Husserl's Part/Whole Theory and Its Influence on the Early Heidegger

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CONTENTS

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 1

2. HUSSERL'S PART/WHOLE THEORY ............................. 35
   2.1. Domain and Objective of the Investigation .............. 35
   2.2. The Essential Distinction ....................................... 40
   2.3. The Multiplicity of Part/Whole Forms; Unity & Foundation .... 46
   2.4. Extended Wholes .................................................. 53
   2.5. Independent and Dependent Meanings ....................... 63
   2.6. The Ideality of Part/Whole Relations and the
        Categorial Intuition of their Forms ....................... 73

3. HEIDEGGER: INNERWORLDLY PARTS ............................ 84
   3.1. Heidegger & Phenomenology ............................... 84
   3.2. Existence & World ................................................. 100
   3.3. Things & Innerworldliness .................................... 117

4. CONCLUSION ............................................................. 135

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................. 147

VITA ............................................................. 151
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The thesis of this dissertation is that there is a certain dependence of Heidegger's "destruction of the history of ontology" in *Being and Time* on an understanding of certain part/whole relations, the theory of which is developed Husserl in the Third Investigation of his *Logical Investigations*. I try to show in various ways that Heidegger is actually following Husserl's directions on the proper method of part/whole analyses, that he relies on the very distinctions which Husserl draws, that he uses much of the very same language as Husserl, and that all of this is essential to Heidegger's procedure, though he never refers to *Logical Investigations* explicitly as the source of his style of part/whole analyses. Is it fair, then, to say that Heidegger is clearly and evidently *using* Husserl's Third Investigation as the method of his "destruction"? I'll bet it is; but I cannot claim to have proven that. But that isn't really the point here. What I wish to argue for is rather that the logical force of Heidegger's "destruction," what is logically compelling about it, is found in its reliance on those formal relations which Husserl explores thematically in the Third Investigation. The main value of this thesis is the light it throws on reading *Being and Time*, as well as other work of the continental tradition founded in Heidegger's analysis of "the worldhood of the world." Moreover, it is an attempt to extend the sort of formalizing,
"cross-over" (analytic/continental) studies recently made of Husserl to the broader realm of Husserl's influence on the tradition of continental philosophy.

* * * * *

*Logical Investigations* is generally regarded as most significant because it is the work in which Husserl began his career as the founder and proponent of phenomenology. Prior to *LI* Husserl had been concerned primarily with problems in the philosophy of arithmetic; and his orientation to the philosophy of arithmetic had been psychologistic, an orientation of which he becomes the strongest critic with *LI*. Husserl appears to have made a complete break with his earlier work and to have made a new philosophical beginning with *LI*. Thus, if one is primarily interested in Husserl as the phenomenologist, it makes sense to start with *LI*, to regard it as really the first work in Husserl's career, and to read it from the perspective of that towards which it points forward. Moreover, this view is somewhat encouraged by Husserl's own remarks in the Forward to the Second Edition: "My *Logical Investigations* were my 'break-through,' not an end but rather a beginning."¹

There is another view emerging in the recent literature, which sees \textit{LI} as more of a \textit{transitional} work than a beginning work. True, \textit{LI} is Husserl's "break-through" into phenomenology. However, phenomenology can be seen as a solution to Husserl's earlier problems, i.e., the problems upon which the psychologistic approach of his \textit{Philosophy of Arithmetic} had foundered. This is the view taken by Dallas Willard. It is a view also supported by Jonathan Cooper-Wiele and Jay Lampart, though we will follow more closely Willard's development of it, as I think his work is the most thorough and well formulated. Willard tells the story of how Husserl's solution to one particular, peculiar problem developed into the wider revision of the principles of human knowledge that is phenomenology. This was the problem of how "blind calculation" (calculation through merely, non-intuitively manipulating arithmetic and mathematical symbols) was possible.

It is especially important in the present context to consider Willard's thesis, as it says something important about the place of phenomenology in the tradition of philosophy, and this will have an important bearing on the present thesis. At the heart of the matter is the issue of transcendence, a theme more readily associated with Heidegger than Husserl. "Transcendence" for Heidegger is one of the names, along with "Being-in-the-World," which is equivalent to "Dasein." The issue of transcendence is Platonic in origin, particularly in the context of the ontology of the world. Reflection on transcendence largely fell into disfavor after Descartes, whom Heidegger says "missed the phenomenon of the world." Indeed, the modern, scientific worldview seems to find little use for any reflection on transcendence. It would appear to
be a theme more appropriate to a religious or a medieval outlook, more natural to men who wanted to think *beyond* the world, toward a divine origin, motive and force, men who wanted to think the world as *ens creatum*, or as governed by providence. This, as we know, was all banished from the modern view of the world through the rejection of final causality as a form of natural explanation. And it is one of the remarkable features of Heidegger's philosophy to have revived a reflection on transcendence precisely as a thought *beyond* the world, as disclosive of the world. The very language of this philosophy is enough to make some scientifically minded philosophers wince, if not to denounce it as an atavism and embarrassment to philosophy. However, it was with a serious scientific purpose that phenomenology initiated a reflection on transcendence, as part of a *Wissenschafstlehre* in Husserl, and extended to a systematic reflection on the world and its disclosure in Heidegger. What Willard argues for is a view that finds the origin of the transcendence problem, as Husserl understood it, in Husserl's earliest philosophical perplexity, which was with the problem of how it was possible to reason truly and with objective accuracy in the field of mathematics by the use of a mere symbolism.

I will not here try to prove Willard's thesis, but rather let his own extensive researches stand as compelling, if not sufficient documentation for it. I am rather interested in examining the evidence for extending the formal, analytic approach to interpreting the development of phenomenology beyond *LI*, by showing how a certain formal development of Husserl's thought within *LI* is evident in Heidegger's application of Husserl's phenomenology in *Being and Time*. It is my view that the birth of
phenomenology was primarily a formal and analytic innovation in philosophy. There is an increasing body of Husserl studies which are analytically oriented, and most of these have been motivated by careful attention to Husserl's work up to and including \textit{LI}, especially the Third Investigation. Some of this work, in particular Peter Simons' brilliant \textit{Parts}, has actually been concerned with attempting a complete axiomatization of the part/whole theory, towards which Husserl tentatively projects six formal propositions. While this analytic attention has been drawn to Husserl's own work, the pertinence of these studies beyond Husserl's work, and in particular to Heidegger, has not drawn any attention, and it is hoped that I can contribute to that here. Moreover, I will not be concerned with developing or testing any sort of formal axiomatization, but rather more with merely showing how this most formal component of Husserl's \textit{LI} is operative in Heidegger's analysis of the world and the concept of worldhood.

I think much is to be gained from this approach and especially by a demonstration of how the formal element of Husserl's thought carries over into Heidegger's philosophy. On the one hand, it calls attention to the formal, analytic possibilities of reading works of the continental tradition. Husserl clearly always understood himself to be developing a new logic, new canons of evidence, a method of reasoning, a \textit{Wissenschaftslehre}. And it is Husserl's method that Heidegger claims to be following in \textit{Being and Time}. The continuing influence of Husserl, as methodologist, in the continental tradition, even where others have set themselves in opposition to him, has probably been its most enduring feature. Yet, logic \textit{per se} has been more or less consigned to the Anglo-American analytic tradition. It is worthwhile exploring how
phenomenology's original logical theses have governed, if only implicitly, in the development of continental thought. On the other hand, the serious analytic and scientific importance of continental philosophy should not be missed on analytic philosophers. In deconstructing the Cartesian metaphysics of the world, Heidegger is challenging the most scientific of philosophies in the most analytic of ways. Far from rejecting scientific thinking, Heidegger is perhaps challenging it as not yet scientific enough, not yet sufficiently grounded in the given, in the evident enough, but pervaded by a deficient dogma of transcendence (a transcendence which it never really grasps thematically, or thinks philosophically). His later essays on technology and scientific thinking especially point to the urgency with which he held to the importance of thoroughly understanding the character of scientific and technological reasoning, thought and understanding. Clearly, Heidegger means to speak to the same audience to which Descartes spoke, and at least partially to unseat Descartes as the philosopher of scientific principle.

The point here, following Willard, is to view LI as neither end nor beginning, but rather more as the beginning work of an elaborate solution to the problem which Husserl had discovered prior to LI. In the Forward to the First Edition of LI, Husserl explains that he came to the work after meeting "unavoidable problems which have constantly hindered, and finally interrupted, the progress of my efforts, spread over many years, at achieving a philosophical clarification of pure mathematics." His work began with the study of formal arithmetic and the theory of manifolds and became

\[LI, 41.\]
interested in "the universal essence of the mathematical as such." He was interested in
the evident possibility of generalizing what was essential to mathematical reasoning
beyond its tradition quantitative applications and in the development of a general
"mathematizing logic." Thus far, we can see that his aspirations coincided with
those of many logicians and philosophers of the turn of the century. However, there
was a further problem: "I began work on the prevailing assumption that psychology
was the science from which logic in general, and the logic of the deductive sciences,
had to hope for philosophical clarification."³ And in many respects he found this
method of psychological clarification instructive. "But once one had passed from the
psychological connections of thinking, to the logical unity of the thought-content (the
unity of theory), no true continuity and unity could be established."⁴ This, Husserl
explains, was the point on which the Philosophy of Arithmetic foundered. And nearly
the whole of the Prolegomena to LI is occupied with criticizing the attempt to found
logic on a psychologistic basis.

Husserl's arguments against psychologism are similar to Frege's arguments in
"The Thought," the first essay in Frege's own Logical Investigations, though Husserl is
more exhaustive in examining the various forms of psychologism. It is not important
here to go through all of the many examinations, criticisms and arguments against
psychologism, though we should say something here about the general outlines of the
problem. In Husserl, as well as in Frege, it boils down to the fact that essentially

³LI, 42.

⁴LI, 42.
nothing is ever truly explained in this way. What Husserl referred to (cited above) as the problem of "the logical unity of the thought-content" still remains after one transfers the locale of this unity, its reality, from someplace such as within external objects to the interior of the psyche. The same exercise is carried out in sociologisms and biologisms, which are really just modifications of the more explicitly psychologistic theories. We could say that what is at issue in the conflict with psychologism is whether our questions should be directed to the truth and validity of reasoning or the causal (perhaps real and efficient) connections of the act of reasoning, judging, believing, etc. Psychological theories pertain no more nor less to incorrect reasoning than to correct reasoning; and thus to take psychological theories for a philosophy of logic is really just to miss the point at issue; and this is the main reason for the foundering of psychologistic projects in logic: the logical problems are all restored in full at the end of it all. This is the meaning of the slogan "To the things themselves!" Psychologism is merely a detour to the problems of logic; it is merely an apparent path to logical and epistemological explanation. Heidegger will further erode psychologism, by undermining the traditional understanding of how both persons and things are "in" the world, "belong to" it or are "part of" it; and this argument, as will be seen, is dependent on the results of Husserl's Third Investigation. But here we are only interested in the issue of psychologism as it pertained to the famous foundering of PA. The return to the things themselves is turned into a basic methodological item for Husserl, and this is the first ground cleared in LI.
The rejection of psychologism only ended an aspect of Husserl's pre-\textit{LI} researches. There still remained Husserl's original problem of achieving a philosophical clarification of pure mathematics, and especially of giving an account of how calculation by the mere manipulation of symbols, was possible. The thesis regarding the transitional character of \textit{LI} is best summarized in the first sentence of the preface to Willard's \textit{Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge}:

This book [Willard's] undertakes to explain how Husserl's early concerns for a philosophical elucidation of number and of the formal methods of arithmetic led to comprehensive reflections upon the problem of the objectivity of knowledge, and how his resolution of that problem in turn led to the conception of philosophy as a rigorous or exact science—which he later came to call "Phenomenology."\(^5\)

Willard here makes a strong statement of the transitional thesis on \textit{LI}, which is that what develops in it is the extension of a solution to a problem in the theory of numbers and arithmetic. I will not try to review the many details of the long version of the thesis presented by Willard in \textit{Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge}, but will sketch rather broadly the outlines of it presented by Willard in his article "Wholes, Parts and the Objectivity of Knowledge,"\(^6\) though we will also draw somewhat on Willard's longer work, as well as cite relevant portions of \textit{LI} itself. The main objective here is to secure a clearer interpretation of \textit{LI}, and, to this end, I have relied heavily on the secondary sources regarding the pre-\textit{LI} work of Husserl rather than


\(^6\)Dallas Willard, "Wholes, Parts and the Objectivity of Knowledge," in Smith, Barry (ed.) \textit{Parts and Moments} (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1982).
venturing an original interpretation of my own of this work from the original sources to the extent that these are involved. What is at issue here is merely whether the available interpretations of the pre-\textit{LI} work fit with the reading I'm offering of \textit{LI}.

First, we learn from the interpretations of the early work that Husserl was highly influenced by his studies with Karl Weierstrass, for whom knowledge of the domain of number could and should be rigorously ordered. This is a desideratum which never leaves Husserl; it is a key sounded in the Introduction to the \textit{Prolegomena} of \textit{LI}; and we can see it still as a prominent feature of Husserl's thought in \textit{Cartesian Meditations} near the end of his career, with its highly Leibnizian language of "com­-possibility," "incom­possibility" and the like, as well as in his continuing deployment of the language of manifold theory. Phenomenology, the \textit{Wissenschaftslehre}, was always to be highly ordered, and in a fashion always familiar to students of number theory, sets and manifolds. A \textit{science} for Husserl is characteristically \textit{systematic}, as it is its systematic character that makes a body of knowledge something more than mere collection of facts and observations.

If we live through and recognize the presence of inner percepts, singly or in groups, we have knowledge, but are far removed from science. \ldots A group of isolated bits of chemical knowledge would certainly not justify talk of a science of chemistry. More is plainly required, i.e. \textit{systematic coherence in the theoretical sense}, which means finding grounds for one's knowing, and suitably combining and arranging the sequence of such groundings.\footnote{\textit{LI}, 62.}
Moreover, this is not merely an aesthetic or arbitrary criterion for determining the scientific status of a body of knowledge. Science, in this systematic sense, makes possible a certain positive addition to knowledge which Husserl refers to as leverage.

All sciences proceed methodically in the pursuit of truth, employ more or less artificial aids in order to bring to knowledge truths or probabilities that would otherwise remain hidden, and in order to use the obvious or the already established as a lever for achieving what is remote and only mediately attainable.\(^8\)

It is this leverage, made possible by the unity of law, that makes it possible to use already attained truths as a "ladder" for the attainment of "higher regions" of truth. Husserl will always make much use of this faith in a systematic, logical order to truth. In *Cartesian Meditations* it is prominent in the theory of being and non-being as correlatives of verifying and nullifying syntheses. The attentive reader can see it, the sense of order and leverage, indirectly expressed throughout Husserl's texts in his frequent use (much like Berkeley) of the *argumentum ad absurdum*, or indirect proof (which is also the familiar favorite of mathematicians). It is the consensus of most commentators, including Willard, that Husserl acquired this fascination with system from his studies with Weierstrass.

According to Willard, the specific failing of the psychologistic approach in Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* was the attempt to found mathematics on an intuitive, presentational theory of number. To understand this, it is important to understand the distinction which Husserl designates by the use of the qualifiers "authentic" and "inauthentic." Much has been made of Heidegger's use of these terms, though I

\(^8\) *LII*, 63.
know of no study which contrasts his use with Husserl's. I think a certain relation can be shown between these two usages, even if there is a major shift of sense, which reflects the different character of the philosophical projects involved with Husserl's logical/epistemological and Heidegger's existential analyses. In both cases we are dealing with a problem of signification or meaning. What Husserl means by distinguishing authentic from inauthentic presentations is most fully developed in the Sixth Investigation, which is also where the Investigations first reach the level of a "breakthrough" into what Husserl would subsequently pursue as the science of "phenomenology." Nonetheless, as Willard shows, the essential foundations of this course of thought were already incipient in Husserl's recognition of the specific failing of a psychologistic foundation for logic and mathematics.

Willard argues that "the view of mathematics . . . that Husserl held in his early publications was not psychologistic in any of the more commonly understood senses." He did not think, for example, of numbers as something essentially mental, and it was always the nature of the numbers themselves that he sought to explain. One is particularly unable to find passages where Husserl advocates a psychologistic logic of the sort which "turns logical principles (e.g., modus ponens) into inductive laws of cognitive processes, relativizing the nature of truth, and of logical relations such as implication, to the individual or to the human species."10 "[A] psychological analysis," says Willard, "has to do specifically with the origins of representations, and

9 Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge, 111.

10 Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge, 111.
... these 'origins' are a matter of the types of acts which those representations presuppose." Willard cites Stumpf for the origin of this definition of the "psychological," and we see the general wording is repeated by Husserl in the Forward to the First Edition of *LI*: "Where one was concerned with questions as to the origin of mathematical presentations, or with the elaboration of those practical methods which are indeed psychologically determined, psychological analyses seemed to me to promote clearness and instruction."\(^{11}\)

The issue of exactly how Husserl's early logic was "psychologistic" appears to be an issue which has yet only been formulated vaguely by Husserl scholars, and Husserl himself says very little specifically about this. In the Forward to the First Edition he does make this interesting remark on his earlier studies:

I began work on the prevailing assumption that psychology was the science from which logic in general, and the logic of the deductive sciences, had to hope for philosophical clarification. For this reason psychological researches occupy a very large place in the first (the only published) volume of my *Philosophy of Arithmetic*.\(^{12}\)

What Husserl appears to be saying here is that he had not really thought much about it, that he had simply adopted "the prevailing assumption." Following this assumption, he had failed to find the sought after clarification. "I became more and more disquieted by doubts of principle, as to how to reconcile the objectivity of mathematics, and of all science in general, with a psychological foundation for logic."\(^{13}\) And this

\(^{11}\text{LI, 42.}\)

\(^{12}\text{LI, 42.}\)

\(^{13}\text{LI, 42.}\)
prompted the new researches which issued in _LI_. I will not attempt here to clarify
the issue of Husserl's earlier "psychologism," nor how the refutations of the _Prolegomena_
relate to Husserl's own earlier errors. What is important here is rather to account
for a certain transition in Husserl's understanding of the character of "presentations,"
and particularly for the distinction between authentic and inauthentic presentations.

From his studies with Weierstrass, Husserl had acquired his conviction that an
understanding of mathematics must be rigorously ordered, that there must be a unified,
transparent foundation for all mathematical knowledge. Yet, says Willard,

> [t]he employment of the artificial symbolisms and formal techniques so pervasively and accurately used in the advancement of arithmetical knowledge (in the solution of equations, for example, or in the ordinary adding up of a column of figures on paper) clearly was not a matter of representing or thinking about numbers and number relations at all, but consisted to a very large extent of a mere rule-governed manipulation of sense-perceptible symbols.\(^{14}\)

This was the problem of "blind calculation" mentioned above. What was remarkable
was that these methods worked, and they worked although various mathematicians
used different methods to arrive at identical results. Thus, there is the lack of systematic relations. More disturbing than this lack of system is the fact that reasoning about
numbers is carried on in this way without having the numbers themselves in view, but
by the use of mere sense-perceptible symbols.

Husserl initially attempted in _PA_ to resolve this problem on an intuitionist basis, in which arithmetic and all of mathematics would be shown to be founded on
the theory of numbers. The concept of number is first derived from the perception of

\(^{14}\)Dallas Willard, "Wholes, Parts and the Objectivity of Knowledge," 382.
a number of things. We walk into a room and see a group of people, or we look into the heavens and see many stars, thus forming the notion of a definite plurality. Of course, the question arises as to how we know in such instances that the group (totality, set) is a group (totality, set), how we know what to count as belonging to the group and what not to count. There is already in this the question of totalization, the question of how the several members of a group are grasped as belonging to a set, giving it a number of constituents.15 The cognitive grasp of sets of individuals as somehow connected in a set, or group, is familiarly illustrated by reference to such things as a flock of geese, a file of soldiers, a lane of trees, a covey of hens, etc.16 Here what Husserl calls a "figural moment" serves to symbolically organize individuals into the unity of a collection, group, set. Something like this can be supposed operative in the recognition of the first several numbers, especially if we imagine several individuals organized into a literal figure, as on the faces of dice or dominoes. It is necessary to admit at least the possibility of an elementary grasp of some of the cardinals in this fashion, as the pair, the triplet, the quad, the quincunx, as well as a few basic compounds of these forms.

However, there is obviously a limit to the account of numbers through such figural moments: "One need only try to distinguish 78 from 79."17 Husserl realized

15 An important study in this connection is Jonathan Cooper-Wiele's *The Totalizing Act: Key to Husserl's Early Philosophy*; though it is less concerned with Husserl's *LI*, it, like Willard's work, involves a very instructive examination of *PA* and the "Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic," published between *PA* and *LI*.

16 Willard's examples, *LOK*, 98.

17 Willard, *LOK*, 100.
that such an account only worked up to somewhere around the number twelve. Our
direct intuitive, or authentic, grasp of numbers is very soon overwhelmed. Thus, a
symbolically mediated, or inauthentic, recognition of numbers comes to appear
indispensable to account for the actually existing use of numbers higher than about 12.
For greater numbers, say 235, we must rely upon the composition of the sign itself.
Whereas the sign of a number such as 3 can be regarded as merely naming something
intuitively grasped, the sign of a number such as 235 is not a mere name, but the con­
struct of a system, which relies on the device of place (a principle utilized equally by
roman numerals, tallies, or any known system for representing numbers higher than the
first few). Thus, the role of inauthentic presentation becomes indispensable for
Husserl in his account of number. The sign itself becomes the principal means of
access to what we grasp as numbers. Willard says of this turn in Husserl's thought,

It must be understood that, for Husserl, even though a given number can be
represented by many different symbols, the symbol used in a given case is
essentially involved in the concept of the number represented. The number is
represented as something with a certain essential correlation to this symbol
herewith used.\textsuperscript{18}

The concept of number as founded on an authentic intuition of quantities is thus
subordinated to the notion of "systematic numbers," numbers whose meanings are
derived from a system of symbolic constructs dependent on an appropriate system of
signs.

Husserl comes to see arithmetic in general, as well as the systematic numbers,
as a sort of "symbolic prosthesis," a means of extending our ability to deal with

\textsuperscript{18}Willard, \emph{KOJ}, 102.
numbers and numerical relations. It is in fact due to the inherent limitations of human intuition that a system of arithmetic is necessary, since otherwise we could just see directly, without calculation, what we are only able to grasp through the arithmetical arts. It is in this turn of Husserl's thought toward the importance of symbolic presentations that Willard sees the turn away from understanding the problem of mathematics as a psychological task.

What, then, is the turn which constituted the "breakthrough" from the early work to Husserl's phenomenology? And how is the new science, or *Wissenschaftslehre*, related to these early studies?

It appears that Husserl began to see in his original problem a new problem, which was itself a sort of solution to the old problem. The problem which at first appeared as the problem of blind calculation in arithmetic was in fact more general. It is the more general problem of representative and signitive presentations, where a representing or signitive content stands as a surrogate for a represented or signified content. The question that occupies Husserl becomes how

\[ \ldots \text{while we are engaged with the representing contents, we believe ourselves to be employed about the represented objects themselves. In the flow of conceptual thinking it is in most cases optical and acoustical sequences of words that do the representing alone or almost alone. The contents meant enter into consciousness either not at all or only in a quite rudimentary fashion. Occasionally wholly different contents, which stand in a distant relation to the contents meant, will act as a surrogate for them, as when at the mention of London merely the shape of England indistinctly comes to mind.}^{19} \]

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This is what I think is the most important element in what I have called the transitional thesis regarding LI. The problem of *transcendence* with respect to Husserl's thought is usually thought of as the problem of how consciousness reaches out beyond itself to an exterior objectivity. However, the problem is not really one of merely getting beyond an interior to an exterior space; it is rather one of transcending one content toward another, of going beyond a representing to a represented content. What began as the problem of accounting for the veracity of blind arithmetical calculation, the problem of how objective and true insight is possible through the often remote use of mathematical symbols, becomes the completely general problem of the epistemology of a signifying consciousness.

