The Foundation, Evolution, and Adequacy of "Authentic Action" in the Corpus of David Tracy

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THE FOUNDATION, EVOLUTION, AND ADEQUACY OF
"AUTHENTIC ACTION" IN THE CORPUS OF DAVID TRACY

by

David Livingston

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
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VITA

The author, David James Livingston, is the son of William James and Joan (McKoane) Livingston. He was born August 18, 1964, in Elgin, Illinois.

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In September, 1988, Mr. Livingston was granted an assistantship in Theology at Loyola University of Chicago, enabling him to complete the Master of Arts in 1990.
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CHAPTER I

A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO
CONTEMPORARY ACTION

Augustine says "What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I want to explain it to someone who does ask me, I do not know."1; something similar may be said about "thoughtful action." How does the human agent integrate the cognitive and ethical demands involved in acting? Within the constant change of social structures and the continual expansion of intellectual horizons, what is the connection between action and thought? What are the limits of cognitively judging action? These questions presuppose that one does not act merely in response to cognitive concerns, but rather one acts in response to many varied factors. Humans act in response to beauty, survival, habits, tradition, and hope as well as many other experiences.

Theologically, the concern is not only one of thought and action, but also one of tradition. Within theology, reflection on action is informed by religious tradition. Although the importance of tradition varies from theologian to theologian, almost all theologians
incorporate traditional, anthropological, ontological, ethical, and epistemological concerns within contemporary theories of action. David Tracy is one theologian who attempts a "revisionist" understanding of the Christian tradition. Inherent in his revisionist retrieval of the Christian tradition is a contemporary model for Christian action, and the concomitant criteria of authentic Christian action. In order to understand the background for his criteria of judging a contemporary model of action, the historical changes of the last three centuries and their transformative influence must be briefly examined.

**Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment Thought**

One of the goals of the Enlightenment was to remove all illusion from the human agent and to allow rationality to guide human action toward the "good" and the "true". Towards this end, the Enlightenment did expose many illusions present in both civil and religious life during the eighteenth century. The "innocence" of pre-Enlightenment philosophy and theology was revealed in a way which spelled the loss of certainty in conceptual and practical thinking. The post-Enlightenment search for meaning seems now to be achieved only through the use of
diverse models, all of which are dependent in varying degrees on the critical demands of the Enlightenment.

Enlightenment rationalism is still present, but it took only a short time before critics found illusions within the "illusionless" Enlightenment. Friedrich Nietzsche's prediction of nihilism, for example, removed meaning from both philosophy and theology. Sigmund Freud identified the role of the unconscious in human thought and action, and so showed that self-conscious rational reflection was not the sole motivation for human action. Karl Marx criticized the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thinkers for accepting an idealistic epistemology. For Marx, idealism in epistemology led to "theological prejudice" and "materialism," both of which are illusions. Because of this criticism of criticism, contemporary thought, language, and action involve diverse and often contradictory models.

**Post-Modern Pluralism**

The pluralism of the "post-modern" world affects human experience, thought, and action. It is no exaggeration to say that all disciplines are now confronted with plural models of interpretation. The advancement of the physical sciences and the development
of computer technology, as well as the immense amount of published material in every field, continue to challenge the inquisitive person with more information than can be examined. The "post-modern" environment requires an awareness of the interconnectedness of previously isolated disciplines. This is especially true within the humanities and social sciences; the disciplines of sociology, psychology, anthropology, history, linguistics, philosophy, and theology now recognize that they are mutually necessary conversation partners. Claims of authority by any one discipline have become suspect because of this necessary dependence. The existence of so many possible models for thought and action at times becomes overwhelming and burdensome, but this pluralism can no longer be denied.

Paralleling the diversity of models in the scholarly community has been the fast paced increase in information in contemporary society as a whole. The increase in information is a "reality" for every individual exposed to the media of television and newsprint. The existence of such a media system, conveying information from around the world in only minutes, necessitates a drastic increase in the experiential world. This expansion involves a recognition of the ethical obligation one has to the approximately five billion "others" who populate this
planet. Requests for help no longer arrive only from one's local neighbor. In fact, for many people, the condition of overwhelming need has caused a modern dilemma for action.

A Shift of Horizons

As society and culture become more and more complex there is also greater complexity in the field of theological ethics. These changes are co-incidental with a shift of horizons within ethics. A change has occurred in Western Christian ethical thought which can be traced to a marked change in soteriology. As recently as the early twentieth century, the Roman Catholic church's ethical thought seemed to focus on legalistic and penitential criteria. The Protestant churches focused many of their ethical models within structures of predestination, salvation, and sin. Both Protestant and Catholic ethics found themselves somewhat limited by their soteriological horizon.

In the Roman Catholic church, fine distinctions between types and degree of sinfulness seemed to be the ruling demand for an ethicist. Charles Curran persuasively argues that the change in soteriology from a high Christology to a low Christology has changed the
landscape of moral concerns.

An older soteriology associated with Christology from above tended to be private, extrinsic, and abstract. ... A Christology from below understands redemption as social, intrinsic, and very concrete.8

In a similar way, the Protestant churches concerned themselves with establishing specific criteria for salvation. Calvin was very explicit in the connection of salvation with ethical action.9 Johnathan Edwards, following within the Calvinist tradition, preached that only by "divine operation" were people able to do good and so were also predestined for salvation.10 The Puritans demanded adherence to strict social guidelines in order to assure membership. The desire to assure members of salvation was a common theme of these churches.

Both Protestant and Catholic theologians began a turn away from an abstract soteriology toward a greater emphasis on anthropology and experience in the early twentieth century. The contemporary concern became the human agent acting in relation to the social world which she or he faced.11 There was a consequent shift from a concern with the future to a concern with the present. Finally, a shift from individual justification to community-based ethics had an impact on the condition of
ethical models. These major movements in ethical models have altered the way in which Christian ethics is understood as a discipline and who the conversation partners should be in developing an adequate model for Christian action.

The increase in significant models for action and the simultaneous increase in awareness of the global needs of the world community have a seemingly paralyzing effect on the human agent. With the shift in horizons of the past century contemporary ethicists are beginning to discuss the perceived paralysis, and offer reflections on how to resolve the dilemma. Richard R. Niebuhr explains the contemporary condition:

He lies pathetically enmeshed in the network of "constant contact news" and has no hour of the day, no sabbath rest, when he is not made to be a sharer in the abrading or engulfing sensations of other men.12

Niebuhr's analysis does not end in pessimism, but develops a model of action based on "inventing." In order to act in the present day, one must invent, that is, act by "moral imagination" as a means of "forming oneself."13 The alternative for Niebuhr is...

...routine existence in the crowd, where the individual is simply "one" who does what "one does" and belongs to the anonymous society called "they," [and which] offers the blessedness of a sleeping life in which he is deaf to his nerve endings.14
Niebuhr's alternative is one which shows the result of inauthentic action. If Niebuhr is correct in his assessment of the contemporary situation, it seems necessary for the Christian theological tradition to establish certain criteria which will point us toward authentic action.

**A Theological Response**

What are the contemporary resources for overcoming the paralysis of action? From a theological standpoint the discussion surrounding hermeneutics, truth, and ambiguity is one fruitful place to begin. The reality which one faces in the contemporary world is complicated by issues of hermeneutics, "truth," and the ambiguity of experience. After Heidegger and Hegel, and with the contemporary figures of Derrida and Ricoeur, the importance of language and hermeneutics for the understanding of reality has become central for many theologians. Heidegger's often-quoted dictum "Language is the house of Being" highlights the contemporary importance of a coherent hermeneutic element in contemporary models for action. Heidegger has also been a major figure in redefining "truth," which he inherently ties to any concept of being.15 In order to look at
the foundations of one's action, one must confront the questions involved in "truth" and language.

In addition to the importance of "truth" and language, ambiguity is present in historical and everyday experience. The introduction of ambiguity as a central theological category has been an important movement in a systematic understanding of our experience and action. Radical ambiguity, for example, is present in the historical event of the holocaust, as this event has acted as an interruption in the thought and experience of Western civilization. Internally, ambiguity presents itself when no choice relieves the tension of experienced need and temporal constraints. Most actions appear to be both good and evil, both true and untrue. The ability of acting in response to the complex of cognitive, cultural, linguistic, affective, and aesthetic issues has become increasingly difficult in contemporary theology.

Christian theology as a discipline needs to confront this complex of issues and at the same time to retain its ties to the historical tradition of Christianity. Theologians can abandon neither their academic integrity nor their role within the Christian tradition. The ability of humans to act "authentically" in light of the plurality and ambiguity in all spheres of life must be
analyzed, and a coherent meaningful account of human action must be established within the Christian tradition.

If contemporary models of action may no longer deny the need for a hermeneutical element, and if every theological system must accept the ambiguous nature of "truth" and experience, an argument can be made that David Tracy's criteria for "authentic" action are relatively adequate within the pluralism of the post-modern condition. His work on a new hermeneutical model for interpreting the "Christian fact" involves a broad range of disciplines and complex philosophical and linguistic analysis. This is a major component of his recent work, but in addition, I will argue that he has developed an implicit model for human action and a set of criteria which judge action as authentic. Tracy's main focus in the last fifteen years has been the "plurality" which is part of the "post-modern" condition,18 and he has articulated the effects of plurality on fundamental, systematic, and practical theology. This is not, however, the only possible reading of his material. Implicit in all of Tracy's work are his criteria for authentic human action which are dependent on his analysis of plurality, but are never completely subsumed into this analysis.

Tracy is most explicit about a developed terminology for his criteria of authentic human action in Chapter
Five of *Plurality and Ambiguity*. He uses three terms to describe his view of informed "Christian" action: "resistance," "solidarity," and "hope." The evolution of these concepts occurs throughout Tracy's three major works: *Blessed Rage for Order* (henceforth BRO), *The Analogical Imagination* (henceforth AI), and *Plurality and Ambiguity* (henceforth P&A). "Resistance," "solidarity," and "hope" cannot be understood without the background created by these three works.

For the purposes of this thesis, I will use the term "analogical action" to designate the complex model of human action developed through each of Tracy's writings, and I will use authenticity as a term to describe the result of Tracy's criteria for acting in a "manner worthy of a human being." Several terms and qualifiers are used by Tracy to describe action and its role in relation to the complex of issues involved in fundamental, systematic, and practical theology. He frequently uses "praxis" to establish a base model in his discussion of action. He also uses Lonergan's model of self-transcendent action as a foundation for analogical action. Resistance is a criterion for authenticity which involves a constant demand for critical reflection. In addition, "resistance" takes on more concrete ethical application in
when it is connected with an opposition to certain oppressive social structures. Solidarity with the oppressed evolves out of Tracy's demand for dialogue, and in the end, questions the limits of dialogue itself. Finally, hope is necessary for a contemporary Christian interpretation of "authentic action." Hope involves the religious dimension of every aspect of life. One faces limits in both language and experience, one also faces evil and ambiguity in every day situations; hope allows for the possibility of acting at all in the face of both finitude and evil.

