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TESTING MODELS OF VOTER CHOICE: THE CASE OF POLISH
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, 1997-2005

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PROGRAM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY
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For Ewa, Emilka, and Sarah.
“There are sadistic scientists who hurry to hunt down errors instead of establishing the truth.”

Maria Curie Skłodowska (1867-1934)

“I do not know what I may appear to the world, but to myself I seem to have been only a boy playing on the sea-shore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me.”

Isaac Newton (1643-1727)
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation presents a systematic empirical study of the Polish parliamentary elections in 1997, 2001 and 2005. The analyses are performed in the framework of behavioralism and rational choice. Under these two broad academic schools of thought various theories of voting behavior have been developed over last 50 years. I demonstrate the main theoretical elements of sociological, socio-psychological, economic, and issue-based models of voting, examine the relative weight of the major variables in each model, and test their statistical significance.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Determining the reasons behind voters’ choice at the ballot box is of fundamental importance to democracy. Understanding ‘why people vote the way they do’ is also the chief concern of this project. In this project I test a number of competing theories and models of voting behavior developed in the U.S. and Western Europe, among them: the socio-psychological model, the sociological model, spatial models, and the economic model. Each of these models offers a different and compelling explanation of the social and attitudinal factors that determine voter choice. We know that voters in developed democracies cast ballots for or against political parties and candidates for a variety of reasons – cleavages, party affiliations, group interest, personal characteristics and perceptions of the candidates themselves, the economy, and policy issues. We know that diverse political settings and institutions may cause voters to behave differently. What we are not absolutely certain of is what accounts for a particular vote. This study seeks to examine what factors might influence the electoral choice of the Polish voter.
1. **Significance of the Study**

   This project focuses on finding an explanation of voting behavior in the complicated and still-emerging democratic setting of Poland, a country that began its democratic experience just over a decade ago. Some of the models discussed in this work have not yet been tested in the Polish context or were tested only on one or two election periods. The field of scholarship dedicated to electoral politics in present-day Poland is still very much in its infancy. Perhaps most importantly, the explanation of voting behavior in Poland is complicated by a lack of consistent findings and the absence of theories explicitly applicable to the studies of Eastern Europe that can guide the researcher in an appropriate direction.

   I regard this research as a sort of remedy. This work starts with an ambition to find syntheses from elements of existing theories of voting behavior and to seek novel theoretical underpinnings that apply explicitly to Poland and perhaps more broadly to other East-Central European countries. It extends from theories of voting behavior well known to scholars who study this subject in developed democracies, which are used to frame my research questions and direct my search for answers. In this study, the case of Poland becomes a subject for testing the chief hypotheses of voting behavior to the aim of presenting tough or critical tests for these hypotheses. Perhaps, the study of post-communist states in general and Poland in particular should not be limited to the application of
theories from elsewhere. It is also possible that this study will reveal that the existing theories of voting behavior are well suited for Poland. This research is driven by the recognition that to examine the puzzles of voting behavior and perhaps to propose amendments and alternatives can move the study of voting behavior in Poland forward. I believe that this project is an important contribution to the field of comparative/post-communist politics in general and Poland in particular, because it incorporates a systematic analysis of competing models of voting utilized by scholars in the study of developed democracies. To the best of my knowledge, no study of Poland or any other post-communist country has been conducted in the manner proposed here.

2. **Research Question and Scope of Analyses**

   This study asks ‘What has determined the results of parliamentary elections in Poland?’ In other words, what are the major and most probable factors underlying the voting decisions of Polish voters? What motivates voters to choose a political party? How has the voting behavior of Polish citizens changed during the democratic transition? How can we predict and explain voter choice? Different schools of thought approach the subject differently. This study draws
on two broad theories of behavioralism and rational choice.\footnote{It is important to distinguish between these two approaches as scholars in political science often place rational choice into the camp of behavioralism; see Terence Ball, "From Paradigms to Research Programs: Toward a Post-Kuhnian Political Science," \textit{American Journal of Political Science} 20, no. 1 (1976).} Within the tradition of behavioralism there are two variant perspectives, the Michigan school of voting and Columbia school of voting, both of which focus on non-policy factors. Rational choice theory includes spatial models of voting and economic models that focus primarily on policy factors. This research tests several models of voting behavior associated with these theoretical traditions. The challenge is to elucidate the voters’ choices using existing models of voting behavior that may or may not have the full explanatory and predictive power in the new setting of democratic transitions.

This research focuses on three recent parliamentary elections: 1997, 2001, and 2005. The reason why the first set of post-communist elections has been omitted in this analysis is two-fold.\footnote{The data for 2007 elections is not yet available.} First, it is widely believed that the first election of 1989 was not completely free since the communist party Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (PZPR) set up an agreement with the opposition that only 30\% of seats in lower house of Parliament will be contested in that election. Further, the voting behavior in the 1989 election can be mostly perceived as voting for a change of the political system. Second, the elections of
1991 and 1993 might be viewed in large part as the contest for or against emerging democracy and free market economy. Their meaning is much more complex due to lack of full crystallization of political parties and their ideologies (parties emerged and disappeared “over night”) as well as voters’ confusion about the entire democratic process. In the same vein, it would be very difficult for a researcher to compare results of voting behavior from early stages of democratic transition with the later ones because the first set of elections were driven by unique factors specific for the post-communist transitions. Last, but not least, the first series of elections has been studied extensively, while the more recent ones have not received sufficient attention in the scholarly work.

3. **Theory and Various Models**

3.1 *Behavioralism: Sociological and Socio-psychological Models of Voting*

Behavioralism is derived mainly from psychology and to some extent sociology and deals with surveys of public opinion and analyses of voters' predispositions and attitudes. The theory posits that political outcomes are determined by the psychological make-up of individuals. Voters select candidates because they identify with them and their political parties. In general, the behavioralist approach stresses that voters are motivated by their own party

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identification and socio-demographic characteristics (age, race, religion, class, etc.). Two models of voting fall under the umbrella of behavioralism: the sociological school (Columbia School) and socio-psychological school of voting (Michigan School).

The Columbia school of voting looks at a range of social indicators such as age, gender, occupation, religion, class, and ethnicity, seeking to determine how social structure and cleavages affect voting. The Columbia model bypasses the party identification mediation and looks at the direct effects of social context on voting behavior. As argued by Pippa Norris, “religious and class identities orient citizens toward the political system and provide a simple, low-cost guide to voting, enabling information shortcuts that allowed people to decide which politicians and policies to support over successive contests.”

To test the sociological approach to voting, this research explores the links between social

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5Harrop and Miller, *Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction*.

structure and voting behavior in parliamentary elections in Poland since 1997 using individual (surveys) level data.

Assuming that voters are likely to vote for parties supporting policies congruent with their class interest, this study will first investigate the association of class and vote.\(^7\) Class voting can be studied by means of ecological inference as well as direct information on the voter’s social class taken from public opinion surveys. This research utilizes only the second approach. Beside the analyses of class voting, this project also focuses on religious voting as well as rural-urban cleavage as a part of sociological approach to study voting behavior. It is expected that cleavages are rather reliable predictors of the vote.\(^8\)

In the socio-psychological model, the socialization process (group membership and family) and individuals’ social context provide the psychological


\(^8\)This prediction is based on discussion of Eastern European countries in Evans (2006).
predisposition that aligns one with a certain political party. In other words, socialization and experience with group members of a particular political persuasion helps voters to develop stereotypes, assumptions, or beliefs about parties that inform their political choices. Party identification helps to shape and orient one's perspective in a complex political world through simplification, and through this simplification the voting choice proceeds. Yet, voters may think outside these stereotypes, filtering and reforming their views against newly acquired information. An experiment conducted by Wendy Rahn revealed that if people can use stereotypes they will, but if they are exposed to new information, their political choices may become more data driven.

Although the Michigan model considers party ID to be the best single advance predictor of the vote, it

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also realizes that not everyone always votes according party lines and that voters may deviate from their historical party identifications due to short term intervening factors such as issue opinions and candidate image. These short term factors directly influence voting decision, but they are themselves partly determined by party identification, i.e., they are not based exclusively on an individual’s self-interested calculation as rational choice theory would argue.

This project asks how, if at all, partisanship in Poland influences voting behavior. The analysis start with simple correlations between party identifications, voting behavior, and demographic characteristics of voters and moves to the more complex analysis to predict the votes based on partisanship attachment as well as attachment to the party family, such as post-communist, post-solidarity, social conservatives, liberal conservatives and social democrats. Informed by the existing literature, it is expected that the socio-psychological model that emphasizes party ID as the most accurate indicator of the vote will be the least explanatory.

3.2 Rational Choice Theory: Economic and Issue Voting

Rational Choice, also called an ‘economic’ approach to the study of politics, focuses on the expected utility model of decision-making: actors make choices on the basis of their calculations of the payoffs they expect to receive in the future, as a consequence of the outcome generated by their choices, in such a
way as to maximize their payoff or utility. This research investigates the validity of the assumption that Polish voters are utility maximizers by asking if voters weigh gains and losses equally. Perhaps Polish voters learn from past experience and make choices on a trial-and-error basis as opposed to future rewards and they are not able to carry out complex calculations routinely assumed in game theory.

Rational choice as a research tradition of its own is associated with the spatial models of voting and economic models of voting. Spatial models (e.g. directional and proximity models); based on Anthony Downs’ *Economic Theory of Democracy*, concentrate on voter decisions in terms of policy outcomes or voter preference for the party whose position most closely aligns to their own position. The theory of economic voting goes back to the 1960s and 1970s and

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includes two basic ideas. First, voters are rational. Because of this they are capable of making logical, informed judgments based on past conditions or events. Second, these rational voters are knowledgeable about the performance of the economy. The issue of economic voting was vitalized and improved by the numerous scholars interested in this subject in the mid-1980s. The main argument is that national economic performance (measured by macroeconomic indicators) may be used to predict electorate support for the government in power.

Rational choice theory has been criticized by political sociologists and political psychologists. Political sociologists often claim that individual behavior is largely a function of social structures. They argue that Down’s approach is inferior to an account of voting that considers the individual’s position in the social structure. Social class, geographic location, gender, patterns of consumption and production, and religion, among other variables, all have known correlations of some degree with voting behavior. Psychologists typically argue

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that individuals' motives need not reflect self-interest and that empirical evidence suggests that they frequently act altruistically in political life.\textsuperscript{15}

Of late, rational choice scholars have begun to apply the concept of economic voting to the post-communist countries in general and to Poland in particular.\textsuperscript{16} Even though supporters of the theory of economic voting use the same analysis for all countries, there are sufficient reasons to believe that voters in Central and Eastern Europe behaved differently (at least in first post-communist elections) than those from Western developed countries. What may account for this behavioral difference is that the economic decline during the initial stages of the post-communist economic transition cannot be directly attributed to the government in office at the time as such a decline was a result

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., 79.

of historical as opposed to political factors.\textsuperscript{17} Other reasons would include voter confusion due to economic turmoil and voter inexperience with the political processes and institutions naturally associated with democracy.\textsuperscript{18} These reasons lead us to question whether voters of post-communist Poland are appropriately perceived as rational voters that fit in the western model of economic voting.

When testing the theory of economic voting, scholars analyze either the intended vote based on surveys prior to an election, or the actual vote based on surveys conducted short after elections.\textsuperscript{19} Using individual level data it is possible to examine at least two relationships. First, the relationship between voters’ perception of national economic conditions and the intended or actual vote is referred to as sociotropic economic voting. Second, the association between voters’ evaluations of personal circumstances and the intended or actual vote referred to as egotropic economic voting. This project examines both relationships.

\textsuperscript{17}Fidrmuc, "Economics of Voting in Post-Communist Countries."
\textsuperscript{18}Fidrmuc, "Political Support for Reforms: Economics of Voting in Transition Countries."
\textsuperscript{19}Sometime scholars regard vote and governmental popularity as essentially interchangeable; see Evans, \textit{Voters & Voting: An Introduction}. Further, besides the analysis of surveys scholars utilize the actual vote on the regional or national level to test economic voting in the cross-regional or cross-national context.
In addition to the voters’ evaluations of economic well-being and the state of their own finances, survey data collected after each parliamentary election permit examination of causal relationships in relation to time. The analysis of future perceptions of national economy and pocketbook economy ("How do you think economy/your own finances will go in the next year") is called the prospective model of economic voting. The voters’ evaluations of past economic performance and their past finances allow to analyze the retrospective model of economic voting. To test the prospective and retrospective egotropic and sociotropic hypotheses, this research employs the actual vote. This study also examines economic voting on the regional level by utilizing the macroeconomic indicators.

The vast empirical findings on mature democracies hold that a voter’s choice of party depends largely on its position on specific issues. These studies help fuel a major debate about whether voters prefer parties whose platforms are most similar to their own preferences or parties whose platforms are more extreme than their own. Proponents of the proximity model argue that voters prefer parties that are ideologically similar to their own views on issues. Supporters of the directional model argue that voters prefer parties that are
ideologically in the same direction as, but are more intense than, their own views on the relevant issues.  

In the context of rational choice theory, the task of this study is to compare the relative contributions of directional and proximity models, both of specific issue preferences and left–right ideological positions, on political party preferences in the Polish electorate. The scholarly literature on the relative adequacy of these two spatial models shows that both models have some empirical support but that the relationships are influenced by additional factors.

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such as the extremeness of a party or its political sophistication.\textsuperscript{21} However, previous comparisons of directional and proximity models have been basically limited to the western democracies. In the context of post-communist democracies, Poland in particular, it is important to first examine whether issues influence party preferences at all. Given the relatively short period of time that Polish voters have been exposed to the parties, compared to established democracies, and considering that the party system is still in the process of stabilization and ideological crystallization, it would not be surprising if voters had difficulty recognizing the precise positions of parties on different issue dimensions. Therefore, voters can be expected to be more susceptible to symbolic politics, i.e. to opt for a more directional approach in developing their party preferences. In addition, the relative contribution of specific issues versus

the general left–right ideological dimension will be assessed. To test the predictive power of issue voting models (proximity and directional) in Polish realm, I utilize conditional logit estimation.

4. **Data**

As already mentioned, this project uses individual level data and aggregate level data. The individual level electoral data that is used as a main source for the analyses performed in this study is taken from the Polish National Election Study also known as the Polish General Social Survey (1997, 2001, and 2005). Interviews for these surveys were carried out shortly after each of the 1997, 2001, and 2005 parliamentary elections. In these three surveys, a unit of analysis is individual. The non-response rate of selected individuals was in 1997 28.6%, in 2001 44.6% and in 2005 44.08%. These surveys are based on the three-level sampling procedure where the following stratification processes were used: administrative regions, address of the residence, and selection of the individual from the household (in case of multi-person household). The weights were

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constructed based on the demographic and socio-economic factors, such as sex, age, education, place of residence, and economic activity. Further, as pointed out in the documentation about these surveys, “because of the probability of selection inside the household are inversely proportional to the number of adults in the household another procedure was implemented to correct such unequal probabilities by weighting the results by the number of adults in the household.” Since the 1997 and 2005 surveys data report only sampling weights and first stage cluster, it is impossible to take into account the complexity of the surveys from these years. The survey data from 2001 provides the population weights, but the indicator for the secondary sampling unit is unclear. Therefore, all estimations performed in this work are conducted by utilizing sampling weights.

Other individual level datasets employed for the complementary analysis include the Polish Public Opinion Research Center (various surveys dated from 1997 to 2006), the World Value Surveys (1995, 2000, 2005), and the European Social Surveys (2002, 2004, 2006). The aggregate level electoral data for geographic/administrative regions is taken from the Polish National Election Commission. The economic data, performance assessments and economic policy information are drawn from the Polish Statistical Office, Ministry of Finance.

23The same description is given in the documentation for surveys in 2001 and 2005. The entire survey documentation is available upon request.
materials, and official documents of various regional administrations. Finally, the
data on regional income inequality and poverty measures is taken from the
Luxembourg Income Study.\textsuperscript{24}

5. **Methodology**

As described in previous sections, several statistical methods will be used in this study. It starts with descriptive statistics for each particular election and goes through more sophisticated analysis of data. Specifically, to estimate cleavage voting, this study utilizes multinomial logit. The socio-psychological model of voting is tested empirically by utilizing probit as well as multinomial logit. To examine the economic voting on the regional level I employ the fixed effects estimator that fits panel data; to estimate the parameters for egotropic and sociotropic economic voting I utilize multinomial logit. Fixed effects logit, also known as conditional logit, is applied in testing the issue-based models of voting. After performing the statistical estimations, a series of post-estimation procedures are utilized to test the predictability of each model, particularly, the marginal effects as well as the simulated and predicted probabilities.

\textsuperscript{24}The Luxembourg Income Study collects the data on Poland from the Polish Central Statistical Office (Household Budget Survey).
6. Literature Review

What has been done on individual voting behavior in Poland? Surprisingly, there are only nine articles written exclusively on the case of Poland in the last fifteen years which try to explain the voter’s choice in parliamentary and presidential election; five of these focus on broadly defined sociological model of voting, three on economic voting, and one article builds on the socio-psychological model. To the best of my knowledge, no one has applied the spatial or directional models to explain voter choice in Poland.

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25 Tucker (2002) observed that there were seventeen articles written on Polish electoral politics, compared to three scholarly articles written on Hungary by 2002. He listed three reasons why scholars write exclusively on Poland. All those reasons are related to the data availability: (1) good survey data; (2) availability of regional level data; (3) there were more elections in Poland then in any other post-communist countries. Surprisingly, the data availability produced mostly research on party competitions, turnout, and economic voting, putting aside other models of voting proposed in this research. Compare Joshua A. Tucker, "The First Decade of Post-Communist Elections and Voting: What Have We Studied, and How Have We Studied It?," Annual Review of Political Science 5 (2002).

26 There is also one book that focuses on cleavages in Poland between 1989 and 1995; see Hubert Tworzecki, Parties and Politics in Post 1989 Poland (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).
\subsection*{6.1 Sociological Model of Voting Applied to Poland}

Scholars who employ some form of sociological model of voting to analyze Polish elections perceive voters as those who are still ‘recovering’ from the electoral politics of totalitarianism, when the vote was nothing more than an act of mass mobilization demanded by the communist regime. They argue that the voting behavior currently exhibited by the Polish citizenry is shaped by their prior experiences with communism and their manner of interpreting those experiences (most still strongly distrust governmental organizations).\footnote{See Giuseppe Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico-Cultural Change in Eastern Europe," \textit{World Politics} 44, no. 1 (1991). Barbara Heyns and Ireneusz Bialecki, "Solidarność: Reluctant Vanguard or Makeshift Coalition?", \textit{The American Political Science Review} 85, no. 2 (1991). See also Evans, "The Social Bases of Political Divisions in Post-Communist Eastern Europe."} This corresponds to what Richard Rose et al. calls a “lifetime learning model,” linking together socialization and institutional performance theories, where “support for the regime is initially shaped by early socialization and then evolves continuously throughout adult life as initial beliefs are reinforced or challenged by latter experiences.”\footnote{Richard Rose, William Mishler, and C. Haerpfer, \textit{Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies} (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1998), 118.}
What unifies research on voting behavior in Poland from the sociological approach is that scholars acknowledge that political cleavages are an important influence on voter choice. Most of the studies explained voter choices based on geographical and state-church cleavages; the others justified electoral choices in terms of income, education, and occupation. Nearly all utilized surveys conducted before the elections of 1991, 1993, and 1997, but none used ecological inference to study class voting. What distinguishes these studies is methodology. Two articles use descriptive statistics, two others employed the ordinary-least-

29 Using factor analysis, Tworzecki analyzed the presidential and parliamentary elections between 1991 and 1995 and showed that voting behavior tended to vary by region and its history; his analysis conformed strong urban/rural and church/state cleavages. See Tworzecki, *Parties and Politics in Post 1989 Poland*.  
squared regression\textsuperscript{33} and only one article used multinomial logit to explain the pattern of sociological voting behavior.\textsuperscript{34} Finding similar results through different methods of estimation confirms that the sociological approach to voting behavior is appropriate for the case of Poland. What is deficient in applications of the sociological model is a lack of research on the most recent elections. The question thus becomes whether cleavage/class voting increases as Poland continues in the uneasy transition from communist command economy to free-market democracy.

\textit{6.2 Socio-psychological Model of Voting Applied to Poland}

As previously mentioned, there is only one article that utilized the socio-psychological model of voting. In it Shabad and Slomczynski tested to see if party preferences correlate with age, sex, education, occupation, region, religion, as well as with former membership in the Communist Party of Solidarity.\textsuperscript{35} This study used panel data collected between 1989 and 1993 covering three

\textsuperscript{33}Wade, Lavelle, and Groth, "Searching for Voting Patterns in Post-Communist Poland's Sejm Elections." See also Heyns and Bialecki, "Solidarność: Reluctant Vanguard or Makeshift Coalition?.


\textsuperscript{35}Goldie Shabad and Kazimierz Slomczynski, "Political Identities in the Initial Phase of Systemic Transformation in Poland: A Test of the Tabula Rasa Hypothesis," \textit{Comparative Political Studies} 32, no. 6 (1999).
parliamentary elections. The authors employed descriptive statistics to show the
distribution of party identity among voters and logistic regression to analyze the
distribution of electoral choices. They showed that social cleavages, prior political
divisions, and socio-demographic characteristics all influenced the formation of
new political identities in the post-Communist period.\textsuperscript{36} These political identities
are expressed in the form of an attachment to a family of political parties and are
manifest in voting preferences. They concluded that since voters’ political
identities are formed through time during consecutive elections, scholars can
expect to find party attachment as a strong predictor of voting tendencies in
future elections.\textsuperscript{37}

\textbf{6.3 Economic Model of Voting Applied to Poland}

Why have scholars focused on the economic model of voting? The answer
might be easily associated with the common perception that economic conditions
always factor into a voter’s choice and that a concern for material values will be
even more evident in transition countries such as Poland than for any developed
country. Voters want to have a decent standard of living so they continue to
search for the government that will provide them with the most comfortable
margin of economic security. This corresponds to the logic of Maslow’s value
hierarchy to political issues as well as to recent work by Inglehart on material

\textsuperscript{36}Ibid.: 708.

\textsuperscript{37}Ibid.: 716.
and post-material values change. More specifically, after the economic transition from commanding to free market economy is accomplished, post-material issues (e.g. environment) begin to attract greater numbers of voters (as is presently happening in Western Europe). Since the economic standard of living in Poland has not yet reached a sufficient level, the economic performance and position-based judgment of incumbent and future governments would be for some researchers the best indicator of voting.

Past research on economic voting in Poland focused on the 1990 and 1995 parliamentary and presidential elections and utilized either aggregate or individual level data to test retrospective or prospective hypothesis. Utilizing the district-level data, Gibson and Cielecka found that neither lower unemployment before the 1993 election nor economic growth influenced a majority of Polish citizens to vote for incumbent parties/coalition. They conclude (surprisingly?) that their model tested by OLS regression is underestimated due to non-linear

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relationship between economic variables and voter support for incumbent government.

Jenice Bell, on the other hand, set up the retrospective hypotheses in the framework of rational choice theory utilizing the regional (voivodship/province) data for 1990 and 1995 presidential elections and 1991 and 1993 parliamentary elections.40 Employing the OLS regression for each presidential election, Bell found that the effect of provincial unemployment rates and per capita monthly income on election outcomes varied from one presidential candidate to the other. In other words, the effect of economic indicators on the level of support for presidential candidates turned out to be significant for some and insignificant for others. Similar findings are offered for parliamentary elections with emphasis that unemployment is “undoubtedly the most significant factor” that explains voting behavior.41

Power and Cox used survey data to test if voters’ satisfaction with economic reforms had any influence on voting in the 1993 parliamentary election. Utilizing the structural equation model, which takes into account endogenous variables (voter blame of communist system, blame of first-wave reformers, and change on living conditions) and exogenous variables (income and occupation),

41 Ibid.: 1282.
they found that the impact of economic reforms on voter choice is not as large as one might expect. They conclude that “the ascendancy of post-communist parties is not so easily explained by economic dissatisfaction and punishment of incumbents.”\(^{42}\) If individual economic circumstances did not play a large role in voter choice, then what did? The importance of blame attributions became relevant in their explanation of voting behavior. Voters either felt that first-wave reformers or the communist system is responsible for Poland’s problems. Further, the authors suggest that noneconomic issues such as church-state issue and lustration as well as the fragmentation of post-Solidarity parties could explain why voters punished the post-Solidarity camp and voted for post-communist parties in 1993 parliamentary election.\(^{43}\)

It is evident that researchers have not reached a consensus on what economic factors influence voting behavior in Poland. If the relationship between economic performance and voting are robust the findings should not diverge so much in their substantive conclusions, even when employing different statistical methods. Perhaps analyzing the post-communist elections of 1990 and 1991 is inappropriate, because they took place shortly after the process of economic reforms started. It might be argued that the first free elections in Poland focused


\(^{43}\)Ibid.
on fully removing the communist regimes rather than improving economic conditions. Therefore, the analysis of the later years of elections proposed in this study might play a considerable role in finding if Polish voter can be called *homo economicus*.

7. **Conclusion**

The main focus of this work is to explain individual voting behavior in Polish parliamentary elections between 1997 and 2005. This comprehensive analysis is conducted within the framework of various theories and models proposed by the scholars in the U.S. and Western Europe. There are several scholarly advantages of such a project. First, we will learn about voters’ choice during the second phase of democratic consolidation. Second, this research proposes to test existing models and assess their validity in a post-communist setting. These systematic and critical tests of various models of voting should move the existing research on comparative electoral politics in Poland and Eastern Europe forward. Third, the contribution to the scholarship of voting behavior will be significant, even if some of these models turn out to have less explanatory and predictive power than expected. Furthermore, perhaps the most significant contribution of this dissertation to the field of comparative voting behavior is the application of issue-based models. Finally, the structure of this work is well suited to search for explanation of patterns in voting behavior during the second phase of democratic transition in Poland and to bring the contribution
to the comparative electoral politics of East-Central Europe in general and Poland in particular by utilizing and evaluating the competing models of voting.
CHAPTER TWO

ELECTIONS IN POST-COMMUNIST POLAND: WHAT HAPPENED
IN LAST 15 YEARS?

The aim of this chapter is to familiarize the reader with Poland’s political history starting with the parliamentary elections prior to 1997 and going through elections of 1997, 2001 and 2005. Although this project is dedicated to test the statistical models of voting behavior, it is essential to understand the formation of new political system, its institutions, processes and prominent issues during political campaigns. It is also vital to highlight the most important actors on political arena, not only political parties but also the Catholic Church, which has played a significant role in formation of Polish democracy.

1. Elections prior to 1997

The turning point in politics for central and East European States appeared after Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power, who in 1987 and 1988 began to encourage the communist leaders of Warsaw Pact to experiment the new socialist reforms. Such suggestions received from Moscow were understood by Polish Communist party as backing against their own hardliners and pursued cautious policies of liberalization. Therefore, the window of opportunity for opposition and a dissatisfied society was opened. Further, the economic crises, the food
shortages, the falling living standards were the primary causes of the economic and political bankruptcy within the communistic regime system.

In Poland, the communist government was forced to open negotiations with Solidarity after series of strikes, which took place in spring and summer of 1988. The formal negotiations began in January 1989 between leader of communist party Rakowski and Lech Walesa. This face to face meeting was the beginning of further negotiations ended by the “Round Table” when communist and the Solidarity officials discussed the shape of the future political and economic issues in Poland. It also inaugurated the transition of political actions to democracy. The outcome of this effort was the “contract” about the future parliament which became a forum for program and party formation, which were supposed to have roots in solidarity. The 1989 “Round Table” agreement was intended by the communists to ensure their continuous control over the key levels of the state power. According to this electoral contract 65% of the 460 seats in the forthcoming elections to the lower house (the Sejm) were allocated in advance to the communistic Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) and their allies, the United Peasant Party (ZSL) and Procommunist Catholic groupings. The remaining 35% were subject to an open contest. In addition, it was agreed that

\[44\] In 1990 the communist elites of ZSL formed new agrarian party the PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe).
the Senate would be elected in a free election. The 1989 election and the “contract” parliament opened the gates to the political competition. The June 1989 election in Poland played an outstanding role in Central and Eastern Europe. In this election solidarity won all the seats in the Senate.

The Parliament of 1989 was dominated by the people from the old regime. Therefore, there was a weak chance for those representatives to be elected again, specifically having in mind that at that time a majority of citizens supported the emergence of democracy. At the last minute of governance in 1991, the new electoral law was adopted. In general, the post communist majority in the Sejm, together with some post-Solidarity groups were in favor of proportional representation while others such as President Lech Walesa and the major Solidarity party advocated mixed electoral systems. Finally, a proportional representation system was adopted. The political dichotomy (old regime versus solidarity-new regime) of 1991 was replaced by highly fragmented polity with 112 parties.

The majority of parties and groups that were elected in 1991 belonged to the former opposition camp. The strongest party in the parliament, the

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Democratic Union (UD), controlled only 13.5% of the seats.\textsuperscript{46} The UD was associated with moderate Christian – liberals. This post-solidarity party might be summarized in the words of “rational and intellectual, self consciously anti-demagogic and anti-populist.”\textsuperscript{47} In the second place (11.98%) was the former communist party and the successor to the Communist Worker Party (PZPR) - Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) which together with the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), created the parliamentary opposition in 1991.\textsuperscript{48} The other post-solidarity parties received less than 10% votes. They are Catholic Electoral Action (KAW), Center Citizens’ Alliance (PC), Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN), Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD), and Solidarity Trade Union. The extreme diversity in parliament gave little possibility to create major coalition containing fewer then 5 parties. This Parliament produced three Prime Ministers, two governments as well as its own yearly departure in 1993.

The ‘war’ among the solidarity elites explains such diversity among political parties in the 1991 elections as well as voting behavior among the confused society. In 1990, after Lech Walesa was elected as the president of


\textsuperscript{47}“Sympatia Dla Politykow,” Gazeta Wyborcza, June 22-23 1991.

\textsuperscript{48}In 1990 the communist elites of ZSL formed new agrarian party the PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe).
Poland, there was trouble considering the agreement between the presidential cabinet and the government. President Walesa publicly accused the Solidarity Prime Minister Mazowiecki of slow speed of reforms, of tolerating corruption and being soft on communists. This was the first step in the breakup of Solidarity between the government’s supporters and president’s supporters. However, some of the main figures maintained the importance of united Solidarity. Thus, the lack of agreement between people within Solidarity caused the formation of new post-solidarity parties: the Citizens’ Movement – Democratic Action (ROAD), the Democratic Union (UD), the Citizen’s Committee (KO) and the Center Citizens’ Alliance (PC). The above listed parties were created by the key leaders of Solidarity. Some of the leaders were Prime Ministers in the period of time from 1991 to 1993. For instance the PC was an ancestor of the Law and Justice (PiS).

In May 1993 President Walesa, having a choice between dismissing the weak government and dissolving the Parliament, chose the latter. Among the Parliament’s last bills were amendments concerning electoral law. They were designed to limit the fragmentation that occurred during elections of 1991 by eliminating weaker parties. Specifically, three changes were put in place: 1. A

50Ibid.: 16.
threshold of 5% for parties and 8% for coalitions; 2. An increase in the number of districts from 37 to 52, expanding districts magnitude to 3 of 17 seats; 3. Implementation of the D'Hondt formula advantages to stronger parties, for allocation for all seats. This reformulated electoral system brought the expected results. Only the strong parties and electoral coalitions were awarded the parliamentary seats and the weak parties had been eliminated from the parliament.

The fragmentation of the political arena in 1991, ‘the war on the top’ as well as very slow economic changes and corruption were the causes of dissolution of parliament in 1991. A realignment in the 1993 elections took place: the first free elected parliament of 1991 with a majority of post-Solidarity groups and parties was replaced by a majority of post-Communist representatives in 1993. The puzzle is whether or not voters desired to restore the communist regime or they were consumed by high unemployment and inflation as well as the ongoing promises of post-solidarity elite about the “heavenly” future. The “left shift” in the Polish electoral politics is well expressed by Wiatr. “We are a disillusioned

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53For more discussion on this issue see Leslie Holmes, Post-Communism: An Introduction (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997).
and for that reason a deeply frustrated society... [most people] feel estranged and helpless in the present situation, they sense that the ground is slipping out from under their feet, that they are losing their bearings and confidence in the future. Even many of those who are not directly affected by social ills like unemployment express a lack of hope and confidence in the future. They are not predisposed to trust the rulers because reality is different from their promises. They feel abandoned because they believed that the ruling elite together with the Catholic Church is less concerned with the public interest than with its own interests.”

This overview of Polish situation truthfully justifies the voters’ choice of former communist parties during 1993 election. Ordinary citizens felt cheated by the great ideas of Solidarity leaders as well as by Church's authorities. Therefore, the slogans ‘things do not have to be like this’ and ‘let reforms serve the people’ offered by the old regime parties drove the electorate away from the post-solidarity parties.

