Is Natural Law Innate?: A Textual Study in the Writings of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas

Dan M. Crone
Loyola University Chicago

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IS NATURAL LAW INNATE?:
A TEXTUAL STUDY IN THE WRITINGS OF
ST. BONAVENTURE AND ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
VOL. I: INTRODUCTION--CHAPTER 3

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
DAN M. CRONE

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
MAY 1995
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to sincerely thank the members of my dissertation committee, Leo Sweeney, S.J., Dr. Francis Catania, and Dr. Tracy Lounsbury. Whatever good scholarship is found in this work is due to them; all shortcomings are my own. I owe special gratitude to Fr. Sweeney for his untiring attention, guidance, and support throughout the writing of this dissertation.

I must also thank Mark Henninger, S.J., for his time and advice concerning the chapters on St. Bonaventure.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my parents and sisters for their encouragement and support during my long tenure as a graduate student.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## VOLUME I

### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

[Page: iii]

### INTRODUCTION

[Page: 1]

1. Occasion and Purpose

2. Review of Secondary Literature

3. Secondary Literature on St. Bonaventure

4. Secondary Literature on St. Thomas

5. List of Texts

   - St. Bonaventure
   - St. Thomas

6. Method of Study

### CHAPTER 1. St. Bonaventure: Key-Text A:

**In IV Sent.**, d. 49, p. 1, a. un., q. 2

1. Context
   - Remote Context #a:
     - St. Bonaventure’s Psychology
   - Remote Context #b:
     - **In II Sent.**, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2
   - Remote Context #c:
     - **In II Sent.**, d. 39, a. 2, q. 1
     - Proximate Context: Peter Lombard’s
     - **Sent.**, IV, d. 49, c. 1, notes 3-7

2. Key-Text A: Translation and Latin

3. Commentary
   - Natural Law qua Habitus
   - Natural Law and Truth
   - Natural Law and Light
   - Natural Law and Perfection

4. Summary and Conclusion

### CHAPTER 2. St. Bonaventure: Key-Text B:

**Commentarius in Evangeliuim Lucae**, c. 19, v. 21, n. 34

1. Context: **Comm. Luc.**, c. 12, v. 57, n. 84
II. Key-Text B: Translation and Latin .............. 112

III. Commentary ........................................ 114
    Natural Law as Universal ......................... 114
    Natural Law and Written Law ..................... 115
    Natural Law and Justice .......................... 117
    Natural Law as Relational-Personal .............. 119
    Natural Law as Preeminent ....................... 121
    Natural Law as Intimate ........................... 123

IV. Summary and Conclusion ............................ 128

CHAPTER 3. St. Bonaventure: Key-Text C:
De Perfectione Evangelica, q. 4, a. 1, concl. ........ 130

I. Context: De perf. Evang., q. 4, a. 1, fund. 2, 4, 7, 10 ........ 130

II. Key-Text C: Translation and Latin ................. 137

III. Commentary ......................................... 138
    Nature of Natural Law Order ...................... 138
    Eternal Law ......................................... 151
    Eternal Law and the Human Soul .................. 153
    Eternal Law and Natural Law ..................... 161
    Natural Law and the Apex Mentis ................. 164
    Natural Law and the Imago Dei .................... 167
    Natural Law and Memory ............................ 168
    Natural Law and the Genetic Unity of Mind ........ 174
    Natural Law qua Ratio Seminalis .................. 177

IV. Summary and Conclusion ............................ 182

VOLUME II

CHAPTER 4. St. Thomas: Key-Text A:
In IV Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, resp ............. 185

I. Context ............................................... 185
    Remote Context #a: St. Thomas’ divisio textus on Peter Lombard’s Libri IV Sententiarum ... 186
    Remote Context #b: Peter Lombard’s IV Sent., d. 33, c. 4., nn. 1-2 ........ 187
    Proximate Context #a: St. Thomas’ In II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3 ... 189
    Proximate Context #b: In III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 4 ........... 191
II. Key-Text A: Translation and Latin ........ 200

III. Commentary .............................. 205
    Introduction ............................. 205
    Movement of Thought .................... 206
    St. Thomas' Doctrine of Nature ........ 211
    Human Nature qua
        Specifically Intellectual ............ 218
    Three Senses of Natural Law .......... 228
    The Naturalis Conceptio .............. 240
    The Production of the
        Naturalis Conceptio ................. 243

IV. Summary and Conclusion .................. 250

CHAPTER 5. St. Thomas: Key-Text B: Summa Theologiae I-II,
q. 91, a. 2, resp. ......................... 253

I. Context .................................... 253

Remote Context #a: St. Thomas' Theory of
    Cognition ................................ 254

Remote Context #b: The Meaning of
    Participation ............................ 267

Remote Context #c: Divine Providence,
    Eternal Law, and Nature ............... 272

Remote Context #d: St. Thomas' Theory of
    Natural Appetency ...................... 279

Proximate Context: Summa Theologiae I-II,
    q. 91, a. 2, sed contra ................ 292

II. Key-Text B: Translation and Latin ........ 294

III. Commentary .............................. 295
    Movement of Thought .................... 295
    Natural Law as Human Nature .......... 297
    Natural Law qua Cognitio ............... 303
    Natural Law qua Naturalis Inclinatio ... 311
    Knowledge of Natural Inclination ...... 316

vi
INTRODUCTION

I. Occasion and Purpose

In recent years, there has been renewed interest among contemporary ethicians in the natural law doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas. However, a great deal of controversy has been generated (as we shall review shortly) as to what St. Thomas considers to be the basis or derivation of natural law. In an attempt, then, to clarify what in fact constitutes for St. Thomas the foundation of natural law, we undertake to study the question: Is natural law innate? In investigating whether natural law for St. Thomas is innate, we are led into the heart of his natural law doctrine inasmuch as it involves both his theory of human knowledge and his theory of human nature. Hence, the question, "Is natural law innate?" is at once determinate in focus, yet complex and broad in scope. The study of St. Thomas' notion of natural law precisely as innate is therefore of merit, not only for clarifying its derivation, but also for appreciating his natural law doctrine within the context of his Weltanschauung as a medieval theologian.

Further, to better grasp the natural law doctrine of St. Thomas, and to better understand the precise manner in which natural law is (or is not) innate for St. Thomas, we will also undertake a comparative study of the innate
character of natural law according to St. Bonaventure. As a Catholic theologian of the thirteenth century, St. Bonaventure's theory of natural law accords with that of St. Thomas in many ways, of course. Nevertheless, St. Bonaventure has his own theological, metaphysical, and epistemological concerns and positions which are quite different from those of St. Thomas. Consequently, the natural law doctrine of St. Bonaventure is different in many respects from that of St. Thomas; indeed, their doctrinal differences come to bear directly on their respective understandings of natural law as innate. Put the other way around, their distinctive positions on natural law as innate reflect the manifold differences between their respective philosophical and theological commitments. Hence, the numerous contrasts which this comparative study reveals concerning the innate character of natural law is of service in illuminating not only each thinker's position on the derivation of natural law, but the unique character of their natural law doctrines as understood within their respective world-views.

II. Review of Secondary Literature

A survey of the secondary literature shows that no previous investigation on natural law precisely as innate has been carried out on either St. Bonaventure or St. Thomas. There are indeed many studies which, to some extent, deal with the natural law doctrines of these two
theologians. However, such studies are either general in scope and thus prove shallow in their analysis of natural law as innate, or else are inaccurate in their interpretations. Further, except for cursory historical treatments, no in-depth comparative study on the natural law doctrines of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas has been undertaken. Thus, our present endeavor offers an original and hopefully useful contribution to the field of scholarship on the subject of natural law. Let us next review briefly the more pertinent literature on natural law in St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas as follows.

III. Secondary Literature on St. Bonaventure

Perhaps the most comprehensive and accurate exposition of Bonaventurean doctrine as a whole is given by Etienne Gilson in his La philosophie de Saint Bonaventure.¹ In this work, he devotes a chapter to St. Bonaventure's moral philosophy and offers in this connection a general contrast between the "Christian Platonism" of St. Bonaventure and the "Christian Aristotelianism" of St. Thomas.² This contrast

¹Etienne Gilson, La philosophie de Saint Bonaventure (Paris: J. Vrin, 1943).

in philosophical orientation is fundamental to understanding the two thinkers' different treatments of natural law. Nevertheless, such a general account leaves uncovered many important implications which need spelling out in light of the contemporary debate on natural law.

Another excellent study on the thought of St. Bonaventure is presented by Efrem Bettoni in his book, *St. Bonaventure*.3 Set in a chapter dealing with the nature of man and human activity, Bettoni gives a succinct account of the "ideal laws which we find within ourselves...as part of our native endowment...given by God."4 While well balanced in presentation, Bettoni's brief exposition provides no detailed analysis of natural law as such.

John Quinn has provided an extensive exposition of St. Bonaventure's thought in *The Historical Constitution of St. Bonaventure's Philosophy*.5 In this comprehensive study, Quinn often touches upon Bonaventure's notion of natural law

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4 Ibid., 95 and 98-99.

in connection with his epistemology and doctrine of human nature; but since, on these occasions, it is not the focus of discussion, natural law is treated in only a cursory manner.

Quinn has also written two important articles which provide a solid overview on the ethical teachings of St. Bonaventure. In "The Moral Philosophy of St. Bonaventure," he sets out to see "how [St. Bonaventure] looks upon moral philosophy as a science of natural reason." After locating moral philosophy within St. Bonaventure's division of sciences, Quinn presents a chronological summary of St. Bonaventure's main texts on moral matters. In this exposition, St. Bonaventure's notion of natural law is dealt with to some extent, but only indirectly. A more focused treatment on natural law is rather taken up in his article, "St. Bonaventure's Fundamental Conception of Natural Law." According to Quinn, Bonaventure himself never treats natural law for its own sake, but rather "refers to it only in connexion with other problems." A complete account of Bonaventure's natural law doctrine, Quinn tells us, would

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6Ibid., 326, 402-03, 609, 798, 802-03.


9Ibid., 572.
necessitate a handling of all texts where St. Bonaventure
discusses natural law. Instead, Quinn narrows his own study
to a "limited number of problems," in order simply to "grasp
his fundamental conception of natural law." Thus, while
Quinn presents a few important texts which deal with the
innate character of natural law, he offers no further
analysis of St. Bonaventure's notion of natural law
precisely as innate.

Lastly, in his article, "Note Sulla Legge Naturale in
San Bonaventura," Gervasio Gestori acknowledges that
Bonaventure's natural law doctrine has never been clearly
mapped out, and that expositions of his doctrine have been
limited to general treatments. Bonaventure himself, Gestori
suggests, was evidently not much interested in the topic of
natural law, or perhaps he was distracted with his
responsibilities as General of the Franciscan order. In
any case, Gestori provides the reader with a useful

10 Ibid.

11 Gestori, Gervasio. "Note Sulla Legge Naturale in San
Bonaventura," La Scuola Cattolica 102 (1974), 50: "...per
quanto ci risulta, il suo insegnamento sulla legge naturale
non è stato ancora esposto adeguatamente, limitandosi di
solito le trattazioni generali a fare qualche vago cenno,
oltre il quale difficilmente si potevano collocare precisi
contenuti critici.

"A dire il vero, bisogna affermare subito che la
riflessione bonaventuriana sull'argomento non è stata molto
vasta, forse perché il tema non l'interessava o forse meglio
perché fu ben presto distratto dallo studio con la nomina a
generale dell'Ordine francescano."
bibliography on the subject of natural law\textsuperscript{12} and offers an historical account of various influences upon St. Bonaventure's own thought concerning natural law.\textsuperscript{13} He also outlines in his article a few general points concerning the role which Bonaventure assigns to natural law with respect to conscience and synderesis. Here, the problem of the innate character of natural law is touched upon, but Gestori makes no attempt to explore the issue further.\textsuperscript{14} Hence, further research remains to be undertaken regarding St. Bonaventure's notion of natural law precisely as innate.

IV. Secondary Literature on St. Thomas

One of the most concise, but thorough, studies on St. Thomas' natural law doctrine is offered by Walter Farrell in his book, \textit{The Natural Moral Law According to St. Thomas and Suarez}.\textsuperscript{15} Here, Farrell devotes a section of his final chapter to the consideration of the innate character of natural law. According to Farrell, "St. Thomas placed the essence of the Natural Moral law in...three elements, namely the natural inclinations, the light of reason and the

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., 50.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., 51-54.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., 60, note 43: "La questione tocca qui un punto importante, che però non può essere risolto in questa sede, perché riguarda la concezione bonaventuriana della conoscenza intellettiva e dell'origine delle idee."

\textsuperscript{15}Walter Farrell, \textit{The Natural Moral Law According to St. Thomas and Suarez} (Ditchling: St. Dominic's Press, 1930).
propositions of reason, taken in some way collectively...."\textsuperscript{16} "As regards the first two essential elements of this law--the natural inclinations and light of reason--there is no difficulty about their being strictly innate and this is the doctrine of St. Thomas."\textsuperscript{17} Further, "St. Thomas says quite plainly that [the] first principles or propositions of reason are innate."\textsuperscript{18} However, this third essential element (the propositions of reason), Farrell tells us, are for St. Thomas innate only in a qualified sense--inasmuch as such principles are naturally known ("naturaliter nota") or implanted in natural cognition ("indita erant in naturali cognitione").\textsuperscript{19} Farrell cites a passage from the \textit{De Veritate}, q. 1, a. 1,\textsuperscript{20} and quotes both Cajetan and Sylvius to help explain the sense in which first moral principles are understood by St. Thomas to be innate.\textsuperscript{21} According to Farrell, the term "innate" for St. Thomas "indicates that every man, by the very nature of his

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., 92.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 144.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 144-5.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 145: "...quod praeexistunt in nobis quaedam scientiarum semina, scilicet primae conceptiones intellectus, quae statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur per species a sensibilibus abstractis,...et hujusmodi, quae statim intellectus apprehendit."
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 145-46; see Commentarium in Summam Theologicam (Leonine edition of the \textit{Summa Theologiae}): Cajetan in \textit{ST} I, q. 82, a. 4; Sylvius in \textit{ST} I-II, q. 89, a. 6, ad 1.
intellect, immediately and without any reasoning, knows the truth of these propositions once their terms are understood through the help of acquired sense knowledge, memory and so on." Such an interpretation, while accurate, is nevertheless inadequate in addressing the challenges of more recent interpretations concerning the derivation of natural law.

Another important exposition on St. Thomas' natural law doctrine is undertaken by Odon Lottin in study, Le droit naturel chez saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs. In this work, Lottin first traces the historical influences which contributed to St. Thomas own synthetic doctrine of natural law. Next, he maps out the general features of St. Thomas' natural law teachings in view of the secular, Dominican, and Franciscan traditions. Similar to the opinion of Farrell, Lottin contends that while St. Thomas speaks of natural law judgments as innate, he means that they are naturally acquired according to the Aristotelian doctrine on the origin of ideas. The term "innate," Lottin tells us, is employed by St. Thomas with respect to natural law judgments merely for the sake of keeping with the

22Ibid., 146-47.

23Odon Lottin, Le droit naturel chez saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs (Bruges: Beyaert, 1931).

24Ibid., 3-60.

25Ibid., 61-68.
formulas of his times. Further, in his account of St. Thomas' understanding of natural law, Lottin speaks of the law of man's own being--his very form--as the internal principle which inclines him towards his perfection or natural end. This natural end preexists in his being in the manner of an "idea" or "form" to be achieved by man who must find there the norms of human activity; accordingly, it is in natural reason, Lottin tells us, that man finds his fundamental direction towards his proper end.

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26 Ibid., 70: "Il faudra en conclure que ces jugements, naturels, sont innés. De fait, saint Thomas accepte toutes les expressions du temps pour désigner cette innéité." See also ibid., 73: "N'était-ce pas le moment de retoucher les formules qui accentuaient l'innéité de la loi naturelle et de dire tout uniment: la loi naturelle consiste dans les jugements premiers de l'ordre spéculatif que l'homme émet sur les relations de ses actes avec sa nature et l'Auteur de la nature. Ces jugements sont l'oeuvre de notre raison, comme les jugements premiers de l'ordre spéculatif; mais ils s'acquièrent tout naturellement, sans le secours du raisonnement. C'est en ce sens uniquement qu'ils sont principia per se nota. Plus que nul autre, saint Thomas était invité à formuler de la sorte l'innéité de la loi naturelle; car, contrairement à saint Bonaventure, il étendait à l'idée même de Dieu la thèse aristotélicienne sur l'origine des idées. Mais saint Thomas était de son temps; et il a maintenu la formule reçue qui accentuait l'innéité de la loi naturelle: 'Praecepta prima et communia sunt scripta in ratione naturali quasi per se nota.'"

27 Ibid., 70-71: "La loi naturelle est n'est pas une 'forme'imprimée violemment du dehors à l'activité de l'être. C'est en un sens la 'forme' même de l'être. Car tout être créé, étant perfectible, tend à se parfaire; il le fait, en atteignant sa fin naturelle. Mais cette fin naturelle préexiste dans l'être à la manière d'une 'idée',d'une 'forme' à réaliser. La loi de l'être, pour saint Thomas, est précisément le principe qui incline la forme de l'être à s'actualiser pleinement. Et si, pour désigner ce principe, le saint Docteur réserve le nom de loi, opposé à l'estimative animale, c'est parce que, préлюдant à sa définition de la loi 'ordinatio rationis', il envisage la
When Lottin states that man's natural end preexists in him, he is referring to the form of man and not to any innate idea as such (see note 16 above); but how this preexistent natural end translates into an idea in human reason is left unexplained. Without further consideration of the manner by which natural law judgments are "naturally acquired," Lottin brings his discussion on the innate character of natural law to a close.

At this very point where Lottin ends his discussion on natural law knowledge, other commentators have pressed further. With respect to the relationship between the natural inclinations of man and his knowledge of natural law, Jacques Maritain proposes the following account of St. Thomas' teaching:

I think that Thomas Aquinas' teaching, here, should be understood in a much deeper and more precise fashion than is usual. When he says that human reason discovers the regulations of natural law through the guidance of the inclinations of human nature, he means that the very mode or manner in which human reason knows natural law is not rational knowledge, but knowledge through inclination. That kind of knowledge is not clear knowledge through concepts and conceptual judgments; it is obscure, unsystematic, vital knowledge by connaturality or congeniality, in which the intellect,
in order to bear judgment, consults and listens to the inner melody that the vibrating strings of abiding tendencies make present in the subject.\textsuperscript{28}

What can be said of Maritain's interpretation of the derivation of natural law knowledge, and the nature of such knowledge as being in some way non-rational? In an incisive article, "The Thomist Concept of Natural Law,"\textsuperscript{29} D. O'Donoghue takes Maritain to task. Granted that such an interpretation bears "a certain plausibility by the language which St. Thomas uses. Nevertheless," asserts O'Donoghue, "they are contradicted by the teaching of St. Thomas."\textsuperscript{30} O'Donoghue then cites several texts which clearly establish that natural law knowledge for St. Thomas is indeed a rational knowledge.\textsuperscript{31} O'Donoghue then gives his own account of St. Thomas' natural law teaching:

The first principles of practical reason are the primary precepts of Natural Law. These principles arise in the mind through the operation of that power which governs all our thinking, the active intellect. The

\textsuperscript{28}Jacques Maritain, \textit{Man and the State} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 93. Maritian also discusses natural law in connection with natural rights in \textit{The Person and the Common Good} (New York: Scribner, 1947); see also \textit{The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain: Selected Readings}, ed Joseph Evans and Leo Ward (New York: Scribner, 1955), 37, 42. In these latter works, however, he offers no further analysis regarding the derivation of natural law.

\textsuperscript{29}D. O'Donoghue, "The Thomist Concept of Natural Law," \textit{Irish Theological Quarterly} 22 (1955), 89-109.

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., 96-97.

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., 97; cf. \textit{De Veritate}, q. 11, a. 1; q. 16, a. 1.
active intellect does not discover these principles within itself, nor within the passive intellect, nor does it find them written in human nature. Neither does it arrive at them by way of a vision of an intelligible world or through contact with the veritas incommutabilis of St. Augustine. It arrives at them by addressing itself to the data provided by the senses.  

While O'Donoghue is justified (we think) in his critique of Maritain, his own interpretation, while sound in its positive affirmations, appears to us to be heavy-handed in its denials--namely, inasmuch as he seems to completely dismiss (or, at least, overlook) human nature and natural inclination as contributing causal factors in the production of natural law knowledge. The question must be asked, however, whether human nature and natural inclinations have any bearing at all upon the formation of natural law principles--and if so, in what way? Further exploration on these matters is therefore in order.

Robert Henle has recently published a translation and commentary on St. Thomas' Treatise on Law (ST I-II, qq. 90-97). The primary purpose of his book, Henle states, "is to provide the background and the explanations necessary for an intelligent and understanding reading of St. Thomas's Treatise on Law." In addition to his introductory

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32 Ibid., 97.


34 Ibid., xv.
exposition of pertinent Thomistic teachings, Henle provides a running commentary on the texts and clarifies points of doctrine along the way vis-à-vis different interpretations or schools of ethical thought. With regard to ST I-II, q. 90, a. 4, ad 1 ("promulgatio legis naturae est ex hoc ipso quod Deus eam mentibus hominum inseruit naturaliter cognoscendam"), Henle comments as follows:

What does "God instilled the Natural Law in the minds of men so as to be naturally known by them" mean? .... Clearly, as opposed to being supernaturally known, Natural Law is "naturally known," But the term "naturally" is still ambiguous and lies open to at least two interpretations. One interpretation is to say that there are in our intellects, prior to reflection or experience, fully formed first principles of the Natural Law and therefore of the moral order.... The correct interpretation [however] is as follows. The Practical Intellect has by nature the habit of the first principles of the Natural Law. This means that the Practical Intellect has the innate ability to recognize the first principles without previously acquiring the ability to do so. The habit is the ability to recognize the first principles, that is, by the habit the first principles are recognized without learning to do so, but the habit is not the first principles themselves. The distinction between the habit as that by which something is known and the things thereby known is fundamental. 35

Henle’s interpretation is, we think, accurate; but he offers no further explanation as to how first moral principles become "naturally known" and recognized as per se nota. In our study of whether (or in what manner) natural law is innate, we hope to explore and clarify what Henle leaves unsaid.

35Ibid., 141-42.
Not only is there controversy over the teachings of St. Thomas on the derivation of natural law; in more recent years, there has even been debate as to whether natural law has any significant bearing for St. Thomas upon his ethical teaching. Among the contemporary disputants is Vernon Bourke who offers a challenge to the usual classification of St. Thomas' ethics as "a theory of natural law." As Bourke sees it, "the ethics of Thomas Aquinas is not grounded on a code of immutable precepts constituting the natural law; hence, to maintain 'that Thomas' 'moral philosophy is dominated by the concept of natural law' is quite an exaggeration." Rather, "the theory of right reason seems...to take precedence over the theory of natural law." Therefore, "instead of classifying St. Thomas's ethics in terms of natural law, we would do better to call it an orthological ethics." 


37 Ibid., 65; Bourke cites here the words of W. D. Hudson in the "Editor's Preface" to D. J. O'Connor, Aquinas and Natural Law (London: Macmillan 1967).

38 Ibid., 66 and 55. Bourke's reservation for identifying St. Thomas' ethics in terms of natural law is twofold. First, he is concerned that "such a classification may give the false impression of imperatives arbitrarily imposed by an omnipotent Legislator." Secondly, "Aquinas thought [Bourke maintains] that lex derives from legere (to read) and so he understood lex to be a written statement of ius. Strictly speaking, then, when Thomas talks about law (lex), he is not discussing what is fundamentally the right thing to do but some sort of reasonable statement of what is generally the right thing." For a refutation of Bourke's exegesis on St. Thomas' use of the terms lex and ius, see
To add to the present debate, Joseph Owens has recently declared that for St. Thomas, "the starting point or first principle of a moral decision cannot be determined by the nature of things. It is determined by human choice." 39

"Choice," Owens tells us,

is the starting point of the moral order. The actual relating of human activities to their ultimate goal, as viewed both in moral philosophy and in moral theology, has to come freely from the human agent. It cannot be dictated by any outside cause. Morality, then, is not to be identified in Aquinas with the eternal law, or with natural law, or with any other law. It is not a set program, fixed and stable after the fashion of a blueprint.... Christian revelation introduced nothing that infringed upon Aquinas' wholehearted acceptance of Aristotle's basic tenet in regard to the order of morality. The starting point remained free choice, and the whole [italics added] moral order could be viewed as man-made." 40

Oscar Brown, Natural Rectitude and Divine Law in Aquinas (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1981), 165-74.


40 Ibid., 170. In this same section Owens also states that "the natural law is a participation of the eternal law by the human mind. But that is still not the moral order. The moral order arises only when the human agent in her or his own thinking freely directs conduct in accord with that law [italics added]." (170). Owens concludes his discussion (172) by assuring the reader that "the foregoing study has remained within the limits of Catholic philosophy." One wonders why Owens feels the need to make such a remark. In any case, inasmuch as the principle of non-contradiction is presumably a tenet of the Catholic philosophical tradition, further clarification by Fr. Owens on the relationship between free choice, natural law, and the moral order is required in order for his assertions--taken as a comprehensible unity--to remain within that philosophical tradition.
There is yet another group of ethical theorists--notably, John Finnis, Germain Grisez, and Joseph Boyle--who, to a great extent, appeal to the moral philosophy of St. Thomas in support of their own version of a natural law ethics. As argued in his book, *Natural Law and Natural Rights*, John Finnis sees no need for a metaphysics or philosophy of nature in order to establish an ethics; rather, morality, as Finnis sees it, is based upon the underived first principles of practical reasonableness. On this score, he claims the patronage of St. Thomas:

For Aquinas, the way to discover what is morally right (virtue) and wrong (vice) is to ask, not what is in accordance with human nature, but what is reasonable. And this quest will eventually bring one back to the underived first principles of practical reasonableness, principles which make no reference at all to human nature, but only to human good. From end to end of his ethical discourses, the primary categories for Aquinas are the 'good' and the 'reasonable'; the 'natural' is, from the point of view of his ethics, a speculative appendage added by way of metaphysical reflection, not a counter with which to advance either to or from the practical *prima principia per se notae*.

Similarly, Germain Grisez asserts that an ethics cannot be founded upon any examination of human nature or metaphysical speculation; rather, morality is based upon the self-evident and underivable principles of natural law. In

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his article, "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the *Summa Theologiae*, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," Grisez thus interprets St. Thomas:

[The first principle of practical reason, namely:] **Good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided**, together with the other self-evident principles of natural law, are not derived from any statements of fact. They are principles. They are not derived from any statements at all. They are not derived from prior principles. They are underivable.... Of course, one cannot form these principles if he has no grasp upon what is involved in them, and such understanding presupposes experience. However, one **does not derive these principles from experience or from any previous understanding** [italics added].

If one supposes that principles of natural law are formed by examining kinds of actions in comparison with human nature and noting their agreement or disagreement, then one must respond to the objection that it is impossible to derive normative judgments from metaphysical speculations. The invocation of a metaphysics of divine causality and providence at this point is no help, since such a metaphysics also consists exclusively of theoretical truths from which reason can derive no practical consequences.

Further, according to Grisez' reading of St. Thomas, the first principle of practical reason "requires only that what it directs have intentionality towards an intelligible purpose." Accordingly, "the first principle of practical

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43 Ibid., 196.

44 Ibid., 188. See also 179: "In forming this first precept, practical reason performs its most basic task, for it simply determines that what it shall think about must at least be set on the way to something--as it must be if reason is to be able to think of it practically." The words
reason does provide a basic requirement for action merely by prescribing that it be for some purpose (or another), and it is in the light of this requirement that the objects of all the inclinations are understood as human goods and established as objectives for rational pursuit." 

Inasmuch, then, as the first principles of practical reason pertain to a multiplicity of human goods taken precisely as "natural" (as opposed to the "supernatural"), natural law, according to St. Thomas, "does not direct man to his supernatural end; in fact it is precisely because it is inadequate to do so that divine law is needed as a supplement."

In line, then, with their interpretation of St. Thomas, Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle have fashioned a "New..." 

"requires" and "must" as used by Grisez in the above statements are misleading inasmuch as the first principle of practical reason presumably lacks imperative force. See ibid., 190-91: "The mistaken interpretation of Aquinas's theory of natural law considers natural law precepts to be a set of imperatives.... I wish to show both that the first principle does not have primarily imperative force and that it is really prescriptive." The term "prescriptive" as used here by Grisez evidently refers, not to what is imperative, but to what is merely advisable or recommended.

45 Ibid., 199.

46 Ibid., 184.

47 At times, Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle admit (or suggest) that they do not embrace certain teachings of St. Thomas; yet, the exact points of disagreement are never clearly identified and discussed. Hence, in his article, "Practical Reasoning, Human Goods and the End of Man" [Proceedings of the ACPA 58 (1984), 33], Finnis writes: "This conclusion, defended by Grisez and myself as valid apart from the authority of St. Thomas [italics added], is:
Natural Law" ethics as based upon the incommensurability of basic human goods. "It follows from this incommensurability that all basic purposes are alike only in being desired for some reason. They differ in desirability because there is no single reason underlying every purpose for the sake of which one acts [italics added]."  

Still other scholars--notably, Russell Hittinger, Ralph

any state which could count as the 'one ultimate good for all humans' must involve a plurality of goods, such as the irreducible complexity of integral human fulfillment." As this statement seems to imply, Finnis and Grisez do acknowledge St. Thomas' view that there is indeed one ultimate good to which all other goods are reducible. Apparently, then, Grisez' interpretation of St. Thomas concerning the first principle of practical reason has changed since his 1965 commentary on the Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2. See also Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends," American Journal of Jurisprudence 32 (1987), 99: "While this paper proposes philosophical clarifications and arguments rather than textual interpretations, it uses some language common in the (broadly speaking, Thomistic) natural-law tradition from which we developed the theory. But what we say here differs in various ways from the theories articulated by Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and others." The points of disagreement between these authors (Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis) and St. Thomas are not spelled out, however. Rather, it is left to the careful reader who is familiar with the authentic teachings of St. Thomas to recognize the fundamental philosophical differences between his doctrine of natural law and their own.

"Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis, "Practical Principles," 110. See ibid., 133: "Nevertheless, integral human fulfillment cannot be the ultimate in the sense of being the ultimate reason why one chooses or should choose whatever one chooses. In this sense, the basic goods are ultimate ends.... But is not God the ultimate end of human persons?... To begin with, God is not the ultimate reason for acting. The basic goods are reasons for actions. In choosing actions to instantiate the goods, one does not find the ultimate reason for one's choices in divine goodness."
McInerny, and Henry Veatch—insist that the "New Natural Law Theory," as proposed by Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle, cannot be squared with the natural law doctrine of St. Thomas. In defense of Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle, however, Robert George thinks that much of the criticism leveled against their theory is unwarranted. In a recent article, George purports to show (1) that contrary to what their critics claim the natural law theory advanced by Grisez and his collaborators does not entail the proposition that basic human good or moral norms have no connection to, or grounding in, human nature, and (2) that Grisez and his followers are correct in maintaining that our knowledge of basic human goods and moral norms need not, and logically cannot, be deduced, inferred, or (in any sense that a logician would recognize) derived from facts about human nature.

With regard to George’s first point, he is quite correct, provided we understand him according to the parameters he sets out in his second point—namely, in the

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See, for example, Russell Hittinger, A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987); Ralph McInerny, Ethica Thomistica (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 54-55; Henry Veatch, "Does the Grisez-Finnis-Boyle Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" Review of Metaphysics 44, (1991), 807-30; "A Possible Mis-Step in the Articulation of the Grifinnboyle Moral Philosophy," in Greek and Medieval Studies in Honor of Leo Sweeney, S.J., ed. William J. Carroll and John J. Furlong (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 145-60. In the above mentioned critiques, Hittinger, McInerny, and Veatch clarify many different aspects of St. Thomas' moral theory (such as the epistemological and metaphysical significance of the term bonus); but such clarifications do not constitute developed expositions of St. Thomas' natural law theory.

sense that a logician would allow. Accordingly, Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis do acknowledge that first practical principles are proper to human nature. It should be clear, they state:

why one cannot derive the moral ought from any theoretical is.... The is-to-be of practical truth cannot be reduced to the is of human nature without eliminating the distinction between, on the one hand, action and fulfillment through it, and, on the other, what persons are by nature, prior to their exercise of free choice. Still this twofold irreducibility does not mean that morality is cut off from its roots in human nature. For the normativity of the moral ought is nothing but the integral directiveness of the is-to-be of practical knowledge. And any adequate theory of human persons will include among its true propositions: Everyone who does rationally guided actions naturally knows the first principles of practical knowledge and naturally wills (by simple volition) the goods to which they direct. In this sense, the is-to-be of the first principles of practical knowledge is itself an aspect of human nature.51

Thus, provided we (1) understand "theoretical" knowledge according to the meaning a logician would permit, and (2) understand by the term, "human nature," to include the proposition, "Everyone who does rationally guided actions...," George is correct in insisting (1) that "it remains logically invalid to move from premises that do not include reasons for action to conclusions that state reasons

for actions,"52 and (2) that Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle clearly admit that basic human goods or moral norms pertain to human nature.

In sum, Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle maintain that the first principles of practical knowledge, "cannot be derived from any theoretical knowledge. Thus, they cannot be verified by experience or deduced from any more basic truths through a middle term. They are self-evident. Self-evident principles are per se nota--known just by knowing the meaning of their terms."53 "Aquinas knew this," Grisez asserts, "and his theory of natural law takes it for granted."54

In the debate over St. Thomas' natural law doctrine,

52George, "Natural Law," 41, note 20; see also Grisez, Finnis and Boyle, "Practical Principles," 102: "The theory we defined also departs from classical models--at least, as many have understood them--by taking full [sic] account of the fact that the moral ought cannot be derived from the is of theoretical truth--for example, of metaphysics and/or philosophical anthropology. Logically, of course, one can derive a moral ought from an is, whenever the is expresses a truth about a reality which embodies a moral norm. Thus, from 'This is the act an honest person would do' one can deduce 'This act ought to be done.' But from a set of theoretical premises, one cannot logically derive any practical truth, since sound reasoning does not introduce what is not in the premises. And the relationship of principles to conclusions is a logical one among propositions. Therefore, the ultimate principles of morality cannot be theoretical truths of metaphysics and/or philosophical anthropology."


however, Grisez begs the question: just what does St. Thomas’ theory of natural law take for granted? does he understand ratio recta in the way Bourke claims—as taking precedence over natural law? does he take moralia as Owens claims—as identified with free choice and not with natural law? does he understand ratio speculativa and ratio practica in the manner that Finnis and Grisez understand theoretical reason and practical reason? does he understand natura as George’s logician takes the word nature? does he think of first practical principles as per se nota in the way Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle understand basic goods of reason—namely, as underived, noncommensurable, and irreducible? From our comparative study on St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas as to whether (or in what manner) natural law is innate, we hope to consider and possibly answer many of these questions.

V. List of Texts

St. Bonaventure

In researching pertinent texts in St. Bonaventure, we have consulted the indices of the Opera Omnia. What follows is a chronological listing of passages where St. Bonaventure discusses either lex naturalis, lex naturae, or

ius naturale.  

1. In I Sent., d. 47, a. un. q. 4, ad 3.
2. In II Sent., prooemium.
3. Ibid., d. 35, dub. 4, resp.
4. Ibid., d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, arg. pro parte 3.
5. *Ibid., d. 39, a. 1, q. 3, fund. 1-6, resp. and ad 2.
8. In III Sent., d. 8, a. 1, q. 2, fund. 2.
9. Ibid., d. 35, a. un. q. 2, resp.
10. Ibid., d. 37, a. 1, q. 3, fund. 1 and 4.
11. Ibid. d. 37, a. 1, q. 3, ad 3 and 4.
12. Ibid., d. 40, a. un. q. 1, ad 3.
14. Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1.
15. Ibid., d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3, arg. pro parte 2.
16. Ibid., d. 22, a. 2, q. 1, ad opp. 1.
17. Ibid., d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, resp.
18. Ibid., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2, ad opp. 4.
19. Ibid., d. 26, a. 2, q. 2, resp.
20. Ibid., d. 33, a. 1, q. 1, resp. and ad 3.
21. Ibid., d. 33, a. 1, q. 2, resp.
22. Ibid., d. 33. a. 1, q. 2, fund. 4.

56 For a chronology of St. Bonaventure's works, see Appendix B. In the following list, an asterisk indicates a passage where St. Bonaventure speaks of natural law or natural law principles as either innata, impressa, scripta, or indita.
23. Ibid., d. 33, a. 1, q. 2, contra 2.
24. Ibid., d. 33, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1.
25. Ibid., d. 33, a. 3, q. 1, fund. 2.
26. Ibid., d. 36, a. 1, q. 1, fund. 1.
27. Ibid., d. 36, a. 1, q. 3, resp.
28. Ibid., d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, fund. 2.
29. *Ibid., d. 42, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1, contra 1 and 2.
30. *Ibid., d. 42, a. 2. q. 1, resp.
31. Ibid., d. 33, a. 3, fund. 2.
32. *Ibid., d. 49. p. 1, a. un, q. 2, resp.
34. *Comm. Luc., c. 12, v. 57, n. 84.
35. *Ibid., c. 19, v. 3.
36. *Ibid., c. 19, v. 21, n. 34.
38. Ibid., c. 15, v. 13.
39. Ibid., c. 18, v. 4.
40. *De Perf. Evang., q. 4, a. 1, fund. 2, 4, 7, 10
41. *Ibid., q. 4, a. 1, resp.
42. *Itin., c. III, n. 2.
43. *Septem Donis Spiritus Sancti., q. 4, a. 2, resp.

From the above list of passages, the following directly concern the derivation of natural law, and thus will serve as key-texts for further investigation:
2. Comm. Luc., c. 19, v. 21, n. 34.

St. Thomas

In consulting the Index Thomisticus\(^57\) we find over seventy pages of citations where St. Thomas employs the terms \textit{ius} or \textit{lex}. Thus, to keep our study within manageable limits, we have searched for the terms \textit{lex naturae}, \textit{lex naturalis}, \textit{ius naturale}, \textit{lumen naturale}, \textit{naturalis inclinatio}, and \textit{natura} as employed only in connection with the terms (and conjugations of) \textit{indere}, \textit{impressio}, \textit{innatus}, and \textit{inscribere}. Further, inasmuch as St. Thomas treats natural law in a topical manner only in his \textit{Scriptum super libros Sententiarum} and \textit{Summa Theologiae}, we have narrowed our scope to cite passages only from these two writings.\(^58\)

Innatus:
1. \textit{In II Sent.}, d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, sol.
2. \textit{Ibid.}, d. 42, a. 1, a. 4, ad 3.
3. \textit{In III Sent.}, d. 23, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1.
4. \textit{Ibid.}, d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, sol.

\(^{57}\)Roberto Busa, \textit{Index Thomisticus} (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1974).

\(^{58}\)Discussion of natural law is found in many of St. Thomas' other works as well--particularly the \textit{De Veritate} and the \textit{Summa Contra Gentiles}; in these works, however, natural law is dealt with only indirectly. We will refer to these other works in our study insofar as they are pertinent and help make clear the thought of St. Thomas as explicated \textit{In I-IV Sententiarum} and in the \textit{Summa Theologiae}.

In the following list, an asterisk is placed at those passages where the terms \textit{lex naturalis}, \textit{lex naturae}, \textit{ius naturale}, or \textit{prima principia} are employed.
5. *In IV Sent.*, d. 17, q. 3, a. 1 sol. 2.
7. ST I-II, 93. 6, resp. (interius)

Impressio:
8. In III Sent., d. 3, a. 1, q. 1 ad 3.
9. *In IV Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4.
11. Ibid., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4.
12. ST I, q. 88, a. 3, ad 1.
13. Ibid., q. 93, a. 6, ad 1.
14. ST I-II, q. 90, a. 3, ad 1 (inscruit).

Indere
19. In II Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 5, sol.
20. In III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 3.
21. Ibid., d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, sol.
23. *In IV Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, sed contra 6.
26. ST I, q. 60, a. 1, ad 3.
27. Ibid., q. 79, a. 12, resp.
29. Ibid., q. 109, a. 1, ad 2.
30. ST I-II, q. 91, a. 3, ad 2.
31. ST II-II, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1.

Inscribere
32. *In II Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 4.
33. Ibid., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3.
34. *Ibid., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, arg 3.
35. In III Sent. d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, sol. and ad 3.

From the above passages, the following are most pertinent to our investigation of natural law as innate, and thus will be studied as key-texts:
1. In IV Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, sol.
2. ST q. 91, a. 2, resp.

VI. Method of Study

Having isolated and arranged in chronological order the various texts which deal directly or indirectly with natural law as innate, we will now investigate the key-texts selected first from St. Bonaventure and then from St. Thomas. In each case we will study the texts in their chronologized order so as better to appreciate the development of St. Bonaventure's and St. Thomas' thought.
Each key-text will be considered according to the following divisions:

1) a contextual introduction to the key-text;
2) its translation followed by the Latin text;
3) a commentary upon it.
4) a summary and conclusion.

Our six textual studies will be followed by a final chapter consisting of a general summation of our findings, a comparison between the natural law doctrines of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, and—in view of our findings—a closing comment with respect to contemporary ethical thought.
CHAPTER 1

KEY-TEXT A

In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. un., q. 2: "Utrum omnes appetant beatitudinem veram."¹

I. Context

Context for this first key-text will be twofold:

(1) remote: Bonaventure’s doctrines on (a) the human soul, (b) conscience, and (c) synderesis.

(2) proximate: Peter Lombard’s discussion, "Si omnes homines volunt esse beati."

Remote Context #a

St. Bonaventure’s Psychology

The soul, according to Bonaventure, is at once the entelechia of the body and also a complete substance in

¹Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia, ed. studio et cura PP. Collegii S. Bonaventura (Quaracchi), 1882-1902, 10 volumes. All textual citations of St. Bonaventure's works are from this critical edition unless otherwise indicated. In citing the Opera Omnia, reference to the volumes and pages of the Quaracchi edition will be indicated by roman numerals and arabic numbers respectively. For example, our present key-text is found in volume II, page 1002, which we indicate as: II, 1002.

Further, all italicized words used for emphasis are my own unless otherwise indicated. The Commentarius in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi was probably written between 1250 and 1255; see Appendix B, note 4 regarding the chronology of Bonaventure's early works.
itself composed of spiritual matter and form. By reason of this hylomorphic composition, Bonaventure distinguishes


See In II Sent., d. 18, a. 2, q. 3, fund. 5 (II, 452): "...anima rationalis, cum sit substantia per se existens et incorruptibilis, habet materiam et formam..." See In II Sent., d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, fund. 1 (II, 445): "Anima rationalis est actu et entelechia corporis humani." Ibid., d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, ad 6 (II, 415): "Licet autem anima rationalis compositionem habeat ex materia et forma, appetitum tamen habet ad perficiendam corporalem naturam; sicut corpus organicum ex materia et forma compositum est et tamen habet appetitum ad suscipientam animam." See Brevil., II, c. 9, n. 5 (V, 227a): "Quoniam autem ut beatificabilis est immortalis; ideo, cum [anima rationalis] unitur mortali corpori, potest ab eo separari; ac per hoc non tantum forma est, verum etiam hoc aliud." The component of spiritual matter is required by Bonaventure to account for the soul's individuality and mutability. See In I Sent., d. 19, p. 2, a. un, q. 3, contra 1 (I, 360) "Boethius, in Libro De Trinitate [c. 2; PL 64, 1250]: 'Forma vero quae est sine materia non poterit esse subjectum.'" Cf. In II Sent., d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, contra 5 (II, 414); ibid., concl. (II, 415b): "...anima rationalis, cum sit hoc aliquid et per se nata subsistere et agere et pati, movere et moveri, quod habet intra se fundamentum suae existentiae et principium materiale, a quo habet existere, et formale, a quo habet esse.... Concedendum est, animam humanam materiam habere. Illa autem materia sublevata est supra esse extensionis, et supra esse privationis et corruptionis, et ideo dicitur materia spiritualis." Cf. ibid., d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1 (II, 447a): "...intellectus individuatus secundum corporis indigentiam; non tamen eius individuatio est a corpore, sed a propriis principiis, materia scilicet et forma sua, quas de se habet, sicut in se subsistit, sicut determinatum est supra."

Bonaventure does not explicitly state that the soul of man is the substantialis forma of the human body. Indeed, he holds that the body itself possesses a substantial form which is light (see note 80). It appears, then, that the human compositum is for Bonaventure constituted by a plurality of forms unified through order. See In II Sent., d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, ad 6 (II, 415), as cited above. Ibid., a. 2, q. 2, ad 6 (II, 423): "Et sic in unionae animae ad corpus servatur ordo." For further discussion on the theory of the plurality of forms implicit in Bonaventure's doctrine, see Etienne Gilson, La philosophie de saint Bonaventure, 260-262. See also K. Ziesché, "Die Naturlehre Bonaventuras," Philosophisches Jahrbuch 18 (1908), 56-89.
between the soul and its powers through which it operates; for otherwise the operations of the soul, he argues, would be the same as its existence and consequently always be in operation--which is clearly not the case. Further, inasmuch as these powers (such as intellect and will) go out from the soul in their operations to their exterior objects, they cannot be entirely identified with the soul. Nevertheless, these powers are consubstantial with the soul since they proceed directly from it and are reduced to it.

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3In I Sent., d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3, ad 3 (I, 86b-87a): "Ad illud quod oblicitur, quod idem est principium essendi et operandi; dicendum quod verum est de principio remoto, sed de proximo est impossibile. Nam si idem omnino esset principium proximum, tunc idem esset in re esse et operari. Similiter, si idem esset principium proximum, cum res semper habeat esse, semper haberet operare. Quoniam igitur forma dicit proximum et immediatum principium essendi, potentia, vero proximum et immediatum principium operandi, patet quod impossibile est esse omnino idem."

4In I Sent., d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3, f. 5 (I, 85b): "...virtus egreditur substantiam, quia operatur in objectum, quod est extra." Ibid., concl. (I, 86a): "Contingit iterum nominare potentias animae, ut immediate egrediuntur a substantia; ut per haec tria: memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Et hoc patet, quia omni accidente circumscripto, intellecto quod anima sit substantia spiritualis, hoc ipso quod est sibi praesens et sibi coniuncta, habet potentiam ad memorandum et intelligendum et diligendum se. Unde istae potentiae sunt animae consubstantiales et sunt in eodem genere per reductionem, in quo est anima. Attamen, quoniam egrediuntur anima--potentia enim se habet per modum egredientis--non sunt omnino idem per essentiam, nec tamen adeo differunt, ut sint alterius generis, sed sunt in eodem genere per reductionem." Through reduction, then, these powers are consubstantial or essential to the soul; indeed, they are necessary for the soul’s perfection. Ibid., ad 1-2 (I, 86b): "Quarto modo dicitur essentiale sine quo res non potest cogitari habere perfectum esse, ut sunt potentiae in anima, in quibus attenditur imago; et hoc est minimo modo substantiale sive essentiale; tamen non transit in alium genus: ideo anima dicitur suae potentiae." The res which we
Hence, Bonaventure regards the intellect and will as distinct powers of a common substance.\(^5\)

The intellective power is itself differentiated into the speculative intellect and practical intellect, the latter being the same power as the former but as joined to the will in directing conduct.\(^6\) Thus, Bonaventure are here concerned with is the human soul. For the meaning and applications of *reductio*, see *In II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, ad 8 (II, 562b).

\(^5\) *In II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, concl. (II, 560ab): "...nec tamen concedunt, eas simpliciter diversificari secundum essentiam, ita ut dicantur diversae essentiae, sed differre essentialiter in genere potentiae, ita ut dicantur diversae potentiae sive diversa instrumenta ejusdem substantiae." Ibid., (II, 561a): "...rationem et voluntatem diversas esse potentias." Bonaventure further distinguishes between powers and their operations. See *In II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3 (II, 561b): "...quia cognoscere et amare absque dubio sunt actus differentes potentiae, quae sunt ad hos actus, per se ipsas diversitatem habent."

\(^6\) *In II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, concl. (II, 566b): "Intellectus enim speculativus secundum alium statum efficitur practicus, videlicet dum coniungitur voluntati et operi in dictando et regendo." Bonaventure catagorizes the various powers of the soul as follows: "Aliquando secundum naturam ipsarum potentiarum, ut cum dividuntur potentiae animae in vegetabilem, sensibilim et rationalem, vel ipsa rationalis in intellectivam et affectivam.--Aliquando vero secundum officia, ut cum dividitur ratio in superiorem et inferiorem--Aliquando secundum status, ut cum dividitur intellectus in speculativum et practicum; intellectus enim speculativus secundum alium statum efficitur practicus, videlicet dum coniungitur voluntati et operi in dictando et regendo.--Aliquando vero fit divisio potentiarum secundum aspectus, sicut dividitur potentia cognitiva in rationem, intellectum et intelligentiam, secundum quod aspicit ad inferius, ad par et ad superius.--Aliquando vero secundum actus, sicut fit divisio in inventivam et iudicativam; invenire enim et iudicare sunt actus potentiae cognitivae ad invicem ordinati.--Aliquando vero fit divisio potentiarum animae secundum modos movendi; et sic est illa, quae est per natruralem et deliberativam." *In II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a.
reiterates the position of Aristotle—namely, that the practical intellect differs from the speculative intellect by the addition of the will. 7

In connection with the operative powers of the soul, Bonaventure employs the term *habitus* as that by which an operative power is easily (*facilis*) capable of a particular act. 8 Conscience is such a habitus of the intellective power; more precisely, conscience is a habitus which perfects (*perficiens*) the intellect to the extent that the intellect is practical—i.e., as it directs the intellect in conduct. 9

2, q. 3, concl. (II 566ab).

7 *In II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (II, 899b): "Intellectus enim speculativus et practicus eandem potentiam dicunt, sola extensione differente." See Aristotle, De Anima, III, c. 9 (432b21-433a8). With regard to *praeeptae* as produced by both reason and will, see *In I Sent.*, d. 35, a. 1, q. 3, concl.; d. 45, a. 3, q. 2, ad 2; *In II Sent.*, d. 44, a. 2, q. 2, concl.; *In IV Sent.*, d. 27, a. 2, q. 3, dub. 2, resp.

8 See *In I Sent.*, d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1 ad 1 (I, 89b): "...habitus est quo potentia *facilis* est in actum." Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, ad. 1 (89-90). Implicit in the meaning of habitus is the facility or aptitude with which a habitus endows an operative faculty. See note 44 below where Bonaventure employs the term *habilis* in this manner. See note 73 for a description of the various modes of habitus with respect to natural law. See Etienne Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, 328, for further discussion on these various types of habitus.

9 *In II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (II, 899b): "[Conscientia] est habitus potentiae cognitivae...*perficiens* intellectum nostrum, in quantum est practicus, sive in quantum dirigit in opere." Note here that the habitus of conscience is said to *perfect* the intellect; in turn, the soul is perfected by the actuation of its powers which are consubstantial with it (see note 4). Conscience is sometimes
In II Sent., d. 39, a. 1, q. 2: "Utrum conscientia sit habitus innatus aut acquisitus."

Taking conscience as a habitus, then, Bonaventure asks whether it is innate or acquired (In II Sent., d. 39, a. 1, q. 2). He opens this discussion with several positions affirming the innateness of conscience. First, Scripture teaches that the Gentiles, without the written law, manifest the law which is written on their hearts; lacking the law of Scripture, they nonetheless possess the natural law (lex naturalis) to which their conscience bears witness.

Conscience is therefore said to be a habitus naturally inscribed within the human heart ("naturaliter cordi humano inscriptum"). Secondly, Augustine teaches that every man

...taken for a power with respect to natural law which is said to be written in the conscience. Ibid., (II, 899b): "Aliquando autem accipitur conscientia pro ipsa potentia consciente, ut ita dicam, secundum quod dicitur, quod lex naturalis scripta est in conscientiis nostris." Because conscience is in some manner joined to the will and operation, it is named not simply scientia but conscientia. Ibid., (II, 899b): "Et propter taliis habitus non simpliciter nominatur scientia, sed conscientia, ut in hoc significetur quod habitus iste non perficit ipsam potentiam speculativam in se, sed prout est quodam modo iuncta affectioni et operationi."

...In II Sent., d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, fund. 1 (II, 901): "Ad Romanos [Romans 2, 14-15] secundo: 'Cum gentes, quae legem non habent, naturaliter quae legis sunt faciunt, ipsi sibi sunt lex, quia ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis, testimonium illis reddente conscientia.' Et Glossa ibidem. 'Etsi gentes non habeant legem scriptam, habent tamen legem naturalem, qua sibi conscii sunt:' ergo ex textu et Glossa patet, quod conscientia dicit habitum naturaliter cordi humano inscriptum." Cf. Petri Lombardi, Collectanea in Omnes D. Pauli Apostoli Epistolas (PL 191,
has received a natural judgment (naturale iudicatorium) by which he places wisdom before error and peace before strife. If, therefore, conscience is of this kind of judgment, it must be an innate habitus in man. Thirdly, St. Isidore holds that as natural law (ius naturale) teaches all animals, all the more does it teach man who excels all animals; but knowledge of natural law is nothing other than conscience; hence conscience is innate. Again, every man

1345). As cited in note 9 above, conscience is considered a potentia in relation to the natural law which is written in the conscience. In the present case, conscience is taken as an innate habitus in virtue of the innate natural law.

11 Ibid., fund. 2 (II, 901): "Item Augustinus in libro tertio de Libero Arbitrio: 'Ante omne meritum boni operis non est parum accepisse naturale iudicatorium, quo sapientiam quis praeponat errori, et quietem difficultati.' Si ergo conscientia est huiusmodi iudicatorium, est igitur habitus homini innatus." Cf. S. Augustinus, De Libero Arbitrio, III, c. 20, n. 56, (PL 32, 1298). From this context, the term naturale iudicatorium seems to indicate a faculty or operative power of judgment rather than an operation. The term iudicium is employed by Bonaventure to indicate the act or operation of judgment. See note 44 below in this regard.

12 Ibid., fund. 3 (II, 901): "Item, Isidorus: 'Ius naturale est quod natura docuit animali:' ergo si natura docuit animalia illud quod est iuris naturalis, multo fortius docuit hominem, qui excellit omnia animalia; sed cognitio iuris naturalis non est aliud quam conscientia: ergo etc." See In IV Sent., d. 33, a. 1, q. 2 (IV, 749-50). Cf. Sancti Isidori Etymologiarum, V, c. 4. n. 1 (PL 82, 199): "Ius naturale est commune omnium nationum et quod ubique instinctu naturae, non constitutione aliqua habetur ut viri et feminae conjunctio, librorum susceptione et educatio, communis omnium possessio et omnium una libertas, acquisitio eorum quae coelo, terra, marique capiuntur." Cf. Gratian's Decretum, D. I, 7. The citation above which Bonaventure attributes to Isidore (died 636 A.D.) is traced either to Justinian (Corpus Iuris Civilis, I tit. 2) or Ulpian (Digest, I, 1, 1, 3), whose position Isidore himself abandons. See Michael Crowe, "St. Thomas and Ulpian's
has a natural inclination (naturalis instinctus) for happiness and to honor his parents; but this could not be without some prior knowledge which seems to be naturally impressed upon us ("naturaliter nobis impressam"); and such knowledge is conscience.\textsuperscript{13} Further, if natural law were known through acquisition, then the law should not be called natural but acquired; but such is not the case.\textsuperscript{14} Finally, natural law naturally binds the will before it is known by the intellect; but as intellect precedes affect ("affectum enim praecedit intellectus"), it seems that knowledge of this law is natural.\textsuperscript{15}

\textit{Natural Law," St Thomas Aquinas Commemorative Studies} (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 261-65. Inasmuch as St. Bonaventure employs the terms lex naturalis and ius naturale interchangeably, we will translate both terms as "natural law" throughout this study. See Key-Text B, note 17, for further clarification on the meaning of these two terms.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., fund. 4 (II, 902): "Item, naturalem habemus instinctum ad appetendum beatitudinem et ad honorandum parentes; sed hoc non potest esse sine aliqua praecognitione: ergo videtur, quod ad huiusmodi facienda habeamus aliquam cognitionem naturaliter nobis impressam. Sed cognitio inclinans ad hoc est conscientia: ergo etc."

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., fund. 5 (II, 901): "Item, lex naturalis cognoscitur ab homine aliquo modo, aut ergo per acquisitionem, aut per naturam. si per acquisitionem: ergo non debet dici naturalis, sed acquisita, sicut nec virtutes politicae. Si vero per naturam; et cognitio legis naturalis non est aliud quam conscientia: ergo etc."

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., fund. 6 (II, 901): "Item, ius naturale naturaliter ligat voluntatem; sed ligamen voluntatis necessario praecedit actus cognitionis--affectum enim praecedit intellectus--ergo si voluntas naturaliter ad illud
Bonaventure also presents several positions arguing that conscience is to some extent an acquired habitus, after which he lays the groundwork for his own solution. Three opinions are presented which claim that a habitus of knowledge is in some manner partly innate and partly acquired; but each position differs as to the manner in which knowledge is both innate and acquired. In the first case, knowledge is considered innate with respect to the agent intellect and acquired with respect to the possible intellect which Aristotle says is originally a *tabula nuda*.
to be perfected through the mediation of the senses.\textsuperscript{16} Bonaventure replies, however, that this theory is neither true nor consonant with Aristotle's own words; for if the agent intellect possessed innate knowledge, it could communicate its knowledge to the possible intellect without the aid of the inferior senses; moreover, the soul would never be in a state of ignorance if in fact the agent intellect possessed its knowledge innately. Rather, knowledge depends on both the possible intellect by which the mind becomes what it knows and the agent intellect by which all knowledge is produced.\textsuperscript{17}

According to the second position, the habitus of knowledge is \textit{innate} with respect to universal knowledge or principles and \textit{acquired} with respect to knowledge of particulars or conclusions. Such a position, however, is

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., concl. (II, 902b): "Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod \textit{innati} sunt intellectui \textit{agenti}, sed \textit{acquisiti} sunt quantum ad intellectum \textit{possibilem}; et quantum ad istum intellectum dicit Philosophus, animam creari sicut tabulam nudam, et ille intellectus est, qui habet perfici mediantibus potentiis sensitivis."

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid. (II, 902b): "Sed istud non videtur esse consonum nec verbis Philosophi nec veritati. Si enim intellectus agens haberet habitus cognoscendorum, quare non possit illos communicare possibili sine adiutorio sensuum inferiorum? Rursus, si intellectus agens haberet habitus cognoscendorum, iam anima a sua conditione non esset ignorans, immo potius esset sciens. Difficile etiam est simul cum hoc intelligere, quomodo species dicantur esse in intellectu agente, cum possibilis dicatur 'quo est omnia fieri,' et agens 'quo est omnia facere.'" Cf. Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, III, c. 5. Correlatively, Bonaventure argues that the agent intellect is individual and not universal, as Avicenna erroneously held. See \textit{In II Sent.}, d. 7, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1 (II, 198b); see note 2 above.
contrary to the words of both Aristotle and Augustine; for Aristotle proves that knowledge of principles is not innate in us, but rather is acquired via the senses, memory, and experience; \(^{18}\) and Augustine, referring to the boy in Plato’s *Meno* who knows the principles of geometry, states that he does not know such principles innately, but sees them in an incorporeal light proper to the soul just as the carnal eye sees corporeal objects in visible light. \(^{19}\) Thus Bonaventure rejects the second theory.

The third position, which Bonaventure accepts, holds that habitus of knowing (*habitus cognitivi*) are innate and acquired, not only with regard to knowledge of particulars and conclusions, but of principles as well; for knowledge requires the presence of both knowable items and a certain


\(^{19}\)Ibid. (II, 903a): "Augustinus etiam in duodecimo libro de Trinitate [c.15. n. 24.], loquens se parvulo, qui respondebat de omnibus principiis geometriae, dicit ibi, quod hoc non erat, quia anima illius parvuli prius illa novisset, sed potius 'ista videbat in quadam luce sui generis incorporeae; quemadmodum oculus carnis videt quae in hac luce corporea contra adiacent, cuius lucis capax eique congruens est creatus.'"
light, by which we are able to judge them. Cognitive habitus are thus in some manner innate in us by reason of a light impressed in the soul ("luminis animae inditi"); yet they are acquired by reason of species ("ratione speciei") derived through the senses. Such a position thus concurs with the words of both Aristotle and Augustine; for the species (species) and the similitudes (similitudines) of things are acquired through the senses, as Aristotle says and experience teaches. Hence, no one ever knows whole or part, or father or mother, unless he receives some external species of them through his senses; and this is why, as Aristotle says, the loss of any one of the senses entails the loss of a corresponding portion of knowledge. But further, the cognitive powers are identified with an innate light or natural judgment which, as Augustine holds, directs the soul in judging both speculative truths (cognoscibilia)

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20 Ibid. (II, 903a): "Et propterea est tertius modus dicendi, quod habitus cognitivi quodam modo sunt nobis innati et quodam modo acquisiti, non tantum logendo de cognitione in particulari et de cognitione conclusionum, sed etiam de cognitione principiorum. Cum enim ad cognitionem duo concurrant necessario, videlicet praesentia cognoscibilis et lumen, quo mediate de illo iudicamus, sicut videmus in visu, et in praecedenti auctoritate innuit Augustinus." Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XII, c. 15. n. 24 (PL 42, 1011): "[S]ed potius credendum est mentis intellectualis ita conditam esse naturam, ut rebus intelligibilibus naturali ordine, disponente Conditore, subjuncta sic ista videat in quadam luce sui generis incorporea, quemadmodum oculus carnis videt quae in hac corporea luce circumadjacent, cujus lucis capax eique congruens est creatus."
and practical truths (operabilia).

21 Ibid. (II, 903b): "Habitus cognitivi sunt quodam modo nobis innati ratione luminis animae inditi, sunt etiam quodam modo acquisiti ratione speciei; et hoc quidem verbis Philosophi et Augustinus concordat. Omnes enim in hoc concordant, quod potentiae cognitivae sit lumen inditum, quod vocatur naturale iudicatorium; species autem et similitudines rerum acquiruntur in nobis mediante sensu, sicut expresse dicit Philosophus in multis locis; et hoc etiam experientia docet. Nemo enim umquam cognosceret totum, aut partem, aut patrem, aut matrem, nisi sensu aliquo exteriori speciem eius acciperet; et hinc est, quod 'amittentes unum sensum necesse habemus unam scientiam amittere.' Illud autem lumen sive naturale iudicatorium dirigat ipsam animam in iudicando tam de cognoscibilibus quam de operabilibus." Cf. Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora, I, c. 18; II, c. 15; De Anima, III, c. 8; Metaphysica, I, c. 1; II, c. 2.

One might infer from the words, "potentiae cognitivae sit lumen inditum, quod vocatur naturale iudicatorium," that the cognitive power of the soul not only possesses an innate light but in fact is identical with this very light which, in turn, is perfectly synonymous with natural judgment. But if so, how can the cognitive power qua lumen or iudicatorium also be distinguished by Bonaventure as both possible intellect and agent intellect? Cf. II Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4. concl. (II 570a): "Intellectum agentem et possibilem duas differentias esse intellectivae potentiae, licet aliquae ex eis non sint multum cogentes." Elsewhere he seems to indicate that while the lumen inditum is proper to the intellect, they are not completely synonymous with one another. See In II Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, concl. (910a): "Et propter a est tertius modus dicendi, quod quemadmodum ab ipsa creatione animae intellectus habet lumen, quod est sibi naturale iudicatorium dirigens ipsum intellectus in cognoscendis." Ibid., fund. 4 (908b): "...sicut intellectus indiget lumine ad iudicandum...." What, then, is the precise relationship between the natural light, natural judgment and the intellective power qua agent and possible? Bonaventure insists that the agent and possible intellects are two differences of the same power and operation. See In II Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4, resp. (II, 568a): "Intellectus agens et possibilis sunt duae ipsius potentiae intellectivae differentiae, quae in unam operationem completam intelligendi inseparabiliter concurrunt." Ibid, ad 4 (II 570b): "...sicut materiale et formale principium ad unum esse compositi constitutendum." Ibid., ad 5 (II, 572): "Sic cogitandae sunt esse illae duae differentiae, quod in unam operationem completam intelligendi veniant inseparabiliter, sicut lumen et diaphanum veniunt in
In speculative knowledge first principles are most evident while particular conclusions are less evident. Similarly, first principles of conduct are most evident, such as "Never do to others what you would not have them do to you," or "God must be obeyed." Cognition of all first abstractionem coloris." But here the difference is expressed in terms, not of pure act and potency (see Aristotle's distinction as cited in footnote 17), but of that which illumines and that which is illumined. Ibid., fund. 4 (II, 567b): "Sed intellectus agens se habet sicut lux, intellectus possibilis sicut illuminatum a luce." Evidently, the lumen innatum, while not fully equated with the cognitive power, is associated most intimately with the active intellect. Moreover, it is noteworthy that Bonaventure assigns the task of iudicium to the possible intellect; yet this operation requires the help of the agent intellect. Ibid., ad 5 (II, 572): "[Intellectus possibilis] non potest sua conversione nec speciem abstrahere nec de specie iudicare nisi adiutorio ipsius agentis." Granted Bonaventure sometimes uses the terms naturale lumen and naturale iudicatorium indifferently; nevertheless he describes the active intellect and possible intellects as two differences of a common power and operation whose roles are distinguished according to light and judgment respectively. Such a description suggests, then, that the naturale lumen and naturale iudicatorium are not perfectly and properly synonymous, but rather are distinct and complementary terms which constitute one complete power and operation. See note 76 regarding natural law qua light. It is not certain from the above passages, however, whether the active and possible intellects are two differences of a single intellect or if they are distinct--but inseparable--intellective powers which conjoin to form a common but composite power and operation qua intellectiva potentia. In any case, there is but one knowing ("ex eis non sint multum cogentes;" see above). G. H. Tavard sums the process of judgment as follows: "The 'judgment' of an acquired species is rendered by the 'passive intellect' by virtue of a power deriving from the 'agent intellect,' which in turn held it from natural illumination." See his Transiency and Permanence: The Nature of Theology According to St. Bonaventure (N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1954), 71.

22Ibid. (II, 903b): "Sed hoc attendendum est praecipue; quia, sicut inter cognoscibilia quaedam sunt valde evidentia, sicut dignitates et prima principia; quaedam sunt
principles is innate in us by reason of that innate light which suffices for knowing them in a self-evident manner upon the reception of sensible species and without any additional persuasion; accordingly, knowledge of first moral principles is innate in us.\textsuperscript{23} Knowledge of particular conclusions, however, must be acquired because that innate light in us does not fully suffice but needs further persuasion or new facility. Thus, knowledge of particular moral conduct requires some additional instruction.\textsuperscript{24} As conscience is that cognitive habitus which directs our judgments of conduct (\textit{operabilia}), it is innate with respect to the directing light of the intellect ("\textit{respectu luminis directivi}") and what pertains to the primary precept of nature ("\textit{de primo dictamine naturae}"); however, it is also acquired with respect to those things which are additionally minus evidentia, sicut conclusiones particulares; sic et in operabilibus quaedam sunt maxime evidentai, utpote illud: 'quod tibi non vis fieri, alii ne feceris [Tobias, 4, 16],’ et quod Deo obtemperandum est, et consimilia."

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid. (II, 903b): "Quemadmodum igitur cognitio primorum principiorum ratione illius luminis dicitur esse nobis innata, quia lumen illud sufficit ad illa cognoscenda; post receptionem specierum, sine aliqua persuasione superaddita, propter sui evidentiam: sic et primorum principiorum moralium cognitio nobis innata est, pro eo quod iudicatorium illud sufficit ad illa cognoscenda."

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid. (II, 903b): "Rursus, quemadmodum cognitio particularium conclusionum scientiarum acquisita est, pro eo quod lumen nobis innatum non plene sufficit ad illa cognoscenda, sed indiget aliqua persuasione et habilitatione nova: sic etiam intelligendum est ex parte operabilia, quod quaedam sunt agenda, ad quae tenemur, quae non cognoscimus nisi per instructionem superadditam."
learned by means of their species. Thus we possess a natural light which suffices for knowing that parents ought to be honored and neighbors should not be injured; yet the species of father and neighbor are not naturally impressed upon our soul but must be acquired through the senses.

Ibid. (II, 903b): "Quoniam igitur conscientia nominat habitum directivum nostri iudicii respectu operabilium, hinc est, quod quodam modo habitum nominat innatum, et quodam modo nominat acquisitum. Habitum, inquam, innatum nominat respectu eorum quae sunt de primo dictamine naturae; habitum vero acquisitum respectu eorum quae sunt institutionis superadditae. Habitum etiam innatum dicit respectu luminis directivi; habitum nihilominus acquisitum respectu speciei ipsius cognoscibilis."


How does knowledge of sensible objects come about for Bonaventure? It begins with (1) perception or apprehension which consists of the reception (receptio) of a sensible species by a bodily organ and an initial judgment (iudicium) of the sensitive faculty upon the impression it undergoes. See In II Sent., d. 8, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2 ad 7 (II, 223a): "...dicendum quod cum ista duo sint in sensu, videlicet receptio et iudicium; receptio est principaliter ratione organi, sed iudicium ratione virtutis." Note that sense perception for Bonaventure is not merely a passion as for Aristotle but involves an act of the soul. See In II Sent., d, 25, p. 2, a. un, q. 6, concl. (II, 623a): "Actum sentiendi [i.e., iudicium] dicitur communicare anima corpori. Cf. In IV Sent., d. 50, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (IV, 1045b): "In potentia sensitiva...activa potentia est ex parte animae, passiva ex organo."

Upon this apprehension there follows (2) a judgment of the inner or common sense which determines whether the object is healthful or harmful (Cf. In IV Sent., d. 12, p. 1, dub. 1 (IV, 286); then (3) a third judgment declares why the object is desirable or not. This judgment is an action of the soul which causes the sensible species to enter the intellective faculty by purification and abstraction from
Bonaventure thus agrees with the opening arguments that conscience is in some way an innate habitus; and this by reason of the light signed upon us which shows us the good; moreover, conscience is a seed-bed (seminarium) of other acquired habitus; thus he also concedes that conscience is in some manner an acquired habitus by reason of the species of knowable objects received through the senses and with respect to particular conduct. However, time, place and motion; in this way, the species is rendered intelligible, that is, immutable, eternal, and wholly spiritual. See Itin., II, 4-6, (V, 300b-301): "Abstrahit igitur a loco, tempore et motu, ac per hoc est incommutabilis, incircumscripibilis, interminabilis et omnino spiritualis. Dilucidatio igitur est actio quae speciem sensibalem, sensibiliter per sensum acceptam, introire facit depurando et abstrahendo in potentiam intellectivam." See In II Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4, ad 4 (II, 569): "...ad nostrum intelligere concurrirt recipere et iudicare sive abstrahere et suscipere; et hi sunt plures actus ad invicem ordinati, ex quibus resultat unus actus perfectus." Accordingly, the sensible species of, say, father is rendered intelligible from an abstraction; however, the abstraction itself is caused by a judgment which comes to bear upon the sensible species. Thus, if our analysis is correct, the sensible species, father, is made intelligible through an act of judgment which produces the universal, father, and simultaneously issues in the recognition that a father ought to be honored. But what enables and directs the act of judgment in producing this twofold knowledge is the soul's naturale lumen, without which no sensible species could be rendered intelligible. See note 21 above.


28 Ibid. (II, 903b-904): "His visis, plana est responsio ad quaestionem propositam etiam ad objecta. Concede enim, quod conscientia dicit habitum quodam modo innatum, videlicet ratione illius luminis super nos signati, quod quidem ostendit nobis bona, et quod est seminarium aliorum
conscience is said to be a habitus simply innate (simpliciter innatus) with regard to things known by their essence, such as 'to love God,' and 'to fear God;' for God is not known through any similitude received through the senses ("per similitudinem a sensu acceptum"); rather, "knowledge (notitia) of God is naturally inserted in us," as Augustine says.²⁹ Nor is love or fear known by us through habituum acquirendorum; et sic currunt rationes ad primam partem inductae. Concede nihilominus, quod conscientia dicit quodam modo habitum acquisitum, videlicet ratione specierum ipsarum cognoscibilium, sicut ostendunt tres primae rationes ad secundam partem inductae. Concede etiam, quod dicit habitum quodam modo acquisitum respectu specialium operabilium, sicut tres aliae rationes ostendunt."

Upon the recognition of a primary precept such as, "Parents must be honored," how does the soul concretize it in conduct with respect to this particular father? Bonaventure explains that conscience is not confined merely to universals, but descends to the particular. See II Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4 (II, 915): "...pro eo quod ipsa conscientia non tantum consistit in universalis, immo etiam descendit ad particulare." Herein the universal father--now characterized by the immediate recognition which bears upon it, i.e., a parent must be honored--is reduced to, and conferred upon, the particular object from which the sensible species originated. For a discussion of the various applications of reductio, including that of similitudines, see In II Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, ad 8 (II, 562b); In III Sent., d. 1, a. 2, q. 3, concl. (III, 28ff); Brevil., II, 9 (V, 226).

²⁹Ibid. (II, 904a): "Si qua [sic] autem sunt cognoscibilia, quae quidem cognoscantur per sui essentiam, non per speciem, respectu talium poterit dici conscientia esse habitus simpliciter innatus, utpote respectu huius quod est Deum amare et Deum timere. Deus enim non cognoscitur per similitudinem a sensu acceptam, immo 'Dei notitia naturaliter est nobis inserta, sicut dicit Augustinus." The Quaracchi editors cite (II, 904, n. 1.) St. Damascene's Fidei Orthodoxae, I, c. 1 (PG 94, 790) as the proper source of the above quotation: "Nemo quippe mortalium est, cui non hoc ab eo naturaliter insitum sit, ut Deum esse noscamus." See also ibid., c. 3 (PG 94, 794): "Velut enim iam diximus, insitum nobis a natura est, ut Deum esse noscamus." See In I
any similitude received externally, but through their own essences (per essentiam); for affections of this kind are in the soul essentially.  

When Aristotle states that nothing is in the intellect which was not first in the senses and that all cognition has its origin in sensation, this must be understood, claims Bonaventure, with regard to things which have being (esse) in the soul through abstracted likeness ("per similitudinem abstractum"); such things are said to be in some manner written ("ad modum scripturae") in the soul; thus Aristotle rightly says that nothing is written ("nihil scriptum est") in the soul, not that the soul knows nothing, but because no picture (pictura) or abstract likeness is in the soul from

\[\text{Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. un, q. 1, ad 5: } \ldots \text{Deus est praesens ipsi animae et omni intellectui per veritatem; ideo non est necesse, ab ipso abstrahi similitudinem, per quam cognoscatur; nihilominus tamen, dum cognoscitur ab intellectu, intellectus informatur quadam notitiam, quae est velut similitudo quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa, inferior Deo, quia facit ipsam meliorem." While God and many truths are known innately, such knowledge is nonetheless occasioned by the knowledge of external things. See De Myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 1, concl. (V, 49); In I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, ad 1 and 2 (I, 75); q. 1, ad 5 (I, 69-70); In II Sent., d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 2, ad 6 (II, 124); Itin., c. 2, n. 3, (V, 300). Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, IX, c. 11, n. 16 (PL 42, 969) and ibid, VIII, c. 3, n. 4 (PL 42, 949), where he describes how the notions of God and good are known to the soul. Cf. note 74 regarding the knowledge of charity as impressed in the soul.

\[\text{30Ibid. (II, 904a): } \ldots \text{Quid autem sit amor et timor, non cognoscit homo per similitudinem exterius acceptam, sed per essentiam; huiusmodi enim affectus essentialiter sunt in anima."} \]
its origin. Thus, in affirming the innateness of conscience, St. Bonaventure closes his discussion with the words of Augustine: "God inserts in us a natural judgment (naturale iudicatorium) by which light and darkness are seen in the book of light, which is truth, because truth is naturally impressed in the human heart."

Let us summarize the above discussion. Bonaventure follows Aristotle in insisting that human knowledge is acquired inasmuch as the knowledge of sensible objects must be acquired through the senses; but he also concurs with Augustine that the soul possesses an innate light or natural judgment which enables us to know such things. Accordingly, conscience is in one sense an acquired habitus of the practical intellect with regard to the acquired knowledge of

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31 Ibid. (II, 904ab): "Ex his patet responsio ad illam quæstionem, qua quaeritur, utrum omnis cognitio sit a sensu. Dicendum est, quod non. Necessario enim oportet ponere, quod anima novit Deum et se ipsam et quae sunt in se ipsa, sine adminiculo sensuum exteriorum. Unde si aliquando dicat Philosphus [De Sensu, c. 6.], quod 'nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu' et quod 'omnis cognitio habet ortum a sensu'; intelligendum est de illis quae quidem habent esse in anima per similitudinem abstractam; et illa dicuntur esse in anima ad modum scripturae. Et propterea valde notabiliter dicit Philosophus [De Anima, III, c. 4.], quod in anima nihil scriptum est, non quia nulla sit in ea notitia, sed quia nulla est in ea pictura vel similitudo abstracta." Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, III, c. 4-8 (429a10-432a130); De Sensu, c. 6 (445b17-20).

32 Ibid. (II, 904): "Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in libro de Civitate Dei [XI, c. 27. n. 2.], 'Inseruit nobis Deus naturale iudicatorium, ubi quid sit lucis, quid tenebrarum, cogniscitur in libro lucis, qui veritas est, quia veritas in corde hominum naturaliter est impressa.'" Cf. St. Augustine, Civitate Dei, XI, c. 27, n. 2. (PL 41, 341).
sensible objects; yet, in another respect, conscience is an innate habitus by reason of the innate light of the intellect; this light suffices for knowing that a man must honor his parents upon the reception of the sensible species of mother or father; hence, conscience can be said to be both an acquired and an innate habitus; but further, conscience is simply innate with regard to things knowable by their essence such as the soul, affections of the soul, and "to love God." Such knowledge, while occasioned by cognition of sensible objects, is not obtained from the sensible species of these objects, but rather is in the soul essentially.

Although much of Bonaventure's phraseology and usage of terms are elliptical and tangential, let us attempt to distinguish relevant terms, identify a few correlations, and draw some inferences from his discussion on conscience with regard to natural law as innate.

1. For Bonaventure, to be natural is to be innate; hence both natural law and natural judgment are innate by definition; both are said to be impressed upon the human heart (see notes 10-12, 14 and 32).

2. All knowledge, whether speculative or practical, requires the presence of an innate light (lumen inditum) and some intelligible content (i.e., sensible species or non-sensible essences). Thus, all knowledge involves an innate component, namely, an innate light. This light is often
identified with natural judgment (*naturale iudicatorium*), most likely because it is the actuating principle (*id quo*) of natural judgment (see note 21). Further, this innate light is distinguished from primary precepts; the latter are apparently are the product of (a) content-determining-causes (sensible species, the soul and its affections) and (b) the innate light itself (see notes 18-19, 23).

