Padre Luis De Valdivia and the Araucanians

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PADRE LUIS DE VALDIVIA AND THE ARaucANIANS

by

Beatrice Lorraine Blum

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Loyola University

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VITA

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She was graduated from St. Xavier Academy, Chicago, Illinois, June, 1935, and received a teachers certificate from Chicago Normal College, Chicago, Illinois, June, 1938.

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PREFACE

Father Valdivia, a Jesuit well known in the land of Chile, has been rather completely ignored by English-writing historians and has been given indeed but cursory notice by the Spanish authorities. Nevertheless the story of his trial and endeavor deserves more than passing mention. His struggles on behalf of the famed Araucanians indicate the vital political, social, economic, and military problems that gnawed at Chile throughout colonial times. Valdivia and those who opposed him fought over issues of a highly important nature and they inaugurated a debate which lasted for almost two centuries after their death. Writers who have not ignored the activities of the padre, have described them in many cases in words dramatic but vague, stating their personal approval or disapproval of Valdivia while failing to indicate specifically just what his work was. Therefore, in writing this paper three questions have been borne in mind. What was the padre trying to do? What did he do? Why did he not achieve his goal?

Despite the element of human interest contained in them, facts not bearing upon the answers of these questions have been conscientiously omitted. I consider it quite sufficient to supply the facts, recognizing that the reader will arrive at his own conclusions without the annoyance of dissenting or agreeing with personal comments.

This thesis is not a biographical sketch. It deals with only twenty of the eighty-one years of Padre Valdivia's life. Merely tracing the travels of the padre would provide material for a difficult cartographical investi-
gation in itself, a study thus far unattempted. The results of my work presented in this paper are the initial findings of an investigation which I intend to continue.
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AFTERMATH

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CRITICAL ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES
CHAPTER I

TO THE BÍO-BÍO

Previous to the fifteenth century no documentary evidence divulging the history of Chile has been discovered. The Peruvian recordings of an expedition made by Inca Yupangui who sent soldiers to subject the Chileans are the first upon which historical facts of Chile may be based. Little force was necessary nominally to subjugate the natives as far south as the Rapel river, which formed thereafter the southern boundary of the Incan empire.

South of these less rancorous aborigines, below the Bío-Bío, dwelled another species of the race - the Araucanian. These fleet, though flat footed fellows, with beading eyes set within circular faces, lived to comfortably ripe old ages, retaining their faculties and teeth almost to their last breath. Their patriotism, or perhaps mere sense of justice, their courage, and their ability to undergo the most rigorous of ordeals, portray them as noble Indians; such a portrait becomes less attractive when their capacity for excessive cruelty, their superstition, and their intemperate imbibing in alcoholic beverages are noted. Especially during times of war were these latter traits brought to the foreground, further arming them

2 Molina, II, 54-55. For a detailed sectional study of these natives see Guevara, I, 191-261.
with the power of inpenetrable resistance.

Living in their rucas or reed tents, sleeping upon piles of straw with tree trunks for their pillows, dining upon partially boiled meat or occasionally fish, and always upon the plentiful herbs of Chilean soil, drinking fruit juices, both fresh and fermented, they lived in a free unhampered style, until they were regimented in military formation when necessity so demanded.

Although they were ignorant of writing, they had developed an exceptionally individual vocabulary and grammatical construction indicating little influence of the northern Chilean language. The creative ability they possessed found expression in their unwritten chants to which their melodic tongue adapted itself beautifully. These barbarians had developed a rudimentary method of calculation satisfactory for their simple needs. They had developed past the huntsmen stage and may be classified as agricultural by the time the Spaniards had arrived.

Slight or nonexistent was their tendency to congregate in urban fashion; they grouped together chiefly as patriarchal units which settled in secluded sections where they could dwell according to their own designs. Grooms purchased their brides from the fathers; the possible number of

3 Molina, II, 5-7; Guevara, II, 94-100.
4 Guevara, II, 365-374.
5 They had a system of irrigation and they used metal implements for farming. Ibid., II, 287.
6 Ibid., 313-343.
brides per groom depended solely upon the groom's purchasing power. The
women, in the same social category as household equipment, did all the
menial tasks while the men mastered such arts as hunting, hockey, and hand-
ball to sharpen further their natural agility.

Only when the exigencies of the time so demanded was there a semblence
of national unity among the Araucanians. In such critical times several
tribes would federate under the leadership of elected chiefs, called toquis,
who were to remain in command for the duration of hostilities. Since peace
became almost an unknown quantity after the Spaniards set foot on Chilean
soil, these military divisions assumed political organization with four
primary divisions or uthalmapus from north to south. Little tribute was
required of the Araucanian other than his military service. Simple was the
life of the Araucanian - proportionately simple his economic needs.

Polytheistic, they rendered special accord to two gods - the good god
Pillan who dwelt somewhere in the clouds, and the evil god Guecubu whom they
held accountable for the majority of their tribulations. Adorned with
countless mythical beasts and serpents, their religion took on the aspect
of many of the credos of such primitive tribes, though it was less sacrificial

7 Molina, II, 60. These divisions were: 1) Lauquenmapu, or the maritime
country, 2) Lebumpmapu, or the plain country, 3) Inapire-mapu, or the foot-
hill country, and 4) Piremapu, the land of the Andes.
8 Ibid., II, 21. The gold, silver, copper, tin, and lead the Indians ex-
tracted were not used for medium of exchange.
9 Cresente Errázuriz, O.P., Los Orijenes de la Iglesia Chilena, Santiago,
1873. Henceforth to be cited as Los Orijenes. Guevara, I, 393-459.
in character. While they held to some form of existence after death should claim their mortal garb, their's was not the conviction that life was in any way preparatory for death.

