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Desegregation Policies and Practices in Chicago During the Superintendencies of James Redmond and Joseph Hannon

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**DESEGREGATION POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN CHICAGO DURING
THE SUPERINTENDENCIES OF
JAMES REDMOND AND JOSEPH HANNON**

by
Christina Hawkins Stringfellow

**A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
Loyola University of Chicago
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

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VITA

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Loyola University of Chicago

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In 1954 the Supreme Court declared segregation in public education to be unconstitutional. In 1967 James Redmond presented a plan which proposed the first out-and-out integration program in Chicago school history. In 1977 the Chicago Board of Education, under the leadership of Joseph Hannon, passed a resolution designed to meet criteria which would establish requirements and procedures for the elimination and prevention of racial segregation in the city's public schools. By the end of 1979 Hannon was gone and desegregation had not occurred.

Twenty-five years passed from the time Chief Justice Warren announced his landmark decision until the time Superintendent Hannon announced his resignation from the school system. Within that timespan, desegregation in public education had been a primary topic of discussion. What had not been addressed was that historically, being educated in segregated settings had been a way of life for many black and white children in America and in Chicago. After the decree,

pressure was put on school systems to desegregate as set forth by constitutional law.

Although Redmond and Hannon inherited overriding problems, both presented programs that they thought: (1) would address answers to desegregating Chicago's schools; and (2) would be answers to the federal government's mandates. One might wonder then if gains were made in eliminating racial segregation in the public schools under the superintendencies of James Redmond and Joseph Hannon. Looking back at past events might help the city's school system avoid future mistakes.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

Prologue

The year was 1954. Earl Warren was confirmed as Chief Justice on 1 March and by 17 May he along with the eight remaining members of the U. S. Supreme Court declared segregation in public education to be unconstitutional.¹ It was a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America. In part the amendment read: "Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a State solely on the basis of race denies to Negro children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."²

It is quite likely that Warren's decision was affected by a recent experience his chauffeur had had. Not long before the Court's decision was announced, Justice Warren had decided to spend a few days visiting Civil War monuments in Virginia. He went by automobile with a black chauffeur. At the end of the first day, the Chief Justice's car pulled up at a hotel, where he had arranged to spend

¹Richard Kluger, Simple Justice (New York: Random House, Inc., 1977), 708.

²Brown et. al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et. al. 347 U.S. 483. (1954).

the night. When the Chief Justice came out of his hotel the next morning to resume his tour, he soon figured out that the chauffeur had spent the night in the car. He asked the black man why. "Well, Mr. Chief Justice," the chauffeur began, "I just couldn't find a place--couldn't find a place to. . . ." Warren was stricken by his own thoughtlessness in bringing his employee to a town where lodgings were not available to the man solely because of his color. "I was embarrassed, I was ashamed," he recalled. "We turned back immediately. . . ."³ The more Warren pondered the question, the more he had come to the conclusion that the doctrine of separate-but-equal rested upon the concept of the inferiority of the colored race. Although he was concerned about the necessity of overruling earlier decisions and lines of reasoning, he had decided that segregation of Black schoolchildren had to be ended.⁴ He had come to the conclusion that the school-segregation laws were nothing but black codes, and if he were to uphold them now he would be affirming that for some reason Blacks were inferior to all other human beings.⁵

³Kluger, 699.

⁴Kluger, 679.

⁵Kluger, 674.

Brown vs. Board of Education and Other Cases Through 1975

Prior to 1954, young black schoolage children were seeking the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their communities on a nonsegregated basis. They had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws permitting segregation according to race. Statutes requiring the maintenance of separate schools for whites and blacks were in force in eighteen states and the District of Columbia.⁶ Such statutes were previously thought to be constitutional under the theory that separate facilities were permissible if they were equal. In 1896, Homer Plessy, a Negro was not allowed to ride in the car of a train designated "for whites only." Plessy sued the courts in 1896 and lost because the courts upheld that separate car facilities for Negroes were equal to those for whites.⁷ From 1896 to 1954, a series of court cases upheld the separate but equal doctrine until under Warren's direction the 1954 Supreme Court decided that "separate but equal" did not apply to education.

The 1954 case concerned Linda Brown of Topeka, Kansas, an eight-year-old black child, who lived in an integrated neighborhood where she played with white children after school and on weekends. During the week, she was bused away from the school nearest to her home. That school was for white children only.

⁶"Supreme Court Equity Discretion: The Decrees in the Segregation Cases," Yale Law Journal, 64: (1954-55), 124-136.

⁷J. Harvie Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 40.

Because Linda had to travel a good distance from her neighborhood surroundings to the school for black children, her father, Oliver Brown, brought suit against the Board of Education on behalf of elementary black children. The result of Mr. Brown's suit was in his favor. The federal district Kansas court found that even though segregation had a detrimental effect on black children, it denied relief on the ground that both black and white schools were equal in many respects.⁸

Brown et. al. versus Topeka was the landmark case challenging the constitutionality of segregation in public education. However, it represented four other companion cases that were listed in federal court records.

Because all five cases were arguing for equal educational relief based on the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, they were later grouped under what was to become known as the Brown versus the Topeka Board of Education landmark decision. The first one involved black children of high school age residing in Prince Edward County, Virginia. Representatives for the children brought action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in 1950 to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which required the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools.⁹ District court judges denied the request even though they agreed the school for Blacks was inferior. The court ordered the Davis County School board to "fix-up" and remove the inequities. Nevertheless, the

⁸Brown et. al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et. al. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

⁹Ibid.

plaintiffs were denied admission to the white schools during the equalization program.¹⁰

A second case saw parents of both elementary and high-school age children bringing action against the Delaware Court in *Gebhart versus Belton* 1935. The chancellor heard the case and ordered minority children to be immediately admitted to all-white schools on the ground that the black schools were indeed inferior. Unfortunately, due to public pressure, the chancellor modified his decision. The defendants contended that the courts had made-a mistake in ordering immediate admission of the minority plaintiffs.¹¹ Black schoolchildren of Clarendon County brought suit against the Eastern District of South Carolina in 1942 and became the third case under the *Brown* case.¹² A three-judge District Court denied the requested relief. Even though the court found the black schools to be inferior to the white schools, the court sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs in the *Briggs versus Elliott* case admission to the white schools.

A companion case to the previous ones was *Bolling versus Sharpe* heard in the District of Columbia in 1954. Black children were denied admission to a public school attended by white children solely on the basis of their race. The district court heard the complaint and dismissed it because the plaintiffs had based their

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹*Brown et. al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et. al.* 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

¹²*Kluger*, 783

argument on denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment. (The courts argued that the Fifth Amendment did not contain an equal protection clause as did the Fourteenth Amendment.) The court did recognize however, that discrimination was unjustifiable.¹³In fact, Chief Justice Warren continued:

"Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws."¹⁴ The Court did not decide just how the illegal segregation should be eliminated but placed the case on the docket for further reargument which occurred in 1955.¹⁵

Again, Chief Justice Warren delivered the judgments which stated that racial discrimination in public education was unconstitutional. Succinctly put, the courts had formed the law; now it was up to the school authorities to assess, clarify and solve while fully implementing the law set forth by the Constitution. Naturally problems were to arise from the change to a system of public education that was to be freed of racial discrimination.

The courts had made a declaration, but would the action of school authorities constitute good faith? The government suggested the case be given to the district courts and instructed the defendants not to use race or color as a basis of admission to their public schools. More specifically they suggested: "If the defendants show that it is impracticable or inequitable to grant the plaintiffs the

¹³Kluger, 786.

¹⁴Brown v. Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

¹⁵Ibid.

remedy of immediate admission to nonsegregated schools, the court shall order the defendants to propose and, on approval by the court after a public hearing, to put into effective operation a program for transition to a non-segregated school system as expeditiously as circumstances permit."¹⁶

The federal courts often concluded that details of decrees were best left in the hands of district court judges because they were closer to the facts of the case. In addition, they felt the district court judges might spend more time hearing evidence on the segregation decree. Thus, the Supreme Court adjured the lower courts to "enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis 'with all deliberate speed' the parties to these cases."¹⁷ Implementation of the decrees was to begin immediately. Because it modified the 1954 Brown decision, the decisions became known as Brown I and II respectively.

The National Context

After Brown I and II, the Supreme Court decided that the nation's schools must integrate with "all deliberate speed." Many school systems responded by not readily complying.

When a state is dissatisfied with a Supreme Court decision, to the point of noncompliance, the state may assert: (1) that the decision violates the

¹⁶"Supreme Court Equity Discretion", 135.

¹⁷"Brown v. Topeka, 294.

Constitution; or, (2) that it denies federal judges review over state action. Also, the state may adopt a legislative plan designed to avoid or delay the full impact of the Court's decision.¹⁸ Since the "with all deliberate speed"¹⁹ phrase was vague and left open to question, some states employed delaying tactics such as noncompliance. The Supreme Court justices seemed aware that this might happen, but the Court had ruled. Although Chief Justice Warren stated: "such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws,"²⁰ he recognized that the Court's decision would have widespread repercussions varying in intensity from state to state. Thus, he knew that moving for compliance would have to be approached in as tolerant and understanding a way as possible.²¹

Besides holding it unconstitutional for governmental authorities to use dual public school systems as a means of segregating students by race, the Supreme Court also held it unconstitutional for governmental authorities to: (1) maintain racially segregated, so-called "private" schools; (2) close public schools rather than

¹⁸Robert B. McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed: A Study of School Desegregation", New York University Law Review 31, (1956), 1039.

¹⁹A subtle but useful phrase became useful in solving the dilemma of how to spur the desegregation process without fixing a firm timetable for its completion. The phrase "with deliberate speed" had been used by Justice Frankfurter in the mid 1940s and had been used again in early 1954. Justice Frankfurter had borrowed it from Oliver Wendell Holmes who had used it in writing a Court's opinion in a 1918 case. Still others say the term originated from a nineteenth century poet, Francis Thompson. (Richard Kluger, Simple Justice, 1977).

²⁰Ernst Borinski, "A Legal and Sociological Analysis of the Integration Decrees of 31 May 1955," University of Pittsburgh Law Review 16 (1955), 329.

²¹Kluger, 680.

desegregate dual public school systems; (3) cause public school teachers and other educational employees to be racially segregated.²² For example, in *Griffin versus County School Board* (1964) Virginia, the public schools were closed although public schools in all other counties of the state remained open, and the "private" schools which took the place of the closed public schools were supported by state and county funds. The reason which county officials gave for closing the schools was that they sought to avoid the admission of white and black children to all the schools of the county without regard to race or color. The court noted that the record in the case could not be clearer concerning the fact that the county's public schools were closed to black children and "private" schools operated in their place with state and county assistance. The sole reason was to insure that white and Negro children would not, under any circumstances, go to the same school.²³ Because grounds of race and opposition to desegregation were unconstitutional, the "private" school plan was created by Virginia county officials. Thus they perpetuated racial segregation by closing public schools and operating only segregated schools supported directly or indirectly by state and/or county funds. The plan worked to deny black students equal protection of the laws.²⁴

According to John W. Davis, an attorney, arguing for school desegregation-segregation cases: at the heart of all these cases was the diehard South's defense

²²Sheldon R. Shapiro, "Racial Discrimination in Education - Supreme Court Cases", United States Supreme Court's Reports, Lawyer's Edition. 24, 2d, 765.

²³Shapiro, 773.

²⁴Ibid.

that prejudice had nothing to do with the practice of segregation; it was simply something that served both races well.²⁵ Brown I and II, however, shot holes in this defense and gave the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) a new platform from which to call for equality.

Thurgood Marshall, lawyer for the NAACP, believed in the United States and the Constitution, but he also believed that the whole system was tragically flawed by the segregation laws.²⁶ Marshall, along with other NAACP lawyers, had researched an historical account of the history of segregation in the wake of the Compromise of 1877.²⁷ The resulting law brief strongly stated that

Segregation was designed to insure inequality--to discriminate on account of race and color--and the separate but equal doctrine accommodated the Constitution to that purpose. Separate but equal is a legal fiction. There never was and never will be any separate equality. Our Constitution cannot

²⁵Kluger, 673.

²⁶Kluger, 639.

²⁷Scholarly researchers said that the Compromise of 1877 handed control of the Republican Party to those who believed that the protection and expansion of their economic power could best be served by political conciliation of the southern irreconcilables, rather than by unswerving insistence upon human equality and the rights guaranteed by the postwar Amendments. Once the Redeemers of white supremacy took over in the South, they brought massive peonage, disenfranchisement, segregation, and terror to the colored masses, the brief argued, and Plessy legitimized that caste system. Thus the Negro "was effectively restored to an inferior position through laws and through practices, now dignified as 'custom and tradition.'" (excerpt from Richard Kluger's Simple Justice, 646.)

be used to sustain ideologies and practices which we as a nation of people abhor.²⁸

Once the Brown II case was decided, the nation of people turned their eyes towards the White House to get a hint of its leader's opinion on the matter. President Dwight D. Eisenhower was said to have favored prompt desegregation of colleges and secondary schools. However, "he thought that in the primary schools a more gradual approach would diminish the probability that severe and very likely violent opposition would result in the event that little children were forcibly intermingled".²⁹ His assistant added that "Eisenhower's advisors differed among themselves and that the Department of Justice was more eager to promote a definitive resolution of the matter than was the Executive".³⁰ The national mood was somber because it was evident that any effort to integrate Southern schools would lead to great strife and turmoil. Opponents from the state of Florida cried that: "an immediate inrush of turbulent ideas might cause a tornado which would devastate the entire school system." The Governor of Virginia declared: "I shall use every legal means at my command to continue segregated schools in my beloved state."³¹ Though reactions and opinions were wide and

²⁸Kluger, 646.

²⁹Kluger, 651.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Kluger, 711.

varied from coast to coast, a factor commonly agreed upon was that something basic in American lives and values had been touched.³²

The reaction from Chicago seemed to be of a more accepting nature as when for example, black scholar, Allison Davis saw the decision as a triumph for the entire nation. He said, "when this decision is implemented, it will result in a tremendous increase in the fund of ability and skill available to our country".³³ This is not surprising considering the fact that Chicago's history and its treatment of Blacks was different from that of Virginia and the South. Instead of separate but equal, it had neighborhood schools.

The Chicago Context

The earliest account of public schooling in Chicago began with twelve children in an integrated setting. There had been little schooling for the children of the settlement before the sale of the land. In 1832 Richard Hamilton had donated a twelve-foot-square log stable north of the river. Here a young Easterner named John Watkins taught reading to four white and eight Indian children as they sat on old boxes. There were also twenty children in a school at the little Presbyterian church and a handful of boys at the Baptist church.³⁴ For the next thirty-one years, little was written or known about black children attending

³²Kluger, 709.

³³Kluger, 714.

³⁴Mary J. Herrick, The Chicago Schools: A Social and Political History, (Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications 1971).

Chicago's public schools. Finally, in 1863, a separate school for colored children was opened in the Mission School building. It was not well suited to the wants of the school because it was entirely destitute of yard room and in other respects was very inconvenient. Attendance was irregular. The average attendance in 1864 was 55 and in 1865 was 102. The school was closed in April 1865.³⁵

There is no information on what happened to the black children after the close of the "colored school." However, it was speculated that the parents of black children in the already established schools refused to obey the ordinance to send their children to a separate school based on race and continued to send their children to the schools in which they were already enrolled.³⁶ The ongoing pressure of delegations of black citizens descending on the mayor and on the board of education brought about the repeal of the so-called Black School Law of 1863. A separate evening school for blacks, however, was maintained between 1869 and 1870.³⁷ Finally, in 1874, a new regulation was written into the Municipal Code of Chicago which in theory abolished the segregation laws. In part, it read:

All directors of school officers whose duty is now, or may be hereafter, to provide in their respective jurisdictions schools for the education of all children between the ages of 6 and 21 years are prohibited from excluding,

³⁵ Chicago Board of Education Archives

³⁶Herrick, 53.

³⁷Ibid.

directly or indirectly, any such child from such on account of the color of such child.³⁸

A reaction to the regulation quickly set the tone which was to follow for many years after. The following day an editorial in the Chicago Tribune read in part:

The City School Board at its session last night decided to strike the word white from the regulations of the city school and admit all children without regard to color or previous condition, upon equality into the city schools.

There is some excitement about the matter, and the State Register in its issue tonight denounces the action in unmeasured terms. It is probable that some white children will be withdrawn by the overnight.³⁹

Segregation had now been declared unacceptable by the city's municipal code but acceptance would have to come from within the school system. From the very onset, "legalizing" integration in Chicago met with resistance that came from groups small in number yet powerful in vocal opposition. Early accounts labeled the public school system of Chicago as being racially polluted. According to Roger Pulliam, black historian, legally segregating Blacks in Chicago's public schools was a goal.⁴⁰ But the wishes of a few could not alleviate the fact that the black population was steadily and rapidly increasing.

³⁸Roger L. Pulliam, "Historical Review of Black Education: Chicago," Negro Educational Review, 29, 1, (January 1978): 24.

³⁹Pulliam, 25.

⁴⁰Ibid.

Before the 1900s, the total black population of Chicago was less than 1 percent. Approximately, fifteen years later, Chicago experienced a large influx of black migrants from the south. By 1939, when the United States was about to enter a world war, the black population had become an integral part of Chicago's expanding labor force and the problems of black education had to be solved.⁴¹ The schools had become segregated and the black schools were inferior in teaching, staffing, and facilities.⁴²

An analysis of the 1950 and 1960 censuses shows that the separation of the races had become sharper than in the early 1940s in Chicago.⁴³ During the fifties, large numbers of neighborhood blocks changed from almost completely white to virtually all black. A Chicago Urban League Research Report revealed that in 1950, the North Lawndale area had a black population of 13 percent. By 1960, that same area had a black population of 90 percent.⁴⁴ However, population increase was not to blame for the virtually segregated population of North Lawndale. Thousands of families had to be relocated as a result of urban renewal, expressway construction, and slum clearance.⁴⁵ A high percentage of those persons relocated were blacks but a segregated housing pattern had now

⁴¹Pulliam, 26.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Pulliam, 27.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid.

been established. Because Chicago's public schools had grown on the basis of the neighborhood school, the schools had also become segregated. Official restrictive housing covenants and neighborhood school policies established to be consistent with them worked to contain blacks and other minorities in specified areas of the city. By 1956, 91 percent of the elementary schools and 71 percent of the high schools had student enrollments representative of a single race.⁴⁶ Segregation was disturbing but it seemed to be an accepted fact that Chicago had a higher degree of residential black segregation than any other large northern city.⁴⁷

Finally, in the 1960s, national attention was focused on the city's public school system.⁴⁸ Robert J. Havighurst, an educator at the University of Chicago, was asked by the school board to undertake a major survey of Chicago schools. When completed, the survey not only stressed the need for integrating Chicago schools but further recommended that its administrative apparatus, headed by Dr. Benjamin Willis, be decentralized.⁴⁹

Dr. Willis did much to correct and upgrade the educational system.⁵⁰ Welcomed in 1953 to succeed Dr. Herold Hunt, Willis was credited with working

⁴⁶Student Desegregation Plan for the Chicago Public Schools: Annual Desegregation Review, 1982-83.

⁴⁷Herrick, 311.

⁴⁸Pulliam, 28.

⁴⁹Peterson, Paul. School Politics, Chicago Style., Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976, 32.

