Diagnosing Silent Forgiveness at the Dialogical Limit in Endō Shūsaku’s Novel Silence

Catherine Buescher

Loyola University of Chicago Graduate School

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss

Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Buescher, Catherine, "Diagnosing Silent Forgiveness at the Dialogical Limit in Endō Shūsaku's Novel Silence" (2024). Dissertations. 4073.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/4073

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

DIALOGICAL HERMENEUTICS, SILENCE, AND FORGIVENESS AT THE LIMIT IN
SHŪSAKU ENDŌ’S NOVEL SILENCE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PROGRAM IN THEOLOGY

BY

CATHERINE FRANCES BUESCHER

CHICAGO, IL

MAY 2024
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the cloud of witnesses to this work for their forbearance, patience, encouragement, and prayers. Foremost among these is Dr. John McCarthy, director of this dissertation. I have the distinction of being his last graduate student. My completing this work testifies to his willingness to walk alongside his graduate students along long, winding academic roads. Thank you, John, for everything.

Thank you, too, to Dr. Hille Haker and Dr. Hugh Nicholson, my readers, who provided valuable feedback in the most patient and collegial manner. Please know how grateful I am for your kindness and encouragement to see this through.

The number of family and friends who deserve my thanks are legion. I thank each and every one of you for the myriad ways your presence in my life contributed to reaching this day. I needed those jokes, pictures of Nebraska sunrises and sunsets, random “checking on the book” inquiries, time together on the Zoom Room, and toward the end, suspension of the question, “When will you be done?” Because of all of you, I can now answer, “Today.”
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** iii

**LIST OF FIGURES** v

**CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION** 1
   A Vignette 1
   The Novel 6
   The Dialogues 14
   A Return 35

**CHAPTER 2: DIALOGUE AND SILENCE: TRACY AND DAUENHAUER** 39
   Tracy and Dialogue 39
   Dauenhauer and Silence 45
   Conclusion 66

**CHAPTER 3: FORGIVENESS: JANKÉLÉVITCH** 70
   Introduction 70
   The Possibility of Forgiveness 75
   An Account of Forgiveness: The Foundation 78
   An Account of Forgiveness: Event 81
   An Account of Forgiveness: Relationship 84
   An Account of Forgiveness: Gift 86
   Complicating Forgiveness 88
   Conclusion 92

**CHAPTER 4: THE HUMAN AND THE TRANSCENDENT: FARLEY** 95
   Introduction 95
   Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity 96
   Apprehension and Appresentation 101
   The Who and Shape of Silent Forgiveness 104
   Symbols, Appresentation, Christianity, and Silent Forgiveness 108
   Conclusion 113

**CHAPTER 5: SILENT FORGIVENESS: A WAGER** 115
   Dialogical Hermeneutics and Silent Forgiveness: Initial Claims 116
   Martyrdom and Silent Forgiveness: Initial Claims 132
   Rodrigues and Ferreira 133
   Rodrigues and Kichijiro 135
   Conclusion 137

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** 145

**VITA** 146
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Structure of Forgiveness 4

Figure 2. Principle of Positivity and the Human Person 97
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Talk about forgiveness invokes many things: what it means to forgive, what it takes to forgive, what and who to forgive, how many times to forgive. Invoking these types of questions about forgiveness underscores forgiveness as action. An action in response to an action, with both actions under the control of the person(s) involved. This dissertation asserts that another type of forgiveness—one that decents the normal understanding of forgiveness—exists. I name it silent forgiveness. This dissertation presents my diagnosis and description of silent forgiveness and points toward but does not fully explore the role silent forgiveness might have in addressing the myriad of polemical social issues confronting the world. To begin, I present a personal experience.

A Vignette

In December 1993 I was in a car with Jen Hartnett, one of two support people for the Jesuit Volunteer Corps community in Portland, Maine.¹ Jen was driving me to the airport so that I could fly home to visit my family for Christmas. Our conversation revolved around a wrong I believed one of my four community members committed against me. I saw myself as an adult entitled to making decisions about what I should do and how I should do it. I saw my community member infringing upon my rights by critiquing my decisions and telling me how I should do

¹ The Jesuit Volunteer Corps is a nonprofit organization that partners post-baccalaureate young adults with nonprofit agencies for a year of volunteer service. Volunteers live together in communities of anywhere from three to nine people in cities across the United States. Website: jesuitvolunteers.org.
things. I, in turn, judged her for this behavior, angry at her demeanor, opinions, and directives. At one point, I stated pointedly to Jen that I already had one mother, I did not need a second. Jen listened sympathetically, nodding occasionally to confirm that she was hearing me. I was in a huff when we reached the airport, annoyed that this person was spoiling what was otherwise a great post-college year-long volunteer experience. I boarded the plane not knowing how I was going to put up with my community member for the remaining eight months of our volunteer year.

A week later I was back from visiting my family. I do not recall being in a huff on the return flight, angry at the prospect of having my decisions criticized and my adulthood disregarded by this person, but the surprise I remember experiencing suggests I probably was. For some reason, my community member’s ongoing critiques, infringements, and directives no longer elicited angry judgment and resentment from me. Rather, I felt friendly toward her even though I still experienced her as that of a second mother that I didn’t want. I had not done anything to ease my angry judgement, at least not intentionally. She had not changed. Why could I now live with her in (relative) peace, patience, and graciousness—a state of relationship that extends to this day?

This question and the experience from which it arises marks the beginning of a dissertation in which I do not intend to provide a logically deduced answer to that question. Why? Because at the heart of this dissertation is a fundamental wager. A wager that this discrete personal experience is an instance of an important and wide-spread existential phenomenon that I name silent forgiveness. This dissertation aims to describe and better understand silent forgiveness.
Informing this fundamental wager are three additional wagers about the nature of silent forgiveness. First, silent forgiveness is enigmatic and elusive but can bear phenomenological description and theological analysis. Two, that silent forgiveness, while it can be conceptually clarified, is not a conceptual issue; rather, it is an existential issue. Three, that silent forgiveness is an emergent phenomenon. Its appearance cannot be predicted nor made to happen. My phenomenological analysis and theological description suggest certain elements contribute to a matrix from which the phenomenon of silent forgiveness emerges, but the configuration of the matrix remains in flux and exceeds an intentional description of human action.

As a first step toward supporting my wagers, I offer the results, in no particular order, of an initial reflection on the event at the heart of the vignette. First, there was a psychological movement from judgment and disgust toward my roommate to relative peace, patience, and graciousness toward her. Second, this was an interaction between people, not objects or ideas. Third, the event was not momentary but embedded in a long past that included my mother and future that included this community member. Fourth, I experienced a transition from one complex outlook on life to another. Fifth, there was a complicated interplay of personal and physical distance. And sixth, there was the experience that something happened to me rather than the experience that I did something.

But why call this forgiveness rather than selective amnesia, or resignation, or escape from a bad mood? What makes me claim that in this vignette is a small-scale instance of an enigmatic, even troubling, instance of an elusive type of forgiveness? First, it is forgiveness because it is an
instance of the movement that, phenomenologically, I take to be the movement of forgiveness.\textsuperscript{2}

Table 1 presents the basic movements of forgiveness.

Figure 1. Structure of Forgiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial movement of phenomenon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• An awareness that a wrong has been committed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• An awareness that the wrong committed violated a pattern of personal and social interchange assumed to be acceptably normal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Awareness and concurrence that the wrong deserves judgement/punishment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Middle movement of phenomenon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Awareness of a subsequent suspension of the need to act with a sustained pattern of interchange that reiterates the judgment of the wrongdoing and its consequent actions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Final movement of phenomenon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Leads to a re-engagement of a pattern of interaction assumed to be acceptably normal and now inclusive of the memory and consequences of the wrongdoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Take the first movement—an awareness that a wrong has been committed. When I analyzed the wrong within the vignette, I identified two. First, I believed my community member had committed a wrong by violating a pattern of personal and social interchange assumed to be acceptably normal and that deserved judgement (if not passive aggressive punishment). The

\textsuperscript{2} Chapter 3 addresses the larger conversation on forgiveness in which I situate my argument.
violated pattern: I was a responsible, autonomous adult free to make decisions based on my understanding that others did not have the right to direct my behavior. She was trying to direct my behavior therefore she was in the wrong. Passive aggressive punishment took the form of avoidance, complaints about her to others, and feelings of superiority. Second, I had committed a wrong by violating a pattern of personal and social interchange assumed to be acceptably normal and that deserved judgement. The violated pattern: the Christian commandment to love others as oneself and to not judge, least thee be judged. Punishment took the form of self-criticism and self-censure.

Turning to the middle movement of forgiveness, there was a suspension of the need to act with sustained judgment of the wrongdoing being committed by my community member. Upon my return from Nebraska, I no longer took her directive behaviors as wrong. But this suspension was not my own doing. I had not engaged in any act of will to change my acts of judging my community member. Rather, the suspension of my judging her behavior with the angst and complaints just seemed to happen. Related, the self-criticism and self-censure I engaged in of myself diminished.

The final movement produced 1) a re-engagement with my community member that did not include my ongoing angst as a reaction to her behavior toward me even though I remembered (still remember) the angst her behavior generated in me and 2) a re-engagement with myself that no longer punished myself. As stated before, this state of engagement exists to this day. In the end, my community member was unaware and uninvolved in this movement of forgiveness.

The second reason for calling this vignette a small-scale instance of an elusive type of forgiveness rather than some other forgiveness-like phenomenon is that it has an odd but indispensable aspect that differentiates it. It occurred in silence. Yes, I spoke with my roommate
before and after the event, although not about my judgments of her and my angst or about the
disappearance of both. I spoke with Jen about the actions causing my judgment of my roommate
and myself. I spoke with others after the event about my surprise and inability to explain what
had happened (I did not have the words, so to speak). But the actual event of forgiveness, the
movement from judgement and angst to acceptance and peace was saturated with silence.

In the following exploration of this enigmatic form of forgiveness, I need to clarify three
broad conceptual components I hold to be at work in silent forgiveness, and to do this while
maintaining my wager that this is an existential phenomenon and not simply a conceptual one.
The three broad conceptual components and their corresponding chapters in this dissertation are:
1) the limits of dialogue and the extent and activity of silence (Chapter 2); 2) forgiveness and its
temporality (Chapter 3); and 3) the odd agency and shape of silent forgiveness that makes it an
emergent phenomenon (Chapter 4). But to be clear, I am claiming that the phenomenon of silent
forgiveness is NOT an algorithm of these conceptual components. Rather, it is a human event. It
occurs in life, is part of life, but not one we control or can ascertain as we do with a recipe or set
of instructions or a mathematical proof. For this reason, I choose to maintain and explore this
existential character by transitioning my initial vignette to what I take to be a profound literary
exploration of this phenomenon of silent forgiveness, Endō Shūsaku’s *Silence*.

The Novel

Endō Shūsaku’s novel *Silence* provides a narrative replete with characters, conflict,
dialogues, themes, and forms of silence that raise questions similar to my question about what
changed in my relationship to my community member. This section provides an overview of the
novel so that the reader can more easily follow the various analyses I undertake in the following
chapters.
Summary

The catalyst for the action in the novel *Silence* is a search for an answer to a question: Did the Jesuit priest Christóvão Ferreira, because of torture at the hands of the Japanese government, renounce his Catholic faith rather than undergo martyrdom for his faith?\(^3\) Did he apostatize? While Christóvão Ferreira is an actual person, attested to in various historical records of having renounced his faith after edicts of the Japanese Shogunates outlawed Christianity in the early 1600s,\(^4\) Shūsaku extends this historical record through his fictional characters to pose challenging existential questions. The protagonist of the novel is the Jesuit priest Sebastian Rodrigues, a former student of Ferreira, who is determined to ascertain what has happened to his esteemed teacher. Rodrigues succeeds in convincing both his Portuguese superiors and the Jesuit superior in Macao, China, that he and his fellow Jesuit, Francisco Garrpe, should secretly enter Japan, search out any information pertaining to Ferreira and, God-willing, minister to the Catholic Japanese practicing their faith clandestinely.

The first four chapters of the novel are presented as letters from Rodrigues to his superiors, relating his and Garrpe’s experiences upon reaching Macao; finding passage and a

---

\(^3\) The novel is set in 17th century Japan and accurately reflects the dramatic change in circumstances of Japanese Catholic Christians and those missionary Catholics, particularly priests, who ministered to them. The first Christian missionary to Japan was the Jesuit priest Francis Xavier, arriving in 1549. Thirty years later, Christians numbered over 150,000 and the missionary priests attained esteemed positions before multiple Japanese government officials. Twenty years later, fearing the possibility of a Spanish invasion and conquest, the expulsion and execution of both Japanese and European Christians began in earnest. By 1614, an edict of expulsion was issued by the Tokugawas, followed by extreme forms of torture to induce a renunciation of the Christian faith and execution. Endō Shūsaku, *Silence*, translated by Willaim Johnston (New York: Picador, 2016).

guide to Japan; being taken in, cared for, and hidden by a village of secret Japanese Catholics; ministering to that village while also being found by Catholic Japanese of another village and traveling to that village to minister; witnessing the interrogation of the villagers about whether they are secret Christians by Japanese officials, followed by the detainment, torture, and martyrdom of two of the villagers; and fleeing the village separately to avoid capture but ultimately being captured because of betrayal.

The betrayal comes at the hands of Kichijirō, Rodrigues and Garrpe’s guide into Japan. Rodrigues and Garrpe meet Kichijirō in Macao after learning that there was a Japanese man in the city who may be willing to help smuggle them into Japan. Rodrigues and Garrpe question the reliability of Kichijirō, given his drunken, disheveled state and his subsequent cowardly, sly demeanor. They also question his faith, asking him point blank if he is a Christian during their first meeting. He says he is not, although he tells of witnessing the persecution of Christians before he left Japan. Eventually they learn that Kichijirō is, indeed, Catholic. He fled Japan after renouncing his faith by stepping on a picture of Christ (called the fumie in the novel) and witnessing the martyrdom of his brothers and sisters who had refused to apostatize. Kichijirō repeats his act of renunciation when local government officials suspect that the villagers hiding Rodrigues and Garrpe are secret Catholics, requiring Kichijirō and two other members to step on the fumie and spit on a crucifix while calling the Virgin Mary a whore. Kichijirō flees after being let go.

Kichijirō’s betrayal of Rodrigues occurs after the two cross paths on an island to which Rodrigues flees. Rodrigues is wandering the mountains, looking for a new group of secret Catholics. Kichijirō appears at a moment that stops Rodrigues from rushing into a village that was being ransacked by government officials, effectively saving Rodrigues from capture. The
very next day, Kichijirō betrays Rodrigues to the officials for 300 pieces of silver. With this the letters from Rodrigues end.

The subsequent chapters, no longer in Rodrigues’ own voice, follow Rodrigues through his initial capture; transfer to a local prison; encounters with various government officials, including the local Japanese lord, Inoue; the martyrdom of Garrpe; and the answer to the question that put the novel in motion. Had Fr. Ferreira apostatized? The answer: yes. Inoue arranges for Rodrigues to travel to the Buddhist monastery where his former teacher now resides, writing books on astronomy and medicine as well as one refuting the teachings of Christianity. In addition to the work, Ferreira now lives as a Japanese, wearing a black kimono and answering to the Japanese name Sawano Chuan.

The reason for the meeting is to have Ferreira/Sawano convince Rodrigues to apostatize. Their conversation centers on Ferreira’s assertion that the Catholic faith of the Japanese is a twisted, erroneous imposter. That the true Catholic faith can never grow in Japan because “the Japanese are not able to think of God completely divorced from man; the Japanese cannot think of an existence that transcends the human.”5 Ferreira claims that this makes Rodrigues’ work useless and done at the expense of the persecuted Japanese peasants. He underscores this last point by describing his own torture: being hung upside down over a pit with small incisions behind each ear from which blood slowly drains from his body. The encounter concludes with Rodrigues stating that Ferreira is not the Ferreira he knew. Sawano concurs.

As the novel draws to its climax, Rodrigues once again encounters Kichijirō, and not for the first time since Kichijirō’s betrayal. Prior to the penultimate exchange, Kichijirō appears at

---

the prison housing Rodrigues, begging for forgiveness. Kichijirō, thrown by the guards into prison with the rest of the Christians, pleads with Rodrigues to hear his confession. Rodrigues eventually does so formally, only to witness in the very next scene Kichijirō running from the prison after having once again apostatized. In the penultimate exchange, Kichijirō once again appears at the prison the night prior to Rodrigues’ own apostatizing. Kichijirō, not actually seeing Rodrigues, yells for forgiveness. Rodrigues, while contemplating the life of Judas and with a bitter taste on his tongue, utters absolution.⁶

Rodrigues also once again encounters Ferreira. Rodrigues has been told by an interpreter that Inoue has said Rodrigues will apostatize that day and is escorted out of his cell by the interpreter and Ferreira. Ferreira’s presence and words beat against Rodrigues’ own confusion as he finds out that unless he apostatizes, the Japanese Christians who are already hanging in the pit, groaning in agony, will be left there to die. The interpreter takes out the fumie and puts it in front of Rodrigues. As Rodrigues stares at the fumie, he “hears” the bronze Christ speak, “Trample! Trample! I more than anyone know of the pain in your foot. Trample! It was to be trampled on by men that I was born into this world. It was to share men’s pain that I carried my cross.”⁷ Rodrigues tramples.

The novel concludes with Rodrigues living a life like that of Ferreira. His time during the day is spent with Ferreira examining items for possible Christian significance, and, like Ferreira, Rodrigues is told by the Japanese lord, Inoue, that Rodrigues is to take the name, home, wife, and child of a Japanese man who has died. Rodrigues is now Okada San’emon.

---

⁶ Ibid., 174.

⁷ Ibid., 183.
Not insignificant to the themes of the novel and to the work of this dissertation is the appearance of Kichijirō in this section. Kichijirō seeks out Rodrigues after Rodrigues tramples, asking yet once again for forgiveness. Rodrigues questions whether he can administer the sacrament in light of his act of apostatizing but ultimately does. The rest of the novel is composed as an Appendix, that of a diary of an officer at the Christian residence and of entries of a Japanese officer. Through its journal entries we learn that Kichijirō becomes an attendant to Okada San’emon/Rodrigues. The last diary entries recount the death and cremation of San’emon/Rodrigues.

Themes

The themes at the heart of *Silence* are at the heart of this dissertation: silence; forgiveness; dialogue; the im/possibility of language and dialogue bridging cultural differences; and the reality of the human condition, mystery, and the multi-faceted experiences related to transcendence (the transcendent as God, in the case of the novel). Additional themes raised in the novel that I touch on are martyrdom and the acculturation of faith as lived out in time and space. I provide here brief comments on the ways Shūsaku depicts these themes in the novel, giving me a paradigmatic narrative from which I draw the questions addressed in my analyses.

Shūsaku announces (ironically?) silence as a main theme of the novel by putting it on the cover. But what about silence? What or who is silent and why? One signpost is the structure of the novel itself. The chapters move from first person letters written in the voice of Rodrigues to chapters conveyed through a third-person subjective narrator who uses the generic term priest when referencing Rodrigues to an appendix of diary entries of a Dutch clerk and Japanese officer. What does the “silencing” of Rodrigues’ voice through this structure serve?
Rodrigues’ internal dialogue addresses another “silence” of the novel: the silence of God. I find this the most intriguing silence. What leads Rodrigues to complain of the silence of God? How does he understand silence in the first place? Is God really silent? If so, why and what are the consequences? Are those consequences positive or negative?

The theme of forgiveness envelops the relationship between Rodrigues and Kichijirō. I already referenced above the multiple times that Kichijirō receives the sacrament of reconciliation through Rodrigues. Shūsaku provides numerous scenes highlighting Rodrigues’ struggle with Kichijirō—his cowardness, his slyness, his self-seeking. Rodrigues more than once brings to mind how Jesus Christ would see Kichijirō, trying to model his response to Kichijirō on that of Jesus. He fails more than once in his attempts. Yet, at the end of the novel, Kichijirō is shown to be serving Rodrigues/San’emon.

Forgiveness—or lack of?—features in Rodrigues’ relationship to Ferreira. Rodrigues rails against his former teacher, unable to understand how Ferreira has done what he has done and continues to do. When Rodrigues finds himself in the same circumstances, he struggles with his feelings about Ferreira. Comparing how Shūsaku illustrates the Rodrigues/Ferreira relationship with how he illustrates the Rodrigues/Kichijirō relationship raises multiple questions about the struggle to forgive, not only others but one’s self. Kichijirō seeks out forgiveness; Ferreira does not.

In terms of the themes of forgiveness, I wish to raise one additional example: forgiveness between Rodrigues and God. As part of his struggle with the “silence” of God, Rodrigues castigates God for not doing more for the persecuted, impoverished Catholic Japanese peasants. He also castigates God for his own confusion over how to serve and love God in his current circumstances. God has created the universe; God grants free will to finite, historical humans
who inevitably fail to fully return that love. How is one to respond to such a situation? Is it appropriate to say that one forgives God?

Two themes mentioned above are linked: the im/possibility of language and dialogue to bridge cultural differences and the acculturation of faith in time and space. While language (symbolic communication) seems to be a universal feature rooted in humans’ intersubjective nature, the symbolic nature of language and its rootedness in time and space make it subject to individual interpretation and understanding. My unique circumstances inform my interpretation and use of language just as another person’s unique circumstances inform theirs. The result: I am unable to know exactly how you understand, interpret, and use language just as you are unable to know how I understand, interpret, and use language. This situation gives rise to dialogical hermeneutics, which I touch on in the next chapter.

Finally, Shūsaku asks the reader to consider the nature of martyrdom and its relation to faith. I understand Shūsaku’s use of the martyrdom theme to question how we can really know something without having experienced it and how, once one experiences something, our understanding of it may be called into question, thus calling into question what went into building up our understanding. This is an immensely challenging situation in which to find oneself. And one that I wager is a fertile ground for forgiveness: silent or otherwise.

One facet critical to my wagers, analyses, and arguments about silent forgiveness is dialogue. The next section details four dialogues from Silence. Similar to providing an overview of the novel and its themes, I provide these in support of the work taken up in the following chapters.
The Dialogues
Rodrigues and Inoue

The first dialogue is that between Rodrigues and Inoue. Both are introduced in the novel’s Prologue. Sebastian Rodrigues is introduced as one of three students of the Jesuit priest, Christóvão Ferreira, who cannot accept the idea that Ferreira chose apostasy over martyrdom. Overcoming the hesitation of their Superiors about traveling to what had become a place of hostility and torture for Christians, Rodrigues and his companions set out for Japan. Upon reaching India, they learn that a massive Christian rebellion resulted in Japan closing its borders to all Portuguese ships and personnel. They also receive secondhand news on Ferreira, which introduces Inoue: “The only thing that could be said with certainty was that Ferreira had been cross-examined by the newly-appointed magistrate Inoue, the Lord of Chikugo.”

Additional details about Inoue appear in the Rodrigues’ first letter (Chapter 1), when another Jesuit describes Inoue as a “terror for the Christians” and the architect of the Christian persecution. The Jesuit also offers that Inoue’s cunning and savagery has led to previously implacable Christians succumbing to his torture and apostatizing (e.g., Ferreira). Against this description, the Jesuit also offers that Inoue was once Christian: “‘he was formerly of our faith. He is even baptized.’”

Rodrigues’ first encounter with Inoue involves little direct dialogue. It occurs after Rodrigues’ capture and transport to a prison near Nagasaki. Rodrigues has been brought forth from his prison cell for formal examination by a set of Japanese officials. Unbeknownst to

---

8 Ibid., 10.
9 Ibid., 13.
Rodrigues, Inoue is one of them. At the end of the examination, Rodrigues declares, “‘No matter what I say I will be punished,’”\(^{10}\) to which Inoue (still unknown as such by Rodrigues) replies, “‘We will not punish the fathers without reason.’”\(^{11}\) Rodrigues retorts, “‘This is not the idea of Inoue. If you were Inoue you would punish me instantly.’”\(^{12}\) The officials laugh and Rodrigues wants to know why they are laughing, to which one of them replies, “‘Father, this is Inoue, the Governor of Chikugo. He is here in front of you.’”\(^{13}\) As Rodrigues reflects in amazement at this revelation, the officials depart.

Rodrigues and Inoue’s first full dialogue begins with Inoue telling a story of a Japanese man, Matsuura, who had four concubines who constantly quarreled, the result of which was the man expelling all four. Inoue situates the story in the context of Japan and Christianity, stating, “[Japan] is just like Matsuura…Spain, Portugal, Holland, England and such-like women keep whispering jealous tales of slander into the ear of the man called Japan…you surely realize that Japan’s outlawing of Christianity is not unreasonable and foolish.”\(^{14}\) While formed as a statement, the underlying question is obvious.

Rodrigues answers the underlying question, with an overt question, “‘Our Church teaches monogamy…If a man has a lawful wife, I wonder if it is wise thing to let himself be burdened

---

\(^{10}\) Ibid., 118.

\(^{11}\) Ibid.

\(^{12}\) Ibid.

