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Loyola University Chicago

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MODERATORS OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN IMPLICIT AND
SELF-ATTRIBUTED MOTIVES

by
Barry J. Hoffman

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate
School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial
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VITA

The author, Barry James Hoffman, was born on February 7, 1964, in Metuchen, New Jersey. From August, 1982 to May, 1986, Mr. Hoffman studied at the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois. He graduated Summa Cum Laude, with the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Psychology.

In August, 1986, Mr. Hoffman entered Loyola University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, where he went on to win two fellowships. He earned his Master of Arts degree in October, 1989. His masters thesis, "Agency and Communion in Personality Style," was concerned with the interface between broad motivational tendencies and characterological patterns. Mr. Hoffman has received clinical training at three Chicago sites: Humana Hospital-Michael Reese, the University of Illinois at Chicago Student Counseling Center, and Lakeside V.A. Hospital. His work at the latter spawned "Personality Change with Aging in Male Psychiatric Patients," a paper presented at the 97th annual meeting of the American Psychological Association.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. IMPLICIT AND SELF-ATTRIBUTED MOTIVES</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Motive Construct</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit Motives and Self-Attributed Motives in Theory</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research on Implicit and Self-Attributed Motives</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domain of Behavioral Influence</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated Incentives</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental Origins</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measurement of Implicit and Self-Attributed Motives</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operant and Respondent Measures</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability Issues</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validity Issues</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit and Self-Attributed Variables Are Unrelated</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motives</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory and Research</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. CONSTRUCTS GERMANE TO THE CLARIFICATION OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN IMPLICIT AND SELF-ATTRIBUTED MOTIVES</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner-Directedness</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other-Directedness</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Strivings</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality Abilities</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. AGENCY AND COMMUNION

Theoretical Background
Agentic Constructs and Measures
- TAT Power Motivation
- TAT Achievement Motivation
- Autobiographical Agency
- Bem Sex Role Inventory
  - Masculinity Scale
Agentic ACL Scales
Agentic Strivings

Communal Constructs and Measures
- TAT Intimacy Motivation
- Autobiographical Communion
- Bem Sex Role Inventory
  - Femininity Scale
Communal ACL Scales
Communal Strivings

Summary

V. SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESES

VI. METHOD

Subjects
Procedure and Measures
Scoring Procedures

VII. RESULTS

Variable Formation
Preliminary Intercorrelations
Mediation of Implicit/Self-Attributed Motive Relationships by
  - Inner-Directedness
    - Preliminary considerations
    - Agency
    - Communion
  - Other-Directedness
    - Preliminary considerations
    - Agency
    - Communion
Mediation of Implicit/Self-Attributed Motive Relationships by
  - Combined Mediational Effects of Inner-Directedness and Other-Directedness
Comparative Relationships of Personality Abilities and Self-Attributed Motives
to the Implicit Domain
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agency ........................................ 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communion .................................... 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Strivings and the Bi-Level Motivational System .............. 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative alignments of strivings and self-attributed motives with implicit motives .......... 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative alignments of strivings and implicit motives with self-attributed motives .......... 153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. DISCUSSION ................................ 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motive Congruence Revisited: Baseline Relationships Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motives .......... 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermotive Congruence and Self-Consciousness Variables ............ 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner-Directedness .................................... 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other-Directedness .................................... 165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships Between Motives and Motive-Like Constructs ............ 167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality Abilities .................................... 167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Strivings .................................... 168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bi-Level Motivational System in Perspective ............ 169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations of the Present Work and Suggestions for Future Research .......... 171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary ........................................... 174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES ........................................ 176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

Table                                                                                           Page
1. Classification of Agentic and Communal Motive Measures ........................................... 115
2. Baseline Correlations Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motive Variables in Overall, Male, and Female Samples .... 134
3. Correlations Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motive Variables for High and Low Inner-Directedness Subjects in Overall Sample ........................................ 137
4. Correlations Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motive Variables for High and Low Inner-Directedness Subjects in Male and Female Samples .............................. 138
5. Correlations Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motive Variables for High and Low Other-Directedness Subjects in Overall Sample ........................................... 142
6. Correlations Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motive Variables for High and Low Other-Directedness Subjects in Male and Female Samples .................................... 143
7. Correlations Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motive Variables for Various Inner-Directedness/Other-Directedness Groups .... 146
8. Comparative Correlations of Self-Attributed Motives and Personality Abilities with Implicit Motives in Overall, Male, and Female Samples ........................................ 149
9. Comparative Correlations of Self-Attributed Motives and Personal Strivings with Implicit Motives in Overall, Male, and Female Samples ............................................. 152
10. Comparative Correlations of Implicit Motives and Personal Strivings with Self-Attributed Motives in Overall, Male, and Female Samples............................. 154
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The impetus for the present inquiry is a long-standing, well-documented inconsistency in motivation research. This inconsistency, which will be termed, motive noncorrespondence, stems from the failure of different measures of the same motive construct to intercorrelate significantly. Specifically, self-report measures of intimate, affiliative, efficacious, or dominant social motives are generally unrelated to contentually equivalent projective measures (McClelland, 1980). Researchers such as Entwisle (1972) and Raven (1988) have argued that psychometric problems associated with either projective or self-report motive measures account for motive noncorrespondence. For them, both measure types tap the same construct, though one more or less well than the other. Others, however, find psychometric explanations hard to swallow, as both self-report and projective motive measures predict motive-relevant behaviors under certain conditions (McClelland, 1980).

The present investigation examines the utility of the bi-level explanation, a recently advanced alternate
explanation for motive noncorrespondence. McClelland, Koestner, and Weinberger (1989) contend that self-report and projective motive measures do not interrelate substantially because they tap distinct motivational layers of the individual. Projective motive measures tap the *implicit motivational system*—an unconscious, affect-based arrangement that is aimed at the ongoing satisfaction of basic, often contradictory, wishes. Self-report measures, on the other hand, assess a *self-attributed motivational system*. This conscious, verbal-conceptual network is concerned with the production of behavior consistent with both self-image and social demands. Through McClelland et al.'s (1989) propositions, the psychodynamic ego and id have crept back into motivational psychology, albeit sporting a more contemporary, scientifically-acceptable metaphorical clothing. Freud (1910) and Jung (1971) derived much of their explanatory firepower from the postulation of dialectically opposed, or at least poorly aligned, intrapsychic subsystems (Rychlak, 1981). Likewise, McClelland et al. propose that the id-like implicit system and ego-like self-attributed system are somewhat at odds in the normative case. Projective and self-report motive measures are unrelated because they tap layers of personality that are typically incongruent.

The ensuing research seeks validation of the bi-level
explanation in two different ways. The first involves demonstrating that projective and self-report motive measures do in fact correspond, but only for certain people. Specifically, inner-directedness and other-directedness (Wymer & Penner, 1985), two self-consciousness variables, will be employed to identify a priori groups for whom implicit and self-attributed systems should and should not correspond. To the degree that these groups differ in predicted ways, the bi-level explanation will be upheld. Additionally, personal strivings (Emmons, 1989) and personality abilities (Paulhus & Martin, 1987), two motive-like constructs, will be examined. If the constructs' conceptual relations to implicit and self-attributed motives are reflected empirically, the bi-level explanation will again be supported. It is noteworthy from the outset that patterns of intermotive relationship will be examined in a way that departs somewhat from research tradition. Traditional motivational investigations typically address circumscribed motivational contents, such as achievement, power, intimacy, and affiliation. Presently, focal motives will be construed as reflecting either agency or communion (Bakan, 1966), two broad, superordinate categories. Agency connotes aims of separation, mastery, and dominance, while communion reflects aims of unity, intimacy, and nurturance. The imposition of
organizational rubric affords a conceptual coherence, clarity, and generalizability that is often lacking in psychological studies of more idiosyncratic, limited dimensions (Rychlak, 1981).

In summary, the present investigation works at the interface of contemporary motivational and psychodynamic domains. It is hoped that McClelland et al.'s (1989) bi-level explanation, a reframing of basic psychodynamic concepts, will help elucidate motive noncorrespondence, a long-standing anomaly in motivational research.
CHAPTER II

IMPLICIT AND SELF-ATTRIBUTED MOTIVES

In this chapter a more detailed account of implicit and self-attributed motives will be advanced. Early sections will sequentially address motives in general, implicit and self-attributed motives in particular, and relationships between implicit and self-attributed motives. Subsequent sections will examine a number of constructs that may mediate and/or shed further light upon relationships between the two motive types.

The Motive Construct

Before the differences between implicit motives and self-attributed motives can be more closely examined, the similarities between them should be underscored and clarified. These similarities reside in their shared grounding in the more general idea of motive. Motives are abstractly defined by McClelland and his associates as emotionally-charged groupings of ideas or images that express basic wishes or desired experiences (Winter & Stewart, 1978). McAdams (1988b), for example, defines motives as "affectively-toned cognitive clusters centered around general preferences" (p. 71). The imagistic
component of the motive, then, is a representation of a desired outcome in one's ongoing life; the affective component represents a sense of vitality, press, or urgency that accompanies the imagistic component.

While motives themselves are unobservable, they do exert observable effects on behavior and experience. Specifically, "motives energize, direct, and select behavior" (McAdams, 1988b, p. 71). Individuals high in achievement motivation, for example, will persist longer than others when put in an achievement-related situation, such as taking a final examination (Atkinson & Litwin, 1960). In other words, they become more driven or active, sustaining achievement-related behaviors for longer periods of time than others. Achievement-oriented people also can identify achievement-related words, presented tachistoscopically, more quickly than others (McClelland & Lieberman, 1949): in this example, achievement-oriented individuals selectively focus, or direct, their attention toward achievement-related stimuli. Finally, achievement-oriented individuals have been found to learn moderately difficult materials more quickly than others (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953); they more effectively select out responses that lead to the achievement reward (i.e., learning the materials). More generally, a motive's activity is inferred from the thematic ordering it exerts upon the individual's overt and covert behavior.
Motives organize interpersonal behavior, fantasy, cognition, selective attention, perception, and memory.

The motive construct can be further clarified by identifying its philosophical grounding in Aristotelian notions of final, formal, and efficient causation. Causes in general are grand meta-constructs, or predicate assumptions, that we bring to bear in explaining or making sense of various phenomena (Rychlak, 1981). A final cause is "any concept used to account for the nature of things (including behavior) based on the assumption that there is a reason, end, or goal 'for the sake of which' things exist or events are carried out" (Rychlak, 1981, p. 500). Popular final cause constructs in psychology are needs, wishes, and goals. A formal cause meta-construct, on the other hand, is "any concept used to account for the nature of things (including human behavior) based on their patterned organization, shape, design, or order" (Rychlak, 1981, p. 500). Formal cause meta-constructs underlie popular psychological concepts such as trait, personality style, and personality type. Efficient causes, finally, are concepts "used to account for the nature of things...based on the impetus in a succession of events over time" (Rychlak, 1981, p. 499). Such concepts are expressed in behaviorism's S-R laws and in cognitive psychology's computer flowchart models. Final, formal, and efficient causes, then, are three different meta-
constructs or perspectives that we employ in grasping or making sense of phenomena under study (e.g., motivation, personality). Furthermore, the three constructs are complementary rather than mutually exclusive, each making a valuable and distinct contribution to our construing.

In seeking to avoid the pitfalls of confounding different framings of the same phenomenon with different phenomena, the present paper views motives as hybrid efficient-formal-final cause constructs that encompass connotations of impetus, trait, and need/wish. As is suggested by the motive construct's historical basis in the mechanistic drive models of Freud (1940) and Hull (1943), motives can be seen as primary impetuses that temporally precede behavior and actually propel the individual into action--this sense is reflected in McClelland's (1980) aforementioned definition of motives as "drivers," "directors," and "selectors." Motives also encompass both the final-cause connotation of "need" and the formal-cause connotation of "trait." Many clinically-oriented accounts of motives emphasize a final cause connotation, likening motives to wishes or fantasies for the sake of which individuals behave. Motives in this sense are imagined outcomes in the future for the sake of which the individual acts in the present. Motives, however, are also trait-like in that they account for the patternings in the individual's behavior. More
specifically, the individual brings behavioral patterns (traits) to bear in seeking attainment of a given end (need) associated with a motive. The individual high in intimacy motivation, for example, has a desire, wish, or need for close contact with others. In seeking to attain close contact, the individual invokes a warm, intimacy-fostering interpersonal stance, characterized by making eye contact, smiling, and laughing (McAdams, Jackson, & Kirshnit, 1984); the individual, in other words, evidences intimacy-related behavioral patterns.

Implicit Motives and Self-Attributed Motives in Theory

Implicit and self-attributed motives are both motives in the senses discussed above; both are clusterings of feeling-toned ideas or images that account for drive, need, and trait. However, the two motive types do differ from each other in a number of important ways. Specifically, they differ in terms of (1) their mode of operation; (2) the classes of behavior that they influence; (3) the types of incentives that encourage their expression; and (4) their proposed developmental origins. In this section, these differences will be discussed more fully. Henceforth, McClelland et al.'s (1989) labels for representing implicit and self-attributed motives will be adopted: implicit motives will be signified by an n, for "need" (e.g., n Power, n
Achievement, n Intimacy, etc.), and self-attributed motives will be signified by the prefix, san, for "self-attributed need" (e.g., san Power, san Achievement, san Intimacy).

One hallmark of implicit motives' operational mode involves a dissociation from conscious processing. Implicit motives belong to a primitive motivational system that "automatically influences behavior without conscious effort" (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 698). This is not to say that implicit motives are unconscious in the psychodynamic sense: implicit motives are not necessarily banished from awareness through the individual's active deployment of repression and its allied defenses (Biernat, 1989). Instead, implicit motives "comprise a motivational system for which phenomenal (i.e., self-reflective) awareness is not a requirement of personality functioning" (Koestner & McClelland, 1990, p. 542). The implicit system, then, serves as a sort of "automatic pilot" for spontaneous behaviors, lending them their form and direction in the absence of conscious reflections and deliberations. A practical consequence of implicit motives' unconscious operational mode is that they orchestrate motivational and emotional life themes (i.e., formal-final cause orderings) that are "unevaluated as to their appropriateness in terms of (verbal) concepts of self, others, and what is important (McClelland et al.,
There is, hence, no reason to assume that implicit motive dispositions should be in accord with the individual's conscious, verbalized self-image, at least in the normative case. Indeed, it is doubtful that accurate information pertaining to implicit motive dispositions can be obtained via self-reports (McClelland, 1980).

A second defining feature of implicit motives' operational mode concerns the issue of how information is represented. In this case, the "information" includes perceived and/or anticipated environmental events and perceived and/or anticipated personal responses. Implicit motives, unlike the more familiar verbal-conceptual schemas of information-processing theories, represent and process information via an affective code. Relevant here is Raynor and McFarlin's (1986) distinction between affective value and information value. Specifically, affective value addresses questions like, "How good or bad does this behavior feel?" or "How good or bad do I feel while behaving this way?." Information value, on the other hand, is concerned with the implications of a behavior for the self-image, addressing questions like, "How good or bad am I doing?" Representation of events based on their affective value, then, is experience-near and almost visceral, while representation based on information value is experience-distant and evaluative. Implicit motives are posited to represent situations in
terms of their immediate affective value only, remaining oblivious to situations' concomitant information value. In this sense, implicit motives bear resemblance to classical psychodynamic formulations of the id (Freud, 1933), which seeks pleasure in the here-and-now and is unconcerned with the personal and social implications of behavior.

Implicit motives' affective representational code, as well as their residence in psychic strata outside the bounds of conscious reflection, colors their domain of behavioral influence, associated behavioral incentives, and proposed developmental origins. As already alluded, implicit motives do not affect all behavior, but only a certain class of behavior. Specifically, implicit motives influence operant, or spontaneous, behavior (McClelland et al., 1989). Operant behaviors are responses that occur in the absence of any detectable external stimuli and hence appear to be spontaneous in the sense of "unelicited" or "autonomously initiated" (McClelland, 1980); the operantly behaving individual appears to be operating-on the environment rather than responding-to it. By virtue of their autonomous qualities, implicitly motivated behaviors are more evident in behavior trends extended over time than in immediate, circumscribed behavioral episodes. This truism was even noted by Skinner (1938), who recommended that operant behaviors be measured in terms of
frequency of response over time rather than in terms of intensity of response to a known stimulus (McClelland et al., 1989). Implicit motives yield a thematic coherence to the full net of behaviors that an individual initiates over time. As such, they can be likened to internal navigation systems that guide the individual's behavioral course when external signposts, in the form of environmental initiatives, social expectations, and social constraints are absent.

While it is true that implicitly motivated behaviors occur in the absence of external elicitors, this is not to say that they occur in the absence of any form of incentive. To the contrary, Koestner and McClelland (1990) assert that implicit motives are responsive to task-related, or behavioral, incentives, where behavior and reward are intimately intertwined. More specifically, the pleasure in implicitly-motivated behavior is a natural by-product of the behaving itself, coming from the "doing" rather than from the "having done." In this sense, implicit motivation bears similarity to intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1980), which occurs when an individual becomes "absorbed in an activity because of its inherent qualities, such as its interest value or level of challenge" (Koestner & McClelland, 1990, p. 532). However, while the incentive for all intrinsically motivated activities is purported to be a sense of
competence and self-determination that accompanies action (Deci & Ryan, 1985), the behavioral incentives associated with various implicitly motivated activities are much more varied (e.g., feeling competent, feeling powerful, feeling close, etc.).

The incentives for implicit behavior can also be understood as pleasurable, "innately triggered affective experiences" (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 697) that accompany motive-relevant experiences and behaviors. Actually, two studies have supported the framing of implicit incentives as "hard-wired," internally-administered emotional rewards. Individuals high in Power evidence a greater release of norepinephrine than others when exposed to an impactful experience (McClelland, Ross, & Patel, 1985), and only people high in Affiliation show increased dopamine release when viewing romantic films (McClelland, 1989); both norepinephrine (Olds, 1977) and dopamine (Wise, 1980) have previously been linked to pleasure and reinforcement.

A final defining feature of implicit motives concerns their proposed developmental origins. Implicit motives are built upon a foundation of early, prelinguistic affective experiences (McClelland et al., 1989). Motive formation is thought to follow from the interaction of nature with nurture, whereby the individual's innate incentive proclivities (i.e., some people are
psychologically, or even biologically, wired to find dominating, doing better, or being close more pleasurable than others) are either activated or left dormant in early dealings with significant others. To the degree that the infant is exposed to motive-relevant interpersonal experiences, a consistent motive disposition will crystallize around the repeated experiencing of the innate behavioral incentive. Implicit motive predispositions are converted into formal motive dispositions, then, via repeated affective arousal (McClelland et al., 1989). It is presumed that motive predispositions that are not aroused via interpersonal experience (e.g., the infant with a strong proclivity to find closeness pleasurable who is raised in an icy, aloof family atmosphere) remain as latent motivational potentials in the adult. Rather than being ephemeral precursors to a verbal-conceptual motivational system, implicit motives comprise a distinct, stable motivational setup that operates throughout the individual's lifespan. As an interesting sidenote, it is speculated that implicit motives, as outlined above, could conceivably develop in animals as well as in humans. McClelland et al. (1989), for example, note that since they are built on direct experiences of affect also characteristic of animals...it should be possible for implicit motives like n Achievement and n Power to develop in animals without language, so long as the
species responds to the natural incentives on which these motives are based. (p. 698)

Implicit motives, in fact, have been linked to the workings of basic midbrain structures that both humans and animals possess (McClelland, 1987a).

Self-attributed motives comprise a second, developmentally more advanced motivational system that is divorced from the implicit system's grounding in basic affective reactions and (perhaps) animal heritage. Self-attributed motives rely upon a verbal-conceptual representational code. In other words, actions and experiences are perceived abstractly and linguistically rather than experientially and viscerally. Self-attributed motives are, in fact, intimately related to the self-image, or the set of individual beliefs as to who one is, who one would like to be, and how one is supposed to behave. When the individual apprehends experience through the spectacles of self-attributed motives, experience is understood in terms of its relevance to this image rather than felt in terms of its immediate affective weight (Raynor & McFarlin, 1986). Self-Attributed motives' operational mode also involves self-awareness. Indeed, self-attributed motives are related to a representation of reality that is detached, self-conscious, and decidedly evaluative—to an orientation toward self-as-object rather than toward behaving-as-subject. An interesting result of this defining
involvement of consciousness is that self-attributed motives can only exert their influences under situations where the individual has become self-aware, or ego-involved (deCharms, 1968). As long as the person is in a state of task involvement, or "absorbed in an activity because of its inherent qualities" (Koestner & McClelland, 1990, p. 532), self-attributed motives are in a sense inert. If, however, one should become aware of the implications of an activity for one's intrapsychic (i.e., self-esteem) or interpersonal (i.e., social reputation) standing, then self-attributed motives will become active. In summary, then, self-attributed motives comprise a verbal-conceptual "self-system," which requires phenomenal awareness and is motivated to maximize positive value regarding one's self-image" (Koestner & McClelland, 1990, p. 542).

Self-attributed motives are clearly more abstract and experience-distant than implicit motives, allying themselves with verbally-represented answers to the questions, "Who am I," "Who is it good to be?," and "Who would I like to be?" This is not to say, however, that self-attributed motives are detached cognitive entities with no behavior-determining firepower; like any motive, self-attributed motives do energize, direct, and select a certain class of behavior. Specifically, self-attributed motives govern respondent behavior, or behavior that
occurs in the presence of clear external elicitors. Where the operantly behaving individual appears to generate behavior from within, the respondently behaving individual seems to react. By virtue of their dependence of external elicitation, san-derived behaviors are manifest as fleeting behavioral episodes rather than as sustained behavioral trends. Self-attributed motives, for example, are especially predictive of choice behavior, or behavior involving "immediate specific responses to specific situations" (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 691). A second reason for self-attributed motives' lack of relationship to more sustained behavioral trends concerns the invocation of self-consciousness that is a prerequisite to their activity. Since self-consciousness itself is more of a fleeting, often socially-induced state than a stable phenomenal trait, it follows that the behavioral expression of self-attributed motive dispositions would have a similarly episodic nature.

Where the incentives associated with implicit motives are task-intrinsic, the incentives pertaining to self-attributed motives are decidedly social. Self-Attributed motives' incentives, paradoxically, have nothing to do with specific motive content: individuals high in san Power do not necessarily enjoy feeling powerful more than others, and people high in san Intimacy do not particularly enjoy closeness. Instead, the incentive for
san motive-derived behavior is the same regardless of the particular motive. Specifically, people high in a given self-attributed motive behave for the sake of identity confirmation and/or impression management. The former incentive involves a sense of intrapsychic congruence, in which the individual perceives personal behavior as being consistent with personal expectations. The latter incentive involves a sense of social competence, whereby a desired self-image has been effectively communicated to others, and the individual has responded correctly to perceived social demands and expectations. Along these lines, Koestner and McClelland (1990) note:

rather than cherishing the process of performing an activity, extrinsically oriented people (i.e., san-motivated people) behave as they believe they are supposed to. Instead of being associated with interest, (self-attributed motivation) is likely to be associated with feelings of pressure and tension. (p. 543)

Actually, it is quite conceivable that the emotional component to san behavior's reward is the decrement in tension that follows successful self-presentation or identity confirmation.

Since self-attributed motives are inextricably meshed with more developmentally advanced verbal-conceptual phenomena, it makes sense that they should develop somewhat later than do implicit motives. Self-attributed motives develop only after the individual "can comprehend linguistic communication and organize its meanings into
such constructs as self, others, and social norms" (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 699). Rather than through affective arousal, as in the case of implicit motives, self-attributed motives are acquired through a process of cognitive assimilation, whereby the individual internalizes the explicit, often verbal, teachings of significant others and of society. In particular, self-attributed motives are grounded in early teachings as to what values and goals one should pursue, or what motivational traits are good for the self. Along with the content of such teachings, the individual presumably internalizes the significant other's positive reactions to motive-consistent behaviors, such that subsequent motive-driven behaviors are imbued with a positive evaluative overtone.