3. The cognitive habitus are identified with the innate light (or natural judgment) which directs the soul in both *cognoscibilia* and *operabilia* (see note 21). Sometimes the innate light and natural judgment are identified with the cognitive power itself qua agent intellect and possible intellect respectively (see note 21).

4. *Lex naturalis* is equated (or at least associated) with *naturale iudicatorium* insofar as each term is held as (a) that by which conscience is innate and (b) that by which conscience knows moral principles and directs conduct (see notes 10, 11, 32).

5. If the same innate light (or natural judgment) directs both the speculative intellect and the practical intellect, and if the practical intellect is an *extension* of the speculative intellect, then first moral precepts are metaphysically and epistemologically related to first speculative principles by reason of this same innate light
6. Recall that the will and intellect are consubstantial to the soul (\textit{animae consubstantiales}) because they proceed directly (\textit{immediate}) from the soul and are reduced to the soul (see note 4). Now, since natural law directly binds the will prior to any mediation on the part of the intellect (see note 15), natural law must hold an ontological primacy over the will. Consequently, natural law must be situated at a depth of the soul which precedes the division of powers; for as the will proceeds \textit{directly} from substance (\textit{a substantia}) (see note 4 above), it follows that

\begin{quote}
\textbf{33}The epistemological and metaphysical connection between first speculative principles and practical precepts is a function of the organic unity St. Bonaventure envisions between metaphysics, epistemology, and moral philosophy. See \textit{Hex.}, I, 13 (V, 331b): "Metaphysicus enim assurgit ad illud esse considerandum in ratione principii omnia originantis.... Assurgit etiam ad considerandum illud esse in ratione ultimi finis; et in hoc convenit cum morali sive ethico, qui reducit omnia ad unum summum bonum ut ad finem ultimum considerando felicitatem sive practicam, sive speculativam.... Nam idem est principium essendi et cognoscendi." See also note 86 below. Indeed, for St. Bonaventure, epistemology is co-extensive with metaphysics inasmuch as intelligibility is possible only through being (\textit{esse}) precisely in act (\textit{in actu}). See \textit{Itin.}, V, 3 (V, 308b): "Si igitur non ens non potest intelligi nisi per ens, et ens in potentia, non nisi \textit{per ens in actu}; et \textit{esse nominat ipsum purum actum entis}: esse igitur est quod primo cedit in intellectu, et illud esse est quod est \textit{purus actus}. Sed hoc non est esse particolare, quod est esse arctatum, quia permixtum est cum potentia; nec esse analogum, quia minime habet de actu, eo quod minime est. Restat igitur, quod illud esse est esse divinum." Bonaventure's meaning of \textit{esse in actu} should not be confused, however, with St. Thomas' notion of \textit{existentia}. Regarding Bonaventure's use of the term \textit{esse}, see George Klubertanz, "\textit{Esse} and \textit{Existere} in St. Bonaventure," \textit{Medieval Studies} 8 (1946), 169-88. See Appendix D for a further account of Bonaventure's understanding of metaphysics.
\end{quote}
natural law itself must be rooted at this substantial level from which this power directly proceeds; hence, natural law must itself be consubstantial to the soul (see note 44).

7. Further, because practical reasoning is comprised of natural judgment as conjoined to the operation of the will (see notes 6, 7 and 9), the first moral precepts of practical reason thus represent a confluence of operations of powers. Hence, natural law represents an ontological and epistemological nexus between the intellect and the will at both (a) the level of reduction of powers and (b) in the combined operations of those powers respectively.

Remote Context #c

In II Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 1: "Utrum synderesis sit in genere cognitionis, vel affectio?"34

In this discussion on synderesis, Bonaventure maps out the relationships between natural and deliberative will.

34In II Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, (II, 908-911). The term synderesis, which was frequently employed in the thirteenth century, appears to be derived from St. Jerome's Commentary on Ezechiel, I. 7. Cf. S. Eusebii Hieronymi, Commentariorum in Ezechielem Prophetam, I, 7. sqq. (PL 25, 22-23). Herein, St. Jerome relates a common interpretation of the Prophet's vision of the four living creatures--man, lion, ox, and eagle--to Plato's threefold division of the soul. Above and beyond these three principles was a fourth, which the Greeks call synderesis. Cf. In II Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, quaestio incidens 2 (II, 909a). For a history of this term, see Michael Crowe, "The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics," in Irish Theological Quarterly 23 (1956), 151-64, 228-45; cf. Lottin, Odon, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, II (Gembloux-Louvain, 1942), 105-10. For parallel discussions, cf. St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 16, a. 1; q. 17, a. 2; ST I, q. 79, a. 12; I-II, q. 94, a. 1, ad 2.
cognition and affectation, synderesis and conscience—and the place and role of natural law. Let us present a summary of this discussion as follows.

Bonaventure first presents three different theories to explain the roles of synderesis, conscience, and natural law. The first and third theories are of particular concern to us. According to the first theory, synderesis is identified with the power of superior reason which is turned to God; conscience is named a habitus by which superior reason governs lower reason according to the direction of natural law. However, Bonaventure rejects this theory because synderesis, he states, is invariably inclined to the good and thus cannot be mingled with sin; but mortal sin always involves superior reason; hence, synderesis cannot

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35 What is superior reason? Bonaventure divides the functions of reason into portio superior and portio inferior rationis, which represent a distinction of dispositions of the rational soul (see footnote 6). The portio superior represents the rational soul as it is turned toward the eternal laws and divine powers; the portio inferior represents the rational soul as it is turned toward earthly and carnal things. See In II Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2, concl. (II, 564a): "...superior portio rationis et inferior, etsi aliquo modo recte condividuntur, tamen diversae potentiae non sunt--ista enim membra, videlicet superius et inferior, essentiam potentiae non variant--sed dispositiones et officia." The point at hand is that the portio superior, unlike synderesis, can be involved in sin. Not only can the judgments of superior reason be determined by the light of eternal laws or by the influence of objects through inferior reason, but also by its own natural light which has been considerably obscured by original sin. The superior reason can thus fall into sin by following its own light. Ibid., p. 2, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (II, 574a): "Et quamvis aspiciendo ad leges aeternas non peccet iudicando, tamen, secundum ea quae percipit a sensibus vel etiam secundum lumen sibi datum et innatum, potest deficere et errare, maxime in statu naturae.
be the same as superior reason. Moreover, while the superior portion of reason is said to be ordered to God, the act of synderesis regards both God and neighbor according to natural law.³⁶

lapsae." See In III Sent., d. 25, a. 1, q. 2, ad 6 (III, 541).

Within the scope of superior reason the intellect regards three degrees of being—material, spiritual, and divine. To each level, Bonaventure assigns a corresponding aspectus or field of vision. With respect to the universal rationes abstracted from space and time, the mind's aspectus is called ratio or reason. Above the corporeal world is the spiritual realm to which corresponds a second aspectus called intellectus; the intellectus is that which recognizes the mark of God imprinted upon spiritual creatures and in objects which have been spiritualized by means of abstraction. See Hex., V, 24 (V, 358a): "Intellectualis potentia est duplex: aut ut considerat universales rationes abstractas, ut abstrahit a loco, tempore et dimensione; aut ut elevatur ad substantias spirituales separata; et sic duae potentiae, scilicet, ratio et intellectus." The third aspectus through which man is destined to know God directly is called intellectus or potentia divina. See ibid, V, 24 (V, 358a) and De Regno Dei, 9. With reference to this supreme aspectus, the soul is named mens. See Itin., I, 4 (V, 297): "Secundum hunc triplicem progressum mens nostra habet tres aspectus principales. Unus est ad corporalia exteriora, secundum quem vocatur animalitas seu sensualitas; alius intra se est et in se, secundum quem dicitur spiritus; tertius supra se, secundum quem dicitur mens."


³⁶In II Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, concl. (II, 909b): "...synderesis aliis peccantibus non se immiscet. Cum enim mortale peccatum non possit esse absque actu superioris portionis quia in manducatione viri consistit consummatio peccati; si synderesis esset superior portio rationis, utique aliis peccantibus se immisceret. Praeterea, superior portio rationis dicit ordinationem ad Deum, actus autem synderesis non tantus respicit Deum, sed etiam proximum, secundum quod lex naturalis respicit utrumque." Because synderesis regards both God and creatures according to natural law, it is evident that natural law itself pertains
The third opinion, which Bonaventure accepts, is stated as follows:

Just as the intellect of the soul possesses from its creation a light or natural judgment which directs the intellect in thinking, so the will (affectus) bears a certain natural propensity (pondus) which directs its desiring. 37

What is desired is of two kinds, the noble (honesti) and the useful (commodi). Likewise, what is knowable can be distinguished either as speculative truth (speculabilium) or moral truth (moralium); and as conscience properly denotes natural judgment in its direction of moral activity, so synderesis denotes that natural propensity insofar as it inclines the will toward the noble good (bonum honestum). And as the name conscience may be taken for a power with such a habit, or vice versa, so may synderesis. 38

While distinguished from conscience, synderesis is said to be the spark of conscience (scintilla conscientiae); for as the intellect is unable to move except through the mediation of the will, so conscience itself is induced through the mediation of

to man in his relations with both God and creatures.

37 Ibid. (II, 910a): "Et propterea est tertius modus dicendi, quod quemadmodum ab ipsa creatione animae intellectus habet lumen, quod est sibi naturale iudicatorium, dirigens ipsum intellectum in cognoscendis; sic affectus habet naturale quoddam pondus, dirigens ipsum in appetendis." Bonaventure defines pondus as an orderly tendency; see Brevil., II, 4 (V, 219b): "Pondus [est] inclinatio ordinativa."

38 Ibid. (II, 910a): "Appetenda autem sunt in duplici genere: quaedam enim sunt in genere honesti, quaedam in genere commodi; sicut et cognoscibilia sunt in duplici genere: quaedam in genere speculabilium, et quaedam ex parte moralium. Et quemadmodum conscientia non nominat illud iudicatorium, nisi in quantum dirigit ad opera moralia; sic synderesis non nominat illud pondus voluntatis sive voluntatem cum illo pondere, nisi in quantum illam habet inclinare ad bonum honestum. Et quemadmodum nomen conscientiae potest accipi pro potentia cum tali habitu, vel pro habitu talis potentiae; sic etiam synderesis."
synderesis.$^{39}$

Properly speaking, synderesis is an affective power (potentiam affectivam) of the affective habitus insofar as the will is moved naturally (naturaliter) and rightly (recte) with respect to the noble good or its opposite.$^{40}$

The relationship of synderesis with conscience is also likened to that of charity with respect to faith or the affective habitus in relation to the habitus

$^{39}$Ibid., ad 3 (II, 910): "Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod synderesis est scintilla conscientiae; dicendum, quod ideo dicitur scintilla, pro eo quod conscientia, quantum est de se, non potest movere nec pungere sive stimulare nisi mediante synderesi, quae est quasi eius stimulus et igniculus. Unde sicut ratio non potest movere nisi mediante voluntate, sic nec conscientia nisi mediante synderesi." Cf. ibid., d. 39, div. text. (II, 897b); a. 1, q. 1, ad. 4 (II, 900). For a history of the term scintilla, see Michael Crowe, The Changing Profile of Natural Law (Hague: Martinus Nijoff, 1977), 127, 129.

$^{40}$Ibid., ad 4 (II, 910): "[D]icendum, quod est potentia proprie, attamen non nominat potentiam voluntatis generaliter, sed solum voluntatem, in quantum movetet naturaliter; nec adhuc universaliter, sed solummodo respectu boni honesti, vel eius oppositi. Nihilominus potest etiam dicere habitum; sed ille non debet dici nec virtus et vitium proprie respicient liberum arbitrium et voluntatem, in quantum est deliberativa, non in quantum est naturalis." Ibid., ad 2. quaestionem incidentem (II, 911b): "Synderesis autem nominat potentiam affectivam, secundum quod movetur naturaliter et recte; et ideo non distinguitur ab illis potentissi secundum essentiam potentiae, sed secundum modum movendi; et quia secundum illum modum movendi semper movet recte: hinc est, quod dicitur super alias volare et aliis errantibus non se immiscere, sed eas corrigere."

St. Bonaventure sometimes states that the natural appetite is invariably inclined toward beatitudinem (In II Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a 2, concl. (II, 566b), toward the bonum honestum (ibid., II 566a), or toward the good in generali (In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, q. 2, concl. (IV, 1003b). However, the present passage makes clear that, properly speaking, the natural appetite is oriented to the bonum honestum as opposed to good quodcumque. Cf. In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, q. 2, fund. 2 (IV, 1003-4).
of the practical intellect.⁴¹

Having arranged conscience and synderesis as correlative habitus and powers of intellect and will, St. Bonaventure then characterizes their relationship with natural law as follows:

Natural law bears upon both synderesis and conscience and may be understood in two ways: first, as a habitus in the soul, natural law is that by which we are instructed in truth and rightly ordered to good. Enclosing both will and intellect, it thus encompasses (comprehendit) synderesis and conscience; hence it is spoken of as a habitus.⁴²

In a second way, natural law refers to a collection of natural law precepts ("collectio praecptorum iuris naturalis"); as such, natural law is the object (objepectum) of both conscience and synderesis whereby the one dictates and the other inclines toward what is right; for conscience dictates and synderesis desires or avoids.⁴³

Although natural law may be taken in both ways, this second mode is more precise; for, properly speaking, synderesis is called an affective power insofar as it is the natural ability of the will to incline

⁴¹Ibid., concl. (II, 911a): "...dicendum, quod sic se habet synderesis ad conscientiam, sicut se habet caritas ad fidem, vel habitus ipsius affectus ad habitus intellectus practici, secundum quod est habitus."

⁴²Ibid. (II, 911a): "Lex autem naturalis communiter se habet ad utrumque, videlicet ad synderesim et ad conscientiam. Nam lex naturalis duplicitur accipi potest: uno modo, prout dicit habitum in anima; et sic quia per legem naturalem instruirum et per legem naturalem recte ordinamur, dicit habitum, qui comprehendit intellectum et affectum, et ita comprehendet synderesim et conscientiam."

⁴³Ibid. (II, 911a): "Alio modo lex naturalis vocatur collectio praecptorum iuris naturalis; et sic nominat objepectum synderesis et conscientiae, unius sicut dictantis, et alterius sicut inclinantis. Nam conscientia dictat, et synderesis appetit vel refugit."
toward the good; conscience is the habitus of the practical intellect, but natural law is the object of both synderesis and conscience.\textsuperscript{44}

To summarize, Bonaventure sets up a fairly symmetrical correspondance between truth and goodness, intellect and will, conscience and synderesis; but it is natural law which holds common ground between each set of complementary terms. Disposing the soul in \textit{moralia} and orienting it to the \textit{bonum honestum}, the natural law habitus is that by which the soul is instructed in truth and is rightly ordered to good;

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid. (II, 91lab): "Et utroque istorum modorum inventur lex naturalis in diversis locis; hoc tamen ultimo modo accipitur magis proprie. Et sic, ut proprie loquamus, synderesis dicit potentiam affectivam, in quantum naturaliter habilis est ad bonum et ad bonum tendit; conscientia vero dicit habitum intellectus practici; lex vero naturalis dicit objectum utriusque.

The distinction and connection between natural law and natural judgment is now apparent. While conscience (qua habitus) properly denotes natural judgment in its direction of moral activity (see footnote 38), natural law is that which directs conscience (see footnote 42 and 43). \textit{Iudicium} in itself implies for Bonaventure an act of reason which is regulated by a norm of truth or higher law. See II Sent., d. 25, p. 1, dub. 1 (II, 607a): "Iudicium importat actum rationis regulatum secundum regulas veritatis sive supernae legis." Evidently, then, natural law is itself the norm of truth which regulates (the habitus and, consequently, the act of) natural judgment.

Since natural judgment, as Augustine holds, directs the soul in judging both speculative truths and practical truths (see note 21), and since natural judgment is itself regulated by a norm of truth or higher law, it follows that speculative and practical reason are at root regulated by one and the same natural law. Further, since practical reason is speculative reason as conjoined to the will (see notes 6 and 7), and the will itself is naturally bound to natural law (see note 15), both intellect and will are at root regulated by one and the same natural law (see note 33).
natural law is thus distinguished from the *naturale pondus* of synderesis and the *naturale iudicatorium* of conscience inasmuch as it is the underlying habitus which encompasses (*comprehendit*) both synderesis and conscience.\(^{45}\)

\(^{45}\) What does Bonaventure mean in stating (see note 42) that natural law "*comprehendit* intellectum et affectum, et *ita comprehendit* synderesim et conscientiam?" Consider his definition of *mens*: "Mens dupliciter accipitur: aliquando communiter, et sic *comprehendit* memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem...." *In II Sent.*, d. 25 p. 1, a. un., q. 2, concl. (II, 596a). "Secundum hunc triplicem progressum, mens nostra tres habet aspectus principales: unus est ad corporalia exteriora, secundum quem vocatur animalitas seu sensualitas; alius intra se et in se, secundum quem dicitur spiritus; tertius est supra se, secundum quem dicitur *mens*. Ex quibus omnibus disponere se debet ad conscendendum in Deum, ut ipsum diligat ex tota mente, ex toto corde et ex tota anima, in quo consistit perfecta Legis observatio et simul cum hoc sapientia Christiana." *Itin.*, I, 4 (V, 297a). On this point, P. L. Landsberg comments: "La notion de *mens* dans ce sens et l'identification permanente du *mens* avec une vue de l'esprit (*oculi mentis*, *acies mentis*, etc.) est d'origine augustinienne.... Ici, chez Bonaventure, vers l'au-delà, vers le spirituel, les idées, la vérité pure, c'est-à-dire vers Dieu, Le Logos, Le Christ, qui est le centre de la doctrine bonaventurienne. Dans sa triple distinction, il ne s'agit pas de facultés différentes, inhérentes à une substance stable de l'âme, il s'agit de possibilités dynamiques de l'existence implicite de directions cognitives." "La philosophie d'une expérience mystique: *L'Itinerarium*," *La Vie Spirituelle* LI (1937), 77.

We take Bonaventure to mean that *mens* is pre-eminent over its co-essential faculties, constituting them in a unity of operation towards God. This orientation of mind towards God appears to be tantamount to natural law itself. Thus, as it comprehends (*comprehendit*) the intellect and will--indeed, the mind, heart, and soul of man--natural law likewise holds primacy over the soul and its faculties, unifying the soul by way of orientation to God. Here, the notion of ordination seems implicit in Bonaventure's use of the verb *comprehendit*; that is, in encompassing (*comprehendit*) the intellect and will, natural law binds these powers (see note 15) and so orders them to God. So ordered, the will and intellect are endowed with a facile ability for God. For this reason natural law is understood by Bonaventure as a *habitus* (see note 42). See note 72 with regard to the *rectitude* of operations by which the soul
More properly, however, natural law refers to a collection of natural law precepts ("collectio praeceptorum iuris naturalis") insofar as it is the directing object (obiectum) of both conscience and synderesis whereby the former dictates and the latter inclines towards what is right.

In what way, then, is natural law innate? Taken as a habitus, natural law encompasses (comprehendit) both the intellect and the will--and, consequently, conscience and synderesis (see note 42). In this respect, natural law preceeds the distinction of operative powers in the ground of consubstantiality (see note 4); as such, natural law is evidently intrinsic to the nature of man (see notes 33 and 42).

Taken as a collectio praeceptorum, natural law follows upon the operative confluence of the intellect and will in practical reasoning. Thus, natural law precepts are the products of several factors--namely, the combined operations of the intellect and will, and various content-determining causes of knowledge (both innate essences and acquired species; see notes 23, 26-27, and 30). Further, inasmuch as they are the objects of both synderesis and conscience (see note 43 above), natural law precepts represent for Bonaventure a psychological common ground between moral truth and goodness.

attains its ultimate end.
Proximate Context

Peter Lombard’s Sent., IV, d. 49, c. 1, notes 3-7: "Si omnes homines volunt esse beati." 46

Our key-text below, "Utrum omnes appetant beatitudinem veram," is initiated by, and corresponds to, Peter Lombard’s treatment of the same question. Let us look, then, at the problem Lombard puts forward and which Bonaventure will take over. On this question Lombard, citing exclusively from Augustine’s De Trinitate, 47 puts forward the following two premises: first, the will to possess the blessed life (beatitudo) is common to all; secondly, since one can only love what one knows and blessedness is loved by all, it follows that blessedness is known by everyone.

However, two difficulties challenge these claims: first, the diversity of wills concerning the blessed life indicates that not all know it; for if all knew blessedness, it would not be considered by some to consist in the goodness of the soul, by others in bodily pleasures, or still others in both, etc; secondly, if the blessed life means living according to goodness of soul, it follows that not everyone wills to live the blessed life since many do not will to live life in such a manner. Nevertheless, it


47 St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XIII, c. 4, n. 7, (PL 42, 1018); ibid., c. 5, n. 8 (PL, 1019-20).
must be held that all will to be blessed; hence these unavoidable contradictions.\footnote{Lombard, \textit{Sent.} IV, d 49, c. 1, n. 4 (II, 549): "De hoc Augustinus in libro XIII \textit{De Trinitate} ita disserit [c. 4, n. 7]: 'Mirum est, cum capessendae retinendaeque beatitudinis voluntas una sit omnium, unde tanta existat de ipsa beatitudine rursus diversitas voluntatum: non quod eam aliquis nolit, sed quod non omnes eam norint. Si enim omnes eam nossent, non ab aliis putaretur esse in virtute animi, ab aliis in voluptate corporis, ab aliis atque aliis alibi atque alibi. Quomodo ergo omnes amant quod non omnes sciunt? Quis potest amare quod nescit? sicut supra disputavi [\textit{De Trinitate} III, d. 24, cc. 4-5]. Cur ergo beatitudine amatur ab omnibus, nec tamen scitur ab omnibus?'" Ibid., n. 5 (II, 549): "Augustinus: 'An forte falsum est quod pro vero posuimus, beate vivere omnes homines velle? Si enim beate vivere est, verbi gratia, secundum animi virtutem vivere, quomodo beate vivere vult, qui hoc non vult?.... Non igitur omnes beate vivere volunt, immo pauci hoc volunt, si non est beate vivere, nisi secundum virtutem animi vivere: quod multi nolunt.... An dicendum est, etiam si nihil sit alius beate vivere quam secundum virtutem animi vivere, tamen et qui hoc non vult, beate vivere vult? Nimis quidem hoc videtur absurdum. Tale est enim ac si dicamus: Qui non vult beate vivere, beate vult vivere. Istam repugnantiam quis audiat, quis ferat? Et tamen ad hanc contradit necessitas, si et omnes beate vivere velle verum est, et non omnes sic volunt vivere, quomodo solum vivitur beate.'"}

Further, to say that all are blessed who simply live as they please is false; rather, one is made wretched by a bad will and becomes even more miserable when the desire of bad will is satisfied. Indeed it is true, Augustine insists, that all men will to be blessed, and all will this one thing and will other things for its sake; and since no one can love what he is wholly ignorant of, nor be ignorant of what it is that he knows he wills, it follows that all men know the blessed life. But those who do not have what they will or have what they do not rightly will are miserable. Thus
only the man who has what he wills and wills nothing wrongly is blessed.⁴⁹

Peter Lombard’s discussion of this particular question goes no further than the remarks of Augustine offered above; and so the question remains how to reconcile the position that all men will, and somehow know, the blessed life, with the obvious facts which seem to prove the contrary. It is in view of such difficulties that Bonaventure takes up the problems related to knowing and desiring the true good; and it is here that his own response will shed further light on his doctrine of natural law as innate.

⁴⁹Ibid., c. 1, n. 6 (II, 550): "'An illud ab his angustiis nos poterit eruere, si dicamus nihil esse beate vivere secundum delectationem suam, et ideo falsum non esse quod omnes beate vivere velint, quia omnes ita volunt ut quemque delectat?—Sed id quidem falsum. Velle enim quod non deceat, est esse miserrimum; nec tam miserum est non adipisci quod velis, quam adipisci velle quod non oportet. Quis ita sit caecus ut dicat aliquem ideo beatum, quia vivit ut vult, cum profecto etsi miser esset, minus tamen esset, si nihil eorum quae perperam voluisset, habere potuisset? Mala enim voluntate vel sola miser quisque efficitur; sed miserior cum desiderium malae voluntatis impletur.'" Ibid., n. 7 (II, 550): "'Quapropter, quoniam verum est quod omnes homines esse beati velint, idque ardentissimo amore appetant, et propter hoc cetera quaecumque appetunt; nec quisquam potest amare quod omnino quid vel quale sit nescit, nec potest nescire quid sit quod se velle scit, sequitur ut omnes beatam vitam scient. Omnes autem beati habent quod volunt, quamvis non omnes qui habent quod volunt, continuo sint beati. Continuo autem miseri sunt, qui vel non habent quod volunt, vel id habent quod non recte volunt.'"
II. Key-Text A

In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. un., q. 2: "Qualiter beatitudo sit appetibilis" and "Utrum omnes appetant beatudinem veram."\(^{50}\)

In treating the two-fold question put forward in the key-text, Bonaventure offers three introductory statements which (1) affirm the universal desire for the true good and to some extent (2) characterize the nature of beatitudo itself. All three statements bear on natural law and thus set the immediate focus for and support of Bonaventure's own conclusion and commentary:

According to Boethius, 'Inserted in the mind of man is the desire for the true good;' but the true good is that which effects our true happiness; therefore all desire true happiness.\(^{51}\)

Building on Boethius' assertion that the desire for true happiness is implanted in the mind of man, Bonaventure further states that man desires beatitude by a natural

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\(^{50}\) In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. un, q. 2 (IV, 1002-04). For parallel discussions, cf. St. Thomas, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 3; Summa I-II, q. 5, a. 8.

\(^{51}\) In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. un, q. 2, fundamenta 1 (IV, 1002): "Boethius: 'Inserta est mentibus hominum veri boni cupiditas;' sed verum bonum est quod nos beatos vere efficit: ergo omnes appetunt beatudinem veram." The words Bonaventure attributes to Boethius are not the same as those of De Consolatione Philosophiae, III, prosa 2, (PL 63, 724): "Est enim mentibus hominum veri boni naturaliter inserita cupiditas." The meaning is essentially the same, however.
appetite which is lasting and common to all.\textsuperscript{52}

The second introductory statement indicates something of the nature of the true good according to which we naturally and rightly desire it:

The Philosopher states that 'everyone desires the good,' now either they desire any good whatsoever or the good which suffices. Such good cannot be of any [insufficient] sort, otherwise one's desires would never be sated; hence it must be the sufficient good which all desire. But no good suffices to fill the human soul except the true good; thus all men desire the true good\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{52}Ibid., fund. 3 (IV, 1002): "Ergo appetit appetitu naturali. Sed naturalis appetitus est communis omnibus et perpetuus: ergo si talis est appetitus beatitudinis, patet, etc." See note 66 below regarding the constancy of the natural appetite.

\textsuperscript{53}In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. un, q. 2, fund. 2 (IV, 1002-03): "Item, Philosophus dicit, quod 'omnia bonum exoptant;' aut ergo exoptant bonum quodcunque, aut bonum quod sufficit. Non quodcunque, quia si quodcunque, tunc processus est in infinitum: constat ergo, quod bonum, quod sufficit. Sed nullum bonum est sufficiens implere animam nisi beatitudo vera: ergo omnes homines appetunt beatitudinem veram." See Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, I, c. 1 (1094a): "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." From The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 935. While Aristotle speaks of a multiplicity of goods, he nevertheless echoes Plato in acknowledging a supreme good [end] to which all other goods [ends] are subordinate: See ibid., I, c. 2 (1094a18): "If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good." McKeon, Basic Works, 935. Cf. Plato's Republic, X (618c-d). On this score, Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle are outside the tradition of Western philosophical thought; see our Introduction, note 48.
The third introductory statement forms the undisputed premise of the second *sed contra* position which further indicates the nature of the true good:

Sin [according to Augustine] consists in hating the immutable Good and adhering to what is mutable; but beatitude is the immutable Good.\(^{54}\)

Here, then, are revealed two aspects of the true good which distinguish it from every other good—namely, sufficiency and immutability. Recall in this connection that the will is bound by natural law (see note 15), and is moved naturally and rightly with respect to the noble good according to natural law (see notes 39 and 42). Evidently, then, it is according to the distinction and relation between the true good and other goods\(^{55}\) that natural law

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\(^{54}\) *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, p. 1, a. un, q. 2, contra 2 (IV, 1003): "Item, 'peccatum est, spreto Bono incommutabili, rebus commutabilibus adhaerere;' sed beatitudo est Bonum incommutabile...." See St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, II, c. 19, n. 53 (PL 32, 1269): "Voluntas ergo adhaerens communi atque incommutabili bono, impetrat prima et magna hominis bona, cum ipsa sit medium quoddam bonum. Voluntas autem aversa ab incommutabili et communi bono, et conversa ad proprium bonum, aut ad exterius, aut ad inferius, peccat. Ad proprium convertitur, cum suae potestatis vult esse; ad exterius, cum allorum privia, vel quaecumque ad se non pertinet, cognoscere studet; ad inferius, cum voluptatem corporis diligit.... Ita fit ut neque illa bona quae a peccantibus appetuntur, ullo modo mala sint, neque ipsa voluntas libera, quam in bonis quibusdam mediis numerandam esse comperimus; sed malum sit aversio ejus ab incommutabili bono, et conversio ad mutabilia bona."

\(^{55}\) See *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, p. 1, a. un, q. 2, contra 3 (IV, 1003): "Item, beatitudo aut appetitur propter se, aut propter aluid. Si propter aluid: ergo non appetitur ut beatitudo, quia omni, a quo appetitur, propter se...."
rightly orders the will; hence, an intimate relationship obtains between the soul's natural appetite, the true good, and natural law. Let us see what Bonaventure's concluding discussion further reveals on this relationship:

Respondeo:

[1] It must be said that there are two factors which comprise appetite, namely, conformity and need. Therefore, because the rational soul (a) has been created in the image and likeness of God, (b) has been made capable of the most sufficient good, and (c) does not suffice for itself since it is empty and in want, it naturally seeks true happiness.

Dicendum quod duo sunt quae faciunt appetitum, scilicet convenientia et indigentia. Quoniam igitur anima rationalis creatae est ad Dei imaginem et similitudinem and facta est capax boni sufficientissimi; et ipsa sibi non sufficit cum sit vana et deficiens; ideo dico, quod veram beatitudinem appetit naturaliter.

Bonaventure next makes several distinctions necessary to locate natural law with respect to knowledge (cognitio) and love (amor) and to explain its significance precisely as innate:

[2] ...just as there is in us a twofold love, natural and deliberative, so similarly there is a twofold knowledge: thus, just as deliberative knowledge precedes deliberative love, so natural knowledge precedes a natural love.

56See In II Sent., d. 16, a. 2, q. 2, fund. 1 (II, 403a): "Creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam, masculum et feminam creavit illos; si igitur mulier creatae est imaginem Dei et ad aequalitatem viri...videtur ergo, quod in viro et muliere reperiatur ratio imaginis." Cf. In I Sent., d. 1, a. 3, q. 2.
...sicut in nobis est duplex amor, naturalis et deliberativus; sic similiter et duplex cognitio: ergo sicut deliberativa cognitio deliberativum amorem praecedit, sic naturalis naturalem.

[3] Accordingly, just as there is a double inclination toward good, namely generally and specifically, so also there is a double appetite.57 And the precept concerning the general good comes from natural cognition and here there is no error; but the precept concerning this or that particular good is not wholly from a natural habitus, but through our assumption made by deliberating reason; and concerning this error arises. It must likewise be understood with regard to the appetite. Therefore everyone has the general knowledge of, and desire for, true happiness. For everyone believes that happiness is the good which fills the soul, and all people seek that.

57 It is not clear what distinguishes instinctus from appetitus. One might suppose that instinctus commonly signifies the tendency or impulse proper to any creature while appetitus specifically signifies an impulse as characterized by desire proper to a sensitive or rational creature; but Bonaventure does not make any such a clarification and, in fact, uses these terms rather loosely; he does, however, distinguish appetitus according to (1) natural necessity, (2) sensual impetuosity, and (3) rational liberty. Self-movement is most proper to rational liberty, less proper to sensual impetuosity, and improper to natural necessity. See In II Sent., d. 38, a. 2, q. 2 concl. (II, 891a). In any case, Bonaventure explains that a thing moves according to its appetite which follows from a certain indigence that characterizes its form. See In II Sent., d. 14, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2, contra 5 (II 348a): "Item, omne quod movetur propria forma, movetur propter proprium indigentiam; natura enim formae non movet nisi propter appetitum rei, qua naturaliter indiget." Moreover, appetite not only characterizes the natural indigence of a creature but also specifies its fulfilling object. See In II Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4, ad 4 (II, 567b): "...et appetitus, ibi distinguitor naturalis potentia a rationali non solum quantum ad modum appetendi sed etiam quantum ad appetibile; et penes hoc contingit diversas differentias potentiarum accipere." Appetitus thus bears a double significance (1) by revealing the indigent nature of a creature (indigentia), and (2) by indicating its proper object or end (convenientia).
Et propterea dicendum, quod sicut duplex est instinctus ad bonum, scilicet in generali et in speciali; sic et duplex appetitus. Et dictamen boni in generali venit a cognitione naturali, et quantum ad hoc non est error; sed dictamen in speciali illius vel illius non est omnino ab habitu naturali, sed per assumptionem actum a ratione deliberante, et circa hoc est error. Similiter et de appetitu intelligendum. Omnes ergo habent appetitum beatitudinis verae in generali et habent cognitionem in generali. Omnes enim credunt, quod beatitudo sit bonum quod sufficit, et omnes istud appetunt.

Through these distinctions Bonaventure illustrates how someone who naturally desires true happiness may falsely assume honor or money to be the object of that happiness.\textsuperscript{58} He then explains the nature of this general knowledge of happiness:

[4] If you ask how he knows in general, I answer that such type of knowledge is innate;\textsuperscript{59} and if you

\textsuperscript{58}In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1 a. un., q. 2, concl. ad 1-3 (IV, 1003b): "In speciali vero, quando, assumit: hoc sufficit, scilicet honor, vel pecunia, errat cognition, et declinat affectio. Et est simile de eo qui vult emere aurum et credit, hoc frustum aurichalci esse aurum, et frustum auri credit esse aurichalcum.... Similiter, si ab avaro quaeras, utrum appetat beatitudinem veram et velit habere; respondebit, quod sic. Si quaeras, quid velit, utrum paradisum vel denarium; respondebit: denarium. Et huic ratio est, quia hic credit sufficientiam, ibi non."

\textsuperscript{59}See St. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, II, c. 9, n. 26 (PL, 32, 1254): "...ergo antequam beati simus, mentibus tamen nostris impressa est notio beatitatis [read: beatitudinis]; per hanc enim scimus, fiderentque, et sine ulla dubitatione diciamus, beatos nos esse velle." Ibid., I, c. 6, n. 15 (PL 32, 1229): "Ut igitur breviter aeternae legis notionem, quae impressa nobis est, quantum valeo verbis explicem, ea est qua justum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima;" See also De Trinitate, VIII, c. 3, n. 4 (PL 42, 949), regarding the notion of the good as impressed within us.
ask, "through what?" I will say that he knows what is sufficient through what he needs. If you object that privation is not a way of knowing a habitus, it must be said that there is one indigence which is wholly a privation, and another which is a disposing and inclining towards certain things; and this is the way of knowing. Whence if matter necessarily had the power of knowing, it would at least know the form to which it is inclined and disposed; thus the soul knows what suffices it through its own lack.

Si quaeras: quomodo cognovit in generali? dico, quod sufficientiam cognoscit per indigentiam. Si opponas, quod privatio non est via cognoscendi habitum; dicendum, quod est quaedam indigentia omnino privans, quaedam disponens et inclinans; et haec est ratio cognoscendi. Unde si materia necessario haberet potentiam cognoscendi, cognosceret utique formam, ad quam inclinatur et disponitur; sic anima sufficientiam per suam indigentiam.

[5] In the same way, we can say that knowledge of beatitude and of many natural things, such as the reckoning of natural law, is innate in us, and if the soul should be said to have been created "as

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60 As the context indicates, habitum appears to signify a condition of being precisely as a capacity for completion. See footnote 8. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, I, c. 5 (411a2-5): "One element in each pair of contraries will suffice to enable it to know both that element itself and its contrary." McKeon, Basic Works, 552.

61 Such an indigence issues in a corresponding kind of appetite. See In II Sent., d. 12, a. 1, q. 3, ad 6 (II, 301b): "...dicendum, quod appetitus non semper sequitur formam completam, sed etiam attenditur secundum appetentis indigentiam et aliquam dispositionem semiplenam." See note 57 regarding the significance of appetitus.

62 For Aristotle's example of matter as disposed toward its form, see Physics, I, c. 9 (192a17-22). Cf. St. Anselm, Cur Deus homo, I, c. 24 (PL 158, 397): "Beatitudo est sufficientia, in qua nulla est indigentia."

63 Cf. Itin., II, 3 (V, 300); St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XII, c. 15. n. 24 (PL 42, 1011).
Let us briefly summarize the discussion up to now and identify a few key points with respect to natural law. Appetitus is a determinate tendency or inclination which follows from the indigence and conformity of a creature’s form for its fulfilling object (see notes 57 and 61). Hence, the soul of a rational creature possesses a natural desire for its fulfilling object (true happiness) according to the convenientia and indigentia of its natural form qua imago Dei. Now, inasmuch as the knowledge of a thing’s indigence is a way of knowing the fulfilling object of that thing, so man has knowledge of his fulfilling object through knowledge of his indigent nature; and to the extent that knowledge of his own indigent nature is innate, it follows that knowledge of his fulfilling object is innate. Simply put, man has an

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64See Aristotle, De Anima, III, c. 4 (430a).

65In I Sent., d. 17. p. 1. a. un, q. 4 (I, 301-302). See note 74 for a citation of this passage.
innate knowledge of his end (the true good) through the
innate knowledge of his indigent nature which is disposed
and inclined toward that end; for this reason, knowledge of
natural law is said to be innate.

Since the natural appetite for the general good is
determined by (the indigence of) human nature itself, and
the knowledge of the general good is inferred according to
the knowledge of that indigent nature, there can be no error
in either the natural desire or in knowledge of the general
good. Hence, the intellect and will bear a natural
orientation for the general good—simply by virtue of the
human form as *imago Dei*.  

In light of the above account, how can we understand
the nature and role of natural law as *habitus* and as a
*collectio praeceptorum*? Insofar as man has knowledge of his
fulfilling end according to the knowledge of his own natural
appetite for the end (as determined by his own indigent
nature), then natural law qua *habitus* corresponds or
correlates in some way with the rational form of man as

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66See section [3] above. With regard to the absence of
error in the natural appetite, Bonaventure cites Aristotle
as follows: "Quod naturale est non assuescit in contrarium." See *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, p. 1, a. un, q. 2 contra 2 (IV,
(1103a20): "For nothing that exists by nature can form a
habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which
by nature moves downward cannot be habituated to move
upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up
ten thousand times; nor can anything else that by nature
behaves in one way be trained to behave in another." McKeon,
*Basic Works*, 952.
characterized by *convenientia* and *indigentia*; as such natural law is innate.

Note that natural law as a *precept* concerning the general good is not knowledge simply, but something that follows upon natural cognition ("dictamen boni in generali venit a cognitione naturali"); this precept subsequently serves as the directing object of both synderesis and conscience (see note 43). Accordingly, one can see the ontological and epistemological connection between the indigent nature of man, the consubstantial habitus of natural law, the natural inclination for the true good, and the natural law dictate, "God must be obeyed," which comes from that underlying natural law habitus (see notes 22, 29-30).

Let us summarize a few important points in light of the above discussion.

1. Inasmuch as (a) natural law is said to bind and rightly order the will towards the general good (see notes 15, 39 and 42), and (b) man's natural inclination follows from and according to his indigent nature (see [3] and [4] above), it appears that natural law qua habitus corresponds with human nature itself, as marked by its capacity and need for God (see [1] above); as such natural law is innate.

2. Knowledge of natural law is innate inasmuch as knowledge of man's true good is innate (see [5] above); in turn, knowledge of man's true good is innate inasmuch as
knowledge of man's own indigent nature is innate.

3. To the extent that natural law precepts are rooted in the knowledge of a habitus which is proper to the nature of man, there is an evident correspondence between human nature, natural inclination, the natural law habitus, and natural law precepts.

III. Commentary

Let us begin our commentary with a closer look at natural law qua habitus and follow with a consideration of natural law as associated with truth, light, and perfection. From this study we hope to further illumine the relationship between human nature, natural law, and the true good.

Natural Law qua Habitus

With regard to habitus itself, Bonaventure distinguishes three different modes of habitus--namely, by acquisition (acquisitione), by innate disposition (innata dispositione), and by natural origin (naturale origine). Since a habitus is that by which a power is endowed with a facile ability to act, a power is facilitated in its action by these three modes. For example, the affective power (see note 15) possesses the ability for (1) loving some good through an acquired disposition, as through a virtue; for (2) loving one's proper good through a innate disposition;
and (3) for loving one’s self by natural origin.  

To which modality does the natural law habitus correspond? Recall that the will and intellect are consubstantial to the soul (animae consubstantiales) because they proceed directly (immediate) from the soul and are reduced to the soul (see note 4). Since natural law encompasses and directs both intellect and will (see note 46), it holds an ontological primacy over these powers. Rooted at this substantial level from which these powers directly proceed, natural law is itself consubstantial to the soul (see notes 33, 44). With regard to the modality of habitus, then, natural law is clearly an innate habitus per naturalem originem.

Next, as natural law knowledge regards both God and creatures (see note 36), and natural law precepts direct the naturale iudicatorium and incline the naturale pondus towards the soul’s proper good, it follows that natural law, taken precisely as knowledge and precept, is also an innate habitus per innatam dispositionem.

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67 In I Sent., d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1 ad 1 (I, 89b): "...dicendum quod triplex est habitus. Quemdam enim habitum habet animae potentia ab acquisitione, quemdam ab innata dispositione, tertium habet a sui ipsius origine. Hoc autem patet, quia habitus est quo potentia facilis est in actum; potentia autem his tribus modis est facilis, verbi gratia, affectus noster habet facilitatem ad diligendum bonum alienum per acquisitam dispositionem, ut per virtutem; ad diligendum vero bonum suum per innatam dispositionem; et ad diligendum se ipsum per sui naturalem originem." The term affectus as used here appears to signify the operative power of the soul and not merely an emotional state. Cf. note 15.
Finally, as the operation of intellect and will are necessary for the perfection of the soul (see notes 4, 9, and 49), and natural law encompasses and rightly orders the intellect and will in their operations (see notes 42 and 43), it follows that natural law is a habitus per acquisitam dispositionem in the order of action or perfection.\(^{68}\)

Bonaventure also distinguishes three modes of habitus

\(^{68}\)The terms operatio and perfectio both denote a state of action which characterizes this third likely mode of natural law; but more precisely, the term operatio signifies the movement of the operative powers themselves. Through their own proper activity—according to the norm of natural law—these powers are perfected; and through the perfecting actuation of these faculties, the perfection of the soul is attained (cf. notes 4 and 9). See In II Sent., d. 33, a. un, q. 5, ad 4 (III, 724): "Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum una operatio, an plures perducant ad virtutis completionem; dicendum, quod plures, quia non ex una operatione generatur habitus, sed ex multis." In II Sent., d. 4, dub. 3, resp. (II 143a): "Dicendum, quod perfectum dicit complementum sive completionem, in qua est status." In I Sent., d. 17, p. 2, a. un, q. 4, concl. (I, 317a): "Sed notandum quod quantitas virtutis perfecta est dupliciter: vel simpliciter, vel generis. Simpliciter perfecta est in summno et simplicissimo, ut in Deo; in generi vero omnibus, qui pertingunt ad actum completum, ad quem sunt, et hoc est diligere Deum ex toto corde et ex tota anima et ex tota virtute." Man's perfection thus consists in loving God with one's whole heart, soul and power. Cf. Itin., I, 4 (V, 297) where Bonaventure speaks of loving God with one's whole mind: "ex tota mente, ex toto corde et ex tota anima, in quo consistit perfecta Legis observatio et simul cum hoc sapientia Christiana." See note 46. As human conduct is guided by conscience ("...dirigit ad opera moralia;" see note 38), and conscience is regulated by natural law, we may say that natural law is concretized in such conduct (opus). Further, the soul is said to be the perfecting act and entelechy of the body (see note 2). Hence, by way of the soul, natural law is implicated in the perfection of the human compositum. In sum, natural law is clearly at work in the operation and perfection of the soul's faculties—and consequently in the perfection of the soul itself. Let us see if further texts confirm the role of natural law in the perfection of the human compositum.
in a slightly different but correlative manner with regard to the powers of the soul. The first type of habitus is that by which a power is made easily capable of an act by reason of its own nature; such a habitus differs from its power only by a distinction of reason.

The second kind of habitus is that according to which a power is given a certain facility which is added to its nature, but is nevertheless proper to it; for example, the intellect as such does not know geometrical figures, but is capable of adding the accident of geometrical knowledge to itself; this habitus of knowledge is added to the intellect and thus is really distinct from it.

The third mode of habitus pertains to an operative power with the facility for its own natural action as conjoined in operation with another power; such is the habitus of free choice which adds nothing to the essence of the soul or to the rational power, but only gives the intellect a conjunction with the will.69

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69 In *II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 1, a. un, q. 5, concl. (II, 603b): "Quaedam namque potentia respectu alicuius actus est facilis per se ipsam, ut patet, cum dicitur mens esse nata ad meminendum sui ipsius vel intelligendum se; et tunc talis habitus non differt a potentia secundum rem, sed secundum rationem et modum dicendi.... Quaedam est potentia, quae respectu alicuius actus est habilis per aliquid sui sicut potentia intellectiva ad cognitionem figurarum geometricarum non est habilis per se ipsam, sed potius per aliquod accidens quod habet esse in ea; et tunc habitus talis addit supra potentiam, non solum secundum rationem, sed etiam secundum essentiam et rem. Aliqua vero potentia facilis est ad aliquem actum per se ipsam, non tamen sola, sed cum alia; et sic potentia rationalis sine aliquo habitu superaddito ex sola coniunctione sui cum appetitu nata est in actum.
How do the habitus of natural law per naturalem originem, per innatam dispositionem, and per acquisitam dispositionem correlate to this second set of distinctions? Natural law as an innate habitus per naturalem originem appears to correspond with the first instance whereby a power is capable of an act by reason of its own nature; in this case, natural law differs from the powers it encompasses and directs only by a distinction of reason (see note 45).

Natural law as an innate habitus per innatam dispositionem correlates with the second case in which a power is capable of an act which is added to its nature, but is nonetheless proper to it. As the science of geometry is at once really distinct from the intellect and yet proper to it, so we may say that natural law as knowledge and precept is added to the intellect but is nevertheless proper to it. 70

70 Although Bonaventure has distinguished natural law qua habitus from natural law qua collectio preceptorum (see notes 42 and 43), it is now evident that natural law
Finally, natural law as a habitus *per acquisitam dispositionem* corresponds with the third distinction whereby a power capable of an act is conjoined with another power for its *operation*; such is the habitus of free choice.\(^{71}\)

Since free choice represents the conjunction of intellect and will, and both these powers are encompassed and rightly precepts themselves represent a mode of habitus—namely, the habitus of *innate disposition*. On this point, see note 28 regarding conscience as a *seminarium* of other acquired habitus.

\(^{71}\)Free choice is defined by Bonaventure as a habitus of reason and will (see note 96 below); more precisely, it is a conjunction of the rational and appetitive habitus. See *In II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 1, a. 1. q. 2 (II, 601b): "Quoniam igitur liberum arbitrium secundem proprium suam assignationem facultas rationis et voluntatis esse dicitur, hinc est quod liberum arbitrium principaliter dicit habitum et complectitur rationem et voluntatem, non tamquam una potentia ex eis constituta, sed tamquam unus habitus, quidem recte dicitur facultas et dominium, qui consurgit ex conjunctione utriusque et potens est super actus utriusque potentiae, per se et in se consideratae, sicut arbitraria potestas in duabus personis regimen habet super actus utriusque in se consideratae." Note that the operation of free choice presupposes the actuation of the operative powers of intellect and will. See *In II Sent.*, d. 25, dub. 1, resp. (II, 607a): "Judicium importat actum rationis regulatum secundum regulas veritatis sive supernae legis; arbitrium vero importat actum rationis regulatum secundum imperium voluntatis." Moreover, free choice requires that the intellect and will be able to reflect upon their own acts. Ibid., a. 1, q. 3, concl. (II, 599a): "Nisi enim posset se super actum suum reflectere, numquam posset illum refrenare, nisi posset se ipsam movere, nec posset in illum exire, quando vellet." The point here is that the operation of free choice represents a degree of actuation beyond the levels of essence (or consubstantiality of powers) and knowledge (or intellection). For a concise discussion of free will, see W. G. Thompson, "The Doctrine of Free Choice in Saint Bonaventure," *Franciscan Studies* 18 (1958), 1-8. Regarding natural law in the conjunction of operative powers, see note 33 and the concluding paragraph of Remote Context #b.
ordered by natural law, natural law itself is implicated in the complex operation of free choice.

In view of the various modalities of habitus described above, we may conclude that natural law is an innate habitus in the orders of (1) natural origin (or essence) and (2) innate disposition (or knowledge and precept). However, natural law is an acquired habitus in the order of acquired disposition (or perfection; see notes 67 and 68).

**Natural Law and Truth**

There are several passages throughout Bonaventure’s *Commentarium* which, taken together, strongly associate natural law with truth as impressed in the soul. Let us consider a few of these associations and then bring our findings to bear upon our key-text.

1. Bonaventure states that conscience and synderesis are rightly ordered (recte ordinamur) by natural law (see note 42); but Bonaventure equates rectitude (rectitudo) itself with truth (veritas) and asserts that when our intelligence is turned to truth, it is rectified (rectificatur) and coincides (aequatur) with truth through imitation ("per quamdam imitationem").

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72 See *In II Sent.*, prooemium (II, 4a): "Primo igitur homo rectus est, cum intelligentia summiae veritati aequatur; aequari autem dico non per omninem impletionem, sed per quamdam imitationem. Si enim 'veritas,' ut dicit Anselmus, 'est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis,' et rectitudini non potest aequari nisi rectum; cum intellectus noster aequatur veritati, necessario rectificatur. Tunc autem aequatur, quando actualiter se convertit ad veritatem. Veritas enim in
2. It is God alone who most perfectly unites with a soul according to truth and intimacy; for only God, in His sublime simplicity and spirituality, can imbue the soul so that according to truth, God is more intimate to the soul than the soul is to its own self.  

Itu definitur, quod est adaequatio rei et intellectus. Intelligentia autem nostra ad veritatem conversa verificatur, ac per hoc veritati aequatur, et dum aequatur rectitudini, rectificatur."

Correlatively, Bonaventure speaks of the will: by the rectitude of its operation, man attains his ultimate end (finum ultimum). Note here the implication that the right operation of man’s faculties entails the rectitude of man himself and the attainment of his final end. Ibid., (II, 4b): "Similiter homo rectificatur, dum voluntas summae bonitati conformatur. Summa enim bonitas est summa aequitas sine iustitia.... Sed, ut dicit Anselmus [Dialog. de lib arbit., c. 3; PL 158, 494] 'iustitia est rectitudo voluntatis:' nihil autem conformatur rectitudo nisi rectum. Dum ergo voluntas bonitati summae et aequitati conformatur, necessario rectificatur.... Nihilominus homo rectificatur, dum virtus summae potestati continuatur. Rectum enim est cuius medium non exit ab extremis. Extrema sunt primum et ultimum, alpha et omega, principium et finis. Medium inter haec est operatio, per quam efficiens pervenit in finem. Illa ergo virtus recta est, cuius operatio est a principio primo et ad finem ultimum." Cf. De Reduct. Art., 23 (V, 325a). Bonaventure also links natural law with rectitude. See In III Sent., d. 35, a. un, q. 2, concl. (III, 777b): "Et haec fundata est super principia iuris naturalis, quae ordinatur ad rectitudinem et honestem vitae."

For further discussion on Bonaventure’s notions of truth and rectitude in connection with his epistemology of illumination and metaphysics of exemplarism, see Ewert Cousins, "Truth in St. Bonaventure," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 43, (1969), 205-10. Cf. note 45 regarding natural law as comprehending the intellect and will.

73 In I Sent., d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, concl. (I, 41a): "Item, quia ibi est coniunctio; solus autem Deus est qui perfectissime coniungitur [animae]. Nam coniungitur secundum veritatem et intimatem. Solus enim Deus propter summam simplicitatem et spiritualitatem illabitur animae, ita quod secundum veritatem est in anima et intimior animae quam ipsa sibi."
3. Conscience denotes the *naturale iudicatorium* in directing moral activity (see notes 6, 7 and 38); in turn, natural law rightly orders conscience (see note 42); hence natural law directs natural judgment. Now *iudicium* in itself implies for Bonaventure an *act* of reason which is regulated by a norm of truth or higher law ("*regulas veritatis sive supernae legis*"; see footnote 44); thus natural law is implicated as the norm of truth regulating the habitus (and consequently, the act) of natural judgment.

4. Bonaventure concurs with Augustine that "God inserts in us a natural judgment by which light and darkness are seen in the book of light, which is truth, because truth is naturally impressed in the human heart" (see note 32).

5. Concerning the innate knowledge of charity, Bonaventure states that whatever is known by man is known in the eternal truth. Truth pours into the mind, as in the case of the Prophets, or because it is impressed in our being (see note 29). Although charity is not known by sinners by infused species, it is nevertheless known by a certain innate species of truth which is a similitude of charity. Bonaventure distinguishes innate species in two ways: (1) by mere similitude (*similitudo tantum*), such as the species of stone, or (2) by a similitude (*similitudo*) which is a certain impression of the eternal truth in the soul. Now, the soul is given a certain guiding light (*lumen quoddam directivum*) and a certain natural direction (*quaedam*
directio naturalis) which also extends to the will. The soul thus knows what rectitude is, what affection is (see note 15), and so knows what right affection is; and since charity is right affection, the soul knows charity by a certain truth which is a similitude of charity. As Augustine asserts, such truth is impressed in the soul by Truth itself. 

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74 See In I Sent., d. 17. p. 1. a. un, q. 4, concl. (I, 301b-302): "Dicendum, quod cognitione experientiae non cognoscitur caritas nisi ab habente; cognitione vero speculationis certum est cognosci caritatem etiam a non habente. Modus autem huius cognitionis non potest esse per caritatis essentiam nec per similitudinem a sensibus acquisitam: ergo necesse est, quod sit per similitudinem infusam, vel innatam. Utraque autem, quae sic cognoscuntur ab homine, dicuntur ab Augustino cognosci in Veritate aeterna, aut quia a conditione imprimit secundum illud: [Psalm 4, 7] 'Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine etc.' Caritas autem non cognoscitur a peccatoribus per speciem infusam: ergo oportet, quod per innatam cognoscatur. Species autem innata potest esse dupliciter: aut similitudo tantum, sicut species lapidis, aut ita similitudo, quod etiam quaedam veritas in se ipsa. Prima species est sicut pictura et ab hac creatae est anima nuda. Secunda species est impressio aliqua summae veritatis in anima, sicut verbi gratia animae a conditione sua datum est lumen quoddam directivum et quaedam directio naturalis; data est etiam ei affectio voluntatis. Cognoscit igitur anima, quid sit rectitude, et quid affectionis; et cum caritas sit hoc, cognoscit caritatem per quandam veritatem, quae tamen veritas est similitudo caritatis; et tunc recte habet rationem similitudinis, dum accipitur ab intellectu; habet tamen rationem veritatis, prout est in anima. Unde quod Augustinus dicit, quod huiusmodi habitus cognoscuntur in ipsa veritate et per similitudines, quae sunt idem quod ipsae, non dicit hoc [ad opp. 1; De Trinitae, IX, c. 6, n. 9; PL, 42, 965-66], quia non fiat aliqua species in intellectu cognoscentis, sed quia in anima non est pura species, sed veritas quaedam ab ipsa veritate impressa." Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate., VIII, c. 6, n. 9; c. 9, n. 13; IX, c. 6, n. 9 (PL 42, 955 sqq., 959, 966); cf. De Gen ad lit., XII, c. 31, n. 59 (PL 34, 479): "Aliud autem est ipsum lumen, quod illustratur anima, ut omnia vel ipse Deus est, haec autem creatura, quamvis rationalis et intellectualis ad ejus imaginem facta, quae cum conatur lumen illud intureri palpitat infirmitate, et
minus valet." Consequently, the habitus of conscience is **simply innate** with regard to an affection (affectio) such as love (amor) since affection is in the soul **essentially** (see notes 15 and 30). Note in this connection the intimate relationship of charity (right affection) with natural law as that by which the will (i.e., affectus sive appetitus ratiocinatus; see notes 30 and 42) is rightly ordered. See *Comment. in Sapientiam*, VI, v. 19 (VI, 149b): "'Finis praecepti est caritas;' legem, scilicet naturalis, Moysaicae et evangelicae." Indeed, right ordering of the will constitutes charity.

What is the object of charity? See *In III Sent.*, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5 (III, 593a): "...objectum caritatis non est quodcumque bonum, sed bonum summam et bonum sub ratione boni." As the soul knows charity (right affection) by knowing its own essence, and natural law is the norm of right affection (charity), the soul knows natural law innately in knowing its own essence. Evidently, natural law characterizes the very essence or nature of the human soul. See *In IV Sent.*, d. 33, a. 1, q. 2. fund. 4 (IV, 749b): "Item, quod indictum est homini a sua constitutione spectat ad ius naturale; sed a sua constitutione dictum est: 'Relinquet homo patrem et matrem, et erunt duo in carne una.'" Cf. notes 46, 68-69, and 79. Moreover, charity is described by Bonaventure as the root of all emotions (radix omnium affectionem) and the end and form of all virtues (finis et forma omnium virtutum); see *Hex.* VII, 14-15 (V 367b). Hence, natural law, as the norm of charity, can, with even greater profundity, be said to be the root of all emotions and the end and form of all virtues. In this connection, the divine archtypes are said to work upon the soul in the orders of knowledge, will, and operation. See ibid., VI, 10 (V, 362a): "haec imprimuntur in anima per illam lucem exemplarem et descendunt in cognitivam, in affectivam, in operativam." See ibid., VI, 6 (V, 361b): "Dico ergo quod illa lux aeterna est exemplar omnium, et quod mens elevata, ut mens aliorum nobilium philosophorum antiquorum, ad hoc pervenit. In illa ergo primo occurrunt animae exemplaria virtutum." There appears, then, to be a connection between the Eternal Light, the divine archetypes, and the light of natural law. What the precise relationship between these terms may be remains to be clarified. Cf. notes 91 and 105 in this regard. Further, since natural law is a habitus proper to the essence of the rational soul, and since the rational soul is conscious of itself ("Reflectere autem se super se hoc est virtutis cognitivae;" *In II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3, concl.; II, 599a), knowledge of natural law is implicit in self-consciousness. This innate knowledge accounts for the the self-evident knowledge of natural law precepts as constituted in accord with the
What can be said of the above? The truth impressed in the soul by the eternal truth appears to be natural law itself; it is not clear, however, whether this impression of truth refers to the operative powers themselves--i.e., the natural light and the natural appetite--or to the underlying habitus which rightly directs those powers. In any case, natural law qua similitude or imitation of truth, is proper to the soul itself, and thus is intrinsic to man.

**Natural Law and Light**

In addition to the correspondence found between natural law and truth, we find a similar connection between natural law, truth, and the notion of light. For example, these three terms all bear a parallel correspondence in their common distinction and relations qua created (natural) and uncreated (eternal). Accordingly, Bonaventure describes the conformity of man to God in terms of light.\(^7^5\) Indeed, man

\(^7^5\)See ibid., d. 17, a. 1, q. 1, ad 6 (II, 412b): "Lux enim spiritualis, quae Deus est, cum sit simplicissima, non potest esse perfectio rerum diversarum naturarum. Cum autem sit omnipotentissima, potest producere et facere lucem creatam aliquo modo sibi conformem; quae tamen sibi non sufficit, etiam postquam producta est nisi adsit ei summae lucis influentia. Et sic intelligendum est in anima humana quod ipsa habet lucem propriam, scilicet creatam, per quam completur, quae a luce aeterna et producitur et conservatur." See notes 35, 74, and 100, for references to eternal law, eternal truth, and eternal and uncreated light respectively. See Comment. in Sapientiam, XVIII, v. 4 (VI, 223a) where Bonaventure links law with the light which illumines the intellect: "Notandum quod lex aliquando dicitur lumen, quia illuminat intellectum; Proverbiorum sexto: 'Mandatum lucerna, et lex lux;' incorruptum, quia
bears in himself the light of the divine visage; and by a
conformity of order—which evidently is the work of natural
law—man is an image of God with a capacity to be configured
to Him.\textsuperscript{76}

Finally, as natural law is equated with truth (see note 72), so truth is equated with light (see notes 32 and 100). Consider, for example, the following words of Bonaventure:

\begin{quote}
Secunda species est impressio aliqua summae veritatis in anima, sicut verbi gratia animae a conditione sua datum est lumem quoddam directivum et quaedam directio naturalis; data est etiam ei affectio voluntatis.
\end{quote}

(cited in note 74; see note 21)

It is unclear whether natural law, created light, and created truth differ for Bonaventure by anything more than a distinction of reason. All things considered, natural law appears to be for Bonaventure an impression or similitude of the eternal light of truth. As a created truth impressed

\begin{quote}
purificat vel a corruptione conservat affectum, secundum illud Psalmi: 'Eloquentium Domini igne examinatum, probatum terrae, purgatum septuplum.' Cf. ibid., IX, 13, v. 11 (VI, 374), where Bonaventure associates light and law with Christ.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{76}See note 79 below. Moreover, Bonaventure states that light is the substantial form of the body. See In II Sent., d. 13, a. 2, q. 2, concl. (II, 320b): "...lux dicitur ipsa forma, quae dat esse corpori lucido, et a qua luminosum corpus principaliter est activum, sicut a primo movente et regulante. Alio modo lux dicitur ipse fulgor, qui est circa corpus luminosum, qui consequitur existentiam lucis in tali materia, et qui etiam est sensus objectum et operationis instrumentum." Ibid., ad 6 (II, 322): "...forma enim substantialis per se posse agere videtur...lux interiorius perficiens sit substantialis forma...." Yet, the body is ordered to the spiritual soul as its \textit{act} and \textit{entelechia}. Cf. notes 2, 80 and 93).
upon the soul, natural law is itself an illumination--a lumen quoddam directivum--by which the soul is ordered, rectified, and conformed to God. Natural law thus bears a teleological significance, particularly in conjunction with appetite and free choice. It remains, then, to explore its innate role in the actuation and perfection of the rational soul.

**Natural Law and Perfection**

Let us then take up Bonaventure's conclusion from the key-text--namely, that all men naturally desire true happiness (see [1] above). His *respondeo* outlines the nature of the rational soul and can be reduced to the following syllogism:

1. **Appetitus** is to be understood in terms of *convenientia* and *indigentia*.

2. The *anima rationalis*

   (a) is created to the *imago* and *similitudo* of God [natural conformity];

   (b) is made capable [natural habitus] of the most sufficient good;

   (c) is deficient in itself [natural indigence].

3. Therefore, the rational soul is characterized by natural capacity and appetite.

Such a response sums up the nature of the human soul, which in turn reveals man's *raison d'être*--for his soul is characterized in terms of (a) conformity, (b) capacity, and
(c) indigence; and it is precisely conformity and indigence which produce (faciunt) his desire (appetitus) according to his capacity for the true good. Let us look more closely at these various terms with a view to their bearing on natural law.

With regard to man as created to the image and likeness of God, Bonaventure argues that a rational creature is born to be directly ordered ("nata est ordinari") to God;" and

"In II Sent., d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, (II, 394b): "Ipsa autem creatura rationalis, quia de se nata est et laudare et nosse et res alias in facultatem voluntatis assumere, nata est ordinari in Deum immediate." Bonaventure continues (ibid., II, 395a): "Et hoc est quod dicit Augustine de Trinitate decimo quarto [c. 8, n. 11; PL 42, 1044], quod 'eo est anima imago Dei, quo capax eius est et particeps esse potest.' " For a parallel discussion, cf. St. Thomas, ST I, q. 93, a. 1 sqq. Man is ordered to God as his beatitude in two related senses—namely, as obiectum and as informans. That which satisfies our appetite as obiectum is God alone, to which the human soul is ordained to possess; and that which fills our appetite as informans is the influencing presence of God in the soul, which thereby becomes God-like (deiformis). The name, beatitudo, is accorded primarily to uncreated beatitude as the fulfilling end as obiectum and secondarily to created beatitude which is fulfilling as informans or deiform in virtue of its object. See In IV Sent., d. 49, a. un., q. 1, concl., (IV, 1000b): "Dicendum, quod beatitudo est finis satiens nostrum appetitum est dupliciter: vel sicut obiectum, vel sicut informans. Satians nostrum appetitum sicut obiectum solus Deus est, ad quem capiendum humana anima ordinatur. Satians autem sicut informans est ipsa influentia Dei in animam, quae est ipsa deiformatis et satietas. Secundum hoc nomen beatitudinis commune est secundum prius et posterius ad beatitudinem increatam, quae est finis satians ut obiectum, et ad creatam, quae est satians ut informans; et per prius dicitur de beatitudine increata, per posterius de creatae, quia non satiat influentia obiecti nisi propter obiectum."

For parallel discussions cf. St. Thomas, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 2; ST I-II, q. 3; Scotus, Oxon., IV, d. 49, q. 1, (XXI, 5 sqq); Rep., d. 49, q. 1, (XXIV, 614 sqq). While we translate the expression nata est as born, G. H. Tavard renders this expression as destined. He states that "the
because (quia) he is so ordered, he is capable (capax) of Him (and vice-versa): because (quia) he is capable of God, he is born (or destined) to be configured (configurari) to Him\textsuperscript{78} and bears in himself from his origin (a sua origine) the light of the divine visage. Thus according to similitude (similitudinem), which pertains to a conformity of order (convenientiam ordinis), man is properly said to be the image of God.\textsuperscript{79}

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\textsuperscript{78} Such is a spiritual configuration. Cf. ibid., ad. 4 (II, 395b): "dicendum quod imago corporalis exigit configurationem corporalem, imago vero spiritualis configuratione et effigie spirituali contenta est."

\textsuperscript{79} In II Sent., d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (II, 395a): "Quia enim ei immediate ordinatur, ideo capax eius est, vel e converso; et quia capax est, nata est ei configurari; et propter hoc fert in se a sua origine lumen vultus divini. Et ideo quantum ad similitudinem, quae attenditur ad convenientiam ordinis, perfecte dicitur image Dei, quia in hoc ei assimilatur expresse."

Further, man is created to the image of God through conformity of proportionality whereby man’s own essence bears a resemblance to the relation of Divine Persons according to power order and distinction; ibid. (II, 395a): "Similiter in similitudine, quae attenditur in convenientia proportionalitatis vel proportionis, expresse assimilatur Deo creatura rationalis, et ideo secundum eam recte dicitur imago.... Creatura vero rationalis non solum sic convenit, sed etiam quantum ad intrinsecarum suarum potentiarum originem, ordinem et distinctionem, in quibus assimilatur illi distinctioni et ordini, quae est in divinis personis intrinseca divinae naturae.... Et ideo est ibi expressa
Without direct reference to natural law, the above argument is nevertheless suggestive of the innate role of natural law—precisely as a consubstantial habitus—in directly ordering man to God; for natural law, which rightly orders the intellect and will (see note 42), is that innate habitus by which these operative powers are capable of operation (see notes 8 and 67) and subsequent perfection (see notes 9 and 49). By reason of this ordination, man has a capacity for God; and because of this capacity, he is born to be configured to God and bears in himself a sua origine the light of divine visage; such a capacity itself bears a congruence to the natural law habitus per naturalem originem (see note 67). Indeed, if natural law is the impression, imitation, or similitude of eternal truth (see notes 72, 74, and 79), then it is implicated as the similitude pertaining to a conformity of order, according to which man is said to be an image of God. 80

similitudo proportionis; et propter hoc rationalis creatura, quae est homo, est imago Dei." The similitude of man as creata informans (or deiform; see note 77 above) certainly qualifies as a convenientia proportionalis with God; but what distinguishes it precisely as a convenientia ordinalis is its causal and telic significance as created similitude which the relationship of proportionality in itself does not involve. See Itin., III, 5-6 (V, 305a) where Bonaventure further describes the structure of the human soul according to a trinity of powers—namely, memory, intelligence, and will. These powers represent the Blessed Trinity—Father, Son (Word), and Holy Spirit (Love)—respectively. Cf. Brevil. II, 9.

80Evidently, as natural law is that by which man is directed to God as obiectum and informans, it is according to natural law that he is subsequently rendered God-like
If capacity for Bonaventure entails conformity, what can be said of indigence? We recall that the soul knows what fulfills it through its own indigence (see [4] above); What then does man's indigence reveal of his capacity and corresponding true good? Nothing satisfies the human soul, Bonaventure tells us, except the highest good which is infinite. As the natural cognition of the soul is unbounded, it is not sated by any particular knowledge, but only in possessing all knowledge and that by which everything is known.\(^{61}\) Similarly, the desire (affectio; see note 15) of the soul is able to extend itself to where the intellect holds esteem and thus necessarily surpasses all limitations; thus, nothing finite can satisfy the soul.

\(^{61}\)In I Sent., d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, concl. (I, 40b): "Et ratio huius est, quia nihil potest animam sufficienter finire nisi bonum, ad quod est. Hoc autem est bonum summum, quod superius est anima, et bonum infinitum, quod excedit animae vires. Cognitio enim animae naturalis est cognitio non arctata; unde nata est quodam modo omnia cognoscere, unde non impletur cognitio eius aliquo cognoscibili, nisi quod habet in se omnia cognoscibilia et quo cognito omnia cognoscuntur."
Rather, perfect enjoyment is in God alone, because He is the highest and infinite good. The correspondence between indigence, capacity, and fulfilling good is summed up by Bonaventure as follows:

The appetite is not fully pacified except through something else which fills it; for the soul is of itself deficient of peace in virtue of its lack of completeness; however, the soul is capable of God according to its appetite. Thus if every creature is less than infinite, then nothing can fulfill the desire of the soul. So Augustine says: "Nothing less than the Trinity can fill the soul capable of the entire Trinity." 

Ibid., (I, 41a): "Aestimatio autem supergreditur omne finitum, quia omni finito postest maius cogitari aliquid: Ergo cum affectio possit se extendere ubi et aestimatio, necessario affectio animae supergreditur omne finitum; et si hoc, nullo bono finito sufficienter finitur. Fruendum est solo Deo, quia summum bonum et infinitum." Cf. De Myst. Trin., q. VI, a. 1, concl. (V, 99a), where God is further described as immutable, simple, immense, unchanging, eternal, etc. Cf. Hex., V, 28, (V, 358). Desire or affection (i.e., qua operation of the appetitive faculty) for Bonaventure presupposes knowledge. See note 13. Cf. In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. un. q. 2, contra. 1 (IV, 1003): "'Invisa possumus diligere, incognita nequaquam,' ut dicit Augustinus." See Augustine, De Trinitate, X, c. 2, n. 4 (PL 42, 975). Note here that the precept concerning the infinite good cannot rightly be construed as a kind of Kantian "categorical imperative;" for man's natural desire for the infinite good transcends all categories and essences. Simply put, man is determined by his God-given nature for the indeterminate Good.

Ibid., fund. 3 (I, 40a): "Item, appetitus non sufficienter quietatur nisi per aliquid, quod animam implet, qui ex ea parte anima deficit in quiete, qua [sic] deficit in plenitudine; sed est capax Dei secundum appetitum; ergo omne omne creatum est in infinitum minus illo, nullum supplet animae appetitum. Et hoc est Quod dicit Augustinus: 'Animam totius Trinitatis capacem nihil minus quam Trinitas potest implere.'" The Quaracchi editors [I, 40, note 2] attribute this latter remark to the author of De Spiritu et Anima, c. 27. (PL 40, 799): "Animam tamen hominis, id est mentem, nulla creatura iuxta substantiam implere potest, nisi sola
The soul, then, is capable of God according to its appetite (see notes 57, 61, and 66); and this appetite, as we have seen, is bound and directed by natural law (see notes 15, 42, and 80). Further, since appetite follows upon indigence and conformity (see [1] above), it itself is characterized both by the indigent nature of the soul as well as by its fulfilling object—namely, the supreme and infinite good (see note 83).

In light of the above analysis, let us bring natural law into focus with regard to capacity, indigence, conformity, and appetite.

1. As an innate habitus *per naturalem originem*, natural law rightly orders the soul to God; in virtue of this natural ordination, the soul is made capable of God.

2. This capacity is marked by both indigence and conformity which in turn produces and characterizes man's appetite for God according to natural law.

3. As a similitude (*similitudo*) of truth, natural law pertains to a conformity of order (*convenientia ordinis*) by which man is properly said to be the image of God.

In short, the rational soul is characterized by natural capacity and appetite; but in turn, the natural law habitus characterizes capacity and appetite. As previously noted

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(see note 67), natural law is an innate habitus per naturalem originem which is consubstantial with the soul; as such, it differs from the operative powers it encompasses only by a distinction of reason; hence, the difficulty in delineating natural law from the natural powers themselves. Since man is born to be configured to God—and this according to natural law—his perfection is clearly rooted in natural law in the order of essence.

What can be said of natural law per innatam dispositionem in the order of knowledge/precept? It was noted earlier (see notes 53-54) that the soul discerns the true good from every other good according to sufficiency and immutability (incommutabilitas). Here, the true good is further distinguished qua supreme (sumnum) and qua infinite (infinitum).84 Knowledge of these distinctions between the inferior and supreme and between the finite and infinite is innate to the soul since the very indigence which characterizes the creature itself is the point of reference

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84See notes 81-83 above. Two other distinctions between the true good and other goods are offered in Bonaventure’s discussion on beatitude in terms of propter se and propter aluid, and honestum and commodum. See In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. un., q. 2, contra 3 and 4 (IV, 1003a); see also note 38; cf. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XIX, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 41, 621): "Illud enim est finis boni nostri, propter quod appetend sunt cetera, ipsum autem propter se ipsum." See Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, I, c. 2 (1094a18), as cited in note 53.
from which such knowledge issues (see [4] above).  

Ordering the mutable to the immutable, the inferior to the supreme, and the finite to the infinite, the habitus of natural law per innatam dispositionem (see note 67) directs the naturale iudicatorium and inclines the naturale pondus toward the soul's proper object--namely God.

It follows that the natural law precepts, at once distinct from the soul and yet proper to it (see note 67), direct the soul according to these same innate metaphysical criteria.  

Pertaining to both God and creatures (see

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85Knowlede of God as the immutable, supreme, and infinite good is thus innate, but it is not direct. As our Key-Text indicates (see [4] above, and notes 69-64), such knowledge is attained through a kind of natural inference; accordingly, the immutable is innately known from knowledge of the mutable, the supreme from the inferior, and the infinite from the finite. As we will later see, Bonaventure accounts for such knowledge by a process of resolution. See De Myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 1, concl (V, 49-50). Regarding Bonaventure's doctrine on contuition, see De Scientia Christi, q. 4, concl (V, 22-24). For a well researched and cogent refutation of the claim of ontologism in Bonaventure, see Thomas Mathias, "Bonaventurian Ways to God Through Reason," (Part One) Franciscan Studies 36 (1976), 192-247; (Part Two) Franciscan Studies 37 (1977), 153-206; see also Anton C. Pegis, "The Bonaventurean Way to God," Medieval Studies 29 (1967), 207-42; for a comparison of Bonaventure and Aquinas on this issue, see Thomas Fay, "Bonaventure and Aquinas on God's Existence: Points of Convergence," The Thomist 41 (1977), 588-96.

86Namely, the ordination of the mutable to the immutable, the inferior to the supreme, the finite to the infinite, the in alium to the in se, the bonum commodum to the bonum honestum, etc. See Hex., I, 13 (V, 331b): "Metaphysicus enim assurgit ad illud esse considerandum in ratione principii omnia originantis.... Assurgit etiam ad considerandum illud esse in ratione ultimi finis; et in hoc convenit cum morali sive ethico, qui reducit omnia ad unum summum bonum ut ad finem ultimum considerando felicitatem sive practicam, sive speculativam.... Nam idem est
footnote 36), natural law precepts are practical formulas of metaphysical import which serve to orient and guide man to his proper object through conduct. On this score, let us restate the following passage as cited earlier (see note 54):

Sin [according to Augustine] consists in hating the immutable Good and adhering to what is mutable; but beatitude is the immutable Good.... The immutable Good is none other than God Who is at once the supreme and infinite Good.

The immutable Good is none other than God Who is at once the supreme and infinite Good (see note 84). By extension, then, we may say that sin consists in hating the supreme and infinite Good and adhering to what is inferior and finite; but beatitude (or perfection) consists in loving the supreme and infinite Good with one's whole heart, soul, and power (see note 49). Evidently, moral deliberation is based upon the principle of reduction as applied to the metaphysical conditions of esse (see notes 33 and 86). These

principium essendi et cognoscendi." See In III Sent., d. 1, a. 2, q. 3, concl. (III, 28): "Posterius habet reduci per illud, quod est prius in eodem genere." See Brevil., II, 9 (V, 226): "Lex divinitatis haec est ut infima per media reducantur ad summa." Ibid., IV, 5 (V, 245); Itin., IV, 3 (V, 306); Hex., III (V, 342 ff.).

We can now better understanding the metaphysical and epistemological connection between rules of conduct (such as God must be adored) and speculative principles (such as the whole is greater than its parts); see footnote 9 regarding the common psychological origin of practical and speculative reasoning. Note the principle of reduction as key to Bonaventure's metaphysics, his epistemology--and also his moral philosophy. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, II, 2 (994a-994b30). See also noted 29 and 33 above and Appendix D.
various conditions of being, as well as their proper ordinations, are innately known—or recognized—by all men according to natural law. 87

Let us now consider natural law with respect to the order of operation which involves deliberation. How does the appetitive power qua deliberative differ from the appetitive power qua natural? Bonaventure holds that they may be distinguished according to an object proper either to a rational creature or a brute; 88 but in another sense, these appetitive powers may be distinguished according to the mode of desire (modo appetendi)—that is, either by (1) natural will (voluntas naturalis or synderesis), which inclines the will toward the noble good (bonum honestum) and flees from evil, 89 or (2) deliberative will (voluntas deliberativa

87 See [5] above. For Bonaventure, then, the moral dimension of man rests upon and operates within a metaphysical—and corresponding epistemological—context, not outside or opposed to such a context; see notes 33 and 86.

88 See In II Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, concl. (II, 566a) "Dicendum, quod cum dividimus appetitum in naturalem et deliberativum, sive quamcumque aliam potentiam; hoc duplicitur potest intelligi: aut ita, quod appetitus naturalis et deliberativus diversitatem habeant in obiectis, utpote cum unum est appetibile solum a substantia rationali, aliud autem est appetibile a brutali." Cf. Aristotle De Anima, III. c. 9. sqq.

