Herakleia Trachinia in the Archidamian War

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HERAKLEIA TRACHINIA IN THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR

By

Mychal P. Angelos

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May, 1993
For Dorothy

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VITA

The author was born in Chicago, Illinois in 1929. He first entered Loyola University of Chicago in 1946 where he followed a liberal arts program. He was admitted to the University of Chicago Law School in 1948 and was awarded the Juris Doctor degree in 1951. He was admitted to the Illinois Bar in the same year and has been in private practice as an attorney in Chicago for 41 years.

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Mychal Peter Angelos is presently senior partner in a Chicago law firm, specializing in civil litigation.
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<td>AA</td>
<td>Acta Antiqua. Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHR</td>
<td>American Historical Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJA</td>
<td>American Journal of Archaeology</td>
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<td>AJP</td>
<td>American Journal of Philology</td>
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<tr>
<td>CQ</td>
<td>Classical Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GICR</td>
<td>The Great Isthmus Corridor Route</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCAC</td>
<td>The Journal of the Classical Association of Canada. Phoenix</td>
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<td>JFA</td>
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In the first years of the Archidamian War Sparta resolved to gain quick victory by invading and devastating Attica. Under the persuasive influence of Perikles the Athenians responded by seeking protection behind their walls and by avoiding pitched battles. They followed this strategy successfully until several years after Perikles' death. The Spartan invasions proved ineffective; thus, Sparta initiated a new strategy. It aimed to destabilize Athens' alliances in Thrace and the Hellespont, disrupt the tribute from these allies and, possibly, deprive Athens of its grain supply from the Black Sea.

Execution of these plans required a secure route to Thrace for uninterrupted flow of support troops and logistical supplies. In the following it will be shown that such a route was not only gained by Sparta, but was secured and controlled during the Archidamian War by an unprecedented colonization effort of the Spartans in Trachis with the foundation of Herakleia Trachinia in 426.¹

¹ All Greek names, toponyms and terms will use the Greek spelling, with the exception of commonly used spellings in English which are different from the Greek. All dates given hereafter will be B.C., unless otherwise noted.
Ancient sources and modern commentators place the new colony in the environs of the Trachinian cliffs along the southwestern rim of the Malian Gulf,\textsuperscript{2} and concentrate on Herakleia’s proximity to Thermopylai as the raison d’être for its existence. Recent investigations of the Phokis-Doris Expedition of Loyola University contradict these theories.\textsuperscript{3} According to topographical and geological evidence, Herakleia could not, nor did, neutralize Thermopylai. Instead, Herakleia controlled an all-weather road system within a natural Isthmus Corridor west of Thermopylai that connected the Malian and Corinthian Gulfs and bypassed Thermopylai. Located near the Corridor’s northern entrance, the Dhema Gap, Herakleia was the key for Spartan movements between Central and Northern Greece.

This study is based on autopsy and topographical research that the author completed in three seasons as a member of the Phokis-Doris Expedition in Greece. It will argue that Sparta selected the site of Herakleia to control this road system through Central Greece to implement new strategic plans in the latter part of the Archidamian War, 426-421.

\textsuperscript{2} I accept with some reservations the generally accepted locus of the colony. A detailed discussion of the site of ancient Herakleia and its topography, based on ancient sources, modern investigators and autopsy will be given below.

\textsuperscript{3} E. W. Kase et al. (eds.), The Great Isthmus Corridor Route, Minneapolis, 1991
CHAPTER II
PROLEGOMENA

Beginnings

At the beginning of the Archidamian War the declared purpose of the Spartan Alliance was the liberation of the subjects of Athens (2.8.4). According to Thukydides, however, the true explanation for the Spartan initiative was fear created by the growth in Athenian power (1.23.6), and the consequent Spartan resolve to break that power and to dissolve the Athenian Empire (1.88; Gomme 1945:256; Hammond 1986:347).

For Sparta, a land power, the strategy was simple: march into Attica in the spring to destroy homes and growing crops outside the walls of the city. Such invasion had proved successful against Athens in the past. Faced with the

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4 References to book and chapter in which the author's name is not given are to Thukydides.

5 Attica was invaded in 431, 430, 428, 427 and 425. The longest period of time the Peloponnesians spent in Attica was 40 days in 430 (2.57); the shortest was 15 days in 425 (4.6.2). In 429 there was no invasion, perhaps for fear of the plague (Kagan 1974:101-2). Instead, that year the Spartans began the siege of Plataiai.

6 In 446 King Pleistoanax of Sparta invaded and laid waste Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria (1.114). Not long afterwards the Athenians made a truce with the Lakedaimonians and their allies which was to last for thirty years (1.115.1).
invasion of Attica, the Athenians could either go out to fight the enemy and meet certain defeat, or retreat within the walls and see homes and crops destroyed. Effective siege techniques against walled cities had not been mastered by the Greeks of the fifth century, and the storm or siege of Athens was not therefore considered a feasible alternative.

Athenian strategy, following Perikles' mandate to counter the Spartan offensive, was clear: neither offer nor accept a land battle with the enemy; consider Athens an island to be safeguarded, and, if necessary, abandon homes and lands (1.143.4/5; 2.13; 2.65/67; Bengtson 1988:138). An expected stalemate with Sparta would mean victory, because Sparta would eventually become disenchanted and seek peace.

7 The Spartans would hope for a pitched battle with the Athenians. In any such battle the Peloponnesians would undoubtedly be victorious. Even Perikles conceded that in a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies were strong enough to withstand all the Hellenes (1.141.6). The Spartans believed that after a year or two of invasions the Athenians would be forced to capitulate. No one believed Athens could last more than three years of repeated devastation (7.28.3).

8 Sparta in particular was inept in siege warfare. The Lakedaimonians had to appeal to Athens for assistance in the siege of Ithome because of their own deficiencies in this technique (1.102.2; Gomme 1945:301; Kagan:1969:71; 1974:20).

9 Perikles' strategy has been compared with the strategy of attrition of Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War (Delbrück 1975:135-142, espec. excurs. #2 on p. 140; Adcock CAH 5 196; Bury 1975:253).

10 Sparta had not been too eager to enter the war in the first place, but had deferred to the entreaties of Corinth whose commercial rivalry with Athens kindled the flames which led to the War (1.67-88; Gomme 1945 ad l.c.; Bengtson 1988:135).
Apparently, Sparta had not considered that Athens would be able to withstand the devastation of fields and crops by the importation of food by sea. But, perhaps as early as 429, the Spartans realized that their annual invasions of Attica would not force Athens to capitulate (Busolt 1920:322-323; Gomme 1956b.395). They became aware that Athens' control of the Hellespont and the Bosporos insured regular and unimpeded shipments of grain from the littoral of the northern Aegean and the Black Sea. So long as this food supply lasted, the Athenians could withstand the devastation of Attica. Thus, Sparta had to find another strategy to

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11 The topographical similarity of Athens with her Long Walls to Miletos, which in 496 was able to withstand a long Persian siege because imports from the sea were available (Hdt. 1.17), was probably unknown to Sparta (Brunt JCAC 19 1965:264).

12 By the fifth century Athens was required to import food. Of the four main granaries serving the Mediterranean world in this period, Egypt after 454 was again under Persian influence (1.109.2-3; Diod. 11.75, 77); North Africa was under Carthaginian influence; and Sicily and southern Italy were not only a great distance away but under the influence of Sparta (Ehrenberg 1951:326; Michell 1957:20,228; French 1964: 108-113). The littoral of the Black Sea, and the northern Aegean, were the most important granaries for Athens, also supplying other food stuffs, including dried fish.

interdict the shipment of these supplies and to force the capitulation of Athens.

**Changed Strategy**

Thrace, the littoral of the northern Aegean, was the only region of the extended Athenian empire that was vulnerable by land. If the Spartans, with the most formidable army in Greece, could gain control of Thrace, they could strike a serious blow at Athens' tribute-paying allies.\(^{14}\) Amphipolis in Thrace had the greatest value to Athens (Brunt JCAC 1965:274; Kagan 1974:288); it not only furnished mining revenues and timber, it also commanded the Strymon river crossing and the route to the rich subject allies of Athens on the Hellespont and the Bosporos.

Athens' hold over these territories was tenuous at best. Athenian supremacy in the Attic Maritime League had from the sixties onward induced various members to avoid her oppressive rule (Bengtson 1988:129).\(^{15}\) Furthermore, the revolt of Potidaia in 432 had been followed by revolts of the Bottiaians and Chalkidians, and these revolts had never been suppressed (1.57.5;58;2.79; Bengtson 1988:136). The siege of Potidaia

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\(^{14}\) The formulation of this brilliant strategy has been attributed to Brasidas (Gomme 1956b:395 n. 4; Kagan 1974:196). Cartledge calls Brasidas the founder of Herakleia (1987:45). Thukydides does not comment on Brasidas' role in the formulation of the plan.

\(^{15}\) There is evidence for more than 400 cities in the Attic Maritime League in 425, according to Bengtson (1988:115). Starr states that at its height Athens ruled directly 179 states which included perhaps 2,000,000 Greeks (1989:38).
also had taught a lesson to both Athens and Sparta. Athens became aware of the precariousness of her alliances in that region, and Sparta painfully realized that lack of a land passage to Thrace forced her to abandon Potidaia to Athens.

Thus, a new Spartan strategy was formulated. It aimed to strike at the tribute-paying allies of Athens along the Thracian littoral. The Spartans hoped that the presence of Spartan hoplites in Chalkidike and Thrace would induce other allies of Athens to rebel (Gomme 1956b:359; Busolt 1967:1011 & n. 1) and imperil Athens' supply of grain from the Black Sea (4.108.1; 105.1; Gomme 1956b:580-581; Brunt JCAC 1965:274; Kagan 1974:196; Bengtson 1988:124).

**Sparta's Opportunity**

To implement this new strategy Sparta needed an overland route through Central Greece and Thessaly, as well as an easily defensible base to guarantee the flow of logistical

---

16 After the tenuousness of support in the Chalkidike became clear, Athens attempted to strengthen alliances with the Thracian tribes, particularly the Odrysians, and Macedon. By a diplomatic coup in 431 Athens gained an alliance with Sitalkes, the King of Thrace (2.29). Sitalkes brought about a short-lived reconciliation between Athens and Macedon.

17 Grote accurately observed that it was "the impracticability of such passage" by the Spartans that forced them "to leave Potidaia to its fate" (Grote 6.308).

18 In 432 the Corinthians at the Assembly of Sparta and her allies had suggested that the Spartans assist the allies of Athens to revolt, thereby depriving Athens of revenue and sailors (1.121). Following the revolt of Mytelene in 428, Sparta sent a fleet of 40 ships to assist the rebellious Lesbians (3.26.1).
support to the north (3.92.4; Brunt JCAC 19 1965: Kagan 1974:196).

A unique opportunity presented itself to Sparta, probably by the third year of the Archidamian War, i.e. 429/428, to gain control of such a route through Central Greece and establish a base at a key geographic location in Malis in the direction of Thrace. The route was partially controlled by the Oitaians (Szemler GICR 83-86), whose mountainous region lay between Trachis to the north and the Doris to the south. Unable to resist effectively the aggressive ravaging of their territories by the Oitaians, the Trachinians and Dorians requested Spartan assistance (3.92.2). The Spartans’ response to the invitation was predictable. They decided to dispatch colonists to the Malian Gulf to found a fortified colony, from which they would have access to Thrace.

But Sparta had never been a colonizer, and its expansion had historically been within the Peloponnese. The decision to found a colony was an extraordinary event in Spartan history. Sparta colonized Taras or Tarentum in Italy circa 700 with partheniai, young Spartans born out of wedlock while the Spartan army was away at war, only because the government wanted to get rid of them (Strabo 6.3.2-3). Earlier myths relate Spartan origins for Lyttos in Crete, Lokri in Italy and Thera (A.H.M. Jones 11/12).
Doris was the traditional mother city of Sparta, and for intervention in Trachis, Sparta could claim a moral imperative\(^{19}\) (1.107.2). Omens and natural catastrophes occurring at the time may have also influenced the highly superstitious Spartans that the timing was propitious,\(^{20}\) but the decision was based on newly formulated strategic considerations.

\(^{19}\) Diodoros Sikoulos informs us that it was because of the Spartans' kinship with the Doriens and because Herakles, their ancestor, had made his home in Trachis that they decided to make the colony into a great city (Diod. 12.59.4).

\(^{20}\) The Spartans had consulted the oracle of Delphi in 432 whether it was propitious to go to war against Athens. The god told them they would be victorious, and that he himself would help them (1.118.3). The Spartans might assume that the plague, which struck the population in Athens and the troops of Hagnon besieging Potidaia (2.58.2) was the action of the god. Apollo has traditionally been identified as the god of pestilence. Cf. Smintheos, the mouse-god, in Iliad Bk. 1.

In the winter of 427 a great number of earthquakes occurred in Athens, Euboia and Boiotia (3.87.4). In the same winter the plague broke out again in Athens. In the summer of 426, the year Herakleia was founded, an earthquake forced King Agis of Sparta to abort at the Isthmus the fifth campaign to Attica (3.89.1; Diod. 12.59.1). In the same summer devastating floods occurred in Euboia and the coast of Opuntian Lokris, destroying Athenian fortifications at Atalante (3.89.2-4). Earthquakes also caused the postponement of the meeting of the Ekklesia (5.45.4) According to Thukydides no other period in history witnessed disasters, such as earthquakes, eclipses of the sun, droughts, famine and pestilence as the Peloponnesian War (1.23.1-3).
CHAPTER III
HERAKLEIA: PURPOSE AND FOUNDATION

Ancient Sources

Among the many ancient Greek and Roman literary sources which refer to Herakleia Trachinia,²¹ only Thukydides and Diodoros make any direct reference to the foundation of the colony. Both attribute the foundation of the colony to Sparta's intention to support the Dorians and Trachinians in their struggle against Oitaian aggression.

²¹ All ancient sources referring to Herakleia, other than Thukydides and Diodoros Sikoulos, concern themselves with events occurring in the centuries after its foundation. Xenophon describes the defeat of the Herakleioti by the Oitaioi in 409 and the destruction of its walls by Jason of Pherai in 371 (Xen. Hell. 1.2.18; 6.4.7; 6.4.27; 6.5.23). Pausanias provides valuable descriptions of its topography and environs and its connection with Herodotos' "Pass through Trachis" into Greece, in relating the invasion of Central Greece by the Celts in 279 (Her. 8.31-35; Paus. 10.20.6-8; 21.1-2; 22.1; 22.8; 23.12). Strabo's references to topographical landmarks, e.g. the Asopos river, are invaluable in locating the site (Strabo 8.6.24; 8.8.5; 9.2.23; 9.4.13; 9.4.17). Livy, writing half a millennium after the foundation of Herakleia, describes the city when it was besieged by the Romans in 191. Livy is useful for locating physical landmarks, e.g. the citadel, and confirming Herakleia's strategic importance for the control of the Corridor (Livy 28.5; 31.46; 33.3; 36.15-17; 36.22-25; 36.30). Although none of these authors discuss the foundation of the colony, their importance in assessing its location and strategic importance requires that they be evaluated carefully.
The alleged main purpose is explained by Thukydides as follows:22

XClI. Τπο δὲ τὸν χρόνον τούτον Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἡρακλειαν τὴν ἐν Τραχινίᾳ ἡποκίαν καθίσταντο 2 ἀπὸ τοιαύτω γνώμης. Μηλιῆς οἱ ξύμπαντες εἰσὶ μὲν τρία μέρη, Παράλιοι, Ἰερῆς, Τραχίνιοι τούτων δὲ οἱ Τραχίνιοι πολέμῳ ἐφθαρμένοι ὑπὸ Οἰταίων ὀμόρων δικτών, τὸ πρῶτον μελλήσαντες Ἀθηναίοις προσθείναι σφᾶς αὐτούς, δείσαντες δὲ μὴ οὐ σφίσι πιστοὶ ὦσι, πέμπουσιν ἐς Λάκε
3 δαίμονα ἐλόμενοι πρεσβευτὴν Τεισαμενόν. ξυνε-
πρεσβεύοντο δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ Δωρίης, ἡ μητρόπολις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, τῶν αὐτῶν δεόμενοι· ὑπὸ γάρ
4 τῶν Οἰταίων καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφθείροντο. ἀκούσαντες
dὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι γνώμην εἶχον τὴν ἡποκίαν ἐκτέμπειν, τοῖς τε Τραχινίοις βουλόμενοι καὶ τοῖς Δωριεύσι τιμωρεῖν.

