoritarian. The case in point is the Korean immigrant group in the Chicago area. The Koreans have been the third-fastest growing immigrant group in the United States during the 1970s. The yearly inflow of this group reached more than 30,000, exceeding the annual immigration quotas assigned them during the late 1970s. Currently, the Korean-American population is estimated at more than 1,000,000 of which 80,000 are said to be living in the Chicago area.

The social network of Chicago Koreans includes 100-plus ethnic churches (including house churches), more than 200 voluntary organizations, and two Korean-language daily newspapers. But this group is experiencing difficulties in organizing political leadership and mobilizing its resources for political goals. That is why the general applicability of the pluralism model is brought into question.

B. The Korean Political Culture

The dominant features of Korean political culture are precisely described by Khil (1984) as: the politics of hierarchy and deference, the politics of voter mobilization, increasing participatory orienta-

tion, widening elite-mass cleavage, and the politics of defiance during acute crises. Those characteristics can be summarized in three elements which are relevant to this study.

1. The Politics of Hierarchy and Deference

The most dominant characteristics of Korean politics appear as hierarchy and deference in authority relations. Those who are in leadership position perceive their roles to be active, commanding ones, while those on the receiving end accept their roles as blind submissive ones. Vertical and unequal interpersonal relations prevail in Korean society at every level including family, school, formal group, and workplace, all probably manifesting the Confucian hierarchical principle. Such verticality is especially acute between the rulers and the governed, elite and mass. The ruler takes a paternalistic attitude toward the mass, and the ruled accept total submission toward and compliance with the authority.

On the basis of this hierarchical structuring, it is relatively easy for the person in power to exercise supreme leadership with the support of loyal military generals and technocrats. Political participation by the masses is tightly controlled and manipulated by the supreme leader.

The sense of deference for persons in superior position is found in the public language. Nopun-Saram (someone on high) exists in most collectivities. Especially the word Gowicheung (high ranks) formerly a common word, is now being used as a formal expression by the newspapers to indicate the President indirectly. Decisions made by the President are referred to Youngdan (heroic decisions) by the major

Korean news media.

2. Politics of Voter Mobilization

The Korean constitution has prescribed universal voting rights since the 1948 independence of the Republic of Korea in the south. During the four decades since, five regimes have succeeded, in turn, with most of the rulers manipulating the popular vote. The earlier three civilian regimes allowed free elections manipulating the process with maximum participation by the less educated voters in supporting the candidates or issues presented by the ruling party. The opposition party could obtain a foothold only in the big cities. This split in support is termed Yo-chon Ya-do (ruling party in farms, opposition in cities). The two recent military regimes have tightly controlled and manipulated elections, blocking the direct election of the President who sits at the apex of the power pyramid and whose defeat would mean the collapse of the ruling party.

Therefore, political participation in Korea is largely the result of directives from Gowicheung (President) with the citizenry compelled to play essentially passive roles in campaigns and voting. Otherwise, their livelihoods could be directly or indirectly threatened. Political participation is not of the voluntary kind generally found in Western democracies. Mass participation operates by habitual compliance with the order of authority, not by voluntary support. The increasing political participation in post-war Korea has not been a direct result of conscious choice by the populace, except for the case of the short-lived, chaotic, liberal regime of premier Chang Myun in 1960-61.

3. Elite-Mass Gap and Potential for Rebellion

There has been a wide gap between the Korean elites and masses in their perception of political issues through the past century. This gap is an outgrowth of the caste system of traditional Korea, and still fosters class consciousness among the masses. The most recent caste system in Korea was the Yang-bahn system (twin-class of scholars and warriors), while all others remained as Sang-min (common people). Only Yang-bahn had the right to be recruited to public offices, with Sang-min rarely having such opportunity until the turn of the 20th century.

The masses (Sang-min) were not even allowed to have an education (mostly reading Confucian literatures in tutorial settings) until the final days of the Yi dynasty (1890s). The masses were not expected to hold opinions on social issues, let alone political ones, in traditional Korea. But the elite-mass gap in perception and preference on conflicting issues historically resulted in several revolts by the masses.

The Tonghak revolt (1894) was the most significant uprising in the political modernization of Korea because it was based on beliefs in egalitarianism. The leader of this revolt proclaimed that man had divine quality and all were created equally. But this religio-political movement was crushed by foreign troops and resulted in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.

Although Tonghak might not have been clearly referred to, its spirit or sense of people's rights has played a key role in more contemporary bloody revolts in Korea. Outbreaks of defiance and rebellion have often had the explosive power of a volcanic eruption when the masses have perceived governmental authorities and policies to be

arbitrary and unjust. The Sam-il (March 1, 1919) independence movement against the Japanese colonial rulers, the April Student Revolution of 1960 against Syngman Rhee's dictatorial regime, and the 1980 Kwangju uprising against the current military power group all are said to have been triggered by the spirit of Minjoong (people or masses).

Because the Korean people are generally submissive to and deferential toward authority during normal and routine periods, their acts of defiance and rebellion may sound contradictory and incomprehensible. But it is significant that their anger and frustration have accumulated under the cover of passive and compliant behavior, over a period of time. Nevertheless, an act of defiance, when it reaches the boiling point of massive protest, takes the form of violence, including anarchic behavior.

The questions explored through this research are expected to shed some light, not only on the potential of this group's political assimilation into the United States, but also on the potential for democracy in their homeland. The findings may have similar relevance for other new immigrant groups coming from similar authoritarian backgrounds and for those in their homelands.

C. Theoretical Aims of the Research

This study links the variables at three levels of analysis: personality, culture, and society. A research of this nature has a potential for contributing to at least the following purposes.

1. Voluntary Organization Research

This study explores the psychological roots opposite to volun-

tarism and attempts to link them to the positive functions of voluntary organizations. By doing this, this study could partially fill a notable gap in research between the powerful effects of parental socialization vs. those of voluntary organizations (D.H. Smith, 1975). It aims also to shed some light on the question of whether attitude and personality dispositions are to be seen as causes or consequences of voluntary organization participation. The answers vary by researchers and the issue remains unresolved.

2. The Theory of Socialization

The effects of earlier (parental) socialization have been widely studied. But adult socialization, especially the causes of sudden attitudinal and behavioral changes in the later life-cycle, needs more attention. This study offers a comparison of the effects of child and adult socializations.

3. The Theory of Unconventional Political Participation

Unconventional political participation (protest activities) is a new area of study in political sociology and political science (Barnes & Kasse, 1979). The deterrent effect of voluntary organizations to protest activities has been suggested by mass politics theorists (Kornhauser, 1959), but voluntary organizations can also promote protest activities. This study will explore the strengths in both directions.

D. Plan of Presentation

After reviewing related literature in Chapter II, theoretical designs and major variables are discussed in Chapter III. Historical backgrounds and demographic description of Korean immigrants (as a part

of the findings) are presented in Chapter IV. Authoritarian features and involvement in organizations are described in Chapter V; then, in the same chapter, political affects are examined as the dependent variable of authoritarianism under the influence of organizational involvement. Chapter VI deals with how the respondents' voting participation and political issue preferences are affected by the preceding variables (authoritarianism, organizational involvement, and political affects). In Chapter VII, major findings are summarized and discussed within the theoretical framework of political sociology and also within that of adaptation theories. Then the conclusion of the research follows in Chapter VIII.

NOTE

1. Data from the Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C.; published by the Korea Times-Chicago, March 12, 1987.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

A. Pluralism

1. Background of Pluralism

The role of voluntary associations in democracy has drawn the attention of political theorists since Aristotle. As a socio-political theory, pluralism has its origins in Greek and Judaeo-Christian heritages. The decisive event for the uniquely pluralistic character of the West is the Reformation and its outcomes. Religious toleration and freedom of conscience were conceived as a natural right.

Locke assumed that individuals have the unalienable right to associate and that this right of groups demythologized the sovereignty of the state (Horn, 1969). English pluralists of the 19th and 20th centuries promoted the demythicizing of the state and anticipated active participatory citizenship (Laski, 1920; Cole, 1920).

Although voluntary associations are found in many other societies, their successful integration into the political system is viewed as primarily an Anglo-American phenomenon. Tocqueville (1947) was the first author who perceived the connection between the proliferation of voluntary associations in America and the democratic character of the society. Pluralism has been the unspoken ideology of American political practice as both a normative and an empirical frame of reference for much of the nation's history.

In France, voluntary associations were selectively restricted by Rousseau's theory of "general will" which was hostile to plural societies. Therefore, a number of repressed associations developed but were not allowed to function openly in the political arena (Rose, 1954).

In Germany, both the conception and tradition of voluntary associations were confined within a corporate view. German liberal theorists of the 19th century considered the rights of individuals as subordinate to those of community and the state. The crucial ideas of natural law and of the state as an association with limited purposes were absent from German political theory. This is why Germans moved in the direction of political nihilism and totalitarianism (Iggers, 1965).

The Western philosophical and religious beliefs, ethical aspirations, empirical findings, and structure of personalities are more or less sufficiently integrated to the foundations for the theory and practice of political pluralism, although there is still a lack of understanding of its processes of integration (Chapman, 1969, p.93).

In the American scene, the role of voluntary associations in the democratic process has been examined and explained by Lipset and his colleagues (1956). They asserted that democratic politics necessarily rest on a multitude of independent organizations.

Such organizations serve in a society as a whole or in unions (i) as arenas within which new ideas are generated, (ii) communication networks through which people may learn and form attitudes about politics, (iii) as means of training potential opposition leaders in skills of politics, and as a place in which they can attain the status necessary to become political leaders, (iv) as one of the principal means of getting individuals to participate in the larger political arena, and (v) as bases of opposition to the central authority (1956, p.89).

2. Two Analytical Models of Pluralism

The choice of an explanatory model of pluralism is basic to definitions of democracy. In the conflict perspective, political democracy is the process in which all active and legitimate groups compete to receive a hearing at some crucial stage in the process of making a decision. The task of the political process is to accommodate the conflicting demands of individuals or groups, with the dominant mechanism as bargaining (Dahl, 1965; Keim, 1975).

In the structural-functional perspective, democracy is a system which recognizes and enforces the rights of the individual to participate in making decisions that affect him and his community (Bachrach, 1975). The key processes are direct or indirect participation in the formulation and dispersion of opinion and in decision making. The dominant mechanism in this process is arriving at consensus by maximum participation in voting.

These two processes are complementary, and the study of conditions encouraging democracy, therefore, must focus on the sources of both cleavage and consensus (Lipset, 1963). Upon the choice of perspective, whether to maximize consensus through optimal participation by individuals or whether to accommodate conflicting demands of groups in their access to power, pluralists make distinctions between mobilization and intermediation models.

a. Mobilization Model

The mobilization version (which underlies the social participation thesis) focuses on individual actors and maintains that involvement in voluntary associations will activate individuals politically.

The theorists of this version emphasize the recruiting and training function of voluntary associations for potential political actor. They posit, after K. Deutsch's (1961) concept, that mobilization is "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior." Deutsch uses this concept in the context of modernization of traditional societies and argues that this progress is required for political development.

Although the original concept denotes institutional, normative, and attitudinal changes at a macro-societal level, it also involves the induction processes of personal activities by mobilizing agents. People caught in traditional societies and politically inactive must be mobilized through involvement in new social contexts (such as voluntary associations) if they are to become politically active.

The mobilization perspective rests on several assumptions: involvement in voluntary associations (i) broadens an individual's interest in political affairs and issues; (ii) stimulates the individual's political activity via interactions with others; (iii) increases one's information and leadership skills; and (iv) provides gratification for participation in political activities and a sense of satisfaction with the democratic process as members perceive the process and results in concrete situation (D.L. Rogers et al., 1975).

The politically relevant key process in the voluntary organization is socialization of the members or the participants. This socializing process is easily, and perhaps best, explained with the concept of "reference group." Finifer (1974) made her argument on the

basis of three related propositions, that: (i) people do identify with members in the groups; (ii) these identifications motivate responsiveness to normative cues coming from the groups; and (iii) the level of integration varies according to the degree of identifications with others in the groups.

The effects of participation in voluntary association have been demonstrated by many empirical data as active political involvement. Although they did not explicitly mention the mobilization theory, numerous researchers since W. Dennis (1930) found a causal relationship between involvement in voluntary associations and in politics. It is also postulated that political participatory behavior is preceded by a set of attitudinal and value changes. The aggregate of the attitudes and values held by the people of a given society is called their political culture.

The concept of political culture was first introduced by Gabriel Almond (1956). Political culture is a set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and govern the political behavior in a given political system. Almond (1951), citing Parsons and Shils' General Theory of Action, identified three elements of political culture as (i) the cognitive, (ii) the affective, and (iii) the evaluative. Almond (1956), along with Verba (1965) introduced several measurable dimensions of political culture. Within their approach, political efficacy is considered as the key predisposing variable in personal political activity. Efficacy is an outcome of various socializations through the political actors' lives, and political mobilization at a macro-level can have

much effect on it. It is both the product of a political system and the life history of the members of that system. Thus, they treated political culture as both an independent and dependent variable of the political system (Almond and Verba, 1980).

Almond and Verba (1965) saw "political affect," as the aggregate form of the psychological dimension of politics, and as the key element of political efficacy. "The feeling is perhaps the most important test of the legitimacy of its political system and it is also the most important measure of political alienation and aspiration" (1965, 100 - 252). These emotional elements are oriented toward (i) the political system as a whole (system affect), (ii) the administration and regulations (output affect), (iii) the processes and agencies involved in election and policy implementation (input affect), and (iv) the political actor himself being subject to the political system (civic affect).³

System theorists were more concerned about the objective affect felt toward the system. Lane's key concept, "trust in the system" (1962) and Easton's concept of "diffuse support" (1965), correspond to Almond and Verba's "system output affect" or "objective competence" (1965). "Political culture" is a public subculture which is the resource of political socialization, and which can be acquired by individuals through internalization. Also it has been proved that involvement in voluntary organizations results in a significant increase of efficacy. Almond and Verba found in their five-nation study that membership even in nonpolitical organizations affects the members' political attitudes. They postulated that the experience of social inter-

action, the opportunity to participate in decision making, and the general broadening of perspectives that occurs in the organizational activities all would be expected to increase individuals' potential for political involvement. And they found in all five nations they surveyed that those respondents who are members of organizations are generally higher in the subjective competence scale and those respondents who consider their organizations to be involved in politics have higher subjective competence (1963, 305-373). J.D. Wright (1970) and R.E. Bunch (1974) also found similar results in their research.

For the last three decades, the theoretical and methodological flaws with the major variables of political culture have not been resolved. However, their concepts and measures have been narrowed to three separate variables; ie. "internal (political) efficacy," "external (political) efficacy," and "political trust" (Craig, 1979).

b. Mediation Model

The mediation model focuses on the autonomy of voluntary associations and their protective function for individuals against monopolized power. The so-called "mass society" viewpoint holds that the destruction of old communities has separated individuals from social ties, and that this atomization has produced a sense of powerlessness which can be both personally devastating and destructive to democratic processes. Their important theme concerns the organizational tie that must mediate between the isolated, hence potentially powerless, individuals and the massive state.

There are two major versions of mass political theory originating from two opposite intellectual sources (Kornhauser, 1959, p.21f).

The democratic version asserts that the masses are vulnerable to domination by the elite. This danger to political order and civil liberty is believed to result from the automatization of society and the rise of an elite capable of mobilizing isolated and unattached people. The aristocratic version stresses that the primary cause of mass politics lies in the loss of exclusiveness of the elite as a result of greater popular participation in the critical center of society. According to this version, the main danger to political order and civil liberty is the domination of the elite by masses.

Arnold Rose postulated that in the United States a plurality of voluntary organizations plays a major role in supporting democracy by (i) distributing power over social life among a large portion of the people (1954, p.51); (ii) by serving "to tie society together and to minimize the disintegrating effects of conflict;" and (iii) by giving individuals a feeling of identification and status (1967, pp.250-51). In contrast, French voluntary organizations were ineffective in mediation because they were based on the tradition of Catholicism, a liberal tradition concerned with freedom of individuals, and a strong repressive central government (1954, p.114).

Kornhauser (1959) saw that there are tendencies toward loss of autonomy both by the elite and by independent groups in modern society. A society is a "mass society" to the extent that both elite and nonelite are directly accessible to one another by virtue of the weakness of groups capable of mediating between them. Mass politics occurs when a large number of people engage in political activity outside the procedures and rules instituted by a society to govern political action.

Kornhauser argues that liberal democracy requires widespread participation in the selection of leaders and a large amount of self-governing activity on the part of the nonelite. And to the basic question of what kind of social structure meets these conditions of liberal democracy, Kornhauser answers that social pluralism is the arrangement which performs this function.

A plurality of independent and limited-function groups supports liberal democracy by providing social bases of free and open competition for leadership, widespread participation in the selection of leaders, restraint in the application of pressures on leaders, and self-government in wide areas of social life. Therefore, where social pluralism is strong, liberty and democracy tend to be strong; and conversely, forces which weaken social pluralism also weaken liberty and democracy (1959. pp.230-31).

Neal and Seeman (1964) have argued that what is congruent with the mass society thesis is that "membership in mediating organizations is an element in generating a fundamental sense that the persons' social world is manageable." Their finding supported the idea that powerlessness is a function of the lack of mediating organizational ties. However, they were unsure whether organizational membership leads to low alienation (structural argument) or that only the nonalienated join organizations (motivational argument). They agreed that both processes were in operation in their research.

Therefore, the theory of mass society stresses the need for the autonomy of certain social units if order with freedom is to be secured, whether primary emphasis is placed on the autonomy of the elite or on the nonelite (Neal and Seeman 1964, pp.226-29).

The mediation version of pluralism takes the view that even normally nonpolitical associations can temporarily play the role of

"para-political" actors by participating directly in the political system, influencing political leaders' decision making and providing the channels between the political elite and their constituents. In this approach, voluntary associations are seen as the actors, even while the effects on members are not focused.

What we should consider along with mediation model is the impact of unconventional political involvement by the masses. Unconventional, noninstitutional political behavior has received comprehensive attention from Gurr (1968). Disruptive political protest is seen to have its roots in relative deprivation of general values (Gurr, 1968). A lack of general affect toward political authority was deemed as an alternative motive for protest behaviors by Gamson (1968) and Wright (1970). Easton termed this as lack of "diffuse support" (1965). Muller (1972) differentiated political dissent from conventional political behavior on the basis of the presence or absence of three properties: (a) conformity to legal regime norms, (b) conformity to customary regime norms, and (c) the use of violence.

The mobilization and mediation versions of pluralistic theory are not incompatible, and both functions could be performed by the same association. However, those are separate processes that must be kept analytically distinct.

B. Authoritarianism

Considerations of the role of authoritarian character in social structure and the rise of Fascism began in the 1930s and 1940s. The debate was continued after Adorno and his colleagues (1950) introduced

the F-scale to measure anti-semitic prejudice. Because of the rigidity of their ego defense-mechanisms, susceptibility to radical political ideologies, and tendencies toward submission/domination, authoritarian personalities have been also considered as non- or antidemocratic personalities. The negative relationship between authoritarianism and democratic political process has been widely recognized.

Although Adorno admitted that it was not possible to use their F-scale alone as the basis of selecting their interviewees, they were confident of relating the 38-item F-scale to various other indices of antidemocratic personality, brought to light by other techniques. They did not proceed with this in a strictly empirical fashion but were guided by a theoretical orientation, constructing each scale item with a hypothesis, involving following variables (1950. p.228f):

(i) Conventionalism: Rigid adherence to conventional middle-class values. (ii) Authoritarian submission: Submissive attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the in-group. (iii) Authoritarian aggression: Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn those who violate the conventional values. (iv) Anti-intracception: Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tender-minded. (v) Superstition and stereotype: Belief in mystic determinants of the individual's fate. (vi) Power and toughness: Preoccupation with dominance-submission, strong/weak, leader/follower dimension(identifies with power figures). (vii) Destructiveness and cynicism: Generalized hostility and vilification of the human. (viii) Projectivity: Projection outwards of wild emotional impulses. (ix) Sex: Exaggerated concern with sexual 'goings-on'

These variables were thought of as going together to form a psychological cluster, more or less enduring personality structure that predisposes him to be receptive to anti-democratic propaganda. The coherence of the scale items could better be explained theoretically, by positing an inner structure of personality than on the ground of

external association. Also in order to cover a widely underlying theory, single items were sometimes used to represent two or more different concepts (228-229).

5

Despite the criticisms and attempts to replace the F-scale, there followed empirical evidence which showed that authoritarianism and other personality traits patterned by early childhood socialization can be transferred to one's political attitudes (Pye, 1962; Almond and Verba, 1963; Renshon, 1977). Authoritarians tend to have low political efficacy and low trust in the system (Greenstein, 1965; Rosenau, 1975). And authoritarianism is related to an isolationist attitude, lack of efficacy, and nonvoting (Knutson, 1972). It is also related to a habit of submission, little access to the sources of information, lack of verbal facility, and unwillingness to participate in middle-class culture (Knuffer, 1947). Authoritarians do not join many community groups as compared with nonauthoritarians (Sanford, 1950). Janowitz & Marvick (1953) and Sanford (1950) noted that the F-scale was related negatively to voting in a cross-cultural sample. Milbrath and Klein (1962) found the tendency for high F-scorers to shun political activities.

However, authoritarianism is not always related to nonparticipation. Mass politics theorists found that authoritarians are more susceptible to totalitarian mobilization (Kornhauser, 1959). Lane found that; authoritarians tend to have lower political efficacy and lower political participation; to be more susceptible to group pressure or to personal and material advantages which make them join organizations and participate in politics (Lane, 1972). Massive partici-

pation by such authoritarians might endanger the stability of the system because of their submissiveness to authority and their need to express their unconscious hostility (Greenstein, 1969).

NOTES

1. Freeman & Showel (1950) are those who focused on mobilization effect through organizations as reference groups, and so did Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), Verba & Nie (1972), Olsen (1972), D.Jaros & L.Grant (1974).

2. This relationship has been supported in the studies by Freedman & Alex (1952), Berelson et.al. (1954), Hastings (1954), Lipset et.al. (1956), C.R.Wright & H.H.Hyman (1958), Lane (1959), Milbrath (1965), and others.

3. Apart from the above authors, Campbell (1954) developed the Sense of Political Efficacy Scale, which measures an individual's feelings about the effects of his own action on political events. This is equivalent to Almond and Verba's 'subjective competence' (Wright, 1972). As Gamson (1968) narrowed down 'political culture' into two measurable dimensions, 'efficacy' (input dimension) and 'trust' (output dimension), 'political culture' has been generally measured by the foregoing two types of scales.

4. Another explanation comes from social learning theory. Some suitable cues (such as ideology or successful experience of aggressive model behaviors) will lead to aggressive behavior. In addition to this cognitive/motivational explanation, Kass & March (1979) gave attention to the individual's position in the society (status, age, organizational membership, etc.) and socio-political values as the important antecedent variables of political action.

5. R. Christie (1954) asserted that the F-scale captured something other than authoritarianism because it was constructed without a hypothesis and adequate data. Christie and P. Cook (1958) again criticized that it tapped only earlier childhood authoritarianism. Greenstein (1965, 1969) saw the F-Scale as a valuable tool in connecting psychology and political studies but expressed his doubts about the exact content it was supposed to be measuring. He also pointed out the response-set problem with the scale. C. Bay criticized its cognitive simplification (1958). E.Shils (1954) criticized the F-scale for failing to discriminate between leftist and rightist autho-

ritarianism.

Knutson (1972) critically reviewed the F-scale as setting a false dichotomy without narrowing down rightist authoritarianism and without mentioning democratic scale. She saw the F-scale measuring the individual's value preferences rather than personality traits. However, there have been many researchers who have tried to improve the utility of the F-scale.

R. Lee and P. Warr (1969), Byrne(1974) are among those who tried it in two respects: (i) by attempting to extract the scale items for behavioral traits from those for value (belief) preferences, and (ii) by attempting to offset the response set problems. Berkowitz and Walkon (1964), Gough and Lazzari (1974) successfully tested F scale by reducing the original items.

Ray (1976) focused on the dominance-submission dimension of the authoritarian personality and developed a 26-item Directiveness scale. Both scales appeared to have a positive relationship with the F-scale and to be usable along with the F-scale.