⁵⁰Cynthia Wnek, "Big Ben, the Builder" (Ph. D. Dissertation, Loyola University of Chicago, 1988).

out a new salary schedule for teachers, reducing the average elementary class size, overhauling the high school curriculum and offering vocational education in some of the schools. In addition, new educational methods were introduced, funds were allocated for special programs and school buildings were upgraded, modernized or built.⁵¹ Nevertheless, it became evident that in black neighborhoods, the superintendent was operating a proportionately high number of mobile classrooms known notoriously as "Willis Wagons."⁵²

Many Black leaders, civil rights groups and integration activists, were positive that this policy and the resulting constructions were quite simply a way of making sure that Black populations were kept contained within certain areas and neighborhoods and not allowed to spread to all-White areas and neighborhoods of the city.⁵³

Charges that Willis's plans for using federal money were not directed at schools having high concentrations of children from low-income underprivileged families resulted in an investigation.⁵⁴ The government withheld the funds from the City of Chicago pending the hearing on the complaints to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) on segregation in the Chicago schools. The hearing resulted in a suit brought by the Coordinating Council of Community

⁵¹Herrick, 308.

⁵²Pulliam, 28.

⁵³Wnek, 229.

⁵⁴Ibid.

Organization (CCCO) in 1965. In part, it read: In 1964-65, with the addition of 10 new elementary schools and two new secondary schools accommodating an increase of 642 white and 264 other pupils, segregation in the Chicago schools was shown to have increased. Absolutely segregated elementary schools now constituted 82.3% of the total, and in both categories, segregated schools now constituted 74.4% of the total.⁵⁵

In 1963, the Chicago Board of Education had also created an advisory panel of five members to study the problem of segregation in the public schools. The panel was headed by Phillip Hauser, a demographer at the University of Chicago. The report and its findings were later to become known as The Hauser Report.

The panel was assigned the following task:

to analyze and study the school system in particular regard to schools attended entirely or predominantly by Negroes, define any problems that result therefrom, and formulate and report to the Board as soon as may be conveniently possible, a plan by which any educational, psychological, and emotional problems or inequities in the school system that prevail may best be eliminated.⁵⁶

The panel met together for a total of twenty-four days. At the very onset, the group established that de facto segregation (actual segregation due to living

⁵⁵Pulliam, 50.

⁵⁶Phillip M. Hauser et. al. Hauser Report to the Board of Education, City of Chicago by the advisory panel on Integration of the Public Schools, March 31, 1964, 2.

patterns) was not unique to Chicago. It went on to reveal that de facto segregation was not the result of the intent or design of the Board of Education of Chicago, nor of boards of education in most other metropolitan areas. It was a by-product of segregated patterns of settlement and housing.⁵⁷ Therefore, as a result of residential concentration, the black population, like white immigrants before them, found their children attending de facto segregated schools.⁵⁸ While the Hauser Report revealed that many white immigrants found their children attending de facto segregated schools, there were important differences that seemingly "punished" black children based solely on skin color.

The Negro, unlike the white immigrant, was and is an American citizen; the Negro remains visible and therefore identifiable, even after long residence in the City; in addition to the handicaps of being a newcomer, the Negro carries the added burdens of his heritage of slavery, the destruction of his African culture, underprivileged rearing, denigration, and widespread racial prejudice. In consequence, although they have made considerable progress in Chicago as measured by higher levels of education, occupation, and income, Negroes have not been as free as their white immigrant predecessors to break out of segregated settlement areas and to achieve rapid economic and social advance.⁵⁹

In the early 1960s double shift schedules forced classrooms in black schools to be overcrowded while under-utilized space remained in white schools. Instead of pursuing a policy of pupil integration, the board undertook a crash program to increase the number of classrooms in black neighborhoods. Elementary school building schedules were accelerated, mobile units were purchased, and vacated

⁵⁷Hauser Report, p. 4.

⁵⁸Ibid, 5.

⁵⁹Hauser Report, 5-6.

commercial facilities were converted into schools⁶⁰ Through all of this activity, the basic problem still existed: segregated schools were more widespread in the City of Chicago than ever before.

These conditions did not go unnoticed, however.

Charles Armstrong a Chicago representative to the Illinois General Assembly, had long realized that the city's efforts to desegregate its schools were futile. Finally, in 1963, he successfully introduced and the assembly passed House Bill 113 which made critical changes in the School Code of Illinois. In part, it read:

In erecting, purchasing, or otherwise acquiring buildings for school purposes, the Board shall not do so in such a manner as to promote segregation or separation of children in public schools because of color, race, or nationality. As soon as practicable, and from time to time thereafter, the Board shall change or revise existing (attendance) units or create new units in a manner which will take into consideration the prevention of segregation, and the elimination of separation of children in the public schools because of color, race, or nationality. All records pertaining to the creation of attendance units shall be open to the public.⁶¹

Enacting the Armstrong Law into the School Code did not necessarily mean that it would be put into practice. At its regular meeting held on 10 July 1963, the board of education approved the superintendent's recommended high school attendance area boundary revisions for the fall term of school without adhering to the previous agreement of keeping the public informed of revision changes. These boundaries maintained segregated schools. Young civil rights leaders were so

⁶⁰Chicago Urban League, Research Report, Racial Segregation in the Chicago Public Schools, 1965-66.

⁶¹House Bill 113, State of Illinois General Assembly. Amendments to the School Code, paragraphs: 10:20-11, 34:22, 10:21-23, 1963.

incensed by the board's attitude that a group of them staged a sit-in. Many were evicted, many arrested, and many lost control, but a concession was won from board President Roddewig who agreed to a formal meeting to listen to their demands.⁶²

Beginning in May of 1966, Chicago newspapers began discussing the picking of a successor to Willis. Many organizations became a part of the "fixing of the criteria" for the selection of the next superintendent. A newspaper article stated that forty-eight business and industrial leaders in Chicago urged the school board to pick a Willis successor promptly. . . . Many speculated about James Redmond's appointment to the job. Editorials put a lot of emphasis on the fact that Redmond was a public relations expert and stated that: "some think it is more important for the superintendent to be a public relations expert than a gifted educator. Certainly a superintendent needs the patience to suffer fools gladly, along with the courage to oppose them when he thinks they are wrong."⁶³

Benjamin Willis, school superintendent, resigned 31 August 1966.

⁶²William A. Vrame, "A History of School Desegregation in Chicago Since 1954" (Ph. D. Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin-Madison 1971), 52-76.

⁶³"Criteria for New Superintendent," Chicago Tribune, 11 May 1966 and "The New Superintendent," Chicago Sun Times, 12 May 1966, 34.

CHAPTER II

JAMES REDMOND AND CHANGE

James F. Redmond was appointed General Superintendent of Schools for the city of Chicago 25 May 1966 and he was "exceedingly pleased" to learn he had been selected to succeed Benjamin C. Willis.¹ Dr. Redmond's salary was an impressive \$32,500, and he had signed a five-year contract. At age fifty he exhibited a friendly, calm and deliberative manner and characterized himself as more of a liberal in education "but with some old-fogy [sic] ideas like loyalty, commitment to the profession and a real faith in the value and power of public schools."² He said he thought one of the major things he had done in Syosset, New York was to institute an experimental program under which children could voluntarily go eleven months of the year and complete six years of junior and senior high school work in five. He viewed with pride that staff reduction turnover was only about 10 percent.

¹"Need to Learn a Lot, Says School Chief", Chicago Tribune, 11 May 1966.

²Ruth Dunbar, "Redmond", Chicago Tribune, 11 May 1966.

Prior Experience

Dr. Redmond was a product of Kansas City schools, and his first teaching experience was there as well. When Herold C. Hunt was Kansas City school superintendent, Redmond was his assistant from 1940 to 1946.³ After Hunt became Chicago school superintendent in 1947, he brought Redmond in as his assistant and trouble-shooter.⁴ In 1950, Redmond began handling purchasing for the schools and in that capacity became involved in several controversies. He recommended awarding a fuel oil contract to a firm that was later discovered to be controlled by relatives of a board member. A lower bid had been rejected as not meeting specifications, although the fuel oil supplied by the favored firm did not meet specifications either.⁵

Another controversy involved excessive charges for hauling federally donated foods. Redmond had signed the report authorizing the arrangement. He later testified to a county grand jury that he was not aware of the exorbitant fees.⁶ In spite of the controversies, Dr. Redmond was the man thought most likely to succeed Herold Hunt when he left as superintendent in 1953. However, a month before Hunt announced his resignation, Redmond had committed himself to

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

become superintendent of schools in New Orleans, Louisiana where he assumed the post 1 June 1953.⁷ A month later, when Chicago school board members began to search for a successor to Hunt, Redmond was sought to fill the post. He told the board that he could not ask New Orleans to release him from his contract. He did not realize at the time that he would have the opportunity years later.⁸

The 1954 Supreme court decision on school desegregation had a resounding effect on Redmond's career, but not until 1960. "A federal court order directed New Orleans schools to intergrate [sic] and Redmond attempted to enforce the order."⁹ Governor of Louisiana, Jimmie H. Davis, and the state legislature attempted to take over operation of New Orleans schools from Redmond. Governor Davis seized administration of the schools, but a federal court returned control to Redmond and the New Orleans board of education.

Efforts to integrate white schools by enrolling five Negro girls were scheduled for 15 November 1960. But the state legislature rammed thru new resolutions giving the legislature control over New Orleans schools and firing Redmond. Hours later, a federal judge issued a restraining order preventing any state interference with the New Orleans school system and integration.¹⁰

⁷Dunbar.

⁸"Redmond's Career Shows Meteoric Rise", Chicago Tribune, 11 May 1966.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

As scheduled, five black girls entered the first grade in two formerly all-white schools. A week later, a homemade bomb exploded in a parking lot space reserved for Redmond.¹¹ In addition, the legislature withheld pay for Redmond and New Orleans teachers. Funds for the school system were held, and bills incurred were not paid. Banks were hesitant to issue loans, and Redmond was fired by the state legislature seven times. However, the firings were ruled invalid each time by a federal District court. Finally, in 1961, James Redmond left New Orleans to become eastern director of school administration services for Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, a nation-wide management consultant firm in New York City.¹² Then in 1963, Redmond became school superintendent in Syosset, New York.

Taking the Helm in Chicago

James F. Redmond was a "new breed" of school superintendent. No devices could be tried by segregationists in Chicago which would be new to him. Perhaps two of his greatest assets for Chicago schools were a quiet dignity with which he habitually met differences of opinion and a habit of emphasizing issues and goals rather than his own personal importance.¹³

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Mary J. Herrick, The Chicago Schools: A Social and Political History, (Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1971), 341.

When he arrived in October 1966, Superintendent Redmond found many things waiting to be done for which he had no opportunity to set a time-table.¹⁴ He was criticized because he kept most of the administrative staff and he retained spokesmen who had been accused of racist and at times, hostile attitudes.¹⁵

Earlier in the year when the school board was voting for Redmond's appointment as superintendent, little did Thomas J. Murray, Board Vice-President, realize how prophetic his words were when he said: "I cast my vote for Dr. Redmond and in doing so fervently pray that he will do half as well as his predecessor. If he can accomplish that in the troublesome times that lie ahead, he will be a great Superintendent of Schools."¹⁶ And troublesome times followed. The election which chose the Chicago Teachers Union as bargaining agent in June 1966, required the immediate negotiation of a contract. Business and industrial leaders needed to be heard. A tax referendum had been authorized by the legislature in 1961 but had never been put on the ballot. The reactions of leaders in the black community were cautious. The Coordinating Council of Community Organizations and the Chicago Congress of Racial Equality showed continued suspicion of Dr. Redmond's motives and hostility toward his plans.¹⁷ However, "Gentleman Jim" as he was affectionately called,

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶_____. Chicago Board of Education Official Report of Regular Meeting, 25 May 1966, 3235.

¹⁷Herrick, 342.

set about deepening and widening channels of communication with business and industrial leaders, with the board of education, with the legislature and with as many elements in the city at large as he could reach.¹⁸ He offered to work with the board committee in the teacher negotiations and spent many days doing so. Within his first month in the city he explained the urgency of the schools' financial situation to the fiscally cautious Civic Federation--and won its approval of a tax referendum for \$25 million for buildings, to be voted in the upcoming November elections.¹⁹ Although Chicago seemed willing to accept Redmond, he was still facing a myriad of problems.

At the end of the superintendent's first year he asked the board to authorize a series of studies on which recommendations for a building program could be constructed to achieve social and educational goals necessary for the welfare of the city. His first study, Design for the Future: A Recommended Long Range Educational Plan for Chicago, 1967-1971, received criticism. It was said to be too vague and based on past planning.²⁰ The second study, Organization Survey: Board of Education of the City of Chicago, was presented in May 1967 by a management firm employed by the board. The report recommended specific changes in board procedure.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Herrick, 343.

The Board should no longer spend at least eighty percent of its time reviewing detailed administrative and housekeeping [sic] items for which its members had no special competence, and should be free to deliberate on major issues of policy, to evaluate alternate courses of action, and to be responsive to the educational needs of the city. It stated that these were the reasons for the Board's existence and the areas in which it could be effective. Board members were urged to seek staff assistance in analyzing reports and doing independent research. The general superintendent should have enough additional assistance in the task of coordinating divisions of the huge school organization. . . . More areas of decision-making and administrative responsibility should be delegated to area and district superintendents . . . to tailor a school's services to the needs of a particular group of students at the local level, and to work with parents and community leaders in doing so. Services such as curriculum planning should be distributed among the districts. . . . A human relations department should be included at the top administrative level. The top administrative staff should be able to operate as a team so that the general superintendent might be relieved to work closer with the Board and to handle educational matters outside the school system. February 1968, the board of education voted to accept these recommendations and to use them as a basis for streamlining its activities.²¹

²¹Herrick, 343-344.

However, there was still a very serious problem.

Chicago schools were segregated. Only 28 percent of its white students were in schools more than 5 percent black and only 4.7 percent of its black students were in predominantly (more than 50 percent) white schools.²² Many felt that Chicago had failed in integrating its public schools. Therefore, many felt that constitutional law was being violated, and Chicagoans were waiting to see what James Redmond would do.

In January 1967, the Chicago public schools received from the United States Office of Education for Civil Rights a statement of findings and recommendations concerning the schools. The report, entitled Report on Office of Education Analysis of Certain Aspects of Chicago Public Schools under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, highlighted four areas of special concern: Faculty Assignment Patterns, Boundaries and Student Assignment Policies, the Apprenticeship Training Program, and Open Enrollment for Vocational and Trade Schools.²³ Dr. Redmond replied with a proposal requesting a planning grant from the U.S. Office of Education under Section 405 (a) (2) of Title IV of Public Law 88-352. The purpose would be to fund the employment of specialists to advise the staff and to develop feasible plans for the solution of the following problems: (1) Apprenticeship Training Programs; (2) Open Enrollment for Vocational and

²²David J. Kirby, R. Robert Harris, and Robert L. Crain, Political Strategies in Northern School Desegregation, (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1973), 243.

²³Redmond Report, Board of Education, Chicago, 23 August 1967.

Trade Schools; (3) Boundaries and Student Assignment Policies; and (4) Faculty Assignment Patterns.²⁴

The grant was approved by the United States Office of Education, and it provided for the employment of specialists to assist the staff in seeking solutions to the problems.²⁵ In brief, it called for a number of desegregation proposals.

Dr. Redmond stipulated the following recommendations:

I. Apprenticeship Training Programs

A. Cooperate with the U.S. Office of Education and the U.S.

Department of Labor in a review of the Mayor's program to increase enrollment of students from Negro and other minority groups.

B. Develop plans for working on a continuing basis with apprenticeship councils to assist in increasing minority representation in apprenticeship programs and to develop public confidence in the procedures of the councils.

C. Develop a program to more effectively inform students from minority groups about apprenticeship opportunities and to plan additional programs to prepare such students to achieve eligibility.

II. Open Enrollment for Vocational and Trade Schools

²⁴Official Chicago Board of Education Report, 25 January 1967, 2400.

²⁵Redmond Report, 1.

- A. Arrange conferences with the U.S. Office of Education to explore additional procedures to implement the open enrollment policy now in effect in Vocational and Trade Schools in order to increase integration in these schools.
- B. Investigate opportunities for extension of career development programs.

III. Boundaries and student Assignment Policies

- A. Retain independent and objective specialists to work with the staff.
- B. Review attendance boundaries and assignment policies of students.
- C. Determine the feasibility of various actions within the power of the Board of Education to reduce segregation.

IV. Faculty Assignment Patterns

- A. Retain personnel administration experts as consultants.
- B. Involve representatives of teacher organizations.
- C. Review teacher personnel assignment procedures to plan for increased integration of faculties.
- D. Develop feasible plans to equalize the distribution of experienced teachers to the greatest possible degree.
- E. Identify characteristics and conditions of schools which distinguish desirable and less desirable schools as seen by teachers.²⁶

²⁶Proceedings: Board of Education, City of Chicago, 25 January 1967, 2400.

It was made clear that the report was an answer to the questions raised by the Office of Education earlier and that its preparation had been financed by a planning grant from that office.²⁷ Planning began 1 April 1967, and action was initiated immediately. Experts from ten universities, from the school staffs of three other large cities, from several national and local organizations, including the Chicago Urban League, representatives of Chicago teacher organizations, and of the Chicago school administrative staff and also teachers below the administrative level served as consultants in drawing up its recommendations.²⁸

In direct response to the report, the team stated the following basic assumption:

Particularly are we concerned about racial and economic deprivation in our midst. . . . When a condition so pervasive in our city bears in upon the schools, the schools can not hope to solve the problem except in commitment and action shared by the community--a genuine shared commitment with all groups who can make common cause with the Board of Education for quality education for all. We see an obligation to undertake a comprehensive educational program aimed at reversing a pervasive social condition that has become deeply rooted in our society . . . and seek educational pathways to a better society.²⁹

²⁷Peterson, 143.

²⁸Herrick, 344.

²⁹Herrick, 344-345.

After a period of restudying ongoing procedures, making plans for feasible changes and developing new techniques to solve the problems indicated, the team drew up a plan. On 23 August 1967, Dr. Redmond presented the plan entitled: Increasing Desegregation of Faculties, Students, and Vocational Education Programs. It was later to become known as the Redmond Report. In brief, the plan called for a number of desegregation proposals which made front page headlines that same evening:

At a special session of the Board of Education, Redmond proposed the first out-and-out integration program in Chicago school history. It would include dispersion of limited numbers of Negro pupils into outlying all-white schools. They would be moved from integrated schools whose neighborhoods are becoming predominantly Negro, such as those in South Shore and Austin.³⁰

First reactions were from qualified acceptance to outright hostility. Early predictions were that schools would open amid the same climate of argument and tension that had marked school openings in previous years.³¹ Edwin C. Berry, executive director of the Chicago Urban League, said that the plan was a good first step but he was not endorsing the quota system. He added, "As a beginning to gain integration in the schools, this is all right to start with. In order to implement the educational system and get better education for our kids, I have to

³⁰Helen Fleming, "Set Racial Quotas in Schools: Redmond", Chicago Daily News, 23 August 1967.