\(^{13}\) Ibid.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 129-130.
with concubines. What if Japan were to choose one lawful wife from among these four?"’\(^{15}\) After asking Rodrigues if that wife should be Portugal and Rodrigues responds that he means the Catholic Church, Inoue asks another question. “‘Father, don’t you think it is better for this man called Japan to stop thinking about women from foreign countries and to be united with a woman born in the same country, a woman who has sympathy for his way of thinking.’”\(^{16}\) Rodrigues and Inoue continue trading questions and answers regarding Christianity’s suitability for Japan, coming to an apparent stalemate when Inoue states, “‘Father…you and the other missionaries do not seem to know Japan’” and Rodrigues replies, “‘And you, honorable magistrate…you do not seem to know Christianity.’”\(^{17}\) An openness to transformation is not present. Interestingly, though, the encounter ends with Inoue leaving Rodrigues with a directive: “‘Father, I want you to think over two things this old man has told you. One is that the persistent affection of an ugly woman is an intolerable burden for a man; the other, that a barren woman should not become a wife.’”\(^{18}\)

The only other encounter between Rodrigues and Inoue occurs at some indeterminate time, although at least several months, if not years, after Rodrigues has apostatized. Oddly placed in between extracts from the diary of a clerk at a Dutch trading firm in the last chapter of the novel, Inoue is the primary speaker, announcing to Rodrigues that Rodrigues is to move to a new

\(^{15}\) Ibid., 130.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 131.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 132.

\(^{18}\) Ibid.
town and take the name, wife, and household of a Japanese man who has died. Upon announcing this, Inoue poses the question, "'Well?'" with Rodrigues responding, "'Very good.'"\(^1^9\)

Inoue then switches to statements regarding Japan and Christianity. "'I’ve told you. This country of Japan is not suited to the teaching of Christianity. Christianity simply cannot put down roots here…Father, you were not defeated by me…You were defeated by this swamp of Japan.'"\(^2^0\) Rodrigues counters, "'No, no…My struggle was with Christianity in my own heart.'"\(^2^1\) Inoue counters, "'I wonder…I have been told that you said to Ferreira that the Christ of the fumie told you to trample—and that that was why you did so. But isn’t this just your self-deception? Just a cloak of your weakness? I, Inoue, cannot believe that these are truly Christian words.'"\(^2^2\) Rodrigues’ last statement to Inoue follows, "'It doesn’t matter what you think.'"\(^2^3\)

The dialogue ends pitting Inoue’s interpretation of what has happened against Rodrigues’ interpretation. Neither conveys that they think the other is right or that they care whether the other thinks they are right.

**Rodrigues and Ferreira**

One is almost three-fourths of the way through *Silence* before Rodrigues and Ferreira have their first dialogue. Rodrigues has been brought to the monastery where Ferreira is

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 199.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 199.

\(^{21}\) Ibid.

\(^{22}\) Ibid.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., 200.
currently spending his days. The dialogue begins haltingly, with Rodrigues’ vocal statements intermixed with his internal dialogue.

“Father, so long since we have met…” At last the trembling voice of Rodrigues broke the silence…And yet Ferreira remained silent…

“Please…say…something.” Rodrigues was almost panting as he spoke. “If you have pity for me…please…say…something.”

…

“What can I say to you on such an occasion?” said Ferreira.

“You’re deceiving yourself.”

“Deceiving myself? How can I explain the part of me that is not all self-deception?”24

From here Rodrigues turns to asking Ferreira what he has been doing. Ferreira answers:

“At the magistrate’s order I am translating a book on astronomy.” Ferreira spoke out the words rapidly as if he wanted to shut the mouth of the interpreter. “Yes, that’s what I am doing. And I am of some use. I am of some use to the people of this country. The Japanese already have knowledge and learning of all kinds, but in the line of astronomy and medicine, a Westerner like myself can still help them. Of course in this country there is an outstanding knowledge of medicine learnt from China; but it is by no means useless to add to it our knowledge of surgery. The same is true of astronomy…So I am not useless in this country. I can perform some service. I can!”25

Rodrigues reflects on Ferreira’s mantra of being of use, acknowledging to himself that “to be useful to others, to help others, this was the one wish and the only dream of one who had dedicated himself to the priesthood” and that “Ferreira had not been able to escape from the old psychological orientation that had motivated him. Ferreira seemed to be relying on his old dream

24 Ibid., 152-153.

of helping others like a crazy woman who offers her breast to a baby.”26 In light of these thoughts, he asks Ferreira if he is happy. Ferreira responds that “there are all kinds of subjective factors in the concept of happiness.”27

From here, their exchange is interrupted by the interpreter who accompanied Rodrigues announcing that Ferreira has taken a Japanese name and is helping the Japanese by writing a book that refutes Christianity. Rodrigues exclaims that this is cruel, worse than any torture. At this Ferreira turns his face and Rodrigues sees a tear on Ferreira’s cheek. Rodrigues thinks to himself: “The black Japanese kimono! The chestnut hair bound back in Japanese style! The name: Sawano Chuan! And yet this man is still alive! Lord, you are still silent. You still maintain your deep silence in a life like this!”28

The conversation then abruptly shifts at the prompting of the interpreter to the reason for bringing Rodrigues and Ferreira together. Ferreira is to tell Rodrigues to apostatize. He does so, pointing to a scar behind his ear and relaying the story of his torture in the pit. “You’ve probably heard of it. They bind you in such a way that you can move neither hand nor feet; and then they hang you upside down in a pit…These little openings are made behind the ears so that you won’t die immediately. The blood trickles out drop by drop. It’s a torture invented by the Magistrate Inoue.”29

26 Ibid., 154.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 155.
29 Ibid., 156.
Ferreira then switches tactics, announcing that having lived in Japan for 20 years, he knows it better than Rodrigues and has been defeated by missionary work. Rodrigues replies, “‘No one can be defeated by missionary work. When you and I are dead yet another missionary will board a junk at Macao and secretly come ashore somewhere in this country.’”\textsuperscript{30} The interpreter interjects that the missionary would be captured and more Japanese blood would flow for the missionaries’ selfish dream. Ferreira responds, “‘For twenty years I labored in the missions…The one thing I know is that our religion does not take root in this country.’”\textsuperscript{31} Rodrigues cries, “‘It is not that it does not take root…It’s that the roots are torn up.’”\textsuperscript{32}

This statement leads to an extended exchange about the universality of concepts and truth. It takes the form of Ferreira and Rodrigues arguing over the ability/inability of the Japanese to understand the Catholic faith. Ferreira argues that they do not and that they never will:

“…throughout this country the Japanese were not praying to the Christian God. They twisted God to their own way of thinking in a way we can never imagine. If you call that God…No. That is not God. It is like a butterfly caught in a spider’s web. At first it is certainly a butterfly, but the next day only the externals, the wings and the trunk, are those of a butterfly; it has lost its true reality and has become a skeleton. In Japan our God is just like that butterfly caught in the spider’s web: only the exterior form of God remains, but it has already become a skeleton.”\textsuperscript{33}

Rodrigues counters, stating, “‘Nothing of the sort! I don’t want to listen to your nonsensical talk. I have not been in Japan as long as you, but with these very eyes, I have seen the martyrs…With

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 157.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 160.
my own eyes. I have seen them die, burning with faith.”

Ferreira replies, “They did not believe in the Christian God…The Japanese till this day have never had the concept of God; and they never will…The Japanese are not able to think of God completely divorced from man; the Japanese cannot think of an existence that transcends the human.”

Rodrigues responds, “Christianity and the Church are truths that transcend all countries and territories. If not, what meaning is there in our missionary work?”

Ferreira: “The Japanese imagine a beautiful, exalted man—and this they call God. They call by the name of God something which has the same kind of existence as man. But that is not the Church’s God.”

Rodrigues: “Is that the only thing you have learnt from your twenty years in this country?”

Ferreira: “Only that…And so the mission lost its meaning for me. The sapling I brought quickly decayed to its roots in this swamp. For a long time I neither knew nor noticed this.”

The exchange ends with Rodrigues whispering that Ferreira is not the Ferreira he knew. Ferreira concurs, “I am a man who has received from the magistrate the name of Sawano Chuan…and not only the name. I have received the wife and children of the executed man.”

---

34 Ibid., 160. Rodrigues is thinking of the Japanese peasants from the village that first sheltered Garrpe and he, a Christian held captive in the same prison as he who was beheaded for not trampling, and Garrpe himself, who drowns trying to save other Japanese Christians.


36 Ibid., 161.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.
The novel implies that Rodrigues and Ferreira spoke after this but only one dialogue is presented. It occurs as part of the climax of the novel when Rodrigues steps on the fumie, apostatizing under the gaze of Ferreira. Ferreira has been brought by the interpreter to the room in which Rodrigues is being held. Ferreira speaks first, asking Rodrigues if he can hear him – the room is pitch black and Ferreira is unable to see Rodrigues. He goes on to say that on the wall in the room are etched the words *Laudate Eum*, words put there by himself when he was imprisoned. He recounts to Rodrigues that he, too, heard the moaning that Rodrigues has been hearing. That he, too, came to learn that the sound was coming from men hanging in the pit in agony.

“Listening to those groans all night I was no longer able to give praise to the Lord. I did not apostatize because I was suspended in the pit. For three days, I who stand before you was hung in a pit of foul excrement, but I did not say a single word that might betray my God…The reason I apostatized…are you ready? Listen! I was put in here and heard the voices of those people for whom God did nothing. God did not do a single thing. I prayed with all my strength; but God did nothing!”

“Be quiet!”

“Alright. Pray! But those Christian are partaking of a terrible suffering such as you cannot even understand. From yesterday—in the future—now at this very moment. Why must they suffer like this? And while this goes on, you do nothing for them. And God—he does nothing either.”

Ferreira continues to narrate what is happening as Rodrigues wildly tries to not hear both Ferreira and the people hanging in the pit. Rodrigues at one point lashes out, stating that Ferreira should have prayed, to which Ferreira responds, “I did pray. I kept on praying. But prayer did

---

41 English translation: Praise him.

42 Shūsaku, *Silence*, 179.
nothing to alleviate their suffering…Prayer does nothing to alleviate suffering.” Rodrigues attempts to justify letting the Japanese suffer: “In return for these earthly sufferings, those people will receive a reward of eternal joy.” Ferreira retorts:

“Don’t deceive yourself! …Don’t disguise your weakness with those beautiful words.”

“My weakness?” The priest shook his head; yet he had no self-confidence. “What do you mean? It’s because I believe in the salvation of these people…”

“You make yourself more important than them. You are preoccupied with your own salvation. If you say that you will apostatize, those people will be taken out of the pit. They will be saved from suffering. And you refuse to do so. It’s because you dread to betray the Church. You dread to be the dregs of the church, like me…Yet I was the same as you. On that cold, black night, I, too, was as you are now. And yet is your way of acting love? A priest ought to live in imitation of Christ. If Christ were here…”

Ferreira then repeats three times in various forms that Christ would have apostatized for them, with Rodrigues responding no and telling him to go away. Ferreira concludes the dialogue by repeating that Rodrigues is now about to perform the most painful act of love ever preformed and that “Your brethren in the Church will judge you as they have judged me. But there is something more important than the Church, more important than missionary work: what you are now about to do…Ah, courage!” Rodrigues tramples the *fumie*.

---

43 Ibid., 180.
44 Ibid., 181.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 182.
The centrality of the relationship of Rodrigues and Kichijirō to *Silence* and to this dissertation make it difficult to provide a succinct yet useful summary of their dialogues. That their relationship is suffused with antipathy and forgiveness also complicates any attempt to bring forth the nuances and subtleties that characterize the relationship. What follows are dialogues selected to bring to the fore the idea of forgiveness and the way the Catholic sacrament of reconciliation serves as the fulcrum of their relationship.

To set the stage for the first of the dialogues, I take a step back. The first time Rodrigues and Garrpe meet Kichijirō in Macao, Garrpe asks if he is a Christian. Kichijirō emphatically replies “‘I’m not…No, I’m not.”47 Twice more at different points in the opening chapters, Garrpe asks Kichijirō if he is a Christian. Twice more Kichijirō insists he is not. That this is a lie is conveyed in one of Rodrigues’ letters back to Portugal. He explains that he and Garrpe learned that Kichijirō was a Christian, that he had apostatized eight years before when put to the test, and that he had fled his village when the rest of his family refused to trample the *fumie* and were burned at the stake.

Rodrigues also shares that it is Kichijirō who is instrumental in bringing Rodrigues to a second village of secret Christians. It is during Rodrigues’ time there that he encourages Kichijirō to confess his sins – the first time – and orders him to “keep in mind the words of Our Lord: ‘He who confesses my name before men, him also will I confess before my Father who is

---

47 Ibid., 16.
in heaven; but he who denies my name before men him also will I deny before my Father who is in heaven.”\(^{48}\)

The first full dialogue between Rodrigues and Kichijirō occurs as a lead into Kichijirō’s betrayal of Rodrigues to the authorities. The dialogue commences as Rodrigues is sliding down a hill to enter a village that he has come to believe contains his next parish. Mid-slide, he pulls up short, retreating, and in the process spies a man fleeing in the opposite direction. Both men stop. Rodrigues then hears “‘Father!’” and recognizes Kichijirō. Kichijirō approaches, stating “‘Father… Father, how glad I am to see you… It’s dangerous here… But I’ll look after you,’” and then repeats, “‘Father, why have you come to this island? This is a dangerous place. But I know a village where there are some hidden Christians.’”\(^{49}\) Rodrigues turns and walks away, recalling different stories about apostates, priests, and martyrs. Kichijirō follows, complaining, “‘Don’t walk so fast…I’m sick. Tell me where you are going. The magistrate says that the man who finds a father will get three hundred pieces of silver.’”\(^{50}\)

“All my price is three hundred pieces of silver.” These were my first words to Kichijirō, and as I spoke them a bitter laugh crossed my face. Judas had sold Our Lord for thirty pieces of silver; I was worth ten times as much.

“It’s dangerous to go alone,” he said…

“All, Father, I know a place where there are Christians. It’s safe there. Let’s go. Tonight we can sleep here; tomorrow we’ll set out.”\(^{51}\)

\(^{48}\) Ibid., 43.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., 75-76.

\(^{50}\) Ibid., 77.

\(^{51}\) Ibid.
Without waiting for a reply, Kichijirō sets to making a fire and offers Rodrigues some dried fish. The night passes with Rodrigues filled with anxiety over the possibility that Kichijirō will set off to betray him. Morning arrives with Kichijirō still at the fire. They set out walking.

Their next extended dialogue commences upon Kichijirō’s return from fetching water for a parched Rodrigues, who has set off again, plagued by thoughts of betrayal.

“Father! Father!...Are you running away?” he asked as he looked sorrowfully down at me. “Father, you were running away. Don’t you trust me?”

“I don’t want to hurt your feelings,” I said. “We’re both tired. Please go away. Leave me alone!”

“Alone? Where would you go? It’s dangerous. I know a village of hidden Christians. There is a church there and a father.”

“A father?” Unconsciously I raised my voice. I couldn’t believe that there might be a priest other than myself on the island. I looked at Kichijirō with growing suspicion.

“Yes, father. And not a Japanese. I’ve heard so.”

“Impossible!”

“Father, you don’t trust me.” He stood there tearing at the grass and snivelling in his weak voice. “No one trusts me.”

“And yet you know how to look after yourself. Mokichi and Ichizo have sunk to the bottom of the sea like stones and yet…”

“Mokichi was strong—like a strong shoot. But a weak shoot like me will never grow no matter what you do.” He seemed to feel that I had dealt him a severe rebuke…Yet I had not said these words with the intention of rebuking him…Kichijirō was right in saying that all men are not saints and heroes. How many of our Christians, if only they had been born in another age from this persecution would never have been confronted with the problem of apostasy or martyrdom but would have lived blessed lives of faith until the very hour of death.

“I have nowhere to go. I’m just wandering around the mountains,” complained Kichijirō.
A feeling of pity surged up within my breast. I bade him kneel down and in obedience to my command he tremulously bent his knees down to the earth. “Do you feel like confessing for Mokichi and Ichizo?” I asked.\textsuperscript{52}

The text does not note a yes or no from Kichijirō, only Rodrigues’ ongoing rumination about the categories of the strong and the weak. The scene is interrupted by the appearance of Japanese men and Kichijirō cries, “‘Father, forgive me!’ …‘I am weak. I am not a strong person like Mokichi and Ichizo.’”\textsuperscript{53} At that moment, Rodrigues is seized by the Japanese. As he is led away, he witnesses one of his captors throw silver coins into the face of Kichijirō.

The next encounter between Kichijirō and Rodrigues involving dialogue occurs in a prison. Rodrigues has been transported to a prison. He spends his day ministering to Japanese Christians who are also prisoners. Kichijirō shows up at the prison, demanding that Rodrigues listen to him, admitting to deceiving Rodrigues and to being weak, and pushing the guards to put him in the prison as well as he is a Christian. Kichijirō ends up with the other Japanese Christians. When Rodrigues arrives from his cell to minister to the Christians, Kichijirō once again entreats Rodrigues.

“Listen to me, father,” Kichijirō whimpered in a voice that the other Christians could hear. “I am an apostate; but if I had died ten years ago I might have gone to paradise as a good Christian, not despised as an apostate. Merely because I live in a time of persecution…I am sorry.”

“But do you still believe?” asked the priest, doing his best to put up with the foul stench of the other’s breath. “I will give you absolution, but I cannot trust you. I cannot understand why you have come here.”

Heaving a deep sigh and searching for words of explanation, Kichijirō shifted and shuffled. The stench of his filth and sweat was wafted toward the priest. Could it be possible that Christ loved and searched after this dirtiest of men? In evil there

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 81-82.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 83.
remained that strength and beauty of evil; but this Kichijirō was not even worthy to be called evil. He was thin and dirty like the tattered rags he wore. Suppressing his disgust, the priest recited the final absolution, and then, following the established custom, he whispered, “Go in peace.”

The scene ends with Rodrigues reflecting to himself about who the Lord searched out, acknowledging that it was people with no attraction, no beauty; that “true love was to accept humanity when wasted like rags and tatters. Theoretically the priest knew all this; but still he could not forgive Kichijirō.”

After this dialogue, Rodrigues and Kichijirō encounter each other in non-dialogical ways. Rodrigues sees Kichijirō among the crowd witnessing the procession of Rodrigues through the streets of Nagasaki. Kichijirō appears at the magistrate’s office where Rodrigues is held after the procession, crying out to Rodrigues for forgiveness, something Rodrigues does silently with a bitter taste in his mouth. Their next and only other dialogue ends the last chapter of the novel.

“Father, father…

With sunken eyes he looked toward the door as he heard a voice that was somehow familiar. “Father, father. It’s Kichijirō.”

“I’m no longer ‘father’, answered the priest in a low voice, as he clasped his knees with his hands. Go away quickly. You’ll pay for it if they find you here.”

“But you can still hear my confession!”

“I wonder.” He lowered his head. “I’m a fallen priest.”

…

54 Ibid., 123-124.
55 Ibid., 124.
56 Ibid., 167.
57 Ibid., 174.
“Please hear my confession. If even the Apostate Paul has the power to hear confessions, please give me absolution for my sins.”

It is not man who judges. God knows our weakness more than anyone, reflected the priest.

“Father, I betrayed you. I trampled on the picture of Christ,” said Kichijirō with tears. “In this world are the strong and the weak. The strong never yield to torture, and they go to Paradise; but what about those, like myself, who are born weak, those who, when tortured and ordered to trample on the sacred image…”

…

“There are neither the strong nor the weak. Can anyone say that the weak do not suffer more than the strong?” The priest spoke rapidly, facing the entrance. “Since in this country there is now no one else to hear your confession, I will do it….Say the prayers after confession….Go in peace!”

Kichijirō wept softly; then he left the house.58

The novel’s Appendix conveys that Kichijirō ultimately becomes an attendant of Okada San’emon (Rodrigues’ Japanese name) at the Christian residence (prison) where Okada San’emon resides. During that time Kichijirō is found with a Christian talisman. When asked if he received it from Okada San’emon, he replies that there is never a chance to get anything from San’emon.59 Similarly, San’emon is asked if he tried to convert Kichijirō. He states that he never tried to convert Kichijirō.60 This is the last reference to either until the final Appendix entry announcing the death of Okada San’emon at age 64, thirty years after his capture.

58 Ibid., 202-203.
59 Ibid., 208.
60 Ibid.
Rodrigues and God/Jesus

The final set of dialogue partners that I use in my analyses is Rodrigues and God/Jesus. The following captures the one-sided nature of this dialogue with two critical exceptions. What to make of this one-sided nature and why I choose to include it as a dialogue I leave to the analyses in the following chapters.

Leading up to his first direct address to God/Jesus, Rodrigues’ questioning of God starts in earnest in response to a question levied by Kichijirō as Kichijirō is led away for questioning by Japanese officials who have raided the village to which Rodrigues and Garrpe were ministering: “‘Why has Deus Sama given us this trial? We have done no wrong.’”

Rodrigues reflects to himself:

…even as I write these words I feel the oppressive weight in my heart of those last stammering words of Kichijirō…Kichijirō was trying to express something different, something even more sickening. The silence of God. Already twenty years have passed since the persecution broke out…in the face of this terrible and merciless sacrifice offered up to Him, God has remained silent.

Over the course of the rest of the chapter, Rodrigues considers the silence of God, at times attempting to justify it, at other times wrestling with the question of whether it meant that God did not exist. Interestingly, it is only after the narration of the novel switches from Rodrigues’ first-person letters to the more distanced narration that Shūsaku has Rodrigues addressing God/Jesus directly.

Rodrigues has been brought to a clearing where other captives are waiting. He learns that they are Christians and shares both conversation and some food with them. When the official in

---

61 Ibid., 56.
62 Ibid., 57.
charge directs them to continue on, we have the first direct words of Rodrigues to God/Jesus:
“‘Lord,’ he murmured, ‘do not increase their suffering. Already it is too heavy for them. Until today they have been able to bear it. Can you give even more trials to people already crushed with the burdens of taxation, officialdom and cruelty?’”63 No response or further thought is stated. Rodrigues’ next direct address to God/Jesus returns to the theme of God’s silence: “‘Lord, why are you silent? Why are you always silent…?’”64

A more extended entreaty occurs as Rodrigues is being moved to a new prison. Along the way they pass through a harbor that once contained a town that served as a port for Jesuit missionaries. A great Jesuit church with a huge crucifix standing next to it had served as the destination of the yearly Easter procession undertaken by the Japanese Christians. Seeing no trace that any such buildings or processions had existed, Rodrigues sets out a series of questions to his God:

Why have you abandoned us so completely?, he prayed in a weak voice. Even the village was constructed for you; and have you abandoned it in its ashes? Even when the people are cast out of their homes have you not given them courage? Have you just remained silent like the darkness that surrounds me? Why? At least tell me why? We are not strong men like Job who was afflicted with leprosy as a trial. There is a limit to our endurance. Give us no more suffering.65

Another set of statements to God about God’s silence is made by Rodrigues at the new prison in response to hearing the Christian prisoners raise their voices in prayer: “‘Yet you never break the silence,’ he said. ‘You should not be silent forever.’”66

63 Ibid., 89-90.

64 Ibid., 98.

65 Ibid., 103.

66 Ibid., 111.
The next time Rodrigues speaks to God – more specifically, to the face of Christ as it appears before Rodrigues one night at the prison – Christ replies. Rodrigues whispers, “‘Lord, you will not cast us away any longer,’…his eyes fixed upon that face. And then the answer seemed to come to his ears: ‘I will not abandon you.’…the priest felt that for one instant his heart had been purified.” The next day, Rodrigues meets Inoue.

Rodrigues complains to God about God’s silence again upon witnessing the soon to be martyrdom his fellow Jesuit, Garrpe, and three Christians: “You are silent. Even in this moment are you silent?...There is still time! Do not impute all this to Garrpe and to me. This responsibility you yourself must bear!” The last words he hears the drowning Garrpe shout are “‘Lord, hear our prayer’…‘Lord, hear our prayer.’”

Rodrigues’ next entreaty to God occurs after his first meeting with Ferreira. He has been returned to his prison cell and is contemplating whether Ferreira is now sleeping or awake just as he is, enduring a desolate solitude. He considers whether Ferreira is just trying to regain some self-respect by convincing others to trod the path of apostasy. With this thought, Rodrigues questions God, “‘Lord, will you not save him? Turning to Judas you said, ‘What thou dost, do quickly.’ Will you number this man, too, among the abandoned sheep?’”

The face of Christ returns as Rodrigues’ dialogue partner in the scenes leading up to Rodrigues’ apostasy. In the first of these scenes, Rodrigues has been brought to a cell in the

---

67 Ibid., 113
68 Ibid., 143
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 164.
magistrate’s building. It is night and pitch black in the cell. Rodrigues scans the wall, finding etched into one the Latin phrase *Laudate Eum*. He imagines that the person who etched it meant it to be an encouragement to those who might come afterward. As Rodrigues contemplates the command to praise God, he brings to his mind Christ’s face. In the darkness, the face is first silent but then Rodrigues imagines that it speaks to him: “‘When you suffer, I suffer with you. To the end I am close to you.’”\(^71\)

But soon Rodrigues questions those words as he learns from Ferreira that he must apostatize to save peasants who are hanging in the pit from their suffering: “‘Lord, until this moment have you been mocking me?’”\(^72\) At one point, he puts both fingers into his ears, trying to break from the sound of Ferreira’s voice and the groaning of the peasants. It is no use, and he internally cries out, “Stop! Stop! Lord, it is now that you should break the silence. You must not remain silent. Prove that you are justice, that you are goodness, that you are love. You must say something to show the world that you are the august one.”\(^73\) Ferreira continues his cajoling until Rodrigues is led out and stands before the *fumie*. Rodrigues makes a final statement to God:

> “Lord, since long, long ago, innumerable times I have thought of your face. Especially since coming to this country have I done so tens of times. When I was in hiding in the mountains of Tomogi; when I crossed over in the little ship; when I wandered in the mountains; when I lay in prison at night…Whenever I prayed your face appeared before me; when I was alone I thought of your face imparting a blessing; when I was captured your face as it appeared when you carried your cross gave me life. This face is deeply ingrained in my soul—-the most beautiful, the most precious thing in the world has been living in my heart. And now with this foot I am going to trample on it.”