The first Spanish entrada into the present Chile was made by Amalgro who within the years 1535 to 1537 managed to mistreat an astonishingly large number of natives, both those with whom he came in contact and those whom he had brought from Peru as yanacanas. Heedless of the admonitions of those ecclesiastics who accompanied him, he blotted the name of Spaniard with bloody connotations.

Regardless of the reported lack of ready wealth in the new territory, Pizarro's quartermaster Pedro de Valdivia, with 100 to 200 Spaniards reinforced by Indian auxiliaries of Peru, turned southward to the Chilean land. Departing from the plaza of Cuzco January 20, 1540, Pedro and company travelled for seven months over the rought route Amalgro had traversed on his return trip to Peru. Arriving at the fertile valley of Copiapo he harvested the animosity Amalgro had sown. In February of the following year the resourceful Valdivia founded the capital of Santiago where he organized a cabildo the following month; to return the compliment the cabildo elected

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10 The native "priests" were more like policemen than spiritual guides.
11 By 1533, when Pizarro had completed his conquest of the Incas, disputes had risen over the division of the spoils. Meanwhile Amalgro went ought to investigate rumors of wealth. With 600 Spaniards and 15,000 natives he began his expedition; 150 Spaniards and 10,000 natives died. Molina, II, 29-31.
12 Accompanying Amalgro were the Mercedarians Antonio Rondon and Francisco Ruiz and the secular priest Cristobal de Molina. Errázuriz, Los Orígenes, 46-47.
him governor of Chile. Santiago was soon to undergo the ravages of demolition and reconstruction—the cycle so often repeated by the cities and forts of Chile.

In 1543 when the "Men of Chile" violently ushered Pizarro out of the world of mortals, Pedro de Valdivia felt completely freed from subservience to anyone in Peru, holding himself accountable only to the authorities in Spain. The following year he travelled south to the Bio-Bio where he came in contact with the Araucanians, engaging in a brief but undecisive scrape. Overcoming the obstacles of insufficient supplies, delays, mutinous soldiers and natives, he might be said to have pacified northern Chile by 1549; thus the conquistador moved southward to found Concepcion on October 5, 1550. The natives of the vicinity looked for assistance from their Araucanian neighbors, who had given Valdivia a more bitter taste of their macana in an attack made shortly before the founding of Imperial on the Coutín river, and of Valdivia on its present site. Valdivia founded six towns; the seventh was to be in the center of Araucania, Los Confines or Angol. With the forts of Arauco along the coast, Tucapel on the western slope of the cordillera, and Puren east of the same Nahuelbuta, security seemed assured. But the Spaniards had neglected to take into account the "no trespassing attitude of the Araucanians.

14 "Cartas de Pedro de Valdivia al Emperador Carlos V", Colección Historiadores, I.
During 1550 the toqui Aillaralu, with 4000 followers, crossed the Bio-
Bio to challenge the Spaniards on the banks of the Andalian where Valdivia
experienced painful astonishment at their courage and their military ability.

A year later the Araucanians made a second attack upon the Spaniards.

While Pedro de Valdivia was busily dotting the territory with the seven
cities and three forts, a youthful fugitive yanacona, formerly a favorite of
the Spanish governor, escaped to the Araucanian land where he further roused
the inhabitants by orations upon the nobility of defending their own land and
rights. In absolute accord with the unto death resistance fostered by the
youth were Caupolican and other Araucanian toquis. Informed of the annoyances
inflicted by Caupolican, Pedro de Valdivia departed from Concepción to punish
such audacity. Valdivia arrived at Tucapel on Christmas day, 1553, only to
view the ruins of the fort he had erected. Nor had the natives ceased their
activity. They fell upon the Spaniards with all their savage instincts well
in the foreground. Such was the frenzy to which the Spanish intrusion had
aroused the Araucanian that before life flowed from the governor, they were
consuming his flesh.

16 Ibid., II, 133.
17 Anunátegui, Descubrimiento, 322.
18 Ibid., 333-334. While not cannibalistic according to taste (they pre-
ferred a herbaceous diet) they developed an appetite for fresh killed
Spaniards as the war proceeded. Diego Barros Arana, Historia General de
Chile, Santiago, 1884-1902, I, 432-437. Hereafter this latter work will be cited as Historia.
In less than twenty years the region of Chile had been subdued north of the Bío-Bío. The warfare south of the river was to continue for over 200 years.

Spain was at the peak of her power. Although Felipe II (1556-1598) waged wars with his European neighbors, he had established notable prestige. His colonies had grown. Under his reign giant strides in colonial organization were made. In Chile, however, the conquistador had not only opened the door for the Spaniards, but remained within the Fortals, dominating the civil and political institutions. Militarism was the keynote of Chile. Militarism continued to predominate even through republican times.

Francisco Villagra, unsuccessful in his pursuit of the Indian Lautaro who had roused the natives to the slaying of Valdivia, was forced to forswear hope of speedy vindication. Insistent that someone suffer for the atrocity, Villagra ravaged the countryside of Imperial, under the guise of the rights of war. The smallpox germs were more effective than the superior Spanish weapons and armor in subduing the natives. The cities of Valdivia, Villarica, Imperial, Angol and Concepcion looked to Francisco Villagra for protection he was able to supply. The inhabitants of Angol and Villarica were forced to retreat to Imperial or Concepción. Villagra fortified with cavalry, infantry, armades, arquebuses, and six canons marched for two days through

19 Molina, II, 159; Cresente Errazuriz, Historia de Chile sin Gobernador 1554-1563, Santiago, 1912.
20 Amunátegui, Descubrimiento, 343.
the land past the Bío-Bío, sighting no sign of activity. Then from the hill of Mariguenu a troop of Araucanians rained down under the leadership of Lautaro. For five hours the battle continued; not even the death-dealing canons deterred these sons of Chile. Never was Francisco Villagrá to erase from his memory the display of Araucanian physical as well as psychological stamina he witnessed in his bitter defeat. Consternation plagued Concepción; the city was depopulated. Nor was his success in reestablishing the city substantial, for Lautaro again effected its ruination. Ardently the audacious Araucanians planned to wipe out the cities of Imperial and Santiago simultaneously. For two days the battle raged near Santiago; until a missile of death extinguished the stormy Lautaro successful resistance was not at all assured the Spaniards.