Instead of F-scale, Rokeach (1960) developed his Dogmatism scale which measures the rigidity of personality in value preferences. He argued that the Dogmatism scale was associated with the F-scale but was more accurate in dealing with authoritarianism (1967).

6. There is some empirical evidence which did not confirm the relationship between authoritarianism and low political activity. Knutson (1972) rather hypothesized that authoritarians with lower needs to fulfill will be nonparticipants, while those motivated by unfulfilled needs for affection or esteem will join or lead organizations. She attempted to test Maslow's 'hierarchy of needs' (1943) in association with authoritarianism in political behavior.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL DESIGN AND DATA

A. Postulates and Hypotheses

The following postulates and hypotheses are derived from the previous theoretical considerations within the review of the literature, and have been tested against data.

1. Postulates

a. Those high in authoritarian personality traits are less active in their participation in voluntary organizations and in politics than those with low authoritarian traits.

b. Individuals have different cognitions, affects, and evaluations of their roles in the political system and the performance of the political system. The aggregate of such cognitions, affects, and evaluations is a part of the political culture of a given society. And the political culture of each country is a key factor which fosters or inhibits political participation, development of democracy, and stability of the polity.

c. Participation in voluntary organizations does politicize individuals by increasing their knowledge about politics, sensitivity to issues, and skills or capacity to act politically and most of all it increases political competence.

d. Participation in the electoral process (from campaign to voting) is the major type of political activity which fulfills the

principle of democracy. However, protest behaviors also have their part in the democratic process if discretely exercised.

2. Hypotheses

a. Among authoritarians, those who participate in voluntary organizations have higher political competence than authoritarians who do not participate in voluntary organizations, in terms of their affect about their own position as a political subject, their ability to influence the political system, the output responses by the political system, and the national political system as a whole.

b. Among authoritarians, those who participate in voluntary organizations and have higher political competence are more likely to participate in the electoral process than those who do not participate in voluntary organizations.

c. In their choices of political issues, the authoritarian and politically less competent individuals exhibit significantly different emphases than their less authoritarian and more politically competent counterparts. The authoritarian/ less competent are more likely to prefer basic needs-oriented and homeland-oriented political issues.

B. Variables

1. Independent Variable

a. **Authoritarianism:** There are a number of versions of the F-scale designed and tested by researchers. In the 1972 National Election Study (by SRC), a six-item scale was used to measure authoritarian aggression and submission, deleting other dimensions of the F-scale.

This SRC scale was adopted in the current study, with minor changes in wording to convey culturally relevant meanings and to prevent response-set problems.

The original design of this study assumed that these six items would form a single scale that measures one dimension, i.e., authoritarian aggression/submission. But examination of the correlation among the six items (and with dependent variables) revealed that these items are measuring at least two different dimensions (authoritarian submission/aggression and liberal/conservative attitude) simultaneously. Therefore, two separate indices, Authoritarian Index and Liberalism Index, were constructed (Appendix I.1.).

2. Intervening Variable

a. Organizational Participation: In the current study, eight types of ethnic (provincial, alumni, service-oriented, professional, etc.) organizations were specified. The degree of participation was measured by the respondent's total number of memberships, officerships, and frequency of attendance in organizations; they made the composite Organizational index (Appendix I.2.). Involvement in churches is excluded from the index because its voluntariness has been questionable.

3. Dependent Variable

a. Political Efficacy: Taking the affective dimension from the political culture approach (Almond and Verba, 1963), the current study measured (i) the individual's feeling about being subjected to the political system, (ii) input affect to the political processes, (iii) output affect toward the political system, and (iv) the feeling about the political system as a whole.

Following the theoretical model of Almond and Verba (1963), R.E. Bunch (1968) studied the political orientation of Japanese-Americans of Oregon. Since the scale items revised by Bunch were too complicated to use in a mailed survey, this researcher used a new omnibus of political competence scales, deleting cognitive and evaluative dimensions from the ICPR questionnaire (Appendix I.3).

b. Political Participation: It would be desirable to have this variable as the dependent variable. But when this study was being planned, the majority of the sample were not expected to be naturalized citizens who could vote; and even among the citizens, very few were expected to have registered for voting. Therefore, this variable was not seriously considered as the dependent variable. However, after the survey, it was found that Koreans may not be invisible voters.

Some of the political-participation items were designed to measure the future potential of participation by those who were not yet eligible voters (noncitizens). These people, also, were asked about their involvement in the political meetings, monetary contributions, etc. Also the potential for political protest activities was examined as a form of unconventional political participation along with political issue preferences (details in Chapter VI).

C. Data

The primary data were generated from the Korean communities of the Chicago area and the neighboring Midwestern states by means of a readership survey of the Korea Times (the largest Korean language daily newspaper in the Midwest). The National Election Data (1972-76

panel studies by SRC; and 1980-82 Election studies by ICPR) and the 1980 Census data have been partially used for comparison. The reason for using the old SRC data is that these are latest available ones which measured authoritarianism along with participation in voluntary organizations and in politics.

1. Sampling

There is no way to know the exact size of the population for the Korean sampling. The 1980 census enumerated about 24,000 Koreans in Illinois but the Korean community's own estimate is two or three times larger than that. The Korean Directory published by the Korean Association of Chicago in 1982 lists about 4,000 names. But compiling and publishing that kind of list normally takes a year, so a high proportion of the list is out-of-date. Any chosen list of Koreans in the area must be checked against the Illinois Bell Directory because these new immigrants are highly mobile. Still, this elaboration might exclude those who do not have telephones. The problem is even worse in the case of Koreans residing in the neighboring states.

The most reasonable sampling method, in this respect, seems to be cluster sampling (or area sampling). While it is impossible to list the whole Korean-American population in the area, a researcher can reduce the listing problem to manageable proportions by first sampling a set of clusters which contain the population and then enumerate/ randomly select from the clusters (Sonia R. Wright, 1979, p.22).

The Korea Times keeps an up-to-date list of its subscribers (totaling about 7,500 including out-of-state readers), but this list has limited value for sampling a population because it excludes non-

subscribers. However, a readership survey of a considerably large sampling was expected to bring in a well balanced representation of the population. This type of sample could not be random in the sense that it excludes the nonsubscribers of the newspaper. But the initial selection of those who received the questionnaire was done randomly within the population of the subscribers. And the cross-comparison with previous Korean sample studies in the Chicago area and with the U.S. Census qualified the representativeness of the current sample.

At first, target clusters were identified by postal zip codes in the city of Chicago and its suburbs while each of the six states other than Illinois was taken as a single unit. Thirty per cent of the subscribers were randomly selected from each target zip code or units (Appendix II.1.).

Initially 1,077 subscribers (417 from the city of Chicago, 208 from Chicago suburbs, and 452 from neighboring states) were selected. The first questionnaires were mailed out in mid-September, 1983 (for the city of Chicago city and its suburbs). Other than writing in postal zip codes, the respondents were not asked to identify themselves. The guarantee for anonymity of the respondents was clearly mentioned at the top of the questionnaire and in the newspaper's announcement about the beginning of this survey.

Because the initial return rate was too low, about two-thirds of the suburban sample and half of the Chicago city sample received a second wave of questionnaires during the first two weeks of November 1983. At this time the neighboring state addresses received their single mailing of questionnaires. A third wave of questionnaires was

sent only to Chicago addresses (the size was about 60 per cent of the second wave) in February 1984. The final total responses include 268 cases from Chicago and suburbs (return rate 42.6 per cent) and 128 from out of state (return rate 28.3 per cent). The total analyzable cases reached 344 (36.8 per cent of the total initial samples).

2. Representativeness of the Sample

a. Comparison with the 1980 U.S. Census Data: Because of the nature of the sampling method, it is necessary to check to what extent the current sample represents the population. The mean ages and educational attainments of the Koreans in the 1980 Census and in the current sample are not significantly different. Also, occupational characteristics are similar when job-categories are collapsed into white-collar, blue-collar, and others. But income categories are much different between the two sets of data (Appendix II.2).

b. Variance within the sampling clusters: Since the data were gathered from three large clusters with the assumption that each cluster represented certain local demographic characteristics, it is necessary to check if the samples from different clusters can be considered as parts of the same population.

The respondents in the three-cluster samples shared the same characteristics in terms of age and education and almost the same in occupation. But income distribution and years of sojourn are different across the locality. Most of the cases in the sample could be analyzed as a whole, while it may be necessary to control the effects of occupation, income, and years of sojourn in this country (Appendix II.3).

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF KOREAN AMERICANS

A. Historical Background of the Korean Immigrants.

Korea was the last nation in Far East to open her doors to the United States by signing the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1882. The history of Korean immigration began in 1903, when 101 Koreans (including 21 women and 25 children) arrived at the Hawaiian sugar-cane farms as laborers. By 1905 a total of 7,226 Koreans had immigrated to Hawaii but then large migrations stopped until the late 1960s.

The first factor in this cessation of Korean immigration is the U.S. Immigration Act of 1924, which grew out of the Quota Act of 1921 and was known as the Oriental Exclusion law. These acts limited non-European immigration, and especially Asians, who were entitled only to a quota of under 100 per country per year until around the end of World War II. All Asians were generally forbidden to become naturalized U.S. citizens until the passage of Walter-McCarran Act of 1952.

Another factor which blocked Korean immigration was the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. Under the 36 years of Japanese colonial rule, almost no Koreans (except about 1,100 "picture brides") were allowed to emigrate to America. In fact, fewer than 900 students, and political refugees came to America during that period(1910-1945).

At the end of the World War II, Korea was divided along the 38th parallel by the United States and the Soviet Union. The historical

division of this country was discussed in the Potsdam Conference in July, 1945, and materialized as General Order No.1, drafted on August 11 by the United States, as the terms of Japanese surrender in Korea.

The four big powers (The United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China) wanted a military trusteeship in Korea but the Koreans struggled for an independent government, both in the South and the North. Being unable to solve the dispute among themselves and manipulated by the foreign powers, two separate elections were held, resulting in two governments in 1948. This election was the first experience of democratic political process for Koreans.

The invasion of the South by the Russian-backed North Koreans in June, 1950, became a three-year civil war. The futile war between the South and North Koreans involving the United Nations forces and Red Chinese forces ended in July, 1954, leaving the country still divided. Since then, North Korea has never been friendly to the United States and the two countries have no formal relationship. Therefore, Korean immigrants to the United States are all from South Korea, although some of them had fled from the North during the Korean War.

Before the Immigration Act of 1965, during the interim period (from the Korean War to 1964), thousands of Korean brides of American servicemen and orphans arrived in the United States. During the period of 1950-1975, a total of 28,205 Korean war brides arrived in the U.S., while 6,293 Korean orphans arrived between 1955-1966 through adoption (Hurh and Kim, 1984).

Few of the earlier immigrants, however, reached the Midwest and

almost none of them survived here. The so-called "old timers" are the few oldest sojourners and the students who came around the end of World War II, and the hundreds of students who came before the new immigration act (1951-64).

The war brides of the U.S. servicemen or those who had interracial marriages have been isolated from later Korean immigrant groups. Only a small portion of those Korean wives of Americans who came after 1965 seem to be trying to become partially integrated with Koreans among the mass immigration group.

The adopted Korean-born children (during the 1950s) have almost become lost to the Korean community in the U.S. About 46 percent of them were hybrid white American-Koreans, 41 percent were pure Koreans, and the rest were hybrid black American-Koreans (Huhr, 1972). Not much information is available about them. But recently the adopting American parents of the pure-Korean orphans are searching for ties with the Korean communities in large cities to educate their adopted children to be aware of their heritages and find their own unique ethnic identity.

Therefore, the Korean communities in the Midwest are mainly the communities of later immigrants (post-1960s) mixed with the small number of the "interim period" student group, who tend to be considered elite members of the Korean communities.

The majority of constituents of the Midwestern Korean communities arrived in the United States as the doors were opened by the Immigration and Naturalization Act Amendments of 1965. This law lifted the quota limits for the nationals of the Eastern Hemisphere and adopted a preference system which assigns a certain portion of annual im-

migration quotas to family reunion and to those who can fit into the American labor market segments where manpower is short.

As a result, the Asian share of total immigration to the U.S. grew from 7.6 percent (1961-65) to 27.4 percent (1969-73), equaling the European share for the first time in American history. The Korean share of the total U.S. immigration increased from 0.7 percent to 3.8 percent during that eight-year period.

Annual Korean immigration numbers exceeded 10,000 by 1971, and their annual numbers have been maintained above 30,000 since 1976. In terms of annual immigration numbers, Korea is the third largest supplier of immigrants after Mexico and the Philippines (Table IV.1).

Even among the new Korean immigrants (since 1965), the demographic configuration has changed drastically over the 20 year period. Because of the preference system used in issuing immigration visas, about 75 percent of the Korean immigrants during the 1964-68 period were professionals, most being physicians, nurses, or scientists and

Table IV.1. Number of Korean Immigrants to the U.S.

Year	Immigrants	Year	Immigrants	Year	Immigrants
		1970	9,314	1980	32,320
		1971	14,297	1981	32,633
		1972	18,876	1982	31,724
		1973	22,930	1983	33,339
1964	2,362	1974	28,028		
1965	2,165	1975	28,362		
1966	2,492	1976	30,803		
1967	2,956	1977	30,917		
1968	3,811	1978	29,288		
1969	6,045	1979	29,248		

Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Reports

technicians. But professional immigration declined noticeably after the mid-1970s. Before a minor revision of the immigration law in 1976, the preference system favored professionals over the family reunion provisions (60 per cent of available quota for professionals vs. 40 per cent for family reunions). But this proportional preference was reversed in 1976, allowing 60 per cent for family reunion and 40 per cent for professionals (Keely, 1980).

This change of rule reflects the demands of the U.S. labor market. By 1974-76 the United States was becoming self-sufficient in the professional field but needed more people who could fill in the marginal labor markets. Therefore, instead of those professional immigrants who could compete in the middle-upper labor market on their own merits, their adult brothers and sisters and the families of the latter were brought in to fill the nonskilled labor markets. And the later group invited their aging parents who had grown out of their wage-earning ages.

Because the permanent residents (legal immigrants) can be naturalized in five years and attain new privileges, such as the right to file petitions for immigration of their nonimmediate relatives, the demographic characteristics of the Korean communities are rapidly changing over a short period of time.

B. Demographic Description of Korean-Americans.

The 1980 Census enumerated 354,593 people in the U.S. (24,351 in Illinois) whose national origin is Korea. But according to the Korean government (Passport Office), the number has reached 800,000,

and estimates by leaders of the Korean-American communities in large U.S. cities are about three times higher than the Census numbers. For example, in the Los Angeles area, the Korean community claims a quarter of a million population, Greater New York Koreans claim 120,000, and Chicago area cognoscenti claim 70,000. The Washington D.C. and San Francisco areas each claim 50,000 Koreans.

1. Age, Sex, and Marital Status

As in most other Korean surveys (Huhr and Kim, 1984,b), males showed a higher response rate (68.7 per cent) than females (31.3 per cent) to the current survey. However, according to 1980 Census, the Korean community of the Chicago SMSA has more females(53.7 per cent) than males (46.3 per cent). The higher response rate from males in surveys, as in social activity in general, reflects the Korean culture still dominated by males.

The majority of Korean-Americans are very young. Their median age in nation-wide census is 26.1 years but is 26.9 years in Illinois (Table IV.2). Among the five major Asian-American groups in Illinois, the Koreans are the youngest. The Japanese have the highest median age (32.1 years), followed by the Filipinos (30.2 years), the Indians (28.9 years), and Chinese (28.7 years), with the median age of Illinois' total population being 29.9 years.

The mean age of the current sample is 40.9 years and the median age is 40 years (minimum 22 years, maximum 82 years). Considering that all those who reported their ages are over 20 years old and this sample was taken three-and-a-half years after the 1980 Census, the age distributions of the current sample and that of the 1980 Census show

very similar patterns. If the age group under 19 years is excluded from the Census, and the three-and-half year lapse is calculated, these two age distributions peak (mode) at 39.0 years (Illinois) and 41.7 years (current sample), respectively. More than four-fifth of the Koreans in Illinois (84.8 per cent) and of the current sample¹ (83.8 per cent) are in the age category of 20 to 49 (Table IV.3).

Table IV.2. Age Distribution of Koreans

	National		Illinois	
Total Persons	354,593		24,351	
under 9 years	80,502		6,069	
10 - 19 "	59,958		3,569	
20 - 29 "	63,212	* 29.52 %	4,100	* 27.87 %
30 - 39 "	75,531	* 35.27	5,812	* 39.50
40 - 49 "	44,752	* 20.90	2,955	* 20.08
50 - 59 "	16,022	* 7.48	866	* 5.89
60 - 69 "	9,536	* 4.45	728	* 4.95
70 and over	5,080	* 2.37	252	* 1.71
sub total		* 99.99		*100.0
median age	26.1		26.9	

* (% 20 years. or older).

Source: 1980 U.S. Census

Table IV.3. Age by Sex (Current Sample)

Age	Male (%)	Female (%)	Row Total N	Column %
20 - 29	8.2	16.0	36	10.6
30 - 39	32.2	50.0	128	37.8
40 - 49	39.1	27.4	120	35.4
50 - 59	12.9	3.8	34	10.0
60 - 69	6.0	1.9	6	4.7
70 and over	1.7	0.9	5	1.5
Total	233 (68.7)	106 (31.3)	339	100.0

Mean Age=40.9 Median Age=40.0 Missing Cases=5

Most of the respondents in the current sample (89.2 %) are married and divorce rate is very low (6.4 %), even though this sample is mostly represented by the age group which could be in a mid-life crisis, indicating strong traditional family solidarity.

2. Educational Achievement

As has been reported (B.L. Kim, 1978c; Hurh et al., 1978; Huh and Kim, 1984), the recent Korean immigrants are one of the highly educated ethnic groups. About two-thirds (62.8 per cent) of our respondents have graduated from four-year colleges in Korea. In addition, more than a quarter (26.9 per cent) received some education in the U.S., with 21.3 per cent of the total respondents having received bachelor or higher degrees in the U.S. (Table IV.4).

This educational achievement appears strikingly identical to the results of the 1980 U.S. Census, which shows that 61.9 per cent of Illinois' Koreans are college graduates. The proportion of high school

Table IV.4 .Educational Attainment of the Respondents

Level of Education	Education I (in Korea)		Education II(in the U.S.)	
	N	%	N	%
under Junior High	9	2.6	1	0.3
High School Drop-out	7	2.0	1	0.3
High School Graduation	68	19.8	2	0.6
College Drop-out	37	10.8	15	4.4
College Graduation	174	50.6	16	4.7
Some Graduate Work	15	4.4	22	6.4
Master's Degree	10	3.2	24	7.0
Doctoral Degree	4	1.2	11	3.2
No Answer	19	5.5	8	2.3
Total	344	100.0		

Respondents in the Education II are also included in the Education I.

graduates (and higher) among Korean-Americans is 83.4 per cent in the 1980 Census (Illinois) and 89.1 per cent in the current sample. Probably the respondents in the current sample are slightly more educated, because a newspaper readership survey attracts more responses from those who can read and enjoy reading.

Table IV.5. Educational Attainment of Koreans in Illinois

Years of School Completed	Male	Female	Total	%
Elementary 0 to 4 yrs	84	307	391	2.97
5 to 7 yrs	79	481	560	4.26
8 yrs	79	308	387	2.94
High School 1 to 3 yrs	242	597	839	6.38
4 yrs	862	1,968	2,830	21.53
College 1 to 3 yrs	863	1,821	2,684	20.42
4 yrs	3,434	2,021	5,455	41.49
Total			13,146	99.99
% of High School Graduates	91.4	77.4		83.44

Source: 1980 U.S. Census.

3. Occupational Status

Previous Korean surveys have revealed (Hurh and Kim, 1980) that about three-fourth of Koreans in the Los Angeles area were employed; similarly, 72.3 per cent of the respondents in the current sample are employed. More male respondents (82.3 per cent) are employed than females (49.5 per cent). The respondents to the current survey show a slightly higher employment rate than in the 1980 U.S. Census. In the Census, 69.4 per cent of Illinois' Korean males (over age 16) were in the labor force vs. 61.4 per cent for females. This employment rate

is a little higher than that of Illinois' total population (Tables IV.6 and IV.7).²

The first wave of Asian mass immigration with the post-1965 Immigration Amendment was highly professional. Similarly in the current sample, one-third (32.5 per cent) are in the professional and technical groupings, vs. 23 per cent of Illinois' Koreans in the 1980 Census. The next most represented occupation in the current survey is proprietors (24.1 per cent), while the skilled or nonskilled factory workers had the second highest representation (25.8 per cent) in the 1980 Census. The comparison supports the idea that the current sample

Table IV.6. Occupational Status of the Survey Respondents
Compared with 1980 Illinois Census

Occupations	Current Survey		Illinois Census	
	N	%	N	%
1. Professionals (M.D., Professor, Scientist, Clergy etc.)	25	7.3	1,607	10.1
2. Technicals (Nurses, Technicians etc.)	56	16.3	2,257	14.2
3. Managerial (Corp. Managers, Public Officers, Salesmen)	12	3.5	551	3.5
4. Clericals (Office Clerks, Assistants, Secretaries etc.)	9	2.6	974	6.1
5. Skilled Labor (Factory Foremen, Mechanics etc.)	12	3.5	876	5.5
6. Nonskilled Labor (Factory Assemblers)	14	4.1	2,723	17.2
7. Proprietors (Small Business)	60	17.4	985	6.2
8. Service Workers (Janitorial, House Maid, etc.)	5	1.5	571	3.6
9. Others	56	16.3		
Unemployed	95	27.5	5,321	33.5
Total	344	100.0	15,865	99.9

fairly represents the occupational status of the Koreans in Illinois census figures, except that there has been more representation from the self-employed proprietors. It might also indicate that during the three-and-half years since the 1980 Census more factory workers turned into small-business owners and more people completed training and then moved into white-collar professions.

Table IV.7. Respondents' Occupation by Sex

Occupations	Male: N	%	Female: N	%	Row Total	%
Professional	25	10.5	0	0	25	7.3
Technical	41	17.3	15	14.0	56	16.3
Managerial	47	19.8	13	12.1	60	17.4
Clerical	10	4.2	2	1.9	12	3.5
Skilled Worker	4	1.7	5	4.7	9	2.6
Nonskilled Worker	12	5.1	0	0	12	3.5
Proprietor	12	5.1	2	1.9	14	4.1
Service Worker	2	0.8	3	2.8	5	1.5
Others Employed	42	17.7	14	13.1	56	16.3
Unemployed	42	17.7	53	49.5	95	27.6

There are some indications that for Koreans the length of residence in the United States is positively related to higher occupational status ($\text{Gamma}=.20$). Most of the selected professionals (87.5 per cent) have lived longer than six years in this country, while 81.6 per cent of the nonskilled workers have lived in this country for less than five years. And among the self-employed small business group, 71.7 per cent have lived in his country for longer than five years.

4. Income Ranks

The average combined annual family gross income of the current (1983) sample is \$35,788 (minimum \$4,000, maximum \$300,000). This is

much higher than the median income for all Illinois' families (\$22,746 in 1980) and for white families (\$23,999). But the median family income of Koreans in the 1980 Census (\$20,485) is lower than the above figures. Although inflation during the three-year time lapse is considered, the current sample seems to have drawn more respondents from higher income groups. If it is true that people state income moderately in public reports but inflate it when talking to fellow Koreans, the census income statistics may be incorrect. This tendency has been mentioned by accountants or real-estate salesmen in the community.

Age has no relationship to high income among the current Korean respondents, but the type of occupation and length of sojourn in this country are positively related. Professionals and technicians may well earn high salaries, but it is the small-business operators who are doing best among all occupational groups in the Korean community. The current data clearly support speculations in the community that small-business operators are the best-off among Koreans.

The existence of status inconsistency in a mid-age group who are highly educated and financially well-off but unsatisfied with their

Table IV.8. Income Status of the Respondents

Income Level (\$)	N	%
under 15,000	37	10.5
16,000 - 25,000	82	23.9
26,000 - 35,000	72	21.0
36,000 - 50,000	57	16.7
over 50,000	96	28.0
Total	344	100.0

social positions may have many implications for political potential. According to Kim and Hurh's study of Chicago's Southside (1984, b), (mostly Black and Latino areas) businesses, 60.7 per cent of Korean small-business people are college graduates. While the proprietors are well educated like other Koreans in general, and so have high achievement motivation, they cannot find satisfying positions in the occupational strata in America, perhaps because of language barriers and lack of know-how, or because of discrimination .