The interplay between intellectual, ethical, and traditional demands is the horizon within which a determination of "authentic action" becomes possible. Tracy describes the "authentic" person as one "committed above all else to the full affirmation of the ultimate significance of our lives in the world." I will use this desire for meaning to engage and interrogate Tracy's texts as a means of establishing a more comprehensive understanding of "authentic action." There are limits to any linguistic articulation of action, and this project will explore the possibilities as well as the limits of a contemporary model for action.
CHAPTER II

AUTHENTIC ACTION AS A FOUNDATIONAL ELEMENT

IN BLESSED RAGE FOR ORDER:

THE BEGINNING OF ACTION AS RESISTANCE

A foundation must be established on which contemporary criteria for "authentic" action may firmly rest. Blessed Rage for Order establishes such a foundation through Tracy's appropriations and reinterpretations of fundamental theological concepts. I will attempt to simplify the complexity of BRO by visualizing it as a pyramid with three levels. The first level is Tracy's insistence on a critical stance for all thought and action. The second level involves his appropriation of models of truth and meaning. The third and final level introduces fiction, evil, and fact, which, when taken together, establish the necessary framework for discussing Christ as the representation of "authentic action."

The foundation established in the three levels allows Tracy to take the first steps toward a set of criteria for "authentic" action. Six foundational elements make up the three levels of BRO: level one -
critical stance; level two - meaning and truth; level three - fiction, evil, and fact. The three levels come to a synthesis in Christ. Tracy claims that Christ "...has all the power of a complete and true manifestation of the fundamental meaning of authentic human existence." In order to understand how Christ represents the criterion of "authentic action," the base of the foundation must be laid.

**Level One: The Critical Mandate**

From the outset of **BRO**, Tracy continually demands that a theologian take on a "critical posture." To be critical, for Tracy, does not involve a simply negative view of every theory and model.

But *critical* does mean a fidelity to open-ended inquiry, a loyalty to defended methodological canons, a willingness to follow the evidence where it may lead.2

He thus establishes three concrete characteristics of the critical posture of the theologian.

In order to understand the practical applications of this critical stance these characteristics require further examination. First, one must be faithful to "open-ended inquiry," which disallows any predetermined boundaries to the investigation. In order to remain critical, all areas
must be open to inquiry, including all doctrines, dogmas, and traditions. Second, the critical stance must retain certain loyalties.

The fundamental loyalty of the theologian as theologian is to that morality of scientific knowledge which he shares with his colleagues, the philosophers, historians, and social scientists.3

This morality involves "...autonomous judgment, critical reflection and properly skeptical hard-mindedness...."4 A loyalty such as the one Tracy establishes is not fixed; rather, it continues to evolve within certain parameters. By this loyalty's very establishment, creativity and change are always present as each investigation allows for further criticism and reformulation. Finally, his critical stance requires one to extend every inquiry as far as possible. The extension of logic and imagination continue to produce new horizons which must be examined by the critical investigator. The sum of these three characteristics become the ground for the possibility of authentic action.

The demands of the critical stance exist in everyday life just as they do in academic pursuits. A critical stance helps to inform the human agent before he or she can authentically participate in the worlds of education, commerce, or family. If one is to take on Tracy's critical posture in everyday life, one cannot
accept, without question, the statements of the government, the church, or the advertising industry. Once individuals begin to accept, in an uncritical way, the information of the culture, they begin to lose sight of their own integrity.

Level Two: Meaning and Truth

In order for humans to act and think in response to the ethical, aesthetic, and cognitive experiences of their culture, a model of meaning, whether conscious or unconscious, must be accepted and used. Ricoeur's model of the text is Tracy's first component in formulating a theory of meaning. Tracy begins his analysis of the text as a source of meaning by outlining the historical development of hermeneutical thought. He outlines the movement from "proof texts" devoid of historical contexts to the primary importance placed on historical consciousness. Following from historical consciousness, the introduction of the hermeneutical circle has been an important but limited historical movement. The problem involved with many interpretations of the "hermeneutical circle" is the insistence on a psychological sharing between the author and the interpreter. Tracy wants to avoid the pitfalls
involved in an overdependence on historical consciousness and psychological sharing in his model of interpretation.

Tracy uses Ricoeur's hermeneutical model as a way to avoid these problems. Ricoeur's revision of the hermeneutic circle involves his theory of distanciation. For a proper understanding of Ricoeur's model, three important parts of discourse need to be initially examined: the speech event which is the specific act of speaking and occurs in a specific place and time; the language which is an atemporal system of symbols; and, finally, the text, which is a fixed unit of discourse removed by its codification from its specific historical setting.

A rather in-depth analysis of Ricoeur's model of the text is necessary in order to allow Tracy's concepts of fact, fiction, and imagination to be understood. Meaning, for Tracy, is based on possibilities and on the imaginative world of the text. Meaning is not confined by what is established through historical critical means. At the same time, the meaning is not completely relative, but depends on the internal linguistic coherence and the internal "sense" of the text. Tracy uses Hans-Georg Gadamer's model of a "fusion of horizons" to establish a base for his model of meaning.

The reader overcomes the strangeness of another horizon not by empathizing with the psychic state or
cultural situation of the author but rather by understanding the basic vision of the author implied by the text and the mode-of-being-in-the-world referred to by the text. 10

The initial point Tracy appropriates from Ricoeur involves how and where one finds meaning. Tracy argues that the speech event and the meaning are not the same. The speech event or "intended" speech of the author, has often been understood as the "real" source of meaning. It has been taken for granted that if one could understand what the writer intended or if one could listen for what the speaker "really" meant, one would there find the "meaning" of the dialogue. Instead Tracy claims that,

written language, especially language codified in literary genres, is an intending (a meinen), because it suppresses the original speech-event in order to fix and retain the meaning intended. 11

The "suppressing" of the speech-event is a move away from a hermeneutic based on a shared consciousness. In this way, the psychological intention is no longer the key in establishing meaning in a discourse. The meaning is, in a sense, in the text itself, and no longer can be obtained through psychological or historical analysis of the author.

A second distanciation occurs in Ricoeur's textual hermeneutic by what he terms a "reformulation of the 'dialectic of explanation and understanding'."12
This involves two more hermeneutical terms: the "sense" of the text, and the "referent" of the text. "Sense" and "referents" are terms which Ricoeur finds useful in his search for a clear conception of meaning. The "sense" of a text is a completely internal explanation of the way a word refers to other words in any text. It allows for the possibility of explaining any word by using internal references included within the text and the language system employed by the text. Yet, the "sense" of a text is only the first step towards meaning. The "sense" offers an "explanation" of the text but does not allow for a full "understanding" of the "meaning" of the text.

13 The process of "understanding" a text requires the use of external "referents." 14 The question is: "To what aspects of reality, ordinary or perhaps extraordinary, do these texts refer the reader?" 15 An understanding of the meaning of a text is obtained through a combination of the sense of the text with the possibilities to which the text refers. A very important distinction must be explicitly formulated at this point. The "referents" of the text do not refer to the "meaning behind the text (such as the author's intention or the social-cultural situation of the text), but to the meaning 'in front of the text.'" 16 Tracy clarifies this
understanding by citing two types of referents "in front of the text": the object referent and the subject referent. The object referent is the "mode of being-in-the-world which the text opens up for any intelligent reader." These are the imaginative possibilities which the reader of the text may see. The subject referent is the "personal vision of the world" implied by the author. This is not obtained solely through a historical critical method, but through a linguistic analysis of the vision internally developed within the text.

The use of Ricoeur's hermeneutical model is a key element in Tracy's development of "authentic" action. Opening up the concepts of meaning and understanding to notions of possibility rather than certitude allows Tracy to view action and fiction as closely tied. As will be seen below, when meaning is dependent on a text which offers possible modes of being in the world, action is able to appropriate these worlds into authentic concrete acts. The importance of fiction for action takes on greater importance when the fiction is released from a strictly historical analysis and becomes a symbolic structure which informs action. Tracy's emphasis on pluralism requires a hermeneutic which does not limit but expands the possible interpretations of a text and he has
found such a hermeneutic in Ricoeur's model. Once a theory of meaning is established the inevitable question arises of how this pluralistic view can ever be "true."

Truth

The missing piece of level two is Tracy's model of truth, which interlocks with his model for meaning and allows for meaningful action. He does not use one specific model for "truth" throughout. Instead, he allows the term to develop as it is used. In spite of Tracy's lack of a specific definition for truth, there is one main supportive model in Tracy's development which is of special interest to the present concern with action: Heidegger's model of truth as aletheia. Heidegger retrieved his understanding of aletheia from the early Greek understandings of truth, and he argues that the early Greeks understood aletheia not as an issue of correspondence but rather as an issue of disclosure.

Aletheia as a model based on disclosure is not a static model of truth, but has an active component. The thinking and acting of humans is directly tied to aletheia. For Heidegger, the question of truth is a question of Being; he says "the essence of truth is the
One might interpret this as saying that it is in the disclosure of other beings that one comes to realize truth. Dasein, which is Heidegger's term for a thinking human being, is the place where disclosure occurs. Dasein, although it is his term for human being, is often referred to as a place. Dasein is the place, the "where", of disclosure. It is the engagement with reality which allows for truth, for only when one engages the "other" does disclosure occur.

An important revision of the truth which Heidegger introduces is the dialectical nature of truth.

Considered with respect to truth as disclosedness, concealment is then undisclosedness and accordingly the untruth that is most proper to the essence of truth.

Heidegger is making a claim to something which he knows goes against common sense and logic. How can any concept of truth be dependent at its core to its antithesis? The paradox of this claim is not overlooked by Heidegger. In fact, he says because of the paradox one must logically renounce the statement. In spite of its illogical character, Heidegger retains truth as an instance of both disclosedness and concealment. Tracy's use of aletheia, with its dialectical character, radically opens up his argument for "authentic" action to the plurality and ambiguity of experience.
Tracy uses aletheia as the backdrop to his own model of truth. For Tracy, to claim that an experience or linguistic expression is true, it must be "adequate to experience." The need for disclosure is tied to a transcendental need for adequacy to the limit situations of experience. He does not point out, however, that the dialectical nature of aletheia contains within its definition his desire to understand religious language and experience as limit situations. Limits are experienced as both disclosive of and concealing the possibilities present in each encounter of the world. Only through the disclosure does one realize that there is also a limit - (a concealment) - in experience. Tracy's use of Heidegger as a base motif in his model of truth is more powerful than he admits. Therefore, I believe that aletheia will prove helpful in his discussion of ambiguity.