The following April, 1557, Don García de Mendoza arrived with military supplies and new hope for the Spaniards. Erecting the city of Cañete upon the site of the demolished Tucapel where Pedro de Valdivia had been slain, populating the cities of Concepción and Villarica, engaging in numerous skirmishes, Don García had established control more definitely to the Bío-Bío. When, 1559, he left Chile to succeed his father as Viceroy of Peru,

21 Ibid., 349-350.
22 Ibid., 360; Errázuriz, Historia de Chile sin Gobernador, 65-67.
23 Errázuriz, Historia de Chile sin Gobernador, 418-428.
24 Not only did Don García rebuild Concepcion and Angol, but he built the cities of Cañete in Tucapel, Osorno in Chaurcovi, and San Juan de la Frontera in Cuyo. He reestablished the forts of Arauco and Tucapel. Amunategui, Descubrimiento, 494-501.
Don Garcia's governorship was delegated to the veteran Francisco de Villagrá
whose failures to squelch the uprisings in Tucapel and Arauco, and whose dis-

grace in depopulating Cañete and the fort of Arauco were by no means effaced

by his successor Pedro de Villagrá. No strikingly permanent advances were
made by Don Melchor Bravo de Aravia Sotomayor whose encounters with the
rugged race led to a repeated depopulation of Cañete which had been reesta-

blished six leagues from its original site by governor interno Rodrigo de

Quiroga, Lèbu, which had been established also by Quiroga, and to retirement

from the fort of Arauco which had been rebuilt. Followed by Rodrigo de

Quiroga, this time as actual governor, Sotomayor's defeats were scarcely

balanced. An appreciable amount of peace propaganda was dispersed during
the governorship of Don Martin Ruiz de Gamboa, who, nevertheless, continued
to suffer military defeats. The comparative moderation of Gamboa found
striking contrast in the renewed merciless castigation under Don Alonso Soto-

mayor. Despite his attacks throughout Puren, Ilicura and Tucapel, he was
forced to retire to the Bio-Bio, having gained nothing but the increased

hatred of the Araucanians who soon forced the evacuation of the forts of Puren,
Trinidad, and Spiritu Santo. The governor's defeat in the battle of Marigua-

25 Diego de Rosales, S.J., Historia General del Reino de Chile, Valparaiso,
1878, II, 106-123.
26 Ibid., II, 192-196.
28 Rosales, II, 206-211.
no and the repeat performance on the hill of Villagrá bespeak the reaction of the natives.

While Sotomayor was in Peru requesting reinforcements, he met his soon to be successor, the nephew of St. Ignatius, Don Martin García Ofiez de Loyola. While Governor Loyola was less harsh than his predecessor, he still continued the way of the sword.

Chile was no pot of gold, but rather a file of debts. It had been an economic disappointment from the time Amalgro returned with no evidence of loot or tales of abounding opportunity. The land itself was rich, but it required working. The natives were most unobliging, possessing no traditional treasure houses which could be pilfered. The continual warfare was a great financial drain upon the so called treasury of Chile; since the treasury amounted to nothing more than an accumulation of expenses, the king was distracted by the situation. His solution was to order the Treasury of Peru or Potosí to assume the financial burden of Chile. Delays in the recompensing of the soldiers and even the lesser officials did little to heighten the morale or efficiency of the Spaniards. Continual requests for more supplies in order to pursue the war added immeasurably to the high price of Chile. Commerce which might have been profitable was rendered almost impossible.

29 Ibid., II, 220-227.
30 Rosales, II, 260-263.
31 Commercial pursuits would have been extremely cumbersome even without the existing internal impediments, for according to the prescribed trade routes of the Spanish fleet system all goods would have to pass through Portobelo. The expense of shipment was enormous. Similarly multiplied in cost was European goods by the time it would arrive in Chile.
Only those who indulged in the exploitation of the native through personal service found pecuniary compensation.

For the Chilean native "Spaniard" spelled drudgery and bondage. Amalgró had raised the Indians to a peak of hostility; Pedro de Valdivia mounted the peak. Following the conquistador perogative of alloting to those who had served him well large tracts of land with repartimientos of natives who were to be held in encomienda, Valdivia had distributed the Indians and their land with generous abandon. According to the theory of the encomienda system, the owner of the haciendas has the right to require the personal service of the native in return for which he should supply his temporal and spiritual necessities. As the system operated in Chile the phrase "personal service" was just an euphemistic designation of slavery. With no remuneration the Indians were forced to labor in the mines, work in the fields, leave their families frequently, being assured of severe castigation should they fail to discharge their "duties."

The rabid Father Las Casás had instigated the famous New Laws which became legally effective in 1542, stipulating the cession of hereditary encomiendas demanding that all the repartimientos pass to the hands of the king. Grossly exaggerating the condition of the native in all colonial America, though his personal experience was extremely limited, Father Las Casas served only to create a legend of cruelty which other nations attributed to

Spaniards. The Viceroy of Peru, Blasco Núñez Vela, who arrived at Tumbez in the March of 1544 gave no serious consideration to these laws which were given similar treatment throughout Spanish America.