The survey conducted in 1993, shows that 64% of respondents agreed that the past four years of Solidarity rule had run the country into poverty and chaos. On the contrary, while in 1991 65% of respondents agreed that forty five


years of communist rule ruined the country and drove people into poverty, by 1993 only 47% agreed with this statement.\textsuperscript{56}

After the 1993 election the relatively stable coalition government between SLD and PSL was formed and ended one month before 1997 election with the dispute between incumbent parties about subsidies for agriculture.

2. The Catholic Church and Polish Electoral Politics

The Catholic Church was likely to be one of the most important ways in which political preferences were shaped. Chapter 3 of this project discusses how the participation in religious services influences voter choice, and what kind of direction the voting behavior may take under the influence of Church. There is no doubt that the Catholic Church played a role in Polish Politics. In the 1980’s the Church became closely associated with the solidarity movement, playing the role of legitimate social and religious authority. Whatever the Church claimed as the undeniable truth it was used by the Polish opposition for dismantle the communist ideological monopoly. During the period of the Roundtable Accord the Catholic Church stood on the side of Solidarity.

The change of the regime was absolutely beneficial to the Catholic Church – the Church supported Solidarity during the old regime, subsequently Solidarity trade union and the political parties associated with this movement supported the Church. The Catholic Church was pushing for the restoration of Catholicism

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., 5.
as the official state religion of Poland, tightening of the divorce laws, guarantees of Christian values as the values of the Roman Catholic Church not to be offended by mass media. After the June 1989 elections the Church requested the introduction of Catholic Education classes in the public schools and for several administrative restrictions of abortion rights. By August 1989 the return of properties confiscated from the Church had began and by the end of March of 1994 the Church obtained the return of some 45000 acres of agricultural land.\textsuperscript{57} Under such circumstances the electorate was unsatisfied and exhausted because the Church was present in every political, economic, social and individual dimension of human life. In addition, people attending church, heard from the pulpits whole sets of political instructions they should undertake. For instance, before 1991, the Catholic Church engaged itself in political campaign, naming the parties people should vote for.

The Church’s theocratic tendencies seem to contribute to the polarization of the Polish society. One of the Polish newspapers warned in 1995, “now we have to protect democratic values from powerful authoritarian church. The church, which before had been the defender of the people, has become the new obstacle to self-expression.”\textsuperscript{58} Therefore, public opinion toward the Church


\textsuperscript{58}W Obcegach," \textit{Gazeta Wyborcza}, August 9 1994, 10.
actions changed dramatically from undeniable authority to questionable political - religious institution in the period from martial law to the year 1992. The efforts of the Catholic Church and Catholic Parties to reaffirm the role of religion and religious values in social life gave people fears of possible “re- ideolgization” of life, with another set of strict rules replacing those in force during the communists years. And as Sabrina Ramet argues “the Catholic Church’s legislative advance in Poland has been made against the expressed wishes of most Poles.”

As indicated by various surveys from the CBOS, citizens began to trust the Church again in 1997. It happened because, unlike 1991, the Catholic Church did not engage itself much in the campaign process choosing instead simply to remind the faithful of their civic duty to vote. Although the Church has not become as politically powerful as it was in the beginning of 1990s, its sponsorship helped the AWS to unite in 1996 and win elections in 1997. The Church’s influence over the Concordat as well as the elections of 2001 and 2005 were also significant, nevertheless it took different form. The growing popularity of Radio Maryja, the voice of Catholic fundamentalism, gave power to some clergy to influence the public opinion during the time of elections. For instance, the

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extreme right party League of Polish Families (LPR) as well as the right-of-center Law and Justice were strongly supported by *Radio Maryja* in 2001 and 2005 electoral campaigns.

3. **Elections of 1997**

3.1 **Overview**

The largest right-wing party, the Solidarity Electoral Action, *Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc* (AWS), won the elections in 1997 receiving a majority of seats in Lower House (see Table 1). Its rival, former communist party Democratic Left Alliance, received second place. The Solidarity Election Action was an “alliance of the Solidarity trade union with multifarious parties, proto-parties, and groups.”

Its constituent parties and groups differ in various ways, but “united in one conviction – no more ex-communist rule.” Similarly to the AWS, the SLD was also an alliance. Supporters and members of the SLD included former communist cadres, social democrats, and former communist trade unionists, OPZZ. Other parties that gained seats in the parliamentary

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Table 1. Parliamentary (Sejm) Elections Results, 1997-2005.

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote Share (%)</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>Vote Share (%)</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>Vote Share (%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>33.83</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>27.13</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>41.04</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>11.31</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>7.31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8.98</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6.96</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.20</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>11.41</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.68</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>24.11</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>26.99</td>
<td>155</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.87</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7.97</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.73</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.22</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>460</td>
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election of 1997 were the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) and the Movement of Reconstruction of Poland (ROP). The Polish Peasant Party, a former satellite of communist party PZPR during the old regime, most likely sustained its existence in the political arena thanks to its rural constituency and the huge party membership. The ROP, on the other hand, was a rightist post-solidarity formation that was founded in 1995 by the former Prime Minister Jan Olechowski. The ROP leader did not join AWS while more then 20 other right-wing parties did it in 1996. As pointed by Ka-Lok Chan, “ROP’s development was stalled by the emergence of the AWS.”

The Freedom Union (Unia Wolności), a centre party with Solidarity background and a successor of

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42Ibid.
Democratic Union (UD) and the Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD), was perceived as a party of intelligentsia gaining the third place in electoral race of 1997.

The new government was set up after the post-solidarity party the Freedom Union (UW), joined the coalition with the AWS. This coalition lasted almost half of the term and the AWS ended up running the minority government. At least last two years of AWS governance were marked with divisions between and within government ministries. Several months before the 2001 elections Prime Minister Buzek dismissed four ministers and some ministers resigned. Further, the financial position of the state budget was dramatic. The AWS, or rather Buzek’s government, was accused of failing to reform health sector, pensions, local governments, and education. Also the increase in unemployment level (from 10.3% in 1997 to almost 17% in 2001) did not promise a bright future for AWS. Public opinion polls were clearly showing that the AWS would not reach again a passing electoral threshold (e.g. CBOS). Therefore, new political parties emerged as a product of electoral calculations and analysis of probabilities

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to be elected to parliament in 2001. Sure enough, the future prospects of the incumbent party was not promising.

### 3.2 Issues in the Elections of 1997

It might be surprising, but the real party programs appeared for the first time in a meaningful way during the campaign preceding the parliamentary elections in September 1997. The party competition as well as citizen’s deliberation started to evolve around important political and social issues. Nevertheless parties’ declarations and manifestos did not fluctuate a lot – they had similar content and a lot of convergence; often they even looked the same. The common project for all parties running in the 1997 elections was to fundamentally reform the state and build strong local governments. Further, to improve the economy, political parties promise to obey the rules of open markets as well as legislation establishing stable economic and financial laws. All the parties promised a better financial system that would allow citizens to take credit for purchasing real estate and open up new enterprises. They advocated less unemployment, better wages and salaries, lower taxes, and strengthen the social insurance and social assistance. All parties supported reforms of public health institutions. In terms of agriculture innovations, most of the parties (not only the agrarian party PSL) focused on modernization of agriculture by giving subsidies to farmers as well as fighting with the improper agricultural
competition form abroad.⁶⁶

Looking at the surveys before the election of 1997 several issues stand out as the most important for voters irrespective of their electoral choice. The following are in descending order and refer to the most important issues for the state and democracy: 1. Security of citizens’ welfare; 2. State securing health and education services; 3. Rule of law; 4. Good parliament and good legislation. Analyzing the responses about the importance of specific issues the following are prominent: 1. Government taking care of citizen’s welfare (63.46%); 2. Crime (61.12%); 3. Unemployment (54.53%); 4. Tax policy (37.2%).⁶⁷ All the above were identified as a priority issues and were asked in the separate questions. The responses for the other issues are more or less equally distributed and might be considered as falling under a normal distribution curve.

Since the parties’ stands on political, social and economic issues generally did not differ, it will be interesting to see in the following chapters what factors caused the distribution of votes in 1997 elections. Before conducting statistical analysis it essential to point out at least one factor that divided political parties and voters. It is the ideological factor that constitutes the symbolic presuppositions of social standing as well as voting behavior. There are at least


⁶⁷See dataset "Polskie Generalne Studium Wyborcze 1997."
three basic dimensions of this ideological factor. First, the position of voters and political parties toward the communist system and its legacy played an important role in voting behavior. The main arguments here concerned the deliberation around who has contributed to the independence of Poland in 1989 from the communist regime and rebirth of democracy in the country. Second, the problem of decommunization and lustration as well as re-privatization was obviously a part of this ideological factor. The main arguments were about how to deal with former communist functionaries – should former communist be allowed to hold public positions, or going even further, should they be punished? Third, beliefs about natural law, abortion, the role of the Catholic Church in society and the preservation of Catholic values in public life were highly deliberated during public discourses and evident in political parties’ programs.

For instance, the manifesto of Solidarity Election Action (AWS) emphasizes “a modern, fair and sovereign state that is based on patriotic and Christian values.” According to AWS, a basis for legal and social order should be natural law, including the right to life of every human being from conception to natural death. Further, AWS as a post-Solidarity party advocated lustration and decommunization, joining NATO and EU, and re-privatization that would lead to redistribution of communist property to entire society.

In the manifesto of Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), we find reference to

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68Slodkowska and Dolbakowska, eds., Wybory 1997: Partie I Ich Programy, 42.
“the best traditions of the Polish Left, and European social-democracy.”\textsuperscript{69} The SLD also called attention to the fact that “no one can deny women's opportunities for self-regulation and the fate of their rights to responsible maternity.”\textsuperscript{70} Further, the SLD as a party of old regime, supported secular state and “building a solid foundation of material existence.”\textsuperscript{71} SLD, similar to AWS, emphasized that Poland should join the European Union. In contrast to AWS, SLD rejected decommunization, lustration and re-privatization.

The Freedom Union party (UW) stressed that they are a group of people that goes back to the roots of Solidarity in August 1980. “Heritage of our struggle for human rights in the years 1980-1989, the contribution of Poland in toppling the communist system, and success in the introduction of democracy are of great moral standing of political elite drawn from this trend. This is also a tradition of the Freedom Union.”\textsuperscript{72} Further in their manifesto we read “the Freedom Union opposes both a race to create atheistic state, as well as religious state” and therefore all citizens and political parties should pursue the friendly separation between church and state and cooperation of those two institutions for the common good.\textsuperscript{73} As previously mentioned political parties, UW also

\textsuperscript{69}Ibid., 14.
\textsuperscript{70}Ibid., 25.
\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., 26.
\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., 53.
\textsuperscript{73}Ibid., 60.
supported membership in NATO and the European Union.

4. **Elections of 2001**

4.1 **Overview**

Elections of 2001 brought several major surprises to scholars of voting behavior. First, the AWS and the UW, in the past very important parties, disappeared from the political spectrum by not getting enough votes. The Freedom Union (UW) did not receive enough votes to get seats in parliament, possibly because some liberal wing leaders left the party 8 months before election to form new political party Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska*, PO). As pointed out by Millard, “PO also attracted the core of the leadership of the Conservative-People’s Party (SKL), the most pro-market wing of AWS.”

The Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) weakened by the abandon by many of its constituent parties and individual leaders, failed to meet its threshold and found itself with no seats. Two new parties emerged from the AWS coalition: the Law and Justice (PiS) and the League of Polish Families (LPR). The PiS was not entirely new on political spectrum, “it relied on the hard-core supporters of a defunct party, the Centre Accord (Porozumienie Centrum, PC), established in 1990.” Besides attracting politicians who had previously been members of AWS, the League of Polish Families “was [also] drawn from discontented and failed

75 Ibid.
politicians of some ten clerical nationalist formations under the patronage of Radio Maryja.” As pointed out by Castle, the failure of AWS and the relative success of PiS and the LPR suggested that the right’s future might lie with more ideologically coherent parties (the PiS was united by its law and order concerns, while the LPR was composed of devoutly Catholic Euroskeptics”). Castle’s prophecy came through in 2005 elections.

Thus, four out of six parties/coalitions winning parliamentary seats were new to the parliament; only the coalition SLD-UP (Democratic Left Alliance-Labor Union) and PSL returned to their old offices. The absolute victory went to the leftist coalition led by the former communist party SLD, which won over 41% of votes. This was the first time in the history of Polish democracy that a single political coalition/party received so many votes. As pointed by Castle et al., “if there was one clear tendency, it was the exponential growth of the SLD electorate from election to election – even in 1997 when the government was formed by coalition of AWS and UW.” The Polish rightist parties were defeated for the second time within less then ten 10 years of democracy.

It is also worth noting that the Self-Defense (Samoobrona), a populist movement established in 1991 by streetwise Andrzej Lepper, become a national

76Ibid.
78Ibid., 170.
party for the first time in 2001 elections and received 10% support from the voters. Self-Defense (SRP) claimed to be a representative of the dispossessed. Interestingly, the Self-Defense’s agrarian foundation and populist rhetoric appealed not only farmers but also to many discontented citizens from small towns. The SRP, similarly to LPR, represented Euroskeptic voters.

After elections the government was formed by SLD-UP and PSL; yet this coalition government survived only 16 months and SLD-UP ended up as a minority government until 2005. The entire period of SLD-UP governance was marked by accusations of members of the SLD-UP for corruption, which has contributed to the creation of three parliamentarian investigation commissions. Public opinion started to change after the commissions revealed some of the scandals and frauds within the SLD-UP. In the beginning of 2004 there was a clear indication from surveys that the Leftist coalition is losing the public support. Some public opinion polls indicated that SLD-UP might not even meet the 5 percent threshold in 2005 elections (e.g. CBOS).

4.2 Issues in the Elections of 2001

The main issue in electoral campaign of 2001 was unemployment. It was dictated by the fact that unemployment rate increased from 10.3% in 1997 to 15.8% in 2001.\textsuperscript{79} Voters did not doubt that every political party wanted to decrease the number of unemployed, yet they could easily perceived various

\textsuperscript{79}“Trzy Po Trzy,” \textit{Gazeta Wyborcza}, August 1 2001, 14.
solutions offered by differences between parties. The SLD wanted to expand the Social Found to help unemployed, the PO proposed to lower the tax on enterprises so they could hire more people, PSL wished for a loan from the World Bank to start a new infrastructure program that could give jobs to many, and PiS wanted to restructure education so it fits the employment sector. Besides unemployment, the political parties deliberated other issues (e.g. tax policy, finances, and the European integration) offering not necessarily very distinctive solutions to voters. Did the electoral campaign of 2001 reflect voters’ social and political concerns? According to Polish General Electoral Studies (PGSW) survey taken right before elections, 83 percent of voters identified unemployment as a priority issue that needs to be taken care of be the government. The voters’ responses on the importance of other issues were more equally distributed.

The aim of the electoral coalition of SLD-UP was to gain a majority of seats in parliament. The electoral campaign of SLD-UP was built on two pillars: a program for the future and criticism of the political parties on the right, specifically AWS. SLD-UP wanted to be perceived by voters as a party that is sensitive to citizen’s needs, socially fair, free of corruption, honest, competent and prepared to govern. The main programmatic issues referred to important social problems: unemployment, poverty, modernization of agriculture, development of
local governance, and improvement of education system.\textsuperscript{80}

The Civic Platform (PO) wanted to make an impression on voters as a competent and modern political party. The PO postulates were rather specific and definitely more liberal compared to those of the SLD-UP. They advocated to lower taxes and imposition of flat-rate tax, reform and reduce bureaucracy, and to stop founding of political parties from central government budget. They also pointed toward the emerging young business circles supporting the opportunity for new enterprises.

The advantage that the PiS possessed in the political arena in 2001 was dictated by the fact that its leader Kaczyński resigned from his ministerial position (the Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs) at AWS government with the appearance of a politician who really cares about the rule of law. Besides the PiS surely had one of the most apparent programs related to broadly defined aspect of security. The PiS program was really clear that there is a need to take vigorous anti-corruption measures as well as fight with other forms of social injustice. There was no doubt in every message of the PiS political campaign that law and justice could be really part of Polish social and political life. And the Catholic tradition should be a guideline how to make Poland a better place. As pointed by Millard, “PiS had made its mark as a strong law and order, anti-

corruption party, unabashedly *etatist*, stressing the need for a strong, centralized state based on traditional moral values."\textsuperscript{81}

In the 2001 political campaign, voters received very specific offers from two radical political parties: the extreme right League of Polish Families (LPR) and the radical left-populist Self-Defense (SRP). The common feature of both parties was their aversion toward the state as well as a wish to change the entire socio-political system. The LPR presented ideology rather than a genuine program that could lead to constructive public policies in opposition to the “communist-liberalism” of SLD, PO and UW.\textsuperscript{82} The League of Polish Families wanted to appeal and represent “hard core” Catholics with nationalistic tendencies. The main political issue that distinguished LPR from other parties was its revulsion toward the enlargement of European Union. As noted by Migalski, “the anti-European appeal built the political power of the LPR since other parties did not even talk about it.”\textsuperscript{83}

The rhetoric of Self-Defense (SRP) was to convince the voter that the surrounding reality can be perceived only in black and white and political parties that are running in 2001 elections are not going to change anything in the society.


The criticism of the incumbent party as well as political elites that used to be in government and parliament in last 10 years for not being sufficiently democratic in listening to the voice of common people gave the SRP the opportunity to attract have-not voters dissatisfied with current economic and political situation. The party manifesto stresses out the importance of unemployment as well as subsidies for agricultural production, specifically for small farmers. The issue of subsidies was also common for the PSL. There were two main additions to the PSL program in 2001 compared to 1997. First, the leaders stressed out the role of tradition and family. Second, they were in favor of passing a the bill that would prohibit foreigners from buying farming land in Poland. The last issue developed after 2001 elections into Euroskepticism.

5. **Elections of 2005**

5.1 **Overview**

The opinions of citizens regarding the socio-economic situation in Poland in the mid-2005 were rather unsatisfactory. According to the public opinion polls 65% of Poles believed that Poland was going in wrong direction and only 23% thought otherwise.\(^8^5\) The polls also indicated the declining popularity the incumbent party (SLD) due to corruption scandals. Therefore, it was no surprise that the

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SLD did not win in 2005 elections. The party’s aspirations “were not to win but emerge as a strong ideologically secular left-wing opposition to the right.”

Two other parties that were already present in the parliament since 2001 benefited from this decline, namely the Law and Justice (PiS) and the Civic Platform (PO) receiving 26.99% and 24.11.1% of votes respectively. It is imperative to note that the same political parties were elected to parliament in 2005 as in 2001. This is not to say that there was no party split before elections. There was only one split (not many as in the past), but the divide was, as usual, within the incumbent party. The leaders that formed the new Polish Social Democracy out of SLD did not meet the 5% threshold.

After the elections it was assumed by many voters and analysts that the PiS and the PO would form a coalition government as they had promised for two years. This did not happen because both parties “quarreled over the allocation of ministries and failed to resolve their programmatic issues.”

Therefore the PiS formed a minority government with the support of the LPR and the SRP. In the spring of 2006 the PiS formed a coalition with the LPR and the SRP after the agreement that these two radical parties would be able to propose and hopefully implement the list of laws mostly related to agriculture (for the SRP) and education (for the LPR). There is no doubt that getting ministerial positions by

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87Ibid.: 214.
the SRP and the LPR drove these parties into coalition with the PiS. In terms of ideology it could be argued that these three political parties have had similar nationalistic tendencies. While the LPR and the SRP were definitely Euroskeptics, the PiS wanted a strong Poland within the European Union which later on led to isolation of the country from the EU. The main political goal that connected these parties ideologically was their stand against the corrupted elites of the old regime. The PiS-LPR-SRP coalition lasted for over a year and then the parliament decided to dissolve itself and new elections took place in the fall of 2007.

5.2 Issues in the Elections of 2005

Parties’ manifestos did not change much from those of 2001. All political parties, as in the past, stressed the need to fight with unemployment which rose to about 20% in some administrative regions. Not surprisingly, pre-election surveys revealed that unemployment was a priority issue for 81.87% respondents. Further, all parties marked in their programs the importance to fight corruption and crimes. Yet they differ in what they mean by these two terms and how to fight them.

The PiS stands out here. For the Kaczynski brothers fighting corruption and crime meant building a the Fourth Republic of Poland that would be free from the ‘old political arrangements’ led by the communist descendants and liberals after 1989. These old political arrangements, according to the PiS, were
responsible for social and political injustice in Poland. Therefore, PiS proposed re-opening the process of decommunization and lustration. The cleansing of the state would also take institutional form by establishing the new Anti-Corruption Agency. The LPR and the SRP also favored an end to the rule of corrupt elites of the Third Republic. There was a new rhetoric of the Self-Defense about the ‘theft’ of national property by SLD leaders in 2005. Further, the SRP’s leader Andrzej Lepper claimed during political campaign that since “the old left was bankrupt [...] SRP was the ‘new’ left”88 The PiS idea to built strong rule of law in the Fourth Republic free of the old regime functionaries distinguish them greatly not only from the leftist post-communist SLD but also from the liberal post-solidarity Civic Platform.

Other issues emphasized during the 2005 election campaign were related to the public health programs. Again, all parties called attention to reform of public health services, but they differ in their solutions. For instance, both the SLD and the PiS proposed to spend more money from the governmental budget on public health, while the PO offered an almost completely new idea for Polish citizens: private health insurance. The PO also brought out their old ideas of lowering taxes, the imposition of flat-rate tax (15%), and cutting bureaucracy. The new aspect of their program included the suggestion to remove the minimum wage. The SLD and PiS absolutely opposed this concept, arguing for strong

88Ibid.: 211.
welfare state; for the SLD it was explicitly reducing poverty and income inequality while for the PiS implementation of pro-family public policies based on the Christian values of social justice. The Catholic values, tradition and pro-family policies were also manifested by the LPR. The SLD accused the entire right wing of being intolerant by their conformity with Christian values and pronounced its stand for a secular state that promotes social tolerance for all. Both the LPR and the SRP supported independence from foreign capital and reform of the National Central Bank. Finally, while the LPR and the SRP were Euroskeptics, the SLD and the PO called for more integration with the EU.\textsuperscript{89}

The political system after the 2005 elections was defined around two political camps: “the social-solidarity camp” represented by the PiS and “the liberal camp” represented by the PO.\textsuperscript{90} The post-communist left was marginalized with the scattered electorate. The extreme right and populist parties (LPR and SRP) gained power in the government in 2006, yet they disappeared from parliament after 2007 elections.


6. **Conclusion**

This chapter described the development of Polish electoral politics, highlighting the major political players and issues they advocated during the political campaigns. It is apparent that the stabilization of party system in Poland has been a lengthy process. This stabilization process is the product of both electoral design and improved elite behavior.\(^{91}\) The analysis of the process of party evolution and party differentiation points to the more significant options for the electorate in each subsequent election. The emergence of political parties capable of facilitating political choice based on the important social and political issues only prove that democratic consolidation is advancing.

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\(^{91}\)Toole’s research confirms this conclusion. See James Toole, "Government Formation and Party System Stabilization in East Central Europe," *Party Politics* 6, no. 4 (2000).
CHAPTER THREE

THE SOCIOLOGICAL MODEL OF VOTING

Chapter 1 of this project described a debate around the different schools of thought on how to examine voter’s choice in democratic elections and which model of voting behavior best explains/predicts the winner in elections. This chapter is set up around this debate and contributes to it by testing one of the models, namely the sociological model of voting. The test of the sociological model of voting behavior is associated with the theoretical tradition of behavioralism, but also draws from rational choice theory. This research takes an unusual path to investigate the validity of utility assumption in the context of sociological model of voting, by employing the utility function used by rational choice researchers. In other words, it is assumed that voters make rational electoral decisions based on their social status. It also asks how the voting behavior of Polish citizens has changed during the democratic transition. The main task is to test whether the Polish voters cast ballots for or against political parties based on the broadly defined cleavages. The challenge is to explain the voters’ choices using the existing sociological model of voting behavior that may or may not have large explanatory and predictive power when applied to
Polish electoral politics in late 1990s and first half of the decade in twenty first
century.

1. Sociological Approaches to Voting Behavior

Assuming that voters are likely to vote for parties supporting policies congruent with their class interest, this study will first investigate the association of class and vote. Class voting can be studied by means of ecological inference as well as direct information on the voter’s social class taken from public opinion surveys.\(^{92}\) This research utilizes only the second approach.

When analyzing the social class (cleavage) model of voting from individual level data, scholars have proposed different ways of measuring the relationship between social position and party choice. One of the methods to measure relative

\(^{92}\)To estimate individual level covariation in class voting from aggregate level, a researcher might use Søren Risbjerg Thomsen’s method of ecological inference called ‘logit method’ (also known as ‘latent structure method’) or Gary King’s method. Thomsen approach estimates parameters based on \(n \times m\) tables and seems to be better than Gary King’s method, which is not applicable for tables larger then 2x3. It is intended by the author to use ecological inference in the future to improve this research paper. See Søren Risbjerg Thomsen, "Issue Voting and Ecological Inference," in *Unpublished Manuscript* (2000). See also Gary King, *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
Cleavage voting was proposed in 1985 by Heath. This methodology is based on the odds of a member of one class voting for one party rather than another. The odd ratio (standardized) is illustrated by the following formula:

\[
\ln R = \ln \frac{p_{nr} / p_{nl}}{p_{mr} / p_{ml}}
\]

where \( R \) is an odds ratio for group n that are voting for party r rather than party l divided by the odds for group m that are voting for party r rather than party l.

This analysis employs odd ratios to explore the voting behavior of voters belonging to the core groups along the most central cleavages: class, religion, and rural-urban.

It is expected that religious voting occurs at a higher level than class voting all through the period beginning with the democratic transition, even

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94Ibid.

95The calculation procedure and explanations are provided in the later section.
though religious voting is expected to decline through time. It is also expected
that the last two Polish parliamentary elections (2001 and 2005) brought rise to
an old rural-urban cleavage due to the European Union enlargement in May 2004.
The analysis of the sociological model of voting is expected to show that cleavage
voting in Poland is not declining and cleavages are rather reliable predictors of
the vote.96 Finally, this project analyzes the effect of social characteristics of
voters, such as gender, age, education, and occupation on their electoral choice by
employing multinomial logit.

As it was already pointed out in Chapter 1, researchers that focus on the
sociological factors to explain voting behavior in Poland point out to the fact
that the Polish citizens were shaped by the communist system and this
socialization process is reflected in the behavior of electors, at least during the
first democratic elections.97 While time passes, voters are socialized by new
political and societal settings and what they learned from communism is most
likely to disappear. Therefore, new forms of cleavages are most likely to emerge

96As already mentioned in chapter 1, this prediction is based on discussion of
Eastern European countries in Evans, "The Social Bases of Political Divisions in
Post-Communist Eastern Europe."
97Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico-Cultural
Change in Eastern Europe." Heyns and Bialecki, "Solidarność: Reluctant
Vanguard or Makeshift Coalition?." Evans, "The Social Bases of Political
Divisions in Post-Communist Eastern Europe."
since the initial beliefs are challenged by latter social, political and economic experiences.

There is a consensus among researchers who study the voting behavior in Poland from the sociological perspective that political cleavages have influence on voter’s choice. As already mentioned in Chapter 1, some scholars examined voter choices based on geographical and state-church cleavages, the others tried to explain the electoral choices in terms of income, education, and occupation. The utilization of different types of methodologies, such as descriptive statistics, the ordinary-least-squared regression, and the multinomial logit to examine the influence of sociological factor on voting behavior in Poland and obtaining similar results through different methods of estimation only confirms that the social structure influenced the Polish electors at least in first set of elections. What is deficient in applications of sociological model is a lack of research on the most recent elections. This chapter investigates whether or not cleavages are still good

99 Wade, Lavelle, and Groth, "Searching for Voting Patterns in Post-Communist Poland's Sejm Elections."
101 Wade, Lavelle, and Groth, "Searching for Voting Patterns in Post-Communist Poland's Sejm Elections." Heyns and Bialecki, "Solidarność: Reluctant Vanguard or Makeshift Coalition?."
102 Jackson, Klich, and Poznanska, "Economic Transition and Elections in Poland."
predictors of vote as well as which cleavages are important as Poland continues in the process of democratic consolidation.

2. Variables and Method

2.1 Dependent Variable: Party Sympathy versus Party Choice

When studying voting behavior, scholars have an option to choose as a dependent variable either party sympathy or party choice. It is often argued that it is easier for a (potential) voter to express the degree of sympathy on some rating scale rather than simultaneously compare all competing parties and make a rational decision for which political party to cast the vote. In other words, those who vote must compare the utilities of different parties while the party sympathy is associated with indicating the utility of one particular party.\textsuperscript{103} It is not definite that voters who express a strong sympathy for a particular party will vote for this party. To put it simply, while studying voting behavior a researcher should not substitute the actual party choice with the party sympathy scores.

when the former is available.\textsuperscript{104} The correlation of the actual party choice and party sympathy does not disclose a perfect association between these two variables and usually varies between 0.6 and 0.8.

Researchers who study voting behavior sometimes use party sympathy for a simple reason: it is easier methodologically to analyze a voter’s choice when a scholar is presented with a point scale that can be treated as continuous dependent variable. In those situations ordinary least-squared regression (OLS) is utilized to estimate regression parameters.\textsuperscript{105} Of course there is nothing wrong with using OLS method in this data setting, but putting a fairly simple estimation method over an explanation of voting behavior does not seem to be right choice.

\textsuperscript{104}Utilization of party sympathy instead of party choice in the study of economic voting in Poland can be found in Joshua A. Tucker and Andrew Owen, "It’s Multifaceted Economic Effect, Stupid! Conventional Vs. Transitional Economic Voting in Poland, 1997-2005," in \textit{Midwest Political Science Association} (Chicago: 2007).

\textsuperscript{105}Perfect example of such approach is in Krzysztof Jasiewicz, "Pocketbook or Rosary? Economic and Identity Voting in 2000-2001 Elections in Poland," in \textit{Studies in Public Policy (No. 379)} (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 2003), 18.
2.2 Independent Variables

In testing the sociological model of voting, I utilize data from Polish National Election Study (PGSW) from 1997, 2001 and 2005.\footnote{Note that only ‘first wave’ of PGSW 2005 survey is used in this analysis.} Following the standard convention of using several cleavages first described by Lipset and Rokkan\footnote{Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research (New York:; Free Press, 1967).} and re-visited by Harrop and Miller,\footnote{Harrop and Miller, Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction.} I operationalized the rural/urban cleavage by employing two different variables that measures where the respondent lives. The first corresponds to those who live in villages, the second corresponds to towns with the population below and above 20 thousand inhabitants. The second cleavage is associated with religion. In all three surveys questions asked respondents to identify the frequency of church attendance that is ranging between ‘never attend church’ to ‘attend church several times a week.’ For the purpose of this study a dummy variable was created to distinguish between those who attend church more then twice a month and those who attend less or never.

The third cleavage is associated with social class to which a voter belongs to. As noted by Harrop and Miller, the traditional class stereotype is represented by those who have “minimum education, living in rented house, working in heavy
industry and surrounded by friends and relations who themselves possess these attributes.”

Therefore, this project makes use of an education variable that is measured in two categories: those who possess uncompleted secondary education and below and those who hold gymnasium/technical diploma or higher education degree. I also include the variables that measure housing and divide it into two categories: those who own the house/flat or live in cooperative flat and those who rent house/flat or live with families. This research also employs two classifications of occupation: manual and white-collar workers as well as division between those who are owners of any business and those who are not. The next cleavage is closely related to the vertical division of social class, namely the cleavage that addresses the impact of the state on a particular voter, is associated with the divisions between those who are supported by the state in terms of unemployment benefits and those who are not. This category also includes those who retired (there is basically no other alternative to Polish citizens than a pension from the state). The fifth cleavage (apparently linked with previous cleavage of class) is the membership in trade unions. Here the distinction is made between those who belong to Solidarity trade union and those who are members of OPZZ trade union (a former communist union). This research does not include household income of the voters as a predictor of voting behavior due

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109 Ibid., 188.
to the amount of missing data.\textsuperscript{110} The final social bases of voting are expressed by employing age and gender of the respondents.

\textbf{2.3 Method}

This study utilizes the multinomial logit, a statistical model that offers an interesting opportunity to study party choice as the dependent variable. This opportunity has not yet been fully exploited by scholars who have analyzed Polish national elections, although the rather large Polish elections surveys since middle of the 1990s have included questions about party choice, social status and demographics of a voter. This paper explores multinomial logit for party choice conditioned on all these mentioned aspects. The sociological model of voting proposed in this paper is represented by multinomial logit model

\[ p_{ij} = \frac{e^{U_{ij}}}{1 + e^{U_{i1}} + e^{U_{i2}} + \ldots + e^{U_{im}}} \]

where \( U_{ij} = \beta_j X_i + \varepsilon_{ij} \) and \( \beta_j \) is a coefficient, \( X_i \) indicates specific characteristics of a voter to choose party \( j \) and \( \varepsilon_{ij} \) is voter specific error for each political party.

