The Economy of Time: Heidegger and Derrida on Aristotle, Time and Metaphysics

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VITA

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This dissertation explores the main texts of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida on the relation of the so-called "straight-line" theory of time to the so-called "metaphysical tradition." In *Being and Time* Heidegger states that a determination of Being as presence characterizes metaphysics and that such a determination of Being can be found in Aristotle's theory of time. Derrida examines how such a characterization of metaphysics affects Heidegger's project.

Chapter I explores in detail how Derrida's essay "Ousia and Grammê" posits a "formal rule" that implies the "haunting" of time by space in any discourse that attempts to ground spatiality in temporality. Chapter II shows how the disseminative economy of *Sinn* in the *Seinsfrage* in *Being and Time* installs an irreducible spatiality in Heidegger's description of temporality, precisely as Derrida's "formal rule" had predicted. Chapter III concludes the dissertation by showing how Heidegger's extended treatment of Aristotle in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* also conforms to Derrida's "formal rule."
INTRODUCTION

Space and time have always been among the primary topics for philosophical discussion. The classical treatments include Plato's *Timaeus*, Aristotle's *Physics*, Plotinus' *Enneads*, Augustine's *Confessions*, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Hegel's *Encyclopedia*, Bergson's *Essay on the Immediate Givens of Consciousness*, and Husserl's *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*—in other words, works by virtually every major philosopher of the Western tradition. Besides the philosophic treatments, early modern science debated the status of space and time, the Leibniz-Clarke debate shaping consequent scientific discussions on the issue of the absoluteness of space and time.¹ Today, contemporary physics uses concepts of space/time, which analytic philosophy of science attempts to explain.²

In the continental tradition, the twentieth-century talk of the end of philosophy has not lessened interest in space and time; if anything, it has increased it. Given such a huge tradition any dissertation on this topic can only hope to carve out a tiny area of expertise. I therefore restrict myself to examining some of the most important writings on time of the men I take to be two of the three most important European philosophers of our century—Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida.³ Since the confrontation with the tradition has always been integral to their main task, I take up their readings of Aristotle's treatise on time in *Physics* 4.10-14. The Heideggerian and Derridean texts examine the relation of the so-called "straight-line" theory of time to the so-called "metaphysical tradition." I call the articulation of these discursive fields "the economy of time."

I take "economy" in the widest sense to mean "range of interpretative possibilities" for a word, concept, or text. These possibilities are governed by rules particular to each word, concept, or text. Yet this particularity is not so abstract as to prevent a minimal structural identity
that allows for intertextual grafting whereby a family resemblance of texts governed by the "same" set of rules can be recognized. These governing rules may be called an "economy" in a narrower sense.

The feature of the economy of time upon which I focus in this dissertation is that an irreducible spatiality haunts the discourse of time. I display this feature by showing how any discourse on time contains terms that can also be iterated in a discourse on space. Hence those terms are undecidably spatial/temporal. Such undecidability is the basis for the analogy of time and the line from which the "straight-line" theory of time gets its name. Confronted with such undecidability, an author may attempt to settle the undecidability by determining a proper (temporal) and improper (spatial) sense for them, but such strategy fails in the discussion of time, for a determination of sense—or at least Heidegger’s determinations—is caught in what I call the "question of sense." In German, the "question of sense" would be the *Sinnsfrage*—a play on Heidegger’s phrase "the question of Being" (the *Seinsfrage*). The economy of the *Sinnsfrage* itself contains an irreducible spatial moment so that temporal discourse cannot be purified of spatial terms via a determination of proper sense, because "sense" is irreducibly spatial. To be more precise, the possibility of iterating *Sinn* in a spatial context (i.e., a context other than that determined by Heidegger as properly temporal) cannot be reduced. Similarly, the infection of temporal discourse by terms capable of iteration in spatial discourse cannot be controlled by appeal to the concept of "metaphor." That is, language cannot be said to be dominated by spatial terms which function as metaphors for a properly intended temporal sense because "metaphor" is itself a "metaphor" of *meta-pherein,* and thus contains an irreducible reference to spatial motion.

For its most basic argument, then, the dissertation relies on Derrida's related notions of "iteration" and "dissemination." As Derrida explains in "Signature Event Context" "iteration" comes from the Sanskrit *itara,* meaning "other." Iteration refers to the play of identity and difference in the repeated inscriptions of a mark. Each inscription—"iteration"—of a mark is different from the other inscriptions yet maintains a minimal recognizability as an inscription of the same mark. Derrida shows in his *Introduction to Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry* how
such (material) inscription is necessary for ideality. Derrida shows that for Husserl a mark must be able to function in the possible absence of a controlling intention—hence the talk of the "death of the author." But the possibility of function beyond intention is also the condition Husserl analyzes as "crisis." Writing, Derrida’s term for durable inscription in any medium, is thus the life and death of thought.

Iteration then produces dissemination as its effect. Meaning produced by iterations functioning beyond controlling intention is not the end of meaning but the beginning of too much meaning. Meaning spills out from under the boundaries set by intention, and a fortiori, from under the boundaries of that which one might wish to interpret as the author’s intention. Such spilling is what Derrida names "dissemination." As with many of Derrida’s terms, this one combines performative and indicative functions—that is, it does what it says. It produces meaning from a fortuitous combination of marks—semen and seme—that have no real etymological connection, yet produce a meaning-effect.

It is also important to realize, however, that dissemination does not mean the end of all authorial control—although it does entail giving up dreams of complete control. As Derrida explains in "Signature Event Context," his writings do not imply that intentions are useless. Rather, intentions will still produce effects even if one accounts for dissemination, but these effects will be produced within a system that is not fully controlled by intention. To what can one appeal then in claiming that one reading is a "misreading"? Derrida makes it clear in the "Afterword" to Limited Inc that appeal can only be made to historically determined, and hence only relatively stable, contexts—such as the profession of academic philosophy in the latter 20th century. The relative stability of such a context makes possible appeals to standards of evidence in reading texts, but does not imply that an author’s intention can or even should be the only guideline in producing a reading.

In the rest of this introduction I shall a) provide a brief historical background for the issue of straight-line time and metaphysics; b) explain some key terms and assumptions involved in this issue; c) give a brief outline of my dissertation; d) mention some of the special methodological issues involved; and finally, e) review the literature relevant to my project.
Since Immanuel Kant's work in the 1780s many European philosophers have been concerned with the rules that govern that certain type of philosophical discourse traditionally called "metaphysical." A useful first approximation to the contemporary continental sense of this most vexing concept can be found in Heidegger's "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking." In this essay Heidegger defines philosophy as metaphysics, that mode of thought that thinks the whole of beings with regard to their Being in the manner of a grounding representation [begründenden Vorstellens]. Metaphysical thought thinks Being as the ground of beings. As such a ground, Being plays an active role; it brings [bringt] beings into their presencing [Anwesen]. Metaphysics is further characterized by its thinking the ground as presence [Anwesenheit]. Thought metaphysically, then, the present ground is responsible for the presencing of beings, in that presence produces [hervorbringt] beings into their presencing for a while. As the ground of this production, presence has itself a temporal present [Gegenwart] in its bringing presencing things [Anwesende] into presence. The characteristic mark of metaphysics then for Heidegger in this essay is that it conceives of the process of presencing as the production by one present ground of the presencing of all other presencing things.

Thus Heidegger's discourse seeks to articulate the rules governing metaphysics. How does Heidegger characterize metaphysics in Being and Time? There he claims that a certain "straight-line" notion of time characterizes "metaphysical" texts. According to Heidegger, metaphysics conceives time as a sequence of present moments best represented by a straight line: hence the term "straight-line theory of time"). This claim has provided one of the most profound stimuli to philosophical thinking in this century.

But my dissertation is not just on Heidegger, but also on the series of interpretations of his work offered by Jacques Derrida, many of whose most influential essays are devoted to the issues raised in Heidegger's work. Derrida is also the one responsible for my often having put the word "metaphysics" in quotation marks throughout this introduction. Let me explain this typographical device. Derrida is concerned in his writings on Heidegger to explicate the economy of Heidegger's discourse on the linking of the straight-line theory of time and metaphysics. For example, Derrida will show that Aristotle's text on time, which Heidegger in his 1927 work Sein
und Zeit seems to "blame" for starting metaphysics because of its being the first formulation of a straight-line theory of time, also contains other conceptual possibilities than those of metaphysical thought, even the ones that enable Heidegger to thematize the link of the straight-line theory and metaphysics. Thus after Derrida it is difficult to call any one text "metaphysical," for he shows that what seemed to be the very epitome of a metaphysical text, namely Aristotle’s, also contains elements of other-than-metaphysical thought.

What then is metaphysics for Derrida? In the period of Marges Derrida sees metaphysics as the attempt to order a field of marks (a "text") by a mark that claims to be outside the field. Contrary to some overwrought critics, in thus characterizing metaphysics while also claiming that the isolation of the governing mark is impossible ("there is no out-text"), Derrida does not leave us adrift in these fields. He recognizes we must pattern our texts, and this recognition on his part forces us to recognize the radical political import of Derrida’s thought. Texts must be structured, but not necessarily as hierarchies of exploitation or domination. If we then see structuring as a necessary structure, we must by the same token recognize that any particular structure—as particular, historical, contingent—is also destabilizable. In other words, what has been constructed can be de-constructed. Professional philosophers specialize in detecting metaphysical pretensions in philosophical texts, but the structures also script life, as institutional patternings, discursive formations, etc. We must see here the role of force, as twisting the conceptual possibilities of what Derrida calls the "general text" into the hierarchies that pattern specific institutional texts.

With the preceding as its context, the dissertation will show that while metaphysics has always seen itself as beyond (meta) physics, Heidegger’s work, when it seeks to characterize metaphysics, does not provide another level, that is, is not a "meta-metaphysics," or "3rd level" discourse that would be radically purified of metaphysics, but instead provides a breakthrough to a thought somehow "other" than that of metaphysics. Similarly, Derrida’s discourse, which seeks to explain Heidegger’s explanation of how metaphysics orders the general text (seemingly from outside), is not a "4th level" discourse, but rather one that explicitly thematizes the economy (that is, the interplay of metaphysics and an exceeding of metaphysics), of the "other" thought
by which Heidegger's text can characterize metaphysics as the thought of Being as presence. Derrida precludes characterizing his writings on Heidegger as "critique" by showing that his discourse is only possible due to the way its subject matter is hinted at in Heidegger's discourse. Thus Derrida does not operate from a level above Heidegger's text, but instead radicalizes and thematizes certain tendencies in Heidegger's own text, playing one off against the other. The main task of the dissertation, then, is to explore the relations between the two discourses of Heidegger and Derrida on time and metaphysics, the one a breakthrough into a thought "other" than metaphysical, the other the explicit thematization of the mechanisms and consequences of that breakthrough.

The dissertation will also provide a framework for discussing Derrida's reading of Heidegger's career path, that most vexed of issues, so often confused with the so-called "turn." The dissertation prepares the way for such a reading, which would focus on the move from time to time/space. In the Marburg period Heidegger's thesis that a straight-line, or "vulgar" concept of time characterizes metaphysics gave him a clue in his destruction of the handed-down content of ancient ontology. In the course of the project of fundamental ontology Heidegger thus sought a primordial temporality of Dasein, one that would ground the primordial spatiality of Dasein, as a preliminary to posing time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being, die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein überhaupt. In the middle of his career, while researching the "history/sending of Being," the Seinsgeschichte, Heidegger admitted the failure of the project of fundamental ontology in placing the blame on the constraints of the metaphysical concept of language within which his work moved at the time. Finally, at the end of his career, Heidegger admitted that the attempt to ground Dasein's spatiality in its temporality was ill-conceived, and that one must think time-space as the "open." However, one can still discern a subordination of space in Heidegger's insistence on naming the granting of this "open" as "authentic time." The Derridean-inspired questions that guide this dissertation, then are: What is the link in Heidegger's text of language and space/time, or more precisely, metaphysical language and the attempt to isolate a temporality of Dasein that grounds its spatiality? How do spatial terms haunt the attempt to purify the language of temporality? How does this haunting of the allegedly
purified language relate to the metaphysical straight-line time concept? I try to draw together all these questions in what I call "the economy of time."

In spelling out the economy of time I am mostly concerned with Derrida's early writing--up to and including Marges de la Philosophie (1972). Derrida's readings of Heidegger have informed his career from the beginning. One could trace something of the following path: In Of Grammatology (1967) Derrida focuses upon the question of Being in discussing the "priority" of différance to the ontological difference. In "Ousia and Grammé" (1969) the focus on the question of Being shifts to an examination of the form of the question as a question of sense (sens or Sinn) as this form of the question relates to Heidegger's change to examining the epochality of Being. In The Post Card (1980) and "Sending: On Representation" (1978) Derrida takes up the Heideggerian reading of the history sending of Being in discussing the Seinsgeschichte. Finally, in Of Spirit (1986) Derrida takes up the question of the question itself as it relates to epochality.

These points bring me to the outline of my dissertation. Briefly stated, Chapter I will lay out the economy of time, by showing how Derrida's formal rule, arrived at in a reading of Heidegger's note on Aristotle, predicts a haunting of time by space, or in other words, an irreducible spatial moment in the economy of time. Chapter II shows how the Sinnsfrage is implicated in the economy of time, by showing how Sein und Zeit cannot purify the discourse of temporality of all spatial reference because Sinn as directionality is iterated in both spatial and temporal discourses. Chapter III shows how Heidegger's reading of Aristotle proceeds via an attempted purification of Aristotle's time discourse through skewing several economies Aristotle leaves undecidable. Heidegger attempts these skewings via a determination of the proper (non-spatial) sense of key terms. I show how this strategy is limited by the Sinnsfrage. Chapter III also shows how another Heideggerian strategy of regulating undecidable economies in attempting to purify time discourses fails. This is the strategy of naming terms undecidable across the ontico-ontological difference "ontic images." This strategy falls under the economy of time, and specifically the Aristotelian economy, since "metaphor" is itself a "metaphor" of meta-pherein, and
hence includes an irreducible reference to *phora*, the Aristotelian term for spatial motion.

Let me now give a bit more detail for each chapter. Chapter I details Derrida reading Heidegger reading Aristotle. Thus the dissertation does not proceed chronologically, but will first examine Derrida's 1969 essay "Ousia and Grammé," in which Derrida articulates the economy of Heidegger's discourse in his 1927 *Sein und Zeit* concerning Aristotle's significance as the first formulator of a straight-line theory of time for the metaphysical tradition. Chapter I explores in detail how Derrida's essay examines the constraints under which Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's significance for the tradition (e.g., the way Hegel paraphrased Aristotle and thus was the apotheosis of the "vulgar concept of time") operated in the famous note in *Sein und Zeit* #82. These constraints make up what Derrida calls the "epoch(e)" of *Sein und Zeit*. "Ousia and Grammé" shows that Aristotle's text on time also contains other conceptual possibilities than those of metaphysical thought, even the ones that enable Heidegger to thematize the link of the straight-line theory and metaphysics. Derrida also shows that his discourse, which may seem a criticism of Heidegger directed from a higher level, is only possible due to the way it is hinted at in Heidegger's discourse. Thus there is no infinite regress of levels of discourse, for Derrida's discourse operates from within Heidegger's breakthrough, explaining both how Heidegger's text operates and how the total fulfillment of its project of developing a discourse on temporality purified of all spatial reference is impossible. In this way Derrida does not operate from above Heidegger's project, but instead radicalizes and thematizes certain tendencies in Heidegger's own text.

I set up the analyses of Chapter II by showing how "Ousia and Grammé" reads the textual effects of Heidegger's posing of the question of Being in terms of the *Sinn* of Being. In attempting to show how asking the question of Being in terms of *Sinn* keeps to the system of presence, that is, the system in which Aristotle asks about the Being of time on the basis of a predetermination of the sense of Being in terms of a specific sense of time, viz. the present, Derrida tries to show how the resultant "formal rule" limits any attempt to escape metaphysics to a shaking from within. In my terms, the formal rule articulates the marginality of any text to
the system of (desire for) presence. Now the formal rule of marginality is linked to the structure of the re-mark. As with several of the other essays of Margins, Derrida shows in "Ousia and Grammé" how any attempt to isolate a single concept from a field in an attempt to dominate that field will always result in a supplementary fold or re-mark that comes to double the isolated term, as in the famous "metaphor of metaphor" around which turns the analysis of "White Mythology." The doubling of the re-mark is formally similar to what I call "haunting" in cases of conceptual pairs, such as time-space. In Heidegger's case the concept to be isolated from its partner is that of time, the original time that grounds the vulgar (i.e. spatially-conceived) time that characterizes metaphysics. In attempting to isolate a purified notion of time, Heidegger's discourse finds itself haunted by the repressed member of the pair time/space. If a spatialized concept of time is (Heidegger's) hallmark of metaphysics, and if Heidegger can be said to be attempting to escape metaphysics by a notion of time purified of spatial reference, we must admit that he nonetheless uses terms iterable in spatial contexts, so we must say his discourse is pulled back into metaphysics—as he defines it in terms of spatialized time. But let us add that it is not totally pulled back—Heidegger's discourse is marginal to metaphysics as defined by allegiance to the system of (desire for) presence, for his use of terms that can be iterated in spatial contexts is in the discussion of schemata that direct the ecstases of ecstatic temporality, an analysis that cannot be assimilated to metaphysics defined in terms of presence.

In my second chapter I return to Sein und Zeit to ask whether Derrida in "Ousia and Grammé" takes *seriously* enough this work's attempted transgressions of the metaphysical tradition. Here I examine what I call the *Sinnfrage* as it comes to limit the *Seinsfrage* when posed as *die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein überhaupt*. Derrida writes of Heidegger's attempt at dismantling metaphysics with "the thought of Being as presence," a dismantling that operates by posing the question of the *Sinn des Seins*; for Derrida, such a question—in so far as it is a question about *Sinn*—remains tied to metaphysics. What are we to make of this seemingly flat claim about the metaphysicalness of *Sinn*, when Derrida himself reminds us that there are no metaphysical concepts *per se*, for all depends upon the use to which they are put?\(^{19}\)

To what use is *Sinn* put in *Sein und Zeit*? The textual performance of *Sein und Zeit*
twists several acceptations historically sedimented in the mark "Sinn," viz. the sensuous, linguistic, and directional, into each iteration of "Sinn." Such sedimentations open possibilities of iteration that cannot be totally controlled, even though Heidegger attempts to rewrite the historical sedimentation of Sinn as "linguistic meaning" from noematic correlate to pivot of an existential projection of Dasein in its Being-in-the-world. These uncontrollable possibilities of iteration result in a twisting of the question of Being. So while the Seinsfrage cannot be considered a simple subjectivizing, an inquiry into a concept of Being in the sense of a representation, neither can it totally escape from such a "misunderstanding," about which Heidegger complained in the "Letter on Humanism." On the other hand, it is no longer so clearcut, as Derrida seems to imply, that the textual work of Sein und Zeit does not disrupt the system of presence, even as the historical sedimentations of Sinn open it to iteration in contexts Heidegger would wish to name subjectivistic misunderstanding. Derrida does seem correct however in his analysis of the haunting of the allegedly purified temporal terms by terms Heidegger also uses in discussion of space. Even though Heidegger is aware of the "haunting" he still casts it in terms of misunderstanding by attempting to identify the proper Sinn for such terms; however, this move results in the Sinnsfrage. The important thing for us is not to give up the concern for following an author's attempts at terminological control, but to see the economy of possible interpretations here, and the inability of an author to control fully the disseminative drift. The drift brings us to see the possible iteration of Sinn as direction as an irreducible spatial moment in the economy of time, since Heidegger iterates Sinn as direction (Richtung) in discussions of both space and time.

In my third chapter I take up Heidegger's extended treatment of Aristotle in his 1927 lecture course now known as The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. This text was not published until after Derrida published "Ousia and Grammé" so I will be able to test whether what Derrida says about the way Heidegger wrote during the "epoch" of Sein und Zeit holds as well for this contemporaneous work. In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger tries to show how the usual interpretation of Aristotle as the father of the straight-line concept is a "misunderstanding"—though perhaps a necessary one due to Dasein's falling, which causes it to
couch its interpretation in terms oriented toward things encountered in the world. In pursuing this reading Heidegger must subvert several Aristotelian economies: that of metabolé, proteron kai husteron and kinesis. Heidegger must equate metabolé and kinesis, ignore Aristotle's privileging of topos in the economy of proteron kai husteron and similarly ignore the privilege of phora in the economy of kinesis. Heidegger skews Aristotle's three economies, but his reading rests on distinguishing proper Sinne, a strategy disrupted by the Sinnsfrage. Heidegger must attempt such overturnings in order to reduce space in Aristotle's time notion so he can read it as a clue to Dasein's temporality. But key terms in Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle, such as Übergang, are iterated in contexts of both time and space. Confronted with such undecidability Heidegger tries to manage their economies by determining their proper (non-spatial) Sinn, but this strategy is embroiled in the Sinnsfrage.

Now Heidegger does seem to broach a trace-structure in the transition character of the now, but the word he uses, Übergang, is iterated in both temporal contexts—in the economy of the now—and in spatial contexts—in the economy of kinesis. The spatial economy is itself undecidable, as Heidegger uses Übergang both generically (as the character of all metabolé) and specifically (as the character of phora). All these economies which hinge on undecidable terms could only be managed by positing a proper Sinn for certain key terms, but this attempt runs into the Sinnsfrage.

At this point, let me mention that a few special procedural concerns present themselves in my project. I will be interpreting in my dissertation the changing interpretations developed by Heidegger and Derrida of the relation of the metaphysical tradition to various notions of time. I must therefore be especially careful to note this doubled interpreting of interpretative possibilities, and thereby take into account the ways in which Heidegger and Derrida account for the possibility of various interpretative stances, even as I take them up in interpreting their texts.

Only two books have broached this issue, neither in the detail it requires. David
Wood's *The Deconstruction of Time* does not discuss either "Ousia and Grammé" or *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* with an eye to their relation. Herman Rappaport's *Heidegger and Derrida: Reflections on Time and Language* ignores Derrida's notion of the "formal rule" in favor of focusing upon the various rhetorical schemes to be found in the respective texts.\(^{21}\)

Heidegger's work has provoked an enormous amount of commentary, with much of Derrida's own work, which has provoked considerable interest on its own accord, able to be counted therein. Among the major interpreters of Heidegger on the issue of time and metaphysics, several, namely Richardson,\(^{22}\) Pöggeler,\(^{23}\) and W. Marx\(^{24}\) published their major works before Derrida's publishing career began. Others, such as Bernasconi,\(^{25}\) Kockelmans,\(^{26}\) Schürmann,\(^{27}\) and Sheehan,\(^{28}\) either do not treat of Derrida or dismiss him polemically. A few approach Heidegger with greater or lesser appreciations of Derrida, such as Caputo,\(^{29}\) Föti,\(^{30}\) Gasché,\(^{31}\) Greisch,\(^{32}\) Kockelmans,\(^{33}\) and Sallis.\(^{34}\) Several of these at least mention the texts I will examine, so I will note their works whenever appropriate, pointing out as much as possible their contributions to my study. My work will differ from theirs mostly in scope, in that they have written articles about a few specific textual interconnections, while I will attempt to articulate a much broader network.

Most commentators on Derrida cannot avoid mentioning his relation to Heidegger, inasmuch as Derrida himself constantly writes of the importance of Heidegger for his own work. Harvey,\(^{35}\) Llewelyn,\(^{36}\) and Wood are only marginally relevant to my project, but Gasché's\(^{37}\) work will be very important in informing my reading of Derrida in general as well providing insights into specific textual interconnections. My work will differ from his in both direction and scope. His articles do not treat directly of the time and metaphysics issue, while *The Tain of the Mirror* is an explication of Derrida that treats of Heidegger only in passing.
NOTES


2. In the analytic tradition much work has been done on theories of space and time. They seem oriented to an explanation of the theory of time-space of contemporary physics. This is outside my competence so I must defer a confrontation with this tradition. Van Fraasen’s bibliography indicates that the following are important texts in the field: L. Sklar, *Space, Time and Space-Time* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); A. Grünbaum, *Philosophical Problems of Space and Time*, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973); M. Friedman, *Foundations of Space-Time Theories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

3. I must therefore defer a confrontation with the writings of the third great twentieth-century European philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas, whose *Time and the Other, Existence and Existents, Totality and Infinity*, and *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence* develop an extraordinarily rich notion of time as the gift of the radically other (person).


7. In one sense, all of Kant’s critical enterprise can be thus characterized, but this is most clearly so in the Transcendental Dialectic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.


   a) "Die eigentliche Zeit ist vierdimensional."
   b) "Die eigentliche Zeit ist die ihr dreifältig lichtendes Reichen einigende Nähe von Anwesen aus Gegenwart, Gewesenheit und Zukunft."
   c) "Das Geben, das Zeit gibt, bestimmt sich aus der verweigernd-vorenthaltenden Nähe. Sie gewährt das Offene des Zeit-Raumes . . ."


21. Herman Rappaport, *Heidegger and Derrida: Reflections on Time and Language* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988); David Wood, *The Deconstruction of Time* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989). Rappaport stresses the performative temporality in the cross- translating of the texts of Heidegger, Derrida, and Anaximander. According to Rappaport, both Heidegger and Derrida neglect to read Anaximander's *to apeiron*, and this omission alters the text in their translations of it, effecting a wearing away of the text. Such a difference wrought into the surface of the same text performs "time as translation." Rappaport's otherwise fine reading is marred for me by his psychologizing of the Heidegger-Derrida relation whereby Derrida "critiques" Heidegger's "hesitancy" or "reluctance" to move beyond metaphysics. David Wood's work, also very useful, comes closer to my concerns, as he focuses on Derrida's claim that there is no such thing as a metaphysical concept per se, but only concepts used in metaphysical textual work. However, Wood ultimately fails to appreciate Derrida's elucidation in "Ousia and Grammé" of a "formal rule" governing any reading of the text of metaphysics.


CHAPTER I

DERRIDA ON HEIDEGGER ON ARISTOTLE:
A READING OF "OUSIA AND GRAMME"

Introduction

As Derrida himself has written, "the task proposed here is enormous and difficult." In this chapter I will begin the articulation of the economy of time by examining "Ousia and Gramme,"1 the essay in which Derrida reads Heidegger's reading in Sein und Zeit of the paradigmatic force of Aristotle's thesis on time for the metaphysical tradition. In "Ousia and Gramme" Derrida writes of the "epoch of Sein und Zeit" (72/62), which includes for essential reasons Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. The epoch in question is one in which Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology seeks to develop time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being. This project necessitates a destruction of what remains of the history of ontology,2 a destruction guided by the thesis that the tradition has, without thematizing it, determined the meaning (or sense) of Being—the Sinn von Sein, the sens de l'être—by means of only one determination of time, that of presence. The intricate problems of translating Sinn with "sens," "meaning" or "sense" will be addressed in Chapter II of this dissertation. In this chapter I will provisionally translate "Sinn von Sein" and "sens de l'être" as "sense of Being" rather than the usual "meaning of Being." In Chapter III of this dissertation I will address the further question of whether or not one can include The Basic Problems of Phenomenology in this epoch, even though it falls chronologically between Sein und Zeit and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.

For Derrida, the delimiting of metaphysics accomplished in Sein und Zeit, and
specifically in Heidegger's note on the texts of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel and Bergson, is itself situated by its failure to open the "hidden passageway that makes the problem of presence communicate with the problem of the written trace" (37/34). We cannot, of course, simply render the Heideggerian text in terms of his thought of "presence," as Derrida notes in proposing that one might read "Ousia and Grammé" as "a timid prolegomena to a problem of translation" (35n.2/33n.6). The nexus of the terms Vorhandenheit, Anwesen, Anwesenheit, Gegenwart, Präsenz traverses the entire history of Heidegger's text, and they undergo crucial shifts in determination as Heidegger moves toward thinking the history of Being. Thus "Ousia and Grammé" does not deal solely with the epoch of Sein und Zeit, but poses the question of the development of Heidegger's thought (which is not to be confused with the "turn," already operative in Sein und Zeit).³ "Ousia and Grammé" thus questions an epoch of Heidegger's thought prior to the question of the epochality of Being. Posing the question in such terms indicates that I will use "epoch" not only in its chronological sense, but also in the sense Heidegger uses in his discussions of the history of Being. That sense, the one intended here by Derrida, is derived from the Greek epoché, to hold back. My question then becomes, what does Derrida think is held back in order to allow the text of Sein und Zeit to function? In answering this question over the course of this dissertation I will show the relation of the trace to the question of presence as well to the withdrawal of Being.

Posing the question of the epoch(e) of Sein und Zeit is far from what anyone could call a "criticism" of Heidegger,⁴ but rather records Derrida's attempt to show the rules governing any attempt to delimit metaphysics. Derrida thus writes of a "formal rule for anyone wishing to read the texts of the history of metaphysics," a rule that formalizes the "play of submission and subtraction" with regard to the determination of Being as presence (72/62). Such a play, as formalized by Derrida, articulates the furrowed margin of the metaphysical text, for which the image of an inside governed by presence that is simply enclosed by an opposing outside governed by absence is inadequate. All the texts one would wish to label "metaphysical," Derrida claims, and all concepts within these texts, both are and are not governed by presence, that is, they are submitted to the system of concepts governed by the desire for simple self-presence
but also at the same time *subtracted* from that very system. Thus, for example, any attempt to isolate a concept of time as characteristic of metaphysics in order to delimit the field of metaphysics and thereby assure oneself of the purity of one's position beyond metaphysics will find itself anticipated by even the most classic of "metaphysical" texts. As Derrida writes in "Ousia and Grammé":

\[ \ldots \text{every text of metaphysics carries within itself, for example, both the so-called 'vulgar' concept of time and the resources that will be borrowed from the system of metaphysics in order to criticize that concept. (70/60)} \]

If there is no simple escape from metaphysics, what is the relation of "metaphysics" to "other-than-metaphysical" thought? As Derrida shows again and again, presence and absence are articulated at the margins of philosophy according to various "graphics" (e.g., the supplement, the pharmakon, différence, the trace) rather than by a Hegelian logic of opposition. The formal rule of submission and subtraction articulated in "Ousia and Grammé" is imaged in the "graphic" of the trace, as Derrida shows in his analysis of "The Anaximander Fragment" at the conclusion of his essay. Reading "Ousia and Grammé" thus allows one to see how the formal rule of the margin governs any attempt to escape from metaphysics by means of thematizing the previously unthought determination of Being as presence (72/62), thus limiting any attempt to escape metaphysics to a shaking of metaphysical security from "within." Heidegger's "destruction" of the sedimented remains of the history of ontology must then be able to be read as governed by this formal rule. Derrida is thus attempting to show in "Ousia and Grammé" the extent to which *Sein und Zeit* had to operate by means of certain propositions or conclusions within which the Heideggerian breakthrough has had to constrain itself \ldots For example, the reading of Aristotle and Hegel during the epoch of *Sein und Zeit* (72/62)

These readings are those in which the relation of metaphysics to that which exceeds the determination of Being as presence (from which metaphysics lives), is addressed by Heidegger in terms not suited to the graphic of the trace, but in terms of *Sinn*. As we will see in Chapter II, *Sinn*--as it functions in the textual performance of *Sein und Zeit*--can itself articulate a economy marginal to metaphysics, that is, an economy at once disruptive and conforming to the
telos of self-identical presence. However, the marginal economy of Sinn disrupts the metaphysical answers to the question of Being without being able to inscribe the graphic of the trace. We can thus call the holding back that allows Sein und Zeit to function an epoché of the trace. Since Derrida shows that the trace is inscribed in "The Anaximander Fragment"--in the thought of the epochality of Being--we can also say that Sein und Zeit is governed by an epoché of epochality.

Now one should also realize that the elucidation of the formal rule of the margin is one of the abiding themes of Margins of Philosophy, from "Tympan" through "Ousia and Grammé," "Form and Meaning," "The Linguistic Circle of Geneva," "The Supplement of Copula," and "White Mythology." The question of the margin appears in all these essays via Derrida's analyses of attempts to isolate a single concept or group of concepts--drawn from the general fund of metaphysical predicates, the "general text"--by a specific science--such as linguistics, "metaphorology," or indeed, fundamental ontology--in order to "dominate" or characterize that general text univocally. Such attempts always result in the structure of the re-mark, in which there is always one mark too many or too few missing from the to-be-dominated field, such as the "category of category" ("The Supplement of Copula") or the "metaphor of metaphor" ("White Mythology"). We can say that such a doubling "haunts" the attempted domination of the field.

In this chapter I will work out the analogy between the formal law of the re-mark and the formal rule of submission and subtraction necessary for reading the metaphysical text. Doing so articulates the economy of time. Thus I will show a move to a prior undecidable (time-space, or "différance") analogous to the move to the re-mark as a response to the attempt to isolate a concept from its "original" pairing, as Derrida focuses on the textual effects of isolating "time" from its quasi-transcendental "origin" in time-space, or "différance." Ousia and Grammé" can thus be read as Derrida's analysis of Heidegger's attempt to dominate the metaphysical text by isolating time as the transcendental horizon of Being, and the consequent destruction of the history of ontology on the basis of its unthematized determination of Being as presence. Derrida's formal rule of "submission and subtraction" with regard to the determination of Being as presence reveals how Heidegger's attempt to think a primordial temporality of Dasein
preparatory to the isolation of time as the transcendental horizon of Being remains caught in the graphic of the margin, that is, is both inside and outside metaphysics. This marginality is indicated by the way the supposedly purified description of primordial temporality, which would enable Heidegger to delimit the metaphysical time concept as one oriented to the falling temporality that allows for the encountering of the spatial present-at-hand, is itself "haunted" by "spatialized" language.

Let me pause for a minute to explain what I mean by the term "spatialized language." I do not mean that some terms are essentially or inherently spatial—that is, have a spatial sense—but that the discourse that seeks to purify the description of time or temporality of space functions by means of terms iterable in discourses on space. Now the possibility of such iteration cannot be reduced; thus such terms are haunted. Such haunting betrays the repression of one member of the pair "time-space" from which Heidegger must draw the conceptual resources for such an attempt. In Chapter II I show how Heidegger's attempt in Sein und Zeit to determine a proper (non-spatial) sense for the terms of the discourse on temporality founders on what I call the Sinnsfrage, the economy of which contains an irreducible spatial moment. Chapter III will then show how the Sinnsfrage disrupts Heidegger's reading of Aristotle in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. One cannot call such haunting a spatial "metaphor," that is, one cannot attempt to understand it as a spatial "image" subsequently coming to invade a previously pure temporal flow without becoming enmeshed in the abyssal structure Derrida analyzes as "metaphoricity" in "White Mythology." Thus the dissertation shows how Heidegger is caught by the formal rule that operates whenever the sign "time" is used, a formal rule that makes time the name of the evasion by metaphysics of the thought of the trace, an evasion marked by Aristotle's determination of "gramme" in the system of dynamis and energeia—as grammé in act.