The second level of Tracy's foundation brings together two major figures and constructs an interlocking system which revises two of the most basic concepts in any theological analysis. If meaning is determined by the possibilities in front of the text and truth is understood as a dialectical structure of disclosure and concealment, the determination of criteria for authentic action must shift its horizon. The new horizon for theological
criteria of authentic action has shifted from an abstract and definitive structure to a new model of practical possibilities. The criteria of truth and meaning allow for the possibility of meaningful action. For something to be meaningful it must pass two criteria: it must be "genuinely disclosive of our lived experience," and it must involve the advancement of "more encompassing modes of personal and societal transformation." This requires meaning and truth to have additionally a transformative quality.

The introduction of an element of transformation is very important in Tracy's analysis. It allows for the beginning of a connection between theory and action. Yet, there seems to be a gap in this connection. Why do truth and meaning include transformation, and what criteria will judge the nature of a desirable transformation? This may only be answered by the introduction of three further categories: fiction, evil, and fact.

**Level Three: The Christological Synthesis; Fiction, Evil, and Fact**

With a clearer understanding of the possibilities for meaning and truth we can now look with Tracy at the central symbol for action: the Christian texts and the
Messiah they introduce. Tracy synthesizes all of the important characteristics for "authentic" action in his chapter on Christology. He uses his interpretation of meaning and truth to show that Christ is the center of the Christian tradition, and more importantly for the present project, that Christ is a uniquely powerful symbol of "authentic action."

He begins by calling for a rereading or "overhearing" of the Christian texts. His hermeneutical model requires him continually to view the texts as occasions which allow for "singular moments of a redescriptions of life's possibilities and a transformative reorientation of life's actualities." Understanding is never simply cognitive, but always involves action in the form of transformation.

The transformation occurs through attention to three central categories: fiction, evil, and fact. He first establishes the need for fiction as an intrinsic human quality. Second, he shows that "evil" is a fact of the human situation. Finally, he distinguishes between facts as "actualizations of possibilities" and facts as "representations of possibilities." By establishing these three points he not only establishes his argument for a Christocentric view of Christianity, but further develops the criteria which will determine "authentic action."
Human beings need story, symbol, image, myth, and fiction to disclose to their imaginations some genuinely new possibilities for existence; possibilities which conceptual analysis, committed as it is to understanding present actualities, cannot adequately provide.29

This statement brings up several terms which will require further discussion. Tracy's view of imagination, his understanding of possibilities, and the power of symbolic language are all keys to understanding his position. First the meaning of fiction and its use in the process of human transformation must be examined.

For Tracy, fiction is not a negative term. "Fictions do not operate to help us escape reality," rather fictions are key symbolic frameworks which allow humans to experience reality more fully and to be transformed by these experiences.30 He fights against the common understanding of fiction as an escape mechanism or a simple redescription of our present reality. Fictions are something other than either of these ideas, they "open up our minds, our imaginations, and our hearts to newly authentic and clearly transformative possible modes-of-being-in-the-world."31 These re-presentations are neither mere fantasies or banal pictures; they are models by which one
often reorients one's most basic attitudes.

The need for fiction cannot be established using a metaphysical argument of necessity. Tracy does not try to prove philosophically the need for fiction. Rather, he relies on common human experience and the history of Western thought to establish his position as adequate. "The modern form of Pascal's wager may well have become the risk of entering imaginatively into the fictional worlds."32

How are these fictions to be judged? Which fictions represent the true, the good, and the beautiful modes-of-being-in-the-world? These questions point out the state of mutual dependence which exists between judging a symbol system and acting authentically.

Only Aristotle's "just man" can adequately distinguish the stories of true justice from injustice. Only Lonergan's self transcending human being can be trusted to weigh the relative real strengths and real weaknesses of competing character forming myths. Highly "subjective" criteria, to be sure. But criteria which somehow - as a matter of fact - suffice.33

For Tracy, the "character forming myths" and "authentic" modes of being are interdependent. Tracy appears to have hit a limit situation in his analysis, or more appropriately, he has entered into a new version of the hermeneutic circle. It is a revised circle which is not only hermeneutical, but may also be described as a
symbolic/ethical circle. For Tracy, the validity of a symbol depends on its ability to transform human beings. In addition, the one who is to validate the symbol is only so qualified because he or she has already been transformed by such a symbol system. This leaves the validation of a specific symbol system entrapped in a circle. The influential models of Aristotle and Lonergan are self correcting, but is there a way out of the circle and into a model which enables a logical and verifiable path to "authentic action?" This question may only be answered with further investigation.

Tracy introduces a second criterion which is similar though methodologically different from the first. The second criterion is a Marxian model of praxis. He cites Ernst Bloch's contemporary formulation: "Besides theory and practice, true praxis also needs appropriate personal and societal symbols." Praxis requires the interplay of theory and practice, with an appropriate symbol structure if it is to inform the active life towards transformation. Tracy has inserted his criterion of transformative symbol structures into a traditional understanding of praxis. If both the need for symbolic structures and the recognition of the transformative character of action are recognized, their synthesis, if pursued to its end, may establish the
criteria for "authentic action."

At this point we begin to notice a gap which exists between cognitive categories of meaning, meaningfulness, and truth and the practical category of "authentic action." Is there a way to move between these two areas and retain a critical posture? Tracy implicitly claims that there is and continues his argument using the background of the praxis dialectic as an accepted model. His development of fiction as a category of possibilities refines the discussion and attempts to form a bridge between concept and action. A further analysis of this movement of the imagination will be necessary, but at this point further development of the foundational elements is required.

Evil

Tracy's argument for a revisionist Christology as a basis for authentic action must now focus on the fact of evil in human existence. Tracy uses Ricoeur's discussion in Freedom and Nature to establish that human beings possess a metaphysical necessity for both freedom and nature. The problem is how to understand the experience of evil, which is not merely error, without destroying the necessity for freedom. Tracy again returns
to common human experience as the source for establishing the "reality" that all humans, both individually and societally, commit evil.36 His preliminary conclusion agrees with the mainline Christian theological tradition, which understands evil as an inevitability rather than a necessity.

His next step is to raise the contemporary theological view as a further means of establishing beyond doubt the existence of evil. Reinhold Niebuhr has been one of the most thorough and articulate recent advocates of the pervasive nature of evil. For Niebuhr, in order to begin to create a model for human transformation one must first accept the fact of evil. Tracy uses Niebuhr's persuasive argument as the impetus for his criticism of contemporary culture's self-perceived "innocence." He cites the horrors of the twentieth century and wonders how it is possible that the American culture can continue to claim innocence. He further challenges revisionist theologians to use the anthropology established by the neo-orthodox theologians as a base for all theological inquiry.37 The neo-orthodox theologians, Niebuhr being a good example, make very strong arguments for the necessity of a comprehensive model of evil in any theological system. Using this base Tracy suggests that any model of "character-forming action" must study all
available symbols which may transform the condition of evil.

Evil acts as an interruption to both the criteria of a symbolic/ethical circle and a contemporary model of praxis. Evil exists not only as error but as distortion, deformation, and negation of the desire to act authentically. Both Aristotle's just person and Lonergan's self-transcending individual, if they remain human also remain prone to doing evil. By stressing that all human beings are prone towards evil, Tracy reshapes his criteria for authentic action. Symbolic structures are useful in so far as they allow evil to be transformed into the good, the just, and the true. The interruption which evil causes in an attempt to act authentically is a fact. One cannot develop a contemporary model of action without acknowledging and persistently struggling with the interruptions evil causes in the transformative process.

Fact

Common sense understands a fact as an "actualized possibility." This conception of facts goes back to the Greek tradition and is taken for granted in Western thought. In contrast to these "facts" stand "mere possibilities." These possibilities are products of the
imagination, which remain fantasies until they are concretely actualized in the daily life of a specific person.

Tracy wants to expand the common conception of fact to include some of these "mere possibilities". He states that, in addition to actualized possibilities, "representations" of possibilities in "disclosive symbolic language and action" also should be termed facts.38 The initial response to this redefinition of fictions as facts may be one of reluctance or indifference, but the acceptance of this model for facts is crucial to Tracy's entire system.

They are facts: facts, to be sure, not as actualization of a possibility but facts as ritual, as fictional, as symbolic representations of a real possibility. All genuine re-presentations are not to be assigned to the category "mere-possibility" but to the category of "fact."39

This may seem at first to be a matter of "mere semantics," but with the importance of language in modern understandings of reality, to say "mere semantics" is contradictory.

How one understands and names one's experiences is very important and may determine the way in which one acts toward those experiences. By establishing previously the need for fictions, Tracy now pushes for an interaction
with these necessary fictions as facts. That is, the
characters which become "larger than life" in a fiction
are truly-(that is disclosively)-"more faithful to the
meaning of our experience than everyday experience
itself."40 We must return to our discussion of
fiction in order to reiterate that this does not imply
that fictions help us to escape from our "reality". Fictions, as facts, engage us more deeply in reality and
draw us towards the actualizations of imagined
possibilities.

This is not true only in fictions, but historical
persons become "larger than life" and begin to represent
possible modes of being in the world for entire cultures. The "symbolic dimension" of the lives of Martin Luther
King Jr., Gandhi, Oscar Romero, or Dorothy Day have had
and continue to have lasting significance in the cultures
they represent. These figures become symbols of a mode of
being which otherwise may be thought of as a mere
possibility. When these figures take on a symbolic
character, the evil which was present in each of their
lives is subordinated to the ethical, political,
religious, and hopeful possibilities they come to
represent. These women and men represent what it means to
live "authentically."
In the Christian tradition the ultimate and limit representation occurs in the life of Christ. Tracy establishes Christ as the representation of how life may be lived in relation to a loving God. This does not mean, for Tracy, that Jesus had to have actualized all of the events and actions which are attributed to his life, or that Jesus had to have been self conscious of his "divine character".

Rather we need to know what his words, his deeds, and his destiny, as expressions of his office of messiahship, authentically re-present as real human possibilities for genuine relationship to God.41

Christ becomes the limit symbol of the Christian tradition's search for a symbolic representation of "authentic human existence".42 Christ is not the only symbolic re-presentation of a relation to God; but for a Christian, Christ is the most meaningful and true re-presentation. The inclusive character of Tracy's Christology does not make his view completely relative. Although it may allow many possibilities, there are only certain symbols and persons which act as disclosive of the limit experiences in life.

