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The Attitudes and Activities of the Republican Party in the Election of 1916

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THE ATTITUDES AND ACTIVITIES
OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
IN THE ELECTION
OF 1916

BY

MARCELLA K. ALVERSON

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INTRODUCTION

The election of 1916 holds a distinctive place in the national history of the United States. Presidential elections are frequently political battles that affect the lives of only those directly concerned by changes in the political administration of our government. Especially is this true when the results of the election cause no change in the party in power as when the Republican Party continued its administration of governmental affairs. However, elections can and have had far reaching effects, when the issues raised in the campaign were of a very vital nature or when the questions deeply affected the lives of the people. The campaigns and elections of 1828, 1860, 1896, 1912, and 1916 are instances of Presidential elections which vitally affected and changed the lives of the people and the history of our country.

The writer has chosen the election of 1916 as the topic of this thesis. History records that the Democratic Party won this election and thereby successfully succeeded itself for another four years and kept at the nation's helm Woodrow Wilson. However, the writer is not concerned with the campaign and successful election of the Democratic nominee. Most frequently the efforts of the victorious party are kept before the public eye and, being the winning questions and issues, they loom brighter and stronger under the banner of victory. Meanwhile, the minority party with its issues, questions, and standards fades into oblivion under the ignominy of defeat.
If in 1916 the victory of the issues, platform, and candidate of the Democratic Party directly affected the history of the nation for the following four years, then the failure, likewise, of the issues, platform, and candidate of the Republican Party in this election affected, if only inversely, the fate of the nation during four very crucial years of its history. Granting that the success of the Democratic Party affected the history of our nation it would seem to follow that its success was heightened by the failure of the Republican Party. Believing this to be true, the writer has endeavored to learn of the activities and actions of the Republican Party in the election of 1916.

Before starting on the topic proper it seemed worth while to consider briefly the election of 1912 because affairs and events in that election directly influenced the one which followed in 1916. In 1912 the Republican Party, having been in power for many years, had apparently become confident and overbearing in its manner of handling governmental affairs. It had, consequently, incurred the enmity of many, not only those in the camp of the opponents, but also many progressively minded men in the Republican fold. In the convention halls that year the wishes and demands of these more alert, more progressive men were stifled by the 'steam roller' methods of the 'Old Guard' Republicans. Ruthlessly and relentlessly the demands and desires of this dissenting group were ignored. Independently many delegates and their friends left the Republican Convention in Chicago and

assembling in Orchestra Hall in the same city, signified their intention of organizing a new political party. From this group developed the Progressive Party.

The new group, inspired by their leader, Roosevelt, grew in numbers and in political strength in the months between June and November, 1912. The Republican Party was divided into two groups. One faction, made up of the regular Republicans continued their program under the leadership of their candidate, William Howard Taft, while the new Progressive group, under the guidance of Roosevelt, enthusiastically campaigned throughout the country. These two groups, these two strong leaders, zealously worked to be victorious in the election. Consequently, instead of being a combat between the Democrats and the Republicans, the political struggle became a tri-cornered affair with the Republicans and Progressives struggling not so much against the Democrats as against each other. As was almost inevitable, the schism in the Republican fold led to a Democratic victory and the election of Woodrow Wilson. For the first time in sixteen years, the Democratic Party was to be at the helm of the government.
CHAPTER I

THE PRE-CONVENTION PERIOD OF 1916

Beginning with the pre-nomination campaign in the earlier months of the year a Presidential election creates much interest for the public at large. Newspapers, periodicals, meetings, and conversations continually place the political activities foremost in the minds of the citizens. Continuing through the summer the political speeches made on the campaign tours heighten the interests of the political thought and only after the votes from the last state have been recorded does the public relax and return to normal ways of living. Like an avalanche that is first started in the spring the interests and political activities of the citizens in the Presidential election continue or grow until the final count brings joy to the victors and despair to the losers.

Early in January of 1916, rumbles of the forthcoming political battle were heard. Not from the camp of those in control in Washington, but from those groups out of power, from the Republicans and Progressives came the first sound of the political contest. The burning question in the minds of all who were keenly interested in political affairs was: Would the Republicans and Progressives unite in order to defeat the Democrats? In 1912, the Progressives had been strong enough to cause the defeat of the Republican nominee. While the power of this new party had not been great enough to elect its own nominee, yet the four million dissenting Progressive
votes had been sufficient to cause the defeat of Taft. 1 However, after
the election the new party failed to gain in numbers and in popularity.
By 1914 its decline had been definitely noted for in the Congressional
elections of that year the party received fewer than two million votes.
By 1916 the strength of the Progressive Party was being questioned. How-
ever, that it still had strength, that it could aid or hinder the Republican
Party, was not denied. Could the Republicans afford to ignore or disregard
the Progressive group? Did the Progressive leaders wish to enter the
Presidential campaign as a third party? These burning questions no one
wanted to answer. If a conciliation could be effected, if a reunion of the
two groups could be brought about the chances of defeating the Democrats
would become more certain.

Cautiously and carefully the Progressives made the first move. Their
leaders gave out the statement that the Progressive Convention would be
called at the same time, in the same city as the Republican Convention,
namely, on June 7 in Chicago. Two interpretations were made from this
statement, either it meant that the Progressives were ready to enter the
Presidential campaign with the Republicans or that the Progressives meant
to induce the Republicans to nominate Roosevelt. Seemingly, it was the
hope of the Progressives that the two Conventions would nominate the same
candidate and write the same principles in the platforms. Since the defeat
of the Democratic Party was the aim of both the Republicans and the Pro-

   New York, 1920, 184.
2. Ibid., 184, and William Starr Meyers. The Republican Party, The Century
   Co., New York, 1928, 419.
gressives the latter group showed a willingness to lay aside partisanship and prejudice was the opinion expressed by one editor. However, the Progressive Party leaders announced that the party would continue its allegiance to its principles of the protection of American citizens around the world, to a program of complete preparedness, and that it would follow only a leader who stood for these principles. To this editor, this first gesture of amalgamation indicated that

...nothing but a shortsighted unwillingness on the part of the Republicans to meet these overtures in ungrudging spirit could now seem to stand in the way of a complete and harmonious readjustment of the relations of the two groups.

In the light of later events one wonders whether this gesture of the Progressives was wholehearted, whether they meant to ever join the Republican group or whether they meant they would merge with the Republicans on two conditions, namely, that Roosevelt was the candidate and that his principles became the platform.

The Republican leaders and writers maintained silence during the month of January. Only one incident worth noting occurred, namely, the speech given by Charles Evans Hughes, a Justice on the bench of the Supreme Court.

Before the New York Bar Association the Justice gave a very creditable speech for which he was highly lauded and commended, but not one word was written concerning the possibility of his candidacy as a Presidential nominee.

6. Ibid., 109.
7. Ibid., 109.
Early in February the political situation was still very nebulous. That the Progressive and Republican leaders were heartily in favor of removing the Democrats from their position of control was agreed upon by all. But this opposition to the party in power was united only in its singleness of purpose, not in its program nor in its choice of leadership. Two groups were struggling for party dominancy, not openly but warily. All indications gave evidence that the group leaders were quietly and carefully sounding out the situation, were seeking to learn the strength of the various factions. Until the Convention was over each group would diligently work for the success of its aims and its chosen leader.

The 'dyed in the wool' Progressives headed by George Perkins were the most outspoken of the groups. They indicated that definite plans were being made for the Progressive Convention and that their program revolved around Theodore Roosevelt as the Presidential candidate for the party. However, even the Progressive Party was divided into two groups, namely, into those who believed in the principles of the party and would only follow their leader, Roosevelt, while the second group hoped for victory under the banner of Roosevelt but were willing to follow a compromise leader.

The other large group was the Republican Party and it, too, was divided, not into two groups but into three. The first was that group of regular Republicans known as the 'Old Guard' who, in the main, favored Elihu Root as a Presidential candidate; the second group was made up of those who loyally and enthusiastically sponsored nominees from their native

9. George Perkins, Chairman of the National Committee of the Republican Party.
states; and the last group just coming into political prominence was composed of those Republicans who believed that Justice Hughes of the Supreme Court should be the standard bearer for the Republican Party in the Presidential race. However, definite alignments, outspoken affiliations were not the mode of the moment. Too much was at stake, a rash statement too apt to be ruinous, so caution and tact were practiced by all leaders in each group. All were desirous of victory but were unwilling to forfeit their particular desires by unification, at least, not until it became absolutely necessary to do so.

Seemingly, the Progressive leaders were more willing to openly profess their aims and plans. Theodore Roosevelt was their choice although the former President had made no public statement to the effect that he wished to be considered as a candidate. However, portions of a letter written to a friend indicated that the Colonel was contemplating the idea of being a Presidential candidate. The letter stated:

Of two things, at any rate, I am sure. In the first place I not only do not desire but I will not take the nomination if it comes as a result of manipulation or of any maneuver which would seem to make it appear that I am striving for my own personal aggrandizement to secure it. Unless there is a popular feeling in the Republican Party in the country at large such as to make the Republican leaders feel that not for my sake but for the sake of the party and the country, it is imperative to nominate me, why I won't even consider accepting the nomination. In the next place it is utterly idle to nominate me if the country is in a mood either of timidity or of that base and complacent materialism which finds expression in the phrase 'Safety First.' If the country is not determined to put honor and duty ahead of safety, then the people most emphatically do
not wish me for President, for I will not take back by one finger's breadth anything I have said during the last eighteen months... 1

From this lengthy statement one could conclude that Roosevelt would become a Presidential nominee under certain conditions, the main one being if he were chosen as the candidate of both the Republican and Progressive Parties. The likelihood of such a proposal had not arisen in the minds of Republican leaders. Citizens and political leaders knew that Roosevelt was fervently opposed to the Democratic administration and to the policies of President Wilson but not all agreed as to the ulterior motives that would prompt the Colonel to enter the Presidential race. Many believed that the welfare of the nation rather than personal ambition was the dominant reason for his entering the political arena once again. In Washington it was understood that Roosevelt was not determined to force himself upon the Republican Convention but being desirous of reentering the Republican Party it was believed that the Colonel would abandon what seemed to be his special desires in order to assure success to the Republican Party and failure to the Democratic administration. That many of the voters wished to have the former President become a nominee was evident from the favorable sentiment that was developing in many sections of the country reported one paper.

The Progressives seemingly felt that by being the first to declare

policies, by being the first to sponsor that prominent American, Theodore Roosevelt, as a Presidential candidate they would be in a better position to dominate the political situation at a later date. While they publicly made it evident that as a party they proposed to go ahead and plan their own campaign yet they made it evident that they were willing to meet and discuss the political situation with their former enemies in the Republican Party. Late in February, the Republican and Progressive leaders met at a dinner and while the Progressives stated their aims and named their candidate they, also, by their approval of several nominees proposed by the Republican leaders, made it apparent that they might be willing to support such nominees. 17

Meanwhile the regular Republican Party was having difficulties. Too many factions existed within its fold, each group anxious to dominate, each faction eager to place its nominee in the White House. The one group known as the 'Old Guard' working from its headquarters in the state of New York was divided into several groups. While some leading Republicans in the state were advocating Governor Whitman for the Presidency, others proposed Justice Hughes, while William Barnes, arch enemy of Roosevelt, heartily endorsed Elihu Root as a Presidential candidate. Of the three groups the last mentioned was most powerful in the state and consequently Elihu Root came to the foreground as the Presidential nominee of the 'Old Guard.' 18

Not only in the state of New York but also in many sections of the country Root was looked upon favorably as a candidate. On February 15 Root made a stirring speech that had far reaching effects for it became the

keynote of the Republican Party campaign. In it he bitterly assailed President Wilson and severely criticized the policies of the Democratic administration, especially those policies relating to affairs in Mexico, to the tariff; and he caustically denounced both the President and the administration for their manner of handling the nation's foreign affairs. The speech was given wide publicity for it contained every battle cry that the Republican Party intended to hurl against President Wilson and his party. It gave evidence that the Republicans were beginning to formulate the grounds upon which they would challenge the Democratic administration. Many were impressed by the striking similarity of Senator Root's opinions on prominent issues and problems to those held by Roosevelt, so much so that many felt that it sounded as if the speech had been written by the former President. Some felt the speech indicated that Root had thrown his influence toward Roosevelt despite their political differences in 1912. While it drew cheers from the most conservative Republicans there was nothing in it to offend the susceptibilities of the most sensitive Progressive was the opinion expressed by one writer.

However, Root failed to receive the support of the delegates from his own state for when the Republican State Convention met it decided not to endorse any candidate for the Presidency but rather chose to allow the state delegates to attend the National Convention in Chicago uninstructed.

22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
Political friction within the state caused the decision. Barnes, refusing to endorse Roosevelt, sponsored Root, others sponsored the former President, while another group was inclined toward Justice Hughes. Consequently the focal state of New York failed to aid in clarifying the political situation for neither Root, Roosevelt, Whitman, nor Hughes were assured the political support of that state. Who was to be the Republican nominee? New York did not answer the question. However, some ideas were crystallized at this State Convention. It was believed that whether or not Root became a Presidential candidate he would be the logical person to write the platform of the Republican Party and that the candidate would have to fit the principles incorporated in it. Some felt that Root by his actions and words had indicated that in his opinion Roosevelt had the necessary specifications for the Presidential office, yet the 'Old Guard' made it known that it was their belief that Roosevelt would eventually support the cause of Root although the Progressive Party had definitely indicated that it was against the venerable Senator.

Although the New York State Convention failed to agree upon a Presidential candidate, thereby adding to the complexity of the national political situation, the platform that was adopted by the State Convention was to have national influence. It was hoped that it would serve as a pattern for other State Conventions. 'Americanism' was the keynote and 'Preparedness'

27. Ibid., The Chicago Daily Tribune, February 27, 1916.  
a watchword. It was significant that in the platform foreign affairs rather than political issues were to be the focal point in the pre-convention campaign for while the Republicans were in accord in regard to the dominant issues, an agreement on a candidate was another matter.

In every Presidential election there always rises a group of men who loyally propose and support as Presidential candidates prominent leaders from their home states and these 'favorite sons' play a part in the preliminary rounds of the political skirmish. In 1916 the list of 'favorite sons' included Senator Burton from Ohio who was regarded as a most powerful figure from the Middle West. Likewise, Senator Sherman was considered a likely candidate not only in his home state of Illinois but also on the Pacific Coast. Friends of Governor Whitman of New York had groomed him for the Presidency but the opposing factions in the state had forced them to drop their plans. In the West the stock of Senator Borah was being boosted as Presidential timber. However in the earlier months of the year no one of these potential candidates loomed particularly bright in the political sky.

The last faction to be considered among the divided Republicans was that group of persons who were sponsoring Justice Charles Evans Hughes as a candidate for the Presidency. A peculiar situation in as much as the sponsorship was made without the approval of the Justice, in fact, with his open disapproval. In a letter written by the Justice his viewpoint concerning

31. Ibid., February 21, 1916
the efforts being made in his behalf was stated as follows:

    I am entirely out of politics and I know nothing whatever of the matters to which you refer. I am totally opposed to the use of my name in connection with the nomination and to the selection and instruction of any delegate in my interests, either directly or remotely.34

The immediate reaction to this statement made by the Justice was a mixed one. Some papers expressed the belief that Hughes was sincere in his refusal and congratulated him upon the stand he had taken. It was believed by these editors that the name of the Justice had been presented to the people in order to affect other nominations. The tone used by these writers indicated utter disgust that such tactics should have been employed. Meanwhile, politicians were expressing their viewpoints, namely, that Hughes in refusing to allow his name to be used in connection with the Presidential nominations was being sincere, but they felt that since he hadn't stated that he would not accept the nomination this signified that he would accept the nomination if presented by the party. As the days of February slipped by more interest was shown not only in the general political situation but in the candidacy of Hughes. As one writer expressed:

    Because of widespread confidence in his character and admiration for his record, the name of Charles Evans Hughes of The United States Supreme Court has been constantly mentioned in connection with the Republican nominations for the Presidency, but there is no evidence of an organized movement in his candidacy until recently.37

34. Hitchcock, former Postmaster General, was believed to have started the boom for Hughes for selfish reasons. Republican Representative Slemp of Virginia learning of the situation wrote to Justice Hughes who replied as above. The Chicago Daily Tribune, February 10, 1916; and New York Tribune, February 11, 1916.
It was believed in Washington that Hughes was more popular in the West and Middle West and this was especially significant since the strength of the Progressive Party was in those sections of the country. To some this meant that the Justice was acceptable to the Progressive leaders; others felt that the members of the Progressive Party were not united in their feeling toward the Justice, while others indicated that Hughes, as a candidate, was not acceptable to them because he was a reactionary, and had done nothing to put him in the Progressive class.

With the closing days of February the political situation began to take some shape. The Republicans and Progressives were united in one idea—defeat of the Democratic Party. The Progressives openly were hedging, were seeking to dominate the situation yet knew they needed the support of the Republicans. Publicly the Progressives gave the impression of being willing to work along with the Republicans for the good of the nation, but actually no other candidate than Roosevelt was acceptable to them. As one Progressive leader stated:

I propose to vote for a candidate who honestly believes in progressive principles of government and who is able and competent to guide the Ship of State through troubled waters without dishonor to the flag or danger to the ship . . . We (Progressives) believe Theodore Roosevelt is the only man in the country who can fulfill these requirements.

So with Perkins and other Progressive leaders against Root and the 'Old Guard' and for Roosevelt only; with Barnes and a portion of the 'Old Guard' against Roosevelt and strongly for Root, the name of Hughes appeared in the list, if 'favorite sons' can be discounted, as the only available candidate for the party that must unite in order to defeat the Democratic Party.

All during March the question as to who should oppose Wilson in November continued to be unsolved. Newspapers and periodicals warily made efforts to sound out the thought and reaction of a public that for the time at least, was not wholly aware of the political situation. For in March, 1916, the American affairs in Mexico claimed the focal attention of the public only to be superseded, frequently, by ominous rumbles of affairs across the seas. As a leading American wrote: "Our relations with Germany and the Mexican expedition have crowded politics to the rear, and only the professionals are taking an interest." 41

But the election by the very nature of world conditions and by the unusual situation existing in the Republican circles was bound to be an important one. A good, scholarly account of the political situation was expressed by one editor who wrote that both the Democrats and those opposing them were too confident of victory and that the result would "...be determined finally by the increasingly large body of patriotic citizens who, especially in a time like this, place their country far above party or prejudice." 42

No one was in a position to forecast. The paramount question

in the minds of many was: Can the elements comprising the opposition be united effectively? In the opinion of one editor the answer was in the affirmative. In the years between 1912 and 1916, the differences between the Republicans and the Progressives had been lessened, primarily, by the Progressive leader himself and while Roosevelt wasn't ready to abandon all Progressive principles, he had indicated that they were of minor importance in the "...face of more pressing problems." \(^{44}\) The problems then became not a question of whether the opposing groups could amalgamate, but rather could they agree on the selection of a candidate, and could they draw up a platform that would, first, eliminate the possibility of a third candidate, secondly, win the support of the individual voters. Eliminating the 'favorite sons' the race for the Presidency dwindled to three candidates: Roosevelt, Root, and Hughes. In the opinion of this editor Hughes could be eliminated because he did not have the necessary qualifications for the Presidency; and, therefore, the question really became, "Would the regular Republicans forgive Roosevelt and vote for him or would the Progressives forget the part played by Root in the Convention of 1912 and be willing to sponsor him." 

Early in March Roosevelt added to the perplexity of the situation when he issued a statement which announced that he prohibited the use of his name on any primary ballot. Many took this to mean that he did not wish to run for the Presidency. However, on March 9th, the Colonel issued another

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\(^{44}\) Ibid., 334.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., 335.

statement which neither affirmed nor definitely denied his intentions to enter the Presidential race and this action served to make the situation more hazy than before. His statement read as follows:

I will not enter into any fight for the nomination and I will not permit any factional fight to be made in my behalf. Indeed, I will go further and say that it would be a mistake to nominate me unless the country has in its mood something of the heroic - unless it feels not only devotion to ideals but the purpose measurably to realize those ideals in action.

It is for us of today to grapple with the tremendous national and international problems of our own hour in the spirit and with the ability shown by those who upheld the hands of Washington and Lincoln. Whether we do or do not accomplish this feat, will largely depend on the action taken at the Republican and Progressive National Conventions next June.47

In this statement he definitely requested that his name be kept from all primary ballots so as to allow all the delegates as the convention "... to be free to make a choice of candidates and in accordance with the needs and demands of the situation."48

This statement of the Colonel's caused various reactions throughout the country for some felt that this speech put him one step nearer to the nomination, others gathered that it meant that he was sponsoring Hughes,49 while those in the 'Old Guard' shuddered. Undoubtedly they had cause for their feeling for Roosevelt had ardent followers in many sections of the

48. Ibid.
49. Expressions of opinion as found in New York Tribune, March 9, 24, 1916; and The Chicago Sunday Tribune, March 5, 1916.
country. West of the Missouri River the allegiance to Roosevelt was strong and vigorous, from the Northeastern states came indications of an earnest desire that Roosevelt should be the eventual choice, and from Pennsylvania came the word that Senator Penrose and his group would probably back Roosevelt. Colonel House, a leading Democrat, was of the opinion that Roosevelt with his ability for attracting the Western states and votes, would be the logical Republican opponent to Wilson. A poll made by two leading newspapers gave proof of a growing sentiment in favor of Roosevelt, although in final analysis, these polls definitely indicated that most of the delegates were going to the Convention uninstructed.

With so many factions fighting for supremacy and doing it so warily, to determine the actual strength of any one candidate was very difficult. Many felt that Roosevelt was not helping to clarify the situation. Was he in the race or not? Was the Colonel in a position to make a definite declaration regarding his intentions toward the Presidential race? One editor felt that Roosevelt was in an unusual predicament for he could neither allow his name to be used in the primaries unless he was ready to commit himself to the candidacy nor could he allow himself to be nominated by the Republican Convention in Chicago on a platform which enunciated views contrary to those with which his public career was identified. Seemingly, the only course open for him to take was one of waiting, of learning the attitudes and wishes of the citizenry and abiding by their decision. The

50. Seymour, II, 346.
voters of the nation were not in doubt as to the principles or the political and economic viewpoints of the former President for by his deeds, actions, and speeches he had made known to the people his position, his beliefs, on foreign and domestic problems and issues. While the former President was willing to be the nation's executive once again, yet he was willing to accept the nomination only under certain terms. To gain a domestic or international reputation, to lead as he had done in 1912 a crusading group under the Progressive banner were not his aims. Rather to be chosen as the nominee of both parties, Republican and Progressive, and to be elected the chief executive of the nation during what apparently was to be a critical period was his aim.

While Roosevelt had many followers he also had many enemies, for many Republicans did not consider him the man of the hour. The events of 1912 were still fresh in their minds. However, some of the stalwart leaders of the Republican Party indicated their willingness to accept the Colonel "...if", as one editor stated, "it shall appear that he is the most available man." Likewise, Roosevelt was gaining strength in Wall Street for some of the financial and industrial leaders who had opposed him in 1912 were showing a readiness to follow him in 1916.

During the month of March Roosevelt gained in popularity and political strength. That the political situation was in his hands was the opinion of one editor. If Roosevelt should declare that he would support the choice

55. Ibid.
56. Fred Davenport, "The Republican Trilemma." The Outlook, March 29, 1916, 738
of the Republican National Convention the outlook would be clear; if he should declare himself in favor of Hughes the breach between the two factions would be closed; and if he should formally announce himself as a candidate, he would, in the opinion of this editor, receive the nomination from the Republican Party at the Convention in Chicago.

One writer summed up the political situation by terming it a trilemma with three splendid men - Roosevelt, Hughes, and Root - seeking the candidacy. However, it can not be honestly said that Hughes was seeking the nomination and the actions of his friends in promoting his cause placed the Justice in an extraordinary position. He was caught between two very respectable traditions; one, that a Justice of the Supreme Court should not seek the Presidency, and the other tradition that was deep in American feeling which said that no man had a right to refuse a call from the people. The writer who held the above opinion felt that Hughes was hoping to abide by both traditions by "...refusing to seek the office and refusing to make it impossible for the office to seek him."

That Hughes was an extremely capable leader, a thorough student of the law, an experienced statesman, and a man endowed with firm principles was agreed upon by both friends and critics. One such critic wrote:

He (Hughes) combines a knowledge of practical politics which comes from an intimate knowledge in political administration, with the farseeing vision of the statesman which comes from the

61. Ibid.
knowledge of the history of the principles that underlie our republican institutions and the moral, social, and industrial needs of our people. We yield to none in our admiration for his unswerving integrity and genuine Americanism.63

The greatest difficulty in the way of the nomination of the Justice was that the people had no means by which they could discover the views and political alignments of Hughes. Since his appointment to the bench in 1910 the Justice had made no speeches, written no articles that gave indications of his viewpoints because, as he had himself stated: "The Supreme Court must not be dragged into politics and no man is as essential to his country's well being as is the unstained integrity of the courts."64 Hughes, by his previous actions, had indicated that his views on national policies were strong and conservative, that he was neither a pacifist nor an advocate of preparedness and although the public was not aware of the convictions Hughes would take in national problems, it could be stated, wrote one editor, that: "It is not possible to conceive Hughes in a position of responsibility and then as going off on a tangent. He would do the sane thing."65 However, an admirer of Hughes felt that the detachment of the Justice from political strife and friction added to his availability in the minds of politicians and cautious voters. The fact that his current political views were not known would make him less subject to political attack by the opposition it was believed.

Since the great problem of the moment was the amalgamation of the Progressive and Republican factions, and since Hughes had played no part in

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64. Ibid.
the bitter quarrel of 1912 it was hoped that both factions would be willing
to sponsor him as the party leader in 1916. As so many leaders and voters
were so bitterly opposed to both Roosevelt and Root because of their actions
in the political upheaval in 1912, it seemed quite logical that Hughes
would be the man for the voters to follow four years later. While political
leaders and friends of the Justice were of the opinion that he would receive
the nomination yet no great interest in the candidacy of Hughes was shown
by the rank and file of the voters. 67

One by one the states held their conventions and in the majority of
the cases the delegates were sent to the Convention in Chicago with no
68 instructions. Seemingly there was a feeling among the voters of the
nation that the election would be a very crucial one, there was an awareness
that no one candidate loomed above all others, or rather that three
unusually splendid men dominated the political horizon. With the political
situation at home and abroad so vital yet so uncertain, with Presidential
candidates having opinions either divergent or unknown, the voters adopted
the attitude of waiting to see what would happen, or, as one writer stated:
"... there is a possibility of a change of feeling before the day of
decision arrives." 69

Meanwhile the stalwart leaders of the regular Republican organization
continued their program of watchful waiting. Late in March the National
Republican Committee met to choose a chairman for the National Convention

66. Ibid., 628.
Monitor, March 12, 1916.
68. The Chicago Sunday Tribune, March 15, 1916; and New York Tribune, March
22, 24, 1916.
69. "Presidential Primaries and the 1916 Situation." The Nation, March 30,
but no selection was made and the meeting was deferred for another month. Such dominating leaders as Barnes and Hilles could neither agree on a chairman nor on the keynote speaker. A suggestion that the two groups, Progressives and Republicans, amalgamate their Conventions was not well received in the 'Old Guard' circles for such a move would place the Progressive leaders in a position to nominate Roosevelt and, while the Republicans were unwilling to accept the Colonel, yet they were ready to agree on another candidate, one who would be satisfactory to the Progressives. Even the 'Old Guard' realized that a hope of victory for the Republicans in November would be lost without a united front, yet their immediate plans to attain that end were not an acceptance of Roosevelt. The 'Old Guard', seemingly, was fearful of adopting a bold front, thereby losing all possibilities of the Progressive support and yet by their hesitant attitude they were allowing the Progressives to gain ground and the Roosevelt boom to reach formidable proportions. No doubt, these seasoned political leaders felt that while their opponents were heralding to the nation their plans and program they, by their silence, would profit by the mistakes made by the opponents and would be in a better position to plan counter attacks.

The political campaigns having been outlined in March, changed little in the following month. While the Democrats were solidly united in their

efforts to renominate and re-elect Wilson, the Republicans were torn asunder by the divergent groups within their ranks. While the voters were cognizant of the wisdom of choosing the next executive of the nation, both wisely and carefully, yet their political decision was hampered by the strangeness of the situation. Seemingly, the list of active Republican nominees had dwindled to two, Roosevelt and Hughes, yet the former, as one newspaper stated:

"...is not a candidate and there is no open assurance that he will accept the nomination. The defensive army bears Hughes' banner, but cannot assure the voter that the Justice will accept the nomination if it be offered to him."

Each was a candidate and yet not a candidate. If the sincere hope of the parties was to be realized, namely, the fusion of the Republicans and the Progressives, then it seemed to one editor that the wisest move was to have the nomination seek the man, "... one who would make the strongest appeal to the sentiment of the country."

On March 31, Roosevelt set off a political bombshell by lunching at the home of former Ambassador Bacon and among the guests were General Wood and Roosevelt's erstwhile enemy, Elihu Root. It was the first time these two political leaders had met in five years and although the occasion was supposedly not of a political nature, yet the meeting of leaders of opposing factions could not help but be significant. Deep meanings were given to the so-called reunion, yet strangely each group gave opposite interpretations.