The Contexts of "Ousia and Grammé"

The rest of this chapter will take the form of a commentary on "Ousia and Grammé." Let us first consider the French title: "Ousia et Grammé." We can begin our reading by
considering the title as a rejoinder to Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*. We thus have two pairs of words, *Sein* and *ousia*, plus *Zeit* and *grammé*, as well as a pair of conjunctions, *und* and *et*. The first pair is not a perfect match. *Ousia*, which Heidegger tells us \( \text{ontologically-temporally signifies [bedeutet] Anwesenhelt,} \) was a determination of the *Sinn von Sein*.\(^\text{12}\) Heidegger further tells us that this determination is the "outer document" for the fact that the Greek understanding of Being was gained from "Zeit.\(^\text{13}\) As I will show in Chapter II, Heidegger places *Zeit* in quotation marks to mark its derivation from "original time," the Zeitlichkeit of Dasein. The pairing of the words *Zeit* and *grammé* suggests that the relation of what goes by the name of "time" to a certain determination of *grammé* will be the focus of "Ousia et Grammé." Derrida will name "grammé" that which is elided in the determination of *grammé* that constitutes the metaphysical concept of "time." Alan Bass, the English translator of "Ousia et Grammé,\(^\text{14}\) explains the relation of the Greek "grammé" to Derrida's French neologism "gramme":

It should be noted, however, that there is a difference between the Greek *grammé* and the French *gramme*. Thus, for example, the title of this essay is "Ousia and Gramme," roughly, "presence and line," while the last two subtitles are "Gramme and Number" and "The Closure of the Gramme and the Trace of Différance." Derrida uses "gramme," which of course "derives" from *grammé* (line, trace), and reminds us of *gramma* (letter), as a neologism related to the concept of différance, as is evident in the last subtitle, which makes this relationship specific. Like différance it is best left untranslated. (Margins, English translation, p. 34)

Thus *gramme* and différance, and hence "the possibility of the trace in general" (69/60), are occluded by the determination of *grammé* that allows for "time" to determine the *Sinn von Sein* in the system of metaphysics. Thus "Ousia and Gramme," so close to the title, says "Being and that which allows time to determine Being," or in other words, "Being and Trace.\(^\text{14}\)"

The complexity of the essay is further revealed when we note that "Ousia and Grammé," which poses the question of an epoch at the beginning of Heidegger's career, has for an epigraph an excerpt from "Zeit und Sein,\(^\text{15}\)" a work that appeared close to the end of Heidegger's publishing career, bringing it around full circle, as it were, from the epoch of *Sein und Zeit*. The excerpt, quoted in German by Derrida, reads:

Am bedrängendsten zeigt sich uns das Weitreichende des Anwesens dann, wenn wir bedenken, dass auch und gerade das Abwesen durch ein bisweilen ins Unheimliche...
gesteigertes Anwesen bestimmt bleibt.\textsuperscript{16}

This sentence, bearing on the determination of absencing by presencing, occurs in the context of Heidegger's discussion of the destiny of Being as logocentrism, that is, our being bound to a determination (\textit{Prägung}, stamping) of Being as \textit{Anwesen}, from "the beginning of the unconcealment of Being as something that can be said, that is, can be thought."\textsuperscript{17} Such a determination of Being as \textit{Anwesen}, initiated by the Greeks, holds as well for modern technology, in the way in which entities come to presence for us in the sense of calculable property (das \textit{Sein als Anwesen im Sinne des berechenbaren Bestandes}). We needn't think back to the Greeks to apprehend (vernehmen) \textit{Anwesen}, however, because we can see it in any simple, sufficiently unprejudiced reflection on presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand. However, to pick up the point of the epigraph, \textit{Anwesen} shows itself most oppressively when it determines even \textit{Abwesen}. In this context Heidegger goes on to develop the motif of \textit{Seinsgeschichte} as he gives a list of the ways in which \textit{Anwesen} has shown itself in the abundance of its metaphysical transformations (\textit{Wandlungsfülle}). However, the \textit{Geschichte} of Being is not history in the way cities and people have history, but is determined by the way Being is given (\textit{wie Es Sein gibt}), which is a fateful sending, a destiny, \textit{Geschick}.

Thus the context of the epigraph outlines virtually the whole of Heidegger's itinerary,\textsuperscript{18} from the attempt to apprehend \textit{Anwesen} on the basis of a reflection on \textit{Vorhandenheit} and \textit{Zuhandenheit}--a transformation of the Marburg period project to thematize time as the transcendental horizon, or sense, of Being--through the examination of the Greek beginning of metaphysics from the perspective of the \textit{Seinsgeschichte}--to the last attempt at a topology of Being in terms of \textit{Ereignis}/\textit{Enteignis} that would situate the \textit{Geschichte} of Being in a sending that withdraws, an \textit{entziehende Schickung}. The epigraph itself, which opens Derrida's essay examining the first period, names the pivot between these last two periods, the questioning of the determining of absencing by presencing that enables us to think the non-present/non-absent "source" that regulates such determination, or in Heidegger's terms, that which grants \textit{Anwesen} such binding power.\textsuperscript{19}

Thus "Ousia and Grammé" opens by questioning the last period of Heidegger's
thought, and, as we will see, concludes by questioning his first period by way of his second. We can clearly see that "Ousia and Grammë" deals with the first period of Heidegger's thought by way of the entirety of his thought by following the path of Derrida's notes, the first of which (34/31) deals with the early Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, the second of which (35/33) opens the question of the history of the Heideggerian text by considering the "privileged" example of the middle-period "Anaximander Fragment," and the fourth of which (37/34) refers us, by way of a mention of the "problem of the written trace" to Derrida's essay "The Ends of Man." In this essay we find, instead of an explicit discussion of the written trace, the issue of Dasein's self-proximity being examined in terms of supplement (148/124) and metaphoricity (156-58/130-32). At this point in "The Ends of Man," in the course of a discussion of the Heideggerian thought of the presence of the present in terms of metaphoricity, Derrida refers us by way of a note (158 n.19/131 n.35) to the play of the proper (eigentliche) four-dimensional time/space in "Zeit und Sein," which Heidegger names as a reaching that holds the dimensions of time apart in their "nearness" (Nahheit). Derrida then asks us in the text of "The Ends of Man" to regard Heidegger's thinking of "le proche et le propre" according to the opening of espacement, which "belongs neither to time nor to space, and which dislocates, while producing it, any presence of the present" (159-60 / 132-33).

Where are we at the end of this labyrinth of notes on notes? What indeed is the "hidden passageway" (passage dissimulé) opening the problem of presence, that is, metaphysics, to the problem of the written trace? What connects the trace to metaphor, and metaphor to the opening of space and time, and thus metaphor to the problem of presence? That is, finally, what connects metaphor to metaphysics? Is it indeed a "passageway" in the sense of a tunnel we are dealing with here, or rather the passage around the perimeter of a circle connecting all these?

I continue my reading of "Ousia and Grammë," then, at the point where Derrida asks us to take up the chain of interdependent concepts (ousia, parousia, Anwesenheit, Gegenwart, gegenwärtigen, Vorhandenheit) as they are "deposited" at the beginning of Sein und Zeit and then taken up again at the point of interruption of the text in Heidegger's note on the "vulgar concept of time." This note offers itself to several readings, Derrida continues, but he wishes to
restrict himself to extending it a bit according to two motifs. The first is the "highly determined form" of the question in *Sein und Zeit* about the determination of the sense of Being by ontotheology as presence. The key here for understanding Derrida is to emphasize the two types of "determination" in his sentence: "To read in it, such as it is announced in highly determined form, the Heideggerian question about presence as the ontotheological determination of the sense of Being" (35-36/34-35). We should note that the question of Being in *Sein und Zeit* is itself determined--by its époque of the epochality of Being. Such an époque enables the question of Being to focus on the determining of Being as presence in the history of Being. For Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* the question of Being is asked in terms of Sinn. However, if the question of Being is to become the question of the Seinsgeschichte, that is, if it is to ask what grants Being in sending and withdrawal, then this question can only be posed in terms of the trace, not in terms of Sinn. Thus "Ousia and Grammè" says that the delimitation of metaphysics produced by thematizing the previously unthought determination of the sense of Being as Anwesenheit/Vorhandenheit remains subject to the formal rule, that is, remains within metaphysics, even though it subjects metaphysics to a powerful shaking. That Vorhandenheit is itself put into question by Heidegger's analyses of Zuhandenheit in *Sein und Zeit*, as John Sallis correctly points out, is not Derrida's point. Derrida need not deny the transgressive opening of the analyses of worldhood and significance in order to focus on the form of the question about the sense of Being, and point out the economy of such a delimitation in what he calls the "formal rule." All this will be spelled out in more detail in Chapter II.

Heidegger does indeed transgress metaphysics in his question about the determination of Being as presence, Derrida claims, but asking about such determination in terms of the sense of Being articulates an economy that contains an irreducibly metaphysical moment. As we have noted before in anticipating Chapter II, the text of *Sein und Zeit* establishes a economy marginal to metaphysics for the mark Sinn, an economy both disruptive and conforming, and hence not to be condemned prima facie. To modify slightly Derrida's position, we can say that metaphysics is transgressed in a more forceful way when Heidegger's texts inscribe the trace as the form of a meditation on the bending back upon the limit of metaphys-
ics to examine the epoché of Being, than when the transgression takes the form of a question of the Sinn von Sein. The inscription of the trace as the margin of metaphysics allows us to think that which hides itself in the movement of its presentation, that is, that which allows itself to be determined as presence while exceeding such determination (36/34). Such a thought of presence as sent, as determined by a movement beyond presence, would transgress metaphysics, for metaphysics could never thematize what serves it as the very element of evidence in determining even the (absent) past and future as past and future presents, as the passage used as the epigraph mentioned above suggests. This first motif according to which Derrida reads Heidegger thus sets as its task the situating—by the notion of epochality—the delimiting of metaphysics. That is, it seeks to determine how Heidegger’s first attempt to delimit metaphysics by means of the working out of the sense of Being as Temporalität—which reveals the previously unthematized determination of Being as presence—implies the movement of epochality. That such movement was hidden from Heidegger in Sein und Zeit is the meaning of Derrida’s phrase “epoch of Sein und Zeit.”

Derrida’s second motif considers the question of the written trace, the gramme, as it leads us to a center and a margin of Aristotle’s text. Derrida is not certain that the concepts involved in a thought of the gramme are dominated by the concepts Heidegger fixes as decisive in Sein und Zeit’s note on Aristotle (37-38/34-35). My task in this chapter is to show how these two motifs—the epoché of epochality and the trace—are related.

Derrida next calls attention to the context of the note in the last chapter of Sein und Zeit, entitled: “Temporality and within-time-ness as the Source of the Ordinary Concept of Time.” The note asks whether Hegel’s affirmation of a fall of history into time indicates, by way of the displacement of Hegel by fundamental ontology, that Hegel’s formulation remains (merely) the most radical formulation of the vulgar concept of time. Derrida notes that for Heidegger this is not a criticism, but a sharpening of differences between fundamental and classical ontology (38-39/35-36).

Derrida reproduces the note in toto, then remarks that the note’s calling attention to the “extraordinary right” of the present, to the impossibility of thinking outside the present as
self-evidence, amounts to a shaking of the metaphysical closure by thinking the link between
truth and presence.\(^{24}\) This shaking must not be considered a positing of absence as another
center from which to think, for such a positing would be a movement subject to incorporation
by dialectical negativity in a movement which would negate the first center in yielding another,
higher, truth. The situating of truth—the tying of it to a determined philosophical, and in fact,
vulgar, concept of time—is a thought that "henceforth may no longer need to be either true or
present, and for which the meaning and value of truth are put into question in a way impos­
sible for any intraphilosophical moment, especially for skepticism and everything that is
systematic with it" (42/38).

After this first sketch of the relation between metaphysics and a thought that would
shake metaphysics as proposed in *Sein und Zeit*, Derrida moves on in the section entitled "The
Exoteric" to ask about the contact between the concept of vulgarity and Aristotle's aporetic treat­
ment of time. Specifically, the question concerns the connection of vulgarity with the
"exotericness" of Aristotle's *logos* (43/39).\(^{25}\) Aristotle's aporetic is the question about the being
and non-being of time according to an exoteric *logos*. That is, Aristotle will deal with what
appears to common sense, what appears as self-evident. We have just seen above that the
privilege of the present is self-evidence itself. Thus our question becomes: What connects
Aristotle's aporia to presence?

**Aristotle's Aporetic and its History**

In its most formal terms, Aristotle's aporetic states that time is what is not: time must
appear as the now, yet the now appears as "no longer" and "not yet." As such, as containing "un
certain né-ant," time cannot participate in presence, substance, "étantité" itself (*ousia*)
(43/39-40). To reach this conclusion, the aporetic has two phases: in the first, time is divisible
into parts, yet no now (= part) is in the present; while in the second, the now is not a part, so
time is not composed of nows. The now is thus seen as the atemporal kernel of time, its form. In
order to be, the now must remain present: *ousia*, presence, is what is. So far Derrida's reading
of Aristotle conforms to what one would suspect Heidegger would think.\(^{26}\)
In the next section, however, entitled "The Paraphrase," Derrida begins to develop his thought of the formal rule we mentioned above, the rule whose formulation depends on a recognition of the margin furrowing all ("metaphysical") texts. Derrida shows the way in which Hegel's repetition of Aristotle in the *Encyclopedia* only cannot be seen under the rhetorical schema of the "paraphrase,* as Heidegger would have it, but also includes Hegel's own critique of intratemporality, a critique that is in a way "analogous" to Heidegger's critique in Sein und Zeit. This Hegelian critique must be seen in terms of metaphoricity, so Hegel's texts on time-as including both a repetition of Aristotle and a critique of intratemporality—seem furrowed by the margin of metaphysics, seem to be at once inside and outside metaphysics.

Derrida's characterization of Hegel's text proceeds as follows: Hegel's repetition of Aristotle occurs in the section on "Mechanics" where space and time are categories of the Idea as immediately, that is, abstractly and indeterminately, outside itself. In Hegel's text space is pure exteriority which must be determined by a self-negation in the point. The point negates and retains itself in lifting itself into the line, and the line in turn becomes the plane. This process is circular; we could start with concretely determined space and proceed inversely to indifferent abstraction. What of time in this account? Derrida reminds us that time has already appeared, in that space is a process of self-negation: time is required in the Aufhebung as the work of space spacing itself; in Derrida's words, "le temps est espacement" (47/43). We will see the significance of this dialectic of time and space when Derrida examines the "dialectic of the gramme" that enables Aristotle's text to function while never resolving its central aporia.

We next move to the section of "Ousia and Gramme" entitled "What the Question Evades." Here Derrida will show that what Heidegger considers the Kantian breakthrough--a breaking with the Aristotelian tradition via a thinking of time as the condition of possibility of experience--is possible only by means of a development of Aristotle, who both "establishes" and "critiques" metaphysical security in anticipating the concept of the nonsensuous sensuous (55-56/48-49). Derrida here refers to Physics 219a 3-4: *hama gar kinéseōs aisthanometha kai chronou*. Such an Aristotelian anticipation of Kant is enough for Derrida to establish the "marginality" of Aristotle's text.
Derrida will also claim here that Heidegger's shaking of metaphysics by an appeal to the sense of Being is also implicated in metaphysical conceptuality due to the irreducible binding of sens, sense, to presence (58/51). As I have already made clear, Derrida does not here take into account the marginal economy instigated by Sinn in Sein und Zeit, an economy that exceeds metaphysics in one of its moments without, however, inscribing the graphic of the trace. Most importantly for his purposes, Derrida is on his way to showing that the texts of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel are all furrowed by the margin of metaphysics—a marginality that the note under examination in Sein und Zeit does not thematize. The marginality of Aristotle and Hegel escapes the note, Derrida claims, because it does not see the "problem of the written trace" and its relation to the circle and the line.

In explicating this claim for the importance of the written trace in thematizing the marginality of metaphysics, Derrida's question here is this: In demonstrating that the now is not a part of time, that is, in overturning the first hypothesis of the aporia, does Aristotle extract time from the "spatial" concepts of part and whole (52/46-47)? We must recall that Aristotle never settles the aporia: unlike the treatise on place, which precedes the discussion of time in Physics IV, he does not offer here a critical, non-exoteric level of discussion, but moves on past the aporia of the being of time to consider the physis of time, whose belonging to being remains undecided.

Now, explicating Sein und Zeit, Derrida emphasizes that metaphysics is posited precisely by this evasion of the question of the Being of time, or rather, by asking the question in terms of the belonging of time to Being already determined as ousia, presence, Vorhandenheit. Thus Aristotle's treatise contains an unexamined determination of the now as a (present) entity. In other words, it evades the question: How is Being already determined in investigating (the Being of) time? Sein und Zeit brings to light, Derrida points out, this omission by posing the question of the transcendental horizon for Being, that is, time as the transcendental horizon for any possible understanding of Being. In this way, Derrida notes, Sein und Zeit is thus a decisive step "au-delà ou en deca" metaphysics. The relation of "on that side" to "on this side" is precisely what is articulated in the "formal rule."
Metaphysics as the effect of this evasion is seen not only in the determination of time as nothingness or accident prior to Kant, Derrida continues, but also in what is "least metaphysical" in Kant, the notion of time as the pure form of inner sensiblity (53/48). For Kant, it is because time is not a being that it must be made into a pure form of sensibility: this move belongs to metaphysics in that it was made possible by the evaded question that predetermined Being as presence and thus enabled Kant to conclude that time was not a being. Thus Aristotle can be seen as having prepared the Kantian break with metaphysics that Heidegger lauds in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, but that he denies to Aristotle and Hegel in the epoch of Sein und Zeit (54/48).

What is the link of Aristotle to Kant? For Derrida, time as the form of inner sense still seems "rigorously prescribed" in the famous Aristotelian phrase of 219a: hama gar kinéseôs aisthanometha kai chronou. Derrida reads Aristotle as saying here that time and movement are united in aisthesis, a sensibility that functions even in the dark, when the only movement is in the soul. Thus time is the form of movement, even that movement that can occur only in the soul, thereby preceeding any objectivity; that is, time is the form of all phenomena in general, a formulation identical to Kant's (54-56/48-49).

Derrida concludes:

What Aristotle has set down, then, is both traditional metaphysical security, and, in its inaugural ambiguity, the critique of this security. In anticipating the concept of the nonsensuous sensuous, Aristotle furnishes the premises of a thought of time no longer dominated simply by the present . . . (56/49)

The question of "Ousia and Grammé," then, is whether Sein und Zeit has arrested these possibilities of an inaugural break by means of its reading of Aristotle, that is, in its epoché of the trace, which forces it, because of its use of the concept of "time," to repress the other member of the undecidable pair time/space, a pair whose articulation can only be thought in the graphic of différance.

Thus we seem to have arrived at a paradox: that Kant's breakthrough transgresses vulgar time only by making explicit the possibility of a break hinted at in Aristotle's very establishing of the possibility of the vulgar concept of time. Thus the formal rule is first sketched by Derrida in claiming that "at a certain point, then, the destruction of metaphysics remains within
metaphysics, only making explicit its principles" (54/48).

Derrida next shows that the breakthrough of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, as it is retrieved in the question of the sense of Being, is also subject to the "formal rule." As Derrida puts it: "Making explicit the evaded question always and necessarily keeps to the system of what is evaded" (57/50). This necessity follows from the fact that time is thought on the basis of the present as nontime, as not yet or no longer, that is, on the basis of the silent predetermination of the question of the Being of time in terms of ousia and Vorhandenheit.

Now as we will see in Chapter II, "sense"—in terms of which Heidegger poses the Being question in Sein und Zeit—is bound to an economy marginal to presence. Derrida spells out the consequence of this bond in a note part of which runs as follows:

And if time has a meaning (sens) in general, it is difficult to see how it could be extracted from onto-theo-logy .... It is not any given determination of the meaning (sens) of time that belongs to onto-theo-teleology, but it is the anticipation of its meaning (sens). Time already has been suppressed at the moment one asks the question of its meaning, when one relates it to appearing, truth, presence, or essence in general. (60n/52n)

Thus if the question of sense in general must be posed within the closure of metaphysics, then the economy of the question of the sense of Being would retain a moment that remained within such a closure, no matter the "force, necessity and value (irruptive as well as fundamental) of such a question" (58-59/51-52).

The formal rule, which in its narrow sense concerns the thought of Being as presence, articulates the marginality of all metaphysical texts, which Derrida demonstrates here in the case of Hegel. On the one hand, Hegel does not interrupt Aristotle in that "the concept as absolute subjectivity itself thinks itself, is for itself and near itself, has no exterior, and it assembles, erasing them, its time and its difference in self-presence" (59-60/52). On the other hand, we are drawn to the definition of time at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit: time is what erases (tilgt) time. However, this erasure is a writing that maintains time, enables it to be read while erasing it: thus Hegel ends with time as the inscription of a circle, infinitely self-reflective, and as Derrida reminds us, the circle is also the Aristotelian model for thinking time and the grammē (Physics IV 223b) (60n./52n.). From this we can conclude that Hegel is both
"inside" and "outside" metaphysics: he thinks absolute spirit as self-presence, but thinks time in terms of self-erasing writing.

We now move to the section of "Ousia and Grammé" entitled "The Pivot of Essence." Here Derrida calls attention to the fact that the aporetic form of the question of the physis of time is never questioned by Aristotle. What is this form? How do number and gramme intervene dialectically here? We recall that the formal structure of Aristotle's time aporia depends on defining time as composed of parts (the now), then realizing that the now is not a part of time because the unity and identity of the now in relation to time do not accord with the relation part/whole.

What is the dialectic of the gramme that resolves the aporia? Time is affirmed by Aristotle as the line, the solution of the contradiction of the point, which is a nonspatial spatiality. Yet time is not the line, for the nows are not points, since they destroy each other in a way that points do not. These contradictions are taken up and affirmed together as the physis of time. However, the dialectic of the gramme is governed by the potentiality/act distinction, which itself is governed by a teleology of presence, that is, the determination of energeia as ousia (62/54).

Let us follow the way Derrida develops the dialectic of the gramme. At first it seems, he claims, that Aristotle rejects representing time by the gramme, but this is only the gramme in the sense of a linear inscription in space; he will later accept time as gramme in the sense of the circle in act. At first, then, time is different than space, for time is successive, not coexistent: the nows destroy each other as points do not, so that noncoexistence is the essence of the now as presence. However, the now must be the same in its essence as the other now it destroys, so that time is an "impossible possiblity" (63/55), the synthesis of identity and difference in the same. On this first level space is also different from time, in that space is the space of possible coexistence. However, this simultaneity can only appear in a synthetic relating of two points, that is, the temporal synthesis shown above in Derrida's discussion of Hegel (63-64/55). Thus space implies time, which in turn implies the possibility of space: in order to relate points to themselves in dialectical self-negation, the nows--as now--must be simultaneous,
that is, must coexist, which is the definition of space.

So we must conclude that space and time must be thought together, which Derrida remarks is what Hegel and Heidegger remind us (64/55). I point out here, anticipating Chapter II, that Heidegger does not speak of the necessity of a concept of space/time in Sein und Zeit, where there is precisely an attempt to ground spatiality in the temporality of Dasein, but only later in "Zeit und Sein." Derrida here makes the regression to the quasi-transcendental "time/space" by showing how Aristotle gives the difference between space and time as already constituted; the articulation of this difference, the hama, would then reveal an undecidable that Derrida calls "différance" or timespace. As the articulation of same and other in the "difference" of time and space, "Being-together" as "the very production of Being," the hama would reveal "the common origin of time and space" (64-5/56). In other words, the determination of Being (in Aristotle's case, ousia) as presence depends upon a mode of time, the present, but time itself is undecidably articulated with space: thus ousia is "produced" by time/space. Here the demand is made for us to think différance as that which, in exceeding it, allows for the determination of Being as presence.

**Différance**

How are we to clarify this most difficult point? A brief detour to the "Différance" essay, following the lead of Rodolphe Gasché's analysis in The Tain of the Mirror, can help here. In trying to explain the neologism "différance," which is "neither a word or a concept" Derrida shows its construction from the Latin differre by way of the French différer (8/7). In so doing he shows how one meaning is that of delaying or deferring, which he names "temporization" (temporisation). Différance as temporization names the constitution of the present on the basis of a relation to an "absolute" past and future:

It is because of différance that the movement of signification is possible only if each so-called "present" element, each element appearing on the scene of presence, is related to something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element, this trace being related no less to what is called the future than to what is called the past, and constituting what is called the present by means of this very relation to what it is not: what it absolutely is not, not even a past or a future as a modified present. (13/13).
In discussing the constitution of any present element, such as the "now," Derrida brings to bear the graphic of the trace, which bears a certain resemblance to the Hegelian logic of self and other. The relation to a "radical" or "absolute" alterity is necessary for the constitution of a self-identity, even of that self-identity, the present, in which all other identities would be registered in a classically determined subjectivity. This alterity constitutive of identity, when considered in the context of the constitution of "time" as thought on the basis of the present, is the becoming-time of space. How so? According to the graphic of the trace, "space," the exterior, the other of time, "becomes," that is, constitutes, "time." This becoming-time of space is also a becoming-space of time, writes Derrida, an equation to which we now turn.

Derrida links the moment of delay, temporization, of différance to the moment of active differing with an astonishing sentence:

In constituting itself, in dividing itself dynamically, this interval is what might be called spacing, the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time of space (temporization). And it is this constitution of the present, as an "originary" and irreducibly nonsimple (and therefore, stricto sensu nonoriginary) synthesis of marks, or traces of retentions and protentions (to reproduce analogically and provisionally a phenomenological and transcendental language that soon will reveal itself to be inadequate), that I propose to call archi-writing, archi-trace, or différance. Which (is) (simultaneously) spacing (and) temporization. (13-14/13)

Spacing is, in the language of Of Grammatology "the opening of the first exteriority in general." Spacing, espacement, is the becoming-space of time in which the present, the pure interior is opened out by the alterity that constitutes it in its self-identity. Spacing is then the interval within the present that allows it to bend back upon itself in auto-affection as well as the opening to the "outside."

Différance, then, includes within its scope two becomings, the becoming-space of time and the becoming-time of space. Temporization and spacing make possible "time" thought on the basis of the present— but they also make this "time" impossible by producing presence as the effect of an absolutely other past and future. Now if time is always already becoming space, and space always already becoming time, this implies that any attempt to isolate one member of the undecidable pair "time/space" will find itself becoming its "opposite." That is, to take the
instance most relevant for us, any attempt to isolate, or describe in purely temporal terms, "time" will find itself becoming "space," that is, will find its description haunted by "spatial" terms.\textsuperscript{42}

We can see Derrida working out an example of this haunting most clearly in Speech and Phenomena. He writes concerning Husserl's descriptions in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness that "there is a duration to the blink [the Augenblick], and it closes the eye."\textsuperscript{43} Here Derrida demonstrates that Husserl's descriptions of temporal constitution betray that the moment of self-presence is invaded by alterity. Here the conceptual series time:presence:identity:space:absence:difference is worked out by Derrida as it functions in Husserl's text. Now we must not think of the invasion of time by space as temporally subsequent, as an unhappy accident befalling an previously pure essence, especially when at issue is the very constitution of time. The "outside," "space," has always already invaded the "inside," "time," constituting it from within. Derrida writes:

Since the trace is the intimate relation of the living present with its outside, the openness upon exteriority in general, upon the sphere of what is not "one's own," etc., the temporalization of sense is, from the outset, a "spacing." As soon as we admit spacing both as "interval" or difference and as openness upon the outside, there can no longer be any absolute inside, for the "outside" has insinuated itself into the movement by which the inside of the nonspatial, which is called "time," appears, is constituted, is "presented." Space is "in" time; it is time's pure leaving-itself; it is the "outside-itself" as the self-relation of time.\textsuperscript{44}

Here we see that spacing makes possible the temporalization of sense. That is, if the supposedly pure stratum of interior monologue is invaded by time, this temporalizing cannot be accomplished by a "time" that would be a pure time without any spatial reference.\textsuperscript{45} If the temporalizing of sense is only possible because space is always already within time, then "time" as thought on the basis of the present as pure self-identity must be rethought:

But what we are calling time must be given a different name—for "time" has always designated a movement conceived in terms of the present, and can mean nothing else. Is not the concept of pure solitude—of the monad in the phenomenological sense—undermined by its own origin, by the very condition of its self-presence, that is, by "time," to be conceived anew on the basis now of difference within auto-affection, on the basis of identifying identity and nonidentity within the "sameness" of the \textit{im selben Augenblick}?\textsuperscript{46}

How are we then to think the relation of \textit{différence} and the "time" thought on the basis of the
present? Derrida, in keeping with the graphic of supplementarity that structures texts that attempt to determine origins, names the final chapter of *Speech and Phenomena* "The Supplement of Origin." Of perhaps more interest to this dissertation, however, is his naming of time a "metaphor." In discussing Husserl’s descriptions of the pure movement of temporal constitution, about which Husserl claims that "for all this names fail us," Derrida points out that Husserl nonetheless names it "flux," thus taking up a name from the level of experience that the temporal synthesis makes possible. This transfer of a name is a "metaphor," writes Derrida, but this must be understood in terms of his notion of metaphoricity as analyzed in "White Mythology." Derrida writes:

> We speak metaphorically as soon as we introduce a determinate being into the description of this "movement"; we talk about "movement" in the very terms that movement makes possible. But we have been always already adrift in ontic metaphor; temporalization here is the root of a metaphor that can only be primordial.

The transfer of this name, "flux," from conditioned to condition, cannot be the same as the transfer of names from one thing to another, the traditional definition of metaphor, but must be seen as a "primordial metaphor." We cannot understand the oxymoronic phrase, "primordial metaphor," except in terms of Derridean metaphoricity. Recognizing something like metaphoricity is no doubt why Heidegger will write about *Zeitlichkeit* that it is not a being, that it "is" not, but that *Zeitlichkeit sich zeitigt*.

Derrida continues on the issue of the metaphoricity of "time":

> The word "time" itself, as it has always been understood in the history of metaphysics, is a metaphor which at the same time both indicates and dissimulates the "movement" of this auto-affection. All the concepts of metaphysics—in particular those of activity and passivity, will and nonwill, and therefore those of affection or auto-affection, purity and impurity, etc.—cover up the strange "movement" of this difference.

"Time" thus names, via metaphoricity, *différance*, which in turn names "under erasure" the undecidable pair time/space. For a gloss on this sentence, risking an explanation of the obscure by the more obscure, I refer to the section in *Of Grammatology* entitled "The Hinge": "Origin of the experience of space and time, this writing of difference, this fabric of the trace, permits the difference between space and time to be articulated..." The "fabric of the trace," that is,
différence, can permit the articulation of the difference between space and time because it says
the undecidable pair time/space.

Let us recall that besides time/space, différence also names the play of differences
within which the general text is structured:

The same, precisely, is différence (with an a) as the displaced and equivocal passage of
one different thing to another, from one term of an opposition to the other. Thus one could
reconsider all the pairs of opposites on which philosophy is constructed and on which our
discourse lives, not in order to see opposition erase itself but to see what indicates that
each of the terms must appear as the différence of the other, as the other different and
defered. (18/17)

Thus différence, which names the "possibility of conceptuality" (11/11) as the systematicity of the
general text—^the relation of any pair to each other and all other pairs—also names the relation
of one particular pair of concepts. For Instance, the relation of time to space and space to time,
which as we have seen, Derrida calls alternatively "spacing" or "temporization." As irrevocably
linked in this primordially undecidable pair, any attempt to isolate one side from the other will
result in a haunting, in which the language used in the allegedly purified description will betray
the repression of the other member of the pair, just as any attempt to isolate a concept from the
general text will be haunted by a re-mark. Thus the haunting of time by space is formally similar
to the way a re-mark, such as "metaphor of metaphor," comes to haunt any attempt to isolate
a single concept from the general text.53 In this way we see the place "Ousia and Grammé" holds
in the investigations into the margins of philosophy in the book of the same name. "Ousia and
Grammé," like the other essays in Margins, investigates the textual effects of the attempt to
isolate concepts, either from their (repressed) partner, or from the general text as a whole. As
Derrida says in "Signature Event Context,"54 all conceptual oppositions are hierarchies, so any
attempt at isolation involves repression of the other member of the pair, a repression that results
in a haunting.

"Time" and the Gramme

Let us now move on to the penultimate section of "Ousia and Grammé," "Gramme
and Number." Derrida claims here that the aporia prevents Aristotle from identifying time with the **gramme** as mathematical movement along a line, the "cinematographic concept of time" denounced by Bergson (66/57). Although Aristotle rejects the grammé as series of points, as a composition of parts each of which would be a limit, the distinction between potency and act comes in here: the point as limit is only potential; it takes its existence only from the line in act, so one can preserve the analogy of time/line on the basis of the line in act, that is, thought on the basis of its extremities (ta eskhata) present to themselves. Thus fully completed, the line, in act, is the circle, the finite movement of the circle repeating itself indefinitely. Derrida concludes that the **gramme** is "comprehended" by metaphysics between the point and the circle, between potency and act, so that any critique of the spatialization of time must operate in terms of the gramme thought in terms of presence. That is, one comes to criticize a "spatialized" time in terms of "time" thought on the basis of presence—on the basis of the epoché of the trace. "Time" must be rethought as **différence**—as time/space—Derrida tells us, so that one cannot give a "critique" of a description of time that uses spatial terms, as if this were a contingent failure of a specific author that might be subsequently improved upon in giving a purified description of a pure time. Instead, one must instead see this spatializing as a "haunting" necessitated by the very attempt at a pure description of time.

Thus Derrida charges that metaphysics can only think the gramme, which he now links with the "possibility of trace in general," in terms of presence, that is, in a way that cannot inscribe its peculiar graphic (69/60). This inability of metaphysics to think the trace in general other than in terms of presence is one of Derrida's recurrent topics. Here in "Ousia and Grammé" this necessarily limited comprehension of the gramme will mark the limits of the epoch of Sein und Zeit.

We begin to see this use of the thought of the gramme as trace, when we read that for Derrida "time" becomes the name of these limits, potency and act, within which the gramme is comprehended. That is, time can only be thought on the basis of Being as presence since the question of the Being of time is posed by the evaded question, which presupposes **ousia** as presence, Vorhandenheit. Thus différence, "that which is related to time, but is not time" is indeed
to be thought beyond the determination of Being as presence, but cannot still be called time (69/60).\textsuperscript{55} Derrida is thus claiming that Heidegger\textemdash s attempt to describe a primordial temporality in \textit{Sein und Zeit} is caught by the formal rule that operates whenever the sign "time" is used, a formal rule that makes time the name of the evasion by metaphysics of the thought of the trace, an evasion marked by the determination of "gramme" in the system of dynamis and energeia. Such an evasion returns as the haunting of any attempt to purify a temporal description of all spatial elements, as Derrida shows is the case with Aristotle\textemdash s \textit{hama}. In Chapter II of this dissertation I will show how Heidegger\textemdash s description of Dasein\textemdash s primordial temporality, which Heidegger calls "original time," is similarly haunted by spatiality.

Because of the necessity of thinking time according to presence, Derrida contends, to criticize any one of the concepts of metaphysics is to go around in circles, reconstituting the same system. This circle will then, a priori, envelop any delimitation one thinks applicable to a "past" text. As Derrida puts it: "More simply, every text of metaphysics carries within itself, for example, both the so-called \textquoteleft vulgar\textquoteright concept of time and the resources that will be borrowed from the system of metaphysics in order to criticize that concept" (70/61). Thus Derrida claims that Aristotle can be read as confirming Heidegger\textemdash s delimitation, for he does think Being as presence depending on the now as point, yet one could also read Aristotle in a way that would repeat both this limitation and its opposite (what opposes the now as point--the gramme), and make it appear that the de-limitation (Heidegger) is still governed by the same concepts as the limitation (Aristotle) (70/61).