The importance of plural symbolic representations, in addition to the uniqueness of one representation for
each religious community, is very important when attempting to understand how one acts in a plural world. Claiming a symbolic structure as true allows one to encounter the world with a vision of possibilities informed by one "supreme fiction". A "supreme fiction" allows a community to live together with a shared vision. Though the community has one central fiction, there remains a plurality of practical manifestations and reinterpretations of the community's tradition.

A meaningful understanding of Christ, for Tracy, requires the six conceptual reinterpretations which he presents in BRO. In addition, if authentic action is to take as its central symbolic structure the Christ and the stories which traditionally surround him, a continued reinterpretation of Christ must be pursued. Action, informed by a multidimensional symbolic structure, becomes a complex issue which entails a spiraling relationship between symbol and act. The actions of a person cause reinterpretations of the symbolic system, and the symbolic system, though reinterpreted, is fundamentally stable and initially informs the actions of the individual. The hermeneutic circle is thus revised into a spiral. The interaction of act and symbol moves beyond the two dimensional constraints of the circle to a three dimensional system. The spiral is the path of an
individual seeking to act authentically, but many gaps remain in the spiral as each individual confronts the fact of evil. To continue the spiraling interaction between symbol and action the category of imagination must be further examined. The potentially transformative use of an "analogical imagination" is the next step in the struggle for "authentic action."

Achieving criteria for "authentic action" is a very complex task. It involves consulting many diverse disciplines including philosophy and theology. As has been shown above, it also involves linguistic, hermeneutical, ethical, and anthropological concerns. One begins to understand the importance of a dialectic between interpretation and ethical action as one uncovers the role which cultural symbolic structures play in everyday life. In order to continue to develop criteria of "authentic action", we must analyze the importance of the symbolic structures which embrace and inform us. At the same time, we may not lose sight of the critical stance which requires all symbols to be open to reinterpretation, reformulation, and possibly negation. The desire of this analysis is to understand the conditions for and the steps toward acting authentically. Yet it seems that the analysis itself, so based on theories, language, and thought, is frustratingly removed from action. Can we
continue to search for understanding without losing sight of our goal: acting, and acting authentically? The existence of this project itself claims that we may; and that discourse, understanding and education are components of "authentic action".
CHAPTER III

THE ANALOGICAL IMAGINATION AS
A CRITERIA OF AUTHENTIC CHRISTIAN ACTION

The missing link between thought and action in Tracy's writings may be compared to Lessing's "ugly broad ditch." It seems at times impossible to understand how the complexity of BRO may become a practical set of criteria for authentic action. In BRO, texts offer a world of real possibilities which could be, but what of the need to be concrete and the demand for practical criteria of authentic action? An "analogical imagination" may be the needed link, an imagination which may be able to appropriate the world of thought, though it be so different, into the world of action. The idea of an analogical imagination is not simply an imagination which can see the world of thought and action as like one another. Rather it is an imagination which recognizes the "similarity-in-difference." That is, it focuses on both the radical difference between thought and action and, simultaneously, on the similarity which actually exists.

The three final points established in Blessed Rage
for Order left our criteria of authentic action enhanced but incomplete. First, people need fictions, fictions which provide possible modes of being in the world. Second, people have an innate tendency towards evil which may interrupt the potentially transformative possibilities in any fiction. Finally, both fictions and evil are facts and so entail real possibilities and real interruptions for action. The foundation of BRO is given depth and religious significance in AI. The depth occurs in the movement toward an increasingly radical nature of meaningful possibility in front of a text. When a fiction is understood as a religious classic it produces a world in front of the text which has ultimate meaning for human action.

The Classic

The category which allows Tracy's argument to progress is the introduction of the classic. Classics are "those texts, events, images, persons, rituals, and symbols which are assumed to disclose permanent possibilities of meaning and truth." The movement from a fiction to a classic rests most significantly with the issue of permanence. Classics persevere as disclosive and transformative symbols from generation to generation.
The classic is neither a symbol confined to the "classicist" nor is it the latest fad of contemporary culture. Tracy argues against a "pop art" view of the classic which depends on each individual's "aesthetic sensibility." In contemporary culture, a move towards autonomy and freedom has instilled a desire for each individual to determine what is and is not art. For many people, what should and should not be a classic has become a matter of purely individual taste. For Tracy, it cannot be a matter of individual choice. Rather, the classic's very definition demands that each classic depend on a traditional and cultural heritage to determine it as a classic.

Classics and Truth

In attempting to understand the truth claims of a classic, more than one model of truth is necessary. Both the metaphysical and transcendental aspects of fundamental theology, and the disclosure/concealment model of systematic theology require the further criteria of transformative praxis. "More concretely, there is never an authentic disclosure of truth which is not also transformative." Theologically it is important to recognize the indebtedness owed to the practical
theologians who have clearly pointed out the limits of metaphysical and disclosure models of truth.4

Practical theologians differ on many aspects of "praxis," but Tracy cites a central positive proposal accepted by most praxis oriented theologians.

Any proper understanding of praxis demands some form of authentic personal involvement and/or commitment. Any individual becomes who he or she is as an authentic or inauthentic subject by actions in an intersubjective and social-historical world with other subjects and in relationship to concrete social and historical structures and movements. Praxis, therefore, must be related to theory, not as theory's application or even goal as in all conscious and unconscious mechanical notions of practice or technique. Rather praxis is theory's own originating and self-correcting foundation, since all theory is dependent, minimally, on the authentic praxis of the theorist's personally appropriated value of intellectual integrity and self-transcending commitment to the imperatives of critical rationality. In that sense, praxis sublates theory, not vice-versa.5

Tracy accepts the centrality of praxis as one criterion for truth, but will not allow praxis to become a model beyond criticism. Praxis, if allowed to be sole judge and jury, may lead to corruption, distortion, and inauthentic action. Only by requiring praxis to be open to criticism from theories of disclosure and critical rationality can praxis become a relatively adequate criterion of the truth status of a classic.

Conversation remains for Tracy the central category
in any discussion of truth. In his view, once the possibility of conversation has been eliminated distortions and illusions often pass for truth. For the classic to claim to be true it will require plural interpretations as well as the appropriation of these interpretations in actions. Action is not merely an afterthought to the interpretation of a classic. Rather, the acts which the classic produces will be one of the criteria which will determine the truth and adequacy of the classic.

The Classic as Game

The classic is an active object which involves the subject in a disclosive relationship. In order for a classic to be authentically experienced, for Tracy, one may not remain autonomous, removed, or indifferent to the work. Rather, the initial encounter with the classic involves a loss of control of one's subjectivity. Tracy uses Gadamer's model of the game to further elucidate the nature of one's encounter with the classic.

I do not experience a subject over and against an object with my subjective consciousness in complete control. Rather I experience myself caught up in a relationship with the work of art in such a manner that I transcend my everyday self-consciousness and my usual desires for control.
The game becomes a disclosive model for how the subject initially encounters the work of art. The classic "grabs" or "pulls you into" the world which it presents. The loss of autonomy is important in phenomenologically describing what occurs when one encounters the classic. One first encounters, then interprets, and only after the world in front of the text is presented, does one begin to criticize the classic. The three steps involve a critical correlation between the experienced world and the demands of one's intellectual integrity. One can neither lose sight of the critical demand of one's mind or become so engrossed in critical theory that one is no longer able to encounter anything. The model of a game remains relatively adequate for describing the encounter with the classic, only to the degree that it recognizes the need for a critical correlation between the encounter of a classic and the demands of critical rationality.

The dissolution of the autonomous self and the suspension of critical reflection in the presence of a classic does not negate or destroy the possibility of plural interpretations. The suspension of one's critical stance is simply that, a suspension; it does not remove the need for critical reflection to be an integral part of one's overall experience of the classic. Critical reflection is reclaimed when one steps back from the game
and recognizes the game's rules as rules. The game model highlights the need to initially experience the classic without the intellectual protection of the autonomous post-Enlightenment thinker.

When I enter a game, if I insist upon my self consciousness to control every move, I am not in fact playing the game. Rather I am playing some curious game of my own where self consciousness is the sole rule, while any vulnerability and any ability to transcend myself are the forbidden moves in the only role or game I am willing to play. 9

It is by engaging in the risk of the game that we allow ourselves to experience the power of the classic.

Works of art have the ability to transform people, if only for a brief time, by their new and often unique view of reality.

Here the back and forth movement of every game becomes the buoyant dialectic of the true freedom, surprise, release, confrontation, shock, often reverential awe, always transformation.10

Allowing praxis to act as a criterion for truth involves an analogous entrance into the game of human action. When one wishes to act in a meaningful way one risks the possibility that one's actions will be inadequate, misinformed, or systemically distorted. The risk of attempting to act authentically is a risk often plagued
with disappointment. In order for one's actions to remain potentially authentic one must retain the ability of critically correlating theory, symbol, and action.11

In order to allow a work of art to transform us, we must be willing to temporarily relinquish our control. This seems to be a very dangerous risk. How do we know that the classic we encounter is a classic that will transform evil and not produce it? The classic may be an art work which has had a transformative effect on people from generation to generation, but does this absolutize or authenticate the classic beyond revision and beyond error? The classic involves a vision of possibilities which has stood the test of time, yet we know history is not beyond error.12 If history may involve the distortions of a patriarchal church and a history which has forgotten the poor, then we must choose our classics with care. We must find some way to judge the classics as adequate to the task of transforming evil into truth and goodness. The classic should also be judged on its ability to transform injustice, oppression, and hatred into justice, solidarity, and love.

Judging the Classics?

Before one can begin to judge the different classics
of any culture or tradition, one must first attempt to understand who the self is and what factors one brings to the judging of a classic. Tracy discusses this question in his analysis of the reception of the classic. For Tracy, an individual comes to any classic with a preunderstanding.

...the preunderstanding of the subject is itself informed, both negatively and positively, by the history of the effects and influences of the classic—INCLUDING THE HISTORY OF THE EFFECTS, INFLUENCES, AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THIS CLASSIC TEXT IN THE CULTURE.13

Because one cannot, in any easy way, adjudicate the many possible modes of being in front of the classics, one must realize one's preunderstandings and attempt to move towards an informed discussion of the complex ethical, aesthetic, transformative, and traditional demands of the authentic classic. It must be noted again that in spite of the difficulty of judging the classic there is a necessary order in the adjudication process.

