The Philosophical Vocabulary of St. Thomas Aquinas in De Veritate I

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

IN DE VERITATE I

by

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VITA

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PREFACE

St. Thomas Aquinas himself would be the first to insist now, as he did in a well-known passage, that the purpose of the study of philosophy is not to learn what opinions men have held, but what is the truth about reality. Nevertheless, as a matter of actual fact it is a great help toward attaining the truth to be able to take advantage of the accumulated philosophical experience of mankind, and particularly of the recorded statements of the admittedly great thinkers of the remote and recent past. So true is this that, if the fact be noted, in a great many philosophical discussions, when we attempt to solve a problem about reality we find it advisable and even necessary to avail ourselves of the added help afforded by such thinkers as Aristotle or St. Thomas. But immediately the problem becomes, just what did Aristotle say? or, just what did Aquinas mean when he said this or that? Consequently, any work which will facilitate our study of the meaning of St. Thomas' philosophical language will be a great help ultimately in our pursuit of the truth about things, that is, of philosophy itself.

The existence of many works testifies to this fact. Not a few men have thought it worth their while to compile some sort of lexicon or glossary of the terminology of philosophical writers, especially that of St. Thomas. Most notable, perhaps, is that of Dr. Ludwig Schütz, whose Thomas-Lexicon was compiled first from the two Summas and later from the other works of St. Thomas.

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1In De Coelo et Mundo I, lect.22.
Thomas. Whatever be its excellence in comparison with the present offering, it has the disadvantage of being in German, besides being ill-adapted for comparative study between the terminology of the different works of St. Thomas and study of chronological development in the use of terms such as is afforded by dictionaries prepared from individual works, and lastly it cannot hope to account for every occurrence of a term as does the present work. The great Du Gange Glossarium Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis is of little value to students of St. Thomas, for it practically ignores him. Other works, such as N. Signoriello, Lexicon Peripateticum Philosophico-Theologicum, and George Reeb, S.J., Thesaurus Philosophorum, treat of axioms and distinctions rather than of the precise meaning of terms. Moreover, the last three mentioned all include other writers than St. Thomas and hence are not truly representative of his characteristic terminology. Similar difficulties occur in connection with such works as that of Jos. Zama Mellinio, Lexicon Scholasticorum Verborum, and the various lists in the edition of the Summa Theologica edited by Xavier Faucher, O.P. There are a few other glossaries prepared for certain other works of St. Thomas, but nothing on De Veritate I.

Since none of the above-mentioned works is in English, they are of little

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Weger, Brixinae, 1871, 421 pp.

S. Thomae Aquinatis Summa Theologica, Marietti, Taurini, 1928 (not in earlier editions), VI, "ex editione Patavina, 1712."

Editio Altera, Lethielleux, 1924, V.
use to a large number of American students interested in St. Thomas. There is in preparation at the present time in another American university a glossary of the complete works of St. Thomas. This will lack the advantages of dictionaries for each separate work, as discussed above, and involves a different procedure than that used in the preparation of this work. Furthermore, since it is being undertaken by the classics department of that university, it would seem to be linguistic rather than philosophical. It is impossible to settle the precise meaning of St. Thomas' terms on linguistic grounds alone, since the precise meaning of each term depends on the philosophical context and hence requires such knowledge of the philosophy of St. Thomas as will make the context clear. Moreover, a knowledge of the history of medieval philosophy can be shown to be very important in the preparation of such a glossary.

There is only one translation of De Veritate I published in English. The small glossary at the end of that volume is not only not confined to the language of St. Thomas, but the poor rendering of many of the terms in the translation makes it suspect; to give but two examples, "comparatio" is translated "comparison" when the obvious meaning is "relation," and "pertingit ad" is translated "pertains to" when the obvious meaning is "arrives at" or "attains to."

8 Ibid., 182.
9 Ibid., 232.
The burden of this present undertaking, then, was to develop a technique for the detailed study of St. Thomas' use of philosophical terms in a given work, and to apply it to the first of his Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate. The results of this task are presented in the form of a dictionary in which is laid down the meaning of some 321 terms as used by St. Thomas in that work, with appropriate comments as occasioned. (It will be seen that almost any one of these words could form the subject of a research task of doctorate proportions.) The chief values of the procedure used are that every occurrence of the word being studied is accounted for, and the exclusive use of just one work of St. Thomas makes the present work of value to later students who may wish to do comparative study either with other works of St. Thomas or with later scholastic terminology.

Although the use of the term in other works of St. Thomas as well as the works of subsequent philosophers and critics have been taken into account and occasionally noted, the primary source of information has been, in keeping with the foregoing comments and criticisms, the context of De Veritate I itself with reference to the exact thought of St. Thomas as developed in that work. That such intensive attention to a philosophical text, not from the viewpoint of textual criticism or paleography or linguistics but with the primary aim of philosophical meaning always in view, has been of real profit to a student of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas can be put down as a matter of recorded fact.

Sincere acknowledgment is due to the Rev. John J. Wellmuth, S.J., chair-
man of the Philosophy Department of Loyola University, whose help and guidance at every stage of this work have been invaluable.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE DE VERITATE

CHAPTER I

CIRCUMSTANCES AND DATE OF ITS COMPOSITION

Henry Denifle, O.P., the great authority on documentary sources for the history of the University of Paris during the time of St. Thomas Aquinas, makes the remark in a note in the Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis\(^1\) that the old lives of St. Thomas agree about one date if about nothing else: St. Thomas was made a magister in theology at the University of Paris in the year 1256. This is important, because it clinches beyond all doubt the dating of the Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate. For biographers, historians, and critical scholars are in unanimous agreement that the work was the fruit of his first years of teaching at the University of Paris, immediately after he was advanced to the magisterium.

The oldest sources for the life of St. Thomas are in remarkable agreement on the facts of these years of St. Thomas's life and work. A study of the writings of William of Tocco, Bernard Guido, and Peter Calo reveals that St. Thomas was made licentiate in theology in the early months of 1256, and master later in that same year.\(^2\)


Lucca was a disciple of St. Thomas and a church historian who died in the year 1327. In his life of St. Thomas he says, "Post hoc, ipso magistrato, fecit Questiones de Veritate. Post tres annos magisterii sui redit in Itali- am..." Another early biographer, Bartholomew of Capua (Logotheta), a Sicilian who as a student followed the lectures of St. Thomas, dates the De Veritate as being written after St. Thomas was made master and during his first period of teaching at Paris, before going to Italy in 1259. The English Dominican Nicholas Trevet, who died in 1328, made a catalogue of the works of St. Thomas between the years 1319 and 1323, in which he notes that St. Thomas "scripsit etiam primam partem de Quaestionibus disputatis de Veritate et ultra, quas Parisiis disputavit." 

The older historians, following these sources, tell us that the young Thomas came to Paris in 1252 from the school of Albert the Great at Cologne, and spent the years 1252-1256 as a bachelor in theology in Paris. Although they agree that he was made master in 1256, there seems to be good evidence that the formal inceptio by which he was recognized as a master by the faculty of the University of Paris did not take place until October, 1257. This is the opinion of J. Echard in his life of St. Thomas, of the church historian

4Alexander Birkenmajer, "Kleinere Thomasfragen," Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 1921, XXXIV, 32.
5Mandonnet, Des Ecrits Authentiques, 47-48.
Fleury, of John Francis Bernard Maria de Rubeis, O.P., and of Ueberweg. Since all agree that he left for Italy in 1259, Quaestio I of the De Veritate was almost certainly written in 1257. The editors of the Vivès edition, however, say "1257 Parisiis...Laurea donatus, ab anno 1258 ad annum sequentem Questiones de Veritate...scripsit." (The fact mentioned by the Bollandists in the Acta Sanctorum, that St. Thomas was made doctor of theology in the year 1253, must not be confused with his being made magister at the University of Paris, for the doctorate was always previous even to the licentiate in those days, and in this case was probably granted by the Dominican Order rather than by the University.)

The most recent investigations confirm these conclusions. Dr. Martin Grabmann in his Thomas von Aquin states that St. Thomas received his licentiate in 1256 and left Paris in 1259, and in his latest work on Die Werke des Hl. Thomas von Aquin he makes these the outside dates for the writing of the De Veritate. Pierre Mandonnet, O.P., in the latest expression of his mind on the subject dates the De Veritate I as somewhere in the year 1256-

7Dissertationes Criticae etc. (Pasquali, Venetiis, 1750, Dissertatio XI, caput ii), S. Thomas Aquinatis Opera (ed. Leonina), Romæ, 1882, I, clxxv.
10Martii, I, "Commentarius praevius," 657b.
11F. Pustet, München, 1926, 3-5.
12Aschendorff, Münster, 1931, 276, 280.
A most recent summary (1939) of the investigations on the subject lays down the following chronology:

1252-1256 Parisiis, Baccalaureus
1256 Obtenta licentia, fit magister in theologia
1257 a collegiis magister agnoscitur
1259 in Italiwm reedit.

and states that the disputed questions _De Veritate_ date at the outside from 1256 to 1259. From all this we gather that it is quite safe to assign the year 1257 as the extremely probable date for the first question, for it is certain that St. Thomas was at work on them by that time and it is highly probable that he at least did not progress very far during 1256.

It must be noted that the controversies which raged for some time in the various European learned periodicals between Grabmann, J. Koch, Mandonnet, P. Synave, O.P., and others regarding the chronology of the disputed questions does not touch the date of the _De Veritate_ at all, but centers rather around the dating of _De Anima_, _De Spiritualibus Creaturis_, and _De Unione Verbi Incarnati_. A good idea of these discussions can be obtained from the reviews in the _Bulletin Thomiste_ for 1924 and 1926. All the authorities, as well as all of the old catalogues, especially two "book lists" of the

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14 Walz, _op. cit._, 470.

15 Ibid.

University of Paris dating from 1275-1286 and 1292-1294 respectively, assure us that the De Veritate is the first of the disputed questions of St. Thomas.

The historical facts being established, it remains to interpret them in terms of their setting. The De Veritate represents the work of St. Thomas during a relatively early period in his productive career. But he was by this time no novice in the realm of philosophy and theology. He had been commenting on Peter the Lombard's books of Sentences since 1252 and had committed the fruits of this teaching to writing. He had composed some seven or eight small philosophical works, including the De Ente et Essentia. He was by then a veteran of the battle which grew out of the antagonism which the secular clergy and laity of the University of Paris had shown toward the new Order of Preachers; as his own share in the controversy he had contributed the Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem. Now with William of St. Amour condemned and his own Order vindicated by the Pope, Aquinas began to teach as a master of theology in one of the two Dominican colleges which by that time had been incorporated into the University of Paris.

This meant a very active engagement in the public scholastic life of that violently intellectual atmosphere. For in the Paris of that day school meant more than dull classroom routine. In the twelfth century a question arising out of the interpretation of scripture or some author, usually Peter the Lombard, had formed the basis of the lecture of the master. This easily

17Denifle-Chatelain, Chart. Univ. Paris., I, 646.

18J. Echard, Vita Santi Thomae, uses the expression, "Facatis tandem rebus laurea donatus questiones de veritate disputavit..." loc. cit., x.
turned into a discussion or dispute. The dispute finally detached itself from the lesson and became a separate exercise in its own right, being known as the "ordinary disputation." Every master in theology at Paris had to put on several of these ordinary disputations a year. According to Mandonnet and Synave St. Thomas held them as often as twice a week. Pelster¹⁹ and Birkenmajer²⁰ disagree with the methods used to arrive at that conclusion, but only, it would seem, in order to dispute about the chronology of some of the later Quaestiones Disputatæ. At any rate, he certainly held them oftener than a few times a year.

The subject was fixed in advance, and was usually confined to a single topic although more than one might be discussed if they were related. All the classes of the other bachelors and masters ceased for that morning, and we may imagine with what curiosity they flocked to the disputation hall of the brilliant young disciple of the Aristotelian Albert, already making a name for himself. At this session, however, the magister only presided; he might summarize and otherwise help, but the bachelors did the arguing. The next day, or the first day on which nothing prevented, there followed the magisterial "determination," the formal recapitulation and pronouncement of the master upon the subject of the previous disputation. Bachelors could not "determine," this being the sole right of the master, though the preliminary arguments which he presented were usually those proposed by the


bachelors the day before. The Quaestiones Disputatae as we have them are the written form, then, not of the disputation but of the determinatio of the master. 21 Each article of the present form represents one such determination. We possess 510 of these written by St. Thomas, of which 253 are under the general title De Veritate, though only twelve are included under the first question which really forms the treatise bearing that name.

These disputations with their magisterial determinations gave St. Thomas a chance to work out at great length and in a controversial atmosphere much of what he was later to set forth more positively and succinctly in the two Summas. They do not, it is true, represent his best period, namely that from 1268 (when he got hold of certain material in translation from the Greek) until his death in 1274. Yet they do form an important part of his writings, being often his fullest treatment of a topic. The De Veritate shows a decisiveness and a firmness of touch not observed in the commentaries on the Sentences. The problems essayed are difficult, the manner of their treatment profound and skillful. Since in them historical background is more prominent than in the Summa Theologica, they reflect better the doctrinal milieu in which he was working. The significance of this will come to fuller light in Chapter V of this introduction.

As might be surmised from the foregoing chapter, the authenticity of the De Veritate I is beyond all dispute. It is attested by the unanimity and forthright nature of the assertions of all the early chroniclers of St. Thomas's life and of all the early cataloguers of his works. A recent and thorough study by Jean A. Destrez, O.P., "La Texte de la Question Disputée 'De Veritate' de Saint Thomas d'après la tradition manuscrite"¹ assures us that the authenticity of this work is unquestionable, whether one examines the extant manuscripts of the text or the codices containing the old catalogues. Mandonnet in 1910 in his Des Ecrits Authentiques had quoted the catalogues of Nicholas Trevet, Ptolemy of Lucca, Bernard Guido, and the so-called "official" catalogue of the year 1319 (MSS. 3112 and 3113 lat., Bibliothèque nationale de Paris), and had declared that all the thirteen catalogues listed by him² leave no doubt as to the authenticity of the De Veritate I. An old price list of works sold by a stationer in Paris at prices fixed by the masters of the University in the years 1275-1286 gives us precise information about such details as the number of its pages and the price.³ The

¹Etudes Critiques sur les Oeuvres de Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Bibliothèque Thomiste, XVIII), Le Saulchoir, Kain, Belgique, 1933, 33-160.
³Denifle-Chatelain, Chart. Univ. Paris., I, 646.
Bollandists quote William of Tocco quite definitely on the point, and De Rubeis is no less certain. Birkenmajer assures us that the controversies between von Michelitsch and Grabmann on the "official" catalogue in no way involve the De Veritate. More recently, Synave has made a new study of this catalogue in comparison with others and confirmed our assurance as to the authenticity of the De Veritate, whatever question it may occasion concerning other works.

Fr. Pelster, S.J., reported in 1929 that he had found an autograph MS. of the De Veritate (Vat. lat. 781). This would put it along with one half of the Summa Contra Gentiles and parts of the commentaries on Boethius and Isaias in that very privileged group of works which we have in St. Thomas's own hand. Fr. Destrez, however, expressed rather strongly in 1933 his opinion that it was not an autograph, though it is evidently not in the hand of a professional copyist. He conjectures that it is probably that of some student of the time of St. Thomas or shortly after.

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9"Le Texte de la Question Disputée 'De Veritate'..." 105, note 2.
CHAPTER III

THE TEXT: PRINCIPAL EDITIONS

The text of the first question of the De Veritate does not present great difficulty. Destrez, in his work on the text of the De Veritate referred to in the last chapter, reports that there are 66 extant manuscripts. He lists them on pages 106-140, giving a full description and the location of each. They are deposited in universities and libraries all over Europe and date from the late thirteenth century on. He has personally examined 48 of the 66. He traces very carefully the history of the manuscript sources for the earliest printed editions of the work, and especially the Roman, or Pian, edition of 1570 from which all later ones stem. A summary criticism of his method of exemplaria and peciae and the reception which it got among reviewers, as well as ample references to the pertinent literature on the question, can be found in the Preface to the new Ottawa edition of the Summa.1 Since any actual consultation of the manuscripts is out of the question for the present, and since the results of his investigations bring no important changes to the part of the text involved in this work, the question is not as important here as the survey of what texts are actually available in this country.

In order to establish as sound as possible a text from which to elaborate

1S. Thomae de Aquino Summa Theologiae (ed. Institutii Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis), Stud. Gen. O. Pr., Ottawa, 1941, I, viii-x.
the dictionary, every available edition was carefully checked for possible
variant readings, as follows.

1. *Divi Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici, O.P.*, Opera Omnia,
Gratissi privilegiisque Pii V Pont. Max. typis excusa, ed. Vincentius
Justinianus et Thomas Manrique(s) (the title page has
Marrique(s), but this is probably a typographical error as Man
riques appears three distinct times on p. vii), Apud Julium
Accoltum, Romae 1570, 17 vols. in folio (some catalogues say
18, but the copy examined had only 17 and it is so listed in
the Prefaces to the Vivès and Parma editions).

De Veritate I is found in vol. XIII, pages 289-296 (each
number represents four folio columns, as every other page is
numbered). In article five it reads "ad sextum dicendum"
where all the others read "ad sextum et septimum dicendum,"
with the result that the reply to the eighth argument is en-
titled "ad septimum" and so forth for the rest of the article.

2. *Divi Thomae Aquinatis…Opera*, editio altera Veneta, cudebat
Simon Occhi, Venetiis, 1775-1788, 28 vols. in quarto. Contains
the Life of St. Thomas by Echard and the Dissertationes Criticae
of Jo. Fr. Bernard Maria De Rubeis. This edition seems to be
identical with that brought out apud Jos. Bettinelli, Venetiis,
1745-1788. This opinion is based on the absolute similarity of
paper, format, and printing, and upon the fact that in those days
such undertakings occasionally changed hands when one printer died or sold out.

De Veritate I is contained in volume XVI (1784), pages 124-147.


De Veritate I is in volume IX (1859), pages 5-22.


De Veritate I is in volume XIV (1875), pages 315-341.

5. S. Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones Disputatae ad fidem optimarum editionum diligenter recusae, sumptibus P. Lethielleux, Parisiis, 1884, 3 vols. in 12 mo. This edition is the same, except in arrangement of questions, as the following.


De Veritate I is in the first of the three 12 mo. volumes, pages 1-30.

7. S. Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones Disputatae, editio quinta
De Veritate I is here numbered Question XI (i.e., of all the disputed questions) and occupies pages 1-26 of volume III.

Thus every available edition of the De Veritate was examined; there are also extant those versions of the 1750 Roman edition printed at Venice in 1592-1594, at Antwerp in 1612, and at Paris in 1636-1641 and 1660,2 and a few editions mentioned by Ueberweg (op. cit., p. 422).

In only three places has there been sufficient difference in the readings to demand recognition in the construction of the dictionary itself. These will be discussed below. Some very minor and insignificant variations serve as clues to trace the relations between the various editions. Many of these editions state bluntly that they are based on the Roman edition of 1570. Examination of the others revealed that they likewise stemmed from it. Unfortunately, the editors of many of the editions keep it a dark secret upon what they based their text and how they emended it—"idem tenet silentium altissimum," as we find the Ottawa editors saying.3

The Venice edition of 1784 is based directly on the Roman edition, having only three minor variants. John Mary Allodi, the editor of the Parma edition, tells us that except for a few certain works, not including the De Veritate,

Pro aliis vero operibus universis adhibuimus

2Listed in the Vivès edition, I, xviii.
3Summa Theologiae, I, xix-xx.
The Parma edition does have minor variations in six places, three of which are the same as those of the Venice edition. The Lethielleux edition of 1884, the Mandonnet edition, which is admitted to simply reproduce it, and the Marietti edition all follow the Parma edition exactly. The Vivès edition is the only one of the six to vary at all notably from the Roman edition. The editors state that they have used the Parma text but checked it against four MSS. of the Bibliothèque nationale de Paris and adopted variant readings from them when they seemed justified. The fact that they strangely fail to identify the four Paris codices used except as A, B, C, and D presents little difficulty, for in the complete list of extant manuscripts which Destrez prints, only four MSS. are listed as in the Bibliothèque nationale de Paris. Due, evidently, to the influence of this added textual source, the Vivès edition varies in some fifteen minor places from the Roman. In summary, the relatively small number of discrepancies among the various editions, extremely few of which are attributable to anything but unimportant and obvious typographical errors, seems to indicate that the text for at least Question I is fundamentally sound.

Since the majority of the available editions followed the Roman edition

4 *Opera Omnia*, Parma ed., 1852, I, xii.
5 *Opera Omnia*, Vivès ed., 1871, I, xix.
6 "Le texte de la question disputée 'De Veritate'...", 124-126.
quite faithfully, and especially since the Parma, Mandonnet-Lethиelleux, and Marietti editions agree exactly, it was thought practical to use the most commonly available text, the Marietti, in the preparation of the dictionary, and to refer to it in the manner which is customary in referring to the Bekker pages of Aristotle's works. The Marietti differs from the Parma only in one place, an obvious typographical error, rendering "sensus" for "sensus" in 25a48 contrary to all six of the other editions examined.

As to the variant readings which seem of enough import to enter into this work, they are all instances in which one or more of the Paris MSS. used by the Vivès editors give a different reading from that in any of the printed editions. In 4b19 they read "personis" with codex B, in place of "personae"; correctly, it would seem, as noted under the word APPROPRIIO in the dictionary, infra. In 21a17 they read "aliquam" for "aliam" with all four of the codices to support them, and in so doing confirm the conjecture of the Venice editors in a footnote hoc loco, and copied by the Parma and Mandonnet editions in similar footnotes; this reading is accepted, as noted under the word RECTITUDO, infra. In 12b11 the Vivès editors again have all four codices as grounds for inserting "quamdam," as against all the printed editions; the manuscripts are probably correct because St. Thomas in similar contexts does use the expression "adaequationem quamdam," e.g., in 3b11. Lastly, in 21a35 they omit the word "exemplari" from the expression "de causa exemplari efficiens" with B, C, and D; this is no doubt correct, and the questionability of the word in the printed editions is further revealed by the fact that in
this single instance the Roman edition varies from all others by having "exemplaris," pointing to some corruption of the text because it makes no sense at all in the passage.
CHAPTER IV

OUTLINE OF ITS CONTENTS

The progression of ideas in the treatise is very deliberate. It is made up of twelve articles of varying lengths. St. Thomas begins by asking the age-old question, "What is truth?" and proceeds to answer it in the first article. Here he is careful to keep unentangled from subsequent questions, laying down the meaning of the bare notion of truth in its most basic and all-inclusive sense, "adaequatio rei et intellectus." The preliminary arguments consist largely of various definitions of truth taken from older philosophers; and in the body of the article, after explaining truth as a certain attribute of being itself, he is at pains to accept these definitions in some sense or other as agreeing with what he has said. He does not use the modern scholastic term "transcendental attribute," but he substantially conveys this idea, and he does say that being and true are convertible.

