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Stadium Development and Urban Communities in Chicago

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ABSTRACT

In recent years, cities across the United States have invested considerable amounts of public funds to finance the construction of stadium facilities. Supporters of these projects have utilized, through the use of multiplier effects, positive direct and indirect economic outcomes, as well as community building and cultural identification factors to argue in favor of these public expenditures. As sports become part of a culture industry, questions remain as to whether these sports construction projects are viable urban development tools.

This study examines the relationship between three urban communities in the city of Chicago (South Armour Square, Lake View and Near West Side) and the stadiums which rest within their boundaries. Qualitative and quantitative data was employed to conduct this research and investigate the relationship among stadium development, business interests and community issues.

This study concludes that (1) there is a strong relationship between the interests of stadium developers and the actions of public officials, who work to support private enterprise, (2) Race matters since minority communities prove to be more directly affected by these projects, (3)
the media plays an important role as it works to support the interest of the developers, (4) social inequality proves to be the outcome of these projects within the urban environment, and (5) the stadium as an urban development tool is capable of not only reorganizing the physical space but also of transforming local culture. Thus, stadium development can effect urban change.
To my parents,
Mr. Ploutarchos- Stylianos Spirou and
Mrs. Yvonne Charalambaki Spirou
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Goal of this Project

Urban development and its implications toward the quality of life for those residing within the urban environment has been shaped by multiple factors. The primary emphasis on ecological, political and economic factors, as ways to understand urban processes, has often excluded the investigation and impact of various cultural influences.

Cultural aspects affect the character of the metropolis. More specifically, cultural differences, as represented by the effects of social factors such as income, education, race, etc., inform the organization of the urban environment. Symbolic values, such as dress code and reliance on the automobile can help differentiate between experiencing life in New York and experiencing life in Los Angeles. These symbolic values have emerged from both historical and demographic variations (Gottdiener, 1994) and can assist in the creation of positively identified images of place (Hummon, 1986).

One of the cultural factors which has shaped and continues to shape the urban environment has been that of
professional sports. Professional sports and the stadiums which host their teams have utilized cities across America as places of operation. These sports enterprises are unique when compared to other businesses that affect the character of a metropolitan area. Though they retain the profit oriented mode which typifies other businesses, they are often perceived as a collective representation of a metropolis while depicting the qualities of its residents. As a result, professional sports can construct the metropolitan character. The presence of a team becomes a cultural symbol of the city. These symbolic images of sports become powerful tools of city identification, capable of leaving a mark on the urban terrain and its communities.

This project examines the relationship between three urban communities in the city of Chicago (South Armour Square, Near West Side and Lake View) and the stadiums which rest within their boundaries (New Comiskey Park, United Center and Wrigley Field). Specifically, the purpose of this research is threefold. The first is to investigate the development of these sports facilities and their relationship to the community. The issues to be addressed here are: What role did the local and/or state government play in the construction of these stadiums? What rationale(s) were utilized to support these developments and what was the site selection process? How did the local communities respond to these development plans? What were
the consequences of these developments on these urban communities? Who won and who lost?

The second purpose is to compare how these three communities experienced the stadium development plans. Issues to be addressed here include: What is the ongoing relationship between these urban developments and the local communities? Are there any similarities and/or differences in the way the sports developers managed to achieve their goals? Are there any similarities and/or differences in the way the three urban communities responded to the development plans? If so, what might account for the similarities and/or differences?

Finally, the third purpose is to draw on the general patterns of recent stadium development as representations of the changing nature of capitalism. The issues to be addressed here are: What might be driving the recent construction of stadium facilities across the United States? What is the general relationship between this gentrification of stadiums and the role of government? How does this collaboration between sport enterprise and government support, as exemplified by stadium development, differ from other cases where government engages in activity aimed at advancing the interests of free enterprise? Does the study of stadium development, help us better understand the evolving relationship between social institutions and capitalism within the urban environment? What role does
urban communities play in these processes?

This research will build on the work of sociologists who have been concerned with urban development and the various roles of determining the political and economic directions of the city, including the social implications on urban life. Also, political scientists who have been interested in the government's role in supporting urban development projects such as stadium construction. Finally, sport sociologists who have been concerned with the social significance of sport and its infiltration and impact on various social institutions, specifically urban communities.

Cities across the United States invest considerable amounts of public funds to finance the construction of stadium facilities. To rationalize their "need", supporters of these projects have utilized positive, direct and indirect economic outcomes and cultural identification factors. They have also upheld the status, which these types of cities are perceived to gain by becoming accepted into the unique "major league club", as a key element in making public investment in these projects worthwhile. Thus, drawing from these general developments, the purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship among (1) stadium development, (2) business interests and (3) community issues in Chicago.
Selection of Communities and Stadiums for Case Studies

The presence of five major league professional franchises in Chicago (White Sox, Bears, Cubs, Blackhawks and Bulls) provided four different opportunities to investigate the relationship between the local communities and the sport enterprise as expressed through the construction of stadium facilities (both the Blackhawks and Bulls play at the United Center). The unique opportunity to have two of these stadiums, the New Comiskey Park in South Armour Square and the United Center on the Near West Side, complete their construction and open within the last few years, made those stadiums two strong candidates for inclusion. In addition, the nature of the local communities as areas experiencing economic and social distress - a fact which was utilized as a rationale for building these facilities at these locations - made for interesting circumstances to study.

The construction of the United Center on the Near West Side and of the New Comiskey Park in South Armour Square, are two recent developments exemplifying the relationship between the urban environment and professional teams. In looking at these two communities, one can note a number of similarities. However, the dynamics which brought about the construction of these sports facilities are quite different. Both the United Center and the New Comiskey Park have affected these communities and will continue to shape the
landscape of their urban environment in the future.

The location of Soldiers Field (current home of the Bears), at the lakefront, does not make it an attractive option to be included as a case study. This stadium is isolated from a residential community and fits well within the museum/landmark campus which exists on that general area of Lakeshore Drive. Yet, the professional franchise of the Bears and its impact on the urban environment, as part of this intense stadium development, can be examined on the Near West Side. It was there when, in the mid to late 80's, a strong effort took place to build a 75,000 spectator, open-air stadium for the Bears. This expansion effort will be considered when examining the relationship between the Near West Side and the United Center.

Finally Wrigley Field, on the north side of the city, is a ballpark of special status. It continues to attract fans even though the Cubs have poor seasons on the field. It is also one of the only three ballparks left which represent the "old" era of stadiums in America (the other two being Tiger Stadium and Fenway Park). The community in which Wrigley Field is located has in recent years attracted a younger crowd. This case study also offers an insight on the issue of stadium development. Specifically, the introduction of lights at Wrigley Field made this ballpark become the last stadium in the major leagues to have night games.
It is because of these reasons that these three communities and their stadiums fit well within the scope of this project and have been chosen as case studies. At the same time, these three stadiums will provide an additional opportunity to compare a stadium of 'historic status', such as that of Wrigley Field, to the other two stadiums, which are patterned after a "new shopping mall" form of development. Simultaneously, having three very different communities will also allow for unique comparisons to emerge.

Methodology

The case study approach is an appropriate way to study the development of sport stadiums and their relationship/effect to local communities. First, the case study approach provides an opportunity to integrate a historical perspective to the analysis and investigate the political, economic and social influences which brought about the construction of these facilities. Second, case studies will allow for variations and similarities to emerge. For example, the demographic composition of the communities involved in these stadium development processes, their organizational strategies, the role of the local political leadership, their physical location within the city, the degree of city and state intervention, the role of the media, etc., allow for interesting comparisons. Yet,
examined comprehensively, these cases studies will provide an opportunity to move from the micro to a macro level of analysis and draw conclusions about the relationship between stadium development and urban communities in general.

The case studies of these three urban, stadium communities will be based on: (1) a review of newspaper accounts of events related to these stadium developments, (2) interviews, (3) inclusion of census data from 1980 and 1990 for these communities, and (4) review of local documents/publications. Specifically:

**Review of newspaper accounts:** The events which led to the stadium development examined in these three case studies received considerable coverage by local and national media. Much of the coverage concentrated on issues related to site selection, finance, role of the local and state government, community response to the development plans, etc. A history of the social, political and economic occurrences which led to the construction of the new Comiskey Park and United Center, and the installation of lights at Wrigley Field will prove useful in understanding these stadium development issues.

**Interviews:** Another source of data employed was the interviews which were conducted with community leaders and others involved in the stadium issues. Using a snowball effect, I identified individuals engaged in the community response to the stadium development plans. These
individuals included local activists, stadium preservation advocates and even an architect. For example, in the case of the new Comiskey Park, the response of the South Armour Square residents was discussed with community leaders. A stadium architect, critical of contemporary "urban ballpark design" who had proposed an alternative stadium development plan in that same area was interviewed. Finally, other organization leaders like those of the "Save Our Sox" group which argued that it was the increased profit on the part of the ownership and not the disintegrating old Comiskey which drove the demands for a new ballpark were also interviewed. In the process of these interviews, the tactics of setting one city against another for the public finance of a new stadium for the White Sox were revealed.

Similar interviews were conducted for the other case studies. In the case of Wrigley Field, the effect of the lights on the local community was discussed with the owners of local businesses. These interactions provided additional insights to this analysis. It is important to note here, that, due to the large number of individuals involved with these issues, these interviews were utilized as means to access information which complemented the other methods of data collection employed in this project.

Census data: The use of census data was also utilized in these case studies at two different levels: (1) at the community level, and (2) at the census track level. Even
though the New Comiskey Park and the United Center were built after the 1990 census was completed, they were both constructed next to the previous facilities. As a result, the use of census data provided insights on the social and economic characteristics of the surrounding community. In addition to community characteristics, census track data from around the ballpark in the Wrigley Field/Lake View case study was employed. Specifically, 1980 and 1990 census tract data was utilized to convey population changes and compare socioeconomic trends in the area surrounding the ballpark.

Local documents/publications: The last source of data for these case studies was the review of local documents/publications. For example, community organizations involved with these stadium related issues, produced documents crucial to understanding these urban developments. Similarly, various documents published by the City of Chicago and/or the franchises themselves were incorporated in the analysis. Such publications included, neighborhood assessments, neighborhood improvement and protection plans, surveys by the sports franchises on community impact, reports on the teams’ value for Chicago, committee minutes, reports by the city, community redevelopment plans, etc.

The general questions which will guide this research project include:
1. What is the business climate within which urban centers across America operate?

2. Is growth an urban development strategy utilized by cities?

3. What is the general relationship between the state and private investment within urban development?

4. Are professional sports franchises and stadiums being viewed to be part of an urban development strategy?

5. What types of rationales are employed by cities to support these projects?

6. What are the social implications and community effects of these projects?

7. What role does the political system, local or state, play in the stadium development plans of this study?

8. In the case of neighborhood residents, how were they impacted by these changes?

9. How did the community organize to respond to these development plans?

10. Has the stadium development impacted positively/negatively on the local community?

11. What role has the media played in this process?

12. Does the case of the United Center on the West Side of Chicago, the New Comiskey Park in South Armour and the developments in Wrigley Field, with the addition of lights, represent the changing role and structure of stadiums within urban communities?
13. Is there a relationship between the socioeconomic status of the community and the site selection process?
14. Does such status impact upon the response of the community and upon the benefits/losses incurred after or during the construction?

Organization of the Project

The general questions identified above will direct this analysis to better understand the relationship between professional sports and urban environments. This project is divided into four parts. The first part, which includes chapters 1 and 2, provides an introduction to the research, the methodology employed for conducting the three case studies, and the identification of two major factors (role of state intervention and cultural symbolism in urban development) which provide the theoretical framework for this project.

The second part of this analysis includes chapters 3 and 4. This part investigates the rationales utilized by cities across America to support the construction of stadiums. According to city officials, large public investments in stadium construction are necessary since without them professional franchises cannot be retained or attracted.

Chapter 3 examines the use of the multiplier effect in input-output analysis. Public spending in projects like
stadiums has been rationalize through economic multipliers. The chapter investigates the multiplier use in various areas including the defense industry, manufacturing, tourism, the arts and sports. The chapter concludes with a critique of this methodology, outlining its limitations.

Chapter 4 assesses the proposed social benefits reported to result from the presence of a professional sports franchise in cities across America. Drawing from the functionalist perspective in sports, arguments related to social cohesion, community building and perceived urban status are discussed. This chapter concludes with an assessment of these social based arguments.

Part three consists of five chapters. Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, concentrate on the three case studies in Chicago. These case studies examine the three recent stadium developments and their effects on Chicago’s local communities.

Chapter 5 provides the political economy of the new Comiskey Park’s construction. It analyzes the rationales behind the deteriorating condition of the old Comiskey Park and the demands for a new facility in South Armour Square, on the south side of the city. This chapter also discusses the strategy utilized by the ownership of the White Sox team to obtain a new stadium by setting suburban communities, the City of Chicago and the City of St. Petersburg in Florida against each other in return for the franchises’ presence.
This chapter concludes with a discussion of the more than generous financial package which the State of Illinois and the City of Chicago awarded to retain the White Sox.

Chapter 6 investigates the response of the local community to this project, community organizing, the role of the local political leadership, displacement, cultural implications and redevelopment efforts following the construction of this facility. The chapter concludes with the presentation of an alternative plan which, though it received no serious consideration, could have had a different influence on the local community. Specifically, according to its architectural designer, this plan could have produced limited displacement and possibly worked in such a way as to provide a "real" urban development opportunity for the area.

Chapter 7 addresses the political economy of Wrigley Fields' stadium development plans on the north side of the city. Specifically, the interest on the part of baseball's Cubs to install lights on the last ballpark in the Major League to play only day games, was economically motivated. When the local community of Lake View responded to these plans with dissatisfaction and as legal efforts to approve the installation of lights proved fruitless, the Cubs threatened to leave for a suburban location and cease playing at historic Wrigley Field. This chapter also investigates the response of the Chicago City Council and
the politics related to the final approval of the lights installation, regardless of continued expressions of community dissatisfaction.

Chapter 8 examines the implications of the stadium development plans at Wrigley Field and its effect on the local community of Lake View. After a discussion of community efforts and various strategies utilized by resident organizations, the chapter addresses the response of the city to the demands of the community. It becomes clear that the advancement of a protection and improvement plan allowed these residents to have a say as to how the problems of traffic, congestion, and others would be addressed after the fact of lights installation. The chapter concludes with an investigation of how a permit parking program around the ballpark and the presence of night games assisted in transforming the surrounding community into an entertainment district. Possible long term implications of the lights for the community are also discussed.

Chapter 9 examines community response to development plans by the Chicago Bears in the mid to late 80's to construct a large, open-air football stadium, and of the Chicago Bulls and Blackhawks in the 1990's to build a large sporting indoor arena. Both of those stadium development efforts took place on the Near West Side of Chicago. The chapter outlines the urban development claims which could
flow into this economically disadvantaged community by the presence of these sports facilities. In addition, the defeat of the Bears’ plans and the eventual construction of the United Center is discussed. The implications for this west side community from these stadium development plans, including displacement, the role of the local media, the role of the local and state governments, as well as reorganization of the west side of the city are also addressed in this chapter.

The fourth part of this project consists of two chapters. Chapter 10, compares the three case studies and chapter 11 provides conclusions.

Chapter 10 provides a comparative view of the three case studies conducted in this project. This chapter discusses the differences and similarities of the three urban communities, the differences and similarities in the government response to the needs/demands of the residents and stadium developers, issues related to displacement, race and class, the role of the media and the possible long term effects of these stadium development plans on these three urban communities.

Finally, chapter 11 concludes with how cultural factors such as sporting events and the presence of professional franchises, through stadium development plans have direct implications and shape the urban environment. In that regard, professional sports becomes a case where through
their presence, economic interests are advanced. In the process, government support is easily generated making this another example where the political and economic systems become responsible for determining the nature and development of the urban environment.
CHAPTER 2

THE STATE AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT: STADIUMS AND URBAN GROWTH

Introduction

Urban centers across America are increasingly faced with multiple economic, social and political challenges, some of which have never before been encountered. Local political leadership often steps in and responds to these issues through the use of innovative approaches such as facilitating business licensing, establishing economic development corporations, creating industrial parks, floating industrial development revenue bonds, land-write downs, direct loans, employee training programs, etc... (Wolman 1979; Bessire, 1981; Huddleston, 1984; Seymour, 1985; Malizia, 1985; Rubin and Rubin, 1987).

In addition, the recent construction of sports facilities to attract professional sports franchises has been viewed as another effective urban development strategy. These partnerships between public and private sectors, provide examples where public investment in private development become critical to urban change.

The literature on stadium construction as an urban development strategy, which includes the effect of these projects on urban communities, franchise relocation and city
competition, the political economy of sports, its implications on the urban environment, etc., lacks a solid theoretical foundation. The coverage of these and related issues is primarily conducted by journalists whose reports appear in local and national newspapers, as well as other related forms of mass media. Social scientists have not engaged in concentrated efforts to investigate the dynamics of stadium development, leaving the literature in this field sparse.

Though the relationship of sports to the urban environment is generally under-researched, political scientists have recently conducted most of the research in assessing the relationship between government and sports as expressed through franchise relocation and stadium investment issues (Johnson, 1979; 1983; 1986; 1993; Johnson and Frey, 1985; Euchner, 1993). Similarly, economists have addressed the business relationship between sports and stadiums, including the operational aspects of professional franchises (Scully, 1989; Quirk and Fort, 1992; Baim, 1994; Gorman and Calhoun, 1994). Although sociologists have engaged in work in the general area of sport and society (Boyle, 1963; Edwards, 1973; Nixon, 1976; Figler, 1981; Snyder and Spreitzer, 1989; Coakley, 1990; Leonard, 1993), very little attention has been placed on investigating the role of stadiums and their relationship to local urban communities within the framework of capitalist operations.
Due to the limited analysis conducted in this area, this chapter identifies two major points which provide an insight into understanding the relationship between stadiums and urban development. The first point addresses the relationship between state intervention and urban development as framed within a Marxist model of political economy driven by the growth machine/growth ideology. State investment in private projects such as stadiums has been viewed as resulting in community-wide economic benefits. Advocates of these projects claim extraordinary economic benefits through the use of multiplier effects and economic impact studies. Similarly, driven by these same rationales, cities compete with each other as they attempt to attract or retain professional franchises at considerable public expense. Professional sports teams and stadium construction then becomes a part of an urban growth strategy.

The second point concentrates on the role of cultural elements. In this regard theorists have searched for answers regarding urban development through an analytical incorporation of the ways cultural aspects influence and shape urban centers. Specifically, stadium construction as a form of urban development is unique, since, in addition to the economic arguments of revitalization and redevelopment, professional sports franchises have also been viewed by cities as cultural communicators, sources of prestige, capable of constructing the identity of its citizenry and
producing sentiments and experiences which result in community building. Sports then, like the arts, urban tourism, landmark sites, theme parks, etc., can be viewed as part of a culture industry.

This chapter frames the theoretical issues on which the following chapters, on the use of multipliers and social rationales for the support of professional franchises and stadium construction, rely. Similarly, these theoretical perspectives will assist in reflecting on the case studies of this project. Thus, it is elements of the growth ideology and the "new" urban sociology, which provide a comprehensive theoretical framework in understanding urban development as it relates to stadium construction and ensuing community impact.

Growth Machine and Growth Ideology

In response to urban ecology, the growth machine and growth ideology has emerged as a perspective of understanding and doing urban science. Urban ecology theories and analysis, influenced by the biological sciences, searched to investigate the development of the "natural areas" in the urban environment (Park 1969; Park, Burgess and McKenzie, 1925; Hoyt, 1933; Harris and Ullman, 1945; Hawley 1950; 1956; Wingo, 1961; Losch, 1964; Berry and Kasandra, 1977). This approach to studying urban society is generally incomplete since it fails to include the effect of
cultural factors in addition to business and government interests. Human ecology also fails in its consideration of the economy since it has a limited view of the competitive nature and multiple representations of capitalism. Its monolithic view, regarding the primacy of the core when addressing urban development patterns, does not integrate the ideology of growth.

Molotch (1976), and later Logan and Molotch (1987), described the city as a "growth machine." According to this approach, growth can provide an explanation of the dynamics of urban development. The growth machine/growth ideology is a response to the functionalist perspective which was utilized to explain the nature and interrelationship of political powers amongst various urban communities.¹

Cities engage in activities which are directed towards growth. Molotch (1976: 309-310) writes on this approach of

¹ This functionalist approach emphasizes the departure from a centralized model of urban power and political control. Operating through competing interest groups, citizens have an opportunity to influence government, thus, making the political system responsive to organized groups. Power then rests in multiple centers rather than single interests (Dahl, 1967; 1989). Based on these assumptions, it is noted that as cities expand, the political power will be decentralized and a pluralist model will emerge. Thus, large heterogeneous urban structures and the varying political interests, which urban development produces, are accommodated by pluralist structures of power (Dahl, 1961; Clark, 1968, Polsby, 1980). Bachrach and Baratz (1962) have criticized this model and according to Schattschneider (1960:35): "The flaw in the pluralistic heaven is that heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent." The elite theory has also surfaced as an alternative perspective to both these majoritarian and pluralist models of democracy (Mills, 1956; Dye, 1990).
seeing the city as a growth machine:

I speculate that the political and economic essence of virtually any given locality, in the present American context, is growth. I further argue that the desire for growth provides the key operative motivation toward consensus for members of politically mobilized local elites, however split they might be on other issues, and that a common interest in growth is the overriding communality among important people in a given locale—at least insofar as they have any important local goals at all. Further, this growth imperative is the most important constraint upon available options for local initiative in social and economic reform. It is thus that I argue that the very essence of a locality is its operation as a growth machine. ...The city is, for those who count, a growth machine.

As a result, the drive for growth provides both the rationale and the need for capital investment. These activities are most often advanced by elites who control the political, economic and cultural aspects of the city. Consequently, their priorities affect the overall nature of the urban environment, particularly land use patterns.

It is through this growth driven ideology that capitalists will have an opportunity to generate conditions supportive of their goal which simply is to create profit. For example, as the city expands and grows there is an additional demand for services which the existing tax-base cannot support. This scenario, of cities in demand for additional income for services, is very common across urban centers. In addressing these concerns, local interests will come together to develop a plan and respond to these "emerging" needs. Government will then engage in a plan which often requires monetary subsidies to generate growth
As government contributes, through the use of tax monies to attract capital investment, and as investors search for places which can provide them with the greatest profit return in the shortest period of time, certain areas within the city benefit more than others. The ability of capital to easily relocate, especially with the emergence of the global economy can have an impact upon the life of urban residents (Sassen, 1991) and the emergence of the "dual city" could be viewed as a direct outcome of these changes (Castells and Mollenkopf, 1991).

Capitalists, after assessing and weighing the pros and cons of an area, will determine its profitability. The perceived financial outcomes will form the extent to which investment occurs. Capitals' decision, when considering investing in a socioeconomically devastated area, will have
serious implications as to the future condition and
direction of that particular urban community.

Non-investment in an economically devastated area
allows negative existing conditions within those areas to be
reproduced. On the other hand, a low-priced area that can
be gentrified and redeveloped will be likely to receive
special attention by business interests. Such decisions
could have adverse outcomes for the current community since
displacement of its members will be likely to follow. The
nature of capital investment can then have a direct impact
on the quality of life within the urban environment.²

Often, urban centers become preoccupied with an
emphasis on growth and expansion as a means of addressing
the social ills and problems they face. As a study of
Chicago points out (Squires, Bennett, McCourt and Nyden,
1987:11-12), it is important to examine the real
implications of this approach to urban development:

That Chicago's industrial mix is shifting from heavy
manufacturing to service and high technology industries
is noted, along with the conviction that the city

² Scott (1980), in his theory of "urban land nexus"
outlines that land development patterns are the result of a
contradictory relationship between the private and public
sphere. Both capitalist interests and the state work
against each other. The former, though empowered to make
decisions, cannot carry out its plans without the latter and
the latter, for the sake of general interest, attempts to
direct (through urban planning) the former. What results,
according to Scott, is uneven urban development. Though
uneven development is the outcome of the growth
machine/growth ideology, as put forth by Logan and Molotch
(1988), for Scott (1988), uneven development results from
within the process of capitalist production.
should encourage such developments to take advantage of emerging growth industries. Yet more fundamental structural and particularly exploitative dimensions inherent in the process of uneven development are either ignored or viewed as issues that can only be addressed after higher-priority concerns-generating economic growth-have been resolved. If it is widely understood that the city's economic and social problems will not be resolved simply by the next upturn in the business cycle, with perhaps a few exceptions nobody is demanding fundamental changes in the city's and nation's basic institutional structure either.

The emphasis on solving the problems of Chicago by creating greater economic growth by providing incentives for private capital investment has generated a strategic approach which has not fully responded to the social needs of the city and its residents. Because of these urban development strategies and the effects of uneven development, the distinction and segregation of groups based upon their racial, ethnic and class identities has been intensified.³

The different roles in determining political and economic directions of the city is the major strength of the growth ideology. Regarding the organization of the growth machine, Logan and Molotch (1987) point to the importance of government operations as they relate to advancing corporate interests.

³ Sawers (1984), for example, claims that an investigation of class needs to be further incorporated in order to better understand the formation of urban development, while Gordon (1984) provides a class/labor based analysis in explaining urban development. Finally, biracial tensions which emerged in many urban centers after the great black migration to the North (Drake and Cayton, 1945; Pettigrew, 1980; Yetman, 1985) have contributed to the development of a racial/ethnic based identity within the urban environment (Massey and Denton, 1988a; 1989; 1992).
The Political Environment:  
Private Interests and Public Needs

The relationship between the private enterprise and the government's impact on local urban policy has provided interesting views amongst urban theoreticians. According to Logan and Molotch (1987:153-154), the private interests are integrated with local government and become represented through the growth machine. Logan and Molotch point out that the political leadership often becomes one with business interests, making for a combination of a political and economic class whose actions are responsible for explaining the dynamics of urban development. They write:

Intervention in land use in the United States has never been meant to replace the operation of the property marketplace, only to smooth out its functioning. Even though individual entrepreneurs may balk at specific decisions or even denounce the entire planning process when they lose a particular contest, entrepreneurs throughout the twentieth century have come to appreciate that selective intervention can yield, in the end, benefits for the growth process. In this sense, the necessity for the "relative autonomy of the State" percolates down to the local level: In order to keep the property market rising, government must act on behalf of the market.

Similarly for Gottdiener (1987), the local government eventually works to promote the interests of the private enterprise. Yet for him, the relationship between

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4 Harvey (1976; 1983; 1990) and Mandrel (1975) advocate that the state has played an important role to ensure capitalist survival. For Harvey, it is the political economy of capitalism which determines the power of the state, making the state a tool of capital accumulation. Capital interests evolve to establish the state-capital articulation and promote capitalist control. In this regard, politics and economics become one with each other.
government and private interests is different. Gottdiener (1994:140), in the sociospatial perspective, views the role of government as separate and distinct from various economic interests. Gottdiener writes:

...the SSP [sociospatial perspective] considers government intervention and the interests of politicians in growth as a principle factor in metropolitan change. Traditional urban ecology and the newer approaches of urban political economy either ignore completely the role of government in channelling growth or treat the state as simply derivative of economic interests. The SSP considers the state as relative autonomous, that is, with officials having interests of their own, and more specifically considers politics as highly linked to the concerns of property development (emphasis mine).5

Whether local government and business interests fall within two separate classes, each with distinct interests and agendas, or whether local government is itself integrated into a business elite, the outcome of their operation is similar. Private interests are advanced through the presence of a growth machine guided by political leadership. Its goal is to promote its "style of economic growth."6 Capitalism then has two centers of authority. The first is represented by the decisions of the economic

5 Gottdiener (1977), addresses the issue of political control and urban planning. According to Gottdiener, the interests of business partners find a way into the process of zoning/rezoning and are supported by the political system.

6 The need for social control of the inhabitants of areas which were rapidly deteriorating (mostly in central city areas), thus signaling possibilities of reoccurring ghetto riots, has also been cited as a reason behind the states' finance of these projects (Mollenkopf, 1975).
system and the second, by the decisions of the political system (Wilson, 1994). Both work in accordance with each other to support the private interests. Though on the surface this economic growth is legitimized and rationalized as a strategy aimed at providing stability and financial prosperity to distressed urban centers, it often results in the creation of additional urban stress.

Economic growth in cities has had direct cumulative affects. When economic growth is cited as a result of some strategy put forth by the local government the question of "Who benefits from this arrangement?" must be addressed. The usual outcome of this interaction between the public and private enterprise is that the 'investors', assisted by the state, emerge as the beneficiaries from these economic opportunities present within the urban environment (Carruthers, 1969; Boyer, 1973; Leinsdorf and Etra, 1973; Lamarche, 1977; Scott, 1980; Harvey, 1973; 1982; Mollenkopf, 1983; Hartman and Kessler, 1984).

But what becomes the role of the local government in this process? The local government is caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, it supports private enterprise since it perceives such action as the only way to address the multiple social issues facing the city. On the other hand, city government must support the interests of the public. Advocating and supporting, through various policies, the public interests and needs, comes into sharp conflict with
the political machine's choice to support individual business interests. As a result, the political system is caught in a cycle; in order to deal with public needs it must promote private interests which, in turn, create unequal opportunity structures thus, expanding public needs.

Castells (1978:18-19), discusses the much needed infrastructure for capital production:

...the intervention of the state becomes necessary in order to take charge of sectors and services which are less profitable but necessary for the functioning of economic activity. ...This intervention of the state is functional and necessary to the monopolies, even though it done in opposition to some capitalist interests. In effect, it assures the necessary reproduction of the labour power at a minimum level, it lessens the cost of direct salaries, while at the same time easing demands. Besides public investment, as we know, is an essential form of 'devaluation of social capital', a major resource for counteracting the tendency toward the lowering of the profit margin.

...the intervention of the state, covers the functional or economic 'holes', thus making it possible for private capital to take over (thus the public highway infrastructure which makes use of the automobile possible, or urban renewal operations which permit the actions of private promoters, etc).

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Castells' other related work (1977) applies the Althusserian structuralistic view to the examination of the urban. Social structure for Castells is composed of the economic system, the political system and the ideological system. Such investigation of the social structure will allow for the formulation of a theory of the "urban system." In this regard, Castells (1977: 460) introduces another form of consumption which he refers to as "collective consumption." He defines collective consumption as "...being consumption whose economic and social treatment, while remaining capitalist, takes place not through the market, but through the state apparatus." So, for example, the privatization of natural resources before they become profitable, require the intervention of the state. In this regard, a conflict emerges since the two responsibilities are ideologically and diametrically opposed. O'Connor (1973) has also discussed this "crisis of the state."
The state then is charged with a dual responsibility; the creation of opportunities for capital expansion, and the maintenance of the quality of life.\(^8\)

Growth and expansion has heavily impacted upon the demands for services in the city. As the city grows and is called to provide for its members, it necessitates additional resources to meet those needs.\(^9\) Thus, the city is faced with multiple challenges. Providing public services for a poor neighborhood, whose residents contribute very little to the city's tax base, is financially a loss. As a result, cities look elsewhere for generating the appropriate income to perform these services. Promoting economic growth by supporting business interest has been a strategy toward urban growth.

Similarly, sports and stadium development has been

\(^8\) The removal of old commercial areas and residential communities for the construction of modernized administrative facilities are not uncommon to emerge since various forms of state subsidies are meant to cover land costs (Fellmuth, 1973; Goodman 1971; Marcuse 1981; Gottdiener, 1985). Corporate presence then extends beyond economic competition into the ownership of land and power over the production of space. In this regard, the state has the ability to reproduce social relations.

\(^9\) For example, as minority and immigrant population, which has served as cheap labor force for various business interests in the city increases, additional funding to meet the expanded needs of these populations is required. Health, education and other social services becomes the responsibility of the government. As public investment in transportation routes strive to meet the needs of a growing economy, additional expenditures to maintain these structures are required. Finally, as housing decays and the trapped city population cannot afford to maintain new structures, public housing is required.
viewed by cities across the United States as a pro-growth strategy. Reports of multi-million dollar economic benefits resulting from sport related activities generate a climate of intense competition among cities. This competition requires considerable capital investment which often takes the form of public expenditures.

**Capital Investment and Competition: Stadiums, Professional Franchises and Urban Growth**

Cities also engage in activities to attract professional teams as an urban development strategy aimed at ensuring or expanding local and regional economic growth. Capital investment by the government aimed at growth has led to the construction of sports stadiums. In 1970 about 70 percent of sports facilities were publicly financed and owned (Okner, 1974). In 1988 (Riess, 1989) and in 1991 (Quirk and Fort, 1992), over 80 percent of the facilities utilized by professional teams across the country were publicly owned. Even small municipalities, where minor league baseball is played, know that if they do not pay for the expensive upgrades of stadium facilities, other cities will accommodate such requests (Mahtesian, 1994; S.A.F.E., 1995a; S.A.F.E., 1995b; Austin Sports Development Authority, 1995). As a result, cities across the country have engaged in extensive public investments and intense competitiveness to retain or attract a professional sports franchise (Whelan, 1987; Berss, 1992; Hammonds, 1993; Norton, 1993;

The rationale behind the subsidies which professional teams receive from local and state governments is based on the perception that such action is a form of capital investment, similar to other urban redevelopment projects.\(^{10}\) Euchner (1993), while investigating the competition between cities in North America for a professional team concludes that sports are viewed as part of a development strategy. Cities will "make a good business environment" by extending financial support to professional franchises hoping to attract one of them to their town. This drive towards attracting franchises is consistent with, and a part of, the notion of the growth ideology; generating opportunities towards expansion as a strategy for revitalization and the creation of economic and

\(^{10}\) Squires, et.al, (1987:163-165) in a study of Chicago provide three modes of redevelopment utilized by the local government after WWII: (1) infrastructural development, (2) cooperative ventures with private groups and (3) essentially private investment. All three modes, directly or indirectly found the local government supporting and advancing private interests. These projects were viewed to attract outside investment, resulting into job opportunities, increased income and additional taxes. This income will increase spending and consumption by city residents providing the city with additional money for public services.
This emphasis on urban revitalization and redevelopment has introduced a spirit of competitiveness amongst cities. Research has shown that poorer cities are more likely than economically stable cities to engage in activities which are aimed at generating economic development. Rubin and Rubin (1987:55) conducted a study analyzing census data in Illinois comparing the public investments of various types of cities. They concluded that:

... cities that are poorest - that have the poorest citizens and the highest unemployment rates - are the ones that are spending the most money on expensive and possibly ineffective economic development incentives.

In their attempt to generate economic growth, cities will find themselves in contested arrangements.

In the area of professional sports, cities compete with each other to attract an existing franchise or become chosen by a league to host an expansion team. Regarding stadium

Johnson (1993) shows that the economics of minor league baseball makes the stadium the core of the relationship between the team and the local community. Johnson concludes that teams influence local governments to perceive minor league stadiums as redevelopment opportunities and strategies toward urban growth.

In recent years, cities like Baltimore (football), St. Louis (football), Jacksonville (football), Charlotte (basketball), Nashville (football), Oakland (football), Tampa (baseball), Phoenix (hockey), Denver (baseball), Dallas (hockey), Orlando (hockey) and others, have been involved in efforts to attract professional sports teams. On the other hand, cities across America like Cleveland (football), Houston (football), Los Angeles (football), Seattle (football), Tampa (football), Pittsburgh (baseball), Minneapolis (basketball), Chicago (football) and others have been involved in efforts to retain professional franchises.
construction Snyder and Spreitzer (1989:278), noted that the purpose for this type of public funds use is questionable:

The taxpayers subsidize professional sports through construction bonds, stadia rent below the market value, taxes foregone on the land, and appropriation of public services to sports facilities in the form of water and sewage facilities, mass transit, law enforcement, and improvement of access roads. This use of public funds in support of private enterprise raises the critical question of "cui bono", who benefits?

Similarly, according to Wilson (1994:261):

The real issue with sport franchises is how local elites are able to get public sanction and subsidy for the private accumulation of wealth. Local capitalists stand to gain much from a city's successful pursuit of a sport franchise.

As a result, cities will find themselves considering the extent to which they are, stadium wise, capable of supporting and competing with other cities.

Thus, at one level, the construction of stadiums is viewed as an urban development strategy, a part of a growth ideology, yet, at another level, in order for their construction to occur, the state has to contribute by (1) allocating public resources and (2) convincing the public that the proposed civic expenditures are wisely disbursed. For the latter to occur, both the state and the private interests have to join together and become one, since they share similar objectives.

which threaten to leave.
Sports Driven Economic Rejuvenation

Cities in the United States have attempted to rejuvenate downtown economically depressed areas through the utilization of sports. In recent years, stadium developments such as those of Coors Field (1995) in Denver, Colorado, New Comiskey Park (1991) and United Center (1994) both in Chicago, Illinois, Jacobs Field (1994) in Cleveland, Ohio and Camden Yards (1992) in Baltimore, Maryland have all been located in the downtown or near downtown areas.

This approach of "pumping money" into a downtown, economically depressed area is the driving force behind these stadium location decisions. According to Baim (1994:220):

For a depressed inner city, the unemployment and incidence of crime is already high. The increase in employment related to a stadium and sports team will be more valuable and the increased crime less objectionable in the downtown area. Thus, the rational place to locate the stadium in a city with a depressed center district would be downtown. The residents of the suburbs are willing to commute the extra distance to keep the stadium "out of their neighborhood," and the residents of the inner city are aided by the increased economic growth.

Similar to urban tourism and the advancement of the arts in urban centers, sports stadiums are viewed as part of an

13 State intervention in the renewal of downtowns has been viewed as a means of capital accumulation in response to diminishing profits in those areas (O'Connor, 1973; Mandel, 1975; Harvey, 1982; Hirsch, 1982). It has also been noted that the restructuring of the downtown areas, assisted by the state, has served various business interests through real estate actions, providing no direct opportunities to the urban poor (Anderson, 1964; Friedland, 1980; Mollenkopf, 1983; Hartman and Kessler, 1984; Gottdiener, 1985).
ideology toward urban growth.

Through the use of multipliers, cities employ economic impact studies on sports to report impressive local and regional benefits. These findings are then utilized to justify the public dollars invested in the construction of stadium facilities. However, the long term economic implications of these projects in cities across America remain questionable.

The stadium as an urban revitalization tool has been identified by cities across America. In Cleveland, Ohio, the recent partnership (private-public) between the city and the Gateway Economic Development Corporation, known as the Gateway Project, to which has been attributed the economic rebounding of Cleveland by the local government (Barrett and Green, 1993).

The goal of this project is to attract people to the downtown area, making it vibrant once again (Kosowatz, 1993). The city has attempted to generate redevelopment from this stadium project. Even though Cleveland Indians' representatives asked for 10,000 on-site parking spaces, the

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14 The owners of the Cleveland Indians (Major League Baseball) convinced the city to build a new stadium facility which would generate more jobs and prosperity. The city participated in the project by investing about $434 million. This project, on a 28 acre site on the southern edge of the downtown area, intends to capitalize on the presence and activities of a 42,000 seat Jacobs Field, built in 1994 for $161 (home of the Cleveland Indians) and the neighboring $118 million, 21,000 seat indoor arena for the Cleveland Cavaliers of the NBA (Bartimole, 1994).
city approved only a third. City officials felt that having spectators park a distance and walk to the ballpark, will expose them to the area, and thus, possibly (1) lift negative beliefs associated with the downtown location and (2) help revitalize local business. As a result the ballpark becomes viewed as a magnet for downtown activity (Kamin, 1994).

In Baltimore, the 1992 construction of Camden Yards, is expected to generate economic growth and give rebirth to its surrounding areas. It is claimed that this project has helped revitalize part of the urban core in the city of Baltimore and serves as a the standard of urban design.\textsuperscript{15} According to a survey conducted by Baltimore’s Mayor Kurt Schmoke, $52.8 million of spending by the fans outside the park make the project a "financial grand slam" (Schrotenboer, 1995).

For the Chicago Bears of the National Football League, Camden Yards is a model stadium. Assuming that they receive the requested financial support from the City of Chicago and the State of Illinois ($200 million) the Bears claim that a similar type of stadium design would aid the community/site and be a catalyst for economic development. In a recent radio program, Michael McCaskey, President of the franchise

\textsuperscript{15} This 48,000-seat baseball facility cost $206 million to complete. In 1994, Camden Yards was distinguished by the Urban Land Institute as the best public project in the country (Chicago Tribune, November 26, 1994).
Camden Yards made a valuable contribution to the city of Baltimore. What makes that ballpark special is not the design by itself...it is the way that it's integrated into the inner-harbor area. There is that long warehouse and that has served as a venue for retailing operations, for food courts, and for other things that draw people to it on non-game days. And we would like to do the same thing with the football stadium. Just don't focus on the box that's the football stadium, but let's look at the entire surrounding area, and let's look at the way to use that stadium as a stimulus for economic development for a much wider neighborhood around it. In the same way that Camden Yards has done it (WBBM RADIO-780AM, 1995).

In response to McCaskey's requests, the City of Chicago has offered to renovate Soldier Field at a public expense of $156 million. Yet, the Bears continue to promote the concept of a new, open-air stadium as an urban redevelopment tool.

In Denver, two years prior to the opening of Coors Field for the expansion Colorado Rockies of the MLB in Denver, the stadium was credited with benefiting the hotel industry. It was noted that the presence of the sports facility would have a positive economic outcome and improve upon the currently thriving business growth of hotels in that city (Jesitus, 1993).

Since its construction, Coors Field has been described as a representation of "a thoughtful and successful effort at urban revitalization" (Muschamp, 1995). Its presence in Denver's Lower Downtown district complements the gentrified neighborhoods, galleries, small shops, and the "SoHo" like atmosphere. Coors Field becomes an outstanding addition to
a newly emerging downtown area, one which replaces the deteriorated, industrially based, central business center with a central district geared toward a culture of the arts and popular entertainment (Judd, 1995; Muschamp, 1995; Schrotenboer, 1995).

Similar assessments of economic growth, resulting from the construction of sports stadiums, have been made in San Francisco (Margolis, 1989), Detroit (White, 1994), Washington, DC (Pyatt, 1993), Alexandria, Virginia (Howe, 1993), Atlanta (Faw, 1993), and Salt Lake City (Wright and Jorgensen, 1993) and the Meadowlands, New Jersey (Ibata, 1985), amongst other cities.

The Use of Cultural Factors in Urban Development

In addition to addressing the political economy of space, an understanding of sports and stadiums within the urban environment requires the investigation of related cultural factors. Numerous culturally based factors have been utilized to support the construction of sports facilities. For example, social cohesion, community building and other related arguments have been widely reported when governments and team representatives attempt to convince the public that expenditures on these projects are necessary. At the same time, images of the cultural relationship between the team and the city are continuously communicated, thus producing a strong link between the team
and the urban environment.

The "new" urban sociology has integrated cultural factors in its investigation regarding patterns and social implications of urban development. Though at the core, this perspective remains Marxist and shares many, if not most of the characteristics which define other Marxist perspectives, the addition of these culturally based elements provides for an understanding of the dynamics of the urban development.

Gottdiener (1994:17), influenced by Gramsci (1971) and Lefebvres' (1991) notion of "the production of space", provides the dimensions of what he refers to as the "sociospatial perspective." These dimensions include: (1) utilizing a regional perspective of studying the factors which shape both the urban and suburban space by looking at the two as interrelated and interconnected, capable of impacting the fate of each other, (2) considering both the implications emerging from the global nature of capitalism, as well as the national, regional and local settings, which shape urban development and affect urban life, (3) integrating government policies and real estate actions ("supply-side forces" which have a direct impact on development processes), and (4) analyzing the importance of cultural factors such as gender, class, social status, age and race and their impact on the built environment, specifically as to how these factors shape that environment and then are shaped by it. Increasingly, cultural symbols
are associated with objects, describing urban communities or elements within these communities. 16

Gottdiener (1994:16) explains the dual relationship between people and space:

In the past, urbanists have regarded the space of habitation as only a container of social activities. But this view is limited. Space not only contains actions but also acts as a meaningful object to which we orient our actions. The factor of space constitutes a part of social relations and is intimately involved in our daily lives. It affects the way we feel about what we do. In turn, people alter space and construct new environments to fit their needs better. Hence, there is a dual relationship between people and space. On the one hand, human beings act according to social factors such as gender, class, race, age, and status within and in reaction to a given space. On the other hand, people also create and alter spaces for themselves that express their own needs and desires.

16 David Harvey (1990) utilizes a postmodernist perspective to analyze architecture and urban design. In opposition to modernists, who manipulate space to be shaped for social purposes, postmodernists view space as something independent, driven by the aesthetic principles. Architecture then, as a form of symbolic representation, becomes a form of communication, a language, which sets the stage for a dialogue (Barthes, 1975). As Harvey notes (1990:74), the presence of Trump Tower and of Philip Johnson's AT&T buildings in New York City, represent two different eras. The modernism of the former battles the postmodernism of the latter for control over the city's skyline. Cultural representations then become integrated in urban form. Others, including Jencks (1984), see postmodern architecture as the outcome of technological shifts. Soja (1989), argues for a historical and geographical materialism, while Bourdieu (1984; 1986) remarks that consumption can be related to product differentiation in the urban environment. 'Symbolic capital' for Bourdieu are goods which serve as representations capable of defining the owner's taste and distinction. Finally, for Lyotard (1984:73), the emergence of a culture of choice is a part of cultural development: "Eclectism is the degree zero of contemporary general culture: one listens to reggae, watches a western, eats McDonald's food for lunch and local cuisine for dinner, wears Paris perfume in Tokyo and 'retro' clothes in Hong Kong."
Gottdiener (1994:15) also notes:

A variety of images has been used, such as signs of industry ("the twin cities"), signs of vision ("city of tomorrow"), and signs of good quality ("the city of leisure"). Slogans such as these are often linked to images or objects, such as the skyline or graphic logo of some kind. In this way a symbolic identity is created for a place, which gives the impression that it is special.