(3.92.1-4)

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22 "It was about this time that the Lakedaimonians established Herakleia, their colony in Trachinia, with the following object in view. The people of Malis, considered as a whole, consist of three divisions, Paralians, Hiereans and Trachinians. Of these the Trachinians after they had been ruined in war by their neighbors, the Oitaianis, at first intended to attach themselves to the Athenians, but, fearing that these might not be loyal, sent to Lakedaimon, choosing Teisamenos as their envoy. And envoys from Doris, the mother city of the Lakedaimonians, also took part in the embassy, making the same request, for they too were being ruined by the Oitaians. After hearing their appeal, the Lakedaimonians were of the opinion that they should send out the colony, wishing to aid both the Trachinians and the Dorians" (3.92.1-4 tr. C.F. Smith).
According to Diodoros, the purpose of the foundation was as follows:

"Αμα δὲ τούτοις πραττομένοις Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὴν Τραχίνα καλουμένην φύκισαν καὶ μετωνόμασαν τὴν Πράκλειαν διὰ τοιαύτας τινὰς αἰτίας. Τραχίνιοι πρὸς Οιταίους ὀμόροις ὄντας ἄτη πολλὰ διεπολέ-μουν καὶ τοὺς πλείους τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπέβαλον. ἔρημοι δὲ οὐσίς τῆς πόλεως ἤξισαν Λακεδαι-μονίους ὄντας ἀπαίκους ἐπιμεληθῶν τῆς πόλεως. οὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν υμνήμειαν καὶ διὰ τὸ τὸν Πράκλεων πρόγονον ἑαυτῶν ὄντα, ἐγκατακτικόν κατὰ τοὺς ἀρχαῖους χρόνους ἐν τῇ Τραχίνῃ, ἐγκυρῶσαν μεγάλην αὐτὴν ποιήσας πόλιν.

Diod. 12.59.3-4

Unlike Diodoros, Thukydides, gives additional reasons for the foundation:

"While these events were taking place, the Lakedaimonians colonized Trachis, as it was called, and renamed it Herakleia, for the following reasons: the Trachinians had been at war with the neighboring Oitaïans for many years and had lost the larger number of their citizens. Since the city was deserted, they thought it proper that the Lakedaimonians who were colonists from Trachis, should assume the care of it. And the Lakedaimonians, both because of their kinship and because Herakles, their ancestor, in ancient times had made his home in Trachis, decided to make it a great city" (Diod. 12.59.3-4 tr. C.H. Oldfather).

"At the same time, the site of the proposed city seemed to them well adapted for carrying on the war against Athens; for a fleet could be equipped there for an attack upon Euboia and the crossing thus made from a short distance away, and the place would also be useful for expeditions along the coast towards Thrace. In short, they were eager to found the settlement" (3.92.4 tr. C.F. Smith).
Thus, Thukydides informs us, almost parenthetically, that the Spartans were also eager to found Herakleia because the site of the proposed city seemed to them well adapted for carrying on the war against Athens, offering as the first reason that a fleet could be equipped there for an attack upon Euboia (3.92.4).

Thukydides discusses the Athenians' concern with the use of Herakleia as a naval base:

\[\text{XClI. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς πόλεως ταύτης ξυνοικιζομένης τὸ πρῶτον ἔδεισάν τε καὶ ἑνόμισαν ἐπὶ τῇ Εὔβοιᾳ μᾶλιστα καθίστασθαι, ὅτι βραχὺς ἐστὶν ὁ διάπλος πρὸς τὸ Κήναιον τῆς Εὔβοιας.} \]

(3.93.1)

Evidently, the Athenians' fears were real. Euboia was a rich and important island, situated on the principal route for Athenian ships sailing to the Hellespont (Kagan 1969:124) and paying sizable tribute to Athens (2.14; 8.9.52). Its loss as an ally would indeed be ominous for Athens and would place an intolerable strain on the empire.

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25 "As for the Athenians, while the colonists were being gathered for this city, they at first became alarmed, thinking it was being established chiefly as a menace to Euboia, because it is only a short distance across from here to Kenaion in Euboia" (3.93.1 tr. C.F. Smith).

26 The immediacy with which Perikles responded to the revolt of Euboia in 446 attests to its importance to Athens (1.113.3; 1.114.1; Plut. Per. 22.1)).
Yet, according to Thukydides, no harm ever came to Euboia from the colony:27

\[\text{επειτα μέντοι παρὰ δόξαν αὐτοῖς ἀπέβη· οὐ γὰρ 2 ἐγένετο ἀπ' αὐτῆς δεινὸν οὐδέν.}\]

(3.93.1)

There is no evidence that Herakleia was ever used by the Spartans as a base for naval operations (Kelly 1987:49); in fact, a Spartan naval assault from Herakleia would have been unrealistic in view of Sparta's previous experiences with the Athenian fleet (Kagan 1974:196).

If the naval docks were built at all, an issue to be discussed below, they did not reflect the intention of the Spartans who relied traditionally on the army, rather than a navy, to accomplish military objectives.28 In giving primary strategic importance to Herakleia as a naval base, Thukydides may have reflected his own fears, rather than the intention of the Spartans. His obsession with the importance of naval power pervades his Histories29 and may have colored his assessment

27 "Afterwards, however, the matter turned out contrary to their expectations; for no harm came from the city" (3.93.1 tr. C.F. Smith).

28 It took the Athenians a long time to appreciate the threat that Herakleia posed for them in Thrace (Gomme 1965b:398).

29 The following are among the numerous references made by Thukydides in Book I to sea power and its importance: in earlier days there was no land commerce (implying communications were all by sea) (1.2.2); Minos, by being the first to acquire a navy, made himself master of the Hellenic Sea (1.4.1); commerce and surplus revenues gained by cities founded on the sea permitted them to thrive (1.71); wealth of
of Sparta's purpose. Thus, Thukydides' statement that Herakleia was intended as a naval base against Euboia is debatable. We may even speculate whether his statement that the colony would also serve as a land base for Thrace was a revision made by him only after Brasidas' march to Thrace in 424 had made Sparta's intent patent.30

islanders seemed to depend on seafaring and the establishment of safe navigation by Minos (1.8.2); Agamemnon was able to assemble his fleet because he surpassed all other princes in power (1.9.1); Pelops acquired his power by reason of the great wealth brought back (by ships) from Asia (1.9.1); Agamemnon ruled over many islands by virtue of his fleet (1.9.4); Agamemnon's fleet in Troy had 1200 ships (1.9.4); as the Hellenes became more powerful and wealthy, they began to fit out navies and apply themselves to the sea (1.1.3.1); the earliest sea fight of record was between the Corinthians and Korkyrians (1.13.3); Hellenes in olden days communicated with one another more by sea than by land (1.1.3.5); the Corinthians raised their city to great power, when they acquired ships and offered a market by sea (1.13.5); the Ionians, by acquiring a powerful navy, kept control of the sea from the Persians (1.13.6); the Phokaians, colonizing Massalla, conquered the Carthaginians in a sea fight 1.13.6); the development of the trireme was made by the tyrants in Sicily and Korkyra shortly before the Persian War (1.14.3); until the Persian War most ships, including the Athenian, consisted only of 50 oars (1.14.3); no expeditions by land resulted in accession of power, only expeditions by sea (1.15.2); Darius was able to enslave the islands because of his possession of the Phoenician fleet (1.16); the Athenians became sailors, when in response to the Persian attacks, they abandoned their city and boarded ships (1.18.2); Athens emerged as the most powerful naval force after the Persian War (1.18.2); Athens maintained her hegemony by taking over the ships of allied cities (1.19)).

30 Thukydides might have kept contemporary diaries of the war which he later revised and "subordinated to a considered design of the work as a whole" (Gomme 5 1981:384). The passages describing the foundation of the colony (3.92-3) also refer to the Boiotian control of the colony and the expulsion of Agesippidas, ca. 419 (5.51-52.1; Gomme 5 1981:408) The question whether the stated purpose of the colony as a roadway to Thrace may have been a textual revision made after
Modern Commentaries: Purpose of Herakleia

Modern commentators appear divided in their assessment of Herakleia's value to Sparta as a passage to Thrace, a reason to which Thukydides apparently assigned secondary importance. Representative examples will suffice.

According to Georg Grote "the passage of troops against the subject-allies of Athens in Thrace, would also be facilitated" by such a colony (Grote 6.308). A. W. Gomme notes that Sparta was exploring other means to win the war by a sea attack and "a distant expedition by land" (Gomme 1956b:395), clearly a reference to Thrace. Donald Kagan suggests that the Spartans intended to expand the land war into Thrace, which is underscored by his consideration of the sea campaign as unrealistic (Kagan 1974:196). Hermann Bengtson hedges his position by stating that Herakleia would provide the Spartans a base against Central Greece (Bengtson 1988:141). F. E. Adcock does not mention the threat to Euboia at all, and suggests that the entire Thracian project was an opportunistic afterthought of Brasidas' adventurism, implemented in 424 only through fear of a Helot uprising (Adcock CAH 5:243). According to J. B. Bury and R. Meiggs, Euboia was the primary purpose for the foundation of the colony, and Chalkidike, the secondary; Thrace is not even mentioned (Bury 1975:265). In N. G. L. Hammond's view the Brasidas' campaign in 424 is unanswered.
primary purpose for the foundation of the colony was a base from which "to push northward to join hands with the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans"; and the secondary purpose an attack on Euboia (Hammond 1986:361). Simon Hornblower suggests that the two motives Thukydides gives are "not quite enough on their own to explain the giant size of the colony", but fails to offer any other reason (Hornblower 1991:505). P. A. Brunt alone appears unequivocal in recognizing that the purpose of the colony was "to attack the only part of Athens' empire which they could reach by land, the Thracian districts" (Brunt JCAC 1965:265-266).

Among contemporary commentators one intriguing suggestion has been raised by G. Bockisch, according to whom Sparta's purpose for the foundation of Herakleia was the creation of a new territory of periokoi in Central Greece (Bockisch AA 1967:311-317). She cites overpopulation at home as a reason, but the assumption of an expansionistic policy for Sparta in the Archidamian War is not supported by the evidence presented and must be rejected.31

31 In Bockisch's earlier publication "Harmostai" (Klio 46 1965:129-23(9), she suggested that Spartan imperialism was Sparta's motive in colonizing the fertile, plains of Malis, citing Lysander's actions, as an example of Spartan policy. The assumption that the post-Peloponnesian War reality of Spartan imperialism motivated Sparta while in a grim struggle for survival with Athens, a half century earlier, is highly questionable. Furthermore, the first mention of Sparta's use of harmosts is not until 412, when Agis provided a harmost for the Lesbians (8.5.2.; Gomme 1956b:623).
If we accept that the purpose of the colony was a base to Thrace, a problem arises, nevertheless, because the ancient sources lack details necessary to identify the parodos, or passage, from the Peloponnese to the Malian Gulf and from there to Thrace, along which Herakleia was situated.

Modern commentators, unaware of the Isthmus Corridor route, have mistakenly concluded that only the coastal road by Thermopylai provided such an access, and the strategic purpose of Herakleia was to secure this coastal road. G. B. Grundy and Johannes Kromayer both considered Herakleia a necessary factor in the defense of Thermopylai (Grundy 1901:264, 268 n.; Kromayer 1907:137).

Such a single-minded focus on Thermopylai, supported by indirect references in ancient sources, has formed the communis opinio expressed by Grundy who explicitly states that no road for military use into Central Greece existed west of Thermopylai (Grundy 1901:267 n.). Grundy also concluded that

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33 Stählin RE 424.68-425.9; Bury 1975:366; Pritchett 1985:190 ff.)

34 Herodotos' reference to Trachis (Hdt. 7.199), the identification by Diodoros of Trachis with Herakleia (Diod. 12.59.3), and the location of the site forty stades from Thermopylai by Thukydides (3.92.6) and six stades from Trachis by Strabo (Strabo 9.4.13).
Herakleia effectively defended the environs of Mt. Oite by commanding the passes through the Asopos gorge to the wide upland plain of Mandritsa (Grundy 1901:264), an assumption which has been proved impossible (Szemler GICR 61). Kromayer also believed Herakleia's importance was in part based on its command of the canyon of the Asopos gorge (Kromayer 1907:140).

According to William Martin Leake, Herakleia "commanded the passes from Thessaly into Southern Greece, as well along the shore by Thermopylae into Locris, as over Mount Oeta into Doris"; but in a later passage he makes it clear that the Asopos gorge is the north-south passage into Central Greece west of Thermopylae (Leake 1835:30-31).

J. A. R. Munro was, perhaps, the first to question that Thermopylae furnished the sole route to Central Greece, and suggests, but does not further identify, a route west of the Asopos gorge (Munro 1902:292 ff.; Szemler GICR 63/64 n. 12). Subsequent investigators, too, sought to define other penetration routes west of the Asopos (Kromayer-Veith 1903-31:2.127; and 4.54/55; Farrel 1910:116/117; Kolas 1933: 72 ff.; Burn 1977:98; ff.; MacKay 1963:241-45; Wallace 1980:15 ff.; Pritchett 1982:220 ff.), but did not connect their suggested routes with Herakleia.

35 Munro states that the citadel of Trachis (later identified as the site of Herakleia) must have been occupied by the Greeks in 480 to bar the Persians the route through the Asopos gorge to Doris (JHS 22, 1902, 313 n. 31).
Some scholars recognized the topographical difficulties and the logistical impracticability of Herakleia controlling Thermopylai. They concluded that Herakleia was not the key to the security of Thermopylai. They saw the value of this fortification in its command of an alternate route, or routes, into Central Greece and Doris, from which easy access to the Kephissos valley or the Corinthian Gulf was available (Cary CQ 1922:98/99; Béquignon 1937:254; Andrewes 1978:96 ff.; Hornblower 1991:505). In their reassessments, however, they concluded, without exception, that the Asopos gorge and Thermopylai were the only principal entrances into Central Greece. This reassessment is best summed up by Yves Béquignon (1937:38):

Dans l'antiquité, comme à l'époque moderne, la vallée du Spercheios ne communique avec les pays plus méridionaux que par deux passages: l'Asopos et les Thermopyles

These investigators were generally unaware of the existence of the Corridor road system, and therefore, did not grasp its close topographical connection with Herakleia. Although Friedrich Stählin incorrectly connected Herakleia with the control and defense of Thermopylai, he is the only

one to recognize the northern entrance to the corridor at Dhio Vouna as the connecting link to Oite from the Spercheios river valley (RE 5A:2401.63), as well as the strategic unity of the Thermopylae-Dhema defensive line (RE 5A:2401.21-28).

