



1991

The Relationship of Temperamental and Representational Personality Dimensions to Each Other and to Subjective Life Satisfaction

Stephen M. Gedo
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses



Part of the [Psychology Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Gedo, Stephen M., "The Relationship of Temperamental and Representational Personality Dimensions to Each Other and to Subjective Life Satisfaction" (1991). *Master's Theses*. 3888.

https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/3888

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License](#).
Copyright © 1991 Stephen M. Gedo

THE RELATIONSHIP OF TEMPERAMENTAL AND REPRESENTATIONAL
PERSONALITY DIMENSIONS TO EACH OTHER AND TO
SUBJECTIVE LIFE SATISFACTION

by

Stephen M. Gedo

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

February

1991

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr. John Shack, who has offered me his vision of the field of psychology, and been a frequent source of encouragement. My gratitude also extends to Dr. Dana Murphy, my other committee member, for her timely and valuable comments. Dr. Fred Bryant was extremely helpful in introducing me to the area of Life Satisfaction. Special thanks go to my co-raters, Carla Leone and Cindy Nowinski, for their generous assistance, and to Jerry Cleland.

In addition, I would like to express my appreciation and affection for those friends who lent confidence and encouragement whenever my own resolve lagged. And finally, thank you to those students who participated in this effort, and made it all possible.

VITA

Steve Gedo is a veteran of the United States Navy, where he served as a general duty Hospital Corpsman, and Psychiatric Technician. He received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in psychology from the University of Minnesota in 1985.

He continued his studies at Loyola University of Chicago in the clinical psychology doctoral program. He has received two teaching assistantships in psychology, and pursued testing and clinical training at Evanston Hospital, the Charles I. Doyle Center, and the Loyola University Counseling and Developmental Services Center. He is a student member of the American Psychological Association and the Chicago Association of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ii
VITA	iii
LIST OF TABLES	vi
 Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE	9
Personality Structure	9
Biologically Based Temperaments	10
Subjective Well-Being and Life Satisfaction	15
Life Satisfaction and Personality	19
Positive and Negative Affect	20
Personality and Parental Representations	22
Object Relations Theory	24
Object Representation Research	30
Nurturance and Striving	36
Representations, Temperament, and Life Satisfaction.....	38
Statement of Hypotheses	39
Relationships between personality variables	39
Life Satisfaction	43
III. METHOD	46
Subjects	46
Measures	48
Biological Personality Dimensions	48
Life Satisfaction	49
Object Representation	50
Procedure	52
Statistical Analyses	53
IV. RESULTS	55
Preliminary Analyses	55
Relationships among E, N, Nu, and St	59

Interactions of E, N on Nu, St	59
Interactions of Nu, St on E, N.....	60
Life Satisfaction	60
Interactions of E, N, Nu, St on LS ...	64
V. DISCUSSION	66
The N, Nu Reciprocal Relationship.....	66
Nu and Positive and Negative Affect...	68
The Puzzling Dimension of St.....	68
The Inter-Relatedness of Nu,	
St, and E.....	69
LS, Affect, and Personality.....	70
Future Research.....	72
REFERENCES	74
APPENDIX	82

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
1.	Demographic information	47
2.	Mean scores, median splits, and standard deviations (SD) for personality and life satisfaction variables	57
3.	Pearson correlation coefficients of raters' scoring for representational dimensions of Blatt Prose Descriptions	58
4.	Pearson correlation coefficients for personality variables and Life Satisfaction	61
5.	Observed cell means of Nurturance and Striving scores as a function of high and low Extraversion and Neuroticism	62
6.	Observed cell means of Extraversion and Neuroticism scores as a function of high and low Nurturance and Striving	63

7. Observed cell means of Life Satisfaction as a function of high and low Extraversion, Neuroticism, Nurturance, and Striving 65

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Many writers throughout history have speculated on the causes of human happiness and life satisfaction. These conjectures have often dealt with inherited or acquired personality characteristics, or choices and fortune influencing life events. For example, Fielding (1963) in Tom Jones, implied through his main character that a sanguine temperament was more important than external advantages. The Ascetics held that detachment from the world led to well being, while the Stoics emphasized inner psychological causes of happiness. Others, particularly in contemporary times, have particularly stressed the importance of personal relationships (e.g., Gellner, 1985).

Arguments as to the relative importance of each of these factors continue to the present time. However, the contention here is that debating the hegemony of one or the other of these variables provides perspectives which are less useful than those obtained through examining the interaction of the key factors.

Fictional accounts of the human experience tend to support this point of view, and to emphasize personality and relational factors. The Tom Jones

character was affected not only by a resilient temperament, but by fortuitous and disastrous interpersonal alliances as well. The classic character of Silas Marner (Eliot, 1968), presumably possessed of a more delicate constitution, was prompted to withdraw from social and religious life by the false accusations of others. Yet it was a loving relationship which restored him to humanity. In these accounts, relationships with others were among those life circumstances impacting most powerfully on the protagonists' experience of life. An aggregate conclusion from these sources might be that critical life circumstances, including interpersonal relationships, along with inherent qualities of the individual mediating these experiences, in large measure account for one's degree of happiness or satisfaction in life.

There is an important distinction to be made between the fictional accounts of individuals noted above, and philosophical or religious beliefs speaking to the causes of happiness. In literature, subjective accounts of individuals are composed, whereas philosophical or religious tenets are prescriptive and presumably, objective. Faced with the choice of subjective versus prescriptive accounts, scientific investigations of life experience have generally chosen

to use the former, and contemporary empirical studies concerning subjective happiness have most often been based on subjects' self-reports.

In many studies, happiness and related terminology have often been vaguely defined and synonymously used. It was not until Bradburn's (1969) conception of "Psychological Well-Being", that an operational equivalent of happiness was generally agreed upon. Another term, "Subjective Well-Being" has been used interchangeably, and is more often used today. The construct involves both affective and cognitive components, specifically, the tendency of the individual to experience positive affective experiences over negative affectivity, and a conscious, cognitive self-evaluation by that individual of his or her life. The cognitive component of subjective well-being is referred to in the literature as "Life Satisfaction" (Diener, 1984).

While there is general consensus that health, socioeconomic status, and degree of social interaction influence life satisfaction (Larson, 1978, Palmore, 1979), more recent studies suggest that personality factors may be more important to both Subjective Well-Being and Life Satisfaction than external demographic variables (Campbell, 1981, Diener, 1984). In accord with this view, the present study will emphasize

personality dimensions rather than external contextual variables. Since the personality variables used here have been closely related to affective experiences, the cognitive component of Subjective Well-Being, Life Satisfaction, will be specifically represented. However, as Subjective Well-Being and Life Satisfaction are similarly influenced by the same factors (Diener, 1984), they are frequently studied together, often making their concurrent mention necessary in this study.

The importance of stable personality traits has been emphasized in establishing reliable relationships between personality variables and Subjective Well-Being or Life Satisfaction (George, 1978). While a large number of personality dimensions have been proposed, the temperamental continuums of Extraversion-Introversion and Neuroticism-Emotional Stability, first conceptualized by Hans Eysenck (1952), have held as the most consistently valid over time.

Observed differences along these Eysenckian dimensions (temperaments) are believed to be manifestations of individual variations of physiology, which leave the Extravert with lower level of cortical arousal, and thus motivated to seek added stimulation. The Introvert is in contrast, overstimulated, and therefore more quiet and withdrawn. Those high in

Neuroticism are prone to experience more negative emotions such as anxiety and depression, become more emotionally engaged by stimuli, and take longer to return to baseline levels following emotional arousal than those who are more emotionally stable, or lower in Neuroticism (Eysenck, 1967). Thousands of studies conducted in cultures throughout the world have found consistent and significant differences between the Eysenckian temperamental types in many areas of human functioning (Eysenck, 1981). These include a wide variety of cognitive tasks, sensory thresholds and physical response rates, social behaviors, emotional experiences, and a myriad of other characteristics.

The affective aspects of temperament may be more significant than is readily apparent. A confluence between many personality dimensions and studies of emotion has recently emerged in the literature. Meyer (1987) has proposed that the continuums of Extraversion-Introversion and Neuroticism-Stability actually encompass the same dimensions as Positive Affect and Negative Affect. Positive Affect concerns feelings related to animation and involvement with life, while continuum of Negative Affect spans distressed versus peaceful feelings (Watson & Tellegen, 1985). As presently conceived, Positive and Negative affect, though not identical to Bradburn's (1969)

conceptualization in defining Psychological (Subjective) Well-Being, are quite similar. This would suggest that both Subjective Well-Being and Life Satisfaction may be closely related to the Eysenckian temperamental dimensions.

Research concerning the impact of early relationships on subsequent life experience has taken a much different course. With the advent of psychoanalysis, Freud also stressed innate biological factors from which human personality develops. The drives were seen to express themselves by creating tension states, which led to activity from the individual, and a subsequent response from the environment. Decisive environmental responses were presumed to come from parental figures, early on in the life of the child. The emphasis on early relational experiences was critical in the development of psychoanalysis, and is one of the foundations of the present study.

Freud first used the term "object" to signify the person (or quality of that person) towards whom (or which) a drive was directed. For the infant, "object relations" involves either frustration or gratification of drive demands. Contemporary psychoanalytic theories place less emphasis on the drives, and assign object relations a primary importance in defining personality

development, through the quality of experienced object relations and their internalization. Modern object relations theory (e.g., Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983) contends that early childhood relationships are internalized, forming symbolic representations of the self and the object. These representations shape subsequent experiences of the self, as well as relations with others. The affective tone of early relational experiences is also internalized, and tends to be replicated in other relationships throughout life. From this perspective then, aspects of early relational experiences which are internalized form the foundations of important facets of personality structure.

The representational dimensions examined in this study, Nurturance and Striving, have been shown to be particularly relevant in relation to depression (Blatt et al., 1979). Nurturance is a composite of various aspects of emotionally accepting responses experienced by the individual, while Striving represents achievement-related internalizations.

This study proceeds on the premise that inherent, biologically based personality factors, or temperaments (represented here as Extraversion and Neuroticism), mediate, and are themselves affected by internalized elements of early relational experiences (Nurturant and

striving dimensions of internalized object representations). These temperamental and representational elements will be examined in terms of their interaction, and used here as a framework of personality structure. These personality elements may have direct bearing on subjective Life Satisfaction, given the convergence of the proposed domains of emotion, temperament, and Life Satisfaction, along with the connection between representational dimensions and depression, a key manifestation of Negative Affect.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE

Personality Structure

As noted in the introduction, the interaction of temperamental and representational factors will be taken as a framework of personality in the present study. This view has been represented in the literature for some time. For example, Thomas et al. (1964) have demonstrated that based on infant temperament and aspects of the early subjective experience of mothering which are internalized, infants develop stable patterns of behavior and responsiveness by their second month. The authors note that these patterns are initially pliable, and are particularly shaped by the degree to which environmental responses are accepting and consistent. Yet despite their malleability, the infant's established patterns of personality clearly arbitrate the influences of the world at large.

Although some connections have been established, research as to the ways in which temperament and early relational experiences combine is scarce; this is somewhat less true in regards to temperament and Life

satisfaction, but even more evident when examining representational dimensions and Life Satisfaction. However, this study hopes to establish that all of these variables can be meaningfully related.