Derrida makes these claims by reading two Aristotelian texts of the time discussion, 220a and 222a. In his reading of 220a, Derrida shows that the now is a constitutive part of time and a number foreign to time as well as the fact that the now is a constitutive part of time and an accidental part of time (as limit) (71/61). The difference that here allows such contradictory determinations is the difference between act and potency. In his reading of \textit{Physics} IV, 222a, which is organized by the definition of \textit{kinésis} as \textit{hé tou dynatou, héi dynaton, entelecheia} at \textit{Physics} III, 201b 4, Derrida shows that time, as number of movement, is potential; Being in act, \textit{entelecheia}, is not time but eternal presence. On the other hand, though, time is not non-Be-
ing, and non-Beings are not in time, for potentialities are in movement toward act. Thus movement and time are neither (present) beings nor (absent) non-beings (72/62).

With this conclusion Derrida is ready to formulate his "formal rule." The non-presence/non-absence of movement and time implies that the desire for presence (dynamis as movement toward energeia) and time (which is thought according to this movement) in Aristotle's text are "submitted and subtracted" (72/62). Submitted and subtracted with regard to what? Derrida must mean with regard to the determination of Being as presence. He says movement and time, which are neither present nor absent, belong "as much to" the de-limitation of metaphysics (Heidegger's gesture in Sein und Zeit, which operates by the thought of the present, of the presence of the present) as to the simple overturning of metaphysics (that is, thinking absence as another center, which will just end up in dialectics).

Thus Derrida can claim that the play of submission and subtraction (to the determination of Being as presence) is the formal rule for "anyone wishing to read the texts of the history of metaphysics" (72/62). Derrida's emphasis alerts us that the formal rule governs the reading of texts: as such, it should not be equated with, although it conforms to, the metaphoricity that articulates the formation of the thereby "marginalized" texts themselves in the relation of philosophy to non-philosophy. Thus the formal rule situates the delimitation of metaphysics wrought by the thought of presence, showing that it must operate, as Derrida notes at M 70/61, with the same concepts as the Aristotelian foundation of a metaphysics of presence. This means we can read the history of metaphysics within the opening of the (1st) Heideggerian breakthrough, that is, the thought of the sense of Being as presence, but must also read them beyond the constraints of this 1st breakthrough, that is, the constraints that form the epoch of Sein und Zeit, the occlusion of the problematic of the written trace. Derrida then concludes that the formal rule must be able to guide our reading of the entire Heideggerian text.

As Derrida notes, this implies that we can see the inscription within the formal rule of the epoch of Sein und Zeit. Does this mean that we must also be able to read the inscription of the middle period, for instance, "The Anaximander Fragment" within the formal rule? Or is it that "The Anaximander Fragment" is Heidegger's inscription of the formal rule, so that by reading
"The Anaximander Fragment" in terms of the trace—whose possibilities of legibility are denied by the metaphysical comprehension of the grammé—Derrida is able to situate the early Heidegger, by means of the formal rule, in terms of an occlusion of the grammé? Entertaining this latter possibility implies that we can be moved to destroy what remains of the history of metaphysics by an imperative made possible by the thought of Being as presence, but that we can be called to read the Seinsgeschichte as the result of a sichentziehende Schickung only on the basis of this play of submission and subtraction, that is, on basis of the trace which Heidegger sees in Anaximander.

The Conclusions of "Ousia and Grammé"

Let us try to see these dynamics at work in the last section of "Ousia and Grammé," entitled "The Closure of the Gramme and the Trace of Difference." Derrida numbers his conclusions here. In the first he spells out how the formal rule regulates the question of the sense of Being in the text of Sein und Zeit; in the second he shows how a second gesture of Heidegger's—that of questioning the determination of the sense of Being as presence in terms of epochality—situates the epoch of Sein und Zeit; finally in the third he describes the movement of the trace in "The Anaximander Fragment" in terms of difféance.

When we consider Derrida's first conclusion we must keep in mind that this is only his first conclusion. That this is only the first move in a long and complex conclusion to a long and complex essay situated by a series of interlocking notes to other long and complex essays in Margins and other texts renders immediately suspect any easy protest over this as the site of one of Derrida's "misreadings," or "critiques" of Heidegger. Here Derrida writes that Heidegger cannot oppose another, originary concept of time to the vulgar, for the so-called originary concept would also rely on metaphysical concepts for its formulation (73/63). Derrida wants here to enforce his notion of marginality, and the impossibility of simply leaving metaphysics behind. In other words, a simple reading of Sein und Zeit as beyond metaphysics ignores the formal rule that regulates the attempts to shake metaphysics from within, or better, which forces one to regard the attempted destruction of metaphysics as precisely a shaking from within. Der-
Derrida writes that one could multiply questions about the irreducible ties to metaphysical conceptuality of fallenness and origin—the concepts that dominate the two types of temporality Heidegger opposes to one another—around the notions of finitude or the proximity to itself of Dasein. We have noted above that this "enigmatic" proximity to itself of Dasein is the focus of Derrida's "The Ends of Man." Why does Derrida make no reference to his essay at this point? It must be that because nowhere—not here, nor in "The Ends of Man"—is Derrida interested in simply showing the adherence of Heidegger, or anyone else, to metaphysics. This move would indeed be a "critique," but we must remember that "The Ends of Man" asks its question in terms of metaphoricity, which as a "marginal" notion obviates any questions of a simple inside or outside of metaphysics.

Derrida next asserts that his question remains within Heidegger's thought. Derrida's question is that of situating the relation of ordinary to primordial time, so he is calling attention to the development from the first period of Heidegger's thought, dominated by the issue of Dasein's temporality, to the second period, which situates this thought by means of the epochality of Being. Derrida notes that Heidegger interrupts Sein und Zeit to ask whether originary temporality leads to the sense of Being; in finding himself unable to answer this question Heidegger found himself forced to change horizons, and ask about the epochality of Being (74/64).

Derrida situates the change in horizon by paying attention to the terms governing the concept of presence in Heidegger. In Sein und Zeit and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Derrida claims, "presence" is interchangeably expressed as Anwesenheit and Gegenwärtigkeit. Beyond Sein und Zeit, however, Derrida continues, Gegenwärtigkeit appears as a restriction of Anwesenheit, and Präsenz will be another narrowing of Anwesen under the heading of subjectivity and representation (75/64). Derrida concludes from this movement that the Heideggerian delimitation of metaphysics must be thought of as two gestures: one subject to the formal rule and hence caught in an economy that remains metaphysical though capable of shaking metaphysics, and one that, in inscribing the trace, would transgress metaphysics by articulating the formal rule of its very margin in showing how Being is determined as presence.
The first gesture consists of an appeal from a more narrow to a less narrow determination of presence--from the present as Gegenwart to the thought of Being as presence, Anwesenheit. Now this move, the imperative in Sein und Zeit to destroy the history of ontology, "... se tiendraient à l'intérieur de la métaphysique (de la présence) en général." Since delimiting metaphysics is possible only by the thought of presence, as Derrida's parentheses claim, Sein und Zeit is subject to the formal rule of submission and subtraction with regard to the thought of Being as presence; it can only shake metaphysics from within, by developing the possibilities laid down in Aristotle.

The second gesture consists in questioning the determination of Being as presence itself as the closure of Western metaphysics. This is the gesture of the epigraph, the pivot between the 2nd and 3rd Heideggerian periods, which situates the Anaximander fragment by thinking a "Wesen that would not yet even be Anwesen" (75/65). Indeed, Heidegger writes that to khreon is that which Anaximander "als das Wesende im Anwesen denkt." We might try here to say that the attempt to think to khreon as what abides in Anwesen is the thinking of what allows the determination of Being as presence, a thinking that leads us to think the Seinsgeschichte as the result of a withdrawing sending. Now this second gesture is Heidegger's "more difficult" gesture, Derrida claims, and he continues by stating that it can only be sketched out from its announcement in "certain calculated fissures of the metaphysical text"--as we will see, in the thought of the trace. In other words, then, thinking what gives Being must be done in terms of the trace. Here an enormous project announces itself: thinking sending and withdrawing, the active differing of the Unter-Schied, the revealing-concealing Austrag of Identity and Difference, in terms of the trace, and the granting of such difference in the es gibt of Ereignis in terms of différencé.

Such a project would no doubt involve Derrida's essay "The Retrait of Metaphor," in which he analyzes the withdrawal of Being in terms of metaphoricity. Derrida writes that the inscription of the trait of the incision, "marks the Ereignis," in such a manner "as I have attempted to articulate it in the trace or in différencé." The self-withdrawing of the Ereignis--which allows the sending and withdrawal of Being, and the reaching that withholds and denies
in the play of timespace—is here thought as the movement of differance. Derrida later confirms such a reading when he writes that:

We thus have recognized the relation between the re- of retrait [the movement thought above as trace or differance] ... and the Ereignen of the Es gibt ... in precisely this trait whereby the Enteignen ... happens to empty out all Ereignis.

The third point of Derrida's conclusion sketches a reading of "The Anaximander Fragment" in terms of the trace and differance. The two Heideggerian gestures Derrida outlined above are said to be "together simultaneously and separately" (as are time and space, we recall). What then is the relation of the two texts of Heidegger, the delimitation and the transgression? Derrida will name this relation "trace," for he says the relation between the text of the question of presence in general—the first gesture, the question of the sense of Being as Anwesenheit—and the text of the question of what exceeds Anwesenheit "at the daybreak or on the other side of (à la veille ou au-delà)" Greece—the second Heideggerian gesture—cannot be a relation of presence or absence (which would either give us nothing to think, or would be thought as merely an absent presence, not yet or no longer) (75-76/65). Yet this relation must still signify; it must still be legible—that is, it must be an inscribed trace: here we see the reason for the focus on the gramme, the "problem of the written trace." The gramme is precisely that which gives us the opportunity to think the relation of the two texts as an inscription other than in the mode of presence. But to think this other mode of inscription is to think what exceeds metaphysics—which means to think the second text as the one that poses the question of what enables metaphysics—that granting which determines that Being will be thought as presence for metaphysics. As we will see in Chapter II—but as Derrida apparently does not—Heidegger's question of the Sinn von Sein poses the question of the determination of Being as presence, but is subject to such violent twisting that its disruption of metaphysical answers to the Seinsfrage necessitates the move to thinking the Seinsgeschichte (in terms of the trace). The trace names the relation of the delimitation of metaphysics to the thought of what exceeds metaphysics, thus situating the delimitation bound to the formal law. What is at stake here is the development in Heidegger's thought from a science of Being that would delimit metaphysics by isolating (by way
of a destruction of what remains of the history of ontology) time as the transcendental horizon of Being, to the thought of the Seinsgeschichte as a Geschick, as the gift of a self-withdrawing giving.

The mode of inscription of such a trace is the erasure of the trace in its own production (76/65), which, as we noted above, "The Retract of Metaphor" asks us to think as the movement of Being in its self-withdrawal. The first stage in reading Heidegger this way is to note that it is the forgetting of the ontological difference as difference that enables metaphysics, that is, the forgetting that Being withdraws so that it can be determined as Anwesenheit, and Anwesenheit as Gegenwärtigkeit, (and later as Präsenz). Now this withdrawal is so complete that there is no trace of it. Since difference (is) (itself) trace, then the trace of the trace has disappeared (76/65-66). Here we see a structure of triple concealment in which even the forgetting of withdrawal is forgotten, so Being is no longer questionable. This structure of concealment seems to correspond, writes Derrida, to that in "The Anaximander Fragment," where the early trace of distinction is obliterated when Anwesen appears as the highest Anwesende. However, the erasure of the trace must be traced in the text of metaphysics, so that it must still be legible, must still be able to be read as "presence," so that presence is now read as the trace of the erasure of trace (76-77/65-66). In Heidegger's text on Anaximander, the distinction between Sein and Seienden can be experienced only with its unveiling with the Anwesen des Anwesendes. This implies that the difference as difference, which is the self-concealing granting of Being, must have left a trace which is preserved in Anaximander. In other words, to khreion is not the Heideggerian Sache, but the Sache has left a trace in to khreion which we are to read in order to think the Sache.

Derrida does not quote this passage from "The Anaximander Fragment," but we are led to it in this context. It should be compared with the passage from the "Logos" essay noted above. Heidegger's German relies on the plays of Über and Unter, Geschick and Geschichte:

The translation [Übersetzung] of to khreion as "usage" has not resulted from a preoccupation with etymologies and dictionary meanings [Überlegung]. The choice of the word stems from a prior crossing over [Übersetzen] of a thinking which tries to think the distinction in the essence of Being in the fateful [geschicklichen] beginning of Being's oblivion. The word "usage" is dictated to thinking in the experience of Being's oblivion.
What properly remains to be thought in the word "usage" has presumably left a trace [Spur] in to khreōn. This trace quickly vanishes in the destiny of Being [im Geschick des Seins] which unfolds in world history [weltgeschichtlich] as Western metaphysics.

Thus all the names of this trace, that is, all the ways in which the self-effacing difference that grants Being has been determined as the Being of beings, starting with to khreōn and on through hen, logos, idea, energeia, are all metaphysical names. This is a very difficult point. Does not Heidegger think to khreōn as a word dictated to early thinking, before the turn into metaphysics with Plato and Aristotle? Any number of texts could be marshalled to support this claim. However, "The Summary of a Seminar on the Lecture Time and Being" tells us we must move away from what is still metaphysical in the ontological difference: not that Being is thought as ground, as in "classical" metaphysics, but that Being is "subjugated" to beings. The point is not to forget the relation of Being to beings, but to think it as a "letting," an "Anwesenlassen: thought in the manner of Ereignis". Thus to khreōn, thought through the kata which refers irreducibly to a higher that has a lower under it, would be "metaphysical" in the second of the above senses. Of course the relation of the "Summary of a Seminar" to the rest of Heidegger's thought remains problematic; here I follow Schürmann's lead in his chapter "A Theory of the Texts." In any event, we must ask how we are to think the relation of Anaximander's thought of "das Wesende im Anwesen" to the thought of Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle of the "Grundzug des Anwesens" in the following passage from "The Anaximander Fragment":

The energeia, which Aristotle thinks as the fundamental character of presencing [Grundzug des Anwesens], of eon, the idea which Plato thinks as the fundamental character of presencing, the Logos which Heraclitus thinks as the fundamental character of presencing, the Moira which Parmenides thinks as the fundamental character of presencing, the Khreōn which Anaximander thinks is essential in presencing [als das Wesende im Anwesen]--all these name the Same. In the concealed richness of the Same the unity of the unifying One, the Hen, is thought by each thinker in his own way.

All these names belong to the text of metaphysics, Derrida would claim, not to the trace "itself," for there is no trace "itself" that can be named. Is this not what Heidegger himself says? Here we touch upon the controversial ending to Derrida's essay "Differance" where he quotes Heidegger from "The Anaximander Fragment" about the quest for the single word, the proper name of
Being, which he names "Heideggerian hope" (29/27). Without wishing to advance any final judgments here, we can note that Derrida omits the last sentence of the paragraph he quotes; restoring this sentence might lead us to think that the quest for the single word is metaphysics' quest, not that of eigentliche Denken, which, we might venture with the help of "The Retreat of Metaphor," is a thinking that recognizes metaphoricity. I quote the paragraph in its entirety, and ask the reader to note that the relation of the phrases Wesen des Anwesens and das Wesende des Seins to das Sein selbst, and the attempt to think das Sein selbst als Ereignis in Zeit und Sein, which also finds itself faced with the problem of language—in terms of what the "Summary of a Seminar" calls the issue of "ontic models"—is worthy of much scrutiny for its relation to the Derridean notion of metaphoricity.

The relation to what is present that rules in the essence of presencing itself is a unique one, altogether incomparable to any other relation. It belongs to the uniqueness of Being itself. Therefore, in order to name the essential nature of Being, language would have to find a single word, the unique word. From this we can gather how daring every thoughtful word addressed to Being is. Nevertheless such daring is not impossible, since Being speaks always and everywhere throughout language. The difficulty lies not so much in finding in thought the word for Being as in retaining purely in genuine thinking the word found.68

Now if all naming is a naming of presence ("only presence is mastered" Derrida says above at 76/65), then all the names of difference are metaphysical too, not just the difference between Anwesen and Anwesende but also the difference between Sein and Seiende (77/67). Thus difference is older than Being itself, if Being has always let itself be determined as a being (n'a jamais voulu dire que l'etant). That is, if as Heidegger says in "The Anaximander Fragment," "Die Sache des Seins ist es, das Sein des Seienden zu sein."69 Now Heidegger attaches two notes to this sentence in the 1950 edition of Holzwege, the first asking us to consider "Sache" as "Geschick," and the second telling us that the entire sentence is a hint to regard the ontological difference. Thus the destiny of Being is to be the Being of beings and thus open to determination as a being. Now "Geschick" gives us to think the withdrawing sending, whose structure we noted above is thought by Derrida in terms of the trace. Now, that difference is older than the Being of beings is what Heidegger tells us in another note from the 1950 edition: "Der Unter-Schied ist unendlich verschieden von allem Sein, das Sein des Seienden
bleibt. Daher bleibt es ungemäss, den Unterschied noch mit 'Sein'--sei es mit, sei es ohne y--zu benennen." The extent to which difference is older than Being itself (which might be Ereignis) is another issue, to be analyzed--as we noted above--by means of the relation of the Heideggerian thought of "ontic models"--which arises when we attempt to think Being itself as Ereignis--to the Derridean notion of metaphoricity.

Derrida then moves, at the very end of "Ousia and Grammê" to name the difference which is beyond Being and beings, which traces itself by itself, différance (78/67). Différance would then let us think writing beyond the metaphysical comprehension of the gramme between point and circle, that is, in a teleology of presence. We asked earlier about the passage dissimulé opening the problem of presence to the problem of the written trace. Now that we have reached the end of "Ousia and Grammê" we can hazard some guesses. One can attempt to go beyond metaphysics only by first marking off its limits by a thought of Being as presence. This attempt, in its questioning after the sense of Being as presence, remains within an economy that includes an irreducibly metaphysical moment. To overcome metaphysics in the Heideggerian fashion, Derrida would conclude, one must not just ask about the sense of Being as presence, but about the granting that determines that Being be so thought throughout the history of metaphysics. For Derrida, such a granting that withdraws cannot be thought on the basis of the Sinn von Sein, but only as trace, or différance, which, as the spacing and timing of the text, can only be thought beyond presence. Such a textual movement, a trace that erases itself in its own production, can only be called an inscription beyond presence. It is hence unthinkable for metaphysics, which precisely is sustained by its comprehension of the gramme within the limits of a teleology of presence, that is, by its blindness to the movement of inscription, the trace in general, différance.
1. All references to “Ousia and Grammé” in this chapter will be in the text, with the French page number given first.

2. Heidegger does not seek, as is often written, to destroy the history of ontology, but instead to destroy the sedimented remains (überlieferten Bestandes) which cover over the history of the Seinsfrage (Sein und Zeit, p. 22). In the next paragraph Heidegger specifies that his target is not the past but the contemporary dominant ways of interpreting the history of ontology.

3. David Krell’s Intimations of Mortality (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986) provides a very strong account of the "turn" that should lay to rest any further attempts to think it chronologically rather than structurally, that is, as having structured Heidegger’s text from the very beginning. Briefly, the “turn” is best thought not as the move from Dasein to Being, or from phenomenological ontology to a meditation on the history of Being, but as the step back from the metaphysical determination of the being of beings, the Sein des Seienden, to what enables such a determination. Such enabling was at first thought by Heidegger to be a transcendental horizon, hence the formulation of the project of scientific philosophy, or phenomenological ontology, as the working out of die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein überhaupt.

4. Since Derrida’s relation to Heidegger is precisely what is in question here, I think it best to avoid any characterization of that relation as "critique." Both Kantian critique and ideology critique imply a standing outside a textual object and discovering its condition of possibility in a totally different arena, thereby finding the truth of the error under critique. Deconstruction, on the other hand, intervenes in a social text by situating it in the general text, thereby exposing the force investments of its construction. Deconstructive intervention thus changes the balance of a field of forces by robbing the examined text of its aura of naturalness and (pure) reasonableness.

5. Whether or not "Heidegger" (that is, the unity of those hermeneutical determinations of the author’s intention of those texts signed by the man Martin Heidegger) was under any illusions concerning the purity of his position vis-à-vis metaphysics, such a schema is useful in directing our readings of Heidegger.

6. See note 3 above.

7. See "Tympan," in Marges: “Therefore, if they appear marginal to some of the great texts in the history of philosophy, these ten writings in fact ask the question of the margin” (xviii-xix/xxiii).


9. On the relation of the trace to différance as time/space see the section of Of Grammatology entitled "The Hinge," as well as Irene Harvey’s commentary on it in her Derrida and the Economy of Différance.
10. Rodolphe Gasché has developed the term "quasi-transcendental" in The Tain of the Mirror to describe the way in which any mark in a textual field can assume a position of domination of that field (and thus as ordering the field seem exterior or transcendent to it) and yet still remain a member of the field. Such a structure always results in the "haunting" of which "the metaphor of metaphor" described in "White Mythology" is perhaps the best example.

11. Derrida discusses the impossibility of controlling iteration, of limiting iteration to contexts deemed appropriate by an author, under the rubric of "dissemination." See "Signature Event Context" in Margins; Limited Inc; and "The Double Session" in Dissemination.


14. I am indebted to Lawrence Waxman for helping me see the significance of the title, as indeed I am for many more points that must go otherwise unacknowledged.


17. Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 6. It is of course much too precipitous to simply equate the Heideggerian thought of the history of Being and the Derridean notions of logocentrism (and phonocentrism). A complex move at the end of Heidegger's essay "Logos (Heraclitus, B 50)" renders any simple readings of his notions of the connections of the Greek logos, metaphysics, and the privilege of the voice extremely problematic, as he poses them explicitly in terms of the trace, or more suggestively, in terms of a non-trace, what has not left a trace, a trace that has erased itself:

The Greeks do experience saying in this way. But, Heraclitus included, they never think the essence of language (das Wesen der Sprache) expressly as the Logos, as the Laying that gathers.

What would have come to pass (sich ereignet) had Heraclitus—and all the Greeks after him—thought the essence of language expressly as Logos, as the Laying that gathers! Nothing less than this: the Greeks would have thought the essence of language from the essence of Being—indeed, as this itself. For ho Logos is the name for the Being of beings. Yet none of this came to pass (ereignete sich nicht). Nowhere do we find a trace (Spur) of the Greek's having thought the essence of language directly from the essence of Being. Instead, language came to be represented—indeed first of all with all the Greeks—as vocalization, phone, as sound and voice, hence phonetically. . . . Once, however, in the beginning of Western thinking, the essence of language flashed (blitzte) in the light of Being—once, when Heraclitus thought the Logos as his guiding word, so as to think in this word the Being of beings. But the lightning abruptly vanished (verlosch jäh). No one held onto its streak of light and the nearness (Nähe) of what it illuminated. (Vorträge und Aufsätze [Pfullingen: Neske, 1961, pp. 24-25; Early Greek Thinking, pp. 77-78.)

I will later examine Derrida's reading of Heidegger's "The Anaximander Fragment" in terms of the trace.

18. This account of the development of Heidegger's thought is indebted to Reiner Schürmann's Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy, which was in turn influenced by Werner Marx's Heidegger and the Tradition.

19. Although I find Schürmann's reading of Heidegger extremely enlightening, such that I will use his three-fold schema throughout, the distinction between "Heidegger 2" and "Heidegger 3" seems extremely hard to draw. And indeed Derrida in this essay does not seem to recognize
such a distinction. For instance, "The Anaximander Fragment," the centerpiece of the Seinsgeschichte period, speaks of the beginning of the sending of Being in terms of Ereignis: the oblivion of the distinction [Unterschiede], with which the destiny of Being [Geschick des Seins] begins, and which will carry through to completion, is all the same not a lack, but rather the richest and most prodigious event [Ereignis]: in it the history of the Western world comes to be borne out [zum Austrag kommt]. It is the event [Ereignis] of metaphysics. What now is stands in the shadow of the already forgone destiny of Being's oblivion. (Holzwege, p. 336/51)

For that matter, Heidegger's letter to Richardson complicates any thought of a simple turn from "Heidegger 1" to "Heidegger 2," as the following sentences show:

As a result, even in the initial steps of the Beingquestion in Being and Time thought is called upon to undergo a change whose movement cor-responds with the reversal . . . only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But [the thought of] Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II" (Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, xviii, xxii).

But Heidegger himself would never ask us to unquestioningly accept any author's self-interpretation, so let us continue examining Derrida's reading of the changes in Heidegger's focus.


21. "Le proche et le propre" should be read as "the near and the proper," not "the near and the far," as Bass mistranslates it.

22. We will note several times Derrida's reading of espacement as that which grants presence. Here we must carefully note Heidegger's insistence on moving away from "production" models in describing this process: "Thus the character of effecting [Bewirkens] is removed from the letting in letting-presence [Anwesenlassen]" (Zur Sache des Denkens, 50/47). Derrida takes no fewer precautions in insisting that différance be thought of as neither passive nor active, as this passage from "Différance" shows:

Thus one comes to posit presence . . . no longer as the absolutely central form of Being but as a "determination" and as an "effect." A determination or an effect within a system which is no longer that of presence but of différance, a system that no longer tolerates the opposition of activity and passivity, nor that of cause and effect . . . (17/16)


24. I am indebted here, as indeed in much of this dissertation, to stimulating discussions with Charles Scott on "Ousia and Grammé" at the Collegium Phaenomenologicum in Perugia, Italy, during the summers of 1987 and 1989.


26. Recall here that the Basic Problems were unavailable at the time Derrida wrote "Ousia and Grammé." I will address this point in Chapter 3, since this is obviously one point at which a reading of Basic Problems of Phenomenology would be critical. Derrida does refer us here to the privilege of the 3rd person present active indicative of the infinitive "to be," as Heidegger mentions it in Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1953); (English translation, Introduction to Metaphysics, by Ralph Mannheim [New York: Doubleday, 1962]) and as Derrida takes it up in his essay "The Supplement of Copula," Marges.


29. In a note at this point in his text, Derrida refers us to "White Mythology," Marges.


31. Derrida writes: "sense (in whatever sense it is understood: as essence, as the meaning of discourse, as the orientation of movement between arche and telos) has never been conceivable, within the history of metaphysics, otherwise than on the basis of presence and as presence," Marges (58/51). This quote will be one of the foci of Chapter 2.


33. See also the conclusion to Einführung in die Metaphysik.

34. Bass' "within" for "en deca" seems problematic in the context of a thought attempting to exceed metaphysics.

35. In Chapter III I discuss this point in relation to the Heideggerian and Derridean notions of self-affection.

36. Derrida remarks here (Marges 49/55) that Kant also relates while distinguishing time to movement and change. He refers in a note to the Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Time as it appears in the Transcendental Aesthetic. The Kantian move also takes off, Derrida continues, from the "analogy constituted by what is traced determined as line (grammé, Linie)," as does Aristotle.

37. As Rodolphe Gasché remarks on this point, the irreducible tie of the question of the meaning of time to the system of presence suppresses the thought of différence as temporalization, the spacing and timing of a text of traces. See his The Tai:ii of the Mirror, p. 197.


39. Here there seems an explicit reference to Identity and Difference. Derrida's full sentence at Marges 64/56 reads:

Now, if Aristotle gives himself the difference between time and space (for example, in the distinction between nun and stigme) as a constituted difference, the enigmatic articulation of this difference is lodged in his text, hidden, sheltered, but operating within complicity, within the complicity of the same and the other, with the with or the together, with the simul in which Being-together is not a determination of Being, but the very production of Being.
To think the belonging-together of identity and difference in the same as the granting of Being is Heidegger's project in *Identity and Difference*.

40. I cannot even begin to explore the relation of Derrida's graphics [plural and lower-case] to Hegel's *Logic* [singular and capitalizing] here. Derrida himself acknowledges his "almost absolute proximity to Hegel" in *Positions*, p. 44, even as he distinguishes *différence* from Hegelian *Unterschied* at the point where Hegel "determines difference as contradiction only in order to resolve it ..." See John Llewelyn, "A Point of Almost Absolute Proximity to Hegel" in *Deconstruction and Philosophy*, ed. John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).


42. Of course, "spatial" must be put between quotation marks as well, for similar reasons. As I make clear in the Introduction, I explain the undecidable spatial/temporal status of specific terms by virtue of the irreducible possibility of their iteration in both spatial and temporal contexts. More precisely put, in contexts one might wish to denominate as "purely" spatial or temporal, but whose denomination as such is haunted.


44. Derrida, *La voix*, 96/86. This is of course exactly what Heidegger says about the ecstatic nature of temporality. Derrida's complaint, as we will see in Chapter II, is with Heidegger's naming of temporality as "original time" and thinking the description of this time could be kept pure of spatial reference.

45. My use of "reference" here perhaps calls for some explanation. Just as marks refer to the other marks of the field via traces, so does one iteration of a mark refer to all the other iterations of that "same" mark. To say that a pure time is impossible without any spatial reference is to say that any discourse on time must make use of marks which refer to their possible iteration in spatial contexts.


52. Of course, Derrida is no simple structuralist, as the emphasis on "system" might seem to imply. See here his "Structure, Sign and Play in the Human Sciences," and "Force and Signification" in *Writing and Difference*.

53. Gasché articulates the strange interlocking of these and all other quasi-transcendentals. *Différence* can seem to order the field of quasi-transcendentals from which it is drawn, thus appearing as a master name, Derrida's fundamental concept, and so on, only to be itself subject to a re-marking. Likewise, the re-mark relates itself to other quasi-transcendentals according to *différence*, that is, for example, as the supplement different and deferred.
54. Derrida, Marges, 392/329.

55. As indeed Heidegger recognizes, when he speaks in "Zeit und Sein" of that which grants time, but is not temporal, even though its "movement" is one of withdrawal (Zur Sache des Denkens, 18/17).

56. As Schürmann warns us on this point, we have to be careful equating Anwesenheit and Anwesen, as Derrida seems to do here, without taking into account the difference between the phrase Anwesen des Anwesenden, which as similar to Sein des Seiendes seems indeed to be the same as Anwesenheit, and the meaning of Anwesen that would be analogous to das Sein selbst. To make matters even more complex, Heidegger uses the phrases das Wesende des Seins, and das Wesende des Anwesen in the "Anaximander Fragment." Also, Präsenz appears in Basic Problems of Phenomenology as the horizon of everydayness, the "handiness of the handy," p. 438/308.

57. Bass' "would remain within the metaphysics of presence in general" eliminates the emphasis of the parentheses.


61. Bass' "before or beyond" misses the "vigilance," the "keeping watch," connotations of "à la vieille" that Derrida thematizes in "Plato's Pharmacy," the sense that the constitution of metaphysics requires a vigilance to insure the success of its repressive gestures, as well as the plays on Greece as the dawn of the evening-land, die Frühe des Abend-Landes in Heidegger, e.g. Holzwege, pp. 300-302.

62. Derrida here writes "is" under erasure, for at issue here is precisely the relation of difference to Being. If difference is "older" than Being, it could never be a being about which one could say it "is."


64. Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 36/33.


69. Heidegger, Holzwege, p. 335/50.
CHAPTER II
THE SINNSFRAGE AND THE SEINSFRAGE

Introduction

As we have seen in beginning the articulation of the economy of time in Chapter I, Derrida's "Ousia and Grammé" reads the constraints within which operates Heidegger's reading in Sein und Zeit of Aristotle's relation to the metaphysical tradition. For Derrida, Heidegger's attempt to isolate Temporalitat as the Sinn von Sein überhaupt remains tied, via the marker "Sinn," to the system of metaphysical conceptuality oriented by the desire for self-presence. The accompanying attempt to destroy what remains of the history of ontology thus produces textual effects which can be analyzed according to what Derrida calls a formal rule of "submission and subtraction" with regard to the system of the evaded question, that is, to the determination of Being as presence as it serves to delimit metaphysics. "Time," which Heidegger wishes to isolate as the horizon for any understanding of Being, for Derrida serves as a mark of the epoche of the trace, that is, as an indication of metaphysics' necessary occlusion of "différance" as time/space. "Ousia and Grammé," via its posing of the "formal rule" as the articulation of the textual effects of using a notion of "time," will thus enable us to understand how Heidegger's attempt to isolate "time" as the transcendental horizon of Being is haunted by "spatial" terms. Such a haunting also explains the necessity to use quotation marks in this context. As I have explained in the Introduction, such haunting is the result of the irreducible possibility of iterating the terms of temporal discourse in spatial contexts.

At question here is Heidegger's move from a science of Being to the history of Being, a move often confused with the Heideggerian "turn." John Sallis asks in his recent essay
"Twisting Free"--regarding the foundering of the project of Sein und Zeit--whether "an analysis of temporality could ever suffice for developing the question of the meaning of Being."3

Continuing along this line of questioning, we can see the larger context of my task: What were the constraints that led Heidegger at the end of his career, in Zur Sache des Denkens, to end up speaking about Ereignis/Enteignis in terms of time/space, explicitly backing away from Sein und Zeit's attempt to ground Dasein's spatiality on its temporality on the way to isolating time as the the Sinn von Sein überhaupt? What was it about the working out of the project of fundamental ontology announced in Sein und Zeit that led Heidegger, as Derrida puts it, "to change horizons" and move from the question of the Sinn von Sein to take up the question of the Seinsgeschichte?

In moving toward an answer to these questions, in this chapter I will focus upon the effect that what I will call the "Sinnsfrage"--the question of the sense of sense, or the Sinn von Sinn--has upon the Seinsfrage, the question of the Sinn von Sein überhaupt. I will show that posing the Seinsfrage in terms of Temporalität as the Sinn von Sein überhaupt does not remain simply tied to the system of presence, as Derrida seems to claim, but articulates an economy marginal to the system of presence. However, I will also show that the transgression of metaphysics wrought by the economy of the Sinnsfrage / Seinsfrage is a dead-end street, so to speak, one that necessitates the change to the graphic of the trace that Heidegger later comes to inscribe in his text in the question of the Seinsgeschichte. The move from Temporalität as the Sinn von Sein überhaupt to the inscription of the graphic of the trace in the Seinsgeschichte is thus a move from time to time/space.

It is now time to give a first indication of the focus of this chapter, the Sinnsfrage as it is at work in Sein und Zeit. The Sinnsfrage arises through two mechanisms. In the first, various historically sedimented acceptations of the mark "Sinn" are intertwined in each iteration of "Sinn." In the second mechanism of the Sinnsfrage, Heidegger attempts a double rewriting of the historical sedimentation of one acceptation--that of Sinn as "meaning." Here Heidegger takes as the most common acceptation--the one he assumes most readers would adopt--the metaphysical notion of an intentum expressible in a statement. I call this a metaphysical notion
because it seems bound to a notion of a stable, self-present subject who aims a flashlight-like
ray of intentionality at a mental object. Heidegger will first—and only provisionally—rewrite the
notion of meaning as *intentum* as the "pivot" of an existential projection of *Dasein* in its *Being-
in-the-world*. Later, in the temporal recapitulation, he will rewrite the notion of "pivot" as the
direction of *Dasein*’s movement (*Bewegtheit*).