Ethical judgments seem far more hermeneutically appropriate after the interpretation of the "world" of the work as possible-mode-of-being-in-the-world.14

The emphasis falls on when the judging occurs. Texts are often judged prior to their interpretation which leads to an inadequate judgment of the text. When the author's
political, religious, or ethnic background become determinate factors in judging a text, the judgment can no longer claim to be authentic. The text is "autonomous," and so any judgment of the text should remain exempt from prejudices against the background of its production.

Tracy does not attempt here to judge the classics on specific moral issues, but rather calls for further conversation on the issue. His concern at this point in his argument is that one not move to judgment without conversation. Conversation of this sort should include philosophers, social scientists, critical theorists, theologians, as well as the oppressed and poor.

The Religious Classic

There are various ultimate classics for Tracy; they are the religious classics which take an individual to the limit situations in his or her life. The religious classics hold one key to living authentically, because they allow for the possibility of the presence of God. In order for authentic action to be complete within any religious tradition, the religious classic must be examined as the source of possible modes of being. Through correlating action, symbol, and theory, an interpretation of the religious classic may disclose the
truth present in the limit experiences of life.

For Tracy, the religious classic "may be viewed as an event of disclosure of the 'limit of', 'horizon to', 'ground to' side of religion."15 The reception of the classic also allows the community to be transformed through its invitation to new acts of resistance, solidarity, and hope.

For in the actual moment of response to a religious classic, religious persons are convinced that their values, their style of life, their ethos are in fact grounded in the inherent structure of reality itself. In that response to a religious classic, religious persons seem to sense that there exists an unbreakable inner connection between the way one ought to live and the way things really are.16

This statement at first seems to be a retreat from critical reflection and a retrenchment into a first naivete. Religion appears as a state of being which denies the world outside of the tradition and focuses solely on the actions and ethos described in the religious classic. Tracy is not attempting to judge the religious experience here, but to explain it. He is attempting a brief phenomenology of what occurs when one responds to the religious classic. In the Christian religious classic, one enters a game where one finds a mediating symbol structure between the necessarily existent God and the actual experiences of society and culture.

Tracy explains this game dynamic by using the
traditional term of faith. The moment of "encounter-response" with the Christian classic is one of a risk which is analogous to the self abandonment of the game. He understands this as an authentic stepping into and letting go of oneself. The experience of faith is not one of "imagine-reality-as-if-it-were-this-way" for reality is "that-way" in the encounter with the religious classic. In spite of the need for an initial abandonment of self, Tracy acknowledges, and even requires, that faith remain rooted in critical reflection. Critical reflection may lead one to a new interpretation of the religious experience and of the classic as an "as-if" experience. But for the theologian, without the initial encounter of risk, there can be no authentic criticism of the religious classic.

The religious classic is also different from the cultural classic because it has the ability to express the relationship of individual experiences to the "whole." By being religious, the classic is a "genuine manifestation of the whole from the reality of the whole itself." He sees the religious perspective as qualitatively different from morality, art, science, politics, or economics. Religion as religion cannot be absorbed into these components of life, but rather religion is what informs and sometimes transforms all of life. Religion
qua religion is the whole.

The final point of understanding the religious classic is its dialectical character. We noted earlier that all classics have the dialectical character of disclosure/concealment. The religious classic is one source which has the power to disclose and conceal the whole of reality. When one encounters the religious classic one enters a game which explains not only the limit situations, but also involves practical understanding of our everyday experience.

All great religious traditions have a mysterious element within the disclosure of the ultimate. The native Peruvians of the Incan tribe have lost much of their cultural heritage due to the Spanish conquest. Yet they still retain this sense of mystery when they speak of the mountains which surround the city of Machu Picchu. The mountains, as well as all of the natural world, hold religious significance for the Indian tribes. It is said that the mountains which surround the city of Machu Picchu are mysterious because they only reveal a part of the beauty and magic of the forest on any one journey. The rains come so often and the mist is so dense, that on any five day trip there are always several sections of the trail which remain shrouded in mystery. The mountain controls the disclosure and concealment of its beauty, and
the guides who make the trek every week claim that they will never discover all the beauty and wonder which the mountains hold. Analogously a lifetime within a religious tradition reveals many things of the religion, but the mystics of every faith live knowing that there are always hidden moments of grace, and the whole is never wholly revealed.

The Christian Classic

In order to move from the general religious classic to a Christian model of authentic action, we must initially limit our discussion to the Christian classic: "the Jesus Christ event." As a Christian people, we recognize, "Jesus in the Christ event as the person whom God's own self is decisively re-presented as the gift and command of love." This initial definition of the Christian classic sets the backdrop to the dialectic of the Christ event. In the Christ event, we experience a dialectic of the "always-already" and the "not-yet." Jesus re-presents the "always-already" graced world and the "not-yet" realized event of God in each person and in history.

The "always-already" defines, in a strictly Christian context, the possibilities which are always
present in front of the scriptures. These possibilities may be found in the parables, narratives, and apocalyptic writings of both the New and Old Testaments. These texts stand as continual reminders of how a life could be lived in relationship with the God of Jesus. God is always-already present in Jesus Christ, and yet the always already character of the Christ is cautioned by the "not-yet" experience of God in everyday life.

The revealing, self-disclosing, comprehensible, present God who is always-already present to us is at the same time the hidden, concealing, incomprehensible, even sometimes absent God of Christian experience.20

Apocalyptic literature captures the temporal character of our lived experience of the "not-yet." In addition to the temporal character of the "not-yet" there is also our experience of moral finitude which is expressed as the "not-yet" through the symbol of the cross.21

Responses to the Christian Classic

Tracy highlights three paradigmatic responses to the Christian classic which are present in contemporary theology: manifestation, proclamation, and historic action. Each of these three responses claims to be the key interpretive model for understanding the relationship
between human beings and the God revealed in the Christian classic. Tracy accepts all three models as relatively adequate, but none as the exclusive interpretation of the Christian experience of God.

Those who experience the Christian classic as fundamentally requiring a response of respect for the manifestation of God see an intense immediate irruption of God in experience. Manifestation occurs as both an affirmation of God's grace and a radical negation of the journey of the Christian. When manifestation is understood as the core of the Christian message a fundamental trust in God is the result.22

The second paradigmatic response to the Christ event is the proclamation of the Word of God. Tracy focuses on the neo-Orthodox Protestant theologians as the demonstrative group for proclamation. The Bible and its proclamation is that through which one recognizes one's relationship to God and the world. Human sinfulness takes on a central role as the word confronts humans with their shortcomings and evil.

They [the neo-orthodox theologians] demanded that the event of the proclaimed word - the radical transcendence of God and the eschatological coming of God's Word into this world in the triumph of grace in Jesus Christ - be kept steadily in view by all theology worthy of the name Christian.23

The final response is that of historical action, and
is a very important response for our present study. Tracy focuses on the political and liberation theologians as contemporary examples of this response. The central theme in liberation and political theologies is a sense of praxis which acts as the judging criterion for both rituals and Word. The criterion of praxis neither negates proclamation or manifestation, but revises the significance of both models by reinterpreting the aim of both responses through the lens of action.

The word event of proclamation commands, the gift event of manifestation demands a singular recognition: the recognition of the primacy of praxis, action in and for a church and a global society groaning to be set free from the alienating events and oppressive structures in the contemporary situation.24

The central theme of praxis replaces the centrality of either word or ritual. Ritual and word become only steps along a path of transformative action.

Tracy's analysis of the three responses does not conclude with one being more disclosive than the others, but instead he returns to a call for dialogue and conversation. He recognizes the importance of all three responses in the post-modern situation. But what remains central to his project is a call for pluralism and a fight against a reduction of theology into any one response as the only "Christian" response.
An Analogical Imagination

Tracy has remained cautious, always stating all sides and arguing for plural models instead of one "true" model. He has revised the fiction into a cultural classic, and several cultural classics have been understood as religious classics. The religious classic has become the ultimate game which must be risked: the game of life. But have we come any further in knowing what it may mean to act authentically in the face of the paralysis cited by Niebuhr? Or do we still "lie pathetically" without any new means of viewing our actions as authentic or inauthentic? It appears as though we have complicated the situation more than simplified it. Complexity may be a part of what has occurred, but there has also been further disclosure of what our situation is and a trajectory has begun towards practical criteria of authentic action.

Tracy does not end AI by simply stating the three responses to the Christian classic without taking a position himself. He synthesizes the work done so far in his model of the "analogical imagination." The analogical imagination is a means by which one may begin to understand the complexity and pluralism of the
contemporary situation.

Once a focal meaning is chosen and formulated, the rest of the journey of a systematic analogical imagination begins. For then each theologian strives - through critical interpretations of the core symbols in the full range of the Christian tradition and through critical interpretations of the realities of the contemporary situation - to find some ordered relationships for understanding the similarities-in-difference in the whole: the realities globally named God-self-world.25

Theology becomes a process a continual journey of understanding, criticism, and reinterpretation. The initial "focal meaning" is dependant on the geographical, socio-political, familial, and other varied factors of one's life.

In attempting to synthesize what has occurred thus far in our search for criteria of authentic action, it will be helpful to employ Tracy's concept of analogy as similarity-in-difference as the key for moving from thought to action. The two volumes discussed so far have focused on the methods, problems, and needs of the theologian qua theologian. We have desired to draw out of Tracy's theology an implicit model for human action and the criteria which judge that action as authentic. The problem has remained one of the radical difference between thought and action.

There are many similarities between the means of establishing theological adequacy and the means of
establishing relatively adequate criteria of authentic action. Action, if it is to be authentic, requires a complex of interrelated forces. Is it not the case that in arguing for a critical stance in all of theology Tracy is analogously arguing for a critical posture for the authentic human agent? By claiming that humans need fiction and that the religious classic stands as the ultimate fiction does not Tracy claim that authentic human action requires some symbolic structure, and the possibilities which that structure presents? Finally, is not Tracy's claim that theology requires a correlation between the experience of God, self, and world and the Christian classic also a call for the same in authentic Christian action? If Tracy's argument is adequate, then we may argue that authentic action involves similar criteria as the analogical imagination.