While representational features of the experience of mothering are internalized after birth, the infant is born with temperamental characteristics, and it is with these innate elements which the present review of the personality literature will begin.

Biologically Based Temperaments

The importance of stable and broad based personality dimensions has been discussed since ancient times---for example, Hippocrates considered four basic temperament types (Choleric, Sanguine, Melancholic, and Phlegmatic). While there has been a plethora of temperamental and other personality dimensions proposed since, the continuums of Extraversion-Introversion (hereafter referred to as Extraversion), and Neuroticism-Emotional Stability (Neuroticism), first conceptualized by Hans Eysenck (1952), have proven to be the most basic and well validated.

These Eysenckian temperaments, or types, are believed to be manifestations of individual physiology, and involve four levels of behavior organization (Eysenck, 1947). At the lowest level are specific acts

or behaviors, which coalesce to form habituated responses tending to recur under similar circumstances. Habitual behaviors form higher level patterns and interactions, which can be identified and labeled as traits, such as persistence or irritability. Traits in turn associate with one another, grouping together to form the highest order construct in this model, the type. The four temperament types with which the present study will be concerned are Extraversion, Introversion, and high and low Neuroticism.

Eysenck & Eysenck (1975) described the outward manifestations of these temperamental types:

The typical Extravert is sociable, likes parties, has many friends, needs to have people to talk to, and does not like reading or studying by himself. He craves excitement, takes chances, often sticks his neck out, acts on the spur of the moment, and is generally an impulsive individual. He is fond of practical jokes, always has a ready answer, and generally likes change; he is carefree, easy-going, optimistic, and likes to 'laugh and be merry'. He prefers to keep moving and doing things, tends to be aggressive and lose his temper quickly; altogether his feelings are not kept under tight control, and he is not always a reliable person.

The typical Introvert is a quiet, retiring sort of person, introspective, fond of books rather than people; he is reserved and distant except to intimate friends. He tends to plan ahead, 'looks before he leaps' and distrusts the impulse of the moment. He does not like excitement, takes matters of everyday life with proper seriousness, and likes a well ordered mode of life. He keeps his feelings under close control, seldom behaves in an aggressive manner, and does not lose his temper easily. He is reliable, somewhat pessimistic, and places great

value on ethical standards.

We may describe the typical high Neuroticism scorer as being an anxious, worrying individual, moody and frequently depressed. He is likely to sleep badly, and to suffer from various psychosomatic disorders. He is overly emotional, reacting too strongly to all sorts of stimuli, and finds it difficult to get back on an even keel after each emotionally arousing experience. His strong emotional reactions interfere with his proper adjustment, making him react in irrational, sometimes rigid ways...If the high Neuroticism individual has to be described in one word, one might say that he is a worrier; his main characteristic is a constant preoccupation with things that might go wrong, and a strong emotional reaction of anxiety to these thoughts. The stable individual, on the other hand, tends to respond emotionally only slowly and generally weakly, and to return to baseline quickly after emotional arousal; he is usually calm, even-tempered, controlled and unworried (p. 5).

Eysenck (1967) suggested that individual differences along the continuum of Extraversion could be accounted for by differences in the central nervous system--specifically, functional variations of the reticular arousal system (RAS) of the brain stem. The RAS is thought to be responsible for monitoring a wide array of internal and external stimuli. Introverts appear to have systems which screen fewer stimuli, resulting in higher resting levels of cortical arousal. They therefore tend to avoid added stimulation. Extraverts, receiving less stimulation due to greater screening activity of the RAS, attempt to raise their lowered cortical arousal level by seeking social and other excitations.

For the Neuroticism dimension of personality, it

is proposed that the limbic system of the autonomic nervous system differs across individuals in its activation threshold. The limbic system is thought to be where many emotional responses originate; those high in Neuroticism become more emotionally engaged by stimuli, as their systems are more easily aroused, and take longer to return to baseline levels after emotional arousal. In addition, as the limbic system is situated directly above the RAS there are excitatory neural connections between the two systems. Thus, when the limbic system is stimulated there is an increase in RAS activity, causing those high in Neuroticism person to respond to stimulation in a manner similar to Introverts. Since individuals low in Neuroticism are less easily engaged by stimuli, their response style is more influenced by their location on the Extraversion end of the continuum.

As mentioned, there has been a multitude of personality traits proposed throughout history. However, measures devised in this century to measure a wide variety of seemingly disparate traits have consistently and clearly represented Extraversion and Neuroticism (Costa & McCrae, 1985). Wiggins (1968) termed the Eysenckian dimensions "the big two". Costa & McCrae (1976) cluster analyzed scales from the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (Cattell,

Eber, & Tatsuoka, 1970), finding Extraversion and Neuroticism as two of the three underlying domains represented.

Eysenck (1981) reported that over 5000 studies of the Extraversion and Neuroticism typologies have been carried out. Studies comparing typologies have found significant differences in learning, memory, sensory thresholds, physiological response patterns, rates of conditioning, and perceptual after-effects (Eysenck, 1981), as well as social behavior (Wilson, 1981), pain tolerance (Barnes, 1975), and a host of other characteristics.

Other research has shown these typologies to be stable and constant for up to 50 years (Conley, 1985, Guiganino & Hindley, 1982). The Extraverted and Introverted types have been consistently found across 26 countries in all parts of the world (Eysenck et al., 1986) through administrations of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). There have also been adoption, twin and cross-generational studies of the genetic heritability of the two typologies--these studies have generally found a heritability of about 50% (Loehlin, 1985, Young, Eaves & Eysenck, 1980).

Although there has some work which relates temperamental variables to Life Satisfaction, before

these relationships can be reviewed, the nature of Life Satisfaction must be clarified.

Subjective Well-Being and Life Satisfaction

Throughout the literature, Life Satisfaction and related terminology have often been poorly defined and interchangeably used. In one review of the literature on Life Satisfaction, Trafton (1977) found the term equated with "happiness", "the will to live", "general adjustment", "psychological well-being", and "mental health". Horley (1984) found "happiness", well-being", "satisfaction", and "morale" to be closely related but not identical constructs, although they have often been treated synonymously in the literature. Before any coherent study can be attempted, Life Satisfaction must be distinguished from related but non-equivalent constructs.

Perhaps the broadest and most important term to clarify is that of happiness. In equating happiness with success relative to some standard, Tatarkiewicz (1976) was generally consistent with historical cultural conceptualizations. In reviewing these conceptions, Coan (1977) found normative definitions concerned not with subjective feeling states, but possession of some desirable quality. The standard for this type of happiness is not the protagonist's

subjective judgement, but the value framework of the observer. Thus when Aristotle designated virtue as the criterion against which people's lives may be judged, he did not mean that a virtuous life led to subjectively buoyant feelings.

Contemporary empirical efforts have been more often based on the consensus that subjective happiness is best judged by the individual in question, according to more personal standards (Bradburn, 1969, Campbell 1981). There is now a large body of research based on this subjective approach. Bradburn's (1969) influential early work was based on his findings that positive and negative affect were independent dimensions. He found that positive affect related to greater levels of social contact and the experiencing of novel events, while negative affect was associated with fear, anxiety, and somatic symptoms. Bradburn denoted happiness as the degree to which an individual experiences a preponderance of positive affect over negative affect. Bradburn substituted the term "Psychological Well-Being" for happiness; while this term has since been used interchangeably with "Subjective Well-Being", the latter is more commonly used today.

In addition to Bradburn's affective component, Subjective Well-Being is now widely viewed as

containing an evaluative component; influences on subjective life evaluation have been the focus of a number of recent studies. (Campbell, 1981, Diener, 1984). This subjective, conscious, and cognitive evaluation of one's life has been termed Life Satisfaction.

Most research in this area has found similar factors affecting both Life Satisfaction and Subjective Well-Being (Diener, 1984). This is an important point, as several studies do not clearly distinguish between the two. Many of these studies have been cross-sectional and have used different populations, while focusing on correlating a multitude of discrete life situation variables with Subjective Well-Being and Life Satisfaction. Results have therefore been difficult to integrate.

Studies of this type which have been specific to Life Satisfaction have typically proceeded by asking subjects how satisfied they are with particular aspects of their lives, and their life overall. For example, from a 1982 General Social Survey using national probability sampling, Mookherjee (1987) analyzed data pertaining to reports of Life Satisfaction. Subjects (1506 adults, age 18 to 89) were asked attitudinal questions relating to satisfaction in the following aspects of their lives: Health, residence, family,

friendship, hobbies, financial condition, and condition of health. In addition, two questions were related to life as a whole. Life Satisfaction was measured by a cumulative score. Results indicated that race, marital status, and education were significant variables. White, married, and better educated persons were more satisfied with their lives than black, unmarried, and less well educated respondents. Mookherjee also concluded (tentatively) that overall Life Satisfaction increased with age and education.

However, a number of authors have suggested that several specific variables appear to become more important to the elderly in evaluating Life Satisfaction. Among these variables are health (Murphy, 1975), activity level (Peterson, 1974), and retirement attitude (Thorson, 1977).

While observing that health, socioeconomic status, and degree of social interaction predicted both satisfaction and longevity, both Larson (1978) and Palmore (1979) noted another problem which has hampered these types of studies: The variables used accounted for only a small proportion of the variance reported in measures of Life Satisfaction and Subjective Well-Being.

These findings have been consistently replicated and many more recent studies have found psychological

and personality variables more important than demographic factors to both Life Satisfaction and Subjective Well-Being (Andrews & Withey, 1976, Campbell, 1981, Diener, 1984, George, 1978).

Life Satisfaction and Personality

Neugarten and her associates (1964, 1968) made significant early contributions to this area, particularly in relation to aging. They found that levels of activity often were important to aging successfully, and developed eight personality types which they believed mediated between Life Satisfaction and activity level.

Others have particularly stressed the importance of stable personality traits in establishing reliable relationships between Subjective Well-Being or Life Satisfaction and personality (George, 1978). The enduring nature of temperament is particularly relevant in this respect; moreover, there is a correspondence in the literature between aspects of Extraversion and Neuroticism and the experience of Subjective Well-Being. This correspondence comes through Watson & Tellegen's (1985) suggestion that the interaction of the domains of Positive Affect and Negative affect comprise the structure of affective experience. A closer examination of these domains is now in order.

Positive and Negative Affect

Meyer (1987) has argued that the temperamental personality dimensions of Extraversion and Neuroticism and the affective dimensions of Positive and Negative Affect actually tap the same dimensions of human experience. There is a growing body of research concerning the confluence of emotional experiences and personality. While a full review is beyond the scope of this paper, the highlights will be noted.

Watson & Tellegen (1985) have proposed that two orthogonal affective traits, Positive Affect and Negative Affect, underlie the experience of emotion. Those experiencing high Positive Affect feel excitement, enthusiasm, and a general zest for life, while low Positive Affect is manifested by fatigue, sleepiness, and general low energy. Negative Affect is characterized by feelings of distress, nervousness and hostility; those low in Negative Affect experience peaceful feelings (Watson & Clark, 1984).