Having settled the notion of truth in general, he goes on in article two to refine more precisely the matter by asking "Whether truth is to be found chiefly in the intellect rather than in things?" He answers that truth is to be found as a primary and intrinsic analogue in the intellect, secondarily and by extrinsic denomination in things. He does not use the terms "logical" and "ontological truth."

In the third article he takes up the point made in the second article that truth is primarily in the intellect, and asks in more detail "Whether
truth is in the intellect compounding and dividing?" i.e., in the judging intellect. He answers that it is more properly in the intellect combining and separating, i.e., affirming and denying, than in the simple formation of intellectual quiddities; still less properly is it said of things, and lastly it is said of man who can speak truly or falsely.

Article four asks "Whether there is only one truth by which all things are true?" and here for the first time a long series of preliminary arguments, fifteen in all, betrays the fact that he is on more controversial ground. The reason, of course, is St. Augustine's persistent emphasis on the Divine Truth. But St. Thomas manages to preserve what is good in Augustine and fit it in with his Aristotelianism by carefully distinguishing between truth in the mind and truth in things, then subdistinguishing truth in the divine mind from truth in the created mind, and likewise differentiating the truth of things because of their relation of conformity to the divine mind from their truth because of conformity or conformability to the created mind. The truth in the divine mind is one, of course, and the truth of any one thing is one insofar as it is simply the entity of the thing itself; but there are as many truths in created minds as there are created minds conformed to the thing's entity.

Article five continues the discussion of matter important to the Augustinians, as is shown by the number of arguments, twenty-four in number this time, which precede the body of the article. He asks "Whether any other truth is eternal besides the first truth?" and proceeds very surely upon the
foundation he has already laid for himself in previous articles. The truth in
God's mind is of course eternal, and there is a sense in which the enuntiable
truth contained in a proposition is eternal, but truth in things and in
created minds is not eternal.

In the sixth article he deals with a rather intricate point, "Whether
created truth is unchangeable?" This requires many subtle distinctions.
Truth cannot be the subject of change; but things can change with regard to
it, in certain ways. The truth of a thing with respect to the divine mind
cannot change into falsity when the thing is changed (any more than can the
truth of the divine mind itself), but only into another truth. In relation
to the human mind, however, the truth of a thing changes into another truth
if the mind keeps pace with the change; but if the mind fails to change with
the thing, there is falsity.

Article seven takes up a purely theological question, "Whether in God
truth is predicated personally or essentially?" He dispatches it in short
order with the necessary distinctions between predicating attributes of the
divine Essence and appropriating them to a certain divine Person, and between
the proper use of the term "truth" in regard to God and the metaphorical use
of it in connection with the Person of the Word.

In article eight he returns to matter in which there is room for dis-
agreement between him and anyone with Neoplatonic leanings, as the Augusti-
nians were almost bound to be. He asks "Whether all truth is from the first
truth?" He answers that the truth of things, their being, must be from God,
as imitations of His divine exemplarity. He further placates the Neoplatonists in his audience by saying that truth in the created intellect must also be from God; but he avoids the illumination theory by giving as his reason that truth is a good of the intellect, and all good is from God ultimately, thus leaving open the possibility of an Aristotelian theory of cognition.

Article nine completes the positive treatment of truth by taking up the question of its lowest possible mode of existence in a knower—"Whether truth is in the sense?" The article is deplorably short, considering the importance attached to it nowadays. He answers that truth is properly in the sense, but not formally. That is, sense knowledge can be true, but being incapable of perfect reflection the sense cannot recognize its conformity with the object which it truly knows; however, it does have a sort of imperfect reflection by which it is conscious of its act.

The last three articles deal with the opposite of truth, namely falsity. Here the order is ascending, the first step being taken in article ten with the question "Whether any thing is false?" In the light of articles four, five, and eight it is easy to reply that no thing can be false with respect to God's intellect, nor consequently in its own being. But because our human knowledge is acquired through a multiple process beginning in the sense knowledge of accidents and ending in the intellectual knowledge of essences, material things can be called false in the sense that the discrepancy between their sensory appearance and their internal nature may sometimes be the occasion for falsity in our minds.
Article eleven continues the discussion of falsity with the question, "Whether falsity is in the sense?" The answer is that falsity can be said to obtain in sense knowledge in two ways: first, insofar as sensory impressions are the occasion of falsity in the intellect; secondly, insofar as they misrepresent reality. In the first case, he notes, the sense impression can partake of falsity not as an entity itself, for every thing is truly what it is, but only insofar as it presents things to the intellect. In the second case, the sense is false, strictly speaking, only when there is sense judgment, i.e., the action of the internal senses upon the common sensibles and the sensibles per accidens; in the direct sensation of proper sensibles falsity is only improperly said to occur, when there is an impediment in the organ or the medium of cognition.

Article twelve concludes the treatise by raising the question of falsity to the highest plane, "Whether falsity is in the intellect?" The answer to this is simply the natural correlate of article three, and the brevity of the article indicates that he considers it such. Falsity is properly said of the intellect when judging, and never properly of its simple apprehension of quiddities except insofar as there is an implied false judgment in a definition.

Such is the doctrine, very briefly, of St. Thomas's most formal treatise on truth. He treats of substantially the same points in questions 15 and 16 of the first part of the Summa Theologica. It is there in much more condensed form—often, one must admit, without suffering in clarity on that account. The long series of preliminary arguments give way to two or three at
the head of each article. The treatment smacks much less of the controversial
air of the disputation hall, and although St. Augustine is still prominent,
one is not so conscious of an effort to keep an audience of Augustinians
satisfied as the various points are taken up. The subject-matter of portions
of De Veritate I is also treated in the commentary on the first Book of the
Sentences, distinction 8, question 1, article 3; distinction 19, question 5,
articles 1, 2, and 3. It is scattered through the Summa Contra Gentiles,
Book I, chapters 59, 60, 61, and 62; Book II, chapters 36, 83, and 84; Book
III, chapter 47. Parts of it also appear in lecture 4 on Book VI of Aris-
totle's Metaphysics, Question XXI De Veritate, articles 1 and 3, and Summa
Theologica, Ia, 85, 6.
CHAPTER V

DOCTRINAL SIGNIFICANCE

What the Good was to Plato, or Being to St. Thomas, Truth was to St. Augustine. "We gaze upon indestructible truth,"¹ he says, for "In every place, O Truth, thou givest audience to such as consult thee, and at the same time thou answerest all their demands, be they ever so diverse."² Charles Boyer, S.J., in the first sentence of the first chapter of his L'Idée de Vérité dans la Philosophie de Saint Augustin, states that "On every page of St. Augustine, one reads the word truth."³ Whether or not this be literally true, the general impression it conveys is sound. When Fr. Erich Przywara, S.J., undertook to arrange An Augustine Synthesis, he saw fit to set the keynote, as it were, by devoting the first forty pages to Section I, "Truth," in which he reproduces selections from all the important works of Augustine.⁴

Consequently, when St. Thomas essayed to discuss the subject of truth in a series of formal disputations, he could not have helped being conscious of the prevalence of Augustinians at the University of Paris in his day. This put him in a difficult predicament, for while he was determined to propound the doctrine of Aristotle, he yet had to placate the Franciscans and other

¹De Trinitate, IX, vi, n. 9 (PL 42, 966).
²Confessiones, X, xxvi, n. 37 (PL 32, 795).
followers of Augustinian teaching who made up such a large part of his audience if he wanted to get a hearing at all. Hence the notable prominence of quotations from Augustine and of Augustinian expressions in the De Veritate I, and the paucity of references to Aristotle, as compared with other and especially later works of St. Thomas.

In certain matters it was relatively easy to give Augustine prominence as an authority, especially when there was question of the one first and eternal truth, God. For in matters pertaining to God Aquinas really owes much to Augustine, and finds no quarrel with the latter's exclamations, "O Eternal Truth...thou art my God" and "thou art truth presiding over all." Also, the impact of the Neo-platonic strain in Augustine appears in such expressions as "exemplariter procedit" in De Veritate I, article 4, ad 5um.

But on other matters he saw in Augustinianism error which he could not tolerate. An early biographer of St. Thomas, William of Tocco, in speaking of the disputed questions of St. Thomas seems extremely impressed with the newness of doctrine contained therein:

He was proposing new articles in his lectures, finding a new and clear method of determining, and adducing new arguments in the determinations; so that no one, who had heard him teach these new things, could doubt that God had illumined him with the rays of a new light...so that he did not hesitate to teach and write new opinions...

5Confessiones, VII, x, n. 16 (PL 32, 742).
6Ibid., X, xli, n. 66 (PL 32, 807).
7Vita Sancti Thomae, caput iii, n.15, in Acta Sanctorum: Martii, I, 663 (translation and italics mine).
This can best be interpreted as meaning that St. Thomas created no little stir in a hall thronged with Augustinians by proposing theories which were largely those of Aristotle. For, as M. Gilson has brought out in his excellent study "Pourquoi saint Thomas a critique saint Augustin,"8 his quarrel was really with Neoplatonism and with what the Platonizing Arabs had done to Aristotle's doctrine. St. Thomas recognized the Platonic nature of Augustinian philosophy,9 though it is extremely difficult even for modern scholars to say just how much influence the Neoplatonists had on Augustine.10 Dr. Martin Grabmann has studied the question with regard to the matter of cognition, so important De Veritate I, in his Der Göttliche Grund Menschlicher Wahrheitserkenntnis nach Augustinus und Thomas von Aquin, and tells us that St. Augustine's theory is a grafting of Platonic and Neoplatonic influences on the thought from the New Testament that Christ is the "Light of the world."11

However that may be, the Platonizing Augustinians of the University of

8 Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen âge, 1926, 1, 5-127.


Paris and Platonizing Arabians like Alkindi, Alfarabi, Algazel, and Avicenna were alike unwelcome to St. Thomas's Aristotelian mind. On the fundamental question of human cognition he held strongly for the Aristotelian acting intellect, abstracting essences from sense data and then reasoning to what is above sense. He opposed the ontologism and divine illumination theory common among the Franciscans which centered around truth in the judgment, as he did the illumination and separate intellect theory of Avicenna concerning the production of the concept.\(^{12}\) Just what proportions of Platonism and Aristotelianism go to make up the complete doctrine of St. Thomas is not easy to determine;\(^{13}\) unfortunately, he has left us no "Confessions" or "Discourse on Method." But Wilhelm Schneider is not far wrong in his "Die Questiones Disputatae des Thomas von Aquin in ihrer Philosophiegeschichtlicher Beziehung zu Augustinus" when he says that in the matter of human cognition Aquinas paid lip service to Augustine in the discussions, but held close to Aristotle's line of thought in his own doctrine.\(^{14}\) However, Aquinas does take what is true in Augustine and incorporate it into his own doctrine whenever possible, and tries at every point to show that he is not in opposition to Augustine when properly understood.


\(^{13}\) Aimé Forest, La Structure Métaphysique du Concret selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin, J. Vrin, Paris, 1931, 323-325.

Another thing to remark about the *De Veritate* from the standpoint of doctrine is that it is one of the chief sources for texts relative to the critical problem and the so-called Louvain solution. St. Thomas never discusses the matter formally, but moderns interested in the problem find much to say about the last four articles and especially articles nine and eleven. To give even a brief survey of the literature of this question is far beyond the compass of this work, as is evident from a mere listing of such names as Noël, Roland-Gosselin, Cardinal Mercier, Jeanniere, Picard, Jolivet, Maréchal, Bonnet, de Tonquédec, Barron, Boyer, Maritain, Gilson, Rousselot, Gardel, Naber, Kremer, Sentroul, Leslie Walker, Frank Simon, and Chevalier. (It is peculiar to note that in Maréchal's *Le Point de Départ de la Métaphysique*, replete though it is with quotations from St. Thomas, no mention of *De Veritate* meets the eye, and there are only a few citations from the other question of *De Veritate*.) Paul Wilpert is quite right in "Das Problem der Wahrheitssicherung bei Thomas von Aquin: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Evidenzproblems" when he says that St. Thomas was undoubtedly a realist, and avoided the difficulties arising from Augustinianism by adhering to Aristotelian realism. An important point, however, is that he escapes the semisensism of Aristotle by his clever working out of the matter of intellectual


reflection in articles nine and twelve. M. Gilson's Réalisme Thomiste is perhaps the best expression of how the doctrine of St. Thomas stands with regard to the critical problem. St. Thomas's treatise on falsity in articles ten, eleven, and twelve is also most illuminating in this connection.

A final feature to be noted about the doctrine of De Veritate I is the prominence given to sense knowledge in the treatise. This is brought out by a study of the texts and usages which appear under the words APPREHENDO, COGNITIO, COGNOSCO, JUDICIO, JUDICO, VERITAS, VERUM, VERE, etc., in the body of the dictionary. In brief, St. Thomas uses all these terms with reference to sense knowledge as well as intellectual knowledge. The significance of this for the critical problem is brought out by Gilson in his Réalisme Thomiste. St. Thomas's treatment avoids Platonism both in epistemology and

17 See also Blaise Romeyer, "La Doctrine de Saint Thomas sur la vérité," Archives de Philosophie, 1925, III, n. 2, 32. On the importance of intellectual reflection as described by St. Thomas in De Veritate I, see also Blaise Romeyer, "Saint Thomas et notre connaissance de l'esprit humain," Archives de Philosophie, 1928, VI, n. 2, 1-114. That Augustine is the source of this is clear from an examination of De Trin., IX, iv (PL 42, 963), and vi (PL 42, 965-966).


with regard to the ultimate nature of man, guarantees the realism of our intellectual knowledge, and brings out strongly the unity of our cognitive processes.
II. THE DICTIONARY

NOTE ON THE METHOD OF ARRANGEMENT

Treatment of the Vocabulary Items.

The aim of this work is primarily to establish the meaning of the various words which make up the philosophical vocabulary of Saint Thomas Aquinas in the first of his disputed questions on truth. Everything has been pointed as far as possible to this end. Many helps for translation are given, but the English equivalents are offered first of all as an attempt to indicate meaning, whatever the result in point of beauty or smoothness of expression so achieved.

Likewise, the aim being philosophical and not literary, only those words are studied which have some philosophical import or are peculiar to the language of St. Thomas, or which are necessary to the understanding of his meaning. And since it is his meaning with which we are here concerned, no attempt has been made to study the vocabulary of other writers quoted by him, except insofar as he makes their language his own in later discussion. For the same reason the language of the preliminary dialectical arguments with which each article begins, sometimes questionably called "objections," is quite obviously of no concern here unless taken up by Aquinas in his reply; experience in constructing the dictionary has shown that the study of words in these arguments is otherwise irrelevant, for they are sometimes deliberately beguiling and vague and downright equivocal, and never represent the
formed opinion of Saint Thomas.¹

Unless the contrary is explicitly stated, the principal source of evidence on which the choice of meaning is based is the context. This means the way Saint Thomas uses the word in the passage cited, as compared with other occurrences of the word in Question I of De Veritate, but nowhere else, whatever other works of St. Thomas or extraneous sources may have been consulted. This exclusive use of textual evidence guarantees the usefulness of the dictionary for comparative studies.

It is presupposed throughout this work that the reader has some knowledge of Latin. It does not presume to supplant a standard Latin dictionary when use of such may be necessary for words not appearing in this dictionary, or for details of grammatical forms, etc. The source for all classical usages has been the Lewis and Short revision of Harper's Latin Dictionary.²


The system of arrangement used was designed with a view to making up for lack of that variety of type-faces at the disposal of the printer, and at the same time of not employing such a multitude of arbitrary signs and artificial devices as to render the dictionary difficult to use.

¹See the Note under the word OBJICIO in the body of the dictionary, infra.

The vocabulary entries are made up as follows.

First, the word studied is given in its alphabetical place, in capital letters. If a verb, it is listed under the first person singular, present indicative active, followed simply by the infinitive ending. When a participle is used as an adjective or substantive in its own right, and the verb from which it is derived does not appear in the work, it is listed under its own form. Likewise the verbal substantives "esse," "essendi," and "ens."

For nouns, the genitive singular is given, and the three genders of the nominative singular are given in the case of adjectives. The part of speech is not further indicated except when there is danger of confusion or for some other special reason. Phrases are listed under the first word of the phrase. Cross references are given.

On the same line with the word-entry, a simple English translation of the word is attempted, giving the basic meaning common to all further refinements. If possible, this is done by giving one word which will serve as an English equivalent in translation of the word anywhere in the work, though perhaps without all the shades of connotation discussed later. However, if such an equivalent is not available, as many words are added in this basic translation as are necessary to sum up the representative meaning of the word in the various contexts. This basic and general meaning is always followed by a period.

Each subsequent refinement of meaning or added translation is given on a new line, and is always followed by a colon(:). It may be followed by explanations and examples of usage quoted from the text. These citations and
explanations are followed by a period only when there is a distinct change of meaning, otherwise the subdivisions and clarifications are separated by a semicolon (;). Meanings of a word which are notably divergent are indicated by arabic numerals (1, 2), slight variations in meaning or differences of usage by small letters (a, b).

Every specific meaning set down is justified by the citation of at least one context from De Veritate I in which the word occurs with that meaning, the word studied being underlined. Each occurrence is identified after the manner of the Bekker paging of the works of Aristotle, by page, column (a or b), and line, not separated by any punctuation. Thus, 2a17 means that this word appears on page 2, the left-hand column, line seventeen, in the context cited. The location of every other occurrence of the word in that meaning is added, preceded only by a comma. The edition used is the Marietti, as explained above (p. 15). The location of the word under consideration is always given without parentheses; that of any other word referred to is in parentheses. In the case of a few words used very frequently and with consistent meaning throughout the work, only a few typical citations are given and any discrepancies noted, as will be stated in each case.

If reference is made to the alphabetical listing of another word in this dictionary, the word is printed in capital letters. If cross-reference is made, the reader is simply told to "see" the other heading. If for the understanding of the meaning of one word comparison is necessary with the discussion of another word, the reader is told to "confer" (cf., or q.v.) the other
entry. If it is felt that another word will throw some additional light on a topic, reference is indicated by "see also."
A

ABSOLUTE adv. Absolutely, unqualifiedly.

1. Absolutely: opposed to relatively -- 3a1, 10, equivalent to "in se", which is contrasted with "in ordine ad aliud" (2b54).

2. In every respect:
   a) unqualifiedly: 2b7, equivalent to "per se" (23b4);
   b) with no exceptions: "oportet etiam absolute dicere, quod omnis veritas sit a Deo" 20b27.

ABSTRAHO, -ERE To abstract.

To prescind: "[Dei] cognitio...abstrahit ab omni tempore"

13a34.

Note. The word literally means to draw away from, but in philosophical usage it usually means to abstract, to attend to some aspect and disregard some other. The most usual sense is that of intellectual abstraction of intelligible form from a material body. In this, the only occurrence of the word in this work, the meaning is not so restricted, but closely similar.

ACCEPTIO, -IONIS Acceptance, acceptation.

The understanding of a word or statement in a certain sense: 18b52; cf. ACCIPIO, 1.

35
ACCIDENS, -ENTIS  n. Accident.

That which is non-essential: hence,

1. In the real or physical order,
   opposed to "res" -- "quantum ad accidentia, mutatio accidere potest etiam manente re" 18a7;
   opposed to "quod quid est" -- "accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est" 23a36;
   opposed to "natura" -- "color auri et alia hujusmodi accidentia" 23a47;
   opposed to "essentia" -- "sensus et imaginatio sola exteriora accidentia cognoscunt" 26a54.

2. In the mental order,
   a non-essential note: "per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidentis subjecto" 2b29.

3. The logical fallacy resulting from an illegitimate shift from accidental to essential or necessary predication:
   "fallacia accidentis" 20b32.

(PER) ACCIDENS  see  PER ACCIDENS.

ACCIDENTALIS, -E  adj. Incidental.

That which need not be, an attribute which does not necessarily pertain to a given subject: "Veritas autem quae dicitur de rebus in comparatione ad intellectum humanum, est rebus quod-ammodo accidentalis, quia posito quod intellectus humanus non
esse nec esse posset, adhuc res in sua essentia permanerent" 9a22;

opposed to "essentialis" -- in a context of the same import as above, 23b6.

Used as a substantive, equivalent to ACCIDENTS, 1 -- "mutatio accidere potest etiam manente re, et ita quantum ad accidentalia potest fieri mutatio veritatis rei" 18a9.

ACCIPIO, -ERE

1. Except as noted below, nn. 2, 3, the word is always used in this work in a metaphorical sense,
to take mentally, to consider in such a way, to take as meaning a certain thing: "nomen intellectus dupliciter accipi potest" 26b4, "si intellectus accipiatur secundum illam actionem a qua nomen intellectus imponitur" 26b37, etc.

2. Once it is taken in a logical sense,
to include: "qui rationem non entis accipit in seipso" 3b15.

3. A few times it is taken in a literal or ontological sense,
to be acted upon, to receive a perfection from outside: "in majori mundo superiora nihil accipiunt ab inferioribus" 26a12, "intellectus speculativus accipit a rebus" 5b29, "intellectus a rebus scientiam accipit" 9a36, "intellectus aliquid accipit a sensu" 26a15.
ACTIO, -IONIS Action, activity, operation.

1. Very broadly, in any sense in which a being can be said to "agere" (q.v.) -- 24a14, 23.
2. The proper action of a specific human power: "illam actionem a qua nomen intellectus imponitur" 26b38; cf. ACTUS, 2.

ACTIVUS, -A, -UM Active

Being a source of action as opposed to a recipient, active:
"principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus" 21b27.

Note. This is an excellent instance of the way St. Thomas reminds us of the fact that, although the acting intellect and the possible intellect are really distinct (cf. Summa Theologica, Ia, 79, 7 corp.), still they must not be separated to the extent of failing to consider the intellect as a whole, as one active principle, including the possible intellect which is the formally cognitive part.