75. Ibid., editorial, April 6, 1916.
The Progressive leaders were elated for they were sure that the meeting indicated that the Colonel had broken through the defense of the 'Old Guard' and that Roosevelt was out to win the Republican nomination from a united party. It was pointed out that Root's keynote speech in the previous month had been 'preparedness' which was the slogan of Roosevelt. George Perkins at a later Progressive conference emphasized the political importance of Roosevelt's meeting with Root, reiterated his belief that throughout the nation there was a growing sentiment for Roosevelt, and, therefore, the Progressive organization would go ahead with its plans for its Convention, and it expected to have a more representative body of delegates in June than it had had in 1912. Some leaders felt the coming together of Root and Roosevelt indicated that an effort to form a coalition government was in the offing while others, with a feeling of hopefulness, believed the meeting assured victory for the Republican Party. It was one writer's opinion that the gathering together of men who had opposed each other in 1912 indicated that the differences over which they had disagreed had been 'ironed out' and these leaders, having wisdom and foresight, appreciated that the events of the day were leading to a national crisis, the solution of which demanded a reunion of Republican forces. Among the 'Old Guard' opinions differed as to the significance of the luncheon meeting. Some felt that it indicated that Roosevelt was considering the possibility of giving his support to Root while other Republicans were confident that

77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
the Colonel had decided to support Justice Hughes.  

Within a week after the luncheon Roosevelt gave out a clear, ringing statement of his views. To a political visitor from Washington he stated:

Get it perfectly clear in your head that if you nominate me it must not be because you think it is in my interest, but because you think it is in your interest and the interest of the Republican Party and because you think it is in the interest of the United States to do so.\textsuperscript{33}

In no uncertain terms the Colonel reiterated that there would be no 'pussyfooting' on any issues raised by him, that the platform upon which he could stand must contain a policy of ample and thorough preparedness, that he would not tolerate any semblance of hyphenated Americanism for he believed that:

Every American citizen must be for America first and for no other country even second and he has not any right to be in the United States at all if he has a divided loyalty between this country and any other.\textsuperscript{34}

He clearly stated his attitude toward war when he said:

I am not for war. On the contrary I abhor an unjust and wanton war and I would use every honorable expedient to avoid even a just war. But I feel with all my heart that you don't in the long run avoid war by making other people believe that you are afraid to fight for your own rights.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{82} New York Tribune, April 2, 1916.
\textsuperscript{83} The Chicago Daily Tribune, April 6, 1916.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
In conclusion he said:

... the surest way to keep peace and to keep it on terms that will enable Americans to hold their heads high and not hang them in shame is for him (Uncle Sam) to be so prepared in advance and I mean prepared in his own soul, as well as with his army and navy, that when he says anything the rest of the world will know that he means it and that he can make it good. 86

The statement was stirring and typically Rooseveltian. Not once did he openly say that he was a candidate for the Presidency, yet very clearly did he enunciate the terms under which he would consider accepting a nomination for that office. Perhaps it was his inimitable way of serving notice upon his ancient foe, the 'Old Guard' that it would not do to try to run him on a platform that dealt with platitudes or on one designed to attract any element in the voting population that might be repelled by an out and out statement of principles. This was the opinion given by one newspaper. 87

The speech had far reaching effects. It not only served to clarify in the minds of the voters the policies and principles of the former President, but with damaging effects it brought out the fact that his opponent, Justice Hughes, was silent as to his views on all the important problems and issues of the day. Once again there was a countrywide boom for Roosevelt, at least, these Republican or rather those anti-administration newspapers by their editorials and news articles lead the public to so believe. It becomes very difficult for a reader to decide whether some of the newspapers of that period expressed the actual political sentiment of the people or that their glowing reports were only an expression of the beliefs they hoped or would like to have the voters express. Especially in the West and
Middle West the newspapers gave forth the opinion that the people were
giving their allegiance to Roosevelt and to the principles for which he
stood. That he was the man the people wanted, the man the people believed
in, the man who could be trusted to lead the Nation in an honorable manner
during the critical times to come was the growing sentiment of many leaders
and citizens. The Democrats in Washington were becoming fearful for to
them all signs pointed to a fusion of the Progressive and Republican
factions before June and to a harmonious Republican Party with Roosevelt as
the chosen leader. This situation, naturally, was not to their liking.

Definite statements and information concerning the candidacy of
Justice Hughes could not be made by those who sponsored him as the Presi-
dential candidate. Conjecture was all they could offer. It was the firm
belief of his friends that the Justice would accept the nomination if it
were offered to him for Hughes was reported to have said that "... he could
not refuse the Presidential nomination if it came to him properly and that
he would not enter such a refusal." The sentiment that the Justice would
accept the nomination if the conditions were propitious crystallized during
the month of April. A movement was started to prove that the Justice was
'right' on the main issues on which it was expected the campaign would be
started. Friends and critics alike agreed that the toughest barrier to

86. Ibid; other accounts of the speech found in: New York Tribune, April 6, 1916; and The Christian Science Monitor, April 6, 1916.
89. Editorial "The Pre Nomination Campaign." The Outlook, April 19, 1916, 880.
cross, the greatest stumbling block, the highest obstacle to surmount in the proposed nomination of Justice Hughes was the fact that no one knew his convictions, his viewpoints on the current problems and political issues. His position on the bench of the highest court in the land prevented him from making any statement concerning them.

Those who opposed Hughes agreed that as long as he was a member of the Supreme Court, he should not express his viewpoints on current political problems but as long as his convictions remained unknown they felt he could not be considered as a Presidential nominee. One writer summed up the situation aptly when he wrote:

If the Republicans nominate Mr. Hughes they will nominate an unknown quantity. They will nominate a man of the highest character and ability, but one whose lips are artificially sealed on the great problems facing us.95

Another group who opposed the nomination of the Justice did so on the score that the greatest service that the Justice could render to his country was to continue to serve, ably and well, as a member of the Supreme Court.

Only from intimate friends and political associates of Justice Hughes could the Republican sponsors glean information as to the views and ideas of the Justice on the current problems. It was reported that the Justice favored the development of the navy, the doubling of the size of the army, the upholding of the Monroe Doctrine; that he believed that at the outbreak

95. Editorial: "The Pre-Nomination Campaign." The Outlook, April 19, 1916, 880
96. Ibid.
of the war the nation should have prepared for aggression; that American
rights and property should be protected by force, if necessary; that we
should not have interfered in Belgium at the outbreak of the war; and that
he was opposed to our withdrawal from the Philippines until the people in
the islands were ready for self government.

However, secondhand knowledge was not satisfactory to the voters of
the nation and so the Justice continued to be regarded by many in a
suspicious manner. Even those who admired him as a man and as a judiciary
were reluctant to consider him as a Presidential candidate. That a member
of the Supreme Court should enter a political contest for the Presidency
was distasteful to many citizens. One writer seemingly expressed the
opinion of many who believed as he did when he wrote:

... his convictions that no member of
the Supreme Court should ever entertain
any political ambitions whatever since,
in his view, the safety of the country
might sometime depend upon a general
confidence in the Supreme Court and
such a confidence could not exist if
there should be a possibility that its
decisions could be influenced by the
personal ambitions of any of its members.

Refutation of this conviction came from one who earnestly advocated the can-
didacy of the Justice for, in his opinion, the Justice was not using his
judicial office as a 'stepping stone to a political office' nor would the
courts suffer by his action. Likewise, he felt that such action would

98. Jacob Schurman, "Hughes-Why." The Independent, May 29, 1916, 329; also,
and The Chicago Daily Tribune, April 9, 1916.

99. William Garrill, "The Candidacy of Justice Hughes." The Nation, April 13,
1916, 405.

not become a precedent, that the bench would not be made a place for nursing political ambition and if Hughes were nominated it would not become a "...case of a political judge gaining the end of his manoeuvres on the bench but of a man called to public service wholly irrespective of his course as a judge." On all sides the controversy was waged on the question: Should Justice Hughes become a Presidential candidate? To many it apparently seemed unfortunate that a man as fine and splendid as Charles Evans Hughes could not have been in a position to openly declare his willingness to become a candidate for the Presidency. Yet had he not been a member of the highest court in the land would the political leaders and citizens have drafted him as a candidate? Was not his prominence as a Justice on the Supreme Court a major reason, a dominating factor in their conviction that he was a desirable candidate for the Presidency? The most unfortunate angle of the whole situation was the fact that in 1912 the Justice had indicated his attitude toward the Supreme Court and the Presidency. When questioned in that year as to his willingness to become a candidate for the Presidency he had said:

I hope that as a Justice of the Supreme Court, I am rendering public service and may continue to do so for many years; but the Supreme Court must not be dragged into politics and no man is as essential to his country's well being as is the unstained integrity of the courts.102

That in 1916 Hughes still held to the above view can be deduced from the fact that in the interim of four years no action nor statement had been made by him refuting this conviction.

If this political struggle of 1916 had been waged between the two contestants, Roosevelt and Hughes, the story would have been far more simple. It was the part played by the 'Old Guard' that complicated the situation. That they were a dominant force can not be denied and that as shrewd, crafty, experienced politicians they played a 'waiting game' in the months before the convention must be admitted. Having no powerful candidate to propose other than Root, who had few followers West of the Allegheny Mountains, they were forced to choose between Roosevelt and Hughes. However, this they were not ready to do, so they adopted the course of playing one candidate against the other and by so doing they hoped in the end to dominate the situation and to nominate a candidate of their own choosing. While the irreconcilables were not ready to support Roosevelt yet a victory for the Republican Party was their paramount aim. To win without the Colonel was their hope but eventually, if events so dictated, they would be forced to accept him, but meanwhile they continued to be non-committal in regard to him. This attitude was not taken by such hidebound Republicans as Barnes and his followers who, because of their intense hatred for Roosevelt, definitely intimated that party defeat was preferable to victory under Roosevelt.

These seasoned politicians were certainly in a predicament. Roosevelt in his stirring speeches against the Democratic administration had practically drawn up the Republican platform, had enunciated the principles upon which the Republicans could hope to defeat the Democrats. The majority of the Republicans, while satisfied to inaugurate the principles of

Roosevelt into the party platform, felt that Roosevelt by his dominating manner had overstepped his prerogatives. As one leader stated that "... he (Roosevelt) is trying to dictate the platform, the nominee, and run the whole party, even before he is back in it." How some of the 'stand pat' Republicans of the 'Old Guard' hated Roosevelt, for to them his perfidy of 1912 was still very fresh in their minds, yet they had to face the fact as it was in 1916. As one delegate from Massachusetts expressed it: "If it shall appear that there is no alternative to Roosevelt and victory or some other nominee and division and defeat, then it may be taken for granted that the 'regulars' of Massachusetts will prove neither stubborn nor rebellious. It will be 'Anything to Beat Wilson at Chicago.'" However, if it was to be the Colonel because of his drawing power, then it must be with the control of the party in the hands of the 'Old Guard'. One of the first moves made by this Republican group to accomplish their purpose was to draw up a "... platform containing a ringing declaration of the attitude of the Republican Party toward Americanism, preparedness, and the tariff." By espousing the two causes closest to the heart of the Colonel, the wily politicians hoped to outsmart Roosevelt and force his followers, first, to agree to the principles written into the platform and then to accept any man nominated upon it.

That the 'Old Guard' was unwilling to support Roosevelt unless forced to do so was true yet they were really not favoring Hughes as their candidate.

108. Ibid.
With many in the Republican group the Justice was a second choice and if he was the only one who could defeat Roosevelt, then all was well and good. However another candidate, one of their own group, and with many this was Root, was preferable. If, as events developed, their allegiance to Hughes became unnecessary, they were ready to change their allegiance. Continuing to be non-committal the members of the 'Old Guard' looked forward to the events at the Convention for the final results.

Of the 'favorite sons' little need be said. The common opinion was that their names would be eliminated after the first ballot. While it was true that at many of the State Conventions the name of the leading citizen was proposed as a candidate for the Presidency, yet these political figures had little influence outside of the native state. One editor expressed the current opinion that the old idea of each state proposing a candidate was gone. In more recent elections the dynamic men, leaders in the nation's limelife, overshadowed the state choices.

As the month of April came to a close, only a rash prophet would forecast the events of June. The Republican Party was still disorganized, but hopeful of a harmonious reunion. In order to win, the party must unite, unite on a platform and on a candidate presenting a sharp contrast to the candidate and platform of the Democratic Party. The Republicans had hoped to win as a result of the unpopularity of the Democratic administration but this probability had become remote. The Democrats, according to one writer,

112. Editorial: "A Bad Year For Favorite Sons." The Nation, April 13, 1916, 400
were forestalling Republican criticism of governmental affairs by adopting a more active Mexican policy, by increasing the army and the navy, and while the Democrats were not able to propose definite convictions concerning affairs across the waters, neither were the Republicans. Therefore, the Republicans were not able to use criticism of the Administration as an effective means to attain victory as they had previously planned to do. The Republicans needed an aggressive leader and a sharp issue and they could not get it unless they were willing to pay a high price, concluded this editor.

In the weeks before the Convention one would expect to find definite alignments being made, a closer harmony of the three factions, efforts being made to subordinate the hopes of each group in order to bring victory to the party to which, in the final analysis, all groups gave their allegiance. However, this was not the true picture. May was only a repetition of the previous months with each group fighting for the advantage point, each unwilling to give in one iota, each claiming to have the perfect nominee, and each confident that victory was theirs.

During the month the amount of printed matter devoted to the forthcoming political event both in the periodicals and newspapers increased in volume and in intensity. All attention was focused on the question: Who would be the Republican candidate? During the month those papers and periodicals which favored Roosevelt as the Presidential nominee published his speeches, lauded his viewpoints, extolled his character, and did everything within their power to promote his candidacy. The principles for which the Colonel

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114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
stood were clearly and forcibly reviewed and summarized into four cardinal points, namely, first, for a revision of the tariff scale; second, for a government honestly and efficiently administered; third, for a definite program of preparedness; and fourth, for a strong foreign policy.

Vigorously and consistently during the previous twenty months the Colonel had enunciated his viewpoints in regard to Mexican and European affairs, the very ideals which for years had been in full accord with "... the best traditions and prevailing sentiment of the Republican Party," wrote one staunch Independent Republican. Another believed that the Colonel was the only candidate who could put up an effective and significant opposition to the Democratic administration.

The Colonel because of his speeches and announcements from his home in Oyster Bay was continually in the limelight and the attention paid to him was summed up as being indicative of his popularity. There can be no doubt but that they who were working for him left no stone unturned to accomplish their purpose. Leagues and organizations were formed to further his cause, a cause which in the opinion of his critics was on the ebb until the Colonel began his nationwide speaking tour. One of the most important organizations formed was called the Roosevelt Non-Partisan League whose aim

117. McDonald, loc. cit., 90.
was to express and crystallize public opinion in the behalf of Roosevelt as a presidential candidate. This league sent a long letter to the Colonel explaining the purpose of the organization which, of course, was to further the nomination of Roosevelt. In the Colonel's reply he stated to the organization that he earnestly approved of its work but that his nomination would have to be made with a full understanding that it meant "... hearty indorsement of the principles for which I stand," and he again reiterated his attitude toward preparedness and peace. A queer situation, indeed, when a man endorsed the work of an organization the purpose of which was to further his nomination when up to the moment the man had not signified his willingness to be a candidate for the nomination. Of course, after the letter was published in the papers many believed that it was tantamount to an avowal of his candidacy and that he was desirous of obtaining the nomination from both the Republican and Progressive Parties.

Other organizations under the leadership of business and professional men were formed to aid Roosevelt in his political campaign. The women, too, under the leadership of Harriet Vittum banded together to further the cause of Roosevelt since he, in the previous month, had made known his willingness to sponsor the Federal Suffrage Amendment. Labor, although not organized into official groups, had given evidence of aligning its votes

with the Colonel. Labor was expressing confidence in him and was confident that he would, if elected, do everything in his power to push the social justice planks of 1912. Seemingly, men, women, politicians, business men, and labor groups were eager to see the former President stand once more on the portico of the White House.

Naturally, many opposed Colonel Roosevelt. The 'Old Guard', the ultra-conservative Republicans, and that group of the citizenry which might be termed German-American did everything to lessen his chances of victory. This last group had indicated its unwillingness to support the Colonel because in his speech in St. Louis he had openly condemned certain groups of German-Americans for attempting to shape American politics and he had vehemently denounced all Americans in the hyphenate group. Lastly, it was reported that those Progressives in the West, who were lukewarm in their attitude toward preparedness, had lessened their enthusiasm for Roosevelt because his views on the subject were too extreme for them.

During the month of May the Justice continued to be non-committal in regard to the political situation. Those who disfavored his candidacy continued their opposition on the several scores already mentioned, always stressing their main points - that no one knew the views of the Justice. His supporters answered this charge. One editor, in defending Hughes wrote:

127. The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 1, 1916; and The Christian Science Monitor, June 1, 1916.
"It is for his demonstrated quality, not for his unknown opinions that so many Republicans in so many parts of the country have been turning to him for their best hope this year." The personality of the Justice, his impeccable character, and his splendid public record were of such a nature as to inspire the confidence of the voting population. "We, the People, care more for what a man is than for what he says," stated another. Did it matter so much that Hughes remained silent toward the disturbing affairs in Europe? Since the Republican Party had not issued a party plank on that question perhaps a nominee was wise to remain silent on the issue. Suppose Mr. Hughes had not given out a statement as to the program he would adopt toward international affairs if elected? Neither had the other nominees adopted so foolhardy a task. Perhaps the silence of the Justice was not so great a detriment to his cause. Over and over again the papers and periodicals stated that Hughes was the popular choice of the people; that they, the voters, were interested in electing a "... man brave, wise, honest, independent, and strong enough to grapple successfully with whatever issues may arise." Or as another writer phrased it

... the people were confident that Mr. Hughes would not fail to meet any situation involving our Nation's dignity and honor with an intelligence, a courage, a spirit and a disregard of consequences to himself equal to that of Mr. Root, or of Mr. Roosevelt, or of any other living American.

132. Ibid.
One periodical made an interesting report of the favorable attitude of the voters toward the candidacy of Hughes as expressed by them in letters sent to twenty nine leading newspapers throughout the country. Early in May one leading Democrat wrote:

The Roosevelt tide has receded and that of Hughes is advancing. Roosevelt has overplayed his hand and the reaction has set in. He may be nominated but it does not look like him today. Polls taken in Congress and in legislative and political groups in various sections of the country reported results in favor of Hughes yet the limitations of these polls were so evident that the results gave scant indications of the will of the voters.

While the supporters of Roosevelt were claiming victory for him the friends of Hughes were making the same claim for the Justice. Those who argued for the nomination of Hughes favored him because they were of the opinion that he was the most popular choice among all classes of the nation, that he had proven himself a highly efficient executive and competent leader, that he would act as a harmony candidate who would heal the breach of 1912 and reunite the Republican Party, that the people wanted him because he did not want to run, and that "...on issues growing out of the affairs in Europe he would take a just and equitable view for which his judicial experience has fitted him, that he was an ardent protectionist."

Although the views of Hughes remained unknown it was assumed that the Justice would not consider an invitation to leave the bench and make a campaign for the Presidency if he were not as strongly opposed to the policies and methods of President Wilson as was Roosevelt.  

However, granted that Hughes had a good chance of winning the nomination the question still remained, Would he accept the nomination? While his silence had been interpreted to mean his acquiescence, yet it was generally agreed that he would withdraw from the contest or refuse the nomination if an "... unseemly struggle for delegates occurs in which a Justice of the Supreme Court would be made to appear as a contestant" wrote one political writer. It was believed that if Roosevelt opposed him the Justice would withdraw.  

Early in May the group known as the 'Old Guard' came out into the open and entered the campaign in an active way. Opening headquarters in the city of New York they set about to accomplish their purpose, namely, to dominate the Convention in June, to have their candidate or one who was agreeable to them nominated in Chicago, and to defeat the Democrats in November. Elihu Root was their choice as the Presidential candidate even though they were aware that although he was popular and well received in the East, he was looked upon with disfavor by the voters of the territory west of the Allegheny Mountains. During the first months of 1916 the 'Old Guard' had

been confident that any Republican candidate would be victorious in the
election in November, but it had been the opinion of many that this attitude
was a sheer bluff. The 'Old Guard' must have been aware that only
Roosevelt or Hughes could defeat President Wilson. However, defeat of the
Democratic administration and a victory for the Republican Party was their
sole goal. They well knew that it was absolutely necessary to have the
votes of the Progressive group and in order to be assured of this they had
announced a straightforward platform thereby hoping to secure the support
of Roosevelt and the Progressives whom they felt were more anxious to defeat
the Democratic administration than to enter the political arena as a third
party. If they could eliminate Roosevelt as a contender for the Presi-
dency and at the same time be assured of the support of the Progressives
they hoped to convince the Convention that Elihu Root would be the man to
bring victory to the Republican Party in November. To attain their end
they had maneuvered and manipulated, had pitted Hughes against Roosevelt,
hoping thereby to eventually eliminate both men and to be able to put up
their own candidate.

However, when it became so evident that the voters of the nation were
showing a decided interest in both Roosevelt and Hughes, the 'Old Guard'
became so concerned that secret conferences were held and plans were re-
organized. Since they were unwilling to accept Roosevelt their only alterna-
tive was to be content with Hughes. However, if Roosevelt could be elimi-

144. Editorial: "Roosevelt and the Progressives." The North American Review,
June 1916, 801; New York Tribune, May 24, 1916; and The Christian
146. Editorial: "Who is Back of Hughes, the People or the Old Guard?" Current
Opinion, June 1916, 32
ated and Hughes did withdraw, the stage would be set to their liking, yet if Hughes did not withdraw they would be forced to accept the Justice
"... with appropriate relief in escaping Roosevelt but with misgivings of
the future," was the opinion of one newspaper man. The 'Old Guard'
seemingly was alarmed. With the Convention so near and with the political
situation practically the same as it had been at the outset they could be
definitely sure of only one thing, namely, they were quite certain of the
support of the delegates from the state of New York and this was a point in
their favor, for without the support of the pivotal state of New York it
was felt that neither Roosevelt nor Hughes could win the nomination.

On the eve of the Convention the Republican Party was definitely
divided into three factions, each with its chosen candidate, each working
desperately to assure victory for its chosen leader. Most assuredly the
delegates and political leaders must have entrained for Chicago with mixed
apprehensions as to the outcome of the Convention.

CHAPTER II
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THE PROGRESSIVE AND REPUBLICAN CONVENTIONS

Before considering the interesting subject, the political conventions, a survey of the nation as to political thought and economic conditions seemed to be in order. A review of the newspapers and periodicals of May and June had led one to believe that the people, the actual voters of the nation, were not extremely interested in the conventions nor in the election in November. More space was given to other news items, mainly to the disturbing affairs in Mexico and in Europe. Either these, by their very nature, were of more vital concern to the people or else the citizenry, having the 'steam roller' efforts of 1912 still fresh in their minds were aware that the political leaders of the parties would run the Conventions to suit their own plans. Then, too, the primaries had failed to play the part expected of them, owing to the fact that neither Roosevelt nor Hughes had permitted his name to be placed on these state primaries. Throughout the nation and especially in the Middle West there seemed to be a feeling of apathy, a lack of interest in the approaching political Conventions to be held in Chicago.

The reasons for this feeling were not difficult to find. The nation was experiencing an era of prosperity, was enjoying the benefits derived from high wages and flourishing business conditions. The general consensus seemed to be that business was striding forward at a great pace; wages were increasing rapidly; workers were in great demand, in fact, the demand overbalanced the supply; domestic consumers were buying heavily; and the nation and the workers were benefiting from an era of increased prosperity.

Whether this prosperity was real or would disappear with the cessation of the war in Europe was a mooted question. However, a prosperous, well-fed nation of people was not likely to become overwhelmingly interested in a political battle.

The voters may have been disinterested but not the throngs which traveled to Chicago to view or to participate in the political drama that was scheduled to begin on June 7. Days before the doors of the Coliseum opened for the Republicans and the portals of the Auditorium swung back to welcome the Progressives the lobbies of the Michigan Avenue hotels were thronged with the politically minded; not only with the important leaders whose sincere hope it was that a conciliation between the members of the two parties could be effected, but likewise, with the lesser political figures who may or may not have known what it was all about.

On the eve of the Conventions several writers expressed their viewpoints as to the emotional attitudes of the delegates and their political parties. One wrote:

The Republican Party is fighting within itself for its soul, for a policy and a leadership of national altruism and powerful Americanism.

Another stated that the party was "... disunited, distracted, and demoralized ..." and was "...without any definite policy or coherent program...." while a third saw the whole situation as an example of 'Republican fumbling.'

In the week prior to the opening of the conventions the newspapers were filled with articles favoring the nomination of Justice Hughes and impetus was given to his cause by the announcement made by the Executive Committee of the Progressive Party. It reported that the Progressive Party was ready to support the Justice on two conditions, first, if the Republican Party absolutely refused to nominate Colonel Roosevelt; and second, if the Justice made a declaration of his principles immediately upon his acceptance of the Republican nomination and that these principles proved him to be in sympathy with the principles of Americanism for which the Progressives under Roosevelt's leadership had been fighting. While the friends of Hughes viewed this announcement as a good omen, those less friendly interpreted it otherwise. It was known that the Justice was not likely to make any public statements until after June 13, at which time he was scheduled to make reports on important cases before the Supreme Court and since the

progressives had definitely stated that they would not take him unless he did express his views it was believed that the Progressives were hoping, therefore, to force the Republicans to take the Colonel.

A friendly spirit was exhibited between those working for the Justice and those working for the Colonel, a spirit that resulted in several conferences at which both groups outlined their aims. While the Progressives clearly stated their aims, their principles, and their loyalty to Roosevelt as the Presidential candidate the Republicans were less committal, stating only that it was their hope that if the Republican Party adopted a sincere, straightforward platform and nominated a man "... equal to the important tasks which will confront the next President..." the Progressives would lend their support. The Republican leaders agreed to send a copy of their party platform to the Progressive leaders and both parties agreed, at these informal meetings, to consider the possibility of a compromise candidate other than Hughes or Roosevelt. About this time rumors to the effect that Roosevelt was definitely committed to the idea of running as third party candidate if the Republicans refused to nominate him began to be circulated but they had no foundation for at no time had Roosevelt made a direct statement to that effect.

These conferences while promoting an amicable spirit between the two political parties caused strife within the Progressive ranks for those more radically minded were greatly disturbed by the actions of their leader, George Perkins, because in their opinion he was making too many efforts to placate the Republicans. On June 6, seventeen state delegates met and informed Perkins that they had not come to Chicago to be 'supinely acquiescent' in what the Republicans might wish to do and it was their opinion that the Progressive Party should conduct its convention without reference to the Republican convention. Governor Johnson of California, likewise, issued a statement to the effect that "... he was not in favor of dickering with the Republican chiefs on any basis but the nomination of Roosevelt. There is but one logical outcome to the situation confronting the Republican and Progressive Conventions. If Mr. Wilson is defeated or ought to be defeated it will be on the clear cut, definite issue of preparedness and Americanism. This issue has been made by one man - Theodore Roosevelt." Perkins had the double task of making friendly overtures to the Republican leaders and, at the same time, restraining the wishes of the more radical Progressives who preferred party defeat to a fusion with the Republican group.


15. Chicago Sunday Herald, June 4, 1916

The 'Old Guard', the group which because of its overwhelming power had controlled the Republican Convention of 1912, was in Chicago and, in the opinion of some of this group was determined to rule the Convention of 1916. Whether it could or not was problematic. In the first place it was at a disadvantage because it could not advance a popular candidate, and the one prominent figure, Justice Hughes, it was unwilling to sponsor because it knew it could not control him. Just what plan or program the 'Old Guard' intended to adopt at the Convention was never revealed by its leaders, at least, not officially to the press of the day. Though silent, and non-committal these leaders nourished a slim hope that if they could play Roosevelt against Hughes, the convention might be split in two, thereby offering the 'Old Guard' the opportunity to bring forth as an alternative their candidate, Elihu Root, or one of the more popular 'favorite sons.' If the above events came to pass then it could be justly said that the 'Old Guard' managed the Convention, however, one old member of this seasoned political group expressed the opinion that the delegates to the Convention of 1916 could not be managed. This Convention was different from the one held in 1912 not only because a majority of the delegates had come uninstructed but also because of the nine hundred and eighty six delegates present only one hundred and seventy five had been to the earlier

17. Editorial: "Republican Possibilities." The Outlook, June 7, 1916, 301
convention and, therefore, the convention was less likely to be influenced by the old leaders. Then too, the new method of selecting delegates by vote at the primaries, adopted in some states, had lessened the power the political leaders usually had exercised in the selection of the delegates, although not as effectively as had been hoped. A scathing, bitter denunciation of the 'Old Guard' was made by one, an admirer of Colonel Roosevelt, who saw the Republican convention of 1916 as one that was definitely controlled by the all-powerful bosses of the party and he viewed the convention not as a body of men free to act as they were instructed or in the manner they deemed wisest but rather as pawns in a game, a game the plays of which had been quietly worked out by those unseen political leaders of the 'Old Guard'.