\(^71\) Ibid., 172.

\(^72\) Ibid., 179.

\(^73\) Ibid.
... How his foot aches! And then the Christ in the bronze speaks to the priest: “Trample! Trample! It was to be trampled on my men that I was born into this world. It was to share men’s pain that I carried my cross.”  

Rodrigues’ next statement to God comes as Rodrigues struggles with guilt and attempts to justify his action, wondering if they are only an ugly defense when, as he states succinctly, “I fell. But, Lord, you alone know that I did not renounce my faith.” Yet, he stills wonders if justifying his action as the action of love is just a cover for his weakness. “I acknowledge this. I am not concealing my weakness. I wonder if there is any difference between Kichijirō and myself. And yet, rather than this I know that my Lord is different from the God that is preached in the churches.”  

Rodrigues final dialogue with God is mixed into his final dialogue with the last recorded request from Kichijirō for the sacrament of reconciliation. As Kichijirō states that he betrayed Rodrigues and trampled on the picture of Christ, Rodrigues once again hears the Christ of the fumie telling him to trample. Rodrigues responds

“Lord, I resented your silence.”

“I was not silent. I suffered beside you.”

“But you told Judas to go away: What thou dost do quickly. What happened to Judas?”

“I did not say that. Just as I told you to step on the plaque, so I told Judas to do what he was going to do. For Judas was in anguish as you are now.”

---

74 Ibid., 182-183.

75 Ibid., 186.

76 Ibid., 187.
He had lowered his foot on to the plaque, sticky with dirt and blood. His five toes had pressed upon the face of one he loved. Yet he could not understand the tremendous onrush of joy that came over him at that moment.

…

No doubt his fellow priest would condemn his act as sacrilege; but even if he was betraying them, he was not betraying his Lord. He loved him now in a different way from before. Everything that had taken place until now had been necessary to bring him to this love. “Even now I am the last priest in this land. But Our Lord was not silent. Even if he had been silent, my life until this day would have spoken of him.”

A Return

With these four dialogues summarized, it is now time to turn to providing support for my three wagers about the nature of silent forgiveness. I stated earlier that silent forgiveness can bear phenomenological description and theological analysis; that it can be conceptually clarified (although it is an existential issue); and that it is an emergent phenomenon. These issues are taken up in the following chapters. I present a brief overview of those chapters here.

Chapter 2 focuses on the limits of dialogue and the extent and activity of silence. I turn to the work of David Tracy and Bernard Dauenhauer to present key facets of my argument. David Tracy discusses the limits of Western dialogical hermeneutics in the context of intrareligious dialogue. Tracy opens by asserting that dialogue only occurs if one is open to being transformed through the logic of the dialogue. From this assertion, Tracy notes that dialogue has negative and positive limits. I utilize both types of limits in my analysis, with Tracy’s argument about the positive/natural limit of dialogue providing a key card to my wager’s hand.

77 Ibid., 203-204.
Dauenhauer’s work on the phenomenological aspects of silence provides additional cards to my hand. He notes the existence of a type of silence he names deep silence. Deep silence points to the reality that silence does not require an already constituted realm of expression, i.e., discourse based on pre-existing concepts that make up our thinking realities. By working beyond existing concepts, deep silence forms a ground for new realities. Another phenomenological aspect attendant to deep silence is deindividualizing silence. Deindividualizing silence sets up a mutuality between dialogue partners. I play both aspects in my wager for silent forgiveness. In doing so, I also show the role of silence’s temporality, another key phenomenological aspect within Dauenhauer’s presentation. This temporality further reinforces the role silence has in the emergence of new realities.

Three additional phenomenological aspects of silence are important: the role of terminal silence, a resulting experience of finitude and awe, and the interplay of the determinate and indeterminate. Terminal silence, when experienced, highlights discourse’s inability to express certain experiences. This may result in the experience of finitude and awe on the part of one in dialogue as the person recognizes an inherent limitation to dialogical communication yet realizes that limitation may be only temporary. New realities may arise, may emerge from that terminal silence; those new realities may allow the dialogue to go forward but this is not guaranteed. Combined, all the preceding aspects point to the existence and interplay of the determinate (all that can be expressed symbolically) and the indeterminate. In this, the transcendental comes to light. I use these cards to support my wager about the role of the transcendental in silent forgiveness.

Chapter 3 focuses specifically on forgiveness. Vladimir Jankélévitch’s work on forgiveness provides a ground from which I discuss forgiveness in the sense of what it is and
what it is not in a more traditional sense (see movements of forgiveness above). Jankélévitch argues for three main characteristics of forgiveness. It is an event, a gift, and a relationship. I engage these three characteristics in my discussion of silent forgiveness, noting where I integrate them into my own argument and where I diverge from his assertions. Jankélévitch, in his discussion of these three characteristics, uses an approach that I find appropriate and helpful: the apophatic approach. This dissertation, while attempting to provide clarification about silent forgiveness, in the end, acknowledges the role of the apophatic. I cannot fully say what the existential experience of silent forgiveness is and involves. In this, I agree with Jankélévitch and hold to my choice of his work for that reason.

Chapter 4 argues for the odd agency and shape of silent forgiveness that makes it an emergent phenomenon. My wager takes seriously the role of the transcendent in the phenomena of the world and the human person. Edward Farley’s work on the phenomenon of faith as based on and situated in reality also takes the role of the transcendent seriously. Utilizing the concepts of contingency, intention (as phenomenologically understood), and presence/appresence, Farley presents the human person as refusing her inherently contingent nature by trying secure herself through contingent objects, including other humans, when only a non-contingent reality can secure her. That non-contingent reality for Farley is the transcendent. Farley leverages the concepts of intention and presence/appresence to argue for the reality of the transcendent; an argument I find convincing.

The transcendent is not under the control of the human person (something also noted by Dauenhauer in his discussion of deep silence), therefore the human person cannot “make” the transcendent appear, act, change, etc. The transcendent “emerges” when the transcendent wills to emerge. In the meantime, the transcendent may be said to be silent. The human person can make
ready, be open to the emergence of the transcendent but that is all. In agreeing with Jankélévitch that silent forgiveness is a gift, and here, I add a gift of the transcendent, this emergent quality of the transcendent superimposes itself onto silent forgiveness. Silent forgiveness emerges. This emergent quality sets it apart from forgiveness as it is regularly understood; an act that I and another have control over enacting.

I have made a wager, a rather substantial one at that. I play the cards developed in the next three chapters in the fifth chapter, drawing together a hand that incorporates the dialogues of Silence presented in the previous section. I lay these cards on the table, asking whether they present an existential experience—silent forgiveness—that is recognizable to the reader. I then posit questions about the implications that a recognition of silent forgiveness has for addressing the wrongs of today.
My path to conceptual clarification begins with two texts: David Tracy’s “Western Hermeneutics and Interreligious Dialogues” and Bernard Dauenhauer’s *Silence: The Phenomenon and Its Ontological Significance*. The chapter’s first clarification concerns the nature and role of dialogue and its limits, providing the ground for my assertion that a normal dialogical forgiveness—I’m sorry, please forgive me for x. I forgive you for x.—is not sufficient to meet all the existential situations in need of forgiveness. In light of those limits, I turn to a second clarification based on an analysis of silence and its various components, laying the groundwork for arguing that silence generates possibilities unachievable through dialogue.

**Tracy and Dialogue**

David Tracy’s purpose in his article “Western Hermeneutics and Interreligious Dialogue” is to assert a clarification role for Western dialogical hermeneutics within interreligious dialogue. To do so he takes up the Gadamerian hermeneutical model of conversations, highlighting its strengths, critiquing its weakness, and offering corrections. I am appreciative of Tracy’s work and find three of his clarifications helpful to my own work of clarification.

Tracy’s first clarification is that Western dialogical hermeneutics provides an understanding of what a dialogue is and is not. Tracy defines dialogue as “an attempt to

---

understand some other, some subject matter, by allowing the event of understanding to emerge as a ‘blow’ to one’s earlier self-understanding as well as one’s initial understanding.” In *Plurality and Ambiguity*, Tracy introduces dialogue as a game of movement originating from and continuing forward through questions proffered and answered by players of the game, the dialogue partners. Questions control the dialogue, and the players operate within a set of rules:

[S]ay only what you mean; say it as accurately as you can; listen to and respect what the other says, however different or other; be willing to correct or defend your opinion if challenged by the conversation partner; be willing to argue if necessary, to confront if demanded, to endure necessary conflict, to change your mind if the evidence suggests it.

That questions control the game of dialogue results in a second critical feature of dialogue, a feature that makes possible the rules outlined above: players must shift focus from themselves to the other. As Tracy puts it in “Western Hermeneutics,” “the emphasis of dialogue must shift from the self to the other—the person, the text, the symbol, the event—that is driving the questioning.” They must relinquish their self-consciousness and allow themselves to enter the ontological reality of “being-played,” of being “in the zone.” The game and its rules supersede the dialogue partners’ self-conscious selves; they relinquish themselves as directors of the action. An “other,” the game directs.

---

2 Ibid, 9.


5 Tracy, “Western Hermeneutics,” 2.

6 Ibid.
These characteristics ground the differences between dialogue and a host of other types of discourse: monologue, exhortation, discussion, argument. In monologue, there is a single self-directing speech toward an audience, conveying the thoughts and claims of the speaker without an expectation of a response. In an exhortation, there still is a single speaker conveying thoughts and claims but, different from a monologue, the speaker intends to affect the audience in some way, i.e., change their thinking, their action. Discussions involve multiple parties, all offering their own experience and content to gain clarity and understanding around the stated issue. While questions may occur in a discussion, they do not control the discourse. Argument differs in two respects. One, in argument the logic of the conversation is that of premises linked to and built upon each other to a conclusion. Second, in argument, the selves remain individual actors in the conversation, offering their individual sets of premises and conclusions over and against the other’s premises and conclusions.

Returning to the ontological reality of “being-played” that occurs in dialogue, the players encounter two other facets of being in dialogue. The first facet comprises difference and otherness. One must accept that the dialogue partner is not the same as oneself, that the partner has different experiences and different understandings. If the other were not different, were not other, the logic of question and answer would have no basis. Sameness asking itself questions about itself makes no logical sense. The second facet comprises a recognition that “the self-in-dialogue-with-the-other through the ‘game’ of conversation is always a self interpreting, discovering, constituting (i.e., not inventing) an ever-changing self.”\(^7\) These facets underscore for

---

\(^7\) Ibid, 2-3.
both players that “the different is possible.” And this recognition opens up the possibility for more difference, for change going forward.

These facets lead to a final set of recognitions: the self’s finitude and historicity. I am finite; I cannot know the other. There is a boundary (one that I would argue is set within an infinite horizon) to who I am and what I can know. In recognizing this, I also see that who I am consists partly in all that I have experienced, my history, which is a part of the larger historicity of the world. These characteristics of the self inform my wager regarding silent forgiveness. They will appear again in my analysis of silence, forgiveness, and the odd agency of emergence in Chapters 3 and 4.

Tracy’s point in clarifying the nature of dialogue allows him to then assert this important claim: “dialogue fully occurs only when one risks encountering the other in the logic of questioning in preparation for some new, transformative understanding.” Part of my wager is that the content of that new, transformative understanding may hinge in certain situations on the presence of silent forgiveness.

Tracy’s second clarification points to another challenge to dialogue even when both parties understand and are open to dialogue and its transformative possibilities: “Dialogical thinkers must, at times, be willing to interrupt dialogue for however long necessary whenever someone suspects that a repressed, unconscious distortion is disrupting attempts at genuine dialogue.” In his discussion, Tracy names the various -isms as some of the possible content of

---

8 Tracy, *Plurality and Ambiguity*, 20.
9 Ibid, 43. Emphasis mine.
10 Tracy, “Western Hermeneutics,” 43.
the repressed, unconscious distortion. Until this distortion is addressed, the dialogue struggles to move beyond the distortion. If the distortion is never addressed, the dialogue, as a mechanism of understanding, ends. At other times, argument, as defined above, may need to be employed. Dialogue partners may argue for a particular point central to moving the dialogue forward. If successful, the dialogue may resume its logic of question and answer. If not, the dialogue may not resume. These types of endings represent reaching dialogue’s negative limit.

Tracy’s final point of clarification regarding dialogical hermeneutics raises what happens at the natural limit of dialogue. The dialogue partners so deeply engage in the to-and-fro movement of question-and-answer when seeking understanding that they find themselves understanding themselves as finite, historical beings who may experience something beyond their finite, historical limits. Tracy describes that beyond as “a reality that impinges on one from somewhere beyond one’s limits.”\textsuperscript{11} From that reality one may also (but not necessarily, and perhaps only if one waits serenely\textsuperscript{12}) experience “a sudden moment of insight…a new, unexpected, often sudden experience.”\textsuperscript{13} An excess beyond current understanding.

Tracy names this “beyond” the Unexpected, noting that it can manifest itself as a religious experience but does not necessarily need be one. He also provides an overview of the names given by others to this experience: the Impossible, the Impassable, the Infinite, the Incomprehensible, Love.\textsuperscript{14} Tracy even concludes the article with a presentation of Derrida’s

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid, 10
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, 22.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, 21.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, 20, 23.
articulation of this phenomenon as *Justice to come*. In presenting these names, Tracy notes that some are “more apposite than others…but that is a further question beyond this present study.” It is directly here that I wish to insert my wager. That one possible experience at the positive limit of dialogue can be named silent forgiveness.

To do so requires a move to the features of silence, something generally absent from Tracy, although he does recall Heidegger’s move to meditative, poetic thinking and the possibilities available in a “more apophatic perhaps even mystical sense—a sense of both naming and not naming the experience,” and the idea of waiting—a silence of activity?—insisted upon by Plotinus and Plato.\(^\text{15}\) I turn to Bernard Dauenhauer’s work on silence as it engages both the phenomenological aspects and ontological aspects of silence.\(^\text{16}\) The following section identifies key facets of silence that support my argument for a “silent” forgiveness.

---

\(^\text{15}\) Tracy presents Plotinus’ image of moving ever upward through the realm of the Intelligible and then waiting for the experience of one’s home in the One and the Good and Plato’s intellectual journey in *The Republic* which may or may not result in experience of the Good beyond Being since it is not a personal achievement. Ibid, 21-22.

\(^\text{16}\) A good overview on theories of silence is provided by Colum Kenny in his chapter, “Theories of Silence,” in *The Power of Silence: Silent Communication in Daily Life*. A variety of disciplines undergird the theories presented: philosophy, psychology, sociology, business, linguistics. A key facet of these different theories is whether they focus strictly on silence as a phenomenon, i.e., how it is experienced by humans and the role it plays in communicating (in whatever form) or if they address the implications silence has for ontology. Kenny highlights this himself by noting the following about one influential work on silence, an edited volume titled *Perspectives on Silence* by Deborah Tannen and Muriel Saville-Troike: “They do not specifically ask how silence, in general, challenges humanity’s understanding of itself or investigate if it is the key to some kind of transcendent experience or reality.” (79). Kenny does present theories that engage with the spiritual (Max Picard, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Buddhism) and the impact religious beliefs have on communication (Keith Bosso, Adam Jaworski), but these are not engagements that make ontological claims. My choice of Dauenhauer reflects his use of his phenomenological analysis in service of making ontological claims. This is important to my existential claims about silent forgiveness. Colum Kenny, “Theories of Silence,” *The Power of Silence: Silent Communication in Daily Life* (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2011), 67-86.

This leads Dauenhauer to assert that *Silence: The Phenomenon and Its Ontological Significance* provides the first systematic account of silence in terms of its phenomenological

---


features and its ontological significance. I concur with Dauenhauer's claim and use his work to show how silence can generate possibilities—of insight, imagination, symbols, signs, understanding—not available through dialogue. But I do not use Dauenhauer's work in its entirety. Rather, I highlight six key phenomenological aspects within Dauenhauer’s phenomenological analysis that support my assertion about silence’s active role in generating possibilities and point toward their relevance to the structure of silent forgiveness. What follows are brief introductions to those six aspects. More full discussions of each aspect are presented in the following sections.

The first stems from the investigation of what Dauenhauer names deep silence. That investigation reveals that deep silence involves an abstaining that is more accurately specified as a severing. In turn, the investigation of this severing uncovers that silence and discourse are not reciprocally constituted. Not all silence requires an already constituted realm of expression.

The second phenomenological aspect of silence presented below is drawn from Dauenhauer’s ontological interpretation of his phenomenological analysis of silence. It is the interplay of the determinate and nondeterminate and the irreducible tension between the two.

---


Below I will present his ontological claim about silence and how the determinate and nondeterminate undergird the claim.

The third key aspect derives from Dauenhauer’s exploration of interpersonal involvement in intentional discourse. He names three levels: soliloquy, bipolar discourse, and co-discourse. While a soliloquy involves a single speaker, bipolar discourse requires the establishment of a relationship between interlocutors. Co-discourse requires a severing of bipolar discourse through what Dauenhauer’s identifies as deindividualizing silence. Deindividualizing silence opens to a new reality in which there is mutuality among interlocutors. Neither participant singularly controls the discourse. In Tracy’s language, the participants, in co-discourse, have entered “the zone,” they are in the game, where the dialogue takes over and the selves become a “we.”

The fourth phenomenological aspect that I draw on is terminal silence. Terminal silence occurs when interlocuters experience the inadequacy of discourse’s ability to express certain experiences. Terminal silence is “a final cut that interrupts the ‘and so forth’ of the entire domain of motivated discourse,”\(^\text{23}\) which in principle can go on indefinitely. It closes the domain of discourse. Turning back to Tracy, the interlocuters have hit the positive limit of the dialogue.

Dauenhauer addresses a fifth key aspect of silence to my project, silence’s temporality. Dauenhauer’s identification of the temporality of silence hinges on his point that “the temporal structure of silence comes to light only in conjunction with the temporal structure of…the different types of discourse…and the multiple levels and shapes of interpersonal involvement.”\(^\text{24}\) Dauenhauer identifies three irreducible moments within the temporal structure of silence: a)

\(^\text{23}\) Dauenhauer, *Silence*, 75.

\(^\text{24}\) Ibid, 77.
silence originates or opens the way for something; b) silence makes possible the shifts within the types and levels of discourse; and c) silence establishes the unity of the domain of discourse. A more thorough review of this temporality is provided below.

The final phenomenological aspect I discuss is the experience of finitude and awe by those who come upon discourse’s inadequacy. Finitude in so far as they recognize the limitations of their ability to communicate their experience. Awe in so far as they “know” that their inadequacy does not negate the fact that they are experiencing a new reality not of their own making. An attendant aspect of silence is that it binds and joins. The experience of finitude and awe binds and joins the interlocuters. The experience of a new reality binds and joins. The mutuality of co-discourse binds and joins. Again, this tracks with Tracy’s description of dialogue. The interlocutors recognize their finitude and historicity, experience being part of the “game,” and brought to positive limit of “something beyond.”

What follows presents these concepts in more detail.

Deep Silence and Severing

Dauenhauer’s phenomenological analysis of silence begins with his first approximations of silence. In these first approximations, Dauenhauer observes the appearance of three types of silence involved in discourse. The first two are intervening silence and fore-and-after silence. Intervening silence is the “occurrence or sequence of occurrences of silence which punctuates both the words and phrases of a spoken sentence and the string of sentences which fit together in discourse.” Specifically, it terminates one sound phrase or sentence, preparing space for the

\[25\] Ibid.

\[26\] Ibid, 6.
next sound phrase or sentence, and in doing so, can provide a unifying effect to the sound phrases and sentences. Were this intervening silence missing, the utterance would likely be rendered unintelligible.²⁷

Similar to intervening silence, fore-and-after silence provides a unifying function to a specific discourse. The fore silence prepares and opens the way for the discourse. The after silence closes the discourse and provides space for the next fore silence to appear. Per Dauenhauer the discourse is “the ‘figure’ for which the fore-and-after-silence taken as a unity is the ‘background.’”²⁸ Much more is said about these types of silence, and they contribute to the overall phenomenological description of silence, but they do not play a substantial role in my delineation of the phenomenon of silent forgiveness. On the other hand, Dauenhauer’s identification and description of the third type, deep silence, plays a substantial role.

That substantial role develops out of a key difference between the first two types of silence and deep silence. The first two types correlate to specific utterances. Intervening silence occurs between the sound phrases of an utterance. Fore-and-after silence occurs between different sets of utterances. Without each other, these silences and their corresponding utterances would not achieve their purpose.

Deep silence does not correspond to specific utterances. Instead, Dauenhauer states that “numerically distinct occurrences of deep silence cannot be identified for all occurrences of utterances.”²⁹ Dauenhauer also argues that deep silence “is at play in all utterances of whatever

²⁷ Ibid.
²⁸ Ibid, 13.
²⁹ Ibid, 16.
sort…[and] do not appear to be subordinate to utterance.”
This creates a sort of opaqueness to
deep silence but one that Dauenhauer tries to alleviate through a description of three types of
deep silence. For the purpose of strengthening my wager about silent forgiveness, it is
worthwhile to touch on the three different types of deep silence described by Dauenhauer.

The first of these deep silences is the silence of intimates. In Dauenhauer’s words, “The
conversation among intimates has no specific achievement as its primary goal…intimates stand
in an abiding, settled-though-unsettleable silence which is interwoven or interspersed with
utterance.” In the case of the silence of intimates, deep silence abides between them, forming
the backdrop to their utterances to each other, yet not corresponding to specific utterances. While
brought about by certain utterances and sustained by certain utterances, no specificity as to
number, type, frequency can be deemed as normative to the silence of intimates. In addition, the
silence of intimates, once operative, informs the understanding of utterances made prior to its
establishment, and should the intimacy end, the utterances made after the dissolution. Within the
silence of intimates, there is an openness to whatever comes next and a certain preeminence of
the silence over the utterances.

The second type of deep silence is liturgical silence. Touching on both Catholic and
Quaker communal worship, Dauenhauer notes that what is common between the two types of
worship is “the expectation that God will work within the space of silence the worshippers hold

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid, 17. Dauenhauer notes that intimates are not solely those who love each other; there is intimacy
created through hate, resignation, shared experience.

32 Ibid.
open.” When and what that work will be is open-ended. Similar to the silence of intimates, liturgical silence is not “intrinsically coordinated with some specific utterance or deed that is awaited” and obtains a certain preeminence over the utterances of the liturgy. I see here two connections to the earlier discussion of Tracy. Within liturgy, one enters into a type of discourse not controlled by the individual participants but by an “other” beyond themselves: the liturgical formula handed down through tradition. In engaging in that discourse fully, one enters into a type of “game” where one enters the “zone” that moves the participant(s) to the positive limits of dialogue, to the space where the “something beyond” the positive limit of dialogue may present itself.

The third type of deep silence is the silence of the to-be-said. Dauenhauer asserts that all utterances appeal to something beyond themselves for authentication, for confirmation that what was said was indeed the correct thing to say. Dauenhauer describes the silence of the to-be-said as “that silence beyond all saying, the silence of the what-ought-to-be-said in which what-is-said is embedded.” Dauenhauer uses the notions of tact and of good sense as manifestations of this type of deep silence. One understands what ought to be said—or not said—in a given situation based on the concrete reality of the situation. He underscores, via Gadamer, that that understanding comprises a certain inexplicitness and inexpressibility. Further, unlike the silence of intimates and liturgical silence, which creates space for an other to respond (be it the

33 Ibid, 19.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
partner or a divinity), the silence of the to-be-said does not involve a specified other who may respond.

Dauenhauer ends his description of deep silence on the note that more cannot be said about the appeals and responses within deep silence without moving to an intentional analysis. I turn to that analysis now not only to explore more deeply the nature of the appeals and responses of deep silence, but also to set up the framework for another aspect of silence important to my work: the interplay of the determinate and nondeterminate via severings.

Interplay of the Determinate and Nondeterminate

Many of the following aspects of silence with which I engage involve the language of the determinate and the nondeterminate. What exactly is meant by the determinate and the nondeterminate? Dauenhauer takes this up in his discussion of the genesis of silence and discourse, situating it within an intentional analysis of silence. 37

Dauenhauer begins with the formula of an utterance: A utters p about x to B. He questions how being able to utter p about x is possible and what motivates A to move to do so. He offers the following answer: “the motivation for the shift to actual discourse lies in the capacity of what is given pre-predicatively to be made thematic, coupled with the availability of

---

37 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides a helpful statement about intentionality from the philosophical standpoint: “the relevant idea behind intentionality is that of mental directedness towards (or attending to) objects, as if the mind were construed as a mental bow whose arrows could be properly aimed at different targets.” Put another way, what is my mind doing (the noetic) and toward what is that doing directed (the noema). Am I questioning? Am I identifying? Am I judging? In doing any of those, what is the content/object of that mind action? Am I questioning a person, a book, a concept? Am I identifying notes of music, sensation of cold? Am I judging a statement made to me, the taste of the three-day old bread on the counter? The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online, s.v. "Intentionality," by Pierre Jacob, accessed August 23, 2023, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/intentionality/.
other persons to whom the discourse can be addressed.”