What remains to be discussed in P&A are the specific criteria which Tracy establishes for authentically appropriating the Christian classic. These criteria will involve the critical stance developed in BRO, and the analogical imagination which has been established in AI. Without the ability to have a correlation between the religious classic and the experienced world, any claim to authentic Christian action appears inadequate.
CHAPTER IV

RESISTANCE, SOLIDARITY, AND HOPE
IN THE FACE OF PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY

Tracy uses specific and practical concerns as he initiates his most recent text. The focus in P&A falls more heavily on practical ways to act and specific criteria for authentic Christian action than it did in either BRO or AI. The criteria of judging an act as authentic are informed by the complex system of the "analogical imagination." If we propose to set forth universal criteria of relative adequacy for authentic action it may be necessary to be specific on the limits of such criteria. Neither scholars nor beggars are the only people able to act authentically. Contemporary criteria of authentic action would seem to require the ability for all people to act authentically regardless of their social, geographic, economic, and political background. But is this possible? Are there such criteria that may judge equally all people, at all times, and in all places?

The plurality of Tracy's model of interpretation would seem to imply that there are no universal criteria of judging actions nor is there a universal model for
human action. Here we need to make an important distinction between a model of action and the criteria which are used to judge actions. A model for action involves the specific steps which are taken in any action. Two examples of models of action are Lonergan's model developed in *Insight* and an Aristotelean model of praxis. Tracy focuses on both these models at different times in his writings, but our focus has been and continues to be on the criteria which may judge actions as authentic or inauthentic.

Criteria of relative adequacy, for Tracy, depend on the foundation established in *BRO* and *AI*. He develops three criteria for authentic action: resistance, solidarity, and hope. Though these criteria are only "relatively adequate", they are proposed as able to determine, with relative adequacy, the authenticity of an act for all Christians. I will argue for this claim in depth in the following chapter. Using the steps of adjudication explained above, we must first understand these three criteria before we can judge their relative adequacy.

Resistance has its background in the first step of Tracy's project: the critical stance. Since the very beginning he has argued for critical forms of resistance within the academic community. He now extends this demand
for a critical stance into the broader social, economic, and political world. Solidarity is the practical application of resistance to the situations of everyday life. It begins with the theoretical understanding of conversation and an emphasis placed on the community rather than the individual. Actions based on the community's shared traditions, shared history, and shared classics, are acts of solidarity. Hope is the final embracing act of Tracy's model of action. Hope is the risk of acting after one faces the ambiguities and interruptions of life. Hope is not blind, rather hope is strange and unusual, hope is our response to the limit.

These criteria of authenticity receive further clarification and greater depth when Tracy develops them within the experiences of plurality and ambiguity. Both plurality and ambiguity describe characteristics of the criteria of resistance, solidarity, and hope. By further examining the radical nature of plurality and ambiguity in our experience we may better understand how the criteria of authentic action may remain useful in contemporary life.

Language

In P&A, Tracy maintains the high profile accorded to
linguistic considerations in his earlier works. Through a highly distilled discussion of contemporary work in philosophy of language and linguistics, he locates the major issues concerning plurality.

Tracy initially points out the inadequacies of both a positivist use of language and a romantic sense of one's "own" language. He states that positivism, as with any inquiry which claims to be talking about a "pure object out there" is no longer an adequate model of language or experience. Romanticism is equally unacceptable for Tracy because of its claim to a "truth inside the self" which does not need interpretation but only explication.

Language is not an instrument that I can pick up and put down at will; it is always already there, surrounding and invading all I experience, understand, judge, decide, and act upon.

What has surfaced out of the debate over linguistics is the importance of language as a pervasive, ever present, horizon to our experience. The structuralist, post-structuralist, deconstructionist, and semiotic analysts have highlighted the instability of language.

Tracy is convinced that language is meaning-ful, and that meaning may be best understood through the category of discourse. He sees the existence of sentences, paragraphs, and texts to be signs that there is meaning within linguistic structures. Appealing to
discourse as an alternative to understanding language as system or use, Tracy argues that language, understood as discourse, relates experience to society and history.

Language as system is inadequate because it does not allow for meaning in front of the text. Additionally, it is limited because of its emphasis on words alone when studying language. Language as use is similarly inadequate because it does not take into account the disclosive fact that language is in part a system of differences and opposites. When language is understood as use, it cannot take into account the autonomy of the text and the meaning present in the text apart from the author who wrote the text. As a way of combining the two understandings of language, Tracy, borrowing from Beneviste, argues that language is best understood as discourse.7 Discourse is relatively adequate because it takes into account the previous views of language as use and system, while also attempting to study the meaning involved in the movement from words to sentences to texts.

Why is it so important to study the movement from words to texts and the co-incidental increase in linguistic complexity? For Tracy the fundamental answer is that the world is meaningful. By moving away from either of the formal analyses of language, discourse leaves us in history and society. History, society, and
contemporary experience, though they may never escape from language, are different from language.

Language understood as discourse, because of its recognition of society and history, also points to our need to "converse with one another on the ethical-political implications of all analysis of language and reality." Tracy here shows a strong connection between the interpretation of a text and the ethical-political actions which will be informed by that text. Inasmuch as each possible world in front of the text is a social and political world, all texts take on an ethical-political voice as they attempt to persuade one to act in certain ways.

At this point we come to the connection between the classic - (the text and its interpretation as discourse) - and action. Tracy's concept of action appears to be informed by two models of action: a self-transcendence model and a redefined model of praxis. The two models seem to be a tensive pair. Yet, Tracy understands a relatively adequate model for action to involve both of these models. His understanding of analogical action takes into account both self transcendence and praxis. Tracy tempers both his understanding of Lonergan's self transcendence and any Marxist utopian vision of praxis with an understanding of history as interruptive.
History as Ambiguity and Interruption

In addition to Tracy's introduction of the classic into a traditional view of praxis, he also criticizes the idea of praxis when it becomes an idealized means to a utopian society. History as an account of past actions informs us that there is no continually progressive teleology but rather a history of interruptions. History is plagued with interruptions which instead of producing a clear meaningful tradition result in a history most aptly described as ambiguous.

Ambiguity may be too mild a word to describe the strange mixture of great good and frightening evil that our history reveals.

Ambiguity is the tensive character of history itself. It is not the tension of disclosure/concealment, but an analogous tension of "great good and frightening evil" existing in the same event. The evil and good exist as "both/and" rather than "either/or" in history. An event may be portrayed by the history books as either good or evil but a more accurate view of history is one which explores both the good and the evil of an event.

What does such a history disclose about the world in which we live? Foremost is the fact of evil in history
which cannot be ignored or minimized. Even for those who do not read the history of the great cultures, our recent heritage is enough to confirm the existence of evil in history. The holocaust of World War II in Germany is one stark example. The war in Ethiopia, which denies relief effort food to the victims of famine because of boundaries drawn by the the war, continues to be an ugly commentary on the extent of evil. What are these situations to be termed? Is evil or sin strong enough language to disclose the radicallity of these events?

Tracy describes history as interruptive. Evil interrupts what may have appeared to be a teleological path taken by history. Even those seemingly great steps forward like the American colonization and revolution are not without interruption. The near complete destruction of the American Indians occurred within the great experiment of freedom we call the discovery of America. The list of interruptions in history is as long as that of historical events: the slavery of the blacks, the destruction of the Incan empire, the rape and subjugation of women throughout history. How can history be seen as moving towards a specific goal? It appears rather to be a wayward path without direction; a struggle marked by interruptions.

Tracy presents a base motif of responsibility as an initial means of acting in light of history's
interruptions. He borrows from Abraham Joshua Heschel who insists: "Not all are guilty but all are responsible."11 Here responsibility is understood in the sense of being "capable of responding." It is a responsibility which begins with the step of accepting ambiguity; accepting the complex dialectic of good and evil in history. It involves resisting any history which accepts only the good and views reality as a utopia.

If one is to face history without a naive acceptance of history as a utopian drive toward truth and justice, then one must take on a critical posture.12 The conscious and unconscious ideologies of all history, and of the present, need to be questioned and often criticized.

Ideologies are unconscious but systematically functioning attitudes, values, and beliefs produced by and in the material conditions of all uses of language, all analysis of truth, and all claims to knowledge.13

These ideologies inform all our actions and thoughts and once we recognize their existence we must struggle to pay attention to their subtleties.

To interpret history in all its ambiguity requires both a retrieval of the historical texts and events, and a suspicion of the ideologies which inform those texts. This raises again the issue of the classic and especially the religious classic. If the religious classic is that
to which we bring our limit questions and that which provides a world of possibilities we risk entering, then it seems crucially important that we interpret the religious classic with both a hermeneutic of suspicion as well as retrieval.

**Analogical Action**

Having placed ourselves within the instability of language and a history filled with interruptions, we come to the question of how the informed person may act authentically. It is assumed that the future will hold new interruptions and that the complexity of understanding our situation will only increase. If plurality and ambiguity are not to lead to a paralysis of human action then certain criteria of authentic action need to be proposed. Relatively adequate criteria of authentic action are proposed as means by which any model of action can be judged as adequate to the experiences of the contemporary person in the contemporary world.

Authentic action may better be described at this point as "analogical action". The conceptual framework laid out by Tracy for the "analogical imagination" is a set of guidelines which will also inform a model for authentic action. "Authentic analogical action" will
involve the correlation of the religious classic with the contemporary situation of plurality and ambiguity. Such action will be open to many possibilities, not restricted to specific rules and strict guidelines of dogmatic interpretations. Authentic Christian action will interpret the past through a method of correlation with the present, and will not rely on a desire to return to the time of Christ in order to act exactly as his disciples did. These criteria of action require an analogical imagination which can inform the human agent of an immense number of possibilities and critically appropriate these possibilities to the condition of human finitude.

I maintain that resistance, solidarity, and hope are the criteria of authenticity for contemporary "analogical action". The foundation established in BRO of a critical stance and the dialectic of fact and fiction support action. The possibilities of the classic and the understanding of the contemporary situation produce the horizon for action. The final move must be one which involves thought in all its possibilities and criticisms, but must not be restricted to thought. We may always think, but we must also act. The following sections will argue that the criteria of resistance, solidarity, and hope are criteria of relative adequacy for judging
authentic Christian action.

Resistance

Resistance remains, in many ways, the most theoretical criteria of the three proposed. Resistance begins with a critical stance and involves a hermeneutics of suspicion. Tracy understands all religions as exercises in resistance. For Tracy, in order for any interpretation of a religious classic to remain relatively adequate it must retain a critical correlation of the experienced world and the world in front of the text. Resistance remains a relatively adequate criterion of authenticity when it resists any pretense of purity, any statement of absolute authority, and any claim to complete autonomy.

Tracy focuses his argument by citing the lives of people who have resisted the status quo based on their interpretation of the religious classics. These people have lived authentically through acts of resistance. People such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi have risked acting on their interpretations of their religious classics. These people's lives represent authentic action: action which resists the political, economic, and societal oppression of people. Yet no set
of resistive acts is universally authentic. In fact, to claim Gandhi's life or Martin Luther King's life as the way to act in all situations removes one from a critical stance and so from authentic action.