On June 7 the Republican National Convention was called to order by the temporary chairman, Warren G. Harding of Ohio. Almost one thousand delegates from all parts of the nation were gathered to deliberate upon the selection of a Presidential candidate for their party. The group while divided as to its choice of a candidate expressed a feeling of unanimity on one point, namely, that the man chosen to be the candidate must be one who was a party man and the delegates were determined not to choose a man from outside the party. These delegates appeared to the members of the press in several divergent roles, for while one called the assemblage a heartening

25. Fred Davenport. "Two Chicago Conventions." The Outlook, June 21, 1916, 419;
sight made up of men who were "... obviously of sires who held their Freeman's Oath as no less sacred than their religious faith...," another writer saw the convention as a group of serious, determined delegates, not 'handpicked' but delegates who were "... men of substance and of assured party position who would have the party point of view, and who would not by any manner of means be stampeded to anybody who was not a party Republican..." Others viewed the delegates in a less favorable light, as a docile group composed of "... politicians great and small to whom party regularity was the breath of their nostrils..." or as "... a gathering together of distributed privileges, of tariff-protected manufacturers, business lawyers, and pillars of society from all over the union. It was the quintessence of all that is commonplace, machine made, complacent and arbitrary in American Life;" or as a gathering of politicians who had not erased the disastrous events of 1912 from their memories.

On the first day of the Convention quietly and without much enthusiasm or fanfare followed the usual procedure of convention routine under the experienced guidance of such prominent leaders as Smart, Crane, Watson,

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27. Davenport, loc.cit., 419

28. Howland, loc.cit., 476

29. Lippmann, loc.cit., 164.

Harding, Penrose, and Lodge. Senator Harding gave the keynote address in which he stressed the need for forgetting the differences of 1912, for reuniting the groups, and for "... rededicating here and now the Republican Party to the progress and glory of the Republic...." A long speech in which he covered such national problems as national defense, protective tariff, business conditions, national expansion, and foreign relationships. According to the newspapers the speech aroused little enthusiasm from the audience, a fine speech, polished and repolished, written so as to hurt no one except President Wilson and a speech definitely aimed at peace. In the opinion of one reporter the speech, while splendid, was not outstanding and the reception given it by the delegates indicated that any chance that Harding might have had of becoming the convention's 'dark horse' disappeared.

On the same day the Progressive Party opened its National Convention at the Auditorium. The tone of its meeting was quite different from that of the Republicans. The Progressive convention was 'all soul' wrote one, an assembly which was eager, alive, earnest, and as "... solid a body of idealists as ever assembled...." reported another. Not only was the convention different in spirit but also in purpose. The Progressive delegates, uncontrolled and unbossed, were fired by a singleness of purpose;

33. Ibid., 20-29.
34. The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 8, 1916; Chicago Herald, June 8, 1916.
35. Chicago Herald, June 8, 1916.
they knew what they wanted and they proposed to get it. They were determined to nominate Roosevelt, and they were ready to put themselves behind him again and to wage another bitter, heartbreaking fight on behalf of the things he represented and in which they believed.

On the first day the Progressives, too, followed the usual routine program of a convention. Temporary Chairman Robbins delivered a brilliant and persuasive speech in which he reiterated and reviewed the purposes and the plans of the party. That the Convention solidly agreed with him and was enthusiastically in favor of Colonel Roosevelt was evidenced by the noisy and long demonstration, lasting one hour and a half, which interrupted the keynote speech of Robbins. How to accomplish their set purpose caused a rift in the convention. One group, the irreconcilables, was enthusiastically determined to nominate Roosevelt, adopt a platform, and go home without paying any attention to the actions of the Republicans.

The other group led by George Perkins, realizing the importance of a reunion of the two factions if Wilson was to be defeated in November, counseled moderation and deliberation. It planned to arrange conferences with the leaders of the Republican Party hoping, thereby, to bring the two conventions to an agreement as to the choice of a Presidential candidate. Officially the Progressives closed their first meeting without giving their sanction to these conferences, nevertheless, an unofficial meeting was held.

38. Howland, loc.cit., 476; and Lippmann, loc.cit., 165.
that night. Nothing was actually accomplished for the Progressives continued to insist upon their candidate and while the Republican leaders quite definitely refused to consider him they did show a willingness to discuss a compromise candidate who would be agreeable to both parties.

In their second meeting the more radical Progressives again tried to force the nomination of Roosevelt but Perkins prevailed upon them to wait, and finally these recalcitrants agreed to the selection of a committee composed of George Perkins, Charles Bonaparte, Horace Wilkinson, Governor Hiram Johnson, and John M. Parker, which group was to meet and confer with a similar Committee from the Republican convention. The Progressive convention after tabling a report on their platform adjourned in order to give the joint Committee ample time in which to confer and again in the evening the convention reassembled but accomplished nothing.

The Republicans, in their meeting on Thursday, continued their routine schedule. First, approval was given to the seating of the delegates, then the temporary organization was made permanent, and Senator Harding became the Chairman of the convention. After the report of the Rules Committee had been adopted and while waiting for the report from the Committee on Resolutions several leading Republicans, Depew, Cannon, and Senator Borah, gave lengthy and 'timefilling' speeches. Finally the convention adjourned

42. Chicago Herald, June 8, 1916; and New York Tribune, June 8, 1916.
43. Ibid.
44. Davis, 449; Chicago Examiner, June 9, 1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 9, 1916.
46. Accounts of this meeting found in The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 9, 1916; and Chicago Herald, June 9, 1916.
until the afternoon at which time Senator Lodge read the platform for the party. This platform, while receiving the close attention of the delegates, failed to arouse any controversial discussion and was unanimously adopted by the convention. In the platform the Republican Party committed itself to a policy which guaranteed protection of every American citizen "... in all the rights secured him by the Constitution...," a policy in which the Party, while denouncing the administration for the methods it had used in handling the Mexican situation pledged itself to aid in restoring order and maintaining peace in Mexico; and, likewise, reaffirmed its approval of the Monroe Doctrine, and indicated that it favored those efforts which would bring the United States into closer relationships with the countries of South America. The party went on record as favoring "... an adequate and complete policy of national defense..., a sufficient and effective regular army ...," and a strong and well prepared navy, capable of defending both coasts. The plank on the tariff definitely reiterated the party's faith in a protective tariff "... to American industries and American labor..." and stressed the need for a creation of a tariff commission. The party believed in "... encouraging business and will seek to advance all American interests ..." and, therefore, advocated the building of an adequate, privately owned merchant marine. Other items favored by the Republicans included the control by the Federal government of the transportation system; the enforcement of Civil Service laws, and "... all Federal laws passed for the pro-

47. Ibid.; and Howland, loc.cit., 477.
48. Republican Campaign Textbook, 1916, 48-52. The entire account of the platform was taken from this source.
tection of labor;" and "... the extension of the suffrage to women but recognized the right of each State to settle this question by itself."

In conclusion the platform made an appeal to all Americans "... to prove to the world that we are Americans in thought and in deed, with one loyalty, one hope, one aspiration..." and called upon the citizens to be true to the "... great traditions of their common country and above all things, to keep the faith."

The platform was clear and scholarly in tone and "... showed an honest effort to include those policies of the Progressive Party that were possible of acceptance by all Republicans of whatever factions" wrote one historian. Another writer, while expressing a like belief, felt that the platform had failed to express views sharp and strong enough, and, therefore, it would be up to the candidate to put the necessary vigor and vitality into it. The plank favoring woman suffrage was considered a victory although only a partial one since each state was given the final decision in the matter which fact was, in itself, a noteworthy item since it was the first time a Republican platform had carried a "... straightaway state right plank." Universal training, prohibition, and arms embargo were three planks which failed to be written into the platform.

After the adoption of the platform Chairman Harding read the request from the Progressive convention which invited the Republicans to appoint a

49. Meyers, 420.
50. Davenport, loc. cit., 422.
52. Ibid.
committee which was to confer with a like committee from the Progressive convention. Being agreeable to the request the Republicans selected Senators Smoot and Borah, William Murray Crane, A. Johnson, and Nicholas Murray Butler to serve on the Joint Committee. Before the afternoon session adjourned the convention agreed to give voting privileges to the six delegates from Hawaii, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands which increased the convention to 989 delegates and the necessary plurality for a nomination became 495 votes.

The Committees from the two conventions met in a three hour conference but failed to reach an agreement. The Progressives remained firm in their conviction that Roosevelt was "... the one man on whom the two parties could unite logically and with hope of success," wrote one reporter, and the Republicans refusing to consider him stated that no progress could be made until the Progressives were ready to eliminate him and were willing to discuss other possible nominees. The Progressives were unwilling to commit themselves until they had reported back to their Convention, and, also, until they had received a message from the Colonel at Oyster Bay.

It can not be stated that all matters of importance were decided by the delegates in the convention halls. Too many group meetings of the leaders before and during the conventions were held privately in the hotels

56. Howland, loc. cit., 477
57. The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 9, 1916
58. Ibid.
so that as one writer bitterly expressed it, the delegates were "... but pawns and pieces..." and the real players were not at the Conventions but at the Blackstone Hotel where the real game "... is being played." In one of these combined conferences there was proposed a suggestion that Colonel Roosevelt be invited to Chicago to address the conventions separately or at a joint session and to present a peace pact. It would be necessary however for the Colonel not only to declare himself out of the race for the nomination, but also ready to enter into an agreement on the selection of a Republican candidate. William Jackson, Republican from Maryland, acting upon his own initiative sent a telegram to the Colonel in which he outlined the plan. Roosevelt in his reply to Jackson stated:

In answer to your telegram, I can only say that the matter lies with the Republican Convention, and that if the Convention desires me to address it I shall be glad to do so.

I very earnestly hope that the Republicans and Progressives assembled at Chicago will keep steadily in mind the gravity of the crisis not only for America but for the world, and the need that their action in dignity, foresight, and patriotism, shall rise level to the crisis.

I hope their aim will not be merely to nominate a man who can be elected next November but a man of such powerful character, steadfast convictions, and proved ability, that if elected, he will again place the nation where it belongs by making it true to itself, and therefore, true to all mankind.61


60. The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 8, 1916.

The Colonel expressed his personal views in regard to the policies of President Wilson and in his conclusion he carefully evaded a direct answer to the question "Would he withdraw from the Presidential race?"

In the session on Friday, the names of the various Presidential candidates were presented to the Republican Convention; the names of Hughes, Roosevelt, and the 'favorite sons' which included Root, Burton, Weeks, Coleman, Dupont, Sherman, Fairbanks, Cummins, La Follette, and Governor Brumbaugh. Before the balloting commenced the convention listened to a report from the Joint Committee but since the Committee had not reached a conclusion there was nothing upon which the Convention could act.

The voting began and the results of the first and second ballots indicated that the Convention did not know whom it wanted nor had it a Presidential candidate whom it was ready and eager to nominate. The second ballot differed little from the first except that Governor Brumbaugh of Pennsylvania had withdrawn his name in favor of Roosevelt. The results of the ballots were:

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<th>1st</th>
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<tr>
<td>Burton</td>
<td>77(\frac{1}{2})</td>
<td>76(\frac{1}{2})</td>
<td>La Follette</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>Cummins</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>103</td>
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<td>Dupont</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Sherman</td>
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<td>Fairbanks</td>
<td>74(\frac{3}{4})</td>
<td>88(\frac{1}{2})</td>
<td>Weeks</td>
<td>105</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hughes</td>
<td>253(\frac{1}{2})</td>
<td>328(\frac{1}{2})</td>
<td>Some scattering votes</td>
<td>64</td>
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The group sponsoring Justice Hughes tried to force a third ballot but was blocked by the various factions backing the 'favorite sons.' This situation quite pleased the 'Old Guard' for they were confident that if the voting

62. Ibid
64. Ibid.
would remain scattered among the 'favorite sons' there would be a hope that after the sixth ballot the Justice would be forced out and then they could come forward, unite on a 'favorite son' or a 'dark horse', dominate the Convention and the nomination, reported one paper. The delegates realized the graveness of the situation, sensed that the only hope for success lay "... in a union between the warring factions of the party...." wrote one reported. The Convention, therefore, decided to adjourn in order to allow the Joint Committee the opportunity to meet once again and renew its discussions.

Meanwhile in their Friday session the Progressive delegates had listened to the report of the Joint Committee and they felt encouraged not only because the Republicans had no candidate of their own to suggest but, also, because the Republican leaders had brought forth no arguments to answer the claims of the Progressives for the nomination of Roosevelt. While waiting to learn how the Republicans received the report of the Joint Committee the Progressives listened to a report on their party platform and then carefully discussed it plank by plank. In an eloquent and forcible manner the platform enumerated the aims of the party and reiterated the principles upon which it had been founded in 1912. It stated that the United States in its place among the nations of the world was subject to

68. Howland, loc. cit., 476
69. The following resume of the Progressive platform was taken from the Chicago Herald, June 9, 1916.
certain basic duties, namely: "To secure the rights and equal treatment of our citizens, native or naturalized, on land or sea, without regard to race, creed, or nativity; to guard the honor and uphold the just influence of our nation; and to maintain the integrity of international law." With so many of the European nations at war it was the duty of our government to seek to keep peace, but not a "... peace at the price of submission..." for there must be "... an unflawing determination and a prepared ability to defendour rights and to fulfill our international obligations." Regarding the situation in Mexico the platform stated that the disorders in our neighboring country had "... brought conditions worse than warfare..." and had weakened "... our national self respect." One of the foremost national concerns was the "... adequate provision for the common defense..." and that this task should be shouldered by those who had an "... undivided allegiance to America ...," a determination to keep "... America's great heritage and traditions unflawing in the first place." In order to further this plan for preparedness there must be a navy restored to "... at least second rank in battle efficiency; a regular army of 250,000 men;" "... a system of military training adequate to organize with promptness ..." and "... behind that first line of the army and navy a citizen soldiery supplied, armed, and controlled by the national government."

Once again the Progressives wrote down their principles of social justice, namely, the passage of a child labor law, the extension of the workmen's compensation law, and the removal of the artificial causes of the high cost of living. In order to further the cause of social justice it would be necessary to insure prosperity for both business and industry.
This could be done by the regulation of business "... so as to promote its growth and prosperity..." with a just distribution of its returns and a healthy expansion of foreign trade. The Progressives favored the conservation and and development of our natural resources; the reestablishment of a merchant marine; the development of interstate national highways; the establishment of a "... a new standard of governmental efficiency through a complete civil service system...;" the creation of a permanent, expert tariff commission with a view of intelligently and scientifically adjusting of the tariff, so as to build up rather than to destroy American business; and a protective tariff which was essential to the nation's prosperity. The platform was not a proposal of new principles but rather a plea that there be an urgent and immediate performance of these principles by the citizens of the nation and by their leader who should be a man capable of directing the execution of these national needs.

On the issue of suffrage for women the platform stated:

We believe that the women of the country who share with the men the burdens of the government in times of peace and make equal sacrifice in times of war, should be given the full political right of suffrage.70

One significant incident in the reading of the platform was the proposal of a plank favoring Prohibition. While the Progressives after some discussion rejected the plank they did so not because they opposed the proposition but rather because they were fearful that such a plank would distract the attention of the voters from the real, paramount issues of the

70. Chicago Examiner, June 9, 1916
However when the members of the Convention were asked to indicate their personal belief in Prohibition a great majority arose.

At the evening session the Progressives continued to do little but listen to reports by telephone of the actions of the Republican Convention. This procrastination angered Governor Johnson who in a passionate speech stated that he was not in accord with the plan of waiting, that he felt that the delegates had an "... obligation to keep the Progressive faith intact..." and therefore he was in favor of the immediate nomination of Roosevelt. While the Progressives were eager to nominate their candidate yet they were earnest in their desire to give the Republicans every chance for considering Roosevelt as a candidate. Their hopes were bolstered when they learned that Brumbaugh had retired his name in favor of Roosevelt. After the Republicans had adjourned, following their second ballot, the Progressives, too, adjourned.

Again on Friday night the Joint Committee met and after hours of discussion was unable to reach an agreement. By this time it had become evident that the Progressives would not give up Roosevelt and the Republicans had, seemingly, quite decided upon the Justice. The Republicans were confident that Roosevelt would not under any circumstances head another third party ticket, confident because, in the opinion of one historian, they had...
been furnished with information to that effect; and so, in their opinion, there was no need to consider the Colonel as a fusion candidate.

Very early on Saturday morning affairs began to take more definite shape. At five o'clock the Progressive members of the Joint Committee received a message from Roosevelt in which he restated his views as he had expressed them in his telegram to Senator Jackson and to the surprise of many, the Colonel suggested that the name of Senator Lodge be offered as a compromise candidate to both Conventions. The Republicans of the Joint Committee, likewise, came to a decision, namely, to present the name of Justice Hughes to the Progressive Convention.

When the Republican Convention convened later in the morning all hopes of reunion with the Progressives were gone and affairs moved rapidly. Roosevelt's communication suggesting Senator Lodge as a compromise candidate was tabled and the names of one 'favorite son' after another were withdrawn. At the end of the third roll-call the ballot indicated that Justice Hughes was to be the Presidential nominee for the Republican Party.

The results were:

Hughes ....... 949 1/2
La Follette ...... 3
Lodge ........ 7
Roosevelt ...... 16 3/2
Some scattered

On the next ballot the choice was made unanimous. Immediately after the nomination of Charles W. Fairbanks as the nominee for the Vice-Presidency the Convention adjourned.

76. Davis, 449.
Between the late hours on Friday and the morning hours on Saturday the majority of the delegates had swerved their allegiance to the Justice and no satisfactory written explanation for their sudden and overwhelming change of attitude could be found. "It seemed like a landslide or a stampede but it was more serious and thoughtful, with more of deliberate purpose and conviction for great accomplishment than a mere stampede can imply," was the opinion of one historian. Another felt that the delegates had done the thing they had not wanted to do "... and their only consolation was that the one thing they dreaded more had not been forced upon them." The Republicans had conducted their own convention, nominated their own candidate and, seemingly, had been little influenced by the presence or the tactics of the Progressives. Although they had been polite to them, and had attended the joint conferences, nevertheless, they had ignored the Progressives was the opinion of one historian. Yet that was not the true picture, for although the Progressives had been unable to convince the Republicans to accept Roosevelt, still the "... nomination of Hughes was in itself a concession to progressivism," stated another writer. The Republicans were cognizant of the fact that victory in November would be impossible without the support of the Progressives and so they wisely chose not just any Republican but an able, independent candidate and, also, wrote.

81. Ibid.
84. Howland, loc. cit., 480.
85. Bishop II, 412
86. Lippmann, loc. cit., 164
their most progressive platform since 1860 with the hope that many of the
four million progressive voters of 1912 would line up with the Republican
forces in 1916, was the view expressed by journalists. The critical state
of affairs in the nation and in the world, the widespread antipathy toward
Colonel Roosevelt, and the inability of the followers of the various
'favorite sons' to unite on one man were given as the reasons why the
Republicans finally chose to nominate Justice Hughes as the candidate who
could best unite the divided forces of the Republican Party.

Meanwhile at the Auditorium amid much excitement and emotional stress
the Progressives were continuing their Convention. The assemblage had
learned that early in the morning Roosevelt had sent his message to the
Joint Committee suggesting that Senator Lodge be considered as a compromise
candidate. The delegates resented the suggestion, could not understand why
Roosevelt had made it; and so they tabled the suggestion, likewise, the one
made by the Republican conferees that the candidacy of Hughes be considered
by the Progressives. Once again the Convention waited in order to learn
just what action was taking place at the Republican Convention. The Pro-
gressives, while extremely anxious to nominate their own candidate wanted

87. "Roosevelt." The Outlook, June 21, 1916, 402; editorial: "A Word of
Thanks to Mr. Roosevelt." The World's Work, August 1916, 371;
"Rise of Hughes in Politics." The American Review of Reviews, July 1916,
3; and "The Nomination of Hughes." The Nation, June 15, 1916, 135.
88. Ibid.
89. Accounts of this meeting found in Ernest Abbott, "The Progressives at
Chicago." The Outlook, June 21, 1916, 423-427; Harold Howland, "The
Conventions at Chicago." The Independent, June 19, 1916, 475-480;
Chicago Sunday Herald, June 11, 1916; The Chicago Sunday Tribune, June
11, 1916; The Christian Science Monitor, June 12, 1916; and Joseph B.
Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time - As Shown in His Own Letters,
90. Lodge II, 486; and The Chicago Sunday Tribune, June 11, 1916.
to make sure that they had kept faith with Roosevelt and had allowed the other Convention an opportunity to consider the Colonel's last proposal. When they were informed that the third ballot was being taken at the Coliseum the important question was put to the Progressives and at twelve thirty-one, just two minutes before the Republicans had officially nominated Justice Hughes, the Progressives by acclamation chose Theodore Roosevelt as their Presidential candidate. The Convention then adjourned and at Three o'clock eagerly reassembled to receive a telephoned message from the Colonel. For two hours there was suspense while the routine of the Convention continued. Speeches were made, John M. Parker of Louisiana was nominated as candidate for the Vice-Presidency, pledges were subscribed to the campaign fund, and finally Roosevelt's reply was read. It stated:

I am very grateful for the honor you have conferred upon me by nominating me as President. I can not accept it at this time. I do not know the attitude of the candidate of the Republican Party toward the vital questions of the day. Therefore, if you desire an immediate decision I must decline the nomination. But if you prefer it, I suggest that my conditional refusal to run be placed in the hands of the Progressive National Committee.

If Mr. Hughes' statements, when he makes them, shall satisfy the committee that it is for the interests of the country that he be elected they can act accordingly and treat my refusal as definitely accepted. If they are not satisfied they can so notify the Progressive Party and at the same time confer with me and then determine on whatever action we may severally deem appropriate to meet the needs of the country. 92

It was not the unqualified acceptance they had dared in their exaltation to expect. "It fell like lead upon their exuberant spirits," wrote one reporter while another stated: "The foundations of their faith seemed swept away ..." and it was a tragic sight to see an assemblage so crushed. They adjourned. Many left the Convention halls puzzled, disheartened, overwhelmed, and some were bitter, ever so bitter. Those who tried to justify the actions of the Colonel claimed that eventually the delegates would appreciate how wise and foresighted the Colonel had been. That Roosevelt acted as he had because of the crisis facing the country, because of his intense hatred of the policies of Wilson's administration and his keen desire for its defeat was the opinion of another. Once again the Progressives were split asunder for some of the Moose leaders, it was believed, would follow the Colonel while others, the irreconcilables, were determined to keep the party intact. One Progressive leader appreciating that his party was doomed said "... we still have an opportunity for service in supporting Justice Hughes. I believe the great majority of the rank and file of the country will fall in line."

While it was believed that Roosevelt's action sounded the death knell for the Progressive Party yet high praise was given to the Colonel. Roosevelt had always been a splendid leader, enthusiastic supporter of the party's

94. Howland, loc.cit., 480
97. Howland, loc.cit., 480
98. Abbott, loc.cit., 420
principles, and loyal to his followers; but when the events of the hour presented an opportunity to further the "... true cause of Progressivism..." he did not hesitate to accept the situation regardless of the effect it might have upon himself was the opinion of one editor. The Colonel had to make sure that the hopes of the Progressive Party lay rather with the support of the Republican candidate than with an insistence upon his own candidacy on a third ticket. In this editor's opinion, Hughes in his letter of acceptance had enunciated the same principles for which Roosevelt had been so forcibly preaching and, therefore, every sincere Progressive could actively support the Justice. Similar viewpoints were taken by those who openly approved of the decision made by the Colonel.

The spectacular decision of Roosevelt did not pass without some measure of censure being heaped upon the Colonel's head and upon the leaders of the party. While it was felt that Roosevelt had declined skillfully yet he had done so "... without a note of comradeship for the men and women who had adored him," wrote one who had been present at the Convention. In his opinion the leaders had fooled the delegates, had been unfair with them, had tried to use the Progressives as a threat and a bluff to force Roosevelt upon the Republicans, and "... everyone seemed to realize the emptiness of the threat except the naive Progressive delegates." Granted that the Convention of the Progressive Party ended in an unexpected manner.

102. Ibid.
104. Lippmann, loc. cit., 165.
105. Ibid.
yet the most sincere praise was given to that highly motivated body of 106
deleagtes for the service they had performed to the nation. By their
presence in Chicago they had forced "... the issues of supreme moment upon
a reluctant Republican Party and a dormant people," and without them the
Republicans might have seen fit to choose some one less desirable than
Justice Hughes, wrote one who believed in Progressive principles.

Immediately upon receiving the notification from the National
Republican Convention that he had been nominated as their Presidential can-
didate Justice Hughes sent his letter of acceptance to the Chairman of the
Convention. It read:

I have not desired the nomination. I
have wished to remain on the bench. But in
this critical hour of our national history
I recognize that it is my paramount duty to
respond ... and to that call in this crisis,
I can not fail to answer with the pledge of all
that is in me to the service of our country.
Therefore I accept the nomination.108

In the body of his speech Hughes stated very clearly and convincingly
that he "... stood for the firm and unflinching maintenance of all the
rights of American citizens on land and sea ..." that he "... desired to
see our diplomacy restored to its best standards ..." that he stood for
"... Americanism that knows no ulterior purpose; for a patriotism that is
single and complete ...;" that he believed "... in making prompt provision

        480; and Lippman, loc.cit., 419.
108. Republican Campaign Textbook, 1916, 30. A complete copy of Hughes' speech of acceptance found in Appendix A.
to assure our national security." He continued: "We are devoted to the ideals of peace ... We have no policy of aggression, no lust for territory, no zeal for strife." Hughes believed that the nation should be prepared industrially and economically as well as in military matters; that there should be a wiser and more fair readjustment of the tariff; that the principles of the civil service laws should be enforced; and he declared that he fully endorsed the platform of the Republican Party. In conclusion he wrote: I have resigned my judicial office and I am ready to devote myself unreservedly to the campaign.

To President Wilson the Justice wrote: I hereby resign the office of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. As briefly and as courteously the President accepted the resignation.

Hughes, in his letter of acceptance, did more than acknowledge his willingness to become the Presidential nominee for in it he clearly and at great length stated his position on all the vital questions of the day in such a manner that it was believed the Progressives would find no fault with his enunciations. His acceptance pleased many for it was believed that the combination of Hughes and the Progressive Republican Party platform would attract many of the Progressive voters, would reunite the factions, and would make the outlook for 1916 a bright one.

109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
On June 26, the Progressive National Committee met and discussed at great length the letter which they had received from Colonel Roosevelt. In it he expressed his refusal to become the Presidential candidate for the Progressive Party and in it he gave his wholehearted endorsement to the candidacy of Hughes. In this letter Roosevelt praised most highly the men and women who had served as members of the Progressive conventions, lauded the ideals to which they had subscribed, and reviewed the splendid work of the party "... in awakening the public to a better understanding of the problems of social and industrial welfare." Regretfully he faced the fact that the people of the nation were, evidently, unprepared and unwilling to accept a new political party. Therefore the Progressives while not abandoning their convictions must face "... the situation and endeavor to get out of it the best that it can be made to yield from the standpoint of the interests of the nation as a whole." In this long letter the Colonel in his usual stinging manner criticized the Democratic leaders and President Wilson for their handling of foreign affairs and, believing that Wilson and his party should not be given the opportunity to govern the nation for another four years, the Colonel appealed to the Progressives to consider only the welfare of the nation and to nominate the man whose integrity was the highest and who morally and intellectually was fitted to be at the nation's helm.

114. Republican Campaign Textbook 1916, 33; "Hughes, Roosevelt, Union." The Outlook, July 5, 1916, 532-34. A copy of this letter may be found in Appendix B.

115. Ibid.
The Committee after five hours of discussion and oratory finally decided by a vote of thirty-two to six to endorse the candidacy of Hughes and directed the Executive Committee of the Progressive Party to ally itself with Mr. Hughes' campaign and to do all in its power to aid in his election. Once again George Perkins had to resort to maneuvering for the minority group, led by John Parker, being of the opinion that this Committee had no right to turn the party over to Hughes, refused to accept the resolution.

The actions of Roosevelt received favorable commendation from both newspapers and periodicals. It was felt that if the majority of the Progressive voters paid heed to the plea of Roosevelt then Wilson and his party would be doomed. Once again high tribute was bestowed upon the Colonel by those who felt that his decision resulted from an unselfish desire to place the interests and welfare of his country above his own political fortune. To the Republican leaders his letter came as a heartening note for they appreciated that Roosevelt in taking the broader view and in sponsoring the man for whom he had never expressed a heartfelt, personal admiration was proving himself worthy of his splendid reputation.

They more than welcomed his cooperation.

117. Ibid.
118. "Hughes, Roosevelt Alliance." The Literary Digest, July 8, 1916, 57.
By his refusal Roosevelt delivered a mortal blow to the party he had founded. The problem which it faced was a difficult one to solve. While the party had no Presidential candidate, yet Parker continued to be the nominee for the Vice-Presidency; while the national organization was functioning yet many of the state groups had disbanded and had merged with the Republican forces, in most instances. These irreconcilables, who felt that the betrayal of Roosevelt was cowardly, were determined to meet again and to outline their plans for a campaign by the Progressive Party. Their numbers would be augmented by those groups who, prior to 1912, had been Democrats and by those western Progressives who could not agree with Roosevelt on preparedness. But in the opinion of most writers the influence that the Progressives would exert in November would be negligible, although it was agreed that their 'revolutionizing spirit' would continue to be felt no matter to what political group they finally became pledged.