Historically, in the area of sports, there has been a symbolic connection between a community and a team: "to watch a club compete was to watch a community perform" (Wilson, 1994: 234). Similarly, sports teams became signs of modernity, postmodernity and progress for the city, while at the same time have been utilized to advertise the strength of the local business climate (Goldstein, 1989; Riess, 1989; Wilson, 1994).

This approach of integrating cultural factors to better understand the dynamics of urban development, provides a perspective which analytically can be responsive to the changing nature of contemporary urban life. Thus, the arts and sports can be viewed as aspects of culture which have been integrated into urban development planning.

The Arts as Part of Urban Growth

Cities have identified the arts to be part of a pro-growth, urban strategy. Support for the arts is seen to have numerous positive outcomes. Specifically, (1) investment in physical facilities and "good" arts allows cities to compete with those communities which have
primarily relied on their natural amenities (i.e., good weather) to attract potential growth activities; (2) the presence of arts activities can bring more visitors to the downtown area; (3) those likely to attend performing arts activities have higher disposable incomes, making them "good customers" for downtown businesses; (4) the enticement of performing arts groups means that many of these companies will renovate existing structures, thus physically revitalizing the downtown area; (5) businesses will be attracted to the immediate area; and (6) the emergence of a vital performing arts in a downtown district will have positive "spill-over effects" for surrounding business and residential communities (Whitt, 1987).

Building on earlier studies (Whitt and Mizruchi, 1986; Whitt, 1987; 1988), Whitt and Lammers (1991) conducted a study of the relationship between arts and development organizations. After investigating the ties of board members to a group of arts organizations in Louisville, Kentucky, Whitt and Lammers concluded that the development of the arts in urban centers is a pro-growth strategy which includes the involvement of multiple business-elites. The implications of these findings are more extensive since they inform us that culturally perceived activities (theater, ballet, opera, orchestra, museum) are directly and indirectly part of larger business interests.

Taking into consideration the previous studies on arts
and urban development, Whitt and Lammers (1991:388) concluded that:

...(1)...growth is central to urban politics; (2)...there is a local inner-circle of businessmen who provides structural bridges among large corporations, arts organizations, and the leading groups devoted to urban growth policies; (3) the arts are, at least in some cities, governed at the top levels by powerful people (primarily men) who appear to be active participants in the local growth machine; (4) the major arts and cultural organizations of downtowns may have become essential components of urban growth machines, implying an increasing mutual dependency between corporations and cultural institutions.

Besides being economic contributors, the arts have also been perceived to serve as an advertisement for urban centers, capable of generating prestige and a positive city image (Whitt, 1988).

Sports as a Culture Industry

The relationship between government and free enterprise can also be investigated within a broader cultural framework. Sports are an example of symbolic expressions of culture and stadiums are the locales where these cultural symbols emerge as products to be bought and sold.

Sports have evolved in American society becoming much more than just a game, and yet, remaining a central aspect of American culture. The sense of civic identity, pride

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The ownership of professional sports, for example has changed. The corporatization of sports is well outlined by Quirk and Fort (1992:39) who notes that 22 owners of professional sports franchises made a list which outlined the 400 richest individuals in the country. The list also included several others who were previous owners of a
and representation makes cities identify sports stars as "their" ambassadors. Sports then have a symbolic value, as cultural communicators and, from this rising association, a culture industry develops. According to Zukin (1995:12): "Because culture is a system for producing symbols, every attempt to get people to buy a product becomes a culture industry." Thus, sports, like museums, the arts and theme parks become part of the culture industry. The demand for sports creates the stadium, both a social space and a space of economies and consumption. Public gatherings at the stadium promote cultural collectiveness. As a result, the production of capital and commodities emerges, and, within this framework, a culture industry develops.

This emergence of sports as a culture industry is also consistent with larger economic shifts from an industrial to a post-industrial economy. Lash and Urry (1994) explore the emergence of new economies, the 'economies of signs.' These economies are organized around symbols, images and desires. As a result, culture industries develop. According to Lash and Urry (1994:17):

The old Fordist, organized capitalist core was characterized by a set of producer networks clustered around a heavy-industrialized hub of the motor, chemicals, electrical and steel industries...This old professional franchise. Ted Arinson, owner of the Miami Heat of the NBA, was listed with an estimated wealth of $2.1 billion, as was Laurence Tisch, owner of the New York Giants of the NFL with $1.5 billion. Media revenue and stadium related revenues have contributed into making professional sports 'wise' business investments.
order has been significantly undermined by two processes. The first is the disintegration of the old core with finance, distribution, property, service, and knowledge and R&D functions each taking their own autonomy. The second is the formation of a new core, one in which 'the post-industrial tail is of the old order begins effectively to wag the Fordist and industrial dog'. The new core is clustered around information, communications and the advanced producer services, as well as other services, such as telecommunications, airlines and important parts of tourism and leisure.

Sports and stadium development can then be viewed to be part of this emerging capitalist framework.

Lash and Urry (1994), examine the relationship between cultural objects such as music, movies and paperbacks, and their process of development into the culture industries of recording labels, television and publishing. Regarding music, Lash and Urry (1994:134) write:

Thus, as the EMI executive said, for the industry to be really big business the music had to 'become a part of teenage lifestyle'...But these objects [music, movies, paperbacks] are not yet ready for market. First, they must become intellectual property. That is firms can only exploit or make money from cultural objects, when they have been juridically converted into intellectual property. Only when firms are able to exclude other entrepreneurs and consumers from rights to the use of cultural objects can the culture industries survive.

In the area of sports, the firm is the professional franchise. There are two reasons these franchises have been able to control the 'cultural product' and become its select distributor. First, the ownership structure of the professional leagues has excluded others from control over their "product." Second, through exclusive agreements with media sources, sportswear manufacturers, vendors, etc,
franchise owners have ensured that, even if new competing leagues develop, the visibility of their product becomes quickly limited. In this regard, sports as a cultural product can evolve into an industry which includes the stadium as its place of operation and yet, because of advanced means of communication and league arrangements can become non-localized.

This notion of sports as a culture industry provides an understanding of the dynamics regarding the relationship between the consumer, the commodity and the firm with capitalist relations. It is within this framework that the city becomes connected to the sports culture industry.

According to Zukin (1995:12):

Culture is intertwined with capital and identity in the city's production systems. From that point of view, cultural institutions establish a competitive advantage over other cities for attracting new businesses and corporate elites. But in American and European cities during the 1970s, culture became more of an instrument in the entrepreneurial strategies of local governments and business alliances. In the shift to a post-war economy, who could build the biggest modern art museum suggested the vitality of the financial sector. Who could turn the waterfront from docklands ruble to parks and marinas suggested the possibilities for expansion of the managerial and professional corps.

These culture industries then, which includes sports are viewed to be stimulates for the urban economy.

The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Stadium Development

Race and ethnicity are also additional factors which must be integrated in an analysis of urban development and
urban life as it relates to stadium development. The strong association between ethnicity and race with patterns of residential segregation (Lieberson, 1980; Massey and Denton, 1987; 1988a; 1992) has resulted in distinct socioeconomic differences amongst the various groups, leaving these groups without political and economic power capable of effectively responding to urban renewal projects (Guest and Zuiches, 1971; Molotch, 1972; Harvey, 1976; Schneider and Logan, 1982; Schuman, Steeh and Bobo, 1985; Yinger, 1986; Massey and Denton, 1988b; Galster, 1990; Massey and Eggers, 1990; Massey and Fong, 1990; Massey, 1990; Massey and Denton, 1993).

Regarding stadium construction, urban development and community impact, issues of race and ethnicity have also surfaced to play an important role. For example, the construction of the new Comiskey Park (1991) in Chicago displaced a predominantly African-American community. In that same city, the construction of the United Center (1994) was viewed as a catalyst of redevelopment for the surrounding African-American community in the Near West Side. In Miami, the privately constructed Joe Robbie Stadium (1982) has been positioned in the vicinity of an African-American community, leaving the residents of this nearby subdivision to suffer the long lines of traffic and pollution through their residential streets.

In addition, the position of stadiums in predominantly
minority, urban communities has been a primary reason for the owners of the New York Yankees, the Chicago White Sox, the Washington Redskins and others to search for replacement facilities in suburban, non-minority communities (Kifner, 1994). Yet, many of these efforts remain unsuccessful since suburban, residential communities tend to reject the presence of these large projects (i.e. Addison, IL rejected the White Sox from moving to their town), viewing them as sources of activities, which would negatively affect the quality of living.

Yet, these concerns don’t surface when considering the construction of sports stadiums in urban communities. Like many other publicly supported projects (i.e., highways, universities, etc), race/ethnicity, in addition to class, plays a critical role. Do sports facility development authorities (the state) and private interests find it much easier to displace minority residents and make use of the land for the construction of stadiums? Also, how do these authorities deal with the complaints of minority residents who have to contend with increased traffic, fan rowdiness, public consumption of alcohol, congestion, noise and air pollution, in addition to possible vandalism before and after the games? Answers to these questions will allow for an understanding of the extent to which race and ethnicity prove important factors in the investigation of stadium development and community impact.
Urban Social Movements

When urban development and/or urban renewal projects are advanced through a private/public partnership, as in the case of stadium developments, communities are likely to be affected. Often, these arrangements result in the physical and cultural transformation of these areas and could even include community displacement. At that point, community organizing as a response to these plans frequently develops into community-based, resistance movements.

Castells (1977; 1980; 1983) has been concerned with these urban responses or urban social movements including the role which they play in understanding urban change. He identifies urban social movements in relation to the capitalist mode of production. For Castells, urban social movements integrate the class struggle, production and the state. Interested in understanding the relationship between cities and social change through urban social movements, Castells (1983:291) writes:

The city is a social product resulting from the conflicting interests and values. Because of the institutionalization of socially dominant interests, major innovations in the city's role, meaning, and structure tend to be the outcome of grassroots mobilization and demands. When these mobilizations result in the transformation of the urban structure, we call them urban social movements. Yet the process of urban social change cannot be reduced to the effects produced on the city of successful social movements. Thus a theory of urban change must account both for the spatial and social effects resulting from the action of dominant interests as well as from the grassroots' alternatives to this domination.

As Castells notes, urban social change is not only the
outcome of "successful social movements," but they also are due to the "action of dominant groups." In this regard, stadium development plans, become an expression of the dominant interests and could evolve into urban change.

In addition, urban social movements emerge as the effect of contested meanings of space within the urban environment. This notion of meaning is addressed by Castells (1983: 304-305), who notes. Specifically:

The dominant class in a given society, having the institutional power to restructure social forms (and thus cities) according to its interests and values, changes the existing meaning. ...A social movement develops its own meaning over a given space in contradiction to the structurally dominant meaning.

And,

Society is a structured, conflictive reality in which social classes oppose each other over the basic rules of social organization according to their own social interests. Therefore the definition of urban meaning will be a process of conflict, domination, and resistance to domination, directly linked to the dynamics of social struggle and not to the reproductive spatial expression of a unified culture. Furthermore, cities and space being fundamental to the organization of social life, the conflict over the assignment of certain goals to certain spatial forms will be one of the fundamental mechanisms of domination and counter-domination in the social structure (Castells, 1983:302).

This notion of contested meaning of urban development can be exemplified in the cases where the state and the stadium developers' view of urban growth comes into sharp conflict with that of the community's. Because of these conflicting perceptions of urban meaning, and through the "grassroots" struggles that ensue, an understanding of the process of
urban change emerges.

At the same time though, these urban social movements prove to be limited. Castells discusses the role of these movements within the larger context of social change. He writes (1983:319): "Urban social movements are [not] the new historical actors creating social change, nor are they pivotal source of alternative social forms." Similarly (1983:329):

They are not agents of social change, but symptoms of resistance to the social domination even if, in their effort to resist, they do have major effects on cities and societies.

Finally, (1983:331): "Urban movements do address the real issues of our time, although neither on the scale nor terms that are adequate to the task."

Yet, Castells allows for a long term contribution of these urban social movements. The movements can have an additive value directed towards social structural change. Accordingly, Castells (1983:331) notes:

But they [urban social movements] are more than a last, symbolic stand and desperate cry: they are symptoms of our contradictions, and therefore capable of superseding these contradictions. They are the organizational forms, the live schools, where the new social movements of our emerging society are taking place, growing up, learning to breath, out of reach of the state apparatuses, and outside the closed doors of repressed family life. They are successful when they connect all the repressed aspects of the new, emerging life because this is their specificity: to speak the new language that nobody yet speaks of in its multifaceted meaning. When the vocabulary becomes too restricted (a single focus on rent control, for instance) the movements lose their appeal and become yet another interest group in a pluralist society. When they try to impose their programme, they become a
counter-society, and collapse under the combined pressure of multinational capital, a mass media system, and the bureaucratic state.

In this regard, this analysis will also address the role of the stadium-based, urban social movements of this study and search for their contribution to urban change.

Conclusion

An investigation of the relationship between sports and stadium development within the urban environment has to integrate in its analysis the utilization of two theoretical frameworks. The first is the growth ideology and the second is the "new" urban sociology. In this regard, combining urban political economy and cultural factors allows to view sports and stadium development as being part of a culture industry.

The stadium, as noted above, has become the connection between the city and its professional franchise. Cities across the country fear most the loss of a professional sports franchise due to an inadequate stadium facility. Thus, they invest considerable public resources to attract and/or retain professional sports franchises. This action is consistent with an ideology of urban growth since the perception on the part of local and state governments is that investment in these stadium projects is another way to create an attractive business climate. The urban development component of these investments and other
related, socially perceived factors take center stage when cities attempt to rationalize their spending actions.

In the process, private interests and public needs overlap each other making it difficult to distinguish their specific objectives. The investigation of the relationship between stadium development and urban communities has to incorporate numerous factors. These factors include (1) the business climate within which urban centers across America operate, (2) the drive towards growth as an urban development strategy, (3) the competition between urban centers inherent within this framework, (4) state intervention and state investment in urban development, (5) the role of professional sports franchises as part of an urban development strategy, (6) the utilization of economic and cultural rationales to support these projects, and (7) the social implications and community effect of these projects. Regarding these community effects, an understanding of the community response and the reorganization of urban space as a result of these projects allow for a perspective within which the relationship between stadium development and urban communities can be analyzed.

Such a perspective, being critical in nature, also considers the factors of race, ethnicity, role of the state, class, cultural images and symbols. All these factors, semiotics and otherwise, operate and influence the structure
of the urban environment and subsequently urban life.
CHAPTER 3

MULTIPLIER EFFECT AND STADIUM DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

This chapter explores the use of the multiplier effect in input-output regional analysis. The multiplier method has been employed by government officials and private firms to assess the economic benefits resulting from public and/or private investments. These "investments" usually take the form of programs, projects or policies. Through the use of multipliers, economic impact studies report impressive local and regional benefits (sometimes over a billion dollars).

The economic contribution of professional sport franchises, through the use of multipliers, has also been utilized to justify the construction of stadium facilities. However, the long term economic implications of these projects in cities across America remain questionable. As this chapter shows, it is very difficult to accurately measure the economic effect of these urban projects and even more difficult to ensure that the proposed spending occurs within these local economies. Some of the problematic elements surrounding these assessments, which affect the reported findings, include definitional issues, estimation processes, numerous questionable assumptions, as well as the
self-serving interests of the "investors" themselves.

After providing an overview of the methodology utilized in determining multipliers, a discussion of its use through impact studies is addressed. Such studies have been conducted in the defense industry, manufacturing, the arts, urban tourism, sports, etc. The chapter continues with a look at stadiums as urban regeneration tools and provides a brief outline of the perceived economic benefits resulting from the presence of professional sports franchises. The chapter concludes with a critique of the multiplier use in economic impact studies and the problems surrounding arguments made by those promoters who claim that increased neighborhood development is likely to result from the construction of stadiums.

The Multiplier Effect

Multiplier analysis emerged in the discipline of economics as a way to estimate the effects of expenditures on total income. The concept of income multipliers was utilized by Keynes in his theory of employment (1936), building on his earlier discussions of the effects of reemployment on total employment (1933:9). Many others (Johannsen, 1903; Pigou, 1929; Kahn, 1933) contributed to the development of the economic multiplier theory, making it a well established branch of economics.

Since then, such analysis has been utilized to measure
the long and short term effects of various investments on economies. The use of multipliers has been a part of input-output analysis. Its purpose has been to assess the relationships between fiscal contributions and economic outcomes within a given environment.

Regional Input-Output Analysis

The development of an empirical input-output system to analyze inter-industry relations was first introduced in the 30's (Leontief, 1936). From that system, regional input-output analysis began to further appear in the 50's. Isard and Kuenne (1953) for example, introduced an analytical model aimed at measuring the economic impact resulting from a major industry's expansion on a region. Leontief (1953) also developed a model to assess the impact of national market industries on local economies.

In later years, the use of adjusted coefficients allowed for the development of models which were perceived to be more accurate in evaluating regional input-output economics. Such studies included the Moore and Petersen (1955) study of Utah and the Hirch (1959) study of St. Louis.

After the 60's the use of interregional models became common in input-output regional analysis. According to Richardson (1972:53), interregional models "enables us not only to identify but, at the cost of certain rigid
assumptions, to measure the interdependence of the economic structure." In that regard, such models investigate the economic relationships between different regions based upon the introduction of public and/or private expenditures.

Building on the theoretical work of interregional models conducted by Isard (1951) and Moses (1955), the applicability of these models has been widely expanded. Specifically, determining shifts in the location of industrial activity and employment; preparing regional impact studies; drafting transportation planning reports; establishing regional economic development programming and planning defense spending; assessing the regional economic effects of military and aerospace spending; and measuring the effect of increased economic development in wealthy regions on nearby poorer regions, have all been identified as areas where interregional models can be utilized (Polenske, 1969).18

How are economic multipliers determined?

Economic development multipliers are determined based on the distinction that there are two types of economic sectors operating within a single region. The first sector

18 Studies have been conducted on the economic links between separate regions. These interregional analyses consider similar products as different commodities. The primary reason for that differentiation is the assumption that regional economies operate independently (Isard, 1951; Dolenc, 1968; Riefler and Tiebout, 1970; and Isard and Langford, 1971).
is referred to as the primary economy. This includes all those employers involved in activities which create products exported from the local to outside regions. The second sector is referred to as the secondary economy, which produces goods that are sold locally and supports the activities of the primary economy sector.

Suppose a new factory which produces television sets is introduced in a specific region. Since the company will export its products across other regions, it would be categorized as part of the primary economic sector. Other smaller factories will be introduced into the local economy, possibly involved in the manufacturing of television tubes, plastic, knobs, and other smaller parts which the larger television factory will purchase to assemble its products. These smaller economic units would be then a part of the secondary economy sector.\footnote{Stevens and Lahr (1988:89) provides a definition of a regional economic multiplier as "the total economic effect that occurs in a region per unit of the direct economic change that caused the effect." The employment and income multipliers are the two single multipliers which tend to receive the attention of policy makers and interest groups. The employment multiplier is intended to forecast the jobs created from an expansion activity within a given economy. The income multipliers can be either the amount of money added to the income of the residents in a given region, as a result of the direct and indirect employment due to an expansion activity, or the income change as a result of the direct, indirect and induced employment (Richardson, 1972:32-33). Other multipliers utilized in impact studies include value added multipliers, output multipliers and return on investment multipliers (Miller and Blair, 1985). Though the measurements of regional economic multipliers have a long history of development, the complexities and fluidity of economic forces, especially}
The Use of Economic Impact Studies

Numerous impact studies have been conducted to assess the economic effects of public and private investment projects. These assessments have extended from the economic effects of the presence of an airline maintenance hub (Kantor and Savitch, 1993), to the construction of a medical center (Real Estate Research Corporation, 1972), to local business patronizing each other (Thompson, 1989), to stock shows (Raabe, 1994), and even the defense industry (Richardson, 1972; Leontief and Hoffenberg, 1961; Gordon, 1966; Billings, 1970; Bolton, 1966; Karaska, 1967; Isard, 1951; Miernyk, et al, 1967). These investigations have relied on the application of regional input-output analyses and multipliers. 20

Though these and other related studies have been widely utilized by public officials and private investors, serious within a market economy, have made the development of a "one formula fits all" approach to output assessment absent (Richardson, 1985).

20 Defense and military spending by the government became a motivating factor for the use of regional input-output analysis. The regional effects of military and defense government spending has served in the 60's, a growth period of this form of analysis, as the framework for assessing the economic effects of these public investments. In addition, these expenditures became a great opportunity for social scientists to methodologically "perfect" the use of input-output regional analysis. As a result, numerous other studies have been conducted in this area (Karaska, 1966; Peterson and Tiebout, 1964; Benoit and Boulding, 1963; Isard and Schooler, 1964; Leontief, 1965; Leontief and Hoffenberg, 1961; Hughes, 1964; Tiebout, 1965; Peterson and Tiebout, 1964; Isard and Langford, Jr., 1971; Wiedenbaum, 1966).
questions persist about their validity and reliability. In the following, some of the areas outlined are: manufacturing, urban renewal and enterprise zone programs, urban tourism, the arts and sports, where many of these studies inform public policy decisions and public perceptions.

**Manufacturing and Related Impacts**

Manufacturing industries have been assessed to determine whether these investments contribute to the economic well-being of local and regional areas. In New York and in Philadelphia it was found that the steel industry had positively effected these economies (Isard and Kuenne, 1953), and the presence of the aluminum industry in the northwest region of the United States proved economically beneficial (Miller, 1957). Other studies have assessed the economic effect of factory jobs (Oppenheim and Swinney, 1992), recycling facilities (Cotlier, 1995), and steel industry facilities (American Iron and Steel Industry, 1985).

On the impact of plant closings, Buss and Reduburn (1987:172-173) reported that the 1977-1978 shutdown of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Works in Campbell, Ohio has had wide and long term effects in the region. This shutdown eliminated over 5,000 workers employed in steel production. Buss and Reduburn concluded that: (1) Two years following
the closing, 27% of those who lost their jobs were still unemployed. Eight years later that percentage had remained identical. These findings also communicated long-term effects on incomes. (2) Demand for public assistance programs increased during that decade. (3) The "secondary economic effects" continued for years, as "the typical worker laid off in the closing...held an average of two jobs from 1977 to 1985." As a result, "declining job status", "lessened job security" and "periodic interruption of earnings" are other measurable long-term losses, and (4) An increase in levels of "emotional stress" and "symptoms of psychiatric disorder" were observed. Buss and Reduburn conclude that the effects of plant closings will vary depending on the size of the economy affected. Smaller communities are more likely than larger communities to be extensively devastated from these shutdowns.

The impact of factory closings is also communicated through "social cost analyses" and "job impact statements." These are part of the organizing efforts of labor to convincingly represent the effects of these shutdowns and/or relocations on various regions. These assessments include the effects of closings on tax revenues, taxes spent on public programs, indirect effects on other businesses, etc. (LeRoy, 1992).
Urban Renewal and Enterprise Zones Impacts

Many government supported programs have been assessed to determine their effect at the local, regional and national level. For urban renewal and enterprise zone programs, multiplier effects are often utilized to account for their supposed success. Redevelopment activities following land acquisition in urban renewal programs and business incentives (i.e., tax incentives, local political support) in enterprise zones, are part of the investments aimed at revitalization and growth.

Many urban renewal projects which concentrated on the support and creation of manufacturing related economies have also been assessed. Through the concept of input-output analysis, these assessments have been aimed at determining the cost and benefit ratios of these programs (Rothenberg, 1967; Weicher, 1972). According to Lineberry and Sharkansky (1978:378-379), a multiplier effect is the outcome of these programs:

The most universally accepted claim for urban renewal, and probably the most valid one, is that it has expanded the tax base and improved the economic vitality of the city. The Urban Renewal Administration liked to emphasize the "before" and "after" tax effects of renewal. For 768 projects on which land acquisition had been completed by 1971 the estimated increase in property values was from $464 million to $1.7 billion; from this increase the cities could reap generous tax revenues. In economic terms, each of these projects also had a potential multiplier effect, stimulating more jobs and production in service industries...[and] both direct and multiplier effects enhance municipal revenues and stimulate economic growth.

Regardless of the proposed benefits outlined above, concerns
have been expressed about the success of these urban renewal programs. Anderson (1964), who conducted a study of the effects of renewal programs at Boston's West End, indicated that caution should be employed when assessing these projects. Anderson was critical of the extent to which the proposed tax benefits and land values for the city had increased.

Another program, the enterprise zone concept-first introduced in the U.S. in 1979-has received considerable support from governments across the United States. It has been reported that in 22 states, between 1982 and 1988, these state or operational enterprise zones increased from 135 to 510 (Gunn, 1993). This capitalist approach to addressing the socioeconomic ills of urban America has been perceived by politicians and the media to be economically effective in meeting its prescribed goals.

According to Herman (1985), 60,000 jobs were created and over $2 billion of investments resulted. These assessment reports have continually increased to exceed 660,000 new jobs and over $40.6 billion in investments (U.S. HUD, 1992). Yet, considerable problems exist with the evaluation process and assumptions made on the impact of these enterprise zone programs (Clarke, 1986; Skoro, 1988; Grady, 1989; James, 1991; Gunn, 1993).
The Impact of Urban Tourism

Urban tourism has been traditionally associated with historic, capital, old industrial, and resort cities. Theoretically, urban tourism has been viewed as being part of an urban life cycle concept. As cities go through evolutionary stages of development and change; urbanization, suburbanization, disurbanization and reurbanization, it has been claimed that the industry of urban tourism complements the last of those stages as efforts toward central core revitalization occur (Jan Van Der Borg, 1991).

Increasingly, tourism activities are perceived to have positive economic effects for cities across America and Europe. Urban tourism is visibly replacing the manufacturing character of some cities. In Baltimore, for example, tourism activities in Harbor Place have replaced the once dominant manufacturing industries. As a result, the tourism industry has been credited with the revitalization of downtown Baltimore (Levine, 1987).²¹

Overall, urban tourism has been viewed as a vehicle for downtown revitalization (Judd and Collins, 1979; Buckley and Witt, 1985; 1989; Vetter, 1985; Morton, 1985; Edgell, 1988; Page and Fidgeon, 1989; Law, 1991a; 1991b; 1992; Cullingworth, 1993). Even though one of the critiques of the urban tourism industry is that it creates low-paying,

²¹ Berkowitz, (1987) has criticized these assessments in Baltimore noting the continuous urban social problems in the "targeted areas."
seasonal jobs, for some (Law, 1992: 604) this industry can be viewed as a proper match to the types of inner-city labor:

Whilst many of the [urban tourism industry] jobs are low-skilled, this could be in its favour when it is located in or near the inner city with its labour reserves of the unskilled.

Though this statement searches to provide labor fit for this industry, one has to be seriously concerned about the assumptions made here; that in fact low-paying, low-skilled and seasonal jobs are somehow acceptable for this segment of the urban population.

The evaluation of urban tourism for cities and the role of these activities in urban regeneration, has become more and more a concern of public policy makers. Impact studies have been conducted, through the use of multipliers and national ratios, to determine the economic effect of these investments (Henderson, 1975; Vaughan, 1979; 1986; 1991; Hughes, 1982; Beekhuis, 1988; Myerscough, 1988; Jeffrey, 1989; 1990). According to Law (1992:607), there are three types of impacts which these project assessment studies attempt to determine:

Project impact studies attempt to calculate the number of jobs created directly at the facility or event (primary impact), the number of jobs created indirectly because of the expenditure of visitors (secondary impact), and the number of induced jobs as a result of the extra income in the local economy. The latter two topics require extensive survey work so that national ratios are frequently used to avoid this. Assessments are also made in terms of the profitability of the project, impact on the environment, perception of residents, displacement effects, use of facilities by
local residents and, where grants are given, cost per job and additionality.

Theme parks, casinos and convention activities are also viewed to have considerable economic effect on generating tourism dollars for cities (Lawson, 1982; Abbey, 1987; Hall 1987; Whyte, 1988; Smith 1989; Cambell, 1995; Worthington, 1995; Sabo, 1995). The 1995 International Manufacturing Technology convention at McCormick Place was assessed to have contributed $165.8 million to the city, according to the Chicago Convention Bureau (Smith, 1995). A recent Associated Press report (1996), noted that attracting military veteran reunion activities, has become a local/regional economic development strategy for many cities across the U.S. Thus, it has been estimated by the Montgomery, Alabama, Area Chamber of Commerce that veteran reunions have a "$10 million annual impact on Montgomery’s economy."

The Impact of the Arts

The presence of the arts has also been viewed as a strategy toward urban development since their economic effects are perceived to be considerable (Zukin, 1982; McNulty, 1985; Tighe, 1985; Whitt, 1987; Myerscough, 1988; Whitt and Share, 1988). Cities have attempted to restore and revitalize downtown areas through the use of cultural anchors such as museums, art centers, libraries, theaters and other related cultural events (Logan and Molotch, 1987;
Bianchini, et al., 1988; Bianchini, 1991). Orum (1995:134-136), for example, discussed how efforts to revive the vitality of Milwaukee included the War Memorial Museum. Attracting people to downtown Minneapolis-St. Paul is driven by the Minneapolis Symphony, which holds regular free outdoors and indoors concerts for the local residents (Orum, 1995:183). Other cities, including Tampa (Mormino, 1983), Dallas (Tomkins, 1983), New Orleans (Hill, 1984), Knoxville and Atlanta (Schmidt, 1984), Salt Lake City (Wright and Jorgensen, 1993) utilize similar techniques to revitalize their downtowns.  

Multiplier effects have been utilized to show the economic impact of the arts on a state's economy. In Illinois, a study conducted by Laventhol and Horwath (1988) for the Illinois Arts Alliance Foundation utilized a 2.65 multiplier for museum-related organizations and 2.36 multiplier for non-museum related organizations. The study concluded that the indirect spending generated by the arts was $337 million for the state.

Economic Impacts Through the Use of Multipliers in Sports

Multiplier analysis has also been used to measure the

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22 The role which the arts play in urban development can be seen in Chicago. The announcement of new productions by Walt Disney at the Chicago Theater and theatrical performances at the renovated Oriental Theater, are expected to create considerable positive economic effects in the North Loop area (Allen, 1996).
economic effects of these investments/projects on metropolitan areas. Economic impact studies of sporting facilities and sport franchises use a formal economic model based on location quotients to calculate direct and indirect impacts (Isserman, 1977). Yet, the figures employed in the determination of these economic effects are arbitrary. The multiplier effect figures utilized across the United States has varied widely from 3.2 to 1.2 points. Such difference points not only to the lack of uniformity when attempting to assess the financial outcome of these projects, but it also indicates the political influences of these determinations. The findings of these evaluations can have serious political implications since government support of stadium development projects must be rationalized. Politicians favoring the advancement of these expenditures must ensure that their decision is valid. It is through research then that the public can be informed of its proposed benefits. As a result, the use of multiplier figures has fluctuated tremendously, revealing in the process the politics of research.

For example, the 3.2 figure mentioned above was employed in a study conducted by the Chicago Cubs (Melaniphy and Associates, 1986), while a 3.0 figure was utilized in a study conducted on the impact of a Class A baseball stadium in South Bend, Indiana (Peck, 1985). A Minnesota study conducted by a State Task Force utilized a 2.6 multiplier
(Minnesota Major League Baseball Task Force, 1985), and a similar analysis by the City of Denver employed a 2.3 multiplier (Midwest Research Institute, 1983). Other multipliers have ranged from 1.7, used to assess the contributions of professional sports on Philadelphia (George, 1989), and a similar 1.7 figure and a 2.0 figure to calculate the economic impact of the White Sox on the City of Chicago and the State of Illinois respectively (Department of Economic Development, 1986). Finally, the economic effect of the Pirates of Major League Baseball in Pittsburgh was determined through a 1.2 multiplier for goods and services and a 1.6 multiplier for wages and salaries (Greater Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce, 1980).

There have been three forms of assessment which have been taken into consideration when accounting for the effects of a professional sports franchise on local and regional economies. Those are the direct, indirect and intangible effects.

Direct and indirect economic benefits include revenue created not only in the form of ticket sales, parking, and franchise employee salaries, but also in employee taxes, ticket and parking taxes, food and souvenirs at the game, stays at hotels, entertainment after the game, etc. As a result, the combination of spending at the stadium or the arena and the revenue generated in service industries because of the sports events, makes up the direct and
indirect economic benefits. These benefits have been viewed to stimulate the local economy by generating additional funds for the municipalities and promote economic growth (Euchner, 1993; Leonard 1993).

An economic study in Austin, Texas, for example, advocated that the presence of a new stadium in the city for a new AAA baseball team would provide substantial direct and indirect economic benefits to the area. According to the study, three different multipliers were utilized to assess the overall economic contribution. One for "total output" which represents the total direct, indirect and induced spending effects surrounding the project. Another for "total earnings" which represents wages and salaries as well as earnings of proprietorships, partnerships, corporations and other entities. Finally, the third multiplier was used for "employment" which represents the number of jobs generated by the project. The study concluded that over 450 jobs would be created and a total of over $37 million would be contributed as a result of the presence of a new minor league franchise in the city. 23 The total construction costs were also estimated at $18 million (Coopers and Lybrand, 1995).

Similarly, a 1985 report by Edward B. Shils noted that

23 Economic impact studies in the area of sports report number of jobs without indicating the types of jobs and the average wages. Such reports tend to be misleading since without data on wages, the real employment implications are left to individual interpretation.
the total indirect economic impact of the professional teams on the city of Philadelphia during 1983 was $343 million and on the Philadelphia SMSA (made up of five counties in Philadelphia and four in New Jersey) was over $574 million. Shils reached these figures by first determining the direct revenue and then adding, (1) spending on ticket and television/radio payments and concessions, (2) spending on food, entertainment, public and private (i.e. taxi and shuttles) transportation as well as lodging and (3) revenue paid by advertisers to television/radio stations during broadcasting. He concluded that these three sources of revenue generated $202 million. To identify the overall economic impact on the city of Philadelphia, he utilized a 1.7 multiplier effect which estimates the indirect economic impact coming out of direct spending. The overall economic impact on the city then becomes $343 million. Shils used a multiplier effect of 2.6 to calculate the $574 million figure for the SMSA of Philadelphia (George, 1989). 

Direct and indirect economic benefits in sports are widely communicated across America. Such assessments have included the economic effects of a professional basketball team in New Orleans (Finney, 1994), the annual contribution of the Bears (WBBM-TV2, 1995) and of the White Sox (Laventhol and Horwarth, 1985) on Chicago's economy, as well as the impact of the professional leagues on U.S. cities (CNN Headline News, 1994). Other reports have included the economic effects of the Indiana Sports Corporation on Indianapolis (Macnow, 1989), the economic impact of the 1993-1994 MLB player strike on Chicago (Carlino, 1994), the financial contributions of the McDome project on Chicago (McCarron, 1990) and the economic impact of the Louisiana Superdome and the 1990 Super Bowl on New Orleans (Ragas, et.al, 1987; New Orleans, 1995).
Intangible effects, the economic benefits which result from the attention which cities receive as a result of its professional sports team are also assessed. Specifically, it is believed that nationally and/or regionally broadcasted games, in addition to team coverage, provides citizens across the country with an opportunity to become exposed not only to that team but also the city's attractions. The presence of the city's name in the score box of local newspapers across the country can be sources of economic growth. In this regard, sports teams become an influential source of advertizement for urban centers.

For the city of Chicago, these intangible economic benefits can prove substantial. According to a report by the Department of Economic Development, (1986:5-6):

...these 'intangibles' make a very real contribution to the economy of Chicago, for any exposure of the team to outsiders--whether potential tourists or businessmen--also indirectly promotes the city of Chicago. ...the Department estimated that a Chicago baseball franchise produces about three million dollars worth of intangible benefits in an average year, and that a team in a peak year could generate up to eleven million dollars. Throughout these calculations, the Department was conservative as possible. Just how conservative becomes clear when we compare these calculated intangibles with other estimates of the impact of sports publicity. Local advertizing executives hypothesize, for example, that the championship-winning 1985-1986 Chicago Bears football team produced publicity for Chicago equivalent to a $30 to $40 million promotion campaign.

Even smaller cities like Aurora, Illinois, view a professional sports team as a source of exposure. According to Paul Borek, executive director of the Aurora Economic
Development Commission (Dardick, 1995): "You can't possibly put a price tag on the exposure and recognition that a national sports franchise would bring to a community. Aurora would be good for the stadium and the stadium would be good for Aurora."

The problems with accurately estimating the economic benefits for local and/or regional economies, because of the activities of a professional sports franchise and a new stadium are numerous. Private interests concerned with profit and public officials in pursuit of growth have utilized these findings to push their separate but converging agendas, making these investments realities.

Yet, serious concerns exist about the estimates and predictions on which the multipliers and impact studies rely as they identify the economic effects of a given project in local/regional economies. These concerns exist in both the calculation assumptions made by the firms and the individual business interests of those involved in conducting these studies.

A Critique of Regional Economic Multipliers

Various aspects of the regional economic multiplier have been criticized since the introduction of this analysis. Some criticisms concentrated on the bias of its matrix (Dietzenbacher, 1995), problems with the use of constant coefficients (Conway, 1980), effects of errors on
the eigenvector corresponding to the dominant eigenvalue (Dietzenbacher, 1990), its applicability to small and underdeveloped communities (Mulligan and Gibson, 1986; Rephann and Isserman, 1994), its accuracy (Jensen, 1980), etc.

There are numerous problems with the use of multipliers in assessing the total regional impacts of proposed or existing projects, policies or programs. These problems can be the outcome of (1) definition, (2) estimation, (3) assumption, and/or (4) vested interest.

Problems with Definition

The issue of definition is important because the information presented as a result of regional input-output analysis can differ based on concept description(s). Most of these definitional problems tend to be about employment and income. Specifically, regarding employment, the relationship between "jobs" and "full-time equivalent" or FTE, is one which tends to obfuscate the employment projections that are often communicated in regional input-output analysis (Stevens and Lahr, 1988:90-91).

The employment multiplier estimations are made based on jobs not FTE’s. The reason for that is because the data utilized for the multiplier determination derives from sources such as the U.S. Department of Commerce or the Bureau of Economic Analyses. These sources present data
figured out in number of workers or number of jobs, not FTE's.

This could be problematic, especially when employment multiplier estimation is conducted for different occupational sectors. For example, certain sectors (i.e. mining, heavy manufacturing) tend to have a low ratio of workers to FTE, whereas other sectors (i.e. retailing, service) tend to have a high ratio of workers to FTE. In addition to the occupational sector, the area of the country, as well as the season could play an important role in communicating serious inconsistencies in multiplier estimations (Stevens and Lahr, 1988).

As a result of these inconsistencies, the employment multiplier estimation for two projects would be presented in jobs and not FTE's. From that, the presented employment effect would be both misleading and inaccurate. Thus, for example, a $100 million public investment in renovating the stadium of a professional sports franchise might be hailed as a project retaining or generating many more jobs than the number of jobs which the same amount of money would produce if invested in the steel industry. The difference here would be that the jobs in the steel industry are more likely to be FTE's and year round, whereas the professional franchise would employ seasonal and part-time workers.

Another definitional concern is the income multiplier estimation, specifically the induced multiplier effect. The
value of output multiplier is employed widely to assess the economic impact. This total economic value of output, resulting from the exogenous change, tends to be quite impressive. Yet, a careful evaluation of its definition should pose serious concerns for its accuracy. Specifically, the total exogenous value might not be regionally grounded. For example, products consumed in the regional economy as a result of a given economic activity might not themselves be produced in part or in whole by that same economy. According to Stevens and Lahr (1988:91):

The difficulty here comes about because the induced multiplier effect...should depend on the marginal propensity to consume regional goods out of regionally-generated incomes. This marginal propensity is much more difficult to estimate for a region than for U.S. as a whole. In fact, most regional income multipliers are really average propensities to consume out of a restricted definition of income. ...Output, or sales, is almost always misleading because of the double-counting inherent in this measure. The output per employee of a region could be very high, for example, if its only industry consisted of assembling high-priced computers out of costly components imported from outside the region.

As a result of these definitional problems with determining induced effects, misleading figures would be likely to emerge. A value added multiplier might be a better approach to isolating these economic effects. However, the outcome of that approach would be very likely to produce deflated impact values from those currently reported.

Other definitional problems have arisen with the explanation of the concept under investigation. For example, studies about the effect of tourism have identified
the tourist in different ways. A tourist has been defined as the visitor who has, at a minimum, stayed overnight at the place of attraction. On the other hand, other studies considered those visiting for one day only to also be tourists. If the latter is the case then, it is possible that spending at the attraction is merely displaced from within the same economy. As a result, the definition of the regional economy itself is very likely to vary, producing incompatible outcomes (Johnson and Thomas, 1990).

Problems with Estimation

In addition to the employment and income effects surrounding the multiplier definitional problems, there have also been problems related to the process of estimating these economic multipliers. The major concern in estimation has been the accuracy of measuring the product consumption following a given program, project or policy. The indirect and induced economic benefits are often, by far, most financially impressive. The multiplier estimation concerns are more likely to affect these types of benefits.

In the case that products are imported from the outside, the acclaimed benefits in the production, employment, income, etc, as a result of a given program is seriously questionable. The consistent estimation of the "leakage", resulting from regional purchases produced outside the region has been a problematic aspect of
multiplier assessment.

Let's say, for example, that a public investment of $100 million to expand the seats of a stadium in a given city from 50,000 to 75,000 spectators is hailed to generate additional dollars, resulting from the increased consumption of foodstuffs sold during the games. That would obviously account for the direct spending. The indirect and induced benefits would include the additional foodstuff production to be sold at the stadium. Such increased production might be acclaimed to create additional jobs for the factories involved in the supply of these products, additional income spent by these newly employed workers, etc.

Therefore, one would conclude that the more local production as a percentage of the total production exists, the stronger that local economy would be. As a result, changes in export activities (assuming that 25,000 additional spectators come from outside the regional economy to view the game) would have positive economic effects on the local production activities and thus, the regional/local economy. Since the local employment depends on its relationship to the total employment, the question then is: How can we determine what part of the regional economy is serving the local economy and what part serves the export economy? If the answer to this question is that the local economy serves exclusively the export activities, then the multiplier effect would be considerable, making the
investment in the expanded stadium worthwhile. Otherwise the proclaimed indirect and induced benefits should be questioned.

Problems with Assumptions

Various assumptions are also being made during the assessment process as to the effect of private and public investments on regional economies. These assumptions tend to be responsible for creating the extraordinary amounts which are typically reported. Consider the case of stadium construction and its effects on local economies. According to Euchner (1993:71):

The biggest problem with the multiplier argument is its assumption that the spending that occurs at the stadium would not occur elsewhere in the local economy without a sports team - in other words, the dollars spent at a game would not otherwise be part of the urban economy.

This conclusion is valid since within large urban centers there are multiple attractions, many of which compete for the consumers' money. Thus, if people do not spend their money at the stadium watching a professional sporting event, they will spend it at the local zoo or museum. On the other hand, what would the economic impact be on smaller towns which might provide limited attractions to its residents? This argument has been made (Reich, 1989) to show the economic impact of professional franchises for smaller towns: "But such an easy transfer of dollars [within large cities due to the multiple attractions] is
less likely in a small community, with only a few attractions..." (Reich, 1989:48). The position taken here by Reich is inaccurate. Having many or few attractions in a city, does not necessarily mean that the consumption patterns of its residents will increase. More specifically, the consumption volume will continue to be the same. People in the smaller towns will spend their money purchasing other goods or making investments, and by doing so they are impacting the local economy as if they were spending their money at the local stadium.

A recent economic impact study conducted in Austin, Texas (Cooper and Lybrand, 1995:14), outlined the possibility of "displacement" money being spent regardless of the presence and activities related to a professional sports team and of a stadium. However, it rationalized the economic benefits. Specifically, the study assumed that (1) there are increased taxes imposed on spending inside the stadium and, (2) stadium related spending is a "significant entertainment opportunity", greater than any of the others being available to its residents. This study noted:

It should be noted that the operations of a new sports and entertainment project, the phenomena of "displacement" will take place to some degree. Specifically, this refers to the fact that some portion of the spending generated by the new project may take place on some other entertainment activity if the new facility is not built. For example, an individual, attending a concert or the Firebirds game at the Stadium may instead go to a movie without the development of the stadium. As a result, the spending by the attendee may not be entirely new to the local area. While this displacement of spending will take
place to some degree, it is important to note that [1] spending which results in place of the stadium related spending, should the project not be completed, may be on goods and services taxed at lower rates, and [2] without the significant entertainment opportunities associated with the Stadium, less overall spending in the County may result.

This emphasis on consumption patterns, often outlined by these studies, serves as the primary means of providing an economic rationale, and explaining the overall impact of stadiums and professional teams in various communities. Since consumption is related to production within a capitalist system, rather than assessing consumption patterns, it would be more beneficial to research the impact on production within the local economy. What kind of jobs and how many jobs are produced by the presence of a professional team? An answer to this question would allow for an accurate gaging of the economic impact of professional teams and the rationalization for building stadiums to attract them. Regarding this question, there is no evidence that the creation of jobs is an outcome of the presence of sports franchises. It has been argued (Baade and Dye, 1990) that because of the subsidies extended to franchises by the local government, low-paying jobs are being created. These types of jobs do not have the economic effect claimed by politicians and team owners.

Another assumption that has been utilized widely across the country, when conducting impact studies, has been the "Taj Mahal Syndrome" (Hunter, 1989). According to Hunter,
it is believed that the larger the project to be conducted
the greater its economic impact will be. Hunter showed that
a multiplier analysis of a bridge construction would
generate twice as much in community income as that produced
from repairing the existing bridge. As a result of that
observation, Hunter (1989:1008) concluded:

The use of the new multiplier in the comparison between
old bridge repair and new bridge repair construction
makes the bias of the analysis clear. By increasing
public expenditures, even greater increases in
community income can be effected through the
multiplier's ripple effect. Why then stop with just a
new bridge? Why not build an even larger bridge, or
perhaps several bridges? Why not build new highways
connected to the new bridge? Certainly if one bridge
can generate far more community income than additional
community cost, several bridges connected by new
highways will bring even more income. Can this
analysis be correct?