³¹"First Reactions: Hostility, OK", Chicago Daily News, 23 August 1967, 1.

go along with the plan at this point."³² Meyer Weinberg, history professor at Wright Junior College and editor of Integrated Education magazine stated: "Its tone is much more constructive than anything that came out from the office under (Willis). My question is will intentions be carried out?"³³

A final reaction from S. Thomas Sutton, an Elmhurst, Illinois attorney who headed "Operation Crescent" an organization opposed to black residential moves and school integration, was that the plan might force his group to "press Operation Withdrawal." He predicted that whites would move enmasse from the city and he urged Redmond to build more schools in the black and white communities where the students lived.³⁴ Even though Dr. Redmond's plan was labeled as racist and discriminatory by many blacks, his long-term goal intentions were to anchor whites that resided in the city. He hoped to achieve and maintain stable racial attendance proportions in changing fringe areas.³⁵ While Chicagoans were trying to absorb the news of this revolutionary plan, board members were meeting with Redmond to adopt it.

Mrs. Louis A. Malis moved for adoption of the report. She further moved that the general superintendent of schools be instructed to forward a copy of it to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. All votes were yeas with the

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Chicago Daily News, 5.

exception of a pass vote by Mr. Edward S. Scheffler. Mr. Scheffler's reservations lay in the fact that some of the suggestions would require judicial interpretation and costs had not been calculated.³⁶ He went on to state:

At present in our large cities in the field of school integration many impractical promises have been made and the fulfillment of those promises have been discouraging. The Chicago Board of Education should not be compelled to make commitments as suggested in the report until such a time as we have good reason to believe that we can fulfill them. For that reason, I pass.³⁷

Still other board members had misgivings. Mrs. Wendell E. Green's concern was with costs for implementation, but she countered with "We are being asked to adopt a statement of philosophy, a statement of policy . I would urge that we do not delay because the situation in the City of Chicago is urgent."³⁸ Even though board member, Mrs. W. Lydon Wild had voted "yea," she wanted the record to show that accepting the plan in principle did not mean it should be implemented immediately since there were no cost projections and no funds were available.³⁹

In connection with the adoption of the report, Board President Frank M. Whiston stated:

³⁶Official Proceedings, Chicago Board of Education, 23 August 1967.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid.

I think . . . that we are talking about tremendous sums of money. We are broke now. We don't know where we're going to get money, but we are going ahead with a program and I think we're beginning to invite some criticism. If it gets to a point where we cannot get enough money to put this program well on its way--for example, if the program is going to cost \$40 million or \$20 million or whatever it may be, and we only get \$5 million from someone, I wonder where we should start the program. At that point I want to continue to be free to express myself and while I'm voting aye, I do it with the provisions that I can change as we go along.⁴⁰

In keeping with a new spirit of racial comity that had arisen since Willis's departure, the school board unanimously approved "in principle" this document which rapidly became known as the Redmond Report.⁴¹

Chicago's American newspaper had already hinted that educational park complexes and magnet schools were outlined in the report as ways of desegregating for the future, but the next morning, The Chicago Tribune printed highlights of Redmond's broad program for the Chicago schools:

Educational parks would be developed during the next 30 years with each serving up to 20,000 pupils on eight to ten peninsulas to be created along the lakefront. Another 15 to 20 similar educational centers would be built largely around the rim of the city. Each center would include

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Peterson, 143.

elementary, high and specialized schools. These would permit eventual closing of some 300 neighborhood schools.

Magnet schools offering "exemplary programs in specialized fields" in attractive nonresidential locations such as parks and white residential areas near suburbs would be established. The schools would be open to all students in the city with transportation provided if required.

Instruction would be provided on those school buses which would carry pupils from their home districts to other schools to extend integration. Pupils would attend schools primarily in "areas least threatened by residential change." Percentage limits on minority attendance of integrated schools would be established.

A quota system, incentives and rules to bring a proportionate share of the best qualified and most experienced teachers to inner-city schools would be established. Instructional groups would be headed by experienced teachers and include less-experienced teachers, aides, interns and practice teachers. Integration of teaching personnel would be encouraged.

Parking lots would be built at inner-city schools for the protection of teachers. School buses would carry groups of teachers to and from inner-city schools if necessary.

Vocational education programs would be improved and expanded with campaigns conducted to increase attendance.

A metropolitan area educational council would be created to develop pupil and teacher exchange programs within the city and between Chicago and predominantly white suburbs.

City officials would act to bring about city-wide integrated housing in order to fully integrate schools.

Money required for the long-range plan would come from the federal government.⁴²


Obviously, total desegregation would not come about quickly, but Redmond had finally initiated policies moving towards it, and Chicagoans had taken notice. Board of education member Thomas J. Murray was heard to comment on several of the bolder proposals for increasing Chicago school integration. He said: "The recommendations are proper and right and should be implemented as soon as possible."⁴³ But little did anyone realize just how complicated and interwoven Redmond's solution to desegregation would become.

Less than a month after his report made headlines, James Redmond was again front page news because he moved to implement a decentralization policy which divided the school system into three parts. An area associate superintendent would be named to administer each segment. The new districts, with headquarters to be located near the center of each of their areas would mark the

⁴²"Board OK's Redmond Plan", Chicago Tribune, 24 August 1967, 1.

⁴³"Good-by to old policy", Chicago Sun-Times, 24 August 1967, 2.

first major administrative reorganization of the schools in a long time. (See map on following page).



**CHICAGO
SCHOOL
DISTRICTS**

The purpose of the three smaller districts would be to "bring the responsibility for decisionmaking closer to the local school."⁴⁴ Each man would have full administrative authority over what would amount to his own school system except that technical assistance and major policy decisions would come from the central office. Named to the posts were: Dr. Curtis C. Melnick, in charge of Area A on the South Side; Julien D. Drayton, administrator of Area B on the West Side; and Dr. George W. Connelly, head of Area C on the North Side.⁴⁵ After the appointments were confirmed, all three men expressed strong conviction that more decisions should be made at the local level and that relations with the communities should be improved. Redmond said the areas were divided to provide a balanced work load in each of the districts with approximately the same number of students. Even though Area A would be comprised of 73 percent black students, Area B 60 percent black students and Area C 25 percent black students, Chicagoans seemed to accept Redmond's decentralization program because civil rights groups, community organizations and city agencies had been consulted before Redmond had made his final decision.

Redmond had finally won little but significant approval in his efforts to desegregate the public schools.⁴⁶

⁴⁴Christopher Chandler, "Schools Divided Into 3 Districts", Chicago Sun-Times, 14 September 1967, 1.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid.

On 28 December 1967, the school board voted eight to two in favor of plans to bus some five thousand students in February of 1968 in an effort to stabilize racial integration in the Austin and South Shore communities.⁴⁷ The proposal would be the first major implementation of the Redmond Plan for integrating and upgrading the public schools.⁴⁸ The busing proposal would involve the transportation of less than 1 percent of the total student body for the next semester with a slight increase for the fall semester. No school involved in the program would be less than 65 percent white in enrollment and newly integrated schools would not be less than 85 percent white. On 29 December, opposition was voiced.

Reactive and Proactive Forces are Heard

Thirty-three of 47 speakers at the first citywide hearing on the board's busing plan opposed busing. Thirteen favored busing and the Chicago Region of the Illinois PTA congress favored more integration but took no stand on busing. Thirty of the opponents represented community groups and PTA's from all-white areas. Even though none of the communities represented were directly affected

⁴⁷For detailed accounts, see Neil E. Lloyd, "The Decision-Making Process and the Chicago Board of Education: The 1968 Busing Decision" (Ph. D. diss., Loyola University of Chicago, 1974) and William A. Vrame, "A History of School Desegregation in Chicago Since 1954" (Ph. D. diss., The University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1971).

⁴⁸Chris Chandler, "School Busing For Austin and South Shore OKd", Chicago Sun-Times, 28 December 1967.

by Redmond's immediate busing proposals, opponents regarded the busing plans as the beginning of the end of the neighborhood school concept. Others cited the threat of air pollution and congested traffic from the use of buses. Four denounced busing as a Communist plot.⁴⁹ An anti-busing PTA member of one public grade school summed it up poetically:

We feel it is dangerous, as well

as quite cruel

To send kids out of their neigh-

borhood school.

Some think we oppose busing

'cause these kids are not white.

But wouldn't busing then, in-

crease the suburban flight.

So we ask, and we beg, and we

plead heart in hand

We don't live in Russia, give

us back our free land.

A Rogers Park community leader found himself, not surprisingly, in the minority when he invited the board of education to bus black children to unused classrooms in the all-white North Side area. When he repeated his group's

⁴⁹Henry De Zutter, "Busing backer draws jeers", Chicago Daily News, 27 February 1968.

support of the plan and invited "the admission of all children to schools in our area," there were shouts of: "We hope you get 'em all."⁵⁰

While some opponents of busing took a light-hearted "it's inevitable" approach, others were seriously dead-set against it. A parent on the northwest side of Chicago sent a letter to board member, Cyrus H. Adams III, dated 26 February 1968, the day of the first citywide hearing. In part, it read:

I am a mother of seven children, all going to school. . . . we are supporting all of their education with real estate taxes and tuition. Three of these children use public transportation every day at our own expense. No colored parents have agreed to pay \$150,000.00 to transport anybody else's children and I could imagine the thought that would come to their minds if they were asked to do so. They would say we were crazy. Well that is exactly what I think of Mr. Redmond's plan. . . . No matter how bad the weather or how far these children live they have to walk home for lunch. Now you want us to approve the right for these colored children to have lunchroom facilities at this school. Where do you see equal rights in this situation. . . . you want the negroes to have the right to chose [sic] their neighbors but not the whites, who pay most of the tax dollar in Chicago. Our forefathers had to work hard when they came to this country. The negroes have jobs handed to them and they loaf on the job, stay home from work, rob and steal, because they know they have Civil Rights groups protecting them charging "Discrimination." . . . We are called hysterical and panicky. This is correct.⁵¹

If black support of the Redmond Plan was at first half-hearted, the white hostility to busing subsequently provoked sturdier black support.⁵² Mr. Edwin Berry, executive director of the Urban League, observed that "anyone who can stand against such a little busing plan as this must be in favor of reinstating

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Cyrus Hall Adams, III, Papers, Box 37, Chicago Historical Society.

⁵²Peterson, 150.

slavery."⁵³ After the board finally rejected compulsory busing, Mr. Warren Bacon, the black community's leading representative on the school board alleged that it had "retreated in the face of bigoted opposition."⁵⁴

At a special meeting 4 March 1968, the school board changed one of the busing plans from compulsory to voluntary. Even though parents of black children were reluctant to send their children into neighborhoods where there was talk of violence, voluntary transfers increased gradually.⁵⁵ But there were those who opposed voluntary busing. The education committee of the Citizens' Council at a northside high school sent a letter stating their opposition because they felt it was too heavy a responsibility for the parents themselves; they felt the voluntary basis indicated less than full support from the Board of Education and they felt that voluntary busing would make the children and parents more susceptible to intimidation and pressure.⁵⁶ The group went on to say: "We know the difficulty of proceeding with the business of education in overcrowded class rooms. Since no miracle is forthcoming to provide an adequate number of new class rooms in the near future, it is a waste of tax dollars to allow vacancies to continue."⁵⁷

Realizing that busing was a vital part of the magnet school concept, the council

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Herrick, 352.

⁵⁶Adams Papers, Box 37, Chicago Historical Society.

⁵⁷Ibid.

did not want to jeopardize proposals for quality integrated education by leaving the decision to bus or not to bus up to the parents. The council commended Dr. Redmond and his staff for proposing solutions to problems that had been facing Chicagoans for year.

A northside ministers association also voiced support for the busing plan when, in part, they wrote: "we realize that the welfare of Northwest Chicago, both now and even more so in the future, is bound up with the welfare of the rest of Chicago. Likewise we believe that it is good economy and a good educational procedure to relieve the overcrowding in some schools and to make use of vacant seats in other schools."⁵⁸ The ministers favored the busing proposal to allow children from the Austin area to go to receiving schools in Northwest Chicago. The ministers hoped that by showing good will to all children, others would be encouraged to follow suit. Cyrus Adams received yet another letter. The endorsement was from a family of six "in favor of the plan for the betterment of education for all children in Chicago."⁵⁹ Even though the northside interest groups were supportive through letters and phone calls, southside groups were just as vocal.

The Women's Board of the Chicago Urban League voiced concern due to harsh "resistance being offered to this plan, for it seems clear that much of the protest is

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid.

really against even the merest bit of integration rather than against busing per se."⁶⁰ They encouraged full implementation without further delay. A Hyde Park resident was more adamant in his letter to Mr. Adams in reference to the board's vote change from compulsory to voluntary busing when he wrote: "On Ash Wednesday you have helped give Chicagoans another great sin to repent of."

While many private and public interest groups from all areas of the city were voicing support for the Redmond Plan, The Executive Board of Chicago Teachers Union resolved support of the school busing proposals and urged implementation and approval immediately and without further delay. The Union further requested the board to file suit immediately to compel the State of Illinois to discharge its constitutional obligations to provide equal educational opportunity for all children attending the public schools of the state. The Redmond Report was cautiously but increasingly becoming accepted.

In 1975, Redmond announced to the board of education that he would not seek reappointment as general superintendent. He left for a final vacation 1 June after being head of the Chicago Public Schools for nine years. His contract would not expire until 13 September, therefore the school board set about to find a replacement. A newspaper editorial printed the following:

School system with 50,000 employees and 530,000 pupils seeks man with vision of philosopher, organizational ability of political boss, efficiency of corporation executive and finesse of Vatican diplomat to put public education

⁶⁰Ibid.

back on the track in Chicago. Must be able to spend \$1 billion a year wisely.

Salary: negotiable to \$65,000 with excellent fringe benefits.⁶¹

Board members pressed for commitments in two areas they felt were shortcomings during Redmond's administration. They faulted him for permitting deficient principals and administrators to keep their positions and for making infrequent visits to schools.⁶² They were seeking a new direction.

⁶¹"Selecting a school chief", Chicago Sun-Times, 9 July 1975, 59.

⁶²Casey Banas. "3 finalists in search for school chief told", Chicago Sun-Times, 29 June 1975.

CHAPTER III

JOSEPH HANNON AND NEW DIRECTIONS

Hannon Before Becoming Superintendent

In 1970, an executive recruiting firm found Joseph P. Hannon working at the University of Northern Colorado as a graduate research assistant. Later that year, he was hired by James Redmond as Facilities Planning Superintendent for the Chicago schools. On 23 July 1975, the school board passed a motion to appoint Dr. Joseph P. Hannon as General Superintendent of Schools for four years, and on 24 July he was appointed with an effective starting date of 14 September.

Hannon's Shaky Beginnings as Leader

Dr. Hannon inherited a myriad of problems. A \$50 million deficit headed the list. In addition, reading scores were low; minority student percentages had increased but minority teacher percentages had not; the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) was threatening to cut off up to \$100 million in federal funds for the school system's failure to integrate

faculty; pupil desegregation was almost an impossibility and worst of all, a crippling teachers' strike was already in progress.⁶³

The strike ended four days after Hannon's contract took effect, but damage had been done. Ninety-six percent of the teachers had stayed away from school; seven class days would have to be made up at the end of the schoolyear; and the deficit was widened due, in part, to the teachers' raise. Hannon had indeed inherited a monumental and unenviable task.⁶⁴ In addition, he was faced with a great deal of opposition due to his election over the immediate Deputy Superintendent, Manford Byrd, who was black. In light of the circumstances, however, Hannon's response was:

I've been brought in as a head coach, and I think if you're going to have a winning season you've got to expect the maximum out of everyone on the team. And those that cannot produce, I think they no longer should be on the team. The critical aspect is to have in each one of the working stations people who are highly committed to what their jobs are supposed to be.⁶⁵

Hannon went on to say that with the decreasing white population, desegregation in Chicago was a moot issue. He felt that the critical needs were to provide good schools wherever the children were and to provide alternatives so that if parents and/or children wanted to go to a different location, they could do so. A

⁶³Joseph Hannon, "Plight of the Chicago Schools: A Profile of and Interview with the New Superintendent Joseph Hannon," interview by Earl J. Ogletree, 1976.

⁶⁴"Strike over; school today", Chicago Tribune, 18 September 1975.

⁶⁵Ogletree, 13.

confident young superintendent had taken a stand but the pressures of heading Chicago's schools were just beginning.

By the end of 1975 Hannon had another immediate pressing problem to address: the concerns of HEW (under Title IX of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act) whose officials had threatened earlier that year to cut federal funds to Chicago if the teaching staff was not integrated. Early in 1976, Dr. Hannon submitted a summary of a plan to the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) which was in direct response to HEW's request to remediate segregation policies in order to comply with Title VI by September 1976. The document was an attempt to put together in one resource booklet the facts and figures related to the Plan to Integrate Local School Faculties, Equalize Staff Services, and Provide Special Services to National Origin Minority Children.

The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) rejected the plan and asked for additional information. OCR informed Dr. Hannon that it had reviewed data to determine how faculty and staff were assigned to create or maintain the racial identifiability of schools. Moreover, OCR wanted to know whether teachers were assigned so that minority group students were taught by teachers with less experience or less professional training than nonminority students. Finally, the office wanted to determine whether or not equally effective educational opportunities were provided to national origin minority children.⁶⁶

⁶⁶Response to the Request from the Office for Civil Rights, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, for a Plan to: Integrate faculties, Equalize professional staff services, Provide special services to national origin minority

Next, the HEW Office for Civil Rights requested a plan to be submitted within sixty days outlining steps to be taken by Chicago Public Schools for assigning faculty and ways that would comply with desegregation. By September 1976 OCR expected the ratio of minority to nonminority personnel in each of the district's schools to be substantially the same as the ratio of the district as a whole. Within the same timeframe the proportion of teachers with extensive professional education and experience and the proportion of teachers with lesser amounts of professional training and teaching experience were to be comparable in all of the district's schools. In addition, OCR expected each student who spoke a primary language other than English to be provided special instructional services necessary to ensure equally effective participation in all of the district's educational programs.⁶⁷

Joseph Hannon requested an additional extension of sixty days to respond to the Office for Civil Rights request, and he outlined the steps that would be necessary for Chicago to comply with the provisions of Title VI as:

- (1) collecting and analyzing current data on the characteristics of students and programs for the 1975-76 school year as they relate to the regulations of Title VI;
- (2) developing assessment techniques for the identification of the English language proficiency of national origin minority students;

children," (Chicago Public Schools, 8 February 1976), viii.

⁶⁷Ibid, 19.

- (3) reviewing the regulations of Title VI with the Chicago Teachers Union;
- (4) reviewing and discussing the provisions of Title VI with the board of education and developing recommendations related to a plan for compliance for the board's approval;
- (5) coordinating the regulations of Title VI with the requirements of the State of Illinois for mandated bilingual education programs and for school district desegregation plans;
- (6) developing instructional models that meet programmatic needs in schools with students of national minority origins who have English language problems;
- (7) identifying sources of funding for the development of assessment techniques, instructional models, and staff inservicing;
- (8) studying alternative methods of reallocating support services in schools attended by national minority students; and
- (9) establishing procedures for identifying individual racial and ethnic data on students and staff.⁶⁸

Hannon went on to specifically state that in schools in which more than 50 percent of the teachers were non-black, no more than 75 percent of its teachers should be non-black in the future. In addition, in schools in which more than 50 percent of the teachers were black, no more than 75 percent of the teachers should be black in the future. To achieve these goals, he proposed to: intensify a

⁶⁸Response to the Office for Civil Rights, 29.

program for recruitment of black and minority teachers and establish a review board which would help to enhance and/or maintain faculty integration.