Further, understood in this way, the Husserlian problem of transcendence is more easily connected to transcendence as understood by Heidegger, though the Heideggerian elaboration of the transcendence problem obviously makes some important philosophical advances. In Heidegger, for whom "transcendence" is one of the names equivalent to Dasein, the term always has to do in some way with being beyond something toward something; and in this form it is a pervasive schema in Heidegger's analytic. There is involved in Heidegger's analyses the play of the thematic and transparent (or, inconspicuous), illustrated by the way things are disclosed and understood pragmatically, in letting them be involved in the projects which employ them. Heidegger's most famous example is that of the way a hammer is disclosed, as *a hammer*, not by merely looking at it with respect to its external properties, but by picking it up and using it, say, to nail down a shingle on a roof, where attention is not
on the hammer directly, but on how the process of the nailing down of the shingle, a process understood in terms of a certain in-order-to, say, in order to protect one from the weather. In general the world, as well as things in the world, are disclosed inconspicuously, non-thematically, transparently in a similar manner, always in terms of a certain way of being beyond, of multifarious transcendences. This is how Dasein is fascinated with and absorbed in its world.

There is also here, I think, a connection to be made between the Heideggerian and Husserlian use of the distinction between what is authentic and inauthentic. If the authentic in Husserl is the directly intuited, as opposed to the inauthentic, which Husserl also calls the symbolic or signitive, we can see a close relation to Heidegger's use of the terms in what at first glance appears a very diverse sense. That is, the authentic for Heidegger is what pertains to Dasein's own, non-relational being. The world is authentically disclosed to Dasein precisely when meaning falls away from its involvements in innerworldly concerns, when things cease to signify, in the state of mind which Heidegger calls anxiety. His own insistence that the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity should not be understood in a moral sense, but purely analytically and descriptively, is more intelligible, if we relate his usage to Husserl's. It is, however, perhaps ironic that where Husserl seems to extol the authentic philosophical vision, Heidegger, without mentioning Husserl in this connection, shows it to be the comportment (perhaps the authentic Socratic comportment of the philosopher) toward (the philosopher's own) death.
There will be more to say in connection with Heidegger on the theme of transcendence. What is important is to keep in mind the peculiar way in which the problem arose with Husserl. Beginning as a problem in the philosophy of arithmetic, it turned into a problem of thought and awareness in general. And we find already in this early work a central element of phenomenological analyses: "while we are engaged with the representing contents, we believe ourselves to be employed about the represented objects themselves." This theme of the permeation of one thing by another, the recognition of the work of symbolic protheses, is essential to what we normally understand as phenomenology. One is reminded of Sartre's example of how in reading the words on a page the printed letters fade to a "transparency," through which what is said occupies one's actual attention. The later Husserlian language of "adumbrations," of verifying and nullifying syntheses, analogizing apperceptions, etc., all depend upon the relational schema of one thing permeating another, something shown through something, something beyond something. Of course, I do not mean to suggest that the theme of transcendence originated with phenomenology; it appears to have originated with Plato. However, it is to the credit of phenomenology to have made it a central issue, and I will argue that Heidegger can be credited with the most thorough revival of the theme since the beginning of modern philosophy, and I will argue that Husserl's Third Investigation plays a major role in preparing the formal possibility of this philosophical rethinking of transcendence.

The transitional thesis regarding the significance of \( LI \) sees the problem of blind calculation as an incipient form of the more general and fundamental problems
regarding the issues of symbolic prosthesis, of a signitive consciousness, and finally of transcendence. The foundering of PA, its failure to give an adequate psychological account of the first problem, gave way to the "beginning" represented by LI, Husserl's "breakthrough" to the form of solution that he came to call "phenomenology." LI begins only dimly aware of the full character and style into which this solution will develop. In the Forward to the Second Edition, Husserl discusses, in connection with his strategy for the revision of the work, how it only gradually approaches the level of phenomenological clarity achieved in his Ideas. The First Investigation "retains its merely preparatory character,"20 while in the Fifth Investigation "cardinal problems of phenomenology . . . were tackled,"21 and of the Sixth Investigation he says that "[its] fund of problems still were my pace-setter."22 The course of the work, the sequence of the investigations actually traces the development of Husserl's own thought, whose course he only discovers as he carries out the work; that is, the sequence does not express a rhetorical design, but has rather the character of a journal, almost a researchers log.

We must here voice the reminder that the work was a systematically bound chain of investigations but not, properly speaking, one book or work in a literary sense. There is in it a regular ascent from a lower to a higher level, and a working of oneself into ever new logical and phenomenological insights, which never leave the previously achieved ones quite untouched. Ever new phenome-

20 LI, 48c.

21 LI, 49d.

22 LI, 50a.
nological strata swim into our view and add determination to our conceptions of the earlier ones.\textsuperscript{23}

Husserl says he exploits this rising quality of the original work to direct the priorities of the revision, so that while the Fifth and Sixth Investigations undergo extensive rewriting, even reformulation, the earlier ones are mostly improved only in matters of expression. Of the Third, he says that it underwent extensive revision, though "[a]ll that was here needed was to assist the inner sense of the Investigation, and what I thought were its important results, to better operation and to remove numerous imperfections of statement."\textsuperscript{24} Over the long course of the whole work, its transitional character is evident, from the announcement in the Forward to the First Edition of how it has grown out of certain puzzles in the philosophy of arithmetic and the theory of manifolds to the fully phenomenological level achieved in the Sixth Investigation, whose fund of problems Husserl says were still his "pace-setter"\textsuperscript{25} when he turned to revise the work after completing his Ideas.

Let us consider, then, how the original problem of "blind calculation" in mathematics, which Willard shows that Husserl began to understand as the more general epistemological problem of "symbolic prosthesis," emerges toward the end of \textit{LI}. Most important, I think, is the descriptive distinction Husserl draws between intuition and signification. The problem is already broached in the First Investigation, "Meaning and Expression," as are certain persistent features of the Husserlian solution

\textsuperscript{23}\textit{LI}, 46c.

\textsuperscript{24}\textit{LI}, 49b.

\textsuperscript{25}"Zwar soll auch ihr Problembestand allein maßgebend bleiben," \textit{LU}, I, xvi.
to it.\textsuperscript{26} In particular, Husserl emphasizes the "act-character" of the employment of signs in thinking: "Signs are in fact not objects of our thought at all, even surrogative-ly; we rather live entirely in the consciousness of meaning, of understanding."\textsuperscript{27} By the Fifth Investigation, he is prepared to discuss the complex involvement of signs in thinking with respect to the "partial acts" composing particular instances of thought or consciousness. Here, some acts subsume and comprehend acts which are subordinated in the union. With respect to the relation between the sensuous verbal sound and the meaning attached to it, Husserl says, "The expression is indeed perceived, but our interest does not live in this perception; we attend, when not distracted, to the signified rather than the signs."\textsuperscript{28} Throughout, Husserl recurs to the above sighted peculiarity of how experiences transcend the directly intuitive contents, such that "while we are engaged with the representing contents, we believe ourselves to be employed about the represented objects themselves." What is peculiar in Husserl's treatment of this theme is not so much that things are thought to be given indirectly in experience, a thesis more or less taken for granted in most post-Cartesian theories of sensuous experience. It is rather his emphasis on the mediating character of the presenting contents, their

\textsuperscript{26}On this point, see Jacques Derrida's \textit{La voix et le phénomène} (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967). Of course, Derrida's study is primarily concerned with another issue. But he amply shows the transparency of signs and indicators, to the point of their effacement, by what Derrida calls a "soliloquizing consciousness," a point made evident by Derrida primarily with respect to the First Investigation of \textit{LI}, and this accords in important respects with the point to be made here, which is Husserl's early concern with with "symbolic prosthesis."

\textsuperscript{27}\textit{LI}, 304c.

\textsuperscript{28}\textit{LI}, 582b.
non-thematic presence, the transparency of their involvement, and the peculiar manner in which they are combined in an intentionality which grasps them in the partial acts, which are subsumed, transcended, effaced, and which we live beyond. A careful analysis of part/whole relations in the Third Investigation, of course, prepares a way to carefully think this through in Husserl's own novel and fruitful ways.

A better view of how the whole/part theory is involved in the reflections of the Sixth Investigation will have to wait on the exposition below of the whole/part theory as presented in the Third Investigation. Nonetheless, this is the place to pursue certain aspects of the matter of the Sixth Investigation, in order to round out the view of LI as a work in transition from Husserl's studies in the foundations of mathematics to his phenomenology, and especially to say how the signitive/intuitive distinction functions towards the adequacy of this transition.

Ever since Descartes' exposition of his systematic doubt, there has been a certain preoccupation of metaphysics with the presumption of a certain gap between the appearance and reality of the world. It has generally grown from a wonder about perceptual experience, as in Descartes' own examples: "for I from time to time observed that those towers which from afar appeared to me to be round, more closely observed seemed square, and that colossal statues raised on the summit of these towers, appeared as quite tiny statues when viewed from the bottom."29 No doubt, the new astronomy of Descartes' day, as well as the continuing importance of advancements in scientific instruments for extending and controlling perceptual experience

29 Cahn, 339b.
contributed heavily to this emphasis on the perceptual. Husserl's approach is peculiar in that it moves from a reflection on signs (originally the signs employed in blind calculation) to a reflection on perceptual objects in general and, thus, sees the latter problem more in the light of the former. That is, he begins with a reflection on how the perceptually given arithmetical sign is related to what is symbolically mediated through this perceptual element, and he comes to see this as a special case of the central problem of modern metaphysics, which in turn he reinterprets on the basis of this special case. Nonetheless, Husserl is still centrally concerned with the role of images (perceptual and imaginary) in the process and possibility of reflection.

For Husserl, there are two fundamental components in the presentation of an object: the intuitive (either perceptual or imaginative) and the signitive contents of the presentation. This distinction is fundamental throughout Husserl's later work, where he always stresses the aspectualizing character of presentations; where, for example, I see only the front of a house presented to sensuous intuition, but I am

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30 I'm thinking particularly of the numerous accounts of the significance of the telescope and the development of the various optics which relate the appearances (through hypothesis) to possible causes; see especially Koyrè’s *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe*; however, a good example is given by Peirce's explanation of hypothesis (or "abduction") by reference to Kepler's discovery of the orbital ellipse: Kepler's problem was essentially to figure out what sort of orbit would have a certain appearance when viewed from a position on the earth. The new astronomy was largely the work of an optics of celestial illusions, which was extended the appearances in general as a founding impetus to the modern sciences.

31 We are here limiting the discussion to what Husserl calls "sensuous intuition," which is extended at the end of the Sixth Investigation with the notion of "categorial intuition," which Heidegger, in *Being and Time* and *History of the Concept of Time*, describes as one of the most important discoveries of phenomenology.
somehow signitively given a house, and not just an aspect. This is how Husserl extends the general distinction between sign and meaning to the whole of the perceptual world. It is important to note that signitive contents are always dependent on some intuitive substance, either perceptual or imaginary. There are no free-floating significations.

A purely signitive act would be a mere complex of quality and matter, if indeed it could exist by itself at all, i.e. be a concrete experiential unity 'on its own'. This it cannot be: we always find it clinging to some intuitive basis. . . . An act of signification is only possible in so far as intuition becomes endued with a new intentional essence, whereby its intuitive object points beyond itself in the manner of a sign (whether as a sign regularly or fleetingly used). 32

However, the relation between sign and signification may be completely arbitrary:

Signitive matter has a general need for supporting content, but between the specific nature of the former and the specific being of the latter no bond of necessity can be found. 33

This arbitrariness does not hold for intuitive contents.

The case of purely intuitive representation is quite different. Here there is an internal, necessary connection between matter and representing content, fixed by the specific stuff of both. Only those contents can be intuitively representative of an object that resemble it or are like it. 34

We usually operate with a mixture of intuitive and signitive contents, in which the weight of one or the other may predominate, but which Husserl describes as possibly approaching one or the other limit cases of purely presentative and purely signitive presentations.

32 LI, 738-9.

33 LI, 741c. Italics are Husserl's.

34 LI, 741d.
If we now define the weight of the intuitive (or signitive) content as the sum total of the intuitively (or signitively) presented (vorgestellte) moments of the object, both 'weights' in each presentation (Vorstellung) will add up to a single total weight, i.e. the sum total of the object's properties. Always therefore the symbolic equation holds: \( i + s = 1 \).  

The limit cases are presented as follows:

\[
i = 0 \quad s = 1 \quad \text{[purely signitive]}
\]

\[
i = 1 \quad s = 0 \quad \text{[purely intuitive]}  \]

These have to be described as "limit" cases, since signitive content is never on its own, but always "clinging to some intuitive basis," though Husserl seems willing to leave open at least the possibility of a "purely intuitive" act. To say that the purely signitive and purely intuitive acts are limit cases is to say that we only approach such acts, suggesting that there is always some slight, if infinitesimal, mixture of the one in the other.

There are certain analogies that ought to be noticed between this account of intuitive and signitive contents and the pre-\( LI \) theses and problems described above. First, there is the necessity of founding signitive acts on intuitive. Secondly, there is the issue of the arbitrary connection of signified content to the founding, intuited, signifying content. Here, the formula is applied with complete generality to the whole of intentionality, to all that is meant, intuited, perceived, imagined, etc. However, applied to the field of arithmetic, this would be to reiterate Husserl's earlier discovery that arithmetic is dependent on a system of signs, or on a symbolic prothesis. The

\[35 LI, 732b.\]

\[36 LI, 732c.\]
arbitrary relation of signifiers to signified, moreover, makes possible the same sort of error with respect to experience in general which emerges in the problem of blind calculation in arithmetic. If there is an arbitrary relation between any signifier and any signified, then what makes for the objectivity of signified contents?

The answer lies in what Husserl calls *categorial intuition*. Categorial intuitions are founded acts. They are higher order acts built upon simple sensuous intuition. Ordinary sensuous intuition does not operate blindly, but in categorially shaped percepts. And these percepts obey the ideal laws pertaining to the understanding. However, the categorial in Husserl should not be confused with any sort of psychological laws; they are not merely regulative of the human intellect, but of the things themselves insofar as they instantiate the categories, and thus are determinative of access to categorially shaped objectivities by any understanding whatsoever. Moreover, Husserl's categories are not a set of laws transcendentally deduced, but forms of understanding which are objectively intuited from the things themselves, though not as real (sensuous) constituents.

In the perception of a state of affairs of the sort expressed in the statement "Gold is yellow," for example, I can see the gold, and I can see the yellow, but there is no sensible impression that would correspond to "being-yellow."

The form-giving flexion *Being*, whether in its attributive or predicative function, is not fulfilled, as we said, in any percept. . . . I can see colour, but not *being-*coloured. I can feel smoothness, but not *being-*smooth. I can hear a sound, but not that something *is* sounding. Being is nothing in the object, no part of it, no
moment tenanting it, no quality or intensity of it, no figure of it or no internal form whatsoever, no constitutive feature of it however conceived.\textsuperscript{37}

Further,

The 'a' and the 'the', the 'and' and the 'or', the 'if' and the 'then', the 'all' and the 'none', the 'something' and the 'nothing', the forms of quantity and the determinations of number etc.—all these are meaningful propositional elements, but we should look in vain for their objective correlates . . . in the sphere of real objects, which is in fact no other than the sphere of objects of possible sense-perception.\textsuperscript{38}

Husserl rejects the account, traditional since Locke, which says that I grasp these constituents by reflection upon mental acts, by a sort of "inner perception," as they can no more be real constituents of such interior perceptual objects than of exterior perceptual objects; the same problem is merely translated from "outside" to "inside," without at all advancing explanation.

Husserl concludes that we simply have a form of intuition which relates to objects in their categorial structure and that this form of intuition is distinct from sensuous perception and sensuous imagination. In the perception of an aggregate, for example, relations are intuited on the basis of a perception of sensuous relata. Something may be seen to be part of something, to entail something, to exclude it, include it, or pertain to it as a property or condition of it, to be like or unlike it, to signify it or be signified by it, etc. Moreover, things are represented as possibilities, necessities, probabilities, contradictions, etc. And all of this is as objectively constitutive of what is sensibly intuited as is anything which shows itself as a simply sensory

\textsuperscript{37}LI, 780d.

\textsuperscript{38}LI, 782.
element. Moreover, the categorial does not merely distribute what is sensory, but is bound up with the objects founded on the sensory. "What is categorial is not bound up with representing sensuous contents, but only and necessarily with their objects, and yet not with them in their sensuous (real) contents."

On the one hand, we have a lot of freedom to categorially shape what is sensuously apprehended, as the categorial is no real constituent of objects. "The concrete contents are many-sided, they sustain various abstract moments in themselves, they underlie manifold possibilities of alternation and connection. We accordingly refer many kinds of connection to this or that moment in such contents." One and the same matter can be apprehended categorially in many ways, and we are largely free to express diverse categorial pertinencies of objects. We can consider a river, to use a perhaps more Heideggerian example, as a hydraulic system (subject to the closed laws of such a system), or as the natural power and agency it represents in the course of a dramatic human development to the romantic vision of it, or as the diverse biological eco-system of environmental biology.

On the other hand, all these variations require a foundation in presentations which are compounded of signification and sensuous intuition. What can be unified in a percept is subject to governing categorial legality, such that not just anything can be made out of anything. Only ideally consistent combinations of constituents are possible as unities of objective experience. Thus, categorial regularities, possibilities

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39LI, 811a.

40LI, 810d.
and necessities pertain only and necessarily to the matters which fit them, and which they fit, as matters formally appropriate to the respective categorial laws.

These pure laws can therefore not prescribe what forms a given matter can assume, but can only tell us that, when it, and any matter in general, assumes a certain form, or is capable of assuming it, a definitely limited circle of further forms remains open to the same matter. There is, i.e., an ideally closed circle of possible transformation of a functioning form into ever new forms.\footnote{LI, 823b.}

The ideal regularities of categorial law are what first give force to material determination, disallowing contradictory attributions to pertain to a given matter, and thus making the possible permutations of experienced significance more than a free-floating semantic revery. That is, it is with categorial law that anything truly becomes objective in Husserl. And it is certainly first with the systematic regulation of determinations provided by the categorial that the possibility of a completely general science of being emerges with Husserl.

We have seen how the problem of transcendence emerged in Husserl from the time of his early studies in the philosophy of arithmetic and how the themes of these early studies were involved in the development of phenomenology. It should not be left unnoted that the Platonic character of Husserl's philosophy is marked both by this

\footnote{It is important to note that "matter," for Husserl, only occasionally means something like "stuff," or "what is subject to form." "Matter," for Husserl, usually means the "principle of identity," and when he uses it to mean "stuff" or "what form forms" (which he does sometimes, explicitly indicating so), it still turns out under examination that in those places "matter" has the property of determining identity. However, while his definition serves well to cover these other traditional senses, it also works well in uses such as "the matter at hand," which is also subject to categorial regulation.}
reliance on transcendence, a thinking beyond the sensuous, and by the discovery of a
governing ideality. Of course, in Descartes one finds a similar Platonism. However,
after Descartes, modern philosophy mostly finds the governing idealities somehow
there in the human mind, or maybe in consciousness, or somehow in "the subject," or
even as necessitated by the laws constituting the possibilities of any subjectivity. 43
Husserl, with his concept of categorial intuition, squarely fixes the categorial's location
in what is objectively intuited, though non-sensuously.

Categorial intuitions are associated with a certain arbitrariness to their
founding intuitions. They give a universal form to objects, subsuming them under
categorial laws. A categorial intuition is founded on an intuition of individuals,
without, however, meaning the individuals, nor meaning the sensuous. It abstracts
from all that is bound to the instance, and yet it is directed to the very objectivity of
the object, to the sensuality of the sensuous and to the substantial's substantiality. It
transforms straightforward (founding) intuitions into a different level of presentations
of new objects. "What is categorial is not bound up with representing sensuous
contents, but only and necessarily with their objects, and yet not with them in their
sensuous (real) content." 44 That is, what is categorial is bound up with the objects of

43 I cannot here do justice to the complex position of Kant, for whom "the tran-
scendental unity of apperception" could hardly count as any sort of "psychological"
principle, though I think it fair to say that Kant, with his "Copernican revolution," did
place the principle of the categories on the side of the subject. It is also interesting to
note that where Kant presented a preformed set of operative categories, Husserl's
categories appear to be indefinite in number, and possibly of an infinite number, only
to be discovered as everything objective is discovered, through intuition.

44 LI, 811a.
sensuous intuition, and categorial intuition abstracts from both the sensuous element and the individuality of the particular objects.

The intuition of arithmetical relations serves as a good example of categorial intuition. What is intuited arithmetically has the highest order of objectivity and must obey arithmetical laws, into whose nature we see by an intuition which abstracts from any individual or sensuous instances. Thus, the nature of arithmetical laws is intuited categorially. However, we generally practice arithmetic without thinking on the arithmetical laws themselves, but on the quantities or on things quantitatively related under the laws.

We should let this suffice as an account of the intuitive/signitive distinction in \textit{L1}, which is of obvious importance to the development of the phenomenological movement. What it is most important to emphasize in the present context is that (1) the development of this distinction is easily and fairly interpreted as continuing and elaborating Husserl's early work on what he saw as a problematic, though evident, reliance of arithmetic always on some sort of sensuously presented signs and that (2) Husserl's development of the intuitive/signitive distinction also prepares for a radical new perspective on the central metaphysical problematic of the modern era: the gap between reality and appearance. In connection with the latter, which is the modern form of an ancient problem, it is interesting to note that Husserl, much like Descartes, is primarily concerned with problems in the philosophy of science, with the character of the known, the true and the evident. But, where Descartes takes his stimulus from the illusory character of perceptual evidence (e.g., that square towers look round in the
distance), Husserl's fascination is directed to such problems as the fact that mathematics (the highest of the sciences) is dependent on a sensuous foundation in the signs (whether imaginative or perceptual), which he subsequently generalizes to the whole of both the sciences and ordinary evidence.

In what follows we will see that the part/whole theory plays a special role in the development of phenomenology, and we will see how this development is carried over into Heidegger's "destruction of the history of ontology." This "destruction" will be viewed as largely a formal critique of modernism, which itself is viewed largely as a revision of what we understand the world to be.
2.1. Domain and Objective of the Investigation

The primary conceptual distinction developed in Husserl's Third Investigation is that between dependent and independent parts, which he also calls, respectively, moments and pieces. The distinction first arose, according to Husserl, within the field of the descriptive psychology of sense data. Accordingly, he initiates his own discussion of it by reference to certain analyses of Carl Stumpf's in his Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung (1843), where the distinction is considered one respecting the "contents" of conscious presentations, which Stumpf distinguishes under the descriptive terms "abstract" and "concrete." Husserl sometimes uses these terms himself to mark the distinction, where it seems that the context justifies it, although his expressed intention is to develop the distinction as one that pertains to the ontology of objects as such. It is a distinction which "extends beyond the sphere of conscious contents and plays an extremely important role in the field of objects as such."\(^{45}\)

Husserl further helps us place the discussion by offering a list of ideas which bear a certain similarity (in that they are treated by the same science) to this distinction:

\(^{45}\text{LI, 435.}\)
The systematic place for its discussion should therefore be in the pure (a priori) theory of objects as such, in which we deal with ideas pertinent to the category of object, ideas such as Whole and Part, Subject and Quality, Individual and Species, Genus and Species, Relation and Collection, Unity, Number, Series, Ordinal Number, Magnitude etc., as well as the a priori truths which relate to these.\(^{46}\)

The distinction of parts into the dependent and independent, the abstract and concrete, pertains to objects a priori, i.e., with respect to the pure possibilities of objects, or to the possibilities of being objective. It pertains to these possibilities in the same way the distinctions of Whole and Part or Genus and Species do, or such concepts as Number, Series or Magnitude do. It is with the ideal sense of the distinction itself as applicable to objects in themselves that Husserl is concerned.