The approach that a larger, more capital-intensive project
would bring about greater economic benefits than a smaller,
less expensive one is an assumption which multiplier
analysis supports. Similarly the assumption that the return
of a larger project will always outweigh the public
investment is incorrect. In reality, such thinking stands
opposite to logic. If spending more meant increased
economic growth, then, local governments across America
would spend themselves into affluence.

Another assumption found when analyzing multiplier
effects is that which views the use of local services for a
given public project as fiscally better for the local
economy than a scenario where out-of-region services were to
be utilized. It is possible that, the completion of a public project conducted by purchasing in-state only materials and utilizing exclusively local labor, to prove a financial loss. The multiplier predictions of such a project would then be inaccurate, making the proclaimed economic development outcomes questionable. Consider that, in its efforts to stay within the state, the project materials and the labor utilized might prove to be more expensive than that which could have been purchased from out of region locations (Hunter, 1989). Under this scenario, it is possible that in an effort to create economic growth, the public project is likely to run over its projected budget and become more expensive to complete. What would then be the cost to the taxpayers? Taxpayers will have to subsidize a costlier project. Does advocated economic expansion then result into hidden financial costs? As the above scenario shows, local spending does not always guarantee positive, short-term or long-term economic effects.

Finally, the issue of opportunity cost is not taken into consideration when multiplier effects are reported. According to Hunter (1989:1010):

Estimates of the income and employment multipliers for private firms are misleading for the same reason that they are misleading when applied to public works projects: they neglect to factor in opportunity cost. What are the alternative uses for the business' productive resources: labor, plant and equipment? If the business were to go bankrupt or for some other reason to cease operation, would its workers find other employment? Would the buildings be used for other productive purposes? Could the equipment be sold to
other productive capacities?

In the case where these transfers are likely to transpire, and in most cases they do, then, based on incorrect assumptions, the multiplier effect proves misleading. In this case then, the multiplier business effects reported are not unique to the specific business since such economic benefits are likely to also occur without its presence.

Problems with Vested Interests

Another issue which should be taken into consideration when reviewing the results of an impact study is that of vested interests. Who benefits from the over-inflated figures reported by these studies? Also, who conducts these studies? Answers to these questions should provide an insight into the inherent biases which might exist even prior to the analysis of any data. According to Hefner (1995), because of the multiplier effect, economic impact studies, such as those conducted to forecast the effect of the 1996 Olympics on Atlanta and Georgia, can be manipulated.

Multiplier analyses have been utilized for both private and public projects. Yet, what remains consistent in both circumstances is that almost all of these impact studies are either attempting to (1) rationalize new spending, (2) maintain current spending, or (3) increase spending.

Regarding public projects, large contracts end up going
to private interests, thus, showcasing large benefits through the use of multipliers only rationalizes the direct support of private capital by public funds. On the other hand, regarding private investments, multipliers effects have been utilized by businesses to draw additional economic benefits from local, state and/or federal governments. For example, owners of professional franchises will utilize the "ripple-effect" argument to receive public financial support for the construction/update of their playing facilities. Continued funding for the arts might be rationalized when, as expressed by various impact studies, one takes into consideration the possibilities for fiscal urban regeneration. Tax benefits for business might also be justified when considering the local economic effects of their activities.

Finally, the fact that many private firms are employed to conduct these analyses also points to the inherent bias in this process. The results of these analyses will serve a specific purpose and in a situation where the methods of input-output investigation are extremely fluid, the "right" results can be easily compiled. Also, the lack of knowledge on the part of the public to critique the specifics of these impact studies makes them indisputable.

Sports, Stadiums and Economic Development

Though incentives provided by cities are often expected
to generate local economic development, it has been shown that, in the majority of the situations, this is not the case (Willis, 1985; Wren, 1987; Okuno and Yagi, 1990; Storey, 1990; Boviard, 1992; Folley, 1992; Wassmer, 1990; 1994). The economic impact studies in sports most often tend to exaggerate the benefits making these reports misleading and unnecessary.

In recent years, the economic effects of sports facilities on local/regional economies has been questioned (Baade and Dye, 1988b; Nicklaus, 1991; Howe, 1993; Colclough, Daellenback and Sherony, 1994; Dauten, 1995). Robert Baade and Richard Dye (1990) attempted to assess the influence of professional sports and stadiums on the economy of a metropolitan area. Utilizing census data from nine different metropolitan areas (Cincinnati, Denver, Detroit, Kansas City, New Orleans, Pittsburgh, San Diego, Seattle and Tampa Bay), and methodologically employing a regression analysis, Baade and Dye concluded that the effects of stadiums and professional teams on area development were not as positive as those advocated by the local government and the professional teams themselves. The often recommended, multiplier assumption proved a doubtful factor in urban development. New or renovated stadiums do not increase personal income and, according to Baade and Dye, they could even have a negative impact on local development. Baade (1987:15), in an earlier report published by the Heartland
Policy Institute in Chicago, utilized the results of this analysis to conclude that:

The construction or renovation of a stadium, or the presence of a professional sports franchise, might well have a positive effect on the economy in the stadium’s immediate neighborhood. But at what cost to the rest of the city or to the region as a whole? Perhaps a new restaurant will open up in the vicinity of a new sports stadium; it is however, just as likely that an established restaurant fifteen blocks away will close its doors as a result. Is this what stadium proponents consider economic growth?

And, the results of this third regression confirm the thesis that stadiums and professional sports induce a reduction in SMSA income as a percent of regional income. In five of the nine cities, stadiums and professional sports had a significant negative impact; in the remaining four cities, the stadium and professional sports variables, failed to exert a significant impact, positive or negative, on city incomes. In no instance did a positive, significant correlation surface among stadiums, professional sports, and city income as a fraction of regional income.

The changing internal construction of sporting facilities, local/state laws and the positioning of stadiums close to expressways, all must be taken into consideration when attempting to assess the economic impact of sports facilities on local economies. In addition, the beneficiaries of labor contracts from the construction of these sports facilities have not come from local communities. The rise of the suburban economy and the decentralization of the industry in the 40’s and 50’s has taken away many of the labor opportunities once held by the central cities (Ashton, 1984). As a result, many contracts
given for the construction of sports facilities have gone to companies which operate from surrounding suburbs and most often out of the state.

The Malling of Stadiums: Capturing the Consumer

The changing character of sport complexes should be taken into consideration when assessing the multiplier effects of stadiums on local communities. Newly constructed sporting facilities have become more geared towards consumer spending on products which are sometimes completely unrelated to the sporting event itself. For example, the United Center in Chicago, Illinois, conveys an impression similar to that of visiting the local mall or walking through an airport concourse being full of small shops on either side of the walkway. According to architecture critic Blair Kamin (1995):

The hypercommercialized arena [United Center] is part theme park, part shopping mall, part circus, part movie theater, part hotel lobby, part airline terminal, part Niketown—everything, in short, but a match for the Madhouse on Madison Street...Maybe Benny the Bull [mascot of the Chicago Bulls] should wear mouse ears instead of horns.

This "malling" of stadiums encourages spending within its structure, thus discouraging opportunity for the local community to benefit from the presence of the crowds coming
to the games.25

The $308 million SkyDome in Toronto, Canada, is another example of a sports facility which captures the spending of the fans in multiple ways. In addition to being the home of the Blue Jays of the American League, the Skydome is also an entertainment center. According to David Garrick, vice president of Marketing for the Stadium Corporation of Ontario, the downtown Skydome can provide an evening worth of entertainment. He noted (Buursma, 1988):

It's [Skydome] a city within a city. People will be able to leave work at 4:30 p.m., play a game of squash, shower, have dinner, go to a baseball game, then go to a nightclub after the game if they want, all without ever leaving the complex.

Finally, the fact that new stadiums are being built close to expressways making them easily accessible to the public, and/or in communities which suffer economically, can have negative affects for the neighboring communities. By the easy expressway access to the stadium, fans will never become exposed to the restaurants or other various entertainment attractions and small businesses available within the local community. In addition, because of the harsh social and/or economic conditions experienced within

25 Other factors have also contributed to limiting the economic growth of surrounding neighborhoods, resulting from the presence of a stadium. For example, a local Chicago Park District law prohibits fans from bringing foodstuffs and alcoholic beverages into Chicago’s Soldiers Field. Similarly, an Illinois state law passed in 1988, gave the White Sox exclusive rights to sell food and liquor within and around their South Side stadium.
these local communities, those who attend home games will choose not to even purchase gasoline from the local station. Many will do their spending either at their home communities or within the stadium itself.

In Search of an Economic Impact

At the heart of every multiplier analysis is the assumption that the amount of money invested on a given project will be smaller than the amount predicted to be generated by that same project. As a result, state subsidies have often exceeded the impact expectations. Mitsubishi/Chrysler were provided with over $85 million in the form of incentives to operate in Illinois. In return the state expected to capitalize on the corporation's considerable subcontracting business within Illinois. Yet, as it turned out, the forecasted 8,000 new jobs and the additional $300 million a year in personal income never materialized. Only 16 percent of the subcontracts went to Illinois firms. As a result, in this case, the multiplier inflated the outcome of the state subsidy (Hunter, 1989).

Similarly, the amount of dollars generated for the city by having a professional team often proves to be less than the amount invested by the city to support that team's operations. A study of Baltimore's support for the MLB Orioles and the NFL Colts from 1977 to 1983 by Arthur Johnson (1986), provided some interesting findings. The
study showed that for 1977, 1978 and 1982 the city expenditures on these professional franchises, outweighed the city revenues by $2,628, $442,530 and $774,043 respectively. The net city revenue for 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1983 was $798,653, $393,685, $91,191 and $801,096. Also, these public subsidies do not translate into increased access to the games for the public. Thus, the savings which the owners enjoy are not passed down to the consumers of their product. Coakley (1989a) reports that even though the residents of the state of Louisiana subsidize the New Orleans Superdome deficits by $3 to $5 million a year, most of these residents cannot afford to pay for a guided tour of this massive structure. Similarly, in Michigan, taxpayers have subsidized the Pontiac Silverdome between 1976 and 1987 to the amount of $11 million (Baade and Bast, 1987). Such findings definitely question the extent to which the presence of professional franchises adequately represent the proposed economic success for the city.

If it is the case, that there is no economic benefit for the community, then why do cities continue to compete and be willing to invest such extraordinary amounts of money to host a team? To answer this question it is important to note how the beneficiaries of these activities (stadium construction) strategize to convince cities of their (city) "perceived benefits."

Baade and Dye (1988a:38) describe the process and the
various stages through which proposals for the utilization of public resources to support sports franchises advance. The different types of benefits are not economically grounded. Rather, proposed economic development through the use of multipliers and impact studies, serves political/persuasive needs:

At the first level, there is disagreement on the meaty, earthly matters relating to direct municipal revenue projections on stadium income statements. If these projections fail to support stadium plans, the discussion usually ascends to a second stage, where the stadium advocates recruit indirect benefits or multiplier effects in boosting their stadium proposals. Failure here generally ignites a third booster-phase, in which the city economy is said to be propelled upward by the ability of stadiums and their big-league sports franchises to attract other business to their environs. Failure to convince skeptics at this level produces deep space debate on the stadiums' intangible benefits. In deep space, any weight can be assigned to these benefits, and stadium advocates have assigned a weight sufficient to support their case on "rational" grounds.

As a result, public officials become convinced that spending public money will result in economic growth and redevelopment opportunities, especially for the inner-city.

Baim (1994) conducted two studies aimed at better understanding the relationship between local/state governments and public subsidies provided to professional sports franchises. His objectives (1994:217) included: (1) determining the existence of these public subsidies, and (2) identifying the extent of the size of these subsidies. Baim analyzed financial data on fifteen stadiums of the NFL and MLB and he reached the following conclusions: (1) municipal
investments almost always involve taxpayer support, (2) the size of these subsidies vary, (3) the fans receive none of those subsidies, (4) the presence of external benefits which are utilized to retain/attract a professional franchise are not universal.

Findings such as those above strongly suggest that the economic benefits are not as extensive as the ones predicted. Stadium construction and economic development, at the local or regional level, are not an automatic given, and the economic outcomes of this relationship is either negative or not equivalent to those publicized (Okner, 1974; Johnson and Frey, 1985; Harvey, 1990; Baade and Dye, 1990; Bale, 1993; Euchner, 1993; Hiestand, 1993; Baim, 1994; Wilson, 1994).

Conclusion

Multiplier effects have been employed in economic impact studies to show the fiscal contribution of a given investment. Though this type of analysis has been conducted for the last few decades, serious questions should be raised regarding the accuracy of reports which have employed multipliers and outline extraordinary economic benefits to a local and/or regional economy.

Multipliers have been utilized to forecast the economic effect of manufacturing, urban tourism and the arts, urban renewal and state enterprize zone programs, sports and
stadiums, amongst others. Yet, due to multiple assumptions, estimation and definitional problems, many of these studies are deceptive and incorrect. As a result, the interpretation of reported findings often does not adequately describe the actual economic impact of the assessed project or proposed investment.

In the area of professional sports, the financial subsidies offered by the cities are aimed by the local and state government at generating direct, indirect and intangible economic benefits. Though these claims are made by local officials, team owners, the media, and commissioned impact studies, research shows that there is no empirical link between public investments in stadium construction and urban development.

Estimating the positive economic effects of having a professional sports franchise in a city is clearly subjective. Reliance on multipliers and impact studies in sports and stadium development has resulted in the rationalization of public support for private enterprise.
CHAPTER 4

SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF SPORTS: ARE THEY REAL?

Introduction

This chapter provides an insight into the way public officials, professional team representatives, supporters of sports franchises and the mass media, utilize social factors and cultural representations to convince the public that the presence of a sports team is vital for a city. In addition, the quality of the city is measured by the presence of a professional franchise. To that extent, such reasoning has been employed to justify the public support for stadium development. Arguments that a professional franchise represents and symbolizes the city in which it plays, have become increasingly common. Similarly, it is believed that the team reflects on the city itself and a successful team on the field, the ice or the hardwood floor, is a sign of a first class city. Additionally, it has been noted that a professional franchise is essential for a community since it serves as a generator of social cohesion and community building.

These arguments have been based on the social roles which sports play in society. Drawing from within this framework, these claims concentrate on processes of order
and stability. Thus, structure, function and equilibrium are the critical factors on which these arguments rely. The presence of a professional team in a city, has been claimed to provide positive role models to the youth and even to decrease crime.\(^{26}\)

After providing a brief overview of the social function which sports play in society, the issue of status and representation will be addressed. Supporters of professional sports franchises across America have identified increased city status as a direct result of these teams' activities. I will also outline other arguments, namely those related to community building and social cohesion. The chapter concludes with some drawbacks, when attempting to understand sports and professional franchises in society by exclusively relying on their social contributions.

The Social Function of Sports

Society has been viewed as an organism which has a structure and, as a system, is composed of interrelated parts (Parsons, 1951). Some of these parts, or social institutions, include the family, education, religion, the political system and the economic system. In addition, each

\(^{26}\) The testing of a correlation between sports teams and crime showed that there is no overall, statistically significant relationship between the two variables (Baim, 1994:186-188).
of the parts of the social system have manifest and latent functions (Merton, 1968). Accordingly, like many other social institutions, sports serve various functions for society. Thus, sports contribute to the smooth functioning of the social system.  

In its most direct way, one of the functions of sports in society is to provide opportunities and encourage its citizens to engage in physical exercise and thus, develop a healthy population. Sports can also serve as a way for citizens to exert aggression in a manner which is non-threatening to the social system. In that regard, sports become a "safety valve" for society (Proctor and Eckard, 1976; Marsh, 1978). Similarly, sports can be utilized to manage tensions, promote stability and ensure that society continues to function within its existing status quo (Riordan, 1977; Pickering, 1978; Riordan, 1981; Whannell, 1983; Allison, 1986; Hoberman, 1986; Redmond, 1986; Hulme, 1990).

Sports can also bring people together. It generates a sense of collective identity and even represents the values of the society itself. So, for example, teamwork, perseverance, success, competition, discipline, all become

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27 Coakley (1982; 1989b), in his examination of the social functions of sports, utilized a four "system needs" approach (Parsons and Smelser, 1965). According to Coakley (1989b:26-28), the four areas include: (1) sports as a pattern of maintenance and tension management, (2) sports as a means of integration, (3) sports as a means of goal attainment, and (4) sports as a means of adaptation.
communicated through sports. According to Eitzen (1989:44): "...American sport, like American society, is authoritarian, bureaucratic, and product oriented." In this regard, there is a strong interrelationship between sports and the social system.

Another function of sports in contemporary society has been that, like education, the family, the peer group, religion, etc, sports serves as an agent of socialization. Within the organized setting of sports, young children learn to value order, structure, patience, commitment, authority, stability and realize the notion of hierarchy (Ball, 1976; Watson, 1977; Kohn, 1980; Fine, 1987; Eitzen, 1989; Underwood, 1989). In the process, these children become prepared to enter society with the attitudes and understandings which the larger culture values. So, for example, the acceptance of the calls made at the game by the official, signifies the power and powerlessness of its participants (players and officials). These judgements by the officials also occur within a highly structured environment. Such an environment is usually composed of records/statistics, disciplinary actions against the individual which often affect the team, credentialism, etc. Within the larger society, similar elements can be found as

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28 Sports have also been viewed as a reflection of society. Curry and Jiobu (1984:17), note that the events and issues (i.e., sexism, racism, drugs, corruption, violence, crime, etc) which take place in society can also be found in the social institution of sports.
one observes the operation of the legal system and the enforcement of laws.

Drawing from this perspective of sports, arguments of status, cohesion and community building have been utilized to rationalize the need for the presence of a professional sports team in cities across America. Thus, the high social value of these franchises becomes another reason for cities across America to find themselves competing against each other for an opportunity to receive the national attention promised by the leagues and their teams. Sports teams have also been viewed as representing the city to the rest of the nation. These factors have been employed to defend the use of public funds expended on renovating existing sports facilities or building new stadiums.

A Professional Franchise as an Urban Status Symbol

It is believed that having a professional team in a given city places that city on the national "map." Amplifying the prestige of the community and improving the morale of the citizens have also been cited as some of the factors for the willingness of cities to rent their facilities inexpensively to professional teams (Okner, 1974). These and other related factors have in recent years supported decisions for considerable public expenditures in stadium construction.

Recently, St. Louis, Missouri offered an excellent
financial package to attract a professional football team back to that city. The city identified the presence of a football team as a way of regaining its national image. According to former Missouri Senator Thomas Engleton (Kramer, 1995b), the presence of the Rams in St. Louis is nothing short of a blessing, making every effort and dollar spent rewarding. He noted:

Whether one agrees with it or not, some people measure the caliber of a city in terms of having a professional baseball team and a professional football team. When St. Louis lost football, it became a second-class city. With football back, St. Louis is once again a first class city.

Having a professional team then denotes an increased image for the city and makes that city enter into a unique club of cities which can be called "major league cities." Hoffman and Greenberg (1989:154), reported the comments of an executive who analyzes the values of various companies across the country. He said:

I talked about what teams mean to cities to the chairman of the board of Westinghouse. He said, 'How can I bring people to Pittsburgh to work for Westinghouse if I can't tell them that we have a major league community?' Now you want to translate that into dollars. It can't be done. But that's not the important thing. It's the desire, the image.

And, according to Dave Mona, a public relations executive who worked to keep the Timberwolves in Minnesota after they threatened to leave for New Orleans:

There is a real benefit to people in other parts of the country looking in their newspapers and seeing "Minnesota" in stories and in agate. It's one of those intangibles that makes an area "major league." For a long time, this was the smallest area that had every
The defection of a professional team can also have negative perceptions towards the community. University of Minnesota Athletic Director, McKinley Boston concludes: "My sense is that [the relocation of a professional team] changes the overall perception of our [Minneapolis] community. I think professional sport franchises have a lot to do with how people out of the area view you" (Bennet, 1994).

Cities also take pride in their sports teams. Often, the success of the franchise on the field is perceived to add considerable prestige and status to the community. Claims that Chicago is the greatest sports town in the country and that its residents should be proud to reside there are constant subjects of discussion on the local sports radio shows (SCR-820 and WMVP-1000). In these sports stations, during the period of the championships won by the NBA's Chicago Bulls (1991-1993), it was common to hear analogies being made between the success of the team and the greatness of the city. Similarly, the sudden decision to move the Browns of the NFL from Cleveland to Baltimore in 1995 was viewed as unfair by the residents of Cleveland. They repeatedly described themselves as members of a first-class city which continued to support the franchise over the many years when the Browns exemplified poor performance on the field (Pearson, 1995).
Civic-identity and civic self-esteem arguments have also been made to support the construction of sports facilities at considerable public cost. Edward Williams in 1988, as part of a request to the Maryland General Assembly to fund a stadium replacement (retire the 35-year-old Memorial Stadium in Baltimore) for his Baltimore Orioles, argued for the status that his team provided to that city. It was portrayed that, if the Orioles decided to leave Baltimore, the social cost to the city would be extremely high.

Fearing the loss of this baseball franchise, especially when a few years earlier in 1984, the Colts of the NFL carried through their threats and moved to Indianapolis, the State Assembly voted for a new baseball stadium. According to Marc Ganis of SportCorp, a stadium development and financing company: "Baltimore is a perfect example of a community that developed an inferiority complex because they lost a team" (Buursma, 1988). As a result, the proposed 50,000 open-air seat stadium was expected to cost the Maryland taxpayers $155 million. Yet, as it turned out, the 48,000 seat Camden Yards actually cost them $206 million.

In order for a city to gain the perceived status resulting from the presence of a professional franchise, it is believed that, that city should be willing to make considerable financial contributions to its team(s). Michael McCaskey, the owner of the Chicago Bears of the NFL,
in 1995, requested over $185 million in public funds for a new stadium. On a question as to whether the state and the city should provide him with these funds or invest the money in education and health care, McCaskey responded:

In logic class we call that a false dichotomy. It is not a question of choosing between schools or inner city hospitals on the one hand and sports and entertainment amenities on the other. A great city has resources to do both. I firmly believe that Chicago is a great city (WBBM RADIO-780AM, 1995).

A sports franchise also, according to some, has the ability to transform the status of a city. Hudnut (1995), former mayor of Indianapolis, pointed to the effects which the presence of a team can have:

In Indianapolis, we fought to keep the Indiana Pacers from moving to Sacramento because we realized it would be devastating to our image as an emerging American city if the team relocated. We fought for the Colts against Baltimore, San Antonio, Phoenix, Birmingham, Jacksonville and Memphis because the potential benefits were equally as dramatic. ...They [Colts] transformed us from "India-no-place" into a destination city, "a Cornbelt city with Sunbelt sizzle."

Some cities will even promote new sports stadiums as landmarks since they believe that they add to the status of their city. For example, The Ohio Turnpike Commission (1994) went as far as to advertize Cleveland’s Jacobs Field in its James W. Shocknessy Ohio Turnpike Map as a site for tourists to visit. The Indians’ ballpark was listed along the Toledo Museum of Art, the Toledo Zoo, Sea World & Cedar Point, and a variety of other theme parks. In addition, the inclusion of stadiums as landmarks informs us of the extent to which city officials will go to present these structures.
In the process, cities engage in the debasing of landmark status.

The presence of a professional sports team is also perceived to "put on the map" and benefit small cities which search for the attention that large cities gain. Attracting the Giants from San Francisco to San Jose has been viewed as a status builder strategy for San Jose (Seal, 1992).

Kenneth Adams, an attorney who worked on the Irwindale, California stadium deal is quoted in the Reich (1989) article saying:

The value of a major professional sports franchise to a young and growing community that is trying to put itself on the map is inestimable. ...The inescapable conclusion of the last 10 years is that a professional sports franchise has more value to an Irwindale or a Sacramento than to a Los Angeles or a San Francisco. And accordingly it's very difficult to persuade the citizens in the big cities to spend taxpayer money on retaining a team.

This notion of the difference between newer and older cities, as it relates to the extent to which they are willing to attract a professional franchise, depends on factors such as local political organization, organized labor and citizen interests. Wilson (1994: 241) addresses some of these factors:

The bidding war for franchises tended to pit newer, prodevelopment cities against older, more democratically run communities. Cities in the South, Southwest, and West, such as Atlanta, Houston, Dallas, San Antonio, Phoenix, Los Angeles, Miami and San Diego were especially well adapted to more open competition because they had weaker public sectors, fewer calls for public accountability, an unorganized working class, and a far stronger military influence. Their goal was to encourage growth, rather to regulate it. They were
not disturbed by the fact, commonly acknowledged, that the sports business mainly benefitted developers, financiers and realtors, rather than the average citizen, who could only be expected to enjoy its benefits as they "trickled down."

Recently this "easier acceptance" of propositions to accommodate the interests of professional teams in the Southwest is changing. Such challenges to the intentions of local government come from residents who have retired to the Southwest and might be more aware of the uneven benefits which come from building a new stadium. A proposal to build a new stadium to replace the Cubs' current winter home of Ho Ho Cam in Mesa, Arizona with a new $24 million reminiscent of Wrigley Field, was opposed by area residents. The locals felt that taxpayers' money should not assist the Cubs' interests (de Lama, 1994).

Other Proposed Social Benefits for the City Resulting from the Presence of a Professional Sports Franchise

Additional social benefits have also been advocated to result from the presence of a professional sports franchise in a city. The perceived value of a franchise has made public officials view the team as being one with the city itself. Pat Quinn, an Illinois Democratic candidate for U.S. Senate, who proposed the "Sports Fans Bill of Rights", indicated that the Bears of the NFL are one with the community of Chicago (WBBM-TV2, 1995). He noted:

The Bears are like utilities. They belong to the fans. There is an issue of trust. Generation after
generation people have come to see them. They belong to the community.

But, how did statements like the one above, which indicates a very strong relationship between the city and the professional franchise, come to be? In attempting to answer this question, I will discuss the way city officials and others across America, who are involved in attracting or retaining professional franchises, argue the prevailing or anticipated social benefits.

A Professional Franchise as a Generator of Social Cohesion and Community Building

In addition to the status related arguments mentioned earlier, the presence of a professional franchise has also been viewed as a means of community empowerment, pride and community maintenance. Jerry West, a long-time NBA great and most recently General Manager of the Los Angeles Lakers, described the 1995-1996 regular season success of the Chicago Bulls as a community building experience for Chicago. For him, Chicago is fortunate to have this great team play there. According to West, the achievements of the Bulls on the court "builds community pride...It is great for Chicago...This is great to have in your city...[and], I wish that we had it here in Los Angeles" (WSCR-SCORE 820 AM, 1996). William Hudnut (1995), former mayor of Indianapolis also noted that the Colts of the NFL have served a similar, socially cohesive function for that city:
The team can supply some of the glue that holds a community together. The Colts galvanized the spirit of Indianapolis.

This notion of community building has also been expressed recently in Tampa, Florida. As the NFL Bucs threatened to leave the city, unless they received a commitment for a new stadium, social cohesion and community building arguments surfaced. These arguments were constructed to support every effort to keep the team in the area. According to Edwin Roberts, Jr., (1995), columnist for The Tampa Tribune, the economic benefits, though critical, are not the most important reasons for keeping the franchise. Rather it is the "civic worth" which is "the major reason for keeping the Bucs." He wrote:

The economic benefits accruing to the citizenry as a whole from the presence of a professional football team are probably smaller than advertised. Nevertheless, the civic worth of a sports franchise has less to do with expanding local wealth than with expanding local pride, and that's not easy to evaluate. ...when the [Washington Red] Skins won their first Super Bowl, there was so much hugging among strangers in Washington and its suburbs that the celebration put one in mind of V-J Day. Nothing, absolutely nothing can bring to a diverse community so much shared rapture. ...The Bucs' great gift to us is the unity they inspire among so many different sorts of people, and it is a unity that thrives on the team's success but doesn't entirely dissipate when the team fails.29

Similarly, in Chicago, when the Bears of the NFL threatened to leave the city for a suburb or another city, a

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29 It is important to note that success on the field does not always result into happy street celebrations. The Chicago Bulls' championship victory in 1993 led to deadly riots after the game.
Chicago Tribune commentary (Papajohn, 1995) responded:

The Bears have long been a unifying element for a city where North Side, South Side, West Side and the Loop all distrust one another, where the Sox and the Cubs split the baseball community and where racial divisions run below the surface like so many fault lines.

Public officials and community leaders have also outlined the social effects which a professional team has on a city. In a Los Angeles Times article, Keneth Reich (1989) assesses the value of sports teams for various cities. In that same article a number of public officials proclaim their importance. Alameda County Supervisor Don Pareda, addresses why focusing on bringing the NFL Los Angeles Raiders back to Oakland is important for building city morale and social cohesion. He noted:

It really provides a galvanizing affect for the community. It fuses an identity. It provides the community a separate and distinct interest which people share in common, and for us, in Oakland, that is very important because we have such a diverse community, socially, economically and ethnically. It provides a common reference for us and we know that that’s very valuable.

It is a similar value for the city of Los Angeles that California State Senator Bill Cambell identified:

I think there is an extreme value, even to Los Angeles, in these teams. You have the community pride, the cohesiveness that a sports franchise brings. ...In the office, everyone is talking about the game the day before or the night before. It brings an esprit de corps to a community that otherwise is not there.

This idea of community togetherness and identification is also interestingly argued by labor leaders such as Bill Robertson who was instrumental in bringing the Raiders from
Oakland to Los Angeles. In assessing the value of a professional franchise for the city of Los Angeles he stated:

The same conditions apply today. Not only the primary economic effect, and the ripple effect in Los Angeles at large, but also because the [Los Angeles] Coliseum is located in a depressed area and it’s very important for the morale of the people living in that community to keep it busy.

What might also be inferred from this statement is that professional sports have the ability to pacify the masses and to misdirect their attention from the issues facing their community.

Cultural and Symbolic Elements

Cities across America pride themselves in their museums, orchestras, art galleries, etc. These cultural institutions prove capable of communicating the status of the city. As a result, the recent Monet Exhibit at the Art Institute of Chicago, was viewed to not only convey artistic expressions, but also proved to be an opportunity for Chicago to showcase itself to the rest of the nation. Thus, through art, the connection between the Institute and the city becomes reinforced.

Yet, the symbolic influence which a museum and an orchestra have on its citizens is limited. As forms of high culture, these institutions prove mostly accessible to a segment of the city’s population (those with higher socioeconomic background). Sports on the other hand, are
part of a mass culture, which, because of extensive media coverage, proves widely available to the city’s residents. In this regard, the success and/or failure of a professional team, its style of play and its history will be likely more known within the community than the latest exhibit at the museum would be. As a result of this broader audience base, sports and professional franchises become strong representations of urban centers across America.

Numerous cultural and symbolic elements serve as means of strengthening the relationship between the professional team and the city. The team shapes the identity of the community and in turn, the team becomes shaped by the values and attitudes of the community itself. The "finesse", "fast-pace" and "flamboyant" type of basketball played by the NBA Los Angeles Lakers at the L.A. Forum during the 1980’s, communicates the life style and culture of the city of Los Angeles. In Chicago, sportswriters and sportscasters use the term "Bear football" to describe the playing style by the Chicago Bears in the NFL. "Bear football" means hard-hitting, in your face, as players reach deep within themselves when no energy is left. It is these same descriptions that also characterize the residents of the city, as well as its roots. Such descriptions imply that Chicago is an honest city whose residents are not afraid to work hard and get the job done the laborious way. These descriptions have emerged out of the historical position of
Chicago as a manufacturing center and out of the blue-collar attitudes and values which characterized its residents. In the 1970’s, the NFL Pittsburgh Steelers, through their style of football, represented the values of the working class "Steel Town." Their dominant defense on the field was referred to, even today, as the "Steel Curtain." Finally, as observed in nationwide radio sports shows, the image of the NBA Detroit Pistons as a "dirty" team in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, carried on to generate a similar impression of its residents. Thus, there is a dialectic relationship between the city and its team(s). The image of the team can inform us of the city, as the image of the city can affect the actions of the team.

When the Raiders of the NFL moved back to Oakland in 1995, the city welcomed the franchise and according to Elihu Harris, Mayor of the City: "There are clear economic benefits, because corporations can identify with sports teams. And it’s a source of pride, at a time when there are so many negative influences" (Witt, 1995).

The move back to Oakland, brought the Raiders to their "heritage." The hard working, blue collar approach of the Raiders on the field, exemplified by Davis’s motto "Just win baby", best complemented the Oakland community than the ‘glitsy’ and football passive community of the City of Los Angeles. Bringing the franchise back to the bay area meant that the City of Oakland and the Raiders belonged to each
other all along. According to Matt Millen, a football player who played with the Raiders at both Oakland and Los Angeles: "Los Angeles is where the score is tied in the third quarter, you're driving for the go-ahead touchdown, someone yells 'Surf's up and...everybody heads for the beach." Gene Upshaw, head of the NFL players association, and a Hall of Fame Raider also noted: "Anyone who played in both cities knows the difference. There was a passion to the Oakland fans. Every game was life and death. They talked about us in the bars. In Los Angeles we were just another bit of passing entertainment" (Goldberg, 1995). The city and the team then become representations of each other.

Can New York City think of itself without the Yankees, Boston without the Red Sox, or Chicago without the Cubs and the White Sox? These franchises often, through traditions, take on a life of their own within the urban environment and develop influence over the metropolis that very few other businesses could showcase. These cultural and symbolic elements depict the strong relationship between the team and the community. It is because of this strong relationship and the perception that the team represents the community, that local governments will often go to extremes to satisfy the business needs of these professional franchises.

A recent commentary by Chicago Tribune staff writer George Papajohn (1995) best exemplifies the relationship
between a sports team, the Chicago Bears and the City of Chicago. He writes:

The Bears, more than any other Chicago franchise, represent every cherished character trait and every tour-bus cliche that gives the city its identity. Thinking of big shoulders? Think Dick Butkus. The ethnic success story? Think Bears founder George Halas, the son of Bohemian immigrants. Personalities as unforgiving as steel? Think "Iron Mike” Ditka. Tough but graceful architecture? Think of Walter Payton’s bruising and baletic build. The beautiful lakefront? Think Soldier Field. The brutal Chicago weather? Think Bear weather. The Bears are the only reason Chicagoans can take pride in our miserable winter.

These symbolic and cultural connections between the city and the professional teams have been at the core of many social arguments made to support the interests of professional franchise owners. In the process, the notion that cultural images are increasingly utilized to represent and define cities and the urban environment (Bourdieu, 1984; 1986; Harvey, 1990; Gottdiener, 1994) also finds support in sports.

**Stadium Construction as a Source of City Greatness**

Cities have also viewed the construction of a sports stadium as a way to showcase their position as progressive cities or identify themselves as being capable to rebound from natural disasters or other catastrophes. The construction of stadiums, especially domed facilities, have in recent decades become sources of civic identity and pride.
The Astrodome in Houston, the Superdome in New Orleans, the Metrodome in Minneapolis, the Kingdome in Seattle, the Silverdome in Detroit and the RCA Dome (formerly Hoosier Dome) in Indianapolis, have all been sources of pride for their residents and have also been viewed as signs of city progress (Gershman, 1993). In New Orleans, for example, the Superdome is more than just a place to play. During its construction, Moon Landrieu, the Mayor of New Orleans, noted: "The Superdome is an exercise of optimism. A statement of faith. It is the very building of it that is important, not how much it is used or its economics" (Reid, 1974).

On the other hand, in San Francisco, Bob Lurie, the owner of the Giants of the National League vowed in 1989 to take the team to another city if he did not get a replacement stadium. The city attempted to generate support for a publicly financed ballpark. The November 1989 earthquake in San Francisco, directed the attention of its residents to issues other than the stadium proposal. Yet, the Mayor of the city, Art Agnos, used the stadium development proposal as a way to bring the city together after this natural disaster. He noted that "It’s our last and final shot to keep the team in San Francisco. It’s now or never." Agnos also viewed the construction of the stadium as a civic response to those who challenged the ability of the city to recover from its most recent natural
disaster. In a letter to the residents of the city he noted: "Building the ballpark will be a signal that says to the rest of the world that we believe in our future" (Buursma, 1989).

Perceived Social Benefits as Reasons for Franchise Support

Sports franchises are communicated to be ways of citizen identification and part of a process toward community building (Mitnick, 1984; Bickley, 1995). Regardless of citizen doubts, the commitment to the professional franchise by the local government and the perceived status symbol which it brings for the city has persisted. In the end, these social effect arguments ensure public support for professional franchises.

The following quote by the Mayor of Kansas City Richard Berkeley from a U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary hearing in 1983 shows the importance of the team for the city and the support his city is willing to extend:

Professional sport leagues are a unique form of business. One level they sell entertainment, but they also sell civic identity, emotion and community involvement. The name Kansas City Chiefs says it all. The Chiefs belong to the fans and the community of Kansas City. We support the team. We share the glory of their victories. We share the bitterness of their defeats. It is because we, the citizens of Kansas City, share so much with our team that we have been willing and we will continue to be willing to make the public investments in stadia and other projects to provide the teams with the facilities which are necessary to operate (quoted in Wilson, 1994, p. 246).

Similarly, a civic task force in Milwaukee, the Greater
Milwaukee Committee, fearing the loss of the Brewers of the American League noted:

The success of the team as a business is the responsibility of team management. However, a community can and should take supportive steps to assist a team's survival and to help ensure that it will remain a part of the community. Teams need civic support (Buursma, 1988).

By considering the above comments, one would conclude that there is a symbiotic relationship between the franchise and the community. In the case of the Brewers, such strategy worked. Late in 1995, the state of Wisconsin approved the public financed construction of a new stadium for the baseball franchise.

**The Problematic of Exclusively Viewing Sport as a Social Function**

One of the general critiques of viewing sports as a social function has been the extreme emphasis on social order and stability, while failing to fully account for social change (Edwards, 1973; Melnick, 1975; Figler, 1981; Gruneau, 1983; Coakley, 1989b; Leonard, 1993). A number of assumptions are being made to view the social institution of sport in a manner which always makes positive contributions to society. When considering the arguments by public officials, franchise supporters and the media, no reference is ever made to any negative implications which sports might have on society. Coakley (1989:29) outlines this point:

Since sport has been around for some time and is an increasingly significant component of our social
system, most functionalists conclude that it does make positive contributions to society. This conclusion leads them to ignore or underemphasize the negative aspects of sport. After all, it is also possible that sport could distort values and behavioral guidelines (norms). It could impede goal attainment and interfere with methods of coming to terms with the external social and physical environment by diverting a group's attention away from crucial personal and social issues.

Sports also allows for the development of a citizen consciousness which does not engage its members into substantive dialogues as they relate to the social system. As a result the activities within the stadium and the sporting industry as a whole, work to pacify the crowds and assist in the development of a culture which does not challenge the existing social status quo (Hoch, 1972; Aronowitz, 1973; Petryszack, 1978). This "opiate" function of sports diverts attention and even supports the interests of the upper class.

Viewing the social role of professional sports franchises also tends to assume that what might be good for the social system is good for the individual. The possibility of exploitative and coercive strategies employed by the owners of the franchises in order to get the best deal possible for themselves at the expense of the public is not considered within this framework. The innerworkings of powerful interests within sports is also downplayed. Thus, as a result of city efforts across the country to benefit professional franchises, issues of displacement, maintenance of the political and economic interests of big business,
deterioration of the physical and/or cultural environment when stadium construction occurs, etc., receive no serious consideration.

**Conclusion**

Cities are connected to their cultural institutions; their museums, the arts, the orchestras and even their professional sports teams. Professional franchises are viewed to be urban representations, to have symbolic value and to communicate civic status to the rest of the nation and to the world.

Integration, tension management, and the stability and maintenance of the social order are at the heart of these community status and social cohesion arguments. Civic identity, community involvement, and civic pride have been identified as some of the ways through which professional teams contribute to the city. As a result, the professional franchise becomes more than a team on the playing field. It becomes an integral part of community.

These social factors prove to be another intangible which has been utilized by public officials and the owners of the various professional franchises as the justification for the use of public resources to construct stadium facilities. Because of these advocated social benefits, public policy decisions have directly and indirectly supported the interests of private enterprise. In the
process, the existing capitalist social relations, social structure and ideology become reproduced.

Regarding the social effects such as community identity, status, overall social cohesion and instillment of pride, it is true that a sense of identity is provided by having a professional franchise. Professional franchises do allow residents to identify with the successes and failures of their team. Yet, the exclusive reliance on these factors must be reconsidered.

The validity of this socially-based approach to assessing the social significance of professional franchises on urban centers across the United States is questionable. Though certain aspects of its analysis could be accepted, when these social assessments are considered, gross generalizations should not serve as a complete understanding of the relationship between sports and society, nor should they be considered as comprehensive knowledge in guiding public policy decisions.
CHAPTER 5

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW COMISKEY PARK
IN SOUTH ARMOUR SQUARE

Introduction

The intense competition among cities for professional franchises has led to the public finance and maintenance of stadiums. In the cases where city and state governments do not provide these franchises with the incentives they require, the teams threaten to leave for another city. This strategy results into a bidding war as cities battle with their public resources to retain or attract professional teams.

The case of the White Sox in Chicago, is an example of how, through threats, a professional sports team can successfully pressure the City and the State into financing a new stadium. The old Comiskey Park, which until the 1990 season was the oldest ballpark in America, lacked the profit generating features that most of the newer facilities could showcase. The co-owners of the team, Jerry Reinsdorf and Eddie Einhorn, successfully convinced the city that the old facility was too costly to maintain and even structurally dangerous for the public. In addition, they threatened that unless a new stadium is provided, the White Sox would move out of Chicago and even out of state.
Fearing the loss of this franchise to another city and state, the Illinois General Assembly voted in December of 1986, and later in June 1988, to finance the construction of a new baseball-only stadium for the White Sox. The state and the city gave absolute negotiating power to the Illinois Sports Facility Authority (ISFA). The responsibility of the ISFA was to oversee the construction of the new facility, and afterwards own and operate it. The board membership was appointed by both the governor and the mayor. Despite efforts by fan groups to restore the old Comiskey Park because of its historical status, and despite a well thought-out proposal which would create a ballpark responsive to the corporate needs of the White Sox and of the local community, 178 privately owned housing units and 12 community businesses were pushed aside to make room for the construction of the New Comiskey Park.

The case of the Chicago White Sox provides an opportunity to investigate the relationship between the state and private interests within the context of professional sports, as well as the social effects of these policies on urban communities. Pelissero, Henschen and Sidlow (1992:70) in an analysis of the political policy implications as they relate to professional sports in Chicago, concluded that the White Sox case was an example of emerging, progressive, urban politics. Such assessment poses serious questions about the social component of these
policies. They write:

The Washington-Sawyer coalition of 1983-1989 delivered an acceptable stadium package to the White Sox while successfully mediating the competing needs of social and economic development in Chicago. The policy response was innovative when it came to the use of economic development tools, eminent domain, regulation, public authority, and social policy.

Though this assessment is accurate in describing a recent shift in the development of politics aimed at the mediation of conflicting interests, serious questions remain regarding attainable outcomes of social and economic development. To what extent did such progressive policy achieve a union between urban economic/social advancement, and satisfaction of private interests? Was there even an intent to produce any related economic and/or social development? This case study concludes that the state, through its deliberate actions, promoted the interests of private enterprise at the expense of a politically and economically powerless minority community.

At the same time, several additional issues emerge from an investigation of this case. Specifically, (1) the apparent competition amongst cities to attract or retain a professional sports team is the outcome of a strategy, resulting in financial gains for the franchise's ownership, (2) government intervention supports the activities of private enterprise since it perceives that its loss would pose negative economic, political and social effects, (3) a predominantly African-American, low-income community becomes
displaced to make room for the new stadium, (4) alternative baseball stadium restoration and construction plans, which could have proved beneficial to residents and developers, receive no serious consideration, and (5) in addition to the political and economic implications surrounding the construction of the new sports facility, the cultural environment of an urban community becomes reshaped.

This case study is divided into two chapters. The purpose of this segmentation is not to distinguish between politics, economics and community response as they relate in this case study. Rather, the division into two sections is conducted for the purpose of organizing this analysis in a coherent manner and it is not intended to reflect a thematic split.

The first chapter outlines the political economy of the White Sox stadium development plans. While taking into consideration the franchises' intense motivation for profit, this chapter addresses: (1) the franchises' declaration of the old Comiskey Park as structurally dangerous and the opposition of "Save Our Sox", a fan group, (2) the efforts of the ownership to create a climate of competition for the White Sox between the city, the suburbs and St. Petersburg, Florida, (3) the perceived economic benefits of the team for the city, the county and the state, (4) the role which the media and the government played, leading to the passage of the 1988 Illinois Sports Facilities Authority Act, and (5)
the new Comiskey Park, a failed attempt at the construction of an urban ballpark.

The second chapter concentrates on community issues and the community response to the stadium development plans. Specifically, this chapter of the case study, provides (1) information about the South Armour Square community, (2) an historical insight of the relationship between the old Comiskey Park and the surrounding communities, (3) the political implications of displacement and the community division over the proposed relocation program, (4) community tactics, (5) the cultural transformation of the area, resulting from the destruction of McCuddy's, a local landmark and the laws restricting locals from selling their products during the games, (6) proposed stadium development alternatives, including the restoration of the old Comiskey Park and the Armour Field proposal, and, (7) community redevelopment following the completion of the new Comiskey Park.

Stadium construction within the urban environment is becoming a unique, urban development tool. Beyond the economically related arguments, social considerations have been also utilized to support stadium development. In the case of the White Sox, loosing the team was perceived to be an embarrassment to the city and a bad way to showcase the political will of its residents. Yet, as this case study shows, social inequality becomes a central outcome of these
"pro-growth" efforts.

Was it Unsafe or was it the Posts?

When it was announced that the White Sox were interested in moving from the existing old Comiskey Park to a new facility in the Chicagoland area or in another state, a group of fans organized themselves to resist those plans. The group called itself "Save Our Sox" and it had a two fold strategy. Mary O'Connel, a leader of the group told me:

We were so surprised to hear the ownership making these proposals. I have been a White Sox fan all my life and we could not let that happen. Our interest was initially to preserve the old Comiskey. Some of the questions we asked included: why should it be torn down and if there is money to build a new ballpark why not restore the old one?