Unfortunately, unbalanced faculty integration still existed. To rectify the situation and to be in compliance with OCR, the superintendent's office projected a mandatory reassignment of teachers. Criteria included matching minority with non-minority teachers and reassigning or exchanging those teachers if certification and subject areas matched. Based on the January 1976 survey, no less than 5,700 teachers would be affected. However, a realistic figure projected that more than 8000 teachers would be reassigned.⁶⁹ September 1977 found the number of teachers reassigned to enhance integration at thirteen hundred.⁷⁰ Actual transfers were a far cry from the projected ones. Hannon would learn, at a later date, that OCR would not accept the teacher transfer plan.

In 1969 when the Justice Department first threatened legal action to force increased faculty integration, 213 of 578 schools had all-black or all-white teaching staffs.⁷¹ After the teacher transfer plan in 1977, only a slight racial shift from 1969 proportions for faculty integration was indicated in a post survey. In some

⁶⁹Response to the Office for Civil Rights, 49.

⁷⁰"Adjusted number of teachers reassigned for September 1977," Plan for the Implementation of the Provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Related to: Integration of Faculties, Assignment Patterns of Principals, Bilingual Education Programs. (Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 12 October 1977), 41.

⁷¹Casey Banas, "Survey shows advance in teacher mix," Chicago Tribune, 21 February 1979, 1 (section 5).

instances, schools fell out of compliance because of declining enrollment. One school spokesman explained:

A school may be just within the required range but then lose a teacher because of an enrollment drop. The teacher with the least seniority is reassigned. If that teacher is black and the school is predominantly white, the reassignment will increase the percentage of white faculty members and the school will not be in compliance again until a vacancy occurs and can be filled with another black teacher.⁷²

Nevertheless, Hannon and the board thought progress was being made because the schools were attempting in good faith to integrate faculty without totally disrupting the school system.

An equally important goal of the Chicago Board of Education was to provide each student who spoke solely or primarily a language other than English, with special instructional services necessary to ensure equal, effective participation in the Chicago educational programs. Identifying the students and providing appropriate staff were the immediate goals. Inservicing staff, involving parents and community members, monitoring and evaluating were to come later. Planning for desegregation of the schools would require concurrent activity in determining the educational soundness, administrative efficiency and economic feasibility of each alternative course of action. Hannon recognized that equalizing educational opportunity for all students was the most important issue. However,

⁷²Ibid.

the task would be great since neither he nor his predecessors had addressed it before and unanticipated circumstances might arise during the planning phases of the desegregation effort which could result in shifts or changes.

On 26 January 1977, the board of education passed a resolution, which was prescribed by the Illinois Board of Education, "to develop, adopt, and implement a comprehensive Equal Educational Opportunity Plan designed to meet the criteria for conformance with the Rules Establishing Requirements and Procedures for the Elimination and Prevention of Racial Segregation in Schools."⁷³ A confidential working draft was sent to the Office for Civil Rights to ensure that this plan to meet the Illinois resolution would also comply with OCR guidelines. The plan was as follows: (1) to integrate faculties by September 1977; (2) to eliminate any identifiable pattern of principal assignment; and (3) to provide "appropriate" bilingual services.⁷⁴ Dr. Hannon and the board of education seemed to be in control and headed in the right directions, but in February 1977, a federal judge in administrative law rendered a decision which held that the Chicago Board of Education was in violation on the federal faculty/staff racial factor and bilingual issue but was not in violation of the faculty experience factor.

⁷³Equalizing Educational Opportunities in the New Chicago, Chicago Public Schools, February 1977.

⁷⁴Plan for the Implementation of the Provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights of 1964, 1977.

In April, a special consultant was appointed by HEW to assist in the negotiations with the board in the settlement of the Title VI proceedings.⁷⁵ During the month of May, a series of meetings were held between staff from the Office for Civil Rights and the Chicago public schools to "negotiate" provisions included in the 20 January 1977 plan submitted to OCR. On 25 May, The Chicago Board of Education adopted the Plan for the Implementation of the Provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Related To: Integration of Faculties, Assignment Patterns of Principals and Bilingual Education Programs. During the summer months of June through August 1977, teachers and principals were transferred and reassigned to meet the 25 May compliance goals of the federal government. In addition, procedures for the implementation of the bilingual education component were finalized.⁷⁶ A foundation which had been laid for many months was finally being completed.

Creating the Plan

Designing a quality plan became a challenge to members of the board of education, to staff, to parents, to community members, to civic and business leaders and to the general public. The challenge simply put was to make certain that every child had access to the best education that could be provided and to make the Chicago public school system one outstanding example of what public

⁷⁵Plan for Implementation . . . , 172.

⁷⁶Ibid.

education could be. The challenge was to enhance "excellence" in the schools and to give each child full and open "access" to it. Under the superintendency of Joseph P. Hannon, the plan became known as Access to Excellence.⁷⁷ Though the plan was submitted in April 1978, it was designed to become fully realized by the 1982-83 school year. There were three major parts to the plan. First, district programs were educational initiatives such as program options which would be undertaken by each of the twenty-seven districts to serve primarily, but not exclusively, the students within the district. Secondly, system programs such as magnet schools offering specialized courses were to be used as initiatives that would enroll students from all parts of the city. Students would be able to attend an academic center offering programs of personal interest even though the program would be in a district other than the one in which the student might live. Finally, central office administrative actions were to offer initiatives that would afford students the opportunity to extend their school year through the summer, to enroll in the school of their choice and to attend improved educational facilities.

During the interim period of 1978-79, twenty-seven basic skills programs and twenty-seven district-selected programs were to be implemented. Each district would establish a basic skills program so that students needing intensive work in reading, mathematics, and language arts would have access to services that would help them to gain skills necessary for further learning. In addition, each district

⁷⁷Joseph P. Hannon, Access to Excellence: Recommendations for Equalizing Educational Opportunities, 12 April 1978. x.

would develop and implement a program to serve a particular need or interest of students in the district. The educational initiatives would include academic interest centers, enriched studies programs, high school bilingual centers, career education programs, magnet schools and preschool programs. Summarily, every program in every category was designed to attract a racially and ethnically diverse group of students with common interests and aspirations. Through board administrative actions, summer school would be offered for students to extend their learning opportunities. In addition, students would be allowed to seek out the schools in the city offering programs of personal interest. Finally, new classroom building facilities would be constructed so that a majority of the mobile classrooms could be eliminated.⁷⁸

At the core of the plan was the concept of "access to excellence." Each student would be given the chance to choose from an array of educational alternatives. Students would be viewed as individuals with individual interests, needs and potentials. The uniqueness of each student would be emphasized thereby encouraging children to see themselves and others as individuals rather than as stereotypes.⁷⁹

For the programs to be fully developed into operational activities in the schools, mechanisms for implementation were needed. In order to make certain that students would be able to participate in the programs offered thereby ensuring an

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Ibid.

environment conducive to learning, the following services would be provided.

First, students participating in programs implemented under the plan would be provided with transportation if they attended a school outside the attendance area in which they lived and if that school would not be within walking distance.

Second, elementary pupils would be transported by contracted vehicles and high school students would be provided with carfare for public transportation.⁸⁰ The success of the plan to equalize educational opportunities in the Chicago public schools would depend in large measure upon the continuing involvement and commitment of the various segments of the community and particularly upon the parents of the students. The plan would provide for civic participation at all levels and in all phases of the implementation. District and school advisory councils would have a major part in selecting or designing. During the implementation of "access" the advisory councils would be informed of progress, problems, and accomplishments and would, in turn, advise staff on suggested program refinements. The systemwide involvement of the community would continue through the City-Wide Advisory Committee (CWAC). CWAC would serve as an advisory group in the development and implementation of programs and would be informed of progress, results, and any proposed modifications of the programs. CWAC would also serve as one means of communication between the various groups and bodies appointed and the public school system.⁸¹

⁸⁰Access to Excellence, 115.

⁸¹Access to Excellence, 119-120.

Hannon's plan seemed to cover all bases, but an underlying factor for its success was money. The board of education was operating with a deficit of \$97.5 million.⁸² The Chicago Board of Education looked to the Illinois General Assembly to provide the financial support which would enable the board to successfully carry out the desegregation rules of the State Board of Education. The board would work to cooperate with the state in order to receive funds. In addition, Dr. Hannon would solicit monies from federal agencies. Workshops would be scheduled, consultants would be hired, teams would be formed, and program models would be designed. With all of this, Hannon and the board of education believed that the Access to Excellence plan would become a reality.

Making the Plan Work

On 1 March 1979, a local newspaper printed that federal officials had prepared a letter charging Chicago public schools with student segregation. The federal government was demanding a citywide desegregation plan. The Office for Civil Rights confirmed that the letter had to be reviewed and approved by Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Joseph Califano.⁸³ The letter focused solely on student segregation and charged Chicago public schools with violating the Civil

⁸²Access to Excellence, 120.

⁸³Casey Banas, "City schools segregated, federal letter charges," Chicago Tribune, 1 March 1979, 3.

Rights Act of 1964 in its student assignment policies and practices. In part, the letter read:

Specifically, we have determined that the racially segregated conditions in the Chicago public schools are, in substantial part, the result of various policies and practices of Chicago school officials. These conditions have been created, maintained, and exacerbated through the placing of mobile classroom units at certain schools; selecting sites for new or expanded school facilities; creating and altering attendance area boundaries for elementary schools; establishing optional zones and feeder patterns for middle schools, upper grade centers and high schools; implementing student transfer programs; using segregative busing; establishing vocational high school attendance zones and admission criteria; and assigning faculty and other professional staff. The actions and omissions of Chicago school officials in these areas have contributed to racial segregation in the Chicago public schools and demonstrate the intent of school officials to segregate students by race. The information reviewed by OCR further shows that the violation is systemwide. The segregative effects of the actions and omissions of Chicago school officials have indirectly or directly affected virtually all of Chicago's schools.⁸⁴

The letter also requested that the board of education be required to "fashion a systemwide remedy" to eliminate student segregation. No school would be exempt. Chicago schools were instructed to develop a plan which would not

⁸⁴Ibid.

group black and Hispanic students as a single ethnic race. OCR acknowledged that Congress had enacted legislation prohibiting HEW from ordering busing to eliminate segregation. Yet it stated that the Civil Rights Act prohibited it from accepting an inadequate desegregation plan. If a desegregation plan would not be voluntarily submitted, the case could likely be referred to the Justice Department for a federal suit. Dr. Hannon and the board would be given ninety days to submit a plan.

The very next day, newspaper headlines printed that Chicago schools could lose \$26 million in aid from the federal government and \$500 million in state and federal funds. The newspapers further explained that U.S. officials seemed willing to help the school system resolve its dilemma by recommending that a six-agency task force help Chicago develop a school desegregation plan that would include busing but minimize the white flight to the suburbs.⁸⁵ OCR proposed a strategy for the task force to speed up residential desegregation both within the Chicago school district and across district lines. The proposal would be accomplished by using HUD programs to encourage movement of blacks to the suburbs and whites to the city.⁸⁶ Gary Orfield, a University of Illinois associate professor, urged the Illinois school board to consider a new desegregation policy solely for Chicago schools. "A new strategy is needed for Chicago and the emphasis should be on

⁸⁵Barbara Reynolds, "U.S. asks study on school bias here," Chicago Tribune, 1 (sec N1), 3 March 1979.

⁸⁶Ibid.

stabilizing existing integrated neighborhoods," Orfield stated.⁸⁷ In response, Hannon referred to Orfield's "credentials and expertise" as "one of the architects of the Los Angeles desegregation plan--a mandated program that many critics have termed a major failure."⁸⁸

While Orfield was condemning Access to Excellence, others such as state school superintendent, Joseph Cronin, were embracing it. He agreed that Hannon's "access" program was indeed succeeding in desegregating students. However, Cronin told a meeting of the Illinois State Board of Education that he wanted the Chicago school board to prepare a new plan to further push desegregation in the school year beginning in September 1979. The state board of education's Equal Educational Opportunities Committee, however, rejected Cronin's resolution to ask Chicago to submit additional desegregation plans. They wanted to study the new status report of Chicago's schools before taking action.⁸⁹ Prepared by Chicago and state school board staffs, the report stated the following: (1) thirty-four schools, with 16,649 students, had been desegregated under the program; (2) 224 (38.2 percent) schools had achieved minimum acceptable desegregation; (3) 179 schools had been "positively effected by Access to Excellence in terms of desegregation"; (4) 91.5 percent of all schools had been participating in Access to

⁸⁷Casey Banas, "Access to excellence a flop: state school aide," Chicago Tribune, 6 March 1979.

⁸⁸Joan Zyda, "Hannon hits critical report on Access," Chicago Tribune, 7 March 1979.

⁸⁹Casey Banas, "School desegregation is succeeding: Cronin," Chicago Tribune, 9 March 1979, 5 (sec 2).

Excellence either by sending or receiving students taking part in the program; and (5) 25,556 of the 490,000 Chicago public school students had been voluntarily participating in access to excellence programs.⁹⁰ The joint committee concluded that the plan was beginning to succeed in desegregating Chicago's public schools and that substantial progress had been made during the first year of the five-year plan.⁹¹ Cronin still held to an earlier statement that Chicago should be required to desegregate an additional twenty-thousand students which would begin September 1979. The state education committee finally concurred.

Mounting Government Charges

The spring of 1979 was not a pleasant one for Joseph Hannon. The federal government accused the board of perpetuating segregation in its schools and threatened to file a suit against the board unless a comprehensive desegregation plan could be prepared by September. In a letter to Dr. Hannon, Joseph Califano said the board's Access to Excellence program, "does not correct the violations identified."⁹² He did suggest that the program could serve as a foundation for an acceptable plan which would have to be approved by the school board by midsummer in order to be implemented by September. Otherwise, HEW would be obligated under a federal court order to refer the matter to the Justice

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹"In reply: Access program works," Chicago Tribune, 11 March 1979, 6.

⁹²Meg O'Connor, "City faces school bias suit by U.S.," Chicago Tribune, 11 April 1979, 1.

Department. It had previously agreed to file a suit to force desegregation if the board failed to submit a new plan or if it submitted one that was not acceptable to HEW. If a suit were filed, it would mean that a desegregation plan could be imposed upon the city's schools by a federal judge.⁹³ An official from HEW made it clear to Dr. Hannon that the violations were serious.

In tracing case after case using the board's own official records, the federal report stated: "The evidence demonstrates that school officials contained black students in segregated black schools while protecting whites in racially identifiable white schools."⁹⁴ HEW went on to say that these overt, official acts of segregation were accomplished through four means: by building new schools and additions and adding mobile classrooms; by creating and changing school attendance boundaries, optional zones and feeder patterns; by using student transfer programs and segregative busing and by selectively assigning faculty and staff. HEW charged that over the years, the board chose sites for new schools that created or maintained segregation. The report cited that ten new high schools which opened between 1968 and 1977 were intended for students of a particular race. Seven--Manley, Austin Branch, King, Julian, Collins, Robeson and Corliss--opened with enrollments of more than 90 percent black; Curie was 83

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Casey Banas, "U.S. lists cases of bias in schools," Chicago Tribune, 12 April 1979, 1.

percent white: Clemente was 76 percent Latino and Juarez was 93 percent Latino.⁹⁵

Additionally, the government charged that the board "contained" black children living in the Cabrini-Green housing project. It went on to say that two additions built during the 1950s to Jenner Elementary School, near the project, pushed enrollment to 3,711 while the board refused to reassign any black children living in the project to nearby white schools on the Near North Side. HEW said that such containment occurred even though enrollments at two nearby white elementary schools, Headley and Thomas, decreased so much by 1959 that they were combined into one administrative unit. Also nearby was predominantly white Ogden Elementary school which had three empty classrooms in 1961. Instead of taking action to relieve Jenner by shifting its pupils to Ogden, the board changed attendance boundaries between Ogden and Franklin, a predominantly black elementary school. This, the government contended, permitted most of the remaining whites at Franklin to switch to Ogden. Lincoln and La Salle, two other mainly white elementary schools on the near north side, also had space, according to HEW. "No effort was made to utilize these nearby white campuses to accommodate more equitably the large black student enrollments in this area," it said.⁹⁶

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Ibid.

In addition, the government charged that the containment pattern was repeated elsewhere when the black population expanded. It stated that the board built seven schools on the southwest side between 1970 and 1974, all with predominantly black faculties and all-black enrollments, in the Ashland Avenue corridor which was a dividing line between white and black neighborhoods. As blacks pushed westward across Ashland Avenue, the board bent under pressure from whites in initiating other containment measures. Among these, according to the report, were placing mobile classrooms at black Altgeld Elementary School instead of permitting black children to switch to nearly white schools and returning some black children to Cook Elementary School from the predominantly white school after all-night vigils and picketing by whites. More charges stated that the board contributed significantly to segregation in the South Shore area.

By 1965, it said, predominantly black O'Keefe and Parkside elementary Schools had mobile classrooms due to overcrowding, but two nearly white elementary schools, Coles and Bradwell, had none. Bryn Mawr and Mann each had two mobile units although they were both integrated. Use of mobile classrooms at Coles and Bradwell in 1965 "would have helped to accommodate expanding enrollments and to integrate a wider, more stable area," HEW said, but the board did not take that action. Three years later, it rejected another attempt to stabilize South Shore schools when it voted down a proposal by Superintendent James Redmond to bus children up to three miles from Bryn Mawr and Mann to Coles

and other schools.⁹⁷ The board was also accused of using optional attendance zones which gave students living in a given area the choice of two or more schools. HEW viewed it as a segregation device.

A permissive transfer plan to relieve overcrowded elementary schools had "significant potential for accomplishing integration," according to HEW, but the board imposed various limitations and conditions that discriminated against black children. One case cited was: in 1969, graduates of predominantly white Barton and Foster Park Elementary schools could opt for either Calumet or Harper High Schools. The choice gave these graduates the opportunity to stay out of Calumet, the government said. But by 1972, when Foster Park and Barton had become predominantly black, the board ended the optional zone, requiring all graduates again to attend Calumet as their neighborhood high school.

The government cited other instances where black students were contained in black schools but an irony was evident: the incidents prompting the segregation charges had happened before Hannon became superintendent. Joe Hannon, nevertheless, would have to "take the heat" and would need to begin rectifying the mounting problems. The government warned that while it was optimistic about Hannon's ability to develop a plan acceptable to the government, it did not have a proposal to offer. Meanwhile, the government declared the board ineligible to receive desegregation aid under the Emergency School Aid Act, but it added that

⁹⁷Ibid.

an acceptable plan would "waive" the ineligibility.⁹⁸ Dr. Hannon denied the government's charges while promising to cooperate with federal officials to resolve existing problems. He had to clear the way for much-needed federal funding for other school programs.

Satisfying the Government

David Tatel, director of HEW's Office of Civil Rights, delivered a letter to Superintendent Hannon 10 April 1979. The document expressed concern for Chicago's segregated schools and asked that negotiations for a citywide desegregation plan start promptly. Tatel, representing the government, warned that if Chicago refused to begin negotiations, he would refer the case to the Justice Department for court action.⁹⁹ During an interview with a local newspaper, Mr. Tatel said that although white students are only 21 percent of the total school enrollment of 494,000, the school board could take a number of actions to increase desegregation well beyond Hannon's Access to Excellence plan. HEW would also insist that Chicago produce a second mandatory plan for use in case the voluntary proposal didn't work. "If whites don't volunteer to go to "magnate" [sic] schools with blacks, then we want some guarantees that they will

⁹⁸O'Connor, 1.