On the day of the meeting of the Progressive National Committee Hughes sent two messages, one to this Committee and one to Roosevelt. His telegram to the Committee was a long one in which he expressed his sincere appreciation for the Progressive endorsement and proceeded to give them an extended statement of his views on the current questions facing the nation. The message indicated that the Republican candidate was definitely for adequate preparedness and that the hyphenates need expect no quarter from him. In

121. Ray, 34; and "Mr. Roosevelt's Funeral Oration." The Nation, June 29, 1916, 687.
122. Ibid.
124. "Hughes, Roosevelt, Union." The Outlook, July 5, 1916, 534; and "Mr. Roosevelt's Funeral Oration." The Nation, June 29, 1916, 687-88
125. Republican Campaign Textbook, 1916, 39; The Chicago Daily Tribune, June
most emphatic terms he criticized the Democratic administration and gave his endorsement to some of the measures which the Progressives had advocated so vigorously. By his appeal he hoped to convince the Progressives that they and the Republicans were finally united in the common cause to promote national honor, national security, and national efficiency. In his criticism of Wilson's administration he pointed out the mistakes that had been made, condemned the Democratic officials for their failure in Mexico, and concluded his appeal with the statement:

I am deeply appreciative of your endorsement. I find no difference in platform or in aim which precludes the most hearty cooperation and the most complete unity. It is within the party that the liberalizing spirit you invoke can have the widest and most effective influence. I solicit your earnest effort for the common cause.126

In his letter to Colonel Roosevelt, the Republican candidate not only thanked the former Progressive leader for his endorsement but also asked for his cooperation in the ensuing campaign and expressed a desire to meet with him at an early date.127 Two days later these two leaders dined together and discussed the great political questions facing the nation. To the newspaper reporters they gave out the statement: We talked very fully over all matters and are in complete accord.128

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Lodge expressed himself as being satisfied with the viewpoints taken by Hughes and believed that the candidate in his campaign would stand for the more important issues of the Progressive Party.

CHAPTER III

ISSUES RAISED BY THE REPUBLICANS IN
THE CAMPAIGN

The active political campaign did not immediately begin in July. Time was needed by the political leaders, ample time in which to line up their forces, to organize their workers, to outline their program, to conciliate and bind together those of the Progressive group who had returned to the Republican fold; and time in which to watch with clear, sharp eyes the ever-shifting, complexion of foreign and domestic affairs for conditions across the sea might affect both the policies and the program of the Republican Party.

Hughes and his followers fully realized that their problem of ousting the Democratic Party from office was a very difficult one for the party in power has always had the advantageous position. To convince the citizenry that for the best interests of the nation the Republican Party should be returned to the White House was not to be an easy task for the differences between the two political parties were not especially marked. Charles Evans Hughes and Woodrow Wilson by their very characters and nature offered little contrast or argument. Too many agreed that these two men were of the highest moral character, had long political records which had earned them the respect of the nation, that they had given evidence of their ability as
leaders and of neither could it be said that he was 'incompetent' or 'dangerous.' Likewise, the party platforms offered little opportunity for political disagreement for their similarity rather than their contrast was the notable feature or, as expressed by one editorial, their differences in respect to domestic issues were less marked than ever before in our political history. This editor felt that both party platforms demagogically declared for progressive labor legislation; both relegated the issue of equal suffrage to the states; both advanced the development of the merchant marines, the one by subsidies, the other by governmental ownership; neither proposed changes in anti-trust laws; both held forth helping hands to agriculture; neither group had made satisfactory statements in regard to the problem of national preparedness; and on the tariff issue their difference was of degree only. Seemingly, the Republican Party had become "... more radical and the Democratic Party more conservative than usual, with the result that they had reached substantially common ground" was the editor's conclusion. Another writer found nothing in the Republican Party to inspire the voter, saw in it a political straddle which on one hand made an appeal to the large number of people who held resentment against President Wilson for allowing the Germans to insult our nation while on the other hand


4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.
made a diplomatic effort not to offend "... the large number of voters who were willing to pay this price to have maintained peace."

With domestic and international affairs in rather a critical state, the political situation before the people revolved not around the usual differences of party policies but rather was more concerned with the quality of leadership as portrayed by the parties and by their chosen candidates. The question of whether Wilson or Hughes should be placed at the helm of the government seemed to be more important than outlines of the campaign for the respective parties. Since the viewpoints and policies of President Wilson and his followers were known to the voters it became the foremost problem of Hughes to enlighten the citizens as to his stand on the questions before the public. The Republican Party through its nominee would have to make known its stand on military preparedness, international diplomacy, and on our relations with the Latin-American countries.

During the political lull in July the Progressive Party was in the limelight. Both the Republicans and the Democrats realized that the passing of the Progressive Party did not mean the extinction of the Progressives and each political group was competing with the other in offering hostage to the Progressive vote. How best to conciliate and placate those Repub-

licans who had become followers of Roosevelt in 1912 was the problem facing Hughes and his party. Therefore, one of their first moves was to include six prominent Progressives in the Republican National Campaign Committee of eighteen and Hughes let it be known that it was his hope that local campaign boards following the example of the national board would include other Progressive men in their local campaign organizations. Hughes and his aids realized that it would be difficult for members of the Progressive Party to line up with men whom they had been fighting for four years and so every effort was made to make their return less difficult. To the Progressive conference being held in California Hughes sent a telegram expressing his appreciation of the support that he was receiving from Progressive leaders in that state and voicing his earnest desire for a reunited party. During the month the cause of the Republicans was given added encouragement by the public statement of former Senator Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana, a foremost leader in the revolt of 1912, who stated that he not only would support Hughes but that he was willing to take the stump in the nominee's interest. By his reconciliation the Republican leaders were greatly encouraged for they felt that the state of Indiana would swing to the Republican column and each addition to their side increased the solidar-

11. These Progressives were: George Perkins, Oscar Strauss, Chester Rowell, Herbert Smith, James Garfield, and Everett Colby as found in The Chicago Tribune, July 6, 1916, and New York Tribune, July 13, 1916.
ity of the party ranks and the front it would present to its opponents. On the same day on which Roosevelt issued his statement to the Progressives, Perkins issued a statement that he and his aids had lined up for the election of a Republican Senate which action would have far reaching effects in that it would tend to make the contest for the Senatorial seats clear cut between the Republicans and the Democrats and, consequently, make it far easier for the Republicans to gain the nine seats necessary for party control of the Senate.

Not all the Progressives had meekly returned to the Republican fold. Many, angered by the methods used at the National Convention, had indicated their intention of lining up under the banner of the Democrats, which support Democratic Chairman McCormick announced would be sufficient to make the re-election of President Wilson a certainty in November. A third group of Progressives under the leadership of John M. Parker had issued a statement that the Progressive Party would hold a conference in Indianapolis on August 3 at which time would be considered the question of whether or not a convention should be called to complete the party's national ticket. Parker and others were of the firm opinion that the nation should be made aware that the Progressive Party was determined "... to continue the fight for those principles which we have so strongly advocated," and only by

15. Ibid., July 22, 1916.
making a formal party ticket, though probably a futile one, could the former followers of Roosevelt indicate their adherence to their principles and purposes.

During the month Hughes was very busy holding conferences with the officials of the Republican National Committee, with the members of the Republican National Campaign Committee; and writing his formal speech of acceptance, to be delivered in Carnegie Hall on July 31. Busily he worked gathering data, facts, and statistics which would serve as ammunition for his attack on President Wilson and the Democratic administration. His three-fold task of placating the former Progressives upon whose vote it was conceded the election would hinge, of conciliating the irate regular forces of the Republican Party, and at the same time, of preparing a bold, forceful program to serve as an attack upon the party in power was, indeed, a mighty weighty problem. By choosing outstanding Progressives to serve on the National Committee he appeased the spirits of that group, yet his choice rebuked the forces of the 'Old Guard' only four of their members being selected. Hughes, it was believed, thus indicated his unwillingness to allow the 'Old Guard' to run the campaign. However, conferences with former President William Howard Taft and Senator Albert B. Fall gave evidence that Hughes planned to call upon the leaders of the Republican Party to aid him in his campaign. 22

19. Ibid.
On the evening of July 31 in Carnegie Hall in New York City, Hughes gave his formal speech of acceptance. Great crowds filled the hall not only to hear the nominee's speech but likewise to see the candidate's erstwhile opponent, Colonel Roosevelt, whose presence at the meeting had been assured. Technically it was the formal acceptance of Hughes as the presidential nominee, but actually it was the 'love feast' of the reunited Republicans and Progressives and this bit of human interest was an added attraction to the meeting. The long speech of the nominee was a masterly indictment of the national administration, a statesmanly message to the American people in which the major emphasis was placed upon the issues facing the nation and as such would serve as an outline or syllabus for the political campaign. While Hughes carefully presented his viewpoint on the many problems of the day he mainly stressed three which were: our relations with Mexico, our European complications, and the problem of national preparedness. Taking up each issue he, in a pungent manner, showed just where he thought the Wilson administration had failed and just where he stood on each particular question.

Speaking on the pressing situation on the Mexican border Hughes labeled our efforts to settle the problem as "... a confused chapter of blunders." In his opinion the administration had not helped Mexico but rather by its actions and vacillating contradictory policy had succeeded in


24. Republican Campaign Textbook, 1916, 4
alienating the friendship of our southern neighbors. This was regrettable since the United States had no policy of aggression toward Mexico, had no desire for any part of her territory, but rather on the contrary, our nation wished her to have "... peace and stability and prosperity." However, Hughes stated, that the United States expected Mexico, even while disturbed internally, to protect the lives and property of American citizens and "... to protect our border from depredations." Only by adopting a consistent policy, only by convincing Mexico that our government proposed "... to insist in a firm and candid manner upon the performance of international obligations," Hughes continued would a basis for friendly relations be established.

More briefly Hughes touched upon the complications arising from the warring situation in Europe. He promised a firm and efficient foreign policy and by implication he inferred that our difficulties with Germany and England arose from the blundering diplomatic policy adopted by the Democratic regime. It was his viewpoint that

... had this government by the use of both informal and formal diplomatic opportunities left no doubt that when we said "strict accountability" we meant precisely what we said, and that we should unhesitatingly vindicate that position, I am confident that there would have been no destruction of American lives by the sinking of the Lusitania... Moreover, a firm American policy would have been strongly supported by our people and the opportunities for the development of bitter feeling would have been vastly reduced.28

25 Ibid., 8.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 8.
28 Ibid., 8.
On the paramount issue of the day, national preparedness, the candidate spoke at great length. He stated emphatically that he believed the size of the regular army was inadequate, as was demonstrated by conditions on the Mexican border, and not only should the army be increased in size, but also that there should be a "... first citizen reserve subject to call ..." which should be "... enlisted as a Federal army and trained under Federal authority."

The second part of his speech was confined to domestic affairs and became a rather partisan political discourse on such topics as labor problems, agriculture, the tariff, economic readjustment after the war, and woman suffrage, reported one paper. Much attention was paid by the nominee to the perplexing situation that would be inevitable after the cessation of war in Europe. His most constructive proposal, in the opinion of one editor, was the proposal of what Hughes called "... an organization of peace..." in which he advocated "... an international tribunal to decide controversies susceptible of judicial determination; conferences of the nations to formulate international rules, to establish principles, to modify and extend international law so as to adapt it to new conditions; the development of instrumentalities of conciliation..." and behind this international organization, if it is to be effective, must be the cooperation of the nations to prevent resort to hostilities before the appropriate agencies of peaceful settlement have been utilized." Concerning the tariff the nominee took the usual Republican attitude of protection and

29. Ibid., 12.
found the attempts of the Democratic Party at tariff reform a failure. He further accused the administration of inefficiency, extravagance, waste, and of violating the sound principles of civil service. He briefly stated his belief in woman suffrage for in his judgment efforts to defeat this movement would be unsuccessful.

Editors of magazines and newspapers in reviewing the speech offered conflicting opinions on sections of the speech but the general tone of their reactions seemed to be one of either frank, open disapproval or one of impartiality. One editor wrote: "The speech of acceptance of Mr. Hughes was a disappointment to most Progressives, to many Progressive-Republicans..." another remarked that the candidate in his opening paragraph had said: "We come to state in a plain direct manner our faith, our purpose, and our pledge," which pledge, the editor felt, Hughes had not kept for his speech "... consisted chiefly of a clear and forceful statement of the reasons why the President should not be re-elected." Another editor, while agreeing that the speech would make an effective campaign document, stated:

... when the discriminating and independent minded reader lays it down the question will irresistibly press upon him, 'What is lacking?' We think that the answer will be that, while Mr. Hughes has taken the offensive properly, he has not clearly indicated the positive policies which he himself will pursue.

35. Editorial: "Mr. Hughes' Campaign Outlined," The World's Work, September
A lack of constructiveness seemed to be the chief fault of the address and
the editors in their reviews emphasized this grave shortcoming. Hughes in
a comprehensive and impressive fashion had not told what he would do if
elected President but had devoted two-thirds of his 8000 word speech to
criticism of the administration. On several issues Hughes failed to tell
explicitly what he would do if he were placed in the White House. This was
quite evident in the section where he spoke on our relations with the
nations of Europe. While promising "... a firm and efficient foreign
policy ..." and intimating "... that he would be more drastic against any
English interference with our trade...." he failed to state what the drastic
measures would be, reported one editor, and this same viewpoint was
expressed by the other editors.

For his stand on the issue of the hyphenates the candidate was
criticized severely. It had been hoped that he would utter a decisive word
on German-American intrigue in our politics but his speech supplied that
degree of vagueness which it was believed would enable the German-Americans
to endorse it and continue their campaign against President Wilson. Many
voters were disappointed because Hughes had stressed so briefly such impor-
tant issues as the tariff and the Democratic extravagances which Republicans
in New York felt would be the big issue of the campaign, reported one
editor. Critical though they were of the speech the editors in the main

36. Ibid; similar views taken by the editorials: "Mr. Hughes Accepts," The
Independent, August 14, 1916, 212; and The Nation, August 3, 1916, 96.
37. Ibid.
38. Editorials: The Nation, August 3, 1916, 96; and New York Tribune,
August 2, 1916.
agreed that while the speech had its drawbacks it had helped to clarify the
issues and if supplemented as the campaign went on with affirmative and
constructive proposals it would serve as a strong attack upon the record of
the administration.

Three prominent weekly magazines, while not openly critical in their
reviews, of the speech, were not laudatory in their remarks and left the
reader with the impression that they were reserving their opinions. One
editor felt that Hughes did wisely in making 'Anti-Wilsonism' the Republican
issue for, in his opinion, it was the one issue that would unite the dis-
contented groups and the one way "... of avoiding any dangerous commitment
on any issue which will seriously divide the Republican vote." The second
editor gave a clear, detailed review of the speech but he neither criticized
nor praised it. In the article of the third magazine was found not a
review of the speech but a consensus as expressed by the editors of the
prominent newspapers of the country. Some of them were enthusiastic about
the speech, some were critical of portions of it, and others were less
impressed.

40. Editorials: "Mr. Hughes Campaign Outlined." The World's Work, September
1916, 483; "Mr. Hughes Accepts," The Independent, August 14, 1916, 212;

41. Editorials: "Why Hughes Finds Wilson Wanting." The Literary Digest,
August 12, 1916, 336; "The Hughes Acceptance," The New Republic, August
5, 1916, 4; and "Mr. Hughes States the Issue," The Outlook, August 9, 1916,
827.


43. Editorial: "Mr. Hughes States the Issue," The Outlook, August 9, 1916, 827

44. Editorial: "Why Hughes Finds Wilson Wanting." The Literary Digest,
August 12, 1916, 336.
One Mid-western newspaper was wholeheartedly enthusiastic about the speech, viewing it not as "... a partisan document..." but "... as a statesmanly message to the American people ..." and expected that it would become an outline for the campaign "... which it may be hoped will be one of constructive debate, clarifying public thought and concentrating the American will on a course of definite and unvacillating policy in foreign and domestic affairs." This newspaper reported that the speech had made profound impression in Washington where Republican leaders were jubilant believing that Hughes had put Wilson on the defensive and would keep him there.

Theodore Roosevelt publicly praised the speech of Hughes, asserting that it was an admirable speech and that Hughes was right. The former President was especially pleased with the manner in which the Republican candidate had exposed the folly of President Wilson's Mexican policy.

On the day following his speech of acceptance Hughes again attracted the attention of the nation by issuing a statement in which he declared himself in favor of an amendment to the Federal Constitution granting the right to vote to the women throughout the nation. While the Republican Party had rather sidestepped the issue, the nominee came out squarely in favor of woman suffrage and this action was important for it was known that

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the votes of women would be significant in the fall election. The action of Hughes would gratify the women in those states in which women suffrage was already in practice. It was a known fact that one-fifth of the total vote cast for the Presidency and one-third of the votes necessary to elect the President would come from the suffrage states whose total votes of ninety-one would be important in the necessary majority of 266 in the Electoral College. Women throughout the nation were pleased by the nominee's statement and keener interest was stimulated in the conference of the National Womans' Party which was to be held in Colorado Springs on August 10.

On August 3 the swan song of the Progressive Party was heard. The leaders of the party in their conference in Indianapolis came to the conclusion that since Roosevelt had declined the Presidential nomination and since in many states the Progressive Party organizations had disbanded that any effort to choose another nominee would be unwise. However in every state where there was an organization the name of John M. Parker, as nominee for the Vice-presidency, would be placed on the ticket. Vehemently these supporters of the Progressive principles in a public statement denounced the actions of the Progressive National Committee, held on June 26, as a breach of trust and from Indianapolis came the announcement that a conference of

49. Ibid.
Progressive leaders to consider the ways and means of continuing the
progressive Party would meet after the election in November. However, in
the opinion of most thoughtful people the Progressive Party was dead and
this conclusion was heightened a few days later when Ray Robbins, Chairman
of the National Progressive Convention, announced his intention of supporting
the Republican candidate, Charles Evans Hughes. Robbins stated that in his
opinion the voters had viewed the Progressive Party not as a new political
organization but as a mere expression of revolt against the actions of the
Republican Party. The voters in the primaries of 1914 and 1916 had in
overwhelming numbers abandoned the Progressive Party. Therefore, Robbins,
believing in the "... character and courage of the nominee of the Republican
Party ..." was willing to enlist under the leadership of Hughes. This
announcement brought joy to the hearts of Republican leaders for it was felt
that the sentiment of Robbins was typical of the belief of the majority of
Progressive voters.

During the first week of August the Republicans opened their active
campaign for the election of Charles Evans Hughes. The campaign program
which fared the candidate was a long, arduous one. On his first speaking
trip Hughes planned to start in Detroit, travel to the Pacific coast by
the way of Chicago and Minneapolis, return by the southern route, speaking

51. Ibid.
Editorials: "Raymond Robbins and The Progressives." The Outlook, August
16, 1916, 862; and "Robbins Endorses Hughes." The Nation, August 10,
1916, 118.
53. Ibid. and editorial: "Robbins Endorses." The Independent, August 14,
1916, 215.
in Kansas City, St. Louis, Lexington, Kentucky, and reach Portland, Maine on September 7.  

The purpose of the trip was to lay the general foundation for the Republican campaign before the American people, to outline the important issues of the campaign, to allay all feelings of bitterness among the radicals of the Progressive Party, and, as was expressed in one paper, Hughes intended to explain what he would do "... if elected, in the way of having constructive legislation passed to meet economic conditions that the country will have to face after the war."  

In Detroit on August 7 the opening gun of the Republican campaign was fired. Hughes spoke to six groups and his comments were enthusiastically received by the men and women of that industrial city. In all his addresses he severely criticized the Wilson administration for its disregard of the Civil Service regime, for its disregard of the rights of Americans abroad, but his main attack was against the administration's failure in handling the Mexican situation. He agreed that our nation had a right to demand certain things of Mexico but there was a proper way of demanding them. In one speech he said:

"We should have insisted on the protection we are entitled to from a government that performs the functions of a government. We could have said we would not recognize Huerata if his government could not discharge these functions. But it is another thing to wage war upon an individual and try and take control of Mexican affairs."

55. Ibid., and similar statement in The Chicago Daily Tribune, August 4, 1916.
The administration did a very wrong thing in abandoning its international attitude and in taking an attitude no international lawyer could understand. They said to Mexico: 'We do not want to meddle with your affairs but we will not let Huerata be candidate for President.'

As a consequence of the administration's policy, Hughes said, the Mexicans were confused as to our attitude and protested, feeling we were not sincere, especially after the advent of the 'punitive' military expedition into Mexico.

Hughes intimated that if he became President he would adopt a just position toward Mexico, state it establish the justice of our nation's cause, and "... let the Mexicans understand once for all that we do not intend to meddle with their affairs, that we desire that they shall perform their obligations to us, to protect our citizens, to protect them justly in the enjoyment of their lives and property; that they will perform the guarantees that they have given us, and then we shall have peace and happiness. If they can establish a stable government, we will do all we can to support it." Hughes pledged, if nominated, that he would see to it that "... all the rights of the United States are safeguarded and the name of the United States in administration, in policy and execution is honored throughout the world."

While his remarks were enthusiastically received by his audiences, newspapers on the following day were not in agreement on the speeches. Some

were agreeably impressed, felt that Colonel Roosevelt could have done no better, while another felt that the statements of Hughes of how he would handle the Mexican situation had not been strong enough.

On the following day in Chicago, the Republican candidate by his manner and by his eloquent speeches made a favorable impression on his audiences. He won the support of the people, although he jolted many political leaders, by his announcement that he had dedicated himself to the "... cause of American government, not for party expediency, not for friends, not for political support, but for the American people solely." Once again the major portion of his speech was an attack on President Wilson's policy toward Mexico and his listeners voiced their approval of the candidate's statement that he stood for a "... consistent policy that will make Mexico and every other nation respect the United States." While it was to be noticed that he made no effort to expound his program for fulfilling this aim he did vehemently state that the policy of President Wilson had come dangerously near to involving the United States in war.

Another statement which won the approval of the people was his direct appeal for scientific efficiency in governmental affairs, for the use of the merit system, and for the fitness of the men placed in the diplomatic service. He proposed to put an end to the practice of displacing competent

60. Ibid.; The Chicago Daily Tribune, August 8, 1916; and an editorial: "Mr. Hughes and His Campaign." The Outlook, August 16, 1916, 880.
62. Ibid.
men because of a change in the administration. He proposed to handle the public's business in a businesslike way and it was felt this his past records were indicative that he would do that very thing. He also stressed the waste and extravagance of the Democratic administration, an administration more wasteful than any other administration, and he emphasized the great need for protecting American industry from the demoralizing competition of cheap foreign labor.

While in Chicago Hughes had an opportunity to display his ability as a party leader. Here as well as elsewhere during the campaign months the bickering and squabbling among the local politicians made for an irksome situation for the Presidential nominee. However, to the surprise of many Hughes avoided becoming entangled in the local situation and by his appeal for loyalty and harmony he emphasized to the members of the Republican Party the need for wholehearted cooperation within the party if success was to be theirs in November.

In the twin cities on the next day he again held his audience by his vehement denunciation of the administration, adding little to what he had already stated in his earlier speeches. However, he devoted some time to substantiating a previous statement in which he had declared that the Democrats had been guilty of forcing out of office a competent man in the Census Bureau. In reply to Secretary Redfield (Democrat) of the truth of


E. Dana Durand, Director of Census Bureau.
this accusation Hughes had produced a letter from the ousted man as proof. The incident had been taken up by the newspaper and the Republicans were using it as evidence that Hughes definitely favored the Civil Service system and the appointment of men to governmental position who had special training and ability, regardless of partisan considerations. 66

In these Middle-Western cities Hughes forcibly drove home his denunciation of Wilson's Mexican policy and emphasized the nation's dire need of a more adequate preparedness program, citing the lamentable efforts of the national guards to protect Americans on the Mexican border. The enthusiasm with which this statement was received disproved the belief that the Middle-West, being far removed from the dangers of invasion, was not in favor of a reasonable preparedness program for Hughes' denial that the American people were "... too proud to fight" brought a thunder of applause from his audience. 67

During the following four days, continuing his westward tour across the Dakotas, Montana, and Idaho the nominee made frequent speeches, many from the rear platform of the train, and others in the cities of Fargo, North Dakota; Billings and Butte, Montana; and Coeur D'Alene, Idaho. Forcibly and clearly he continued his denunciation of President Wilson, hammering away at the administration's failure, shortcomings, incompetence, extravagances, inefficiency in its foreign policy, failure to protect


American rights; stressing the need for an expert budget system, for a program of reasonable preparedness "... both of the heart and the individual to meet any demand made in the upholding of the honor of the nation ..." and, lastly, reviewed the value of establishing a protective tariff.

A short, concise statement of his beliefs was summed up in the brief speech he made before several hundred people at Mandan, Montana reported one editor. Here Hughes said:

I propose, if elected, that men appointed to the office shall be fit for the office to which they are appointed. I propose that the government shall be economical, not wastefully and extravagantly administered, and I propose that the American name shall be honored throughout the world, because we firmly stand for every American right.

A new note, one of sectionalism, was added to his speeches. In his attack upon the spoils system Hughes elaborated upon the sectional control of the Democratic Party in Congress, pointing out that the disproportionate representation of the South in the chairmanships of important committees in Congress gave that group the controlling power, and he concluded by stating that the Republican policies, on the other hand, were for the "... benefit of the entire nation."


70. Ibid.

While the nominee’s views on national defense were well received by the people, to a greater degree, in fact, than had been expected by the political leaders, yet his attacks upon the spoils system and his stand for efficiency in governmental affairs, seemingly, had made a deeper impression on the citizenry of the inland country was the opinion of two magazine editors and of the newspaper writers.

At the end of his first week of actual campaigning the nominee and his party were enthusiastic about the manner in which the people had received Hughes and his program and a confidence that the Republican Party would sweep the country in November was expressed. The enthusiasm expressed by the women in those states where their vote would be of vital importance and the keenness with which the erstwhile Democratic state of Montana received the Republican candidate added to the hopefulness of the Republican cause. The straightforward, sincere, and vital presentation of the Republican case against the Democratic administration was so telling as to change the "... President and his advisors from complacent, contented office holders to anxious, apprehensive politicians" was the opinion of one editor.

While his admirers were congratulating Hughes his critics were berating him. In their charges against him they stated that while he was very

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thorough in his attacks upon the policies of the government he, in turn, offered no real, constructive policies in the program he was presenting to the voters. To this charge Hughes answered that the points enunciated in his speeches were "... the fundamentals of constructive policies which this nation is facing today."

Arriving on the Pacific Coast the Presidential nominee turned the emphasis of his speeches from domestic problems to international policies. In Tacoma, Washington, before a crowd of 15,000 he "... explained emphatically his attitude toward the protection of American honor and rights" and his manner of hammering home his remarks made it apparent that he intended them as his real message to those who greeted him on the coast, was the opinion of one newspaper writer. Hughes declared that the doctrine of protecting Americans on our border was a good one and that he believed in making it real and genuine. He stated:

I do not think that in making it real we will encounter the dangers of war. But I would not shirk war if it came with the performance of our obvious duty in the protection of American rights. In the protection of American citizens under international law we do not endanger our peace - we conserve it.

Hughes continued that "... there is no peace permanently secure to you unless you have the respect of the nations of the earth." However, he

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78. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
believed that since all the nations were desirous of our friendship there
would be no danger of war if the Americans made it evident that they meant
what they said and were prepared to back up their statements. While the
remarks of Hughes were more militant than before yet they were received
enthusiastically by the largest audience he had addressed since his speech
of acceptance.

In the same speech he expressed his hope that the United States would
play a part in the international peace organization, in the establishment
of a World Court for it was his aim that the United States be known as a
nation of people that did not desire trouble and was not aggressive but
"... let it be equally known that we are a people who will not stand trif-
ling with our known rights, or rights of American citizens." This view-
point, likewise, was well received by his listeners.

In this speech and in others on the next day in Portland, Oregon, he
spoke of other matters. First, of the responsibility our government had to
the Philippines, as a national obligation which we had assumed and were
bound to discharge, as one which we could not rightfully abandon, as the
Democrats were planning to do. To the business men he spoke of the need
of re-organizing our entire government and our national industries in order
to be ready to face the struggle which would ensue after the war was over,
when Europe would make every effort to regain its lost commerce. Following

82. New York Tribune, August 16, 1916; The Chicago Daily Tribune, August 17,
1916; and editorial: "Progressives In Campaign." The Independent, August
83. Ibid.
this line of thought he stressed his belief in the need of a protective tariff which would build up and maintain American industry for the Democrats since their advent in office had done nothing to reduce the high cost of living. In a speech before 3,000 women who applauded him for his views on equal suffrage he expressed the same views as he had stated to the business men.

In California Hughes had the misfortune to arrive in the midst of a bitter factional fight between the regular Republicans and the Progressives who had left the Republican Party under the leadership of Governor Hiram Johnson in 1912 and who had returned to it with him after the passing of the Progressive Party. In 1910 Californian politics had been notoriously corrupt and boss-ridden and Johnson had been elected governor upon a strong reform ticket. In 1916 Johnson was a nominee for the United States Senate. The 'Old Guard' being opposed to him, they tried to eliminate him from state politics and openly had announced their intention to wreak vengeance upon the Progressives whom they charged with deliberately attempting to wreck the party.