Although they have achieved some success in monetary terms in their businesses, they are trying to find more meaning in their lives, because with their high educational attainments they do not want merely to end up as 'mom-and-pop' shop merchants in black or Latino areas. This sense of status discrepancy (Y. Lee, 1978) may have a potential for political action.

NOTES

1. A similar age distribution was also found in Studies of Korean Small Business of Southside Chicago (Kim and Huhr, 1984, b). The average age of the 94 respondents of their study is 39.8 years (ranging from 21 to 50).

2. In the 1980 census, only 63.9 per cent of males of all races were in the labor force vs. 51.6 per cent of all females. Although the Census statistics included teen-age (over age 16) unemployment, and the current survey does not, both Korean males and females have a higher employment rate than do average Illinois residents.

3. For example, the proportion of those who earned more than \$50,000 a year is 79.1 % for selected professionals, 64.3 % for technical, 58.4 % for managerial, 33.3 % for clerical, 50 % for skilled workers, 35.7 % for nonskilled, 81.6 % for proprietors, 20 % for the service workers, and 64.3 % cent of others.

CHAPTER V

AUTHORITARIANISM, ORGANIZATIONAL PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL EFFICACY

A. Authoritarianism

In this chapter, we shall explore the extent of authoritarian characters, organizational involvement, and their relationship with political efficacy among the respondents.

With the six items selected to measure mainly authoritarian aggression and submissiveness, the Koreans in the current sample expressed more authoritarian aggression-submission on three out of the four items than did Americans (compared with the American sample in the National Election Studies by SRC, 1972-76). And Koreans showed less egalitarianism in the two items than did Americans (Table V.1).

The strong support for women's political participation, in contrast to the strong agreement with most of the authoritarian items, was somewhat unexpected. It may partially indicate that egalitarian values in gender roles are being inculcated among Korean-Americans. Korea has been a male-dominant society, where the female's main role is being a faithful housewife. But in the immigrant families wives' participation in the labor market and the inevitable sharing of household chores with their husbands seem to be bringing some changes in the balance of authority into the family (Kim and Huhr, 1984 a.). However, the cross-tabulations among authoritarianism items reveals

Table V.1 Comparison of Responses to Six Authoritarian Items
Among Koreans and Americans

Items	Koreans (Current Sample)	Americans (1972 Election Studies)
1. What young people need most is strict parental discipline.		
Agree	193 (56.3 %)	1,003 (76.0 %)
Disagree	86 (25.0)	287 (21.7)
Undecided	53 (15.5.)	12 (0.9)
No Answer	12 (3.2)	18 (1.4)
2. Women should stay out of politics.		
Agree	58 (16.9)	219 (16.8)
Disagree	209 (60.8)	1,082 (81.9)
Undecided	69 (20.1)	10 (0.7)
No Answer	8 (2.2)	9 (0.6)
3. Science has limits and may be wrong.		
Agree	236 (68.6 %)	641 (48.6 %)
Disagree	23 (6.7)	605 (45.8)
Undecided	55 (16.0)	61 (4.6)
No Answer	30 (8.7)	13 (1.0)
4. People should pay more attention to new ideas.		
Agree	89 (84.0 %)	880 (66.7 %)
Disagree	28 (8.1)	386 (29.2)
Undecided	16 (4.7)	40 (3.0)
No Answer	11 (3.2)	14 (1.1)
5. Equality has gone too far in this country.		
Agree	144 (41.9 %)	553 (41.9 %)
Disagree	91 (26.5)	681 (51.6)
Undecided	89 (25.8)	72 (5.5)
No Answer	20 (5.8)	14 (1.0)
6. All but the handicapped and old should take care of themselves.		
Agree	256 (74.4 %)	603 (45.7 %)
Disagree	55 (16.0)	684 (51.8)
Undecided	22 (6.4)	24 (1.8)
No Answer	11 (3.2)	11 (0.7)

that egalitarian value preferences are associated with authoritarian aggression.¹

The strong support (84 per cent) for the "openness to new ideas" (item 4) was somewhat unexpected because authoritarianism has been viewed to be associated with conservative orientations. The frequency distribution indicates that Koreans are highly authoritarian in submission-aggression orientation but are very much open to new values. This seems to contradict the original hypothesis about the rigidity (conventionalism, superstitiousness, and stereotyping) of authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1950); and also not compatible with the assumptions of the researchers who found close association between authoritarianism and dogmatism or conservatism (Rokeach, 1956 & 1967). A close examination of the current data revealed that the "openness to new ideas" item also has a strong relationship with aggression/submission items.² This may indicate that those who are open to new ideas are susceptible to suggestion in the name of "the new." Also, authoritarians may support egalitarian values as a function of aggression or susceptibility to "new ideas."

Table V.2. Pearson Correlation Among 6 Items

	item 1 youth	item 2 women	item 3 science	item 4 ideas	item 5 equality	item 6 welfare
item 1	1.00					
item 2	-.09	1.00				
item 3	0.22	0.31	1.00			
item 4	0.35	0.39	0.51	1.00		
item 5	0.17	0.10	0.32	0.27	1.00	
item 6	0.28	0.26	0.28	0.47	0.33	1.00

However, "openness to new ideas" may not reflect psychological disposition alone. Inkeles argues that "openness to new experience" is a part of modernity syndrome, a complex and diffuse personal quality manifested in attitudes, values, and behaviors. Even the permissiveness of women's rights is a part of the modernity syndrome (1974, p.109, 291). We cannot affirm that psychological disposition stands alone as the indicator of "openness to new ideas" or "permissiveness of women's rights."

The intercorrelations among the six authoritarian items is not high, and item 2 (women's political participation) and item 5 (against too much equality) have negative or weak relationships with the other four items (Table V.2). A reliability test shows that the Alpha coefficient among the six items is 69.5³. The Authoritarianism Index, constructed on the basis of cumulative scores of the six items into a unidimensional measure as originally planned, did not work out despite numerous computations. This index showed no significant differences between male and female respondents in the dependent variables, nor in other major variables such as Organizational Index.

If we accept the criticisms that Adorno's F-scale measures only authoritarianism on the right (E. Shils, 1954) and sets up a false dichotomy without specifying authoritarians on the left (Knutson, 1972), then item 2 (openness to women's political participation) and item 4 (openness to new ideas) seem to be measuring a liberal-conservative dimension in addition to aggression-submission.

Rokeach suggests that authoritarians may conform to whatever institutional norms which prevail, even those advocating egalitarianism.

He cites that in Israel highly dogmatic subjects rank equality higher, while in the U.S. dogmatists rank equality lower (1973, pp.114-15).

Clear arguments for the inclusion of the left and center in the analysis of political extremism can be found in the review of political history by Lipset et al. (1960). Also, C. Bay (1970, p. 206) gives a rationale as to why authoritarians can be both conservative and liberal.

Therefore, in the current research, liberalism/conservatism is taken as another dimension of personality traits, with an assumed close association with authoritarianism. Although there is some conceptual weakness with the limited number of authoritarian items, and there is no way to determine to what extent the six items are measuring psychological dispositions vs. cultural values, the Authoritarianism Index constructed of four items and the Liberalism Index made of two items emerged as the best choices from the current data (see Appendix I.5 for index construction).

B. Participation in Voluntary Organizations

Organizational membership of the respondents is largely limited to Korean ethnic organizations, with Korean churches dominating and very few joining American organizations. Sixty-three per cent of the respondents have at least one organizational membership, while 37 per cent have no membership in any organization (Table V.3). More than two-thirds (68.2 per cent) do not hold any positions as officers in those organizations and 31.8 per cent hold one such position (Table V.4.). Less than one-fourth (22.7 per cent) participate frequently

in organizational meetings, while 56.3 per cent do not participate at all (Table V.5.).

The current data support the findings by Huhr and Kim (1978) about the high ethnic organization involvement by Korean immigrants in the U.S. They interpreted the high ethnic organizational involvement by Koreans as an indication of ethnic confinement and saw this as a mode adaptation of immigrants ('adhesive adaptation').⁴

The degree of organization involvement varies widely depending on the types of organizations; 33.8 per cent have memberships in church-related organizations with 19.5 per cent holding offices in these organizations. Frequent participation is also highest in church-related organizations. The next most popular organization is college alumni

Table V.3. Organization Memberships

Number of Orgs. Belong to	cases	per cent
none	127	37.0 %
one	109	31.8
two	55	15.7
three to six	53	15.5
Total	344	100.0

Table V.4. Organization Office Holders

Number of Positions	cases	per cent
none	234	68.2 %
one	74	21.6
two to six	36	10.2
Total	344	100.0

associations with a membership rate of 22.4 per cent. Although the Korean Association has been recognized as the most inclusive organization and the provincial organizations claim the most basic communal ties with the old homeland, affiliations to these organizations are very low (Table V.6.).

Authoritarianism is not significantly related to organization involvement except that liberals hold slightly more organizational offices than conservatives ($\text{Gamma} = -.17$). Organizational involvement (in membership) is lower among females ($\text{Gamma} = -.21$) and highest among

Table.V.5. Organization Participation

Degree of Participation	cases	per cent
often	78	22.7 %
occasionally	73	21.0
not at all	193	56.3
Total	344	100.0

Table V.6. Affiliation by Types of Organizations
(in per cent)

Types of orgs.	member	officer	frequent attendance
provincial	5.8	0.3	0.9
high school alumni	14.9	4.1	6.1
college alumni	22.4	6.4	8.5
church related	33.8	19.6	33.5
service oriented	8.7	6.4	7.6
professional	14.3	4.4	7.9
Korean Association	13.7	3.5	5.5
others	7.9	3.2	5.0

the age group in their 40s (60 per cent), followed by the age group in their 30s (46.1 per cent). Educational attainment ($\text{Gamma}=.18$) and occupational status are significantly related to organizational membership ($\text{Gamma}= -.30$). Better-educated professionals are more likely to be involved in organizations than less educated or blue-collar workers. Naturalized U.S. citizens have higher organizational involvement ($\text{Gamma}= .34$) than alien residents. Years of residence in the U.S. is positively related to organizational involvement ($\text{Gamma}=.32$).

C. Political Efficacy

The concept of political efficacy has been present in most theories and researches of political participation for the last 30 years. However, the concept and measure of political efficacy suffer from major shortcomings.

In the civic culture of Almond and Verba (1963, 16), political culture has three dimensions (cognitive, affective, evaluative) and four different objects as political actors (system as general object; personal input object; system output object; and self as civic object). But the researchers who followed the Survey Research Center (especially the three-wave panel Election Study of 1972-74-76) have focused on the affective orientation toward the self and the system as political actors. The efficacy variables of the SRC researches are centered on internal efficacy, external efficacy, and political trust which roughly correspond to input affect, output affect and system affect of the original design of Almond and Verba (S. Craig, 1979, Abramson, 1983). These three variables have independent roots and do not appear closely inter-

wined although they are the measures of diffuse support for the political system (Iyengar, 1980). There is a trend toward reducing the questionnaire items to the minimum, and some researchers do not distinguish between internal and external efficacy (Abramson, 1983).

The current study adopted the variables close to the original design by Almond and Verba. In the present chapter we shall deal with the generalized attitudes (affective orientation in particular) toward (a) the political system as a whole, its virtues and accomplishments (system affect); (b) the feelings of individuals toward themselves being subject to the civic duties (civic affect); (c) the expectations people have of treatment at the hands of government officials (output affect); and (d) the feelings people have about those governmental agencies as well as their ability to influence the enactment of policies (input affect).

1. System Affect

Almond and Verba, in their original study (1963) of civic culture, measured responses on 10 different aspects of system affect. In the current survey, only four out of those items were chosen (for brevity, by eliminating the items which are not suitable for the Koreans) and were constructed into the System Affect Index (see Appendix I.3.a).

About two-thirds of the current sample has high system affect. This result shows that Koreans (in America) have higher system affect, when compared with other national or ethnic samples, such as Japanese-Americans or the Western five nations. Sixty-three per cent of our Korean-Americans (including non-citizens) have a high regard for the democratic political system of the U.S. The social welfare system,

economic system, and the technology-military power of America are respected in more than two-thirds of the current sample (Table V.7).

The relatively high esteem for the American governmental system has solid roots in the history of Korea (the South Korean Republic).⁷ Through the past century of mutual contact, Koreans (of the South) have always perceived Americans as wealthy, strong, and friendly, even as a rescuer in crises like the Korean War or in internal political turmoil. And broad cultural graftings with the United States after World War II have greatly contributed to the formation of high system affect of this immigrant group for the U.S. and its political system.

Table V.7. Confidence in the U.S. Political System
by Korean Respondents

Aspects of U.S. Government	degree of pride and respect				total
	very much	somewhat	not at all	missing	
democracy	63.0 %	27.7 %	4.1 %	5.2 %	100.0 %
social welfare	60.3	31.5	3.2	5.0	100.0
economy	72.0	20.1	3.2	4.7	100.0
industry/defense	68.8	22.4	3.2	5.5	100.0

The examination of the System Affect Index reveals that females have a slightly higher system affect than do males (Gamma=.14) and the better-educated respondents have a weaker system affect (Gamma=-.24). Age and citizenship status do not make any difference in system affect, although the length of residence in the U.S. has a weak positive relationship to system affect.

2. Civic Affect

Civic affect is the affective orientation toward oneself as a political object. It comprises one's feelings of being obliged to perform citizen's duties in the political system and feelings of capability to handle such obligations. Although civic affect is one of the four political orientations in Almond and Verba's original concepts, it has been gradually eliminated as the efficacy measures got simpler.

The current respondents' sense of civic duty is very low. Of the four selected items, the most satisfying civic duty is voting, yet only 41 per cent of the respondents would vote with satisfaction, and 37 per cent would serve on a jury with satisfaction. Only 18 per cent felt satisfied with paying taxes and 11 per cent with registration for military draft for themselves or for their sons.

On the Civic Affect Index (Appendix I.3.b), only 31.1 per cent showed high civic affect. Females have lower civic affect than do males ($\text{Gamma} = -.30$). Educational attainment ($\text{Gamma} = .17$) and age have weak positive relationship with civic affect. Those who have lived longer in the U.S. and naturalized citizens are more likely to accept civic duties than are alien residents ($\text{Gamma} = .18$). However, civic affect

Table V.8.Civic Affect(Sense of Citizen's Duty)

	satisfied	do as duty	feel annoyed	missing	total
pay taxes	17.5 %	74.1 %	4.1 %	4.4 %	100.0 %
vote	41.4	37.0	6.1	15.5	100.0
serve on jury	37.3	28.3	15.2	19.2	100.0
draft registration	11.1	59.5	11.7	17.8	100.0

seems not to be a function of length of exposure to the demand of civic duties. Among low and moderate civic affect groups, those who have lived longer in the U.S. tend to express more civic affect than those who have lived here only briefly. But among the high civic affect group, years of residence in the U.S. do not make any difference.

Although Koreans have been educated to cherish a deep sense of civic duty (taxation, national defense, and education are three such basic duties in Korea), it seems that their civic affect has not been fully transferred to the new adopted country (Table V.8.).

It is also possible that the respondents, having escaped from the external constraints of the homeland which continuously demanded loyalty, harmony and national consolidation (so-called Gook-Min-Chong-Wha), are now experiencing a vacuum in their sense of civic duties in a more voluntaristic system. In Korea, tax officers visit homes to collect taxes, nonvoters are informally sanctioned, military draftees are preregistered through vital records, and jury selection is not open to the public. A cultural transition from such a background takes time.

3. Input Affect

Another dimension of political competence is the input affect or internal efficacy which denotes one's belief and feelings that he can exercise some influence in the course of governmental decisions. It makes a great difference in one's political participation whether someone has a clear view of the channels open to him for expressing his point of view or has not even the vaguest notion of what he can do.

In order to detect the respondents' input affect, the respond-

ents were asked which strategies they would choose in order to change the legislature at local or federal levels and how confident they were about achieving their goals. Because the Korean government has no differentiation between local and federal levels and the respondents have little sense of such differentiation, they were treated as a single entity in the current study.

For the Korean respondents in the current survey, voting is the most preferred strategy of input to the government. Voting was chosen by 49.4 per cent of the respondents, but 25.5 per cent would choose other strategies in addition to voting (the respondents were allowed to make more than one choice).

Considering that one fifth would do nothing and that 23.9 per cent would depend on voting alone, almost half of the respondents seem to be passive in the process of political inputs, although 79 per cent would do something.

Koreans are less likely to act with other people, or through groups or formal organizations. Only 13 per cent would do that in

Table V.9. Input Affect A. (Actions to be Taken)

Actions to be taken to correct legislation	N	Per Cent
do nothing	66	21.0 %
write or talk to politicians	32	10.2
work through groups	41	13.0
vote	75	23.9
vote and other actions too	80	25.5
protest activities	20	6.4
Total	314	100.0

More than one choice was allowed for this question.
Missing cases=30

their input attempts, and directly contacting (writing or talking to) politicians was chosen by only 10 per cent of the Korean sample. This⁸ rate is also lower than that for other national or ethnic samples.

Intended protest activities as the form of their own expression of input are chosen by 6.4 per cent, but this rate is much lower than their approval rate of others' protest activities. "Taking some violent action" or "just protest" are more likely to happen with Koreans than with other nationals. Also, even among those who would not involve themselves in protest, one-fourth approved such activities by others (further discussions in Chapter V).

The feelings about the possibility of succeeding in these input efforts are moderately high among the respondents of the current study. Two-thirds feel they are likely to succeed in their attempts, while 24 per cent believe it to be impossible (Table V.10).

On the Input Affect Index (see Appendix I.3.c) only one-fourth (26.4 per cent) of the respondents showed high input affect. This rate is much lower than the rates of Americans but comparable to four other⁹ Western nationals.

Table V.10 Input Affect B. (Possibility of Success)

Likely to succeed in Influencing the change of regulations	N	%
Very Likely	28	9.2
Somewhat Likely	193	63.7
Somewhat Impossible	50	16.5
Absolutely Impossible	32	10.6
Total	303	100.0

Missing cases=41

Age has a negative relationship to input affect ($\text{Gamma} = -.10$) and females have a lower input affect than do males ($\text{Gamma} = -.28$). The better-educated respondents have a higher input affect ($\text{Gamma} = .16$). Those who have lived longer in the U.S. have a significantly higher input affect than those who have lived more briefly in the U.S. ($\text{Gamma} = .25$), consequently, U.S. citizens have a higher input affect than do the resident aliens ($\text{Gamma} = .32$).

4. Output Affect

The feeling that people have toward governmental authorities may be inferred from their expectations of how they will be treated by the government officials. The respondents were placed in two hypothetical situations. They were asked to imagine themselves making inquiries to government officials on problems of different magnitude (such as tax questions, immigration problems, or police traffic ticket). And they were asked if they could get equal treatment to anyone else. Half the respondents (52.4 per cent) expected they would get equal treatment from government officials. This proportion is lower than among Americans; 90 per cent of whites and 49 per cent of

Table V.11. Output Affect (Equal treatment from Authorities)

	N	Per Cent
Surely equal treatment	108	32.3 %
I may get equal treatment	67	20.1
It depends	71	21.3
May be not	87	26.0
They will ignore	1	0.3
Total	334	100.0

Treatment by government officials or police were combined.

blacks expected equal treatment by government officials; while 85 per cent of whites and 60 per cent of blacks expected equal treatment by the police (Abromowitz, 1980). Also, same expectations in the current sample are lower than what Almond and Verba found earlier in Western nations sample (1963).¹⁰ The reason for such low expectation may have roots in the Korean political culture of a deep elite-mass gap (further discussion in Chapter VII).

On the second question, asking the respondents how seriously their points of view would be considered by authorities, a similar pattern emerged. Only 30.6 per cent of the current sample thought their opinions would be seriously considered by the officials.

On the Output Affect Index (Appendix I.3.d), 45.5 per cent of all respondents showed high output affect. This rate seems to be higher than the proportion of high external efficacy among Americans (33.9 per cent in 1980 Election Study by ICPSR) but the two measurements are not identical.¹¹

Males tended to have lower output affect than did females (Gamma

Table V.12. Output Affect (Expectations toward Officials)

	N	Per Cent
They will seriously consider	100	30.6 %
They will pay some attention	124	37.9
Depends	91	27.8
They will say nothing	3	0.9
They will ignore	9	2.8
Total	327	100.0

Missing case=17

=.18), and young respondents in their 20s had a lower output affect than their elders. Education was positively related to output affect ($\text{Gamma}=.16$) but occupational status and income were not linearly related to output affect. The time of sojourn in the U.S. was positively related to output affect ($\text{Gamma}=.28$); consequently, naturalized U.S. citizens had higher output affect than resident aliens ($\text{Gamma}=.21$).

D. Authoritarianism, Organizational Participation and Political Efficacy

In the preceding section, we found that the Korean-American respondents have high system affect, while having low input, output and civic affect. In this section we will examine whether their organizational participation had any effect on their political efficacy with the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1. Among authoritarians, those who participate in voluntary organizations have higher political competence than authoritarians who do not participate in voluntary organizations, in terms of their affect about one's own position as a political subject, about one's ability to influence the political system, about the output responses by the political system and about the national political system as a whole.

When authoritarianism is coded as a dichotomous variable, its relationships with system affect and civic affect appear clearly negative as postulated; but it does not vary much with output affect or with input affect. If the liberal/conservative dimension is examined simultaneously, the relationship between authoritarianism and input or output affect appears distinctively as postulated (Figure V.1).


As was hypothesized, the data suggest that the Organizational

Index (Appendix I.2.c) has a modifying effect on the relationship between authoritarianism and political efficacy. Comparison of Gammas reveals the following patterns (Figure V.1. and Table V.13):

i) Liberals who participate in organizations are more likely to have high political affect (except output affect) than nonparticipants whether they are authoritarian or not.

ii) Conservative nonauthoritarians who participate in organizations have high political affect on all four efficacy indices.

Figure V.1. Authoritarianism and Political Affect (Gammas)



Tables.V.13. Organizational Index and Political Affect (Gammas)

	Political Affect			
	System	Civic	Input	Output
Liberal				
Nonauthoritarian	.22 (.21)	.18 (.27)	.29 (.28)	-.35 (-.22)
Authoritarian	.16 (.18)	.02 (.07)	.38 (.51)	-.16 (-.21)
Conservative				
Nonauthoritarian	.76 (.80)	.61 (.58)	.34 (.35)	.44 (.44)
Authoritarian	-.11 (-.12)	.04 (.08)	.16 (.18)	.06 (.04)

Gammas in parentheses are the strength of relationship with Organizational Membership, instead of with the Organizational Index.

But the increase in political efficacy is smaller among conservative authoritarians than nonauthoritarians.

The above patterns of relationships are further explored controlling organizational involvement:

1. Authoritarianism and System Affect

There is a weak negative relationship between authoritarianism and system affect ($\text{Gamma} = -.10$). Authoritarians have a lower mean system affect (2.52) than nonauthoritarians (2.62), supporting the general postulates. When the liberal/conservative dimension is controlled, conservative authoritarians showed a lower system affect than nonauthoritarians but liberal authoritarians showed higher system affect than nonauthoritarians (Table V.14).

Organizational participation generally increases system affect for the current respondents ($\text{Gamma} = .15$), especially for all liberals and nonauthoritarian conservatives; organizational members have a higher mean system affect than nonmembers (Figure V.3a).

As shown in Table V.15 in the case of liberal authoritarians,

Table V.14. Authoritarianism and System Affect (%)

	System Affect Index			Row Total
	Low	Moderate	High	
Liberal				176
Nonauthoritarian	8.0	38.0	54.0	100.0 (59)
Authoritarian	8.5	29.3	62.2	100.0 (117)
Conservative				116
Nonauthoritarian	7.1	21.4	71.4	99.9 (42)
Authoritarian	4.1	37.8	58.1	100.0 (74)

Missing Cases=52/ Gamma for Liberal $-.01$ / for Conservative $-.23$

organizational participants are more represented in the moderate or high system affect category than nonorganizational respondents, clearly in the direction of supporting Hypothesis 1. In the case of conservative authoritarians, the results are opposite to the current hypothesis, for some unknown reason.