One needs to understand the possibilities of resistance in an analogical way. One may resist by many diverse sets of acts. Regardless of the course of resistance taken, a critical correlation between the experienced world and one's faith in a religious classic remains a core requirement of authentically appropriating the religious classic. A Christian act is authentic in part when it resists the temptations to retreat into a classicist understanding of the Christian scriptures. At the same time authentic Christian action may not deny the meaning and truth disclosed by the religious classic. Authenticity involves living the tension between the ultimate reality disclosed in the religious classic and the critical questions provoked by human experience. One attempts to see the similarities between the resistance of Jesus Christ toward the Pharisees and the resistance we may have towards present religious elitism. Christian analogical action in the form of resistance does not have specific people or structures to resist; but attempts to act in a similar fashion to that of Christ, without denying the ever present differences.
Solidarity

What conversation is to the life of understanding solidarity must be to the life of action.16

Solidarity may be understood through its foundation in the analogy of conversation. Language itself elicits the recognition that we have certain preunderstandings and certain horizons determined by our language. Language also establishes a bond between very different people and invites conversation between those who otherwise appear to have no common ground.

Solidarity as a criterion of authentic action demands the denial of an autonomous self and an opening up to the other. "Between person and person, as well as between person and text, there exists in every authentic conversation an openness to mutual transformation."17 In so far as conversation and authenticity are held together as analogous concepts, solidarity also demands an openness to other people as encounters of potential transformation. Actions which are open only to like minded friends and deny the ability to learn and be transformed by those who are different cannot claim to be authentic. Likewise actions which close a person off from experiencing the contemporary world and require one to
live in only familiar and conciliatory surroundings can not claim to be authentic.

Solidarity does not suggest that differences are to be overlooked or brushed aside, but recognized as a part of the common human situation. In spite of our differences, the religious classics bid us into relationship with those different from us. The Christian classic invites us to be in solidarity with the poor, the oppressed, and the marginalized. Jesus Christ lived, worked, and taught the marginalized of society. We may have different ways of understanding who fits into these categories, but the possibilities set out by Jesus Christ exist as real possibilities for action in the contemporary world.

One possibility of solidarity is the formation of community. Actions of solidarity are actions which risk the safety of individuality and threaten to break the welcome boundaries of like-minded friends. When one steps towards the "other" and allows conversation, dialogue, and action to take over one enters the "game" of solidarity. Inherent in Tracy's idea of solidarity is a pluralism of potential actions, but the acts of solidarity are not "mere possibilities;" they are real concrete acts. Acting in solidarity with others is a risk, one which opens up the contemporary world of good and evil and invites one to
be transformed.

Hope

The final criterion of authentic Christian action is that of hope. Hope is a criterion which does not have the intellectual nature of resistance or the practical value of solidarity, but rather takes on a spiritual nature. Hope is based in faith: the faith which is the risk of living according to the religious classic.

The Christian religious classic has many faces, one of which is eschatological. It is a vision of what could be, and as a fiction is also factual as a real and possible world in front of the Christian classic. Hope in this vision is a reasonable hope for Tracy. It is hope in authentic conversation, liberation, and solidarity. Hope exists as the internal power of the human agent to act in light of the possibilities of resistance and solidarity. Authentic Christian action requires hope in the transformative potential of the Christian classic. Without this hope acts may become muddled in the conflicts produced by our experiences of plurality and ambiguity.

Whoever fights for hope, fights on behalf of us all. Whoever acts on that hope, acts in the manner worthy of a human being. And whoever so acts, I believe, acts in manner faintly suggestive of the reality and power of that God in whose image human
beings were formed to resist, to think, and to act. The rest is prayer, observance, discipline, conversation, and actions of solidarity-in-hope. Or the rest is silence.19

The closing lines of *Plurality and Ambiguity* show the connections between resistance, solidarity, and hope. When he states that those who act in hope act in "the manner worthy of a human being", he is alluding to what I have termed authentic human action. The criteria of resistance, solidarity, and hope enable one to judge the authenticity of an act in our contemporary world. The category of authenticity does not imply a moral or ethical standard of behavior. Rather, authenticity is a theological category used to judge actions on how well that action appropriates what is known of the world, the self, and the religious tradition. Moral, aesthetic, and civil judgments will also have to be made of any act, but in addition to our ethical and civil duties the question of authenticity remains important for contemporary men and women.
CHAPTER V

THE LIMITS AND HOPE OF ANALOGICAL ACTION

Acting analogically involves the critical stance described in BRO, the factual possibilities of the religious classic, and a correlation of the religious classic with the contemporary world conditioned by plurality and ambiguity. Analogical action does not propose a model of specific steps taken in every action, but a set of criteria which may judge acts as authentic. The criteria of resistance, solidarity, and hope are only relatively adequate criteria which involve certain limitations. The theoretical complexity implied within the criteria of resistance needs to be cautioned by a recognition of the diversity of human intellectual faculties. The criteria need to be further developed in order to remain relatively adequate to a diverse population outside of an academic community of scholars.

Though analogical action may at first appear as a criteria of authenticity applicable to only those with high levels of cognitive and abstractive abilities, the criteria can be revised into basic understandings which allow almost all people to use them. I will argue that
everyday practical experiences confirm Tracy's criteria of authenticity as applicable for most of the population. There are several questions which must be asked about the criteria of authentic action. What degree of understanding and critical reflection are necessary in order to act authentically? What level of abstraction is necessary in order to understand the similarity in difference of analogical action? What knowledge of historical ambiguity and linguistic plurality is necessary in order to act authentically?

Several distinctions are initially required before we can attempt to answer these questions. First, authenticity and morality are not synonymous and they require very different criteria of judgment. What Tracy has established is not a set of criteria for moral action. He has argued that authenticity is a category involving rational, symbolic, and ethical criteria. Authenticity is not a judgment of a person's goodness or holiness. Rather, it is a category which we use when we speak of an integrated person, someone whose actions are done with a recognition of their relationship to the self, world, and God.

One must be self-conscious in order to act authentically. Additionally, one must be "other" conscious for one's actions to claim authenticity in the
larger society. Finally, Christian authenticity requires one to be conscious of God. All three of these states of consciousness may vary greatly in breadth and depth, but their existence is a minimal requirement for authenticity in its different levels. Authenticity, in this sense, does seem to require certain levels of conceptual and abstractive thought.

What level of self conscious critical reflection is necessary to determine an act as authentic? Resistance seems minimally to require the recognition that all statements need interpretation. One can not accept a statement as fact, merely because it is stated as a fact. Resistance understood within this parameter, excludes children below a certain age from acting authentically. Young children accept their experiences without question. The ability to "fool" or "entice" children is a concern for most parents. Parents recognize something which children often don't: that "things are not always as they seem." The need to question one's beliefs, desires, and dreams is at the base of Tracy's criterion of resistance.

One must not only learn to question, but one must learn to appropriate this questioning stance into one's acts. An action may be just and worthy of praise but remain inauthentic. Such a case occurs when the only response to the question "Why did you do that?" is
"Because I was told to." This scenario shows how Tracy's sophisticated understanding of resistance based on critical theological reflection can be understood in very practical terms. If one remains completely dependent on others for one's reasons of action one cannot authentically act.

The second criterion of authentic action is the use of an analogical imagination and the need for conversation in order to act in solidarity with others. I have argued that solidarity as an adequate criterion of authentic action requires the ability to see others as both similar and different. I have also argued that solidarity requires the ability to engage others in conversation which is open to transformation. Both of these criteria involve respect for the other. If one cannot abstract enough to recognize a person with black skin as equally valuable as one with white skin, one cannot claim one's actions to be authentic.

The skill of recognizing similarity in difference occurs very early in life; one example is when children recognize themselves in the mirror. This level of abstraction gains sophistication and begins to involve ethical and aesthetic judgments as one's abstractive abilities become more complex. In spite of the complexity of one's analogical imagination gained with age, at its
base an analogical imagination requires the ability to see radically different things as also having similarities. The desire to find common ground without denying the other's differences is a mark of solidarity.

Equally important to solidarity is the need to be open to conversation with those who are different. If we remain so convinced of our own position we are unable to enter into a conversation at all, we are merely giving a persuasive speech but not conversing. All authentic acts of solidarity must be open to the possibility of real transformation. Without this quality there is no real encounter of the world outside the self.

In order to claim an act as authentic one must also understand the plurality and ambiguity of experience. What level of understanding of plurality and ambiguity is necessary? Surely it is not necessary to understand the radical plurality argued for by Jacques Derrida in order to act authentically. Nor does it seem necessary for one to know the broad range of historical ambiguity to claim authenticity. This being the case, what are the levels of understanding required for authentic action?

Plurality at its core recognizes that there is no single response in any given situation, but there are many possibilities. At the center of ambiguity is the recognition that "things don't always work out as
planned." Though these are great simplifications of Tracy's concepts of plurality and ambiguity, they appear as adequate reinterpretations under a very simplified cognitive horizon. In order to act authentically one must minimally recognize that one could have acted otherwise. Additionally, one must have had the experience of acting towards a certain end and receiving a very different result than expected. These experiences inform all authentic actors with the knowledge that all acts are potentially ambiguous and open to plurality. The use of plurality and ambiguity, understood on these basic levels, shows that neither category is exclusive or restrictive.

Not all people can act authentically, because not all people can live by these basic reinterpretations of Tracy's criteria. Though the criteria do entail certain restrictions of those able to act authentically, most adults have the capacity to act authentically. In addition to the need for rational criteria of correlation with experience, Tracy understands Christian authentic action as requiring a correlation of the Christian classic with the contemporary world.

Hope is the determinate Christian criterion of authenticity. In order for an act to be authentically Christian it must appropriate the religious classic in light of the contemporary situation. The contemporary
situation, because it offers both good and evil, requires Christian action to respond to the contemporary situation with real hope. Both resistance and solidarity are components of the hope of the Christian classic. In addition to the criteria of resistance and solidarity, hope confirms the Christian faith in a loving God. An act may be authentic without hope, but it is not authentically Christian without hope in the real possibility of a relationship with a loving God.

Though the criteria of authenticity are relatively adequate to experience, I still maintain certain reservations and criticisms of Tracy's criteria. The criteria of authentic action based on a critical stance, an analogical imagination, and an understanding of the plurality and ambiguity of experience; can be misunderstood if interpreted as appropriate to only scholarly endeavors. How does Tracy's argument introduce such a prejudice? The central underlying problem seems to be his overdependence on cognitive structures of development and argumentation in his exploration of these criteria. Tracy's use of conversation has had the tendency to be interpreted as a criteria which judges more favorably those who are intellectually better prepared. I have stated above, the minimal understanding of conversation as a criterion of authenticity, but in spite
of conversation's necessity for solidarity it also involves an inherent risk of distortion.