ACTUS, -US Act, actuality, action, perfection.

In general, the word signifies actuality as opposed to the various senses of potency.

1. The act of existence, the actuality of existence: 3a6-7, 3b30, 4b9, 10 -- it is so interpreted explicitly by St. Thomas when he makes "actus essendi" (4b7) equivalent to "esse" (4b6) -- "cum dicitur 'Diversum est esse et quod est,' distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui actus ille convenit"
4b5-8, where the "actus ille" clearly refers to "actus essendi"; thus the ablative,
actually, really, in existence: 6a48, 14a23 (twice);
actually existing: "in actu" 12b32.
2. Second act as distinguished from first act (existence),
   a) synonymous with ACTIO, 2,
      act, activity, action, operation, perfection:
      "actibus animae" 5b9, "virtutis...actum" 14a55,
      "actus intellectus" 6b32, 33, 21b14, 20, 22, 25, of
      sense power 21b32, 40;
      the activity proper to a given thing: "naturalis
      actus alicujus rei semper est uno modo, nisi per
      accidens impediatur" 25b43; including
      the action of God, considered entitatively and not
      terminatively, and hence in this case not really
      distinct from Himself: "actus divinae voluntatis"
      21a6, 7, 12, "in actu intellectus divini" 6a54;
   b) looked at as an entity in itself rather than as the
      operation or perfection of the acting principle,
      the act, the deed: "actus fornicationis" 20b35, 53, 56,
      the act: "actus cognitionis est medius inter cognos-
      centem et cognitum" 21b50.
ADAEQUATIO, -IONIS  
Equation, equivalence, correspondence, similarity.

Note. St. Thomas seems to have recognized that the word literally means "equality to", as is evident from its use in 23a1 as the opposite of "inaequalitas" (23a3). This is further brought out by his example from algebra of "equals subtracted from equals" (17a54-55) in a context where he uses it in the typical sense found in this work, namely as expressing that relation between intellect and thing known in which is fulfilled the formal notion of truth, 17a53.

Still it is obvious from a comparative study of contexts that when so used it never quite means mathematical equality, but rather a correspondence between the real and the representative orders, a "sort of equation" -- "adaequationemquamdam" 3b11. That mathematical equality is not meant is further brought out by the fact that he uses it to express the relation of the Divine intellect to finite things, and to negative entities (cf. infra). This equality or correspondence refers to that which is represented, though the manner of existence in the two differs.

Explicitly equivalent to "correspondentia" in 3a43, to "conformitas" in 3a47, to "commensuratio" in 12b29, and "proportio" (21b23) and "aequalitas" (18b7, 12, 19) and used to the same effect.
The word most frequently used in the definition of truth — "quae quidem correspondentia adaequatio rei et intellectus dicitur, et in hoc formalis ratio veri perficitur" 3a44, and likewise in 3b27, 5a40, 41, 6b35, 42, 12b11.

Used to express both the relation of intellect to thing 10a54, 20a25 and thing to intellect 20b13, 38, and of both Divine 5b47, 10a54, 23a18 and human intellect 5b55, and also of both "intellectus mensurans" and "intellectus mensuratus" 5b45, and even of the conformity of the intellect when one of the terms of the relation is non-existent 12b29 or a negation 20b38, 23a18.

In 10a51 it might better be translated "mode, or manner," of equation or correspondence.

ADAEQUO, -ARE

To equal, to correspond.

a) active. To make (the human mind) conform or correspond to, to adequate: "omne ens potest sibi adaequare intellectum humanum" 6a22;
to bring (our mind or intellect) into conformity with: 9b5, 13b5.

b) passive. Most frequently used, always to express that relation of mind and object described as truth, to be made equal to, to be equated to, to correspond to, to measure up to: it is used in all the different ways in which ADAEQUATIO (q.v.) is used — of intellect to things
18b28, 20a25 and things to intellect 20a43, 20b16, of Divine 7a27, 10a51, 53, 56, 12b39, 13b3, 14a22 and human intellect 7a28, 20a43, of relation to non-existent objects, whether future 12b33, 39, 14a22, 28 or negative 20a49, 20b8, 23a13, but the meaning always remains the same -- "ens non potest intelligi sine hoc quod correspondeat vel adaequetur intellectui" 3b51, 6b36, 51, 7a41, 17b47, 18b16.

c) p. participle. proportionate, commensurate, adequated, con­formed: "adaequata" 5b21, 6a17, 21, 9b4.

ADDITIO, -IONIS Addition.

Used in this work only in the sense of the adding of notes to the comprehension of an idea or concept -- "omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens" 2b26.

ADDO, -ERE To add.

Used in the same sense as ADDITIO (q.v.) only -- "modum quo differentia additur generi" 2b28; so also 2b26, 33, 43, 45.

See also SUPERADDO.

AEQUALITAS, -ATIS Equality, correspondence, similarity, equivalence.

1. Used, less frequently than ADAEQUATIO but in the same way, to express the relation between mind and object in the definition of truth. The drawing of an analogy between its
literal, strict sense of mathematical equality and its use in his definition and discussion of truth indicates that it is not to be taken literally in such context — "inaequalitatem...quae se habet ad falsitatem sicut æqualitas ad veritatem" 7b9; much less does it mean identity — "sed æqualitas diversorum est" 6b37. This is further confirmed by its use to express the relation between the Divine intellect and finite things 18b7, 12, 19.

2. Literally, when speaking of the Trinity, equality: "æqualitas in divinis quandoque importat rationem quae designat distinctionem personalem, sicut cum dicimus quod Pater et Filius sunt aequales; et secundum hoc, in nomine æqualitatis, realis distinctio intelligitur. Quandoque autem in nomine æqualitatis non intelligitur realis distinctio, sed rationis tantum, sicut cum dicimus sapientiam et bonitatem divinam esse aequales...et talis est distinctio importata per nomen veritatis, cum sit æqualitas intellectus et essentiae" 19a2-15.

AEQUO, -ARE To equal, to correspond to, to be in conformity with.

Used, less frequently than ADAEQUARE but in the same way, to express relation of mind and object — 4a25;

used of both human and divine intellect — 13b10; 13b13 —
"intellectui cuicumque aequetur."

It is used in the passive voice throughout.

AESTIMATIO, -IONIS Estimate, conception.
Concept: "veram aëstimacionem [rei in intellectu humano]" 5b57; correct estimate, judgment: 7a31; evaluating action of the mind: "aëstimacionem animae [de rebus]" 6a39.

AFFECTIO, -IONIS Impression.
Imposed state, impression, condition received: "sensus non possunt omnino enuntiare nisi affectionem suam" 25b1 -- equivalent to "dispositio" 25a54 (q.v.).
Note that the word does not mean a feeling state as in modern psychology.

AFFIRMATIO, -IONIS Affirmation.
Positive predication, affirmation: "definitio non potest esse falsa, nisi in quantum implicat affirmationem falsam" 26b33; 3b33, 24a9; assertion: "affirmationem propositionis" 23b17.

AGO, -ERE To act.
1. To act, to operate: "potentiae naturales insensibiles... agere" 22a14;
opposed to being acted upon -- "anima non patitur...sed magis quodammodo agit" 23a54, "agentis et patientis" 18a19; to act (upon): "quamvis malum non agat in animam nisi per speciam boni" 21a42, 24a16.

2. With "de",
to treat, to discuss: "de qua agebat" 13a44.

(INTELLECTUS) AGENS  see  INTELLECTUS AGENS.

ALIQUID, -CUJUS  neut. pron.  Something.

1. a) Technically defined as distinct being,
some other: "ens accipiatur secundum divisionem unius ab altero; et hoc exprimit hoc nomen 'aliiquid', dicitur enim aliiquid quasi 'aliud quid'; unde sicut ens dicitur unum, in quantum est indivisum in se, ita dicitur aliiquid in quantum est ab aliis divisum" 3a13-22. This etymology is confirmed in classical Latin.

b) Except in this explanatory text in the first article, untechnically,

something, something or other: except,

2. "something" in the logical order, some note: "verum et ens differunt ratione per hoc quod aliiquid est in ratione veri quod non est in ratione entis" 4a29; so in 2b27, 33, 4a31, 52, 57, 14b22, 23b31.
ALTERATIO, -IONIS  

Alteration.

Change of intrinsic, accidental form: 16b57.

ANIMA, -AE  

Soul.

1. The subject in which our operative powers reside: "in anima autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva" 3a28; hence, the (ultimate) principle of our operations: "actibus animae" 5b9; especially the subject of intellectual operations: "anima, quae quodammodo est omnia" 3a26.

2. By synecdoche, the whole being taken for the part, i.e., the ultimate subject for the proximate principles of operation, the mind:

a) the knower: as opposed to the thing known, whether
   i) extra-mental reality -- "res extra animam"
      5b10, 6a26, 38, 40, 6b41, 45, 9a50, 13a53, 20a35, 45, 50; or
   ii) privations and negations -- "non enti, quod est extra animam" 21a29, 31, 32;

b) mind, the (proximate) subject of knowledge:
   i) sometimes non-committal as to whether sense knowledge or intellectual knowledge is involved -- 5b3, 13b7, 8, 17, 20b57, the subject of the total act of knowing, used equivalently to
"mens nostra" (10b3): "res...notitiam sui in anima gignit" 24b17, 23a31, "malum non agat in animam nisi per speciem boni" 21a42, "falsitas in anima" 23a49, "veritas in anima" 9b34, 10b6, "anima decipi" 24a33, 37;

ii) intellect: "anima deprehendit in se rationem defectus" 21a44;
intellect as judging: "anima de omnibus judicat" 9b44, 23a52, "anima...animae quae cointelligit tempus componendo et dividendo" 13a14, 16, "compositio quam facit anima" 20b52;
intellect taken as a whole, acting and possible: "sed anima ipsa hoc facit conformans seipsam nonenti" 21a29.

ANIMAL, -IS
Animal.
Used only in examples of false judgment or false definition made by combining predicates that are irreconcilable -- "animal insensibile" 7a15, 17, "animal rationale mortale" 26b24, 29, 30.

Note. From these instances it is easily inferred that the essential characteristic of animality is sensory life, and that animal is a generic notion including both brute animal and rational animal or man.
APPAREO, -ERE

To appear, to be externally observable.

Used only of the sensible qualities of an object -- "res enim notitiam sui facit in anima per ea quae de ipsa exterius apparent, quia cognitio nostra initium a sensu summit" 23a32, 23bl.

APPETITIVUS, -A, -UM

Orectic, appetitive, affective.

Adj. from APPETITUS, q.v. Very general, opposed to "cognitiva" -- "vis cognitiva et appetitiva" 3a29, "motus appetitivae virtutis terminatur ad res" 5b6.

APPETITUS, -US

Appetite, affection.

a) A generic word to express the activity or affection of a thing toward the good, or the power of being so affected or so acting: "convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen 'bonum', ut in principio 8th. dicitur, 'bonum est quod omnia appetunt'" 3a30, "bonum...dicit ordinem ad appetitum" 5b16;

b) specifically,

intellectual appetite, the will: "res intellecta movet appetitum, et appetitus tunc ducit ad hoc quod perveniat ad rem a qua motus incepit" 5b12.

Note. It seems that no one word is adequate to express the idea conveyed by this term as used by St. Thomas. This is no doubt because it is not univocal but analogous, and must be applicable to the various acts of a variety of things from the natural
inclination of an insensible body for acting in a certain way to the will of God which is identified with the Divine Essence Itself. The word is derived literally from "ad" and "peto", and involves a strong connotation of striving or desiring or tending toward: but the motion and imperfection so implied are not only inapplicable to the Divine Will but also to those acts of the human will which regard a good toward which there is no longer tendency or motion but which is actually possessed and enjoyed, including certain acts of love, "delectatio", "fruitio", "consensus", "usus", etc. (Cf. Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, 12, arts. 1-16).

Spearman suggests Aristotle's word "orexis" (C. Spearman, Psychology Down the Ages, Macmillan Company, London, 1937, I, 303), and this is Brennan's choice also (Robert Brennan, O.P., Thomistic Psychology, Macmillan Company, New York, 1941, 148, 210). But this word in Greek, although it has a very broad meaning, conveys the same notion of tending (hence motion, imperfection) as the Latin "appetitus", so the solution thus offered is unsatisfactory. St. Thomas in Contra Gentiles IV, 19, uses the verb "affici" in this connection, and the root meaning of the English word "affection", "to be affected toward", implied in such a usage indicates that some such word as affection or even attitude might be the most nearly approximate equivalent for the full breadth of "appetitus".
APPETO, -ERE
To desire, to tend toward, to be affected toward.
The root verb from which APPETITUS (q.v.) is derived. It does not seem to have lost so much of its original root meaning as the noun, but retains a meaning closer to that indicated by the literal derivation — "bonum est quod omnia appetunt" 3a33.

APPREHENDO, -ERE
To apprehend.
Literally, to take hold of, to grasp, to seize, but used in this work exclusively in a metaphorical sense to express the act of the knower in somehow possessing or uniting itself to the thing known.

a) of intellectual knowledge,
to conceive, to understand: "apprehensum ab intellectu" 4a38;
to have within the scope of: "apprehensum sub intellectu" 4a46;
to know (in terms of simple essence): "dicimur proprie intelligere cum apprehendimus quidcitatem rerum" 26b7, "negationes et privationes...intellectus...earum rationes apprehendit" 20a51, "intellectus...incipit judicare de re apprehensa" 6b48, 54;

b) of sense knowledge,
to sense, to know:
i) in contrast to "sense judgment" -- "in sensu...
secundum hoc quod sensibile apprehendit, non est veritas et falsitas proprie, sed solum secundum ordinem ad judicium quod ex formatione praedicta consequitur" 25b28;

ii) not opposed to, but rather including in a very general way the notion of sense-judgment --

a') of proper (external) sense power --
"quaedam vis apprehensiva, quae apprehendit speciem sensibilem sensibili re praesente, sicut sensus proprius" 25b56,
"et ideo sensus apprehendit rem ut est" 26a3;

b') of imagination -- "quaedam vis apprehendit eam re absente, sicut imaginatio" 26a1,
"sed imaginatio apprehendit ut plurimum rem ut non est, quia apprehendit eam ut praesentem, cum sit absens" 26a6, 7.

**APPREHENSIO, -IONIS**

Apprehension.

Literally, a grasping, a taking hold of, but used always here of the knowing process metaphorically, in a sense like that of APPREHENDO (q.v.)

a) of the intellect,
i) of simple apprehension of an object, in contrast to judgment, apprehension, conception, understanding: "anima vero in quantum de rebus judicat, quodammodo agit. Unde res non dicitur falsa quia semper de se falsam facit apprehensionem" 23a56, "actus [formationis] apprehensioni animae adaequatur" 20b57;

ii) in a broader sense, implying judgment also, estimate: "[res] natae sunt facere de se veram apprehensionem in intellectu humano" 20a32, 38;

b) of sense,

i) in contrast to sense-judgment (cf. APPREHENDO, b, i), sensation: "ex apprehensione tali natum est sequi tale judicium" 25b33;

ii) more generally, to include the total act of sense-knowledge (cf. APPREHENDO, b, ii), perception: "apprehensionem sensus" 25b54.

APPREHENSIVUS, -A, -UM Cognitive, knowing.
Adj. from APPREHENDO, q.v. Used of sense-power -- "vis apprehensiva" 25b56. See also ELECTIVUS, Note.

APPROPRIO, -ARE To appropriate, to assign or ascribe to.
A theological rather than philosophical term, meaning to predicate an (essential, not personal) attribute of, or ascribe
a work to, a certain Person of the Blessed Trinity -- "si veritas propri accipiatur, essentialiter dicitur, tamen appropriatur Personae Filii" 18b40, "quamvis tres illae personae divinae re distinguuntur, tamen personae [The Vivès edition notes that one of the Paris codices (B) reads "personis" here, a better reading.] appropriata non differunt re, sed ratione" 4b19, 24.

ARS, -TIS Art, exemplar, design.

Knowledge of a thing to be produced:

exemplar, exemplary idea, model, idea: "omnia [positiva] ab arte divini intellectus proveniunt" 23a10, "[res] imitantur intellectum divinum, qui est earum mensura, sicut ars est mensura omnium artificiatorum" 20a29, "res...divino intellectui adaequatur, sicut artificialis arti" 13b4; design, plan: "ordinatioem rerum in intellectu divino existentem, sicut...secundum ordinationem artis in artifice" 15b6.

Note. The meaning of this word always includes what in modern times is called "practical" as well as "fine" art; in fact, the former notion is more predominant in St. Thomas's usage, contrary to the modern notion of art. Moreover, the word always refers in this work to something in the intellect -- "ars et cetera quae ad intellectum pertinent" 18b41 -- not mere skill in external execution. This is brought out clearly by a comparison of the two passages in which St. Thomas curiously interchanges
"ars" with "exemplar" and "intellectus" -- "res...per formam suam imitantur artem divini intellectus" 20a36, 24b15, and "formam, per quam vel imitantur exemplar divinae artis" 20a47.

ARTIFEX, -ICIS Artisan.

Following the notion of ARS (cf. Note, s.v.), the word refers not to an artist in the modern sense but rather means artisan, worker, craftsman, designer: "artificiata in intellectu artificis" 5b38, "ordinatio artis in artifice" 15b7.


Refers to anything produced by the skill of man, as opposed to natural generation or formation -- "res artificiales" 5b43, "res...divino intellectui adaequatur, sicut artificialis arti" 13b3.

ARTIFICIATUM, -I neut. subst. (not classical) Artefact.

Manufactured article, human product: "artificiata" 5b37, "artificiatorum" 20a30.

ASSIMILATIO, -IONIS Assimilation.

The reception of an impression by which the knower becomes like or acquires a certain similarity to the thing known, hence, a "becoming like": "omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, ita quod assimilatio dicta
est causa cognitionis" 3a36, 37.

Note. That this assimilation (which may be interpreted as the reception of the impressed species) does not formally constitute cognition is clear from the fact that St. Thomas here makes them cause and effect, which are always really distinct. Compare De Veritate VIII, 6, De Potentia IX, 5. And see Joseph de Tonquedec, Critique de la Connaissance (Beauchesne, Paris, 1929), Appendice II, "Connaissance et Assimilation", 461-467.

ATTENDO, -ERE

To notice, to recognize.

Used only in a non-committal way almost synonymous with "cognosco" — "adaequatio inter intellectum et rem attendi potest" 6b42.

AUCTORITAS, -ATIS

Authoritative quotation, argument from authority.

Used only once in this work, to refer to words of St. Augustine quoted in the dialectical arguments preceding the body of the article — "in auctoritate inducta" 25a56.

AURUM FALSUM

Fool's gold.

That which can be mistaken for gold because of external appearances, probably iron or copper pyrites: "aurum falsum, in quo exterius apparat color auri, et alia hujusmodi accidentia, cum tamen interius natura auri non subsit" 23a45.
BONITAS, -ATIS

Goodness.

The abstract of "bonum", the attribute of being good: "in rebus ...
ipsa ratio bonitatis" 24b13; "dicimus sapientiam et bonitatem
divinam esse aequales" 19a11.

BONUS, -A, -UM

Good.

a) As an adjective,

The attribute of a thing by which it is appetible, or which
establishes a relation of suitability of that thing with
appetite: "convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit
hoc nomen 'bonum', ut in principio Ethic. dicitur: 'bonum
est quod omnia appetunt'" 3a31, 32, "bonum dicit ordinem ad
appetitum" 5b14;

an attribute or property not really distinct from the one,
the true, and being, even in creatures -- "ens, verum, unum,
et bonum...non oportet quod in rebus creatis distinguantur
etiam realiter" 4b26, "sed ens, verum, unum et bonum secundum
suam rationem habent quod sit unum" 4b36;

but which does express a character not formally expressed by
the term being, hence a "quasi-differentia" of "ens" --
"verum proprie loquendo non potest esse differentia entis...

sed aliquod verum se habet ad ens per modum differentiae,
sicut et bonum; in quantum, videlicet, exprimit aliquid
b) used in a more substantive way,
   i) in a quasi-abstract sense,
      good, the good, goodness: "bonum et malum sunt in
      rebus" 5b18, "bonum, debitum, rectum, et hujusmodi
      omnia alio modo se habent ad permissionem divinam, et
      alio modo ad alia signa divinae voluntatis" 21a1,
      "hoc pertinet ad rationem boni" 20b55, "unde in hoc
      consistit ejus bonum" 20b24, "bonum uniuscujusque rei
      consistit in perfecta operatione ejus" 20b19;
   ii) more concretely,
      a good, some good, good thing: "malum non agat in
      animam nisi per speciem boni; quia tamen est bonum
      deficiens, anima deprehendit in se rationem defectus"
      21a43, "omne bonum sit a Deo" 20b25, "ipse honor
      parentum bonum quoddam est" 21a10, "ipsum verum sicut
      bonum intellectus" 20b17, 24b24.
CADO, -ERE  To fall.

Used figuratively,

To fall under the scope of, to be the object of: "id quod cadit sub actu voluntatis" 21a6, "id quod sub permissione cadit" 21a14.

CAUSA, -AE  Cause.

a) Non-committal — "ut causa aliorum" 5a48, "ad creaturas...intellectus divinus comparatur ut mensura et causa" 18b34, 9a34 (the question of how God's intellect is the cause of creatures is not discussed);

b) efficient cause: "unde non esse extra animam existens non est causa efficiens veritatis, sed quasi exemplaris" 21a32, in reference to which passage is to be read — "non esse non est causa veritatis negativarum propositionum quasi faciens eas in intellectu" 21a27, so also 23a49; "illa quae sunt causa aliorum essendi" 4a14, "causa veritatis aliorum" 4a16; and by inference, "assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis" 3a38 (cf. ASSIMILATIO, Note s.v.)

Note. In "causa exemplari efficiens" 21a34, the Vivès edition omits the "exemplari" on the authority of three of the four Paris codices used (cf. EFFICIENS, Note).

The word is used in this work without any attempt to define it or take care as to its technical meaning.
CAUSO, -ARE  
To cause.

Like "CAUSA", the word is used here in a general and usually unspecified sense -- "inaequalitas ex ipsa re causatur" 23a30, "intellectus practicus causat res" 5b27; but with a slight implication of efficient causality -- "nec tamen res [falsa]... necessario falsitatem causet" 23a50, "negationes et defectus... Deus non causet" 23a15.