The Phokis-Doris Expedition, in which this writer was privileged to participate, discovered and explored this northern entrance to the Corridor at Dhema and its road system located within a natural passage of passes and upland plains through Central Greece, connecting the Malian and Corinthian Gulfs. This Isthmus Corridor, traversing a distance of ca. 37 linear km or ca. 80 km by existing roads, from Amphissa on the south to the environs of the Malian plain on the north, is the only easily negotiable, all-season, well defined road system capable of supporting north-south military and migratory movements through Central Greece (Kase & Szemler 1982:357 ff.). The discovery of the Great Isthmus Corridor route revealed the immense importance of the Dhio Vouna-Thermopylae line as a defensive barrier to Central Greece (Szemler GICR 60-64). Herakleia, connected topographically with the Corridor route and controlling not only its northern entrance, the Dhema Gap, but also, all overland movements between Thessaly and Central Greece, was a main component of this road system. Therefore, the reasons for its foundation by the Spartans and its impact on events in the Archidamian War must be reassessed.

37 Kase, E.W. and Szemler, G. 1982; id. GICR 60-64.
CHAPTER IV

SPARTA IN CENTRAL GREECE

Sparta had an interest in Central Greece long before the Archidamian War. Precedent was established for such intervention when the Spartans sent troops to assist Doris, their metropolis (Tyrtaios Anth. Gr., Diehl 1943), in Central Greece thirty years earlier in an armed conflict, which one may properly entitle the First Peloponnesian War. Sparta had also attempted before the War to expand her influence in the Delphic Amphiktyony. The documented presence of Spartan forces in Central Greece before the Archidamian War precludes the possibility of Spartan ignorance about the

38 Among the aggressive actions taken by Sparta outside the Peloponnese before the Archidamian War were the campaign in Boiotia in 519 (Hdt. 6.108), and in Attica to expel the Pisistradids in 511 (Hdt. 5.63), and the expedition to Thessaly in 470 (Hdt. 6.72). See Hornblower 1991:503.

39 In 457, following a Phokian attack on Doris, Sparta sent hoplites to aid the Doriens and force the Phokians to make peace (1.107.2). With the job done, the Spartans returned home; there was no attempt made at that time to found a permanent base.

40 For fifth century evidence of Spartan interest in the Amphiktyony consider Sparta's unsuccessful attempt to exclude all Greeks who had medized (Plut. Them. 20); also Spartan intervention in Central Greece in the Second Sacred War (1.112). A desire to expand influence in the Amphiktyonic League by gaining control of one of the Trachinian votes has been offered as a motive for the foundation of the colony, although there is no evidence that Sparta exercised this vote until 343 (Hornblower 1991:168,502).
Corridor road system which, before the opening of Thermopylai,41 was the only route connecting the two centers of the Amphiktyony, Anthele and Delphi. Thus, we must safely assume that during the formulation of the new strategic plans, the Spartans were aware of this road system, and they considered the strategic and tactical difficulties, as well as the possibilities, that a fortified eagle's nest at the north end of the Corridor could offer. They properly concluded that a colony anchored at this juncture was expedient not only for expansion into Central Greece, but toward Thessaly and Thrace as well.

To implement these plans the Spartans were confronted with five problems. They had to:

1. select an overland route to the new colony;
2. establish control over the small ethne along this route, either through political negotiation or military action;
3. gain the approval of Delphi for colonizing a new site;
4. ascertain the suitability of the site to build a colony; and
5. secure and fortify the site for execution of their strategic plans.

41 An issue to be discussed below, p. 55.
Lifeline to the New Colony: The Corridor’s Road System

The Spartans had two basic choices for a route to Doris and the proposed site of Herakleia. One route to the new colony could begin at the north coast of the Peloponnese, from which a short ferry trip across the Corinthian Gulf would lead to the south terminus of the Corridor at Kirrha.⁴²

Although Athens was mistress of the sea throughout the Archidamian War,⁴³ Sparta’s numerous allies with about 100 triremes, most of which were Corinthian-built for the Korkyran campaign, made the Lakedaimonian fleet a significant force⁴⁴ (Busolt GGIII 2 863-864; Hammond 1986:345). Spartan influence was especially dominant in the eastern Corinthian Gulf. Athens had relinquished Pegai, Megara’s port on the Corinthian Gulf, to Sparta in 446 under the terms of the Thirty Years Peace

⁴² In 457, the Spartans, going to Doris to assist against a Phokian invasion (1.107.1-2; Diod. 2.79), most probably made a sea crossing from the Peloponnese to Kirrha (Gomme 1956a:314; Ste. Croix 1972:190-95; Szemler GICR 116; contra Hammond 1986:294). This same route was probably used by the Spartans in the Second Sacred War in 449 (1.112.5). After 429, the Athenian naval base at Naupaktos dominated the western end of the Corinthian Gulf and, undoubtedly, the Rhion-Antirhion crossing, ca. 9 km to the southwest of Naupaktos. A disembarkation point in Central Greece further east of Naupaktos would be a necessity for the Spartans.

⁴³ At the beginning of the War Athens had a fleet of 300 triremes, aside from those furnished by Chios, Lesbos and Korkyra (2.13.8; Bengtson 1988:137).

⁴⁴ Although Athens’ base at Naupaktos and Phormio’s brilliant victories in 429 may have dashed the hopes of the Spartans at sea and restricted their passage from the Gulf to the Ionian Sea (Hammond 1986:355; contra Kelly 1987:25-54), there is no evidence that within the eastern half of the Gulf traffic was seriously affected by the Athenian victories.
Corinth, Sikyon and Pellene in Achaia, three of the seven allies of Sparta who furnished ships for the Peloponnesian fleet (2.9.3), were situated in the eastern Corinthian Gulf. Thus, we must assume that Lakedaimonian troops could be ferried safely across the Gulf to Kirrha and to the Corridor's road system from more than one location on the north-eastern coast of the Peloponnese.

An alternate route for the Spartans, avoiding the transfer across the Gulf, would be a relatively long, and possibly dangerous, overland journey through the Megarid, Boiotia and Phokis (or from the Megarid into Attica and then into Boiotia), and then, along the Kephissos river to the Dorian metropolis.

Since the Megarid is the only gateway by land from the Peloponnese to Central Greece, its strategic importance to both sides cannot be exaggerated. Mt. Geraneia stretches

Pellene, the easternmost of the twelve Achaian cities and a neighbor to Sikyon, had become an ally of Sparta at the beginning of the Archidamian War. It often acted independently of the other Achaian cities and on other occasions sided with Corinth and Sikyon (Gomme 1956b:10). By 429 Dyme, the westernmost city of Achaia, had probably also joined the Spartans. Knemos' ships fled to Dyme following Phormio's naval victory (2.84.4; Paus. 7.6.1), suggesting that the city was friendly to the Spartans (Gomme 1956b:219). The rest of the Achaians, although neutral at the beginning of the war, later sided with the Lakedaimonians (2.9.2).

It was the friendship of Megara with Sparta that determined the plans of campaign of both sides at the beginning of the war (Henderson 1927:4). It has been suggested that the Megarian Decrees of 432 were intended by Athens as an economic weapon to force Megara to resume her alliance with Athens. For a discussion of different views on this matter, see Kagan 1969:260-264, esp. n. 36).
athwart this peninsula, a distance of about eight miles, from
the Corinthian Gulf on the northwest to the Saronic Gulf on
the southeast. This range, with ridges as high as 1200 m,
forms a relatively easily defensible boundary separating the
Megarid from Corinth.\textsuperscript{47} Megara had been an ally of Athens
since 460, when, threatened by Corinth, she turned to Athens
for support (1.103.4; Hammond 1986:292). The alliance with
Megara, the first step in the so-called First Peloponnesian
War, afforded Athens protection from invasions from the
Peloponnese.\textsuperscript{48} Following Athens' defeat at Koroneia in 447,

\textsuperscript{47} There are only three routes, other than mule paths,
that traverse this range. On the northwest a coastal road
follows the Corinthian Gulf around the west end of the
mountains to Pegai, the port of Megara, whence it continues
north to Aigosthena, also on the gulf, and then into Boiotia.
On the south another route follows the precipitous coast of
the Saronic Gulf along the Skironian Way around the east end
of the Geraneia range to Megara, whence it continues along the
coast to Eleusis in Attica. Only one route goes through the
Geraneia range by a pass leading to Tripodiskos from where
there is an easy passage to Megara (Henderson 1927:55-56).

\textsuperscript{48} It was at this time that Athens built the Long Walls
from Megara to Nisaia. By controlling Pegai on the Corinthian
Gulf and Megara, passage through the Geraneia range could be
interdicted (Henderson 1927:56). When Sparta intervened in
Central Greece in 457 to aid Doris, Sparta was barred from
returning to the Peloponnese via the Megarid, because Athens
held Pegai and Megara and picketed the pass in the Geraneia
mountains. Sparta was forced to retreat to Boiotia (1.108.1).
Pegai also furnished Athens a base to extend her influence in
the Corinthian Gulf.
Megara revolted from Athenian domination (1.114.1). After the Thirty Years' Peace in 446/445, Athens was also forced to surrender Pegai and Nisaia. As the prospects of continued war with Sparta ballooned, a renewed Athenian control of Megara became a strategic necessity.

The Corridor's South Sector

Both the overland route via the Megarid, Boiotia, and Phokis, as well as the sea route through Kirrho, had to converge through the Central Sector of the Great Isthmus Corridor, the only expedient way to Doris (Hammond 1986:361; Kase GICR 21-22). The city of Kytinion in particular, situated in southeast Doris, occupied an eminently

49 The Megarians revolted, while Perikles was putting down the revolt in Eurobia. The Five Year Peace with Sparta had just expired, and with the Megarid open to them, the Spartans invaded and ravaged Attica. King Pleistoanax and his troops advanced as far as the Thriasian plains, but withdrew upon Perikles' return from Eurobia. (1.114; Diod. 12.5; Plut. Per. 22.1-2).

50 The topographic designations of PDE (Kase GICR 21) will be used throughout. The South Sector of the Corridor route extended ca. 29 linear km from the Gulf of Itea and the plain of Krissa on the south to the Gravia pass on the north. Passing Amphissa the road continued by the low Mouchikri pass to the Vinianni valley and then through the Ambliani pass before reaching Gravia (Kase & Szemler 1982:356).

51 The Central Sector of the Corridor extended from the pass at Gravia (between the Parnassos and the Ghiona mountains) on the south to the modern village of Oiti on the north and encompassed the upper Kephissos river valley, i.e. ancient Doris (Kase GICR 21-22).
strategic position on the Phokian-Dorian frontier. Sparta’s new strategy required control of Kytinion and its environs to maintain the stability of the Corridor route through Central Greece to Herakleia.

If the Spartans chose the short ferry ride across the Gulf, the route would be quicker, safer, tactically brilliant and unexpected and, thus, more decisive. Furthermore, from Krissa they could pass unhindered through the South Sector of the Corridor to Doris. Amphissa, the dominant city in Ozolian Lokris, was a Spartan ally (Diod. 12.42.4); thus, the allegiance of most of the Ozolian Lokrians to Athens (Gomme 1956b:11) would not be a significant impediment to passage through the South Sector and the deployment of Spartan forces in Doris and Oitaia.

Kytinion, identified as the local site of Tsouka Khlonou, is located about 1 km north of the pass at Gravia, guarding the entrance to this pass and controlling both of the routes which pass through Doris (Wallace GICR 53/54; Hammond 1986:361). The importance of this site in relation to the Corridor and the affairs in Central Greece is attested in ancient history (e.g., as the target of Phokian aggression in 457, 1.107.2; and a target of Philip II’s campaign in Central Greece in 339, Aeschin. 3.140; Dem. 18-169-179; Diod. 16.84.1).

The importance of this site for the control of the Corridor is demonstrated by the campaigns of Demosthenes in Central Greece in 426 (3.94.2-3.98) discussed below.

In 426 Eurylochos had no trouble in getting the Myonians, Ipneans, Messapians, Tolophonians, Eupaliones, Oineones, and other Ozolian Lokrian tribes, to cooperate with him in his campaign against Naupaktos, subduing some and taking hostages in others to get them out of their Athenian alliances (3.101.2; Hornblower 1991:515/516).
The Corridor' Central Sector

Obviously, the Spartans must have been aware of the obstacles with which, at any time, they might be confronted in their passage through the Megarid, Boiotia and Phokis. The Phokians' attitude toward any such Spartan move was especially critical. The tribal state of Phokis extended westward from Boiotia along the Kephissos river to Doris. 54 Within this land-locked valley in Phokis, wedged between Mt. Parnassos on the south and Mt. Kallidromos on the north, the overland route via the Megarid and Boiotia made its way westward to join the Great Isthmus Corridor route. 55

Phokis had a longstanding friendship with Athens which began shortly after the Persian War. 56 At the outbreak of

54 The Catalogue of Ships attests to the unity of the Phokians, but also to the existence of numerous cities (Il. 2.517-23). To the Phokian tribal state cf. Schober 1924:55. Before the Thessalian conquest, and probably stimulated by it, in the seventh and sixth centuries, there is Phokian representation in the Amphiktyonic League (Larsen 1967:43-44). The minting of Phokian coinage suggests a federal organization (Head 1911:338). No single city dominated the whole (Larsen 1967:43), but each reserved some independence of action.

55 The overland route through Phokis joined the Great Isthmus Corridor route in Doris, ca. 1 km south of the modern village of Oiti (Kase GICR 30).

56 The Phokians had allied themselves with the Athenians, as "the acclaimed winners at Sestos, the new, powerful star of the Aegean" (Szemler GICR 116). In 457 following the battle of Oinophyta, Myronides subdued the whole of Phokis, as well as Opuntian Lokris (1.108.3; Diod. 11.83.2), an indication that perhaps this early alliance had eroded. In 454/453 Phokis, prompted by her enmity to Sparta, Thebes and Thessaly (Hammond 1986:396), concluded another alliance with Athens (Kagan 1969:120). In 449, in the Sacred War, Sparta intervened in Central Greece and took control of the sacred precinct of
the Peloponnesian War, however, Phokis was allied with Sparta (Diod. 12.42.4; 1.9.2; 2.9.3). Since the Phokian confederation had no central control, this alliance was tenuous. The western Phokians might at any time rejoin Athens if the opportunity arose (3.95.1), or Phokian aggression might at any time expand into the Central Sector and defeat Sparta's plans. For the Spartans to maintain uninterrupted control of the Corridor's Central Sector it was necessary to keep the Phokians in check, either by alliance or force. This factor greatly influenced military events in Central Greece after the Archidamian War began.

In response to the destructive Spartan raids on Attica, and after Spartan troops withdrew to winter quarters, Athens cautiously began invading the Megarid, once or twice a year Apollo from the Phokians and delivered it to the Delphians. Athens then, in 447, in a show of strength, restored the temple to the Phokians (1.112.5). Athenian influence in the area continued, even extending to the capture of Chaironeia in Boiotia (Hammond 1986:308). After the decisive defeat of Athens at Koroneia in 446, Athenian aspirations for continental power in Central Greece ended. She was forced to evacuate Boiotia and, without Boiotia, Phokis, as well as Opuntian Lokris, became untenable (Kagan 1969:124). In these circumstances Phokis was forced to join the Spartan League soon after the conclusion of the Thirty Years' Treaty between Sparta and Athens (Hammond 1986:311).

The geographical isolation of Phokis and its exposure to the growing Boiotian influence had strengthened Sparta's hand in gaining this alliance (Gomme 1956b:402).