Thus, for Husserl, the distinction is one that would as necessarily pertain to the psychology of sense data, where, he says, it first arose as a topic, as it would pertain to anything, since it applies to anything objective whatsoever. But, the explanation of the distinction, or an account of basic principles pertaining to it, would no more belong to psychology than would that of such other fundamental principles as those of Number, Series, or those governing the relations of Individual to Species, and the like.

Husserl gives a further important indication as to how he sees the distinction, as well as the part/whole theory, as pertinent to a knowledge of objective possibilities, when he refers to it as one of those "[d]ifficult notions employed by us in our clarific-

\(^{46}\)LI, 435.
atory study of knowledge, and made to work rather in the manner of a lever [He-
bel]." There is a certain "leverage." How do these "difficult notions" provide a
"leverage"? We need to look in two directions to understand it: (1) towards what is
elevated through the leverage, and (2) towards the source, or foundation of the
leverage. It is a leverage in our study of knowledge, and it is clarificatory ([erkennt-
nisklärenden]). What is lifted is the clarification of knowledge. What is uncovered
in this leveraged clarification is the a priori possibilities of objects as such, as objects.
The source of the leverage is the systematic essence of knowledge, which also
corresponds to the systematic essence of objective possibility.

The way the fundamental distinction of the Third Investigation is intended to
function, as part of the pure theory of objects, is presumably in the same way such
notions as those cited above. Just as arithmetic pertains to any objects whatsoever, or
just as whatever is said about unity or series is said about the unity or series of any
objects whatsoever, the part/whole theory pertains to any objects whatsoever. This is
assured by Husserl's opening statement of where parts lie:

Every object is either actually or possibly a part, i.e. there are actual or possible
wholes that include it. Not every object, on the other hand, need perhaps have
parts, and we have therefore the ideal division of objects into the simple and the complex.49

Every object is subject to analyses respecting its being a part, or having parts, or both.
And the theory of parts and wholes is to investigate these objective properties in

47LI, 435; LU, 226.

48LU, 226

49LI, 436.
absolute generality. "These sorts of relations have an *a priori* foundation in the Idea of an object."\(^{50}\) It pertains to the very possibility of *being* an object that there are actual or possible part/whole relations involved.

Husserl considers his own development of a part/whole theory in the Third Investigation only tentative. At the beginning of the second chapter, he offers some definitions and propositions toward an axiomatic development of the theory. And we are told in section 24 (the penultimate section of the Investigation):

> These thoughts can only be meant, and are only meant, to count as mere indications of a future treatment of the theory of Wholes and Parts. A proper working out of the pure theory we here have in mind, would have to define all concepts with mathematical exactness and to deduce all theorems by *argumenta in forma*, i.e., mathematically.\(^{51}\)

Husserl will only develop as much of a part/whole theory in the Third Investigation as in needed here in the context of his epistemological aims. To develop a completely formalized theory would take the Investigations beyond their intended scope. He says, "we are not here engaged on a systematic exposition of logic, but on an epistemological clarification, as well as on the prolegomena to any future exposition of logic."\(^{52}\) To work out fully the part/whole theory in axiomatic form would be to "engage on a systematic exposition of logic." While he thinks this to be of great importance to logic and ultimately to a theory of science, his purpose in the Investigation is only to clarify certain relations and concepts that are necessary for the epistemological

\(^{50}\) *LI*, 436.

\(^{51}\) *LI*, 484.

\(^{52}\) *LI*, 445-6
clarification and for developing a prolegomena to any future expositions of logic. His investigations into part/whole relations stand to a fully worked out formalization much as an exposition of certain properties of triangles might stand to a fully formalized trigonometry, or as some observations on matrices, series, manifolds, predication, etc. would stand to the fully axiomatic development of ideas related to these notions.

The Third Investigation, thus, gets no further into a systematic exposition of the logic of parts and wholes than a partial formalization and the clarification of selected elements. The necessity of what is said about these elements is an ideal necessity, derived from the ideas of part/whole relations, which are, of course, no "ideas" in a psychological sense. The necessity pertains to the possibilities of objects, and only secondarily to the subjective experience of objects. The point is to uncover the "laws of essence" pertaining to dependent and independent parts of objects, "as such." There could be nothing more fundamental, such as a psychology, to ground the investigation which would not already presuppose the distinctions drawn in the analysis. As belonging also to a "prolegomena" to any future logic, the analyses and distinctions regarding part/whole relations could be seen as something that would function in a future logic in the way such distinctions as the familiar Aristotelian distinctions of contrary from contradictory propositions, or of causal from evidentiary reasons, etc. Logic, or Wissenschaftslehre, for Husserl, is not merely a matter of elevating the expression of traditional concepts and deriving ever more subtle or elegant expressions from them, but of discovering new elements of, or terrain within, the a priori.
2.2. *The Essential Distinction*

The distinction between dependent and independent parts is a categorial distinction. In order to grasp it we need some exemplars, either perceptual or imagina­tive; and to this end Husserl employs examples from Stumpf's *Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung*. Stumpf's examples are perceptual, and Stumpf interprets them psychologically. But, where Stumpf uses his examples "to prove the mutual inseparability of Extension and Quality, and hence their non-independence: we shall rather make use of them to define inseparability or non-independence, or contrari­wise separability or independence." The terminology, "dependent parts" and "independent parts," is Stumpf's. However, while relying primarily in his own discussion on the examples of Stumpf, Husserl also shows how the problem was involved in a certain dispute between Berkeley and Locke, although there the language in which the dispute was couched was that of the possibility of "abstract ideas." And it may be simpler to follow Husserl in explaining the distinction in this manner first.

Husserl refers to the way the distinction arose within the dispute between Locke and Berkeley as "in the psychological realm, more specifically in the field of the phenomenology of inner experience." Berkeley, in arguing against the possibility of "abstract ideas," says that we can recall things previously seen and take them apart and put them together in various ways, so that we can, say, imagine something like the head of a man connected to the body of a horse, or isolated pieces, such as an eye or

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53 *LI*, 442.

54 *LI*, 438.
an ear; but, says Berkeley we cannot, for example, separate the idea of a movement from that of a moving body, and we cannot, thus, form the distinct idea of abstract ideas such as that of "movement." It is this very distinction based on the possibility or impossibility of separation which Husserl has in mind with his distinction of dependent and independent parts. Here we are dealing with a distinction in the field of the phenomenology of inner experience, and thus Husserl speaks in this context of "contents," the term he regularly uses to refer to parts as constituents of experience, this being a special case of the wider, objective sense of "parts." Anyway, the distinction is exhibited in "contents" as well as elsewhere, and thus Husserl freely indicates that the distinction is operative here in Berkeley's polemic with Locke, and thus this is a suitable example. And, Husserl bases his first systematic statement of the distinction by reference to the sort of reflection on separability applied by Berkeley to prove the impossibility of abstract ideas. Husserl says: "We have independent contents wherever the elements of a presentational complex (complex of contents) by their very nature permit their separated presentation; we have dependent contents where this is not the case."\(^{55}\)

We will not explore Husserl's account of the dispute between Berkeley and Locke, which, in any case, is more fully treated in the Second Investigation. We may simply note that Husserl points out that, for Berkeley, to be is to be perceived and that it is the inability of abstract ideas, or ideas of inseparable qualities, to be separately presented that Berkeley takes as the basis for denying their existence. What is

\(^{55}\)LI, 439.
important here is rather Husserl's contemplation on this *inseparability* of certain parts of presentations. This inseparability is an *a priori* impossibility, an *a priori necessity* in the very nature of objects. That the property of inseparability should belong to the objects themselves, and not be merely a peculiarity of the human imagination, accords with a principle often repeated by Husserl, and which he also expresses at least once in the Third Investigation: "What cannot be thought, cannot be, what cannot be, cannot be thought." 56

Perhaps Husserl chooses Stumpf's work as his point of departure on account of Stumpf's recognition of two distinct types of content, or for what Husserl regard's as a felicitous nomenclature in "dependent" and "independent contents," or perhaps because of Stumpf's consideration of systematic variations in the examples to mark out the parameters of the distinction. In any case, the description of Berkeley's polemic as one "in the psychological realm" and "in the field of the phenomenology of inner experience" indicates a certain priority of Stumpf's thematization of the problem, which is then applied back to interpret Berkeley's argument on "abstract ideas."

Examples selected from Stumpf are, e.g., the relation of *visual quality* to *extension*, and "the relation of both to the *figure* which bounds them." If we imagine a colored surface, it is possible to vary the color at will while leaving the surface's extension unchanged, or to vary the shape or extension of the surface while leaving the color unchanged. This indicates a certain distinctness of color and surface; they are clearly different constituents of the object. In fact, they appear to be independently

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56 *LI*, 445-6.
variable with respect to last differences. A certain square surface of a certain size can have its color changed while all else stays the same, but it must have some color, or it simply cannot be. It is a law of existence, that a surface, at least a visual surface, must have one color or another, just as a color can only exist as qualifying some surface. Thus, color and surface are mutually dependent parts, i.e., must always appear in association.

Independent parts are those that can be separated. Husserl also calls them pieces (Stücke). Husserl describes this as what one usually means in ordinary discourse by "parts." Pieces are the sort of thing one could break loose and consider completely dissociated from what they are broken loose from, as we might consider the handle broken from a dropped cup. Among pieces we might include bits, fragments, segments, divisions, sections, portions, slices, rations, shares, chunks and smithereens. They are the sort of parts which compose piles, heaps, bunches and the like. The breadth of our common concern with rationalizing pieces is matched by a similar wealth of terms for designating them. Moreover, this preference for pieces over moments is somewhat reflected in the philosophical tradition, as will be seen in what follows.

It is important that we not give a merely linguistic or nominalistic interpretation in assigning the characterizations dependent or independent to parts. Peter Simons seems to make this mistake, as when he illustrates "essential dependence" as follows: "it is essential to men that they possess brains, or tables that they possess
What Simons means here by "essential" is really only that we wouldn't call, say, an object without a top a "table" or an object without a brain a "man." And this is characteristic of his work throughout, that he tests for the essentiality of characteristics by the linguistic test of whether we would assert to the truth of a proposition predicating "man," "table," etc. of objects under certain variations of their characteristics. This is not really in accord with what Husserl means by calling something essential. That brains may be taken as pieces (independent parts) of men, or table-tops taken as pieces of tables should be obvious from one of Husserl's own prime examples of independence of parts: "The head of a horse can be presented 'on its own' or 'cut off', i.e. we can hold it in our fancy, while we allow the other parts of the horse, and its whole intuited setting, to alter and vanish at will." Further, Husserl also says, "every phenomenal thing and piece of a thing is separably presentable." 

It may be that Husserl's formulations are vague in certain respects, i.e., that it isn't always clear how he would answer problems formulated by more recent researchers into part/whole relations. If a table-top is removed from a table, it seems we would not want still to call the remnant a "table." It may not even be recognizable as the bottom part of a table to someone who does not know the history of this remnant. Clearly horses who have lost their heads have undergone some radical transformation in their status as entities, as, surely, have their former heads. The situation becomes


58 LI, 439.

59 LI, 439.
even more complex as we consider parts of machinery, or things picked out and made to work *ad hoc* as pieces of machinery, when perhaps they were never intended for the functional assignment given them as parts of machines, e.g., as one might use a shoe as a doorstop.

However, it appears that Husserl, at least for the most part, has a more fundamental type of "dependence" in mind. A table-top may no longer *be a table-top*, once it is removed from a table, especially if its former function as table-top is disguised or effaced by some new assignment. Nonetheless, it is possible to remove a table-top and still have something, in a way that it is not possible to remove a texture, a color, or extension from the table, or its top, and still have something. A texture that is not the texture of anything is simply an incomplete entity, i.e., something that cannot actually be at all, unless something is added to fill it out as a possible object. We may *think* about a color or texture in isolation from any object *of which* it is the color or texture. This is demonstrated in the Second Investigation. To deny this is to adopt the position Husserl attributes to Berkeley, which denies the possibility of abstract ideas. But this is not to say that "abstract parts," another name Husserl uses for "dependent parts," can have any *objective* existence without something additional, or a supplement.

Husserl still provides the resources for the analysis of various sorts of complexity in the composition of wholes according to the style of formal law involved. Some of these laws clearly imply a variety of dependence relations, such as causal, temporal, natural or functional dependence, though the Investigation hardly gives more
than a vague sketch of how one would proceed in working out a typology of the
combinatory laws that would regulate the various types of possible dependence.
Husserl appears less concerned about uncovering the varieties of such laws and
relations than with delivering certain conceptual distinctions along which such a
typology, or a clarification of dependence itself could find adequate description.

We will now examine in what ways Husserl's theory supplies the conceptual
resources for uncovering this variety in part/whole relations and forms of complexity
possible in the composition of objects.

2.3. The Multiplicity of Part/Whole Forms; Unity & Foundation

The distinction which Husserl draws between dependent and independent
parts is the most fundamental for the Third Investigation, and Husserl gives several
formulations of it throughout the Investigation. However, this is only the starting
point for a rich array of formal types which his theory develops the concepts for
distinguishing.

The Third Investigation gives numerous definitions of dependent and indepen­
dent parts. This is the fundamental distinction Husserl wishes to develop in the Third
Investigation. However, he clearly envisages, that although the question of depen­
dence of parts on wholes or other parts is pervasive, if not always pertinent to
whole/part analyses, there are also many finer distinctions to be accounted for in the
composition of complex objects.

In comparing the relations among the parts of different wholes, or even among
the parts of one and the same whole, we come upon striking differences, on
which our common talk of different sorts of wholes and parts is founded. A
hand, e.g., forms part of a person in quite a different way from the colour of his
hand, from his body's total extent, from his mental acts, and from the internal
'moments' of such phenomena. The parts of the extension are otherwise united
with each other than they are united with their colours etc.\(^60\)

Husserl in no way approaches constructing a complete typology of part/whole forms or
relations. He puts a number of tools at our disposal for describing and analyzing
various sorts of part/whole relations, though it is obvious that these are only part of
what would be called for in a completely formalized theory.

This is consistent with his limited objectives for the Third Investigation. The
point here is above all to deliver a clear account of a few key concepts, whose
leverage is needed in the course of what is a clarificatory study of knowledge, or a
Wissenschaftslehre. Secondly, Husserl is drawing attention to a whole field of formal
reflections which have not adequately been considered in the tradition. Remarkable
categorial properties of objects are evident in the styles of partiality and composition
discernible in them, and these exhibit remarkable differences, which are essential, \(a\)
_priori, and hardly accounted for by the tradition of logic. And, finally, the Third
Investigation is itself a first approach, or rough sketch of an approach to a complete
formal (axiomatic) theory of part/whole relations of the sort he advocates.

Husserl's presentation of various part/whole relations is facilitated by his
introduction of the concept of \textit{foundation}, which he formally defines as follows:

If a law of essence means that an \(A\) cannot as such exist except in a more
comprehensive unity which associates it with an \(M\), we say that an \(A\) as such

\(^60\text{LI, 465-6.}\)
requires foundation by an M or also that an A as such needs to be supplemented by an M.\textsuperscript{61}

This makes possible some convenient ways of formulating relations which otherwise could be expressed in terms of relations of dependence, though with more complexity and difficulty. It will also serve later in LI towards the analysis of acts.

Foundational relations can be one-sided or reciprocal. The relation between color and extension, for example, is reciprocal, as both are required for the presence of either. On the other hand, the character of being a judgment is one-sidedly founded on underlying presentations. That is, a state-of-affairs can be present without a judgment relating to it, but judgments always require a foundation in something that is judged.

Foundations can be mediate or immediate, in that a founded object can found something still further. Husserl does not give the clearest examples respecting this relation. However, we can imagine that a certain light A is perceived to be brighter than another light B, and that a C is perceived to be brighter than a D. Here we have pair-wise relations founded on the perceptions of individual lights, and these relations themselves can then enter into founding a higher relation in the judgment that the difference in brightness between A and B is greater than the difference in brightness between C and D.

The distinction between mediate and immediate foundations, further, allows for the formal description of parts of parts. This simple addition to Husserl's descrip-

\textsuperscript{61}LI, 463.
tive concepts enormously enhances the variability of describable structures. Mediate parts can be ranked on a scale of remoteness (or proximity) from the wholes on which they are mediately founded. Remarkable structural differences in the complexity of wholes become evident through examining the ways in which these proximities are ordered, which may vary from level to level, according to pure formal laws grounded in the essences of the elements combined. One of the most interesting things Husserl shows is how certain properties of objects appear only at specific levels of remoteness from their foundations, or certain levels of the whole in question.

It is possible to dispense with the notion of wholes altogether, and for it substitute a description of the simple relations between the parts comprising it. And Husserl considers this a perfectly equivalent formulation. By means of the notion of foundation, simply construed as the dependence of contents on certain others, Husserl formulates what he calls "the pregnant concept of Whole:

By a Whole we understand a range of contents which are all covered by a single foundation without the help of further contents. The contents of such a range we call its parts. Talk of the singleness or the foundation implies that every content is foundationally connected, whether directly or indirectly, with every other.62 That "direct" and "indirect" foundational connections are provided for is a reference to the possibilities of mediate and immediate foundations. This allows "single foundations" to be the basis of structured wholes of the greatest complexity. It allows for complex hierarchies of parts which are combined to found other parts, which found

62Li, 475.
further parts, and so on. Moreover, this is further complicated by the fact that the *modes* of foundation at each level may, though need not, differ specifically.

It is significant that in the passage cited here the phrase "range of contents which are all covered [umspannt]*^63^ by a single foundation" is ambiguous, depending on the type of whole involved in the foundation. The parts, Husserl says, can all be founded on one another (mediately or immediately), or they can all serve together to found a new content. In the latter case, parts which are 'mutually external', or relatively independent from one another, "serve to found new contents as their 'combinatory forms'".64 These "new contents" are the combinatory forms under which pieces are connected to form wholes. These combinatory forms may correspond to what Husserl elsewhere calls "figural moments," such as an avenue of trees, a flock of birds, or a flight of ducks; to which we might add the pile, the assemblage, or any other sensuously apparent unities. In these examples, the contents, independent in themselves, together found a new content. However, Husserl seems to be especially thinking of what he call extended wholes in this context, as he says, "Only if the whole is an extended whole, and in general one that can be broken down into 'pieces', are such moments obvious and indispensable *a priori*."65 We will return below to the definition of "extended wholes." Here we wish to merely clarify the two possibilities of (1) wholes arising purely from parts founded on one another and (2) wholes

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^63^ *LU*, 275.

^64^ *LI*, 475.

^65^ *LI*, 476.
involving the foundation of a new content, a "moment of unity," which is founded on the parts it spans.

To support the thesis that not all wholes require peculiar moments of unity, Husserl offers some examples and arguments. For example, he argues, "it is vain to look in the unity of the visual phenomenon for special form-contents . . . which will bring together non-independent 'moments' such as color and extension." That neither of these can exist without the other is sufficient to account for their unity. Indeed, if we assume that the unity of any two moments requires a third moment, a moment of unity, this leads to an infinite regress. If any contents \( A \) and \( B \) must have a third content \( U \) to unite them, then there will also have to be moments \( U_1 \) and \( U_2 \) to unite \( U \) to \( A \) and \( B \) respectively, and so on infinitum. That is, if unity is possible only on the condition that a new moment, the moment of unity, is added to the parts united, then what is to unite these new moments, the moments of unity, to the wholes in which they serve as such moments, if there are not endlessly new moments engendered? It is obvious that there must come a point where we recognize that some parts are simply united, without the addition of a new "moment of unity." This shows that it is not necessary to always engender unity through a moment in addition to what is united.

Husserl anticipates a certain resistance that some might feel at the proposal that it is possible to combine parts without there being a 'moment' of combination: 
"[C]ould contents in such a situation be side by side in complete isolation, dependent on each other for their existence and yet entirely uncombined, without their 'founda-
tion' amounting to a connected unity in the manner here supposed?" The objection, he argues, assumes that what is at issue are always relatively independent parts, parts isolated from each other, parts which are side by side:

The picture of side by side existence is revealing. . . . What recommends such an unsuitable picture—unsuitable since it tries to illustrate sensuous formlessness by a case of sensuous form—is the mutual indifference of the contents merely given together in space.

What is explained here is a certain obstacle in the way of understanding a certain form of combination, a certain relation of parts to parts, and a certain way of uniting elements into wholes. That obstacle is the common habit of always thinking of part/whole relations as those depicted in the sensuous form of side by side existence. Husserl will often appeal in later Investigations to the inappropriateness of this conception to various wholes he describes; this is the leverage of his refinements attained here. Heidegger will often repeat this, as we will see, even to the point of repeating key phrases, such as "side by side," in describing how Dasein is not in the world, how knowing relates to the world and the things in it, and even how inner-worldly entities are founded in a certain relation to the world. It is always thought necessary to overcome the resistance to certain conceptions of wholes, which resistance is based on a faulty attempt to understand the whole at issue in terms of this inappropriate picture of side by side, sensuously formed contents.

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67 *LI*, 477.

68 *LI*, 477.
2.4. Extended Wholes

As mentioned above, a special role is played by what Husserl calls "extended wholes." When Husserl speaks of independent parts, or wholes which can be broken up into pieces, he usually seems to have extended wholes in mind. However, there seems to still be some room for wholes which are composed of independent parts, which are not extended wholes; at least, Husserl does not seem to rule this out at any point, even though he never clearly says whether under his conception this is possible or not. For example, when he says with respect to "moments of unity," that "[o]nly if the whole is an extended whole, and in general one that can be broken down into 'pieces', are such moments obvious and indispensable a priori," the direction expressed in the conditional ("only if") would indicate only that extended wholes always need moments of unity, while leaving unsaid whether this relation is symmetrical, i.e., whether wholes having moments of unity are always extended wholes. It is probably prudent to assume that Husserl has in mind the widest possible variation in part/whole relations and types, even where it is hard to find exemplars. We may simply say, for now, that extended parts are always pieces, and leave open the question of whether the converse also holds, i.e., pieces always are extended parts.

Husserl gives us a strict formal definition of extended wholes and extended parts, as well as some subsidiary definitions of the terms he uses in the definition of extended wholes and parts:

When a whole permits the sort of 'piecing' in which the pieces essentially belong to the same lowest Genus as is determined by the undivided whole, we speak of

it as an extended whole [extensives Ganzes], and of its pieces as extended parts [extensive Teile].

He also says precisely what he means by a "piecing":

The division of a whole into a plurality of mutually exclusive pieces we call a piecing (Zerstückung) of the same.

And he explicitly defines what is meant by "exclusive" pieces:

Pieces that have no piece identically in common are called exclusive (disjoined) pieces.

Exclusive pieces may still have a moment in common, in that disjoint pieces may still share a common border. Thus, Husserl defines isolated pieces:

Pieces are said to be isolated when they are disjoined in the strict sense, when they therefore also have no identical 'moments'.

The definition of extended wholes plainly covers the sort of whole described above as involving the "picture of side by side existence," or as involving "the mutual indifference of the contents merely given together in space." This is the kind of relation one usually has in mind when thinking of parts and wholes. It corresponds to all sorts of wholes that can be broken into extensively measured pieces. It might be some material substance that is ordinarily divided, maybe a solid or fluid. Each part of such a whole belongs to "the same lowest genus as is determined the undivided whole." That is, each of the four cups in a gallon of water will itself belong to the

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69 LI, 468; LU, II/1, 267d.