Watson & Tellegen (1985) note that it is only the high end of each affective dimension which represents the experience of emotion; low ends of the dimensions relate a lack of affective arousal. Thus, pleasant and unpleasant emotional states are seen as interactions between the independent dimensions of Positive and Negative affect. For example, subjective experiences

of peacefulness or pleasure indicate a combination of high Positive Affect and low Negative Affect, while sadness or unhappiness are a blend of high Negative Affect and low Positive Affect.

The importance of Positive and Negative affect to Subjective Well-Being and Life Satisfaction has already been noted. Recall that in Bradburn's (1969) conception, individual Psychological Well-Being was determined by the relationship between the independent dimensions of positive and negative affect. While Bradburn's measure of these dimensions were not identical to Watson and Tellegen's (1984) conceptions, they were similar. Bradburn (1969) found positive affect to be associated with the experiencing of new events and more social contacts, while negative affect was related to anxiety, fear, and somatic symptoms. These factors related to Bradburn's positive and negative affect are identical to what have been seen as manifestations of Extraversion and Neuroticism.

McCrae & Costa (1990) have extended the work of Hans Eysenck, adding three personality types to Eysenck's Extraversion and Neuroticism dimensions (Agreeableness, Openness to Experience, and Conscientiousness). These authors have also examined the effects of their personality dimensions on Subjective Well-Being. They found Extraversion to be

associated with positive affect but not with negative affect, while Neuroticism was associated with negative affect but not positive affect (Costa, McCrae, & Norris 1981, Costa & McCrae, 1984).

The similarity of Positive affect to Extraversion and Negative affect to Neuroticism has been noted by those most involved with the present conceptualization of Positive and Negative affect (Watson & Clark 1984, Watson & Tellegan, 1985). These authors have stopped short of equating their constructs with the Eysenckian dimensions, even though Neuroticism has been established as one of the best measures of Negative Affect (Meyer, 1987). This question will not be debated here; it is enough for the purposes of this study to note the high degree of correspondence between Extraversion and Positive Affect, and Neuroticism and Negative Affect, as well as the influence of Positive and Negative Affectivity on Subjective Well-Being, and Life Satisfaction. With these links established, the relationships between temperamental and representational dimensions of personality can now be discussed.

Personality and Parental Representations

There have been few empirical efforts which examine how Extraversion and Neuroticism might interact

with early parental relationships. The most relevant of these appears to be McCrae & Costa's (1988) effort, which correlated adult children's ratings of their parents' behaviors on the Parent-Child Relation Questionnaire II (Siegelman & Roe, 1979) with personality dimensions measured by the NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1985). They found that subjects who reported more loving parents scored lower in Neuroticism and higher in Extraversion. Those who described their parents as casual rather than demanding scored lower in Extraversion, and parental attention (i.e., spoiling) was associated with Extraversion. All associations were modest, and several alternative explanations to child rearing practices were proposed to explain results.

Although McCrae & Costa's parental qualities would seem to be similar to dimensions of object representation used in the present study, their instructions to subjects stressed parental behaviors "before the time you were twelve". The focus on adolescence rather than earlier childhood makes it difficult to extend the authors' conclusions to the present study. However, these results will be used here as a heuristic starting point.

As previously noted, the focus in this paper will be on very early relational experiences, which are

viewed as profoundly influential on the infant and it's developing personality structure. Before relating these experiences to the variables of this study, a review of object relations theory is necessary.

Object Relations Theory

Greenberg & Mitchell (1983) noted that the term "object relations theory" has been used to denote a wide array of theoretical systems within the larger body of psychoanalysis. The term "object" was first used by Freud to signify the person (or quality of that person) towards whom a drive was directed. For Freud, an infant's object relations were derivatives of drive demands, as there could be no drive expression without a drive object, whether external or implicit. Objects, for the infant, either gratified or frustrated the drives.

However, contemporary theories give object relations a more primary importance, defining personality development in terms of the quality of experienced object relations and their internalization. A general description of theories falling under the object relations umbrella was given by Bell, Billington, & Becker (1986):

Personality develops from experiences in early childhood relationships that produce internal self-other representations. These serve as templates for contemporary experience. With

normal development these internal mental structures would grow more complex, differentiated, and flexible according to more or less definable stages of development. Psychopathology would result from disruption of this pattern of psychological growth, and various psychopathological conditions have been described as arrested development at a particular stage (pp.733-4).

The "internal self-other representations", or object representations, involve images of important others (objects) and the developing self. They are at the heart of object relations theory. There is an abundance of terms for this general concept in the psychoanalytic literature, each with a slightly different shade of meaning. For example, Blatt & Lerner (1983a, p.190) described "cognitive affective schemata"; other theories have used "internal objects", "illusory others", "introjects", "personifications", and the "constituents of a representational world" (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p.11). Greenberg and Mitchell themselves signified "internal images and residues of external relations" (p.12) as the broadest delineation of this concept.

As this latter description connotes, object representations are generally thought to contain three distinctive components--for example, in the terminology of Kernberg (1976), these are: Images of the self, the object, and an "affective coloring" of the interpersonal experience. This affective coloring may

be seen as roughly synonymous to Greenberg and Mitchell's "residues of external relations".

The role of object representations is viewed in similar fashion throughout the literature, that is, there are many somewhat different conceptions within a generally coherent framework. Various theories alternately view them as determinants of how the self and others are subjectively experienced (Blatt & Lerner, 1983a), as guides as to what can be expected in interpersonal relationships (Bemporad, 1980), as suppliers of moral guidance or punishment (Atwood & Stolorow, 1981), or other forms of support or persecution in times of stress (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983).

Developmental theories of object relations view the infant's earliest experiences of self, object, and relatedness as variable and undifferentiated episodes of pleasure or frustration (Fraiberg, 1969, A. Freud, 1965, Jacobson, 1964). The child gradually builds increasingly stable and differentiated representations, which are accompanied by affective components. But it is the infant's experience of the early caretaker-child relationship along with its affective tenor which is initially internalized, providing the basic differentiation of reality and the cornerstone of personality organization (Blatt & Lerner, 1983a). This

initial internalization provides the basis for the development of self and other representations (Camper, 1983). Melanie Klein (1959), among the first to focus attention on this period of development, suggested that self-representations emerge from the original symbiosis with the primary caretaker. As the child's internal perceptions begin to incorporate external reality, the sense of oneness with the primary caretaker is gradually altered, and the separateness of self and object acknowledged.

Healthy development of self and object-representation culminates in a stable sense of self which is integrated, autonomous, and which can experience others empathically, but as separate from the self (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975). In Mahler's view, the process of self-other differentiation involves two critical, alternating elements, separation and individuation. During separation, the child emerges from its symbiotic merger with the mother, allowing individuation, or the establishment of a distinct self-identity (representation). As self-representation develops, the child is able to tolerate continuing and greater separations from the mother while developing increasingly sophisticated representations of significant others. The mother's response to the child's assertions during this process

is vitally important, as noted by Winnicott (1965). The "good enough mother" will be able to tolerate the child's moves towards autonomy and self-representation, as well as meeting dependency needs, thereby facilitating healthy formation of object representations.

The structure of early caretaking relationships will tend to be replicated in other relationships throughout life (Blatt & Lerner, 1983a). The early structure and tone of the child's experience with the initial caretaker is thought to be strengthened through patterns of behavior which actualize existing self and other-representation (Atwood & Stolorow, 1981). These patterns of behavior also encourage others to act in ways which repeat important aspects of internalized object representations.

Other sources have provided evidence for differing but hierarchical representational structures, for example, parental representations versus social representations (Lewicki, 1976). Sandler & Sandler (1978) suggested that early forms of object relations can exist concurrently with more recent internalizations. Regression to earlier forms of relating to self and others is believed to occur under duress.

While self and object representations are thought

to be relatively stable and enduring (Blatt & Lerner, 1983a, Cashdan, 1988, Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983), these representations also become increasingly flexible and complex with healthy development, so that:

There is a constant and reciprocal interaction between past and present interpersonal relationships and the development of object representations, and these developing representations, in turn, provide a revised organization for experiencing new, more complex facets of interpersonal relationships (Blatt & Lerner, 1983b, p.9).

It is this process which clinicians attempt to facilitate in their patients (Cashdan, 1988, Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983), a process often impaired due to internalization of destructive relational elements, or lack of necessary positive features such as nurturance. However, Wallace (1982) found that creating unusual interactions in the family milieu changed existing self and object representations among individual family members, allowing the possibility for growth and new adaptations. Wallace contended that not only could insight sought in the traditional psychoanalytic approach lead to altered family interactions, but that novel family interactions could also lead to new insights.

Object Representation Research

Empirical studies in this area have been based on two main assumptions: 1) that dimensions of an individual's representational structure can be measured along a developmental continuum (Bell, Billington & Becker, 1986, Urist, 1973), and 2) that ambiguous stimuli are organized by the individual according to aspects or projections of his or her inner representational world (Blatt & Lerner, 1983a, McClelland, 1980, Ryan, Avery, & Grolnick, 1985).

Martin Mayman (1967) was among the first to link object relations theory with projective test data. Mayman and his associates at the University of Michigan have made use of several projective sources, including manifest dreams and written autobiographical material, as well as initiating new inquiry techniques to Rorschach and TAT responses. Mayman found that the content of human responses to Rorschach blots correlated with independent assessments of interpersonal relations, severity of psychiatric symptoms, and motivation for change (Mayman, 1967). Other evidence has suggested that animal responses contain important references to subjects' inner representational worlds (Mayman, 1967, Urist, 1973).

Mayman (1968) also introduced a new assessment procedure, the Early Memories Test. His

conceptualization and use of early memories are illustrative of the direction and expanding influence of object relations theory and research:

Early memories are expressions of important fantasies around which a person's character structure is organized; early memories are selected (unconsciously) by a person to conform with and confirm ingrained images of himself and others; the themes which bind together the dramatis personae of a person's early memories define nuclear relationship patterns which are likely to repeat themselves isomorphically in a wide range of other life situations (Mayman, 1968, p.304).

Mayman's work has focused heavily on content and thematic elements of object representations. In doing so, he has made important contributions involving the translation of abstract psychoanalytic terminology to more empirically-related terms which remain relevant to clinical phenomenology. Thus for example, Mayman initially redefined "superego" as "hostile or loving introjects", while "ego structure" became "the self" or "identity" (Mayman, 1963).

With its strong qualitative bent, Mayman's group has often been concerned with construct validation of important object relational constructs. For example, Krohn (1972) found the construct "level of object representation" to be a valid psychological dimension, involving degree of differentiation, consistency, and variety of object representation; further, that this

dimension could be reliably measured by manifest dreams, early memories, and Rorschach responses. Urist (1973) assessed integrity (consistency) of object representation in a pathological population. He found that subjects tended to describe people in a consistent way across Rorschach and TAT responses, and in written autobiographical material, suggesting that object representations are consistent, relatively stable definitions of self and others.