The split in allegiance between eastern and western Phokians was demonstrated in the third century, when the eastern Phokians allied with Antigonos Doson in 224 and with Philip V in 219, while the western Phokians, allied with the Aitolians, blocked the Dhema-Thermopylai defensive line (Pol. 2.52.7; Larsen 1968:19-20).
Since these annual raids into the Megarid occurred only after the Spartan armies had retreated to the Peloponnese, there was no risk to the Athenian hoplites, nor any inconsistency with the declared Periklean strategy of fighting a defensive war.

Thukydides does not give us any explanation for these military actions or raids, but evidence suggests a purpose other than mere harassment. The 431 invasion, for instance, involved the largest army of Athenians ever assembled (2.31.2). The size of this army belies a purpose limited to the devastation of the Megarian countryside. Continued aggressive military action in the Megarid suggests that Athens must have been aware of Sparta’s new strategic plans, probably through its spies or contacts at Delphi.

After the death of Perikles in 429, these raids intensified. His absence from the strategia appears to have strengthened the role of the faction seeking aggressive action. In fact, between 429 and 426 Athens abandoned her

59 Other explanations offered for the campaigns are sanctions imposed against Megara for religious misdeeds and a grudge entertained by Perikles against the city (Plut. Per. 30.2-3; Adcock, CAH 5:198-99).

60 Some scholars state that a change in the membership of the strategia in 426 put the war faction in control (West 1924:201; Beloch 1931:324). Others have suggested that the strategia in 426/25 had the same mixture of radicals and moderates as in previous years, and that the change in strategy was due not to politics but to policy (Gomme 1956b:195; Kagan 1974:187-88; Bengtson 1988:141).
strategy of attrition, the "Ermattungs-Strategie" of Hans Delbrück (Delbrück, 1957:139 ff.) in favor of more aggressive policies. Athenian tactical moves suggest such an awareness.

In 427 Athens captured the island of Minoa, taking a major, decisive step to regain control of the Megarid. The island was garrisoned, and Nisaia, Megara's port on the Corinthian Gulf, was effectively blockaded (Hammond 1986:360).

But Sparta did not remain inactive. Under the command of Archidamos, the Spartans attacked Plataiai in 429 (2.71.1), probably about the same time when they decided to found Herakleia. Thukydides gives no reason why the Spartans

61 Among the aggressive campaigns of Athens in this period were the quelling of the revolt in Mytelene (3.18.4-5); intervention in Sicily to aid Leontini (3.88); the garrison at Minoa (3.51); intervention in Korkyra (3.69-85); attack on Melos and the Lokrian coast (3.91); Demosthenes in Leukas and Aitolia (3.94-98); defeat of Peloponnesians at Olpai (3.105-115).

62 Minoa, now a hill on the mainland, but in the fifth century an island at the entrance to the harbor of Nisaia, was captured by Nikias. The use of the island as a watch station for traffic in and out of Nisaia is the only reason Thukydides gives for the Athenian action (3.51).

63 In 424, two years after Herakleia was founded, and while Brasidas' armies were preparing for a march to Thrace, Athens captured Nisaia, again resuming a campaign, unsuccessfully, to gain control of the Megarid. Since the Athenians had believed erroneously that the capture of this port would compel the surrender of Megara (4.69.1), the Athenians did not pursue the invasion of the Megarid (2.31.3). Megara, however, remained allied with Sparta, and passage to Central Greece through Megara's land routes remained open to the Lakedaimonian armies.
undertook this protracted siege to capture the city, but its importance for the free passage of Spartan armies to Central Greece must not be overlooked.64

Plataiai is situated on the north slope of the Kithairon range which, continuous with the Parnes range to the east, forms the border between Boiotia on the north and Attica and the Megarid on the south. Any troop movements into Boiotia from Attica would be exposed to a flank attack at Plataiai.65

The only other road which enters Boiotia from the south follows the coast of the Corinthian Gulf from the Megarid around the west end of the Kithairon range, and it is also

64 The strategic importance of the site has been generally accepted (Grundy 1901:110-116; Busolt 1926:964; especially, Henderson 1927:73-74; Adcock, CAH 5:211). Kagan, conceding its importance, states there is no evidence that control by Athens would disrupt Sparta's communication with Boiotia, and he concludes that Sparta's need for such a land campaign was doubtful (1974:102-3). Grote suggests a desire for revenge against Plataiai for the execution of Theban prisoners (2.6.4) caused Sparta to act (1907:6.213). J.B. Bury states Plataiai commanded the road from Megara to Thebes (1963:410).

65 There are only three passes through these mountains suitable for troop movements from Attica into Boiotia: Dekalea, on the route from Athens to Oropos on the Euripos; Phyle, running northwesterly, and the most direct route from Athens to Thebes; and Dryoskephalai, which pierces the Kithairon range into Boiotia about eight miles south of Thebes. Plataiai is situated on a junction road a few miles to the west of the Dryoskephalai pass. The important defensive outposts of Attica, Oine and Eleuthera, are situated on this route a few miles to the south of the pass.
exposed to attack from Plataiai. The road from Boiotia led through the relatively narrow pass at Parapotamioi to Phokis, and then up the valley of the Kephissos river through Phokis to join the Central Sector of the Corridor route ca. 1 km south of the modern village of Oiti (Kase GICR 30).

The concern of Sparta was not to garrison Plataiai with hoplites, but to insure that Athens' loyal ally would not be able to offer assistance in any venture Athens might undertake in Central Greece against Sparta.

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66 This is the only road into Boiotia that does not pass through Attica. It passes through Pegai and Aigosthenai in the Megarid and enters Boiotia near Kreusis about eight miles to the west of Plataiai. Hammond makes the unlikely suggestion that the route was used by the Spartans in 457 when they marched into Central Greece to settle the Dorian-Phokian conflict (Hammond 1986:294). Kleombrotos may have used it when he withdrew from Boiotia (Xen. Hel. 5.4.20), and the Spartans after their defeat at Leuktra in 371 (Xen. Hel. 6.4.26). A hostile army entering Boiotia from this road and approaching Thebes would encounter the Plataians head on; an army headed northwesterly into western Boiotia, or to the Kephissos valley beyond, would be exposed to a flank attack at Thisbe or Leuktra.

67 Strabo gives a full description of the position of Parapotamioi (Strabo 9.3.16). The site has been located at modern Belesi on a mound dominating the pass through which the Kephissos river flows from the main basin at Elateia in Phokis to the first plain of Boiotia at Khaironeia, a distance ca. 7 km to the south (Fossey 1986:69-71).

68 Before commencing hostilities King Archidammos proposed that the Plataians avoid any assault on their city by maintaining their neutrality both to Athens and to Sparta (2.72.1). Archidammos even suggested the Spartans would hold in trust for the Plataians, until the war was over, all their lands, buildings, and fruit trees (2.72.3). There is no evidence that Sparta was not sincere in this overture (contra Kagan 1974:104). Plataiai was finally sacked in 427, the city razed, and the land incorporated into the territory of Thebes,
The Corridor's North Sector

Herakleia was planned to be built in the environs of the North Sector of the Corridor route, which extended from the modern village of Oiti (Gardhikaki) and the east-west ridge forming the south watershed of the Asopos Basin on the south, to the modern village of Kostalexi in the Malian plain on the north, a distance of ca. 15 km (Kase GICR 27-31). From the village of Oiti the road system provided an easy and gradual descent across the potentially hostile Oitaian territory, skirting the formidable citadel of Kastro Orias, to arrive, at a distance of six km, at the Dhema Gap. The pass at Dhema, controlled at various times by different ethne, was the only feasible passage between the Isthmus Corridor road system and the Malian Gulf. From the Malian Gulf two roads approached

69 Kastro Orias is comparable in extent and defensibility to Acrocorinth (Wallace GICR 49). A suggested identification of the site is ancient Homilai (Philippson 1950:335-36). The site most likely was an Oitaian stronghold (Szemler GICR 81, 83-86).

70 The Dhema Gap or Pass, located ca. 300 m south of Kato Dhio Vouna, is about 500 m long by 50 m wide (the actual stenon measured at 18.20, + 0.50 m Kase GICR 25) and formed by the westernmost end of the Trachinian cliffs and the easternmost end of Mt. Oite (Mt. Tsouka). The mountain stream of the Xirias river bisects the pass and its valley furnishes a route for access (Cherf GICR 56; 1983:5, 23-30). PDE has established that the Dhema pass was "the pass through Trachis" of Herodotos (Hdt. 7.176.2; Kase GICR 23-25; Kase & Szemler 1982:356-62).
Dhema, merging into one road just south of Kato Dhio Vouna before entering the pass.\textsuperscript{71}

Less than 0.3 km south of the Dhema pass, a secondary road branched off the main Corridor roadway and ascended ESE to the upland Pergara plain located south of the Trachinian cliffs and connected with the north escarpment of these cliffs, only 5 km away. It was upon these cliffs that Herakleia would be founded. The topographic details of the "Herakleia roadway" will be discussed below. The connection of this roadway to the Isthmus Corridor route insured Herakleia its enormous strategic and tactical importance.

\textbf{Stabilization of the North Sector}

As a first step in implementing the new strategic plans, Sparta had to stabilize the recalcitrant belligerents of the North Sector. By the fifth century distinct tribal units with definable territories and boundaries occupied this sector, contesting for control of Dhema and its environs (Szemler GICR 83). The friction among these tribes along the frontier zones for control of the fertile upland plains and the strategically important Dhema pass made the North Sector unstable and

\textsuperscript{71} One road, approaching from the modern village of Vardhates, 2.5 km to the east, crossed the plain of Vardhates, continued westward through the narrow gorge of the Xirias river, piercing a ridge, ca. 80 m high, to the west of and above the modern town of Kato Dhio Vouna. A second road, approaching from Franzi, crossed the Gorgopotamos river and, continuing for 4 km, ascended the foothills of Oite to the village of Kato Dhio Vouna.
incompatible with a secure and reliable all-purpose road system. Before Sparta could establish its colony at Herakleia these tribes had to be pacified and brought under Spartan control. Among these tribes were the Dorians, Oitaians, Malians and Ainianes.\footnote{For an exhaustive discussion of the tribes in the North Sector and their territories (Philipson 1950:334 ff.; Szemler GICR 74-89).}

**Oitaians**

The Oitaians, a loose association of mountain people, occupied a land-locked territory centered around their central cult place on Pyra, near the fountainhead of the Gorgopotamos river and the watersheds between the Mornos and the Asopos and the Mornos and the Kephissos rivers. Their domain, enclosed by the Tsouka massif in the north and the Xerovouni and Katavothra on the west,\footnote{The northwestern frontier ran from Ano Dhio Vouna, situated south of and above the Dhema gap, thence southeast across the Pergara plain where it turned SSE along the Skatias gorge, including within its domain Kouvela and Kastro Orias (Wallace 1980:18/19). Crossing the Asopos river and following its western branch (Karnaria), the frontier zone probably extended SSW between Kalivia Eleftherochoriou and the modern village of Oiti (Gardhikaki) (Szemler GICR 99),} was hemmed in by the Dorians on the southeast, the Phokians on the northeast, and the Malians and Ainianes on the north and northwest.

On the east and southeast, a wide erosion area, which included the upper Kephissos valley and the Central Sector of the Corridor, constituted a triple border where the Dorian, Malian and Oitaian frontier zones, as well as those of the
Dorian, Malian and Phokian, met, the *podeon steinos* of Herodotos (Szemler GICR 83, 99). These border zones must have brought the Oitaians into continuous conflict with their neighbors. Significantly, before the fifth century the Oitaians controlled a greater part of the Corridor's routes from above the Dhema Gap to its descent to the upper Kephissos valley (Szemler GICR 84).

**Malians**

The Malians\(^7^4\) occupied the south and western rim of the Malian Gulf from Antikyra in the west as far as Alpenos of the Lokrians in the east (Gomme 1956b:395; Szemler GICR 78). The watershed of the Tsoukes and Portes mountains to the south of the Gulf probably represented the south frontier of their territory.\(^7^5\) Their frontiers bordered on the Oitaians to the southwest, the Dorians to the southeast and the Ainianes to the northwest. The Trachinians, a division of the Malians, occupied the Trachinian cliffs, upon which Herakleia was founded, and the alluvial fans of the Melas (modern Xirias)

\(^7^4\) According to Thukydides the Malians consisted of three divisions: the Paralians, Hieraians and Trachinians (3.92.2). The Paralians and Hieraians, judging from their name, must have been located along the Malian Gulf and at the religious site of Anthele, respectively. The Trachinians probably occupied the upper reaches of the Trachinian cliffs (Macan 1908:1.297: Gomme 1956b 394; Hornblower 1991:503).

\(^7^5\) From Elafopededema the south frontier of the Malians probably ran NNW, skirting Kastro Orias, and Kouvela, and descended north across the Pergara plain to the Xirias gorge. Thence to the Dhema Gap and Kato Dhio Vouna (Szemler GICR 81).
and the Asopos rivers below (Béquignon 1937:346-48; Szemler GICR 77/78).

**Ainianes**

The Ainianes were located within the open and relatively defenseless middle and upper Spercheios valley west of Stavros (Beki) (Szemler GICR 82), and connected only peripherally with the Corridor. Their expansion to the south would place them into the North Sector of the Corridor in conflict with the Malians. The road leading to the Dhema pass from the north went through the territory of the Ainianes and fits Pausanias' description of the road taken by the Persians in 480 and the Celts in 279.

We do not know who actually controlled the Dhema pass at the beginning of the Archidamian War. It appears from Herodotos that the Malians controlled the pass at the time of the Persian invasions (Hdt 7.201; Szemler GICR 82). If the Malians still controlled Dhema and its environs fifty years later, when Sparta undertook to found its colony, then, the

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76 Herodotos describes Antikyra as the first Malian city one encounters from the country of the Ainianes (Hdt. 7.198.1). The Ainianes, along with the Dolopians, Thessalians and others, had submitted to Xerxes before his arrival at Thermopylai (Hdt. 7.132). Their frontier would extend SSE from Antikyra along the foothills of Mt. Oite toward Franzi and then south to the Gorgopotamos river, Dhi Vouna and the Dhema pass. Thence, it turned west over Tsouka and Xerovouni.

77 Pausanias informs us that the road Hydarnes took, and later followed by the Celts, was not the steep way over Mt. Oite, but the easier way, more passable for an army, through the land of the Ainianes (Paus. 10.22.8). Cf. Szemler GICR 83.
spartans, as the saviors of the Malians, could easily have substituted their own authority in the area. If the pass in 426 was controlled by the Oitaians, Sparta's subduing the Oitains would have placed the pass in Sparta's hands.

Delphi's Role

Before taking action the Spartans, true to tradition, consulted Delphi.⁷⁸ The oracle gave approval and colonists were sent out (3.92.5). Invitations to join the enterprise were extended throughout Hellas (3.92.5). Diodoros Sikoulos informs us of a population of 10,000: 4,000 Spartans and other Peloponnesians and 6,000 other Greeks (12.59). Although the numbers are questionable⁷⁹ even if scaled down, the foundation of the colony would be a major enterprise, demanding time and careful coordination of logistics.

Oikists

The stipulations and terms under which a colony was founded by a mother city were customarily memorialized by

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⁷⁸ Consultation of the oracle was obligatory before the foundation of a colony (Hdt. 5.42.2; Parke and Wormell I 1956:49; A. Misiou, Thoukididou Seigraphei 1958:414). The procedures were very technical and ritualistic. Responses of the oracle were given only at dawn on the seventh day of each month, except the three winter months (Parke and Wormell I 1956:30).