\textsuperscript{110}The method of multinomial logit employed in this analysis is estimating the coefficients and standard errors based on the number of cases (respondents/voters) for each category (political party). With the missing data on the household income, the estimation of some coefficients would be based only on the handful number of cases posing a danger of biasness and inefficiency. The household’s disposable income is utilized in the chapter on economic voting.
Using the random utility model borrowed from rational choice theory, it is assumed that a voter is presented with a choice of several parties. Estimation in this context is undertaken by means of generalization of the multinomial logit. The probability that a particular voter will choose a particular party is given by the probability that the utility of that party to that voter is greater than the utility to that voter of all other parties. Using multinomial logit, the utility of choosing one of the alternative parties by a voter during election time is specified as a linear function of voter’s social/individual characteristics with a different set of parameters for each alternative party. The intercept in multinomial model captures options that affect utility, but does not depend on voters’ social/individual characteristics such as age, gender, the trade union membership, etc. Utilizing multinomial logit, we are presented with slope coefficients for each characteristic of a voter estimated for each of the alternative parties except one party that serves as a base for comparison.\footnote{Instead of using one of the alternative political parties as a base, it is also possible to take advantage of nonvoters’ category as a base. Since these research is concerned only with voters, such estimation is not provided here, but available upon request. Further, the best practice, while utilizing multinomial logit, is to examine the effects of covariates on dependent variable using every political party as a base category. This requires from researcher to rerun multinomial logit with different base categories to be able to compare all pairs of alternatives (we must remember that although the estimated parameters in each model are different, they are only different parameterizations that provide}
reports coefficients for the effect of each independent variable on each political party relative to the political party that is chosen to be a base category. Utilizing multinomial logit, we are presented with slope coefficients for each characteristic of a voter estimated for each of the alternative parties except one party that serves as a base for comparison. The multinomial logit estimation reports coefficients for the effect of each independent variable on each political party relative to the political party that is chosen to be a base category.

To deal with the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) common in estimating multinomial logit, I excluded from the analysis political parties that ran for parliamentary elections, but whose role was really insignificant (their support was marginal). In other words, the voter’s choice of major political parties was unaffected by the presence of these irrelevant alternative parties; the Hausman test and Small-Hsiao test that evaluate the significance of estimators with and without excluded political parties confirmed my decision. This is the

the same predicted probabilities, see J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese, Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata (College Station, TX: Stata Press, 2006), 228. This might generate much output as well as confusion how to interpret the coefficients of estimation that are different for each rerun. Nevertheless, I believe that to accurately interpret the result, researchers need to carry out such a task. The multinomial logit estimations that account for different bases are available upon request.
best way of dealing with IIA beside of estimating the model with multinomial probit or conducting multilevel binary logit estimations.  

The interpretation of multinomial logit might be challenging due to the number of alternative parties in the model. To make the analysis easier, I utilize Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King’s program clarify. The advantage of using this program is that interpretation and presentation of statistical results for multinomial logit becomes fairly easy even for those who are not familiar with this estimation technique. Clarify simulates parameters from multinomial logit parameters and converts those simulated ones into substantively interesting summary of simulated probabilities. For instance, clarify allows the researcher to present and interpret the probability that voters with a specific set of characteristics choose party $j$ (in formal notation: $\Pr(Y=j)$ for all $j$). In other words, a researcher might be interested in the probability that


voters who are retired, uneducated, and former members of solidarity movement will vote for one of the post-solidarity party in 2005 election. In short, this program allows researchers to calculate quantities that shed light on many particular problems associated with interpretation of multinomial logit.

3. Analyses

Before we turn to the discussion of results from multinomial logit estimation, it is possible to examine the odds ratios as proposed by Heath (Table 2). Using the standardized odds ratio formula presented above and not even employing maximum likelihood estimation, we can calculate the relative risk ratios for each category (party) $j$. For instance referring to Table 2 that demonstrates voters’ church attendance in 1997, we can calculate that among voters who attend church the odds favoring the AWS over the SLD are

$$P(\text{AWS})/P(\text{SLD}) = (333/668)/(133/668) = 2.504$$

In similar way we can calculate odds for those who do not attend church regularly.

$$P(\text{AWS})/P(\text{SLD}) = (59/265)/(134/265) = 0.4402$$

\footnote{It is necessary to point out that these relative risk ratios are similar to those estimated by multinomial logit, but they are not the same. Therefore, it is not redundant to present them in the analysis but rather these relative risk ratios are complementary to the analysis of cleavage voting estimated by the multinomial logit.}
Thus, the odds favoring the AWS over the SLD in 1997 elections are 5.688 times higher ($2.504/0.4402=5.6883$) for churchgoers then for others. Looking at the next two elections (2001 and 2005) and the church attendance we can similarly calculate the relative risk ratios. Therefore, in 2001 (calculations based on figures in Table 2) the odds favoring the LPR (the extreme right party created from the right wing of AWS and supported by Radio Maryja) over the SLD are around 5.9 times higher for those who attended the Church often then for others. The data from 2005 indicates similar results. Analyzing the same political parties, the

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<td>133</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(50.2%)</td>
<td>(49.8%)</td>
<td>(40.2%)</td>
<td>(59.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(16.5%)</td>
<td>(83.5%)</td>
<td>(22.4%)</td>
<td>(77.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (25%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(75%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (25%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(75%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (20%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(80%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (7.8%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(92.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(28.4%)</td>
<td>(71.6%)</td>
<td>(30.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistics</td>
<td>Pearson $\chi^2$</td>
<td>103.51</td>
<td>44.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Probability</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
calculations show that the odds favoring the LPR over the SLD are 7.9 times higher for the churchgoers then for others. The odd ratios from multinomial logit estimation illustrates a similar pattern. For instance, Table 3 demonstrates the relative risk ratio of 6.23 for the AWS (variable “church attendance”) comparing to the SLD. It means that the odds favoring the AWS over the SLD are 6.23 times higher for those who attend often than for others. It needs to be stressed that drawing the definite conclusions about the religious voting from these simple analysis of odd ratios is sort of shallow. We need to look more deeply by estimating the multinomial logit.

When examining the statistical results of multinomial logit, it should first be noted that the proposed sociological model of voting for all election periods is statistically significant at the level of 0.000 when the multinomial logit is employed (see Tables 3-5). On the other hand, the overall explanatory power of the model is very weak. The coefficient of determination pseudo-\(R^2\) ranges between 0.1075 and 0.1146 depending on the election year. In other words, the regressors in the model(s) explain approximately between 10% and 11% of the variation in the party choice. The pseudo-\(R^2\) slightly increases from 1997 to 2005, which indicates that cleavage voting is somewhat increasing as democratic consolidation is advancing. Further, only some intercepts are significant at 0.05 or below. Notably, analyzing the cleavage that addresses the impact of domestic
Table 3. Multinomial Logit Estimations – Sociological Model of Voting in 1997 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>UW Coefficient/S.E.</th>
<th>UW Odds Ratio</th>
<th>AWS Coefficient/S.E.</th>
<th>AWS Odds Ratio</th>
<th>PSL Coefficient/S.E.</th>
<th>PSL Odds Ratio</th>
<th>ROP Coefficient/S.E.</th>
<th>ROP Odds Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.0082 (0.0113)</td>
<td>0.9918</td>
<td>-0.0063 (0.0088)</td>
<td>0.9937</td>
<td>0.0208* (0.0115)</td>
<td>1.0209</td>
<td>-0.0101 (0.0154)</td>
<td>0.9899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.4123* (0.2457)</td>
<td>1.5102</td>
<td>0.2667 (0.1974)</td>
<td>1.3057</td>
<td>0.0885 (0.3167)</td>
<td>1.0926</td>
<td>0.1093 (0.3579)</td>
<td>1.1155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Education</td>
<td>-0.3374 (0.3274)</td>
<td>0.7137</td>
<td>0.2501 (0.2660)</td>
<td>1.2842</td>
<td>-0.1231 (0.4475)</td>
<td>0.8842</td>
<td>0.4546 (0.3692)</td>
<td>1.5756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner of Enterprise</td>
<td>0.8769** (0.3396)</td>
<td>2.4033</td>
<td>0.5838** (0.2672)</td>
<td>1.7928</td>
<td>1.2741*** (0.3780)</td>
<td>3.5756</td>
<td>0.6242 (0.4791)</td>
<td>1.8668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Worker</td>
<td>-0.2302 (0.3263)</td>
<td>0.7944</td>
<td>0.4269 (0.2748)</td>
<td>1.5325</td>
<td>0.3409 (0.4849)</td>
<td>1.4062</td>
<td>0.2766 (0.4207)</td>
<td>1.3187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Resident</td>
<td>-0.5722 (0.3672)</td>
<td>0.5643</td>
<td>0.0138 (0.2367)</td>
<td>1.0139</td>
<td>1.7206*** (0.3723)</td>
<td>5.5877</td>
<td>-0.3089 (0.4561)</td>
<td>0.7342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.8432 (0.5496)</td>
<td>2.3239</td>
<td>0.3539 (0.4846)</td>
<td>1.4246</td>
<td>-0.1664 (0.7696)</td>
<td>0.8467</td>
<td>0.6608 (0.7417)</td>
<td>1.9363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner of House/Flat</td>
<td>0.1345 (0.2679)</td>
<td>1.1440</td>
<td>-0.0297 (0.2271)</td>
<td>0.9707</td>
<td>-0.3344 (0.3871)</td>
<td>0.7158</td>
<td>-0.0330 (0.3912)</td>
<td>0.9675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>-0.0501 (0.3572)</td>
<td>0.9511</td>
<td>-0.4249 (0.2866)</td>
<td>0.6538</td>
<td>-0.7232* (0.4110)</td>
<td>0.4852</td>
<td>-0.4413 (0.5331)</td>
<td>0.6432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPZZ Membership</td>
<td>-0.5890 (0.6521)</td>
<td>0.5549</td>
<td>-1.1232* (0.5514)</td>
<td>0.3252</td>
<td>-0.3798 (0.7149)</td>
<td>0.6840</td>
<td>-30.802*** (0.3904)</td>
<td>4.20e-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity Membership</td>
<td>1.4526** (0.6674)</td>
<td>4.2741</td>
<td>1.5927** (0.6508)</td>
<td>4.9169</td>
<td>1.1807 (0.9456)</td>
<td>3.2568</td>
<td>0.5516 (0.9405)</td>
<td>1.7361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attends Church</td>
<td>0.8936*** (0.2712)</td>
<td>2.4439</td>
<td>1.8306*** (0.2283)</td>
<td>6.2375</td>
<td>1.2708*** (0.3748)</td>
<td>3.5638</td>
<td>1.1562*** (0.3695)</td>
<td>3.1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.3095** (0.6323)</td>
<td>-1.2744** (0.5463)</td>
<td>-4.0908*** (0.7875)</td>
<td>-2.2399** (0.9670)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 933, Wald χ² (55) = 13090.92
Pseudo R² = 0.1075

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 (one-tailed tests). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The SLD is the base outcome.
Table 4. Multinomial Logit Estimations – Sociological Model of Voting in 2001 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SRP</th>
<th>PiS</th>
<th>PSL</th>
<th>PO</th>
<th>LPR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient/S.E.</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
<td>Coefficient/S.E.</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
<td>Coefficient/S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.0069 (0.0109)</td>
<td>0.9931</td>
<td>-0.0109 (0.0107)</td>
<td>0.9892</td>
<td>-0.0232* (0.0139)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-0.0030 (0.2756)</td>
<td>0.9970</td>
<td>-0.1251 (0.2829)</td>
<td>0.8823</td>
<td>-0.2360 (0.2895)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Education</td>
<td>0.3378 (0.3562)</td>
<td>1.4019</td>
<td>-0.4060 (0.3213)</td>
<td>0.6663</td>
<td>-0.2339 (0.3357)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner of</td>
<td>0.6057* (0.3169)</td>
<td>1.8324</td>
<td>1.1556*** (0.3804)</td>
<td>3.1761</td>
<td>0.7992 (0.3085**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise</td>
<td>0.6142* (0.3319)</td>
<td>1.8482</td>
<td>-0.3635 (0.3519)</td>
<td>0.6952</td>
<td>0.4851 (0.3759)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Worker</td>
<td>1.0067*** (0.2788)</td>
<td>2.7364</td>
<td>-1.0602*** (0.3753)</td>
<td>0.3464</td>
<td>1.9931 (0.3515**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Resident</td>
<td>0.0535 (0.4824)</td>
<td>0.5855</td>
<td>0.4985 (0.4747)</td>
<td>1.6463</td>
<td>-0.4170 (0.6013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.1499 (0.3201)</td>
<td>1.1617</td>
<td>0.2846 (0.3173)</td>
<td>1.3292</td>
<td>0.0012 (0.3348)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner of</td>
<td>0.0543 (0.3826)</td>
<td>1.0558</td>
<td>0.3022 (0.4187)</td>
<td>1.2241</td>
<td>0.2989 (0.4956)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House/Flat</td>
<td>0.1990 (0.3795)</td>
<td>1.3900</td>
<td>-3.2480*** (0.3977)</td>
<td>7.8300</td>
<td>0.6335 (0.9658)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>0.0261 (0.7075)</td>
<td>1.0264</td>
<td>0.8735 (0.7240)</td>
<td>2.3953</td>
<td>-0.8358 (1.1638)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPZZ Membership</td>
<td>0.3366 (0.3036)</td>
<td>1.4001</td>
<td>1.2930** (0.3024)</td>
<td>3.6400</td>
<td>0.5663 (0.3471*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>0.0261 (0.7075)</td>
<td>1.0264</td>
<td>0.8735 (0.7240)</td>
<td>2.3953</td>
<td>-0.8358 (1.1638)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>0.3366 (0.3036)</td>
<td>1.4001</td>
<td>1.2930** (0.3024)</td>
<td>3.6400</td>
<td>0.5663 (0.3471*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attends Church</td>
<td>0.3366 (0.3036)</td>
<td>1.4001</td>
<td>1.2930** (0.3024)</td>
<td>3.6400</td>
<td>0.5663 (0.3471*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.4066*** (0.6651)</td>
<td>-1.1880** (0.6435)</td>
<td>-1.9937 (0.7494**)</td>
<td>-1.1787* (0.5888)</td>
<td>-5.7642*** (0.9412)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 889, Wald $\chi^2$ (60) = 16725.24
Pseudo $R^2$ = 0.1085

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 (one-tailed tests). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The SLD is the base outcome.
### Table 5: Multinomial Logit Estimations – Sociological Model of Voting in 2005 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SRP</th>
<th>PiS</th>
<th>PSL</th>
<th>PO</th>
<th>LPR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient/S.E.</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
<td>Coefficient/S.E.</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
<td>Coefficient/S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0327*</td>
<td>0.9678</td>
<td>-0.0280*</td>
<td>0.9724</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0185)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0155)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.0577</td>
<td>1.0594</td>
<td>0.0736</td>
<td>1.0764</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.4846)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.4096)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Education</td>
<td>0.1715</td>
<td>1.1871</td>
<td>-0.4200**</td>
<td>0.6570</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5441)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.4383)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner of</td>
<td>0.6183</td>
<td>1.8559</td>
<td>0.1709</td>
<td>1.1863</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise</td>
<td>(0.6664)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.6018)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manual Worker</td>
<td>2.2959***</td>
<td>9.9337</td>
<td>1.4664</td>
<td>4.3337</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.6089)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5143)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.7378</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.5084)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.4569)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>-0.5577</td>
<td>0.5725</td>
<td>-0.9830</td>
<td>0.3742</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.8158)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.6827)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner of House/Flat</td>
<td>-0.6572</td>
<td>0.5183</td>
<td>-0.5609</td>
<td>0.5707</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5176)</td>
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<td>(0.4427)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>0.2112</td>
<td>1.2352</td>
<td>0.3309</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.6512)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5388)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPZZ Membership</td>
<td>-2.0632*</td>
<td>0.1270</td>
<td>-0.8202</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.2253)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.7416)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>-1.1597</td>
<td>0.3136</td>
<td>-0.1579</td>
<td>0.8539</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>(1.4069)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.0929)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attends Church</td>
<td>1.0495*</td>
<td>2.8561</td>
<td>1.3382*</td>
<td>3.8122</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5153)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.4374)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.2604</td>
<td>2.0347*</td>
<td>-2.4555*</td>
<td>3.6118***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.1177)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.9982)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(N = 513, \text{ Wald } \chi^2 (60) = 9294.28\)

Pseudo \(R^2 = 0.1146\)

\(^*p<0.05, \ **p<0.01, \ ***p<0.001\) (one-tailed tests). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The SLD is the base outcome.
governmental expenditure such as unemployment benefits, there is evidence that unemployed voters support the SRP if compared to the PSL only in the 2001 elections, but not any other alternative party across other elections. This might disprove the argument that apathy, abstention and withdrawal political system is present among those who become losers in the transition from state commended to free market economy. In addition, retirement does not appear to have any influence over the party choice across time and space. Voters’ level of education also does not seem to have impact on party choice in any of the elections except in 1997 were educated persons voted for the UW. This indicates that there are other factors that affect voters’ utility, but are not associated with their social/individual characteristics. These factors might include economy or desire to change the incumbent party due to corruption (issue voting). What is evident from this research is that religion plays an important role in voter’s decision. This confirms what has been found in analysis of 2001 Polish National Election Study conducted by Krzysztof Jasiewicz.\textsuperscript{117} His findings substantiate that “When wants to predict how a Pole will vote, one should ask him not ‘How thick is your pocketbook?’ but ‘How often do you say your rosary.’”\textsuperscript{118}

Table 6 shows the simulated probabilities that voter \(i\) will cast a ballot

\textsuperscript{117}Jasiewicz, "Pocketbook or Rosary? Economic and Identity Voting in 2000-2001 Elections in Poland."

\textsuperscript{118}Ibid., 24.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Prob. 1. (St. Err.)</th>
<th>Prob. 2. (St. Err.)</th>
<th>Prob. 3. (St. Err.)</th>
<th>Prob. 4. (St. Err.)</th>
<th>Prob. 1. (St. Err.)</th>
<th>Prob. 2. (St. Err.)</th>
<th>Prob. 3. (St. Err.)</th>
<th>Prob. 4. (St. Err.)</th>
<th>Prob. 1. (St. Err.)</th>
<th>Prob. 2. (St. Err.)</th>
<th>Prob. 3. (St. Err.)</th>
<th>Prob. 4. (St. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>.1190 (.1086)</td>
<td>.1092 (.1156)</td>
<td>.0595 (.0335)</td>
<td>.0779 (.0491)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>.4809 (.1279)</td>
<td>.2115 (.0888)</td>
<td>.1697 (.0481)</td>
<td>.4096 (.0870)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>.0725 (.0465)</td>
<td>.0779 (.0516)</td>
<td>.2368 (.0799)</td>
<td>.2306 (.0833)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>.2139 (.1056)</td>
<td>.5149 (.1303)</td>
<td>.4685 (.0890)</td>
<td>.1903 (.0601)</td>
<td>.4799 (.1291)</td>
<td>.6375 (.1250)</td>
<td>.4339 (.0947)</td>
<td>.2278 (.0768)</td>
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<td>.1115 (.0830)</td>
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<td>.1442 (.1133)</td>
<td>.0483 (.0294)</td>
<td>.0450 (.0316)</td>
<td>.1591 (.1467)</td>
<td>.0511 (.0736)</td>
<td>.0103 (.0200)</td>
<td>.0374 (.0419)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>.1636 (.0917)</td>
<td>.0648 (.0314)</td>
<td>.0488 (.0300)</td>
<td>.2876 (.1545)</td>
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<td>.0311 (.0286)</td>
<td>.0371 (.0316)</td>
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<td>PO</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>.0206 (.0167)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.0556 (.0456)</td>
<td>.0215 (.0197)</td>
<td>.2182 (.0983)</td>
<td>.3908 (.1351)</td>
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<td>.0848 (.0856)</td>
<td>.0495 (.0689)</td>
<td>.0066 (.0083)</td>
<td>.0216 (.0283)</td>
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Probabilities that a voter will cast the ballot for one of the parties in analyzed parliamentary elections are calculated based on the following characteristics of voters (1684 simulations performed):

**Probability 1:** Minimum education with the occupation as a manual worker that resides in village/small town who is currently unemployed or retired, lives in multifamilies homes/apartments and attends church more than twice a month.

**Probability 2:** Minimum education with the occupation as a manual worker that resides in village/small town who is currently unemployed or retired, lives in multifamilies homes/apartments and does not attend church more than twice a month.

**Probability 3:** Average age voter with higher education, has its own business, resides in city, owns home or flat, and does not attend church more than twice a month.

**Probability 4:** Average age voter with higher education, has its own business, resides in city, owns home or flat, and attends church more than twice a month.
for party $j$ for all examined elections. To assess religious voting in 1997, we need to look at the probabilities of voting for political parties that are considered to be secular or associated with the Catholic Church, specifically the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS). In particular, a post-opposition party AWS, relied in their electoral slogans (not necessarily the economic policies, for details see chapters 2 and 5) on a fundamental interpretation of Catholic teaching, as well as specifically Polish traditions. On the other hand, the communist successor party, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), has been viewed as secular or even anti-clerical. These two major electoral blocs in the 1997 election represented a roughly similar and wide range of opinion on economic policy. Even more, they scarcely touched upon economic problems in their campaigns. Yet in their propaganda and practice the SLD and the AWS has been remarkably moderate in economic policies; they have pledged not to abandon the ongoing neo-liberal economic reforms, but instead to carry them out better and to take care of those hurt worst by the economic transition.

What divided these two political parties was the role of the church in the state and decommunization. This divide, based on these two cultural and historical issues, was even strengthen by the external sponsorship for the AWS, namely the Solidarity trade union and the Catholic Church. These two nonparty entities were huge source of support, to whom the AWS kept looking for legitimacy and aid. As the simulated probabilities of voting for the AWS and the
SLD indicate a voter who attends the Catholic Church more than twice a month is likely to vote for the AWS. This probability lies between 40 and 48 percent depending on the voters' characteristics (see description below Tables 6). Moreover, it really does not matter that much if a voter is rich or poor, lives in village or large city, is employed or unemployed, young or old – the factor that is standing out is the church attendance. On the other hand, those who do not attend church tend to vote for SLD. Specifically, the probability that a nonreligious voter casts ballot for SLD ranges between 46.85 and 51.49 percent.\footnote{It needs to be emphasized here that the conclusion that the religious voting occurred during the election of 1997 was reached not only by analyzing the coefficients estimated by the multinomial logit, but going into deeper analysis of simulated probabilities calculated thanks to \textit{clarify}.}

Looking at simulated probabilities from the 2001 elections we notice a puzzle in respect to votes for the left-wing coalition SLD-UP. Table 6 indicates that the probability of voting for this coalition ranges between 22.78\% and 63.75\% irrespective of the regular church attendance or its lack. In other words, the retired as well as the unemployed and uneducated manual workers who reside in the multifamily homes in villages are predicted to vote for the SLD-UP irrespectively of their passion for the religious practices (probability over 40\%). The losers of the economic and democratic transition who are also ‘non-churchgoers abstainers’ would rather vote for SLD-UP (63.75\% probability) then
any other political party. This might be the indication of class voting, the puzzle that is discussed later.

Another group of citizens likely to vote for the SLD is the non-religious educated business faction (probability around 43.39%) that could be associated with the business elites that emerged from former communist elites in the beginning of the 1990s (see Table 6). Yet this is just a supposition rather than certainty. On the other hand, the division within the business faction appears clearly by looking at Table 6. The business community who attend church are predicted to vote for the PiS (probability of 39.08%) and the PO (probability of 27.48%) more frequently then for the SLD (probability of 22.78%). This is another indication that the religious cleavage was present and perhaps stronger then the class voting in 2001 election.

Now the question becomes whether or not the same set of rules of cleavage voting is applicable for 2005 elections. The simulated probabilities in last four columns of Table 6 point out the realignment of the educated business groups. They are more likely to vote for the liberal PO then the right-of-center PiS and much less likely for leftist SLD. Further, this study confirms that some business owners had slightly conservative sympathies in 2005 elections by casting their ballot for the PiS. This is rather surprising, since the ‘Polish conventional wisdom’ pronounces that this group of voters supported Civic Platform (PO). In particular, Table 6 shows that the class voting became more apparent
irrespective of the church attendance. If the white-collar voters attended church the probability that they vote for the PO is 63%, while for the PiS and the SLD 21.95% and 5.38% respectively. For non-attendees the probabilities are 70.45% for the PO, 13.56% for the PiS, and 11.15% for the SLD. This is not to argue that religious voting disappeared during 2005 elections. For instance, the business men and women who are practicing Catholics are more likely to support PiS then the others. Similarly, the supporters of SLD are more likely to be the secular white-collar workers.

If class voting truly holds, we would expect the blue-collar workers as well as those who are unemployed would vote for the leftist SLD or the SRP. Table 6 (probability 1 and 2 in 2005 elections) indicates that the SLD electorate does not belong to this group. It might be quite surprising for scholars of voting behavior in Poland that the SLD did not attracted the traditional left-wing voters.\footnote{Other predicted probabilities that support this conclusion area available upon request.} They rather supported the winner of 2005 election (PiS) as well as the party that just before elections manifested its program as leftist (SRP). In other words, blue-collar workers were more likely than white-collar workers to cast vote in 2005 elections for the SRP and PiS relative to leftist SLD. It must be noticed that the PiS being conservative on the socio-cultural issues is very leftist on the socio-economic issues. This might be one of the explanations why the predicted
probabilities indicate the PiS picked up the traditional leftist electorate. The other justification might be associated with the fact that losers from the economic transition would vote for non-incumbent party to punish the former government that did not provide them the economic well-being. While it might be concluded with confidence that class voting holds for the upper middle class, there is not enough empirical evidence to be so obvious in relation to the lower class of the Polish society. Other models of voting have to be tested before we are able to make a decisive conclusion about the unprivileged. Starting with 2005 elections, there is definitely a crystallization of party politics in respect to the issues they emphasized and ideology they pronounced.

Now the question becomes whether cleavage voting is declining or staying about the same. \footnote{All the findings below are confirmed by comparing the odds ratio as well as plotting the odds ratio. Detailed graphs and figures are available upon request.} Comparing the odds ratios of church attendance across time and space we can conclude with certainty that religious voting is not intensifying or staying at the same level but rather getting much weaker. To be more specific, let us focus on the LPR (a party that is strongly associated with Catholicism, family values, nationalism) voters in 2001 and 2005 elections. The odds ratios for 2001 and 2005 are 10.314 and 7.46 respectively. All the political parties elected to the parliament between 1997 and 2005 except one (SLD – former communist party) had a significant number of voters who attended church more than twice a
month. As we would expect, if a voter perceives a party on the left spectrum, the party is less associated with religious cleavage. It is interesting to see that the negative effect of church-going becomes less strong over time for the SDL. Specifically, comparing the marginal effects for the SLD with respect to the church attendance the predicted probability of voting for the SLD in 1997 is .33 lower for church goers than none attendees. In the 2001 and 2005 elections the predicted probabilities are .21 and .12, respectively (Table 7). It appears that those who do not attend church regularly picked up by the PO in 2005; specifically, it is true for the business community (Table 6). Somewhat interesting is the association between most of the leftist parties and manual

122The marginal effects, sometimes called marginal changes or partial effects, are calculated after the multinomial logit estimation and are based on the predicted probabilities of choosing political party 'j'. As the predicted probability after the multinomial logit estimation is calculated separately for each outcome, so the marginal effects are also calculated separately for each political party. The marginal effects demonstrate how the probabilities of each outcome (here the vote for each political party) change with respect to change in the independent variables. In other words, by calculating the marginal effects we can determine the effect of regressors for the probability of voting for each political party at certain values of independent variables. Since all the independent variables in the estimated model are binary except age, Table 7 presents the discrete changes as the dummy variables change from 0 to 1. The explanatory variable age is set up to its mean.
Table 7. Marginal effects and discrete changes for political parties with respect to different background variables, 1997-2005.

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<td>-.009</td>
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<td>-.0004</td>
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<td>.001</td>
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<td>-0.07*</td>
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<td>.031</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>-.012</td>
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<td>.055</td>
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<td>Owner of Enterprise</td>
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<td>.015</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>-1.3**</td>
<td>-1.8***</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>.06*</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.066</td>
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<td>Manual Worker</td>
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<td>.11*</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>-0.07*</td>
<td>-.053</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.03*</td>
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<td>-.025</td>
<td>-.09**</td>
<td>-.019</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.15***</td>
<td>.03*</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>-1.2***</td>
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<td>.098</td>
<td>-.084</td>
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<td>.012</td>
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<td>Owner of house/flat</td>
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<td>.023</td>
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<td>.034</td>
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<td>.025</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.013</td>
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<td>OP/Z member</td>
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<td>-.18**</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>23*</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.016</td>
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<td>-.004</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.004</td>
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<td>Solidarity member</td>
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<td>.037</td>
<td>-.21***</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>-.28***</td>
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<td>Attends Church</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>-33***</td>
<td>-22***</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.07*</td>
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Significance Level: *p<0.1, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 two-tailed test. (*) Discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. For each dummy variable yes=1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
workers over time.\textsuperscript{123} As it was discussed above there is no obvious path that could strictly relate voters to leftist political parties and indicate class voting for this group of voters. In the 1997 elections the manual workers supported the right-of-center AWS, while in the 2001 elections workers supported post-Solidarity right-wing as well as radical populist organization (Self-Defense-SRP). In 2005 the support for LPR diminished and the majority of workers appear to cast the ballot for the SRP (Table 7).\textsuperscript{124} The vote of white-collar workers, on the other hand, tends to be somewhat equally distributed along left-right political spectrum over time with some preference for the post-solidarity parties.

In terms of labor unions, this study indicates that members of the Solidarity union voted for post-Solidarity party AWS in 1997 and their significance disappeared in the 2001 elections for the PO and the PiS (post-solidarity parties that were formed by leaders who left the AWS). This might be due to the dissatisfaction with the reforms performed by the post-solidarity coalition government after 1997 elections as well as declining number of membership. Interestingly enough, the members of solidarity labor union supported the post-solidarity party LPR in the 2001 elections and the PiS in the

\textsuperscript{123}Leftist Parties in 1997: SLD; Leftist Parties in 2001: SLD, SRP, UP; Leftist Parties in 2005: SRP, SLD
\textsuperscript{124}Note that from the simulated probabilities (Table 6) we also learned that manual workers who were also likely to support the PiS.
2005 elections (Table 7). A relatively similar story might be told when looking at former communist OPZZ labor union whose members stopped to be loyal to the former communist party SLD, and strongly opposing the former solidarity parties as well as left-wing SRP. It is clear that the role of the solidarity labor union in electoral politics has weaken in 2001 but came back to live in the 2005 elections. The findings about the role of the labor unions in electoral politics might also indicate the historical divide between supporters of the old regime and those who opposed it.

The other evident cleavage is a rural/urban cleavage. Political parties, such as PSL and SRP tend to be supported by the residents of villages in all three elections. This analysis indicates the rural/urban conflict of interest exists in Polish politics. The marginal effects for the PSL increased from 0.15 in 1997 to 0.19 in 2001 and decreased to .1 in 2005 (Table 7). The similar situation can be observed for the SRP. In 2001 there was a positive relationship between support of the SRP by voters from rural areas with the marginal effect of 0.05. In 2005 elections SRP lost support from their former voters (insignificant relationship) but gained more voters from small towns and blue-collar workers by being recognized as a leftist party.