In addressing structural dimensions of object representations, Urist (1977) also developed a Mutuality of Autonomy Scale (MAS), which assessed level of self-object representations based on Rorschach responses. The scale was designed to measure degrees of development in the separation-individuation process, with an emphasis of self-autonomy. The MAS scale ranges from the experience of relatedness of self to another as characterized by imagery of dominance and control, (or conversely, others are experienced as an extension of the self), to more autonomous experiences allowing for the integrity of both self and other, with mutual interaction and common goals. This is consistent with general object relations theory, which contends that excessively controlling or inconsistent objects result in more primitive internalized object representations. Urist (1977) found that for a group

of psychiatric inpatients, there were significant correlations between the MAS, staff evaluation of mutuality of autonomy, and ratings based on patient auto-biographies. The results supported the use of the Rorschach as valid in measuring self-object representations as well as a structurally based consistency of subjects' levels of object relations.

In another study using the MAS, Ryan, Avery, & Grolnick (1985) used a non-clinical child sample (fourth to sixth graders). Results indicated that children with more mature object representations were perceived by teachers as being more socially adjusted, displaying better attention, possessing higher self-esteem, and as working more effectively than others. The behavioral correlates to qualities of object representation support the theoretical assertions of representational influence on personality. As was the case in Urist's (1977) study, there was convergence between self-report, projective, and behavioral ratings, strengthening the suggestion an underlying structure of self-object representation.

Another research group, Sidney Blatt and his colleagues at Yale, have particularly focused on structural dimensions of object representation, using quantitative analyses primarily of Rorschach responses, but also the TAT, manifest dream content, and open-

ended descriptions of significant figures. They have established a number of assessment procedures for object representations and studied the relationship of object representation to normal and pathological (particularly schizophrenic and depressive) development. In summarizing their work, Blatt & Lerner (1983a) stated:

Conceptualizations and empirical findings have led to the discovery of differentiations within the broad diagnostic categories of depression and schizophrenia. Findings also demonstrate that the structure of object representations continue to develop throughout the life cycle into early adolescence and adulthood, and that the quality of object representations provides insight into psychotic and the depressive experiences that has implications for the therapeutic process (p. 196).

Blatt & Ritzler (1974) found that differing levels of schizophrenia could be identified by defining varying levels of boundary disruptions displayed in patients' Rorschach responses. The authors defined boundary differentiation as including:

The initial capacity to differentiate between independent objects, including self-nonsel, and later to differentiate between the actual object and the mental representation and verbal signifier used to designate the object differentiation between outside and inside (pp. 371-2).

Patients with greater boundary disturbances had responses indicating less appropriate and realistic thought, with less cognitive and affective control.

These patients were less involved with the hospital, less responsive to intervention, and displayed more disrupted representations of human figures. The authors concluded that increasing degrees of boundary disruptions effectively indicated the extent and severity of thought disorder present.

A comprehensive system was developed by Blatt et al. (1976), designed to assess representations of human figures of Rorschach responses in terms of differentiation, articulation, and integration. According to Blatt's system, more mature levels of object representation are displayed in whole, well articulated human responses, while more primitive representations lead to less articulated, part-object responses. The system scores human responses along a developmental continuum in six categories: Differentiation, articulation, motivation of action, integration of object and action, content of action, and nature of interactions. Disturbances or distortions within these categories were found on inspecting the Rorschach protocols of five psychiatric inpatients with diagnoses ranging from non-paranoid schizophrenia, to borderline-narcissistic character disorder, to anaclitic and introjective depression. In other words, the authors found that the various pathologies of these patients could be described in

terms of disturbances of object representations across the categories mentioned.

Nurturance and Striving

In a study which used a non-clinical sample, Blatt, Wein, Chevron, & Quinlan (1979) investigated the relation between depression in adults and aspects of early family life, employing a measure they call The Family Interaction Questionnaire. The measure is actually a booklet, the first two pages of which instruct subjects to describe their parents. The next section is a version of the Semantic Differential (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) involving more structured descriptions of parents and self. The rest of the booklet includes various measures of depression.

The unstructured descriptions of parents were rated on a seven-point scale for thirteen adjectives, which loaded onto two factors, termed "Nurturant" (Factor I), and "Striving" (Factor II). The degree of ambivalence expressed towards each parent was also rated, as was conceptual level (cognitive complexity) of the parental descriptions.

There were a number of significant correlations between the unstructured parental descriptions and ratings of each parent on the semantic differential. Most impressive, and relevant to the present study in

terms of construct validity, was the highly significant ($p < .001$) positive correlations between the Nurturant (Factor I) scale of the unstructured descriptions (of both parents) with all three basic factors (evaluation, potency, and activity) of the semantic differential. It was primarily the Nurturant scale of the unstructured parental descriptions which correlated significantly with measures of depression. Unstructured descriptions of both mother and father as nurturant also were significantly correlated with a positive self-description on the semantic differential. Conceptual level of unstructured parental descriptions was found to be related to different types of depression theorized elsewhere by Blatt (Blatt, 1974, Blatt & Lerner, 1983b), and those subjects with low depression scores had the highest conceptual levels in their parental descriptions.

The authors concluded that parental images can be effectively assessed by the methods used, and that "It is the perception of parents as lacking in nurturance, support, and affection (Factor I) which is related to depression rather than perception of parents as striving, harsh, and judgmental (Factor II) (p.394)." Moreover, it appears that depression can be placed on a continuum related to the conceptual level of parental representation (signified by written descriptions)

present in the individual.

The adjectival descriptors which comprise Nurturance involve emotionally nourishing responses experienced by the individual, while striving adjectives relate to achievement-related internalizations. Other studies (e.g., Jacobson, Fasman, & DiMascio, 1975) have found consistent and significant associations between depression in adults and parental (object) representational structures which lack nurturing elements. Representational elements related to striving for excessive achievement and success are seen as attempts to win love and approval (Blatt et al., 1979), perhaps implying an under-representation of nurturing elements.

The present study will limit itself to the open-ended parental descriptions from which the Nurturance and Striving representational dimensions are measured. In addition to mother and father descriptions, this study will add a description of a significant other person to each subject.

Representations, Temperament, and Life Satisfaction

As noted above, representational structures lacking Nurturance have been strongly associated with depression in both normal and clinical populations. High levels of Striving may also imply a proclivity for

depressive experiences. Thus, the common theme of affect, which runs across the temperamental and Life satisfaction variables used here, can be seen to pertain to representational variables as well, as depression is one of the primary displays of Negative Affect.

Statement of Hypotheses

Relationships Between Personality Variables

1) As has been established, Neuroticism is a powerful representative of Negative Affect. The significant relationship of Nurturance to depression might also be explained through it's relationship to Positive and Negative Affect, the common thread which runs through all of the variables used here. The emotionally nourishing nature of Nurturance, which is comprised of adjectives such as "affectionate" and "nurturant", would seem antithetical to experiences of Negative Affectivity. Therefore, it is expected that Nurturance and Neuroticism will be negatively correlated.

2) It cannot be expected that Extraversion, being similar to Positive Affect, will then be positively correlated to Nurturance. Both Extraversion and Positive Affect do not simply involve pleasant emotion, which is rather, a combination of high

positive Affect and low Negative Affect. Both Extraversion and Positive Affect do involve positive emotions, but in addition are comprised of qualities related to animation and high levels of energy, which lead to active involvement in life stimuli. There is no indication that the adjectives comprising Nurturance necessarily relate to this type of life involvement, even though positive emotional experiences might be expected to be associated with high levels of Nurturance. Therefore, a significant correlation between Extraversion and Nurturance is not expected.

3) The adjectives loading onto the representational dimension of Striving include "judgmental" and "punitive". These would seem to be qualities which might induce negative affectivity. In addition, as was previously mentioned, Blatt et al., (1979) conceptualized Striving elements as attempts to win love and approval. This might imply a relative lack of internalized Nurturance features. Therefore, a positive correlation between Neuroticism and Striving is hypothesized.

4) "Ambitious" is another descriptor loading onto the Striving representational dimension. This factor, along with Blatt et al.'s (1979) view of Striving as representing active efforts to attain approval and affection, does seem more likely to result in seeking

out stimulation and greater involvement in life activities, similar to the high Extraversion individual. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that Extraversion and Striving will be positively correlated.

5) In going beyond the simple association of temperamental and representational qualities to the consideration of how these qualities might shape one another, an examination of how varying levels of the temperamental and representational dimensions interact will be made. Thomas et al.'s (1964) assertion that infants develop stable patterns of behavior by their second month based on temperament and internalized aspects of the infant-caretaker relationship has been noted. As the infant begins life with its temperament, the premise here is that manifestations of a particular temperament will elicit varying responses from caregiving figures, based on personality characteristics and life circumstances of the caregiver in question. A baby born with a physiology producing high levels of Neuroticism might be expected to introduce negative stimuli to its environment, for example, crying more than others, and being less easily soothed. Consistent displays of this type of behavior could provoke harsher responses from the caregiver, or at least fewer positive responses.

If high Neuroticism is combined with high Extraversion, the infant could be expected to exert it's Negative Affectivity on it's environment in a more vigorous manner, as it also needs to seek high levels of stimuli. At the same time, combining high Neuroticism with low Extraversion (the Introverted temperamental type), might result in a less intrusive child, but one which still provided negative experiences for the caregiver, for example, sullenness or unresponsiveness. This line of reasoning suggests that Neuroticism is the temperamental variable which impacts most on Nurturance. Therefore, it is hypothesized that regardless of the degree of Extraversion present in the individual, high Neuroticism will combine with low Nurturance.

6) While it is believed here that Neuroticism rather than Extraversion is most influential on Nurturance, the other representational dimension, Striving, may be affected differently. Recall that hypotheses 3 and 4 predict positive correlations between Neuroticism and Striving and Extraversion and Striving, respectively. These predictions suggest that both temperamental variables are important to Striving. With this premise, it is expected that high levels of both Extraversion and Neuroticism should result in the highest Striving scores, and low levels of both

Extraversion and Neuroticism the lowest Striving scores.

Life Satisfaction

7) The connections established between all of the variables used in this study to positive and negative affect make predictions concerning Life Satisfaction relatively straightforward. As Life Satisfaction is a component of Subjective Well-Being (one component of which is Bradburn's (1969) positive and negative affect), and is affected similarly by the same variables (Diener, 1984), Extraversion (similar to the dimension of Positive Affect (Meyer, 1987)) should be closely related. It is therefore hypothesized that Extraversion and Life Satisfaction will be positively correlated.

8) Neuroticism, a good representative of Negative Affect, is easily seen as opposed to Life Satisfaction. Accordingly, a negative correlation between Neuroticism and Life Satisfaction is predicted.

9) Although Nurturance is viewed here as conducive to pleasant emotional experiences, this is not the same as Positive Affectivity. However, it does argue against the presence of negative affect. High levels of Nurturance, by discouraging negative emotional experiences, may affect levels of Life

satisfaction. It is hypothesized then, that Nurturance and Life Satisfaction will be positively correlated.

10) Since Striving is expected to relate positively to both Extraversion and Neuroticism, and thus contain aspects of both Positive and Negative affect, no significant correlation is expected between striving and Life Satisfaction.