89 Ibid., d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, ad. 2 (II, 910): "Et propterea iudicatorium illud quod quidem est conscientia, bonum est, quando bonum dictat et ad bonum inclinat et a malo retrahit et ipsum refugit...." Ibid., ad. 3: "Unde remorsus non est a conscientia principaliter movente, sed sicut a dictante; a scintilla autem conscientiae, quae quidem est synderesis, est sicut a movente...."
appetitus) by which we sometimes adhere to good and
sometimes to evil.\textsuperscript{90} This distinction of will (voluntas or
appetite (appetitus) into naturalis and deliberativa does
not, however, represent a diversity of powers or essences;
rather there is but one voluntary (or appetitive) power
which is capable of moving in diverse modes.\textsuperscript{91} This common
power, as it is invariably inclined toward happiness, is
called natural; but insofar as it desires to do this or that
particular good with a view toward happiness, it is called
deliberative;\textsuperscript{92} Thus, as deliberation represents a mode of

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3. concl. (II, 566a):
[2] "Alio modo potest dividi appetitus sive potentia in
naturalem et deliberativam, ita tamen, quod non sit
differentia in obiectis, sed in modo appetendi; ut cum
appellamus synderesim esse voluntatem naturalem, quae quidem
naturaliter inclinat et instigat ad bonum honestum et
murmerat contra malum; et voluntatem deliberativam
appetitum, quo post deliberationem aliquando adhaeremus
bono, aliquando malo." Note the indiscriminate use of the
terms voluntas and appetitus to characterize one and the
same operative power; cf. note 15.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., (II, 566a): "Et sic divisio potentiae per
naturalem et deliberativam non variat eam secundum essentiam
potentiae, sed secundum modum movendi. Et hoc modo dividit
Damascenus, non quia naturalis et deliberativa sint diversae
potentiae, sed quia una est potentia, diversimode tamen
movens." See Quaracchi editors' note 1 (II, 565), for a
detailed explication of Damascene's division of rational
powers.

\textsuperscript{92} In II Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, concl., (II,
566b): "Eadem enim est potentia, qua appeto beatitudinem, et
qua appeto virtutem, sive facere hoc bonum vel illud ad
beatudinem ordinatum; quae, ut appetit beatitudinem, dicitur
naturalis, quia immutabilitur appetitus eius ad beatitudinem
inclinatur; ut vero appetit hoc vel illud bonum facere,
deliberativa dicitur, et secundum iudicium rationis potest
ad contrarium inclinari." See also ibid., fund. 1-2 (II,
565-66); ibid., d. 28, dub. 4; ibid., d. 39, dub 2; In III
Sent., d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. For a parallel discussion, cf. St.
appetitive motion with respect to the particular, and natural law binds and directs the appetitive power itself, it follows that natural law enters into deliberation. Indeed, as Bonaventure asserts, conscience is not confined merely to universals, but descends to the particular.  

Subsequent conduct, however, need not instantiate man's proper ordination to God as innately directed by natural law; for the deliberative appetite is not determined to any particular good; rather, the will is free—that is, it has full dominion (dominium) over its object and its act.

Thomas, *ST* I, q. 82, aa. 1-2.

93 See note 28 for this citation as well as an explanation of how a natural law precept is concretized in the particular. See footnote 26 regarding the formulation of a natural law precept from the apprehension of the particular. See notes 2 and 80 with regard to natural law in relationship with the human body. There is no doubt, then, that in Bonaventure's doctrine natural law extends its jurisdiction into the physical realm. See *In II Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 3, ad 6 (II, 416): "Licet autem anima rationalis compositionem habeat ex materia et forma, appetitum tamen habet ad perficiendam corporalem naturam." Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 2, a. un., q. 3, ad. 7 (I, 172). Thus man—a composite of soul and body—is rightly ordered with relation to God and other (bodily) creatures (see note 36) according to natural law.

94 See *In II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, ad 2 (II, 566): "Licet autem determinate inclinatur ad beatitudinem, ad multa tamen genera appetibilium illa et eadem voluntatis potentia est indeterminata, ita quod nata est moveri in opposita."

95 Put another way, the rational soul in its power of self-movement is not bound to any particular good. See *In II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (II, 593a): "...unde illa potentia dicitur esse libera qua dominium habet plenum tam respectu obiecti quam respectu actus proprii." Ibid., ad 4: (II, 594a): "Unde non quicumque motus ab intrinseco facit potentiam liberam, sed ille motus quo vis motiva movet se
While free choice (liberum arbitrium) is born to act with equity in its bearing toward a good object, it nevertheless possesses a natural defectability rendering it capable of sin, as well as error through false assumption (see [3] ipsam; 'voluntas enim et liberum arbitrium,' ut dicit Anselmus, est instrumentum se ipsum movens.'"

The term arbitrium, which we translate as choice, implies an act of reason as regulated by a command of the will; choice is thus an act of judgment by which other powers of the soul are moved. See In II Sent., d. 25, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1 (II, 593b): "Arbitrium enim idem est quod iudicium, ad cuius nutum ceterae virtutes moveantur et obediant. Iudicare autem illius est secundum rationem completam, cuius est discernere inter iustum et iniustum et inter proprium et alienum." Ibid., dub 1 (II, 607a): "[Arbitrium] importat actum rationis regulatum secundum imperium voluntatis." See note 71 above.

In II Sent. d. 25, p. 2, a. un., q. 3, concl. (II, 614b): "[Liberum arbitrium] natum est exire in actum aequitatis susceptibilem et aequitate informatum.... Sic...liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum est, habet objectum bonum et exit in bonum, non in malum.... Nihilominus tamen, in quantum cum liberate habet defectibilitatem, potest in malum, ita quod malitia non est objectum liberi arbitrii nec a libero arbitrio secundum quod liberum, sed secundum quod deficiens." Cf. In II Sent., d. 24, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (II, 575a): "...in [superior] portione consistat arbitrii libertas, et ita per naturam insit ei ad malum vertibilitas, et ita possibilitas ad peccandum." Bonaventure cites three ways in which the will of man is defective: "Unus quidem naturalis, alius culpabilis et tertius poenalis." In II Sent., d 39, a. 1, q. 2 concl. (II, 807a).

The nature of an object which the soul regards can influence the soul toward good or evil. See In II Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2, concl. (II, 564a): "Dum enim ratio nostra ad superiora convertitur, purgatur et illuminatur et perficitur; dum leges aeternas conspicit et immutabilitatem divinae virtutis et aequitatis, in bono fortificatur et vigoratur; dum autem ad haec inferiora convertitur, utpote ad sensibilitatem et carnem, quodam modo trahitur et emollitur." Nevertheless, the soul may be ill-disposed and sinful even while regarding a noble object. See In II Sent., d. 24, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1 ad 3 (II, 575b): "...non solum est peccatum, quando fit conversio ad id quod secundum veritatem
above). But if the soul is capable of error and sin, it is also capable of right deliberation and good works. In this case, the good will (bonitas voluntatis) in natural appetite is thus consummated (consummatur) in deliberation; indeed, man himself attains his final end through conformity of will to the highest Good (see note 72). Thus, when man acts deliberatively with a right will (recta voluntas)—i.e., according to natural law—his conduct is rightly ordered; and through such conduct (although not exclusively; see note 100) man attains his final end.

Cf. notes 35, 54 and 90. For further discussion of man's fallen nature with regard to natural law, see John F. Quinn, "St. Bonaventure's Fundamental Conception of Natural Law," 571-98.

98 See In II Sent., d. 25, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3, concl. (II, 599a): "...liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum est, habet objectum bonum et exit in bonum, non in malum..." Ibid., d. 34, a. 1, q. 2, concl. (II, 807b): "...sed ipsa voluntas, quae est domina sui actus et libera, potest se ipsam convertere ad illud ad quod vult et sicut vult.... Unde sicut ille qui stat rectus, posset statim, si vellet... sic voluntas, recta consistens et in ordine ad ultimum finem, potest illum exire."

99 See In II Sent., d. 39, dub. 3 (II, 917): "Dicendum quod bonitas voluntatis inchoatur in appetitu naturali et consummatur in virtute deliberativa; nec est voluntas simpliciter bona et recta, nisi sit recta in quantum movetur deliberative et in quantum movetur naturaliter.... Sicut enim melius est bene vivere quam vivere, et bene vivere praesupponit vivere, sic melior est voluntas, quae recte movetur et naturaliter et deliberative quam naturaliter tantum." The phrase "bonitas voluntatis inchoatur in appetitu naturali," suggests that voluntas for Bonaventure is not precisely synonomous with the appetitive power, but rather represents the impulse of the appetitive power for its object.
ultimate end. Such attainment clearly represents the perfection or consummation of man himself qua *compositum*. In this manner we may say that natural law is instantiated in the order of perfection.\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{100}See note 49 for an explanation of the terms *operatio* and *perfectio*. Insofar as (1) the soul is perfected through the operation of its powers according to natural law, (2) the body is perfected by the soul, (3) conscience directs man in his moral conduct (*opus*), we speak of natural law as instantiated in the orders of operation and perfection (see notes 49, 80, and 93); but further, (4) man, through right conduct, attains his ultimate end (*finum ultimum*) (see notes 38, 72, and 99). In this sense, we speak of natural law in the highest order of perfection (or consummation) which is none other than beatitude. Recall that the perfection of man consists in loving God with one's whole mind, heart, and soul—"in quo consistit perfecta Legis observatio et simul cum hoc sapientia Christiana." See note 46. See *In III Sent.*, d. 37, a. 1, q. 3, ad 4 (III, 820b), where Bonaventure states that the precepts of the Decalogue, which are explicit dictates of natural law, will abide in the state of glory: "Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ea quae sunt de dictamine legis naturae, manent in statu gloriae; responderi potest dupliciter. Primum quidem, quia, sicut dicitur de virtutibus, quod manent in patria secundum excellentiores et nobiliores usus et actus;...et quod est de dictamine legis naturae simpliciter et explicite, illud manebit in statu gloriae."

Free choice as directed by natural law produces good acts which can be ordered to man's proper end; however, beatitude requires the assistance of God for man's good efforts to be brought to completion. Thus while right conduct according to natural law is necessary for man's perfection, such conduct is insufficient of itself. See *In II Sent.*, d. 38, a. 2, q. 3, concl. (II, 689b): "In bonum autem, quod ducit ad bonum perfectum, sive merito congruisse merito condigni, non potest absque auxilio Dei.... Et constat quod, se habet hoc naturale iudicatorium, per illud per quod potest nosse parentes esse honorandos, per illud potest cogitare; et cum habeat naturalem instinctum, potest etiam velle; et cum habeat exteriora organa sibi subservientia, potest opere implere. Sed prout illud facit iudicium rationis rectae absque munere gratiae, non diriget ad obtinendum finem, qui Deus est, et mercedem aeternae beatitudinis, quam nosse non potest nisi Deus revelet.... Lumen creatum non potest perficere operationem suam absque cooperatione luminis increati, per quod illuminatur omnis
Is natural law innate or acquired in the order of perfection? In the sense that man's own nature is perfected through conduct according to natural law qua innate habitus, we hold that natural law is indeed innate in the order of perfection; but insofar as such perfection is attained only by deliberation through free choice, natural law must be said to be acquired.

IV. Summary and Conclusion

It is clear from the above exposition and analysis that natural law for Bonaventure is proper to the soul in the order of essence; in this case, natural law is an innate habitus *per naturalem originem*; according to this kind of habitus, a power is capable of an act by reason of its own nature. Evidently, then, natural law--qua habitus *per naturalem originem*--is equated with the very nature of the soul's powers inasmuch as the nature of a power determines

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homo qui venit in hunc mundum." Cf. ibid., d. 29, a. 1, q. 2, concl. and ad 4 (II, 698-99). This dependency upon the uncreated light is stated with even greater force when Bonaventure later writes against the Averroists at Paris. Identified as the light of Christ, divine illumination is held as necessary, not only for moral perfection, but for all knowledge—even that of sense knowledge. See Hex., XII, 5 (V, 385a): "Christus est doctor interius, nec scitur aliqua veritas nisi per eum... interius illustrando.... Si enim scire est cognoscere rem aliter impossibile se habere, necessarium est ut ille solus scire faciat qui veritatem novit et habet in se veritatem." Cf. Itin., III, 7 (V, 305b); see Hex., I, 13 (V, 331b), where Christ is further identified as the immutable truth (*veritatem immutabilem*). Cf. notes 75 and 86. For further discussion on this point, see Hayes, "Christology and Metaphysic," 82-95; Sweeney, "Christian Philosophy," 271-308.
and directs its operations; precisely in this sense natural
is consubstantial to the soul, and thus is innate or
intrinsic to man.

Secondly, natural law—qua innate habitus per innatam
dispositionem—is proper to the soul in the order of
knowledge; in this case, natural law is understood as innate
inasmuch as the intellect possesses a certain facility to
acquire knowledge which, while distinct from the intellect,
is nevertheless suitable to it. In yet another sense,
natural law precepts are taken as innate (see [5] above)
insofar as they are self-evident upon knowledge of sensible
objects; nevertheless, such precepts are acquired insofar as
the sensible knowledge which, in part, constitutes the
contents of these precepts is itself acquired.

Finally, in the order of operation or perfection,
natural law appears as a habitus per acquisitam
dispositionem through deliberative conduct; nevertheless,
this mode of natural law may be said to be innate precisely
insofar as right conduct itself is ordered according to
natural law per innatam dispositionem. Here we see the
teleological connection among the orders of essence,
knowledge/precept, and operation; for natural law as
consubstantial with the soul corresponds with a certain
truth which is impressed upon the soul; such truth is an
imitation or similitude of the eternal truth; and through
deliberate conformity with truth, man becomes united to God
(qua obiectum) and becomes God-like (deiformis). Such union and conformity with God constitute the perfection and beatitude of man.

Let us enumerate a few general implications drawn from the above investigation:

1. Since the practical intellect differs from the speculative intellect only by its extension to will and operation, an ontological and epistemological connection between rules of conduct (such as God must be adored) and speculative principles (such as the whole is greater than its parts) is implicated (see note 9). This point of connection is the naturale iudicatorium which, in turn, is guided by natural law as its normative principle. Thus, both practical and speculative reasoning are rooted in the ordination of natural law.

2. As a habitus per naturalem originem, natural law precedes the distinction of intellect and will in the ground of consubstantiality. Encompassing and regulating both operative powers, this mode of natural law represents the ontological and psychological ground of unity between the intellect and will; as a collectio praeeptorum, natural law is an innate habitus per innata dispositione and represents the progeny of intellect and will as conjoined in the act of practical judgment.

3. Knowledge of the (a) metaphysical distinction between the true good and (relative) good and the (b) natural
ordination of relative good to the true (absolute) good is innate to the soul by virtue of the innate knowledge of soul's own indigence; this innate knowledge (concerning the ordination of the mutable to the immutable, the inferior to the supreme, the finite to the infinite, etc.) is the (moral) standard according to which the soul is ordered to its true good.

4. Natural law precepts are thus intelligible formulas of this standard of ordination; pertaining to both God and creature, these precepts are practical dictates of metaphysical significance which regulate the relations of the human person with God and other creatures.

5. Hence, moral judgment and deliberation (free choice) are carried out within a metaphysical order which is innately known by all men according to natural law.¹⁰¹

6. There seems to be a correspondence between the light of natural law and the eternal light; it may in fact be that natural law for Bonaventure is the radical divine illumination as found in man. In any case, it appears that Bonaventure gives primacy of law and morality over all other aspects of human life (see notes 45, 74, 86, and 100 above).

¹⁰¹Let us reiterate that although first practical principles are self-evident, knowledge of particular moral conduct requires additional instruction; thus conscience for Bonaventure is also an acquired habitus (see notes 24 and 28). Of course, the development of moral knowledge represents a further explication of natural law consistent with its own order.
CHAPTER 2
KEY-TEXT B

Commentarius in Evangeliunm Lucae, c. 19, v. 21, n 34.¹

I. Context
Comm. Luc., c. 12, v. 57, n. 84.

This passage incorporates much of the same terminology employed in the Commentarius in libros Sententiarum and further implicates natural law as innate. Here, Bonaventure comments on the question Christ puts to the multitude (Luke 12, 56-57):

You hypocrites. You know how to discern the appearance of earth and sky; but how is it that you do not discern the present time? And why even of yourselves do you not judge that which is just?²

The significance of Christ’s words are explained by Bonaventure as follows:

We take this to mean: even if you neglect the more outward warning, do not neglect the more interior warning. For as it says in Ecclesiasticus [31, 18]:

¹This work was most likely composed between 1253-1257; see note 5 in Appendix B. Throughout our study, we will abbreviate the Commentarius in Evangeliunm Lucae as Comm. Luc.

²Ibid., (VII, 334b): "Secundo quantum ad commonitionem interioris iudicii subditur: Quid autem et a vobis ipsis non iudicatis quod iustum est?"
"Recognize the things of your neighbor from your self—that is, by your own natural judgment." For natural judgment has been inserted in man through which he is directed in living and choosing. As the Psalm says [4, 6]: "The light of your countenance is signed upon us, Lord;" and Isaiah [46, 8]: "Liars, return to your heart;" for what is said therein is just. 3

Bonaventure continues:

Among all things which are just, natural reason dictates that it is just (justum est) to submit to God and not to think mortal man equal to God. This, therefore, is eminently just—and everyone ought to judge so—namely, that God must be worshipped, and Christ honored, and the gift of the Holy Spirit be received with reverence; for "He who does not honor the Son does not honor the Father [John 5, 23]." It is even just to judge that "God will judge the world in equity [Psalm 95, 13], and to judge oneself in anticipation of that judgment; because, if we judge ourselves, we will not be judged. 4


4 Ibid., (VII, 334b): "Et inter omnia, quae iusta sunt, haec dictat ratio naturalis, quae dixit etiam Antiochus, secundi Machabaeorum [9, 12]: 'Iustum est subditum esse Deo, et mortalem hominem non paria Deo sentire.' Hoc ergo potissime est iustum, quod debet iudicare quilibet, scilicet Deum esse colendum et Christum honorandum et Spiritus sancti donum cum reverentia suscipiendum; quia, Ioannis [5, 36-47], 'qui non honorificat Filium non honorificat Patrem,' etc. Iustum est etiam iudicare, quod "Deus iudicabit orbem terrarum in aequitate [Psalm 95, 13], 'et se ipsum iudicando praevenire illud iudicium, quia, primae ad Corinthios [11, 31], 'si nosmetipsos diiudicaremus, non utique iudicaremus,'
Bonaventure then concludes:

Our conscience naturally murmurs against our evil deeds and bears witness that such evil, if disregarded, will not go unpunished. We must therefore be solicitous in meriting divine grace. [As St. Paul says] to the Romans [2, 14-15]: "When the Gentiles who do not have the [written] Law do those things that are of the Law, these not having the Law are a law to themselves, because they show the work of the Law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them." 5

What does this passage reveal about natural law? We have seen Bonaventure speak of a universal norm of conduct as impressed upon man's heart in terms of natural judgment, 6 the light of God's countenance, 7 truth, 8 and law. 9 To this constellation of terms Bonaventure now introduces the notions of justice, obligation, and culpability, which qualify man's relationship with God and etc."


6See Key-Text A, note 11.

7See Key-Text A, notes 27 and 28.

8See Key-Text A, notes 72-74.

9See Key-Text A, note 10.
his neighbor. Note also the implication of congruity between the written law and the law which is impressed upon the heart. These new characterizations carry over into Key-Text B where natural law is explicitly identified as innate.

II. Key-Text B

Commentarium in Evangelium Lucae, c. 19, v. 21, n. 34.

The scriptural passage upon which Bonaventure comments (Luke 19, 21) is as follows:

I was afraid of you, because you are a severe man; you take up what you did not lay down, and reap what you did not sow.

Bonaventure recalls the words of Christ with regard to those who would wrongly blame their laziness and negligence on the austerity of the Lord. On the contrary, the Lord says, "Learn from me, for I am gentle in heart." Nevertheless, it is true that the Lord harvests where he did not sow; that is to say, He holds guilty of impiety those to whom He did not minister the word of law or the word of the

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Comm. Luc., c. 19, v. 21, n. 34 (VII, 484a): "Secundo quantum ad excusationem nequam subdit: 'Timui enim te, quia homo austerus es;' in quo se excusat ut piger per timorem; Proverbiorum [22, 13]: 'Dicit piger: Leo est in via, leaena in itineribus, et in medio platearum occidendus sum.' Unde et talibus competit illud Psalmi [56, 6]: 'Trepidaverunt timore, ubi non erat timor.' Excusat nequiter, quia culpam suae negligentiae imponit austeritati Domini iudicantis, cum e contrario ipse dicat Matthaei [11, 29; cf. Romans 2, 4]: 'Discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde.'"
Gospel. How can this be? Because the law of nature (legem naturae) is impressed (impressam) in mens' hearts:

[1] However, the Lord punishes also those to whom he did not give the Law, from whom he requires justice, because even though they do not have the written law, nevertheless, they have the law of nature impressed interiorly. Therefore, [as St Paul says] to the Romans [Rom. 2, 12]: "Those who sinned without the Law will perish without the Law;" and then from the same place: "For when the Gentiles who do not have the Law do naturally those things which are of the Law, not having a law of this kind, they themselves are for themselves a law; for they show the work of the Law written in their hearts with their conscience giving witness to them from whence God will judge the secrets of men through Jesus Christ.

Punit autem Dominus illos etiam, quibus Legem non dedit, a quibus requirit iustitiam, quia, etsi non habent legem scriptam, habent tamen legem naturae interius impressam; propter quod dicitur ad Romanos secundo: "Qui sine Lege peccaverunt sine Lege peribunt." Unde et ibidem: "Cum enim gentes, quae Legem non habent, naturaliter ea quae Legis sunt, faciunt, eiusmodi Legem non habentes, ipsi sibi sunt lex, qui ostendunt opus Legis scriptum in cordibus suis, testimonium reddente illis conscientia ipsorum, cum iudicabit Deus occulta hominis per Iesum Christum.

11Ibid., (VII, 484b): "Et ad Romanos secundo: 'An ignoras, quoniam benignitas Dei ad poenitentiam te adducit?' Excusat etiam insipienter, quia, cum deberet loqui pro se, loquitur contra se, cum subdit: Tollis quod non possuisti, et metis quod non seminasti; Gloss: 'Metit Dominus, ubi non seminavit, id est, eos reos impietatis tenet, quibus verbum Legis, vel Evangelii non ministravit.' In quo allegat severitatem divini iudicii, quia Dominus punit etiam ignorantes; et ideo timere debet, quod multo fortius puniet negligentes; unde Ecclesiastici [2, 19]: 'Qui timent autem Dominum inquirent quae beneplacita sunt ei.'"
III. Commentary

Natural Law as Universal

Taken in tandem with Comm. Luc., c. 12, n. 84, which implies natural law as innate, Key-Text B (Comm Luc., c. 19, n. 34) clearly establishes natural law as the innately known standard of conduct which is common to all people. It is precisely in virtue of this innate and universal norm that the Lord holds guilty of impiety even those to whom the word of law or the Gospel has not been given. Moreover, the apparent congruence between this natural norm and the

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12 In Comm Luc., c. 12, n. 84, Bonaventure expressly indicates that the natural judgment has been inserted in man through which he is directed in living and choosing (see note 3 above); Bonaventure further acknowledges that the Gentiles have the Law written on their hearts (see note 5). He does not explicitly say in this passage, however, that natural law is interiorly impressed in man; rather, such an explicit statement appears in ibid., c. 19, n. 34 (see B [1]).

13 As exemplified by the Gentiles who have the law written in their hearts, natural law is evidently common to all cultures. Further, Bonaventure indicates that natural law is common to all times. See In III Sent., d. 37, a. 1, q. 3, fund. 2: "...obligatio, quae se extendit ad omne tempus attenditur secundum illam legem, cuius dictamen currit in omni tempore;.... Ergo obligatio illorum mandatorum attenditur secundum legem naturae." Cf. In IV Sent., d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, concl. (IV, 591b): "Communia sunt illa quae sunt quodam modo ex dictamine naturae, quod quia semper idem manet..." Cf. In I Sent., d. 47, a. un, q. 4, ad 3 (I, 847a): "Ad illud quod oblicitur, quod [Deus] potest super omnem legem datam; dicendum, quod verum est quod potest, quia potest imponere, sed non potest destruire iam positam. Quoniam enim ordinationem ad ipsum dicunt aliqua mandat, sicut non potest contra suam iustitiam facere, sic nec contra illa praecipere."
written law suggests some connection between them.  

**Natural Law and Written Law**

What, then, is the precise relationship between natural law and the written law? In his *Commentarius in libros Sententiarum*, Bonaventure states that the Decalogue precepts possess the force of obligation according to natural law; for, aside from Scripture, grace, the law of Moses and the law of the Evangelists, such precepts are themselves dictates of right reason. Consequently, inasmuch as the

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14 In a broad sense, the term *lex* for Bonaventure includes in its scope of meaning natural law, the law of Scripture, and the law of grace. See *In II Sent.*, d. 35, dub. 4, resp. (II, 837b): "Dicendum, quod lex aliquando accipitur stricte pro lex scripta vel data; aliquando large, prout comprehendit legem naturae et legem Scripturae et legem gratiae." What does Bonaventure mean by the term *gratia*? See *In II Sent.*, d. 26, a. un, q. 4, concl. (II, 638): "[Gratia] sit simpliciter donum gratuitum et omnino deorsum descenduns a Patre luminum." See *De donis S. S.* (ca. 1268), VIII, 6 (V, 495): "Gratia fundamentum est rectitudinis voluntatis et illustrationis perspicuae rationis." Cf. *Itin.* (ca. 1259), I, 8 (V, 298). For further discussion of grace as a gift of understanding for the healing of our fallen nature, see Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, 356-59.

15 See *In III Sent.*, d. 37, a. 1, q. 3, fund. 3 (III, 818): "Item, mandata, quae obligant hominem, circumscripita Scriptura et gratia, habent obligare secundum legem naturae; sed talia sunt mandata Decalogi--sunt enim de dictamine rationis rectae, circumscripita lege Moysi et lege Evangellii." Ibid., fund. 4 (III, 818): "Ea autem, quae in Decalogo prohibentur vel praecipiuntur, de se sunt mala vel bona, secundum quod dictat ratio recta--sicut Deum esse colendum, et parentes honorandos, hoc utique bonum est de se; falsum testimonium et homicidium, hoc utique de se malum est--sed talia spectant ad legem inditam: igitur obligatio mandatorum Decalogi attenditur secundum vinculum legis naturalis." Since obligation is rooted in natural law, and natural law pertains to knowledge of one's own indigent nature as disposed and inclined towards its true good (see
obligations explicated in the Decalogue are rooted in and follow from (radicaliter sequitur) natural law, the latter evidently holds an ontological priority over the Decalogue. Because of the obscurity of mind and weakness of will which mark man's fallen nature, the law was made explicit to help regulate him in justice; further, since the law written in the heart has been clouded by sin, and as man is now prone to sin though his bodily senses, it is fitting that the law be exteriorly written so as to be received through his bodily senses. 16

Key-Text A, notes 62-63), then obligation can be understood as arising from the knowledge of one's natural orientation for his proper end.

16See In III Sent., d. 37, a. 1, q. 3, concl. (III, 819b): "...obligatio mandatorum Decalogi radicaliter sequitur legem naturae, sed quantum ad explicationem sequitur legem Scripturae. Explicatio enim plenaria mandatorum Decalogi opportuna fuit secundum statum peccati propter obscurationem luminis rationis et propter obliquationem voluntatis. Quia enim voluntas corrupta prompta erat ad multiplicem deordinationem, oportebat eam religari per multiplicia mandata. Rursus, quoniam scriptura cordis interior propter peccatum erat obnubilata, et homo, qui fuerat spirituali mente praeditus, effectus erat sensibilis et carnalis; opportunum erat, ut exterius legeret et audiret per sensus corporis ea, per quae posset in rectitudinem iustitiae regulari." See also In II Sent., d. 35, dub. 4, concl. (II, 837); In III Sent., d. 40, q. 1 ad 3 (III, 886); Brevil. (ca. 1254-57), prol. n. 2 (V, 203-04).

There is yet another link between light, truth, Christ, and the law as written interiorly and exteriorly See Itin., VI, 7 (V, 312) where Bonaventure speaks of Christ as the book written within and without: "...librum scilicet scriptum intus et extra." See Key-Text A, note 100, where Christ is described as the interior teacher. See Key-Text A, note 32, where Bonaventure cites Augustine: "Inseruit nobis Deus naturale iudicatorium, ubi quid sit lucis, quid temembrarum, cogniscitur in libro lucis, qui veritas est, quia veritas in corde hominum naturaliter est impressa." As the interior law itself was explicated in history, so the
Natural Law and Justice

In addition to establishing an accordance between the impressed law of nature and the expressed law of Scripture, Bonaventure implies a connection between natural law and justice (\textit{iustitia}) (see [1] above). What, then, is the relationship between these two terms? As previously noted (see Key-Text A, note 72), natural law--qua similitude of eternal truth--is that innate principle by which the soul is rectified; now, Bonaventure tells us that man is rectified when his will is conformed to the \textit{sumnum bonum}; hence, man is conformed to the \textit{sumnum bonum} according to the direction of natural law. Bonaventure understands justice, however, as the rectitude of will (\textit{voluntas}) with respect to the \textit{sumnum bonum}.\footnote{See \textit{In II Sent.}, prooemium (II, 4b): "Similiter homo rectificatur, dum voluntas summae bonitati conformatur. Summa enim bonitas est summa aequitas sive iustitia.... Sed, ut dicit Anselmus, 'iustitia est rectitudo voluntatis:'" In this connection, see Key-Text A, note 15: "...ius naturale naturaliter ligat voluntatem."} In turn, the will's rectitude with respect to the \textit{sumnum bonum} depends on right reason, since natural reason

Son, the interior teacher and eternal Art and Wisdom of all creation, entered into history and became incarnate; hence the conformity and continuity between the interior law and exterior law as united in the Person of Christ. See \textit{Brevil.}, II, 11 (V, 229a) as cited in Key-Text C, note 27. See notes 29 and 33 below with regard to this theme of interiority and exteriority. In this vein, G. H. Tavard writes: "Christ is present to knowledge by a two-sided immanence; objectively, in the resemblance of God which constitutes created beings and is apprehended through all acts of knowledge that go to the core of their object; subjectively, through an active presence inside the mind's functioning." \textit{Transiency and Permanence}, 58.
dictates what is just (see note 4 above); but natural reason itself is rectified according to natural law; hence, it is evident that justice is rooted in natural law and represents the combined rectitude of both reason and will—inasmuch as the rectitude of the will (justice) depends upon the rectitude of reason (qua conformity to truth—i.e., natural law). On this score, charity (caritas) is seen to be equivalent with justice since charity is likewise defined by Bonaventure as right affection (rectitudo affectionis). Further, as justice involves the conformity of man to the summum bonum (see note 17), so the object of charity is the summum bonum qua good. Consequently, we can say that charity is rooted in justice which, in turn, is rooted in natural law. Indeed, inasmuch as charity consists in human affection as ordered—by right reason—to the summum bonum, charity represents the conformity of the whole man

18 See In I Sent., d. 48, a. 1, q. 2, fund. 4 (I, 853b): "Item, intellectus noster non potest conformari divino, quin efficiatur verus: ergo nec affectus noster potest conformari divino, quin efficiatur iustus; sicut enim veritas est rectitudo intellectus, sic iustitia est rectitudo affectus." See Text A, note 72, where rectitude is equated with truth, and truth is equated with natural law. See note 4 above where justice is linked with natural reason (ratio naturalis) inasmuch as everyone judges it just (est iustum)—according to natural reason—that God must be worshiped. See also 15 above.

19 See Key-Text-A, note 72, for further analysis of the term charity as rectitudo affectionis.

20 See In III Sent., d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5 (III, 593a): "...quia obiectum caritatis non est quocumque bonum, sed bonum summum et bonum sub ratione boni." See Key-Text A, note 72.
(intellect and will, soul and body) to the sumnum bonum; accordingly, charity is said to constitute the perfection of the law.\textsuperscript{21}

**Natural Law as Relational-Personal**

If justice is natural law as it pertains to the will, and since justice itself involves an ordination of persons,\textsuperscript{22} then natural law itself implies an ordination of persons. Indeed, Bonaventure states that natural law regulates man’s relationship towards God (see note 21 above), towards his neighbor,\textsuperscript{23} and towards himself.\textsuperscript{24} In

\textsuperscript{21}See *Itin.*, I, 4 (V, 297a): "Ex quibus omnibus disponere se debet ad conscendendum in Deum, ut ipsum diligat ex tota mente, ex toto corde et ex tota anima, in quo consistit perfecta Legis observatio et simul cum hoc sapientia Christiana." See Text-A, note 46 for the full citation. See *In III Sent.*, d. 39, a. un., q. 2, fund, 1 (III 641a): "Primo per illud mandatum, Deuteronomii sexto [vers. 5]: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo et ex tota anima tua; hoc dicitur esse primum et summum mandata: si ergo nulli alii praecipitur ut impendamus totam affectum nisi soli Deo; videtur quod in dilectione caritatis Deus teneat primum et summum locum." See John 14, 15: "If you love me, keep the commandments [of the law].

\textsuperscript{22}See *In III Sent.*, d. 33, dub. 1 (III 728b): "Alio modo dicitur iustitia rectitudo ordinans ad alterum in reddendo ei quod suum est." In this regard, see notes 4 and 15 above.

\textsuperscript{23}See *In III Sent.*, d. 37, a. 1, q. 3, concl. (III, 819): "Statum vero naturae lapsae respicit obligatio mandatorum Decalogi implicite secundum duo praecepta iuris naturalis, quae natura semper dictabat, videlicet quod faceret alii quod sibi vellet fieri, et non faceret alii quod sibi nollet fieri. Statum autem naturae institutae respiciebat quodam modo implicite, quodam modo explicite. Quaedam enim sunt praecepta ordinantia ad Deum, quaedam vero ordinantia ad proximum." See Quaracchi editors’ note 6 (III, 819) for references to Hugo of St. Victor and St. Augustine on this point. See *In II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, concl.
each case, the standard of justice (i.e., natural law) is based upon the distinction and relationship discerned between relative goods and the infinite and immutable good (see Key-Text A, notes 62-63, and 86). According to this metaphysical knowledge—and the innate cognition of his own nature as disposing and inclining him towards his proper good—man bears the obligation (obligatio) to regulate his conduct properly with regard to God, neighbor, and self.\footnote{Thus Bonaventure’s moral philosophy, while clearly rooted in his metaphysics (see Text-A, note 33, 86 and 100), is at once what might be called today “personalistic” insofar as law or justice for Bonaventure presupposes a relation of persons. What does Bonaventure mean by person (persona)? See In I Sent., d. 25, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (I, 436b): "Et propter ea est intelligendum, quod persona dicitur rationalis naturae suppositum proprietate distinctum, secundum omnes qui intelligent eius significacionem specialem; sed suppositum rationalis naturae constat esse substantiam, proprietatem distinguentem constat relationem. Cum ergo persona utrumque importat, scilicet suppositum et proprietatem, necesse est dici secundum substantiam et secundum relationem." See ibid., a. 1, q. 2, ad 2 (I, 440b): ". . . dicendum, quod ‘rationale’ dicitur uno modo, quod habet potentiam discernendi bonum a malo, verum a falso [see note 14]—et sic Deo et creaturae convenit." Ibid., a. 2, q. 2, concl. (I, 444b): "Quoniam ergo consimilis habitudo reperitur in personis creatis et in increatis, hinc est,
For Bonaventure, then, natural law represents an ordination of persons which entail a radical and ultimate accountability towards God—and by extension, relative obligations towards other persons and oneself (see note 4 above).

**Natural Law as Preeminent**

An ontological and psychological priority of law over the habitus of intellect, will, and free choice is again evident from the above exposition because disregard of the law cannot nullify the law nor eradicate the innate knowledge of the law; nor does the act of free choice establish man as the arbiter of justice. On the contrary, man knows in his heart that he is obligated to live and

[quod hoc nomen persona non dicitur aequivoce, sed analogice.... Et quod quæritur, utrum persona sit commune personis creatis et increatis; dicendum quod si dicitur commune univocum, non."

The *sumnum bonum*, which is the object of charity (see note 20 above) and the perfection of the Law (see note 21), is the final end of both metaphysics and morality (See Key-Text A, notes 86 and 100) The *sumnum bonum* and ultimate end is, of course, God, Who Bonaventure identifies as a Trinity of persons. See In I Sent., d. 4, dub. 5, respl (I, 105b): "Dicendum, quod hoc nomen 'Trinitas' est collectivum personarum; 'unas' autem et 'solus,' addita huic termino 'Deus' non dicunt discretionem personae, sed naturae ab aliiis. Unde unus solus Deus dicitura una sola natura; et quoniam in divinis est idem natura et res naturae sive suppositorum, ideo praedicatione per identitatem Trinitas de Deo praedicatur." Only the Divine Trinity can completely satisfy the human soul. See ibid., d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, fund. 3 (I, 40a): "Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus: 'Anima totius Trinitatis capacem nihil minus quam Trinitas potest implere.'" Cf. Key-Text A, note 84 Hence, natural law is no less metaphysical for being rooted in a relation of persons (vs. G. Marcel); nor is it any less personal for its metaphysical intelligibility (vs. M. Heidegger).
choose according to natural judgment (see note 3 above), or right reason (see notes 4 and 15 above), which tells him what is just.\textsuperscript{26} Thus, while man might freely disregard and violate the law, he cannot do so without incurring punishment and remorse of conscience (see note 5 above).\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26}Although man is endowed with free choice by which to act justly or unjustly, his \textit{judgment} is not free to determine justice itself. Judgment for St. Bonaventure involves an act of reason regulated by a rule of truth or higher law; choice, however, implies an act of reason regulated by a command of the will. One who decides a case according to law is called a judge; but one who decides a case according to his own will is called an arbiter. Thus, since the decisions of free choice more properly enjoin the will than the precept of law, the deliberative faculty is properly named from choice rather than from judgment. See \textit{II Sent.}, d. 25, p. 1, dub. 1, resp. (II, 607a): "Magis autem facultas illa censetur hoc nomine, ut dicatur liberum arbitrium quam liberunt iudicium, pro eo quod iudicium importat actum rationis regulatum secundum regulas veritatis sive supernae legis; arbitrium vero importat actum rationis regulatum secundum regulas veritatis sive supernae legis; arbitrium vero importat actum rationis regulatum secundum imperium voluntas nutum magis quam iuxta iuris praeceptum; hinc est, quod magis proprie nominatur per nomen arbitrii quam per nomen iudicii." Hence, justice for Bonaventure is not determined by human choice, but rather is either freely embraced or disregarded; accordingly, the free choice of a human action (precisely as human) may be either just or unjust.

\textsuperscript{27}Because of an obscurity of intellect, a man might confuse an evil for a good and thus not properly respond to the impulse of synderesis; moreover, a man can impede and weaken his conscience through sinful conduct and thereby deaden his sense of remorse; nevertheless, the stimulus of synderesis towards good can never be completely obliterated. See \textit{In II Sent.}, d. 39, a. 2, q. 2, fund. 3 (II, 912a): "...quae naturaliter insunt sunt inseparabilia; sed synderesis inest nobis naturaliter: ergo videtur, quod actum eius non possumus omnino per peccatum amittere, cum 'vitium, sicut dicit Augustinus, non deleat extrema naturae vestigia.'" Ibid., concl. (II, 912a): "...synderesis quantum ad actum impediri potest, sed extingui non potest." Obstinancy in sin, however, can permanently impede the natural instinct of synderesis. The damned who are confirmed
Granted that free choice for Bonaventure is a *sine qua non* of the moral life, it is not the ground or standard of morality; rather, morality is rooted in the *obligation* to live and choose according to justice—a justice which is universal and innately known by virtue of natural law.

**Natural Law as Intimate**

Correlative to the metaphysical, personal, relational, and preeminent aspects already mentioned, there is a certain interiority which characterizes natural law; for natural law is not only innate to the soul, but is said to be written in the heart.\(^{28}\) Evidently, the heart for Bonaventure is associated with truth as intimate or latent.\(^{29}\)

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in evil can no longer effectively be inclined toward good; however, their conscience endures in an endless pang of self-accusation and remorse. See Ibid., concl. (II, 912b): "Propter duritiam obstinationis impeditur etiam synderesis, ne [sic] ad bonum stimulet, sicut in damnatis, qui adeo sunt in malo confirmati, ut nunquam possint ad bonum inclinari. Et ideo synderesis, quantum ad instigationem ad bonum, sempiternum habet impedimentum; et propterea, quantum ad istum actum, potest dici extincta; non tamen est extincta simpliciter, quia habet alium usum, videlicet remurmurationis. Secundum enim illum usum, secundum quam synderesis habet pungere et remurmurare contra malum, maxime vigebit in damnatis."

\(^{28}\)See note 5 and section [1] above; see also Text-A, notes 10 and 11. See Comm. in Sapientiam, XV, 13 (VI, 207b): "Dicendum, quod hoc scit vel potest habitu legis naturalis scriptae in corde suo."

\(^{29}\)Bonaventure notes a contrast between the head and the heart with respect to truth as manifest or as intimate and latent. See In III Sent., d. 13, a. 2, q. 3, ad 1 (III, 289b): "Ad illud vero obiicitur, quod generalior est influenza cordis quam capitis; dicendum, quod generalior est secundum veritatem, sed tamen influentia capitis generalior est secundum manifestationem, pro eo quod in
Consider in this regard the exhortation by Isaiah as cited by Bonaventure: "'Redite, praevaricatories, ad cor;'
ibi enim dictatur quod iustum est (see note 3 above)." The manifold implications here are that: (1) deceit is linked with injustice; (2) truthfulness is linked with justice; (3) injustice represents a departure or deviation from the heart; (4) justice represents a return to the heart; moreover, (5) because justice is found in the heart, it is implicated together with truth, which is proper to the heart. In this connection we have seen natural law equated with both truth (see Key-Text A, note 72) and justice (see note 18 and section [1] above). We are thus led to regard truth, rectitude, and justice as aspects of same thing--
namely, natural law. Now consider Bonaventure’s words as cited earlier (Key-Text A, note 73):


According to truth, God is more intimate to the soul than the soul is to itself; but may it not be equivalently stated that, according to natural law (qua scriptum in corde), God is more intimate to the soul than the soul is to itself? In view of this intimacy between man and God--an

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Since the truth here is evidently the truth of natural law qua scriptum in corde, God is intimately united with the soul by way of the heart. See In III Sent., d. 35, a. un., q. 3, concl. (III, 778a): "Dicendum, quod cognitio de Deo sub ratione veri potest haberi secundum triplicem modum: uno modo habetur cognitio de Deo per simplicim assensum; alio modo per rationis admimiculum; terio modo per simplicem contuitum. Primum est virtutis fidei, cuius est assentire; secundum est doni intellectus, cuius est credita per rationem intelligere; tertium est beatitudinis munditiae cordi, cuius est Deum videre." Note here that the beatific vision of God is held by way of the heart; such vision constitutes the perfection of man (see Text-A, note 100; cf. Itin., I, 2-4 (V, 296-97), regarding the interior journey of man towards God). Consequently, if natural law, according to the orders of essence and knowledge/precept, can be characterized in terms of latent interiority and explication (or manifestation; see note 28 above), what can be said of natural law in the order of perfection? Surely, natural law qua perfection could be qualified at once as intimate (implicit) and manifest (explicit). Such a qualification would jibe with Bonaventure’s trinitarian theology and metaphysics of emanation, exemplarity, and consummation (see Key-Text A, note 33).

The term contuition as cited above specifically refers to an indirect knowledge of God through His effects. See Itin., VII, 1, (V, 312): "...mens nostra contuita est Deum extra se per vestigia et in vestigiis, intra se per imaginem
intimacy attained through the truth and justice of natural law—the personal, relational, and preeminent aspects of natural law can be seen as involving and explaining one another. Man bears in himself, from his origin (origine), the light of the divine visage (see Key-Text A, note 80); further, the soul possesses, from its creation (creatione), a light or natural judgment (see Key-Text A, note 37). Certainly, then, the habitus of natural law (qua light, truth, and justice) is implicated as residing at the core of man's being; and it is precisely at this level of interiority that man bears his most intimate relationship with God. Through natural law as written in the heart, et in imagine, supra se per divinae lucis similitudinem super nos relucentem et in ipsa luce, secundum quod possibile est secundum statum viae et exercitium mentis nostrae." See J. M. Bissen, "De la contuition," Etudes Franciscaines, 46 (1934), 559-69. Contuition is thus distinguished from a more direct intuition such as the grasping of axioms or first principles. However, according to some interpreters, the above passage suggests that there may be a form of contuition which is intuitive to some degree. This possibility is noted by T. Mathias, "Bonaventurian Ways to God," 189, note 22; see also J. M. Bissen, "De la contuition," 565-68.

God is intimately present to man precisely because man is created by God. See In IV Sent., d. 4, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, contra 2 (IV, 103b): "Necesse est, causam esse coniunctam effectui, alioquin, si causa praeterit et non est, ergo nihil facit." See In III Sent., d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (10a): "Et quemadmodum Deus, cum est in creatura per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam...." In I Sent., d. 37, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (I, 639a): "Quia enim creatura est et acceptit esse ab alio, qui eam fecit esse, cum prius non esset; ex hoc non est suum esse, et ideo non est purus actus, sed habet possibilitatem; et ratione huius habet fluxibilitatem et variabilitatem, ideo caret stabilitate, et ideo non potest esse nisi per praesentiam eius qui dedit ei esse. Exemplum huius apertum est in impressione formae.
man is oriented beyond himself toward God. Hence, God is at once immanent and transcendent to man; \(^{33}\) correlatively, since natural law is that by which man is conformed to God (made deiform) as exemplar, and ordered beyond himself towards God as object (see Key-Text A, notes 80 and 81), it

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\(^{33}\)See \textit{Itin.}, V, n. 8, (V, 310): "Quia perfectissimum et immensum, ideo est intra omnia, non inclusum, extra omnia, non exclusum, supra omnia, non elatum, infra omnia, non prostratum." This passage makes it clear, however, that Bonaventure is not a pantheist. Cf. \textit{In III Sent.}, d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4 (I, 11a), where the relationship of a creature with God is described as a sponge immersed in the sea. This same metaphor appears is St. Augustine's \textit{Confessions}, VII, 5, 7 (\textit{PL} 32, 736) where Augustine describes his view of God and creation during the time he was a Manichean. The metaphor is also found in Plotinus' \textit{Enneads}, IV, 3, 9, from where it probably derives. For further discussion of the paradoxical relationships between man and God, see Ewert Cousins, "The Coincidence of Opposites in the Christology of Saint Bonaventure, \textit{Franciscan Studies} 28 (1968), 27-45.
follows that natural law can likewise be characterized as immanent and, perhaps in a sense, transcendent to the soul.\(^{34}\)

IV. Summary and Conclusion

Let us summarize the above discussion as follows.

1. Because natural law is written in the human heart, it is universal to all men; natural law thus establishes an inexorable and common moral order which transcends cultural and historical bounds (see note 13 above).

2. Natural law is intrinsically relational and personal—that is, it pertains to an inherent ordination of rational creatures (see note 25 above) in a communion of knowledge and love with God and one another. As an ordination of persons, natural law is a norm of justice which entails obligations towards God, other persons, and oneself.\(^{35}\)

\(^{34}\)Since natural law is intrinsically relational, it bears a transcendent aspect insofar as it orients a person beyond his own being towards another (cf. Key-Text A, note 40). The notion of natural law as intrinsically relational (see notes 22-25 above with regard to persons, and note 32 with regard to efficient causality) is further corroborated in view of the psychological dependency man has upon God as his Final End (see Key-Text A, notes 82-84): because of his created nature which renders him indigent, the intellect and will of man cannot not rest in the finite self, nor in any other creature; rather, the human person can only be fulfilled by the infinite Trinity: "Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus: 'Animam totius Trinitatis capacem nihil minus quam Trinitas potest imprire.'" See note 25 above.

\(^{35}\)We will explore the nature and dynamics of this ordination of persons in Key-Text C.
3. Natural law qua habitus *per naturalem originem* is ontologically prior to the intellective and volitional habitus (see Key-Text A, notes 33 and 71); as such, it holds an ontological priority over the habitus of free choice (see note 26 above). Indeed, man is obligated to live and choose according to the norm of natural law qua habitus *per innatam dispositionem*; hence, natural law precepts hold a psychological priority over the act of free choice. Accordingly, while a moral act requires free choice to be characteristically moral (or immoral), such a deliberative act is itself based upon natural law.

4. As impressed within the heart of man, natural law is situated at the core of man's being. As the norm of truth and justice, natural law directs man beyond his own interiority towards God and other persons. Hence, we may say that natural law is at once immanent and transcendent to the soul.

5. Given its relational character, what can be said of natural law as innate? Inasmuch as (a) natural law for Bonaventure involves relations among corporeal creatures (human and subhuman), and (b) knowledge of such relations is acquired through the senses, natural law knowledge but must be acquired through sensible experience; to this extent, natural law knowledge for St. Bonaventure is not innate.
CHAPTER 3

KEY-TEXT C

De Perfectione Evangelica, q. 4, a. 1, concl.¹

I. Context

(a) De Perf. Evang., q. 4, a. 1, fund. 2, 4, 7, 10.

Article 1 of De Perf. Evang., q. 4, opens with the question, "Utrum sit consonum iuri naturali, quod homo obediendo subiaceat alteri." Both the fundamenta and sed contra statements which precede and follow Bonaventure's conclusion give still broader scope to natural law. One of the arguments which affirm obedience as consonant with natural law states that the Decalogue is written in the heart through the dictate of nature. Nature itself teaches, for example, that parents are to be honored; hence, the duty of honor is consonant with natural law; and since honor is accomplished through rendering obedience, obedience itself is consonant with natural law.²

¹This work was most likely composed between 1255-1256; see Appendix B, note 6. In this study, we will abbreviate the De Perfectione Evangelica as De Perf. Evang.

²Ibid., fund. 2 (V, 179): "Item, lex decalogi scripta in corde hominis dictat per dictamen naturae; sed ipsa hoc praecipit, scilicet parentes honorari: ergo illud est consonum iuri naturali. Hoc autem fit per obsequium obedientiae: ergo." See Key-Text B, note 14.
Again, natural law dictates order (ordo); but, as Augustine states, "Order is the arrangement of things equal and unequal, each assigned to its proper place"; thus, if order involves subordination of one thing to another and natural law requires order, then natural law commands that one ought to be subject to another.³

More precisely, natural law dictates a hierarchal order (ordinem hierarchicum) which descends from the highest hierarchy through the angels to human beings; but it is in keeping with this hierarchal order that the lower obey the higher; therefore, obedience is implicit in natural law.⁴

Again, natural law dictates that the entire man obey right reason in itself; accordingly, natural law reasonably commands that the less skilled and ignorant submit in obedience to the more skilled and knowledgeable; it follows,

³Ibid., fund. 4 (V, 179): "Item, ius naturae dictat ordinem; sed 'ordo est parium dispariumque sua loca cuique tribuens dispositio,' ut dicit Augustinus decimo nono de Civitate Dei: si ergo ordo est, quod unun subdatur alteri, et ius naturae dictat ordinem; dicat ergo, quod unus alteri debet subiici." See Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XIX, 13, n. 1 (PL 41, 640). Cf. Itin., I, 14 (V, 299b).

⁴Ibid., fund. 7 (V, 180): "Item, ius naturae dictat ordinem hierarchicum, qui descendit a summa hierarcha per angelicam usque ad humanam; sed ordini hierarchico consonat, quod inferior superiori obtemperat: ergo, etc." With regard to the meaning of hierarchia, cf. Dionysius, De Caelesti Hierarchia, c. 4, §3 (PG 3, 179 sqq.): "Quasi id ordo divinae legis sanxerit, ut per superiora ista quae inferiorea sunt, ad divinum numen adducantur." Ibid., c. 10 (PG 271 sqq.). See In II Sent., d. 9, praenotata (II, 237a-241).
then, that obedience is consonant with natural law.\(^5\)

(b) De Perf. Evang., solutio oppositorum 4, 6, 9.

Bonaventure presents the following objection: the law of nature dictates that the dignity of image in man must be preserved; but image comes immediately from God and is subject solely to Him because man is formed as image by the first Truth without any other nature intervening; therefore, for man to be subject to another man through obedience seems to be opposed to his truly being an image of God.\(^6\) Consequently, man’s obedience to another creature seems contrary to the law of nature.

To this objection Bonaventure answers that the submission of one person to another befits man as an image of God, not as originally formed (or created) but as deformed or even as needing reformation. Such is the case in the Sacraments: someone in need of reformation is in a certain sense subjected to the sensible sacramental

\(^5\)Ibid., fund. 10 (V, 180a): "Item, de dictamine legis naturae est, quod homo totus obediat rationi rectae in se: ergo pari ratione ius naturae dicat, quod minus peritus et ignorans obediendo subiaceat magis perito et scienti: ergo videtur, quod homo obtemperet homini, consonum esse iuri naturali." See Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, II, 2 (1103b31): "That we must act according to the right rule is a common principle and must be assumed." Cf. ibid. VI, 12, (1143b30 sqq.).

\(^6\)Ibid., ad opp. 4 (V, 180b): "Item, ius naturae dictat, dignitatem imaginis esse servandum; sed imago est immediate a Deo et soli Deo subiecta, quia 'nulla interposita natura, a prima Veritate formatur.' Ergo videtur, hoc, quod homo subiaceat obediendo homini, esse contra dignitatem imaginis." Bonaventure cites Augustine, De Div. Quaest. 83, q. 51, n. 2 (PL 40, 33). See Key-Text A, note 84.
elements, although it is fitting that such a person be subject to God alone. Bonaventure here distinguishes the human soul qua image either as image simply (in se) or as incarnate (relatione ad carnem): as simple image, the human soul by reason of itself owes its being [created and] infused into a body solely to God; hence the soul is subject to God alone; yet, by reason of that flesh [into which the soul is infused], and which it has with the help of human generative powers, the soul is subject to its origin just as offspring are subject to their parents—but in such a way that [corporeal] generation in no way compromises the soul's status as a genuine image of God.

To the argument that natural law dictates that love must be preserved and that love produces unity, conformity and equality, Bonaventure replies that the perfection of a

7Ibid., ad 4 (V, 182a): "Ad illud quod obiiciter de dignitate imaginis, iam potest patere responsio: quia, licet huius subjectio non competat imagini formatae, competit tamen imagini deformatae, vel etiam reformandae; sicut videmus in Sacramentis, quod homo reparandus quodam modo subiicitur sensibilibus elementis, licet homini stanti conveniat subiici respectu solius Dei."

8Ibid., (V, 182a): "Aliter etiam potest dici, quod dupliciter est loqui de imagine: vel in se, vel in relatione ad carnem; et licet ipsa anima ratione sui a solo Deo habeat infundi et illi soli subiici, ratione tamen carnis, quae habet per vim humani ministerii propagari, subiicii habet suae origini, sicut proles parenti, ita tamen, quod ex hoc in nullo dignitati imaginis praetuditicium generetur." Cf. Peter Lombard, IV Sent., d. I, c. 5 (p. 234). As his reply (see note 6 above) indicates, Bonaventure does not dispute the truth or validity of the objection's first and second premises; nor does he dispute the conclusion, if properly qualified.
living body requires a complex equality of parts in which every member is distinguished and some members are ordered ahead of others; so it must be understood concerning the mystical body of Christ. Therefore, the unity of love does not exclude the multiform gifts and distinctions of honors and offices, according to which one member stands in subjection to one who governs. Hence, in preserving love, natural law preserves obedience.⁹

To the objection that the honor owed to God must not be given to a creature, Bonaventure answers that honor is owed to God Himself and to man as His image; indeed, the honor shown to a man because of God is honor given to God (ad Deum refertur). What is not to be attributed to another creature is precisely the honor of worship which belongs exclusively to God. Nevertheless, governance, rule and sovereignty over subjects are not unfitting and, in fact, accord with God in His working through other agents (per ministrum); honor is thus shown to a creature through God, because of God, and according to God; for such honor refers to God entirely

⁹Ibid., ad 6 (V, 182b): "Ad illud obiicitur, quod ius naturae dictat, caritatem esse servandam; dicendum, quod sicut ad perfectionem corporis vivi requiritur aequalitas complexionis, in qua omnia membra conformantur, et multiformitas organizationis, in qua membra distinguunter et ordinantur et secundum variam influentiam alia aliis praeponuntur; sic intelligendum est circa corpus Christi mysticum [I Cor. 12, 12]. Et ideo unitas caritatis non excludit multiformitatem charismatum et discretionem dignitatum et officiorum, secundaum quae unum membrum alteri habet subiici et secundum legem praelationis et subiectionis ab altero gubernari."
according to right order which is preserved (servat) in God's governance of the world (gubernando mundum).\textsuperscript{10}

As the above arguments collectively demonstrate, obedience is indeed consonant with natural law; moreover, these various demonstrations shed light on the nature of natural law--i.e., man's right ordination to God and creatures. From these arguments, two syllogisms can be formulated to establish a double ordination proper to natural law:

1. Natural law requires that the dignity of [man as]

\textsuperscript{10}Ibid., ad 9 (V, 182b): "Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod honor Deo debitus nulli alii est reddendus; dicendum, quod honor debetur Deo et in propria natura et in imagine sua; honor enim, qui exhibetur homini propter Deum, ad Deum refurtur; et ideo quod proprium est Dei, scilicet honor latriae, non debet alteri attribui. Quod autem convenit Deo operanti per ministrum, scilicet gubernatio et regnum et imperium respectu subjectorum, non est inconveniens, quod per Deum et propter Deum et secundum Deum alii tribuatur, quia totum refurtur ad ipsum secundum rectum ordinem, quam guidem servat in gubernando mundum." Cf. ibid., ad 8 (V, 182): "Sicut enim [lex naturale] dictat, quod quis debet subiici alteri ad obedientiam; sic dictat, quod alter debet praefici alteri per providentiam." In upholding an ordination of authority and submission among creatures, Bonaventure warns against proud ambition and arrogance. See ibid., (V, 182): "Sicut enim dictat, quod quis debet subiici alteri ad obedientiam; sic dictat, quod alter debet praefici alteri per providentiam. Sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod ibi debeat appeti praelatio, sicut appetitur subiection. Nam appetitus subiectionis consonat humilitati et reverentia; appetitus vero praelationis degenerat ut plurimum in fastum ambitionis et arrogantiae: ideo, quamvis locus dignitatis recte possit administrari secundum dictamen naturae, non tamen debet appeti propter annexus typum superbiae." Pride and arrogance can be understood as an inordinate adherence to a mutable (created) good. The disorder here lies precisely in failing to reduce the merely finite to the infinite and supreme Good; such disorder constitutes sin (see Key-Text A, notes 54, 77 and 86).
image be preserved; but [man as] image is immediately (immediate) ordered to God; thus natural law dictates this direct ordination to Him (see notes 6 and 8).

2. Conversely, obedience to other creatures befits man, particularly man as incarnate and fallen image;¹¹ further, God governs through the mediation of others (per ministrum) and is given honor through the honor shown to men (ad Deum honor refertur); thus, since natural law maintains the integrity of [man as] incarnate image, it follows with equal force that natural law involves a mediated ordination to God (see notes 8 and 10).

3. As love (see note 8), honor (see note 2), right reason (see note 5), the hierarchal ordination of persons (see notes 3 and 4), and the immediate and mediate ordination of man to God (see notes 8 and 10) are implicated within the scope and meaning of natural law, so natural law itself (qua dictate of nature) is implicated as written in the heart (see note 2 above).

4. Inasmuch as (a) man's ordination to God is immediate, and (b) knowledge of God is innate, knowledge of natural law--as it pertains to man's direct ordination to God--is innate. However, inasmuch as (a) man is mediately

¹¹The justification of obedience as befitting man--and hence the consonance of obedience with natural law--is argued from the standpoint of love (see note 8), honor (see note 2), right reason (see note 5), and the hierarchal ordination of persons (i.e., human beings and angels) to God (see notes 3 and 4).
ordered to God through creatures, and (b) knowledge of creatures is acquired through the senses, knowledge of natural law—as it pertains to man's indirect ordination to God—is acquired.

Let us now turn to Bonaventure's concluding discussion for a further account of natural law as innate.

II. Key-Text C

De Perf. Evang., q. 4, a. 1, concl.

Respondeo:

To understand what was said above, it must be noted that natural law, as Augustine states, is the impression made in the soul by the eternal law; the eternal law, which is permanent and unchanging, is that by which everything else is ordered. Whence Augustine [states]: "So that I can briefly express in words...the notion of eternal law which is impressed in us, I will say: it is that law by which man is just and by virtue of which everything is most perfectly

12 See Augustine, De Div. Quaest. 83, q. 53, n. 2 (PL 40, 36): "Ex hac igitur ineffabili atque sublimi rerum administratione, quae fit per divinam providentiam, quasi transcripta est naturalis lex in animam rationalem, ut in ipsa vitae huius conversatione moribusque terrenis homines talium distributionum imagines servent." Cf. ibid., q. 51, n. 2 (PL 40, 32).

13 See Augustine, De Libero Arbitriu m, I, c. 6, n. 15 (PL 32, 1229): "Simul etiam te videre arbitior in illa temporali nihil esse justum atque legillum, quod non ex hac aeterna sibi homines derivarint: nam si populus ille quodam tempore juste honores dedit, quodam rursus juste non dedit; haec vicissitudo temporalis ut justa esset, ea illa aeternitate tracta est, qua semper justum est gravem populum honores dare, levem non dare.... Ut igitur breviter aeternae legis notionem, quae impressa nobis est quantum valeo verbis explicem, ae est qua justum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima.... Cum ergo haec sit una lex, ex qua illae omnes temporales ad homines regendos variantur, num ideo ipsa variari ullo modo potest?"
ordered." Recall what is said in *De Civitate Dei*: \(^{14}\) "Order is the arrangement of things equal and unequal, each assigned to its proper place." Therefore, if the proper role of a superior is to rule, and that of an inferior to submit, natural law, which flows from eternal law, naturally commands that the inferior submit in obedience to the superior; and this has some general dictates— but in different ways, inasmuch as superiority and inferiority are found to involve a diversity of differences.

Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod, secundum quod dicit Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum, lex naturalis est impressio facta in anima lege aeterna; lex autem aeterna est illa, qua incommutabili permamente, cetera ordinantur. Unde Augustinus, primo de Libero Arbitrio: "Ut breviter aeternae legis notionem, quae impressa est nobis, quantum valeo, verbis explicem: ea est, qua iustum est, ut omnia sint ordinatissima." Sed sicut dicitur decimo nono de Civitate Dei, decimo tertio capitulo: "Ordo est parium disparium quae sue cuique loca tribuens dispositio." Si ergo superioris est praeesse, et inferioris subesse, lex naturalis, quae manat a lege aeterna, naturaliter dictat, quod inferior superiori obediendo subiaceat; et hoc quidem dictat in generalitate quadam, diversimode tamen, secundum quod superioritatis et inferioritatis reperire contingit differentias diversas.

III. Commentary

**Nature of Natural Law Order**

In the contextual arguments presented above, a broader characterization of natural law is presented. Let us now give an integral account of this presentation. It is stated that natural law dictates right reason (see note 5 above) and preserves love (see note 9 above); but as we have previously seen, right reason and love (i.e., right affection) constitute rectitude— that is, the ordination of

\(^{14}\)See Augustine, *De Civitate Dei.*, XIX, c. 13 (PL 41, 640); see note 3 above.
man towards his final end and supreme good. Natural law is
none other than this rectitude or order (see Key-Text A,
notes 46 and 71; Key-Text B, notes 17 and 18); and the
perfection of this order consists in loving God with one's
whole mind, heart, and soul (see Key-Text A, notes 46 and
100; Key-Text B, notes 20 and 21). What is further developed
in the above contextual arguments is the nature of this
ordination which specifies a complex and multiform hierarchy
of persons (see notes 3, 4, and 9 above). This hierarchal
ordination is seen to involve two distinct, yet
complementary, directions of activity: (1) God governs the
world through the mediation of creatures (see note 10); (2)
through the mediation of creatures God is reverenced and
loved (see note 8 and 10). We can thus say that the order of
natural law involves a double movement of what may loosely
be described as (1) an outward extension or descent (action
from God), and (2) an inward return or ascent (action
towards God).\footnote{Such movements appear to correspond with the extreme
terms of Bonaventure's general metaphysics--namely,
emanation and consumption. See Hex. (ca. 1273), I, 17 (V,
332b): "Domini, exivi a te summo, venio ad te summum et per
te summum.--Hoc est medium metaphysicum reducens, et haec
est tota nostra metaphysica: de emanatione, de
exemplaritate, de consummatione." The natural law ordination
of image will presently be shown to correspond to the second
metaphysical moment--namely, exemplarity. For a discussion
of this double or cyclic movement in Bonaventure's general
synthesis, see A. Schaefer, "The Position and Function of
Man," 262-64.} Now let us investigate what this double
movement further entails.
Taken as image simply (in se; see note 8 above) the human person is directly (immediate) ordered to God; this direct and intimate relationship with God is possible by virtue of the rational soul's capacity to know, love, and praise God.\textsuperscript{16} It is recalled (see Key-Text A, notes 78-80) that the rational creature, qua image, is born (or destined) to be ordered (nata est ordinari) directly to God as its beatitude both as uncreated (God thus is objectum) and as created (God thus is informans); beatitudo is accorded primarily to uncreated beatitude as the fulfilling end as objectum, and secondarily to created beatitude which is fulfilling as informans or deiform in virtue of its object; by virtue of this divine influence in the soul (influentia Dei), the soul can be configured (configurari) to God. As image simply (in se), the soul therefore (1) is directly created by, and ordered to, God as object; and by virtue of the influencing presence of its object, the soul (2) becomes

\textsuperscript{16}See note 15 above; Key-Text A, note 73; Key-Text B, note 31. Gilson writes in this regard: "...nul effet ne s'ordonnera plus complètement vers elle que celui qui la connaîtra et l'aimera. Connaître et vouloir une Perfection qui ne vous a connu que par soi et voulu quae pour soi, c'est reproduire ce vouloir et cette pensée dans l'acte même par lequel ils vous ont conféré l'être. Plus profondément qu'un effet de Dieu, l'image est donc un analogue de la vie divine, et c'est pourquoi, lorsqu'elle s'observe attentivement elle-même, l'âme discerne comme un reflet de l'essence créatrice au sein de ses obscures profondeurs." La philosophie de saint Bonaventure, 177.
God-like (deiformis). In this connection, recall that it is natural law by which the soul is rightly ordered to God both as (1) objectum and (2) informans (see Key-Text A, note 81). Thus, within the double movement noted above (see note 15 above), a third and middle moment or phase of the natural law order can be identified as image. Natural law thus involves an immediate and trifold ordination of the soul in se to God as efficient cause, exemplar cause, and final cause; these three relations to God appear to coincide with the general phases of Bonaventure’s metaphysics—namely: emanation (descent), exemplarity (image), and consummation.

17 The causal (efficient) and teleological ordination is said to be primary with respect to the ordination of image since the being of an image is derived from an exemplar-agent cause which engenders the image. Since it is a product of efficient causality, an image implies a definite relation of subordination—namely, effect to cause. See In I Sent., d. 31, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (I, 540): "Dicendum quod sicut exemplar secundum proprietatem vocabuli dicit expressionem per modum activi unde exemplar dicitur ad cuius imitationem fit aliquid sic e contrario imago per modum passivi; et dicitur imago quod alterum exprimit et imitatur.

Further, since efficient and final causes are correlative terms [see In IV Sent., d. 4, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, contra 2 (IV, 103b): "Efficientis et finis sunt causae correlativae."]], an image also implies a definite ordination to its end. Regarding the interconnection of efficient, formal-exemplar, and final causes, see Aristotle, Physica II, c. 7 (19815-35). Cf. Plotinus, Ennead III. 8, 7. With regard to man’s perfection via conformity in truth, see Text-A, note 72. For a discussion of the intimacy of presence which efficient causality entails, see Key-Text B, note 32. See Key-Text A, note 78, concerning the expression nata est which G. H. Tavard renders as "destined."
This triple and direct ordination of the soul to God is antecedent to the soul's relationship with the body and corporeal world; hence, the obligation to love God with one's whole mind, heart, and soul (see Key-Text A, notes 46 and 100). In accord with this primary and direct ordination, man must regulate his conduct with regard to God, neighbor, and self (see Key-Text B, notes 23-25). This immediate ordination to God is the foundation for the inviolable dignity of every human being (see Key-Text A, note 81); further, since the image of God constitutes the very nature of the soul qua human, the dignity of a human creature can never be effaced.

The human soul, however, is also an incarnate image (relatione ad carnem; see note 8) and by reason of the body which it possess through the help of human generative powers, the soul is subject to its (corporeal) origin as offspring are subject to their parents. Bonaventure states, however, that such (corporeal) generation does not

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18 See note 15 above and notes 30 and 44 below. Consider in this regard the following corroborating remarks; Serm., (IX, 565a): "In similitudinem hominum factus et habitu inventus ut homo, et in hac (etiam) primus homo, secundum illud Genesis primo: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; et secundum istam omnis lex scripta est in corde hominis." In II Sent., d. 11, a. 1, a. 1, fund. 3 (II, 277a): "Lex universitatis hoc exigit, ut media reducantur per prima, et postrema per media ad suum primum principium; et hoc confirmatur per illud quod dicit Dionysius in libro de Angelica Hierarchia [c. 4. §3]: 'Lex divinitatis est in nullo negligere ordinem, sed per prima media, et per media postrema reducere." Cf. Brevil. (1254-57), II, 1 (V, 219b), and VII, 1 (V, 281a).
compromise the soul's status as an image directly ordered to God. How can this be? Recall that for Bonaventure the soul is a complete substance in itself composed of spiritual matter and form (see Key-Text A, note 2); as such, the soul is an image in se; however, the soul has an inclination for the perfection of the body just as the body has a tendency to be received by the soul. Although the body for Bonaventure possesses its own substantial form (see Key-Text A, note 76), the body is nevertheless ordered to the spiritual soul as its act and entelechia. Hence, because the body is perfected by the soul and the soul is perfected by natural law (see Key-Text A, note 100), the human body is thus subordinate to the dominion of natural law (see Key-Text A, notes 2 and 81). Indeed, the entire material universe is composed of a hierarchy of substantial forms, each form ordered to the next higher form; and as the spiritual human soul is the highest substantial form in this world, the ordination of all other corporeal forms culminates in man. As incarnate image, man represents in


20 See Itin., II, 2 (V, 300a): "Notandum igitur, quod iste mundus, qui dicitur macrocosmus, intrat ad animam nostram, quae dicitur minor mundus, per portas quinque sensuum, secundum ipsorum sensibilium apprehensionem,
his own body the whole of creation. In this way, the entire visible world is (proximately) ordered to the soul and brought to perfection. 21 Thus, since the cosmos is ordained


Although man is a mediator between the corporeal world and God, such mediation culminates in Christ Who, as God-man, is the Alpha and Omega of creation. See ibid., (V, 324b) : "Per similem igitur rationem potest argui, quod summa perfectio et nobilissima in universo esse non possit, nisi natura in qua sunt rationes seminales, et natura, in qua sunt rationes intellectuales, et natura, in qua sunt rationes ideales, simul concurrant in unitatem personae, quod factum est in Filii Dei incarnatione.---Praedicat igitur tota naturalis philosophia per habitudinem proportionis Dei Verbum natum et incarnaturm, ut idem sit alpha et omega, natura scilicet in principio et ante tempora, incarnaturm vero in fine saeculorum." Cf. In II Sent., d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, ad 6 (II, 415b).

21 See Itin., II, 3 (V, 300a): "Homo igitur, qui dicitur minor mundus..." See Brevil., II, 4 (V, 221b): "Corpora humana, quae disposita sunt ad nobilissimam formam, quae est anima rationalis; ad quam ordinatur et terminatur appetitus omnis naturae sensibilis et corporalis, ut per eam quae est forma ens, vivens, sentiens et intelligens, quasi ad modum circuli intelligibilis reductur ad suum principium, in quo perficiatur et beatificetur." Cf. In II Sent., d. 16, a. 2, q. 1, concl. (II, 401b). Cf. Plato's Timaeus (69b-92c) where the structure of the human body is characterized as representing the hierarchal order of the cosmos.

Further, Bonaventure likens the the physical universe to a house constructed by God for the service of man. As steward who is responsible to God, man lives in this world as its lord and administrator until he returns to his heavenly home. See Dom., VIII, sermo I, c. 1, n. 2 (IX, 385b): "Totus mundus servit homini, quia factus est pro homine, ut ipsa serviat ei qui fecit mundum et hominem. Ergo [si] sentis beneficium continuae administrationis, redde debitum bonae operationis." Brevil., II, 4 (V, 222a): "Haec igitur sensibilis corporalium machina est tanquam quaedam domus a summo opifice homini fabricat, donec ad domum veniat
to the soul of man and man's soul is ordained to God according to natural law, we may even say (in a loose sense) that the cosmic order is an extension of natural law.\textsuperscript{22}

Because of man's rational capacity for God—a capacity fulfilled through free choice—man excels every corporeal power. In this way, the dignity of man as incarnate image remains uncompromised by the body and world.\textsuperscript{23}

Such direct ordination of the soul to God nevertheless involves the mediation of the visible world. As previously mentioned (see Key-Text B, note 16) Bonaventure compares the universe to a book through which man comes to know its Author; now all creatures to some degree represent God;

\begin{quote}
non manufactam in caelis."
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{22}The cosmic order, the order of nature, and the natural law which is written in man's heart evidently constitute different senses or aspects of one and the same pervasive order which Bonaventure identifies as the divine (or eternal—see [1] above) law. See \textit{In IV Sent.} d. 19, a. 3, q. 1, concl. (IV, 508b): "Sicut dicit Dionysius, 'lex divinitatis est media per prima, et ultima per media perducre ad purgationem, illuminationem et perfectionem.' Ideo, sicut videmus in omnibus, sive in rationalibus, sive in naturalibus, sive in caelestibus, quod ad hoc, quod sit concordia et decor, oportet, quod sit ordo." See \textit{In II Sent.}, d. 11, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (II, 277b). One might say that natural law is an extension of the cosmic order insofar as such order pertains to man; but since the visible universe is itself subordinate to man (see notes 20 and 21 above), it seems proper to say that natural law embraces or comprehends the cosmic order rather than simply being an aspect of it.

\textsuperscript{23}See \textit{Brevil.}, II, 4 (V, 221b): "Ideo quantum ad arbitrii libertatem praecellit omnem virtutem corporalem; ac per hoc cuncta nata sunt sibi servire, nihil autem sibi dominari habet nisi solus Deus, non fatum seu vis positionis siderum."
thus, by way of knowledge of creatures, man is led to praise, adore, and love Him. But precisely how does

24 See Brevil., II, 11 (V, 229a): "Et secundum hoc duplex est liber, unus scilicet scriptus intus, qui est aeterna Dei ars et sapientia; et alius scriptus foris, mundus scilicet sensibilis." Man is endowed with a corresponding twofold sense to understand both interior and exterior books. Ibid., (V, 229a): "Ad perfectionem universitatis debuit fieri creatura, quae hoc sensu duplici esset praedita ad cognitionem libri scripti intus et foris, id est Sapientiae et sui operis." See Hex., XIII, 11 (V, 389b): "Omnis creatura repraesentat Deum, qui est Trinitas, et qualiter pervenit ad eum." Ibid., XIII, 12 (V, 390b): "Certum est, quod homo stans habebat cognitionem rerum creatorum et per illarum repraesentationem ferebatur in Deum ad ipsum laudandum, venerandum, amandum." The visible world is also compared to a mirror through which man is led back to loving and praising God. Brevil., II, 11 (V, 229a): "Primum principium fecit mundum istum sensibilem ad declarandum se ipsum, videlicet ad hoc, quod per illum tanquam per speculum et vestigium reduceretur homo in Deum artificem amandum et laudandum."

Visible nature thus expresses a moral significance which man is able to recognize. Rooted in a common and pervasive metaphysical order (see note 22 above), the visible universe and the moral universe are truly one and the same universe (see Key-Text A, note 33). This unity between the moral and visible realms is corroborated by Bonaventure's doctrine on the relationship of practical and speculative judgement and the preeminence given to natural law over the intellect and will of man (see Key-Text A, notes 21, 44, 46, 86 and 100). See Itin., IV, 6 (V, 307b), where Bonaventure speaks of the tropological, allegorical and analogical meanings implicit in Scripture. Because Scripture is an explication of the interiorly written law and the Book of Nature (see Key-Text B, note 16) these various spiritual meanings are evidently implicit in the natural order itself--although such meanings are now obscured due to original sin. On this score, let us call attention to the fact that Christ (Who is the Eternal Art, interior Teacher and Book written within and without; see Key-Text B, note 16) spoke in parables to communicate his moral teachings. In understanding the nature of seeds and soil, wine and skins, sheep and goats, bread, vines, salt, yeast, etc., we come to understand great practical (moral) truths. It is apparent to Christ, at least, that the understanding of the nature of things is indispensible for moral wisdom. For further discussion of Bonaventure's use of the book analogy, particularly with respect to the notion of
creation represent God and lead man to Him? Bonaventure asserts that because a cause shines in its effect, and the wisdom of the artisan is manifested in his work, God, Who is the artisan and cause of all creatures, is known through His creatures.\textsuperscript{25} There emerges a double aspect to the being and medium, see G. Tavard, Transiency and Permanence, 12-15, 118-19, 142, and 185-87.


Bonaventure explains the twofold manner by which God is known through creatures; ibid, (I, 72a): "Et ad hoc duplex est ratio, una est proper convenientiam, alia propter indigentiam." A cause is thus recognized in and through its effect both positively whereby genuine perfections may be properly attributed to a cause (attribuendo), and negatively (removendo) whereby the deprivations which characterize the effect qua effect are eliminated from the cause (removendo); ibid., ad 1 (I, 72a): "Dicendum quod dupliciter est cognoscere creaturam: vel quantum ad proprietates specialis et quae sunt imperfectionis, vel quantum ad conditiones generales, quae sunt completionis; si autem quantum ad specialis conditiones et imperfectionis: aut attribuendo Deo, aut removendo. Primo modo est via erroris, secundo modo via cognitionis; et sic cognoscitur Deus per ablationem." In short, we may say that in virtue of an effect’s conformity to its cause (convenientia), we know in some manner--via attribution--what its cause is; in virtue of an effect’s insufficiency (indigentia), we know--via remotion or ablation--only that its cause is. While the aspects of convenientia and indigentia are distinguishable in a creature, it can be seen, however, that both these aspects mutually determine each other. For example, man’s indigence limits his perfection of intelligence to that of a rational (i.e., discursive) nature; correlative, man’s indigence is characterized as an intellectual indigence. Accordingly, man’s indigence, qua intellectual, not only indicates a cause, but specifies that cause as intellectual (but not
intelligibility of a creature insofar as its perfection can be viewed either as a picture in itself or as an image which signifies something more than itself—namely, its cause. While the former sort of view does not lead to God, the latter aspect is indeed a way of knowing Him; for in knowing a creature qua image, every noble property it possesses is referred or attributed to God in a preeminent manner. The

Regarding the exemplarity of creation and the cosmic movement from and to God, see, A. Schaefer, "The Position and Function of Man," 264. For a comprehensive account of mediation between man and the world, see Schaefer's second chapter in _Franciscan Studies_ 21 (1961), 310-382.