Research on Implicit and Self-Attributed Motives

This section is concerned with the empirical basis for the just-outlined distinctions between implicit and self-attributed motives. Although no studies to date have explicitly addressed the distinction between motives based on operational mode, numerous studies have examined the distinctions concerning class of behavior influenced, motive-related incentives, and developmental origins. While Chapter Four will address motive research as it bears upon the construct validity of specific,
circumscribed motives and motive measures, the present
discussion is concerned with research on specific motives
only as it pertains to a more general theory of implicit
and self-attributed motivation. In this spirit, special
attention will be given to those studies that include both
implicit and self-attributed motive variables and thus
permit a direct comparison of the two motive types' effects.

Domain of behavioral influence. Over the years, a
substantial body of data has been amassed supporting the
idea that implicit motives predict trends in operant
behavior over time (McClelland, 1980). An individual's
level of intimacy motivation at age 30, for example,
has been shown to predict marital happiness and
psychosocial adjustment at age 47 (McAdams & Vaillant,
1982). Similarly, n Achievement, assessed during college,
has predicted employment in small business years after
graduation (McClelland, 1965) as well as number of
promotions in a large company over a three-year span
(Andrews, 1967) and in another over a 16 year period
(McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982). The implicit "leadership
motive pattern," a combination of average or above-average
n Power that also exceeds level of n Affiliation and is
accompanied by high self control, has been shown to
significantly predict office holding in voluntary
organizations 14 years after motive assessment (Winter,

While self-attributed motives have at times appeared to predict operant behavior as well, examination of specific studies reveals a proneness to alternate interpretations and/or an inability to establish the temporal precedence of the self-attributed motive disposition (Calder & Ross, 1973; McClelland et al., 1989; Mischel, 1968; Schuman & Johnson, 1976). For example, well-respected self-attributed motive scales, such as those included in Jackson's (1984) Personality Research Form (PRF), often employ peer rating-motive scale correlations as their sole demonstration of scale scores' relation to long-term trends in behavior (e.g., Jackson, 1984; Paunonen, 1979). It is assumed in such studies that peer ratings reflect peers' simple observance of long-term trends in an individual's behavior. This assumption, however, is of questionable accuracy. It is quite possible that people who see themselves as possessing a certain motive orientation communicate these opinions about themselves to peers via conversations, etc; these peers may then only be dutifully reiterating subjects' relatively explicit self-descriptions in filling-out peer rating forms (McClelland, 1972, 1980). As a second example, Kreitler and Kreitler (1976) purported to have demonstrated the ability of San Achievement-like constructs to predict final grades. Examination of the
study, however reveals that achievement orientation correlated with grades received during the prior academic year, and hence, it is just as likely that grades predicted subsequent self-reported achievement orientation. In summary, then, there is little evidence that self-attributed motives predict extended trends in spontaneous behavior.

There is, on the other hand, a good deal of evidence that constructs similar to self-attributed motives predict immediate responses to externally-defined situations (McClelland, 1980). For example, subjects' self-reported behavioral intents (i.e., a more circumscribed version of their self-attributed motives) for an immediately upcoming Prisoner's Dilemma game correlate highly with subsequent behavioral choices made in the game (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970). On a more general level, Bandura (1982), in reviewing a number of confirmatory studies, concluded that judgments of self-efficacy in a specific domain of functioning strongly predict subsequent performance in the domain. Kreitler and Kreitler (1976), furthermore, found that childrens' self-attributed level of curiosity is significantly correlated with curious behaviors in an explicitly-defined testing situation; "explicitly-defined," in this case means that potential curious behaviors were defined for children as such prior to testing. In summarizing findings such as these, Azjen
and Fishbein (1970) caution that "the longer the time interval between the statement of intention (i.e., the assessment of the san-like construct) and the actual behavior, the lower the correlation between intent and behavior will tend to be" (p. 469). San-like constructs are most predictive of behavior when construct and criterion evidence a high degree of correspondence (Azjen & Fishbein, 1977), such that (1) self-reported construct and behavior are similar in level of specificity, and (2) the time lag between motive assessment and behavioral criterion is minimal.

Unlike self-attributed motives, implicit motives do not generally predict behavior in situations characterized by a high degree of externally-provided structure or definition (Koestner & McClelland, 1990). As a case in point, the introduction of controlling external contingencies has repeatedly been found to dampen n Achievement's behavior-predicting power. Andrews (1967) found that while n Achievement predicted work performance in a less-constraining work environment, these motive effects did not hold in a second work environment characterized by a more authoritarian, controlling organizational structure. Similarly, the imposition of an explicit competitive goal structure has been shown to eliminate performance differences between individuals high and low in n Achievement (Grosko & Morgenstern, 1974). It
is proposed that external structurings precipitate a shift from operant to respondent behavioral modes, with a corresponding shift in activation from implicit to self-attributed motivational systems (Koestner & McClelland, 1990).

While there is a plethora of studies that either link implicit motives to operant behaviors or self-attributed motives to respondent behaviors, there are precious few that include both (1) implicit and self-attributed motive measures and (2) operant and respondent behavioral criteria. In the first of these more definitive studies, Constantian (as reported in McClelland, 1985) gave college students both implicit (i.e., TAT) and self-attributed (i.e., self-report) measures of the affiliative motive, which is defined as a recurrent preference for establishing, maintaining, and restoring warm interpersonal relationships (Atkinson, Heyns, & Veroff, 1954; Boyatzis, 1973). Subsequent to motive measurement, subjects' affiliative behavior in both operant and respondent domains was assessed. The operant measure involved an experience sampling approach, where subjects wearing pagers were beeped randomly and repeatedly over a number of days. Upon each paging, subjects were instructed to describe what they had been doing immediately prior to paging, among other things. Operant affiliative behavior, in this case, was operationalized as
the number of random pagings for which a subject was found talking with someone. In contrast to the operant behavioral criterion, which left subjects' behavior unconstrained and assessed behavioral trends extended in time, the respondent criterion tapped immediate affiliative choice behavior. Specifically, subjects were asked to choose between pairings of affiliative and nonaffiliative behavioral alternatives (e.g., living with roommates versus living alone; seeing a film with someone versus seeing a film alone, etc.). As would be predicted, n Affiliation correlated more robustly with the operant behavioral criterion than did san Affiliation, while san Affiliation was more highly related to affiliative choice behavior than was n Affiliation.

A second study conducted by Heckhausen and Halisch (1986) also supports the connection of implicit and self-attributed motives to distinct behavioral domains. In this case, the focal construct was achievement motivation, defined as "a concern with doing things better, with surpassing standards of excellence" (McClelland et al., 1953, p. 228). As in the previous study, implicit and self-attributed measures of this general motive content evidenced different behavioral correlates. Subjects' level of n Achievement predicted the successful initiation of job-related activities in the absence of explicit external guidelines. Where n Achievement
predicted spontaneous behavioral trends, san Achievement was related both to setting high aspirational levels and to rating oneself as high in ability level on various questionnaires. Hence, san Achievement's net of correlates involved immediate choice behavior (i.e., choosing an aspiration level from a list of alternatives) and subjects' thoughts about themselves, or verbal self-image (i.e., attributing a high level of achievement traits to oneself).

Biernat (1989) has also reported a study that bears on the topic under discussion. Following assessment of both $n$ Achievement and san Achievement, subjects were given the Wendt (1955) mental arithmetic task and were also asked about their willingness to serve as an organizer or leader on a subsequent task. Performance on the arithmetic task, which involves little mathematical ability but much mental effort, was seen as an operant criterion: Biernat (1989) comments:

> although there is an experimental demand to perform, how well subjects perform; how much effort and persistence they put into the task, are not dependent on any particular cue, but rather depend on the inclination of the subject for whom numerous behaviors are possible (e.g., concentrating very hard, letting the mind wander, setting a very low or a very high goal). (pp. 6-7)

The question regarding willingness to lead, on the other hand, represents a respondent criterion, in that subjects are presented with a highly-structured stimulus (i.e., the
question) that, by social convention, implies clear response alternatives (i.e., answering "Yes" or "No"). As hypothesized, \( n \) Achievement predicted performance on the arithmetic task while being unrelated to responses to the leadership question. Conversely, \( sa \)n Achievement related positively to "Yes" responses on the leadership question while failing to relate to arithmetic performance. Although there is perhaps some question as to an externally-imposed mental arithmetic task's viability as a "pure" measure of operant behavior, these results, considered in tandem with those of Constantian and of Heckhausen and Halisch offer support for the contention that implicit and self-attributed motives exert their influences in distinct behavioral domains.

**Associated incentives.** Four definitive experiments have sought to differentiate implicit from self-attributed motives based on the former's relation to behavioral incentives and the latter's to social incentives. For the first two of these, Koestner, Weinberger, McClelland, and Healy (1988) assessed subjects' levels of \( n \) Achievement, via the TAT, and \( sa \)n Achievement, via the PRF. All subjects next participated in an associate memory task (Experiment One) followed by a word-finding puzzle task (Experiment Two). In the memory task, subjects were assigned to either no-incentive or social-incentive conditions; in the latter condition, an experimenter
repeatedly mentioned ways to improve word recall. Stated differently, the experimenter introduced a verbal framing of the recall task as one with relevance to achievement. While the recall task pitted a social-incentive condition against a no-incentive condition, the second, puzzle task simply varied the level of task difficulty. For subjects high in \( n \) Achievement, the more difficult puzzles were expected to provide a behavioral incentive (i.e., the difficulty allows for an opportunity to feel a sense of accomplishment and success not afforded by simple puzzles) that would not be as germane for subjects low in \( n \) Achievement.

A series of ANOVAS yielded confirmatory results in both the memory-task and puzzle-task experiments. In the memory experiment, a significant condition \( \times \, san \) Achievement level interaction was obtained: subjects high in \( san \) achievement performed significantly better in the presence of a social achievement incentive than did those low in the motive, while they actually performed worse than low-achievement subjects in the absence of a social incentive. No such relationships occurred in the first experiment when subjects were divided into high- and low-\( n \) Achievement groups; the performance of people high in \( n \) Achievement was not affected by the presence of a social incentive. ANOVAs conducted in the second, puzzle-task experiment reveal a significant difficulty \( \times \, n \) Achievement
level interaction, such that subjects high in 
Achievement showed relatively enhanced performance under 
the difficult condition, while low-achievement subjects 
showed the opposite pattern. Level of san Achievement did 
not interact with degree of difficulty in a significant 
way. Taken together, these results strongly support the 
contention that implicit motives are tied to behavioral 
incentives, or incentives embedded in doing the task, 
while self-attributed motives are tied to social 
incentives--at least in the case of achievement 
motivation.

A third experiment (Koestner et al., 1988) has 
examined the above types of relationships as they apply to 
power motivation, which is defined as a "desire to have 
impact on others by influencing, persuading, helping, 
arguing with, or attacking them" (McClelland et al., 1989, 
p. 694). In this study, n Power was assessed using the 
popular TAT method (Winter, 1973), while san Power was 
assessed using the Dominance scale from Jackson's (1984) 
PRF. Following motive assessment, all subjects worked on 
a social perception task (Sternberg, 1986), which involved 
viewing a series of pictures of two people and determining 
the relationship between the two for each picture. For 
half of the pictures, subjects were asked to judge the 
**power relationship** in the dyad--to determine which of the 
two people was the boss over the other; for the remaining
pictures, subjects judged the dyadic affiliative relationship between the two people (e.g., lovers, friends, etc.). Hence, half of the pictures involved a behavioral power incentive, while the other half featured a behavioral incentive unrelated to power. A further methodological twist in this study involved the introduction of a social power incentive to half of the participants: while half of the subjects were simply told how to perform the social perception task, the others were additionally told that performance on the task as a whole (i.e., not just on the pictures involving power relationships) was related to managerial and persuasive abilities.

As with the experiments on achievement motivation, this power-focused study yielded relevant, confirmatory results. First, $n$ Power was related to enhanced performance on the power-related pictures only, and there was no $n$ Power level by social incentive condition interaction: introduction of a social power incentive did not differentially affect those high in $n$ Power over those low in $n$ Power. Second, $san$ Power did not predict a relatively better performance on power-oriented pictures than on affiliation-related pictures. Subjects high in $san$ Power, in other words, evidenced no special motivational investment in construing or processing power-related interpersonal scenarios. $San$ Power did, however,
interact with social power incentive condition, such that high-san Power participants performed better than low-san power participants when the social incentive was introduced. Furthermore, this "social incentive effect" held for power-related and affiliation-related pictures alike. For san-motivated individuals, it seems, an activity's relation to a motivational content is irrelevant. Instead, it is the explicit, verbal association of any activity to the concept of "power," "achievement," etc. that causes an increased investment in the activity.

In contrast to the last experiment, a final experiment conducted by Koestner and Zuckerman (1989) suggests that while san-motivated individuals are apparently oblivious to the rewards inherent in different types of activity, they are, unlike implicitly motivated individuals, actually quite sensitive to fine distinctions between social incentive types. After assessing \( n \) Achievement, \( n \) Power, san Achievement, and san Power in the standard ways, Koestner and Zuckerman had participants work on a word maze. Subjects' work was interrupted by an experimenter who gave each participant either achievement-oriented performance feedback or power-related performance feedback. The achievement feedback focused on mastery, or how much of the task a subject had completed, while the power feedback focused on competition, or how well the
subject was doing relative to others. Following feedback, participants were informed that the experiment was over and were left to do as they pleased. Their subsequent persistence on the word maze task was then measured. For subjects high in \textit{san} Achievement, a greater percentage evidenced task persistence following mastery feedback than did following competitive feedback. In the case of subjects high in \textit{san} Power, the reverse was true: more subjects persisted following competitive feedback than did following mastery feedback. No such relationships were obtained for subjects high in \textit{n} Achievement or \textit{n} Power. While implicitly-motivated individuals are unaffected by verbally-presented incentives, then, it appears that \textit{san}-motivated people respond to motive-consistent feedback with an enhanced behavioral investment in the activity at hand (i.e., the motive's energizing function). The combined results of the four experiments just discussed allow for at least some preliminary validation of the contention that implicit motives are tied to behavioral incentives while self-attributed motives are linked with social incentives.

\textbf{Developmental origins.} The evidence for the grounding of implicit and self-attributed motives in different sorts of developmental experiences is limited to a single longitudinal study conducted by McClelland and Pilon (1983). When the study's participants were five
years old, their mothers were exhaustively interviewed on their child-rearing practices. Twenty-six years later, the participants were administered TAT measures of achievement, power, and affiliation and adjective checklist (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983) measures of these three constructs' self-attributed counterparts. Analysis of relationships between specific child-rearing practices and adult motivational constitution revealed a number of significant correlations. In the domain of achievement motivation, achievement correlated positively with regularly scheduled feeding and with the severity of toilet training, while achievement correlated with early task setting by parents. McClelland et al. (1989) reason that these findings are consistent with implicit motives' proposed grounding in early, prelinguistic affective experiences and self-attributed motives' basis in explicit, verbal dealings with significant others. First, toilet training was typically completed during the first 19 months of life for this cohort, such that lingual comprehension would not have permitted a predominantly verbal coding of the experience. Additionally, teaching a child to master hunger states through scheduled feeding certainly involves less verbal-conceptual interchange than does explicitly outlining the tasks that a child is to perform. It is proposed, then that parental rigor in the areas of feeding and toilet training simply provided
children with more opportunities to experience the pleasure inherent in mastering internal states. The setting of early tasks to master, on the other hand, was more aligned with verbal-conceptual structuring (i.e., explicitly outlining the achievement task) and extrinsic, more abstract rewards (i.e., verbalized praise).

McClelland and Pilon also garnered relevant results in the case of power motivation. Here, parental permissiveness around sexual and aggressive play predicted adult Power. "Permissiveness" in this case can be equated with parents' allowing or ignoring behavior (McClelland et al., 1989); hence, it appears that implicit motive development was encouraged by the parental provision of a nondirective environment--one that allowed for the child's unconstrained and repeated experiencing of the pleasures attendant to having impact on others. In the case of san Power, both punishment of aggression directed at parents and frequency of mother-administered spankings were predictive of adult motive strength. McClelland et al. (1989) frame these relationships as confirmatory, noting that "spanking and punishment for aggression are usually accompanied by explicit statements forbidding the child to do something and explaining why he or she is being spanked for violating a prohibition" (pp. 699-700). The researchers contend that it is the child's internalization of the verbal accompaniments to the
punishments that facilitates san motive development. While this explanation seems somewhat plausible, it does not explain the relationship of san motive development to punishment. It is plausible that the san motive develops through an identification with the aggressor—with the parents' display of power. However, a bevy of equally plausible, theory-inconsistent explanations are also available. It is, for example, possible that a self-attributed desire to dominate develops as a compensation for early experiences of being dominated by more powerful others.

The results for the affiliative motives are, like those for power motivation, inconsistently conclusive. The sole significant correlate of adult n Affiliation was a lack of maternal responsiveness to the infant's crying, while adult san Affiliation was related to mothers' repeated teachings that the child should "not fight back." The latter finding is quite supportive: explicit parental teachings that one should be nice and not fight predict the development of affiliative self-constructs as tapped by a self-ascriptive affiliative questionnaire. The finding for n Affiliation, however, is less clear. It can be speculated that children who were allowed to suffer longer prior to receiving maternal attention experienced a more strong positive affective reaction when the contact did finally arrive; repeated experiencings of this
distress-followed-by-interpersonal-relief scenario could lay the affective-experiential groundwork for motive development. However, alternate explanations of this finding are clearly possible. McClelland et al., (1989) actually diverge from their own theory of implicit motive acquisition in interpreting this finding, suggesting that Affiliation may have it's affective genesis in feelings of anxiety rather than in pleasurable affective experiences. Specifically, they contend that early experiences of insecurity in the maternal relationship crystallize into an "implicit fear of rejection" (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 700), which persists into adulthood and is related to Affiliation (Koestner & McClelland, 1990).

In conclusion, only a few partially supportive findings have related implicit and self-attributed motives with specific, distinct developmental origins. Some of the relationships obtained by McClelland and Pilon (1983) are compelling, as in the linkings of parental permissiveness to adult Power and of explicit instructions to "not fight back" to adult San Affiliation. It is also noteworthy that in no case did an implicit motive and a self-attributed motive share a parenting correlate; the two motive types do appear to have distinct developmental roots. These immediately convincing findings, however, are accompanied by a series
of less conclusive results—results less readily assimilable by McClelland et al's, (1989) developmental propositions. Furthermore, both the compelling and less compelling explanations advanced for obtained relationships are all post-hoc. Clearly, more research must occur in this area before more definitive conclusions can be reached.

Measurement of Implicit and Self-Attributed Motives

Operant and respondent measures. The previously-discussed functional differences between implicit and self-attributed motives influence the types of measures used to assess them. Not surprisingly, self-attributed motives are best-assessed by respondent measures, which sample choice behavior under highly-structured, explicit situations (McClelland, 1980). Two of the most widely used respondent measures of self-attributed motives are Jackson's (1984) Personality Research Form (PRF) and Gough and Heilbrun's (1980) Adjective Check List (ACL). The former requires the test-taker to respond "True" or "False" to a number of self-statements (e.g., "I am quite effective in getting others to agree with me"), while the latter simply asks the test-taker to endorse or not endorse a series of potentially self-descriptive adjectives. As exemplified by the PRF and ACL, respondent measures generally constrain the test-taker, specifying
both the stimulus, in this case a test question, and the range of possible responses to the stimulus. They also engender "consistency and social desirability sets" (McClelland, 1980, p. 36), asking how the subject generally feels or generally is. In fact, some have cautioned that respondent questionnaires may tap self-presentations rather than self-reports (Hogan & Nicholson, 1988).

Unlike self-attributed motives, implicit motives are best-assessed via operant measures, or instruments that sample spontaneously-generated, unconstrained behavior (McClelland, 1980). The most popular operant measures in implicit motive research involve the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT): subjects are asked to tell imaginative stories to pictures of vague interpersonal scenarios. These stories (i.e., samples of operant behavior) are then rigorously scored for the presence of various motive-related themes. In the case of Intimacy, for example, subjects' imaginative stories are scored for thematic categories such as Dialogue, Commitment or Concern, and Harmony (McAdams, 1979). Operant measures, unlike respondent instruments, provide little in the way of explicit task structure. In other words, there is no specific test question and no specific set of responses; the test-taker operates on the test, rather than responding to it. Operant measures also leave the social
implications accompanying various responses undefined. The comparative absence of explicitly-defined social meanings, in turn, allows for a relative circumvention of self-conscious processing. McClelland et al. (1989), for example, note, "the imaginative stories from which implicit motives are coded reflect motivational and emotional themes in the person's life, unevaluated as to their appropriateness in terms of concepts of the self, others, and what is important" (p. 698). Operant measures are finally distinguished from respondent measures based on the response sets that they encourage. Rather than consistency sets, operant measures create variability sets, or tacit demands for variable responding, via instructions that emphasize imagination and creativity (McClelland, 1980).

Reliability issues. The most biting criticisms of TAT motive measures involve their reliability, estimates of which typically reside well below the range accepted by traditional psychometric criteria. Entwisle (1972), for example, in an analysis of both published and unpublished TAT n Achievement data, estimated the measure's homogeneity reliability (i.e., internal consistency) to reside in the .30 to .40 range. Similarly low estimates have been obtained for various TAT measures' test-retest reliabilities, which range from an $r$ of .10 to .35 (McClelland, 1980). These psychometric shortcomings are
brought into even sharper relief by comparisons with well-established self-report motive measures. The ACL scales for san Achievement, san Power, and san Affiliation, for example, boast internal consistencies of .84, .79, and .88, and test-retest reliabilities of .73, .76, and .63, respectively (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983).

In examining reliability issues in motive measurement, McClelland (1980) has argued that the reliability figures associated with self-report motive measures are spuriously inflated. There are at least four ways through which motive questionnaires, rather than the constructs they tap, may pull for exaggerated reliability coefficients. First, the instructions accompanying most self-report measures communicate an implicit consistency demand through instructions like "answer honestly," and "state your true feelings." These sorts of guidelines discourage possible construct-driven inconsistencies, allying contradictory responses with concepts of "dishonesty" and "wishy-washiness." Second, self-report measures often tap generalized response sets in addition to the targeted motive construct. These sets can lead to consistently_positive or negative responses regardless of item content (Edwards, 1957; Couch & Keniston, 1960). Third, self-report measures gain non construct-related consistency by
asking the same question in many different ways... as D'Andrade (1965) has demonstrated, there is so much semantic overlap among the adjectives used in different descriptions that the subjects cannot really discriminate what is being asked. They are answering the same question, semantically speaking, over and over again, and it is the psychologist who has been fooled into thinking that he has established response consistency, when the subject cannot tell one stimulus from another. (McClelland, 1980, p. 32)

A final contributor to self-report measures' inflated reliabilities is their frequent inclusion of questions concerning past behavior. Unless the subject blatantly malingerers, it is doubtful that responses will change, even if the construct targeted by the question has. McClelland (1980) concludes, "The most reasonable inference to be made from these facts is that the true reliability of characteristics measured in the usual type of personality questionnaires ...is unknown" (p.31).