The warfare in Chile was not conducive to the persuading of military men to treating with leniency the natives whom they were rivalling in savagry. Nor did the institution of personal service, most despised by the natives, incline them to sentiments of peace with men who interpreted peace as their own comfort aided and abetted by the slavery of the natives.

Don García de Mendoza had shown a spark of concern over the plight of the natives. Immediately the oidor, Santillan, fanning the spark, proposed a plan whereby but one-sixth of the natives be obliged to labor; he proposed that the toquis select those who should be included in the one-sixth.33 For less strenuous service the largest proportion of the natives to be engaged in such tribute should be one fifth. There was to be no overburdening of the natives by the encomenderos, but the Indian was to be accorded the necessities which he rightfully deserved according to the theory of the encomendero plan. Since this system, by limiting the number of slaves would reduce the profit of the encomendero, while it would abolish the trade of enslaved captives so lucrative to the soldier, it resolved itself into nothing but words.

The next interim of attempted mercy, or justice, occurred during the

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33José Toribio Medina, ed., Colección de documentos inéditos Para la historia de Chile desde el viaje de Magallanes hasta la batalla de Maipo, Santiago de Chile, 1881-1902, XXVIII, 284-302. Hereafter to be cited as Medina, Colección.
office of Martín Ruiz de Gamboa, governor interno, when in 1580 he vainly attempted pecuniary substitution for personal service.34 Again neither were the Indians who paid no tribute during times of peace to their own toquis willing to cooperate nor would the Spanish unconscientious objectors - the soldiers and the encomenderos - agree to any alteration which would reduce their profits.

The Dominican Fray Gil Gonzalez de San Nicolas and the Bishops Fray Antonio de San Miguel and Fray Diego de Medellin, contrary to their fellow Spaniards, had expressed the sentiment that Christian treatment be meted to the natives.

Fray Gil Gonzalez de San Nicolas attempted to restrain the severity of Pedro de Villagrá and of Quiroga by vociferous preaching against such maltreatment. He offered no plan, nor did he present any skeleton of coherent constructive solution, but confined himself largely to denunciations of the Spanish tactics with a zeal that too frequently savored of the frantic.35

The first bishop of Imperial, Fray San Miguel, viewed with horror the physical and spiritual degradation that the war had wrought upon the land and people. Numerous were his efforts to alleviate the pitiable condition of the natives on the haciendas of Imperial. Still he too neglected to present any

34 Domingo Amunátegui y Solar, Historia Social de Chile, Santiago, 1932; 30-34; Errázuriz, Los Orijenes, 339-341.
35 The friar declared that anyone guilty of slaying an Indian would be dammed to hell. His eloquence carried him further into declaring that should the soldier not possess a clear conscience when told to fight the Indians, he was under no obligation to comply with such a command. Errázuriz, Pedro de Villagrá, Santiago, 1916, 229-345; Errazuriz, Los Orijenes, 150.
plan for eradicating their plight, but rather displayed a holy zeal in assisting the natives who were ill and suffering, and by personally appealing to the various encomenderos to deal more justly with these Indians.36

A later bishop of Imperial, Fray Don Diego de Medellin frequently dispatched letters of complaint to the king protesting against the wrongs inflicted upon the natives.37 The sole evidence of the influence of Fray Medellin is in the personal inducements he effected upon certain encomenderos to provide hospitalization for those natives who needed care.38 Laudable as are the efforts of the bishop, they too were merely attempts to alleviate the suffering instead of endeavors to cut the core of tribulation away.

The ten ecclesiastics whom Pedro de Valdivia brought to Chile included three secular priests and seven Mercedarians; these fathers were occupied in providing the Spaniards, principally the soldiers, with spiritual guidance though occasionally they attempted to help the natives within the city of Santiago.39 Great was the need for ecclesiastics in Chile. On September 14 a royal cédula charged the Dominican provincial of Peru, Fray Domingo de Santo Tomas, with the duty of dispatching priests to Chile.40

36Errázuriz, Los Orígenes 221-226.
37Ibid., 225.
38Ibid., 226, 255-265.
39The secular ecclesiastics were the Fathers Rodrigo Gonzalez, Diego Perez, and Juan Lobo; the seven Mercedarians were the frays Antonio Rondon; Antonio Correa, Bernabé Rodriguez, Juan de Zamora, Antonio de Olmedo, Diego Jaime (sacerdote) and the brother Martin Velazquez. Ibid., 50.
40Ibid., 97-98.
with the cedula Gil Gonzalez de San Nicolas had been sent to Chile with the title of vicario de mision, accompanied by Fray Luis de Chávez and another religious whose name is not known. Arriving in Chile in 1552 the Dominicans founded the convent of Nuestra Señora del Rosario. Here they began their work, caring primarily for the Spaniards. The following year the first Franciscan convent of Chile was established in Santiago. By 1593 the Dominicans had four convents in Chile, the Franciscans, eight, the Mercedarians, six, while the Agustinians were not to arrive for two more years. The work of the clergy had been centered among the Spaniards and the efforts directed toward the care of the Spaniards.

So great was the distance from the bishopric of Cuzco to the settlements of Chile that it had been necessary to erect two bishoprics in Chile — the first at Santiago, the second at Imperial.

This was the Chile to which the Jesuits were to come.