Thus, via these two mechanisms of historical sedimentation and attempted rewriting,
the textual performance of *Sein und Zeit* twists several acceptations of the mark "*Sinn*," viz. the
sensuous (the bodily "senses"), linguistic (the "sense" or meaning of a phrase), and directional
(the "sense" of a river), into each iteration of "*Sinn*." Now, as Derrida has shown in his analyses
of dissemination, to be recognizable as a mark "*Sinn*," like all marks, must be citable in contexts
other than the ones a hermeneusis could specify as corresponding to the author’s intention. The
meaning of "*Sinn*" hence drifts back and forth among all its senses, haunted by the ones it tries
to delimit. As a result of its haunted drifting, the *Sinnsfrage* poses a marginal economy of the
*Seinsfrage, the Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein überhaupt.*

By accounting for the haunted drifting the *Sinnsfrage* sets loose in *Sein und Zeit*,
we arrive at the following economy of possible interpretations of the question of *Being* as it is
posed in terms of *Sinn* in *Sein und Zeit*. While it cannot be considered solely a simple
subjectivizing—an inquiry into a concept qua representation of Being, a concept discoverable by
investigating the use of the word-family gathered under the infinitive "to be"—neither can it totally
escape from such an understanding, about which Heidegger complained in the "Letter on
Humanism." On the other hand, it is no longer so clearcut—as Derrida seems to imply—that *Sinn*
in *Sein und Zeit* remains hopelessly caught within a metaphysical pattern. As I will show, the
textual work of *Sein und Zeit* installs a moment in the economy of possible interpretation of the
mark *Sinn* as it functions in the question of the *Sinn von Sein überhaupt* that is refractory to the
system of presence. Such refraction, however, functions even as the historical sedimentations
of the marker "*Sinn*" open the question of *Being* to subjectivistic misunderstanding. The
economy of *Sinn* in the *Seinsfrage* that is *Sein und Zeit* is thus marginal to metaphysical
patterning. It includes readings that do and do not cohere with metaphysical patterns.
Recognizing the marginality that the Sinnsfrage installs in the Seinsfrage of Sein und Zeit is what allows my reading to differ substantially from that of Derrida. Derrida claims that the Seinsfrage, when posed in terms of Sinn, is inherently metaphysical, as the following quotation from "Ousia and Grammé" shows:

The determination of beingness (ousia) as energeia or entelekheia, as the act and end of movement, is inseparable from the determination of time. The sens of time is thought on the basis of the present as nontime. And this could not be otherwise: any sens (in whatever sens it is understood: as essence, as the meaning [signification] of discourse, as the orientation of the movement between arché and telos) has never been conceivable, within the history of metaphysics, otherwise than on the basis of presence and as presence. The concept of sens is governed by the entire system of determinations that we are pointing out here, and every time that a question of sens [Derrida's emphasis] is posed, it must be posed within the closure of metaphysics. To put it quite summarily, one seeks in vain to extract the question of sens (of time or of anything else) as such from metaphysics, or from the system of the so-called "vulgar" concepts. Such also would be the case, therefore, for a question of Being determined, as it is at the beginning of Sein und Zeit, as a question of the sens de l'être, whatever the force, necessity, and value (irruptive as well as fundamental) of such a question. Heidegger doubtless would acknowledge that as a question of sens, the question of Being is already linked, at its point of departure, to the (lexical and grammatical) discourse of the metaphysics whose destruction it has undertaken. In a certain manner, as Bataille gives us to think, the question of sens, the project of preserving sens, is "vulgar." This is his word too.²

However, this seems rather a flat condemnation of Sinn / sens by Derrida, one not quite as nuanced as other of his writings.³ For instance, at the end of Margins he writes: "there is no metaphysical concept in itself, only a work performed in conceptual systems." If Derrida does not then seem justified in simply condemning prima facie any inscription of Sinn/sens, we then need to ask: What work does Sinn perform in Sein und Zeit?

As we will see, Sinn sets up an economy marginal to the telos of self-presence, and hence inscribes Sein und Zeit at the margin of metaphysics. It does all this, however, without inscribing the graphic of the trace. The useful thing about "Ousia and Grammé" for our purposes is that Derrida does seem correct in his analysis of the haunting of the allegedly purified temporal terms by "spatial" "metaphors." Thus, using Derrida's lead in "Ousia and Grammé," as I have interpreted it in Chapter I, I will explain how the moment of the economy of the Sinnsfrage in which Sinn functions as "direction" shows the spatial haunting of the allegedly purified language about time. Now, this means that that which disrupts any metaphysical interpretations of several analyses in Sein und Zeit--the rewriting of Sinn as the direction of ecstatic self-movement--is both
haunted by Sinn as meaning and installs a spatiality at the heart of Heidegger's descriptions of Zeitlichkeit. Such a spatiality limits Heidegger's attempt to isolate Zeitlichkeit as the ground of Dasein's spatiality on the way to exhibiting Temporalität as the Sinn von Sein überhaupt, and hence time, redeemed from the vulgar concept, as the horizon for any possible Seinsverständnis.

Thus two hauntings will need to be articulated with each other: the haunting of time by space and that of Sinn as direction by Sinn as meaning. These hauntings, along with others centered on the Sinn of sight as it is redetermined by Heidegger from bodily to understandingly disclosive, could only be disentangled by asking about the proper Sinn for the mark "Sinn." Even though Heidegger is aware of these "hauntings" he casts them in terms of misunderstanding; the important thing for us to see is the economy of possible interpretations here, and the inability of an author to control fully the disseminative drift to which his or her terminology is subject, even as he or she analyzes its conditions of possibility, as Heidegger does in Sein und Zeit.¹¹

The two hauntings are related in the following way: On the way to determining Temporalität as the Sinn von Sein überhaupt Heidegger tries to rewrite Sinn as he rewrites understanding in the temporal recapitulation whereby projection becomes Dasein's Bewegtheit. The "upon-which" of a projection then becomes the unity of horizontal schemata that provide direction to Dasein's ecstatic movement. Projection can thus no longer be seen as a subjective intending, so that the image for "understanding" becomes one of thrownness into the clearing, not that of a flashlight shining from a fixed point. Now, in order that Zeitlichkeit be kept pure of the vulgar time concept, Heidegger tries to keep the Bedeutung of several temporal marks free of any spatialized acceptation. But Heidegger never succeeds in fully breaking free of the historically sedimented "spatial" terms. The "temporal" terms employed by Heidegger are "spatial" as well: movingness, which Heidegger attempts to define as the Bewegtheit of Dasein as opposed to the Bewegung of present-at-hand entities, is still described in back and forth terms, directional terms. Heidegger's struggle is with such a historically sedimented spatial language, a sedimentation that opens possibilities of iteration he makes a last attempt to manage by claiming it is brought about by Dasein's falling self-interpretation in terms of present entities encountered within the world.¹²
At this point one might be tempted to say that Heidegger intends a purified original time–Zeitlichkeit as the Sinn of care–as the Sinn of his discourse, but is betrayed by the language at his disposal, so that "spatial representations" occur only at the level of expression. This attempt would however bring up the problem of metaphoricity analyzed in "White Mythology." I will show in the rest of this chapter that Heidegger's being forced to use what he acknowledges as a language dominated by "spatial representations" (369) to talk about Zeitlichkeit is not contingent failure, but rather the inscription of a haunting that limits the alleged purity of its description by recalling its birth in time/space. In other words, the inevitability, even in a highly sophisticated and self-conscious text like Sein und Zeit, of "spatial representations" in describing a primordial time constitutes what I call the "haunting" predicted by the formal rule articulated by Derrida in "Ousia and Grammé." My question will be, following Derrida, if spatial representations are the result of falling temporality, and falling is a necessary structure of Dasein, why call it "falling" and "inauthentic," and why not account positively for the way spatial terms inhabit the description of temporality? I call such a positive account "the economy of time." Now, one cannot avoid the positive account by calling this necessary spatializing a metaphor without risking an abyssal reduplication—or an endless proliferation of scare quotes—because "metaphor" bespeaks an "original" carrying ("phora"), a carrying beyond ("meta"), the primary signifying "field."

The Formal Structure of the Sinnsfrage

Let us begin with the formal structure of the Sinnsfrage. The abyssal question about the "sense of sense" or "meaning of meaning," is posed whenever one attempts to establish a privileged Sinn for the mark "Sinn." Asking about the primary or proper Sinn of Sinn already presupposes that we know what Sinn as Bedeutung "means." In asking about the Sinnsfrage as it operates within Sein und Zeit, we must not only be cognizant of the system of exchange between the English "sense," the French "sens" used (and mentioned) by Derrida and the German "Sinn" used (and mentioned) by Heidegger; we must also distinguish between the
historical sedimentations of "Sinn" in German and Heidegger's attempted rewritings of its various acceptations. Heidegger's attempts to rewrite Sinn by privileging some of its acceptations run afoul of the Sinnsfrage because "acceptation" (which I here take as equivalent to Bedeutung) is also an acceptation of "Sinn." Consulting dictionaries here is most illuminating. Wahrig Deutsches Wörterbuch lists under Sinn the following: "Bedeutung, geistiger Gehalt (einer Dichtung, Aufgabe, Frage, eines Wortes)." The OED has for #22 under "sense": "In a (specified) sense, according to a particular acceptation or interpretation (of a word, phrase, etc.) ..." And Robert has for III.2 under "sens": "Ce qu'un signe (notamment un signe du langage) signifie. Acception, signification, signifié, valeur ... "

We might attempt to avoid the Sinnsfrage by unraveling this doubling through the use of something like the use/mention distinction of speech act theory developed by Austin and Searle and explored by Derrida in Limited Inc. However, the distinction breaks down in the case of "sense"; the quotation marks can multiply ad infinitum. Is the second "acceptation" (which I have just mentioned, hence the quotation marks) used or mentioned in the sentence: "This task is most complicated because 'acceptation' is also an acceptation of 'Sinn'? But then again could I not have doubled the quotation marks, since the second "use" is also a "mention"? Then the sentence would have to be written: "This task is most complicated because 'acceptation' is also an 'acceptation' of 'Sinn.' " Each step up the use/mention "ladder" would then necessitate another set of quotation marks, yet we would still be faced with the question of the sense of sense.

In this chapter I will often use "acceptation," but I ask readers not to think this solves the Sinnsfrage. Rather it is only a strategically adopted device for the sake of readability.

What were the acceptations of Sinn that Heidegger could assume in his audiences? Obviously I can do no more than begin to answer this question with a brief survey of the use of "Sinn" in philosophical German in the 50 years prior to Sein und Zeit. Brenatano's Von der mannigfachen Bedeutungen des Seiendes nach Aristoteles, which, as is well known, played an important role in Heidegger's philosophical development, does not thematically distinguish
between Sinn and Bedeutung. Thus Sinn could here be taken as quite close to the English "meaning [of a word or phrase]." As the title indicates, Heidegger changes Brentano's question from the Bedeutungen des Seiendes to the question of the Sinn von Sein.

Sinn and Bedeutung were first thematically distinguished by Frege in his 1892 article "Über Sinn und Bedeutung." In this essay Frege discusses his distinction first for what he calls "proper names," that is, those units of discourse that denominate a single object, and then for "declarative sentences." In the case of proper names, the Bedeutung is the object intended in the talk, while the Sinn lies between the Bedeutung and the idea in the mind of the speaker; Sinn is "indeed no longer subjective like the idea, but is yet not the object itself." Frege also uses the following analogy: Bedeutung : Moon :: Sinn : telescope image :: Idea : retinal image.

In the case of declarative sentences, Frege is a bit more clear. Bedeutung is the truth-value of the sentence, while Sinn is the "thought" contained in the sentence. The thought is not the "subjective performance" to be sure, but "its objective content, which is capable of being the common property of several thinkers." Frege goes on to criticize natural languages as containing expressions without a definite Sinn and of allowing for expressions with a Sinn but without a Bedeutung. These shortcomings, which can wreak political havoc, as the example of the phrase "the will of the people" shows, should not be tolerated in a logically perfect language, Frege's famous project of a Begriffsschrift.

Sinn also plays an important role in Husserl, as Derrida has shown in Speech and Phenomena (which analyzes the Logical Investigations) and "Form and Meaning" (which analyzes Ideas I). I cannot investigate these most complicated analyses here, but will instead show only how Sinn is thematized in its relation to Bedeutung. In the Logical Investigations Husserl tells us he will use Sinn and Bedeutung interchangeably, and even defends the usefulness of their ambiguity against Frege. In the process he inscribes the Sinnsfrage as he uses Bedeutung in the definition of Sinn and Sinn in the definition of Bedeutung:

Bedeutung gilt uns ferner als gleichbedeutend mit Sinn... Einerseits ist es gerade bei diesem Begriff sehr angenehm, parallele Termini zu haben, mit denen man abwechseln kann; und zumal in Untersuchungen von der Art der vorliegenden, wo eben der Sinn des Terminus Bedeutung erforscht werden soll.
Later in his career Husserl distinguishes Sinn and Bedeutung. In *Ideas I*, Husserl restricts Bedeutung to the "logical" or "expressive" stratum, while Sinn is conceived as the determinable noematic matter stamped by the elevation to the stratum of Ausdrucken.

Heidegger's Inscription of Sinn

The Introduction to Sein und Zeit

In moving to discuss Heidegger we should realize that Sinn appears in Heidegger's work prior to Sein und Zeit, especially in Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit and Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffes, two lecture courses immediately preceding the 1927 publication of Sein und Zeit. Here Heidegger characterizes the question of the Sinn von Sein, the Seinsfrage, as the question of "was besagt Sein," "Was ist Sein," "Was heisst Sein" or "was Sein bedeutet." Sometimes Heidegger will also write "Was besagt 'Sein," indicating with the scare quotes that the Seinsfrage at this time, as it would become again in Introduction to Metaphysics, was enmeshed with the question of the meaning of the word "Sein." As is well known, Introduction to Metaphysics addresses the etymology of the word "Sein" as a clue to exploring the history of Being. At the time of Introduction to Metaphysics, however, Heidegger had not yet completed the move toward an explicit posing of the Seinsgeschichte in purely "structural" terms, as he does in "The Anaximander Fragment." Finally we arrive at the inscription of Sinn in the text of Sein und Zeit. I will attempt something of the "perverse" reading of Heidegger alluded to in Derrida's *Of Spirit*. That is, I will take Heidegger seriously when he commands us to re-determine several key terms of his text, especially Sinn and Sicht. To do so I will have to take up another of Derrida's strategies in *Of Spirit*, that of paying special attention to Heidegger's use of quotation marks.

In the rest of this chapter I will first read closely the opening page and Introduction to Sein und Zeit, in order to lay out the various mechanisms of the Sinnsfrage. Then, in the first part of the section on the existential analytic, I will explore a bit more closely Heidegger's struggles with re-determining "sight," as well as the important discussions of Vorhandenheit and
extension in the analysis of Descartes and the analysis of Dasein's spatiality. In the second part of the section devoted to the existential analytic I will begin a "structural" reading of the Sinnsfrage, beginning with the privileging of Sinn as meaning over Sinn as the senses. Then in the section on the "Temporal Recapitulation" I will trace the third acceptation of Sinn, that of "direction," as it is at work in the analyses of Zeitlichkeit, the transcendence of world, and historicality. We will then finally be in a position to consider Chapter 6 of the Second Division, on the genesis of the ordinary concept of time, within which occurs the note that is the object of Derrida's "Ousia and Grammé."

My major concern with Sein und Zeit is its posing of the Being question in terms of Sinn. The usual translation of die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein is "the question of the meaning of Being." However, the English "meaning" is a poor translation of Sinn as it operates throughout Sein und Zeit. This is so first of all because Heidegger's text rewrites Sinn from the metaphysical notion of intentionum—leaving aside the question of the status of the Husserlian Sinn as noematic correlate of a sense-conferring act—to "pivot" of an existential projection, and secondly because this first rewriting is itself rewritten in the temporal recapitulation of Part I, Division 2, Chapter 4. If we wish as well to take Derrida's writings on dissemination into account we must concede that Sinn's plurivocity cannot be totally governed by a hermeneusis of contexts, so that many acceptations are twisted into each mark, a twisting that broaches the abyssal Sinnsfrage.

Heidegger's struggles with the intertwining of the Sinnsfrage and the Seinsfrage—posed in terms of Seinsverständnis, the understanding which projects upon the Sinn von Sein—begin on the first page of Sein und Zeit. Under the Greek quotation from the Sophist Heidegger asks us if we today have an answer to the question of what we intend [meinen] with the word "Being" [seiend]? Heidegger places in scare quotes "seiend" to indicate he is using it to translate Plato's to on. We should notice here the emphasis on the word "Sein," which will result in a doubling of Sinn throughout Sein und Zeit. The metaphysically marginal economy of Sinn in Sein und Zeit, the Sinnsfrage, will partially be posed between Sinn as Bedeutung of the word "Sein"
and the Sinn von Sein as Heidegger rewrites Sinn as the direction of Dasein's Bewegtheit. Heidegger will attempt to restrict the range of Sinn as Bedeutung of the word "Sein" to its function as a clue to the Seinsfrage. That is, Heidegger wants the level of our awareness of the Bedeutung of the word "Sein"—how aware we are about that which we intend by "seiend"—to function as a clue to the need to renew the Seinsfrage. As we will see, the answer to the question of Being will not come in the form of an acquaintance with the use of a word, but rather in the form of a practice, "concrete phenomenological investigation," that will investigate the Bewegtheit of Dasein. Having to conduct this concrete phenomenological investigation under the rubric of the single mark "Sinn"—Heidegger’s having to hunt, via the analysis of Dasein’s Zeitlichkeit, for Temporalität as the Sinn von Sein—is, however, contaminated by the metaphysical system in which Sinn as the Bedeutung of the word "Sein" would yield us a concept we could use for the regulation of our representations. I call the economy of such contamination the "Sinnsfrage," since its undecidable oscillation could only be stilled by posing the question of the sense of sense, the Sinn von Sinn.

Because we have no answer even here as to what is intended by the word "seiend" Heidegger tells us that we must "pose anew die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein." Heidegger then asks if we even experience the perplexity that engulfs the interlocutors in Plato’s dialogue. Keineswegs, he answers, "no way," a literal translation of the Greek aporia, the root of Plato’s verb éporékhamen which ends the quotation from the Sophist. We thus have no way even to reach the Greek aporia; we are confronted with an aporia of aporia.

In response to this double Impasse Heidegger tells us that we must "first of all reawaken an understanding for the Sinn of this question." Heidegger’s phrase "den Sinn dieser Frage" is ambiguous. It could mean "Sinn as it operates in the question of the Sinn of Being," or it could very well mean "the Sinn of the question of the Sinn of Being." To say that we need to reawaken an understanding for the Sinn of the Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein, is thus a first posing of the Sinnsfrage in conjunction with the Seinsfrage. Then, Heidegger continues, the "concrete working out" of the Sinn of "Sein," the goal of the text, can proceed. Why does Heidegger italicize and place between scare quotes "Sein"? As we mentioned above, our
awareness of our use of the word "Sein" is an important clue to the status of the Seinsfrage, but Heidegger wants the Sinn von Sein überhaupt not to be confused with the Sinn/Bedeutung of the word "Sein," even though they both are undecidably at work within each iteration of the mark "Sinn."

The first paragraph of the first page ends with Heidegger telling us of the "provisional goal" of the work: "The interpretation of time as the possible horizon of any understanding of Being."

Heidegger’s Introduction, entitled "The Exposition of the question of the Sinn von Sein," begins by explaining the necessity of an explicit retrieval of the question of Being because the question of Being, the question of the Sinn of Being, has been today forgotten. Heidegger shows that the dogmatic assertions that Being is a) the most universal concept, b) is indefinable, and c) is self-evident, do nothing to dismiss the question of Being, even though they serve to plunge it into an obscurity that reinforces its having been forgotten. That Being is self-evident for Heidegger means only that we "live already in an understanding of Being," so that precisely because this understanding is an enigma, and the "Sinn of Being is still veiled in darkness," the question of the Sinn of Being must be retrieved (4). Not only is an answer lacking to the question of Being, the question itself has not yet even been posed correctly: "the question itself is obscure and without direction [richtunglos]" (4). If we recall that Heidegger saw part of his task on the first page as calling for a revival of a Sinn of the question of the Sinn of Being, and that here the question is lacking direction, we see here a first hint of Sinn as "direction," an acceptation of Sinn that I will trace in its workings in the text of Sein und Zeit.

Heidegger continues in #2 by exploring the formal structure of the question of Being. Here Heidegger explains the hermeneutic necessity of some already accessible clue for guiding our questioning. He claims the question of Being must also have such a clue: "The Sinn von Sein must already be available to us in some way" (5). Heidegger then alludes to the results of #1 by saying that "we always already animate ourselves [wir bewegen uns] in an understanding of Being." Here we see a first mention of the "movement" of Dasein. In the rest of this chapter
I will show the necessity of the scare quotes as well as the economy within which Heidegger attempts a distinction between Dasein’s Bewegtheit and the Bewegung of present-at-hand entities. Out of such a preconceptual understanding, Heidegger continues, "arise both the explicit question of the Sinn von Sein and the tendency toward its concept" (5).

Next Heidegger reinforces the preconceptual nature of our understanding of Being as he tells us that "We know not, what 'Being' means" ["Wir wissen nicht, was 'Sein' besagt"] (5). Heidegger here means to reinforce the distinction between, on the one hand, our Leben ["Dass wir je schon in einem Seinsverständnis leben"] (4) and Bewegtheit30 ["wir bewegen uns immer schon in einem Seinsverständnis"] (5) in an understanding of Being and, on the other hand, our lack of an explicit conceptual grasp of the Sinn von Sein. Even though we cannot fix conceptually what the "Is" bedeutet, even though we do not even know the horizon within which such a Sinn can be fixed, Heidegger continues, the vague average understanding of Being is a fact in need of investigation.

Even though our understanding of Being can fluctuate and grow so dim as to move itself [sich bewegen] to the border of a mere acquaintance with a word, such a movement needs an explanation that the investigation into the Sinn von Sein cannot be expected to give at the outset. Here again we see the interlacing of movement, Dasein’s understanding, and the Sinn von Sein. Heidegger here attempts to control the economy of Sinn, the Sinnsfrage, by characterizing our knowledge of the Bedeutung of the word "Sein" as a degeneration of the living movement that makes up Dasein’s full understanding of Being. The investigation of the average understanding of Being needs the development of the concept of Being so that it can then work out which distortions of an explicit illumination of the Seinssinn are "possible and even inevitable."

Next Heidegger alerts us to the preponderance of "theories and opinions" about Being. Here we see the necessity of the Destruktion, since these theories hide their role as sources of the dominant understanding of Being operative today. Here we can see the fact that while the tradition has certainly entertained many determinations of Being, it has never posed the question of the horizon of those determinations, the question of the Sinn von Sein.
Section #2 continues with the threefold formal structure of the Seinsfrage: Das Gefragte, "what is asked about," Sein; das Erfragte, "what is to be found out by the asking," der Sinn von Sein; das Befragte, "what is interrogated," das Seiende selbst (6). Being, Heidegger explains—that which determines beings—is that upon which [woraufhin] beings are understood. Thus the Being of beings "is" not a being, so the "is" must be used in scare quotes when applied to Being. Being thus demands its own mode of exhibition, different from that which discovers beings. Likewise, the Sinn of Being, which as we will see is that upon which [woraufhin] Being is understood, demands its own conceptuality. We must note that posing the Seinsfrage in terms of Sinn is already beyond the metaphysical move of determining a Being for an entity, because we have asked about the horizon of such determination. Thus the Seinsfrage always operates on the third "level," has always already made the turn, taken the step back. The move from the Marburg period science of Being to a thought of Seinsgeschichte and from there to a topology of Being is not the turn in this sense but represents a radicalizing movement (more historical, more concrete) on the same "level."

In determining which being is to be interrogated Heidegger runs up against the Aristotelian problem, as repeated by Brentano, that Being is said in many ways, to on legetai pollachōs, which Heidegger renders as "Aber 'seiend' nennen wir vieles und in verschiedenen Sinne" (6). The scare quotes alert us to the undecidable play within each iteration of the mark "Sinn" between our linguistic naming of Being and our living movement in a preunderstanding of Being. Heidegger then provides a list of these Sinne: Dass- und Sosein, Realität, Vorhandenheit, Bestand, Geltung, Dasein, "es gibt," and then asks from what entity is the Sinn of Being to be read off, and in what Sinn does it have a priority (7)? Thus Heidegger is forced to ask about the Sinn of Dasein’s priority in the question of the Sinn of Being, another instance of the Sinnsfrage.

In the next paragraph the Sinnsfrage takes another turn. If the question of Being is to be explicitly posed in its full self-transparency, Heidegger writes, then we must explain the way of sighting of Being, of understanding and conceptual grasping of Sinn, and the preparation of the choosing of and gaining access to the exemplary entity. Here we find a double twisting of
Sinn. First in the question of the Hinsehen auf Sein: we will soon see (146-47) how Heidegger must pose the structure of metaphoricity—which precisely concerns the metaphysical definition of metaphor as a transfer from sensible to intelligible—by means of scare quotes and statements of authorial intention warning against misunderstanding, in order to subordinate bodily Sinne, e.g., the "sight" of the eyes, to the various "sights" of disclosedness.\(^{31}\) Secondly, in the paragraph under discussion here, Heidegger tells us that the role of Sinn in understanding must be clarified in order to pose the question of the Sinn of Being, that is, that the Seinsfrage is dependent upon the Sinnsfrage in Sein und Zeit (7).

Such dependency cannot be conceived as a vicious logical circle, Heidegger explains, in a famous passage about hermeneutical preconception. Entities can be factically determined in their Being by the various discursive practices that make up our everyday movement within a preunderstanding of Being without our having made ready an explicit concept of the Sinn of Being. Again Heidegger appeals to a vorgängigen Hinblicknahme auf Sein to show that were are not caught in a circle, but in a "noteworthy 'back and forth relation'" of what is asked about (Being) to questioning as the mode of Being of an entity (8). The "essential pertinence [Betroffenheit]" of the questioning to what is questioned belongs to the Sinn of the Seinsfrage, that is, to the Sinn of the question of the Sinn of Being (8). Again we see Dasein described in directional terms ("back and forth") when it is a matter of clarifying the Sinnsfrage/Seinsfrage relation.

In #3 Heidegger tells us that regional ontologies remain naive in their inquiries into various determinations of Sein for entities if they leave undiscussed the Sinn von Sein (11). As we have mentioned above, Heidegger articulates many modes of Being. As granted a priority with regard to the Being question, the Being of Dasein is to be explored in an existential analytic that will provide a fundamental ontology. However, Heidegger’s goal in Sein und Zeit is not so much fundamental ontology as "ontology proper." Fundamental ontology is only propaedeutic to ontology proper, the working out of the Sinn von Sein überhaupt. As we will see, fundamental ontology concludes as Heidegger isolates a Being for Dasein, which he will call care, and a Sinn for that Being, which he will call Zeitlichkeit.\(^{32}\) Ontology proper, then, is the search for the Sinn
von Sein überhaupt as Temporalität.

Of course we must not gloss over the complexities of Sein und Zeit. In this work Heidegger tirelessly repeats that Being is always the Being of beings, and is nothing outside Dasein’s understanding of Being. The relation of Temporalität to Zeitlichkeit is then the relation of the Sinn von Sein überhaupt to the Sinn von Sein of Dasein. Here we see the peculiar intertwining, the back and forth implication, of the question of Being and Dasein. In #4 Heidegger expresses this implication in an extremely contorted phrase that indicates the ontic priority of Dasein:

Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship toward that Being—a relationship which is itself one of Being. . . . Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being. (Zu dieser Seinsverfassung des Daseins gehört aber dann, dass es in seinem Sein zu diesem Sein ein Seinsverhältnis hat. . . . Seinsverständnis ist selbst eine Seinsbestimmtheit des Daseins.) (12)

Some of these intricacies are worked out in #5. Here Heidegger specifies that the ontological analytic of Dasein is to serve as a freeing of the horizon for an interpretation of the Sinn von Sein überhaupt. The preontological understanding of Being will serve as a clue: Dasein has a tendency to understand itself from out of the world. Such a world-understanding, Heidegger writes, exerts a “backpressure” [Rückstrahlung] on Dasein’s self-interpretation (16). In Sein und Zeit the difference between scattered inauthenticity and gathered authenticity will be played out in the difference of projections. Heidegger will develop this point as the difference between spatial, scattered presence-at-hand (accessible to falling temporality) and authentically temporal, gathered Dasein.

Dasein’s everydayness is chosen as the access to Dasein which allows it to show itself from itself in the way it is “proximally and for the most part” (16). The existential analytic that will reveal Dasein’s everydayness is of course oriented only toward the working out of the question of Being. As such it will be only provisional, bringing out only the Being of Dasein, without interpreting the Sinn of this Being. Once the horizon for the most originary interpretation of Being is prepared the existential analytic will need to be repeated.

This repetition will reveal the Sinn of Dasein’s Being as Zeitlichkeit. This is not the
answer to the question of Being—Zeitlichkeit is not the Sinn von Sein überhaupt—but is the ground for the winning of an answer to the question of Being. Heidegger's task is to explain time as the horizon of the understanding of Being from Zeitlichkeit as the Being of the entity that has an understanding of Being as part of its Being. Doing so, Heidegger explains, presupposes that one fulfill the demand to delimit [abzugrenzen] Zeitlichkeit from the vulgar understanding of time (17). This delimiting is two-fold: we must explain how the traditional time concept and the vulgar understanding of time arise from Zeitlichkeit, and we must restore to the vulgar time concept its rights to operate within a limited and derivative domain (18).

Heidegger opposes this treatment of the vulgar time-concept to Bergson, for whom, claims Heidegger, time as intended in the vulgar time-concept is space (die mit ihm gemeinte Zeit sei der Raum) (18). Although I will not be able to pursue the point here, we can note that this is not quite what Bergson says in the Essai, where time as we ordinarily conceive it is called the phantom [le fantôme] of space. Bergson will appear again several times in Sein und Zeit as well as in Basic Problems; I will deal a bit more with Heidegger's reading of him in my treatment of the latter work.

Next Heidegger begins a very important, but complicated, paragraph. Again we must pay close attention to the way Heidegger uses quotation marks. Heidegger writes:

"Time" has long functioned as an ontological—or rather an ontical—criterion for naively discriminating various realms of entities. A distinction has been made between "temporal" entities (natural processes and historical happenings) and "non-temporal" entities (spatial and numerical relationships). (18)

Here Heidegger introduces quotation marks to help him distinguish between ontological and ontical. "Time," in quotation marks, vulgar time, is not the time to which primary reference is made, although it is homonymic with original time. "Time" is ontical, and hence derivative upon Zeitlichkeit, which Heidegger will later call original time (426).

Here we can see the importance of the delimiting of the vulgar concept of time. Without the assured purity of Zeitlichkeit the entire project of establishing a Sinn von Sein überhaupt is threatened. That it is threatened precisely by the Sinnsfrage is visible in the following sentence from the paragraph under discussion: "The fact remains that time [no
quotation marks in original], in the sense of [im Sinne von] 'being in time,' functions as a criterion for distinguishing realms of Being" (18). Here we see that time has various senses, one of which, "being in time" has served the tradition for the purpose of determining Sein in various ways. This determination of Being by a derivative sense of time needs to be replaced in the question of the Sinn von Sein überhaupt by the primary sense of time, Zeitlichkeit. But how is the Sinn of time to be decided before the Sinn von Sein überhaupt, if the very notion of Sinn is abysmally reduplicated in a Sinnsfrage?

We must let the full exposition of the Sinnsfrage wait for a moment. Heidegger now distinguishes between zeitlich and temporale, because the Bedeutung of "zeitlich" has been preempted by pre-philosophical and philosophical language use for the sense of time as "being in time." Heidegger wishes to reserve temporale for the "originary determination of the Sinn of Being [die ursprüngliche Sinnsbestimmtheit des Seins]." Thus the exposition of the problematic of Temporalität will provide the concrete answer to the question of the Sinn of Being (19). This answer will not take the form of mere sentences, since the propositional content is prey to an empty passing on. Here we find a first mention of the problem of the author's intention in the face of textual dissemination. Heidegger continues that the answer to the question of the Sinn of Being will find its most proper Sinn in the form of a concrete ontological investigation within the horizon laid bare (19)—time, or more precisely, that Sinn of time we call Temporalität.

I now turn to #6, the "Task of a Destruction of the History of Ontology," where Heidegger specifies that he is after the possibility of metaphysics when he questions after the Sinn of Being. Heidegger first makes clear that the destruction is oriented by the question of Being. Its target is not the ontology of the ancients, but the sedimented way of reading these texts that results in today's occlusion of the question of Being. Thus the target is the "handed-down content [überlieferten Bestandes] of ancient ontology," which is to be "destroyed" by referring it to the "originary experiences" by means of which "the first and continually guiding determinations of Being were made" (22; trans. modified). With even more clarity, Heidegger repeats that "Negatively, the destruction does not relate itself to the past [zur Vergangenheit], but its critique aims at 'today' and the prevalent way of treating the history of ontology" (22-
Heidegger then briefly touches upon Kant and Descartes as problematic texts for which the destruction of received readings will lead us onto the path of the question of Being. Descartes' dependence on medieval conceptions becomes significant only, Heidegger writes, when the destruction leads to the *Sinn* and boundaries of ancient ontology considered in light of the question of (the *Sinn* of) Being (24). Considering ancient ontology in terms of the problematic of *Temporalität* will show that the ancient interpretation of Being proceeded in terms of "world" and "nature" in its widest *Sinn*. Thus we can see how the understanding of Being was taken from "time" (25).

The quotation marks, as I have remarked above, indicate that Heidegger will attempt to invert the contemporary, sedimented assumption of the primary term involved in these homonyms. Thus the everyday, vulgar *Sinn* of world (totality of present-at-hand entities), nature or time (succession of nows) will be considered as derivative upon the originary *Sinn* of world (network of bedeutsam relations), nature or time (*Z*eitlichkeit).

Heidegger continues—in a passage discussed by Derrida in "Ousia and Grammé"—that the "external document" for the fact that ancient ontology understood Being in reference to time is the determination of the *Sinn* of Being as *parousia* or *ousia*, which means (bedeutet), when considered ontologically and temporally, *"Anwesenheit"* (25). In ancient ontology, then, entities were grasped (gefasst) in their Being as "presence" (*"Anwesenheit"*; Heidegger's quotation marks), or in other words were understood with regard (mit Rücksicht) to one determinate mode of time, the "present" (*"Gegenwart"*) (25; italicized and in quotation marks in the original).

Here we can see that *Sinn* is used as the pivot of a understanding projection. In this passage, however, Heidegger's metaphorics suggest projection as a flashlight rather than the movingness of Dasein; hence understanding was largely described in visual terms ("with regard to": mit Rücksicht auf). Or at least what seem to be visual terms, those oriented to the bodily eyes. As we will see, Heidegger will redetermine the primary term with regard to sight and senses.
In #7, the "Phenomenological Method of Investigation," only one important instance of the Sinnsfrage occurs. In subsection C, "The Fore-Conception of Phenomenology," Heidegger writes that the privileged Sinn of "phenomenon" is that which constitutes the "Sinn and ground" of that which shows itself, that is, that which in an extreme Sinn remains hidden (35). And this is of course nothing other than the Being of beings, which can remain so hidden that it becomes forgotten and the question about it and its Sinn is excluded (35). Here we see that many Sinne of phenomena are to be distinguished so that the Being of beings, which provides many Sinne for beings, enabling them to be understood in the manifold ways enumerated above, is itself to be questioned with regard to its Sinn, the Sinn von Sein überhaupt.