While there is evidence that reliability estimates are spuriously high in the case of self-report measures, there is actually reason to believe that reliability estimates for TAT motive measures are artificially deflated. Standard TAT instructions prime subjects to be creative and imaginative. To the degree that a subject heeds these instructions, it is improbable that a series of consecutive stories will address the same thematic content, even if there is an implicit-motive press for thematic repetition. There is nothing creative or original about copying one's own stories. In fact, a
"sawtooth effect" has been identified in TAT achievement stories (Atkinson, 1950): it is normative for consecutively written TAT stories to alternate between a relative presence and relative absence of achievement themes. Notably, the test-retest reliability estimates associated with TAT measures improve substantially when creativity sets are eliminated through altered instructions. Winter and Stewart (1977), for example, told subjects not to worry about similarities between previously written TAT stories and stories written on a second TAT administration. They obtained a test-retest coefficient of .58 for $n$ Power. Comparable effects have been reported in the case of $n$ Achievement (Heckhausen, Schmalt, & Schneider, 1985) and $n$ Intimacy (Lundy, 1980).

The just-discussed measure-based explanations for operant and respondent measures' discrepant reliabilities are supplemented by construct-based explanations. In particular, presses toward consistency are probably inherent in the self-attributed motive system itself (Guidano & Liotti, 1983). Subjects may attach consistency demands to respondent self-report tasks, then, even in the absence of bias-fostering instructions. Furthermore, self-attributed motives are intimately linked with social presentation. Hence, it somewhat befits the construct that self-presentational factors should influence test scores. In conclusion, some of the factors that
McClelland (1980) frames as reliability-inflating measurement artifacts may actually be indigenous aspects of self-attributed motives. This argument, however, only applies to some of McClelland's criticisms. Implicit consistency demands and generalized response sets may be "in the motive" rather than "in the measure." On the other hand, self-report measures' inclusion of semantically interchangeable items and use of past-focused questions certainly reflect unwanted measure-based bias.

There are also theory-based reasons why implicit motive measures should not exhibit high reliabilities. McClelland (1980) asserts that implicit motives function according to an alternative manifestations model. The crux of this idea is that implicit motives, to the extent that they express themselves one way in a behavioral episode, will be less apt to express themselves in another way at that time. To the extent that n Power is expressed by telling a TAT story about an argument, for example, there will be less of a press to tell a relational exploitation story to another TAT card. In other words, "the alternative manifestations are not highly intercorrelated as the consistency hypothesis assumes they should be" (McClelland, 1980, p. 32). The varying of operant responses (i.e., alternation behavior) is furthermore assumed by general behavior theory to have both adaptive value and evolutionary basis; behavioral
variability may be hard-wired into the implicit system. In fact, Atkinson (1981) has argued that phenotypic expressions of unobservable, genotypic implicit motive dispositions are systematically inconsistent, rather than random and incoherent.

A final construct-based reason for TAT motive measures' low reliability concerns the dimension of sensitivity. Implicit motives are proposed to be extremely sensitive to fluctuations in internal and situational states. The influences of such uncontrollable factors as random daily events, reactions to the experimenter and other subjects, mood during test administration, and degree of recent motive satisfaction all interact with stable motive dispositions to yield obtained motive scores. In other words, there is a relatively low "signal to noise ratio" when TAT measures are used to assess stable motivational traits. It is worth mentioning that this is not the case with the measurement of self-attributed motives. To the degree that the subject is a stable, well-integrated person, daily fluctuations in internal and external environments will not precipitate marked fluctuations in the self-image. Furthermore, self-report measures' concern with how subjects generally behave or generally feel helps preclude extraneous influences.

McClelland has argued passionately that estimates of
TAT measures' reliabilities are spuriously deflated while reliability values for self-report motive measures are inflated. Cogent speculation, however, must not be confused with empirical support: McClelland and his associates have offered no empirical evidence that self-report measures' reliability suffers when certain measurement artifacts are removed. It may well be that both measure types' "true" reliabilities reside in the moderate range. Nonetheless, it is equally probable that when all measurement artifacts are removed, questionnaire motive measures are still more reliable instruments than TAT motive measures. In fact, it is theoretically warranted to expect that even with the elimination of all confounds, respondent measures are more reliable than operant instruments. This follows from the self-attributed system's alliance with consistency and self presentation, as well as the implicit system's tendencies toward sensitivity and behavioral alternation.

Validity issues. TAT motive measures, particularly the TAT measure for $n$ Achievement, have also been criticized on validity grounds (Entwisle, 1972; Klinger, 1966). Indeed TAT-assessed motive studies are prone to inconsistently supportive findings and to difficulties with replication (McClelland, 1980). Klinger (1966), for example, concluded that $n$ Achievement "scores are shown to be correlated with performance measures in (only) about
1/2 of the studies reported" (p. 291). In defending the validity of TAT motive measures, McClelland (1980) invokes their aforementioned sensitivity, which is actually desirable from a construct validity perspective, as a major contributor to variable findings. Due to implicit motives' sensitivity, TAT studies are much more prone than questionnaire studies to situational interferences. McClelland (1980) cautions, "much more care must be taken when operant measures are used to insure that testing conditions are standardized, neutral with regard to arousing cues, and the same for all subjects tested" (p. 35). Without such care, he asserts, experimental lackluster will masquerade as validational deficit. While McClelland's argument again makes sense, it is also a particularly convenient "escape hatch" for nonsupportive findings: whenever TAT measures fail to predict a behavioral criterion, spurious, unnoticed situational factors can be retrospectively identified.

Entwisle (1972), in a particularly damaging critique, has also condemned the TAT measure of n Achievement on the grounds that it does not often predict academic performance. This appraisal does seem misguided, in that grades are not an apt validity criterion: a straightforward relationship between n Achievement and something as multi-determined as school performance has never been posited by motive researchers. McClelland et
al. (1953), in fact, explicitly cautioned investigators against expecting such a simple linear relationship from the outset. As it turns out, TAT-assessed $n$ Achievement does predict scholastic excellence, but only when certain achievement fostering situational elements are present, i.e., autonomy-supportive context, provision of moderate challenge, frequent performance feedback (Koestner & McClelland, 1990; McKeachie, 1961; O'Connor, Atkinson, & Horner, 1966). In other situations, $n$ Power and even $n$ Affiliation have been found to predict academic success (McKeachie, 1961).

While operant motive measures suffer from erratic relationships to validational criteria, McClelland (1980) contends that respondent motive measures suffer from consistent covariance with criteria of only questionable worth. Popular self-report motive measures typically cite three types of validity data. These involve correlations between the measure of interest and (1) scores on instruments measuring similar constructs, (2) behaviors specifically covered by the questionnaire, and (3) peer ratings (Scott & Johnson, 1972). All three of these sources are problematic in that they allow ample opportunity for predictor-criterion contamination, and hence, foster spuriously inflated validity estimates (McClelland, 1980). In the case of the first validity source, criterion scales often share items with the
predictor scale, in addition to sharing (desirable) conceptual similarity. To the degree that item overlap is responsible for obtained correlations, evidence of reliability, but certainly not validity, is garnered. In other words, predictor-criterion contamination has occurred. A similar problem occurs when a measure of an abstract concept (e.g., san Power, san Intimacy) contains items that specifically address a behavioral validity criterion. Consider the case, for example, where a power measure containing the item, "I often find myself in positions of power over others" is significantly correlated with working as a manager: this sort of result, which essentially correlates something with itself, does not provide particularly convincing validity data. Finally, obtained correspondences between self-reports and peer ratings may reflect only the tendency of peers to repeat statements that individuals make about themselves in the context of ongoing social interaction (McClelland, 1980).

In summary, it is possible that validity estimates for operant measures are deflated due to an interaction between construct sensitivity and uncontrolled situational-experimental factors. Validity estimates for respondent motive measures, on the other hand, may be somewhat inflated by measure-criterion contamination. Story-based motive measures' perennial reputation as
"black sheep" in the psychometric community is perhaps somewhat justified. However, closer examination of questionnaire measures' probable "true" validities, renders their validational superiority questionable.

Implicit and self-attributed variables are unrelated. McClelland et al. (1989) note that "measures of self-attributed and implicit motives seldom correlate significantly with one another," adding that "few facts in psychology are as well established as this one" (p. 691). This general finding was first reported by McClelland et al. (1953), who found an absence of significant correlations between TAT and self-report measures of achievement motivation. This finding for achievement motivation has been replicated many times over (e.g., Atkinson & Litwin, 1960; Heckhausen, 1980; Heckhausen & Halisch, 1986, Holmes & Tyler, 1968). The finding has also been replicated in the cases of power motivation and intimacy motivation (Hoffman, 1989), and only weak, barely significant correlations have been obtained between TAT and questionnaire-assessed affiliation motivation (Constantian, 1982). As a recent illustration, of implicit and self-attributed constructs general lack of relationship, Koestner et al. (1988), in a two-experiment study, found the following pattern of nonsignificant correlations: (a) the pairing of **Achievement** and san
Achievement yielded correlation coefficients of -.21 and .15; (b) the corresponding values of an n Power with san Power correlation were .08 and .05; and finally, (c) the obtained n Affiliation with san Affiliation coefficients were -.06 and -.08. In this case, implicit motives were assessed using the usual TAT measures while the self-attributed motives were assessed using PRF Achievement, Dominance, and Affiliation scales (Jackson, 1984).

Four major explanations address the lack of relationship between the two motive types. Some contend that there is really only one type of motive, and that the two types of motive measure do not correlate because TAT motive measures are psychometrically worthless (Entwisle, 1972; Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Similarly, others have contended that the problem lies in self-report motive measures' faulty design (Raven, 1988). In fact, many have tried in vain to develop self-report motive measures, particularly of achievement motivation, that relate consistently to TAT motive measures (Edwards, 1954; Gough & Heilbrun, 1983; Jackson, 1974; Kreitler & Kreitler, 1976; Raven, Molloy, & Corcoran, 1972). A third explanation grounded in measurement issues implicates neither of the two measures as "the culprit." As underscored by Campbell and Fiske (1959), every test score represents an amalgam of construct-related variance and method-related variance. It is possible, then, that TAT
and self-report measures are both measuring the same construct, but that their shared construct variance is obscured by the contributions of extremely divergent method variances.

Unlike the preceding three explanations for the failure of TAT and self-report motive measures to intercorrelate, the final explanation, which guides the thrust of the present investigation, is grounded in construct-related considerations. Specifically, this argument, as advanced by McClelland et al. (1989), asserts that there is no fatal methodological flaw in either self-report or TAT motive measures. Instead the measures do not correlate because they tap qualitatively different types of motives that are not necessarily in accord with each other. Koestner and McClelland (1990) reflect, "another way to react to this lack of correlation...is to take it seriously, to insist that at a minimum, psychologists should not call by the same name two measures that do not correlate with each other" (p. 542). Against this backdrop, many of the presumed psychometric flaws in the measures (e.g., the TAT's low reliability, self-reports' failure to predict long-term trends in behavior, etc.) can be reframed as defining features of the constructs they tap. As already discussed, TAT measures should not show high test-retest reliability, since implicit motives are extremely sensitive to
environmental arousal; self-report measures, by the same
token, should not predict long-term trends in behavior in
most cases, as self-attributed motives are only aroused in
more circumscribed, socially-defined episodes.

**Interactions Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motives.**

**Theory and research.** To assert that implicit and
self-attributed motives comprise distinct motivational
layers which need not be in accord is not to say that the
two motive types do not interact. In fact, dynamic
theorists such as Freud (1910) and Jung (1971) have gained
much of their behavior-describing firepower by positing
conscious and unconscious psychic levels in dynamic
interplay. McClelland et al. (1989), perhaps following
the lead of earlier psychodynamic theorists, propose a
similar interplay between implicit and self-attributed
systems. They comment:

> In evolutionary terms, a conscious motivational
system has been built on top, so to speak, of a more
primitive motivational system. The evolutionary
advantage of such an arrangement is obvious because
the more primitive, automatic motivational system is
not well equipped to make plans or to set specific
goals that take into account contextual
circumstances...self-attributed goals often serve to
guide implicit motives into specific channels.

(p. 699)

The self-attributed system, then, is framed as a reality-
oriented "brains" that directs the implicit system's raw,
behavior-driving and activity-sustaining "braun." Where
the implicit personality presses for a continuing
succession of intrinsic pleasures (i.e., "What would feel good to do now?")}, the self-attributed system mediates implicit motive expression, taking into account perceived social constraints and incentives, as well as the implications of various behaviors for the self-image. Much as the psychodynamic ego sublimates unacceptable wishes into ego- and superego-syntonic gestures, self-attributed motives are purported to channel implicit motive expression along identity-consistent lines. In more cognitive terms, the self-attributed system serves as a temporary override system to ongoing automatic functioning, allowing the verbal mediation of behavior vis-a-vis conscious motives and concerns (Bargh, 1984; Buck, 1985).

A number of studies featuring achievement motivation provide support for the general proposition that self-attributed motives mediate implicit motive expression. Patten and White (1977), for example, found that subjects in whom \( n \) Achievement had been aroused experimentally outperformed controls on a digit symbol task. While the researchers reported that \( san \) Achievement had no similar effect on performance, McClelland (1985a), in a re-presentation of the data, found that high \( san \) Achievement was in fact related to enhanced performance, but only for subjects high in \( n \) Achievement. Biernat's (1989) aforementioned study, which relied on "trait"
Achievement rather than "state" Achievement, replicates this finding. Once again, an implicit motive by self-attributed motive interaction was obtained, such that san Achievement related to enhanced performance on an operant mathematics task only for subjects high in n Achievement. In summary, it appears that conscious commitments toward accomplishment are associated with an enhanced ability to convert both situationally-aroused and dispositional implicit achievement press into operant performance.

French and Lesser's (1964) study on women and achievement further illuminates the relationships between implicit and self-attributed motives. In this case, n Achievement predicted different operant behaviors depending on subjects' self-reported commitments to either a domestic role (i.e., wife and mother) or a career. For the former, n Achievement correlated significantly with doing better at a social task (i.e., generating a list of ways to make friends upon moving to a new community), while it was unrelated to performance on an academic task (i.e., solving anagrams). For career-oriented women, on the other hand, the reverse pattern was obtained: n Achievement correlated significantly with excelling at the academic task, while failing to relate to performance on the social task. Hence, san-like constructs seem to channel implicit motive expression into identity-
consistent operant domains while blocking motive expression in identity-inconsistent areas.

Various results from Constantian's (1981) beeper study generalize the findings of achievement-focused studies to the domain of affiliation. First, n Affiliation predicted frequency of affiliative activity in randomly-paged college students (r=.42), while san Affiliation and affiliative skills did not significantly predict the same criterion. Affiliation's predictive power, however, was boosted to an r of .60 when n Affiliation, san Affiliation, and affiliative skills were predictively combined via a multiple correlation technique. More decisively, self-reported interpersonal orientation was found to mediate n Affiliation's operant correlates. For subjects with an explicit commitment to affiliation (i.e., san Affiliation greater than san Autonomy), high n Affiliation was associated with a preference for taking walks with friends. For subjects explicitly committed to solitude (i.e., san Autonomy greater than san Affiliation), n Affiliation was related to involvement in letter writing during random pagings—a sort of compromise behavior that allows implicit motive satisfaction within the bounds of the self-image's constraints.

The results of the above studies are rendered more strongly supportive of a specific, directional
relationship between self-attributed and implicit motives by the repeated finding that implicit motives do not enhance self-attributed motives' prediction of respondent behavior. For example, in a multiple regression analysis of Constantian's just-discussed data, McClelland (1985a) concluded, "The only significant contributor to predicting affiliative choices is (san) Affiliation: neither (implicit) motive nor perceived skill level nor their interaction is related to reports of liking to do things with friends" (p. 823). In Biernat's (1989) study, san Achievement was significantly related to the number of achievement-related statements selected as the "eight most appealing attributes" of a hypothetical person, chosen from a list of 21 statements. However, n Achievement was significantly related to the dependent measure for neither overall, high-san Achievement, nor low-san Achievement groups. In general, then, it seems that implicit motives do not exert a channeling effect on self-attributed motives analogous to the empirically-supported mediating role that self-attributed motives adopt vis-à-vis implicit presses (Biernat, 1989; McClelland, 1975a).
CHAPTER III

CONSTRUCTS GERMANE TO THE CLARIFICATION OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN IMPLICIT AND SELF-ATTRIBUTED MOTIVES

As already noted, both measure-based and construct-based explanations have been advanced to explain the failure of TAT and self-report motive measures to intercorrelate. One way to marshal support for the construct-based explanation, which is the primary goal of this study, would be to show that the two types of measure do in fact correlate, but only for certain people. Specifically, TAT and self-report measures should intercorrelate only for those individuals for whom implicit and self-attributed systems are in relative harmony. The a priori division of people into motive-consistent and motive-inconsistent subgroups, then, should result in one group for whom the TAT and self-report motive measures are unrelated (or even correlate negatively) and another group for whom the two types of measure corroborate—if the construct-based explanation is correct. If measure-based explanations for TAT-questionnaire incongruities are correct, however, no differential relationship should be obtained for motive-
congruent and motive-incongruent groups.

The present chapter concerns itself with inner-directedness and other-directedness, two variables presumed to differentiate motive-congruent individuals from others. Additionally, personal strivings and personality abilities will be introduced, both of which may mediate relationships between self-attributed and implicit systems. All four of these constructs will permit further examination of the relationships between implicit and self-attributed motives.

**Inner-Directedness**

Inner-directedness refers to a general proclivity toward focusing one's attention inwardly and intrapsychically, rather than outwardly and socially. Wymer and Penner (1985) define the construct as a tendency to "be aware of and attentive to internal dispositions" (p. 1004). Actually, inner-directedness, which is a factor-analytically derived dimension, is composed of two defining facets—*private self consciousness* (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) and *personal identity* (Cheek & Briggs, 1982). The former facet concerns a tendency to direct one's attention toward one's motives, feelings, thoughts, and behavioral dispositions (Scheier, Buss, & Buss, 1978), while the latter involves an imbuing of the self-knowledge gained from this internal focus.
with self-definitional import. Taken in tandem, private self-consciousness and personal identity make for an individual who (1) knows his or her inner, organismic self and (2) expresses that self via self-image, word, and choice. From a contemporary motivational perspective, inner-directedness should mediate congruence between implicit and self-attributed layers: a focus on implicit experience, with a concomitant commitment to the incorporation of such experience into the self-image should, over time, lead to a schematic identity that fits the implicit "facts." Inner-directedness, in other words, should foster the self-attributed system's accommodation to experiential realities. McClelland et al. (1989), in fact, implicate self-conscious processes in the equilibrating of implicit and self-attributed systems, speculating that "systematic experience-based self observation...may bring the two types of motives into alignment" (p. 700).

The speculation that inner-directedness should foster motive congruence is supported by Wymer and Penner's (1985) finding that inner-directedness mediates the prediction of operant behavior from self-report. In an initial session, subjects took a battery of measures assessing various mediator variables, including inner-directedness. Their attitudes toward religion (i.e., a san-like construct) were also assessed via Thurstone and
chave's (1929) Attitudes Toward the Church Scale and Zanna, Olson, and Fazio's (1980) measure of religious attitudes. One month later, subjects filled-out a comprehensive, retrospective inventory of their recent involvement or non-involvement in various religious behaviors. Hence, at least to the degree that responses were accurate, the measure tapped religious trends in (largely) operant behavior. As predicted, subjects high in inner-directedness showed a greater correspondence between value and behavior scores than did their less inner-directed peers. In other words, inner-directed individuals' views of themselves mirror, in relative terms, the flavor of their implicitly-motivated behavior.

The framing of inner-directedness as a determinant of motive congruence is further supported by a wealth of data concerning its private self-consciousness facet. Private self-consciousness, like inner directedness, is related to enhanced congruence between self-reports and behavior. Scheier et al. (1978), for example, assessed subjects' degree of private self-consciousness and san Aggressiveness. Weeks later, subjects' actual aggressiveness was measured via an "aggression machine" paradigm (Buss, 1961, 1963), in which subjects served as teachers to pupils (actually experimental confederates) in a concept formation task. "Aggressiveness" was operationalized as the average intensity of bogus shocks
administered by teachers as punishment for errors made on learning trials. As predicted, the overall correlation between san Aggressiveness and behavior differed markedly for subjects high and low in private self-consciousness. While the former evidenced a highly significant self-report/behavior correlation, the latter's behavior did not correspond at all to their self-attributed aggressiveness. While the dependent variable in this study did involve choice behavior (i.e., choosing between various shock magnitudes), participants were in no way made aware of the implications of shock administration for their san Aggressiveness (i.e., there was no social aggression incentive). In fact, the task was, if anything, explicitly allied with achievement (i.e., being an effective teacher). Hence, this study seemed to involve behavior residing in a middle position on the operant-respondent continuum. Turner (1978c, Experiment One), employing a more definitively operant behavioral criterion, has replicated Scheier et al's. general findings. In this study, power was the focal attribute, operationalized as degree of conversational domination in a problem-solving group. As predicted, private self-consciousness mediated the correspondence between a previously-obtained measure of san Power and the operant power criterion. High private self-conscious subjects, then, evidence a more robust self-report/behavior
correlation than low self-conscious subjects.

A number of studies have additionally linked private self-consciousness to (1) an enhanced awareness of one's affective state and (2) a subsequent expression of this state in behavior. Scheier (1976), for example, employed the aforementioned aggression machine paradigm with a twist: prior to the teaching phase, confederate-pupils watched teacher-subjects perform a difficult puzzle task. While the confederates observed quietly for control subjects, they actively badgered and insulted the experimental subjects, thus inducing anger. For low private self-conscious subjects, neither average shock intensity nor self-reports of post-experimental anger differed between experimental and control conditions. Experimental high self-conscious subjects, however, reported significantly more anger and also administered a higher mean shock level than did high self-conscious controls. Hence, high-self conscious subjects seem to be both more aware of their angry reactions and more willing to let these reactions guide their behavior.

Subsequent studies have found private self-consciousness to mediate other types of affective experiences as well. Scheier and Carver (1977), for example, had male undergraduates rate either arousing slides of nude women or disgusting slides of human atrocities "according to how much of a bodily reaction
(they) seemed to be having" (p. 628). In another experiment, the researchers had subjects rate their mood following induction of either elation or depression via Velten's (1968) previously validated procedure. In all analyses, private self-consciousness was positively related to more elevated affect-based ratings, whether the induced affect was attraction, repulsion, elation, or depression. This "self-consciousness effect" has also been found in regard to the experience of sympathy (Scheier, Carver, & Shulz, 1978, Experiment Two): high private self-conscious individuals show more compassion for a handicapped target person than do others, as reflected in more favorable overall evaluations.

A final relevant study suggests that private self-consciousness is related to a relative focus on internal cues and away from social cues and pressures. More specifically, Scheier, Carver, and Gibbons (1979) found high private self-conscious subjects to attend more to internal sensory cues and less to socially-provided expectancies in judging the taste of various solutions. Moreover, these taste-judgements were made on a respondent scale; private self-consciousness, then, was related to the self-attributed system's relative reorientation from social presses to internal promptings.

While validity data abounds on private self-consciousness, as assessed by Fenigstein et als.'(1975)
Self-Consciousness Scale, validity data pertaining to inner directedness' second facet, personal identity, is restricted to the Personal Identity Scale's (Cheek & Briggs, 1982) face validity. This instrument requires subjects to rate six items on a five-point Likert scale (0 = "Not at all important to my sense of who I am;" 5 = Extremely important to my sense of who I am."). Specific items address intrapersonal phenomena such as "emotions and feelings," "dreams and imagination," and "thoughts and ideas." While private self-consciousness concerns both an awareness of the organismic self and a tendency toward behavioral expression of this self, personal identity seems more concerned with a reorienting of the self-attributed system, or self-image, to fit internal reality. The person high in both dimensions, then, should show an enhanced consistency between operant and respondent behaviors.