41Errázuriz, Los Orígenes, 103.
42Ibid., 440; Francisco Enrich, S.J., Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en Chile, Barcelona, 1891, I, 9.
43Errázuriz, Los Orígenes, 191-193, 212-220. The diocese of Santiago was created by a papal bull on June 27, 1561, while that of Imperial was created March 22, 1564. Carlos Silva Cotapos, Historia Eclesiástica de Chile, Santiago, 1925, 5, 12-13.
CHAPTER II
PADRE VALDIVIA-SPECTATOR

From the time of their entrance into Peru in 1568, the number of members in the Society of Jesus enjoyed a remarkable increase. Numerous had been the pleas for their services in Chile. In 1568 Bishop Fernando de Barrioaciero of Chile, on behalf of the members of his diocese, communicated such requests to Don Lope Garcia de Castro, viceroy of Peru, who relayed them to the king.¹ Upon receiving these the king wrote to Saint Francis Borja who, despite the comparative scarcity of numbers, sent padres to Peru, where the viceroy detained them with assignments of work midst the Peruvians.²

In 1577 Felipe II commissioned the Jesuits to Chile. This request arrived at an inopportune time, for each padre was already occupied with tasks which seemed accomplishable only by the multi-dexterous.³ The bishop, the governor, and the cabildo of Santiago persisted in their pleas for los padres.⁴ Still the Jesuit General was forced to forestall sending them.

In 1590 Felipe II issued three royal óédulas to facilitate the establishment of the Jesuits in Chile; in these the officials were urged to offer the padres all the accommodations customarily accorded the religious, while the king vouched his assistance that they might receive sufficient temporal

¹Enrich, I, 11; Antonio Astrain, S.J., Historia de las Compañía de Jesús en la Asistencia de España, Madrid, 1912-1925, IV, 668.
²Enrich, I, 11-12.
³Enrich, I, 12; Astrain, IV, 669.
⁴Enrich, I, 12.
aid to establish themselves in the new province. Such promises were not the unusual; the fact is that according to the patronato real the king was under compulsion to assist in the evangelizing of those who were within his vast estanciero - in other words of all those on Spanish land, for all Spanish land was the private property of the king. His Most Catholic Majesty rarely extended his religion as far down as his purse strings however.

The viceroy of Peru, García Hurtado de Mendoza, Marqués de Cañete, a former governor of Chile, was especially interested in the progress of his former governorship. He too, was anxious to have the Jesuits begin their labors there.

In 1590 it seemed certain that the padres were to leave for Chile. This time a small group of seven that had hoped to depart was detained by the Provincial Sebastián Parricio who deemed it necessary to alter his instructions from Spain; the padres were sent to another province of Peru instead.

Finally the Provincial assigned to Padre Baltasar Piñas the task of selecting members for the missionary work in Chile. His was the duty of ascertaining whether those chosen would be able to withstand climatic variations, possible privation, and vigorous labor as well as whether they

5Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias, Madrid, 1775, Tomo I, Libro I, titulo 6.
7After the resolution was passed for the Jesuits to enter Chile, thirty laborers were sent to the New World. Their leader, Padre Zuñiga died in Panama. The new provincial possessed little authority to designate a group larger than the few chosen for the spiritual entrada into Chile, Astrain, IV, 669-670.
8Piñas, a venerable padre, had been procurador general in Rome and was to be
possessed the capability for treating successfully with such notably belligerent natives.

First among those of his selection was Luis de Valdivia. Not only had this padre excelled in philosophy and theology, but he was an especially zealous missionary as had been displayed in Cuzco and Julí; at the time of his new appointment Padre Valdivia was master of the novices. Born in Granada in 1561, he studied at Salamanca, and, at the age of twenty entered the Society in the province of Castile. Shortly after his ordination in 1589 he was sent to Peru where for the next three years he served in various capacities, from teaching theology in Lima to laboring among the missions of Julí. His linguistic ability (already he had acquired command of three native tongues), his eloquence of delivery, his intellectual achievements, his administrative aptitude determined his selection by Piñas.

Included also in this group were two Chileans, the padres Hernando de Aquilera and Juan de Olivares, the padres Luis de Estela and Gabriel de Vega and the hermanos coadjutores Miguel de Talena and Fabián Martínez.

This little band received the blessings of their provincial and departed from Callao on the "San Francisco Javier" February 9, 1593. A heavy gale swept the craft from its course to Valparaiso. After surviving perilous

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9 Miguel de Olivares, S.J., Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en Chile, in Colección Historia-doras, VII, 14.
10 Enrich, I, 14; Carlos Sommervogel, S.J., Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jesus, Paris, 1908, 377-382.
11 Enrich, I, 14.
12 Pablo Pastells, S.J., Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la Provincia del Paraguay, Madrid, 1912, I, 100.
difficulties the crew and the Jesuits disembarked at the port of Coquimbo. Animated with holy gratitude, the padres walked barefoot from Coquimbo to La Serena (a distance of two and a half leagues), where they entered the church of San Francisco to offer prayers of thanksgiving.

While awaiting the completion of repairs on the ship, the padres displayed such zealous charity among the inhabitants of this vicinity that it was with great sorrow that the natives bade them farewell. After the ship was once more considered navigable, the inhabitants of La Serena were convinced they could not detain these Black Robes; still they were unwilling to see them risk the further perils of a sea voyage. They gave the padres mules that they might travel with less hazard by land. Continuing the journey to Santiago upon the beasts, they arrived at their destination April 12, 1593. Here a magnificent reception had been prepared. They were offered the hospitality of the principal persons of the city. The illustrious prior of the Dominican convent, Fray Pedro Alderete and the learned provincial Francisco de Riveros graciously insisted upon sharing the Dominican abode with the padres. Nor would they consider the departure of the Jesuits until they should have suitable living quarters of their own.