4. Conclusion

This chapter took into consideration only social cleavages. A definite conclusion on what drives a Polish citizen to cast a vote in a particular way
cannot be reached through analyzing only one model of voting behavior. Although social cleavages play a role in the process of voting, they are not the only factors. As indicated by the results, the sociological model of voting turned out to have less explanatory and predictive power than expected. This makes it possible to discuss different approaches to study voting behavior in Poland to understand voter’s choice in new democratic setting. In other words, other important factors, such as issues and political party attachments should be tested. This is done in next chapters. There are several possibilities here. Specifically, in the context of rational choice theory, the task of this project is to compare the relative contributions of directional and proximity models, both of specific issue preferences and left–right ideological positions, on political party preferences in the Polish electorate. Going further with the rational choice explanation of voting behavior, the concept of economic voting is of particular importance. Specifically, testing retrospective and prospective egotropic and sociotropic economic model of voting could bring the conclusion that Polish voter is *homo economicus*. Finally, the Michigan School of voting behavior argues that a rational calculus is insufficient to explain voting behavior, but the attachment to a particular political party or a family of parties is best single advance predictor of the vote. The explanatory power of this model is tested in next chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE MICHIGAN MODEL OF VOTING

This chapter focuses on the Michigan model of voting (also referred to as the socio-psychological model) first introduced by Campbell et al. (1960) in *The American Voter* and consequently developed and tested specifically in the western democracies. According to this model there are many factors that influence electoral choices such as issue opinions, candidate images, political ideology, and party attachment as well as the political and socioeconomic conditions. All these elements are portrayed by so-called *funnel of causality* (Figure 1). As pointed out by Dalton, the Michigan model of voting “can predict voting decisions more accurately than individuals can predict their own behavior in the months before the election.”\(^{125}\) Yet the main factor that determines a voting choice, according to this model, is the concept of partisan attachment.\(^{126}\)

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\(^{126}\)Green et al. point out that “party identification is by no means the sole determinant of vote preference.” Donald P. Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler, *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters*, *Yale Isps Series* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 17.
Figure 1. The Funnel of Causality Predicting Vote Choice

Source: Dalton (2006:178, Figure 9.1)
Scholars affiliated with the Michigan model of voting point out that if voters feel some psychological affiliation to a party, then their party identification strongly shapes their political behavior.\textsuperscript{127} As noted by Campbell et al. in \textit{The Voter Decides} “parties serve as standard-setting groups for a significant proportion of the people … it is assumed that many people associate themselves psychologically with one or the other of the parties, and that this identification has predictable relationships with their perceptions, evaluations, and actions.”\textsuperscript{128}

The recent literature on voting behavior in East-Central Europe in general and Poland in particular casts doubt on whether or not the voters can identify themselves with political parties at all in the political surroundings were parties come and go. Scholars often ask whether the party identification is even relevant in new democracies like Poland.\textsuperscript{129} Others argue that “fluid and fragmented party systems do not provide adequate and meaningful referents for the formation of political identities and preferences.”\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{127}Michael S. Lewis-Beck et al., \textit{The American Voter Revisited} (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 305.

\textsuperscript{128}Angus Campbell, \textit{The Voter Decides} (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954), 90.


\textsuperscript{130}Shabad and Slomczynski, "Political Identities in the Initial Phase of Systemic Transformation in Poland: A Test of the Tabula Rasa Hypothesis," 691.
In order to test the socio-psychological model of voting, first we need to find out to what extent party ties are present in the Polish public. Therefore, I analyze the distribution of votes comparing the answers of respondents regarding their previous vote and current vote available in each analyzed survey controlling for the strength of party identification to assess the stability of party attachment. Second, I categorize the voters into four groups based on their party attachment and cognitive resources they hold to assess the nature of partisanship and partisan independence. This groundwork analysis reveals that while the party ties are not entirely stable over time and partisan types change from election to election, they are indeed present among the Polish electorate. Thus, I analyze the party identification and votes casted in each parliamentary election utilizing descriptive statistics. Subsequently, I utilize probit estimation to assess the relationship between party attachment and voting for post-communist and post-solidarity parties distinguishing between the levels of partisan attachment. Finally, I employ multinomial logit to evaluate the impact of party attachment and ideology on voting for party families (social conservatives, liberal conservatives, and social democrats) controlling for the social and political characteristics of voters. All the analyses are conducted based on the Polish National Elections survey from 1997, 2001, and 2005.
1. **Theoretical and Empirical Debates and Their Applications to the Polish Elections**

The importance of party attachment in the socio-psychological model of voting was extended by Shively (1979) who developed the functional model of party identification.\(^{131}\) Shively argued that if social cleavages that are traditional short-cut devices are weakening, then the party identification becomes a short-cut. The functionalist theory of political party as information short-cut to all kinds of political decisions (even which party to vote for) became controversial when scholars started to find out that more citizens become independents. Scholars started to argue that party attachment is declining as voters become more educated. Well-informed citizens do not need partisan attachment to orient themselves in politics; they can do it on their own. The implication of this was a development of cognitive mobilization theory that accepted “the importance partisanship as a heuristic that helps citizens orient themselves to politics” but also argued that “because the voters’ political awareness and sophistication are growing, more people can deal with the complexities of politics without passive reliance on external cues or heuristics.”\(^{132}\)


The cognitive mobilization theory added to the already exiting debate concerning the impact of party identification on voting behavior. One set of scholars point out that partisan attachments are getting weaker as compared to 1950s and 1960s, not only in the U.S. but also in Europe.\textsuperscript{133} The other group of scholars argues that the partisanship (understood as a psychological attachment to a particular party) had declined in 1970s but it is ever since growing, especially in the U.S.\textsuperscript{134} European scholarship came to similar and debatable conclusions regarding party attachment and voting choice, but it also added the special twist into the entire debate by pointing out that a political party represents a social group, which in turn is a base for party preference.\textsuperscript{135}

Further, some researchers have expressed doubt whether or not the concept of party identification can be transformed into different political settings


other than the U.S. Most of all these scholars argue that “party identities are overshadowed or encompassed by other identities, such as social class, religion or language.” Others defended the applicability of party identification. To summarize, the concept of party attachment and identity has been called into question not only as one of the best predictors of vote, but also as a concept that can be transferred to other polities beside the U.S.

Now the question becomes how these theoretical and empirical debates relate to the Polish electoral politics in general and a test of socio-psychological model in particular. Experts on voting behavior agree that public at large needs short-cuts to be able to perceive and evaluate public affairs. The previous chapter on the sociological model of voting confirmed that it would be hard to predict


137 Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters, 164.

with high level of certainty the vote in Poland based on the social characteristics of voters or social cleavages. This finding might suggest that political parties might play a role of short-cuts to orient some citizens in politics. Further, Shively pointed out that “if the social or economic conflicts in which a voter is involved are sufficiently clear; and if the position of parties or groups of parties with regard to these conflicts is sufficiently clear; then there is no need for the voter to develop lasting ties to any party per se, and he will no do so.”\textsuperscript{139} Since Polish politics seems to be in turmoil and traditional short-cuts are weak, it would seem that the Polish electorate needs political parties (parties give cues).

The debates between functionalism and mobilization theory are also explored in this chapter. Specifically, this chapter follows Dalton (2007) and Bartels (2000) to assess the impact of partisanship on voting preferences. Both scholars built their work on the Michigan model of voting developed in \textit{American Voter}. Dalton extends his theoretical framework to the functional theory of party identification developed by Shively (1979) and Petersson (1978) and distinguishes between party mobilization and cognitive mobilization while testing the electoral choices. Bartels, on the other hand, tests the socio-psychological model focusing on the strength of partisanship over time in the U.S. Bartels and Dalton come to distinct conclusions about the party attachment as a predictor of vote. Bartels

claims that there is no clear evidence of partisan decline in the American electorate and the party identification is a still a good predictor of vote. Dalton agrees that “party identification remains a key element in our understanding of electoral behavior,” but the American electorate is changing from ritual partisans to more sophisticated and cognitive society with a growing number of independents and cognitive partisans who make “independent judgments on candidates and issues of the day, rather than voting on the basis of habitual party loyalties inherited from one’s parents.” This chapter utilizes the methods and findings of Dalton and Bartels and examines the composition of Polish electorate in terms of party attachment and the cognitive mobilization as well as tests the predictability of voting choice utilizing the variation in loyalty rates among strong, medium, and weak identifiers and non-partisans. This chapter also tests the applicability of party attachment in the Polish political setting, by examining the stability in the distribution of votes controlled for the party identification for the same set of respondents in each survey.

2. Previous Findings

Informed by the literature, it could be expected that the socio-psychological model that emphasizes party ID as the most accurate indicator of the vote will be the least explanatory in Polish setting. Specifically, Mishler and

Rose claim that citizens in post-communist countries have a skeptical attitude toward political parties due to their dissatisfaction with the current economic situation and low expectations for its improvement.\(^{141}\) The most recent European Values Survey also shows that citizens place little trust in political parties.\(^{142}\) Converse contends that it takes three generations before the electorate will psychologically identify itself (or form attachment) with a party under new political regimes.\(^{143}\) In the beginning of its democratic transition, political parties in Poland frequently changed their names and merged with other parties, a practice that was not conducive to building a loyal base and which engendered confusion among ordinary voters. One would argue that the Michigan model of voting might be a useful predictor of voting in future elections, because the practical dynamics on which the theory rests have not had enough durability in present-day Poland. As noted by Beck, a single generation that is sufficiently


\(^{142}\) "European and World Values Surveys Four-Wave Integrated Data File," (European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, 2006).

partisan is able to pass on its loyalties to the next generation. On the other hand, the generation of voters active in political life during communism might show long-term partisan attachments, especially towards the ex-communist parties. Furthermore, if there is weak attachment to a specific political party, perhaps loyalty is attached instead to a particular family of parties. This chapter tests all these speculations and doubts.

One of the prominent Polish scholars of voting behavior, Radoslaw Markowski, noticed that “there is no party system in Poland” as we know it in the Western democracies or even newly democratized states in Latin America (e.g. Brazil, Bolivia or Peru). The only party that has existed in Poland since 1991 and did not change its name is PSL. He also points out that none of the governments that were created since 1991 consisted of the same party configuration, even though party leaders appeared several times in different


145Compare conclusion by Shabad and Slomczynski, "Political Identities in the Initial Phase of Systemic Transformation in Poland: A Test of the Tabula Rasa Hypothesis."

political parties throughout this entire period. As argued by Markowski, the very remarkable phenomenon is that voters change their party preferences not only from one election to the other (which would be understandable due to the fact that parties come and go), but also right after or before an election. This fact indicates (at least from the sociological perspective) the weak link between specific social groups and political parties. As Markowski puts it, “political parties lack the social roots…this is evident from indicators of swing voters…there are also weak links between political parties and social groups.”

Markowski claims that the Polish General Election Studies survey data for 2001 and 2005 elections shows that around 28% of voters changed their political preference: those who cast the ballot in 2001 for leftist parties, voted in 2005 for the rightist parties. For this scholar, this is an indication of very weak ties between the public and the political parties. Further, Markowski portrays the durability of partisan attachment in the form of party switching rates, but we need to be cautious when drawing conclusions from finding like this. It depends how we treat, for instance, independents or those voters who switch to and from

\[\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
minor parties. Unfortunately, it seems that Markowski does not take into account which voters changed political parties. Are they attached partisans or independents? This is one of the subjects of this chapter. Finally, Markowski’s opinion about weak party attachment within the Polish public is not entirely new – similar comments and suggestions appear in scholarly research of past decade or so indicating the weakness of political identity formation not only in Poland but also in other Eastern European countries. Specifically, previous research pointed out that “ordinary citizens, lacking clear partisan referents, found it difficult to construct distinct political identities of their own.”

The justification of such assertions is given by referring to the low party membership since the collapse of communism, distrust for the political parties as well as the high electoral volatility. All of these statements are true, but an important point has to be emphasized here: the widespread belief that Polish voters (perhaps the Eastern European voters, too) did not develop party ties seems to evolve from research which did not focus exclusively on voters. This chapter, on the other hand, takes into account only electors.

149 A great discussion of this kind of analysis and dangers of misleading interpretation that party attachment is subject to frequent change see Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters*, 166-68.

If political parties in Poland lack social roots, the question remains what factor would create psychological attachment to political parties? This research shows that some voters are attached to political parties; therefore, the social roots of political parties seem to exist. These roots go back to the communist past. On one side, there are political parties that have roots in communism, and on the other, there are political parties that arose from opposition to the communism. Further, opposition to communism, first concentrated around the Catholic Church, split in the beginning of the 1990s into different fractions representing somewhat different ideological perspectives on new polity. This divide is less clear as time passes and the polity becomes fully democratized. The divisions within electorate based on the historical past are taken into account while estimating the socio-psychological model of voting.

3. **Operationalization, Methods, and Findings**

3.1 **Party Identification and Stability of Vote**

Before I test the socio-psychological model of voting, I need to assess whether political identities are stable in the Polish electorate. As argued by Shabad and Slomczynski, the term political identity is “usually operationalized as attachment to or identification with or preference for a particular political party or alternatively, as a self-placement on the Left-Right continuum.”\(^\text{151}\) At this stage, I utilize party preference over time as a test for political identity.

\(^{151}\)Ibid.: 695.
**Table 8.** Comparison of Votes: 1993 and 1997 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VOTE IN 1993</th>
<th>VOTE IN 1997</th>
<th>TOTAL IN 1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>UW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS*</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL IN 1997</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*AWS did not exist in 1993, but I created this category from votes that were casted for political parties that later (1997) formed this coalition.
Analyzing the stability of party preference gives as also a chance to (approximately) appraise whether or not voters are attached to political parties under the following, although very broad, assumption: if voters are psychologically attached to a political party or family of parties, some of them should cast their votes for the preferred party in the same way in consecutive elections.\footnote{The best way to investigate the party attachment would be to analyze panel data. Unfortunately, such data is not available for the Polish elections.}

Tables 8-10 present the cross-tabulation of the distribution of votes for the previous and current elections. Specifically, respondents were asked for which political party they voted in the current and previous elections. The numbers in italic font portray the percentage of voters a party lost to other party in current comparing to previous elections. The numbers in regular font show the percentage of voters a party gained from other party in current election. The numbers in gray boxes have two numbers: the number in lower right corner (bold) illustrates the percentage of voters who stayed loyal to a political party from previous election to current election; the numbers in upper left corner (bold-italic) demonstrate the loyal voters as a percentage of total votes received in current elections.

Looking at Table 8, approximately 80\% of voters stayed loyal to the SLD and voted again for this party in 1997 election. Table 9 illustrates very similar
number for SLD/UP supporters where 82.6% of respondents indicated that they voted for the SLD/UP in 1997 and again in the 2001 elections. This pattern is broken when we analyze the responses from 2005 survey. Only 40.4% voters declared that they cast a ballot for SLD in 2001 but not in 2005. Around 82% of those who stay with the SLD in 2005 expressed their partisan identification with SLD (see Table 14). Around 40% the voters who supported SLD in 2001 switched post-solidarity parties such as the Civic Platform (PO) and the Law & Justice (PiS). The reason for such a change might be associated with the economic and political scandals and corruption within circles of SLD. Of course such findings can put into question the central claim of the Michigan model, namely the psychological attachment to this specific post-communist party.

These results confirm what has been argued regarding the development of party attachment some 20 years ago by Morris P. Fiorina (1981) in *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections.* “When citizens first encounter politics, they may inherit the partisan identities of their family and friends, but as they accumulate experience, their attachment comes to reflect their assessment of how parties have performed in the office”\(^{153}\) This explanation of partisanship by referencing to the utility maximizing voters seems to fit the case of 2001 elections.

\(^{153}\)Cited in Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters,* 112.
### Table 9. Comparison of Votes: 1997 and 2001 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOTE IN 1997</th>
<th>SRP</th>
<th>SLD/UP</th>
<th>PSL</th>
<th>UW</th>
<th>AWS</th>
<th>LPR**</th>
<th>PO</th>
<th>PiS</th>
<th>TOTAL IN 1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLD*</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROP**</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.2</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL IN 2001</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>N=658</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Combined SLD and UP

**ROP formed coalition with LPR in 2001.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOTE IN 2001</th>
<th>VOTE IN 2005</th>
<th>TOTAL IN 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>SLD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLD/UP</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL IN 2005</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Similar to the SLD, around 80% of voters trusted again parties that formed AWS coalition in 1997. Swing voters for these two political parties constitute about 20%. Further 52% were loyal to UW and 31% moved to AWS, 3% switched to ROP, 7% to SLD and 4% to PSL. If we consider UW, AWS, and ROP as post-solidarity parties, we can conclude that 86% of voters who voted in 1993 for UW were loyal to the post-solidarity group of parties. Similar pattern can be seen for other parties. Comparing 1993 and 1997 election, every 10\textsuperscript{th} person out of 100 shifted their vote from SLD to UW and approximately every 15\textsuperscript{th} person switched from SLD to AWS. Further, it seems that every 3\textsuperscript{rd} supporter of UW in 1993 reallocated its vote to AWS in 1997.

Looking at Table 9 a reader might get the impression that the psychological attachment to political parties measured by comparison of votes casted by respondents in 1997 and 2001 elections is very weak. On the other hand, it could be argued that voters are psychologically attached to families of parties, at least in the framework of post-communist and post-solidarity parties. Specifically, in the elections of 2001 many leaders left AWS and formed the LPR, the PO, and the PiS. If we combine the percentages of votes received by these political parties (11.2 + 16.6 + 20.6 + 19.3) we end up with 67.7% of votes that have been cast in 2001 for the ‘same’ political party, namely ‘old’ AWS.

The interpretation of Table 10 is very similar to that of Table 9. Particularly, 2001 the percentage of voters who stay loyal to a political party
from the elections to the 2005 elections ranges from 40.4 to 76.6 (excluding the PD/UW). The vote for the SLD in 2005 diminished significantly and voters spread over to the opposition parties that happened to have post-solidarity roots. Around 40% of supporters of the SLD allocated their vote in 2005 to the PiS or the PO. There was also quite significant reallocation of votes within post-solidarity parties. For instance, the PO lost 20.9% of voters to the PiS in 2005, and the PiS lost about 12% of votes to the PO. Both of these post-solidarity parties gained votes in 2005 from the LPR and the former supporters of AWS. Overall, the 2005 survey reveals that more than three-quarters of voters who supported post-solidarity parties in 2001 elections did it again in 2005 elections. The same cannot be really claimed about the post-communist parties, unless we consider the SRP as a New Leftist party (as it proclaimed itself in 2005 electoral campaign) which gained 33% of its votes from previous supporters of the SLD/UP. To sum up, these groundwork analyses disclose that the political identities are present in the Polish electorate at least with the respect to the party families.

Tabulating the previous and current votes by party identification for each analyzed election reveals what has not been previously acknowledged by researchers. The responses of those who voted in 1993 and in 1997 elections for the same political party as well as expressed the attachment to this party are recoded in the first column of Table 11. Specifically, 78% of respondents who voted for the SLD in 1993 and 1997 declared that they feel close to this political
party. The distribution of stability of vote by party identification for these years ranges from 64.5% to 81.5%. This distribution is much lower for the years of 1997 and 2001, ranging from 46.6% for the AWS to 71% for the PSL. There seems to be a large stability in partisan votes while looking at the last column in Table 11. The distribution ranges from 63% for the SLD to the 89% for the PO. On average, around 71% of respondents who voted for the same political party or party family in previous and current elections expressed a partisan attachment to the same party or party family.\textsuperscript{154} Such findings might already suggest that the Polish voters have developed psychological attachment to political parties in very short period of democratic experience.

Table 11. Distribution (%) of Vote for Previous and Current Elections by Declared Party Identification in Current Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>82.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{154}This average was calculated based on means reported in Table 11.
Tables 12-14 display the cross-tabulation of party identification with the party vote for each election. In the 1997 elections (Table 12) the larger amount of voters who identify themselves being close to a political party are supporters of the SLD (95%). From those who voted for the UW, approximately 68% articulated their attachment to this party while the rest cast their votes mostly for the AWS (18.25%). A very similar pattern is evident for the ROP supporters; 29% of the respondents casted votes for the AWS while expressing their proximity to the ROP. It is worth noting that these three political parties emerged from the Solidarity movement. Further, these parties had very similar ideologies in terms of socio-cultural aspects. Yet, the UW had a more liberal stand on economic issues than the AWS and the ROP which were rather supporters of welfare state economics.

Table 12. The distribution (%) of Votes in 1997 by the Party Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party ID</th>
<th>UW</th>
<th>AWS</th>
<th>SLD</th>
<th>PSL</th>
<th>ROP</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>67.88</td>
<td>18.25</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>87.50</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>95.14</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>78.85</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>29.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>67.74</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>9.26</td>
<td>22.22</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>51.85</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Party ID</td>
<td>12.66</td>
<td>40.94</td>
<td>20.10</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>14.14</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>112.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 13. The distribution (%) of Votes in 2001 by the Party Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party ID</th>
<th>SLD</th>
<th>AWS</th>
<th>UW</th>
<th>SRP</th>
<th>PiS</th>
<th>PSL</th>
<th>PO</th>
<th>LPR</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>91.30</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>6.06</td>
<td>54.55</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>21.21</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>64.71</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>29.41</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>14.29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>75.00</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>7.55</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>79.25</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>100.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>95.24</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>11.11</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>22.22</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>11.11</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>40.65</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>13.01</td>
<td>11.18</td>
<td>7.93</td>
<td>13.21</td>
<td>7.93</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>100.00</td>
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<td>No Party ID</td>
<td>43.58</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>11.41</td>
<td>9.47</td>
<td>8.76</td>
<td>12.83</td>
<td>6.82</td>
<td>7.13</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13 reflects similar results to Table 12 in respect to the SLD. Again, the 2001 elections reflect the similar pattern for the same group of political parties. Particularly, around 21% of the AWS partisans cast the ballot for the...
PO and 9% for the PiS. The UW partisans split mostly between the UW and its successor the PO. In 2005 elections (Table 14) on average over 80% of respondents who expressed partisanship for a particular party, voted for the same party. Again, there is evidence of swing voters within the same group of political parties. An average less than 6% claimed to be close to post-solidarity parties, but voted for the post-communist parties during the analyzed elections. These results do not confirm what Markowski claimed in his work discussed above. These tables reveal that nothing in the definition of party identification precludes voters who identify themselves with one party from voting for another party. As put by Dalton “party attachments are distinct from voting preferences...[and] the conceptual independence of voting and party identification initially gives the latter its significance.”

The last issue that needs to be exposed from Tables 12-14 is the percentage of independents and their support for the winning party in each election. In the 1997 and 2001 elections they constituted around 40% and in 2005 around 34%. They definitely constitute a large force that determines the outcome of elections. Now the question remains, who are these independents: are they disconnected from the political world and change their votes from election to election depending were the wind blows or are they truly evaluating partisan

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performance? A similar question should be asked about those who proclaimed that they are attached to a political party.

3.2 Cognitive Mobilization and the Polish Electorate

Following Dalton (2007) and cognitive mobilization theory, I constructed four groups of voters: ritual partisans, cognitive partisans, apartisans, and apoliticals. The ritual partisans are those voters who habitually support a political party in the election without much understanding or involvement in politics. The cognitive partisans represent the sophisticated group of partisans who “possess the cognitive resources to be involved in politics even when party cues are lacking.”\footnote{Dalton, "Partisan Mobilization, Cognitive Mobilization and the Changing American Electorate," 277.} The apartisans are a group of voters who possess the same cognitive skills and resources as cognitive partisans, but they are not attached to any of the political parties. Finally, the apoliticals are those who are “neither attached to a political party nor cognitively involved in politics.”\footnote{Ibid.} Dalton argues that distinguishing between apartisans and apoliticals who are usually put together into group of independents, clarifies “our understanding of contemporary electoral behavior.”\footnote{Ibid.} Again following Dalton, I constructed this typology using three variables available in the analyzed surveys. Specifically, I distinguished

\[\text{Cognitive Mobilization and the Polish Electorate}\]

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between those respondents who articulated their partisan attachment on the initial party identification question, and those who do not. The cognitive aspect of this typology was operationalized by combining education with the interest in politics.

Table 15. The distribution (%) of mobilization types over time, 1997-2005

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voters</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Voters</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Voters</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ritual Partisan</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Partisan</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apartisan</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apolitical</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15 presents the mobilization types over three elections. The distribution of partisan types changed substantially from 1997 to 2005. The number of ritual partisans is lower in the 2005 as compared to 1997, but higher than in 2001. The percentage of cognitive partisans is higher than ritual partisans for these three elections and reached the highest point in 2005 comprising of 37.2%. The 2001 electoral studies survey recorded the relatively low number of partisans as compared to 1997 and 2005. In the 2001 elections around 50 % of

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159Ibid.

160For further description how to create this typology see Ibid., specifically footnote 4.
voters claimed no party attachment at all while in 1997 and 2005 independents constituted around 35%.

Among independents, most voters are apoliticals, but there seems to be a growing number of apartisans. Note that the 2001 elections do not follow the pattern predicted by the cognitive mobilization theory which claims that the number of apartisans and cognitive partisans should grow from election to election while the percentage of ritual partisans and apoliticals ought to decline as the educational level of the public expands. In this sense, more election points need to be analyzed to state with confidence that cognitive mobilization is really present in the Polish public and there is a decline in the number of the ritual partisanship and apoliticals. Nevertheless, the results in Table 15 disclose something interesting about the Polish electorate if compared to the results reported by Dalton (2007) about the American voters. Perhaps surprisingly for some, the numbers for these four groups of voters are almost identical for the 2004 presidential elections in the U.S. as for the 2005 parliamentary elections in Poland. Does this mean that the Polish voters (similar to the American voters

\footnote{A very interesting is the number of apolitical voters in 2001 and 2005. The media reports after 2005 electoral victory of PiS proclaimed that this political party won elections thanks to uneducated middle and lower class as well as older population of church goers. The results presented here put this ‘conventional wisdom’ into question.}

\footnote{Ibid.: 278.
as portrayed by Dalton) become more sophisticated electors who do not need political parties or social cleavages to give them cues? Again, more data points over time is necessary to answer this question, but one point is clear from Table 15: the Polish electorate is not much different (as claimed by some scholars) from at least the U.S. electorate and perhaps other electorates in the developed democracies. Last, but not least, this finding confirms again that the party identification is applicable to the Polish political setting. The rest of the chapter focuses on assessing the impact of party identification on the vote choice.

3.3 Impact of Different Levels of Partisan Attachment on Vote Choice: Model 1

As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are several possibilities to test the Michigan Model of voting. First, instead of tracing the votes for a particular party, I analyze the vote for the same group of parties, namely the former communists and the post-solidarity. The justification for such a decision is supported by the recent literature on voting behavior in Poland. For instance, Tucker found that Polish voters cast a ballot either for Old Regime or New Regime parties with the respect to retrospective economic voting.\footnote{Joshua A. Tucker, \textit{Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic, 1990-1999} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).}

Further, it is reasonable to believe that it is easier for voters to distinguish as well as attach to a political party based on the party’s historical root, or, even
more convincing, to associate a particular party with its leader who was present in the opposition or supported the communist system. As we know from chapter one, some political parties disappeared from political arena and new ones were created. Of course this does not mean that leaders of these political parties truly disappeared. On the contrary, these “new” political parties were formed by the same politicians who advertised or promoted similar or even the same party programs. Usually, the split took place as a result of an ambition of leaders or the prediction that an “old” political party would not have a chance to win votes in the upcoming elections, for instance, because of the corruption scandals. Thus, I constructed the matrices of “old” and “new” political parties for particular elections to test whether voters would vote for the “same” political party. In other words, if party X dissolved before an election and as a result two other parties Y and Z emerged, I treated the votes for parties Y and Z as a vote for X to examine the trend in psychological attachment. Such an approach allows me to test the impact of partisanship on dichotomous dependent variable that
represents the votes for post-communist and post-solidarity parties using probit regression.\textsuperscript{164}

Closely following Bartels’ analysis of partisan voting for the U.S. elections from 1952 to 1996, I replicated his logic to analyze the recent Polish elections.\textsuperscript{165} Particularly, I estimated the influence of partisanship on voting behavior employing probit model in which the dependent variable is a vote choice for either post-solidarity parties (coded 1) or post-communist parties (coded 0).\textsuperscript{166} The covariates represent the three levels of partisan attachment “strong”, “medium”, and “weak”. These three categories were created from three survey questions. First, respondents were asked to identify whether or not they feel close to any political party. If the answer was positive, the respondent was asked

\textsuperscript{164}The probit estimation is widely used by econometricians and it has an advantage over the logit estimation that “the coefficients may be transformed directly into probabilities at particular levels of the independent variables simply by using values from a standard normal distribution” John P. Hoffmann, \textit{Generalized Linear Models} (Boston: Pearson: Allyn & Bacon, 2004), 55. Further, the choice between logit and probit estimation seem not to make a much difference even though both estimations follow different distribution functions William H. Greene, \textit{Econometric Analysis}, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2008), 774.

\textsuperscript{165}Bartels, "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996."

\textsuperscript{166}The classification of political parties into the post-communist and the post-solidarity parties is available upon request.
to name the political party to which he or she feels close to. The respondent’s identification with a political party was then recoded to indicate a group of parties, either post-solidarity or post-communist party family. Further, a respondent was asked to identify how close s/he feels to this party with four possible answers “very close”, “somewhat close”, “not very close”, and “don’t know, hard to say”. The category “strong” party attachment includes respondents who answer “very close” and was coded 1 for strong identifiers with post-solidarity parties, -1 for “strong” identifiers with post-communist parties, and 0 for all other voters. The category “medium” identifiers includes respondents who answer “somewhat close” and was coded 1 for “medium” identifiers with post-solidarity parties, -1 for “medium” identifiers with post-communist parties, and 0 for all other voters. The category “weak” includes respondents who answer “not very close” and was coded 1 for “weak” identifiers with post-solidarity parties, -1 for “weak” identifiers with post-communist parties, and 0 for all other voters. The intercept in probit estimation indicates the pro-post-solidarity bias of “pure” independents. The coefficients for strong, medium, and weak attachment, as pointed by Bartels, “reflects the extent to

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167 Category “don’t know/hard to say” was recoded to not very close to a party. This category constituted roughly between 3 and 4 percent of respondents depending on the dataset.
which the choices of voters with these various levels of partisan attachment departed from the choices of ‘pure’ independents.”

The results from probit estimation for the parliamentary election of 1997, 2001, and 2005 are reported in Table 16. From the coefficients we can simply calculate the probabilities at the mean values of covariates using the standard normal distribution table. The calculations reveal that on average we expect about 90% of the partisans to vote for the post-solidarity parties in all three elections. We would expect that the highest probabilities are associated with the strong partisans, but this is not true for 1997 and 2001 elections. Surprisingly, the highest probability goes to medium partisans, then to weak partisans, and at the end to strong partisans in both elections. Only the 2005 elections follow the rationality of partisanship with the hierarchy of probability going from strong to weak partisans. The independents were leaning more toward the post-solidarity parties in 2005 than in 1997. The probability that an independent would vote for the post-solidarity party in these two elections is 0.7 and 0.6 respectively. There is no evidence of any bias of pure independents toward either post-communist or post-solidarity parties in 2001 elections. Finally, based on the descriptive statistics presented earlier, it is not surprising that the model for 2001 election is

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169Of course there are deviations between elections with the highest percentage for 2005 and the lowest for 2001.
Table 16. Probit Estimates for the Michigan Model of Voting – Model 1

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficients / S. E.</td>
<td>Coefficients / S. E.</td>
<td>Coefficients / S. E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Strong&quot; Identifiers</td>
<td>1.2362*** (0.2960)</td>
<td>1.2309*** (0.2876)</td>
<td>1.8421*** (0.4492)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Medium&quot; Identifiers</td>
<td>1.5913*** (0.1458)</td>
<td>1.4400*** (0.1493)</td>
<td>1.5432*** (0.1593)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Weak&quot; Identifiers</td>
<td>1.3050*** (0.1864)</td>
<td>1.4443*** (0.1398)</td>
<td>1.3429*** (0.0904)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (pro-Post-solidarity bias of &quot;pure&quot; independents)</td>
<td>0.2682*** (0.0506)</td>
<td>0.0339 (0.0527)</td>
<td>0.5207*** (0.0557)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1097
Wald $\chi^2$ (3) = 303.87
Pseudo R$^2$ = 0.3752
Log pseudolikelihood = -439.493

N = 982
Wald $\chi^2$ (3) = 214.37
Pseudo R$^2$ = 0.2855
Log pseudolikelihood = -485.697

N = 1180
Wald $\chi^2$ (3) = 339.49
Pseudo R$^2$ = 0.4451
Log pseudolikelihood = -312.256

Binary dependent variable was coded 1 if respondent voted for post-solidarity party and 0 otherwise.
***p<0.001 two-tailed test. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
least explanatory and the model for 2005 elections explains the largest portion of variance.

**Figure 2.** Estimated Impact of Party Identification on Vote

As suggested by Bartels, I computed “the average of the probit estimate, each weighted by the proportion of the electorate in the corresponding partisan category”.\(^{170}\) The computation of such indicators is “appropriately sensitive both to the *proportion* of party identifiers of various types in the electorate and the *impact* of their partisan attachments in the voting booth”.\(^{171}\) Figure 2 presents

\(^{170}\)Ibid.: 39.

\(^{171}\)Ibid.
these indicators for each election. The noticeable decline of partisanship voting is evident in 2001 when compared to previous and subsequent elections. Both post-communist and post-solidarity party identifiers discarded their partisan identity in 2001. Figure 2 also informs us that the increase in partisan voting from 2001 to 2005 accounted for 44.6%. The level of partisan voting decreased from 1997 to 2001 by 20.5%. In 2005 a level of partisan voting was 24.1% higher then in 1997.