⁷⁹ These numbers have been criticized as impossibly large (Beloch Bevölkerung 1927:512).
inscription on a stele. Unfortunately, no such stele or foundation decree is extant for Herakleia. Our only sources are Thukydides (3.92 ff.) and, four centuries later, Diodoros Sikoulos (12.59.3-5). We are informed that the founders of the colony were three Lakedaimonians: Leon, Alkidas and Damagon (3.92.5-6).

Leon was a well known historical figure. He had an illustrious political and social career in Sparta in the last half of the fifth century. Alkidas had extensive naval experience; he is depicted by Thukydides as incompetent and

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80 For example, an inscribed bronze plaque c. 500-475 (?) by Hypoknemen Lokrians for the establishment of a colony at Naupaktos (Meiggs & Lewis, no. 20=Tod 24). The foundation of Brea by Athens c. 445 is the subject of two fragments of a marble stele (Meiggs & Lewis, no. 49=Tod 44). Cf. Graham 1964:25 ff..


82 In 440 his horses were victorious at Olympia (Eustath. ad Hom. Il. 2.852). In 421 he was recruited as an ambassador to Athens to settle disputes. Eponymous ephor for the year 419/18. (Xen. Hell. 2.3.10). In 411 assisted the Chians in their naval battle against Athens (8.61.1-3). His son, Pedaritos appointed governor of Chios in 412/12 (8.28.5). His son, Antalkidas, was instrumental in the Peace with Persia in 387 (Plut. Artax. 21.5).
There is no further information about Damagon, except this one reference in Thukydides (Graham 1964:38).

The Spartans chose with care. Leon would lend dignity and prestige to make Herakleia a great city (Diod. 12.59) by welding the colonists into a new united population and thereby underscoring to the other Greeks the importance of the enterprise. Alkidas might have been appointed to take charge of the building of the docks at Herakleia or, as Gomme has suggested, his appointment might have been the reward of an easy post in the aristocratic manner in view of his avowed incompetency (Gomme 1956b:395 n. 4). A reasonable interval for the accomplishment of these tasks would be two or three years. Accordingly, the decision by Sparta to found Herakleia may safely be placed to the third year of the Archidamian War. i.e. 429/428.

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83 In 427 he was dispatched with 40 ships to render assistance to Mytelene in her revolt against Athens. By "loitering on the way" (3.27.1 tr. C.F. Smith) his mission failed. On his return voyage home he butchered most of his captives (3.32). When near Ephesus he sighted two Athenian triremes, he "sailed in haste and took to flight" (3.31.1). When he was dispatched to Korkyra to assist an oligarchic coup d'état, he won a naval victory due more to the enemy's incompetence than to his own skills (Adcock CAH 5:221). He failed to follow up the naval victory the next day (despite the urging of his subordinate, Brasidas), and set sail for home upon learning that an Athenian fleet was approaching (3.81.1).
The New Colony and Its Relation to Trachis

Thukydides locates the site of Herakleia in Malian Trachis, forty stadia\(^{84}\) from Thermopylai and twenty stadia from the sea (3.92.6). The territory of Trachis extended from the Spercheios river up to, but not including the komé of Anthele,\(^{85}\) along the ridges of the mountains to the south, between the alluvial fans of the Melas (now the Xirias) and the Asopos rivers.\(^{86}\) According to Herodotos, the Asopos gorge hemmed in the Trachinian territory on the south (Hdt. 7.199). The location of Herakleia must be sought, therefore, within this sweep of land, ca. 2.5 km, running NW from the Asopos gorge along the Trachinian cliffs.

Diodoros Sikoulos\(^{87}\) and Strabo\(^{88}\) furnish additional information to pinpoint the locus of Herakleia by describing the site in relation to ancient Trachis city, presumably the tribal center of Trachinia. The location of Trachis city,

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\(^{84}\) For the metric equivalent of a stade our study will use a mean measure of 172.14 meters. Cf. Jüthner RE 3A:1961-62; Szemler GICR 100 n. 34.

\(^{85}\) If Thukydides (3.92.2) is correct, an issue we may securely assume, Anthele was controlled by the Hieraians. Cf. Gomme 1956b:394.

\(^{86}\) Szemler GICR 77/78. See also footnote 73 above.

\(^{87}\) Diodoros Sikoulos states that the Lakedaimonians colonized Trachis and renamed it Herakleia (Diod. 12.59.3), presumably assuming that the Spartan colony was founded on the same site.

\(^{88}\) Strabo describes Herakleia as in earlier times having been called Trachin, and he locates the city at a distance of about six stades from the old Trachin (Strabo 9.4.13).
therefore, becomes the key for establishing the site of the city of Herakleia.

The location of both Herakleia and Trachis city depends mainly on the identification of the Melas river, which, according to Herodotos, was reached by the Persians five stades before their arrival at Trachis. He informs us that the Persians in 480 marched twenty stades from Antikyra on the Spercheios river to reach the Dyras river (modern Gorgopotamos), and from the Dyras another twenty stades to the Melas river (modern Xirias). Five stades' distance beyond the Melas the Persians passed the city of Trachis, built at the widest point between the mountains and the sea (Hdt. 7.198-9).

Some observers, agreeing that Trachis, located on the foothills of the cliffs adjacent to the actual route taken by Xerxes to Thermopylai, have failed to follow correctly Herodotos' directions. Others have assumed that Trachis

89 The generally accepted identification of the modern Xirias with the Melas of Herodotos is critical to this assessment (Grundy 1901:282; Hignett 1963:360; Szemler GICR 80-81). A problem is that the Melas may be one of two streams now called Mavroneria. Stählin (RE 5A:204) identified the Mavroneri, a tributary of Mavronera, and flowing from Trachinian cliffs as the Melas. Béquignon (1937:64) identifies Stählin's Mavroneri with the Xirias, contra Pritchett who locates the Melas at springs only 0.90 km north of Herakleia and identifies the Xirias, rather than the Gorgopotamos, as the most likely candidate for Herodotos' Dyras (Pritchett 1985:201-202 n. 15). Harmening (in Kromayer-Veith 1903-30:24-25) and Gomme (1956b:396) followed Herodotos' measurements from the Xirias in fixing the site of Trachis.

90 Béquignon (1937:243-244) placed Malian Trachis in the plain south of Moustafa Bey at modern Hiraklion Trachinion, north of the Asopos' exit from the gorge (near Aghia Paraskevi). He concluded that Mycenaean Trachis was located on
city was removed from Xerxes' route. Only a few have followed the directions of Herodotos precisely in locating Trachis five stades beyond the Melas river.

The topographical and archaeological evidence, supported by the literary sources, suggests that a distinct promontory, the hilly ground above, and when the Malians later entered the area of the Malian gulf, Mycenaean Trachis became the acropolis of Malian Trachis (Béquignon 1937:257; Gomme 1956b:396).

Pritchett has located Trachis at the base of Béquignon's Skliphomeli ravine, 0.90 km south of a mountain spring which Pritchett incorrectly identified as the source of the Melas and from which he concluded Herodotos took his measurements (Pritchett 1985:201-204).

Leake concluded that the Trachis of Herodotos occupied the low ground between the Mavroneria (Xirias) and the Karvunaria rivers (Asopus) (Leake II, 1967:29). Munro concluded that the Trachis of Herodotos occupied the low ground and that only after Herakleia, originally founded on the same site, moved up the hill in later centuries, did the lower town, six stades below, become exclusively known as Trachis (Munro JHS 22 1902:313).

Stählin placed Trachis six stades out on the alluvial fan below the Trachinian cliffs, in the area of modern Hiraklion Trachinion (Stählin H.T 208 and RE 6A:1863 ff.). Pausanias refers to the ruins of Trachis at the end of a path past Herakleia (10.22.1), suggesting to one observer that in 426 Trachis was abandoned and became the acropolis of Herakleia (Levi, 1971:263 n. 631). Cf. Szemler GICR 76-77.

Grundy (1901:264-283) concluded not only that Herakleia was at a different site than Trachis, but he suggested Trachis was in the Kastro-Orias-Kouvela area, as the crow flies, five km south of Vardhates. The site has never been securely identified (Harmening A.S. 25 n. 2). Koliás, EEBS 10:80-81 (1933); Lolling 1989:135; see Béquignon 1937:254).


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named Rakhi ta,93 about 18 m above the Malian plain and ca. 1.5 km WNW of the Asopos gorge is the most likely site of the Malian Trachis of 480 B.C., as well as of the Homeric Trachis of Achilles94 (Szemler GICR 80). The distance from Rakhita to Vardhates, the outlet for the Xirias river (Herodotos' Melas) is ca. 850 m. This measurement accords with Herodotos' statement that Trachis was five stades (860.7 m) beyond the Melas river. Late Mycenaean pottery found at this location and a cist grave (L.H. III A-B) in nearby Vardhates confirm the early occupation of the area (Simpson and Lazenby 1959:103-104; Wallace GICR 48). From its proximity to Vardhates Trachis would control access to the Corridor (Szemler GICR 81).95

93 A toponym with a probable Slavic origin (Rosser GICR 146).

94 The Catalogue of Ships included the men of Trachis as part of the contingent under Achilles' command (Il. 2.681.5). That the kingdom of Peleus was centered in the Spercheios valley is established (Simpson and Lazenby 1959:102). Some scholars have raised doubts whether there ever was a Homeric Trachis. Others question whether Herodotos' city was a continuation of the Homeric city, and, despite the explicit distances given by Strabo, locate the Trachis of Herodotos within Spartan Herakleia. For a detailed discussion cf. Szemler GICR 78.

95 Since the sea extended to the base of Kallidromos in the Mycenaean period, there was no passage at Thermopylai at that time (Kraft GICR Chap. I). Trachis controlled the only access to Central Greece. The coast line in that period was not as far west and along the Trachinian cliffs as in ca. 4500 B.P. (Kraft GICR Fig 1-1 to 1-10), but it had to be further west than appears in contemporary maps. It was probably north and west of Moschohori in the south and just north of Frantzi in the west (Szemler GICR 78), so Trachis at that time was probably on the water.
The site Rahkita cannot, however, be the site of Spartan Herakleia. Although there is easy access from Rahkita to the corridor through Vardhates (Paus. 10.22.8; Szemler GICR 132 n. 56), the Trachinian cliffs, which rise dramatically and precipitously to the south of the site, obstruct all views to the south. With no vista to the south, Rahkita would have difficulty monitoring activity in the North Sector of the corridor, and particularly, the Oitàians, whom the colony was ostensibly founded to subdue. Furthermore, the distance from Rahkita to Thermopylai is ca. 46.4 stades (8 km), significantly greater than the 40 stades (6.9 km) which Thukydides gives for the distance from Herakleia to Thermopylai (3.92.6).

Béquignon, Munro, Leake, W. Kendrick Pritchett, and other observers, have correctly placed Herakleia between the Asopos and the Xirias rivers, but they

96 The railroad, constructed in 1890 and passing above Rahkita, was required to blast tunnels blasted in the cliffs, since there was no room for switchbacks.

97 Béquignon concluded the later citadel of Herakleia was on the site of Mycenaean Trachis (Béquignon 1937:257).

98 According to Munro, Herakleia was founded on the site of ancient Trachis, but when Herakleia moved up the hill in later centuries, the lower town, six stades below, became exclusively known as Trachis (JHS 22 (1902).

99 Leake concluded that Herakleia at the Roman siege in the second century occupied the low ground between the Mavroneria (Xirias) and Karvunaria (Asopos) at the same site as the Trachis of Herodotos (II 1967:29).

100 Pritchett (1985:203) located Trachis on the same site as later Herakleia.
have erroneously assumed that Herakleia was established on the site of Trachis city. Contributing to this erroneous conclusion may have been Diodoros Sikoulos' statement (12.59.3) that the Lakedaimonians colonized Trachis and renamed it Herakleia; and Thukydides' statement (3.92.6) that the Spartans built new walls around Herakleia. It is uncertain whether Trachis city was still inhabited when Herakleia was founded. We may, nevertheless, assume that the Spartans strengthened its fortifications, only 1 km away, or alternately, subsumed the city within the defensive perimeters of the new colony.

**Site of Herakleia**

The site of Spartan Herakleia is to be sought on the escarpment of the Trachinian cliffs above the left bank of the Asopos river as it emerges from the gorge, at an elevation ca. 60 to 200 m (Wallace GICR 48; Szemler GICR 118). The site is ca. 7 km from the hot springs at Thermopylai. If Thukydides, in measuring the distance from Thermopylai to Herakleia used

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101 To Gomme (1956b:395 n. 6) the evidence suggests Herakleia was founded on a new site, contra Pritchett 1985:201. This issue will be discussed below, p. 59 ff..

102 Although Trachis existed when Herodotos visited the area, Diodoros Sikoulos states Trachis was deserted when Herakleia was founded (Diod. 12.59.4) The date of Herodotos' visit to the area is uncertain. The final edition of his last three books has been dated to the first years of the Peloponnesian War (How & Wells 1928:1.9 par. 9 and n. 1), in which event his visit to the area would have been before Herakleia was founded.
the hot springs at Thermopylai as the base, as did Herodotos (Hdt. 7.176.2), the distance of forty stades (6.9 km) which Thukydides gives from Thermopylai to Herakleia fits precisely. The placement by Thukydides of the colony twenty stades from the sea also conforms to the assumed coast line in the fifth century, ca. 3.5 km from the Trachinian cliffs, as suggested by geological evidence. This site is, furthermore, ca. 1.0 km SE of Rakhita. The measurement conforms to Strabo’s statement placing Herakleia six stades (ca. 1032 m) from Trachis (9.4.13).

The Herakleia described by Béquignon, for example, extended ca. 0.50 km along the Trachinian cliffs from the Sklirophomeli gorge on the west to the Asopos gorge on the east (Béquignon 1937:245-246). Many monuments which Bequignon described are no longer extant. Toward the northwest along the present road to Ano Vardhates there are only a few scattered sections and single blocks from the circuit wall which Béquignon described. East of the old Lamia road near the

103 Kraft GICR 8/9 and Fig. 8-2. By the fifth century the coast line was further east than in the Late Helladic period and probably followed a line between the villages of Moschohorion and Komma (Szemler GICR 118), a distance of ca. 3.5 km.

104 The eastern wall system of the lower city was completely destroyed by modern activity, especially bulldozing (Wallace GICR 48). Béquignon had reported a 16 meter section of wall, 3 meters high, near Aghia Paraskevi church east of old Lamia road. This wall section no longer exists. The church ruins in the immediate area are not Aghia Paraskevi but reportedly the church of Zodohospigi, washed away by the flooding of the Asopos. The rubble remains of Aghia Paraskevi are about 30 or 40 meters to the south and east.
gorge there are only a few stone remnants of the site identified by Béquignon as the gymnasium.105

Sherds from the Classical period have been found in the plain forty meters below the Trachinian cliffs along with sherds from the Hellenistic and Roman periods, as well as remnants of the circuit wall of the city (Wallace GICR 48). Some investigators identified these remains as the site of the Spartan colony, although the archaeological evidence in the plain suggests the Herakleia of the Aitolian and Roman periods, described by Pausanias106 and Livy.107

The Classical sherds in the plain appear to be washout from the Spartan colony founded at the higher elevation on the escarpment of the Trachinian cliffs. The Hellenistic and Roman sherds, and probably the remnants of the circuit wall, appear to be of a later period when the population of Herakleia expanded into the Malian plain from the colony’s original perch.

105 Cut stones with dimensions as large as 0.65 m x 0.50 m are in situ. Parallel walls, ca. 10 m apart, each 2 blocks high and ca. 3 m long, butt into the living rock of the mountain. Béquignon’s map, however, shows the gymnasium is free standing and in a declivity in the mountain and not abutting it. The gymnasium played a tactical role in the siege of Herakleia in 191 (Livy 36.22.7).