The Existential Analytic

The introduction concludes with #8, the outline of the projected treatise. Heidegger then moves through the existential analytic. It is most important for us to focus upon his analysis of worldhood, because his establishing the term "significance" (Bedeutsamkeit) for the context of relations that is the world insures that discourse (Rede) can remain one of the three-fold equi-originary constituents of the "there," the Da- of Dasein. The characterization of world as bedeutsam thus maintains the link with Sinn as meaning. After Chapter 1, which expounds the task of the preparatory analytic, Chapter 2 names Being-in-the-world as the basic state of Dasein. Chapter 3 then analyzes the worldhood of the world, Chapter 4 analyzes "who" is in the world, and Chapter 5 analyzes "Being-in as such."

While Chapter 1 does not concern us here, there is one point in Chapter 2 which we need to address. In #12, "A Preliminary Sketch of Being-in-the-World," Heidegger distinguishes, again with the help of quotation marks, the type of spatiality appropriate for Dasein, an existential spatiality made possible only by Dasein’s Being-in-the-world (56). Since Being-in-the-world will ultimately have its Sinn in Zeitlichkeit, Dasein’s spatiality will ultimately have to be reconceived on the basis of Zeitlichkeit. Heidegger will later make it clear that this is not a "deduction" of pure space from pure time (367), but as we will see he will not be able to purify the language used to describe Zeitlichkeit from all spatial reference—at least not without
posing the Sinnsfrage.

Chapter 3, which articulates the "Worldhood of the World," requires more detailed consideration. Heidegger's world analysis is famous for its precision and complexity. It is divided into three parts, in which he analyzes environmentality and worldhood in general, contrasts his notion of worldhood with Descartes' interpretation of the world, and concludes with a discussion of Dasein's spatiality. In its broadest outlines Heidegger's analysis undercuts any relation of subject and object by showing Dasein's already-being-in-the-world as the ground for any encounter between Dasein and another entity. The analysis of environmentality and worldhood in general consists of four sections, #15-18. The first discusses the Being of entities encountered within the world, the second, the manner in which the worldly character of the environment is announced, the third, reference and signs, and the fourth, involvement, significance and the worldhood of the world.

In #15 Heidegger shows how a totality of equipment is structured as a network of "assignments" or "references" (Verweisungen). The mode of Being of tools is then called "ready-to-hand" (Zuhandenheit). The ready-to-hand subordinate themselves to the field of references, which is accessible to circumspection, Umsicht. As thus subordinated, tools withdraw from consideration in favor of the work to be done. In #16 Heidegger then shows how because of this withdrawal only a non-assignable tool becomes conspicuous, obtrusive, or obstinant. Since the Being of tools is determined by references, an unusable--hence obvious--tool reveals its assignments, as disturbed. The cluster of disturbed assignments reveals in turn the context of the tool (Zeugzusammenhang) as a totality sighted beforehand in circumspection. And, Heidegger concludes, with this revelation of the context of tools the world announces itself.

In #17, then, we learn that signs are addressed to a "spatial" Being-in-the-world that is always already "directed" (ausgerichtet) (79). Here we see two important themes we will take up in more detail shortly, the necessity of quotation marks and the notion of directionality, Richtung. Then, in #18, Heidegger gives his definition of worldhood. He begins by reminding us that the ready-to-hand are determined by references; another way of saying this is to say that
the character of their Being is "involvement," Bewandtnis. The totality of these involvements is
finally oriented by the "for-the-sake-of-which," the Worum-willen, a possibility of Dasein. Not only
does Dasein assign its tools to a series of references, but Dasein also assigns itself, that is, a
possibility of itself, along the paths of the totality of assignments. Now that wherein Dasein makes
these self-assignments is the upon-which (Woraufhin) of a prior "letting-be-encountered-as-involved." This wherein/upon-which is world, and the structure of that upon which Dasein assigns
itself is worldhood. (We will see Woraufhin at two other crucial points, the definition of Sinn at
151 and the discussion of the horizontal schemata at 365.)

Heidegger then gives the briefest of forecasts of the upcoming analysis of
understanding. Dasein makes its assignments (of itself, thereby letting entities be encountered
as involved) by an understanding projection into the context of relations. The relation-character
of the relations that are assignments is that of "signifying," be-deuten. The totality of relations
(Bezugs ganze) is then called "significance," Bedeutsamkeit. This disclosing significance is an
existential constituent of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Since, as we will see, the articulation of
these relations is named Rede, discourse, and Sinn is the terminus or pivot of these projections,
Sinn will govern Being-in-the-world.

As we turn now to Heidegger's discussion of Descartes in sections #19-21, we must
keep in mind that Heidegger enters into his confrontation with Descartes in order to clarify his
own approach to the phenomenon of world. I will concentrate on the notion of spatiality
Heidegger sees in Descartes. Heidegger begins by claiming that "Descartes sees the extensio
as basically definitive ontologically for the world" (89). Since extension is identified by Descartes
with spatiality, the Cartesian ontology of the world will be useful as a foil to the notions of
Dasein's spatiality, which Heidegger will develop later. This spatiality will be shown to be
grounded not in the extension of entities encountered within the world, but in Dasein's Being-
in-the-world. In #19, "The Determination of the World as res extensa" Heidegger presents textual
evidence as to Descartes' distinguishing of the ego cogito from the res corporea. Both are
substances; the distinguishing characteristic of the res corporea is extension (90), that which
maintains itself throughout changes in shape, and motion (Bewegung) (91). In #20 Heidegger
takes up the Cartesian determination of world via a discussion of substance—that which is in need of nothing—in terms of his own question of the **Sinn von Sein**. Descartes distinguishes three substances, God as the **ens perfectissimum** and the **ego cogito** and the **res corporea** as the two types of **ens creatum**. The **Sinn von Sein** held in "common" among these three types of Being is left unexplored by Descartes, Heidegger claims (93), and since "'Being' is not in fact accessible as an entity, it is expressed through attributes—definite characteristics of the entities under consideration, characteristics which themselves are" (94). Here we see Heidegger's posing of the question of metaphoricity that Derrida examines in detail in "White Mythology" and "The Retreat of Metaphor." Now, significantly, for Descartes the attribute of an entity that serves to express the "unexpressed yet presupposed **Sinn von Sein** and substantiality" is **extensio** (94). We will soon see the link of extension and presence-at-hand in the metaphysical determinations of the **Sinn von Sein**.

#21 is Heidegger's "hermeneutical" discussion of the Cartesian ontology of the world. Heidegger here shows that the mode of access to the substance characterized by extension is that of knowing, **Erkennen, Intellectio**, in the sense of mathematico-physico knowledge (**Erkenntnis**). This mode of access is dependent upon Dasein's Being-in-the-world; it in fact does not allow the entities encountered within the world to show themselves as they are, but instead prescribes for them the aspect they will show. (This account of scientific knowing forecasts the account in #69b of thematization as a priori projection of the Being of a region of beings.)

The **Sinnsfrage** appears here in all its problematic complexity. Heidegger writes that Descartes remains bound to traditional ontology in deciding the mode of access to entities within the world as "**noein, 'intuition' in the widest sense** (der 'Anschauung' im weitesten Sinn)" (96). Thus, according to Heidegger, it is on the basis of a certain **Sinn** of intuition that Descartes presents his "critique" of sensation (**sensatio, aisthésis**) versus **intellectio**. The most famous instance of that to which Heidegger refers here is the reduction of sensibility via radical doubt as Descartes performs it in the **Meditations**. (As we will see, Heidegger will himself soon be caught up in the **Sinnsfrage** in deciding the question of the role of the senses, **die Sinne**.)
Heidegger continues his investigation of Descartes by claiming that for Descartes, the idea of Being (Seinsidee) is "constant presence-at-hand (ständige Vorhandenheit)" (96). If we recall the point made above that the attribute of an entity that expresses the Sinn von Sein for Descartes is that of extensio, we can see clearly here the link between Vorhandenheit and extension. As we will see in discussing #69b, extension can characterize spatiality only in virtue of an overturning (Umschlag) of the understanding of Being that lets tools be encountered in everyday falling commerce with the entities of the world. This will mean Descartes' determination of Being takes its bearings from a falling self-interpretation of Dasein in terms of the entities encountered within the world. This orientation leaps over the phenomenon of the world and the spatiality of tools as they are encountered on the basis of the spatiality of Dasein, which is founded on its Being-in-the-world. As a result, the inappropriateness of Descartes' orientation to presence-at-hand will become clear only after "we have assigned to the concept of Being in general the horizon within which its intelligibility becomes possible" (100). Again the economy of the Seinsfrage appears: the question of the Sinn von Sein can harden into an answer in the form of the elucidation of a concept, or it can be freed into an investigation of ecstatico-horizontal Sinn as direction of movement.\(^\text{34}\)

Let us now explore Heidegger's discussion of Dasein's spatiality as distinguished from the spatiality of the present-at-hand, #22-24. The two key terms for Heidegger's discussion of Dasein's spatiality are Ent-fernung and Ausrichtung. The former is awkwardly translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as "de-severance," while the latter is rendered as "directionality."

In #22 Heidegger tells us that the ready-to-hand has the character of "nearness," Nähe.\(^\text{35}\) The near tools do not just cluster about, but belong to various "regions," Gegende. These regions are ordered by the concern of Dasein, so much so that even the sun—which will play an important role in the relation of primordial time to the ordinary time concept—has its place assigned to it by Dasein's concern (103).\(^\text{36}\) Earlier Heidegger had determined the Being of the ready-to-hand as "involvement," Bewandtnis. He combines the two definitions when he writes that the "discovery of regions beforehand is co-determined by the totality of involvements..."
(Bewandtnisganzheit) for which the ready-to-hand, as something encountered, is freed" (104).

When Heidegger then moves to discuss space he tells us that space—as discovered in circumspective Being-in-the-world as the spatiality of the totality of tools—belongs to entities as their "places." He continues: "Bare space itself is still veiled over. Space has been split up (aufgesplittert) into places" (104). Bare space, the space within which present-at-hand things are encountered in their extension, is founded on Dasein's spatiality, which is itself founded on Dasein's Being-in-the-world.

Next in #23 Heidegger discusses the "Spatiality of Being-in-the-world." In order to explain what he means by this properly existential spatiality Heidegger begins with a discussion of the term Ent-fernung, which denotes dissolving of distance, the bringing close of something. Dasein has an essential tendency to nearness, that is, an essential tendency to bring things into the circle of circumspectively close ready-to-hand, oriented by concernful Being-in-the-world (107). This nearness does not mean that Dasein is "here"; rather, Dasein comes back (zurückkommt) to its "here" from a "there" of circumspective involvement (107-108). Zurückkommen will also be used to describe Dasein's ecstatic movement in the discussion of the horizontal schemata of temporality.

Dasein also has the character of directionality, Ausrichtung. As we noted above, Richtung is one of the Sinne of Sinn. One must not forget, Heidegger warns, that directionality belongs to Ent-fernung, and is founded on Being-in-the-world. These two characteristics of spatiality are needed to pose the question of #24, "Space and Dasein's Spatiality." Heidegger shows here how it is only in virtue of Dasein's spatiality that the ready-to-hand can be encountered in their spatiality. And this means that the freeing of a totality of involvements is at the same time the freeing of the spatial belonging-together of the ready-to-hand. Thus in significance, Bedeutsamkeit, lies an essential co-disclosedness of space (110). Here we see Sinn as meaning and Sinn as direction brought closely together. As Heidegger will make clear in #69b, the space of physics is only discovered in a neutralizing of significant, worldly spatiality. Only when significant places become neutral points can calculation proceed with confidence. Extension is thus derived from Dasein's spatiality, which is founded on Being-in-the-world, and
which will be reinterpreted finally in terms of Zeitlichkeit.

At this point we are finally in a position to discuss the inscription of the Sinnsfrage in the structure of the existential analytic. First, I will discuss how Heidegger attempts to quiet the Sinnsfrage—to manage its economy—by subordinating Sinn as "the senses" to Sinn as existential meaning. Then, in the next subsection, on the "Temporal Recapitulation," I will discuss Sinn as direction as it comes to complicate even further the Sinnsfrage posed between Sinn as meaning and Sinn as sensory.

Heidegger's attempted subordination of Sinn as sensory to Sinn as (existentially redetermined) meaning occurs in Chapter 5 of the First Division. The course of the existential analytic takes us—after Chapter 4, the investigation of the "who" of everyday Dasein—to Chapter 5, the analysis of "Being-in as such." Here I explore #29 on Befindlichkeit, #31 on understanding, and #32 on understanding and interpretation. I will use two John Sallis essays to focus my discussion of the relation of Sinn as meaning and Sinn as sensory. The most recent of the two, "Twisting Free: Being to an Extent Sensible" traces an undecidability between the first two acceptations, those of meaning and sensation. Sallis shows a Platonic investment in Heidegger's analyses of the tool as granted a Sinn by a system of relations determined as a system of meanings, that is, a Verweisungsganzheit determined as Bedeutsamkeit. As Sallis succinctly puts it: "the operation of the senses is founded, primarily upon disposition, more generally upon disclosedness as such." Sallis concludes his analysis in a way pertinent to my point here:

If the sensible is freed from the yoke of meaning, if it is not assimilated to disclosedness, then the simple unity of the Heideggerian question cannot but be disrupted. . . . It will not be possible then, to enclose the Heideggerian question within the compass of time, which as temporality extends no further than disclosedness.

In an otherwise insightful analysis Sallis makes no mention of a possible third sense of Sinn, that of directionality, which would complicate the matters under discussion even further. He splits Sinn into two "senses" (the necessity of these quotation marks should be well-established by now) "existentially determined meaning" and "an irreducibly sensible shining" and speaks of their being twisted together in a way that would fracture the unity of the attempt to
isolate time as Sinn in the sense of "existentially determined meaning." As I will show, this latter sense of the Sinn von Sein is even further fractured by Sinn as directionality. Here I refer to the problem raised in one of Sallis’ earlier essays, "Language and Reversal," where he writes: "the connection of the analytic of Dasein to the question of the meaning of Being remained largely implicit." The following extended quotation outlines my discussion:

... (our movement within language) is ... that ground-movement through which intelligibility is already delivered up to our understanding, always already granted. But what is this understanding that is always already granted? Sein und Zeit gives the answer: "Understanding of Being has always already been taken for granted in projecting upon possibilities." This understanding ... is taken for granted, however, not in the sense that man as a subject is always in possession of a representation of Being, but rather in the sense that it is always granted to man in that he "stands in the openness of the project of Being."

Here Sallis distinguishes between two interpretations of Sinn as that upon which Seinsverständnis is projected. The first is what could be called the metaphysical interpretation of Sinn as meaning, one in which the "meaning of Being" is a representation expressed in a statement. The second interpretation would be that of Sinn as the direction of Dasein's Bewegtheit constitutive of the "openness of the project of Being." At stake here is Heidegger's "temporal" rewriting (Sinn as direction) of the existential rewriting (Sinn as "pivot" of a existential self-projection) of the common acceptation of Sinn (Sinn as intended meaning of a "flashlight"-projection). The necessity felt by Sallis of indicating the proper sense of Sinn in order to still the oscillation between Sinn as direction and Sinn as meaning in the question of the Sinn von Sein will be the topic of my next sub-section. There I will show that yet another sense of sense is twisted into the mark Sinn. This third acceptation, that of directionality, comes to operate as Heidegger rewrites Sinn in the temporal recapitulation from existential meaning to Dasein's Bewegtheit.

With these questions in mind, let us pick up the thread of Sein und Zeit as Heidegger privileges Sinn as meaning (albeit rewritten as "pivot" of a self-projection) over the Sinnlichkeit of "the senses." In #29, "Being-there as State-of-mind" (Befindlichkeit) Heidegger first grounds the senses on Befindlichkeit and then determines Befindlichkeit as a mode of disclosure (Erschlossenheit). Heidegger writes:
We must pay special attention to Heidegger's use of quotation marks here. In placing "Sinne" between quotation marks Heidegger broaches, without thematizing it, a reverse metaphorics. He implies that the use of Sinn to mark the "senses" is dependent upon Sinn as intelligibility--"intelligibility" that has, to be sure, been rewritten as "disclosedness." Positing such dependency amounts to a reversal of the classic determination of metaphor as a transfer of a name drawn from the sensible realm to an entity of the intelligible realm. This move is even more complicated than a reverse metaphor based on an etymological claim--such as claiming that conceptual grasping is primary with regard to physical grasping--for the attempted reverse transfer is directed at the very markers used to make the distinction from which "metaphor" derives its traditional "sense" (and of course here my own discourse is under suspicion.)

Heidegger's becoming enmeshed in the problematic of metaphoricity, as Derrida would call it, is even more pronounced a few pages further in #31 "Being-there as understanding." Let us note only in passing here what will become more important to us later, namely that Dasein projects itself. Heidegger tells us that "... any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting" (145). Dasein's understanding is thus best not seen with the image of a flashlight projecting a ray outward from a fixed point, but as a self-movement. Here, however, I am not so much concerned with the best images for understanding, as I am with Heidegger's wrestling with the metaphoricity of the Sinnsfrage. Let us follow what he has to say about the sense of sight. He writes: "In its projective character, understanding goes to make up existentially what we call Dasein's 'sight' (Sicht)" (146). We must note here that Heidegger does not place quotation marks around his word "Sicht" at this point in the text--as Macquarrie and Robinson do--although he does italicize it. Heidegger then claims that Dasein is its various "sights," as they are existentially in Dasein's disclosing:
With the disclosedness of the 'there' (no quotation marks in original) this sight is existentially; and Dasein is this sight equiprimordially in each of those basic ways of its Being which we have already noted: as the circumspection of concern (Umsicht), as the considerateness of solicitude (Rücksicht), and as that sight which is directed upon Being as such (Sicht auf das Sein als solches), for the sake of which any Dasein is, as it is. (146)

Although Dasein is purported to be the various sights of its disclosedness, the description of Dasein in terms of sight is confusing. Sight requires light, yet Dasein's movement—which functions as Lichtung—is that which lets (ontic) light appear to Dasein through the sense of vision, by granting the open space for play of light and dark. And this self-movement of Dasein as Lichtung conditions even "intuition," the "sight of the mind," as we see when the quotation marks soon reappear around "Sicht":

We must, to be sure, guard against a misunderstanding of the expression "sight" ("Sicht": Heidegger's quotation marks). It corresponds to the "clearedness" (Gelichtetheit; no quotation marks in the original) which we took as characterizing the disclosedness of the "there" (Da; no quotation marks in the original). "Seeing" (Das "Sehen": Heidegger's quotation marks) does not mean (meint) just perceiving with the bodily eyes, but neither does it mean pure non-sensory (unsinnliche) awareness of something present-at-hand in its presence-at-hand. (147)

Heidegger's attempt to avoid identifying "sight" with either vision or intuition by positing its correspondence with Gelichtetheit refers us to an important passage from #28, "The Task of a Thematic Analysis of Being-in." Here Heidegger touches upon the problematic of metaphoricity, just as he did earlier in the discussion of Descartes. Heidegger has recourse to the notion of figurative language when he confronts the necessity of naming—across the ontic-ontological difference—the relation of, on the one hand, access to ontic entities, to, on the other hand, the ontological disclosedness that makes such access possible. Heidegger writes:

When we talk in an ontically figurative way (die ontisch bildliche Rede) of the lumen naturale in man, we have in mind (meint) nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this entity, that it is in such a way as to be its "there." To say that it is "illuminated" ("erleuchtet") means that as Being-in-the-world it is cleared (gelichtet) in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing (Lichtung). Only for an entity that is existentially cleared (gelichteten) in this way does that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. By its very nature, Dasein brings its "there" along with it. If it lacks its "there," it is not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. Dasein is its disclosedness. (133)
What is it of Dasein that is expressed metaphorically as lumen naturale? Just as (physical) light allows for the vision of the eyes, Heidegger must here be identifying "natural light" with that which allows Dasein to "see," in other words, with the clearing self-movement that opens the "there." Several questions arise here. If "natural light" is a metaphor when applied to the condition of Dasein's "sight"—which as I have just shown Heidegger leads us to think in an inverted metaphors—what would be the metaphoric status of "natural light" in its opposition to the "super-natural light," the divine illumination, of the Augustinian tradition? Further, what of the rewriting of "natural light" as Dasein's being "illuminated" ("erleuchtet")? Is the relation of conditioned ("illuminated") to condition (Lichtung and "clearing") thinkable as a metaphoric relation? If we allow the condition-conditioned relation to be expressible by metaphor, then it is Lichtung—the condition for (sensory) access to things in (ontic) light—that ultimately allows Dasein's "illumination" ("natural light") to be metaphoric with relation to everyday "light." Then if one wished to say further that this "illumination" is in turn metaphoric with relation to Gelichtetheit and Lichtung one would have to posit that the classical determination of metaphor as transfer of name from sensible to intelligible is transformed into a transfer from ontic phenomena to ontological condition.

To return to the determination of "sight" we should recall that Heidegger explicitly denies that "sight" means a "pure unsinnliche apprehension," or "intuition" (Anschauen). Heidegger makes this distinction, removing sight from the sinnlich/unsinnlich determination, so the sense of sight is here not merely a reversed metaphor, but instead inverts the very terms used to determine the sense of "metaphor"—as I have called it, an "inverted metaphors." Heidegger continues:

In giving an existential signification (Bedeutung) to "sight," (Sicht; no quotation marks in original) we have merely drawn upon the (die; italicized in original) peculiar feature of seeing, that it lets entities which are accessible to it be encountered unconcealedly in themselves. Of course, every "sense" (jeder "Sinn") does this within that domain of discovery which is genuinely its own. (147)

Here Sinn must be put in quotation marks, for as we have seen above (137) Sinn as sensory has been grounded upon Sinn of disclosedness—"sensory sense" is now a transfer of Sinn from its
primary sense as disclosedness. Heidegger next appends a fascinating few sentences that will play an increasingly important role in my interpretation. He writes:

But from the beginning onwards the tradition of philosophy has been oriented primarily toward 'seeing' as a way of access to entities and to Being. To keep the connection with this tradition, we may formalize 'sight' and 'seeing' enough to obtain therewith a universal term for characterizing any access to entities or to Being, as access in general. (147)

This formalization, as we have seen, broaches the Sinnsfrage, for it necessitates the privileging of Sinn as meaning, which controls disclosedness, over the Sinnlichkeit of the senses. Such privileging becomes more explicit later, in #70c "The Zeitlichkeit of Falling." There Heidegger writes:

Like the concept of sight, 'seeing' will not be restricted to awareness through 'the eyes of the body.' Awareness (Vernehmen) in the broader sense (im weiteren Sinne) lets what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand be encountered 'bodily' in themselves with regard to the way they look. (346)

Here we see that a privileged Sinn must be indicated for the awareness that subordinates the senses to disclosedness. Heidegger had earlier played out these distinctions in The History of the Concept of Time. At p. 80 of that lecture course he distinguishes categorial intuition from sensory perception (sinnliche Wahrnehmung), and at p. 95-96 spatiality is termed a sinnlich concept. Here is the key for my interpretation. If spatiality is sinnlich—even if in the sense of a Kantian form of intuition, as is the case here—it must be subordinated to disclosedness, which is ultimately to be grounded in temporality. These subordinations will not be complete however, as spatial reference will be irreducible in the terms used in the description of temporality. This irreducible spatial "reference" occurs because terms iterable in discussions of space are also iterated in the description of temporality, thus inscribing a "haunting" whose formalization I call the "economy of time."

Heidegger's #32, "Understanding and Interpretation," contains the only thematization of the acceptations of Sinn that will be twisted into each iteration of the mark. Sinn here is a component of the existential understanding, which is Heidegger's first way of rewriting Sinn as "meaning": Heidegger has already moved from Husserl's scheme of intentionality to the condition
of possibility of that intentionality, what he calls Being-in-the-world.

*Sinn* is that wherein the intelligibility (Verständlichkeit) of something maintains itself. That which can be Articulated in a disclosure by which we understand, we call *Sinn.* . . . *Sinn* is the "upon-which" (Woraufhin) of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception. . . . *Sinn* must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the disclosedness that belongs to understanding. *Sinn* is an existentiale of Dasein . . . (151)

Here we encounter *Sinn* as the "terminus" or "pivot" of a projection (in John Caputo's felicitous phrase from *Radical Hermeneutics*): this is Heidegger's first, existential rewriting of *Sinn* as "meaning." We should read here *Vorsicht* in the redetermination given it above.

Heidegger then discusses the *Sinn von Sein* in these terms (152), as not what is profound (tiefsinnig) or standing behind Being, but Being itself in so far as it enters into the understandability of Dasein. The *Sinn* of Being can never be opposed to beings or to Being as the "ground" of beings, because any "ground" is only accessible as *Sinn*, even when *Sinn* has dissolved into the *Abgrund* of *Sinnlosigkeit*. Here Heidegger once more distinguishes between the metaphysical search for grounds and the destructive investigation of the *Sinn* of Being, which first makes possible any positing of grounds, or indeed for any nihilistic giving up of the search for grounds.

Heidegger then discusses the hermeneutic circle at 152-53. Understanding has an existential *Sinn* that must be properly determined. The circle in understanding belongs to the structure of *Sinn*, which is grounded in the existential constitution of Dasein. Dasein itself has an ontological circle-structure.47

The Temporal Recapitulation

In this section my reading is oriented by the little-known acceptation of *Sinn* as "direction."48 I will discuss the way *Sinn* as direction functions in the *Sinnsfrage/Seinsfrage* economy to disrupt the purity of the description of temporality by installing an irreducibly spatial haunting.49 *Sinn* will take on an acceptation as the direction of Dasein's ecstatic contortions as it moves back and forth from its horizontal schemata. Insofar as the existential analytic has revealed Dasein as thrown projection, *Sinn* in its acceptation of "meaning" is repeated here as
the "pivot" of a self-projection is temporally retrieved to become the direction of Dasein's movement.

On the third acceptation of Sinn, note Reiner Schürmann's treatment of this point from his Heidegger on Being and Acting:

If this is the case [that Heidegger's late writings attempt to elaborate the traits of a plural economy of presencing], it is clear that the "phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology" promised in Sein und Zeit, can be fully understood--and carried out--as a deconstruction only from the standpoint of Heidegger's last writings. Only then does it become apparent how time can be "der Sinn des Seins": not the "meaning" of being, but its directionality: the "sense" as the direction in which something, e.g., motion, takes place (this acceptation of both the English and the French sens-'sense' of a river, or of traffic-stems, not from Latin, but from an Indo-European verb that means to travel, to follow a path). Not the "signification" of being for a man and hence "a human accomplishment" (a misunderstanding that Heidegger says threatened the deconstruction in its first phase, that of a destruction in Sein und Zeit), but the directionality of the orderings by which constellations of presencing produce themselves. Not the sens unique, the one-way street of the epochs unfolding across the ages either (a misunderstanding that threatened during the phase of "the history of being"), but the multiple presencing in which things present emerge from absence. . . .

One should note here Schürmann's use of "not ... but ..." constructions designed to protect a proper meaning for Sinn in the phrase "der Sinn des Seins." My questions here are: how can one accomplish such prescription--in this case, literally a "writing down beforehand"? Doesn't this amount to a writing down before writing, for is it not writing that we have to consider in order to take into account the possibility of misunderstandings and their threats? Can one keep the Latin and Indo-European heritages separate as they merge in the single mark "Sinn"? What happens when we no longer look for the regulation of a polysemy (for wouldn't this be the question about a Sinn von Sinn überhaupt?) but for the articulation of a disseminative economy?

In Part One, Division Two of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger breaks off the existential analytic to ask if the foregoing interpretation, which culminated in the analysis of care as the Being of Dasein, was adequate. He answers that it was not, for it could not guarantee the authenticity and totality of the entity under discussion. To remedy this, Heidegger undertakes the analyses of guilt and death, and determines that the authentic totality of Dasein lies in its "anticipatory resoluteness, [vorlaufende Entschlossenheit]."
On the basis of this last set of analyses Heidegger then sets out to determine 
Zeitlichkeit as the "ontological Sinn" of care, the Being of Dasein. #65 begins with the warning 
that the "unbroken discipline" of the existential analytic must be brought to bear to keep the 
mode of Being of Dasein from becoming perverted [verkehren] by being sighed in the "wholly 
indifferent mode of Vorhandenheit" (323). This reference to "indifference" points back to an earlier 
passage in which—in the discussion of logos as misinterpreted as present-at-hand—Heidegger 
says of Vorhandenheit:

this Sinn of Being is left undifferentiated and uncontrasted with other possibilities of Being, 
so that Being in the Sinn of a formal Being-something becomes fused with it simultaneous­
ly, and we are unable even to obtain a clear-cut division between these two realms. (160)

If we recall the Vorhandenheit-extensio relation developed in Heidegger's analysis of Descartes, 
we see here that the issue is one of distinguishing Dasein's mode of Being from that of the 
spatial. Dasein's Being is care, and as we will see, the Sinn of that Being is Zeitlichkeit. The 
overall goal of Sein und Zeit is to exhibit the Sinn von Sein überhaupt as Temporalität. The 
descriptions of these temporal phenomena must be kept separate from that of the spatial. Now 
spatiality is three-leveled, including the spatiality of Dasein, of the ready-to-hand, and of the 
present-at-hand. The spatiality of Dasein grounds that of tools, while Dasein's spatiality is 
grounded in its Being-in-the-world, which is in turn grounded in temporality. Tools are accessible 
to falling temporality, while for authentic temporality tools fall away as anticipatory resoluteness 
holds itself in the mode of anxiety. Finally, as #69b points out, presence-at-hand is derived from 
a certain Umschlag of falling temporality (361). As thus several steps removed from original 
temporality, Vorhandenheit would fatally corrupt or pervert descriptions of the phenomenon of 
original temporality.

Heidegger asks, in #65, "What are we seeking ontologically with the Sinn of care? 
What does Sinn signify [Was bedeutet Sinn; Heidegger's italics]?" (323). He gives three answers: 
first, he refers us to the analysis of understanding, and repeats the definition first given at 151: 
"Sinn signifies the Woraufhin of a primary projection" (324). Then Heidegger develops the second 
answer to the Bedeutung of Sinn as he tells us that Sinn is that which makes possible the
phenomenon to be understood. The projected in this case is the Being of Dasein, and that upon which the projection is made is that which makes possible the constitution of Dasein's Being as care in the unity of its articulation.

For his third answer Heidegger discusses Sinn and the understanding of Being, repeating the definition of Sinn as "upon-which," but this time putting the priority on Seinsverständnis. "Taken strictly [Sihreng genommen]," Heidegger writes, "Sinn means [bedeutet] the Woraufhin of a primary projection of the understanding of Being" (324). Heidegger here spends a few paragraphs on Sinn as an existential of Dasein. He concludes that the question about the Sinn of the Being of a being thematizes the Woraufhin of the understanding of Being that grounds the Being of beings (325).

How can one understand that upon which the Being of Dasein is projected? In other words, the question is, what is the Sinn of the Being of Dasein? The Being of Dasein is care, and the Seinssinn of Dasein is the self-understanding Dasein itself, Heidegger concludes (325). To answer the question of the enabling of the Being of Dasein in more detail, Heidegger then discusses Seinkönnen in its reliance on Zukunft, Being-guilty as grounded in Gewesenheit, and the situation as grounded in Gegenwärtigen. Care is the unity of "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)" (192). The authentic mode of care is anticipatory resoluteness. The temporal elements of Zukunft, Gewesenheit, and Gegenwärtigen make the separate elements of care, "ahead-of-itself," "Being-already-in," and "Being-alongside" possible, while the unity of these three temporal elements, Zeitlichkeit, which Heidegger defines as a "gewesend-gegenwärtigende Zukunft einheitliche Phänomen" (326), thus makes care possible as a unified phenomenon.

After having shown how temporality makes care possible, Heidegger turns to the Bedeutung of the mark "Zeitlichkeit." This Bedeutung must be kept clear from the vulgar time-concept by a rigorous policing of the terminological use of these expressions (326). Violence is unavoidable here (327). Why? Because of sedimented Bedeutungen. Heidegger writes concerning the expressions "before" and "already" as they function in the definition of care: "ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-
If these expressions are taken solely in their vulgar senses, in which time is conceived on the basis of the flow of nows, the Being of Dasein would be conceived in vorhanden terms.

If the expression 'before' and 'already' were to have a time-oriented signification [zeithafte Bedeutung] such as this (and they can have this signification also), then to say that care has temporality would be to say that it is something which is 'earlier' and 'later,' 'not yet' and 'no longer.' Care would then be conceived as an entity which occurs and runs its course 'in time.' The Being of an entity having the character of Dasein would become something present-at-hand. (327)

Terminological vigilance will keep vulgarity and originality separate, Heidegger hopes. Yet, as we will see, Heidegger must use a language oriented to the ready-to-hand from which, via an Umschlag, the present-at-hand is accessible. In this regard, it is important to note here that Heidegger concedes that the terms he wishes to redetermine do also carry these vulgar "temporal significations." I am concerned here with the economy of this "also." It seems the marks "ahead" and "before" can operate on both sides of the boundary separating vulgar from originary. Heidegger's attempted redetermination is thus limited by the sedimentation which thereby yields possibilities of non-fully-controllable iteration. Because of this, an economy of interpretation is set up that can account for the possibility of misunderstanding positively, in terms of dissemination, or that attempts to fix terminology by means of the metaphysical distinctions of vulgar versus originary.

If the terminological distinctions that express the conceptual distinction between originary temporality and vulgar time were to collapse, the entire project of fundamental ontology would be threatened. If this is not to be so, Heidegger writes, the "temporal signification [zeithafte Bedeutung] of these [originary] expressions must be different [eine andere]" (327). The "ahead" and "before" indicate the future, Zukunft, which grounds the self-projection that constitutes "existentiality." Of existentiality Heidegger then claims: "Its primary Sinn is the future, Zukunft" (327). Clearly the Sinnsfrage is at work here. Only by distinguishing between Sinne of temporal expressions can Heidegger clarify existentiality and thus kept the description of temporality clean of vulgarity. Yet here Sinn must not only be read as the Bedeutung of the mark "existentiality," but must also be read as "directionality," so that Zukunft is taken literally, as "coming toward." But if this is so, then the spatiality of direction must be taken into account in the determining of
temporality, and not as derivative upon temporality--as Heidegger implies when he grounds Dasein's spatiality on its temporality.