See In I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. un, q. 2, concl. (I, 72b): "Si autem cognoscatur quoad conditiones perfectionis, sic potest esse dupliciter, sicut pictura, aut sicut imago; unde aut sistitur in pulcritudine creaturae, aut per illam tenditur in aliud. Si primo modo, tunc est via deviationis; unde Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio: 'Vae his qui nutus tuos pro Te amant et aberrant in vestigiis tuis et derelinguunt Te ducem.' Si secundo modo, prout est via in aliud, sic est ratio cognoscendi per superexcellentiam, quia omnis proprietas nobilis in creatura Deo est attribuenda in summo; et sic patet illud." See Augustine, _De Libero Arbitrio_, II, c. 16, n. 43 (PL 32, 1264). Regarding the metaphysical dependency of an image upon its exemplar, see note 17 above and Key-Text B, note 32. For the corresponding epistemological implications of such a causal relationship between image and exemplar, see note 25 above.

The attribution of a created perfection to its Creator is not by way of univocation, but rather by analogy which involves either a comparison of relations or a simple comparison as that of a copy in relation to its model. See In I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. un, q. 2, ad 3 (I, 72): "Dicendum, quod non est commune per univocationem, tamen est commune per analogiam, quae dicit habitudinem duorum ad duo, ut in nauta et doctore, vel unius ad unum, ut exemplaris ad exemplatum." Cf. In I Sent., 48, a. 1, q. 1, concl (I, 852); In II Sent., d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (II, 394); ibid., d. 25, a. 2, q. 1. For a discussion of analogy in Bonaventure, see Bernard Landry, "La notion d’analogie chez saint Bonaventure," _Revue neoscolastique de philosophie_ 24 (1922), 138-69.
recognition of a creature qua creature (i.e., insufficient, mutable and finite), and the consequent reduction of created perfections to God, involve, however, metaphysical judgments which are determined and guided by natural law itself (see Key-Text A, notes 33 and 86). It seems, then, that the mediation of the entire created world is a function, so to speak, of a common metaphysical order (see note 22 above); and our corresponding recognition of this order is determined and directed by natural law; indeed, it appears that natural law is this order insofar as this universal order is written in man's heart (see [1] above). It is upon this double aspect of creation that the moral dimension of man turns; for either man can ascend to God through the mediation of the visible universe or fall into sin through the inordinate love of the creature. Indeed, man as incarnate image (ad carnem) bears a relation with the visible world; but it is according to natural law that this

27 See In I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. un, q. 2, ad 4 (I, 73a): "Primus autem gradus quantum ad ascensum ad aspectum praesentiae est in consideratione visibilium, secundus in consideratione invisibilium, ut animae vel alterius substantiae spiritualis; tertius est ab anima in Deum, quia imago ab ipsa veritate formatur et Deo immediate coniungitur."

28 See Key-Text A, notes 34 and 52. Upon the distinctions cited in notes 25 and 26 above, erroneous and sinful moral judgments can be seen to result from either (1) wrongly attributing the indigence of a creature to its cause, or from (2) ignoring the indigence of a creature and regarding the creature (or any created perfection) as sufficient in itself without due relation to its cause. See Key-Text A, note 58.
relation is **rightly** ordered.

Let us sum up two fundamental characteristics of the natural law order as follows: (1) natural law involves a triple movement or dynamic of emanation, conformity, and return; this threefold ordination corresponds with Bonaventure’s metaphysics as represented by efficient, exemplar-formal, and final causality (see notes 15 and 18 above); (2) there are two different aspects of but one natural law whereby man is ordered to both God and the world: (a) as simple image, (i) man is directly ordered to God (see note 6 above) and (ii) man is mediator and (proximate) end to which the world is ordered (see note 20 above); (b) as incarnate image, man is ordered to God through the mediation of the world.

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29 Bonaventure explicitly distinguishes a twofold order of things, one within the universe and another with respect of their end. See *In I Sent.*, d. 47, a. un., q. 3, concl. (I, 844a): "Duplex enim est ordo rerum: unus in universo, alter in finem." Cf. Ibid., d. 3, a. 1, dub. 4 (I, 80b) and d. 40, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1 (705b). Both kinds of orders are related in such a way that that one is conformed to the other. See *In I Sent.*, d. 44, a. 1, q. 3, concl. (I, 786a): "Et sunt isti duo ordines ita coniuncti, ut unus alteri conformetur, et ordo parium in universo est propter ordinationem ad finem." Cf. *In III Sent.*, d. 37, a. 2, q. 1, concl. (III, 822a): "Fides autem dictat, nos primo ordinari ad Deum, et deinde ad proximum secundum coniunctam ad Deum." Cf. *In II Sent.*, d. 9, a. un., q. 2, ad 3 (II, 244b). Understood in this twofold way, the order of natural law may be said to possess both (1) a vertical axis (ad finem) insofar as man is directly ordered to God (and the visible world is ordered to man), and (2) a horizontal axis (ad invicem) insofar as man is ordered (to God) through the mediation of the visible world. See *In II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 2, a. 2, intro. (II, 43a). Indeed, Bonaventure has stated that natural law regards both God and neighbor (see Key-Text A, note 36 and Key-Text B, notes 21-25).
Eternal Law

In his *Respondate*, Bonaventure describes natural law as the impression made in the soul by the eternal law (see [1] above). What, then, can be said of eternal law? While given only passing attention in the *De Perfectione Evangenica*, eternal law is treated more extensively in the *Collationes in Hexaemeron* (ca. 1273-74). Let us look, then, at this later work as an indication of what his notion of natural law--precisely as an impression of eternal law--will develop into. Here (in the *Collationes*) Bonaventure characterizes [Christ] as the conserving cause and governing leader of creation. He is the first in the government of all actions according to which things are subject to government. Unlike the artisan who leaves home but still preserves and manages his belongings, Christ is constantly present to creatures and has within Himself the most direct norms for them; nor is it in the same manner that a creature issues from the Creator according to expressive forms or reasons and that the rules for its preservation emanate from the divine mind according to the direction of eternal laws (aeternarum

Regarding Bonaventure's doctrine of order in the universe, see E. Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, 144-45; A. Schaefer, "The Position and Function of Man," ch. 1, 273-74. The horizontal and vertical aspects of order are noted also by Aristotle; see *Physica*, II, c. 2 (194b12): "Man is begotten by man and by the sun as well."
regularum). Christ is said to possess these direct norms and He inscribed (superscribit) them first in human nature, next in industry or progress, then in grace, and finally in glory. In every state, He issues His norms which, by necessity, He possess within Himself. These norms flow from God’s will which is the first and supreme cause of all species and motions; hence, there is no event in creation that does not proceed either by command or permission from the inner, invisible, and rational authority of God; nor does anything occur which does not conform to His ineffable justice according to which rewards and penalties, favors and

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30 See Hex., XII, 4 (V, 385a): "Quia [Christus] est causa conservans, est dux gubernans. Praeest enim ad dirigendum onmes actus, secundum quod gubernabiles sunt; non sicut artifex, qui domum dimittit, sed res conservat et dirigit. Ideo habet apud se normas directissimas. Nec est idem modus, ut creatura manat a Creatore secundum formas vel rationes expressivas, et secundum quod a mente divina emanant regulae ad conservationem ipsarum secundum directionem aeternarum regularum." This passage underscores the Aristotelian doctrine that a cause is present to its effect (see Key-Text B, note 32). Unlike the example of the artisan with respect to his belongings, creatures for Bonaventure require the continual presence of God to sustain them in being.


Insofar as human industry involves deliberation, knowledge is implicit; hence, the inscription of eternal norms into human nature, human industry, grace, and glory corroborates our trifold distinction of natural law according to essence, knowledge/precept, and actuation or perfection (see Key-Text A, note 100).
punishments are bestowed.  

**Eternal Law and the Human Soul**

How are we to understand the influence of eternal law upon the human soul? Bonaventure states that all the sciences—natural, rational, and moral—have certain and infallible rules which descend as rays of light into our minds from the eternal law. Such rules are necessary, immutable, and eternal since they are uncreated and eternally exist in the eternal art by which, through which, and according to which, all things possessing form are formed.  

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32 See *Brevil.*, I, 9, (V, 217b): "...secundum quae disponuntur a voluntate beneplaciti quaecumque in universo flunt. 'Est enim voluntas Dei prima et summa causa omnium [corporalium] specierum ac motionum. Nihil enim fit visibiliter et sensibiliter in ista totius creaturae amplissima quadam immensaque republica, quod non de interiore invisibili atque intelligibili aula summi Imperatoris aut iubeatur, aut permittatur, secundum ineffabilem iustitiam praemiorum atque poenarum, gratiarum et retributionum.'" See Augustine, *De Trinitate*, III, c. 4, n. 9 (PL 42, 873), whose phrasing is edited here by Bonaventure.

33 See *Itin.*, III, 7 (V, 305b): "Omnes autem hae scientiae habent regulas certas et infallibiles tanguam lumina et radios decedentes a lege aeterna in mentem nostram." See ibid., III, 6 (V, 305b) where Bonaventure catalogues the various branches of science which are illumined by the light of eternal law.

34 See *Itin.*, II, 9 (V, 302a): "Ut dicit Augustinus, 'nullus de eis iudicat, sed per illas:' necesse est, eas esse incommutabiles et incorruptibiles tanguam necessarias, incoarctabiles tanguam incircumscriptas, interminabiles tanguam aeternas, ac per hoc indivisibles tanguam intellectuales et incorporeas, non factas, sed increatas, aeternaliter existentenses in arte aeterna, a qua, per quam et secundum quam formantur formosa omnia."
us; and according to these unchanging rules the mind knows
and judges that which could not be otherwise—namely, that
the supreme principle must be venerated, that the supreme
truth must be believed and assented to, and that the supreme
Good must be supremely desired and loved. Eternal law is
thus equated with the divine exemplars and hence with Christ
Who is the exemplar of all things and the light and
principle of all knowledge and justice. Indeed, we may
say that eternal law is the divine light of Christ inasmuch
as this light is the order by which man’s soul is formed,

35 See Hex., II, 9 (V, 338a): "Haec igitur apparat
immutabilis in regulis divinarum legum, quae nos ligant.
Regulae istae mentibus rationalibus insplendentes sunt omnes
illi modi, per quos mens cognoscit et iudicat id quod alter
esse non potest, utpote quod summum principium summe
venerandum; quod summo vero summe credendum et assentiendum;
quod summum bonum summe desiderandum et diligendum." In
Bonaventure’s view, then, every science is a way to God (see
note 41 below).

36 See Hex., XII, 2 (V, 385a): "[Christus est] exemplar
omnium rerum...conditor rerum, gubernator actuum, doctor
intellectuum, iudex meritorum. Et ex hoc intelligitur, quod
est causa causarum et ars praestantissime originans, dux
 providissime gubernans, lux manifestissime declarans vel
repraesentans, ius rectissime praemians et iudicans." See
note 40 below. See Key-Text A, note 73 with regard to God as
intimate to the soul. See Brevil., I, 8, (V, 216b): "Et quia
ipsa non tantum est cognoscitiva, sed est etiam ratio
cognoscendi; ideo, in quantum est ratio cognoscendi omnia
cognita, dicitur lux; in quantum est ratio cognoscendi visa
et approbata, dicitur speculum; in quantum est ratio
cognoscendi praevisa et disposita, dicitur exemplar; in
quantum vero est ratio cognoscendi praedestinata et
reprobata, dicitur liber vitae.--Est igitur liber vitae
respectu rerum, ut redeuntium; exemplar, ut exeuntium;
speculum, ut euntium; lux vero respectu omnium." See also
Key-Text A, note 100 on this point. Cf. In IV Sent., d. 43,
a. 2, q. 1-3. Cf. Itin., II, 13 (V, 303a) as cited in note
40 below.
rectified, and perfected.

It is by virtue of eternal law that Bonaventure solves the problem of certitude: since our mind is itself mutable, it cannot see unchanging truth except by some unchanging light; and it is impossible that such a light be a mutable creature. Now certain judgments are made through some law; but no one can judge with certitude unless he is certain that such a law is right and that he must not judge it; but our mind judges itself. Since, then, it cannot judge the law by which it judges, that law is superior to our mind; and through this higher law one judges according as this law is impressed upon us. Nothing, however, is superior to the human mind except Him Who made it. 37 Thus, Bonaventure concludes, certitude of human knowledge is secured only by way of the motivating and regulative action (regulans et motiva) of the eternal reasons upon [human] reason. 38

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37 See Itin., III, 3 (V, 305a): "Iudicium autem certum de consiliabilibus est per aliquam legem. Nullus autem certitudinalier iudicat per legem, nisi certus sit, quod illa lex recta est, et quod ipsam iudicare non debet; sed mens nostra iudicat de se ipsa; cum igitur non possit iudicare de lege, per quam iudicat; lex illa superior est mente nostra, et per hanc iudicat, secundum quod sibi impressa est. Nihil autem est superioris mente humana, nisi solus ille qui fecit eam."

38 See De Scientia Christi (ca. 1255-56), IV, concl. (V, 23b): "Et ideo est tertius modus intelligendi, quasi medium tenens inter utramque viam [namely, between acquired sensible knowledge and the grace of infused knowledge], scilicet quod ad certitudinalem cognitionem necessario requiritur ratio aeterna ut regulans et ratio motiva." G. Tavard comments in this regard "that the certainty of human knowledge is reached through an impression of the divine truth in the mind.... Now and again, such 'similitudes' of
In this connection let us consider the nature of the human soul as pertaining to its manner of knowing. Bonaventure states that every spiritual substance is light; hence the Psalm: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us." At the same time, the soul is a mirror (speculum) since it receives and represents all things; further, the soul has the nature of light so that it may pass judgment on things; lastly, since the spiritual creature is both light and mirror containing images of things, it is image too. 39

39 See Hex., XII, 16 (V, 386b): "Omnis substantia spiritualis lumen est; unde in Psalmo [4, 7]: 'Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine.'--Simul etiam cum hoc est speculum, quia omnia recipit et repraesentat; et habet naturam luminis, ut et iudicet de rebus. Totus enim mundus describitur in anima.--Et est etiam imago. Quia ergo est lumen et speculum habens rerum imagines, ideo est imago." That the soul for Bonaventure possesses its own natural light as distinct from the light of Christ is evidenced by his warning that the soul can fall into error and sin by following its own light (see Key-Text A, note 35). See also Itin., IV, 2 (V, 306a): "Ideo, quantumcumque sit illuminatus quis lumine naturae et scientiae acquisitae, non potest intrare in se, ut in se ipso delectetur in Domino, nisi
How, then, do the eternal reasons engage the soul and secure for it certain knowledge? Bonaventure states that Christ Himself Who is intimately present to every soul shines from within our mind upon the obscure species of our understanding. In this way, these obscure species impressed upon the soul, mixed with the phantasms derived from the sensible world, are illumined by the radiance of His most clear species so that the intellect understands. Accordingly, the mind is led back to the eternal art as to light and truth and, consequently, it attains certitude;\textsuperscript{40}

mediante Christo." With regard to the images or similitudes which the mirror of the soul contains, Bonaventure distinguishes between species abstracted from sense experience and those innate species as impressed upon the soul by the light of the eternal reasons (see notes 31, 33, 35, and 38 above; Key-Text A, notes 26 and 74). As received into the soul, both kinds of species contribute to the quality or character of the soul as mirror and image. See Key-Text A, notes 35 and 102 on this matter. Cf. \textit{In I Sent.}, d. 3, p. 1, a. un. q. 1, fund. 2 (I, 68b): "Intellectus enim non intelligit nisi quod est sibi proportionabile, et quod sibi aliquo modo unitur, et de quo iudicat, et a quo acies intelligentiae informatur." Cf. Key-Text A, note 74.

\textsuperscript{40}See \textit{Hex.}, XII, 5 (V, 385a): "Christus est doctor interius, nec scitur aliqua veritas nisi per eum, non loquendo, sicut nos, sed interius illustrando; et ideo necesse est, ut habeat clarissimas species apud se, neque tamen ab alio acceperit. Ipse enim \textit{intimus} est omni animae et suis speciebus clarissimis refulget super species intellectus nostri tenebrosas; et sic illustrantur species illae obtenebratae, admixtae obscuritati phantasmatum, ut intellectus intelligat." See \textit{De Scientia Christi}, IV, concl. (V, 23b): "...quod in huiusmodi cognitione recurratur ad artem supernam ut ad lucem et veritatem: lucem, ingquam, dantem infallibilitatem scienti, et veritatem dantem immutabilitatem scibili." See \textit{Itin.}, II, 13 (V, 303a): "Deo autem gratias per Iesum Christum, Dominum nostrum, qui nos de tenebris transtulit in admirabile lumen suum, dum per haec lumina exterius data ad speculum mentis nostri, in quo relucent divina, disponimur ad reintrandum." See \textit{Dom. III
for as the impression of a species upon a corporeal organ
leads to its origin--namely, to its sensible object of
knowledge--so the radiance of the eternal reasons within the
mirror of the soul leads the soul back to God as primordial
source and object.41 However, the light of Christ, while

Adv. Sermo. 14 (IX, 73a): "Ideo non nisi per veritatem
primam potest illuminari nec apprehendi, et ideo signantur
lux aeterna dicit: 'Ego sum lux mundi; qui sequitur me, ut
omnem veritatem aliam cognoscat per me et per eam
illuminet a me, non ambulant in tenebris, sed habebit lumen
vitae.' Ipsa enim prima lux est sicut speculum tersum, in
quo anima rationalis videt et cognoscit se et alia a se."
See ibid., III, 1 (V, 303a); Hex., XII, 8 (V, 385b).
Bonaventure follows here the Augustinian principle that the
Word is the Sun of the mind. Cf. Regis Jolivet, Dieu, Soleil

41See Itin., II, 7 (V, 301a): "Nam cum species
apprehensa sit similitudo in medio genita et deinde ipsi
organo impressa et per illam impressionem in suum
principium, scilicet in objectum cognoscendum, ducat;
manifeste insinuat, quod illa lux aeterna generat ex se
similitudinem seu splendorem coaequalem, consubstantialem et
coaeternalem; et quod ille qui est imago invisibilis Dei et
splendor gloriae et figura substantiae eius, qui ubique est
per primam sui generationem, sicut objectum in toto medio
suam generat similitudinem, per gratiam unionis unitur,
sicut species corporali organo, individuo rationalis
naturae, ut per illam unionem nos reduceret ad Patrem sicut
ad fontale principium et objectum." See In II Sent., d. 24,
p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, concl. (II, 563a): "Si autem sunt
similitudines, sic sunt in genere per reductionem et
reducuntur ad idem genus, sub quo continentur illa quorum
sunt similitudiner."

Bonaventure further identifies the exemplary virtues--
moderation, prudence, justice, and fortitude--as the first
to appear in the eternal light; these are impressed upon the
soul by that light and they descend into the cognitive,
affective, and operative faculties. See Hex., VI, 6 (V,
361b): "Dico ergo quod illa lux aeterna est exemplar
omnium." Ibid., VI, 7 (V, 361b): "Apparent ergo primo in
luce aeterna virtutes exemplares sive exemplaria virtutum." 
Ibid., VI, 9 (V, 362a): "Ecce iustitia.... Disponit omnia
suaviter.... Sobrietatem enim et prudentiam et iustitiam et
virtutem docet, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus." 
Ibid., VI, 10 (V, 362a): "Haec imprimitur in anima per
immediately present to and active upon the soul, is nevertheless inaccessible for any direct vision of the mind in this life; rather, it is only indirectly known by way of the mirror of our soul which reflects its radiance.42

illam lucem exemplarem et descendunt in cognitivam, in affectivam, in operativam." These virtues, then, flow from the eternal light, penetrate the hemisphere of our mind, and bring the soul back to its origin just as a vertical or direct ray of light is reflected back upon its descending path; See ibid., VI, 24 (V, 363b): "Hae virtutes fluunt a luce aeterna in hemisphaerium nostrae mentis et reducunt animam in suam originem, sicut radius perpendicularis sive directus eadem via revertitur, qua incessit." Note that justice for Bonaventure is that which governs everything well; further, all virtues reduce to justice. See In III Sent., d. 33, a. un., g. 4, ad. 4 (III, 721b): "Sic intelligendum est in humilitate et patientia et aliis etiam specialibus virtutibus, quae reduci habent ad ipsam iustitiam, secundum quod est virtus cardinalis et specialis." Insofar, then, as (1) justice holds a preeminent position above all norms in the exemplary light and (2) justice is equated with natural law (see Key-Text B, notes 17 and 18), law and morality evidently hold primacy over all other aspects of human life (see Key-Text A, conclusion and note 45). See Hex., VI, 19 (V, 363a): "Hoc totum est per regulam rationis....et quantumcumque homo habeat alias scientias, nisi habeat virtutes, non habet vitam; sicut, quantumcumque habeat stellas, nisi habeas solem in duodecim signis, non habebis diem."

42See Hex., XII, 11 (V, 386a): "Haec lux est inaccessibilis, et tamen proxima animae, etiam plus quam ipsa sibi. Est etiam inalligabilis, et tamen summe intima." See ibid., V, 33 (V, 359a): "Primo ergo anima videt se sicut speculum, deine Angelos sive Intelligentias sicut lumina et sicut medium delativum; sive videt in se sicut in speculo, in Intelligentia sicut in medio delativo lucis aeternae et contemporativo; deine in luce aeterna tanquam in obiecto fontano, quantum ad illas sex conditiones dictas, et rationabiliter et experimentaliter et intellectualiter." See ibid., V, 29-32 (V, 359) where Bonaventure describes the stages of reasoning, experience, and understanding by which the soul infers from the creature to God. See De Scientia Christi, IV, concl. (V, 23a): "...ratio aeterna ut regulans et ratio motive, non quidem ut sola et in sua omnimoda claritate, sed cum ratione creatae, et ut ex parte a nobis contuita secundum statum viae." Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica,
Let us summarize the meaning and significance of eternal law as follows. Insofar as it is equated with the divine light of Christ, eternal law is that necessary, immutable, and eternal order by which all creatures are formed and preserved in being (see notes 30 and 34 above); constantly present to and active upon the soul (see note 42 above) eternal law is the motivating and regulative influence which secures certain and infallible knowledge for man (see note 38 above) and which guides him by way of justice and virtue to his proper end (see notes 35, 36 and 41 above); hence eternal law is that order which forms, preserves, illumines, guides, rectifies, and perfects man (see note 31 above). But granted eternal law is directly present and active upon the soul, nevertheless it is only

II, I; cf. Text-B, note 31 regarding contuition. See In I Sent., d. 3, a. un., q. 3, ad 1 (I, 75a): Deus est medium efficiens et objectum ipsius mentis." Cf. In II Sent., d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 2, ad 6 (II, 124a), where Bonaventure explains that although God acts directly on the soul, He is not directly perceived by the soul. See ibid., d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, concl. (II, 545a): "In statu vero innocentiae et naturae lapsae videtur Deus mediante speculo; sed differenter, quia in statu innocentiae videatur Deus per speculum clarum; nulla enim erat in anima peccati nebula. In statu vero miseriae videtur per speculum obscuratum per peccatum primi hominis; et ideo nunc videtur per speculum et in aenigmata." Cf. In I Sent., d. 3, a. un, q. 3, ad 1 (I, 75a); In II Sent., d. 3, p. 2, a. 3, ad 6 (III, 124a). See also De Myst. Trin., q. 1, a. 1 (V, 49-50), where Bonaventure further discusses the innate but indirect knowledge of God. Cf. Key-Text A, note 85. Hence, Bonaventure's theory of knowledge cannot rightly be regarded as an ontologism; see Key-Text A, notes 33 and 85. See P. J. M. Bissen, "De la contuition," 559-69; cf. P. Jean de Dieu, "L'intuition sans concept et la théorie bonaventurienne de la contemplation," Études franciscaines 7 (1956), 66-74, 133-54.
known indirectly by way of its impressed similitude (see note 42 above); it is this impression of eternal law which Bonaventure identifies as natural law (see [1] above).

Eternal Law and Natural Law

What, then, constitutes the distinction and relationship between eternal law and natural law? Since natural law is said to be the abiding impression (impressio) made in the soul by the eternal and unchanging eternal law, natural law must be an indelible trace or sign of that eternal and unchanging law; as such, natural law is akin to eternity and immutability; accordingly, natural law is that by which man is preserved in being, made just, and perfectly ordered; nevertheless, as created, natural law

43 As the impressio of eternal law, natural law is the effectus of eternal law; as an effect, natural law signifies its cause--namely, eternal law. See Itin., II, 12 (V, 303): "...omnis effectus est signum causae...." See notes 17, 25 and 26 above.

44 See Key-Text A, note 72 and Key-Text B, note 18; see note 31 above. In a different context, Bonaventure employs the term impressio with respect to the preservation and nourishment an agent supplies to an indigent recipient. See Itin., II, 5 (V, 301a): "[Proportionalitas] attenditur, in quantum tenet rationem efficaciae et impressionis, quae tunc est proportionalis, quando agens imprimendo replet indigentiam patientis, et hoc est salvare et nutrire ipsum." The term impressio for Bonaventure evidently carries within its meaning the integrity and sustenance a cause supplies to its effect. Accordingly, natural law qua impressio implies eternal law (qua cause) as the preserving and nourishing influence upon the soul (qua effect). See notes 30 and 43 above. Recall in this connection the meaning of natural law habitus as that specifying indigentia by which we are rendered capable of God; see Key-Text A, notes 57, 61, 66 and section [4]. Thus, while the term impressio connotes the bearing a cause has upon its recipient effect, the term
must still bear in itself the qualities of temporality and mutability. As an effect and sign of eternal law, natural law thus cannot be wholly identical with eternal law—that is, we cannot simply say that natural law is eternal law qua present in the human soul; but neither can we understand natural law as opposed to or merely parallel with eternal law as if the two were unrelated orders; rather, as a created impression, natural law is produced (facta) by eternal law and is reduced (reducantur) to eternal law (see note 18 above and Key-Text B, note 32). We may say, then, that natural law participates (participat) eternal law by virtue of a trifold relationship of efficient, formal-

habitut appears to stress the disposition and inclination that effect bears towards its cause. Hence natural law qua impressio indicates God primarily as efficient cause; natural law qua habitus indicates God primarily as final cause. See note 18 above concerning natural law in relation to God as efficient, exemplar, and final Cause.

G. Tavard writes: "As a result and in spite of the certainty which affects knowledge when 'eternal reasons' play their role, there remains in all perceptions of the truth of creatures an element of fleetingness which is part and parcel of man's intellectual atmosphere.... This impression of evanescence offers man an occasion to conceive of and desire a nobler kind of truth." Transiency and Permanence, 88. See Dom., III, sermo 14 (IX, 73a): "Omnis enim veritas praeter primam semper est in fluxu usque ad illam." Hence, while natural law is necessary for the perfection of man, he still requires divine illumination and grace "sine qua non opera hominum vana sunt, etsi etiam videantur laudabilia." See In II Sent., d. 25, p. 1, dub. 1, resp. (II, 607b). See note 47 below and Key-Text A, note 100 in this regard.
exemplar, and final causality.\textsuperscript{46} This point is corroborated and clarified by Bonaventure's discussion of charity where he speaks of a certain truth as a similitude of charity. Such truth is said to be impressed in the soul by truth itself (see Key-Text A, note 74). Thus, insofar as natural law is equated with this impressed truth (qua rectitude of will), it follows that natural law is itself a similitude and hence an image or sign of divine truth.\textsuperscript{47} For this

\textsuperscript{46}For a discussion of Bonaventure's doctrine of participation, see In I Sent., d. 22, dub. 4, resp. (I, 400b): "Participare est partem capere, et si partem capit, ergo minus est quam totum." Cf. In II Sent., d. 34, a. 2, q. 1, fund. 5 (II, 810b): "Omne dictum per participationem reducibile est ad dictum per essentiam." De Myst. Trinit., q. 3, a. 1, ad 11 (V, 73): "Dicendum quod dupliciter dicitur aliquid participari, scilicet secundum formam, sicut genus participatur a speciebus; vel secundum influentiam, sicut causa participatur a suis effectibus." Cf. In II Sent., d. 34, dub. 3, resp. (II, 817). See Itin., II, 12 (V, 303): "...omnis effectus est signum causae, et exemplatum exemplarum, et via finis, ad quem ducit." Insofar, then, as (the impression of) natural law is (1) an effect of eternal law (see note 44 above) and is thus (2) a sign of its cause (see note 47 below) which is (3) reducible to its cause, we may properly say that natural law participates eternal law. Cf. note 57 below where natural law is implicated as a participation of eternal law in connection with the function of memory. We will explore in more detail the philosophical notion of participation in our study of St. Thomas, Key-Text B, notes 24-32. For further study on participation in the thought of St. Bonaventure, see John Quinn, The Historical Constitution of St. Bonaventure's Philosophy, 207, 252-54, 383-58, 517-18, 573-4.

\textsuperscript{47}Bonaventure argues similarly with respect to justice which is known not from an abstracted species but rather according to what is above the soul--namely the eternal reason. See De Scientia Christi., IV, 23 (V, 19b): "[Iustitia] non per speciem acceptam ab extra, cum non habeat similitudinem abstrahibilum per sensum: ergo necesse est, quod cognoscat illam per aliquid aliud, quod est supra intellectum suum.... Restat ergo, quod cognoscatur in ratione aeterna. Similiter potest argui de qualibet forma
reason, we must say that natural law is not the divine light per se, but rather an image--created by the divine light--which signifies the divine.

Natural Law and the Apex Mentis

Let us take a closer look at the interface of eternal law and natural law within the human soul. Bonaventure concurs with Augustine that the most intimate part of the soul is its summit, and the more a power is interior, the higher it is. It is at this interior summit that the human soul most approximates God so that the more the soul turns inward, the more it ascends and is united to eternity. Further, it is precisely at this core and summit where God is said to penetrate and operate upon soul. Recall in

inteligibili substantiali, ac per hoc de omni cognitione certitudinali." See Key-Text A, note 74 where we have shown that the soul innately knows natural law (qua rectitude of will or charity) in knowing its own essence. Consequently, one might argue as follows: if natural law can be recognized by the soul by virtue of knowing its own essence, then nothing requires natural law to be anything more than the soul's created essence. However, since all knowledge for Bonaventure depends on divine illumination (see note 36 above), it follows that self-knowledge--and, hence, knowledge of natural law (or perhaps better stated, knowledge of its true significance)--depends on divine illumination. See note 45 above and Key-Text A, note 100.

48See Hex., XII, 16 (V, 387a): "Secundum Augustinum, intimum animae est eius summum; quanto potentia intimior, tanto sublimior." Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate, XII, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 42, 997); ibid., XIV, c. 8, n. 11 (PL 42, 1044).

49See In II Sent., d, 8, p. 2, a. un., q. 2, concl. (II, 226b): "Dicendum quod illabi aliquid alicui importat, quod illud intimum sit ei et quod intime operetur in illo; nihil autem tale est respectu animae nisi solus Deus: ideo solus divinus spiritus animae potest illabi.--In anima
this connection the supremacy which characterizes natural law in relation to the intellect and will; for if natural law is rightly said to comprehend and regulate conscience and synderesis, then natural law must be distinguished by a certain preeminence and transcendence with respect to these faculties (see Key-Text A, note 45; Key-Text B, note 26); indeed, in separate discussions, Bonaventure identifies both superior reason and the spark of synderesis with the apex of the mind (apex mentis);\(^5\) and since natural law is that which encompasses and directs both the intellect and

\[\text{namque humana idem est intimum et supremum; et hoc patet, quia secundum sui supremum maxime approximat Deo, similiter secundum sui intimum; unde quanto magis redit ad interiora, tanto magis ascendit et unitur aeternis. Et quia solus Deus superior est mente humana secundum sui supremum, solus Deus potest menti esse intimus; et ideo illabi spiritui rationali est divinae substantiae proprium.} \]

Cf. In II Sent., d. 10, a. 2, q. 2, concl. (II, 265b): "Dicendum quod animam quod superiorem portionem rationis illuminare solius Dei est proprium."

\(^{50}\)See In II Sent., d. 24, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1, fund. 1 (II, 574a): "Ieremiae 2, 16: 'Filii Mempheos et Taphnes constupraverunt te usque ad verticem.' Si ergo vertex, secundum quod Sancti exponunt, dicitur ibi apex mentis sive superior portio rationis, videtur quod et illa habeat per peccatum constuprari et foedari." See Itin., I, 6 (V, 297b): "Iuxta igitur sex gradus ascensionis in Deum sex sunt gradus potentiarum animae per quos ascendimus ab imis ad summa, ab exterioribus ad intima, a temporalibus conscendimus ad aeterna, scilicet sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, intelligentia et apex mentis seu synderesis scintilla. Hos gradus in nobis habemus plantatos per naturam, deformatos per culpam, reformatos per gratiam; purgandos per iustitiam, exercendos per scientiam, perficiendos per sapientiam." Properly speaking, the apex mentis is associated with synderesis since it holds a supremacy over conscience. See Key-Text A, note 39. See also In II Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, ad 4 (II, 911a) where the relation of synderesis to conscience is compared with that of charity to faith or of affectus to the practical intellect.
will (and therefore superior reason and synderesis; see Key-
Text A, notes 35 and 42) it follows that natural law holds
that place within the soul which is at once most intimate
and supreme.\(^\text{51}\)

\(^{51}\)See Key-Text A, note 45; Key-Text B, note 26.
Moreover, Bonaventure states that the visage of the mind is
the superior part of the soul by which it is destined to see
Thus, since natural law is that by which this vision will be
realized (see Key-Text A, note 100; Key-Text B, notes 32 and
34), one can equate natural law with the visage of the mind;
indeed, from his origin, man bears the light of the divine
visage (or face of God, \textit{vultus divini}) which renders man an
image of God through a conformity of order (see Key-Text A,
note 80); but since natural law is evidently that which
constitutes this order (see Key-Text A, note 81), natural
law must be the image of the face of God; hence, it can be
said that man is destined to see God face to face by virtue
of natural law.

The supremacy of natural law is suggested in yet
another way: as justice and charity are truths impressed
upon the soul from above (see note 47 above and Key-Text A,
note 72), so the intellect, Bonaventure states, is informed
(informatur) by a certain notion (notitia) which is a
similitude of God. Such an impressed truth is inferior to
God, but nevertheless is \textit{superior} to the soul because it
makes the soul better. See In \textit{II Sent.}, d. 3, q. 1, ad 5
(II, 70): "Dicendum quod Deus est praesens ipsi animae et
omni intellectui per veritatem; ideo non est necesse, ab
ipso abstrahiri similitudinem, per quam cognoscatur;
nihilominus tamen, dum cognoscitur ab intellectu,
intellectus informatur quaedam notitia, quae est velut
similitudino quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa, inferior
Deo, quia in natura inferiori est, \textit{superior} tamen anima,
quia facit ipsam meliorem." See Key-Text A, note 29.
Insofar, then, as it is an impressed truth, natural law is
apparently \textit{superior} to the soul since it makes the soul
better. This superiority to the soul, does not mean,
however, that natural law is an entity separate or \textit{other}
than the soul itself. Further, in light of the various
relations we have seen between natural law and other
impressed similitudes such as justice and charity, we are
led to consider natural law (qua \textit{habitus per naturale
originem}) as either (1) the totality of impressed
similitudes which inform the soul from above or perhaps (2)
a common impressed similitude which the intellect and will
may grasp under a multitude of different aspects such as
Natural Law and the Imago Dei

Let us consider this interior primacy of natural law as it relates to the human person precisely as image. Although the whole soul is God's image, man is properly said to be an image of God in virtue of his unity of essence and trinity of powers—namely, memory, intellect, and will. By the mark of this resemblance, the soul is destined to be sealed by the Highest Trinity.\(^{52}\) As we have seen, this resemblance is realized to the extent that the intellect and will function together in the act of deliberation according to the direction of natural law qua habitus *per innatam dispositionem* or *collectio praecepta* (see Key-Text A, notes 44, 96, and 99). Right deliberation thus involves not merely the *conjunction* of intellect and will, but rather an *inward*

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\(^{52}\) See *In III Sent.*, d. 1, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1 (III, 15b): "Imago de ratione sui dicit expressam representacionem, non secundum totum illud, in quo est imago, sed secundum aliquid sui." See *Brevil.*, II, 9, 3 (V, 227a): "Quia forma beatificabilis est capex Dei per memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem; et hoc est esse ad imaginem Trinitatis propter unitatem in essentia et trinitatem in potentiis." See *In I Sent.*, d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1 concl. (I, 89b): "Nam proprie loquendo, imago consistit in unitate essentiae et trinitate potentiarum, secundum quas anima nata est ab illa summa Trinitate sigillari imagine similitudinis." Cf. Key-Text A, note 80.
ascent toward the apex of the mind and a resulting convergence of these two faculties upon natural law (as known and commanded). In this deliberate embrace of natural law (as knowledge and precept), natural law represents the formal principle of resemblance to God which now may be regarded as a habitus per acquisitam dispositionem in the order of operation.\textsuperscript{53} But simply as the innate habitus in the soul encompassing intellect and will--prior to any act of knowledge and deliberation--natural law must be regarded as a habitus per naturalem originem (see Key-Text A, note 67). One might say, then, that the habitus of natural law per acquisitam dispositionem is nothing other than the participation of intellect and will (through deliberative operation) in the natural law habitus per naturalem originem (see note 46 above); this participation is effected through those natural law precepts which are derived from the knowledge one’s own nature as disposing and inclining towards God.

**Natural Law and Memory**

Now, in addition to these two powers (intellect and will) the image of God also includes memory. What, then, can be said of memory and its relationship to natural law? As explained in the *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, the operation

\textsuperscript{53}See Key-Text A, notes 43 and 100; cf. G. Tavard, *Transiency and Permanence*, 98-100, for a concurring discussion on this point.
of memory for Bonaventure is retention and representation, not only of things present, corporeal, and temporal, but also of past and future things, simple and everlasting; for memory retains the past through recollection, the present through reception, the future through foresight. It retains the simple, as the principles of continuous and discrete quantities—the point, the instant, the unit—without which it is impossible to remember or to think about those things whose source is in these.54

Memory also retains the eternal principles and axioms of the sciences and retains them eternally. For it can never be so forgetful of them while it uses reason that it will not approve of them when heard and assent to them, not as though perceiving something new, but as if it were recognizing them as innate and familiar, just as when someone says to another, "One must either affirm or deny," or, "every whole is greater than its part," or any other

54 See Itin., III, 2 (V, 303b): "Operatio autem memoriae est retentio et repraesentatio non solum praesentium, corporalium et temporalium, verum etiam succedentium, simplicium et sempiternalium.—Retinet namque memoria praeterita per recordationem, praesentia per susceptionem, futura per praevisionem.—Retinet etiam simplicia, sicut principia quantitatum continuarum et discretarum, ut punctum, instans et unitatem, sine quibus impossibilie est meminisse aut cogitare ea quae principiantur per haec." Cf, Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, c. 7, n. 13 (PL 42, 1066). In presenting Bonaventure's doctrine of memory we have followed to a great extent the translation of George Boas, The Mind's Road to God, (N.Y.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953).
axiom which cannot be rationally contradicted.\textsuperscript{55}

In light of Bonaventure’s doctrine of memory, we may reasonably conclude that memory is the seat of natural law; for natural law is that by which all first principles are innate in us and self-evident upon the reception of sensible species (see Key-Text A, note 23). Further, natural law is that by which the soul recognizes in a self-evident manner, the acquired species of, say, father—spiritualized through an abstracting judgment—as a simple object which is deserving of honor.\textsuperscript{56}

The connection between memory and natural law, however, does not end here; for Bonaventure speaks further of the role of memory: from the first actual retention of all temporal things—past, present, and future—memory bears the likeness of eternity whose indivisible present extends to all times. Secondly, it seems that memory is not only formed from without by phantasms, but also by receiving simple forms from above (\textit{a superiori}) and holding them in itself---

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{55}\textit{Itin.}, III, 2 (V, 303b): "Retinet nihilominus scientiarum principia et dignitates ut sempiterna et sempiternaliter, quia nunquam potest sic oblivisci eorum, dum ratione utatur, quin ea audita approbet et eis assentiat, non tanquam de novo percipiat, sed tanquam sibi innata et familiaria recognoscat, sicut patet, si proponatur alicui: 'De quolibet affirmatio, vel negatio;' vel: 'Omnem totum est maius sua parte,' vel quaecumque alia dignitas, cui non est contradicere 'ad interius rationem.'"
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{56}See Key-Text A, note 25. In speaking of the simple and principles of discrete quantities, we understand Bonaventure to include in his meaning the soul’s ability to recognize essences—that is, substantial unities as opposed to mere accidental qualities or "phenomena."
\end{quote}
forms which cannot enter through the doors of the senses and the phantasms of sensible things. Thirdly, from the retention of eternal principles, memory has an immutable light (*lucem incommutabilem*) present to itself in which it remembers unchangeable truths. And thus, through the operations of the memory, it appears that the soul itself is the image of God and His similitude, so present to itself and having Him present that it receives Him in actuality and is capable of receiving Him in potency; in this way, the soul is able to participate in Him.  

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57 *Itin.*, III, 2 (V, 303a): "Ex prima igitur retentione actuali omnium temporalium, praeteritorum scilicet, praesentium et futurorum, habet effigiem aeternitatis, cuius praesens indivisible ad omniatempora se extendit.--Ex secunda apparet, quod ipsa non solum habet ab exteriori formari per phantasmata, verum etiam a superiori suscipiendi et in se habendo simplices formas, quae non possunt introire per portas sensuum et sensibilibum phantasmas.--Ex tertia habetur, quod ipsa habet *lucem incommutabilem* sibi praesentem, in qua meminit invariabilium beritatum.--Et sic per operationes memoriae apparet, quod ipsa anima est imago Dei et similitudo adeo sibi praesens et eum habens praesentem, quo eum actu capi et per potentiam 'capax eius est et particeps esse potest.'" Because (1) the soul is said to participate in God through memory and (2) memory is evidently characterized by natural law (see subsequent paragraph) and (3) natural law is that which unites the soul to eternity (see note 49 above), one can infer that the impression of natural law is for Bonaventure a participation (*participatus*) in eternal law. Cf. *In Sent.*, I, d. 3, p. 1, a. un., q. 1, fund. 1 (I, 168b), where Bonaventure cites Augustine: "Eo mens est imago Dei, quo capax Dei est et particeps esse potest." See Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XIV, c. 8, n. 11 (*PL* 42, 1044); see Key-Text A, note 77. Insofar as *image* is identified with natural law (see note 18 above and Key-Text A, notes 79-80), it can be said that man is able to participate God according to natural law. Cf. note 46 above concerning Bonaventure’s doctrine of participation. With regard to the related meanings of the terms *capax* and *particeps* in Bonaventure’s doctrine of *image*, see Alvin Black, "The Doctrine of the Image and Similitude in Saint..."
We see, then, further evidence that natural law is situated within the memory; indeed, memory is apparently characterized by natural law. Recall, first of all, that natural law is the impression of the eternal law and so bears a likeness to eternity (see note 43 above); moreover, it is through natural law that the soul is united to eternity (see note 49 above); but memory itself is described as a likeness of eternity and, in fact, is said to lead to eternity (see note 58 below); it appears, then, that memory is equated with natural law at least insofar as natural law is a component of memory. Secondly, Bonaventure has equated natural law with the similitudes of the eternal reasons as impressed from above (see notes 41 and 47 above); but again, memory is described as the repository of such forms from above; in this case it follows that memory is the repository of natural law. But there is evidently more to memory than the presence of natural law; for memory is said to possess within itself an immutable light by which it remembers unchangeable truths. Now the light of natural law is a created light and thus cannot properly be considered immutable in itself (see notes 39, 45 and 48 above); rather, the immutable Light present to the memory is none other that the light of Christ which shines within the mirror of our mind (see notes 39-40 above and 58 below).

To sum up, memory appears to be the stage or repository of both natural law and eternal law; that is, memory represents the interior chamber, so to speak, of the mind wherein the light of eternal law radiates and interfaces with its created impression—natural law. The unity with, and conformity to, God is thus achieved by way of an interplay within memory between the light of eternal law and natural law: (1) the light of natural law is that which (lumen quod) signifies eternal law; (2) the light of eternal law is that by which (lumen quo) the soul recognizes natural law as a sign of its cause—namely, God. With respect to the powers of the soul which distinguish man as an image of God, natural law—as proper to memory—clearly is (1) the point of unity of the mind’s powers and operations and (2) the point of unity between the mind and God. "See then," Bonaventure exclaims, "how close the soul is to God and how memory in its operations leads to eternity, intelligence to truth, the power of choice to the supreme good." More

See the Quaracchi editors' commentary on this point (note. 7) in their Scholion to the *Itinerarium* (V, 315). Cf. *De Myst Trin.*, q. 1, a. 1, concl. (V, 49-50); *Itin.*, III, 3, (V, 304b).

Ibid., III, 4 (V, 305a): "Vide igitur, quomodo anima Deo est propinqua, et quomodo memoria in aeternitatem, intelligentia in veritatem, electiva potentia ducit in bonitatem summam secundum operationes suas." In this regard, See Plato’s *Symposium* (210a-212a) where the ascent from the temporal to the eternal is described. See *Hex.*, XX, 11 (V, 427a) with regard to the divine Light which illumines the highest portion of the mind—namely, memory; see note 48 above. Cf. Alvin Black, "The Doctrine of the Image," 275.
precisely, the common and unifying medium between the soul and eternity, truth and the supreme good is natural law which is evidently the root of memory.

**Natural Law and the Genetic Unity of Mind**

The habitus of natural law *per naturalem originem* has yet a deeper significance which accounts for the unity of powers within the soul and the soul's resemblance to God as image; for insofar as the powers of the soul constitute the image of God as a Trinity of Persons, we may follow the order, origin, and comportment of these powers to the most Blessed Trinity Itself. How so? According to Bonaventure, there is an organic or genetic unity existing among memory, intelligence, and will: from memory arises intelligence as its progeny; for when a similitude which is in the memory leaps into the eye of the intellect--which is nothing other than a word--it is then that we know.⁶⁰

From memory and intelligence is breathed forth love, which is the bond between the two. These three—the generating mind, the word, and love—are in the soul as memory, intelligence, and will, which are consubstantial, coequal and coeval, mutually immanent. Now God as perfect Spirit has memory, intelligence, and will; and He has both

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⁵⁰Ibid., III, 5 (V, 305a): "Secundum autem harum potentiarum ordinem et originem et habitudinem ducit in ipsam beatissimam Trinitatem.--Nam ex memorai oritur intelligentia ut ipsius proles, quia tunc intelligimus, cum similitudo, quae est in memoria, resultat in acie intellectus, quae nihil aliud est quam verbum."
the begotten Word and spirated Love. These are necessarily distinguished, since one is produced from the other—distinguished, not essentially nor accidentally, but personally. When therefore the mind considers itself, it rises through itself as through a mirror to the contemplation of the Blessed Trinity—Father, Word, and Love—three persons coeternal, coequal, and consubstantial; so that each one is in each of the others; yet one is not the other, but all three are one God. 61

In this connection, we recall the trifold dynamic within the order of natural law (see note 18 above) which now deserves consideration vis-à-vis (1) the generation of intelligence from memory, (2) the procession of will (love) from memory and intelligence, (3a) the bond of memory and intelligence through will, and (3b) the bond of soul to God (through the unity of memory, intellect, and will). In each of these three instances, there appears a fairly consistent correlation with the habitus of natural law in the modalities of essence (per naturalem originem), knowledge/precept (per innatam dispositionem) and operation

61 Ibid., III, 5 (V, 305a): "Ex memoria et intelligentia spiratur amor tanquam nexus amborum. Haec tria, scilicet mens generans, verbum et amor, sunt in anima quoad memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, quae sunt consubstantiales, coaequales et coaevae, se invicem circumincedentes. Si igitur Deus perfectus est spiritus, habet memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, habet et Verbum genitum et Amorem spiratum, qui necessario distinguuntur, cum unus ab altero producatur, non essentialiter, non accidentatliter, ergo personaliter."
(per acquisitam dispositionem; see Key-Text A, note 69); for 
natural law in the modality of essence is situated in the 
memory; natural law in the modality of knowledge/precept--as 
generated from the memory--is manifested in the intellect; 
natural law in the modality of operation--which transpires 
from both the modes of essence and knowledge and is realized 
in the deliberate act of the will--represents a unity of 
powers in actuation; finally, natural law is instantiated in 
the realm of perfection insofar as the soul itself is united 
(and conformed) to God (see Key-Text A, note 100). Thus, 
according to the metaphysical moments of generation, 
conformity, and consummation which characterize natural law, 
the three habitus of natural law (in the modes of essence, 
knowledge/precept, and deliberation) are genetically 
unified; and insofar as this natural law order constitutes 
and directs the tripartite mind, the structure and 
operations of the mind itself (memory, intellect, and will) 
reflect and refer to the inner life of the Holy Trinity. As 
memory represents the originative principle of the mind to 
which the other powers refer, so the habitus of natural law 
per naturalem originem holds primacy over the other natural 
law habitus insofar as it is their radical and terminating 
principle.⁶²

⁶²Recall that right deliberation involves the ascent of 
intelligence and volition to the apex of the mind (see notes 
50 and 51 above); this interior summit is memory, the seat 
of natural law and pathway to eternity, truth, and supreme 
goodness (see notes 57-58 and 60); hence, insofar as memory
Natural Law qua Ratio Seminalis

In determining the structure and function of the mind, natural law qua habitus per naturalem originem finds its essential meaning and significance. In this connection, natural law might very well be understood according to Bonaventure's doctrine of seminal reasons. According to this doctrine God creates seminal principles which, as posited as potencies within matter, are capable of becoming actualized. After being sown (so to speak) into matter, a seminal principle or form is actualized in matter by the primary and internal agency of God in cooperation with the secondary and more external influence of other creatures. A natural

is the locus of the ascending convergence of intellect and will upon natural law (see note 53), it represents a (proximate) principle of termination as well as origination. In the same way, the habitus of natural law per naturalem originem is both an origative and terminating principle of the other natural law habitus since the other two habitus arise from this originate principle; but through deliberation they are again commonly united in it insofar as the powers of intellect and will ascend to and participate in this common habitus. For further discussion of the metaphysical, psychological, and moral implications with regard to this originate habitus, see Key-Text A, notes 33, 44, 86, and 100.

63 See In II Sent., d. 7, dub. 3, resp. (II, 206): "Quaedam est virtus quae in productione rerum solum operatur exterius, quaedam quae perfecte operatur interius, quaedam partim interius partim exterius. Virtus artificis solum exterius operatur, amovendo sive iudgendo et applicando unam naturam cum alia. Virtus Dei operatur perfecte interius, quia ipsa primordialia semina, quae sunt intima, producit. Virtus vero, quae est partim interius partim exterius, est virtus naturae, quae exterius est respectu rationum seminalium, sed interius respectu producendorum ex ipsis. Natura enim, dum operatur, immittit virtutem suam usque ad intima passi; et in illa immissione ipsam essentiam formae, quae erat in potentia incompleta, non producit, sed
form is therefore not a static entity, but bears a
teleological character from its creation as a potency
destined for actuality according to its ratio seminalis:
"illud potest esse forma et fit forma sicut globus rosae fit
rosa." Consequently, a natural form can never be wholly
productam a Deo supponit: ipsam tamen adiuvando ad actum
perfectum adducit. Solus igitur ille potest seminales illas
rationes facere, qui potest creare: quoniam ipsae non sunt
ex aliis sed ex nihilo, et ex ipsis fiat omnia, quae
naturaliter producuntur. Igitur nec pater est creator filii
crucis nem agricultura segetum; quia licet pater operetur interius,
sicut natura, tamen operetur exterius et circa aliquum et ex
aliquo, non ex nihilo, licet non operetur adeo exterius,
sicut agricultura." See In II Sent., d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, concl.
(II, 436a): "Ipse enim rationes causales modo dicit rebus
fuisse insertas, modo dicit quantum ad aliqua in divina
voluntate fuisse servatas." See ibid., d. 7, p. 2, a. 2, q.
1, concl. (II, 198b), where Bonaventure distinguishes
between intrinsic and extrinsic causes.

"See In II Sent., d. 7, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, concl. (II,
198b); ibid., ad 6 (II, 199): "Formae naturales sunt in
materia quantum ad potentiam et in qua, et ex qua, et a qua,
secundum praedictum modum. Et si tu obiicias, quod materia
non agit nec constituit, dicendum, quod essentia materiae
solum se habet per modum receptivi; sed seminarium inditum
se habet quodam modo per modum activi, quodam modo per modum
passivi, quoniam cooperatur agenti, et nihilominus ipsum
variatur ab una dispositione in aliam, ut dictum est." While
Bonaventure speaks of ratio seminalis as an inchoate and
intrinsic power (virtutem), he also distinguishes between
the productive power itself and the essential rule which
directs or regulates this natural power. See In II Sent., d.
18, a. 1, q. 2, concl. (II, 436b): "Regula autem agentis
increati est forma exemplaris sive idealis, regula vero
agentis creati est forma naturalis; et ita rationes causales
sunt formae ideales sive exemplares, rationes vero seminales
sunt formae naturales.... Similiter naturales rationes et
seminales re idem sunt, ratione vero differunt. Quia enim
semen dicit ut ex quo, et natura dicit ut a quo, ratio
seminalis attenditur in quantum dirigat potentiam naturae,
ut ex aliquo fiat aliquum; naturalis vero, ut ab aliquo fiat
aliquid.--Vel ratio seminalis respicit inchoationem et
intrinsecam virtutem, quae movet et operatur ad effectus
productionem; naturalis vero concernit producentis ad
productum assimilationem et modi agendi assuetudinem." We
destroyed, but [its essence] remains in the womb of matter in a potential or virtual state after corruption just as before generation.  

Natural law as a habitus per naturalem originem appears, then, to fit the description of a kind of seminal reason since the soul of man as a hylemorphic substance of spiritual matter and form is said to become the image or 

are concerned here primarily with Bonaventure’s understanding of ratio seminalis precisely as a regulative and formal principle but nevertheless as inseparable from the natural and productive power which it characterizes and directs. In this respect, see Key-Text D, note 4, regarding the distinction between essentia and natura.

65 See In IV Sent., d. 43, a. 1, q. 4, concl. (IV, 889a): "Supponamus nunc, quod natura aliquid agit, et illud non agit ex nihilo; et cum agat in materiam, oportet quod producat formam; et cum materia non sit pars formae, nec forma fiat pars materiae, necesse est aliquo modo formas naturales esse in materia, antequam producantur; et substantia materiae praegnans est omnibus: ergo rationes seminales omnium formarum sunt in ipsa. Sed ad illud stat resolutio, a quo incipit generatio: ergo nulla forma omnino corrumpitur, sed manet in materia, sicut antequam produceretur. Et sic dicit Augustinus; unde formas in materia ante productionem dicit esse quantum ad rationes seminales. Dicit etiam resolvi ad materiam, sicut ad occultissimos sinus naturae, idem utroque nomine secundum alteram et alteram rationem intelligi volens. Quid autem haec sint, alibi melius patet, scilicet in secundo. Nunc autem hoc dixisse sufficiat, quod omnes formae, cum corrumpuntur, non omnino corrumpuntur, sed manent aliquo modo." See In II Sent., d. 7, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3 (II, 199a): "Potest dici quod essentia eius manet in potentia post corruptionem, sicut ante generationem." Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate, III, c. 8, n. 13 and c. 9, n. 16 (PL 42, 875, 877). For further discussion of Bonaventure’s doctrine of seminal reasons, see In II Sent., d. 18, a. 1, q. 3, (II, 440a); see the Quaracchi editors’ Scholion (II, 199, 443); Gilson, La philosophie de saint Bonaventure, 236-53; K. Ziesché, "Die Naturlehre Bonaventuras," 169-89.
Further, natural law is not only said to be (interiorly) impressed upon the soul, but insofar as natural law is equated with the image of God by which man becomes deiform, natural law can never separated from man’s being—not in man’s present state of fallen nature, nor even in the state of damnation. One might reasonably conclude, then, that

66 As the eternal reasons exist in God as exemplar forms (see notes 30 and 31 above), so natural law, as a created impression of eternal law, exists in man as a natural form—a seminal principle—which serves as the rule of rational operation and consequent perfection; for, as noted (see Key-Text B, note 18), man’s perfection is achieved through the operation of reason and will according to the regulative principle of natural law. See notes 15, 17, 18, 31 above; Key-Text A, notes 2 and 81; Also see note 63 above where Bonaventure speaks of natural forms or seminal reasons as regulative principles which direct the natural powers of a creature; See Key-Text A, note 28 and corresponding paragraph where Bonaventure speaks of conscience as a seed-bed (seminarium) of other acquired habitus. Thus, in characterizing natural law as a seminal reason, we do not intend to construe natural law as a natural power, but as that rational principle which characterizes and regulates such a power. That the human soul comes into being like other natural forms as educated from preexisting matter is not suggested here. Bonaventure clearly states that each human soul is directly created by God and united to a body. See In II Sent., d. 15, a. 2, q. 3; ibid., d. 18, a. 2, q. 3 and ad 5. What we suggest here is that natural law, as Bonaventure understands it, corresponds with the nature and function he assigns to seminal reasons in nature. With respect to the theory of seminal reasons vis-a-vis the human soul, see Conrad John O’Leary, The Substantial Composition of Man According to Saint Bonaventure (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1931), 49-60, 87-94.

67 See De Scientia Christi., IV, concl. (V, 24a): "Quoniam igitur certitudinalis cognitio competit spiritui rationali in quantum est imago Dei, ideo in hac cognitione aeternas rationes attingit. Sed quia in statu viae non est adhuc plene deiformis, ideo non attingit eas clare et plene et distincte; sed secundum quod magis vel minus eas attingit, semper tamen aliquo modo, quia nunquam potest ab
the habitus of natural law per naturale originem, is indeed the ratio seminalis of the human soul; and since natural law is that regulative principle according to which man is created to the image of God (see Key-Text A, note 56) and becomes that image (see note 18 above), it is not enough to say that natural law is essential to man, but rather that natural law is the essence of man; for if God is more intimate to the soul than the soul is to itself (see Key-Text A, note 73) and if natural law represents that interior point of contact with God (see notes 49-51 above), then natural law represents the very core and inner limit of man's being. To affirm natural law as innate is similar to predicating being of God: the predicate in each case is bound up within the identity of the subject and only differs by a distinction of reason; for while God is His Being, 68 natural law qua seminal reason is innate because it is the intrinsic principle by which man is capable of becoming what he is--namely, the imago Dei (see note 18 above).

**eo ratio imaginis separari.** Unde quia in statu innocentiae erat imago sine deformitate culpae, nondum tamen habens plenam deiformitatem gloriae, ideo attingebat ex parte sed non in aenigmate. In statu vero naturae lapsae caret deiformitate et habet deformitatem, ideo attingit eas ex parte et in aenigmate. In statu vero gloriae caret omni deformitate et habet plenam deiformitatem, ideo attingit eas plene et perspicue." See Key-Text B, note 27 with regard to the inexorable presence of natural law in the souls of obstinate sinners and even in the damned who are confirmed in evil.

68 See Itin., V, 3 (V, 308b).
IV. Summary and Conclusion

As we learned from the study of the contextual text above, natural law is characterized by its metaphysical phases or movements of emanation, conformity, and return (see notes 15 and 18 above); according to this movement, man is ordered to God both directly and indirectly through creatures (see note 15 above). In the key-text itself, natural law is described as the impression made in the soul by the eternal law (see [1] above).

To better understand natural law precisely as an impression of eternal law, we studied St. Bonaventure's teaching on eternal law as explicated in the Collationes in Hexaemeron; here we learned that eternal law consists of those eternal reasons by which God creates and governs all creatures (see notes 30-33). Equated with the light of Christ, these immutable and eternal reasons illumine man's mind and provide the certain norms for all natural, rational, and moral knowledge (see notes 33-37); such norms guide man in justice and virtue to his proper end (see notes 35-41). Although the light of eternal law is directly present to and active upon the soul, this light is only indirectly known by way of its impressed similitude—namely, natural law.

As an abiding impression of eternal law, natural law participates in eternal law and thus preserves man's being and directs him to perfection (see notes 43-47); guiding
synderesis and superior reason, natural law holds that most intimate and supreme place in the mind where God meets and operates upon (within) the soul (see notes 48-51). In the Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, Bonaventure identifies this locus of contact between natural law and eternal law as memory; accordingly, it is through the operation of memory that the soul is said to be an image of God and capable of participating Him (see notes 54-57). As the root of memory and the apex of the intellect and will, natural law thus represents that point of unity between the powers of the mind and God (see note 55).

There is a correspondence between the three metaphysical movements of natural law and the structure and powers of the mind: natural law in the modes of essence, knowledge/precept, and operation characterizes and regulates memory, intellect, and will respectively; thus, according to the natural law order which is intrinsic to the soul, the powers of the mind bear a genetic unity which images the inner life of the blessed Trinity (see notes 59-60). This interior primacy of natural law over the powers of the soul leads us to consider natural law as a ratio seminalis insofar as it is the radical principle by which man is created to and becomes the imago Dei (see note 62-65). Inexorably impressed within the soul, natural law represents the very center of man's being and is thus innate in the most profound sense of the word (see note 66).
Let us conclude this summary with four general points:

1. As a created impression of eternal law, natural law is a likeness of the order proper to the blessed Trinity Itself as marked by generation, conformity, and unity.

2. Indelibly impressed upon the soul of man, natural law internally orders the structure and functions of the soul according to this threefold process of generation, conformity, and unity.

3. Natural law is thus radically innate to man in the orders of being, knowledge/precept, and love; in virtue of this intrinsic and trifolrd ordination, man is said to be created to the image of God and is thus capable of union and conformity with Him.

4. Insofar as (the impression of) natural law is (1) an effect of eternal law, and is thus (2) a sign of its cause which is (3) reducible to that cause (namely, eternal law), we may properly say that natural law participates eternal law. 69

69See notes 47 and 58 above regarding St. Bonaventure’s understanding of participation; see also Key-Text A, note 77. We will explore in more detail the notion of participation in our study of St. Thomas’ natural law doctrine.
CHAPTER 4

KEY-TEXT A

In IV Sent., d. 33. q. 1, a. 1, resp.: "Utrum habere plures uxores sit contra legem naturae."¹

I. Context

Context for this key-text is twofold:

(1) Remote: (a) St. Thomas' divisio textus on Peter Lombard's Libri IV Sententiarum; (b) Peter Lombard's discussions, De praeceptis legis, c. 5, and Cui licebat plures habere vel non.

(2) Proximate: (a) St. Thomas' In II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3; (b) In III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 4; (c) In III Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, sol.; (d) In III Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 3, sol.; (e) In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 2; (f) In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, sed contra 6.

¹Thomas Aquinas, St., Opera Omnia, Parma ed., 1852-1873. Reprint, N. Y.: Musurgia, 1948, 25 vols. All textual citations of the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum are from this uncritical edition. Reference to volume and page will be indicated by roman numerals and arabic numbers respectively. For example, Key-Text A is found in volume VII-2, page 967a, which we indicate as: (VII-2, 967a). All italicized words used for emphasis in this study are my own. The date of composition of the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum is commonly given as 1254-1256. For dates of St. Thomas' writings, we have relied upon the chronology provided by James Wiesheipl, Friar Thomas D'Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works, (New York: Doubleday, 1974), 351-63. See Appendix C for a summary of this chronology.

185
There are two major divisions in St. Thomas' commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*: (1) "de rebus divinis secundum exitum a Deo ut a principio" (books I and II) and (2) "de rebus divinis secundum reeditum in Deum ut in finem" (books III and IV). In this latter division, book IV deals with the Sacraments (de sacramentis), and in its distinction thirty-three, the propriety of marriage is considered with respect to the Fathers of antiquity. As St. Thomas explains in the *divisio textus* which prefaces this distinction, Lombard divides his discussion on this matter into two parts: in the first, the good of matrimony prior to the [Mosaic] law is shown; in the second part the good of matrimony is considered during the time of the [Mosaic] law. Lombard introduces the question of polygamy in the first part and, citing the authority of Augustine, upholds its licitness with respect to the Fathers—both before and subsequent to the law of Moses.

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2These two general divisions are found in the *divisio textus* of *In I Sent.*, d. 2 (Parma VI, 20). For a detailed catalogue of St. Thomas' classification on the whole of Lombard's *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, see Paul Philippe, *Bulletin Thomiste*, tome I (Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1931-1933), 131-54.

3See *In IV Sent.*, d. 33, (VI, 966).
Remote Context #b

Our first passage here is from Peter Lombard’s III Sent., d. 37, c. 5, n. 5: De praeceptis legis. In this discussion, Lombard presents the teaching of St. Augustine on the concordance between the natural law, the Gospel (Evangelium), and the law of moral precepts. Because man did not attend (non legebat) to the truth written in his heart (i.e., natural law), it was necessary, Lombard relates, to make that truth explicit by writing it in stone (i.e., the Decalogue).

We turn next to Lombard’s IV Sent., d. 33, c. 4, nn. 1-2: "Cui licebat plures habere vel non." It is this question to which St. Thomas’ discussion, "Utrum habere plures uxores sit contra legem naturae" (In IV Sent., d. 33.

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5III Sent., d. 37, c. 5, n. 5 (II, 212): "Augustinus, super Psalmum. Hic opponitur quod etiam boni in illo opere peccaverunt, qui naturalem legem, cui concordat Evangelium et lex moralis praeceptionis, transgressi sunt, quae est: 'Quod tibi non vis, ali ne feceris' [Tob. 4, 16; Math. 7, 12; Luc. 6, 31]. 'Quam Veritas scripsit in corde hominis; et quia non legebat in corde, iteravit in tabulis, ut voce forinsecus admota, rediret 'ad cor' et ibi inveniret quod extra legeret.' See Jeremias 31, 31-35. With respect to Lombard’s understanding of natural law as proper only to human creatures, see Michael Crowe, "St. Thomas and Ulpian’s Natural Law," in Saint Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), vol. 1, 268-69. See note 58 below where St. Thomas also speaks of natural law as impressed upon the heart (cordibus impressa).

6Libri IV Sententiarum (II, 461).
q. 1, a. 1), directly corresponds. What, then, does Lombard say concerning the licitness of a plurality of wives? He first cites what is written in Deuteronomy [17, 17]: "He shall not have many wives that may allure his soul." On this passage, Lombard presents the commentary of Augustine: "It is evident that Solomon transgressed this precept." David, however, had several wives but did not go beyond this precept; for it was permitted for a king to have many wives—but not to multiply 'wives that may allure his soul.' Thus, it is added [Deuteronomy 17, 20]: 'So that his heart may not be lifted up [in pride],’ having many foreign wives (alienigenas) seems to be prohibited. Although a multiplicity of wives was generally prohibited, it was permitted, however, for a king to have many [wives], but not to multiply them so as merely to gain sexual pleasure."

When the fullness of time was come, Lombard adds, by which the grace of Christ was extended everywhere, the law

'See St. Augustine, Quaestitionum in Heptateuchum, V, q. 27 (PL 34, 760).

'Th Sent., d. 33, c. 4, n. 1 (II, 461): "Sed numquid sub Lege licebat plures haberet uxores? Audi quid scriptum est in Deuteronomio [17, 17]: 'Non habebit uxores plurimas, quae alliciant animam eius.'—Augustinus. Super quem locum Augustinus ait: 'Manifestum est Solomonem hoc praeceptum transisse; David autem plures habuit, nec praeceptum praeterit. Permissum est enim plures habere, non 'plurimas quae alliciant animam' multiplicare. Cum tamen additur [Deut. 17, 20]: 'Ut non elevetur cor eius,' alienigenas prohibitum esse videtur. Verumtamen multiplicatio uxorum generalier prohibita est; permissum est autem regi plures habere, sed non multiplicare."
of matrimony was restored to its prior integrity and condition; accordingly, man is to have one wife according to the figure of Christ united to His Church; nor is the choice of a wife [merely] for the sake of offspring, but for the perfection of life and integrity of knowledge.  

**Proximate Context #a**

Let us now take up the thought of St. Thomas as proximate context with regard to natural law. In the first passage, *In II Sent.* d. 42, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3 ("Utrum peccatum veniale distinguatur a mortali"), he considers in what way venial sin is distinguished from mortal sin:

The precepts of the law intend to order men to the love of neighbor and God: the end (finis) of such a precept is love (caritas); and therefore only those [sins] are mortal according as they are said to kill the soul: these [sins] also directly violate the precepts of law, not only the written laws, but even the natural (naturalis) law. However, although something may not be evil because it is prohibited by the exterior [written] law, it is nevertheless evil because it is prohibited by the interior law (lege interiori). The interior law is the light of reason itself, by which we discern what must be done: and whatever in human actions is consonant with this light is wholly right (rectum); however, that which is contrary to this light is unnatural and evil (innaturale et malum) to man. And to this extent, something is said to be evil because it is prohibited.

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*Ibid.* n. 2 (II, 461): "Veniente autem plenitudinis tempore [Gal. 4, 4], quo Christi gratia ubique est dilatata, reducta est lex nuptiarum ad priorem honestiorumque institutionem, ut unus uni in figura Christi et Ecclesiae iungatur.--Nec quaeritur electio munere in successione generis, sed in perfectione vitae et sinceritate scientiae...."
by the interior law.\textsuperscript{10}

Let us enumerate a few points from the above passage which bear upon St. Thomas' doctrine of natural law as innate:

1. In contrast to the written and exterior law, natural law is identified as the \textit{lex interior}.

2. This interior law is further identified as the light of reason.

3. Whatever in human actions conforms with the light of reason is morally right (\textit{recte}) [and natural to man].

4. Whatever is contrary to the light of reason is evil and unnatural to him.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10}See \textit{In II Sent.}, d. 42, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3 (VI, 763a): "...praecepta legis intendunt hominem ordinare ad dilectionem proximi et Dei: qui finis praecepti est caritas, 1 Tim. 1; et ideo illa sola mortalia sunt ex genere de quibus dictum est: haec enim directe fiunt contra praecepta legis, non solum legis scriptae, sed etiam naturalis. Quamvis autem aliquid non sit malum, quia est prohibitum lege exteriori, tamen ideo est malum, quia prohibitur \textit{lege interiori}; lex enim interior est ipsum lumen rationis, quo agenda discernimus: et quidquid in humanis actibus huic lumini est consonum, totum est \textit{rectum}; quod autem contra hoc lumen est, homini est \textit{innaturale et malum}; et pro tanto malum dicitur, quia prohibitur interiori lege." In our commentary, we will refer to these proximate texts by using letters (e.g., \#a, \#b, \#c) to distinguish them from key-text references as indicated by bracketed numbers (e.g., [1]).

\textsuperscript{11}St. Thomas offers no explanation here as to whether there is a relationship between what is morally right or evil and what is natural or unnatural. He simply states that what is contrary to the light of reason is at once evil and unnatural. See notes 35-36 and 46 below for further discussion on this matter.
In the second passage, *In III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 4 ("Utrum aliqua potentia animae sit subjectum alicujus virtutis"), St. Thomas compares the principles of practical reason with those of speculative reason:

Just as in speculative reason there are innate principles of demonstration, so in practical reason there are innate ends (innata fines) connatural to man (connaturales homini).\(^{12}\)

Three points may be drawn from the above passage:

1. Insofar as practical principles (innata fines) are said to be in (practical) reason, they are evidently distinguished from the operative power to which they belong.

2. Such principles are in some way understood to be innate in practical reason.

3. These principles are distinct from, yet accord with, human nature (see note 17 below).

In a later discussion, *In III Sent.*, d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, sol. ("Utrum fuerit necessarium tradi legem scriptam"), and ad 3 of the same article, St. Thomas addresses the question concerning the necessity for the written law:

\(^{12}\) *In III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 4 (VII-1, 365a). Unde sicut in ratione speculativa sunt innata principia demonstrationum, ita in ratione practicu sunt innati fines connaturales homini. For a clarification of the the meaning of the term *innata*, see note 13 below. With regard to the significance of the meaning of connaturality, see notes 14 and 17 below.
It was necessary to give to people in [the form of] precept those things which natural reason dictates, which are said to pertain to the law of nature (legem naturae) and to express them in writing.

Those precepts were implanted (indita) [by God] in all people in natural cognition.\(^\text{13}\)

What points do these two statements make regarding natural law?

\(^\text{13}\)See *In III Sent.*, d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (VI, 422): "...necessarium fuit ea quae naturalis ratio dicta, quae dicuntur ad legem naturae pertinere, populo in praecipient dari, et in scriptum redigi...." Ibid., ad 3 (VI, 422): "Ista praecepta omnibus indita erant [a Deo] in naturali cognitione." This passage corresponds to Lombard's discussion as cited in note 5 above. See note 52 below regarding St. Thomas' indiscriminate use of the terms lex naturae, jus naturale, and lex naturalis. To avoid confusion with modern understanding of the term "right," we will translate jus naturale as natural law.

What can be said of the meaning of the term indita? Taken simply, indita characterizes anything which has been imparted from a causal principle to a recipient item. Now, a causal principle may be either extrinsic or intrinsic to the recipient item. In the present case, as well as in #f below, God is the extrinsic cause of natural law given (indita) to man (see note 27 below). In these two cases (#c and #f), indita is opposed to the meaning of innata which always denotes something precisely as inborn to an item by virtue of an intrinsic cause (e.g., #c and #e). Nevertheless, inasmuch as indita may also connote something as imparted into or within an item, that which has been imparted to an item is, as a result, intrinsic to it. Thus, in the present case, natural law (jus naturale) is intrinsic to man consequent to being imparted into him from without. For this reason, we translate indita as "implanted," to indicate primarily (1) that which is imparted from an extrinsic cause, and secondarily (2) that which, as a result of being implanted into an item, is intrinsic to that item. The exception to this rationale is found in #e below where, for want of a better term, we render inseruit as "implanted" despite the fact that the causal principle in that case is, as Cicero puts it, an innata vis. In this connection, see *In I Sent.*, d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 (VI, 327b), for a related discussion on immanent and transitive action.
1. The dictates of natural reason (to which the written precepts correspond) pertain to the law of nature (legem naturae) and are put into written law.

2. Precisely as dictates of natural reason, natural law precepts appear to be taken by St. Thomas as a product or operation of the intellectual faculty; as such, natural law precepts are intrinsically caused by man as agent (see note 13 above).

3. Inasmuch as these precepts (dictates of natural reason) were given (datum) to men or implanted (indita) [by God] in the natural cognition of all people, the cause(s) of the law of nature is/are extrinsic to man.¹⁴

¹⁴When St. Thomas speaks of precepts as implanted [by God] in natural cognition, God is clearly the principal and extrinsic cause of natural law. However, two different (yet complementary) interpretations may be advanced with regard to the secondary causes of natural law: (1) God implants natural law precepts into man through the mediation of sensible creatures qua content-determining-causes of human knowledge; that is, man acquires knowledge of natural law precepts from his experience of the material world (consisting of human and subhuman sensible natures) as created by God; this interpretation focuses on the extrinsic secondary causes (the content-determining-causes of human knowledge) involved in the process by which man attains knowledge (see our commentary discussion below concerning the production of the naturalis conceptio); (2) God implants natural law precepts into man inasmuch as He endows man with a human nature and those operative powers proper to that nature by which--and according to which--man discerns what is good and evil; here, the focus is upon the intrinsic secondary causes of natural law precepts (man's God-given nature, which includes his intellective and appetitive powers). In this connection, see note 32 below:

"[S]impliciter perfectum dicitur quod habet operationem convenientem suae formae." See note 35 below: "[I]llud dicitur esse naturale alicui rei quod convenit sibi secundum conditionem suae formae." See also note 52 below: "[N]atura dictat animali cuilibet secundum modum convenientem suae
Proximate Context #d

In a related discussion, In III Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 3, sol. ("Utrum omnia legis praecepta ad haec decem ordinentur"), St. Thomas discusses the relationship between the Decalogue, civil law, and natural law:

"Utrum omnia legis praecepta ad haec decem ordinentur". See also note 12 above where St. Thomas speaks of innata fines connaturales homini. See our commentary discussion below on St. Thomas' doctrine of human nature. In what sense, then, does St. Thomas presently speak of precepts as indita in naturali cognitione? Note here that he is addressing the question raised by Lombard, "Utrum fuerit necessarium tradi legem scriptam?" (see note 5 above). In that commentary, Lombard speaks of natural law as written in man's heart (in corde; see also note 59 below where St. Thomas likewise speaks of natural law as cordi impressa). Evidently, the focus of Lombard's discussion is the Law as corresponding to the natural constitution of man. Now, in his own discussion, St. Thomas asserts that (natural law) precepts are commonly known by all people; apparently, natural law precepts are universal by virtue of human nature--common to every man--to which these precepts accord. The assertion that knowledge of precepts is universal, however, cannot be based merely on the premise that such knowledge is sensibly acquired; it also requires the premise that there is (first of all) a human nature divinely implanted in man which, (secondly) by virtue of its definite structure and function, (a) subsequently enables man to participate in knowledge, (b) serves as a content-determining-cause of knowledge as attained through sensible experience, and (c) serves as that intrinsic principle to which innata fines correspond (connaturales homini). Accordingly, we interpret the phrase, "praecpta omnibus indita erant [a Deo] in naturali cognitione," as referring principally to the intrinsic causes of natural law precepts (man's underlying nature and corresponding operative powers as implanted in him by God) and secondarily to the extrinsic causes of human knowledge (human natures and other sensible natures taken as content-determining-causes of acquired knowledge). See in this connection Contexts #a-#b above and #d-#f below which discuss natural law with emphasis on the constitution of man (his nature and natural powers) and not on extrinsic (content-determining) causes of knowledge per se.
There are certain laws which are implanted in reason itself (ipsi rationi sunt inditae) which are the primary measure and rule of all human actions...and these laws are called natural law (jus naturale).  

From the above statement, three points can be made:

1. Natural law is the primary rule and measure of all human actions.

2. Inasmuch as it is said to be implanted in reason itself (ipsi rationi sunt inditae), natural law must be traced to content-determining-causes which are extrinsic to the intellectual power.

3. While the content-determining-causes of natural law are extrinsic to the intellectual power, natural law is in some way proper to that power.