⁹⁹Casey Banas & Meg O'Connor, "Busing plan needed, U.S. official says," Chicago Tribune, 12 April 1979, 12.

be required to," Tatel said.¹⁰⁰ The office also reported that the Chicago school system lost \$30 million in 1978 and would stand to lose another \$42 million in emergency aid funds if it failed to submit an acceptable desegregation plan.¹⁰¹ He gave "off the record" suggestions but emphasized that he did not want to impose any plan on Chicago.¹⁰² He said that even the best of desegregation plans would still leave a number of schools with all-black enrollments. Finally, he admitted that a key factor in seeking a Chicago desegregation plan was the National Association for Advancement of Colored People's (NAACP) suit against HEW seeking a court order to compel the federal government to complete its investigations in all northern school segregation cases.

Joseph Hannon responded by sending a letter to federal officials asking for a hearing to give the Chicago school system a chance to tell its side of the segregation controversy. "We're not guilty of the allegations," he said. "We should be made eligible for funding."¹⁰³ Hannon set about to challenge the government findings and convince federal officials that Chicago had indeed made substantial strides toward desegregation, primarily through his Access to

¹⁰⁰Barbara Reynolds, "Leave integration to Byrne: HEW aide," Chicago Tribune, 28 June 1979, 18 (sec 3).

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Casey Banas, "Hannon to fight U.S. Charges of school bias," Chicago Tribune, 19 April 1979, 1 (sec 7).

Excellence plan.¹⁰⁴ He said that federal officials had been investigating Chicago schools for more than two years and were handling school segregation charges differently from similar allegations in other cities. Usually, the federal government contends that a local school system has violated the federal Civil Rights Act and asks that a desegregation plan be submitted for its approval. For Chicago, an exception was made because the federal government rejected the school board's application for desegregation funds under the Emergency School Aid Act in the hope that Chicago would develop a plan to make it eligible for funds.¹⁰⁵ Hannon was given two choices by federal officials: either ask for a "show cause" hearing to prove the charges incorrect or ask for a waiver to receive funding. He felt that asking for the latter would be an admission of guilt. He chose the first option when he stated that his Access to Excellence program, which was developed in response to the Illinois Board of Education desegregation demands, was indeed a strong one.¹⁰⁶ Hannon's frustration was evident when he stated that the problem of integrating Chicago public schools surfaced long before his superintendency. In addition, he intended to ask federal officials, "What was good enough?" and "What did they mean by compliance?"¹⁰⁷

The Problems Mount

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Ibid.

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

On 4 May 1979, Dr. Hannon was scheduled to appear before officials of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to show cause why federal funds to the Chicago public school system should not be cut off. He reportedly asked that his hearing be made public. In addition, four Chicago aldermanic representatives were scheduled to make the trip to Washington, D.C. for the proceedings. One alderman, Clifford Kelley, had submitted a resolution earlier calling for Joseph Hannon's dismissal as school superintendent. One of the grounds for dismissal cited was the action taken by HEW in threatening to cut off federal school funding unless the board of education improved its program for school desegregation. Alderman William Lipinski, chair of the Chicago city council's newly-formed Education Committee, confirmed that one of the reasons he was making the trip was to see if Hannon had an adequate explanation for Chicago's desegregation plans.¹⁰⁸ At the Washington D.C. hearing, Hannon defended his Access to Excellence plan in stating that it had been a factor in stabilizing neighborhoods. He added, "If we don't stay with this plan, we could lose the greatness of Chicago. . . . The burden of proof is on the accuser, not the accused," he emphasized. He asked federal officials to revoke their findings that Chicago schools were deliberately segregated and make the school system eligible

¹⁰⁸Robert Davis, "Aldermen to join Hannon at HEW's bias hearings," Chicago Tribune, 1 May 1979, 12.

for \$36 million in funds under the Emergency School Aid Act which provides money for desegregation programs.¹⁰⁹

The Access to Excellence plan had now become part of Hannon's response to state demands for school desegregation. Two days after his return from the Washington hearings, the board of education voted to expand the Access to Excellence programs by adding thirteen sites for use as language academies, classical schools and preschool programs, effective in September.¹¹⁰ Several weeks later, more sites were slated for the 1979 fall access program but on 26 May, the superintendent was notified that HEW stood by its previous charges that official board actions led to segregation. The government reiterated an earlier conclusion that Access to Excellence did little to reduce segregation.

Having lost the appeal, Hannon had the option of negotiating with HEW for a new desegregation plan or facing the likelihood of a federal court suit seeking to force desegregation. HEW stated that "although there were many sound educational programs contained in Access to Excellence, it did not correct the unlawfully segregated conditions that had been identified."¹¹¹ The superintendent's reply to the news was that he would continue talks with the federal government. However, his disgust was evident when he retorted that some

¹⁰⁹Barbara Reynolds, "Hannon denies federal charges of segregation," Chicago Tribune, 5 May 1979, 3.

¹¹⁰Casey Banas, "Add 12 schools to "Access" plan," Chicago Tribune, 10 May 1979, 5.

¹¹¹Barbara Reynolds and Meg O'Connor, "HEW holds to school bias charge," Chicago Tribune, 26 May 1979, 9.

middle-level federal officials pressing for desegregation had become regulatory characters with almost demonic powers. He said that the officials were acting as "judge, jury, and hangman" over Chicago public schools.¹¹²

However, federal officials reaffirmed their position that Chicago was not eligible for federal desegregation funds because the school system, over the years, had taken deliberate actions to contain black students in black schools. Since many of the "access" programs involved students for only part of the day or the school year, HEW rejected it. The government also rejected Chicago's definition of desegregation. Under Chicago's standard, a school was desegregated when no more than 90 percent of its students belonged to one race. Under federal standards, with white and black students only, a school was desegregated when its full-time student enrollment was 25 to 50 percent white and 50 to 75 percent black. A school with white, black and Latino enrollments would be desegregated with 15 to 35 percent white, 50 to 70 percent black and 15 to 35 percent Latino.¹¹³ Dr. Hannon reminded a determined HEW that with white enrollment at an all-time low and dropping, any plan would have to take the "demographic realities" into account. The low percentage of white students had made total desegregation in Chicago an impossibility. He continued to press for

¹¹²Casey Banas, "Hannon lashes U.S. for pushing board," Chicago Tribune, 30 May 1979, 11 (sec 4).

¹¹³Meg O'Connor, Hannon: "I'll reject mandatory plans for desegregation," Chicago Tribune, 8 June 1979, 2 (sec 5).

HEW's definition of "compliance" and emphasized a willingness to go beyond his access program.¹¹⁴

Revamping "Access"

Again Hannon said that he would be willing to establish goals for the school system's all-voluntary access to excellence but "would not consider anything mandatory. I think we've been very consistent about that."¹¹⁵ He went on to say that thirty-eight thousand students participating in the program for the first year alone, was proof enough that voluntary plans could work. Access to Excellence, he said, "is the most successful, qualitative educational and desegregation program in urban America."¹¹⁶

On 13 July 1979 Jane Byrne, Mayor of Chicago, announced that she had met with Joseph Hannon to discuss the progress of desegregation negotiations with the federal government. She said that "Hannon's staff was preparing an expanded desegregation plan to present to the Office for Civil Rights."¹¹⁷ Byrne mentioned that the plan would include "clustering", which involved combining school populations of three or more schools in proximity. The magnet schools plus the addition of clustering would require little busing. When asked

¹¹⁴Ibid.

¹¹⁵Ibid.

¹¹⁶Ibid.

¹¹⁷David Axelrod, "School officials seek plan with little busing," Chicago Tribune, 13 July 1979, 1 (sec 3).

whether the federal government would accept such a plan, Byrne replied that the public would know once Hannon met with federal officials in Washington, D.C.¹¹⁸

Hannon's staff had been in meetings with HEW in order to reach an agreement of how much desegregation was to be achieved in the city's schools and what measures would be used. Timing would be critical since HEW had demanded that the city prepare an expanded desegregation plan by mid-September or face a federal suit seeking to force desegregation. Negotiations were also focusing on a federal demand for mandatory backup measures to be instituted if voluntary efforts would fail to meet the goal of achieving desegregation acceptable to HEW.¹¹⁹ On 26 July, David Tatel, director of the Office for Civil Rights stated: "We have decided that further progress would be enhanced by developing some specific desegregation options; one of the options will be busing."¹²⁰ He went on to say that the plan had to be developed and approved by 15 September but the implementation date would be determined during negotiations. During the month of August, the government would be gathering demographic information from the school board so that the federal government could propose "pairing and clustering plans." The next step would be for the school board to react to the

¹¹⁸Ibid.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

¹²⁰Casey Banas, "U.S. to develop options for school desegregation," Chicago Tribune, 26 July 1979.

proposed options.¹²¹ HEW and the school board seemed to be inching towards each other.

A Battle Ensues

Pressures on the Chicago schools for massive, mandatory integration had been building slowly and quietly for years. Now they were about to erupt. One by one, OCR or the courts had forced on the big northern cities mandatory integration plans that went far beyond simple desegregation. Now it was Chicago's turn.¹²² On 26 August, Patricia Harris, newly appointed secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, announced that even though she would be willing to help Chicago officials map out an acceptable school desegregation plan, she would not allow a delay beyond the 15 September deadline.

On 31 August, HEW drafted and released a desegregation proposal for Chicago public schools that relied on the mandatory busing of 114,000 elementary pupils.¹²³ Chicago would not be required to accept it but, if accepted, would desegregate 60 percent of the city's schools and involve 55 percent of the public schoolchildren.¹²⁴ The proposal was presented as a "feasibility study" which the government said proved that desegregation could be accomplished in Chicago.

¹²¹Ibid.

¹²²"A battle threatens our schools," Chicago Tribune, 19 August 1979, 4 (sec 2).

¹²³Casey Banas and Meg O'Connor, "U.S. proposes busing 114,000 pupils in city," Chicago Tribune, 31 August 1979, 1.

¹²⁴Ibid.

Joseph Hannon was unavailable for immediate comment but a spokesperson issued a statement saying top staff members had "serious concerns that the material presented did not address itself to the educational program for the children of Chicago public schools."¹²⁵ HEW had other suggestions to offer in negotiations but basically, the next move would be left to Hannon and the Chicago Board of Education.

Further adding to his woes, Hannon's contract as superintendent would be expiring within the week and the school board would have to vote on whether to retain or release him. Jesse Jackson, president of Chicago-based People United to Save Humanity (PUSH), had urged that Hannon be fired because he had not complied with the law in desegregating the schools. While some highly visible leaders, such as Chicago city council members, viewed the superintendent with skepticism, others spoke out in support of his Access to Excellence plan. During a news conference, Joseph Hannon commented that the HEW study suggesting that 114,000 schoolchildren be bused to achieve the government's definition of integration, offered no educational improvements, would not aid the city's stability and would be costly.¹²⁶ He now had a revised plan to present to federal

¹²⁵Casey Banas, "What federal school plan means to city," Chicago Tribune, 2 September 1979, 5.

¹²⁶Casey Banas, "Hannon won't seek forced busing," Chicago Tribune, 5 September 1979, 1.

officials and with the beginning of another school year, his first goal was to "calm the waters a bit."¹²⁷

Presenting "Access" Again

Front-page headlines, one week after school began and two days before the federal deadline, greeted readers with: HANNON SCHOOL PLAN RUSHED TO U.S.¹²⁸ The Hannon proposal, an expansion of his Access to Excellence program, was presented to the board of education in response to the federal proposal that called for busing. Hannon's extended plan would achieve greater racial balance throughout the school system.¹²⁹ It would require thousands of students to choose new schools because segregated ones would be closed, overcrowding would be eliminated and racial quotas would be established in order to maintain integrated schools.¹³⁰ Hannon, seeking to diffuse busing as an issue, volunteered: "The school bus is the key to opening up the school system and we are not opposed to busing. The important question is not how a child gets to school, but what the school is offering the child."¹³¹ Hannon's revised "access"

¹²⁷Ibid.

¹²⁸Casey Banas, "Hannon school plan rushed to U.S.," Chicago Tribune, 13 September 1979, 1.

¹²⁹Ibid.

¹³⁰Ibid.

¹³¹Access to Excellence: "Further Recommendations for Equalizing Educational Opportunities" 12 September 1979, Board of Education, Chicago.

plan targeted four major strategies. His first strategy was to reduce the number of twenty-seven school districts to twenty. (See Appendix E) The rationale was that district reduction would increase the number of districts that would contain diverse racial/ethnic groups. It would also increase the number of students in the racially diversified districts, thereby increasing the potential for successfully developing desegregated programs. Because the revision would be solely an administrative reorganization, it would not change student or teacher assignments, attendance boundaries or high school feeder patterns. Hannon's second strategy was to target student assignment policies. The policies would be designed to equalize the use of school facilities and to stabilize enrollments. Hopefully, mobile classrooms would be eliminated, overcrowding would be reduced, enrollment ceilings would be established to maintain racial diversity, and selected school buildings would be closed. In addition, an open enrollment policy would permit students to apply for an available seat in another school if the move enhanced desegregation. A third set of strategies would involve new program models. The ultimate objective for employing the models would be through the use of part-time programs. By participating in short-term full-day or recurring part-day learning activities in desegregated groups, children would have an opportunity to gradually come to know one another as unique individuals. Parents would be able to discover the positive aspects of desegregated education and the negative attitudes that could undermine stable desegregation could be confronted and changed. The final group of recommendations were concerned

with improving program management and operation. Included were community involvement, staff development and public information programs. Hannon proposed that businesses and public agencies "adopt a school" to develop studies in their business areas of expertise. The goal would be to "adopt" fifty high schools and one hundred elementary schools. The businesses could help to develop specialized courses for forty-five hundred students.¹³²

Hannon did not place a cost estimate on the expanded access program. However, he prepared a request for federal funds under the Emergency School Aid Act which would provide some money for desegregation. Even though the federal government had rejected Chicago's application for such funds seven times, Hannon was hopeful that his latest plan would be termed eligible for federal funds.¹³³ Though Hannon was optimistic, there were others who were not.

James Compton, president of the Chicago Urban League, had strongly voiced his opposition to the expanded Access to Excellence desegregation plan. At a league meeting, Compton cited the controversy surrounding the integration of the city's schools as indicative of the "selfish attitude that prevailed."¹³⁴ He went on to say that even the revised "access" was nothing more than "an effort to appease and protect the white, middle-class income segment of the population,

¹³²Joseph Hannon, Access to Excellence: Further Recommendations for Equalizing Educational Opportunities, Board of Education, City of Chicago, 12 September 1979.

¹³³Banas, 13 September, 22.

¹³⁴Jacqueline Thomas, "Race relations here declining--black leader," Chicago Tribune, 10 October 1979, 8.

rather than serve the minority communities that desperately needed a comprehensive desegregation plan to open new vistas of educational opportunity."¹³⁵

Another citizen felt that integrated policies should foster neighborhood renewal and stability. Busing was unpopular and not effective.¹³⁶ Still another citizen was frightened that her child's education would be disrupted because of overt racism such as parents yelling "Nigger go home."¹³⁷ Finally, in a letter to the newspaper, a Chicago student, wondered why "liberals who want to do what's good for the kids, won't ask the kids?"¹³⁸ The school year had gotten off to a bad start and it seemed to be worsening.

The Court Battle Resumes. . .

On 18 October the superintendent told the Chicago board of education he had been informed that HEW Secretary Patricia Harris would send him a letter announcing Chicago's desegregation case would be received by the Department of

¹³⁵Ibid.

¹³⁶Charles R. Johnson, "Big-city busing: a cure that kills the patient," Chicago Tribune, 6 October 1979, 38. (A letter to the editor).

¹³⁷Denise Llorens, "Black against busing", Chicago Tribune, 6 October 1979, 38. (Letter to the editor)

¹³⁸Gaile Eidukas, "Let them ask us kids," Chicago Tribune, 13 September 1979, 2. (Letter to the editor)

Justice.¹³⁹ Hannon asked HEW to extend negotiations for 170 days, but admitted that he had not considered presenting any modifications of the same revised Access to Excellence desegregation plan that HEW rejected earlier.¹⁴⁰ Even though Patricia Harris labeled "access" as illegally vague and said that it would not work well enough to stand a court test, some board members urged Hannon to resist HEW's demands and fight it out in court.¹⁴¹ Still, Harris had reminded Hannon of a two-year government study which revealed that for forty years the Chicago school board had intentionally segregated its schools by the way it drew school district boundaries, installed temporary classrooms (mobile units) and located new schools.¹⁴² "Through its policies and practices, the Chicago Board of Education . . . has confined its minority children to schools that are separate and unequal, depriving both black and white children of the educational opportunities promised in the law," Harris said.¹⁴³

¹³⁹Jonathan Landman, "School Board defies U.S.; challenges HEW to court fight," Chicago Sun-Times, 18 October 1979, 1.

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

¹⁴¹Landman, 10.

¹⁴²Ellen Warren, "Take school fight to court--HEW," Chicago Sun-Times, 19 October 1979, 8.

¹⁴³Ibid.

And Hannon Resigns

On 30 November 1979, the superintendent's performance was yet again criticized. Harsh words from James Compton were felt when he said: "Hannon's inability to fulfill his dream of changing the system points out the need to obtain a replacement who is well-versed in management skills, negotiation techniques and financial savvy."¹⁴⁴ In addition, a new coalition of black civic and church leaders urged the board to replace Hannon with the black deputy superintendent who was presently serving.¹⁴⁵

To the consternation of some and to the relief of others, Dr. Joseph P. Hannon made a surprise announcement that he would resign effective 25 January 1980. Sources said that Hannon believed the schools would never be able to work through pressing problems such as desegregation and finance until all elements of the community became actively involved and put education before politics.¹⁴⁶

On 16 December still another surprise shook the school system. A much-speculated rumor that the board would not be able to meet its payroll was surfacing. The board found itself unable to borrow working funds in the financial markets and state government refused to rescue the board once again.¹⁴⁷ As

¹⁴⁴Linda Wertsch and Betty Washington, "Hannon's performance criticized," Chicago Sun-Times, 30 November 1979, 3.

¹⁴⁵Ibid.

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

¹⁴⁷Alan D. Mutter and Brian J. Kelly, "Officials predict 2 tax increases, school closings," Chicago Sun-Times, 16 December 1979, 3.

leader of Chicago's schools, Hannon would have to absorb the bruises and take the blame. Only, he was no longer the superintendent. He had resigned two days earlier. Joseph Hannon had gone but his Access to Excellence plan had "planted patches of progress" acknowledged even by some of his critics.¹⁴⁸

Aftermath

In the midst of a crisis, there was no superintendent. Speculation ran high that money would be found to pay employees. Rumor became a stark reality when paychecks scheduled for 21 December did not arrive. With morale at an all-time low and the possibility of schools shutting down, Angeline P. Caruso, Associate Superintendent of Curriculum and Instruction Services, was appointed interim superintendent. In addition, all school board members, except one, were asked to resign.