11) Bradburn's (1969) components of (Subjective) Well-Being are, as mentioned, similar to Watson & Tellegen's (1985) Positive and Negative Affect, as are Extraversion and Neuroticism (Meyer, 1985). If it is recalled that the same variables affect Subjective Well-Being and Life Satisfaction in comparable ways, it is easily predicted that Extraversion would encourage higher levels of Life Satisfaction, and Neuroticism lower levels of Life Satisfaction. Therefore, it expected that the highest Life Satisfaction scores will occur in subjects who have high Extraversion and low Neuroticism scores, and that the combination of low Extraversion and high Neuroticism will lead to the lowest Life Satisfaction scores.

12) Nurturance is predicted to correlate positively with Life Satisfaction (Hypothesis 9), while no significant correlation is expected between Striving and Life Satisfaction (Hypothesis 10). The importance of Nurturance as opposed to Striving is expected to

hold in more detailed analyses---a significant positive relationship between Nurturance and Life Satisfaction is expected to occur, regardless of the level of striving involved.

CHAPTER III

METHOD

subjects

Subjects were 65 student volunteers, recruited from various undergraduate psychology courses at the Loyola University Applied Psychology program. There were 53 females (82%) and 12 males (18%). Fourteen percent of the students were in their freshman year of college, 11% were sophomores, 22% juniors, and 38% were seniors. Eight percent had been in college longer than four years, and 8% failed to identify their level of education. Mean age of the group was 24.2 years. Eighty three percent of the subjects were single, 11% married, and 1 subject each classified themselves as divorced, widowed, or engaged. The racial composition of the group was 65% Caucasian, 14% African-American, 5% Semitic (Jewish or Arab), and 3% Hispanic. Eight percent were of mixed racial origin, while 6% failed to identify their racial background. The demographic information of this sample is shown in Table 1.

Table 1.Demographic information.Age

Mean age = 24.2 years (Range: 18-43)

Sex

Males = 12 (18%) Females = 53 (82%)

Race

Caucasian = 42 (65%) African-American = 9 (14%)

Semitic = 3 (5%) Hispanic = 2 (3%)

Mixed = 5 (8%) Not Identified = 4 (6%).

Marital Status

Single = 54 (83%) Married = 7 (11%)

Divorced = 1 (1.5%) Widowed = 1 (1.5%)

Engaged = 1 (1.5%) Not Identified = 1 (1.5%)

Education Level

Freshmen = 9 (14%) Sophomores = 7 (11%)

Juniors = 14 (22%) Seniors = 25 (38%)

B. A. = 5 (8%) Not Identified = 5 (8%)

MeasuresBiological Personality Dimensions: NEO Personality
Inventory

The NEO-PI is a 181-item questionnaire designed by Costa & McCrae (1985) to measure the personality traits of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. This study will limit itself to the Neuroticism and Extraversion dimensions, as these have been the most thoroughly validated.

The subscales for Neuroticism are: Anxiety, Hostility, Depression, Self-consciousness, Impulsivity, and Vulnerability. Extraversion subscales include: Warmth, Gregariousness, Assertiveness, Activity, Excitement Seeking, and Positive Emotions. There are 8 items for each of these subscales. Subjects are asked to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement to items along a 5-point Likert scale.

McCrae & Costa (1983), using self-reports on the NEO-PI and spouse ratings of each subject, obtained internal consistencies for the individual Neuroticism and Extraversion subscales which ranged from .60 to .86, with similar figures for both males and females. Coefficient alpha ratings for Neuroticism and Extraversion were .93 and .89. Six month test-retest reliabilities were .87 and .91 for Extraversion and

Neuroticism (McCrae & Costa (1983).

In comparisons with scores from the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), NEO scores for Neuroticism and Extraversion showed correlations of .84 and .76 respectively. Favorable convergent and discriminant correlations between NEO-PI scores of Neuroticism and Extraversion and those of tests such as the Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey (Guilford, Zimmerman, & Guilford, 1976), and the Cornell Medical Index (Brodman, Erdmann, Lorge, & Wolff, 1949) have been noted (Costa & McCrae, 1985).

Life Satisfaction: Satisfaction With Life Scale

The SWLS (Diener et al, 1985) is designed to measure life satisfaction as a cognitive-judgmental process. The 5 item scale asks subjects to indicate the extent of their agreement or disagreement along a 7-point Likert scale with subjective, global judgments about their lives. For scoring purposes, the item ratings are summed to produce a total life satisfaction score.

Diener et al. (1985) obtained a 2-month test-retest correlation coefficient of .82, with a .87 coefficient alpha. A principal axis factor analysis on the inter-item correlation matrix showed one factor accounting for 66% of the variance. The factor

loadings of the 5 items ranged from .61 to .84. Scores on the SWLS correlated .02 with scores on a social desirability scale, the Marlowe-Crowne measure (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964), indicating the SWLS did not evoke a social desirability response set. Diener et al (1985) also found correlations of .54 and -.41 between SWLS scores and scores on measures of self-esteem and neuroticism, respectively. The SWLS correlation with interviewer estimates of life satisfaction was .43, suggesting that interviewer estimates were more influenced by affective content. This is consistent with results obtained elsewhere (Larsen, et al., 1983) which showed that the SWLS had weaker correlations with affect than measures of the broader construct, subjective well being. Finally, there was a correlation of .57 with summed domain satisfactions, indicating that while global satisfaction and domain satisfactions share a significant amount of common variance, they are not equivalent constructs.

Object Representation: Blatt's Prose Description

The prose descriptions are the descriptions of mother and father from the Family Interaction Questionnaire, described earlier. This study will add a description of a significant other. Subjects were

asked to "Describe your mother", "Describe your father", and "Describe another important person in your life". Five minutes were allowed for each description.

Parental descriptions are rated on a seven point scale in the categories of affection, ambition, benevolence, degree of family involvement, evaluative, intelligence, nurturance, punitive, personal strength, personal success, positive or admired ideal, and warmth (Blatt et al., 1979). A score of four is given if the judge is unable to make a decision or the category is not applicable.

Inter-rater reliability estimates of the individual adjectival ratings ranged from .69 to .95 in the Blatt et al. (1979) study. The thirteen adjectives load onto two factors: Nurturant (Factor I), and Striving (Factor II). In a factor analysis, Blatt et al. (1979) found that Factor I accounted for 40% of the variance in their study, and Factor II was responsible for 29%. The following qualities have high loadings on Factor I: Nurturance (.901), positive ideal (.895), benevolent (.879), warmth (.870), family involvement (.840), affectionate (.795), strong (.665), and successful (.477). Adjectives which loaded onto Factor II were: Judgmental (.904), ambitious (.890), punitive (.881), intellectual (.816), strong (.665), and successful (.654) Blatt et al., (1988). In the present

study, those adjectives (strong and successful) which load onto both factors will not be used.

In the Blatt et al. (1979) study, there were a number of significant correlations between the parental descriptions and ratings of each parent on the Semantic Differential (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). Most impressive, and relevant to the present study in terms of construct validity, was the highly significant ($p < .001$) positive relationship of the (Factor I) scale of both parental descriptions with all three basic factors (evaluation, potency, and activity) of the Semantic Differential. Factor I showed significant negative correlations with measures of depression, and parental descriptions which contained high levels of Factor I also correlated with a positive self-description on the Semantic Differential. The authors concluded that "It is the perception of parents as lacking in nurturance, support, and affection (Factor I) which is related to depression rather than perception of parents as striving, harsh, and judgmental (Factor II) (Blatt et al., 1979, p. 394).

Procedure

Data were collected from five different college undergraduate courses. There was an average of 14 subjects per group, and a range of 6-25. Subjects

received course credit for their voluntary participation in the study. Participants were told that the study was concerned with the ways in which people view their parents, themselves, and their lives, and that they would be asked to provide descriptions and complete a number of questionnaires in these areas. After signing informed consents, participants were given 5 minutes to complete each description of Blatt's Prose Description, and given instructions on how to complete each of the other measures in the research packet. These included the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS), the Tennessee Self Concept Scale (TSCS--not used in data analysis for this study), the NEO Personality Inventory, and a demographic information sheet. Each session took approximately 40 minutes. Subjects were asked to fill out each home questionnaire in one sitting.

Statistical Analyses

In arriving at scores used in analyses for the representational personality dimensions (Nurturance and Striving), means of composite scores from each of the three sources (mother, father, and significant other) were used. To establish inter-rater reliability on the Blatt Prose Descriptions, all of the descriptions were scored by two raters, with consultation. Correlations

were computed between the two raters' scores on each of the thirteen adjectives which comprise the representational personality dimensions. Each of the raters was a graduate student in a doctoral level clinical psychology program.

Pearson Product-Moment correlations were used to examine relationships between the variables Extraversion (E), Neuroticism (N), Nurturance (Nu), Striving (St), and Life Satisfaction (LS). In addition, a total of six 2 X 2 simple effects analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were employed, which used high-low median splits for the variables E, N, Nu, and St.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

The data of this study fall into three clusters: results of preliminary analyses, results dealing with relationships between temperamental and representational personality variables, and results addressing the interaction of personality variables and Life Satisfaction.

Preliminary Results

Given that the ratio of females to males in this sample was greater than 4:1 (82% to 18%), multiple t -tests (two tailed) were computed, comparing female and male scores across all the variables. Male subjects tended to score somewhat higher in St than females ($t(63) = .14$, $p = .125$, two tailed), but this difference was not significant, and was by far the greatest difference observed between the sexes.

The mean score for E was 114.66, with a standard deviation of 16.96. The median split for high versus low scores in ANOVA calculations was 114.0. For N, the mean score was 97.08, with a standard deviation of 22.11, and a median split of 95.0. The Nu mean was 27.35, with a standard deviation of 3.71, and a median

split of 27.5. For St, the mean score was 14.70, with a standard deviation of 1.74, and a median split of 14.83. The LS mean was 21.86, and a standard deviation of 5.98. Median splits were not required for calculations for LS. Means, medians, and standard deviations for all of the variables are shown in Table 2.

Each unstructured description of mother, father, and significant other was rated by two judges on each of the thirteen adjectival scales, which comprise the Nu and St representational dimensions. The following Pearson Product-Moment correlations were obtained on comparison of each judges' score. For the adjectives loading onto Nu: Affectionate = .56, Malevolent-Benevolent = .65, Cold-Warm = .72, Degree of Constructive Involvement = .54, Negative-Positive Ideal = .81, Nurturant = .71. For the Striving adjectives the correlations were: Ambitious = .68, Intellectual = .77, Judgmental = .74, Punitive = .55. The average correlation between Nurturance adjectives was .67, and between Striving adjectives, .69. The average Pearson Product-Moment correlations between the two raters for all adjectives was .67. These figures are listed in Table 3.

Table 2.

Mean scores, median splits, and standard deviations (SD) for personality and life satisfaction variables.

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Median</u>	<u>SD</u>
E	114.66	114.00	16.96
N	97.08	95.00	22.11
Nu	27.35	27.50	3.71
St	14.70	14.83	1.74
LS	21.86	-----	5.98

Table 3.

pearson correlation coefficients (Pearson r) of
rater's scorings for representational dimensions of
Blatt Prose Descriptions.