To summarize, the analysis reveals that party attachment, operationalized in the form of degree of partisanship identification, is an important predictor of the vote. The statistics presented in this model might bring us to the conclusion that Polish voters have been developing a psychological attachment to political parties. This attachment seems to be associated with the growing number of cognitive partisans (Table 15). As the party volatility diminish and the cognitive learning of the partisanship continues (as predicted by the cognitive mobilization theory), it could be expected that the party identification would be even better predictor of vote in the future elections. It is not to say that there could not be a downturn in the partisanship identification as it was in the 2001 elections.\footnote{Again, more time-series data on elections is necessary to evaluate these speculations.}

Nevertheless, it is evident from these analyses that voters are learning how to be partisans.
3.4 Impact of Party Identification, Ideological Orientations and Group Interests on Vote Choice: Model 2

So far, this chapter focused only on the partisanship attachment. Further investigation follows the recommendations of the recent scholarship on the socio-psychological model of voting. Specifically, I utilize the same method of estimation as above but expand the analysis by including in addition to party identification covariates that capture voters’ ideological orientations and their groups’ interests. As pointed out by Green et al. (2002) “if a sequence or regressions reveals that the apparent influence of party disappears after one controls for factors that potentially cause party identification, the implication is that the correlation between party and the vote is spurious.” There is no doubt in the literature on voting behavior that people are socialized into partisanship by their experience with group members broadly defined. Social

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173 As pointed out by Green et al., the literature on voting behavior is divided between those who argue that either ideology or party identification should be included in the estimation models and those who argue that ideology is useless predictor of vote because only small fraction of electorate is capable of casting the ideological vote. Green et al., on the other hand, argues that it is appropriate to include both of this measure into one equation. As argued in the following, this chapter follows this suggestion. Compare Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters*, 207. Ibid., 213-14.

174 Ibid., 207.
Table 17. Probit Estimates for the Michigan Model of Voting – Model 2

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right Self-Placement</td>
<td>2.5611*** (.2982)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.4876*** (.2725)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.4628*** (.2924)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
<td>2.1834*** (.1944)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.367*** (.231)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.4598*** (.186)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party Membership</td>
<td>-.4703** (.1864)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.0254 (.2249)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.1585 (.2204)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
<td>.2839* (.1379)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.1553 (.1329)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.0979 (.1568)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (pro-Post-solidarity</td>
<td>.0643041 (.1178)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.0199 (.1122)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.4787*** (.1318)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bias of “pure” independents)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

N= 1034
Wald χ²(4) = 223.80
Pseudo R² = 0.5085
Log pseudolikelihood = -324.88
Percentage Predicted Correctly = 75.5%

N = 870
Wald χ²(4) = 187.01
Pseudo R² = 0.4391
Log pseudolikelihood = -337.81
Percentage Predicted Correctly = 46.5%

N = 804
Wald χ²(4) = 242.49
Pseudo R² = 0.5135
Log pseudolikelihood = -198.54
Percentage Predicted Correctly = 89.2%

Binary dependent variable was coded 1 if respondent voted for post-solidarity party and 0 otherwise. *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 two-tailed test. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
groups help people to create stereotypes of the parties and used them as information short-cut.\textsuperscript{175} The Polish electorate could learn partisanship from the former communist party (the PZPR) or the Catholic Church and transform it into the party preference at least during the first several democratic elections.\textsuperscript{176} Therefore, besides the ideological orientations of voters measured by the left-right self-placement, I also employ two other covariates that capture the group interest and are associated with the process of partisanship learning.\textsuperscript{177} Particularly, church attendance and the membership in the PZPR enter the estimation equation as a set of dummy variables coded 1 for the positive responses and 0 otherwise. Finally, the party identification variable was coded 1 if a respondent identified himself/herself with post-solidarity party and coded -1 if a respondent identified himself/herself with post-communist parties; code 0 was assigned to independents.

Table 17 presents the probit estimates on vote share in the examined elections. First, we notice that communist membership and church attendance

\textsuperscript{175}Of course people can think outside these stereotypes, by using the incoming information to change their minds and update their views, as argued by the cognitive mobilization theory.

\textsuperscript{176}It is obvious that the influence of the membership in the PZPR is going to diminish as time passes and older generation dies out.

\textsuperscript{177}The ten point left-right self-placement coded from -0.5 to 0.5 where negative values indicate left and positive values right self placement.
played a role in voting behavior in the 1997 elections, but not in the later elections. In other words, political divisions of the past were present in the 1997 elections and declined as time passed; similarly, the social cleavage defined as religion declined comparing 1997 elections and 2001 elections. These findings confirm what the analysis of sociological model of voting suggested in the previous chapter. On the other hand, controlling for these two covariates this model does not improve the accuracy of prediction. Specifically, the percentage correctly predicted goes from 71% to 72%, a one percentage difference.\textsuperscript{178} These group interest variables do not add anything at all to the predictability of the model for the 2001 and 2005 elections.\textsuperscript{179}

\textsuperscript{178}The percentage predicted correctly for the examined elections without control variables is available upon request.

\textsuperscript{179}It is worthy noting here that in order to properly test the influence of these two covariates on the formation of partisanship and then the vote choice, the structural equations model should be applied. But the estimation procedure for the binary dependent variable and some binary independent variables is not available in any available statistical software; it is also quite difficult to program this kind of estimation to get the correct standard errors even in the powerful open-source software such as \textit{R}. Thus, the results presented here for the control variables need to be interpreted with caution. For the description of such estimation see Takeshi Amemiya, \textit{Advanced Econometrics} (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
Special attention should also go to the constant, which reflects the pro-post-solidarity bias of ‘pure’ independents and those who are neutral on the left-right self-placement and without previous communist party membership and without church attendance. While the constant is only significant for 2005 elections, the sign reflect the direction of this bias. In particular, the independents were more likely to vote for post-solidarity parties in 1997 and 2005 elections and post-communist parties in 2001. Note that post-solidarity parties won the 1997 and 2005 elections and post-communist parties 2001 elections. This might suggest that the independents, at least in 2005, determine the outcome of elections. Further, Table 17 suggests that the effect of ideological attachment is larger than party attachment while predicting or explaining the votes in all but the 2005 elections. For instance, each unit increase in the left-right self-placement (moving from left to right on the political spectrum) is expected to increase on average the probability of voting for post-solidarity parties about 0.8 in the 1997 election, 0.98 in 2001 elections and 0.27 in 2005 elections.180 The

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180These numbers represent the marginal effects that were computed at mean values for “left-right self-placement” and “party id”; the marginal effects for covariates “communist party membership” and “church attendance” are the discrete changes from 0 to 1. Full set of marginal effects is available upon request. Please note that party ID has a range of 2 (from -1 to +1), thus the coefficient for the ID in Table 17 is multiplied by 2 to be able to compare this coefficient with the coefficients of the other variables.
coefficients in Table 17 are interpreted using predicted probabilities presented in Figures 3-5.

**Figure 3.** Probabilities of Voting for the Post-Solidarity Parties in 1997 Elections

These figures present the probability of voting for post-solidarity parties. More specifically, these probabilities are graphed as the function of the left-right self-placement. They were calculated for average voter distinguishing between those who identified themselves as close to or distanced from post-solidarity parties. The distribution of probabilities for 1997 and 2001 elections look similar while the probabilities for 2005 election are noticeably different from previous estimates. In particular, Figures 3-4 demonstrate the likelihood for voting for post-solidarity parties for voters who are attached to this family of parties and
placed themselves right-of-center is between 0.9 and 1. This likelihood is even higher for 2005 elections, ranging from 0.95 to 1.

**Figure 4.** Probabilities of Voting for the Post-Solidarity Parties in 2001 Elections

The probability of voting for post-solidarity parties as a function of left-right self-placement for the independents approximates linear function for all three elections. Figures 3-4 show that those voters who placed themselves in the middle of ideological distribution are predicted to vote for the post-communist parties almost with the same probabilities as for the post-solidarity parties (Pr=0.59 in 1997 and Pr=0.52 in 2001). This finding suggests that the
ideological perspective was a benchmark for independents while casting the vote in 1997 and 2001 elections.

Figure 5. Probabilities of Voting for the Post-Solidarity Parties in 2005 Elections

Figure 5 presents the independents as lining toward the post-solidarity parties while casting the ballot. This finding is also confirmed by the estimated constant in Table 17. Further, independents who placed themselves left-of-center on the ideological scale are more likely to vote for the post-solidarity parties in 2005 election comparing to previous elections. Figure 5 requires special attention in terms of party identification for those who are attached to one of the party families. Specifically, the bottom and top lines are more flat, linear, and further
apart from each other, indicating a larger effect of party identification on vote share compared to the previous elections. The calculated probabilities for the 2005 elections suggest that the left-right self-placement does not have as large influence on the probability of vote as in the previous elections if a respondent expressed the attachment to one of the post-solidarity parties. This might mean that the left-right spectrum could change its meaning for some voters; instead of classification based on the socio-cultural and historical divides, perhaps some of the Polish voter started to perceive left-right dimension in the economic terms. This speculation is justified on the bases of party programs and the electoral campaign during which most of the post-solidarity parties emphasized the welfare state. This issue is further investigated in the last part of the chapter.

3.5 Multinomial Logit Estimation: Model 3

A final step to test the socio-psychological model of voting is to examine whether or not the influence of party identification on voting choices holds for the different groups of political parties. Therefore, I constructed the dependent variable to reflect three different groups of parties that are associated with the programmatic stands on the socio-cultural and economic issues. While classifying the parties into groups, I also referred to the European Union party associations to assess parties’ affiliation within the parliamentary structures. Specifically, I categorized the political parties into social conservatives, liberal conservatives and social democrats. The group of social conservatives consists of parties that are pro-welfare state and have conservative views
on the socio-cultural issues. *Liberal conservatives* have the same stand on the socio-cultural issues as *social conservatives* but their view of economic policies differs from *social conservatives* in the way that they are supporting more economic liberalism. The *social democrats* have similar views on economic policies as *social conservatives*, but they are very liberal compared to social democrats. Most of the post-solidarity parties belong either to the group of *social conservatives* or *liberal conservatives* while *social democrats* mostly comprise of post-communist parties.181

The independent variables that represent the party identification are based on the initial question used in the survey “which party respondents feels close to?” and recoded to reflect three groups of parties described above. In particular, the independents were always coded 0 while 1 was assigned to respondents who identify themselves as close to a political party family and -1 to others. For example, the social conservative party identification variable was coded 1 for those who identify with this group of political parties; code 0 was given to independents and code -1 to others. The same logic was applied to two other variables representing party identification. The same control variables are used in statistical model, namely church attendance and the communist party membership. The method of estimation is the multinomial logit extensively described in chapter 3.

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181 The names of the parties classified into these three groups are available to reader upon request.
Table 18. Multinomial Logit Estimates – Model 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Election of 1997</th>
<th>Election of 2001</th>
<th>Election of 2005</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef./S.E.</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
<td>Coef./S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Conservatives</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right Self-Placement</td>
<td>4.766****</td>
<td>117.47</td>
<td>5.312****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.5865)</td>
<td>(.6257)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.6788)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID Social Democrats</td>
<td>-0.8967****</td>
<td>40.79</td>
<td>-1.158****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.2808)</td>
<td>(.3908)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3889)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID Liberal Conservatives</td>
<td>0.716**</td>
<td>2.047</td>
<td>-0.0315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.2852)</td>
<td>(0.3073)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3707)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID Social Conservatives</td>
<td>1.607****</td>
<td>4.9852</td>
<td>0.7621****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.2649)</td>
<td>(.3787)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.4071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party Membership</td>
<td>-0.593*</td>
<td>0.5523</td>
<td>-0.0823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.3447)</td>
<td>(.4341)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5441)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
<td>833****</td>
<td>2.3001</td>
<td>0.458*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.2563)</td>
<td>(.2958)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.3582)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (pro-Social Conservatives bias of “pure” independents)</td>
<td>-0.3796</td>
<td>-0.3487</td>
<td>-3864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.2409)</td>
<td>(0.2279)</td>
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<td>(0.3494)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberal Conservatives</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.5711)</td>
<td>(.6093)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.6606)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party ID Social Democrats</td>
<td>-1.012****</td>
<td>36.358</td>
<td>-1.87****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.3804)</td>
<td>(.3665)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.4004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID Liberal Conservatives</td>
<td>1.556****</td>
<td>4.7412</td>
<td>0.8635**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.4303)</td>
<td>(.3748)</td>
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<td>(.3935)</td>
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<td>Party ID Social Conservatives</td>
<td>0.1755</td>
<td>1.1918</td>
<td>-0.7455**</td>
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<td>(0.3272)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.3997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party Membership</td>
<td>-1.255****</td>
<td>28.506</td>
<td>-0.6844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.6227)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.5619)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
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<td>1.3958</td>
<td>0.0874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.2983)</td>
<td>(.2833)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.3538)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (pro-Liberal Conservatives bias of “pure” independents)</td>
<td>-1.03****</td>
<td>-0.4741*</td>
<td>-4613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.2985)</td>
<td>(.2517)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3439)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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N = 1036
Wald χ²(12) = 380.4
Pseudo R² = 0.4720
Log pseudolikelihood = -553.68807

N = 864
Wald χ²(12) = 257.9
Pseudo R² = 0.4001
Log pseudolikelihood = -554.10855

N = 804
Wald χ²(12) = 394.4
Pseudo R² = 0.5248
Log pseudolikelihood = -379.8602

Category “Social Democrats” is the base outcome. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001 two-tailed test.
Table 18 presents the estimated coefficient and odds ratios. The effects of party identification, ideology and social groups’ interests on voters’ choice are on average strongly moderate. The pseudo R-squared ranges between 0.4 in the 2001 elections and 0.52 in the 2007 elections. The model predicts 40% of the variance in vote preferences for the 1997 elections. The postestimation techniques allow us to calculate the predicted probabilities for each group of political parties.

The prediction based on the specified model for the 1997 elections works best for social conservatives where 49% is correctly predicted. For social democrats the percentage correctly predicted constitutes 37% and for liberal conservatives only 13%. In the 2001 elections the highest prediction of 43.9% goes to social democrats while the probability of voting for liberal conservatives is 23.6% and for social conservatives 32.4%. In 2005 elections the predictions are as follows: social conservatives 63%, liberal conservatives 29.8%, and social democrats 7.2%. It seems that probability of voting for the specific group of parties is higher if the group won the election. This could indicate the bias in the survey responses, the possibility that cannot be excluded.

The notable finding is that this model best predicts the vote preference for two groups of party families that are distinct in terms of socio-cultural stands and the political histories, namely social conservatives and social democrats. The reason for this is the vast impact of the ideological orientation on the vote choice. The odds of voting for social conservative relative to social democrats are 117.4 (in 1997), 202.6 (in 2001) 58.7 (in 2005) times greater for those who identify themselves on the right-of-center
ideological spectrum, holding party identifications, church attendance and communist party membership constant. We can clearly see that the impact of ideology is immense, but also declining over time. On the other hand, the odds of voting for liberal conservative compared to social democrats are 21.6 (in 1997), 117.7 (in 2001) and 39.5 (in 2005) times greater for those who identify themselves on the right-of-center of the ideological spectrum, holding other variables constant. Adding the substantive meaning to these odds ratios, the conclusion is straight forward: those voters who placed themselves right-of-center are more likely to vote for social conservatives or liberal conservative than those whose ideological orientation is left-of-center. In other words, when voters identify themselves on the right-of-center ideological spectrum, we could be confident that out of 100 voters at least 95 would vote either for social conservatives or liberal conservatives parties; to simplify even more, voters with this particular ideological orientation would support post-solidarity parties rather than post-communist parties. Further, our understanding of the left-right dimension of the Polish electorate seems to be founded on socio-cultural-historical bases rather than economic ones. This was not very clear, at least for 2005 elections, from binary logit estimation presented above.

Note that the impact of ideology on voting choice is greater while the impact of party identification is smaller. This is specifically true for the 2001 elections. To analyze the impact of party identification on vote choice we look again on odds ratios. The odds of voting for social conservative relative to social democrats are 4.9 (in 1997), 2.1 (in 2001), and 3.2 (in 2005) times greater for those who claim to feel close to social
conservative parties, holding other independent variables constant. Further, social conservatives’ partisans are not likely to vote for social democrats and vice versa. Again there is a pattern indicating the decline of partisan voting in 2001. To sum up, those voters who are attached to a specific group of parties are more likely to vote for them than those who do not hold such affection.

The previous analysis showed that the independents were more inclined to vote for post-solidarity parties. This results reported in Table 18 might give us a wrong impression of inconsistency. Specifically, the signs of the coefficients are negative indicating the there was a pro-social conservative bias of pure independents. This interpretation is only partially true. Estimating the model again with the liberal conservatives as a base outcome reveals that the “pure” independents vote rather for social democrats or social conservatives than liberal conservatives. The constant is a little larger for the social conservatives than social democrats.

Finally, this estimation confirms previous findings regarding the communist party membership and the church attendance. Both of these covariates were significant determinants of vote for social conservatives in 1997. To translate the odds ratio for church attendance in 1997 for social conservatives, imagine a voter who does not attend the church at all and his chance of voting for social conservatives are 50%. If this voter starts to attend the church at least 3 times a month, the probability of voting for social democrats would increase to 59.9%, ceteris paribus. The church goers also supported
social conservatives in 2001 but not in 2005. The communist party membership is not significant for the last two elections.

To sum up, it is apparent that the voting behavior can be explained in part by reference to psychological orientations that form ideology as well as party attachments. It is also clear that the influence of ideological orientation exceeds the influence of the party identification in all but the 2005 elections.

4. Conclusion

This chapter provided an extensive analysis of various dimensions of the Michigan model of voting. Specifically, it was shown that the previous doubts present in the literature on electoral behavior in Poland about the formation of political identities might not hold anymore as the democratization process goes on and voters learn how to understand the new political and electoral settings. Partisan attachments and identities found in the Polish electorate demonstrate that political identities are in the process of formation. Party attachments seem to serve as heuristics in the electoral process and they are fine predictor of vote. The applicability of the commonly used explanatory framework for the voting behavior might lead us to conclude that the Polish electorate does not seem to be very different from other polities. Even though this study utilized only a tiny part of the socio-psychological model of voting, I believe the findings suggest the importance of exploring further the various approaches to voting behavior already developed and tested on the established democracies. Thus, the message from this
chapter is clear: the Michigan model of voting is applicable to Poland and perhaps to other newly emerged democracies.

The contribution of this chapter to existing research is definitely the addition of the neglected concept of party identification and to some extent voters’ ideological orientations for prediction and explanation of voting choices. Classifications of the political parties into family groups and the estimation of voting choices based on the variation in loyalty rates among partisans and non-partisans and the application of cognitive mobilization theory to the Polish electoral behavior brings the remarkable possibilities for future investigations of partisan voting.
CHAPTER FIVE

ECONOMIC MODELS OF VOTING

Previous chapters indicated the explanatory powers of various models of voting behavior. This chapter focuses on economic voting and examines whether rational choice methodology and western-style rational voter perception actually fit the case of Poland. Researchers differ in their evaluations of the economic model of voting by employing the aggregate and individual levels of analyses. Following this divide, this chapter consists of two parts. The first part employs the regional level data to examine the voter’s reaction to the past economic condition (retrospective hypothesis). In other words, this analysis is based on the number of actual votes the political parties/coalitions received in each administrative region in last three elections.

The second part of this chapter utilizes the survey microdata and tests the so called retrospective hypothesis, which states that voters react more to the past economic events that relate to their pocketbook finances than to expected ones as well as prospective hypothesis, which states that voters’ future perception of the economy matters more in their voting decisions than their past economic status. To examine these hypotheses, I test the retrospective and prospective model of egotropic as well as the sociotropic economic voting. It is expected that both
levels of analysis will confirm the thesis that economically satisfied voters will reward the incumbent parties, whereas voters that are unhappy economically will punish the incumbent parties by voting for parties in opposition.

1. **Theory of Economic Voting in the Comparative Context**

The theory of economic voting, based on the American school of rational choice, goes back to the 1960s and 1970s and includes two basic ideas. First, voters are rational. Because they are rational, they are capable of making rational judgments based upon past conditions or events.\(^\text{182}\) Second, these rational voters are knowledgeable about the performance of the economy.\(^\text{183}\) Further, the proponents of economic voting agree in general that there are factors that influence the perception of economic voters. As pointed out by Harrop et al., party identification influences economic voters in the U.S. whereas class and religious identities persuade voters in Europe to interpret selectively political and economic events. The remarkable point in the entire economic voting literature is that voters are perceived and analyzed as consumers; they acquire brand loyalties (through party identification, class or religion) but they are also willing to change a brand if the performance of an incumbent party drops significantly or if fresh

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ideas and new parties emerge. To some extent, it could be argued from the perspective of economic voting that electors choose political parties the same way as they choose their washing detergent in the supermarket. If the washing detergent is harming the environment and/or it is destroying the consumers’ clothes, the clients will change it for a different brand even if they were attached to this brand for various reasons and for a long time. In other words, consumers/voters who believe that the specific brand is harming the environment/economy, but not necessarily their clothes/personal finances, will change it to a different one. This corresponds to the sociotropic model of voting. Those consumers/voters who blame the specific brand for their own misfortunes will also change the brand to a different one. This corresponds to the egotropic model of voting.

The literature on economic voting indicates how well these two models perform in different countries and relates it to the well known ‘clarity of responsibility’ hypothesis proposed by Powell, Whitten and Palmer.\textsuperscript{184} For instance, current research points out that in Denmark the egotropic model is

\begin{footnotesize}
\end{footnotesize}
stronger than the sociotropic model whereas the opposite is evident in the U.S.\textsuperscript{185} One would ask why the citizens of the social welfare state are concerned more about their pocketbook finances than the citizens of neo-liberal system. One of the plausible explanations in the literature points out to the cultural values of citizens in different states. In the liberal democracies, like the U.S., citizens are responsible for their own fortune or misfortune, not government(s). In the social democracies, like Denmark, where governments have higher responsibility for the individuals’ welfare, the government(s) is blamed for the decline of personal finances.\textsuperscript{186} Also, basic security provided by the state is greater in Denmark, so Danes have more freedom to worry about their personal situation. Testing the sociotropic and egotropic models of voting in Poland would also allow to access whether or not the Polish voters behave similarly to the American or Danish voters when casting a ballot for their representatives.\textsuperscript{187}


\textsuperscript{186}Certainly there is a clear link between state of national economy and the personal finances.

\textsuperscript{187}The pre-analysis of voters’ responses to the surveys questions (1997, 2001, and 2005) about the government responsibility of citizen’s welfare and the dependence of households’ situation on governmental policies show that the Polish voter acts similarly to the American voter.
Further, the theory of economic voting diverges into two groups. One group believes that voters reward governments for good times and punish them for bad times. In other words, voters are perceived as very brutal since they are concerned with results, not policies. “What have you accomplished in past 4 years?” is a question for incumbent parties posted by voters. Further, the reward or punishment of political parties in power is closely linked to voters’ evaluations of economic problems, such as unemployment.

The other perspective on economic voting portrays citizens as those who perform their search for the party based on policy preferences. The policy oriented voters make judgments about the responsibility of political party on various aspects of socio-economic spectrum, such as welfare state policies. This chapter implements these two paths within the theory of economic voting by employing various independent variables that correspond to the performance evaluations and the policies concerns.

The issue of economic voting was revitalized and improved by the numerous scholars interested in this subject in the mid-1980s, such as Michael S. Lewis-Beck and his books Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: The United States and Western Europe and Economics and Elections.\textsuperscript{188} The main

\textsuperscript{188}Eulau and Lewis-Beck, Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: The United States and Western Europe, Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies.
argument presented by Lewis-Beck is that national economic performance (measured by macroeconomic indicators) may be used to predict electorate support for the government in power when analyzing Western developed countries such as France, Great Britain, and the United States.

It appears that, when testing the theory of economic voting (in the cases of states that have democratic systems), researchers have reached a consensus that economic conditions/factors influence voting behavior. For instance, Richard Nadeau et al. found a relationship between governmental responsibility for public policy and economic voting.\textsuperscript{189} Christopher J. Anderson dealt with the similar problem of governmental responsibility, but his argument was that it is more difficult to assign responsibility to the government in some systems than in others.\textsuperscript{190} As an example of Anderson’s argument, G. D. Whitten et al. pointed out that “multiparty governments will concentrate more on improving growth … [if] incumbent parties cannot agree on whether to focus on reducing inflation or unemployment.”\textsuperscript{191} Scholars from this tradition usually use unemployment, wages, taxes, etc. as they key economic variables. The use of these macroeconomic


\textsuperscript{191}Whitten and Palmer, "Cross-National Analyses of Economic Voting," 52.
variables is based on scholarly suggestions that voters may take the national economy into account more than their personal financial circumstances or social benefits.\(^{192}\) This chapter tests this statement by analyzing the voter’s behavior by focusing on the voters’ subjective perception and evaluation of economy as well as objective measures of economic security collected on the regional level.

The main articles written on economic voting in Poland were discussed in chapter 1. Yet it seems to be appropriate to extend the research on economic voting to the literature that focuses on East-Central Europe after 1989 to have a broader perspective on the application of the theory in question. There are two main articles that examine regional economic voting in the post communist countries.\(^{193}\)

First, the article by Jan Fidrmuc “Economics of Voting in Post-Communist Countries” analyzes elections in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Hungary, and East-Central Europe after 1989.\(^{193}\)


Poland, and Slovakia. Fidrmuc’s findings are consistent with the theory of economic voting in that he discovers that voters who benefit from the reforms “vote for the right wing pro-reform parties whereas those who have become worse off vote for the left wing parties.”\textsuperscript{194} His findings also indicate that unemployment strongly reduces support for parties in power.\textsuperscript{195} The second article written by Joshua A. Tucker (2001) argues that there is empirical evidence that “economic conditions help Primary Incumbents more often then Other Incumbents.”\textsuperscript{196} In other words, economic conditions have a strong relationship to the political success of parties in power.

2. \textbf{Regional Economic Voting}

2.1 \textit{Voting Behavior and Regional Analysis}

In his book \textit{Parties and Politics in Post-1989 Poland}, Hubert Tworzecki emphasized the importance of region and history in both party system formation and voting behavior.\textsuperscript{197} Based upon Tworzecki’s argument, this paper extends the approach of regional analysis of political behavior to the regional analysis of

\textsuperscript{194}Fidrmuc, "Economics of Voting in Post-Communist Countries," 199.


\textsuperscript{196}Ibid.: 323.

\textsuperscript{197}Tworzecki, \textit{Parties and Politics in Post 1989 Poland}, 83.
voting. If the local context matters because of geographical differences in political power and economic wealth, then it is obvious that the regional analysis of voting behavior is justified. It may be argued that every country contains both “core” and “peripheral” regions, at least in the context of economic prosperity. The same is true for Poland. The East, North-East, and South-East regions are less developed and therefore represent the periphery while West, North-West, and South-West are generally wealthier, with the Central regions representing a type of “center ground” on the scale of economic prosperity. Further, a continued psychological acceptance of communist norms is more evident in some regions than the others.  

Following Tworzecki’s work, I could divide Poland into geographical regions according to cultural and historical contexts. Yet, such approach would eliminate a detailed breakdown available on the level of administrative units (wojewodztwo) as well as decrease the number of observations for the analysis (the well known small-N problem). Further, due to the fact that Polish administrative units changed, the smaller units of analysis applicable to the 1997 elections had to be aggregated to match administrative division relevant for the later elections. In other words, to create the balanced panel dataset for the 1997,  

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2001 and 2005 elections Poland was restructured into administrative units according to the new administrative division instituted in 1999.\textsuperscript{199} The reason to create the balanced panel data set is to increase the number of observations for analysis and ability to generalize from the broader perspective whether or not the Polish voters behave as \textit{homo economicus}.

\subsection*{2.2 Independent variables – regional level data}

The theory of economic voting and previous research indicate that the state of national economy, measured by the growth rate in gross domestic product (GDP), unemployment, inflation, income, public health expenditure, and even public spending on education explain voting behavior. Since part of this chapter

\textsuperscript{199}As noted by David Jesuit et al., “due to the reform of Poland’s Provinces in 1999, the regional aggregations for Poland 1999 are not exactly comparable to the groupings in 1992 and 1995” David K. Jesuit, Michael Förster, and Timothy Smeeding, "Regional Poverty and Income Inequality in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study," (Luxembourg: Luxembourg Income Study, Working Paper 324, 2002), 5. To overcome this obstacle, I collected the actual number of votes on the smallest unit of analysis (gmina) and aggregated it into larger wojewodztwo (voivodship). In the case of income inequality and poverty data from LIS, it was impossible to disaggregate the larger units into smaller and reconstruct them into larger based on gmina. Similar problem was encounter with other independent variables, such as unemployment and GDP growth available only on the voivodoship. Therefore I used approximation to much the old administrative divisions with the new ones for all independent variables while employing balanced panel data estimation.
focuses on the regional level votes, it is impossible to collect the data for all these economic factors. Thus, to examine the effects of the national economy on voting behavior, I employ the measure of unemployment, GDP growth, poverty, and income inequality.

As argued by many rational choice scholars, unemployment is crucial when analyzing the economy of voting.\footnote{See for instance discussion on which variables to choose when analyzing economy of voting, and why to choose unemployment in Blount, "Unemployment and Economic Voting."} High unemployment rates indicate the economic problems that are certainly evaluated by the voters. As suggested by previous research, higher unemployment would generate the vote against the incumbent parties. Analysis on the regional level utilize the annual percentage of the rate of unemployment measured as a percentage of total labor force and refers to the share of the labor force that registered as unemployed and available for and seeking employment.\footnote{Główny Urzad Statystyczny, "Rocznik Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej," in \textit{Seria Roczniki Statystyczne} (Warszawa: Główny Urzad Statystyczny, 2001).}

Usually the measure of economic prosperity is based on the GDP growth rate. Since the Statistical Office of Poland provides only data on GDP per capita for each administrative region, the approximation of growth had to be calculated. Specifically, I computed the percentage change of GDP per capita using the figures from the year of election and a preceding year and corrected them for the
inflation that was measured on the national level. Similar to the unemployment rate, the theory of economic voting suggests that the slow or lack of economic growth signify some economic difficulty that should is evaluated by the voters at the ballot box. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the higher economic growth on the regional level would bring the same or greater number of votes for incumbent parties.

There is almost no evidence of utilizing the income inequality and poverty data in analysis of economic voting for one obvious reason: lack of data. Yet there is a justification for using both measures as indicators of economic voting behavior. It might be argued that voters living in the regions were there is a large number of poor people may have inclination to support political parties that would maintain “a higher rate of growth of the public sector of the economy, larger central government budgets, more income equalization, greater efforts to

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\(^{202}\)For instance, Andrew Leigh employed Gini index in his analysis of economic voting in Australia. Yet there is no evidence of income inequality measures utilized in the economic voting behavior in Eastern Europe in general and Poland in particular. See Andrew Leigh, "Economic Voting and Electoral Behavior: How Do Individual, Local, and National Factors Affect the Partisan Choice?," *Economics & Politics* 17, no. 2 (2005).
reduce unemployment, and more emphasis on education, public health, and social welfare spending.”

This logic would obviously generate votes for the socio-economic politics of “western style” Left-oriented governments. Interestingly, each political party that received the most votes in last several parliamentary elections could be placed on the left side of the economic equality spectrum. Further, a notion of Left-party among Polish voters has been associated with parties and institutions prior to 1989 or its continuity after 1989. On the Right-side of the political spectrum, voters perceived political parties and governments that emerged after 1989 and

were in the opposition to the former communist party. Therefore, in case of Poland, the votes for the socio-economic politics of “western style” Left-oriented governments could be perceived as economic votes for an incumbent party if poverty is low. Further, if the national economy is not growing as expected and poverty is increasing voters are likely to vote for the opposition or alternative

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205 Further, the disposable income that is a base for the calculation of income inequality has been previously used in the research on economic voting by Brooks and Brady who argued that income is an important indicator how voters chose political parties and their leaders. See Clem Brooks and David Brady, "Income, Economic Voting, and Long-Term Political Change in the Us, 1952-1996," Social Forces 77, no. 4 (1999).
parties to express their fear that they could ‘join’ the economically unprivileged.\footnote{206}

Similar to poverty, economic inequality might be thought of as a source of economic insecurity, but only after it reaches a certain level. It could be speculated that Polish voters, specifically middle class voters, are not concerned with economic inequality until the income disparity reaches a point which might indicate the danger for their own financial well-being or the community. In other words, the middle income voter (the largest group in the society) wants to bring the affluence to the household and is not so concerned with income disproportion, specifically in the society where during the time of commended economy a manual worker earned very similar amount of money as highly educated white collar worker. Even further, it could be argued that middle and upper middle class voters are ‘happy’ that inequalities exist for the objective of economic growth, as long as they are not becoming poorer. These voters might be perceived as students of Adam Smith’s laissez faire economics, which proclaims that income inequality promotes economic growth, which in turn brings a decent standard of living.