Caruso served until Dr. Ruth Love, Chicago's first black school superintendent, was hired April 1980. In May, ten new members were appointed to the board of education and one of their first acts was the creation of a student desegregation committee. A consent decree resulted after the committee entered into negotiations with government officials during the summer. The decree was

¹⁴⁸Linda Wertsch, "Hannon leaving behind bits of progress," Chicago Sun-Times, 16 December 1979, 4.

entered in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 24 September 1980 under presiding Judge Milton Shadur.¹⁴⁹

The decree stated:

The United States has filed a complaint alleging that the Board of Education of the City of Chicago has engaged in acts of discrimination in the assignment of students and otherwise, in violation of federal law. The United States alleges further that such acts have had a continuing system-wide effect of segregating students on a racial and ethnic basis in the Chicago public school system. In addition, the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1979 and in 1980 found the Board ineligible for funding under the Emergency School Aid Act on the basis of its determinations that the Chicago public school system is characterized by racially segregated and overcrowded schools. Following a presentation of facts by the Board in defense of its actions, these HEW determinations were reaffirmed by the Department of Education on June 12, 1980.¹⁵⁰

As a result of the decree, a plan was put in place to create the greatest practicable number of stably desegregated schools and to provide educational and related programs for any black or Hispanic schools remaining segregated.

Hopefully, educational disadvantages of past or continuing racial isolation would

¹⁴⁹Ibid.

¹⁵⁰United States District Court Consent Decree, 24 September 1980.

be lessened.¹⁵¹ The Chicago Board of Education and Superintendent Love entered into a new era with the old problem of desegregating its schools.

¹⁵¹Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Overview

In 1954 the Supreme Court declared segregation in public education to be unconstitutional. In 1967 James Redmond presented a plan which proposed the first out-and-out integration program in Chicago school history. In 1977 the Chicago Board of Education, under the leadership of Joseph Hannon, passed a resolution designed to meet criteria which would establish requirements and procedures for the elimination and prevention of racial segregation in the city's public schools. By the end of 1979 Hannon was gone and desegregation had not occurred.

Twenty-five years passed from the time Chief Justice Warren announced his landmark decision until the time Superintendent Hannon announced his resignation from the school system. Within that timespan, desegregation in public education had been a primary topic of discussion. What had not been addressed was that historically, being educated in segregated settings had been a way of life for many black and white children in America and in Chicago. After the decree, pressure was put on school systems to desegregate as set forth by constitutional law.

Although Redmond and Hannon inherited overriding problems, both presented programs that they thought: (1) would address answers to desegregating Chicago's schools; and (2) would be answers to the federal government's mandates. One might wonder then if gains were made in eliminating racial segregation in the public schools under the superintendencies of James Redmond and Joseph Hannon. Looking back at past events might help the city's school system avoid future mistakes.

Redmond in Retrospect

Redmond proposed two plans to integrate the schools. The earlier plan, Project Wingspread, was a city-suburban endeavor between Chicago and Highland Park public schools that would help to develop an understanding between central city and suburban youth. Both groups were to exchange classrooms in the morning and then spend time together involved in a curriculum of metropolitan studies in the afternoon. A six-week pilot summer program was planned which was to be followed by a semester program. Funding was to come from private and government sources but much needed funds never surfaced and the program was forgotten.

Redmond's second "bold and comprehensive" desegregation plan followed shortly after "Wingspread" when as part of the plan, he proposed that more than a thousand black children be bused some distance from their homes. At first, the school board embraced his plan but as details of implementation costs, lengthy

travel times and fear of bodily harm became available to the school board, the members reassessed the plan and rejected the designed busing scheme.¹⁵² In addition, bitter opposition from white parents as well as hesitance from black parents placed pressure on the school board to revise Redmond's recommendations.¹⁵³ Redmond's plan did not allow for parental input. While the board could not leave pupil placement decisions to parents, the parents could not be ignored either. With negative factors heavily outweighing the positive ones, overwhelming controversy dulled further efforts to implement the large and comprehensive Redmond Plan. Redmond's efforts to desegregate were commendable, but his plan failed. The school board realized the costs and rejected it. There was not enough money for buses, and parents were then asked to transport their children to school. For any number of reasons: disinterest, lack of private transportation, too distant or time-consuming, effective desegregation did not happen.

Hannon in Retrospect

Joseph Hannon also incorporated busing in his efforts to desegregate. Besides, who would deny any student "access to excellence?" Magnet schools under his plan offered students an alternative to the regular educational program and was open to them on a citywide basis. Because magnet schools may draw students

¹⁵²Peterson, 143.

¹⁵³Ibid.

from a broad area, they can make an important contribution to a desegregation effort.¹⁵⁴ Perhaps Hannon viewed the magnet school as an attractive technique in the desegregation effort but, because participation was voluntary, students and parents had to be convinced that a superior quality education was provided at the selected magnet school.¹⁵⁵ Though Hannon presented the magnet school as part of a broad spectrum, public mindset associated magnet schools with desegregation and probably viewed them with skepticism.

The commission who served on the school desegregation project in 1980 under the leadership of Robert L. Green, Professor at Michigan State University, stated: "In order for voluntary techniques like magnet schools to have a significant effect on a total desegregation effort, the overall plan must incorporate pupil reassignment."¹⁵⁶ Those who could choose their schools, embraced the "magnet" ideals; those unable to attend their school of choice saw yet another obstacle to an equal opportunity for learning.

In the midst of Hannon's woes was the ever-present lack of funding. The government had denied emergency aid under Title VI and a new HEW secretary, Patricia Harris, set a deadline date for Hannon to fully desegregate Chicago's schools. There was not enough time or money to execute a successful

¹⁵⁴Robert L. Green, LEAD consultant, Student Desegregation Plan for the Chicago Public Schools: Recommendations on Educational Components and Student Assignment, Board of Education, City of Chicago, 1981, 11.

¹⁵⁵Robert L. Green, Consultant, Student Desegregation Plan for the Chicago Public Schools: Recommendations on Educational Components, 1980.

¹⁵⁶Green, 27.

desegregation plan. Besides, white flight to suburbs had increased in large numbers and minority children made up over 80 percent of the schools' population. Hannon resigned in frustration.

Conclusion

Both Redmond and Hannon involved support staff they had each selected but both failed to realize that while making policy, the people directly affected should have been involved in the policy-making decisions. They each put their plans in place and then notified those affected (schoolchildren and their parents) of the rules. While implementing their plans, input should have been sought from those involved so that they could have been made to feel part of the decision-making process. When introducing this change, the superintendents ignored the democratic ideology so deeply-rooted in the American way of life. The "key" players had not been asked to help set the rules. Both leaders seemed to have firm backing and respect from the board of education. However, pressure from city government, citizens groups and private parties, caused the board members to change their minds on critical issues such as busing.

Money was also an issue. Even though one board member questioned where the money would come from, she voted "yea" in principle just in case money would be found later. Funding was anticipated from government revenues but was not released in some instances. Because Hannon's plan was not acceptable to the federal government, much needed funding was withheld. Redmond received a

federal grant to fund writing his proposed desegregation plan, but, when time came to implement it, federal funds were lacking.

Neither plan provided recommendations for correcting existing inequities in faculty racial ratios. Although both plans included strategies for inservicing personnel in preparation for the new programs, the dollars were not there. Trying to incorporate new programs into a system with a history of financial crises was difficult if not impossible. Funding was not the major drawback, however.

During the superintendencies of Redmond and Hannon, while both plans were anticipating acceptance, several things had happened: (1) white flight from the city was occurring and growing at a rapid pace, (2) school finances were at crisis proportions, and (3) the federal government was not readily embracing remedies Chicago was offering. Though both men were attempting to set policy as dictated by the government, what was not taken into account by each of them was that segregation had been the American way of life for so long that it was viewed as a legacy. While Chief Justice Warren and the remaining eight voted what they thought was right, they did not consider those people who would not embrace what was constitutionally right. America, for so long, had been accustomed to the longstanding tradition of segregated educational settings.

In any policy implementation process, leaders must have their pulse on the attitudes and experiences of the people involved.¹⁵⁷ Policy analysts well know

¹⁵⁷John Martin Rich, New Directions in Educational Policy, Lincoln, NE, Professional Educators Publications, 1974.

that educational policy is not made in a vacuum; it is a product of both history and contemporary forces.¹⁵⁸ According to Chicago Tribune newspaper writers, Jack Houston and Casey Banas, "There must be a national recommitment to public education, a broader understanding of its role in our democracy and a better appreciation for what it has done and is doing in developing our society."¹⁵⁹ With the lopsided numbers of minorities in the majority in Chicago, desegregation has become a secondary issue on which many feel too much time has been spent. A growing sentiment is that we must now be about the business of giving all public schoolchildren in the city of Chicago a good education. Desegregation alone does not guarantee that it will happen.

¹⁵⁸Paraphrase from Introduction to Education Policy course taught by Dr. Michael Bakalis, Loyola University of Chicago, 1989.

¹⁵⁹Jack Houston and Casey Banas, "Active parents are key to many reform programs," Chicago Tribune, 29 May 1988, 1 (sec 4).

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APPENDIX A

Justices voting the landmark Brown I & II decision 17 May 1954 were:

The Honorable Chief Justice Earl Warren

The Honorable Justice Hugo L. Black

The Honorable Justice Stanley Reed

The Honorable Justice Felix Frankfurter

The Honorable Justice William O. Douglas

The Honorable Justice Robert H. Jackson

The Honorable Justice Harold H. Burton

The Honorable Justice Tom C. Clark

The Honorable Justice Sherman Minton

Source: Brown et. al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et. al. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

APPENDIX B

Cases argued for equal protection of the laws as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment, and later known as Brown I & II were:

Oliver Brown et al., Appellants,

v.

Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County,
Kansas, et al. (No. 1.)

Harry Briggs, Jr., et al., Appellants,

v.

R. W. Elliott et al. (No. 2.)
South Carolina

Dorothy E. Davis et al., Appellants,

v.

County School Board of Prince Edward County,
Virginia, et al. (No. 3.)

Spottswood Thomas Bolling et al., Petitioners,

v.

C. Melvin Sharpe et al. (No. 4.)
Washington, D.C.

Francis B. Gebhart et al., Petitioners,

v.

Ethel Louise Belton et al. (No. 5.)
Delaware

Source: Brown v. Board of Education, Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1954).

APPENDIX C

James F. Redmond
General Superintendent of Schools

BOARD OF EDUCATION
CITY OF CHICAGO

Increasing Desegregation of Faculties, Students, and Vocation Education Programs

Highlights of the Report Presented to the Board of Education
August 23, 1967

INTRODUCTION

In January 1967, the Chicago public schools received from the United States Office of Education a statement of findings and recommendations related to Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A proposal by the Chicago public schools to initiate action in response to the report resulted in a planning grant which provided for the employment of specialists to assist in seeking solutions to the problems indicated. The report developed details as a result of that study: this leaflet presents highlights from the full report.

Significantly more integration is desirable throughout the school system.

Several forces act to prevent staff integration: fear and uncertainty, misconceptions, representation of "desertion" of the teacher's own people, and segregation in housing.

A program is recommended through which teachers may become fully aware of staffing Problems and may aid in their solution.

A city-wide policy should be adopted which would result in each school having the same percentage of regularly certified teachers.

FACULTY

ASSIGNMENT

PATTERNS

Staffs are presently racially imbalanced.

It is necessary to build stability and reduce turnover in the staffs of all inner city schools.

Significant numbers of more experienced and better qualified teachers are needed now to balance staffs in inner city schools.

Inner city schools must be made more attractive to teachers.

Intensive efforts should be made to recruit, prepare, and keep teachers in inner city schools.

Teachers in inner city schools should be provided with guarded parking lots and/or transportation to and from school.

Instructional groups consisting of the following members are recommended as a staffing pattern for each 150 students:

- 1 master teacher
- 3 regular teachers
- 1 beginning teacher
- 2 practice teachers
- 3 aides.

Principals who are likely to be successful in inner city schools should be identified and selected for assignment there. A prerequisite to taking the principal's examination should be 2 to 3 years of service in one inner city school.

Professional staff, special classes, and assistance of parents and community agencies should be more widely utilized in providing for children who are serious discipline problems.

Teacher aides should be available immediately with or without new organizational patterns.

Community support of teachers should be immediately and widely cultivated.

Intensive efforts should be made to reduce absenteeism and to attract and keep substitute teachers.

Some activities already in progress should be continued and expanded:

- summer school staff integration
- Transfer on loan

- Exchange programs within Chicago and with suburbs
- Joint programs with teacher preparation institutions concerning inner city problems.

Attention should be given to modifying the Illinois School Code to permit assignment and transfer which would promote staff integration.

The May 1967 observation count shows a decrease in all-white faculties from 44 percent in 1966 to 33.8 percent.

BOUNDARIES AND STUDENT ASSIGNMENT POLICIES

Certain assumptions are basic to the details of this report:

- that integration is desirable for white and Negro children alike.
- that every effort should be made to retain the white population and promote stabilization in integrated school situations.
- That the responsibility for integration should be shared by all of the white community by maintaining fixed racial proportions in the schools.
- That efforts should be made to provide cooperative programs with the private and parochial schools in the city as well as the suburban schools in the metropolitan area.
- That the present housing segregation pattern in this city will probably continue for some time, making it essential for the Board of Education to continue to improve the quality of education in all schools and particularly in the ghetto schools.

- That the transporting of pupils by the school system is necessary to achieve racial integration.
- That the funds to implement the recommendations should be available from state or federal as well as local sources.

The overwhelming percentage of Chicago's students attend segregated schools (90 percent or more of one race).

Any workable plan to decrease segregation must be based on details to be worked out at various times. All plans must begin immediately.

Children have the opportunity to attend school only once; those who are currently in school cannot wait for future changes. Plans which can be completed within three years are called short-range in this report; intermediate plans can be operating in three to seven years.

Long range plans will require ten or more years to be fully operative.

Short-term Plans

In fringe area schools (now integrated), the minority percentage should be limited to a workable racial balance. In order to maintain the balance, pupils will be transported to a receiving school in an all-white attendance area not adjacent to the sending school attendance area.

Voluntary transfers will be available from the inner city to less crowded schools in other parts of the city.

Boundary changes should be made to reduce racial segregation and to assist in neighborhood stabilization.

School pairing plans (clustering) should be used in key transition areas to achieve integration and stabilization.

A Metropolitan Area Educational Council should be established to encourage, expand, and co-ordinate exchange programs between city and suburban schools.

Intermediate Proposals

Magnet schools, both specialized and general purpose, should be established, with very broad racially mixed attendance areas.

Long-Range Plans

Education parks should be established, combining many kinds of educational programs in one location. Several education parks should be located in a wide variety of places near the outer rim of the city.

The cost of not providing adequate education is infinitely greater than the cost of providing one which will prepare a young person to support a family. For example, it costs an average of \$2690 to maintain a person in prison and an average of \$1800 to maintain a mother and 3 children on relief a year; Chicago spends only about \$600 per student per year while suburbs spend more than \$1000.

Changes in the way funds are raised for education in Illinois can aim toward more equal distribution of opportunity for children.

School and city governments should work more closely together to effect integration in housing, in schools, and in community development.

VOCATIONAL EDUCATION

The Apprentice Program it is the task of society through various social agencies, especially the schools, to prepare young people for work.

For the general welfare of the nation it is essential that minority groups participate fully in the skilled trades. There are proportionately more Negroes in the professions of medicine, law, and education than in the various apprenticeable trades.

The Washburne Trade School, operated by the Chicago Board of Education, has a serious racial imbalance in classes. Selection of apprentices is made by the various sponsoring agencies-employers and unions.

Apprenticeship is a work-study process; the apprentice spends 10 to 20 percent of his time in school and the remainder on the job. The sponsor (employer, union, or other) must accept the enrollee. With few exceptions, apprentices are paid full wages for each day in school.

Since few school systems operate a trade school, operation of Washburne could be discontinued. However, it is felt that the school should be continued but that every effort be made to improve racial balances.

Negro participation can be increased by increasing the number admitted and decreasing the number dropping out of the program.

Since Negroes have been denied opportunity to enter and make progress in the trades, many have not entered the apprentice program.

A more effective program of recruitment must be adopted.

Advisory committees should be established for the general functions at Washburne and for each individual trade taught. Through these groups, communication between the school and current concerns of the trade should be improved.

Studies should be made to determine (1) compliance of trades with federal regulations, (2) relationship between entrance requirements and tasks in the trades, and (3) the effectiveness of vocational education in preparation for employment.

Open Enrollment in Vocational Schools

Enrollment in the ten vocational high schools is open on a city-wide basis; however, all except two are segregated schools (more than 90 percent of one race).

Open enrollment should be widely publicized and emphasized.

Active and aggressive recruitment should be city-wide.

Recruitment should be most active in grades 10 and 11.

Transfer and shared time plans with regular high schools should be expanded and publicized.

Vocational offerings, buildings, and equipment should be attractive and up to date.

Greater variety in programs should be available within the capability of students and the current job opportunities. More summer programs should be offered.

Location of the programs should be considered as a means of promoting racial integration. Job placement services should be aided by follow-up of graduates.

Advisory committees should be established for general policy-making and for each career field taught.

PUBLIC

UNDERSTANDING

By its nature, a public school system depends for maximum results on understanding and support from the public.

Expansion in public relations operation is essential, especially at this time when potential for improved education involves program and policy changes which cannot succeed without public acceptance.

Close coordination in and with the local community as well as with city-wide news agencies is essential.

A system of fast, flexible, internal communication is needed to keep all school personnel fully informed.

A widespread program of public communication should be initiated to generate interest in and support for Chicago's schools, keeping the public fully informed.

The Department of Communications and Community Relations must be refined and updated as the schools and the communities change. Public opinion surveys will help determine the tasks of the Department.

The community will be brought into the schools through visits and tours.

RESEARCH

Information can be provided through research which can determine the makeup of a program or policy, changes during operation, and the wisdom of continuing or ending a program or policy.

Research involves surveys to find out how, where, and why changes should be made.

Changes must be both cautious and aggressive. Detailed information must be available so that decisions of great importance to individual children and to the entire metropolitan area can be made judiciously.

Research will be an integral and continuing part of the details in all sections of the report. A few sample topics for research are listed below. Similar research will be conducted for each section of the report.

- What factors will attract both Negro and white students from all sections of the city to a magnet school?
- What in-school experiences in addition to academic activities will encourage adjustment to integration?
- How can the inner city school be made more attractive to teachers?
- How can candidates be prepared to meet admission requirements for apprentice programs?
- How can the outer city, fringe areas, and segregated areas be defined in terms that are workable? How often should the areas be reclassified and redefined?

APPENDIX D

FOREWORD

In 1976, the Chicago public schools began the task of preparing a quality desegregation plan that would improve the educational opportunities available to all our children. Creating a quality plan became a challenge to all of us--members of the Board, staff, parents, community members, civic and business leaders, and the general public. This challenge has been, and is, to reinvigorate the schools of Chicago, to make certain that every child has access to the best education we can provide, to make the Chicago public school system one of the outstanding examples of what public education can be. The challenge is to enhance "excellence" in our schools and to give each child full and open "access" to it. This plan, Access to Excellence, is a dynamic, vital agenda for meeting that challenge.