Table V.15. Organization Involvement and System Affect

	Low	System Affect (Per Cent)		Row Total
		Moderate	High	
Liberal Authoritarian				
Organization Membership				
None	10.2	28.6	61.2	100.0 (N=49)
One or Two	0	41.5	58.5	100.0 (N=41)
More than Two	0	25.9	74.1	100.0 (N=27)
Conservative Authoritarian				
Organization Membership				
None	6.1	30.3	63.6	100.0 (N=33)
One or Two	5.0	40.0	55.0	100.0 (N=20)
More than Two	0	47.6	52.4	100.0 (N=21)

2. Authoritarianism and Civic Affect

There is a weak negative relationship between authoritarianism and civic affect ($\text{Gamma} = -.15$). The mean civic affect of authoritarians (2.27) is lower than that of nonauthoritarians (2.33), supporting the general postulates about authoritarianism (Table V.16). The negative relationship is upheld when the liberal/conservative dimension of authoritarianism is controlled ($\text{Gamma} = -.13$ for liberals and $-.18$ for conservatives, respectively). The mean civic affect of the conserva-

tives (2.29) is not much different from that of the liberals (2.30).

Those who were involved in organizations expressed a slightly higher civic affect than nonparticipants ($\Gamma=.13$), although the difference of mean civic affect between organizational members and nonmembers is very small (Figure V.3b).

The strength of the relationship between organizational member-

Table V.16. Authoritarianism and Civic Affect (%)

	Civic Affect Index			Row Total
	Low	Moderate	High	
Liberal				158
Nonauthoritarian	3.8	60.4	35.8	100.0 (53)
Authoritarian	2.9	68.6	28.6	100.1 (105)
Conservative				109
Nonauthoritarian	5.3	55.3	39.5	100.1 (38)
authoritarians	0	73.2	26.8	100.0 (71)

Missing Cases= 77/ Γ for Liberals $-.13$ / Conservatives $-.18$

Table V.17. Organizational Membership & Civic Affect (%)

	Civic Affect (in Per Cent)			Row Total
	Low	Moderate	High	
Liberal Authoritarians				
Organization Membership				
None	2.4	73.8	23.8	100.0 (N=42)
One or Two	2.6	63.2	34.2	100.0 (N=38)
More than two	4.0	68.0	28.0	100.0 (N=25)
Conservative Authoritarians				
Organization Membership				
None	0	76.5	23.5	100.0 (N=34)
One or Two	0	66.7	33.3	100.0 (N=18)
More than Two	0	73.7	26.3	100.0 (N=19)

ship and civic affect, measured by Gamma coefficients, is very weak. But the frequency distribution (Table V.17) clearly shows that organizational members have higher civic affect than nonmembers, even when authoritarianism and liberal/conservatism are considered.

Although the number of organizational memberships is not linearly related to civic affect, the data weakly confirm the direction of the relationship as stated in Hypothesis 1.

3. Authoritarianism and Input Affect

There is little difference of mean input affect between authoritarians (2.03) and nonauthoritarians (2.01), although authoritarians tended to show a slightly lower input affect than nonauthoritarians. The liberals had a slightly higher mean input affect (2.10) than the conservatives (1.92). But when the liberal/conservative dimension is controlled, liberal authoritarians showed lower input affect than nonauthoritarians (Gamma = $-.24$), while conservative authoritarians showed higher input affect than nonauthoritarians (Gamma = $.20$). This pattern supports the general postulates of authoritarianism in the case of liberal authoritarians, while conservative authoritarians showed a relationship opposite to such postulates (Table V.18).

Organizational involvement significantly increases input affect for all respondents (Gamma = $.30$). Organizational members have higher mean input affect than nonmembers (Figure V.3c). The positive effect of organizational involvement is sustained for both authoritarians and nonauthoritarians alike, and regardless of their being liberal or conservative. Among those who are highly involved in organizations, the proportion of high input affect is much higher and the proportion of

low input affect is lower than among nonorganizational members (Table V.19). Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported in the case of input affect. Especially with liberal authoritarians the hypothesized pattern appears clearly.

4. Authoritarianism and Output Affect

There is little difference in mean output affect between nonauthoritarians (2.17) and authoritarians (2.15). When the liberal/conservative

Table V.18. Authoritarianism and Input Affect (%)

	Low	Input Affect Moderate	High	Row Total
Liberal				165
Nonauthoritarian	14.8	50.0	35.2	100.0 (44)
Authoritarian	22.5	54.1	23.4	100.0 (111)
Conservative				111
Nonauthoritarian	38.5	43.6	17.9	100.0 (39)
Authoritarian	30.6	40.3	29.2	100.0 (72)

Missing Cases= 68; Gammas, Liberal= -.24/ Conservative= .20

Tables V.19. Organizational Membership & Input Affect (%)

	Input Affect (in Per Cent)			Row Total
	Low	Moderate	High	
Liberal Authoritarians				
Organization Membership				
None	32.6	56.5	10.9	100.0 (N=46)
One or Two	23.7	55.3	21.1	100.1 (N=38)
More than Two	3.7	48.1	48.1	99.9 (N=21)
Conservative Authoritarians				
Organization Membership				
None	38.2	32.4	29.4	100.0 (N=34)
One or Two	38.9	33.3	27.8	100.0 (N=18)
More than Two	10.0	60.0	30.0	100.0 (N=20)

vative dimension is controlled, liberal authoritarians tended to show lower output affect than nonauthoritarians, as in the general postulation, but the opposite was true among the conservatives (Table V.20).

Organizational involvement alone seems not to increase output affect, although there is a small difference in mean output affect between organizational members and nonmembers (Figure V.3d). When the liberal/conservative dimension was controlled, the relationship between

Table V.20. Authoritarianism and Output Affect

	Output Affect			Row Total
	Low	Moderate	High	
Liberal				177
Nonauthoritarian	27.6	32.8	39.7	100.1 (58)
Authoritarian	34.5	32.8	32.8	100.1 (119)
Conservative				120
Nonauthoritarian	47.7	25.0	27.3	100.0 (44)
Authoritarian	34.2	27.6	38.2	100.0 (76)

Missing Cases = 47: Gammas Liberal= -.20, Conservative=.17

Table V.21. Organizational Membership & Output Affect (%)

	Output Affect			Row Total
	Low	Moderate	High	
Liberal Authoritarians				
Org. Membership				
None	30.0	30.0	40.0	100.0 (N=50)
One or Two	29.3	41.5	29.3	100.1 (N=41)
More than Two	50.0	25.0	25.0	100.0 (N=28)
Conservative Authoritarians				
Org. Membership				
None	38.9	25.0	36.1	100.0 (N=36)
One or Two	30.0	20.0	50.0	100.0 (N=20)
More than Two	30.0	40.0	30.0	100.0 (N=20)

organizational involvement and output affect became clearly negative among liberals but positive among conservatives.

Although the strength of the relationship is too small to claim a clear-cut support for Hypothesis 1, the case of conservative authoritarians shows a pattern that partially fits the hypothesis; but the case of the liberal authoritarians contradicts Hypothesis 1 as far as output affect is concerned (Table V.15).

Summary

On the six authoritarian items, Korean respondents showed a higher degree of authoritarian aggression, submissiveness, and anti-egalitarianism than Americans but the inter-correlations among the six items were not high. Authoritarian on the left and right should be identified because they manifested different traits. Organizational involvement of the respondents was very high but limited to ethnic organizations, indicating ethnic confinement in structural assimilation. The data did not support the general assumption that authoritarianism is negatively related to organizational participation.

Korean-Americans have a high regard for the U.S. governmental system and their system affect is higher than that shown among the samples of five Western nations (including the U.S.). On the contrary, their sense of citizens' duty being subject to the government (civic affect) is very low. This may be a result of their passive defiance (see Korean Political Culture in Chapter VII), inasmuch as they were accustomed to their homeland government which exercised many external constraints, and now they are in a vacuum of such constraints in this

voluntaristic society.

Input affect is relatively low among the Korean-Americans. Almost half of the respondents feel passive about influencing governmental policies and Koreans are least likely to act with other people. Their trait of distrusting others, as a syndrome of authoritarianism, and their difficulty in working with other people may have contributed to their low input affect and also to low output affect.

The time factor and citizenship are positively related to all items of political efficacy, indicating the progress of political acculturation. The findings presented in this section can be summarized in the following points (Figure V.2.):

i) The relationship between organizational involvement and political affect is stronger (even when negative) among nonauthoritarians than authoritarians on all four political affect items. Despite the effect of organizational involvement, authoritarians do have lower political efficacy than nonauthoritarians.

ii) With liberal authoritarians, the hypothesized relationship that even authoritarians have higher political affect if they are involved in organizations was found with system affect and very weakly with civic affect, in addition it has been supported with input affect but not with output affect.

iii) With conservative authoritarians, the hypothesized relationship was found with input affect, weakly with civic and output affect, except the case of system affect.

The findings generally support the participationist thesis and also Hypothesis 1. The above pattern shows that the conservative authoritarians whom the original researchers of the F-scale (Adorno et al.) dealt with as authoritarians could have higher input and output affect, contradicting their hypothesis. But the liberals whom they did not differentiate in their studies seem to fall in the response patterns that they predicted. Therefore, it is only liberal

authoritarians who are reacting as "alienated political subjects," while the conservative authoritarians remain as "allegiant participants" (Almond and Verba, 1963).

Figure.V.2. Summary: Authoritarianism, Organizational Involvement And Political Affects

	Postulates Authoritarianism	Hypotheses Org. Involvement	Variance Explained
System Affect	supported	supported (Liberals only)	5.2 %
Civic Affect	supported	supported (weakly)	6.7 %
Input Affect	supported (Liberals only)	supported	8.5 %
Output Affect	supported (Liberals only)	not supported	9.3 %

NOTES

1. In the cross-tabulation between the item 2 and item 6, four-fifths (79 %) of those who supported women's political participation agreed on authoritarian item 6 ("all but the handicapped and old should take care of themselves"), indicating that the majority of egalitarians are aggressive. And 65 % of the aggressive respondents (on item 6) supported women's political rights. In the cross-tabulation between item 2 and item 3 (science has its limitation), again 80 % of those who supported women's political rights express superstitiousness. And 69 per cent of the superstitious respondents supported women's political rights.

2. Item 4 (openness to new ideas) is not only related to the egalitarian item (item 2; $\Gamma=.44$) but also to aggressiveness/submissiveness items. For instance, 92 % of those who expressed aggressiveness on item 1 support the openness to new ideas. And 62 per cent of the open-minded respondents on item 4 are highly aggressive on item 1 ($\Gamma=.45$). Item 4 has a very strong relationship ($\Gamma=.80$) with

item 3 (superstitiousness). It indicates that the respondents who agreed on these two items expressed susceptibility to suggestions by others and not only the openness to liberal ideas. Again the relationship between item 4 and item 6 is very strong ($\text{Gamma}=.65$). In here, the 'open minded' respondents are more aggressive in claiming self-support by the able-bodied.

3. If the 30 missing cases are excluded, the Alpha coefficient is reduced to 46.1).

4. Hurh and Kim found more intense ethnic confinement in Los Angeles area; ie. 76.1 % were participating in Korean organizations (78.6 % of them were affiliated with Korean churches), and only 0.5 % were affiliated with American associations (1984, pp. 95-97).

5. Labor unions were not included in the questionnaire and church involvements were excluded from the computation of organization indices, because church membership was so prevalent and could have been duplicated with other memberships.

6. Bunch's interview of 212 Japanese-Americans in Portland, Oregon, 1967 and D.B. Conradt's German data of 1978 can be compared as follows:

High Regard for Political System (percentage)

	Korean-Americans	Japanese-Americans	Germans
Political System	63 %	65 %	31 %
Social Legislation	60	4	18
Economic System	72	34	40
Contribution to Science	69	0	23

Although the measurements are not identical, political trust of the five Western nations surveyed in 1974 is much lower than Korean-Americans' system affect. The proportion of high political trust among adults of the five nations is; 36% for the Netherlands, 20% for Great Britain, 23% for the U.S., 52% for Germany, and 51% for Austria (Jennings et al., 1979. 480).

7. As mentioned in Chapter IV., North Korea has no formal relationship with the U.S. and cannot send immigrants to the U.S. Even those Koreans who fled from the North during or before the Korean War of the 1950s are considered as South Koreans. Therefore, the Koreans in this study exclude any possible immigrants from the North.

8. "Acting with other people" was chosen with much higher rates

by Americans 30%; Germans 14 %; Dutch 16%; Japanese 15%; Austrians 3% (compiled by Conradt, 1980, p. 249); and British 18% (Kavanagh 1980, p. 150).

9. The proportion of high and medium internal efficacy among the white Americans was 54% in 1978 and 55% in 1980 (Abramson, 1983, p. 185). The proportions of high (internal) efficacy among the five

Western national adult samples of 1974 are as follows: Netherland 22%; Britain 22%; U.S. 41%; Germany 24%; Austria 5% (Alberbeck, 1979).

10. The expectation of equal treatment by officials and police were also higher among the British, Germans and Italians than in the current Korean sample. Only Mexicans had lower output affect than did Koreans. Among the Mexicans, the positive expectation of equal treatment was 42% for government officials and 32 % for the police.

11. Although input affect and internal efficacy are essentially the same variables, their measurements adopted are slightly different. In the Korean sample, the respondents with medium-high input affect were 45.5% of the total.

12. Among liberal authoritarians, organizational members have higher system affect than those who do not have organizational membership ($\text{Gamma}=.16$), as well as among liberal nonauthoritarians ($\text{Gamma}=.16$). Among conservative authoritarians those involved in organizations have lower system affect ($\text{Gamma}=-.11$). But among the conservative nonauthoritarians, system affect is higher for the organizational members ($\text{Gamma}=.76$).

13. Among the nonauthoritarians, civic affect is higher for those who are involved in organizations both for liberals ($\text{Gamma}=.18$) and conservatives ($\text{Gamma}=.61$). Even among authoritarians, civic affect was slightly higher for organizational members, both for liberals ($\text{Gamma}=.02$) and conservatives ($\text{Gamma}=.04$).

14. The positive relationship is stronger among liberal authoritarians ($\text{Gamma}=.38$) than conservative authoritarians ($\text{Gamma}=.16$). Among nonauthoritarians, the positive relationship is relatively stronger for the conservatives ($\text{Gamma}=.34$) than for the liberals ($\text{Gamma}=.27$).

15. Liberal organization members had lower output affect than do nonorganizational counterparts ($\text{Gamma}=-.35$ for nonauthoritarians, $\text{Gamma}=-.16$ for authoritarians). Conservatives who are organizational members had higher output affect than do the nonorganizational members ($\text{Gamma}=.44$ for nonauthoritarians, $\text{Gamma}=.06$ for authoritarians).

Figure.V.3a. ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT AND SYSTEM AFFECT (MEANS)




Figure.V.3b. ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT AND CIVIC AFFECT (MEANS)






Figure.3.2c. ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT AND INPUT AFFECT (MEANS)Figure.V.3d. ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT AND OUTPUT AFFECT (MEANS)

CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND ISSUE PREFERENCE

A. Political Participation

In the preceding chapter, we have examined the relationship between organizational participation and political efficacy. In general, higher political efficacy was found among respondents who participated in voluntary organizations, even among authoritarians. In this chapter, we shall further examine whether such high political efficacy, presumably gained by organizational participation, can have an effect on political participation (namely in electoral process and protest activities) and on the political issue preferences of the respondents. Thus, the following hypothesis will be tested in this section:

Hypothesis 2. Among authoritarians, those who participate in voluntary organizations and have higher political efficacy are more likely to participate in the electoral process than those who do not participate in voluntary organizations.

Preliminary analysis of the data shows that Korean-Americans' participation on various levels of political action is very low. This was predicted because only 52.3 per cent of Korean-Americans are naturalized citizens, although the Asians' naturalization rate is highest among the new immigrants. About two-thirds (61.7 per cent) of the 180 citizens among the respondents have registered for voting and 48.3 per cent of these citizens voted in the congressional election in 1982 and 37.8 percent did so in the local election of 1983.

The respondents' participation in the electoral process other than voting is relatively lower than voting and had to be collapsed into one response category (Table VI.1). However, nonvoting activities are a more active form of participation in the political process than voting because such participation requires more time, effort, and money than merely presenting oneself at the polling place on election day. There was a tendency for better-educated respondents with white-collar jobs and with higher income to participate more in the political processes other than voting. On the Political Participation Index (see Appendix I.4.a), authoritarianism has little effect ($\Gamma=.02$). But the relationships between other key variables and the Political Participation Index are confirmed as generally assumed.²

Table VI.1. Political Participation of Korean American Citizens
(Comparison with U.S. Voting Rates)

Types of activity	Current Sample	U.S. Total	Chicago City
Voting: 82 Congress	48.3 (N=180)	64.1	---
Voting: 83 Local	37.8 (N=180)	---	82.0
Other Activities*	24.1 (N=344)**		

* Political discussion with politicians (N=25), rallies (N=17), campaign fund donation (N=33), and writing to media (N=8) etc.

** Noncitizens are also involved in nonvoting political actions.

1. Voting in Congressional and Local Elections

About a quarter (25.9 per cent) of the total respondents voted in the 1982 congressional election. The total rate seems to be low; but if only the citizens are considered, voters' registration rate is

61.7 per cent and the actual voting rate of the registered voters is 78.4 per cent (48.3 per cent of the 180 citizens). This seems to belie the general perception that Korean-Americans are nonactive voters. Their registration and voting rate is lower than the U.S. average but higher than that for Hispanics. Authoritarians voted slightly more in the congressional election than nonauthoritarians. But this relationship was very weak, while social status and sex had a greater effect on voting.

The voting rate in the local election (Spring, 1983) is lower than that in the congressional election—only 37.7 per cent of citizens voted. Authoritarians voted slightly less in the local election than nonauthoritarians, but the contrast is negligibly small ($\Gamma = -.08$). Again, the variables of sex and social status had stronger effects on voting in local elections.

2. Organization Involvement, Political Affect, and Voting

a. System Affect and Voting

For all respondents with citizenship, system affect had a posi-

Table.VI.2. The Profiles of Voters in Elections
(Gammas)

	Congressional Election	Local Election
More Males than Females:	-.42	-.29
Better-Educated than less Educated.	.57	.44
Mainly White-collar Employee Activity	-.33	-.21
Have Lived Longer in the U.S.	.40	.14

tive relationship with voting in congressional and local elections. Those with higher system affect voted more in both elections, regardless of their degree of authoritarianism.

In the congressional election, authoritarians with system affect voted more for both liberals (Gamma=.25) and conservatives (Gamma=.20). The same relationships with similar strengths of association were found in the local elections (Table VI.3).

When organizational involvement is controlled the following patterns become apparent among the citizens (Table VI.4).

i) Among liberal authoritarians, high system affect is positively related to voting in the congressional election if they are involved in organizations, but negatively related if they are not involved in organizations.

Table VI.3. Authoritarianism Political Affect and Voting (Gammass)

Voting in Congressional Elections

	System	Political Affect Civic	Input	Output
Liberals				
Nonauthoritarian	.61	.23	-.02	-.17
Authoritarian	.25	.48	.24	.0
Conservatives				
Nonauthoritarian	.65	.58	.36	.09
Authoritarian	.20	.30	.26	.0

Voting in Local Elections

Liberals				
Nonauthoritarian	.24	.0	-.15	.01
Authoritarian	.25	.42	.28	-.06
Conservatives				
Nonauthoritarian	.17	.52	.32	-.27
Authoritarian	.29	.32	-.04	.03

ii) In the local election, the strength of the relationship between system affect and voting is stronger for the liberal authoritarians involved in organizations than for nonorganizational members.

iii) With the conservative authoritarians no such pattern was found. Those with high organizational involvement did not vote any more than nonorganizational members in both elections despite their possibly high system affect.

Thus, the case of liberal authoritarians clearly supports Hypothesis 2, but that of conservative authoritarians does not.

b. Civic Affect and Voting

For all respondents with citizenship, civic affect is positively related to voting in the congressional election regardless of authoritarianism. A similar relationship was found for the local election, except for liberal nonauthoritarians, among whom civic affect does not make any difference in voting (Table VI.3).⁷

Because civic affect already has a positive effect on voting in both elections, organizational involvement does not intervene in the relationship between civic affect and voting. Regardless of their involvement in organizations, those with high civic affect voted more both in national and local elections. And the effect of civic affect on voting seems not to be different between authoritarians and non-authoritarians whether they are liberals or conservatives (Tables VI. 3. and VI.4.). Since overall civic affect is so low, respondents with high civic affect seem to be those who have the urge to vote to fulfill their civic duty. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported in the case of civic affect.

c. Input Affect and Voting

Except among liberal nonauthoritarians, input affect is posi-

tively related to voting in the congressional election. Authoritarians with high input affect showed a higher voting rate in congressional election (for the liberals $\Gamma=.24$; for the conservatives $\Gamma=.26$). But in local election, the voting rate was lower than in congressional election and the effect of input affect was not consistent for authoritarians. With liberal authoritarians, input affect was manifested in a higher voting rate ($\Gamma=.28$) but not with conservative authoritarians ($\Gamma= -.04$).

Input affect is positively related to voting in congressional

Table VI.4. Authoritarianism, Organizational Involvement
Political Affect, and Voting (Gammas)

Voting in Congressional Election		Political Affect		
	System	Civic	Input	Output
Liberal Authoritarians				
Org. Membership None	-.10	.74	-.15	-.44
One or Two	.60	.07	.38	.10
More than Two	.11	.48	.21	.38
Conservative Authoritarians				
Org. Membership None	-.07	.33	-.23	.0
One or Two	.71	.32	.69	.23
More than Two	-.20	.11	.43	.0
<hr/>				
Voting in Local Election				
Liberal Authoritarians				
Org. Membership None	.05	.48	.13	.03
One or Two	.36	.43	.25	.04
More than Two	.29	.66	.28	-.19
Conservative Authoritarians				
Org. Membership None	.47	.20	-.33	-.11
One or More	.76	.44	-.41	.60
More than Two	-.36	.22	.54	-.12

election if respondents are involved in organizations, both for liberal and conservative authoritarians (Table VI.4). In the local election, that positive relationship was also found among liberal authoritarians but faltered a little bit among conservative authoritarians. However, the general direction is that even authoritarians, those who participate in organizations are more likely to vote with high input affect.

Organizational involvement further enhances the relationship between input affect and voting in the congressional election for authoritarians (both liberal and conservative), supporting Hypothesis 2.

d. Output Affect and Voting

High output affect itself alone is not positively related to participation in voting with the citizens in the current sample. Authoritarians voted more than nonauthoritarians in the congressional election, if they had high output affect, both for the liberals (Gamma = -17) and the conservatives (Gamma = -.27).⁹

Organizational involvement intervenes in the effect of output affect on voting in congressional election for liberal authoritarians, clearly supporting Hypothesis 3. That relationship is weaker among conservative authoritarians. No such pattern is found in local election (Table VI.4).

3. Nonconventional Participation--Protest Activities

Although it was not clearly stated in Hypothesis 2 about protest activities as unconventional political participation, they were a part of the agenda in the current study. As was mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, Koreans have been exposed to a political

ethos in which protest activities are perceived as a routinized form of political participation because direct voting rights have been withheld on many occasions. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 can be rephrased as follows:

Hypothesis 2.a. Among authoritarians, those who participate in voluntary organizations and have higher political efficacy are more likely to approve political protest than those who do not participate in voluntary organizations.

In the current survey, four types of protest activities were proposed to respondents, who were asked whether they approved or disapproved of such activities. Responses to those items (Table VI.5) made up a composite Protest Index (see Appendix I.4.b).

Table.VI.5. Responses Protest Items (percentage)

	Disapprove	Depends	Approve
Protest Letters to politicians	2.3%	39.6%	58.1%
Demonstration and Marching	15.1	52.8	32.1
Disobeying Unjust Government	17.0	38.7	44.3
Violent Protest	27.5	44.6	27.9

The current data revealed that Koreans are highly prone to approve of protest activities compared to respondents to a five Western nations' sample (Barnes and Kasse, 1979. pp.69-82). Although the two sets of measurements may not be exactly comparable, the Korean respondents were more likely to approve protest letters and disobeying unjust government than any of the five Western nationals. Koreans are

more likely to approve of demonstrations and violent form of protest
 11
 than Americans, British, or Germans.