Heidegger next broaches once again the question of metaphoricity. He tells us that Zeitlichkeit "is" not a being. It is not, but it "temporalizes itself" [zeitigt sich] (328). The question that concerns my project in this dissertation then is: How describe temporality, which is not a being, with a language oriented to beings? Indeed, how describe it with a language oriented to the spatiality of those ready-to-hand entities accessible in falling temporality? At this point Heidegger describes how the directional characteristics denoted in the prefixes zu (from the "Auf-sich-zu" of the authentic future, Zu-kunft), auf (from the "Zurück auf" of the authentic having-been, Gewesenheit), and bei (from the "Begegnenlassens von" of the present, Gegenwart) reveal Zeitlichkeit as the ekstatikon pure and simple (329). Here Heidegger's analyses are perhaps at their most radical, showing how any notion of the subject as self-identical substance must be completely rethought on the basis of an ecstatic "outside-itself." Now this "itself" does not pre-exist the ecstases, but is precisely constituted by the unity of their "movements." Heidegger tells us first that Zeitlichkeit is the "originary 'outside-Itself' in and for its very self [an and für sich selbst]" (329). He continues that Zeitlichkeit is not a being, that "first steps out of itself, but its essence is temporalizing in the unity of ecstases [Sie ist nicht vordem ein Seiendes, das erst aus sich heraustritt, sondern ihr Wesen ist Zeitigung in der Einheit der Ecstasen]" (329). The "itself" of the "outside-Itself" thus comes to be through the temporalizing of the ecstases; since the issue here is the constituting of temporality, it would make no sense to postulate an entity that, pre-existing, spins time out of its already constituted "self." And because of this delay, a language oriented to supposedly-present entities can only be metaphorically used in describing that which renders entities accessible.

In Chapter I we have seen how Derrida calls espacement, one of the workings of différence, the "opening to the first exteriority in general." Does not Heidegger himself inscribe such an opening in the Ausser-sich of temporality? Of course. To what then does Derrida object in Heidegger's description? It must be Heidegger's refusal to name the Ausser-sich a spatiality in order to safeguard a privileging of time over space. Let us see how Heidegger
attempts such safeguarding.

Continuing his discussion of temporality, Heidegger tells us that vulgar time is the result of a levelling off of this originary ecstatic temporalizing (329). This levelling is nonetheless, in its existential Sinn, grounded in a specifically determinate temporalization, that of inauthentic temporality. If this is so, continues Heidegger, then we are justified in naming Zeitlichkeit as "originary time [ursprüngliche Zeit]" (329). Now precisely this equation seems to evoke Derrida's severest strictures. If Heidegger himself holds that "time" is a vulgarly understood metaphysical concept, why would he turn around and assimilate his most radical analyses to this concept? The addition of the adjective "originary" to "time" in the equation of Zeitlichkeit and originary time, Derrida seems to say--since "originary" is caught in a metaphysical opposition to "derivative"--is not enough to wrench Zeitlichkeit from the system governing the mark "time." Let us recall his words in "Ousia and Grammé":

Time is that which is thought on the basis of Being as presence, and if something--which bears a relation to time, but is not time--is to be thought beyond the determination of Being as presence, it cannot be a question of something that could still be called time.

In Chapter I I claimed Derrida was here referring to his notion of différence. However, Derrida's strictures are obviously also applicable to Heidegger's "temporality." Of equal concern to me in this dissertation is the fact that Derrida also writes about the metaphysicalness of posing the question of Being in terms of Sinn. How is Heidegger's definition of Zeitlichkeit as the Sinn of Dasein and Temporalität as the Sinn von Sein überhaupt related to Derrida's strictures on both Sinn/sens and the mark "time"? I can answer this question only after the discussion of the horizontal schemata in #69c.

The finitude of originary temporality is the final topic of #65. This finitude is not a breaking off [Aufhören], but a character of temporality itself. Heidegger tells us here that "Primordial and authentic coming-toward-oneself is the Sinn of existing in one's ownmost nullity" (330). Here we find a preview of the reading of Sinn as direction that I will pursue in more detail in the discussion of #69c. The sentence must be read both as "Primordial and authentic coming-toward-oneself is what existing in one's ownmost nullity means" and "Primordial and authentic
coming-toward-oneself is the direction which the movement that is existing in one's ownmost nullity takes."

Chapters 4-6 of Division Two attempt to develop the full contours of Dasein's temporality by exploring temporality and everydayness, historicality, and within-time-ness as the origin of the vulgar concept of time. Chapter 4 discusses the temporality of disclosedness in general, of Being-in-the-world and the problem of transcendence, of Dasein's spatiality; and concludes with the *zeitliche Sinn* of Dasein's everydayness. Section 68 is divided in four subsections, dealing with the temporality of understanding, *Befindlichkeit*, falling, and discourse. I cannot enter their analyses here. Section 69 is entitled "The temporality of Being-in-the-world and the Problem of the Transcendence of the World." #69a, "The temporality of circumspective concern," cannot detain us here. #69b "The *zeitliche Sinn* of the way circumspective concern is modified into theoretical discovery of the present-at-hand within-the-world" contains an important discussion of the way the understanding of Being that reveals the ready-to-hand must undergo an *Umschlag* in order to reveal the present-at-hand.

Heidegger begins #69b by announcing that the discussion of the ontological genesis of the theoretical comportment will investigate science as a mode of existence, that is, of Being-in-the-world (357). Asserting a mere disappearance of praxis will not do, Heidegger continues, but one must begin by acknowledging the subordination of circumspection (*Umsicht*) to the primary understanding of the totality of involvements (*Bewandtnisganzheit*) (359). After a discussion of the grounding of the as-structure in the temporality of understanding, Heidegger sets out to analyze an "elementary assertion" and its modification. To understand the genesis of the theoretical comportment, he continues, we must understand that the change from a sighting of the ready-to-hand to a sighting of the present-at-hand is the result of an *Umschlag* of the understanding of Being involved therein. This *Umschlag* not only overlooks the tool-character of the ready-to-hand, it also overlooks the "place" that belongs to each ready-to-hand tool (361). The place becomes the "spatio-temporal position [*Raum-Zeit-Stelle*]," a "world-point [*Weltpunkt*]; Heidegger's quotation marks]" (362). Such a dissolution of the tool-place connection means the
entities of the environment are "released [entschrankt]," and the totality (All) of the present-at-hand becomes thematized (362). Heidegger concludes by showing how the transcendence of Dasein must underlie both the objectifying thematization of the present-at-hand and that of which it is the Umschlag, circumspective concern. The transcendence of Dasein is then to be shown as grounded in temporality, the object of the next sub-section, #69c.

When we turn to #69c, "The Temporal Problem of the Transcendence of the World," we see the problem is the ground of the unity of world and Dasein, that is, the way significance holds together the "for-the-sake-of-which" and the "in-order-to." The unity of significance is grounded in temporality, so that the "existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a horizon" (365). At this point Heidegger introduces the concept of horizon as providing a direction for Dasein's ecstatic movement:

Ecstases are not simply raptures in which one gets carried away. Rather, there belongs to each ecstasis a 'whither' [Wohin] to which one is carried away. This 'whither' of the ecstasis we call the horizonal schema* (365).

The ecstases are not simply raptures in which one gets carried away. Rather, there belongs to each ecstasis a 'whither' [Wohin] to which one is carried away. This 'whither' of the ecstasis we call the horzional schema· (365).

The ecstases are given paths, are set upon tracks; Dasein is not a simple ripping open. An undirected rapture, an Entrückung without a schema, would be too close to a maddening, a Verrückung. Zeitlichkeit would have no sense, in both the senses of meaning and direction. Indeed, horizon will now be linked to Sinn via the notion of "terminus" or "pivot" [Woraufhln]: "The horizon of Zeitlichkeit as a whole determines that whereupon [Woraufhln] factically existing entities are essentially disclosed" (365). We must remember here the movement beneath intentionality to Being-in-the-world. Dasein is its projects, Heidegger constantly reminds us; we cannot understand Dasein's projections in terms of intentions issuing from a subjectivity, but must see Dasein's Being in its ecstatic movement. We should recall here the definition of Sinn just given: "Taken strictly, Sinn means the Woraufhln of a primary projection of the understanding of Being" (324). The understanding of Being discloses beings by a self-projection of Dasein. Such a project--considered temporally--involves Dasein ecstatically projecting itself upon Sinn as its ecstases take the paths laid out for it in advance by the horizontal schemata. How do the
schemata provide for such disclosure? They provide a point from which Dasein can rebound and come back to entities. Heidegger explains:

Factual Dasein, understanding itself and its world ecstatically in the unity of the 'there' comes back from these horizons to the entities encountered within them. Coming back to these entities understandingly [Das verstehende Zurückkommen auf . . .] is the existential Sinn of letting them be encountered by making them present. (366)

Here we can see most clearly the doubling of Sinn as meaning and Sinn as direction. One must read the last sentence both as "coming back to entities from horizons is what letting them be encountered means" and as "coming back to entities from horizons is the direction of Dasein's movement that lets entities be encountered."

At this point we can see most clearly the spatiality that inhabits Heidegger's descriptions of temporality. Zurückkommen, which is here used to describe Dasein's temporality, was previously used to describe Dasein's spatiality in its achieving of a "here" from its "there." Heidegger writes: "Das Dasein ist gemäss seiner Räumlichkeit zunächst nie hier, sondern dort, aus welchem Dort es auf sein Hier zurückkommt . . ." (107). When we compare this passage from the discussion of Dasein's spatiality to the preceding from the discussion of Dasein's temporality we can clearly see the spatial-temporal undecidable economy of zurückkommt, its irreducible possibility of iteration in both spatial and temporal contexts.

The Zurückkommen corresponds to one of the features of Dasein's spatiality, Entfernung. The "Wohin" and "Woraufhin" we noticed in the descriptions of the temporal schemata install a directionality, an Ausrichtung--the second feature which Heidegger has developed in the analysis of Dasein's spatiality--at the heart of temporality.

As iterable in spatial contexts, Zurückkommen and Wohin/Woraufhin show that the supposed purity of temporality is haunted by spatiality. We must not leap to the conclusion that this haunting is accomplished in the name of the spatiality of the present-at-hand. Heidegger's descriptions of temporality disrupt metaphysical, Vorhanden, notions of the subject via its ecstatics; the schemata direct the ecstatics, providing a unitary out and back movement. Now this "out" (to the schemata) and "back" (to entities) is a movement without a fixed starting point.
Strictly speaking, it "is" not a "movement" but a "temporalizing" of ecstases along a certain path. However, such ecstastics cannot be conceived purely temporally. The descriptions of temporalizing cannot totally reduce the spatiality of movement,\(^5\) for the ecstases must be given a direction, made to make sense. They must have something to bounce off and come back to entities in disclosing them, for Dasein is essentially with the entities it discloses. Without schemata to direct the ecstases, Dasein could not be alongside other entities. It would not then be Dasein, essentially falling. But the necessity of providing directions for the ecstases provides an additional threat to the attempt to isolate the Sinn von Sein überhaupt as Temporalität, as terms iterable in spatial discussions find their way into the description of temporality.

The haunting of temporality by terms iterable in spatial contexts doubles the haunting in which Sinn as Bedeutung threatens the radicality of Sinn as direction. Here we must consider Derrida’s strictures on the mark Sinn/sens. As we remarked above, he writes in "Ousia and Grammé" that Sinn/sens is irreducibly bound to the system of presence:

\[ \ldots \text{sense (in whatever sense it is understood: as essence, as the meaning [signification] of discourse, as the orientation of the movement between arché and telos) has never been conceivable, within the history of metaphysics, otherwise than on the basis of presence and as presence.} \]

Has Derrida exhausted all the ways Sinn works in the text Sein und Zeit? Sinn as direction orienting Dasein’s ecstases is haunted by Sinn as meaning, it is true, but is Sinn as direction inherently metaphysical? Is the direction provided by the schemata thinkable as "orientation of the movement between arché and telos"? When Dasein exists authentically, it is its projects as possibilities; realizing a telos is precisely reducing possibility to actuality, is bringing a being into its entelecheia. Dasein’s keeping alive the possibility-character of its projected possibilities, especially when it concerns Dasein’s "ownmost possibility," cannot be thought within the system of arché and telos. Do not the resources of the mark Sinn thus allow it to disrupt metaphysical conceptuality? Consider here Merleau-Ponty, who, in the section of temporality of The Phenomenology of Perception, sees sens as inherently ecstatic:

In all uses of the word sens, we find the same fundamental notion of a being orientated or polarized in the direction of what he is not, and thus we are always brought back to a
conception of the subject as ek-stase, and to a relationship of active transcendence between the subject and the world."

*Sinn* reins in the ecstases, tames them, makes them make sense, yet all the while in an economy marginal to metaphysics. For Bataille's nobles, it may be so, any check on expenditure would be vulgar, any making sense metaphysical. But Derrida is not Bataille, and surely neither is Heidegger. Would Heidegger not reply that Dasein must find its way among beings, and for that it needs to encounter them by making sense? Can this not be described in a way that avoids madness as well as total vulgarity? Is not Heidegger's project that of making some new sense? Does it then finally make sense to see *Sinn* in the system of *arché* and *telos*?

I have maintained that *Sinn* as direction—as it functions in the description of temporality—is a haunting of time by space as predicted by the "formal rule" of "Ousia and Grammé." I have called the articulation of such irreducible haunting "the economy of time." What does Heidegger himself have to say about the relation of time and space in *Sein und Zeit*? 

#70 concerns the temporality of Dasein's spatiality. Heidegger is concerned in the beginning of the section that the analyses of spatiality seem to want to impose themselves as co-originary with those of temporality. Heidegger writes, obviously disapproving such pretension on the part of spatiality:

Thus with Dasein's spatiality, existential temporal analysis seems to come to a limit, so that this entity which we call "Dasein" must be considered as "temporal" "and also" as spatial co-ordinately [in der Nebenordnung]. (367)

Why the disapproval? What happened to the praise of analyses that preserve the Gleich-ursprünglichkeit of phenomena and deride the desire for an origin? Preparing the way for the analyses of *Das In-Sein als solches* Heidegger writes:

The phenomenon of the equiprimordiality of constitutive items has often been disregarded in ontology, because of a methodologically unrestrained tendency to derive everything and anything from some simple "primal ground." (131)
Granted that temporality, due to its ecstases, could never have been a "simple" Urgrund, Heidegger must still explain why spatiality is consigned the status of a pretentious Nebenordnung rather than that of an authentic Gleichur-sprünglichkeit.\(^6^0\)

Rather than admit the equality of Dasein's spatiality with that of its temporality, Heidegger states that we must ground the "specific" spatiality of Dasein in temporality: "Dann muss aber auch die spezifische Räumlichkeit des Daseins in der Zeitlichkeit gründen" (367). Now this does not mean a "deduction" of space from time, he clarifies, nor does it mean the "dissolving" (auflösen) of space in pure time (367). Dasein can only be spatial as care in the Sinn of factual-falling existence, Heidegger writes, and thus only because Dasein as Zeitlichkeit is ecstatico-horizontal can it take along with itself a space. Thus Dasein's spatiality is to be grounded in ecstatic temporality. To repeat our earlier question: Why does Heidegger refuse to grant the Ausser-sich of ecstatic temporality the status of a spatiality, and why does he insist on calling ecstatic temporality an "originary time"?

The ecstatic temporality of Dasein's spatiality, Heidegger continues, renders understandable the independence of space from time, but it also renders understandable the "dependence" of Dasein on space. This dependence is visible, Heidegger tells us, in the "well-known" phenomenon that Dasein's self-interpretation and the stock of significations [Bedeutungsbestand] of language are dominated by "spatial representations ["räumlichen Vorstellungen"; Heidegger's quotation marks]" (369). Such a priority of the spatial in the articulation of significations [Bedeutungen] and concepts, Heidegger tells us, is grounded in a mode of Being of Dasein:

Temporality is essentially falling, and it loses itself in making present; not only does it understand itself circumspectively in terms of objects of concern which are ready-to-hand, but from those spatial relationships which making-present is constantly meeting in the ready-to-hand as having presence [als anwesend], it takes its clues for Articulating that which has been understood and can be interpreted in the understanding in general. (369)

The spatial relationships of the ready-to-hand, we recall, are those of nearness, place, and region (#22). These are grounded in Dasein's Being-in-the-world, whose spatiality is directional (#23). Now if "spatial representations" are linked to falling temporality, and falling is a necessary
structure of Dasein, then we must ask that Heidegger give a positive account for the spatiality in the descriptions of Dasein's temporality. Heidegger attempts to ground Dasein's spatiality on its temporality, yet we find the very description of temporality using terms iterated in the analysis of Dasein's spatiality. Even if one grants that Heidegger has avoided the encroachment of Vorhandenheit into the description of Dasein, we must claim that he cannot reduce all spatiality. As such, his discourse is haunted. He has attempted to isolate a notion of originary time from any "spatial" descriptions, but they will not be kept out.

The following schema thus seems to be in place: falling, scattered, spatially-dominated Dasein is gathered to itself in authentic temporality. But the "itself" is an "outside-itself" that Heidegger refuses to call a spatiality, refusing thus to recognize an originary time-space. At this point we can partially conclude that Derrida in "Ousia and Grammé" was not as nuanced as he could have been about the economy of Sinn/sens. However, he did predict the haunting of temporal descriptions by spatial terms we have unraveled with the help of the economy of Sinn and that we have called the economy of time, in which we have seen Heidegger is enmeshed.

To finish our discussion of the Sinnsfrage at work in Sein und Zeit let us consider Heidegger's treatment of historicality. Providing an interpretation of historicality, Heidegger writes, will be a "more concrete working-out" of Zeitlichkeit (382). In beginning the descriptions of historicality Heidegger tells us the preceding analyses of temporality depended on grasping Dasein in its authentic totality. Yet death, which provides for Dasein's totality in its "Being-toward-the-end," provides only one "end" of Dasein. Birth is the other end that must be taken account of. The question is, how is Dasein "between" its two ends, birth and death? Heidegger considers the vulgar response, that the connectedness of Dasein "consists" of a sequence of experiences (373). Heidegger then proposes the notion of Dasein's unique Being as the "between" that connects birth and death as Dasein's "stretching" [Erstreckung] (374). Heidegger writes at 375:

The movement [Bewegtheit] of existence is not the motion [Bewegung] of something present-at-hand. . . . The specific movement [Bewegtheit] in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along [erstrecken Sicherstreckens] we call its historizing [Gesc-
Historizing, like the analyses of temporality of which it is the concretion, must be kept clear of terms derived from *Vorhandenheit*. Yet is *Bewegtheit* clear of all spatiality? Does not the *Weg* mark a Being-on-the-path? Such a path need not be a straight line, of course. Heidegger soon differentiates the directionality of Dasen's happening from the direction a movement along a straight line takes, that of arriving, lingering and departing:

The movement of historizing [Bewegtheit des Geschehens] in which something "happens to something" is not to be grasped in terms of motion as change of location [Bewegung als Ortsänderung]. . . . And because, further, the ordinary understanding of Being understands "Being" as presence-at-hand without further differentiation, the Being of the world-historical is experienced and interpreted in the sense of something present-at-hand which comes along, has presence, and then disappears [wird das Sein des Welt-Geschichtlichen im Sinne des ankommenden, anwesenden und verschwinden Vorhandenen erfahren und ausgelegt]. (389)

The *Sinn* of *Bewegtheit* is not that of a straight-line, but of a self-stretching—between two ends—which, at each encounter with entities, moves out and back along the paths of its ecstases. The *Weg* of *Bewegtheit* is not that of the hands of a clock. But, we may ask, is the essentiality of -heit the price Heidegger must pay to make such a distinction?

**Vulgar and Primordial Time**

We are now in a position to investigate Heidegger's analyses in Division Two, Chapter 6. Heidegger has set up his treatise in such a way that he must redetermine the significations oriented to vulgar time so that the descriptions of originary temporality be kept clear. At this point in his text Heidegger sets out to show the derivation of vulgar "time" from originary temporality. Vulgar time is to be shown as a "genuine" [echtes] temporal phenomenon; although derivative, it is not a spatializing of time, but is temporal through and through. Despite its temporal nature, vulgar time understands itself in terms of *Vorhandenheit*, whose spatiality is one of extension.

Chapter 6 of Division Two has the following structure: #78 details the incompleteness of the analysis so far; #79, Dasein's temporality and our concern with time; #80, this
concernful time and within-time-ness; #81, within-time-ness and the genesis of the vulgar concept of time; #82, the contrast with Hegel; and the concluding section of Sein und Zeit, #83, the question of fundamental ontology and the Sinn von Sein überhaupt.

#79 details three structures of concernful time: datability, spannedness, and publicness. In this section "time" is defined as "the making-present which interprets itself—that is, that which has been interpreted and is addressed in the 'now'" (408). Heidegger explains that such self-interpretation is made possible by ecastico-horizonal temporality, which consitutes the "there." As thus constituting the "there" temporality is always interpretable and thus familiar to us in the "there" (408). However, our familiarity with "time" does not preclude that primordial temporality, and its temporalizing the origin of expressed time, remain unknown and unconceived (408).

How does this definition of "time" relate to that of Derrida, who sees "time" as the mark of the limits within which the trace has been determined? Derrida sees "time" as the mark of the effacement of the trace; Heidegger sees "time" as a derivative self-understanding of temporality as originary time. For Derrida, "time" cannot but be metaphysical, for it is conceived in terms of the present, which, as constituted by the arche-trace, can only be seen "as such" by an effacement of the trace. For Heidegger, "time" is vulgar, for it is understood on the basis of the now as present-at-hand, a conception only possible in an Umschlag from the falling temporality that allows the ready-to-hand to be encountered. Falling temporality, while genuinely temporal, is inauthentic compared to the authentic temporality of anticipatory resoluteness. Both inauthentic and authentic modes are ways in which temporality temporalizes itself, but inauthentic temporality understands itself in terms of what it allows to be encountered, while authentic temporality should understand itself only on its own terms. However, since temporality is not a being, but temporalizes itself, its description broaches the problem of metaphoricity since it must proceed with a language oriented to the ready-to-hand.

Derrida focuses on the equation of temporality and originary time. Why this equation? If falling temporality is essential, the question goes, why call its self-interpretation vulgar? Why attribute originality to that which must, essentially, be supplemented by a falling
temporality which "genuinely" misinterprets itself? Why not cast mis-interpretation as metaphor-icity?  

Now the three structures of falling temporality—datability, spannedness, publicness—are tied to Dasein’s ecstacies, historicality, and Being as Mitdasein, respectively. Datability reflects (is the Widerschein of) the ecstatic constitution of temporality, in that temporality is for the most part falling into a making-present of entitles within the world, thus allowing for the dating of a time by its relation to an occurrence. Spannedness involves the ecstatic stretching of historical temporality, which I discussed above. Publicness is grounded in Mitdasein; here we use the time that is there for everyone.

In #80, on time-reckoning, we learn that the sun, the natural clock, provides an "hour" that is ready-to-hand (413). Eventually, through a discussion which is not to be confused with a historiography of time-pieces, Heidegger shows that the movement of the clock is interpreted as a present-at-hand manifold of nows. The saying "now" of telling the time, Heidegger maintains, is a dating with the character of measuring. As such, it reveals time as a vorhandene Jetzt-mannigfaltigkeit (417). The move from the sun to the clock completes the publicness of time. Now, temporality makes the disclosure of space possible, so that concernful time is bound up with a place (Ort). In this way, dating is possible, so that, regarding the alleged spatialization of time, Heidegger claims that making-present and measurement make accessible the change of location of a spatial thing (417). Thus the temporality of disclosure is prior to the time revealed in the measuring of motion—hence the necessity of distinguishing Bewegtheit from Bewegung. Now the final question becomes: How does the everyday conception of time block an understanding of primordial temporality? The everyday concept, Heidegger answers, understands time from out of entities encountered within time.

#81 explores "Within-time-ness and the genesis of the vulgar concept of time." Heidegger begins by showing that the understanding of time that develops from clock-time is that expressed in Aristotle’s definition of time. He continues to claim that all subsequent philosophies of time conform to Aristotle. Now the ordinary understanding of time conceives time as a stream of nows. Such an understanding is possible only when datability and significance
are covered-over, so that the ecstatico-horizontal constitution of temporality is levelled-off (422). The now becomes understood as present-at-hand (423). In doing so, inauthenticity shows itself as a looking-away from finitude, and so grounding the misunderstanding that is vulgar time (424). Such inauthentic looking away also explains the covering-over of the genesis of vulgar time. Dasein falls in among entities and eventually comes to understand itself in the terms offered by these encounters.

I have dealt sufficiently with #82, the object of "Ousia and Grammé," in Chapter I.

#83 describes the breaking off of the project of Sein und Zeit. How is the disclosive understanding of Being possible in a way suited to Dasein, asks Heidegger? Dasein’s originary temporality must make possible the ecstatic project of Being, Heidegger reminds us, but how is this to be interpreted? Is there a way from originary time to the Sinn of Being? (437) Does time reveal itself as the horizon of Being? What is the trouble with the system of Sinn/time? We have seen how Sinn as direction is haunted by Sinn as meaning; we have also seen how Sinn as direction is a spatial haunting of the description of Dasein’s temporality. Such doubling, or haunting, prompts the Sinnsfrage so that the question of a Sinn of Being in general is haunted by Dasein’s temporality being implicated in the metaphoricity of Dasein’s "movement." This haunting is accompanied by another: Sinn as the Bedeutung of the word "Sein" threatens to provide a hardened, metaphysical answer to the question of Being in terms of a concept that can control our representations, that can give a meaning to "Being." Because of these intertwinings, Dasein’s Zeitlichkeit is described in irreducibly spatial terms, despite the attempt to ground Dasein’s spatiality on its temporality. Just as Derrida had predicted, the attempt to provide a pure temporal description of Dasein’s Zeitlichkeit prior to the posing of the question of Temporalität as the Sinn von Sein überhaupt is haunted by the repressed member of the pair "time/space," a haunting indicated by the spatiality of direction.
1. Heidegger distinguishes between Zeitlichkeit and Temporalität. The English convention is "temporality" for Zeitlichkeit and "Temporalität" for Temporalität. Because capitalization in English is often used for emphasis this convention runs the risk of thinking Temporalität is somehow more important than Zeitlichkeit, which is not the case. In this dissertation I will retain the German word Temporalität, but translate Zeitlichkeit as "temporality."

2. See here David Krell's Intimations of Mortality.


5. This acceptation does not come across very strongly in English. According to Kluge Etymologisches Wörterbuch the contemporary German Sinn combines the Bedeutungen of two separate roots, that of the Latin sensus and the neuhochdeutsch sinnan. The OED tells us that the English "sense" is derived from the Latin sensus, while Kluge claims sinnan has the same root as the germanisch sinpa, "Reise, Weg."

For Sinn as directionality compare the French sens unique and Italian senso unico for "one-way street." I will discuss all these acceptations of Sinn later in this chapter.

6. See the "The Double Session," in Dissemination, as well as "Signature Event Context" and "Limited Inc," in Limited Inc.


9. See here also the conclusion of "Form and Meaning" (Marges 206/172), where the sense of Being and the form of presence are linked, with the economy of their circulation seen as able to be disrupted by a notion of the trace, such as it is inscribed in the text of Plotinus. Derrida also devotes a note to Plotinus at the end of "Ousia and Grammé."

10. Derrida, Marges, pp. 392-93/328. David Wood uses this point to structure his The Deconstruction of Time.

11. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 36.


13. See Cassell's German-English Dictionary under Bedeutung: "3. sense, acceptation (of a word)."


26. That is, Heidegger in *Introduction to Metaphysics* still constructs narratives of a pre-metaphysical origin victimized by the hardening terminology of Plato and Aristotle. These narratives are undercut within the text of *Introduction to Metaphysics*, however, by the analyses that show that *physis* contains always already within it *idea*.

27. I touched upon the latter essay in discussing Derrida's treatment of it in "Ousia and Grammé" (Chapter I).

28. This mention of the perverse reading appears in the long footnote concerned with the way affirmative *Zusagen* undercuts the privilege of the question. *Of Spirit*, p. 153 / 134.

29. *Sein und Zeit* operates with the hermeneutic strategy thematized within it. That is, Heidegger will, in using several terms, rely upon the vague preunderstanding of the words he can assume to be at work in his audience. Heidegger will then in the course of the work rewrite, redefine thematically, these terms. A tension is then set up between the received meaning and the redefined term. As we will see, this tension between received and redefined meaning is especially severe when the term to be redefined is *Sinn* itself, one of whose received meanings is of course "meaning."
30. David Krell has pointed out in an unpublished class lecture the relation between Heidegger's interchangeable use of the verbs leben and sich bewegen and Aristotle's definition of entities by physis as those having the arche of their kinesis within themselves. See Physics 81 and Heidegger's commentary on that text.

31. See here Sallis, "Twisting Free: Being to an Extent Sensible."

32. Heidegger is not totally consistent here. In the table of contents he calls Zeitlichkeit the "ontological Sinn," while care is called the "existential Sinn" of Dasein. Of course, care is also, as the Being of Dasein, an ontological determination.


34. See here Heidegger's marginal note: "Verständlichkeit: sic! wobei freilich 'Verständlichkeit' auf Verstehen als Entwurf und dieser als ekstatische Zeitlichkeit."


36. In Chapter III I discuss the role of the sun in the Aristotelian economy of time.


43. There is a long history here, starting with Aristotle's Poetics and continuing through Cicero, Quintillian, Donatus, Augustine, and Aquinas, to name only the most prominent.

44. See here the etymologies of Begriff and con-cipere.

45. See here Sein und Zeit, pp. 350-51 for the equation of original light and Zeitlichkeit.

46. See here Derrida's "The Retrait of Metaphor."

47. See Caputo's Radical Hermeneutics here.

48. See Kluge: Etymologisches Worterbuch where the corresponding neuhochdeutsch sinnan means "reisen, streben, gehen." See also the French "sens unique" and the Italian "senso unico" for "one-way street." Littre list "direction" under the 21st definition of sens. See note 5 above.
49. Heidegger himself never thematizes the acceptance of Sinn as direction in Being and Time, although he does make it the object of several fascinating paragraphs in the 1953 essay on Georg Trakl, "Die Sprache im Gedicht," in Unterwegs zur Sprache. See also Derrida’s commentary on this passage in De l’esprit.

50. Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, p. 13.

51. Richardson at this point equates Sinn and Being, no doubt taking his lead from SZ 31, where the Being of a being is seen as constituting, although as hidden, the Sinn and ground of that which does show itself.

52. See Caputo’s Radical Hermeneutics for the distinction between primary and secondary projections.

53. Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 70. See above, p. 56.

54. Derrida, Marges, p. 69/60.

55. See here Richardson, p. 88.

56. See also the following passage setting up the attempt to ground Dasein’s spatiality on its temporality: "Es [Dasein] bestimmt je seinen eigenen Ort so, dass es aus dem eingeräumten Raum auf den 'Platz' zurückkommt, den es belegt hat" (Sein und Zeit, p. 368).

57. I will show in Chapter III how in the Aristotelian text any movement refers to spatial movement as the key term of its economy.


60. See here Nietzsche’s strictures on levelling of Rangordnungen in Beyond Good and Evil.

61. Heidegger is careful to place "between" [Zwischen] in quotation marks so that he might use sous rature a "spatial" term.

62. Heidegger does not make this distinction at 147 of Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, although he does express some hesitancy about the use of Bewegung: "Und dieses Sich-vorweg-sein als Zurückkommen ist eine eigentümliche Bewegung, wenn ich so sagen darf, die das Dasein selbst ständig macht."

63. Here we come to the dissemination of semantic kernels. Derrida will even come to discuss the dissemination of letters in "The Double Session."

64. See here Derrida’s interrogation in De l’esprit of Heidegger’s statement that "the essence of technology is nothing technological."

65. Derrida’s "Retrait" essay shows Heidegger moving toward such an understanding. To complement the analyses of "Retrait" one could compare the self-evisceration of the end of "Zeit und Sein" ("Ein Hindernis dieser Art bleibt auch das Sagen vom Ereignis in der Weise eines Vortrags. Er hat nur im Aussagesätzen gesprochen." [Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 25]) with the discussion of "ontischen Modelle" in the "Protocol to a Seminar" (Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 51).
CHAPTER III

THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY
AND THE ECONOMY OF TIME

Introduction

The Basic Problems of Phenomenology is the text of a lecture course given by Heidegger in Summer Semester 1927, just after the publication of Being and Time. It was the first release of the Gesamtausgabe, volume 24, in 1975. Thus, although typescripts of the course may have been available prior to publication, Derrida most likely had no idea of its contents when he wrote "Ousia and Grammé" in 1969. This is unfortunate, for we could have expected many interesting comments had he had the chance to read Basic Problems, since Heidegger devoted a substantial portion of the course to a detailed analysis of Aristotle's text on time in Physics IV 10-14.

In this chapter I will continue with the articulation of the economy of time by presenting a reading of Heidegger's reading of Aristotle. I will show how the very same spatial haunting I have called "the economy of time"--articulated by Derrida's "formal rule"--is at work in Basic Problems. I will do so by showing how Heidegger's attempt to purify Aristotle's time discourse of any spatial elements necessitates his overturning of three Aristotelian economies of meaning, those of proteron kai husteron, metabolé, and kinésis. All these overturnings attempt to reduce space, but the allegedly purified discourse on time is haunted by the possible iteration of its key terms (in Heidegger's case, Übergang) in the economy of spatial motion, phora, that Aristotle shows is primary in the economy of kinésis. Heidegger attempts to regulate these economies by distinguishing between the proper (formal and non-spatial) and improper...
(spatial) Sinn of key terms, but I show how this attempt is caught up in the Sinnsfrage, the economy of which itself contains an irreducible spatial moment. As I have claimed in Chapter I, the formal rule of the margin is one of "submission (to) and subtraction (from)" the system of Being as presence. The formal rule can thus be said to articulate the submission to the self-effacing of the trace (which allows for presence) and the subtraction from that system (the hollowing out of presence by the trace that must be able to be read from the inscription of [the desire for] presence). The self-effacing of the trace—which, as difféance, articulates time/space—allows for time to appear, but as always haunted by the repressed member of the pair, space. In showing how Heidegger’s attempt to purify Aristotle’s time discourse of spatial elements is haunted by space I will have shown that the reading of Aristotle in Basic Problems fits into what Derrida calls "the epoch of Sein und Zeit," since I will have shown that its key terms—as capable of iteration in an economy with an irreducible spatial moment—are undecidably spatial/temporal. In other words, I will have shown that Basic Problems falls under the sway of the "formal rule" of the occlusion of "the problem of the written trace" that governs the project of the question of the Sinn of Being.  

I will round out the chapter with a short comparison of the reading of Aristotle in "Ousia and Grammé" and Basic Problems.

The Outline of the Course

As Heidegger’s note on the first page of Basic Problems tells us, the course was intended as a "new working out of the third division of the first part of Being and Time" (1). As such, it was to work out "Time and Being," and thus provide the concrete answer to the question of the Sinn of Being. The outline of the course calls for three parts. The first lays out four traditional theses about Being; the second was to have tied them to four fundamental problems, but is cut off after the discussion of the first problem. The third, which never appeared, was to have laid out the scientific method of ontology and the idea of phenomenology.

The four traditional theses are those of Kant, the medievals via Aristotle, the
According to Heidegger, the four theses may be expressed by the following propositions: Kant says Being is not a real predicate, the medievals via Aristotle that essence and existence belong to the Being of beings, the moderns that res extensa and res cogitans are the divisions of Being, and logic that the copula may be used to address all beings (20). The basic problems corresponding to these are those of the ontological difference, the fundamental articulation of Being, the unity of the modes of Being, and the truth-character of Being (22-25).