The ownership of the old Comiskey Park and of the White Sox, contended that the facility was structurally unsafe and too costly to maintain. The "Save Our Sox" group took issue with that approach and searched to identify the extent to which the ballpark had "truly" deteriorated, beyond restoration. A letter from structural engineer Peter Krallitsch of George A. Kennedy & Associates to the group read in full:

The purpose of this letter is to emphasize some of the points we raised at yesterday's meeting. As we indicated, we were very surprised at the rapid deterioration that has occurred at Comiskey Park since the extensive renovation project just three years ago. Unfortunately, we foresee the likelihood of significant expenditures on an annual basis to keep the park in safe and usable condition through the 1989 season. Beyond that time there are no realistic long-term solutions since the deterioration is irreversible.
Simply put, Comiskey Park is nearing the end of its useful life (letter released by Jerry Reinsdorf, July 11, 1986).

Was the condition of Comiskey Park so deteriorated that it rendered replacement or did the White Sox inflate its condition so that they could campaign for a new stadium? Would a new stadium provide the franchise with the profits that only new ballparks can offer? It was the latter approach which the "Save Our Sox" took and one which community residents adjacent to the park later supported.

According to this group, the White Sox claims that the park had deteriorated irreversibly were false. This group challenged the franchises' recommendations noting that:

(1) The short letter provided by the structural engineer who assessed old Comiskey and was employed by the franchise, communicated no technical data. In addition it generated no cost estimates of renovation and maintenance or any other information which could be utilized to compare the renovation cost to the proposed cost of constructing a new facility.

(2) The ownership of the White Sox avoided any discussion about the condition of the Comiskey Park. Such discourse, according to "Save Our Sox", would have worked against the corporate interests of the franchise, since it would have brought the issue to the public's attention. In the Addison Press (November 14, 1986, p. 1) of Addison, IL, one of the proposed sites for a new stadium, team vice
president Howard Pitzer was reported saying: "...the Sox released an engineer’s letter explaining the report and do not have to justify the contents of that report to anyone."

(3) Other information on the condition of the facility by city inspectors indicated that the park was not in an extremely deteriorating condition as reported by the team. Though city inspectors reported numerous concerns with the structure of the ballpark, they did not close the park and the team continued to generate income from its activities. In addition, prior to a game between the Cubs and the Sox at Comiskey, city inspectors declared the condition of the ballpark as safe.

(4) When the team was for sale in the 1980’s inspectors for prospective buyers reported its structure to be sound and safe.

(5) Though skyboxes were added in 1982, at that time, there was no report indicating the inability of the ballpark to accommodate their weight.

(6) Other reports showed that the facility was sound and it could accommodate activities for many years.

(7) The franchise had been continuously successful in obtaining liability coverage for their game seasons, thus precluding its sound structure (Bukowski, O’Connell and Aranza, 1987).

But, why did the White Sox attempt to show the ballpark as dangerous and too expensive to maintain? It is because a
new stadium would provide increased profits to the franchise, since the architectural style of old Comiskey was not conducive to generating the expected income.

An integral part of architecture in old ballparks is the presence of posts which provide support for the second deck, while allowing for a slow incline, bringing those on the upper deck close to the action. The old Comiskey Park had many of those posts supporting its structure. Yet, this set-up created many obstructed view seats, thus, minimizing potential income. The old Comiskey Park had 2,000 obstructed view seats due to these posts, many more than other baseball ballparks.30

Furthermore, the presence of posts in the old Comiskey Park made the installation of additional luxury boxes practically impossible. A comparison of old and new Comiskey Park aerial pictures, on September 30, 1990, during the last game day played at the old ballpark, shows according to Gershman (1989:228) that:

Side by side, the old and the new (unfinished) Comiskey parks have little in common... particularly the steepness of the rake of the upper deck and the overall height of the new park compared to the old. It is due to the inclusion of log seating between the upper and lower decks, a way of gouging a few more dollars from the well to do, while ignoring the legitimate interests of the average fan.

And according to O'Connell:

30 For example, Wrigley Field (1914) has 500 column-obstructed seats, Riverfront Stadium (1970) has 0 column-obstructed seats, and Royals Stadium (1973) has 0 column-obstructed seats (Bess, 1989).
Posts generated obstructed view at the old Comiskey, thus, with the assumption of removing them to increase revenue, every report on the old Comiskey Parks’ viability would turn negative. Under this assumption it would be very costly to renovate the ballpark. It was this large cost which provided the justification for the construction of a new stadium.

Similarly, independent architect Philip Bess, who proposed the construction of Armour Field in the area, told me that:

One of the distinct features of old ballparks is the columns which allow for a close and intimate viewing experience. Though viewing would have been obstructed, architecturally, it is possible to carefully place limited columns, control the obstructed viewing, and still allow for an intimate viewing experience.

Another reason reported for "making" the old Comiskey structurally dangerous was that Reinsdorf and Einhorn did not want to own the old ballpark. It was too expensive to maintain and the tide of ownership nationwide had definitely shifted toward public rather than private construction and maintenance of stadiums. The White Sox were one of 6, out of 26 teams in the major leagues, which owned their own stadium (Bukowski, O’Connell and Aranza, 1987).

Though the state decided to authorize its own study on the structural status of the old Comiskey Park, that report was made public on August 5, 1988, a month after a favorable lease agreement was passed by the Illinois legislature (June 30, 1988). Though this engineering report supported the findings of the previous White Sox study, by that time, a new stadium agreement had been finalized and no group was able or even willing to challenge a done deal.

The strategy of declaring the old Comiskey Park unsafe
enabled the franchise to gain the attention of the local and state governments. From then on, the stage was set for the team to present its demands for a new facility.

Moving to the Suburbs

Reinsdorf and Einhorn realized that the location of the old Comiskey Park was not suitable for generating the attendance which would result in high incomes from ticket prices, parking and concessions. Suburban Chicago, especially in the west and northwest, was a booming area. Those who could afford to pay the increased prices at the games were not frequenting the old Comiskey Park. In addition the black fans did not regularly attend White Sox games. A move to the suburbs would bring the team closer to its consumers. The ownership also viewed a suburban location as one with an opportunity for additional real estate development to augment the proposed stadium (Goozner, 1986).

Anti-Urbanism, Racism and the Loss of the Black Fans

The presence of the White Sox fans in the suburbs can be extracted from a White Sox promotional brochure which posed the following question: "Who attends White Sox games?" The answer provided was: "Demographics of White Sox fans reveal they are the same people who comprise the majority of DuPage County. Approximately 50 percent of White Sox season
ticket holders and 75 percent of all fans who attend games at Comiskey Park live in the suburbs" (Cattau, 1992).

The local press viewed the move to the suburbs consistent with the larger suburbanization movement of the 1950’s and 1960’s. It was believed that, the White Sox’s interest in moving was due to the large African American population living in the general area and the slumlike neighborhood around Comiskey Park (Wood, 1988). That fact made fans apprehensive about attending games in that area. According to a Chicago Tribune staff writer:

Comiskey Park, you see, is also a tie to that bygone age when the ball and everything else about the game were white. Many of the people who would like to see the ballpark preserved—a noble sentiment, to be sure—would also like to turn back the clock of urban change. So no matter how weighty the engineering surveys, no matter how costly the maintenance, no matter what rationalizations are used to cover the team’s track to the northwest, another issue cannot be hidden. It could politely be called demographics. "If it [the move to Addison] happens, it would be part of white flight, but that isn’t the reason for the move," Reinsdorf says. The fans moved away from the South Side. Why can’t we?"...It is one thing, of course, not to have blacks in the park. It is another to have them frighten away whites. A perception that the neighborhoods around Comiskey Park are dangerous began during the riots of the late 1960’s...many fans have probably never returned (Hersh, 1986).

And according to a Chicago Sun-Times staff writer:

I think that Reinsdorf and Einhorn want to move the White Sox as far away from the black South Side as quickly and comfortably as possible. Reinsdorf came close to actually verbalizing this unspoken desire yesterday when he assured his new suburban pals that they needn’t worry about a dangerous element following the White Sox into the suburbs. "We’re not gonna bring bad people to the ballpark" he promised (Fitzpatrick, 1986).
Finally,

Given the dichotomy of black inner city, white suburbs found in many metro areas, the anti-urban bias of stadium relocation often projects an anti-black bias. The anti-urban, anti-black bias in no doubt related to the fact that white-middle class suburbanites make up the bulk of [professional sports] patrons (Devise, 1986).

It is interesting to note here that the neighborhood adjacent to the Suncoast Dome in St. Petersburg, also became an issue for the White Sox when they considered a move to Florida. Specifically, the White Sox were concerned about a public housing building near the dome. According to a Chicago Sun-Times staff writer:

The St. Petersburg proposal, released under a court order, reveals the Sox demanded that a rundown public housing project near the Florida Suncoast Dome be demolished by July, 1991, to make way for 2,500 parking spaces. An estimated 168 black families living in the Laurel Park project would have been relocated to a new complex (Spielman, 1988).

Apparently St. Petersburg was even willing to relocate these individuals if it meant that the White Sox would move to their city.

Another factor regarding low attendance, is the lack of black fans at White Sox games and at Major League Baseball games in general. According to Sherwood Brewer, an all-star for the Negro League during the 1949 and 1950 seasons, the Major Leagues have been unable to draw the young blacks to play the game. That has isolated the black fans from baseball even more. He said:

Black kids don't care about playing baseball especially in Chicago. Now they are playing basketball. Very few
of our [black] players come from urban areas...If you go out on Sunday afternoon all across the city you might see two fields with black kids playing. ...I grew up in Centralia, IL, St. Louis territory, all I heard growing up was; Baseball! Baseball! Baseball! (CLTV, 1995).

In the case of the White Sox, even though 69 percent of blacks in the metropolitan Chicago area live on the South Side of the City, according to the 1990 census data, market surveys have consistently shown that only 5 to 7 percent of blacks regularly attend major league baseball games (Cattau, 1992). An analysis of the ChiSox Club membership by zip code revealed that few club members are black. Of the 2,600 club members in Illinois, 860, or 33 percent, live in Chicago zip codes. Of those Chicago members, only 10 percent live in zip codes which are more than 50 percent black. From the predominantly black suburban zip codes of Maywood (60153) and Markham (60426), the club list did not indicate even one member. Sam Cannizaro, President of the ChiSox club, also echoed the results of this analysis: "Our Black membership is a lot lower than what I think it should be...the racial composition of the club reflects the fans who go to the park" (Cattau, 1992).

For some of the Negro League stars who played in the past, the White Sox have not made an effort to attract the black fans to Comiskey, a claim which the team has denied. Jimmie Crutchfield, who played for the Chicago Negro League team in the outfield during WWII, no longer visits Comiskey Park. After Veeck's death, the team has made no effort to
invite him to any of the events which would showcase the history of baseball in Chicago to the new generations of baseball fans (Cattau, 1992).

It was a combination of the potential revenue generated from the suburban market, fears of decreased revenue due to the location of Comiskey, and the inability to attract the black fans to baseball games, which drove the ownership to search for a suburban location. In this regard, anti-urbanism and racism can be viewed as two factors which have contributed to the franchises' interest to look elsewhere.

The Addison Location

One of the sites sought after by the White Sox owners for the construction of a publicly owned stadium was in suburban Addison, IL, a village of 30,000. The franchise applied through CWS Development, a White Sox company, for $100 million in tax-free state bonds to finance a stadium with a retractable, shell-shaped domed roof, on a 140-acre site owned by the White Sox in Addison. The land was purchased by Reinsdorf in December of 1984 for $7 million. The early purchase indicates that, as early as 1984, the team was interested in moving out of the old Comiskey Park and to the suburbs. The application for the state bonds was approved by the Illinois Development Finance Authority and the proposed facility would seat 55,000 and have parking space available for 15,000 cars.
During this process, the ownership of the White Sox maintained that Chicago remained a serious contender for the team in case the plans fell through. This approach by the team ownership, is one which will repeat itself as the White Sox would later threaten to leave for the Tampa Bay area in Florida. Professional franchises increasingly showcase strong negotiating skills forcing cities to offer considerable incentives to attract or retain them.

A report prepared for the White Sox by the accounting firm of Laventhol & Horwath of Chicago, noted that a possible domed stadium in that area would mean 1,321 new jobs for DuPage county and an additional annual income of $41.4 million for county. The economic benefits in the form of jobs for the area would be 224 full-time and 1,070 part-time jobs. The annual wages and salaries, according to the report would result in $18.5 million. The construction of the facility would also generate 1,902 construction jobs in DuPage County and 1,516 construction jobs in Cook County. The report concluded that from the construction activities, $82.1 million would remain in DuPage County. Regarding the community of Addison, this report noted positive economic affects. Specifically, the construction of the facility would generate over $2.9 million for the village in sales taxes and the operation of the stadium would bring in $1.7 million annually (Presecky and Fuentes, 1985).

The local Addison community opposed the move of the
White Sox to their suburb. The primary concerns were the traffic, alcohol, and the overall impact of night games on their community. The "Save Our Sox" group also worked with the residents opposing the move and according to O'Connell: "we built a coalition with that group and supported their effort to defeat the referendum, because we were most interested in keeping the Sox in Chicago."

In the end, Addison did not become the new home of the White Sox, even though the local political leadership supported the concept. A vote by the residents would determine whether the community would approve the stadium development proposal and have the White Sox move to their area. Though the White Sox invested over $100,000 on a campaign to pass the referendum and the opposition spent only $3,000 to stop relocation, the team lost its battle in a narrow outcome, since 50.3 percent voted against the measure and 49.7 percent voted in favor of having the White Sox in Addison (Euchner, 1993:146).

The Chicago Response

The announcement by the White Sox that Addison was the preferred site, generated concern in Chicago. Mayor Washington worked hard to retain the White Sox in the City of Chicago, as he proposed numerous plans. He said: "We don't want to lose the team...We will move as speedily as we can to provide what they need" (Presecky and Fuentes, 1985).
His initial proposal included the construction of a multipurpose facility for baseball and football. The facility would house both the White Sox and the Bears of the National Football League. The proposed location of this stadium was along the east bank of the Chicago River, south of Roosevelt Road in the South Loop area.

This proposal proved unsatisfactory to the ownership of the White Sox. Though the franchise approved the city's efforts to retain the team and construct a new facility, the idea of sharing that facility with another team, especially a football team, was unacceptable. Reinsdorf criticized this part of the proposal noting that baseball fans would be removed from the action in a facility which would have to also meet the large dimensions of a football stadium.

Fearing the loss of the team to the suburbs, Mayor Washington made the White Sox the priority and revisited the issue of the stadium proposal. He noted: "The pressing force right now is the White Sox...They seem to have the greatest urgency" (McCarron, 1985a). This "urgency" provides for a unique insight into the role of professional sports teams in urban politics. Specifically, what would the potential implications for urban politics be if a mayor, and in this case an African-American mayor, failed to retain the White Sox in Chicago? Though this question, connecting political effectiveness and sports franchise behavior, have surfaced in cities across America, there is no evidence to
support such correlation. Specifically, between 1953 and 1990, there is only one case where a mayor of a large city was re-elected because of that mayor's position on a stadium construction issue.\textsuperscript{31}

Yet, a new stadium proposal came forth which also outlined the South Loop area as the location site. While the city remained sensitive to the financial concerns of the White Sox, they also took into consideration the previously expressed dissatisfaction with the multi-purpose facility proposal. As a result, the city outlined a plan for a baseball-only, open-air structure.

This 50,000 spectator facility would cost $125 million to build; $25 million would come from the developers, and $100 million from the sale of city's tax-exempt industrial bonds. The city would also provide $54 million in infrastructure improvements. The 60-acre parcel required for the construction of the facility would be purchased from three railroads. The taxpayers would not be affected, since the $10 million annual debt service would come from the White Sox in the form of rent and other related payments. The proposal drafted by the city ensured that the team would

\textsuperscript{31} The case is that of Thomas D'Alesandro who in 1955 was re-elected mayor of Baltimore overcoming a number of family scandals and Baltimore's newspaper endorsements of his opponents. The D'Alesandro campaign was helped by his position and leadership in building a new stadium and bringing the Orioles to that city. Apart from this instance, voters typically perceive a stadium issue as one of many others to be considered when electing representatives (Baim, 1994:180-190).
not lose financially if annual attendance fell below 1.5 million a season (McCarron, 1985b).

The South Loop community did not approve the site for the construction of the proposed sports facility. The residents feared traffic, noise and the related effects of a stadium in their neighborhoods. For the South Loop residents, there was a strong possibility that other events such as concerts were to be held at the proposed facility, if playing baseball proved economically unsuccessful. This would create even more community problems.

At the same time, the area was becoming gentrified as new developments such as River City, Dearborn Park and Printer’s Row were added to this community. A stadium in the area would have posed serious limitations to further residential development. According to Ken Calvin, a spokesperson for Citizens Against the Stadium (CATS): "The proposed South Loop location would stifle the development of a neighborhood that is in its infancy" (Devall and Sjostrom, 1986).

In this regard, having two forms of development (residential and stadium) raises the issue of profitability. Which one of the two is more likely to return higher profit to its investors? In the long run, the economic benefits of residential development were to be much more extensive than those accruing from the construction of a sports facility. The potential profitability of residential development in
the South Loop can then be attributed to the decision not to utilize this area as the site for a White Sox stadium.

The residents of this community were also vocal about the proposed plans. CATS, a local neighborhood organization, resisted these stadium development efforts. They politicized the issue by attacking the mayor who had received campaign contributions from developers of the stadium project. They signed petitions to enlist the support of Ald. Fred Roti (1st Ward) and attempted to ban the sale of alcohol in the area. Finally, they campaigned through demonstrations against the issue, ensuring that these stadium development plans were not to be pursued any further (Euchner, 1993).

**Economic Rationalizations and the Eventual Site**

Ira Elderson, an advisor to the Mayor on the stadium issue, responding to criticism that the White Sox might be using the Addison site as a way to get Chicago to propose the best deal possible, explained that the White Sox are worthy of the attention, since the team is a viable economic contributor to the city. He said:

> Loosing a major-league baseball team is no different than losing a Wisconsin Steel [the far Southeast Chicago steel plant]. The White Sox generate about $100 million a year in economic activity for the city, and the direct loss of sales and amusement tax revenues would alone amount to several million dollars (McCarron, 1985a).

The implications of this statement are clear; the city would
do anything in its power to keep the team in Chicago, even if that meant providing these private interests with support that no other business can retain so openly from government officials.

The White Sox commissioned a study which claimed they contributed to the economy of the city, the county and the state, $100.3 million annually (Laventhol and Horwath, 1985). The study noted $30.6 million in direct and $69.8 million in indirect economic benefits. The results of this study were confirmed by a study conducted a year later by the City of Chicago on the impact of major league baseball on the local economy (Department of Economic Development, 1986). This study also linked new stadium development to additional economic incentives for local economies. A Department of Economic Development study (1986:8):

...demonstrated that a baseball team has a substantial impact on the local economy, both through measurable effects and 'intangibles.' The Department has also shown how a team is a substantial source of revenue for the City, County and State. Finally, we have indicated that a new stadium will increase the cumulative economic impact of a Chicago baseball team, and sharply boost the revenues received by local government.

The report, which was eventually employed to convince the lawmakers in Springfield, IL that an approval of funding for a new White Sox stadium was a rational act, provided some interesting comparisons between the economic contributions which an old vs. new stadium would have on the state of Illinois and the City of Chicago. The comparison (See Table 2) shows that a new stadium makes higher economic
contributions to the local and state economy than does an older one.

**TABLE 1**

**COMPARISON OF THE ANNUAL AVERAGE VS. PEAK TOTAL CONTRIBUTION OF A BASEBALL TEAM IN ILLINOIS & CHICAGO, AND TAXES PAID TO THE STATE, COUNTY AND THE CITY BETWEEN AN OLD AND A NEW STADIUM**

**STATE OF ILLINOIS**

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**STATE TAXES**

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**COOK COUNTY TAXES (in thousands)**

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**CITY OF CHICAGO TAXES**

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* Indicates an average attendance regular season year without post-season play.
** Indicates 2.2 million in attendance, plus 300,000 attendees in six-post season games.
*** Indicates 2.2 million as an average attendance regular season year without post-season play.
**** Indicates 2.7 million in attendance, plus 360,000 attendees in six-post season games.
Even though a new stadium usually heightens fan interest and leads to increased attendance, viewing the new facility wears off and yearly attendance levels drop (Johnson, 1983), especially if the ballpark is an architectural bust, as proved by the new Comiskey Park.

While negotiations persisted between the two sides, some challenged the strategy utilized by the ownership of the White Sox to receive financial gains. Simultaneously, these same critics undermined the supposedly, publicly provided economic benefits which the franchise and others claimed. A *Crain's Chicago Business* editorial (7/14/86, p. 10), asserting the poor winning record of the team in recent years, noted that its economic distribution to the area has been less than impressive:

> And as for being a contributor to Chicago’s gross metropolitan product, the Sox are strictly second division. In the course of an 80-game home season, the Sox, filled a few hotel rooms with visiting team players, sold a few hot dogs and plastic batting helmets at the park and stimulated the sale of a lot of beer at neighboring watering holes. Sears, Roebuck and Co. exerts a bigger impact each week when it brings in field personnel for education sessions at the [Sears] Tower.

In addition, serious questions could be raised about the tax benefits which the White Sox supposedly contribute to the City. According to a comparison of the 1987 tax year assessment for White Sox properties and South Armour Square, some interesting observations can be made. The total assessed value of White Sox properties including the Comiskey Park was $2,672,917 and the taxes owed were
$488,418. On the other hand, the entire community of South Armour Square, excluding the White Sox properties which rest within the area, was $1,795,703 and the taxes owed were $328,126 (Staton, 1988). Thus, serious questions should be raised about these publicized economic benefits, since the economically devastated community of South Armour Square nearby contributed to Chicago's tax base as much as the White Sox.

The clash between the city and the suburbs became interestingly exemplified by the position which the city of Chicago took in its efforts to ensure the financing options for a White Sox stadium in Chicago. Mayor Harold Washington attempted to stop suburban Addison from selling tax exempt bonds to finance a stadium for the White Sox. The Mayor, according a Crain's Chicago Business editorial, asked Rep. Dan Rostenkowski to "rewrite a grandfather provision in a tax reform bill protecting the city's right to issue tax-exemptions to exclude anyone else hereabouts from using the clause" (8/4/86, p. 12). This "guerrilla warfare approach" would not prove to be the type which would allow the city and the suburbs to work together and cooperate for the well-being of the metropolitan community. Another Crain's Chicago Business editorial advised the Mayor to make the deal which he offered to the Sox more competitive, rather than downplay and sabotage the attempts of the opposition (8/11/86, p. 10).
In the end of 1986, an agreement between the White Sox and political leaders was reached calling for a new stadium across from Comiskey Park in the community of South Armour Square. Construction cost would be financed by state-bonds through a city-state authority. This agreement proved to be less costly than the one discussed where the South Loop area was the proposed site. The estimated savings for the city were approximately $54 million. The cut in cost was due to the fact that the new ballpark at this new site would not require the infrastructural developments necessary at the South Loop location. Many city services which had supported Comiskey Park (transportation, sewage, etc), would be utilized to support the new stadium. In addition, land at this new location was more attractive to the stadium developers. Across from Comiskey Park, land was estimated at as little as $35,000 an acre. In comparison, the cost of land at Roosevelt Road was estimated at $261,000 per acre (Bayard, 1986).

Finally, the status of this new proposed community was different from the one which successfully resisted the stadium plans in Addison and South Loop. The new community was comprised of predominantly African-American, low-income residents, many of which were senior citizens in public housing. This type of community, from the perspective of the stadium developers, could be more easily convinced of a new facility in their area, an assessment which would later
prove correct.

Going to Florida or Staying in Chicago: The Media Push

The city of St. Petersburg, Florida observed the developments in Chicago as the White Sox threatened to leave the city. In 1988, St. Petersburg attempted to attract the team to the Tampa Bay area. That city had begun, in the mid-80's, the construction of a domed stadium which was nearing completion. The White Sox, frustrated with the slow moving pace of events in Chicago and Springfield turned to Florida searching for the economic and political support which that state and city claimed to offer.

This interest by the White Sox could be categorized as more directed at applying pressure on the political leadership in Chicago and Illinois, than representing a genuine intent to move to Florida (see discussion below on whether a move to Florida would have been financially sound for the team). Yet, those in the Tampa/St. Petersburg area viewed the possibility of a team in the area as a great opportunity and worked hard to lure the franchise. The Tampa Bay Baseball Group, a private group seeking to bring a team to Tampa, with the support of the Tampa Sports Authority, "blessed" the efforts of St. Petersburg to attract the White Sox, indicating they would not compete with the nearby city for the team.

An editorial by the Chicago Tribune on May 11, 1988,
fearing loss of the White Sox to St. Petersburg, chastised the government for moving slowly and requested the franchise break talks with representatives from Florida until adjournment of the Illinois legislature. At the same time, the editorial admitted the possibility that the White Sox might be trying to set-up the best possible deal for themselves. According to the editorial:

Their [state government] abrupt decision to break off discussions with White Sox owners raises doubts about either their sincerity or their judgment. Intentionally or not, this latest shift once again nudges the Sox toward St. Petersburg. ...Maybe the Sox owners have no intention of staying in Chicago, and are only using these talks to win more goodies from St. Petersburg. ...if the stadium authority persists in refusing to negotiate, it virtually guarantees that the Sox will move, and puts much of the blame on itself.

In Chicago, the media pressured the government to move quickly and ensure that the White Sox stay in Chicago. Bob Verdi (1988), a columnist for the Chicago Tribune attacked the political leadership in Illinois and Chicago. He criticized them for acting slowly and not agreeing to meet the needs of the White Sox, thus allowing the team to ponder the possibility of moving to Florida:

If meetings [with government representatives in Illinois and Chicago] were mortar and if promises were pipes, the White Sox presently would have a facility large enough to accommodate the entire population of Florida instead of every reason to move there. ...Should Reinsdorf and Einhorn depart for clearly a better situation in St. Petersburg, they will be gone, out of sight, out of mind. But not forgotten will be those striped suits who helped arrange the going-away party. They are the ones who will have to stand up for a change and explain what happened. They are the ones who will have to answer questions from voters who put them in office. They are the ones who will beg for an
expansion franchise and be laughed at by major league baseball, because major league baseball understands that the White Sox are not doing the squeezing, but are the ones getting squeezed. ...And a major league baseball franchise must be fairly special, because there are only 26 in existence. Does [Governor Thompson] want the St. Petersburg White Sox on his resume?

Even though political representatives in Springfield agreed with this logic, they felt caught in the middle. On the one hand, political support would indicate the advancement of private interests, and, on the other hand, losing the White Sox could have direct re-election implications. According to Rep. Robert Churchill (R., Lake Villa):

It's a difficult thing for Democrats or anybody else to sell to voters—that you voted for Reinsdorf and Einhorn but not for schools. But this White Sox issue could generate some heat later. No leader or legislature wants to be collared with the mantle of loosing the Sox. That's not good politics either (Kass, 1988a).

This type of reasoning, outlining the political implications for government officials involved in the negotiations, applied additional pressure to retain the White Sox in the City. In addition, other, economically driven rationales were utilized to retain the White Sox. According to some, keeping the White Sox in the city would allow Chicago to "retain an estimated $112 million to $162 million in annual local spending, taxes and economic activity" (Hornung, 1988a). What politician would want to be responsible for the loss of this revenue?

The governor of Illinois attempted to defend his slow
action on the matter and noted that the White Sox should discontinue talks with St. Petersburg. According to Gov. Thompson:

It's kind of hard to negotiate when you have given the other party everything they asked for. That's the astounding part of all of this, I mean, we said last night, 'Okay, we'll give you everything you've asked for, literally everything, every single thing.' Now what's left? (Kass and Franklin, 1988).

The White Sox ownership responded with disagreement. According to a team representative: "They [government] wanted us to cut off one leg in exchange for a promise that Springfield would try and give us another. We said we wanted the deal. They wanted us to go along and kill other options on a promise. That's not good business" (Kass and Franklin, 1988).

On the other hand, in St. Petersburg, the construction of the state funded Suncoast Dome, was nearing completion. Negotiations between the White Sox and the political representatives in Illinois and Florida persisted. The Florida legislature, in order to make its case more competitive, considered providing another $30 million to the construction project if that meant that the dome could have been completed by the opening of the 1989 season (117-0 vote on the passage of Florida's House appropriations bill which included support for the funding of the Suncoast Dome in St. Petersburg). The delaying actions and uncertainty in Illinois was viewed with excitement in Florida. According to a state of Florida representative "They're [Illinois
government] pushing the Sox out the door and right into St. Pete." (Kass and Engler, 1988b).

The "Save Our Sox" group in Chicago also realized that losing Comiskey Park was not going to be as painful as losing the White Sox to Florida. O'Connell indicated to me:

When Reinsdorf and Einhorn threatened to move the team to St. Petersburg much of the support to our group decreased. Many of our members dropped out fearing that their pressure on the ownership to save Comiskey could have an impact on driving the team out of town. All of a sudden we thought that our team would be gone...I remember testifying at a hearing and I held an orange with an 'X' on it and told them that the Floridians would not take our team.

In the end, the following five factors can be cited for the backing of a proposal in Springfield to retain the White Sox in Chicago, and finance the construction of an open-air, baseball-only stadium: (1) fan support as expressed by the "Save Our Sox" group, (2) the perceived negative political implications by state representatives, (3) the perceived economic loss for the city and the state, (4) pressing support by the media for keeping the White Sox, and, (5) the willingness of the franchise to remain, since in the long-run, Chicago would continue to provide a larger market for the team.

State Financial Support and Implications

Representatives from the two sides (Illinois and Florida) began the development of financial packages which would be "most appropriate" for the White Sox. The proposal
which the city of Chicago and State of Illinois offered to the franchise, pending state legislature approval, was the one which kept the White Sox in Chicago. It included the following points:

(1) $150 million in bonds would be authorized for the construction of the facility.\(^{32}\)

(2) If the stadium is not available for the White Sox by 1991, the ISFA will pay the team a penalty of $5 million.\(^{33}\)

(3) The maintenance of the new stadium would be the responsibility of the White Sox. The ISFA would contribute, beyond the debt services, $2 million in annual subsidies toward that purpose and would assume any and all structural costs of the facility.

(4) For the first ten years of the lease agreement, the White Sox will pay the ISFA $2.50 per ticket if yearly attendance is between 1.2 million and 2 million. If the attendance exceeds 2 million, the White Sox will pay the ISFA $1.50 per ticket.\(^{34}\)

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\(^{32}\) The bonds would be retired with revenue generated from a 2 percent tax on hotel and motels room charge bills. Direct city and state subsidies would also be required to retire the bonds.

\(^{33}\) According to the agreement, this penalty would increase to $7.5 million in 1992 and continue to increase by $2.5 million every year after that time.

\(^{34}\) During the second ten years of the lease agreement the ticket cost, which the White Sox will pay ISFA under the first scenario, will be $4.00 per ticket and the per ticket price will remain at $1.50 if attendance exceeds 2 million. During the second ten years of the agreement, if attendance falls below 1.5 million, the ISFA is responsible for
(5) The ISFA will pay $10 million for the design and construction of a scoreboard for the new stadium. The city of Chicago will receive no property taxes from the new sports facility, an estimated loss of approximately $800,000.

(6) The City of Chicago will spend $19.6 million to move a garage facility for city vehicles, located on the site of the proposed stadium. ISFA will provide $3 million to defray that cost.

(7) As reported in Bess and Decker (1989), the lease agreement provides the team with an "exclusive right...to any and all proceeds from...concession and vending machine rents or payments, sales of souvenirs, sales of food and beverage, including alcoholic beverages, club membership fees, parking revenues, and [skybox] Suites rents."

(8) The stadium will be protected in case adjacent

purchasing up to 300,000 tickets from the White Sox, bringing the estimated cost to the state at more than $2 million a year (Kass and Engler, 1988a). Bess and Decker (1989:3), provided the following hypothetical: "This [part of the agreement] means that if the White Sox in a single year sell every seat for every game, ISFA will receive approximately $4.3 million; if the White Sox draw 2.0 million, ISFA will receive $2 million; if the White Sox draw 1.5 million during the first ten years, ISFA will receive $750,000; if the White Sox draw 1.5 million during the second 10 years, ISFA will receive nothing; and if the White Sox draw 1.2 million during the second 10 years, ISFA will pay the White Sox anywhere from $1.5 million to $2.5 million, depending upon the average cost of a White Sox ticket. The White Sox have exceeded 2 million in attendance twice in their history, in 1983 and 1984; in 1987 they drew approximately 1.208 million fans, in 1988 approximately 1.116 million."
neighborhoods attempt to ban the sell of beer inside the ballpark.

(9) The ISFA will be responsible for the "clearing" of land, removing homeowners, renters and business owners, for the construction of the sports stadium.35

(10) The ISFA will receive 35 percent of all local radio and television broadcast revenues beyond $5.8 million and 35 percent of stadium advertizing revenues that exceed $2 million.36

(11) The White Sox will play rent-free during the two years prior to the old Comiskey Park's demolition (1989 and 1990 seasons). In the new stadium, the White Sox will not pay rent, as long as attendance remains under 1.2 million annually.

The executive director of the ISFA Peter Bynoe described the proposed plan between the State of Illinois and the White Sox in a way which indicates that government involvement in this case directly assisted the profit oriented mode of this private enterprise. He noted: "The theory of this deal is to provide the Sox a cushion on the downside, while allowing us to participate on the upside on

35 The estimated cost of this proved to be $12 million.

36 It was also agreed that The ISFA will not claim any of the revenue generated by the contract which the Major League Baseball and the White Sox had signed with ABC and NBC for national broadcasting. Under that particular contract the White Sox received in 1988 over $7.8 million (Hornung, 1988a).
a clearly defined basis" (Hornung, 1988a). The "upside" as described by Bynoe is not only difficult to predict in the competitive nature of sports, but also unlikely to occur when one considers that the White Sox have traditionally invested less money than the average team on player salaries (the ownership of the franchise, for example, has announced a trimmed players salary budget for the 1996-1997 season).

In addition, if the state expected that through a winning team, (a promise made by the ownership of the White Sox after the approval of the lease agreement), they would share in the fortunes of the franchise, the events which took place during the 1993, 1994 and 1995 seasons should have made the state and Bynoe reconsider. During the 1993 and 1994 seasons, the White Sox were very competitive, winning a division title. Yet, the fan support was as disappointing as it was during the 1995 season when the White Sox had a miserable on-field performance.

The real implications of the lease agreement between the White Sox and the State of Illinois, are not going to be found on its "upside." Rather, they can be extracted from the significance of the "downside" as noted by Bynoe above. This lease agreement will have two direct, economically related implications, both favoring the White Sox. On the one hand, the deal will significantly increase the $21 million dollar value of the team (its purchase price in 1981). On the other hand, this arrangement contributes
substantial capital to the business, ensuring that a downfall or "downside" does not occur, thus, continuing the maximization of its profits.

The St. Petersburg package was also very attractive, even more attractive than the one put forth by the city of Chicago and the state of Illinois. It included a ten year rent-free agreement. The team would not have to pay maintenance costs for the life of the agreement and they would not have to share any income from their television contract and marketing revenues with the state. The franchise would also receive a $10 million, low interest loan from the state of Florida (Hornung, 1988a).

Rationalizing Competition: Government Perceptions of Outcome

Though the distribution of costs and benefits in this partnership between the public and private sectors was uneven, Governor Thompson strongly supported its passage. The following statements by the Governor indicate the urgency of this legislation and the importance of keeping the Sox in the city. He said: "Chicago deserves to keep the White Sox and the White Sox want to stay" and "But they [White Sox] can't stay at the price of financial abandon" and "Illinois and Chicago can't afford to lose anything at all" and "...we [Illinois State legislature] support county fairs Downstate, the museums in Chicago, the arts. Why can't we support a state owned stadium?" (Kass and Engler,
In the end, with the backing of the leadership in the House, the Senate, and City Hall, the governor asked the legislature to approve the proposal. The package was approved on June 30, 1988 by the Springfield legislature, largely due to the successful legislative lobbying of Illinois House Speaker Michael Madigan (D., Chicago). Madigan was able to recruit 36 House Democrats to support the plan. These votes provided more than the 60 votes required to pass the measure.

The Illinois Sports Facilities Authority Act (1988:#3) made the following declarations:

As a result of deteriorating infrastructure and sports facilities in the metropolitan area of Chicago, there is a shortage of sports facilities suitable for use by professional sports teams.

As a result of the costs to repair or replace such infrastructure and facilities, and as a result of current high financing costs, the private sector, without the assistance contemplated in this Act, is unable to construct feasibly adequate sports facilities.

...the creation of modern sports facilities and the other results contemplated by this Act would stimulate economic activity in the State of Illinois, including the creation and maintenance of jobs, the creation of new and lasting infrastructure and other improvements, and the retention of sports and entertainment activities which generate economic activity.

...professional sports facilities can be magnets for substantial interstate tourism resulting in increased retail sales, hotel and restaurant sales, and entertainment industry sales, all of which increase jobs and economic growth.

These justifications above, communicate the value of a
professional sports franchise as perceived by the government, making the use of considerable public funds to build a new stadium a rational act.

Governor Thompson, during a home plate ceremony at the old Comiskey Park in July of 1988, under mixed fan support from the stands, signed the White Sox deal. Afterwards, he reminded St. Petersburg that Chicago is a first class city and its will could never be undermined. He said: "I want to send a message that we don’t give up anything in Chicago and that we don’t let anybody take anything away from us" (Kass, 1988b).

This type of response strongly describes the tension which existed between the two sides over the White Sox. It also allows for an interesting interpretation of the events which had precipitated between Chicago and St. Petersburg. Retaining the White Sox became a contest and a battle of willpower. The status and world-class position of the City of Chicago was at stake and retaining the team was a way to prove that its political leadership and ability to influence state legislation was superior to that of another city. City pride and a proof of Chicago’s strong character were channeled through events surrounding a professional baseball team. In the meantime, the real issue (the fact that a for-profit corporation received unbelievable financial support from the public, a situation that no other business in Chicago could probably ever be capable of attaining), went
astray.

The city of St. Petersburg felt that there were a number of positives which came out of its pursuit of the White Sox. According to Bill Bunker, executive director of the Pinellas County Sports Authority in St. Petersburg:

The White Sox interest in this project is the best thing that happened to us as far as getting our story across to baseball and the country. We couldn’t have accomplished more if we had hired a fancy New York PR firm (Sherman, 1989).

Rick Dodge, Assistant City Manager who worked to attract the White Sox to Florida was also optimistic as he reflected on the turn of events:

One way of looking at it is that the White Sox went through their own expansion review. The good news for us is that they determined that the best move for them would have been here, and their analysis of this area was communicated throughout baseball and elevated the Tampa Bay area. That was a very important and a significant assistance to us. What better endorsement than someone willing to bet their economic future on you? (Isaacson, 1991).

The events also brought the two cities in the Tampa Bay area together as they continued their efforts to attract an existing or expansion baseball franchise. Finally, the City of Tampa was awarded an expansion baseball team which began play in 1996. Until that time, 7 years after its construction, the $138 million, 43,000 seat Florida Suncoast Dome remained empty at considerable tax payer cost.

Was a Sox Move out of State a Financially Sound Possibility for the Team?

The White Sox threatened to leave Chicago for another
city unless their demands for a new stadium were not satisfied by local and state political leaders. Did the White Sox use the possibility of their move as a way to pressure the political leadership in Chicago and Springfield to attain the best deal possible? How sincere was the ownership of the White Sox about leaving for another state?

When considering the profitability of a professional franchise it is important to account for the implications which a stadium might have on raising revenue. The old Comiskey Park had 35 skyboxes, considerably less from the number of skyboxes available at newer baseball stadiums. Even though the White Sox estimated that $15 million was spent to keep that ballpark "in shape" since its purchase by Reinsdorf in 1981, continuous claims were made by the ownership that the team "would go bankrupt" if it were to stay at that facility. Yet, other factors should be taken into consideration when one attempts to determine team profitability.

Professional sports franchises, regardless of the amenities which a new stadium can provide, would financially do much better in Chicago than in most other markets since mere attendance is not the largest source of revenue. Julie Taylor, Director of Guest Services of the Chicago White Sox told me:

If we [White Sox] sold all the seats for the whole year we could not pay for the players salaries, but with the skyboxes and a good marketing of signs, television contracts etc., we can do that and more, maybe make
some profit. You see that Boston Market sign out there in the outfield. That is a new sign and it cost that company $500,000 for the year, plus they [Boston Market] have to sponsor a big firework show, that is about $80,000. On the other hand do you see that small Fontanini sign in the upper deck. It costs $30,000 for the year and the(y) [company] has to sponsor an event during the season.

The success of television contracts and other agreements will be determined, to a large extent, by the size of the local market. Chicago has the third largest market in the nation and teams in the largest markets will be more successful in negotiating attractive broadcast-right deals with television stations. In 1986, the White Sox negotiated a deal with WFLD-TV/Channel 32 for the broadcast of 70 games. When compared to the previous broadcast arrangements, this agreement doubled their revenue. The 1986 deal brought $8.3 million, which was up from $4 million in 1985. Market size will determine the television revenues generated by baseball franchises across the country. For example, the New York Yankees, who played in the nation’s largest market that same year, received $15.5 million for broadcast rights. On the other hand, the Seattle Mariners who played in the twenty-second, largest metro area generated $2.1 million, the Kansas City Royals, who played in the twenty-ninth, largest market received $2 million and the Cleveland Indians, who ranked twelfth received $3 million (Bremner, 1986).

If playing at the old Comiskey Park was such a financial strain; then why would the ownership take the team
to Tampa or Denver which ranked twenty-fourth and twenty-first respectively in market size and settle for revenues between $1.5 to $2 million from television broadcast rights? In addition, though the White Sox could have attempted to leave the metropolitan area, under the shared revenue clause that exists in the league, the team owners of the American League would have to approve the move, something which would have cost them additional income in fees and penalties. Though owners have successfully challenged this clause in recent years (both the Raiders and the Rams of the NFL can be cited as examples), moving the team against the will of the league would have been an additional hurdle.

Revenue generated by the advertisement opportunities in a new market could not be guaranteed for the White Sox to the extent to which it was established in Chicago. Representatives of two cities which courted the White Sox, Denver and Tampa, noted that revenue could not have been as easily generated in their smaller markets. An executive of the Denver Baseball Commission noted "the TV deal in Chicago is significantly better than the one they could get in Denver" and according to a spokesman for the Tampa Bay Baseball Group involved in attracting the White Sox to that area: "it is difficult to move an [established] franchise." The officials in Florida proposed to call the team the "Florida White Sox", aiming to market the team at a wider state level. Yet, that would not necessarily generate
increased revenue. Bryan Burns, Director of Broadcasting in the Baseball Commissioners Office commented on the statewide broadcast offer that: "The regional sports networks don't have a great track record" (Bremner, 1986).

It seems that, from a financial point of view, when taking into consideration the above mentioned economic implications, it would have been most profitable for the White Sox to stay in the Chicago area and take advantage of the type and size of the existing market. The introduction of the relocation possibility to another state was a way to hold Chicago "hostage" and in the end pressure the local and state government into providing the franchise with a new stadium; a source of increased revenue.

**Contracting the Facility and the Actual Product**

The proposed construction of a new stadium brought a bidding war between politically powerful firms in the Chicago area. Some of the firms competing for the $90-100 million, initially estimated cost award of the sports facility, included close supporters of Governor Thompson and House Speaker Madigan (D., Chicago). Owners of other firms competing for the contract, had previously served in various local and state government positions (McCarron, 1988b).

The ISFA signed a no-strike agreement with the 26 unions expected to participate in the construction project and approved six construction companies to present their
bids. From the six, four companies submitted stadium construction costs. All four exceeded the expected cost. The lowest bid was at $129 million and the highest was at $139 million.

Bynoe described the proposed cost as a "serious problem." Added to the $150 million available in the form of construction bonds, there was approximately $33.5 million from the 2 percent hotel tax. This raised the total available money for the project to $183.5 million. Yet, $35 million had already been spent for land acquisition and land clearance. The relocation costs of residents were also more than $6 million. Accepting the lowest bid at $130 million would make the overall project financially risky. In addition, according to the lease signed in 1988, in the case that the ISFA was unable to proceed with a contractor, the White Sox could break the agreement and search elsewhere for another deal (McCarron, 1989a).

This developing scenario would seriously undermine the actions of those involved with the approval and administration of this project. Up to this point, (1) millions of taxpayers' dollars had been spent, (2) an extremely favorable agreement was given to the franchise and a neighborhood had been physically destroyed, (3) residents were to be relocated and others had been displaced, and (4) the culture and atmosphere surrounding the old Comiskey Park had been transformed. Yet, there was still a chance for the
White Sox to leave Chicago.

The ISFA managed to bring the stadium cost down by $10 million. The cuts included television sets and wet bars in some of the skyboxes, an amenity to be added in the following two to three years. The authority also received assurance from the White Sox that they would contribute $18 million toward the construction of the new stadium. The $18 million contributed by the White Sox would go back to the team in the form of rent subsidies. Reinsdorf responded, characterizing the entire agreement as "a bad deal":

All we are doing is continuing a bad financial deal. But we didn't enter into this for financial purposes. We feel an obligation to remain in Chicago if it's at all possible (McCarron, 1989b).

The Authority then awarded the contract to the lowest bidder at $120 million.

As scheduled, the new Comiskey Park opened across the street from the old ballpark in 1991 at a final cost of $135 million. The new Comiskey Park has no columns to obstruct the view, but a visit to the new facility and a seat assignment in the steep upper deck will convince anyone that intimacy is not its strongest point. The upper deck in this stadium begins where the upper deck ended at the old Comiskey Park. The measurement from home plate to the beginning of the upper deck in the new Comiskey is 160 feet. The distance to the end of the upper deck at the old Comiskey measured only 150 feet.

The slope of the upper deck's design has allowed for
the construction of 103 luxury skyboxes, layed out beneath it in three different levels. Those skyboxes are leased for 3 to 5 years ranging in price from $60,000 (10-12 persons) to $90,000 (18 to 25 persons) (Sherman, 1991).