106 10.20.4-in reference to Brennos’ failure to take the city in 279, although he plundered the surrounding fields and slaughtered the people working there.

107 36.16.5-in reference to the battle at Herakleia in 191. Livy probably never visited the area and wrote nearly two centuries after the campaign of Acilius Glabrio, cos. 191. Thus, accepting his topography for fifth century Herakleia is questionable.
CHAPTER V

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF HERAKLEIA

Herakleia's Connection with Dhema and the Corridor Route System

The strategic importance of the colony lay in its proximity to, and tactical connection with, the Dhema pass. Based on autopsy, sight lines from the Trachinian cliffs are unimpeded to the pinnacle of Aetos and to the citadel of Kastro Orias on the south and to the Malian Gulf on the north and west. To the east, the view is unobstructed to the Damasta spur of Mt. Kallidromos, approaching the west gate of Thermopylae. These superb lookout points lend themselves to

108 The hill, Aetos, ca. 6 km SW of Herakleia, was within the core area of the Oitaians (Szemler GICR 83), whose belligerence was instrumental in the foundation of the colony. On the top, at a height of 950 m, there are remnants of a fortification. On its eastern slopes sherds were excavated and dated from the Early Neolithic to the Late Helladic periods. Classical, Hellenistic, Roman and Byzantine sherds, contemporary with Herakleia, were also found.

From Aetos there are clear and unobstructed views of the pass at Dhema; and of the Malian Gulf to the north (from Frantzi on the west to the west gate of Thermopylae on the east). Toward the south, the site dominates the upper Kephissos valley and the Gravia pass (Kase GICR 30; Wallace GICR 50).

109 Kastro Orias, ca. 4 km WSW of Herakleia at an elevation of 743 m, was also in the territory of the Oitaians (Szemler GICR 85). It offers excellent views of the Malian Gulf and Gravia (Wallace GICR 50).
Polybios' description of fire and smoke signalling posts (Polyb. 10.43-47) from which the colony could be alerted immediately of approaching danger from all directions. Herakleia would supply the permanent garrison for Dhema pass, only 5 km away, and control mass movements in and out of Central Greece.

Such a control was made possible by an elaborate road system, (designated by PDE as the "Herakleia roadway" Kase GICR 25), which connected Herakleia with Dhema and the Corridor's road system. This roadway is also the shortest distance from the upland plains of Pergara and Zirelia between Herakleia and Dhema to the Malian Gulf below. The 5 km long road is not a path, but a well-built and well-engineered mountain roadway. It affords immediate and easy passage from Herakleia to the Great Isthmus Corridor. It could have been constructed by the Spartans for direct access to Dhema and the Corridor, when they founded Herakleia (Kase GICR 27).

The road ascends from the escarpments of the Trachinian cliffs by means of wide-angle, banked turns and switchbacks. In its course the roadbed alternates from packed colluvium to rock. The rock cut section of the roadway is ca. 2.20-3.0 m wide, and it uses retaining walls of placed stone on the downside and terracing on the upside. The first kilometer of this roadway from Herakleia negotiates a steep section of the

110 Based on notes dictated to the writer by E.W. Kase at autopsy of the region in 1987. For a detailed description of the Herakleia road see Kase GICR 25-27.
Trachinian cliffs. It begins ca. 180 m southeast of a line of ashlar blocks identified as the ancient city wall and at an elevation of 60 m. As previously noted, it proceeds by wide-angled banks, turns and switchbacks. The road makes a steep ascent to an elevation of 320 m where it turns around a large semi-circular platform identified as the phrourion of Herakleia.  

At an elevation of 435 m the rock cut roadway becomes a narrow causeway separating two ravines: to the north of the causeway, one of the ravines, the Sklihomelion, declines northerly to form a cleft in the face of the Trachinian cliffs and the westernmost limit of Herakleia; to the south, the Siderhoporto ravine declines southward to join the Asopos gorge. The walled citadel of Herakleia was situated in a highly defensible position between these ravines. The identification of this site as the citadel of Herakleia described by Livy in the Roman siege appears certain.

A large rock-hewn semi-circular structure with a diameter of 14.5 m N-S and 12.5 m E-W the perimeter of which is outlined with small cut stones. The site furnishes a 180 degree view of the Malian plain. Wallace, probably referring to the Malian plain rather than sea level, placed it at an elevation of 280 m (Wallace GICR 48). This site was not reported by Béquignon. The foundation of worked stone at a lower elevation and ca. 150 m to the southeast, identified by Béquignon as the phrourion, may have been the meeting place of the Aitolian League (Kase GICR 26).

Livy's description of the siege of the citadel of Herakleia unequivocally establishes this site as the citadel. Acilius Glabrio deployed troops to a cliff about equal in height to the citadel, but cut off from the citadel by a valley so narrow that weapons could be hurled into it (Livy 36.24.8-9).
roadway continued around the south side of the citadel. A short distance west of the citadel the two ravines converge until they are separated only by a narrow causeway on which the road continues.

Beyond the causeway the roadway divides into a north branch and a south branch. The north branch ascends west by northwest, before rounding at an elevation of 520 m the peak of Mt. Panayia. It continues for ca. 2 km around the north end of Delphinon before rejoining the south branch of the road. The south branch ascends to an elevation of 575 m within a distance of 650 m southwest of the citadel. Here, on an eastward projecting flat-topped promontory overlooking the lower end of the Asopos gorge, a site locally identified as Siderhoporto is located. 113

After the north and south branches rejoin west of Delphinon, the roadway continues an easy passage for about 2 km through the well-watered and fertile plains of Pergara and Zirelia, which could have supplied food and water for

113 The ceramic evidence at Siderhoporto is contemporary with Herakleia, and various conjectures concerning its identity have been made. The site may have been the city of Parasopioi, referred to by Strabo (9.2.23,9.5.10). Possibly, the site may have been part of the defensive perimeter of Herakleia (Kase CGICR 44 n. 18). Among modern investigators Munro identified Siderhoporto as the citadel of Trachis, concluding it must have been occupied in 480 by the Greeks to bar passage through the gorge. Hignett believed Siderhoporto was the citadel of Herakleia (1963:357). Stählin shared this view (Plate XII 1, facing page 224). Grundy identified Siderhoporto as the site of Herakleia in the post-Spartan period, concluding it would command passage through the Asopos gorge (1901:264).
personnel of the Herakleia-Dhema-Thermopylai complex. The Herakleia road then joined the Great Isthmus Corridor route ca. 2.5 km north of Kastro Orias (Kase GICR 26). Another branch of the road joined the Isthmus Corridor route ca. 300 m south of Dhema.

**Herakleia's Connection with Thermopylai**

In light of the intimate geographic and strategic connection of Herakleia and its well engineered roadway with the Dhema pass and the Isthmus Corridor route, the connection between Herakleia and the pass at Thermopylai must be reassessed as well.

The geological investigation of PDE has revealed startling evidence proving that until the end of the sixth century the "gates" at Thermopylai were virtually closed by the encroachment of the marine waters of the Malian Gulf upon the alluvial fans of the rivers that drained Mts. Oiti and Kallidromos (Kraft GICR 8). Thermopylai was not suitable for the mass movement of men and goods before ca. 200 (Kraft GICR 6-8) and, therefore, unavailable through the greater part of pre-Roman history as a major access route to southern Greece (Kraft et al. JFA 1987:194; Szemler GICR 110). Thus, when Herakleia was founded, Thermopylai was not yet passable for major military and commercial traffic (Szemler GICT 112), and would not have influenced the Spartans in their selection of a site for their colony.

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Contrary to the *communis opinio*, some scholars concluded that Herakleia was not intended to, nor did it ever, control the pass at Thermopylai, situated ca. 7 km to the southeast (Cary CQ 1922:98/99; Béquignon 1937:254; Andrewes 1978:96 ff.; Hornblower 1991:505). But, without knowledge of the Great Isthmus Corridor route and the pass at Dhema, they assumed that the Asopos river bed, immediately to the east, in a gorge ca. 60-200 m below the Trachinian cliffs was the entrance to Central Greece, and asserted that Herakleia was to secure that entrance and not Thermopylai. Béquignon succinctly expresses this opinion: "Pourtant si Héracléia permit à Sparte de surveiller tout le golfe Maliaque, elle ne commande pas les Thermopyles, mais elle se borne à barrer l'accès en Béotie par l'Asopos" (1937:254).

The misleading assumption that Thermopylai provided the primary access to Central Greece has been reinforced by the interpretation given to a sentence of Thukydides:

\[
\text{neporía te} \\
\begin{align*}
\text{παρεσκευάζοντο καὶ εἴρξαν τὸ κατὰ Θερμοπύλας} \\
\text{κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ στενὸν, ὅπως εὐφύλακτα αὐτοῖς} \\
\text{εἶη.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(3.92.6)

Most commentators who interpret this passage argue that the Spartans, as a defensive measure, fenced off the approach

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114 That the importance of Herakleia was its connection with Thermopylai: Grundy 1901:268; Stählin RE 8.68-425.9; Bury 1975:366; Pritchett 1985:191 ff.. Cf. Chapter III above.

115 Autopsy, however, has shown that passage through the Asopos gorge for any movement, other than occasional mules, is impossible and, in any event, seasonal (Szemler GICR 61-62).
from Thermopylai by presumably placing a wall across the pass itself. Although textual analysis is beyond the skill of this writer, the acceptance of a reading of "εἰρέσανον" (a reading found only in MS E), rather than "ηρέσαντο" (in all other manuscripts), followed by Gomme's characterization of the latter reading as "clearly impossible" (1956b:397), is questionable. The author concedes that the former reading fits syntactically; but the latter reading, found in all other manuscripts, notwithstanding the syntactical difficulties, corresponds more closely to the topographical features of the area. The latter, and possibly more appropriate, reading, i.e. that the Spartans made preparations and began to put up boat slips along the shore toward Thermopylai in the direction of the pass itself, eliminates any suggestion of a wall across the narrows toward Thermopylai.

According to the geological evidence of PDE, it is inconceivable that neoria, i.e. docks for triremes, or other naval vessels with offensive capabilities, would have been built in the fifth century in the shallow waters of the western Malian Gulf adjacent to the coastal road toward Thermopylai.117 These waters may have been deep enough for an

116 Thuk. ad l.c., H. S. Jones and J. E. Powell, eds.; MS E=11th century Heidelberg 252 (Palatinus), in Hall 1913:ad Thuk.

117 Geological core borings suggests that in the fifth century the waters adjacent to the west and middle gates at Thermopylai had a depth of only 1-2 meters (Kraft GICR 8).
Athenian “rowing boat”\textsuperscript{118} to remain near the shore and maintain contact with the Greek army at Thermopylai during the Persian War, or for boat slips for flat bottomed, or slightly v-shaped, boats, not unlike modern sharpies, but probably inadequate for anchoring triremes or other ships with offensive capabilities.\textsuperscript{119}

Thus, according to the reading in the majority of the manuscripts and the topographical evidence, it is improbable that a wall was built by the Spartans across the pass at Thermopylai; and, if a wall was built by the Spartans, as these commentators conclude, we are neither informed of its purpose, nor can we identify an enemy which this wall was intended to block.

It is known there was a wall at Thermopylai, but its location is questionable. Spyridon Marinatos found remains of a wall at the Kolonos hill which he identified as the Phokian wall described by Herodotos (Hdt. 7.176.3-5; Marinatos 1939-40:333 ff.). But, it was shown that this wall, facing southeast, was probably erected in the sixth century by the

\textsuperscript{118} Hdt. 8.21. tr. A. D. Godley.

\textsuperscript{119} The trireme had an estimated draft of 3 feet and with its complement of 170 to 200 men, a displacement of ca. 69 tons (Rodgers 1964:45-48; Casson 1991:85). Such a vessel would appear to require deeper waters than the shore at Herakleia Trachinia provided in the fifth century.
Malians as a defensive wall against Phokian raiders (Szemler, GICR 107).¹²⁰

Ultimately, Gomme's suggestion must be rejected. There is no evidence that the Spartans built a wall, either to secure control of Thermopylai as an easy passage to and from Central Greece, or to remove threats from the north to Sparta's Lokrian, Phokian and Boiotian allies (Gomme 1956b:397). If the Spartans built a wall at all, it was probably intended to defend against forays from the south-east along the coastal road, possibly by the Athenians or their allies.

The erection of a wall at Thermopylai had little strategic significance for the colony whose purpose—as was argued above—was the control of activity in the Corridor's road system.

When Herakleia was founded, Thermopylai was an available, but less direct and desirable, route for entry into Central Greece. Thermopylai had not yet become an essential component of the Dhema-Herakleia defensive complex which, in later centuries, became the main line of resistance against invaders. But even in the later centuries, Thermopylai was the weak link of the defensive line and invariably became the main target for invasions, when passage into the Corridor road

¹²⁰ The wall was mistakenly identified by Herodotos as the wall initially built by the Phokians against the Thessalians and rebuilt by the Greeks in 480 against the Persians (Hdt. 8.27-33). For an analysis of this mistaken identification cf. Szemler GICR 106 ff.
system through Dhema was foreclosed by the defenders of Herakleia.
CHAPTER VI
HERAKLEIA TO THE PEACE OF NIKIAS

Athenian Initiatives in Central Greece

In the year of Herakleia's foundation, Athens conducted two major campaigns in Central Greece. These campaigns were responses by Athens prompted by the change in Sparta's strategy to dominate Central Greece, to acquire control of the Corridor, and to establish a base at Herakleia.

In the first major campaign Nikias, with 60 ships and 2,000 hoplites, joined forces at Tanagra with other Athenian troops under Hipponikos and Eurymedon. Although the ancient sources recognize the troop movements of Nikias and those of Hipponikos and Eurymedon as coordinated for concerted action (3.91.5; Diod 12.65.4), these sources fail to give a purpose for these campaigns. One commentator has found this failure "puzzling and unsatisfactory" (Kagan 1974:198).

In a second major campaign in 426 Demosthenes, commanding a fleet of 30 Athenian ships, sailed around the Peloponnese

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121 Athens' new offensive strategy is shown by Nikias's 426 campaign. After sailing to Melos and ravaging that island, he landed at Oropos and then marched to Tanagra. After Tanagra, he made a detour to pillage the Lokrian coast before returning to Athens (3.91.1-5).
and attacked Leukas. Right before a decisive victory at Leukas, however, Demosthenes abandoned this campaign and proceeded against the Aitolians. According to Thukydides, Demosthenes made this decision "chiefly because he thought that, without help from Athens (emphasis supplied), he would be able with his allies from the mainland, once the Aitolians had joined him, to make an overland expedition against the Boiotians..." (3.95.1 tr. C.F. Smith).

Thukydides is not clear about the proposed route of Demosthenes' campaign, other than that he intended to pass through Ozolian Lokris to Kytinion (3.95.1). Demosthenes most probably planned to use the South Sector of the Corridor to get to Kytinion. Kytinion, as part of the tetrapolis

122 Thukydides informs us that Demosthenes was induced to undertake this new campaign not only because the Aitolians were hostile to Naupaktos, a strategic naval base of Athens, but also by the prospect that by defeating the Aitolians "he would find it easy to bring the mainland in that region into subjection to the Athenians (3.94.3 tr. C.F. Smith).

123 Gomme suggested that the campaign followed the Mornos river valley (probably the modern Daphnous) and Demosthenes intended to cross the headwaters of the Mornos at the watershed of Mt. Oite (Gomme 1956b:482). B.W. Henderson also accepts this view, indicating it is only a march of eight miles across the watershed to the north-south road in Doris (1927:55). This suggestion must be rejected. Although the trek across the watershed does reach, and is a short distance from, the north-south road in Doris (the Isthmus Corridor route) south of the Pindos river near modern Kastelli (Kase GICR 31), autopsy of PDE has determined it is impassable for any fighting force.