On the Protest Index, higher protest potential was found among
 12
 younger males, better-educated, and nonprofessionals. Authoritari-
 anism alone had little effect on protest approval but when the libe-
 ral/conservative dimension of authoritarianism was controlled, libe-
 rals were found more likely to approve of protests than conservatives
 ($\Gamma = -.16$), as in the following patterns (Tables VI.6 and VI.7):

i) Liberal nonauthoritarians were less prone to protest if they had high system, civic and output affects.

ii) Liberal authoritarians were more prone to protest if they had high system and civic affects but low input and output affects.

iii) Conservative nonauthoritarians were more prone to protest if they had high system, input and output affects.

iv) Conservative authoritarians were more likely to approve protest if they had high civic and input affects.

Liberal authoritarians were more likely to approve protests when they had high regard for the political system and when they were performing civic duties with loyalty, but they did not see the govern-

Table VI.6 Protest Approval by Authoritarianism (Percentage)

	Protest Index			Row Total
	Low	Moderate	High	
Liberals				
Nonauthoritarians	1.8	52.7	45.5	100 (N = 55)
Authoritarians	1.0	55.0	44.0	100 (N = 102)
Conservatives				
Nonauthoritarians	2.6	68.4	28.9	100 (N = 40)
Authoritarians	3.0	64.2	32.8	100 (N = 68)

ment's fair treatment nor did they feel confident about their ability to influence the political process.

Conservative authoritarians were more likely to approve protests when they performed their civic duties with loyalty and felt that they could influence the political processes; but they did not feel that the government and politicians were doing their part. Approval of protest activities was more likely to happen with the respondents who had higher system affect ($\text{Gamma}=.11$), civic affect ($\text{Gamma}=.21$) and input affect ($\text{Gamma}=.17$), but not output affect ($\text{Gamma}=.02$)

Those who participated in organizations were slightly more likely to approve protests ($\text{Gamma}=.13$). The Protest Index shows that organizational participation does not, in a specific pattern, intervene in the effects of political efficacy on approving protest activities. Even among those who are not involved in organizations, all four political efficacy items have positive effects on protest approval.

Table VI.7 Protest Approval by Authoritarianism & Political Affect
(Gammass)

	System	Political Affect		
		Civic	Input	Output
Liberal				
Nonauthoritarians	-.19	-.07	.16	-.07
Authoritarians	.36	.43	-.13	-.05
Conservatives				
Nonauthoritarian	.32	.04	.19	.22
Authoritarian	.04	.17	.38	.03

B. Political Issue Preference

The respondents of this survey, in general, are more interested in the political issues about their native homeland than the issues facing America; more about Korean politicians than American politicians; and less about Korean-American power building in the U.S. than in influencing the politics in their homeland (Table VII.8). However, the naturalized citizens are more likely to have greater interest in American political issues, while the non-citizens are more likely to have greater interest in Korean political issue (Table VII.8).

As to preference among liberal-conservative issues, interest in liberal issues prevails over conservative ones. The human rights problem was rated as more important than security assistance to Korea, while social welfare was rated as more important than defense in U.S. domestic spending (Table VI.9). However, in regard to minority politics in the U.S., they showed more conservative preferences. Placing ethnic (Korean) persons in public offices is more important (56.0 %) than getting help through American politicians (35.0 %) as a goal in political participation (Table VI.10).

As the main theme of this research is on the effects of authoritarianism on political efficacy and behavior, this section explores how authoritarianism and political efficacy are related to the preference among political issues, with the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: In the choices among political issues, the authoritarian and politically less-competent respondents exhibit significantly different emphases than their less-authoritarian and more politically competent counterparts. The authoritarian/less-competent respondents are more likely to prefer basic needs-oriented and homeland-oriented political issues.

Table VI.8. Issue Preference in Political Discussions

Issues	degree of interest (%)			
	Great	Somewhat	Almost none	Missing
U.S. Political Issues	35.3	47.8	13.4	3.5
Korean-American Power	22.2	34.1	41.1	2.6
U.S. Politicians	19.8	53.9	21.9	3.5
Korean Political Issues	45.5	38.8	12.8	2.7
Korean Politicians	31.2	43.1	23.6	2.1
Influence Korean Politics	25.1	32.9	39.4	3.6

Table VI.9. Political Issue Preferences by Citizenship
(per cent of "great interest" expressed)

Issues	Citizens	Noncitizens	Row Total
U.S. Political Issues	46.9	23.3	N = 113
Korean-American Power	24.9	18.7	69
American Politicians	27.9	12.8	65
Korean Political Issues	42.3	46.7	137
Korean Politicians	26.6	36.8	97
Influence Korean Politics	22.7	26.7	76

Table VI.10. Government Policy Preference (in Per cent)

U.S. Policy on Korea	
Aids and Security	42.0
Human Rights	50.1
No Answer	8.9
Sub Total	101.0
U.S. Domestic Policy	
Social Welfare	67.3
Defense	23.0
No Answer	9.7
Sub Total	101.0
Goals of Minority Participation in Politics	
Positions (Placement of Koreans)	56.0
Help through American Politicians	35.0
No Answer	9.0
Sub Total	100.0

1. Authoritarianism and American Political Issues

Three American political issue items were added to make up the American Political Issue Index, and similarly for the Korean Political Issue Index (see Appendix I.5.a). There is not much difference in interest in American vs. Korean politics between the authoritarians¹³ and the nonauthoritarians. Educational attainment is positively related to interests in both Korean and American political issues and females tend to have lower interest in both issues. Occupational and income status is not related to political issue preference. But most other key variables such as organizational involvement and years of residence in this country are positively related to interest in the American political issues but negatively to the Korean issues (Figure VI.1.)¹⁴ As years of residence in this country increase, interest in American politicians also increases ($\text{Gamma}=.19$), while interest in

Figure. VI.1. Major Variables and Political Issue Preferences (Gammas)

Korean Issues		vs.	American Issues	
Negative	<----- -.12	Sex	-.22	-----> Negative
Positive	<----- .13	Education	.26	-----> Positive
Negative	<----- -.27	Years Lived	.22	-----> Positive
"	<----- -.11	U.S. Citizen	.40	-----> "
"	<----- -.12	Organization	.27	-----> "
"	<----- -.22	English Use	.29	-----> "
"	<----- -.01	Authoritarian	.09	-----> "

Korean politicians decreases ($\text{Gamma} = -.20$) as does influencing Korean politics ($\text{Gamma} = -.18$). Language proficiency is related to political efficacy. Those less fluent in English are less interested in U.S. politics ($\text{Gamma} = .29$) and in American politicians ($\text{Gamma} = .15$), but are more interested in Korean politicians ($\text{Gamma} = -.22$).

a. System Affect and Interest in Political Issues

System affect shows a positive relationship with American political issue preferences both among the authoritarians and nonauthoritarians in the following patterns. Patterns (i) and (ii) support Hypothesis 3 (see Table VI.11):

Table.VI.11. Authoritarianism, Political Affect, and Issue Preference
(Gammass)

American Political Issues				
	System	Political Affect Civic	Input	Output
Liberal				
Nonauthoritarians	.22	.60	.20	-.15
Authoritarians	.14	.22	.11	.05
Conservative				
Nonauthoritarians	.12	.31	.33	.10
Authoritarians	.24	.32	.16	.04
Korean Political issues				
Liberal				
Nonauthoritarians	.19	-.07	-.48	.06
Authoritarians	.08	.11	-.28	-.05
Conservative				
Nonauthoritarians	-.38	-.21	.02	-.16
Authoritarians	-.08	-.29	-.04	-.05

i) Authoritarians, both liberals ($\text{Gamma} = .14$) and conservatives ($\text{Gamma} = .24$) are likely to have a high interest in American political issues if they have a high system affect.

ii) Even the conservative authoritarians and also conservative nonauthoritarians are less likely to prefer Korean political issues if they have a high system affect.

iii) Liberal nonauthoritarians with a high system affect are slightly more likely to have interest in Korean politics than those who have a low system affect.

b. Civic Affect and Interest in Political Issues

Civic affect is strongly related to interest in American political issues among authoritarians and nonauthoritarians. Both of the following patterns support Hypothesis 3 (see Table VI.11):

i) Authoritarians both on liberal ($\text{Gamma}=.22$) and conservative ($\text{Gamma}=.32$) sides are more likely to have high interest in American political issues if they have a high civic affect.

ii) Except for liberal nonauthoritarians, those with lower civic affect are more likely to have interest in Korean politics. Especially, conservative authoritarians are more likely to prefer Korean issues if their civic affect is low ($\text{Gamma}=-.29$).

c. Input Affect and Interest in Political Issues

Most respondents with high input affect expressed more interest in American and less in interest Korean political issues as hypothesized. In other words, if their input affect is low, both liberal and conservative authoritarians are not likely to have much interest in American political issues, in the following patterns (Table VI.11):

i) For most of the respondents, input affect is negatively related to interest in Korean political issues, except among conservative nonauthoritarians.

ii) Authoritarians with low input affect, both liberal ($\text{Gamma}=-.28$) and conservative ($\text{Gamma}=-.04$) are more likely to have higher interest in Korean politics than their counterparts with high input affect.

The above patterns show that, in the case of input affect, Korean vs. American issue preferences clearly coincide with the hypothesized

direction.

d. Output Affect and Interest in Political Issues

With output affect, the hypothesized relationship appears among most of the respondents, although the strength of relationships is very weak (Table VI.11):

i) Except for the liberal nonauthoritarians, most respondents with high output affect are more likely to prefer American political issues; but those with low output affect are more likely to prefer Korean political issues.

ii) Liberal nonauthoritarians with high output affect have less interest in American political issues ($\text{Gamma} = -.15$), but more interest in Korean political issues ($\text{Gamma} = .06$).

Thus, in the case of output affect, Hypothesis 3. is supported among the respondents excluding liberal nonauthoritarians.

2. Authoritarianism and Liberal/Conservative Issue Preferences

There is another point of concern whether authoritarianism and political efficacy have any effect on preference for liberal vs. conservative political issues. The responses to the six policy items shown in Table VI.9 made up the Political Issue Index (Table VI.12) so that on a continuum of the index, the lower values represent liberal issue preference and the higher values represent conservative choices (Appendix I.5.b).

The utility of the Liberal/Conservative Issue index is limited because some of the items do not precisely measure the traditional liberal vs. conservative issue preferences as far as the Korean immigrants are concerned. Particularly, social welfare spending by the U.S. government cannot be considered as a liberal issue but rather should be considered as a conservative issue, because many Korean

immigrants are linked to this as beneficiaries. It does not mean that a high proportion of Korean immigrants are direct welfare recipients but rather that a good proportion of medical doctors and small-business owners depend on clients whose disposable income is primarily derived from the social welfare budget.

When welfare spending is counted as one of conservative issues, the Issue Index shows sensible relationships with other variables. Therefore, in the current analysis, the concept of conservative issues should be considered rather as self-preserving ones, while liberal issues as altruistic ones.

Table VI.12 .Authoritarianism and Liberal-Conservative Issues (%)

	Liberal 1	Issue Index 2	3	4 Conservative	
Liberal					
Nonauthoritarian	20.8	39.6	37.7	1.9	(N = 53)
Authoritarian	16.0	45.3	29.2	9.4	(N = 106)
Conservative					
Nonauthoritarian	20.5	33.3	41.0	5.1	(N = 39)
Authoritarian	15.9	36.2	37.7	10.1	(N = 69)

Missing cases=77 / Gamma=.09

There is a trend that authoritarians, overall, are slightly more likely to prefer conservative issues (mean issue score 2.35 vs. 2.24) but the differences between the two groups are minimal (Gamma=.08). When liberal/conservative dimensions of authoritarianism is controlled, the following patterns appear:

i) Authoritarians have higher mean issue scores than non-authoritarians among the liberals (2.31 vs. 2.19) and also among the conservatives (2.43 vs. 2.32).

ii) The conservatives have a little higher issue score than the liberals (2.39 vs. 2.27).

Although the differences in mean issue scores are small, the above patterns support the hypothesized relationship. And a small but consistent pattern can also be found in the frequency distribution (Table VI.12). The effect of organizational involvement on conservative/liberal issue preference is very weak ($\Gamma = -.03$), although the sign indicates that organizational members are more likely to prefer liberal issues.

a. System Affect and Issue Index

Respondents with high system affect are more likely to prefer conservative issues regardless of whether they are authoritarians or not. Thus the following patterns are opposite to the predicted relationship and Hypothesis 3 is not supported (Table VI.13):

i) Among the liberals, the strength of relationship between system affect and Issue Index is slightly stronger for nonauthoritarians ($\Gamma = .34$) than authoritarians ($\Gamma = .19$).

ii) Among the conservatives, nonauthoritarians ($\Gamma = .16$) are not much different from authoritarians ($\Gamma = .17$) in the relationship between system affect and Issue Index.

b. Civic Affect and Issue Index

There are some mixed responses with civic affect. The following pattern i) contradict Hypothesis 3, while ii) weakly support Hypothesis 3 (see Table VI.13):

i) High civic affect is related to the preference for conservative issues among conservative authoritarians ($\Gamma = .12$). Same trend was found among liberal nonauthoritarians ($\Gamma = .20$).

ii) Among conservative nonauthoritarians, low civic affect is related to preference for conservative issues ($\text{Gamma} = -.06$). A similar trend was found for liberal authoritarians ($\text{Gamma} = -.11$).

c. Input Affect

Clearer patterns were found with input affect for most of the respondents, supporting Hypothesis 3 (see Table VI.13):

i) All authoritarian respondents with low input affect showed more preference for conservative issues ($\text{Gamma} = -.22$ for liberals and $-.19$ for conservatives).

ii) The above trend was also found with conservative nonauthoritarians ($\text{Gamma} = -.16$), but not with the liberal nonauthoritarians ($\text{Gamma} = .04$).

d. Output Affect

Only nonauthoritarians with low output affect responded in the direction of Hypothesis 3 (see Table VI.13):

i) Liberal nonauthoritarians are more likely to choose liberal issues if their output affect is high than liberal authoritarians ($\text{Gamma} = -.18$) if their output affect is high.

ii) Among the conservatives, nonauthoritarians are, again, more likely to choose liberal issues ($\text{Gamma} = -.34$) if their output affect is high, than are authoritarians ($\text{Gamma} = -.34$).

Table .VI.13. Political Affect, and Liberal/Conservative Political Issue Index

	Political Affect (Gammass)			
	System	Civic	Input	Output
Liberal				
Nonauthoritarian	.33	.20	.04	-.18
Authoritarian	.19	-.11	-.22	.02
Conservative				
Nonauthoritarian	.16	-.04	-.16	-.34
Authoritarian	.17	.12	-.19	.01

In the above patterns, both liberal and conservative authoritarians are not likely to show their responses in the hypothesized direction. So Hypothesis 3 has not been supported in the case of output affect.

Summary

Although Korean-Americans are one of the new immigrant groups, the rate of their naturalization to U.S. citizenship and voter registration is higher than for Hispanics. Voting rate is positively related to educational attainment and years of residence in this country. Organizational involvement increases political efficacy and political participation (protest activities as well as voting). These findings indicate that the Korean-Americans' future in political participation will be very active.

Authoritarians, both liberal and conservative, would be most protest-prone if they had high civic affect. In other words, authoritarians who perform their civic duty with a great sense of satisfaction are also most likely to protest against improper governmental performance. The profiles of protest-prone authoritarian subjects can be summarized as shown in Figure VI.1.

Hypothesis 2 was fully supported by input affect, partially by system affect (for liberals) and output affect (for conservatives) but not by civic affect.

In the choices of political issues, the respondents generally expressed more concerns with their homeland politics than American politics. However, the naturalized citizens definitely showed more

Figure VI.2. Profiles of the Protest Prone Authoritarians

Liberals	High System Affect ----->>	Highly Protest Prone
	High Civic Affect ----->>	"
	Low Input Affect ----->>	"
	Low Output Affect ----->>	"
Conservative	High Civic Affect ----->>	Highly Protest Prone
	High Input Affect ----->>	"

interest in politics in America than in homeland and the years of sojourn in this country are positively related to this trend, indicating that a slow political assimilation is taking place among this immigrant group. Organizational involvement and competence in English usage seem to be two other major variables in their political assimilation; they are positively related to the preference for American political issues but negatively to Korean political issues.

Besides these variables, authoritarianism alone has not much effect on the choices among political issues either in their homeland or in the U.S. But if the conservative/liberal dimension is added, some recognizable patterns appear. Generally, authoritarians with high political efficacy seem to be more politically assimilated. But the liberal nonauthoritarians who have high expectations in regard to the government (high system and output affect) and low subjective efficacy (low civic and input affect), tend to show more interest in

Korean political issues.

In regard to preference for liberal vs. conservative political issues, authoritarians showed more preference for conservative issues than nonauthoritarians as hypothesized. High system affect is related to preferring conservative issues regardless of authoritarianism. All authoritarians with low input affect preferred more conservative issues, while nonauthoritarians with high output affect preferred more liberal issues. These patterns generally support Hypothesis 3. But no clear pattern can be established with civic affect.

NOTES

1. Citizenship acquisition among immigrants from selected countries and regions: 1971-1980 totals and percentage of total immigrants.

Cuba	Mexico	S. America	Canada	W. Europe	Asia
178,374	68,152	40,843	130,380	371,683	473,754
12%	5%	3%	9%	25%	32%

Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Report, 1980.

2. The Political Participation Index is significantly related to the years of residence in the U.S. ($\text{Gamma}=.58$), to U.S. citizenship ($\text{Gamma}=.80$), to educational attainment ($\text{Gamma}=.35$), and also to organizational membership ($\text{Gamma}=.31$).

3. The voting rates in the 1980 U.S. presidential election by race are 58% for Whites, 45% for Blacks, and 38% for Hispanics (Abramson et al., 1982. p.80), although the voting rates in the off-year con-

gressional elections have been about 5% lower than in the presidential elections through the 60s and 70s (Presidential Commission for National Agenda for the Eighties, 1981).

Hispanic voter registration rates among eligible voters were 53.6% in 1980 and 51% in 1982 (Pachon, 1985. p.247).

4. The relationship between authoritarianism and voting is very weak ($\text{Gamma}=.01$ for congressional and $.08$ for local elections). Voting in the congressional election is positively related to educational attainment ($\text{Gamma}=.57$) and years of residence in the U.S. ($\text{Gamma}=.40$), weakly to income ($\text{Gamma}=.11$). Apparently white-collar job holders are more active in voting than blue-collar workers and others ($\text{Gamma}=-.33$). While 75% of professionals, 63.2% of technical workers, 57.1% of clerical workers, and 48.5% of managerials voted in the congressional election, the voting rate of unskilled factory workers was 38.6%. Females tended to be less active voters ($\text{Gamma}=-.42$). About one-third (35.0%) of female citizens and 57.4% of males voted in the 1982 congressional election.

5. The females' voting rate is lower than males' (42.6 % vs. 28.3 % ; $\text{Gamma}=-.29$). Educational attainment is also positively related to voting in the local election ($\text{Gamma}=.44$); blue-collar workers voted less than white-collars ($\text{Gamma}=-.21$). Income had almost no relationship to voting ($\text{Gamma}=-.04$); years of residence in this country had a positive relationship ($\text{Gamma}=.14$).

6. In the congressional election, one half of the high system affect group (50.5%) and 38 per cent of the moderate system affect group voted while only one member of the low system affect group voted. In the local election, 45.7% of the high system affect group and 29.1% of moderate system affect group of the citizens voted, while only one person of the low system affect group voted.

7. The voting rate in the congressional election is higher with the high civic affect group (69%) than with the moderate civic affect group (47.6%), while only one person among the low civic group voted. But the voting rates in the local election are not much different between the high civic affect group (52.4%) and the moderate civic affect group (54.8%).

8. In the congressional election, 61.7% of the high input affect group and 48.7% of the moderate input affect group voted, while 45.8% of the low input affect group did. In the local election, voting rates were lower and the group differences are small; 47.8% of the high input affect group and 36% of the moderate input affect group voted, while 37.5% of the low input affect group did.

9. In the congressional election the voting rates of the high output affect group (54.4%) and those of the moderate output affect group (55%) were not much different, while the low output affect group had a slightly lower voting rate (44.4%). In the local election, those

with higher output affect had higher voting rate (52.9%) than those with moderate (46.2%) and low (32.6%) output affect.

10. The current study used protest approval measurement only, while the five nations studies used protest approval and protest intention measures. However, the intercorrelations between the protest approval and intention ("might do protest") measures were very high (average $r=.53$, lowest $r=.45$ among Austrians and highest $r=.67$ among Americans).

11. Marsh and Kasse (1979) analyzed the data collected in 1974 by a joint project, initially from five nations (Germany, the U.S., Britain, the Netherlands, and Austria). The approval rates of protest activities by the Koreans can be compared with the highest approval rates among the Western national samples as follows:

- * Petitions - Koreans' (58.1%) approval rate is twice higher than of the British (23%).
- * Boycotts - most approved by the Americans (26%), but 44.3 % of the Korean respondents approved disobeying the unjust government.
- * Demonstrations - 33% by the Austrians vs. 32.1% by the Koreans; both much higher than by the Americans (21%).
- * Violent form of protests - the Koreans followed very closely (27.9%) the Dutch (31%); Americans showed less approval (20%).

12. Females had lower protest potential than did males ($\Gamma = -.29$), while better-educated respondents were more likely to approve protest activities ($\Gamma=.25$). Although occupational status does not have a linear relationship with the Protest Index, professionals were less likely to approve protest activities than were blue-collar workers. Also age did not have a linear relationship with the Protest Index, but those in their 20's were more protest prone than any other age grouping: approval of protest activities by age; 20's 50%, 30's 34.8 %, 40's 39 %, 50's and older 40 %. Length of residence in the U.S. had little relationship with protest potential ($\Gamma=.01$), but U.S. citizenship had some effect on this ($\Gamma=.13$).

13. Authoritarians are slightly more interested in Korean politics than nonauthoritarians; 40.6 % of nonauthoritarians and 44.6 % of the authoritarians have great interest in Korean politics.

14. More than than half (55.2 %) of those who have lived less than five years in this country have great interest in Korean politics, while that proportion is 43.3 % for the 5 -10 years group and 26.6 % for those who lived over ten years in this country. The U.S. citizens are less interested in Korean politics than resident aliens ($\Gamma = -.21$).

15. Only one-third of the respondents can communicate well in English (12.5 % speak fluently and 23.0% well).

16. All respondents who have high input affect are more likely to have high interest in American political issues, even authoritarians both liberal ($\text{Gamma}=.11$) and conservative ($\text{Gamma}=.16$).

17. Women are more likely to prefer conservative issues ($\text{Gamma}=.25$) and better-educated respondents are less likely to choose conservative issues ($\text{Gamma} = -.21$). The Liberal-Conservative Issue Index is negatively related to years of residence in this country ($\text{Gamma} = -.11$) and citizenship ($\text{Gamma} = -.05$). Those who have lived here longer are more likely to choose liberal issues.

CHAPTER VII

DISCUSSION

A. General Findings About Authoritarianism and Its Political Implications

The Korean respondents expressed higher authoritarianism than Americans in traits of aggression, submissiveness, and anti-egalitarianism. However, the Koreans' preferences for egalitarianism and openness to new ideas were much higher than expected. It is interesting to find that authoritarian submissiveness and aggression are correlated positively with egalitarianism and openness to new ideas.

Although some of the relationships were statistically insignificant, major findings confirmed the direction of relationships between authoritarianism (either liberal or conservative) and political affect. The findings indicate that the liberal authoritarians are the predominant population in Korean political activism (34 per cent) rather than the conservative authoritarians (22 per cent), whom the original writers were concerned about (Adorno, et al., 1950), or than non authoritarians.

One of the writer's goals in this research was to determine a causal sequence between organizational involvement and political competence. At the beginning of this research, there was a question whether the effect of personal competence as the result of childhood socialization precedes one's organizational involvement, or whether

organizational involvement in a later stage in life has the greater effect on political efficacy. The writer has been unable to resolve this question with the current data, because regression analyses for the path model failed to present any significant equations.

Authoritarianism is associated with social class variables in the current data and social class variables have stronger explanatory power than authoritarianism does in the relationship with political efficacy and participation variables.