Other-Directedness

A second construct that should, assuming the correctness of McClelland et al's. (1989) theory, mediate TAT/self-report congruence is other-directedness. This factor-analytically derived construct subsumes two facets. These are other-focus, or a "willingness to change one's behavior to please others" (Wymer & Penner, 1985, p. 1003) and situational variability, or a tendency toward
"situational instability in trait-related behaviors" (Wymer & Penner, 1985, p. 1003). The former is assessed via several items from Snyder's (1974) factorially complex Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS), which requires subjects to rate self-statements as "true" or "false." Analysis of these items suggests a high-scorer who is keenly attuned to social incentives and invested in pleasing others (e.g., "In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people expect me to be rather than anything else." <True>; "When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior of others for cues" <True>). The situational variability facet is measured by Bem and Allens' (1974) three-item Situational Variability Scale (SVS), which requires test-takers to rate their cross-situational variability on traits of sociability, conscientiousness, and helpfulness. This scale, then, implicates variation in "situations," rather than changes in internal press, as the culprit for behavioral variability. Furthermore, these behavior-influencing situations are predominantly social; helping, socializing, and some aspects of conscientiousness (e.g., punctuality) cannot occur in a vacuum. It is hence assumed that high scorers on the SVS will be strongly oriented, at the self-attributed level, toward social demands while being relatively ignorant of their implicit dispositions.

A precious few studies suggest that other-
directedness and its facets are detrimental to the self-attributed system's alignment with implicit realities. First, Wymer and Penner's (1985) aforementioned study of religious values and behaviors examined the mediating effects of other-directedness. As expected, subjects low in other-directedness showed a significantly greater correlation between san Religiosity and subsequent religious behavior than did other subjects. Although the SMS has undergone extensive validational research, none of these efforts have considered the other-focus factor independently. As the SMS is composed of multiple factors (i.e., other-focus, acting, and extraversion) that often have opposing behavior-mediating effects, it would be misleading to cite global SMS research in examining the other-focus factor's effects (Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980; Gabreyna & Arkin, 1980; Wymer & Penner, 1985). Other-directedness' situational variability facet, however, has been researched in a single, well-devised study. In a pretest session, Bem and Allen (1974) measured subjects' san Friendliness and san Conscientiousness via self-report, as well as their variability on each dimension. San Friendliness predicted the spontaneous initiation of conversation—an operant behavioral criterion, only for subjects low in situational variability. Situational variability effects were also obtained in the case of conscientiousness: situational stability significantly
enhanced *san* Conscientiousness' prediction of two out of three operant criteria (i.e., promptness in returning a series of questionnaires by mail and number of assigned course readings completed at mid-semester).

**Personal Strivings**

Personal strivings reflect, along with life tasks (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987), personal projects (Little, 1983), and current concerns (Klinger, 1977, 1987), personality psychology's recent reinvestment in motivational constructs (Emmons, 1989). Strivings have previously been defined as "idiographic instantiations of major (implicit) motives, such as achievement, affiliation, intimacy, and power" (Emmons & McAdams, 1989). Further clues as to strivings' theoretical nature come from the way in which they are assessed. Personal strivings are operationalized as responses to a *striving list*, which requires subjects to generate between 10 and 20 written rejoinders to the stem, "I typically try to..." (Emmons, 1989, p. 96). Notably, the striving list task straddles the operant-respondent assessment continuum. Striving lists resemble operant measures in that (1) specific responses are not provided, and (2) the social incentives attached to various subject-generated responses remain undefined. On the other hand, striving lists are similar to respondent questionnaires in their invocation
of verbal, self-reflexive thought: strivings represent subjects' conceptualizations about their actions rather than their spontaneous, artless behavior itself. The full striving assessment procedure, as employed by Emmons (1989), also has subjects make a number of judgments and ratings of their strivings following list generation; the various resultant variables (e.g., valence, ambivalence, past attainment, probability of success, etc.) are, however, beyond the scope of the present discussion. Emmons has also developed a coding system that allows for the assignment of individual strivings to various thematic groupings, such as achievement, intimacy, and power. Via this assignment, idiographic strivings (e.g., "I typically try to understand others;" "I typically try to dominate in conversation."), much like idiosyncratic TAT stories, can be recategorized into nomothetic constructs (e.g., intimacy strivings, or \$ Intimacy, and power strivings, or \$ Power) and be quantified.

Much as they straddle operant and respondent measurement categories, personal strivings, when examined against the backdrop of McClelland et al.'s (1989) bi-level motivational theory, seem to occupy an interesting middle ground between implicit press and self-image. As already noted, Emmons (1989) sees individual strivings as more circumscribed instantiations of pervasive implicit dispositions. In addition to being more focused than
implicit motives, strivings are conscious, verbal, and explicit. Hence, they can be imagined as emissaries between vast, silent implicit regions and more verbal governing bodies. Strivings personalize transpersonal implicit presses, such that autochthonous motives (e.g. "Dominate at every opportunity.") now feel familiar, ego-syntonic, socially acceptable, and consistent with explicit, abstract goals (e.g., "Win the football game."). Personal strivings represent compromises or limited agreements between often discordant layers of personality.

If the above premises are correct, then personal strivings should relate to both implicit and self-attributed systems, even if the two systems are largely unrelated—or even in disharmony. Actually, Emmons and McAdams (1989) have garnered some initial, tentative support for this contention in an analysis of the intercorrelations between implicit motives (n Achievement, n Intimacy, and n Power) and their self-attributed and striving counterparts. In the case of achievement, our hypothesis was supported: significant correlations between both (1) n Achievement and s Achievement, and (2) san Achievement and s Achievement seem more robust than the obtained correlation between n Achievement and san Achievement, although the relative strengths of correlation coefficients were not analyzed statistically. In the case of power, a more definitive picture emerged.
specifically, $n$ Power - $s$ Power and $san$ Power - $s$ Power pairings yielded significant positive correlations, while the $n$ Power - $san$ Power pairing suggested an almost complete absence of relationship. In the case of intimacy, the results were less conclusive. It is clear that $n$ Intimacy and $s$ Intimacy are significantly related. Due to a low $N$ in analyses involving $san$ Nurturance (an intimacy-like construct), however, neither a significant, moderate $n$ Intimacy with $san$ Nurturance correlation nor a nonsignificant $san$ Nurturance with $s$ Intimacy correlation are particularly illuminating. In summary, then, Emmons and McAdams' (1989) analysis provides partial support for strivings' mediational role in relationships between implicit and self-attributed systems. Furthermore, a replication of their findings is clearly needed.

**Personality Abilities**

Like personal strivings, personality abilities are motive-like constructs that occupy a conceptual middle ground on the implicit/self-attributed continuum. Paulhus and Martin (1987) define a personality ability as "the degree of skill with which an individual can execute a particular social routine under optimal conditions" (p. 355). While their term will be preserved, the present study conceives personality abilities to be more akin to
motivational traits than to skills: personality abilities, as assessed in the relevant research, seem less concerned with the success of, say, dominant behaviors and more concerned with the frequency and magnitude of attempts at domination. The personality ability concept follows from Wallace's (1967) suggestion that observed personality traits, or tendencies toward displaying certain types of behavior, represent an interaction between predispositions toward trait expression and trait inhibition. In the present terminology, then, it may be that self-attributed motives are composed of two components—a "pure" motive component, or personality ability, and an inhibition component. From this vantage, the personal ability would be closely allied with implicit dispositions, as a sort of verbal-conceptual accompaniment or reflection of organismic realities. The inhibitory component, on the other hand, would be allied with the self-image and related concerns of identity-management and social propriety. In interaction, the inhibitory component, but not the personality ability component, would serve to squelch both (1) the awareness and accurate self-report of implicit motive dispositions (as with repression, denial, etc.), and (2) the enactment of such dispositions under self-conscious situations. If these theoretical speculations are correct, then, personality abilities should relate more strongly to implicit motives.
than do self-attributed motives.

In trying to separate raw personality ability from obscuring inhibition, Willerman, Turner, and Peterson (1976) have advocated the use of maximal measures. Rather than asking about the test-taker's typical behavior, maximal measures address the most extreme level of trait-related behavior that the test-taker is capable of. Standard respondent, self-report measures can be transformed into maximal measures by simply rewording the basic test question: instead of subjects being asked, "How friendly are you?," for example, they are now asked, "How friendly are you capable of being?" It is presumed that maximal measures largely circumvent response inhibition by side-stepping the issue of self-image. Maximal measures allow one to self-attribute a high degree of a personal ability without owning it (e.g., "I can be very competitive, but I am not necessarily a competitive person."). In more cognitive terms, maximal measures require a scanning of long-term memory for a most extreme exemplar of a behavioral trait expression. Motive questionnaires, on the other hand, require the invocation of abstract self-schemas.

The premise that maximal questionnaires tap a motive-like index that is relatively unconfounded with inhibitory anxiety has as yet to be addressed empirically. Maximal instructions for laboratory behavior, however, do seem to
foster the disinhibition of behavioral dispositions. Klein and Willerman (1979), for example, found that the replacement of typical instructions (i.e., "Behave as you typically would") with maximal instructions (i.e., "Be as dominant as you can") eliminated female subject's reluctances to behave dominantly toward a male: while women behaved more dominantly with female than with male confederates under typical instructions, they were equally dominant with both genders under maximal instructions. In a similar study, Turner (1983) found peers to rate socially anxious subjects as being significantly less dominant than other subjects under typical instructions. Under maximal instructions, however, peer ratings did not differ for anxious and nonanxious groups. To the extent that maximal measures have the same effect as maximal instructions for laboratory behavior, then, it appears that maximal methodologies are relatively successful in separating the effects of personality abilities from those of inhibition.

There is an additional reason to believe that maximally-assessed personality abilities will relate more strongly to implicit motives than do self-attributed motives. As is readily evident from a perusal of McClelland et al.'s (1989) paper, the implicit motive system represents, among other things, a contemporary reframing of psychodynamic conceptions of "id" and
"unconscious." This theoretical heritage is evident, for example, in descriptions of the implicit system's automatic (i.e., unconscious) functioning and orientation toward intrinsic pleasures (i.e., pleasure principle). It is also probable that, as with the psychodynamic unconscious, notions of opposition are irrelevant at the implicit level. In other words, the coexistence of "dialectical" implicit motives, like Affiliation and Autonomy, may not imply conflict or contradiction. Indeed, Atkinson (1981), in his account of implicit functioning, frames the stream of overt, spontaneous behavioral activity as reflecting the covert, unconflicted fluctuations and interactions of motive arousal levels. The consummation of one implicit aim, which is followed by a sort of motivational refractory period, allows for the nonconflictual expression of different and opposing implicit aims.

At the self-attributed level, however, opposition is a relevant concept. In fact, factor analyses of self-attributed motives suggest opposition to be a key ingredient in the conceptual glue that binds the self-image. Paulhus and Martin (1987), for example, comment that "one of the best established results in personality assessment is the circumplex structure of interpersonal traits" (p. 355); the 16 most popular motivational traits, when factor analyzed, fall into a circular array
of opposing constructs, such as hostility/nurturance and dominance/submission (Smith, 1984; Wiggins, 1979; Wiggins & Broughton, 1985). Furthermore, variation between dialectically opposed aims is for many, including many clinically-minded psychologists, related to ideas of incoherence, contradiction, splitting, and identity diffusion. The important point for the present discussion is that self-attributed personality abilities do not share self-attributed motives' grounding in an organizational rubric of opposition. Hence, they may reflect the implicit system more accurately. In fact, factor-analyzed personality abilities yield a positive manifold structure rather than a circumplex (Broughton & Paulhus, 1984): personality abilities which stand in conceptual opposition to one another show no negative correlations with one another. It seems, then, that personality abilities are again more closely aligned with implicit motives than are self-attributed motives.

Summary

The present study aims to garner support for theoretical, as opposed to methodological, explanations for operant and respondent motive measures' lack of relationship. One way to do this is to show that certain conceptually-relevant variables mediate obtained operant-respondent relationships. First, mediational roles would
be implicated if "self-consciousness variables," such as inner-directedness or other-directedness, were found to affect operant-respondent correspondence for certain people. Inner-directedness, a dispositional tendency toward focusing attention on one's inner world, should be related to increased intermotive correspondence; other-directedness, which involves an attentional focus on social demands and behavioral guidelines, should be related to decreased intermotive correspondence. Mediational roles would also be suggested if "go-between constructs," such as personal strivings and personality abilities, were shown to relate to implicit and self-attributed constructs that are unrelated to each other. In particular, personality abilities, or inhibition-free, verbal representations of organismic realities, should relate more strongly to implicit motives than do self-attributed motives. Personal strivings, or focused, verbal-conceptual instantiations of broad implicit dimensions, should relate to both implicit and self-attributed motives.

The above propositions represent the conceptual groundwork that underlies the present work's investigative hypotheses. Each posits a relationship between various constructs based upon structural considerations. However, the interrelation of motives and motive-like constructs depends as much upon content as
upon structure. Structural considerations aside, we would not expect, for example, n Intimacy to relate substantially to san Achievement, while we might expect n Power to relate to san Dominance. Before hypotheses can be formally stated, then, issues of motivational content must be addressed. It is with such matters that the next chapter is concerned.
CHAPTER IV
AGENCY AND COMMUNION

The present work is primarily concerned with the structural aspects of motivation—with the organization of motives into a bi-level system. This focal examination of social motives' structural attributes, however, occurs against an organizing backdrop of thematic contents. As a prelude to the introduction of featured motives and their measures, which occurs later in the present chapter, and to the formal statement of hypotheses, which occurs in the next chapter, this background will now be brought to center stage.

Theoretical Background

Virtually all of the specific motives and motive-like constructs employed in the present study reflect one of two broad thematic categories. These categories have been identified by Bakan (1966) as agency and communion. He writes:

Agency manifests itself in the formation of separations, isolation, alienation, aloneness, the urge to master, and the repression of thought, feeling, and impulse; communion is manifested in a sense of being at one with other organisms, a lack of separations, the lack and removal of repression, contact, openness, and union, and noncontractual cooperation. (Bakan, 1966, p. 15)
Agency and communion are two fundamental adaptational modalities that apply to all living things. Agency encompasses basic instincts toward the protection, assertion, and expansion of the self. Communion, on the other hand, is reflected in collective phenomena—phenomena of inclusion, participation and interdependence. As noted by McAdams (1988a), agency and communion are particularly pertinent to the classification of human social motives. Agentic motives involve the individual's mastery of other, and to a lesser degree of self, from a vantage of separateness. Communal motives, on the other hand, pull for empathic merger with social and perhaps intrapsychic contexts.

The concepts of agency and communion are not new. Instead, they represent timeless, archetypal clusterings of ideas that continually resurface in the theorizing of dualistically-inclined philosophers and psychological theorists (McAdams, 1988a). For example, Empedocles, a preSocratic philosopher, identified strife, or separation, and love, or union, as the root principles inherent in all movement and change (McAdams, 1988b; Russell, 1945). Not only did love and strife account for the phenomena of physics; they also accounted for the dynamics of human relationships and even history. Many centuries later, Freud reduced the gamut of human motivation to the
workings of two primal ends—eros and thanatos. Eros, like communion, aims to "combine more and more living substance into even greater quantities," (Freud, 1933, p. 140). On the other hand, thanatos, or agency, encompasses both aggression and the repetition of traumas for the sake of mastery and control, with an ultimate aim of reaching an inorganic state. Agency and communion are similarly reflected in Rank's (1936) life fear/death fear duality. For Rank, there is an innate terror inherent in emerging from symbiosis to face one's individuality; like communion, this life fear promotes social embeddedness and attachment. Furthermore, it is offset by an opposing fear of losing whatever individuality one has won, or death fear. Like agency, Rank's death fear fosters both self-protective strivings and a related distancing from the interpersonal and intrapsychic contexts. As noted by McAdams (1988a), agency and communion are also inherent in a number of more recently proposed theoretical dualisms. These include, for example, masculine and feminine sex-role orientations (Bem, 1974), interpersonal distancing positions of individuation-deindividuation and attachment-detachment (Kaplan, 1988), and developmental psychologics of independence and inclusion (Kegan, 1982), or individuation and interdependence (Gilligan, 1982).

Both agency and communion, as they apply to social motives, are captured by a few central, defining facets.
Agency's three components are separation, mastery, and domination. The separation component involves the individual's disengagement from interpersonal contexts, contexts which for others would comprise a rich life field. Agentic separation is exhibited, for example, in strivings toward autonomy and in the person's active dissociation from the opinions and values of others or of society at large. Agentic separation is further evident in a willful foregoing of strong interpersonal attachments or investments. In summary, motives toward separation foster the objectification of inner and outer reality: agentic separation informs the vital developmental process of "casting-out" or "throwing away from" that replaces contextual embeddedness with the possibility of relationships between a self and distinct social and phenomenological objects (Kegan, 1982).

While agency's separation facet fosters a distancing from context, the mastery and domination facets concern the individual's attitude toward context. More specifically, mastery involves an attitude toward the objectified self while domination represents an attitude toward objectified others. Regarding the former, agentic mastery is embodied by the heroic ego (Hillman, 1979), which separates itself from the chaos of id and establishes a reality-based dominion over it. In fact, a major criticism of Freud is that he ignored the ego's own
mastery-based motives, framing it as a victim of contradictory forces rather than a goal-seeking force in its own right (Patterson, 1986). The ego, as a conceptual embodiment of agentic mastery, finds both (1) limiting the self, as with repression, suppression, sphincter control, activity regimens, abstinence, and inhibition, and (2) pushing the self to its physical, intellectual, spiritual, and ethical limits to be inherently satisfying. Agentic mastery, then, involves both pushing personal limits, as in excelling, and limiting personal "push," as in self-control. Mastery is expressed phenomenologically in experiences of ambition, determination and effort.

Agentic domination, which represents an other-directed mirror image of self-mastery, involves the submission of the interpersonal world to personal ends. Agentic domination renders other people as both vehicles for the individual's continuing self-aggrandizement and subjects to it. The former is evidenced in activities as diverse as persuading, competing, helping, exciting, exploiting, teaching, degrading, and inspiring; the latter is evident in concerns with prestige and impression management, as well as investment in high-visibility activities such as acting, public speaking, and politics. All of these examples involve a tacit, temporary transformation of relationships between equals into relationships between superiors and inferiors (e.g.,
winner-loser, helper-helpee, film star-fan); agentic individuals gain particular pleasure from being in the superior, "one-up" social position and also from having an impact on others. While dominative motives typically receive a negative cast in contemporary American society, it is noteworthy that they can serve both benevolent-prosocial, as in teaching and leading, as well as malevolent-antisocial ends.

Like agency, communion is reflected in three central facets: unity, intimacy, and nurturance. The first of these facets is manifest in "the participation of the individual in some larger organism of which the individual is a part" (Bakan, 1966, p. 15). Unity is an orientation toward contact and connection with one's social group, reflecting an ethic of interdependence rather than independence. The unity-oriented person tends toward sociability, cooperativeness, and gregariousness, as benevolent relations with the social group become the very fabric of personal identity. Rather than the ego, then, it is the social group that provides organization, direction, and self-esteem. Unity also pulls for an unquestioning adoption of group concerns, beliefs, values, and conventions. In a sense, unity represents a voluntary, pleasurable relinquishing of individuality: self-other distinctions become blurred, as "I-ness" is subsumed by "We-ness."
Communion's second facet, intimacy, is concerned with select others rather than the social group as a whole. Intimacy, in short, represents a drive toward sharing oneself and experiencing someone else in the deepest possible sense. Deriving from the Latin term for "inner" or "inmost" (Perlman & Fehr, 1987), intimacy most centrally reflects a sharing with another of that which is inmost (McAdams, 1988a). McAdams (1988a) writes:

In communion, the vulnerable self risks even greater vulnerability by surrendering control in interpersonal relations and offering the self up as a kind of gift, awaiting the reciprocal gift-giving of the other. Bakan's communion mandates intimate self-disclosure in the presence of a listener who receives the disclosure as a gift, cherishing it as a token of an ever-developing closeness. (p. 20)

Intimacy hence represents an attraction to a special type of dyadic interpersonal relationship characterized by openness, receptivity, and reciprocity—by a non-contractual giving of oneself and receiving of other. Also encompassed by the intimacy facet are 1) a real concern for the other's well-being and 2) a surrender of any form of control over the parameters of the relationship (McAdams, 1988b). In summary, intimacy is epitomized by "being in an encounter which is perceived as an end in itself rather than (by) doing or striving to attain either a relationship or some extrinsic reward (McAdams, 1988b, p. 76). Although it is underemphasized in the literature, the intimacy facet also has a self-
reflexive aspect, as manifest in openness to experience (McCrae & Costa, 1985), regression in the service of the ego (Holt, 1970), abaissement di niveau mental (Jung, 1968), and absorption (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). In fact, measures of socially-defined communion correlate positively with a self-report measure of openness to experience (Hoffman, 1989).

Communion's final facet, nurturance, is exclusively concerned with the giving and receiving of help, where help is broadly defined to include emotional, material, physical, developmental, and social forms of aid. In Murray's (1938) terms, nurturance, as defined presently, encompasses needs for both nurturance and succorance. The former is expressed in sympathetic attempts at gratifying the needs of a helpless other: "an infant or any O (other) that is weak, disabled, tired, inexperienced, infirm, defeated, humiliated, lonely, defected, sick, mentally confused" (Murray, 1938, p. 184). Hence, nurturance involves the response to an empathic perception of another's need, rather than indiscriminate helping. Murray's succorance, on the other hand, involves wishes to "have one's needs gratified by the sympathetic aid of an allied O:" "to always have a supporter" (p. 182). From a truly communal perspective, the distinction between giving and receiving help is actually irrelevant, as communion is predicated on a sort of blurring of boundaries between
self and other, mine and yours.

It should be clear at this point that agency and communion stand in conceptual opposition to one another. However, as recognized by Bakan (1966), Jung (1971), Bem (1981), Kaplan (1988), and others, the two dimensions represent independent human potentials rather than poles of a single thematic dimension. Actually, levels of agency and communion interact so as to either mitigate and transform each other's effects or facilitate one or the other's pure expression. Agency mitigated by communion, for example, loses its malevolent, destructive qualities (Bakan, 1966). On the other hand, unmitigated communion is related to a dependent personality style, and unmitigated agency is reflected in an aggressive personality style (Hoffman, 1989). A lack of both agency and communion, finally, is related to the schizoid personality style, with its acquisitive and interpersonal apathies. Agency and communion, then, are separate dimensions whose interactions account for different personological patterns. Actually, some recent factor analytic research suggests that agency's empirical opposite is concerned with anxiety and a lack of confidence rather than with communion. Communion's opposite, furthermore, seems to be an apathetic, unresponsive cold-heartedness (Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990).
Agentic Constructs and Measures

TAT Power Motivation. Winter (1973) has developed a TAT measure of n Power, which is a "recurrent preference or readiness for experiences of having impact and feeling strong...vis-a-vis the environment" (McAdams, 1988b, p. 84). As a facet of implicit agency, power motivation captures the aforementioned domination facet. Winter and Stewart (1978), for example, write, "the essence of power is the ability to make the material world and the social world conform to one's own image or plan for it" (p. 400). Indeed, a drive toward domination is reflected in each of n Power's four defining themes: conquest, exploitative relationships, organization, and prestige. Conquest represents the urge to dominate in its most primitive, unveneered form—in the urge to overpower through patently aggressive acts. Males high in n Power, for example, participate in directly competitive sports significantly more often than others and also engage in more frequent aggressive acts, such as insulting store clerks and yelling in traffic (Boyatzis, 1973; Winter, 1973). Similarly, n Power is positively correlated with frequency of reported arguments in working-class males (McClelland, 1975). Power motivation's second defining theme, exploitative relationships, involves the use of friendships and romantic relationships as vehicles for further domination. In the realm of friendship, men and
women high in $n$ Power tend to adopt an active, assertive, controlling role and to prefer large groups to more intimate dyads (McAdams, Healy, & Krause, 1986). In men, $n$ Power also correlates positively with number of sexual partners (Winter, 1973) and with disclosure of details of sex life (McClelland, 1975). More generally, high-$n$ Power men, like the literary character, Don Juan, have an eat-them-up-and-spit-them-out orientation toward love relationships, as evidenced in a tendency to move from one serious relationship to another in rapid succession.