CLAUDO, -ERE  
To enclose, to bound.

Note. The word is quoted from St. Anselm in the first dialectical argument of the article (5), and is thus distinguished in the reply by St. Thomas -- "veritas enuntiationis non clauditur principio et fine, non quod absque principio ratio fuerit, sed quia non potest intelligi quando illa oratio esset et veritas illi deesset" 13a41.

COGITATIVA (VIS)  
see VIS COGITATIVA.

COGNITIO, -IONIS  
Knowledge.

The result of assimilation -- "cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad cognitum, ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis" 3a35, 38, or of conformity -- "ad quam conformitatem sequitur cognitio rei" 3a49, or of truth -- "cognitio est quidam veritatis effectus" 3a51 (hence knowledge is not truth, but there can be no knowledge, even false, without some
truth. See Note under COGNOSCO.) It serves as a medium to unite the knower and the known object — "actus cognitionis est medius inter cognoscentem et cognitum" 21b50;

a) in general,

created knowledge: "omnis autem cognitione perficitur per assimilationem...assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis" 3a35, 38, where the "omnis" must be taken as exclusive of God, because of the "perficitur" and "causa";

human knowledge: "scientia et cognitione rerum" 2b19,

which is seen in its fullness to be a composite act involving both sense and intellect — "cognitione nostra quae a rebus initium sumit...primo incipiat in sensu, secundo perficitur in intellectu" 25a26, "cognitione nostra initium a sensu sumit" 13b7;

Note. An indication of how closely St. Thomas united the notions of sense-knowledge and intellectual knowledge is had in 3a35-49, where he speaks of "cognitione rei" 3a49 which is the effect of "adaequatio rei et intellectus" (3a47), and yet the example to which he refers ("ut dictum est" 3a48) is of sense-knowledge — "visus...cognoscit colorem (3a38-40). Cf. COGNOSCO, b.

b) sometimes specifically,

i) human intellectual knowledge: "invenitur veritas in intellectu quidem secundum quod adaequatur
rebus quorum cognitionem habet" 20a26, "adaequationem rei et intellectus...sequitur cognitio rei" 3a49, even of non-being 13b11;

ii) God's knowledge: in this work, always of His knowledge of created things -- it is independent of time -- "eius cognitio non concernit aliquod tempus" 13a32;

and by it He knows truly what is in the future, and that in its own proper nature and not merely in its causes -- "divina cognitio vera fuit de rebus pluribus futuris in tempore" 1a17, "et ideo veram cognitionem habuit ab aeterno de rebus etiam in propria natura quamvis rerum veritates ab aeterno non fuerint" 14a30;

and it is absolutely one -- "Deus...illa plura scivit una cognitione" 1a16, 15b44, 13a27, "quantumoumque diversa non cognoscit nisi unica cognitione" 15b42, without any diversity -- "non enim de diversis rebus diversas cognitiones habet" 13a26, 25, "non singulis suam cognitionem inmittens" 13a30.

COGNITIVUS, -A, -UM Cognitive, knowing.

Knowing, having the power of knowing: 5b2, 23b54, opposed to
"appetitiva" 3a29, in which instance intellectual knowledge is implied by "ad intellectum" below (3a34).

COGNOSCO, -ERE To know.

a) said of intellect,
   i) of God's intellect -- 6a49, 13a28, 29, 15b44, 17a46, 23a11, 23a14;
   ii) of angelic intellect -- 9b49;
   iii) of human intellect, knowing things -- 3a6, 37, 5b4, 5, 6a47, 13a12, 20b23, 21b21, 24 (second occurrence), 25, 26, 29, 35, 36, 39, 46, 49, 51, 53, 22a6, 14, 15, 26a52, 26b11, 12, 17;
   with truth rather than things as object -- "veritas ...cognoscitur autem ab intellectu secundum quod intellectus reflectitur supra actum suum" 21b18, 15, 23, 24 (first occurrence), 48;

b) said of sense,
   i) of sense knowing its object -- "sensus cognoscit sensibile" 22a3, 8, 26a54, "visus cognoscit colorem" 3a40;
   ii) of sense knowing its own act, imperfectly -- "sensus cognoscit se sentire" 21b38, 22a4.

Note. The body of article IX contains an important series of occurrences of various forms of the word COGNOSCO. Modern
writers find in this passage some of the texts to which they most frequently appeal in discussing St. Thomas's position on the critical problem, as for instance the following:

Respondeo dicendum, quod veritas est in intellectu et in sensu, licet non eodem modo. In intellectu enim est sicut consequens actum intellectus, et sicut cognita per intellectum; consequitur namque intellectus operationem, secundum quod intellectus reflectit in suprema actum suum, non solum secundum quod cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cognoscit proportionem ejus ad rem: quod quidem cognoscit non potest nisi cognita natura ipsius actus; quae cognoscit non potest, nisi cognoscatur natura principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus, in cujus natura est ut rebus conformetur...(21b11-28)

I answer: it must be maintained that truth is in the intellect and in the sense, though not in the same way. For it is in the intellect both as naturally following upon the act of the intellect, and as known by the intellect: following upon the operation of the intellect insofar as the judgment of the intellect is of a thing according as it is, but known by the intellect insofar as the intellect reflects upon its own act in not only knowing its own act but in knowing its correspondence to the thing. Now this cannot be known unless the nature of the act is known, and this cannot be known unless is known the nature of the active principle, namely the intellect itself, whose nature it is to be conformed to things...(trans. mine)

The expressions "cognita natura ipsius actus" and "nisi cognoscatur natura principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus" seem particularly strong, and might seem to favor what might be called in general a "critical" stand rather than a natural realist viewpoint on the critical problem.

But to maintain that St. Thomas is here talking of some ex-
explicit recognition of the formal nature of our knowing power and its act is highly questionable. Later works like the *Summa Theologica* (Ia, 16, 2) and the *Contra Gentiles* (I, 59), as well as an analysis of our own experience, favor the view that he refers simply to the concrete recognition of our mind's conformity to reality, the kind of recognition which is natural to intellectual knowledge as such, not due to any critical self-analysis. (See Chapter V of the Introduction, supra, and the references therein.)

**CO-INTELLIGO, -ERE**

To understand simultaneously, to unite mentally.

"Cursus enim Socratis est una, sed anima quae componendo et dividendo cointelligit tempus...diversimode intellegit currsum Socratis ut praesentem, praeteritum, et futurum" 13a17.

**COLLATIO, -IONIS**

Comparison.

Literally, a conferring or comparison. Here, a comparison or mental juxtaposition, not intellectual -- "collatio quaedam" 25b37, but under the influence of intellect, a sensory awareness of concrete relation: "quam facit in homine vis cogitativa" (25b37-38) in man, contrasted to the instinctive estimate of animals "loco cujus in aliis animalibus est existimatio naturalis" (25b39-40), and to "judicium naturale" about the proper sensibles (25b34).
COMMENSURATIO, -IONIS  Commensuration.

Proportion, correspondence, equation: used equivalently with "adaequatio" in notion of truth -- "commensuratio vel adaequatio intellectus ac rei" 12b30, 12b11.

COMMENSURATUM, -I  p. participle of commensuro, -are. Commensurate.

Known as equal, commensurate, measured, equated: "unde secundum hoc denominatur aliquid verum, sicut et denominatur aliquid commensuratum" 12b14.

COMMUNIS, -E  Common.

a) As an adjective,

common: common to several senses -- "de sensibilibus communibus" 25b42, 50, as opposed to "sensibile proprium";

b) substantively,

a common note or attribute: "praedicationem communis" 5a48, 49.

COMPARATIO, -IONIS  Relation.

Commonly in this work,

relation: "de rebus in comparatione ad intellectum" 9a20, 26, 31, 15a23, 42, 23a25, 27, 23b2, 5, used in the same sense as "convenientia" 3a40, and "ordo" 6a6 (Cicero uses it to translate ἀναλογία -- compare "comparatur" 23b25).

Note. Only once is it used in a sense even approaching that of
the English "comparison", i.e., a putting things in relation mentally -- "res autem dicitur vera per comparationem ad intellectum divinum et humanum" 17a31, and here also the notion of ontological relationship predominates.

COMPARO, -ARE To relate, to connect, to compare.
As with COMPARATIO, the notion is usually that of ontological relation, not mental comparison.
passive. is related to: "res aliter comparatur ad intellectum practicum, aliter ad intellectum speculativum" 5b24, so also 6b9, 9a33, 9b10, 18, 23a3, 6, 23b35, 25b17, 18b33; although it sometimes approaches the English meaning -- 15a32, 17b46, studied or considered in relation to: "comparatus" 25a32, 33, 50, 53, 25b2, 13.

COMPETO, -ERE To be attributable to, to belong to.
"Veritas secundum quod competit negationibus et defectibus" 21a20.

COMPLEMENTUM, -I Completion, fulfillment, perfection.
"Complementum cujuslibet motus est in suo termino" 5bl.

COMPONO, -ERE To combine, to join, to judge, to compare.
Never used in this work in a physical sense, but always of a mental operation, of the joining of objective concepts -- "partes definitionis...componi ad invicem" 7a14,
usually in combination with a parallel form of "divido", to judge (affirmatively): "intellectus componens et dividens" 6b2, 33, 56, 25b22, 26b21, "anima componendo et dividendo" 13a17.

COMPOSITIO, -IONIS Composition, judgment.
1. In the ontological order, to denote actual co-existence of the realities signified by the subject and predicate, composition: "compositio quae implicatur definitione" 7a16, 25, "veritas non consistit in compositione quae est in rebus" 20b50.

2. In the intellect, the combining of two objective concepts, judgment: "in compositione quam facit anima" 20b51, 7a9, 19, 18a23, usually in combination with "divisio", (affirmative) judgment: "compositio et divisio" 7a2, 4, 23.

COMPREHENDO, -ERE To comprehend, to include.
1. Of a concept,
to include in its comprehension: 20b11,
to include in its application or consideration: 26b43.

2. Of the mind, metaphorically (like APPREHENDO, q.b.),
to comprehend, to grasp, to understand: "intellectus ex essentiis rerum comprehensis" 26b1.

COMPRIMO, -ERE To press.
To exert physical pressure on, to press on: "ut cum oculus comprimitur" 25a12 (in such a way as to distort the eyeball).
CONCEPTIO, -IONIS
Conception, notion.
The act of knowing, possessing truth: 19a19;
notion, idea, conception: "conceptiones diversas...in quibus
diversae veritates inveniuntur" 13a22, 13, 2b21, 25, 24b27.

CONCIPIO, -ERE
To conceive.
To think of, to consider, to conceive: "ut si animal rationale
mortale conciperet quasi definitionem asini" 26b25, 28, 2b20,
19a17, 21a45.

CONFOrunTAS, -ATIS
Conformity.
Literally, having the same form as. Used equivalently with
"adaequatio" (3a47) in the definition of truth, but less
frequently -- "addit verum supra ens conformitatem sive adaequa-
tionem rei et intellectus" 3a46, 48. That it is not to be taken
literally but rather as indicating a representative correspondence
or proportion is clear from its use for the relation between

CONFORMO, -ARE
To conform.
Literally, to have the same form as. Said of the relation of
knower and object of knowledge, whether or object to intellect
4b1, 10a13, 17a46 or of intellect to object 21b28, even non-
being -- "anima...conformans seipsam non enti quod est extra
animam" 21a30.
CONJUNGO, -ERE  
To join.
Used of mental composition of objective concepts, like COMPONERE.
To join mentally, to associate in a judgment: "conjungerat partes
definitionis ad invicem quae conjungi non possunt" 26b26, 27
-- equivalent to "implicat affirmationem" (26b33).

CONNOTATIO, -IONIS  
Connotation, implication.
Used in the same sense as "importat" (18b21) -- "sine aliqua
connotatione principii" 18b26.

CONSENTANEUS, -A, -UM  
Befitting, in accord with.
"Virtus...est habitus in modum naturae rationis consentaneus"
14a52.

CONSEQUENTER  
adv.  
Secondarily.
Opposed to "principaliter" (18b11) -- "veritas in Deo principaliter
importat aequalitatem intellectus divini et rei quae est essentia ejus, et consequenter intellectus divini ad res
creatas" 13b13, without the notion of consequence implied in
the root.

CONSEQUOR, -I  
To follow, to flow from, to belong to.
a) To follow upon: "cognitorum...diversas conceptiones, quas
diversae verititates in anima consequuntur" 13a14 (where it
has a slight implication of its classical meaning "to
achieve,""to obtain"), "sicut effectum consequentem" 3b16,
opposed to "cognita" -- "veritas... est in intellectu sicut consequens actum intellectus" 21b14, 15, 32;
to flow from the nature of, to belong to: "veritas non ex ea parte consequitur creaturam qua deficiens est" 10a10, 2b50, 52, 53, 3a9, 24b18;
b) to follow: used equivalently with "sequi" (25b33) -- 25b25, 32.

CONTRADICTORIUM, -I neut. subst. A contradictory (proposition).
Used equivalently with "affirmatio et negatio" -- "non sequitur contradictoria esse vera" 24a9.

CONVENIO, -IRE To accord, to fall together, to suit or befit.
Literally, to come together.
a) to agree, to accord: "in aliquo genere convenirent" 2a17;
b) to be the same thing: "ergo secundum quod id est, conveniunt verum et ens" 1b7;
c) to belong to, to suit, to befit: "distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui actus ille convenit" 4b8, 10, 3a25.

CONVENIENTIA, -AE Fitness, accordance.
Literally, a coming together.
a) The word expresses more than a mere relation -- "convenientiam unius entis ad alium" 3a24 -- a certain fit-
ness, or aptitude, something in a nature which appeals to or squares with something in another nature -- "convenientiam ergo entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen 'verum'" 3a33, "convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen 'bonum'" 3a30, 6a27;

b) a sort of ("quaedam") agreement, accordance: "veritas, cum sit quaedam convenientia intellectus et rei, non proprie inventur in utroque" 10a18 (the cum-clause is adversative, not illative).

**CONVERTO, -ERE**

To convert, to interchange.

Used always in this work in the sense of logical conversion, the interchanging of subject and predicate in a proposition -- "verum ...convertitur cum ente" 6a17, 19, 25, 2a1, 35, 39, 4b47, "cum verum et ens convertantur" 17a38.

**CORPORALIS, -E**

Bodily, corporeal.

"Sensus nihil cognoscit nisi per organum corporale" 22a9.

**CORPUS, -ORIS**

Body.

Not defined or analysed in this work. It has reference to a body which has dimensions -- "diversorum corporum sunt dimensiones diversae" 9b28, the internal dimensions being three in number -- "mensuratur corpus mensura intrinseca, sicut linea, vel superficie, vel profunditate" 12b15; it is changeable -- "corpus
esse mutabile" 16b17; and cannot be God -- 24a53, 56, 24b1.

CORRESPONDENTIA, -AE Correspondence.

Used like "adaequatio" in the formal definition of truth -- "quae quidem correspondentia adaequatio rei et intellectus dicitur, et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur" 3a43.

CORRESPONDO, -ERE To correspond.

Equivalent to "adaequetur" -- 3b50, 6b42, implying at least the suitability for assimilation -- "ut ens intellectui correspondat" 3a42.

CORRUMPPO, -ERE To corrupt.

a) active. To corrupt, to destroy: "dispositio corrumpens" 4a8;

b) passive. opposed to "perpetuum esse" (14b8), to cease to be: 14b19, 51.

CORRUPTIO, -IONIS Corruption, change.

a) Substantial change, ceasing to be, corruption: "corruptionem individui" 14b20, 49;

b) accidental change: "corruptionem quantum ad accidentia... manente re" 18a6.

CREDO, -ERE To believe, to opine.

Not said of faith, whether human or supernatural, but of opinion,
to opine, to judge: "corpus...aliquos in errorem induxit,...ut crederetur unitas" 24b3.
DEFECTUS, -US

Defect, lack.

Lack, imperfection, absence of something which ought to be: used equivalently with "negatio" 21a21, 23, 24, 23a13, with "privatio" 23a18, with "deformitas" 20b43, 46, 47;

(moral) defect: "rationem defectus, et in hoc concipit rationem mali" 21a45, "defectus in actu fornicationis" 20b35;

(physical) defect: "defectum intrinsecus vel extrinsecus impedimentum; unde sensus...nisi sit impedimentum in organo, vel in medio" 25b45;

lack of similarity: "defectum, in quo formaliter ratio falsitatis consistit, ex dissimilitudine surgit" 24a25, 1012.

DEFICIO, -ERE

To cease, to be defective.

1. To cease to exist: "perpetuum et incorruptibile...quae nunquam inceperunt nec deficient" 14b13;

2. pres. part. defective, imperfect, falling short of, incomplete: "creatura in quantum deficiens est" 10a9, 11, 21a44.

DEFINITIO, -IONIS

Definition.

a) In logical sense,

definition: "definitio veri" 3b24, 36, 37;

b) mental, rather than verbal, definition, our conception or mental expression of "quod quid est",
concept, notion: "intellectus...conciperet quasi
definitionem asini" 26b23, 25, 26, 28, 32;
opposed to judgment,
simple apprehension: "in intellectu formante definitiones"
7a7, 8, 10, 11, 13;
c) ambiguously, either (a) or (b) -- 7a14, 18, 24.

DEMONSTRABILIS, -E
Demonstrable.
Being susceptible of strict proof, as opposed to "investigando"
(2b16) -- "in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in
alia principia per se nota" 2b14.

DEMONSTRO, -ARE
To show forth.
To manifest, to show forth: "sensibles qualitates demonstrantes
naturam quae eis non subest" 23a39, 25a55.
Note. The word is used only twice in this work, and then not
in its usual significance of logical demonstration but in its
root meaning.

DEPREHENDO, -ERE
To be aware of, to note.
"per speciem boni...anima deprehendit in se rationem defectus,
et in hoc concipit rationem mali" 21a44.

DESIGNO, -ARE
To designate, to mean.
"aequalitas in divinis quandoque rationem quae designat
distinctionem personalem" 19a3.
Note. The word differs from SIGNIFICICO by having a greater implication of intrinsic meaning, whereas the latter connotes more an arbitrary or external sign.

DICENDUM QUOD

It must be maintained that.

Introduces St. Thomas's own position (see OBJICIO, Note).

DIFFERENTIA, -AE

Difference.

a) Strictly, as one of the five predicables of logic, (logical) difference: "verum, proprie loquendo, non potest esse differentia entis" 23b26, "ens enim non habet aliquam differentiam" 23b27, 2b28, 43, "ut differentia ad genus" 23b36;

b) in a loose sense of (a) -- "quodammodo" (23b36) 23b30.

DIGESTA, -ORUM

Digests, Pandects.

"in principio Digestorum" 14a56.

Note. The reference is to the code of Justinian, as is clear from the identity of the definition of justice given there.


DISPONO, -ERE

To modify.

passive. To be modified, to receive an impression, to become such: "visus per hoc quod disponitur per speciem coloris, cognoscit colorem" 3a39, "sensus disponitur" 25a54.
**DISPOSITIO, -IONIS**

Disposition, condition.

a) In general,

any condition, state, quality or attribute: "dispositionem inducere" 14b34, "dispositio enunciabitur" 14b34, "res... divino intellectui conformatur, qui eam cognoscit ut est secundum quamcumque dispositionem" 17a47, "dispositio vel corrumpens vel minuens" 4a8;

order, arrangement: "dispositio ibi non accipitur secundum quod est in genere qualitatis, sed secundum quod importat quemdam ordinem" 4all;

b) more specifically,

i) an attribute not really distinct: "verum est dis­ positio entis non quasi addens aliquam naturam" 4a2;

ii) real quality or condition: "dispositiones materiales quae sunt causae corruptionis" 14b48, "dispositio rerum" 25b15;

determination of a sense power, impression: "sensus ...dispositionem suam intellectui demonstrat" 25a54, 25b14.

**DISSIMILITUDO, -INIS**

Dissimilarity.

Contrasted with SIMILITUDO (q.v.) — 24a27, 35, 46, 49.

**DISTINCTIO, -IONIS**

Distinction.

a) real distinction or difference: "realis distinctio" 19a7,
under which is included the distinction between Persons of
the Blessed Trinity — "distinctionem personalem, sicut cum
dicimus quod Pater et Filius sunt aequales" 19a3, 12;
b) mental distinction, difference of concept: "non realis...
distinctio, sed rationis tantum, sicut cum dicimus sapientiam
et bonitatem divinam esse aequales" 19a9.

DISTINGUO, -ERE
To distinguish, to conceive as different.
 passive.
 a) to be conceived as differing in reality: "etsi personae
 realiter ab invicem distinguantur, non tamen ab esse
distinguuntur" 4b21, 23, "tres illae personae divinae re
distinguuntur" 4b18, "ens, verum, unum et bonum...non...
in rebus creatis distinguuntur etiam realiter" 4b30, 35;
b) to be conceived as only differing mentally, in concep-
tion: "ens, verum, unum et bonum...in Deo ratione
distinguuntur" 4b29.

DIVERSIFICO, -ARE
To diversify, to make multiple.
 Contrast with "una" (13a9) — "diversificatur veritas" 13a10.

DIVISIO, -IONIS
Division.
 a) Literally, in the ontological order,
state of physical division or distinction: "ens...secundum
divisionem unius ab altero, et hoc exprimit hoc nomen
'aliquid'" 3a16;
b) metaphorically, applied to the recognition of discrepancy of objective concepts, (negative) judgment: see COMPOSITIO, 2, with which it is always paired.

DIVIDO, -ERE

To divide.

Always metaphorically, to denote the separation of objective concepts in the mind, to judge (negatively): see COMPONO, with which it is always paired in contrast.
EFFECTUS, US

Effect.

Of truth, as the result of the action of the object upon the intellect -- "veritas...ad intellectum divinum comparatur quasi ad causam, ad humanum autem ad effectum" 9a35; 18a18.

EFFICIENS, -ENTIS

 Efficient.

In contrast to "exemplaris" -- "non esse extra animam existens non est causa efficiens veritatis, sed quasi exemplaris" 21a32. 

Note. In 21a35 it is preferable to omit "exemplari" as do the Vivès edition and three of the four Paris codices used for it (B, C, D), or else amend the text to read "([non] de causa exemplari [sed] efficiente".