These findings and the unresolved questions with authoritarianism and political efficacy lead to the question of other covariates, such as social class variables and the political culture unique to Koreans.

There is also a conceptual problem than a problem of method or data. The writer's assumption has followed predominantly Freudian explanation of the genesis of authoritarianism, emphasizing the results of early childhood socialization. But the authoritarian characters attributed to psychological traits also reflect cultural values. In Marxian explanation, authoritarianism is the internalized cultural values and the harnessed human energy being molded to meet the social structure and role requirements (Greenstein, 1965, p.267). These arguments are not resolved and the current writer had no intention to tangle with this conceptual problem with his limited data.

Christie and Cook, citing that highly educated individuals prefer general liberality of social outlook, argued that "F-scale is a measure of social sophistication to a much greater extent than originally intended" by the authors of the "authoritarian personality." And

F-scale is most meaningful when employed in middle-class sample but uncertain with working class sample (1958, p.176). They argued that "In broad terms authoritarian syndrome reflects adherence to values which run counter to those accepted by liberal and literate citizens of the U.S." (1958, p.188).

But the writer does not concede that the utility of F-scale is limited to measuring American cultural values. If a modified F-scale have failed to measure the psychological traits of the Korean respondents, then, it is possible that certain cultural factors have prevented psychological traits from detection. And there should be a search for alternatives.

Considering that social psychological variables (ie., political efficacy) were found to have no significant relationship in a massive sample in Korea (Kim, et al., 1980), current findings may mean much more than what they seem to. As Kim et al. (1980) have speculated in regard to their Korean sample, the results which even contradicted their hypothesis might indicate that their respondents have not given truthful answers in fear of retaliation by the government against such opinions which are not in accordance with the goals of the government. Political organizations in Korea depend upon government for approval and protection even for their continued existence. Many such organizations are organized by the government itself and others are under its formal or informal auspices, except for a few autonomous groups such as student and Christian clubs acting in defiance of government controls. This remnant of homeland political culture may be still functioning in the immigrant communities in the U.S.

B. A Political Culture in Transition

The dominant features in Korean political culture can be summarized in three categories as described in the Introduction to this research.

1. Politics of Hierarchy and Deference

In Korean politics, those in leadership positions used to perceive their roles to be active commanding ones, and those on the receiving end were used to accepting their roles as blind submissive ones. Such attitudes and values have their roots in the traditional religions (Shamanism, then Buddhism and Confucianism) which legitimized the totalitarian practices by the sovereign ruler. Even Christianity has been melted into the perspectives of vertical human relationships, and except for a few liberal Christian leaders the majority of Protestant affiliates have been aligned with the established power since President Syng Man Rhee (1948-1960) and the military ruler Chung Hee Park (1961-1979).

Even the major newspapers are describing President Doo Whan Chun, who took power by military coup d'etat in 1980, as Tong-chi-kwon-ja (sovereign leader, the one who has the right to rule), and challenges to his legitimacy have not been tolerated.

Under these circumstances, political actors cannot play the role of allegiant participants because their political affects are constantly threatened and cannot be freely exercised in action. The majority's choice could be either submission, revolt, or self-alienation (with apathy).

The political culture in such a nation could not be dominated by the allegiant participants who present the best profile of a stable democracy. The political culture of a given nation is comprised of a number of subcultures. From a typology of political cultures (Almond and Verba, 1963, pp. 12-42), modified types of political actors can be derived and the respondents of the current sample can fit in as shown in Figure VII.1.

Figure VII.1.Types of Political Culture and Political Actors
(in Per cents, from Current Data)

	Political Affects				N	(%)
	System	Civic	Input	Output		
Allegiant Participant	high	high	high	high	10	(3.5)
Allegiant Subject	high	low	low	high	151	(52.8)
Alienated	low	high	low	low	94	(22.9)
Parochial Subject	low	low	low	low	31	(10.8)

It is often argued that the political climate of Korea pushed many Western-oriented intellectuals to emigrate to America. It is true that the Korean immigrants who came to the U.S. during the first decade after implementation of the 1965 Immigration Law are highly represented in the productive age group (29-39 years old) and among professionals (Choy, 1979, pp. 242-43 and Hyung C. Kim, 1977, p.115).

In the current data, only 3.5 per cent of the valid cases are allegiant participants who make up an ideal subculture for a stable

democracy. Half (52.8 per cent) of the respondents are allegiant-subjects in the presence of strong leadership or system; 32.9 per cent are alienated; and 10.8 per cent are parochial subjects.

These findings indicate that the Korean immigrants' political orientation might not have changed much from what they used to be before their emigration, or from what the homeland Koreans are currently holding. With such political orientations the Korean immigrants seem to fall into the mixed category of the "subject-participant culture" of Almond and Verba (*op.cit.*, pp.25f.):

In the mixed subject-participant culture a substantial part of the population has acquired specialized input orientations and an activist set of self-orientations, while most of the remainder of the population continue to be oriented toward an authoritarian governmental structure and have a relatively passive set of self-orientations... In the Western European examples of this type of political culture - France, Germany, and Italy in the nineteenth and present centuries - there was a characteristic pattern of structural instability with an alternation of authoritarian and democratic governments.

Our findings on authoritarianism, organizational involvement, and political efficacy (Chapter V) indicate that the respondents in the current study poses political subcultures according to the following patterns:

i) Conservatives are more parochial, more submissive, and less alienated than liberals, making them a bit backward in political orientation.

ii) Liberal nonauthoritarians have the lowest proportions of allegiant subjects or parochial subjects. They are more likely to be allegiant participants with high proportion of alienated individuals.

iii) There are no allegiant participants among liberal authoritarians, who are more likely to be allegiant subjects. When compared to liberal nonauthoritarians, they have the same proportion of alienated and parochial respondents.

iv) Conservative nonauthoritarians have the highest proportion of allegiant subjects and the lowest proportion of alienated subjects.

v) Conservative authoritarians are less likely to be submissive to government authorities but are more alienated than conservative nonauthoritarians.

Liberal nonauthoritarians seem to be the most democratic group, while liberal authoritarians seem to be the most threatening to stable democracy. Conservative nonauthoritarians seem to be the group most compliant with nondemocratic and mobilized political culture, while their authoritarian counterparts could be more resistive.

Females are slightly more oriented as allegiant subjects but are less parochial than males. Age, educational attainment, and organizational involvement have no linear relationship with this typology of political orientation. White-collar workers seem to have the most stable political orientation among the respondents. Blue-collar workers are most likely to be allegiant subjects (60 per cent) and the least alienated, but the most parochial, making them the most backward group among the respondents.

Table VII.1 Authoritarianism and Types of Political Orientation

	Types of Political Orientation				Row Total
	Alg-Part.	Alg-Sub.	Alien.	Par-Sub.	
Liberal					
Nonauthoritarian	9.4	45.3	37.7	7.5	99.9 (53)
Authoritarian	0	54.8	37.5	7.7	100.0 (104)
Conservative					
Nonauthoritarian	2.9	60.0	22.9	14.3	100.1 (35)
Authoritarian	5.6	50.0	30.6	13.9	100.1 (72)
Alg-Part: Allegiant Participant		Alg-Sub: Subject			
Alien: Alienated Subject		Par-Sub: Parochial Subject.			

2. The Politics of Voter Mobilization

Between the two distinct models of adult political socialization, the Korean scene fits the mobilization one. In the mobilization model, organizational activities and voting do not grow out of citizens' psychological involvement but the citizens act either in compliance with the pressures from government or in deference to community leaders. The citizenship model, on the other hand, is firmly rooted in citizens' awareness of political affairs, psychological involvement, and their social positions (Figure VII.2 and 3).

Korea is one of the nations which have the highest voting rate in the world. Kim et al. (1980) found that, while the average voting rate among 2,276 Korean respondents was 87 per cent, involvement in any political organization was barely more than 4 per cent. They found that voting participation in Korea did not stem from individual citizen political awareness, nor from any psychological involvement in politics. Even the direct effect of holding social positions was irrelevant (1980, p. 49). Their evidence supported the notion of mobilized voting, many citizens participating in voting merely in deference to government pressure or to the wishes of community notables (Yooji).

With these two models, Kim et al. found that massive voting is taking place predominantly among those in social positions susceptible to mobilization, i.e. females, the old, the less educated, and rural residents (Figure VII.2).

They argued that a transition from the mobilization model to the democratic citizenship model is essential for a stable democracy, but in reality they found that only a partial transition has taken place

(Figure VII.3).

The current sample from the immigrant community in the U.S. indicates that such a transition has progressed further here than in Korea. Better-educated respondents, males, and white-collar job-holders are more likely to participate in voting and in other political activities. Also, the voting rate is highest among those aged in their 40s, followed by those in their 30s. People older or younger than these two groupings have a lower voting rate. Because Korean immigrants primarily reside in urban areas, a rural vs. urban comparison is not relevant. Instead, years of residence in the U.S. make a great difference in various attitudes and behaviors. Specifically the vot-

Figure VII.2. Mobilized Voting Model

Social Position	Psychological Involvement	Modes of Participation
sex: female age: old residence: rural education: low	low psychological involvement/high vulnerability to mobilization	voting, organizational activities

Figure VII.3. Democratic Citizenship Model

Social Position	Psychological Involvement	Modes of Participation
sex: male age: young residence: urban education: high	high political interest, high efficacy, high propensity to absorb information	active in political discussion, campaigns, contact with officials

ing rate of naturalized citizens is higher among those who have lived longer than 10 years in the U.S. than among the new citizens.

Therefore, the transitional citizenship model for Korean immigrants is characterized by high political activity (including voting) among males, the middle-aged, the better-educated, and those who have lived longer in the U.S. (Figure VII.4).

The Korean immigrants are undergoing a transition in their political culture through their participation in voluntary organizations (as presented in Chapter VI), with the time factor (years of residence in the U.S.) playing a key role.

Figure VII.4. Transitional Citizenship Model

Social Position	Psychological Involvement	Modes of Participation
sex: male	high political interest	active in
age: middle-ages	high sense of efficacy	political affairs
education: high	high propensity to absorb	voting
longer in U.S.	information	

3. Elite-Mass Gap and Potential for Rebellion

The current data revealed that more Koreans approve of political protest activities (Table VII.5) than do respondents in five Western nations (Barnes and Kasse, 1979. p. 80). Protest approval has an extremely high correlation with individuals' actual participation or intention toward such protest activities ("r" ranges between .72 to .92, in the five Western nations sample). Although the current data have

no proper measure to relate protest approval to intended or actual protest, the political reality in Korea supports the high protest potential in the current data as very meaningful.

In the Korean political reality, protest activities are viewed with ambivalence. The students' protest in 1960 was instrumental in toppling dictator Syng Man Rhee's First Republic. Since then, students' protest activities have been highly valued among the liberals in the context of the historical struggle for the independence of the nation and resistance against foreign invasion (cf. Political Culture in Chapter I.).

However, conservative Koreans view the students' endless protests as a disruptive element in the nation's political and economic progress, undermining the legitimacy of the government and the existing political and economic system.

Koreans on both sides seem to view protest activities as a part of transitional phenomena. The liberals seem to assume that once the dictatorship is removed, there will be no more need for protest activities; while the conservatives are determined not to listen to the protesters, believing that repression can silence protesters. Both groups seem to expect an end to this struggle on their own terms.

Although the writer started with a main assumption that a psychological variable (authoritarian sensitivity to relative deprivation or to structural discrepancies) could explain protest potential, he finds more variables involved.

A number of theoretical factors of political protest seem to be applicable in explaining the case of Korean protesters: (i) political

and economic structures and conditions, (ii) perceived relative deprivation, (iii) expected success of rebellion despite the cost of conflict, and (iv) situations in which the dissident group has a certain control over power sources (E. Muller, 1979. Chapter II). All these seem to be working together in Korea.

The current data indicate that the liberal authoritarians will be more prone to protest if their high system and civic affect are matched with low input and output affect; and the conservatives are more likely to do so if their high civic and input affects are matched. The liberals' protest potential seems to be occurring in Korea as projected from the current data.

The Korean respondents in the current sample expressed more protest potential than did those in a purely American sample (Barnes and Kasse, 1979), although there was almost a decade's time gap between the two samples.

For Koreans in the U.S., three of the above explanatory factors seem applicable. They are faced with structural discrimination; have a strong perception of relative deprivation; and they have reached a position where they can expect success in protest despite the cost of conflict. The only explanatory factor that may not be applicable to the Korean-Americans' protest potential is that of group control over power resources. No one can predict how fast they can reach such a position, but they are currently striving for such access.

As Barnes and Kasse argued (1979, p. 523f.), protest activities are not merely a challenge to the fading legitimacy of the government, nor are they just a fad of youth revolting from Oedipal urges. Protest

is also a form of routine political activity by the populace and will remain a stable part of democratic political processes. It will affect elite positions, changing them to become less hierarchical and less encompassing, increasing the extent of plural structure.

C. Adaptation and Political Integration

Although years of residence in the U.S. has a strong positive association with political activities and issue preferences, that relationship is not a linear one. There are turning and regress points in the process of transition in political orientation and participation among the respondents in the current data. Interestingly, this pattern of conversion in political orientation seems to parallel the critical stages in the respondents' cognitive inconsistency about life in America. The findings support the argument that the time variable is not a causal factor per se, but rather a pervasive indicator of the immigrants' acculturation, social assimilation and economic improvement. The data also support the argument that the adaptation-³ related factors vary in curvilinear fashion (Hurh and Kim, 1984).

1. Transition in Civic Identity

On the assumption of curvilinear relationship between the time factor and adaptation variables, Hurh and Kim proposed a hypothetical model of stages in the adaptation of Korean immigrants. In their procedural model of adaptation (Figure VII.5), Korean immigrants would go through the following processes (1978, pp.96-100):⁴

- i) Initial excitement and exigency of immigration; conditions of culture shock, underemployment, language barrier, social isolation, etc. (1 to 3 years).

ii) Resolution: exigent conditions are redressed through their familiarity with American culture, employment, improvement in English, and relatively stable income. Taste for material affluence, interaction with Americans, and desire for Angloconformity may have increased. Thus, a degree of cultural assimilation may progress as time goes on (3 to 8 years).

iii) Optimum point: past aspirations "in the land of opportunity" may be revitalized, hence, life satisfaction and desire for assimilation may reach its peak (10 years).

iv) Relative deprivation: comparison of their life chances to those of white Americans brings the Korean immigrants to face the racial barriers in social mobility and lead to a sense of personal inadequacy as well as institutional inadequacies (13 years).

v) Identification crisis/social marginality: the sense of marginality follows the above stage. The question of "who am I" is raised as an intense problem (15 years).

iv) Marginality acceptance or new identity: they may passively accept their marginal identity as "Koreans in America" and remain dysfunctional or create a new ethnic identity as the "Korean-Americans" by a positive coping strategy (20 years).

Figure VII.5 CRITICAL PHASES IN ADAPTATION PROCESS





Figure VII.6 TRANSITION OF CIVIC IDENTIFICATION
BY YEARS IN THE U.S.



N = 202 : for earlier year groups per cents may not make 100, because they exclude those who want to remain as alien residents.

Among the current respondents, the new civic identity ("being proud as American citizens") gradually emerges between 8 and 10 years after immigration, coinciding with the optimum adaptation stage of Hurh and Kim (op. cit.). After passing through the identification crisis (14 years after immigration), the new identity as Americans begins to prevail as the old identity declines. Yet they seem to find two solutions to the identity dilemma as "Koreans in America" and as "Korean-Americans" by 15 years after immigration, a few years earlier than Hurh and Kim's suggestion (Table VII.2 and Figure VII.6).

Table VII.2. Years of Residence in the U.S. and Civic Identification
(Proud as "Koreans" or "American Citizens")

Years	Americans	Koreans
1 - 5	8.0 %	85.5 %
6 - 8	25.5	66.6
9 - 11	31.1	58.7
12 - 14	51.8	48.2
15 and over	55.6	44.4
Total	N = 80	N = 143

2. Transition in Political Issue Preference

For respondents in the current sample, obviously the turning point of political issue preference arrives after 8 to 10 years following immigration (Table VII.3 and Figure VII.7). The proportion of

respondents with more interest in Korean politics than in American political issues is higher up to 8 years after immigration. Then after 10 years of immigration the trend reverses; and the proportion of the respondents interested in American political issues becomes higher. The turning point in political interest coincides with the optimum satisfaction stage in Hurh and Kim's model (1978, pp.96-100).


Table VII.3. Years in the U.S. and Political Issue Preferences
(% of Respondents with "Very Much Concern" in Political Issues)

Years	Korean Issues	American Issues
1 - 5	52.8 %	27.1 %
6 - 8	49.0	42.0
9 - 11	37.8	42.8
12 - 14	24.9	47.2
15 and over	33.3	44.4
Total N	331	325

When they go through the identification crisis, because they are tired of the illusion of Anglo-conformity but are not yet accepted by mainstream society, their interest in political issues seems to stumble (although it does not appear clearly in a condensed figure). After 15 years of immigration, they may remain with marginally accepted feelings, and thus, become less interested in politics whether of America

or Korea (Table VII.3). But the current data do not have enough cases to make predictions beyond 15 years after immigration.

Figure VII.7 POLITICAL ISSUE PREFERENCE BY YEARS IN THE U.S.
(% of Respondents, "Very Much Concerned")



3. Transition in Voting

The first peak in voters' registrations occurs 10 years after immigration, during the optimum adaptation stage, in Huhr and Kim's model. After that stage, voters' registrations stumble (although it does not appear clearly in a condensed figure) but it seems to make another upturn after the identification crisis. When they perceive status inconsistency and head for the identification crisis stage, their interest in American political issues reaches its peak and they actively participate in voting, probably in an attempt to overcome

perceived institutional barriers. The upward turn of voting rates after that critical point (identification crisis) may indicate that they are headed toward positive coping behavior instead of passive acceptance of marginality, but the current data do not have enough cases for a reliable prediction (Table VII.4 and Figure VII.8). We cannot be sure about voting trends after 15 years of immigration because all the available data (including the writer's data) about the Korean immigrants are non-random, cross-sectional data.


If these critical points of issue preference, voters' registration, and voting did not occur as a result of sampling deficiency, then there may be a significant theoretical implication for both adaptation and political theories. Although the current data support the rejection of a positive linear relationship between the time factor and the progress of immigrants' adaptations, the writer feels that relationship may not end up in a reverse U-curve either. Hurh and

Table VII.4. Years of Residence in the U.S. and Voting

Years	Registered Voter	Voted in	
		Congressional Election	Local Election
1 - 5	16.7 %	0 %	0 %
6 - 9	40.6	26.1	29.5
10 - 11	69.7	52.3	42.2
12 - 14	77.4	60.6	41.4
15 and over	75.0	71.4	28.6

Valid Cases = 169 (citizens only)

Figure VII.8 VOTERS REGISTRATION AND VOTING



Kim, in their under-going research with Koreans in the Chicago area (1986-87), are projecting an alternative upturn in morale around 15 years concurrently with acceptance of marginality, and creation of a new identity by 20 years after immigration. Their alternative model seems to hypothesize a lopsided S-curve.

The current writer found somewhat different indications through unplanned encounters with Koreans who came to America for their own professional advancement but ended up staying longer than 20 years. Some have never given up the hope of Geum-Eui-Hwan-Hyang (returning home in silk robes) and contributing to the homeland, if political stability and opportunities were provided. They may have a dual sense of relative deprivation, in reference to American colleagues and in reference to their cohorts in the homeland.

At the same time, there are plenty of Korean senior citizens who are content with their lives in the U.S., primarily because of the social welfare system. They may be content because they do not have any more aspirations in social competition and their primary subsistence is guaranteed by Uncle Sam rather than by their Hyo-Ja(loyal son) whom they use to depend on for their subsistence in the homeland.

The existence of this relatively aged group does not allow any simple prediction about Korean immigrants' adaptation and political integration with the time factor. The writer feels that adaptation of Koreans in the U.S. might go through a series of cyclical ups and downs without full political integration among the first generation of Korean immigrants. That prospect for the next generation of Korean immigrants is even more uncertain. Further longitudinal studies are

needed in order to establish a clearer model of political integration of this immigrant group.

NOTES

1. Chong Kim and his colleagues treated data, collected from their interviews with 2,276 people in Korea during 1973-1974.

2. The indication that Koreans in Chicago have reached such a position was demonstrated during two-month-long protest activities during the Albany Bank incident in the fall of 1985. Mistreatment of a Korean customer by an employee of the bank resulted in the arrest and forced detention of that Korean male at a mental hospital. Through various organized protest activities, they gained the attention of the mainstream media and succeeded in getting written apologies from the president of the bank and the Superintendent of the Chicago police department. But this "success" was a rather symbolic political one.

3. Hurh and Kim reject the previous adaptation models which hypothesize a positive linear relationship between years of residence in a new country and satisfactory adaptation (such as by Milton Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life*, 1964). They rather agree with arguments that dissatisfaction in immigrants' lives can occur at certain times after arrival (A.H. Richmond, *Aspects of the Absorption and Adaptation of Immigrants*, 1974).

4. The sixth stage in Hurh and Kim's model has been revised by the authors for their new research to be completed in 1987.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

A. Summary of the Findings

The current data support the general postulations in pluralism about the positive effect of organizational involvement on political competence and the negative relationship between authoritarianism and political participatory behavior.

On Hypothesis 1, liberal authoritarians showed low scores on all four political affect items as general postulations. Organizational participation had an effect on this relationship and increased system, civic, and input affect as hypothesized, but lowered output affect contradicting the hypothesis.

Conservative authoritarians showed low system and civic affects as generally postulated but showed high input and output affects opposing the postulations. In these relationships, organizational involvement increasing civic, input, and output affects as hypothesized but lowering system affect.

On Hypothesis 2, the voting rate was high among all respondents with high system, civic, and input affects; but the voting rate could not be consistently predicted with output affect. The low or inconsistent voting rate associated with high output affect needs further investigation. It may have resulted because the high output affect group is small in proportion or it may not have been explainable with

the current data.

On Hypothesis 3, authoritarianism itself was not much related to preferences for Korean vs. American political issues. Those who have high system, civic, input, and output affects are likely to have more interest in American political issue than Korean. This is in the direction of the hypothesis, although some of the relationship is not significant. Also on the liberal/conservative issue dimension, authoritarians tend to express preferences for more basic, need-oriented issues than for altruistic ones. Political affects do not have a uniform effect in the direction of hypothesis.

Although some of the relationships were not strong, major findings confirmed the direction of the relationship between authoritarianism (either liberal or conservative) and political affect. But it was disappointing that the explained variances were too small in the test of political affect items.

One of the writer's goals in this research was to determine a causal sequence between organizational involvement and political efficacy. He has been unable to resolve this question with the current data, because regression analyses for a path model failed to present any significant equation.

The findings suggest that variables involved in the adaptation to the American culture by immigrants have much more influence than do individual authoritarianism on their political socialization. Educational attainment and years of residence in the U.S. are especially the most important variables for reaching relative life satisfaction in the adopted country and consequently in political socialization.

Although the massive immigration of Koreans began only less than two decades ago, the current data revealed an indication of changes in their political attitudes and behavior. Those who passed the optimum adaptation stage began to be more conscious of American politics than homeland politics and to participate more actively in voting.

The current data support a hypothesis by other researchers about the relationship between the time factor and adaptation of the Korean immigrants. So far the relationship between the time factor and political adaptation seems to be curvilinear. However, because the time span of the massive immigration experience of this group is so short, it may not be safe to make a long-term prediction about its political integration.

If the current data allow any projection as to future trends, it can be predicted that the Korean immigrants are highly politicized in terms of affective efficacy but this can fluctuate critically depending on their ability to cope with social barriers associated with racism. For this reason, it is desirable to add cognitive and evaluative dimensions of political efficacy to the study of immigrants' political assimilation in the U.S.

Concerning the potential for a stable democracy in their homeland (or in other nations which are in similar situations), the role of voluntary organizations seems also to be encouraging. The writer has tried to search out the meaning of the rampantly emerging "voluntary" organizations to the Korean immigrants who were used to much more limited experience with voluntaryism in their homeland. Koreans in the U.S. are joining with organizations voluntarily (without constraints by any

authorities) in search of a sense of belonging and status (linked to Gam-Too, a symbolic cap of high office) as argued by the writer earlier (1978). Whatever the motive for voluntary associations may be, such involvement seems to contribute to political socialization.