After taking a private tour of the new Comiskey Park, I had a first hand look at the amenities of a "new ballpark." From the 16,000 square foot clubhouse which seats 340 people, one has a direct view of the action on the field. In order to become a member and have the privilege of paying for a meal, you must be a season ticket holder and pay a $700 yearly membership fee. The White Sox rent the clubhouse for wedding receptions and other functions during the off season.

The skyboxes provide a birds' eye-view and are wall-to-wall carpeted, equipped with wetbars, seating areas, kitchen cabinets with sinks and large refrigerators. Suite 431 & 432 are directly overlooking home plate, and are reserved for Reinsdorf and Einhorn. Square footage wise, each could easily qualify for a residential apartment. Between the two open suites, there is a smaller skybox which enables them to join as one. According to Julie Taylor: "That is were Mr. Einhorn and Mr. Reinsdorf would meet to discuss a financial deal."

The reviews of the new stadium have become increasingly negative. The recent openings of Camden Yards in Baltimore and Jacobs Field in Cleveland, two ballparks that have made
great strides in going back to preserving the nature of the traditional ballpark, have proven the new Comiskey Park a failed attempt at an urban ballpark design. According to Gershman (1993:226-227):

From both an architectural and a baseball point of view, Camden Yards has passed tests that have exposed the new Comiskey Park as a shallow pretender. The White Sox had buildings condemned and businesses moved so that they could surround their park with parking lots and souvenir stands owned by the team instead of independent shops and restaurants that would have added to the neighborhood feeling. It bears no relation to its surroundings and, at first glance it might be a municipal power station or similarly anonymous public building. It's also the kind of place that belies the White Sox blue-collar heritage, which Charles Comiskey respected and for which he made allowances.

The new Comiskey Park seems to be a suburban style ballpark which has proved unable, from an architectural point of view, to communicate any of the mystique found in the "traditional ballpark."
CHAPTER 6
COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO STADIUM DEVELOPMENT PLANS
IN SOUTH ARMOUR SQUARE

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of South Armour Square and addresses the relationship between the old Comiskey Park and the surrounding communities. The local political developments, the community responses to this stadium development plan and the physical and cultural effects of the new Comiskey Park on the community are discussed. The chapter concludes with an examination of viable alternative plans as well as recent attempts towards community redevelopment.

The Community of South Armour Square

The community of South Armour Square is located on the southern part of Comiskey Park, approximately four miles south from downtown Chicago. The first settlers to the area were Irish, German and Swedish laborers. The Chicago White Sox first built a ballpark at Pershing and Wentworth which was later used by the Negro League. Comiskey Park was built on 35th and Shields which extends from 35th to 33rd Street and was positioned in the middle of the Armour Square community. In the 1940's the population of Armour Square
increased due to the influx of African Americans moving to Chicago to work in the industries. In the 1960's, the community was racially split between the north and south part of Comiskey Park which served as a physical boundary. As the following table shows, the north was predominantly white and the south predominantly African American.

**TABLE 2**

POPULATION OF PRECINCTS BY RACE IN THE VICINITY OF WHITE SOX PARK

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Precinct</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>%Black</th>
<th>%White</th>
<th>%Hispanic</th>
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</tr>
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Like many other urban communities in Chicago, South Armour Square was economically affected by the population movement to the suburbs. The number of jobs in the zip code area which encompassed the old Comiskey Park from the 70's to the mid 80's decreased by half. The community has been struggling to provide economic opportunities for its
residents (Strahler, 1986). According to a report by the Natalie P. Voorhees Neighborhood Center at the University of Illinois at Chicago, (1995:3) the South Armour Square is:

...a small community of 1,500 residents, all African-American, who either live in the Wentworth Gardens public housing development or the TE Brown Senior Citizen building. TE Brown is a federally subsidized 202 development owned and operated by the Progressive Baptist Church.

The same report noted that the 1989 median income was $7,000 and that the majority of the households were headed by women (82 percent). Most of the households receive public aid or social security and 43 percent of the population is over the age of 55 years old.

According to the U.S. census data, the percentage of families with income below poverty level in that area increased from 45.4 percent (1980) to 88.3 percent (1990). The percentage of high school graduates was 40.7 percent in 1980 and 51.5 in 1990 (U.S. Census 1980, 1990).

Yet, the residents perceive their community to be stable and established. At a community meeting a resident noted: "A lot of money has gone into improving conditions here. These people, mostly lower-income families, have sunk a lot of money into restoring their property..." Another resident described the community as "an old, established neighborhood" (Jamison, 1987).

The Old Comiskey Park and the Local Community

The old Comiskey Park opened in 1910 and was designed
by architect Zachary Taylor Davis at an estimated cost of $750,000. The so called, "Baseball Palace of the World" was constructed with a 420 foot centerfield wall which proved to be favorable to pitchers. The seating arrangements made it a friendly ballpark where fans felt close to the action. According to a report (Bukowski, O'Connell and Aranza, 1987:4), the ballpark, from its early years, was considered the preferred baseball entertainment of the South Side's working-class. It was positioned in the heart of many industries which employed blue-collar workers:

Close to the [Comiskey] ballpark were the Union Stockyards and the International Harvester Plant, somewhat further the steel mills of South Chicago. These and other factories nurtured blue collar neighborhoods like Bridgeport, Canaryville, and Hegewisch. There, people worked hard and lived simply. By necessity, entertainment had to be close at hand or at least a bargain. Even if the White Sox lost 90 or more games a season, Comiskey Park always was accessible and affordable. It also offered real working-class heroes to cheer.

The location of the ballpark made it the favorite of many generations of South Siders in Chicago. It was a place where the fans could identify with their heroes, since their hard work ethic in the factory was similar to the one exemplified by the Sox players on the field. According to that same report: "They [players] hustled on the field the same way their working-class fans hustled on the job" (p. 5). In that regard the old Comiskey Park was well integrated and strongly connected with the immediate community and the South Side of the city.
The local steel industry often advertised for openings at White Sox games. A 1953 White Sox scorebook contained an ad from the U.S. Steel, South Works. The ad read "Join a Major League Team: Work at United States Steel Corporation, South Works." Charles Comiskey's commitment to the White Sox blue-collar heritage was also evident by the allowance of a considerable 10,000 bleacher seats at the old Comiskey Park (Gershman, 1993).

According to Douglas Bukowski, a White Sox historian, this ballpark was also a unique place in terms of racial and ethnic relations. The events hosted by the park included the boxing fight between Joe Louis and James Braddock in 1937, when before an integrated crowd Louis became the first African American to win the crown. Minnie Minoso, a Cuban black player for the Sox from the early 50's and into the mid 60's was a Comiskey Park favorite. William Veeck, a colorful Chicago sports personality, a two-time owner of the Chicago White Sox and the founder of the exploding scoreboard, was very invested in bringing black players into the league. Many of the black players still communicate an enormous respect for Veeck, and according to Al Smith who was signed by Veeck in the late 1940's: "He [Veeck] was like a dog. He didn't know about color" (Cattau, 1992).

The Chicago American Giants, a team of the Negro League, would regularly draw 10,000 to 20,000 black fans to their games on the South Side. The Negro League began in
1933 their annual East-West games at the old Comiskey Park, an occurrence which became the major black sports event in the country and continued for many years. For many blacks attending a White Sox game was an exciting form of entertainment. Many would write back to their families and friends in the South noting their attendance of a game at Comiskey. According to James Grossman, Newberry Library historian, "that [type of letter writing] was some heavy-duty bragging" (Cattau, 1992).

This integration between the White Sox and the community also included the residents of South Armour Square. But, in a new environment where profitability is intensely pursued by professional franchises, and a critical element of this search includes the construction of a new sports stadium, South Armour Square is now a hurdle in the path of increased revenues. It is from within this framework that local government support of private enterprise results in the eventual displacement of this community.

Setting the Stage for the Takeover: Politicizing the Issue

The political will of the state became illustrated through its negotiations with the White Sox and the final passage of the lease agreement, keeping the franchise from moving to Florida. The City government’s support for the team was exemplified in its dealings with the community of
the South Armour Square. The community residents were split in their response to the takeover plans. The split was primarily due to city politics, specifically the upcoming Chicago mayoral elections, which influenced the residents' approach to the situation.

The site chosen for the construction of the new stadium was on the side of the street immediately south from the old Comiskey Park. That area was occupied by residences and businesses. Many of the structures had to be removed so construction could begin. The proposal for property clearing did not include the nearby Wentworth Gardens public housing development and the TE Brown Senior Citizen building.

The Wentworth Gardens was a public housing development built in 1945 located at the southeast corner of the South Armour Square community. It covers 16.34 acres of land and consists of 37 low-rise structures, of which 28 are two story and 9 are three story apartment buildings. But why did the stadium plan not include the demolition of this public housing development? Diane Kallenback of the Center for Economic Policy Analysis in Chicago speculated on this question:

If Wentworth Gardens were destroyed by public action, city officials would have to relocate replacement housing for 1,246 low-income people. The paucity of units now available for low-income people and, coupled with the lack of federal government support for new low-income housing, would make the destruction of 422 units of public housing a politically unfeasible option (Kallenback, 1988).
The ISFA, under the agreement with the White Sox, had to have residents removed and have taken control of the properties by October 15, 1988. If the ISFA was unable to retain the properties by that time, the White Sox could break their lease agreement and move to St. Petersburg. To ensure that the deadline was met, the ISFA was given legal power over these residential properties to be enforced on, or before September 15, 1988.

Since the agreement between the government and the franchise was signed on July 1988, the deadline of October 15 afforded the residents only 3 months to ponder the potential loss of their homes and a short period of time to reflect and develop a strategy that would benefit the community at a time of crisis. In reality, when one considers the September 15 court action threat by the ISFA, the residents had only two months to decide. Johnnie Tyler who owned a small restaurant and lived in the area for 25 years noted: "How can I move all my staff by October. I don't know what to do. I can't go anywhere because I don't have anywhere to go" (Devall, 1988a). As it turned out it was in early August 1988 when the relocation agreement was reached and approved; it took the ISFA less than a month to remove 178 privately owned housing units, 12 neighborhood businesses, thus, wiping out an entire community.

The political implications of the removal of these black residents were serious. At a time when mayoral
elections were a few months away, Mayor Sawyer did not want to be identified as the black mayoral candidate who orchestrated the displacement of black residents to benefit white business interests. As a result, Mayor Sawyer distanced himself by noting that he was only following the plans of the late Mayor Washington. In a meeting with residents from South Armour Square, immediately following the signing of the agreement, the Mayor criticized the actions of his enemies as politically motivated (Kass, 1988b):

Most of the people [here] have legitimate concerns, but you could see some of Slim Coleman's people, some of Jacky Grimshaw's people, in here manipulating and trying to make me look bad...I see my opponents had their people in there ready to criticize me for keeping the White Sox. But this is the Harold Washington's site. This is his legacy to keep the team and other people are picking and choosing on which of Mayor Washington's points they want to side with...Anybody who knows politics could tell you what that means.37

Both Ald. Timothy Evans (4th Ward) and Ald. Danny Davis (29th Ward) became openly critical of the proposed relocation of black residents. As Evans was preparing to campaign against Sawyer in an upcoming mayoral primary election, politicizing the issue and presenting an

37 Walter "Slim" Coleman was an organizer from the north side community of Uptown. Along with Jacky Grimshaw, Coleman served as political organizers for Mayor Washington. They were both supportive of Ald. Timothy C. Evans (4th) for mayor. Grimshaw and Coleman had organized a political rally for Evans and characterized it as a memorial for the late mayor. In addition, the two activists supported Evans who criticized Mayor Sawyer for supporting the displacement of a predominantly African-American community.
insensitive, black Mayor who was willing to assist in the displacement of other blacks could prove helpful to his election efforts.

The ISFA attempted not to politicize the issue, since such a strategy would make the acquisition of land even more difficult. According to Bynoe of the ISFA, in reference to Evans and Coleman: "Our job was to keep those outside interest groups out of the discussions" (Kass, 1988e). But, the politicization of the issue brought a split within the community. Some viewed the relocation as an urban renewal program, while others viewed the relocation as a racist act.

The Community Response

It was in 1987, under the leadership of the South Armour Square Neighborhood Coalition, that the residents of South Armour Square, fearing the loss of their homes and businesses to a new stadium, organized to fight against relocation. This community organization, after a split within the community and the approval of the relocation package in 1988, became controlled by those who opposed that offer.

The organization hired Mary Milano of the law firm Baker & McKenzie to assist in their efforts. The residents operated without information from the ISFA regarding their neighborhood, and were not part of the site decision making process. At a local meeting, confusion and complaints about
lack of information regarding plans by the government and/or the franchise owners were communicated. According to a resident:

It's just as if we don't exist... Area residents only know what they have read in the newspapers. No one has talked to us. No one has answered our calls or letters, and no one has responded to our petitions (Jamison, 1987).

As the signing of the agreement between the state and the White Sox was nearing a close, the residents began to loudly resist their possible relocation. A resident at a meeting noted:

...We have a choice area and we do not want to give it up... My roots are here. My family moved here when I was 6 months old [in 1946]. It's going to be hard to get me out of here" (Jamison, 1987).

Armed with $10 million for the relocation, the ISFA initiated its efforts to acquire the titles of the residential and industrial properties. A way for ISFA to speed up the process was to avoid confrontation with the community. Thus, $200,000 was offered to the residents for a consultant who would assist them with their relocation plans. In return, the residents promised that they would not sue the ISFA.

The ISFA's position was that the residents had very little choice in the matter and at this point they should attempt to negotiate the best deal possible for themselves. According to Thomas Reynolds, chairman of the stadium authority:

We want to let the neighborhood residents have input.
It would result in a more congenial relocation...I think they [residents] realize that they will be displaced and that they ought to work on a plan that gives them as many options as they want and as many as we can afford (Camper and Davis, 1988).

At this point the residents became divided. Some felt strongly about challenging the stadium developers, while others supported a settlement. George Marshall, president of the neighborhood coalition, fearing complete loss noted: "If we can stay in the area - namely, about two blocks south of here - and get some decent replacement housing built, that'll be a victory" (Devall, 1988a). Willie Jones, another resident, responding to talks of a lawsuit against the White Sox provided a similar response and urged for a compromise: "The White Sox are going to get this land, so we better make the best deal we can. And we are looking at a good deal. Let's not ruin it with a lawsuit" (Kass, 1988c).

The lawsuit was advocated by Walter "Slim" Coleman, an Uptown community activist and supporter of Ald. Timothy Evans (4th Ward). Coleman encouraged the community to stop negotiations with the ISFA and take the city, the state and the White Sox to court. A class-action law suit would charge the White Sox, the city and the state with racially motivated, discriminatory actions; specifically, that the ISFA and the White Sox did not exhaust their efforts to avoid displacement and, based on the racial composition of the South Armour Square community, continued to push their plans forward. Others called for a cautious decision making
process. According to a coalition board member:

> I don’t think that people from outside the neighborhood should be talking anybody into a lawsuit. We reserve the right to sue, but we are also negotiating. Let’s see how far negotiations will take us (Kass, 1988d).

This division proved critical as the ISFA successfully removed the residents, making room for the stadium construction plans.

The proposed relocation package which the ISFA offered the homeowners included the following options: (1) a cash payment for the market price of the homes, plus a $25,000 "good will" payment, (2) move existing structures to a nearby site and provide a $2,500 cash settlement, (3) provide replacement housing in the form of new construction or from existing available houses, and (4) renters would receive a $4,500 settlement, assistance in locating a new apartment and a $500 moving allowance. Fearing that relocation would increase property taxes and thus rents, tax breaks were later requested by the residents (Kass, 1988d; Kass, 1988e).

The agreement signed between the ISFA and the South Armour Square Neighborhood Coalition received mixed community response. Most residents accepted the relocation package proposed by the ISFA. Yet, residents from Wentworth Gardens and the TE Brown Senior Citizen building were dissatisfied and continued to fight the relocation of the stadium.
One Voice: Accept the Relocation Package

For those who accepted the relocation package (98 percent of all neighborhood residents in the area), it was viewed as the best deal under the circumstances. The relocation sites which were presented to the residents by the ISFA included Bridgeport, Kenwood-Oakland, a site nearby South Armour Square, and the Gap, approximately eight blocks east of South Armour Square. The Gap was an upscale neighborhood which was rapidly becoming gentrified. Of the 47 residential lots affected by the move, 27 of the owners elected to accept the option which called for a market value of their home plus a $25,000 cash settlement. The other 20 families chose to receive a replacement home. The ISFA rejected an earlier request by the residents to be exempted from increased property taxes due to relocation (Davis, 1988).

From the 20 residents entitled to a replacement home, 19 expressed interest in relocating to the Gap. Homes in the Gap were selling considerably higher than those in the South Armour Square neighborhood and the ISFA would have to provide additional subsidies. Those extra subsidies would come from the 2 percent hotel tax which would be used to repay the $150 million bonds. According to George Marshall, President of the Neighborhood Coalition:

The Gap is a good neighborhood, close to shopping and close to our old neighborhood...We didn't like the other sites the authority offered us (Kass, 1988f).
The Chicago Tribune in a series of articles entitled "Chicago on Hold: Politics of Poverty" praised the decision of these residents and chastised the claim of others to continue a "battle" with the stadium developers. An article from the series entitled "1 Community Finds Renewal Can Pay Off" by urban affairs writer McCarron (1988a), referred to the approach of the residents in South Armour Square as "pioneering a community-based approach to urban renewal-an approach that could be used by families...anywhere in the city where major redevelopment is contemplated." According to McCarron, a move to the Gap would allow the 25 residents to "trade their tired by tidy cottages south of the existing Comiskey Park for new houses worth three times as much in a more fashionable neighborhood..." At the same time, the article praised the decision of these residents to reject those promoting the "politics of displacement."

Specifically,

"...a politics exploited by a handful of politicians and community organizers bent on enhancing their positions by stopping change in neighborhoods that needs change the most."

Though the replacement homes at the Gap would be valued at $150,000 each, and the ISFA was investing a total of $3 million in that area of the city, when community organizers from that area found out the plan of relocation they expressed concern. Phillip Jackson, President of the Gap Community Organization, in a community meeting, noted concern about the ability of the relocated residents to pay
the increased taxes. He indicated:

...being in the Gap means you have to have certain consciousness...There's a good chance that those people [coming from South Armour Square] may not understand our program for future development" (Seigel and Karwarth, 1988).

Mary Milano, the lawyer for the coalition, was also supportive of the relocation agreement and according to her, as reported in Euchner (1993:154): "I approached this project as I would approach a commercial real estate deal, which is my usual line of work. I tried to get the best deal possible for the people affected by the development."

Even though the efforts to relocate and move the residents continued, concerns persisted for the 70 renters. These were mostly elderly residents who were to receive very little financial support in the form of a cash payment under the agreement. It was not until May 1990 that the homes at the Gap were completed, two years after the signing of the relocation agreement.

Another Voice: Reject the Relocation Package

Residents of the Wentworth Gardens, TE Brown and some renters were outraged with the arrangements. For Marcella Carter and others from Wentworth Gardens this was a really bad deal. These residents felt left behind to experience all the negative consequences of the new stadium. Increased traffic, littering, fans under the influence of alcohol following the games, noise from the exploding scoreboard and
even fireworks. According to Carter: "There's 300 of us here from Wentworth, and we are angry because we are getting nothing" and for Robert Robinson, a renter in the area: "[this] is worse than slavery... We've been sold down the river, with no choice at all. It's either get out or get put out" (Kass and Luft, 1988). On February 9, 1989, this group filed a federal lawsuit. The suit has 49 plaintiffs charging the violation of the community members' civil rights. The case is still pending in the courts.

Sheila Radford-Hill, a community activist in South Armour Square, representing the interests of the Wentworth Gardens, TE Brown Senior Citizen Building and of the general community of South Armour Square, outlined for me the various strategies utilized by these residents:

(1) **Grassroots Campaigning**: For a two year period demonstrations were held at the games in the old Comiskey, City Hall, and the offices of ISFA. The residents, during a neighborhood meeting, also staged a mock funeral of their community. Many gathered around and told stories of their lives in the area, raising their children, interacting with one another, etc. The residents also engaged in a letter campaign, drawing support from other community organizations in the City of Chicago to protest displacement.

(2) **Coalition Building**: The residents organized with other groups, such as the "Save Our Sox", a fan group which also advocated no displacement. Though the two groups, the
residents and the fans, had different agendas, saving the old Comiskey Park would have been welcomed by both. The fans would continue to attend games at the oldest park in the league, and the residents, who feared displacement resulting from a new stadium in the area, would save their homes. As a result, a coalition emerged between the two groups. O'Connell told me:

We had a common interest with the residents. They were concerned with saving their homes and concerned about the impact of a new stadium on their community, parking, police protection, drinking, etc. We were concerned about saving the team and saving the park because we loved the White Sox.

Though these two groups had similar interests, obvious divisions of race existed. According to O'Connell:

The plan was for the two groups to meet at a tavern and discuss a plan of action. I walked in with Sheila [Radford-Hill, a community organizer for the residents] before the meeting, and we saw the whites sitting at one side, and a few tables away, at another corner, the blacks. Yet, the two groups worked together to the extent possible to challenge the government and the stadium developers.

It was also because of racial tensions, that the community residents were unable to recruit support from the nearby white, middle-class community of Bridgeport whose long history of asserting power in city politics could have proved beneficial (Euchner, 1993).

According to a Bridgeport resident the new stadium would be good for the area since it would "make the neighborhood look better." He noted:

Sure you got lots of jobs at the park. That's important and we're gonna make the neighborhood look
better. We're gonna clear out that old neighborhood. It'll be a lot classier (McNamee, 1986).

These statements outline the sharp divisions which existed between the residents in the larger area. An investigation of mayoral election results in the ward support the notion that race is a critical factor in determining voting behavior in that area (see TABLE 3).
### TABLE 3
1983 & 1987 PRIMARY AND GENERAL MAYORAL ELECTION RESULTS IN THE WARD SURROUNDING COMISKEY PARK*


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<th>NE Armour</th>
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#### 1987 Primary (February 24)-Ward Map dated January 8, 1986

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#### 1987 General (April 7)-Ward Map dated January 8, 1986

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* Note that the 11th Ward Map changed between December 16, 1981 and January 8, 1986 in South Armour Square. Specifically the precincts numbers in that area changed from 54 and 64 to 33 and 54. This change did not have a significant change on the racial composition of those precincts. All figures in percentage points.


An additional observation from Table 4 can be made as to the voting behavior of the predominantly white precincts during
the general elections. Though these precincts have been historically democratic, when it came to voting, they chose not to support a black democratic candidate. Rather they supported a white republican candidate. Race, in this case, becomes a more important factor than party identification in terms of influencing voting behavior, a fact which further outlines the racial tensions in this area.

(3) **Negotiation of Benefits:** The South Armour Square Neighborhood Coalition called for additional spending on the relocation of the residents. Eventually more than $10 million was authorized by the ISFA to address this resettlement.

(4) **Civil Rights Class Action Suit:** The suit charged that relocation of the stadium to the North of the existing old Comiskey was possible (see the discussion below in **Second Alternative: The Armour Field Proposal**). Yet, it would have resulted in the displacement of some white families. According to the suit, those involved in the construction of a new stadium: "in the course of their conspiracy...have destroyed or are in the process of destroying approximately 178 sound residential units which provided affordable housing for over 425 black residents" (Gorman, 1989).

Though the law-suit was utilized by the residents to stop the destruction of their homes, after it became clear that the plan would move forward, the law-suit was about reparations. A secondary goal of the law suit, according to
Radford-Hill, was to keep the community together and communicate the injustices to the rest of the city.

(5) Community Planning: Even though the loss of the homes seemed imminent, the residents attempted, through a redevelopment grant from the City of Chicago, to anticipate and address the physical changes of their community. The grant was used to plan for community business services taken away during the stadium development process.

Radford-Hill also recommended ways to make similar cases more responsive to community needs. Specifically:

(1) The government should be allowed to utilize its "quick take and imminent domain powers" only in projects which could clearly benefit the public. The case of a sports stadium, according to Radford-Hill, is not a public benefit. It advances the interests of a few and gives nothing back to the community affected, and, (2) If the government becomes involved in these cases, it should be responsible and accountable for the entire cost of displacement, extending beyond replacement housing.

The city and the state were extremely satisfied with the turn of events. According to Mayor Sawyer: "[the agreement is] a noteworthy example of public-private partnership that works for the good of the entire city" and according to the executive director of the ISFA Peter Bynoe: "The relocation issue is the most critical one facing completion of this project, the one that was potentially the
most explosive, the one with the most down-side risk..." (Kass and Luft, 1988). Finally, Crain's Chicago Business, credited Mary Milano, the coalition lawyer and the ISFA with the success of the relocation package (Hornung, 1988b).

McCuddy's: The Loss of History and Local Culture

McCuddy's, across from the old Comiskey park, was more than a neighborhood bar. It had been there since 1910, when Charles Comiskey opened the ballpark. The pub would do business only during the baseball season, approximately 80 days a year.

There was a special connection between the White Sox and the surrounding neighborhoods, and McCuddy's was the link. Most immediately associated McCuddy's with Comiskey Park, giving it landmark status. For White Sox fans the bar was imprinted in their memories. It was the place where the magic and fantasy of the sports world would meet the pragmatic nature of everyday life.

McCuddy's was built across the ballpark in 1910 by John McCuddy, a friend of Charles Comiskey who had tipped him as to the position of the new stadium. Since then, thousands have visited the bar which has contributed to the aura and culture surrounding the area on game days. The true White Sox fan never achieved that status unless he/she visited McCuddy's; it had become a place of fan initiation.

At McCuddy's fans listened to sports stories,
confirming the strong connection between the bar and the White Sox. One of the stories goes back to the New York Yankee dynasty and the Babe. When the Yankees came to town and the White Sox suffered defeats at the hands of Babe Ruth, it is said that the Babe himself, during the third inning, would go across the street to McCuddy's for a quick beer. He would then dash back to Comiskey and continue his "assault" on the White Sox. Frances McCuddy, granddaughter of the founder, noted how Ruth once destroyed the carpet in the bar with his baseball spikes as he rushed through the tables trying to finish four sandwiches and four beers, and make it on time back to Comiskey between innings (Kass, 1988g).

Many Chicago Mayors and politicians would visit McCuddy's on White Sox Opening Day and it is said that the bar was a regular hang-out place for members of the Black Sox. Governor Thompson, immediately before signing the agreement which would keep the White Sox in Chicago, stopped by McCuddy's and high-fived the fans who viewed him as their "savior."

Unfortunately, the development of the new stadium called for the destruction of McCuddy's. The bar, according to the plan, was located around third base. This was a disappointment to many since, a few months earlier, Thompson had promised the McCuddy's patrons that the bar would be saved and that it would be moved across the street from the
new stadium. Yet, the ISFA plans called for control of all properties by October 15. The ISFA, under its quick take power, filed lawsuits to obtain the commercial parcels before the deadline and planned to settle with their owners afterwards. One of the parcels was McCuddy’s and the history and local culture generated by this neighborhood bar went down as fast as the one hour that it took, on March 1989, when a wrecking ball demolished its structure (Davis, 1989).

The authority eventually settled with Pat Senese, the owner of the bar for $235,000. Senese was extremely disappointed as he reflected on the proposed settlement:

...I don’t want the money. It’s the place. It’s the name that should remain across the street. Do you just break history off like a stick? Wash it away? I want my grandchildren to see that sign up there. That’s what I want" (Kass, 1988g).

The owners of McCuddy’s attempted to re-open their pub in the winter of 1991, months before opening day of the new Comiskey Park. Their proposal called for a new McCuddy’s right across the street from the new stadium or within the nearby vicinity of the site. The presence of this establishment would continue the long historical and cultural relationship between the neighborhood and the White Sox. The proposal was turned down by the ISFA. According to executive director Peter Bynoe: "[McCuddy’s] cannot be relocated on the [stadium] site" because of state law and due to the fact that the White Sox have "the exclusive right
to sell food and liquor" within and surrounding the sports facility (Reardon, 1991a). It is that same franchise right which took much of the culture and atmosphere which surrounded the ballpark as the local vendors sold their merchandise outside the ballpark.

First Alternative: Restoring Old Comiskey Park

Those in favor of renovating old Comiskey Park underscored the importance of the structure for the city by emphasizing the historic nature of the ballpark. The ballpark was the oldest in Major League Baseball, and according to a proposal by "Save Our Sox" (1987) landmark status should be granted to the ballpark. Specifically: "[the renovation of Comiskey Park would] celebrate the oldest ballpark in baseball [and] enhance the tourist appeal of the park and the surrounding areas of Bridgeport and Armour Square" (pg. 10). The group advocated Comiskey Park as a National Monument and upon its purchase by the ISFA, it should be donated to the National Park Service which would be responsible for its control and operation.

The renovation proposal reintroduced the facility to its 1933 physical stature during baseball's "Golden Age." In addition, the proposal called for the construction of a nearby baseball museum where "its archives would focus on baseball as social history" (pg. 14). Exhibits of White Sox history and Chicago baseball would make the museum an
excellent addition to the proposed landmark plan.

The report also proposed that the city take advantage of its unique position to have the oldest ballpark and called for a marketing of the facility as a place of tourist attraction. It described a renovated Comiskey Park as "a major tourist draw", a place for people from all over the country, to experience an era in American history gone by.

In addition, according to this proposal, Comiskey Park could become the focal point from which the entire history of the South Side of the City of Chicago could be communicated to the rest of the nation. The nearby neighborhood of "the Gap", the distinct architecture of the Illinois Institute of Technology, the surrounding century-old churches, Armour Square Park, the historic past of adjacent neighborhoods, blues and jazz, could all become part of an effort to showcase this section of the city. Under this general scenario, the local community could receive substantial economic benefits and could even be rescued from its current condition.

The last rationale put forth by those attempting to convince the city and the White Sox that a renovation of the old Comiskey Park should be seriously considered was based on sentimental reasons. Over the years, the ballpark had gained a special place in the hearts of many Chicagoans. Drawing on emotional factors, the report described the ballpark as "an urban institution, an irreplaceable piece of
Chicago" (p. 20). A place where generations after generations of residents witnessed events which have remained in their memories forever. In the end, this proposal was never realized as the old Comiskey Park was pushed aside to become a parking lot for the new Comiskey Park.

Second Alternative: The Armour Field Proposal

When the Illinois Sports Facility Authority was created in 1986 by the Illinois General Assembly to oversee the construction of a new baseball facility for the White Sox, it was given both the land and the money necessary to accomplish this task. The ISFA was provided with over 90 acres of land by the City of Chicago.

Phillip Bess, an independent architect in Chicago saw this as an opportunity to propose a plan for a baseball park which would challenge the current trend in sports facilities architecture. Stadium construction in the 60's, 70's and the 80's, concentrated on circular, multi-purpose structures, high in volume, with maximum use of acreage, due to the fact that parking lot space was critical to this suburban style model. For Bess, this was a chance to propose "the urban baseball park" since the site selected for this facility was in the core of a large urban center. According to Bess:

I worked on the design of this plan for over four months. Contemporary ballpark construction poses no
physical constrains to the designer. The reason for that is because their [sports stadium] location has been primarily either in suburban communities or near railroad yards where acquiring space is not an issue. Here is an opportunity to attempt something different; building a stadium in the midst of a neighborhood. I was first interested [with my proposal] to address the nature of the urban ballpark, the building of the facility was of secondary interest.

Bess proposed the construction of Armour Field. This urban ballpark proposal is one which deserves special attention since its implications extend beyond the play of baseball. Such structure can affect the fabric of the city itself.

The Armour Field Proposal: The Ballpark

Armour Field, was named after Armour Square Park, a park adjacent to the old Comiskey Park. The park on the north side of old Comiskey would be the site of the proposed stadium and it would occupy only 79 acres. The design projected for a $63 million, open air-ballpark. It would accommodate 42,250 seats and it would include 66 luxury boxes. The footprint of the ballpark itself would be 9 acres. To place this figure into perspective, the footprint of Wrigley Field, arguably the most intimate ballpark in the majors, is just 8 acres. On the other hand the footprint of the new Comiskey Park is 12.1 acres (Bess, 1995).

Approximately 7,560 spaces will be provided in the form of (1) surface parking, (2) designated parking lots within a mile of the ballpark, and (3) four, two-and-a-half story parking garages (Bess, 1989).
The proposal would also avoid displacement of residents. Specifically, Bess (1989:29) notes:

The ISFA proposal [of the new Comiskey Park] requires the demolition of 78 privately-owned dwellings, and displaces approximately 220 families. Our Master Plan would require the demolition of about 25 buildings containing approximately 50 dwelling units to accommodate one of the parking garages; but no families would be displaced from the neighborhood because we propose that an equal number of replacement housing units be built right in the neighborhood, on the new east/west block south of 35th Street, and on currently vacant lots on Shields, Princeton, and Wells Streets.

Some of the residents to be displaced by the construction of the sports facility south of the old Comiskey also offered the Armour Square Park site as a more appropriate location. According to a resident:

I'm a sports fan, I'm an athlete. But why displace people? The team's owners could have moved the ballpark to the blocks now occupied by Armour Square Park...That's more room than we have over here (Devall, 1988a).

The loss of the Armour Square Park to the proposed ballpark was also addressed by Bess. He outlined the creation of two smaller parks on vacant land. The area which the old Comiskey Park covered, south of the proposed Armour Field facility, would also be transformed into a recreational area. That space would accommodate the activities of Armour Square Park, while being functional for the local community.

Another interesting observation regards the proposed design of Armour Field. It takes us back to the golden era of baseball park construction between 1912 and 1914 when
Fenway Park, Ebbets Field and Wrigley Field were built. The distance from the top seat in the upper deck to the home plate at Wrigley Field is 210 feet. At the old Comiskey Park that same distance was 150 feet. The Armour Field proposal listed that distance at 225 feet. The baseball parks which have followed the architectural direction of the 60's, 70's, and 80's present lengthier figures. Specifically, that same distance at the New Comiskey Park (250 feet), Riverfront Stadium (262 feet) and Royals Stadium (265 feet), indicates that viewing a game in those facilities is likely to generate a different feeling.

The Armour Field Proposal: The Local Community

In addition, this proposal attempted to accomplish something which recent stadium construction has been unable to; integrate the stadium structure into the existing environment of the local community. Bess indicated to me:

One of the challenging aspects of stadium design is to integrate that facility into the city. Generating local development as a result of a project of this kind could be something which can be accomplished. Suburban style stadium developments need not respond to integration since they utilize superblocks. Here you have to take into consideration the existing boundaries. The physical layout of the community in the form of streets, blocks, parks...should be preserved.

Bess' plan called for nine acres of land around Armour Field to be designated for mix-use development. The development would produce retail stores, 480 condominium and rental units, studio housing, and other all-year round,
small-scale businesses and living quarters. On game days, the two and three story nature of these developments surrounding the ballpark, would allow the residents to escape the street traffic and enable them to view the game from their balconies.

This urban structure would not impose itself on the physical environment. Rather it would blend and complement the local neighborhood. It would make the streets active and it would bring people closer together, providing opportunities for interaction. 38

This proposed plan can be cited for its multiple positive contributions. The design of Armour Field can accommodate the construction of a new, single-purpose, contemporary ballpark with luxury boxes, while outlining the mystique of a classic ballpark. The proposal also ensures that displacement would not be the issue that it proved to be in the new Comiskey Park plan. The Armour Field proposal could have also assisted community development and could have served as a model for urban ballpark design. As Bess (1989:33) notes: "Our design of Armour Field itself was governed by a concern that it be a genuinely urban building, constrained by its block, with an architectural presence, scale, and monumentality befitting its status as a public

38 This notion of mix-use development, emphasizing human interaction is similar to the ideas advocated by Jane Jacobs (1961), who was a strong critic of single-purpose urban design during the 50’s.
building."

The Armour Field Proposal: Its Defeat

But if this proposal had so many positive implications for the city and the surrounding community, why did it not receive the attention it deserved? First the proposal received negative reviews from the architectural firm HOK of Kansas City, MO, which was retained by the franchise. According to HOK architects involved: "[speaking of the Armour Field proposal] it would be unwise to put stores and apartments so near a stadium" (McCarron, 1987d). Second, both the management of the White Sox and the City of Chicago, had an opportunity to review the Armour Field proposal, but they did not support the concept for different reasons. The White Sox were not interested in the urban ballpark concept, since they were sold on the revenue capabilities of the suburban model (Euchner 1993:158). On the other hand, the city did not want to address the multiple issues which the Armour Field proposal raised. The city, primarily interested in keeping the team in Chicago and fearing that the White Sox would move to St. Petersburg, FL, did not want to delay by debating the Bess proposal. With the change in administrations after the death of Mayor Washington, Mayor Sawyer worked to see the deal through as quickly as possible.

Bess indicated to me that the close relationship
between the private and the public sectors in this case was the primary reason for the eventual defeat of his proposal. He noted:

The assumption by the City was that whatever the White Sox wanted was good for Chicago residents. If one takes that approach then whatever the White Sox proposed was good for the public. The ownership of the White Sox, especially Reinsdorf, was fascinated with the Royals Stadium in Kansas City. Every team owner wanted one just like that. Why? Because it was the prototype at the time [being built in 1973] of not only the suburban-style stadium, but also the baseball-only facility. That's "big" and HOK had designed it. Well, the team recommended HOK and the City responded that HOK is good for Chicago. It is an interesting logic.

Bess also felt that the implementation of his proposal would have been difficult, even if it had been supported by the management of the team and the city administration. Armour Square Park, the site of the proposed Armour Field, was a public park which served as a physical boundary between the white, middle-class Bridgeport neighborhood to the North and the African-American community to the South. According to the 1990 U.S. Census, the census track south of the old Comiskey was 99.9 percent African American (99.9 percent in 1980) and the census track north of the ball park was 26.0 percent African American (20.6 percent in 1980). Bess told me:

The proposal would have faced resistance from one of the neighborhoods to the North. We would probably be tied in court since that was public property and belonged to the Chicago Park District.

The real threat to that community was not the loss of the park, since the proposal would replace the park with two
smaller parks in the area. Rather, it was the Armour Field location and the surrounding elements of that proposal (shops, adjacent residences, etc.). Armour Field could have been a catalyst, generating a lively neighborhood environment. The ballpark could have served as a "seam", between two racially distinct communities. Taking into consideration the long history of segregation in that general area, this proposal would have threatened the separation between these groups.

It is unfortunate that the Armour Field proposal was never implemented since it will never be known what its implications for the community could have been. Once again, corporate interests prevailed at the expense of a plan which would have been responsive to both the interests of the franchise, as well as to the interests of those who live and work in the area.

Attempting to Rebuild: Redevelopment After New Comiskey Park

In 1988, South Armour Square residents began to investigate the effects of the physical reorganization resulting from the construction of the New Comiskey Park. The goal of the South Armour Neighborhood Coalition (SANC), a community organization, was to consider these potential changes and create a plan aimed at rebuilding South Armour Square. One of the major community concerns was the loss of economic revenue, resulting from the removal of community
After applying for a City of Chicago community planning grant in 1988, the SANC completed a feasibility study in December of 1994 for the construction of a commercial shopping center in the area. The shopping center would replace the businesses destroyed by the stadium developers. The residents realized that with the removal of various small community goods stores, many dollars had left the local area. The goal of this plan was to reclaim that spending.

The residents worked closely with The Natalie P. Voorhees Neighborhood Center at the University of Illinois at Chicago to advance their plans for community planning and community development. Upon completion of a market survey in South Armour Square, they concluded that a shopping center would generate the highest amount of income for the community. After reviewing four schematic design alternatives, they agreed on a shopping center which would include a convenient grocery store and a restaurant. Based on the market survey, the grocery store would be expected to generate $1.2 million in annual sales, whereas the restaurant could post $414,000 in annual sales. In addition, plans to add a video arcade to the shopping center as well as other retail space, is currently under review. The development would be located in the corner of Pershing Road and South Wentworth Avenue, south of the new stadium.
The community also agreed that this development would be owned and operated by the South Armour Square Neighborhood Coalition. This would be a consumer owned cooperative and according to the report, its goals would be to: (1) meet community needs for local goods and services, (2) employ community residents, (3) maintain local ownership and control, (3) ensure the quality of goods and services, and (4) capture community dollars. The coalition would rent space to entrepreneurs in the shopping center, ensuring that the economic benefits in spending remained in the neighborhood. According to the report, "the importance of community ownership of the development is key to the South Armour Neighborhood Coalition's efforts to rebuild community", and "this development would ensure the economic viability of the community" (p. 9).

After observing the recent developments in South Armour Square, it becomes clear that out of the defeat which the community suffered in the form of displacement by the city, the state and the stadium developers, efforts to address various community concerns are currently underway. The question though remains as to the extent to which these efforts will be sustainable and whether the proposed benefits will materialize.
Conclusion

Under the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority Act, according to a 1989 state audit, the taxpayers will pay $657 million over the next 20 years to keep the White Sox in Chicago (Pearson and McCarron, 1989). This study shows that this extraordinary amount of public spending is the outcome of a smooth functioning relationship between a professional franchise and the state. As a result, private, corporate interests become interconnected with public policy actions.

At the same time, this case study reveals the vast inequalities, based on class and race, which exist in American society. A predominantly African-American, low-income neighborhood becomes displaced in order for a stadium development to occur. The residents, excluded from the planning stages of this stadium project, are incapable of confronting, in a united manner, the powerful private interests as advanced by the state. In addition, other forms of societal inequalities become communicated. Specifically, the status and treatment of individuals who fall into different residential categories (homeowners, renters and public housing residents) varies. Thus, based on the relocation arrangements of this case, the homeowners received the best possible deal, followed by the renters, and as for the public housing residents, they were left behind to suffer the social consequences of the new stadium.

The last conclusion which can be reached from this
analysis regards the increasing role and effect of sports in American society. As shown in this case study, stadium development plans proved influential in shaping the urban environment. The destruction of McCuddy’s, a landmark area institution with a long history in the community; the removal of a tight knit neighborhood and the inability of small businessmen to sell their products outside the stadium due to the White Sox lease agreement, support the fact that life around the ballpark has been transformed. The rearrangement of the physical environment has implications which occur at the core of everyday, human experience. The reorganization of physical space then reshapes our social experiences.

The stadium development plans of the White Sox extended beyond having merely political and economic implications. Their effect entered into the reorganization of the cultural fabric of the city. Thus sports are capable of reconstructing the urban terrain at the political, economic, as well as, at the cultural level.
CHAPTER 7

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STADIUM DEVELOPMENT PLANS ON THE NORTH SIDE: THE LIGHTS INSTALLATION AT WRIGLEY FIELD

Introduction

The notion of symbolism and representation between professional franchises and cities is well exemplified in the case of the Chicago Cubs. Over the years, the Cubs have shown strong cultural connections with the city and the community surrounding Wrigley Field; Wrigleyville. According to Bart Giamatti, former National League President: "Most of our franchises, even the new ones, have sunk real roots...the Cubs may have the deepest roots of all" (Holtzman, 1988).

Wrigley Field has added to this long relationship between the City and the franchise. The continuation of daytime professional baseball at Wrigley Field was a connection to the past, something that no other professional baseball park in the country could offer.

In the early 1980's, the Chicago Cubs expressed a strong interest in installing lights at Wrigley Field. The addition of lights, a stadium development plan, would provide for increased revenue in the form of television programming and increased attendance at the Cubs games. The franchise would have to convince the City Council to pass an
ordinance, making the conducting of night baseball games at Wrigley Field possible. The Cub's organization and the City would also have to persuade the residents surrounding the ballpark that night games would not threaten the existing status of their neighborhoods and would not deter from their lifestyles.

The following two chapters comprise a case study which investigates this stadium development plan at Wrigley Field in Chicago. The first chapter provides an insight into the political economy surrounding this issue, while the second outlines the community response and community effects. It is important to note here that one cannot distinguish between politics, economics and community response. That in fact, political developments are interwoven with the community response. The segmentation of these areas into two sections is conducted for the purpose of organizing this project in a coherent manner and it is not intended to reflect a thematic split.

While taking into consideration the above observation, the first chapter addresses: (1) the economic incentives for the Cubs, (2) the use of threats by the franchise to leave Chicago, (3) the use of economic impact studies to justify the importance of the Cubs for the local and state economies and rationalize state support, (4) the local politics surrounding this issue, and, (5) the role of the media. The media proves to be in a unique position. On the one hand it
part of the ownership of the Cubs, while on the other it is capable of influencing policy making.

The second chapter investigates the community response and the long term implications for the community of Lake View. Specifically, some of the issues addressed in the second chapter of this case study include: (1) the strong community response to the lights issue and the community strategies utilized, (2) the ability of the community residents to maintain the city's commitment to improving/protecting the neighborhood after the installation of lights by applying continuous pressure, and (3) the effect(s) which this stadium development plan has had on the area surrounding the ballpark. Night games at Wrigley, the outcome of this stadium development project, have assisted in generating a cultural environment which has contributed to reshaping the local community area of Lake View.

The case of the Chicago Cubs and the installation of lights at Wrigley Field extended for over a six year period. It is an example of a professional baseball team which, drawing from its perceived economic and social standing within a large metropolitan area, is able to enlist the support of Chicago politicians to achieve its goals. In addition, this case is an example of how stadium development plans, though aimed at advancing the corporate interests of its ownership, also assist in the creation of a culture which transforms the local urban environment.
Night Play in the Majors

The introduction of playing baseball under the lights in Major League Baseball was primarily a response to reduced attendance at the ballpark during the Great Depression. The first night baseball game was played on May 24, 1935 in Crosley Field in Cincinnati.\(^{39}\) The Reds experienced a sharp decrease in attendance during the early 1930's and in reaction to the small gate revenues, they were able to convince the league owners to permit baseball under the lights and reverse an existing rule passed by the National League which outlawed night baseball.

The argument by the Reds concentrated on economics, noting that 70 percent of the income for the team during the 1934 season derived from fifteen days-holidays, opening days and Sundays. Allowing lights would strengthen the attendance during the scheduled week day games, since such action would make the game available to more fans (Pietrusza, 1993).