Voters’ main concern with material well-being, specifically in a country where economic development have not reached a standard of living known to the developed states, could be supported by the Maslow’s value hierarchy. Maslow

\footnote{206}Or voters could articulate their displeasure by not voting at all.
suggests that people first desire to achieve comfortable margin of economic security before they start to search for higher order needs. This speculation can be also confirmed by Inglehart’s recent work on material and post-material value changes in democratic states. As argued by Inglehart, before citizens achieve the sufficient economic standard of living they are concerned with Old Politics (material) values, such as economic growth. Once economic security is achieved then the New Politics (postmaterial) values such as social equality, social trust, or responsibility for community, etc. start to play role in voters’ decision-making process during elections.\textsuperscript{207} If income inequality can be a proxy measure for social capital and interpersonal trust, as suggested by recent literature, the societies/communities that reached a comfortable margin of economic security

\textsuperscript{207}Inglehart, \textit{Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies}, Inglehart and Welzel, \textit{Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence}. 
would care to reduce income inequality.\textsuperscript{208} By doing so, citizens would demonstrate their commitment to postmaterial values. As indicated in the World Value Surveys (Waves 1995, 2000, 2005), Polish citizens are rather concerned with material values than postmaterial values.\textsuperscript{209} While choosing between incumbent and non-incumbent parties, the average Polish rational voter would stress the need to improve economic conditions at the expanse of rising income


\textsuperscript{209} I analyzed three variables: postmaterial value index, traditional/secular rational values, and survival/self-expression values. Analyses available upon request. Data downloaded from \url{http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org}. See "European and World Values Surveys Four-Wave Integrated Data File."
inequality. Consistent with Inglehart’s theory, economic needs and security take precedence over postmaterial goals in Poland at least at a certain point of economic transition. For instance, the simple descriptive statistics (Table 19) of those who voted in the 1997 Parliamentary elections and their ideas about the income equality being good or bad for economy indicates that around 57% of voters definitely or rather agreed that the income equality is bad for economy. The remaining 43% of voters rather disagreed or definitely disagreed with this concept. It is worth to remembering that this question was asked during the middle of the economic transition where income inequalities boosted by several percentage points. Further, analyzing the same question and controlling for the

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210 Even if there is a small shift from middle to lower part of income distribution among voters, it is likely that the vote for incumbent political parties will not be negatively and significantly affected. Since the majority of voters belong to the middle income group, the major economic crisis is required for bulk of middle income group voters to swing to the lower class.

211 The National Election Survey of 1997 (PGSW) conducted under the supervision of the Institute of Political Studies in Polish Academy of Science.

212 According to Luxembourg Income Study data, on average the inequality in Poland (measured by the Gini Index) increased from 0.2743 in 1992 to 0.31695 in 1995 and decrease by 0.01332 points in 1999. The Gini index increased again significantly in 2004 and reached a value of 0.32326. Data accessed on November 24, 2008.

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<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Cumulative Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<td>Definitely Agree</td>
<td>23.21</td>
<td>57.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather Agree</td>
<td>34.24</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather Disagree</td>
<td>33.81</td>
<td>42.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Definitely Disagree</td>
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<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q: Income equality is bad for economy</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Cumulative Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely Agree</td>
<td>24.89</td>
<td>62.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather Agree</td>
<td>37.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather Disagree</td>
<td>30.13</td>
<td>37.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely Disagree</td>
<td>6.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q: Income equality is bad for economy</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Cumulative Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely Agree</td>
<td>20.51</td>
<td>53.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather Agree</td>
<td>32.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather Disagree</td>
<td>37.82</td>
<td>46.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely Disagree</td>
<td>8.97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
levels of voters’ income (low, medium, and high) it is evident that high income voters are more prone to support income inequality then middle or low income voters (Tables 20-22).\textsuperscript{213} Specifically, around 63% of high income voters, comparing to 53% and 58% of middle and low income voters respectively, declared that equally is bad for economy. It is not surprising for political scientists that a higher percentage of high income voters believe that income equality is bad for economy, but it might be shocking for some that on average low income voters were more supportive of income inequality then the middle class voters in 1997. Last, but not least, the Polish voter might be perceived as a true believer of laissez faire economic policies at least until 1997.

Unfortunately, the National Election Surveys of 2001 and 2005 did not ask the same question again. As a remedy, I utilized the European Social Surveys

\textsuperscript{213}The high, middle, and low incomes are computed based on the income percentiles (25, 50 and 75 percentile).
(ESS) conducted in 2002, 2004, and 2006 to inspect the trends of voters’ believes about the income inequality. Fortunately, the ESS surveys asked an even more precise question about income distribution: “Do you think that government should reduce differences in income levels?” As indicated in Tables 23, 24, and 25, the opinion of voters changed dramatically comparing to 1997 PGSW survey. Approximately 80% of voters responded that governments should reduce income gaps. Why such a dramatic change? The answer might be associated with the fact that income inequality as well as poverty levels increased significantly from 1999 to 2006. Based on this data we could call the Polish voter a true believer of the welfare state at least for last several years.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q: Governments should reduce differences in income levels</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Cumulative Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>27.36</td>
<td>80.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>52.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
<td>8.10</td>
<td>8.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>11.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As pointed out in footnote 28, the Gini index increased significantly between 1999 and 2004 (based on the Luxembourg Income Study calculations) reaching a even further increase in 2006 (Gini figure for 2006 is based on my own calculation using 2006 Budget Survey Data from Central Statistical Office in Warsaw).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q: Governments should reduce differences in income levels</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Cumulative Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>38.99</td>
<td>81.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>42.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
<td>7.49</td>
<td>7.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>8.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q: Governments should reduce differences in income levels</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Cumulative Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>31.13</td>
<td>80.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>49.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree or Disagree</td>
<td>9.39</td>
<td>9.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>9.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.1 Measures of Poverty and Income Inequality

One of the measures that is most commonly used to analyze income inequality is called Gini index (coefficient).\(^{215}\) The Gini index uses “0” to indicate

\(^{215}\)The other measures of income inequality include among others share of income by quintile and ratio of those shares. Further, Gini coefficient is associated with Lorenz curves where in the Descartes’ graph 45° line indicates perfect egalitarian society and the gap between this 45° line and the actual line (formed by quintiles and cumulative share of income) unequal distribution of income measured by Gini coefficient.
total earnings/income equality, meaning that the perfect economically egalitarian society would be given a Gini index rating of “0”. The Gini index uses “1” to indicate total inequality, meaning that one individual within the society receives all the earnings/income. In practice, Gini index ratings usually fall between 0.20 and 0.45.\textsuperscript{216}

To fully understand what is measured by the Gini index, it is important to refer to the so called ‘Principle of Transfers” which holds that “the change in inequality resulting from a transfer between two individuals depends only on the individuals’ income share.”\textsuperscript{217} The principle of transfers, as it relates to Gini coefficient, is associated with the rank ordering of two persons. Assume that there are persons A, B, C, D, E, and F. The incomes of persons A and B are close to the mode of the distribution. The income of persons C and D are close to the lower tail and the income of persons E and F are close to the upper tail. If $1000 is transferred from person A to person B, then the change in Gini coefficient will be greater then if there was a transfer from person C to person D or E to F or any other transfer from upper tail to lower tail. To put it in Jenkins’ words, “the change [of Gini coefficient] will be the larger the closer that

\textsuperscript{216}Certainly there are extremes where Gini index for income per capita might rich 0.7. For further research on this subject look at World Bank and OECD publications on income inequality.

pair is to the more crowded middle of the distribution (more precisely, the mode) rather than the sparser upper and lower tails”. \(^{218}\) Essentially, the Gini coefficient is sensitive to inequality changes around the middle of the income distribution.\(^ {219}\)

Scholars chose from several units to evaluate income inequality based upon the specific needs of their research. The most common units are persons (personal income of individuals), families (income of related individuals living together), or households (single people living alone and unrelated individuals living together). In general, income might be examined as pre-tax income or


\(^{219}\)The alternative measures of income inequality differ in their sensitivities to income differences in different parts of the distribution. For instance, the Theil inequality index that belongs to the Generalized Entropy Family (GE) is transfer sensitive at the top part of the income distribution. Another inequality index sometimes used by economist is called Atkinson and is sensitive to inequality changes in the lowest part of the income distribution only if the inequality aversion parameter \(\varepsilon\) is larger than 1. Since this measure of inequality measures different aspect of inequality then the Gini coefficient, it is not surprising that there are often great differences in the magnitudes between these two indices. These two measure of inequality are not utilized in this project. Compare R. L. Basmann, K. J. Hayes, and Daniel Jonathan Slottje, *Some New Methods for Measuring and Describing Economic Inequality*, *Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis* V. 71 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1993), 114.
post-tax income, and income is usually divided into several other categories such as total earnings, factor income, market income, total gross income, which all together create disposable income. This project uses the distribution of disposable income based on distributions from grouped data from household budget surveys conducted by the Polish Central Statistical Office (Główny Urząd Statystyczny) and reported to the Luxembourg Income Study project for the so called “lissification process” and available in harmonized form from LIS. More specifically, calculations of the Gini index are based on the post-tax income received from gross wages, salaries, self-employment, and other forms of income associated with the government’s social insurance and social assistance (e.g. retirement benefits, unemployment benefits, etc). I choose this particular form of income since it is associated with domestic governmental policies, and would therefore have a great impact on voting behavior.

The same definitions of income are associated with the measurement of poverty levels on the regional level.\textsuperscript{220} Similarly to the income inequality measures, there are several indices to measure poverty levels. This project utilizes the Head Count Ratio (HCR), a measure form the whole family of Foster-

\textsuperscript{220}Poverty measures were calculated based on LIS datasets mentioned above.
Greer-Thorbecke indicators, which reports the percentage of poor individuals in the total population of the region.\textsuperscript{221}

2.2.2 Descriptive Statistics

The presentation of box-plots allows us to compare the principal characteristics of the distributions of independent variables. Each box-plot represents a specific measure of for each independent variable (indicated on Y-axis) for all regions by year. The central box of box-plots encompasses the middle half of the measures. The line in the central box represents the median. The whiskers above and below the central box represent the extreme observations on upper or lower end of distribution. In some graphs, the lower whiskers are shorter than the upper whiskers or vice versa. There are also several outside observations (represented by the circles) at the upper or lower end of distribution, especially in the Gini index in 1997 and 2001 as well as poverty, unemployment, and GDP growth in 1997. All of the box-plots indicate that there are differences between regions in terms of inequality, poverty, unemployment, and GDP growth.

Looking at the box-plots for the unemployment rates (Figure 6), we can clearly see the significant increase of jobs loses over the course of not even a decade. Comparing the income inequality in the middle class (as best reflected

\textsuperscript{221}Other possible measures of poverty include, among others, the Sen, Takayama, Clark, and Thon indices.
Figure 6. Box-plots for Independent Variables by Year – Geographical Regions

- **Gini Index**
- **Poverty (%)**
- **Unemployment (% regional level)**
- **GDP growth (controlled for inflation)**
- **GDP per capita (current prices)**
by the Gini index) in 1995 to other years, it is clear that the index declines in 1999 and increases in 2004. Similar pattern can be noticed by poverty rates. Both indicators approximate U-shaped curve. Yet to grasp a full picture of the economic situation in Poland it is necessary to go back to the years preceding the 1997 election. As indicated by Figure 6 which portrays, among others, the GDP per capita in the current prices, one would assume that there was a steady growth of economy with some differences between the regions and one influential case – the central (“Warsaw”) region of Poland. If we take this measure of economic prosperity into account, we would assume that voters should support the incumbent government, as predicted by the theory of economic voting. Yet we know that none of the governing coalition received the same or more numbers of votes in the analyzed elections. Therefore, we would most likely reject the hypothesis that a Polish voters behaves similarly to the Western-style rational voter while employing the GDP per capita as a predictor of vote. The box-plots of GDP per capita are misleading if we do not control for inflation. Looking at Figure 4 we notice, on average, a decline in the economic growth from 1996 to 2002, and a tiny growth from 2003 to 2004.

2.3 Dependent Variable – regional level data

Before I define the dependent variable I must present a method that I used to create this variable. Let us assume that we have parties A and B that formed a coalition after the elections in year X. Parties A and B received a certain percentage of votes from the elections in year X, yet not necessarily the majority of votes. The next elections are in year Y. At this time, parties A and B receive a certain percentage of votes (not necessarily the same as in elections X) or do not get any percentage of votes due to either lack of public support or the dissolution of a party. Thus the percentage of votes might vary from 0% to 100%. If a party has electoral support, it would receive the same or a higher percentage of votes in year Y than year X. If it does not have electoral support, the percentage of votes from year Y would be smaller than in year X. Thus, to show this arithmetically, I create a ratio of the percentage of votes received by party A in year Y to percentage of votes received by party A in year X. This is then done for party B. If the ratio is smaller than 1, then the party did not gain electoral support between elections X and Y. If the ratio is equal or higher than 1, then voters have supported an incumbent party giving them the same or more amount of votes as they had in election X.

Further, I consolidate the percentage of votes received by the various parties. If between the years X and Y there was more than one coalition, the parties that are examined in year Y are those that composed the last coalition,
because that coalition appears accountable for socio-economic conditions at the
time of the election. Then I take the percentage of votes each party within the
coalition received in the election of year X. These percentages are then added to
create the coalition category. This category reflects the percentage of voters that
would support a particular coalition. The category election is formed in the same
way as that of coalition. Specifically, it is formed by summing up the percentage
of votes received by party A, B, and C from election in year Y. A ratio is then
formed by these two categories (coalition/election ratio). Again, the ratio might
range from 0 to 1 (one excluded) if a coalition did not get the same support from
voters in year Y as in the elections of the year X.

There is an advantage to using this method that is applicable to the multi-
party system only. One could correctly argue that voters usually target a whole
coalition, a party within the coalition, or even a particular economic policy
associated with a particular party when judging governmental responsibility for
economic conditions. This method helps to eliminate the source of unstable
results produced by such behavior by first taking into consideration the
percentage of votes for each particular party, then the percentage for the
coalition, and finally creating ratios of these two percentages (without averaging
votes within the coalition, which would create results that might be
disadvantageous for one or the other party). Finally, this method of creating a
dependent variable (coalition/election ratio) seems to be the very first one and
has not been employed in any analysis of economic voting. Since not every voter would be dissatisfied with a governing coalition, this method allows analyzing the specific distribution of votes for incumbent parties.\textsuperscript{223}

Since the analyzed elections are described in detail in chapter 2, I will only remind a reader which political parties formed coalitions and whether or not they lost votes in next elections. After the 1993 election the SLD and the PSL formed the coalition that lasted until 1997 election. It is worth mentioning that the SLD received more votes in 1997 then in 1993, but less than the AWS which had the privilege of forming the governing coalition. The UW joined the AWS and lasted in the coalition government until 1999. It is important to note that when creating the coalition/election ratio I included the UW as an incumbent party. In 2001 election the SLD/UP run together as coalition and won 41\% of seats in the Parliament and form a coalition government with the peasant PSL. Since the coalition with the PSL lasted only 16 months, I did not include the PSL as an incumbent party while creating the dependent variable.

\footnote{Researchers usually analyze the vote for the incumbent party versus the combination of all the others what creates the dichotomous dependent variable and determents the use of logit or probit model. Some scholars argue that dichotomization of the electoral system into “a pseudo-two-party contest” results in “bias and information lost”. See Jonathan N. Katz and Gary King, "A Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral Data," \textit{American Political Science Review} 93, no. 1 (1999): 15-16.}
run by SLD/UP coalition lost many votes in 2005 election and the PiS formed the coalition with the LPR and the *Samoobrona*.

### 2.4 Statistical Method

Beside the estimation for the analysis of distribution of electoral results that are based on the economic conditions in the multi-party system proposed by Katz and King and mentioned in the previous section, there are at least two other methods of estimation used in the field of economic voting. For instance, Tomz et al. recommend estimating the model for multiparty electoral data by means of a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), a methodology that is a multi-equation version of ordinary least-squares (OLS).\(^{224}\) In other words, if there are the same explanatory variables in each equation and error terms from these equations are not correlated, than the model can be estimated by each equation separately. However, Tomz et al. argue that error terms are correlated across equations because “the dependent variable is constructed from vote shares, such that a higher log ratio for one party means a lower log ratio for the others.”\(^{225}\) This situation justifies using SUR.

---


\(^{225}\)Ibid.: 68.
Another group of scholars, Mikhailov et al., apply the Theil group logit method to transform the data for the purpose of efficient use of SUR regression using a set of logit equations.\textsuperscript{226} The main advantage of using the method is that it transforms the data to make errors homoscedastic and as a result the data can be also analyzed by ordinary least squares (OLS) using the logit equations for individual parties.\textsuperscript{227} Further, using SUR after the data transformation by the Theil group logit method appears to produce less biased results than without such a transformation (error terms are not correlated and variance across equations is constant). In summary, using SUR regression and the Theil group logit method scholars examine how economic factors influence support for particular parties or coalition in each election for every country or district creating separate equation for each observation. Neither one of these two methods are used in this paper. The reason for rejection of SUR regression and the Theil group logit method is that this chapter utilizes the dependent variable measured as a proportion of the vote share received by each coalition party in each election.

The data analyzed in this part of the chapter has cross-sectional and time series dimensions, namely the same group of administrative regions over time.


\textsuperscript{227} Ibid.: 635.
There are several methods to estimate the parameters while employing the balanced panel data depending on the identification of problem that could create biased results, specifically heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous correlation and serial correlation. If one of these problems is detected, scholars are left with at least three options: the generalized least squares (GLS); the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), and the panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). Since the panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) method produces more unbiased standard errors and confidence intervals as opposed to feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) or ordinary least squares (OLS) methods with robust variance estimator, the PCSE estimation might be an excellent choice for researchers who deal with large $T$ (points-in-time) dataset.\footnote{Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz, "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data," \textit{American Political Science Review} 89, no. 3 (1995).} Unfortunately, in this analysis $T=3$; therefore, I had to choose between the fixed effects and random effects. The Hausman’s specification, based on chi-squared statistics comparison of coefficients estimated by various methods, provides a clear choice for the fixed effects estimation which was utilized to examine the relationship between socio-economic factors and the vote share for the incumbent parties.\footnote{For further discussion on the subject of proper methodology for panel data analysis see Jesuit, Paik, and Paradowski, "Domestic Sources of Income Inequality in the Developed and Developing Countries: 1970-2002."} Finally, I tested for heteroscedasticity using modified Wald test, rejected the null hypothesis of...
homoscedasticity, and corrected for the heteroscedastic error structure by computing the robust standard errors.

2.5 Hypotheses

This chapter offers two models to analyze the economic model of voting on the regional level. In Model 1, the relationship between voting behavior measure as coalition/election ratio \((y_i)\) and four independent variables including GDP growth \((x_i)\), unemployment measured as percentage of total labor force \((z_i)\), poverty \((q_i)\), income inequality \((w_i)\), is represented by the equation:

\[
y_i = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 x_i + \beta_2 z_i + \beta_3 q_i + \beta_4 w_i + \epsilon_i + u_i
\]  

(1)

where \(\epsilon_i\) is the fixed (unobserved) effect, \(u_i\) is time-varying error (idiosyncratic error), and the \(\beta_k\) represents coefficients. In the above notation \(i\) denotes the cross sectional observation number and \(t\) denotes the time period.

In Model 2, I added the squared measure of income inequality to examine whether or not the rational voters support the incumbent parties while the income inequality increases, but stop to do so as the economic inequality reaches a certain (unacceptable) point.\(^{230}\) Therefore, the equation (1) is modified as follows:

\(^{230}\)In other words, it is assumed that this relationship approximates the quadratic function \(y = c + bw_i + aw_i^2\) where the “turning point” can be determined by calculating the point \(W(p, q)\) where \(p = \frac{-b}{2a}\) and \(q = \frac{b^2 - 4ac}{4a}\).
When testing the theory of economic voting that proposes that better economic performance causes voters to vote for the incumbent party, I assume that coefficient of $x_i$ in the regression equation to have a positive value. The justification for such an assertion is dictated by the simple fact that increasing GDP growth on regional level pleases voters (a positive relationship). As a reverse of this relationship, an increase in the unemployment and poverty rates displeases voters so they might vote for parties in opposition (a negative relationship). Taking into consideration the inverted U-shape relationship between income inequality and the vote share in Model 2, I expect income inequality to have a positive value whereas the squared income inequality to have a negative value. If supporters of economic voters are correct in their arguments about economic voting then two other basic regression requirements must be met. First, the whole regression model must be statistically significant at least at 0.05 level. Second, the relationship between each independent variable and dependent variable must be statistically significant at the level of $p<0.05$ in one tailed-test. Thus the hypothesis that I am going to test is as follows: increase in economic performance will tend to an increase in support for the coalition parties.

Assuming that the whole model is statistically significant I will take into consideration the effect of each independent variable (separately) on the
dependent variable (while other independent variables are constant) and test the following hypotheses:

A. the higher the level of economic growth, the higher the support for the incumbent coalition parties;

B. the lower the level of unemployment, the higher the support for the incumbent coalition parties;

C. the lower the poverty rates, the higher the support of for the incumbent coalition parties;

D. the higher the level of income inequality, the higher the support for the governing party or coalition parties (Models 1);

E. as the income inequality in the regions increases, the support for the incumbent coalition parties rises to reach its maximum point at \(-b/2a\), and then the support for the incumbent coalition parties decreases as income inequality still increases (Models 2).

The above hypothesis is also presented in Table 26 where I formalize those using mathematical expressions and illustrate whether or not each of the hypotheses was rejected.

2.6 Findings

The statistical analyses, described in Table 27, tell us exactly what was hypothesized. All coefficients associated with all independent variables in both models have a noticeable and significant effect on the coalition/party ratio. Using
Table 26. Hypothesis for Models 1 and 2 (Regional Level Analysis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative Hypothesis</th>
<th>Null Hypothesis</th>
<th>Mathematical Expressions</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1 Results for testing ( H_0 )</td>
<td>reject ( H_0 )</td>
<td>( y = \beta_0 + \beta_x x + \beta_z z + \beta_w w + \beta_q q )</td>
<td>reject ( H_0 )</td>
<td>reject ( H_0 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2 Results for testing ( H_0 )</td>
<td>reject ( H_0 )</td>
<td>( y = \beta_0 + \beta_x x + \beta_z z + \beta_w w + \beta_q q + \beta_{w^2} w^2 )</td>
<td>reject ( H_0 )</td>
<td>reject ( H_0 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. \( y \) depends on \( x, q, w \)
2. \( y \) depends on \( x, q, w, w^2 \)
3. \( y \) depends on \( x \)
4. \( y \) depends on \( z \)
5. \( y \) depends on \( q \)
6. \( y \) depends on \( w \)
7. \( y \) depends on \( w^2 \)

This table is based on Kam and Franzese (2007, p.45 and 50-51). Notations: \( y \) = incumbent parties vote share; \( x \) = GDP growth; \( z \) = unemployment; \( w \) = income inequality; \( q \) = poverty.
statistical language, we are at least 95% confident in our prediction that there is a correlation our independent variables and support for the party coalition. Overall, the four regressors in Model 1 and the five regressors in Model 2, when taken together, explain approximately 74% of the variation in coalition/election ratio (the coefficient of determination for Model 1 equals 0.7433 and for Model 2 equals 0.7484).

Table 27. Results: Fixed Effects Estimation for the Regional Level of Economic Voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth (x)</td>
<td>2.585323*** (0.4127)</td>
<td>2.5288*** (0.3936)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate (z)</td>
<td>-0.0245855** (0.0114)</td>
<td>-0.0255** (0.0115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate (q)</td>
<td>-1.785999** (0.7968)</td>
<td>-1.9111*** (0.571)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini Index (w)</td>
<td>4.11649** (1.5773)</td>
<td>26.1707** (11.3219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini-squared (w²)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-35.0081* (18.6432)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.1146*** (0.4358)</td>
<td>-6.4679*** (1.799)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.733  R² = 0.748
N = 48       N = 48

*p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001 one-tailed test.
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in administrative regions are in parenthesis.

The interpretation of the regression coefficients produced by the fixed effects estimation in Model 1 and 2 is as follows. Predicted coalition/election ratio increases by 4.12 points with each one-point (here 0.01) increase in Gini index, while other regressors are constant. In other words, if the Gini index increases by 0.01, the support for the coalition in elections increases by 4.12%, which is a considerable raise. Comparing the coefficient for Gini index in Model
2, it is evident that Gini index increases vote share for the incumbent parties up to Gini=0.37 and thereafter decreases them.\textsuperscript{231} Each percentage point increase in GDP growth at the regional level in both models increases the vote share for incumbent parties by about 25%; the vote for the coalition parties is reduced by 2.5% if unemployment rises by one percentage point (both models). Last, but not least, each percentage of poor individuals in the regions, decreases the vote for the governing parties by 1.78% and 1.91% based on the estimation in Model 1 and Model 2 respectively.

We can plug in our election/coalition ratio from each region and all economic variables into equation (1) and (2) and see how good are the predictions when compared to the actual scores of election/coalition ratio. Performing such an analysis would directly show the reader whether the Polish citizens are economically minded rational voters when choosing their representatives and how well we predict this economic rationality based on our model. One way to present such analysis is to create 48 equations for every election (=3) in each region (=16). Because this kind of analysis is somewhat inefficient, I constructed graphs for both models that contain the empirical and probability curves for each independent variable. Further, Table 28 presents the

\textsuperscript{231} See footnote 228 how to calculate the turning point.
actual coalition/election ratio together with the predicted values for every administrative region for Model 1.\textsuperscript{232}

Looking at Figures 7-8 we can be confident that that we improve our estimate of the support for the coalition parties by using the information represented by the independent variables. Therefore, the theory of economic voting, specifically the retrospective hypothesis, seems to be applicable to Poland. This is not to say that we could predict perfectly the votes using only economic indicators. There are some cases where statistical analysis over or under-predicts economic voting behavior.

Specifically, looking at Table 28 we notice that in 2001 election 2 regions did not follow the path of economic voting whereas in 2005 election 6 out of 16 regions. For instance, according to economic voting predictions, voters in the Mazowieckie voivodship should cast ballots for the incumbent parties in 2005 elections, but they did not. This is the region of fastest economic growth and larger income inequality and smallest unemployment rate.

The opposite example to Warsaw Region is the Warminsko-Mazurskie voivodship in the North-East part of Poland. Voters in this administrative region, based on the economic voting theory, should have not cast the ballot for

\textsuperscript{232} Since Model 2 is very similar, I choose not to present it here.
Figure 7. Predicted Probabilities for the Regional Level of Economic Voting – Model 1
Figure 8. Predicted Probabilities for the Regional Level of Economic Voting – Model 2
Table 28. Real and Estimated Values for the Regional Level of Economic Voting – Model 1

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dolnoslaskie</td>
<td>1.0531</td>
<td>0.9849</td>
<td>0.2773</td>
<td>0.2158</td>
<td>0.2776</td>
<td>0.2743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kujawsko-pomorskie</td>
<td>0.9973</td>
<td>0.7884</td>
<td>0.2646</td>
<td>0.2253</td>
<td>0.2639</td>
<td>0.0885*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubelskie</td>
<td>0.8158</td>
<td>1.0361</td>
<td>0.1626</td>
<td>0.4185</td>
<td>0.2395</td>
<td>0.3639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubuskie</td>
<td>1.0449</td>
<td>0.8430</td>
<td>0.2609</td>
<td>0.0799*</td>
<td>0.3020</td>
<td>0.0645*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodzkie</td>
<td>1.0924</td>
<td>0.9735</td>
<td>0.2439</td>
<td>0.3668</td>
<td>0.2823</td>
<td>0.2481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malopolskie</td>
<td>0.8206</td>
<td>1.0734</td>
<td>0.1883</td>
<td>0.3319</td>
<td>0.2314</td>
<td>0.3986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazowieckie</td>
<td>0.8816</td>
<td>1.1293</td>
<td>0.3448</td>
<td>0.7678</td>
<td>0.2620</td>
<td>0.8044^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opolskie</td>
<td>0.8989</td>
<td>0.9228</td>
<td>0.2412</td>
<td>0.2238</td>
<td>0.2581</td>
<td>0.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podkarpackie</td>
<td>0.7261</td>
<td>0.8233</td>
<td>0.1928</td>
<td>0.2578</td>
<td>0.2782</td>
<td>0.0700*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podlaskie</td>
<td>0.8183</td>
<td>1.0709</td>
<td>0.3486</td>
<td>0.4315</td>
<td>0.3320</td>
<td>0.3668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomorskie</td>
<td>1.0280</td>
<td>0.9178</td>
<td>0.2229</td>
<td>0.2974</td>
<td>0.2870</td>
<td>0.3724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slaskie</td>
<td>1.1340</td>
<td>0.9659</td>
<td>0.2525</td>
<td>0.3136</td>
<td>0.2559</td>
<td>0.1545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swietokrzyskie</td>
<td>0.9168</td>
<td>0.9498</td>
<td>0.2706</td>
<td>0.1985</td>
<td>0.2395</td>
<td>0.0991*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warminsko-mazurskie</td>
<td>1.0112</td>
<td>0.7164</td>
<td>0.2804</td>
<td>-0.067*</td>
<td>0.2572</td>
<td>0.0277*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wielkopolskie</td>
<td>1.0609</td>
<td>1.1555</td>
<td>0.2842</td>
<td>0.3850</td>
<td>0.2933</td>
<td>0.3976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zachodnipomorskie</td>
<td>1.1749</td>
<td>0.9064</td>
<td>0.3095</td>
<td>0.2061</td>
<td>0.2893</td>
<td>0.1281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* indicates these regions that should not vote for incumbent parties and
^ indicates a region that should definitely support the governing parties
the incumbent parties, but they did. This is the region of relatively slow
economic growth, the high poverty and unemployment level. What other factors
could explain such a voting behavior becomes unknown at this stage of research.
There are certainly many factors that are not directly associated with voter
perceptions of macro- or micro-economic factors (e.g. corruption, party and
candidates popularities, media, social class, etc.). What might help is the
analysis of voters' personal perceptions of economy and politics that can be
performed by using individual level data.

Utilizing the marginal effects, the postestimation procedure after the fixed
effects estimation, we can assess under what conditions the incumbent parties
would receive the lower, same or higher percentage of votes. For instance,
employing the mean values for each independent variable in Model 1, we predict
that the incumbent coalitions gain only 50% of the votes compared to the initial
election.233 This finding parallels the reality in the past three elections where
voters switched from one group of parties to the others. Now the question
becomes when the incumbents would gain the same or higher number of votes.
Following the theory of economic voting in general and the hypotheses in this
part of the chapter in particular, the parties in office should gain support if

233The mean values are as follows: GDP growth=1.14%, unemployment=16.1%,
poverty=12%, Gini index= 0.306. The full table for marginal effects is available
to the reader upon request.
inequality is high, GDP growth is increasing, and unemployment and poverty are low. I employed the 10th percentile for unemployment and poverty level and 75th percentiles for Gini index and GDP growth and estimated by utilizing the marginal effects that under such conditions the departing coalitions would gain about 5% more votes than in the previous election.\textsuperscript{234}

The opposite also holds: the lower GDP growth and Gini Index as well as higher unemployment and poverty rates on the regional level, the less support for the incumbents. Under this condition, the coalition parties would gain only about 11%. Thus I find support for the notion that higher economic performance tend to increase the support for the coalition parties and the lower economic performance tend to decrease the support for parties in office.

2.7 Conclusion

I believe we can conclude with confidence that the Polish voters in most administrative regions are rational and economically motivated actors. Or put it differently, economic factors play an important role in shaping the voting behavior among Polish voters. My findings bring an expected result if compared to the theory of economic voting. Further, the empirical analysis provide a confirmation of the results presented by scholars supporting the rational choice

\textsuperscript{234}The values are I plugged in are as follows: GDP growth=1.26%, unemployment=10.8%, poverty=8%, Gini index= 0.3196. The results are given for Model 1, but the results are similar for Model 2.
theory approach to economic voting behavior in developed democracies and the post-communist states. The results presented here are not backed up by the previous findings on economic voting in Poland, specifically the research presented by Gibson and Cielecka who found that unemployment and the economic growth did not influenced voters in 1993 election cast a ballot for incumbent parties/coalition.\textsuperscript{235} Also Power and Cox results indicate the difficulty to explain the logic of award or punishment of incumbents in 1993 elections.\textsuperscript{236} Yet my findings go in hand with Jenice Bell’s findings from 1993 election that indicated significant role of unemployment on voting behavior on the regional level.\textsuperscript{237} It has to be remember that the elections of 1993 could be perceived as a last contest for or against new or old regime with issues that reflected only the economic conditions improvement (e.g. church-state relation). It seems that starting in the 1997 election the Polish voters became more concern with economic performance and policies of incumbent governments.

\textsuperscript{235}Gibson and Cielecka, "Economic Influences on the Political Support from Market Reform in Postcommunist Transitions - Some Evidence from the 1993 Polish Parliamentary Elections."