Proximate Context #e

We next look at In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 2 ("Utrum confessio sit necessaria ad salutem"); in this text, St. Thomas takes up the question whether the sacrament of confession is necessary for salvation:

Faith is above the knowledge of natural reason; hence, even the Sacraments are above the dictates of natural reason; for "natural law (jus naturale) is that which opinion has not generated, but a certain innate power innata vis) has implanted (inseruit)," as Tullius states. Therefore, the Sacraments are not of natural,

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15In III Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 3, sol. (VII-1, 426a): "Quaedam enim sunt leges quae ipsi rationi sunt inditae, quae sunt prima mensura et regula omnium humanorum actuum...et hae leges jus naturale dicuntur." See note 53 below regarding St. Thomas' use of the terms lex naturae, jus naturale, and lex naturalis.
but of divine law which is supernatural; sometimes even the word natural is said inasmuch as that is natural for anything which is given (imponitum) it by its Creator; nevertheless, natural [items] are properly said to be those [items] caused from principles of nature.16

From the above statement, let us note three important points regarding natural law:

1. Natural law (jus naturale) is implanted (inseruit) in man by an innate (innata) power.

2. Hence, natural law (in contrast to faith and the Sacraments) is properly "natural" to man insofar as it is caused from a principle of [man's] nature.

3. St. Thomas offers no explanation in this text regarding the innata vis or the production of natural law

16In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 2 (VII-2, 793b): "Fides autem est supra cognitionem rationis naturalis; unde etiam sacramenta sunt supra rationis naturalis dictamina. Et quia "jus naturale est quod non opinio genuit, sed innata quaedam vis inseruit," ut Tullius dicit (de invent. Rhetor., num. 56); ideo sacramenta non sunt de jure naturali, sed de jure divino, quod est supranaturale; et quandoque etiam naturae dicitur, secundum quod cuilibet rei illud est naturale quod ei a suo Creatore imponitur: tamen proprie naturalia dicuntur quae ex principiis naturae causantur." In this connection, see In II Sent., d. 19, q. 1, a. 4, sol., where a similar contrast is made between what is "natural" to man in the proper and improper sense of the term. See Cicero, De Inventione, II, c. 53, 161 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 328: "Naturae ius est, quod non opinio genuit sed quaedam in natura vis insevit, ut religionem, pietatem, gratiam, vindicationem, observantiam, veritatem." While Cicero recognizes common biological tendencies as implanted in all living natures (see De Officiis, I, c. 4, 11), his notions of ius and lex appear to apply only to man qua rational being. On Cicero's understanding of jus naturale, see Patrick Farrell, "Sources of St. Thomas' Concept of Natural Law," The Thomist 20 (1957), 259-67.
from principles of [man's] nature. What this *innata vis* is and how natural law is produced will be investigated in our commentary discussion on the production of the *naturalis conceptio*.

**Proximate Context #f**

Finally, in the *sed contra* 6 of our key-text (In IV *Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1), St. Thomas takes up the question of monogamy with respect to the law of nature:

That precept which is implanted (*inditum*) in man in the constitution (*institutio*) of his human nature seems to be of natural law (*jure naturali*). But [monogamy] (*quod sit una unius*) is implanted in him in the constitution of human nature, as *Gen.* 2, 2 makes clear: 'They shall be two in one flesh.' Therefore [monogamy] is of the law of nature (*lege naturae*). 17

The above passage may be reduced to a simple syllogism as follows:

1. A precept which is implanted in man in the constitution of his human nature is of natural law;
2. monogamy is implanted in him in the constitution of

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17 *In IV Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, *sed contra* 6 (VI, 967a): "...illud praecipue videtur esse de jure naturali quod homini in ipsa institutione humanae naturae est *inditum*. Sed quod sit una unius, in ipsa institutio humanae naturae est *inditum*, ut patet *Genes.* 2, 24 'Erunt duo in carne una.' Ergo est de *lege naturae*." For St. Thomas, then, "no moral precept can be proposed which in some way (*aliqua* \*aliqua\*) is not derived from the nature of man. All moral precepts are dictates of reason. Hence, the decalogue adds nothing to the substance of the act as prescribed by the natural law." Henri Renard, "Introduction to the Philosophy of the Existential Moral Act," *The New Scholasticism* 28 (1954), 164. Compare St. Thomas' above statement with the D. O'Donaghue's interpretation of St. Thomas's natural law teaching as cited in our Introduction, 13.
his human nature;
3. therefore, [monogamy] pertains to the law of nature.

As this last text makes clear, the law of nature and its precepts are in some way rooted in the nature of man.

What observations can be drawn from these six proximate context passages (see #a-f above)? First, we note the several different (but related) ways St. Thomas speaks of lex naturalis (or jus naturale or lex naturae): (1) as the light of reason (lumen rationis); (2) as the interior law (lex interior); (3) as innate ends (innata finis) in practical reason which are connatural to man (connaturales homini); (4) as precepts (praecpta) (a) implanted (indita) by God in natural cognition and (b) which reason dictates; (5) as the primary measure and rule of all human actions which are implanted in reason itself (ipsi rationi sunt inditae); (6) as implanted (inseruit) in man by an innate power (innata vis); (7) as precepts implanted (indita) in the constitution of human nature.

In turn, these several accounts of natural law may be reduced to four inasmuch as natural law is identified either with (1) man's nature (#f and perhaps #c), (2) an operative power (#a, #d and #e), (3) the product or operation of such a power ("quae naturalis ratio dicta"; see #b, #c and #e),
or (4) precepts or principles (#b, #c, #d and #f).\footnote{The extrinsic causes which determine the contents of natural law knowledge will be discussed in our commentary discussion on the naturalis conceptio. Until then, our study will focus primarily on the intrinsic causes of natural law and natural law knowledge.} Taken as man's nature, natural law is understood as implanted \textit{(indita)} by God. Insofar as the term \textit{indita} implies a relationship of an item to a causal principle, natural law--qua nature--is not simply intrinsic to man, but bears reference to something else outside of him--namely, God. Next, taken as an operative power of man, natural law is understood as natural and innate to man (#a, #d, and #e). Now, insofar as this power is "natural" to man, natural law-qua natural power--bears a correspondence to man's nature or form (see note 35 below); and inasmuch as such a power is innate to man, so natural law-qua power--is understood as innate--i.e., as rooted in man's nature. However, taken precisely as a product (#b and #e) or operation (#c) of man's innate power, natural law is understood as innate or (naturally) implanted \textit{(inseruit)} in man; as such, natural law is "natural" inasmuch as anything caused by a principle of [some] nature is said to be "natural" to that nature (#e). Finally, taken as precepts, dictates, or principles, natural law is said to be innate \textit{(innata)} to practical reason (#b), connatural to man \textit{(connaturales homini; #b)} and implanted \textit{(indita or inseruit)} either (i) [by God] in natural cognition (#c), (ii) in reason itself (#d), (iii)
(inscrivit) by an innate power (#e), or (iv) [by God] in the constitution of human nature (#f). What St. Thomas means when he speaks of natural law knowledge as innate, connatural, and implanted remains to be explicated.

Now, as we noted above (see note 10), natural law is the moral norm which directs man in his activities towards his end according to the light of reason; on this score, there is a connection between what is right (recte) and what is natural to man and, correlative­ly, what is evil and unnatural to him (see note 46 below). Accordingly, in taking up Lombard’s discussion concerning polygamy ("Cui licebat plures habere vel non"; see note 6 above), St. Thomas does not merely consider the question of licitness as such; rather, he asks the more profound and radical question: "Utrum habere plures uxor­es sit contra legem naturae;" for it is according to the law of nature that the good or evil of polygamy must be determined with respect to man’s nature and his end.

II. Key-Text A

In IV Sent., d. 33. q. 1, a. 1, resp.: "Utrum habere plures uxor­es sit contra legem naturae" (ca. 1252-56). 19

After offering nine arguments—five of which hold that polygamy is not contrary to natural law, and four of which hold that it is—St. Thomas responds as follows:

19 (VII-2, 967a). Except for changes in punctuation, the same text appears in Suppl., q. 65, a. 1.
[1] It must be said that there are certain principles naturally present in all things whereby they are able not only to perform their proper actions, but also to render them suitable to their end, whether such actions flow from a thing by virtue of its generic nature or by virtue of its specific nature: thus it belongs to a magnet to fall downward according to its generic nature and to attract iron according to its specific nature.

Respondeo dicendum, quod omnibus rebus naturaliter insunt quaedam principia quibus non solum operationes proprias efficere possunt, sed quibus etiam eas convenientes fini suo reddant; sive sint actiones quae rem aliquam ex natura sui generis sive consequantur ex natura speciei: ut magneti competit ferri deorsum ex natura sui generis, et attrahere ferrum ex natura speciei.

[2] Now just as forms are principles of action in things that act from natural necessity, by which they perform suitable actions proportionate to their end, so also in creatures which participate in cognition, the principles of action are knowledge and appetite. Hence in the cognitive power there must be a natural conception and in the appetitive power a natural inclination whereby the action suited the genus or species is rendered fitting to its end.

Sicut autem in rebus agentibus ex necessitate naturae sunt principia actionum ipsae formae, a quibus operationes propriae prodeunt convenientes fini; ita in his quae cognitionem participant, principia agendi sunt cognitio et appetitus. Unde oportet quod in vi cognoscitiva sit naturalis conceptio et in vi appetitiva naturalis inclinatio, quibus operatio conveniens generi sive speciei reddatur competens fini.

[3] But since among all animals man knows the meaning of an end and the ordination of actions to the end, therefore the natural conception implanted in him by which he is directed in suitable action is called natural law or natural right; but in other animals it is called natural estimation; for brutes are impelled to produce proper action more from the force of their nature than directed to act by their own choice.

Sed quia homo inter cetera animalia rationem finis cognoscit, et proportionem operis ad finem: ideo
Natural law, therefore, is none other than the knowledge naturally implanted in man by which he is directed towards suitable conduct in his activities, whether they are proper to him by virtue of his generic nature (such as in generating offspring or eating and so on), or belong to him by virtue of his specific nature (as in reasoning and the like).

Lex ergo naturalis nihil est aliud quam conceptio homini naturaliter indita, qua dirigitur ad convenienser agentum in actionibus propriis, sive competant ei ex natura generis, ut generare, comedere, et hujusmodi; sive ex natura speciei, ut ratiocinari, et similia.

Now whatever renders an action unsuitable to the end which nature intends some operation to achieve is said to be against the law of nature. But an action may be unsuitable either to a principal end or to a secondary end; and this two-fold unsuitability may occur in two ways: first, something may wholly frustrate an end as when too much or too little eating impedes bodily health—which is the principal end of eating; it may also impede suitability for conducting business, which is a secondary end of eating. In a second way, something makes difficult or decreases the fitting attainment of either the principal or secondary end—as when eating is inappropriate at an unsuitable time.

Omne autem illud quod actionem inconvenientem reddit fini quem natura ex opere aliquo intendit, contra legem naturae esse dicitur. Potest autem actio non esse conveniens fini vel principali vel secundario; et sive sic, hoc contingit dupliciter. Uno modo ex aliquo quod omnino impedit finem; ut nimia superfluitas aut defectus comestionis impedite salutem corporis quasi principalem finem comestionis; et bonam habitudinem in negotiis exercendis, quae est finis secundarius. Alio modo ex aliquo quod facit difficilem aut minus decentem perventionem ad finem principalem vel secundarium,
sicut inordinata comestio quantum ad tempus indebitum.

[6] If, therefore, an action is not suited to its end by completely thwarting the principal end, then directly through the law of nature it is prohibited by the primary precepts of the law of nature, which hold the same place in matters of conduct as the first principles hold in speculative matters. If, however, an action is in any way unsuitable to the secondary end, or again to the principal end as rendering its attainment difficult or less fitting, then it is prohibited, certainly not by the primary precepts of the law of nature, but by the secondary precepts which are derived from the first—just as conclusions in speculative matters are given our assent by virtue of self-evident principles. Thus the action under consideration is said to be against the law of nature.

Si ergo actio sit inconvenientis fini quasi omnino prohibens finem principalem, directe per legem naturae prohibetur primis praecceptis legis naturae, quae sunt in operabilibus, sicut sunt communes conceptiones in speculativis. Si autem sit incompetens fini secundario quocumque modo, aut etiam principali, ut faciens difficilem vel minus congruam perventionem ad ipsum; prohibetur non quidem primis praecceptis legis naturae, sed secundis, quae ex primis derivantur; sicut conclusiones in speculativis ex principiis per se notis fidem habent; et sic dicta actio contra legem naturae esse dicitur.

Now matrimony, St. Thomas states, has for its primary end the procreation and education of children; such an end certainly befits man by virtue of his generic nature which he holds in common with other animals; thus, offspring is assigned as a good of marriage. But for its secondary end, it has, among men alone, the community of works that are a necessity of life; and with respect to this, [both husband and wife] owe fidelity to one another, which is one of the goods of matrimony. Further, among believers, marriage
involves yet a higher end since it signifies the relationship between Christ and his Church; here the sacrament is said to be a good of marriage. Thus, the primary [generic] end corresponds to matrimony insofar as man is an animal, the second [specific] end inasmuch as he is a man, the third inasmuch as he is a believer.²⁰

The plurality of wives, therefore, neither totally destroys nor otherwise impedes the primary end of marriage, since one man suffices to beget children from a plurality of wives and educate children born of them. But the second [specific] end, while not totally destroyed, is nevertheless greatly impeded by a plurality of wives; for it is difficult to have peace in a family where one man is joined to many wives, since one man cannot suffice to satisfy the needs of many wives, and because the sharing of several in one

²⁰In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (VII-2967b): "Matrimonium ergo habet pro fine principali prolis procreationem et educationem; qui quidem finis competit homini secundum naturam generis; unde et aliis animalibus est communis, ut dicitur in 8 Ethicor (cap. 12, vel 14); et sic bonum matrimonii assignatur proles. Sed pro fine secundario, ut dicit Philosophus, habet in hominibus solum communicem operum quae sunt necessaria in vita, ut supra dictum est; et secundum hoc fidem sibi invicem debent, quae est unum de bonis matrimonii. Habet ulterius alium finem, inquantum in fidebus est, scilicet significationem Christi et Ecclesiae; et sic bonum matrimonii dicitur sacramentum. Unde primus finis respondet matrimonio hominis inquantum est animal; secundus, inquantum est homo; tertius, inquantum est fidelis." Note that the generic and specific ends are determined according to the generic and specific nature of man. In this connection, see Proximate Context #b regarding the innate ends (innata fines) in practical reason which are connatural to man (connaturales homini); see also Proximate Context #f.
occupation generates strife among its members. The third end is completely destroyed by a plurality of wives; for, as Christ is one, so also His Church is one. Hence, a plurality of wives is in some [specific] manner against natural law; but in some [generic] manner it is not.21

III. Commentary

**Introduction**

Before we consider in detail the many points which St. Thomas puts forward in this text, let us call attention to the general form and thrust of his response. Note that the moral issue of polygamy is not immediately addressed; rather, St. Thomas opens the discussion with a brief exposition of his theory of nature. Next, he introduces his teaching on natural law which is clearly an extension of this doctrine of nature. Only then does he proceed to the moral problem at hand; and the solution he offers is squarely set in terms of his introductory discussion on nature and natural law. Let us, then, look more closely at

21Ibid., (VII-2, 967b): "Pluralitas ergo uxorum neque totaliter tollit neque aliqualiter impedit primum finem, cum unus vir sufficiat pluribus uxoribus fecundandis, et educandis filiis ex eis natis; sed secundum finem etsi non totaliter tollat, tamen multum impedit, eo quod non facile potest esse pax in familia ubi uni viro plures uxor(es) junguntur, cum non posse viri sufficere ad satisfaciendum pluribus uxoribus ad votum; et quia communicatio plurium in uno officio causat litem, sicut figuli corrixiuntur ad invicem, et similiter plures uxor(es) unius viri. Tertium autem finem totaliter tollit, eo quod sicut Christus est unus, ita Ecclesias una; et ideo patet ex dictis quod pluralitas uxoruum quodammodo est contra legem naturae, et quodammodo non."
his movement of thought to see the connection he establishes between his doctrines of nature, natural law, and the moral question of polygamy.

**Movement of Thought**

St. Thomas puts forward a chain of arguments whereby the conclusion of one syllogism becomes the major premise for the next. First, he states his major premise (see above [1]) which consists of (1) the subject--namely, *omnes res*; (2) certain principles predicated of the subject which (a) are naturally present within (*naturaliter insunt*), (b) enable things to perform proper actions and (c) render such actions suitable toward their end. Also predicated of the subject are (3) the generic and specific nature and (4) the actions which flow from--and according to--a thing's generic or specific nature. Implicit in this first premise, then, is the conclusion that the principles of action proper to a thing direct both generic and specific actions towards a thing's suitable end--according to its generic and specific nature.

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22This premise is itself a conclusion which St. Thomas arrives at in the course of other investigations. See, for example, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 3; d. 45, q. 1, a. 3; *In II Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 1; d. 37, q. 3, a. 2; *In III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 2; *In IV Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1. On this topic, see George Klubertanz, "St. Thomas' Treatment of the Axiom, 'Omne Agens Agit Propter Finem,'" in *An Etienne Gilson Tribute* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1959), 101-17; Joseph Owens, "The Causal Proposition--Principle or Conclusion?" *The Modern Schoolman* 32 (1955), 159-270; Russell Collins, "Finality and Being," *Proceedings from the ACPA* 28 (1949), 36-46.
Next, St. Thomas introduces the minor premise (see above, [2]) consisting of (1) the identification of two sorts of the subject (omnes res), i.e., (a) those things which act [simply] from the necessity of nature and (b) those things which [further] participate in cognition; (2) the identification of two kinds of principles of action which correspond to the above distinction of species respectively--i.e., (a) forms (formae) and (b) knowledge (cognitio) and appetite (appetitus). Thus, in view of the major premise [1a-c], it follows that the principles of action of both kinds of things are (a) naturally present within their respective subjects, (b) enable such things to perform their proper [generic or specific] actions, and (c) render such actions [generic or specific] suitable toward their respective end according to the [generic or specific] natures of those subjects.

In the phrase that follows (see above, [2]), St. Thomas narrows the focus of the discussion to the consideration of cognitive agents and their respective principles of action which he identifies with further precision: there must be in the cognitive power (in vi cognoscitiva) (a) a naturalis conceptio and in the appetitive power (in vi appetitiva) (b) a naturalis inclinatio or desire. Hence, in light of [2], it follows that the naturalis conceptio is a cognitio which is distinguished from--but proper to and efficiently caused by--the cognitive power; similarly, the naturalis inclinatio
is an operation of desiring which is distinguished from--but proper to and efficiently caused by--the appetitive power; these two principles of action (the *naturalis conceptio* and the *naturalis inclinatio*) (a) are naturally present (*naturaliter insunt*; see #b, #e and [1] above) in those cognitive agents, (b) enable such agents to perform proper actions [whether generic or specific], and (c) render such actions [whether generic or specific] suitable for attaining their proper end according to the [generic and specific] natures of those agents. This conclusion now serves as the major premise for the next syllogism.

In the next section of the response (see above, [3]), St. Thomas provides several minor premises: *homo* is distinguished from other cognitive agents (*animalia*) as one who knows the end as such and the means to that end; the *naturalis conceptio* is designated in man as *lex naturalis* or *jus naturale*; in other animals, the *naturalis conceptio* is identified as the *naturalis aestimatio*.

From the force of [2], which itself is founded upon [1], these minor premises ([3]) issue in the following conclusion [4]: natural law is the knowledge (*cognitio*; see above [2]) which (a) is naturally implanted in him (*hominis naturaliter indita* or *naturaliter inest*; see #b, #e and [1]), (b) enables him to perform proper actions--both generic (such as eating) and specific (such as reasoning)--and (c) renders those generic and specific actions suitable
for attaining his proper end according to his [generic and specific] nature. This conclusion, then, is a particular result stemming from the opening premise [1]. Accordingly, St. Thomas' doctrine of *lex naturalis* in man must be understood as a specific application of a more general doctrine of natural activity pertaining to *omnibus rebus*. Accordingly, natural law is here taken as a product or operation of man which is naturally implanted (i.e., naturally produced; see #b, #e and [4] above) in him by his innate cognitive power (qua efficient cause), the *vis cognoscitiva* (see #b and #e); but further, natural law is also a naturally implanted knowledge (see #c, #d, #e, #f and [4] above). Precisely as implanted (*indita* or *inseruit*), the contents of natural law knowledge are imparted to the faculty of knowing (see notes 13 and 14 above); but whether the content-determining-causes of natural law knowledge are intrinsic or extrinsic to the intellectual power itself remains to be investigated.

Having identified *lex naturalis* as that specific principle of action proper to man, St. Thomas next lays down the foundational criteria of suitability with respect to natural ends: anything which renders an action unsuitable to an end which a nature intends (see #f) by way of some operation ("quem natura ex opere aliquo intendit"; see #c) is against the law of nature (*legem naturae*) (see above, [5]). It is not clear whether the term *legem naturae* as used
Here [5] applies generally to omnibus rebus or only specifically to man. In any case, the term lex naturae is subsequently applied only with respect to man for the rest of the discussion. To this extent, the terms lex naturae and jus naturale are evidently synonymous with the term lex naturalis, which is used in our present text only with reference to man.

Next, St. Thomas provides the further minor premise (see above, [5]) by (1) distinguishing between (a) principal ends and (b) secondary ends to which the criteria of suitability [4] pertains and (2) identifying how this criteria applies with respect to each kind of end--namely, when something either (a) wholly thwarts [either] end (e.g., bodily health or good business) or (b) inhibits or decreases the fitting attainment of either a principal or secondary end (as intended by nature). In light of the major premise as stated in [5], St. Thomas now derives two conclusions from this minor: (1) an action (e.g., the generic action of gluttony) which is unsuited to [either] end and wholly thwarts the principal end is directly prohibited through the law of nature (per legem naturae) by its primary precepts [6]; to this conclusion is added the comparison of primary precepts in practical matters to the communes conceptiones which pertain to speculative matters [6]; (2) an action which (a) in any way is unsuitable to the secondary end or (b) makes the attainment of the primary end difficult or
less fitting is forbidden by the secondary precepts [6]. Concerning this conclusion, St. Thomas explains that secondary precepts are derived from the first precepts ("quae ex primis derivantur") similar to the way by which conclusions in speculative matters achieve [validity] by virtue of the self-evident [first] principles [6]. It is clear, then, that St. Thomas' moral doctrine has as its basis the natural law, which itself issues from his doctrine of nature--specifically, human nature.

St. Thomas' Doctrine of Nature

To appreciate, then, the meaning and significance of natural law precisely as innate, let us briefly mark out the general lines of St. Thomas' doctrine of nature as expressed in the Commentary on the Sentences. We first recall the opening statement of our key-text:

There are certain principles naturally present in all things whereby they are able not only to perform their

23For the sake of clarity, note in this discussion that a principal end corresponds (respondet) to man's generic nature while a secondary end pertains to man's specific nature (see note 16 above). However, an action, whether it stems from man's generic or specific nature, may be directed towards or against either a generic or specific end (see above, [5]). Therefore, it follows that a primary precept always directly prohibits the complete obstruction of a principal (generic) end [6]--regardless of whether the action involved stems from man's generic or specific nature; accordingly, a primary precept always directly prohibits generic or specific actions insofar as either kind of action completely thwarts a principal (generic) end. A secondary precept, however, never bears directly upon the total obstruction of principal end [6]--regardless of whether the action involved stems from man's generic or specific nature.
proper actions, but also to render them suitable to their end, whether such actions flow from a thing by virtue of its generic nature or by its specific nature. (see [1] above)

Simply put, "nature" for St. Thomas is that intrinsic principle by which a thing is determined in its proper actions and directed in those actions towards its proper end.  

This same teaching on nature and natural action is expressed more fully In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1:

It is said in Wisdom, chap. 8, that God disposes all things sweetly, because each and every thing by the nature (ex natura) divinely implanted (indita) in it tends towards that to which it is ordained by divine providence according to the exigency of the impression it has received. Because all things proceed from God inasmuch as He is good, therefore all created things, according to the impression received from the Creator ("secundum impressionem a Creatore receptam"), are inclined towards seeking the good according to their mode. Thus a certain circulation (circulatio) is discovered in things, while, proceeding from the good, they tend towards the good.

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24 In I Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, sol. (VI, 324b): "Sicut Dionysius (Div. Nom., IV), non est providentia naturas rei destruere, sed salvare; et ideo quasdam res sic instituit ut secundum suam conditionem consequatur finem per principium quod est natura." In II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (VI, 361a): "...eodem ordine res referuntur in finem quo procedunt a principio, eo quod agens unusquisque ordinat effectum suum in finem aliquem; et ideo secundum ordinem agentium est ordo finium." In III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, sol., (VII-1, 294a): "...omne quod sequitur aliquem finem, oportet quod fuerit aliquomodo determinatur ad illum finem." See also note 49 with respect to nature as an intrinsic principle (intrinsica principia) of action.

25 See In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1 (VII-II, 1191b): "...dicetur Sap. 8, quia Deus omnia suaviter disponit: quia unaquaque res ex natura sibi divinitus indita tendit in id ad quod per divinam providentiam
Here, in addition to identifying *natura* as an intrinsic principle of action, St. Thomas emphasizes its relational significance as divinely implanted (*divinitus indita*) in each and every creature. All created things proceed from God and—according to the impression (namely, *natura*) received by the Creator—tend towards the good.26 Hence, every natural item is related to God as principle agent, exemplar, and final cause.27

As the primary agent, exemplar, and final cause of

ordinatur secundum exigentiam impressionis receptae. Et quia omnia procedunt a Deo inquantum bonus est...ideo omnia creata secundum impressionem a Creatore receptam inclinantur in bonum appendendum secundum suum modum; ut sic in rebus quaedam circulatio inveniatur; dum, a bono egredientia, in bonum tendunt." *In I Sent.*, d. 14, q. 2, a. 2, sol. (VI, 113a): "In exitu creaturarum a primo principio attenditur quaedam circulatio et regiratio eo quod omnia revertuntur sicut in finem in id a quo sicut a principio prodierunt." See also *In I Sent.*, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2; *In II Sent.*, d. 12, expos. text.; ibid., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2; *In III Sent.*, d. 27, q. a. 2. On St. Thomas' doctrine of *circulatio*, see Gustaf Gustafson, *The Theory of Natural Appetency in the Philosophy of St. Thomas* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1944), 84-90.

26Regarding the relationship between good and end, see *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 3, sol. (VI, 69a): "...bonum habet rationem causae finalis...." Ibid., d. 37, q. 3, a. 2, sol. (VI, 725b): "...ratio boni a fine sumitur.... Finis autem est perfecti agentis inquantum est agens, eo quod finis movet agentem ad operandum; unde finis, et etiam obliquatio a fine, per prius comparatur ad agens quam ad patiens." See also *In II Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (VI, 729a).

27In *II Sent.*, d. 1, expos. text. (VI, 401a):
"...secundum ipsum, primum principium agens et ultimus finis reducuntur in idem numero...ex quo sequitur quod sit unum principium primum extra rem, quod est agens et exemplar et finis..." Insofar as it is *divinitus indita*, the *nature* of a creature is related to God as its extrinsic cause; see note 13 above.
creatures, God is an extrinsic cause (see note 27 above); nevertheless, He is an immanent (or indwelling) cause insofar as He [alone] is the cause of that which is innermost in all things—namely esse. Since esse is more intimate to a thing than any cause through which a thing is determined, it follows that the operation of the Creator penetrates more deeply to the core of a thing than the operation of any secondary determining cause. 28

The supreme causality of God, however, does not exclude the causality of creatures—nor is the causality of creatures the result of any insufficiency on the part of God; rather, from the order of His wisdom, God has arranged to bring about an effect by the mediation of [secondary] causes; in this way the dignity of causality is communicated by God to creatures; 29. Hence, there proceeds from the

28 In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. (VI, 389b): "Horum tamen causa etiam Deus est, magis intime in eis operans quam aliae causae moventes: quia ipse est dans esse rebus. Causae autem aliae sunt quasi determinates illud esse.... [E]sse autem est magis intimum cuilibet rei quam ea per quae esse determinatur.... Unde operatio Creatoris magis pertingit ad intima rei quam operatio causarum secundarum."
In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, sol. (VI, 68a): "Deus est esse omnium non essentiale, sed causale.... Unde patet quod divinum esse producit esse creaturae in similitudine sui imperfecta: et ideo esse divinum dicitur esse omnium rerum, a quo omne esse creatum effective et exemplariter manat."

29 In I Sent., d. 45, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4 (VI, 361a): "...causalitas divinae voluntatis non excludit omnes causas proximas rerum; nec hoc est ex insufficientia voluntatis, sed ex ordine sapientiae ejus quae effectus mediantibus aliis causis provenire disposit, ut sic etiam causandi dignitas creaturis communicaretur." In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. (VI, 389b): "...ideo hoc quod creatum est causa alii creaturae, non excludit quin Deus immediate in rebus
first principle of all things a diversity of particular principles; correlative, there are found different proper ends according to the diversity of created agents (see notes 24-25 above). All creatures are nevertheless ordered to a common ultimate end—namely, God—inasmuch as every created good refers to the goodness of God from which the good of creatures flows.30

Good, then, is found in things according to a double order—namely: (1) the order of one thing to another thing, such as the order of members of an army to one another and (2) the order of things to the ultimate end, similar to the order of an army to its leader; and because things bear reference to an ultimate common end by the mediation of various proper and immediate ends, there is effected a diversity of relations of things vis-à-vis the ultimate omnibus operatur, inquantum virtus sua est sicut medium conjungens virtutem cujuslibet causae secundae cum suo effectu."

30 See In II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (VI, 361a): "In progressu autem rerum a principio invenitur unum rerum principium primum, quod commune est omnium, sub quo inveniuntur alia principia propria, quae in diversis sunt diversa: ita etiam in referendo res ad finem invenitur ultimus finis omnibus communis, qui est ultimus finis; sed inveniuntur diversi fines proprii secundum diversitatem entium." In I Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, contra (VI, 13b): "...ratio dilectionis est bonitas. Sed omnis bonitas refertur ad bonitatem Dei a qua fluit et cujus similitudinem gerit. Ergo nihil est diligendum nisi in ordine ad Deum." See also In II Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 2.
In this connection, St. Thomas explains that the perfection (perfectio) of a thing consists in the attainment of its ultimate [end] (ultimum); perfection, however, is understood in two ways: with respect to what is within a thing (in re) and what is outside a thing (extra rem). Now, perfection within a thing--understood simply--consists in the operation which befits its form by which a thing is what it is. But a thing which possesses a substantial form is

31 See In II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (VI, 361a): "Bonum enim invenitur in rebus secundum duplicem ordinem, ut in 12 Metaphys. (text. com. 52) dicitur, scilicet secundum ordinem unius rei ad rem aliam, qui ordo similis est ordini quem partes exercitus ad invicem habent: et alius est ordo rerum ad finem ultimum, qui scilicet est similis ordini exercitus ad bonum ducis: et quia res referuntur in finem ultimum communem, mediante fine proprio; ideo secundum diversitatem finis proprii efficitur diversa relatio rerum ad finem ultimum." St. Thomas then concludes (VI, 361a): "Sic ergo dicendum est, [quod sicut] rerum omnium unus est finis ultimus, scilicet Deus; ita et voluntatum omnium est unus ultimus finis, scilicet Deus...." With respect to the ordination of secondary causes and goods to God, see In I Sent., d. q. 2, a. 1, contra; d. 45, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4; In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. Regarding instrumental causality, see In IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol.; d. 8, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1. The mediation of creatures will be seen to play a crucial role in human activity insofar as man as a cognitive agent attains knowledge of his end through the knowledge of creatures--as derived from sensible experience; see our commentary on the naturalis conceptio below.

32 In IV Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 (VII-2, 583a): "...perfectio rei consistit in hoc quod res ad sui ultimum perducatur. Est autem dupliciter ultimum rei; unum quod est in re, et alius quod est extra rem.... Ultimum autem cujuslibet rei in seipsa est ipsa rei operatio, propter quam res est.... [S]impliciter perfectum dicitur quod habet operationem convenientem suae formae...." In III Sent. d. 27, q. 1, a. 4. sol. (VII-1, 297): "...in rebus omnibus duplex perfectio inventur; una qua in se subsistit; alia qua ad res alias ordinatur." See also In I Sent., d. 37, q.
not said to be perfected [merely by virtue of the form itself], but is perfected in and through esse or perfected in the first perfection which is esse. This latter principle by which a creature has esse is the ultimate end of a thing extra rem; and through union to this principle, a thing is completed and established. Thus, the first agent--namely God--is understood as a creature's ultimate perfecting end (ultimi finis perficientis).

On this score, a relationship between perfection in re and extra rem becomes evident insofar as the ultimate end of a thing (perfection extra rem) is at once the immanent or indwelling efficient cause by which that thing has esse (see note 28 above).

Let us sum up St. Thomas' doctrine of nature as follows:

1. Natura is an intrinsic (intrinseca) principle of action.

2. Insofar as it is an impression (impressio) divinely implanted (divinitus indita) in creatures, natura signifies

3, a. 2, sol. (VI, 725b): "...finis autem est perfectio agentis inquantum est agens...." See note 26 above for the full citation.

33 In IV Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 (VII-2, 583a): "Unde res quae habet formam substantialem per quam est, esse non dicitur perfecta simpliciter, sed perfecta in esse, vel perfecta perfectione prima.... Ultimum autem cujuslibet rei extra seipsam, est principium a quo res habet esse: quia per conjunctionem ad ipsum res complementur et firmantur...et ideo primum agens habet etiam rationem ultimi finis perficientis." Such a passage exemplifies the irreducibility of St. Thomas' metaphysics of esse to that of Aristotle's doctrine of substance.
an ordination to God as its extrinsic causal principle.

3. According to their proper natures, creatures are ordered to God as their ultimate end and good.

4. This ordination to God involves the mediation (causal relationships) of creatures to one another.

5. Perfection of a creature consists in (a) operation suitable to a creature's nature or form; (b) its union with the ultimate perfecting end of its being (esse).

**Human Nature qua Specifically Intellectual**

Let us next consider how St. Thomas applies his doctrine of nature to man. In related discussions on natural activity and natural ends, St. Thomas explicitly identifies man as among those creatures which participate in cognition. This kind of participation is proper to man by virtue of his nature:

We are said to be god-like with respect to our soul, not in such a way that our soul is of the divine essence, but because it participates in an intellectual nature, which is also in God; accordingly, man is said to be [created] to the image of God.34

That is said to be natural to something which corresponds to what its own form is, through which it is constituted in such a nature.... The form, however, through which man is man is reason and intellect. Thus, the soul of man naturally strives towards what is

34 *In II Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2 (VI, 530a): "...dicimur nos esse genus Dei quantum ad animam, non ita quod anima sit de divina essentia, sed quia participat naturam intellectualem quae etiam in Deo est; secundum quod etiam dicitur ad imaginem Dei." The meaning of the term *participatio* in connection with natural law will be explored in the following textual study.
suitable to it according to reason (rationem) and intellect (intellectum).\textsuperscript{35}

The intellectual nature attains to being an image of God in which the species of its nature in some way consists; and thus it is that we posit the ultimate happiness of an intellectual creature to be intellection, that is, intellectual contemplation, in which God's happiness also consists.\textsuperscript{36}

Man is naturally ordered to God through cognition (per cognitionem) and through affection (per affectionem) inasmuch as such participation is natural to him.\textsuperscript{37}

As these four passages reveal, man's natural form is a rational and intellectual form; accordingly, what is "natural" to man is that which corresponds to his intellectual nature. Thus, since man naturally strives

\textsuperscript{35}In II Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 1, sol. (VI, 758a): "...illud dicitur esse naturale alicui rei quod convenit sibi secundum conditionem suae formae, per quam in tali natura constituitur.... Forma autem per quam homo est homo, est ipsa ratio et intellectus. Unde in illud quod est conveniens sibi secundum rationem et intellectum, naturaliter tendit." See ibid., d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, sed contra (VI, 532b): "...anima rationalis est forma cujaslibet hominis." The distinction between ratio and intellectus will be touched upon later in this commentary.

\textsuperscript{36}In II Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 2, sol. (VI, 525a): "...intellectualis natura attingit ad imitationem divinam, in qua quodammodo consistit species naturae ejus; et inde est quod in eadem operatione ponimus ultiam felicitatem intellectualis creaturae, in qua est felicitas Dei, scilicet in contemplatione intellectiva." Cf. note 10 above where St. Thomas states that the end of man is [the operation of] caritas for God and neighbor. See note 38 below where St. Thomas briefly explains the meaning of caritas.

\textsuperscript{37}In III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1 (VII-1, 244b): "...homo naturaliter ordinetur ad Deum et per cognitionem et per affectionem, inquantum est naturaliter ejus particeps...." Hence, contrary to the interpretive reading of Germain Grisez (see our Introduction, note 46), St. Thomas clearly holds that man is directed by nature towards his supernatural end.
toward the good according to reason (see notes 40-43 below),
his perfection lies in (a) that operation—namely,
intellectual contemplation—which befits his form (see notes
32 and 36 above) and (b) union with God—the ultimate
perfecting end of man—through cognition and affection (see
notes 33 and 37 above). These two aspects of perfection are
seen to converge in St. Thomas’ doctrine of natural law
which involves the notions of (1) operation of (2) natural
powers as rooted in, and in conformity with, (3) one’s own
human nature or form (see [4] above), and (4) the end as
intended by that nature.\textsuperscript{38}

How does St. Thomas’ doctrine of circulatio apply to
man? We noted above (see notes 28 and 33) that God is the
efficient cause of that which is innermost in all things—
namely, \textit{esse}. Let us further note that the rational soul of

\textsuperscript{38}See Proximate Contexts \#b and \#f and section [5]
above; see \textit{In I Sent.}, d. 3, exp. text (VI, 44a) where the
convergence of man’s perfection in \textit{re} and extra \textit{rem} is
clearly stated: "...mens nostra dicitur capere Deum sicut
perfectibile [capit] suam perfectionem. Objectum enim
operationis aliquo modo est perfectio operantis. Mens autem
nostra habet operationem circa Deum per cognitionem et
amorem quam non habent creaturae irrationales." \textit{In III Sent.}
d. 27, q. 1, a. 4, sol. (VII-1, 297a): ". . .cognitio pertinet
ad perfectionem cognoscentis, qua in seipso perfectum est:
volutas autem pertinet ad perfectionem rei secundum ordinem
ad alias res et ideo objectum cognoscitivae virtutis est
verum, quod est in anima, ut dicit Philosophus, 6 \textit{Metaph.}
(text. 8): objectum autem appetitivae bonum, quod est in
rebus...." \textit{In II Sent.}, d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (VI, 729a):
"Debita autem relatio voluntatis ad finem ultimum salvatur
secundum illum finem quo voluntas nata est ultimum finem
participare, in quo distinguitur a rebus aliis, quae alio
modo ultimum finem participant; et hic est caritas, vel
beatitudo; et ideo non solum Deus, sed etiam caritas finis
est omnium rectarum voluntatum."
man is immediately caused [created] by God.\textsuperscript{39} Inasmuch, then, as the intellectual soul of man is created by, and ordered to, God as his ultimate perfecting end through knowledge and affection, the natural movement of circulation in man is carried out in an intellectual manner.

What can be said of man's ordination to God in view of the multiplicity of other causes and goods he experiences in the world? In our key-text, St. Thomas sums up this ordination of man to his end according to knowledge and appetite as follows:

Man, among all animals, knows the meaning of an end and the ordination of actions to the end (see [3] above).

The will following [knowledge] can be taken in two ways: either insofar as it follows the conception of the end simply; and thus the will tends towards the common end without any determination of that which is [ordered] to the end; or insofar as the will follows the conception of what is [ordered] to the end and its condition; and thus the will attains the end according to some determinate mode.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{39}In II Sent., d. 18, q. 2, a. 2, sed contra (VI, 518a): "...Genes. 2, 7, dicitur, quod 'inspiravit Deus in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae.' Haec autem est anima rationalis, qua homo vivit. Ergo videtur quod immediate a Deo sit." Ibid., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. (VI, 389b): "...unde nec Angeli nec animae rationales possunt generari, sed solum creari...."

\textsuperscript{40}In I Sent., d. 47, q. 1, a. 3, sol. (VI, 572b): "Voluntas autem consequens dupliciter potest accipi. Aut secundum quod sequitur conceptionem finis tantum; et sic voluntas est de fine in communi sine aliqua determinacione ejus quod est ad finem. Aut secundum quod sequitur conceptionem ejus quod est ad finem, et conditionem ejus; et sic voluntas consequens est de consecutione finis secundum aliquem determinatum modum." In I Sent., d. 6, exposit. text. (VI, 59b): "Voluntatem oportet quod praecedat aliqua
By virtue of his intellectual nature, man is able (through sensible experience; see note 64 below) to discern causal relationships in the world and thus trace secondary principles to their first principle (see note 30 above); likewise, inasmuch as he naturally tends to his end according to reason, man is able to refer secondary ends (goods) back to God as his ultimate end (or good) (see note 31 above). In this case, [man, through his appetitive power] proceeds from the love of the end (ex amore finis), which is its principle, by desiring in the end those things which lead towards it. He thus embraces (accipit) things which lead towards the end, insofar as they are included in the end itself, and rests in them through love; therefore, desire (desiderium) follows upon love of the end, although desire precedes the love of those things which are ordered to the end. 41 Put another way, the will of man naturally

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41 In III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1 (VII-1, 295b) "...sicut in operatione intellectus concluditur quidam circulus, ita et in operatione affectus.... Similiter etiam affectus ex amore finis, qui est principium, procedit desiderando in ea quae sunt ad finem, quae prout accipit ut finem in se aliquo modo continentia, per amorem in eis quiescit; et idéo desiderium sequitur amorem finis, quamvis
seeks the end and desires other things for the sake of this end (i.e., God). This end, St. Thomas states, is naturally known in the reason as good and as to be sought; and the will following this knowledge is called will as nature. Now, in ad 9 of our key-text, St. Thomas identifies this knowledge of the end (as good) as the naturalis conceptio:

praecedat amorem eorum quae sunt ad finem."

42 See In I Sent. d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, contra (VI, 13b): "...ratio dilectionis est bonitas. Sed omnis bonitas refertur ad bonitatem Dei a qua fluit et cujus similitudinem gerit. Ergo nihil est diligendum nisi in ordine ad Deum." Here, St. Thomas flatly contradicts the position of Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis, who assert that "God is not the ultimate reason for acting." See our Introduction, note 48.

43 In II Sent. d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2 (VI, 739a): "Unde illud quod finis est hominis, est naturaliter in ratione cognitum esse bonum et appetendum, et voluntas consequens istam cognitionem dicitur voluntas ut natura." In stating that the will follows upon knowledge, St. Thomas does not mean that the appetitive power proceeds from the intellective power. Both powers are rooted in, and determined by, the essence of man; hence, the natural inclination is ordered to the end, not by reason, but by human nature; nevertheless, there is a natural communication between the two powers whereby the natural inclination naturally conforms itself to the regulation of reason. See In III Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 4 (VII-1, 365a): "Sed quia naturalis inclinatio ad finem aliquem est ex praestituente naturam, qui talem ordinem naturae tribuit; ideo naturalis inclinatio voluntatis ad finem non est ex ratione, nisi forte secundum naturalem communicatiam, qua fit ut appetitus rationi conjunctus naturaliter tendat ad conformandum se rationi sicut regulae; et ex hoc est quod voluntas est naturaliter inclinata ad finem, qui naturaliter rationi est inditus."
The natural inclination in the appetitive power follows the natural conception in cognition.\textsuperscript{44}

Natural law knowledge (the \textit{naturalis conceptio}), however, is not knowledge of the end simply; rather, the \textit{naturalis conceptio} is evidently a complex knowledge which involves knowledge of (1) determinate goods (human persons and other creatures existing in the sensible universe), (2) man's actions as flowing from--and in accord with--his own nature (generic and specific), and (3) the common end or good.\textsuperscript{45} This complex knowledge is the moral norm by which we discern what we must do ("quo agenda discernimus"); see

\textit{\textsuperscript{44}In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 9 (VII-2, 968b): "...naturalis inclinatio in appetitiva sequitur naturalem conceptionem in cognitione." In this connection, see In III Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 2 (VII-1, 424a): "Sicut enim natura ex parvis seminibus maximas arbores proficit, ita etiam et lex [naturae] ex his quae in principio et in promtu sunt." Such a description of natural law suggests the organic unity of all natural law precepts as rooted in a common intelligible principle which, apparently, is the \textit{naturalis conceptio}.}

\textit{\textsuperscript{45}See [3] and [4] above; In II Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 1, sol. (VI, 758a): "Bonum autem cujuslibet virtutis est conveniens homini secundum rationem: quia talis bonitas est ex quadam \textit{commensuratione actus ad circumstantias et finem}, quam ratio facit. Unde quaedam inclinationes virtutum sive aptitudines praexistunt naturaliter in ipsa natura rationali.... [I]deo homo naturaliter in bonum tendit [secundum rationem]." Note that this proportion (\textit{commensuratio}) of action to circumstances and end is something which reason produces (\textit{quam ratio facit}) from the knowledges of act, circumstance and end; in this connection, see \#c and \#d above; see also In II Sent., d. 40, q. un., a. 3, sol. The term \textit{circumstantia} as employed here apparently refers to all other intelligible factors (man's concrete situation consisting of persons, things, place, etc.) from which, in addition to the knowledge of \textit{actus} and \textit{finis}, the notion of "good" is conceived by reason. See our discussion on the production of the \textit{naturalis conceptio} below.}
note 10 above). Now, if the will, in following this natural law knowledge, subordinates secondary ends (or goods) to the ultimate end, the will will be right (recta), and human action will be morally good and natural to man; but if the will does not follow natural law knowledge, the will will be perverse (perversa), and human action will be evil and unnatural to man. 46

In view of St. Thomas' doctrines of nature in general and nature as typically human, what can be said of natural law in man? Let us summarize as follows:

1. Natural law is understood by St. Thomas as (a) a nature which is divinely implanted (divinitus indita) in

46 In II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (VI, 729a): "...sicut rerum omnium unus est finis ultimus, scilicet Deus; ita et voluntatum omnium est unus ultimus finis, scilicet Deus; nihilominus tamen sunt alii fines proximi, et, si secundum illos fines servetur debita relatio voluntatis in finem ultimum, erit recta voluntas; si autem non, erit perversa." On the will as right, see also note 38 above; cf. In II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3 as cited in note 10 above. The relationship between natural law, right reason, moral rectitude, and what is natural to man is explicated in In II Sent., d. 42, q. 2, a. 5, sol. (VI, 772ab): "Et ideo simpliciter concedendum est, unum peccatum alio gravius esse. Hoc autem contingit duobus modis. Uno modo ex parte ipsius peccati in se: alio modo ex parte peccantis. Ex parte peccati in se accedit major vel minor gravitas peccati ex illa causa ex qua quis actus malus secundum se dicitur. Hoc autem est secundum quod actus discordat a rectitude rationis. Unicuique enim naturae indita est naturalis quaedam inclinatio in suum finem: et ideo in ratione est quaedam naturalis rectitudo, per quam in finem inclinatur: et ideo illud quod abducit a fine illo, est discordans a ratione: et quia lex naturalis est secundum quam ratio recta est, ideo Augustinus dicit contra Faustum manich. (lib 22, cap. 27), quod peccatum dicitur, inquantum discordat a lege aeterna, cujus expressio est ipsa lex naturalis. Quanto ergo aliquis actus magis abducit a fine humanae vitae, tanto in se gravius peccatum est."
man, (b) a natural power which is innate (*innata*) to man, (c) a product or operation which is innate (*innata*) or naturally implanted (*naturaliter indita*) in him, and (d) a knowledge which is innate or naturally implanted in him.

2. Taken precisely as man's nature, natural law is:

(a) an intrinsic principle of action.

(b) an impression (*impressio*) divinely implanted (*divinitus indita*) in man.

(c) that principle of action which orders man to God as his ultimate end and good.

(d) that principle of action by which man is ordered to other creatures as proximate ends and goods.

(e) that principle of action by which man attains his perfection both with respect to (i) activity suitable to his own human form or essence and (ii) his union with God as his ultimate perfecting end.

(f) that principle of action by which man attains to being the image of God in which the species of his nature in some way consists (see notes 34 and 36 above).

3. Taken precisely as operative powers of man (the *vis cognoscitiva* and the *vis appetitiva*), natural law is:

(a) natural to man, inasmuch as it corresponds to what his form or nature is (see notes 35 and 46 above).

(b) innate to man, precisely because such powers are innate to man (i.e., they are intrinsic parts of his nature).

4. Taken precisely as a product or operation of an innate power (i.e., the *naturalis conceptio* and the *naturalis inclinatio*), natural law is:

(a) natural to man, insofar as it (i) is an
operation of, or is produced (i.e., efficiently caused) by, a principle of his nature (see #e, [1] and [4] above), (ii) conforms to or befits his nature (see #b and notes 32, 35 and [4] above).

(b) naturally implanted (inseruit) or innate (innata) in man, insofar as it is produced efficiently caused) by an innate natural power--the vis cognoscitiva (or the vis appetitiva) (see note 14 above regarding another complementary interpretation).

5. Taken precisely as a knowledge, natural law is:

(a) natural to man, inasmuch as it (i) is efficiently caused by a principle of his nature (see #e, [1] and [4] above), (ii) corresponds to or befits his nature (see #b, #f, and [4]).

(b) intrinsic to man, inasmuch as it is (i) innate (innata) in practical reason, (ii) naturally implanted (inseruit) in man by an innate power, (iii) implanted (indita) [by God] in natural cognition, (iv) implanted [by God] in the constitution of human nature.47

6. Natural law, taken precisely as (a) a product or operation of the cognitive power, and (b) a knowledge is identified by St. Thomas (in our present text) as the naturalis conceptio.

7. This naturalis conceptio is a complex knowledge which involves knowledge of (a) determinate goods within man's concrete (sensible) situation, (b) man's actions as flowing from his own nature (generic and specific) as concerned with (c) the common end or indeterminate good.

To further understand St. Thomas' notion of natural law

47 What St. Thomas means by the terms innata, indita, and inseruit in each of these cases will be examined shortly.
as intrinsic to man, let us investigate (1) three different ways in which St. Thomas understands natural law and (2) the different factors--namely, the efficient and content-determining causes--which together produce the naturalis conceptio as a complex cognition.

Three Senses of Natural Law

In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, videtur quod non 4, it is argued that polygamy is not against the law of nature:

Natural law (jus naturale) is "that which nature has taught all animals," as stated at the beginning of the Digests. But nature has not taught all animals that one male should be joined to only one female, since in many animals, one male is united to many females. Thus, it is not against the law of nature (legem naturae) [for man] to have a plurality of wives.48

In response to this argument, St. Thomas offers three different accounts of natural law:

48 In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, videtur non quod 4 (VI-966b): "...jus naturale est 'quod natura omnia animalia docuit,' ut in principio Digestorum [I, 1, 1] dicitur. Sed natura non docuit hoc omnia animalia, quod sit una unius; cum unum mas in multis animalibus, pluribus feminis conjungatur. Ergo non est contra legem naturae habere plures uxorres." The same passage cited from the Digest (compiled by Justinian around 533 A.D.) was borrowed from Ulpian (died 228 A.D.) and appears again in the Corpus Juris Civilis, lib. I, tit. II; see Thomas C. Sandars, ed., Institutes of Justinian (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970), 7: "Jus naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Nam jus istud non humani generis proprium est, sed omnium animalia, quae in caelo, quae in terra, quae in mari nascuntur." On the meaning of jus naturale according to Ulpian and Justinian, see Thomas Sandars, Institutes, xxix-xxxiv and 7; Odon Lottin, Le droit naturel chez saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs, 7-8, 61-67; Michael Crowe, "St. Thomas and Ulpian's Natural Law," 261-82.
Natural law (jus naturale) is taken in many ways:
First, a law is said to be natural from its principle, because it is implanted by nature (a natura est inditum); thus Tullius defines [jus naturale] when he says: "the law of nature is that which opinion has not generated, but a certain innate power has implanted ("quaedam innata vis inseruit").

And even because in natural things some movements are called natural, not because they are from an intrinsic principle, but because they are from a higher moving principle—just as the movements which are in the elements from the impression of heavenly bodies are said to be natural, as the Commentator states. Thus, those things which are of divine law are said to be of natural law, because they are from the impression and infusion of a higher principle—namely, God ("sint ex impressione et infusione superioris principii, scilicet Dei"). Thus, it is understood by Isidore who states that "natural law is that which is contained in the law and the Gospel."

Thirdly, natural law is said to be not only from an [extrinsic] principle, but from nature, because it is

49 In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, ad 4 (VII-2 968a): "Ad quartum dicendum quod jus naturale multiplicitur accipitur. Primo enim jus aliquod dicitur naturale ex principio, quia a natura est inditum; et sic definit Tullius in 2 Rhetoricorum, dicens: 'Jus naturae est quod non opinio genuit, sed quaedam innata vis inseruit.' Regarding Cicero's understanding of naturae ius, see note 16 above.

50 Ibid., (VII-2, 968a): "Et quia etiam in rebus naturalibus dicuntur aliqui motus naturales, non quia sint ex principio intrinseclo, sed quia sunt a principio superiori movente, sicut motus qui sunt in elementis ex impressione corporum caelestium, naturales dicuntur, ut Commentator dicit in 3 Caeli et Mundi (com. 20); ideo ea quae sunt de jure divino, dicuntur esse de jure naturale, cum sint ex impressione et infusione superioris principii, scilicet Dei; et sic accipitur ab Isidoro (lib. 5 Etymol., cap. 4, et habetur in princ. Decret.), qui dicit, quod 'jus naturale est quod in lege et in Evangelio continetur.'" See Averroes, In De Caelo, lib. III, com. 28. The definition of natural law, "jus naturale est quod in lege et in Evangelio continetur," which St. Thomas falsely attributes to Isidore, is derived from Gratian (ca. 1140); see Decretum, (prol.) D. I, 1. For a related discussion on the relationship between divine providence, nature, and the law of nature, see In I Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, sol.
of natural things. And because nature is distinguished from reason, whereby man is man, therefore, taking natural law in the strictest sense, those [norms] which pertain man to alone--although they are of the dictates of natural reason--are not said to be of natural law; rather, only those [norms] which natural reason dictates commonly of both men and other animals [are said to be of natural law]. Thus is given the definition stated above [videtur quod non 4]: "Natural law is what nature has taught all animals."\(^{51}\)

Therefore, a plurality of wives, though not contrary to natural law taken in this third way, is nevertheless against natural law taken in the second way since it is prohibited by divine law. It is also against natural law taken in the first way, as apparent from what has been said, inasmuch as nature instructs each animal according to the manner suitable to its species; thus, even certain animals, in which the care of both male and female are required for the education of offspring, maintain the union of one with one by natural instinct, as is evidenced in the case of the turtle-dove, the dove, and other [animals] of this kind.\(^{52}\)

\(^{51}\)Ibid., (VII-2, 968a): "Tertio dicitur jus naturale non solum a principio, sed a natura, quia de naturalibus est. Et quia natura contra rationem dividitur, a qua homo est homo; ideo strictissimo modo accipiendu jus naturale, illa quae ad homines tantum pertinent, etsi sint de dictamine rationis naturalis, non dicuntur esse de jure naturali: sed illa tantum quae naturalis ratio dictat de his quae sunt homini aliisquae communia; et sic datur dicta definitio, scilicet: 'Jus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit.'" See also In IV Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 (VII-2, 918a): "Natura hominis ad aliquid inclinat dupliciter. Uno modo quia est conveniens naturae generis; et hoc est commune omnibus animalibus; alio modo quia est conveniens naturae differentiae qua species humana abundat a genere, inquantum est rationalis, sicut actus prudentiae et temperantiae."

\(^{52}\)Ibid., (VII-2, 968): "Pluralitats ergo uxorum quamvis non sit contra jus naturale tertio modo acceptum, est tamen contra jus naturale secundo modo acceptum, quia jure divino prohibetur; et etiam contra jus naturale primo modo acceptum; ut ex dictis patet, quod natura dictat animali cuilibet secundum modum convenientem suae speciei; unde etiam quaedam animalia, in quibus ad educationem prolis requiritur sollicitudo utriusque, scilicet maris et feminae; naturali instinctu servant conjunctionem unius ad unum, sicut patet in turtura et columba, et hujusmodi." St. Thomas
What do these three different accounts of natural law (jus naturale) reveal about natural law precisely as intrinsic to man?53 In the first sense (see note 48 above), natural law is understood by St. Thomas both (1) as the nature [of man] which instructs [him] according to the manner suitable to his species (see note 52 above and our discussion of the naturalis conceptio below), and (2) as implanted by a certain innate power, as Cicero states (see note 49 above). Of course, insofar as this innate power is taken as part of man’s nature, natural law is said to be implanted by nature (a natura est). Hence, natural law is said to be "natural" from its principle--namely, (1) as implanted or caused by [man’s] nature through [his] natural powers ("proprie naturalia dicuntur quae ex principiis

also speaks of natural law in terms of an instinct; see In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2 (971a): "...lex illa processit, et non ex instincu legis naturae...." Cf. ibid., d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 1 (VII-2, 774a): "...ex aliquo interiori instincu, quo cor hominis movetur a Deo."

53In light of the various statements of St. Thomas cited up to now, his understanding and use of the terms lex naturae, jus naturale or jus naturae, and lex naturalis appear to be as follows: (1) lex naturae is the most general term which may apply to every kind of creature--such as a magnet, an animal, or man (see [1] and [4] above); (2) jus naturale or jus naturae are more exclusive terms which may apply to all animals, including man (see notes 48-52 above); (3) lex naturalis is the most exclusive term which St. Thomas applies to man alone (see note 10 and [3] above). With respect to man, these different terms appear to be used synonymously. For a discussion on the convertibility of the terms jus naturale and lex naturalis in St. Thomas, see Oscar Brown, Natural Rectitude and Divine Law in Aquinas, 165-74.
naturae causantur"; see #e above), (2) as conforming to, or befitting, his nature (see #b, #d, #f, notes 14, 17, 32, 35-36, 52 and [4] above).

Now, St. Thomas has expressly identified natural law both as the light of reason (proximate text #a) and, as stated in the key-text, the naturalis conceptio (see [3] above). These two principles evidently correspond to the principles cited in Cicero's definition of natural law: (1) a certain innate power and (2) what is implanted or caused by that power (proximate texts #c and #e). Hence, taken as an intellectual conception implanted by man's own natural power ("quaedam innata vis inseruit"), natural law is said to be naturally implanted in man ("conceptio homini naturaliter indita"; see [4] above). In this sense, natural law--taken precisely as a conceptio implanted or caused by man's vis cognoscitiva--can be understood as innate or inborn inasmuch as it is produced (i.e., efficiently caused) from a principle intrinsic to man (see notes 13 above and 59 below). Thus, this first account of natural law identifies it with (1) man's own nature ("in ipsa institutione humanae naturae est inditum"; see text #f), (2) the operative power or faculty of his nature (the intellectual light; see #a above), and (3) the operation or product of that power (the naturalis conceptio; see #b, #c, #e and [4] above).

Note  

54 See [2] above where, correlative to the vis cognoscitiva and the naturalis conceptio, St. Thomas also speaks of the vis appetitiva and the naturalis inclinatio.
also that the animal nature of man is not taken in this first account (see note 49 above) as in any way opposed to his intellectual nature, but rather as specified by it and ordered to it. In this sense, natural law secures the real substantial unity of man's being as a rational animal.

Taken in the second sense (see note 50 above), St. Thomas understands natural law in relation to divine law as its extrinsic principle. Hence, taken strictly in its aspect as impressa or infusa from God as extrinsic cause (see note 27 above), natural law (qua natura) is received from without. In this sense, natural law cannot properly be said to be innate to man—that is, as imparted from a principle intrinsic to him (see note 13 above).

Now, in speaking of its derivation from God, and citing Gratian's definition of natural law (mistakenly attributed to Isidore) as "that which is contained in the law and the

Hence, although not explicitly stated in ad 3 of this key-text, it follows that natural law must also be equated with man's appetitive power and its respective natural operation. On this matter, see note 43 above.

55 In this regard, see notes 35 and 51 above. See also In IV Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 (VII-2, 918a): "Et sicut natura generis, quamvis sit una in omnibus animalibus, non tamen est eodem modo in omnibus; ita etiam non inclinat eodem modo in omnibus, sed secundum quod unicuque competit." In IV Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3 (VII-2, 1033b): "...conjunctio maris et feminae dicitur esse de jure naturali quia natura hoc omnia animalia docuit; sed hanc conjunctionem diversa animalia diversimode docuit secundum diversas eorum conditiones." Compare this view of man's generic nature as specified by his rational nature with that (Ulpian's) view of man's generic nature (see note 50 above) taken simply in its element of commonality with other animals-prescinding from specification.
Gospel," does St. Thomas compromise the intrinsic character of natural law? In answer to this question, recall that *natura* for St. Thomas is that intrinsic principle of action (see note 50 above) which is itself divinely implanted (*divinitus indita*) in things (see note 24 above); indeed, the nature of a creature is characterized by him as an impression received by the Creator.\(^56\) Now, among the things of nature, man is said to be an image of God precisely because his soul participates in an intellectual nature which also is in God ("*participat naturam intellectualem quae etiam in Deo est secundum quod etiam dicitur ad imaginem Dei*").\(^57\) Therefore, just as *natura* is an impression which the creature has received from the Creator, so the law of nature--taken as *natura*--is derived from the impression and infusion of God; indeed, on another occasion, St. Thomas states that natural law is impressed [by God] upon the heart (*cordibus impressa*; see note 59 below).

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\(^{56}\) See note 24 above. Recall that every natural item is related to God as its principle agent, exemplar, and final Cause (see note 27 above). Further, God is at once the immanent or indwelling Cause of a creature’s *esse* (see note 28 above) and the ultimate perfecting end of every creature (see note 33 above). Hence, the meaning of *natura* for St. Thomas carries a relational significance whereby God is implicitly understood as the radical origin, exemplar, and ultimate end of (a thing’s) nature. Contrast St. Thomas’ view of nature against a logician’s notion of nature as described by Robert George in note 50 of our Introduction.

\(^{57}\) See note 34 above. Further, God is the immediate efficient and exemplar cause of man’s intellectual soul (see note 39 above); hence, man is *directly* related to God as his principal efficient and exemplar cause.
Clearly, then, the origin of natural law—qua natura—is extrinsic to man; accordingly, natural law, understood as natura, cannot properly be said to be innate. Nevertheless, having been divinely implanted in him, natural law—as man’s nature—is now intrinsic to him; and, as intrinsic, the nature of man orders him to God through the operations of his natural powers (see notes 36-37 and [2] above)—as befitting his nature (see #b, #f, notes 32, 35-36, 52 and [4] above); This notion of natural law—qua nature—as received from God as extrinsic cause appears to correspond with the account found in the sed contra 6 of our key-text (proximate text #f); there, [monogamy] is said to be implanted (indita) [by God] in the constitution of human nature [so as to accord with human nature itself]. Now, these natural powers, insofar as they are taken as part of man’s God-given nature, are likewise said to be implanted in man from an impression of God; taken as such, these powers are not properly said to be innate or inborn (see note 13 above). However, as implanted by God, they too become intrinsic to man; consequently, the operations produced by these intrinsic powers are properly said to be innate or inborn to man:

The operation of a secondary cause is founded upon the operation of a first cause and presupposes it; and so it must be that every operation of the soul proceeds by presupposing that it is given to the soul from the divine first agent’s impression; ("inditum est animae ex impressione primi agentis, Dei scilicet"); and therefore, we see from the side of the intellect ("ex
parte intellectus") that the soul cannot proceed to any understanding except by presupposing [first principles] whose cognition is innate in it ("quorum cognitio est ei innata"); and because of this, the soul is unable to assent to anything which is contrary to those principles which it naturally knows ("quae naturaliter cognoscit"); and it must be a similar situation from the side of the will ("ex parte voluntatis"). Thus, since from the impression of the first cause—namely, God—this is present in the soul: [namely], that it desire what is good and that it desire the perfect good as its ultimate end.\(^5^8\)

Thus, inasmuch as it is equated with man’s nature and faculties as divinely implanted in man, so natural law is understood by St. Thomas as divinely implanted in man; but inasmuch as it is identified with operations of natural cognition and natural inclination, natural law is understood

\(^{5^8}\)In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2 (VII-2, 1192a): "...operatio causae secundae semper fundatur super operatione causae prima et praesupponit eam; et ideo oportet quod omnis operatio animae procedat ex suppositione ejus quod inditum est animae ex impressione primi agentis. Dei scilicet; et ideo videmus ex parte intellectus, quod ad nihil intelligendum anima potest procedere nisi ex suppositione illorum quorum cognitio est ei innata; et propter hoc non potest assentire alicui quod sit contrarium his principiis quae naturaliter cognoscit; et similiter oportet esse ex parte voluntatis. Unde cum ex impressione primae causae, scilicet Dei, hoc animae insit ut bonum velit; et perfectum bonum tamquam finem ultimum appetat." Surely, the cognition of first principles is innate to man inasmuch as cognitio is an operation and a product of man’s vis cognoscitiva; but see our next section below with respect to the different content-determining causes (intrinsic and extrinsic) which, together with the cognitive power, constitute natural law knowledge. Insofar as natural law is taken as man’s nature and natural powers as divinely implanted (passively received by man), it is understood by St. Thomas as the impression (impressio) of Eternal Law; however, insofar as natural law is taken as right reason directing man in his activities (i.e., precepts actually produced or naturally implanted by the intellective power) it is apparently understood by St. Thomas as the expression (expressio) of Eternal Law (see note 46 above).
by St. Thomas as naturally implanted or innate—precisely as produced (i.e., efficiently caused) by man’s nature through his natural powers.

With respect to Revelation (the law and the Gospel), St. Thomas has previously explained that the exterior (written) law, by which man is ordered to the love of neighbor and God, is an explication of the interior (natural) law (see above, notes 10, 13, and 16); hence, although Gratian’s definition does not adequately distinguish the natural (interior) law from the written (exterior) law and the Gospel, St. Thomas himself makes this distinction clear. Further, he at once stresses the divine (extrinsic) origin and the distinctively intrinsic character of natural law as *cordibus impressa*:

The law concerning [monogamy] is not humanly but divinely instituted, not ever handed on by word or letter, but as impressed upon the heart (*cordibus impressa*), just as other [precepts] which pertain in any way to the law of nature.\(^59\)

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\(^59\)See *In IV Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, sol. (VII-2, 969a): "Lex autem de unitate uxoris non est humanitus, sed divinitus instituta, nec unquam verbo aut litteris tradita, sed *cordi impressa*, sicut et alia quae ad legem naturae qualitercumque pertinent." See also ibid., ad 3 (VII-2, 969): "...quia _lex naturae_ non est litteris scripta, sed _cordibus impressa_." See Lombard’s similar description of natural law as [inscribed] _in corde_ in note 5 above. Concerning the second formulation of natural law, Patrick Farrell states that "Gratian, whose definition, ‘id quod in lege et evangelio continetur,’ fails to distinguish adequately between divine and natural law... In failing to distinguish natural from divine law, it fails also to accommodate St. Thomas’ conception of the intrinsic character of the former." "Sources of St. Thomas’ Concept of Natural Law," 280-81. In response to Farrell, it should be
The third account of natural right is exemplified by Ulpian's definition, "Jus natuale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit." On the basis of this definition, St. Thomas draws the distinction between primary precepts (those dictates common to man and animals alike) and secondary precepts (those dictates which pertain to man alone). Thus, this third meaning of natural law contrasts with the first meaning inasmuch as man's generic nature is now considered simply with respect to what it shares in common with animals--and not as humanly specified.\(^6\) Both the first and third accounts of natural law, however, agree in stressing the intrinsic character of natural law as rooted in the nature of man: "jus naturale...a natura est inditum" (see

\(^6\)For an example of the law of nature employed in this third sense, see In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1. For further discussion on this matter, see Jean M. Aubert, Le droit romain dans l'oeuvre de saint Thomas (Paris: J. Vrin, 1955), 97-99; P. Farrell, "Sources of St. Thomas' Concept of Natural Law," 262-64.
note 48 above) and "jus naturale non solum a principio, sed a natura" (see note 50 above). While St. Thomas relies upon the third formula of natural law to resolve the difficulty at hand, each different meaning stresses an aspect of his own comprehensive understanding of natural law as pertaining to (1) the substantial unity and internal ordination of human nature, (2) man's intrinsic ordination to an extrinsic principle--namely, God, (3) the distinction (but not disparity) between his generic nature and specific nature.

In view of these three accounts of natural right, let us sum up St. Thomas' own teaching on the intrinsic character of natural law:

1. Natural law is intrinsic to man inasmuch as it is identified with (a) his human nature, (b) his natural powers (the vis cognoscitiva and vis appetitiva), (c) the operations or products of those powers (the naturalis conceptio and naturalis inclinatio), and (d) knowledge (the naturalis conceptio, principia, or praeepta).

2. Insofar as it is identified with man's nature and natural powers (taken precisely as part of his nature), natural law is understood as divinely implanted (divinitus indita) in him (see #c, #d, #f, and notes 24, 51, 58, and 59 above).

3. Inasmuch as it is identified, not precisely with man's nature, but with his natural powers proper to his nature and with what his natural powers produce, natural law
is understood as naturally implanted (naturaliter indita) or innate (innata) (see #b, #e, [1], [4], and notes 48 and 57 above).

4. Inasmuch as it is identified as knowledge--either as the naturalis conceptio or as a precept--natural law is said to be both naturally and divinely implanted in man (see #c-#f and [4] above). Further, St. Thomas speaks of man's cognition of first principles (speculative and practical) as innate ("quorum cognitio est ei innata"; see #b and note 57 above).

The Naturalis Conceptio

Notwithstanding its identification with man's nature and powers, St. Thomas formally identifies natural law in the key-text as the naturalis conceptio.61 Evidently (see note 46 above), this knowledge is a complex cognition involving knowledge of (1) determinate goods within man's concrete (sensible) situation, (2) man's actions as flowing from his own nature (generic and specific) as concerned with (3) the common end or good. Let us investigate, then, more closely the naturalis conceptio and its constitutive elements in order to understand precisely how St. Thomas

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61See [4] above: "Lex ergo naturalis nihil est aliud quam conceptio homini naturaliter indita...." See also In III Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 3, sol. (VII-2, 426a): "Quaedam enim sunt leges quae ipsi rationi sunt inditae, quae sunt prima mensura et regula omnium humanorum actuum; et haec nullo modo deficiunt, sicut nec regimen rationis deficere potest, ut aliquando esse non debeat; et hae leges jus naturale dicuntur."
understands this natural law knowledge as implanted, as innate, and also as acquired.

Now, an intellectual conception (conceptio intellectus), St. Thomas tells us, consists of both (1) the operation of knowing (operatio intelligendi) and (2) the species which is a similitude of the object known ("species quae est similitudo rei intellectae"). Thus, on the side of the knower, there is the agent intellect (i.e., the intellectual light), and the recipient intellect (intellectus possibilis); and on the side of the object known is the similitudo (or intelligible species) which is caused by the known object, and through which knowledge of the object is determined. Natural law, then, taken simply
as a conceptio intellectus is "natural" to man, not as an essential part of his nature, but insofar as it is an operation and effect or product of that vis innata--namely the lumen intellectuale acting as efficient cause. 64 Moreover, inasmuch as all human knowledge for St. Thomas is made through some abstraction from sensible items, it follows that the naturalis conceptio is a knowledge constituted by a sensible object precisely as a content-determining-cause; hence, natural law knowledge must be an acquired knowledge. 65 Indeed, inasmuch as natural law

rej per quam cognitio rei determinatur." See In II Sent., d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, sol. (VI, 553a): "...dicitur intellectus possibilis qui est in potentia ad recipiendum omnes formas intellectas, sicut oculus est in potentia ad recipiendum omnes coloris; intellectus autem agens dicitur qui facit intelligibilia in potentia esse in actu, sicut lumen quod facit coloris in potentia visibles, esse actu visibles...." In II Sent., d. 3, q. 3, a. 1, ad 1 (VI, 422a): "...anima dicitur species specierum, inquantum per intellectum agentem facit species intelligibiles actu, et recipit eas secundum intellectum possibilum, sicut ibidem sensus dicitur species sensibilis, et manus organum organorum, inquantum videlicet omnia artificialia per manus efficiuntur...."

64See proximate texts #b, #e, [2], [3], [4], and notes 46, 49, and 58 above with respect to natural law cognition as produced or naturally implanted in man. With regard to the notion of cognition as immanent or indwelling operation in contrast to a transitive activity, see In I Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 (VI, 327b).

65In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4 (VII-2, 1202b): "... omnis cognitio fit per aliquam abstactionem a materia...." In IV Sent., d. 50, q. 1, a. 1, sol. (VII-2, 1247a): "...sed illud [i.e., the theory of innate forms in the human intellect] contradicit sententiae Philosophi qui dicit intellectum humanum esse sicut tabulam in qua nihil est scriptum: contradicit etiam experientiae, qua experimur nos nihil posse intelligere, nisi ex praeeacceptis a sensu ad intelligendum manuducamur." See also In I Sent., d. 35, q.
concerns man in his concrete circumstances in a world of other sensible creatures, among which are human persons (see note 45 above), natural law knowledge must involve knowledge of sensible objects outside the knower. Hence, natural law knowledge must be a knowledge acquired from the sensible objects known because they are its content-determining-causes.

If the above interpretation is correct, we must nevertheless account for the ways in which natural law--precisely as a knowledge, and not merely as a product of an operative power--is understood by St. Thomas as naturally and divinely implanted and innate; to this end, let us look more closely at how the \textit{naturalis conceptio} is produced.

\textbf{The Production of the Naturalis Conceptio}

Does St. Thomas offer any explanation as to how the \textit{naturalis conceptio} might be produced? Let us consider two different texts which shed some light on how this complex knowledge is attained.

In the first text, "Utrum intellectus sit donum" (\textit{In III Sent.}, d. 35, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1), St. Thomas explains

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the manner by which man (in contrast to separate intellectual substances) apprehends essences; here, also, knowledge of [natural law] principles is identified as a kind of *intellectus*:

Sometimes, however, [a knower] is not led to the interior of a thing except by approaching it as through a certain entrance; and this is the manner of apprehending in men, who proceed from effects and properties to the knowledge of the essence of a thing. And because in this [process] there must be a certain movement (*discursum*), the apprehension proper to man is therefore called reason (*ratio*)—even though [reasoning] is terminated in intellection (*intellectus*) [namely, to the knowledge] of the essence of a thing to which investigation leads. Thus, if something is immediately apprehended without discursive reasoning, it is not said to be a matter of reason, but of intellection; and so it is with first principles, which everyone assents to upon hearing them. By the first mode, *intellectus* is a power; but taken according to the second mode, *intellectus* is called a habitus of principles. However, just as the human mind does not enter into the essence of a [corporeal] thing except through its accidents, so even in spiritual [items] the mind does not enter into an essence except through bodies and sensible similitudes, as Dionysius states.

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66*In III Sent.*, d. 35, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1 (VII-2, 403b): "Aliquando vero ad intima non pervenitur nisi per circumposita quasi per quaedam ostia; et hic est modus apprehendi in hominibus, qui ex effectibus et proprietatibus procedunt ad cognitionem essentiae rei. Et qui in hoc oportet esse quemdam discursum; ideo hominis apprehensio ratio dicitur, quamvis ad intellectum terminetur in hoc quod inquisitio ad essentiam rei perducit. Unde si aliqua sunt quae statim sine discursu rationis apprehenduntur, horum non dicitur esse ratio, sed intellectus; sicut principia prima, quae quisque statim probat audita. Primo ergo modo intellectus potentia est; sed secundo modo accipiendo, habitus principiorum dicitur. Sicut autem mens humana in essentiam rei non ingreditur nisi per accidentia, ita etiam in spiritualia non ingreditur nisi per corporalia, et sensibilium similitudines, ut Dionysius dicit (*De Cael. Hier.*, c. 1 and *De Eccl. Hierarc*. c. 1)." Cf. Dionysius, *De Cael. Hier.*, c. 1 (PG 3, 122) and *De Eccl. Hierarc*. c. 1 (PG
From the above statement, it is clear that first principles (both speculative and practical) are known in themselves according to intellection (intellectus); nevertheless, the mind does not attain intellection except through material existents (among which are human persons) which are the content-determining-causes of human knowledge. Consequently, man has no knowledge (intellectus) of any first principle apart from knowledge of the created universe as acquired through his senses and agent and recipient intellects.67

The second informative passage on natural law knowledge is found in ad 3 of the discussion, Utrum habitus in nobis existens cognosci possit" (In III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 1); here, St. Thomas explains the process by which the soul reflectively comes to know its acts, powers, essence--and consequently, the good as such:

3, 374).

67In I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, sol. (VI, 33a): "...quia ea quae per se nobis nota sunt [i.e, first principles], efficiuntur nota statim per sensum; sicut visis toto et parte, statim cognoscimus quod omne totum est majus sua parte sine aliqua inquisitione." In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, sol. (VI, 600b): "...licet ad determinationem cognitionis eorum [i.e., of speculative and practical principles] sensu et memoria indigereamus, ut in 2 Poster. (cap. ult.) dicitur. Et ideo statim cognitis terminis, cognoscuntur, ut in 1 Poster. (cap. 1) dicitur." In I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3 (VI, 33a): "Unde etiam anima sibi ipsi praesens est; tamen maxima difficultas est in cognitione animae, nec devenitur in ipsam, nisi rationcinando ex objectis in actus et ex actibus in potentias."
The soul reflecting through knowledge upon itself, or upon those things which are proper to it, occurs in two ways: by one mode, the soul, according to its cognitive power, knows its own nature or what is proper to it; and this is merely the knowledge of the intellect by which it knows the quiddities of things. The intellect, however, as stated in the De Anima, knows itself inasmuch as it knows what is other than itself—namely, through a species, not indeed itself, but of the object, and this species is its form; from this it knows the nature of its own act; and from the nature of its act, it knows the nature of its power of knowing; and from the nature of this power, it knows the nature of its essence and, consequently, its other powers: not that the soul has diverse similitudes of all these [items], but because in [knowing] its object, not only does the soul know the meaning of truth (rationem veri), according to which the intellect is [the same as] its object, but every other ratio in that object and, hence, it knows what "good" is (rationem boni); and therefore it follows that, through that one and the same species, the soul knows the act of will, the nature of the will, and, similarly, also the other powers of the soul and their acts. 68

68 In III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3 (VII-2, 240b): "...animam reflecti [read: reflectens] per cognitionem supra seipsam, vel supra ea quae ipsius sunt, contingit dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod potentia cognoscitiva cognoscit naturam sui, vel eorum quae in ipsa sunt; et hoc est tantum intellectus cujus est quidditates rerum congnoscere. Intellectus autem, ut dicitur in 3 Anima (tex. 8), sicut alia, cognoscit seipsum, quia scilicet per speciem non quidem sui, sed objecti, quae est forma ejus; ex qua cognoscit actus sui naturam, et ex natura actus naturam potentiae cognoscentis, et ex natura potentiae naturam essentiae, et per consequens aliarum potentiarum: non quod habeat de omnibus his diversas similitudines, sed quia in objecto suo non solum cognoscit rationem veri, secundum quam est ejus objectum, sed omnem rationem quae est in eo, unde et rationem boni: et ideo consequenter per illam eamdem speciem cognoscit actum voluntatis et naturam voluntatis, et similiter etiam alias potentias animae et actus earum." See also In In Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 5, sol. (43a): "Alio tamen modo, [intellectus or intuitum] secundum Philosophum, intellegitur quod anima semper se intelligit, eo quod omne quod intelligitur, non intelligitur nisi illustratum lumine intellectus agentis, et receptum in intellectu possibili. Unde sicut in omni colore videtur lumen corporale, ita in omni intelligibili videtur lumen intellectus agentis; non tamen in ratione objecti sed in ratione medii cognoscendi."
In short, in, through, and according to, the knowledge acquired through the intelligible species produced by sensible objects, the soul reflectively knows its operations, powers, and essence; further, according to the correspondence of the intellect to the known object, the soul knows what "truth" is (rationem veri) and every other ratio in that sensible object; hence, the soul attains to knowledge of what "good" is (rationem boni). In this knowledge act, we find the knowledges of those three factors required of natural law knowledge (see note 45 above)—namely, (1) the sensible existents in the created world (human and subhuman) which are the content-determining-causes of all our knowledge; (2) actus—the person’s own activities as flowing from his (generic and specific)

nature; knowledge of our actions, powers, and underlying nature is a reflective knowledge which is acquired only in and through knowledge of our sensible world and the human persons it includes;\(^6^9\) (3) \textit{finis}--the good as such; knowledge of "the good" is attained through the knowledge of a sensible existent (such as another human person) precisely as loved by the knower.\(^7^0\)

We are now in a position to understand how knowledge of natural law is at once divinely implanted, naturally implanted, innate, and acquired. First, one's own nature and operative powers are (a) efficient causes of natural law

\(^6^9\) Note here that sensible experience is not merely the occasion which initiates reflective self-knowledge; rather, self-knowledge is framed, so to speak, in the conformity of the intellect to the sensible object known; that is, the soul knows its operations, powers, and nature according to the formal determination of the recipient intellect (through the sensible and intelligible species) caused by the known object. Further, self-knowledge is necessarily relational inasmuch as knowledge of one's own operations, powers, and nature is attained only with regard to a sensible object. For St. Thomas, there is no self-knowledge apart from the knowledge of something else.