Organization and prestige, $n$ Power's third and fourth defining themes, represent more sublimated expressions of agentic domination. In the case of the former, social domination is sought through the occupation of socially-sanctioned power positions. For example, $n$ Power correlates positively with occupation of leadership positions in various organizations by both college students (Winter, 1973) and working-class adults (McClelland, Wanner, & Vanneman, 1972), and with preferences for careers that involve the direction of others' behaviors (Winter & Stewart, 1978). Fodor and Smith (1982), furthermore, found high $n$ Power individuals to foster an authoritarian, discussion-inhibiting atmosphere when appointed leader of a problem-solving group. Power motivation also leads to attempts at social domination via alliance with consensually-defined signs of
power. Along these lines, n Power is related to both the furnishing of personal dorm rooms with prestige possessions, such as televisions, framed posters, and tape players, and number of credit cards carried on one's person (Boyatzis, 1973; Winter, 1973).

**TAT Achievement Motivation.** N Achievement, which is the most extensively researched of the TAT social motives, is defined as "a concern with doing things better, with surpassing standards of excellence" (McClelland et al., 1953, p. 228). This implicit disposition, then, involves a rendering of the self as a vehicle for agentic assertion and expansion, such that power or potency is experienced through personal accomplishment rather than through social domination; n Achievement is differentiated from n Power, then, in that the former concerns personal performance while the latter concerns social impact (Veroff, 1982). From another perspective, n Achievement can be seen as a more socialized derivative of n Power, where the individual seeks to dominate symbolically, by surpassing internalized societal standards in a benevolent, prosocial manner, rather than literally, by overwhelming others in an adversarial manner. The excitement of power-related activity is replaced by the satisfaction of a job well done. Taken in tandem, these considerations suggest n Achievement to be a relatively pure marker for agency's
mastery facet.

A substantial body of research supports \textit{n} Achievement's contentual grounding in agentic mastery. In particular, \textit{n} Achievement has been repeatedly linked to a gravitation toward, striving at, and success in academic and business endeavors. In particular, achievement-oriented college students adopt a performance-oriented stance toward their schoolwork, such that grades take-on special significance. Andrews (1966), for example, found positive correlations between \textit{n} Achievement and both (1) investigating course requirements prior to registration, and (2) discussing exams with instructors before and after exam administration. \textit{n} Achievement assessed during the college years also predicts involvement in the business world 14 years later (McClelland, 1965). In fact, \textit{n} Achievement has repeatedly been found to predict involvement and success with entrepreneurial activity, which places a premium on personal performance, control, and responsibility (Koestner & McClelland, 1990). As an example, Indian farmers (i.e., agricultural entrepreneurs) high in \textit{n} Achievement are more likely than others to both experiment with innovative farming approaches (Sinha & Mehta, 1972) and to show enhanced productivity over time (Singh, 1979).

Several studies have also examined \textit{n} Achievement's relation to "doing better" in social and even physical
domains. High-achievement children receive higher ratings than others on social cooperativeness and general likeability (Feld, 1967; Lifshitz, 1974; Teevan, Diffenderfer, & Greenfeld, 1986). In adults, achievement is related to marital adjustment (McAdams & Vaillant, 1982; Veroff & Feld 1970) and peers' perceptions of the individual as successful in life, as well as work (Kaltenback & McClelland, 1958). Finally, achievement is related to higher self-ratings of personal health (Veroff, 1982); it also predicts cardiac health, 30 years subsequent to motive assessment (McClelland, 1979).

Various mediators and mitigators have been identified in the relationship between achievement and performance. Furthermore, each of these factors supports achievement's linking with a specific behavioral, as opposed to task, incentive, thus supporting achievement's structural grounding in the implicit motivational system. As already alluded, the presumed behavioral incentive for achievement is an innately pleasurable sense of "doing better." This presumption is supported by numerous studies linking achievement to a preference for activities of moderate challenge (Atkinson, 1958; Clark & McClelland, 1956; Karabenick and Youseff, 1968; McClelland et al., 1989; Raynor & Entin, 1982). Apparently, moderately challenging activities maximize the probability of experiencing the emotional-behavioral
incentive, as neither too-easy nor too-difficult tasks afford a sense of having accomplished something or improved performance (Koestner & McClelland, 1990). Other studies have identified self-determination and performance feedback as further preconditions for the expression of achievement in behavior. Extrinsic incentives and controls, such as money (Atkinson, 1958; Douvan, 1956) or promptings to hurry (Schroth, 1988), eliminate achievement's performance-enhancing effects. This makes sense theoretically, in that social pressures (1) tacitly reframe the task in an incentive-irrelevant manner, and (2) de-emphasize personal responsibility for outcome (Koestner & McClelland, 1990). Performance feedback on the other hand, has been shown to enhance achievement's behavior-predicting power (Bartmann, 1965; French, 1958). Again this finding is consistent with theory, as knowing whether or not one has "done better" is essential to the postulated behavioral incentive for achievement behavior.

Autobiographical Agency. Unlike TAT measures of achievement and power, which only capture a given facet of agency, McAdams' (1990) story-based autobiographical agency measure taps all relevant facets of agency, or agency. In fact, the measure was explicitly designed with Bakan's (1966) formulations in mind. Like TAT measures, the autobiographical agency
measure relies on the thematic coding of subject-produced stories. In this case, however, the stories represent accounts of nuclear episodes from the test-taker's life narrative, rather than stories told to vague pictures of interpersonal events. Although McAdams' formal system calls for the scoring of ten nuclear episodes, the present study examines only two of these--the earliest memory and the peak experience. These two were chosen because of their conceptual fit with the previously-advanced notions of implicit motives. Peak experiences are defined in McAdams' (1990) Guided Autobiography packet as a moments or episodes in the individual's life "in which he or she feels a sense of transcendence, uplifting, inner joy or peace, excitement, or some other highly positive emotional experience." As such, the peak experience seems an especially apt medium for implicit motive assessment, as implicit motives are purportedly built upon, and organized around, pleasurable affective experiences (McClelland et al., 1989). Early memories, on the other hand, are thought to represent symbolic expressions of foundational object relations paradigms. Mayman (1968), for example, comments that early memories are expressions of important fantasies around which a person's character-structure is organized....the themes which bind together the dramatis personae of a person's early memories define nuclear relationship-patterns (i.e., patterns of social motivation) which are likely to repeat themselves in a wide range of other life situations (p. 304)
Similarly, Saul et al. (1956) note that early memories "reveal, probably more clearly than any other single psychological datum, the central core of each person's psychodynamics (and) chief motivations" (p. 235). In conclusion, there is good reason to expect both peak experiences and early memories to be appropriate vessels for implicit motivational themes.

At present, McAdams' autobiographical coding system remains an experimental measure; relevant empirical validity data on autobiographical agency scores' suitability as operationalizations of n Agency does not yet exist. The coding system does, however, boast a high degree of face validity. Specifically, peak experiences and early memories are scored for the presence or absence of four agentic themes: strength/impact, status/recognition, competence/accomplishment, and autonomy/independence. The strength/impact category reflects particular aspects of both agentic domination (i.e., trying to have an impact on others) and agentic mastery (i.e., trying to expand the self's strength in physical, mental, moral and/or emotional domains). Status/recognition and competence/accomplishment, furthermore, capture those aspects of agentic domination and mastery not covered by strength/impact. Status/recognition involves attempts to "attain a high level of
social standing vis-a-vis others" (McAdams, 1990, p. 5),
while competence/accomplishment addresses attempts at
pushing one's personal limits, or excelling. Lastly,
McAdams' autonomy/independence category is a clear,
straightforward operationalization of agency's separation
facet.

Bem Sex Role Inventory Masculinity Scale. In a
comprehensive review of numerous popular self-report
scales, Wiggins and Broughton (1985) identified the Bem
Sex Role Inventory's (BSRI's) Masculinity scale as the
best measure of "ambitious-dominant traits" (p. 39), or in
our terms, san Agency. Furthermore, analysis of the
scale's 20 self-descriptive adjectives suggests a
comprehensive and relatively even covering of agency's
three defining facets. Seven of the items deal with
agentic separation (sample items: "independent;" "self-
sufficient,"") while another seven reflect agentic
domination (sample items: "act as a Leader;" "forceful"").
The remaining five scale items address assorted aspects of
agency's mastery facet (sample items: "ambitious," "athletic").

Studies relevant to the BSRI Masculinity scale's
validity are restricted to examinations of masculine sex-
typed subjects, or subjects who score both high on BSRI
Masculinity and low on the BSRI's Femininity scale. Bem's
(1981) definition of masculine sex-typing bears striking
resemblance to McClelland et al.'s (1989) more general formulations of self-attributed motives. Specifically, the masculine sex-typed individual is someone motivated to keep her or his behavior consistent with an idealized image of masculinity, a goal that she or he presumably accomplishes both by selecting behaviors and attributes that enhance the image and by avoiding behaviors and attributes that violate the image. (Bem, 1981, p. 4).

The present paper's exclusive consideration of masculine sex-typed subjects, rather than of all subjects scoring high on BSRI masculinity, follows from Bem's (1981) warning that androgenous individuals (i.e., people who score high on both BSRI masculinity and femininity) are not necessarily high on san Agency; instead, they are usually people for whom sex-role distinctions are not salient. Androgenous people, in other words, do not construe themselves and their implicit impulses based on sex-role constructs. Instead, they exhibit a behavioral and situational flexibility (some have called this inconsistency) that belies a lack of investment in being consistently masculine or feminine.

Research on BSRI Masculinity, or more accurately, masculine sex-typing, supports both the construct's structural basis in the self-attributed system and its contentual basis in agency. Several studies have examined masculine sex-typing's effect on the processing of verbal, self-conceptual information. Masculine sex-typing is
related both to enhanced recall of agentic self-descriptive adjectives and to enhanced access to episodic memories supportive of agentic self-ascribed traits (Markus, Crane, Berntein, & Siladi, 1982; Mills, 1983). Masculine sex-typing also affects processing speed for identity-consistent, or agentic, and identity-inconsistent, or communal, descriptors: masculine sex-typed people take significantly less time to endorse agentic self-descriptive adjectives than to endorse communal self-descriptive adjectives; they also take less time to identify inapplicable communal adjectives as such than to identify inapplicable agentic adjectives (Markus et al., 1982). Following exposure to a masculine identity threat, masculine sex-typed individuals rate themselves as significantly more masculine than do masculine sex-typed controls or androgenous subjects (Babl, 1979). Taken together, the above findings suggest BSRI-assessed masculine sex-typing to tap an investment in both (1) maintaining and presenting an agentic self-image, and (2) avoiding or denying potential communal attributes inconsistent with this self-image.

Numerous studies have also linked masculine sex-typing to agentic behavior (Bem, 1981). Bem (1975), for example, found masculine sex-typed individuals to display an agentic separation from the opinions of peers. Specifically, masculine sex-typed subjects' ratings of
cartoons' funniness were relatively unaffected by (bogus) information as to others' ratings. As another example, Bem and Lenney (1976) had subjects choose 30 behaviors from a list of 60 agentic, communal, and neutral options, informing them that they would subsequently be photographed engaging in these 30 activities. Masculine sex-typed subjects evidenced significantly more avoidance of communal behavioral options than did others. Masculine sex-typed individuals also display significantly more aggression than do others, where "aggression" is operationalized as the average magnitude of shocks administered to a bogus opponent in a competitive shock paradigm (Hoppe, 1979). Kaplan and Sedney (1980) have criticized studies like those above for their artificiality, noting that BSRI validational studies are typically conducted in "high self-conscious" situations. From the present perspective, however, BSRI masculine sex-typing's apparent predictive restriction to agentic behaviors in self-conscious situations enhances the instrument's validity as a measure of san Agency.

A maximal rephrasing of the BSRI masculinity scale will be used to assess agentic personal abilities, or a Agency. Specifically, each agentic adjective from the BSRI scale will be embedded in the stem, "How _____ are you capable of being?" As with the standard BSRI, subjects will rate each of these stems on a seven-point
Likert scale (1 = Not at all capable; 7 = Extremely capable). This is a purely experimental measure for which no prior validational research exists. It does, however, share the BSRI Masculinity scale's face validity as a measure of agency.

**Agentic Adjective Checklist (ACL) scales.** A second measure of agency to be employed in the present study is actually a composite measure of the ACL's Achievement and Dominance scales. These scales were chosen for two reasons. First, the two scales, taken in tandem, cover the ambitious-dominant factor's, or agency's, full breadth (Wiggins & Broughton (1985). Second, they share a common heritage with TAT and autobiographical motive measures—both are based in Murray's (1938) need formulations. The ACL Achievement scale is expressly concerned with agency's mastery facet, assessing a self-attributed need "to strive to be outstanding in pursuits of socially recognized significance" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 8). Gough and Heilbrun (1983) expand on this definition thusly:

> The high-scorer on Ach is a hard-working, goal-directed individual, who is determined to do well and usually does. The motivation to succeed seems to lie less in competitive drives than in an insistent need to live up to high and socially commendable criteria of performance.  

(p. 8)

The ACL's Dominance scale, on the other hand, captures a self-attributed need "to seek and maintain a role as leader in groups, or to be influential and controlling in
individual relationships" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 8), or agentic domination. Adjectival descriptors with a high positive loading on ACL Dominance include aggressive, dominant, assertive, forceful, and stubborn. Actually, one third of ACL Dominance's items concern agentic separation, rather than dominance. In fact, these items are also included on the ACL's Autonomy scale. ACL Dominance, then, concerns a self-reported need to "act independently of others or of social values and expectations" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 12) as well as a need to dominate. This truism is reflected in Gough and Heilbrun's description of the high-scorer on ACL Dominance as someone who is "little...inhibited by the disapproval or opposition of others" (p. 9).

Validity data for the ACL scales comes from two sources: peer ratings and correlations with similar constructs from other psychological instruments. As regards the former, ACL Dominance is positively correlated with observers ratings of masculinity (i.e., robust, self-sufficient, and strong) and dominance (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983). For women, ACL Achievement is also positively related to dominance ratings. In a correlational analysis of the ACL and Gough's (1987) California Psychological Inventory (CPI), Gough and Heilbrun (1983) found both ACL Achievement and ACL Dominance to correlate positively and significantly with the CPI's Intellectual Efficiency
(i.e., persistent, self-motivated, and economical) and Dominance scales. Additionally, ACL Achievement related to CPI Achievement via Conformance, while ACL Dominance was related to CPI Capacity for Status (i.e., ambitious, independent) and Social Presence (i.e., self-assured, forthright). In addition to supporting ACL Dominance's and ACL Achievement's, validities, the above nomological net also suggests a good deal of Dominance-Achievement overlap. Hence, the general validity of the superordinate agency construct is supported as well.

Agentic strivings. Emmons' (1988) manual for the thematic coding of personal strivings includes three striving categories concerned with agency—Self-Sufficiency/Independence, Power, and Achievement. In fact, each of these dimensions represents a relatively pure measure of one of agency's three facets. Self-Sufficiency/Independence is concerned with agentic separation. Scoring criteria include "Concern with being an individual, separated, autonomous from others," and "Concern with seeking, establishing, or maintaining independence" (Emmons, 1988, p. 25). Examples of category-relevant strivings include "Be myself and not do things to please others," "Be different," and "Keep my thoughts independent of others" (Emmons, 1990, pp. 25-26). Power, on the other hand, captures agentic domination, encompassing strivings for social impact, social control,
status, notoriety, winning in competition with others, and indiscriminant helping. Typical instantiations of \(\text{\textbullet} \text{Power} \) are "Be the dominant sibling in a family of six," "Impress people," "Act as therapist to friends," "Entertain others," and "Show that I'm superior to others" (Emmons, 1988, p. 16). While \(\text{\textbullet} \text{Power} \) involves dominating others via competition, \(\text{\textbullet} \text{Achievement} \) is more concerned with agentic mastery, or competing with self-imposed standards. Scoring criteria for \(\text{\textbullet} \text{Achievement} \) involve meeting goals, excelling, or expending effort; sample strivings include "Set high goals for myself and try to reach them," and "Put my best effort into everything I do" (Emmons, 1988, p. 5).

Although some validational research has been conducted on various striving variables (for a review, see Emmons, 1989), Emmons and McAdams' (1989) aforementioned study is the only one to examine individual agentic strivings. While the results have already been presented as supportive of strivings' structural attributes, these same results also corroborate the just-discussed content validity data, at least for \(\text{\textbullet} \text{Power} \) and \(\text{\textbullet} \text{Achievement} \). Specifically, both striving categories were found to correlate positively and significantly with more well-validated markers of their agentic facet domains: \(\text{\textbullet} \text{Achievement} \) correlated with TAT-assessed \(\text{\textbullet} \text{Achievement} \) and PRF-assessed \(\text{san} \) \text{Achievement}, while \(\text{\textbullet} \text{Power} \) was related to
TAT-assessed n Power and PRF Dominance.

Communal Constructs and Measures

TAT Intimacy Motivation. McAdams (1979) has developed a TAT motive measure of n Intimacy that is explicitly derived from Bakan's (1966) reflections on communion. N Intimacy is defined as "a recurrent preference or readiness for experiences of warm, close, and communicative exchange" (McAdams, 1988b, p. 77). As such, it represents an orientation to dyadic interpersonal relationships characterized by reciprocal self disclosure: one's innermost self is surrendered or offered to another, and reciprocally, the other is warmly received through careful listening.

Validational research both expands on n Intimacy's nature and further illustrates its grounding in communion's intimacy facet. Employing a beeper methodology, McAdams and Constantian (1983) found college students high in n Intimacy to spend significantly more time involved in conversation and letter-writing than others. Furthermore, n Intimacy correlated positively and substantially with percentage of random beepings during which students where concerned with interpersonally-oriented thoughts; it also correlated negatively with percentage of interacting episodes in which students wished to be alone or not interacting. McAdams and Powers
105

(1981) have also linked Intimacy to a thematic clustering in thought and action. High-intimacy individuals engage in significantly more discrete behaviors indicative of merger, such as physical proximity behavior and "we" references. They also emphasize communal themes—themes of reciprocal dialogue, surrender of control, and positive affect, when asked to structure their own psychodramas. Finally, high-intimacy individuals tend toward a communal presentation of self, as reflected in positive correlations with peer ratings on communal adjectives (i.e., sincere, loving, and likable). In two distinct studies, then, Intimacy has been linked to a communal ordering in both spontaneous thought and operant behavior.

A number of additional studies attest to Intimacy's validity and breadth as a facet measure of communion. Coding videotaped, open-ended interviews, McAdams, Jackson, and Kirshnit (1984) found high-intimacy individuals to engage in eye contact, smiling, and laughing—all nonverbal behaviors aimed at maintaining or bolstering contact and warmth. These same persons' interview accounts of friendship episodes also evidenced a comparative emphasis on self disclosure and adopting the listener role with friends. Additionally, intimacy has been shown to relate to information processing: high-intimacy individuals are selectively attentive to
communion-related facial cues (McAdams, 1979) and selectively recall episodic memories tinged with communal interpersonal themes (McAdams, 1982b). Finally, McAdams and Vaillant (1982) found intimacy to predict adult males' marital satisfaction 17 years after motive assessment.

**Autobiographical Communion.** McAdams' (1990) autobiographical coding system, as previously discussed in the context of agency (see p. 93), also includes a highly face valid, four-category thematic coding system for communion. In this case, the categories are unity/togetherness, love/friendship, dialogue/sharing, and care/support. As in the case of McAdams' four agentic categories, these four communal dimensions address the full range of implicit communal social motives, or communion, in a comprehensive way. The unity/togetherness category encompasses allusions to the blurring of boundaries between self and social context, and as such, marks communion's unity facet. The love/friendship and dialogue/sharing categories respectively involve the experience of "positive affect as the result of an interpersonal relationship" (McAdams, 1990, p. 11) and an actor's engagement in reciprocal, noninstrumental social interaction. In tandem, then, the two categories cover communion's intimacy facet. Care/support, the autobiographical communion system's
final thematic category, reflects communion's nurturance facet, involving either the giving or receiving of help, support, or comfort.

**Bem Sex Role Inventory Femininity Scale.** After factor analytically reviewing several of personality psychology's most popular self-report trait scales, Wiggins and Broughton (1985) judged the BSRI Femininity scale to be the "best" (i.e., contentually most accurate) measure of "warm-agreeable interpersonal traits" (p. 39), or communion. The scale's thematic fit with communion can be further fine-tuned via observance of Pedhazur and Tetenbaum's (1979) factor analytically informed recommendations. Specifically, they advocate the elimination of six communion-inconsistent items from the Femininity scale and the addition of five communion-consistent items from the BSRI's 20 neutral, "filler" items. The resultant 19-item, revised BSRI Femininity Scale is both thematically and empirically more homogenous (Costos, 1986). In fact, content analysis of the scale suggests a broad covering of communion's various facets. The intimacy facet is represented by adjectives that either address the behavioral-affective concomitants of closeness (e.g., "warm;" "affectionate") or imply a concern with relational honesty and empathy (e.g., "sincere;" "understanding"). Other items address the friendly, prosocial orientation that accompanies communal
union (e.g., "cheerful," "friendly") and the caring, supportive stance of communal nurturance (e.g., "eager to soothe hurt feelings;" sympathetic).

The distinction between sex-roles and androgyny advanced in the context of BSRI Masculinity applies to BSRI Femininity as well. Hence, the evidence supporting BSRI Femininity's validity as a measure of san Communion will be restricted to data on feminine sex-typed individuals. Some of this data links feminine sex-typing with self-schematic processes. Feminine sex-typed people exhibit enhanced recall for both recently-presented communal self-descriptors and episodic memories that support their espoused communal identities (Markus et al., 1982). Additionally, feminine sex-typing increases the speed with which individuals can identify identity-consistent descriptors as such and also deny identity-inconsistent descriptors. Feminine sex-typed individuals endorse identity-consistent communal descriptors faster than noncommunal identity-consistent adjectives; they also deny identity-inconsistent agentic descriptors more quickly than other identity-inconsistent descriptors (Markus et al., 1982; Mills, 1983). Feminine sex-typing, then, seems related to a schematic "pocket of certainty" concerning an espoused communal persona and denied agentic attributes.

Feminine sex-typing also has a number of correlates
in the domain of communal choice behavior. When given a choice between various activities, for example, feminine sex-typed individuals spend more time engaged in a nurturant activity (i.e., interacting with a kitten) and also enjoy the nurturant activity more than masculine sex-typed people (Bem, 1975). Feminine sex-typing is also related to an avoidance of agentic activity options when individuals are presented with a variety of activities to choose from (Bem & Lenney, 1976). As a final example, feminine sex-typed individuals choose communal (traditional) career interests over agentic (non-traditional) ones on a career preference questionnaire (Clarey & Sanford, 1982).

As in the case of the BSRI Masculinity scale, a rephrased version of the revised BSRI Femininity scale will be employed to assess communal personal abilities, or Communion. Each of the scale's communal adjectives will be inserted into the stem, "How ______ are you capable of being?," and subjects will rate each sentence's self-relevance on a seven-point Likert scale. This experimental measure is unresearched. By virtue of its derivation from the BSRI Femininity scale, however, it does have appreciable content validity as a measure of communion.