In his sermon from the pulpit of the cathedral the following Sunday Pinas struck the keynote of the work of his Order, offering to minister unto those who so desired, both native and Spaniard, during night or day, in the

13Astrain, IV, 670.
14Pastells, I, 100. The journey from Serena to Santiago was a distance of 160 leagues of hard riding.
camp or in the city, with no expectation of temporal remuneration, reminding them that all Jesuit labor was and is "Ad majorem Dei Gloriam." He realized further the pitiable poverty of the people; the drastic reverses they had suffered due to the war had so inconvenienced them that he would expect not even residence or chapel, but only their enthusiasm and prayers.\(^{16}\)

Though Piñas expected no such donation, the inhabitants gathered from among their ranks 3,916 pesos - sufficient to purchase a residence formerly of impressive worth which had been occupied by the governor Rodrigo de Quiroga, but which had depreciated significantly in value. Indispensable alterations were made upon this building by Miguel de Teleña. Six weeks later the residence was habitable.\(^{17}\) Though the primary purpose of the Jesuits was to establish themselves in missionary work among the natives, they resided in Santiago upon the insistence of the inhabitants, moved by the deplorable situation wrought by the combat, accepting only the essentials of existence from these inhabitants.\(^{18}\)

As Piñas spoke in the cathedral to the Spaniards, Father Hernando de Aguilera was preaching from the pulpit of Santo Domingo to the Indians in their own language. Encouraging was the joyous response of these natives who never before had heard the word of God uttered in their native tongue.\(^{19}\) Until the Jesuits arrived in Chile, these Indians who took pride in their language, were not to hear it raised to such a dignity. They flocked to Santo Domingo and to Aguilera for instruction. Exuberantly they celebrated

\(^{16}\)Enrich, I, 20.
\(^{17}\)Errázuriz, Los Orígenes, 435; Enrich, I, 21.
\(^{18}\)Errázuriz, Los Orígenes, 435.
\(^{19}\)Enrich, I, 21-22.
in processions, taking great delight in the more ceremonious aspect of religion.

Each padre was entrusted with a primary obligation. Valdivia was en-
charged especially with the instruction of the Indians, Gabriel de Vegas,
the morenos, Luis de Estella, the children, Olivares, the Spaniards, and
Aguilera, the natives and the negroes. All heard confessions, adminis-
tered the sacraments, made regular visits to the prisons and hospitals,
and exercised other works of charity.

Valdivia, impressed by the remarkable progress of Aguilera, realized
the priceless asset of the ability to reach the natives through their own
language. Extraordinarily adept at philological pursuits, he was, in a
very short time, hearing confessions, preaching and conversing in the native
tongue. His deep concern for the natives stirred him to ever increasing
activity. The unhappy prisoners of war, among those natives most despised,

20 Ibid., I, 26-27; Errázuriz, op. cit., 436; Astrain, IV, 671.
21 Much issue has been taken in calculating the exact length of time it took
Padre Valdivia to learn the language of the Chileans. He is credited by
some as learning the language in three days, others in nine days, still
others in twenty-two to twenty-eight days. Olivares, in Colección Historia-
dores, VII, 18; Enrich, I, 22; Errázuriz, Los Orígenes, 434; José Toribio
Medina, Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena, Santiago de Chile, 1897, I, 189-192.
Doubtless Padre Valdivia applied himself to the study of the language while
on the two month voyage from Peru to Chile in the company of the two
Chilean fathers. His appreciation of the necessity of possessing the
knowledge of the language in order to facilitate the conversion of the
Indian prompted him to work out a grammar of the Araucanian language which
was printed in Lima in 1606. Medina, op. cit., II, 386. Not content with
delivering sermons he arranged a dialogue form of the dogmas of the Faith
which he later composed into a catechism. Medina, op. cit., I, 109-111;
Rodolfo R. Schuller, Discovery of a Fragment of the Printed Copy of the
found to their amazement a patient friend in this Black Robe who consumed himself in assisting them.22

A year after the arrival of the Jesuits in Chile, Piñas, feeling the infirmities of his age, returned to Peru. He had witnessed the establishment of the Jesuit residence and chapel in Santiago, the advances made by the padres into the hearts of the natives, and the beginning of the Jesuit instruction in Chile23 Upon his retirement Valdivia was named rector of Santiago in recognition of his ability and fervor. Not only did the ambitious padre continue to hold a chair of philosophy at the college of Santiago, attend the prisoners of war and other natives within the city, but he travelled to the most remote haciendas to attempt to alleviate the distress of the hapless victims of personal service.24

Valdivia convinced Governor Don Martín Oñez de Loyola not only of the desirability, but of the necessity of having priests who were versed in the

22Enrich, I, 28.
23At this time P. Baltasar de Piñas was 67 years old. He died in Peru in 1611 at the age of 84, having been in the Society 62 years, and professed 47. Enrich, I, 37-45.
24In 1594, on the day of the Asunción, Olivares was teaching grammar to the children of the Spaniards while Padre Valdivia began a course of instruction in philosophy for the religious students of the Dominicans, Franciscans, and mercedarians who had been established in Chile. The college of San Miguel Arcángel was built due to the generosity of the coadjutors Andres de Torquemada and Agustín Briscoño, both of whom were exceptionally fervent Christians. They arranged to donate "inter vivos" from their haciendas, reserving the usufruct for the rest of their lives. Valdivia, on October 16, 1595, formally accepted the donation in the name of the General Claudio Aquaviva. Among the first students at the college were eleven Dominicans, six Franciscans, and several Mercedarians. Olivares, in Colección Historiadores, VII, 25. Enrich, I, 52-54; Errázuriz, Los Orijenes, 437.
native language minister to them. Thus it was that Padres Hernando de Aguilera and Gabriel de Vega went to Arauco where their efforts among the natives were well repaid spiritually. They baptized the children, the aged, and the infirm, though they withheld the sacrament from the others until they should have instructed them thoroughly in the fundamentals of Christianity. While a cessation of hostilities had been temporarily effected in Arauco and Tucapel when the Jesuits arrived, the natives were offered no instruction. Aguilera and de Vega were soon replaced in order that they might introduce their methods in the vicinity of Angol, Concepción, Imperial, Osorno and Valdivia. Here these spiritual trail blazers met with similar indications of success. Assisting them in the missions were the captain Andrés de Torquemada and Agustín Briceno as well as Maestre de Campo, Jerónimo Bravo de Saravia.