70 LI, 468b; LU, II/1, 267b.

71 LI, 468b.

72 LI, 468.
genus "water." It will not matter which cup of it one gets, as long as it really is the
same water, the same stuff as in each of the other cups, as long as it is a portion of
the same substance. Moreover, there is an indifference of each of the portions to the
others; one portion can be changed or removed in complete indifference to the others.

This is obviously, ordinarily and historically an important way of conceptualizing parts and wholes. It is involved in all sorts of exchanges. And the systematic
place for its theoretical exposition is in ordinary plane and solid geometry. Its concep-
tion and its laws are categorial. It is the type of whole involved in the ancient
Egyptian geometer's art of parceling land into comparable segments. It is involved in
all sorts of metering, as with "metered service" (say in kilowatts, where quality is
assumed uniform). It may be necessary to grade what is metered, precisely to insure
that portions of the same lowest genus (No. 2 Unleaded Gasoline, or minutes of prime-
time telephone connection, or as in the graded commodities of the speculative ex-
changes) are exchanged. As long as what is involved is portions of something all of
which belong to the same lowest genus, "all the same stuff," the parts will be related
to one another under the laws of extended wholes. If one is in possession of a
quantity of gold, it doesn't matter which particular portion it is, as, for practical
purposes, it is all the same, all pieces of the same lowest genus as is determined by
the undivided whole. The qualification "of the same lowest genus as is determined by
the whole" here guarantees that it is, for example, the gold which is divided, and not,
say, the electrons from the protons, in case such a confusion is possible. Extensive wholes are operative wherever one is dealing in parts one regards as fungible.\textsuperscript{73}

Or, we may consider extended wholes in a slightly different way, as involved in some task to be done, where each part is just like the others. To this would correspond, say, a job like dipping water with cups out of a large tub. It makes no difference on which end one begins such a task, as the parts are not founded on one another, but have the "mutual indifference of the contents merely given together in space," are related merely under the categorial laws pertaining to "side by side existence."

It is easy to simply pass over Husserl's statements on extended wholes as merely defining the type of whole his theory is not about. This is, after all, the ordinary conception of wholes, the one with which everyone is already familiar, and about which further comment can be left to ordinary geometry courses. However, he takes considerable care to set the concept of extended wholes in relief, to contribute directly to our understanding of what is involved in this kind of "ordinary" whole, as well as to clarify the distinction, in order to avoid certain sorts of fallacious reasoning. We are warned of insisting on the necessity of "moments of unity" in all wholes as reasoning from a certain "unsuitable picture—unsuitable since it tries to illustrate sensuous formlessness by a case of sensuous form." This is a tendency which Husserl repeatedly counters in the subsequent Investigations, and which Heidegger will counter

\textsuperscript{73}Webster's Ninth New Collegiate defines "fungible" as follows: "1: of such a kind or nature that one specimen or part may be used in place of another specimen or equal part in the satisfaction of an obligation 2: INTERCHANGEABLE."
in trying to explain such things as why Dasein is not in its world as a coat is in the closet, as well as in his critique of Descartes' treatment of how innerworldly entities are in the world.

There are ways in which the distinction may also prove useful in the analysis of the traditional part/whole fallacies of composition and division. The composition fallacy is committed by falsely reasoning that, just because the parts of some whole have a certain property, the whole also has it. And the fallacy of division is the converse fallacy of reasoning that the parts must have a property, on account of their whole having that property. The fallacy is regarded as "informal," on account of the fact that though it is often fallacious to reason from part to whole, or whole to part in this way, it is sometimes quite reasonable. The difference is well illustrated in Hurley's *A Concise Introduction to Logic.* As examples of reasoning from part to whole, Hurley offers these, where I've assigned the legitimate cases to the even numbered examples and the fallacious cases to the odd numbered:

(1) Each atom in this piece of chalk is invisible. Therefore, the chalk is invisible.

(2) Every atom in this piece of chalk has mass. Therefore, the piece of chalk has mass.

(3) Sodium and chlorine, the atomic components of salt, are both deadly poisons. Therefore, salt is a deadly poison.

(4) Every picket in this picket fence is white. Therefore, the whole fence is white.

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Again, numbering the fallacies odd and the non-fallacies even, Hurley offers the following examples of the converse procedure of reasoning from whole to part:

(5) This jigsaw puzzle, when assembled, is circular in shape. Therefore, each piece is circular in shape.

(6) This piece of chalk has mass. Therefore, the individual atoms that compose this piece of chalk have mass.

(7) Salt is a nonpoisonous compound. Therefore, its component elements, sodium and chlorine, are nonpoisonous.

(8) This field of poppies is uniformly orange in color. Therefore, the individual poppies are orange in color.

Hurley explains that the fallacies of composition and division are normally classed as informal because it cannot be determined from a mere inspection of form whether an attribute can be transferred from parts to whole, or from a whole to its parts. Hurley also says that detecting the fallacies "requires a general knowledge of the situation and of the nature of the attribute being transferred." I have quoted the examples at length to show that, at least for these and similar examples, Husserl's definition of extended wholes serves as an adequate criterion for determining whether an attribute is transferable.

Each of the even numbered cases here is a case of reasoning from an extended whole to its pieces, or of reasoning to an extended whole from its pieces. Moreover, I have unable to find or think of any examples that violate the criterion. Or, perhaps the formula ought to be expressed the other way around, that if it is fallacious to transfer a property from part to whole, or conversely, then we are not discussing an

\[75\text{Hurley, 154.}\]
extended whole; and if it is not fallacious, then we are discussing and extended whole. What is at issue is whether "a whole permits the sort of 'piecing' in which the pieces essentially belong to the same lowest Genus as is determined by the undivided whole"; if it does, then, if we reason to the transference of property between parts and whole, then we do not commit the fallacies of composition and division; and if the whole does not permit this sort of piecing, then we will commit these fallacies by such a transference the property.

Let's consider the easy cases first. An extent of uniform color obviously is the sort of thing that permits the sort of piecing in question in the definition of extended wholes and parts; and therefore (4) and (8) are valid. The color at issue is a dependent part of the extension it covers. However, the extents in question are independent of one another, merely side-by-side, present together in space and indifferent to one another. The mutual dependence of the moments of color and extent involved in the piecing merely implies that the fragmentation of the one is exactly correlative to the other, and the pieces on one side stand in the same relation to each other as the pieces on the other side. Husserl describes exactly this sort of piecing:

\begin{quote}
the fragmentation of a non-independent 'moment' conditions a fragmentation of the concrete whole, in so far as the mutually exclusive 'pieces', without themselves entering into a foundational relation with one another, attract new 'moments' to themselves in virtue of which they are singly distributed to the 'pieces' of the whole.\footnote{LI, 485. Italics are Husserl's.}
\end{quote}

The fragmentation of a white picket fence into the white pickets that make it up, and the fragmentation of an orange poppy field into the orange poppies that make it up,
can only be done on the basis of this mutual conditioning of fragments of an extent and color, where the pieces of one are distributed exactly on the pattern of the other moment's pieces.

A similar logic is followed in examples (2) and (6). Mass is an *addable* attribute, just as extension is. Mass is added and subtracted piece-wise to or from a total mass. The piecing of a chunk of gold, for example, will condition a piecing of the chunk's value, as the quantity of the chunk's value is precisely dependent on the quantity of the chunk's mass. This is, of course, part of how the extensive properties of money arise, as well as the values of everything measured in money. It, of course, corresponds to the extensive valuation of other regular and ordinary commodities that are traded in extensive portions.

In examples (3) and (7) the wholes, which are a chemical compound (Salt) belong explicitly to a different genus from the parts (atomic components, or elements). Therefore, there is no piecing of the whole out of parts belonging to the same last genus as the undivided whole involved here.

Examples (5) and (1) should be interpreted in the light of Husserl's discussion of parts nearer and farther from the whole, where he specifically discusses the moment of shape. He says there is an essential formal distinction between such 'moments' as can only satisfy their need for supplementation in the complete whole, and such as can satisfy this need in pieces of this whole. This makes a difference to the mode of belonging, to the *form of foundation*: by it certain parts, e.g. the total extent of the intuited thing, belong exclusively to the thing as a whole, while other parts, e.g. the
Therefore, in example (5), the fact that the property of being circular in shape would belong to the *whole* jigsaw puzzle is no grounds for inferring that its *pieces* are circular. Similarly, in example (1) the visibility of the whole is founded on it *as* a whole. If we regard *The Visible*, as a genus of the whole, and regard *The Invisible* as a genus of all the atoms that are part of this whole, then clearly the whole is not in this respect divisible into pieces belonging to the same lowest genus as does the whole. This reasoning is of course a reversal of our application of the formula. That is, rather than using the definition as a predictor that a fallacy will or will not ensue from part/whole reasoning, we are using the obvious fallaciousness of composition or division in this instance to show that the wholes in question are not extended with respect to the properties in question. But this should suffice to show that the formula still at least works as a definition. Whatever the formula indicates is an extended whole and parts will be of the same whole/part type as permits a reasoning from one's having the attribute to the other's having it; and whatever the formula indicates is not of an extended whole/part type become involved in a fallacy (either of composition or division) if there is a reasoning from its parts to its whole or whole to parts.

It would require more research than is possible here to elevate what is offered here as an hypothesis to a reliable general principle. However, in a fully formalized part/whole theory of the type envisaged by Husserl, it may be possible through Hus-

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77 *LI*, 483.
serl's definitions to formalize a criterion for determining when composition or division is fallacious and when it isn't. As this would turn one of the main traditional informal fallacies into a formal fallacy, that would surely be no small gain for logic. This would require, I think, a formalization based on a closer reading and interpretation of the whole Third Investigation than what has been rendered to date, where efforts have concentrated on the six propositions of Section 14.

Husserl is in no way arguing in the Third Investigation to replace the "ordinary conception" of parts and wholes, as is evident in the care he takes to define the essence of the type of relation involved in extended wholes. However, the ordinary conception is misapplied in many contexts, where its application actually produces a sort of fallacious reasoning. In this aspect, Husserl is up to a very traditional sort of logical research in LI. LI is concerned primarily with a certain descriptive phase, uncovering some fundamental descriptive distinctions, much as the most radical of logicians, Aristotle, set out such distinctions as that between contradictories and contraries, or evidential and causal reasons. The detailed elaboration and exposition of logic depends on this previous phase of discovery, i.e., on a prolegomena to logic. Thus, Husserl only gives a rough, preliminary sketch of the sort of propositions which would belong to a formal exposition, though he goes to considerable length to make the fundamental distinctions clear. In the course of this, it is important to set the concept of extended wholes in sharp relief, in order to clearly show what the concept is, as well as what it isn't.
2.5. Independent and Dependent Meanings

Where the Third Investigation illustrates what is meant by dependent parts primarily through sensuous examples, following the psychological researches of Stumpf, and similarly minded contemporaries, the whole of the Fourth Investigation is taken up with illustrating an application of the theory to the field of meaning and its linguistic expression. The Fourth Investigation provides an important bridge to the studies of the Fifth and Sixth Investigations, on intentional experiences and on the clarification of knowledge. Meanings are correlated to acts of meaning; or, as Husserl says in the Introduction to the Fifth Investigation, "to meanings in specie correspond acts of meaning, the former being nothing but ideally apprehended aspects of the latter."\(^{78}\) Moreover, as he says in the Introduction to the Sixth Investigation, "All thought, and in particular all theoretical thought and knowledge, is carried on by way of certain 'acts', which occur in a context of expressive discourse."\(^{79}\) The Fourth Investigation, "The Distinction between Independent and Non-Independent Meanings and the Idea of Pure Grammar," serves not only to illustrate an application of the part/whole theory of the Third Investigation, but to carry the pertinence of its analyses forward into themes of the Fifth and Sixth Investigations. It is particularly important to us here, as it serves as a primary illustration of the dependence of parts on wholes or other parts, i.e., as a counterbalance to the previous discussion of extended parts.

\(^{78}\) *LI*, 533.

\(^{79}\) *LI*, 667.
Husserl begins the Investigation in a manner parallel to that of the Third, by showing how meanings are divisible into simple and complex. An expression is complex if it contains parts which themselves have meanings; it is simple otherwise. Moreover, the meanings contained as parts of a complex meaning may themselves have further meanings as parts of themselves, and so on indefinitely. However, at some point division must come to an end, where simple meanings come to the fore. And the possibility of simple meanings Husserl illustrates by the "the undubitable case of something." 80

What Husserl has in mind here is fairly obvious. We discover in expressions parts which are themselves expressions, words in phrases, phrases in sentences, etc. However, several significant distinctions are operative in his analysis. In the first place, there is the application of the formal distinctions which were developed as a part of the pure theory of parts and wholes in the Third Investigation. Secondly, the application of the theory to expression and meaning is seen to turn into a many-sided analysis. The articulation of (1) the sensuous elements of language (e.g., the complex of sounds in spoken discourse) does not correspond to the division of (2) meanings expressed in expressions. Moreover, neither the complexity of the meaning nor of the sensuous element is in any way parallel to the complexity of (3) the objects intended or meant in expressions. The demonstrated lack of parallelism respecting these three domains indicates that indeed we are dealing with distinct and irreducible parts of experiences of meaning. The distinctions drawn here by, and for the sake of applying,

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80LI, 494c.
the part/whole theory play an increasingly important role in accounting in the Sixth Investigation for the objectivity of knowledge. Let us note the differences.

First, Husserl says that no one would count the German word "Konig" as a complex expression, merely because of its consisting of more than one syllable. To count as complex an expression must consists of parts which are meaningful. Syllables are for the most part like letters, with some simple meanings formed through combinations of them merely as a convenient way to supply a language with more simple expressions than would be possible if all simple meanings were expressed monosyllabically. The difference can be seen by considering how the incompleteness of meaningful parts of complex expressions differs from the incompleteness of sensuous parts of a word.

To a conjunction like 'but', or to a genitive like 'father's', we can significantly attribute a meaning, but not to a verbal fragment like 'fu'. Both come before us as needing completion, but their needs of completion differ essentially. . . . In the successive formation of a complex verbal structure its total meaning gets built up, in the successive formation of a word, the word alone gets built up; only when the word is completed does it house the fleeting thought.81

There are, of course, questionable cases respecting whether words contain parts, as in the cases of prefixes and suffixes, or of the components of compound words. But, Husserl argues, for the most part these are not functioning a "parts of an expression qua expression," are "not its significant parts," but only "parts of the expression as a sensuous phenomenon."82

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81 LI, 502-3.

82 LI, 502.
Second, the partiality of expressions does not parallel the partiality of objects. The notion that this would be the case arises from the error of thinking that a meaning has the character of *picturing* an object. If meaning pictured its objects, then the complexity of expressions might map part-wise the complexity of the expressions' objects. Husserl has already rejected this sort of side-by-side image as appropriate for capturing certain kinds of part/whole relations, and he explicitly rejects it here as appropriate for capturing the relation of expressions to their objects. The inadequacy of the notion is shown by counterexample.

The very expression "*non-independent moment*" provides a decisive counterexample. It is a categorematic expression and yet presents a non-independent object. *Every non-independent object whatever can be made the object of an independent meaning,* and that directly, e.g. *Redness, Figure, Likeness, Size, Unity, Being.*

That is, we can talk of the size of something, where "size" is not a partial meaning, not syncategorematic, while it is plain that *size* itself can only exist as the size of *something.* In fact, any object, any dependent or independent part, whether concrete or abstract, whatever can be made the object of a categorematic expression, i.e., the object of an independent meaning.

Moreover, the simplicity of meanings may not correspond to the simplicity of objects. It is common to use a simple expression, such as a proper name, to refer to an object which is complex. Husserl argues for a separation of the complexity of the object from the complexity of an expression referring to it. When, for example, I use the name "*Schultze,*" I mean him simply, and not a list of properties that I might

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83 *LI, 507.*
associate with the man Schultze. Any or, perhaps, all of the particulars I think of when I mention Schultze can change, or someone else may associate a completely different set of particulars with the expression "Schultze" at the very moment I use it, and yet Schultze would still mean the same man. However, in any presentation of Schultze in association with the name "Schultze" there will be some complex determination of the referents; and that there should be one such complex determination or another may well be what is meant by an expression, though this is meant with a certain indefiniteness as to exactly how the referent may be presented. An expression may mean its object with a certain indefiniteness as to its possible presentations. Thus, Husserl draws an essential distinction, which again serves to found a split between the part/whole analysis of expressions from the part/whole analysis of the objects referred to in them, which he describes as:

... the distinction between concrete, meaning-conferring experiences, which are complex or simple as regards their meaning conceived purely as meaning, and such experiences as are complex or simple only in a secondary respect, through the presentative content through which one is conscious of the object meant.\(^{84}\)

What we have seen is that the combination of meanings into complex or compound meanings corresponds neither to the complexity of the objects meant nor to the complexity of the sensuous element of expressions (e.g., speech, writing). Yet it is obvious that not just any meanings can be combined with any others. There are pure, apriori laws, Husserl argues, for the combination of meanings into new meanings. The grammars of the various natural languages give diverse possibilities for symbolizing

\(^{84}\text{LI, 497.}\)
the distinguishable meaning-forms, yet they are all constrained by the necessity to make sense according to what is possible apriori.

What is fundamental is the act of meaning; it pervades both expression and intended objects. The act of meaning is not itself meant, unless by a second act of reflection. It presents its referent, but is not itself presented in itself. This is essentially the structure of intentionality, which is the primary concern of the Fifth Investigation, where intentionality is explored in relation to the contents of consciousness. In contrast to a common sort of sense-data theory of experience, Husserl maintains that what appears is distinct from what presents it.

... truly immanent contents, which belong to the real make-up (reelen Bestande) of the intentional experiences, are not intentional: they constitute the act, provide the necessary points d'appui, which render possible an intention, but are not themselves intended, not the objects presented in the act. I do not see colour-sensations but coloured things, I do not hear tone-sensations but the singer's song etc. etc. 85

"Points d'appui," "Anhaltspunkte": intentionality is always founded on something not intended but experienced, always founded on something which is non-thematic, but which serves as presentative of the actually minded objects intended. Objects are meant, not merely presented blindly; they are recognized in perceptions, imaginings, thoughts, etc., as objects. And, all of this is to say that meaning pervades intentional experiences generally.

The essence of expression is to convey a meaning. Expression originates to fulfill a communicative function (I-7), though they continue to serve meaning-confer-
ring acts even in soliloquy (1-8). Whatever unities of sense can be experienced, whatever can be the object of intentional experience, can be conveyed in expression. The same principles of identifying or nullifying synthesis which are generally operative in an objectifying consciousness are also operative in the regulation of what can be expressed. Yet, this does not conflate expressions with objects presented in them. An expression's meaning, as was said above, is in specie nothing but an ideally apprehended aspect of the acts of meaning. Meaning arises through an idealizing abstraction of a sameness from context to context.

However, the possibilities of unity of meaning are not equivalent to the possibilities of objective fulfillment or intuition of actual objects. Thus, Husserl distinguishes "laws which discourage nonsense" from "laws which discourage absurdity." It is possible to mean things which are objectively (even apriori) impossible. The expression "round square" has a meaning, even though what it expresses is impossible by its very essence, impossible precisely because of what the expression means. Meanings appear to have their own irreducible essence in Husserl's philosophy, as well as their own apriori set of governing laws for combination into complex meanings, their own laws of dependent and independent existence.

The possibilities of combining meanings are constrained by antecedently definite laws which pertain to their essence. Syncategorematic expressions, such as "only if," "not without," "and," "the father's" or "on the way to" call for completions of very definite types in each case. They are dependent on larger expressions into which they fit to acquire any definite meaning at all. They contribute a part to the
meanings in which they are properly fitted, and this because they are essentially partial, i.e., are essentially dependent parts of meanings that include them.

The question arises as to how a syncategorematic expression can mean anything alone, why an expression such as "but," "equals," or "or" is not merely a senseless noise when used out of context. Modes of combination are themselves accessible to an idealizing abstraction, and thus we recognize and convey the partial intentions expressed in the syncategorematica, even when they are uttered as fragments, though we also recognize the need for completion as part of their very sense. Husserl's "dependent meanings" can be seen to be very much like Russell's "propositional functions," though the former comprise a more general class, as partial meanings can contribute to parts of propositions, or to parts of parts of propositions.

Finally, it must be seen that the connection of parts of expressions to other parts, or to whole expressions, differs essentially from any sort of side-by-side, or extensive relations. This is plain from what Husserl says about the complexity of intentional acts in the Fifth Investigation. First, an act of meaning must have a unified correlate:

\[\text{Whatever the composition of an act out of partial acts may be, if it is an act at all, it must have a single objective correlate, to which we say it is 'directed', in the full, primary sense of the word.}^{86}\]

Secondly, we are told explicitly that the part acts are not related in a side-by-side fashion to the whole:

\[\text{86 LI, 579; LU, 400.}\]
the unity of what is objectively presented, and the whole manner of the inten­tional reference to it, are not set up alongside of the partial acts, but in them, in the way in which they are combined, a way which realizes a unity of act, and not merely a unity of experience.⁸⁷

Further, Husserl gives definite descriptions of the specific mode of being in which partial acts have to the unities founded on them:

... there are great differences in the energy, so to speak, with which acts assert themselves in an act-complex. Generally the greatest energy will be displayed by the act-character which comprehends and subsumes all partial acts in its unity. ... In this act, we live, as it were, principally; in the subordinate acts only in proportion to the importance of their achievements for the whole act and its intention.⁸⁸

In the last quoted instance, Husserl is primarily concerned with how expressions are involved in experiences involving them, particularly in the instance where we attend to what is said rather than to the expression in which it said, i.e., where an expression is part of a total complex experience involving perhaps a perception or other relevant involvement in what is meant. Nonetheless, it is in this sort of complex unity that expressions themselves are brought to unity in intentional experiences. "All perceiving and imagining is, on our view, a web of partial intentions, fused together in the unity of a single total intention."⁹⁹

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⁸⁷LI, 580c.

⁸⁸Es wird auch eine weitere Beobachtung illustrieren, die hier niemandem entgehen kann, nämlich daß sozusagen hinsichtlich der Aktivität, mit welcher sich Akte einer Komplexion geltend machen, sehr erhebliche Unterschiede möglich sind. Normalerweise wird der Aktcharakter, der die Einheit aller Teilakte umspannt, sie alle unter sich hat ... die größte Aktivität entfalten. In diesem Akte leben wir vorzugsweise, in den untergeordneten Akten aber nur nach Maßgabe der Bedeutsamkeit ihrer Leistung für den Gesamtakt und seine Intention. (LU, II/I, 405b; LI, 582).