The four theses are discussed in depth, but only the first of the corresponding problems, that of the ontological difference, is discussed. It is in the discussion of the problem of the ontological difference that the analysis of Aristotle’s text on time appears. How does Heidegger manage to reach Aristotle in Basic Problems, when Being and Time is cut off before the historical discussions? Let us consider the starting point of the two investigations: In Being and Time Heidegger starts from the oblivion of the question of Being, while in Basic Problems Heidegger sets out to investigate the possibility of phenomenological ontology as scientific philosophy, as the science of Being (#3). Being and Time thus aims at awakening the question of Being via phenomenological investigation of the entity that has the Being question as a mode of its Being. After the phenomenological task is completed, Being and Time was to have attempted an historical destruction. Basic Problems, in contrast, includes destruction as one of the moments of its phenomenological investigation from the beginning. It investigates the question of Being with three moments of phenomenology that are at work simultaneously. Heidegger calls them reduction, construction, and destruction (31). Reduction moves from a being to its Being (29); construction is the “projecting of the antecedently given being upon its Being and and the structures of its Being” (29-30); while destruction [Destruktion] is “a critical process in which the traditional concepts, which at first must necessarily be employed, are deconstructed [ein kritischer Abbau] down to the sources from which they are drawn” (31). Such destruction is necessitated by the way traditional concepts pervade philosophy. Thus in Basic Problems the confrontation with the tradition, which is certainly not lacking in Being and Time, even though it is deferred, is brought to the forefront and is part of the investigation from the first.
What of the unity of the project of Basic Problems? How are the two parts connected to each other and how are the four problems related to each other? Heidegger writes in Basic Problems that the four problems basic to the science of Being cannot be seen as unified, nor cannot even be seen as problems, if the "fundamental question [Fundamentalfrage] of the whole science of being has not been put and answered: the question of the Sinn of Being in general" (21). This is the question to which the second part of the course will be devoted. At this point Heidegger also reminds us that the question of the Sinn of Being is tied to the possibility of the understanding of Being, that is, the horizon upon which the understanding of Being is projected (21). The investigation of this horizon presupposes an analytic of Dasein which has revealed that temporality makes possible the understanding of Being (22). From this conclusion grow the four problems: the ontological difference, the basic articulation of Being, the unity of Being's modifications, and the truth-character of Being (22-25). The unity of these questions thus is tied to the question of the Sinn of Being, the "fundamental question" of ontology as science. Heidegger here projects a continuation of #4 of Being and Time that would show how ontology has an "ontic fundament" (26). Such a project opens the path that will eventually result in the overturning (Umschlag) of ontology in(to) metontology, as sketched out in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. The problem of metontology is the problem of the irruption of Dasein in the midst of beings as a whole, das Seiende im ganzen. Heidegger's radicality here belies Herman Rappaport's claim that Basic Problems is "a conservative version of Being and Time." 

The Analysis of Aristotle's Text on Time

That Heidegger construes the four basic problems as grounded in the question of the Sinn of Being is made clear by the title of Part Two of Basic Problems of Phenomenology: "The Fundamental Ontological Question of the Sinn of Being in General." The subtitle of Part Two is "The Basic Structures and Basic Ways of Being." Chapter One, the only one to appear, is "The Problem of the Ontological Difference [Differenz]." It is important to clarify the order of grounding
Heidegger lays out here if we are to understand how the analysis of Aristotle fits into the text of Basic Problems. Heidegger shows in the introduction to Part 2, Chapter 1 how the possibility of ontology, that is, philosophy as science, "stands and falls" with the possibility of a carrying through of the difference [Unterschiedung] of Being and beings (322). The Unterschied in turn depends upon the conceptualizing of the understanding of Being [In den Griff bekommen].

Here we see the problem of (scientifically) objectifying that upon which (everyday) projections project. This entails the objectifying of that upon which Being is projected, or in other words, a rendering explicit of what had served as the implicit term of the projection that makes up our vague everyday understanding of Being. Heidegger explains that "It is in the objectification of Being as such that the basic act constitutive of ontology as a science is performed" (398). The problem is this: since objectifying is scientific understanding, upon what is one to project the objectifying projection that seeks to understand everyday projection (437)? Heidegger will deny an infinite regress and refer us to the problem of the finitude of time: that is, death.11

Understanding the understanding of Being means clarifying how understanding belongs to the being who understands, that is, Dasein. Thus the "ontological analytic of the existential constitution of Dasein" is third in the series of grounding analyses necessary for the possibility of ontology as scientific philosophy, the science of Being (322). Heidegger reminds us that such an analytic is subject to the demand that it ground the ground-structures of Dasein in their "unity and wholeness."12 Heidegger now tells us we must presuppose the essential result of the existential analytic as an "already established result" (323). The result we are to take up is that "the constitution of Dasein's Being is grounded in temporality [Zeitlichkeit] (323). But precisely because we are simply taking the term over as a result, we have no guarantee that we will hear it correctly. Here we see the problem of floating assertions, cut off from grounding intuition, as analyzed by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit."13 So, Heidegger continues, we must find a way to win an understanding of what temporality means [besagt] (323). This way is to take up the vulgar concept of time and show that it presupposes temporality. This will show that the ontological condition of possibility of the understanding of Being is temporality, which also makes possible the other problems of ontology (323). When temporality [Zeitlichkeit] is explicitly shown
as the ground of ontology Heidegger calls it Temporalität (324).

The order of groundings is then as follows: Ontology is grounded on ontological difference, which is grounded on the understanding of Being, which is grounded in Zeitlichkeit. Zeitlichkeit in its turn is both presupposed as the result of the existential analytic and is to be seen again from the reading of the vulgar time concept. Heidegger adds that the whole project is one of seeing Being in its temporal [temporalen] determination (324). Following this pattern of grounding Chapter 1 has four sections, #19-22, that work their way from (19) vulgarly-understood time to temporality [Zeitlichkeit] to (20) temporality as the ground of Dasein’s transcendence to (21) temporality [Temporalität] as the ground of the understanding of Being to (22) the ontological difference. Thus #19 is entitled "Time and Temporality [Zeit und Zeitlichkeit]," #20 Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität, #21 Temporalität und Sein, and #22 "Being and beings. The Ontological Difference."

#19 contains the analysis of Aristotle, as subsection a) "Historical orientation regarding the traditional concept of time and a delineation of the common understanding of time that lies at the basis of this concept." Subsection a) has two further subdivisions, (alpha) "Outline [Aufriss] of Aristotle’s treatise on time," and (beta) "Interpretative exposition [Auslegung] of Aristotle’s concept of time." Subsection b) then deals with "The common understanding of time and the return to original time," with 4 subdivisions dealing with clock time, expressed time, the derivation of expressed time from existential temporality, and finally the "derivation of the structural moments of now-time from ecstatic-horizontal temporality. The mode of being of falling as the reason for the covering up of original time." The analysis thus proceeds from the common-time—to the original—temporality—the opposite path from that taken in Being and Time.¹⁴

In chapter 19 Heidegger distinguishes between the vulgar understanding of time and its conceptual expression in philosophy. He does not so much here mean to emphasize the difference between a vague projection and the scientific objectifying of the Sinn of that projection as he means to claim that the conceptual expression retains the vulgarity of the experience it articulates.¹⁵ Its vulgarity would consist in its missing the originality of the phenomenon of which it is a derivative. To articulate this claim Heidegger has recourse to a very traditional schema
of expression. He writes that the conceptual expression is a stamping [Prägung] of the phenomenon of time (326). Heidegger will also claim that the ancients (Aristotle and Augustine) have already put forth the essentials of the content of the traditional concept of time (327), and that they have said the essential that can be said from within the vulgar understanding of time (329). He then asks whether the interpretation we find in the traditional concept of time has been to the measure of the phenomenon, and whether the originality of the phenomenon has been grasped (326). The ordering here is: 1) vulgar understanding of time; 2) traditional concept of time (the expression of the vulgar understanding); 3) the phenomenon of time; 4) the original phenomenon of time; 5) original time (327).

After these distinctions Heidegger moves on to #19a, "Historical orientation to the traditional time concept and the characteristic of the vulgar understanding of time that underlies it." He mentions Plotinus, Simplicius, Thomas Aquinas and Suarez as having provided classic commentaries on Aristotle's time discourse, or as having provided treatises on time in their own right. Heidegger then discusses Bergson, in what we have come to recognize as his cavalier way. He claims Bergson misunderstands the Aristotelian understanding of time in his attempted confrontation with Aristotle's concept of time (328-29). We will come back again to the way Heidegger attempts to control the economy of undecidably spatial/temporal terms with just such a recourse to a distinction between proper interpretation and misunderstanding. I should make clear here once again that I do not believe one can or should always avoid the attribution of a misunderstanding. I only wish to account positively for the possibility of the so-called spatializing of time. In my own terms, I wish to account for the irreducible spatial moment of the economy of time, the way supposedly purified discourses about time or temporality (when it is equated with original time) operate with terms haunted by the possibility of their iteration in spatial contexts. This does not mean one who simply equates time with space (as Heidegger claims Bergson does, but, as we have seen in Chapter II, he is far from doing) is not misunderstanding when attributing such an understanding to Aristotle. Such an equation--of time with space--would amount to a discourse of space purified of all temporal terms, and would simply be the mirror image of a discourse that attempted to purify time of all spatial terms. What
is needed, and what I attempt to do in this dissertation, is to articulate the economy of time.

We must note at the outset that Heidegger denies himself a detailed interpretation of Aristotle's treatise. He proposes at first a brief presentation of the outline of Aristotle, then to illustrate the concept with a selective reading of Aristotle. Thus in the encounter with Aristotle Heidegger will only "select a few characteristic propositions in order to illustrate by them the traditional time concept" (329). He will preface his interpretation with a "short account of the structure of the Aristotelian treatise on time" (329), to which we now turn.

Heidegger's Aufriss of Aristotle's Time Treatise

At first, it is important to note that Heidegger provides no context for the time chapters, dealing neither with its place in the Physics nor with the relation of the Physics to the rest of the Aristotelian corpus. This is strange, since Heidegger scrupulously provided the context for his discussion of the historical doctrines in the first part of Basic Problems. Later I will suggest that Heidegger must ignore or overturn several of Aristotle's economies of meaning in order to read the Aristotelian treatise on time as a clue to Dasein's temporality. Perhaps the failure to provide a context is related to the violence of these overturnings. In any case, I shall give a bare sketch of the context of the Aristotelian discussion of time. Ross claims the following structure for the Physics:

What we find, then, is two main parts of the Physics. (1) books i-iv, referred to as ta phusika or ta peri phuseos, (2) books v, vi, vii, referred to as ta peri kinéseos, but also included in ta phusika in a wider sense of that term. There is also (3) a comparatively isolated book, book vii.

Following this outline, the first four books deal with the concept of phusis. The first book sets the method of study as that of the study of principles, specifically matter [hulë or hupokeimenon], privation [antikeimenon or sterésis], and form [morphé or eidos or arché hés ho logos]. The second defines the relation of physics to mathematics and first philosophy by defining the field as studying those beings with the arché of their kinésis or stasis within themselves. The second book continues with the doctrine of the four causes, upon which Heidegger will comment many
times in the course of his writings. The third book shows how the study of *kinésis* involves the study of the infinite, place, the void, and time, and undertakes the study of *kinésis* and the infinite. The fourth book takes up the study of place, the void, and time. According to Ross’ schema, book four concludes the discussion of *physis*, while books five, six and eight discuss *kinésis*. Book five discusses the different types of change (*metabolé*), essential and accidental. It is important here at the outset to make clear how Aristotle sets up these economies. Fuller discussion with textual references will follow. Aristotle specifies three types of essential changes: generation (*genesis*), destruction (*phthora*), and motion (*kinésis*). Motions are understood according to the doctrine of the categories. Substances (first category) move, according to three succeeding categories: quality (alteration), quantity (increase or decrease), or place (locomotion) (*phora*). Books 6 and 8 then discuss problems in the theory of motion involving continuity and divisibility, infinity, contact and the doctrine of the unmoved mover. As we noted above, Ross considers Book 7 an early, immature effort that moreover does not fit the flow of the discourse—an "excrescence" in his words.

Heidegger, as we noted above, does not provide any context for the time treatise, but begins with *Physics* 4.10. Heidegger’s outline proceeds by way of the division of Aristotle’s time text into chapters. Heidegger’s first treatment is straightforward and unexceptional, except for one strange assertion we will discuss shortly. Since many detailed commentaries are available on Aristotle’s time treatise I will not attempt to duplicate them, but will only sketch out Heidegger’s sketch. These few pages provide a most useful overview of Aristotle’s discussion before plunging into the details. Heidegger points out first that in the first chapter under consideration (Chapter 10: 217b 29-218b 20) Aristotle devotes unequal attention to his two guiding questions, whether time belongs among beings or non-beings, and what the *physis* of time might be. This is true enough, but then, after Heidegger notes that the form of the discussion is that of the *aporia*, he most oddly claims that a positive answer is given by Aristotle in the last chapter at 223a16-224a17. What is strange about this claim is that *Physics* 4.14 does not seem to offer anything like a "positive answer" to the question of time’s Being or non-Being. Chapter 14 certainly does answer the question of time’s dependence on the soul, but
it does not address the question of the Being of time arising from the non-Being of its parts. Martineau notes his perplexity at this point: "But I have never succeeded, in reading and rereading this passage, and all of chapter 14, in all its senses, in finding anything which resembles such a 'positive answer,' nor even any sort of answer, even indirect." We should recall here that Derrida also denies such an answer is ever given; in fact he uses this lack to set up his analysis of the "evaded question."

To what could Heidegger be referring? Why would he say such a thing? At 335 Heidegger will only say Aristotle picks back up again the first problem: "Where and how is time?" Why this way of putting Aristotle's question whether time belongs to beings or non-beings? As we will see Heidegger uses Aristotle's question of the relation of time and the soul as a bridge to discussing the grounding of ordinary time in Dasein's temporality (350).

Heidegger very briefly explores the way Aristotle sets up the two aporiai (330-32). In discussing the way Aristotle sets up the first aporia we should note that Heidegger uses the equation of ein Vorhandenes and ousia first set up in Being and Time #6:

With reference to the first question, whether time is a being [etwas Vorhandenes] or a mé on, the latter determination appears to suggest itself. How should time exist as a whole [als Ganze vorhanden sein], an ousia, if the parts that go to make it up are non-existent [nichtselend sind] and are so in different ways? (330-31)

Here we see the ambiguity of to on and ousia which Heidegger will explore in Introduction to Metaphysics, "Hegel's Concept of Experience," and elsewhere. Heidegger exploits the ambiguity of ousia by showing how it can be iterated in contexts that intend either a being, or the Being of that being. Here we see an undecidability of a term across the ontico-ontological difference.

At this point it might be helpful if I give here a bit more of Aristotle's detail on the first aporia, that of time's Being as threatened by the non-Being of its parts (217b 30-218a 30). As both Derrida and Martineau note, but Heidegger does not, the discussion is "according to the exoteric doctrine" [dia tôn exotericón logón]. The discussion of whether or not time belongs to beings seems to indicate that it does not, or at best hardly does. The discussion centers on the determination of the now as a part of time. Three possibilities ensue from this determination: the
now can be considered as a part of time, as not a part of time, and as both same and different. Each of these ways of considering the now, however, leads to its own paradox. If one takes the now as a part of time three consequences follow: first, the parts of time, past and future, are not; second, any time would have to be composed of past and future, but that which is composed of non-beings cannot share in ousia; third, a thing with parts must have existing parts, and time is with parts, yet the past and future are not. If one takes the now as not a part of time, we find that, since the part measures the whole, and the whole is composed of parts, then time does not seem to be composed of wholes. Considering the now as same or different, Aristotle says about the now as different: that two different parts cannot exist hama, but the earlier one must be destroyed. Yet it cannot be destroyed in itself, nor in another now. One cannot consider the now as same, though. No divisible and finite thing has only one limit, yet the now is a limit, and a limited time can be taken. Furthermore, if to be hama is to be in the same now, prior and posterior would not be different.

The next discussion concerns the phusis of time. Heidegger runs through the historical answers which Aristotle considers and rejects. They need not concern us here. The upshot of the consideration of the tradition for Aristotle is that time is not a motion, but is equally not without motion. Thus he concludes, time must be something in connection with motion. Aristotle uses the genitive, ti kineseôs. Two terminological notes should briefly detain us here. One is Heidegger’s use of Bewegung to translate Aristotle’s kinésis. We should recall here Being and Time’s distinction between the Bewegung of a thing and the Bewegtheit of Dasein as I discussed it in Chapter II. Second, Heidegger here tells us of the Aristotelian equation of kinésis and metabolé. He writes, “For kinésis Aristotle says equally metabolé” (332). Metabolé, Heidegger continues, is the most general concept of motion, literally [wörtlich] Umschlag. Umschlag is an extraordinarily rich term for Heidegger. He had used it in #69b of Being and Time to describe the change from Zuhanden to Vorhanden projection, and he will come to use it in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic to describe the self-collapse of ontology into metontology, as the question guiding his research moves of its own weight from Dasein to that of Dasein in the midst of Beings as a whole, das Seiende im ganzen. The equation of kinésis and metabolé
we note in this passage will be crucial for Heidegger in attempting to skew the economy of kinésis and hence purify the economy of time of its spatial moments.

Heidegger merely records the result of Aristotle's second chapter on time (Chapter 11: 218b 21-220a 26), the famous definition of time, touto gar estin ho chronos, arithmos kinéseós kata proteron kai husteron (219b 1-2). In its standard English translation, this line reads "this then is time, the number of motion according to the prior and posterior." Heidegger's German reads "das nämlich ist die Zeit: ein Gezahltes, das im Hinblick und für den Hinblick auf das Vor und Nach an der Bewegung sich zeigt; oder kurz, ein Gezahltes der im Horizont des Früher und Später begegnenden Bewegung" (333). Hofstadter renders this as: "time is this, namely, something counted which shows itself in and for regard to the before and after in motion or, in short, something counted in connection with motion as encountered in the horizon of earlier and later." We will see how the translation of proteron kai husteron by "before and after" and "earlier and later" will be a main focus of Heidegger's Auslegung of Aristotle and how this double translation allows Heidegger to skew the economy of kinésis.

For Heidegger, Aristotle's third chapter (Chapter 12: 220a 27-222a 9) defines in greater detail the connection between motion and time. Here arises the phenomenon of "being in time," or "intratemporality." The numerical character of the now is discussed here as well as the phenomena of rest and that which is outside time (334). The fourth chapter (Chapter 13: 222a 10-222b 29) then sets out "the unity of time in the manifoldness of the sequence of the nows." Here the now is seen as constitutive of time's continuity. The fifth chapter (Chapter 14: 222b 30-224a 17) concludes the Aristotelian treatise on time by discussing the relation of the "earlier and later" to the "before and after." In addition to this question the relation of time and the psyché, the problem of simultaneity, and the purest measure of time in the circular locomotion [kuklophoria] of the outermost heaven are also addressed here. Significantly for us, Heidegger does not follow up in his Auslegung on the last topic he mentions here in the Aufriss, that of circular locomotion. We will come to explore fully the consequences of the role circular locomotion plays in Aristotle's economy of time when we discuss the privilege of phora in the last book of the Physics.
Heidegger closes the sketch with his standard claim about Aristotle's paradigmatic role for the tradition of metaphysics:

all the central problems which were thereafter discussed in the course of the further development of philosophy are already marked out. It can be said that subsequent times did not get essentially beyond the stage of Aristotle's treatment of the problem--apart from a few exceptions in Augustine and Kant, who nevertheless retain in principle the Aristotelian concept of time. (336)

As we have seen in Chapter I, Derrida takes issue with this move, by demonstrating the marginality of all texts, Aristotle's included. The margin is articulated by the formal rule--all texts have exceptions (are subtracted from) the system of presence governing what Heidegger calls "the Aristotelian concept of time." One might even say Derrida articulates the way exceptions are the rule.

Heidegger's Auslegung of Aristotle's Time Treatise

Next Heidegger embarks on his Auslegung of Aristotle's treatise on time. He remarks that he will not keep strictly to the text, but by a "free discussion" and by "carrying the interpretation somewhat further, we shall try to focus more clearly on the phenomenon as Aristotle sees it" (336). In this sub-section I shall trace the overturnings of three Aristotelian economies licensed by this freedom with the text. Those three are the economies of proteron kai husteron, metabole, and kinésis. It is important to note at the outset that Aristotle sees these economies, like the all-important economy of Being centered on the phrase to on legetai pollakhós, as regulations of a polysemy. As Derrida shows in distinguishing polysemy from dissemination in "White Mythology," Aristotle's conception of signification in the Metaphysics' discussion of the principle of non-contradiction assumes that "not to mean one thing is not to mean at all." Thus univocity is the telos of the regulated polysemy, even if, as Aubenque claims, such univocity is never to be reached in the science of Being qua Being. I will be pointing to the dissemination resulting from the possibility of iteration in contexts other than the one an author might attempt to designate as governed by a proper Sinn. Let me stress that dissemination does not entail the loss of all meaning, but the proliferation of meaning. Instead of no meaning we find ourselves faced with too much meaning to be fully controlled by intentions.
made possible by inscription within a text—but this does not entail no control whatsoever.

Heidegger starts the Auslegung by citing Aristotle's definition of time: *touto gar estin ho chronos, arithmos kineseōs kata to proteron kai husteron.* Martineau notes here that Heidegger skips the interpretation of the way Aristotle sets up the *aporias.* This is a crucial difference with Derrida, which we will explore later. In the body of his interpretation Heidegger discusses six topics: 1) the example of the moving pointer, 2) the translation of *proteron kai husteron* by "before and after" and by "earlier and later," 3) the experience of motion, 4) the identity and difference of the now, 5) the numerical character of time and the now as transition, and 6) time and the soul. I will show the way the overturning of the three Aristotelian economies undergirds Heidegger's interpretation as he moves through these six points.

Heidegger first takes up the connection of time with motion via the example of the moving pointer. I will not discuss in detail Heidegger's points in this passage, since they will come up again later. By means of his own phenomenological descriptions, Heidegger shows that time is not a property of the pointer. Heidegger here reminds us that Aristotle distinguishes between the moving thing and motion, and that time belongs to motion [Bewegung], even though it is certainly not identical to motion (337). Heidegger next reminds us that Aristotle has specified that time is a number, and precisely the number as counted, not as counting. He then calls upon us to attempt an experiment, asking, "What can I count about the motion of the rod?" (339) After some patient investigation Heidegger concludes that time is "read off [ablesen] from the motion of the pointer" (340). Heidegger bolsters this conclusion with the the example of the sun attended to by the human being in "natural, everyday existence [der Mensch im natürlichen-altdäglichen Dasein]."

Here I must mention the extraordinary role played by the sun in Aristotle, even though I will not be able to explore completely the circle of the heliotrope and its role in the economy of time. For Aristotle, the sun, along with the moon and planets, is moved by the first heaven, which is in turn moved by the prime mover. The movement of the sun, as analyzed in *De Generatione et Corruptione,* causes generation and destruction (336a 32-33; 336b 17-18). In the *Physics* Aristotle will even say that "both man and the sun beget man" (194b 13-14). We
should also recall here that Heidegger tells us that the path of the sun lays out "regions of life and death" for Dasein. I will return to discuss the sun when I analyze the role of circular locomotion in the economy of kinésis and hence of time later in this chapter.

The second topic discussed by Heidegger is that of the translation of proteron kai husteron. This is the first Aristotelian economy in which we shall have to trace Heidegger's intervention. The importance of the proteron kai husteron devolves upon the question: What is the horizon for the telling of time? Heidegger translates Aristotle's definition of time as saying that "time is something counted in connection with encountered motion with a view to the before and after [Vor und Nach], in the horizon of the earlier and later [Früher und Später]" (341). The looked-for horizon is thus that of the "earlier and later." We must carefully note here that Heidegger has translated proteron kai husteron with two phrases: "before and after" and "earlier and later." Webb points out Heidegger's unique choice of the temporal "earlier and later," claiming that the standard English translators Barnes, Wicksteed and Cornford, and Hussey all use "before and after." Apostle, on the other hand, has "prior and posterior."

Heidegger claims that it is "not necessary" to translate proteron kai husteron by the "indifferent" set of terms "before and after" (342). Now Aristotle himself sets up an economy for proteron kai husteron at Metaphysics 5.11, 1018b 8-19a 14. Things are said to be prior when they are: 1. things nearer some beginning [arché]; 2. things prior in knowledge; 3. the attributes of prior things; 4. things prior by phusis or ousia. Within the first area, "things nearer some arché." Aristotle will name: a). place [topos]; b). time; c). movement [kinésis]; d). power [dunamis]; and e). arrangement [taxis]. The economy as Aristotle lays it out thus shows, among others, both spatial and temporal moments. We can thus call proteron kai husteron undecidably spatial/temporal. However, Aristotle does not leave the economy just as he lists it, but he attempts to determine a primary "sense" for proteron: the prior sense of prior, we might say. In the Metaphysics Aristotle claims that the primary sense of proteron kai husteron is 4). things prior by phusis or ousia (1019a 11). However, in the Physics' time treatise Aristotle will say that proteron kai husteron is primarily [prôton] in topos (219a 15). Thus we can say that in the determination of kinésis the order of relata is accomplished primarily by reference to some arché,
and that that arché is a topos—or better, in some topos.\textsuperscript{37}

In Heidegger's terms then, "before and after" represents ordering by reference to topos and "earlier and later" ordering by reference to time. Heidegger will go against Aristotle's economy by privileging the temporal sense of "earlier and later" over the topos-directed, or "indifferent" sense of "before and after." However, could not one show that even "before and after" [Vor und Nach] is not "indifferent," but "undecidable" with regard to space and time? Surely common usage testifies that "before" [Vor] can be used to mean "prior" or "in front of" while "after" [Nach] can mean both "posterior" and "in back of."\textsuperscript{38} Now Heidegger cannot bring himself to completely censure the translation of proteron kai husteron by "before and after." Such a translation does have its "specific rights in accordance with the phenomenon [bestimmtes sachliches Recht]" (342; translation modified). Thus Heidegger has set up what he will later call a "wavering" (349) in Aristotle's text between these two meanings of proteron kai husteron, i.e. "before and after" and "earlier and later." I will show how such "wavering," despite Heidegger's explicit intention, acknowledges the undecidability of proteron kai husteron and hence the irreducible spatial haunting in the economy of time.

For now let us follow Heidegger as he notes that the translation by "earlier and later" appears impossible, for "earlier" and "later" are themselves "determinations of time" (341). Aristotle's time definition thus seems tautologous, defining time by means of two sets of temporal determinations, so that in essence the formula reads "time is time." For Heidegger, however, this is not tautologous, as is shown by a comparison of what is intended by "earlier and later" [was sie meinen] with what is intended by the subject of the definition (341). "Perhaps," Heidegger continues, "the second term 'time' means [sagt] something different and more original [Ursprünglichere] than what Aristotle means [meint] in the definition itself" (341). This seeming tautology in not in fact a tautology, but "betrays the inner coherence of the Aristotelian time phenomenon, that is, of time as commonly understood, with the original time which we are calling temporality" (341). Here we can clearly see Heidegger's recourse to assertions about Aristotle's intention—obviously a strategy caught up in the Sinnsfrage—to regulate the undecidability of proteron kai husteron. I will return to this point shortly, but for now, let us
continue following Heidegger’s text.

Heidegger continues by noting that if we understand the way “earlier and later” refers to temporality as original time, then we can allow “earlier and later” to translate proteron kai husteron. Such a translation, the result of our more authentic [einigermassen] understanding of Aristotle, is also the result of our interpreting Aristotle’s definition “In conformity with its original approach [gemäss Ihrem Ansatz]” (342). It is this insistence on the propriety and originality of only one moment of an economy of interpretation that one could confidently predict would have attracted Derrida’s strictures had he read Basic Problems at the time of his writing of “Ousia and Grammè.”

Heidegger concludes this section of the discussion by demanding that the origin of vulgar time in temporality should be revealed (342). He approaches this by investigating the way proteron kai husteron directs our vision in the counting of time. He first takes up the translation by “before and after” to allow this to justify the translation by “earlier and later.”

With the question of translation as his bridge Heidegger moves on to discuss his third point, how time becomes visible in the experience of motion. Here the second of our three Aristotelian economies come into play, that of metabolé. Heidegger here assimilates two concepts Aristotle rigorously distinguishes, kinésis, “motion,” and metabolé, “change.” Heidegger writes: “To motion [Bewegung] in general, kinésis or metabolé, there belongs kinoumenon kinetai: a moving thing is moving, is in motion” (342-43). What is the economy of metabolé in the Physics? For Aristotle, kinésis, change “from a subject to a subject” (225b 2), is itself a species of metabolé, change. The other species of metabolé are genesis, “generation,” the change “from a nonsubject to a subject,” and phthora, “destruction,” the change “from a subject to a nonsubject.” Aristotle provides an extended discussion at Physics E 1, 225a 1-b9. A key phrase that clearly shows the subordination of kinésis to metabolé occurs at 224a 35: “Since every motion [kinésis] is a kind of change [metabolé tis].”

To be sure, Heidegger’s assimilation of kinésis and metabolé in the time discussion is not entirely without foundation in Aristotle’s text. Aristotle does claim that “in the current discussion it is not necessary to distinguish kinésis and metabolé” (218b 19-20). For Heidegger,
such an equation removes the reference to space in the discussion of time, leaving us with only the formal sense of change. However, Aristotle does use *kinésis* almost exclusively in his discussions of time; and—as we will see in exploring the economy of *kinésis*—*phora* is the primary term in the economy of both *kinésis* and *metabolé*, one to which all other terms for motions and changes make reference as subordinate in one way or another. In other words, Aristotle will make clear that all other motions and changes depend upon *phora*, a type of motion, for their existence. Thus the attempted assimilation does not hold once one takes into account Aristotle’s other texts on the economies of *kinésis* and *metabolé*. Now if one would wish to bring the ontico-ontological difference to bear at this point, by saying, as Heidegger will say in the 1931 lecture course on *Metaphysics* Theta, that *kinésis* refers to the Being of beings as well as to specific ontic motions, one would be forced to address the issue of a term undecidable across the ontological difference. The only way to decide such undecidability would be by recourse to an ostensibly proper *Sinn* for the term, and this would fall prey to the *Sinnfrage*. In any case, I will show that the reference to *phora* as the primary term in the economies key to the definition of time is irreducible.

We should also note here that although Aristotle seems to use *kinésis* generically in the time discussion at 223a 32, a closer examination of the latter quote reveals things are not that clear. Aristotle writes, using the middle voice throughout, which renders the verbs undecidably active/passive, and necessitates orthographic gymnastics in English translation, that "and indeed [is] generate[s/d] in time and [is] destroy[s/ed] and [is] grow[s/n] and [is] alter[s/ed]. In so far as these are *kinésis*, in that respect there is a number of each motion [kai gar gignetai en khronoi kai phtheiretai kai auxaneitai kai alloloutai kai pheretai; héi oun kinésis esti, tautèi estin hekastés kinéseos arithmos]." Now this "in so far” makes problematic the claim that *kinésis* is intended as a genus here. Rather, Aristotle seems to be indicating that to some extent the other forms of *metabolé* can be seen as similar to *kinésis* in this particular field.

Why would Heidegger, normally the most careful of readers, assimilate the species-*kinésis*—to the genus--*metabolé*—or at best, privilege the assimilating text (218b 19) over the distinguishing one (225a 35)? In order to answer this question we must discuss our third
economy, that of kinésis. In discussing time, Aristotle, and Heidegger too, for that matter, almost always interprets kinésis in terms of its primary instance, phora, "motion with respect to place." Why is this? What is the privilege of phora? What is its role in the economy of kinésis? For Aristotle, there are four types of kinésis: locomotion [phora], growth, decay, and alteration. Locomotion is for Aristotle paradigmatic: he says in the discussion of topos at Physics 4 1, 208a 31-32 that "the most common and most important motion, which we call 'locomotion,' is a motion with respect to place [kai tés kinéseōs hé koiné malista kai kuriótate kata topon estin, hén kaloumen phoran]." See also in this regard 243a 39 where phora is called "first of motions [prôte tôn kinéseōn]"; 260a 28 where phora is called "the motion that is necessarily first [tautén anagkaion einai protén]"; 261a 28 where phora is called "first among motions [tôn kinéseōn hé phora prôtè]"; and 266a 1 where kinésis kata topon is called kuriós. We will return to consider Aristotle’s arguments for the primacy of phora. If we would follow them, these arguments would lead us into the circle of the heliotrope. Unfortunately, this path must remain untrodden for us in this dissertation. For now let us rejoin the Heideggerian text.

As we have seen in our exposition of the context of the discussion of Aristotle, Heidegger needs to read the Aristotelian time treatise in a way that will enable him to elucidate a clue to the ecstatic temporality he names original time. Furthermore, as we have seen in Chapter II, Heidegger needs to ground spatiality on temporality in order to safeguard his project of investigating the question of the Sinn of Being in general. The key here is this: the Aristotelian economies, with their emphasis on the primacy of phora, make plain the irreducible reference to space in the measurement and experience of time because any iteration of kinésis contains a reference to the primacy of phora. The discourse that seeks to define and describe time uses terms haunted by the possibility of their iteration in spatial contexts. These defining and describing terms are inscribed in economies with irreducible spatial moments--irreducible precisely because the possibility of iteration in spatial contexts cannot, de jure, be completely controlled. Heidegger attempts such control, but can do so only by trying to determine the proper Sinn of kinésis as completely formal. But this recourse to Sinn founders on the spatiality inscribed in the Sinnsfrage.
Let me expand on how this point can be seen in terms of the Sinnsfrage. Here we will come upon the key term in Heidegger's analysis: Übergang. He will use this term both generically, to indicate pure change-over [Umschlag] and specifically, to indicate locomotion, phora. He will also use it to indicate the characteristic of the now as "open on both sides," as an Übergehendes (352). Heidegger finds himself compelled to distinguish the proper Sinn for kinésis as non-spatial by assimilating it to metabolé. He writes: "The most general character of motion [Bewegung] is metabolé, that is, a turn or change [Umschlag], or better, a transition [Übergang] from something to something" (343). Previously Heidegger had used Übergang in the discussion of motion with regard to place: locomotion; in Greek, phora. He writes at 337: "We say: its change of place [Ortsveränderung], that is, the transition [Übergang] from a position [Stelle] to another." Übergang also appears in discussions of locomotion at 338 and 343 (line 15). Let me be clear: I do not mean to claim that Übergang is "spatial"—i.e., that it "has a primarily spatial sense"—but that it is used both generically as equivalent to Umschlag—metabolé—and specifically with regard to locomotion—phora. It can be iterated in either context: it is undecidable. The only way to decide this generic/specific undecidability is by claiming to identify a proper, non-spatial, Sinn. But Sinn, as we have shown, cannot reduce the spatiality of direction. The irreducibility of spatiality in the economy of Sinn will be of the utmost importance in the discussion of now as transition, where Heidegger will also use Übergang.

Heidegger continues: "The simplest form of motion [Bewegung], of transition [Übergang] and the one most frequently used by Aristotle in his analysis of motion, is phora, transition [Übergang] from one place (topos) to another, change-over [Umschlag], change of place [Ortsveränderung]" (342; translation modified). Here Heidegger uses Übergang both generically and specifically. He also says phora is the "simplest." This characterization of phora is not strong enough to do justice to the Aristotelian economies. We have seen how Aristotle has called phora the "most important" kinésis. I will return to this point in discussing circular locomotion.