To define thematic, he turns to Husserl’s definition: “an exclusive looking-at-something which consequently notices nothing else.” To do this requires a cut from the whole of spontaneous, pre-predicative experience, i.e., that which is happening that is within my ability to perceive, be it an apple, a thought, a movement. That cut turns the thematic into something determinate. It also introduces a “mine” quality to what was anonymous. This is what “I” choose to look at to the exclusion of all else. This is again the backdrop of that whole of spontaneous, pre-predicative experience which is the non-determinate. It is the interplay between the non-determinate and determinate and additional cuts to these aspects of experience that make discourse possible.

In addition to the first cut discussed above, two more cuts are required for discourse to occur. A second cut occurs when one acknowledges 1) that there are others who also thematize and 2) that thematizing, whether one’s own or another’s, cannot exhaust the possibility of thematizing. The third cut distances one from that which she has been thematically absorbed, opening up space for “the self to mediate its perceptual experience both to itself and to other selves through symbolic performances which can be both initiated and received.” The advent of what Dauenhauer calls the motivatedly possible domain of discourse becomes possible.

---


39 Ibid, 62.

40 Ibid, 61, 63. The possibility of this second cut is based on the Dauenhauer’s concurrence with Husserl’s presupposition for discourse to occur: a commonality to the world and a recognition of the multiplicity of persons. The multiplicity of others gives sense to the second cut.

41 Ibid, 64.
Having established these cuts, Dauenhauer identifies the third cut as the originary fore silence discussed above. Saying p about x is now possible, but only because the non-determinate can be thematized into the determinate and then made sayable through sign and symbols. The link between the non-determinate and the determinate appears in Dauenhauer’s intentional analysis of silence, to which I turn next.

The first facet of Dauenhauer’s intentional analysis comes in the form of asking whether the noetic and noematic correlates of silence can be identified. Using the everyday sense of silence, Dauenhauer notes that one could argue that the noema—that to which the intentional act is directed, be it discourse or silence—is the same: an antecedently established predicative realm containing determinate expressions, i.e., all expressions/utterances which one may employ or refrain from employing. But Dauenhauer undercuts this conclusion by stating that not all occurrences of silence can be accounted for using this argument. There are silences for which the noema is not utterable; rather it is non-determinate, existing in a pre-predicative domain. Using the example of liturgical silence, he points out that a worshiper leaves open room for a response but that one is not necessarily required: “The worshiper abstains from uttering expressions for the sake of what is, in intention, not necessarily utterable.”

Turning to the noetic correlate of silence, Dauenhauer asks how one intends the non-determinate. Here he returns to the movement between the non-determinate realm and the determinate realm, which requires a mechanism of movement from one to the other. Above, the

\[42\] Ibid, 54.

\[43\] Ibid, 55.

\[44\] Ibid, 57.
term cut was used. Dauenhauer now turns to the terms severing and rupture. We have already seen instances of this severing, most recently in the cut that made way for signifying performance/expression. To reiterate: this severing, this originary fore silence interrupts a stream of pre-predicative, non-thematized experiences but does not require nor predelineates forthcoming determinate expressions. But what is the severing when its noema is the non-determinate?

Dauenhauer makes it clear that this severing is not a movement to abstaining from utterance while continuing to attend to the determinate expressions in the predicative realm in silence (think daydreaming). Rather, it is a rupture, again a severing from the predicative realm: “detaching from absorption in the set of actual and motivatedly possible expressions in which I have been living.” It is just here that we find the deep silence discussed above. Silence is an act that severs one from the realm of determinate expressions, opening up a space for some totally new expression to emerge, to rupture into existence…or not, as in the case of the third type of silence: the silence of the to-be-said.

With these points in place Dauenhauer concludes that only a formal characterization of either of the correlates of silence is possible. The noetic correlate is the severing “from some specific set of performances, predicative or pre-predicative, which in principle could continue indefinitely without interruption.” The noematic correlate of the severing cannot be fully

\[45\] Ibid, 58.
\[46\] Ibid, 57.
\[47\] Ibid, 60.
specified since some silences—deep silences—involves no determinate noematic correlates. Having investigated the x and p of the formula for an utterance, I now turn to a discussion related to the A and B of the formula as it involves another aspect key to my wager.

Interpersonal Involvement in Intentional Discourse: Soliloquy, Bipolar Discourse, and Co-Discourse

The third key phenomenological aspect of silence that manifests in silent forgiveness is silence’s structure of interpersonal involvement. Dauenhauer returns to the formula of A utters p about x to B, identifying three types of interpersonal structure to discourse, i.e., how A and B relate to each other. The three types are: soliloquy, bipolar discourse, and co-discourse. While interesting, Dauenhauer's analysis and description of soliloquy contributes little to the development of silent forgiveness. Rather, I focus on the analysis of bipolar discourse, co-discourse, and the severing/the silence that moves the discourse partners between the two.

In bipolar discourse, there are two shapes. One shape is monologue. The other is dialogue. Both shapes require that the A and the B of the analytic formula A utters p about x to B to be two distinct entities: an author and an audience (whether one or more). In the monologue shape, A (the author) controls the uttering of p about x but recognizes B’s (the audience’s) ability to say p about x, even if B does not or is not allowed to. Dialogue, the second shape of bipolar

---

48 Ibid.

49 Contra soliloquy used as a literary device, Dauenhauer's soliloquy does not necessarily involve two distinct discourse partners nor original content. A literary soliloquy involves a distinct author and distinct audience as well as original, new content. The author of a soliloquy speaks indirectly - as opposed to directly as in an aside - to the audience so the audience may more clearly understand the author's inner thoughts and feelings. Using the A utters p about x to B formula, Dauenhauer describes soliloquy as that kind of discourse where neither the author (A) nor the audience (B) are distinct and that which is uttered (x) could be uttered by another at any other time. Dauenhauer, 65, and Britannica Academic, s.v. "Soliloquy," accessed October 9, 2020, https://academic-eb-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/levels/collegiate/article/soliloquy/68599.
discourse, is made possible by a severing that ends A’s uttering p about x in order to allow B to utter p about x. Dauenhauer names that severing interpersonalizing silence.

On the other side of interpersonalizing silence, in dialogue, A and B can alternate roles of author and audience or change the content of p and x. Regardless of which role the A or B is in at any given point in the discourse, both A and B exercise control over the p and the x in the analytic formula. Both determine, to some greater or lesser degree, the what and when of utterances. Dauenhauer puts it this way:

Such streams of utterances are those which some one or several persons can accomplish regardless of what their fellow participants in the discourse do. The streams of utterances which occur at the second level of interpersonal involvement in discourse are, of course, in practice intertwined with other streams. But in principle they are separable streams belonging to individualized selves.\(^50\)

I noted something similar above in Tracy. In bipolar discourse, the individuals are not caught up in the “game” of the dialogue; they have not relinquished their selves to the game, to the rules, allowing the dialogue to control the game’s movements.

The move from bipolar discourse to co-discourse requires a severing of the bipolar discourse. That severing Dauenhauer names deindividualizing silence. Deindividualizing silence is distinctive within the set of identified silences. The silences that open the way for discourse and the silences that move the utterer(s) between types of discourse up to this point have all worked to create distinction between autonomous participants. Dauenhauer states that “the [severing] opening the way for codiscourse changes the direction of this movement. The

\(^{50}\) Dauenhauer, *Silence*, 70-71.
previous movement toward discrete individuality is now changed to one toward interpersonal coalescence.”

This interpersonal coalescence reflects the participants’ “yielding of autonomy for the sake of an interpersonal relationship which is more profound than that which can be established under the sway of autonomy.” Examples of this are making music, participating in rituals, and discourse among intimates. The participants have relinquished autonomous control to that which is not properly any one person’s. But why move to co-discourse?

Dauenhauer cites two reasons. The first is the “spontaneous, pre-predicative experience of the commonality of the referent, the x” about which the discourse partners say p. The second reflects the statement about co-discourse above: the anticipation that co-discourse makes possible the articulation of that which is inarticulable in bipolar discourse. What that articulation will be is no longer under the control of any of the participants. In Tracy’s language, if that discourse is dialogue, they are now in the game, where they are no longer in control. Some new reality may emerge.

The shape that this emergent new reality takes may not be predicted from the outset. Perhaps it will be in the shape of mutual understanding, a recognition of similarities and differences. Like any game, how it will be played is not predetermined. A general shape of what will occur is available via the rules, but the play itself hinges on the moves made in reaction to

---

51 Ibid, 73.
52 Ibid, 71.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
other moves. In co-discourse, the participants have entered the game, they are “in the zone.” It is, I argue, a prerequisite to reaching the positive limit of dialogue, where a blow to one’s understanding may emerge from “somewhere beyond.”

Terminal Silence

The fourth key phenomenological aspect of silence important to the phenomenon of silent forgiveness is terminal silence. Terminal silence closes the domain of discourse. It does so in ways relevant to my wager. The first way is that terminal silence is linked to the realization of the inadequacy of discourse to human experience (God, immediate perceptual experience, love, suffering, *forgiveness*?) and the futility of trying to overcome that inadequacy. 55 This also serves as the ground for the apophatic, i.e., describing something by stating which characteristics it does not have. 56

The futility is made apparent at the conjunction of Dauenhauer’s discussion of thematizing and co-discourse. Recall the second severing discussed above that interrupts the self’s thematizing of the spontaneous, pre-predicative experience in recognition that there are others who thematizes. There is an additional recognition that both the self and others can thematize indefinitely. Unless I am in co-discourse with everyone everywhere all at once, I cannot overcome discourse’s inadequacy. I would argue that Tracy’s positive limit within dialogical hermeneutics is another example.

Terminal silence functions as the severing that acknowledges this inadequacy. Unlike the previous silences discussed, which make way for a shift in the type of discourse or the response

55 Ibid, 75.

56 While an apophatic approach can be used in general, it is most closely associated with Christian theology and its attempts to talk about God.
to the discourse occurring, terminal silence does not make way for a shift in type or response of any sort. Rather, it allows the inadequacy of discourse to be present, allows “the pointlessness of expanding the string of utterances” to stand.\(^{57}\) It contributes to Dauenhauer's point that “the intentional performance of silence need not in all cases be directed toward a determinate object as that which is required for its fulfillment… the performance of silence does not ask for fulfillment by some determinate object.”\(^{58}\) It does not require a return to the predicative domain.

The second, and closely related, experience involves the recognition that the realm of intentional performances comprises two domains: the signitive and the perceptual/pictorial. This recognition, when placed in conjunction with originary silence discussed above, leads to a second recognition: the radical incommensurability of the signitive with the perceptual/pictorial domains. Why? Originary silence is the severing from the perceptual/pictorial intentional performances to the signitive. Terminal silence confirms that existing gap but in reverse order. Terminal silence closes the entire domain of motivated discourse/signitive performances, leading back to intentional perceptual/pictorial performances.\(^{59}\) Dauenhauer captures this in his description of terminal silence as a postpredicative, postexpressive terminal surd.\(^{60}\)

One final aspect of Dauenhauer’s discussion of terminal silence aids my process of clarification of concepts important to silent forgiveness. Dauenhauer juxtaposes terminal silence, interpersonalizing silence (the move from monologue to dialogue within bipolar discourse), and

\(^{57}\) Ibid, 75.

\(^{58}\) Ibid, 82.

\(^{59}\) Ibid, 75.

\(^{60}\) Ibid, 76.
deindividuationing silence (the move from bipolar discourse to codiscourse). In doing so, he notes that both interpersonalizing silence and deindividuationing silence can be seen to not only open and expand the domain of discourse, but also to acknowledge the insufficiency of the previous levels of discourse.\footnote{Ibid.} This creates the possibility of mistaking interpersonalizing silence and deindividuationing silence as terminal silence. That mistake, according to Dauenhauer, arises out of either immaturity or pathology.\footnote{Ibid.}

While not a direct correspondence, I do hear echoes of Tracy’s discussions for why dialogue encounters a negative limit. Mistaking interpersonalizing silence as terminal silence prevents A (the author) from opening up the way for B (the audience) to contribute, to participate in a dialogue; A stands permanently in monologue mode. In the case of immaturity, imagine the child who talks nonstop at another about trains, unicorns, dinosaurs, etc. In the case of pathology, think of the narcissist commanding the conversation at the dinner table.

In the case of mistaking deindividuationing silence as terminal silence, the participants in the dialogue never move beyond individual control of utterances; never enter the realm of the game, of participants being open to a blow of new understanding. Nothing new can be achieved. In terms of immaturity, think of two children engaged in utterances about their favorite cartoon character. They “know” all there is to know about their character so they are uttering p about the same x but no new knowledge about x comes to pass. In terms of pathology, a racist is unable to open their self to the move to codiscourse because nothing more can be said that would change

\footnote{Ibid.}

\footnote{Ibid.}
their beliefs about race. Both of these mistakes close off the possibility of the new; they stunt the possible. They are negative limits.

Temporality of Silence

The temporality of silence is the fifth key phenomenological aspect of silence that I use in my description of the phenomenon of silent forgiveness. Dauenhauer points to three key instants—he names them irreducible moments—in the temporality of silence. The first temporal moment opens the way for the entire domain of discourse. The second moment opens the way for the shifts between the different shapes and levels of discourse and preserves the inaugural moment of discourse. The third moment ends discourse and turns that discourse back on to itself, creating a unitary domain of discourse. This third moment also situates discourse and silence within the entire range of human experience.

While not an exact mirror, I do find some resonances between silence’s temporality and the movement in the structure of forgiveness outlined in Chapter 1. For instance, the first movement involved awareness. This awareness opens up the ground for forgiveness by recognizing the wrong. The second movement is a subsequent suspension of action, that of the judgment of the wrongdoing and its consequent actions. That suspension opens up, allows for the possibility of new ways of acting. The final movement of forgiveness—a re-engagement of a pattern of interaction assumed to be acceptably normal and now inclusive of the memory and consequences of the wrongdoing—mimics the third moment of silence by creating an experience that redounds on itself in a way that changes the original experience. This temporality of moments of opening, shifting, ending contribute to my wager that silent forgiveness is

63 Ibid, 77.
existential, not conceptual. I will say more about the temporality of silent forgiveness in subsequent chapters, particularly the next chapter on forgiveness.

**Finitude and Awe, Binding and Joining**

A final key aspect of silence functions within several of the previous aspects already discussed but it is worth exploring further. That aspect is the role of finitude and awe in creating a binding and joining of those involved in discourse. What follows will seem familiar; the basis for what follows derives from the earlier points about thematizing. Thematizing gives the thematizer as sense of self, a self that then recognizes that others may thematize as well and that those thematizations may be different. In other words, discourse partners recognize "the finitude of any set of particular performances intending determinate objects of any specific sort."64 Their ability to describe is finite, and they experience finitude.

At the same time, those same interlocuters may also come to realize that they are not bound by their already known finite set of performances/descriptions. Each can sever that stream and join/start a new stream of discourse. Each can realize that not only can they do this, but others can as well. This is accompanied by another realization: discourse requires co-creation. As Dauenhauer puts it, “there is the awe-filled realization that he who engages in active performances has a responsibility for letting this other appear.”65 A single person cannot create a domain of discourse if one wishes to be understood by others. One must be willing to sever one’s own stream of signitive performances and hear others' streams of signitive performances and

---

64 Ibid, 80.

65 Ibid, 25.
then work to integrate their individual streams in a way that they can understand each other. This “awe-filled” realization may or may not be comfortable.

Dauenhauer argues that these experiences of finitude and awe motivate the "yielding" inherent to silence. More precisely, the yielding "is a suspension of the claim upon subsequent performances which arise from the motivated ‘and so forth' of previously constituted streams of determinate intentional performances, whether signitive or perceptual or pictorial." I yield my claim of authorship/ownership of the subsequent performances because my experience of finitude and awe tell me that I alone am not responsible for what may come next. This yielding joins and binds me with all others as they, too, yield their singular claim on subsequent performances.

Before moving on I want to reiterate that the experiences of finitude and awe are robust in the sense that they can be both inspiring and frightening; something welcomed and something rebuffed. On one hand, I may resist the idea of my finitude in any number of ways (constant striving, perfectionism, etc.) and the awesomeness of my need for the other. Conversely, I may delight in knowing that I do not and cannot know everything. I may be inspired by what others say and how they contribute to my own understanding. I can have each of these experiences, perhaps even all at the same time. This multiplicity is present in the moral dimension of silence as well. I address that below. But first, a turn to Dauenhauer’s first approximations of silence as a phenomenon.

Silence is a cut, a suspension or interruption, which establishes and maintains the indissoluble tension or incessant oscillation (1) between perceptual and pictorial

---

66 Ibid, 80.

67 Ibid.
performances on the one hand and discursive performances on the other, (2) among the motivedly possible modes of living with others, (3) among the several levels and shapes of discourse itself, and (4) between one’s streams of perceptual and predicative experience on the one hand and his interpretation of the gap between them on the other.  

As will be seen below, Dauenhauer abridges this statement into his summary of the intrinsic sense of silence.

The tension, the oscillation within silence noted by Dauenhauer previews a type of oscillation appears in the next chapter on forgiveness. An oscillation between good and evil. To preview that, I return to one last aspect of silence: its moral impact. Dauenhauer points out that silence, like discourse, is polyvalent; it can oscillate between benign and malign. That silence has moral impact derives from the fact that silence is not an autonomous act, as we noted earlier when discussing thematizing and the possibility for discourse at all. As Dauenhauer puts it

If the performance of silence were purely autonomous, then its author should be able to determine the impact it would have on him. But obviously he cannot do this. Phenomenally, then, silence shows itself as an act that cannot be performed in radical independence…he must act in concert with someone or something which is fundamentally distinct from him.  

How the act of silence registers as benign or malign is taken up more fully in Chapter 4. In the meantime, this moral impact seems at play in Tracy’s discussion of the negative and positive limits of dialogue. At the negative limit, one may understand as benign the silence that appears when dialogue is suspended to deal with a distortion that is interrupting the dialogue. But one may also understand that silence as malign if the reason for the suspension is not to deal with a

---

68 Ibid, 81.

69 Ibid, 24-25.
distortion but to impose one’s own determinate realm on another. The silence at the positive limit of dialogue appears benign at first glance. A determination of whether this first glance is accurate takes place in Chapter 4.

**Conclusion**

Dauenhauer concludes his intentional phenomenological analysis of silence by offering the following intrinsic sense of silence.

(1) Silence is a founded, active intentional performance which is required for the concrete clarification of the sense of intersubjectivity. In its pure occurrences, (2) it does not directly intend an already fully determinate object of any sort. Rather, motivated by finitude and awe, (3) silence interrupts an “and so forth” of some particular stream of intentional performances which intend determinate objects of some already specified sort. As such, (4) silence is not the correlative opposite of discourse, but rather establishes and maintains an oscillation or tension among the several levels of discourse and between the domain of discourse and the domains of nonpredictive experience.  

Using this intrinsic sense coupled with his analysis of other attempts at clarifying silence, Dauenhauer presents his ontological claim about silence:

Both man and world are syntheses of two irreducible, but non-self-standing, components which are not contraries of one another. Rather, these components are simply other than one another. Being is the interplay of the play of these two components in man on the one hand and the world on the other... The components of this synthesis, this dyad, are appropriately named the “determinate” and the “nondeterminate.” This dyad, this synthesis, cannot, at least with the resources available to philosophy, be resolved into a perfect finished Whole or One.

Dauenhauer’s phenomenological description of silence and his ontological claim both provide clarification about silence and evidence the aspects of silence that contribute to my

---

70 Ibid, 82.

71 Ibid, 142-143.
wager about silent forgiveness: deep silence; the interplay of the determinate and nondeterminate; interpersonal involvement in intentional discourse; terminal silence; the temporality of silence; and the role of finitude and awe in binding and joining. It is time to now start previewing the ways the conceptual clarification of dialogue and silence contribute to that hand I intend to play my final chapter. How, specifically, has the preceding analysis contributed to an understanding of silent forgiveness? I would suggest the following points.

Dauenhauer’s analysis of silence demonstrates that silence is not exclusively the absence of sound nor the absence of words. The identification of deep silence in relation to a variety of other forms of silence suggests two considerations for the phenomenon of silent forgiveness: a) forgiveness need not be, cannot be, exclusively some form of speech act. The act of saying “I forgive” or “You are forgiven” does not capture silent forgiveness and may even mask it. I am wagering that existence shows instances of a form of forgiveness founded in and saturated with silence.

Dauenhauer speaks of silence as a severing, a rupture. Silent forgiveness will likely involve some similar kind of severing, but not simply a breaking off of sound or speech, but the kind of cut described by deep silence. At the same time, the phenomenon of forgiveness cannot simply be exchanged with silence, even deep silence. Forgiveness is not silence itself, nor is silence always forgiving. Additionally, silence, even deep silence, may be a form of noise that impedes forgiveness and its silence, as silent forgiveness. Silent forgiveness is not merely being silent about what has occurred.

Silence, as Dauenhauer notes, involves in some cases the suspension of certain kinds of determinate speaking, or alternatively, singing, or praying, or acting. This “suspension of the determinate” makes space for an indeterminacy in speaking—something other can be said than
what has continued to be said. Analogously, and because of this kind of silence, silent forgiveness will also likely have this marker of suspension of the determinate in favor of the indeterminate. Silent forgiveness may bear this mark of indeterminacy, of uncertainty, of risk, and of potential promise.

Tracy’s analysis of dialogue and its limits, via Gadamer, used the language of dialogue as a game, one in which the players suspend themselves in favor of “being in the zone,” being played by the issue of the dialogue. This is helpful as a part of the analysis of silent forgiveness but does not recognize that there may be a game within a game. Forgiveness presumes a “wrong,” a violation of a previous way of playing a game. The recourse to “dialogue” is a kind of “time out” to play another game. Herein lies a potential confusion. One may expect that at the end of this time out, play of the original game resumes. Indeterminacy holds that description in abeyance; there may be return, there may be a new dialogue, there may be something that looks quite different, but never so different as to forget the previous game.

Deitrich Ritschl describes forgiveness as “the hope that the past will not destroy the future.” I will comment on this more in the next chapter, but for now, Ritschl’s approach to forgiveness is important because it extends the discussion of the temporality of silence that Dauenhauer introduced. Silent forgiveness is not likely to be a moment, an instance, a present unhinged from a larger flow of time. If Ritschl is on the right track, the approach to forgiveness will demand a better sense of the kind of temporality associated with the intentional structure of hope.

---

In Dauenhauer’s analysis, silence involves the pictorial-significative divide, with silence leaning more heavily on the pre-predicative, pictorial. This may indicate a role for imagination as a part of the pictorial to be taken up in the complex of silent forgiveness.

Likewise with awe as a form of de-individualizing: silent forgiveness may participate in the de-individualizing, and, as with awe, it may be comforting, intriguing, or overwhelming and horrible.

And, for a moment, recall the original existential locations in Chapter 1, my initial vignette of silent forgiveness and the literary narrative of silent forgiveness in *Silence*. Forgiveness in these situation, either the odd forgiveness of a housemate or the forgiveness of an institution and a religion, involved a phenomenon that was saturated in silence, not speech acts. There was a suspension of “more of the same” in favor of something else, even something not quite seen or heard, as in the conclusion of Shūsaku’s *Silence*. There was a rupture, an indeterminacy, a combination of past and future, a re-imagining. My contention is that as helpful as the ontological and phenomenological description and isolation of silence may be, it is only in the messiness of an existential reality that silent forgiveness takes place. That messiness appears more prominently in the next chapter as I analyze forgiveness through the work of Vladimir Jankélévitch.
CHAPTER 3
FORGIVENESS: JANKÉLÉVITCH

Introduction

In Chapter 1, I presented an opening vignette that served as a starting point for my wager about silent forgiveness. I looked at that experience through a typical structure of forgiveness, one of three movements: 1) a recognition of a wrong that deserves judgment, inclusive of a changed pattern of interaction between those involved; 2) a suspension of behavior that reiterates that judgment and pattern of interaction; and 3) a re-engagement of normal interaction, inclusive of the memory of the wrong and its consequences.¹ And while I identified facets of that structure in my experience, I noted that there was a distinctive oddness about my experience.

That oddness involved the absence of any direct engagement between myself and my roommate about what I judged wrong and my associated way of interacting with her, my suspension of the judgment and behavior, and the change in the interactions I had with her. It was not the “I am sorry I did X to you” followed by “I forgive you” version. There was, in words, a silence.

I also turned to the novel *Silence* and its depictions of situations that further complicate the phenomenon of forgiveness. It raises questions related to the forgiveness of structures, cultures, theologies. It questions the development of moral evaluations of right and wrong. It portrays an existential situation of having to make an impossible choice and of having to confront the asymmetrical relationship that can exist between forgiveness and justice.

In this chapter, I will continue this process of complicating the notion of forgiveness in building my wager about silent forgiveness. I will do so by suggesting what forgiveness will likely involve/look like when set within the framework of silence, particularly those facets of silence noted in Chapter 2. The choice to place this chapter on forgiveness after the chapter on silence is deliberate on my part and signals my assertion that any understanding of forgiveness as independent of the existential situation in which it occurs is at best overly formal and at worst morally misleading. In what follows I will take the methodological risk of presenting a description of forgiveness that I ultimately deem to be "overly formal" because this formal description gives me a solid framework to show how the silence of silent forgiveness modifies an essentialist approach to forgiveness in very significant ways.