<u>Nurturant Adjectives</u>	<u>Pearson r</u>
Affectionate	.56
Malevolent-Benevolent	.65
Cold-Warm	.72
Degree of Constructive Involvement	.54
Negative-Positive Ideal	.81
Nurturant	.71

Mean Adjective Correlation	.67
<u>Striving Adjectives</u>	<u>Pearson r</u>
Ambitious	.68
Intellectual	.77
Judgmental	.74
Punitive	.55

Mean Adjective Correlation	.69

Relationships among E, N, Nu, and St

A highly significant negative correlation between N and Nu ($p = .004$) was observed. This finding was predicted, as was the lack of correlation between E and Nu ($p = .51$). However, it was also expected that St would correlate positively with both E and N. These predictions were disconfirmed by the data. In addition, there were trends towards negative correlations between E and N ($p = .066$), and Nu and St ($p = .10$). A correlation matrix showing the Pearson Product-Moment correlations for all the variables is displayed in Table 4.

Interactions of E, N on Nu, St

It was expected that N would affect Nu negatively, regardless of the level of E. An analysis of variance performed using Nu as the dependent variable with E and N as independent variables found a trend towards a main effect for N ($F_{(1,64)} = 3.28, p = .075$), with the lowest Nu scores occurring when N was high, consistent with predictions.

It was also predicted that higher St scores would occur in those with high E and N, and vice-versa. An analysis of variance with St as the dependent variable and E and N as independent variables revealed no main effects or interactions, contradicting the predictions.

Results from both of these analyses of variance are reproduced in Table 5.

Interactions of Nu, St on E, N

An analysis of variance with E as the dependent variable and Nu and St as independent variables yielded a two-way interaction, Nu X St ($F(1,64) = 3.73$, $p = .058$). An inspection of cell means revealed that when high Nu was combined with high St, the lowest E scores occurred, while the highest levels of E were observed when high Nu and low St were combined.

An analysis of variance with N as the dependent variable, and Nu and St as independent variables, revealed a significant main effect for Nu ($F(1,64) = 10.74$, $p = .002$). Results of these analyses are also shown in Table 5.

Life Satisfaction

There was a significant positive correlation between LS and Nu ($p = .027$). While this result was expected, the prediction that LS and E would positively correlate did not hold. Another hypothesis, that LS and N would be negatively correlated, was borne out by the data ($p = .01$). A final correlation hypothesis, that LS and St would not significantly correlate, was also confirmed. These results are reported in Table 4.

Table 4.

pearson correlation coefficients for personality variables and life satisfaction.

	E	N	Nu	St	LS
\bar{E}	-----	-.2291*	.0824	-.1489	-.0059
N	-.2291*	-----	-.3872***	.0490	-.3175***
Nu	.0824	-.3872***	-----	-.2058*	.2746**
St	-.1489	.0490	-.2058*	-----	.0222
LS	-.0059	-.3175***	.2746**	.0222	-----

*p < .10

**p < .05

***p < .01

Table 5.

Observed cell means of Nurturance and Striving scores as a function of high and low Extraversion and Neuroticism.

	<u>Nurturance Scores</u>	
	High N	Low N
<hr/>		
<u>Observed Means</u>		
High E	26.38	28.21
Low E	26.48	28.11
<hr/>		

	<u>Striving Scores</u>	
	High N	Low N
<hr/>		
<u>Observed Means</u>		
High E	14.42	14.70
Low E	14.79	14.81
<hr/>		

Table 6.

Observed cell means of Extraversion and Neuroticism scores as a function of high and low Nurturance and striving.

	<u>Extraversion Scores</u>	
	High Nu	Low Nu
<hr/>		
<u>Observed Means</u>		
High St	109.19	114.17
Low St	123.40	112.50
<hr/>		

	<u>Neuroticism Scores</u>	
	High Nu	Low Nu
<hr/>		
<u>Observed Means</u>		
High St	91.88	105.72
Low St	84.33	104.50
<hr/>		

Interactions of E, N, Nu, St on LS

An analysis of variance in which LS was the dependent variable, with E and N the independent variables, revealed a two-way interaction of E X N ($F(1,64) = 3.87, p = .054$). Inspection of cell means clearly shows that the highest LS scores resulted from high E with low N, and that the lowest LS scores came with high E and high N. While the former result was hypothesized, the latter was not.

A final analysis of variance used LS as the dependent variable with Nu and St the independent variables. In this case, there was a significant main effect for Nu ($F(1,64) = 4.52, p = .038$). Cell means indicate that LS scores covary positively with Nu scores. Results of these final two analyses of variance are reproduced in Table 7.

Table 7.

Observed cell means of Life Satisfaction as a function of high and low Extraversion, Neuroticism, Nurturance and Striving.

Life Satisfaction Scores

High E Low E

Observed Means

High N	18.73	21.85
Low N	23.95	21.15

Life Satisfaction Scores

High Nu Low Nu

Observed Means

High St	24.06	19.67
Low St	22.87	21.19

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The N, Nu Reciprocal Relationship

All of the hypotheses concerning N and Nu were solidly supported by the results obtained. The single strongest finding of this study is the negative relationship between N and Nu, for which there may be several possible explanations. Object relations theory suggests that early and repeatedly non-nurturant relationships would directly lead to the same type of emotional experiences (anxiety, depression, and so on) expected in high N individuals. It may be that there are two paths to the emotional experience of the high N individual, each potentiating the other---being born with physiologies producing levels of negative affectivity which are both strong and of relatively long duration, and the experience of early and consistently non-nurturant or depriving relationships.

Object relations theory also implies that nurturing environmental responses would have little if any lasting impact on the infant unless they can be internalized. The infant high in N might be impaired in the ability to internalize nurturing responses due to a preoccupation with it's innate and regenerating

flow of negative affectivity.

On the other hand, those with high levels of N may evoke less nurturant responses from others, leading to less nurturant representations, which in turn shape other relational experiences. From this perspective, relational experiences would be influential in shaping the neurotic experience.

Blatt et al. (1979), distinguished between anaclitic and introjective depression, where anaclitic depressives (presumably due to severe early deprivation) have representational structures which are so impaired that they are unable to maintain contact with the object in its absence. Introjective depressives, while able to maintain this contact due to more highly developed representational structures, nevertheless suffer constant fear of losing the object due to perceived negative aspects of themselves. It is possible to conceive of the anaclitic depressive as a high N individual who experienced extremely non-nurturant early relationships, while the introjective depressive might also be a high N person who had more nurturant interpersonal experiences. Even if anaclitic depressives start with only moderate levels of N, these levels would seem likely to be accentuated with severe early deprivations. On the other hand, even highly nurturant relationships may be able to do no more than

moderate the impact of temperamentally based sources of N, such as those theorized here to be present in introjective depression. In this latter case, it may also be postulated that any deprivation would be heightened in terms of experience and recall (see Mayman's (1968) view of early memories as unconsciously selected to confirm existing personality structure).

Nu and Positive and Negative Affect

Recall that Positive Affect (PA) involves a component of animation, which manifests itself in an appetite for life stimuli. Hypothesis 2 theorized that Nu does not directly relate to this type of high energy level, and would therefore not significantly correlate with E, as E closely resembles PA (Meyer, 1987). This hypothesis was supported by the data, and is interesting in light of the significant negative relationship found between Nu and N (and thus Negative Affect {NA}). Thus, while Nu appears important in terms of limiting or encouraging NA, (or N), it does not display a primary relationship to PA (or E).

The Puzzling Dimension of St

St was expected to be positively correlated to both E and N. These predictions were based on the seeming similarity of adjectives loading onto St to

both E ("ambitious"), and N ("punitive", "judgmental"). However, St showed no significant correlations with either E or N. One possible explanation is that if the aspects of Positive and Negativity are both contained within the St dimension, they may work to neutralize each other, leaving St relatively unrelated to any of the variables used in this study. Although N and E did not work together in any combination to impact on St (as was predicted), it may be that with only four adjectives loading onto St (one of which, "intellectual", seems affectively neutral), there is not enough opportunity for opposing elements of Positive and Negative Affectivity to eclipse the other, for example, in the case of high N and low E.

The Inter-Relatedness of Nu, St and E

There was one instance where St related in a significant way to the other personality variables; this was also the only case where Nu had even an indirect bearing on E. It appears that high levels of Nu can influence E through St, which showed a negative relationship to E when Nu was high. When low levels of Nu are present, St appears less influential to E.

An explanation may come through the already observed sensitivity of Nu to N (or NA). E scores were by far the highest when combined with high Nu and low

st. This would suggest not only that Nu, while not the same dimension as PA, may be conducive to PA, but that the dimension of St may contain more negative than positive affective elements.

In sum, it appears that there are significant and reciprocal relationships between temperamental and relational dimensions of personality; more specifically, that N and Nu are strongly negatively related, as are E and St when Nu is high. In addition, it is useful to consider the dimensions of PA and NA in understanding the interaction of the personality variables. The strength and clarity of these relationships would be expected to increase within a larger sample.

LS, Affect, and Personality

The significant positive relationship of Nu and LS was also expected, and perhaps necessary in terms of construct validation for Nu. Although there has been little in the way of empirical linkage between dimensions of object representation and subjective life satisfaction, findings by Blatt et al. (1979) and others, as well as general object relations tenets suggest that representational dimensions, and particularly nurturance, will impact on life adjustment, and presumably, subjective assessment of

satisfaction with life. It is hard to imagine giving much credibility to the construct of Nu if it did not relate positively to LS.

Affective variables seem basic to LS, given the resemblance of PA and NA to Bradburn's (1969) positive and negative affect. This conclusion is only strengthened by the results obtained here: The dimension of Nu can be seen in part as an internalization of positive emotion (but not PA) or elements which induce positive emotion (e.g., descriptions which load onto the Nu dimension include "affectionate", "degree of constructive involvement", "nurturant"). On the other hand, the strong negative correlation between N and LS speaks directly to the effect of NA on satisfaction with life. Although LS is clearly a cognitive element, it seems just as clearly to be affected by feeling states.

The implication is that personality characteristics which most impact upon subjective emotional experiences will be the most influential upon LS. This may be the reason why E was not correlated significantly with LS, but did interact with N to produce an effect (high E and low N interacted to produce low LS scores). Again, the animation and arousal that is part of E, is not necessarily the same as pleasant emotion. St did not associate

significantly with LS probably because it appears to be a weak, or perhaps mixed bearer of NA. It is possible that with a larger sample, E and St might show more direct connections to LS.

Future Research

Clearly, all of the variables used in this study are either strongly affected by affect, are closely related to affective states, or both. Although indications are St may be related, if weakly, to PA, it is the possible exception, and future work could focus on clarifying this construct. Is it a slightly negative mix of variables containing primarily PA and NA, or does it contain significant other aspects as well?

In any case, from the results noted here, a strong statement can be made here for the importance of emotional experience, both to personality and life experience. As all of the personality variables examined are quite broad, it is believed that a substantial portion of general personality structure is represented here. Future efforts might consider examining aspects of personality which are less apparently related to affect, for example, Blatt et al.,'s (1979) cognitive complexity, or Blatt & Ritzler's (1974) conception of boundaries.

The reciprocal relationship of temperament and representational structures has received little attention to date, and promises to be a rich area for future research. Future studies could also increase the sample size examined, to allow for more complex analyses, and strengthen effects which may be unclear.