Communal Adjective Checklist (ACL) scales. A second measure of san Communion employed in the present study
involves the combination of the Murray need-derived ACL Nurturance and ACL Intraception scales into a composite measure. The choice of these two scales stems largely from Wiggins and Broughton's (1985) identification of both as zero-order correlates of the warm-agreeable, or communal, interpersonal trait dimension. ACL Nurturance is defined as a need "to engage in behaviors that provide material or emotional benefits to others" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983). While the scale is expressly concerned only with communion's nurturance facet, however, it, upon closer examination, appears to involve union and intimacy facets as well. Regarding the former, the high scorer on ACL Nurturance "appears to like people; to have a cooperative, unaffected, and tactful social manner" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 10). Furthermore, the intimacy facet is suggested by descriptions of the high-nurturance individual as someone who both "moves toward people, rather than away from them (and) attempts to understand others" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1980, p. 10), and "has warmth...(and) the capacity for close relationships" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 10).

Where ACL Nurturance is at least predominantly concerned with the provision of material and emotional benefits to others, ACL Intraception is more concerned with communion's intimacy facet. Specifically, ACL Intraception concerns a self-attributed need "to
understand one's own behavior or the behavior of others" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983, p. 10); hence, Intraception concerns intimacy in both its interpersonal and intrapsychic manifestations. Analysis of actual scale content corroborates this conclusion: 50 percent of the items are concerned with a humane, communal interpersonal orientation (sample items: considerate, forgiving, sensitive, tolerant), while another 20 percent address an openness to experience (sample items: imaginative, reflective, insightful). The remaining scale items, which involve logicality and foresightedness, are unrelated to communion.

Only limited validity data is available for the ACL's Intraception and Nurturance scales. At least in the case of women, ACL Nurturance correlates significantly and positively with observer's ratings on femininity; "femininity" in this case was operationalized as a behavioral manner that is "receptive, responsive, and sympathetic" (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983). Nurturance is also positively related to a few communal CPI constructs, such as Good Impression (i.e., an orientation toward pleasing others rather than asserting the self), Communality (i.e., focused on "fitting in" with the group and being "average"), Socialization (i.e., ready to conform comfortably to societal guidelines; men only) and Tolerance (i.e., tolerant of alternate beliefs and values;
women only). Like ACL Nurturance, ACL Intraception is also positively correlated with CPI Good Impression, Communality (women only), Socialization (men only), and Tolerance. It is additionally related to CPI Sociability (i.e., friendliness) and Hogan's (1969) Empathy Scale (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983).

Communal Strivings. Two striving categories from Emmons' (1988) coding system, § Intimacy and § Interpersonal, connote aspects of communion. These will now be discussed sequentially. Five of the six scoring categories for § Intimacy are concerned with strivings toward empathic, euthymic, reciprocal, communicative relationships with select others. As such, they capture communion's intimacy facet. The sixth scoring category for § Intimacy, which concerns loyalty and responsibility toward the social group, seems more reflective of communion's unity facet. Sample intimate strivings include "Stay close to Pam," "Be respectful to everyone," and "Try to be a good listener," (Emmons, 1988, pp 13-14). Furthermore, § Intimacy correlates positively and significantly with n Intimacy, a well-validated measure of communion's intimacy facet (Emmons & McAdams, 1989). To the degree that Emmons' long list of sample intimate strivings is a representative one, it appears that § Intimacy's single, unity-based scoring category accounts for a disproportionate amount of the actual intimate
strivings that people produce. Furthermore, items concerning nurturant helping also appear with some frequency. Intimacy, then, may be best construed as a composite intimacy-unity-nurturance measure.

The Interpersonal category includes all strivings that concern others rather than the self. Unlike other striving categories, then, Interpersonal addresses the object, or direction, of the striving rather than the striving's specific content. Contentually agentic strivings, such as "dominate in arguments with others," can still be scored in this (purportedly) communal category. The inclusion of this dimension in the present study is based on the theoretical assumption that the proportion of other-referent to self-referent strivings provides a rough index of communion's unity facet: to the extent that strivings reflect integrations of the self, as James (1890) and Rank (1936) would agree, then a high score on Interpersonal suggests a self with a social, rather than personal locus. As already noted, this social locus of the self is the very crux of communion's union facet. Tentative support for Interpersonal's communal nature comes from its modest, positive correlation with Intimacy (Emmons & McAdams, 1989).

Summary

All of the motive and motive-like constructs employed
in the present study are thematically grounded in either agency or communion, both of which represent exceedingly broad contentual clusterings. Both agency and communion can be reduced to three defining facets or themes: separation, mastery, and domination, and unity, intimacy, and nurturance. The specific constructs and related measures employed in the present study cover all three agentic and communal facets at the implicit, striving, and self-attributed levels (see Table 1). Implicit agency, or \( \text{Implicit Agency} \), is connoted by McAdams' (1990) autobiographical agency measure, TAT \( n \text{Power} \), and TAT \( n \text{Achievement} \), while communion, or \( \text{Communion} \), is assessed by both McAdams' autobiographical communion measure and TAT \( n \text{Intimacy} \). At the respondent level, agency, or \( \text{San Agency} \), and communion, or \( \text{San Communion} \), are each measured with the BSRI and ACL. Both the BSRI Masculinity scale and the combined ACL Achievement and Dominance scales cover agency's three facets. Similarly, communion is comprehensively covered by both BSRI Femininity and the ACL Nurturance/ACL Intraception composite. Finally, one striving construct is included for each of agency's facets. These striving-facet pairings are as follows: \( s \) Self-Sufficiency/agentic separation, \( s \) Power/agentic domination, and \( s \) Achievement/agentic mastery. Communion is represented at the striving level by \( s \) Intimacy and \( s \) Interpersonal.
Table 1.—Classification of Agentic and Communal Motive Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive Variables</th>
<th>Agentic Facets</th>
<th>Communal Facets</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>Mas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strivings</td>
<td>$n$ Ach</td>
<td>$n$ Pow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Attributed</td>
<td>BSRI-M</td>
<td>BSRI-M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motives</td>
<td>ACL AG</td>
<td>ACL AG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Parentheses indicate a secondary covering of the facet area. Sep = Separation facet; Mas = Mastery facet; Dom = Domination facet; Int = Intimacy facet; Uni = Unity facet; Nur = Nurturance facet; Bio AG = Autobiographical Agency; Bio Cm = Autobiographical Communion; $n$ Ach = TAT-assessed $n$ Achievement; $n$ Pow = TAT-assessed $n$ Power; $n$ Int = TAT-assessed $n$ Intimacy; $s$ Ind = $s$ Self-Sufficiency/Independence; $s$ Ach = $s$ Achievement; $s$ Pow = $s$ Power; $s$ Inter = $s$ Interpersonal; $s$ Int = $s$ Intimacy; BSRI-M = BSRI Masculinity; BSRI-F = BSRI Femininity; ACL AG = ACL Agency; ACL CM = ACL Communion.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESES

The present study seeks support for construct-based, as opposed to psychometric, explanations for operant and respondent motive measures' lack of relationship. There are in fact numerous reasons why implicit and self-attributed motives should be normatively misaligned. Specifically, the two types of motive differ from each other in terms of operational mode, domain of behavioral influence, behavioral incentives, and developmental origins. Implicit motives are affect-based schemata that automatically influence spontaneous behavior and respond to behavioral incentives; self-attributed motives are conscious, verbal schemata that influence choice behavior in the face of social incentives. Furthermore, implicit motives stem from early, preverbal affective experiences, while self-attributed motives develop somewhat later, via internalization of verbalized parental/societal values.

While implicit and self-attributed motives comprise distinct motivational systems that need not be in accord, certain factors should nonetheless mediate intermotive relationships---if the whole implicit/self-attributed
framework is valid. First, inner-directedness, a tendency to focus attention on one's inner world, should relate to increased intermotive correspondence. Second, other-directedness, a tendency to focus attention on social demands and guidelines, should result in decreased intermotive correspondence. Third, high inner-directedness and low other-directedness should interact to produce a particularly high degree of intermotive correspondence. Finally, personality abilities and personal strivings should relate to implicit and self-attributed motives in specific ways: personality abilities should relate more substantially to operant motives than do self-attributed motives, while personal strivings should relate to both implicit and self-attributed motives.

(For a summary of the reasoning informing the above propositions, see Chapter III).

The above ideas are restated below as formal investigative hypotheses. For each proposition, two hypotheses are advanced— one for agentic motives and one for communal motives. Agentic motives are thematically organized around separation, mastery, and domination, while communal motives share a thematic basis in unity, intimacy, and nurturance.

1a. Increased inner-directedness will be related to increased correspondence between operant-agentic and respondent-agentic measures.
1b. Increased inner-directedness will be related to increased correspondence between operant-communal and respondent-communal measures.

2a. Decreased other-directedness will be related to increased correspondence between operant-agentic and respondent-agentic measures.

2b. Decreased other-directedness will be related to increased correspondence between operant-communal and respondent-communal measures.

3a. Subjects high in inner-directedness and low in other-directedness will show a higher degree of agentic operant-respondent correspondence than other subjects; subjects low in inner-directedness and high in other directedness will show a lower degree of agentic operant-respondent correspondence than other subjects.

3b. Subjects high in inner-directedness and low in other-directedness will show a higher degree of communal operant-respondent correspondence than other subjects; subjects low in inner-directedness and high in other directedness will show a lower degree of communal operant-respondent correspondence than other subjects.

4a. Agentic personality abilities, tapped via maximal measures, will relate more strongly to operant-agentic measures than do respondent-
agentic measures.

4b. Communal personality abilities, tapped via maximal measures, will relate more strongly to operant-communal measures than do respondent-communal measures.

5a. Agentic personal strivings should relate to both operant-agentic and respondent-agentic measures, even if these measures do not relate to each other.

5b. Communal personal strivings should relate to both operant-communal and respondent-communal measures, even if these measures do not relate to each other.
CHAPTER VI

METHOD

Subjects

A sample of 133 undergraduate students was studied. All subjects were students in introductory psychology courses at a medium-sized urban midwestern university. Subjects received class credit in exchange for their participation. Two subjects from this overall sample were eliminated following their giving obvious misinformation on the demographics sheet (i.e., reporting their ages as 106 and 95). Of the remaining 131 subjects, 67 (51%) were female and 64 (49%) were male.

Procedure and Measures

Subjects were run in groups of 15-20 in a single session lasting 1-3/4 hours. In all sessions, the same, single experimenter was present. At the beginning of the session, subjects were informed, "Today you will be taking a number of psychological measures." After 1) reading and signing a statement of informed consent and 2) entering their age and gender on a demographics sheet, subjects were administered the TAT following standard procedures for group administration (McAdams, 1979; Winter, 1973).
This consists of 6 pictures projected on a screen for 15 seconds each. After each picture, subjects have 5 minutes to write an imaginative story based on the picture.

Upon completion of the TAT, all subjects were given an initial test battery, along with the instructions:

This packet contains a number of paper-and-pencil measures. When you are done with this packet, please raise your hand. I will then bring you a second packet which you will have the remainder of the session to complete. Finally, I would like to underscore that you may notice some similarities between various measures that you take today. Despite this, please try to answer each item on its own terms only, and do not worry about your previous responses to similar items on other measures.

The comment in these instructions regarding item similarity was meant to discourage mechanical reproduction of BSRI responses on the maximal modification of the BSRI (B-MAX). At the end of the testing session, subjects were appropriately debriefed.

The first test battery consisted of the following measures, listed in order of their appearance in the packet:

(1) Peak Experience and Early Memory. Peak experience and early memory tasks were extracted from McAdams' (1990) more comprehensive Guided Autobiography packet. For both, subjects are first provided with 1) a general definition of one or the other type of life episode and 2) guidelines for written accounts of episode exemplars. A written example of a personal peak
experience or early memory is then solicited. In the case of peak experiences, subjects recount a personal high point, noting what happened in the episode, when it happened, relevant thoughts and feelings, and who was involved. Subjects also comment on the implications of the episode for their identity. The early memory task requests a written account of the subject's earliest clear episodic recollection. Subjects also estimate their age at the time of the episode and speculate on the personological ramifications of the memory.

(2) Striving list. Emmon's (1988) striving list consists of 20 reproductions of the sentence stem, "I typically try to." Instructions identify strivings as "things that you typically or characteristically are trying to do in your everyday behavior," and subjects are encouraged to consider the life domains of work/school, home/family, social relationships, and leisure/recreation in identifying their strivings. No striving limit is provided, although subjects are asked to provide a minimum of 10.

(3) Situational Variability Scale (SVS). The SVS is a three-item self-report questionnaire that asks subjects to rate their level on a given trait dimension (sample item: "In general, how friendly and outgoing are you?") and then their variability on that same dimension (sample
item: "How much do you vary from one situation to another in how friendly and outgoing you are?"). Both trait level and variability are rated on a seven-point Likert scale (1="Not at all;" 7="Extremely"). The three variability responses were summed to yield an overall behavioral variability index, while the three trait ratings were not employed. It is noteworthy that trait ratings on this scale are independent of variability ratings (Bem & Allen, 1974). The SVS variability index has a coefficient alpha of .51 and has previously been found to mediate self-report/behavior congruence (Bem & Allen, 1974; Wymer & Penner, 1985).

(4) Personal Identity Scale. This six-item self-report measure was extracted from Cheek and Briggs' (1982) larger Aspects of Identity Scale. Each item (sample item: "My emotions and feelings;" "My dreams and imagination") concerns a phenomenological domain; subjects are asked to rate each of these domains' self-definitional importance on a five-point Likert scale (0="Not at all important;" 4="Extremely important"). Wymer and Penner (1985), obtained a coefficient alpha of .77 for the scale and also reported an unpublished "45-day test-retest reliability of .69" (p. 1006). This face valid measure comprises part of inner-directedness, which has been found to mediate self-report/behavior congruence (Wymer & Penner, 1985).
(5) **Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS)**. Fenigstein et al.'s (1975) SCS is a 17-item self-report instrument that measures both public and private self-consciousness. Although the entire measure was administered, only the 10-item Private Self-Consciousness subscale is germane to the present study. Each item (sample items: "I'm always trying to figure myself out;" "I'm constantly examining my motives") is rated as to its self-relevance on a five-point Likert scale (0="Extremely uncharacteristic;" 4="Extremely characteristic"). Wymer and Penner (1985) computed a coefficient alpha of .59 for this scale, and Fenigstein et al. (1975) report a test-retest reliability of .79. Substantial validity data is available on private-self consciousness' relationship to both self-report/behavior congruence and affective awareness.

(6) **Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI)**. This 60-item self-report measure requires the test-taker to rate a series of potentially self-descriptive adjectives and phrases on a 7-point Likert scale (1="Never or almost never true;" 7="Always or almost always true"). For the sake of efficiency, only the BSRI items relevant to BSRI Masculinity or Femininity, as outlined earlier, were included on the form given to subjects. In line with the recommendations of Pedhazur and Tetenbaum (1979), item content for the Femininity Scale was altered to better fit
both abstract conceptualizations of communion and factor analytic findings. The researchers' further recommendation that the item, "Masculine," be dropped from the BSRI Masculinity Scale was also followed; the inclusion of a gender-based descriptor for a dimension that transcends gender seems inappropriate. Respective coefficient alphas for the standard BSRI Masculinity and Femininity scales are .78 and .87, while their test-retest reliabilities have been estimated at .85 and .86, over a 4-week period (Bem, 1981). As discussed previously, the BSRI Masculinity and Femininity scales have undergone extensive validation.

(7) Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS). Although only the SMS' Other Focus facet is of interest in the present study, the entire, 25-item instrument was administered. Each item is a self statement (sample items: "At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like" <false>; "In different situations with different people, I often act like very different persons" <true>). The test-taker endorses each of these statements as either true or false. Eleven of these items comprise the SMS Other Focus measure, which has a coefficient alpha of .70 (Wymer & Penner, 1985). Although test-retest reliability data is not available on just the Other Focus subscale, the whole SMS has a
reliability coefficient of .84, with a 1-month lag (Snyder, 1974). This highly face valid measure has been found in a previous study to mediate self-report/behavior congruence (Wymer & Penner, 1985).

The measures comprising the second test battery, listed in order of appearance, were as follows:

(1) **Adjective Checklist (ACL)**. A shortened, 152-item version of the 300-item ACL was devised such that only items relevant to the Achievement, Dominance, Intraception, and Nurturance scales were included. Subjects endorse adjectives as self-descriptive by placing an "X" next to them; the spaces next to inapplicable adjectives are simply left blank. Coefficient alphas for the Achievement, Dominance, Intraception, and Nurturance scales are .84, .79, .78, and .83, respectively. The scales' respective test-retest reliabilities, computed over a 6-month delay, are .73, .76, .61, and .73 (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983). As previously noted, the four scales have been validated against peer ratings and correlations with similar constructs from other psychological instruments. For the purposes of this study, ACL Achievement and Dominance scales were summed to yield an overall ACL Agency measure, and ACL Intraception and Nurturance were combined to yield ACL Communion.

(2) **Maximal modification of the BSRI (B-MAX)**. Items
from the BSRI Masculinity and Femininity scales, as outlined above, were inserted in the stem, "How _____ are you capable of being?" to yield a maximal measure of agency and communion, or a Agency and a Communion. Although the items' order of appearance was switched from that of the BSRI, the BSRI's 7-point Likert scale format was preserved. The B-MAX is a purely experimental measure for which no consistency or reliability data exists. B-MAX measures of a Agency and a Communion do, however, share their BSRI counterparts' substantial face validity as measures of agency and communion.

Scoring Procedures

After all data were collected, various thematic coding systems were implemented. The TAT protocols were scored according to the manuals for n Achievement (Atkinson, 1958), n Power (Winter, 1973), and n Intimacy (McAdams, 1984). Each motive was scored by a different trained scorer who had previously achieved acceptable agreement with expert scoring, both in terms of overall inter-rater reliability (i.e., r=.86 or over) and category agreement in motive imagery (86% or over). The above three TAT measures exhibit internal consistencies that fall below the range accepted by traditional psychometric standards. In the case of n Achievement, for example, average inter-story correlations of .12 and .15 have been
obtained--both of which were nonsignificant (Biernat, 1989). As discussed by Atkinson (1981) and McClelland (1980), however, there are solid, construct-based, as opposed to measurement error-based, reasons why homogeneity estimates for TAT measures should be low. Test-retest reliabilities for the above three TAT measures are also typically low, ranging from .10 to .35 (McClelland, 1980). As noted earlier, however, these figures can be significantly increased when the variability demands tacit in standard TAT instructions are removed; explicit instructions that subjects may fully or partially reproduce previously written TAT stories result in enhanced reliability estimates. In the case of $n$ Power, Winter and Stewart (1977) obtained an $r$ of .58, over a 6-8 day testing interval, while Lundy, as cited in McAdams (1982), obtained an $r$ of .48 for $n$ Intimacy (one-year retest delay). Similar figures have been documented for $n$ Achievement (Heckhausen et al., 1985). All three motive measures have been extensively validated, as outlined earlier.

Autobiographical and striving data were submitted to thematic analysis as well. Subjects' early memories and peak experiences, taken from the Guided Autobiography form, were scored according to McAdams' (1990) agency and communion coding system. This process culminated in a
single, overall autobiographical agency and autobiographical communion score for each subject. Striving lists, on the other hand, were scored for five of Emmons' (1988) striving categories: Self-Sufficiency/Independence, Power, Achievement, Intimacy, and Interpersonal. Actually, final scores for the first four of these striving dimensions reflect the quotient of the number of category-relevant strivings divided by the number of strivings provided. Final scores for Interpersonal, the fifth striving dimension, express the ratio of interpersonal-to-intrapersonal strivings. Both Guided Autobiography responses and striving lists were independently scored by the experimenter and an assistant. Following this independent scoring, scoring discrepancies were discussed and resolved, such that each subject received one final score for each autobiographical or striving index. Both autobiographical and striving instruments are experimental measures for which no published internal consistency or test-retest reliability data is available. As already noted, both exhibit substantial face validity.
CHAPTER VII
RESULTS

Variable Formation

Composite measures of various mediator and motive variables were obtained through the summation of relevant facet measures. Composite inner- and other-directedness measure formation followed Wymer and Penner's (1985) factor analytically informed guidelines. Specifically, inner-directedness was operationalized as the T-score average of the Personal Identity Scale and the SCS' Private Self-Consciousness subscale. The T-scores from the SVS and the SMS Other Focus subscale were likewise averaged to yield a measure of other-directedness.

Furthermore, the T-scores for 1) BSRI Masculinity and ACL Agency, and 2) BSRI Femininity and ACL Communion were averaged to yield composite measures of san Agency and san Communion, respectively. In addition to being conceptually justified (see Table 1, p. 115), these latter combinations were supported by obtained correlational patterns: BSRI Masculinity correlated strongly with ACL Agency, \( r (119) = .78, p < .001 \), and BSRI Femininity correlated substantially with ACL Communion, \( r (119) = \)...
Correlational analyses of agentic/communal implicit and striving measures revealed a weak and inconsistent pattern of interrelation. The average correlation between \textit{n} Achievement, \textit{n} Power, and autobiographical agency was extremely low, \text{rho} = .15. In the realm of implicit communion, \textit{n} Intimacy and autobiographical communion correlated at \text{rho} = -.08, \text{ns}. Similarly, the average correlation between the three agentic strivings was \text{rho} = .03, while \text{s} Intimacy and \text{s} Interpersonal correlated modestly, \text{rho} (128) = .28, \text{p} < .01. Especially in the case of the implicit motive measures, these results are not surprising. First, the autobiographical tasks immediately followed TAT administration, such that a subject's reported peak experience and early memory could be viewed as responses to (imaginary) "TAT cards 7 and 8." In lieu of the internal consistency figures typically obtained for TAT \textit{n} Achievement, \textit{n} Power, and \textit{n} Intimacy measures, these two latter "stories" would not be expected to relate to the others strongly. On a similar note, the abridged autobiographical agency and communion measures employed in the present study can be likened to two-item tests: alone, they represent too small a sampling of operant behavior to overcome the sampling error associated with each response. However, they can, when combined with other operant responses, contribute meaningfully to a
larger instrument's overall validity. To the degree that personal strivings share some of the attributes of implicit motives, the obtained weak pattern of inter-category relationships between agentic (and communal) strivings is also not surprising.

Despite the low level of empirical relationship within implicit motive and striving domains, implicit motive and striving variables were nonetheless combined, via averaged sums of T-scores, to yield composite agentic and communal measures (for a listing of various relevant facet measures, see Table 1, p. 115). Hence, \( n \) Agency reflects the average of \( n \) Achievement, \( n \) Power, and autobiographical agency, while \( n \) Communion reflects the average of \( n \) Intimacy and autobiographical communion. Composite measures of \( s \) Agency and \( s \) Communion are composed respectively of the following averages: \( s \) Achievement, \( s \) Power, and \( s \) Self-Sufficiency/Independence, and \( s \) Intimacy and \( s \) Interpersonal. It is expected that the by combining larger numbers of observations, more valid and more reliable striving and implicit motive indices will be obtained.

For each of the five investigative hypotheses, analyses were conducted on both circumscribed and composite motive dimensions. Similarly, striving hypotheses were tested using both single and composite striving indices. For the sake of both brevity and
clarity, however, the ensuing report focuses exclusively on findings for composite motive and/or striving dimensions. Results for single motive and/or striving dimensions were generally nonsignificant.