Before moving forward with my complicating of forgiveness, I wish to clarify how my wager about silent forgiveness relates to justice and to other philosophical and psychological engagements with forgiveness. First, on how I position the relationship between forgiveness and justice. I situate forgiveness and justice in separate domains that at times—quite often and quite rightly—intersect. Yet, in the vein of the deep silence of the to-be-said, the domain of forgiveness may also include a forgiveness for which there is no corresponding justice. This should not be read as setting aside justice or activities focused on fostering and securing justice. Rather, it should be read as an existential reality. Justice has not, does not, and will not occur for
all instances of harm, committed wrongs, injustices. If I follow Derrida, existence itself is always “out of joint” and justice will always be delayed.² Part of my wager is that silent forgiveness may be connected to the inherent violence that makes consciousness of experience and relations to the other (myself or another) possible: Derrida’s auto-affection, his differance.³ I will say more on this below.

Second, on how I position silent forgiveness within the larger field of inquiry on forgiveness. The recent publication of The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Forgiveness conveys the intricate interplay of historical, theological, sociological, philosophical, and psychological thought involved in attempts to understand forgiveness.⁴ My work is not set over and against these attempts. I am asking us to consider an additional entry into the concept of forgiveness. Doing so, I assert, helps account for additional experiences of what, at the core, seem to me to be attempts to overcome an unavoidable fault line—à la Derrida—in human experience.

Now, I turn to Vladimir Jankélévitch’s work on forgiveness, who positions “pure” forgiveness as perhaps, like “pure” justice, impossible in everyday existence. My choice of Jankélévitch might be considered odd given the description of Jankélévitch as “a relatively

---


³ Ibid.

⁴ Jankélévitch’s investigation of forgiveness stands in a line of contemporary philosophical work with roots in ancient Greek philosophical writing on virtues. For an overview of forgiveness literature from both the philosophical and psychological domains, see Glen Pettigrove and Robert Enright, eds., The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Forgiveness (New York: Routledge, 2023).
marginal figure whose name and works are largely unknown in the English-speaking world.”

But in my reading the central strength of Jankélévitch’s work is both the strength of his formal description of forgiveness as well as the excessive conditions that his formal analysis places on forgiveness.

My decision is due in part, also, to Jankélévitch’s apophatic method, a method he uses because of the difficulty of conceptually clarifying forgiveness. Indeed, he declares that “The élan of forgiveness is so impalpable, so debatable, that it discourages all attempts at analysis.” A key part of this method is an analysis of three “replacement products” (to be discussed below) that may be mistaken as forgiveness, allowing Jankélévitch to identify, through contrast, key aspects of forgiveness.

Despite the difficulty in defining forgiveness, Jankélévitch does offer the following descriptions. Authentic forgiveness “put[s] an end to a situation that is critical, tense, or abnormal and that would unravel one day or another, for a chronic hostility that is passionately rooted in a rancorous memory demands to be resolved.” Forgiveness “lifts the state of exception, liquidates what the rancor maintained, and resolves vindictive obsession.” This tripartite observation about forgiveness echoes the structure of forgiveness I have noted, but it is

---


7 Ibid., 5.

8 Ibid.
an echo that simultaneously lets me begin to identify some of the excessiveness of Jankélévitch’s position. An end, a total resolution cannot be achieved, placing forgiveness, for Jankélévitch, in the realm of the impossible.

Jankélévitch’s formal description of forgiveness takes shape through his presentation of three phenomena: event, gift, and relationship. Below, I detail these three phenomena, noting how my placing these phenomena within the facets of silence noted in Chapter 2 complicates Jankélévitch’s points and how I diverge in my understanding of the phenomena’s roles in silent forgiveness. But before moving into these sections, I turn to a final reason for choosing Jankélévitch’s work on forgiveness: his own writings that complicate, and, to an extent, bring into question his notion of forgiveness in light of the existential situations that arise in the messiness of life.

First, Jankélévitch’s departure point for examining forgiveness is, in his own words, a limit case: the Holocaust. Why? Because in putting forth the Holocaust, Jankélévitch is providing the reader with an instance of an inexcusable, incomprehensible crime for which forgiveness “is, in the last instance, the only thing and the unique thing that there remains to do.” To be sure, there is no question that the Holocaust stretches any consideration of the scale of wrongdoing, of memory, of justice and of future action to the limit. I agree with Jankélévitch that whatever forgiveness might mean at this limit it involves time, giving, and relations. Nevertheless, it is the very excessiveness of his descriptions of event, gift, and relationship, shown below, that transform forgiveness into something that removes it from the realm of "doing" signaled by the phrase "the unique thing that there remains to do" and places it in the

9 Ibid., 106.
realm of "having been done to" by an instantaneous intervention from beyond oneself. My wager about silent forgiveness does not diminish the difficulty of the very possibility of forgiveness in the context of the Holocaust, or racism or genocide. At the same time, I gamble that silent forgiveness describes better the often slow, arduous, uncomfortable, even resentful process through which forgiveness may come to pass.

Second, Jankélévitch ultimately ends up offering a concept of forgiveness so pure that it takes on an almost miraculous nature, leaving it unmoored from the existential situations in which we all live. This quasi-miraculousness is rooted in Jankélévitch’s discourse on paradox, infinite limit (will), impossible gift, and an event that is neither being nor non-being (more on each of these below). My wager is that placing his pure forgiveness within silence provides an avenue for questioning this quasi-miraculous nature and offering a response. It paves the way for a forgiveness that does not draw such a rigid border between Jankélévitch’s "replacement products" substituting for pure forgiveness, thus allowing a more nuanced description of forgiveness, especially in limit situations.

The next section takes up the origin and trajectory of Jankélévitch’s work on forgiveness and sets the stage for showing how silence pushes the limit character of his work and his development of forgiveness in a direction of the existential.

**The Possibility of Forgiveness**

Jankélévitch's work on forgiveness is complicated by seeming contradictions within his writings on the subject, noted earlier. His two main works on the subject are the book *Le*

---

76

Pardon (hereafter I use the English translation, Forgiveness) and "L'Imprescriptible," an article published in 1965. This brief overview below explores the contradictions between these two texts and shows how Jankélévitch needed to move to a quasi-miraculous type of forgiveness.

The catalyst for "L'Imprescriptible" was whether France should abide by its 20-year statute of limitation for the prosecution of crimes when the crimes were those of the Holocaust. Jankélévitch argued the position that the statute of limitation should not apply to these crimes. His primary argument rests on the nature of the crimes committed. In an opinion letter to Le Monde, he describes the crimes as a crime, singular, stating that this "crime without a name is a truly infinite crime," going on to state that "one cannot punish the criminal with a punishment proportional to his crime...strictly speaking, what happened is inexpiable." He concludes that because the crime is inexpiable, the only response left is to "feel, inexhaustibly...[feel] the renewed and intensely lived feeling of the inexpiable thing." In other words, to continually feel the horror of what has happened so as to not ever think that those who perpetrated the crime should be freed of their crime.

---


12 "Ce crime sans nom est un crime vraiment infini, dont l’inexpiable horreur s’approfondit à mesure qu’on l’analyse." Vladimir Jankélévitch, "L'Imprescriptible," Le Monde, January 3, 1965. Translation provided by Dr. Eileen Burchell, Associate Professor of French, Marymount College, retired.

13 "On ne peut pas punir le criminel d’une punition proportionnée à son crime: car auprès de l’infini, toutes les grandeurs finies tendent à s’égalier; en sorte que le châtiment devient presque indifférent; ce qui est arrivé est à la lettre inexpiable." Ibid.

14 "Quand on ne peut rien “faire”, on peut du moins ressentir inépuisamment. C’est sans doute que les brillants avocat de la prescription appelleront notre ressentiment, notre impuissance à liquider le passé. Au fait, ce passé fut-il jamais pour eux un présent? Mais le “ressentiment” peut être aussi le sentiment intensément renouvelé et vécu de la chose inexpiable." Ibid.
A more detailed answer for why Jankélévitch describes the crime as inexpiable is found in the follow-up article titled "L'Imprescriptible," later published in English as "Should We Pardon Them?" He states his main thesis thus, "Crimes against humanity are imprescriptible, that is, the penalties against them cannot lapse; time has no hold on them."\(^{15}\) The crime of the Holocaust is an infinite crime and "…in relation to the infinite all finite magnitudes tend to equal one another; hence the penalty hardly seems to matter."\(^{16}\) And what makes the Holocaust a crime against humanity, an infinite crime for Jankélévitch? Its nature of being directed, methodical, and selective in character: "it was doctrinally founded, philosophically explained, methodically prepared, and systematically perpetrated…it fulfills an intention to exterminate that was long and deliberately matured."\(^{17}\)

An additional aspect that makes the Holocaust inexpiable—and one key to the understanding the contradiction in Jankélévitch's writing on forgiveness—is the collective nature of the crime. The Germans, as a people, as an entire people, have responsibility for a crime that was perpetrated in the name of German superiority.\(^{18}\)

The monstrous machine for crushing children, for destroying Jews, Slavs, and Resistance fighters by the hundreds of thousands, could only have functioned thanks to innumerable complicity and in the complacent silence of all; the torturers tortured and the small fry of minor criminals helped out or laughed.\(^{19}\)

---

\(^{15}\) Vladimir Jankélévitch, "L'Imprescriptible," \textit{La Revue Administrative}, 103 (1965), 37-42. Translation provided by Dr. Eileen Burchell, Associate Professor of French, Marymount College, retired.

\(^{16}\) Ibid.

\(^{17}\) Ibid.

\(^{18}\) Jankélévitch does recognize that there were Germans who resisted but does not back away from national responsibility.

\(^{19}\) Ibid.
Add to this Jankélévitch's argument that it is the victims who pardon a crime. In the case of the Holocaust, "it is not our place to pardon on behalf of the little children whom the brutes tortured to amuse themselves. The little children must pardon them themselves." But they cannot.

So, again, what makes the Holocaust inexpiable? It was an infinite, directed, methodical selective crime against humanity perpetrated by the collective of the German nation on victims who perished and are incapable of forgiveness (even if they wanted to). Against this backdrop, Jankélévitch took up his extended philosophical engagement of forgiveness.

**An Account of Forgiveness: The Foundation**

Jankélévitch's exploration of forgiveness in *Forgiveness* starts with his discussion of what he calls Kantian paradoxes in relation to the duty to forgive. There are two. The first regards human will and what it can and cannot do. The second regards whether a purely selfless act of forgiveness has ever taken place. These paradoxes set the stage for Jankélévitch's position that forgiveness comprises the three phenomena noted earlier: event, gift, and relationship. They also contribute, as noted in the section above, to the quasi-miraculous nature of Jankélévitch’s forgiveness. For that reason, a closer look at these two paradoxes is appropriate.

Jankélévitch begins his argument through the lens of Kantian duty. It is always a duty to do good. And if it is a duty, there must be a means to accomplishing the duty. But what is that means? This is where Jankélévitch employs the first paradox: “to will is to be able, and that if our will is infinite, then our ability in this sense is no less…And the will to will, infinitely, depends only on our liberty, and it rests on an instant.” With an infinite will, one can always

---

20 Ibid.

21 Jankélévitch, *Forgiveness* 2.
will to do good. If one can will to do good, it must be possible to do good. If it is not possible to
do the good one wills, then the duty to do good is "a commandment that commands the
impossible" and turns into an enterprise of demoralization.\textsuperscript{22}

From this, Jankélévitch establishes that forgiveness must be possible but possible in a
way different from other actions of the will. This different action of the will comes as an event, a
gift, and a relationship, but in forms that override the existential in favor of versions at the limit
of human capability. This comes out in Jankélévitch’s discussion of the second paradox.

The second paradox is whether “in the history of humankind there has ever been a single
act of virtue that was purely selfless,”\textsuperscript{23} i.e., has pure forgiveness—where pure forgiveness is
defined as a forgiveness that has no ulterior motive, no self-interest, no subsisting resentment—
ever occurred?\textsuperscript{24} Jankélévitch suggests that it has not; that pure forgiveness is a limit case which
is "nearly" impossible for any person. If Jankélévitch is correct about the near impossibility of
pure forgiveness, then how is any person capable of forgiveness?

This is where the role of the first paradox presents itself. Jankélévitch asserts that though
“our abilities are effectively limited,...we have to ignore this and act as if we were capable of
doing all that we will.”\textsuperscript{25} Putting these two paradoxes in conversation results in Jankélévitch’s

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 1.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
claim that “the grace of forgiveness and of selfless love is granted to us in an instant and as a disappearing appearance—this is to say that at the same moment it is found and lost again.”

It is in this statement that we see one of Jankélévitch’s three aspects of forgiveness: an event that is initial, sudden, spontaneous. It is possible as an event that “happens at such and such an instant of historical becoming.” I intend to appropriate Jankélévitch’s inclusion of event as an aspect of silent forgiveness but in a way that complicates the idea of event. But before taking that up, I briefly introduce Jankélévitch’s two other aspects of forgiveness—gift and personal relationship—and make a comment on the role of hope in forgiveness.

In terms of Jankélévitch’s two other aspects of forgiveness, personal relationship is, on one hand, self-explanatory. In the conventional notion of forgiveness, two parties are necessary to the act of forgiveness: the offender and the offended. Some form of relationship exists that allows for the offense to take place and some form of relationship is necessary for the forgiveness of that offense. On the other hand, who can constitute those parties? Can the self serve as both parties? Can the parties comprise an individual and a group or two groups? The short answer for Jankélévitch is that the two parties are two individuals. But this is not a straightforward answer as Jankélévitch sets forth a limit case, the Holocaust, that is not between two individuals. In addition, he has a specific understanding of what is meant by an individual involved in forgiveness. Both are important facets to my wager about silent forgiveness and I detail why below.

\[26\] Ibid., 4.
\[27\] Ibid., 3.
\[28\] Ibid., 5.
In speaking of the gift aspect of forgiveness, Jankélévitch argues that forgiveness is pure gift. There is no reason for the offended to give forgiveness to the offended. It is a free and gracious act not tied to any rationale. In fact, Jankélévitch states that forgiveness, if it is tied to a rationale, it is no longer forgiveness but something else. It is a replacement product. It “appears” as forgiveness, i.e., on the other side of it (whenever that may be), the rancor\(^{29}\) initiated by the wrong may appear to be mitigated yet it is missing the “heart” of forgiveness. In the next sections I will provide a more detailed presentation of event, gift, and personal relationship.

**An Account of Forgiveness: Event**

To begin, Jankélévitch offers this statement on the event nature of forgiveness: “True forgiveness is a significant *event* that happens at such and such an instant of historical becoming.”\(^{30}\) To fully appreciate what Jankélévitch is claiming in this statement, a closer look at the words “instant” and “historical becoming” is necessary. First, historical becoming.

Jankélévitch grounds all temporality and history in the “becoming” of life, using the term futurition to capture the idea that time has a single direction: the future. “Becoming ceaselessly posits a future, and with the same stroke and at the same time it deposits a past behind it…Indeed, to construct a becoming, a *recollecition* and an *appearing* are necessary at the same time.”\(^{31}\) In a present moment, the deposit of the past provides a springboard for appearances that trigger actions toward the future. One might think of Tracy’s invoking of the game and the zone

---

\(^{29}\) Jankélévitch uses rancor to designate the composite of inner resentment, moral hatred, revenge created by an offense. Looney, *Vladimir Jankélévitch*, 44.

\(^{30}\) Jankélévitch, *Forgiveness*, 5. Emphasis in the original. Derrida’s idea of repetition and trace function in much the same way.

\(^{31}\) Ibid., 14. Emphasis in the original.
as a present moment based on a deposit of the past that acts as a springboard for new, future moment of the game to appear. Or think of Dauenhauer’s notion of the nondeterminate serving as the springboard for the determinate symbol, language, discourse.

Using different language, Jankélévitch talks about human beings as mixtures of intervals and of instants. Alex Kelly provides a good summary Jankélévitch’s instant:

[An instant] is neither being nor non-being...Rather, the instant is that which comes to pass or that which happens. Movement, according Jankélévitch is the contradictory of being, it is not nothing at all, but, likewise, it cannot be described or accounted for, adequately, in terms of something that “is,” that is, that partakes of the form of being.”

It is pure act/doing. It sets in motion the interval of being. The implications of Jankélévitch’s instant are not insignificant. As pure act, the subject becomes pure Subject, “which is beyond any type of reduction to a thing...or subject knowing itself as an object.” In other words, that an instant is pure act turns out to be a negation of self to one’s self.

This instant takes the act of forgiveness out of the existential realm of the human person, pushing forgiveness in the direction of the quasi-miraculous. Jankélévitch does go on to state that this instant of non-self returns the self to itself in a different configuration. This return to being is the interval mentioned above. Regardless, Jankélévitch insists that becoming requires both; neither the instant nor the interval is understandable without the other. In a sense, the instant somehow leaps out of the circle of being only to return, opening up the question of what


33 Ibid., 35.

34 Ibid., 33.
mechanism makes that possible. Again, one is confronted with a quasi-miraculous ingredient in Jankélévitch’s work.

What Jankélévitch means by an instant is directly applicable to what he means by event in terms of forgiveness. Forgiveness is a particular pure act of becoming that negates a rancorous self, allowing a new self without rancor to emerge. How does Jankélévitch come to forgiveness as an initial, sudden, spontaneous event? He does so through a contrast with the temporal replacement products which betray the structure of forgiveness: forgetting, integration, ataraxia. His argument is that these temporal replacement products both lack the necessary intentional structure of forgiveness, which has as its object the rancor caused by the offense, and the character of the negation of the subjectivity of the one who forgives in a pure act. The result is a firewall between forgiveness and these temporal replacement products.

The temporal replacement product of forgetting is just the marching on of a person’s becoming without a specific act of forgiveness. The temporal replacement product of integration lacks the negation of the thinking subject since integration involves an egoistic stance that all facets of living contribute to the making of myself, thus the rancor caused by a transgression doesn’t require dissolution. The temporal replacement product ataraxia is similar to integration since it involves how the self views the transgressions against it. With ataraxia, the self places the transgression within the entire scope of time and history, accepting that individual actions pale in the face of the vastness of all that has been, is, and will be. Instances of offense are lessons to which the philosophical pedagogy of indifference is applied.35

35 Jankélévitch, Forgiveness, 6-7. The Stoics are Jankélévitch’s example.
In addition, Jankélévitch notes how any sort of temporality other than an instant, a moment, undercuts true forgiveness. Why? Because on its own, temporality is neutral, involuntary, and infinite. Temporality is neutral because it is a natural process that has no distinct moral value. It appears to have value because of the value assigned to the memories that found the actions and choices of successive moments. Time, in and of itself, cannot and does not remediate a moral action. Likewise, as involuntary, temporality is not something about which one decides whether to participate. Nor can one hold oneself to a single point in temporality. The infinite quality of temporality ensures that the process of positing the future while depositing that past keeps some aspect of the transgression within its march. As such, forgiveness is outside of time, an intervention from elsewhere. Time becomes something of a Newtonian backdrop to that which breaks into time and transforms a negated subject.

None of the temporal replacement products exhibits what Jankélévitch considers to be the requisite characteristics of forgiveness. Time may hide or forget a wrongdoing for Jankélévitch, but it has no role in forgiveness. Jankélévitch’s analysis of this temporality surely captures the change that must be a part of any description of forgiveness, but the cost of this for Jankélévitch is excessive. Forgiveness is outside of time, an act of transcendental subjectivity that, by definition, ends rancor. Forgiveness as an ongoing phenomenon may involve the aftershocks of rancor, resentment, and suspicion seems impossible on Jankélévitch’s account.

An Account of Forgiveness: Relationship

Jankélévitch insists that forgiveness, however described, involves an aspect of relationship. For instance, in Forgiveness, Jankélévitch describes a dyadic relationship between

36 Ibid., 28, 38-42.
the offender and the offended. But more needs to be said because, for Jankélévitch, there are two elements to relationship regarding forgiveness that must be kept in mind.

First, certain relationships might appear to include forgiveness, but for Jankélévitch, are replacement products. The intellective excuse shows this point. The intellective excuse appears as forgiveness: I forgive you because I “understand” that your action was a result of something other than a free act of your will. Your past brought you to this point and you could not help doing what you did, so I forgive you. This is not the type of relationship at the heart of forgiveness for Jankélévitch.

Rather, for Jankélévitch, the relationship from which true forgiveness arises is characterized by an appreciation of the otherness of the other (radical Other, like Levinas, as well as the other of l'autre). This other, though on the same ethical and metaphysical plane as I who forgive, is nonetheless not capable of being fully known or understood by me. It is a type of otherness unbreachable by discursive thinking. Here, again, Jankélévitch creates a pureness of relationship that moves forgiveness out of the day-to-day understanding of forgiveness and the messiness of situations and relationships in need of forgiveness.

The second element of relationship as a feature of forgiveness requires that the relationship between those involved function outside of an economic model. A common conception of forgiveness functions along a more transactional model. By forgiving you, I give you something you want and, hopefully, free myself from something (resentment, anger) I don’t want. From the other side, the person asking for forgiveness may be asked to do something—a

---

37 Ibid., 5, 157.

38 Ibid., 58-59.
penance, in Christian speak—for forgiveness to be valid. I referenced this dynamic earlier when situating forgiveness and justice in separate domains. This dynamic is absent from the relationship characteristic for Jankélévitch: “Without being obliged, the offended person renounces any claim to what is due to him and any exercise of his right; he freely interrupts his pursuits and decides not to take into account the wrong that he has suffered.” Jankélévitch questions whether anyone has been able to do this. I ask the same question. My wager is that Jankélévitch’s relational criteria is impossible unless forgiveness takes place in his instant. This leaves forgiveness absent from the temporal existence that we understand ourselves to be a part of.

**An Account of Forgiveness: Gift**

Jankélévitch’s third characteristic of forgiveness, gift, recognizes that in forgiveness, there is the advent of a new creation, a new order of relationship between the offended and offender. “True forgiveness, which is at the margins of all legality, is a gracious gift from the offended to the offender.” The gratuitousness of forgiveness recognizes evil as a reality that is unforgiveable but forgives anyway. Forgiveness as gift understands that the offender does not merit forgiveness. They did the evil deed; they deserve judgment and punishment according to some system of justice. (Even in face of the recognition that the offended could commit the same offense.)

For Jankélévitch, forgiveness is the gift of self-negation in order to grasp the ipseity of other. One can only do this in a pure act, an instant; otherwise one understands the other through

---


40 Ibid, 5.
the “eyes” and the discursive thought of one’s self. Working against the common understanding of giving and gift as a transfer of something that already exists between two persons who already exist, Jankélévitch argues for a giving that echoes the idea that “that which makes is not that which it makes” and “a principle is not that of which it is the principle.” It is a giving, a generosity that cannot be or partake of what it gives. The gift emerges through the act of giving. Kelly provides a helpful summary.

It is the “fact” of the giving in which the generosity resides and this generosity reduced to its pure “quoddity” is the act of giving. It should come as no surprise that Jankélévitch understands position, creation, intuition, and true generosity, to be wholly other, because these all fall “beyond” the realm or purview of discursive thought.

Jankélévitch returns to interrogating the intellective excuse to support his position. He characterizes the intellective excuse as “the taking of a position on the wrong of the culprit of whom a fault is reproached.” In other words, the intellective excuse allows that the wrong committed may have not been a willful wrong to begin with and so the culprit is excused from culpability. There is no inherent evil in a person’s will; one’s will always seeks to do good, thus any evil enacted is a function of something external to the individual. The individual is not responsible for the offense; he is excused.

Forgiveness as a gift, in Jankélévitch’s sense, though, moves it outside of any system of justice. Returning to the event nature of forgiveness, the event of the gift of forgiveness functions

---


42 Kelly, “Jankélévitch,” 34.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid, 58.

within—or I should say outside—its own temporality. The gift of forgiveness will not necessarily neatly appear after justice has been served, after a truth and reconciliation committee has uncovered and presented the offense being forgiven. As gift, particularly as Jankélévitch understands gift, forgiveness may ignore, disrupt, supersede the temporality and symmetrical equations of justice.

This gift aspect of forgiveness, like the event aspect and relationship aspect, is at the limits of the self, seemingly impossible, and thus, semi-miraculous. This is what comprises Jankélévitch’s pure forgiveness. One, that you will recall, he questions whether has ever come to pass. Jankélévitch’s pure forgiveness is not only a complex human intentionality and relationship but also one that, in its pure form, seems to argue that the limit of the inexcusable is the only place in human action where forgiveness can occur. And it is this approach that leads to both an enlightening formal account of forgiveness as well as an excessiveness in an understanding of the event, the relationship, and the gift elements of forgiveness, rendering forgiveness, at best, the act of a transcendental subject and, at worst, a human impossibility.

**Complicating Forgiveness**

In Chapter 2, I presented the characteristics of silence that Dauenhauer’s phenomenological analysis uncovered and concluded with his conception of silence. What follows is my use of some of those characteristics and that conception as modifiers of Jankélévitch’s construction of forgiveness.

I start in the reverse order with Dauenhauer’s four key claims about silence. The first claim was that silence is a founded, active intentional performance which is required for the concrete clarification of the sense of intersubjectivity. Setting forgiveness within this aspect of silence strengthens Jankélévitch’s claim that forgiveness is an event. It also strengthens
Jankélévitch’s insistence on a personal relationship as silent forgiveness would involve intersubjectivity. But whereas Jankélévitch insists on a relationship in which the other can never be completely known, silent forgiveness, given Dauenhauer’s fourth claim about silence, may ground the interchange between those involved and allow for brief moments where the participants move to co-discourse and an emptying of themselves so that something new may occur. It allows for hope as well as gift.