Even though a number of exhibition games followed, night baseball was perceived to be acceptable for the far

\(^{39}\) Crosley Field was not the ballpark where the first night game in America was played. It was the minor and negro leagues which invented night baseball. E. Lee Keyser, president of the Class A Western League's Des Moines Demons installed permanent lights at a cost of $19,000 and the first game was played on May 2, 1930 between the Demons and the Wichita Aviators. The game was also nationally broadcast by NBC radio (Pietrusza, 1993). According to The New York Times: "In the opinion of many fans, the contest was viewed as clearly as a game played under daylight conditions" (Gershman, 1993:152).
away cities but not for the large metropolitan centers. In those large cities, the perception was that baseball was not the only form of entertainment and that night time should be reserved for the theater and other related, outing events. The issue of baseball under the lights became a unique event and spread throughout the league in the following years.40

Although night games eventually became fully accepted, related concerns persisted. Some felt that night games were not good for the future of the game. Playing at night limited the youngsters from coming to the ballpark, thus isolating the future supporters of the game. Others noted that the game would dramatically change since the players were becoming actors. Finally, others, such as Senators' owner, Clark Griffith responded in the early years of night baseball: "There is no chance of night baseball ever becoming popular in the biggest cities...High-class baseball cannot be played at night under artificial light" and Phil Wrigley responded to Bill Veeck who attempted to convince the owner of the Cubs and Wrigley Field to install lights at the ballpark: "[lights are] just a fad. A passing fancy" (Gershman, 1993:155).

The one thing clear about playing night baseball was its strong economic implications for the team owners.

40 The Detroit Tigers were the last, before the Cubs, to play night baseball in 1948. The economics of night games was the primary reason for playing under the lights in Detroit (Atkins, 1988).
During the first year of playing under the lights, the Cincinnati Reds brought 123,991 fans during 7 night games (17,713 avg. per game), while during the 69 other day games, 324,256 (4,699 avg. per game) attended games at Crosley Field. At Ebbets Field, the Brooklyn Dodgers' first year of night games in 1938 averaged 30,000 spectators at night and only 4,000 during the day (Gershman, 1993).41

In Search of Profits through Stadium Development Plans: The Installation of Lights

After the death of Phil and Helen Wrigley in 1977, their son, Bill Wrigley took over the Cubs. In December of 1980, the new owner discovered that he had to pay $40 million in family estate and inheritance taxes to the federal government, and the states of Illinois, California, and Wisconsin. On June 17, 1981, the Tribune Company purchased the Cubs for $20.5 million. The Tribunes' holdings in Chicago included the influential Chicago Tribune, and the WGN broadcast station (WGN-Radio and WGN-TV). WGN-TV at the time, was broadcasting nationally, televised programming. In addition, the Tribune Co. owned many other smaller radio and television stations nation-

41 In later years, Phil Wrigley ordered lights for Wrigley Field, but after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, he changed his mind and donated the lights to the U.S. government. President Roosevelt later gave a boost to night baseball when he asked Commissioner Landis to extend night games because it provided an opportunity to the army day shift to view games (Jauss, 1988).
The new ownership, from the very beginning, considered the Cubs an excellent addition to their other media holdings. In their view, the baseball franchise would complement WGN-TV and WGN radio. In the early 1980's, baseball franchises were reaching national markets through exclusive contracts with nationally broadcasting cable stations. Television stations like WOR-TV in New Jersey and the Superstation WTBS in Atlanta, were exclusively transmitting games of the New York Mets and the Atlanta Braves to audiences across America. The only limitation to those arrangements was the Major League television contract itself which had broadcasting priority over these cable stations. Because of these cable stations, the above mentioned baseball franchises, did not have to rely exclusively on the MLB contract with the big networks (ABC, CBS and NBC) as their only source of live television coverage.

As a cable station that broadcasted nationally, WGN-TV viewed the Cubs as an excellent addition to their televised schedule. According to John Madigan, executive vice president of the Tribune Co., the Cubs were a "good programming" opportunity. In responding to the motivation behind the purchasing of the Cubs, Madigan noted:

It was the opportunity to control live programming which is the most important thing to a television and radio station- live programming, good programming (Gershman, 1993:218).
The goal of Tribune Co., was to make the Cubs a nation-wide entertainment product. In order for that to be accomplished, the Cubs would have to play at night, enabling the team to reach a wider national market. As a result, the Chicago Cubs became part of the corporatization of American sports.

According to a survey conducted by Market Facts, Inc., for the Chicago Cubs in the Chicago metropolitan area during the month of September in 1985, lights at Wrigley Field would allow for more games to be broadcast on television during the evenings, thus capturing a bigger market. Of those surveyed, 38% indicated that night baseball at Wrigley Field would provide them with an opportunity to view more Cubs games on television. Only 11.6% noted that, under these circumstances, they would view less Cubs games on television and for 48.7%, lights at Wrigley wouldn't make much difference in their television game viewing habits (Chicago Cubs, 1985a).

Wrigley Field: Chicago's Favorite

The possibility of lights at Wrigley Field became of interest to many in the Chicagoland area. The franchise conducted a general public survey in the Fall of 1985 to find out how the general public in the 6-county area felt about the lights issue, Wrigley Field and the Cubs (Chicago Cubs, 1985a). This study was eventually employed to support
the Cubs’ request for lights at Wrigley.

According to the survey which was prepared by Market Facts, Inc., the Cubs were Chicago’s favorite professional baseball team (51.4%). Among those who considered themselves to be baseball fans, 77.4% noted the Cubs as their favorite baseball team.

The survey also investigated how the general public felt about lights at Wrigley. Among those who considered themselves to be baseball fans, 31.7% felt that lights should not be installed at Wrigley or be available for post-season play only. For those who fell in this same category of opposing lights/restricted use of lights, 15.5% did not want to see lights at the ballpark under any circumstances. The majority of the respondents though (64.6%), were willing to accept either unrestricted use of lights, or lights at 18 to 20 games during the season. Among them, 43.6% were willing to have only unrestricted use of lights. When fan respondents were asked to choose between having some night baseball at Wrigley Field vs. a new stadium for the Cubs, 59.8% chose baseball under the lights and 35.6% responded that they would accept a new Cubs stadium.

This last finding is surprising since one would expect that a much smaller number of respondents would be willing to see the Cubs play at a ballpark other than Wrigley Field. That acceptance of a new stadium for the Cubs was even more
unexpected when one takes into consideration the strong rating which Wrigley Field received amongst fans in that same survey.

When asked to rate the ballpark, the majority of the fans viewed Wrigley as an 'excellent' or 'very good' ballpark, 31% and 28.6% respectively. Only 10% rated Wrigley as 'fair', and an unsubstantial percentage of 1.9% rated Wrigley as 'poor'. The mean of the responses in regards to rating was 3.79 (5=excellent, 4=very good, 3=good, 2=fair and 1=poor), certainly a favorable rating.

In further investigating what makes Wrigley Field an 'excellent' ballpark, fans noted the traditional aspect and history of the park (19.3%-net), the friendliness and comfort, including the type of neighborhood in which it is located (24.3%-net), the traditional characteristics which the ballpark exemplifies, such as the ivy (28.9%-net) and the good seating/layout of the ballpark making every seat a good seat for viewing the game (28.4%-net). Based upon the information provided by this survey it becomes clear that fans in the Chicago metropolitan area have a great sense of appreciation for the Cubs and Wrigley Field.

Another study conducted by the Chicago Cubs on the neighborhood residents (Chicago Cubs, 1985b), showed that the majority of those living close to Wrigley Field viewed the presence of the Cubs as an asset to the area. Specifically, 77.6 percent of those residing zero to half a
mile from the ballpark, and 91.0 percent of those residing a half a mile to one mile from the ballpark agreed with the statement that the "Cubs are an asset to the neighborhood."

All this data was used by the Cubs in their efforts to convince the City of Chicago that they were worthy of lights at Wrigley and that their presence in Chicago was positive for Chicagoland and local residents. Yet, this approach was challenged by the local community. They charged that the Cubs' indication of overwhelming support by the local residents toward the Cubs and Wrigley Field was inaccurate.

**The Issue of the Lights**

It was just a few months after the Cubs were bought by the Tribune Co., on March 10, 1982, that, under the leadership of General Manager, Dallas Green the franchise announced publicly its intent to install lights at Wrigley Field. According to Green, if the lights are not allowed: "we'll have to think about playing in another ballpark" (Wrigley Lights Chronology, 1988:6).

A few months later, the Illinois House of Representatives passed a bill that would make night-time sporting events a violation of the Illinois noise pollution law. The law would apply to sporting facilities where night sports had not been played before July 1, 1982. The amendment noted:

Baseball, football, or soccer sporting events played during nighttime hours, by professional athletes, in a
city with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants, in a stadium at which such nighttime events were not played prior to July 1, 1982, shall be subject to nighttime noise emission regulations promulgated by the Illinois Pollution Control Board (Note, 1987: 372).

Governor Thompson supported the legislation which banned night baseball in Wrigley Field. Thompson noted after signing the legislature on August 23, 1982: "Wrigley Field is located in an old, established neighborhood... [night baseball] would impose an undue hardship on nearly 60,000 residents who live within a four-block area of the stadium (Wrigley Lights Chronology, 1988:6).

A year later on August 25, 1983, the alderman of the Wrigley Field neighborhood, in response to the Cubs’ request, proposed and eventually convinced the City Council to pass an ordinance (42-2 vote) to the Municipal Code of Chicago. The ordinance made illegal, night sporting events in a facility with more than 15,000 seats which is within 500 feet of residences of 100 or more units (Elie, 1986).

In 1984 the Chicago Cubs advanced at the National League’s playoffs. Peter Ueberroth, Commissioner of Major League Baseball announced that post-season play should be played under a night atmosphere and he threatened to move future Cubs’ postseason games to St. Louis. The franchise filed a suit in late 1984, in hopes to reverse the city and state anti-lights legislation on the grounds of being unconstitutional. The community around Wrigley Field was represented by the Lake View Citizens Council (LVCC) and
challenged the Cubs' suit. Both the Cook County Circuit Court and the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the franchises' request to allow the installation of lights (Elie, 1986).

Judge Richard Curry of the Cook County Circuit Court wrote in his ruling:

On the basis of an alleged necessity to play championship games at night, they ask for a reversal of the status quo which has existed at this ballpark for 70 years (Wrigley Lights Chronology, 1988:6). And,

Tinkering with the quality-of-life aspirations of countless households so that television royalties might more easily flow into the coffers of twenty-five distant sports moguls is... repugnant to common decency (Gershman, 1993:220).

The quality of life argument put forth by this judge was similar to the position taken by the community residents.

The Economic Development Commission in Chicago was interested in finding out how the public in Lake View and in the city of Chicago perceived the issue of lights at Wrigley Field. The commission retained Elrick and Lavidge, Inc. which in the Fall of 1987 prepared a report (Economic Development Commission of the City of Chicago, 1987). The study identified three different groups to question: (1) those who lived within one half mile of Wrigley Field (Close-in Lake View) bounded by 1600 W. Ashland, 3200 N. Belmont, Lake Shore Drive and 4200 N. Berteau; (2) those who lived between half a mile and one mile from Wrigley Field (Expanded Lake View) bounded by 2000 W. Damen, 2600 N.
Wrightwood, Lake Michigan and 4600 N. Wilson, and (3) those who lived over one mile from Wrigley Field but still resided within the city limits (Greater Chicago).

The overall reaction to the installation of lights in Wrigley Field by location showed that those who lived closer to the ballpark were more likely to oppose the installation of lights than those who resided further away from the sports facility. Specifically, of those who lived within one half mile from the facility, 32% favored, 52% opposed and 16% had no opinion on the installation of lights. Amongst those who lived between one half mile and a mile from the ballpark, 33% favored lights, 36% opposed lights and 31% had no opinion on the issue. Finally, amongst those in the Greater Chicago group, 49% indicated support for the lights, 22% opposed and 29% had no opinion on the subject.

It is important to note here that the differences in the percentages between the Close-in, Lake View respondents and the responses of those in the Expanded Lake View group were, according to the report, statistically significant. From these findings it becomes clear that the lights were a neighborhood issue since the residents in that area felt that they would be directly affected by their installation.

This report by the Economic Development Commission of the City of Chicago (1987) provided additional findings between the three groups regarding the issue of lights. Specifically, all three groups equally agreed that the city
of Chicago would suffer if the Cubs were to move to the suburbs. Yet, respondents from the close-in Lake View sample were more likely than the other two groups to agree that the installation of lights would negatively impact the atmosphere at the ballpark. Respondents from all three groups also agreed that the neighborhood would not be better off if the Cubs moved elsewhere and that the franchise should not move to a new stadium with lights.

Regarding the Cubs' threat of leaving Wrigley Field if they could not install lights, amongst those who opposed the lights, 22% in the close-Lake View category, fearing the loss of the Cubs, would now approve their installation compared to 40% (Expanded Lake View) and 42% (Greater Chicago). On the other hand, regardless of the threats, 72% (close-in Lake View) continued to oppose the lights, as did 53% of the respondents from the "Expanded Lake View" sample and 46% of the respondents from the "Greater Chicago" sample.

Amongst those favoring lights at Wrigley Field, the three most frequently mentioned reasons for that support included: (1) increasing attendance, (2) keeping the Cubs in Wrigley Field, and (3) the team being good for Chicago. Other, less frequently mentioned reasons for favoring the lights included: (1) being that other teams have lights and play night games, there is no reason why the Cubs should not play night games too, (2) lights would provide increased
revenue for the city and the team, and (3) lights would enable post-season play at Wrigley.

On the other hand, among those who opposed lights, the most frequently mentioned reason was the effect which the lights would have on the neighborhood resulting in the deterioration of the community, including the general disruption in the form of increased traffic, trash, fan rowdiness and noise. A much smaller group opposed the lights because they felt that the tradition and the uniqueness of day-only-play at the ballpark would be jeopardized.

The Threat of Moving Out of Wrigley Field: Its Implications for Chicago

With the Chicago Cubs receiving heated opposition from the residents around Wrigley Field, discussions of the Cubs moving out of the "friendly confines" surfaced. The threats became even more serious after the failure of legal efforts by the Cubs to get lights at Wrigley. A spokesman for the team on June 30, 1985 indicated that "the lights issue is dead" making the consideration of moving out of Wrigley Field a strong possibility (Wrigley Lights Chronology, 1988:6). A number of different scenarios were speculated. One scenario saw the Cubs move into a new, multi-purpose, domed stadium with the Chicago Bears. Another viewed an attempt by the Cubs to move out of Chicago to the nearby suburbs, specifically to Schaumburg, Illinois (Cappo, 1985).
A Cubs move under either of the above mentioned scenarios would have meant that Wrigley Field would become the possible victim of a wrecking ball. Along with that, the history of the ballpark would also disappear. According to Donald Grenesko, the Cubs vice president for operations: "Lights is still our first choice and without them we cannot stay at Wrigley" (McCarron and Burton, 1986). That was a frightening thought for many in Chicago. According to an editorial in the *Crain's Chicago Business* (6/24/85, p. 10) the loss of Wrigley would be the loss of a Chicago trademark:

A domed stadium may be a good deal for the Bears and the White Sox. And we can't recall anyone praising the delights of watching games at Soldiers Field, Comiskey Park or the Chicago Stadium. But Wrigley Field is one of Chicago's greatest treasures - right up there with the Chicago Theater and the rest of the preservationists' causes. As Cubs General Manager Dallas Green recently gushed to Chicago Tribune columnist Jerome Holtzman: "I'm not the same guy I was in '81 and '82... Wrigley Field is a landmark. It's Chicago."

That same editorial, fearing that the Tribune Co., would pull the Cubs out to the suburbs called for a settlement between the two sides. Specifically, since the owners were willing to be satisfied with 20 night games during the season, the residents should give in a little and meet them half way, thus allowing lights at Wrigley and ensuring the presence of Wrigley Field for the years to come:

Tribune Co. made it clear that the Cubs will play night baseball sooner or later—at Wrigley Field or elsewhere.
The company's compromise offer—no more than 20 night games a year and expanded seating in the upper decks—sounds reasonable to us. If the company can be held to those terms, we'll back it. The Wrigley neighbors should do likewise.

At this point the Chicago Cubs began to pressure the city, documenting the positive economic effects which the franchise generated for Chicago. First, they commissioned a neighborhood survey and then they prepared a detailed economic impact study. The ownership of the Cubs publicized the results of the survey and the impact study, outlining the need for serious consideration of their request.

The survey conducted by the Cubs showed that an overwhelming majority of those living close to Wrigley Field indicated that their neighborhood would be negatively affected if the Cubs were to move out of the area. Specifically, 61.2 percent of those living zero to half a mile from Wrigley Field and 73.9 percent of those who lived half a mile to a mile from the ballpark indicated a negative effect on the community if the Cubs were to move. The majority of the respondents cited negative economic/business effects on the local community (Chicago Cubs, 1985b). This data, was intended to motivate the City of Chicago rethink its position. The report was also meant to communicate the possibility that if the city of Chicago did not take into consideration the positive economic benefits which the Cubs generate, it is certain that another community would grant the franchises' wishes. What strengthened the position of
the Cubs even more was the results of their commissioned economic impact study.

In 1986, the franchise employed the consulting services of Melaniphy and Associates, to prepare an economic analysis report. The study, outlining the economic impact, concluded that $90.7 million are contributed annually by the Cubs to the Chicago's economy. Of that contribution, $37 million came from direct economic benefits, while $31.4 million came from "indirect benefits." That second figure was arrived at by considering the $12.2 million spent on concessions, $8.1 million on restaurants and bars, $3.5 million on business which the Cubs organization provided to local suppliers, licensed and unlicensed parking from the games accounted for an additional $3.6 million, $2.5 million from the use of hotels and CTA services, $600,000 from taxi, bus charter and gasoline, $600,000 was added from fan expenditures at retail stores and from street vending, and $300,000 from towing and parking fines (Melaniphy and Associates, 1986).

The report also added another $22.3 million in Cubs related spending to the Chicago economy through the use of a multiplier effect contribution using a 3.2 percent multiplier figure. This income is accrued to neighborhood residents and others in the city of Chicago as a result of the presence and activities of the Cubs in the economy (Melaniphy and Associates, 1986). The 3.2 figure is considerably higher from those employed by other studies
which also aim at estimating the economic impact of professional franchises on local economies.

This same study also identified the revenue, in the form of taxes, which the Chicago Cubs contribute to the State of Illinois and Cook County. According to this report, an estimated $2.9 million in State of Illinois taxes and $26,000 in Cook County property taxes resulted from the spending generated by the presence of the Chicago Cubs. Of the state generated taxes, approximately $1.4 million were in the form of income taxes, $620,000 was from concession related activities, $400,000 from restaurant/bar spending, $134,000 from hotel related uses, while service stations and overall gas taxes added another $41,000. The report outlined an additional $30,000 in taxes resulting from retail and vendor sales and $10,000 in utility taxes in the forms of phone, electricity and natural gas usage (Melaniphy and Associates, 1986).

Finally this study reported the direct and indirect tax revenue contributed to the City of Chicago as a result of the Cubs' presence. The overall amount was estimated at $2.8 million annually. The taxes paid to the City as a result of direct economic activities due to the Cubs were identified at $1.2 million; $649,000 from amusement taxes; $223,000 from property taxes, $122,000 from concession taxes; $46,000 from parking; $36,000 from utility taxes; $18,000 from employment and direct sales taxes and $60,000
from miscellaneous taxes. The city taxes generated by indirect activities were estimated at $131,000; $43,000 from hotel sales, bus fares and parking tickets; $80,000 from restaurant and bar spending; and $8,000 from vendor, service station and retail spending. Other indirect revenue in the form of taxes included the amounts generated by CTA and parking tickets, totaling $1.5 million (Melaniphy and Associates, 1986).

If the franchise had not made its point to the city officials that losing the Cubs to another city would have serious economic implications for Chicago with this report, another report prepared by the City's Department Economic Development in 1986, strengthened the economic importance of the Cubs even more. This three month study not only accepted the findings of the Chicago Cubs' economic impact study, but concluded that the overall economic contribution of a baseball team to the city of Chicago was even higher, at approximately $100 million annually. The study stated that: "It is interesting to note that the consulting reports prepared [for the two baseball teams in Chicago] come to remarkably similar conclusions about the total impact of a baseball team on the local economy--about $100 million" (Department of Economic Development, 1986:2).

The city commissioned study also proposed that the Cubs' previous economic impact report did not consider additional revenue for the City of Chicago in the form of
taxes which would result from multiplier economic activities. Specifically:

The Department added two other sources of tax revenues to the list identified by the [Cubs] consultant. About 2.5 percent of state income taxes are returned to the city of Chicago; thus, a baseball team will generate at least $23,000 for the city coffers. More significantly, the consultants [for the White Sox and the Cubs] did not consider the fact that the multiplier activity generated by a baseball team will lead to added tax revenues. Using rough ratios of City, County and State revenues to economic activity, we made a very crude estimate of how much revenue this added activity produces (Department of Economic Development, 1986:7).

As a result of these multiplier activities, the added revenue in taxes for the State of Illinois was estimated by this city sponsored study to be between $1.8 and $2.5 million. For Cook County, it was estimated to be between $77,000 and $107,000 (pp. 22). For the City of Chicago these additional tax revenues were estimated to be between $230,000 and $319,000 (pp. 24).

The information provided by these reports helped the Cubs with their demands for lights. Robert Mier, commissioner of Economic Development during the Washington and Sawyer administrations, and mayoral advisor on stadium issues, warned at a 1988 city council committee meeting that the issue of the lights might become the reason for the Cubs leaving Wrigley Field and possibly Chicago. Mier also noted that his experience would support such possibility. He said:

I have always taken business seriously when they say they have problems and are going to move. I've seen too many say that, and when there is no solution, they
move (Strong, 1988a). Accounting for the importance of the Cubs in the local and state economic spheres, in ways that very few other businesses can demonstrate, made the political leadership more attentive and eager to resolve any of their concerns, and to ensure that the city did not lose a viable economic and social partner.

The Politics of the Lights at Wrigley Field

Advancing the lights proposal within the political arena and convincing the City Council to pass a related ordinance proved to be a process which included various components. Threats, the media, mayoral politics, and political power, all played a role in a process which ended with an approval of night games at Wrigley Field by the Chicago City Council.

The Lights Issue During Mayor Washington

Mayor Harold Washington, fearing the loss of the Cubs and the perceived economic benefits that the team provided Chicago, attempted in October of 1986 to bring together local community leaders and representatives from the franchise to resolve the lights issue. He sponsored numerous, close door discussions and two open summits between the two sides and the city. However, his efforts did not bring success since opposition by the community
persisted.

What pushed Mayor Washington to take a stronger stance on the issue was a threat made by the Cubs in May of 1987. Specifically, if the franchise was not allowed to install lights at Wrigley by the following year, they would move to St. Louis and play their post-season games on the astroturf of Busch Memorial Stadium.\textsuperscript{42}

In July of 1987, Mayor Washington, pressured by the turn of events, took an approach which he felt would be fair to both the Cubs and the neighborhood residents; he openly supported a limited number of regular season games to be played under the lights at Wrigley Field. This compromising approach to the issue also received the support of the City Council, since Washington’s political stature allowed him to easily recruit the necessary votes. In early November of 1987, the passage of an ordinance by the Council seemed just weeks away. The ordinance would allow the Cubs to play 8 night games during the 1988 season and 18 night games every season thereafter. But with the death of the mayor two weeks after, the lights issue lost political direction and the endorsed plan lost momentum.

\textsuperscript{42} St. Louis and the Cardinals had been long archrivals and the possibility of a playoff game being played there would surely be not accepted or forgiven by Chicagoans.
The Loss of Political Direction After Washington

Early in 1988, the incoming Mayor Sawyer announced his support for the Washington plan. Yet, the new mayor had lost some of the support of the City Council which his predecessor had so easily enlisted in the past. The repealing of a noise ordinance, which stood in the way of lights at Wrigley Field, under the Washington administration was almost surely to occur. Yet, now under the Sawyer leadership it seemed impossible.43

The situation became even more complicated when Ald. Bobby Rush (2nd Ward), chair of the Energy, Environmental Protection and Public Utilities committee, held a public hearing on the issue in January 1988. Though Rush openly advocated the 18 regular game night proposal, his action not only delayed the possible repeal, but also fueled the hope of the residents to, if not eliminate the lights plan at Wrigley, at least slow down its process. At that hearing, both city officials and representatives of the Tribune Co. urged for a city approval of the installation of lights at Wrigley Field (McCarron and Devall, 1988).

Increasingly, because of the time delay to revisit the

43 One way to advance the idea of lights at Wrigley was to limit the plan for seat expansion proposed by the Cubs and provide additional parking. The Cubs would also limit the 3:05 p.m. game starts to 7 from the usual 29. It was believed that this proposal would be more attractive to the residents around the ballpark. Yet, even with these concessions the anti-lights activists with the support of Ald. Bernard Hansen (44th Ward), continued their strong opposition (Devall and McCarron, 1988).
issue, Ald. Hansen (44th Ward) began to generate support from colleagues in the City Council to stop the installation of lights in his ward. For example, although Ald. William Banks (36th Ward) on the far west side of the city had no directive from his constituency on the issue, supported Hansen. Other aldermen showed similar support, since in the absence of Mayor Washington, to advocate for an elected official who represented the interests of his constituency seemed most collegial (Strong, 1988a).

The Passage of the Lights Ordinance

Mayor Sawyer pushed for the passage of an ordinance by lobbying the support of other aldermen on the issue. Along with the Cubs, the mayor underscored the importance of the lights issue since the franchise was ready to submit a proposal for the 1990 All-Star Baseball Game to be played at Wrigley Field.44

Ald. Rush (2nd ward) criticized the mayor for his political maneuvering and charged that Sawyer wanted to "pass a barebones ordinance granting lights without adequate neighborhood protections or city wide benefits." Fearing that the mayor's move to rally aldermanic support would mean a soon to be released mayoral proposal, Rush, prematurely

44 The Cubs strongly advocated the importance of an All-Star game in Chicago, since, according to the management, it would mean an additional $15 to $35 million to the local economy (Solomon, 1988).
offered a new ordinance which would allow night baseball under conditions which would be responsive to the community demands (Strong and Sly, 1988).

The Rush ordinance failed. A Sawyer proposal then offered to repeal the existing law and allow the installation of lights at Wrigley Field. The terms of the mayor's proposal could be characterized as "pro-Cubs" since the desired economic outcomes from lights at Wrigley Field would come from national television programming and its related advertising revenue. After the proposal received the support of the Environment and Energy Committee (7-2 committee vote), Mayor Sawyer responded:

Thanks to the input of the residents of the community and the responsiveness of the Chicago Cubs, I'm confident that we have come up with a compromise proposal which will ensure that one of America's most loved baseball teams stays in Chicago for all of us to enjoy (Strong, 1988c).

Ald. Hansen (44th) viewed the proposal as insensitive to the feelings and concerns which the residents of his ward repeatedly expressed. Hansen unsuccessfully attempted to delay a full city council vote after a March 15 scheduled referendum on the issue by voters in 21 precincts of the 44th and 46th wards (the area surrounding Wrigley Field) (Strong, 1988c).

On February 25, 1988, the mayoral proposal was approved by the city council (29 for-19 against-2 absent). An effort to delay the vote until after the March 15 referendum by Ald. Luis Gutierrez (26th Ward) was defeated by a 28-19
council vote, as was an effort by Ald. Lawrence Bloom (5th ward) who proposed to (1) provide the city with the right to repeal the lights vote if the neighborhood improvement plan was not implemented, and, (2) commit the Cubs to play all home games in Chicago until 2002 (Solomon, 1988).

The Role of the Media

The role of the media in this case proved to be significant. Specifically, the media served as a link between economic development and cultural representation. The Cubs utilized social/cultural and economic rationales to convince the city and its political leadership that the passage of a city ordinance to allow lights at Wrigley Field was necessary. In terms of social/cultural reasoning, the Cubs publicized opinion survey results which showed the strong connection between the residents and the team. Similarly, the franchise argued its economic contributions at the state, county, city and even neighborhood level by promoting the findings of its economic impact studies. In this regard, the team utilized the media to advance its stadium development plans.

The Chicago Tribune became a corporate tool as the Tribune Co. attempted to advance its business interests. The newspaper took strong positions against politicians and anti-lights advocates when the momentum seemed to shift away from the passing of a lights ordinance. In this regard, the
media played a dual role in both owning the Cubs and in having the ability to influence public policy making.

For example, a 1988 editorial by the Chicago Tribune (1988a) referred to those aldermen who once supported the lights installation, and now were having second thoughts on the subject as "boneheads." Specifically, the editorial read:

Suddenly, some old Washington supporters who were for the lights compromise now are against it. Maybe it is just coincidence that they are the same boneheads who keep trying to thwart commercial and residential growth in the city and get criticized by the newspaper for it. But not likely. The only change from the Vrdolyak-Madigan days is that it is a different set of political manipulators who think they can silence or negate Tribune editorial criticism and undercut a mayor at the same time (pp. 22).

At the same time the Chicago Tribune editorial reminded the city that it was not charged to support the Tribune Co. and influence the installation of lights at Wrigley Field:

And in case that anyone still thinks that Cub decision-making and editorial position-taking have any connection, consider this: if the Tribune editorial board had any say in Cubs policy, the team would long since have had enough of political rebuffs and runarounds, and be ready to move into a new Wrigley Field replica in the suburbs. And the opponents of the lights would be trying to figure out whether to pave over the hole in the ground left at Clark and Addison (pp. 22).

The editorial angered many city politicians who saw it as an attack on their political integrity. Ald. Rush (2nd ward) who had been an advocate of the lights at Wrigley responded:

If the vote were right now, I feel as a result of this editorial this [ordinance] would fail 50 to 0...I think
they [Cubs] are obviously impatient with the democratic process. Maybe they want a back-room deal to be signed by a rubber stamp council. That's not going to happen (Strong, 1988b).

For others, the editorial was viewed as an effort by the Tribune Co. to move the Cubs to the suburbs and place the blame on the city council (Dellios, 1988). Regardless of the intent, the editorial brought the issue once again to the forefront of the city's agenda. For the Cubs this was especially important at a time when, after the death of Mayor Washington, the passing of an ordinance was clearly off-track as politicians began to view the lights issue as an opportunity to test their own political power.

The Chicago Tribune also charged the anti-lights activists as self-serving and insincere. Columnist Mike Royko, for example, attacked Ald. Hansen (44th ward), identifying the adlerman's attempts to stop the Cubs from installing lights at Wrigley Field as inconsistent with other community issues. Because of night games at the ballpark, Hansen contended that late evening drinking by the fans would negatively affect the community and cause serious problems for the residents. According to Royko, the alderman should also attempt to control the late drinking of the 200 or so bars in his precinct. Royko wrote:

Hansen seems to be perfectly content to have a million people getting drunk in his ward year in and year out. He just wants to prevent Cubs fans from having a few beers before the 7th inning, 18 evenings a year...With 200 bars in his [Hansen's] ward...that probably explains how he gets elected (Royko, 1988).
Even at the end, after the passage of the lights ordinance, a Chicago Tribune editorial (1988b) charged that the anti-lights community activists were "still determined to make the Cubs play only day baseball game or leave town." The editorial once again blamed the Chicago politicians as being responsible for sacrificing economic development and the strengthening of Chicago's neighborhoods by acting in ways which advanced their personal political agendas over the good of the public. It described the lights issue to "have served best as a diversion of attention from more critical urban problems that are paralyzing Chicago, its neighborhoods and its political leadership." The editorial concluded by congratulating the Cubs' civic actions of bringing an All-Star game to Chicago.

The role of the media proved extremely influential in advancing the interests of the franchise. The Chicago Tribune worked to support the installation of lights at Wrigley Field by communicating the social/cultural and economic value of the team to Chicagoland residents. At the same time, the newspaper engaged in agenda building, a political function of the media. Specifically, through its editorials, the newspaper ensured that the installation of lights at Wrigley Field remained an issue of concern for Chicago's government. Yet, the inherent conflict of interest in the relationship between the newspaper and the issue of the lights proved to be an advantage for the Cubs.
as they searched for approval of their stadium development plans.

Conclusion

The process through which the installation of lights at Wrigley Field occurred is a good example of how a professional franchise is capable of advancing its business interests through stadium development plans. The ownership of the franchise was successful, regardless of the strong opposition by the residents, in convincing the City Council that lights at Wrigley Field were more important than the potential negative quality of life effects of the surrounding residents.

The process of advancing these stadium development plans can be categorized into four general areas: (1) economic rationales, (2) social/cultural factors, (3) political developments, and (4) media effects. The franchise successfully outlined, through its own studies, the economic contributions which it makes to the City, the County and the State. At the same time, the city itself supported these projections. In the process, legitimate questions related to the method and utilization of these analyses never surfaced. Similarly, the franchise also convinced the public and the elected officials that the Cubs are an important element of the social fabric of the city, making the team worthy of special attention.
The issue of the installation of lights at Wrigley Field also became an issue of political will after Mayor Washington's death. Political opponents of Mayor Sawyer saw the installation of lights as an opportunity to showcase or test their political power. Though most Chicago aldermen supported an even more "pro Cubs" lights proposal advanced by late Mayor Washington than the one proposed by Mayor Sawyer, many became populists and supported the neighborhood anti-lights campaign. In reality, with mayoral elections in the near future, the lights issue became an opportunity for these politicians to put forth an early challenge to Mayor Sawyer. In the end, not even a referendum proved capable of changing the will of the city in passing a lights ordinance.

The media also played an important role. The Tribune Co., utilized the Chicago Tribune to advance its interests by shaping public perceptions. In the process, the arguments favoring the franchises' position were furthered.

The following chapter continues the investigation of this stadium development plan by addressing the community response and community effects. In this regard, the chapter also discusses the ability of the community to maintain the support of the city in its efforts to address the implications of the lights installation at Wrigley Field. Finally, the chapter outlines the community effects of this stadium development plan in Chicago, including how lights at Wrigley, a stadium development plan, have contributed in
reshaping this part of the city.
CHAPTER 8

TURNING THE LIGHTS ON AN URBAN COMMUNITY: THE IMPACT OF WRGLEY FIELD ON LAKE VIEW IN CHICAGO

Introduction

After a brief profile of the community of Lake View, this chapter is divided into two sections. The first section investigates the community response to this stadium development plan, the community strategies utilized by the residents, and the creation of the "Neighborhood Protection and Improvement Plan." This plan showcases the success of this community in ensuring that Lake View remains a focal point for both the city government and the Cubs after the installation of lights at Wrigley Field.

The second section concentrates on the community effects of this stadium development plan. The installation of lights contributed in reshaping the culture of this area. In this regard, this stadium development plan can be viewed to have effected this community in two ways. On the one hand, lights at Wrigley assisted in producing a vibrant night life within the community and contributed to gentrification. On the other hand, the long term effects of this plan could include a much different type of coexistence between Wrigley Field and Lake View. The presence of this ballpark within a residential community might cease to
describe the future relationship between Wrigley Field and Lake View. Thus, stadium development plans can directly and indirectly affect the urban environment.

The Community of Lake View

Lake View is an old established community located on the north side of downtown Chicago, along the lakefront. During its early years, the area was occupied by German immigrants and according to the U.S. Census, like many other urban communities in Chicago, Lake View went through population increases until the 1950’s. In 1950, over 125,000 made their homes in Lake View. Since then, the area has experienced considerable population decline. During the 1960’s, housing along the lakefront became high priced, and today, Lake View is predominantly a white residential community.

Over the years, the southwest corner of the community has remained a strong retail center (Belmont, Lincoln and Ashland Avenue). In addition, other commercial developments can be found along Clark Street, between Belmont and Addison and along Broadway Avenue (Diversy and Belmont), on the east part of its boundaries.

Wrigley Field is located in North Lake View. The ballpark was built for the Whalers and in 1916, after a league merge, the sports facility was taken over by the Cubs. Originally called Weeghman Park, it was renamed
Wrigley Field after the Wrigley family purchased the stadium and the team following WWI.

**Community Response to the Lights**

Upon announcement of the Cubs' interest in installing lights at Wrigley Field in 1982, the local community, under the leadership of the Citizens United for Baseball in the Sunshine (C.U.B.S.), protested and contested the stadium development proposal. Since then, the community became involved in a battle over the Cubs' stadium plans which spanned over a decade.

The residents organized to stop the Cubs from installing lights at Wrigley Field. The Lake View Citizens Council (LVCC) and the C.U.B.S., along with the strong support of the local alderman, engaged in an anti-lights campaign representing the community interests. For them, night games at the ballpark would mean increased traffic, noise, vandalism, rowdiness, and related negative community consequences (Crimmins, 1988).

The residents testified at city hearings indicating that lights at the ballpark would generate intolerable conditions for the surrounding neighborhoods. At a public hearing in February of 1988, for example, 350 community residents reiterated to a city committee their strong concerns about litter, traffic, crowd rowdiness, drunkenness and an overall state of neighborhood decline due to night
games. The introduction of lights would also negatively affect the property values in the surrounding area and evening street parking would be impossible. Some of the resident reactions at that hearing included: "We're going to be prisoners in our own homes" and "We can barely tolerate what we have now, and please don't ask us to tolerate more than that." Wayne Krauss, president of the Lake View Citizens Council, reflected on the proposed repeal of the existing ordinance by saying: "We worked hard to get those laws. We feel angry" (Seigel, 1988a).

As the Cubs received political support for their cause after they threatened to leave Chicago and move out of Wrigley Field, the residents lobbied against the efforts of Mayor Washington who supported a compromise on the issue. After the death of Washington, the community residents and their elected representative to the City Council began an effort to reverse the previously outlined support for the lights. Yet, Mayor Sawyer's ability to advance a similar compromising proposal and eventually pass a lights ordinance made night games at Wrigley Field possible.

As the residents saw their battle being lost and noted that the Sawyer proposal did not even include an 11:00 p.m. curfew during night games, they responded angrily with threats. Paul Kendall, president for C.U.B.S. a community organization which led the opposition against the Cubs noted:
I can't believe this is happening to Lake View. If you go through with this [lights ordinance], there will be hell to pay. We're getting screwed; it's not fair...[if the lights are installed, Wrigley Field] will not be known as the friendly confines anymore (Strong, 1988c:1).

The eventual passage of the lights ordinance at Wrigley Field generated concern and fear amongst residents in the surrounding neighborhoods. According to a local resident: "Sometimes [during day games] I have to park seven blocks from [home]...I have a sick mother, and with all the traffic we'll have at night, I'm afraid the ambulance would take 10 minutes to go a couple of blocks." A local store owner noted: "I'm here [at my store] during the day games and I see them bang my windows when they walk by...Now I'll have to stay here until the games are over for self defense." A police officer predicted increased illegal activity with night games. He indicated: "Under cover of darkness, I think we'll see more cars broken into...More scam operations will go on. Also, when you get a large crowd that has been drinking, eventually they'll get rowdy. I'm sure we'll have our hands full" (Casuso and Montana, 1988).

Regardless of these concerns, the lights at Wrigley Field became a reality. Since then, community representatives have attempted to monitor its implications and ensure that the city and the Cubs continue to respond to their promises, making the play of night games at Wrigley as orderly for the neighborhood as possible.
The Non-Binding Referendum

Since lights at Wrigley were to become a reality, the non-binding referendum became the last opportunity for the residents to express community dissatisfaction. The results of the non-binding referendum could also have an influence on the upcoming Chicago mayoral elections.

As the after-the-fact referendum in the 21 precincts around Wrigley Field (44th and 46th wards) was nearing a close, the future political implications of its outcome for Mayor Sawyer became clear. Late Mayor Washington's two-term electoral success was largely due to his effectiveness in receiving the vote of the north side lakefront. A strong anti-light sentiment expressed by these 11,647 residents at the referendum would signal the unlikely support which Mayor Sawyer should expect in the mayoral election. Mark Atkinson, former president of C.U.B.S. noted on the political implications of the nonbinding referendum for Sawyer:

A solid rejection of lights also would send a message to Mayor Eugene Sawyer who supported the ordinance. Mayor Sawyer has never been elected mayor. If he thinks he can ignore a substantial portion of the North Side, the lakefront, he could have a hard time being elected (Devall, 1988b).

What might become even more troublesome for the election efforts of Mayor Sawyer is how his political opponents might employ a strong anti-light referendum vote. Mayoral opponents Ald. Timothy Evans (4th ward), Ald. Edmund Burke (14th Ward) and Ald. Danny Davis (29th Ward), voted
against the lights ordinance. They could easily utilize the referendum results to politically attack Sawyer (Casuso, 1988).

The non-binding referendum results in the 21 North Side precincts, overwhelmingly supporting the position of the anti-lights community organizers. From the total votes at that referendum, 4,007 opposed and 1,292 favored lights at Wrigley Field. The importance of the lights issue for the community can be extracted from the fact that the voter turnout in those 21 precincts was higher than those in the surrounding precincts. Yet, total voter registration in both of these wards dropped during the November election (Devall, 1988c).

Strategies Utilized by the Lake View Community Residents

A number of different strategies were utilized by the residents during their battle with the city and the Cubs over the installation of lights at Wrigley Field. Specifically:

1. Early advocacy on traffic concerns: It was years before the 1988 decision to install lights at Wrigley Field, that the community of Lake View became involved in addressing concerns over traffic congestion due to baseball games. A Wrigley Field transportation study conducted by the Bureau of Traffic Engineering was requested by the community in
In 1984, the community lobbied the Department of Streets and Sanitation to address traffic related concerns. These early advocacy efforts by the community served as an existing base around which the residents could organize as the Cubs kept their pressure on the city government to pass an ordinance which would allow for the installation of lights.

(2) Legal Action: The community threatened to sue the Tribune Co., the Cubs, the City and Major League Baseball for a conspiracy to generate aggravation in the neighborhood surrounding Wrigley Field. They charged that in addition to the aggravation, the lights would generate increased traffic, crime, noise and decreased property values. The community also planned to investigate Wrigley Field itself for being in violation of zoning restrictions since the  

On April 16th and April 17th, 1980 (season opening day), the study compared the arriving traffic volume between 11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. and departure traffic volume 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. The study showed that most of the traffic volume occurred at Belmont and Lake Shore Drive (arriving=61% of total/ departing=37% of total). Based on these findings, this study recommended that the public should be encouraged through the installation of appropriate directive signs to use the Irving Park and Lake Shore Drive exits (current use at arriving= 10% of total/ current use at departing=27% of total) (Memorandum, 1980).

In 1984, the Lake View Citizens Council expressed concerns over parking in the area during afternoon Cubs games. A communication by this group to the City of Chicago and the Department of Streets and Sanitation requested that additional towing trucks should patrol the area since the cars illegally parked "endanger our homes and families" (Memorandum, 1985).
ballpark is zoned for commercial use and not as a sports stadium (Devall, 1988b).

(3) Non-binding referendum: The residents placed on the March 1988 ballot a non-binding referendum on the issue of lights at Wrigley Field. The voting results showed an overwhelming expression of anti-lights sentiment and were received as a great victory by the community. Viewed as a source of hope for overturning the City Council approved ordinance, the results became a threat to Mayor Sawyer who supported the installation of lights. According to Charlotte Newfeld, coordinator of the referendum efforts for the C.U.B.S.:

I believe that it will have a great effect. This referendum push has provided a political army of trained people who know the political process-and there will be other elections in Chicago (Casuso, 1988).

(4) Local Political Support: The community worked within the confines of the political system, an approach which proved somewhat successful. Alderman Bernard Hansen (44th ward) effectively advanced the interests of the residents and attempted to generate political support when possible. During the "battle", Ald. Hansen was concerned if he was truly representing the voice of his ward, since the Tribune Co. often claimed that the anti-lights sentiment was concentrated amongst few individuals. However, the overwhelming support of the 1988 non-binding referendum strengthened his position.

Hansen also utilized the results of traffic volume
studies showing the effect which day baseball exerted on the local community. He requested that the Bureau of Traffic Engineering conduct additional studies on this subject. One of the studies requested by Hansen was completed in 1984. It showed that, when compared to normal traffic volume, one hour before each of the Cubs' games (June 14, 15 and August 3, 1994) the traffic in the area increased by 1625 cars, and one hour after each of these games the traffic increased by 1319 (Memorandum, 1985).

(5) Strong Community-wide Involvement: The residents engaged in strong grassroots campaign activities to protest the installation of lights. As early as 1982 and 1983 they lobbied the court system to turn down the Cubs' request to repeal the anti-lights legislation. In later years they sustained pressure on the Chicago City Council by strong participation at public hearings.

(6) Strong Internal Community Organization: A critical factor contributing to the constant public pressure applied by the community, can be extracted from the fact that the "cause" did not experience internal divisions. Former presidents of the local community organizations involved in this multi-year issue, continued to provide support, thus creating a long-lasting united front. Also, prior to the March 1988 referendum, the community organizations were successful in registering additional voters who would resist the lights ordinance. That effort was well orchestrated
since one can consider that the C.U.B.S. organization had assigned specific individuals to spearhead these efforts.

Even during the first night game, the community organizers enlisted over 200 residents to participate in a review of the surrounding events. Some participated as "watchers." They sat in the front of their homes and took notes on any occurrences on their street. Others were responsible for monitoring events taking place at the block level, and finally, a group of others were involved in assessing the neighborhood effect at a three to five block radius (Temkin, 1988).