\textsuperscript{236}Powers and Cox, "Echoes from the Past: The Relationship between Satisfaction with Economic Reforms and Voting Behavior in Poland."

\textsuperscript{237}Bell, "Unemployment Matters: Voting Patterns During the Economic Transition in Poland, 1990–1995."
The analysis of regional economics in Poland contributes to the existing literature by employing new independent variables, namely the Gini coefficient and the poverty rates. Based on the finding related to the income disparities we can conclude that the economic inequalities are important for voters but not in the same way as the quasi-Marxist would predict or would like to see. Judging on the bases of this finding, the Polish voters could be called true supporters of neo-liberal economics/policies. On the other hand, they are also concern with the growing poverty levels on the regional level by giving less support to the governing coalition if under their ‘rule’ poverty get higher. Rising poverty levels might be perceived as stagnation in economy that brings the fear to voters that they could fall down to the lower economic class. If I had to create a billboard for the political parties in coalition to be used in the political campaign, I would write: No! for poverty, No! for unemployment, No! for economic equality policies, Yes! for economic growth.

3. **Individual Level of Economic Voting**

3.1 **Individual Level Data, Variables, and Method**

To test the models of economic voting on the individual level, I examine survey data from the Polish National Election Study in 1997, 2001 and 2005. Interviews for these surveys were carried out shortly after each of the 1997, 2001, and 2005 parliamentary elections.
Since I am interested in the relationship between the voters’ perceptions of economic conditions and vote choice, the dependent variable in the analyses I present below is the respondents’ answer to the question “For which political party did you vote in the past election”. There are at least two choices how to utilize the voter’s answer in this analysis. First, I could take respondents’ vote choice for different parties and employ the multinomial logit or probit to estimate party utilities. Second, respondents’ electoral choices might be aggregated to the binary discrete choice between incumbent and non-incumbent parties. The second approach is used in this investigation by employing binary logit estimation. The outcome is a dummy variable that equal 1 for the incumbent parties and equals 0 otherwise.

The independent variables are the respondents’ evaluations of the economic conditions related to the national economy as well as the financial situation of their households. Respondents were asked to give the retrospective 

238 As already mentioned in chapter 3, it is also possible to utilize the respondent’s evaluations of the political parties. This approach is not taken here for the same reasons as argued in chapter 3.

239 See the description of party coalitions as described in chapter 2 and in this chapter above.

240 Please note that the abstainers were excluded from the analysis and the weights provided in the dataset were used while conducting the logit estimation. The code 1 was assigned to the incumbent parties and 0 to non-incumbent parties.
and the future evaluations of the economy. These questions allow me to rest the retrospective and prospective sociotropic model of voting. In the similar manner, respondents were asked to provide the past and future evaluations of the financial situation of their households. This set of questions permits to

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241 The question wording in 1997 was as follows: 1. “Would you say that over twelve months, the state of the economy in Poland has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?”; 2. Do you think the condition of our economy in the next 12 months will definitely improve, rather improve, will not change, rather deteriorate, definitely deteriorate, hard to say?” The question wording in 2001 and 2005 was as follows: 1. “Do you think that in the last year economic situation in Poland strongly improved, rather improved, not changed, rather worsened, strongly worsened, hard to say?” 2. Do you think in the next 12 months economic situation in Poland will strongly improve, will rather improve, will not change, will rather worsen, will strongly worsen, hard to say?”

242 Respondents also answer questions about the current financial situation of the household and the current state of the economy, but these questions were not analyzed.

243 The question wording in 1997 was as follows: 1. “And if you compare the current financial situation of your household with the situation a year before, would you say that: current situation is much better, slightly better, the same, slightly worse, current situation is much worse”; 3. And do you think the financial situation of your household, in a year from now, compared to the current one, will: improve considerably, improve moderately, remain the same, worsen moderately, worsen considerably, hard to say.” Questions in 2001 and 2005 surveys contain the same categories for households’ financial situation as for the economic situation (see footnote 239).
estimate the retrospective and the future egotropic model of voting. Further, as suggested by previous research, I take into account the ‘clarity of responsibility’ hypothesis that states that in order to evaluate whether or not the economic voting exists, we need to examine whether or not the voters hold governments responsible for the economic changes. Fortunately, the PGSW surveys in 1997 and 2001 asked respondents whether or not they believe that the government policies have impact on economy and whether or not respondents’ household situation depends on governmental policies. Unfortunately, the survey in 2005 asked only the latter question, which makes it impossible to test the sociotropic model of voting in the proposed methodological design. Nevertheless, this model is estimated, but the findings must be treated with the caution. Further, I


The question wording in 1997 and 2001 was as follows: 1. “Let’s focus now on our economy. In your opinion, does and if yes to what extent, the condition of our economy depend on decisions and policies implemented by the government? Answers: considerably, moderately, insignificantly, does not depend at all; government policies have no impact on economy, hard to say”; The following question wording corresponds to 1997, 2001 and 2005: 2. “To what extent in your opinion- does the financial situation of your household depends upon governmental policies of the recent period? Answers: depends extremely highly, considerably, moderately, is totally independent, hard to say”.

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identified those voters who, according to the survey responses, recognized that
government is responsible for their own finances and estimate the egotropic model
of voting. If respondents indicated that the government is responsible for the
state of national economy, they enter the estimation of the sociotropic model.

Since all the independent variables are categorical, a researcher must
decide how to incorporate these variables into the right-side of the equation.
There are two options. First, all the ordinal variables can enter the equation as a
set of \( J - 1 \) binary (dummy) indicator variables. Second, the categorical
variables can be treated as interval variables but there must be a “strong
assumption that successive categories of the ordinal independent variable are
equally spaced”.\(^2\) I performed the adjusted Wald test, as suggested by Long et al,
after estimation of each economic model of voting that included \( J - 2 \) dummy
variables as well as the categorical variable treated as an interval variable.\(^3\) The
results indicate that most categorical variables should be recoded to dummy
variables and only few could be treated in the models as interval variables. Since


\(^3\)The other test for such testing is the likelihood-ratio test, but because the
sample weights are utilized, the likelihood-ratio test is no longer valid. STATA,
*Survey Data: Reference Manual, Release 10* (College Station, TX: Stata Press,
2007), 75.
variables, I decided to recode all independent variables to binary variables for the purpose of consistency.\textsuperscript{248}

I also combined the detailed categories to broader categories, for example the categories “very good” and “good” were recoded to the category “good” and the categories “bad” and “very bad” were recoded to category “bad”.\textsuperscript{249} To give just another clear example, for instance the retrospective sociotropic performance evaluations of the coalition government in 1997 were recoded to four distinct dummies: “past economy got better” “past economy stayed the same”, “past economy got worst”, and “past economy – hard to say”. The same logic was applied to the answers about the financial situation of the household in all survey data. Respondents that answer “hard to say” enter the estimation as the reference category with the exception for 2005 analysis of egotropic model of

\textsuperscript{248}Note that it would be easier to analyze the estimated model with the categorical independent variables treated as interval variables (and perhaps scaled from -1 to 1), but I believe it is more important not to loose information.

\textsuperscript{249}The same logic applies to categories “worse” and “slightly worse”, “strongly improved” and “improved”, etc.
voting where the reference category is “stay the same”. Finally, in the set of dummy independent variables 1 indicates the positive response to the question and 0 indicates otherwise. For instance, the dummy variable “last year financial situation of the household improved” equals 1 for those respondents who answer that their financial situation in last improved and equal to 0 otherwise.

3.2 Hypotheses

The hypotheses for the individual level of analysis correspond to those presented in the previous part of this chapter for regional level analysis. Generally, the better the state of the economy or the subjective perception of household financial situation, the better voters’ assessment of the incumbent parties that ultimately generate the vote for the parties in office and vice versa. Particularly, as suggested by the theory of economic voting, I expect to find that

\[\text{Note that the reference category could be any other category, but in order to explain whether or not respondents punished the incumbent parties during elections I believe it is better to use “hard to say” category as a reference that can be thought of as a neutral point. In addition, in 2005 dataset only handful responses “hard to say” were left in the sample after controlling for the ‘clarity of responsibility’ hypothesis. Thus it was necessary to change the reference category to “stay the same”. Further, category “hard to say” was excluded from 2005 analysis.}\]

\[\text{A number of variables, aside those proposed here, could be also included in the model as control variables (e.g. sociodemographics). Yet, I decided to keep this model ‘pure’ and test for the economic effects alone.}\]
voters who believe that the economic well-being have improved over the previous period would support the incumbent parties. If the well-being of the national economy and household financial situation has deteriorated, voters would support the opposition parties.

As pointed out in the previous research, the prospective model of economic voting predicts that citizens choose their representatives based on the prospect for their future well-being.\textsuperscript{252} Therefore, we would reason that citizens whose prospective economic expectations are positive would vote for the parties in office. This, however, might not always be a case. Voters could believe that better times are ahead because they predicted the defeat of the incumbents. If so, voters' positive evaluation of future well-being could hardly be projected to positively correlate with the support for the parties in office.\textsuperscript{253} This is of course true for the analysis of the pre-election surveys. Similar logic applies to post-election surveys. Knowing the results of an election, the citizens' expectation about future economic conditions should be positively correlated with the winners. Since the surveys data used in this analysis were collected immediately after each election, I expect to find that the negative economic and personal financial expectations would be evident among the supporters of the incumbent.

\textsuperscript{252}Lanoue, "Retrospective and Prospective Voting in Presidential-Year Elections," 193.

\textsuperscript{253}Ibid.: 194.
parties, and positive ones among those respondents who did not support the coalition parties.

3.3 Findings

Table 29 displays the estimation of the relationship between respondents’ perceptions of economic conditions/financial situation of their household and evaluations of the incumbent political parties. As the table indicates, there are some differences between each election, but also clear similarities. One evident finding is that the effects of economic evaluations on voters’ choice are, on average, weak. The pseudo R-squared ranges between 0.022 and 0.146. The independent variables often fail to indicate the impact on voting for the representatives.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that the effects of prospective evaluations consistently exceed those of retrospective judgments. Additionally, meaningful effects for retrospective voting become visible only for sociotropic model. There is no evidence of significant retrospective voting in egotropic model. On the other hand, the estimations indicate that prospective economic voting was far more common then retrospective voting. For instance, prospective voting takes place in all three elections while retrospective judgments have the apparent effect on voters’ choices only in 1997 and 2005 elections.254

254Reminder: the estimation of sociotropic model for 2005 election was not based on the ‘clarity of responsibility’ hypothesis.
Table 29. Logit Estimation for Economic Model of Voting – Individual Level

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient/S.E.</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
<td>Coefficient/S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>got better</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.692 * (0.424)</td>
<td>1.998 (.847)</td>
<td>0.896 (0.736)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stay the same</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.550 (.395)</td>
<td>0.577 (.228)</td>
<td>0.306 (0.655)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>got worst</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.607**** (.469)</td>
<td>0.2005 (.944)</td>
<td>-0.3929 (0.625)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>improve</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.286**** (.298)</td>
<td>0.276 (.082)</td>
<td>-0.719** (.3128)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stay the same</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.2287 (.275)</td>
<td>0.795 (.218)</td>
<td>0.237 (0.291)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deteriorate</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.148**** (.335)</td>
<td>3.154 (1.057)</td>
<td>0.543* (.323)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2089 (.397)</td>
<td>-0.375 (0.620)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>N = 783</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pseudo R² = 0.146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01, ****p ≤ 0.001 two-tailed test. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All models are significant at least at 0.001 level. Reference category, unless otherwise stated in the table, is “hard to say”.

Reference category
There is evidence here that sociotropic voting is somewhat stronger than egotropic voting. In each election, sociotropic evaluations are present (except in the case of 2001 elections, where retrospective voting appears to be insignificant). Coming back to the analogy of consumers in the supermarket and the voters' choices at election time, it appears that Polish citizens change the brand of political party if they perceive that the previous brand damaged the economy or is unable to manage it in the efficient way.

This assertion relates specifically to those voters who believe that the condition of Polish economy depend on decisions and policies implemented by the government. At the same time, voters do not seem to blame the specific government for their past own misfortunes, even though they believe that the governmental policies impact the condition of their household well-being. Nevertheless, they seem to believe that casting a ballot for the incumbents would improve their household financial future, a correlation evident from the estimation.

Let's take a closer look at the estimation results. The signs of the coefficients correspond to the prediction advocated by the theory of economic voting. For instance, those respondents who believe that the economy improved

\[^{255}\text{The analysis of respondents economic vote without taking into consideration the ‘clarity of responsibility’ hypothesis show slightly weaker findings (estimation results available upon request).}\]
voted for incumbent parties in 1997 and 2005 (positive coefficient for the category “got better” in retrospective sociotropic model). By the same token, those voters who perceived the economy as deteriorating did not vote for the parties in office in 1997 (negative coefficient in the same model). The impact of prospective personal and national measures on voting indicates similar relationships. For instance, those voters who believe that the economy and/or their household financial situation will improve in the future did not support the incumbents compared with those who have hard time to predict the future (“hard to say” category of respondents in all models except egotropic model for 2005 where the reference category is “stay the same”). In the prospective models of voting, the positive coefficients are associated with the category “deteriorate” for 1997 and 2001 elections for both sociotropic and egotropic evaluations. It means that the sociotropic and egotropic evaluations of the future by those who voted for the incumbent parties are negative. In other words, knowing that the former governing party would not be able to form a coalition government again and implement the policies that have effect on personal well-being and national economy lead the supporters of the incumbents to believe that that times to come will be worse then before.

Along with the logit estimation, Table 29 displays the odds ratios that allow the interpretation of the models in terms of factor changes in odds. Take, for instance, the effect of prospective egotropic evaluations on voting for
The odds of supporting the incumbent parties are 0.368 lower if the voter believes that his or her household financial situation will improve in the future compared with the voter who is not sure about the financial future of his or her household, holding other variables constant. To give just another example, if a respondent reports an improvement in national economic conditions as opposed to a respondent who is not sure whether or not the economy improved in 1997, the chance that the former would vote for the incumbent parties is 1.998 times higher compared with the later respondent.\textsuperscript{256} The same logic applies for analysis of other odds ratios. Adding the substantive meaning to this odds ratio estimation, the conclusion is straightforward: those respondents who recognize the improvement in the national economy are more likely to vote for the incumbent parties than those whose perception is opposite. The same does not hold for egotropic voting at all.

Comparing the models across elections, it seems that the 2001 election could be the hardest to predict in terms of retrospective voting, but during this time prospective egotropic and prospective sociotropic voting was far more common then in other years. The 1997 election has the most significant effects for sociotropic voting, and in 2005 election significant prospective and retrospective

\textsuperscript{256}This conclusion is based on the estimations performed using different reference categories – they are available upon request.
voting took place where voters stressed more the condition of national economy than the personal finances.

To sum up, analyzing the sample of voters who consider government responsible for economic change, the strongest component of economic voting in Polish parliamentary elections was sociotropic and prospective. Citizens are more interested in outcomes than future policies and they find easier to assess performance than future plans. Looking from the comparative perspective at these findings, it appears that the Polish voters are similar to American voters rather than to Danish voters in their assessments of incumbents. In other words, the statistical estimation presented here might bring into conclusion that the Polish voters develops the skills of rational economic voters and citizen under the umbrella of liberal rather then social welfare ideology. This fact might be also confirmed by the studies conducted on the regional level analysis in the first part of this chapter. Last, but not least, this finding might be developed and utilized further in the further chapters of this work.

4 Conclusions

The conclusion from this chapter is that the retrospective economic model of voting does capture a substantial portion of electoral reality on the regional level of analysis (the regressors in the model(s) explain a little over 70% of the variation). To some extent, this finding is supported by sociotropic model at the individual level of analysis. Both analyses confirm that that the national
economic conditions are important for the Polish voters, probably more than their personal finances while making a choice on the Election Day. In other words, voters seem to be rational actors who evaluate the assessment of the governing parties and punish or award them at the ballot box, much as has been found to be common in the developed democracies. Past research until recently was not clear whether or not Poland can be put on the list of countries where economic model of voting is applicable. It was rather assumed that political and economic situation in Poland is too fluid to permit for systematic economic voting behavior. Even though this study utilized only a tiny party from the list of possibilities to test the economic voting theory, I believe the findings continue to suggest the importance of considering old and new factors related to the Polish economics and politics in modeling patterns of economic voting. The contribution of this chapter to the existing research on economic voting in Poland is definitely the inclusion of ‘new’ independent variables related to the economic redistribution. The individual level of analysis finds the previously lacking evidence of support for the sociotropic and egotropic evaluations (depending on election time) and the vote for incumbent parties.

\[257^{257}\] Recent study by Tucker indicated that this is a case for dozen of countries in East-Central Europe. See Tucker, *Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic, 1990-1999.*
CHAPTER SIX

ISSUE-BASED MODELS OF VOTING

The last substantive chapter of this work presents the analysis of two issue-based models of voting, referred in the literature as proximity and directional models. Neither of these models has been tested using elections in Poland or in any other countries in Eastern Europe except Hungary.\footnote{Bojan Todosijevic, "Issues and Party Preferences in Hungary – a Comparison of Directional and Proximity Models," \textit{Party Politics} 11, no. 1 (2005).} Therefore, this chapter contributes to understand voting behavior in Poland from the rational choice perspective using voters’ evaluations of political parties. Voters’ assessments of political parties are modeled by specifying the utility function that is either a function of policy distance from voters to political parties (proximity model) or a function of direction and intensity of policy movement desired by voters and espoused by the political parties relative to the status quo (directional model). This study also points out the concerns within the literature related to the explanation and prediction of voter behavior while employing these two models. The analysis of both models is also extended by utilizing party identification and party sympathy as suggested by recent literature on voting behavior. All these analyses are based on the Polish National Election Studies.

1. **Proximity and Directional Model Defined**

   The proximity and directional models of voting are described by Iversen in terms of ‘reason’ (spatial proximity) and ‘passion’ (directionality) that motivates voters to cast a ballot for a specific party. According to the proximity model that has roots in the classical spatial theory presented by Downs (1957), voters prefer political parties that are closer to them on a specific issue without taking into consideration the neutral point or political “side” on which the political parties and voters are located. In this model voters compare a party’s position on policy issues to their own ideal points and support the political party with issue position nearest their own preferences. The proximity theory predicts that the centre position of political parties is a winning position for the parties, which corresponds to the median voter theorem.

   While testing the proximity model of voting, there are two possible ways to calculate the distance between a party’s position and a voter’s position on a specific issue. First, the Euclidean one-dimensional distance z between $V_i$ and party $P_i$ is calculated in the following way.

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\[ z = \sqrt{(V_1 - P_1)^2} = |V_1 - P_1| \]  \hspace{1cm} (1)

In the multidimensional (multi-issues) policy space the Euclidean distance between the voter and the party is (note: Pythagoras’ Theorem remains valid).\(^{260}\)

\[ z = \sqrt{(V_1 - P_1)^2 + (V_2 - P_2)^2 + \ldots + (V_n - P_n)^2}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (2)

Typically, researchers use the squared Euclidean distance (instead of equation (2)), and they multiply each distance term with an issue saliency parameter. Thus the utility of party \( P \) for voter \( V \) on \( n \) issues can be expressed as

\[ U_{vp} = -\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i (V_i - P_i)^2 \]  \hspace{1cm} (3)

where the term \( U \) is called the voter’s utility function or the voter’s quantitative evaluation of a party; \( U \) is a declining function of policy distance from voter to party and \( a_i \) denotes the policy-salience parameter for the \( i \)th issue estimated from the data.\(^{261}\) This study follows the standard practice of previous research on proximity model and calculates the quadratic proximity.

A recent alternative to the proximity theory of voting is directional theory proposed first by Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989). This perspective is not


based on the same assumption as proximity theory where voters are solely concerned with the distance between their ideal preferences on issues and political parties’ position, but rather voters do indeed look for parties with stances that are clear and in the same political camp as their own.\textsuperscript{262} Evans (2004) has characterized the directional model in the following way: “Given the assumption that voters want a clear stance, the centre position is the losing position, contrary to the proximity theory. Thus, the directional theory provides a possible explanation as to why parties do not converge on the centre – it would be a vote-minimising strategy.”\textsuperscript{263} Kedar, for instance, argues that voters will support those parties whose platform is distanced from their views but are more effective as far as policy legislation and implementation goes.\textsuperscript{264} The rationale for preferring a party whose positions are distanced from the voter’s views, yet on

\textsuperscript{262}Some scholars suggest that both proximity and directional models are complementary rather than contradictory. They suggest that inherent in voter choice are aspects of both the proximity and directional models. Iversen, "Political Leadership and Representation in West European Democracies: A Test of Three Models of Voting." Merrill and Grofman, A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models.

\textsuperscript{263}Evans, Voters \\& Voting: An Introduction, 108.

the same side of political spectrum defined as a neutral point or status quo, is policy oriented; voters endorse parties insofar as the parties pull policy outcomes in a desired direction. Finally, some formulations of the directional theory point out that as the distance between the party and the voter preference grows, the voter’s support for that party will gradually diminish, which refers in the literature to the unclear concept called the ‘region of acceptability’.

Rabinowitz and Macdonald suggest that the utility of a party for an individual voter is not defined by proximity but by the scalar product that can be reflected in one dimensional or multidimensional space. 265 To calculate directional product scores in one-dimensional space (one issue) we apply the following formula: (voter position – neutral point) x (party position – neutral point). The neutral point representing the status quo could be either the midpoint on the issue scale or the mean position of the majority party. 266 Instead, this study employs the measurement of the status quo defined as the weighted mean of all voters’ position on the specific issues. The formal utility function for the multidimensional directional model is:

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265 Rabinowitz and Macdonald, "A Directional Theory of Issue Voting."
\[ U_{vp} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i V_i P_i \] (4)

Again, \( a_i \) denotes the policy-salience parameter for the \( i \)th issue. Further, this study includes an intercept for each party to model the general support for each party besides the support explained by issue stance. The utility function of the directional model for a certain party \( P \) then becomes

\[ U_{vp} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \beta_i V_i P_i + \alpha_p + \epsilon_{vp} \] (5)

where \( \alpha_p \) is the intercept terms for the party, \( \beta_i \) indicates the saliency of issue no. \( i \), and \( \epsilon_{vp} \) is a random term. The analysis presented in this chapter enhances the rational cost-benefit explanations by including the non-rational factor of party identification that influences voter choice. Therefore, the final utility functions for proximity and directional models with party identification are expressed as

\[ U_{vp} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \beta_i (V_i - P_i)^2 + \alpha_p + \gamma D_{vp} + \epsilon_{vp} \] (6)

\[ U_{vp} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \beta_i V_i P_i + \alpha_p + \gamma D_{vp} + \epsilon_{vp} \] (7)

where \( D_{vp} \) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if \( V \) identifies with \( P \) (else equal to zero) and \( \gamma \) is a coefficient for the importance of the party ID.
2. Debates over the Proximity and Directional Models

There are two ways to calculate the utility function while utilizing spatial models, depending on how the issue positions are approached. Differences in measurement of party positions brought to scholarship a debate, which has not been solved until now. On one side we have scholars who argue that the idiosyncratic party placement in the mind of the individual voter corresponds to the real politics. These researchers usually utilize the respondents’ perception of a party position to test the proximity model of voting. In other words, the argument goes that each voter has his or her own perception of a political party and its issue stance. One voter might be exposed to a political party during the campaign process, let’s say in the industrial unit, and receive a different message from that party regarding the issue of privatization than other voters, let’s say in the banking sector. Thus the presentation of issue positions to the voters by political parties as well as the voter’s perception might diverge. As noticed by Lewis and King (1999) “standard utility theory explicitly assumes that any two individuals’ utility functions need not be comparable”. In other words, the perception of political parties by most of the electorate might not be relevant to

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267 See articles dedicated to the debate between the proximity and directional models of voting in *Journal of Theoretical Politics* (1997), Volume 9, No. 1.

the specific voter. Thus to assess the voters’ utility, the argument proceeds, we need to focus on their perception of political parties.

Those who oppose the idiosyncratic position and embrace the use of the overall sample mean for the party’s positions on specific issues argue that “psychological research demonstrates that in fact voters tend to make up their minds about party’s positions before elections using short-term information rather than previous perceptions, and as such all voters are receiving a common picture during the course of a campaign prior to election.” The argument against the idiosyncratic party placement is based on the assumption that not every voter recognizes the ‘true’ party stances on a specific issue and that party positions should be analyzed from the broader perspective that corresponds to the ‘true’ stance of political parties. In other words, a voter who believes that his/her views are conservative might tend to think (using some kind of short-cut or heuristic) that the conservative party has a similar position to his/her own position on the privatization issue, whereas in reality it is a false perception. The danger of using the idiosyncratic party placement becomes even more realistic if researchers utilize the post-election surveys. Respondents asked about a party position on specific issue (let’s say the position of party they voted for) could indicated their own position rather than the position of political party. Similarly, they could place a political party they

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did not vote for on the opposite site than their own. Thus, the party issue placement, as measured, “may be endogenous to the feeling thermometer and thus may be systematically biased.” Therefore, scholars propose to replace each respondent’s perception of political party issue position with the mean position in the sample for each party. Interestingly enough, the use of idiosyncratic or average party placement on specific policy issues tends to corresponds to the utilization of proximity and directional models. In other words, those who ‘favor’ the directional model tends to argue for utilizing the mean of party positions while those who ‘favor’ the proximity model tends to defend the use of respondents’ idiosyncratic party placements. This study employs both the mean party position and the idiosyncratic party position while estimating the directional and proximity models. Such a decision allows comparison of both models without privileging either the proximity model or the directional model.

As much as the proximity and directional theories seem to be plausible in explaining the voting behavior, there are some doubts whether or not the utility functions, statistical assumptions regarding the issue positions, existing statistical methods, and available survey data can falsify empirically the validity of these

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271 Lewis and King discuss this issue extensively citing scholars who propose this transformation and those who oppose it. See Ibid.: 26-30.
two different theories. This is why recent scholarship produced opponents, supporters, and those who are in the middle regarding the applicability of the proximity and directional model of voting. The debate also persists on the theoretical and mathematical ground. Those who oppose the directional model, criticize that the ‘region of acceptability’ beyond which parties will be panelized is not clear in the directional theory. Further, they also point out to the deficiency of the directional model in measuring the intensity of propensity in the issue salience. Specifically, consider two issues in the two dimensional space when voter and a political party are on the same side of one issue (both agree e.g. on privatization) but are on the exactly opposing sides of the other issue (e.g. taxes). The directional model does not account for the change in the utility under the special circumstance, for instance, when the voter locates herself at +1 and the political party on -1 with the respect to tax policy and locates herself and the political party at position +1 with the respect to the issue of privatization. There are also scholars, such as Lewis-Beck, who argue that the support for each of these models is “marginal at best” due to the untested methodological

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272For a good discussion about validity of these theories see Ibid.


274Mathematically, this special case is presented as follows: $U=(1-1)^2 + (1-1)^2=0$. This could be also extended to other positions of the voter and political parties in two-dimensional space, for instance $U=(4-4)^2 + (4-4)^2=0$. 

assumptions the scholars accept, the poor quality of data utilized for these models, and small empirical evidence of superiority of one over the other model.\textsuperscript{275}

Other researchers, such as Macdonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug (1998 and 2001) argue that directional model does a better job in explanation of voting behavior than the proximity model, specifically in the multiparty system.\textsuperscript{276} On the same side of the fence is Soren Risbjerg Thomsen (2004 and 2008), but his analysis and investigations go even further than demonstrating the superiority of directional over proximity model in multiparty systems.\textsuperscript{277} Thomsen presented mathematically and empirically that the estimates for the issue salience in directional model are equal to those of the proximity model times -2 under the condition that both models are desired to be calculated based on the mean party positions rather than the idiosyncratic positions. In other words, Thomsen provided the evidence that there is really no substantive difference in the results while estimating these two models using the same measurement of issue

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Lewis and King, "No Evidence on Directional Vs. Proximity Voting," 22.
\item Stuart Elaine Macdonald, George Rabinowitz, and Ola Listhaug, "On Attempting to Rehabilitate the Proximity Model: Sometimes the Patient Just Can't Be Helped," \textit{Journal of Politics} 60, no. 3 (1998).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
I also believe that from the mathematical point of view the difference between these two models is not as great as it looks from the theoretical perspective. Specifically, the squared Euclidian distance \((X-Y)^2 = X^2-2XY+Y^2\), contains the scalar product of \(XY\), which is used in calculation of directional model of voting, as was demonstrated above. Therefore, we could expect that these models would not differ a lot in their predictions of voting behavior.

Further, Thomsen discovered that in many multiparty systems the intercept terms are easily interpreted as the mean party sympathy scores after estimating the directional model, while this cannot be easily concluded for the intercept estimates for the proximity model. Such findings give a clear superiority to the directional model of voting. Thomsen interprets the party constants (intercepts) as the cultural effects in voting behavior and they are identified “when all voters tend to react in the same way to political events.” These cultural effects are different from the structural effects in the way that the later ones “are identified when voters tend to react differently according to their

\[\text{Therefore, there is no need to show here the results for both models with the utilization of the mean party position, yet as it was already mentioned above, this study presents the results for the proximity model based on the idiosyncratic party positions to assess its explanatory and predictable power and in some way contribute to the existing debate within the literature.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., 2.}\]
special interests.” In other words, political parties receive votes both because on average they have sympathy from the electorate (the specific cultural acceptance) and because they represent the specific interest of voters. This chapter follows findings of Thomsen and test whether or not the party intercepts correspond to the party sympathy in each analyzed Polish parliamentary elections.\textsuperscript{280}

Specifically, I test the proximity and directional models utilizing the fixed effects logit (conditional logit) that is appropriate for the alternative-specific datasets and for the simplicity it can be thought of as an estimation of the panel data with the discrete/nominal dependent variable that varies over groups. In other words, the conditional logit can estimate the effect on voting behavior of the distance between a voter and a political party on a political issue where the distance from each party to each voter varies across voters. The alternative specific variables are the distances between voters and parties on specific issues. After the estimation of utility functions, following Thomsen’s (2008) suggestion, I compute the mean of all the party coefficients (intercepts) including the one that was set to zero during the conditional logit estimation and subtract this mean

\textsuperscript{280}Note that the “hardliners” of rational choice would argue against including the intercepts while testing the spatial models.
from each estimated party intercept.\textsuperscript{281} Finally, the computed intercept values are regressed with the party sympathy. The results are presented graphically in Figures 15-17 for proximity and directional models without party identification and are discussed below.

How do all these theoretical and mathematical debates relate to the substantive electoral political realm in general and to Poland in particular? Both theories agree that support from the median voter is vital to electoral triumph of political parties.\textsuperscript{282} Yet the difference between these two theories is how to win the support of the median voter. Morris and Rabinowitz state that “in directional theory the median voter will support the candidate who takes a strong stand on the side of the issues that she favors, provided she perceives the candidate as responsible. In proximity theory, she will prefer the candidate whose set of policy positions most closely matches her own.”\textsuperscript{283} Under the directional theory voters “decide only what side they are on and how intense they

\textsuperscript{281}As pointed out by Thomsen, the transformation of party intercepts is purely arbitrary but it becomes attractive when one wants to compare these party intercepts over time. Note also that the true intercept is not estimated in the conditional logit because it does not play any role in determining the conditional probabilities of positive outcomes. Further, in each estimation the intercept for PSL party is set to zero.


\textsuperscript{283}Ibid.
feel.” Under the proximity theory there is no need to take sides. As was already demonstrated in the previous chapters, the Polish electorate seems to be divided, to some extent, in terms of post-communist and post-solidarity party preferences. This could suggest that the directional theory would be more applicable to the Polish setting, because the side of the political fence matters to voters. Further, during the political and economic transition the strong and definite positions of responsible political parties might have a strong effect on voters’ choice. The growing support among Polish voters for populist political parties in the parliamentary elections of 2001 and 2005 could indicate the deficiencies in the proximity theory of voting compared to the directional theory. This is not to disregard the proximity model. Polish electors could as well behave as true rational voters and choose a political party that is closer to their own idiosyncratic ideal stance. Yet, the crucial point here is to assess whether or not there is a significant statistical difference while testing both theories as well as which model explains and predicts better the electoral outcomes.

3. Variables and Descriptive Statistics

While testing these two models of issue-based voting this project employs the announced vote for a particular party as the dependent variable and the set of covariates that represent both parties and voters positions on issues of political salience at election time. These include de-communization of public offices,

284 Lewis and King, "No Evidence on Directional Vs. Proximity Voting," 23.
privatization, European integration, economic foreign policy, the role of the Catholic Church in state politics, and taxation.\textsuperscript{285} Also, self-placement of the voter and the voter’s perception of where the political party is located on the left-right scale are used in these models as the independent variable. Since recent scholarship suggests including party identification in issue-based models and it was shown in chapter 4 that the voters’ party identification has a significant impact on voting behavior, I decided to estimate each model for each election twice, with and without party ID. This procedure allows a better assessment of the impact of issues on voting preferences. In other words, after controlling for party identification in each model, the significant influence of issue(s) on voter choice might disappear, most likely indicating that, on average, the party attachment is more important indicator of vote than the issue(s).