⁹⁹LI, 701.
Thus, part/whole relations, through their involvement in the constitution of meaning, are a pervasive aspect of conscious experiences of all kinds and at every level. And it is through the analysis of dependent and independent meanings in the Fourth Investigation that Husserl prepares the ground for applying the pure part/whole theory of the Third Investigation to the far reaching problems of intentional experience and the phenomenology of knowledge in the Fifth and Sixth Investigations. It is important to see this operative relation to understand the significance of the Third Investigation to the whole project of *Logical Investigations*. It is especially important to understanding why the "investigations" of *LI* are called "logical." While Husserl says the we are not engaged in a systematic exposition of logic in *LI*, but a prolegomena to any future such exposition, it is plain that he intends to primarily advance logical theses in this work, and the part/whole theory, often considered little more than incidental to the main tasks of the work, is perhaps the most formally advanced of logical theses in the work. The themes of intentionality, signification, consciousness, objectivity, etc., which are usually considered most central to *LI* can be interpreted as motivating; i.e., Husserl perceives an inadequacy of understanding of these matters, which is largely based on inadequate doctrines of logic, and it is primarily this logic which he wishes to set straight, if only because its inadequacy to epistemology has been shown in the perplexities based on it.
2.6. The Ideality of Part/Whole Relations and the Categorial Intuition of their Forms

A whole, in Husserl's sense, is more than a mere aggregate. An aggregate is a categorial unity corresponding to the mere form of thought, "it stands for the correlate of a certain unity of reference relating to all relevant objects." That is, while it is possible to define collections of any entities we like, however disparate or separate, and such collections are governed by their own pertinent categorial forms, there is always something more to the composition of wholes. But, this extra in the composition of wholes is not itself a further part, less we fall into an infinite regress, as discussed above (section 3). A whole always depends for its unity on relations of foundation, and these relations are always governed essentially by the kinds of parts involved. Husserl explicitly locates the governing principle in the parts, rather than in the wholes, it belonging to the essence of parts to be the parts of just certain formally definite types of wholes. It pertains to the "generic essence" of parts, by "laws of essence," which are apriori, that they can only enter into certain formally definite types of wholes, and this according to certain formally definite types of foundational relations.

Husserl distinguishes "material," or "synthetic," laws from "formal," or "analytic" laws. The distinction is applied to part/whole relations in the problematic

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90"Inbegriff" is der Ausdruck für eine "kategoriale", der blossen "Form" des Denkens entsprechende Einheit, er bezeichnet das Korrelat einer gewissen, auf all die jeweiligen Objekte bezogenen Einheit der Meinung. (LU, II/1, 282b; LI, 480.)
context of the possibility of a pure formal theory of parts and wholes. In III, §11 the
difference in analytic and synthetic propositions is explained by way of illustration:

It is now immediately plain, that all the laws or necessities governing
different sorts of non-independent items fall into the spheres of the synthetic a priori: one grasps completely what divides them from merely formal, contentless items. Laws of the type of the causal principle . . . or the laws . . . which assert the non-independence of mere qualities, intensities, extensions, boundaries, relational forms etc. — would not be put on a level with a purely 'analytic' generalization such as 'A whole cannot exist without parts' or with analytic necessities such as 'There cannot be a king (master, father) without subjects (servants, children) etc.' We may say in general: correlatives mutually entail one another. . . . If we set beside these any definite propositions of the opposite sort, e.g., 'A colour cannot exist without something coloured' . . . the difference leaps into view. 91

Analytic laws are those which are completely free from any dependence on the
content. Where empirical propositions are found "analytically true" ("e.g., If this
house is red, then redness pertains to this house"), it is due to the proposition's
empirically specifying an analytic law, not because of any of the content of the objects
specified. However, propositions such as that there cannot be a color without some
surface over which it is spread are true only in virtue of the sorts of content involved.

Thus, it seems, the greater part of Husserl's theory is concerned with introducing a
pure formal account of wholes whose laws are immune to a purely analytic descrip-
tion, or to "complete formalization," as foundational relations are dependent on the
types of content involved.

Husserl indicates the contradiction himself in §23. After having said in §22
that "[t]he only true unifying factors, we may roundly say, are relations of 'foundation',

91LI, 456b.
and that "Unity is in fact a categorial predicate,"\(^{92}\) he seems to run into problems with his own efforts to use the notion of categorial form to distinguish wholes from mere aggregates:

The form of an aggregate is a purely categorial form, in opposition to which the form of a whole, of a unity due to foundation, appeared to be a material form. But did we not say in the previous section that unity (and we were talking specifically of a unity based on foundation) was a categorial predicate?\(^{93}\)

The resolution Husserl makes of this conundrum is very important to understanding the sense of a pure formal theory of parts and wholes, though it is easy to read over as merely saving the consistency of a certain word usage, particularly as he often does resolve apparent inconsistencies by merely disambiguating, or showing that a word can have more than one sense and separately designating these senses. However, what takes place here is that Husserl employs an extended syllogism, a sorites, which both resolves the apparent contradiction and gives the essential form of the conditions of the possibility of a pure theory of parts and wholes.

Here we must note that, on our doctrine, the Idea of unity or the Idea of a whole is based on the idea of 'Founding', and the latter Idea upon the Idea of a Pure Law; the Form of a Law is further as such categorial—a law is not thinglike, not therefore perceptible—and that to this extent the notion of a Founded whole is a categorial notion.\(^{94}\)

But how can this resolve the contradiction? If the Idea of a unity or the Idea of a whole is based on the idea of 'Founding,' and the latter on the Idea of a Pure Law, and the form of this is purely categorial, then aren't the analytic relations pervasive?

\(^{92}\)LI, 478a.

\(^{93}\)LI, 481b.

\(^{94}\)LI, 481b.
Aren't, then, all part/whole relations analytic? Where is there room for the material laws which are supposed to govern the composition of wholes with dependent contents?

The answer appears immediately in the following section, though its sense can perhaps only be fully grasped after the expositions of the Sixth Investigation:

The pure forms of wholes and parts are determined by the pure forms of law. Only what is formally universal in the foundational relation, as expressed in our definition, is then relevant, together with the a priori combinations that it permits. We rise, in the case of any type of whole, to its pure form, its categorial type, by abstracting from the specificity of the sorts of content in question. . . In formalization we replace the names standing for the sort of content in question by indefinite expressions such as a certain sort of content, a certain other sort of content etc. At the same time, on the semantic side, corresponding substitutions of purely categorial for material thoughts take place.95

What takes place is a "formalizing abstraction," by which the forms of laws are specified without any reference to the specific contents of the wholes from which the forms are abstracted.

This formalization, while ignoring specific content, still leaves us with a wealth of important relations and distinctions. "The distinctions between abstract parts and 'pieces' are purely formal,"96 as are the distinctions between nearer and remoter parts, of immediate and relative dependence or independence, as are the laws pertaining to the piecing of wholes through the piecing of their moments, the formal descriptive properties of concatenations, of reciprocal and one-sided foundations, of relative and absolute concretions, simple and complex objects, etc. The material specifications

95 LI, 482a.

96 LI, 482.
of these formal relations are to the formal principles as are empirical specifications of
cmathematical principles to those principles, or as analytic statements are to empirical
instances generally.

In the Sixth Investigation Husserl introduces the theory of categorial intuition,
and it becomes clear how we rise to what is purely formal and universal in developing
a pure theory of parts and wholes. According to Husserl, there is a special form of
intuition by which we become aware of certain non-real elements of objects and states
of affairs ("real" here having the usual sense of existing in space and time). The case
is analogous for language and perception. Just as in the case of the former we can
understand the syncategorematica, without any individual sensible parts corresponding
to them,

The 'a' and the 'the', the 'and' and the 'or', the 'if' and the 'then', the 'all' and the
'none', the 'something' and the 'nothing', the forms of quantity and the determina-
ations of number etc.—all these are meaningful propositional elements, but we
should look in vain for their objective correlates (if such may be ascribed to
them at all) in the sphere of real objects, which is in fact no other than the
sphere of objects of possible sense-perception.\textsuperscript{97}

so it is also in the case of perception or sensible representation: "I can paint $A$ and I
can paint $B$, and I can paint them both on the same canvas: I cannot, however, paint
the both, nor paint the $A$ and the $B$."\textsuperscript{98} Yet, though there are plainly parts of what is
meant in speech and perception which cannot be isolated in any way from the whole
as a sensible phenomenon, Husserl rejects any recourse to a psychological explanation,

\textsuperscript{97}L\textsubscript{I}, 782.

\textsuperscript{98}L\textsubscript{I}, 798.
such as that the mind brings these dependent elements with it. What is meant in each such case is precisely something in the object or state of affairs itself. Husserl uses the example of being: I can see color, or feel smoothness, but not see or feel being colored or being smooth; being is something absolutely imperceptible. It is one of his prime examples of a categorial. However, it is also the case that, say, being red is something we know from experiencing things which are red. We experience being red as something actually present in those things which are red, but not as a real part of them. In fact, he argues that all intuition is based on sensuous intuition, at least as a founding moment, though what is intuited may go beyond what is sensuous in a sensuous presentation. Husserl finds that the only solution to the problem of how we have knowledge of categorial elements is to admit an irreducible form of intuition corresponding to them: "there must at least be an act which renders identical services to the categorial elements of meaning that merely sensuous perception renders to the material elements."

It is important to stress that Husserl's solution is not to merely abandon the problem. His solution depends on arguments showing both the necessity and the possibility of categorial intuition.

First, there is the negative critique of psychological explanations of nonsensuous elements. This is the usual solution for empiricism. Since Locke, says Husserl, what is nonsensuous has been thought to exist through the combining operations of the mind, which are revealed to 'reflection', when we look internally at the thoughts in

\[99LI, 785.\]
which sensuous elements are put together to give the forms of objects and states of affairs. This, he says, really does nothing but push the problem back into another sphere of the sensuous, into the sphere of internal sensibility. The question still remains as to how we would perceive such connections internally. No such account, therefore, really answers the question as to how we come to know the categorial elements of experience. I.e., it is still necessary that categorial relations and properties come to intuition themselves, that they be recognized as themselves; nothing is gained by merely postponing the intuition of them to a second interior stage of 'reflective' perception.

Second, the possibility of categorial intuition is shown through the theory of foundational relations. All intuition depends on some sort of sensuous intuition (either perceptual or imaginative). These, however, are generally pervaded by signitive intentions, for which the sensuously present elements are a point d'appui, are Anhaltpunkte, i.e., are supports for an intuition which perceives something beyond and through them. This basic structure is repeated at numerous levels. The first gives us ordinary objects, which are perceived in a manner which Husserl calls 'straightforward perception.' The objects of 'straightforward perception' are not simple sensuous properties, but the things synthesized through an already complex synthesis of 'adumbrations.' These perceptions are 'straightforward' only in distinction from the acts which Husserl characterizes as categorial intuitions, which abstract from a given perception or intuition to a universal element, which is only illustrated in the objects presented by straightforward perceptions. This founded intuition is a sort of second
sight; it constitutes a certain view or conception of objects first given in straightforward perception. This view leaves straightforward objects fundamentally unaltered, while it is still to a certain degree free with regard to them; the same fundamental objects can serve to illustrate numerous possible conceptions founded on them; these latter, however, are not completely free in 'authentic' categorial intuition, as there are essential laws regulating what kinds of connections founding contents can be involved in.

Husserl replaces the empiricist reflection, an internal perception of perception, with another sort of second sight. Here we see one of those strategic turns from psychology to the things themselves. Perception of the universal is a founded perception, but not a perception of a perception. What is sighted in categorial intuition is rather a second objectivity. Such ideas as those of relation, number, whole and part are founded on intuitions (perceptual or imaginative) of things related under these ideas. It is possible to then found further categorial notions on other founded notions, and there is no theoretical limit to the possible complexity of such foundations. I may see that \( A \) is brighter than \( B \), and from this and similar instances form the idea of a general relation of \( x \) being brighter than \( y \). This can then found a higher level relation of the sort illustrated in the judgment "The difference in brightness between \( A \) and \( B \) is greater than the difference in brightness between \( C \) and \( D \), thus giving way to judgments of the most complex relations. As long as we can find actual fulfilling instances of the types of relations described we having authentic intuitions of them; where we only have symbolic intuitions, merely signitive intentions toward relations whose
foundations are not actually secured, we have *inauthentic* thoughts of such relations. The categorial intuitions are not the same as the mere relational noticing, perceiving or experiencing of things, but are the perceptions of the founded relations *themselves*. It is not in the mere perception of a number of things that the category of number is perceived, but in the thought directed to the *number itself*. Thus we rise from straightforward perception to founded intuitions of a categorial type. And it is on this possibility that Husserl would ground a pure theory of parts and wholes.

Categorial intuitions are objective. In the case of wholes and parts, or relations between wholes and parts, or parts and parts, there are definite laws founded on the types of parts combined, whose form can be abstracted as the pure categorial form of a law. These forms are ordinarily already (a priori) operative in the constitution of objects and states of affairs, as dependent (abstract) parts of these objects or states of affairs. Obviously, explicit reflection on these abstract contents allows a categorial reshaping of objective experience, a reconceptualization, a fresh objective interpretation. The distinctions of the Third Investigation are only a first, tentative and approximate statement of generalities pertaining to a pure theory of parts and wholes. And this is largely to extract a refinement of some notions needed to work "in the manner of a lever," in an epistemological clarification. The primary objective is to clarify the distinction between dependent and independent parts, but it is also to call attention to the more general fact of a multiplicity of ways of being a part.

There are indications scattered throughout the Third Investigation of some interesting basic methodological considerations, such as the following:
If we say, for example, that the 'moment' of sensory quality, e.g. of sensory colour, is non-independent, and requires a whole in which it may be embodied, we have only laid down one side of our governing law, the side of a part which belongs to the Genus Sensory Quality. We have not, however, laid down the character of the whole, the manner in which such a 'quality' is its part, or the sort of supplement it needs to achieve existence. It is different when we say that a sensory quality can only exist in a sense-field, and a sensory colour in a visual sense-field, or that it can only exist as qualifying an extension. There the law lays down the other sides as well; the notion of a visual sense-field is given; and it means a particular, definite sort of whole among various possible sorts of whole. Just so, the notion of 'qualifying an extension' points to quite specific possibilities of law-governed inherence that a non-independent 'moment' may have to a whole.\footnote{\emph{LI}, 453-4.}

Here we are generally encouraged to be specific in the description of part/whole relations, to state in addition to the dependence of a part (1) the character of the whole, (2) the manner in which the part is a part of the whole and (3) the sort of supplement the part needs to achieve existence. The general course of this methodological suggestion is worked out with respect to a sensory phenomenon. However, I think the passage is significant in that it already raises the question of what is meant by "being-in," of which Heidegger makes much use in \emph{Being and Time}.

As has been indicated, Husserl makes much use of the general problematic opened by the Third Investigation in the rest of \emph{LI}. There has already been some recognition in the literature of the importance of Husserl's Third Investigation to the rest of \emph{LI}. I hope I have laid the groundwork here for showing a broader significance for the Third Investigation in the general confrontation of phenomenology with the philosophical tradition. In particular, I intend to show in what follows how the Third
Investigation lays the theoretical and methodological groundwork for Heidegger's critical analysis of the prevalent modern view of the world and innerworldly things.
CHAPTER 3

HEIDEGGER: INNERWORLDLY PARTS

3.1. Heidegger & Phenomenology

*Being and Time* is a work of complex interests. Heidegger seems to have spent a decade working on it (at least, he had not published anything for ten years before its emergence), and it could perhaps be looked on as *his* "breakthrough"; it is at least the work from which he emerges as a "major philosopher." There is much insight into the formation of Heidegger's thought to be gained from reading the recently published lecture series given shortly before the completion of *BT*, *History of the Concept of Time*, which is referred to in the "Translator's Foreword" as including "the most sustained and specific confrontation of phenomenology in general and Husserl in particular that we are likely to get from Heidegger. Here we find Heidegger not only at his most phenomenological, but we can also see more clearly how the phenomenological problematics lead him into domains of inquiry which transcend the philosophical motivations of Husserl. There are also some fundamental insights into how Heidegger became involved in the peculiar complex of interests expressed in *BT* to be found in a short article "Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie," which appears in *Zur Sache des Denkens*. 101 We will consider the latter text first. The point here, of course,

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is to drive toward an interpretation of the method of BT, which will allow us to see the impact of the Third Investigation on Heidegger's analysis of the world.

In "Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie," written for the occasion of Max Niemeyer's 80th birthday, Heidegger tells how he first became aware of Husserl's work, as well as how he eventually came to be published by the same press which had published Husserl's Logical Investigations. In particular, we find that the issue of being, and, further, the meaning of being, were issues which animated Heidegger long before any study of Husserl. Heidegger came to the study Logical Investigations through a mistaken impression that, as Husserl had somehow been influenced by Brentano, the work would further Heidegger's researches into issues he had approached through Brentano's dissertation "Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles" (1862). His remarks are sufficiently interesting to quote at length:


Heidegger was expecting to find in LI some decisive advances on the questions raised in Brentano's dissertation. But his efforts were in vain, because, as he would only find

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102 Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie," 81.

103 Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie," 82.
out much later, he was not seeking in the right way. Nonetheless, he remained so fascinated (betroffen) by Husserl's work that in the following years he read from it again and again, without any adequate insight into what it was that fascinated him.

The spell (Zauber) which emanated from the work extended to the exterior appearances of the text and the title page. It was on this title page, which he "can see to this day as clearly as then [das mir noch heute so vor Augen steht wie damals]," that he first encountered the name Max Niemeyer Verlag. The name was attached to that still strange name "phenomenology," which appeared on the title page of the second volume.

Of course, as this article was written in celebration of Max Niemeyer, one can only surmise that Heidegger's fascination with the way the book looked finds more emphasis here than it might otherwise. However, it is interesting to read how opaque Heidegger originally found LI. We see that he came to read it only because he thought it would have something to do with Brentano's researches on the manifold senses of "being" in Aristotle. In this regard he found it useless, though he was still sufficiently fascinated with it to go back to reading it again and again, not even knowing himself what it was about it that fascinated him. It was several years later that Heidegger participated in a seminar led by Heinrich Rickert, in which they studied two works of Rickert's student Emil Lask, which themselves were influenced by
Husserl's *L.I.* And this led Heidegger to work through *L.I* again. However, the work especially gained interest for Heidegger when, in 1916, Husserl came to Freiburg as the successor to Heinrich Rickert (who went to Heidelberg).

Heidegger says that Husserl's instruction took the form of a step-wise exercise in "phenomenological seeing," which required that one refrain from making unexamined use of philosophical notions, but which also involved refraining from any engagement with the authority of the great philosophical thinkers. Heidegger undertook in 1919 to teach while learning (*lehrrend-lernend*) the method of phenomenological seeing, while at the same time teaching a seminar on Aristotle. This inspired him to undertake a new study of *L.I.*, in which he found the distinction worked out in the Sixth Investigation between sensuous and categorial intuition to be of significance for the "manifold sense of being."[^104] What he was learning from his phenomenological studies appeared to him to be something which the Greeks had actually grasped better as Ἀλήθεια.

Was die phänomenologischen Untersuchungen als die tragende Haltung des Denkens neu gefunden haben, erweist sich als der Grundzug des griechischen Denkens, wenn nicht gar der Philosophie als solcher.^[105^]

The operative attitude of thought which had been newly discovered by phenomenology proved to be the principle feature of Greek thought, if not of philosophy as such. It could be said that Heidegger's perspective at this point transcended phenomenology

[^104]: Der hier herausgearbeitete Unterschied zwischen sinnlicher und categorialer Anschauung enthüllte sich mir in seiner Tragweite für die Bestimmung der »mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden«. "Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie," 86b.

[^105]: "Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie," 87b.
toward the radical philosophical possibility of phenomenology. But the possibility, as Heidegger remarks at the end of this essay, is higher than the actuality. That is, more profound than what Husserl found (phenomenology) is the possibility of Husserl's discovery (the possibility of phenomenology). This seems to have been for Heidegger the radical discovery of philosophy, or the ground from which philosophies emerge; it was the emergence of Heidegger himself as an original philosopher. The revised reading of phenomenology in the light of Heidegger's new insight into the Greeks, for sure, a phenomenologically illuminated insight, entailed a decisive revision of what he viewed as its central philosophical problematic.

What is it which following the phenomenological principle is to be experienced as "the things themselves"? Is it consciousness and its objectivity, or is it the being of what is in its unconcealment and concealment?

* * * *

The central task of Being and Time is to raise the question of the meaning of being. And the method is proclaimed to be phenomenology. It is a work in phenomenological ontology, or an investigation into the meaning of being through a method

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106"Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie," 87c.
that is characterized as phenomenological. However, it is obvious that Heidegger had already transcended the philosophical problematics of the originator of the method. The method itself is the theme of §7, "The phenomenological method of investigation," where he discusses "A. The concept of phenomenon"; "B. The concept of logos"; "C. The preliminary conception of phenomenology." In these subsections, Heidegger uses an explication of the name "phenomenology" as a device for explaining what he means by the phenomenological method, and this explication departs considerably from the style of any of Husserl's explications. Heidegger signals his intention to free the term "phenomenology" here from any essentially Husserlian roots, when he says, "The history of the word itself, which presumably arose in the Wolffian school, is here of no significance." Moreover, the explication of the method on the basis of the name makes possible a manoeuvre by which Heidegger turns immediately to what it was he thought the Greeks had grasped, of which phenomenology was merely a recent rediscovery. He says, "We shall set forth the preliminary conception of phenomenology by characterizing what one has in mind in the term's two components, 'phenomenon' and 'logos', and by establishing the meaning of the name in which these are put together." What follows is an interpretation of the Greek φαινόμενον and λόγος, in which the central Husserlian themes and problems are stated in a

107 Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 50-51; abbreviated in the following as "BT"; "SZ" will be used to abbreviate the German edition, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1984), 28.

108 BT, 50; SZ, 28.
different cast, while at the same time a certain advance in understanding what was
meant in the Greek is made by freely employing certain Husserlian concepts. Section
7 of the Introduction to Being and Time clearly incarnates the transcendence of
phenomenology toward the Greeks, or toward philosophy as such, which in "Mein
Weg in die Phänomenologie" Heidegger says was the course of his own thought.
After the Introduction, phenomenology as a theme in Being and Time finds little
discussion.

In what ways the phenomenological method is involved in the development of
Being and Time can better be seen by examining the lecture course which preceded
the publication of BT, History of the Concept of Time. As was noted above, here we
find Heidegger's most direct and sustained discussion of Husserlian phenomenology.
Many of the themes which occupy BT are worked out in the lecture course in a form
very close to how they appear in BT. The present discussion will rely heavily on the
lecture course.

There is one development of LI which is singled out by Heidegger in "Mein
Weg in die Phänomenologie" as especially significant to his understanding of the
ontological question which had occupied him from his earliest years: the distinction
worked out in the Sixth Investigation between sensuous and categorial intuition.
Heidegger devotes about twenty-five pages (all of §6) of HCT to explicating the
discovery of categorial intuition and its significance. There is also at least a reference
to the significance of the slogan "to the things themselves!" In HCT an explication of
these themes is worked out in ways that exhibit what become characteristically
Heideggerian themes: discourse, everydayness, the world, existence, history, the work-world, and the like. The exposition of time only receives about 14 pages, before the lecture course comes to an end. In any case, it appears to have been the logical possibility of categorial intuition that best accords with the model of foundation, which inspired a whole new world of philosophical relations, which emerge first in the lecture course, and then in Being and Time. So, we should consider most significant here what Heidegger understood of the newly discovered form of intuition and its consequences for his style of description.

The concept of categorial intuition is worked out by Husserl in the utter formality of an exercise in theory construction. It is intended as an element in the theory of science (Wissenschaftslehre). The main point is to arrive at a more rigorous and thoroughly developed sense of evidence and of objectivity. As was argued above, Husserl is especially concerned with symbolically mediated experiences of the objective, as in mathematics, a problem whose scope it is increasingly apparent ranges far beyond Husserl's original problem and which extends to the objectivity of the most ordinary, everyday experiences. The impact of Husserl's work on the student is more immediate; it lies in the actual modification of how one evaluates what is evident, in the reflective exercise. We are not too surprised that Husserl taught, as Heidegger reports, in what must have been the very unconventional style of a step-wise exercise in phenomenological seeing, nor that he was less interested in engaging the authority of the great thinkers. Categorial intuition, after all, a form of intuition, would have been something one was taught to distinguish in the course of these reflective exercises.
Heidegger, on the other hand, always engaging the great thinkers, showed more interest in discerning how the thought of the great thinkers has already pervaded one's view. In fact, it turns out that the use of the very concept itself makes possible Heidegger's demonstration of how what is seen is always already something talked over to such an extent that he proclaims that "we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what one says about the matter."\textsuperscript{109} Of course, Heidegger too is concerned with the objectivity of what is said, and particularly in connection with the attainment of phenomenological results themselves.