The advent of Hughes on the scene brought the state political difficulties into the national limelight and placed Hughes in a dilemma. He thought


to satisfy both groups by declaring his neutrality in the local fight but this attitude of his disappointed not only the followers of Governor Johnson for they had hoped that the Presidential nominee would publicly endorse their claims but also the regular Republicans who had announced their unwillingness to declare a truce. Hughes had expected the support of both groups. The Republicans had warned him that if he did anything which might be construed as endorsing Governor Johnson they, the conservative Republicans, would throw their vote to Wilson. Governor Johnson and the Progressives while openly endorsing Hughes were disgruntled, annoyed because they had been relegated to minor positions in the receptions and speaking program arranged for Hughes. The newspapers and magazines agreed that the situation while a local one, might have far-reaching effects. Two editors, skeptical of the outcome, felt that the non-recognition of Governor Johnson would make the Progressives feel that they had not received the recognition due them and as a consequence, these editors believed there might be a serious deflection of the progressive Republican vote in favor of President Wilson. A newspaper writer, believing that the appeal of Hughes for harmony in national politics would serve to unite both groups, was confident that California would add to the Republican victory in November. A third attitude was taken by an editor who in the previous weeks had been quite critical of the speeches of Hughes. This editor, while

86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
expressing the belief that the Republicans and Progressives would unite to elect Governor Johnson as Senator failed to give his opinion as to the stand the Progressives would take in the Presidential election. All in all it was a very baffling political entanglement which Hughes, the most interested party, had to encounter; and yet, his hands being tied, he could really make no effort to solve the problem.

In his speech in San Francisco, Hughes addressed a large audience and to them he presented the same salient points which he had uttered in his previous speeches in the Middle West, dwelling on the necessity of a tariff reform, on Mexico and the protection of Americans and American interests abroad, on the need of a preparedness program, and on the need for efficiency in governmental affairs. His audience listened attentively but showed little enthusiasm, applauding his declarations for military preparedness but showing little approval of his stand on the Mexican problem.

The day following this speech the Progressives who took their politics seriously voiced their disapproval of the stand taken by Hughes that local, factional fights were not the concern of the Presidential nominee. While the Progressives were willing to abide by the truce, yet they indicated quite definitely their desire that Governor Johnson who was campaigning in southern California should be invited to preside at a later political meeting in the southern part of the state.

92. Ibid., August 20, 1916.
The next important address was made in Sacramento on August 21. Here, as in later speeches in the state, Hughes made a definite appeal to the Progressive vote. For the first time he claimed the support of that group and emphatically repeated his approval of several policies upheld by Governor Johnson, whom, as yet, he had not met. Hughes, speaking of standpatism placed it in the same category with demagogy as things not to be desired in America. He preached the Progressive 'social justice' doctrine, demanded conservation of women and children, talked about efficiency in governmental affairs, and condemned the practice of allowing special privileges at the expense of the people. He won the people of southern California by his assertions on the Mexican situation, a problem close to the hearts of these citizens near that border. First stating that he was a man of peace he forcibly said "... but I recognize the necessity of compelling recognition of our acknowledged rights as a means of forcing peace ... We lost the esteem of Mexico as soon as we failed to adequately protest against the killing of American citizens ... but I am ready to lay down my life to protect the nation's honor at any time such sacrifice may be demanded."

The results of his campaign in the pivotal state of California were summed up with conflicting results. Both Republicans and Progressives agreed that he would carry the state, although his visit had failed to unite the hostile groups. The failure of Hughes to meet and confer with

95. Ibid.
Governor Johnson irked the hearts of the Progressives. One newspaper reported that this group had felt slighted and had begun to question the genuineness of the progressivism of Hughes. His refusal to do anything to recognize the Progressive Party and his failure to indicate clearly his stand on many of the Progressive issues might cost him, this editor believed, not only the support of the rank and file of the Progressives in California, but might also impair the faith of the Progressives throughout the country in the genuineness of his policies and his economic liberalism. His speeches in the state fell short of those specific pledges to political and economic regeneration that the Californian Progressives wished to hear. It was true that the people of California had attended the political meetings in large numbers, yet their response to the speeches of Hughes had not been overly enthusiastic. One newspaper reported the meetings as being more in the nature of deliberative assemblies rather than the usual political meetings. While Hughes had made an impression upon the voters by his discussions on the tariff and the Mexican situation yet there remained among the many independent voters in the state a strong sentiment for President Wilson.

The Republican leaders in the East, while definitely worried about the complaints of the Progressives in California announced that the tour of the Republican Presidential candidate in California had been a success and from all indications the election in November would bring victory to the Republican Party.

98. Ibid.
Starting eastward, speaking in the states of Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, and Colorado, Hughes delivered many speeches in which he again and again made every effort to refute the Democratic criticism that he was tearing down the policies of the President and offering none as substitutes. Hughes, however, maintained that his ideas were constructive and gave as examples his Mexican policy, his attitude toward efficiency in governmental affairs, his stand on military preparedness, his belief in a protective tariff, and his proposed program for a world court. The people in these western states greeted him cordially and the Progressive and Republican leaders assured Hughes that these states would add to the Republican victory in November, especially as the women of these suffrage states were working wholeheartedly for the Republican candidate.

Yet on August 25, in Greeley, Colorado, in a typical speech Hughes again flailed the administration. He said:

Our opponents said they would reduce the cost of living. They haven't. They said they would stand for the merit system. They have shamelessly betrayed the merit system. They said they were for the maintenance of constitutional rights of American citizens throughout the world. They left our citizens to be murdered and their property to be destroyed right here in Mexico, close to our own boundary. They did say they were opposed to a tariff for protection. This they carried out with the result that before the European war broke out unemployed men were walking the streets of our cities jobless, asking for work, and having to be fed by countless charitable organizations.

100. Account of this part of the candidate's trip found in: The Chicago Daily Tribune, August 22-26, 1916; and New York Tribune, August 22-26, 1916.
The next day in Denver the Republican delivered one of his 'America first and America Efficient' speeches, which concluded his western speaking tour. He had traveled through twelve states, had addressed one hundred and fifty audiences of over one-half a million voters and had expounded his beliefs and views on the problems facing the nation. 103

For three weeks the citizens of the nation had been given the opportunity to hear or to read and to digest the import of the Republican candidate's speeches. Whether the trip had been successful could not be agreed upon by the editors of magazines and newspapers. One editor maintained that the influence of the campaign tour had been far-reaching and that the candidate had made a very favorable impression "... by the simple device of appealing to the reasoning powers of his audiences." However, the consensus of opinion on the part of the editors, seemed to be one of disappointment. One criticism hurled at Hughes was that his attacks upon the administration were non-constructive, while some "... assert them petty ..." although the same editor agreed that even the most far-sighted candidate could not have been constructive about everything. In criticizing Hughes the editor wrote:

Mr. Hughes' procedure has been to take up one act after another of the Administration and denounce it without reference to any fixed principles which would bring his attacks into harmony and unity. Many hoped that the Republican nominee would translate

their own general dissatisfaction with Wilson's record into one fundamental criticism as illuminating as a shaft of light.106

To this editor's way of thinking the nominee had failed to arouse any deep feeling among the citizens of the nation and both friends and admirers were disappointed in many aspects of the candidate's speeches. 107

Another editor, while agreeing that Hughes had been well received by large and enthusiastic crowds and that the friendly manner of the candidate had dispelled the myth which pictured him as being cold, reserved, and austere stated, nevertheless, that Hughes had not come up to expectations. 108

The trouble (he wrote) is he has not told the American people positively and concretely just what he proposes to do if elected President. It is not enough to demonstrate President Wilson's sins of omissions and commission. The American people know them already. It is not enough to promise to install efficiency in the governmental service and to eliminate graft. Everybody knows Mr. Hughes will endeavor to do this....The American people want to know what constructive program Mr. Hughes has to offer them. They demand of a leader demonstrations of leadership.109

However, this same editor, a week later, praised Hughes for choosing to emphasize in his speech of acceptance the 'remote and colorless' subject, the national budget. The editor felt that Hughes had courage and insight when he chose this topic, one which although very dull to the average American, was an issue far more important to our national welfare than half the party creeds as protection, preparedness or any other topic, which might so

106. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
easily attract the voter's attention and enthusiasm.

Another editor while reviewing the campaign speeches in a dispassionate fashion did express the opinion that the critics of Hughes in asking him to state what he would have done had he been the chief executive were demanding more of the candidate than any human being could answer. Yet, in conclusion, the editor expressed the sincere hope that Hughes would expound in greater detail his views on our future international relationships.

An impartial resume of political opinion as expressed by the editors of leading newspapers throughout the nation was given by a well known magazine. It stated that the newspapers were reporting favorably on the campaign on the personality and character of the Republican nominee, and on the impression made on the people by the candidate. The political leaders and party managers, according to press dispatches, were pleased with the results of the western campaign and were claiming certain victory in the states of California, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming, and a fighting chance in Montana, Nevada, and Colorado. On the other hand this magazine gave the political viewpoints of several non-partisan or independent newspapers which were decidedly unfavorable in their comments on the success of the Hughes tour. While one newspaper stated that "... Republicans as a rule are disappointed in the campaign of their nominee, Mr. Hughes," another editor felt that:

113. Ibid. 114. Ibid. 115. Ibid.
Hughes in the latter half of the campaign would be a different figure.

A very glowing account of Hughes' campaign was given by a staunch admirer of the candidate. He was of the opinion that Hughes on his western tour had accomplished much as was attested by the editorials in the Democratic journals whose editors in their columns sought "... to criticize and belittle the candidate and his speeches." To the criticism that Hughes in his speeches had failed to hold the interest of the people because of the sameness of subject matter this writer replied that the fragmentary excerpts in the newspapers each day gave the impression of repetition "... but it must be remembered in all fairness," he stated, "that Mr. Hughes has necessarily much the same general message to tell everywhere." In his opinion Hughes had planned to win the West and he had succeeded.

This likewise was the opinion of a correspondent who had been a member of the campaign party. In denying the hostile charges concerning the speeches of Hughes this writer stated very emphatically that the West had received the candidate very enthusiastically and that large, interested crowds had attended his speeches everywhere. To them the candidate in a frank, sincere, personal fashion had delivered his messages on the broad issues which faced the nation and his views more than satisfied his listeners, reported this correspondent. In his magazine articles he earnestly tried to dispel the stories concerning the aloofness of the candidate, refuted the

116. Ibid.
117. Jacob Schurman, "Mr. Hughes' Trip." The Independent, September 4, 1916, 342
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
criticisms of the "... hostile portions of the Atlantic press," and this writer by his enthusiasm and sincerity gave the impression that the people of the West would vote the Republican ticket in November.

In the opinion of another editor the real political campaign had not begun and just how it would develop remained to be seen although he believed that it would be "... concerned with large issues of public policy and with national leadership in critical times," and that it would be decided upon by the independent voter, many of them from the Progressive Party.

That the members of the Progressive Party would play an important part in the Presidential election seemed to be a well accepted viewpoint. This was evident by national interest displayed in the state elections of California. There, early in August, Governor Johnson won the nomination for the position as state Senator. This victory was viewed in various lights. The Progressives were jubilant; candidate Hughes sent a telegram of congratulations to the victor and Republicans and Progressives hailed it as "... an omen of national victory for a reunited party," reported one writer. However, a Democratic paper saw in it a hope that the people of California would vote for President Wilson because many Progressives were still rankled by the behavior of the Republican candidate toward Johnson. The editor of a non-partisan newspaper while aware that the victory of Johnson was

121. Ibid.
effect the California vote will have upon the vote in November. He inferred that the Progressives, since they were heartily eager to defeat the Democrats would compromise and agree on Hughes. However, he brought out the fact that there were many Progressives who were disgruntled with Hughes not only because of his actions while in California, but also were displeased with his views on European and Mexican affairs. As a consequence they were earnestly working to convince the independent voters of the state that "... a vote cast for Mr. Wilson will better express the social, economic, and political faith that is in them than a ballot cast for Mr. Hughes."

While the Republican candidate was campaigning in the West, party leaders were busy in the East. It was planned that Fairbanks, after his notification on August 31, should make a whirlwind speaking tour, covering practically the same ground as Hughes. Colonel Roosevelt, too, was to join the list of campaign speakers. After a meeting with Republican National Chairman Willcox it was announced that the Colonel would actively campaign for Hughes and although no definite schedule was announced other than his speech in Lewiston, Maine on August 31, it was reported he would be used wherever he was most needed. This announcement plus the news that

123. The Outlook, September 13, 1916, 64.
126. Ibid.
Albert Beveridge would deliver a speech in Chicago on October 5, and the news that Colonel Harvey, formerly a supporter of President Wilson, had indicated his willingness to campaign for Hughes started "... joy radiating through the political circles and did much to push away some of the gloom clouds caused by pessimistic reports industriously circulated as to conditions in the West," reported one paper.

Late in August the campaigners met in Indianapolis to prepare plans for launching an aggressive program all over the country especially in the western sections which needed Republican attention. 'Americanism and National Efficiency' was to be the campaign slogan. Besides the candidate and Colonel Roosevelt such prominent speakers as Senators Borah and Harding were to deliver many speeches. Their efforts would be directed toward impressing the public that the campaign was not one of politicians or localities, but of 'absolute nationalism' reported the papers.

As the first month of the campaign closed the center of attention was directed toward the state of Maine. Both major political groups were concentrating their energies there in the hope of winning a victory in the Pine state which was to hold its state elections on September 11. Maine was known as the barometer state and the trend of its early fall elections was usually indicative of the results in November for the nation as well as for the state, reported one editor.

As had been planned Colonel Roosevelt delivered his first real campaign speech in Lewiston, Maine on August 31. In reporting on the speech one editor said that the Colonel in his usual and characteristic fashion had denounced the Wilson administration while another stated that the address was an "... appeal to the chivalry and courage of the American people...;" and one in which the Colonel attacked the hyphenates, reported a third writer. The reviews of the speech indicated that the major portion of the speech had been devoted to an attack upon the foreign policy of President Wilson declaring, as wrote one editor, "... that the timidity and vacillation of the President had brought indelible disgrace upon the country." Roosevelt in condemning the Democrats for their slogan, "Mr. Wilson Has Kept Us Out of War," cited that the 'peace' existing between the United States and Mexico was one of words only, for Roosevelt said:

These are the words. Now for the deeds. During the war with Spain fewer Americans were killed by the Spanish than have been killed by the Mexicans during the present 'peace' with Mexico. Moreover, when the war with Spain was thru, it was thru. But peace still continues to rage in Mexico.137

In his speech Roosevelt advocated an immediate increase of the army, the creating of "... a system of universal, obligatory military service in time of peace, and in time of war universal service in whatever capacity the man or woman shall be judged most fit to serve the commonwealth."138

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137. Ibid.
The Colonel appealed to the people and gave his reasons why in his judgment it was a grave misfortune to re-elect Mr. Wilson. He attacked those who in his opinion were aiming to organize American citizens along 'politico racial' lines and stated that "... every citizen voting this year shall consider the question from the standpoint of America and not from the standpoint of any other nation." In conclusion he contrasted the two presidential candidates, picturing Hughes as a man of his word and Wilson as a man who had been tried and found wanting.

The speech was doubly important because it not only was a clear indication of Roosevelt's views toward the fall election but also showed that the Colonel was wholeheartedly willing to campaign for Hughes. It was believed that his active participation would have great influence in "... keeping his fellow Progressives from straying off the ranch," reported one editor.

Meanwhile Hughes to his listeners in Kansas City, Missouri, on September 1 gave one of his usual speeches placing special emphasis on the need for protection in its broadest sense. On this topic he stood for the "... protection of American lives upon land and high seas and foreign lands, for protection of workingmen throughout the country, for protection of all American industries, for protection of the Treasury from raids of job seekers and reckless legislators." Hughes also appealed to the people to vote

139. The Chicago Daily Tribune, September 1, 1916.
141. Ibid.
into office a Republican House of Representatives and Senate in order to have an administration that would be able to achieve results.

Upon reaching St. Louis, the home of many German-Americans, Hughes was directly confronted with the hyphenate problem and he met it in a direct manner by subscribing to the utterances of Colonel Roosevelt as expressed in his Lewiston speech. In the congratulatory telegram to the Colonel the Republican candidate said: "I heartily congratulate you on your speech at Lewiston and warmly appreciate your support." Later when questioned as to whether his telegram indicated his acceptance of the Colonel's views on the hyphenates Hughes replied: "The telegram may be taken on its face value. I mean just what I said." Thus Hughes made it so obvious that he was against any foreign-born citizen who placed his allegiance to another country over his duty to his adopted land and that there could be no possible doubt of his meaning reported one paper. As one editor expressed it, the German-American group no longer had "... a shadowy basis for a belief that he favors in the smallest degree their views upon our relations with Germany." Following up the subject Hughes stated that while he was not too proud to fight he believed that there would be no occasion for fighting if our rights were upheld. The enthusiasm with which these straightforward utterances were received by the audiences in St. Louis surprised the political leaders, stated one newspaper.

143. Ibid.
144. "The Field of Politics." The Outlook, September 13, 1916, 63.
145. Ibid.
On the next day Hughes traveled to Nashville, Tennessee and his address there was noteworthy on several scores. One newspaper brought out the fact that it was the first time a Republican Presidential nominee had entered the territory for campaign purposes. His hostile audience ridiculed, heckled, and jeered his speech in which he criticized the administration for its policies, argued for a protective tariff, and asserted, in a firm manner, that he stood for the arbitration of all industrial disputes. This last issue was a new note in the campaign due to the signing by President Wilson on September 3 of the so-called Adamson law which had been hastily rushed through Congress in order to avert a threatened strike of railroad employees. The methods used in the passage of the bill were seized upon by the Republican candidate and criticized severely. Referring to this bill Hughes asserted that he stood for two things, first, "... for the principle of fair, impartial, thorough, candid arbitration; and, second, for legislation on facts according to necessities of the case...." To this statement his audience cheered and agreed but in the middle of the candidate's criticism of the administration's Mexican policy one heckler shouted: "What would you have done?" To this Hughes quickly replied: "I would have protected American lives." There was no more heckling and one

153. Ibid.
newspaper writer reported that Hughes had turned "... an almost riot into a personal victory," and in his opinion whether or not the speech won a single vote for Hughes his audience had left the hall with a warm feeling toward the candidate. Republican leaders and writers were pleased by the candidate's 'flatfooted' declaration for arbitration in labor disputes and felt that he had seized upon a weakness in the administration which would develop into a patent issue in the national campaign. One editor stated that this speech of Hughes "... may well prove to be the turning point in his campaign." Not that the speech would necessarily determine the election, believed the editor, but rather that the candidate in this speech showed himself to be the man whom the people had nominated, the man with firm principles, dauntless courage and of whom it could be said that "... not the power of wealth nor the pressure of populace nor the threats of labor-unions will swerve him from following the dictates of his clear convictions."

On the next day the crowds in Lexington, Kentucky were won over by the speeches of Hughes in which he again openly attacked the President for his railroad wage policy, for his humanitarian policy in Mexico, and for his diplomatic appointments. It was reported that there was a possibility that the state of Kentucky might vote Republican in the fall election due

155. Ibid., and "The Field of Politics." The Outlook, September 13, 63.
157. Ibid.
to the fact that the Progressives in the state had indicated their willingness to endorse Hughes.

On September 7 Hughes invaded New England in an effort to swing the state of Maine to the Republicans in the elections to be held on September 11. It was believed that the well known axiom 'As goes Maine, so goes the Union' while unfounded, would prove to have a psychological effect on the country at large and both major parties were anxious and determined to make a good showing in the voting in the state elections. The Republican candidate toured the state speaking in many of the smaller cities and giving his main addresses in Portland and in Bangor on the following day. In Portland his address followed the lines of those previously delivered by him. The high spot of his speech was his attack on the President for the enactment of the Adamson bill. In criticizing this so called eight-hour act Hughes charged that the administration had substituted "... the rule of force" for "... the rule of reason." He objected very strenuously to the methods used in the passage of the bill and declared that if he had been the chief executive of the United States he would not have yielded to force exerted by capital or labor short of a "... fair examination of their facts and a knowledge of what the case demanded." Further on in his speech he stated: "This country must never know legislation under oppression."

159. Ibid.
162. Ibid.
163. Ibid.
164. Ibid.
Again he reiterated that he believed in the peaceful settlement of all grievances by arbitration and felt that the nation might "... as well give up Democratic government if we are not ruled by reason, if we yield to force." In this address he also spoke on the grave need for protecting American labor, for making preparations for the economic conditions which would naturally arise at the end of the war in Europe, and on the need for each and everyone to work for the good of the nation, reported one paper.

An interesting sidelight of the occasion was the presence on the platform of Raymond Robbins, former Progressive leader. In his address he gave his reasons for supporting the Republican candidate, namely, that he believed that Hughes would carry out the ideals of the Progressive Party. The reception given these remarks indicated the presence of many Progressives in the audience.

On the next day in Bangor the newspapers reported that Hughes again developed in a vigorous fashion his opposition to the Adamson bill. In answer to his critics he made clear his attitude toward labor. He replied that he was a friend of the laboring man and that he would be the first to give higher wages where the demand for higher wages was found to be just after an examination of the facts.

His speeches in this state were reported as having been more vigorous, more to the point, and this new zest of the candidate brought hope and added

165. Ibid.
169. Ibid.
However, many were skeptical of the wisdom of making the Adamson law an issue, but Hughes being convinced of its importance continued to make it the high point of his speeches as he campaigned in the New England states and in New York. It was reported that he had injected more vim and 'more vote-getting utterances' into his addresses since he had first attacked the Adamson bill in Nashville.

The results of the election in Maine were an overwhelming victory for the Republicans for not only was a Republican governor elected but also two United States Senators and four Representatives. That the jubilant Republicans regarded this decisive election as indicative of what would happen in the national election in November was reported by the newspapers and magazines. Clearly the Progressives in Maine had united once more with the Republican forces and one editor stated that he believed this amalgamation was "... as complete the country over as it has now been proved to be in Maine," and so to him and others the chances of a re-election of President Wilson were negligible. While many agreed that the election results proved conclusively that the Progressives of Maine had rejoined the Republican Party yet the editors of several magazines and newspapers expressed the opinion that the merger in Maine was not indicative of a similar realignment in other states in the union especially in the doubtful states of the West.

Candidate Hughes ending his first transcontinental campaign tour in Plattsburg, New York on September 12, expressed his gratification of the results in Maine. The returns convinced him, he stated, of the following: that the party was reunited; that the people were satisfied with his campaign methods; and that they approved and would endorse his views on the Adamson bill.

Another feather in the Republican cap was the announcement by the nationally known Progressive leaders, Gifford Pinchot, that he, following the example of Roosevelt and Robbins, had chosen to join the Republican ranks. In his statement he gave his reason for so doing and in conclusion stated: "I cannot vote for Wilson because I cannot trust him. He does not do what he says. Hughes does. Therefore, my choice is Hughes and I shall work and vote for him." Approval of his stand was given by one editor who wholeheartedly agreed with him and firmly believed that many people felt precisely as Pinchot did.

Within the Republican Party there was a murmur of strife. Many members of the 'Old Guard' were not satisfied with the campaign, felt it lacked the vigorous spirit, believed that Willcox as National Chairman was not sufficiently aggressive, and asserted that the speeches of Hughes were

not the kind to win the election. In their opinion his tour of the
West had been a failure. Hughes, however, quite satisfied with the way the
campaign had been managed, met with Willcox and assured him of his confi-
dence.

Hughes having finished his first campaign tour immediately arranged
for his second trip which would take him through the states of Illinois,
Wisconsin, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey. On
this tour he planned to speak in such leading cities as Milwaukee, Cleve-
land, Pittsburg, New York, and Buffalo. Great results were expected by
Roosevelt of Hughes' trip in the Middle-West, a section of the country
definitely Republican in allegiance, reported one paper. The Republican
leaders met and carefully perfected their plans. While confident of victory
they emphasized the need of every political leader getting out and working
hard, the need for arousing the political interest in every state which
was doubtful. According to the plans of Hughes he would continue his
drive against the Adamson law, and at the same time he hoped to make it
clear to the public that he was not opposed to the principle of an eight-
hour law. The major business interests of the Middle West such as

177. Gifford Pinchot, "Wilson's Record Should Make Every Progressive Vote
   for Hughes." The Literary Digest, September 30, 1916, 852-53; and
179. New York Tribune, September 13, 1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune,
   September 12, 1916.
180. Ibid.
181. The Chicago Daily Tribune, September 14, 1916; and The Christian Science
   Monitor, September 14, 1916.
183. Ibid., September 14, 1916.
farming, dairying, shipping, and commerce were particularly interested in
the subject of the Adamson act and, according to one paper, Hughes proposed
to remove the disguise from the measure and show it up for what it was.
Likewise, the Republican candidate would earnestly refute the Democratic
slogan: "Wilson Kept Us Out of War," to argue that it would "... have been
only a befuddling blunderer who could have pitched the country into war."

Campaign speeches were to be made by many prominent Republicans.
Fairbanks was to take the stump traveling westward through Oklahoma and
Missouri, to be followed by Senator Lewis. Taft and Root, also, were to
campaign in October in support of Hughes. Beveridge was to cover the western
sections in order to arouse and convince the Progressives and to swing them
to the standard of Hughes. Roosevelt, too, was to speak in the West
in those 'vital spots' where it was believed his fire and enthusiasm was
needed in order to turn the tide to the Republicans. The Colonel,
reported one newspaper, was not as optimistic about the outcome of the
election as some for he realized that a hard fight was ahead, that stronger
efforts would have to be made in order to corral the Progressive vote in
the Middle West and West. It was generally conceded, this paper stated,
that the election "... would be determined by that large element of former
Progressives who will return this year to one or the other of the two old
parties and to bring this now floating element back to the Republican fold

188. New York Tribune, September 15, 1916. Similar viewpoint as expressed by
leading newspapers found in: "Progressive Leaven in the Republican
is the task ahead of Hughes and his managers."

Beginning his second tour in Springfield, Illinois, Hughes spoke before a large audience. Here again he made the Adamson law the chief topic of his address. After pointing out the fallacies and weaknesses of the bill he denounced it, criticizing the manner of its passage. In his opinion there had been no need to rush the law through Congress, for by appealing to public opinion the threatened railroad strike would never have been called. He said: "I am satisfied there could have been no strike. We are still ruled by public opinion, and no administration need fear the results if it stands firmly for essential principle." He pointed out that the bill did not establish an eight-hour workday nor did it have provisions that would tend to bring the eight-hour workday into effect. Granted that the law did give an increase in wages to certain groups of railroad men and granted that this increase might have been justified by facts, yet the fact remains, he said, that "... it has been forced upon Congress and the country by the President of the United States without prior inquiry, in the face of an appeal for arbitration, and at the cost of the repudiation of that principle and the shame of the national Congress."

Wilson's excuse that a dire emergency existed which made necessary the passage of the bill, Hughes exposed as being false, because, he stated, the

situation had been developing for months and neither the President nor Congress had done anything about it. In an appeal to all wage-earners he asked that they wisely consider all angles of the issue for in the end, he believed, all wage-earners would lose because of the means used in the passage of the bill.

At the State Fair in Peoria, Illinois, Hughes won the approval of his listeners by his doctrine of protection. He said:

We are devoted to the doctrine of protection.... We propose that American rights with respect to life, property, and commerce shall be protected with respect to every nation on earth. We are for protection of American peace. We are not militaristic but we must be firm and unflinching and prepared in such a manner that none will mistake either our disposition or our ability to maintain our just rights. 193

He ridiculed the statement that others had kept us out of war and again said that only a 'blunder' could get the nation into war for no nation desired trouble with us. He stated: "It is weakness and vacillation and permitting others to misunderstand us which brings us dangerously near such an outbreak of resentment as may lead us to serious trouble." All matters he felt could have been handled in a diplomatic manner, but, he declared, "... we must be firm. We must be for America First."

These addresses were well received by the voters in Illinois, reported the papers. Hughes had been more direct in his remarks and had driven home his points with telling effect. In this state he gained the enthusiastic support of the women who were to vote for the first time.

192. Ibid.
194. Ibid.
195. Ibid.
The people in Wisconsin received the candidate and his views most enthusiastically stated the papers. In Milwaukee, notwithstanding the fact that his audience was largely made up of naturalized Americans, Hughes spoke directly of 'undiluted Americanism' and his 'straight from the shoulder' remarks were well received by his listeners.

In his many speeches throughout the state he stressed as issues the tariff, 'Americanism,' Federal Reserve Law, and the Shipping Bill. Speaking on the failure of the Underwood Tariff he declared that only a protective tariff could preserve prosperity by safeguarding business interests and by keeping the wages up to the American standard. On the protection of American rights his remarks were the same as those in his previous speeches. Bringing the Federal Reserve bill for its place in the campaign against the administration he stated that the Democrats had hoped by its passage to gain friends from business interests. Yet Hughes maintained that the greater part of this valuable act of legislation had been taken from material supplied by a Republican Commission and a draft of a Republican bill. Therefore, it was really based upon Republican efforts and upon Republican foundations. On the Shipping Bill which the Democrats called an aid to business and which Hughes declared a direct blow to American business and, therefore, should be removed, he said: "It unjustifiably introduces the government into the shipbuilding business."