The central criticism of Tracy's work has been that it is too cryptic and overly academic. The criticism is valid to a point, but there is also a need to read what has been written and not solely the style in which it is presented. The real problem may lie in the reception of Tracy's texts. Because of the complexity involved in Tracy's writings, especially BRO and AI, the audience has been mostly intellectuals. Many readers have used Tracy's texts inappropriately to support an elitist mentality. In Tracy's writings, he is very explicit to renounce such elitism and call for conversation with all groups of people.

This kind of unconscious elitism, I have come to believe is not a mere error. Like other distortions, elitism is both unconscious and systemic. It is a distortion whose power will be broken only when we learn to hear these alternative readings of the oppressed. The most powerful acts of resistance are often those where the first lesson is to resist oneself.1

Here Tracy criticizes those who have interpreted his previous texts, as well as any other text, as confirming the elite world of scholarly discourse. Authenticity demands that we shatter this illusion of elitism in theology and enter into a true dialogue about the religious tradition of our heritage.
The fact is that many people don't read, and they experience the world not through a linguistic theoretical lens but through a material lens. Their reality is defined by a horizon of wet and dry earth, strong crops and unwelcome grubs, hard steel and black coal. These images, though always expressed in language and interpreted by one's linguistic preunderstanding, are fundamentally different than the world of thought, idea, and argument. The differences between a life lived without daylight in the coal mines of West Virginia and the life of an academic on a midwest university campus are starkly different realities. Only by retaining the respect for solidarity and the openness of an analogical imagination do Tracy's criteria remain authentic to themselves.

There is a subtle tendency to slip into a pejorative attitude towards the "naive" actions of the coalminers, steel workers, orange pickers, and taxi drivers in such academically oriented criteria of authentic action. This limit stands as the largest potential error in Tracy's criteria of analogical action. The criteria themselves seem ambiguous, since they are both disclosive of the many possibilities of authenticity and yet able to be distorted as they are received by the academic community.
The hope of Analogical Action

For those who have experienced the need for a critical posture and a symbolic structure of meaning, and who have faced the "facts" of radical plurality and interruptive ambiguity, on whatever level is individually appropriate; analogical action can be a disclosive and transformative criterion of judging action. The criteria reveal possible ways in which to act authentically. Authenticity is not limited to one way of acting, thinking, or understanding reality. On the contrary, authenticity becomes expansive and encompasses the possibilities of transformation present in all religious classics.

Analogical action also allows people to view themselves as authentic without needing to inauthenticate other points of view. For many Christians there has been a new appreciation for the other great religious traditions, but these other traditions are often understood as inappropriate options for discovering God. With Tracy's criteria one may act in light of one's own tradition and religious classic, and still view actions of other traditions as equally authentic, though very different. In this there is hope. Hope that we as a world community will neither become one uniform people all
believing the same tradition or a community of intolerance and prejudice. The criteria of solidarity, resistance, and hope allow people to live for others and retain their own necessary traditions.

In spite of the many limits of Tracy's criteria, analogical action remains a very useful set of criteria offering contemporary men and women a model of continual transformation. Within these criteria of authenticity, the Christian scriptures remain a stable core, but also require continual reinterpretation. Likewise, intellectual models are internally revised through critical reflection and cautioned by the constant need to act in solidarity with others. Possibly the most hopeful aspect of Tracy's criteria of analogical action is that they have a built in requirement of constant revision and renewal. With a central core of change and conversion, a life lived according to the criteria of authenticity will never retreat from experience or become deaf to new views.

In fact, one may face the plurality, ambiguity, and evil of the contemporary world with a genuine hope in the possibilities of transformation presented in the Christian classic.
NOTES CHAPTER I


7 Although there exist scholars in every field who consider their claim to be the most telling and important insight in any field, the majority of contemporary scholars have recognized the complexity of each subdiscipline. In accepting the complexity, most scholars engage in interdisciplinary dialogue as a matter of necessity.


10 Ibid., pp. 256-265.

11 The work of Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan in the mid twentieth century continued an earlier shift towards phenomenology seen in Bernard Haring's work. Many contemporary ethical models can be found which develop out

14 Ibid., p. 4.
17 Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza and David Tracy, eds., The Holocaust as Event of Interruption, Concilium, 175, 1984.
18 This is especially true in Tracy's three main works as cited above in footnote 16.
19 Tracy, P&A, pp. 82-114.
20 Tracy, P&A, pp. 82-114.
21 See note 16 above.
22 Tracy, P&A, p. 114.
23 Ibid., p. 8.

NOTES CHAPTER II

1 Tracy, BRO, p. 223.
2 Ibid., p. 7.
3 Ibid., p. 7.
4 Ibid., p. 7.
5 Tracy uses both Paul Ricoeur and Hans-Georg Gadamer in his development of his hermeneutics. In BRO he mainly focuses on Ricoeur's model of the text, and will focus more on Gadamer's emphasis on dialogue in AI.
6 A concise description of the hermeneutic circle can be found in Philip August Boeckh's essay "Theory of

7 Tracy, BRO, pp. 73-79.
8 Ibid., pp. 74-77.
9 There are very important differences between Gadamer and Ricoeur. The central difference is between Ricoeur's emphasis on the text and Gadamer's emphasis on dialogue. Tracy does not appear to be concerned with the differences, but focuses instead on synthesizing the two models into his system.

10 Tracy, BRO, p. 78.
11 Ibid., p. 75.
12 Ibid., p. 75.
14 Ibid., pp. 76-77.
15 Ibid., p. 77.
16 Ibid., pp. 77-78.
17 Ibid., p. 78.
18 Tracy primarily uses a model of transcendental correlation in BRO. But I also find a heavy emphasis on the disclosure/concealment model in this text. He will be more specific about its use in AI. Tracy introduces AI by showing how the three different subdisciplines of theology all focus primarily on a model of truth; note pp. 62-79.


20 Krell, Basic, p. 140.
21 Heidegger, B&T, p. 27.
22 I use dialectical here in the sense of Heidegger's reformulation of Hegel's dialectic. For Heidegger, the moment of truth is always a moment of tension between disclosure and concealment. It is this sense of tension which is meant by describing truth as dialectical.

23 Krell, Basic, p. 132.
24 Ibid., p. 133.
25 Note here Tracy's discussion of "limit to" and "limit of" as a more comprehensive analysis of his use of limit language. BRO, pp. 105-109.

26 Tracy, BRO, p. 69.
27 Ibid., p. 80.
28 Tracy, BRO, p. 204.
29 Ibid., p. 207.
30 Ibid., p. 207.
31 Ibid., p. 205.
32 Ibid., p. 209.
35 Ibid., pp. 211-212.
36 Ibid., p. 212.
37 Tracy is more detailed as to the character of the focus on proclamation for understanding human nature. "For they recognized that the word liberates us from all our attempts at self-justification by its dialectic of an explosive judgment and healing grace". (BRO, p. 389).
38 Tracy, BRO, p. 215.
39 Ibid., p.215.
40 Ibid., p.215.
41 Ibid., p.218.
42 Ibid., p.223.

NOTES CHAPTER III

1 Tracy, AI, p.68.
2 Ibid., p.109.
3 Ibid., p.78.
4 The practical theologians are not the first to question these models of truth. Marx and Nietzsche laid the foundation for these questions. The practical theologians have used both philosophical and theological traditions of critical theory to revise traditional notions of truth.
5 Tracy, AI, p.69.
6 Conversation is a very important concept in Tracy's system. He describes the rules of conversation as follows: "Conversation is a game with some hard rules: say only what you mean; say it as accurately as you can; listen to and respect what the other says, however different or other; be willing to correct or defend your opinions if challenged by the conversation partner; be willing to argue if necessary, to confront if demanded, to endure necessary conflict, to change your mind if the evidence suggests it." (P&A, p.19).
8 Tracy, AI, p.112.
9 Ibid., p.113.
10 Ibid., p.114.
11 As will be argued in chapter five, the criteria established for authentic action are relatively adequate for almost all people. Though the criteria are established in abstract and highly sophisticated language,
they can be reinterpreted to be applicable to everyday experience. These reinterpretations make them practical criteria for judging authentic Christian action.

12 We will find this idea examined extensively in P&A. Chapter four on ambiguity deals specifically with the issue of distortions within history.

13 Tracy, AI, p. 118.
14 Ibid., p. 145, fn 75.
15 Ibid., p. 163.
16 Ibid., p. 163.
17 Ibid., p. 164.
18 Ibid., p. 172.
19 Ibid., p. 234.
20 Ibid., p. 331.
21 Ibid., p. 331.
22 Ibid., pp. 384-386.
23 Ibid., pp. 387-388.
24 Ibid., p. 390.
25 Ibid., p. 423.

NOTES CHAPTER IV


3 It is beyond the scope of this paper to fairly outline the structuralist, post-structuralist, and deconstructionist "models" of language. Each area involves subtle and complex arguments which Tracy has distilled as far as possible in chapter 3 of P&A, and seemingly at times too far to allow the nuances of the arguments to be shown. For further reading see Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); and Of Grammatology (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974); Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, (Bloomington, IN.: Indiana University Press, 1976); Terence Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977); Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

4 Tracy, P&A, pp. 47-49
5 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
6 Ibid., pp. 60-65.
7 Ibid., p. 53.
8 Ibid., p. 65.
9 Tracy's most thorough examination of praxis from its Aristotelian roots is found in his article "The Foundation of Practical Theology" pp. 72-81; found in Don S. Browning ed., Practical Theology (San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1983), pp. 62-82.
10 Ibid., p. 70.
11 Tracy, P&A, p. 69.
12 I am not arguing here that there may not be authentic visions of a utopia, or that these visions are not able to become actualized. Rather I am suggesting that faith in such a vision which does not also contain a critical correlation with experience and history is not adequate.
13 Tracy, P&A, p. 77.
14 Ibid., p. 84.
15 Ibid., p. 85.
16 Ibid., p. 113.
17 Ibid., p. 93.
18 Ibid., pp. 103-104.
19 Ibid., p. 114.

NOTES CHAPTER V

1 Tracy, P&A, pp. 104-105.


APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by David Livingston has been read and approved by the following committee:

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The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the thesis is now given final approval by the committee with reference to the content and form.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

4/14/90
Date

Director's Signature