Dauenhauer’s second claim—that silence does not directly intend an already fully determinate object of any sort—suggests that a forgiveness set within silence will not fit any type of algorithm; rather it will emerge from the existential situation that gives rise to it. Deep silence provides a framework for thinking of forgiveness in this way. Recall that within deep silence there are three shapes: the silence between intimates, liturgical silence, and the silence of the to-be-said. All of these complicate Jankélévitch’s notion of pure forgiveness.

At the most basic level, deep silence exhibits an excess that goes beyond and grounds certain types of discourse. The deep silence between intimates showed silence as a background that supports the ongoing discourse of the individuals involved. The discourse remains open and unfinished. Similarly, one way that silent forgiveness may emerge is as a background to an ongoing relationship that occasionally gives rise to an intentional, verbal act of forgiveness but more likely holds in place Jankélévitch’s contention that in forgiveness one recognizes that “I, as well, I sinned or will sin. I could have done as you did; maybe I will do as you did. I am like you, weak, fallible, and miserable.”

---

A significant complication of Jankélévitch’s forgiveness occurs within the context of liturgical silence. Jankélévitch underscores the two intentional acts of forgiveness (request for forgiveness; forgiveness offered); in one sense a very symmetrical exchange relating the two acts. Liturgical silence recognizes that an intentional act (prayer, worship, etc.) may not be reciprocated either in the form or the timeframe of the worshipper. Silent forgiveness may then not “require” this symmetrical relationship. The offender may not “receive” forgiveness in a predetermined form or timeframe. The offended may not “forgive” in a predetermined form or timeframe. The “act” of forgiveness may exceed the form of discourse; it may “exceed” the event as outlined by Jankélévitch.

The deep silence of the to-be-said complicates forgiveness by taking it outside the framework of justice. On one level, the deep silence of the to-be-said within the frame of justice supports an appropriate “punishment” for the offense. But on a different level, the level of love, the deep silence of the to-be-said may undercut justice. Silent forgiveness, as a free gift, does not coincide with the workings of justice. Rather, it more likely involves mercy that exceeds retributive justice while still allowing for the discourse of justice to proceed. It opens up the ability to imagine a future in hope.

Dauenhauer’s third claim—that silence severs an “and so forth” of some particular stream of intentional performances which intend determinate objects of some already specified sort—supports Jankélévitch’s position that forgiveness interrupts a stream of intentional performances (of rancor) which intend determinate objects (offender) of some already specified sort (intended evil). But it also strengthens my claim that silent forgiveness may sever that already-in-progress stream of intentional performances in ways not predetermined by those intentional performances. Rather, the person finds themselves at a limit that opens up for space for an imaginative
reconstituting of the symbolic systems that mediate our experiences. And from that imagination, forgiveness and hope may more adequately, but never completely, bridge our disjointed relationships.

Something similar may be said of Dauenhauer’s fourth claim—that silence establishes and maintains an oscillation or tension among levels of discourse and between the domain of discourse and the domains of nonpredictive experience. It echoes Jankélévitch’s notion of forgiveness as an event that is an instant, followed by an interval. It echoes Jankélévitch’s idea of forgiveness as a gift, i.e., an instant of self-negation through pure act that oscillates back into a reconstituted self that cannot discursively understand the pure act from which it reappears. But it also opens up the possibility that silent forgiveness may require the imagination, a move to disrupt one’s determinate thinking so that non-describable, nonpredicative experiences may give rise to some newly constituted sense of another or the world. In this way, silent forgiveness might provide a hope that looks at the future as an open possibility.

Turning to one of the specific characteristics of silence identified by Dauenhauer, I uncover other facets of forgiveness that are likely to be complicated within the context of silence. Dauenhauer talked of the binding and joining power of silence through awe and finitude. Jankélévitch’s forgiveness, best demonstrated by the quote “I could have done as you did,” takes seriously each person’s finitude and in such a way that it binds and joins people in and through acts of forgiveness. What is less evident and how I suggest silence complicates forgiveness is through the feeling of awe. While awe can arise out of happy wonder—a newborn, a brilliant multi-hued sunset, the majesty of a piece of music—it can also arise out of trembling uncertainty and feelings of contingency. Silent forgiveness may, similarly, reflect a multi-dimensional awe.
Silent forgiveness may feel uncomfortable, may feel disconcerting and unpredictable, and not simply be the end of rancor.

**Conclusion**

So how has this foray into Jankélévitch’s portrayal of forgiveness and the complicating of that portrayal through the facets of silence either added to or bolstered the cards in my hand upon which I am making my wager? I see the following. Jankélévitch complicates his own attempts at delineating forgiveness by arguing for a pure forgiveness with specific parameters but developing that pure forgiveness through a limit case that exceeds those specific parameters.

That limit case, the Holocaust, demonstrates that this pure forgiveness does not respond to the different forms that instantiate evil. It is not just a single person carrying out an evil action. That evil action contributes to disrupted relationships that contribute to additional evil actions that create structures that carry that initial evil action forward even though those who maintain the structure do not intend evil. Here I am thinking of slavery, racism, certain economic systems, certain cultural and religious traditions. Jankélévitch’s conception of forgiveness appears to leave us powerless in face of those.

Refracting forgiveness through the lens of silence opens the structure of forgiveness in such a way that forgiveness becomes the hope that the past may not destroy the future\(^\text{47}\) and “allows for the possibility of beginning again, creating something new, and moving forward into a future pregnant with possibility.”\(^\text{48}\) This hope likely involves gift and event and surely relationship. But, I have argued, silence in its many forms is a better starting point for

---


understanding forgiveness as a hope rather than as a gift when nothing else can be done. It also
draws a marked line between the economy of justice and the excess of forgiveness,
disconnecting one from the other such that there is not necessarily an order to justice and
forgiveness where justice must be served first before forgiveness can take place. Forgiveness
may occur independent of justice. It may occur independent of any pre-determined structure.

If one hedges their bets in favor of my wager, giving credence to the cards I have laid on
the table, one may still not be willing to ante up since I have not yet shown another card that is
necessary to complete my hand. That card deals with who enacts silent forgiveness if it is not
necessarily under the control of either the offended or offender; if its forms may be ever new;
and it offers the possibility of unhooking structural evil from continuing into the future,
disrupting relationships between people, cultures, religions.

In Chapter Four, I discuss these two aspects, the structure and the who, of silent
forgiveness. I argue that both answers only appear when looked for within the structures of
intersubjectivity, determinate social worlds, and apprehension/appresentation. Regardless, we
already have some clues about both the who and structure of silent forgiveness. The who may be
active within temporality but not bound by it; it may exist outside of determinate discursive
thinking yet be a reality that discursive thinking can approach; it may provide an antidote to the
finitude of both the offender and offended; it may invoke a sense of awe, in both its uplifting,
jubilant dimension as well as its trembling, uncomfortable instantiation; and it may have the
capacity to shape and direct the excess of the nondeterminate. The structure may involve but
exceed the formal structure of forgiveness presented by Jankélévitch. It must be able to address
the messy, existential situations arising within an ever-changing world populated by ever-
changing individuals. In showing the who and structure of silent forgiveness, my contentions about why it is silent forgiveness becomes even more clear.
CHAPTER 4
THE HUMAN AND THE TRANSCENDENT: FARLEY

Introduction

The questions left at the end of Chapter 3 were 1) who enacts silent forgiveness since the situations that give rise to the question often lack an answer in terms of a single human person and 2) why the shape of silent forgiveness cannot be predetermined. This chapter presents the answers to those questions and the ideas and work underlying those answers.

My wager is that the answers to both questions involve the complex interplay of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity with the realities encountered each day. That interplay includes a) the opaqueness and dynamism of subjectivity/intersubjectivity and the realities consciously/unconsciously apprehended by each; b) the contingency of the universe and everything in it, including the self; c) the reciprocal effects that world and subjectivity/intersubjectivity have on each other; and d) the role and functioning of the transcendental within the self and the world. These components move the who of silent forgiveness from the realm of individual persons into a matrix of intersubjectivity and conditions that allows for the activity of the transcendent. These components also move the shape of silent forgiveness away from formal characteristics that are determined and static toward ones that are dynamic and, to an extent, ineffable. In the following sections, I provide an overview of these various components and how I support my wager about the who and shape of silent forgiveness.
Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity

Intersubjectivity is the a priori condition for any conscious relationship between individuals, peoples, and the universe. It comprises phenomenological intentions and co-intentions that allow for the development of shared meaning and experiences among individuals. Yet, there is an opaqueness and dynamism constitutive of intersubjectivity. The opaqueness is rooted in and resembles the “fault line” within the structure of subjectivity. I can never fully objectify myself; there is always the I that is doing the constituting of myself as subject.¹ In addition to this inherent opaqueness in subjectivity, there is an inherent dynamism to subjectivity that appears in intersubjectivity as well. Edward Farley, in his text Ecclesial Man: A Social Phenomenology of Faith and Reality, captures this dynamism through the principle of positivity and the role of determinate social worlds on subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

In the diagram below, the various strata of the human person make up the pyramid, with the most universal strata—what I designate as humanbeing—serving as its base. We could, in one sense, say that this universal strata, this humanbeing, involves, à la Jankélévitch, the ipseity of a person. The fact that they exist. This strata undergoes a transformation that sets up structures that allow for an individual consciousness, i.e., Husserl’s Urpräsenz, or originary presence.² That originary presence is the basis of subjectivity as it reflects on itself as a self. The originary

---


presence and its subsequent subjectivity take on a particular shape through embodied existence. That shape is at the same time affected by its relationship to the world it encounters and apprehends. Farley states it this way: "Each general stratum undergoes transformation when it is incorporated into the strata more determinate than itself."\(^3\) This shaping also occurs through time, creating a dynamic matrix of existence affecting and being affected by each unique individual and the world around them. In Jankélévitch’s language, a person lives out their becoming. This is the principle of positivity.

Figure 2. Principle of Positivity and the Human Person

---

Critical to that becoming is intersubjectivity. As I noted above, intersubjectivity is the a priori condition that undergirds conscious relationality. Farley summarizes it this way: each self has an interpersonal structure which exists pre-consciously and prior to any relationship with another person and which presupposes reciprocity and interpersonal relations. It underpins phenomenological intentions and co-intentions so groups of subjects can develop shared meanings and experiences. And like subjectivity, determinate intersubjectivity and its resulting apprehensions are affected by the world(s)—one’s determinate social world(s)—in which it finds itself.

Recall Farley’s principle of positivity: humanbeing evolves into the individual human person through the aggregation of the person's relationships, memories, experiences, and decisions that occur in a determinate social world. Because of the particularities of those relationships, memories, experiences, and decisions, "consciousness is predisposed in some ways and not others. Gradations of importance are built into it which ground specific acts of evaluating, deciding, rejecting, changing one's mind, etc." In other words, one’s determinate social world founds and enhances certain perceptivities that mediate a reality being apprehended.

These features contribute to the perceptivities of both individual people as well as groups of people, altering their "capacity to bring into the foreground what otherwise remains amorphous, hidden, or entangled in the complex interweaving of the background" of their

---

4 Ibid, 90, 92.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 191.

7 Ibid., 192.
determinate social world. These capacities reflect the way the determinate social world has affected the structures that make consciousness of oneself and others possible. They affect the phenomenological intentions and co-intentions underlying and structuring conscious thought, turning intersubjectivity into determinate intersubjectivity.

It is key to note that as a determinate social world affects these aspects of the individual and of groups, it involves not just bringing aspects of one’s world into focus, it also sublimates other aspects of oneself, others, and the determinate social world. Indeed, it may close off any number of structural configurations possible for intersubjectivity so that one’s determinate intersubjectivity reifies and includes an unconscious acceptance and belief that how things are is the only possible way for things to be. This disruption of the dynamism of humanbeing’s subjectivity and intersubjectivity reflects the desire of the self to secure itself “at all costs, [and] to render [oneself] and [one's] home-world beyond criticism.”

A couple of examples illustrate this dynamic. A particular determinate social world may intend anyone already part of their determinate social world as being worthy of the same freedoms and obligations they live out while intending anyone not part of their determinate social world as not being worthy of those same freedoms and obligations. These intentions/co-intentions may be codified into either moral codes or laws and sustained through narratives and systems. The intentions/co-intentions of the slave owners of the Antebellum South in the United States regarding the people they enslaved is an example.

Alternatively, a determinate social world may intend anyone not a part of their determinate social world as individuals to be invited into their determinate social world. These

---

8 Ibid., 192.
intentions/co-intentions take shape in the methods of outreach and engagement with others, practices and rituals that shape new members’ intentions/co-intentions to match those of their new determinate social world, and additional practices, rituals, and narratives created to maintain those intentions/co-intentions. Additional intentions/co-intentions are present in how the determinate social world interacts with those who leave or never join the determinate social world. The intentions/co-intentions of members of a Christian denomination regarding non-members is an example.

Luckily, human subjectivity and intersubjectivity and resulting consciousness demonstrates dynamism in a second, more fundamental way. Grounded in humanbeing's structural openness, humanbeing demonstrates an inherent ability to transcend itself and its determinate social world. This structural openness allows for perceptivities that "range beyond the social world in which they are effected into various alien-worlds." In the end, the determinate social world and the resulting determinate intersubjectivity then can either hold a person captive to her determinate social world or it may provide opportunities for a) perceptivities that highlight the disruption of humanbeing's dynamism and b) perceptivities on addressing that disruption. And one of the foremost of those perceptivities is the very capacity to apprehend.

---

9 Ibid., 193.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., 191.
Apprehension and Appresentation

At the outset of this chapter, I wagered that the answer to the who and shape questions of silent forgiveness involved the interplay of the opaqueness and dynamism of intersubjectivity’s apprehension of the realities it encounters. In addition to the inability of the I that is doing the reflecting to ever be independent of its act of constituting itself, thus opaque to itself, another reason for the opaqueness of intersubjectivity’s apprehensions is the role of appresentation in any apprehension. Appresentation is "that aspect of any apprehension in which those aspects of the apprehended object or its field are 'required' by the very nature of that object, but which are notoriginarily present in the apprehension itself."\(^\text{12}\) In regard to intersubjectivity, my apprehension of another person as another person appresents the “I” that does the constituting of myself as a self and the constituting of various features within my field of apprehension that allow me to understand another person as a particular person, not a tree or a different person. There is an immediacy to this appresentation to the apprehension such that one is not consciously aware of the role of appresentation and what it makes possible.

Another contribution of appresentation to the opaqueness of apprehension is the fact that one cannot always access the originary presence of what is appresented. The consciously thinking me can never access the originary presence of the I doing the constituting. I can never access the originary presence of another person’s subjectivity, yet another person’s subjectivity is appresented in the constitution and use of language, art, shared experiences, etc. Another example is the originary presence of that which brought the universe into existence. We know the created universe and even have robust theories and cosmologies about how it came to be, but

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 203.
we don’t know why it came to be. Its existence appresents a why but we can never fully apprehend that why in its originary presence. What we can apprehend is the universe’s contingency and, as a result, our own contingency.

The universe and we—you and I—do not have to be as we are; the universe and we could have been/can be otherwise. Our intersubjectivity, our intentions and co-intentions could be otherwise. That dynamism and contingency play out against an infinite horizon of changing possibilities. We choose an act—which may be a non-act—in each moment of our existence, thus creating ourselves, history, and the universe. These acts may be conscious acts, or they may not be. Regardless, we do choose, and those choices always appresent and involve intersubjectivity and our intentions and co-intentions.

Each of these choices, each of these acts addresses, at some level, conscious or not, the fundamental contingency of ourselves, others, the universe. They indicate either a) an acceptance that contingency is the case and that we can never fully secure ourselves from that contingency; b) an acceptance that contingency is the case and that we are capable of securing ourselves from that contingency; or c) a denial that contingency is the case.

Each of these choices appresents freedom and obligation. I can freely choose among these approaches. And if I can freely choose, intersubjectivity requires that other selves can freely choose. My own freedom to choose obligates me to allow others to freely choose. When I, another person, or a group of others prevent me from freely choosing, or when I prevent another from freely choosing, an alienation occurs, creating a particular relational state within myself, with the other, or with the group. That relational state becomes part of the interplay of self, others, and the world that informs subsequent intentions, co-intentions, acts, meanings, and
symbols of intersubjectivity. Recall the two examples above of how individuals of a determinate social world may intend/co-intend those individuals not part of their determinate social world.

A slightly different example illustrates a more mundane example of the impact of appresented realities within determinate social worlds and oneself. A legitimate question is how does one live out the freedom and obligation of intersubjectivity. For example, I wish to fly to see my family. This requires an outlay of $400. At the same time, my husband wishes to take his daughter on vacation. This requires an outlay of $400. Between the two of us, we only have $400. I wish to do one thing; my husband wishes to do another. How we decide to proceed is informed by how we intend freedom and obligation. We may have similar intendings of freedom and obligation or we may have different intendings. Those intendings have been shaped by the determinate social world(s) into which we were born, have lived, and are living.

Our specific intendings of freedom and obligation also appresent a host of other intentions: how to prioritize our values and actions; the requirements of marriage and family; the role of money and its use. These intentions may be in accord; they may not be. Intentions on the way to communicate our thoughts come into play. Intentions on how to resolve differences, should they arise, add another layer to the process. Over time, our experiences as a couple inform our individual intentions and our co-intentions. In the process, we create our own determinate social world.

Our small, two-person determinate social world overlaps with the other determinate social worlds that form and inform our relationship, our individual intentions, our co-intentions. Those other determinate social worlds may include families of origin; work world; faith world; local community world; national community world; political community world; environmental
and geographic world; art world, etc. The complexity and ambiguity of negotiating these overlapping determinate social worlds should be readily apparent.

That complexity and ambiguity opens up the realm of interactions to transgressions that can affect subjectivity and intersubjectivity. The way those involved in a transgression perceive, represent, understand, and communicate themselves, the other, the world may be altered, leading to the creation of a history inclusive of the changes wrought by the transgression. In a sense, the transgression altered or “killed” a set of possible acts. The set has been silenced and is no longer available. A type of blindness, deafness, imperceptibility has occurred within intersubjectivity and altered the intentions and co-intentions involved. If the same type of transgression continues to occur, the change to/alienation within intersubjectivity may extend beyond the original participants in the transgression. Changed intentions and co-intentions propagate out through the matrix of relationships within which those involved live. The changes may eventually encompass an entire community of people, creating a “blindness” in their perception, understanding, and communication of themselves, others, and the world.

How can such a pattern of transgression, such an intersubjective alienation/blindness be overcome? Some phenomenon must occur that changes the alienated intersubjectivity at work; it must “raise from the dead” the possibility of acts, meanings, symbols that honor the freedom and obligation inherent in intersubjectivity. It re-instantiates the possibility to see, to hear, to perceive options for a relationship. The phenomenon enlivens the intention/co-intention of hope. What are the necessary conditions for such a phenomenon to occur?

The Who and Shape of Silent Forgiveness

I identify a set of five initial conditions for silent forgiveness to occur. The first is recognition of the above: that each self is born into and comes to be through intersubjectivity
informed by a matrix of determinate social worlds which are themselves contingent. The second condition is the recognition that ourselves, others, and the world are only ever partially available to us given the opaqueness of the self to the self and the opaqueness of others and the universe to us. This opaqueness deepens through our use of symbolic systems to understand ourselves, each other, and the world, e.g., language, the arts. These symbolic systems can never capture the entire dynamic reality of our individual selves, others, and the universe.

A third condition is recognition that one does not fully control the possibilities available to intersubjectivity and that the possibilities available are not predetermined. Following upon that, a fourth condition is the recognition that reality itself emerges in new and unpredictable ways. A final condition is recognition that a new way of perceiving and engaging with the self, others, and the worlds—a new matrix of relationships—is possible but may exceed what those involved are capable of enacting. This requires an other interceding and acting on behalf of those involved. That other I identify with the concatenation of transcendence/transcending/the transcendental. I do so to draw attention to the difficulty of locating/delineating in language that which moves us beyond our selves and the dangers of reifying that “that” through the use of particular words or symbols.

These recognitions comprise a set of intersubjective quasi-intentions/co-intentions. They are the conditions for silent forgiveness and provide the basis for responding to 1) who enacts silent forgiveness since the situations that give rise to the question often lack an answer in terms of a single human person and 2) why the shape of silent forgiveness cannot be predetermined.

I believe it is apparent from the above but to state clearly, the enacting of silent forgiveness is not a who in a singular subjective sense. The who is a dynamic matrix of conditions and agencies that create possibilities for those involved to exercise freedom and
obligation in the context of mutual concern. The set of conditions respond to the existential situation of the transgression, whatever that might be. It may include both the entities involved in the transgression (whether those entities are a single subject, two separate subjects, or groups of subjects). Or it may include only one of these entities (such as my vignette). It may include transcendence/transcending/the transcendental functioning in any of a multiplicity of ways: transcendental subjectivity, imaginative transcendence, the nondeterminate emerging as a wholly new way of proceeding. Because of the infinite variety of existential situations in which humans find themselves, the who of silent forgiveness—the configuration of conditions and agencies—will correspond to that infinite variety. It is why, unlike Jankélévitch’s very formal conception of forgiveness, silent forgiveness may be able to address limit cases that strain Jankélévitch’s forgiveness.

The dynamism of the who involved in silent forgiveness contributes to the answer of why the shape of silent forgiveness cannot be pre-determined. Just as the existential situation of the transgression informs the matrix of conditions that act as the who of silent forgiveness, it informs the shape of silent forgiveness. For Jankélévitch, the shape of forgiveness required that the offender ask for forgiveness from the offended, limiting the types of existential situations open to forgiveness. It involved selves acting in a particular way.

My contention is that silent forgiveness is not solely the result of an internal action of the will (although actions of the will may play a role). Rather, it is only possible through a configuration of the conditions constituting the who responding to that specific situation. Compare my opening vignette to the situations in Silence. I was not confronting the actions of a foreign regime or a drunken, cowardly person from a different culture. Nor did my community member come to me asking for forgiveness. I was confronting the intentions of how I thought
adults should treat each other, which led to the rancor in my relationship with her. Rodriguez confronted his own intentions regarding Ferreira. In addition, consider situations where the offender is no longer available to the offended (death, distance, inability to communicate either due to physical limitations/incapacity or different language, ways of expressing oneself) or situations where the offender does not know their offense (Father, forgive them they know not what they do.) The dynamism of individuals in their becoming and the dynamism of the universe in its becoming demonstrate that existing realities may appear in a wide variety of configurations and that new realities may emerge that cannot be predicted. Again, making the delineation of a formal structure of silent forgiveness misguided.

Another factor contributing to the indeterminacy of the shape of silent forgiveness is one that I have already asserted: that there may be situations beyond the capabilities of the selves involved. I gestured toward this when I introduced an other that is capable of addressing this situation: transcendence/transcending/transcendent. I noted that it may appear in the situation in any number of ways: transcendental subjectivity, imaginative transcendence, the nondeterminate emerging as a wholly new way of proceeding. Silent forgiveness may involve one or the other or any combination of these ways of appearing. Or it may involve some appearance never seen before.

This is all to say that no subject controls the entirety of their determinate social world, another person, or the functioning of transcendence/transcending/the transcendent. Silent forgiveness involves the same contingency at the core of a self, another, and the universe. The structure may appear a certain way in a particular instance (my vignette) and another way in a different instance (Rodrigues and Kichiji at the end of Silence). One is left to stand in silence with the hope that silent forgiveness is possible and may emerge. The shape of silent
forgiveness—directed at but not bounded by the existential situation—can address itself in myriad ways to alleviate the rancor and re-establish a relationship of freedom and obligation.

**Symbols, Appresentation, Christianity, and Silent Forgiveness**

My exposition above involved an other designated as *transcendence/transcending/the transcendental*. What follows is the theological turn I make by demonstrating how the various components used in making my claims about the who and shape of silent forgiveness are appresented in a particular determinate social world: Christianity.

I do so for a couple of reasons. First, Christianity plays a central role in the novel *Silence*. It informs the self-understanding, choices, and actions of the main characters, even the non-Christian Japanese. Second, it is one of the determinate social worlds that informs my own subjectivity/intersubjectivity and how I understand the situation of my vignette. My main focus will be on the appresentation of deep realities such as that designated by *transcendence/transcending/the transcendental* that are operative within and underlie the symbols and rituals of Christianity, drawing on examples provided by Farley.

The path to designating the role of the other represented in my use of *transcendence/transcending/the transcendental* as the Christian God runs through the reverse path of *humanbeing’s* transcendental intersubjectivity: from redeemed determinate intersubjectivity back through fallen determinate intersubjectivity to originary determinate intersubjectivity. These intersubjectivities bear certain apppresented realities which are "simply present and do not require deliberate acts of investigation."\(^{13}\) In other words, realities that just are. The central reality that just is within Christianity is Jesus Christ, believed to be the historical redeemer of humankind. I

---

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 203.
begin by showing, via Farley, how the underlying theological concept of historical redeemer becomes operative in Christian intersubjectivity.

The components Farley identifies as necessary to asserting the reality of the theological concept of historical redeemer are a) obligation and the appresentation of a realm of human action where some events are decisive for human good + b) a communal matrix of redemptive existence. Listed here as separate components, each component overlaps/bleeds into the others.