Whenever a phenomenological concept is drawn from primordial sources, there is a possibility that it may degenerate if communicated in the form of an assertion. It gets understood in an empty way and is thus passed on, losing its indigenous character, and becoming a free-floating thesis.\textsuperscript{110} Heidegger, like Husserl, is concerned with the fact that a gap can open between intuition and expression, with the fact that expression can become uprooted from any genuine grasp of what is said in it. He is concerned, in fact, with the problem of inauthentic understanding in a Husserlian sense, which is the sense in which mere symbols are manipulated blindly without any actual apprehension of what the symbols supposedly express. For Heidegger, however, this pertains with equal force to the extant expressions of great thinkers. These too can be taken up and used without any real grasp of the matters at issue. Moreover, there is more emphasis in Heidegger on the gap as it functions in everyday understanding. This problem of the gap that opens

\textsuperscript{109}History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, translated by Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 56a. Hereafter abbreviated "HCT."

\textsuperscript{110}BT, 60-61; SZ, 36.
between expression and understanding, the problem of the inauthentic use of symbols, is the theoretical antecedent of the Heideggerian theme of inauthentic everydayness, however much the concept of authenticity is modified in Heidegger.

The concept of categorial intuition is especially important because of the complex of relations involved in its explication. The phrase "categorial intuition" is already philosophically provocative. For Kant, there were the categories of intuition (space and time) and categories of the understanding (essentially derived from the transcendental unity of apperception). In "intuition" is the notion of presence to perception, the simply given sensuous appearance. In "categorial" is contained a certain sense of ideality, or universality. It isn't clear in the traditional associations of these words how we are to make sense of the expression "categorial intuition." It is a concept which among modern philosophies is unique to phenomenology, though something akin to it is evident in Plato.\(^{111}\) What is meant in phenomenology by "intuition" is no sort of privileged or mysterious awareness, but "simply apprehending the bodily given as it shows itself."\(^{112}\) "Intuition" means something quite close to the sense it had had since Kant. When I look at my pencil, I see that it is yellow. If asked how I know it is yellow, then I can answer in the philosophical sense by saying that I know this through the intuition, that it is simply given to me in this way,

\(^{111}\)We can understand Plato's doctrine of recollection as akin to the notion of categorial intuition, where it is argued, for example, that we must have pre-experienced such notions as "equality," since we couldn't have learned them empirically. That is, Plato supposes in the doctrine of recollection that the universal is something that one has actually perceived (intuited).

\(^{112}\)HCT, 47b.
without any reasoning or any sort of previously having learned about the matter. This
is what is meant by "simply apprehending." However, particularly since Kant, but
even with the British Empiricists, the categorial (or universal) element of knowledge
would be something extra, something beyond the sensuously (intuitively) given, which
arises somehow through reason, reflection, thought, something more on the side of the
subject. The categorial would be something somehow put into the empirically given,
something not itself of the same empirical element. The expression "categorial intu-
ition" means that the categorial is intuited, that it too is found there in the things
themselves, bodily given. The notion of categorial intuition is a Platonism, at least on
one reading of Plato. What is important to note here is the provocative nature of the
very expression "categorial intuition," which must have had something of the air of a
conceptual monstrosity, in view of the senses which had accrued conventionally to
"categorial" and "intuition."

Heidegger's exposition of categorial intuition in HCT is substantially true to
Husserl's. However, in Heidegger's explication, the significance of the discovery is
more closely interwoven with the more general sense of the way discourse is involved
in the way things show themselves. On the one hand, "Categorial acts are founded
acts; in other words, everything categorial ultimately rests upon sense intuition."113
On the other hand, "categorial intuition is found in every concrete perception (perception
of a thing)."114 In other words, categorial and sensuous intuition are complementary

113HCT, 69c.

114HCT, 48c.
constituents of every intuition, and they stand in the complementary relations of a founded (categorial) and founding (sensuous) content. Moreover, Heidegger expounds at length upon the objectivity of the categorial, repeating parts of the Husserlian arguments against psychologistic interpretations of the categorial. The peculiarly Heideggerian turn of emphasis first becomes evident in the functional priority Heidegger ascribes to the categorial over the sensuous:

When I perceive simply, moving about in my environmental world, when I see houses, for example, I do not first see houses primarily in their individuation, in their distinctiveness. Rather, I first see universally: this is a house. This "as-what," the universal feature of house, is itself not expressly apprehended in what it is, but is already coapprehended in simple intuition as that which to some extent here illuminates what is given. 115

Not only do I first see universally, but the universal element, this as-what, functions inexplicitly. This notion of the inexplicit is also referred to by Heidegger in the phrase "something is experienced but not apprehended." 116 The inexplicitness, the coapprehendedness of the categorial is, of course, already discussed as a possibility by Husserl, where a second act of ideating abstraction is required to apprehended the categorial explicitly. But it seems to take an increasingly important role in Heidegger, who also comes to prefer the expression "thematic" and "nonthematic" as descriptive of the distinction.

Where the role of the inexplicit, lived through, experienced but not apprehended categorial constitution of things becomes most important in Heidegger is

115HCT, 67a.

116HCT, 52a.
through the function of discourse. Not only do I first see universally, but this sight is always pervaded through and through by assertions. "We see what one says about the matter." The distinction which Husserl raises as that between authentic and inauthentic thinking arose with him in the fact that thinking through symbolic prosthesis—as in the use of mathematical symbols, which often may be unaccompanied by any intuition of the matters themselves—can become detached from the matters themselves, can lose sight of them, can become cut adrift from what the thought is about. Something similar pertains to inauthenticity in Heidegger. The pervasion of thought by discourse, in Heidegger, however, receives a different emphasis, less a matter for the philosophy of science than a matter for the whole of a meaningful life. It pertains to the historicality of human existence. It's significance is above all to render the central philosophical problematics as hermeneutic.

None of this should be taken as meaning that what is disclosed under the sway of discourse is somehow less objective than what would appear to an uncontaminated gaze. It is not a matter of stripping the pure appearances of the disguises of discourse. What is shown by the thesis of categorial intuition is that what is given always is more than the purely sensuous element. When I see houses, I first see universally, of necessity. A house simply is not a collection of sense data. It is primarily, in its very concreteness as an entity, that talked over, meaningfully pervaded and practical possibility signified in discourse. This is the thing itself. What is given in categorial intuition is founded on sensuousness, but it is itself an object of a higher order than the sensuous.
Heidegger's discussion of the phenomenological method in §7 of *Being and Time* does not recapitulate what is said in the lecture course, *History of the Concept of Time*, even though the latter went unpublished until very recently (1979 in German). In *BT* he focuses on the meanings of "phenomenon" and "logos," with special attention to their senses in the Greek. "λόγος," he says, "means rather the same as δηλοῦν: to make manifest what one is 'talking about' in one's discourse."¹¹⁷ What is to be exhibited in phenomenology, he says, is "the Being of entities." Indeed, "[i]n the phenomenological conception of "phenomenon" what one has in mind as that which shows itself is the Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives."¹¹⁸ This equivalence of phenomenology and ontology appears to be rather asserted than proven, though it is clear that "being" would be the phenomenon to be exhibited in *Being and Time*, as that is the declared purpose of the work. In any case, the point is well made that "that which remains hidden in an egregious sense, or which relapses and gets covered up again, or which shows itself only 'in disguise', is not just this entity or that, but rather the Being of entities."¹¹⁹ *Being and Time* is itself a discourse aimed at exhibiting *being*. And this task must first disclose the ways in which it is hidden, covered up, disguised. That is, the first problem is to make plain the necessity of raising the question, as it seems that what is to be exhibited is something with which we are all quite well familiar.

¹¹⁷ *BT*, 56b; *SZ*, 32.

¹¹⁸ *BT*, 60a; *SZ*, 35.

¹¹⁹ *BT*, 59; *SZ*, 35.
Our familiarity with being is precisely what keeps it covered up. As we are told in *HCT*, we speak of being constantly, as in the statement "The chair is yellow." Heidegger uses the example to illustrate categorial intuition. That is, I can sensuously perceive the chair and the yellow, but *being yellow*, or *the chair being yellow*, which are asserted in the proposition are not *real*, but *ideal* or *categorial* elements of what is meant in the proposition. Though not real, the categorial element is yet bodily given there simply, just as the real or sensuous elements are. The example is used by Heidegger mostly to illustrate that *there is* categorial intuition. However, something more can be shown by it, i.e., the nature of synthesis. There are two important statements regarding the nature of synthesis in §7 of *BT*, which we should consider as important for what will follow here when we consider Heidegger's concept of the worldhood of the world.

First, there is a statement regarding what synthesis is:

And only *because* the function of λόγος as ἀπόφανσις lies in letting something be seen by pointing it out, can the λόγος have the structural form of σύνθεσις. Here "synthesis" does not mean a binding and linking together of representations, a manipulation of psychical occurrences where the 'problem' arises of how these bindings, as something inside, agree with something physical outside. Here the συν has a purely apophantical signification and means letting something be seen in its *togetherness* [*Beisammen*] with something—letting it be seen as something.\(^{120}\)

Synthesis does not take two or more separated objects and bring them together. Rather, it first displays something which one apprehends simply, by taking it apart, setting out a part in relation to the whole, or setting parts in relation to one another,

\(^{120}\) *BT*, 56d; *SZ*, 33.
and at the same time bringing these parts together by indicating their togetherness. This is how things are articulated. And from this example we can see how discourse pervades such articulation. In this instance, the common subject-predicate form of articulation pervades the form in which it is pointed out in discourse.

The second important statement Heidegger makes on the nature of synthesis is the following:

When something no longer takes the form of just letting something be seen, but is always harking back to something else to which it points, so that it lets something be seen as something, it thus acquires a synthesis-structure, and with this it takes over the possibility of covering up. 121

This happens either because of an original failure of discourse to let the things be seen from themselves as they are, or due to the tendency of discourse to trivialize, to make the matters accessible in an inauthentic way. This, of course, happens above all to being, of which we speak constantly, without any originary grasp of what we mean by "being." Being is the most indispensable and, therefore, the most trivialized of phenomena. Thus, the task of phenomenological ontology is to discover, or uncover, or unconceal what we mean by "being."

This is the close connection in which Heidegger holds phenomenology and ontology. His sense that the question was already a live one for the Greeks is the basis on which he transcends Husserlian phenomenology, and arrives at the understanding expressed in the sentence, "Philosophy is universal phenomenological

121 BT, 57c; SZ, 34a.
ontology. Which is of course how his own thought transcends phenomenology toward a newly discovered sense of the original task of philosophy. The involvement of phenomenology from this point becomes mostly implicit. Yet the fundamental discoveries can be plainly seen as operative throughout the analyses of *Being and Time*. And our task will be to show how the Husserlian part/whole theory is involved in Heidegger's exposition of the nature of worldhood and the significance of this for the tradition.

3.2. Existence & World

Phenomenology serves Heidegger as the right way of access to whatever is to be made the theme of ontological investigations. This involves for the most part adhering to phenomenology's main results in securing the right way to the things themselves. We have already seen, in the previous section, how what is seen ordinarily is pervaded by discourse, that, in fact, we see what one says about the things. One is not freed of this pervasion by finding some "neutral" standpoint, perhaps "prior to" this discourse, at which one might arrive by simply "ignoring" what "they say" about the things. It is rather a matter of grasping this very process of pervasion, and of owning up to it in its very "otherness," of recognizing the dependence of one's "own" perception and general awareness on the authorship of "the they." Heidegger is in this way renewing a certain traditional imperative of philosophy, as the reflective life, which exposes the ordinary, everyday lack of responsibility for what one thinks or

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122 *BT*, 62c; *SZ*, 38.
believes. The way of access to the things themselves is not to pretend to have not heard the discourse that always already has pervaded whatever there is of significance. It is rather a matter of uncovering the very uprootedness of significance in the "they." To know one's self is to know that for the most part one has been already co-opted, occupied, or even "haunted" by a view that is ultimately "no one's." I not only see first universally, but also generically, or as "anyone."

When I am simply carried along in the way I relate to things by what one says about them, my comportments toward things are "inauthentic," even in the Husserlian sense that they are based on a merely signitive relation to the actual things towards which the discourses which carry me, or which I actually assist in carrying on, are purportedly directed. What is specific to the Heideggerian analysis is the view that inauthenticity is essentially constitutive of our relations to things, that inauthenticity belongs to the constitution of everything manifested of worldly significance. Though there is always still a possibility of authenticity, it is always founded on inauthenticity, or, as Heidegger says, is a modification of inauthenticity. Things are at first given under the sway of discourse, and they remain so mostly. The route to the things themselves is not through finding a standpoint which is "prior" to this discourse, nor by somehow pretending not to have heard it, nor by "controlling" for it by seeking a broader "intersubjective" "synthesis." Rather, what is required is an authentic appropriation, actually accepting the discourse in the way of making it phenomenal, and uncovering what is concealed in it. Phenomenological ontology (an expression which for Heidegger is pleonastic) is at first and essentially hermeneutic. Further, to realize
its possibility, which is to be a philosopher, is a matter of properly inhabiting the discourses under which understanding is held in sway. This is what Heidegger calls an *existential* possibility of Dasein, a possibility of being-in-the-world which only gets worked out in existing. This, I think, we could fairly identify as a Socratic element in Heidegger's philosophy.

To bring ourselves before the things themselves, it is necessary to first uncover how discourse has already pervaded their appearances. And by "discourse," Heidegger means something broader than language. It includes every way in which the issue of existence is worked out with an inconspicuous glance at the Others. These Others are those for whom the world is there too, and they are disclosed as constitutive of the very sense of things. First, they are given in the very nature of artifacts and articles of use. In manufacture, things are always cut with reference to someone for whose use the articles are intended, and we use things which have come from someone, who shapes them with a view to certain uses. Moreover, it is less with a view to any specific Others that objects are shaped, but rather with reference to a sort of *average* useability. Even if I cannot discern the purpose of some article, the fact that it has been manufactured, managed, placed, or otherwise is something taken into the concern of Others is constitutive of its appearance. Finally, there are the ways in which things have actually been *talked over*, the publicly formulated grammars through which we learn to talk about and understand things, which "remains for the most part inconspicuous, because the language already hides in itself a developed way
of conceiving."¹²³ Moreover, just as there prevail certain linguistically formulated ways of interpreting, there are also exhibited certain publicly formulated styles of usefulness, which are as determinative of the way things are interpreted as is what is literally said.

In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the newspaper, every Other is like the next. This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of 'the Others', in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the "they" is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as they shrink back; we find 'shocking' what they find shocking.¹²⁴

Not only do we "see what one says about the matter," but we do what one does about it as well. And in this doing is articulated an understanding which controls the appearances at least as primordially as do the conventions and products of the language.

Not since Plato (with the possible exception of Nietzsche) has the necessity of philosophy's eccentricity been propounded with such force and clarity as in BT. The dictatorship of "the they" exerts a leveling, averaging influence, such that even those things which may have once been gained for genuine insight by the utmost effort are taken as easily understood and accessible to everyone.

Publicness proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted, and it is always right—not because there is some distinctive and primary relationship-of-Being in which it is related to 'Things', or because it

¹²³BT, 199; SZ, 157.

¹²⁴BT, 164; SZ, 126-7.
avails itself of some transparency on the part of Dasein which it has explicitly appropriated, but because it is insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness and thus never gets to the 'heart of the matter' ["auf die Sachen"]. By publicness everything gets obscured, and what has thus been covered up gets passed off as something familiar and accessible to everyone. 125

The eccentricity of philosophy is not merely a matter of the need to somehow get above "the great mass," for this can be accomplished in the way one shrinks back from the great mass as one shrinks back. Such comportments are rooted in what Heidegger calls "distantiality ["Abständigkeit"], which is the care for how one differs from the Others, whether this care is merely for a difference to be leveled out (as in "fitting in"), whether it is for the way one is lagging behind the Others and needs to catch up, or whether it is a matter of one already having some priority over the Others which one seeks to maintain. In fact, distantiality is better served by the idle curiosity which is always "on the scent" of whatever is newest. The genuine and necessary eccentricity of philosophy has nothing to do that sort of arrogance which has contempt for the rabble or the ordinary. The eccentricity is rather a resoluteness, which tracks the things themselves. The eccentricity of philosophy is not an affected eccentricity. It is one that arises from the core of resoluteness, whose issue and measure is none other than authenticity.

The point of departure for Heidegger's efforts to raise the question of the meaning of being is to make the question transparent through interrogating the very being of the entity which raises the question, our own being, which he identifies as "Dasein," or, equivalently, as "being-in-the-world." But why give it these names,

125 BT, 165; SZ, 127.
"Dasein" and "being-in-the-world"? Isn't calling our kind of being "being-in-the-world" already to load a complicated assumption into the characterization of this entity, which ought properly to wait on the results of the investigation? It only seems so, on account of a very fundamental and well-entrenched error in the traditional ontologies. Heidegger takes his departure with a phenomenon of which we have a certain primitive and pre-ontological experience. We never experience ourselves as worldless, and thus this is never something that shows itself from the phenomena. The notion of a worldless subject is only possible as the residue of an abstraction, though it was a very natural abstraction, in that it is founded on certain essential characteristics of the way Dasein is in its world. In any case, this primitive experience is that of our own Being, to which attaches essentially the characteristic of mineness. Moreover, there is never any experience of this being after death, beyond the world or in another world, or before our worldly existence.\textsuperscript{126} The issue of my being is always the issue of my being here,\textsuperscript{127} in the world.

Thus, the starting point for an investigation into the meaning of being is an existential analytic. We begin with an analysis of that being which is always already

\textsuperscript{126}Heidegger explicitly claims that he does not wish to prejudice the question of whether there is an after-life, but he says that whatever we could mean by such expressions as "after-life" could only be clarified by understanding what we mean by this life, in this world, in the world.

\textsuperscript{127}The expression "Dasein" is more often translated "Being-there," a translation which is easily misleading to those who don't read German, for which reason it is more often simply left untranslated. The "da" of "Dasein" means neither "here" nor "there." For example, if you call someone on the phone and ask "Ist Helmut da?" ("Is Helmut there?"), the correct German answer may be "Nein, er ist nicht da?" ("No, he is not here."). "here" and "there" being represented in German by the same word "da".
an issue, what it means to be in the way that we are. Traditionally the phenomenon of being-in-the-world has been missed, by interpreting it as something it isn't. That is, we draw our idea of being from the entities encountered within the world which are not of the character of Dasein. This is how the pre-ontologically experienced question of the meaning of being deteriorates into a theory of present-at-hand entities. Moreover, it was discovered early on that there are certain ways in which whatever can show itself as present-at-hand will always already have certain determinations, which are those the ancients identified as the categories. Thus, Heidegger identifies categorial being as the being of things which Dasein encounters within the world which do not have the character of being-in-the-world in the way Dasein is in the world. Accordingly, Heidegger distinguishes the apriori characterization of Dasein from the categorial of the present-at-hand by using the expression existentiale for the former. "[A]ny entity," he says, "is either a "who" (existence) or a "what" (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense)." In BT, the difference is developed formally in terms of a distinction in the two senses of "in" as they function in the expressions "being-in-the world," and "innerworldliness" (or, innerworldly entities, or being within the world). An ontological characterization of the being-in of Dasein's being-in-the-world supplies

\[1^{28}\] The odd expression "always already" ("immer schon"), which occurs so frequently in BT, can be seen to function systematically and semantically as roughly equivalent to, or as a germanization of, the expression "universal apriori." Although he does not make an explicit point of the fact that he is using "immer schon" in this fashion, I believe that this is what is meant by it.

\[1^{29}\] BT, 71; SZ, 45.
the decisive formal propaedeutic to a fundamental revision of ancient ontological assumptions, whose efficacy is shown to govern throughout modern philosophy.

First, it is important to grasp how the difference here is not the familiar distinction of mind/body, subject/object, or any of the modern variations, simply with added emphasis.

Descartes was well aware of the importance of distinguishing his own type of being from that of the non-human, especially unconscious objects experienced in the realm of the cogito, and the distinction has in one way or another been insisted on by all but that rare sort of physicalist, who describes mind or experience as an "epiphenomenon," or the like. In fact, we find in Descartes Meditations this remarkable statement: "I must be careful to see that I do not imprudently take some other object in place of myself."130 This would be imprudent indeed. What is it that Descartes is afraid he will take in place of himself? Something that he could imagine himself to be: a flame, a wind, a breath, an ether spread through the grosser parts. There is more here than a mere simple assertion that humans aren't material things. We are given a specific indication of where the ontological understanding of our kind of being (thinking being) goes awry. One thing (something of which I can form an image) is taken for another (me).

We can easily see the influence of Plato on Descartes; it shows through in the very style of his arguments for a truth beyond the appearances. It is probably a fair

assumption, considering the importance of Descartes to the development of modernism, that what was at least partially at stake in Descartes' arguments (e.g., towers which in the distance look round, look square when one gets closer) was the new science, which was essentially an optics. Things aren't what they appear to be. The sun doesn't pass overhead; we turn under it. The planets don't move at irregular velocities (nor in epicycles); they follow the simple mathematical orbit of the ellipsis. The essence of modern physics is actually the progress of systematically proving in what ways the real world is different from what it seems to natural perception. The scientifically (or, theoretically) most significant discoveries are precisely those that overturn the greatest weight of assumption, and especially of natural assumptions. The success of modernism as a view is evident in the way every school child knows that what appears to be solid is really mostly space (in the form of atomic and sub-atomic interstices). The modern view displaced that which went beyond the world toward God, and which interpreted innerworldly entities through reference to divine purposes. But what it displaced it with was a transcendence of the apparent world toward one which the new optics showed to be more real and certain (as well as more fitting to the limited, finite human intellect). Yet, what Descartes argues for is precisely a presence, and a more real presence, beyond the worldly appearances. Though this is a revolution respecting the world's significance, the essential distinction between the

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131"... I should not be astonished if my intelligence is not capable of comprehending why God acts as He does... and this reason suffices to convince me that the species of cause termed final, finds no useful employment in physical [or natural] things; for it does not appear to me that I can without temerity seek to investigate the [inscrutable] ends of God." Descartes, Cahn 329.
medieval and modern worlds, there is a continuity in the understanding of being as presence.

What entities are present to in Descartes is, of course, the cogito. This too, however, is present-in-the-world, just as things which are present to it in the world. It is merely present under a different category of substance, as thinking substance rather than as extended substance. Now, these become incommensurable substances. In the language of Husserl's Third Investigation, the cogito is not a piece, or extended part of the material world. Let us consider this precisely in relation to the Husserlian definition of extended parts and wholes, by reviewing the Husserlian text.

When a whole permits the sort of 'piecing' in which the pieces essentially belong to the same lowest Genus as is determined by the undivided whole, we speak of it as an extended whole, and of its pieces as extended parts.\textsuperscript{132} Clearly, in describing the mind and body as belonging to distinct substances, Descartes has separated their lowest genera in such a way that they cannot fit the Husserlian definition of pieces of the same extended whole. However, there are ambiguities introduced, for example, by Descartes' grouping both mind and matter under the genus of created, as opposed to creator, substance. Moreover, though there is an incommensurability of mind and matter, famous as the modern mind/body problem, it seems that the mind may nonetheless be present side-by-side with what is present to it. Without explicitly citing the Husserlian formula, Heidegger does criticize the image of "side-by-side" existence as the model of how the being of innerworldly entities is related to

\textsuperscript{132}Logical Investigations, 468d.
that of Dasein, and he does this in much the same language which was used by Husserl in the explication of intentionality.