\(^7^0\) Inasmuch as what is "good" is that which is loved (see notes 30-33, and 41-42 above), knowledge of what good is must be constituted by the knowledges of (1) one's own natural inclination with respect to (2) the object (such as another human person) known and loved (see note 45 above). Note, however, that knowledge of one's own nature, faculties, and natural operations is itself formally determined by, and grasped with reference to, the known and loved object (see note 68 above). Therefore, concepts such as "true" and "good" are relational (and, hence, complex) concepts which are constituted primarily by the knowledge of sensible objects, and secondarily by the knowledge of one's own natural operations (intellective and appetitive)--as formally and intentionally determined by those known and desired objects.
knowledge (#a, notes 34-37 and 49 above), and, to some extent, (b) content-determining-causes of such knowledge (#b, #c and #f and notes 68-69 above); hence, inasmuch as human nature--taken precisely as (a) the efficient cause and (b) a content-determining-cause of natural law knowledge--is divinely impressed upon man, natural law knowledge is said to be divinely impressed in man. Secondly, one’s natural operations serve to some extent as content-determining-causes of natural law knowledge; hence, inasmuch as one’s natural operations--taken precisely as content-determining-causes of natural law knowledge--are produced by man’s own natural powers, natural law knowledge is understood as naturally implanted or innate in man (#d, #e and [4]). Thirdly, one’s own natural operations, powers, and nature are known only reflectively through the knowledge of sensible creatures; and since the knowledge of such creatures is itself acquired only through sensible experience, the whole of natural law knowledge--as constituted by both its intrinsic and extrinsic content-determining-causes--is an acquired knowledge. Hence, properly speaking, natural law knowledge for St. Thomas is an acquired knowledge; only in a qualified sense is such knowledge considered as innate or naturally or divinely implanted in man.
IV. Summary and Conclusion

As this key-text reveals, St Thomas' moral doctrine has as its basis natural law, which itself issues from his doctrine of nature. Simply stated, \textit{natura} is that divinely implanted principle by which a creature is determined in its proper actions and directed in those actions towards its proper end. Accordingly, St. Thomas identifies the law of nature in man with (1) human nature itself, (2) man's natural powers (the \textit{vis cognoscitiva} and \textit{vis appetitiva}), (3) the natural operations (the \textit{naturalis conceptio} and \textit{naturalis inclinatio}) corresponding to them, and (4) precepts or principles. In our key-text, however, natural law is formally identified as a knowledge--namely, the \textit{naturalis conceptio}--which is said to be naturally implanted in man (\textit{hominis naturaliter indita} (see [4]).

What, then, can be said of the \textit{naturalis conceptio}? On investigation, we learned that this cognition is a complex knowledge involving the knowledge of (a) determinate goods (human persons and other creatures existing in the sensible universe), (b) man's actions as following from his (generic and specific) nature, and (c) the common or indeterminate good. Taken precisely as an operation and immanent effect of the \textit{vis cognoscitiva} as its efficient cause, the \textit{naturalis conceptio} is understood as \textit{innata} or \textit{naturaliter indita}; but inasmuch as its contents are constituted by material objects acting as content-determining-causes, the \textit{naturalis}
conceptio is a knowledge acquired from the sensible universe.

How is the naturalis conceptio produced? Through sensible experience in the created world, man acquires knowledge of other human persons (as well as other creatures); according to the knowledge of these other existents, man acquires some knowledge of his own operations, powers, and nature in relation to those known creatures; and from the knowledge of himself in relation to those creatures—precisely as desired or loved—he attains knowledge of what "good" is. Thus, from the combined knowledges of (1) other creatures (human and subhuman), (2) the knower’s own nature and operations in relation to those creatures as desired, and (3) what "good" is, the naturalis conceptio is constituted.

From our analysis of the production of the naturalis conceptio we came to understand how natural law knowledge is at once innate, divinely and naturally implanted, and acquired. First, one’s own nature and operative powers are (a) efficient causes of natural law knowledge (#a, 34-37 and 49 above) and, to some extent, (b) content-determining-causes of such knowledge ((#b, #c and #f and notes 68-69 above); hence, inasmuch as human nature—taken precisely as (a) the efficient cause and (b) a content-determining-cause of natural law knowledge—is divinely impressed upon man, natural law knowledge is said to be divinely impressed in
man.\textsuperscript{71} Secondly, one's natural operations serve to some extent as content-determining-causes of natural law knowledge; hence, inasmuch as one's natural operations--taken precisely as content-determining-causes of natural law knowledge--are produced by man's own natural powers, natural law knowledge is understood as naturally implanted or innate in man.\textsuperscript{72} Thirdly, one's own natural operations, powers, and nature, are known only reflectively through the knowledge of sensible creatures; and since the knowledge of such creatures is itself acquired only through sensible experience, the whole of natural law knowledge--as constituted by both its intrinsic and extrinsic content-determining-causes--is an acquired knowledge. Hence, properly speaking, natural law knowledge for St. Thomas is an acquired knowledge; only in a qualified sense is such knowledge considered as innate or naturally or divinely implanted in man.

\textsuperscript{71}See Proximate Contexts \#a, \#b, \#c and \#f, and notes 34-37, 49, 68-69.

\textsuperscript{72}See Proximate Contexts \#d, \#e and [4].
CHAPTER 5

KEY-TEXT B

*Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 91, a. 2, resp.: "Utrum sit in nobis aliqua lex naturalis."¹

I. Context

Context for this key-text is twofold:

(1) remote: (a) an overview of St. Thomas' theory of cognition as explicated in the *Summa Theologiae*; (b) an explication of his theory of participation; (c) a presentation of his teachings on divine providence, eternal law, and nature as found in the *Summa Theologiae*; (d) an explication of his doctrine of natural appetency.

(2) proximate: *ST* I-II, q. 91, a. 2 ("Utrum sit in nobis aliqua lex naturalis"), *sed contra*.

¹Thomas Aquinas, St., *Opera Omnia*, Leonina ed. Incomplete. Roma: Polyglotta, 1882. All citations will be taken from this edition unless otherwise indicated. Reference to volume and page will again be indicated by roman numerals and arabic numbers respectively. See appendix C for a chronology of St. Thomas' writings. All italicized words used for emphasis in this study are the author's. In our translations of passages from the *Summa Theologiae*, we have consulted Anton Pegis, *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vols. 1 and 2 (New York: Random House, 1954); R. J. Henle, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Treatise on Law*, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993).
Remote Context #a

St. Thomas' Theory of Cognition

For St. Thomas, the human intellect is a power of the soul which itself is united to a body as its substantial form. Inasmuch as the human soul is united to a body, it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual substances. Hence, the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to intelligibles and is at first like a tabula rasa on which nothing is written. Hence, man is at first only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards he is made to understand actually. How, then,

2ST I, q. 85, a. 1, resp. (V, 331a): "Intellectus autem humanus...non enim est actus aliquidus organi; sed tamen est quaedam virtus animae, quae est forma corpori...." See also ibid., q. 76, a. 1, resp.

3ST I, q. 51, a. 1, resp. (V, 14b): "...sicut humanae animae competit uniri corpori, quia est imperfecta et in potentia existens in genere intellectualium substantiarum, non habens in sui natura plenitudinem scientiae, sed acquirens eam per sensus corporeos a sensibilibus rebus...." See also ibid., q. 84, a. 6; q. 89, a. 1.

4ST I, q. 79, a. 2, resp. (V, 259b): "Intellectus autem humanus, qui est infimus in ordine intellectuum, et maxime remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in potentia respectu intelligibilium; et in principio est 'sicut tabula rasa, in qua nihil est scriptum,' ut Philosophus dicit [De Anima, III, 4 (430a1)]. Quod manifeste apparat ex hoc quod in principio sumus intelligentes solum in potentia,
does man attain actual knowledge? Through abstraction of a determinate species; such species are derived through the senses from material objects as content-determining-causes of knowledge:

The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species of things. On the contrary, phantasms are actual similitudes of certain species, but they are immaterial in potentiality. Therefore, nothing prevents one and the same soul, inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, from having a power by which it makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions of individual matter (this power is called the agent intellect), and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the possible intellect by reason of its being in potentiality to such species."

As the above passage indicates, the bodily senses and

postmodum autem efficimur intelligentes in actu."

"ST I, q. 79, a. 4, ad 4 (V, 268b): "...anima intellectiva est quidem actu immaterialis, sed est in potentia ad determinatas species rerum. Phantasmata autem, e converso, sunt quidem actu similitudines specierum quarumdam, sed sunt potentia immaterialia. Unde nihil prohibet unam et eandem animam, inquantum est immaterialis in actu, habere aliquam virtutem per quam faciat immaterialia in actu abstrahendo a conditionibus individualis materiae, quae quidem virtus dicitur intellectus agens; et aliam virtutem receptivam huiusmodi specierum, quae dicitur intellectus possibilis, inquantum est in potentia ad huiusmodi species." While the term species has many meanings, St. Thomas employs it with respect to his epistemology as meaning "that by which something is known to be what it is." On this, see notes 18 and 19 below; see also ibid., q. 55, a. 1, ad 2; q. 84, a. 3, resp. and 6 resp. For a further explication of the meanings of species and similitudo, see Leo Sweeney, Christian Philosophy: Greek, Medieval, Contemporary Reflections (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1995), 554-58; J. Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. G. B. Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), 86-100, 111-28 and 387-418.
the phantasms (as derived from the apprehension of sensible objects; see note 17 below) are necessary in order for the human knower to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual object. As proportioned, then, to man's natural constitution—namely, a spiritual soul united to a body—the proper object of the human intellect is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter:

The lower spiritual substance—that is, [human] souls—have a being (esse) akin to a body, insofar as they are the forms of bodies: and consequently from their very mode of being (essendi), it is necessary for them to seek their intelligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies; otherwise they would be united with bodies to no purpose.

6 ST I, q. 89, a. 1, resp. (V, 370a): "...anima, quamdiu est corpori coniuncta, non potest aliquid intelligere non convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut per experimentum patet.... Animae igitur secundum istum modum essendi quo corpori est unita, competit modum intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata corporum, quae in corporeis organis sunt.... Unde modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est animae naturalis, sicut et corpori uniri." Ibid., q. 84, a. 7, resp. (V, 325b): "...ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum objectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem." Ibid., q. 79, a. 4, ad 3 (V, 268b): "[Intellectus agens] non se habet ut objectum, sed ut faciens objecta in actu: ad quod requiritur praeter praesentiam intellectus agentis praesentia phatasmatum...." See ibid., q. 5, a. 2, resp.; q. 51, a. 1, resp.; q. 84, a. 4, ad 1; q. 87, a. 3, ad 1; ST I-II, q. 3, a. 8, resp.; De Veritate, q. 10, a. 8, ad 1 (XXII-2, 322b): "...intellectus noster nihil actu potest intelligere antequam a phantasmaticus abstrahat...." Ibid., q. 21, a. 1, resp.; In III Meta., lect. 7; SCG III, c. 56; In III de Anima, lect. 9; cf. Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora, II, c. 19; De Anima III, c. 4.

7 ST I, q. 55, a. 2, resp. (V, 56a): "Substantiae enim spirituales inferiores, scilicet animae, habent esse affine corpori, inquantum sunt corporum formae: et ideo ex ipso modo essendi competit eis ut a corporibus et per corpora
The power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing known. Therefore, the proper object of the angelic intellect, which is entirely separate from a body, is an intelligible substance separate from a body. Whereas the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; and through these natures of visible things it rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs to such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter; for instance, it belongs to the nature of stone to be in an individual stone, and to the nature of horse to be in an individual horse, and so forth. Therefore, the nature of stone or of any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except inasmuch as it is known as existing in the individual. 8

Note especially the last sentence of the above passage:

"The nature of stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except inasmuch as it is known as existing in the individual." Not only is an object of knowledge properly understood in its concrete individuality, but the perfect judgment of any such item requires all

suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequantur: alioquin frustra corporibus unirentur."

8ST I, q. 84, a. 7, resp. (V, 325b): "...potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili. Unde intellectus angelici, qui est totaliter a corpore separatus, objectum proprium est substantia intelligibilis a corpore separata; et per huiusmodi intelligibilia materialia cognoscit. Intellectus autem humani, qui est conjunctus corpori, proprium objectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum, etiam in invisibilibum rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit. De ratione autem huius naturae est, quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali: sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel ciuscunque materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens." See also ST I, q. 5, a. 2, resp.; De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1; q. 10, a. 6, ad 2; q. 21, a. 1, resp.; In III Meta., lect. 7; SCG III, 56.
pertinent data proper to it. A carpenter, for example, cannot judge a knife perfectly unless he knows its action (actus); and similarly, the natural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural things unless he knows them in their actual condition. Cognition is not yet fulfilled for St. Thomas in merely grasping an abstracted essence in its universality, but only in referring such an abstraction to its concrete and individual circumstance. Moreover, as the complete knowledge of an item involves knowing its activity, it must be viewed in its dynamic relation of causal interaction with other existing items. In other words, the full and true intelligibility of an essence or nature necessarily involves its concrete actuality; for a thing is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as it is actual.

Let us detail the process by which man attains

9 ST I, q. 84, a. 8, resp. (V, 328a): "...proprium obiectum intellectui nostro proportionatum est natura rei sensibilis. Iudicium autem perfectum de re aligua dari non potest, nisi ea omnia quae ad rem pertinent cognoscantur; et praecipue si ignorantur id quod est terminus et finis iudicii.... Faber enim non quaerit cognitionem cultelli nisi propter opus, ut operetur hunc particularem cultellum; et similiter naturalis non quaerit cognoscere naturam lapidis et equi, nisi ut sciat rationes eorum quae videntur secundum sensum."

10 ST I, q. 87, a. 1, resp. (V, 355a): "...unumquodque cognoscibile est secundum quod est in actu, et non secundum quod est in potentia, ut dicitur [Aristotle, De Anima., III, 4 (42822)]: sic enim aliquid est ens et verum, quod sub cognitione cadit, prout actu est." Ibid., q. 12, a. 7, resp. (IV, 127b): "Unumquodque enim sic cognoscibile est, secundum quod est ens actu."
knowledge of material objects:

1. In the experience of the sensible world, the human percipient is presented with intelligible items (tulips, pine trees, other human persons); these objects are the content-determining-causes of human knowledge which act on man’s external senses to help produce sense knowledge.¹¹

2. Next, the internal senses produce phantasms (expressed species) which disclose to the knower individual existents qua individual. Through the internal and external senses, as conjoined to their respective sense organs, the soul knows material things as individual and particular.¹²

3. The agent intellect efficiently produces knowledge of the form of a material existent—precisely in its

¹¹ST I, q. 17, a. 1, resp. (IV, 218b): "...nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet, qui primo et per se est exteriorum accidentium." Ibid., q. 78, a. 3, resp. (V, 253b): "Est autem sensus quaedam potentia passiva, quae nata est immutari ab exteriori sensibili."

¹²ST I, q. 78, a. 4, resp. (V, 256a): "Sic ergo ad receptionem formarum sensibilium ordinatur sensus proprius et communis.... Ad harum autem formarum retentionem aut conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive imaginatio, quae idem sunt: est enim phantasia sive imaginatio quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum." Ibid., q. 84, a. 7, resp. (V, 325a): "Utuntur autem organo corporali sensus et imaginatio, et aliae vires pertinentes ad partem sensitivam.... Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem." Ibid, q. 85, a. 1, resp. (V, 330b): "Quaedam enim cognoscitiva virtus est actus organi corporalis, scilicet sensus. Et ideo obiectum cuislibet sensitivae potentiae est forma prout in materia corporali existit. Et quia huismodi materia est individuationis principium, ideo omnis potentia sensitiva partis est cognoscitiva particularium tantum." Concerning the formation of phantasms, see ibid., q. 85, a. 2, ad 3, as cited in note 17 below.
universal aspect--by abstracting from phantasms. Thus, we know material objects as individual items in virtue of our external and internal senses; and we know what individual objects are in virtue of the act of intellection. St. Thomas summarily explains the manner in which a material object is comprehended by man both in its concrete existence and in its quiddity as follows:

Our intellect cannot know the singular in material things directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the principle of singularity in material things is

\[\text{ST I, q. 85, a. 1, resp. (V, 331a): "Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali, quam repraesentant phantasmata. Et ideo necesse est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstahendo a phantasmatisbus." Ibid., q. 84, a. 6, resp. (V, 324a): "...ad causandam intellectualem operationem, secundum Aristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium corporum, sed requiritur aliquid nobilium, quia agens est honorabilius patiente, ut ipse dicit [De Anima, III, 5 (430a18)]. Non tamen ita quod intellectualis operatio causetur in nobis ex sola impressione aliquarum rerum superiorum, ut Plato posuit: sed illud superius et nobilium agens quod vocat intellectum agentem...facit phantasmata a sensibus accepta intelligibilia in actu, per modum abstractionis cuiusdam. Secundum hoc ergo ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a sensu causatur. Sed quia phantasmata non sufficient immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem; non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitione sit totalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia causae." See also note 87 below.}\n
\[\text{ST I, q. 85, a. 3, resp. (V, 336a): "...in cognitione nostri intellectus duo oportet considerare. Primo quidem, quod cognitione intellexitiva aliquo modo a sensitiva primordium sumit. Et quia sensus est singularium, intellectus autem universalium; necesse est quod cognitio singularium, quoad nos, prior sit quam universalium cognitio.... Est ergo dicendum quod cognitio singularium est prior quoad nos quam cognito universalium, sicut cognitio sensitiva quam cognitio intellectiva."}\n
individual matter, whereas our intellect...understands by abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is abstracted from individual matter is the universal. Hence our intellect knows directly the universal only. But indirectly, and as it were by a kind of reflection, it can know the singular, because...even after abstracting the intelligible species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs to turn to the phantasms in which it understands the species.... Therefore it understands the universal directly through the intelligible species, and indirectly the singular represented by the phantasm. 15

4. With respect to knowledge of the universal, the agent intellect, as efficient cause of knowledge, uses as instrumental cause a phantasm whose content is particular, so as to produce in the recipient intellect an initial entitative actuation whose contents is the universal; accordingly, the recipient intellect is reduced from potentiality to act by the active intellect. 16

15ST I, q. 86, a. 1, resp. (V, 347a): "...singulare in rebus materialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia principium singularitatis in rebus materialibus est materia individualis: intellectus autem noster...intelligit abstrahendo speciem intelligibilem ab huiusmodi materia. Quod autem a materia individuali abstrahitur, est universale. Unde intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium. Indirecte autem, et quasi per quamdam reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare: quia...etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit.... Sic igitur ipsum universale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata." See also ST I, q. 12, a. 4, resp.; De Veritate, q. 10, a. 5, resp.

16Quodlib. (ca. 1257) VIII, q. 2, a. 3, resp. (Parma IX, 574a): "Intellectus agens est principiae agens, quod agit rerum similitudines in intellectu possibili. Phantasmata autem quae a rebus exterioribus accipiuntur, sunt quasi agentia instrumentalia: intellectus enim
5. The conformity and assimilation of the possible intellect issues into knowledge when, in a second actuation, the intellect efficiently causes the concept or word (verbum). On this score, St. Thomas affirms that the

possibilis comparatur ad res quarum notitiam recipit, sicut patiens quod cooperatur agenti." ST I, q. 84, a. 4, ad 3 (V, 321b): "...intellectus noster possibilis reducitur de potentia ad actum per aliquod ens actu, id est per intellectum agentem, qui est virtus quaedam animae nostra...."

17De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1, resp. (XXII-1, 5-6): "Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis: sicut visus per hoc quod disponitur per speciem coloris, cognoscit colorem.... Hoc est ergo quod addit verum supra ens, scilicet conformitatem sive adaequationem rei et intellectus, ad quam conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio rei. Sic ergo entitas rei praecedit rationem veritatis, sed cognitio et quidam veritatis effectus." ST I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3 (V, 334b): "...in parte sensitiva inventur duplex operatio. Una secundum solam immutationem: et sic perfectit operatio sensus per hoc quod immutatur a sensibili. Alia operatio est formatio, sedundum quod vis imaginativa format sibi aliquod idolum rei absentis, vel etiam nunquam visae. Et utraque haec operatio coniungitur in intellectu. Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus possibilis secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur. Unde ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio; et enuntiatio significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus. Non ergo voces significant ipsas species intelligibiles, sed ea quae intellectus sibi format ad iudicandum de rebus exterioribus." Cf. Ibid., III, q. 11, a. 2, ad 1. The knowledge of a sensible object thus involves two intellectual actuations: (1) the act of abstraction by which the recipient intellect is reduced to act by the agent intellect; here the intellect becomes formally determined to be its object (intentionally, but not yet cognitively); (2) the subsequent act of judgment whereby the conceptio or verbum is produced; here, the intellect is aware of its own conformity to the object known. On these two actuations, see In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7; Leo Sweeney, Christian Philosophy, 548-58. On the conceptio intellectus, see Gerard Smith, "The Concept in St. Thomas," 52-56. See Key-Text A, note 61.
intelligible species is not the object of our understanding, but rather "that by which" the intellect understands its actually existing object. Likewise, the sensible image is not itself the object of perception, but "that by which" the senses perceive its concrete object.  

6. Thus, in a certain sense, the intellect, the object known, and the cognition of the object are entitatively one and the same:

As sense in act is the sensible in act, by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act, by reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of the intellect in act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual through the species of the object understood, is itself understood through the same species as by its own form. Now to say that in 'things without matter the intellect and what is understood are the same,' is equal to saying that 'as regards things actually understood the intellect and what is understood are the same.' For a thing is actually understood in that it is

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\textit{ST I, q. 85, a. 2, resp. (V, 334a):} "...species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum ut quo intelligit intellectus...et similitudo rei intellectae, quae est species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit. Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eandem reflectionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellecta secundario est id quod intelligitur. Sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res cuius species intelligibilis est similitudo." Ibid., ad 1 (V, 334b): "Unde non sequitur quod species intelligibiles abstracta sit id quod actu intelligitur, sed quod sit similitudo eius." As these passages indicate, St. Thomas's theory of cognition cannot rightly be construed as any type of representationalism. On this point see Leo Sweeney, \textit{Christian Philosophy}, 545-48, especially note 15.
immaterial.\textsuperscript{19}

Accordingly, St. Thomas states that the human intellect is measured by things, so that the human concept is not true of itself, but is called true inasmuch as it conforms to reality.\textsuperscript{20} Properly speaking, truth is in the intellect according to the conformity of the intellect to the extramental object; nevertheless, the aspect of the true--as caused by the existence of an object known--must pass from the intellect to the object understood, since the true

\textsuperscript{19}ST I, q. 87, a. 1, ad 3 (V, 356b): "Sicut enim sensus in actu est sensibile, propter similitudinem sensibilis, quae est forma sensus in actu; ita intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu, propter similitudinem rei intellectuae, quae est forma intellectus in actu. Et ideo intellectus humanus, qui fit in actu per speciem rei intellectae, per eandem speciem intelligitur sicut per formam suam. Idem autem est dicere quod in his quae sunt sine materia idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, ac si diceretur quod in his quae sunt intellecta in actu, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur: per hoc enim aliquid est intellectum in actu, quod est sine materia." See In XII Meta., lect. 8, n. 2539 (Marietti, 594): "...fit enim intellectus intelligibilis per hoc quod attingit aliquod intelligibile. Et ideo, cum ipse intellectus fiat intelligibilis concipiendo aliquod intelligibile, sequitur quod idem sit intellectus et intelligibile." See also ST I, q. 55, a. 1, ad 2; q. 84, a. 3, resp., and a. 6, resp. With respect to self-knowledge, Joseph Owens stresses that "objects other than the cognition [of self] appear as primary for human awareness. Through them the specific traits of the cognition become known.... The notion of cognition itself, as explained by Aquinas, does not require that human cognition should first be directly aware of itself and its own contents." See "Aquinas on Cognition as Existence," 82.

\textsuperscript{20}ST I-II, q. 93, a. 1, ad 3 (VII, 163a): "Intellectus enim humanus est mensuratus a rebus, ut scilicet conceptus hominis non sit verus propter seipsum, sed dicitur verus ex hoc quod consonat rebus: ex hoc enim quod res est vel non est, opinio vera vel falsa est." See also ibid., q. 91, a. 3, ad 2.
denotes that towards which the intellect tends.\(^{21}\)

Hence, for St. Thomas, not only is the actual existence of sensible objects the (proximate) locus from which all nonconstructual knowledge\(^{22}\) is derived, it is also the

\(^{21}\text{ST I, q. 16, a. 1, resp. (IV, 206a): }"...sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum nominat id in quod tendit intellectus.... [C]um verum sit in intellectu secundum quod conformatur rei intellectae, necesse est quod ratio veri ab intellectu ad rem intellectam derivetur, ut res etiam intellecta vera dicatur, secundum quod habet aliquem ordinem ad intellectum." Ibid., ad 3 (IV, 207b): 
"...esse rei, non veritas eius, causat veritatem intellectus. Unde Philosophus dicit quod opinio et oratio vera est ex eo quod res est, non ex eo quod res vera est." Hence, truth which is in the soul--but caused by things--does not depend on what one thinks, but on the existence of things. De Veritate, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3 (XXII-2, 10a):
"Veritas quae in anima causatur a rebus, non sequitur aestimationem animae sed existentiam rerum." On this point, Etienne Gilson remarks that "since ens (being) includes its own esse (to be), each and every real knowledge ultimately is resolved into the composition of an essence with its own existence, which are posited as one by an act of judging. This is why judgment ultimately bears upon esse (to be), and also why the truth of cognition ultimately rests upon the fact that the thing is; for all true knowledge is resolved into being, and, unless we reach 'to be,' we fail to reach 'being.'" Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), 205. See also ST I, q. 22, a. 2, ad 3; q. 79, a. 4; ST I-II, q. 87, a. 7; q. 91, a. 3, ad 2; q. 93, a. 1, ad 3; In II Sent., d. 17, q. 2, a. 1; In III Sent., d. 31, q. 2, a. 4; SGC II, 77 and 78; In III de Anima, lect. 10, nn. 730-739; ibid., I, lect. 5, n. 85; De Spirt. Creat., 10, ad 17. See also G. B. Phelan, "Verum Sequitur Esse Rerum," Mediaeval Studies 1 (1939), 11-22; Armand Maurer, "St. Thomas and Eternal Truths, Mediaeval Studies 32 (1970), 91-107; Joseph Owens, "Judgment and Truth in Aquinas," Mediaeval Studies 32 (1970), 138-58; M. J. Farrelly, "Existence, the Intellect, and the Will," The New Scholasticism 29 (1955), 145-74, especially 169-70. In this connection, see note 100 below.

\(^{22}\text{By "nonconstructual knowledge" we mean that knowledge which is based directly on actual existents; by contrast, constructual knowledge (such as found in logic, mathematics, as well as our knowledge of physical and moral evil) seems to be based directly on the mental activity itself which}
(proximate) measure according to which human judgment is formed, pronounced, and validated; indeed, the actual existence of sensible natures (human persons and other subhuman creatures) is the term to which all nonconstructual knowledge directly refers.

Let us sum up the above discussion in the following points:

1. Corresponding to man's natural constitution—namely, a spiritual soul united to a body—the proper object of the human intellect is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter. Hence, human knowledge is derived from, determined by, and oriented towards, the sensible world of actually existing creatures.

2. Human knowledge thus depends upon two causes: (1) the cognitive powers (external and internal senses; the agent and recipient intellects) as the efficient cause of cognition; (2) sensible existents (human and subhuman helps constitute such knowledge and remotely upon actually existing items. See Leo Sweeney, Authentic Metaphysics in an Age of Unreality (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1988), 338, 139, note 10. Nevertheless, cognition of actually existing creatures is just as necessary for constructual knowledge as it is for nonconstructual knowledge. For example, the notion of, say, the hole of a donut—and by abstraction, the idea of "holeness," and the contribution which the mind itself imposes upon the original data to formulate the notion "emptiness"—presupposes, and is reducible to, the knowledge of an actually existing donut; see ibid., 221, note 69. In this connection, St. Thomas cites St. Hilary: "Non sermoni res, sed rei debet esse sermo subjicius." ST I-II, q. 96, a. 6, sed contra (VII, 187b).
natures) as content-determining-causes of cognition.23

Remote Context #b

The Meaning of Participation

In Key-Text A, St. Thomas speaks of participation within the context of his discussion on natural law: "in his quae cognitionem participant, principia agendi sunt cognitio et appetitus."24 Note here that natural law itself is not expressly considered in such terms;25 but in the Summa Theologiae (as we will see) his treatment of natural law is explicitly framed within the rubric of participation. Hence,

23ST I, q. 105, a. 3, resp. (V, 473a): "Operationis autem intellectus est duplex principium in intelligente: unum scilicet quod est ipsa virtus intellectualis, quod quidem principium est etiam in intelligente in potentia; aliud autem est principium intelligendi in actu, scilicet similitudo rei intellectae in intelligente." Ibid., ad 2 (V, 473b): "...lumen intellectuale, simul cum similitudine rei intellectuae, est sufficiens principium intelligendi; secundarium tamen, et a primo principio dependens." Ibid., q. 84, a. 6, resp. (V, 324a): "...ad causandam intellectualem operationem, secundum Aristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium corporum, sed requiritur aliquid nobilium, quia agens est honorabilius patiente...." See also De Veritate, q. 10, a. 6, resp.; ST I, q. 12, a. 13, resp.; ibid., q. 79, a. 4, ad 3.

24See Key-Text A, section [2]. Regarding a creature’s relationship to God through participation, see In I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, ad 6; In II Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; d. 18, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1; d. 37, q. 1, a. 2. Recall that St. Bonaventure also speaks of man’s participation in God through memory, knowledge, and love; see Key-Text A, note 77; Key-Text C, notes 47 and 58.

25From early in his career, however, the notion of participation—or what amounts to it—is implied in his teaching of natural law; see Key-Text A, note 47: "ideo ea quae sunt de jure divino, dicuntur esse de jure naturale, cum sint ex impressione et infusione superioris principii, scilicet Dei."
in order to properly grasp St. Thomas' doctrine of natural law, let us consider briefly his understanding of participation.

What can be said about participation? The philosophical notion itself finds its origin in Plato who uses the term to explain the relationship between contingent realities and the Forms.²⁶ As Leo Sweeney observes, platonic participation involves three principle factors—namely, (1) the Form itself, (2) the participated-in-perfection, and (3) the participant.²⁷ The first factor, the unparticipated Form or Essence, exists independently and subsistently in the world of Forms. It is present in its participants, not directly, but through the participated-in-perfections which inhere directly in each individual participant. A Form is an extrinsic formal cause of what a participant is.

The third factor, the participant, is the individual item (material, finite, and mutable) which receives the


²⁷The brief account of platonic participation which follows is a concise summary of Sweeney's observations as found in his "Participation in Plato's Dialogues: Phaedo, Parmenides, Sophist, and Timaeus," The New Scholasticism 62 (1988), 125-49. For a extensive investigation of Plato's notion of participation, see Sweeney's Divine Infinity in Greek and Medieval Thought (New York: Lang Publishing, 1992), 29-94.
participated-in-perfection through which it participates in its corresponding Form.

The second factor, the participated-in-perfection, is actually present in each particular participant, and yet is the medium through which the Form makes the many individuals participating it be what they are. Thus, the participated-in-perfection is (1) that by which the Form is present in its participants, (2) that which the Form has in common with its participants, and (3) that by which participants are (univocally) like one another and (analogically) like the Form. The participated-in-perfection is an immanent form or intrinsic formal cause of what a thing is. The participated-in-perfection, Sweeney says, "is crucial if the Form is itself to remain transcendent and yet be the immanent source of perfection in multiple participants." 28

But how does St. Thomas himself understand participation? Although he makes extensive use of the term in various discussions, he never treats it as a topic in itself; consequently, the general features of his theory of participation must be culled from an examination of many different texts. 29 As such texts collectively reveal, his

28 Sweeney, Divine Infinity, 51.

29 St. Thomas offers a somewhat general explanation of participation in his Expositio in Librum Boethii de Hebdomadibus (1256-59), lect. 2 (Parma XVII, 349-69): "Est autem participare quasi partem capere; et ideo quando aliquid particulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet universaliter, dicitur participare illud. Ita homo dicitur participare anima, quia non habet rationem animalis secundum
notion of participation incorporates the main elements of platonic participation—but as transfigured (so to speak) within his own metaphysical vision. Accordingly, Robert Henle sums up the general features of St. Thomas' participation doctrine as follows:

Participation [for St. Thomas] means that the participating entity has something that resembles the exemplar cause, though in a limited, deficient or imperfect way and that the participating entity is derived from the exemplar by efficient causality. 30

A more precise account of the factors involved in St. Thomas' theory of participation is offered by Leo Sweeney:

30 Robert Henle, The Treatise on Law, 155. More accurately, however, that which "is derived from the exemplar by efficient causality" is the "something" that both (1) resembles the exemplar cause, and which (2) the participating entity possesses in a limited way.

[1] An item which of itself is common, general, ample, unencumbered, indeterminate, free and, in some cases at least, rich, perfect, noble [2] becomes part of another, [3] with the result that this other becomes perfected, enriched, filled out, ennobled [4] but the item itself becomes restricted, confined, limited, determined. The item in question can be [a] an intelligibility, [b] any sort of form or act and [c]
the perfection entailed in an analogous cause situation.\textsuperscript{31}

In view of Henle's and Sweeney's accounts of St. Thomas' participation theory, what can be made of St. Thomas' assertion that natural law is a participation in us of eternal law?\textsuperscript{32} First, eternal law is the unparticipated exemplar cause, which exists independently, subsistently, commonly, freely, and perfectly [in the mind of God, as we will see]. Eternal law is present to the multiplicity of men (qua participants)--not directly, but through natural law which inheres directly in each man. Eternal law is the extrinsic formal cause of what a man is. Precisely as present to him through natural law, eternal law is restricted, confined, limited, and determined.

Next, man is the individual participant (material, mutable, and imperfect) which receives natural law, and through which he participates in eternal law; as a result of this participation, man is perfected in his moral life.

Finally, natural law itself is the participated-in-perfection which--derived from eternal law through efficient

\textsuperscript{31}Leo Sweeney, "Existence/Essence in Thomas Aquinas's Early Writings," Proceedings from the ACPA (1963), 121.

\textsuperscript{32}\textit{ST} I-II, q. 91, a. 2, resp. (VII, 154b): "...lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura." For other uses of the term participatio in connection with natural law, see ibid, q. 90, a. 2, resp.; q. 91, a. 2, ad 1 and ad 3; q. 91, a. 4, resp.; q. 91, a. 6, resp. and ad 2-3; q. 93, a. 2, resp; q. 93, a. 3, resp.; q. 95, a. 5, ad 2.
causality—is actually present in each particular human being; it is the medium through which eternal law makes each man participating it to be what he is as a moral agent. Thus, natural law is (1) that by which eternal law is present in each human being, (2) that which eternal law has in common with each human being, and (3) that by which men are (univocally) like one another as moral (intellectual and volitional) agents and (analogously) like God as intellectual and volitional Agent. Natural law is an immanent form of what man is as moral agent.

As we will see, natural law participation can pertain to (1) knowledge, (2) human nature or activity, and (3) the perfection of man through his actual relationship with creatures and God.

Remote Context #C

Divine Providence, Eternal Law, and Nature

As previously stated (see note 8 above), the human intellect rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible through the knowledge of the natures of visible things;\(^{33}\)

\(^{33}\)Recall that, for St. Thomas, all knowledge—including the knowledge of incorporeals—depends on phantasms; See ST I, q. 84, a. 7, resp. (V, 325a): "...impossibile est intellectum nostrum, secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata." How, then are incorporeal things known? See Ibid., ad 3 (V, 326a): "...incorporea quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparisonem ad corpora sensibilia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Sicut veritatem intelligimus ex consideratione rei circa quam veritatem speculamur; Deum autem, ut Dionysius dicit [De Div. Nom., I, 5 (PG 34, 466)],["
thus, according to the knowledge of sensible natures as they actually exist in the world, man is able to attain to the knowledge of Divine Providence:

passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata." How, then are incorporeal things known? See Ibid., ad 3 (V, 326a):
"...incorporea quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad corpora sensibilia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Sicut veritatem intelligimus ex consideratione rei circa quam veritatem specularur; Deum autem, ut Dionysius dicit [De Div. Nom., I, 5 (PG 34, 466)], cognoscimus ut causam, et per excessum, et per remotionem; alias etiam incorporeas substantias, in statu praesentis vitae, cognoscere non possimus nisi per remotionem, vel per aliquid comparationem ad corporalia. Et ideo cum de huiusmodi aliquid intelligimus, necesse habemus converti ad phantasmata corporum, licet ipsorum non sint phantasmata."

Accordingly, knowledge of God is attained through knowledge of His effects; see, for example, ST I, q. 84, a. 4, ad 1 (V, 320b): ". . . species intelligibiles quas participat noster intellectus, reducantur sicut in primam causam in aliquod principium per suam essentiam intelligibile, sic liber in Deum. Sed ab illo principio procedunt mediantibus formis rerum sensibilium et materialium, a quibus scientiam colligimus." ST I-II, q. 93, a. 2, ad 1 (VII, 163b): ". . . ea quae sunt Dei, in seipsa quidem cognosci a nobis non possunt, sed tamen in effectibus suis manifestantur, secundum illud Rom. 1, 20, 'Invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur.'" See also ST I, q. 2, aa 2-3; q. 44, a. 1 and ad 1. Concerning the demonstration of God from the nature of beings qua composite, see ST I q. 3, a. 7, resp.; q. 47, a. 1, resp.; see also SCG I, cc. 11 and 15. In this connection, Joseph Owens comments that the knowledge of causality and the "causal proposition is not synthetic a priori. [Such knowledge] is based upon things, not upon the exigencies of human reason. It is not postulated but is concluded from the nature and being of things. One may say with truth that the being of created things cannot be understood except as caused [see In I Post. Analyt., lect. 7; De Pot., q. 3, a. 5, ad 1]; but the reason for that exigency lies ultimately not in the human intellect but in the being of those things themselves. They would have to have a cause even though no human intellect ever considered them, as human reasoning itself is able to demonstrate." "The Causal Proposition--Principle or Conclusion?," 338.
It is impossible for things contrary and discordant to fall into one harmonious order always or for the most part, except under some one guidance, assigning to each and all a tendency to a fixed end. But in the world we see things of different natures falling into harmonious order, not rarely and fortuitously, but always or for the most part. Therefore, there must be some [principal] by whose providence the world is governed; and that we call God.\textsuperscript{34}

In what, then, does divine providence consist?

According to St. Thomas, two things belong to notion of providence--namely, (1) the plan (ratio) of the order of things pre-ordained towards an end and (2) the execution of this order, which is called government.\textsuperscript{35} Now, God, through His wisdom, is the creator of all things, to which He is related as an artist is to his artifacts. He is also the ruler of all the acts and movements that are found in each

\textsuperscript{34}\textbf{SCG} (ca. 1259) I, c. 13 (XIII, 34a): "Impossibile est aliqua contraria et dissonantia in unum ordinem concordare semper vel pluries nisi alicuius gubernatione, ex qua omnibus et singulis tribuitur ut ad certum finem tendant. Sed in mundo videmus res diversarum naturarum in unum ordinem concordare, non ut raro et a casu, sed ut semper vel maiori parte. Oportet ergo esse aliquem cuius providentia mundus gubernetur. Et hunc dicimus Deus." St. Thomas borrows this argument from Damascene, \textit{De Fid. Orthod.}, I, 3 (\textit{PG} 94, 796).

\textsuperscript{35}\textbf{ST} I, q. 22, a. 3, resp. (IV, 267b): "...ad providentiam duo pertinent: scilicet ratio ordinis rerum provisarum in finem; et executio huius ordinis, quae gubernatio dicitur." See also, ibid., a. 1, ad 2 (IV, 264a): "...ad curam duo pertinent: scilicet ratio ordinis, quae dicitur providentia et dispositio; et executio ordinis, quae dicitur gubernatio. Quorum primum est aeternum; secundum temporale." For an exposition of St. Thomas' doctrine of providence and the relationship between order and reason, see Edward Pace, "The Teleology of St. Thomas," \textit{The New Scholasticism} 1 (1927), 213-31; "The Concept of Order in the Philosophy of St. Thomas," \textit{The New Scholasticism} 2 (1928), 51-72.
single creature. Hence, just as the plan in the divine wisdom though which all things were created has the nature (ratio) of an art or exemplar or idea, so the plan in the divine wisdom which moves everything to its proper end has the nature (ratio) of law. Accordingly, the eternal law is nothing other than the plan (ratio) in divine wisdom inasmuch as it directs all acts and movements of creatures towards their proper ends.⁳⁶

How, then, are creatures subject to the government of divine providence? St. Thomas explains that every created being is divinely impressed with a certain inherent nature by which it is directed towards its proper end:

The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular course is a kind of impression from God, directing them to their end ("est impressio quaedam Dei dirigentis ad finem"); just as

³⁶ST I-II, q. 93, a. 1, resp. (VII, 162a): "Deus autem per suam sapientiam conditor est universarum rerum, ad quas comparatur sicut artifex ad artificiata, ut in Primo [q. 14, a. 8] habitum est. Est etiam gubernator omnium actuum et motionum quae inveniuntur in singulis creaturis, ut etiam in Primo [q. 103, a. 5] habitum est. Unde sicut ratio divinae sapientiae inquantum per eam cuncta sunt creata, rationem habet artis, vel exemplaris vel ideae; ita ratio divinae sapientiae moventis omnia ad debitum finem, obtinet rationem legis. Et secundum hoc, lex aeterna nihil aliud est quam ratio divinae sapientiae, secundum quod est directiva omnium actuum et motionum." See also ST I, q. 14, a. 8, resp.; q. 22, a. 2, resp. Cf. Plato's Timaeus, 28a-30b. In its simplest terms, law, for St. Thomas, denotes a kind of plan directing action towards an end. ST I-II, q. 93, a. 3, resp. (VII, 164a): "...lex importat rationem quandam directivam actuum ad finem...." See ST I-II, q. 90, a. 4, resp., (VII, 152b), for St. Thomas’s formal definition of law as: "nihil est aliud quam quaedam rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis habet, promulgata." Cf. ibid., q. 90, aa. 1 and 2.
the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their nature is something violent. Therefore, just as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows the government of divine providence. 37

Correspondingly, St. Thomas tells us that every creature, according to its nature as divinely impressed upon

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37 ST I, q. 103, a. 1, ad 3 (V, 454a): "...necessitas naturalis inhaerens rebus quae determinantur ad unum, est impressio quaedam Dei dirigentis ad finem: sicut necessitas qua sagitta agitur ut ad certum signum tendat, est impressio sagittantis, et non sagittae. Sed in hoc differt, quia id quod creaturae a Deo recipiunt, est earum natura; quod autem ab homine rebus naturalibus imprimitur praeter earum naturam, ad violentiam pertinet. Unde sicut necessitas violentiae in motu sagittae demonstrat sagittantis directionem; ita necessitas naturalis creaturarum demonstrat divinae providentiae gubernationem." In Meta. (ca. 1269-72), V, lect. 5, n. 819 (Marietti, 267): "Quia vero motus rerum naturalium magis causatur ex forma...ipsa forma dicitur natura." Ibid., n. 826 (Marietti, 268): "...primo et proprie natura dicitur substantia, idest forma rerum habentium in se principium motus inquantum huiusmodi.... Forma est principium motus rerum existentium secundum naturam, aut in actu, aut in potentia." ST I, q. 39, a. 2, ad 3 (IV, 399a): "...natura designat principium actus...." ST III, q. 75, a. 4, resp. (XII, 168a): "Et ideo cujuslibet agentis creati actio fertur super aliquem determinatum actum. Determinatio autem cujuslibet rei in esse actuali est per ejus formam." SCG III, c. 1 (XIV, 3a): "Finem autem ultimum unaquaque res per suam consequitur actionem, quam oportet in finem dirigiri ab eo qui principia rebus dedit per quae agunt." As explained in note 13 of Key-Text A, expressions such as impressa and imprimit characterize anything which has been imparted or given to a recipient item from an extrinsic cause. Hence, nature, precisely as an impressio, is a determinate principle of activity which is given to a creature from something outside itself. Likewise, with respect to knowledge, a sensible impressio is a determinate content of cognition which the percipient is given from an extrinsic content-determining-cause--namely, a material existent.
it, is subject to eternal law:

Now, just as man, by a pronouncement, imprints on man subject to him an internal principle of action, so God also imprints on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions; and in this way, God is said to command the whole of nature, according to Ps. 148, 6: 'He has made a decree and it shall not pass away.' And for this reason also, all movements and actions of the whole of nature are subject to the eternal law."  

For St. Thomas, then, all creatures participate in eternal law according to their natures as divinely impressed upon them; as a kind of impression of eternal law, a nature is itself a kind of interior law--precisely as it directs the activity of a creature towards its proper end.  

For St. Thomas speaks of the natural inclinations proper to creatures as "natural laws." See In Lib. Div. Nom (ca. 1265-67) X, lect. 1 (Parma XV, 383b): "Ipsae naturales inclinationes rerum in proprios fines quas dicimus esse naturales leges, sunt quidam partus, id est effectus 'dulces,' id est consoni naturali appetitui effectus...." See below, Key-Text section [1]; see also ST I-II, q. 91, a. 3, ad 3.
nothing other than natural law:

Through natural law we participate in the eternal law in proportion to the capacity of human nature (capacitatis humanae naturae). 40

There are two ways in which a thing may be implanted into man (inditum homini): first, through being part of his nature, and thus the natural law is implanted into man. 41

Through natural law, man participates in eternal law (i.e., the ratio of divine providence) according to the capacity of his human nature. What this participation consists in will be explicated in our Commentary section in light of St. Thomas' doctrine of knowledge as discussed above. For now, let us sum up the above discussion as follows:

1. Divine providence consists of (a) the plan of the order of things pre-ordained towards an end and (b) the

   40 ST I-II, q. 91, a. 4, ad 1 (VII, 156b): "...per naturalem legem participatur lex aeterna secundum proportionem capacitatis humanae naturae."

   41 ST I-II, q. 106, a. 1, ad 2 (VII, 274a): "...dupliciter est aliquid inditum homini: uno modo quasi pertinens ad naturam humanam: et sic lex naturalis est lex indita homini. See also ST I-II, q. 94, a. 6, sed contra (VII, 173a): "...lex scripta in cordibus hominum est lex naturalis." In this connection, St. Thomas traces all human laws to natural law as rooted in (human) nature; see ST I-II, q. 91, a. 3, resp. (VII, 155a): "Unde et Tullius dicit, in sua Rhet. [De Invent. Rhet. II, 53], quod 'initium iuris est a natura profectum; deinde quaedam in consuetudinem ex utilize rationis venerunt; postea res et a natura profectas et a consuetudine probatas legum metus et religio sanxit.'" ST I-II, q. 95, a. 2 (VII, 175b): "...omnis lex humanitus posita intantum habet de ratione legis, inquantum a lege naturae derivatur." See also ST I-II, q. 91, a. 6, resp.
execution of this order, which is called government.

2. Eternal law is nothing other than the plan of divine providence by which God directs all acts and movements of creatures towards their proper end.

3. All creatures are subject to eternal law according to their inherent natures—as impressed upon them by God.

4. Hence, man, who also is a creature of God, participates in eternal law according to his own divinely impressed nature; this participation in eternal law is nothing other than natural law.

Remote Context #d:

St. Thomas' Theory of Natural Appetency

To further understand how man participates eternal law according to his inherent nature, let us take a closer look at St. Thomas' doctrine of natural appetency. Proper to each and every form, St. Thomas tells us, is a determinate tendency or inclination to a definite operation:

From each and every form follows some inclination, and from the inclination an operation; as from the natural form of fire follows an inclination to a place that is upward, according to which [inclination] form is called light; and from this inclination operation follows—namely, the movement which is upward... The inclination following the natural form is called natural appetite; from appetite follows operation. 42

42 See II De Anima, lect. 5 (XLV, 88b): "Ex unaquaque autem forma sequitur aliqua inclinatione et ex inclinatione operatio, sicut ex forma naturali ignis sequitur inclinatione ad locum qui est surusm, secundum quam ignis dicitur lexis, et ex hac inclinatione sequitur operation, scilicet motus qui est sursum... inclinatione consequens formam naturalem
St. Thomas' doctrine of natural appetency thus involves a distinction and relationship between three terms: (1) a creature's nature or form, (2) the natural inclination itself as a determinate tendency which is possessed by that nature, (3) the natural operation which follows upon, and according to, that determinate tendency. Hence, inasmuch as all creatures are endowed with certain inherent natures, all creatures possess natural inclinations towards certain operations and ends. Now, some creatures, such as inanimate bodies and plants, possess non-cognitive natural inclinations and, hence, are inclined towards their proper operations and goods without knowledge, according to their nature; such inclination is called natural appetite.

\[\text{dicitur appetitus naturalis, ex appetitu autem sequitur operatio} \ldots\]

See also De Veritate, q. 27, a. 2, resp. (XXII-3, 794a): "Cum enim diversarum naturarum diversi sint fines, ad consecutionem alicuius finis in rebus naturalibus tria praexiguntur, scilicet natura proportionata ad finem illum, et inclinatio in illum finem, quae est naturalis appetitus finis et motus in finem." Note that inclinatio and appetitus are, for St. Thomas interchangeable terms; on this, see note 44 below.

"St. Thomas asserts categorically that natural inclination follows natural form; see ST I, q. 80, a. 1, resp. (V, 282a): "...quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio.... Formam naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio, quae appetitus naturalis vocatur."

"ST I, q. 59, a. 1, resp. (V, 92a): "...cum omnia procedant ex voluntate divina, omnia suo modo per appetitum inclinantur in bonum, sed diversimode. Quaedam enim inclinantur in bonum per solam naturalem habitudinem, absque cognitione, sicut plantae et corpora inanimata: et talis inclinatio ad bonum vocatur appetitus naturalis." Ibid., q. 78, a. 1, ad 3 (V, 251,b): "...appetitus naturalis est inclinatio cuiuslibet rei in aliquid ex natura sua."
Other creatures, such as animals, are inclined towards their respective operations and goods according to sense knowledge—not that they know the aspect of goodness itself, but rather as apprehending some particular sensible good; such inclination—as determined by its sensitive nature towards a sensibly apprehended good—is called sensitive appetite. Still other creatures possess an inclination towards certain operations and goods according to intellection whereby they perceive the very aspect of goodness; such inclination towards the good as such—precisely as known—is termed the will.

45 ST I, q. 59, a. 1, resp. (V, 92a): "Quaedam vero ad bonum inclinantur cum aliqua cognitione; non quidem sic quod cognoscant ipsam rationem boni, sed cognoscunt aliquod bonum particulare; sicut sensus cognoscit dulce et album, et aliquid huiusmodi. Inclinatio autem hanc cognitionem sequens dicitur appetitus sensitivus."

46 Ibid., (V, 92a): "Quaedam vero .inclinantur ad bonum cum cognitione qua cognoscunt ipsam boni rationem, quod est proprium intellectus...; et haec inclinatio dicitur voluntas." SCG IV, c. 19 (XV, 74b): "...in qualibet intellectuali natura oportet inveniri voluntatem.... Unde etiam oportet quod ex forma intellibibili consequatur in intelligente inclinatio ad proprias operationes at proprium finem. Haec autem inclinatio in intellectuali natura voluntas est...." See also ST I, q. 19, a. 3, resp.; q. 78, a. 1, resp. and ad 3; ST I-II, q. 9, a. 1, resp.; De Veritate, q. 25, a. 1, resp. The terms appetitus and inclinatio are thus predicated of different natures in an analogous fashion; see, for example, SCG III, c. 26 (XIV, 71a): "Appetitus autem non est proprium intellectualis naturae, sed omnibus rebus inest: licet sit diversimodo in diversis. Quae tamen diversitas procedit ex hoc quod res diversimodo se habent ad cognitionem. Quae enim omnino cognitione carent, habent appetitum naturalem tantum. Quae vero habent cognitionem sensitivam, et appetitum sensibiliem habent.... Quae vero habent cognitionem intellectivam, et appetitum cognitionis proportionatum habent, scilicet voluntatem." While St. Thomas distinguishes between a power and its proper
What can be said, then, of natural appetency with respect to human nature? Let us first recall St. Thomas’ teaching on the nature of man; here, human nature can be taken in two ways: first, inasmuch as intellect is the principal part of human nature, man has his own specific nature; secondly, man’s nature can be taken in contrast with reason—namely, as that which is common to man and other animals, especially that part of man which [as directed by natural necessity] does not obey [human] reason. 47

How is man’s specific nature related to his common nature? As noted above (see note 2), man is composed of soul operation, the terms inclinatio and appetitus often refer, not merely to an appetitive power, but to its respective operation as well. See, for example, SCG II, c. 55 (XIII, 394b): "Naturalis enim appetitus quibusdam quidem inest ex apprehensione, sicut lupus naturaliter desiderat occisionem animalium de quibus pascitur, et homo naturaliter desiderat felicitatem; quibusdam vero absque apprehensione ex sola inclinatione naturalium principiorum, quae naturalis appetitus in quibusdam dicitur sicut grave appetit esse deorsum."

47 ST I-II, q. 31, a. 7, resp. (VI, 221): "Natura autem in homine dupliciter sumi potest. Uno modo, prout intellectus et ratio est potissime hominis natura, quia secundum eam homo in specie constitutur.... Alio modo potest sumi natura in homine secundum quod condividitur rationi: id scilicet quod est commune homini et aliis, praecipue quod rationi non obedit. Et secundum hoc, ea quae pertinent ad conservationem corporis, vel secundum individuum, ut cibus, potus, lectus, et hujusmodi, vel secundum speciem, sicut venerorum usus dicuntur homini delectabilia naturaliter."

The bodily parts of man, while lacking understanding, can be said to obey [human] reason inasmuch as they are ordered to human reason. For a clarification of this point, see ST I-II, q. 93, a. 5, ad 2; q. 94, a. 2, ad 2, as cited in notes 50 and 85 below. Concerning the method by which St. Thomas draws the distinction between the man’s specific nature and generic nature, see ST I, q. 76, a. 3, ad 4.
and body; and inasmuch as his soul is the form of the body, he exists as a substantial unity. Now, the human soul is characterized as an intellectual soul (anima intellectiva); but if the human soul is specifically intellectual, how can it also be the form of the body? St. Thomas explains that the soul is the first [principle] by which the body lives and by which each vital operation is performed. Consequently, the soul is at once the primary [principle] of our nourishment, sensation, locomotion--as

48 See notes 2 and 3 above; De Veritate, q. 16, a. 1, ad 13 (XXII-2, 506b): "...non enim in anima sunt duae formae sed una tantum quae est eius essentia, quia per essentiam suam spiritus est, et per essentiam suam forma corporis est, non per aliquid superadditum." SCG II, 57 (XIII, 406b): "Oportet igitur ex anima et corpore unum fieri, et quod non sint secundum esse diversa.... Est igitur anima forma corporis animati.... Est igitur anima forma corporis.... Ergo anima est forma et actus corporis." In II de Anima, I, c. 2, n. 233 (Pirotta, 83): "Anima est actus primus corporis physici organici." See also SCG II, 65; ST I, q. 75, a. 1, resp.

49 ST I, q. 76, a. 1, resp. (V, 208b): "...intellectus, qui est intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani corporis forma.... Hoc ergo principium quo primo intelligimus, sive dicatur intellectus sive anima intellectiva, est forma corporis." Note that St. Thomas distinguishes the intellectual soul—the formal principle of man’s being—from the intellective power and all the other powers which flow from the soul. See ST I, q. 79, a. 1, resp. (V, 258a): "...intellectus sit aliqua potentia animae, et non ipsa animae essentia." Nevertheless, the intellectual soul is sometimes called intellectus inasmuch as the intellect is the soul’s chief power; see ibid., ad 1 and 3; ibid., q. 77, a. 6, resp. (V, 246b): "Unde manifestum est quod omnes potentiae animae, sive subiectum earum sit anima sola, sive compositum, fluunt ab essentia animae sicut a principio." Cf. ibid., q. 54, a. 3; q. 77, a. 1.
well as our understanding. No other substantial form, then, belongs to man other than the soul. Specifically intellectual, the soul nevertheless contains virtually the sensitive and nutritive souls as well as all inferior forms; and it alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things. In this way, for example, Socrates is said to be both animal and man by one and the same soul.

Because the human soul is one and its powers are many, St. Thomas argues, and since a number of things that proceed

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50 ST I, q. 76, a. 1, resp. (V, 208b): "Manifestum est autem quod primum quo corpus vivit, est anima. Et cum vita manifestetur secundum diversas operationes in diversis gradivus viventium, id quo primo operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est anima: anima enim est primum quo nutrimur, et sentimus, et movemur secundum locum, et similiter quo primo intelligimus." See ibid., q. 77, a. 6, ad 1 (V, 246b): "...ab uno simplici possunt naturaliter multa procedere ordine quodam; et iterum propter diversitatem recipientium. Sic igitur ab una essentia animae procedunt multae et diversae potentiae, tum propter ordinem potentiarum, tum propter diversitatem organorum corporalium." See also In II de Anima, 4, nn. 271-278; De Spir. Creat., a. 2.

51 See ST I, q. 76, a. 4, resp. (V, 224a): "...nulla alia forma substantialis est in homini nisi sola anima intellectiva; et quod ipsa sicut virtute continet animam sensitivam et nutritivam, ita virtute continet omnes inferiores formas, et facit ipsa sola quidquid imperfectionis formae in aliis faciunt. Et similiter est dicendum de anima sensitativa in brutis, et de nutritiva in plantis, et universaliter de omnibus formis perfectionibus respectu imperfectionorum." See also ST I, q. 76, a. 3, resp. (V, 221b): "...eadem numero est anima in homine, sensitiva et intellectiva et nutritiva.... Sic igitur anima intellectiva continet in sua virtute quidquid habet anima sensitiva brutorum, et nutritiva plantarum...ita nec per aliam animam Socrates est homo, et per aliam animal, sed per unam et eandem." In speaking of the human soul as virtually containing all inferior forms, St. Thomas does not advocate the theory of a plurality of substantial forms in man; for his refutation of such a theory, see ibid., q. 76, a. 5, ad 3; SCG II, 58.
from one must proceed in a certain order, there must be some order among the various powers of the soul. In this respect, he identifies a twofold order of dependence of one power upon another: (1) according to the order of nature insofar as perfect things are prior to imperfect things; (2) according to the order of generation (and time) inasmuch as a thing reaches perfection from a prior condition of imperfection. In the first case, those powers of the soul which come first in the order of perfection and nature are the principles of the others after the manner of the end and active principle. For example, the senses are for the sake of the intellect and not the other way around. Further, the senses are a certain imperfect participation of the intellect so that, according to natural origin, they proceed from the intelligence just as the imperfect proceeds from the perfect. Thus, prior to the sensitive powers, the intellectual power directs and commands them as their end and active principle; similarly, the sensitive powers are prior the powers of the nutritive soul.  

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52See ST I, q. 77, a. 4, resp. (V, 243b): "...cum anima sit una, potentiae vero plures: ordine autem quodam ab uno in multitudinem procedatur; necesse est inter potentias animae ordinem esse. Triplex autem ordo inter eas attenditur. Quorum duo considerantur secundum dependentiam unius potentiae ab altera: tertius autem accipitur secundum ordinem objectorum. Dependentia autem unius potentiae modo secundum naturae ordinem, prout perfecta sunt naturaliter imperfectis priora; alio modo secundum ordinem generationis et temporis, prout ex imperfecto ad perfectum venitur." The third kind of order mentioned above concerns the ordination of certain sensitive powers to one another and has no bearing on our present discussion. See also ST I, q. 77, a.
In the second kind of order (i.e., generation), the priority is reversed; here the powers of the nutritive soul come before the powers of the sensitive soul insofar as they prepare the body for their actions; likewise, the sensitive powers are prior with respect to the intellectual powers.\textsuperscript{53} This distinction between the orders of nature and generation is also expressed by St. Thomas in terms of what is more essential (essentialius) as opposed to what is more excellent (dignius). That which is more essential is prior in generation; and that which is more excellent is prior in nature.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{53}See ST I, q. 77, a. 4, resp. (V, 243b): "Secundum igitur primum potentiarum ordinem, potentiae intellectivae sunt priores potentiiis sensitivis: unde dirigunt eas, et imperant eis. Et similiter potentiae sensitivae hoc ordine sunt priores potentiis animae nutritivae. Secundum vero ordinem secundum, e converso se habet. Nam potentiae animae nutritivae sunt priores in via generationis, potentiiis animae sensitivae: unde ad earum actiones praeparant corpus. Et similiter est de potentiiis sensitivis respectu intellectivarum." Cf. ST I, q. 77, a. 7, resp. (V, 247b): "Et propter hoc Imperfectiores potentiae sunt priores in via generationis: prius enim animal generatur quam homo." For a more thorough metaphysical discussion of these two orders, see In Lib. de Causis, lect. 1; In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 2; ST I, q. 77, a. 6.

\textsuperscript{54}For example, man’s state of nature is more essential to him than the state of grace; yet the state of grace is more noble than the state of nature. See Suppl., q. 49, a. 3, resp. (XII, 94a): "...aliquid dicitur in re aliqua principalius altero duorum modorum: aut quia altere essentialius; aut quia dignius. Si quia dignius, sic omnibus modis sacramentum est principalius inter tria bona conjugii. Quia pertinet ad matrimonium inquantum est sacramentum gratiae. Alia vero duo pertinent ad ipsum inquantum est quoddam naturae officium: perfectio autem gratiae est
It is in view of the hylemorphic constitution of man and the ordination of his natural powers that natural appetency in man must be understood. Man is truly a substantial unity comprised of a hierarchy of natural powers; and inasmuch as each power of the soul is in itself a certain form or nature, it bears a natural inclination to some [determinate operation].

Hence, man's non-cognitive powers possess determinate tendencies towards certain operations; above these powers man possesses appetitive powers which bear determinate tendencies (natural inclinations) towards operations according to sense cognition; higher still, man possesses an appetitive
dignior perfectione naturae officium." In this connection, see De Veritate, q. 22, a. 5.

See ST I, q. 80, a. 1, ad 3 (V, 282b): "... unaquaeque potentia animae est quaedam forma, seu natura, et habet naturalem inclinationem in aliquid." Ibid., q. 78, a. 1, ad 3 (V, 251b): "Unde naturali appetitu quaelibet potentia desiderat sibi conveniens." See also In III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 2; De Veritate, q. 22, a. 3. Accordingly, the eye--by its very nature--possesses a determinate tendency (natural inclination) towards its proper operation of vision; likewise, the intellect possesses a determinate tendency (natural inclination) towards its proper operations of apprehension, reasoning, judgment, etc; the natural inclination of the intellect is not to be confused, however, with the will which is an operative power in its own right; see De Veritate, q. 22, a. 11, ad 6 (XXII, 640a): "Voluntas non directe ab intelligentia procedit, sed ab essentia animae, praesupposita intelligentia." De Virt., in Comm. (ca. 1269-72), a. 5, ad 11 (Parma VIII, 556a): "...ex propinquitate voluntatis ad rationem contingit quod voluntas secundum ipsam rationem potentiae consonet rationi...."

ST I, q. 78, a. 1, ad 3 (V, 251b): "Sed appetitus animalis [qua operation] consequitur formam apprehensam; et ad huiusmodi appetitum requiritur specialis animae potentia, et non sufficit sola appprehensio." Ibid., q. 80, a. 1, ad 3
power—namely, the will (voluntas)—which bears a natural inclination towards operation according to intellectual cognition.\footnote{De Malo (ca. 1266-67), q. 6, a. 1 (Parma VIII, 310a): "...sicut in rebus naturalibus invenitur forma, quae est principium actionis, et inclinatio consequens formam, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis, ex quibus sequitur actio; ita in homine invenitur forma intellectiva, et inclinatio voluntatis consequens formam apprehensiam, ex quibus sequitur exterior actio." ST I, q. 80, a. 2, resp. (V, 284a): "...appetitum intellectivum esse aliam potentiam a sensitivo.... Quia igitur est alterius generis apprehensum per intellectum, et apprehensum per sensum, consequens est quod appetitus intellectivus sit alia potentia a sensitivo." ST I-II, q. 94, a. 3, resp. (VII, 170b): "unde cum anima rationalis sit propria forma hominis, naturalis inclinatio inest cuilibet homini ad hoc quod agat secundum rationem." Note in these latter two cases (sensitive appetite and intellectual appetite) that the operations of these powers only follow upon the knowledge of some sensible good. See notes 36 and 37 above regarding the proper objects of the sensitive and intellectual appetites.} Human nature is thus comprised of many different powers with corresponding tendencies (inclinations) and operations. But while a lower power possesses its own proper action, it is nevertheless subject to a higher power; likewise, a lower appetite naturally follows the movement of the higher appetite.\footnote{See ST II-II, q. 158, a. 8, resp. (X, 284b): "...naturaliter appetitus inferior sequitur motum appetitus superioris, nisi aliquid repugnet."} Accordingly, the intellective powers direct and command the sensitive powers which, in turn, have dominion over the nutritive
powers. Correlatively, the lower inclinations of man are naturally subordinate to the higher inclinations. By virtue of this ordination of powers, all human inclinations naturally reduce to the rational inclination for the universal good, which is God. St. Thomas sums up this hierarchical ordination of man-quaque-composite-creature towards his ultimate end as follows:

First, each and every part exists for the sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; secondly, the less noble parts exist for the more noble, as the senses for the intellect and the lungs for the heart; thirdly, all the parts are for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form, since the parts are, as it were, matter of the whole; finally, the whole man is ordered to an extrinsic end—namely the enjoyment of God.

See ST I, q. 77, a. 4, resp. (V, 243): "Secundum igitur primum potentiarum ordinem [i.e., the order of excellence or nature] potentiae intellectivae sunt priores potentiiis sensitivis, unde dirigunt eas, et imperant eis. Et similiter potentiae sensitivae hoc ordine sunt priores potentiiis animae nutritivae." See ST I-II, q. 93, a. 5, ad 2 (VII, 166b): "...membra corporis humani moventur ad imperium rationis, non tamen participant ratione, quia non habent aliam apprehensionem ordinatam ad rationem."

ST I-II, q. 9, a. 6, resp. (VI, 182b): "...voluntas habet ordinem ad universale bonum; unde nihil aliud potest esse voluntatis causa, nisi ipse Deus qui est universale bonum." ST I, q. 93, a. 4, resp. (V, 404b): "...homo habet aptitudinem naturalem ad intelligendum et amandum Deum: et haec aptitudo consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quae est communis omnibus hominibus." See also note 63 below.

See ST I, q. 65, a. 2, resp. (V, 50a): "Si autem alicujus totius et partium eius velimus finem assignare, inveniems primo quidem, quod singulae partes sunt propter suos actus, sicut oculus ad videndum. Secundo vero, quod pars ignobilior est propter nobiliorem; sicut sensus propter intellectum, et pulmo propter cor. Tertio vero, omnes partes sunt propter perfectionem totius, sicut et materia propter formam: partes enim sunt quai materia totius. Ulterius
To the hierarchy of man's powers and inclinations, there can be inferred a corresponding hierarchy of human goods (ends): bodily goods are subordinate to the good of, say, marriage; in turn, the good of marriage is ordered to the knowledge and love of God. In short, man's natural inclinations for determinate (finite) goods are ordered to his natural inclination for the indeterminate (infinite) good—namely, God. By virtue of this hierarchal ordination of ends, a unity of human activities is attained.  

autem, totus homo est propter aliquem finem extrinsecum, puta ut fruatur Deo." Ibid., q. 103, a. 5, ad 3 (V, 458b): "...creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam per intellectum et voluntatem, quorum utrumque indiget regi et perfici ab intellectu et voluntate Dei. Et ideo supra gubernationem qua creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam tanquam domina sui actus, indiget gubernari a Deo." Cf. ibid., q. 49, a. 3; q. 65, a. 2, resp.; ST I-II, q. 10, a. 1.

62 See In I Ethic., lect. 9, n. 106 (Marietti): "Si ergo occurrat statim aliquis finis, ad quem ordinentur omnia quae operantur omnes artes et operationes humanae, talis finis erit operatum bonum simpliciter, idest quod intenditur ex omnibus operibus humanis. Si autem ad hoc occurrant plura bona ad quae ordinentur diversi fines diversarum artium, oportebit quod inquisitio rationis nostrae transcedat ista plura, quousque perveniat ad hoc ipsum, idest ad aliud unum. Necesse est enim unum esse ultimum finem hominis inquantum est homo, propter unitatem humanae naturae." It is in light of the double order of priority that the primary and secondary precepts of natural law, as explicated In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, must be understood. There, primary precepts bear upon man's generic nature which is first in the order of generation or essence, while secondary precepts pertain to man's specific nature which is first in the order of nature or dignity. Cf. Key-Text A, notes 23. See note 54 above. For further discussion on the the hierarchy of perfections in nature, see SCG IV, c. 11. For an analysis on the composite nature of man and the unity of human actions, see George Klubertanz, "The Unity of Human Activity," The Modern Schoolman 27 (1950), 75-103. For an application of the hierarchical ordination of human goods with respect to
Further, inasmuch as man's appetitive powers (both sensitive and intellectual) bear a natural determination to desiring and loving other sensible creatures (human and subhuman) as known, the perfection of the human existent is attained through actual (physical, sensual, and intellectual) communion with those creatures.

Let us summarize the above discussion on natural appetency in the following points:

1. Every nature (whether the nature of a substance or of an operative power) possesses a natural inclination (i.e., a determinate tendency) towards a certain operation or end.

2. Natural inclination can be non-cognitive (as in the case of chemicals and plants), sensitive (as in the case of animals which are inclined by sense appetites to particular goods as sensibly apprehended), or intellectual (as in the case of man who is inclined by will to the universal good according to the knowledge of sensible goods).

3. By virtue of his hylemorphic constitution, man possesses all three kinds of natural inclinations. Inasmuch as the lower inclinations are naturally subordinate to the higher inclinations, a corresponding hierarchy of human goods is established by which the various activities of the marriage, see Bernard Lonergan, "Finality, Love, Marriage," Theological Studies 4 (1943), 477-510; Paul Quay, "Contraception and Conjugal Love," Theological Studies 22 (1961), 18-40.
human existent are brought into line towards a unifying end—namely, the knowledge and love of God.

4. Man's appetitive powers (sensitive and intellectual) bear a determinate tendency towards the actual desire and love of sensible creatures—precisely as known; accordingly, the perfection of man's nature requires his actual communion with those creatures—as known and loved in the concrete world. 63

Proximate Context

Let us next take up St. Thomas' treatment of moral theology as found in the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae—in particular, De Lege (I-II; qq. 90-94); here, he considers the essence of law itself (q. 90), the

63 De Veritate, q. 27, a. 2, resp. (XXII-3, 794a): "Homo autem secundum naturam suam proportionatus est ad quendam finem, cuius habet naturalem appetitum; et secundum naturales vires operari potest ad consecutionem illius finis; qui finis est aliqua contemplatio divinorum, qualis est homini possibilis secundum facultatem naturae." Thus, while acknowledging a multiplicity of finite human goods (or ends), St. Thomas maintains that all such goods are reducible to one ultimate Good; see, for example, SCG III, c. 25 (XIV, 66b): "Nam etiam ipsae actiones ludicrae, quae videntur absque fine fieri, habent aliquem finem debitum, scilicet ut per eas quodammodo mente relevati, magis simus postmodum potentes ad studiosas operationes: alias esset semper ludendum, si ludus propter se quaeretetur, quod est inconveniens.... Est ergo cognitio divina finis ultimus omnis humanae conditiovis et operationis." See also SCG III, c. 37. Such a position stands squarely against the theory of incommensurable and irreducible human goods as proposed by Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle (see our Introduction, notes 37 and 38). For a comprehensive exposition of St. Thomas' doctrine of natural inclination, see Gustaf Gustafson, The Theory of Natural Appetency in the Philosophy of St. Thomas (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press), 1944.
different kinds of law (q. 91), the effects of law (q. 92), the eternal law (q. 93), and natural law (q. 94). Now, in the key-text discussion, "Utrum sit in nobis aliqua lex naturalis" (ST I-II, q. 91, a. 2), he presents three arguments denying that there is a natural law in man; his own response is preceded by this sed contra:

Concerning Rom. 2, 14, "When the Gentiles, who do not have the law, naturally (naturaliter) do those things that are of the law," the Gloss comments as follows: "Although they have no written law, they do have the natural law by which each one knows and is conscious of what is good and what is evil."

From this sed contra passage two important points can be derived:

1. According to natural law man knows what is good and what is evil.

2. Further, man is said to do naturally (naturaliter) those things that are of this law.

With respect, then, to the issue of natural law as innate, two questions concern us: (1) how is knowledge of natural law attained? (2) in what sense do human beings naturaliter ea quae legis sunt faciunt? With these questions in mind, we now turn to the key-text.

"ST I-II, q. 91, a. 2, sed contra (VII, 154a): "Sed contra est quod super illud [Rom. 2, 14], 'Cum gentes, quae legem non habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt faciunt,' dicit Glossa: Etsi non habent legem scriptam, habent tamen legem naturalem, qua quilibet intelligit, et sibi conscius est quid sit bonum et quid malum.'"
II. Key-Text B

Summa Theologiae q. 91, a. 2, resp.: "Utrum sit in nobis aliqua lex naturalis."

In his response to whether there is in us a natural law, St. Thomas asserts that man participates in the eternal law; this participation in the eternal law is none other than natural law:

[1] As was said above (q. 90, a. 1, ad 1), law, since it is a rule and measure, can be in something in two ways: in one way, as in the one regulating and measuring; in another way, as in that which is regulated and measured, since, inasmuch as it participates in something of the rule or measure, it is thus regulated and measured. Hence, since everything that is subject to divine providence is regulated and measured by eternal law, as is clear from what has been said (a. 1), it is evident that everything participates in some manner in the eternal law, inasmuch as, from the impression of eternal law, it has an inclination to its own proper acts and ends.

Sicut supra dictum est (q. 90, a. 1, ad 1), lex, cum sit regula et mensura, dupliciter potest esse in aliquo: uno modo sicut in regulante et mensurante; alio modo sicut in regulato et mensurato, quia inquantum participat aliquid de regula vel mensura, sic regulatur vel mensuratur. Unde cum omnia quae divinae providentiae subduntur, a lege aeterna regulentur et mensurentur, ut ex dictis (a. 1) patet; manifestum est quod omnia participant aliqualiter legem aeternam, inquantum scilicet ex impressione eius habent inclinationes in proprios actus et fines.

[2] Among all others, the rational creature is subject to divine providence in a more excellent way, inasmuch as it participates in providence by providing for itself and others. Hence, it participates in the eternal reason through which it has a natural inclination to its due act and end; and this sort of participation in the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law.
Inter caetera autem, rationalis creatura excellentiori quodam modo divinae providentiae subiacet, inquantum et ipsa fit providentiae particeps, sibi ipsi et aliis providens. Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna, per quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem. Et talis participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura lex naturalis dicitur.

Hence, after the Psalmist had said (Ps. 4, 6), 'Offer up a sacrifice of justice,' he adds, as though someone had asked what the works of justice are, 'Many say, Who shows us good things?' He answers this question by saying, 'The light of your countenance, Lord, is signed upon us,' as though the light of natural reason, by which we discern what is good and what is evil—which pertains to the natural law—is nothing other than an impression in us of the divine light. And from this it is evident that the natural law is nothing other than a participation in the eternal law in the rational creature."

Unde cum Psalmista dixisset (Ps. 4, 6), 'Sacrificate sacrificium iustitiae,' quasi quibusdam quaerentibus quae sunt iustitiae opera, subiungit: 'Multi dicunt, Quis ostendit nobis bona?' cui quaestioni respondens, dicit: 'Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine:' quasi lumen rationis naturalis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum et quid malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit quam impressio luminis divini in nobis. Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura."

III. Commentary

Movement of Thought

Let us summarize St. Thomas' movement of thought in the following points:

1. There is a distinction between (a) law in the one
regulating and measuring--namely, the lawgiver and (b) law in the one regulated and measured.

2. That which participates in something of the law is said to be regulated and measured by the law.

3. Every creature subject to divine providence is governed by eternal law; hence, every creature participates in some manner in the eternal law inasmuch as, from an impression of eternal law, it has an inclination to its own proper acts and ends (see [1] above).

4. The rational creature participates in eternal law not simply through natural inclination, but in a more excellent manner--namely, by discerning what is good and evil, and governing himself and others according to the light of natural reason; this light is an impression in us of the divine light.

5. This (twofold) participation in eternal law by the rational creature is called natural law.

65 ST I-II, q. 97, a. 3, resp. (VII, 191a): "Omnis lex profiscitur a ratione et voluntate legislatoris." See also note 57 below.