Although the current data suggest that a considerable transition of political culture has taken place from the mobilization model of the homeland to one of democratic citizenship among the Korean immigrants here, there are no available data which might explain how much of such a transition has taken place in Korea. This may be a major task for future research.

The current data indicated that very few among the Korean immigrants are the ideal-typical allegiant participant, or democratic constituents. Half of the sampled constituents are allegiant subjects and more than one-third are alienated subjects. Although the writer has no comparable data on such characteristics among their homeland contemporaries, he assumes there are no more allegiant participants in Korea than in the immigrant community here.

If this is the case, the realization of a stable democracy seems to be still decades away, despite a popular belief that removal of the military dictatorship would immediately allow free democracy to bloom. Unfortunately, such freedom may not be sufficiently exercised by the dominant (in proportion) allegiant subjects nor be properly shielded from the liberal-minded alienated subjects. The considerably high voting rate will continue regardless of any constitutional revision, and rampant protest activities persist irrespective of the policies of the government in Korea. Such protest activities may even become

more rampant with increased freedom as long as there is a big pool of liberal, authoritarian, alienated subjects.

B. Comments on the Method and Data

There were two types of technical setbacks in this research: (i) with measurement of key variables and (ii) with the sampling. The most difficult problem of measurement happened with authoritarianism. Reducing the number of authoritarianism items down to six, for the sake of brevity, was a risk. And even expanding authoritarianism into liberal/conservative dimensions of was rather arbitrary. It may be mathematically unsound to rely on such measures, but it seemed worthwhile to attempt to treat the leftist authoritarians as equal partners of the conventional rightist authoritarians.

There may be criticism for treating cognitive traits (openness to new ideas and egalitarian values) equally with psychic traits (aggressiveness and submissiveness). But without breaking down the authoritarian items, the writer was unable to find any logical and consistent results in determining relationships between authoritarianism and other major variables. The writer feels, as the result of this study, that there should definitely be a distinction between authoritarians on the left and on the right in future research. It will be desirable, to enlist additional questionnaire items to measure these dimensions more completely.

The writer also admits that it is incomplete to measure political competence only in terms of affective orientations, leaving out the cognitive and evaluative political orientations that the political

culture theorists originally introduced. But the writer finds his own justification because the Koreans' affective orientations are stronger than purely cognitive or evaluative ones. They characterize themselves as the nationals of Jung (affection) and Euiree (fraternal piety). Even limited knowledge about the affective political efficacy of Koreans (in the U.S.) may shed some light on the possibility of a stable democracy in their homeland as well as their political assimilation in the U.S. Concern for research economy also made it inevitable to reduce the number of factors and variables as much as possible.

There was also weakness in the randomness of the data. It was impossible to estimate sampling error because an accurate number of the population has not been attainable other than the one in the 1980 Census. Fortunately, the demographic characteristics of the current sample were found to be very compatible with the 1980 census data.

Despite these shortcomings, this research makes its own contribution, revealing the unknown political realities and potentials of a new immigrant group, although it may be difficult to generalize the findings beyond this sample.

C. Theoretical Implication and Suggestions for Further Research

1. Support for Pluralism

The findings reaffirm the general theses of pluralism, i.e., that participants in voluntary organizations have higher political efficacy and participate more in voting. Organizational involvements by the Korean immigrants are almost purely voluntaristic and probably more frequent than comparable activities in the homeland. This factor

seems to be positively functional for moving a political culture toward the democratic citizenship model with the current respondents.

However, because very few of these immigrants' organizations are political organizations oriented to the external community; and because the majority of them are oriented toward ethnic concerns, it is not clear how much in fact these organizations are contributing positively to political acculturation. Especially, the potential role of ethnic organizations, in making the choice between creative identity (toward Korean-American) or the older regressive identity (toward Koreans in America) seems to be dubious at the point of existential dilemma. More detailed research is desirable in order to identify what types of organizations for this immigrant group are or will be facilitating political assimilation vs. ethnic confinement.

2. Liberal/Conservative Authoritarians

In addition to the submission/aggression dimension of authoritarianism, a liberal/conservative dimension was added in the process of analyzing the data. The additional dimension was not considered in the original design of the research but was added later for effectiveness of the analysis. The results indicate that liberal authoritarians are the major active constituents in Korean politics. Not only that, liberal authoritarians have attitudes and behavior (or behavior potentials) distinctive from those of conservative authoritarians to whom most attention was paid previously. With the growing interest in nonconventional political (protest) behavior--not only in the U.S. but also in the third world--liberal-authoritarians may become more important targets for future research.

3. General Adaptation and Political Assimilation

The writer found that political acculturation is taking place slowly among the Korean immigrants, and that the critical points in the transition coincide with certain stages in an adaptation model by Hurh and Kim (1978). This adaptation-stage model for Koreans has been proposed by them as only a hypothetical one and has not been challenged or supported by any other party. The interesting coincidence between their findings and the writer's provide support for mutual propositions. Hurh and Kim are testing their hypothetical model a third time currently (1987). Their new findings can be tied to further political acculturation research.

Clear cut projection can not be made at this point about the extent of future acculturation and political integration among the Korean immigrants because they have been here for only a relatively short time. They have already perceived an immutable racial barrier and have begun to concede that they will remain unmeltable ethnics.

At this juncture, their acculturation may progress further and also their political integration as Korean-Americans. But if they passively accept their social marginality, the first generation immigrants may remain as "Koreans in America."

Under such circumstances, their high organizational activities may serve as a functional equivalent to participation in mainstream politics or in homeland politics, leaving the potential for further political integration undeveloped. As the data suggested, Koreans are more protest-prone than the set of five Western nationals (Barnes and Kasse, 1979). The alienated Korean immigrants may turn into a highly

protest-prone ethnic group with the encouragement of organizational involvement.

However, the prospect for their second generation may be rather different, although the majority of the Korean immigrants' children who currently arrived at their adulthood are Korean-borns; they are labelled as "trans-generation" (T.G.) or "1.5 generation." The "1.5 generation" do not have English language problems (of their parents' generation) and are starting their professional careers in the mainstream occupational strata, after their superb academic achievements.

They are pressured by their parents to maintain their Korean identity and its cultural values, but they are less sensitive to issues of homeland or Korean community. They are not as much active as their parents in community organizations and reluctant to express their interest in community leadership. They subscribe more to egalitarian values rejecting the authoritarian outlooks of the first generation. They show stronger preferences for individualism than collectivism and less ethno-centricity. The U.S.-born Korean second generation are called "banana generation" because only their skins are yellow (Koreanish) but their insides are almost white (American).

About forty per cent of the Illinois' Korean population was 19 years old or younger in 1980, according to the 1980 Census (Table IV.2 in Chapter IV). If this trends hold on, the future Korean immigrant community will have lower authoritarianism, higher political efficacy, less ethno-centric associations, and less interest in homeland issues, when the "trans-" or second generation arrive at their matured leadership. But we cannot predict how active they will be in organizational

and political participation. The degree of political assimilation by the next generation seems to be much depending on the political achievements and further designs by the first generation.

4. For Further Research

Confirming a general postulation of pluralism among the Koreans and finding a political acculturation pattern parallel to the curvilinear adaptation model are achievements of the current research. The writer wishes to see further research in the following fashion and magnitude:

a. Authoritarianism and Political Culture: More elaborated measurements are needed for authoritarianism and political efficacy (including cognitive and evaluative dimensions). Comparative studies (i) between the Koreans in the homeland and in the U.S., and (ii) between the Koreans and other newly arrived immigrant groups from less democratic cultures can be conducted. A nationwide study with a design similar to the current one can be conducted in Korea or cross-culturally. Since protest potential is becoming a more important expression of political participation than the electoral process in many of the less democratic countries, protest potential deserves major attention in such studies.

b. Acculturation and Political Integration: Continuous longitudinal studies on acculturation, with more refined variables are necessary in order to determine whether new immigrant groups like the Koreans are going to be politically integrated or remain alienated.

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APPENDIX I

MAJOR VARIABLES AND INDICES

1. Authoritarianism Index

In the original F-Scale and the SRC Election studies (1972), the respondents were forced to say "Yes" or "No" to the the questionnaire items. In the current study a choice for "undecided" was added in order to diffuse the acceptance/rejection response-set problem. The "undecided" responses were included later in a "No" category.

Values assigned for each of the six items:

"agree"= +1, "disagree"= -1, "undecided"= -1

a. Addition of 4 items makes Authoritarianism Index.

item 1 (youth need discipline)	-1	0	1
item 3 (science has limits)	-1	0	1
item 5 (too much equality)	-1	0	1
item 6 (take care of themselves)	-1	0	1

The cumulative scores are divide into 2 groupings:

@ - 4 to 2.... nonauthoritarian
@ 3, 4 authoritarian

b. Addition of 2 items make Liberalism Index.

item 2 (women in politics)	-1	0	1
item 4 (open to new ideas)	-1	0	1

The total scores are divide into 2 groupings:

@ -2 liberal
@ -1 to 2 conservative

2. Organization Indices

The responses to each organization are coded with different values as assigned in the following manner;

membership; nonmember = 0, member only = 1, officer = 2,
participation; rarely = 0 , sometimes = 1, often = 2

a. Organization Membership Index:

The cumulative scores of the membership items are divided into 3 groupings.

- @ 0 nonmember
- @ 1,2 menial member
- @ 3 and over ... active member

b. Organizational participation Index:

The cumulative scores of the participation items are divide into 3 groupings.

- @ 0 nonparticipant
- @ 1 to 3 ... moderate participant
- @ 4 and over ... active participant

c. Composite Organization Index:

The degree of membership, officership, and participation are combined into following 5 rank index.

Composite	membership	participation	officer
Org. Index 1	none	none	none
2	yes	none	none
3	one	yes	none
4	two or more	yes	none
5	yes	yes	yes

3. Political Affect Indices

a. System Affect Index:

To determine the positive, negative or lack of feelings of the respondents toward the general political system, the current research drew four politically relevant items from the 10-items asked in the ICPR questionnaire. Those are the affects toward full democratic system, social welfare system, economic system, and advanced technology and national strengths (Question II.15). The responses to the four system affect items were coded as follows:

i) Degree of pride and respect for the country

very much = 3 somewhat = 2 not at all = 1

ii) The cumulative scores were divided into 3 groupings

- @ 0 to 6 = low system affect
- @ 7 to 10 = moderate system affect
- @ 11, 12 = high system affect

b. Civic Affect Index:

The ICPR(Almond and Verba) questionnaire measured the respondents' feeling of obligation to country allowing multiple responses toward 10 items of civic duty. In the current study (Question II.13), the respondents' feelings about four key civic duties (voting, paying taxes, serving on a jury, and defending the country) were asked and coded as follows:

i) Scores assigned

- @ satisfied with civic duties = 3
- @ do it only because it is duty = 2
- @ feel somewhat annoyed = 1

Because there are so many missing case on jury and defense items, one-third of the total sample should be excluded without an adjustemnt. A mean value (1.5) of the four ranks of the qestionnaire items ($0 + 1 + 2 + 3 = 6$; $6/4 = 1.5$) was assigned in the place of missing values on jury and defense items.

ii) The cumulative scores of the four items are divide into 3 groupings.

- @ 0 to 5 = low civic affect
- @ 6 to 9 = moderate civic affect
- @ 10 to 12 = high civic affect

c. Input Affect Index:

E.N. Muller (1979) rearranged the 6 items of the ICPR questionnaire (Variables 39 through 45) to form a scale to measure the ability to influence government. These items ask the respondents what they would and can do to change regulations which they consider unjust or harmful (both at local and national levels). In the current study those items were reduced to three items asking what they would do, how successful they think they would be, and if they ever tried to exercise these input attempts. Two input-efficacy items (Question II.14.a & b) were treated as follows:

i) Values assigned

... "how much successful in input attempts?"

- @ very likely = 4 @ moderately likely = 3
- @ somewhat unlikely = 2 @ not at all likely = 1

... "what do you think you could do ?"

- @ protest activities= 1 @ do nothing= 2 @ write, organized activities, vote =3 @ checking more than two items = 4

ii) Scores of the two items multiplied and sorted into 3 groups.

- @ 0 to 4 = low input affect
- @ 6,8,9 = moderate input affect
- @ 12,16 = high input affect

		Feeling of Success			
		1	2	3	4
Input Attempt	1	1	2	3	4
	2	2	4	6	8
	3	3	6	9	12
	4	4	8	12	16

d. Output Affect Index:

The ICPR questionnaire has four items on output affect, asking the respondents if they thought they would get serious attention and equal treatment like everyone else when they presented their questions or point of view to the government officials or police. In the current study, two output efficacy items were used without distinction between local and federal authorities, and made into a scale as follows:

i) Values assigned.

... equal treatment by the authorities

- @ surely equal treatment = 5/ @ may get equal treatment = 4
- @ it depends = 3/ @ may not get equal treatment = 2
- @ will ignore my question = 1

... attention to your point of view

- @ seriously consider = 5/ @ pay some attention = 4
- @ it depends = 3/ @ would not say anything = 3
- @ will ignore my point of view = 1

ii) Scores of the two items were multiplied and sorted into two groups

- @ 1 - 6 = low output affect
- @ 8 - 15 = moderate output affect
- @ 16 - 25 = high output affect

		Attention to Your Point of View				
		1	2	3	4	5
Equal						
Treatment	1	1	2	3	4	5
by	2	2	4	6	8	10
Authorities	3	3	6	9	12	15
	4	4	8	12	16	20
	5	5	10	15	20	25

4. The Political Participation Indices

a. Participation in Electoral Process

The respondents' actual participation in the political processes were originally measured with the following six items. The sum of the scores on these six items were divided into six and the numbers below decimal points were rounded to make up the Participation Index. However, because there were too many "did not" responses, 87.8 per cent of the valid responses fell into a moderate participant category, thus limiting the utility of the index.

Six Items of Political Participation (in Per Cent)

	Did	Did Not	Will Do	Missing
Discussion with Politicians	7.3	71.4	17.5	3.8
Rallies	5.0	78.7	12.2	4.1
Donation	9.6	73.2	13.1	4.1
Vote in 82 Natl' Election	25.9	64.1	5.0	5.0
Vote in 83 Local Election	20.1	64.7	9.9	5.2
Writing to Media	2.3	73.5	20.1	4.1

b. The Protest Index

The Protest Index was made up of the responses to the four items, which asked if they approved of the major protest activities. The cumulative scores on the four items were divided into four and the numbers below decimal points were rounded:

Frequencies on Protest Index

Protest Index	N	Per Cent
Low	47	13.7 %
Moderate	162	55.9 %
High	81	27.9 %

Four Protest Items

i) **Protest Letter to the Politicians:** About half of the respondents approved of writing protest letters to politicians but there was no difference between nonauthoritarians and authoritarians.

Approval of protest letters has a significant positive relationship with educational attainment ($\text{Gamma}=.23$), and also positive relationship with the length of residence in the U.S. ($\text{Gamma}=.24$) and with citizenship. White-collar workers are slightly more likely to approve of writing protest letters than blue-collar workers ($\text{Gamma} = -.11$) and women are significantly less in favor of protest letters than men ($\text{Gamma} = -.29$).

ii) **Demonstration and Marching:** It is interesting to see that only 28.8 % of the Korean respondents approved of political demonstrations and marches despite the common notion that the students' demonstrations have been the most effective means of expressing dissent to the government in Korea. Student demonstrations actually overthrew the regime of President Syng Man Rhee in 1961 and have been feared most by the military successors in Korea.

Authoritarians in general are less in favor of demonstrations than nonauthoritarians. About a quarter (24.4 %) of authoritarians approved and 17.1 % disapproved. About one-third (31.2 %) of the non-authoritarians approved demonstrating and 11.3 % disapproved.

As expected, females are less likely to approve demonstrations than males (21.5 % vs. 32.1 %; $\text{Gamma} = -.18$). College educated respondents are more likely to approve of demonstrations than the high school graduates ($\text{Gamma}=.12$). Blue-collar workers are more likely to approve demonstrations than white-collar workers ($\text{Gamma} = -.11$), presumably because of work-site experiences of strikes or more frustration in human relations at work. Although there are some income groupings which approves of demonstrations more than others, there is no linear relationship between income and approval of demonstration.

The naturalized U.S. citizens tend to approve of demonstrations

more than do the resident aliens ($\text{Gamma}=.14$). Those who have lived longer than 5 years in the U.S. are more likely to approve than those who lived less than five years in the U.S. ($\text{Gamma}=.11$).

iii) Disobeying Unjust Government Actions: Disobeying an unjust law or action by government authorities is approved of by 39.5 % of the respondents. There is a significant positive relationship between authoritarianism and disobedience ($\text{Gamma}=.20$). More authoritarians (44.7 %) approve of this type of protest than do nonauthoritarians (36.7 %).

Females are less likely to approve of disobedience than do males (32.7 % vs. 42.6 %, $\text{Gamma}=-.17$). College-educated respondents are more likely to approve disobedience than the high school educated ($\text{Gamma}=.11$). While the approval of disobeying is low among the clericals (16.7 %), service workers (20.0 %), and small-business operators (28.6 %). More than 40 % of the professionals and factory workers approve this type of protest.

Although those in the upper income brackets are less likely to approve of disobedience, income has not a linear relationship with such approval of disobedience. Neither years of residence in this country nor legal status of citizenship/resident alien makes a difference on the matter of disobeying governmental actions.

iv) Stopping Government: Less than one-fourth (24.1 %) approve of violent actions that may stop the normal functions of the government. Authoritarians are less likely to approve (20.1 %) than the nonauthoritarians (26.2 %).

Females are less likely to approve of violent protests than males ($\text{Gamma}=-.20$). Only 16.0 % of females approve violent protests vs. 27.4 % for males. Educational attainment, occupational status, and income have no significant relationship with approval of violent protest nor do the years of residence in this country. However, the naturalized U.S. citizens are more likely to approve of such protests (28.3%) than the alien residents (19.3 %).

5. The Political Issue Index

a. Homeland vs. American Political Issue Index

Two sets of questions concerning issue preferences were asked of the respondents. Question No.II.7 asked about the degree of interest in Korean vs. American politics, and if they were involved in political discussions as shown in Table VI.8. The sum of the three of the six items which concern Korean politics and politicians were divided into three categories and make up the Korean Political Issue Index, while the other three items make up the American Politics Issue Index in the same manner.

Korean vs. American Political Issue Index

	Low	Moderate	High	Row Total
American Issue Index	7.1	55.8	37.1	100.0 (N = 326)
Korean Issues Index	9.0	48.8	42.2	100.0 (N = 332)

b. The Liberal-Conservative Political Issues Index

Question No.II.8 asked for the traditional liberal vs. conservative responses to the three-pair items (Table VI.10). It was not reasonably possible to obtain clear-cut liberal vs. conservative responses from the data. If they were coded into dichotomous indices they would not be clearly correlated with liberal-conservative traits of authoritarianism. The responses rather seem to reflect altruistic (for the liberals) and self-preservative (for the conservatives) attitudes. At any rate they were given the status of liberal vs. conservative issue preferences. And the Liberal-Conservative Issue Index was made up so that on a continuum the lower values represent liberalism and the higher values represent conservatism, in the following manner:

Liberal/Conservative Issue Preference

Liberal	vs. Conservative Choices	Issue Index	%
three	none	1. Low (liberal)	16.9
two	one	2.	41.0
one	two	3.	33.8
none	three	4. High(Conservative)	8.3

Missing cases=54

APPENDIX II

CENSUS DATA AND CURRENT SAMPLE

1. Sampling Strategy and Schedule

Out of the 7,500 subscribers of the Korea Times, three typical characteristic clusters related to the history of Korean's mobility were initially selected as follows:

a. The inner city samples were selected from the neighborhoods where relatively newer Korean immigrants are living. These areas are Lakeview (zip codes 60613,60657), Uptown (zip code 60640), Rogers Park (zip codes 60645,60659), and Albany Park (zip codes 60618,60625,60630).

b. The suburban samples were selected from (a) the near north suburban towns such as Skokie, Morton Grove, Des Plaines, Glenview (the first three digits of zip code is 600), (b) northwest suburbs such as Elk Grove Village, Schaumburg area, Elmhurst (the first three digits of zip code are 600 or 601), and (c) southern suburbs such as

Sampling Schedule

Areas	1st Wave/Returns	2nd Wave	3rd Wave	Total Returns (%)
Chicago City				
Lakeview	114 / 15	74	28	
Rogers Park	87 / 14	51	31	
Albany Park	216 / 45	120	51	
Sub Total	417			174 (41.7%)
Suburbs				
Near North	103 / 17	87	0	35 (34.0%)
North West	71 / 16	42	0	31 (43.7%)
Southern	34	22	0	11 (32.3%)
Sub Total	208			77 (37.7%)
Other than Cook county suburbs				16
Chicago Area Total	625 :			268 (42.9%)
			Analyzable cases	242(38.8%)
Neighboring States(one batch/returns)				
Ind.	81 / 23;	Ga. 54 / 17;	Mich. 104 / 31;	
Minn.	58 / 15;	Mo. 73 / 18;	Wis. 82 / 24.	
Sub Total	452 / 128:			128 (28.3%)
			Analyzable cases	102(22.6%)
Total Return		396 out of 1,077		(36.8%)

Hinsdale, Downers Grove, Palos Heights, and Lombard (the first three digits of zip code are 604 or 605).

c. Four neighboring states and Georgia were included in the survey because the Koreans in these states share the sense of community with Chicago's Koreans by subscribing for the same newspaper and share similar social characteristics.

2. Census Data and Current Sample

According to the 1980 census, the median age of the Korean-American population in the country (total 354,593) is 26.1 years and 26.9 years in Illinois (total 24,351). The median age of current sample is 40.0 years because the sample was drawn from adult population (over 20 years old) while the census includes persons under 19 years old. But when only the persons over age 20 considered, the T-Test shows that the mean age of the Koreans in census is not significantly different from that of the current sample ($F=6.99$; with d.f. 1 and 10; $0.05 < p < 0.01$).

The educational achievement status is a little difficult to compare because the junior and senior high school systems are not identical between the two countries and the measurements are organized differently in the census and current survey. The T-Test after adjusting the measurement of the current survey into four categories, compatible with the census measurement (Table II. 2) shows that the mean education scores of the two groups are different ($F=18.84$; with d.f. 1 and 6; $p < 0.01$). The frequency distributions indicate that under-educated people are counted more in the census than in most of Korean community surveys, which usually show that two-thirds of the Korean immigrants are college graduates.

However, when the educational achievement categories are collapsed into two (high school graduates or under vs. college educated) the there remains no difference between the census population and the current sample ($F=16.68$; with d.f. 2 and 1; $0.05 < p < 0.01$). It may be said that Korean community surveys draw more responses from highly educated people, however, the basic constituency is not significantly different in terms of educational achievement.

The comparison of occupational status does not show that the current sample represent the census population with statistical significance (see Tables II.5 & II.6). The census has more representation from factory workers than the current sample (skilled and non-skilled workers 22.7 % vs. 6.1 %), while the ratio of self-employed proprietors is reversed (6.2 % vs. 17.4 %). Also the proportion of white collar job holders decreases from 1980 Census (33.5 %) to current sample (29.7 %). However, if the occupational categories are collapsed into three (white-collars vs. others, and unemployed) the

group difference disappears ($F=0.57$; with d.f. 1 and 4: $p < 0.01$). The income status needs no comparison because the average income (combined gross annual household income) of the current sample far exceeds that of the Koreans in the census (\$35,788 vs. \$22,833).

To sum up, the current sample shares identical characteristics in age and educational achievements with the Illinois' Koreans. And the proportion of white-collar workers and unemployed are very close. Considering the three-and-half years time gap between the two sets of data, there is no significant difference between the two groups even though there is a considerable income gap between the two data.

3. Variance Between the Sampling Blocks

The crosstabulation of age distribution among the three clusters indicates that the Chicago city sample has slightly more (about a dozen more) elderly respondents than the suburban and out-of-state clusters but Chi-square is not significant. And the T-test proves that there is no difference in variance from the mean age between Chicago area (including suburbs) and the out-of-state samples ($F=1.83$ with d.f. 1 and 11; $p < 0.01$).