What is lacking in Descartes, according to Heidegger, is an analysis of being-in-the-world, especially with respect to the relation of being-in. In fact, the Cartesian analysis of being never goes beyond what is essentially a categorial distinction between entities, which are either uncreated (God) or created; and, in the latter case, either res extensa (matter) or res cogitans (mind). What Descartes means by "substance" is "nothing else than an entity which is in such a way that it needs no other entity in order to be." Of course, only God is absolutely substance, needing nothing whatever in order to be; while mind and matter are only substance relatively to other created substance, not needing any other created entities in order to be. How the term "substance" can embrace the infinite difference between God and creation is not something Descartes attempts to resolve, though he clearly indicates his awareness of the problem. "[T]he idea of substantiality," says Heidegger, "... not only remains unclarified in the meaning of its Being, but gets passed off as something incapable of clarification, and gets represented indirectly by way of whatever substantial property belongs most pre-eminently to the particular substance." Neither the being of res cogitans nor of res extensa is actually ever made problematic. Rather, the properties which distinguish them categorically are formulated. It is shown that the world is best

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133 Heidegger (BT, 125b; SZ, 92) quotes Descartes (Principia Philosophiae, I, Pr. 51, 24).

134 BT, 127b; SZ, 94.
known through the properties of extension, but the being of the knowing, or the knower, is left in obscurity. Or, it is referred to the productive activity of God, and thus it falls under the ancient notion of being as product (in which respect res extensa and res cogitans are not distinguished). The cogito, though differing categorically, and though lacking extensive properties, is merely interpreted as another sort of present-at-hand entity.

In contrast, Heidegger distinguishes Dasein's being from that of things in the world by an analysis of the way the being-in of being-in-the-world differs from the way other entities are in the world. Heidegger's analysis of the way things other than Dasein are in the world will be discussed in the following section. What needs to be noted here is how Heidegger's treatment of the way Dasein is in-the-world supplies the formal basis for a certain ontological revolution. Once the issue of Dasein's being-in is made the basis of an ontological revision of our own kind of being, this is further leveraged into a reconception of the being of things unlike Dasein. And with this a different 'world' is opened up. Heidegger's destructive or negative task is to break down the picture of side-by-side existence, which functions always implicitly as the traditional conception of how entities are related to one another. While our own kind of being is asserted to be fundamentally different from the way things are, it is still, at least implicitly, assumed that we are somehow side-by-side with other entities, whether like ourselves or mere things. Descartes is the best expositor of this view, at least in its modern form. Heidegger's constructive or positive task is to explain, if not as side-by-side, how entities are related. This he does through the analysis of the two senses
of "in" which he signifies by "being-in-the-world" and "innerworldliness." It could be said that where the tradition has focused the question of being upon substance, Heidegger's analysis is strategically grounded in a focus on relation. These fundamen-tals, "being-in" and "innerworldliness," are constitutive of the entities so characterized. Which is to say that Dasein and innerworldly entities are not first substantial beings, which then get involved in relations, but they are apriori and universally relational. To positively explicate these relations, as constitutive of the entities involved, is the constructive task, i.e., the task of supplying a replacement for the image of side-by-side existence.

What is usually meant, Heidegger says, by "being-in" is the kind of being in which one thing is in another "as the water is 'in' the glass, or the garment is 'in' the cupboard."

By this 'in' we mean the relationship of Being which two entities extended 'in' space have to each other with regard to their location in that space. Both water and glass, garment and cupboard, are 'in' space and 'at' a location, and both in the same way. This relationship of Being can be expanded: for instance, the bench is in the lecture-room, the lecture-room is in the university, the university is in the city, and so on, until we can say that the bench is 'in world-space'. All entities whose Being 'in' one another can thus be described have the same kind of Being—that of Being-present-at-hand—as Things occurring 'within' the world.135

It is important to notice precisely how the description of the sense of "in" given in this passage corresponds to the Husserlian description of extensive part/whole relations. It does this first in an obvious way, by reference to the way the objects are "extended 'in' space," Husserl's own prime example. But, beyond this identity of illustrative matter,

135 BT, 79c; SZ, 54a.
there is the formally specified characteristic of the relation as one in which the relata are 'in' space and 'at' a location "in the same way," "within" the world," "in' world space." What is said to be "in the same way" here is the being in of the relata. It is a modality of being, which is specified relationally rather than substantively. What is at issue here is the being of the entities so related, where the relation is constitutive of them as they are. Such entities "have the same kind of Being." Which is to say, formally, that they essentially belong to the same lowest Genus. Things so related occupy the objective stratum of things in world space, side-by-side, etc.

This is the most ordinary sense in which we talk about things "being in" one another, and the sense is easily carried over to speak of how we are 'in' the world. But this is not the way Heidegger wants to describe Dasein's "being-in." It is again important to note that Heidegger's thesis depends on a certain formal shift in the traditional style of ontology, which always takes being as fundamentally substantive. "Being-in," a relational being, is not founded on entities, which are first substantially and then brought together under a relation. It is rather the case that the relata, in both senses of "being in," are founded on these possibilities of relation. That is, the relations are constitutive of the entities themselves. We tend to want to add "constitutive of them as relational," or "qua relational." But, it must be remembered that the entities at issue are never given without these constitutive features of them, and thus these modalities of 'being in' are to be understood as a priori constitutive of the very possibilities of the entities so characterized, and it is only our prejudice for the substantiality of entities as a fundament of being that draws us constantly toward the
ordinary understanding of being. The already fully developed way of conceiving things which lies hidden in the language is carried over vaguely to condition our understanding of our own "being in," where we appear as a sort of substantiality there beside things, which are likewise substances, though of another substantial genus.

The "being-in" which pertains to Dasein's "being-in-the-world" expresses a different relation altogether:

Dasein's facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed [zerstreut] itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining . . . All these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being.136

This concern is founded in Dasein's being as care, a term to which Heidegger devotes considerable elaboration in BT, but which we need not elaborate here. In the following section we will discuss the other side of the relation, i.e., that with which or about which Dasein is concerned in its being-in, i.e., the world and innerworldly entities. And, there we will see that mere spatial side-by-sidenedness is not sufficient to describe or explain even the way things are 'in' the world. Here we merely wish to consider how Heidegger analyses the way the spatial sense conceals the true ontological nature of Dasein's being-in.

The phenomenon of being-in is something already experienced pre-ontologically. That is, Dasein already has an understanding of being, in which its being is an issue for itself, and it already comports itself in some way toward entities on the basis

136BT, 83b; SZ, 56-7.
of this understanding. However, when we seek to interpret and articulate this understand­
ing ontologically, we miss the original, primitive phenomenon of being-in by an exp lava­
ation of presence at hand. The question of the meaning of being, towards which the whole of $BT$ is oriented is to take its departure from that fundamental phenomenon of "being-in-the-world," the very being which is most immediate and familiar to the question­ing Dasein. This is no abstract or barely attainable phenomenon; it is the very issue of Dasein's being-in-the-world, which is at once the closest sense in which the question of the meaning of being can occur. However, this pre-ontological experience of being is prior to any theoretical or expressed interpretation of it. For the most part, Dasein takes over the readily accessible, though inappropriate ways at its disposal for articulating the sense of this being. The most readily available way of interpreting "beings" is that which is developed in the course of talking things over, which is primarily a talk about things present at hand within the world. There is a certain transfer of the sense of how things within the world are conceived to the discourse on all beings, including Dasein. Which is to say, in a way reminiscent of Descartes' caution to "not take something else in place of myself," Dasein does take something else in place of itself as itself; it understands the character of its own being in terms of the very being which it isn't, i.e., those things within the world with which it has concernful dealings. Heidegger says of the way our pre-ontological experience is obscured in the conventional interpretations,

... this 'seeing in a certain way and yet for the most part wrongly explaining' is itself based upon nothing else than this very state of Dasein's Being, which is such that Dasein itself—and this means also its Being-in-the-world—gets its ontological understanding of itself in the first instance from those entities which
it itself is not but which it encounters 'within' its world, and from the Being which they possess.\textsuperscript{137}

Dasein is not related to the world in which it is as one entity set over opposite to another. Rather, Dasein's being is \textit{founded} on \textit{being-in} and on the \textit{world}. There can be no Dasein, which is being-in-the-world, without the constitutive items of the world and being-in. Dasein is \textit{dependent} on these constitutive items; it is not an independent piece side-by-side with other parts of the world. The latter delusion arises, not from authentic experience of Dasein's being, but from the inauthentic, uprooted habits of discourse, which are preoccupied with indicating entities present-at-hand in their presence-at-hand. In this way Dasein forgets itself. It signifies itself inauthentically, both in the Husserlian sense (emptily, with a mere play of signs) and in the Heideggerian sense (from the world, as \textit{one} discourses on the matter, as one is carried along and sees, and as one discourses on "the mind," "spirit," "life" and "death," etc.).

On the one hand, grasping and properly explaining what is at issue here (the being of Dasein) is a matter of taking one's orientation from the things themselves, of primordially \textit{seeing} the phenomena. On the other, there is the \textit{methodological} labor of a phenomenological description, of rightly explaining. The primary tool employed by Heidegger here is plainly the method of part/whole analysis developed in the Third Investigation. Having established in the second chapter of the First Division a more apt sense of "being-in" for the being-in of Dasein, a sense which overturns all piece-

\textsuperscript{137}BT, 85; SZ, 58.
wise images of Dasein, as side-by-side with the world and entities within the world, the fifth chapter of the First Division then articulates in detail the constitutive moments of being-in. We need not rehearse that description here, as all we wish to make is the formal point of how Heidegger's analysis is dependent on a certain view of part/whole relations, as well as of dependence and foundation.

3.3. Things & Innerworldliness

There is perhaps nothing more intellectually taken for granted than the superiority of modernism in understanding the nature of "things," i.e., what is commonly thought of as the material world. Thus, in his analysis of the "worldhood of the world," Heidegger is most decisively engaging modernism, and engaging it precisely with respect to its view of what it presumes to best understand and to understand best. Surely, no one would deny that modernism does in fact understand the nature of the material world better than anyone has ever previously understood it. And it is not the point of Heidegger's attack on modernism to deny the truth or accomplishments of it, but rather to more surely disclose its ontological grounds, to examine these ground essentially, and to surpass it in its own central tendency, which is to understand the world and the things in the world. The challenge that Heidegger throws up to modernism is that it has not yet understood the world well enough, and perhaps not even understood the world at all; in fact, modernism, says Heidegger, has missed the phenomenon of the world altogether, and it has also missed the way the world's worldhood is announced within innerworldly things. The objective of the chapter on "The Worldhood of the World" is to reach a better understanding of innerworldly things and
of the world, in just the sense that philosophy usually speaks of "things" and "the world"; these are the things at issue in the third chapter of BT, not another world, nor the world in some other sense of "world." That is, Heidegger will show in this chapter that modernism is philosophically in error, and it is principally in error with respect to what it takes as its prime object.

It is not only modernism's understanding of the world that Heidegger challenges, but that of the whole ontological tradition, at least as far back as Aristotle, from whom we get the notion of substance. Substance is that which underlies things. In the ontological tradition "substance comes to simply signify the most fundamental being, accounted for by nothing further, not being relative to anything else and that to which the being of everything else is referred. The mutual exclusion of substance from substance is already implied in Aristotle's descriptions of it: "With regard to primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such possibility [of being relative], for neither wholes nor parts of primary substances are relative"; \(^{138}\) "it is a common characteristic of all substance that it is never present in a subject"; \(^{139}\) "the most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities."\(^{140}\) These characteristics all point to the fundamental separation and independence characteristic of relations between


\(^{139}\) Same, 7d.

\(^{140}\) Same, 8d.
substances. And it is in terms of this sort of formal characterization that Heidegger carries out his destruction. The destruction can be applied equally well to any ontology that is founded on the notion of substance (always identified by its formal features, whether it be called "substance," "presence," or any other name).

Descartes is only the most extreme expositor of the ontological view that begins with the concept of substance. But, he is especially important to us, as it is also with Descartes that we see the beginnings of the modern world view. The modern sciences, with their descriptions of the world and everything in it, all have their foundations in this extreme view. Moreover, as is often remarked, Cartesianism has become practically the very form of modern common sense. It is for these reasons that it is especially important that we understand Heidegger's destruction of the concept of substance with respect to the way it is developed in Descartes. What is sighted in the destruction of Cartesian ontology are the very things about which Cartesianism is presumed to be most illuminating, as the point is that it is precisely about these things that modernism is most in error. Which is to say that Heidegger should not be read as thinking that what happens in Descartes is a matter of misplaced emphasis; rather what has been correctly emphasized (the being of ordinary material objects) has been seen wrongly and has been misunderstood.

Where modernism takes a wrong turn is in the formal aspect of the concept of substance. Previous criticisms of the concept of substance have mostly faulted the notion of substance materially, as in the phenomenalist argument that the assumption of something underlying and being the subject of the evident qualities, which one
would assume are supported by it, uselessly multiplies entities. What Heidegger is interested in is the *substantiality* of substance. As we have indicated, already in Aristotle, what was most characteristic of substance is its absence of relation, its self-subsistence, having neither its parts nor whole relative. Descartes repeats this formula by defining substance by its independence: its not needing anything else in order to be. Of course, he draws the further distinction of saying that only God is substance absolutely, absolutely not needing anything further than Himself to be, while independence can be predicated of created beings only relatively; i.e. asserting only that created substance needs no other created substance in order to be.

It is easy to see that Descartes' formula for the substantiality of substance fits the Husserlian definition of extensive wholes. That is, in *ens creatum* we have a whole whose parts are of the same last genus, *en creatum*, are all outside of and independent of one another, etc. To be substantial is no more than to be a piece of a substantial whole or to be the substantial whole itself. Descartes subtracts everything characteristic of the entities of experience that can be subtracted and still imagine those entities as being, and he thereby arrives at extension as the most fundamental attribute by which entities can be identified as being. Or, as Heidegger says:

> Because 'Being' is not in fact accessible *as an entity*, it is expressed through attributes—definite characteristics of the entities under consideration, characteristics which themselves are. Being is not expressed through just any such characteristics, but rather through those satisfying in the purist manner that meaning of "Being" and "substantiality," which has still been tacitly presupposed. To the *substantia finita* as *res corporea*, what must primarily be 'assigned' is the *extension*.\(^{141}\)

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\(^{141}\) *BT*, 127a.
It is this reduction of entities to the same fundamental attributes (independence and extension) that places them all in the same last genus; the method of systematic doubt is already a search for something like that, something indifferently applicable to all of them. Primarily what Husserl's theory has added to the usual conception of extensive wholes is his emphasis on the feature of independence, as well as the mutual indifference of the parts to one another.

The revolutionary significance of Cartesian philosophy was that through the model of side-by-side relations it focused attention on the order of things this side of the theological transcendence, by insisting that the finite human intellect could hardly comprehend God's purposes, a thesis by which he also dismisses final causes as a legitimate form of explanation in the natural order. With the withdrawal of knowledge (natural science) from the realm of religious transcendence, there is instituted a new transcendence, which takes the form of an optics. It is a transcendence which corrects for such errors of appearance as that square towers when seen from a distance look round, and with this it discloses the real world as unlike its appearances. Although this is clearly a form of transcendence, "transcendence" recedes as a theme from modern thinking. Transcendence itself is something that one can only think about in terms of side-by-side relations, maybe of a subject and object (both substantially conceived). And it is as much this picture of indifferently side-by-side pieces of material substance that will fall under Heidegger's destruction of modern ontology. However, our concern here is only with what is categorial, having to do with the possibility of innerworldly entities, those
which don't have the character of Dasein.

In opposition to the mutually independent pieces of the world supposed by the concept of substance, Heidegger argues for another sort of categoriality, which he calls "innerworldliness." To the substantiality of the substantial thing, he opposes the innerworldliness of the innerworldly thing. To highlight it, we can represent this as a formal analogy:

innerworldliness : innerworldly entities :: substantiality : substantial entities

Innerworldliness and substantiality are forms of categoriality. The destruction of modern ontology and the institution of another ontological order is implicitly guided by this analogy,\(^{142}\) at least as far as the categorial component of the destruction and analysis. The justification of instituting innerworldliness as a categorial is the premise that the things we come across, things in the ordinary sense, are "always already" (Heidegger's germanization of "universal apriori") within the world. The categoriality of innerworldliness could trivially be justified, by a limitation of the theme, as when Heidegger explicitly limits the analysis of Dasein to being-in-the-world. But clearly the point is to establish the ontological priority of innerworldliness over substantiality, which Heidegger seeks in several ways, including the demonstration that substantiality

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\(^{142}\)This can only be seen by reading the relevant chapters in the light of the analogy, which is expressed, in an oblique context, in HCT, 172c: "The word 'substantia' has a double meaning: first, the entity itself which is in the mode of being of substance, and at the same time substantiality. This corresponds to our distinction between world as the things which are in the world and worldhood as the mode of being of the world, where we must however emphasize that the sense of worldhood and the structure of substantiality are radically distinct."
("presence at hand") is a mode of being founded on innerworldliness (as "readiness to hand").

The Greeks, says Heidegger, had a felicitous word for things: "προφηματα—that is to say, that which one has to do with in one's concernful dealings (πραξις)." There is more wisdom revealed, for Heidegger, in this choice of words than in the ancient ontology. Things show themselves in our having to do with them in our concernful dealings, and only by a modification of our having to do with them do we merely look at them, as attending to their look, or as reflecting on them in their pure presence (presence at hand). Proximally and for the most part (or, immediately and usually) we are guided in our dealings with things by a kind of sight that Heidegger calls "circumspection." That things matter to Dasein is expressed in Heidegger by the term "concern," which then appears in the Heideggerian compounds "circumspective concern" and "concernful circumspection," which reflect the sense that the proximate and usual mattering of things is one guided by a looking around appropriate to concern and that this looking around is a looking toward what matters. Now, concern is an existentiale, not a categoriale; it is a constituent of Dasein, not of things. It is Dasein's way of being toward things, which Heidegger distinguishes from solicitude, which again has its own forms of sight. We will not follow these relations so far as to the existential analysis, as our objective is only to see how Heidegger's destruction of the Cartesian ontology of innerworldly entities makes use of Husserl's part/whole theory. The point to get here is that things are sighted in more ways than

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143 BT, 96-97; SZ, 68b.
by merely looking at them as present-at-hand entities. And we must see how this is possible and what it means ontologically.

With the concept of categorial intuition, of which Heidegger makes so much in his explicit discussions of the phenomenological method, phenomenology first formulates the possibility of a founded intuition. What we are seeking in Heidegger's phenomenological description of the being of things is what he describes as the categorial constitution of them. As with Kant, we are seeking what they are universally and apriori, which in Heidegger is germanized to what they are immer schon, which is always already. Moreover, for phenomenology, the categories do not constitute subjectivity, such that they are merely the forms in which objects appear to a subject of necessity; but they themselves are intuited through the process of categorial intuition; they too are objective. The phenomenological categories are not apriori on account of subjectivity always bringing these forms prior and ready to experience, but because what we find is that things always were what is discovered about them in a categorial intuition. Through the doctrine of categorial intuition, the phenomenological "apriori" is closer to Plato than to Kant.

Heidegger musters examples to show the categoriality of innerworldliness. These examples are of perfectly ordinary things, average things, much as Descartes uses a ball of wax, or some men out on the street wearing raincoats. They are much like the average geometrical figures, average triangles and such, which Kant says the geometer uses to reason to the general case, through disregarding anything that could not be assumed of any of them as general exemplars of the category.
Following the clue of the Greek "πράγματα," Heidegger chooses to call innerworldly entities, those things encountered in the world, by the German word "Zeug." It can mean "material" in the textile sense, but it also appears in such words as "Spielzeug" (toy), "Werkzeug" (tool) or "Flugzeug" (airplane). Macquarrie and Robinson translate it into English as "equipment." "Equipment" is as good a translation as any, but it is easier to understand, if one bears in mind the Greek "πράγματα," as Heidegger means to pragmatize all innerworldly entities, and we normally only use "equipment" in English for a certain sort of artifact. Where "equipment" serves well is in that the formal characteristics of equipment, its "equipmentality," is a general model or paradigm of the categorial structure of innerworldly entities. Of course, the evidence for this must be read off from the way things actually show themselves; it is not merely a matter of the possibility of taking things as equipment, but of discovering that this structure is a necessary condition of the possibility of innerworldly entities. That is, grasping the fundamentally pragmatic character of things is a matter of categorial intuition.

Equipment, far from being characterized by its independence, its lack of being founded in anything else, or its being distinctly articulated into pieces which are all fundamentally outside of one another, is always in a certain way relational:

Equipment—in accordance with its equipmentality—always is in terms of its belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These 'Things' never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill up a room. What we encounter as closest to us (though not as something taken as a theme) is the room; and we encounter it not as something 'between four walls' in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing. Out of this the 'arrangement' emerges, and it is in this that any 'individual' item of equip-
ment shows itself. Before it does so, a totality of equipment has already been discovered.\(^{144}\)

Thus we have a total complex of equipment, out of which any particular item shows itself. Further, Heidegger is more specific about the relational character of this belonging to a context, which is everywhere constitutive of equipment:

Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as \textit{an} equipment. \ldots Equipment is essentially 'something in-order-to \ldots'. A totality of equipment is constituted by the various ways of the 'in-order-to', such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability.\(^{145}\)

The equipmentality of equipment precludes by its very essence the structure of substance. An adequate intuition of the categorial form of equipment is assisted by an exemplary list of various ways of the 'in-order-to' constitutive of equipment: serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability. In contrast to the "presence-at-hand" of substance, these ways are also constitutive of the innerworldly entity's "readiness-to-hand."

It is important to not confuse Heidegger's concept of readiness-to-hand (equipmentality, etc.) with a mere acknowledgement of relations extant between things. This would again be to merely reinstate the picture of side-by-side relations that the model of equipment is intended to displace. And there are several arguments for the ontological priority of an entity's readiness to hand over its presence at hand, of its innerworldliness to its substantiality.

\(^{144}\)\textit{BT}, 98.

\(^{145}\)\textit{BT}, 97b.
First, there is the fact that the ontological tradition has presumptuously privileged a certain kind of knowing and has ordered the question of being in accordance with this way of knowing: thematically. In fact, this isn't true most of the time, nor immediately (proximally). For the most part, we know things in a way Heidegger calls familiarly. This starts with a familiarity with the world. Dasein, which is always already in the world, discovers things always against the prior discovery of a world as the wherein of its existence. This prior familiarity with the world follows from Heidegger's starting point: the question of the meaning of being, directed through an interrogation of "being-in-the-world," of which we are primordial familiar as our own "being-here." But we need to look more closely at the structure of what is meant by "familiarity."

When using a hammer (to follow Heidegger's famous example), we don't usually (for the most part) attend to the hammer itself, but to what we are doing with it. But this is how we know the hammer, in hammering with it. Its specific manipulability as a hammer would never be disclosed by merely gazing at it as something present. Hammers are understood in hammering, as involved in the hammering, most likely involved in nailing something down. But, in this way, the more the hammer recedes from attention, all the more is it grasped in this essential involvement of it in hammering. That is, it is best known non-thematically. It does not become non-thematic through our looking away from it, but by a certain sort of looking through it toward what it's involved in. That is, equipment shows itself most essentially as what it is when it functions transparently, as do the words of language. Familiarity is the
structure of this being towards something thematic on the basis of something in which Dasein absorbs itself as a transparent (non-thematic) basis. Dasein founds its directedness on familiarity. But it is not the case that there is first a familiarity independently established at one moment, which is then applied to some further element; rather, familiarity, as essentially foundational, is established precisely in the moment of transcendence. We become familiar with something not by looking at it, but by looking at something through it. To venture a pedagogical example, we become familiar with something not through the study of it, but through understanding something else on the basis of it, even if the thematic study of it is propaedeutic to the possibility of its becoming familiar. To say that our familiarity with the world is "primordial" is to say that this familiarity is prior to any involvement in any particular things whatsoever.