(7) Wrigley Field Traffic Operations Committee: The Wrigley Field Traffic Operations Committee, a group of elected officials and community representatives, served as a link between the Lake View residents and the city. The purpose of the group was to assist with the implementation of a plan which would be responsive to the related community concerns. In this regard, the primary functions of this group were to conduct community advocacy at the city level.47

(8) Efforts to Eliminate Alcohol Consumption: The residents attempted to use the anti-lights results from the area referendum to, in a latter referendum, vote both the Wrigley

47 A review of committee meeting minutes in 1991 and 1992 showed that community residents/business owners were able, through these meetings, to either address or solve other legitimate community issues and concerns. Some of these concerns were unrelated to the scope of the February 25, 1988 city ordinance (i.e., sidewalk replacement) (Wrigley Field Traffic Operations Committee, 1992b).
Field and the surrounding are "dry." The community would take advantage of a state law enacted in 1934, after the repeal of the Prohibition, which allowed residents of precincts in Chicago to vote their areas "dry", thus, canceling all alcohol licenses and making the sale of alcohol in that area illegal. This strategy was aimed at ensuring that the strong anti-lights sentiment expressed in the referendum was carried through, thus, showcasing continuous community strength on this issue. One of the concerns which emerged from this community planning effort was the impact which such a "dry" referendum would have on local businesses. According to Jimmy Jones, a tavern owner in the area:

I'm upset. [The referendum] would hurt me when they're [community organizers] trying to hurt Wrigley Field. The biggest tavern owner, the ones that get most of the people from the games, aren't in the precinct, so they won't be affected. They should take the small tavern owner into consideration (Casuso, 1988).

A few months later, Mayor Sawyer and Governor Thompson included a repeal of that state law in a legislation proposal which was approved in June 1988. This made it impossible for the residents to carry out their threats of placing such a referendum on the November 1988 ballot.

(9) Continuous pressure after the installation of lights: The community groups continued their involvement in the process of implementing an effective protection and improvement plan after the installation of lights. Showcasing such a strong level of involvement ensured that
the city and the Cubs sustained their commitment to minimize the negative neighborhood effects.

Community and City Relations After The Lights: The Neighborhood Protection and Improvement Plan

Since the issue of the lights at Wrigley was heavily contested among the city, the Cubs and the local community, the residents were successful in sustaining the interest of the city by ensuring that their concerns were to be continuously monitored and addressed. The ordinance passed by the Chicago City Council on February 25, 1988, noted that the city would "ensure that the interests and concerns of the residential neighborhoods which surround Wrigley Field are adequately protected" as a result of the installation of lights at Wrigley Field (City of Chicago, 1988a).

Based on the city ordinance, a task force under the direction of the Department of Planning was formed to develop a plan which would most adequately respond to the community concerns. The task force worked closely with community representatives and Chicago Cubs officials to meet its objectives. As a result, yearly plans were developed to address the community concerns. The creation of the "Neighborhood Protection and Improvement Plan" shows that the community proved successful in engaging the city and the franchise to address the effects of this stadium development plan on its residents.

This plan, from its inception, recognized the effect of
night baseball and outlined its development assumptions:

A major premise used to develop the plan is that the most "extraordinary" impact to the residential community which surrounds Wrigley Field presently occurs during the baseball games on weekends and major holidays and on days when baseball games begin at 3:05 p.m. These are the days and times during which residents normally need access to their community and to the available but limited on-street parking. The community will similarly be impacted by night baseball. The plan developed is applicable to all weekend, major holiday, and night baseball games, becoming effective with the first night baseball game... A second premise underlying this plan, is that the primary means for ameliorating traffic congestion, limited neighborhood parking, and related community concerns, is the creation of remote parking opportunities that will reduce the number of vehicles and persons using Lake View and Uptown streets in the immediate Wrigley Field area. An essential element of the remote parking operation will be a Resident Permit Parking program. However, the permit parking component of the plan, as per the ordinance, will be effective only on days which night baseball games are played (eight games in 1988) (City of Chicago, 1988b, pp. 1-2).

This plan would add to another plan already in existence that was advanced in 1984 by community Alderman Bernard Hansen (44th Ward). Alderman Hansen had attempted, under the 'Wrigley Field Traffic Operations Committee', a committee with local elected official and community resident representation, to address existing neighborhood concerns. Under that particular plan, a litter pick-up program was implemented by the City and the Cubs, and police services during Cubs' games were successfully expanded.

At the end of the first year, a residential parking permit program and a police hotline was added, service bus service was expanded, police presence to assist with area traffic and to address fan related disorderly conduct was
increased, a new litter control program which required the participation of the Cubs was instituted, and the Cubs would restrict the sale of beer during the games. Finally, the franchise would advance the entire plan through public relations. The task force also concluded that the plan would be continuously updated based on the input of the community (City of Chicago, 1988b).

After the first year, a review of the previous plan and recommendations for the 1989 baseball season at Wrigley, would assist in developing a smoother and better neighborhood improvement plan. This report acknowledged the importance of community involvement in the project and expressed its interest in continuing the improvement of the plan. According to the report:

Community involvement has played a major role in the development of the plan, both before and after the first night game. Modifications to the plan have occurred with community participation and input. This report will serve as an outline for a continuing dialogue between City agencies and Lake View/Uptown community and business representatives (City of Chicago, 1988c, pp. 2).

The overall assessment of the 1988 community plan was characterized as successful, yet changes would be needed.

Based upon the 1988 plan assessment, some of the recommendations provided by the task force to be considered for the 1989 revised plan included: (1) the reducing the length of permit parking hours from 4:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., to 5:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. This would provide for street parking access to local business employees, (2) possible
expansion of the residential parking permit zone to encompass additional streets, (3) a public relations program to communicate these changes to the residents would be enacted, (4) expanded parking arrangements and bus services would be renewed, (5) a publicity effort will be undertaken by the City of Chicago to inform the public of the parking regulations and encourage the ridership of public transportation, (6) a reevaluation and improvements of traffic flow will be conducted, (7) the Chicago Cubs will increase its communication with local religious and cultural organizations to ensure that events which would potentially generate increased congestion are limited, (8) signs will be installed by the city at areas designated by the community, prohibiting charter bus parking and engine running, (9) continuation of the litter program, (10) the Cubs would expand their involvement by communicating through their media, numerous aspects of this phase of the "Neighborhood Protection and Improvement Plan."

A 1990 city report evaluated the effectiveness of the 1989 plan and made recommendations for the upcoming season. This report outlined two major problems from the previous year. These problems were "people problems on the public way associated with the consumption of alcohol" and "residential on-street parking problems in the immediate Wrigley Field area during night ball games" (City of Chicago, 1990a, pp. 1).
Continuous efforts, according to this report, will take place by the police department to address the "peoples’" problems. The use of the police hotline which will specifically operate for the night baseball games out of the Department of Streets and Sanitation Command Post should prove helpful in these efforts.

The 1990 plan proposed that the city work with the community to develop a plan which would address these traffic concerns. The city would also work with the community on charter bus operations and continue to promote the permit parking program for night baseball through various means of communication, thus, making the residents aware of its logistics (City of Chicago, 1990b).

Finally, the city would expand the availability of remote parking. Efforts to secure additional parking for night games by the city were spearheaded by a Cubs' proposal to turn city-owned vacant land east of Graceland Cemetery, north of the ballpark, into a remote parking facility. The proposal would be taken into consideration by the city, the CTA, the park district and the community. This proposal was approved by the residents neighboring the vacant land (206-118 vote) in early 1990 (Kendall, 1990).

It becomes clear from the developments presented above that the city responded with great diligence to the concerns of the Lake View residents. Due to the effect of night baseball on the community, resident representation has been
a part of the plan development process to improve and protect the neighborhood. The 1990 report, also outlined community input on the proposed plans. The report noted:

The 1990 Lake View/Uptown Neighborhood Protection and Improvement Plan was developed with community input and participation primarily through the Wrigley Field Traffic Operations Committee (City of Chicago, 1990a, pp. 5).

The community of Lake View has been very effective in addressing the multiple concerns which arose from night baseball. Yet, the greatest success of the community has been its ability to ensure that the city of Chicago respond to these community issues with great support. In addition, the organization of the Chicago Cubs has also been responsive to the various community apprehensions and has attempted to address the need to make night baseball an event with limited negative effects for the surrounding neighborhood. This ability of the community to engage and sustain city support has been largely due to successful advocacy strategies.

**Reshaping Lake View**

The community area of Lake View saw the installation of lights at Wrigley Field in 1988. What were the implications of this stadium development plan on the surrounding neighborhoods? Did the lights and the implementation of the area parking permit program, as a result of this stadium project, assist in transforming this community? What type
of population has been occupying this northside community in recent years and how could the socioeconomic characteristics of this population complement the environment created by the lights at Wrigley Field? These are some of the questions which can provide us with an insight into whether stadium development can reshape the urban environment.

Angela Fadragas (1980:17), when considering the future of Lake View, noted the importance of the relationship between business and residential interests as a result of night games played at Wrigley Field:

The latest threat to the equilibrium between businesses and residential use centers around Wrigley Field, where the Cubs' organization, no longer managed by the Wrigley Family, has indicated an interest in staging night baseball games. A large number of residents in the central area of Lake View believe that this would create many problems - parking, noise, vandalism, crime - that would lower the quality of life. However, some say baseball contributes to many businesses in the vicinity, and the introduction of night games would create more opportunities. Development of Lake View seems likely to be determined by further variants of this continuing conflict between businesses and residential interests (pp. 17).

The development of businesses serving the night games clientele could have a direct effect on the future of this community area.

Though many factors can be accounted for when considering community change (real estate interests, government, business interests, transportation, etc.), the goal here is to address the relationship between the stadium development plans at Wrigley Field and their possible implications for the local community. In that regard, an
assessment of both the introduction of night baseball and the parking program could serve as additional factors in the overall physical and social reorganization of that area.

In addition to the factors mentioned above, demographic changes should be taken into consideration, such as the possible movement of population in communities which surround Lake View. For example, recent increases in property values within the community of Lincoln Park, immediately to the south, could have pushed to the north, a young, professional, single population, now priced out of that market.

By taking these issues into consideration, I will address (1) how the introduction of a parking permit program, a response to the stadium development plan, and night games negatively affected some businesses over others, contributing to the creation of an entertainment area around Wrigley Field, and (2) how, as a result of these changes, an increased movement of population characterized as "cosmopolites" and "unmarried and childless" emerged in this area (Gans, 1962).

**Boosting a Night Life Atmosphere**

The stadium development plan at Wrigley Field had a direct effect on the economic organization of the community. In order to understand the relationship between the installation of lights at the ballpark and the
reorganization of the business establishments in the area, two factors must be taken into consideration. The first is the growing parking problem and the second is the imbalance in the businesses benefitting from this stadium development plan. At the same time, it should be noted that parking problems contributed to this imbalance.

At a community meeting, representatives recognized the need for a plan to address a growing parking issue. The area problem, according to committee members, resulted from the increased activities of commercial establishments. It is interesting to note here that the community representatives at that meeting described these "problems" as being "unrelated to sporting events." The meeting minutes read:

It was the consensus of the attendees that there was a growing need to develop a strategy to deal with the significant increase in commercial bar, restaurant, and entertainment activity along Clark Street, Sheffield and Belmont Avenues in the program area. This growth has resulted in traffic control and parking problems, totally unrelated to sporting events, which aggravate those experienced during night baseball games (Wrigley Field Traffic Operations Committee, 1992a, pp. 3).

This community concern, three years after the installation of lights, though initially viewed as independent of the games at Wrigley Field, can be related to the newly enforced parking permit program. The parking program has had negative economic implications on certain local businesses since these establishments cannot derive income from the night games played at the ballpark.
Specifically, a video store, a cleaners, a salon, etc., will not experience increased business activities from the crowds brought into the area to watch night games. On the other hand, restaurants, bars, clubs, and related commercial activities will benefit from the atmosphere generated by night games. The parking permit program then, instituted by the residents and the city to alleviate the negative affects of the crowds, has had different effects on the local businesses.

During the initial stages of the Permit Parking Program many business owners felt that the introduction of lights at Wrigley Field and the measures aimed at addressing parking concerns had negative implications for their operations. According to Barbara Orre, owner of a salon in the area, the permit program has hurt her business: "It's unfair. My customers have no place to park. If you have a license and can buy a city sticker, you should be able to park anywhere." And, according to Richard Friedman, general manager of a nonprofit theater in the area: "People will drive around, get frustrated and go home. This could be dangerous for business in the area." Finally, Mike Quigley, aid to Ald. Hansen (44th ward), agreed that not enough consideration was given to the effect which the permit parking program will have on the local businesses. According to Quigley, the plan is "basically saying they [local business] are going to be closed that evening."
Let’s face facts: No one is going to come to this area during games if there is nowhere to park” (Burnside, 1988). Fearing towing and parking tickets, many potential customers for these businesses chose not to make any purchases when night games were played at Wrigley Field. Some store owners estimated a drop of business during night games as high as 75 percent and others blamed Mayor Sawyer for discouraging non-parking sticker owners from visiting the area. Sam Toia, president of the Lake View Central Business Association, noted: "Even the mayor is saying don’t go to Wrigleyville if you don’t have a sticker. They are scaring business away" (Seigel, 1988b).

A new expanded parking plan instituted for 1989 was meant to take away the pressure from the local businesses. But according to local businesses it did not help. The parking plan continued to negatively impact the small businesses which did not sell alcohol. Bob Roschke owner of a used books and records in the area commented:

I think what happens is that you do get some new people coming in to the neighborhood that wouldn’t otherwise be around. But with the night games, it’s horrible. I think that everyone around here will agree it’s killed businesses for them, except for the bars, maybe. People won’t come to the neighborhood at noon, even, if they know they know there’s a night game, because they feel like they won’t find a parking space. It’s a 20 to 30 percent drop in business for us" (McCracken, 1989).

On the other hand, sports bars in the area like "Sluggers" and the "Cubby Bear" know that when the Cubs are in town their business will skyrocket. Mike Vasilevich,
manager of "Sluggers" outlined his business plan:

What we want is to generate some business when the Cubs are on the road, because we know we're going to get them when the Cubs are at home (McCracken, 1989).

Eventually a renewed parking program was instituted which prohibited parking in the LV-Zone designated areas from 5:00pm to 10:00pm during night ballgames. The effect of that new parking program has remained the same. The owner of a small grocery store in the corner of Damen and Addison told me when asked about his perceptions of night games and business growth:

...right here where I am (about a mile from the ballpark) they [night games] do not affect me. Business has not been better here because of the lights. But I tell you what, my buddy who is further closer to Wrigley and runs a small bar has seen better business because of the lights. The people come at night and they stay outside longer. At night people will drink, eat... These businesses benefit from the night games.

Clark Street between Sheffield and Grace has become a viable night district. The overwhelming majority of the businesses are restaurants and bars. Though many of these establishments are sports oriented, trendy Japanese, Ethiopian and Chinese restaurants, along with noodle shops and an oyster bar, do well in that area. The "Wrigley Side", a few feet away from the ballpark advertises "Live blues after the game" hoping to attract some of the thousands who pour out of Wrigley following night games.

The other non-alcohol businesses which have remained, acknowledge that they might be in the wrong type of
businesses. Joe Pinter, owner of the Pinters' Violin Shop on Clark, north of the ballpark told me:

I have been here for 28 years and things in recent years have changed tremendously. Parking has helped around here for the better, I mean for the residents. There have been more bars and restaurants in the area than ever before. My business has not gotten any help from all this. The bar and restaurant business is the type of business you want to get in here. That's where the money is now.

Jeffrey Frisone has been working for the last two years at the "Bookworks", on Clark and Sheffield, a store that buys and sells books and records. He told me about the business activity in that store:

There has been definitely an increase in trendy stuff around here. Many young people are bar hopping. Often you have long lines outside these bars as people wait to get in. The lights have been good for those businesses but they have not helped ours. The crowds tend to be loaded [with alcohol] and some of them are even dangerous. It can get crazy around here sometimes.

Frisone also told me about the reasons for the late evening store hours, while commenting on the type of customers that frequent the store:

Our hours go from noon to 10 p.m. and noon to 11:00 p.m. Some of the people who come here to go to the game might stop by and pick up a baseball book. But you cannot rely on that. Many of the local residents are our customers. The long evening hours are mostly for them since you cannot rely on the crowds after the night games for business.

An investigation of indicators of economic change support the above assertions. The data on the number of employees by sector in the 60613 zip code (Lake View-Wrigley Field is in that code) shows a decrease in the number of
manufacturing and retail employees and a sharp increase in the "other" category which would include restaurants, bars and similar types of commercial establishments. This trend is not observed in the Lake View zip code (60657), nor in the zip codes which encompass the New Comiskey Park (60616) and the United Center (60612).

Specifically, in 1986, two years before the introduction of night games at Wrigley Field, 6,100 were employed in the 60613 zip code. Of those, 3800 (62%) were employed in the non-manufacturing/non-retail sector. In 1988, the year that night games were introduced at Wrigley Field, in that same zip code, approximately 6,900 employees worked in the area. Of those, 4300 (62%) worked in the non-manufacturing/non-retail sector. In 1990, two years after night games, the overall number of employees increased to approximately 8,100. Of those, 6,100 (75%) worked in non-manufacturing and non-retail sectors (Woodstock Institute, 1994).

**A New Type of Wrigleyville Resident**

The creation of a night life atmosphere in Lake View has attracted a specific resident to this community. According to Herbert Gans (1962), the quality of life in the urban environment varies since its residents do not assume a
common lifestyle. Others, including Wirth (1938), Fischer (1982; 1984), Kadushin (1983), and Creekmore (1985), have viewed urbanism in either positive or negative ways.
negatively affected by life in the city.

In considering Gans' typology, Lake View has seen in recent years an increase in 'cosmopolites' and 'unmarried and childless.' According to Ann Ralston, a real estate agent for Burton Realty in the area: "There are a lot of young people around here because of the ballpark...and that gives the area a youthful, vivacious feel" (Buursma, 1990b). It is also interesting to note how the area which was once called North Lake View, now has received a strong identity from Wrigley Field and is called Wrigleyville. Advertisements by real estate agents sometimes use the word "Wrigleyview" to describe a listing, a fact which also denotes the influence of the ballpark on the identification of the area.

A 1985 survey showed that 36 percent of the residents within a mile distance from Wrigley Field (31.3 percent of those living between zero and half a mile from the ballpark and 40.7 percent of those living between half a mile and a mile from the ballpark) outlined the presence of Wrigley Field as a positive factor in their decision to live in the area. Only 9.3 percent (11.9 percent of those living between zero and half a mile from the ballpark and 6.5 percent of those living between half a mile and a mile from the ballpark) indicated that Wrigley Field was a negative factor. The rest, 54.8 percent, described the ballpark as neither a positive nor a negative influence in their
decision-making (Chicago Cubs, 1985b).

Bob Murphy moved in the area in the late 1980's. Bob grew up in the Chicago suburbs, went to college, and when he completed his degree, found a job in the Loop. He was not married at the time and the Wrigley area was exactly what he was looking for. He told me:

Wrigleyville was exactly what I was looking for. I had just finished college and I was able to take public transportation to work. I got an apartment a few blocks away from the ballpark which was owned by an older couple. It was a great place because there are many people there like me. I went to Wrigley, but most of the fans are not there for the games. It is the atmosphere, its an event, the history and tradition of the park...there is a lot of things to do there [Wrigley area]. There are a lot of bars and that type of an environment.

Bob married a few years later to someone whom he met in the area and moved to a suburban home. Now he takes the suburban train to the Loop. He indicated to me his reasoning:

After you marry, it is difficult to stay in that environment. I don’t know how people do it. For us who are planning a family, moving to the suburbs seemed to be the right choice.

Nora Weston provided a similar logic to the fact that she currently resides in that area. She indicated to me:

I came here after I completed college. This is the place to be. There are many people who live here and are of similar age. I work in human resources for a large accounting firm downtown. Transportation is great and in the evenings there are so many places to visit and things to do, nearby. It is great. ...After I get married though, a suburban lifestyle is going to be much better for me since it is more slow paced.

Residential lending has also increased dramatically in
Lake View between 1988 and 1992. The overall number of
loans (including conventional, home improvement, FHA/VA, and
multifamily types) was 1,600 in 1988. In 1992 that number
skyrocketed to near 3,300. Of those loans, most were
conventional. Specifically the number of conventional loans
increased from approximately 1,400 in 1988 to 3,000 in 1992.
Their amount also increased from $150 million in 1988 to
$400 million (Woodstock Institute, 1994).

Mark Abbey, moved to the area, hoping to share the
economic growth which Wrigleyville has experienced in recent
years. He noted:

I wanted to be in a trend-setting group, to get here
before the pack...Now that the Cubs are staying in the
neighborhood it's a positive sign and an indicator that
more Yuppies will move in. There is a tide that has
come into Wrigleyville in terms of money and growth
potential...My feeling is that if the Cubs didn’t win
[in 1984 and 1989] and they didn’t have lights at the
park, I’m doubtful that you would have had the growth
or rise in real estate values we’ve seen (Buursma,
1990a).

The proximity to the lake, the numerous cultural and
social amenities, have drawn young upscale professionals.
Housing costs in the area has increased dramatically. On
Wayne and Addison one has to pay over $250,000 to purchase a
newly renovated unit in a three flat building with a two car
garage and a fireplace. At 1118 West Addison, fifty feet
from the ballpark, a two bedroom, one bathroom apartment
rents for $1,000 a month. Ann Ralston, a real estate agent
in Wrigleyville indicated how many are priced out of the
housing market in Wrigleyville:
Right now, houses are going for $175,000 to $400,000, and the 175,000 home would need a lot of work. So all the people who are looking for a home in the $150,000 to $175,000 range are now buying condos" (Buursma, 1990b).

Along Southport Avenue, two blocks west of Wrigley Field one can observe home rehabilitation as well as the emergence of shops and stores that serve a population which might be characterized as "trendy."

Redevelopment has also taken place around the ballpark in recent years. Many old apartment buildings and small industrial plants have been converted to upscale residential condominium and single home properties. These developments have taken advantage of the cafes, bars, restaurants and taverns, transforming Wrigleyville into an entertainment center for those with high, disposable incomes. During one of my walks through the residential area around the ballpark, I identified 14 homes being rehabbed by construction crews.

Some residential redevelopment, directly associated with the opportunity to view a game from the rooftop of buildings surrounding Wrigley Field, has recently taken place. In 1990, for example, real estate investors purchased a victorian overlooking the ballpark. With an excellent viewing opportunity from the roof top, one stands 460 feet from home plate along the right side line. The purchasing price was $425,000 in cash, a few thousand dollars more from the asking price of $419,000. The
investors described the deal as an "idiot-proof" investment. After rehabbing the building and adding a rooftop deck for allowing up to 50 people to view the game, the expected sale of the newly created four unit building is $240,000 for the basement condo and $300,000 for each of the three units above. A total resale value of $1.14 million (Buursma, 1990c).

Changes Around the Ballpark

An investigation of census track data from 1980 and 1990 supports the claims made above. Specifically, after identifying the tracks which surround Wrigley Field within half a mile from the ballpark, selected data was compared. The boundaries utilized for this analysis are Ashland (West), Irving Park (North), Belmont (South) and Halsted (East). The census tracks which fell within these boundaries are: #604, #605, #606, #607, #610, #611, #612, #614, #615, #616, #617, #621, #622, #623, #624. The total population of these tracks in 1980 was 27,896 and dropped to 24,853 in 1990.

The data (APPENDIX A) shows that the population around that area of the city changed significantly between 1980 and 1990. Specifically, there was a decrease in the older population (3.1%) and a considerable increase in residents aged between 25 and 34 (11.3%). Those residing in this area of the city are also more likely to live alone (6.6%) or
live with non-relatives (8.0%), when compared to the population which resided in the area during 1980. Another observation relates to the increased transiency as shown by the "Lived in same house 5 years ago" category. The decrease by 8.3 percent from 1980, shows that this area of the Lake View community is less stable now than it was 10 years before. Other considerable changes can be viewed in marital status, occupation, level of education, income and housing value (See APPENDIX A).

These characteristics support the fact that a younger, single, better educated with higher disposable incomes population has occupied the area in recent years. The lights at Wrigley Field and the introduction of night games contributed to the creation of a nightlife atmosphere, making their co-existence possible. The development of this type of environment attracts individuals who would depict the characteristics exemplified by the data above.

In examining the census tract data (APPENDIX B) within the half mile radius around Wrigley Field it becomes evident that the tracts which are closer to Wrigley, specifically #610, #611, #616, #617, #621 and #622, bounded by Grace, Racine, Belmont and Halsted Avenue, support the above assertions even more than the expanded census tract data.

Specifically, this second group of tract data (closer to Wrigley Field) shows that the educational level of its residents, in 1990, was higher (56.3% had a Bachelor's
degree or higher) than the overall average of the tracts within half a mile radius around Wrigley Field (49.7% had a Bachelor's degree or higher). In addition, the percent change between 1980 and 1990, regarding the 20-24 year olds, is higher in this second, closer zone (+ 3.6%) than in the first more expanded zone (+ 1.2%). Similarly, the 25-34 year olds percentage change is also higher in this closer zone (14.4% versus 11.3%). Also, the percentage change of males who never married in this closer zone, between 1980 and 1990, is 16.5% compared to the 13.7% change in the more expanded zone. Finally, in this closer zone, the percent change between 1980 and 1990 of females that have never been married is 23.3% compared to the expanded zone which is 17.7% (See APPENDIX B).

Though the lights were installed in 1988, the extensive six year coverage of the issue generated considerable attention to the mystique and historical tradition of Wrigley Field. Such overwhelming coverage made Wrigley Field an even greater landmark for Chicago, spotlighting the community area surrounding the ballpark.

The Long Term Effect of Lights on the Community

The long term implications of the lights installation on the community of Lake View might be more difficult to assess. As indicated above, night games have generated a culture which has transformed the surrounding area into an
entertainment hub, attractive to young professionals. But is it possible to hypothesize on the status of the community twenty to thirty years from now?

Night games in stadiums always began in limited numbers, yet, in later years, the number of night games increased to eventually become the norm. If night games at Wrigley Field become the norm, then, the effect which transportation might have on the surrounding community should be considered.

With the increase of night games, the automobile will become the primary source of transportation. If that is the case, street or surface parking will not be adequate to support the demand. The question then would be whether buildings in the area remain more profitable than surface parking. In responding to this question Bess and Decker (1988:71) wrote:

A typical six-flat in Wrigleyville has a current market value of $400,000-500,000, and generates a minimum gross income of approximately $36,000 a year. A typical Chicago six-flat lot is 50 by 125 feet. Adjacent to Wrigley Field, and cleared for surfaced parking, such a lot might now generate about $25,000 per year in gross income (assuming 200 square feet per car, valet parking, $10 per car in parking fees, and 81 games per year), but with fewer maintenance costs and much lower taxes assessed to the "unimproved" real estate...Assuming that night baseball does generate more automobile traffic, how much of this traffic can a neighborhood tolerate before prices escalate to $20-25 per space making surface parking too economically attractive to resist (pp. 70).

If this assessment is accurate, then it is possible that in the pursuit of profit, residential properties will
give way to potential revenue generated by parking. That would mean the end of a coexistence between Wrigley Field and the surrounding community.\textsuperscript{49}

When examining current parking practices in the area around Wrigley Field, one can arrive at the development scenario discussed above by Bess. Specifically, on game days, businesses along Clark and Addison streets become transformed into parking garages for the automobile traffic. 'Krystals Hand Car Wash' on Clark Street, stops washing cars on game days and charges $10 for parking, promising a quick and easy exit out of the area after the game. One of the attendants who was flagging cars in the car wash/garage told me:

On game days there is demand for parking around here. We have a business that can be a garage. Why not use it. You can make some good bucks from that...The competition [for parking] is rough around here but we do well. See from here you get on Clark and then you go south and you are out of the congestion. That is why this is a good place to park when you come to the game.

Local gas stations and even the parking lots of adjacent

\textsuperscript{49} An example which could be considered to support this hypothesis is the case of Crosley Field in Cincinnati. It was there that the first night baseball game was played in 1935. Crosley Field just like Wrigley Field was an urban ballpark. It rested within a residential community and was well connected to the surrounding neighborhoods. A comparison of aerial pictures depicting Crosley Field in the early 1930’s, during the 1953 All-Star game and in the 1960’s, prior to its demolition, reveal some interesting findings. In the early 1950’s, many of the residential properties began to deteriorate and by the 1960’s, there was nothing left around the ballpark but large parking lots, similar to those found in the recently constructed suburban style ballparks.
fast food restaurants also become transformed into game day parking garages.

Clearly, the future stability of Wrigleyville depends on the ability of the local community organizations to consider the long term implications which an increased night game schedule could have on Lake View. Though noise, drunkenness, rowdiness are all concerns that affect the daily life of the immediate residents, the reorganization of space due to economic rationales could have wider implications and threaten the stability of this community.

Conclusion

The installation of lights at Wrigley Field by the Cubs in 1988 is an example of how professional franchises through stadium development plans attempt to generate increased revenues. The sale of the Cubs to a corporation in 1981 adds to the dynamics of the lights issue. The derived income from expected, nationally broadcasted night games makes the installation of lights a "necessity" for the new ownership.

Wrigley Field is also positioned in a predominantly white residential community and its strong, sustainable response to the lights issue made the installation of lights a difficult task for the franchise. Concerns about increased community problems and decreased property values, allowed the residents to enlist the support of the local
political leadership in the "battle."

Yet, the fear of losing the historic franchise becomes an unthinkable possibility to most including the local government. The perceived economic implications take center stage and are utilized as a rationale to apply pressure on the anti-lights organizers. The city becomes involved in supporting the needs of the franchise by passing an ordinance which allows night games at the ballpark.

In response to citizen concerns, a permit parking program for the surrounding neighborhoods, during nights games is approved. Yet, that decision has helped some businesses over others and in the process impacted the existing economic balance within the community. The area around Wrigley Field becomes an entertainment center, providing a great opportunity for restaurants, bars, clubs and related businesses to succeed. On the other hand, other small businesses found that the parking permit program discouraged many customers from visiting their shops due to fear of parking tickets and towing.

This general culture which the lights fostered, contributed to attracting many young professionals to the area, since the presence of a night life atmosphere complements their lifestyle. The introduction of night baseball has assisted in reorganizing this area and has transformed life in this community. As economic rationales have driven the current status of this urban community, it
is going to be the evolution of these same economies, which, in the long term, will shape its future. As Bess (1988:74) indicates: "...the character of Wrigley Field depends on the health and well being of Wrigleyville."

The issue of the installation of lights at Wrigley Field also became an issue of political will after Mayor Washington's death. Political opponents of Mayor Sawyer saw the installation of lights as an opportunity to showcase or test their political power. Though most Chicago aldermen supported an even more "pro Cubs" lights proposal advanced by late Mayor Washington than the one proposed later by Mayor Sawyer, many became populists and supported the neighborhood anti-lights campaign. In reality, with mayoral elections in the near future, the lights issue became an opportunity for these politicians to place forth an early challenge to Mayor Sawyer. In the end, not even a referendum proved capable of changing the will of the city in passing a lights ordinance.
CHAPTER 9
COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO SPORTS-DRIVEN URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEAR WEST SIDE

Introduction

This chapter examines two recent attempts to construct professional sports stadiums in Chicago’s disadvantaged Near West Side during the 1980’s and into the 1990’s. The first attempt was initiated by the Chicago Bears who proposed to build a 75,000 seated, open-air, spectator facility. The second effort led to the construction of the United Center which was completed in 1994 to host the Chicago Bulls of the NBA and the Chicago Blackhawks of the NHL. The United Center is also the site of the upcoming, 1996 National Democratic Convention.

This chapter investigates these stadium development projects within the context of urban redevelopment. Specifically, proponents of these stadiums perceive the construction of these facilities as leading to the improvement of a low-income community. As a result, the stadium becomes viewed as a vehicle of urban regeneration. In this regard, this analysis outlines the political economy of these stadium development plans while concentrating on the response of the local community. Specifically, (1) driven by increased profit possibilities, the ownership of
these franchises identifies numerous stadium construction proposals, (2) community activists show themselves to be surprisingly effective in extracting substantial, short-term benefits in negotiations with sports team owners, (3) the only long term beneficiaries of these negotiations, however, are the team owners, whose voices predominate in the financial, political and media arenas wherein negotiation outcomes are determined, and (4) the advancement of these corporate interests, as expressed through sports and stadium construction, also result in the reorganization of city space at the physical, economic and cultural level.

The Community of the Near West Side

Like many other urban communities, the Near West Side in Chicago has experienced the great white flight to the suburbs. The U.S. Census reports a decrease in local area population since the 30's. In addition, the sharp increase of the African-American population, combined with the sharp decrease of the white population, has made this area predominately African-American. Housing vacancies, exacerbated by the urban renewal projects of the 1960's and 1970's, have also increased over the years.

Prior to the 1960's, land had become available for the construction of the Henry Horner Homes, a high-rise public housing development. Later, major developments such as the University of Illinois at Chicago, Malcolm X College and the
expansion of the nearby Medical Center also proved to impact the Near West Side. The construction of the University of Illinois at Chicago in the 1960's displaced many residents, and more recently, the elimination of historic Maxwell Street transformed part of this community area.

In describing its own community, a publication by The Interfaith Organizing Project (IOP) (1992:1), a local community organization, notes:

Like many inner-city neighborhoods, [the Near West Side] is short on resources, but long on talent and potential...Chicago's West side experienced a massive flight of capital and resources in the late 1960s and 1970s; the main shopping district had been tortured in the 1968 uprisings following the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and high-paying factory jobs soon relocated to the suburbs or Sun Belt.

The same publication addresses the economic impact of these changes on the community: "Much of the surrounding areas suffered from chronic dis-investment--banks refused to lend money, insurers stopped underwriting properties and "slumlords" were more common than not" (pp. 20).

Often, a socially, politically, economically and physically disorganized community will be viewed by developers as an easy place to assert their agenda. Thus, a community like the Near West Side which experiences these problems becomes an open target of urban development programs driven by corporate interests. Though, in this case, government officials, stadium developers and local community representatives all agree that some form of revitalization is needed, the implementation method of any
proposed stadium development plans, as well as the economic and social outcomes of these plans, are topics of contention among these groups.

Though it was in 1989 that the ownership of the Chicago Stadium, Bulls and Blackhawks officially expressed their interest in the construction of a new arena in the area, this was not the first time that this community had been exposed to such plans. A few years earlier, the Chicago Bears viewed the Near West Side as the "natural choice" for a large football stadium.

The Near West Side and the Chicago Bears

After winning the Superbowl in 1986, the Chicago Bears of the NFL expressed interest in moving to a new sports facility. This interest in a new stadium was tied to the lack of an "appropriate number" of skyboxes at Soldier Field and to the fact that 20 percent of the revenues raised by the 60 skyboxes in that facility went to its owner and operator, the Chicago Park District. The Bears estimated that 240 skyboxes at a new stadium would generate substantial income for the team. These economic rationales served as the driving force behind the search for a new site.

The First Football Stadium Proposal on the Near West Side

The University of Illinois at Chicago and Rush-
Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center, both major landowners on the Near West Side, responding to the Bears' quest for a stadium site, began to investigate the possibility of bringing the team to the area. In January of 1987, then Governor James Thompson, announced his support for the west side site over a lakefront site (the lakefront site had received wide opposition from environmental groups) (Bayard, 1987). Other sites under consideration by the stadium committee of the Metropolitan Planning Council included the West Loop area, the railroad yard area south of Roosevelt Road, suburban Arlington Heights, McCormick West and the Illinois Central Railyards west of Soldier Field. Mayor Washington also appointed a Stadium Review Committee to make site recommendations. William Wirtz, owner of the Chicago Stadium on the Near West Side and of the Chicago Blackhawks, expressed an interest in the proposed site. In the end, the plan called for the hospital, the university, the Bears and Wirtz to develop a larger complex which would include linking an "Olympic-class" sports medicine and education facility to a new football field and a refurbished Chicago Stadium. The Chicago Bears also required the plan include the construction of 15,000 parking spaces, 72,000-78,000 stadium seats and 240 skyboxes.

Promoters of the Near West Side site contended it would "yield far more benefits to the city in terms of jobs and urban redevelopment than would any of the others under
consideration for the new football stadium" (McCarron, 1987a) and "it would be hard to find a neighborhood more in need of such help" (Reardon, 1987). The promoters also predicted that the plan would receive the support of local political representatives.

Other observers were not so optimistic. A report by The Nathalie P. Voorhees Center for Neighborhood and Community Development (Steinhoff, 1988), identified four types of economic benefits as a result of a new Near West Side stadium: construction, operating, real estate and taxes. Though this report concluded that over the first ten years the new stadium would attract $364.9 million to the city of Chicago, a net increase of $217.8 million from the economic benefits generated by Soldier Field, it also noted that:

..for the stadium to act as a catalyst, the money that it generates must be made available for neighborhood development (Steinhoff, 1988:24).

and

...unfortunately, very little of the net increases in benefits are easily accessible for the purpose of neighborhood development. Less than a tenth of the benefits would flow to the public sector, the traditional agents for revitalizing depressed neighborhoods...furthermore, Chicago taxpayers could loose up to $23 million if the Chicago Park District lets the Bears out of their lease at Soldier Field (Steinhoff, 1988:24-25).

Speaking more favorably for this plan, The Metropolitan Planning Council, a civic group, noted in its preliminary report that a Near West Side sports complex has "the
potential for numerous neighborhood and citywide benefits" (McCarron, 1987b). Even though 300 housing units would be demolished, the possibility for replacements made it an attractive option amongst sponsors of the proposal. The Near West Side site became more and more attractive because of the limited infrastructural costs (less than $10 million) and was the final recommendation of the Stadium Site Selection Committee (Goff, 1987).

Community Response to the First Football Stadium Plans

As local newspapers began to print front page articles supporting the appropriateness of this plan, Mayor Washington became increasingly concerned about the eventual fate of the local community. Would the proposed plans serve as a way to expand the downtown area, thus pushing the local community further west? Would the residents have a voice in the negotiations?

The local community, led by the Interfaith Organizing Project (IOP), a coalition of clergy and lay-persons founded in November of 1985, questioned this form of urban redevelopment. They viewed the stadium proposal as a "land grab" by white developers, and as a case where the poor would lose out to the wealthy downtown interests.

The goal of this community organization was to redevelop these neighborhoods on the west side of the city independent of a sports stadium construction. Specifically,
the IOP plan included the construction of 2,000 housing units over a 10 year period. These units would fill in the void created by vacant lots. They could be apartment buildings, townhouse developments and/or single family structures. Redevelopment of the commercial establishments along Madison Street was also included in the plan, as was the introduction of community parks. These parks ranged from small parks aimed at eliminating current vacancies, to larger, centrally located developments (McCarron and Thornton, 1987).

The IOP also claimed that the proposed stadium plans would displace 328 families and approximately 1,000-1,500 low income and elderly residents. Rev. Arthur Griffin, a leader of the group, called the stadium a "playground for the wealthy in the suburbs" (Wilson, 1987). Pastors of numerous churches in the area attempted, in Sunday sermons, to engage the local residents in the proposed developments, outlining their potential effect on the local community. Some even claimed that these plans would include the destruction of the local churches which have been there for years. Since a large portion of the membership of these churches resided outside this community, game traffic on Sundays could pose a direct threat on the viability of these congregations. At the same time, local pastors saw no "real" economic development arising from these plans. Rev. Griffin noted: "...we want this neighborhood developed in a
way that it is in conjunction with the aspirations and the
dreams and hopes of the people of this community" and "we
want some jobs that will have some significance, some jobs
that will allow someone to feed a family" (Wilson, 1987).
Others echoed these concerns, and according to Trimina
O'Connor, a member of the IOP: "We don't want members of the
neighborhood's churches and schools displaced so we can
become a service heaven for the rich" (Wilson, 1987).

The media responded to the position of the local
community as short sighted. Front page headlines appeared
in the Chicago Tribune during early September of 1988
The articles criticized Mayor Washington's "open door"
policy to neighborhoods which resulted in the emergence of
community leaders like the IOP's Gates and Griffin. The
series viewed these developments as "part of a growing
political movement...maintaining political and social
control not by improving the lot of the poor, but by
posturing against development" (IOP, 1992). The Chicago
Tribune also reported in those same articles that the
stadium would help revitalize the community.

Mike Royko (1987), a newspaper columnist wrote about
the community response in the Near West Side:

At most, about 330 families would be moved [as a result
of the stadium plans in the Near West Side]. And the
homes they'd be leaving are, for the most part, a bunch
of dumps. Under the new plan, new housing in the same
general area would be built, and they'd move into it.
There would be new parks, playlots and shopping
clusters. It appears, then, that they’re angry because they will be asked to leave beat-out old buildings and move into superior modern housing in an upgraded community. The solution to that problem appears obvious...just build some new dumps and maybe they’ll be happy.

The Midwest Community Council, the oldest community organization on the Near West Side was more positive about the proposal than the IOP. Directed by its longtime leader Nancy Jefferson, a strong supporter of Mayor Washington during his election, this organization advocated for a stadium development plan only if the local community were to be involved in its planning. According to Jefferson (Thomas and Johnson, 1987):

I am excited about this prospect. It could mean a redevelopment of the area that has not happened in 40 years. It means the creation of an economic base for jobs. The spillout from the stadium could create a safe, attractive and good community.

And (Wilson and McCarron, 1987):

It [stadium] has to be carefully planned so that it does not impose on the community and so that it does not replace the community.

The community found itself divided on the issue and newly elected alderman Seneather Butler of the 27th Ward summed up community opinion on the proposed stadium as follows:

One group says they don’t want the stadium. Another group is saying ‘tear the projects down—it’s the only way we will get out of poverty,’ and another group is saying that it wants the stadium, but not on the Near West Side (Wilson and McCarron, 1987).

A report investigating the potential link between economic benefits and the residents of the Near West Side
supported the position taken by the IOP (Steinhoff, 1987). This report concluded that (1) only 2 percent of the temporary jobs created by the construction of the facility (30 jobs) would go to the residents and those hired from within the community would be likely to earn less due to discrimination in the construction industry, (2) one-third of the permanent jobs created (330 jobs), would go to local residents but they would also be low paying, (3) no evidence supports the notion that a sports center would increase the pace or scope of community development, (4) increased spending on the Near West Side will not benefit the local residents since, due to the fact that 84 percent of the property and 86 percent of the privately owned rental units are owned by individuals residing outside the local zip code, new money will leave the area, (5) displacement is a serious threat since it is often likely to follow large capital investments and physical improvements, especially when the majority of local residents are for the most part unable to finance a home and cannot afford to rent an apartment. Specifically, according to a report prepared by the Architectural Firm of Perkins and Will (1987), commissioned by Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center, only 1.5 percent of the existing households on the Near West Side could afford to finance a home and only 11.2 percent of existing rental households could afford to rent an apartment, (6) since the strength of the local economy is in
manufacturing, marketing local strengths and tying them to job training programs could prove far more beneficial than investment into a sports center, and (7) efforts to revitalize the community should be made at the micro level (Steinhoff, 1987).

The proposed sports complex never materialized. Community dissatisfaction and difficulties with the finance of this large project, redirected the Bears' attention to a new stadium development proposal.

The Second Football Stadium Proposal on the Near West Side

In the Fall of 1987, the City and McCaskey agreed to work together in building the stadium for the Chicago Bears, independent of any association with the previously proposed "complex plan." The agreement came after the city allowed new skyboxes at Soldier Field, a plan which, according to Robert Mier, assistant to the mayor for development and planning, "decompresses the intense time pressure of the construction schedule...And it helps the Bears develop their skybox market" (McCarron, 1987c).

Eventually, two possible stadium plans were introduced within the same site area on the Near West Side. The first alternative would displace 475 families and provide 6,200 parking spaces, while the second would displace 400 families and yield 5,400 spaces for parking (McCarron, 1988c).

The Bears sought $90 million in city and state funds to
help finance their privately held stadium. It was during this time that the Chicago White Sox threatened to leave Chicago unless the city and the state provided the franchise with a new stadium. Congressman Dan Rostenkowski introduced a bill in Washington that would grant the City of Chicago $250 million in bonding authority on behalf of stadium development for the Bears and the White Sox on the Near West Side. The city also sought to generate additional funding for these projects and requested approximately $30 million from the state.

In May of 1988, Governor Thompson proposed the construction of a new ballpark for the White Sox on the Near West Side to take advantage of the infrastructural development offered to the Chicago Bears. This plan was supported by State Senator William Marovitz (D-Chicago) whose proposal claimed to save $50 million in infrastructure costs and it would account for no additional displacement. However, according to the IOP, this twin-stadium plan would displace half the area community. Though this plan received the support of the local papers, the IOP continued to challenge its assumptions. The residents participated in numerous marches and protests. They attended community meetings with city officials and held mock-funerals of their community. Their goal was to communicate to the city that these stadium development proposals would only displace the poor so that the wealthy could increase their profits.
Aaron Freeman (1988), a political satirist in Chicago, suggested in a commentary that locals should be allowed to stay in the skyboxes during the week and make them available for the wealthy on Sundays. He wrote:

The city and the stadium developers should let the poor people who will be made homeless by the stadium live in its skyboxes six days a week. Of course on Sunday afternoons they'd have to get the hell out so that the bankers and commodities traders and such can have the boxes to drink, cheer and vomit in. ...If you've ever been in one of these skyboxes you know there are far worse places to live. Skyboxes have color TV's, refrigerators, wet bars, even balconies so that fans can tan in nice weather. With a Murphy bed thrown in, a lot of them could rent as studio apartments or at least luxury housing projects.

In the end, the construction of a Bears' stadium in the Near West Side did not occur. The following reasons can be cited: (1) the city was unable to silence the IOP and the concerns of the local community. Convincing the local constituency of the positive economic outcomes which the stadium development could provide would have made the approval of the site quicker and easier, (2) higher interest rates threatened the Bears financing agreement, (3) Chicago Stadium owner Wirtz, tried to sabotage the proposal. Even though an editorial by the Crain's Chicago Business (October 17, 1988c, p. 10) urged Wirtz to cooperate with McCaskey since a collaboration "would help stabilize West Side residential neighborhoods and prime the pump of economic development", the two failed to reach an agreement over parking revenues on Wirtz-owned land, and (4) the lack of community-wide support for the stadium development plan and
the uncertainty of the Rostenkowski efforts in Washington to raise money, made the state legislators indifferent to advancing the proposal and approving the $30 million funding requested by the city.