198. Ibid.
199. Ibid.
200. Ibid.
201. Ibid.
On the following three days Hughes carried his campaign into Indiana. Before the voters of Richmond he spoke vigorously on the Mexican situation. He charged the President with having done everything that should not have been done in regard to Mexico and with having left undone the things that should have been done. Hughes condemned him for having meddled with Mexican affairs in a way "... which forfeited to us the esteem we should have enjoyed, and finally resulted in leaving Mexico to the ravages of revolution without protection of our citizens or the citizens of any other country.

His conclusions were based on the authentic information which Hughes said he had received concerning the actual instructions given to John Lind, Ambassador to Mexico, in relation to Huerta and the Mexican Presidency. Hughes concluded that there was

one way and one clear way to secure the respect of Mexico and of every other nation and to maintain our prestige and our influence; one way to be really helpful, and that is for America to recognize the just demands of American citizenship and protect American lives and property throughout the world, and I stand here to say that so far as I am concerned, if entrusted with the executive responsibility, I shall to the utmost of my powers maintain American rights on land and sea throughout the world with respect to all nations, as to American lives, American property, and American commerce.

Throughout the state of Indiana, to the thousands who wildly cheered him Hughes contented himself with a review of his usual topics, hitting


204. John Lind had been authorized to state the following to a representative of another government: "Huerta will be out if he does not get out..."
hardest on Wilson's surrender of the principle of arbitration, on the fail-
ure of the tariff, on the betrayal of American rights, and on 'Americanism.'
The last two topics were enthusiastically received and approved by his
audiences. Republican leaders, pleased with the candidate's campaign in
Indiana, reported that in their opinion the three states of Illinois,
Wisconsin, and Indiana were definitely aligned on the Republican side, and
that the speeches and manner of the candidate had encouraged his political
workers. New impetus had been given to the campaign.

A critical editor, in reviewing this part of the campaign complained
that the Republican candidate had devoted himself "... largely to domestic
issues and the Administration's Mexican policy ..." and had not undertaken
"... to any great extent, to carry on a campaign of education of the
American people in the large questions of international obligations raised
by the European war.

In the cities of Dayton, Cleveland, and Toledo Hughes continued to
assail the President and the administration. His attacks upon the Adamson
law were more severe. In reply to the President's defense of it Hughes
declared that "... there had been too much legislation just to get the votes
of one set of men or another and that such action led to civil war and if
continued would cost the nation its democratic form of government...."

that it is the preference of the President that it should be accom-
plished by domestic means if possible, but if it cannot be done by
domestic means other means adequate for the purpose will be resorted

206. Ibid.
206. The Chicago Daily Tribune, September 23, 24, 1916; New York Tribune,
September 23, 24, 1916.
207. New York Tribune, September 24, 1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune,
September 24, 1916.
208. Editorial: "The Presidential Campaign." The Outlook, September 27, 1916,
Continuing, he stated that he believed that those who engineered the passage of the bill never had thought of enacting an eight-hour day law, and the administration by this misnomer, had endeavored to confuse the public. Hughes and his campaign leaders believed, it was reported, that even in the industrial sections of Ohio where the labor vote was large if the "... issue is presented properly the people - labor and all - cannot fail to realize what this sort of legislation means."

In Cleveland, Ohio, referring to President Wilson for the first time by name, Hughes challenged him to deny the charges he had made that John Lind had been instructed to put out Huerta if he did not voluntarily get out.

To the laborers in the steel mills of Pittsburg, to his audiences throughout his stay in that city the Republican candidate expounded the same points he had delivered in his speeches in the large cities on his tour. He placed special emphasis upon the need for protecting the industries of the country and for "... a prosperity that is not based on a European war but on sound policies which will protect industry when there is no European war to give war orders." Hughes stated his belief that a policy should be adopted to insure work, security for the workingman, and, he stated, that the Republican Party would insure that result. His audiences cheered.

210. Ibid.
212. Ibid., and The Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 1916.
214. Ibid.
his statements and listened with equal enthusiasm to his gospel of 'Americanism' and then in 'extra volume' to his attack on the Adamson bill, reported the newspapers. In this city he addressed not only the Republicans but also the Progressives and Hughes learned from his party leaders that ninety per cent of the Progressives in Pennsylvania were working to promote his success in November.

An angered speaker faced the audience in Saratoga, New York on September 28, reported the papers. Hughes, incensed by the accusations of ex-secretary of State, Richard Olney, that he, the former Justice of the Supreme Court had doffed his 'judicial ermine' to appear in the "... motley garb of an ordinary seeker of office ..." defended his actions in running for the office of the Presidency. The former Secretary of State had spoken in defense of the President's actions in connection with the Adamson law and to this defense Hughes replied in strong terms. He produced letters and telegrams which broke down the President's defense of the Adamson law, especially on the point that a crisis demanded the passage of the bill. Hughes charged that the United States Chamber of Commerce had urged Congress and the President to investigate the railroad situation weeks before and he proved that they did have ample time and opportunity for inquiry but had failed to use them. Again his stand met with the approval of the men and

215. Ibid.
216. The Chicago Daily Tribune, September 28, 1916
218. The Chicago Daily Tribune, September 29, 1916
women in the audience and it was felt that the Adamson bill would become a 221 political issue in the East.

At this time criticism was hurled at Hughes by the editor of a non-
partisan paper. It was his opinion that Hughes had made a mistake in stressing in his speeches the Mexican situation and the Adamson bill. 222 It was this editor's belief that the people had made up their minds on the Mexican question and were satisfied that the President had done well in keeping the United States out of armed intervention in Mexico. Secondly, public opinion, he stated, had accepted the eight-hour law as a just and rational measure and so attacks on it were 'equally impolitic.' He suggested that Hughes stress a safer and sounder topic, the tariff, because the administration could not refute it and the Republican candidate could uphold it without much opposition from the Democrats.

At the close of his speech in Buffalo the Republican candidate ended his second campaign tour. The general opinion of his managers was one of approval. 223 It was felt that his tour had been remarkably successful, enough even to gratify the most skeptical and it was believed that Hughes on his second trip had made more progress than on his earlier one. Republican leaders stated that Hughes had put more force and energy into his addresses and had won the confidence of the people. He had visited seven

221. Ibid.
states whose electoral vote of 178 was a large portion of the necessary 266. Confidence was expressed that Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin could be counted as Republican states and that while Ohio was debatable the good impression made by Hughes in the State of Indiana combined with splendid political organization there would bring that state to the Republican column. New York, too, would add to the Republican score and the prospects of victory in New Jersey were hopeful. Hughes, the papers stated, had squared off the issues emphasizing the following three: the Adamson law, the tariff, and 'Americanism;' and he had forced President Wilson to abandon his plan of a 'front porch campaign.' 226

Meanwhile Colonel Roosevelt again stirred the voters of the nation by his two hour address to the people of Battle Creek, Michigan on September 30. The papers reported that the main points of the Colonel's eloquent, fiery speech were: the Mexican situation, the President's foreign policy and the action of the President in connection with the Adamson law. President Wilson in a speech had predicted war if the election was won by the Republicans and to this Roosevelt replied: "Oust him and save the country." In his speech the Colonel pictured Wilson as a coward and as a man whose word was no good. He had termed the President "... as a man of furtive and shifting political maneuvers...." and as one who was as "... cowed by the big labor leaders as he was by Mexico and Germany." Roosevelt in this

224. Ibid.
225. Ibid.
226. Ibid.


228. The Chicago Sunday Tribune, October 1, 1916.
229. Ibid.
speech followed his general indictment of the President and his administration by specific instances of their failures. One editor wrote that the speech was a fighting one, the first of a series and if the pace of this one was indicative of those to follow it, it augured a 'caloric and interesting' campaign.

A few days later on October 3 a very interesting meeting took place in the Union League Club in New York City when three prominent men, Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Charles Evans Hughes, addressed a group of Republicans. Ostensibly the purpose of the meeting was to welcome the Presidential candidate but what attracted the attention of the public was the meeting of the two former presidents. One editor reported:

The real significance of it, however, lay in the fact that many men who have differed radically with one another on certain aspects of domestic policy, and even more radically on certain questions of political morality and methods of political organization and control, found themselves drawn together by the question of Nationalism, and particularly by that question as it has been raised by perils in our foreign relations. It was the principle of Nationalism that was the common subject of the three principle speeches of the evening.232

Both ex-presidents, Taft and Roosevelt, in their brief speeches commended the position taken by Hughes on the issues of the day and "... emph-

230. Ibid.
sized the importance of the forthcoming election to good Americans," 233
reported one editor. Colonel Roosevelt in his address struck directly
at the President's foreign policy. In referring to the rumor that the
German Reichstag was considering whether or not to resume its U-boat warfare
Roosevelt declared: "And you can guarantee that there would be no debate on
that subject if they knew that we had as President of the United States a
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man who would not tolerate any action of that sort." The Colonel
denounced President Wilson's actions as an "... invitation to foreign Powers
to do whatever they wished because if he were in power they need not be
afraid." 235

The most significant passage of Hughes' speech, according to one
editor, was the one in which he answered President Wilson's declaration
"... that to the Democratic policy of peace the Republicans had only one
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alternative to present, namely, war. This was the answer of Hughes:

We have heard in recent days that the alternative
of the policy of the present administration is
war. I think the alternative of the policy of
the present administration is peace with honor.
I am a man devoted to the pursuits of peace. We
cherish the ideals of peace. We entertain no
thought of aggression, we are not covetous, we
are not exploiters, but we are Americans and
American rights must be maintained throughout
the world. That is the cornerstone of our
security, that is the essential basis of our
peace. We ... are not courting struggle, but I
do say with all seriousness that we have been
living in a period of National humiliation. 237

234. Ibid.
236. Editorial: "Republican Rally at Union League." The Independent, October
16, 1916, 94.
More space was given in the newspapers to an account of the meeting of the three men than to their speeches. In commenting upon the meeting one editor wrote that it was the campaign's 'best omen' for it indicated that "... all forces of Republicans and Progressives are united in opposition to the continuance of the shame this country has endured..." and a reunited party is marching on "... dedicated to the preservation of America's best traditions ...." 

That President Wilson by statements regarding the Republicans and war had stirred the nation was evident by the editorials in newspapers.

By his speech in Carnegie Hall on October 5, Elihu Root hurled his challenge at the Democratic administration. To those gathered before him, Root, according to the newspaper reports, "... arraigned the record of the present administration in the most clear-cut indictment of the campaign to date." Root paraded before his listeners the important issues that had occurred during the Democratic administration and "... showed with masterful analysis the unsatisfactory termination of every negotiation for their settlement," wrote one paper. He stressed the administration's failures at home and abroad, its 'scuttling of American rights' which resulted in

the slaughter of many American lives by German submarines and Mexican bandits, the administration's surrender to the railroad unions, and its total inability to prepare the country against future dangers.

242 Of the administration's policy toward Mexico Root stated that the manner of handling affairs with our southern neighbor had resulted in making enemies of both Villa and Carranza and "... no man in Mexico dares to call himself our friend." The speaker in expressing his views toward Germany stated:

Germany paid no attention to the bold and weighty declaration of the American government because upon her trained observation and the estimate of the character of the men who controlled the American government she judged that they had not the nerve, the courage and the resolution, to make their threat good ...." and so Germany continued her program of sea warfare.

243 Root declared that "... if our government meant what it said when it declared it would protect its citizens it should have had the capacity to make Germany understand that it meant what it said and the Lusitania would never have been sunk."

244 Speaking of the eight-hour law Root called it a 'holdup,' a piece of legislation passed in submission to a threat and "... if the attitude of our government under compulsion of the railroad brotherhoods is to be the attitude of the American people we hold our lives at the mercy of the public blackmailer."

243. Ibid.
244. The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 6, 1916.
245. Ibid.
246. Ibid.
His speech struck a new note of appeal, was a call to awaken the real spirit of America which lay asleep was the opinion of one editor. Another editor believed that Root's speech had stirred the Democrats, would force Wilson to give an answer, would minimize the President's play to the hyphenates, and, all in all, would weaken the Democratic campaign program.

As the campaign swung into its final weeks criticism and praise were measured out to the Republican Party and its candidate. Hughes was criticized for the organization of his speeches, for according to one campaign manager the candidate repeated the same thing in all his speeches which made it very difficult for the press to report on them. As a result the candidate and his views received less space in the newspaper and secured less publicity. The suggestion was made that the candidate use one issue in each speech, concentrate on it, for after all, the real audience was not the immediate group in front of the speaker, but rather the large group of voters who read accounts of the speech in the newspapers and journals. Another newspaper writer, while upholding Hughes for his stand on the labor issue, was of the opinion that it would be more profitable for the candidate to change to another issue.

A very comprehensive review of the campaign up to date was given by the editor of a leading newspaper. He brought out the fact that Hughes on

247. Ibid.
250. Ibid.
his third campaign tour would make a definite, personal appeal which the campaign managers hoped would bring back to the Republican fold the voters who had strayed away in 1912. This editor wrote: "The election in November will hinge very largely on whether the Republican candidate succeeds or fails in his efforts to strike a keynote to which the Mississippi Valley will respond." A review of the campaign revealed the fact that Hughes on his first tour had emphasized the faults of the administration's Mexican policy and was diverted from this issue only by the enactment of the Adamson law which he vigorously attacked and continued to attack with vigor. In his earlier attacks upon the bill Hughes had taken an extreme view but later on he modified his language "... so as to avoid the creation of an antagonism to his candidacy in the ranks of organized labor," wrote the editor. Hughes in his later speeches attacked not so much the bill as the manner used in its passage. The editor felt that on the Mexican issue Hughes had maintained with "... growing rather than diminishing vehemence his organized indictment of Wilson's policy."

The campaign was given added impetus by the addresses made by leading figures in political circles. Senator Lodge added the weight of his influence to the Republican cause, refuting Wilson and stating that the Republican Party did not advocate war. In fact, the party meant to keep peace "... but it does not mean to keep it by humiliation and the cowardly abandonment of American rights," declared Lodge. Similar views were

253. Ibid.
254. Ibid.
255. Ibid.
expressed by Senator Beveridge in his address in Chicago. He declared that the Wilson regime had been a futile effort and the Wilson Mexican policy a 'malpractice of statesmanship.' The Republican managers having lost some of their confidence of victory in the Middle West prepared an extensive program of education. It was one which would almost be a man to man canvass of the voters in every line of industry, including the farmers, in the crucial states of Ohio, Wisconsin, and Indiana.

Starting on the last swing of his campaign Hughes spoke in Philadelphia on October 1. Changing the tone of his speech he spoke not so much on domestic issues as on diplomatic and foreign affairs. According to newspaper reports Hughes charged the President "... with attempting to escape deserved condemnation by trying to make the public think the alternative of his policy is war." Hughes believed that Wilson had not kept the nation out of war, for during the Democratic administration the nation had been involved in a war, a war without honor. The candidate made it clear that if he were elected he would enforce American rights on land and sea. He outlined the Republican program in two respects as follows:

We do not propose to tolerate improper interference with American property, with American mails, or with legitimate commercial intercourse.
No American who is exercising only American rights shall be put on any blacklist by any foreign nation.

259. Ibid., October 10, 1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 10, 1916.
261. Ibid.
Again and again Hughes declared that had the American government left no doubt that when it said 'strict accountability' it meant precisely that, he was confident that there would have been no destruction of American lives by the sinking of the 'Lusitania.' "Unfortunately," stated one editor, "such a statement left open to question just what Mr. Hughes himself meant by 'strict accountability,' and gave some support to the charges of persons politically unfriendly to Mr. Hughes that he was striving to hold the support of German-Americans by a deliberate vagueness of statement." The speech, in fact, became the cause of a political controversy for, according to one paper, a leading political writer made the charge that this speech of Hughes had been written under the auspices of a prominent New York German newspaper.

Three days later in Louisville, Hughes made one of the most brilliant speeches of his campaign. One editor felt that this speech was "... the most definite and significant statement upon the relations between the United States and Germany which the candidate has yet given to the public." The editor stated that while the Republican candidate had on many occasions denounced President Wilson for "... his weakness in handling the question raised by the German submarine issue...." yet he had never stated except in a general way what he would have done in the President's place.

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266. Accounts of the speech found in New York Tribune, October 13, 1916; The Christian Science Monitor, October 13, 1916; The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 13, 1916; and editorial: "What Mr. Hughes Would Have
In the midst of the candidate's discussion on the maintenance of American rights he was interrupted by a heckler who demanded, "What would you have done when the 'Lusitania' was sunk?" 269 Hughes quickly answered:

I would have had the State Department, at the very beginning of the administration, so equipped as to command the respect of the world, and next I would have so conducted affairs in Mexico as to show that our words meant peace and good will and the protection at all events of the lives and property of American citizens. And next, when I said strict accountability, every nation would have known that that was meant; and further when notice was published with respect to the action threatened I would have made it known in terms unequivocal and unmistakable that we should not tolerate a continuance of friendly relations through the ordinary diplomatic channels if that action were taken. And the Lusitania, sir, would never have been sunk. 270

After the applause the candidate continued his speech, dwelling on the need for a protective tariff and on the 'new freedom' advocated by President Wilson in 1912 and now transmuted, reported one paper. 271

Reactions to this speech were varied. One editor disagreeing with Hughes believed that the severance of diplomatic relations as indicated by Hughes would not have been sufficient to cause Germany to cease her program. In the editor's opinion only a fear of war with us would have kept Germany from resuming her 'policy of murder.' 273 Another editor, while applauding

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268. Ibid.
270. Ibid.
271. Ibid.
273. Ibid.
the oratorical manner of Hughes and while believing that southern Kentucky had become an admirer of Hughes expressed his opinion that in November the state of Kentucky would follow her usual practice of voting the Democratic ticket. Nevertheless this editor felt as very significant the increased force of the candidate's appeal as demonstrated in his speech in Louisville. The high praise given to the address and to the man who made it by an editor unfriendly to Hughes indicated the spirit and vigor of the address. All in all, it was regarded as quite certain, according to one paper, that Hughes had gained strength all over the country by his 'Lusitania' statement.

Meanwhile Colonel Roosevelt again taking up his campaign duties spoke on October 14 to the miners in Wilkesbarre, Pennsylvania. In his scathing arraignment of the administration and its policies the Colonel spoke on the eight-hour law, and on the chaotic conditions in Mexico for which he held Wilson, Gompers, and Carranza responsible was the report in the papers. The Colonel devoted most of his address to an attack on the Adamson law and the manner of its enactment which he contrasted with his own actions in the Anthracite Strike of 1902. While the Colonel believed in the principle of an eight-hour day and in labor unions, he believed the so called eight-hour act was not right, that it could not be applied to workingmen in all branches

278. Ibid.
of industry, that the law was not just to the railroads and that "... it was deeply prejudicial to the real and permanent interests of the laboring man." 279

Roosevelt in his address stated that he was championing Hughes "... because in every crisis Wilson by his public acts has shown that he will yield to fear, that he will not yield to justice, whereas the public acts of Hughes have proved him to be incapable of yielding in such a crisis to any threat whether made by politicians, corporations or labor leaders." 280

According to the papers this audience cheered the Colonel's fiery oratory in spite of the fact that President White of the United Mine Worker's Union had declared the miners for Wilson. 281 One editor, in reviewing the speech, praised Roosevelt for his remarks on the Adamson law but criticized the Colonel for the abuse and insinuations he had hurled at the President. 282

To the voters of Joplin, Missouri, Hughes selected the protective tariff as the theme of his address. 283 With the end of the war would come the end of 'Good Times,' he stated, and so he earnestly urged the nation to prepare immediately for the economic conditions which would arise at the termination of warfare in Europe. He viewed the current economic condition with apprehension, as one 'resting on sand.' That the exports of the nation had jumped to a fabulous figure he agreed, but he pointed out that this

281. Ibid.
trade was determined not by conditions of normal competition but by an abnormal want in Europe. When the war in Europe ended conditions would change and labor in this country would have to meet competition from Europe. Therefore, he stated, a protective tariff would be necessary and since the opposing political party did not believe in a protective tariff those who wished to see one in force would have to elect Republican leaders.

In his two day campaign of the rather 'doubtful' state of Nebraska, Hughes according to one paper, addressed himself almost exclusively to the task of overcoming the apparent complacency of the farmers with Wilson's policies. He spoke to them and received tremendous ovation when he assured them that legislation for their benefit would continue as it had in the past under Republican leadership if that group was placed in power. He charged that the agricultural interests had received scant consideration from the Democratic Administration. On October 14 speaking in Lincoln, Nebraska, the land of Bryanism and prosperity, he delivered a speech on peace. To the Democratic charge that a vote for the Republican candidate meant a vote for war Hughes said:

Did you ever hear a more preposterous proposition? .... I am a man of peace. I have been spending my life in maintaining the institutions of peace. I desire in that way to promote international peace .... I do not desire petty wars: I do not desire war in Mexico to satisfy personal vindictiveness against a disliked ruler. I do not like that kind of war.

286. Ibid.
He held that the correct policies meant peace, that "... a correct policy would keep America out of war." 287

In the many speeches throughout the state he discussed nearly all the issues of the campaign and the large crowds that came to hear him greeted him enthusiastically and heartily endorsed his views. However, the people in Omaha while not very keenly concerned with the candidate's views on the eight-hour day law were definitely interested in what he had to say on the tariff. They approved his stand that "... there was a need of a protective tariff to insure the safety of American industry after the war." 289

In this speech, according to the papers, Hughes had cause to answer a charge of his opponents who had inferred that his election might mean that an 'invisible government' would be installed in the United States. 290 Hughes told the audience that crowded the auditorium that as there had been no 'invisible government' in New York while he had been governor there would be no invisible government in the United States if he were President.

On the next day in Sioux City, Iowa, hecklers offered Hughes the opportunity to answer several charges against him circulated by the Democrats. To the question of whether or not he would repeal the Adamson law if he were elected Hughes answered at length. He carefully explained that it was impossible for any one to answer such a question and then proceeded to explain what he would have done to avert the railroad strike. Hughes

287. Ibid.
288. Ibid.
291. Accounts of speech found in New York Tribune, October 18, 1916; The Chi-
If arbitration had been refused I should have gone right to the American people, stated the facts and put the responsibility where it belonged....I should at the same time have secured a commission of inquiry so impartial, so fair as to command the respect of the entire country, and directed public opinion to that end. There is no group of men in the United States that would have dared to hold up the instrumentalities of commerce if that were done.

In conclusion Hughes reviewed his record on labor and stated definitely and emphatically that he was not "... the standard-bearer of any group or set," but that he was desirous of serving "... the whole American people." One editor believed that this speech showed clearly the differences between President Wilson and Mr. Hughes; that the record of Hughes indicated that his statements were 'solid truth' and not empty campaign talk and therefore "... there ought to be no question which man should be at the head of a government which has never glorified surrender, in the case of the individual or the nation."

The next important speech by the Republican candidate was given in Youngstown, Pennsylvania. Here, as in all his major addresses, Hughes criticized the administration for its foreign policy, for its claim that it had aided business, for the Underwood tariff, for its failure to observe the merit system, and for its extravagance in governmental affairs. In this speech the candidate devoted more time to a discussion of the nation's policy toward European countries. Secretary Baker in an address in New

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292.Ibid.
293.Ibid.

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Jersey had compared in an uncomplimentary way the soldiers of George Washington to the bandits of Mexico. His remarks gave the Republican candidate an opportunity to reiterate that he meant what he had said at Louisville concerning the 'Lusitania' incident. He still believed that if he had been president the world would have been aware that he meant what he said and that the United States would have had "... a reputation for firm and correct policies. Therefore, the 'Lusitania' would not have been sunk."

The papers reported that this speech had made a fitting climax to the Republican candidate's third western campaign trip, that he had hit straight from the shoulder, and that his audiences had been quick to respond to him. On this trip he had visited ten states, had made thirty-nine speeches, and had replied to the three questions of the Democrats which had threatened to be the most annoying. Hughes had declared what he would have done about the 'Lusitania' incident, about the Mexican situation, and about the railroad strike.

The candidate on his next and last campaign tour planned to cover the four important states of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and New York hoping to place them safely in the Republican column. Beginning in New York City, on October 24, he campaigned all sections of the city, making 'Americanism' his theme.


296. Ibid.

297. Ibid.


300. Accounts of the speeches found in New York Tribune, October 25, 1916.
He declared that he was for an "... American policy in the service of American interests." He proposed, if elected, to have an administration which "... while dealing with all nations on a basis of the most absolute fairness, will maintain American rights on land and sea." He declared that he desired the support of every true American who stood for the principles expounded by him, and he did not wish the support of anyone who had any interests "... superior to that of the United States."

On the next day, addressing the young voters gathered in the Academy of Music in Brooklyn he presented his entire case to them and to the people of the nation. Five thousand young citizens who were voting for the first time crowded the hall to hear him and thousands of others jammed the streets outside the music hall. According to the papers Hughes appealed to these young people with "... a vivid word picture of the kind of United States that young America hopes for ...." and his address won for Hughes "... the most enthusiastic response of his campaign so far." The candidate made an ardent appeal to his youthful listeners who he felt wanted a country respected throughout the world, a country that desired peace, a country prepared for every emergency, and a country administered in an efficient and businesslike manner. His speech, though long, was reported as being exceptionally good, vigorous, appealing, and witty.


Footnotes:
301. Ibid.
302. Ibid.
303. Ibid.
305. Ibid.
306. Ibid.
In Boston, Hughes was greeted by the largest, the most enthusiastic crowd of his New England campaign. The high point of his speech was his declaration of the road he would travel if he were elected. He said:

There are the principles which mark it. An executive responsible to the whole nation, a cabinet chosen from our ablest men, a foreign policy that stands courteously but firmly and consistently for American rights, a flag that protects the American citizen in his lawful rights, wherever his legitimate business may take him, a preparation for trade competition which shall protect all groups of American workmen, a government supervision of business which, while functioning to prevent abuses, will act on the assumption that the average business man is honest, and, finally, a domestic policy which looks to industrial peace and cooperation, and not to industrial war.307

In this address and in others given in the neighboring towns he spoke clearly and in a straightforward manner which more than won the approval of his audiences.

In his four speeches in Rochester, New York, Hughes in the most emphatic and detailed fashion reviewed the economic situation which faced the nation and warned the people of the nation that they must prepare to solve the industrial problem which would arise at the end of the war. In his opinion the Republican protective doctrine was one means of solution.309 Continuing his tour he spoke in the cities of upper New York where he gave his usual speeches. However, to the farmers in this region he especially stressed the two issues - the tariff and the Adamson law because the farmers were


308. Ibid.

309. Reviews of the speeches found in New York Tribune, October 28, 1916; and
were interested in both. They approved his views and it was reported that this region of the pivotal state appeared well in favor of Hughes.

On the same day there appeared in the papers a short statement in which Hughes summarized the points on which he stood. Part of the declaration was similar to his statements made in Boston. However, after outlining his conception of the Presidency he brought out the fact that President Wilson viewed it in a different light, viewed it as the position held by the 'political leader and lawmakers of the nation.' Hughes had made this statement of his views because he believed the people were entitled to know how he felt on the issues.

On the following Monday Hughes entered the Middle West for a final series of speeches to strengthen the loyalty of Ohio and Indiana. If the number of people who turned out to greet him in Ohio was indicative then the Republican leaders were justified in stating that a 'great tidal wave of Hughes sentiment' had begun in the erstwhile doubtful state. In Columbus and in the industrial sections of the state the Republican candidate stressed and emphasized the nation's need for planning and preparing for the "... commercial warfare that will be the bitterest and keenest in history." Throughout the state of Indiana he stressed this point and reviewed his attitude on the leading issues of the campaign. The candidate was so very


pleased by the hearty greetings extended to him in the state that, in a public statement, he assured the people of his confidence of a party victory in November.

The final week of the campaign was devoted to the state of New York. Speaking in Albany and in many cities in the Hudson River valley the candidate did little but repeat his previous addresses. In his whirlwind tour of Brooklyn he addressed three large groups, making his theme 'Americanism.'

At last came his final address in Madison Square Garden in New York City. The newspapers were filled with accounts of the speech. They reported that 65,000 people marched in the monster parade which preceded the speech, a parade which was one 'continuous and tumultuous ovation' for the candidate. When Hughes did reach the auditorium he was cheered for forty minutes by the 15,000 who had jammed the hall to hear his final campaign words. In his address Hughes covered all the issues that he had made prominent in the course of his campaign, laying particular stress upon 'Americanism,' American rights, the tariff, 'war prosperity,' the Adamson law, the administration's attitude toward business at home and abroad. The papers reported that although he talked on the same topics he set his "... declara-

314. The Outlook, November 8, 1916, 526; and "The Hughes Campaign." The Independent, November 6, 1916, 222
316. Ibid.
318. Ibid.; and editorial: "Mr. Hughes." The Outlook, November 9, 473.
tions off in determined, vigorous phrases so that the Garden throng kept
punctuating his speech with applause every few minutes."