66 See [1] and [2] above. The two above points are summed up in ST I-II, q. 91, a. 6, resp. (VII, 157b): "...lex essentialiter invenitur in regulante et mensurante, participative autem in eo quod mensuratur et regulatur." Ibid., q. 92, a. 1, resp. (VII, 159a): "...lex nihil aliud est quam dictamen rationis in praesidente quo subditi gubernantur."

67 See [3] above. This twofold participation in Eternal Law by man is similarly expressed in the discussion, Utrum omnes res humanae subscribantur legi aeternae, ST I-II, q. 93, a. 6, resp. (VII, 166b): "...duplex est modus quo aliquid subditur legi aeternae, ut ex supra dictis patet.
Natural Law as Human Nature

What, then, can be said of St. Thomas' doctrine of natural law as stated in the key-text? Note first that he identifies natural law here with (1) human nature and its operative powers (i.e., the light of natural reason and the will--both of which possess natural appetites) and (2) the operations of those natural powers respectively (i.e.,

[Ibid., a. 5]: uno modo, inquantum participatur lex aeternae per modum cognitionis; alio modo, per modum actionis et passionis, inquantum participatur per modum interioris principii motivi. Et hoc secundo modo subduntur legi aeternae irrationales creaturae, ut dictum est [ibid]. Sed quia rationalis natura cum eo quod est commune omnibus creaturis, habet aliquid sibi proprium inquantum est rationalis, ideo secundum utrumque modum legi aeternae subditur: quia et notionem legis aeternae aliquo modo habet, ut supra dictum est [Ibid., a. 2]; et iterum unicuique rationali creaturae inest naturalis inclinatio ad id quod est consonum legi aeternae; 'sumus enim innati ad habendum virtutes,' ut dicitur in Ethic. [II, 1 (1103a25)]."

The distinction between reason and inclination according to (1) that which measures and rules and (2) that which is measured and ruled is more forcefully stated in ST I-II, q. 90, a. 1, ad 1 (VII, 149b): "...cum lex sit regula quaedam et mensura, dicitur duplicitur esse in aliquo. Uno modo sicut in mensurante et regulante. Et quia hoc est proprium rationis, ideo per hunc modum lex est in ratione sola. Alio modo sicut in regulato et mensurato. Et sic lex est in omnibus quae inclinatur in aliquid ex aliqua lege: ita quod quaelibet inclinatio proveniens ex aliqua lege, potest dici lex non essentialiter, sed quasi participative." Although participation in eternal law through natural inclination is per modum obedientiae (see ST I-II, q. 93, a. 5, ad 2 (VII, 166b), such participation is nevertheless both active as well as passive ("per modum actionis et passionis, inquantum participatur per modum interioris principii motivi"). On the active-passive distinction between natural reason and natural inclination, see D. O'Donoghue, "The Thomist Concept of Natural Law, 92-95; Joseph Collins, "Aquinas and Law: Law a Function of Reason," Irish Theological Quarterly 18 (1951), 220-37.
discernment, desire, and providence). The identification of natural law with human nature and its operative powers corresponds with the previously cited contextual statements—i.e.: natural law is implanted in man as part of his nature ("quasi pertinens ad naturam humanam"); through the capacity of human nature ("capacitas humanae naturae"), man participates in eternal law (see notes 40 and 41 above). In those passages, as well as in the passages on divine providence (see notes 37 and 38 above), the term impressio refers to the very nature of the human creature as given to him by God. This identification of natural law with a power proper to human nature is stated again in the prologue to In Duo Praecepta Caritatis et in Decem Legis Praecepta (ca. 1273):

[The natural law] is nothing other than the intellectual light implanted in us by God, whereby we understand what must be done and what must be avoided. God gave this light and this law to man at creation.

Inasmuch as natural law here is identified as the lumen

Admittedly, St. Thomas does not here explicitly identify the will and its corresponding natural inclination; nor does he presently distinguish the will as an operative power from its respective operation—namely, desire or love.

See In Duo Praecepta Caritatis et in Decem Legis Praecepta, Prologus: (Parma XVI, 97a): "[Lex naturae] nihil aliud est nisi lumen intellectus insitum nobis a Deo, per quod cognoscimus quid agendum et quid vitandum. Hoc lumen et hanc legem dedit Deus homini in creatione." See ST I, q. 88, a. 3, ad 1 (V, 386b), where St. Thomas identifies the light of natural reason as "nihil aliud est quam quaedam impressio veritatis primae." Cf. ibid., q. 12, a. 2, resp.
intellectus, it is equated primarily with the natural constitution of man qua intellectual—and secondarily with natural law knowledge and his intellectual operations which necessarily involve the sensible world as the extramental and content-determining-cause of human cognition. 

70 Natural law, as equated with human nature itself, is tantamount to man's natural capacity or aptitude for attaining his proper end. This natural capacity is ultimately ordered to God Himself:

Since man is said to be to the image of God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is most to the image of God according to that in which he can most imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands and love Himself. Therefore, the image of 

70ST II-II, q. 8, a. 1, resp. (VIII, 66b): "...cum cognitio hominis a sensu incipiit quasi ab exteriori." It is evidently with respect to the very nature of the human person that St. Thomas speaks of natural law as habitually present in a child; see ST I-II, q. 94, a. 1, ad contra (VII, 168b): "...puer non potest uti habitu intellectus principiorum, vel etiam lege naturali, quae ei habitualiter inest propter defectum aetatis." Actual knowledge of natural law, however, must be attained through sensible experience and reasoning. On this, see Key-Text A, notes 34 and 36; De Veritate q. 11, a. 1, ad 12; ibid., aa. 2 and 3. Hence, if the above statement concerning a child indicates that natural law is in some sense inborn in a human being according to the capacity and aptitude of human nature (see notes 41 above and 71 below), the same statement also makes it clear that natural law knowledge, for St. Thomas, does not consist in innate or a priori ideas. Indeed, many years of sensible experience are required before a child attains a certain level of reasoning and actually formulates the first principles of natural law as per se nota. On this, see Lawrence Dewan, "St. Thomas, Ideas, and Immediate Knowledge," Dialogue 18 (1979), 392-404; Maria Theresa Carl, "The First Principles of Natural Law: A Study of the Moral Theories of Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas," Ph.D. diss., Marquette University, 1989.
God may be considered in man... inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men.⁷¹

The point we wish to stress from the above statement is that natural law is proximately rooted in man's God-given nature precisely as a capacity or an aptitude for his end. Note in this case, however, that the term nature is not taken by St. Thomas merely as a quiddity or static essence according to which man is what he is; primarily and properly, nature for St. Thomas means substance (constituted of form and matter): as such, it is the intrinsic principle of movement, whether such movement be actual or

⁷¹ST I, q. 93, a. 4, resp. (V, 404b): "...cum homo secundum intellectualem naturam ad imaginem Dei esse dicatur, secundum hoc est maxime ad imaginem Dei secundum quod intellectualis natura Deum maxime imitari potest. Imitatur autem intellectualis natura maxime Deum quantum ad hoc, quod Deus seipsam intelligit et amat. Unde imago Dei tripliciter potest considerari in homini: uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo habet aptitudinem naturalem ad intelligendum et amandum Deum: et haec aptitudo consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quae est communis omnibus hominibus; alio modo, secundum quod homo actu vel habitu Deum cognoscit et amat, sed tamen imperfecte; et haec est imago per conformitatem gratiae; tertio modo, secundum quod homo Deum actu cognoscit et amat perfecte; et sic attenditur imago secundum similitudinem gloriae." See also the Prologue of ST I-II; ST I, q. 93, a. 8, resp. (V, 411a): "Et sic imago Dei attenditur in anima secundum quod fertur, vel nata est ferri in Deum." On this, see In I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, sol.; q. 3, a. 1, ad 3; In II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3. Hence, contrary to the opinions of Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle (see our Introduction, notes 46-48), natural law for St. Thomas does indeed direct man towards his ultimate and supernatural end.
potential.

Nor is nature for St. Thomas only the power to act as an agent; it is also the capacity to receive the action of another agent. Having said this, three related points must be stressed: (1) inasmuch as it is a capacity or aptitude, human nature requires further actuation for its perfection; (2) while God is the ultimate end of man, knowledge of God can only be attained through the knowledge
of creatures (see note 23 above); (3) man is also a social animal who is ordered by his nature to live in communion with other human persons in the sensible world.75 Hence, inasmuch as a human person must, by the necessity of his nature (qua rational and animal), attain his perfection through actual involvement with other sensible existents, so natural law pertains to (1) human nature (qua active potency) as oriented towards its proper end (perfection), and (2) the natural operations of knowing and willing vis-à-vis other (human and subhuman) existents in the sensible world. Let us take a closer look, then, at these natural operations through which man exists in actual relation with other creatures in order to understand in what way St. Thomas considers natural law to be (or not to be) innate.

75SCG III, c. 85 (XIV, 255b): "...homo naturaliter est animal politicum vel sociale." Ibid., c. 129 (XIV, 394a): "Est autem homini naturale quod sit animal sociale.... Ea igitur sine quibus societas humana conservari non potest, sunt homini naturaliter convenientia. Huiusmodi autem sunt, unicumque quod suum est conservare, et ab iniuriis abstinere." Note here that man is not an intellectual creature simply, but a rational animal: "homo naturaliter est animal." See also ST II-II, q. 109, a. 3, ad 1; q. 114, a. 2, ad 1. In this connection, see notes 97-99 below. As a corporeal creature, then, man must attain his perfection through active engagement with other material creatures in the physical world. Hence, for St. Thomas, the natural order and the physical sciences constitute part of the fabric of man's moral life; see note 86 below; see also Odon Lottin, "Les premiers exposés scolastiques sur la loi éternelle," Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses XIV (1937), 298-301. Contrast St. Thomas' view of natural law with that of A. P. d'Entreves: "The notion of natural law which [Entreves] discusses is a notion which refers to human behavior, not to physical phenomena. Our concern is with ethics and politics, not with the natural sciences." Natural Law: An Historical Survey (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 7.
Natural Law qua Cognitio

What can be said of natural law per modem cognitionis (see note 58 above)? In ST I-II, q. 63, a. 1, resp., St. Thomas tells us that in man’s reason there are to be found naturally present (naturaliter insunt) certain naturally known (naturaliter cognita) principles of both knowledge and (moral) action. However, inasmuch as a natural law principle is a cognitio, it is based upon knowledge of the good as rooted in the apprehension of being (ens); in turn, man’s knowledge of being is derived from the consideration of material existents ("ens et verum consideratum in rebus materialibus"), from which he acquires knowledge of all other things ("et quibus in cognitionem

76ST I-II, q. 63, a. 1, resp. (VI, 372b): "...in ratione hominis insunt naturaliter quaedam principia naturaliter cognita tam scibilium quam agendorum, quae sunt quaedam seminalia intellectualium virtutum et moralium."

77See ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2, resp. (VII, 170a): "Sicut autem ens est primum quod cadit in apprehensione simpliciter, ita bonum est primum quod cadit in apprehensione practicae rationis, quae ordinatur ad opus: omne enim agens agit propter finem, qui habet rationem boni. Et ideo primum principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra rationem boni, quae est, 'Bonum est quod omnia appetunt.' Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod 'bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum.' Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia praecepta legis naturae: ut scilicet omnia illa facienda vel vitanda pertineant ad praecepta legis naturae, quae ratio practica naturaliter apprehendit esse bona humana." In this connection, see ST I, q. 5, a. 1, resp. (IV, 56a): "...bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem: sed bonum dicit rationem appetibilis...."
Hence, in speaking of natural law principles as naturally present (naturaliter insunt) in man, St. Thomas does not mean that man has innate or a priori knowledge of such principles; rather, inasmuch as all knowledge has its origin in the apprehension of material existents (as content-determining-causes, plus the cognitive faculties as efficient causes), it follows a fortiori that knowledge of natural law principles must properly be considered an acquired knowledge.

What, then, does St. Thomas mean when he says that natural law principles are naturaliter cognita? In a related discussion, "Utrum aliquis habitus sit a natura" (ST I-II, q. 51, a. 1), he tells us that something may be called

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78 See note 8 above; ST I, q. 87, a. 3, ad 1 (V, 361b): "...objectum intellectus est commune quodddam, scilicet ens et verum, sub quo comprehenditur etiam ipse actus intelligendi. Unde intellectus potest suum actum intelligere. Sed non primo: quia nec primum objectum intellectus nostri secundum praesentem statum, est quodlibet ens et verum; sed ens et verum consideratum in rebus materialibus [Ibid., q. 84, a. 7]; ex quibus in cognitionem omnium aliorum devenit." Since the notion of good is founded on the notion of being—as derived from the apprehension of sensible existents—there is no epistemological chasm for St. Thomas between practical reason, speculative reason, and the concrete world of existing natures. See ST I, q. 79, a. 11, ad 2 (V, 279b): "...objectum intellectus practici est bonum ordinabile ad opus sub ratione veri. Intellectus enim practicus veritatem cognoscit, sicut speculativus; sed veritatem cognitam ordinat ad opus." Ibid., sed contra (V, 278a): "...intellectus speculativus per extensionem fit practicus. Una autem potentia non mutatur in aliam. Ergo intellectus speculativus et practicus non sunt diversae potentiae." On the organic unity between practical reason and speculative reason—as rooted in the reality of existing beings—see John Hartnett, "Truth, the Aid, Not the Obstacle to Virtue," Franciscan Studies 18 (1958), 9-35; G. Klubertanz, "The Unity of Human Activity," 75-103.
natural in two ways: first, because it is entirely from the nature [of an existent]; secondly, because it is partly from the [intrinsic] nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle." He then applies this twofold distinction of the "natural" with respect to natural habitus in man:

There are, therefore, in man certain natural habitus, owing their existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic principle: in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a natural habitus by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature, and in respect of the individual nature. This happens with regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus, the understanding of first principles (intellectus principiorum) is called a natural habitus. For it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part; and in like manner with regard to other such principles. Yet, what is a whole and what is a part, this he cannot known except through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms; and for this reason, the Philosopher at the end of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses."

79 ST I-II, q. 51, a. 1, resp. (VI, 325a): "...potest dici aliquid naturale dupliciter: uno modo, quia totum est a natura; alio modo, quia secundum aliquid est a natura, et secundum aliquid est ab exteriori principio. Sicut cum aliquis sanatur per se ipsum, tota sanitas est a natura: cum autem aliquis sanatur auxilio medicinae, sanitas partim est a natura, partim ab exteriori principio."

80 Ibid., (VI, 325b): "Sunt ergo in hominibus aliqui habitus naturales, tanquam partim a naturae existentes, et partim ab exteriori principio; aliter quidem in apprehensivis potentiiis, et aliter in appetitivis. In apprehensivis enim potentiiis potest esse habitus naturalis secundum inchoationem, et secundum naturam speciei et secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, ex parte ipsius animae: sicut intellectus principiorum dicitur esse habitus naturalis. Ex ipsa enim natura animae intellectualis convenit homini quod statim, cognito quid est..."
Since the knowledge of first principles comes to us from the apprehension of sensible existents, the \textit{intellectus principiorum} is not said to be a \textit{habitus} entirely from nature; for man is unlike the angels who have intelligible species naturally implanted in them ("habent species intelligibiles naturaliter inditas").\footnote{ST I-II, q. 51, a. 1, resp. (VI, 325b): "Sed tamen neutro modo [i.e., neither with respect to man’s specific nature nor according to his individual nature] contingit in hominibus esse habitus naturales, ita quod sint totaliter a natura. In angelis siquidem contingit, eo quod \textit{habent species intelligibiles naturaliter inditas}: quod non \textit{competit humanae naturae}...." Inasmuch as intelligible species are naturally implanted (\textit{naturaliter inditas}) in angels, angelic knowledge is \textit{acquired} from an extrinsic cause--namely, from God, and not from creatures. See ST I, q. 55, a. 2, resp. (V, 56a): "...ideo suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequuntur per intelligibilem effluxum, quo a Deo species rerum cognitarum acceperunt simul cum}

totum et quid est pars, cognoscat quod omne totum est maius sua parte; et simile est in caeteris. Sed quid sit totum et quid sit pars, cognoscere non potest nisi per \textit{species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus acceptas}. Et propter hoc Philosophus, in fine \textit{Posteriorum [II, 15 (100a3)]}, ostendit quod \textit{cognitio principiorum provenit nobis ex sensu}." In this connection, see note 33 above; \textit{De Veritate}, q. 16, a. 1, resp. In ST I-II, q. 51, a. 1, resp. (as cited above), St. Thomas distinguishes man’s specific nature as the intellectual soul itself--precisely as intellectual (including the powers of intellect and will)--as opposed to his individual nature which is identified with his sensitive (animal) powers; on this, see note 38 above. Regarding the content of knowledge as determined by intelligible species (\textit{id quo intelligit intellectus}), see notes 12-18 and 24 above. For further explanation of the intellectual habitus, see Vernon Bourke, "The Role of Habitus in the Thomistic Metaphysics of Potency and Act," in Essays in Thomism, ed. Robert E. Brennan (Freeport, N. Y.: Books For Libraries Press, 1972), 103-109; "Intellectual Memory in the Thomistic Theory of Knowledge," \textit{Modern Schoolman} 18 (1941), 21-24; Joseph Romero, "Between Being and Nothingness: The Relevancy of Thomistic Habit," \textit{The Thomist} 44 (1980), 427-40; Richard Lambert, "Habitual Knowledge of the Soul in Thomas Aquinas," \textit{The Modern Schoolman} 60 (1982), 1-19.

\footnote{ST I-II, q. 51, a. 1, resp. (VI, 325b): "Sed tamen neutro modo [i.e., neither with respect to man’s specific nature nor according to his individual nature] contingit in hominibus esse habitus naturales, ita quod sint totaliter a natura. In angelis siquidem contingit, eo quod \textit{habent species intelligibiles naturaliter inditas}: quod non \textit{competit humanae naturae}...." Inasmuch as intelligible species are naturally implanted (\textit{naturaliter inditas}) in angels, angelic knowledge is \textit{acquired} from an extrinsic cause--namely, from God, and not from creatures. See ST I, q. 55, a. 2, resp. (V, 56a): "...ideo suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequuntur per intelligibilem effluxum, quo a Deo species rerum cognitarum acceperunt simul cum}
maintains that the agent intellect is not a habitus of indemonstrable principles; rather, we come to know such principles by abstraction from singular things. And even when he speaks of the intellectual light as "a participated likeness of the uncreated light in which are contained the eternal reasons," he explains that these eternal reasons are known in the intellectual light just as we might say that we see in the sun what we see by the sun. Accordingly, the

intellectuali natura." Ibid., ad 1 (V, 56a): "...in mente angeli sunt similitudines creaturarum, non quidem ab ipsis creaturis acceptae, sed a Deo, qui est creaturarum cause, et in quo primo similitudines rerum existunt." By virtue of his composite nature, man, however, must (naturally) acquire intelligible species, not directly from God, but rather from sensible creatures. See ibid., resp. (V, 56a):

"...inferiores substantiae intellectivae, scilicet animae humanae, habent potentiam intellectivam non completam naturaliter; sed completur in eis successive, per hoc quod accipiant species intelligibiles a rebus." See also ibid., q. 51, a. 1; q. 54, a. 1; q. 84, a. 3; q. 85, a. 1; De Veritate, q. 8, a. 1. In this connection, see notes 7 and 33 above and our Recapitulation section below.

82 D. Q. de Anima (ca. 1269-70), a. 5, resp. (Parma VIII, 480a): "Quidam vero crediderunt, intellectum agentem non esse aliud quam habitum principiorum indemonstrabilium in nobis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia etiam ipsa principia indemonstrabilia cognoscimus abstrahendo a singularibus, ut docet Philosophus in 1 Poster."

83ST I, q. 84, a. 5, resp. (V, 322a-b): "Cum ergo quaeircitur utrum anima humana in rationibus aeternis omnia cognoscat, dicendum est quod aliquid in aliquo dicitur cognosci dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut in obiecto cognito; sicut aliquid videt in speculo ea quorum imagines in speculo resultant. Et hoc modo anima in statu praesentis vitae, non potest videre omnia in rationibus aeternis... Alio modo dicitur aliquid cognosci in aliquo sicut in cognitionis principio; sicut si dicamus quod in sole videntur ea quae videntur per solem. Et sic necesse est dicere quod anima humana omnia cognoscat in rationibus aeternis, per quarum participationem omnia cognoscimus. Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale, quod est in nobis, nihil est aliud quam
light of our intellect is not the object it understands, but the medium whereby it understands."

**quiaedam participata similitudo luminis increati, in quo continentur rationes aeternae.**" Ibid., q. 88, a. 3, ad 1 (V, 368b): "Unde cum ipsum lumen intellectus nostri non se habeat ad intellectum nostrum sicut quod intelligitur, sed sicut quo intelligitur...." Concerning the light of natural reason described as a similitudo increatae veritatis, see De Veritate, q. 10, a. 8, resp.; a. 11, ad 12; q. 11, a. 1, resp.; ST I, q. 87, a. 1, resp.; ST I-II, q. 19, a. 5, ad 3; q. 93, a. 2, resp.; q. 109, a. 1, resp. and ad 2. Cf. note 60 above. See also In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 5, sol. (Parma VI, 43a): "Alio tamen modo, [intellectus or intuim] secundum Philosophos, intellegitur quod anima semper se intelligit, eo quod omne quod intelligitur, non intelligitur nisi illustratum lumine intellectus agentis, et receptum in intellectu possibili. Unde sicut in omni colore videtur lumen corporale, ita in omni intelligibili videtur lumen intellectus agentis; non tamem in ratione objecti sed in ratione medii cognoscendi."

"ST I, q. 88, a. 3, ad 1 (V, 386b): "...ipsurn lumen intellectus nostri non se habeat ad intellectum nostrum sicut quod intelligitur, sed sicut quo intelligitur." Such a doctrine of knowledge stands opposed to that professed by Karl Rahner who denies that cognitional determination comes originally from sense perception. Even in his rendering of Thomistic epistemology, he states that "the formal structure of [sense] judgment--and with more reason the structure and the content of universal judgments and especially of metaphysical judgments--cannot be grounded in the evidence of sense perception." See "Aquinas: The Nature of Truth," Continuum 2 (1964), 65. Presumably, for Rahner, St. Thomas teaches that there is an a priori determination as provided by the light of the agent intellect itself: "St. Thomas does not see such a principle, in the line of Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, Bonaventure, Malebranche, in an objective a priori...but in the line of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel, he sees it in a formal a priori of the spontaneous spirit itself.... Its basis, speaking in the manner of St. Thomas, is the light of the intelligence itself, which informs, objectifies, conceptualizes, and judges the data from sense cognition." (Ibid., 65) "This light is the a priori form under which the spontaneity of the spirit perceives the material sensible." (Ibid., 67) For a similar interpretation of a priori determination in Aquinas, see Victor Preller, Divine Science and the Science of God: A Reformulation of Thomas Aquinas (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1967). For a critique of Preller’s interpretation of
Thus, when St. Thomas states that the first principles of practical reason are naturally present (naturaliter insunt) to reason and naturally known (naturaliter cognita), he means that (1) such principles are derived from both (a) extrinsic content-determining-causes of knowledge (namely, sensible existents) and (b) intrinsic efficient causes (primarily the light of natural reason) by virtue of which (2) we can recognize causal relationships in the sensible world, understand the meaning of an end, the ordination of actions to an end,\(^85\) and, accordingly, discern what is good and what is evil ("quo discernimus quid sit bonum et quid malum").\(^86\) The attainment of man’s end according to St. Thomas, see Leo Sweeney, Christian Philosophy, 537-60.

\(^{85}\) On this, see section [3] above; see also Key-Text A, section [3], notes 10, 30-31, 46, 67-69. See note 71 above with respect to the natural capacity and aptitude of the human mind as imago Dei to come to know and love God as final End and Beatitude. See ST I-II, q. 6, a. 2, resp. (VI, 57b): "Perfecta quidem finis cognitio est quando non solum apprehenditur res quae est finis, sed etiam cognoscitur ratio finis, et proportio eius quod ordinatur ad finem ipsum. Et talis cognition finis competit soli rationali naturae." De Veritate, q. 22, a, 2, resp. (XXII-3, 617a): "Unde sola rationalis natura potest secundarios fines in ipsum Deum per quamdam viam resolutionis inducere, ut sic ipsum Deum explicite appetat. Et sicut in demonstrativis scientiis non recte sumitur conclusio nisi per resolutionem in prima principia; ita appetitus creaturae rationalis non est rectus nisi per appetitum explicite ipsius Dei, actu vel habitu."

\(^{86}\) With regard to the discernment of good and evil, see ST I-II, q. 18, a. 5, resp. (VI, 131b): "In actibus autem bonum et malum dicitur per comparationem ad rationem: quia, ut Dionysius dicit [De Div. Nom., IV, 32 (PG 3, 732), 'bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse, malum autem quod est praeter rationem.' Unicuique enim rei est bonum quod convenit ei secundum suam formam; et malum quod est ei
knowledge which, in turn, depends upon both intrinsic (efficient) and extrinsic (content-determining) causes, is summarized in the *Compendium Theologiae*, c. 104 ("Quis sit finis intellectualis creaturae"):

> Our intellect has a natural potency with regard to certain intelligible objects—namely, those that can be reduced to act by the agent intellect. We possess this faculty as an innate principle that enables us to understand in actuality. However, we cannot attain our ultimate end by the actuation of our intellect through the instrumentality of the agent intellect [alone]. For the function of the agent intellect consists in rendering actually intelligible the phantasms that of themselves are only potentially intelligible. These phantasms are derived from the senses. Hence, the efficacy of the agent intellect in reducing our intellect to act is restricted to intelligible objects of which we can gain knowledge by way of sense perception.  

praeter ordinem suae formae. Patet ergo quod differentia boni et mali circa obiectum considerata, comparatur per se ad rationem: scilicet secundum quod obiectum est ei conveniens vel non conveniens. Dicuntur autem aliqui actus humani, vel morales, secundum quod sunt a ratione. Unde manifestum est quod bonum et malum diversificant speciem in actibus moralibus: differentiae enim per se diversificant speciem." In II Ethic., lect. 2, n. 257 (Marietti, 74): "Cuius ratio est, quia bonum cuiuslibet rei est in hoc quod sua operatio sit conveniens suae formae. Propria autem forma hominis est secundum quam est animal rationale. Unde oportet quod operatio hominis sit bona ex hoc quod est secundum rationem rectam. Perversitas enim rationis repugnat naturae rationis." In this connection, Fr. Rousselot states that "intelligence, being the faculty of the real, refuses to acknowledge a moral order that would have no affinities with the order of being; on last analysis, it must refuse to differentiate between judgments of value and judgments of reality." The Intellectualism of St. Thomas, tr. James O'Mahony (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1953), 9. See also notes 75 above and 95, 99, and 129 below.

87 *Compendium Theologiae* (ca. 1269-73; the precise date is uncertain) c. 104 (Parma XVI, 27b): "Est enim intellectus noster in potentia naturali respectu quorumdam intelligibilium, quae scilicet reduci possunt in actum per
More remains to be said regarding natural law knowledge; but first we must look at natural law with respect to the natural operation of the appetitive power.

**Natural Law qua Naturalis Inclinatio**

Further in the same discussion on natural habitus (ST I-II, q. 51, a. 1; see notes 79-81 above), St. Thomas considers the habitus proper to the appetitive powers:

In the appetitive powers, however, no habitus is natural in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the habit; but only as to certain of its principles, as, for instance, the principles of common law (principia iuris communis) are called the seeds of virtues (seminalia virtutum). The reason for this is that the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning (inchoatio) of a habitus, does not belong to the habitus, but rather to the very nature of the appetitive powers. 88

intellectum agentem, qui est principium innatum nobis, ut per ipsum efficiamur intelligentes in actu. Est autem impossibile nos ultimum finem consequi per hoc quod intellectus noster sic reducatur in actum: nam virtus intellectus agentis est ut phantasmata, quae sunt intelligibilia in potentia, faciat intelligibilia in actu, ut ex superioribus patet. Phantasmata autem sunt accepta per sensum. Per intellectum igitur agentem intellectus noster in actum reducitur respectu horum intelligibilium tantum in quorum notitiam per sensibilia possimus devenire." In this connection, see notes 13, 16 and 17 above.

88 ST I-II, q. 51, a. 1, resp. (VI, 326b): "In appetitivis autem potentii non est aliquis habitus naturalis secundum inchoationem, ex parte ipsius animae, quantum ad ipsam substantiam habitus: sed solum quantum ad principia quaedam ipsius, sicut principia iuris communis dicuntur esse seminalia virtutum. Et hoc ideo, quia inclinatio ad obiecta propria, quae videtur esse inchoatio habitus, non pertinet ad habitum, sed magis pertinet ad ipsam rationem potentiarum." With regard to first principles as seeds of virtues, see ST I-II, q. 63, a. 1, resp.
What does this passage reveal with respect to the appetitive powers and the principles of common (i.e., natural) law? First, it should be emphasized that such principles, taken precisely from the aspect of knowledge, do not belong to the nature of the appetitive powers as such; rather, these principles—whose contents have been derived from sensible experience (see notes 80-82 above)—are presented to the will by the intellect. Indeed, there is no natural habitus proper to the will in its beginning; but what is wholly natural to the appetitive power is its own natural inclination (qua voluntas) towards its proper objects—as known through sensible experience and proposed

89 See notes 8, 68 and 71 above; ST I-II, q. 90, a. 2, resp. (VII, 150a): "...lex pertinet ad id quod est principium humanorum actuum, ex eo quod est regula et mensura. Primum autem principium in operativis, quorum est ratio practica, est finis ultimus." SCG III, (XIV, 336b): "...voluntas tendat in bonum intellectum naturaliter, sicut in proprium obiectum et finem...." ST I-II, q. 9, a. 1, resp. (VI, 74b): "Bonum autem in communi, quod habet rationem finis, est obiectum voluntatis." Ibid., q. 19, a. 3, resp. (VI, 144a): "Obiectum autem voluntatis proponitur ei per rationem. Nam bonum intellectus est obiectum voluntatis proportionatum ei...quia voluntas potest tendere in bonum universale, quod ratio apprehendit." Ibid., ad 1 (VI, 144b): "...appetitus voluntatis non potest esse de bono, nisi prius a ratione apprehendatur." Ibid., q. 27, a. 2, resp. (VI, 193a): "Bonum autem non est obiectum appetitus, nisi prout est apprehensum." ST I, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1; q. 82, a. 4, resp. and ad 3; q. 87, a. 4, resp.; ST II-II, q. 4, a. 7, resp.; De Malo q. 6, a. 1; SCG IV, c. 19. With regard to the principles of (practical) reason as proper to a habitus of the intellect, and not to the will, see De Veritate, q. 10, a. 9, ad 1 in contra.
to the will by the intellect. Secondly and correlativey, those *principia iuris communis* which the intellect discerns and presents to the will are understood as natural inasmuch as they are naturally willed by man according to his human nature:

[In one sense], that is said to be natural to a thing which befits according to its substance; and this is that which of itself is in a thing. Now, all things that do not exist of themselves are reduced to something which does exist of itself, as to their principle. Therefore, taking nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing be a natural principle. This is evident with respect to the intellect, for the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like manner, the principle of voluntary movements must be something naturally willed. Now this is the good in general, namely, that to which the will tends naturally, just as each power tends to its object; and again it is the last end, which stands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles

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90 See note 79 above; ST I-II, q. 62, a. 3, ad 1 (VI, 403b): "...intellectus indiget speciebus intelligibililibus, per quas intelligat: et ideo oportet quod in eo ponatur aliquis habitus naturalis superadditus potentiae. Sed ipsa natura voluntatis sufficit ad naturalem ordinem in finem, sive quantum ad intentionem finis, sive quantum ad conformitatem ad ipsum." ST I, q. 60, a. 2, resp. (V, 100b): "Unde voluntas naturaliter tendit in suum finem ultimum: omnis enim homo naturaliter vult beatitudinem. Et ex hac naturali voluntate causantur omnes aliae voluntates [for particular goods; see Key-Text A, notes 38-39], cum quidquid homo vult, velit propter finem. Direclicio igitur boni quod homo naturaliter vult sicut finem, est dilectio naturalis." ST I-II, q. 10, a. 1, resp. (VI, 83b): "Non enim per voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam voluntatis, sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias et ad totum hominem. Unde naturaliter homo vult non solum objectum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae conveniunt alis potentiiis; ut cognitionem veri, quae convenit intellectui; et esse et vivere, et huiusmodi alia, quae respicient consistentiam naturalem; quae omnia comprehenduntur sub objecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona." See also ibid, ad 3.
of demonstrations to things intelligible; and, speaking generally, it is all those things which are suitable to the one willing according to his nature. 91

The good in general, as well as all those goods which

91ST I-II, q. 10, a. 1, resp. (VI, 83a): "secundum [uno modo], illud dicitur esse naturale rei, quod convenit ei secundum suam substantiam. Et hoc est quod per se inest rei. In omnibus autem, ea quae non per se insunt, reducuntur in aliquid quod per se inest, sicut in principium. Et ideo necesse est quod, hoc modo accipiendo naturam, semper principium in his quaee conveniunt rei, sit naturale. Et hoc manifeste apparat in intellectu: nam principia intellectualis cognitionis sunt naturaliter nota. Similiter etiam principium motuum voluntariorum oportet esse aliquid naturaliter volitum. Hoc est bonum in communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibet potentia in suum objectum: et etiam ipse finis ultimus, qui hoc modo se habet in appetibilitibus, sicut prima principia demostrationum in intelligibilibus: et universaliter omnia illa quae conveniunt volenti secundum suam naturam."

Regarding the correspondence between a nature and its proper object, see ibid, ad 3. See also ST I, q. 82, a. 1, resp. (V, 293b): "...sicut dicitur aliquid naturale, quia est secundum inclinationem naturae, ita dicitur aliquid voluntarium quia est secundum inclinationem voluntatis.... Sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo: finis enim se habet in operativis sicut principium in speculativis, ut dicitur [Aristotle, Phys., II, 9 (200a21)]. Oportet enim quod illud quod naturaliter alciui convenit et immobile, sit fundamentum et principium omnium aliorum: quia natura rei est primum in unoquaque, et omnis motus procedit ab alioqu immobili [namely, the ultimate end]." St. Thomas sometimes speaks of man's natural inclination for the good as an instinctus; see ST I, q. 113, a. 1, ad 3 (V, 525b): "...sicut homines a naturali instinctu boni...." Ibid., q. 19, a. 10, resp. (IV, 248a): "Non enim ad liberum arbitrium pertinet quod volumus esse felices, sed ad naturalem instinctum." See ST III, q. 60, a. 6, ad 3, where the law of nature, prior to the Fall, is identified as an interior instinctus. Regarding man's appetitive power as rooted in the substantial form of man, see Key-Text A, note 43; ST I-II, q. 63, a. 1. In this connections, see William O'Connor, "The Natural Desire for God in St. Thomas," The New Scholasticism 14 (1940), 213-67; "The Natural Desire for Happiness," The Modern Schoolman 26 (1949) 91-119; "Natural Appetite," The Thomist 16 (1953), 361-409.
are suitable to man according to his nature, are natural to
man in the sense that they are willed naturally—that is,
according to human nature. A correspondence or proportion is
thus observed between (1) the good (and goods) as known, (2)
natural law principles—the knowledge of which is derived
from sense experience—and (2) human nature itself—as
marked by man’s natural inclination (through his appetitive
powers) towards those goods which befit his human nature.
Before we seek to account for this correspondence, let us
underscore three points from the above discussion:

1. While the intellect of man is in some way formally
determined by the sensible objects which it knows, his
natural appetency is determined towards certain operations
according to the very nature of his appetitive powers
(sensitive and intellectual—i.e., the will) towards certain
goods-as-known.

2. While intrinsically determined by nature towards
certain goods—the principal of which is the common good—
man’s will (qua appetitive power) depends upon the intellect
for the apprehension of, and actual desire for, such goods
(see notes 45-46, 57, 77 and 89 above).

3. Natural law principles are natural to man inasmuch
as they bear a correspondence to his natural inclination
towards certain human goods.

St. Thomas incorporates these three points in his
response to the question, "Utrum lex naturalis sit una apud
omnes" (ST I-II, q. 94, a. 3):

To the natural law belongs everything to which man is inclined according to his nature (secundum suam naturam). However, each thing is naturally inclined to the operation that is proper to it, according to its form (secundum suam formam) as, for example, fire is inclined to give heat. Hence, since the rational soul is the form proper to man, there is in every man a natural inclination [i.e., a determinate tendency] to act according to reason (secundum rationem).

Knowledge of Natural Inclination

Let us now consider the correspondence between natural law precepts as derived from sense knowledge and the natural inclination which is inherent in man. Just as human reason controls and commands the other powers, St. Thomas tells us, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers should be directed according to reason. Hence, all the inclinations of any parts of human nature (e.g., of the concupiscible and irascible parts, insofar as they are regulated by reason) belong to natural law and are reduced

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92 See ST I-II, q. 94, a. 3, resp. (VII, 170b): "...ad legem naturae pertinet omne illud ad quod homo inclinatur secundum suam naturam. Inclinatur tuam unumquodque naturaliter ad operationem sibi convenientem secundum suam formam: sicut ignis ad calefaciendum. Unde cum anima rationalis sit propria forma homini, naturalis inclinatio inest cuilibet homini ad hoc quoad agat secundum rationem." On this, see also notes 96 and 124 below.

93 ST I-II, q. 94, a. 4, ad 3 (VII, 172b): "...sicut ratio in homine dominatur et imperat aliis potentiiis, ita oportet quod omnes inclinationes naturales ad alias potentias pertinentes ordinentur secundum rationem. Unde hoc est apud omnes communiter rectum, ut secundum rationem dirigantur omnes hominum inclinationes." See also ibid., q. 94, a. 2, ad 2.
to, and governed by, one first precept. 94 This first precept, "Do good and avoid evil," is based on the notion of good as derived from the consideration of material existents. 95 To this extent, all natural law precepts are derived from a cognitio which presupposes both an intrinsic principle (the natural light of reason as efficient cause of knowledge) and extrinsic factors (sensible existents as content-determining-causes of knowledge).

However, in response to the question, "Utrum lex naturalis contineat plura praecipita vel unum tantum" (ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2), St. Thomas states that the order of natural precepts of the law of nature is according to the order of natural inclination:

Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil has the nature of the contrary, all those things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently, as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Therefore, the order of the precepts of the natural law is according to the order of natural inclinations. 96

94 ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2, ad 2 (VII, 170b): "...omnes huiusmodi inclinationes quarumcumque partium humanae naturae, puta concupiscibilis et irascibilis, secundum quod regulantur ratione, pertinent ad legem naturalem, et reducuntur ad unum primum praeciputum, ut dictum est [in corp.]. Et secundum hoc, sunt multa praecipita legis naturae in seipsis, quae tamen communicant in una radice." In this connection, see notes 58-62 above.

95 See ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2, resp., as cited in note 77 above; see also notes 78 and 89 above.

96 ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2, resp. (VII, 170a): "Quia vero bonum habet rationem finis, malum autem rationem contrarii, inde est quod omnia illa ad quae homo habet naturalem
He then distinguishes man's natural inclination to good according to three different aspects or orders of human nature. To each of these orders is a corresponding order of natural law precepts:

First of all, there is in man an inclination to the good according to the nature which he shares with all substances, namely, inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own existence (esse) according to its nature, and in accord with this inclination, those things by which the life of man is preserved, and the opposite impeded, belong to the natural law. 97

Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to the nature which he has in common with the other animals; and according to this [inclination] those things are said to belong to natural law which nature has taught to all animal, such as intercourse between male and female, the education of children, and the like. 98

In a third way, there is in man an inclination to good according to the nature of reason which is proper to him; as man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, to live in society; and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to natural law, namely, that a man avoid ignorance, that one should not offend others with whom he must live,

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97 Ibid., (VII, 170a): "Inest enim primo inclinationem, ratio naturaliter apprehendit ut bona, et per consequens ut opere prosequenda, et contraria eorum ut mala et vitanda. Secundum igitur ordinem inclinationum naturalium, est ordo praecptorum legis naturae."

98 Ibid., (VII, 170a): "Secundo inest homini inclinationem ad aliqua magis specialia, secundum naturam in qua communicat cum omnibus substantiis, prout scilicet quaelibet substantia appetit conservationem sui esse secundum suam naturam. Et secundum hanc inclinationem, pertinent ad legem naturalem ea per quae vita hominis conservatur, et contrarium impeditur."
and other such things regarding this inclination. 99

But if the natural inclinations of man are reducible to one first precept as rooted in a cognitio, then how can natural law precepts be said to follow the order of natural inclination? Evidently, natural law precepts are in some way dependent upon both knowledge of some object and the natural inclinations. In order to understand what this twofold dependency consists in, let us first consider more closely the origin of notion of the good. As earlier noted (see notes 77 and 78 above), the natural knowledge of being (ens)--as derived from the knowledge of material existents--is apprehended by reason sub ratione veri. Now, in the conformity of the intellect to the known object--which is truth, 100--the intellect also understands its own act of understanding; and by this reflective act, the intellect

99 Ibid., (VII, 170b): "Tertio modo inest homini inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam rationis, quae est sibi propria: sicut homo habet naturalem inclinationem ad hoc quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo, et ad hoc quod in societate vivat. Et secundum hoc, ad legem naturalem pertinent ea quae ad huismodi inclinationem spectant: utpote quod homo ignorantiam vitet, quod aliros non offendat cum quibus debet conversari, et cetera huismodi quae ad hoc spectant."

100 See note 21 above; ST I, q. 16, a. 2, resp. (IV, 208a): "Cum autem omnis res sit vera secundum quod habet propriam formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus, inquantum est cognoscens, sit verus inquantum habit similitudinem rei cognitae, quae est forma eius inquantum est cognoscens. Et propter hoc per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur. Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem."
knows itself. Subsequent to this apprehension of being sub ratione veri, being pertains to the will sub ratione appetibilis. It is at this stage in the cognitive process that being is apprehended sub ratione boni; for the notion of good is that which all desire ("bonum est quod omnia appetunt"); hence, the notion of the good implies also

101 See notes 18 and 19 above; ST I, q. 87, a. 1, resp. (V, 355b): "Sed quia connaturale est intellectui nostro secundum statum praesentis vitae, quod ad materialia et sensibilia respiciat, sicut supra dictum est [Ibid., q. 86, a. 4, ad 2; q. 84, a. 7]; consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum intelligibilium, et eis mediantibus intellectus possibilis. Non ergo per essentiam suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster." See ibid., ad 3; ibid., a. 3, resp. and ad 1 and ad 2; ibid., q. 14, a. 2, ad 3; De Veritate, q. 1, aa. 3 and 9; ST I, q. 93, a. 7, ad 4 (V, 410a): "Quamvis etiam dici possit, quod, [animal percipiendo actum suum, seipsam intelligit quandocumque aliquid intelligit." see also Key-Text A, note 67.

102 See notes 77 and 94 above. ST I-II, q. 19, a. 3, ad 1 (VI, 144b): "...bonum sub ratione boni, idest appetibilis, per prius pertinet ad voluntatem quam ad rationem. Sed tamen per prius pertinet ad rationem sub ratione veri, quam ad voluntatem sub ratione appetibilis: quia appetitus voluntatis non potest esse de bono, nisi prius a ratione apprehendatur." See also ST I, q. 16, a. 5, resp. Note that ens is not denominated good by St. Thomas because it is desired, but rather the contrary: good is signified indirectly through its effect, namely, as that which moves the appetite. See In I Ethic. (ca. 1271), lect. 1, n. 9 (Marietti, 4): "Prima autem non possunt notificari per aliqua priora, sed notificantur per posteriora, sicut causae per proprios effectus. Cum autem bonum proprie sit motivum appetitus, descritur per motum appetitus, sicut solet manifestari vis motiva per motum." Accordingly, the name good signifies not only a relation, but something upon which a relation is consequent along with the relation itself. De Veritate, q. 21, a. 6, resp. (XXII-3, 609a): "...ratio boni respectum implicat: non quia ipsum nomen boni significat ipsum respectum solum; sed quia significat id ad quod sequitur respectus, cum respectu ipso. Respectus autem qui
an apprehension of the actual desire for being:

Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being.\(^\text{103}\)

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importatur nomine boni, ets habitudo perfectivi, secundum quod aliquid natum est perficere non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed secundum esse quod habet in rebus." Cf. ST I, q. 5, aa. 1-5. Hence, St. Thomas' moral doctrine cannot be reduced to a subjectivism (such as that of, say, Heidegger, in which other persons or things possess a "value" to the extent that such value is imposed upon them by the human subject; rather, St. Thomas' metaphysics and corresponding epistemology affirm the objective goodness inherent in creatures (secundum esse quod habet in rebus)--independent of whether or not such goodness is recognized and appreciated by another human person. In this connection, see notes 103, 119, 120-130 and 133 below. See also Thomas Fay, "Heidegger on the History of Western Metaphysics as Forgetfulness of Being: A Thomistic Rejoinder," in Atti del Congresso Internazionale, ed. Congresso internazionale Tommasso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario, vol. 2 (Rome, 1974), 480-84; Paul Quay, "Morality by Calculation of Values," Theology Digest 23 (1975), 347-64.

\(^{103}\)ST I, q. 16, a. 4, ad 2 (IV, 211b): "...secundum hoc est aliquid prius ratione, quod prius cadit in intellectu. Intellectus autem per prius apprehendit ipsum ens; et secundario apprehendit se intelligere ens; et tertio apprehendit se appetere ens. Unde primo est ratio entis, secundo ratio veri, tertio ratio boni, licet bonum sit in rebus." Cf. De Veritate, q. 21, a. 3 resp. It should be noted that, for St. Thomas, ens qua bonum is not a mere postulate of reason (an "as if") by which man unifies his experience; rather, ens qua bonum is the actually existing reality which the human existent knows--however obscurely, from the knowledge of actually existing beings--and desires for his actual perfection. See note 87 above; In IV Div. Nom. (ca. 1265-67), lect. 11, (Parma XV, 319b): "Iste amor primo est in ipso bono quod est Deus, et ex ipso bono emanavit in existentia et iterum in existentibus participatus convertit se ad suum principium quod est bonum." See also ST I-II, q. 2, a. 8; q. 9, a. 6. In this connection, Donald Gallagher states that "it is more proper to say that the will desires that which will completely exhaust the ratio of the universal good than to say that all men desire the universal good as good in general. The will does not desire the good in the abstract; it desires the good, presented to it secundum modum abstractionis, which
Simply put, knowledge of the good implies knowledge of one's actual desire or inclination for being.\(^{104}\) Hence, a fortiori, natural law knowledge, which concerns the regulation of man's acts with respect to his natural end, must involve knowledge of man's determinate tendency (natural inclination) for the end—as acquired, of course, from the knowledge of the act of the will. To understand precisely how the knowledge of natural law principles involves the knowledge of natural inclinations, we must also consider St. Thomas' notion of rectitude with respect to the intellect, the will, and human acts.

is, in Maritain's phrase, the metaphysical concretized good and is as [sic] universal being itself. The good in general is the necessary formal object under which the will desires whatever it desires, but the will is seeking an existential good that saturates all desire." See "St. Thomas and the Desire For the Vision of God," *The Modern Schoolman* 26 (1948), 167-168; Anton Pegis, "The Natural End of Man," *Proceedings of the ACPA* 23 (1949), 47-79; see note 60 above where St. Thomas identifies the universal good as God; on this, see also Jacques Maritain, *De Bergson à Thomas d'Aquin* (New York: Maison Française, 1944), 156; G. Gustafson, *The Theory of Natural Appetency*, 107-13; Desmond Connell, "St. Thomas on Reflection and Judgment," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 45 (1978) 244; Henri Renard, and William Stackhouse, *The Philosophy of Man* (Saint Louis: Swift, 1946), 106.

\(^{104}\) For a further explication on the manner by which the will is known subsequent, and according, to the knowledge of some sensible object, see ST I, q. 87, a. 4, resp. (V, 363a): "Unde actus voluntatis intelligitur ab intellectu, et inquantum aliquis percipit se velle; et inquantum aliquis cognoscit naturam huius actus, et per consequens naturam eius principii, quod est habitus vel potentia." See *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 9, ad 1 in contra, ad 3 in contra; q. 22, a. 12, resp.; ST I, q. 16, a. 4, ad 1; q. 93, a. 7, ad 4.
The Notion of Rectitude

St. Thomas tells us that those acts by which an agent tends towards his natural end are naturally befitting him. Since man is naturally ordered to God as his end, those acts whereby he is brought to the knowledge and love of God are said to be naturally right (naturaliter recte). Accordingly, rectitude of the will consists in being duly ordered to the last end (precisely as known and proposed to the will by reason); concomitantly, rectitude of (practical) reason consists in being well disposed with respect to the ends. Now, while truth of the (speculative) intellect consists in the conformity of the


106 ST I-II, q. 4, a. 4, resp. (VI, 41a): "...rectitudo voluntatis requiritur ad beatitudinem et antecedenter et concomitanter. Antecedenter quidem, quia rectitudo voluntatis est per debitum ordinem ad finem ultimum." Ibid., ad 2 (VI, 41b): "...omnis actus voluntatis praeceditur ab aliquo actu intellectus: aliquis tamen actu voluntatis est prior quam aliquis actu intellectus. Voluntas enim tendit in finalem actum intellectus, qui est beatitudo. Et ideo recta inclinatio voluntatis praexigitur ad beatitudinem, sicut rectus motus sagittae ad percussionem signi."

107 ST I-II, q. 57, a. 4, resp. (VI, 367b): "In humanis autem actibus se habent fines sicut principia in speculativis, ut dicitur [Aristotle, Ethic., VII, 8 (1151a16)]. Et ideo ad prudentiam, quae est recta ratio agibilium, requiritur quod homo sit bene dispositus circa fines...."
intellect to the things understood (see notes 20, 21 and 100 above), the truth of the practical intellect—which pertains to man's actions with respect to his end—is determined in comparison to right appetite; yet the rectitude of the appetite is itself determined by its conformity with true reason (which proposes to the will the end); thus, we seem to have returned to the dilemma as previously stated above—namely, if the natural inclinations of man, as directed by reason, are reducible to one first precept as rooted in a cognitio, then how can natural law precepts be said to follow the order of natural inclination? The solution lies in distinguishing between the ultimate end itself and the various means to that end with respect to the related operations of the natural appetite (i.e., the will) and natural reason. Accordingly, the rectitude or goodness of the will depends upon the ultimate end (i.e., the bonum universale) as first apprehended by reason from sensible experience and consequently proposed by reason to the will. However, concerning the means to that end, the

108 See also In VI Ethic. (ca. 1271), lect. 2 (Marietti, 310): "Videtur autem hic esse quiddem dubium. Nam se intellectus practici determinatur in comparatione ad appetitum rectum, appetitus autem rectitudo determinatur per hoc quod consonat rationi verae, ut prius dictum est, sequitur quaedam circulatio in dictis determinationibus."

109 ST I-II, q. 19, a. 3, resp. (VI, 144a): "...bonitas voluntatis proprie ex obiecto dependet. Obiectum autem voluntatis proponitur ei per rationem. Nam bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis proportionatum ei.... Et ideo bonitatis voluntatis dependet a ratione, eo modo quo dependet ad obiecto." Ibid., q. 19, a. 10, resp. (VI, 151a):
rectitude of reason depends on its conformity with the desire for the end. In his *Expositio in libros Ethicorum* (ca. 1271), St. Thomas sums up this ordination between intellect and will with respect to the end, and those things ordered to the end, as follows:

The appetite is both of the end and of those things which are ordered to the end. The end, however, is determined for man by [human] nature, while those things which are ordered to the end are not determined for us by nature, but are left to be investigated by reason. It is evident, then, that the rectitude of appetite with respect to the end is the measure of truth in practical reason. And as to this, the truth of practical reason is determined by its consonance to right appetite. However, the truth of practical reason itself is the rule of the rectitude of appetite for those things which are ordered to the end. And, in this regard, appetite is said to be right insofar as it

"Non est autem recta voluntas alicuius hominis volentis aliquod bonum particulare, nisi referat illud in bonum commune sicut in finem: cum etiam naturalis appetitus cuiuslibet partis ordinetur in bonum commune totius." Ibid., q. 2, a. 7, resp. (VI, 23b): "Bonum enim, quod est ultimus finis, est bonum perfectum complens appetitum. Appetitus autem humanus, qui est voluntas, est boni universalis."

ST I-II, q. 58, a. 5, ad 1 (VI, 376b): "...ratio, secundum quod est apprehensiva finis, praecedit appetitum finis; sed appetitus finis praecedit rationem ratiocinantem ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem, quod pertinet ad prudentiam." Ibid., q. 19, a. 3, ad 3 (VI, 144b): "In his autem quae sunt ad finem, rectitudo rationis consistit in conformitate ad appetitum finis debiti." See also *In III De Anima*, lect. 15, n. 82. Regarding *caritas* as the theological virtue which rectifies man's will with respect to the ultimate end, see *In II Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1 a, sol.; *De Carit.*, q. un., a. 6, ad 11 and a. 12, ad 12. Concerning the role of virtue by which the will and intellect are rectified, see Donald Johnson, "The Ground for a Scientific Ethics," *Modern Schoolman* 40 (1962), 357-60; ST I-II, q. 94, a, 3.
follows the judgments of true reason. 111

It is according to this double ordination of reason and will with respect to the end, and those things ordered to the end, that the derivation of natural law precepts can be understood; in a word, according to the natural inclination for the end--as initially apprehended by the intellect with respect to a known object--reason subsequently issues its commands as regards those things ordained to the end. 112

Thus, a natural law precept implies in its very notion a relation of means to a natural end, inasmuch as something is perceived as being necessary to that end; and to the extent that many things are [understood as] necessary to a natural end, many precepts may be given about many things as being

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111 In VI Ethic. lect. 2, n. 1131 (Marietti, 310): "...appetitus est finis et eorum quae sunt ad finem: finis autem determinatus est homini a natura.... Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, non sunt nobis determinata a natura, sed per rationem investiganda. Sic ergo manifestum est, quod rectitudo appetitus per respectum ad finem est mensura veritatis in ratione practica. Et secundum hoc determinatur veritas rationis practicae secundum concordiam ad appetitum rectum. Ipsa autem veritas rationis practicae est regula rectitudinis appetitus, circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Et ideo secundum hoc dicitur appetitus rectus, qui prosequitur quae vera ratio dicit."

112ST I-II, q. 90, a. 1, ad 3 (VI, 149b): "...ratio habet vim movendi a voluntate, ut supra dictum est [q. 17, a. 1]: ex hoc enim quod aliquis vult finem, ratio imperat de his quae sunt ad finem. Sed voluntas de his quae imperantur, ad hoc quod legis rationem habeat, oportet quod sit aliqua ratione regulata."
ordained to the end.\textsuperscript{113}

We can summarize the cognitive process by which natural law precepts are produced by reason as follows:

1. First, from the consideration of material existent sensibly known, natural (speculative) reason apprehends being (\textit{ens}) as such.

2. Secondly, with respect to the apprehended object, the intellect apprehends that it understands its object and common being \textit{sub ratione veri}.

3. Next, there follows from the necessity of man’s rational nature, the \textit{actual} desire of the will for common being with respect to the object known and desired (or shunned).

4. From the reflective knowledge of the operation of the will, natural (now practical) reason then apprehends its

\textsuperscript{113}ST I-II, q. 99, a. 1, resp. (VII, 199a):
"...praecptum legis, cum sit obligatorium, est de aliquo quod fieri debet. Quod autem aliquid debetur fieri, hoc provenit ex necessitate alciuis finis. Unde manifestum est quod de ratione praecpti est quod importet ordinem ad finem, inquantum scilicet illud praecipitur quod est necessarium vel expediens ad finem." A precept, however, presupposes the knowledge of a necessary connection between some means and a necessary end; on this, see \textit{ST} I, q. 82, a. 2 ("Utrum voluntas ex necessitate omnia velit quaeque vult"). Regarding the obligatory force of precepts as rooted in the necessity of the end (as determined by man’s nature), see \textit{ST} I-II, q. 102, aa. 1 and 2; q. 104, a. 1, resp. See also \textit{ibid.}, q. 57, a. 6, resp. where the act of counsel is attributed to the speculative reason, and the act of command is attributed to practical reason. Contrast St. Thomas’ position on these matters with the opinion held by Germain Grisez concerning the merely "prescriptive" (vs obligatory) force of the first principle of natural law, as cited in notes 44-45 of our Introduction. In this connection, see notes 126 and 128 below.
own determinate tendency (natural inclination) for common being *sub ratione appetibilis* as the *bonum universalis* or *finis* with respect to the object known and desired (or shunned). 114

5. According to the above apprehension (#4), practical reason then issues its *praecpt* concerning those things perceived as either necessary to pursue or to avoid with respect to the end as necessarily (naturally) willed (see note 91 above).

Natural law knowledge thus involves the same intrinsic and extrinsic causes according to which all human knowledge is acquired--namely, (1) the natural light of reason as the efficient cause of intelligibility and (2) sensible existents as content-determining-causes of intelligibility. But, further, inasmuch as knowledge of a thing as good implies the knowledge of that thing as desired, natural law knowledge involves knowledge of natural inclinations--

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114 ST I-II, q. 105, a. 4, resp. (V, 474a): "Virtus autem passiva voluntatis se extendit ad bonum in universal: est enim eius obiectum bonum universale, sicut et intellectus obiectum est ens universale. Quodlibet autem bonum creatum est quoddam particulare bonum: solus autem Deus est bonum universale. Unde ipse solus implet voluntatem, et sufficienter eam movet ut obiectum." *Compendium Theologiae* (ca. 1269-73?) c. 104 (Parma XVI, 29a): "Tale est autem in nobis sciendi desiderium, ut cognoscentes effectum, ut cognoscentes effectum, desideremus cognoscere causam, et in quacumque re cognitis quibuscumque ejus circumstantiis, non quiescit nostrum desiderium, quousque ejus essentiam cognoscamus. Non igitur naturale desiderium sciendi potest quietari in nobis, quousque primam causam cognoscamus, non quocumque modo, sed per ejus essentiam. Prima autem causa Deus est. Est igitur finis ultimus intellectualis creaturae, Deum per essentiam videre." In this connection, see notes 90 and 103 above.
preeminently, the natural inclination for the universal good.\textsuperscript{115} Inasmuch, then, as (1) one's own natural inclinations serve as content-determining-causes of natural law knowledge, and (2) man has the capacity or ability to acquire knowledge of his natural inclinations with respect to human goods, natural law knowledge is said to be naturally implanted or innate. Let us immediately add, 

\textsuperscript{115}Thus, E. Gilson writes: "En nous, comme en toute chose, l'inclination qui nous entraîne vers certaines fins est la marque de ce que la loi éternelle impose. Puisque c'est elle qui nous fait être ce que nous sommes, il suffit que nous suivions les penchants légitimes de notre nature pour lui obéir. La loi éternelle, ainsi participée par chacun de nous et inscrite dans notre*pl526Xnaære~it le nom de loi naturelle." Le Thomisme, 6th ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1972), 330.

Notwithstanding the role that (knowledge of) natural inclination plays in the production of natural law precepts, the claim that knowledge of natural law "is not a rational knowledge" (see note 18 in our Introduction concerning Maritain) cannot be attributed to the doctrine of St. Thomas; since, for him, man's inclination is, by nature, a rational inclination. See ST I, q. 60, a. 1, resp. (V, 98a): "Est autem hoc commune omni naturae, ut habeat aliquam inclinationem, quae est appetitus naturalis vel amor. Quae tamen inclinatio diversimode inventur in diversis naturis, in unaquaque secundum modum eius. Unde in natura intellectuali invenitur inclinatio naturalis, secundum voluntatem." ST I, q. 79, a. 11, ad 2 (V, 279a-b):

however, that knowledge of one's own natural inclinations is for St. Thomas not only the result of the knowledge of sensible existents; indeed, knowledge of a natural inclination—which implies the knowledge of the desire for being as such—cannot be conceived apart from the knowledge of a concrete object (see notes 33, 101, 103 and 104 above); a fortiori, neither can natural law knowledge be understood as consummated in the reflective knowledge and contemplation one's own essence; because for St. Thomas, the end of practical cognition is operation, which is concerned with singular existents.¹¹⁶ Further, inasmuch as man's natural inclinations for certain goods are established and characterized by man's very nature as a composite unity of soul-body and various operative powers (see notes 55, 58-62, 90 and 97-99 above), knowledge of natural inclinations, while involving a reflective act of the intellect with respect to one's own being, is a fundamentally objective knowledge of human nature as acquired through

¹¹⁶SCG III, c. 75, (XVI, 221b): "(Adhuc) Haec est differentia inter cognitionem speculativam et practicam, quod cognitio speculativa, et ea quae ad ipsam pertinent, perficiuntur in universali: ea vero quae pertinent ad cognitionem practicam, perficiuntur in particulari: nam finis speculativae est veritas, quae primo et per se in immaterialibus consistit et in universalibus; finis vero practicae est operatio, quae est circa singularia." See Proximate Context #a above regarding human knowledge as derived from, and pertaining to, sensible experience.
experience. Hence, St. Thomas’ moral doctrine (while certainly relational and personal) is not susceptible to the trappings of relativism or subjectivism.

Recapitulation

We can now understand at once (1) how we come to know first principles (such as those of natural law) by abstraction from singular things (see notes 82 and 84

117 Concerning reflective knowledge, see Text-A, note 67. It must be noted that man’s subjective knowledge of, say, his own desire for food does not obviate the recognition—learned through experience—that his desire for nourishment is a universal condition proper to all human beings. Further, not all subjectively known desires are proper to human nature merely by virtue of being subjectively known; in fact, many subjectively known desires can stem from a defect in nature or habitus (either natural or acquired); and if pursued, such desires will thwart authentic happiness. In addition, the knowledge by which practical reason is rectified—in order to properly direct various desires—may be difficult to learn; indeed, many of the more subtle aspects of human nature and human happiness are revealed only through trial and error and careful observance of the collective history of human experience. St. Thomas seems to have this point in mind in response to the question, "Utrum sit aliqua lex humana", ST I-II, q. 91, a. 3, resp. (VII, 155a): "Unde et Tullius dicit, in sua Rhet. [De Invent., II, 53], quod ‘initium iuris est a natura profectum; deinde quaedam in consuetudinem ex utilitatis ratione venerunt; postea res a natura profectas et consuetudine probatas legum metus et religio sanxit.’" See also ibid., q. 100, a. 1, resp. (VII, 206b): "Quaedam enim sunt quae statim per se ratio naturalis ciususlibet hominis diiudicat esse facienda vel non facienda: sicut, ‘Honora patrem tuum, et matrem tuem,’ et, ‘Non occides, Non furtum facies.’ Et huiusmodi sunt absolute de lege naturae. Quaedam vero sunt quae subtiliori consideratione rationis a sapientibus iudicantur esse observanda. Et ista sic sunt de lege naturae, ut tamen indigent disciplina, qua minores a sapientioribus instruantur: sicut illud, ‘Coram cano capite consurge, et honora personam senis’ [Levit. 19, 32], et alia huiusmodi." Regarding natural law as acquired through experience and reasoning, see De Veritate, q. 11, a. 1, ad 12; ibid., aa. 2 and 3.
above), and (2) how the order of natural precepts of natural law is according to the order of natural inclination: for man participates in eternal law both per modum cognitio and per modum interioris principii motivi.118 Accordingly, we are led to understand (3) how natural law knowledge is (a) (properly speaking) acquired, and (b) (in a qualified sense) naturally implanted or innate, (4) how natural law knowledge is "natural" to man and "naturally known," and also (5) how activity in accord with such knowledge is "natural" to him. Recall that a creature is said to participate in eternal law according to the nature which is implanted (impressa) in it. Now, according to St. Thomas' account of law in section [1] above, creatures (including human beings), are regulated and measured by the eternal law of God; but while they are measured (mensuratae) by the knowledge of God qua Mensurans, creatures, in turn, serve as the measures (mensurae) of human knowledge (see note 20 above). In ST I, q. 14, a. 8, ad 3, St. Thomas clarifies the double character of creatures as both mensuratae (with respect to the knowledge of God) and as mensurae (with respect to human knowledge) as follows:

Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, just as the natural things of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior them, and is

118See note 67 above and Key-Text sections [2] and [3].
their measure; as, for instance, a houses is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built.\textsuperscript{119}

Through the knowledge of (human and other) natures which he acquires through sensible experience, man comes to know something of the eternal law. In this connection, the term \textit{impressio} (as implying something as given from an extrinsic cause; see note 37 above) has a double application with respect to man's participation in eternal law—namely, in terms of (1) man's own intrinsic nature and operative powers as divinely impressed upon him (see notes 37 through 41, and 70 above), and (2) the acquired knowledge of eternal law as divinely impressed upon him through the mediation of actually existing natures (human and subhuman):

Just as the intelligible reasons (\textit{rationes}) of everything exist first of all in God, and are derived from Him by other intellects in order that these may

\textsuperscript{119}ST I, q. 14, a. 8, ad, 3 (IV, 180b): "..res naturales sunt mediae inter scientiam Dei et scientiam nostram: nos enim scientiam accipimus a rebus naturalibus, quorum Deus per suam scientiam causa est. Unde, sicut scibilia naturalia sunt priora quam scientia nostra, et mensura eius, ita scientia Dei est prior quam res naturales, et mensura ipsarum. Sicut aliqua domus est media inter scientiam arificis qui eam fecit, et scientiam illius qui eius cognitionem ex ipsa iam facta capiit." ST I-II, q. 93, a. 1, ad 3 (VII, 163a): "...ratio intellectus divini aliter se habet ad res quam ratio intellectus humani. Intellectus enim humanus est mensuratus a rebus, ut scilicet conceptus hominis non sit verus propter seipsum, sed dicitur verus ex hoc quod consonat rebus: ex hoc enim quod res est vel non est, opinio vera vel falsa est. Intellectus vero divinus est mensura rerum: quia unaquaque res intantum habet de veritate, inquantum imitatur intellectum divinum, ut in Primo [q. 16, a. 1] dictum est."
actually understand, so also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist. Therefore God so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as he gives it the power of understanding, whether natural or superadded; and He impresses (imprimit) on the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and preserves both power and species in being (esse).\textsuperscript{120}

In the \textit{sed contra} of the discussion, "Utrum lex aeterna sit omnibus nota" (ST I-II, q. 93, a. 2), St. Thomas cites Augustine: "Knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us (nobis impressa est)."\textsuperscript{121} The meaning which St. Thomas

\textsuperscript{120}ST I, q. 105, a. 3, resp. (V, 473b): "Sicut enim omnes rationes rerum intelligibiles primo existunt in Deo, et ab eo derivantur in alios intellectus, ut actu intelligent; sic etiam derivantur in creatureas, ut subsistant. Sic igitur Deus movet intellectum creatum, inquantum dat ei virtutem ad intelligendum, vel naturalem vel superadditam; et inquantum imprimit ei species intelligibiles; et utrumque tenet et conservat in esse." Ibid., ad 3 (V, 473b): "...intelligibile movet intellectum nostrum, inquantum quodammodo imprimit ei suma similitudinem, per quam intelligi potest. Sed similitudines quas Deus imprimit intellectui creato, non sufficiunt ad ipsum Deum intelligendum per essentiam...." See also ibid., q. 85, a. 2, ad 3; ST I, q. 84, a. 6, resp. (V, 324a): "...ad causandam intellectualem operationem, secundum Aristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium corporum, sed requiritur aliquid nobilium; quia agens est honorabilius patiente...."

\textsuperscript{121}ST I-II, q. 93, a. 2, sed contra (VII, 163a): "...Augustinus dicit [De Lib. Arb. I, 6 (PL 32, 1229)] quod 'aeternae legis notio nobis impressa est.'" In this connection, see ibid., q. 91, a. 3, ad 2 (VII, 155b): "...ratio humana secundum se non est regula rerum: sed principia ei naturaliter indita, sunt quaedam regulae generales et mensurae omnium eorum quae sunt per hominem agenda, quorum ratio naturalis est regula et mensura, licet non sit mensura eorum quae sunt a natura." These two statements are combined together by St. Thomas in the following passage: "...promulgatio legis naturae est ex hoc ipso quod Deus eam mentibus hominum inseruit naturaliter cognoscendam." Ibid., q. 90, a. 4, ad 1 (VII, 152b). Evidently, knowledge of natural law is understood by St. Thomas to be divinely implanted in man inasmuch as (1) God
gives to Augustine's words is clarified by him in ad 1 of the same discussion:

The things that are of God cannot indeed be known by us in themselves, yet they are manifested to us by their effects, according to Rom. I, 20, "The invisible things of God...are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made."\(^{122}\)

As the context of this statement makes clear, knowledge of eternal law is impressed upon man—that is, acquired—through the sensible apprehension of actually existing natures (human and subhuman). According to this acquired knowledge, man's reason subsequently directs him in the activities proper to his own nature.

Thus, when St. Thomas speaks of right reason as the principle of moral action,\(^{123}\) two things must be remembered. First, the knowledge by which man's practical reason is rectified—in order to subsequently direct human activity in a proper manner towards what is humanly good—is

gives directly to man the natural capacity to know natural law (see note 31 and [2] above), and (2) God gives indirectly to man the actual knowledge of natural law through the mediation of sensible creatures as content-determining-causes of knowledge (see note 122 below). With regard to habitual knowledge of natural law as understood as a capacity or aptitude for actual knowledge, see note 61 above.

\(^{122}\)ST I-II, q. 93, a. 2, ad 1, as cited in note 24 above. See also note 78 above.

\(^{123}\)See, for example, ST I-II, q. 100, a. 1, resp. (VII, 206b): "Cum autem humani mores dicantur in ordine ad rationem, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum, illi mores dicuntur boni qui rationi congruunt, mali autem qui a ratione discordant."
derived from his sensible experience of actually existing natures; for nature is the (proximate) foundation or measura of right reason:

Every operation through reason and will is derived in us from what is according to nature. All rationcination is derived from principles that are naturally known. And every appetite for those things which are for the end is derived from the natural appetite for the final end, and thus it is also necessary that the first direction of our acts to the end be through the natural law.\textsuperscript{124}

Secondly, while a natural law precept is said to be constituted through an act of human reason ("aliquid per huiusmodi actum constitutum"),\textsuperscript{125} its obligatory character-

\textsuperscript{124}ST I-II, q. 91, a. 2, ad 2 (VII, 154b): "...omnis operatio rationis et voluntatis derivatur in nobis ab eo quod est secundum naturam, ut supra habitum est [ST I-II, q. 10, a. 1]: nam omnis rationcinatio derivatur a principis naturaliter notis, et omnis appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, derivatur a naturali appetitu ultimi finis. Et sic etiam oportet quod prima directio actuum nostrorum ad finem, fiat per legem naturalem." See also ST I, q. 60, a. 1, resp. From our above analysis of natural law as (1) a moral doctrine which is (2) proximately based upon the actual nature of the human existent, and (3) known only through, and according to, the sensible experience of human natures as actually existing in the world, we cannot accept Bourke's interpretation of St. Thomas' moral doctrine (see our Introduction, notes 36-38) as correct or credible. For a brief critique of Bourke's interpretation of St. Thomas' moral doctrine, see Oscar Brown, Natural Rectitude, 165-74.

\textsuperscript{125}ST I-II, q. 90, a. 1, ad 2 (VII, 149b): "...sicut in actibus exterioribus est considerare operationem et operatum, puta aedificationem et aedificatum; ita in operibus rationis est considerare ipsum actum rationis, qui est intelligere et ratiocinari, et aliquid per huiusmodi actum constitutum. Quod quidem in speculativa ratione primo quidem est definitio; secundo, enuntiatio; tertio, vero syllogismus vel argumentatio. Et quia ratio etiam practica utitur quodam syllogismo in operabilibus, ut supra habitum est [Ibid., q. 13, a. 3; q. 76, a. 1; q. 77, a. 2, ad 4],
the very mark of a precept of law—is not, nor can it be, based merely on the authority of human reason; indeed, if a natural law precept were nothing more than a construct of human reason, it would be devoid of moral force; since, secundum quod Philosophus docet in VII Ethic., 3 [1147a24]; ideo est invenire aliquid in ratione practica quod ita se habeat ad operationes, sicut se habet propositio in ratione speculativa ad conclusiones. Et huiusmodi propositiones universales rationis practicae ordinatae ad actiones habent rationem legis. Quae quidem propositiones aliquando actualiter considerantur, aliquando vero habitualiter a ratione tenentur."

ST I-II, q. 90, a. 1, sed contra (VII, 149a): "...ad legem pertinet praecipere et prohibere. Sed imperare est rationis, sicut supra habitum est [Ibid., q. 17, a. 1]. Ergo lex est aliquid rationis." Ibid., q. 92, a. 1, resp. (VII, 159a): "...lex nihil aliud est quam dictamen rationis in praesidente quo subditi gubernantur." Ibid., q. 92, a. 2, ad 1 (VII, 161b): "...sicut cessare a malo habet quandam rationem boni, ita etiam prohibitio habet quandam rationem praecpti; et secundum hoc, large accipiendo praecptum, universaliter lex praecptum dicitur." In his ex professo explanation of law, St Thomas asserts that lex is derived from ligare, because it binds one to act. See ibid., q. 90, a. 1, resp. (VII, 149a): "...lex quaedam regula est et mensura actuum, secundum quam inducitur aliquis ad agendum vel ab agendo retrahitur. Dicitur enim lex a ligando quia obligat ad agendum." Hence, the primary significance of lex as a decree issuing from a ruler which carries the force of obligation upon his subjects. Concerning the various human activities to which man applies himself, St. Thomas distinguishes between rules of art and precepts of law (see ST II-II, a. 47, a. 8, resp.); unlike rules of art, natural law precepts are not simply "reasonable guidelines" for "the art of successful" living," as might be suggested by the language of the "New Natural Law" theorists or other interpreters of the Thomistic ethics of "right reason," rather, natural law precepts are moral imperatives which carry the force of obligation. On this, see notes 112 and 113 above and 128 below; ST I-II, q. 104, a. 1, resp. (VII, 258a): "...sicut ex supra dictis patet [q. 95, a. 2; q. 99, a. 3 and 4], praecptorum cuiuscumque legis quaedam habent vim obligandi ex ipso dictamine rationis, quia naturalis ratio dictat hoc esse debitum fieri, vel vitari; et huiusmodi praecpta dicuntur moralia, eo quod a ratione dicuntur mores humani." See also Quodl. V, 19.
proverbs speaking, no one imposes a law on his own acts. 127
Rather, the obligatory character of a natural law precept
stems from God as the author and governor of nature:128 for
natural law is itself nothing other than a participation in
eternal law—to which man is inexorably bound by nature:

Every law comes from the reason and will of the
legislator. The divine law and the natural law proceed
from the reasonable will of God, but human law comes
from the will of man regulated by reason.129

127ST I-II, q. 93, a. 5, resp. (VII, 166a): "...nullus,
proprie loquendo, suis actibus legem imponit." Cf. ibid., q.
93, a. 4, ad 2 (VII, 165b): "...Filius Dei non est a Deo
factus, sed naturaliter ab ipso genitus; et ideo non
subditur divinae providentiae aut legi aeternae, sed magis
ipse est lex aeterna per quamdam appropriationem...." With
regard to the nature of constructural knowledge, see note 22
above.

128ST I-II, q. 96, a. 4, ad 1 (VII, 182b): "...sicut
Apostolus dicit, [Rom., 13, 1], 'omnis potestas humana a Deo
est;' et ideo, ' qui potestati resistit in his quae ad
potestatis ordinem pertinent, 'Dei ordinationi resistit;' et
secundum hoc efficitur reus quantum ad conscientiam." See
section [3] above and notes 40 and 41 above. For further
discussion on the obligatory character of natural law as
rooted in the absolute necessity of a natural act in
reference to an absolutely necessary final end, see Walter
Farrell, The Natural Moral Law, 130-41; see also Robert J.
Roth, "Moral Obligation and God," The New Scholasticism 54
(1980), 265-78. For a critique of ethical systems which
purport to establish a morality without the foundation of
God's existence and cosmic governance, see Thomas Wassmer,
"Guilt and Value Philosophy," Franciscan Studies 19 (1959),
227-40; Stanley Jaki, "Thomas and the Universe," The Thomist

129ST I-II, q. 97, a. 3, resp. (VII, 191a): "...omnis
lex proficiscitur a ratione et voluntate legislatoris: lex
quidem divina et naturalis a rationabili Dei voluntate." It
follows that human law carries the force of moral obligation
to the extent that it accords with natural law qua man's
participation in eternal law. ST I-II, q. 95, a. 2, resp.
(VII, 175a): "Unde inquantum habet de iustitia, intantum
habet de virtute legis. In rebus autem humanis dicitur esse
The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the Divine intellect and will. Therefore, above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to be governed by God.\textsuperscript{130}

Finally, let us stress two points with respect to the obligatory character of natural law. First, to say that a precept of natural law is obligatory by virtue of the authority of God should not be construed as eclipsing free choice in man; for man, while naturally inclined towards his last end, is free to choose or shun any particular known good.\textsuperscript{131} Nor should the fact of free choice be construed as

\textit{aliq}uid \textit{iustum ex eo quod est rectum secundum regulam rationis. Rationis autem prima regula est lex naturae, ut ex supradictis patet [q. 91, a. 1, ad 2]."}

\textsuperscript{130}\textit{ST} I, q. 103, a. 5, ad 3 (V, 458b): "...\textit{creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam per intellectum et voluntatem, quorum utrumque indiget regi et perfici ab intellectu et voluntate Dei. Et ideo supra gubernationem qua \textit{creatura rationalis} gubernat seipsam tanquam domina sui actus, indiget gubernari a Deo.}" In this connection, see \textit{ST} II-II, q. 154, a. 2, ad 2 (X, 219b): "\textit{Ratio autem hominis recta est secundum quod regulatur ex voluntate divina, quae est prima et summa regula." See also \textit{ST} I, q. 49, a. 3, resp. As opposed, then, to the view of Heidegger, God (and not Dasein) is for St. Thomas the "shepherd of being." On this, see notes 20 and 36-41, 102 and 133; Odon Lottin, "Les premiers exposés scolastiques sur la loi éternelle," 298-301.