The plan is built upon the foundation laid by the City-wide Advisory Committee, a body established by the Board of Education to ensure participation of all segments of our citizenry in the formulation of the plan. The basic concepts established by the Committee during its months of dedicated labor were presented in their proposed plan, entitled Equalizing Education Opportunities. The recommendations of the citizens' representatives are the basis upon which Access to Excellence has been built.


Access to Excellence reflects the Board of Education's long-standing commitment to the worth and dignity of the individual, to continuing and expanding quality education for each and every child, and to enhancing desegregation. The plan also is educationally sound, reflects the demographic character of the city, and maintains fiscal responsibility.

The plan is educationally sound and innovative: it includes several new and exciting programs and calls for the joint participation of parents, citizens, and staff in planning, implementing, and evaluating these programs. At each level of planning, the primary concern is to ensure that our decisions will contribute to improving the education of all our children.

The demographic character of the City of Chicago, with over 225 square miles of land area, requires that programs operate in all of our districts. Therefore, district superintendents and their district education councils will plan district programs so that every child in our schools has access to a quality program. Most of these district programs will result in desegregated educational experiences; the city-wide programs and administrative initiatives also will increase

desegregation. During the next five years, the Board of Education plans to build 25 new school facilities.

PROGRAM CHOICES FOR 1978-79



SUMMARY

Access to Excellence is a plan for fulfilling the commitment of the Board of Education of the City of Chicago to increase quality educational opportunities for all students, in desegregated settings. The plan is designed to be realized within five years, by the 1982-83 school year. During the next school year, 1978-79, the plan projects approximately 210,000 students learning in desegregated schools or programs, an increase of 30,000 over the current year.

There are three major parts to the plan:

- District Programs - educational initiatives that will be undertaken by each of the 27 districts to serve primarily, but not exclusively, the students of the district
- System Programs - educational initiatives that will enroll students from all parts of the city
- Administrative Actions - initiatives that give students the opportunity to extend their school year through the summer, to enroll in the school of their choice, and to have improved educational facilities.

In each of the first three parts, the specific programs are described in short narratives; where appropriate, maps depict where programs will be located; and charts summarize the estimated numbers of students to be served during the five years of the plan.

District Programs calls for each district to establish a basic skills program so that students needing intensive work in reading, mathematics gain, and language arts may have access to services that will help them the skills necessary for further learning. In addition, each district is to develop and implement a program to serve a particular need or interest of students in the district. During 1978-79, at least 27 basic skills programs and 27 district-selected programs will be implemented.

System Programs groups specific activities into six categories:

- Academic Interest Centers
- Enriched Studies Programs
- High School Bilingual Centers
- Career Education Programs

Magnet Schools Preschool Programs

These programs will serve students from preschool through high school; they appeal to many diverse interests by offering a broad range of subjects and instructional approaches; they provide alternatives to meet the needs of students who are below mastery level as well as to challenge students who are academically gifted. Every program in every category is designed to attract a racially and ethnically diverse group of students with common interests and aspirations.


Administrative Actions provides further opportunities for students: summer school extends their learning opportunities; permissive enrollment allows students to seek out the schools in the city that offer the programs they desire; the removal of mobiles and construction of new facilities gives students environments conducive to learning.

The core of the plan, at the center of all its parts, is the concept of "access to excellence": students in Chicago (and their parents) are to be given the chance to choose from an array of educational alternatives. This is based upon the belief that each child is an individual, with individual interests, needs, and potentials. The school system must offer programs that meet these needs and interests, allowing each child to develop his or her potential to the fullest. This concept emphasizes the dignity and uniqueness of each person, as an individual, thereby encouraging children to see themselves, and others, as individuals rather than as stereotypes.

The following pages graphically summarize the locations of new and existing programs during 1978-79, the first year of the plan; the annual estimated costs for the new programs; and the projected participation of students during the next five years.

It is to be noted that the Chicago Board of Education is emphasizing educational excellence in all schools for all students. The Background highlights the major activities occurring throughout the system to improve the education of all the children. It also indicates how the components of this plan, Access to Excellence, are related to the components in the City-wide Advisory Committee's proposed plan, Equalizing Educational Opportunities.

This is a plan for voluntary participation, in which desegregation is to occur as a result of students seeking new educational opportunities. The plan emphasizes educational excellence, maximum access of students to outstanding programs, fiscal integrity, and the establishment of a realistic pace for change.




DISTRICT PROGRAMS

In order to give every district an opportunity to better serve its students, this Chapter of the plan calls for each district to plan and implement:

- A basic skills program
- A district-selected program

The programs will be designed to meet students' needs and interests, as perceived by district and school administrators, teachers, and parents. All programs will be designed to draw students from a racially and ethnically diverse area.

ACADEMIC
INTEREST CENTERS



- KEY**
- * Existing
 - 1978-79
 - 1979-80
 - 1980-81
(2 additional sites to be determined)
 - ▲ 1981-82
(2 additional sites to be determined)
 - △ 1982-83

ACADEMIC INTEREST CENTERS

Twenty-seven additional academic interest centers will be established during the next five years; during 1978-79, two existing programs will be expanded and six new programs will be implemented.

Description

The centers will bring together students of different racial and ethnic backgrounds to engage in learning activities that advance their understanding of themselves and others. Two or more groups of students from different schools will be brought to each center. The length of time (time cycle) students spend in the center will depend upon the program's design.

Each center will provide additional resources to create a special learning environment that does not exist in the individual schools. The schools that will use each center will usually be within the district or community in which each center is located. Transportation and food service will be provided for all centers.

The resources concentrated in each center will include additional teachers, resource persons, and specialized instruction materials and equipment.

The instructional program will be designed to be part of one or more of the areas that are studied in the regular elementary school curriculum. (Programs are listed on the next page.) The specific program will be designed by the staff and community of the schools using each center.

Participation

Up to 250 pupils will participate during each time cycle. The total number of pupils during the first year is projected to be approximately 16,050. Total annual participation by 1982-83 is projected to be 45,800. Provisions will be made to ensure equal access for pupils of limited English fluency.

Location

See the list on the next page.

Five-year Time Line

See the list on the next page.


Implementation Schedule

April-May Provide in-service training for staff.

June-August
September
October

Develop program components.
Provide liaison to participating schools.
Begin operating centers.

ENRICHED STUDIES PROGRAMS



ADVANCED PLACEMENT PROGRAM

Advanced Placement programs will be opened to all eligible high school students and will be scheduled during 1978-79 to make them available to students from other schools. Beginning in 1979-80, clusters of high schools will be established to permit joint offerings of courses.

Description

The Advanced Placement program offers high school students the opportunity to earn college credit for work in specific courses as approved by the College Entrance Examination Board. These courses are--

American History	English	Music
Art - History	European History	Physics
Art - Studio	French Language	Spanish Language
Biology	French Literature	Spanish Literature
Calculus	German	
Chemistry	Latin	

For 1978-79, Advanced Placement courses will be scheduled at the beginning and end of the school day, whenever possible, to permit students from other schools to enroll in the courses. Offerings will be published and disseminated to all high schools. Carfare will be provided.

Beginning in 1979-80, clusters of high schools will be established to ensure access to Advanced Placement courses for all high school students. During 1978-79, an assessment will be made of current offerings, locations, and needs, as a basis for establishing programs to serve the clusters.

Participation

Any eligible high school students may participate. Projected enrollment for 1978-79 for the current 154 Advanced Placement courses is 4,850 of which 1,213 would be students from other schools. If additional eligible students wish to take Advanced Placement courses, new classes will be opened.

Location

Schools currently offering Advanced Placement courses are listed on pages 31-32.

Five-year Time Line

1978-79 - Open Advanced Placement to all eligible students.

1979-80 - Establish clusters with programs.

1980-83 - Establish additional clusters.

Implementation Schedule

April 28 A catalog of Advanced Placement courses for September 1978 published and distributed to all high schools.

June 2 Final day for applications to be received by identified schools.

June 12 Students notified of acceptance in course.

Cost

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is \$55,400.

ENRICHED STUDIES CENTERS

Eight enriched studies centers will be planned and implemented between 1978-79 and 1982-83.

Description

Enriched studies centers will provide high school students with the opportunity to pursue a sequenced course of study in a specialized area as a basis for post-secondary school study or potential career opportunities.

Schools offering enriched studies programs will provide special resources either in the school or at other educational, professional, or public institutions. Students will enroll in the high school offering the program. Students residing outside the attendance area of the high school will be provided with carfare.

Enriched studies centers will be established as follows:

Program	Site	Date
Science/mathematics	Lane Tech	1979-80
	Morgan Park	1979-80
	Lindblom	1980-81
Professional Govt. Service	To be determined	1979-80
	To be determined	1980-81
Medical Services	Marshall	1979-80
International Studies	To be determined	1980-81
Design/creative Arts	To be determined	1981-82

Participation

Any high school student may apply to participate in an enriched studies center. Participants will be selected according to criteria established by program staff. Students applying for centers in high schools with admissions criteria must also meet those criteria. Total participation will be: 1979-80 - 400; 1980-81 - 1,100; 1981-82 - 1,500; 1982-83 1,600.

Location

Sites are indicated above.

Five-year Time Line

The schedule for implementing centers is indicated above.

Implementation Schedule

April-December 1978 Plan and design program.
January-May 1979 Promote program; determine entrance criteria;
distribute applications; identify staff; recruit
students.
June 1979 Select and notify students.

Cost

There is no cost in 1978-79.

PERFORMING AND CREATIVE ARTS CENTERS

Five city-wide centers in the performing and creative arts will be implemented for approximately 1,100 high school students; three will open in 1978-79.

Description

The programs will offer a sequenced study of art, music, theatre, or dance, with an emphasis on production rather than history or aesthetics. Students will have opportunities to study and work with professional artists, and will perform or exhibit their works. Students will be enrolled in the high school offering the program.

A regular schedule of activities will be developed at Whitney M. Young, Jr., in cooperation with the Chicago Symphony Orchestra. Students in programs at other centers will also participate in these activities. Similar cooperative relationships will be developed at the centers with other professional arts organizations.

Participation

The first year projection is for 100 to 150 students to participate at each of three sites. All high school students in the city will be eligible to apply; participants will be selected by program staff, according to criteria established by staff. Provisions will be made to ensure equal access for students of limited English fluency.

Location

Whitney Young, Jr., 211 South Laflin Avenue, (District 9)
 Martin Luther King, Jr., 4445 South Drexel Boulevard, (District 23)
 Marie S. Curie, 4959 South Archer Avenue, (District 12)
 William H. Taft, 6545 West Hurlbut Street, (District 1)
 South Shore Country Park, (South Shore High School, 7529
 South Constance Avenue, (District 22)

Five-year Time Line

1978-79 - Begin three programs: Young, King, and South Shore Country Park.
 1979-80 - Expand existing programs; begin Curie and Taft programs.
 1980-83 - Operate and evaluate programs.

Implementation Schedule

April-May Promote program; determine entrance criteria; distribute applications; identify staff; recruit students.

June 2 Final day for receiving applications at identified schools.

June 12 Students notified of acceptance into program.

Cost

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is \$532,500.

CENTERS FOR LANGUAGES

A languages program will be established in several locations throughout the city to serve upper grade and high school students.

Description

The program will emphasize the development of bilingualism, knowledge of other cultures, and career opportunities. Daily instruction in a foreign or second language will be provided for an academically and linguistically diverse student population.

The following languages will be offered at eleven centers: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Latin, Polish, Russian, Spanish, and Swahili. Each center will offer instruction in at least two languages.

Participation

Approximately 1,000 upper grade and high school students will be served the first year, with 100 students at each of five centers and 500 students at Waller High School.

High school students will enroll at the school in which the center is located; upper grade students will attend the center but be enrolled in their home schools.

Location

Waller, Curie, Harrison, Hyde Park, Juarez, and Kenwood high schools will have centers the first year. In the second year, additional sites will be opened at Taft, Lake View, Schurz, Morgan Park, and Marshall high schools.

Five Year Time Line


- 1978-79 - Establish six sites.
- 1979-80 - Establish five additional sites, serving 100 students each; increase other centers to 200 students.
- 1981-83 - Operate programs; assess and modify as necessary.

Implementation Schedule

April-August	Select staff; recruit students; order materials; conduct preservice training for staff.
September	Complete student selection; notify students.
October	Begin program operation.

Cost

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is \$1,003,500.



HIGH SCHOOL BILINGUAL CENTERS

Eleven high schools will offer bilingual programs for students of limited English fluency who are currently enrolled in schools serving fewer than 40 students of the same language background.

Description

Nineteen bilingual centers will be initiated or expanded in eleven high schools to consolidate resources and offer a more extensive program. The languages for which programs will be offered are Arabic, Assyrian, Cantonese, French, Greek, Italian, Korean, Polish, Spanish, and Vietnamese.

The instructional program will consist of courses offered in the native language as well as special classes in English as a second language. The Students will participate in the curriculum offering of the selected school for their other required courses. Selected components of the program will be offered to students fluent in English who are already enrolled in the school. Bilingual resource centers will be established in schools with space available.

Participation

High school students with limited English fluency, who have any of the above-mentioned language backgrounds and are currently enrolled in schools serving less than 40 students, may apply for enrollment at one of the schools. Admission will be on a first-come, first-served basis. Students fluent in English may also participate in the program. Projected participation the first year is 2,360.

Location

The programs will be located at the sites listed on the following page, according to the time line indicated.

Five-Year Time Line

- 1978-79 - Establish 15 centers at 9 sites.
- 1979-80 - Establish 3 centers. Analyze results of annual language survey for selection of additional centers.
- 1980-81 - Establish one center. Analyze results of annual language survey for selection of additional centers.
- 1981-83 - Analyze results of annual language survey for selection of additional sites.


Implementation Schedule

April-May	Identify high school students and eighth grade pupils who may be eligible for participation. Prepare and distribute materials to district offices, schools, and parents; meet with human relations coordinators, district superintendents, and other field staff; meet with parents, complete distribution of applications; promote program.
June 2	Last day for receiving applications.
June 12	Notify parents of approved transfers; inform sending school principals of approved transfers.
September	Implement programs.

Cost

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is \$522,600. This is in addition to the regular state allocation for bilingual education.

Language	School	District	Date
Arabic	Curie	12	1979-80
	Amundsen	3	1979-80
Assyrian	Senn	24	1978-79
	Von Steuben	1	1978-79
Cantonese	Senn	24	1978-79
	Mid-southwest Career	26	1980-81
French	Bowen	17	1978-79
Greek	Amundsen	3	1978-79
Italian	Steinmetz	4	1978-79
Korean	Mather	2	1978-79
	Senn	24	1978-79
Polish	Schurz	5	1978-79
	Kelly	12	1978-79
Spanish	Curie	12	1979-80
	Senn	24	1978-79
	Schurz	5	1978-79
	Bowen	17	1978-79
	Roosevelt	1	1978-79
Vietnamese	Senn	24	1978-79



CAREER DEVELOPMENT CENTERS

Twenty-one career development centers will be implemented or expanded during 1978-79, to serve high school sophomores and juniors; six additional centers will be implemented in 1979-80, to serve seniors.

Description

Seven programs will be offered to provide high school sophomores with increased awareness of career opportunities in selected fields, through the equivalent of seven half-days of study at the center. These programs will be in the following fields:

- Marketing and Retailing
- Industrial Occupations
- Urban Government
- Military Occupations
- Urban Energy and Utilities
- Entrepreneurship and Small Business
- Hotel/motel Occupations

Fourteen programs will provide high school juniors with intensive study of selected career fields, through one semester of half-day sessions at the center. These programs will be in the following career fields:

- | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Design · Energy/environmental Management Study · Architecture and Urban Planning · Urban Studies · Maritime Studies · Government/international Languages | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Life/health Sciences Studies · Management Studies · Law and Justice Studies · Economic/business Studies · Urban Communications Studies · Air Transportation Studies · Hotel/motel Studies · Retailing and Merchandising |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

During the second year, senior level programs will be established in six fields to permit students to undertake advanced studies. The fields are as follows:

- Banking
- Management and Leadership Development
- Architecture
- Urban Studies
- Energy/Environmental Management
- Accounting

Participation

During 1978-79, approximately 6,270 high school students will be able to participate: 870 juniors and 5,400 sophomores. Participants will be recruited city-wide through a dissemination-recruitment program. Provisions will be made to ensure equal access for students of limited English-speaking fluency.

Location

The programs will be housed at various businesses and government agencies, which will act as co-sponsors of the centers through their contributions of equipment and resources. Transportation expenses will be reimbursed to the participating students.

Five-year Time Line

- 1978-79 - Implement 21 career development centers.
- 1979-80 - Implement 6 centers; expand existing centers.
- 1980-83 - Assess programs; implement new centers and modify existing centers as appropriate.

Implementation Schedule

April-June	Prepare information and guideline booklet and student application forms; promote program.
May-August	Select and provide preservice training for staff; receive and screen students' applications.
September	Complete meetings with liaison persons; notify students of acceptance.
October 2	Begin classes in 8 programs.
March 1	Begin classes in remaining programs.

Cost

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is \$569,300.

TECHNICAL CENTERS

Seventeen technical centers will be established to provide students with in-depth study in identified job growth fields. Twelve centers will open in 1978-79.

Description

The technical center is an extension of the career development center concept, providing students with opportunities for extended study in job growth fields. With the assistance of the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry and Chicago United, career opportunities will be assessed to provide program direction.

During 1978-79, the following centers will be established:

<u>Field</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Grades Participating</u>
Communication Science Technology	Illinois Bell	11, 12
Air Transportation	Midway	11, 12
Energy/environmental Management	Navy Pier	11, 12
Carpentry Pre-apprentice	Harrison	11, 12
Business Management	Carver	9
Business Management	Orr	9
Computer Science	Harrison	9
Computer Science	Steinmetz	11, 12
Computer Science	Fenger	11, 12
Management Leadership Science	Harrison	9
Technological Development	Corliss	11, 12
Technological Development	Julian	11, 12

Three additional centers will be opened in 1979-80: in Technological Development at Wells High School, in Business Management at Robeson High School, and in Hotel and Restaurant Management at Manley High School. Two additional centers will be opened in 1980-81 in Electronics and Horticulture.

Participation

During the first year the 12 new centers will serve up to 1,495 students. Participation is projected to increase at the following rate: 1979-80 1,980; 1980-81 - 2,220; 1981-82 - 2,400; 1982-83 - 2,640.

Locations

Locations are listed above. Sites for the three programs to be started in 1980-81 are to be determined.

Five-year Time Line

- 1978-79 - Open 12 technical centers.
- 1979-80 - Open three centers.
- 1980-81 - Open two centers, incorporate three centers at Harrison into new technical institute.

Implementation Schedule


May-August Select staff; provide inservice training activities; order materials and equipment; recruit students.

September Begin program.

May Recruit students.

Cost

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is \$2,068,880.



WHITNEY M. YOUNG, JR., MAGNET SCHOOL

The Whitney M. Young, Jr., Magnet School will be established as a grade 7 to 12 citywide school for college preparation, with competitive admissions.

Description

All students are entitled to have access to high quality programs meeting their particular needs and abilities. Whitney M. Young, Jr., Magnet School will become a school for academically talented students throughout the city, offering them a challenging curriculum, personalized instruction, and a desegregated learning environment. The transition to a grade 7 to 12 school will begin in September 1979 and will be completed by September 1981.