124 Although Amphissa, the dominant city in the South Sector, had been allied with Sparta since the beginning of the war (Diod. 12.42.4), the rest of the West Lokrians were allies of Athens (Gomme 1956b:403-405). Demosthenes had used Oineon in West Lokris both in his invasion of Aitolia (3.95.3) and in
of Doris, was most certainly one of the areas "liberated" by Sparta from Oitaian incursions, and we can assume that in 426 it was under Spartan control. Its strategic importance to the Corridor has been previously discussed. It is no surprise that Demosthenes intended to make Kythinion an objective of his campaign. In the hands of Athens Kythinion would disrupt Sparta's access to the Central Sector of the Corridor.

Demosthenes intended to proceed from Kythinion through Phokis, with Kallidromos on his left and Parnassos on his right, and invade Boiotia. Thukydides does not give the purpose of this offensive. He only tells us that the Phokians would be eager to join the Athenian expedition (3.95.1).

Both Nikias and Eurymedon's campaigns in eastern Boiotia and Demosthenes' campaign in Aitolia are described by Thukydides as occurring in the sixth year of the war, i.e. 426/425. He dates the campaign of Nikias as occurring in "that same summer" (3.91.1 tr C.F.Smith); and the campaign of Demosthenes "during the same summer" (3.94.1-3), but he fails to make any connection between the two. He dates the foundation of Herakleia "about this time" (3.92.1 tr.

his retreat (3.98.3).

125 Gomme's opinion that the purpose of the campaign was to overthrow Boiotia (Gomme 1956b:402) does not appear probable. The periodic invasion of Attica by Boiotian cavalry (4.95.2;4.96.8) would not appear to justify such a campaign. Kagan recognizes the value of Demosthenes' campaign in disrupting Spartan passage to Herakleia (Kagan 1974:208).
C. F. Smith, but he makes no connection between the foundation of the colony and the two Athenian campaigns. Thukydides even suggests that Demosthenes' campaign was a spontaneous undertaking without the knowledge or approval of Athens (3.95.1).

The conclusion seems strong, however, that the two Athenian campaigns not only were related, but also were direct counter-measures to the change in Sparta's strategy for conducting the war. The Eurymedon-Nikias campaigns, occurring in eastern Boiotia, were synchronized to detract the Boiotians from Athens' real objective, western Boiotia and Phokis (Kagan 1974:208). The western campaign would have expanded Athenian influence in Phokis and threatened the newly planned colony at Herakleia.

Spartan Reaction

According to Thukydides, the Lakedaimonians, toward autumn 426, dispatched 3,000 hoplites to Central Greece in preparation for the capture of Naupaktos (3.100.2). The

126 Gomme suggests Eurylochos' campaign was about the end of September or early October (Gomme 1956b:409).

127 Naupaktos was Lokrian at the beginning of the fifth century (Meiggs & Lewis 1975: No 20; Szemler CGICR 91). Athenian influence began in 462 with the settlement under Athenian safe conduct, of Messenian helots, who had surrendered at Mt. Ithome (1.102-103). At the beginning of the war Naupaktos was allied with Athens (2.9.4; Diod. 12.42.4).

army convened at Delphi under the Spartan general, Eurylochos. The evidence suggests that the campaign, triggered by Demosthenes' campaign in Aitolia, was probably intended to safeguard for Sparta the route to Herakleia through the South Sector of the Corridor.

Sparta's control of the South Sector of the Corridor was indeed vulnerable from Naupaktos. Naupaktos, a major Athenian naval station, commanded all traffic in and out of the Corinthian Gulf, could curtail grain imports and trade exports, and could cause economic ruin for Sparta's allies along the coast of the Corinthian Gulf (Kagan 1976:30; Bengtson 1988:139). Nevertheless, the stranglehold which this naval fortress had on the western Corinthian Gulf does not appear to have posed a threat to Sparta's interests to explain Eurylochos' campaign. For Athens to close off the grain supply to the Peloponnese by blockading the Gulf was impossible.\textsuperscript{128}

The chief threat which Naupaktos posed for Sparta was that Naupaktos might become a base for Athens to launch an attack upon the South Sector of the Corridor. Such an attack could have come through the Elatos pass that provides a practical passage across the formidable Ghiona mountain range, separating Naupaktos from Amphissa, in West Lokris (3.101.2). The West Lokrians, with the exception of Amphissa which was topographically separate, were friendly to Athens (3.95.3; 3.101.1; Gomme 1956b:11; Hornblower 1991:248). Athens might,

\textsuperscript{128} Kagan 1974:29; contra Miltner, RE 19:781.
at any time, with the support of Naupaktos and the West Lokrians, launch an offensive through the Elatos pass against Amphissa. Eurylochos' campaign to capture Naupaktos appears to have been intended to remove permanently this threat.

We are not informed when Sparta decided to send Eurylochos to Central Greece, but the decision may have been made before Demosthenes aborted his campaign in Aitolia. Demosthenes' campaign, if successful, would have undermined Sparta's control of the Corridor and the Thracian offensive. Thus, Eurylochos' preparations appear to have been directed against Demosthenes.

The troops which Eurylochos mustered at Delphi included 500 hoplites from Herakleia, and these obviously had to be withdrawn through the Corridor from Herakleia to Delphi (3.100.2). Thus, we must assume that in August 426, a month or two before Eurylochos' campaign, the Spartans already controlled the entire Isthmus Corridor route. In the North and Central Sectors of the Corridor Sparta had consolidated its influence by eliminating the Oitaian forays against Doris and

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129 In Thukydides (3.100.1) the Aitolians had urged Sparta to capture the stronghold, even before Demosthenes began his campaign. The Messenians at Naupaktos had previously invited Athens to intervene against Aitolia, which presumably explained Aitolian's hostility to Naupaktos (3.100.1). Gomme suggests that the invitation from Aitolia to Sparta to take action against Naupaktos was extended before the actual invasion of Aitolia by Demosthenes (Gomme 1956b:408).

130 Demosthenes never reached the Corridor. On his way from Naupaktos he was defeated by the Aitolians and was forced to abandon his campaign (3.98.3-5; Szemler GICR 117).
Trachis, while in the South Sector, Amphissa controlled the multiple road system and was cooperative with Sparta. The convergence of Eurylochos' army at Delphi suggests that even the sacred precinct, on the perimeter of the South Sector, was in the pro-Spartan camp.

**Campaigns in 424**

Although the Spartans had established a base at Herakleia in 426, they were unable to use this base as a launching pad for an assault on Athens' allies in Thrace until the summer of 424 (4.78.1), because such a campaign required the cooperation of the king of Macedon and local oligarchs in Thessaly, through whose territories Spartan troops had to cross (Brunt JCAC 1965:274). The opportunity for Sparta came in 424 when Perdikkas, the king of Macedon, needed military assistance to subdue the revolt of his vassal, Arrhabaios, king of the Lynkestrian Macedonians (4.83.1). Perdikkas

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131 Thukydides informs us that Amphissa cooperated with Eurylochos chiefly because of fear of the Phokians (3.101.2).

132 As additional evidence of Delphi's pro-Spartan posture at this time: Delphi bid Sparta to found its colony at Herakleia (3.92.5); at the beginning of the war Delphi had predicted victory for the Lakedaimonians and promised assistance to them (1.118.3).

133. Perdikkas, the king of Macedon, dedicated to the politics of expediency, had throughout his reign vacillated in his relations not only with Athens, but with all his neighbors.

Prior to the founding of Amphipolis in 436 by Athens, Perdikkas had been her ally, but the new garrisons there alarmed him, no less than they alarmed the Potidaiaians, and he shifted his allegiance (Hammond 1986:317). Amphipolis furthermore had obstructed his aspirations of regaining the
for this purpose sought the help of Sparta, promising to share the cost of Spartan troops (4.80.1; 4.83.5-6).

Perdikkas' invitation came at a critical moment for Sparta. Athens had recently assumed an aggressive posture, attributable perhaps to a new war faction at the helm (Bengtson 1988:141). In 424 Sparta was fighting a defensive war, punctuated by Athenian raids throughout the coast of the Peloponnese, the occupation of Kythera by Nikias and the almost total blockade of the Peloponnese (4.53-57; Kagan 1974:263-264; Bengtson 1988:141). The surrender in August 424 of Sparta's hoplites at Sphakteria highlighted the crisis and led to Sparta's vain overtures for peace (4.11-15; Kagan 1974:237-238). It appeared to be only a matter of time before Sparta would be forced to her knees (Bengtson 1988:141). Sparta hastily accepted the invitation of Perdikkas which could make her newly formulated strategy of attacking Athens in Thrace a reality (Brunt JCAC 1965:274; Kagan 1974:289).

coast line and the mining revenues of Mt. Pangaion (Hdt. 5.17). Athenian support of his brother, Philip, as a rival to the throne exacerbated his hostility (1.57.2). Covertly and unsuccessfully, he had sought to get Sparta to deploy military forces against Athens (Hammond 1986:320). Partly due to his instigation both the Chalkidians and the Bottiaians revolted from Athens in 432 (4.56.1-2; 4.57.3). Although a nominal ally of Athens in 429, he offered no assistance to the Athenians in their offensive in the Chalkidike (2.79.1-5).

134. Athens now held fortified posts at Pylos, Kythera, Methana, Nisaia, Minoa, Pteleon and Atalante, and her fleet had bases at Zakynthos, Kephallenia, Korkyra, Naupaktos and Akarnania (Hammond 1986:369).
Brasidas, the daring and highly imaginative Spartan general, took command of the campaign (4.78.1.) He began recruiting forces in the Peloponnese for a counter-offensive for Spartan losses in the Peloponnese.

In August of the same year, Athens initiated a campaign to gain control of the Megarid. The scope of this offensive cannot be justified as an attempt by Athens to block off future invasions of Attica. Minoa, taken by Athens in 427, became the base for this new Athenian offensive (4.67.1). In a coordinated campaign between the Athenian general, Hippokrates, with a garrison from Minoa, and Demosthenes who had just returned to Athens from his campaign in Aitolia and Naupaktos (4.66.3-4), the Athenians breached and occupied the Long Walls joining Megara to Nisaia, Megara’s

Commentators have drawn diverse conclusions concerning Brasidas’ role in the campaign. According to Thukydides (4.81.1), the Spartans sent him on this mission, chiefly from his own desire (δοξόμενον), supported by Gomme (1956b:548); and Kagan (1974:289). Contra, C. Hude (ed. Teubner) who reads δοξόμενον, supported by Adcock (CAH 5 243); and Hammond (1986:372), according to whom the Spartans supported Brasidas’ campaign. Hude’s conjecture is followed by the author.

Sparta had several years earlier abandoned hope that the invasions of Attica would bring Athens to her knees (Gomme 1956b:395). Sparta’s most recent invasion on Attica in 425, the year before the Megarid offensive, lasted only 15 days, the shortest campaign conducted (4.2.1;4.6.2).

Athens had captured Minoa about the same time as Plataiai’s final surrender to the Spartans (3.52.1). We may speculate whether the fall of this last barrier to Sparta’s expanding presence in Central Greece may have invoked an Athenian resolve to stop the enemy at the Megarid.
port on the Saronic Gulf (4.68)\(^{138}\), and captured Nisaia (4.66-77). Sparta was faced with the alarming possibility that Megara itself would go over to the Athenians.\(^{139}\)

The Athenian offensive against Nisaia was undertaken while Brasidas was in Sikyon and Corinth, recruiting troops for the march to Thrace (4.70.1). Brasidas, fearful lest the Athenian armies under Demosthenes and Hippokrates should take Megara, marched to its defense (4.70.1). He also summoned the Boiotians to join him, and they responded with troops and cavalry.\(^{140}\) Although Nisaia had fallen before Brasidas arrived, his presence brought about a stalemate between the Athenian and the Spartan forces which ultimately resulted in

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\(^{138}\) By this action the Athenian generals prevented the Spartans, entrenched in Nisaia, from giving support to Megara (4.66.4).

\(^{139}\) As early as 427 Megara was undergoing civil strife (4.67.1), aggravated by the dreadful economic boycott imposed by Athens (Jones 1968:72). The oligarchic faction, previously expelled from Megara by the democrats, was entrenched at Pegai. The democrats in Megara, fearing their return, enlisted the aid of Athens and promised to deliver the city to her (4.66.3-4), permitting the opening of her ports for trade, and possibly, ending the civil war. Spartan troops, apparently unaware of these covert intrigues, were garrisoned at Nisaia to counter the Athenian presence at Minoa.

\(^{140}\) The Boiotians recognized that Megara in the hands of Athens would isolate them from the Peloponnese and leave Athens free to attack them (4.72.1; Gomme 1956b:532). So concerned were they with this danger that they began their troop movements to assist Megara even before the summons from Brasidas arrived. The Athenians were startled, since they had never seen any previous Boiotian support for Megara in their earlier incursions in the Megarid (4.72.1).
the acceptance by Megara of Brasidas' army and the end of the Athenian initiative.\textsuperscript{141}

Brasidas returned to Corinth and continued his preparations for Thrace (4.74.1). Thukydides does not suggest any connection between the Athenian offensive against Nisaia and Brasidas' imminent march to Thrace.\textsuperscript{142} Modern commentators have either ignored this question (Adcock CAH 5; Hammond 1986:372) or denied any Athenian awareness (Kagan 1974:278, following Gomme 1956b:535-36).\textsuperscript{143}

The implication that the Athenians did not know what was going on is unacceptable and must be rejected. Brasidas had been recruiting throughout the Peloponnese to hire an army. The army that marched to Thrace had 700 freed helots, or neodamodeis, but no Spartans; the bulk of the army was from

\textsuperscript{141} When neither side attacked, the Athenians withdrew and retired into Nisaia, and the Megarians thereupon opened their gates to Brasidas (4.73.4). The Athenian strategy for the betrayal of the city by the democratic element evaporated. Athens lost a great strategic opportunity by the failure of the Megarian campaign (Kagan 1974:278). Athens' early withdrawal from Megara has been criticized (Gomme 1956b:535-36).

\textsuperscript{142} Thukydides tells us that when the Athenians heard about Brasidas' arrival in Thrace, they realized that Perdikkas' intrigues had made the march possible, and they declared war on him (4.82.1). The inference is that the Athenians did not know about Brasidas' planned campaign before Brasidas arrived in Thrace.

\textsuperscript{143} Although Gomme accepts that the Athenians were unaware of Sparta's intended campaign, he suggests Thukydides recognized a connection in the simultaneity between the campaigns in Delion and Thrace (Gomme 1956b:540).
the Peloponnese (4.80.5).\footnote{Thukydides informs us that the Lakedaimonians were glad for an excuse to send out 700 helots to forestall their siding with the Athenians at this sensitive time, when Pylos was in the hands of the enemy (4.80.2,5). Hammond suggests the entire Lakedaimonian campaign was a diversion for this purpose (1986:372).} When the Athenian offensive in the Megarid began, Brasidas was already in Corinth, ca. 38 km away. This proximity at such a critical moment cannot be ascribed to chance. For the same reasons Thukydides' statement that Brasidas just happened to be in the neighborhood of Corinth when the Athenian assault began (4.70.1), and the opinions of commentators who accept this view (Grote 6.380; Adcock CAH 5:239; Hammond 1986:368), must also be rejected. It is more credible that the Athenians were aware of Sparta's imminent march to Thrace, and the Spartans were aware of Athens' new aims against the Megarid.