REFERENCES

- Andrews, F., & Withey, S. (1976). Social indicators of well being: Americans perceptions of life quality. New York: Plenum Press.
- Atwood, G. E. & Stolorow, R. D. (1981). Experience and conduct. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 17(2), 197-208.
- Barnes, G. E. (1975). Extraversion and Pain. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 14, 303-308.
- Bell, M., Billington, R., & Becker. (1986). A scale for the assessment of object relations: Reliability, validity, and factorial invariance. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 42(5), 733-741.
- Bemporad, J. (1980). Review of object relations theory in the light of cognitive development. Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 8(4), 57-75.
- Blatt, S. J. (1974). Levels of object representation in anaclitic and introjective depression. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 29, 107-157.
- Blatt, S. J., Brenneis, B., Schimek, J. G., & Glick, M. (1976). Normal development and psychopathological impairment of the concept of the object on the Rorschach. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 85, 364-373.
- Blatt, S. J., & Lerner, H. (1983). Investigations in the psychoanalytic theory of object relations and object representations. In J. Masling (Ed.), Empirical investigations of psychoanalytic theory (pp. 189-249). Riverside, N. J.: Analytic Press.
- Blatt, S. J., & Lerner, H. (1983). The psychological assessment of object representation. Journal of Personality Assessment, 47(1), 7-27.
- Blatt, S. J., & Ritzler, B. A. (1974). Thought disorder and boundary disturbances in psychosis. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 42(3), 370-381.

- Blatt, S. J., Wein, S. J., Chevron, E., & Quinlan, D. M. (1979). Parental representations and depression in normal young adults. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 88(4), 383-397.
- Bradburn, N. M. (1969). The structure of psychological well-being. Chicago: Aldine.
- Brodman, K., Erdmann, A. J., Jr., Lorge, I., & Wolff, H. G. (1949). The Cornell Medical Index: An adjunct to medical interview. Journal of the American Medical Association, 140, 530-534.
- Campbell, A. (1981). The sense of well-being in America: Recent patterns and trends. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Camper, F. A. (1983). Children's reactions to death of a parent: Maintaining the inner world. Smith College Studies in Social Work, 53(3), 188-202.
- Cashdan, S. (1988). Object relations therapy: Using the relationship. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
- Cattell, R. B., Eber, H. W., & Tatsuoka, M. M. (1970). The handbook for the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire. Champaign, IL: Institute for Personality and Ability Testing.
- Coan, R. W. (1977). Hero, artist, sage, or saint? New York: Columbia University.
- Conley, J. J. (1985). Longitudinal stability of personality traits: A multitrait-multimethod-multioccasion analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 701-711.
- Costa, P. T. & McCrae, R., (1976). Age differences in personality structure: A cluster analytic approach. Journal of Gerontology, 31, 564-570.
- Costa, P. T., McCrae, R., & Norris, A. (1981). Personal adjustment to aging: Longitudinal prediction from neuroticism and extraversion. Journal of Gerontology, 36(1), 78-85.
- Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. (1984). Personality as a lifelong determinant of well-being. In C. Malatesta & C. Izard (Eds.), Emotion in adult development (pp. 188-204). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

- Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1985). The NEO Personality Inventory Manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources, Inc.
- Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1964). The approval motive. New York: Wiley.
- Diener, E. (1984). Subjective well-being. Psychological Bulletin, 95(3), 542-575.
- Diener, E., Emmons, R. A., Larsen, R. J., & Griffin, S. (1985). The satisfaction with life scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 49(1), 71-75.
- Eliot, G. (1968). Silas Marner. New York: Lance Books.
- Eysenck, H. J. (1947). Dimensions of personality. London: Kegan Paul.
- Eysenck, H. J. (1952). The scientific study of personality. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Eysenck, H. J. (1967). The biological bases of personality. Springfield: Thomas.
- Eysenck, H. J. (1981). General features of the model. In H. J. Eysenck (Ed.). A model for personality. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Eysenck, H. J. & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1975). Manual of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. San Diego: Hodde & Straughton/Digits.
- Eysenck, S. B. G., Barret, P., Spielberger, C., Evans, F. J., & Eysenck, H. J. (1986). cross-cultural comparisons of personality dimensions: England and America. Personality and Individual Differences, 7, 209-214.
- Fielding, H. (1963). Tom Jones. New York: The New American Library Inc.
- Fraiberg, S. (1969). Libidinal object constancy and mental representation. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 24, 9-47.
- Freud, A. (1956). Normality and pathology in childhood. New York: International University Press.

- Gellner, E. (1985). The psychoanalytic movement: Or the coming of unreason. London: Paladin Books.
- George, L. (1978). The impact of personality and social status factors upon levels of activity and psychological well-being. Journal of Gerontology, 33(6), 840-847.
- Greenberg, J. R., & Mitchell, S. A. (1983). Object relations in psychoanalytic theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Giuganio, B. M. & Hindley, C. B. (1982). Stability of individual differences in personality characteristics from three to fifteen years. Personality and Individual Differences, 3, 287-301.
- Guilford, J. S., Zimmerman, W. S., & Guilford, J. P. (1976). The Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey Handbook: Twenty-five years of research and application. San Diego, CA: Edits Publishers.
- Horley, James (1984). Life satisfaction happiness and morale: Two problems with the use of subjective well-being indicators. Gerontologist, 24(2), 124-127.
- Jacobson, E. (1964). The self and the object world. New York: International University Press.
- Jacobson, S., Fasman, J., & DiMascio, A. (1975). Deprivation in the childhood of depressed women. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 160, 5-14.
- Kernberg, O. (1976). Object relations theory and clinical psychoanalysis. New York: Jason Aaronson.
- Klein, M. (1959). The psychoanalysis of children. London: Hogarth Press.
- Krohn, A. S. (1972). Level of object relations representation in the manifest dream and projective tests: A construct validation study (Doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1972). Dissertation Abstracts International, 33, 5520B.
- Larsen, R. J., Diener, E. & Emmons, R. A. (1983). Validity and meaning of measures of subjective well-being. Paper presented at the Midwestern Psychological Association Convention. Chicago.

- Larson, R. (1978). Thirty years of research on the subjective well-being of older Americans. Journal of Gerontology, 31(1), 109-125.
- Lewicki, P. (1976). System-subsystem relation as reflected in the organization of the cognitive network and its behavioral correlates. Polish Psychological Bulletin, 7(3), 163-170.
- Loehlin, J. C. (1985). Fitting heredity-environment models jointly to twin and adoption studies from the California Psychological Inventory. Behavior Genetics, 15, 199-221.
- Mahler, M., Pine, F., & Bergman, A. (1975). The psychological birth of the infant. New York: Basic Books.
- Mayman, M. (1963). Psychoanalytic study of the self-organization with psychological tests. In B. T. Wigdor (Ed.). Recent advances in the study of behavior change: Proceedings of the academic assembly on clinical psychology. Montreal: McGill University Press.
- Mayman, M. (1967). Object representations and object relationships in Rorschach responses. Journal of Projective Techniques and Personality Assessment, 31, 17-31.
- Mayman, M. (1968). Early memories and character structure. Journal of Projective Techniques and Personality Assessment, 32, 303-316.
- McClelland, D. (1980). Motive dispositions. In L. Wheeler (Ed.), Review of Personality and Social Psychology. (pp. 10-41). New York: Sage Publications.
- McCrae, R. R. & Costa, P. T. (1983). Joint factors in self-reports and ratings: Neuroticism, extraversion, and openness to experience. Personality and Individual Differences, 4, 245-255.
- McCrae, R. R. & Costa, P. T. (1988). Recalled parent-child relations and adult personality. Journal of Personality, 56(2), 417-434.
- McCrae, R. R. & Costa, P. T. (1990). Personality in adulthood. New York: Guilford Press.

- Meyer, G., J., (1987). The comparison and convergence of the structures of affect and personality. Unpublished Master's thesis, Loyola University of Chicago, Chicago.
- Mookherjee, H. N. (1987). Perception of life satisfaction in the United States: A summary. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 65, 218.
- Murphy, D. (1975). Factors related to the self-concept in the aged: Relationship to interview data and test measures. Unpublished Master's thesis, Loyola University of Chicago, Chicago.
- Neugarten, B. L. (1964). Personality in middle and later life. New York: Atherton.
- Neugarten, B., Havighurst, R., & Tobin, S. (1968). Personality and patterns of aging. In B. Neugarten (Ed.), Middle age and aging (pp. 84-101). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). The measurement of meaning. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Palmore, E. (1979). Predictors of successful aging. The Gerontologist, 19, 427-431.
- Peterson, J. L. (1974). Personality effects of self-esteem, need motivation, and locus of control on the life satisfaction of older black adults (doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1974). Dissertation Abstracts International, 35, 5700B.
- Ryan, R., Avery, R., & Grolnick, W. (1985). A Rorschach assessment of children's mutuality of autonomy. Journal of Personality Assessment, 49(1), 6-12.
- Sandler, A., & Sandler, J. (1978). On the development of object relations and affect. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 59, 285-295.
- Siegelman, M., & Roe, A. (1979). Manual: The Parent-Child Relations Questionnaire II. New York: Author.
- Tatarkiewicz, W. (1976). Analysis of happiness. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

- Thomas, A., Chess, S., Birch, H., Hertzog, M., & Korn, S. (1964). Behavioral individuality in early childhood. New York: New York University Press.
- Thorson, J. G. (1977). Sociological and leisure correlates of life satisfaction among retired men and women (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1977). Dissertation Abstracts International, 38, 3963B.
- Trafton, R. S. (1977). Measuring life satisfaction and its relation to satisfaction with work, family, and leisure (Doctoral dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 1977). Dissertation Abstracts International, 38, 5081B.
- Urist, J. (1973). The Rorschach test as a multidimensional measure of object relations (Doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973). Dissertation Abstracts International, 34, 1764B.
- Urist, J. (1977). The Rorschach test and the assessment of object relations. Journal of Personality Assessment, 41, 3-9.
- Wallace, M. (1982). A common base for psychotherapy and family therapy. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, & Practice, 19(3), 297-306.
- Watson, D., & Clark, L. A. (1984). Negative affectivity: The disposition to experience aversive emotional states. Psychological Bulletin, 96, 465-490.
- Watson, D. & Tellegen, A. (1985). Toward a consensual structure of mood. Psychological Bulletin, 98, 219-235.
- Wiggins, J. S. (1968). Personality structure. In P. R. Farnsworth, M. R. Rosenzweig, & J. T. Polefka (Eds.), Annual Review of Psychology, 19, 293-350. Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews.
- Wilson, G. D. (1981). Personality and social behavior. In H. J. Eysenck (Ed.), A model for personality. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Winnicott, D. W. (1965). The maturational process and the facilitating environment. New York: International Universities Press.

Young, P. A., Eaves, L. J., & Eysenck, H. J. (1980).
Intergenerational stability and change in the
causes of variation in personality. Personality
and Individual Differences, 1, 35-55.

APPENDIX

The NEO Personality Inventory (Form S)

Instructions:

On the accompanying answer sheet, please fill in your name, age, the date, and your sex, using a No. 2 pencil. Mark "Self" in the labeled "Form". Please make all your answers on the answer sheet; do not write in this test booklet.