In closing his address he stated:

If I am elected President - and I expect to be - we shall have an administration which has no
interests but the interests of the United States, which knows no policy but the supreme welfare of
the people of the United States. It will not be coerced by threat from any quarter. It will not
be deflected by an alien machination. It will not be made to subserve any ulterior purpose ... There
is no hope for America if American citizen anywhere in the world is not as proud a title as a man can
bear.321

Thus, Charles Evans Hughes brought to a close his campaign for the
Presidency, a campaign which had lasted three months, had carried him into
thirty-five states, an itinerary covering 30,000 miles which made it one of the longest campaign tours on record.322 It was estimated that about two
million people had heard his addresses and that he had been greeted by
probably five million more. One paper reported that the campaign had been the most strenuous for a Republican Presidential candidate for many
years.

During the last month of the campaign Roosevelt participated most actively and wholeheartedly in it. His part consisted of a twelve day
tour of the middle and southwest and included addresses in Chicago and New

322. New York Tribune, November 4, 1916; and The Christian Science Monitor,
November 6, 1916.
323. Ibid.
325. The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 18, 1916; New York Tribune, October
18, 1916; and Meyers, 424.
York. Speaking first in Louisville, Kentucky, on October 18 he again used
the Democratic slogan, He Kept Us Out of War, as the text of his speech.
In his usual vigorous fashion he flailed the President for his foreign
policies and made it very plain that he wondered what 'outrage' would have
to arise before the President would be willing to fight. Continuing his
journey westward he stopped in Kansas City to chat with William Allen White
who assured him that Kansas would vote for Hughes.

In Phoenix, Arizona, an unusually large number of people from the
surrounding territory gathered to greet the Colonel whom they loved and
admired. To the people on the border he spoke of the lamentable mistakes
made by President Wilson in his handling of the Mexican situation. Roosevelt
forcibly told his listeners what he would have done, how he would have
replied, and how he would have acted. It was his firm conviction that the
President's foreign policy had been "... without plan or purpose." While
the greeting extended to the Colonel in Phoenix took on the nature of an
'old home week' and the people enthusiastically cheered his remarks yet Re-
publican leaders admitted that Wilson would carry the state of Arizona.

Two days later in Albuquerque, Roosevelt made Secretary Baker the center of
his attack on the administration. The Secretary in his speech in New Jersey
had made a comparison between the soldiers of the American Revolution and the

326. New York Tribune, October 18, 1916
327. The Christian Science Monitor, October 20, 1916
328. Accounts of speech found in New York Tribune, October 22, 1916; The Chi-
cago Sunday Tribune, October 22, 1916; The Christian Science Monitor,
October 23, 1916; and editorial: "The Republican Campaign," The Indepen-
dent, October 30, 1916, 186.
and the Mexican bandits of 1916. Speaking of the Secretary, Roosevelt with unusual emphasis said: "The man who professes such doctrines is wholly unfit to stay in the Cabinet and the President who retains him is wholly unfit to remain President of the United States." The crowd cheered his strong words.

To the inhabitants of Denver who turned out in large, boisterous numbers Roosevelt repeated his now familiar condemnations of the Wilson administration. One paper reported that in this speech the Colonel was at his satirical best in what he called the 'sham' of the Democratic slogan.

In Chicago Roosevelt's two speeches were centered around the issues of 'Americanism,' loyalty, and preparedness. Although it was reported that efforts had been made "... to tone down the Colonel's doctrine of 'Americanism,'" he, in his speech, hammered away at the hyphenates as hard as ever. He stated that while he condemned the efforts of professional German-American people "... to shape our policy in the interests not of the United States but of Germany...." he would just as strongly condemn the efforts of any large group of hyphenates. Sternly and at great length he showed the inaccuracy of the Democratic slogan, he appealed to the men and women of Illinois to vote so as to show that they put "... duty and service and national honor first."

331. Secretary Baker denied that such a comparison had been intended.
337. Ibid.
In Brooklyn and several days later in Cleveland, the Colonel gave a
repetition of his 'searching arraignment' of the President's foreign policy.
The papers reported that his remarks brought 'roar upon roar' of approval
from his audiences.

On November 3 in Cooper Hall in New York City Roosevelt made his
supreme plea to his fellow citizens to vote for Hughes for the Presidency.
He called upon the voters to place in the White House "... the upright
Justice, the fearless Governor of New York whose whole public record has
been that of a man straightforward in his thoughts and courageous in his
actions, who cannot be controlled to do what is wrong and who will do what
is right no matter what influence may be brought against him."

Taking as his subject 'Our Nation's Crisis,' the Colonel admitted
having criticized the President but maintained that everything he had said
was absolutely 'accurate and truthful.' "I have criticized," he declared,
"because I believe he has dragged in the dust what was most sacred in our
past and has jeopardized the most vital hopes of our future." Then after
adroitly pulling apart one of President Wilson's campaign speeches Roosevelt concluded:

If we elect President Wilson it will be
serving notice on the world, that the
traditions, the high moral standards, the
courageous purposes of Washington and Lincoln

in "Mr. Roosevelt Discusses the President." The Outlook, November 8,
1916, 528.

339. Ibid.

340. Accounts of the speech found in New York Tribune, November 4, 1916;
The Chicago Daily Tribune, November 4, 1916; The Christian Science Moni-
tor, November 4, 1916, and editorial: "End of Republican Campaign,"
have been obscured and in their stead we have deliberately elected to show ourselves for the time being a sordid, soft, and spineless nation, content to accept any and every insult; content to pay no heed to the most flagrant wrongs done to the small and weak; allowing our men, women, and children to be murdered and outraged; anxious only to gather in every dollar that we can; to spend it in luxury, and to replace it by any form of money making which we can follow with safety to our own bodies.343

The Colonel in this speech exhibited his old time fire' stated one newspaper and his large audience received his message with frenzied cheers.

Roosevelt's last speech was given to the people of his own community at Oyster Bay on the eve of the election as was his custom.345 One editor in reviewing Roosevelt's part in the campaign wrote that the Colonel had played as active a part in the campaign as had the candidate and that the Colonel's speeches had been "...more vigorous if less diplomatic."346

During the final weeks of the campaign political leaders, party officials, prominent political figures, newspapers, and journals were very busy giving out predictions as to the final results on November 7.347 These

342. Ibid.
343. Ibid.
predictions varied from an assurance of overwhelming success to skepticism and a feeling that victory would come only by a very close margin. Early in October it was forecasted that Hughes was sure of 210 votes in the Electoral College, Wilson certain of 149 votes and of the remaining 192, Hughes must only obtain 56 in order to receive the necessary 266 votes. One newspaper editor felt that the Republicans would get the necessary number of votes by simply carrying the normally Republican states and disregarding the doubtful states. The five states which were most regularly placed in the doubtful column and which could swing the election one way or the other were New York, Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Ohio. The editor of a prominent weekly magazine listed the doubtful states as Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, New York, and New Jersey whose combined electoral vote numbered 127 which was nearly one half of the necessary 266 votes. This magazine took a 'straw vote' of 50,000 subscribers in these states. Of the 30,000 who replied Hughes received 17,938 votes, Wilson received 10,646, and the miscellaneous votes totaled 1,236. In comparing the votes of these citizens with their choice in 1912 it was learned that the Republican Party in New York, New Jersey, and Indiana had gained from the opposing parties and in Ohio the Democrats had gained. In Illinois, the shifting of the votes just about balanced.

The Literary Digest, November 4, 1916, 1155

348. Editorial: The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 18, 1916
350. Ibid.
351. "30,000 Straw Votes." The Literary Digest, November 4, 1916, 1155.
352. Ibid.
353. Ibid.
While some Republican soothsayers saw a hope of victory in New York, Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin very few were optimistic enough to place the pivotal state of Ohio in the Republican column. That this state should be doubtful was one of the most surprising developments of the campaign reported one editor. Two explanations were offered for this situation. According to one report the farmers of the state were so prosperous, so contented and no one could tell whether they would be interested enough to vote on election day. Another newspaper stated that the section of the state around Cleveland was strong for Wilson due to the fact that the war industries of that community were enriching the inhabitants. However this editor believed that it was folly to forecast election results for while the politicians knew how the active partisan stood they could not learn the political alignment of the silent voter.

The final predictions as given out by the chairman of the Republican National Committee concluded that Hughes would receive 366 electoral votes which number included the state of New York and Ohio. The Republican newspapers were not so optimistic. While they predicted a victory for Hughes they placed the number of electoral votes under 300.

As the campaign drew to a close all efforts were bent toward impressing upon the voters that Charles Evans Hughes was the wise choice for the Presidency. Every possible means of approach was used — speeches, articles,

358. Ibid., October 25, 1916
360. Ibid.
pictures, cartoons, and advertisements. The daily newspapers carried
detailed accounts of the campaign activities, reporting on all the speeches
of the nominee and on the speeches and actions of the party leaders and
managers. The weekly magazines kept their readers abreast of the news by
giving resumés of the campaign tours and of the nominee's speeches. The
monthly magazines devoted their pages to special articles on the main issues
and problems of the campaign and to the progress of the campaign as a
whole. A review of these articles presented a good, overview of the
campaign.

One magazine placed the situation before its readers in the form of two
questions, namely: Which of the two great parties at this particular juncture
in our progress as a nation is the better fitted and the more likely to
render the highest public service? Secondly, which of the two designated
leaders is the more certain to preserve, protect, and defend the constitution
of the United States? To these questions the editor of the magazine
answered without a degree of hesitancy, the Republican Party and Charles
Evans Hughes. In his opinion the Republicans being more capable, more
experienced, were better suited to solve the weighty problems facing the
nation.

A prominent Republican leader in a magazine article, gave his reasons
for sponsoring Hughes. It was his belief that our nation should prepare
itself for the economic struggle in world trade which would begin when war

Similar view expressed in an editorial in The Independent, November 6, 1916, 213.
362. William R. Willcox, Chairman of Republican National Committee. "Why
ceased in Europe; that our nation should adopt a foreign policy, one by which the American citizen was guaranteed protection throughout the world. Since the Republican Party stood for these principles and since Hughes by his record had proved his worthiness to high office, the Republican Party and Hughes should be the choice of the people.

In an eloquent call to the citizens of the nation Roosevelt briefly, concisely reviewed in a magazine article the faults of the Wilson administration and wrote:

We cannot undo what has been done. But we can repudiate what has been done. We can regain our own self respect and the respect of other nations for this country. We can put in power an administration which will throughout its term of power protect our own citizens and live up to our national obligations.364

Between the two candidates which should be placed at the helm for the following four years, Roosevelt wrote "... the man who has been actually tried and found wanting, or the man whose whole career in public affairs is a guarantee of his power and good faith." Naturally, to Roosevelt, the answer was Hughes.

An editor in expressing his views on the Presidential campaign stated that the campaign had been unusual in that it had failed to revolve around one issue, in fact, it had spread to many issues. According to him one outstanding characteristic of the campaign had been the emphasis placed on

363. Ibid.
365. Ibid.
our foreign relations, especially with Mexico. The Adamson law and the tariff had been the only two domestic issues dominant in the campaign and "... even the tariff has been discussed almost entirely in its relations to the European war and the industrial effects likely to follow it ...." he wrote. In his opinion the campaign had centered mainly around the claim that the President had kept us out of war and the Republican's countercharge that it was not a question "... between peace and war but between peace with honor and peace without honor."

Another editor reporting the campaign as having been clean, as having been conducted with unusual vigor by the major parties, declared that the campaign, however, had not brought forth any clear-cut issue. The three high spots of the campaign, as he viewed them, were first, the Democratic record of legislation which the Republicans are 'chary of attacking' because of its 'unusual fullness and excellence;' second, the administration's foreign policy which had been so strongly attacked by Hughes and Roosevelt; and third, the Adamson law and its manner of passage which had received thorough criticism from the Republican candidate. On the personal side, concluded this editor, Hughes had been a disappointment to many because he had been 'attacking and criticizing' and had not set forth "... a big constructive program of his own." However, at a later date this editor

367. Ibid.
368. Ibid.
370. Ibid.; similar view held by editor of The North American Review, October 1916, 496.
371. Ibid. Similar view held by the editor of The Nation, October 19, 1916, 367.
again reviewed the political situation on the eve of the election. He characterized both candidates as being 'high minded' and 'fearless of conviction,' he reviewed the weaknesses of both the Democratic and Republican campaign programs and in his conclusion stated that it would be up to the independent voter to decide the election.

One editor viewed the political situation quite differently. He claimed that the campaign had been unusual for the reason that "... the country itself has recognized no platforms, no issues, no parties." In his opinion some legislative acts of the Democratic term had been originally Republican and at least one, the banking and currency reform bill, had not been the work of either political party but rather "... the direct outcome of the study and work of our financial and business leaders." By a careful, impartial review of the salient issues of the campaign this editor attempted to clarify them for the voters and left them to draw their own conclusions and to decide whether Hughes or Wilson should be at the head of the government.

Those editors critical of Hughes and his campaign berated him on many scores but principally for his continued attacks upon the administration, without offering a constructive program, and for his failure, in the earlier stages of the campaign, to take a definite stand on the hyphenate question.

With the nearer approach of the election the politicians became busier but 'listlessness' still seemed to mark the public's attitude toward the

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374. Ibid.
campaign was the view of several editors, one of whom reported that this view was held by other journalists.

That the Progressives, the independent voters of the nation would be the determining factor in the election was a fact most generally agreed upon by the political writers and observers. Both the Democrats and the Republicans, with this in mind, earnestly and definitely worked so as to gain the support of this group of voters, both parties aimed to prove that their candidate was the most progressive in viewpoints and in beliefs. The Republicans, citing the splendid record of Hughes as Governor of New York and as Justice of the Supreme Court endeavored to prove that their candidate stood for real progressive principles. The Republicans after the Maine elections were quite confident that as the Progressives in Maine had returned to the Republican fold so would the Progressives all over the nation. According to one prominent Progressive the 'ignominious failure' of the President and the Democrats especially in regard to the Mexican situation and our foreign relations made it impossible for the Progressives to vote for the reelection of Woodrow Wilson.

While writers and editors disagreed as to which issues or, if any, were the outstanding features of the political campaign yet during the Republican campaign certain issues were stressed. The Mexican situation, our foreign

378. Ibid.
relations, the Adamson law, the role played by the laboring group in the campaign, the economic conditions of the nation and the Republican attitude toward the tariff, the Federal Reserve law, and the part played by the women in the campaign program. A review of these topics should help to crystallize the views, beliefs, and principles of the Republican Party as expressed in the Presidential campaign of 1916.

From early in August until the eve of the election Hughes and the Republican speakers and leaders made the Mexican question a paramount issue of the campaign. This was the opinion of many writers and editors. A thorough criticism of Wilson's policy toward Mexican affairs was outlined by one staunch Republican supporter. While praising President Wilson for endeavoring to give the Mexicans what he deemed they needed - a constitutional government - this writer criticized the President for ignoring, first, the primary duty of a President which was "... to respect the independence of other nations and to abstain from all interference with their domestic concerns." Second, it was the right of the President "... to secure protection for the lives and property of Americans lawfully resident under foreign jurisdiction." Wilson, according to this writer, had violated "... the sovereign independence of Mexico and interfered in her internal affairs," and he had failed to protect the lives and property of Americans in Mexico. After summarizing our relations with Mexico during Wilson's term

382. Ibid. 383. Ibid. 384. Ibid., 104
as President the writer concluded:

The nemesis of his unwarranted conduct has been the destruction of some billion dollars' worth of American property, the impoverishment of thousands of American citizens, the murder of hundreds of American men, and the outrage bitterer than death of an uncounted number of helpless American women.385

There appeared to be a unanimity of approval in Republican circles in regard to Hughes' strong criticism of Wilson's Mexican policy.386 One writer summarized the general opinion: "In disastrous consequences to the nation the vacillating and ineffective course pursued by President Wilson in dealing with the Mexican problem is without parallel in the history of the Republic." As a consequence of our Mexican relations one editor wrote: "The united opposition now appeals to the country to dislodge the Administration upon the grounds of criminal blundering with respect to Mexico."387

Praise and criticism were heaped upon the Republican candidate because he chose to make the Mexican diplomatic problem an issue in the campaign. Democrats and independent newspapers criticized him for stressing this issue before the people, reported one editor.388 It was said in Democratic circles

385. Ibid.
386. Viewpoints of newspaper editors as found in The Literary Digest, August 19, 1916, 398.
that Hughes was using the Mexican situation as a battle cry because the Republicans would be able to denounce it to their heart's content "... without offending any of those voters who might be sensitive to frank criticism of the administration's foreign policy as applied to Europe." These Republican critics pointed out that while Hughes fervently denounced Wilson's Mexican policy he had "... failed to give the faintest outline of what his policy would be if he were in power."

To these criticisms Republican newspapers replied, according to one report, that the Mexican situation was a 'live issue,' one of "... great importance to the welfare of this country and to Mexico," especially since "... the inherent deficiencies of President Wilson are revealed nowhere so clearly and so conclusively ..." as they are in the handling of our diplomatic relations with Mexico.

In meeting the cries of the opponents that the Republican candidate offered no constructive policy one editor pointed that Hughes in his speech of acceptance had clearly indicated his intentions of carrying out the Republican diplomatic policies as outlined in the platform of the party.

Throughout the campaign the Republican nominee and his party in no uncertain terms criticized the actions and policies of the Democratic administration in regard to the foreign relations of our country during the Demo-

390. Ibid.
391. Ibid.
392. Ibid.
ocratic term of office. While the criticism of the party in power was direct and often caustic the Republicans, on their part, found the task of determining their foreign policy a difficult one. While direct in their criticisms they were very evasive in their constructive suggestions. When forced to give answer as to what they would have done or proposed to do, their replies usually were couched in terms most general.

The Republican Party in its platform stated:

We declare that we believe in and will enforce the protection of every American citizen in all the rights secured to him by the Constitution, by treaties and the law of nations, at home and abroad, by land and sea .... We desire peace, the peace of justice and right, and believe in maintaining a straight and honest neutrality between the belligerents in the great war in Europe .... The Republican Party believes that a firm, consistent and courageous foreign policy, always maintained by Republican Presidents in accordance with American traditions, is the best, as it is the only true way, to preserve our peace and restore us to our rightful place among the nations.

One editor in reviewing the foreign policy as stated in the Republican platform expressed his belief that while more space had been given to it than in former years, yet the platform was less outspoken and less specific on the topic due to the fact, no doubt, that conditions in Europe had made it unwise for the political leaders to indulge in definite expressions of sympathy and partisanship.

Hughes in his speech of acceptance said:

At the very beginning of the present administration, where in the direction of diplomatic intercourse there should have been conspicuous strength and expertness we had weakness and inexpertness. Instead of assuring respect, we invited distrust of our competence and speculation as to our capacity for firmness and decision, thus entailing many difficulties which otherwise easily could have been escaped. 396

Later on the subject of the maintenance of American rights he said:

We are unreservedly, devotedly, wholeheartedly for the United States. That is the rallying point for all Americans. That is my position. I stand for the unflinching maintenance of American rights on land and sea. 397

He maintained that had our government left no doubt that when we said 'strict accountability' we meant precisely what we said then, in his opinion, there would have been no destruction of American lives by the sinking of the 'Lusitania.' 398 Hughes said: "Moreover, a firm American policy would have been strongly supported by our people and the opportunities for the development of bitter feeling would have been vastly reduced." He criticized the Administration for its laxness in protecting American property and commerce, and stated that as a result of this negligence the nation had suffered. 400

398. Ibid.
399. Ibid.
400. Ibid., 10.
During the months of the campaign the problem of evolving a satisfactory position as to the issue of a foreign policy became more and more difficult. Cleverly and effectively the Democrats played up their campaign slogan: 'He Kept Us Out of War.' The Republican editors bent all their efforts toward showing the reading public that the slogan really was not a correct expression of the Democratic actions, that slogan actually was a misnomer. It was the belief of one editor that it was "... almost inconceivable that any President could have so mismanaged affairs as to have forced us into a European war when both sides are so anxious to maintain our good will." He continued: "We Americans have no quarrel with any country and we wish all men of all nations peace and prosperity ...." He believed that the nations were extremely eager for our friendship and that only by our own shocking mismanagement could we be dragged into a war.

Another writer felt that the slogan was inapt, that there was no purpose to saying that the President had kept us out of war since there was no reason for our being at war. Therefore, the Administration had no right to expect merit on this score.

However, a dilemma faced the Republicans. If they had attacked the slogan too earnestly they would have implied an intention, a willingness to take the nation into a war. If they had failed to attack the Democrats' slogan,

403. Ibid.
404. Ibid.
405. David Hill, "President Wilson's Administration of Foreign Affairs," The
such a failure would have implied satisfaction with the Administration and would have given a stamp of approval to the acts behind the slogan.

The Democrats saw and used the situation to their own advantage. President Wilson in one of his speeches stated that the inference he gathered from the addresses of Hughes was that the Republicans contemplated a change in the nation's foreign policy. Wilson said:

There is only one choice as against peace, and that is war. Some of the supporters of that party, outspokenly declare they want war, so that the certain prospect of the success of the Republican Party is that we shall be drawn in one form or another into the embroilments in the European war....

The Republican candidate openly refuted the inferences made by the President and "... charged the President with attempting to escape deserved condemnation by trying to make the public think the alternative of his policy is war.

In his campaign speeches Hughes again and again expressed his attitude on foreign relations but always spoke in generalities. He failed to bring forward a real positive program. One editor felt that the candidate and his managers by their actions and words failed to set before the people the real truth about the nation's relations with foreign countries, and, therefore, many citizens "... derived the impression that Republican leaders thought that we ought to have gone to war."

Hughes by his very words and actions definitely indicated his belief that the Adamson law was a major issue in the political campaign. In an article written on this subject Hughes stated:

But there is one fundamental issue that has such far-reaching significance for the future of the American people, one occasion on which the present Administration, by its surrender of a vital principle, has so gravely threatened the soundness of our national government that I am glad to emphasize it again...  

Clearly he stated his belief that the passage was "... not only a serious misuse of official power, but a deplorable abdication of moral authority." Criticizing the bill he stated that it was a mistake to call it an eight-hour law for it did not provide for an eight-hour workday, in fact, it simply provided that eight hours should be "... deemed a day's work, and the measure or standard of a day's work." Therefore the act became only a wage bill and as such it should be judged. On this basis the legislative bill became only an effort on the part of a certain group of railroad men to demand an increase in wages and "... the administration in advance of legislation surrendered to this demand," claimed Hughes. That, to him, was the crux of the situation. In his opinion, the railroad situation should have been thoroughly investigated, and in due time the proper action taken. Those who sponsored the bill claimed a crisis had arisen which made the bill a necessity. Hughes believed this untrue for he claimed that the

410. Ibid.
411. Ibid.
412. Ibid., 63.
Administration had been made aware of the situation but had failed to act. Hughes claimed that arbitration would have been the means for solving the problem. He stated:

I stand for the principle of arbitration in industrial disputes. Labor least of all can afford to have that principle surrendered. .... The essence of the matter is a fair and reasonable hearing of all parties concerned and a just determination according to the facts. 413

To him 'force' would never be the correct means for the solution of a problem. He declared "When force is proposed and arbitration is refused there is but one stand to take, and that is to appeal to the judgment of the country, to vindicate the processes of reason." Hughes firmly believed that if the chief executive of our country had gone at once to Congress "... for immediate authority to secure prompt and thorough investigation of the stated grievance in advance of action and he had thus made instant provision for an inquiry so entirely competent as to command the respect of the country, I am satisfied there could have been no strike. We are still ruled by public opinion and no administration need fear results if it stands firmly for essential principle." 415

In conclusion Hughes reiterated that the issue of the Adamson law was important, was fundamental for

... the multiplying activities of the government would be intolerable if we did not proceed in accordance with judgment based on an examination of the facts. Our problems in the future are likely to be, in the main, economic problems and they will severely test our capacity, but we shall find solution if we are open minded and thorough in our investigation.
We can stand mistakes in our policy if we are sound in method, but we cannot yield force to reason. That is the path of sure disaster. I should not take the first step in that path.416

While some editors and writers agreed with the stand taken by Hughes others did not.417 Criticisms of the Adamson law were based not on the question of whether an eight-hour law was justifiable, necessary, or correct, but rather on the manner by which the law was so hurriedly passed through Congress and signed by the President. That Congress after a very brief consideration of the bill whose passage would have far-reaching economic and social effects, that our chief legislative body in response to the threatening demands of a certain group of railroad workers, voted on the issue, was the cause of the great storm of protest which was heard throughout the nation.418

In this campaign as no doubt in others, the vote of the laboring group proved an important factor. The passage of the Adamson law with the ensuing controversy concerning its passage combined with the active participation of Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, in the re-election of President Wilson served to focus political thought on the political alignment of the laboring group.419 One editor stated that "...it rests with the labor element in this country to decide the turn this campaign will take." In August political observers remarked that the

413. Ibid.
414. Ibid., 64.
415. Ibid.
416. Ibid.
Republicans were slow in appreciating the tendency of the labor vote to drift toward President Wilson. However, two months later Hughes made a definite bid for the support of organized labor. While not overconfident of its support his attack on the Adamson law, his exposition of what he regarded "... as its menacing effects upon the maintenance of the principles for which organized labor has always fought, made a decided impression upon the labor communities which he (Hughes) visited," reported one newspaper.

According to this paper the friends of the former Supreme Court Justice believed that the labor group after it had thought over the Adamson act, and had looked beneath its surface, would give to the Republican candidate in November at least the normal percentage of the labor votes. Late in October the efforts of Samuel Gompers to misrepresent the labor record of Hughes for the purpose of influencing organized labor in the interests of


423. Ibid.
the President caused Republican editors to repudiate these charges by calling
attention, in their columns, to organized labor's own support of Hughes when
he became Justice of the Supreme Court in 1910.

Hughes in a stirring speech in Terre Haute, Indiana, defied the efforts
of Samuel Gompers and the railroad brotherhood chiefs to swing the vote of
organized labor to the President. In speaking on this subject he said:

I understand that word has gone out through
labor circles in official channels to vote
against me, and I know perfectly well that
I am saying a profound truth, and every
union labor man knows it - that nobody can
direct or control the labor vote of the country.
That vote is going to be cast according to its
sound judgment, according to what the men
think is right and fair.

This is an American Government and our work­ingmen are the best citizens we have because
they are producing and working, and I have
the utmost confidence in the freedom of their
judgment, according to their conscience,
uncontrolled by any power.425

The approval and enthusiasm which this audience gave these remarks more than
pleased the Republican candidate.426

An interesting feature of the campaign was the use of the medium of
advertising in order to bring the Republican message to the attention of the
voters. During the last weeks of the campaign large advertising cartoons,
often full page, appeared in the newspapers. They directed the attention of
the voter to Hughes' opinions on labor and labor questions, and to organized
labor's opinion of the candidate in 1910.

October 24, 1916; and The Independent, October 2, 1916, 39.
425. New York Tribune, November 2, 1916; The Chicago Daily Tribune, November 2,
1916.
426. Ibid.
In his demand for the return of a protective tariff policy Hughes stressed the fact that the country was enjoying a greater prosperity than it had witnessed in many years yet, in his opinion, the prosperous conditions were based on weak, false foundations. That the country was enjoying prosperity was true. Reports on the nation's export and import trade during the first seven months of 1916 surpassed the amazing figures of the previous year was the report. Reports from leading industrial firms were extremely favorable and the stock market began in September a rise in prices. In the last weeks of the campaign, leading newspapers carried the work on their financial pages that the slump in business and in the stock market which usually preceded a Presidential election had not taken place. One editor expressed the opinion that "... probably never in the history of business in the United States has a national political contest had less influence upon general trade than during the Presidential campaign now drawing to a close." This viewpoint was held by editors of other newspapers as well. While the political contest had been heated it had "... not hampered business nor caused any slackening of business so far as can be noticed," wrote one financial editor. So it would seem that business and especially Wall Street had not been especially concerned with the outcome of the Presidential campaign.

427. New York Tribune, October 31, November 1, 2, 3, 6, 1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 29, November 1, 2, 6, 1916.


429. Ibid.


election. It was reported, however, by one newspaper that those on Wall Street favored the candidacy of Hughes. This belief was also held by the opponents of the Republican candidate.

That business interests were behind Hughes was at least evident in Chicago. In that city an organization known as The Hughes Business Men's League had been formed and had held many meetings, some of them in the industrial houses and plants were the political speakers reached the working people directly and carried to them the message of why Hughes should be elected. In Philadelphia a leading merchant publicly gave his reasons for supporting Hughes and the Republican managers were confident that his efforts would "... prove potent in enlarging Republican vote."

However, the Republican candidate in his speeches toward the end of the campaign argued that the prosperous condition of the country was one of the serious problems facing the American voter. In his opinion the economic boom caused by the unprecedented demand for American products and commodities by European countries had resulted in a false prosperity in the United States, a prosperity which would collapse at the cessation of war in Europe. When European workers went into the trenches, leaving idle their places in the factories, mills, and mines, an extraordinary opportunity was created for...

American enterprise. Europe stretched out for everything America could produce. However, after the war this demand would stop and American labor employed to meet this demand would be without employment. Asa result labor in America would compete with labor and the purchasing power of the workers would be reduced and the soldiers in Europe returning to their peace time occupations would produce more than ever, Hughes declared. The candidate said: "It is perfectly idle for workmen to think there is a future for them with continuous employment at good wages unless we set about protecting American industry." In words of warning Hughes frequently admonished his audiences to consider the graveness of the situation, to realize that the nation must prepare to meet the economic conditions which would come after the war, and that the nation must "... build and maintain a new American policy." He said "... and I tell you at this time you have got to apply the Republican doctrine of protecting American industries."