Let us trace the way the Sinnsfrage limits Heidegger's discourse in this passage. Of the remaining three types of kinésis we have isolated in Aristotle's economy, alloiôsis.
qualitative alteration, auxesis, quantitative increase or growth, and phthisis, quantitative decrease or decay. Heidegger mentions only the first, to reinforce the point that their common characteristic is that of change ek tinos eis ti, "from something into something (else)" (343). Heidegger calls alloiosis merely "another form of motion," not mentioning Aristotle's showing of its dependence on phora later in the Physics. Heidegger remarks that alloiosis does not have the Sinn of transition of place:

Another form of motion [Bewegungsform] is, for example, alloiosis, becoming different in the sense [das Anderswerden in dem Sinne] that one quality changes [umschlapt] to another, one particular color to another, and here too there is an advance ek tinos eis ti, away from something toward something. But this "away from something toward something" does not have the sense of transition from one place to another [hat nicht den Sinn des Übergangs von einem Ort zum anderen]. (343)

Thus ek tinos eis ti is "not necessarily to be grasped spatially" (343). Heidegger calls the structure of motion named by Aristotle as ek tinos eis ti "dimension," and he reminds us to "take[e] the concept in a completely formal sense, [in einem ganz formalen Sinn] in which spatial character is not essential. Dimension expresses [meint] a general notion of stretch [Dehnung]; extension in the sense [im Sinne] of spatial dimension [Ausdehnung] then represents a particular modification of stretch" (343). Such recourse to Sinn obviously falls under the purview of the Sinnsfrage as I have articulated it in Chapter II.

Two terminological notes must be made here. First, Heidegger tells us that the determination of ek tinos eis ti must be kept clear of "spatial representation" [räumlichen Vorstellung], as Aristotle himself had done (343). This is the very phrase Heidegger used in Being and Time to describe the way falling temporality dominates everyday language. Heidegger writes in Sein und Zeit that "die Selbstauslegung des Daseins und der Bedeutungsbestand der Sprache überhaupt weitgehend von 'räumlichen Vorstellungen' durchherrscht ist." In a way, this dissertation is an extended commentary on that single phrase. Second, Heidegger uses a term, Erstreckung, he had reserved in Being and Time for Dasein's Geschehen, to describe the complete formality of ek tinos eis ti. In reading Heidegger's text, it is most disconcerting to realize that Heidegger does not stay with the Dehnung / Ausdehnung distinction developed here as the discussion progresses. At 344 he uses Ausdehnung in two places where Dehnung would...
have been more appropriate. First: "When we experience motion in a moving thing, we necessarily experience along with it suneches, continuity, and in this continuity itself ek tinos eis ti, dimension in the original sense, stretching out (extension) [Dimension im ursprünglichen Sinn, Erstreckung (Ausdehnung)]" (344). Second: "Extension [Ausdehnung] and continuity are already implicit in motion" (344). Heidegger has set up Dehnung as the genus and Ausdehnung as the specific modification. But here he uses Ausdehnung generically, so that we are led to read it as another example of a term undecidable across a generic / specific economy, just as we had previously read Übergang. Here as well, as we might expect, the Sinnsfrage arises. Heidegger tells us that only a completely formalized Sinn of "dimension" will remove spatiality. But this appeal to a formal Sinn presupposes a determination of which Sinn of Sinn is pre-eminent. As we have learned, the economy of interpretation set up by each iteration of the mark Sinn includes an irreducible moment of the direction of Dasein’s self-projective movement. Indeed, as we recall from Chapter II, Heidegger claims this is the primary acceptation of Sinn.45 Since Sinn as direction is irreducibly spatial, that is, each iteration of Sinn contains an irreducible reference to its possible inscription in a spatial context (such as Heidegger himself had inscribed it in the discussions of Richtung), then at least some aspect of spatiality will come to haunt the notion of "dimension," even if, concessio non dato, it is only in the way we attempt to purify the concept of space by projecting it upon a formalized Sinn.

Heidegger next discusses the Aristotelian concept of suneches, continuity, which also belongs to stretch. Megathos, extendedness, is not primarily spatial, we learn.46 I must note here in passing what I will shortly discuss in detail, that Aristotle insists that only phora is continuous (261a 32), and indeed, only circular phora (265a 11-2). But the infinite circular phora (of the sun) is caused by the prime mover, ousia as pure self-presence. We will thus have only come to see the full contours of the Aristotelian economy of time when we have examined the heliotrope.

Heidegger reminds us that the Aristotelian concepts are linked in a specific relation Aristotle names "following," akolouthein, which "expresses the foundational a priori connection of motion with continuity and extendedness" (344-45). Recognizing this relation, Heidegger tells
us, is the key for avoiding "defective interpretations" such as those of Bergson, "who said that time as Aristotle understands it is space." Earlier, Heidegger had said that missing the formality in the formal sense of *megethos* led Bergson into his misunderstanding of Aristotle, for he took the dimension-character of motion in terms of spatial dimension [*räumliche Ausdehnung*] (343-44). We have already remarked, in Chapter II, that Bergson says clearly that time as ordinarily conceived is the phantom of space. In the discussion of *akolouthein* Bergson is said to have "[taken] continuity in the narrower sense of the extensional magnitude of space" (343-44). I would say Bergson's phrase implies that time is haunted by space; Bergson's phrase thus articulates the economy of time, and is as such marginal to the system of presence. Even if one were to take Bergson's text vulgarly—as stating that time is equal to space—as Heidegger does, the possibility of (mis)interpreting time as space is an irreducible possibility which follows from the Aristotelian economy of time, given the role of *phora* in the economy of *kinésis*. The articulation of that irreducibility is the formal law of the haunting of time by space, the articulating of the economy of time. As I have previously insisted, recognizing such haunting does not entail the complete abandonment of all distinctions between proper and improper senses, but it does require the recognition that the spatiality of *Sinn* in the *Sinnsfrage* marks the final, irreducible haunting of time by space.

Let us return to Heidegger's text. He continues his discussion by noting that the motion from which time is read must be ordered, from there to here in the horizon of the prior and posterior. At this point he sketches the grounding of Aristotle's time understanding in ecstatic temporality by showing how it is precisely the retention of the prior and the expectation of the posterior which enables us to see transition as such. Saying "now" assigns time to the clock; the clock gives us the how-many of the nows. A note at this point reads "Vorgabe ist im Grunde die dreifach ekstatisch horizontale Struktur der Zeitlichkeit. Sie gibt sich die Zeit vor" (348). Expectation, retention, and enpresenting are to be seen as original (even if not authentic) temporality. I will not be able, given the constraints of the dissertation format, to pursue this thematic at this point. Let me simply note that the fact that Heidegger attempts such grounding is not as important for my project here as the fact that, as I have shown, the discourse of
ecstatic temporality is composed of terms haunted by the possibility of their iteration in spatial discussions. We need only recall here the definition of ecstatic temporality as "ursprünglich 'Ausser-sich' an und für sich selbst." 

At this point Heidegger picks up his second topic again, that of the translation of proteron kai husteron. As he laid out for us, the translation "earlier and later" interprets the translation "before and after" (349). He explains this relation of interpretation by adding that the first translation (before and after) is literal [die wörtliche Auffassung], while the second (earlier and later) already includes a large element of interpretation [die zweite schliesst schon weitgehend eine Interpretation in sich] (349). Here Heidegger admits that Aristotle states that proteron kai husteron means primarily sequence of places (219a 15). This determination has a "non-temporal sense" [unzeitlichen Sinn], Heidegger claims, but he also claims that "the experience of before and after in a certain manner presupposes the experience of time [Zeiterfahrung], the earlier and later" (349). Heidegger then mentions the economy of proteron kai husteron as developed by Aristotle in the Metaphysics. He then writes an astounding sentence to which we have referred earlier: "Aristotle wavers in the time interpretation in the conceptual determination of proteron kai husteron [In der Zeitabhandlung schwankt er in der Bedeutungsauffassung des proteron-husteron]" (349). With this acknowledgement of "wavering" Heidegger admits that the economy of proteron kai husteron includes a spatial moment and is thus undecidably spatial/temporal. To reduce this undecidability Heidegger once again has recourse to the determination of a proper Sinn. He writes: "Most often he takes it directly as earlier and later and not so much as before and after [Meistens nimmt er es direkt als Früher und Später und nicht so sehr als Vor und Nach]" (349). I have had to modify Hofstadter's translation. Hofstadter's version reads: "Most often he takes it directly as earlier and later and not so much in the sense of before and after." It would have made my task easier if Heidegger had in fact written "im Sinne" but he writes only "als." Nevertheless, the recourse to Sinn is implied by the phrase "he takes" [nimmt er], as well as by Heidegger's previous claim that "before and after" has an "unzeitlichen Sinn."

At this point it may be useful to recall that Heidegger needs to keep Aristotle's time
pure of space, because Aristotle's understanding of time is to serve as the vulgar self-expression of temporality and hence as a clue to the temporality which can be read off of Aristotle's treatise. As we recall from Sein und Zeit, Dasein's spatiality is to be grounded on temporality, so spatial terms are to be kept out of the discussion of temporality. Yet in discussing Aristotle Heidegger acknowledges that the translation of *proteron kai hysteron* as "before and after" in sequence of places is both set forth by Aristotle and has its "specific rights in accordance with the phenomenon [bestimmtes sachliches Recht]" (342). Although he acknowledges this wavering he attempts to regulate its undecidability and thereby reduce its spatial moment via a determination of proper Sinn.

To see the full implications of this attempted regulation and reduction we must here complete our exploration of the Aristotelian economy of *kinésis* and *phora*. Aristotle is far more insistent than Heidegger lets on about the primacy of *phora* in *kinésis*. As we noted earlier, at 243a 10 Aristotle calls *phora* the "first" [*proté*] among motions, and at 260a 28 Aristotle says *phora* is "necessarily first." In the latter passage, in the context of examining continuous motion, Aristotle presents several arguments why *phora* is presupposed in all other types of *kinésis*, how it is prior in time and in nature, and how the prime mover is the principle [*arché*] and causes the motion that is first among motions (260a 20-261a 31). One could object here that Aristotle's privileging of *phora* depends on the demonstration of ontic dependence and that Heidegger is after the ontological Sinn of *kinésis*. But here Heidegger is caught by the undecidability of *kinésis*, as iterable in contexts intending both ontic motion and the Being of beings. If one attempts to regulate this undecidability by means of distinguishing the proper (ontological) Sinn for *kinésis* one is caught in the Sinnsfrage; if one calls *kinésis* an ontic metaphor one is caught in the metaphoricity of *meta-pherein.*

At this point let us take up Aristotle's arguments about the primacy of *phora* in the economies of *kinésis* and *metabolé*. I will focus on Physics Book 8 (Theta) Chapters 5-10. Aristotle is here looking for continuous motion, that caused by the first (unmoved) mover. Theta 5 (256a 4-258b 9) gives an argument for the unmoved mover. Aristotle distinguishes three moments of a motion: that which is in motion, that which moves another, and that with which
the mover moves another (256b 15-16). That which moves another without being an instrument of motion must be immovable (256b 22). Aristotle then turns to consider self-movers (257a 32ff), showing that "it is impossible for that which moves itself to move itself in its entirety" (257b 3). Thus, even within a self-mover there must be division into moved and mover (257b 14), and that which causes a motion must be in actuality (257b 10), since a motion is an incomplete actuality of the movable (257b 8). Thus self-movers must be split, containing both that which is moved and that which, being unmoved, is the mover of that which is moved (258a 19).

It would be very interesting, though far beyond the scope of this dissertation, to begin here to analyze this splitting in terms of auto-affection. Such a possible analysis will come up again in Heidegger’s reading of the famous ἡμα γαρ κινεσῶς αἰσθηνομένη καὶ χρονοῦ (219a 2-3).

We turn now to Theta 6 (258b 10-260a 19), where Aristotle tells us that the first thing moved by the unmoved mover must also be eternal (260a 2). Ross at this point claims that Aristotle here has proven only the eternity of successive generation, but presupposes the unquestionability of the observation of the unceasing rotation of the heavens. Now the unmoved mover always causes one and the same motion and in the same manner (260a 5). This brings us to Aristotle's cosmology. The order of causation is: prime mover, unmoved movers, first heaven, sun/moon/planets, generation (260a 1-19). We have already had cause to mention the role of the sun in generation.

In Theta 7 (260a 20-261b 26) we finally turn to the economy of kinésis. Aristotle presents three arguments for the primacy of phora in the economy of kinésis: 1) there can be no increase without a previous alteration (260a 29), but there must be something that causes the alteration (260b 1). This something must move to come closer in space to the altering thing (260b 3-4). For example, alteration from potentially to actually hot presupposes locomotion, the bringing nearer of the actually hot (260b 3). 2) The next argument concerns condensation and rarefaction as principles of change of quality. Aristotle claims that "condensation and rarefaction are, respectively, coming closer and going further" (260b 11)—and these are obviously locomotions (260b 13). Aristotle further maintains that the magnitude of that which is increasing and decreasing is change with regard to place (260b 14). 3) The final arguments contain a
reference to the economy of proteron kai husteron we explored above. Aristotle reminds us that priority is granted when the following conditions are met: a) independence b) priority in time c) proximity to ousia. Regarding each condition, Aristotle argues that locomotion must be considered prior to other changes a) if other changes cannot exist without locomotion, but it can without them. And this is precisely what Aristotle shows, arguing that:

For there is no necessity for an object in locomotion to be increasing or to be in the process of generation or destruction, but none of these [changes--Apostle's addition] can exist if there is no continuous motion, which is caused by the primary mover. (260b 26-29)

The continuous motion caused by the prime mover is the locomotion of the heavens, as Aristotle will show shortly. Aristotle has thus shown here that phora serves as the prime term in the economy of metabolé, via its primacy in the economy of kinésis.

Secondly, regarding b) primacy in time: Aristotle claims that the only motion possible in eternal things is locomotion, so there is an obvious priority of time in that case (260b 29). Aristotle here also brings up the example of generation. Locomotion appears last in the development of generated things, but generation itself requires the previous locomotion of the parents (261a 4). Thirdly, c) although locomotion appears last in generated things, this is so because it is closer to the substance toward which the generated thing is developing (261a 15). Also, locomotion is the least departure from ousia—that is, the thing moving with regard to place changes itself less than the thing changing its qualities or magnitude (261b 22). But finally, Aristotle says the clearest proof that locomotion is prior to other causes because of its proximity to ousia is that self-movers cause locomotion above all: "malista de délon hoti to kinoun auto auto malista tautén kinei kuriós, tén kata topon" (261b 24). Recalling here the split nature of self-movers--into that which is moved and that which is the (unmoved) mover--we can understand the relation of the previous claim to the next sentence: "the self-mover is the principle of things in motion and of movers and that among things in motion it is the self-mover which is first [kaltoi phamen touto einai tôn kinoumenôn kai kinountôn archén kai protôn tois kinoumenois, to auto auto kinoun]" (261a 25-26). The self-mover referred to here would be the first heaven, which provides the principle of motion for the sun/moon/planets, and which is moved by the unmoved
movers that provide the principle of motion for the self-movers; all this system is of course oriented toward the prime mover.

Next Aristotle moves to show which of locomotions is primary (261a 29). This demonstration will show the primary locomotion to be both continuous and eternal (261a 31). Two arguments appear here: 1) All motions other than the locomotion caused by the prime mover move from opposite to opposite (261a 34); these will come to rest in a contrary (261b 3). 2) Similarly with changes, Aristotle shows that things cannot change in opposite directions at the same time (261b 8). Thus the motion caused by the prime mover, that of the first heaven, the primum mobile, is the primary term in the economy of phora, which is in turn primary in the economies of kinésis and metabolé.

We now move to Book Theta chapter 8 (261b 27-265a 12) where Aristotle discusses the infinity of continuous circular locomotion. He first spells out three types of locomotion: circular, rectilinear, and the combination of the two. Now rectilinear continuous motion is impossible, since it must turn back along the line, and it must stop before turning back (262a 15). Logos can be used here, Aristotle continues, not just sensation. The logos is this: any middle is one numerically, but two in formula; that is, the middle is the beginning of one segment and the end of the other (262a 22). The scheme of potency/actuality enters here: any point is potentially a middle, but the act of division implies stopping one motion and beginning another, so using the middle point as an end and a beginning implies a stop (262b 7). This argument about the potentiality of divisive limits and the necessity of a stop when actuating such limits will come up again in the discussion of the identity and difference of the now, to which Aristotle turns in his discussion of Zeno’s paradoxes. Similarly to a point, a moment as dividing limit is numerically one but two in logos, the end of one segment of time and the beginning of another (263b 15). As we saw in Chapter I, Derrida deals at some length with these arguments; we will pick up the discussion later when we return to Heidegger’s discussion of the now.

We return to the question of circular locomotion as infinite and continuous (264b 9-29). In Book Theta Chapter 9 (265a 13-266a 9) Aristotle comes to address how it is that of locomotions the circular is primary [próté] (265a 14). Circular locomotion is simpler and more
complete than other locomotions, Aristotle claims (265a 17). In rejoining itself in completing the circle such locomotions eliminate the need for a stop, as we saw was necessary for rectilinear motions.

The discussion of Theta 10 shows that the prime mover is unmoved, and also has no parts and no magnitude—hence it is not in a *topos*; it has reduced space (267b 18-25; see also *Metaphysics* 1073a 5). Now the motion caused by the prime mover—that of the first heaven, the primum mobile—must obviously have a magnitude that is single and continuous (267a 22-25). Since circular locomotion is regular its mover (the prime mover) is unchanging, provoking movement as the object of desire (267b 2-5; see also *Metaphysics* 1072b 4: *kinei dé hós erômenon*). Aristotle continues that the prime mover operates at the circumference of the universe, although not in a place (267b 9).

Two things are shown by the primacy of *phora* in the economy of *kinésis*. First, one cannot reduce the reference to space in the Aristotelian discourse on time: any iteration of *kinésis* or *metabolé* refers to *phora* as the prime instance that regulates its economy. Thus in the Aristotelian text time is haunted by space. Secondly, any iteration of *phora* refers to circular *phora*, and through it to the prime mover. Thus the economy of *kinésis* is oriented to the prime mover so that *phora*, which installs an irreducible spatial moment in the economy of *kinésis*, and hence of time, is in turn oriented to the reduction of space in pure self-presence outside space (and time). In Derrida’s terms, time is here submitted to the system of presence oriented to the prime mover. Time and space are as desirous of being reduced.

To return to Heidegger after this long excursus, we see that he acknowledges the economy of translation of *proteron kai husteron* by acknowledging the "wavering" in Aristotle, yet he tries to regulate the undecidability by means of a scheme which opposes the original to the vulgar, the properly understood to the misunderstood. As we have pointed out repeatedly in this chapter in referring back to Chapter II, this attempt is caught up in the *Sinnsfrage*. The "wavering" which Heidegger finds in Aristotle allows him to enter the discussion of the time-line analogy. The economy of *kinésis* as directed to the primary term *phora* seems to set up an analogy of the now
to a point: phora is continuous along a line, with points dividing the line. Similarly, time, as number of kinesis, would seem to be continuous and divided by the now. As Derrida shows in "Ousia and Grammê," this relation between continuous and divided can only be settled by the dynamis-energeia scheme. Here division by points is only potential (thus an infinity of points, the bad infinite, exists only potentially; this is Aristotle's answer to Zeno's paradox of the tortoise and Achilles). The good infinite is the circular motion caused by the prime mover, as we saw in our discussion of Theta 8. Similarly, time is analogous with the line only accidentally.

This is the crucial argument for Derrida. That the now is limit only accidentally means that the grammê is captured as grammê in act. Thus time is submitted to system of desire for presence, but is of course also subtracted in that very gesture, for the effacement of the trace that allows for presence—the prime mover is here seen as a mark that has separated itself in theological illusion52—can also be read from the inscription of presence.

At this point in the text Heidegger moves to discuss briefly his fourth topic, that of the now as same and different (349). Now as we recall from Chapter I, Derrida makes a great deal of the auto-affective structure of the now. Heidegger, on the other hand, brushes over this topic in little over a page. I will deal with the importance of this difference in emphases later. Briefly, Heidegger shows how the now can be seen as a limit only accidentally. Nows are both different, and as now, the same (350). Heidegger explains this via a distinction of essence and existence whereby the essence of the now is to be always the same, while its existence is different (350).

We now move to the fifth point, concerning the numerical character of time. As we recall, this is also one of Derrida's foci. Here Heidegger asks: Why does Aristotle stress the numerical quality of time? He answers his own question: To avoid the misunderstood analogy of time with the line. According to Heidegger, the spatial interpretation—that is, time understood as a line—is a misunderstanding: "This talk of time as a sequence of nows should not be misunderstood and transferred [übergetagen] to the spatial in the sense [in dem Sinne] by which one says time is a line, a series of points" (351; translation modified). According to the by now well-known strategy Heidegger here tries to manage the economy by identifying some Sinne as
proper, others as misunderstandings. The *Sinnsfrage*, of course, arises here, but so does the structure of the metaphor re-mark in Heidegger's use of *übertragen*. Now, *übertragen* is a possible German translation [*Übersetzung*] of *meta-pherein*. As of course is "translation" or "*Übersetzung*.

Heidegger establishes his ruling out of the simple application of the time-line analogy by his interpretation of the now. The now is not a point, he claims, because it is both beginning and end: "seinem Wesen nach Anfang und Ende ist" (351). Thus the now as such refers to the no-longer and not-yet: "In the now as such there is already present [liegt schon] a reference [Verweisung] to the no-longer and the not-yet" (351). Because of this reference to what it is not the now has dimension within itself, Heidegger claims: "Es hat in sich selbst die Dimension, die Erstreckung nach einem Noch-nicht und Nicht-mehr" (351) Now Webb claims Heidegger’s characterization of the now as transition anticipates Derrida’s inscriptions of "trace" or "*différence*." To be sure, the way the now is described as constituted by reference to what it is not is the first step in Derrida’s discussion of the trace in Husserl. But this negativity is still understood with reference to presence. The past and future are understood as negative modes of presence. Derrida’s point is that this understanding is only possible by the erasure of the trace of radical alterity, of absolute past and future, a past and present that could never be understood by reference to the present, and hence could never be called "not-yet" or "no-longer."

As we rejoin Heidegger we see a crucial terminological choice that will pull the discussion of the now into the same sort of (haunted) economy of undecidability we have explored above. Heidegger wants to purify the now of spatial understanding and thus delegitimize the time-line analogy. In the process of doing so he elucidates the dimension-character of the now, and thus claims the now has the character of transition: "Because of this dimensional content [*Dimensionsgehaltes*] the now has within itself the character of a transition [in sich den Charakter eines Überganges]" (352; Heidegger's italics). With the use of *Übergang* we are led to see here a spatial / temporal undecidability. The mark *Übergang*, as we have seen, is "spatial"—that is, it can be iterated within a generic/specific undecidable economy of
metabolé and phora. Now in this passage Heidegger also iterates it in the "temporal" economy of the now. The possibility of its iteration in both economies haunts any iteration of Übergang. Let us follow the way this haunting makes possible the analogy of time and the line that Heidegger tries to rule out via his use of Übergang.55

As transition, the now is both beginning and end. Time is a number as determining as transition the point’s extremes (354). Here we run into a textual controversy: Heidegger’s note four says simply "Ross." But the Ross edition of Aristotle’s Physics was first published in 1936. Hofstadter speculates Heidegger may have used Bekker or Pratl.56 The difference is this: At 220a 16 Ross reads tés grammé̂̈s while Bekker and Prantl read tés autés, referring to 220a 15 hós tés autés stigmé̂̈s. Ross writes in his commentary that the reading of tés autés, as referring to tés stigmé̂̈s, point, "makes no sense."57

The measurement of motion [Übergang] by time is made possible by time’s (now’s) Übergangscharakter (357). Here again we see Übergang as undecidably spatial and temporal. Such undecidability is the condition for the analogy of time and the line. The time discourse cannot be purified; the analogy asserts itself ever and again. As one can read in Kant, in the Transcendental Aesthetic.58 We must acknowledge in the mark Übergang an irreducible reference to possible inscripition in spatial use.

The sixth topic can now be addressed, that of time and the soul (357). Here the interpretation focuses on the famous phrase: hama gar kinésê̈s aisthanometha kai chronou. Heidegger discusses this relation of time and the soul in terms of an opening to the discussion of Dasein’s temporality as grounding ordinarily-conceived time. We can perhaps see an opening to space in general in the splitting of self-affection here. Heidegger writes of the passage of subjective states: "The actions are not intrinsically spatial but they pass over into one another, one changes into the other" (358). The German needs to be read in its entirety: "Die Verhältnungen sind in sich nicht räumlich, aber sie gehen ineinander über, eine schläft in die andere um." Here we might begin to see Übergang and Umschlag as undecidable—or haunted—terms betraying the opening to space in general in the self-affective sphere of pure subjectivity. These hints would have to be rigorously read against the Derridean analyses in Speech and
Phenomena to which I refer in Chapter I.

At the end of his interpretation Heidegger stresses that the key to properly understanding Aristotle is the proper understanding of akolouthēn: ontological connection of founding which subsists among time, motion, continuity, and dimension. Aristotle approaches the mode of measuring time in just the way it is prescribed in the natural understanding of time and in the natural experience of time itself. Because of this, Heidegger hopes to be able to pass from his interpretation of Aristotle to a discussion of “the original concept of temporality” (361).

Comparison of Heidegger and Derrida’s Readings of Aristotle

We have seen how Heidegger concentrates on two major points among the six topics he discusses. Those two are the proper understanding of akolouthēn which grants the proper ontological order of concepts, and the economy of translation of proteron kai husteron as “before and after” and “earlier and later” which reveals the relation of original temporality to vulgar time. Making these points entails overturning three Aristotelian economies, overturnings themselves limited by the Sinnsfrage.

Derrida, on the other hand, focuses upon the aporetic structure of Aristotle’s treatise. For Derrida, Aristotle does not solve the aporia of time’s Being, nor does he thematize the determination of Being as ousia that sets up the aporia, although he does solve the aporia of time’s physis. However the solution to the latter aporia, via the dynamis/energeia schema, is governed by the prior determination of Being as ousia, that is, by the evasion of the question of the determination of time’s Being that precisely sets up the first, unsolved, aporia of time’s Being.

The major difference in the two interpretations occurs at 220a 16. Derrida’s reading of “line” enables him to go on to define time as the name of the limits within which grammē (the possibility of the trace) is effaced by its determination via the system of potentiality/actuality as the grammē in act. Heidegger’s reading of “point” enables him to exploit the extra-metaphysical moment of the now’s openness, but only on the basis of determining a proper Sinn for certain
expressions. Heidegger insists on the proper understanding of Aristotle’s time terms as non-spatial—thus leading us to see original temporality as extra-metaphysical—as opposed to the misunderstanding of these terms as spatial, which would set up a metaphysical spatialized time. Nevertheless, he does set up the “wavering” in Aristotle’s thesis. Derrida, on the other hand, tries to articulate the economy of possible interpretation on which a metaphysical interpretation might draw, but which also includes that which will disrupt the metaphysical interpretation. Hence Derrida articulates the full economy of time, and thereby predicts the haunting of time by space.

**Conclusion: The Basic Problems of Phenomenology and The Epoch of Being and Time**

Let us return at this point to the question implicitly posed in Chapter I. As we recall, Derrida sets up “Ousia and Grammé” as an interrogation of Being and Time in terms of its “epoch(é).” At this point we might ask in what sense Basic Problems falls under the constraints operative in the epoch of Being and Time, that is, to what extent does it fail to pose the graphic of the trace? Can one not claim, as Webb does, that the now as transition poses the question of the trace and hence of time/space? Perhaps. But here one might have to have recourse to a distinction developed by Derrida in “Violence and Metaphysics”—discussing a similar point with regard to Levinas—between inscription of a trace and thematization of the trace (a thematization that ends up thematizing the withdrawal of the trace from thematization). In beginning an inscription of the trace in the Übergang-character of the now, a character which we have seen is haunted by its possible iteration in spatial contexts (thus broaching the problematic of time/space), Heidegger still insists on the primordiality of time, of calling ecstatic temporality “original time.” So even though the key term, Übergang, is undecidably “spatial” and “temporal” Heidegger attempts to manage its economy or settle the undecidability. We have seen how such undecidability can only be settled by appeal to a proper Sinn; but we have also seen how this poses the Sinnsfrage. So we have demonstrated the functioning of an irreducible spatial moment in the economy of time in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology as well as in Being and Time.
NOTES

1. All references in this chapter to Basic Problems will be made in the text, with the German pagination only, since Hofstadter's translation carries the German pagination as well.


4. Due to the typographic limitations of my word-processing system I must transliterate Greek terms. I shall use an "é" to indicate an eta as opposed to "e" for an epsilon, and an "ô" to indicate an omega as opposed to "o" for an omicron.

5. Herman Rappaport, in his Heidegger and Derrida: Reflections on Time and Language, claims Basic Problems is "a conservative version of Being and Time" (p. 5). I will show that Basic Problems and Being and Time operate under the same formal constraints: what I call the Sinnsfrage as it instantiates Derrida's "formal rule." Rappaport's analysis of Basic Problems occurs in Chapter 2 of his book. Some of his observations overlap my own, but since our projects are so different I will not mark every time we agree or disagree on a particular point in Heidegger's treatment of Aristotle. See my Introduction, note 21, above.


7. Tina Chanter brought these questions to my attention at the Heidegger Circle at Notre Dame in May 1989.

8. See the untitled first page of Sein und Zeit, as well as Heidegger's later statement in his letter to Richardson.


11. Sallis points out that Basic Problems avoids repeating the death analyses of Being and Time where the finite (endlich) nature of authentic temporality is sketched out. See "Radical Phenomenology and Fundamental Ontology."
One might very well ask here about the relation of this demand to Heidegger's desire to ground Dasein's spatiality on its temporality. See p. 168 above.

I discussed the difference between the Heideggerian treatment and the Derridean notion of dissemination in Chapter II.

Sallis, "Radical Phenomenology and Fundamental Ontology."

Martineau notes the way Derrida calls attention to Aristotle's phrase διὰ τὸν ἐξωτερικὸν λόγον which precedes the laying out of the aporiai. Both Derrida and Martineau suggest that Aristotle may not have been so caught up in the vulgarity he analyzes as Heidegger might seem to suggest at times.

See, for instance, Basic Problems, p. 37.


See Ross, Aristotle's Physics, pp. 22-23.


At this point in the text kinésis and metabolé are not yet distinguished, although they will becomes so later in the Physics. See Ross, Aristotle's Physics, pp. 45-48.

See Ross, Aristotle's Physics, p. 15ff, for his discussion of book 7.


I noted in Chapter 2 how Heidegger sets up Being and Time with the evocation of an aporia of an aporia, as he repeats the term Keinesweg on the first page.


28. As Derrida shows in "Ousia and Grammé," and as I have discussed in Chapter 1, the Greek *hama*, as undecidably spatial/temporal, is best left untranslated.

29. See Kelly Mink's unpublished PhD dissertation.

30. See Pierre Aubenque, *Le probleme de l'être chez Aristote*, for the problems with a straightforward bringing of this phrase under the rubric of the "analogy of Being." Aubenque claims the analogy of attribution used by Scholastics to discuss the *pros hen* relation of categories is a later imposition that has no counterpart in Aristotle, and tends to efface the aporetic tension of Aristotle's text. Aubenque claims to show an irreducible plurality of categories that can neither be brought under a genus, nor ordered by an analogy of attribution. Thus ontology is an impossible science, or at best an infinite task.


34. Derrida explores these issues in "Signature Event Context" "Limited Inc" and the "Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion" all found in the new edition of *Limited Inc*.

35. See here Jacob Klein *Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969) for a detailed analysis of the Greek concept of number and its relations to the operation of counting. Briefly stated, for the Greeks a number was always the number of counted things.


37. And here my discourse falls prey to the *Sinnsfrage*.

38. *Topos*, as we can read in *Physics* IV.4, is the immediately surrounding envelope of a thing. See 210b 34-211a 1: "axioumen dé ton topon einai proton men periechon ekeino au tapes esti, kai méden tou pragmatos."

39. Here I rely on the Derridean distinction between "indifference" or "indeterminacy" and "undecidability." What is undecidable oscillates between two definite possibilities. See the "Afterword" to *Limited Inc*.

40. Ross notes that although Aristotle uses *kinésis* and *metabolé* interchangeably through Book 4, he later distinguishes between them. See Ross, *Aristotle's Physics*, pp. 7-8.

41. Apostle translates *kuriótate* as "most independent." One of its meanings lets kuriós means "lordly." I prefer "most important." See here Lidell and Scott.

42. Hofstadter has: "The simplest form of motion, and the one most frequently used by Aristotle in his analysis of motion, of transition, is phora, transition from one place (topos) to another, change of place." The original reads: Die einfachste und von Aristoteles meistens in der
Bewegung, des Übergangs, ist der Umschlag, die Ortsveränderung." Hofstadter misplaces Übergang and omits Umschlag.


44. Heidegger uses Ausdehnung to translate extensio in the discussion of Descartes in Sein und Zeit. E.g., p. 90.


47. Ross speaks of a "quasi-megethos" of generation and destruction, as well as alteration. Ross, Aristotle's Physics, p. 64.


50. The psuché is a unmoved mover for living things as self-movers, according to Ross' reading of 259b 2. See Ross, Aristotle's Physics, p. 91. See also Plato's text on the psuché as self-moving in the Phaedrus.

51. Ross, Aristotle's Physics, pp. 91-2.

52. Here we might, with much additional work, begin to see something like an irreducible reference to space in the being-generated of the thing by physis. This brings us to a preliminary sketch of a huge issue to which I can only allude. Is Heidegger here overlooking the irreducible spatiality of Dasein's life with others? Here we would have to investigate Heidegger's later essay on physis in Aristotle's Physics B1. There he shows how the being by physis is "on the way" to another. But for Aristotle this birth is a re-production of the same (eidos = species) with all the male privilege of Aristotle's semenology as developed in De Generatione Animalium. In the Physics we read how eidos is motionless, the first mover in the case of generation (257b). But generation as well is referred to space via the heliotrope in the economy of time. Aristotle insists that phora is necessary for generation—and not just the movement of the parents: he writes that "both man and the sun beget man" (194b 14). We should recall here the sun's role at De Generatione et Corruptione II.10 336a 15ff. Could we not here hazard the notion of another stretching, crossing the temporal Erstreckung of Dasein, a reference to another in the field of natality, that is, a reference to the (m)other? Here we would have to discuss Levinas' notion of fecundity and radical alterity in Totality and Infinity, as well as Arendt's discussion in The Human Condition of human plurality and politics as conditioned by the radical novelty brought about by each birth. Here we might begin a reading of the irreducibility of space as a trace of radical alterity.

53. See Derrida's "Double Session," in Dissemination as well as Gasché's discussion in The Tain of the Mirror.


55. Recall here the epigraph to "Ousia and Grammé," as I discussed it in Chapter 1.

56. "With the aid of the now I can mark a limit ...[but] The now is not limit, but number, not peras but arithmos" (353). Number is not bound to what it numbers. This non-boundedness was later
interpreted by Kant as "form of intuition" (353). See here Rappaport's analysis. Here Heidegger says just what Derrida says: that Aristotle anticipates Kant.


59. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. Derrida points out this passage in a note to "Ousia and Grammé."
LIST OF WORKS CITED


----- "Heidegger on Metaphor and Metaphysics." Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 47, 3 (September 1985).


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The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

4/12/06

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