\textsuperscript{131}See \textit{ST} I, q. 82, a. 1, resp., as cited in note 85 above; ibid., ad 1 (V, 293b): "\textit{Necessitas autem natualis non aufert libertatem voluntatis...." Ibid., ad 3 (V, 293b): "\textit{...sumus domini nostrorum actuum secundum quod possimus hoc vel illud eligere. Electio autem non est de fine, sed de his quaee sunt ad finem, ut dicitur [Ethic. III, 9]. Unde appetitus ultimi finis non est de his quorum domini sumus.}" See also \textit{In II Sent.}, d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5; \textit{De Veritate}, q. 22, a. 5; \textit{SCG} II, c. 55; \textit{ST} I, q. 83, a. 4; \textit{ST} I-II, q. 8, aa. 2 and 3.
a power to make the moral order; for the exercise of free choice, is set squarely within—and, hence, subject to—the order of divine providence:

When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that he does not have a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon as though directed by another towards an end: for they do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free choice, by which these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence, it is significantly said: 'In the hand of his own counsel.' But since the very act of free choice is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise of free choice must be subject ot divine providence. For human providence is included under the providence of God as a particular under a universal cause.\(^{132}\)

In St. Thomas' moral doctrine, then, what is good or evil for man is not based upon free choice any more than upon a mental construct; rather, the moral order of man is

\(^{132}\)See section [2] above and ST I, q. 22, a. 2, ad 4 (IV, 266a): "...in hoc quod dicitur Deum hominem sibi reliquisse, non excluditur homo a divina providentia: sed ostenditur quod non praefigitur ei virtus operativa determinata ad unum, sicut rebus naturalibus; quae aguntur tantum, quasi ab altero directae in finem, non autem seipsa agunt, quasi se dirigentia in finem, ut creaturae rationales per liberum arbitrium, quo consiliantur et eligunt. Unde signantur dicit, 'in manu consilii sui.' Sed quia ipse actus liberi arbitrii reducitur in Deum sicut in causam, necesse est ut ea quae ex libero arbitrio fiunt, divinae providentiae subdantur: providentia enim hominis continetur sub providentia Dei, sicut causa particularis sub causa universali." ST I-II, q. 71, a. 6, resp. (VII,9a): "Regula autem voluntatis humane est duplex: una propinqua et homogenea, scilicet ipsa humana ratio: alia vero est prima regula, scilicet lex aeterna, quae est quasi ratio Dei."
determined by the law of human nature as ordained by God; and it is man's task to come to discern from his experience in the world the moral law of his nature and to

Joseph Owens, however, states that "the starting point or first principle of a moral decision cannot be determined by the nature of things. It is determined by human choice [see our Introduction, note 29]." Note here the ambiguity in the use of the word "determined." One might interpret Owens to mean either that (1) human choice is not determined (read=necessitated) by the nature of things, or that (2) the morality of a decision is determined (read=defined, specified, or established) by choice, and not by nature of things; or perhaps he means to say that (3) the proximate or immediate principle of (any) decision (moral or otherwise) is choice. While the first interpretation is faithful to the moral doctrine of St. Thomas, the second is not; the last interpretation seems to be a tautology inasmuch as a choice and a decision can be taken as synonymous terms. Such ambiguity is out of character for Fr. Owens who usually expresses himself with great precision and clarity. For a similar interpretation of St. Thomas' moral philosophy, see Ignatius T. Eschmann, "St Thomas' Approach to Moral Philosophy," Proceedings of the ACPA 31 (1957), 25-33. On free choice vis-à-vis the necessity of judgment as determined by the things which reason judges upon, see De Veritate, q. 24, aa. 2 and 4; on free choice as rooted in the will and caused by reason (as determined, in turn, by the things which reason judges upon), see ST I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2 (VI, 118b): "...radix liberatis est voluntas sicut subjectum; sed sicut causa, est ratio; ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversae conceptiones boni. Et ideo philosophi definiunt liberum arbitrium, quod est liberum de ratione judicium, quasi ratio sit causa liberatis." Hence, every free act for St. Thomas is necessarily a choice among options that are already constituted as morally good or evil. For further explication on this matter, see David Gallagher, "Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite," Journal of the History of Philosophy 29 (1991), 559-584, especially 570; Gerard Smith, "Intelligence and Liberty," The New Scholasticism 15 (1941), 1-17; Anton Pegis, "Necessity and Liberty: An Historical Note on St. Thomas Aquinas," The New Scholasticism 15 (1941) 18-45; Paul Quay, "The Unity and Structure of the Human Act," Listening 18 (1983), 245-53; "The Disvalue of Ontic Evil," Theological Studies 46 (1985), 262-86; see also ST I, q. 83, aa. 1-4; ST I-II, q. 91, a. 3, ad 2.
freely act in accord with its principles insofar as they come to be understood. Thus, under divine providence, man possesses freedom of choice, even the freedom to choose to sin—for which, of course, he must take personal responsibility.\textsuperscript{134}

Finally, let us state that, for St. Thomas, the precepts of natural law are not violently or coercively imposed upon a human being, as, say, in the case of an unjust law imposed by a tyrannical ruler or government;\textsuperscript{135} rather, inasmuch as natural law precepts are (1) derived from the knowledge of human (and other) natures as actually existing in the created world and (2) are connatural to man, it befits the human person to act in accord with these precepts.\textsuperscript{136} St. Thomas' moral doctrine of natural law—as


\textsuperscript{135}Concerning the difference between natural and violent movements, see ST I, q. 103, a. 1, ad 3 (V, 454a), as cited in note 37 above. See also ST I-II, q. 92, a. 1, ad 4 (VII, 160a): "...lex tyrannica, cum non sit secundum rationem, non est simpliciter lex, sed magis est quaedam perversitas legis." Cf. ibid., q. 95, a. 2, resp.; q. 96, a. 4, resp.

\textsuperscript{136}On the connaturality of natural law precepts, see note 91 above and Key-Text A, note 12. On the role of natural law as making man good, see ST I-II, q. 92, a. 1; q.
the participation in eternal law through voluntary (free) action with respect to natural reason and natural inclination—is well summed up as follows:

Now the due order to an end is measured by some rule. In things that act according to nature, this rule is the power itself of nature that inclines them to that end. When, therefore, an action proceeds from a natural power, in accord with the natural inclination to an end, then the action is said to be right...; but when an action strays from this rectitude, it comes under the notion of sin. Now, in those things that are done by the will, the proximate rule is the human reason, while the supreme rule is the eternal law....

[Hence], it is evident that every voluntary action that turns aside from the order of reason and of the eternal law, is evil, and that every good action is in accord with reason and the eternal law. 137

IV. Summary and Conclusion

In this textual study of St. Thomas' doctrine of natural law, we first reviewed his theory of cognition:

94, a. 3. On natural law as leading to man's happiness as his ultimate end, see ibid., q. 90, a. 2. With respect to happiness considered in both its intrinsic and extrinsic aspects—namely, as (1) perfection of human form and (2) union with God as uncreated good—see ST I, q. 60, a. 1, resp.; q. 62, a. 1, resp.; ST I-II, q. 2, a. 7, resp.; q. 3, a. 1, resp.

137 ST I-II, q. 21, a. 1, resp. (VI, 164b): "Debitus autem ordo ad finem secundum aligum regulam mensuratur. Quae quidem regula in his quae secundum naturam agunt, est ipsa virtus naturae, quae inclinat in talem finem. Quando ergo actus procedit a virtute naturali secundum naturalem inclinationem in finem, tunc servatur rectitudo in actu.... Quando autem a rectitudine tali actus aliquis recedit, tunc incidit ratio peccati. In his vero quae aguntur per voluntatem, regula proxima est ratio humana; regula autem suprema est lex aeterna.... Manifestum est autem ex praemissis [ibid., q. 19, aa. 3 and 4] quod omnis actus voluntarius est malus per hoc quod recedit ab ordine rationis et legis aeterna: et omnis actus bonus concordat rationi et legi aeternae."
inasmuch as man exists as a creature composed of soul and body, the proper object of the human intellect is a quiddity or nature as existing in corporeal matter; all human knowledge is derived from, determined and made true by, the sensible world of actually existing creatures; from such knowledge man can attain to the knowledge of incorporeal things, such as God. Thus, there are two proximate causes of human knowledge--namely, (1) the cognitive powers (primarily, the agent intellect) as the efficient cause of knowledge, and (2) sensible existents as content-determining-causes of knowledge.\textsuperscript{138}

We then looked at St. Thomas' notion of participation as applied to natural law assertion that natural law is a participation in us of eternal law. Three main factors were identified.

Next, we considered St. Thomas' notion of participation as applied to his doctrine of natural law. Natural law, he tells us, "is nothing other than a participation in the rational creature of eternal law;"\textsuperscript{139} as this concise definition indicates, three main factors are involved in natural law participation--namely, (1) eternal law, (2)...

\textsuperscript{138}The knowledge of a sensible object thus involves two distinct levels of intellectual actuations: (1) the act of abstraction by which the passive intellect is reduced to act by the agent intellect; (2) the subsequent act of judgment whereby the concept or \textit{verbum} is produced. On these two levels of actuations, see Leo Sweeney, \textit{Christian Philosophy}, 554-58.

\textsuperscript{139}See note 32 above for the Latin.
natural law, and (3) man (qua rational creature). The first factor, eternal law, is the unparticipated exemplar cause which exists independently, subsistently, and perfectly in the mind of God. Eternal law is present to the multiplicity of men through natural law in a restricted and determined manner. The third factor, man, is the individual participant (finite, mutable, and imperfect) which receives natural law, and through which he participates in eternal law; as a result of this participation, man qua moral agent is perfected. The second factor, natural law, is the participated-in-perfection which--derived from eternal law through efficient causality--is actually present in each particular human being. Thus, natural law is (1) that by which eternal law is present in each human being, (2) that which eternal law has in common with each human being as a participant, and (3) that by which men are (univocally) like one another as moral agents and (analogously) like God as (intellectual and volitional) Agent.

As our key-text study revealed, natural law participation pertains to (1) knowledge, (2) human nature and its activity, and (3) man's perfection through his actual relationships with creatures and God.

Next, we considered St. Thomas' teaching of divine providence, eternal law, and nature. For him, providence consists of (1) a plan (ratio) by which things are pre-ordained to an end and (2) the execution or government of
such a plan; eternal law is nothing other than the plan of
divine providence by which God directs the actions of all
creatures towards their proper ends. It is here that St.
Thomas' doctrine of nature enters in—inasmuch as nature is
that intrinsic principle divinely impressed upon a creature,
by which God's providence directs that creature in its
actions towards its proper end. A creature is thus subject
to eternal law according to the determinations of its
nature; and inasmuch as man is a creature, he, too, is
subject to eternal law according to his human nature as
divinely impressed upon him. Such participation in eternal
law is nothing other than natural law—as it pertains to
human nature and natural activity.

With respect to St. Thomas' teaching on natural
appetency, we noted that every nature (qua active potency)
and every natural power possesses a determinate tendency
towards certain operations and goods; thus man, by virtue of
his hylemorphic nature and operative powers, possesses a
multiplicity of determinate tendencies (vegetative,
sensitive, and rational) towards certain operations and
goods. These different tendencies are hierarchically ordered
to one another so that a corresponding hierarchy of human
goods is established; according to such an ordination, the
natural activities of man are directed towards a unifying
end—namely, the knowledge and love of God.

Man's appetitive powers (sensible and intellectual)
bear a determinate tendency towards the actual desire and love of sensible creatures--precisely as known; accordingly, the perfection of a human nature is accomplished only through actual communion with those (human and subhuman) creatures.

In the proximate context (ST I-II, q. 91, a. 2, sed contra), it was stated that (1) man discerns what is good and what is evil according to natural law, and that (2) man does naturally the things that are of the [natural] law. In view of these statements, we asked two questions: (1) how is knowledge of natural law (i.e., the discernment of what is good and evil) attained? and (2) in what sense do human beings "naturally do the things that are of the law?" With these questions in mind, and in light of St. Thomas's teachings on human cognition, participation, divine providence, eternal law, nature, and natural appetency, we turned to our key-text (ST I-II, q. 91, a. 2,) where St. Thomas addresses the question, "Utrum sit in nobis aliqua lex naturalis."

Let us summarize his respondeo as follows. Every creature participates in eternal law inasmuch as from an impression of eternal law (i.e., the nature which the creature has received from God) it has a determinate tendency (natural appetite) towards its proper acts and end. Now, man, as a rational creature, not only participates in eternal law (1) according to natural inclination, but, (2)
in a more excellent manner, (a) by discerning what is good and evil and (b) providing for himself and others--according to the light of reason which is a God-given impression in us of the divine light. This two-fold participation in eternal law by the rational creature is called natural law.

In our commentary upon this key-text, we noted that St. Thomas identifies natural law in man with (1) human nature and its operative powers (the natural appetites and the natural light of reason) and (2) the operations of those powers (the actual desire towards certain goods, the discernment of good and evil, the government of oneself and others). We saw that natural law, insofar as it is equated with human nature and its operative powers, is tantamount to man's natural capacity or aptitude for attaining his proper end--namely, knowing and loving God; taken precisely in this sense, natural law is intrinsic or innate to man. Nevertheless, a nature, understood as a principle of active potency (i.e., a substance possessing determinate tendencies towards certain operations and ends), cannot be completely and truly understood apart from its operations and those ends by which it attains full actuation (i.e., perfection). Now a human nature only attains its perfection (1) through sensible knowledge of other existents and (2) by living in society with other human creatures; accordingly, natural law is truly and properly understood only by taking into account a human nature as it actually exists as an individual in
relation with other actually existing creatures (human and subhuman) in the sensible world.

At this point, we turned to consider natural law per modum cognitionis. Inasmuch as all human knowledge has its origin in the apprehension of sensible existents, it follows that knowledge of natural law principles must properly be considered an acquired knowledge; indeed, St. Thomas expressly states that first principles are known by abstraction from singular things (see note 82 above). Accordingly, when he asserts that such principles are naturaliter insunt and naturaliter cognita, he means that: (1) they are derived from both (a) extrinsic causes (i.e., material existents as content-determining-causes of knowledge) and (b) intrinsic causes (primarily, the light of the agent intellect as the efficient cause of the actuation in the recipient intellect, which then is the efficient cause of the knowledge itself; see note 17 above); (2) by the natural light which is divinely impressed upon him, man possesses the innate ability or capacity to recognize causal relationships in the sensible world, understand the meaning of an end, discern what is good and evil, and subsequently order his activities towards an end.140

With respect to man's natural appetency, we noted that natural law principles are not innate in the appetitive

140 See Proximate Context, [2] and [3], and note 85 above.
power (the will), but, rather, must be presented to it by reason--since, by nature, actual desire and love only follow upon a good as known. But what is proper to the will is the inherent tendency (natural inclination) and the desiring for the good as such and for certain goods befitting human nature--as determined by human nature itself. In a word, while intrinsically determined towards goods, the will as an appetitive power depends upon the intellect for the apprehension of such goods; in this way, natural law principles are understood by St. Thomas as connatural to man inasmuch as they bear a correspondence or proportion to man's determinate tendencies or inclinations towards certain goods as known.

We next investigated this proportion or connaturality which obtains between man's natural inclinations for certain goods and the natural law precepts concerning them. Now, on the one hand, all human inclinations, insofar as they are regulated by reason, are subordinated to a first principle--arising from the acquired knowledge of sensible natures; on the other hand, St. Thomas states that the order of natural law precepts is according to the order of natural inclinations (see note 96).

How can we understand this apparent vicious circle? First, we noted that knowledge of an object as good for St. Thomas implies the knowledge of that thing precisely as desirable (by virtue of the inherent goodness of the actual
object itself which influences such desire in the subject); hence, natural law knowledge, which concerns the regulation of man's actions with respect to the end, must involve (through reflective knowledge upon his actual desires for certain goods) the knowledge of his natural inclination for the end. Next, we explored the notion of rectitude by which man's activities are properly ordered towards his end (i.e., the knowledge and love of God): while reason is rectified through conformity to the will's natural inclination for the ultimate end (to the extent the end is apprehended by reason and proposed to the will), the will is rectified through conformity to reason regarding the proper means towards that end. Natural law precepts, by which man's activities are directed towards his natural end, thus arise from the knowledge of certain means as necessary with respect to the end. Such knowledge thus involves--in part--knowledge of his determinate tendencies or inclinations for certain goods. In a qualified sense, then, natural law knowledge is said to be naturally implanted or innate--precisely insofar as (1) one's own natural inclinations serve as content-determining-causes of natural law knowledge, and (2) man has the capacity or ability to acquire knowledge of his natural inclinations with respect to human goods. In view of St. Thomas' theory of cognition, however, we stressed that the knowledge of a natural inclination is (1) attained only through the knowledge of a sensible objects, and (2) only
with respect to such an object—as actually desired; for, as St. Thomas states, the end of practical knowledge is operation as concerned with singular existents (see note 107 above).

From the above analysis, we came to understand (1) how knowledge of natural law precepts is (a) (properly speaking) acquired and (b) (in a qualified sense) naturally implanted or innate, (2) how natural law knowledge is "natural" to man and "naturally known," and (3) how activity in accord with natural law knowledge is "natural" to man. In this connection we recalled that creatures possess a double character—namely (1) as measured (mensuratae) by the knowledge of God to be what they are, and (2) as measures (mensurae) of human knowledge as to what is known; correlatively, the term impressio for St. Thomas has two related applications—namely, (1) with respect to (human) nature and those operative powers as divinely impressed upon man and other creatures (see notes 37-41), and (2) with respect to the knowledge of eternal law as divinely impressed upon man through the medium of actually existing (human and subhuman) natures (see notes 119-122). According to this acquired knowledge, man's reason subsequently directs him in the activities proper to his nature.

In view of our consideration of natural law as divinely implanted, naturally implanted, innate and acquired, we concluded our commentary by stressing several related
points:

1. The proximate basis of St. Thomas' moral doctrine is not human reason simply, but human reason as rectified by natural law knowledge; such knowledge is acquired from the actual experience of individual human natures in their actual relationships with one another and with other sensible existents.

2. Correlatively, the obligatory character of natural law precepts is not based simply upon the authority of human reason, but upon God as the author and governor of human nature.

3. The obligatory character of natural law does not eclipse free choice; rather, man's free choice is established by divine providence.

4. Nor can free choice be the foundation of the moral order; for free choice does not determine what is good and what is evil; rather, the moral order is determined by the law of human nature as ordained by God; hence, man is personally accountable to God for his freely chosen actions.

5. The natural moral law is not imposed violently or coercively upon man; rather its precepts are connatural to him and direct him towards his true end, which is perfect happiness.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Having explored St. Bonaventure’s and St. Thomas’
doctrines of natural law in view of their respective
doctrines of being, knowledge, and nature, let us now sum up
their teachings and clarify the manner in which each thinker
understands natural law as innate.

I. St. Bonaventure

In our first key-text study (In IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1,
a. un., q. 2: "Utrum omnes appetant beatitudinem veram"), we
learned that natural law is taken by St. Bonaventure in
three different senses. First, natural law is an innate
habitus per naturalem originem; as such, natural law is
consubstantial to the soul. Secondly, as a collectio
praecipitorum natural law is an innate habitus per innatam
dispositionem, which guides the natural judgment of
conscience and inclines the natural pondus of synderesis.
Precisely as a collectio praecipitorum, natural law for St.
Bonaventure is at once innate and acquired: it is innate
inasmuch as it is identified with the natural light of
reason by which we know and judge everything; it is acquired
with respect to the knowledge of material creatures which we
can only attain through sense perception. Hence, a natural
law precept such as "Parents must be honored" is based upon
acquired knowledge inasmuch as the knowledge of an actual "mother" and "father" is sensibly derived; yet, such a precept is innate inasmuch as the honor due to parents is immediately discernable by the light of natural reason in the very act of knowing "mother" and "father." ¹

Concerning this second habitus of natural law (per innatam dispositionem) Bonaventure goes further. In addition to knowledge per similitudinem a sensu acceptam, he asserts that man is capable of knowledge per essentiam whereby the soul, its affections, and God are known through innate species; these innate species are impressed directly upon the soul by God. According to this mode of knowledge, natural law knowledge is simply innate (simpliciter innatus) with respect to the soul, its affections, and God. For example, a natural law precept such as "Love God" qualifies as simply innate by virtue of both (1) the innate light of natural reason, and (2) the contents of such a precept (the soul, its affection, and God) as interiorly known per

¹See Key-Text A, remote context #a, especially notes 25 and 26. The immediate discernment of the honor due to parents will be explained further below. Note that when St. Bonaventure speaks of the knowledge of mother, father, or any other creature, he does not think of these natures as definitional terms of logic; rather, such knowledge pertains to the actuality of those real beings understood (1) in the light of--and with respect to--absolute being and (2) in their concrete relations with other real beings. St. Bonaventure's notion of actuality, however, is different from that of St. Thomas' inasmuch as reality for St. Bonaventure is light; reality for St. Thomas is existence. See Key-Text A, note 33; Key-Text C, Commentary; Appendix D; note 57 below.
essentiam. ²

By virtue of cognitio per essentiam, the notion of God is said to be naturally inserted in us ("naturaliter est nobis inserta"); yet, such innate knowledge of God is not to be construed in any Cartesian or Kantian fashion. In what way, then, is knowledge of God (qua infinite, immutable, absolute Being) innate for St. Bonaventure? He explains that man has knowledge of his end (infinite Being) through the innate knowledge of his own indigent nature which is disposed and inclined towards that end.³ But how is knowledge of man's own indigent nature innate? God is actually present to the interior of the soul, not as a direct object of knowledge, but as the guiding and ruling Light by which the soul sees itself as signifying God qua infinite Being. Through God's illuminating real presence to the soul, the soul recognizes its sacramental significance as an imago Dei—that is, as a capacity for knowing and loving infinite Being.⁴

Thirdly, natural law can be understood as a habitus per acquisatam dispositionem. Such a habitus is innate insofar as man's nature is perfected through deliberate conduct in conformity to the innate habitus of natural law per naturalem originem; yet, the natural law habitus per

²See Key-Text A, Remote Context #a.
³See Key-Text A, sections [4] and [5], and Commentary.
⁴See Key-Text A, Commentary; Key-Text C, Commentary.
acquisatam dispositionem is acquired insofar as its actual instantiation is only brought about through right deliberation and conduct.⁵

As distinguished according to these three kinds of habitus (i.e., innate origin, innate disposition, acquired disposition) natural law is thus proper to the orders of (1) being/essence (2) knowledge/precept, and (3) operation-perfection.

Our study of Key-Text B (Comm. Luc., c. 19, v. 21, n. 34) revealed several interrelated aspects of natural law in virtue of its character as innate. Insofar as it is equated with justice and charity, natural law is intrinsically relational and personal: it is relational because it orients man's intellect and will beyond his own interiority towards God and other creatures; it is personal because through it man is ordered to God and other human beings in an intimate communion of love.⁶ Because natural law is written in the heart of man—that is, as proper to man's very nature—it bears an ontological and psychological preeminence with respect to the intellect and will, and their respective operations; consequently, natural law establishes in every human person an inexorable obligation to God and grounds a universal moral order which transcends cultural and

⁵See Key-Text A, Commentary, especially note 105.

⁶For an explanation of Bonaventure's notion of persona, see note 25 of Key-Text B.
historical bounds. Finally, natural law bears an ontological priority over the written law inasmuch as the latter is rooted in and follows from the former. Hence, a consonance obtains between the interior and exterior law whereby the latter mirrors and clarifies the former.  

Key-Text C (De Perf. Evang., q. 4, a. 1, concl.), concerns the cosmic significance of natural law; here natural law is said to be an impression of eternal law. All creatures are formed, preserved, and ordered to God according to eternal law; and by virtue of their being, as characterized by efficient, formal, and final causality, all creatures represent God in some way.  

With respect to man, we learned that the human soul for Bonaventure is ordered directly to God as its originative, exemplary, and final Cause. In virtue of this immediate ordination to God, the human person bears an inviolable dignity which is irreducible to any finite good. Further, the soul--a substance in itself composed of form and (spiritual) matter--is the act and entelechiae of the body;  

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7 See Key-Text B, Commentary. Since natural law imposes personal obligation, the external law carries the force of personal obligation to the extent that it is rooted in, and accords with, natural law.  

8 See Key-Text C, Commentary.  

9 See Key-Text A, note 2, where St. Bonaventure (1) asserts that the human soul is a substance in itself composed of form and (spiritual) matter, and (2) argues that the component of spiritual matter is required to account for the soul's individuality and mutability. While the soul for Bonaventure is the entelechiae of the body, it is not the
hence the body is subordinate to the soul; indeed, the
visible universe is (proximately) ordered to the human soul
which, in turn, is (immediately) ordered to God. This cosmic
hierarchy is established according to the eternal law of
God.\textsuperscript{10}

Complementing the immediate ordination of his soul to
God, man is also indirectly ordered to God through the
mediation of the corporeal world insofar as it is recognized
in its metaphysical significance as a likeness of God as
origin, exemplar, and end of all creation. This recognition
is achieved by the light of natural law, which Bonaventure
describes as a similitude of eternal law impressed upon
man's soul. As such, natural law signifies eternal law which
is present to the mind but not directly known therein. The
whole visible universe thus indirectly leads man to God by
way of natural law. In this sense, natural law is understood
as both immanent (intrinsic) and transcendent to man since
its scope extends to all beings and the knowledge of all
beings.\textsuperscript{11}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} See Key-Text C, Commentary, especially notes 19-23.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} See Key-Text C, Commentary, especially notes 25-29.
\end{itemize}

form of the body; rather, the body of man for St.
Bonaventure possesses its own proper form which is naturally
subordinate to the soul.
Within the human mind itself, we learned that natural law as habitus _per naturalem originem_ is situated in the most intimate and supreme locus of the mind--namely, the memory. It is here that the eternal law radiates and interfaces with natural law as its created impression; and by virtue of this causal interplay of light between eternal law and natural law, man is united with the eternity of God. That natural law is the medium by which man refers the cosmos to God becomes clear since natural law serves (1) as the central point of unity among the powers and operations of the mind and (2) as the intimate and supreme point of communion between the soul and God.\(^{12}\)

The significance of natural law as innate is further revealed in Bonaventure's doctrine of the genetic unity of the tripartite mind, whereby the structure and operations of the mind image the relations among the Trinity of Divine Persons--Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Accordingly, the memory, which is analogous to the Father, serves as the radical and terminating principle of the human intellect. Here, the role of natural law is seen in its corresponding modes of essence (as proper to memory), knowledge (proper to intellect and analogous to the Son), and operation (proper to the conjunction of intellect and will and analogous to the Holy Spirit), in constituting the tripartite mind of man and directing its operations in an organically unified

\(^{12}\)See Key-Text C, Commentary, notes 35-51.
Finally, natural law, precisely as a habitus per naturalem originem is a kind of ratio seminalis which, as indelibly impressed upon man’s soul, serves as the regulative principle according to which man becomes what he is—namely, an image of God born with the capacity for union with and conformity to God. As a sort of ratio seminalis of human nature, natural law is that metaphysical principle by which human nature is constituted and regulated in its natural operations; for natural law is itself the abiding impression (impressio) of eternal law; and eternal law is that ordo by which human (indeed, each and every) nature is formed, rectified, and perfected. In this respect, natural law is innate in the most profound sense of the term since it represents the essential definition, core, and inner limit of man’s being.¹⁴

Natural law for St. Bonaventure can thus be summed up quite literally as man’s raison d’être; for natural law is that metaphysical, epistemological, and moral principle by which the human person is rightly ordered to God, to himself, and to other creatures through knowledge and love. Inasmuch as the light of God is interiorly present to man, not only as the principle of his being, but as the principle of all his knowledge, natural law knowledge for Bonaventure

¹³See Key-Text C, Commentary, notes 52-61.
is primarily innate and transcendent in orientation and, secondarily, acquired and worldly in scope.

II. St. Thomas

In our contextual introduction to Key-Text A (In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, resp.: "Utrum habere plures uxores sit contra legem naturae"), we cited passages in the Commentary on the Sentences where St. Thomas identifies natural law with either (1) man’s nature, (2) a operative power, (3) the product or operation of such a power, or (4) precepts or principles. Taken as man’s nature, natural law is understood as implanted (indita) by God. Insofar as the term indita implies a relationship of an item to a causal principle, natural law—qua nature—is not simply intrinsic to man, but bears reference to something outside of man—namely, God.\(^{15}\)

Taken as an operative power of man, natural law is understood as natural and innate to man; as natural, natural law (qua natural power) is understood as bearing a certain correspondence or suitability to human nature or form; as "innate," natural law (qua operative power) is understood here as intrinsic (or proper) to human nature.\(^{16}\)

Taken as a product or operation of an operative power,

\(^{15}\)In this connection, see Key-Text A, Proximate Contexts #f and #c.

\(^{16}\)See Key-Text A, Proximate Contexts #a, #d, and #e, and note 35.
natural law is understood as inborn (innata) or (naturally) implanted (inseruit) in man.\textsuperscript{17} As such, natural law is said to be natural inasmuch as whatever is caused by a principle of [some] nature is said to be "natural" to that nature.\textsuperscript{18}

Finally, taken as precepts, dictates, or principles, natural law is said to be innate (innata) to practical reason,\textsuperscript{19} connatural to man (connaturales homini),\textsuperscript{20} and implanted (indita or inseruit) either (i) [by God] in natural cognition,\textsuperscript{21} (ii) in reason itself,\textsuperscript{22} (iii) (inseruit) by an innate power,\textsuperscript{23} or (iv) [by God] in the constitution of human nature.\textsuperscript{24} At this point in our study, however, the meanings of these various expressions (innate, connatural, implanted) was not yet made clear.

Next, we turned directly to the key-text itself. Looking at the general form and direction of St. Thomas' response, we noted that he opens his discussion with an exposition of his theory of nature. Next, he introduces his teaching on natural law which is clearly an extension of his

\textsuperscript{17}See Key-Text A, Proximate Contexts #b, #c, and #e.

\textsuperscript{18}See Key-Text A, Proximate Context #e.

\textsuperscript{19}See Key-Text A, Proximate Context #b.

\textsuperscript{20}See Key-Text A, Proximate Context #b.

\textsuperscript{21}See Key-Text A, Proximate Context #c.

\textsuperscript{22}See Key-Text A, Proximate Context #d.

\textsuperscript{23}See key-Text A, Proximate Context #e.

\textsuperscript{24}See Key-Text A, Proximate Context #f.
doctrine of nature. Only then does he proceed to the moral issue at hand; and the solution he offers is squarely set in terms of his opening discussion on nature and natural law. We thus concluded that St. Thomas' moral doctrine has as its basis the natural law, which itself issues from his doctrine of nature--specifically human nature.

What, then, is St. Thomas' doctrine of nature as explicated in his Commentary on the Sentences? We summed up his teaching in the following five points: (1) natura is that intrinsic principle by which a creature is determined in its proper actions and directed in those actions towards its proper end;\(^25\) (2) insofar as it is an impression (impressio) divinely implanted (divinitus indita) in creatures, natura signifies for St. Thomas an ordination to God as its extrinsic cause; (3) creatures, according to their proper natures, are ordered to God as their ultimate end and good; (4) this ordination to God involves the mediation (causal relationships) of creatures to one another;\(^26\) (5) the perfection (perfectio) of a creature is understood in two ways: (a) with respect to a thing's operation suitable to its form; (b) with respect to the union of a creature with the ultimate perfecting end of its being (esse).\(^27\)

\(^{25}\)See Key-Text A, section [1], and notes 24-25.

\(^{26}\)See Key-Text A, notes 29-31.

\(^{27}\)See Key-Text A, note 32.
After viewing St. Thomas' doctrine on nature in general, we next looked at his notion of human nature qua specifically intellectual. By virtue of his intellectual nature, man has the capacity to discern—through sensible experience\(^{28}\)—causal relationships in the world and thus trace secondary principles to their first principles;\(^{29}\) likewise, inasmuch as he naturally tends to his end according to reason, man is able to refer secondary ends (goods) back to God as his ultimate end (or good).\(^{30}\)

In Key-Text A, then, St. Thomas identifies knowledge and appetite as the principles of action proper to creatures which participate in cognition; but further, he explicitly identifies natural law in man with the *conceptio* which is naturally implanted in him ("lex ergo naturalis nihil est aliud quam conceptio homini naturaliter indita").\(^{31}\)

What can be said of the nature and derivation of the naturalis conceptio? Our investigation revealed that it is not a knowledge simply of man's end; rather it is a complex knowledge which involves knowledge of (1) determinate goods (human persons and other creatures existing in the sensible universe), (2) man's actions as flowing from his own nature (generic and specific) as concerned with (3) the common end

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\(^{28}\)On this, see Key-Text A, note 64.

\(^{29}\)See Key-Text A, note 30.


\(^{31}\)See Key-Text A, section [4].
or indeterminate good. This complex knowledge is the moral norm by which we discern what we must do (*quo agenda discernimus*).\(^{32}\) Taken precisely as an operation and immanent effect of the *vis cognoscitiva* as its efficient cause, the *naturalis conceptio* is understood by St. Thomas as *innata* or *naturaliter indita*.\(^{33}\) Taken as precisely as a knowledge, the *naturalis conceptio* is (1) both divinely and naturally implanted in man, and (2) innate;\(^{34}\) but further, inasmuch as its contents are constituted by material objects acting as content-determining-causes, the *naturalis conceptio* is (3) acquired from the senses.\(^{35}\)

In order to understand how the *naturalis conceptio* is considered by St. Thomas to be at once innate, divinely and naturally implanted, and acquired, we investigated how the *naturalis conceptio* is produced. Through sensible experience, man acquires knowledge of human persons (as well as other creatures); according to the knowledge of these other existents, man acquires some knowledge of his own operations, powers, and nature in relation to those creatures; and from the knowledge of himself in relation to

\(^{32}\)See Key-Text A, note 10; see notes 45-46 concerning moral good and evil in terms of rectitude (or the lack thereof) of the will with respect to the ultimate end as known.

\(^{33}\)See Key-Text A, Proximate Contexts #b and #e, and sections [1] and [4].

\(^{34}\)For references, see notes 19 through 24 above.

\(^{35}\)See Key-Text A, notes 61-62.
those creatures—precisely as known, desired, and loved—he attains knowledge of what "good" is. Thus, from the combined knowledge of (1) other creatures (human and subhuman), (2) the knower's own nature and operations in relation to those creatures as desired, and (3) what "good" is, the naturalis conceptio is constituted.

From our analysis of the production of the naturalis conceptio we came to understand how natural law knowledge is at once innate, divinely and naturally implanted, and acquired. First, one's own nature and operative powers are (a) efficient causes of natural law knowledge (#a, 34-37 and 49 above) and, to some extent, (b) content-determining-causes of such knowledge (#b, #c and #f and notes 68-69 above); hence, inasmuch as human nature—taken precisely as (a) the efficient cause and (b) a content-determining-cause of natural law knowledge—is divinely impressed upon man, natural law knowledge is said to be divinely impressed in man. Secondly, one's natural operations serve to some extent as content-determining-causes of natural law knowledge; hence, inasmuch as one's natural operations—taken precisely as content-determining-causes of natural law knowledge—are produced by man's own natural powers, natural law knowledge is understood as naturally implanted or innate

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36 See Key-Text A, notes 65-69.

37 See Key-Text A, Proximate Contexts #a #b, #c and #f, and notes 34-37, 49, 68-69.
in man. Thirdly, one's own natural operations, powers, and nature, are known only reflectively through the knowledge of sensible creatures; and since the knowledge of such creatures is itself acquired only through sensible experience, the whole of natural law knowledge—as constituted by both its intrinsic and extrinsic content-determining-causes—is an acquired knowledge. Hence, properly speaking, natural law knowledge for St. Thomas is an acquired knowledge; only in a qualified sense is such knowledge considered as innate or naturally or divinely implanted in man.

In our contextual introduction to Key-Text B (Summa Theologica I-II, q. 91, a. 2, resp.: "Utrum sit in nobis aliqua lex naturalis"), we reviewed St. Thomas' later teaching on human cognition. Corresponding to man's natural constitution—namely, a spiritual soul as form united to a body—the proper object of the human intellect is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter. Thus, human knowledge for St. Thomas is derived from, determined by, and oriented towards the sensible world of actually existing creatures. Human knowledge thus depends upon two proximate causes: (1) the cognitive powers (external and internal senses; the agent and recipient intellects) as efficient cause of cognition; (2) sensible existents (human and subhuman natures) as content-determining-causes of

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38See Key-Text A, Proximate Contexts #d, #e and [4].
cognition.\textsuperscript{39}

We next considered St. Thomas' notion of participation as applied to his doctrine of natural law. Natural law, he tells us, "is nothing other than a participation in the rational creature of eternal law;"\textsuperscript{40} as this concise definition indicates, three main factors are involved in natural law participation--namely, (1) eternal law, (2) natural law, and (3) man (qua rational creature). The first factor, eternal law, is the unparticipated exemplar cause which exists independently, subsistently, and perfectly in the mind of God. Eternal law is present to the multiplicity of men through natural law in a restricted and determined manner. The third factor, man, is the individual participant (finite, mutable, and imperfect) which receives natural law, and through which he participates in eternal law; as a result of this participation, man is perfected as a moral (intellectual and volitional) agent. The second factor, natural law, is the participated-in-perfection which--derived from eternal law through efficient causality--is actually present in each particular human being. Thus, natural law is (1) that by which eternal law is present in each human being, (2) that which eternal law has in common

\textsuperscript{39}See Key-Text B, Remote Context \#a.

\textsuperscript{40}See Key-Text B, note 32 above for the Latin. See also Key-Text A, notes 34-37 and section [2]; in Key-Text A, however, the rubric of participation is used only indirectly with respect to natural law.
with each human being qua participant, and (3) that by which men are (univocally) like one another as moral agents and (analogously) like God as intellectual and volitional Agent. As revealed through the course of our study, natural law participation pertains to (1) knowledge, (2) human nature and its activity, and (3) man's perfection through his actual relationships with creatures and God.

We then presented an overview of St. Thomas' teachings on divine providence, eternal law, and natura, which can be summed up as follows:

1. Divine providence consists of (1) the plan of the order of things pre-ordained towards an end and (b) the execution of this order, which is called government.

2. Eternal law is the plan of divine providence by which God directs all acts and movements of creatures towards their proper ends.

3. All creatures are subject to eternal law according to their inherent natures impressed upon them by God.

4. Hence, man, who also is a creature of God, is said to participate in eternal law according to his own divinely impressed nature; this participation in eternal law is

41 See Key-Text B, Remote Context #b.
42 See Key-Text B, Remote Context #c.
43 See Key-Text B, notes 33-35.
44 See Key-Text B, note 36.
45 See Key-Text B, notes 36-37.
nothing other than natural law—as it pertains to human nature and natural activity.46

We next reviewed St. Thomas' theory of natural appetency. Here, it was noted that every nature (qua active potency) and every natural power possesses a determinate tendency towards certain operations and goods; thus man, by virtue of his hylemorphic nature and operative powers, possesses a multiplicity of determinate tendencies (vegetative, sensitive, and rational) towards certain operations and goods. These different tendencies are hierarchically ordered to one another so that a corresponding hierarchy of human goods is established; according to such an ordination, the natural activities of man are directed towards a unifying end—namely, the knowledge and love of God.47

In the key-text itself, St. Thomas addresses the question, "Utrum sit in nobis aliqua lex naturalis"; and in his respondeo, he states that the rational creature participates in Eternal Law not simply through natural inclination, but in a more excellent manner—namely, by discerning what is good and evil, and governing himself and others according to the light of natural reason; this light is an impression in us of the Divine Light. This twofold participation in Eternal Law by the rational creature is

46 See Key-Text B, notes 40-41.
47 See Key-Text B, Remote Context #d, and notes 42-63.
called natural law.

In our commentary on this key-text, we noted that natural law, as equated with human nature itself (including its operative powers), is tantamount to man's natural capacity or aptitude for attaining his proper end. However, inasmuch as a human person must attain his perfection through actual involvement with other sensible existents, natural law—in the full sense of the term—pertains to a human nature in its operations of knowing and willing vis-a-vis other existents in the sensible world.48

In this connection, St. Thomas reiterates elsewhere in the Summa Theologiae that first principles of practical reason are naturally known (naturaliter cognita) inasmuch as: (1) they are derived from both (a) extrinsic content-determining-causes of knowledge (namely, sensible existents) and (b) intrinsic efficient causes (primarily the light of natural reason);49 (2) by virtue of the natural light which is divinely impressed upon him, man possesses the innate ability or capacity to recognize causal relationships in the sensible world, understand the meaning of an end, discern what is good and evil, and subsequently order his activities towards an end.50 Further, natural law principles are said

48 See Key-Text B, note 68-75.
49 See Key-Text B, notes 76-87.
50 See Key-Text B, Proximate Context, [2] and [3] and notes 80-85. See also Key-Text A, Proximate Context #a.
to be "natural" to man and "naturally known" inasmuch as they bear a correspondence to his natural inclination towards certain goods as known.\(^{51}\)

How are we to understand this correspondence between natural inclinations for certain goods and the correlative natural law precept? Closer study revealed that knowledge of an object as good implies the knowledge of that object precisely as desirable (by virtue of the inherent goodness of the actual object itself which influences the natural desire in the subject); hence, natural law knowledge, which concerns the regulation of man's actions with respect to the end, must involve (through reflective knowledge upon man's actual desires for certain goods) the knowledge of his natural inclination (i.e., his will) for the end.\(^{52}\)

We next studied St. Thomas' notion of rectitude by which man's activities are properly ordered towards his end (i.e., the knowledge and love of God): while reason is rectified through conformity to the natural inclination for the ultimate end (as apprehended by reason and proposed to the will), the will is rectified through conformity to reason regarding the proper means towards that end. It is this double ordination of reason and will with respect to (1) the end, and (2) things ordered to the end (i.e., means), that explains the derivation of natural law precepts; for a

\(^{51}\)See Key-Text B, notes 88-92.

\(^{52}\)See Key-Text B, notes 93-104.
natural law precept implies a relation of means to a natural end, inasmuch as something is perceived as being necessary to that end. Accordingly, insofar as (1) one's own natural inclinations serve as content-determining-causes of natural law knowledge, and (2) man has the capacity or ability to acquire natural law knowledge--according to the knowledge of his natural inclinations with respect to human goods--knowledge of natural law is said to be naturally implanted or innate.

In view of our above analysis, we came to understand (1) how knowledge of natural law precepts is (a) (properly speaking) acquired and (b) (in a qualified sense) naturally implanted or innate, (2) how natural law knowledge is "natural" to man and "naturally known," and (3) how activity in accord with natural law knowledge is "natural" to man. In this connection, we called attention to St. Thomas' double application of the term impressio with respect to (1) human nature and (2) human knowledge. First, inasmuch as man's own nature (including its operative powers) is directly implanted in or impressed upon him by God, natural law (as identified with human nature) is God-given--that is, received from an extrinsic cause; of course, inasmuch as the operations which flow from man's God-given natural powers

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53 See Key-Text B, notes 105-117.
54 See Key-Text B, notes 41, 70-71, and 78.
55 See Key-Text B, notes 118-122.
are intrinsic to man, natural law is understood as innate or inborn. Secondly, inasmuch as the knowledge of human nature (taken precisely as an active potency in its concrete circumstances) is indirectly impressed upon his intellect by God through the medium of actually existing (human and subhuman) natures (as known in and through the actual context of sensible experience), natural law knowledge is (properly) understood by St. Thomas as a naturally acquired knowledge.

III. Differences in Thought

At times, both St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas identify natural law with the nature of man and his natural powers. To this extent, both thinkers speak of natural law as divinely impressed (impressa), implanted (indita), or innate (innata), in man. With regard to natural law knowledge, St. Thomas agrees with St. Bonaventure that natural law principles are innate--precisely inasmuch as (a) all human cognition is efficiently caused by the natural light of reason and (b) by virtue of this natural light, man possesses the capacity to discern what is good and evil. Further, St. Bonaventure agrees with St. Thomas that natural

56See Key-Text B, Remote Contexts #c and #d; see note 57 below. For an explanation of the term innata, see Key-Text A, note 13.

57See Key-Text B, notes 119-121. See Key-Text B, notes 41, 70-71, and 78 regarding natural law knowledge as innate—in a qualified sense.
law principles are acquired—to the extent that natural law pertains to the sensibly derived knowledge of material creatures. But what can be said of their differences concerning natural law knowledge as innate?

A thorough answer to the above question would require an extensive examination of their underlying philosophical and theological differences; suffice it, however, to enumerate a few fundamental differences between their accounts of human nature and human knowledge; for their doctrines of human nature have direct bearing upon their respective epistemologies—which, in turn, account for their different views of natural law knowledge as innate.

1. For St. Bonaventure, the soul of man is a substance in itself, constituted by its own (spiritual) matter and substantial form; likewise, the body of man is a substance in itself, constituted by its own matter and substantial form. Hence, while the body is naturally subordinate to the soul, the soul is not the substantial form of the body, and

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"...in tribus eadem opinionum diversitas invenitur: scilicet in eductione formarum in esse, in acquisitione virtutum et in acquisitione scientiarum." De Veritate, q. 11, a. 1, resp. (XXII, 349b). See also De Virt., q. un., a. 8, resp. For a comprehensive explication of the underlying theological and philosophical differences between St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, see Frederick Charles Herx, "The Problem of Illumination in St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas: During the Period 1250-1259" (Ph.D. diss., Notre Dame, 1961).
thus possesses a certain independence from the body in its proper operations. Accordingly, the operative powers of the soul (the intellect and will) are consubstantial with the soul and likewise enjoy a certain independence from the body in their respective operations. By extension, then, the human soul enjoys a certain independence from the corporeal world in its movements and activities.

For St. Thomas, the soul is not a complete substance in itself, but rather the substantial form of the body which requires the latter as its material principle; together the soul and body constitute a single substantial unity—the human *compositum*. Hence the relationship between the soul and body for St. Thomas is much more integral and crucial. Accordingly, the operative faculties of the soul (the intellect and will) require to a greater extent the bodily faculties (notably the external and internal senses) in order to perform their operations (intellection and volition). Consequently, the corporeal world plays a more important role in the operations of the human soul for St. Thomas than for St. Bonaventure. In this connection, let us consider the differences between their theories of knowledge.

2. According to St. Bonaventure, man’s intellect is a *tabula rasa* only with respect to the knowledge of corporeal

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59 See Key-Text A, Remote Context #a.
60 See Key-Text B, Remote Context #c.
creatures; consequently, he requires sensible experience in order to acquire knowledge of the sensible world; further, knowledge of the extrinsic world is required inasmuch as, by virtue of such knowledge, man is led inwardly to consider the existence and nature of his own spiritual soul. But having turned within, man—without recourse to phantasms—is able to know his own soul in the divine light which shines from within his soul.  

For St. Thomas, not only is sensible experience required for the knowledge of corporeal creatures, but even the knowledge of one’s own soul (excepting supernatural revelation) depends upon phantasms as derived from sensible experience; and when man (naturally) attains to some knowledge of himself, it is only with reference to sensible creatures, and simply by the light of his own intellect.  

This epistemological contrast between St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas is played out in their respective theories on abstraction.

3. For Bonaventure, abstraction involves an intellectual judgment whereby the sensible species of sensibly known creatures enter the mind and are understood in the radiance of the eternal reasons which shines from within the soul; accordingly, the mind is led inwardly from

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61 See Key-Text A, Remote Context #a.

62 See Key-Text A, notes 64-69; Key-Text B, Remote Context #a and note 33.
the knowledge of temporal and mutable creatures to the knowledge of their eternal and immutable Source of being.

Let us note in this connection three corollary points: (a) knowledge of God is directly inferred from the knowledge of creatures; (b) this inference (what St. Bonaventure refers to as a reductio or resolutio) from creature to God is based primarily upon the sacramental significance which every creature bears toward God as its exemplar; (c) there follows an additional reductio where the intelligible species (now known in the light of the eternal reasons) is referred back to the sensible object. 63

For St. Thomas abstraction and judgment represent two distinct levels of actuations (#a and #b). Abstraction occurs when the agent intellect uses the phantasm (as efficiently produced by the internal senses, and whose content is produced by the actual extramental existents) to

63 See Key-Text A, remote context #a, especially notes 26-28. See also Gilson, La Philosophie de St. Bonaventure, 321. With respect to the reductio of the intellect back to particular objects, Leo Sweeney suggests that St. Bonaventure's epistemology may be a representationalism inasmuch he sets up an analogy between the triune God and human epistemology: "Bonaventure does, then, set up a parallel of the Father and Son as parent and offspring, but this parallel apparently works only if the 'similitudo,' which is distinct from the sensible object, is known first and then leads the knower to the object itself. If so, such an epistemology is representational: the similitudo or image, which re-presents the object, is known before the object itself, which thereafter becomes known." Christian Philosophy, 557-58. Such an interpretation accords with Bonaventure's metaphysics of exemplarism (see Key-Text A, note 33 and Appendix D) and his notion of human nature as a compositum of two substances--body and soul.
produce the actuation #a in the recipient intellect; at this level of actuation, the intellect becomes entitatively, but non-cognitively, its extramemental object through the intelligible species (whose content-determining-cause is the extramemental object); then, with the recipient intellect, the agent intellect produces the actuation #b which is the awareness of the object to which the intellect is conformed; in this actuation #b (awareness), the extramemental object is directly known through the intelligible species to which the recipient intellect is conformed.⁶⁴ Judgment represents a further kind of intellectual actuation #b where assent is given that the object known is such or is not such. Thus, while judgment for St. Thomas involves abstraction, abstraction is not identical with judgment.

Let us underscore three important implications which St. Thomas' theory of abstraction entail: simply by the natural light of the intellect, (a) the extramemental object is directly known as it actually exists in the sensible world--without any immediate reference to God; (b) the knower knows himself secondarily and only according to his knowledge of sensible creatures; (c) knowledge of God is arrived at only through further consideration of creatures (including the knower himself) as they actually exist in the

⁶⁴ The intelligible species for St. Thomas is itself known only upon further consideration and by inference. See Key-Text B, Remote Context #a, especially notes 11-21.
world. 65

4. According to his illumination theory and corresponding theory of abstraction, knowledge of natural law for Bonaventure is truly innate; for even the knowledge of creatures, which is derived from the senses, involves a reductio to the knowledge of the eternal principles which illumine, move, and direct the soul from within. Indeed, the illumination of these eternal principles, by which man is directed in all knowledge and activity, radiates from the core of his being ("Solus enim Deus propter summam simplicitatem et spiritualitatem illabitur animae, ita quod secundum veritatem est in anima et intimior animae quam ipsa sibi"). 66 Simply put, the epistemological aspect of natural law for St. Bonaventure involves the ordination of relative being to absolute Being; and inasmuch as the divine presence illumines the mind from within, the mind’s reduction or resolution of relative being to the esse divinum qua actus purus 67 follows an interior course. Hence, natural law knowledge is innate for St. Bonaventure in the most profound sense of the word.

According to St. Thomas’ theory of knowledge, the human intellect is measured, not by the interior light of God, but

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65 See Key-Text A, notes 24-33.
66 See Key-Text A, notes 77-78, 91 and 105.
67 See Key-Text A, note 33 and Appendix D.
by the things created by Him. By the sufficiency of his own natural light, man recognizes causal relationships in the sensible world, understands the meaning of an end, discerns what is good and evil, and can subsequently order his activities towards that end. For this reason, St. Thomas asserts that the first principles of the intellect (both speculative and practical) are derived from the knowledge of extramental existents: "cognitio principiorum provenit nobis ex sensu"; "principia indemonstrabilia cognoscimus abstrahendo a singularibus". For St. Thomas too, natural law involves the ordination of relative being to absolute Being; nevertheless, this ordination is not discovered by divine illumination from within the soul, but from the acquired knowledge of human natures (one’s own and others’) as they actually exist in the concrete world. Thus, for St. Thomas, natural law knowledge is an acquired knowledge.

In sum, because the human soul for St. Bonaventure is a substance in itself which enjoys a certain independence from the body, knowledge of sensible creatures through abstraction is ancillary to the soul’s knowledge of itself

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68 See Key-Text B, note 20.

69 See Key-Text B, notes 79 and 82 respectively. Thus, when we say that (1) St. Thomas’ moral philosophy is an expression of the natural law, (2) that his doctrine of natural law is based upon his doctrine of nature, (3) that his doctrine of nature is rooted in his metaphysics and corresponding epistemology, it must be understood that all these related sciences (metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics) are derived from, pertain to, made true and validated by, man’s actual experience in the concrete world.
and God through an interior divine illumination; accordingly, natural law knowledge for Bonaventure is fundamentally innate inasmuch as it is (1) primarily dependent upon divine illumination and (2) secondarily dependent upon knowledge of sensible creatures through abstraction.

For St. Thomas, however, man exists as a substantial unity of soul and body whereby the soul depends upon the bodily senses for the natural acquisition of knowledge--including the knowledge of itself and God. Consequently, natural law knowledge for St. Thomas is a wholly acquired knowledge inasmuch as all human knowledge is naturally acquired through the bodily senses.

IV. Points of Clarification

In our investigation of natural law as innate, we have considered St. Thomas' related teachings on human nature, knowledge, providence, law, rectitude, the good, perfection, and free-will. Let us now articulate a few of these doctrines vis-à-vis certain contemporary interpretations of St. Thomas as noted in our introduction. 70

1. St. Thomas does not limit the (speculative) science of metaphysics--which pertains to beings as they actually exist in the real world--to the trappings of formal

70The following statements as articulated below are also in line with the teachings of St. Bonaventure--even though his doctrines of human nature and knowledge are in many respects different from those of St. Thomas.
logic;\(^{71}\) nor does he consider a human nature merely as a term of logic; rather, a human nature for him is an actually existing human person who possesses natural inclinations to certain actions and goals. Correspondingly, natural moral law concerns the knowledge of such human natures taken precisely in their teleological significance; hence, for St. Thomas, moral implications do, in fact, follow according to what human natures actually are.\(^{72}\)

There is no warrant, then, for interpreting natural law—as understood by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, at least—as resting upon a merely logical definition of human nature—from which "one cannot validly derive an 'ought' from an 'is.'" Indeed, the charge that the Thomistic doctrine of natural law rests upon the so-called "naturalistic fallacy" is itself based upon the fallacy of confusing speculative knowledge with the limitations of

\(^{71}\)Regarding St. Thomas' understanding of metaphysics as extending to the consideration of matter and motion, see \textit{In Boeth. de Trin.}, q. 5, a. 1, resp.; concerning his awareness that mathematics prescinds from the consideration of final causality, motion and operation, see \textit{In III Sent.}, d. 27, q. 1, a. 4, ad 11; \textit{In Boeth. de Trin.}, q. 5, a. 4, ad 7; with regard to St. Thomas' criticism of certain ancient philosophers who, because of their restrictive terms of intelligibility, were unable to speak of final causes, see \textit{De Veritate}, q. 5, a. 2, resp.

\(^{72}\)For example, because, say, David Hume is a man, he ought to be truthful. With regard to Bonaventure's notions of nature and natural law, see Key-Text A, notes 33, 82, 91, 105; Key-Text C, notes 63-68. On St. Thomas' notions of nature and natural law, see Key-Text B, Remote Context #c.
formal logic.\textsuperscript{73}

2. Since the notion of good is derived from the knowledge of one's human nature with respect to actual beings, first principles of practical reason (natural law principles) are formed according to the speculative knowledge of those real relationships.\textsuperscript{74} As we have noted,\textsuperscript{75} the practical intellect for St. Thomas is the speculative intellect extended to the consideration of

\textsuperscript{73}On this, see Robert B. Ashmore, "Aquinas and Ethical Naturalism," The New Scholasticism 49 (1975), 76-86. The "naturalistic fallacy" indictment against natural law appears to be rooted in a rationalistic conception of being (and a corresponding narrow view of the role of ratio speculativa). Consider, for example, John Finnis' rationalistic approach to being and his treatment of the uncaused cause: "The explanation of its existing can only be this: that the uncaused causing state of affairs includes, as a prerequisite to its existing, a state of affairs that exists because of what it is, i.e. because it is what it is. It will be convenient to label this last-mentioned state of affairs D. In the case of all states of affairs except D, we can describe the state of affairs, say what it is, without knowing that it is (i.e. without knowing whether it is an existing state of affairs). But, of D the argument requires us to say that what it is is all that it requires to exist." Natural Law and Natural Rights, 387. In this same rationalistic vein, see Germain Grisez' approach to the existence of God in Beyond the New Theism (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 36-84. In view of such rationalistic accounts of the uncaused cause, it is no wonder that Finnis' and Grisez' interpretation of St. Thomas is problematic and controversial. For a critique of the rationalistic approach to God as divorced from the tradition of realism, see John Edwin Gurr, The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Some Scholastic Systems: 1750-1900 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1959).

\textsuperscript{74}See Bonaventure, Key-Text A, Remote Contexts #a-b, and Commentary; St. Thomas, Key-Text B, Commentary. See notes 69 above and 88 below.

\textsuperscript{75}See Key-Text B, note 78.
action. Indeed, St. Thomas clearly affirms that counsel (consilium) is an act proper to the speculative intellect with respect to human activities (agibiliala). There is no reason, then, for construing a dualism from the distinction made between the operations of the speculative intellect and practical intellect; man has but one mind.

3. The first principles of natural law for St. Thomas are not merely "prescriptive" as Germaine Grisez asserts; rather, St. Thomas identifies these moral principles as commands (praesepctae). Nor does St. Thomas consider law (lex) as mere "advice." Rather law, for St. Thomas, "is a rule and measure of acts whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting—for lex is derived from ligare,

76 See ST I-II, q. 57, a. 6, resp., (VII, 370a): "Circa agibiliala autem humana tres actus rationis inveniuntur: quorum primus est consiliari, secundum iudicare, tertius est praecipere. Primi autem duo respondent actibus intellectus speculativi qui sunt inquirere et iudicare: nam consilium inquisitio quaedam est." See note 78 below for the continuation of this passage.

77 See our Introduction, note 44, and Key-Text B, note 113; the term "prescriptive" as used by Grisez evidently refers to that which is advisable or recommended—and not what is commanded with imperative force.

78 As clarified in note 76 above, the office of "prescription" which Germain Grisez assigns to the practical intellect is, according to St. Thomas, proper to the speculative reason. It is the role of practical reason, not merely to offer counsel or advise, but to command (praecipere). See ST I-II, q. 57, a. 6, resp. (VII, 370b): "Sed tertius actus [i.e, praecipere] proprius est practici intellectus, inquantum est operativus: non enim ratio habet praecipere ea quae per hominem fieri non possunt." See Key-Text B, note 96. It is evident, then, that St. Thomas knows the difference between counsel and command when he identifies the first principles of natural law as praeccepta.
because it binds one to act." 79 Hence, the precepts 
(praecepta) of natural law (lex) are for St. Thomas not 
simply helpful suggestions for "the art of successful 
living." 80

79 ST I-II, q. 90, a. 1, resp. (VII, 199a): "...lex 
quaedam regula est et mensura actuum, secundum quam 
inducitur aliquis ad agendum vel ab agendo retraititur: 
dicitur enim lex a ligando, quia obligat ad agendum." Note 
that this definition of law serves as the opening statement 
to his treatise on law (ST I-II, qq. 90-97), and thus must 
be taken as primary and foundational. In his discussion on 
the etymology of the term lex ("Is Thomas Aquinas a Natural 
Law Ethicist?," 55), however, Vernon Bourke makes no mention 
of this definition; see our Introduction, note 37.

80 See ST I-II, q. 99, aa. 1 and 5. Common to Grisez, 
Finnis, Boyle, Bourke, Owens, et al, is a certain approach 
to the moral life which one can describe in a word as 
insipid--proper to the dream-world one finds in Charles 
Take, for example, Bourke's interpretation of St. Thomas 
regarding fornication ("Is Aquinas a Natural Law Ethicist?," 
62): "In effect, Thomas concludes that fornication is 
immoral, not so much because God dislikes it as because God 
sees that it is not a suitable and success-promoting 
activity for man [italics added]." In this connection, F. J. 
Thonnard speaks of a certain "egotist and bourgeois" 
approach to the moral life which "is well portrayed in the 
following 'Portrait of an Epicurean' [Martha, Le Poème de 
Lucrèce, morale, religion, science, 7]: "Who has not met, 
even today, a practical sage, unknowingly epicurean, 
moderated in his tastes, virtuous without great moral 
ambition, anxious to live well? He aims to keep body, spirit 
and soul healthy; he only indulges in pleasures which leave 
no regrets, in opinions which are undisturbing; he watches 
his own passions and flees those of others. If he does not 
allow himself to be tempted by positions and honors, it is 
due to fear of taking a risk or of being beaten in a 
contest. Of good humor, polished, more or less a friend of 
science, he is content with current information. Without 
being disturbed by metaphysical problems, he has long ago 
placed God so high and distant that he has nothing to hope 
for, and nothing to fear. With regard to the future life, he 
has, so to speak, effaced it from his soul and does not 
consider death except to decently resign himself to it some 
day. In the meantime, he disposes his life with a timid 
prudence, and does not go abroad among men except within the
4. Inasmuch as the natural inclinations of man are hierarchically ordered towards an ultimate end (namely, the knowledge and love of God), there is a corresponding complexity of human goods which are hierarchically ordered towards that one ultimate end. Thus, friendship, for example, is not an irreducible good-in-itself; rather, true or right friendship is rooted in the love of God and ordered towards the love of God. Indeed, sin (moral evil) consists precisely in the love of any finite good as an end-in-itself. Thus, as opposed to the opinions of Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle, human goods for St. Thomas are commensurable and reducible to one ultimate good--namely God.81

5. While moral judgments are guided by right reason, right reason is itself made "right" by virtue of the dictates of natural law--as acquired from the knowledge of human persons as they actually exist in the world. Hence, Vernon Bourke's assertion that St. Thomas' moral philosophy is not based upon natural law cannot be reasonably maintained; indeed, Bourke's assertion is flatly contradicted by St. Thomas' own words: "...omnia moralia circle of his friends where he can enjoy the sentiments which he inspires and those which he approves. His egoism is noble and delicate and has seen that benevolence is the charm of life whether one is its object or whether one is benevolent to others." A Short History of Philosophy, 161.

81See Bonaventure, Key-Text B, Commentary; St. Thomas, Key-Text B, Remote Context #d. Regarding Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle, see our Introduction, notes 41-54.
praecipita legis sunt de lege naturae.°82

6. While free will is a sine qua non of the moral
dimension of man, the objective moral order is not
established by free choice; rather, a human act is
instantiated as moral or immoral by virtue of free
deliberation in conformity with or against the objective
moral order—as established by the Author of human nature.
Thus, contrary to the opinion of Joseph Owens, the starting
point of the moral order for St. Thomas does not begin with
human choice, nor is the moral order man-man.83

V. A Final Comment

A final word must be said with respect to the opinion
(as maintained by Bourke, Owens, Finnis, et al) that nature
has no direct bearing on ethics, or that metaphysical
reflection is only an appendage to ethics. For St.
Bonaventure and St. Thomas, the concerns of metaphysics,
epistemology, and ethics are in themselves different;
evertheless, these sciences are not unrelated. Why? because
each philosophical discipline is a distinct—but not
isolated—aspect of but one intelligible world in which man

82ST I-II, q. 100, a. 1, sed contra (VII, 206a). See
Bonaventure, Key-Text A, Commentary; St. Thomas, Key-Text B,
Commentary; regarding Vernon Bourke, see our Introduction,
notes 37-38.

83See St. Bonaventure, Key-Text A, Remote Context #b
and Commentary; St. Thomas, Key-Text B, Commentary. See our
finds himself inexorably immersed. Perhaps the most clear-cut example of the interrelation between metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and the real world in which man lives his life with other persons is offered by Jean-Paul Sartre. According to him there is no human nature because there is no God to conceive it; and because there is no God, everything is permissible. Or for another example, consider the practical ideology embraced by Benito Mussolini:

In Germany relativism is an exceedingly daring and subversive theoretical construction (perhaps Germany's...)

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64 See Bonaventure, Key-Text A, note 33 and Commentary; St. Thomas, Key-Text A, Commentary; Key-Text B, Remote Contexts #a-d. For a discussion on St. Bonaventure's division of sciences, see John F. Quinn, "The Moral Philosophy of St. Bonaventure," 39-41; see also Leo Sweeney, "Christian Philosophy in Augustine and Bonaventure," 278-308. Aquinas discusses the division of sciences at length In Boeth. de Trin., q. 5, aa. 1-4.

65 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, tr. Philip Mairet (Brooklyn: Haskell House Publishers, 1977), 29: "If man, as the existentialist conceives him, is indefinable, it is because at first he is nothing. Only afterward will he be something, and he himself will have made what he will be. Thus, there is no human nature, since there is no God to conceive it." Ibid., 33: "The existentialist...finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since there in no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. It is nowhere written that 'the good' exists, that one must be honest or must not lie, since we are now upon the plane where there are only men. Dostoevski once wrote 'If God did not exist, everything would be permitted'; and that, for existentialism, is the starting point. Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself."
philosophical revenge which may herald the military revenge). In Italy, relativism is simply a fact.... Everything I have said and done is these last years is relativism by intuition.... If relativism signifies contempt for fixed categories and men who claim to be the bearers of an objective, immortal truth.... then there is nothing more relativistic than Fascist attitudes and activity.... From the fact that all ideologies are of equal value, that all ideologies are mere fictions, the modern relativist infers that everybody has the right to create for himself his own ideology and to attempt to enforce it with all the energy of which he is capable.86

86 Benito Mussolini, Diuturna, 374-77. Quoted from Helmut Kuhn, Freedom Forgotten and Remembered (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1943), 17-18. In more recent times, the United States Supreme Court has adopted a similar position to that of Mussolini's. Interpreting the meaning of liberty (as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment), the Court states: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). One might ask Benito Mussolini and the modern American Supreme Court Justice (1) what precisely is a right, and (2) what is the foundation of a right? If everyone "has the right" to create his own meaning or ideology, then apparently everyone has the "right" to define his own concept of "right" and "to attempt to enforce it with all the energy of which he is capable." Such a notion of "right"--as evidently rooted in force--appears to have entered into American jurisprudence principally through the influence of Oliver Wendell Holmes. See John C. Ford, "The Fundamentals of Holmes' Juristic Philosophy," Fordham Law Review 11, (1942), 255-78. According to Holmes (257): "[a right] is merely the hypostasis of the prophesied fact and an empty phrase. So we get up the empty substratum a right, to pretend to account for the fact that the courts will act in a certain way...." Ibid., 264: "When it comes to the development of a corpus juris the ultimate question is what do the dominant forces of the community want and do they want it hard enough to disregard whatever inhibitions may stand in the way." Ibid., 271: "It seems to me clear that the ultima ratio, not only regum, but of private persons, is force, and that at the bottom of all private relations, however tempered by sympathy and all the social feelings, is a justifiable (?) self-preference. If a man is on a plank in the deep sea which will only float one, and a stranger lays hold of it, he will thrust him off if he can. When the state finds itself in a similar position, it does the same thing."
For both St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, however, the consistent philosophical reasoning is just the reverse of Sartre's and Mussolini's—namely, since (as experience teaches us) there are actually existing human natures in the world, we know God exists; and because God exists, not everything is permissible; many actions are obligatory; and certain activities are absolutely proscribed. Now, if human nature were different from what it actually is, there would certainly be different practical consequences. This bond between human nature and practical living was not lost on a certain unelected personage who up until recently wielded substantial power in directing public policy in this nation. She states:

Let us be willing to remold society by redefining what it means to be a human being in the twentieth century, moving into a new millennium. 87

St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, however, do not consider human nature as redefinable—i.e., remoldable. 88 Rather, for them, each and every human being possesses an

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88 Inasmuch as Hillary Clinton exhorts us to "be willing to remold society," her motive in "redefining what it means to be a human being" is evidently not to better articulate in words what a human being actually is, but rather to attempt to alter the nature of human beings to be what they are not. On the question of human nature as mutable, see Michael Crowe, "Human Nature--Immutable or Mutable?," The Irish Theological Quarterly 30 (1963), 204-229.
inalienable nature, divinely constituted (i.e., defined), by which they exist as an imago Dei, and are ordained for God. Accordingly, each and every human being possesses an inviolable dignity; and it is only to the extent that such a dignity is recognized and defended that the social order can properly exist. In the wake of the bloodiest century in human history, the attempt to redefine "what it means to be a human being" has proven to be a hideous tragedy for untold millions; instead, what is becoming urgently clear, even among academics, is the need to rediscover what it already means to be a human being. Such a rediscovery, of course, demands the commitment to know the real world as it actually is. To this end the natural law doctrines of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas provide a beacon of light. However, to be properly appreciated, their teachings on natural law must be studied according to their own terms of intelligibility and within the larger context of their respective philosophical-theological positions.

89 St. Bonaventure's view of intelligibility is summed up as follows: "Si igitur non ens non potest intelligi nisi per ens, et ens in potentia, non nisi per ens in actu; et esse nominat ipsum purum actus entis: esse igitur est quod primo cadit in intellectu, et illud esse est quod est purus actus." Itin., V, 3 (V, 308b); see Key-Text A, notes 33 and 86 and Appendix D. For St. Thomas, "intellectus autem humani, qui est conjunctus corpori, proprium objectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens." ST I, q. 84, a. 7, resp. (V, 325b); see Key-Text B, notes 8, 70, and 117.
APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY OF PETER LOMBARD’S LIFE AND WRITINGS

Date

1095  Born at Lumellogno (Novara)
1130-1134?  Studied at Bologna or possibly Vercelli
1134  Arrived at Paris, received licentia docendi
1134-1138  Taught in the school of Notre Dame
1134-1138  Commentarium in psalmos davidicos (PL 191, 55-1296)
1139-1141  Collectanea in omnes D. Pauli Apostoi epistolas (PL 191, 1297-1696; PL 192, 9-520)
1144-1145  Became canon of Notre Dame while in minor orders
1147, April  Took part in the Paris commission of Eugene III (to examine writings of Gilbert de la Porée)
1148, March  Participated in the Council of Reims (concerning errors attributed to Gilbert de la Porée)
1153-1158  Sententiarum libri quatuor (Grottaferrata, 1971-1981, 2 vols.)


2 While scholars are uncertain as to the precise date of composition, Delhaye cites 1153 to 1158 as the certain limits within which this work must have been written. See
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1154</td>
<td>Possibly journeyed to Rome with Bishop Theobald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1156</td>
<td>Became one of the archdeacons of Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1159</td>
<td>Elected Bishop of Paris; consecrated June 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1160, Aug. 21</td>
<td>Died at Paris, August 21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX B

**CHRONOLOGY OF SAINT BONAVENTURE'S LIFE AND WRITINGS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1217</td>
<td>Born at Bagnoregio, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1235</td>
<td>Arrived at Paris as student of arts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1242-1243</td>
<td>Master of arts, entered Franciscan Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1248</td>
<td><strong>baccalareus biblicus</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1250</td>
<td><strong>baccalareus sententiarius</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1250-1255</td>
<td><strong>Commentarius in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1253-1257</td>
<td><strong>Commentarius in Evangelium Lucae</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Listed here are the works most pertinent to our study. For a complete listing of Bonaventure's writings, see Etienne Gilson, *La philosophie de Saint Bonaventure* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1943), 36; Thomas Reist, *Saint Bonaventure as a Biblical Commentator* (Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1985), 12-13.

2 The chronology of Bonaventure's early works is not established with any certainty. While Longpré suggests that the *Commentary* could have been later redacted, Brady maintains the final redaction was begun in the latter half of 1252 after Bonaventure had finished his classroom commentary as a *baccalaureus sententiarius*. Cf. Ephrem Longpré, "Saint Bonaventure," *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de geographie ecclesiastiques*, IX (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ane, 1937), col. 749; Ignatius Brady, "The Writings of Saint Bonaventure Regarding the Franciscan Order," in *San Bonaventura Maestro di Vita Francescan e di Sapienza Christian*, 75 (vol. I, 1975), 90.

3 While it is commonly agreed that Bonaventure began writing his *Commentarium in Evangelium Lucam* in 1248, the work probably did not achieve its final form until many years later. While some scholars place the dating of the final redaction as late as the mid-1260's, Bougerol and Reist both argue for the years 1254-5 to 1257 during the time when Bonaventure was regent master. For a discussion of pertinent research on the dating of this commentary, see J. Bougerol, "Chronologia Sancti Bonaventurae," in *S. Bonaventura 1274-1974*, II, (Grottaferrata, 1972-1974), 15;
Received licentia docendi and taught in the School of Minors as magister sententiarum; acting regent master of theology

Quaestiones disputatae de perfectione evangelica, De scientia Christi, De mysterio Trinitatis

Elected Minister General

Made cardinal by Gregory X

Retired from office of Minister General

Made Doctor of the Church by Sixtus V

APPENDIX C

CHRONOLOGY OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS’ LIFE AND WRITINGS

Date

1224 or 1225
Born in castle of Roccasecca near Naples

1230-1239
Received elementary education at Monte
Casino; read Gregory, Jerome, Augustine

1239-1244
Undergraduate at University of Naples

1244, April
Entered Dominican Order in Naples

1244, May
Abducted on journey; attempted seduction at
Montesangiovanni; taken to Roccasecca and
imprisoned for about a year by mother

1245, Autumn
Allowed to return to Dominican Order

1248, Summer
Went to Paris for Novitiate and study

1251
Accompanied St. Albert to Cologne

1252-1254
Ordained priest at Cologne

1254-1256
Returned to Paris; lectured on the
Scriptures as Baccalaureus Biblicus

1254-1256
Lectured on the Sentences of Peter Lombard
as Baccalaureus Sententiararius; received
Licentiate and became Magister of theology
in 1256; Scripta super libros Sententiarium
Petri Lombardi, De ente et essentia written
De principiis naturae written by 1256

1256-1259
Teaches at Paris; De Veritate, Quaestiones
quodlibetales 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, In Boethium
de Hebdomadibus and In Boethium de
Trinitate written during this period

1259-1268
Teaches in Italy (at Naples, Orvieto, Rome,
Viterbo); Summa contra Gentiles, De
potentia and various commentaries on
Aristotle composed during this time

1265/6
Begins writing Summa Theologiae

1269-1272
Teaches at Paris; engaged in controversy
with the Averroists; various commentaries
on Aristotle; Summa Theologiae, pars prima,

1For a documentation of chronology, see Ignatius
Eschmann, A Catalogue of St. Thomas’s Works, in Etienne
Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New
York: Random House, 1956), 381-430; James Wiesheipl, Friar
Thomas D’Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works (New York:
Doubleday, 1974), 351-63.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1272-1274</td>
<td><em>prima secundae</em> and <em>secundae secundae</em> completed by 1272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teaches at Naples; <em>Summa Theologicae, ters pars</em> completed in 1273; interruption of writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1274, mid-Feb</td>
<td>Set out for Council of Lyons, injured head at Borgonuovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>late-Feb</td>
<td>brought by donkey to Fossanova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 7</td>
<td>died Wednesday morning at Fossanova</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D

THE SCIENCE OF METAPHYSICS
ACCORDING TO ST. BONAVENTURE

Metaphysics for St. Bonaventure is the science of essences qua essence. While other sciences (such as mathematics and physics) deal in some way with essences, metaphysics alone attends directly to the hidden differences within them ("ad quidditatum differentias occultas considerandas").¹ These differences are sixfold: substance and accident, universal and particular, potency and act, one and many, simple and composite, cause and caused.² From the study of [these differences within] created and particular substances, the metaphysician rises to the consideration of the universal and uncreated substance and to the very notion of [First] Being as the origin, exemplar, and end of all things. Although philosophers of nature also study the origin of things, and moral philosophers are concerned with the final end of things, the metaphysician alone considers

¹See Hex., IV, 6 (V, 349b).

²Ibid., IV, 7 (V, 350a): "Secundum quidditatum differentias occultas fit divisio sex modis ad praesens: in substantiam et accidens, in universale et particulare, in potentiam et actum, in unum et multa, in simplex et compositium, in causam et in causatum."
the First Being as Exemplary cause of all creatures. St. Bonaventure sums up the domain of metaphysics as follows:

Our whole metaphysics is concerned with emanation, exemplarism, and the final end of things—namely, to be enlightened by spiritual rays and to return to the Highest [Being].

St. Bonaventure identifies the Supreme Being as purus actus entis, and also as illa lux aeterna which is the

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3See Hex., I, 13 (V, 331b): "Metaphysicus autem... [assurgit] ex consideratione principiorum substantiae creatae et particularis ad universalem et increatam et ad illud esse ut habet rationem principii, medi et finis ultimi.... Sed considerat illud esse in ratione omnia exemplantis, cum nullo communicat et verus est metaphysicus." Concerning the reduction of relative being to absolute Being, see ibid., IV, 7; V, 28; X, 17. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, VIII, 8.

4Hex., I, 17 (V, 332): Haec est tota nostra metaphysica: de emanatione, de exemplaritate, de consummatione, scilicet illuminari per radios spirituales et reduci ad summum. Et sic eris verus metaphysicus." The term summum refers here to God as Supreme Being Who is also the foundation and end of all knowledge; indeed, being is the mark of all that is knowable. See ibid., X, 18 (V, 379b): "Hae igitur speculatione ordinis, originis et completionis ducunt ad illud esse primum, quod praerasentant omnes creaturae. Hoc enim nomen scriptum est in omnibus rebus; et sunt hae conditiones entis, super quas fundantur certissimae illationes. Unde dixit ille: 'Prima rerum creatorum omnium est esse;' sed ego dico: prima rerum intellectualium est esse primum." See Key-Text A, note 33; see also De reduct. artium, n. 4 (V, 320-21).

5See Key-Text A, note 33. Bonaventure’s meaning of purus actus entis or esse in actu should not be confused, however, with St. Thomas’ notion of existentia. Regarding Bonaventure’s use of the term esse, see George Klubertanz, "Esse and Existere in St. Bonaventure," Medieval Studies 8 (1946), 169-88.
exemplar of all things created.\(^6\) Further, creatures for Bonaventure are constituted by light\(^7\); and the process by which creatures and God are known by man are described in terms of light.\(^8\) Evidently, then, to be real for St. Bonaventure is to be light.

\(^6\) *Hex.*, VI, 6 (361a): "...illa lux aeterna est exemplar omnium, et quod mens elevat, ut mens aliorum nobilium philosophorum antiquorum, ad hoc pervenit." *In I Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 1, ad 6 (II, 412b): "Lux enim spiritualis, quae Deus est, cum sit simplicissima...."

\(^7\) See Key-Text A, note 76.


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403


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F. Historical Studies


G. Selected Comparative Studies


"Le problème de la philosophie Bonaventurienne," Lavel Théologique et Philosophique 7 (1951), 9-58.


VITA

Dan M. Crone was born in Minneapolis Minnesota on July 31, 1953. He was educated in the public schools of Wilmette, Illinois and attended New Trier East High School in Winnetka, Illinois.

He first attended Loyola University of Chicago as a part-time student and graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in Nursing in January, 1983. He has since been working in the Chicago area as a psychiatric nurse.

He continued his studies at Loyola as a part-time student in Philosophy and received his M. A. in January, 1988. In 1990 he completed his Ph.D coursework in Philosophy.

After a leave of absence to live with a religious community for eighteen months, he returned to Loyola to complete his Ph.D dissertation.
DISSERTATION APPROVAL SHEET

The doctoral dissertation submitted by Dan M. Crone has been read and approved by the following committee:

Leo Sweeney, S.J., Ph.D., Director
Research Professor, Philosophy
Loyola University Chicago

Francis Catania, Ph.D.
Professor, Philosophy
Loyola University Chicago

Tracy Lounsbury, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, Philosophy
Loyola University Chicago

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is, therefore, accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

4-5-95
Date

Leo Sweeney
Director's Signature