ELECTIVUS, -A, -UM

Able to choose.

"veritas dicitur...de homine, qui est electivus orationem suarum" 7a30.

Note. The suffix "-ivus" usually denotes ability to do the action, with a connotation of actual performance which may vary for different words.

ENS, ENTIS (neuter adjectival substantive from sum, esse, not classical)

Being.

a) Note. The term is never formally defined or analyzed in this work. The derivation of the term is noted as indicating
that the notion of existence is prominent -- "'ens' sumitur ab actu essendi" 3a6, "ratio autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur" 4b8; yet except for a few cases in which an actually existing thing is meant (cf. b, infra), the term as used throughout the work implies simply that to which existence is proper -- "quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens" 2b30 (cf. A. Marc, pp. 87-90 of "L'Idée de l'Être", Archives de Philosophie, 1933, X, 1-144).

(In creatures) composition of essence and existence: "in omni ente...essentia ejus secundum quam esse dicitur" 3a2, "cum dicitur, 'Diversum est esse et quod est', distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui actus ille convenit" (4b6);

b) by emphasis, actually existing being: 6a25, 15a32 (twice), 43 (twice); plural. the hierarchy of existing beings: "illa quae sunt perfectissima in entibus, ut substantiae intellectuales" 21b43;

c) in the mental order,

i) the notion or idea of being: "omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens" 2b26 (twice), "ens non potest esse genus" 2b32, 34, 43, 45, 4b4, 13, 23b26 (twice), 29.

ii) the term or name being: "nomen 'res'...in hoc differt ab ente" 3a4, "verum et ens convertuntur" 17a38,
ENTITAS, -ATIS (not classical) Being.

The abstract term corresponding to the concrete ENS: "diversi gradus entitatis" 2b39, "ratio entitatis" 15b30, 3a49, 4a24, 4b1, 10a39; used in parallel with the abstract "veritas" 9a19, 9b4, 20a41, 55, 20b12.

**Note.** The term is not the abstract of "esse", existence.

ENUNTIABILE, -IS neut. subst. Enuntiable.

The formal object of a judgment, an unasserted judgment, the objective identity or difference of subject and predicate -- "omnium istorum enuntiabilium, Patrem esse vel generare, Filium esse vel esse genitum" 15b16; known by God, but not through separate judgments -- "scivit Deus plura enuntiabilia, sed tamen illa plura scivit una cognitione" 14a14, 12b55; used once of truth precisely as an object of judgment of a created intellect -- 12b48.

ENUNTIATIO, -IONIS Proposition.

1. The external, verbal expression of a judgment, proposition: "enuntiatio est signum intellectus" 24b27, 12b27, 17a29;
equivalent to "propositio" (4a45) 4a44, 17a57 (in reply to argument where "oratio", "enuntiatio" and "propositio" are all used in same meaning);

2. equivalent to "oratio" 13a41, 50;

2. equivalent to ENUNTIABILE -- 14a7, 17b41, 44, 47.

ENUNTIO, -ARE

To declare.

1. Literally,
to predicate, to pronounce: 14b37, 24a40;

2. metaphorically, by simply being such rather than by formal declaration,
to manifest: "sensus...non possunt omnino enuntiare nisi affectionem suam" 25bl.

ESSE

infin. of sum, esse, fui. To be, existence.

1. Used frequently simply as the infinitive of the copula sum.

2. As a noun,

existence, the act of being, to be: "forma uniuscujusque, per quam esse habet" 24b8, 3b35, 14b16, 18, 17a41, 20a40, 23b17, 15b37, "per intellectum divinum eas in esse producendo" 9a29, explicitly equivalent to "actus essendi" 4b6, used equivalently with the gerund "essendi" 4a18;

i) opposed to "secundum rationem" (16b56, 17a3), by emphasis,

reality, extra-mental existence: "remanet idem
secundum rationem sed non secundum esse" 16b56, 17a3;

ii) not really distinct from the Persons in God -- 4b22, 24, 15b14, but really distinct from the created essence -- "nulla res est suum esse" 9b40.

Note. From the explicit statement in the same paragraph that "nulla res est suum esse" (9b40), it is clear that "esse completum" must mean existence which is complemented (by composition with essence) when it belongs to things actually existing in the universe -- "de rebus quae habent esse completum in natura" 9b38.

ESSENDI (gerund of sum, esse, not classical) Existence.

The genitive case of the verbal noun ESSE, with which it is equivalently used 4b7, 15, "diversi modus essendi" 2b40, 46.

ESSENTIA, -AE Essence.

What a thing is: "hoc nomen 'res' exprimit quidditatem sive essentiam entis" 3a8, "in omni ente...essentia ejus secundum quam esse dicitur" 3a2,

the determinate nature of a thing: "forma est invariabili essentia consistens" 16b19, as opposed to what is merely incidental ("accidentalis" 9a22) -- "res in sua essentia permaneret" 9a25;

contrasted with "accidentia" -- "intima rei cognoscit; est enim intelligere...sensus enim et imaginatio sola exteriora accidentia
cognoscunt, solus autem intellectus ad *essentiam* rei pertinet" 26a55, 26b, but used even of accidents, namely of our operative powers (22a6, 11) -- "sensus non cognoscit *essentiam* suam" 22a6, equivalent to NATURA (cf. 2, a, 3.v.) 21b45, 53, 55, 56, 22a3, 6; used of the simple Divine Essence -- 13a24, 15b26, 31, 18b10, 13, 16, 21, 19a15.

(PER) *ESSENTIAM* see PER ESSENTIAM.

**ESSENTIALIS, -E** Essential.

Pertaining to the essence, essential: contrasted with "accidentalia" (18a5, 9) -- "immutabilis quantum ad *essentialia* rei manente re" 17b56, 57, 18a5, equivalent to "per se" (23b4) -- 23b3.

**ESSENTIALITER** (not classical) Essentially.

a) Essentially, naturally, necessarily: "quaelibet natura *essentialiter* est ens" 2b30;

b) opposed to "personaliter" (18a27), (predicated) as pertaining to the simple Essence of God: "esse in divinis non nisi *essentialiter* dicitur," 15b15, 18a27, 18b38, 40. (The expression is from St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VII, 2, PL 42, 936.)

**EVIDENTIA, -AE** Evidence.

The perspicuity proper to cogent argument: "ad cujus *evidentiam*
EXCEDO, -ERE
To exceed, to go beyond.
In a logical sense, referring to the extension of the concept of truth, not to its comprehension (as is clear from 2b32-36)
-- "non excedit nec exceditur ab ente" 4b4.

EXEMPLAR, -IS
Exemplar.
The model or pattern of things in the (divine) mind: "formam,
per quam res imitentur exemplar divinae artis" 20a47, "una
veritas in exemplari" 10a47.

EXEMPLARIS, -E
Exemplary.
Contrasted with "efficiens" (21a32) 21a33.

Note. For "causa exemplari efficiente" 21a35, see EFFICIENS,
Note s.v.

EXEMPLARITER
By way of exemplary causality.
"a veritate intellectus divini exemplariter procedit in intellectum nostrum veritas primorum principiorum" 9b50.

EXEMPIO, -ARE
To be the exemplary cause of.

passive. To be derived or caused by way of exemplary causality,
to have one's exemplary cause in: equivalent to "derivatur
exemplariter" (8a43) in the argument (art. VI, Contra, 2) to
which reply is being made -- "rebus proprie exemplatis ab in-
tellectu divino" 10a27, 3l,
equivalent to "imitandi exemplar divinum" (8b33) in the argument
being answered (art. VI, Contra, 6) -- "res exemplentur dif-
formiter a veritate divina" 10a4l, 46;
"sicut similitudo faciei resultat in speculo" (10b4-5) -- 10b2.

EXISTENS, -ENTIS Existing.

a) With emphasis on actuality or reality of existence,
actually existing: "rei existentis extra animam" 6b45, 3b48,
20a34, 40, 45, 23a17, 23b50;
said even of (real) privations -- "non esse extra animam
existent" 21a32, and of falsity -- "falsitatem in rebus
existentem" 24al;
b) non-emphatically, equivalent to the English participle (not	noun) "being",
being, existing: "Socrate existente albo" 17b16, 11, 14b50,
15bl, 23a52.

EXISTENTIA, -AE Existence.
The fact of existence: "veritas quae in anima causatur a rebus
...sequitur...existentiam rerum" 6a40.

EXISTIMATIO, -IONIS Estimate.

a) In intellect,
estimate, notion, idea: "sicut res...faciunt veram existima-
tionem in intellectu vel falsam" 25a39, 23b47, 53, 25b8, 14;
b) in sense knowledge of brute animals, 
sense-judgment, evaluation: "sensus autem judicium...existi-
matic naturalis; et sic judicat vis sensitiva de sensibilibus 
communibus et de sensibilibus per accidens" 25b40.

EXISTIMO, -ARE To think, to opine.
"quidam existimaverunt Deum esse corpus" 24a53, 55.

EXTERIOR, -IS Exterior, external.
"sensus enim et imaginatio sola exteriora accidentia cognoscent" 26a54.

Note. This wording and the context suggest that "exteriora 
accidentia" are to be contrasted not only with "essentiam rei" 
(26a55), but also with certain accidents, (internal) properties 
known only to the intellect.

EXTREMUM, -I Extreme, term.
The term or extreme of a relation: "in hac adaequatione vel 
commensuratione intellectus ac rei non requiritur quod utrumque 
extremorum sit in actu" 12b31.
FACIO, -ERE

To make.

To make, to cause efficiently (because of the "causa efficiens"
21a32): 21a28, 29, "falsam facit apprehensionem" 23a56.

FALLACIA (ACCIDENTIS) see ACCIDENS, 3.

FALLO, -ERE

To deceive.

"cum 'fallere' dico significo actionem quamdam defectum induc­
tem" 24a13, 14, "et ideo hoc quod dico 'fallere'...quantum ad id
quod importat defectum, in quo formaliter ratio falsitatis con-
sistit, ex dissimilitudine surgit" 24a22, 43, "judicium sensus
fallitur" 25b52.

FALSITAS, -ATIS

Falsity.

Opposed to VERITAS (q.v.) in all its various uses.

a) In dialectical portions of the work, without implying a
settled meaning, e.g. 24b31;

b) Opposed to "veritas rerum" -- "falsitas in rebus existens"
23b57, 17a36, 25a47, 48, 52;

c) opposed to "veritas" in its most proper and formal
sense -- "sicut veritas consistit in adaequatione rei et
intellectus, ita falsitas consistit in eorum inaequali-
tate "23a2, "defectum, in quo formaliter ratio falsitatis
consistit, ex dissimilitudine surgit" 24a26, 17a51, 17b9,
FALSUS, -A, -UM

False.

Opposed to VERUS (q.v.) in all its uses.

a) As an adjective,
false, untrue:

i) in the representative order -- "falsa oratio"
6a42, 7a8, 31, "falsa definitio" 26b30, 32,
"affirmatio falsa" 26b34, "intellectus falsus"
6a42, 7a9, 17, 26, 24a4, 7;

ii) in the order of reality -- "res falsae dicuntur
quae nates sunt videri quae non sunt, aut qualia
non sunt" 6a1, "res dicitur falsa secundum quod
nata est fallere" 24a12, 22a17, 23a41, "per com-
parationem ad intellectum divinum nulla res
potest esse falsa" 23a27, "aurum falsum" 23a45
see AURUM FALSUM;

b) used in a more substantive way, in a quasi-abstract sense
false, the false, falsity: "ipsa veritas creat non
habet aliquid simile falso" 10a6, 7, 8, "malum simplici-
ter inventur in rebus, non autem falsum" 24b21, 5a38,
5b19, 6b28.
FINIS, -IS

End.

1. Ending, termination: "veritas clauditur principio et fine" 13a41, 49.

2. End, purpose: 24b10, 11, 19, 29.

FORMA, -AE

Form.

1. In a very broad sense, attribute, qualification, property: "equivalent to "dispositio" (17a47) -- "veritas est forma maxime generalis, cum verum et ens convertantur" 17a37, 43, "res...sub quacumque forma existens" 23a17, 14b39, 46, 16b17, 18, 21.

2. Physical form, real determining principle:
   a) non-committal -- "res per formam suam imitantur artem divini intellectus" 20a35, 46, 20b15, 26, 24b15;
   b) substantial form: "per quam formam etiam unaquaeque res esse habet" 20a39, 14b40, 42, 17a41, 23b42, 43, 24b7;
   c) accidental form, intrinsic and real accident: opposed to that by extrinsic denomination -- 9b2, 6, opposed to "locus" (16b42) -- "forma inhaerens" 16b50;
      i) generically considered -- "forma generalis...color" 16b53, 17a1;
      ii) specifically -- "forma specialis...albedo" 16b53, 54.
FORMALITER

Formally.

Formally, in the full and most proper sense: "in quo formaliter ratio falsitatis consistit" 24a26.

FORMATIO, -IONIS

Formation.

(Representative) making or forming, formation: "formatio... quidditatum ab intellectu" 25b22, 24;
likewise, of sense apprehensions -- 25b31.

FUNDÚ, -ÅRE

To base (upon), to substantiate (in).

Equivalent to "substantificatur" in the argument (art. X, arg. 3) to which reply is being made -- "oportet falsitatem in rebus existentem supra veritatem fundari" 24a2.
GENERATIO, -IONIS
The act of generation, begetting.
"generatio ad hoc est, secundum Philosophum, ut salvetur perpetuum esse in specie" 14b14, 15a36.

GENUS, -ERIS
Genus, class.
a) In a broad and loose sense ("largo modo accipiendo genus" 10b10),
class, kind: "veritas prima est quodammodo de genere animae humanae, largo modo accipiendo genus" 10b9-10, 11, 2b42, 48;
b) strictly, as one of the predicables of logic, genus: "est in genere qualitatis" 4a12, 14b53, "per modum quo differentia additur generi" 2b28, 32, 23b37.

GIGNO, -ERE
To generate, to produce, to cause.
Metaphorically, of the action of the object on the mind -- "res ...sui notitiam in anima gignit" 24b17.

GRADUS, -US
Grade, degree.
"diversi gradus entitatis" 2b39.
HABITUDO, -INIS  Relationship.

"veritas...superaddit habitudinem adaequationis ad intellectum"
20a42, 56, 20b5.

Note. The above translation is confirmed on the basis of "referri" (20b2).

HABITUS, -US  Habit.

a) Loosely, in a sense approaching the root meaning of "a having",

natural power and tendency to act in a certain way: "unde et intellectus habitus principiorum dicitur" 26b13;

b) strictly, as the genus of virtus,

habit, (acquired) tendency to act in a certain way: "virtus est habitus in modum naturae rationis consentaneus" 14a51.
IMAGINATIO, -IONIS  Imagination.

"vis apprehensiva quae apprehendit speciem sensibilem...re absente, sicut imaginatio" 26a2, 5, 53.

IMITOR, -ARI  To imitate.

"res formam habet, artem divini intellectus imitatur" 24b16, 18, 18b43, 20a27, 35, 46.

Note. The word is used only of the relation of things to intellect, and only to the Divine Intellect.

IMMITTENS, -ENTIS  Imparting, sending to.

"[Deus] per essentiam suam cognoscit, non singulis suam cognitionem immittens" 13a30.

Note. The literal meaning of this word and its use here in the active voice suggest an emphasis on the fact that God's knowledge, unlike human knowledge, in no way depends on or is caused by creatures.

IMMUTABILIS, -E  Unchangeable, immutable.

See MUTABILIS, to the various senses of which it is opposed.

IMPLEO, -ERE  To fulfill, to measure up to.

"res naturalis...dicitur vera, in quantum implet hoc ad quod est ordinata per intellectum divinum" 5b48, 17b39.
IMPLICO, -ARE To implicate, to involve.

passive.

a) involved: "ipse defectus in actu fornicationis implicatus" 20b36;

b) intended, implied: "compositio quae implicatur...
definitionibus rerum" 7a16, 25.

Note. The meaning is stronger than that of the English word "implied", sometimes almost equivalent to "asserted".

IMPORTO, -ARE To connote.

To involve, to imply, to connote: "nullam principii rationem importat" 18b21, 7, 36, 37, 12b12, 19a2, 19a13, 24a23, 25.

Note. The meaning is perhaps not as strong as that of IMPLICO, although often stronger than that of the English "implied". St. Thomas suggests "connote" by the equivalent phrase "sine aliqua connotatione principii" (18b26).

IN ACTU see ACTUS, 1.

IN SE In itself.

Absolutely, without reference to others: in contrast to "in ordine ad aliud" (2b54), equivalent to "absolute" (3a1, 10) -- 2b52.

INAEQUALITAS, -ATIS Inequality, dissimilarity.

1. Literally, in an illustration from algebra,
inequality: 17b8.

2. Loosely,

non-correspondence, dissimilarity: "sicut veritas consistit in adaequatione rei et intellectus, ita falsitas consistit in eorum inaequalitate" 23a2, 29.

INDICATIVUS, -A, -UM

Indicative, representative.

Equivalent to "representativum alterius rei" (25b4) -- "sensus enim et est res quaedam in se, et est indicativus alterius rei" 25a49.

INDIVISIO, -IONIS

(State of) undividedness, absence of division.

"indivisio, et hanc exprimit hoc nomen 'unum'; nihil enim est aliud 'unum' quam ens indivisum" 3a10 -- involving the notion of "in se" (3a20) in contrast to "divisionem unius ab altero... 'aliquid'" (3a17).

INDUCO, -ERE

To bring in, to induce.

1. To induce, to bring about, to be the (inadequate) cause of:

"illa quae nata sunt contrarium dispositionem inducere" 14b35, 24a15, 42, 24b3 (twice).
2. To bring in, to introduce: "cum definitione Philosophi
supra inducta" 3b38, 5b53, 25a56.

INFERIORA, -ORUM
The lower bodies.
"in majori mundo superiora nihil accipiunt ab inferioribus"
26a13 -- ostensibly here the lower heavenly bodies and the
things of earth.

INFINITUS, -A, -UM
Indefinite.
Not actually infinite, but potentially, i.e., implying not
capacity for achieving actual infinity but simply unlimited
potency, hence,
indefinite(ly): "in infinitum iretur" 2b17, "in infinitum
procedere in rebus" 15a12, 16, 37;
indefinite (in number): "possent esse infinitae relationes in
eodem" 15a35.

INFLECTO, -ERE
To reflect.
Equivalent to "reflectitur" (2lb20) -- "intellectus inflectitur
in seipsum, et intelligit se sicut et alias res" 17b30.

INNATUS, -A, -UM
Innate, connatural.
"in intellectum angelicum species rerum innatae" 9b48.

Note. The word cannot be taken in the literal sense of "inborn"
here, obviously, for it is applied only to angels and not to men
or animals.
INQUIRO, -ERE To investigate, to examine.

"ulerius intellectus ex essentiis rerum comprehensis diversi-mode negotiatur ratiocinando et inquirendo" 26b3.

INSENSIBILIS, -E Unable to sense, non-sensory.

"potentiae naturales insensibiles...sicut ignis" 22al2,
"definitio falsa...quod aliquod animal est insensibile" 7al5, 17.

Note. The term is not the opposite of "sensibile" (i.e., able to be sensed), but of "sensitivus" (i.e., sensory, able to sense).

INTELLECTUALIS, -E Intellectual.

Endowed with intellect (angelic or human): "substantiae intellectuales redeunt ad essentiam suam reditioe completa" 21b44, 22al.

INTELLECTUS, -US Intellect.

1. a) The power of knowing essence: "solus autem intellectus ad essentiam rei pertingit" 26a56. Very frequent in this work, usually of the human intellect, but often of God's intellect, sometimes of both -- "adaequationis ad intellectum humanum vel divinum" 20a43, once of angel's intellect -- "intellectum angelicum" 9b47;

of intellect as causing things: "intellectus practicus causat res" 5b25, 26;
of intellect as determined or actuated by things:
"intellectus speculativus...est quodammodo motus a rebus" 5b26, 29;

b) sometimes connoting the power as in act -- "veritas in intellectu" 12b26, 27, 17a30, 17b10, 12, 18a18;

b) the activitating part of the intellect, acting intellect: "intellectus agens describatur quo est omnia facere" 6a50, 3b55, 56;

d) the receptive part of the intellect, passive, or possible, intellect: "et intellectus possibilis quo est omnia fieri" 6a52 (but Cf. ACTIVUS,

Note. St. Thomas suggests an etymological derivation, "nomen intellectus sumitur ex hoc quod intima rei cognoscit; est enim intelligere quasi intus legere" 26a51. The classical derivation is rather from "inter" and "legere".

2. Denoting the intellect precisely as actuated, not merely as in 1, b, supra (cf. De Veritate XVII, 1 corp.),
a) idea, concept: "voces eodem modo...sicut intellectus [nom. plur.] quos significant" 7a35, "addetur in intellectu veritatis ratio principii" 18b31 (compare "compositio intellectuum" in Summa Theologica, Ia, 17, 3 Sed Contra):
b) judgment: "nomen intellectus compositi, scilicet prout significat affirmationem propositionis" 3b32, "enuntiatio est signum intellectus" 4b28, 12b28, "eadem res quae significatur illis tribus propositionibus, non tamen est idem intellectus earum" 18a22, 23, 25.

c) reasoning: "Alio modo potest accipi intellectus communiter, secundum quod ad omnes operationes se extendit, et sic comprehendit opinionem et ratiocinationem" 26b41.

INTELLIGENTIA, -AE Understanding.


INTELLIGIBILIS, -E Pertaining to intellection.

"veritas prima est quodammodo de genere animae largo modo accipiendu genus, secundum quod omnia intelligibilia vel incorporalia unius generis esse dicuntur" 10b11, where it includes both the notion of able to understand and that of able to be understood (intelligible);

"intelligibile lumen" 10a27 see LUMEN INTELLIGIBILE.

INTELLIGO, -ERE To understand.

a) The proper action of the intellect -- "dicimur proprie intelligere cum apprehendimus quidditatem rerum, vel cum intelligimus ea quae statim nota sunt intellectui notis rerum quidditatis" 26b7, 9, 5b11;
"intelligere quasi intus legere" 26a52 see INTELLECTUS, 1.

Note; 

b) to know intellectually, to understand: "aliiquid intelligi sine altero" 3b41, 43, "intelligere se non esse" 13b40.

INTENTIO, -IONIS Notion, concept.