Hughes disagreed with his critics who maintained that European nations would be too weak, too devastated to stage a comeback for at least a year. He believed that the European nations would be able to put up keen competition with the labor of our country shortly after the war ceased.

In order to protect American industries and the American standard of living the Republican candidate and his party advocated a protective tariff:

440. Ibid.
441. Ibid.
A tariff which would be adequate and sound, one which would insure safety to the American industries. Hughes in addressing the mine-workers in southern Indiana painted a picture of the economic conditions caused by the war and said:

It is a perfectly absurd thing that any intelligent man should stand before an American community and talk about tariff for revenue only. You cannot run the United States that way. The nations on the other side are learning the necessity of protecting their interests .... Of course they will seek our markets and then what will happen? Either their products will sell here and our products won't sell or our men have got to take less money in wages. Now that is all there is to it.444

Hughes felt that the governments in the European countries had made every effort to stimulate business interests and after the war would adopt a policy of protecting their industries through a protective tariff. A banker in New York, holding a view similar to Hughes', predicted that unless protective legislation was provided before the termination of the war "... American manufacturers will find both their export and domestic trade in the hands of foreigners."445

In most of his speeches in the campaign Hughes discussed the conditions which made a protective tariff policy a necessity and in one speech he made this concluding statement:

If you want protection to American industry, the protection of the American wage scale, then put in power those who believe in the protective principle, not those who did not believe in it.446

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One newspaper editor while stating that the nation had never enjoyed "... a protracted prosperity except under Republican protective tariff..." expressed his firm belief in a protective policy by stating that "... a vote for a Democratic legislator or executive is a vote for a return of hard times."

That the Republican leaders were extremely anxious to bring the tariff issue before the public was evident by the full page advertisement which appeared in a New York newspaper. It was captioned: "Back to the Bread Line if Wilson's Tariff is not Repealed." Below this appeared a message addressed to President Wilson. In this message the facts were brought out that only the war had saved the nation from the ruinous effects of the Wilson tariff and that with the cessation of the war the work of ruining American industry, because of the Democratic tariff, would be completed and American workmen would return to the breadlines. Similar advertisements appeared not only in the New York paper but also in a Chicago paper. They called attention to the advantages of a protective tariff, gave statistics on business conditions, showed graphs which illustrated the upward climb of the cost of living, and by means of cartoons and pictures called upon the readers to "Vote for Hughes" and the protective tariff.

Rodenberg (Illinois) as found in New York Tribune, August 26, 1916.
448. New York Tribune, October 30, 1916. This advertisement was put in the paper by the Republican National Publicity Committee.
449. Ibid.
450. The Chicago Daily Tribune, November 2, 4, 5, 6, 1916; and New York Tribune, November 4, 5, 6, 1916.
During the campaign Hughes and other Republican speakers had given little attention in their speeches to an important item in the Wilson administration, that is, to the Federal Reserve law of 1913. Not until Hughes had begun his second tour did he bring this Democratic piece of legislation into his addresses, and then only in an incidental fashion. In Milwaukee on September 9, Hughes in speaking of the Federal Reserve act expressed his belief that this bill, from whose passage the Democrats had hoped to gain political friends, had been primarily a Republican accomplishment. He maintained that the greater part of this valuable act had been taken from material supplied by a Republican Commission and from a draft of a Republican bill. In his comments on the bill Hughes stressed these facts and likewise added that the bill as first presented by the Democrats to Congress "... was faulty and objectionable. The removal of the worst of these defects was due to Republican criticism on the floor of Congress, notably from Senator Root," reported one editor. In the opinion of this editor Hughes had not only used unsound reasoning in his remarks on the Federal Reserve act but had neglected to point out that Republican Congresses for several years had failed to consider the matter while they were in power.

A noteworthy and interesting angle of the political campaign was the active part played in it by the women of the nation. Ten days after Hughes' announcement that he favored an amendment to the Federal constitution which

455. Ibid.
would give the right of suffrage to women, a conference of the National Womans' Party was held in Colorado Springs. This group pledged itself for the defeat of President Wilson and commended Hughes for his attitude toward woman suffrage. From then on the women worked actively and with great fervor planning, organizing, and financing their own campaign for it was believed, stated one paper, that the women could best deal with the four million women voters.

That the women of the nation had risen to importance politically, that they could wield power in political affairs was a fact not to be denied. The women in half the territory of the United States had the franchise. It was estimated that four million women would vote in the November election in the twelve states whose electoral count totaled ninety-one votes. Writers agreed that the women were to be an important factor in the Presidential election and wise politicians, early in the campaign, were advised to give heed to the woman angle, especially in the western states.

In September the National American Woman's Association met in Atlantic City. Since an amendment to the Federal Constitution needed the support of both major political parties the group decided to maintain its traditional non-partisan attitude and to work for woman suffrage without alienating either the Democrats or the Republicans.

Early in October the women began their five week trans-continental trip. They were ready and eager to vote for Hughes not only because of his definite stand on woman suffrage but also because of his views on other important issues. The women traveled westward in their private train addressing large groups of men and women in such important cities as Detroit, Chicago, Billings, Montana, and then on to the Pacific coast. On their return trip they held parades and meetings in such cities as Kansas City, Springfield, Chicago, Baltimore, and New York. In their meetings they stressed the reasons why the men and women of the nation should cast their ballot for the Republican candidate. While Republican leaders were willing to admit the worthwhileness of the woman's campaign tour and while large, often enthusiastic groups gathered to hear the women speakers, yet the tour was not entirely successful. In many instances the reception given to the women was not always a friendly one. Political opponents of Hughes frequently staged unfriendly receptions or by their heckling attempted to interrupt the political gatherings sponsored by the women.

On their return to New York these women campaigners had traveled over 11,000 miles, had addressed 191 meetings in twenty-eight states, and it was believed that their trip had been successful in changing many votes to Hughes.

October 21, 1916.


The importance of the woman's vote mounted as the campaign drew to a close for it was generally agreed that their vote would be a deciding factor in the Presidential election, was the report.

1916; and The Christian Science Monitor, November 4, 1916.
SUPPLEMENT

Primarily the purpose of this thesis has been to set forth the attitudes and activities of the Republican Party in the election of 1916. With the close of the campaign to all practical purposes the scope of this work was concluded. No effort has been made to present a detailed analysis of the vote, no great attempt has been made to examine the polled results in order to determine, if possible, the alignments of the polled vote and to learn the causes and effects of such alignments. To make such an attempt would present a problem or problems more in the nature of another thesis. However, a brief report of the election is here presented in order to complete the picture of the political situation in the Presidential election of 1916.

On Tuesday, November 7, 1916, the citizens of the United States went to the polls to decide whether the affairs of the nation should continue under the direction of Woodrow Wilson or be committed to the administration of Charles Evans Hughes. The election was outstanding in as much as the result of the count was not definitely known until the third day after the election.

The early reports on Tuesday definitely gave the Republican candidate victory in the state of New York, in six of the New England states and the reports from Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana were so encouraging that two New York papers conceded the victory to Hughes. On Wednesday morning the reports from the Middle West and far West changed the story and as the day advanced it became very evident that the victory would not be decisive after all. On Thursday the victory was still undecided. Wilson seemed assured of 251 electoral votes but the count for Hughes varied from 243 to 252. The three states remaining doubtful were California with its thirteen votes, Minnesota with its twelve, and New Mexico with its three. By Friday morning Wilson was assured of his re-election, having received 276 votes to Hughes' 255. However, because of the recounts in California the Republican Party did not concede the election to the Democrats until November 23. On that day Hughes acknowledged his defeat and sent a congratulatory telegram to President Wilson.

The Democrats in their victory claimed thirty states, leaving eighteen states for the Republican column. Wilson had carried the South and the West. In the main he had carried every state west of the Missouri River and South of the Ohio or, as one editor expressed it, by the "... solid South and the insurgent, progressive and radical West." According to him

2. Reports from these three states came in slowly because of the voting methods used, or due to the fact that it took time to obtain the election results from the men stationed on the border, or because the results were so close.


4. Meyers, 427. For detailed account of electoral vote by states see Appendix D.

5. Editorial: "The American Election." The Fortnightly Review, December 1916, 1056. (These totals were changed later to 277 and 254.)
the election was "... as complete an expression of the popular will as could probably be secured in a country with a population of one hundred million people." In the record of the popular vote Wilson received 9,116,296 votes and Hughes polled 8,547,474, making the Democratic plurality 568,822. It was reported that this was the largest popular vote ever cast. In accounting for this large number several reasons were given such as increased population, woman's suffrage, and a widespread interest in the campaign. The re-elected executive, although a majority President, had received the smallest margin of electoral votes since 1876, and the smallest popular margin since 1892 reported one editor. However, the popular vote received by Wilson represented better than 49% of the total vote while that of Hughes represented 46% of the popular vote. The consensus of opinion was that the election had been a definite tribute to the President, personally, rather than a victory of the Democratic Party and its policies.

Congressional election returns remained uncertain for many days after the election. The final count indicated that the Democratic majority in Senate had been reduced from sixteen to twelve. In the House the Democrats

6. Ibid., 1057.
7. Meyers, 427. The Tabulations as found in the American Year Book 1916, 170, were as follows: Wilson, 9,128,337 and Hughes, 8,538,330.
9. Ibid.
controlled 215 seats and the Republicans 215. The remaining five seats were scattered among the Progressives, Socialists, and Independents. While the Democrats had been successful in re-electing President Wilson their control in Congress was definitely ended.

Once the election was over it evidently ceased to be of great interest to the American reading public. In the days immediately after the election the newspapers and the magazines made some efforts to review the election and to summarize its results.

No attempt has been made in this paper either to analyze or evaluate the results of the election, or to explain the alleged drifts of sectional sentiment and opinions as shown by the popular vote for such an attempt, as one editor expressed it, would be 'absurd' because of the inability to obtain accurate information on such election results. However, many writers seemed to agree on certain outstanding and apparent results of the Presidential race. The conclusion most commonly commented upon was the new, regional alignment of the political parties. Repeatedly it was observed that the far West had given Wilson his victory or, as expressed by one writer, "... the scepter of power is passing to the West in conjunction with the South and the South-West." Forcibly the East was made to realize by this election that the Atlantic States were not the United States

14. Ibid.
and that no longer could the West be ignored in political affairs.

One writer in summing up the reasons for the Republican defeat outlined four significant elements. First, he pointed out that the West approved Wilson's success in 'Keeping Us Out of War;' second, he felt that the women in the suffrage states except for Illinois and Oregon had given their support to the Democratic Party; third, the Progressives had favored Wilson and his policies; and last, he was of the opinion that the Republicans had failed in their campaign to develop any kind of positive appeal to the voters of the nation. Many other editors and writers expressed views which coincided on the whole with the above summarization. The last reason was enlarged upon by several writers. One editor felt that Hughes' defeat was due to his failure to put words of courage, self respect and 'old-fashioned patriotism' into the hearts of the people, and his absolute refusal to meet the great questions of the campaign fairly and squarely. In the defense of Hughes one historian expressed the belief that no Republican candidate had faced a more difficult task than had Hughes. In his campaign the former Justice had been drawn one way by Roosevelt, another by the hyphenates and still a third by the radical element of the former Progressives. There-

20. Ibid.
23. Dodd, 189.
fore, stated this historian, "... the outcome was a weak appeal on every vital matter that was before the public." Another historian commented that the plans and procedure used by the Republican candidate indicated that either he had lacked courage or else his campaign manager had ordered him "... to offend no one." Consequently he had failed to commit himself on the campaign issues and had based his hope of victory on the belief that the Republican vote of the country would be large enough to elect him. A poll of the press of the nation as to the causes of the Republican defeat not only stressed those already mentioned but added several others as, the prosperous condition of the country, especially in the agricultural regions, the power of Wall Street, and the failure of the Progressives to unite with the Republicans. As one editor expressed it, there were as many reasons as there were groups, sections, interests, and political parties concerned in the outcome.

One phase of the election to which the writer paid particular attention but on which no effort was made to reach a conclusion concerned the part played by the state of California in the Presidential election. The political situation which existed in that state was explained in an earlier chapter. The final election results in California revealed that while Governor Johnson had received a plurality of 300,000 votes in his senatorial contest, the

24. Ibid.; similar view held by Meyers, 425.
25. Seymour, 368.
26. Ibid.
27. "Why President Wilson Was Elected," The Outlook, November 22, 1916, 638; similar views held by Meyers, 425.
Republican Presidential candidate had lost the state by a plurality of 29,800 votes. This count revealed that the state which was strongly Progressive had voted for Johnson but had failed to vote for Hughes. If the thirteen electoral votes of California had been cast for Hughes he would have been elected by a margin of three votes over Wilson stated one historian. That the count was very close was indicated by the fact that a difference of 4,000 votes would have turned the scale for Hughes.

The final results in California raised a hue and a cry across the nation. Republicans accused Johnson, stating that he had failed to openly campaign for Hughes in California. In retaliation Johnson accused the 'Old Guard' and the local campaign managers for the part they had played in the state campaign. One editor stated that Hughes would have won in California if "... these groups had not created a spirit of distrust among the rank and file of the Progressive voters." This was the view taken by a newspaper writer who believed that not only had the petty politicians misrepresented the Republican candidate to the people of California, but by making him appear as a confirmed reactionary they had affronted the progressive-minded voters in California. On the other hand the Progressive

32. Ibid., 303.
leaders charged that Hughes by his failure to meet and confer with Johnson had lost for himself the thirteen electoral votes of the state. However, the fact remained that a sufficient number of Californians cast their ballot for Wilson to give him the thirteen electoral votes of the state.

Likewise, in the nation as a whole a large enough number of citizens had so marked their ballots as to voice their desire to keep Woodrow Wilson at the helm of the government and had indicated their demand that the Democratic administration remain in office.

36. The Christian Science Monitor, November 13, 1916; similar views found in "Why Wilson Won." The Literary Digest, November 18, 1916, 1512; and Seymour, 368.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

In the preliminary reading on this topic a careful search for all possible material relating to the subject was made. The amount of source material to be found in book form was disappointing. Good biographies of all the leading figures could not be found, or as in the case of Roosevelt, was incomplete on the period covered in this thesis. The writer concluded that the wisest procedure was to use daily newspapers and periodicals in order to obtain the best source material.

Newspapers

In using the newspapers the writer carefully examined and read each issue from February 1 to November 25, paying attention to news items, editorials, special articles, advertisements, and cartoons. The following newspapers were consulted:

- New York Tribune
- The Chicago Daily Tribune
- The Christian Science Monitor (Boston)

For the period of the conventions additional material was found in:

- Chicago Examiner
- Chicago Herald
New York Tribune, listed as a Republican paper, indicated early in February its allegiance to Charles Evans Hughes and throughout the year continued to sponsor his candidacy and worked for the success of the Republican Party.

The Chicago Daily Tribune, listed as an Independent-Republican paper, was an uncompromisingly Republican paper. It was definitely prejudiced against the Democrats. Its daily reports and its editorials were colored by its political allegiance. As the campaign drew to a close the editorials against the Administration and the Democratic Party were extremely critical and hostile.

The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), listed as an independent paper, reported the political news from February through November in an impartial, calm manner. The editor, on occasions, criticized the Republican candidate or his party, but on the whole was very fair in reporting the political news. However, it was observed that during the last weeks of the campaign the paper seemed rather indifferent toward the political activities.

Periodicals

The periodicals were carefully consulted, issue by issue, from January through December of 1916. Special care was taken to check and read the editorials, news items, special articles, letters from subscribers, and cartoons for all possible data referring to the topic of this thesis. A wealth of material was found in these periodicals, especially in the weekly

2. Ibid., 64.
3. Ibid., 115.
journals. In view of the great quantity of material in these periodicals the writer believed that it would be out of place to list the individual references in the critical essay but has carefully footnoted them in the thesis proper.

The periodicals have been grouped as weekly or monthly. The weekly magazines in their columns reported the political activities week by week, stressing the high points in the campaign and in the speeches of the Republican candidate.

The Independent, The Independent Corporation, New York, a weekly magazine, made every effort to present both sides of the political situation but became quite sympathetic toward the Republican cause in the later part of the campaign.

The Literary Digest, Funk and Wagnalls Company, New York, a weekly magazine, remained neutral in its viewpoint. While it seldom reported on the political activities of the campaign it was especially valuable for its presentation of the views of editors and citizens from all parts of the nation.

The Nation, The Nation Press, Incorporated, New York, a weekly magazine declared itself to be neutral in the earlier weeks of the campaign and aimed to present both sides of the questions. However in October and November, it became definitely critical of Hughes.

The New Republic, The Republic Publishing Company, New York, a weekly magazine, was Progressive in its complexion in June and by September had indicated that it was anti-Republican.
The Outlook, The Outlook Company, New York, a weekly magazine leaned toward the candidacy of Roosevelt in May and June, and remained neutral during the remaining months of the campaign. It reported the campaign trips fairly although at times very briefly.

The monthly magazines while not reporting on the conventions and the campaign tours in great detail yet they did present splendid, general accounts of the political situation and carefully reviewed the important issues of the campaign.

The American Review of Reviews, edited by Albert Shaw, the Review of Reviews Company, New York, a monthly magazine, while definitely for Roosevelt in June, attempted in its later issues to report impartially on the political situation. Toward the close of the campaign while reporting the Republican activities in an openminded fashion yet the tone of its columns indicated a leaning toward the Democratic side.


The North American Review, edited by George Harvey, American Review Corporation, New York, a monthly magazine favored Root or Roosevelt in the months before the conventions but indicated in July that it would sponsor Hughes. During the last two months of the campaign this magazine earnestly worked for the election of the Republican candidate.

was definitely prejudiced against the Republican Party and its candidate.


The following monthly magazines were consulted but the political material in them did not directly relate to the scope of this thesis: Harper's Monthly Magazine, Harper and Brothers, New York; and The Contemporary Review, The Contemporary Review Company, London.

Source Material

Republican Campaign Textbook 1916, issued by the Allied Printing Trade Council, Washington, D.C., 1916, contained the Republican Party platform and several of the more important political speeches of the convention and the campaign. It did not have a report of the Republican Convention.

Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918, II, edited by Henry Cabot Lodge, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1925, proved useful in providing a general background for the topic. However, the value of the book was lessened because it contained very few letters pertaining to the period of this thesis.

Joseph B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time - As Shown in His Own Letters, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1925, was written at the request of Roosevelt and based on his letters. However, the book did not prove very valuable because the period between January and November of 1916 was hardly touched upon in the book.

A splendid account of the life of the Republican candidate prior to 1916 was found in Addresses of Charles Evans Hughes, 1906-1916, introduction by Jacob Schurman, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1916. It also had copies of the more important political addresses of Hughes.

Samuel Gompers, American Labor and the War, George Doran and Company, New York, 1919, was especially helpful in presenting the part played in the campaign by the labor leader.

A very good account of the Democratic plans to defeat the Republican program, and a negative view of the Republican activities was presented in The Intimate Papers of Colonel House - From Neutrality to War, 1915-1917, II, arranged by Charles Seymour, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1926.

Secondary Material


Miscellaneous

Appendix A

Hughes Accepts - His Forceful and Comprehensive Telegram to Chairman Harding

Mr. Hughes' telegram to Chairman Harding of the Republican National Convention, formally accepting the Republican nomination for the Presidency, was as follows:

Hon. Warren G. Harding, Chairman Republican National Convention, Chicago, Ill.

I have not desired the nomination. I have wished to remain on the bench. But in this critical period in our national history I recognize that it is your right to summon and that it is my paramount duty to respond.

You speak at a time of national exigency, transcending merely partisan consideration. You voice the demand for a dominant, thorough-going Americanism, with firm protective upbuilding policies essential to our peace and security; and to that call, in this crisis, I cannot fail to answer with the pledge of all that is in me to the service of our country. Therefore, I accept the nomination.

Stands for Americanism

I stand for the firm and unflinching maintenance of all the rights of American citizens on land and sea. I neither impugn motives nor underestimate difficulties.

But it is most regrettrably true that in our foreign relations we have suffered incalculably from the weak and vacillating course which has been taken with regard to Mexico - a course lamentably wrong with regard to both our rights and our duties.

We interfered without consistency; and while seeking to dictate when we were not concerned, we utterly failed to appreciate and discharge our plain duty to our own citizens.

Brave Words Stripped of "Force"

At the outset of the administration the high responsibilities of our diplomatic intercourse with foreign nations were subordinated to a conception of partisan requirements, and we presented to the world a humiliating spectacle of inaptitude.

Belated efforts have not availed to recover the influence and prestige so unfortunately sacrificed; and brave words have been stripped of their force by indecision.

I desire to see our diplomacy restored to its best standards and to have those advanced; to have no sacrifices of national interest to partisan expediencies; to have the first ability of the country always at its command here and abroad, in diplomatic intercourse; to maintain firmly our rights under international law; insisting steadfastly upon all our rights as mutual and fully performing our international obligations, and by the clear correctness and justness of our position and our manifest ability and disposition to sustain them to dignify our place among the nations.
Knows No Ulterior Purpose

I stand for an Americanism that knows no ulterior purpose; for a patriotism that is single and complete. Whether native or naturalized, of whatever race or creed, we have but one country, and we do not intend to tolerate any division of allegiance.

I believe in making prompt provision to assure absolutely our national security.

I believe in preparedness, not only entirely adequate for our defense, with respect to numbers and equipment, in both army and navy, but with all thoroughness to the end that in each branch of the service there may be the utmost efficiency under the most competent administrative heads.

Urges Proper Preparedness

We are devoted to the ideals of honorable peace. We wish to promote all wise and practical measures for the just settlement of international disputes. In view of our abiding ideals, there is no danger of militarism in this country.

We have no policy of aggression, no lust for territory, no zeal for strife.

It is in this spirit that we demand adequate provision for national defense, and we condemn the inexcusable neglect that has been shown in this matter of first national importance.

We must have the strength which self-respect demands, the strength
of an efficient nation ready for every emergency.

For Readjustment of Tariff

Our preparation must be industrial and economic as well as military. Our severest tests will come after the war is over. We must make a fair and wise readjustment of the tariff, in accordance with sound protective principle, to insure our economic independence and to maintain American standards of living.

We must conserve the just interests of labor, realizing that in democracy patriotism and national strength must be rooted in even-handed justice. In preventing, as we must, unjust discriminations and monopolistic practices, we must still be zealous to assure the foundations of honest business.

Particularly should we seek the expansion of foreign trade. We must not throttle American enterprise, here or abroad, but rather promote it and take pride in honorable achievements.

Stands for Civil Service

We must take up the serious problems of transportation, of interstate and foreign commerce, in a sensible and candid manner, and provide an enduring basis for prosperity by the intelligent use of the constitutional powers of Congress, so as adequately to protect the public on the one hand, and, on the other, to conserve the essential instrumentalities of progress.
I stand for the principles of our civil service laws. In every department of government the highest efficiency must be insisted upon. For all laws and programs are vain without efficient and impartial administration.

Fully Indorses Platform

I cannot within the limits of this statement speak upon all the subjects that will require attention. I can only say that I fully indorse the platform you have adopted.

I deeply appreciate the responsibility you impose. I should have been glad to have that responsibility placed upon another. But I shall undertake to meet it, grateful for the confidence you express. I sincerely trust that all former differences may be forgotten, and that we may have united effort in a patriotic realization of our national need and opportunity.

I have resigned my judicial office, and I am ready to devote myself unreservedly to the campaign.

Washington, D.C.
June 10, 1916

CHARLES E. HUGHES
Appendix B

Mr. Hughes to Progressive Committee

Hotel Astor, New York City,
June 26, 1916

O.K. Davis, Secretary Progressive National Committee, Blackstone Hotel, Chicago, Ill:

I welcome the support of Progressives. We make common cause in the interest of national honor, of national security, of national efficiency. We unite in the demand for an undivided and unwavering loyalty to our country, for a whole hearted patriotic devotion overriding all racial differences. We want a revival of the American spirit, a nation restored. We insist upon prompt and adequate provision for the common defence, upon the steadfast maintenance of all the rights of our citizens and upon the integrity of international law.

The most serious difficulties the present Administration has encountered have been due to its own weakness and incertitude. I am profoundly convinced that by prompt and decisive action, which existing conditions manifestly called for, the Lusitania tragedy would have been prevented.

We strongly denounce the use of our soil as a base for alien intrigues, for conspiracies and the fomenting of disorders in the interest of any foreign nation, but the responsibility lies at the door of the Administration. The moment notice is admitted responsibility.

1. Republican Campaign Textbook 1916, 39-40
is affixed. For that sort of thing could not continue if the Administration took proper measures to stop it. That responsibility the Administration cannot evade by condemning others.

Indictment of Mexican Policy

It was officially stated by the Secretary of State in the Mexican note of June 20, 1916, that "for three years the Mexican Republic has been torn with civil strife; the lives of Americans and other aliens have been sacrificed; vast properties developed by American capital and enterprise have been destroyed or rendered non-productive; bandits have been permitted to roam at will through territory contiguous to the United States and to seize, without punishment or without effective attempt at punishment, the property of Americans while the lives of citizens of the United States who ventured to remain in Mexican Territory or to return there to protect their interests have been taken, in some cases barbarously taken, and the murderers have neither been apprehended nor brought to justice.

What an indictment by the Administration of its Mexican policy! And still we are unprepared. That unpreparedness in the midst of perils, and after the experiences of three years, is a demonstration of an unpardonable neglect for which the Administration is responsible.

The Government now has and must have most emphatically the unstinted and patriotic support of every citizen in the existing exigency. But unquestioning, loyal and patriotic support of the Government is one thing; approval of the fatuous course which the Administra-
tion has followed is quite another. I cannot in this message adequately review that course, that I shall do later.

Renews Plea for Protection

No intelligent man is deceived by the temporary prosperity due to abnormal conditions, and no one can fail to appreciate the gravity of the problems with which we shall be faced when the war ends. We are alive to the imperative necessity of assuring the bases of honest business. I am in deep sympathy with the effort to improve the conditions of labor; to prevent exploitation; to safeguard the future of the nation by protecting our women and children. I believe in workmen's compensation laws; in wise conservation of our national resources so that they may be protected, developed and used to the utmost public advantage. But underlying every endeavor to promote social justice is the indispensable condition that there shall be a stable foundation for honorable enterprise.

American industry must have proper protection if labor is to be safeguarded. We must rescue our instrumentalities of interstate and foreign commerce, our transportation facilities from uncertainty and confusion. We must show that we know how to protect the public without destroying or crippling our productive energies.

Has Not the National Outlook

To what agency shall we look for the essential constructive programme on which our security and prosperity must depend? It is
vain to expect it from the Democratic Party. That party has not the national outlook. Both its traditions and dominating influences are fatal handicaps. I have no sectional word to utter. We are to elect a President of the whole country, not of a part. The South, as well as the North, East and West, will be the gainers from our endeavors. But it is sober truth as I see it that as we go forward we must make the Republican Party the instrument of our advance. We want deeds, not words; far reaching national policies.

The Progressives have insisted on responsible, not invisible, government; on efficient administration. I yield to no one in that demand. I am eager to call the best ability of the country to our aid. For the conduct of the great departments the Executive is directly responsible and there is no excuse whatever for the toleration of incompetence in order to satisfy partisan obligations.

I am deeply appreciative of your indorsement. I find no difference in platform or in aim which precludes the most hearty co-operation and the most complete unity. It is within the party that the liberalizing spirit you invoke can have the widest and most effective influence. I solicit your earnest effort for the common cause.

CHARLES E. HUGHES.
Appendix C

Mr. Hughes Tells Colonel Roosevelt of Nation's Debt to Him

Hotel Astor, New York City
June 26, 1916

My Dear Colonel Roosevelt:

I warmly appreciate the cordial letter of indorsement which you have sent to the Progressive committee. No one is more sensible than I of the lasting indebtedness of the nation to you for the quickening of the national spirit, for the demand for an out and out one hundred percent Americanism and for the insistence upon the immediate necessity of a thoroughgoing preparedness, spiritual, military and economic.

I am in the campaign because of my conviction that we must not only frame but execute a broad constructive programme, and that for this purpose we must have a united party, a party inspired by its great traditions and reconsecrated to its loftiest ideals. I know that you have been guided in this emergency by the sole desire to be of the largest service to the United States. You have sounded forth the trumpet that shall never call retreat. And I want you to feel that I wish to have all the aid that you are able and willing to give. I want the most effective co-operation with all those who have been

fighting by your side. Let us work together for our national security and for the peace of righteousness and justice.

I enclose a copy of my telegram to the committee, in which I have set forth my attitude. I shall later undertake a full discussion of the issues of the campaign.

Hoping that I may have the pleasure of seeing you at an early day I am, my dear Colonel Roosevelt, with cordial regards,

Faithfully yours,

CHARLES E. HUGHES
Appendix D

Electoral Vote In Presidential Election of 1916

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The thesis, The Attitudes and Activities of the Republican Party in the Election of 1916," written by Marcella K. Alversoh, has been accepted by the Graduate School with reference to form, and by the readers whose names appear below, with reference to content. It is, therefore, accepted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Paul Kiniery, Ph.D. January, 1939
Rev. Eneas B. Goodwin January, 1939