Preliminary Intercorrelations

As a prelude to the empirical examination of investigative hypotheses, the baseline pattern of implicit/self-attributed motive relationship was examined via correlational analyses. Since \( n \) Agency and \( n \) Communion scores were highly skewed, the assumption of normality prerequisite to use of the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient could not be met. Instead, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient (\( \rho \)), a nonparametric correlational technique, was employed. The results of these analyses, conducted on overall, female, and male samples, are summarized in Table 2. In the overall sample, moderate positive correlations between \( n \) Agency and \( san \) Agency, \( \rho (109) = .22, p < .05 \), and \( n \) Communion and \( san \) Communion, \( \rho (104) = .22, p < .05 \), were obtained. This general pattern, however, held in neither male nor female subsamples. Instead, contrasexual motives showed moderate to substantial associations, while gender-consistent motives were unrelated. For males, \( n \) Communion correlated positively with \( san \) Communion, \( \rho (44) = .43, p < .01 \), while \( n \) Agency and \( san \) Agency failed
Table 2.--Baseline Correlations Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motive Variables in Overall, Male, and Female Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Attributed Motive Variables</th>
<th>Overall (N=104)</th>
<th>Males (N=44)</th>
<th>Females (N=59)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n Ag</td>
<td>n Cm</td>
<td>n Ag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>san Ag</td>
<td>22*</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>san Cm</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>22*</td>
<td>-06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. san Ag = Composite self-attributed agency measure. san Cm = Composite self-attributed communion measure. n Ag = Composite implicit agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion measure. The N cited for each sample reflects the lowest N associated with a single correlational pairing within that sample's correlational block; variations between Ns within the same correlational block reflect inconsistencies in the amount of missing data associated with different correlational variables.

a = p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001.
Decimals omitted.

to interrelate, rho (50) = .06, p = ns. For females, on the other hand, n Agency and san Agency evidenced a positive relationship, rho (59) = .36, p < .01, but n Communion and san Communion did not, rho (60) = .08, ns.

Mediation of Implicit/Self-Attributed Motive Relationships by Inner-Directedness

Preliminary considerations. As a prelude to the testing of investigative hypotheses, subjects were divided
into high and low inner-directedness groups. For overall, male, and female samples, these divisions were based upon median splits. Respective medians for these three samples were 49.85, 48.69, and 50.84; respective distribution ranges were 39.54, 39.54, and 35.94. The decision to divide male and female samples based on within-sample medians rather than the overall median followed from a few considerations. First, the division of male and female samples based on the overall median resulted in lopsided Ns between low inner-directedness and high inner-directedness groups. This lopsidedness in turn would have interacted with diminutive male and female sample sizes to seriously compromise statistical power. Dividing male and female samples according to within-sample medians, then, maximized statistical power. Admittedly, this sort of division hampers the generalizability of obtained within-gender findings to an overall population of people high or low in inner-directedness (e.g., some of the females classified as "low inner-directedness" in the female sample might actually fall in the "high inner-directedness" group in the overall sample and in the population which the overall sample represents). However, the present investigation is more concerned with the relative effects of higher and lower inner-directedness rather than with the absolute effects of high and low inner-directedness. Hence, the issue of intersample
noncomparability is less problematic.

**Agency.** The hypothesis that inner-directedness enhances agentic motive congruence was supported for neither overall, male, nor female samples. As a first step in hypothesis testing, a series of nonparametric $n$ Agency / san Agency correlation coefficients was computed. Specifically, values were computed for high and low inner-directedness groups from overall, male, and female samples. Tables 3 and 4 allow for the visual comparison of various correlational magnitudes. In the overall sample, $n$ Agency and san Agency were essentially unrelated for high inner-directedness subjects, $\rho (56) = -.07$, ns, while the two were substantially related for low inner-directedness subjects, $\rho (49) = .45$, $p < .01$. A similar pattern was obtained for females. Specifically, high inner-directedness was related to a marginal intermotive association, $\rho (29) = .27$, $p < .10$, while low inner-directedness was related to a substantial positive correlation, $\rho (27) = .45$, $p < .01$. In the case of males, high inner-directedness was actually related to patent motive discordance, $\rho (25) = -.50$, $p < .01$, while low inner-directedness was associated with a degree of motive accordance markedly above males' aforementioned nonsignificant baseline intermotive correlation, $\rho (24) = .43$, $p < .05$.

While visual analysis of various correlational
Table 3.--Correlations Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motive Variables for High and Low Inner-Directedness Subjects in Overall Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Attributed Motive Variables</th>
<th>High ID (N=52)</th>
<th>Low ID (N=49)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n Ag</td>
<td>n Cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>san Ag</strong></td>
<td>-07</td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>san Cm</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. High ID = Above median on composite inner-directedness measure. Low ID = At or below median on composite inner-directedness measure. **san Ag** = Composite self-attributed agency measure. **san Cm** = Composite self-attributed communion measure. **n Ag** = Composite implicit agency measure. **n Cm** = Composite implicit communion measure. The N cited for each sample reflects the lowest N associated with a single correlational pairing within that sample's correlational block; variations between Ns within the same correlational block reflect inconsistencies in the amount of missing data associated with different correlational variables.

*= p < .10  **p < .05  ***p < .01  ****p < .001.

Decimals omitted.

Magnitudes consistently suggests an unpredicted relationship between inner-directedness and decreased motive congruence, statistical analysis supports this relationship only in the case of men. For each subject, a discrepancy score was computed by taking the absolute value of the difference between n Agency and **san** Agency T-scores. Mean discrepancy scores for high and low inner-
Table 4.—Correlations Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motive Variables for High and Low Inner-Directedness Subjects in Male and Female Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Attributed Motive Variables</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High ID (N=20)</td>
<td>Low ID (N=24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High ID (N=29)</td>
<td>Low ID (N=27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n Ag n Cm</td>
<td>n Ag n Cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n Ag n Cm</td>
<td>n Ag n Cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>san Ag</td>
<td>-50** 31a</td>
<td>43* -07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27a -19</td>
<td>45** 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>san Cm</td>
<td>-01 54** -27</td>
<td>48** 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 14</td>
<td>15 08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** High ID = Above median on composite inner-directedness measure. Low ID = At or below median on composite inner-directedness measure. san Ag = Composite self-attributed agency measure. san Cm = Composite self-attributed communion measure. n Ag = Composite implicit agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion measure. The N cited for each sample reflects the lowest N associated with a single correlational pairing within that sample's correlational block; variations between Ns within the same correlational block reflect inconsistencies in the amount of missing data associated with different correlational variables.

a = p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001.

Decimals omitted.

directedness groups were then compared using the Mann-Whitney (MW) test for two independent samples. The average discrepancy score for high inner-directedness subjects did not differ significantly from that for low inner-directedness subjects in either overall, MW $U_z$ (49,54) = -1.41, ns, or female, MW $U_z$ (27,28) = -.22, ns,
samples. For males, however, low inner-directedness subjects evidenced marginally less discrepancy than did high inner-directedness subjects, \( MW_U (24, 25) = -1.92, p < .10. \)

**Communion.** As in the case of agency, communal intermotive correlations (i.e., \( n \) Communion with \( san \) Communion) suggest a counterintuitive relationship between inner-directedness and motive congruence (see Tables 3 and 4). In the overall sample, \( n \) Communion and \( san \) Communion were only marginally related for high inner-directedness subjects, \( \rho (52) = .18, p < .10, \) while the two were moderately and significantly related for low inner-directedness subjects, \( \rho (49) = .37, p < .01. \) Furthermore, low inner-directedness subjects, in comparison with those high in inner-directedness, had a significantly smaller intermotive discrepancy score, \( MW_U (49, 50) = -2.10, p < .05. \)

Visual comparison of correlational data for the male sample suggests an absence of any sort of inner-directedness effect (see Table 4). However, statistical comparison of average discrepancy scores for high and low inner-directedness males reveals a significant difference, \( MW_U (24, 20) = -2.26, p < .05. \) Males below median in inner-directedness show more \( n \) Communion - \( san \) Communion congruence than above-median males. In the case of females, both visual comparison of correlational data and
statistical comparison of average discrepancy scores suggests the absence of an inner-directedness effect, MW $U_z (27,29) = -.19, \text{ ns.}$

Mediation of Implicit/Self-Attributed Motive Relationships by Other-Directedness

Preliminary considerations. Median splits were employed to divide subjects into various high and low other-directedness groups. Respective medians for other-directedness in overall, male, and female samples were 50.74, 48.33, and 51.48, while the respective ranges were 33.97, 33.97, and 31.23. Median splits for male and female samples employed within-sample medians, rather than the overall median. This decision followed from the same considerations advanced in regard to inner-directedness. Specifically, within-sample median splits ensure relatively equal Ns between high and low other-directedness groups. Hence, within-sample median splits maximize statistical power. Additionally, the present study is primarily concerned with the differential effects of relatively higher levels and relatively lower levels of other-directedness; the generalizability of obtained findings to distinct, normatively defined high and low other-directedness populations, which within-sample median splits hinder, is of secondary importance.

Agency. The hypothesis that low other-directedness
is related to enhanced congruence between \( n \) Agency and \( san \) Agency was not supported for overall and male samples. Mann-Whitney analyses revealed a lack of significant difference between average intermotive discrepancy scores in the overall sample, \( MW U_z (51,54) = .17, \text{ ns} \), and in the male sample, \( MW U_z (22,25) = 1.49, \text{ ns} \). Comparison of \( n \) Agency - \( san \) Agency correlations also suggests the absence of a notable other-directedness effect (see Tables 5 and 6). In the overall sample, agentic intermotive correlations for high and low other-directedness subjects were of the same general magnitude; respective values were \( \rho (56) = .27, p < .05 \), and \( \rho (49) = .14, \text{ ns} \). Similarly, intermotive correlations were weak and nonsignificant for high and low other-directedness males.

In the case of females, results are inconclusive. Statistical comparison of average discrepancy scores for high and low other-directedness groups is consistent with the investigative hypotheses: females low in other-directedness evidence marginally less inter-motive discrepancy than do females high in other-directedness, \( MW U_z (29,30) = -1.53, p < .10 \). However, this relationship is not supported correlationally (see Table 6). Specifically, \( n \) Agency and \( san \) Agency correlate moderately and positively for high other-directedness females, \( \rho (30) = .36, p < .05 \), while correlating nonsignificantly for females low in other-directedness, \( \rho (49) = .20, \text{ ns} \).
Table 5.--Correlations Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motive Variables for High and Low Other-Directedness Subjects in Overall Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Attributed Motive Variables</th>
<th>High OD (N=54)</th>
<th>Low OD (N=48)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n Ag</td>
<td>n Cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>san Ag</td>
<td>27*</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>san Cm</td>
<td>20           a</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. High OD = Above median on composite other-directedness measure. Low OD = At or below median on composite other-directedness measure. san Ag = Composite self-attributed agency measure. san Cm = Composite self-attributed communion measure. n Ag = Composite implicit agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion measure. The N cited for each sample reflects the lowest N associated with a single correlational pairing within that sample's correlational block; variations between Ns within the same correlational block reflect inconsistencies in the amount of missing data associated with different correlational variables.

\[ a = p < .10 \ *p < .05 \ **p < .01 \ ***p < .001. \]

Decimals omitted.

Given the small sample sizes associated with these two correlational figures, the difference in magnitudes is probably negligible; it is, however, clear that females low in other-directedness show no enhanced correlational intermotive congruence relative to high other-directedness females. In conclusion, then, the confirmatory Mann-Whitney finding is somewhat mitigated by nonsupportive
Table 6.--Correlations Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motive Variables for High and Low Other-Directedness Subjects in Male and Female Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Attributed Motive Variables</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High OD (N=24)</td>
<td>Low OD (N=18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low OD (N=30)</td>
<td>Low OD (N=29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n Ag</td>
<td>n Cm</td>
<td>n Ag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>san Ag</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>san Cm</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-37*</td>
<td>54*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. High OD = Above median on composite other-directedness measure. Low OD = At or below median on composite other-directedness measure. san Ag = Composite self-attributed agency measure. san Cm = Composite self-attributed communion measure. n Ag = Composite implicit agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion measure. The N cited for each sample reflects the lowest N associated with a single correlational pairing within that sample's correlational block; variations between Ns within the same correlational block reflect inconsistencies in the amount of missing data associated with different correlational variables.

\( a = p < .10 \quad * p < .05 \quad ** p < .01 \quad *** p < .001. \)

Decimals omitted.

Correlational data: support for other-directedness' negative effect on agentic motive congruence is limited.

Communion. In the overall sample, low and high other-directedness groups did not differ significantly in n Communion - san Communion discrepancy, although differences were in the predicted direction, \( MW U_z (48,52) \)
Visual comparison of intermotive correlations additionally suggests some degree of other-directedness effect (see Table 5): \( n \) Communion and \( san \) Communion correlate significantly and positively for low other-directedness subjects, \( \rho (48) = .32, p < .05 \), while they failed to do so for high other-directedness subjects, \( \rho (54) = .13, \text{ ns} \). Hence, both correlational and Mann-Whitney data suggest a low-level, nonsignificant other-directedness effect in the predicted direction.

Inconsistent and divergent other-directedness effects were obtained in both male and female subsamples. In the case of females, other-directedness' predicted, detrimental effect on \( n \) Communion - \( san \) Communion congruence was supported. Low other-directedness females evidenced marginally less intermotive discrepancy than did high other-directedness females, \( MW U_z (30,30) = -1.49, p < .10 \). It is notable, however, that even for females low in other-directedness, \( n \) Communion and \( san \) Communion were not significantly intercorrelated, \( \rho (30) = .20, \text{ ns} \). The other-directedness effect obtained for males was the reverse of that predicted: high other-directedness males show less intermotive discrepancy than do low other-directedness males, \( MW U_z (18,23) = 1.97, p < .05 \). However, this unpredicted result was not supported correlationally (see Table 6): \( n \) Communion and \( san \) Communion correlate at the same order of magnitude for
high other-directedness males, \( \rho (24) = .43, p < .05 \),
and low other-directedness males, \( \rho (18) = .54, p < .05 \).

**Combined Mediation Effects of Inner-Directedness and Other-Directedness**

Due to the extreme skewedness of \( n \) Agency and \( n \) Communion scores, the assumption of normality prerequisite to the use of ANOVAs could not be met. As a less definitive alternative to ANOVAs, the hypothesis that high inner-directedness and low other-directedness maximize intermotive correspondence was examined correlationally (see Table 7). Specifically, subjects were divided, via median split, into four groups based on their level of inner-directedness and other-directedness. The groups were as follows: \( H/H \) (high inner-directedness; high other-directedness), \( H/L \) (high inner-directedness; low other-directedness), \( L/H \) (low inner-directedness; high other-directedness), and \( L/L \) (low on both inner- and other-directedness).

The prediction that \( H/L \) subjects would evidence enhanced intermotive congruence was generally not supported (see Table 7). In the case of agency, \( L/H \) subjects evidenced the highest degree of \( n \) Agency - san Agency correspondence, \( \rho (27) = .47, p < .01 \), followed by \( L/L \) subjects, \( \rho (22) = .25, ns \). Agentic intermotive correspondence was essentially negligible for \( H/L \)
Table 7.--Correlations Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motive Variables for Various Inner-Directedness/Other-Directedness Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Attributed Motive Variables</th>
<th>H/H (N=24)</th>
<th>H/L (N=26)</th>
<th>L/H (N=27)</th>
<th>L/L (N=22)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n Ag</td>
<td>n Cm</td>
<td>n Ag</td>
<td>n Cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>san Ag</td>
<td>-06</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>-04</td>
<td>-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>san Cm</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-04</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. H/H = Above-median on inner- and other-directedness. H/L = Above-median on inner-directedness and below-median on other-directedness. L/H = Below-median on inner-directedness and above-median on other-directedness. L/L = Below-median on inner- and other-directedness. san Ag = Composite self-attributed agency measure. san Cm = Composite self-attributed communion measure. n Ag = Composite implicit agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion measure. The N cited for each sample reflects the lowest N associated with a single correlational pairing within that sample's correlational block; variations between Ns within the same correlational block reflect inconsistencies in the amount of missing data associated with different correlational variables.

a = p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001.

Decimals omitted.

subjects, rho (28) = -.04, ns, and H/H subjects, rho (26) = -.06, ns. The same pattern was evident in the case of communion. Again, L/H and L/L subjects showed the highest degree of intermotive correlation: respective values for the groups were rho (27) = .40, p < .05, and rho (22) =
.41, p < .05. The magnitude of communal intermotive relationship was only somewhat smaller for H/L subjects, \( \rho_{26} = .29, p < .10 \), while it was negligible for H/H subjects, \( \rho_{24} = -.04, ns \). In summary, these results seem to suggest a main effect for inner-directedness rather than an inner-directedness \( \times \) other-directedness interaction. Contrary to predictions, then, low inner-directedness is related to enhanced intermotive congruence, regardless of level of other-directedness. Unfortunately, low Ns precluded a meaningful analysis of male and female samples.

**Comparative Relationships of Personality Abilities and Self-Attributed Motives to the Implicit Domain**

**Agency.** The general hypothesis that agentic personality abilities (\( \alpha \) Agency), assessed via the BMAX, would relate more strongly to \( n \) Agency than would BSRI-assessed \( san \) Agency was tested via nonparametric analyses. This statistical decision followed from \( n \) Agency's highly skewed distribution. Each subject was assigned an operant-respondent discrepancy score (i.e., the absolute value of the difference between \( n \) Agency and \( san \) Agency T-scores) and an operant-ability discrepancy score (i.e., the absolute value of the difference between \( n \) Agency and \( \alpha \) Agency T-scores). Differences between mean operant-respondent and operant-ability discrepancy scores were
then tested via the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test, a nonparametric analog to the t-test.

Hypotheses were supported for neither overall, male, nor female samples. More specifically, the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test yielded nonsignificant results in each case. Respective values for overall, male, and female samples were as follows: WX $T_z$ (108) = -.30, ns, WX $T_z$ (49) = -.72, ns, and WX $T_z$ (59) = -.22, ns. It is however notable that mean differences were in the correct direction in all three cases. Nonsignificant group differences were further examined via Spearman rank correlation coefficients ($\rho$), computed for $n$ Agency - san Agency and for $n$ Agency - a Agency. The results of these correlational analyses, conducted on overall, male, and female samples, are presented in Table 8. Again, a Agency was more highly correlated with $n$ Agency than was san Agency in all three samples. Hence, group differences consistently fell in predicted directions, although they were not significant.

Communion. A series of analyses analogous to those conducted for agency was conducted for communion. This time, san Communion was operationalized as BSRI Femininity to ensure item comparability with the BSRI-derived BMAX measure of a Communion. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test was used to compare $n$ Communion - san Communion and $n$ Communion - a Communion difference scores.
Table 8.--Comparative Correlations of Self-Attributed Motives and Personality Abilities with Implicit Motives in Overall, Male, and Female Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive Variables</th>
<th>Overall (N=105)</th>
<th>Males (N=44)</th>
<th>Females (N=60)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n Ag</td>
<td>n Cm</td>
<td>n Ag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>san Ag</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a Ag</td>
<td>28*</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>44***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>san Cm</td>
<td>-05</td>
<td>41**</td>
<td>18*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a Cm</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24*</td>
<td>22*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. san Ag = BSRI Masculinity scale. a Ag = BMAX-assessed agentic personality abilities. san Cm = BSRI communion scale. a Cm = BMAX-assessed communal personality abilities. n Ag = Composite implicit agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion measure. The N cited for each sample reflects the lowest N associated with a single correlational pairing within that sample's correlational block; variations between Ns within the same correlational block reflect inconsistencies in the amount of missing data associated with different correlational variables.

* p < .10  ** p < .05  *** p < .001.

Decimals omitted.

As in the case of agency, hypotheses were supported in neither overall, male, nor female samples. The respective values for the three groups were WX $T_z$ (103) = -.39, ns, WX $T_z$ (43) = .18, ns, and WX $T_z$ (60) = -.56, ns. Relevant correlational follow-up analyses, the results of which appear in Table 8, were also implemented. In the case of
females, results were in the predicted direction: a Communion was more strongly correlated with \( n \) Communion, \( \rho (61) = .20, p < .10 \), than was \( san \) Communion, \( \rho (61) = .01, \text{ ns} \), though apparently not at a significant level. Visual analysis of the male sample suggests a nonsignificant opposing trend, such that \( san \) Communion is more highly related to \( n \) Communion, \( \rho (44) = .41, p < .01 \), than is \( a \) Communion, \( \rho (48) = .24, p < .05 \). For the overall sample, differences between correlational magnitudes were negligible.

Personal Strivings and the Bi-Level Motivational System

The twin hypotheses that (1) strivings are more closely related to implicit motives than are self-attributed motives and (2) strivings are more closely related to self-attributed motives than are implicit motives were both tested via a series of Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks tests. This decision followed from both implicit motives' and personal strivings' routinely skewed distributions. Wilcoxon (WX) comparisons were made between pairs of discrepancy scores, which reflected the absolute value of various T-score differences. In the case of agency, for example, \( s \) Agency/ \( n \) Agency and \( s \) Agency/\( san \) Agency discrepancy scores were compared to an \( n \) Agency/\( san \) Agency discrepancy baseline. A comparable series of comparisons were made in the case of communion.
Relative alignments of strivings and self-attributed motives with implicit motives. The hypothesis that strivings are more closely related to implicit motives than are self-attributed motives received some support in the case of agency. As predicted, $g_{\text{Agency}}$ was more closely related to $n_{\text{Agency}}$ than was $san_{\text{Agency}}$, $WXT_z (109) = -2.84, p < .01$. Furthermore, this relationship held for both males, $WXT_z (51) = -2.29, p < .05$, and females, $WXT_z (58) = -1.83, p < .10$. It is notable that these confirmatory relationships were not evident in correlational analyses, which are more sensitive to extreme scores (see Table 9). For the male sample, $g_{\text{Agency}} - n_{\text{Agency}}$ and $san_{\text{Agency}} - n_{\text{Agency}}$ correlations were extremely weak and nonsignificant. Visual inspection of the female sample suggests that if anything, $san_{\text{Agency}}$ is more strongly related to $n_{\text{Agency}}$, $\rho (59) = .36, p < .01$, than is $g_{\text{Agency}}$, $\rho (62) = .09, ns$.

The prediction that $g_{\text{Communion}}$ would relate more strongly to $n_{\text{Communion}}$ than would $san_{\text{Communion}}$ was supported in neither overall, male, nor female samples. In all three cases, Wilcoxon comparisons yielded nonsignificant results that were, however, in the correct direction. Respective values for overall, male, and female samples were $WXT_z (104) = -.77, ns$, $WXT_z (45) = -.74, ns$, and $WXT_z (59) = -.27, ns$. Parallel correlational analyses mirrored Wilcoxon results for
Table 9.—Comparative Correlations of Self-Attributed Motives and Personal Strivings with Implicit Motives in Overall, Male, and Female Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive Variables</th>
<th>Overall (N=104)</th>
<th>Males (N=44)</th>
<th>Females (N=59)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n Ag</td>
<td>n Cm</td>
<td>n Ag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>san Ag</td>
<td>22*</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s Ag</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>-22**</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>san Cm</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>22*</td>
<td>-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s Cm</td>
<td>12a</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. san Ag = Composite self-attributed agency measure. s Ag = Composite striving agency measure. san Cm = Composite self-attributed communion measure. s Cm = Composite striving communion measure. n Ag = Composite implicit agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion measure. The N cited for each sample reflects the lowest N associated with a single correlational pairing within that sample's correlational block; variations between Ns within the same correlational block reflect inconsistencies in the amount of missing data associated with different correlational variables.

a = p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001.

Decimals omitted.

females but not for males (see Table 9). For females, n Communion was equally unrelated to both san Communion, rho (60) = .08, ns, and s Communion, rho (62) = -.09, ns. For males, however, n Communion was substantially more related to san Communion, rho (44) = .43, p < .01, than to s Communion, rho (57) = .20, p < .10.
Relative alignments of strivings and implicit motives with self-attributed motives. The prediction that \( s \) Agency would be more closely aligned with \( san \) Agency than would \( n \) Agency was supported only in the case of males, where a marginally significant effect in the correct direction was obtained, \( WX \, T_z \, (51) = -1.29, \, p < .10 \).