"intentio veri comparatur ad intentionem entis quodammodo ut differentia ad genus" 23b33, 34, 35, 36.

INTIMA, -ORUM Inmost depths, internal nature, essence.

Equivalent to "essentiam" (26a55) -- "intellectus...intima rei cognoscit" 26a51.

INVESTIGO, -ARE To investigate, to analyze.

The method proper to first philosophy, as opposed to strict demonstration "in demonstrabilibus" (2b14) -- "ita investigando quid est unumquodque" 2b16.

IRRATIONALIS, -E Irrational.

Not possessed of the power of reasoning (not merely deprived of the active exercise of the power): "animal irrationale" 26b29, 31.

ISAAC Rabbi Isaac Israeli.

Note. This Jewish philosopher and doctor lived in Egypt c. 845-940. He wrote in Arabic, but a Latin translation of his
writings by Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187) was possessed by the
scholastics and was available in the time of St. Thomas. Several
extant thirteenth century MSS. are listed by J. T. Muckle
("Isaac Israeli Liber de Definicionibus", Archives d'histoire
However, the exact words as given by St. Thomas do not appear
in that text, being only approximated in one place (ibid., 307),
whereas his own definition "veritas est quod est" appears
frequently (ibid., 321, 322, 333). "et sic dicit Isaac, quod
'veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus'" 3b6. Cf. J. T.
Muckle, "Isaac Israeli's Definition of Truth", Archives
d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen Âge, 1933, VIII,
5-8.
JUDICUM, -I

Judgment, perception.

1. Properly, referring to the intellect's own activity, judgment: "sed quando incipit judicare de re apprehensa, tunc ipsum judicium intellectus est quoddam proprium ei" 6b49, 52, "secundum quod judicium intellectus est de re secundum quod est" 21b17, 23a51, 25b24.

2. Analogically, of the operations of the sense powers, perception, natural estimate, sense-judgment: "sensus... judicium quod ex formatione praedicta consequitur; prout scilicet ex apprehensione tali natum est sequi tale judicium" 25b31-33, 34, "judicium sensus est de re secundum quod est" 21b33, "sensus judicium de sensilibilibus propriis semper est verum" 25b47, "in sensibilibus communibus et per accidens interdum judicium sensus fallitur" 25b51, 52.

JUDICO, -ARE

To judge, to perceive.

1. Properly, of the intellect, to judge: "tunc autem judicat intellectus de re apprehensa, quando dicit quod aliquid est vel non est, quod est intellectus componentis et dividendis" 6b53, 48, 9b45, 52, 53, 56, 21a38, 25b10, "anima vero in quantum de rebus judicat non patitur a rebus, sed magis quodammodo agit" 23a53.
2. Analogically, of sensory apprehension,
   to perceive, to sense: "sensus vere judicat de rebus"
   21b36, 37, 25a44, 25b27, "et sic judicat vis sensitiva de
   sensibilibus communibus et de sensibilibus per accidens"
   25b41.

JUS, JURIS

What belongs to someone: "unicuique jus suum tribuens" 14b2.
(No attempt is made at further definition or clarification.)

JUSTITIA, -AE

"justitia est 'constans et perpetua voluntas unicuique jus suum
tribuens'" 14b1, 4, "justitia divina" 14a44, "justitia humana"
14a45.
LOCUS, -I

Place.

"locus est immutabilis terminus continens" 16b45 (Aristotle, Phys., IV, 4, 212a20), explicitly extrinsic -- "est extrinsecum, ...sic ut locus non dicitur moveri quando aliquid secundum locum movetur" 16b42, 43, 12b17, "per localem motum non dicitur esse successio locorum in uno locato, sed magis successio locatorum in uno loco" 16b47, 49.

LUMEN, -INIS

Light, illumination, intelligence.

a) Of God,

(divine) intelligence: "a lumine divino" 10a27;

b) of created intellects, with "intelligibile",

intelligence, light of intelligibility, illumination of the acting intellect: 10a27 (first occurrence), 29.

Note. The word is used only in a preliminary dialectical argument (art. IV, Contra, 2) from the pseudo-Dionysius ("ut patet per Dionisium" 8a46) and in reply to the same. Furthermore, it is always used with the adjective "intelligibile" when said of creatures. The phrase would be translated literally "intelligible light", "light able to be understood", but this is meaningless in the context. Use of this and similar expressions in St. Thomas's commentary In Boetium De Trinitate (I,1) as referring to the action of the acting, or agent, intellect
suggest the meaning given above for the present case. This is
born out by the phrases "vim manifestandi habet" (8a44) and
"ipse vigor intellectus ad intelligendum" (De Ver. IX, 1). It
is analogous when applied to Divine and human intellectual
illumination, by proper analogy — "a lumine divino, tamen lumen
proprie dicitur etiam de intelligibilibus luminibus creatis...
ideo non dicimus unum lumen" 10a27 (second occurrence), 28, 29,
33. Cf. J. Guillet, O.P., "La lumière intellectuelle d'après
S. Thomas", Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du
MALUM, -I

Bad, evil.

a) As an adjective — "quamvis istum fornicari sit malum" 4a56, 21a47;

b) used in a more substantive way,

i) in a quasi-abstract sense,

the bad, badness: "malum est in rebus" 5b18, 24b19, "ratio boni et mali" 20b55, 21a46 (first occurrence);

ii) more concretely,

bad, bad thing: "malum non sit a Deo" 21a37, 38, 39, "malum non agit in animam nisi per speciem boni"
21a42, 46 (second occurrence).

MANEO, -ERE

To remain (in existence), to last.

"prima perfectio est forma uniuscujusque per quam habet esse, unde ab ea nulla res destituitur dum manet" 24b9.

MATERIA, -AE

Matter.

a) (Prime) matter, undifferentiated matter: "unitas per se attribuitur materiae primae, non per positionem alicujus formae unitatis, sed per remotionem formarum diversificantium" 14b38, 42;
b) (second) matter, matter united with form: "dicimus esse plures materias quam unam" 14b43.

Note: The term is only used in an example, and is not treated ex professo in this work.

MATERIALIS, -E Material, physical.

"dispositiones materiales, quae sunt causae corruptionis" 14b48.

MATERIALITER Materially.

In a logical sense, as opposed to formally, in subject-matter only: "non perfecte exprimit rationem veritatis, sed quasi materialiter tantum" 23b16.

MAXIME In the fullest sense, most completely.

"maxime entia...maxime vera" 4a5, 17, 20, 21.

MEDIUS, (-A), -UM subst. Intermediary, go-between.

"actus cognitionis est medius inter cognoscentem et cognitum" 21b51, "non est possibile ut organum medium cadat inter potentiam sensitivam et seipsum" 22a10, "sensus inveniatur quodammodo medium inter intellectum et res" 25a31.

Note: The use of both masculine and neuter genders as substantives is confirmed in classical Latin usage.

MENS, MENTIS Mind.

a) Opposed to "in rebus" (5b19),
mind, thought: "verum et falsum in mente" 5a39, 5b20 (a translation of Aristotle’s Ev [τὸ] ἡμανολα, Metaphys. VI, 4, 1027b27 — "thought" in the Oxford translation by W. D. Ross, ibid.);

b) equivalent to "intellectus",

i) "mente nostra" 10b3, "mens decipitur" 24a48;

ii) of God’s intellect, always in context of exemplary causality — "in mente divina" 14a4, 17b40, 43, 10b3.

MENSURA, -AE

Measure.

a) Norm, standard, pattern: equivalent to "ars" — "veritas... in rebus secundum quod imitantur intellectum divinum, qui est earum mensura sicut ars est mensura omnium artificiorum" 20a29, 9b11, 13, 23a7, usually with "extrinsecas" — "veritas...qua denominantur omnia vera sicut extrinsecas mensura" 12b53, 13a50, 17b28, "mensura extrinsecas, sicut locatum loco" 12b17, 9b18, 20;

b) (internal) dimension, form (cf. FORMA, 1), measurement:

"sicut mensura intrinsecas...et has etiam mensuras oportet plurificari secundum pluralitatem mensuratorum, sicut diversorum corporum sunt dimensiones diversae" 9b23, 25, 17a11, "mensuratur autem corpus mensura intrinsecas, sicut linea, vel superficie, vel profunditate" 12b15.
MENSURATIO, -IONIS

Measure, norm.

Equivalent to "mensura extrinseca" (Cf. MENSURA, a) -- "intellectus enim practicus causat res, unde est mensuratio rerum quae per ipsum fiunt...sicut omnia artificiata in intellectu artificis" 5b27.

MENSURO, -ARE

To measure.

1. To act as the norm for, to determine by way of exemplary causality (not "to ascertain measurement of", as in English): of the Divine intellect toward things -- "res...sunt mensuratae ab intellectu divino" 5b35, 39, 40, 41, 9b11, 23a7, 18b17, 34;
of created things toward created intellect as knowing them -- "sed intellectus speculativus...res mensurant ipsum" 5b31, 34, 41, 12b24, 20a33, but of created intellect toward things it can make -- "intellectus practicus...mensurans" 5b42.

2. Loosely -- "[Dei] cognitio...aeternitate mensuretur" 13a34.

MODUS, -I

Way, manner.

a) Used frequently, with no philosophical implications, to express the way or manner something is done or exists;
except,

b) the way something is conceived,
aspect, meaning: "alia dicuntur addere supra ens in quantum exprimunt ipsius modum, qui nomine entis non
exprimitur" 2b35, 37 (second occurrence), 38, 48, 50, 3a13 (first occurrence), 4a4.

**MOTUS, -US**  
Motion, activity.

a) In an intransitive sense,
   local motion: "per motum localem" 16a46;
   activity, motion: "cujuslibet motus" 5b1, "motus cognitivae virtutis" 5b2, "motus appetitivae virtutis" 5b5;
   whole sequence of connected activities: equivalent to "circulum quemdam in actibus animae" (5b9 -- "res intellecta movet appetitum, et appetitus tunc ducit ad hoc quod perveniat ad rem a qua motus incepit" 5bl4;

b) in a transitive sense,
   activation, causation of movement: "lux quae causatur in aere ab extrinseco, scilicet ex sole, sequitur motum solis magis quam aerem" 6a37.

**MOVEO, -ERE**  
To move, to set in motion.

"res quae est extra animam movet intellectum, et res intellecta movet appetitum" 5bl0, 12, 23b53, "sicut locus non dicitur moveri quando aliquid secundum locum movetur" 16b42, 43;
   perf. part. "intellectus speculativus...est quodammodo motus a rebus" 5b30.

Note. This verb is always transitive in the active voice, unlike the English "move" which is ambiguous. The passive is usually
indicated by the use of the preposition "a, ab", otherwise the passive has the force of a middle voice.

**MULTUS, -A, -UM**

Much, pl. many.

"hujusmodi veritates resultantes in animabus nostris a prima veritate sunt multae" 10b7.

Note. The word here simply signifies numerical multiplicity, not variety of kinds or analogy. Cf. PLUS.

**MUNDUS MAJOR**

The macrocosm, the universe at large.

The universe, including the heavenly bodies as well as the earth and its elements: "in majori mundo superiora nihil accipiunt ab inferioribus, sed everso" 26a12.

**MUTABILIS, -E**

Changeable.

a) Being the subject of change: "subjectum mutationis, sicut dicimus corpus esse mutabile" 16b17, 18, 22;

b) being the formality which changes: "secundum ipsum fit mutatio...et sic quaeritur de veritate, an sit mutabilis" 16b27;

i) by extrinsic denomination -- "locus est immutabilis terminus continentis" 16b45;

ii) by change of internal determination,

a') within a generic form, "secundum esse sed non secundum rationem" (17a3) -- "veritas rei
secundum ordinem ad intellectum divinum...

mutatur veritas rei mutabilis in aliam veritatem, non in falsitatem" 17a35;

b') by change of specific form, "forma enim specialis post mutationem non remanet eadem nec secundum esse nec secundum rationem"

(16b54-56) -- 18a3, 4.

See also MUTATIO, MUTU.

MUTATIO, -IONIS Change.

Note. If translated "change", this word must be understood in a passive or intransitive meaning.

a) In a general sense -- 16b16, 24, 29, "facta omni mutatione" 18a12;

b) specifically,

i) extrinsic change: 16b40;

ii) intrinsic change: 16b37, 51, 52;

a') change within a generic form: "sicut facta mutatione de albo in nigrum, manet idem color secundum communem rationem coloris, sed non eadem coloris species" 17a4, "forma generalis facta mutatione remanet eadem secundum rationem, sed non secundum esse" 17a2, 39, 44;

b') change of specific form: "sicut albedo,
facta alteratione, nullo modo manet"
(16b57-17a1) -- "forma enim specialis post
mutationem non remanet eadem nec secundum
esse nec secundum rationem" 16b55, 17b14, 55,
18a6, 10.

See also MUTABILIS, MUTO.

MUTO, -ARE
To change.

a) In general -- "aliquid dicitur mutari dupliciter; uno modo..."
16b15, 23, 25, 17b24;

b) specifically,

   i) to change only by extrinsic denomination: 16b39;

   ii) to change intrinsically: 16b30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41,
50, "unde res creatae variantur quidem in participa-
tione veritatis primae; ipsa autem veritas prima,
secundum quam dicitur vera, nullo modo mutatur"
17a15;

   a') To change within a generic form: (cf.
MUTABILIS, b, ii, a', and MUTATIO, b, ii, a')
-- 16b53, "si autem accipimus veritatem in-
haerentem rebus, sic veritas mutari dicitur
secundum quod aliqua secundum veritatem
mutatur" 17a22, 24, "mutatur veritas rei
mutabilis in aliam veritatem, non in falsi-
tatem" 17a35;
b') to change as regards a specific form: (cf. MUTABILIS, b, ii, b', and MUTATIO, b, ii, b')

-- 17a57, 17b11, 12, 13, 20, 53.

See also MUTABILIS, MUTATIO.

Note. This verb is always transitive in the active voice, unlike the English "change" which is ambiguous. The passive is usually indicated by use of the preposition "a, ab", otherwise the passive has the force of a middle voice.
NATURA, -AE  

Nature.

1. In the logical order,
   nature as conceived: "enti non potest addi aliquid quasi extranea natura" 2b27, 4a3.

2. In the ontological order,
   a) in general,
      nature, essential constitution: equivalent to "quod quid est" (23a37) -- 23a40, 15a51, 17b41, 42;
      equivalent to "essentia" -- 2b29, 44;
      with implication of internal source of activity,
      14a49, 52;
      i) opposed to "accidentia" -- 23a47;
      ii) said of accidents -- "ex natura virtutis est" 14a53, "natura ipsius actus" 21b25, 40,
          "natura...intellectus" 21b26, 28, 39;
   b) reality, extra-mental existence: "relatio naturae" 15a50;
      order of things: "Deus natura sit prior omnibus creaturis" 15a48, 54;
      i) with "rerum",
          the world of reality, nature, the universe:
          "in rerum natura" 9b39, opposed to "in ratione tantum" (15a5, 25, 31) -- 14b54, 15a1, 4, 11,
          24, 30, 39, 56;
ii) with "propria",
in itself, existing in its own nature: "res non fuerint ab aeterno in propria natura"
14a27, 28, 31.

NATURALIS, -E

Natural.

1. Physical, corporeal: "res naturales" 14a46, 5b32, 40, 42;
   having its own intrinsic nature 5b43;
   contrasted with what is free or voluntary 14a46;
   contrasted to what is in the realm of consciousness --
   "potentiae naturales insensibiles" 22al2.
2. Proper to a nature, flowing from the very nature of a thing:
   "naturalis autem actus alicujus rei semper est uno modo,
   nisi per accidens" 25b43, contrasted with "per quamdam collationem" (25b37) -- "sensus autem judicium de quibusdam est
   naturale" 25b35, "existimatio naturalis" 25b40.

NATUS, -A, -UM

Apt by nature.

Note. Only the perfect participle of the verb "nascor" appears
in the work, and not in the literal sense of "born", but
denoting that which is so constituted that by its very nature
it has a tendency or aptitude for a certain action or object.
Apt by nature, able naturally, tending naturally: "res...natae
sunt facere de se veram apprehensionem in intellectu humano"
20a31, 3a25, 4a24, 4bl, 5b56, 6a1, 7a28, 13b4, 20a31, 37, "illa
quae nata sunt contrariam dispositionem induere" 14b34.

NECESSARIO
Necessarily.

"nec res...necessario falsitatem causat" 23a50, 25b9.

NEGATIO, -IONIS
Negation.

1. (Verbal) negation, denial, negative proposition: "negatio et affirmatio" 24a10, 3a8.

2. In the ontological order,
lack, non-entity: "negationes vel privationes existentes extra animam" 20a44, 13a54, "negationes et defectus" 21a20, 23a12.

NEGOTIOR, -ARI
To engage in.

"intellectus...negotiatur ratiocinando et inquirendo" 26b2.

Note. The word literally means "to do business", used metaphorically of engaging in any activity.

NOMEN, - INIS
Word, name, term.

Note. The word is frequently used, but always in the sense of simply a "word" in the grammatical sense.

NON ENS
Non-being.

a) Opposed to ENS, a (q.v.),

that to which non-existence is proper, that which has not existence: "omnis defectus est non ens" 24a18, "non ens est
apprehensum ab intellectu" 4a37, 38;

b) opposed to ENS, b (q.v., and see also PRIVATIO), privation in the real order: "non ens extra animam existens" 13b8, 13, 15, 22, 55, 14a7, 8, 21a30.

NON ESSE Non-existence.

Opposed to ESSE, 2,

non-existence, the non-being indicated by a negative proposition; "non esse rei" 13b18, "non esse extra animam existens" 21a27, 31.

NOTUS, -A, -UM perf. part. of nosco. Known, understood.

"principia per se nota" 2b15, "quae statim nota sunt intellectui" 26b9, "notis rerum quidditatus" 26b10.

Note. The word is used in this work to refer to intellectual knowledge exclusively.

NOTITIA, -AE Acquaintance, knowledge.

"res...ingerant sui notitiam in intellectu nostro" 20a48, 23a31, 24b16.
OBJECTIO, -IONIS

Preliminary dialectical argument, objection.

"objectio autem procedebat de causa efficiente" 21a34. See OBJICIO, Note.

OBJICIO, -ERE

To put forth, to throw in front of.

"quae contra objiciuntur" 4a50, 24a32, "ex hoc patet solutio ad objecta" 22a16, 26b48.

Note. It is clear from an analysis of the method of St. Thomas that OBJECTIO, "objecta", "objiciuntur", etc., are not to be taken as equivalent to the more recent scholastic "objection", as to a thesis laid down.

Aristotle's typical procedure in approaching a problem was to begin each book or chapter with a review of the opinions of those who had previously discussed the question, less with a view to the setting down of historical fact than with a desire to put himself in contact with the experience of earlier thinkers, and to set the problem in its clearest light before beginning his own analysis and solution. To call this the dialectical phase of his treatment is not to imply any of the display of skill in logic, still less any of the sophistry, sometimes connoted by the modern use of the term dialectical, nor to put it in the class of a mere schoolboy exercise upon a matter already settled, but rather to state the first step in his philosophical method.
St. Thomas imitated Aristotle in this point more closely than the difference of the printed page would lead one to suspect. His word "objicio", like the Greek προβάλλω (whence πρόβλημα, "problem"), means not to "object" against a settled thesis, but to offer for consideration, to throw up as a possible view. His own position, and the demonstration of the same, begins with the words, "Respondeo dicendum". That the arguments offered in the "Sed contra" are still in the dialectical phase of his procedure is clear for many reasons. First, by analogy with Aristotle, as discussed above, he is putting forth various possible solutions. Secondly, these arguments are almost entirely a matter of quoting authorities, and very often of Holy Scripture; yet it is known what place these held for St. Thomas in a strictly philosophical demonstration. Thirdly, the "Sed contra" often represents a view as divergent from his own as that in the first series of arguments, so that his own position is a mean between these extremes; in this case he usually provides answers of "solutiones" to both series (e.g., art. IV of this work). Fourthly, that he does not offer the "Sed contra" as his own view appears from cases where he answers it even though it is a single argument (e.g., Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, 8, 3), or where he disagrees with it explicitly in the body of the article (e.g., Summa Theologica, Ia 78, 4), or finally, where he comes closer to agreeing with the first series ("objections"?) in his
reply (e.g., Summa Theologica, Ia 17, 2).


OBJECTUM, -I
Object.
That which is presented for knowledge, hence, knowable and known:
"quidditas rei est objectum intellectus" 26b15, "sensus...objectum sunt sensibles qualitates" 23a34.

OPERATIO, -IONIS
Operation, function.
"operatio, quae est finis rei, vel id propter quod ad finem devenitur" 24b10, 20b21, 22, "intellectus...secundum quod ad omnes operationes se extendit" 26b42, 26, 7a38, 21b16.

ORATIO, -IONIS
Speech, words, assertion.
"homo, qui est electivus orationum suarum" 7a30; equivalent to "enuntiatio" -- 6a41, 13a42, 43, 44, 48.

ORDINATIO, -IONIS
Ordering, plan.
"verum est secundum ordinationem veram in intellectu divino" 15b3, "sicut...ordinationem artis in artifice" 15b6.
ORDER, -INIS

Order, relation.

1. Order:
   a) arrangement, sequence: "hoc ordine progreditur" 25a28,
   b) place in an order or scheme of things: "idem est ordo alicujus rei in esse et veritate, ita scilicet quod ubi inventur quod est maxime ens, inventur quod est maxime verum" 4a18, 13.

2. Relation: equivalent to "convenientia" -- "bonum...dicit ordinem ad appetitum" 5b15;
   equivalent to "comparatio", "relatio" -- "veritas rei secundum ordinem ad intellectum divinum" 17a34, 49, 3a14, 7a19, 20, 25b23, 30;
   in the phrase "in ordine ad" (does not denote purpose) -- 2b54, 6a9, 9a38, 39, 23b10, 40, 25a36, 41.

ORGANUM, -I

Organ, sense-organ.

"sensus nihil cognoscit nisi per organum corporale" 22a9, 10, 23b49, 26a4.