The crosstabulation of educational distribution shows that Chicago city sample has more college-educated people than the suburban and out-of-state samples (Chi-square: significant at 0.002 level with d.f. 14). But the T-test shows that there is no difference in variance from the mean between Chicago area and out-of-state samples ($F=1.07$ with d.f. 1 and 14; $p < 0.01$).

The occupational characteristics are not significantly different among the three cluster samples although the suburban sample has a slightly higher proportion of technical level professionals and small

Table.A.II.1. Age Comparison by Sampling Blocks
(in per cent)

Age	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-over	Total
Block1	11.2	38.3	34.6	11.2	3.7	0.9	107
Block2	6.0	35.8	46.3	10.4	1.5	0.0	67
Block3	12.3	37.0	32.1	9.3	6.8	2.5	162

Sampling Blocks 1: Out of State 2: Chicago Suburbs 3: Chicago.
Missing Cases=8

of proprietors. The T-test also shows that Chicago area sample and the out-of-state sample are not different in their variances from the mean ($F=3.42$; with d.f. 1 and 18; $p < 0.01$).

Income distribution of the three clusters are slightly different because Chicago city sample has more people with incomes under \$ 20,000 and fewer people in the above \$50,000 level (however, the Chi-square value is not significant although Gamma is $-.12$). Also the T-test tells that Chicago area and out-of-state samples have different variance from the mean ($F=13.64$; with d.f.1 and 18; $0.05 < p$).

Table.A.II.2. Educational Attainment: Comparison by Sampling Blocks
(in per cent)

	Block1	Block2	Block3	Total
High School Graduates or under	34.7	32.3	16.8	82
College Educated	56.4	52.3	76.7	210
Graduate Studies	8.9	15.4	6.5	29
Column Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	321

Missing Cases=23

Table.A.II.3. Occupational Comparison by Sampling Blocks
(in per cent)

	Block1	Block2	Block3	Total
Professional	16.0	9.4	6.8	25
Technical	16.0	35.8	21.2	56
Managerial	24.0	15.1	27.1	58
Clerical	1.3	3.8	7.6	12
Skilled Worker	5.3	1.9	3.4	9
Non-skilled Worker	6.7	3.8	4.2	12
Proprietor	5.3	3.8	6.8	14
Service Worker	2.7	0.0	2.5	5
Others(Employed)	22.7	26.4	20.3	55
Column Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	246

Missing Cases=98

The years of sojourn in this country is significantly shorter among the Chicago city sample than the suburban and out-of-state samples (Chi-square is significant at 0.02 level with d.f. 16 and Gamma= -.16). Also the T-test shows that Chicago area and out-of-state samples are different in their variances from the mean ($F=6.57$; with d.f. 1 and 16; $0.05 < p < 0.01$).

Table.A.II.4 Income Comparison by Sampling Blocks
(in per cent)

	Block1	Block2	Block3	Total
Under \$ 10,000	6.5	1.5	4.2	15
\$ 10,000 - \$ 19,999	16.7	7.5	21.8	59
\$ 20,000 - \$ 29,999	24.0	19.4	26.0	82
\$ 30,000 - \$ 39,999	13.9	20.9	17.6	58
\$ 40,000 - \$ 49,999	8.4	15.0	8.5	33
\$ 50,000 and over	30.6	35.8	21.8	93
Column Total	100.1	100.1	99.9	340

Missing Cases=4

APPENDIX III

The Questionnaire

Please fill in following information about yourself (Fill in or circle appropriate category).

SECTION I.

1. Age: _____ years old.
2. Gender: Male (), Female ().
3. Marital status: Married (), single (), divorced (), other ()
4. Legal status in the U.S.
 - a. American citizen (), b. permanent resident (),
c. others (state _____)if you are a citizen have you registered for voting? Yes (), No()

5. Please check your highest school grade/degree completed.

- | | in Korea | in the U.S. |
|----------------------------|----------|-------------|
| a. less than high school | () | () |
| b. some high school | () | () |
| c. high school graduated | () | () |
| d. some college attended | () | () |
| e. college graduated | () | () |
| f. some post-college works | () | () |
| g. master's degree | () | () |
| h. doctoral degree | () | () |
| i. other(state _____) | | |

6. Are you currently employed?

- () yes(specify your job title _____)
- () employed before but,laid off
- () looking for work
- () retired
- () home maker
- () student
- () never worked

7. What was your family's approximate gross annual income (in 1982)?

-\$ _____

8. How long have you been in the States? () years () months.

9. What is your religious affiliation?

Protestant () Buddhist () Catholic () other (specify _____).

10. What is the major news medium that you rely on to find out how the world is going around(rank the following types in order of greatest importance. Mark 1 for most important, 2 to for next, upto 5.

- a. American TV ()
- b. American papers ()
- c. Korean language newspapers ()
- d. American radios ()
- e. Korean language TV or radios ()

11. Do you regularly read English newspapers? Check one.

Often Sometimes Rarely Never

() () () ()

12. How often do you listen to the radio for news? Check one.

() () () ()

13. How often do you watch TV for news broadcasts?

Check one after each.

- a. national news in the early morning. () () () ()
- b. national early evening news. () () () ()
- c. local early evening news. () () () ()
- d. local late night news. () () () ()
- e. political news specials. () () () ()

*. There were 14 additional questions concerning newspaper readership asked to the respondents in the first wave mailing but deleted in later questionnaires.

SECTION II.

1. Between Korean and English, which language do you use more frequently at home? Check one.

- a. always Korean only ()
- b. mostly Korean with some English ()
- c. about half Korean and half English ()
- d. mostly English with some Korean ()
- e. always English only ()

2. How well do you read, speak, and write in English? Check one after each type.

fluent (1) good (2) fair (3) poor (4) not at all (5)

- a. reading () () () () ()
- b. speaking () () () () ()
- c. writing () () () () ()

3. Are you a member of the following organizations? And have you held any officership in the organizations? And how often do you attend those organizational meetings?

	(Check all that apply)		(Check one)			
	member	officer	attendance	often	sometimes	rarely
a. provincial(homeland) organization	()	() /	()	()	()	()
b. high school alumni	()	() /	()	()	()	()
c. college or university alumni	()	() /	()	()	()	()
d. church related organization	()	() /	()	()	()	()
e. service function organization	()	() /	()	()	()	()
f. professional organization	()	() /	()	()	()	()
g. the Korean Association of Chicago	()	() /	()	()	()	()
h. other,specify _____	()	() /	()	()	()	()
_____	()	() /	()	()	()	()

4. How many times during the past 12 months have exchanged social visits with American friends (e.g.invite to your home or get invited to their homes)?

- a. once ()
- b. 2 to 5 times ()
- c. 5 to 9 times ()
- d. ten times or more ()
- e. never ()

5. Please, mark each of the following items showing how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. Check one under each.

	disagree (1)	undecided (2)	agree (3)
a. What young people most need is strict parental discipline.	(1	2	3)
b. Women should stay out of politics.	(1	2	3)
c. Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood.	(1	2	3)
d. People should pay attention to new ideas even if they seem against to what people generally think.	(1	2	3)
e. In many respects equality has gone too far in this conuntry.	(1	2	3)
f. All but the handicapped and old should take care of themselves.	(1	2	3)

6. When you gather for organizational meetings, how often do you have occasion to talk about politics. Check one.

- a. on almost all the occasions I attend ()
- b. on about half of the occasions I attend ()
- c. sometimes but not often ()
- d. scarcely ()
- e. never ()

7. If you talk about politics at such meetings, what would you be mostly concerned about? Check one after each. Mark one.

would be concerned very much (1)/ not much (2)/ almost not (3)

- | | | | |
|---|-----|---|-----|
| a. current issues in American politics. | (1 | 2 | 3) |
| b. organizing Koreans to consolidate their powers in America. | (1 | 2 | 3) |
| c. American politicians at local and national levels. | (1 | 2 | 3) |
| d. current issues in Korean politics. | (1 | 2 | 3) |
| e. who's who in the Korean politics. | (1 | 2 | 3) |
| f. efforts to help or influence homeland politics. | (1 | 2 | 3) |
| g. other (list) | (1 | 2 | 3) |

8. Of the following pairs of political issue statements, which one do you feel easier to support? Check either (a) or (b) under each.

* In the Korean affairs the U.S. government should put emphasis on...

- | | |
|--|-----|
| a. maintaining the national security and political status than any other needs. | () |
| b. influencing the Korean government for the improvement of human rights and democratic development. | () |

* In domestic policy, the U.S. government should spend more ...

- | | |
|--|-----|
| a. on its aid to education and social welfare programs | () |
| b. on national defence and foreign military assistance | () |

* In the area of minority political participation, the Korean community should aim...

- | | |
|---|-----|
| a. to place Koreans in the public offices as much as possible | () |
| b. support American politicians and obtain maximum access to policy making through them | () |

9. During the past one year have you participated any of the following activities. Mark appropriate number.

- | | | | |
|---|----------|---------|---------------|
| | yes (1)/ | no (2)/ | intend to (3) |
| a. attend political meetings where they have political discussions or have politician(s) invited. | (1 | 2 | 3) |
| b. attend political rallies for a candidate or a political party. | (1 | 2 | 3) |
| c. donate money to a candidate or party. | (1 | 2 | 3) |
| d. vote in the last November election. | (1 | 2 | 3) |
| e. vote in the April local election. | (1 | 2 | 3) |
| g. write an opinion letter to Korean newspaper | (1 | 2 | 3) |

10. There are many ways for people to show their disapproval or disagreement with government's policies and actions. Would you show which one from below you approve/disapprove as the means for showing dissatisfaction with the U.S. government?

Mark appropriate numbers:

approve (1)/ disapprove (2)/ depends on circumstance (3)

- a. writing letters of protest to politicians. (1 2 3)
- b. protest meetings and marches permitted by local authorities (such as the protest against education budget cuts). (1 2 3)
- c. refusing to obey a law which one thinks unjust, and risking to go to jail (e.g. police brutality). (1 2 3)
- d. attempting to stop the government from its usual activities (e.g. sit-ins, mass rallies) after failing in other means of protest. (1 2 3)

11. If you have any preference for American political parties what label would you identify with? Check one.

Democrats/ Republicans/ Independents/ others (state)
 () () ()

12. a. Suppose there were some questions that you had to take to the "authorities"-- for example, a tax assessment, immigration status, or a traffic ticket by the police--, do you think you would be given equal treatment, as well as anyone else?

- () They surely will give me equal treatment.
 () I may get equal treatment.
 () They will ignore my questions .
 () It depends.
 () I may not get equal treatment.

- b. If You explained your point of view to the officials what effect do you think it would have?

- () they will seriously consider
 () they will pay some attention
 () they will ignore my point of view
 () it depends
 () they would not say anything

13. How close are these statements to describe your feelings about performing following citizens' duties?

feel worthwhile (1)/ do it only because it is duty (2)/
 feel somewhat annoyed (3)

- a. when you pay taxes. (1 2 3)

- b. when you have to go to vote. (1 2 3)
 c. if you were asked by a court to serve
 on a jury. (1 2 3)
 d. if you(or your son) are asked to register
 for draft. (1 2 3)

14. Suppose a regulation is being considered by the city council or the legislatures of the state or congress, and that you considered it very unjust or harmful(e.g. mandating every household to own a handgun), what do you think you could do?

a. Check all that you may do.

- () probably do nothing.
 () write or talk to politicians(alderman or congressman etc.)
 () work through organized groups
 () express opinion by voting.
 () take some protest activities, such as sit-ins, march, or
 some violent actions if necessary.
 () simply disobey

b. If you made an effort to change this regulation how likely is it that you would succeed. Check one.

- () very likely
 () moderately likely
 () somewhat unlikely
 () not at all likely

c. Have you ever done anything to try to influence a political (local, state, and federal) decision? Check one.

- () often
 () once or twice, a few times
 () never

15. Speaking about America, the new country you are living in, what aspects gives you the most pride and respect for the country? Mark the degree of pride you feel with appropriate numbers.

Very much (1)/ somewhat (2)/ not at all (3)

- a. democratic system which guarantees
 equality and justice for all (1 2 3)
 b. social legislation which provides
 basic welfare for all (1 2 3)
 c. economic system which provides chance
 for everyone to make living (1 2 3)
 d. its industrial, technological, and
 military strength (1 2 3)

16. Are you proud of yourself for becoming an American citizen or a permanent resident? Check one.

- I'm proud of becoming a citizen
- I'm proud of becoming a permanent resident
- I'd rather be proud of being a Korean
- I am not sure about which identity I should proud of
- don't know

* Three more items were asked for suggestions to the Korea Times and

1. If you have any suggestions to the Korea Times, please, fill in the following space.

2. Is your newspaper delivered on time?

- yes
- it misses _____ times a week

3. Your postal zip code _____

한국일보 애독자 여론조사

본 지사는 교민 여러분의 관심과 요구를 좀더 구체적으로 알아 신문 편집과 독자 서비스를 향상시키기 위해 애독자 여론조사를 실시합니다. 아래 설문은 독자가 신문에 무엇을 기대하는가를 알려줄뿐 아니라 이민후의 가치관 변화, 한인사회의 단합활동과 미국에서의 권리를 위해 우리 한인들의 길을 개척하는데 참고가 될만한 자료들을 수집하도록 작성되었습니다. 응답자의 신분은 밝히지 않으시는 것이므로 약 20분간 시간을 내시어 기입해 동봉한 봉투로 발송해 주시면 신문제작과 한인사회 장래를 위해 좋은 자료가 되겠습니다. 감사합니다.

귀하의 신상에 관해 다음 사항을 기입(또는 표시)해 주십시오.

- 연령 () 세 2. 성별 남()/여()
 결혼관계 기혼() 미혼() 이혼 또는 별거() 기타()

미국내 법적신분

- a. 미국시민() 영주권자()
 기타(구체적으로)
 b. 만약 시민이면 투표권 등록을 했습니까?
 등록했다() 안했다()

귀하의 최종학력

- | | | |
|--------------|------|------|
| | 한국에서 | 미국에서 |
| a. 중졸이하 | () | () |
| b. 고교중퇴 | () | () |
| c. 고졸 | () | () |
| d. 대학중퇴 | () | () |
| e. 대학졸업 | () | () |
| f. 대학원 수학 | () | () |
| g. 석사학위 취득 | () | () |
| h. 박사학위 취득 | () | () |
| i. 기타(상세하게) | | |

귀하는 현재 취업하고 계십니까.

- () 취업하고 있다.(직업의 종류·직위는?)
 또는 사업을 하신다면 구 업종은?

- () 직업이 있었으나 레이어드 됐다.
 () 은퇴했다. () 일케어를 받고 있다.
 () 가정주부 () 학생
 () 미국서 취업한 일 없음

7. 귀하(가정의) 연간 총수입(세금도 포함)은 어느 정도입니까?

연간 만 천달러선

8. 미국 거주한 기간은? 년 개월

9. 어느 종교를 가지셨습니까?

- 개신교() 캐톨릭() 불교() 무종교()
 기타(상세히)

한국에서도 같은 종교를 가지셨습니까?

그렇다() 아니다()

10. 세상 돌아가는 일을 아시는데 주로 어떤 언론매체에 의존하십니까?(제일 중요한 것을 1로 시작 5번까지 순서로 정해 주십시오)

- () 미국 TV
 () 미국 신문 () 미국 라디오
 () 한국말 신문 () 한국말 TV나 라디오

전혀 않는다
 거의 않는다
 가끔
 자주

11. 영어 신문은

자주 읽으십니까? () () () ()

12. 라디오 뉴스는 얼마나

자주 들습니까? () () () ()

13. TV 뉴스를 얼마나

자주 보십니까?

- a. 이른 아침 전국 뉴스 () () () ()
 b. 초저녁 전국 뉴스 () () () ()
 c. 초저녁 지방뉴스 () () () ()
 d. 밤(10시) 지방뉴스 () () () ()
 e. (정치)특별보도 () () () ()

14. 하루에 한국어 신문 보는 시간은?

- 30분정도()
 1시간 정도() 1시간 이상()
 신문 볼 시간이 없다()

15. 신문을 읽으실때 가장 먼저 보는 부분은?

- 한국 일보 본지() 광고란()
 미주판() 소설() 만화()

16. 한국일보를 구독하는 이유는?

- () 기사의 내용이 정확하고 충실해서
 () 기사 보도가 빨라서
 () 지면과 기사가 많아서
 () 전부터 보아왔기 때문에
 기타()

17. 미주 뉴스 1면 기사는?
 거의 안 읽는다()
 반 이상 읽는다()
 관심 있는 것만 골라서 읽는다()
18. 미주 뉴스에서 가장 관심있게 읽는 기사는?
 관심이 많다(1) 약간 관심(2) 별로 관심없다(3)
- 범죄 화재 사고등 사건기사 (1 2 3)
 - 한국내 정치 기사 (1 2 3)
 - 미국내 정치 기사 (1 2 3)
 - 미국의 경제 기사 (1 2 3)
 - 한국 안보에 관한 기사 (1 2 3)
 - 교포 사회내 동정 (1 2 3)
 - 생활정보(이민 법률 취업등 (1 2 3)
 - 자녀 교육에 관한 기사 (1 2 3)
 - 논설 (1 2 3)
 - 종교관·교회기사 (1 2 3)
 - 스포츠 기사 (1 2 3)
 - 부정의 고발과 시점에 (1 2 3)
 - 연예기사 (1 2 3)

19. 매주 1회 발간되는 어린이 한글판은 아이들에게 권한다()
 별로 도움이 되지 않는다()
 있어도 없어도 상관없다()
 매일 있었으면 좋겠다()
20. 미주 뉴스에서 자기 지방에 관계없는 다른 지방 교포사회 기사에 대해
 매우 관심을 갖는다()
 가끔 읽는 편이다()
 거의 관심을 안둔다()
21. 수필이나 독자 부고 같은 독자부고는?
 재미있게 읽는다()
 선택해서 실었으면 좋겠다()
 더 많은 게재를 원한다()
 필요 없다()

22. 생활정보 기사로 필요한 것은(필요하다고 생각하는 것은 모두 표하십시오)
 일반 법률상식() 이민법 해설()
 의료상식() 유아상식()
 부동산 및 투자() 자녀진학()
 미국 관청의 서비스 이용()
 자동차 및 실용기술() 기타

23. 한국일보(미주뉴스와 본지포함) 광고란을 거의 모두 읽는다()
 반정도 읽는다()
 4분의1정도 읽는다() 거의 안본다()

24. 한국일보 광고를 읽는 것은?
 그냥 재미로 읽는다()
 필요한 광고를 찾으러()
 광고 도안에 이끌려서()
 광고 본안에 이끌려서()
25. 미주 뉴스의 영문판 발행은?(타당하다고 생각하시는 것은 모두 표하십시오)
 한글을 모르는 2세들에게 도움이 된다()
 어른들의 영어 공부에 도움이 될 것이다()
 한인사회를 미국사회에 알리는 길이다()
 아직 필요없다()

26. 한국일보 시카고판을 구독한지는
 년 개월 된다.
27. 미주판의 소설, 만화는 자주 보십니까?
 소설 만화(영국지)
 매일 본다 () ()
 가끔 본다 () ()
 거의 안본다 () ()

1. 한국말과 영어중 집에서 어느 편을 더 자주 사용하십니까?
 ()함상 한국말만 한다.
 ()거의 한국말로 하고 영어는 약간
 ()한국말과 영어를 반반정도.
 ()거의 영어로 하고 한국말은 약간
 ()함상 영어만 한다.

2. 귀하는 영어를 어느정도 잘하십니까?
 유창하게 한다(1) 잘한다(2) 적당히 한다(3)
 잘못한다(4) 전혀 못한다(5)
 읽기 (1 2 3 4 5)
 회화 (1 2 3 4 5)
 작문 (1 2 3 4 5)

3. 귀하는 다음 단체의 회원·임원이십니까? 해당 단체의 모임에는 얼마나 자주 참여하십니까?

	회원	임원	자주	가끔	희소
a. 한국고향 단체	() ()	() ()	() ()	() ()	() ()
b. 고등학교 동창회	() ()	() ()	() ()	() ()	() ()
c. 대학 동창회	() ()	() ()	() ()	() ()	() ()
d. 교회관계 단체	() ()	() ()	() ()	() ()	() ()
e. 사회봉사 단체	() ()	() ()	() ()	() ()	() ()
f. 전문직 단체	() ()	() ()	() ()	() ()	() ()
g. 한인회	() ()	() ()	() ()	() ()	() ()
i. 기타 단체	() ()	() ()	() ()	() ()	() ()

거의 안한다.

12. A. 만약 귀하가 어떤 질문(예, 세금, 이민 혹은 경찰의 교통위반 티켓등)에 관해 당국에 가서 질문하면 남과 평등하게 대우를 받을 수 있다고 생각하십니까?
 () 내게도 확실히 평등히 대할 것이다.
 () 내가 평등 대우를 받을수도 있을 것이다.
 () 그들은 내 질문을 묵살할 것이다.
 () 경우에 따라 다르다.
 () 내가 평등 대우를 못받을수도 있다.

- B. 당국자들에게 귀하의 입장을 설명한다면 어떤 효과가 있다고 보십니까?
 () 그들은 신중히 참고할 것이다.
 () 그들은 약간 관심을 두기는 할 것이다.
 () 그들은 내 견해를 무시할 것이다.
 () 경우에 따라 다르다.
 () 그들은 아무말도 않을 것이다.

13. 다음과 같은 국민의 의무를 이행하는데 대한 느낌은 어떻습니까?
 보람을 느낀다(1) 의무이므로한다(2) 성가신 기분이다(3)
 a. 세금을 내야할때 (1 2 3)
 b. 투표하러 가야 될때 (1 2 3)
 c. 법원에 배심원으로 봉사하는 요청을 받았을때 (1 2 3)
 d. 본인(또는 자녀)의 병역 징집등투을 하라는 요청을 받을때 (1 2 3)

14. 만약 시의회나 주의회, 연방의회에서 귀하가 보시기에 불공정하고 해로운 새 규정을 제정토록 검토한다면 귀하는 어떻게 대처하겠습니까? (예, 가정에 총기들 의무적으로 소유케하는 법률)

- A. 해당되는 것은 모두 표하십시오
 () 아마 아무것도 안할 것이다.
 () 정치인들(시의원, 하원의원등)에게 편지 또는 대화를 한다
 () 조직을 통해 대처한다.
 () 투표로 의견을 표한다.
 () 합의회, 농성 또는 폭력적 항의 행동을 한다.
 () 단순히 불복종한다.

- B. 이런 규정변경을 위해 귀하가 노력한다면 어느정도 성공할 것 같습니까?
 () 매우 가능성이 높다.
 () 어느 정도 가능하다.
 () 어느 정도 안될것 같다.
 () 전혀 안될 것이다.

- C. 귀하는 정치인들(지방, 주, 연방)에게 영합력을 행사하려고 무슨 일이든 노력한 일이 있습니까?
 () 종종했다.
 () 그저 한두번 정도
 () 전혀 없다.

15. 새 내라인 미국의 어떤 점에 자람이나 존중심을 어느정도 느끼십니까?
 매우 존중(1) 약간 존중(2) 전혀 못느낀다(3)

- a. 모든 사람을 위한 평등과 정의를 보장하는 민주제도에 대해 (1 2 3)
 b. 전 국민의 기본적인 복지를 주는 사회보장 법률에 대해 (1 2 3)
 c. 누구나 노력하면 살수 있는 경제제도에 대해 (1 2 3)
 d. 미국의 산업, 과학기술, 군사력에 대해 (1 2 3)

16. 미국의 영주자로서 혹은 시민권자로서 자람을 느끼십니까?
 () 시민이란 것이 자람스럽다.
 () 영주권자라는 것이 자람스럽다.
 () 차라리 한국인으로서 긍지를 갖겠다.
 () 어느쪽인지 결정치 못하겠다.
 () 잘 모르겠다.

한국일보의 기사 개발과 서비스등에 부탁하실 말씀이 있으시면 써주십시오.

- 책에 신문매달은 잘되고 있습니까?
 () 잘 된다
 () 책에 안오는 경우가 1주에 ()번 정도이다.
 • 귀하의 신문을 취급하는 우편국 번호 (Zip Code)는

APPROVAL SHEET

The Dissertation submitted by Yoon M. Lee has been read and approved
by the following committee:

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The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore, accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

April 15, 1987

Date

Ross P. Scherer