The threat which these preparations portended may have triggered the Athenian resolve for action in the Megarid. The Athenians would be uncertain which route the Spartans would use to get to their base at Herakleia. If the Spartans elected to take the overland route through Boiotia and Phokis, the Athenian control of the Megarid would block the Spartans at Megara and stop Brasidas' march.

If, on the other hand, the Spartans elected to ferry troops to Kirrha and march through the Isthmus Corridor to Herakleia, Athenian control of the Megarid would still serve a highly strategic purpose. Without the threat of a Spartan
army at her back Athens would be free to regain her influence in Phokis (Gomme 1956b:532). which, as previously noted, was the linchpin for the control of the Central Sector of the Isthmus Corridor. The destabilization of the Central Sector by Athens would undermine the viability of Sparta’s base at Herakleia and Sparta’s imminent campaign to Thrace.

Thukydides does not specify the route Brasidas took from the Peloponnese to Herakleia. He probably ferried his army across the Corinthian Gulf to Kirrha, the south terminus of the Great Isthmus Corridor route\(^{145}\), and then marched his troops through the Corridor to Herakleia. He arrived at Herakleia that summer with 1,700 hoplites (4.78.1). He then marched without resistance through Thessaly (4.78.2-6; 79.1). Although the Thessalians were allies of Athens,\(^{146}\) and the common people well-disposed to the Athenians (4.78.2), the local oligarchs were themselves pro-Spartan. The assistance which these oligarchs gave Brasidas and his adroitness in

\(^{145}\) Thukydides only informs us that before his march Brasidas returned to Corinth from Megara to continue preparations for Thrace (4.74.1). The same considerations that suggest a sea crossing for Sparta’s troops before the Archidamian War and in 426 (cf. Chapter IV above) would apply to Brasidas in 424. Contra, Bengtson who suggests a route through Megara and Boiotia in 424 (Bengtson 1988:141-42).

\(^{146}\) The Thessalians had become allies of Athens following the Messenian revolt at Ithome, ca. 457 (1.102.4). At the beginning of the war the Thessalian cavalry assisted the Athenians against the Spartan invasion of Attica (2.22.3). The Thessalians continually made war upon Herakleia after its foundation (3.93.2), an action implying hostility to Sparta.
dealing with them insured his rapid and uneventful passage (4.78.2-5; Gomme 1956b:541).\footnote{147} If the oligarchs who controlled the splendid Thessalian cavalry had opposed Brasidas’ army in the flat and level plains of Thessaly, it is doubtful whether the army would have been able to cross (Kagan 1974:288).

Brasidas’ campaign in Thrace proved eminently rewarding for Sparta. City after city revolted from the Athenians and admitted the Peloponnesians.\footnote{148} The fall of Amphipolis in particular encouraged rebellion in the rest of Thrace (Kagan 1974:302) and dealt a severe blow to Athenian prestige (Hammond 1986:373; Bengtson 1988:142). Cities that were subject to Athens, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis and the moderate terms offered by Brasidas, were incited to revolution and sent emissaries to Brasidas, urging him to come over to them (4.108.3).

\footnote{147} In contrast, in 423, the Thessalian oligarchs’ changed attitude prevented the Spartan, Ischagoras, in his plans to join Brasidas with a Spartan force ((4.132). Such a change of attitude might have been the result of a possible alliance between Perdikkas and the Athenians in 423, an alliance based on an extremely fragmentary inscription dated to 423 by Gomme 1956b:621/2, 720, followed by Bengtson 1962: #186, and Kagan 1974:314. In 421 a Lakedaimonian army of 900 intended to furnish support to Brasidas but was delayed by Thessalian opposition and was recalled after Brasidas’ death (5.13; Kagan 1974:331).

\footnote{148} Revolt at Akanthos in August, 424 (4.88.1) was followed by revolt at Stagira (4.88.2). The fall of Amphipolis in December, 424 (4.106.1) precipitated an immediate and domino-like defection by Athen’s northern allies, beginning with Mirkinos, Galepsos and Oisyme, east of the Strymon river (4.107.3). The numerous cities of the Akte peninsula were next to revolt or capitulate (4.109; Kagan 1974:302).
As mentioned above, Sparta’s strategy for a campaign in Thrace had depended on three specific conditions: domination of Central Greece, control of the Corridor, and securing a base at Herakleia. The validity of Sparta’s purpose in the foundation of Herakleia as part of a land route to Thrace was proven by the success of the Thracian campaign in bringing about a truce. Conversely, since there is no evidence that Herakleia was ever used by the Spartans as a naval base, Thukydides’ suggestion that Herakleia was intended for that purpose (3.92.4) must be rejected.

Athenian Response

In the same summer, immediately after the Athenians retired from Megara, but after Brasidas had reached Thrace, Athens undertook two coordinated campaigns in Boiotia (4.76.1-3). That these campaigns in Boiotia were part of the same plan with the campaign in the Megarid has generally been recognized (Gomme 1956b:719-720; Adcock CAH 5:239; Kagan 1974:278). The connection, however, between these Boiotian campaigns and Brasidas’ march to Thrace, as with the Megarian campaign, has been overlooked.
In the first Boiotian campaign Siphai, by the prearrangement of certain conspirators within the city, was to be betrayed to Demosthenes. Chaironeia, through the intrigues of disgruntled refugees from Orchomenos, was also to yield to him (4.76.3). Demosthenes recruited troops at Naupaktos and sailed with 40 ships to Siphai (4.76.1) where he was scheduled to arrive at a predetermined date.

Siphai is situated on the shores of the Corinthian Gulf in the territory of Thespiai and is a port of entry into Boiotia (4.76.3). It is situated 7 km to the southeast of Thisbe (Frazer Paus. 9.32.4) and 8 kms. southwest of Thespiai. Its importance as a harbor town is established not only by tradition, but also by archaeological evidence. The site was also known as Tipha, taking its name from the pilot of the Argo who came from Siphai (Keiji Kodai 1991:55). It would have been easier for Athens to attack Boiotia through Plataiai, but this city had surrendered to Sparta three years earlier (3.52.1; Gomme 1956b:541).

Chaironeia's location is 7 km south of Parapotamioi, situated at the pass (ca. 5 km wide) between Phokis and the first plain of Boiotia, the Kaironeian Basin, and through which the Kephissos river enters Boiotia from Phokis (Strabo 9.3.16; Fossey 1986:70-71).

As in Megara, a month or so earlier, the occasion for Athenian intervention was the disaffection of local citizens who wished to transform their city into a democracy (4.76.2).

Demosthenes retired from the Megara campaign ca. August, but his offensive against Siphai was not planned to take place until the beginning of November, some three months later (4.89.1; Gomme 1956b:558). Since the success of the Boiotian campaign required surprise, the delay may have been intended to sail undetected to Siphai. Although Sparta had in 425 turned over her fleet to Athens as collateral in the peace negotiations following Sphakteria ((4.16.1-3; 4.23.1), Sparta had access to at least seven other navies (Kelly 31). Lakedaimonian ships, particularly Corinthian and Sikyonian, invested, or probably controlled, the eastern Corinthian Gulf in 424. A November sailing might be undetected, since rarely would ships sail in winter months (Casson 1973:270 n. 3). From the third day before the ides of November to the sixth day before the ides of March, the seas were closed (Vegetius
coordinated with the second Athenian campaign in eastern Boiotia. Demosthenes' plan was to make a short march from Siphai through Lebadeia to Chaironeia, bypassing any hostile forces from Thebes. Phokians collaborated with Demosthenes in this plot (4.76.3). Thus, we may assume the plan included Athenian penetration into western Phokis, as well as delivery in Athenian hands of Phokian Phanoteus and Parapotamioi.\textsuperscript{153}

While these events were occurring in western Boiotia, Athenian hoplites under Hippokrates would march from Athens to Tanagra in Boiotia and occupy the sanctuary of Apollo at Delion (4.76.4). The Athenian plot, however, was ill-timed and betrayed to the Boiotians. The Athenians never set foot at Siphai, and at Delion they suffered a major military defeat (4.89.1; 4.96; Bengtson 1986:142).

The enormity of the military defeat suffered by Athens in the only pitched battle in the Archidamian War (Hammond 1986:371) has magnified the strategic importance of the campaign. Thukydides mistakenly treats the eastern campaign of Hippokrates at Delion as the primary action and the Siphai-Chaironeia campaign as only a diversion to insure the success

\textsuperscript{153} Panopeus, also known as Phanoteus, situated at the Kephissos river about 20 stadia (ca. 3.6 km) west of Chaironeia (Paus. 10.4.1), was a point of convergence between the road leading from Boiotia up the Kephissos river valley to Phokis and the road to Delphi around the southern slopes of Mt. Parnassos (Strabo 9.3.14 9.2.19; Paus. 10.4.1-2).
of the Delion assault. In neither the campaigns of 426 nor in the campaigns of 424 was the Athenian purpose the conquest of Boiotia (Gomme 1956b:539). In reality, Demosthenes and Hippokrates in the 424 campaign repeated precisely the same strategy they had used unsuccessfully in the 426 campaign.

In both years the Athenians intended by the campaigns in the west to destabilize Sparta's control of the Corridor and regain a dominant presence in Phokis. In both years the campaigns in the east were diversionary maneuvers. In 426 the Athenians hoped to destabilize the Corridor by an attack on Kytinion via Aitolia and West Lokris. In 424, the Athenians hoped to accomplish the same goal through Chaironeia and the Kephissos valley.

If the Athenian offensive in 424 had been successful, it is probable that Phokis and the Central Sector of the Isthmus Corridor route would have come under Athenian influence. Although Brasidas' army had already reached Thrace, perhaps three months earlier, Athens' control of the Corridor would

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154 According to Thukydides the purpose of this two-pronged attack was that in this way the Boiotians "might not concentrate their forces at Delium" (4.76.4 (C.F.Smith tr). Gomme finds the use of the temple site by the Athenians as a base for continuing raids on, or encouraging revolution in, neighboring Boiotian villages an acceptable purpose, consistent with the similar use of bases at Kythera and Pylos (Gomme 1956b:538).
have thwarted Brasidas' spectacular reversal of earlier Spartan misfortunes. 155

Results

As a result of the Thracian campaign Athens lost revenues, and the gold mines of Mt. Pangaion fell into Sparta's hands. With the timber from the area Brasidas could start building a fleet (4.108.1; Hammond: 1986:373). The bridgehead at the Strymon river was opened to the Spartans, and Brasidas urgently begged the Lakedaimonians for reinforcements, a plea which the Spartans chose not to heed (4.108.7; Kagan 1974:303). It appears probable that he intended a major campaign, aiming at a decisive victory (Kagan 1976:302). He may have intended an eastward thrust to gain control of the Hellespont and interdict the Athenian grain supplies from the Black Sea (Kagan 1974:302-303).

The possibility of such an assault, and of further revolt among their allies, greatly alarmed the Athenians (4.108.1; 4.108.7). This alarm most likely contributed to the Athenian receptiveness to Sparta's overtures for peace (Adcock CAH 5:244; Kagan 1974:303-304). For Sparta the campaign in Thrace was a tactical lever to get the Athenians to the negotiating table.

155 Brasidas march to Thrace from Herakleia was probably mid-August (4.78.1; Gomme 1956b:720; Kagan 1974:287). Demosthenes reached Siphai early in November (4.77.1; Kagan 1974:281).
Sparta was not interested in total victory, but rather, wished to recover the prisoners from Sphakteria and bring the war to an end (4.108.7).

Sparta's campaign in Thrace was made possible because Sparta controlled a communication route through Central Greece and a fortified eagle's nest on the Trachinian cliffs. In spring 423 the success of this campaign precipitated the armistice which Sparta wanted (4.117.1) and, eventually, a peace treaty. 157

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156. Ever since the capture of the Spartans on Sphakteria the peace faction in Sparta had been dominant and had sent missions to the Athenians to explore peace, but were rejected (Kagan 1974:303).

157. That the truce was broken, and fighting resumed, before a peace was finally concluded may be attributed to the personalities of Kleon and Brasidas, to whom Thukydides referred as the men on each side most opposed to peace (5.16.1; Gomme 1956b:660; Kagan 1974:331), and not to any defect in the Spartan plan. Included in the terms of the Peace of Nikias was the return of the prisoners from Sphakteria (5.18.7). It is worthy of note that the first stipulation of the treaty grants free access to Delphi for all worshippers (5.18.1), suggesting Sparta still controlled the Corridor.
CONCLUSION

Sparta selected Herakleia as the site for a colony in Trachis land to control the Isthmus Corridor road system and establish a base for the invasion of Thrace.

Unaware of this road system, most commentators believe that Herakleia's role was closely connected with Thermopylae. But the city neither neutralized nor controlled the pass. In the fifth century this pass was virtually closed by the encroachment of the Malian Gulf, and was not suitable for the mass movements of men or goods. It was an available, but less desirable, route for entry into Central Greece.

The strategic importance of Herakleia was its connection with the Great Isthmus Corridor road system, and specifically, its proximity to, and tactical connection with, the north entrance to that road system, the Dhema pass.

Sparta's resolve to maintain control of the Corridor road system, counterbalanced by Athens' efforts to thwart that control, defined military actions in the Archidamian War, the purpose of which previously has been unclear. Among such military actions were: Sparta's two year siege, beginning in 429, to capture Plataiai; Athens' invasion of the Megarid in the same year, ostensibly to conduct a raid, but utilizing the largest military force Athens ever assembled; Demosthenes' campaign in 426, reportedly extemporaneous, but aimed at Kytinion, which happened to be a linchpin of the Central Sector of the Corridor road system; Athens' two-
pronged campaign in 424, again led by Demosthenes, aimed at western Boiotia and Phokis, the underbelly of the Central Sector of the Corridor road system; Eurylochos' siege to capture Naupaktos, which did not infringe Sparta's interests by its domination of the western Corinthian Gulf, but did threaten the South Sector of the Corridor road system.

In 424 Brasidas executed the new strategy by launching the much planned invasion of Thrace. As shown above, this invasion induced Athens' allies to revolt from Athenian domination, brought about a truce and an end to the war, vindicating the purpose for which Herakleia was founded.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Map 2

South Rim of Malian Gulf
MAP 3

SOUTHWESTERN MALIAN GULF AND TRACHINIAN CLIFFS
MAP 5
TRIBAL TERRITORIES IN THE NORTH SECTOR OF THE CORRIDOR

Based on the Map of ΕΘΝΙΚΗ ΣΤΑΤΙΣΤΙΚΗ ΥΠΗΡΕΣΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ

MALIAN GULF

AINIS
Kostalaki
Frantzi
Ano Vardhato
Herakleia
Damastra
Thermopylae Pass

OITAIA
PODEON STEINOS
Gravia

DORIS
Krinion

WEST LOKRIS

EAST LOKRIS

ASSUMED COASTLINE
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Trachinian cliffs. View south from the Malian plain
Plate 2

Dhema Pass. View southwest from Kato Dhió Vouna
Plate 3

View northeast toward Malian Gulf and West Gate
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Kouvela and Kastro Orias.
Plate 5

Siderhoporto.
View ESE toward Asopos gorge from Trachinian cliffs
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Dhema pass. View northwest
Plate 7

Herakleia road
Plate 8
Branch "A" of Herakleia roadway, on Zirelia plain
Plate 9

Branch "A" of Herakleia roadway, near Delphinon
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Branch "B" of Herakleia roadway, near Siderhoporto
Plate 11

Road to citadel of Herakleia
Plate 12
Herakleia causeway.
Plate 13

Herakleia roadway.
Plate 14

Herakleia roadway.
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