This is how Heidegger overturns the traditionally presumed priority of our thematic knowledge of entities, which in turn undermines the traditional ontological priority based on this presumed epistemic priority of the thematic. We see already the impact of the Husserlian studies in intentional complexes, with their non-thematic constituents, etc., though that is not the main issue here. What we are concerned with in this study is how the categorial structure of innerworldly entities is brought to the destruction of the traditional ontology of substantial things. And this mostly turns on showing how the way things are in the world is not at all the way pieces belong to extensive wholes.
The general structure of belonging-to that Heidegger attributes to things is what he calls "reference" ("Verweisung"). With equipment there is always a reference. The general character of what Heidegger means by "reference" is best gathered from his examples of it. With respect to Nature:

The wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the river is water-power, the wind is wind 'in the sails.'

Further, when things are produced, there are references to materials and to the sources of materials:

But the work to be produced is not merely usable for something. The production itself is a using of something for something. In the work there is also a reference or assignment to "materials": the work is dependent on [angewiesen auf] leather, thread, needles, and the like. Leather, moreover is produced from hides. These are taken from animals, which someone else has raised. . . . Hammer, tongs, and needle, refer in themselves to steel, iron, metal, mineral, wood, in that they consist of these.

There are the references to what something will be used for and the suitability of it for that use, but also there are the references to the users for whom we produce things:

The work produced refers not only to the "towards-which" of its usability and the "whereof" of which it consists: under simple craft conditions it also has an assignment to the person who is to use it or wear it. The work is cut to his figure; he 'is' there along with it as the work emerges. Even when goods are produced by the dozen, this constitutive assignment is by no means lacking; it is merely indefinite, and points to the random, the average.

Moreover, there are the references to the publicly interpreted Nature which are built into the artifacts of civilized places:

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146BT, 100b; SZ, 70d.

147BT, 99-100; SZ, 70c.

148BT, 100c; SZ, 70-71.
In roads, streets, bridges, buildings, our concern discovers Nature as having some definite direction. A covered railway platform takes account of bad weather; an installation for public lighting takes account of the darkness, or rather of specific changes in the presence or absence of daylight—the 'position of the sun'.

It is through these references that things belong to the totality of significance which Heidegger identifies with the world's worldhood.

Some important clarifications are in order on the nature of reference. First, it is not the same as signification; the point is not to look around and think of things as though they were signs. Signs are a special kind of equipment for Heidegger. And, as equipment, signs too have a constitutive reference, a sort of readiness-to-hand, which allows them to be signs. A sign is "equipment for indicating." On the basis of this referential structure, which assigns indicating to something, the sign can then indicate. He exemplifies the distinction with the description of how a turn signal on a car both is constituted through a referential structure and "refers" in the sense of indicating:

This sign is ready-to-hand within-the-world in the whole equipment-context of vehicles and traffic regulations. It is equipment for indicating, and as equipment, it is constituted by reference or assignment. It has the character of the "in-order-to", its own definite serviceability; it is for indicating. This indicating which the sign performs can be taken as a kind of 'referring'. But here we must notice that this 'referring' as indicating is not the ontological structure of the sign as equipment.

Instead, 'referring' as indicating is grounded in the Being-structure of equipment, in serviceability for... But an entity may have serviceability without thereby becoming a sign.\(^{150}\)

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\(^{149}\)BT, 100-101; SZ, 71a.

\(^{150}\)BT, 109a-b; SZ, 78.
Reference in this special sense has a structural similitude to the function of signs. But clearly Heidegger means to separate this function (*signification*) from what he wants to call reference. Reference in this sense is a *categoriale*. It is an apriori and universal constituent, belonging to the innerworldliness, of innerworldly entities. Phenomenologically, reference shows itself to a categorial intuition, though we are primordially familiar with it (preontologically), as this familiarity is necessary to the possibility of our preontological understanding of any innerworldly entity whatsoever.

References are made specific in the serviceabilities, conducivenesses, usabilities, manipulabilities, etc., by which things are involved in the possibilities of mattering to Dasein. And this is not merely a subjective or psychological sort of mattering. The light overhead actually *is* suitable for lighting the table and paper on which the pen writes—things *are* in these ways, and *are* more primordially in these ways than they are in the modes given over to the traditionally privileged ways of knowing them, which always take them as present-at-hand entities. Citing the manipulability and handiness of the hammer, Heidegger says, "Only because equipment has *this* 'Being-in-itself' and does not merely occur, is it manipulable in the broadest sense and at our disposal."151 This "Being-in-itself" constituted by the various modes of reference is the point of destruction of the Cartesian ontology, as this being is always founded on a familiarity with the world (the wherein of Dasein).

Things do not refer simply, but are caught up in a whole chain of references:

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151 *BT*, 98b; *SZ*, 69b.
With the "towards-which" of serviceability there can again be an involvement: *with* this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly call a "hammer", there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in making something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad weather; and this protection 'is' for the sake of [um-willen] providing shelter for Dasein —that is to say, for the sake of a possibility of Dasein's Being.\(^\text{152}\)

It is important to see this "involvement" structure correctly. Heidegger describes it as characterized by the expression "*with* ... *in* ...," as in "*with* hammering, there is an involvement *in* making something fast." We have both a reference and a co-reference. Let's spell it out: Suppose we want to eat, and we contemplate ordering out or cooking something, and opt for the cooking. Then cooking is involved in getting something to eat. Then there may be the use of a pan in cooking, and we would say that the pan is involved in cooking: the pan is involved in cooking, and cooking is involved in getting something to eat; and there is an involvement of the pan *with* cooking *in* getting something to eat; there is a reference of the pan to cooking and a co-reference of the pan to getting something to eat.

It is in terms of the referential structure of innerworldly entities that Heidegger argues even for a non-extensional conception of space. Space is disclosed as element of the referential structure of things: "they always are ready-to-hand already in individual places."\(^\text{153}\)

\(\text{With}\) anything encountered as ready-to-hand there is always an involvement in [bei] a region. To the totality of involvements which makes up the Being of the ready-to-hand within-the world, there belongs a spatial involvement which has

\(^{152}\text{BT, 116; SZ, 84b.}\)

\(^{153}\text{BT, 137b; SZ, 103b.}\)
the character of a region. By reason of such an involvement, the ready-to-hand becomes something which we can come across and ascertain as having form and direction.\textsuperscript{154}

Everything is available in its place. Things are always within a region, in a certain direction. But that region is itself lit up by the circumspection which locates what is ready-to-hand there. Spatiality is evidenced primarily as a co-referent: \textit{with} anything ready-to-hand there is an involvement \textit{in} a region, just as \textit{with} hammering there is an involvement \textit{in} fastening something down, just as \textit{with} using a pan there is an involvement \textit{in} cooking.

Then what of the evident possibility of regarding worldly things as substantial or founded on substance? This is made possible by a modification of the evident which abstracts from things as they actually are.

The homogenous space of Nature shows itself only when the entities we encounter are discovered in such a way that the worldly character of the ready-to-hand gets specifically \textit{deprived of its worldhood}.\textsuperscript{155}

However, if worldhood is a necessary constituent of the being of innerworldly entities, then depriving the ready-to-hand of its innerworldliness is to turn away from the actual \textit{being} of the ready-to-hand, whatever calculative purposes may be served by this manoeuvre.

Thus, to be a part of the world, to belong to the world or to be within the world (as a thing) means, for Heidegger, to be a part of the referential totality uncovered as the wherein of Dasein's existence. It is at every point articulated on a familiar-
ity, and it is everywhere pervaded by involvements. The part/whole structure is thus that of significance, rather than of the spatial homogeneity. The ways of this being-in, or being part of, are serviceability, convenience, obstruction, threatening, referring, handiness, etc., whose structures are not that of side-by-side, indifferent, substantial relations. And it is on the basis of these formal differences, rooted in the Third Investigation, that Heidegger's destruction is carried out.
CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

The point of this research has been to explore the relation between Husserl's part/whole theory (Third Investigation) and Heidegger's analysis of the worldhood of the world, with emphasis on his destruction of the Cartesian ontology. We have tried to show in what ways the "destruction" of the traditional ontology (especially in its Cartesian form) is dependent on the part/whole theory. Although Heidegger does not explicitly discuss Husserl's part/whole theory in his own expositions of the phenomenological method, that he is using the Husserlian theory is evident from the fact that it is the Husserlian distinctions which are drawn, and it is in the Husserlian language of "side-by-side" relations, from his use of the concept of "foundation," from the fundamental role of "independence" which he attributes to Cartesian substance, etc.

It was first necessary to conduct a study of the Husserlian theory itself, to spell out and clarify its elements and to indicate the general significance of the fundamental distinctions. After examining the first essential distinction (piece/whole vs. moment/whole), we examined Husserl's general thesis that there is a multiplicity of part/whole forms and his sketch of wherein (respecting what formally specifiable characteristics) one might distinguish the various types. And then (in section 2.4) we devoted considerable attention to the basic concept of extended wholes, which was
important for the sake of better perceiving how Descartes' ontology of the world corresponds to the model of extensive wholes. In keeping with remarks in the Introduction, on Husserl's own application of the part/whole theory to other themes within the rest of *LI*, and on its central significance for the development of Husserl's thought even beyond *LI*, in Section 2.5 one of Husserl's own applications of the part/whole theory is exhibited: to the theory of dependent and independent meanings. This application is especially important for the problem at hand, on account of the Heideggerian equivalence of world and significance, where innerworldly entities belong to the world more in the way of partial meanings than as pieces of something extended. Section 2.6 explored the important concept of categorial intuition in its connection with the part/whole theory, especially with respect to the ideality of the part/whole forms and how the forms are intuited. Heidegger's own discussions of categorial intuition indicate that this concept played a very important role in Heidegger's grasp and interpretation of phenomenology.

We began the third chapter with a discussion of Heidegger's connection with Husserl and with phenomenology. It is worth being reminded of Heidegger's indebtedness to Husserl, as well as to see the early roots of his transcendence of phenomenology. This transcendence lies in his earliest researches into the problem of the meaning of being, which, as we saw, started with his attempts to work out the ambiguities of "being" in Aristotle. In view of the profound importance of Heidegger's own philosophical work, it is easy to neglect those features of his thought which originated as phenomenology. It is a major point of the present thesis to draw one
particular connection of Heidegger's thought to phenomenology. We examined the article "Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie," as it is a very late text of Heidegger's, and in it he explains how he came to discover phenomenology in the course of researching his original problem on the meaning of the being, and some of the factors important for our thesis are indicated there. Section 3.2 brings out the distinction between the existentiale and the categoriale elements of Heidegger's ontology, largely to separate off the categoriale, as that is the dimension in which he will most confront modern ontology. It is also important here that his formulation of the problematic proceeds from "being-in-the-world" as we most immediately confront it in experience, as opposed to the traditional orientation based on existent "present at hand" entities over against which one projects the question of the being of such entities, the traditional orientation pointing somewhat naturally to a conception of being as substance. It also indicates how world enters as the ontological background for the analysis of things, which are taken apriori as innerworldly entities. Finally, in Section 3.3, we have seen how Heidegger specifically articulates the part/whole forms of his own and Descartes' worldly parts and makes this the central issue on which the "destruction" of Descartes' ontology is carried out. And the specific part/whole form which Heidegger opposes to the form of Cartesian substance is represented as the "with . . . in . . . " structure, which we've sought to explain and illustrate.

The introduction reviewed some of the recent studies of Husserl's Third Investigation, but preference was given to an interpretation which I've referred to as the Willard hypothesis. The effort made to explicate and give priority to this interpre-
tation was not merely for the sake of establishing an interesting adjunctive thesis to the main study of part/whole relations. Rather, it is important to see Husserl's work generally proceeds from the sort of perspective established by Willard (though I would certainly include also Sokolowski's view as viable) in order to counter a certain tendency toward formalizing Husserl's part/whole theory without any attention to how the theory functions in its phenomenological context. This, I think, is a mistake.

The proper way to convey the part/whole forms uncovered phenomenologically is through descriptions that are conducive to their categorial intuition, as with other Husserlian categories. Husserl's suggestions toward a pure formalization of a system of part/whole relations would be poorly understood, if these forms are not themselves grounded in the intuitive element characteristic of what he calls "authentic thinking," a concept whose significance it has been argued goes back to his early concerns with the possibility of blind calculation (the purely analytic manipulation of mathematical symbols). It is also, I think, a misunderstanding of phenomenology to take it as a sort of ideological opposition to formal, mathematical philosophy. We should rather take Husserl's own admonitions to formalize more seriously: a mathematical formalization of any of the concepts, theses, discoveries would serve to elevate them and give them more theoretical leverage. That this is in many ways possible is evident from some of the recent literature on Husserl. That the part/whole forms are categorial means, within Husserl's phenomenology, that they are to be exhibited in experience, i.e., either though a perceptual or imaginative intuition, or through a categorial intuition founded on some concatenation of perceptual or imaginative
intuitions—in either case, the forms must show themselves in experience. What
distinguishes Husserl from the empiricists is that what shows itself in experience can
be shown as pertaining to its a priori; and far from this apriori being founded on the
"mind" (as "mental connections," "associations," or the like), the apriori is thought by
Husserl to belong to the things themselves.

It has been most important to approach the Husserlian theory in the right way
for exhibiting its effect on Heidegger's early work. It is important to see that methodo-
logically Heidegger is himself exhibiting the part/whole forms encountered in his
analysis of the being of the world and innerworldly entities in just the fashion pre-
scribed by Husserl in the Third Investigation. And establishing such an approach was
the primary intention of the Introduction. Yet, there was a further reason for the
theme developed in the Introduction. There is an intrinsic interest in the problems
Husserl addresses in the Third Investigation, and it is important to be clear on the
perspective from which he is addressing them. It was from this perspective, the
perspective of phenomenology, that Heidegger's application of the theory ought to be
understood. The effect of Heidegger's application has reverberated throughout the
continental literature and continues to reverberate. The destruction of the history of
ontology, the destruction of substantiality, the radical new view of temporality
developed in \( BT \), the theme of the world's worldhood, so many elements of \( BT \) have
become a part of the basic stock of continental thinking that it would be difficult to
say what continental philosophy would be without the ground and horizons that
Heidegger opened in \( BT \). If Husserl's part/whole theory is as essential to the famous
"destruction" as I have maintained it is, then we can trace a sort of trajectory of the problem from Husserl's perplexity over the problem of inauthentic mathematical thinking to the post-BT styles of contemporary continental philosophy. From Husserl comes the formal leverage of a philosophy attentive to necessity. *LI* is a work on the philosophy of logic, concerned with the character of evidence as well as with necessity. The explosion of formal possibilities in continental philosophy is frequently indebted to innovations rooted in phenomenology. And thus the trajectory of Husserl's early reflections can be seen through and beyond *BT* in its effects on contemporary philosophy. And it is largely with a view to that trajectory that I've wanted the course of the Husserlian problematic and theory, through the Heideggerian application, to be seen.

Where the course of continental philosophy can be read as a formalist enterprise, the techniques of symbolic logicians might well find delightful themes for representation. This was Husserl's hope in venturing his six theorems toward an axiomatic development of the pure theory of parts and wholes. The theory of parts and wholes is, of course, only one of many formal innovations of Husserl which invite the efforts of symbolic formalists, though it is possibly the part of Husserl's work to have most recently received such attention. Peter Simons comes closest to an adequate formalization of the part/whole theory, and his formalization brings out important questions about the Third Investigation. Yet he seems to show very little interest in phenomenology *per se*, as is indicated by the lack of phenomenological works in the extensive bibliography appended to *Parts*. Moreover, he tests the adequacy of his
own interpretations of the six theorems in a way that utterly bypasses the categorial intuition of what those theorems are concerned with; that is, he tests the adequacy of his interpretations by merely applying the test of intuitive validity to ordinary propositions formalized according to the rules of the system. Clearly Husserl's doctrine of categorial intuition would suggest that he placed greater emphasis on the revision of intuition, a revision enabled by the leverage of a proper formalization. Such a concerted interplay of the formal and intuitive is essential to Husserl's method. Unlike with the more recent "ordinary language" bent of contemporary symbolic formalists, Husserl was much closer in perspective to the mathematical tradition of discovering and proving forms and relations as possibilities of objects—his was a much more objectifying formalism. In fact, the discovery of objective forms is such a preoccupation in his own work, that Husserl virtually dispenses with symbolization, only occasionally resorting to it to make little pictograms of relations easily set out in that form.

There have been several excellent studies of Husserl's application of his part/whole theory to other elements of phenomenology, which we considered in the Introduction. In the chapter on Husserl, I have sought to develop similar insights, though the emphasis is on seeing the role of the part/whole theory in phenomenology in those aspect most relevant to a study of the early Heidegger, as well as attempting to clarify a view of the most essential elements of the theory in general, offering some of my own intuitive models of the forms in question. These studies (esp. Willard, Sokolowski, Cooper-Wiele) appear to me to achieve a more adequate understanding of
the Husserlian forms; and perhaps these sorts of non-symbolizing studies are a necessary propaedeutic to any adequate symbolic formulation of the theory. That would have been an excellent goal for the present dissertation: first develop the theory on the side of its objectifying intuitive concepts, and then go for an adequate formalization. However, I thought it more useful to do something which, as far as I know, has not been done, by showing the influence beyond the interior of Husserl's own work to the very important keynote of so much of contemporary philosophy, which is Heidegger's concept of the worldhood of the world and the concomitant destruction of the modern ontology that first appears philosophically in Descartes. This does more, I think, to show the contemporary logical pertinence of the Third Investigation and to make clear what there is to be formalized here in the first place. This is the only rational ground for a rapprochement of continental and analytic schools of thought, that the intrinsic interest of the formality of the problem should be evident in its many ramifications to both schools.

We can consider the central moment of Heidegger's destruction of Cartesian ontology to be his critique of substance and substantiality, with its opposition by the model of innerworldliness as the essential categorial form of those things that philosophy has traditionally taken as present at hand. Far from the first to find the concept of substance problematic, what distinguishes Heidegger's attack on the concept is its formal character. He first sets out to find what constitutes the substantiality of substantial entities or substances. Others have critiqued the concept of substance on grounds relating more to the materiality of substance, perhaps, as with the phenomen-
alists, arguing that a conjunction of directly evident properties suffices to account for what is evident, while the assumption of something underlying those properties is merely a superfluous assumption. From a Heideggerian perspective, however, this really makes no essential conceptual difference, as the substantiality of things (their substantial form) is left intact (as, of course, for the phenomenalist, is whole point of dispensing with the assumption—things are left conceptually intact without it). But I do not mean here to foster the impression that I think that Heidegger is a formalist. It was not just by happenstance that Heidegger chose to attack Cartesian substance formally, nor that he brought a part/whole analysis in as an element of his critique of Descartes' ontology. The point is that Cartesianism is founded on a certain thesis regarding the world and the essence of things in the world: that the parts of the world are related through their extensive attributes (their spatiality) to the whole and as independent, side-by-side pieces of the whole; and they are related through a last common genus (substance—that very independence, side-by-sideness, etc.) to that whole and as belonging to the same last genus as the whole. That is, Husserl's definition of an extensive whole is a perfect description of the form of Descartes ens creatum, or the world. What Heidegger does is address the issue of form when form is at issue. And I see no evidence from this either that Heidegger was a formalist or that he was in principle opposed to formalization, in spite of his polemical stance against empty formalizations, which, he says, are always true on account of their triviality.
We have emphasized Heidegger's application of the part/whole theory to the ontology of ordinary objective things. This is the "categorial" application of the theory. But Heidegger's ontology has another side to it, which is the "existential" analysis; the most explicit discussion of "wholes" is of course the problem of the whole of Dasein. However the possibility of discussing the existential analysis of Dasein requires first the destruction of substantiality in the categorial realm, as that is where the concept arises, and it is through an application of the concepts and forms of analysis developed for things to our own kind of being that the main problems of subjectivity arise. And therefore it has been most important to show how Husserl's theory serves a destruction of the concept of substance at the source.

As an example of the generality of the problems addressed in the Third Investigation for continental philosophy, we might wish to contemplate the very different way in which structuralism, without the benefit of phenomenological ontology, encounters a problem in the nature of language. We find this remarkable picture of "side-by-side"

Figure: *Course in General Linguistics.*
existence in Saussure's *Course in General Linguistics*. Saussure's intention here is to represent what he takes as a sort of conventional view of the reality of language, and it is a view he argues against based on his own theory of language as a system of oppositions. Unfortunately, he still tries to locate language patterns in the brain as their ultimate source, even claims that linguistics is properly a branch of psychology.

From the perspective of Heidegger's phenomenological ontology, it is evident that what occurs in the depicted view is that both the signifier ("arbor") and what is signified (the tree itself) are taken as present at hand entities (as realities, actually) which are subsequently associated in such a way that one of the entities comes to be a sign for the other. It is still a common view in analytic circles. Saussure is compelled to oppose it on account of his view of language as a system of oppositional elements, where the unity of sign and signifier cuts a two-sided distinction, a distinction both on the side of sign and signifier. But our purpose here is not to review the tenants of structuralism; it is rather to note how the paradoxes of Cartesianism emerge whenever ontological moments are set piece-wise in relation to one another. Saussure, so close to grasping the problem, still falls into a certain Cartesian trap by feeling the compulsion to say *where language is* (how does it stand extensionally to the other parts of extensive reality?).

Finally, the structure I've described in the previous section as co-reference, exemplified by the "with . . . in . . ." structure, is a familiar basis of reasoning.

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156 Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, translated by Roy Harris (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1983), 65.
throughout much of the continental literature, though the fact of this structure's belonging to a logic has not yet occasioned sufficient serious attention to provoke a study its behavior in formal systems. This is most likely due to a lack of joint expertise in the continental literature and the analytic. I hope to have made some progress toward at least isolating some of these operative logical elements of continental reasoning in this study in Husserl's theory of parts and wholes. Whether a symbolic formalization ensues from such discoveries, and particularly whether one develops an algebraic or axiomatic expression of them, to merely make these essential forms explicit, as Husserl understood, is the most essential labor of logic. Logic, after all, is not only to be developed, but employed in scholarship, in uncovering the logical dimensions of texts, and uncovering it in them in the way they actually are. A large portion of the splendor of continental philosophy in this century lies in the logical powers of its major writers. Perhaps one has traditionally acquired this logic mimetically, through practice in the reading and writing of works fraught with these forms of reasoning. Explicitly isolating, aspectualizing attention to the forms in their own right always serves to heighten ones command and appreciation; and it is above all this that makes it academically essential.


This is the text of a lecture course given by Heidegger at the University of Marburg in the summer of 1925.


This is the text of a lecture course given by Heidegger gave at the University of Marburg in the summer of 1927.


—. "The Origin of Geometry." Appendix VI of The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, translated by David Carr; see previous.


Panzer gives an especially good discussion of the variation from the First Edition to the Second of LU, which is also indicated throughout this edition in the footnotes and by various devices in the text.


———. "Wholes, Parts and the Objectivity of Knowledge." In *Parts and Moments*. (see below: Smith, Barry).


———. "Wholes, Parts and the Objectivity of Knowledge." In *Parts and Moments*. (see above: Smith, Barry).
VITA

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The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is, therefore, accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date Director's Signature

April 15, 1994 William J. Ellos, S.J.