Visual inspection of correlational data further suggests that strivings may be more strongly related to \( san \) Agency than implicit motives for males (see Table 10): \( s \) Agency and \( san \) Agency correlate moderately and significantly, \( \rho (58) = .29, \, p < .05 \), while \( n \) Agency and \( san \) Agency do not, \( \rho (50) = .06, \, ns \). For females, a significant effect in the opposite direction was obtained, such that \( n \) Agency was more closely aligned with \( san \) Agency than was \( s \) agency, \( WX \, T_z \, (58) = -2.20, \, p < .05 \). This counterintuitive relationship was also supported correlationally, where the \( n \) Agency - \( san \) Agency correlation was sizable and significant, \( \rho (59) = .36, \, p < .01 \), and the \( s \) Agency - \( san \) Agency relationship was negligible, \( \rho (62) = .02, \, ns \). The divergent relationships associated with female and male subsamples combined to produce a nonsignificant effect in the overall sample, \( WX \, T_z \, (109) = -.57, \, ns \).

The hypothesis that \( s \) Communion would relate more strongly to \( san \) Communion than would \( n \) Communion received support in the female sample, \( WX \, T_z \, (59) = -1.44, \, p < .10 \).
Table 10.--Comparative Correlations of Implicit Motives and Personal Strivings with Self-Attributed Motives in Overall, Male, and Female Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive Variables</th>
<th>Overall (N=104)</th>
<th>Males (N=44)</th>
<th>Females (N=59)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>san Ag san Cm</td>
<td>san Ag san Cm</td>
<td>san Ag san Cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n Ag</td>
<td>22* 05</td>
<td>06 -06</td>
<td>36** 19^a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s Ag</td>
<td>22** 01</td>
<td>29* -04</td>
<td>02 09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n Cm</td>
<td>-10 22*</td>
<td>05 43**</td>
<td>00 08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s Cm</td>
<td>19* 47***</td>
<td>13 38**</td>
<td>27* 54***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. san Ag = Composite self-attributed agency measure. s Ag = Composite striving agency measure. san Cm = Composite self-attributed communion measure. s Cm = Composite striving communion measure. n Ag = Composite implicit agency measure. n Cm = Composite implicit communion measure. The N cited for each sample reflects the lowest N associated with a single correlational pairing within that sample's correlational block; variations between Ns within the same correlational block reflect inconsistencies in the amount of missing data associated with different correlational variables.

^a = p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001.

Decimals omitted.

Actually, this effect appears quite robust when viewed correlationally (see Table 10). While n Communion and san Communion were essentially unrelated, rho (60) = .08, ns, s Communion and san Communion were substantially related, rho (63) = .54, p < .001. For males, communal strivings and implicit motives were equally related to san
Communion, WX $T_z$ (45) = -.40, ns. Correlational analysis further corroborates this conclusion: san Communion is moderately related to both $\pi$ Communion, $\rho$ (44) = .43, $p < .01$, and $s$ Communion, $\rho$ (57) = .38, $p < .01$. The striving effect observed in the female sample was reflected in a marginally significant, confirmatory striving effect in the overall sample, WX $T_z$ (104) = -1.37, $p < .10$, which was also supported correlationally.
CHAPTER VIII
DISCUSSION

Motive Congruence Revisited: Baseline Relationships Between Implicit and Self-Attributed Motives

The present investigation sought to gain support for a particular explanation for a well-documented problem. The problem, simply stated, is that operant and respondent measures of the same motive content "seldom correlate significantly with one another" (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 691). By showing that operant and respondent motive measures do in fact relate for people high and/or low in certain conceptually relevant variables, the present investigation aimed to empirically bolster McClelland et al.'s (1989) construct-based explanation for this lack of intermeasure relationship. Their account contends that overall, operant and respondent motive measures are unrelated, because the implicit and self-attributed motive systems that they respectively tap are normatively out of alignment. This explanation stands in opposition to the measure-based explanations of Entwisle (1972), Raven (1988), and others, which implicate psychometric shortcomings of operant or respondent measures as the culprit for motive incongruity.
Undoubtedly, the most important finding of the present investigation concerns McClelland et al.'s (1989) assumption of a normative lack of intermotive relationship. This assumption, in short, is not supported by the current data. For both males and females, contrasexual implicit and self-attributed motive systems showed an unexpectedly high degree of correspondence. In the case of males, \textit{Communion and san Communion} displayed a substantial positive association. Similarly, \textit{n Agency and san Agency} were appreciably interrelated for females. Gender-congruent implicit and self-attributed motive systems, on the other hand, evidenced the negligible degree of interrelationship that would be expected based upon prior research.

The unexpected pattern of obtained results warrants two types of explanation. First, the failure of this sort of pattern to surface in previous research must be addressed, and second, the pattern itself must be interpreted. In regard to the former, it is noteworthy that the present investigation employed composite implicit and self-attributed motive measures, where past investigations have examined only single motive facets, such as \textit{n Intimacy} or \textit{san Power}. Undoubtedly, the combination of many more observations into single composite measures yielded more valid implicit and self-attributed motive measures. The enhanced validity, in
turn, probably allowed for the apprehension of a relationship previously obscured by substantial random error. This explanation is particularly germane to implicit motive measurement, as the popular TAT measures typically sample only a very small portion of operant behavior (i.e., six imaginative stories). The above speculations are upheld by analysis of operant and respondent facet intercorrelations: correlational pairings of single operant with single respondent facets generally yielded positive relationships of negligible magnitude. It appears, then, that measure-based explanations for implicit and self-attributed motive measures' lack of interrelation are somewhat on target, as the more comprehensive assessment of operant behavior and respondent behavior brings into relief previously concealed intermotive patterns. Alternately, the obtained pattern of baseline intermotive relationships may be understood as a fluke, although the occurrence of the same pattern in independent male and female samples (i.e., contrasexual motive interrelatedness; gender-consistent motive unrelatedness) renders this explanation unlikely.

Although unpredicted, the obtained intermotive relationships actually make sense upon scrutiny. However, before explanations can be advanced, some basic distinctions between the two motivational systems must be reiterated. The implicit motivational system can be
likened to Freud's (1962) id, Winnicott's (1965) True Self, and Rogers' (1963) directional organismic processes, or organismic self: implicit motives constitute a basic, true psychic reality—a set of phenomenological coordinates to which the conscious personality must in some way adapt, whether through expression, repression, dissociation, or denial. The implicit system, furthermore, is largely inherited and constitutional, although life experiences can facilitate the crystallization of inherent motivational potentials into formal motive dispositions (McClelland & Pilon, 1983). While the implicit system represents constitutional nature, the self-attributed system reflects internalized nurture, much like the psychodynamic ego and superego (Freud, 1933). In the normative case, then, the self-attributed system reflects parental-societal standards as they pertain to personal identity. The crucial point for the purposes of the present discussion is that these standards differ in content and emphasis for men and women; men are taught to be agentic, or masculine, and women are taught to be communal, or feminine (Birns, 1976; Block, 1976; Brooks-Gunn & Matthews, 1979; Edwards & Whiting, 1983). While individual parents certainly vary in their espousal and subsequent inculcation of sex-typed versus androgenous gender roles, it is nonetheless clear that overall, men and women receive very different
messages as to who they are and who they should be.

The obtained pattern of (1) gender-congruent motive non-relation, and (2) contrasexual motive co-relation makes sense when considered against the above conceptual backdrop. Boys acquire comprehensive, differentiated agentic self-attributed motives and girls acquire similarly extensive, articulated communal self-attributed motives. Furthermore, these gender-congruent self-attributed motives are based in pat social ideologies, rather than in personal motivational idiosyncrasies. By definition, then, they will normatively be somewhat misaligned with the individual's implicit motivational make-up, as was evident in the present investigation. It is also probable that boys and girls receive much less explicit training in regard to contrasexual aspects of identity. In other words, boys receive comparatively little explicit information, reward, or punishment in connection with being or not being nurturant, intimate, and connected; girls likewise receive relatively less explicit shaping in regard to dominance, autonomy, and achievement. While these latter two premises may sound somewhat dated, it is notable that the parents of the participants in the present study received their sex-role training in the 1950s. If the above assumptions are correct, then the development of contrasexual self-
attributed motives should be less related to the internalization of parental-societal imperatives that McClelland et al. (1989) postulate. Instead, self-attributed motive acquisition should follow from the gradual, verbal representation of experienced implicit realities. Such a process would result in a much higher degree of intermotive correspondence, as was obtained. Alternately, it may be that in the normative case, contrasexual self-attributed motives remain much less developed than gender-congruent contrasexual motives. Conceptual judgments about personal attributes, as solicited by respondent motive questionnaires, may involve a cognitive review of memories of operant behavior rather than consultation with an abstract, stable self schema. Again, the latter process would explain the high level of operant-respondent correspondence procured.

Intermotive Congruence and Self-Consciousness Variables

**Inner-directedness.** Contrary to predictions, inner-directedness did not enhance motive congruence. In fact, comparison of pertinent correlational magnitudes and mean differences at times suggests an opposite effect, such that inner-directedness is related to decreased motive congruence. This trend was especially evident in the case of males and agency, where division of subjects into high and low inner-directedness groups shed new light on males'
negligible baseline intermotive correspondence. Specifically, males low in inner-directedness evidence substantial agentic intermotive congruence, while high inner-directedness males display equally substantial intermotive discordance. In both male and female samples, inner-directedness was related to decreased contrasexual intermotive congruence, albeit inconsistently. Inner-directedness had no effect on gender-congruent intermotive congruence for females. In three out of four cases, then, some evidence related low inner-directedness to enhanced congruence.

Although the above results were not predicted, the existence of any sort of inner-directedness effect on intermotive congruence is somewhat supportive of McClelland et al.'s (1989) position. The fact that a psychological construct mediates correspondence seems more supportive of construct-based as opposed to measure-based interpretations. In other words, it is unclear why a self-consciousness variable should affect operant-respondent relationships if one or the other measure type is generally invalid. If operant and respondent measures typically fail to relate due to psychometric problems, then improvement of the measures alone, and not selection of certain types of subjects, should bolster congruence. Instead, both the unexpected baseline patterns of intermotive relationship and the unpredicted results for
inner-directedness suggest a *psychological* rather than *psychometric* explanation.

Actually, the obtained results suggest a framing of inner-directedness vis-a-vis the bi-level motivational system that departs from that advanced earlier. Inner-directedness is clearly not a *cause* or *agent* of intermotive congruence. Instead, it may be a *product* or *effect* of motive misalignment. Discrepancy between implicit and self-attributed systems seems an apt operationalization of general neurosis. Rogers (1963), for example, comments:

> Estrangement of conscious man from his directional organismic processes is not a necessary part of man's nature...The satisfaction...of the actualizing tendency has become bifurcated into incompatible behavior systems. This dissociation which exists in most of us is the pattern and basis of all psychological pathology in man (p. 24)

Similarly, psychodynamic theorists such as Freud (1933) identify unresolved incongruities between id (i.e., implicit system) and superego (i.e., self-attributed system) as a basis for neurotic conflict. In the context of neurotic conflict, inner-directedness takes-on a different connotation from that typically presented. Rather than with openness to experience and an integration-fostering self-focus, inner-directedness may be closely allied with defensive aims. Inner-directedness, especially as assessed via respondent questionnaire, may represent the self-attributed system's
attempt at managing implicit presses at odds with the self-image. Along these lines, Shabad (1991) reflects:

The analytical function of scrutinizing behavior, or consciously observing before participating, reflects a radical mistrust of unconscious impulses and their corollary actions...Indeed, as one gains in self-knowledge, one increasingly becomes equipped also with a foreknowledge that enables one to avoid unconscious patterns of...behavior (p. 10)

Inner-directedness' private self-consciousness facet is in fact related to low self-esteem, a general marker of neurotic conflict (Turner et al., 1978).

From a psychodynamic perspective, intermotive misalignment is reframed as neurotic conflict, and inner-directedness becomes mental vigilance. Furthermore, this reframing affords coherence to previously incomprehensible results. Mental vigilance is a normative response to neurotic conflict, and retrospectively, it makes sense that inner-directedness would be related to intermotive misalignment rather than alignment. Past research on private self-consciousness, the more well-researched of inner-directedness' two facets, can also be assimilated by the above interpretation. First, a number of studies have linked private self-consciousness to increased self-report/behavior congruence (Scheier et al., 1978; Turner, 1978). From the present vantage, private self-consciousness is the tool with which the self-attributed system brings "the unpredictable dynamics of a given process under omnipotent mental control" (Shabad, 1991, p.
8). Hence, individuals high in private self-consciousness "do what they say," because they have achieved conscious control over implicit sectors that remain unfettered in others. Furthermore, their higher aggressiveness (Scheier, 1976) represents the price paid for chronic overcontrol: "it is often what is ruled out that rises and asserts itself, so there is not mastery precisely where mastery ought to be" (Bakan, 1966, p. 89).

**Other-directedness.** The hypothesis that other-directedness is related to decreased intermotive congruence received support only in the case of females' communal motives. Specifically, communal intermotive correspondence was higher for women low in other-directedness than for women high in other-directedness. Female agentic intermotive correspondence failed to be consistently and substantially affected by other-directedness. The results for males suggest an absence of other-directedness effect in the case of agency. Likewise, other-directedness is probably unrelated to communal intermotive alignment in males, although some inconsistent evidence suggested an unpredicted relationship between other-directedness and enhanced communal motive correspondence. If nothing else, the obtained pattern of results underscores the differences between masculine and feminine psychologies. It may well be that other-directedness has a different meaning or
dynamic significance for the male psyche than for the female psyche. Unfortunately, the present investigation was not equipped to further elucidate such differences.

Earlier, other-directedness was framed as a probable facilitator of intermotive incongruence. As with inner-directedness, however, it may be more accurate to consider other-directedness as a symptom or result of intermotive misalignment, or general neurotic conflict. In fact, both person-centered (e.g., Rogers, 1959) and psychodynamic (e.g., Kohut & Wolfe, 1978; Winnicott, 1965) theories "predict that the wider the discrepancy between one's public and private selves (i.e., implicit and self-attributed systems), the greater the individual's anxiety, conformity, and sensitivity to social cues suggesting appropriate behavior" (Tunnell, 1984, p. 549). If this is correct, then the absence of a clear other-directedness effect for males, combined with the aforementioned robust, unpredicted inner-directedness effect, may suggest a certain approach to managing chronic psychological duress. Specifically, intense inner scrutiny may be preferable to conformity and other-focus, as it preserves a sense of agentic self-reliance, which is a cornerstone of the normative male ideal (Bem, 1981). Females, on the other hand, seem to prefer communal adaptations to inner misalignment, and may also be more adaptationally flexible, turning to both other- and inner-directedness.
It was also hypothesized in the present investigation that inner- and other-directedness would interact so as to maximize intermotive correspondence. This hypothesis could not be definitively examined due to (1) operant indices' skewed distributions, and (2) small Ns, which precluded within-gender analyses. Visual inspection of correlational data, however, suggests (very tentatively) an absence of any form of summative effect.

Relationships Between Motives and Motive-Like Constructs

Personality abilities. Contrary to predictions, agentic and communal personality abilities were no more aligned with the implicit system than were their self-attributed counterparts. The most obvious explanation for this finding is that McClelland et al.'s (1989) formulations regarding a bi-level motivational system are incorrect; this possibility will be further addressed later. A number of alternate explanations are possible as well. First, it may be that the predicted maximal measure effect does exist, but is quite small. This interpretation is supported by the fact that nonsignificant results uniformly fell in predicted directions, except in the case of male communal intermotive relationships. Second, it may be that the ability measure employed was invalid—this was an un researched measure constructed solely for the present
Finally, it may be that personality abilities, at least when assessed via respondent questionnaires, are interchangeable with self-attributed motives; the constructs' shared verbal, self-schematic similarities may outweigh their conceptual differences.

**Personal strivings.** In the present conceptualization of the bi-level motivational system, personal strivings are intersystem mediators. Strivings' proposed topographic location actually spawned two related hypotheses. First, it was expected that strivings would be more closely aligned with implicit motives than would be self-attributed motives. Correlational and Wilcoxon analyses of this proposition produced inconsistent and generally nonsupportive results. In the case of agentic motives, $s$ Agency is probably no more closely aligned with $n$ Agency than is san Agency. In the case of communion, $s$ Communion and san Communion appear equally and moderately related to $n$ Communion. The second hypothesis predicted that strivings would be more strongly related to self-attributed motives than would be implicit motives. In this regard, an unexpected pattern of results emerged. Specifically, confirmatory patterns were obtained in gender-congruent motivational domains, while contrasexual domains produced nonsupportive (men) and opposing (women) patterns. Actually, these findings make sense in light of the previously-advanced speculations regarding gender and
self-attributed motive development. It was mentioned earlier that gender-congruent self-attributed motives may be normatively out of alignment with the implicit domain, due to the former's basis in pat societal ideologies rather than in empathic attunement to individual nature. Maintenance of gender-congruent self-attributed motives, then, often amounts to a struggle to maintain a socially desirable, socially mandated self-image in the face of implicit nature. The obtained results suggest that strivings may be allies of the self-attributed system in this struggle, comprising a verbally-represented (as opposed to visceral) goal system. In summary, the general framing of personal strivings as intersystem mediators received inconsistent support in the present investigation.

The Bi-Level Motivational System in Perspective

The approach taken thus far in the present discussion has been to account for findings relevant to individual hypotheses piecemeal. Along the way, separate explanations have been advanced for each group of findings, many of which were unpredicted and/or nonsupportive. This bevy of speculations should not obscure a more basic fact. Experimental hypotheses were generally not confirmed, and thus, strong support for McClelland et al.'s bi-level motivational system has not
been obtained. Indeed, the most parsimonious explanation for obtained patterns is that the implicit/self-attributed motive framework is faulty. Although parsimonious, however, such conclusions seem unwarranted in the face of two findings. First, the most basic unpredicted finding of the present study is that contrasexual implicit and self-attributed motives do evidence substantial correspondence. When both are adequately sampled, then, contrasexual implicit and self-attributed systems evidence an appreciable interrelation. Second, this baseline correspondence can be enhanced by various self-consciousness variables: low inner-directedness, or artlessness, enhances intermotive correspondence for males and perhaps females, while low other-directedness further enhances congruence for females. While both these findings are assimilable via McClelland et al.'s model, albeit with a few modifications to account for gender effects, they are not assimilable by psychometric explanations: if operant and respondent measures do not interrelate because of psychometric shortcomings, then this interrelation should hold for gender-congruent and contrasexual motives. It does not. Furthermore, psychometric explanations do not readily account for intermotive correspondence's mediation by self-consciousness variables, regardless of the direction of mediational effects. If the misalignment is "in the
measures," then factors "in the person" should not substantially reduce misalignment.

Limitations of the Present Work and Suggestions for Future Research

The present work has serious limitations in the areas of statistical conclusion validity, internal validity, and external validity. The major problems in each of these areas will now be addressed. Statistical conclusion validity was firstly compromised by small Ns, which resulted in low statistical power. This limitation was especially evident in within-gender analyses, where memberships in various comparison groups (e.g., low other-directedness males, high inner-directedness females, etc.) typically ranged from 20-30. Additionally, the sheer number of analyses conducted (over 60) certainly led to a few spuriously significant results. The above factors probably interacted with the idiosyncrasies of various statistical techniques to produce the rampant inconsistencies observed between (seemingly) parallel mean-comparison and correlational analyses.

The most prominent threat to internal validity stems from the present work's basis in correlational, rather than experimental, approaches. The characterological natures of inner- and other-directedness prevented the experimental manipulation of the variables, as well as the subsequent random assignment of subjects to high- and low-
inner/other-directedness conditions. Consequently, other uncontrolled variables were left free to covary with experimental variables. Indeed, such unchecked covariation may account for some of the unexpected findings: constructs such as defensiveness, hypervigilance, insightfulness, inner receptivity, openness to experience, and dependence may relate to one or the other of the focal variables. Indeed, measures for inner- and other-directedness have as yet to be empirically discriminated from the above concepts.

The inviability of random assignment in the present research also fostered ambiguity regarding the direction of causal influence. As elaborated earlier, it is unclear whether the self-consciousness variables cause intermotive noncorrespondence or reflect symptomatic reactions to it.

As regards external validity, the present research is hampered by its exclusive focus on college students. It is by no means clear that relationships obtained for individuals traversing the maturational threshold between familial embeddedness and adult autonomy would generalize to fully individuated adults. Similarly, propositions unsupported by the data may in fact hold for an older, adult population.

The most obvious general suggestion for future research is that the present investigation be replicated. Such a replication would feature the post-hoc explanations
advanced above as a priori hypotheses. For example, moderate contrasexual intermotive correspondence would be predicted, and inner-directedness would be expected to relate to decreased correspondence. Future research in this area would additionally do well to examine other potential mediators of intermotive alignment. For example, neuroticism and anxiety should be related to motive misalignment, while maturity, integration, and subjective well-being should be related to relative motive alignment. A particularly powerful test of McClelland et al.'s (1989) ideas might be conducted in a mental health setting: psychotherapy should enhance intermotive congruence, and therapists' ratings of psychological integration should roughly correspond with operant-respondent alignment.

On a more general note, motivational researchers, especially those employing TAT motive measures, should be alerted to the need for more rigorous motive assessment. The present study relied upon the comprehensive, composite assessment of general motivational clusterings. This broader sampling allowed for the uncovering of a relationship that departs from the lack of intermotive correlation reported by the TAT community. In short, researchers such as McClelland (1980) and Koestner et al. (1988) may be confusing sampling error with motive noncorrespondence. Gender, as discussed earlier, seems to
be the biggest mediator of motive congruence. Should future replications corroborate this conclusion, then McClelland et al.'s (1989) system must be refined to account for gender effects. Some tentative refinements of this sort were advanced above. It is also incumbent upon implicit motive researchers to develop alternate measures of implicit motives—measures that relate with TAT indices in predictable ways. The demonstration of such relationships is crucial to the implicit system's validity as a legitimate, coherent domain. While the present study employed alternate implicit motive measures, they were of insufficient length to definitively speak on this issue.

Summary

The primary aim of the present investigation was to examine and clarify the well-documented failure of operant and respondent motive measures to interrelate. Critics such as Entwisle (1972) and Raven (1988) have implicated psychometric flaws in one or the other type of measure as the cause for this failure. For them, both types of measure tap the same construct, only more or less well. McClelland et al. (1989), on the other hand, assert that operant and respondent measures tap distinct motivational layers within the individual, layers which need not be in accord. Obtained results were partially supportive of both psychometric and construct-based explanations, though
definitively supportive of neither. The psychometric perspective was vindicated in that predictions for strivings and personality abilities were generally not supported. Additionally, the comprehensive, composite measurement of agentic and communal motives apparently allowed for the uncovering of intermotive relationships previously submerged in measurement error. In short, contrasexual motives showed an appreciable amount of correspondence, while gender-congruent motives did not. Psychometric explanations, however, can accommodate neither (1) low other-directedness' predicted congruence-enhancing effect (females' communal motives only), (2) the mediation of intermotive congruence by gender, nor (3) inner-directedness' unpredicted congruence-lessening effect. While McClelland et al.'s (1989) bi-level motivational theory did not predict the latter two findings a priori, it can be modified post hoc to account for them. The restriction of normative motive misalignment to gender-congruent domains probably follows from the parental/societal imposition of explicit gender schemata. It is further proposed that inner-directedness and other-directedness are responses to motive incongruence, or neurosis, rather than facilitators of it.
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The dissertation submitted by Barry J. Hoffman has been read and approved by the following committee:

Alan S. DeWolfe, Ph.D., Director
Professor, Psychology
Loyola University of Chicago

Dan P. McAdams, Ph.D.
Professor, Human Development and Psychology
Northwestern University

Patricia A. Rupert, Ph.D.
Professor, Psychology
Loyola University of Chicago

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation, and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

\[10/9/92\]
Date

[Signature]
Director's Signature