Figures 9-14 present the mean positions of voters and political parties on analyzed issues and left-right placement of the parties and voters. Specifically, the average voter moved in his or her left-right ideological position between -0.6 in 2001 elections and 1.7 in 2005 elections on the scale ranging from -5 to 5. In

\textsuperscript{285}Note that at each election the respondents were not asked to place political parties on all the issues. Therefore, this analysis focuses only on the issues positions of political parties that were asked in the surveys. One way to omit this inconvenience would be to replace the party positions on the specific issues with a voter position on this specific issue. Yet this would create a slight bias in the analysis.
Figure 9. Left-Right Placement of the Parties and Voter
Figure 10. Issue Dimension: Role of Church

Figure 11. Issue Dimension: Lustration/Decomunization
Figure 12. Issue Dimension: Tax

**Elections 1997**

**Elections 2001**

**Elections 2005**
Figure 13. Issue Dimension: Privatization

Elections 1997

- UW
- SLD AWS
- PSL
- Voter

More Privatization | Less Privatization

Elections 2001

- PO
- PIS
- SLD
- PSL
- LPR
- SRP
- Voter

More Privatization | Less Privatization

Elections 2005

- PO
- SLD
- PIS
- LPR
- SRP
- Voter

More Privatization | Less Privatization
the 1997 elections the mean voter’s left-right placement was at 0.8. It is interesting to see how the median voter changes the position from right to left were searching between best possible policies.\textsuperscript{286} Such an explanation is supported

by analyzing the specific issues presented in each table. For instance, the issue of
taxation presented for each election in Figure 12 indicates that voters changed
their views in each during election time, which corresponds to the voters’ moves
on the left-right dimension. This is evident for almost all the issue dimensions
presented in these figures.

As perceived by the voters, the positions of the post-solidarity parties on
the left-right dimension changed very slightly. The only party that was placed at
the same left-right position in last three elections was the post-communist SLD.
If we consider the AWS as the ancestor of the PO and the PiS, and the LPR as
the successor of ROP we clearly see that the offspring parties moved toward the
center on the left-right dimension. I believe that these party placements are
fairly accurate portrayals of actual party positions.\textsuperscript{287} The examination of each
issue dimension reveals that most of the parties have a clear stands on the
specific issues and their positions are fairly stretched over the political spectrum,
except the taxation issue in 1997 where all the parties are very closed to the voter
position on taxation issue.

\textsuperscript{287}Note that the populist parties such as the LPR and the SRP are sometimes
placed closer to the center than it would be expected by the most political
observers. Yet I believe that the radicalism of the LPR and the SRP is well
represented on the issue of EU integration as well as the role of the church for the
LPR alone.
Finally, analyzing Figures 9-14 we could roughly guess how the voter could
cast her vote. For instance, Figure 13 presents the voters and parties’ positions
on the issue of privatization. Note that the average voter in 2001 supported less
privatization than any political party. Specifically, the median voter is spaced at
point 2.2 on the scale ranging from -5 to 5 while the SRP is located at point 2. If
privatization was the only issue important for the voter during the elections of
2001, by the crude estimate based on the proximity theory we could assume that
the voter would cast the ballot for the SRP since both have has a vary similar
view on privatization. Since there is no political party on the left of side of the
voter and the status quo is roughly at -.8, the directional theory would predict
that the voter would not for sure choose the PO because they are on the other
side of the fence. Surprisingly to some, obvious to others, the voter’s choice would
be the same under both theories. Just to give one more example, take the issue
of the EU integration from 2005. According to proximity theory, the vote would
go to the PiS and under the directional theory to the SRP if we assume that the
LPR is outside of the ‘region of acceptability’. If EU integration was the only
important issue, the SLD as well as the PO would be the losers in the elections
under the assumptions of both theories. Now the question becomes how these
issue positions affect the voting preferences after we place them into
multidimensional space.
Table 30. Conditional Logit Estimates for Directional and Proximity Models of Voting – Model 1

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* * * p<0.1, ** * p<0.01, *** p<0.001 two-tailed test. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The PSL is the base outcome.
4. Results and Discussions

This section assesses how issue positions affect the vote by studying the relationship between specific policy attitudes and party preferences by estimating the proximity and directional models of voting with both the idiosyncratic and the average party placements. Table 30 displays the estimates of both models without the party identification covariate. As the table indicates, there are clear similarities between each estimated model, but also some differences. One apparent finding is that by employing the mean party position while calculating the voters' utility, the issue saliency estimates in the directional models are twice as large as the estimates of issue saliency in the proximity models.\textsuperscript{288} Further, the explanatory power of proximity and directional models is always the same under the condition that we utilize the mean party position in both models. Only the estimates of party intercepts differ.\textsuperscript{289}

The other notable finding is there is no significant difference in the explanatory power of proximity and directional models while employing the idiosyncratic party placement. The differences of the pseudo R-squared range between 0.069 and 0.021, although on average, the directional model is slightly better at explaining vote choice than the proximity model in each election

\textsuperscript{288}As mentioned previously, Thomsen proved mathematically that this will always be the case if we employ mean party position.

\textsuperscript{289}Note that the same is true for Model 2 with the party ID (Table 32).
irrespective of the utilization of idiosyncratic or mean party positions. This result comes rather as a surprise, since we would expect (based on the previous empirical tests of issue-based models) that the proximity model would perform better than the directional model if the idiosyncratic party positions are utilized in the analysis. This discovery only confirms the superiority of the directional model while testing the issue-based voting. In addition, similar to the models estimated with the mean party position, the issue saliency in the directional models is nearly twice as large as the issue saliency in the proximity models. These minor differences in the empirical estimates of issue saliency confirm what has been argued by Lewis and King (1999) that there is no substantive difference in the understanding of voting behavior when comparing results from the directional and proximity models. The empirical findings in this study go even further and demonstrate that there is no substantive difference in the understanding the electoral choice of the Polish voter when comparing the results of issue saliency in models estimated with the idiosyncratic and mean party position. Again, only the party intercept estimates fluctuate from model to model and unfortunately the party intercepts are very often not reported by researchers.

The effect of issue positions on voters’ choice is on average moderate. The pseudo Rsquared estimated by the directional and proximity models with mean

\[290\text{Again, the same is true for Model 2 presented in Table 32.}\]
party position for 1997, 2001 and 2005 elections are 0.405, 0.303, and 0.254 respectively. These findings indicate that issue-based voting declined over time and is also supported by the R-squared figures estimated by both directional and proximity models with the idiosyncratic party positions. The coefficients for all the issues are significant at 0.05 levels or higher, except the coefficient on the privatization in 2001 estimated by the proximity model using the idiosyncratic party position. The strongest impact on voting for the political parties goes to the left-right self placement across all elections and utilized models. It is not surprising since left-right attitudes probably summarize the voters’ positions on all the issues.\textsuperscript{291} This finding also confirms what has been found in chapter 4, namely that the ideology is an important predictor of vote. Note that all coefficients are positive for both models, indicating the utility of voting for a political party that is either close to the voter’s position (proximity) or is on the same “side” of the status quo (directional). The positive coefficients for the proximity model mean that the closer the political party is to a voter on specific issue, the more likely this party is going to be chosen. Larger coefficients in the directional model would suggest that the political party that is more intense on the issue would be more attractive to the voter. Positive coefficients in this

\textsuperscript{291}One would argue that if the left-right is a “super issue” then it should not be included in the model to avoid the over estimation of issue-based voting. Even though this argument is valid I follow the commonly accepted practice in the research on issue-based voting and include this covariate in all the models.
model indicate that voters choose political parties from the same side of the political spectrum.

More specific interpretations of coefficients are possible by transforming the estimates into the odd ratios by employing the mathematical constant $e$ and coefficients $b$ as power ($e^b$). For instance, the interpretation of the coefficient for joining the EU estimated by the proximity model in 2001 elections is as follows: if a political party moves closer to the voter by one unit (let's say from -3 to -2 while a voter is located at value -1) that odds that voter will chose this party increase by 1%, *ceteris paribus*. The interpretation of the party intercept for the victorious SLD in the same proximity model for the same year of elections would be as follows: if issues were weighted equally by voters, voters would be 6.96 times more likely to choose the SLD than the PSL. Why would voters choose the SLD over the PSL if all the issues are weighted equally? Based on what factors? In other words, what is the interpretation of this party intercept and what are these intercepts estimating? The difficulty of answering these questions forced the “hard core” rational choice scholars to omit them from analysis of issue-based voting or estimating them but not reporting them and interpreting them. As already mentioned, Soren Thomsen is the first scholar, to my knowledge, who discovered that these intercepts measure the popularity or sympathy of political parties. Figures 15-17 present the relationship between the

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Note that the PSL is a base party in each model.
Figure 15. Relationship between Mean Party Sympathy and Party Intercepts – 1997 Elections

Adj. R-sq=0.91

Directional 1997
Mean Party Position

Mean party sympathy

Adj. R-sq = 0.017

Proximity 1997
Mean Party Position

Mean party sympathy

Adj. R-sq=0.69

Directional 1997
Idiosyncratic Party Position

Mean party sympathy

Adj. R-sq = 0.08

Proximity 1997
Idiosyncratic Party Position

Mean party sympathy
Figure 16. Relationship between Mean Party Sympathy and Party Intercepts – 2001 Elections

Adj. R-sq=0.75
Directional 2001
Mean Party Position

Adj. R-sq=0.69
Proximity 2001
Mean Party Position

Adj. R-sq=0.80
Directional 2001
Idiosyncratic Party Position

Adj. R-sq=0.70
Proximity 2001
Idiosyncratic Party Position
Figure 17. Relationship between Mean Party Sympathy and Party Intercepts – 2005 elections

Directional 2005
Adj. R-sq=0.95
Mean Party Position

Proximity 2005
Adj. R-sq=0.22
Mean Party Position

Directional 2005
Adj. R-sq=0.95
Idiosyncratic Party Position

Proximity 2005
Adj. R-sq=0.42
Idiosyncratic Party Placement
mean party sympathy and the party intercepts for proximity and directional models calculated with mean party positions and idiosyncratic party positions for each election. These correlations are much stronger for the party intercepts estimated by the directional models than the proximity models. For instance, the adjusted R-squared for “directional model intercepts over party sympathy” in 2005 elections is 0.95 while for the regression using the intercepts estimated by the proximity model with mean party position and idiosyncratic party positions is only 0.42 and 0.22 respectively. The difference between ‘directional intercepts’ and ‘proximity intercepts’ in 1997 is even more devastating for the proximity model – the adjusted R-squared is 0.91 and 0.017 in favor of the intercepts estimated by the directional model (both models estimated with mean party sympathy). These findings give a clear priority to the directional models at least for the 1997 and 2001 elections.

The differences in correlations between the mean party sympathy and intercepts estimated for the 2001 elections are less evident, yet the adjusted R-squared is still higher for ‘directional intercepts’. One also would wonder what would be the explanation of the estimated intercept for the PO in 2001 since it has a higher value than the mean party sympathy (Figure 16). The explanation of this intercept is quite difficult at this stage of research – we can only declare that other factor(s) influenced voters to cast ballot for the PO besides the issues
and the party sympathy. On the other hand, we can speculate why the average party sympathy for the PO was low in 2001 elections.

Looking at the mean party sympathy scores presented in Table 31, we noticed that the PO, on average, was not very popular in 2001, but it became quite popular in 2005. In order to explain this turn in general sympathy for the PO, it is necessary to go back in time and recall the political roots of PO. As it was already mentioned in chapter 2 of this work, the Civic Platform (PO) was formed 8 months before the 2001 elections by the politicians who represented a liberal wing of the UW. Some key figures left the UW (such as Donald Tusk, who became a popular as a presidential candidate in 2004) and together with some other members of AWS created the PO. The important fact that need not be overlooked is that the UW was in the governmental coalition with the AWS until mid-2000. Notice that the AWS lost its credibility due to inefficient

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>0.79</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<td>-2.82</td>
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<td>PiS</td>
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<td>-0.42</td>
<td>1.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>PO</td>
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<td>-1.64</td>
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<td>SRP</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-1.17</td>
<td>-1.74</td>
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governance and even failed to achieve the 5% threshold in 2001 elections. I believe that the low sympathy for the PO in 2001 is due to the fact that their leaders were in the coalition with the AWS. As we can see from Table 32, which presents the mean party sympathy for all major parties across time, all of the post-solidarity parties (including the PO) were, on average, not voters’ favorites in the 2001 elections. When the post-communist SLD came to power for a second time after the fall of communism in 2001, they almost immediately marked their political actions with the corruption. More specifically, SLD politicians as well as the representatives on the national and local level were involved in several economic corruptions including the allegations for the top SLD figures such as the Prime Minister Leszek Miller and the President Aleksander Kwasniewski. The Orlen affair, just to mention the largest corruption associated with the SLD, involved the privatization of state-owned largest fuel corporation. To investigate the Orlen case the special parliamentary investigation commission was set up and the parliamentary hearings of top SLD figure benefited the politicians of the Civic Platform (PO) and the Law and Justice (PiS) and seriously hurt the SLD. To sum up, the relatively high party sympathy for the UW in 1997 and low sympathy for the PO in 2001 is most likely due to the AWS-UW governmental coalition. The gain of popularity by the PO in 2005 could be
easily explained by the fact that its politicians played a very visible and positive role during the parliamentary hearing of the top members of SLD. 293

The model 2 is displayed in Table 32. One evident finding from this model that incorporates the party identification as an additional independent variable is that significance of some issue fail to indicate the impact on voting preference. For instance, in 1997 elections only two issues out of five remain significant after including the party identification and estimating the models with the idiosyncratic party position. These are the role of church in political life as well as communist nomenclature. These results confirm what has been found in the previous chapters. In the estimation with the mean party position, the issue of privatization stays marginally significant. In the 2001 elections the issue of privatization becomes irrelevant to the electorate and in 2005 the issue of lustration and decommunization loses its significance in the models estimated with idiosyncratic party position but remains important in both the directional and proximity models estimated with the mean party position. This could be explained by the fact that the wining party, the PiS, had a strong position on

293Similar explanation for low sympathy in 2001 and high popularity in 2005 could be given for the PiS. Further, notice that the SLD had low sympathy in 1997, high sympathy in 2001, and again low sympathy in 2005. The low popularity in 1997 elections is most likely due to the SLD governance from 1993 to 1997 and by the same token, there is a clear evidence of large decline in the SLD general popularity between 2001 and 2005.
Table 32. Conditional Logit Estimates for Directional and Proximity Models of Voting with Party Identification – Model 2

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<td>Directional</td>
<td>Proximity</td>
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<td>2a_1</td>
<td>a_2</td>
<td>2a_2</td>
<td>a_3</td>
<td>2a_3</td>
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<td>.105*** (.013)</td>
<td>.084*** (.01)</td>
<td>.078*** (.01)</td>
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<td>.108*** (.012)</td>
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<td>.045* (.026)</td>
<td>.009 (.009)</td>
<td>.005 (.008)</td>
<td>.021 (.017)</td>
<td>.021 (.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>.28 (.714)</td>
<td>.28 (.714)</td>
<td>.036 (.07)</td>
<td>.026 (.018)</td>
<td>.017 (.012)</td>
<td>.017 (.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Nomenclature</td>
<td>.042*** (.009)</td>
<td>.042*** (.009)</td>
<td>.027*** (.005)</td>
<td>.023*** (.0048)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church/State Relations</td>
<td>.033*** (.008)</td>
<td>.033*** (.008)</td>
<td>.027*** (.006)</td>
<td>.021*** (.006)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Capital</td>
<td>.019 (.0138)</td>
<td>.019 (.0138)</td>
<td>.012 (.008)</td>
<td>.0104 (.008)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2 = .581</td>
<td>R^2 = .581</td>
<td>N = 4950</td>
<td>N = 4950</td>
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*p<0.1,  **p<0.01,  ***p<0.001 two-tailed test. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The PSL is the base outcome.
lustration and decommunization advocating that there is a need to take out from public offices and politics the former secret police officers that served under the communist regime. It also seems that the PiS stand on the issue of lustration and decommunization was supported by the general public.

Let us focus again on the party intercepts. We notice that in model 1 and 2 some party intercepts are negative in directional model while they are positive in the proximity model. This indicates that parties such as the LPR in 2001 and the SLD in 2005 in the logic of the directional model received a ‘penalty’ for being extreme and falling outside of the ‘region of acceptability’. Further, the comparison of the intercepts over elections in the directional model allows us to access the change in the overall support for each political party. For instance, comparing the intercept for the SLD throughout these three elections we can see how the party gained the support of voters from 1997 to 2001 and lost drastically in the 2005. Last but not least, if the party intercepts closely correspond to the average sympathy for each party (as in the 1997 and 2005 elections), we can conclude that the insignificant party intercepts demonstrate that some political parties did not gain the general popularity in the public as compared to the other parties. For instance, the populist SRP and LPR in 2005 elections had less sympathy in the public than the PSL, and their votes can be explain by their
positions on the political issue rather than their popularity (compared to PSL).\textsuperscript{294} Finally, calculating the differences in pseudo R-square between models with and without party identifications as well as comparing the coefficients for each election together with party sympathy (party intercepts) estimated by the directional models, the substantive conclusions are as follows. Voters’ electoral decisions in 1997 elections were undertaken based on the mixture of issues, party sympathy and party identifications. The verdicts for the 2001 elections were based on party sympathy but also on issues. In the 2005 elections voters cast the ballots based on the party identification and party sympathy more than issues.

In sum, the proximity and directional model are very similar in their explanatory power even when estimating the proximity model with the idiosyncratic party placement, which according to the literature should give the privilege to the proximity model over the directional model. The issue-based voting is evident in the Polish electorate irrespectively of the utilized model, yet it seems to be diminishing over time and somewhat replaced by the party

\textsuperscript{294}In addition to utilization of the PSL as a base party in the conditional logit estimation for all models, it is also possible to change a base in the estimation. For instance, estimating each model with the winning party in the election as a base (AWS in 1997, SLD in 2001, and PiS in 2005) we could compare the party intercepts across parties with the reference to the winning party. We could also re-run each model with each political party as a base producing 64 estimated models which appears to be infeasible at least for this study. The results for such estimations are available upon request.
identification. The cultural factor of party popularity appears to play a significant role during the elections and could be estimated within the directional model. Looking from the comparative perspective at these findings, it appears again that the Polish voter is not much different from the other voters in the western democracies.

5. **Conclusions**

This chapter provided the analysis of issue-based voting by utilizing the proximity and directional models. The study could be considered to some extent as a ground breaking analysis since there is no prior research conducted on the Polish electoral microdata using the spatial models of voting. This study also pointed out the existing statistical and theoretical debates regarding the applicability and usefulness of rational choice models. From the substantive side of this research, it was demonstrated that in the Polish setting the directional model of voting has superiority to the proximity model due to the predictability of party popularity represented by the party intercepts. It was also shown that the issues determine the voters’ choice, even though other non-policy factors, such as party identification and party popularity might indicate stronger influence on electoral preferences in some elections. Finally, the results in this chapter confirm the findings from previous chapters bringing the comprehensive picture of voting behavior in Poland. Even though this study utilized only two models of issue based voting, I believe these findings suggest the importance of exploring further
these rational choice models. In other words, the estimation of voting choices based on issue positions brings the remarkable possibilities for future investigations, for instance combining the party competition with the issue-based voting or including the political sophistication with the two models of issue voting.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

This dissertation presented a systematic empirical study of the Polish parliamentary elections in 1997, 2001 and 2005. The analyses were performed in the framework of behavioralism and rational choice. Under these two broad academic schools of thought various theories of voting behavior have been developed over last 50 years. I presented the main theoretical elements of sociological, socio-psychological, economic, and issue-based models of voting, examined the relative weight of the major variables in each model, and tested their statistical significance.

1. **What Has Been Learned?**

This research started with an ambition to find something new that applies explicitly to Poland; I also thought (perhaps naively) that the empirical findings would lead me to develop novel theoretical underpinnings. After the empirical analysis conducted in this study, I can declare that my original ambition was deeply flawed. I fooled myself that Polish voters, given the structural aspect of the democratic transition, would behave really differently from other voters in the developed democracies. My motivation to make a new discovery, brought me to the point where this research confirmed existing results not just for Poland,
but for other polities as well. Yet a ‘non-discovery’ is also a discovery. Notably, I found that the existing theoretical principles of voting behavior are applicable to Poland. As in other democracies, variables such as social class and religion help the Polish voters to decide which party to choose on the election day, attachment to the political parties provides an incentive to vote for this party, economic conditions on the national level appear to have an impact on voting, and finally the prominent issues matter to voters while casting a ballot. Such findings should certainly help future research to look at Polish society from the perspective of other democratic states while analyzing voting behavior. Perhaps the divide between old and new Europe is no longer a valid assumption in the analysis of voters’ choice.

Besides ‘no discovery’ of new theoretical foundations, I must say that this dissertation contains ‘small empirical discoveries’ that were not realized by the community of scholars who investigate the electoral behavior in Poland. Most importantly, I discovered that the party identification is applicable to the Polish political setting and it plays a significant role in the Polish electoral politics. Even though this finding contradicts the ‘scientific’ stereotype presented in the literature on Polish voting behavior, I believe this is a significant contribution to scientific studies of electoral politics.

Specifically, this study suggests that even though Polish voters are still learning how to be partisans, they have already developed some psychological
attachment to political parties in a very short period of democratic experience. In other words, the Polish voters identify with a political party, or at least consider themselves closer to one party or the other. Voters are psychologically attached to family of parties in the framework of post-communist and post-solidarity parties as well as in the narrower perspective that identifies party families in terms of their programmatic stands on socio-cultural and economic issues. Party attachment was also operationalized in the form of the degree of partisan identification and the findings imply that parties are used by voters as short-cuts or heuristics, which help them to decide in a complex electoral environment. In terms of the influence of party identification on voters’ choice, this study demonstrated that the party identification was the strongest predictor of the vote in the 2005 elections and weakest in the 2001 elections. Further, the influence of party identification on voting exceeded the influence of ideological orientation in the 2005 elections, but not in the 1997 and 2001 elections.295

295 A reader might be puzzled why ideology measured as left-right self placement seems to be a better predictor of vote than party identification in the socio-psychological model but the opposite is true in the estimation of the issue-based model of voting. In other words, one would ask why the coefficient of determination representing the party identification is larger (has a bigger effect) in the issue model of voting than in the socio-psychological model. In the Michigan model of voting the measurement of party identification was ‘split’ between different groups of parties either according to historical divide (post-solidarity and post-communist) or party families (social democrats, liberal conser-
There is no doubt that other earlier and later elections need to be taken into consideration, other available electoral data need to be tested (e.g. the International Social Survey Program Data), and perhaps other methods need to be employed, but the message from my finding is very clear: party identification cannot be neglected while studying the voting behavior in Poland.

While testing the Michigan model of voting the attention was given not only to partisans but also to independents. It was estimated that non-partisans cast their vote based on the ideological orientations in 1997 and 2001. Further, based on the political sophistication, independents were categorized as apoliticals or apartisans. This study revealed that among voters the number of apartisans seems to be steadily increasing, suggesting that party identification might become a weaker prediction of vote in the future elections, as prophesied by the cognitive mobilization theory. There is no doubt that the analysis of future elections is

...ervatives, and social conservatives) whereas in the issue voting model the party identification was measured and utilized as a dummy variable indicating whether or not a respondent identify with any political party. This clearly implies that while comparing different models we cannot blindly rely on the magnitude of coefficient. Also the left-right self placement in the directional model of voting was differently operationalized than in the socio-psychological model. In other words, this only confirms how careful the researchers and readers have to be in order to interpret these findings properly.
necessary to further test the theory of party functionalism as well as cognitive mobilization.

The issue-based voting model presented in this dissertation is also a ‘small empirical discovery’ which definitely contributes to existing research. First, it is the first approach to test the highly debatable rational choice models on the Polish elections. Second, it was shown that the issues are important factors while determining the voters’ choice irrespective of the type of model (directional or proximity) we employ in the analysis. Third, the estimates from the directional model of voting as compared with the proximity model estimates suggest that the Polish voter is more likely to choose a political party that has more intense stands on issues rather than the political party with an issue position near the status quo. Further, it seems to matter to voter whether or not the political party is on the same side of the fence (here the status quo) – if it is, then the party will gain the voter’s support, if it is not, it will loose votes. Fourth, by the utilization of the directional model of voting, we are able to interpret the estimated party intercepts as overall party sympathy within the polity. Overall, the rational choice models of issue-based voting predict very well the electoral results and seem to provide, together with party identification, the best explanatory power compared to other models of voting.

This work also demonstrated that the electoral politics is influenced by the economic performance. Besides the analysis of individual perceptions of economic
performance I also included regional effects into the voting behavior introducing the aggregate/national level data in economic model. The general perception of economic growth in Poland would suggest that the incumbent parties should retain at least the same number of seats in the parliament. Yet, incumbents lost in every single election. By utilizing the various economic indicators in the economic model of voting, the puzzle seems to be solved. Specifically, what has been shown by conducting the aggregate (regional) level of analysis is that the economic growth per se helps incumbents, but it is not enough to win the majority of votes in the polity when unemployment and poverty rates are increasing. On the other hand, the growth of economic inequality seems to facilitate votes for incumbents, but only to a certain point and then it turns against the governing party or coalition. The utilization of Gini index and the poverty rates as predictors of vote seems to be a definitive innovation in the analysis of Polish elections. Both indicators seem to suggest that the majority of Poles who vote could be classified as supporters of economic neo-liberalism, and in consequence, they choose political parties that support the neo-liberal economic policies.

A very clear message from this work is that economic conditions affect election results but they do not completely determine them. In other words, economy is not the only factor that matters. The analysis of economic voting on the individual level revealed that pocket book voting is inferior to the sociotropic
voting. Further, the aggregate level of analysis showed a stronger support for the economic theory of voting behavior than the individual level study. The divergence between macro- and micro-level analyses has been seen in the previous research. Yet the individual and aggregate level analysis are not mutually exclusive: the findings in this work complement each other demonstrating that national economic conditions affect individual voting decisions and the election results. Future research on this subject should implement both individual level data and aggregate level data at the same time and perform multilevel (hierarchical) analysis. Unfortunately, such a study has not been conducted yet on any of the Polish elections.

This study also confirmed what has been found in previous research conducted on first few democratic elections, namely that societal cleavages exist. What distinguishes this study from previous investigations is that this research determined the changes in social cleavages, clearly pointed out their location and revealed that on average they have weak direct effect on electoral outcomes. Specifically, in the 1997 elections voters’ decisions were based to some extent on the religious cleavage; there was a clear split between those voters who attended church and those who did not. Church-goers voted for post-solidarity parties while others for post-communist parties. In the 2001 elections, the religious practices of voters still influenced their political decisions, but the votes were split

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298 This is a task that I am currently pursuing.
more or less evenly between post-communist and post-solidarity parties. Religious cleavages played a less significant role in the elections of 2005 than in the previous elections, though it was still evident specifically in votes for the populist LPR. In general, in the 1997 elections the religious voting exceeded any other type of cleavage voting, but it subsequently declined. The influence of religion on voting most likely means that the traditional values in the family and the respect for authority have had the political relevance. Yet as the secularization of society proceeds, political parties associated with the Catholic Church must work harder to gain votes and appeal to voters on other than the religious subjects. This is evident at least in the LPR stances on the European enlargement and privatization in the 2005 elections.

My analysis suggests that the influence of class cleavage on voter’s behavior increased from the 1997 to 2005 elections. Specifically, in the 2005 elections class cleavage exceeded the influence of religious cleavage. The other cleavage that influenced the voter’s choice in analyzed elections is the urban-rural divide; the residents of villages tended to vote for rural parties more than others. Further, the political divisions of the past were present in the 1997 elections and declined as time passed. The overall weak explanatory power of cleavage voting is probably associated with the fact that the social characteristics of voters are quite far away from the actual vote in the funnel of causality proposed in The American Voter. In other words, there are other intermediate and closer factors
that dictate the final choice on the Election Day. Last, but not least, the presence of cleavages constitutes an important finding because social cleavages contribute to the development of party system, but we need to realize that most likely they do not take an immediate role of short-cuts or heuristics in the electoral decisions.

So far, I summarized what determined the voters’ choice at the ballot box from the perspective of various models of voting. Clearly, each model portrayed the Polish voter somewhat differently. So, which model should be trusted? I believe that behavioralism as well as rational choice theory are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Rational voters need social bases to make their choices to learn how to calculate their utility. By the same token, sociological voters do not only have the motives that are the same as the motives of the social group. In other words, voters combine elements of social identities and rationality while casting the ballot. Therefore, all the models should be taken seriously even though they have different explanatory and predictive power. On average and across elections, the sociological model and the economic egotropic model seem to have the weakest explanatory and predictive power. Models that seem to explain and predict best voting and electoral outcomes are issue-based and sociopsychological models. The macro-level analysis of economic voting appears to have strong explanatory power as well.
Finally, to stress the robustness of the findings in this work, it is necessary to point out that the dependent variable was operationalized in various ways. In addition to the analysis of voters’ choice for specific parties, I also grouped political parties into families. Such groupings allowed me to assess the importance of political parties social and historical roots as well as ideologies associated with the old and new regime. I also operationalized the dependent variable as the dichotomous variable in the economic and the socio-psychological models of voting. This allowed me to examine the voters’ choice of the incumbents and non-incumbents parties as well as the post-communist and the post-solidarity parties.

2. Directions for Future Research

Although I believe that I have made some important advances by examining how voters decide by testing competing models, I make no claim that I have incorporated all of the possible variables or employed all available statistical methods. Future research is full of opportunities to perform further investigations on the Polish elections. In general terms, future research should focus on, but not be limited to, testing how political campaigns determine voters’ choice as well as how the characteristics of party leaders influence voting. The influence of the media also needs special attention as a determinant of voting. To the best of my knowledge, none of these aspects has been taken into consideration in recent research on the Polish elections. This work focused only
on parliamentary elections, but there is very little research done on the presidential elections as well as European Union elections. This definitely should be a subject of future research.

This work demonstrated that issue voting does occur. Further research could extend this finding and investigate how much of the electorate meets the set of preconditions that are necessary in order to cast ballots with respect to the specific issue. Incorporating the level of cognitive mobilization into the model of issue voting could possibly bring the improvement to the model. In other words, it could be expected, according to mobilization theory, that the politically informed and educated voters account for a higher amount of issue voting; I believe this speculation is worthy to be tested.

While studying economic voting, attention was given to dichotomized categories of political parties, namely incumbents and non-incumbents. Future research on the economic voting might categorize parties another way and examine how economic conditions affect different groups of parties. Attention to categories other than incumbents has been already given in the existing literature, but what might prove useful for testing further the economic model of voting in Poland is to focus on the categories of political parties as presented in chapter 4, namely social democrats, social conservatives, and liberal conservatives. Since such a categorization of parties has not been employed in
previous research on Polish elections, it would be desirable to examine how national economic conditions affect these groups of parties.\footnote{This is a task that I am currently pursuing.}

The vast majority of empirical research on voting behavior examines the direct effect of various independent variables on voters’ choice. In doing so, researchers ignore the fact that, for instance, social cleavages perhaps modify how voters’ preferences are translated into voting decisions. In other words, what has been lacking in the analysis of voting behavior, at least while examining the Polish elections, is that the conditional effects of social cleavages on the other determinants of voting behavior (e.g. party identification) are not taken into consideration. More specifically, by employing conditional effects in the analysis of various models of voting, a researcher could spot, for instance, whether or not religious practices modify the effect of party identification on individual voting choices. Thus, the message for the future research is clear: besides utilizing linear additive models, researchers should also employ the multiplicative interaction models.

Last, but not least, this study briefly touched on the subject of comparative voting behavior, but the findings seem to suggest that there are some similarities in Poles’ electoral behavior as compared to voters in other established democracies. It is not to say that voters in all democratic polities behave the same way. There are differences between the Anglo-Saxon tradition
of voting and the continental European voter. At first glance we would think that the Polish voter behaves similarly to the European voter because of the similar culture, the geographic proximity, and the institutional settings of electoral politics, to name just a few factors. Nevertheless, this study uncovered that the Polish voter seems to behave more like an American than a European voter, specifically in terms of the influence of party attachment on voting decisions, but also in the aspect of the sociotropic economic voting. On the other hand, the electoral system of proportional representation seems to bring the Polish voter closer to the European voter in terms of the predictability of voting behavior based on the party sympathy. This findings would suggest that the further electoral research should focus more on the comparative analysis of Poland and other developed democracies rather than being only attached to the ‘old’ practice of comparing Poland with the other post-communist states and trying to detect there the similar patterns of voting behavior.
REFERENCES


VITA

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