This questionnaire contains 181 statements. Read each carefully. For each statement darken the one bubble on the answer sheet which best represents your opinion, making sure that your answer is in the correctly numbered space.

Mark "SD" if the statement is definitely false or you strongly disagree.

Mark "D" if the statement is mostly false or you disagree.

Mark "N" if the statement is about equally true or false, or if you cannot decide, or if you are neutral on the statement.

Mark "A" if the statement is mostly true or you agree.

Mark "SA" if the statement is definitely true or you strongly agree.

There are no "right" or "wrong" answers, and you need not be an "expert" to complete this questionnaire. The purpose of this questionnaire will be best served if you describe yourself and state your opinions as accurately as possible.

Please read each item carefully and mark the one bubble that best corresponds to your agreement or disagreement. Answer every item. Note that the answers are numbered down the columns on the answer sheet, and make sure that your answer is marked in the correctly numbered space. If you change your mind, please erase your first answer completely.

1. I really like most people I meet.
2. I have a very active imagination.
3. I often feel tense and jittery.
4. I shy away from crowds of people.
5. I keep my belongings neat and clean.
6. Aesthetic and artistic concerns aren't very important to me.
7. I'm an even-tempered person.
8. I am dominant, forceful, and assertive.
9. Without strong emotions, life would be uninteresting to me.
10. I'm pretty good about pacing myself so as to get things done on time.
11. Sometimes I feel completely worthless.
12. I don't get much pleasure from chatting with people.
13. I try to keep all my thoughts directed along realistic lines and avoid flights of fancy.
14. I rarely feel fearful or anxious.
15. I try to perform all the tasks assigned to me conscientiously.
16. I like to have a lot of people around me.
17. I am sometimes completely absorbed in music I am listening to.
18. I often get angry at the way people treat me.

19. I sometimes fail to assert myself as much as I should.
20. I have a clear set of goals and work toward them in an orderly fashion.
21. I rarely experience strong emotions.
22. I have sometimes experienced a deep sense of guilt or sinfulness.
23. I'm known as a warm and friendly person.
24. I have an active fantasy life.
25. I work hard to accomplish my goals.
26. I am easily frightened.
27. I usually prefer to do things alone.
28. Watching ballet or modern dance bores me.
29. I am not considered a touchy or temperamental person.
30. I am not a very methodical person.
31. I never hesitate to assert my rights if I feel I'm being taken advantage of.
32. How I feel about things is important to me.
33. I tend to blame myself when anything goes wrong.
34. Many people think of me as somewhat cold and distant.
35. I pay my debts promptly and in full.
36. I don't like to waste my time daydreaming.
37. I am not a worrier.

38. I really feel the need for other people if I am by myself for long.
39. Certain kinds of music have an endless fascination for me.
40. I waste a lot of time before settling down to work.
41. I am known as hot-blooded and quick-tempered.
42. In meetings, I usually let others do the talking.
43. I find it hard to get in touch with my feelings.
44. I have a low opinion of myself.
45. I try to jobs carefully, so they won't have to be done again.
46. I really enjoy talking to people.
47. I enjoy concentrating on a fantasy or daydream and exploring all its possibilities, letting it grow and develop.
48. I often worry about things that might go wrong.
49. I prefer small parties to large ones.
50. Sometimes I'm not as dependable or reliable as I should be.
51. Poetry has little or no effect on me.
52. It takes a lot to get me mad.
53. I have often been a leader of groups I have belonged to.
54. I experience a wide range of emotions or feelings.
55. I strive to achieve all I can.

56. Sometimes things look pretty bleak and hopeless to me.

57. I find it easy to smile and be outgoing with strangers.

58. If I feel my mind starting to drift off into daydreams, I usually get busy and start concentrating on some work or activity instead.

59. Frightening thoughts sometimes come into my head.

60. When I make a commitment, I can always be counted on to follow through.

61. I'd rather vacation at a popular beach than an isolated cabin in the woods.

62. I am intrigued by the patterns I find in art and nature.

63. I often get disgusted with people I have to deal with.

64. I would rather go my own way than be a leader of men.

65. I like to keep everything in its place so I know just where it is.

66. I seldom pay much attention to my feelings of the moment.

67. I rarely feel lonely or blue.

68. I have strong emotional attachments to my friends.

69. As a child I rarely enjoyed games of make believe.

70. I never seem to be able to get organized.

71. I'm seldom apprehensive about the future.
72. I prefer jobs that let me work alone without being bothered by other people.
73. sometimes when I am reading poetry or looking at a work of art, I feel a chill or wave of excitement.
74. People I work or associate with find me easy to get along with.
75. I am a productive person who always gets the job done.
76. Other people often look to me to make decisions.
77. I seldom notice the moods or feelings that different environments produce.
78. Too often, when things go wrong, I get discouraged and feel like giving up.
79. I take a personal interest in the people I work with.
80. I tend to be somewhat fastidious or exacting.
81. I would have difficulty just letting my mind wander without control or guidance.
82. I have fewer fears than most people.
83. I would rather watch an event on television than be there in the audience.
84. I enjoy reading poetry that emphasizes feelings and images more than story lines.
85. I strive for excellence in everything I do.
86. There are some people I really hate.

87. Others think of me as being modest and unassuming.
88. I find it easy to empathize--to feel myself what others are feeling.
89. I am seldom sad or depressed.
90. I am easy-going and lackadaisical.
91. I'm not the kind of person who must always be busy with something.
92. I'm pretty set in my ways.
93. I seldom feel self-conscious when I'm around people.
94. I often crave excitement.
95. I believe that most people are basically well-intentioned.
96. I often enjoy playing with theories or abstract ideas.
97. I have trouble resisting my cravings.
98. I have never literally jumped for joy.
99. I believe letting students hear controversial speakers can only confuse and mislead them.
100. I often get into arguments with my family and co-workers.
101. I feel I M capable of coping with most of my problems.
102. When I do things, I do them vigorously.
103. I think it's interesting to learn and develop new hobbies.

104. In dealing with other people, I always dread making a social blunder.
105. I go out of my way to help others if I can.
106. I have sometimes done things just for "kicks" or "thrills".
107. I enjoy solving problems or puzzles.
108. I rarely overindulge in anything.
109. I have sometimes experienced intense joy or ecstasy.
110. It wouldn't bother me if I had to punish a child or pet.
111. I believe that laws and social policies should change to reflect the needs of a changing world.
112. I often feel helpless and want someone else to solve my problems.
113. I have a leisurely style in work and play.
114. I like to follow a strict routine in my work.
115. I think most of the people I deal with are honest and trustworthy.
116. It doesn't embarrass me too much if people ridicule and tease me.
117. I like to be where the action is.
118. I enjoy working on "mind-twister" puzzles.
119. When I am having my favorite foods, I tend to eat too much.
120. I try to be courteous to everyone I meet.

121. I am not a cheerful optimist.
122. I believe we should look to our religious authorities for decisions on moral issues.
123. I keep a cool head in emergencies.
124. I often feel as if I'm bursting with energy.
125. Starving masses in foreign countries leave me pretty cold.
126. Once I find the right way to do something, I stick to it.
127. At times I have been so ashamed I just wanted to hide.
128. Fast cars and motorcycles have never had much appeal to me.
129. I find philosophical arguments boring.
130. Some people think I'm selfish and egotistical.
131. I have little difficulty resisting temptation.
132. Sometimes I bubble with happiness.
133. I believe that the different ideas of right and wrong that people in other societies have may be valid for them.
134. When I'm under a great deal of stress, sometimes I feel like I'm going to pieces.
135. I tend to be cynical and skeptical of others' intentions.
136. My work is likely to be slow but steady.
137. I often try new and foreign foods.

138. I often feel inferior to others.
139. I love the excitement of roller coasters.
140. I would rather cooperate with others than compete with them.
141. I sometimes lose interest when people talk about very abstract, theoretical matters.
142. I sometimes eat myself sick.
143. I don't consider myself especially "light-hearted".
144. I believe that loyalty to one's ideals and principles is more important than "open-mindedness".
145. I believe that most people will take advantage of you if you let them.
146. I can handle myself pretty well in a crisis.
147. I usually seem to be in a hurry.
148. I prefer to spend my time in familiar surroundings.
149. I feel comfortable in the presence of my bosses or other authorities.
150. Some people think of me as cold and calculating.
151. I wouldn't enjoy vacationing in Las Vegas.
152. I have little interest in speculating on the nature of the universe or the human condition.
153. I am always able to keep my feelings under control.
154. I am a cheerful, high-spirited person.

155. Most people I know like me.
156. I consider myself broad-minded and tolerant of other people's lifestyles.
157. It's often hard for me to make up my mind.
158. My life is fast-paced.
159. On a vacation, I prefer going back to a tried and true spot.
160. I'm hard-headed and tough-minded in my attitudes.
161. If I have said or done the wrong thing to someone, I can hardly bear to face them again.
162. I'm attracted to bright colors and flashy styles.
163. I have a lot of intellectual curiosity.
164. Sometimes I do things on impulse that I later regret.
165. I generally try to be thoughtful and considerate.
166. I rarely use words like "fantastic!" or "sensational!" to describe my experiences.
167. I think that if people don't know what they believe in by the time they're 25, there's something wrong with them.
168. When everything seems to be going wrong, I can still make good decisions.
169. I am a very active person.
170. If I don't like people, I let them know it.
171. I follow the same route when I go someplace.

172. When people I know do foolish things, I get embarrassed for them.

173. I tend to avoid movies that are shocking or scary.

174. I have a wide range of intellectual interests.

175. In most situations, I try to be aware of how others are thinking and feeling.

176. I seldom give in to my impulses.

177. I laugh easily.

178. I believe that the "new morality" of permissiveness is no morality at all.

179. I'm pretty stable emotionally.

180. If necessary, I am willing to manipulate people to get what I want.

181. I have tried to answer all these question honestly and accurately.

The Satisfaction With Life Scale

Below are five statements with which you may agree or disagree. Using the 1-7 scale below, indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.

The 7-point scale is: 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=slightly disagree, 4= neither agree nor disagree, 5=slightly agree, 6=agree 7=strongly agree.

- _____ 1. In most ways my life is close to my ideal.
- _____ 2. The conditions of my life are excellent.
- _____ 3. I am satisfied with my life.
- _____ 4. So far I have gotten the important things I
want in life.
- _____ 5. If I could live my life over, I would change
almost nothing.

Parental Descriptions

Please note that for the purposes of this part of the study we are equating your parents with your primary caretakers. You may use the back of this sheet if you need more space to write. Please stop writing when instructed. You will have 5 minutes for each description.

Describe your mother.

Describe your father.

Describe another important person in your life (this may be anyone, such as another relative, a friend, a teacher, etc.). Please add over what ages you knew (or know) that person.

THESIS APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Steve Gedo has been read and approved by the following committee:

Dr. John Shack, Director
Associate Professor
Loyola University of Chicago


Dr. Dana McDermott-Murphy
Assistant Professor
Loyola University of Chicago

The final copies have been examined by the Director of the Thesis Committee, and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the thesis is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of M.A.

2-27-91

Date



Director's Signature