Note. St. Thomas is not at all explicit as to the specific organs of sensation in this work. To define the mind of St. Thomas (and Aristotle) accurately on the localization of sense organs is a very difficult problem. Cf. Joseph de Tonquédec, "Notes d'exégèse thomiste: Milieux et organes de la sensation", Archives de Philosophie, 1925, III, 2: 156-167.
PARS, PARTIS

1. Opinion, side of a dialectical discussion: "ideo oportet rationibus utriusque partis respondere".

2. Logical component, note: "conjungit partes definitionis ad invicem" 26b26.

3. A whole considered precisely as source of a certain class of activities: "vis cogitativa, quae est potentia sensitivae partis" (sc. animae) 25b39.

(EX) PARTE RERUM see RES, c.

PATICR, -I To be acted upon.

Opposed to AGO -- "intellectus...non patitur a rebus, sed magis quodammodo agit" 23a53, 18a19.

PARTICULARIS, -E Particular, individual.

Equivalent to "individuo" (14b17, 20) -- 14b12.

PER ACCIDENS Accidentally, incidentally.

1. Accidentally, through mishap, unintentionally: "nisi per accidens impediatur" 25b44, 26b19.

2. a) Incidentally, by reason of something else: "species...non corrumpitur per se, sed per accidens ad corruptionem individui" 14b19, 26, 30, 35;
b) indirectly, by means of something else: "sensus...de sensibilibus per accidentem" 25b42, 51.

PER CONSEQUENS
Consequently.

By logical necessity, as a consequence, consequently: 21b40, 24a55.

PER ESSENTIAM
Essentially, in essence.

a) Opposed to "differunt ratione" (4a28),
in essence, really: "per essentiam differunt" 4a32, 15b36;
b) opposed to "per suam speciem" (5a52),
in real (physical) essence: "res non sunt in anima per suam essentiam, sed per suam speciem" 4b51;
c) opposed to "diversas cognitiones" (13a26),
through (His own) Essence: "[Deus] omnia per unum, scilicet per essentiam suam cognoscit" 13a29.

PER POSTERIUS
Secondarily, less properly.

Explicitly equivalent to "secundario",
secondarily, in an analogous sense: "secundario autem dicitur verum et per posterius" 7a6, 5a45, 55, 5b22, 6a16.

PER PRIUS
Primarily, properly.

a) Contrasted with PER POSTERIUS,
in a primary sense, properly, more properly: "per prius et posterius" 5b22, "verum per prius dicitur de compositione
vel divisione intellectus" 7a22, 4, 5a47, 50, 56, 5b23, 6a5, 15, 6b30, 31;

b) primarily: "per prius etiam inest rei veritas per comparationem ad intellectum divinum" 9a30.

PER SE

Of itself.

a) Of itself, on its own account, in itself: "universale...non corrupitur per se, sed per accidens ad corruptionem individui" 14b19, "nomine substantiae exprimitur quidam specialis modus essendi, scilicet per se ens" 2b47;

b) properly, by reason of its nature: "a sensu...cujus per se objectum sunt sensibiles qualitates" 23a34, 14b22, 38, 23b4.

PERCIPIO, -ERE

To perceive.

To know by sense knowledge: "sensu percipitur" 10a2.

PERFECTIO, -IONIS

Perfection, actuality.

"duplex est perfectio" 24b6,

a) substantial form: "prima perfectio est forma unius-cujusque, per quam habet esse" 24b7, 13;

b) operation: "secunda perfectio est operatio" 24b10, 12.

PERFECTISSIMUS, -A, -UM

Most perfect.

On the highest level of perfection (of species, not of most perfect individuals within species): "quae sunt perfectissima in entibus, ut substantiae intellectuales" 21b43.
PERFECTUS, -A, -UM  Perfect.
   a) Complete, in the full measure: Equivalent to "completa" (5a49) -- "perfecta ratio veritatis" 5a52, 55, 23b15;
   b) perfect, adequate: "bonum uniuscujusque rei consistit in perfecta operatione ipsius" 20b20, 21, 24b26.

PERFICIO, -ERE  To perfect.
   To bring to perfection, to complete: "cognitio nostra...perficitur in intellectu" 25a29, "cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam" 3a35, 45, 3b6.

PERPETUUS, -A, -UM  Perpetual, constant.
   Constant, unvarying once it is established: contrasted with "aeternum" -- 14a5, 46, 47, 14b8.

PERSONA, -AE  Person.
   1. One of the three Divine Persons of the Blessed Trinity (with no attempt at formal treatment or further definition) -- 4b18, 19, 21, 24, 18b41.
   2. Stage character, person of a play: "tragoedus qui representat veras personas in theatris" 24a4.

PERSONALITER  Personally.
   Appropriately to one of the Divine Persons: opposed to "essentialiter" 18a27, "metaphorice vel similitudinariae accipitur veritas in divinis...et secundum hanc acceptionem veritatis
proprie dicitur de Filio, et personaliter dicitur" 13b54.

PERTINGO, -ERE  
To attain.

To attain, to arrive at (not "pertain to"): "solus intellectus ad essentiam rei pertingit" 26a56.

PHANTASIA, -AE  
Power of phantasy, imagination.

Equivalent to "imaginatio" (26a2), contrasted with external sense -- "sensus non est dominus falsitatis, sed phantasia" 26a10.

PHILOSOPHUS, -I  
The Philosopher.

Aristotle: this is the usual manner of referring to him, frequent throughout the work.

PLUS, PLURIS  
More, pl. several.

"Veritatis autem quae sunt in rebus sunt plures" 9a19, 53.

Note. The plurality here indicated is numerical, not of kind.

Logical truth, truth in the mind, is analogous, but ontological truth, the truth of things, is one for each thing, multiplied only by plurality of things -- "plurium verorum sunt plures veritates; sed unius rei una est tantum veritas" 9a53-54.

PONO, -ERE  
To assert, to affirm.

Literally, to place, to set down. Metaphorically, as always in this work,
to assert, to affirm: except in "cognoscunt aliquud extra se positum" 21b47, where the participle means "existing", "located".

POSITIO, -IONIS Affirmation, attribution.

Cf. PONO. "unitas per se attribuitur materiae primae, non per positionem alicujus formae unitatis, sed per remotionem formarum diversificantium" 14b39.

POSITIVE Positively, affirmatively.

"ea quae in rebus positive dicuntur" 23a8, contrasted with "negationes et defectus" (23a12-13).

POTENTIA, -AE Potency, power.

1. Opposed to actuality,

potency, possibility: "nulla est res quam intellectus divinus non actu cognoscit, et intellectus humanus in potentia" 6a50, 56.

2. Opposed to operation,

power, ability, proximate principle of activity: equivalent to VIRTUS, 2, and VIS -- "potientiae naturales insensibiles" 22a12, "vis cogitativa, quae est potentia sensitivae partis" 25b33, "potentia sensitiva" 22a11, 4b33, 10a39.

Note. In view of the fact that St. Thomas uses this word almost exclusively when speaking of the powers of the soul, it seems quite unjustifiable when translating St. Thomas to
risk the unpleasant connotations which have accrued to the word "faculty" in the psychology of the recent past.

PRAEMISSA, -ORUM  
Previous considerations.

"ut ex praemissis apparat" 16al.

Note. Derived from "praem" and "mitt", the word literally means "to send before". It here refers, like "objectum" (22a16, 26b48), to the preliminary dialectical arguments proposed before the body of the article. Cf. OBJICIO, Note.

PRINCIPALIUS  
Chiefly, in a more important sense.

"res aliqua principalius dicitur vera in ordine ad veritatem intellectus divini" 9a37.

PRINCIPIUM, -I  
Principle, beginning.

1. Start, beginning:
   a) first moment (in time): "veritas clauditur principio et fine" 13a41, 42, 46;
   b) first part (in place): "in principio Digestorum dicitur" 14a56, 2b23, 3a5, 4a43.

2. Logical principle, principle of demonstration, basic truth:
   "in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia per se nota" 2b15, "prima principia, quae cognoscimus cum terminos cognoscimus" 26b11, 13, 36, 46, "veritas primorum principiorum secundum quam de omnibus judicamus" 9b51.
3. Ontological principle, origin:
   a) proximate principle of action, active power: "principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus" 2lb26;
   b) origin:
      i) real cause: "ratio principii ad creaturas ad quas intellectus divinus comparatur ut... causa" 18b32, 18, 20, 26, 35, 36, 37, 48, 6a34;
      ii) denoting origin or procession in the Blessed Trinity without dependence, causality, or succession in time -- "hoc modo dicitur veritas in divinis summa imitatio principii, quae Filio convenit" 18b51.

PRIVATIO, -IONIS
Privation.
Lack of something proper to a nature: "privationem quae est caecitas" 20b3, "negationes vel privationes non habent aliquam formam" 20a44, "privatio et negatio rei" 13a54, 20b14, 23a17.

PROCEDO, -ERE
To proceed, flow logically.
"objectio autem procedebat de..." 21a34, 23b39.

PROPINQUIOR, -IUS
Nearer.
Relative degree of perfection (not physical proximity): "sensus ...qui est propinquior intellectuali substantiae" 22a1.
PROPONTO, -IONIS  
Proportion, symmetry.

Note. Like ADAEQUATIO, to which it is equivalent in this work, the word is not to be taken in a strict mathematical sense but as denoting a correspondence between the representative and the real order. "proportio intellectus ad rem" 21b23, 41.

PROPOSITIO, -IONIS  
Proposition.

1. Equivalent to ENUNTIATIO, 1, -- "affirmatio propositionis" 23b18, 4a45;
2. equivalent to JUDICIUM, 1, -- "causa veritatis negativarum propositionum quasi faciens eas in intellectu" 21a28, "intellectus compositi...propositionis" 3b33.

PROPOSITUM, -I  
Proposed (argument).

"Et sic est in proposito" 14b44. Refers to dialectical argument to which reply is being made. Cf. OBJICIO, Note.

PROPRIETAS, -ATIS  
Property, predicate.

Loosely, referring to any quality or attribute which can serve as a basis for predication -- "proprietas quam praedicat hoc nomen 'homo'" 15b34, 13.

PROPRIUS, -A, -UM  
Proper, own.

1. Proper, suitable:
   a) proper or suitable to being known by a given external sense power: "de propriis sensibilibus" 25b35, 48;
b) suited to knowing a certain type of object or sensible quality: "sensus proprius" 26al.

2. Equivalent to "suus",

one's own: "cognoscunt essentias proprias" 21b53, 6b40, 50, 7a40, 26b15.

PURUS, -A, -UM Genuine, unmixed.

Merely, simply (unmixed with any other reality, i.e., real horse in this case): "equus pictus non esset falsus equus, nisi esset pura pictura" 24a8.
QUALIS, -E

Such, of such a kind.

Broadly, not restricted to the category of quality — "dicuntur falsa quae nata sunt videri aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non sunt" 6a2, 23a44, 25b52.

QUALITAS, -ATIS

Quality.

"in genere qualitatis" 4a12, "a forma inhaerente, sicut...a qualitate sua" 9b7, "illam formam cujes indicia exterius ostenduntur per sensibiles qualitates" 23b45, 23a39, "sensus... cujes per se objectum sunt sensibiles qualitates" 23a34.

Note. No attempt is made to define the word or discuss the category in this work.

QUANTITAS, -ATIS

Quantity.

"est inhaerens ei...sicut albedo vel quantitas" 16b34, 17a56, "genera, in quantum hujuusmodi, aliquid ponant in rerum natura, quantitas enim ex hoc ipso quod quantitas est, aliquid dicit" 14b55, 56.

QUIDDITAS, -ATIS

Quiddity.

1. What a thing is: explicitly equivalent to "essentia" -- quidditatem sive essentiam entis" 3a7;

the proper object of intellection -- "quidditas rei est proprie objectum intellectus" 26b14, 8, 10.
2. The mental representation of quiddity, concept: "intellectus formans quidditates non habet nisi similitudinem rei existentis extra animam" 6b43, 25b23, the result of the first operation of the intellect -- "formatio quidditatis sit prima operatio intellectus" 7a38, 6b10, 34.

Note. That knowledge of quiddity does not mean adequate and specific knowledge of an essence precisely as "infima species" is clear from a study of St. Thomas's description of the actual process of human knowledge, in spite of the rather ideal impression he sometimes gives when speaking of knowledge in general. Rather, as Gilson remarks on p. 222 of the work noted below, "the quiddity is the essence insofar as it is knowable and definable by us", at least in its generic but essential notes. The laborious process in store for him who would work out specific differences is referred to in article 12 of the work being studied, and in Summa Theologica, Ia, 85, 5 ad 3um; 17, 3 corp.; 87, 1 ad finem corp., etc. Compare also the texts in which he states that "differentiae essentiales sunt nobis ignotae" (De Veritate IV, 1 ad 8um); Q. Disp. De Spirit. Creat., q. un., 11 ad 3um; Q. Disp. De Anima, q. un., 12 ad 8um. Cf. J. de Tonquedec, La Critique de la Connaissance, Note "Sur l'expression de la dernière différence spécifique", 542-543; Etienne Gilson, Réalisme Thomiste et Critique de la Connaissance, 222 and notes ibid.; Cajetan, In De Ente et Essentia, cap. vi, quaest. xv ad

QUOD EST
That which is, essence.
Explicitly equivalent to "id cui actus essendi convenit" (4b7)
-- "diversum est esse et quod est 4b6.

QUOD QUID EST
What a thing is, quiddity.
Equivalent to "quidditas" (26b14) -- "intellectus in cognoscendo quod quid est" 23a37. (Cf. de Tournédec, La Critique de la Connaissance, Note "Τό η ἔννοια", 531-532.)
RATIO, -IONIS. Note, character, reason, argument.

1. Most frequently, and throughout the work except as noted below, nn. 2, 3, 4, note, character: e.g., any form or perfection which can serve as a basis of predication or conception: "ratio veri in rebus" 24b14, 15b11, 27, 28, 30, "secundum rationem quae invenitur in creaturis" 13b45; nature, essence: "ratio veritatis compleatur in intellectu" 14a34, "ens, verum, unum, et bonum secundum rationem habent quod unum sunt, unde...realiter unum sunt" 4b32, 37; including real privations -- "negationes vel privationes existentes extra animam...intellectus earum rationes apprehendit" 20a49.

2. a) Idea or concept: "intellectus rationem entis accipit in seipso" 13b14, "anima deprehendit in se rationem defectus" 21a45, 46, "nomine veritatis non exprimitur ratio conceptionis" 19a19, 3a44, 3b26, 17a6, 17b34, 18b20, 32, 35, 37, 19a3, 23b15, 24a26;

b) (operation of) the mind: "secundum rationem" 16b56, 17a3, "differunt rationes" 3b44, "distinctio rationis" 19a9, 4a22, 26, 28, 4b20, 29;
c) meaning, comprehension of a term: "veritas de lapide dicta claudit in sui ratione entitatem lapidis, et superaddit habitudinem ad intellectum" 20a55, 41, 20b36, 55.

3. a) Reasoning, consideration; argument: "oportet rationibus utriusque partis respondere" 23b12, "ratio illa concedenda est" 23b38, 4b10, 16, 13b31, 54;

b) reason, explanation: "cuju est ratio, quia..." 21b42, 22a7;

c) abl., because of, by reason of: "attribuitur per se ratione remotionis" 14b32, "dicitur vera vel falsa ratione compositionis verae vel falsae" 7a8.

4. Power of reason: equivalent to "rationalis" -- "virtus est habitus in modum naturae rationis consentaneus" 14a52.

Note. In 6a12 it can be translated "the very fact", "the whole matter", "the reality" -- "etiam si intellectus humanus non esset, adhuc res dicerentur verae in ordine ad intellectum divinum. Sed si uterque intellectus, quod est impossible, intelligeretur auferri, nullo modo veritatis ratio remaneret" 6a7-13. The sentence suggests that Aristotle, whose God did not know the world, had no real guarantee of ontological truth.

RATIOCINATIO, -IONIS Reasoning, discursive thinking.

"alio modo potest accipi intellectus communiter, secundum quod
ad omnes operationes se extendit, et sic comprehendit opinionem et ratiocinationem" 26b44.

RATIOCINOR, -ARI To reason, to think discursively.
"ulterius intellectus...negotiatur ratiocinando et inquiringo" 26b2.

RATIONALIS, -E Rational, capable of reasoning.
"intellectus falso...animal rationale mortale conciperet" 26b24.
Note. The distinction between rational and other intellectual beings is nowhere brought out in this work.

REALIS, -E Real.
Opposed to "rationis" (cf. 2, b, s.v.) -- "realis distinctio intelligitur" 19a6, "non intelligitur realis distinctio, sed rationis tantum" 19a9.

RECTITUDO, -INIS Correctness.
2. Moral rectitude: "Deus permittat deformitatem actus fornicationis incidere; non tamen sequitur ex hoc quod ipsa deformitas aliquam rectitudinem habeat" 21a17.
Note. The reading "aliquam" for "aliam" conjectured by the editors of the 1784 Venice edition and the Parma edition is
confirmed by the four Paris codices upon which the Vivès edition is based, and is adopted by the latter.

RECTUS, -A, -UM  
Right, correct.

1. Logically correct: "recte fiat resolutio in prima principia" 26b45.


REDEO, -IRE  
To return, to reflect.

Literally, to go back, to return. Metaphorically ("quodammodo" 26b47), not of a physical but of a mental return, to reflect: equivalent to "reflectitur" (21b30) -- "secundum vero quod cognoscunt se cognoscere, jam ad se redire incipiunt" 21b49, "substantiae intellectuales redeunt ad essentiam suam reditione completa" 21b44, 56, 22a2, 13.

REDITIO, -IONIS  
Return, reflection.

Like REDEO, of mental returning, reflection: equivalent to REDITUS -- "substantiae intellectuales redeunt ad essentiam suam reditione completa" 21b45, 56, 22a5.

REDITUS, -US  
Return, reflection.

Like REDEO, and equivalent to REDITIO, reflection: "reditus iste completur secundum quod cognoscunt essentias proprias" 21b52.
REDUCO, -ERE

To reduce.

To give meaning in terms of, to reduce to: "veritas secundum quod competit negationibus et defectibus reducitur ad veritatem simpliciter" 21a21.

REDUCTIO, -IONIS

Reduction.

Tracing back, reduction; equivalent to RESOLUTIO -- "in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia per se nota" 2b15.

REFERO, -RE

To relate.

a) Of things,

to relate, i.e., to establish a relation: "veritas superaddit habitudinem ad intellectum...cum habeat aliquid secundum quod referri possit" 20b2, 15a9, 17, 18;

b) of predication,

to have reference to: "affirmatio et negatio...non referuntur ad idem" 24a11, 15b19, 21a5, 12.

REFLECTO, -ERE

To reflect.

Note. The verb in this work always appears in the passive, with the force of a middle voice. Equivalent to "redeunt" (21b44), "inflectitur" (17b30). The word means literally "to bend back"; the metaphorical turn is brought out clearly by St. Thomas's uses.
"intellectus reflectitur supra actum suum, non solum secundum quod cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cognoscit proportionem ejus ad rem" 21b20, 31, 13b46.

RELATIO, -IONIS Relation.
1. That predicament which asserts a relation of one thing toward another: "cum omnia alia genera...sola relatio non habet, ex hoc quod est hujusmodi, quod aliquid ponat in rerum natura, quia non praedicat aliquid, sed ad aliquid" 14b56.
2. The relation so indicated; equivalent to COMPARATIO (q.v.), used frequently throughout the work, e.g., "veritas...in rebus aliis inventur per relationem ad intellectum" 9al.

RELATIVUS, -A, -UM subst. Related thing, term of a relation.
"quando unum relativorum pendet ex altero" 15a26.

REMO TIO, -IONIS Prescinding.
The result of mentally neglecting, prescinding from (not denying): "Quandoque attribuitur per se ratione remotionis...sicut unitas per se attribuitur materiae primae, non per positionem alicujus formae unitatis, sed per remotionem formarum diversificantium" 14b32, 40.

REPRESENTATIVUS, -A, -UM Representative.
Standing for, representative; opposed to "est res quaedam in se"
(25a49), equivalent to "indicativus" (ibid.) -- "sensus...
secundum quod est representativus alterius rei" 25b3.

RES, REI

Thing.

a) In general, and throughout the work,
thing: "sic imponitur hoc nomen res, quod in hoc differt ab
ente...quod ens sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomen rei
exprimit quidditatem sive essentiam entis" 3a4-7;

b) with NATURALIS (q.v.),
body: "res naturales" 5b32, 40, 42, 43, 14a46;

c) with special implication of actual existence,
reality: "ex parte rerum" 10a50, "in rerum natura" 9b39,
14b54, 15a1, 4, 11, 24, 30, 39, 56 (cf. NATURA, 2, b, i),
"differunt re" 4b20, 4a54;

d) thing as known by intellect: "res intellecta movet appetitum" 5b11.

RESOLUTIO, -IONIS

Resolving, reduction.

Equivalent to REDUCTIO -- "resolutio in prima principia" 26b45.

RESPECTUS, -US

Respect, reference.

"veritas...in rebus autem improprie et secundario, quia non nisi
in respectu ad alterutrum duarum veritatum" 9a9.

NOTE. The word is weaker than "relatio" (e.g., in 9al of this
context), and implies mental consideration rather than onto-
logical relationship.
RESPONDEO, -ÆRE

To reply, to correspond.

1. a) To reply, to set down definitely: so used to introduce St. Thomas's own position on the question at issue -- see OBJICIO, Note;

   b) to answer the preliminary dialectical arguments: also indicating St. Thomas's own mind -- "et ideo oportet rationibus utriusque partis respondere" 23b12.

2. To correspond, to accord: "cuilibet vero intellectui oportet quod respondat ens aliquod" 6a29.
SCIBILIS, -E subst. Knowable.

Knowable, object of knowledge: "scientia dependet a scibili" 15a28, 29, 30, 53, 55.

Note. The word is always used in this work of the object of a creature's knowledge, actual or potential, never of God's knowledge.

SCIENTIA, -AE Knowledge.

a) In general,
   intellectual cognition, knowledge: "intellectus a rebus scientiam accipit" 9a36, 2b19, 5b33, 15a27, 29, 31, 54, 55;

b) implying knowledge through principles,
   science: "sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductio in aliqua principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando quid est unumquodque; alias utroque in infinitum iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio rerum" 2b13-19.

Note. The word as used in this work always refers to intellectual knowledge, unlike COGNITIO, and furthermore to that of the human intellect only.

SCIO, -IRE To know.

Equivalent to COGNOSCO, a, -- "ab aeterno scivit Deus plura
enuntiabília, sed tamen illa plura scivit una cognitione" 14a14-15, 21b55.