The instructional program will emphasize the intensive study of English, music, mathematics, science, the arts, social studies, and foreign languages, with a diminished emphasis on business, vocational subjects, and health occupations.

Bilingual services will be provided as needed to ensure all students equal access to the school. Students currently enrolled at Whitney Young may complete the program in which they are currently enrolled.

Participation

All pupils in grade 6 will be eligible to apply for admission. A competitive examination will be administered to select the most academically talented students. The admissions procedures will contain provisions for inclusion of academically talented students who are of limited English speaking fluency. Admissions will also be based on the racial and ethnic proportions established for Whitney M. Young, Jr., to the maximum extent feasible.

Enrollment in grade 7 will be approximately 350 pupils per year; the maximum enrollment for all six grades will be 2,300 students.

Transportation will be provided for all students.

Location

Whitney M. Young, Jr., High School, 211 South Laflin Avenue (District 9).

Five-year Time Line

- 1979-80 - Accept 200 students each in grades 7, 8, and 9.
- 1980-81 - Accept 350 students in grade 7.
- 1981-82 - Accept 350 students in grade 7.

1982-83 - Operate program.

Implementation Schedule

June 1978-January 1979	Plan program.
September-December 1979	Meet with community to explain program and admissions procedures.
January 1979	Distribute admissions information.
March 1979	Select staff and meet to formulate program and choose materials.
April 1979	Administer admissions tests; process tests and select students.
May 1979	Notify accepted students.
July-August 1979	Provide preservice for staff and prepare curriculum; meet with parents and community groups to publicize developing program.
September 1978	Begin program.

Cost

The estimated cost for 1979-80 is \$506,000.

NORTH SIDE CAREER HIGH SCHOOL

A new high school will be opened in September 1979 and will provide opportunities for study in five career fields.

Description

The new high school will offer sequences of courses in the following fields:

- Hotel and restaurant management
- Horticultural studies and landscaping
- Auto mechanics and body repair; small engine repair
- Industrial trades, including pre-apprentice programs
- Business occupations

These programs will be developed and equipped to make them attractive to students having a commitment and interest in these fields. A ten-week exploratory course will be offered so that students can confirm their career interests. The school will also offer a full range of general courses.

Participation

These programs are open to students from the entire city. Total enrollment in 1979-80 is projected at 1,000. Provisions will be made to ensure equal access for students with limited English-speaking fluency.

Location

A new facility is being built at North and Ogden avenues, District 7. (A new name will be proposed for this facility.)

Five-year Time Line

- 1978-79 - Complete construction; plan programs.
- 1979-80 - Establish programs, 75-100 students in each field.
- 1980-83 - Operate and expand programs.

Implementation Schedule

January-June 1979	Publicize school.
March-June 1979	Recruit faculty and students.
May-June 1979	Orient parents and staff.
June-September 1979	Install specialized equipment.
August 1979	Provide preservice activities for staff.

Cost

The estimated cost for 1978-79 for planning is \$40,000. The estimated cost for 1979-80 for operation is \$2,275,000.

MID-SOUTHWEST CAREER HIGH SCHOOL

A new high school will be opened in September 1980 and will provide opportunities for study in business education and cosmetology.

The school will have a basic core of labs in which emphasis will be placed on business education and cosmetology for 700 students from across the city. Cosmetology will be taught in Spanish for limited English-speaking and bilingual Spanish students.

The curriculum for business education will include business machine practices, computer services, typing, accounting, business English, and work experience courses. The cosmetology sequence will provide theory and laboratory experience to meet State of Illinois licensing requirements.

Participation

Fifteen hundred students from throughout the city will enroll in these two career areas. The students will enroll for the full schoolday for four years in the business education program and for three years in the cosmetology program (beginning at the sophomore level).

Location A new vocational high school is being constructed at 31st Street and Western Avenue, District 26. (A new name will be proposed for this facility.)

Five-year Time Line

- 1978-79 - Obtain site.
- 1979-80 - Complete drawings; let bid; assign contractor.
- 1980-81 - Complete construction; implement program.
- 1981-83 - Program is operational.

Implementation Schedule

March-May 1980	Publicize the programs and recruit students.
May-June 1980	Hold orientations for parents and students.
May-July 1980	Assign staff.
August-September 1980	Provide inservice activities for staff.

Cost

There is no cost for 1978-79. The estimated cost for 1979-80 for planning is \$345,000. The estimated cost for 1980-81 for operation is \$1,000,000.

CHICAGO CENTRAL TECHNICAL INSTITUTE

The Harrison High School will be reorganized over five years as the Chicago Central Technical Institute.

Description

The Chicago Central Technical Institute will offer a program with three major areas of emphasis:

- Basic skills development
- College preparation
- Technical skills development

The basic skills development program will provide students below grade level mastery with intensive instruction in reading, mathematics, and language arts. A peer counseling program will be included, and the existing peer culture development program will be maintained. The four-year college preparation program will be open to all students at mastery level.

The four-year technical skills development program will include the following:

- Computer Science
- Additional career fields (based on assessment of job opportunities)
- Logistics: the movement and management of resources for business and industry
- Foreign languages
- Management/leadership Science

The technical centers established in 1978-79 at Harrison will be incorporated into the Chicago Central Technical Institute in 1980-81.

Students graduating from Chicago Central Technical Institute will be prepared to continue their education in college or further technical programs, or to be employed in an early management-level or technical position. Facility in a foreign language will promote access to international as well as domestic job opportunities.

Participation

Open to high school students from the entire city. Total participation will be 1,500 students.

Location

The present Harrison High School, 2850 West 24th Street Boulevard, District 19.

Five-year Time Line/Implementation Schedule

- 1978-79 - Implement basic skills and technical skills programs; enroll 400 students.
- 1979-80 - Expand programs; introduce new programs; add 400 students.
- 1980-81 - Expand all programs; add 400 students.
- 1981-82 - Expand all programs; add 400 students.
- 1982-83 - Programs are operational.

Cost

The estimated cost for 1979-80 is \$1,050,000. Costs for the technical skills programs are included in the budget for Technical Centers.

SIX-YEAR HIGH SCHOOL PROGRAM

Chicago High School for Metropolitan Studies will be expanded to offer high school instruction to part-time students.

Description

In order to permit young adults to work and at the same time complete their high school education, the Chicago High School for Metropolitan Studies will expand its instructional program and time schedule, beginning in September 1979.

Classes will be offered from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m., Monday through Friday, and from 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. on Saturday.

Teachers will be scheduled for regular teaching loads, as established by the Board of Education.

Participation

The equivalent of 600 full-time students will be enrolled; the actual enrollment will be significantly greater because of the large number of part-time students anticipated. Total enrollment is projected at approximately 1,000, by 1980-81.

Location

Site to be determined.

Five-year Time Line

- 1978-79 - Continue present full-time programs; plan part-time program.
- 1979-80 - Enroll part-time students.
- 1980-83 - Operate program.

Implementation Schedule

- April 1979 Conduct meetings with key school and district staffs.
Meet with communities to explain and prepare program.
Publicize program.
- May-June 1979 Identify personnel.
- August 1979 Provide preservice activities for staff.
Recruit and identify students.
- September Register students.

Cost

The estimated cost for 1979-80 is \$490,500.

Cost

The estimated cost for 1978-79 for planning and building changes is \$410,000; the estimated cost for 1979-80 for operation is \$983,400.

CLASSICAL SCHOOLS

Six classical schools will be established during the next two years to provide a challenging course of instruction for kindergarten through sixth grade pupils with high academic potential.

The classical schools will provide an instructional program which is highly structured for achievement in the four major disciplines: science, mathematics, social studies, and language arts; strongly emphasizes the fine arts; and provides a vigorous physical education program geared to sound individual development.

The classical concept of a sound mind in a sound body with aesthetic appreciation will characterize the instructional program of the classical school. The ideal is a well-proportioned individual. The philosophy which undergirds this concept is that of balance in the development of the cognitive, aesthetic, and physical growth of each child.

Classes will be organized on a nongraded, multi-aged basis according to the Continuous Progress-mastery Learning program. Staffing will be based upon the established pupil-teacher ratios, with the addition of two master teachers trained in the classical approach to serve as inservice leaders as well as to teach students. A six-week staff development program will be conducted in the summer for the teachers.

Graduating students will be eligible to attend the Whitney M. Young, Jr., Magnet School without examination.

Students currently enrolled in the designated schools will be eligible to participate in the classical program. Other students will be admitted on the basis of objective criteria to be developed. Provisions will be made to ensure equal access for students of limited English proficiency. The schools will serve approximately 1,700 students. During the first year, three schools will serve 100 students each. Transportation will be provided as necessary.

Location

Classical schools will be established at the following locations:

- Lucy Perkins, 6918 West Strong Street, (District 1)
- William Green, 3021 West Devon Avenue, (District 2)
- James McDade, 8801 South Indiana Avenue (District 16)
- One site in District 9
- One site in District 14
- One site in District 15

These schools will be renamed.

Five-year Time Line


- 1978-79 - Perkins, Green, and McDade open as classical schools, 100 students each.
- 1979-80 - Perkins, Green, and McDade serve 200 each. Open District 9 (150), District 15 (200), and District 14 (300) schools.
- 1980-81 - Add 100 students at District 9 school.
- 1981-83 - Operate programs.

Implementation Schedule

- April-May Meet with community to explain program and admissions procedures; distribute applications for admission; develop standards for admissions.
- June 2 Deadline for applications at schools.
- May-June Select staff and materials.
- June 1 Accepted students notified.
- July-August Provide preservice training for staff and prepare curriculum; meet with parents and community groups to publicize developing program.
- September Program begins.

Cost

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is \$227,800.



PRESCHOOL CENTERS

Ten preschool centers for 3- and 4-year-old children will be opened in existing and new facilities; each center will serve 80 to 100 children.

Description

Centers will contain four to five classrooms; each class will enroll up to 20 children. Class sessions will be full-day. Pupils will engage in sensory-motor development, socialization, and reading readiness activities. Continuing parent involvement will be an integral part of the program. Transportation will be provided as necessary.

Two centers will be opened each year for the next five years.

Participation

The centers will be open to children from all parts of the city. Participants will be selected by a lottery system, on the basis of established proportions for socioeconomic and racial and ethnic characteristics. The maximum participation for 1978-79 will be 200 students.

Location

- 1978-79 - Drake, 2722 South King Drive, (District 11), and Lemoyne, 851 West Waveland Avenue, (District 3).
- 1979-83 - 2 additional sites each year, to be determined.

Five-year Time Line

- 1978-79 - Open two centers; plan for additional centers.
- 1979-83 - Open two additional centers each year.

Implementation Schedule

- April 1978-January 1979 Modernize two centers; order furniture, equipment, and supplies; recruit staff; publicize program; select pupils by lottery; schedule regular parental involvement; provide preservice activities for staff.

Cost

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is \$883,200.

VON HUMBOLDT CHILD-PARENT CENTER

A child-parent center will be opened near the Von Humboldt School to serve approximately 180 pupils.

Description

The child-parent center will offer an instructional program for children from three to six years old. Children will be taught basic language, mathematics, and other skills, and receive instruction in art, music, hygiene, and social interaction with other persons. In addition, children will be involved in activities that promote positive attitudes toward themselves, others, and school.

Bilingual instruction and multicultural activities will also be a part of the instructional program.

Parents will attend the center with their children and receive training in homemaking. The center is staffed with a head teacher, teachers, a nurse, and a social worker. The center will draw pupils from a variety of racial and ethnic groups and social and economic backgrounds.

Participation

Approximately 180 children will be enrolled in half-day sessions for one school year.

Location

A new building is under construction at 1339-1355 North Rockwell Avenue (District 6).

Five-year Time Line

1978-79 - Open child-parent center, September 1978.
1979-83 - Program is operational.


Implementation Schedule

July-September 1978	Provide inservice activities for staff.
September 1978	Implement program.

Cost

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is \$674,500.

HIGH SCHOOL PERMISSIVE ENROLLMENT



HIGH SCHOOL PERMISSIVE ENROLLMENT

High school students will be given the opportunity to enroll in any general high school having available space, through a two-stage program:

- I - permissive transfer for students in overcrowded high schools
- II - open enrollment for other high school students.

Description

Admission to the general high schools will be open to all categories of eligible students, according to the following priority list:

- A. Students residing in the school's attendance area
- B. Students transferring from Gage Park or Morgan Park
- C. Students from overcrowded high schools
- D. Any other eligible high school students.

Transfers for priorities C and D will be on a first-come, first-served basis. The number of students transferring to a receiving school will be within the capacity (100%) of the school and will not alter the receiving school's racial/ethnic composition by more than 15 percent. High school students transferring will be provided with carfare.

Transfer students will become regular members of the receiving school's student body, and are not unilaterally transferable. Parents may, under extenuating circumstances, request that their children be transferred back to the sending school.

For each student transferring under priorities C and D, the receiving school will receive up to \$900 to provide special services for the student.

Participation

- I. Students in the overcrowded (sending) schools listed on p. 97. may apply for admission to any of the receiving schools listed. They will be enrolled after priorities A and B. The number of students eligible for participation in Stage I is 2,896.
- II. Students who will be in grade 9 in September and other high school students may apply for admission to any receiving high school with available space, providing their enrollment will enhance the desegregation of the receiving schools. They will be enrolled after priorities A, B, and C.

No child presently placed or recommended for placement in a mentally handicapped division or social adjustment division will be eligible to participate.

In 1977-78, a total of 629 high school students participated in permissive transfer.

Location

Sending and receiving schools are listed on p. 97.

Five-year Time Line

The maximum participation for 1978-79 is 3,094 students. Projections for the following four years cannot be made until the effectiveness of other programs in the plan is determined.

Implementation Schedule

April-May	Prepare and distribute materials to district offices, schools, and parents; meet with human relations coordinators, district superintendents, and other field staff; meet with parents; complete distribution of Stage I - permissive transfer applications.
May 26	Last day for receiving Stage I applications for early notification.
May 29-June 2	Notify parents of Stage I transfers approved; inform sending and receiving school principals of Stage I transfers approved. Publish list of spaces available for Stage II - open enrollment; distribute applications.
June 16	Last day for receiving Stage II applications.
July 1	Notify parents of Stage II transfers approved; inform sending and receiving school principals of Stage II transfers approved.
July-August	Continue to receive applications at district offices.

Cost

The estimated cost for 1978-79 is \$3,082,000.

APPENDIX E

STATISTICAL DATA - 27 DISTRICTS

1. Student membership in the districts ranges from 9,027 to 28,440, a difference of 19,413.*
2. The number of teachers in the districts ranges from 441 to 1,482, a difference of 1,041.
3. The number of school principals in the districts ranges from 10 to 29, a difference of 19.
4. The number of schools in the districts ranges from 12 to 32, a difference of 20.

DIST.	MEMBERSHIP			SCHOOLS						
	ELEM	H.S	TOTAL	ELEM	H.S	TOTAL	%NON-MINORITY	%MINORITY PRINCIPALS	# TEACHERS	
1	11,156	5,679	16,835	26	3	29	75.8	24.2	22	805
2	5,993	3,034	9,027	10	2	12	65.2	34.8	10	441
3	11,434	7,917	19,351	18	3	21	56.7	43.3	21	1,043
4	22,557	5,883	28,440	29	3	32	25.8	74.2	29	1,482
5	17,679	8,308	25,987	25	5	30	59.6	40.4	28	1,157
6	20,758	5,856	26,614	27	2	29	12.9	87.1	25	1,449
7	10,134	2,803	12,937	19	4	23	17.5	82.5	19	708
8	11,638	3,680	15,318	17	2	19	0.1	99.9	18	829
9	12,195	6,569	18,764	23	5	28	6.8	93.2	24	1,335
10	13,390	2,657	16,047	17	1	18	2.9	97.1	15	793
11	11,399	5,664	17,063	20	2	22	0.6	99.4	19	900
12	11,021	9,256	20,277	26	4	30	69.8	30.2	26	1,056
13	11,979	2,425	14,404	17	1	18	-	100.0	15	767
14	12,607	4,535	17,142	20	2	22	5.6	94.4	19	919
15	17,982	8,389	26,371	26	4	30	35.5	64.5	25	1,274
16	9,716	7,292	17,008	18	2	20	1.4	98.6	17	803
17	10,529	5,115	15,644	21	3	24	29.2	70.8	18	770
18	12,936	4,863	17,799	23	2	25	19.7	80.3	20	889
19	15,493	7,208	22,701	25	5	30	12.7	87.3	27	1,206
20	13,345	4,992	18,337	16	2	18	0.1	99.9	17	849
21	12,357	4,262	16,619	18	2	20	0.7	98.0	18	851
22	16,629	4,389	21,018	20	2	22	0.8	99.2	21	1,001
23	6,751	2,423	9,216	16	1	17	0.1	99.9	14	504
24	10,568	2,465	13,033	15	1	16	38.7	61.3	13	755
25	13,636	4,957	18,593	16	3	19	5.5	94.5	18	1,035
26	10,762	3,264	14,026	15	2	17	23.6	76.4	15	740
27	13,021	7,725	20,746	17	3	20	0.3	99.7	18	1,045

Based on student membership data for January 31, 1979.

STATISTICAL DATA - 20 DISTRICTS

1. The number of districts is reduced from 27 to 20.
2. Student membership in the districts ranges from 23,102 to 25,120, a difference of 2,018. *
3. The number of teachers in the districts ranges from 1,142 to 1,593, a difference of 451.
4. The number of school principals in the districts ranges from 22 to 33, a difference of 11.
5. The number of schools in the districts ranges from 25 to 43, a difference of 18.

DIST.	ELEM	H.S	TOTAL	ELEM	H.S	TOTAL	%NON-MINORITY	%MINORITY PRINCIPALS	# TEACHERS	
1	18,491	5,850	24,341	39	4	43	73	27	34	1,150
2	17,982	7,138	25,120	29	4	33	51	49	27	1,354
3	17,232	7,788	25,020	29	4	33	38	62	29	1,371
4	15,204	9,328	24,532	21	4	25	49	51	25	1,200
5	21,266	3,777	25,043	25	2	27	38	62	27	1,226
6	18,489	5,856	24,345	26	2	28	12	88	25	1,348
7	18,911	6,009	24,920	26	3	29	1	99	24	1,450
8	15,393	9,254	24,647	28	6	34	19	81	30	1,372
9	16,121	8,655	24,776	28	6	34	4	96	30	1,593
10	19,440	5,152	24,592	23	2	25	12	88	23	1,204
11	15,397	7,712	23,109	26	5	31	11	89	28	1,186
12	15,898	7,204	23,102	25	3	28	47	53	24	1,285
13	19,017	5,137	24,154	28	2	30	6	94	25	1,333
14	17,104	7,133	24,237	33	3	36	4	96	31	1,324
15	16,472	8,389	24,861	26	4	30	40	60	23	1,142
16	15,579	9,254	24,833	23	4	27	1	99	26	1,177
17	20,107	4,262	24,369	25	2	27	1	99	25	1,163
18	19,871	4,863	24,734	35	2	37	14	86	31	1,170
19	13,930	10,457	24,387	26	5	31	6	94	23	1,144
20	14,477	9,675	24,152	21	4	25	13	87	22	1,212

* Based on student membership data for January 31, 1979.

APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Christina H. Stringfellow has been read and approved by the following committee:

Dr. Joan K. Smith, Director
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The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date

Director's Signature