First, obligation and the appresentation of a realm of human action where some events are decisive for human good. This component recalls that determinate intersubjectivity chooses idolatry and flight or freedom and obligation. Redeemed intersubjectivity chooses the latter, honoring the contingent humanbeing’s refusal of external determination. Redeemed humanbeing exercises the freedom to self-determine and the obligation to extend the freedom to self-determine to others. Obligation to let others self-determine necessarily creates nomos, a body of law governing the intersection of freedom and obligation. The law requires an evaluation of human relations and actions in terms of how well the relations and actions uphold the sphere of self-determination (freedom and obligation).

Farley asserts that this evaluation creates history. History then is not progress through chronological time. Rather, history comes into being as societies mythologize events, based on the measuring of [these] events and their power and importance to the society. Preeminent among the mythologized events are events that found a society. The reenactment, the retelling, the instantiation of these events within the society’s intendings maintain the society. History captures “the continuing struggle occasioned by the perpetual assessment of leaders, policies,
and institutions against the mythologized founding events.” In other words, how have the leaders, policies, processes, institutions, and members of a society lived up to the ideals behind their founding. History becomes the necessary appresented field to the social manifestation of obligation.

This assertion about history appears within the Christian ecclesia. The Christian ecclesia’s history begins with the advent of a community whose understanding of the manifestation of *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* is as a God of all, “demanding the negation of all social boundaries as a condition of the redemptive presence of God.” An event creates this community. Christian history names that event as the incarnation of God as Jesus Christ and Jesus’ subsequent life, death, resurrection, missioning of disciples, and sending of the Holy Spirit. Or, as Farley puts it, “to participate in [Christianity] is to participate in a re-formed history and re-formed community” that intends Jesus as a historical figure. Jesus is the historical redeemer whose presence and actions inaugurate re-formed relationality, one that cannot exclude anyone and one for whom the action of *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* identified as God is a possibility for all.

We now turn to the appresence of creation-providence, where cosmos is understood as the order of the universe and creation as the action of *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* bringing the cosmos into being. The components Farley identifies as necessary to asserting the reality of creation-providence are a) the three characteristics of the cosmos

---

14 Ibid., 218.
15 Ibid., 219.
16 Ibid., 220.
appresented via freedom + b) the imagery and appresentation of transcendency/transcending/the transcendent as anti-chaos/source of redemptive existence.

Focusing on the role of freedom in appresenting the cosmos, Farley first asserts that freedom appresents the finitude of the cosmos. Freedom allows humanbeing to choose how to secure itself. One option is to choose some aspect of the cosmos or the cosmos in general as that which secures oneself against one’s contingency. But as we have shown above, the cosmos really cannot secure humanbeing from humanbeing’s contingency. Farley restates this point:

Human beings intend their environment through a mixture of fear and hope that somehow the total mix of nature, nation, and self will suffice. Freedom transforms this intention of the world…and in that transformation the world is appresented as a power incapable of being the recipient of this search for security.\(^{17}\)

Second, freedom appresents the origin of evil. Again, because freedom allows humanbeing to choose how to respond to its contingency, the rift of evil appears in humanbeing’s response to its contingency, not in the contingency itself. The contingency of being, of the cosmos in general is also not the origin of evil (contrary to popular theological positions about natural evil). Direct observation of the universe shows that the universe is supportive of acts of freedom and obligation, acts of good. Farley concludes that these two points provide the grounds for claiming three characteristics of the cosmos: its finitude, its inability to secure being from contingency, and that it can support acts of goodness.

Combining these three characteristics with the imagery and stories of the transcendency/transcending/the transcendent as that which does secure humanbeing and grounds the possibility of redemptive existence (lives of freedom and obligation) points to a necessary

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 221.
relationship between *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* and the cosmos. Why?
Because redemptive existence exists within Christianity’s determinate social world, an existence based on sociality grounded in the cosmos. If redemptive existence instantiates a necessary relationship between *humanbeing* and *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent*, the cosmic world and sociality of *humanbeing* necessitates that *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* also be in relation to and effective upon the cosmos. Creation-providence imagery captures this relationship.

But for this point and all the preceding ones to stand, the third reality appresented by the Christian determinate social world must be secured: the reality of an irreducible *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent*. Farley traces the appresence of the irreducible *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* through a progression from a) an indeterminate whatever capable of supporting the transcendental refusal of chaos to b) *humanbeing’s* attempts of self-securing via the idols of disrupted historical existence to c) the capacity to break from self-securing and idols, resulting in the freedom and obligation of redemptive existence. Only a genuinely irreducible, non-coincident *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* is capable of breaking disrupted historical existence. Within the context of Christianity, the community’s imagery of God as the one who can and does disperse chaos and makes it possible to live out freedom and obligation appresents the reality of the *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* as God.

This exposition highlights the deep realities underlying and reflecting the intersubjectivity that find expression in second-order symbolic systems of language, arts, rituals, morality, laws, etc. I wager that it also supports my assertions regarding the presence and action of *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* within silent forgiveness.
Conclusion

I set out at the beginning of this chapter my intention to address the questions related to the who and structure of silent forgiveness in order to support my wager about the reality of silent forgiveness. Those answers advance my argument toward a general definition of silent forgiveness, taking into account the deep effect of silence on a more formal structure of forgiveness, opening it up to existential situations that reflect the dynamic, messy ways that life is lived by human beings from different determinate social worlds. My argument includes a decidedly theological turn as I wager that silent forgiveness involves an “other” designated generally as *transcendence/transcending/the transcendental*. In noting the role of intentions, co-intentions, quasi-intentions as an aspect of silent forgiveness, I hold up the impact of determinate social worlds on intersubjectivity and its role in the establishment of morality. This in turns determines for a given person how they interpret acts of other individuals and cultures, making everyday life ripe for transgressions that affect intersubjectivity at a variety of levels.

I also argued for how a transgression can propagate out into a determinate social world, such that those active in the determinate social world hold intentions and co-intentions that appear to be reality, rather than aspects of their intersubjectivity that were shaped by their determinate social world. I noted this at work in the regard the slave-owners of the United States’ Antebellum South had for the people they enslaved. The freedom and obligation underlying intersubjectivity of those involved were disrupted. The people enslaved did not have freedom to self-determine and those who enslaved did not fulfill their obligation to allow others to self-determine. The Holocaust involved similar determinate intersubjectivity. Racism, sexism, homophobia are only a few of the multitude of other examples of this disruption at work.
Silent forgiveness works at the level of intersubjectivity, intentions, co-intentions, and quasi-intentions—sometimes conscious, but more often unconscious. It is not bound by the capacities of those involved or the systems that structure everyday life. The presence of *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* moves silent forgiveness out of the control of those involved, making it only a possibility, not a guarantee.

I am now able to lay out all the cards in my hand in support of my wagers about silent forgiveness. Those wagers were 1) that silent forgiveness is enigmatic and elusive but can bear phenomenological description and theological analysis; 2) that silent forgiveness, while it can be conceptually clarified, is not a conceptual issue; rather, it is an existential issue; and 3) that silent forgiveness is an emergent phenomenon. I do so in the next chapter, offering a general description of the matrix from which silent forgiveness emerges. I then turn to considering how my wager cashes out in regard to my vignette, the relationships within *Silence*, and a number of today’s existential situations.
CHAPTER 5

SILENT FORGIVENESS: A WAGER

I began this dissertation with a personal vignette and a wager: the wager that my personal experience as relayed in the vignette was an instance of an important and wide-spread existential phenomenon I name silent forgiveness. Over the course of the first four chapters of this dissertation I addressed additional wagers by demonstrating that silent forgiveness can bear phenomenological description and theological analysis, leading to some conceptual clarification, while remaining an enigmatic, elusive, existential, and emergent phenomenon. I proposed that silent forgiveness is a dynamic matrix of conditions and agencies that establishes within humanbeing and human beings the possibility for mutual concern as expressed through the exercise of freedom and obligation despite historical transgressions. Examples of components that may be operative within the dynamic matrix comprising silent forgiveness include, but are not limited to, the following: contingency, determinate intersubjectivity, determinate social world, intersubjective (quasi-)intentions and co-intentions, and transcendence/transcending/the transcendent. With this work in place, I turn back to the novel Silence and the four dialogues presented in Chapter 1, asking whether they witness to instantiations of silent forgiveness. I also juxtapose the theological concept of martyrdom to silent forgiveness, asking how that juxtaposition might reveal a different type of martyrdom.

The novel Silence and its dialogues, when viewed through the philosophical lens of dialogical hermeneutics, highlight the various phenomena at play in attempts to communicate. These phenomena affect the progress and outcome of the dialogue. I discussed many of these
phenomena in Chapter 1, pointing specifically to the phenomena functioning when a dialogue encounters negative limits and ceases (either temporarily or permanently). I also noted that dialogical hermeneutics necessarily falls short of being able to describe what happens in dialogue when it reaches a positive limit. My claim is that the phenomenon I name silent forgiveness surmounts the limits of dialogical hermeneutics to bring about a new level of understanding.

Throughout *Silence*, martyrdom is a central image and action. The novel's Prologue describes the persecution and martyrdom of Christian missionaries and Japanese Christians, setting forth both the historical situation as well as the theological situation of Shūsaku’s text. The rumor that Rodrigues' former teacher Fr. Christóvão Ferreira chose apostasy over martyrdom sets the action of the novel into motion. Oscillating decisions regarding martyrdom spur the action. The novel's climax hinges on Rodrigues' infatuation with and understanding of martyrdom. The image of martyrdom operating in these instances is the image of the heroic Christian giving up one's physical life so as to obtain everlasting life for their soul. But the end of the novel suggests that Shūsaku wants the reader to question this image of martyrdom. To what end? My initial claim is that Shūsaku asks the reader to consider whether there are alternative images and actions of martyrdom necessary to the Christian faith. In doing this, I argue that silent forgiveness is a necessary phenomenon to understanding the alternative type of martyrdom Shūsaku seems to present. The rest of this chapter synthesizes the work in the preceding chapters in support of both my initial claims and these additional claims regarding silent forgiveness.

**Dialogical Hermeneutics and Silent Forgiveness: Initial Claims**

In Chapter 1, I presented a series of dialogues from Shūsaku’s *Silence* that are central to the work of the novel. I examined the dialogue partners, the trajectories of their dialogues, and where those dialogues end. From there, I diagnosed those dialogues through the lens of David
Tracy's critique and reworking of Hans-Georg Gadamer's dialogical hermeneutics. In several cases, I argued that that lens adequately diagnosed the phenomena encountered in the dialogue. These included the dialogues between Rodrigues and Ferreira and between Rodrigues and Inoue. In other cases, I argued that the lens failed to adequately diagnose the phenomena encountered. Those cases are the dialogues between Rodrigues and Kichijirō and between Rodrigues and God.

The dialogues between Rodrigues and Ferreira and Rodrigues and Inoue demonstrate some of dialogue's negative limits. Understanding is not achieved due to phenomena at work in both dialogue partners. But I read the other dialogues as reaching the positive limit of dialogical hermeneutics. Further understanding is not possible through dialogue alone. Yet, I suggest that an understanding between the dialogue partners is achieved on the other side of that positive limit. An event occurs that activates their ability to reach a new level of understanding of each other, themselves, and the nature of being. Their pasts do not destroy their relationship.

That event is the phenomenon of silent forgiveness. Yet, as indicated in the opening of this chapter, silent forgiveness is more than an event. Silent forgiveness is the initiation and maintaining of a co-intention by a dynamic matrix of conditions and agencies within individuals leading to a relationship where each participant appresents themselves and the other as historical human beings whose wills choose acts of idolatry and flight in attempts to secure an insecure and vulnerable existential originary presence, yet whose wills can choose acts of mutual concern. As such, silent forgiveness functioning at Farley's level of existential originary presence necessarily involves transcendence/transcending/the transcendent and the individuals' preconscious appresentations of themselves and the other. At the historical level, silent forgiveness involves God and the determinate social world.
Below I break apart aspects of this definition but before I do, attention must be given to what is meant by *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent*. The main texts of this dissertation—by Shūsaku, Tracy, Dauenhauer, Jankélévitch, and Farley—all point to *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent*, some directly, others more obliquely, each supporting in some form my statements about what I mean when referencing *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent*. Like Dauenhauer’s silence, *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* is an active, necessary background to all that is and a foundation for all that comes to be (creation as speech as the analogy). It is prior to and infinite, able to manifest that which did not exist (the possible from the Impossible, à la Tracy). Following Shūsaku and Jankélévitch, the agency and manifestation of *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* within creation disrupts the known and knowable reality, allowing space and life for the unknown—a new reality—to appear. But this manifestation, this disruption by *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* acts freely, is not at our disposable (see Jankélévitch’s gift language; Shūsaku’s paradigm of the silence of God in the face of prayer; Dauenhauer’s deep silence and the appeal of the to-be-said; Farley’s intersubjectivity). I can make way for and be available to the agency of *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* but cannot force an appearance.

And while I can point toward *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* as a reality (Farley’s appresentation) and its activity, I cannot indicate more. I can only stand in acknowledgement, in awe and finitude, that *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* stands in tension with my consciousness, my ability to intend *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* as part of space and time within my own evolving mental and physical structures. My limits, my contingency require *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* and demonstrate that, while I can gesture toward and be open to *transcendence/transcending/the
transcendent and find its trace or its excess active in space and time, my symbols and my language must always acknowledge a need for the mystical, the apophatic, the “I know not what fully” of transcendence/transcending/the transcendent.

I follow Farley's work in pointing to the necessary reality of transcendence/transcending/the transcendent and the process involved in our conceptualization of transcendence/transcending/the transcendent. Recall that Farley moves toward the reality of transcendence/transcending/the transcendent by arguing the following: that there are realities called life-worlds; that a life-world comprises a concrete life-world and an essential life-world; that the essential life-world encompasses components and universal structures underlying a concrete life-world; that these essential components and universal structures ground an interpersonal structure that exists pre-consciously and presupposes reciprocity and interpersonal relations. The name Farley gives the combination of the concrete and essential life-worlds is determinate social world.


The key characteristics of faith's essential life-world are a) the contingency of embodied human persons and their surrounding historical universe;¹ b) a push-back against (refusal of) that

---
¹ I initially wrote, per Farley, that this is represented by the images of which are chaos, meaninglessness, and external determination, but is this really the case; does contingency necessarily have to be imaged in this way? What about the imagery of the Garden of Eden? Is it not the refusal of the contingency that advenst the chaos, meaninglessness, and external determination? But are we even capable of imaging an originary non-chaotic, non-meaningless, non-externally determined contingency?
contingency; and c) a non-contingent transcendent\(^2\) that secures the person against that

contingency. Farley suggests that the contingency of the human person rises to the level of

consciousness most acutely through the anxiety of dying. This anxiety (among others) activates a

push back against/refusal of that contingency. The push back appears in the form of a seeking of

that which can secure the human person against that contingency. Farley presents two main

forms of that pushback: idolatry and flight. Since both forms of push back are in and of

themselves contingent, they fail to secure the contingency of the person. What is required is a

non-contingent power: the transcendent. The challenge here is specifying the transcendent.

Before moving into Farley’s approach to the question of specifying the transcendent,

Farley argues that the reality of the transcendent appears through the mode of appresentation.

Remember that appresentation is an aspect of intentionality, which is a part of every

consciousness act. Intentionality passively structures the consciousness-act toward the object of

the consciousness-act in such a way that the consciousness-act of the individual fills out the

content of the object. The "content" of the apprehended object, its noema, extends out toward an

infinite horizon of all that could be known or learned about the object. Engaging that infinite

horizon in the conscious interpretation of the objects involves the subconscious mental acts of

judging, determining, and thinking. This completing of the noema by use of these subconsciously

present acts and realities is known as appresentation. Appresented realities are present prior to

any actual act of perception or conscious understanding of an object.

Why is it that appresentation is the mode by which the reality of the transcendent

appears? Farley asserts that human cognition can never fully capture the transcendent in its

\(^2\) The use of the transcendent in place of the concatenation transcendance/transcending/the transcendent is purposeful as I take up Farley’s term when discussing his work in these chapters.
existential originary presence because the transcendent's non-contingent mode of reality is incommensurate with the human person's contingent mode of reality. The human person only knows of the transcendent because the human person has acquaintance with contingent modes of reality that appresent the transcendent's non-contingent mode of reality. Within the determinate social world of faith, the transcendent's non-contingent mode of reality is appresented by the realities related to the redemptive existence. What are these realities?

- That there is an X that has freedom from, stands apart from the chaos, meaninglessness, and external determination of contingency.
- That this X is able and willing to disperse the threat of chaos, meaninglessness, and external determination.
- That X's relation to the world can produce and extend the conditions for actualizing order and meaning. (Farley identifies those conditions as the freedom and obligation of mutual concern.)
- The X grants the human person the possibility of freedom from chaos, meaninglessness, and external determination and the ability to act with freedom and obligation toward others and X.

The ability to act with freedom and obligation toward the transcendent and others is constitutive of redemptive existence and provides the meaning of contingent human existence within the determinate social world of faith. Farley notes that this is the very action of God at the concrete level of Christian faith.

Another contingent mode of reality appresenting the transcendent is disrupted historical existence. Disrupted historical existence is the concrete manifestation of the humanbeing’s
underlying refusal of contingency occurring at the level of the essential life-world. This refusal of contingency, as noted above, appears in the form of idolatry and flight.

The Christian ecclesia cognizes the realities of both redemptive existence and disrupted historical existence into signs, symbols, and images that form the concrete texts, stories, and rituals that found the practice of the Christian faith. These signs, symbols, and images include those of original sin; Jesus Christ and his death and resurrection; grace; forgiveness; faith; hope; love; the triune God; God's Living Word found in the canonical writings of the Bible, etc.

Returning to Farley's assertion that contingent reality is incommensurate with non-contingent reality and that this fact carries over into attempts to concretize the transcendent means that all attempts by the Christian ecclesia to convey God through language misses the mark. This points to the necessary role of silence and for apophatic approaches to imaging the transcendent; approaches that insist on silence toward normative claims about the nature of the transcendent.

Above, I proposed that silent forgiveness is the initiation and maintenance of a co-intention. I want to break this part of the definition of silence forgiveness into two discussions. The first focuses on the initiation and maintenance aspect of silent forgiveness. The second discussion focuses on the co-intention that is created.

To speak of the initiation and maintenance of silent forgiveness is to speak of its contingent nature at the concrete level of the determinate social world. Why is it contingent at the concrete level of the determinate social world? The most important of these reasons is theological. In accepting Farley's argument that the human person comprises a contingent insecure and vulnerable existential originary presence, I also accept his argument that only
transcendence/transcending/the transcendent secures that contingent existential originary presence.

But that existential originary presence acts through the historical embodied person (recall Farley's principle of positivity), who can choose to secure herself through idols or flight, can choose a disrupted historical existence. The choice of idols or flight impinge upon the insecure and vulnerable existential originary presence of other historical embodied persons. We see this clearly in the early dialogues and choices of Rodrigues and Kichijirō. Kichijirō’s choice of securing his historical, embodied existence through apostasy (a combination of both idolatry and flight as he flees the scene after apostatizing the first time in the novel) leads Kichijirō to betray Rodrigues to Inoue (for silver) through manipulation. Rodrigues' choice of securing his historical, embodied existence through the idolization of martyrdom leads him to despise and ridicule Kichijirō.

Their actions, within the context of the Christian ecclesia to which they belong, require forgiveness, and, to a certain extent at the concrete level, they are in control of whether that forgiveness is a manifestation of silent forgiveness. They can choose to create a site within which silent forgiveness may appear, or they can choose not to create a site within which silent forgiveness may appear. This is not the case at the essential level of the Christian ecclesia; they are not in control of whether silent forgiveness may appear. It is here that the contingent aspect of silent forgiveness becomes apparent. Only transcendence/transcending/the transcendent can secure the insecure and vulnerable existential originary presence of the human person. The participants make choices that create the space/possibility for silent forgiveness, but the participants cannot force the action of transcendence/transcending/the transcendent.
I draw additional support for conceptualizing silent forgiveness as contingent from both Dauenhauer (silent forgiveness vis-a-vis relationality and openness to the work of the transcendent) and Jankélévitch (silent forgiveness vis-à-vis gift). Multiple aspects of Dauenhauer's work support my assertion that silent forgiveness is contingent at the concrete level of existence. First, recall that Dauenhauer's description of deep silence; deep silence does not correspond to specific utterances. In the case of the deep silence of intimates, it is the backdrop to an ongoing set of utterances set within an ongoing relationship of utterances between individuals. Silent forgiveness requires such a relationship. Because it does so, two individuals must choose to be in relationship so that a site into which silent forgiveness might appear exists. If they choose not to be in relationship, they abandon the site of potential silent forgiveness.

The deep silence of liturgical silence also supports the contingent nature of silent forgiveness as the concrete level of existence. Liturgical silence is a communal silence, which, like the silence of intimates, is inherently relational. The community can refuse to act as a community, denying transcendence/transcending/the transcendent the possibility of acting within the community. But even if the community acts as a community and engages in liturgical silence so that transcendence/transcending/the transcendent might act, the community does not control when or how transcendence/transcending/the transcendent might act. Thus, those who create a site into which silent forgiveness might appear can ensure that silent forgiveness does not appear by 1) not being in relationship to each other but also by 2) not holding open a space for transcendence/transcending/the transcendent. But even if they hold the site open through an ongoing relationship which involves a mutual openness to transcendence/transcending/the transcendent, they cannot compel transcendence/transcending/the transcendent, or silent forgiveness to appear.
Jankélévitch's work supports silent forgiveness as contingent in two ways. One way is by arguing that forgiveness is a gift. The other way is by arguing that forgiveness creates a new reality. In Jankélévitch's work, forgiveness is a gift given by the offended to the offender. There is no reason to forgive the offender. In fact, if there is, it is not forgiveness but one of the various forms of pseudo-forgiveness that Jankélévitch describes. If the offended chooses to confront the offender for the purpose of mitigating the offense through one of these other forms, the site, the opportunity for the contingent gift of silent forgiveness is closed.

I do differ here from Jankélévitch in a significant way in terms of the giver of the gift. I replace Jankélévitch's offended with transcendence/transcending/the transcendent. The situating of silent forgiveness in the context of Farley's existential originary presence and the historical embodied person requires that the gift giver of silent forgiveness be transcendence/transcending/the transcendent as understood through the ecclesia. The infinite will of the person that Jankélévitch talks about becomes the limited will, a finite will constrained by its historical memory and its decisions directing it toward a desired future. The gift of silent forgiveness is impossible for the offended to give the offender. Silent forgiveness as a gift of over which neither the offended or offender have control. Transcendence/transcending/the transcendent manifests the co-intention of silent forgiveness freely, with none of the issues of the various types of pseudo-forgiveness used by Jankélévitch to uncover pure forgiveness.

What I find particularly interesting about this aspect of silent forgiveness is the level(s) at which it occurs. My example above shows an instance of the offender seeking forgiveness from the offended, opening the space for transcendence/transcending/the transcendent, God, to initiate silent forgiveness. Despite this, I contend that silent forgiveness primarily occurs at the existential level, therefore it is pre-conscious. Neither party may need to bring it to the concrete
level vis-à-vis words and conscious actions. This underscores another way in which this silent forgiveness is indeed silent.

Jankélévitch's argument that forgiveness creates a new reality supports my claim of the contingency of silent forgiveness at the concrete level of the determinate social world but in a different way. The mechanism for the creation of a new reality per Jankélévitch is the death of the self who forgives. The new reality is the new self that appears on the other side of the “death” of the self that experienced the effects of the transgression. With silent forgiveness, the creation of a new reality depends on the appearance of *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent*. Again, those involved may hold open a space for the appearance of *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent*, but they cannot force that appearance. Silent forgiveness is contingent.

And what happens in that space that is held open for silent forgiveness? What actually happens? The first event is the recognition by the individual(s) involved that their infinite will is constrained by their embodied, historical existence, making them unable to secure themselves against their own contingency. Kichijirō illustrates this when he argues that he could have been a good Christian if he had been born in another time, a time without persecution. When he was born, what was happening historically was beyond his control. He recognizes he is weak, which is why he continues to need Rodrigues to administer the sacrament of reconciliation. Rodrigues recognizes that when and where he was born and his experiences in Japan also dictate how he acts.

The second event is *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* enters the space created by the first event. In the case of Rodrigues, *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* meets Rodrigues' recognition of the contingency of his embodied, historical imagery and undergirds the possibility of its transformation via deep silence and the interplay of the
determinate and non-determinate realms of experience. Rodrigues experiences a change of understanding of *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent*, which leads to a new understanding of himself and others and of his ecclesia.

One result of this transformation is Rodrigues recognizing a mutuality with Kichijirō for the need for forgiveness. Rodrigues' intending of Kichijirō involved the presence and appresence of contingent images and understanding of who a Christian is. Those contingent images supported Rodrigues’ judgments of and actions toward Kichijirō, judgments and actions that become the matter for which Rodrigues seeks forgiveness from Kichijirō.

The result is Rodrigues and Kichijirō co-intending each other as contingent, embodied finite persons who will always need forgiveness because they continue to secure their selves through idolatry and flight, rather than mutual concern and obligation. On the other side of the silent forgiveness, Rodrigues engages in that mutual concern and obligation by hearing Kichijirō's confession and providing absolution. Kichijirō engages in mutual concern and obligation by serving Rodrigues in Rodrigues' new Japanese household.