The Near West Side and the United Center

As part of an intense, profit-oriented era by professional teams, many sport organizations have attempted to reconstruct their facilities in order to maximize profits. Many owners recognize that the old facilities are not adequate in a new era of increased player salaries and potential income which can be generated from luxury seating, restaurants, concessions, increased ticket prices, etc. Moving the team into a new facility would increase general revenue, thus, increasing profit (Quirk and Fort, 1992).

Because it lacked skyboxes, the Chicago Stadium, which opened in 1929, had a limited capability to generate additional revenue. As early as 1988, Bill Wirtz described that facility as "economically obsolete" and according to a source close to the owner: "There comes a point when you realize that you could hurt the health of the franchise by not making a move. The numbers right now don't favor keeping things the way they are" (Kass, 1988h). Steve Scanwald, marketing head for the Chicago Bulls explains the reasons that courtside seats at the Chicago Stadium, though originally priced at $35 were going for $300: "It's supply
and demand, the most simple and basic law of economics. It’s the primary economic principle upon which this country was founded. And, of course, there are increased costs."
The escalating player salaries, according to Scanwald, have been critical to the building of the new stadium:

It’s one of the things [paying the high salaries to compete for a championship] that motivated us to build the United Center, to be sure we can compete economically with the other 26 teams... The first objective is to win the championship. The second objective is if we can at the same time break even or even make some money. No bones about it that we want to operate at a profit" (Markus, 1994).

Unmistakably, it was the search for new profit sources that prompted the owners of the Bulls and Blackhawks to build a new stadium (Klein, 1994).

In August of 1988, a few months after the second proposal for a Bears’ stadium had fallen through, Wirtz investigated the possibility of a new basketball and hockey arena across the street from the Chicago Stadium. This facility would be privately financed from revenue generated by the luxury skyboxes and advertising sources. The proposed 180 skyboxes in that facility would range in price from $50,000 to $120,000 a year. Though financing for the facility would come from private sources, city and state assistance for public works improvements would be needed.

Community and stadium developers relations

After observing the conflict between the local community and McCaskey on the proposed construction of a
football stadium for the Chicago Bears, Jerry Reinsdorf, owner of the Bulls, said regarding his approach to the building of the indoor arena (IOP, 1992:3):

...we were determined not to do battle with the community. That is what Mike McCaskey did, and he lost. One person can never win these battles-everyone has to get something. Years ago, it was common for developers to come into a neighborhood with plans and blueprints, but times have changed. We wanted to get this project moving and be a good neighbor; it's just good business.

The community also took a different approach to the proposed basketball and hockey facility. According to a community organizer: "This second time around we wanted to use the opportunity to get something out of it" (Schmich, 1992).

This new approach by the developers, however, did not mean that they would be willing to readily provide community development funds and offer fair compensation to those displaced by this project. The Stadium Joint Venture, organized by Wirtz and Reinsdorf, repeatedly attempted in January and May of 1990, to buy the homes standing in the way of their development at low cost ($35,000 - considerably lower than the value of redevelopment).

Mayor Daley's position also proved to be different from the stance which politicians had previously taken. His approach gave more leverage to the local community since according to Daley: "What this community needs most is jobs and economic development, but not at the expense of homes and neighborhoods" (Reardon, 1991b). In the end, 40 homes were torn down to make room for the new sports facility.
For the stadium developers this project allowed for local economic and social growth. As Gates noted to me:

In one of our meetings, a representative from the Stadium Joint Venture organization said: If you want to make money (referring to the community) you stand in the way of progress. I was outraged. This is ridiculous. They were undermining our intelligence. Like we do not know what is best for our community. See, there comes an outsider to tell you what to do. These were some of the things we had to deal with. Ignorance and being viewed as inferior... You see that is the problem. Others want to tell you what is best for you. Our approach was that we wanted, the community that is, to define our own destiny. We want to make the decisions as to what is best for us. Why? Because we live here, we are the ones to be impacted by the new construction, the traffic and all that. That's why.

Though the Stadium Joint Venture and the community representatives had different perspectives on the way "real" development should occur on the Near West Side, the two groups attempted to work out their differences. As part of these negotiations, the community residents proved capable of asserting their commitment to the well-being of those directly affected by displacement, while extracting from the developers short-term community benefits.

Community Response to the United Center Development Plans

Members of the IOP involved in representing the local community, identified the case of the New Comiskey Park development as one where the developers did not consider the well-being of the South Armour Square community. For them, the Comiskey Park case served as an example of a situation
to be avoided. It was noted to me by an IOP member:

We looked at what had happened on the south side. When they wanted to build that stadium they told the residents who were to be dislocated that they would place them into temporary housing, and then move them into their newly constructed homes. In the meantime, the developers began the demolition of their homes, and went along with the development of the ballpark. This temporary replacement housing proved to be more than temporary, since the people stayed there for ...hm..., I think over a year (thinking)...well it was actually more than a year, about a year and a half. And, after all that, their so called "new housing" was not what you would have expected. The reason why is because they (the residents) were taken over by the developers. This is not what we wanted to happen here.

Jill, a member of the IOP also remarked:

Those being moved from their homes wanted to stay together in their new neighborhood. They had lived next to each other for years. They raised their children together, they had developed close ties, which did not want to break because of the stadium construction. Some of the people to be moved had lived there for 30 and 40 years.

Reinsdorf was also surprised by the strong commitment of the local residents to stay in their neighborhood. In a newspaper account, he responded about those who asked for new homes in the neighborhood:

I was suspicious at first that they were trying to line their pockets. ...I learned that people there are proud of their community and want to stay there. I thought most of the people whose houses would be taken would want cash. I was surprised how many just wanted new homes in their neighborhoods (Schmich, 1992).

During the negotiations with the Stadium Joint Venture, the press continued to depict the efforts of the community and those in leadership positions as counter-productive to the well-being of the general area. Both Gates and Griffin were criticized by the media. Yet, for the community
leaders negotiations with the developers could prove an opportunity from which the Near West Side could benefit.

Gates noted to me:

One of the important issues was for us to understand their tactics. They said to us during the negotiations for the United Center: Well, you know this area is devastated, the land is worth nothing, so you should let it go. You cannot tell me that the land is worthless, that there is no value to the land, when you are doing everything in your power to acquire it. You see what I mean, a piece of land which you want is not valueless, it is worth something; that is why you want it... We also knew that they were going to get their stadium, because they got the resources. That eventually they were going to succeed. And let me tell you, we were not against the stadium. We wanted to make sure that the community would benefit from it and that the people displaced would not get screwed in the process. That’s all.

How did they (the Stadium Joint Venture) respond?

They were surprised. They did not expect such a response. They thought: here is an area which is devastated, we should have no problem getting what we want through.

The community presented its concerns to stadium owners in specific terms. Gates, who played a key role in the negotiations, told me about the strategy:

You do not want to make it a social issue. Frame it in the context of a business deal, keep the social out of it. These people do not care about the community. They want to get something from us. Well let’s deal, we’ll give you what you want, if you give us A., B., C., etc... This approach afforded the community an opportunity to carry forward their plan as they negotiated with the stadium developers.
The Actual Product: The United Center

In the end, 12 national and international lending institutions came together to provide the funding for the United Center. Those included Fuji Bank Ltd., which lead seven Japanese institutions, Westpac Banking Corp., of Australia, Banque Paribas of France and three local-black owned banks: Seaway National Bank, Drexel National Bank and Independence Bank of Chicago made up the syndicate (Reardon, 1992). The City also agreed to cooperate on land acquisition, provide $3.2 million for infrastructure improvements, offer a 40 percent break on amusements taxes and apply a 4 percent tax to 60 percent of the 216 skybox income (Kass, 1991).

This $175 million facility would assist the ownership and management of these two Chicago professional teams (Bulls and Blackhawks) in achieving their goals. To place the size of this new structure into perspective, the United Center surrounds 1 million square feet of space compared to the 275,000 square feet which were available in the Chicago Stadium. Its large structure provided ample flexibility in building facilities (i.e. luxury skyboxes, restaurants, etc). There are 216 luxury boxes in three levels which are priced from $55,000 to $175,000 a year. All of these luxury boxes were rented well before the opening of the facility. They contribute over $25 million to the Bulls and Blackhawks annually.
The Community Agreement with the Stadium Developers

The Stadium Joint Venture and the community of the Near West Side eventually came to an agreement about the construction of a new sports arena in the area. The IOP served as the negotiating arm of the community and the various terms of this agreement are outlined below (IOP, 1992:33-34):

(1) The Stadium Joint Venture will build replacement housing for all resident homeowners. All the houses must be built before the homeowners will vacate their present homes. Construction of the new stadium will begin after the replacement housing is built and residents are resettled.

(2) The replacement homes will be constructed in the community-designated "Better Alternative Area" - this area extends from Damen to Western Avenue, and from Washington Boulevard to the Eisenhower Expressway.

(3) Substantial cash values were set for the residents' homes. Those wishing to receive cash will secure fair market value of their property, plus $30,000; or $75,000 for a single-family home; 100,000 for a duplex; or $130,000 for a triplex.

(4) Rental tenants will be compensated according to the national standard as outlined by HUD. This is $6,000 per unit.

(5) The Stadium Joint Venture will provide a $600,000, no interest loan to IOP to develop 75 "for sale" homes.
(6) The IOP could, if necessary, enjoin construction of the stadium if the Stadium Joint Venture fails to live up to its agreement. The Stadium Joint Venture also agreed to compensate IOP for attorney’s fees and associated costs if litigation is pursued.

(7) The Stadium Joint Venture will provide a subsidy to each resettled resident homeowner for real estate taxes that were attributed to increased property tax assessments.

(8) Near the site of the new housing, a park will be built linking Touhy, Herbert Park and land adjoining Creiger High School.

(9) The Stadium Joint Venture agrees not to acquire any land west of Damen, in the Better Alternative Area. However, the Stadium Joint Venture could exercise an option to acquire one block in this area, only if the end result was a mutually-agreeable, commercial development.

(10) A new public library will be built on Madison Street in the Better Alternative Area.

(11) On stadium-owned land, free parking will be provided for affected churches.

(12) The city will be lobbied by both sides to fund a construction trade program at Malcolm X College.

(13) The Stadium Joint Venture agrees that there will be no simultaneous events in the new and old stadiums.

(14) IOP recognizes the Stadium Joint Venture’s help in reopening Mile Square Health Center [in 1991, the Stadium
Joint Venture gave the clinic a $75,000 grant to meet its payroll.

It becomes clear from the above terms that the community of the Near West Side was successful in receiving various community benefits. Yet, these contributions by the stadium developers will prove limited, since in the long-term, this community will experience additional private and public investment with the potential of transforming the racial and economic composition of the area.

The Impact on the Community

As previously agreed between the IOP and the Stadium Joint Venture, the construction of replacement homes was completed prior to the development of the United Center. Assistance was also provided by the Reinsdorf-Wirtz group to finance 75 two-flats and single family homes for other low and moderate income community residents. In addition, a contribution of $80,000 was made to Malcolm X College as part of a four year scholarship fund. The Bulls' charity, Charitabulls, donated $50,000 to the computer center of the nearby Mabel Manning Library. The library was named after Mabel Manning, who lived in the community for many years and was involved with the "stadium wars." Through these and other programs, the ownership of the United Center responded to many of its financial commitments toward the local community.
In recent months the ownership of the facility has looked beyond the walls of the United Center, interested in expanding local economic growth. In September of 1994, the Bulls donated $4 million to build a recreation and educational facility. More recently, the Bulls announced that a $375,000 contribution would be utilized to support the Chicago Park District’s Midnight Basketball League. Finally, in February of 1995, officials of the United Center announced an economic development program aimed at providing $1 million for new business and job growth initiatives to the local area. The program would be available to entrepreneurs to start or expand services in the area, within the perimeters of Ashland Avenue, the Eisenhower Expressway, Western Avenue and Lake Street (Barron, 1995). Overall, it is estimated that approximately $10 million has been invested in the Near West Side by the stadium developers.

Recent plans in the area have also included the rehabilitation of 403 middle income units at the Henry Horner Homes, the public housing projects in the area. Under the five phase plan (to be completed by the year 2001), a number of new units would replace the 50 percent current vacancy. According to this project, the height of these structures will decrease and the potential for the complete demolition of eight of those buildings is currently under review (Ihejirika, 1995).
These developments have been welcomed by the IOP and local community leaders. Ernest Gates told me that in the case of the United Center, because of the overwhelming response and mobilization of the residents, the local community got the most out of the final arrangements. According to Gates: "The community was so successful in getting much of what it wanted that inquiries are coming in from people in cities in the U.S. and abroad who want to know the West Siders' technique" (Frank, 1992). And, according The Interfaith Organizing Project (1992:26): "The agreement reached between the Near West Side community and the Stadium Joint Venture was historic. A largely black and low-income community was able to turn the tide of "urban renewal" into a useful catalyst for neighborhood based, redevelopment" (pp. 26).

At the same time some important questions persist when considering the future of those residing on the Near West Side. Are these recent developments signs of the local community's success? Will the benefits of these economic investments belong to its current residents? Is this the beginning of a massive displacement and gentrification process which will attract residents of different racial/ethnic and socioeconomic status to the area? Or, will the Near West Side in Chicago become an expansion of the downtown area, providing numerous support services to those who work and live there? In this regard, poverty
becomes functional within the urban environment since it provides the population needed to be displaced for new development (Gans, 1971).

The efforts of the local community were aimed at enhancing economic development through community organizing. Specifically, the focus was to solve the immediate community concerns in exchange for providing support to the profit oriented agenda of the stadium developers. Organizers were successful in mobilizing the residents by directing their energies to the adversarial relationship between the developers and the community. Yet, the nature of the economic development as advocated by the local leadership has been short term and incapable of becoming institutionalized.

The area east of the United Center has been the one to experienced considerable redevelopment. The government has invested over $13 million in streets improvements for the new stadium (Reardon, 1991b) and additional spending in beautification programs have recently occurred. These public investments will ensure that the upcoming 1996 national Democratic convention becomes an opportunity for the city to showcase itself to the rest of the nation. Under this scenario, the United Center development serves as a "buffer", a physical boundary, intended to keep the "unwanted" to the west. If that is the case, the construction of this stadium becomes more than a business
venture and a place for fans to cheer and jeer. The stadium becomes a tool for urban redevelopment, capable of fueling the expansion of downtown Chicago westwards, reshaping in its way the existing urban terrain.

This "redevelopment" supports the notion that as central cities, partly due to the suburbanization movement after WWII, lost jobs to the emerging structures of the periphery, and must refocus and develop a new economic function for themselves. Judd (1995) notes that the efforts on the part of cities across America to redefine themselves and invest in the creation of the central city center as a place of tourism, conventions and sports are a part of this reorganization. Connecting the revitalization of the Near West Side to large-scale capital investment projects such as the stadium projects discussed in this chapter can have broader implications. These forms of investment, due to their proximity to the downtown area, could not only alter the local community but also shape the cultural character of the city itself.

Conclusion

The case of the Near West Side in Chicago is a case of an urban, economically devastated community which has become exposed to various urban renewal programs orchestrated during the last few decades. In addition, the community has been exposed to the corporatization and capitalism of
professional sports. An investigation of the recent political economy of sports shows that place has increasingly become an integral part in the operations of a professional franchise. For the owners of professional teams such as the Chicago Bears, Bulls and the Blackhawks, place has become a critical means of production. It is space (the stadium), which provides the capitalist with an opportunity to expand capital and enlarge profit. Thus, selling entertainment through the use of space becomes vital. The construction of luxury boxes provides privacy, good viewing of the game and an array of personal benefits (i.e., cocktails, dinner, etc.,), all aimed at a better entertainment experience. These are the forces which make the construction of the United Center a "necessity."

We can also see that the existing socioeconomic and political conditions are supportive of this endeavor. Specifically, (1) the local and state governments support the idea of stadium development by providing infrastructural development funds and various tax-benefits and, (2) the economically depressed area makes the construct of the facility easier, since such community is perceived to be weak and more willing to embrace economic development opportunities (Rubin and Rubin, 1987).

The response of the community to this project is critical. Many of the members of the IOP proudly discussed their success in their battle with "Goliath." The ongoing
services which the United Center provides to the community are very different when compared to other past urban development projects in that area. This sports facility, provides very little to the community after its construction. According to an informant: "...it is [United Center] a free standing, money making structure which will be there for many years and after its construction, has nothing to offer to this community."

The stadium development plans lasted for over six years. The exchanges between the developers and the local organizers, during those years, can be divided into two distinct historical eras: (1) the Chicago Bears’ stadium proposal and its eventual defeat (mid to late 1980’s), and (2) the United Center proposal and the eventual construction of this facility (late 1980’s and early 1990’s). Who won and who lost? It is clear that during the McCaskey era, the community succeeded, partly because of its actions and partly because of the inability of the developers to generate adequate funding. The outcomes of the "second battle" with Wirtz and Reinsdorf have yet to be determined but could include the expansion of the city core.

The corporate drive of sports for profits resulted in the construction of the United Center on the Near West Side of Chicago. A poor, African-American community was capable of responding to these urban projects with courage and strength. Yet, the stadium developers’ investments are the
beginning of additional investment which will reorganize this part of the city. In the end, stadium development becomes not only a vehicle for the physical reorganization of urban space but also a means of reshaping the social, economic and cultural fabric of this community.
CHAPTER 10

THREE STADIUM DEVELOPMENT PLANS, THREE URBAN COMMUNITIES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to compare the three case studies presented above at two different levels. First, the chapter examines the communities' responses to the proposed stadium plans. How did each community attempt to resist the proposed plans? What were the similarities and/or differences? What factors were critical as these communities attempted to negotiate with the stadium developers? In this regard, the chapter concludes that race and class, local political influence, internal divisions, occupancy status, the media, political circumstances, and the imposition of state government, proved to have an influence on these community responses.

Second, this chapter investigates the community effects of these stadium development plans. What are the similarities and/or differences in the outcomes following the completion of the new Comiskey Park, the installation of lights at Wrigley Field and the construction of the United Center? What might be the short and/or long term effect of the urban development projects on these three areas?

The chapter concludes with a comparison of the role
which the government played in these developments. Conclusions then are drawn regarding the relationship between government and private enterprise within the urban environment, as exemplified through stadiums. Finally, the role of these urban social movements is addressed.

**Community Response to the Stadium Development Plans**

The responses of South Armour Square, Lake View and Near West Side communities to the proposed stadium development plans differed. For example, the Lake View residents sought to altogether halt the installation of lights at Wrigley Field, whereas the Near West Side residents viewed the construction of an indoor sports arena as an opportunity for urban redevelopment.

In order to compare the community effects of these stadium development plans on the urban environment, a consideration of the social, political and economic organization of these communities is essential. The composition of these communities will determine: (1) the way the government and the stadium developers perceived the community concerns, (2) the extent of community inclusion in the negotiations, and (3) the duration and effectiveness of the community opposition to the proposed plans.

Since community response and effects are interrelated, an understanding of these variations proves fundamental. For example, race played an important role in the
communities responses and consequently in the community effect. The success of the Lake View community in developing a viable and comprehensive program to address the effects of night games at Wrigley Field, and the inability of the South Armour Square residents to enlist on-going government support for their community, is partly due to the racial composition of these communities. Yet, what proves consistent when examining the resident reaction to these stadium plans, is that all three of these communities viewed these projects as cases where the corporate interests of the wealthy came in conflict with the well-being of the powerless residents. Power proves central to these community-based, urban resistance movements.

Following, I identify some of the critical factors which were integral as these communities responded to the stadium development plans. However, it is important to note that all these factors operate together, they are interconnected, influencing the community organization, and thus, the community response.

Race and Class

Race and class proved critically important when comparing these community-based, urban, stadium resistance movements. Both the South Armour Square and Near West Side community residents involved in the "stadium battles" were African-American, whereas the residents in Lake View were ethnic European. Similarly, the incomes of these groups
varied. The south and west side residents were less affluent than their north side counterparts.

The government and the stadium developers perceived these communities differently in the negotiation processes. Because of their race and class position, the community residents from South Armour Square and the Near West Side were viewed as groups standing in the way of urban development and progress. On the other hand, the concerns of the Lake View residents were identified to be very legitimate, and worthy of serious consideration. As a result of these perceptions, the ability of the African-American community in South Armour Square to effectively oppose the construction of the new Comiskey Park and more importantly, ensure that the relocation plans were responsive to all of its residents failed.

O’Connell, involved in the new Comiskey Park development communicated to me how the local residents perceived the developments on the south side, and how race played an important role. She noted:

I was very mad when I talked to people about stadium issues in Chicago. Automatically, everyone assumed that I was talking about the Cubs. People in Chicago were mostly aware of the lights situation at Wrigley Field. Here we have a community on the verge of displacement, and people in Chicago were not talking about it. Yet, the lights issue at Wrigley Field received all the media coverage. Everybody knew about the Cubs. I am sure that race played an important role here. We were more aware of the events affecting a white community than we were about the events affecting a black community. People also viewed the new Comiskey development as something good for South Armour Square. I don’t think that this is a fair assessment.
Because of these differences, the concerns of the predominantly African American residents of the South Armour Square, following the construction of the new Comiskey Park, did not receive the extensive attention which the Lake View residents generated. Specifically, the Neighborhood Protection Plan in Lake View has proven effective, however, such plan has been instituted in neither the South Armour, nor the Near West Side case.

Race continued to play a role when the residents of the South Armour Square community were unable to enlist the support of their neighboring white communities. The sharp racial divisions did not provide these residents with an opportunity to build a coalition which would have proven extremely helpful in the negotiations with the government and the developers.

Finally, it was also proven in this case that it was much easier for the government to directly remove, poor minority residents, than it would have been to remove middle-class or wealthy individuals who are white. The various social, political and economic power which these groups exemplify contributes to these variations.

Local political influence

Though these communities employed many similar tactics to influence the stadium development plans, in the end, involvement in the political process proved critical. A comparison of the three communities' organizing efforts,
shows that the advocacy of their aldermen to City Hall varied. Specifically, the Lake View alderman was actively involved as the community attempted to stop the installation of lights at Wrigley Field. According to McCarron (1987e):

Meetings about lights at Wrigley Field are typically heralded by printed agendas and press releases; emceed by a professional mediator hired by the city; attended by Ald. Bernard Hansen (44th), two state representatives, two state senators, the city's commissioner of planning; covered by reporters from The Tribune, the Sun-Times, the Lake View Booster and Channels 2, 5, 7 and 9.

Although the Near West Side's local alderman engaged in the stadium issues, she did not take a convincing stance in favor of the opposition leaders. Instead, the newly elected alderman attempted to determine the community "feelings" on the issue. As a result, community residents emerged as the leaders who would direct and organize the community response to the stadium development plans.

Finally, in South Armour Square the local alderman's role in the negotiations was less than minimal. He proved incapable of advocating for the interests of the residents in City Hall. According to McCarron (1987e):

They [some residents in the South Armour Square] learned about the bill-signing ceremony only because somebody heard about it on radio. So they gathered over the weekend in the kitchen of neighbor Lillian Brown, tore up a bunch of cardboard soda-pop cartons and hand-lettered some protest signs with Magic Markers. ...They have been told nothing [about the new stadium], not by the mayor, not by his department heads, not by their alderman, Patrick Huels (11th), not even by the precinct captain even though the precinct with all the endangered homes delivered 345 of its 359 votes to Harold Washington in April's election.
After considering these variations in local political representation, it is obvious to see why the Lake View residents proved to be the most successful of the three communities. They attempted to organize and influence decisions through the existing political structure. Forming a partnership with the local alderman, city government and community representatives, resulted in effective negotiations with stadium developers. This type of conventional participation, which uses the institutional channels of representative government (Conway, 1990; Janda, Berry and Goldman, 1996), was clearly a central aspect of the strategy employed by the north side community.

Internal Divisions

A comparison of the three communities' responses to the stadium development plans shows the Lake View community to be the most unified. Although the Near West Side did experience some internal divisions, as various community organizations viewed the proposed plans differently, it was the South Armour Square response which proved to be the most divided.

Contributing to this internal division were the residents' feeling of powerlessness. Because of the influence of the state, they believed that the construction of a stadium in their community was inevitable. As a result, they began to act individually. Their goal became to arrange the best deal possible for themselves, since they
feared the that the state would take over their homes without even providing replacement housing. Likewise, community leaders on the Near West Side also realized that in the end the United Center would be built. Yet, they remained more focused to extract the best possible benefits for the local community. The extent of displacement in South Armour Square and the power of the state, proved much more overwhelming in dividing the community response than in the more limited displacement and state imposition experienced by the Near West Side.

On the other hand, the Lake View residents did not experience the threat of direct reorganization of physical space due to displacement. Thus, their personal interests did not become an issue, and, as a result, the Lake View residents viewed the introduction of lights to be a community problem rather than an individual concern. They remained united.

**Imposition of Local and State Government**

The magnitude of power exercised by the state and local governments also played an important role in influencing the communities' responses to the stadium development plans. In the case of the South Armour Square, the influence of the state government in realizing the construction of a publicly funded stadium for the White Sox proved overwhelming. The state and the city, through the ISFA, had access to many resources - political, legal, financial - in their efforts
to remove the residents. In the face of all this, the community's attempts to challenge these plans proved ineffective.

The role of the state and local government on the Near West Side was not imposed in the same manner that it was in the South Armour Square case. Though the government in this community supported the private interests of the developers, the community leaders did not directly conflict with government representatives. Part of the strategy of the Near West Side community leaders was to exclude the government from the negotiations. As Gates told me:

I knew that if we could keep the government out of the negotiations we would have a chance to get something out of the agreement. You see, that was our goal. You can never beat the government. That's why we were successful.

Finally, in the Lake View case, the government did not directly impose its will on the community. This greatly contributed to the resident's effectiveness. Though, in the end, the ordinance passed by the city allowed for the installation of lights at Wrigley Field, through the active involvement of the local alderman, and a strong voter turnout in a non-binding referendum, the residents had the opportunity to effectively communicate their concerns.

Political circumstances

It was during the Washington administration that the South Armour Square, Lake View and Near West Side stadium development plans first emerged. With the death of Mayor
Washington, these stadium issues in Chicago became even more politicized. The Mayor employed an approach which had attempted to balance the community requests with the interests of the developers. Because of this strategy, Washington proved capable of advancing his agenda by building appropriate political coalitions in City Hall. Following his death, political direction on the stadium issues diminished, subsequently having a different effect on the three communities.

In the case of South Armour Square, this politicization contributed to further dividing the community and weakening its response. On the Near West Side, the effect was neutral. Even though plans to develop a stadium on the Near West Side had the support of Washington, the Mayor was also sensitive to the community's needs. The shift in administrations provided community leaders with an opportunity to assert their agenda. Yet, the lack of local political support, did not provide the residents leverage to halt the stadium development plans.

On the other hand, the death of Mayor Washington provided an already politically engaged Lake View community with an opportunity to further oppose the lights proposal. This community attempted to enlist wider City Hall support since the political agenda on this stadium issue now lacked direction.

The community which had the greatest political means to
resist the stadium development plans (Lake View), proved to potentially benefit the most from these circumstances. On the other hand, the community with the least effective local representation (South Armour Square) proved unable to take advantage of these circumstances and resist the stadium development plans.

Occupancy Status

The type of occupancy also proved to play an important role in these community responses, especially in the case of South Armour Square. The presence of both renters and owners divided this community when the relocation package was proposed. For the renters, the ISFA offer recognized the needs of the owners to a much greater extent than it recognized those of their own. Because of the relocation proposal, the community became further divided due to their occupancy status. The owners, without regard for the renters, concentrated on extracting the best replacement housing possible.

The role of the media

Another factor which proved influential in the way these communities responded to the stadium development plans was the media. The media in all of these cases sided with the developers, often isolating the community leaders describing them as radical, self-serving and insensitive to the well-being of their communities. The media also consistently promoted the proposed social and economic
benefits of these professional sports franchises. Acting in support of urban redevelopment, they urged the construction of a stadium on the Near West Side since it would save this socially and economically devastated community. Though Lake View was more successful in utilizing the media to advance its discontent with the lights proposal at Wrigley Field, none of these communities found the media as an ally in their efforts.

Role of these factors in community response

Because of the above mentioned factors (the types of organizational strategies), the effectiveness of the tactics utilized by the residents proved different. The community of Lake View was most capable in its response to the installation of lights, as exemplified by the neighborhood protection plan. This plan shows that the community ensured continued attention to the effects of this stadium development plan. The community of the Near West Side proved capable of sustaining numerous short term benefits. Yet, this community has been unable to guarantee continued partnerships with the government and the developers on issues facing the Near West Side. Finally, the community of the South Armour Square proved incapable of resisting these stadium development plans, resulting in considerable displacement.

In considering the communities’ responses, it becomes clear that structural forces played a very critical role.
The inability of the South Armour Square to effectively address the community concerns can be attributed to factors such as race, class, and the role of the state. These factors proved to impact each community differently, producing social inequalities, while also communicating their effect on urban change within a larger context.

The communities of South Armour Square and the Near West Side did not rely on the political system to advance their goals. The community leaders instead attempted to take it upon themselves to best respond to the stadium development plans. On the other hand, in Lake View, the community proved most capable of employing the political system to represent its goals. This variation can be attributed to the different ways blacks and whites perceive the effectiveness and inner-workings of the government. Research shows that for blacks, the political system is viewed to be ineffective, untrustworthy and incapable of responding without bias to their needs (Shingles, 1981; Bobo and Gilliam, 1990).

In addition to these structural factors, the residents of the South Armour Square and the Near West Side accepted the fact that eventually these stadiums would be built in their communities. As a result, their goal became to search for the best possible arrangement, thus, contributing to the success of the stadium developers. The community responses then are part of a dynamic experience of both structure and
The Effects of the Stadium Plans on the Three Communities

The stadium development plans discussed in this study contributed to the physical and cultural reorganization of these communities. The effectiveness of the community response and the degree of impact proved interconnected. Following, I summarize these effects:

South Armour Square and the New Comiskey Park

The new Comiskey Park in South Armour Square was completed in 1991. This stadium was meant to provide the White Sox with increased profits since they threatened to leave the city and the state. As a result, the construction of this sports facility required the displacement of an African-American community including numerous businesses. This development has had a direct physical effect on this area, since, over 15 acres of land were taken from the community to develop the new structure.

In addition to this physical reorganization, the culture of this community has also been transformed with the removal of this neighborhood and the demolition of McCuddy’s, a local baseball bar which had become a south side landmark. In addition, the lease agreement between the state and the franchise prohibited locals from selling their products outside the new sports facility, since the franchise was given complete control over all game related...
sales.

Efforts by the community to address these effects have been slow. The public housing residents left behind, without the support of the local government, have recently attempted to redevelop their community. Their goal has been to reintroduce the community businesses destroyed during the stadium development process.

Lake View and Wrigley Field

In 1988, the community of Lake View experienced the addition of lights at Wrigley Field, a stadium development plan. Though, there was no displacement or direct physical reorganization of space resulting from the lights installation, this stadium development plan has contributed to transforming this part of Lake View into an entertainment area. Night games assisted the various entertainment businesses by supplying the "after the game" crowds. A parking program intended to assist the community, affected businesses which did not rely on night games for business. Thus, a different type of co-existence between Wrigley Field and the community of Lake View, driven by this stadium development plan, emerged.

At the same time, the long term implications of the lights at Wrigley Field on the community of Lake View are yet to be determined. Driven by economic rationales and transportation demands, the community could be transformed as efforts to accommodate a larger number of night games are
undertaken. Specifically, under this scenario, surface or multi-level parking structures would yield more profits than the current operation of these structures as rental units. If that becomes the case, Wrigley Field will not be a ballpark integrated with the local community, but rather another suburban-style facility. The future stability of this north side community largely depends on the stability of Wrigley Field.

Near West Side and the United Center

In the 80's and the early 90's the community of the Near West Side was presented with proposals for the construction of two sports facilities. These proposed stadium development plans resulted in the construction of the United Center in 1994.

Though the magnitude of this project is not comparable to the new Comiskey Park, displacement of residents proved inescapable. Beyond this direct, physical effect, the construction of the United Center on the Near West Side has sparked additional physical reorganization, and has served as a catalyst of culture change.

Specifically, driven by the 1996 National Democratic Convention to be held at the United Center, the city has invested considerably into area beautification and other related projects, including the demolition of the nearby Henry Horner Public Housing. This form of public investment occurred along side additional private spending on the area
surrounding the United Center. To that extent, the actions of the private and public sector work to alter the cultural and physical environment of this community.

Though some form of urban redevelopment on the Near West Side was clearly needed, the community advocated different types of spatial reorganization than those advanced by the stadium developers, the local government and the media. The most recent developments on the Near West Side, precipitated by the construction and presence of the United Center, point toward the creation of a space and a culture not inclusive of its current residents. Gentrification, increased cost of redevelopment and higher taxes will likely force many of the current residents to move elsewhere, thus reshaping this part of the city.

**Government and Corporate Partnership in Stadium Development**

This study also outlines the role of the government in these stadium projects. Though the degree of involvement and financial contribution to the plans varied, a clear partnership between government and private interests can be observed.

The government played a critical role in each of these three situations. The most intense government support of private interests can be observed in the case of South Armour Square and of the new Comiskey Park. The local and state governments not only financed the construction of a
new facility for the White Sox, but also agreed to be responsible for its management and operation. In addition to this extraordinary, direct, financial assistance, the government, at public cost, assumed the responsibility for the removal and relocation of community residents.

In the case of the installation of lights at Wrigley Field in Lake View, the local government again played a key role. It was the mayoral support of these stadium development plans which resulted in the approval of a City Council resolution, making night games at Wrigley Field possible.

Finally, the government proved to be in support of the stadium development proposals on the Near West Side. The city government promoted these proposals as a means of redevelopment, while playing a key role in the production of a publicly financed package which would make the construction of a stadium for the Bears in that community possible. Though this plan eventually failed, the government later assisted with the infrastructural development of the United Center, while providing sales and luxury skybox tax incentives.

The professional franchises utilized four methods to ensure that the government would support their goals. Specifically, they (1) threatened to leave Chicago, coercing the city and the state into distributing 'necessary' public funds to support their goals, (2) employed economic impact
studies to show their economic contribution to the city, county and state, (3) argued that the franchises' presence assisted in the advancement of civic pride while noting the special relationship between the public and the teams, and (4) argued that their proposed plans would result into positive urban redevelopment.

The utilization of these methods can be seen in all three of these cases. For example, both the White Sox and the Cubs threatened to leave Chicago unless their demands were met. The same two franchises also published economic impact studies to showcase their contribution to Chicago's and Illinois' economies. The Tribune Co., through various surveys also attempted to bring to the attention of the public and the politicians that Wrigley Field was a special ballpark and that the Cubs were an integral part of Chicago's history. The Tribune Co., advocated that Chicagoans strongly identified with the Cubs and Wrigley Field, thus a move of the Cubs out of Chicago would mean the possible demolition of the historic ballpark.

The Bears, the Bulls and the Blackhawks promoted the concept of urban redevelopment on the Near West Side, claiming a new sports stadium or arena would provide economic opportunities and help revitalize the area. Though the community responses and community effects of the stadium development plans were different in each of the three case studies presented earlier, the driving force
behind these stadium proposals by these professional franchises remained the same; a search toward profits and increased capital. Thus, government support of free enterprise, expressed through stadium development becomes a central finding of this analysis.

The Role of these Urban Social Movements

But what role do these urban community movements play in society and more specifically, can the community responses discussed in this study inform us of the dynamics of social change in the urban environment? What is the social significance of these localized urban movements? Answering these questions will allow both a connection and an interpretation of the events which occurred in South Armour Square, Lake View and Near West Side in Chicago during the 1980's and 1990's into a larger social and urban context.

Castells (1977; 1980; 1983) examines urban social movements within capitalism. Since the city is a social product, class conflict and production relations contribute to the emergence of social movements. The capitalist class reorganizes social forms, and according to Castells results in "changes [in] the existing meaning....A social movement develops its own meaning over a given space in contradiction to the structurally dominant meaning" (Castells, 1983: 304-305).
In this regard, the stadium development plans, an expression of the dominant political and economic interests, perpetuate urban change as indicated by the effect that these stadium development plans have on these communities and the city in general. The conflict between the stadium developers and the communities provides the contested meaning of space within these communities.

This notion of contested meaning of urban development is best exemplified in the cases of the Near West Side and the South Armour Square. Specifically, the city, the developers and the media viewed a new stadium differently than did the residents of these communities. The plans of a new, open-air sports stadium on the Near West Side, for example, would develop into an urban redevelopment project, capable of rescuing that community from its current condition. On the other hand, the community leadership attributed a different meaning to redevelopment, or at least how redevelopment ought to take place. As Gates noted to me:

They [stadium developers] were undermining our intelligence. Like we do not know what is best for our community. ...Others want to tell you what is best for you. Our approach was that we wanted, the community that is, to define our own destiny. We want to make the decisions as to what is best for us. Why? Because we live here, we are the ones to be affected by the new construction, the traffic and all that. That's why.

Similarly, in the case of the new Comiskey Park development in South Armour Square, Radford-Hill noted:

The case of a sports stadium is not a public benefit.
It advances the interests of a few and gives nothing back to the community affected. As a result of these conflicting perceptions of urban meaning, and through the struggles that ensue, an understanding of the process of urban change emerges.

At the same time, these urban movements proved quite limited. Although a variation in the level of success can be observed, in the end, the interests of the developers proved overwhelming. In all three cases the communities proved incapable of suspending the construction of new stadiums in South Armour Square and Near West Side, and the installation of lights at Wrigley Field. What then becomes the significance of these community movements? Is there a long term social significance?

Castells (1983:319) views these movements within the larger context of social change by noting that these movements alone are incapable of producing social change. While reflecting on the role of the urban movements of this study, one can conclude that all three of these movements lost the possibility of a radical focus. A focus which would have attempted to challenge the institutionalization of the dominant interests at the structural level. Rather, all three of the urban movements evolved into interests groups, concentrating on advancing single objectives (i.e., resident relocation, neighborhood protection, etc).

Yet, on the macro level of analysis, these urban social movements can be viewed as assisting in the production of
social change since they "...are the organizational forms, the live schools, where the new social movements of our emerging society are taking place, growing up, learning to breath, out of reach of the state apparatuses..." (Castells, 1983: 331). In this regard, the urban social movements of discussed here, while disjointed, sporadic, and powerless, have the ability to contribute to the creation of a culture structure capable of producing social change. Specifically, the language employed by the community organizers, the community tactics, the exposure of the dominant interests, etc., can have an influence on other urban social movements.

**Conclusion**

The responses of these three communities to the plans of the stadium developers varied. Structural factors such as race, class and the political support of private interests played a critical role in the outcomes. In addition, South Armour Square and the Near West Side, accepted the fact that the developers would eventually succeed, thus, contributing to the construction of the two sports facilities.

It also becomes clear that stadiums and stadium development plans, can have both direct and indirect effects on the urban environment. In this regard, both the physical and the cultural organization of community living is transformed. Finally, the role of the government in this
process becomes crucial. In all three case studies presented, the government worked in accord with the developers to realize their capitalist interests.

In the end, a combination of government, economic and social factors are transcended through the stadium developments of this study. In the process, an opportunity to better understand urban change and urban life is revealed.
CHAPTER 11

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has investigated the relationship between urban communities and stadium development within the larger scope of capitalist relations. Urban centers across America have departed from being identified as centers of manufacturing and industry and have increasingly become involved in promoting themselves as cities of culture. This shift in direction is consistent with the emergence of a post-industrial society, elements of which have included decentralization and globalization. The economies which have emerged from these structural changes can be identified as culture industries. Such industries have included the arts, urban tourism and sports.

Professional sports teams have come to be viewed by local governments, civic boosters, the media and the teams themselves as significant economic and social/cultural contributors. In this regard, these sports franchises differ from other local businesses since they can draw from their symbolic and cultural value to become intensely connected with the cities themselves. The investigation of the urban environment, including urban change, requires a theoretical framework which integrates cultural factors into
an analysis of political and economic aspects.

The stadium becomes the link between the professional team and the city. A new or refurbished stadium provides the sports franchise with an opportunity to substantially increase its profit through advertising and luxury seating. The city on the other hand, since its cultural image and perceived progress relies on the presence of the team, will have to invest in the construction of sports facilities.

Spending on these projects by local and/or state government proves to be another example of how public support of private interests within the urban environment occurs. Rationalizing these governmental expenditures becomes of primary concern to public officials, the media and the franchise owners. In order for the public to accept this spending, an environment supporting its approval must be produced.

Within this context sports and the stadium become first represented in economic terms. Through the use of multiplier effects and economic impact studies, spending advocates argue that the presence of the team and of the stadium will result in regional economic growth and urban redevelopment. Secondly, this line of thinking is followed by social and cultural arguments which outline community building and social cohesion as the outcome of the activities of the professional team. These arguments are advanced by the media which is often positioned to play a
public policy role.

Yet, research shows that the multiplier effects as well as the publicized economic impact studies are seriously exaggerated. Problems with definitions, estimations, assumptions, and vested interests produce findings which prove unfounded. Though one can accept the proposed social functions of professional sports, the extremes to which these arguments extend seriously undermine the reported benefits. Thus, construction of a stadium and the presence of a professional sports franchise for the city, in the majority of the cases, does not provide a return equivalent to the reported benefits.

At the same time, the drive amongst urban centers toward urban redevelopment through the use of culture industries also becomes apparent. Sports, like the arts, museums, conventions, theme parks and other related entertainment industries stimulate public investment and generate government support for stadium construction and development. Cities compete to attract professional franchises by offering huge subsidies and state-of-the-art facilities. In the process, the city develops an identity which often becomes connected to the team and its players.

For example, a recent NIKE ad on a Chicago expressway highlights a Bears football jersey with pads and the slogan: "City of Big Shoulders." Similarly, Michael Jordan has become a role model serving as an ambassador for the
Chicago. The success of the Bulls of the NBA has produced a world-wide following and the name of the city which the team represents, becomes depicted in sportswear worn by fans all around the world. These sports-based, culturally driven representations, do not powerfully communicate a city as a place of industry and a hub of economic activity. Rather, Chicago now becomes portrayed as a sporting city, a city of entertainment and culture. The use and role of these images then become part of a strategy toward urban growth. As a result, sports is a culture industry which takes center stage, able to communicate and construct a new urban identity.

This study further analyzes three stadium development plans in Chicago; the New Comiskey Park in South Armour Square, the installation of lights at Wrigley Field in Lake View, and the construction of the United Center on the Near West Side. These investigations cover the political economy of these projects, the community responses, and the potential effects of these plans on the communities. These case studies allow for the following conclusions to emerge: (1) Stadium development substantially increases the profits of professional franchises. (2) There is strong relationship between the interests of the stadium developers and the actions of the public officials (local and/or state governments), who work to support private enterprise.
(3) Multiplier figures and social/cultural rationales are employed to advance the interests of the professional sports teams.

(4) The community response to these stadium development plans varies since the social and economic organization of these communities differs.

(5) Race matters since minority communities prove to be more directly affected by these projects. At the same time, because of the racial make-up of these communities, the developers and the government find it easier to assert their agenda.

(6) Social inequality proves to be the outcome of these projects within the urban environment.

(7) Effective community organizing proves critical in maintaining continuous government support.

(8) The media plays an important role as it works to support the interests of the developers.

(9) The stadium as an urban development tool is capable of not only reorganizing the physical space but also of transforming local culture. Thus, the stadium can effect urban change.

(10) A coalition of government, the media, and capitalists works to advance private interests.

(11) Culture becomes a driving force behind urban development and urban change.

This study also communicates the need for additional
research regarding the relationship between urban communities and stadium development. Specifically, the following areas are identified where further analysis can be conducted:

(1) Investigation of the political and economic processes through which the agenda of the stadium developers is advanced.

(2) Examination of the ways through which cultural factors are employed to conceal the implications of these projects.

(3) Assessment of the proposed benefits resulting from these projects.

(4) Analysis of community effects and urban change.

(5) Exploration of the changing nature of urban centers as culture cities and the role which sports play within this framework.

The use of an analytic framework which combines cultural factors to political and economic forces expands our understanding of the urban environment and informs us that even sports contribute to shaping the nature of urban centers across America as we move toward the 21st century.
APPENDIX A

CHANGES OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS IN CENSUS DATA TRACKS
WITHIN ONE MILE SURROUNDING WRIGLEY FIELD, CHICAGO BETWEEN
1980 AND 1990 IN PERCENTAGE POINTS

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<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>+ 4.3</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Use public trans</td>
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* Due to changes in categories regarding educational attainment between the 1980 and 1990 census, the figure reflects the percentage of those with Bachelor’s degree or higher within the tracks surrounding Wrigley Field (U.S. Census 1980, 1990).
### APPENDIX B

**CHANGES OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS IN CENSUS DATA TRACKS WITHIN HALF A MILE SURROUNDING WRIGLEY FIELD, CHICAGO BETWEEN 1980 AND 1990 IN PERCENTAGE POINTS**

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(U.S. Census 1980, 1990)

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VITA

The author, Costas Spirou, is the son of Plutarchos-Stylianos and Yvonni Spirou. He was born on September 1996 in Samos, Samos Island, Greece.

His elementary education took place at the 1st Public School of Samos and his secondary education was completed at the 1st Lyceum of Samos, Samos Island.

In 1984, Costas began his studies at the Franciscan University of Steubenville, Steubenville, Ohio and in 1987 he completed the Bachelor of Arts degree in sociology. In 1988 Costas was the recipient of a research fellowship at DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, where in 1989 he obtained a Masters of Arts degree with distinction in sociology.

From 1989 to 1993, he taught sociology and cultural anthropology courses as an adjunct faculty member at Moraine Valley Community College, National-Louis University and Loyola University Chicago. In 1993, he was appointed into a full-time, tenure track, faculty position at the Social Science Department of National-Louis University, Evanston, Illinois, where he currently teaches.

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The dissertation submitted by Costas S. Spirou has been read and approved by the following committee:

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Professor of Sociology
Loyola University Chicago

Dr. Talmadge Wright
Assistant Professor of Sociology
Loyola University Chicago

Dr. Larry Bennett
Professor of Political Science
DePaul University

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of doctor of Philosophy.

Aug. 28, 1996
Date

Signature
Director's Signature