Mention has been made of visits to the Indians on the encomendas. The fathers also journeyed regularly to the Indian rancherios, where they assembled the natives, taught them pious practices, and acquainted them with the singing of hymns in their own language. More clearly than, perhaps, even his visits midst the prisoners on the frontier, did these inspections reveal to Valdivia the futility of hoping for true spiritual progress under the existing system of personal service. Nor was it possible to express to

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26 Olivares, in Colección Historiadores, VII, 45.
27 Ibid., VII, 45.
28 Errázuriz, Los Orígenes, 437.
29 Agustín Briceno later gave up all his worldly goods to become a coadjutor temporal. Ibid., 435.
30 Olivares, in Colección Historiadores, VII, 22-23.
these natives the essence of the Christian spirit when they were so bonded by the encomenderos.

At best the padres could present only inadequately the more superficial aspects of the Faith to the natives held in bondage. Little was being accomplished in actually altering their moral concepts. One typical instance of such inadequacy is illustrated by a visit made by the Valdivia and Aguilera to a rancheria to find the natives combining their knowledge of religious ceremony with their barbarous bachannalian revelry. In a frenzy of inebriation they were cavorting fantasticaly waving the crucifixes given them by the padres. Though they expressed sorrow for their actions when reprimanded, it was extremely doubtful that their sorrow would restrain them from future debauchery. While the padres were able to lessen the disorder around Santiago by prevailing upon the alcalde mayor to ban the giving of liquor to the Indian, they lacked the cooperation of the encomendero who was not averse to such inbibing if it tended temporarily to satisfy the native and thus ward off possible revolt. 31

The spiritual victories of the padres along the frontier convinced them of the wealth of souls that could be harvested under more peaceful situations. After happy contact had been made with the natives of Arauco Padre Valdivia continued from Santiago to Concepción. Dispatching Padre Gabriel de Vega to teach a course in arts at the college of San Miguel in Santiago, he continued accompanied by Aguilera and lay brother Miguel Teleña, in an expedition along the frontier to preach to the Spaniards and to evangelize the natives. 32

31Enrich, I, 24-25.
32Olivares, in Coleccion Historiadores, VII, 46-47.
They returned to Arauco where they baptized many whom they had previously instructed. From there they went to Imperial, Villarica, Valdivia and Osorno. In these more remote frontier towns they were discouraged by the low moral conduct of the Spanish soldiery. During this seven month expedition of 1597, the padres baptized an impressive number of infidels. But they sensed a growing native resentment towards the conduct of the Spaniards. Thronges of natives flocked to hear them speak. Sensitive to the rapidity with which the natives were being roused to the boiling point of rebellion, the padres warned the Spaniards upon their return to the college of Santiago, though such warnings met with derision or indifference.

The cauldron of rebellion was not long in boiling over. On November 22, 1598, while camping on their march from Imperial to Angol, Governor Martín García Oñez de Loyola and his company of sixty officers with three Franciscans were slain by Indians led by the cacique Paillamachu. Within two days the Cuncheños and Huilliches provinces were in the throes of revolt as well as the Araucanians of Osorno, Valdivia, Villarica, Imperial, Cañete, Angol, Coya and the fortress of Arauco. Six cities were destroyed — Imperial, Villarica, Valdivia, Angol, Santa Cruz, Cañete and Osorno. Upon the death of Loyola the seventy year old Pedro de Viscara was selected by the Cabildo of Santiago to act as governor. Gathering all possible reinforcements he had the inhabi-

33 Enrich, I, 64-65. in Colección Historiadores.
34Olivares, VII, 46-47; Enrich, I, 67-68.
35 Molina, II, 253. Rosales, II, 229-306, says these Indians of Puren were led by Anganamons and Pelantaro.
36Olivares, VII, 47; Rosales, 305-355.
tants from Angol and Coya repopulated Concepción and Chillan. Six months later the viceroy dispatched Francisco Quinones to Chile as governor. Quinones ruthlessly waged savage though ineffectual battles. Conquering by means of terrorization proved a poor method when dealing with enraged people who knew no fear, but in whom severity merely tapped new sources of resistance. In February, 1601, Alonso de Ribera became governor, and he continued the ineffectual struggle. In the report delivered to the viceroy in Lima, April 30, 1601, it was stated that there had been twelve cities attacked from the cordilleras to the west - Coquimbo, Santiago, Concepción, Chillan, Millapoa, Arauco, Angol, Imperial, Villarica, Valdivia, Osorno and Cilos. As a result of the slaying of the governor Millapoa was depopulated; as a result of this depopulation an attack was made upon Chillan, Angol and Concepción. The city of Angol was burnt down and only one fortress remained with one hundred men and their families. Fire had demolished Chillan; fifty-eight of the women of the fort had been carried away. Imperial withstood a cruel siege for over a year. Villarica was demolished and Valdivia suffered great destruction. Osorno was destroyed. Only four of the twelve cities remained free from serious ruination - Concepción, Arauco, Santiago and Coquimbo. The old settlements of Imperial and Angol had been permanently abandoned. Tucumán was similarly given up while Concepción was destroyed several times. The physical results of this revolt are harrowing to relate; the spiritual and moral entailed more serious aftermaths. Hatred and savagery

37 Molina, II, 254; Rosales, 304-326.
38 Enrich, I, 77-78; Rosales, II, 355.
39 Pastells, I, 201-203.
raged on both sides. The Spaniards viewed the revolt not as an indication or result of their own harshness, but as evidence of their laxity in not thoroughly subduing the native who by now had, it would seem, proven intractable. So bitter was the reaction of the Spaniards to this revolt that some authors have stated there was unanimous approval of the most rigid enforcement of severe forms of personal service by civilians and ecclesiastics as well as among the soldiers. This cannot be said of Padre Valdivia, who continued to foster the belief of his Society that slavery was not the answer to the revolt; slavery had been the cause.