Silent forgiveness as a co-intention, once initiated, is at the concrete level contingently maintained via *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* as well. The individuals within whom the co-intention has appeared recognize that they need the on-going action of *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* in their lives if they are going to continue to live in mutual concern for each other. Why? Very simply, they are embodied, historical persons living in a contingent universe where not only they, but others may choose to secure themselves through idolatry and flight. Past actions of mutual concern may be disrupted by idolatry and flight. Disrupted historical existence may once again overtake redemptive existence. Jankélevitch gets at this when he argues that neither evil nor good shall prevail indefinitely.
But the contingent maintenance of the silent forgiveness by the *transcendence*/*transcending*/*the transcendent* counters Jankélévitch's position that forgiveness is an event that appears and disappears in an instant. The imagery that I employ to explain this difference is that of the tension between *kairos* and *chronos*. *Kairos* and *chronos* happen at the same time but are different experiences. The initiation of silent forgiveness occurs in kairotic time, which embodied, historical persons can only experience as an instant; here, then gone, as Jankélévitch argues. Yet *transcendence*/*transcending*/*the transcendent*, once it acts, can choose to continue to act within the individuals if the individuals, in their chronological time, hold open that space for the inbreaking of kairotic time. Even so, *transcendence*/*transcending*/*the transcendent* does not have to act, underscoring the contingency of silent forgiveness.

The fact that *transcendence*/*transcending*/*the transcendent* does not have to act raises an important issue regarding who and what might be involved in silent forgiveness. If I claim that the contingent universe requires a non-contingent *transcendence*/*transcending*/*the transcendent*—linking the creation and maintenance of the universe and its inherent contingency to the will of the non-contingent *transcendence*/*transcending*/*the transcendent*—the relationship between an individual and *transcendence*/*transcending*/*the transcendent* requires the co-intention of silent forgiveness. The individual forgives *transcendence*/*transcending*/*the transcendent* for having the freedom to not act on the individual's behalf even though the individual needs *transcendence*/*transcending*/*the transcendent* if she is to secure herself from her contingency. *Transcendence*/*transcending*/*the transcendent* forgives the individual for attempting to secure herself through idolatry and flight. This point is important for the aspect of silent forgiveness with which I engage next.
Here I wish to explore more deeply the co-intention aspect of silent forgiveness. In my definition of silent forgiveness above, I state that it is a co-intention that involves the presence and appresence of a relationship. This is a relationship of three: transcendence/transcending/the transcendent and the two individuals. Each individual appresents transcendence/transcending/the transcendent, themself, and the other in a particular way. In the co-intention of silent forgiveness, the individuals appresent themselves as historical, embodied human beings who choose how to secure their insecure and vulnerable existential originary presences. They understand that they can choose to secure their originary presences through idolatry and flight or through obligation and freedom. Their experiences point out that at times, their choice will be idolatry and flight; at other times, their choice will be obligation and freedom. They understand that an individual needs transcendence/transcending/the transcendent if they are to choose mutual concern and to learn how to act in obligation and freedom. They appresent transcendence/transcending/the transcendent as the source of security and the source of this very co-intention. They accept that the other is neither better nor worse than they and that all need transcendence/transcending/the transcendent to continue in mutual concern and obligation.

The individuals also recognize that there is a dimension to their relationships with the transcendence/transcending/the transcendent that benefits from silent forgiveness as well. As I argued above, silent forgiveness can also be a co-intention between an individual and transcendence/transcending/the transcendent. Indeed, if silent forgiveness is to be efficacious, an individual must accept contingency as her mode of being, otherwise she could not be in relationship with transcendence/transcending/the transcendent and with another individual. Relationality requires silent forgiveness.
This aspect of silent forgiveness—the presence and appresence of a relationship between \textit{transcendence/transcending/the transcendent} and individuals which precedes and creates the space for silent forgiveness—is itself silent. It necessarily occurs at the level of existential originary presence, which precedes and creates the embodied, historical individuals and their actions in the universe. Why? Because the individual can only think \textit{transcendence/transcending/the transcendent} through narratives and images. These narratives and images are themselves contingent because they are accretions of history, contingent on a finite understanding, or a limited predicative domain (to use Dauenhauer).

We see this, as noted above, with Rodrigues. He comes to Japan with images and a narrative of Jesus Christ, the Catholic faith, martyrdom, and the Japanese people based on the geographic location, history, culture, and time of his birth and upbringing. Shūsaku deftly highlights Rodrigues' images and narratives, challenging them through the structure of the Japanese peasants' church; the Japanese peasants' understanding of God, Paradiso, martyrdom, and community; the presence, appearance, and actions of Kichijirō; the apostasy of Ferreira; Inoue's observations; God's silence; and, eventually, the apparent voice of Jesus Christ urging Rodrigues to step on the fumie. For \textit{transcendence/transcending/the transcendent} to remain beyond the images and narratives built with historical, embodied concepts and words—those of the predicative domain—there must be silence so that \textit{transcendence/transcending/the transcendent} remains in the pre-predicative domain.

But persons require the predicative domain of signs and symbols to live together. It is this reality that grounds Farley's assertion that ecclesia serves as the source of the signs and symbols of redemptive existence. As noted above, Rodrigues’ ecclesia engendered certain narratives and images about what it meant to be a missionary, to be zealous to do God's work, to be a martyr,
work within the structures of the Roman Catholic church and faith, to live out redemptive existence. The ecclesia of the Japanese peasants provided different narratives and images. How the Japanese worked out redemptive existence in terms of the structure of the Roman Catholic church and their faith differed due to the historical circumstances in which they lived. Inoue and Ferreira both push Rodrigues to recognize this, suggesting that the historical ecclesia of Ferreira and Rodrigues' faith is not the same historical ecclesia as the Japanese peasants, despite the same name. But I see Ferreira and Inoue as foils to Rodrigues and Kichijirō regarding this point.

I suggest that one can read Shūsaku’s portrayal of Ferreira and Inoue's misreading of that difference in a way congruent with Farley's position. They see the historical, concrete level of the Roman Catholic faith, its ecclesia, as the whole of the Roman Catholic faith. When Roman Catholicism at a historical, concrete level is practiced differently, Inoue and Ferreira can only see these ecclesiae as actual separate faiths, rather than the historical, concrete expressions of a common existential originary level involving the move to redemptive existence.

The experiences of the Japanese peasants, Kichijirō, Ferreira, and Rodrigues himself challenge the narrative and images of Rodrigues' ecclesia. In a sense, those experiences silence the narrative and images of Rodrigues' ecclesia, leaving open a silent space within which the action of silent forgiveness via *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* rises from the existential originary level to the conscious, concrete level captured by the images and narratives of the predicative domain.

Rodrigues' predicative language based on his ecclesia failed and it was only through both his and Jesus Christ's silence to that point that it was possible for an appearance of *transcendence/transcending/the transcendent* as the voice of Jesus Christ coming from the fumie to demonstrate that an existing historical ecclesia may not capture in full what redemptive
existence can look like on the concrete, historical level. Embodied, historical language used to conceptualize redemptive existence and faith in transcendence/transcending/the transcendent is contingent. It never fully captures the transcendence/transcending/the transcendent. In this recognition, individuals from different ecclesiae can turn toward each other in humility, seeking forgiveness for imposing their contingent, historically embodied understandings on the other, whose experience of transcendence/transcending/the transcendent is subject to the same finite predicative language developed out of historical, contingent experience.

My diagnosis is that this is what occurs with Rodrigues and Kichijirō. They, at the end of Silence, have turned to each other in silent forgiveness. Shūsaku symbolizes this through the ever-receding narrative of the novel itself. Shūsaku, and by extension Rodrigues and Kichijirō, forgoes using words, stories, images. Instead, as some of the ending reports note, they live in anonymous mutual concern for each other. They recognize the contingency of both themselves and the stories and images used to narrate their lives. In that recognition of contingency and one's inability to secure oneself, they freely accept that they need transcendence/transcending/the transcendent, their God. This acceptance takes shape in their freely turning to each other in mutual concern.

**Martyrdom and Silent Forgiveness: Initial Claims**

I now turn to my claims about martyrdom and silent forgiveness. Of what importance is my identification and description of the phenomenon of silent forgiveness to the phenomenon of martyrdom? Within the historical ecclesia of Christianity, martyrdom has been understood to be the eminent way of embodying Jesus Christ in his historical, concrete existence and his faith in his God, Yahweh. Jesus' sacrifice of his life, his violent crucifixion, is that which redeems.
From the time of Jesus's crucifixion, countless Christians suffered the same and similarly agonizing deaths. Their martyrdoms became symbols of their faith, and their lives became narratives from which those after them drew strength and courage. This narrative of strength and courage and the often grotesques and bloody images of martyrdom accompanying the narrative are found in Western art throughout the past 2,000 years.

I suggest that through *Silence*, Shūsaku is asking us to consider martyrdom more closely. Is the typical understanding of martyrdom, the silencing of the physical body, the only one operative in the Christian faith? This is exactly the image and narrative of martyrdom that attracts and fascinates Rodrigues. It underlies his disgust with Ferreira and Kichijirō since they have apostatized rather than be martyred. He desires this type of martyrdom, yet he, too, apostatizes.

Is the apostatizing that he does also a type of martyrdom? A martyrdom of not the physical body but of the self within the body? A martyrdom that requires the sacrifice of the certainty I have not only about who I am and how I will act, but the certainty I have about who others are and how they will act? Indeed, about how the universe, about how *transcendence*/*transcending/the transcendent* will act? A martyrdom understandable only through the phenomenon of silent forgiveness? In support of my line of inquiry, I turn to Shūsaku’s climatic scene in *Silence*. Shūsaku makes the authorial choice to refer to Rodrigues not by his name, but by the generic phrase the priest, and where Rodrigues and the reader must grapple with the understanding of martyrdom and apostasy.

**Rodrigues and Ferreira**

Recall that the scene begins with Ferreira confronting the priest, who is being asked to apostatize. The priest refuses. He invokes martyrdom in the traditional sense discussed above by
stating that apostatizing was worse than letting the peasants suffer and die. They, as martyrs, would receive the reward of eternal joy. Ferreira challenges the priest's response by calling the priest's refusal to apostatize a weakness. The priest rejects Ferreira's assertion about his refusal: "My weakness? …What do you mean? It's because I believe in the salvation of these people."³

Ferreira interjects:

You make yourself more important than them. You are preoccupied with your own salvation. If you say that you will apostatize, those people will be taken out of the pit. They will be saved from suffering. And you refuse to do so. It's because you dread to betray the Church. You dread to be the dregs of the Church, like me…Yet I was the same as you. On that cold, black night I, too, was as you are now. And yet is your way of acting love? A priest ought to live in imitation of Christ. If Christ were here…certainly Christ would have apostatized for them.⁴

The scene concludes:

The priest raises his foot. In it he feels a dull, heavy pain…He will now trample on what he has considered the most beautiful thing in his life, on what he has believed most pure, on what is filled with the ideals and the dreams of man…And then the Christ in bronze speaks to the priest: 'Trample! Trample! I more than anyone know of the pain in your foot. Trample! It was to be trampled on by men that I was born into this world. It was to share men's pain that I carried my cross.' The priest placed his foot on the fumie. Dawn broke. And far in the distance the cock crew.⁵

No physical martyrdom has occurred. The priest is alive. But has not something died?

Has not something been martyred? To address these questions, I turn to the closing dialogue between Rodrigues and Kichijirō.


⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., 183.
Rodrigues and Kichijirō

At the beginning of the novel, the concrete life-world of Rodrigues's faith is the Portuguese Roman Catholic ecclesia into which he was born. It is an ecclesia that understands transcendence/transcending/the transcendent as a triune God who calls each person to share the good news of Christianity: faith in Jesus Christ makes redemptive existence possible. Therefore, one must maintain faith in Jesus Christ, even if it means persecution and death. This is the narrative that shaped Rodrigues' understanding of martyrdom as the preeminent expression of one's faith.

Rodrigues' relationship with Kichijirō throws Rodrigues' understanding into relief. Kichijirō had already apostatized prior to meeting Rodrigues and his companion. It was the reason why Kichijirō ends up in the position to be a guide for Rodrigues and his companion. Once in Japan, while Rodrigues and his companion are ministering to Japanese, Kichijirō approaches Rodrigues for the sacrament of reconciliation, which Rodrigues administers. This cycle—Kichijirō asking for reconciliation, Rodrigues administering reconciliation, Kichijirō once again apostatizing—occurs several more times. Rodrigues' attitude toward Kichijirō ranges from ridicule to anger to hatred to resignation. Juxtaposed against Kichijirō's actions is the sufferings and torture of the Japanese Christians who refuse to apostatize, as well as Rodrigues' creeping doubts about whether his understanding and commitment to his faith will hold up under these ongoing experiences. Recall, too, Kichijirō’s own confession to weakness of heart and Rodrigues’ contemplation of Kichijirō as he had been when they traveled to Kichijirō’s village.
He was "the popular man among his fellow Christians. If there had been no persecution, this fellow would undoubtedly have lived out his life as a happy, good humored Christian man."\textsuperscript{6}

When Rodrigues and Kichijirō meet again after Rodrigues has trampled, Rodrigues is now Okada San'emon, a name taken from a dead Japanese man and given to Rodrigues by Inoue. In addition to the name, Rodrigues also has the man's home and the man's wife. He has been stripped of all that made him who he was. Despite this, Kichijirō begs Rodrigues to hear his confession and Rodrigues does so. With this the main narrative of the story ends. Two sections of diary entries comprise the remainder of the novel. From the entries we learn that Kichijirō becomes a faithful attendant to Rodrigues, until Rodrigues dies at age 64.\textsuperscript{7}

What has happened between Rodrigues and Kichijirō and how might it address the question of another type of martyrdom? I propose that Rodrigues and Kichijirō have experienced silent forgiveness: \textit{transcendence/transcending/the transcendent} (in this case, Jesus Christ of the triune Christian God) initiated a co-intention (through a mix of silence and interpersonal confrontations that exposed the contingency of existing knowledge and the necessity of obligation to others) that resulted in both Rodrigues and Kichijirō accepting their contingency and relinquishing their acts of self-determination. For Rodrigues, it was an idol in the form of his certainty about himself and how a Christian should live. For Kichijirō, it was flight from the obligation to care for others.

This opens the space for them to choose lives characterized by freedom and obligation. Rodrigues is free from not only the idol of certainty but also the concern he had about being

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., 175.

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 207-208.
scorned by other Christians. Evidence for his acceptance is his response to Kichijirō's request for the sacrament of reconciliation, a sacrilege in the eyes of the Roman Catholic Church in which he grew up.

Might not silent forgiveness so described be a type of martyrdom? A type of kenosis, an emptying of a self that attempts to secure itself, so that in that vacated space a new self, a new relationship, a new intention/co-intention might appear? In doing so, the self acts out of freedom and obligation toward all other contingent beings. This is what the Christian God, incarnated as Jesus Christ, did.

**Conclusion**

I draw this dissertation to a close in four ways. First, a return to my initial wagers regarding silent forgiveness as an existential phenomenon. Second, in turning to the role of forgiveness in large scale issues, where might we go wrong if we do not take seriously the phenomenon of silent forgiveness as presented. Third, how silent forgiveness as a matrix of conditions makes a positive contribution to large scale issues. Fourth, my attempt to look at one large scale issue in relation to the phenomenon of silent forgiveness.

Through the work in the preceding chapters and in the specific applications of my arguments to the contents of my personal vignette and the novel *Silence* in this chapter, I have presented cards in support of my wager that there is a phenomenon that can be called silent forgiveness. I have provided a description of silent forgiveness as an existential phenomenon capable of appearing in any number of ways. This description pushes back against proposals for a normative structure of forgiveness and against claims that there are existential situations that are unforgivable.
The dangers of adhering to a too formal or normative structure of forgiveness have already been made evident through Jankélévitch’s work. Under his characterization, the Holocaust is unforgiveable. The past has destroyed future. The destruction of the Holocaust shall continue to unfold in perpetuity through the disrupted determinate social worlds and intersubjective intentions/co-intentions that have resulted from the original acts. That this is the case should put us on alert for other approaches to forgiveness/attempts to right past wrongs that cannot meet the dynamic, contingent, emergent nature of reality and relationships. The stance that forgiveness can only occur once justice has been achieved is an example. Another example is that of Derrida, who, echoing some of Jankélévitch’s positions on forgiveness, asserts that forgiveness is not humanly possible since its object is the unforgivable. Forgiveness would be for “radical evil and have nothing to do with reconciliation, healing, remorse or repentance.”

Contrast these approaches to forgiveness to the matrix of conditions and agencies comprising silent forgiveness. That matrix results in a spectrum of configurations of silent forgiveness capable of addressing transgressions occurring at the various strata of the human person (including humanbeing), occurring between various individuals and populations, occurring along timelines of various duration, occurring through various types of actions and inactions. The matrix of conditions and agencies of silent forgiveness may shift—both in components as well as how those components interact—based on the “realm” of transgression.

The realm of my opening vignette was the interpersonal realm. Not understood as such at the time, but now, when considered through my arguments, the matrix of conditions and agencies involved in that experience of silent forgiveness included:

---

8 Richard Kearney, “Forgiveness at the Limit: Impossible or Possible?” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 82 (2009), 85.
• a change to a host of conscious and subconscious intersubjective (quasi) intentions/co-intentions that were a product of my determinate social world (how I “intended” the way a relationship between two adults should unfold being foremost; how I understood my community member’s actions; how I perceived what was possible for a relationship)

• an expression of finitude (my own voicing that I didn’t know how to forgive)

• a duration of time away from the relationship

• a duration to the change in how I related to my community member after I returned from Christmas vacation

• a variety of silences (my choice to not express my frustration directly to my community member; silence around how the change in my intentions/co-intentions came to be)

Recall, my community member was making statements and claims about the “right” way to be/to act. I rejected that she had the standing to make such statements. At the same time, I considered myself in the wrong for being so judgmental. Yet, I experienced helplessness and futility when it came to “forgiving” my community member. I could not “imagine” things being any different. I threw up my hands. In doing so, I recognized my own finitude; I was at my limit. In reflecting back on the experience, I see this as a moment that unconsciously opened a space for the working of transcendance/transcending/the transcendent. In deep silence, the field of the nondeterminate was active, reconfiguring my intersubjective intentions/co-intentions so that when I returned from my Christmas vacation, my conscious relationship with her was irrevocably changed; the past did not destroy the future.
What might the matrix of silent forgiveness involve if the realm is not the realm of relationships between individuals but the realm of people as peoples: institutions, histories, cultures, nations. Shūsaku’s *Silence* provides such a realm. My interrogation of the various relationships within the novel and of martyrdom above uncovers Rodrigues confronting the realm of his Portuguese Christianity and the history and culture of the Japanese. He did not set out to do this and the novel ends in an ambiguous silence that requires the reader to decide for herself the nature and extent of forgiveness that takes place. My argument is that silent forgiveness did take place, and that I can draw from the novel a matrix of conditions and agencies that comprise that silent forgiveness.

In terms of agencies, certainly Rodrigues had agency in that he chose to go to Japan, he chose to face martyrdom, he chose to trust various individuals. Yet his is not the only agency that contributes to the matrix. There is the agency of the Japanese, both Christian and non-Christian. There is the agency of Kichijirō, Inoue, Garrpe, Ferreira. But silence suffuses the other conditions of the matrix, only coming to light upon reflection. They include:

- inescapability—Rodrigues was forced to confront his conception of Christianity and of martyrdom as conceived through his Portuguese culture, upbringing, history
- reconfiguration of identity—Rodrigues had to abandon one identity (the heroic, Catholic priest saving the souls of the oppressed Japanese peasants and clearing the name of his former teacher) for another (the head of a Japanese household that includes the person who betrayed him)
- sacrifice of honored ideas, understandings, plans of the past (the Portuguese Christianity and its notion of martyrdom)
- reconfiguration/redirection of one’s past endeavors toward new goals/new relationships/new future (there is a new shape to Rodrigues’ service and relationships, i.e., with Kichijirō)
- lack of control and finitude (Rodrigues cannot control all the factors of his life)
- lack of an external marker of change/conversion (Rodrigues’ conversion occurs over time and in silence; at no time in the novel does he say to his Portuguese culture/Christianity, “I forgive you”; even the speech acts of “I forgive you” to Kichijirō as part of the sacrament of reconciliation are not what “cause” the forgiveness)
- unintelligibility by those outside the experience (Rodrigues thinks about how those in Portugal will condemn him as an apostate, just like he condemned Ferreira)
- ineffability (Shūsaku models this through the deliberate structuring of the novel’s last chapters as diary entries of an outsider who can only note certain facts and convey what they experience through their own words and symbols)

The value of Shūsaku’s *Silence* to my project also lies in the image it provides of a forgiveness beyond justice. There is no external justice for Rodrigues, Kichijirō, or the Japanese Christians at the end of the novel. Rodrigues is still a captive of the Japanese government, still a priest that stepped on the *fumie*, making him in the eyes of those around him an apostate. Kichijirō and any other Japanese Christian are still forbidden from practicing their faith in the open. They must still undergo regular acts of apostasy, judgement, and punishment if suspected of believing in Christ. Rodrigues still “turns in” Christianity through his work inspecting items coming into the country. The just bulleted elements that I believe give rise to silent forgiveness
in the novel believes that place forgiveness in the arena of the impossible, or that forgiveness only occurs after the work of justice has been done, or that forgiveness requires a speech act. As a phenomenon arising out of a dynamic matrix that meets the existential situation, silent forgiveness is a phenomenon of possibility, of hope.

With these examples of two different matrices of silent forgiveness in front of us, I bring this dissertation to an end by posing the question of how silent forgiveness as a matrix of conditions and agencies that support the hope that the past does not destroy the future might address a large-scale social issue. Let us consider racism. Using the terms of this dissertation, racism is type of determinate intersubjectivity that involves intentions and co-intentions that constitute those not of one’s own race as less than, lacking the same inherent dignity and rights that one claims for oneself. That determinate intersubjectivity, along with its intentions and co-intentions, arose out of the choices made by individuals over time, resulting in structures, laws, codes that perpetuate the original actions. Those structures, laws, and codes constitute a determinate social world that understands itself as true and the way things are to be.

If the agencies and conditions noted above comprise a matrix supporting an appearance of the phenomenon of silent forgiveness, how might that inform how the transgressions of racism at various levels—individual to individual, group to group, nation to nation—are approached? It suggests to me that the following may be key considerations.

- Experiences of and reflections on one’s own lack of control, finitude, contingency and that of one’s determinate social world
- Experiences of encounter with the target group, their culture, their creativity, and their lack of control, their finitude, their contingency
- Openness to the imagination, to the possibility of transcendence
Recognition of the role signs and symbols have in creating our understanding of ourselves and the world and that we are the ones who create those signs and symbols.

I take a moment here to recognize that there exist programs that do just these things, so this is not the constructive part of my work. The constructive part is supporting these activities by surfacing the underlying aspects of humanbeing that lead to racism (transcendental openness, contingency, freedom and obligation related to self-determination, role of determinate intersubjectivity and its attendant intentions/co-intentions, development of signs and symbols necessary for communication and shared understanding) in the first place and showing how those same aspects support and manifest the phenomenon of silent forgiveness, named as such. Silent forgiveness at work may silently give rise to new intentions and co-intentions that spur a racist to reject her way of interacting with those of another race, perhaps even lead her to ask for forgiveness of those she has wronged. She may come to understand herself as having transgressed her obligation to let others exercise self-determination.

In a similar way, silent forgiveness may address the determinate intersubjectivity of the person hurt by racism. A matrix of encounters and agency shift the intentions and co-intentions underlying his response to the racist. He may be able to forgive the repentant racist, he may be able to forgive the unrepentant racist yet work to dismantle racism through programs designed to shift determinate intersubjectivity.

Both may come to realize the impact that humanbeing’s struggle with its own contingency has on the choices each person makes in their attempts to secure themselves. They may come to realize the transgression they commit each time they reify the symbolic systems that allow them to conceptualize themselves, others, and the world around them. These
realizations may come, as Shūsaku depicts in *Silence*, as sometimes violent blows at the hands of another or circumstances beyond one’s control, or they may silently appear between the time one leaves for the Christmas holiday and the time one returns.

I have undertaken the work in this dissertation to assert that there is a phenomenon of silent forgiveness. I have offered an analysis and description of silent forgiveness. I have suggested what it might look like in the context of a larger social issue. Additional work is to be done regarding transgressions that present as unforgivable (Holocaust/any crime against humanity). Can silent forgiveness appear even in these situations? The value of my work on silent forgiveness is that, unlike other models of forgiveness, it does not cut off the possibility before the research begins. Silent forgiveness holds open a space of possibility, not a guarantee. But, in doing so, it substantiates a hope that the past has not destroyed the future.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


VITA

Catherine Buescher received her doctorate in Integrated Studies in Ethics and Theology from Loyola University Chicago in May 2024. Prior to entering the Department of Theology’s doctoral program at Loyola, she matriculated from Fordham University (M.A. in Theology, 2013) and Creighton University (B.S. in Elementary Education, summa cum laude, 1993). She has taught courses in Theology and provided graduate research assistance to the university’s Faculty Center for Ignatian Pedagogy and Center for Faculty Excellence. Prior to doctoral studies, Dr. Buescher worked in higher education administration at Fordham University and Saint Peter’s University.