SE HABERE AD To stand in relation to, to be related to.
Frequently used to designate a relation, e.g., 13a56, 13bl, often the dual relation expressed in a proportionality -- e.g., "in-aequalitatem...quae se habet ad falsitatem sicut aequalitas ad veritatem" 17b9.

SE TENERE EX PARTE To be proper to, to pertain to.
"non tamen realiter ab esse distinguuntur: unde nec verum quod appropriatur personae Filii ab esse quod se tenet ex parte essentiae" 4b25.

SECUNDUM QUID In a certain respect.
In a certain restricted sense, according to a certain consideration; opposed to "simpliciter loquendo" -- 23b9.

SECUNDUM QUOD Insofar as, according as, inasmuch as.
Frequent in the work. The phrase in "judicium intellectus est de re secundum quod est" 21b18 can perhaps best be translated "according to a thing's existence" or simply "as it is".

SECUNDUM REM In nature, in reality.
Opposed to "ratione distinguuntur (4b29), equivalent to "non differunt re" (4b20) -- "sint unum secundum rem" 4b33.
SENSIBILIS, -E  adj. and subst.  Sensible, able to be sensed.

a) In adjectival use,
capable of being known by sense cognition: "sensibili re praesente" 25b57, 6b47, "sensibles qualitates" 23a34, 23b45, 25b57;
b) substantively,
that which is primarily known by sense cognition: "sensus cognoscit sensibile" 22a4, 25b27, 28, 35, 41, 42, 48, 50, 26b16.

Note. The word never has the meaning of the English "sensible", i.e., "possessed of good sense", nor the active meaning "able to sense" -- cf. SENSITIVUS.

SENSITIVUS, -A, -UM  Sensory, able to sense.
"sensitiva potentia" 22a11, 25b39, "vis sensitiva" 25b41.

SENSUS, -US  Sense.
1. Meaning: (as in the phrase "the sense of this passage is...")
"cum dicitur...accipitur secundum quod...ut sit sensus:..."
3b34.
2. Sense power: equivalent to "potentia sensitiva" (22a11) or "vis sensitiva" (25b41) -- "sensus nihil cognoscit nisi per organum corporale" 22a8;
   a) in general, and throughout the work except as herein noted,
the senses (collectively): e.g., "cognitio nostra... incipiat in sensu" 25a29, usually with the implication of
the senses precisely as in act: practically equivalent to "sense knowledge", "sensation" -- e.g., "Utrum veritas sit in sensu" 21a48, 21b12, 57, "sensus sensibilium propriorum semper est verus" 26b16;
b) a particular sense power: "quaedam vis sensitiva, quae apprehendit speciem sensibilem sensibili re praesente, sicut sensus proprius" 25b57, 26a3, 9, 53.

Note. On the soundness of St. Thomas's doctrine on the action of our sense powers in the face of modern experimental and abnormal psychology, see, Ch. Boyer, "Réflexions sur la connaissance sensible selon saint Thomas", Archives de Philosophie, 1925, III, 2: 7-116.

**SENTIO, -IRE**

To sense, to know by sense.

"sensus cognoscit se sentire" 21b38, 22a5.

**SEQUOR, -I**

To follow.

1. To follow logically, to flow by logical necessity: "ratio non sequitur" 4b10, 24a50.

2. To follow, to be influenced by: "illud quod est in aliquo non sequitur illud in quo est, nisi quando causatur a principiis ejus; unde lux quae causatur in aere ab extrinseco,
That which is signified, the object of the signification: "cum dicitur, significatione non existente rectum est aliquid significari, verum est secundum ordinationem rerum in intellectu divino" 15bl.

To signify.

a) Representatively, to mean, to signify: "res quae significatur illis tribus propositionibus" 18a21, "enuntiationi essentiale est ut significet illud ad quod significandum est instituta" 18al-2, 3b30, 33, 18b2, 16b20, 23b17, 24al4;

b) to manifest, to show forth: "enuntiationis, quae intellectum significat" 12b28, 7a36, 17a30.

In this work, manifestative (not representative) sign, external manifestation: "enuntiatio est signum intellectus" 24b28, "signa divinae voluntatis" 21a4.
SIMILITUDO, -INIS  
Likeness.

1. Relation of similarity: "similitudo proprie invenitur in utroque similium" 10a16, 25, 24a20, 21, 24, 33, 36, 39, 44, 48, 49, 57.

2. Likeness, similitude, image:
   a) physical image: "similitudo faciei in speculo" 9a14, 10b4;
   b) likeness, mental image: "in quantum per similitudinem sui receptam in anima, cognitionem de se facit" 13b6, 6b44, 9b54.

Note. The word "image" does not appear in this work. Consequently, there is nothing of the careful distinction between image and similitude found in later works, e.g., Summa Theologica Ia, 93, 1.

SIMPLICITER  
Simply, in a primary and unqualified sense.

"non simpliciter debet enuntiari" 24a40, 9b32, 13b56, 21a22, 24b20; opposed to "secundum quid" -- 23b7.

SINGULUM, -I  
Single thing, individual.

"Deus...una cognitione cognoscit omnia...non singulis suam cognitionem immittens" 13a30.

Note. This passage is not to be construed as meaning that God does not know individuals. The import is that God does not place a separate act of cognition proper to each single thing.
The "suam" is best taken as referring to "singulis" and not to "Deus", as can happen even in classical Latin.

SPECIES, -EI Species.

1. As in logic,

kind, definite class, species: "species coloris" 17a7,
"generatio ad hoc est...ut salvetur perpetuum esse in specie" 14b16.

2. In the ontological order,

specific nature, form: "ea quae sunt diversa specie ex parte rerum" 10a50, "res ex ipsa specie quam habet, divino intellectui adaequatur" 13b2, 4, "vis apprehensiva, quae apprehendit speciem sensibilem sensibili re prae­sentem...apprehendit rem ut est" 25b56.

3. In the mind,

representation, likeness, similitude: "res non sunt in anima per suam essentiam; sed per suam speciem" 4b52, 3a39, 9b47, 21a43;
equivalent to "similitudo" -- 5b1, 6b46.

SUBJECTUM, -I Subject.

That in which something inheres: "accidens subjecto" 2b29,
"subjectum mutationis" 16b16, 20b54, 56.

SUBSISTO, -ERE To subsist.

To exist as a real being, to subsist: "res...non subsistere..."
possunt nisi per intellectum divinum eas in esse producentem" 9a28.

**SUBSTANTIA, -AE**

Substance.

1. In the logical order,

the notion or idea of substance: "substantia non addit super
ens aliquam differentiam, quae significat aliquam naturam
superadditam enti" 2b45.

2. In the ontological order,

"sed nomine substantiae exprimitur quidam specialis modus
essendi, scilicet per se ens" 2b46, "substantiae intellectuales" 21b44, 22a2.

**SUBSUM, -ESSE**

To underlie, to accompany.

1. To underlie, to be the subject of inherence: "quando in
aliqua re apparent qualitates demonstrantes naturam quae
eis non subest" 22a40, 23a48.

2. To accompany, to be mixed with: "creaturae, quamvis aliquam
Dei similitudinem gerant in seipsis, tamen maxima dissimilitudo
subest" 24a46.

*Note*. "To be among" is allowed as a primary meaning of the
word in classical Latin, confirming the second meaning
assigned here.

**SUM, ESSE**

To be.

For the infinitive as a substantive, see ESSE.
For the participle, see ENS.

The word is otherwise used as usual in Latin; in three occurrences the notion of actual existence is strongly connoted — "quae in futurum erunt, nunc autem non sunt" 12b34, "etiam quando non est res ipsa" 12b38, 6a8.

SUMMAUS, -A, -UM Highest degree of, most perfect type of.

"in summa veritate sunt" 25a24.

SUPERADO, -ERE To add.

1. In the logical order, equivalent to ADDO -- "veritas includit in sui ratione entitatem earum, et superaddit habitudinem adaequationis ad intellectum" 20a42.

2. In the ontological order -- "naturam superadditam" 2b44.

SUPERIORA, -ORUM Higher things, the heavenly bodies.

"in majori mundo superiora nihil accipiunt ab inferioribus sed e converso" 26a12. See also INFERIORA, and MUNDUS MAJOR.
TEMPUS, -ORIS

Time.

Time, point of time: "anima...cointelligit tempus...diversimode intelligit cursum Socratis ut praesentem, praeteritum, et futurum" 13al8.

Note. No formal explanation or definition of time is given in this work.

TERMINO, -ARE

To terminate.

To reach a goal, to finish: "motus autem cognitivae virtutis terminatur ad animam" 5b3.

Note. This expression must be taken as speaking of the act of cognition entitatively, or psychologically, considered; terminatively, or epistemologically, it terminates in the object.

TERMINUS, -I

Term.

1. Terminus, stopping-point, goal: "complementum autem cuius-libet motus est in suo termino" 5b2.

2. Member of a proposition, term: "principia, quae cognoscimus cum terminos cognoscimus" 26bl2.
UNITAS, -ATIS
Unity.

1. The abstract of "unum",
unity, oneness: "perfectior est unitas illius rei" 4b39, 14b39, 39, 24257.

2. Concretely,
that which is one, a unity, a unit: "existimaverunt corpus esse unitatem...secundum hoc ergo corpus falsa unitas dicitur" 24a56-24b1, 24a54, 24b4.

UNIVERSALE, -IS subst. Universal.

Universal nature, nature prescinded from individuals: "non dicitur universale incorruptibile, quasi habeat aliquam formam incorruptionis" 14b45, "unde universale in rebus existens dicitur corrumpi in hoc et in illo" 14b50.

Note. The doctrine of universals is not formally treated in this work, these passing references in answer to an objection being the only occurrences.

UNUS, -A, -UM.
One.

a) As an adjective,
one, simple, incomposite: "essentiam divinam, quae una est" 15b26, 24a55;
the attribute which expresses a state of undividedness in a thing -- "indivisio, et hanc exprimit hoc nomen 'unum'": 
nihil enim est aliud unum quam ens indivisum" 3a11-12,  
"ens dicitur unum in quantum est indivisum in se" 3a19,  
"ens, verum, unum, et bonum magis uniantur in Deo quam in  
creaturis" 4b26, 36.  

Note. The usual scholastic definitions of "unum" give two  
notes: "indivisum in se" and "divisum a quolibet alic".  

St. Thomas ascribes only the first to the term "unum",  
reserving the other for the term "aliquid"; see ALIQUID, 1.  

b) In a more substantive use,  
one thing, unit: equivalent to UNITAS, 2, -- "cum in Deo  
sint unum" 4b34, 32, 37, 38;  
some one thing: "unum sine altero intelligi potest" 3b45,  
"unum non sit principium alterius" 13b17.
VERBUM, -I
Word.
1. Word, saying: "verbūm Augustini est intelligendum..." 14al.
2. The Word, the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity: in article VII, "Utrum veritas in divinis personaliter vel essentialiter dicitur" -- 19a19.

VERE
Truly.
Truly, with truth: "si enim sensus vere judicat de rebus, non tamen cognoscit veritatem, qua vere judicat" 21b35-37.
Note. The word here does not mean "in the true sense of the term", as is clear from "veritatem" (21b37, 42). Cf. Paul Wilpert, "Das Problem der Wahrheitssicherung bei Thomas von Aquin: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Evidenzproblems", Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 1931, XXX, 114-119.

VERITAS, -ATIS
Truth.
1. Usually, and throughout the work (the word occurs over 420 times) except as noted below, nn. 2, 3, 4, 5, truth in its full and formal sense: "veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus" 3b7 (on whether this is really the definition of Isaac Israeli, cf. ISAAC, Note s.v.); properly in the intellect rather than in the object -- "reducitur ad veritatem simpliciter, quae est in intellectu"
21a22, as is clear from the whole of article II, "Utrum veritas principalis inveniatur in intellectu quam in rebus", which is summarized by St. Thomas at the beginning of the body of article IV, "Respondeo dicendum quod sicut ex praedictis, art. 2, patet, veritas proprie invenitur in intellectu humano vel divino, sicut sanitas in animali" 8b54-57.

a) Primarily in the Divine Intellect, as is clear from article IV, "Utrum sit una tantum veritas qua omnia sint vera" and article VII, "Utrum omnis veritas sit a veritate prima". The truth of God's mind is called "prima veritas" art. VIII, "veritas aeterna" 12b43, "veritas prima et aeterna" 15b20, "veritas extrinseca [i.e., rebus]" 12b21, "veritas...in intellectu divino" 14a42, "veritas immutabilis" art. VI, 17a15;

b) secondarily, but still "proprie" (8b55) in the human mind -- "Est ergo in intellectu divino quidem veritas proprie et prius, in intellectu vero humano proprie quidem et secundario" 9a5-8;

i) in the intellect, formally and strictly in the judgment -- "per prius invenitur in actu intellectus componentis et dividentis quam in actu intellectus quidditates rerum formantis"
(6b31-34), "veritas per prius invenitur in compositione et divisione intellectus; secundario autem...et per posterius in intellectu formante definitiones" 7a4, 7a2l-25;

ii) and, though not formally, in sense perceptions, especially in the sense judgment (cf. APPREHENSIO, JUDICILUM, 2, and JUDICO, 2) --

"Sed veritas est in sensu sicut consequens actum ejus; dum scilicet judgment sensus est de re secundum quod est; sed tamen non est in sensu sicut cognita a sensu; si enim sensus vere judicat de rebus, non tamen cognoscit veritatem qua vere judicat" 2lb3l-37.

2. Improperly, i.e., analogously,

ontological truth, the truth of things: "veritas...in rebus autem improprie et secundario" 9a8, by extrinsic denomination -- "veritas improprie dicta...Denominantur autem res verae a veritate quae est in intellectu divino vel in intellectu humano, sicut denominatur cibus sanus a sanitate quae est in animali" 9a54-9bl, 9a1-5;

called "veritas inhaerens" 12b20, 45, 17a2l, described as "veritas...quae est in ipsa re, quae nihil est alius quam entitas intellectui adaequata vel intellectum sibi adaequans" 9b3-5, "veritas rerum existentium includit in sui
ratione entitatēm earum, et superaddit habitudinem ad intellectum humanum vel divinum" 20a40-44; 3a51, 3bl, 4a15, 5b33, 6a45, 9a18, 19, 25, 31, 51, 53, 54, 9b2, 24, 37, 42, 10a30, 46, 12b26, 44, 13b21, 24, 54, 55, 14a32, 15b43, 17a10, 27, 28, 33, 35, 36, 37, 43, 17b38, 18a3, 10, 18b44, 47, 50, 53, 20a53, 54, 20b2, 10, 40, 44, 45, 52, 24a1;

a) primarily of the relation of things to God's intellect -- "Per prius etiam inest rei veritas per comparationem ad intellectum divinum quam humanum" 9a31, "veritas quae dicitur de eis in comparatione ad intellectum divinum eis inseparabiliter communicatur" 9a25;

b) secondarily, of the relation of things to the human intellect -- "veritas autem quae dicitur de rebus in comparatione ad intellectum humanum est rebus quodammodo accidentalis" 9a19.

3. Said of words, by attribution to the acts of the intellect -- "voces autem eodem modo recipiunt veritatis praedicationem, sicut intellectus quos significant" 7a34 (cf. INTELLECTUS, 2, a).


5. Dialectically, in a non-committal manner, in the title of the question, in the titles of the various articles, e.g.,
"Quid sit veritas", in the objections or preliminary arguments, and in the following places — 3a50, 51, 52, 55, 3b17, 4a19, 13a37, 56, 13b36, 57, 14a37, 14b5, 16b20, 22, 27, 17a21, 22, 24, 25, 13a12, 18b3, 53, 25a35.

Note. The notion of "veritas" in St. Thomas has been the subject of extensive study, for example, Blaise Romeyer, "La doctrine de saint Thomas sur la vérité", Archives de Philosophie, 1925, III, 2: 1-54; Paul Wilpert, "Das Problem der Wahrheitssicherung bei Thomas von Aquin: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Evidenzproblems", Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 1931, XXX, 1-214; Cardinal D. Mercier, "La notion de la vérité", Revue Néo-Scholastique, 1899, VI, 371-403; Joseph de Tonquédec, La Critique de la Connaissance, Chapitre VI, "La question de la vérité" 219-248, esp. note 2, p. 239, and Appendice VIII, "Commentaire des trois premiers articles de la question I de Veritate", 508-518.

For further readings see the Introduction and the General Bibliography of the present study.

VERUS, -A, -UM True.

Note. This word is used over 340 times in the work, with the same variations of meanings and use as VERITAS, q.v. It expresses the concrete attribute of which VERITAS is the abstract, and St. Thomas in his own usage often makes one definition do
for both, e.g., "convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum expri-
mit hoc nomen 'verum'...quae quidem correspondentia adaequa-
tio rei et intellectus dicitur, et in hoc formaliter ratio veri
perficitur" 3a33-45. He likewise affixes both VERITAS and VERUM
to the same set of divisions, e.g., "Secundum hoc ergo tripliciter
veritas et verum definiri invenitur" 3a52-53. This equating of
the two even when he is laying down formal definitions, and not
merely in a passing reference, suggests that the divisions and
remarks laid down under VERITAS will hold here also.

Furthermore, this close parallel suggests a point which is
brought out by a study of the actual uses of the word, namely
that he often uses VERUM as a substantive and in a quasi-abstract
sense, as the equivalent of VERITAS, e.g., 5b22, 6b34, 7a6, 22,
20b17, 23, 23b24, 29, 24a11, 20, 24b24. However, it is used
substantively in a concrete sense in 4a47, 5a38, 9a49, 53, 12b45,
51 to denote that which is true, a true thing.

1. Usually, and throughout the work except as otherwise noted
herein,

true: "veri ratio consistit in adaequatione rei et intel-
lectus" 6b35, 3a33, 45;

a) primarily and most properly said of intellect,
especially in the judgment — "veritas per prius in-
venitur in compositione et divisione intellectus;
secundario autem et per posteriorius dicitur verum in
intellectu formante definitiones" 7a22, "quando adaequatur ei quod est extra in re, dicitur judicium verum esse" 6b52;

b) but also, though less formally, of sense, particularly sense judgment -- "et sic dicitur esse sensus falsus vel verus...sensus judicium de sensibilibus propriis semper est verum" 25a41-48, "sensus sensibilium propriorum semper est verus" 26bl6.

2. Improperly, i.e., analogously,

ontologically true, conformed or conformable to some intellect: "verum...dicitur...tertio de rebus, secundum quod adaequantur intellectui divino, vel aptae natae sunt adaequari intellectui humano" 7a26-29, "si autem accipiatur veritas improprie dicta, secundum quam omnia dicuntur vera" 9a52, "denominantur res verae a veritate quae est intellectu divino vel in intellectu humano" 9a54-9bl, "res autem non dicitur vera nisi secundum quod est intellectui adaequata; unde per posterius invenitur verum in rebus, per prius autem in intellectu" 5b20-23;

even said of non-beings -- "quamvis istum fonnicari sit malum, tamen...natum est conformari intellectui, et secundum hoc consequitur ratio veri" 4a56-4b2, 20b31, 34, 37;

a) primarily,

conformed to the Divine Intellect: "res aliqua prin-
cipalius dicitur _vera_ in ordine ad veritatem intellectus divini quam in ordine ad veritatem intellectus humani" 9a38, 42, 43, "res...secundum adaequationem ad intellectum divinum dicitur _vera_" 5b48;

b) secondarily,
conformable to a created intellect: "secundum autem adaequationem ad intellectum humanum dicitur res _vera_, in quantum nata est de se formare _veram_ aestimationem" 5b56, "Et ideo in definitione rei _verae_ potest poni visio in actu intellectus divini, non autem visio intellectus humani nisi in potentia" 6a54.

3. Said of words, by attribution to the acts of the intellect ---
"_enuntiatio vera_ dicitur" 13a51, 13b21, 14a7, 15b2, 17b41, 47, "orationum suarum verarum" 7a31.


5. Dialectically, as VERITAS, 3, in the preliminary arguments, etc., and in 20b30.

**VIRTUS, -UTIS**

Virtue, power.

1. Technically, as a species of habit,

_virtue:_ "_justitia...quia virtus...est habitus_" 14a50, 53.

2. Operative power: equivalent to POTENTIA, 2(q.v., especially the Note, s.v.), and VIS --"_virtus cognitiva_" 5b3, 23b54.
3. Power, force: "res...ex virtute ejusdem speciei nata est sibi intellectum nostro adaequare" 13b4, 7b11.

**VIS, -- Power.**

Operative power: equivalent to POTENTIA, 2, and VIRTUS, 2 --
"vis cognitiva et appetitiva" 3a29, "vis sensitiva" 25b41,
"vis apprehensiva" 25b55.

**VIS COGITATIVA** Cogitative power, particular reason, comparative sense.

The internal sense power in man which corresponds to "vis aestimativa" in brute animals, called "comparative" because it operates "per quamdam collationem", called "particular reason" because it is the special instrument of the intellect in our knowledge of singuliars: "sensus judicat...de quibusdam autem quasi per quamdam collationem, quam facit in homine vis cogitativa, quae est potentia sensitivae partis, loco cujus in aliis animalibus est existimatio naturalis; et sic judicat vis sensitiva de sensibilibus communibus et de sensibilibus per accidens" 25b36-43. Cf. De Veritate X, 5 corp., ad 2um, ad 4um; Summa Theologica, Ia, 78, 4; Rudolf Allers, "The Intellectual Cognition of Particulares", The Thomist, 1941, III, 1: 95-163; Julien Peghaire, "A Forgotten Sense, the Cogitative, According to St. Thomas", The Modern Schoolman, 1943, XX, 123-140, 210-229.
VISIO, -IONIS    Vision, knowledge.
    Metaphorically, of intellect, cognition, knowledge: "visio intellectus humani" 6a44, 54, 55.

VISUS, -US    Sight.
    The external sense power of vision, sight: "visus...cognoscit colorem" 3a38.

VOX, VOCIS    Word.
    "voces...intellectus quos significant" 7a33.

VOLUNTAS, -ATIS    Will.
    a) "voluntas divina" 2la5, 6, 7;
    b) state of will, habit: "justitia est constans et perpetua
        voluntas uniuique jus suum tribuens" 14b2.
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The dissertation submitted by James E. Royce, S.J. has been read and approved by five members of the Department of Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Date

Signature of Adviser