In 1602 Padre Paez on his first journey to Chile as visitorador, was grieved to learn of the conditions wrought by the war. After conducting an

40Note the statements to this effect found in Domingo Amunátegui y Solar, Las Encomiendas de Indígenas en Chile, Santiago, 1909, I, 355. Hereafter to be cited as Las Encomiendas and in Errázuriz, Continuación de los Seis Años de la Historia de Chile, I, 291-292.

In a tratado presented to the viceroy in 1601 the licentiate don Melchor Calderon, treasurer of the Cathedral of Santiago and Vicar General of the Bishopric expressed the idea that slavery was the only answer to Chile’s problem. His justification for slavery was based upon the assumption that since conquest of the land could be considered just, such means as would be necessary to effect the conquest would be of necessity just. He held that the native of Chile would be pacified only by the harshest of measures; therefore the harshest of measures should be condoned. Medina, Biblioteca Hispano Chilena, II, 5-20.

Similar sentiments were expressed by captain Domingo de Eraso, the procurador general of Chile whose relation of 1603 summerizes the opinions of the principal personages of Chile as to the most plausible method of pacification of the natives. Ibid., 38-44, 45.

Fear was expressed that should any of the natives be freed from the bondage in which they were admittedly held, they would merely revert back to their pagan ways.

investigation of the situation around Concepción, where he had also occupied himself in preaching and administering the sacraments, he travelled to the troubled Santiago where he visited the Jesuit college. His report concerning the work of the Jesuits was one of only the highest commendation for zeal and progress despite the havoc into which the province had been thrown.\textsuperscript{42} Páez complied with Ribera's request for two padres to work along the frontier, sending Fathers Gabriel de Vega and Francisco Villegas who attempted to alleviate the distress spiritual and physical of the frontier native.\textsuperscript{43}

At this time Valdivia was sent to Peru to take a chair in theology at the college in Lima.\textsuperscript{44} Olivares and Aguilera were also transferred from

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 51
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 54. The influence of these padres was great even over the soldiers so accustomed to laxity. The governor Ribera had been reinforced with troops from Spain, Peru, and Buenos Aires; the few victories of 1602 were not sufficient to be considered true success. Aware of the prestige of the members of the Society he had requested that missionaries accompany his military expeditions in order to renew the morale of his own soldiers as well as to influence them morally and help pacify the natives. These padres reported their progress to their superior. In their letters of February 28 and March 5, 1603, they wrote that in the fort of Santa Margarit de Lebu they had heard the confessions of sixty Spanish soldiers and had been gratified by the reaction of both the Spaniards and the natives to their preaching; after they had distributed Communion there they went to Santa Ines de Paicabi (or Paicavi) where they likewise achieved happy results. Enrich, I, 88-89. Ribera wrote to the cabildo and to his general in Santiago lauding the zealous missionaries. Ibid., 90.

\textsuperscript{44} Although he had never failed to perform his duties as rector of the college of San Miguel in Santiago with conscientious precision. Padre Valdivia seemed to be working under great difficulties. His was a battle against a depressive melancholy which upon occasions manifested itself in his desperate requests to return to Spain. Visitador Esteban Páez had written to the General Padre Claudio Aquaviva that though Padre Valdivia was an extremely religious man, he was painfully distracted in his position as rector. It seems that whereas Padre Valdivia possessed unusual aptitude for academic instruction and administration, he had continually to battle a pervasive dejection while so occupied; he did not indicate such torments when laboring midst the natives, on the other hand. Though he seemed to have conquered this fraility, he succumbed to it again while teaching in
Valdivia had derived through his missionary experiences the knowledge of the fundamental facts of the Indian problems there. In attaining this knowledge he concluded the preparatory phase of his career among and in behalf of the Araucanians. The second phase, that of championing the cause of the Araucanians, was to witness his endeavors in Peru, again in Chile, and then in Spain.

Lima. His request to be transferred to Spain was gently refused by Padre General Aquaviva, who saw fit to have him ade rector of the college in Lima. The Padre General was not unsympathetic however, for he sought to console Padre Valdivia in his struggle against his discouragement. Astrain IV, 692-693.

It is interesting to note that in 1600 Padre Valdivia had been requested to come to Lima by Padre Rodrigo de Cabreado who was desirious of his assistance. Greatly alarmed by the possibility of the departure of the padre, the Cabildo of Santiago wrote to the superiors of the province pleading to retain Padre Valdivia whose services they felt were essential to the pacification of the Indians. Enrich, I, 81-82. When the cabildo understood more fully just how Padre Valdivia would accomplish pacification they were not so anxious to retain his presence.

Enrich, I, 81.
CHAPTER III
PRESENTATION AND ADOPTION OF GUERRA DEFENSIVA

The war was continuing, perhaps less destructively but then there was less left to be destroyed. Hatred and vindictiveness seemed ever to mount new heights. The Araucanian leader Paillamachú who died in 1603 had been succeeded by a toqui, Huneoura, who was equally indisposed to treat with the Spaniards. Alonso Ribera, no longer among the king's chosen people since he had wed a daughter of Aguilera without obtaining the royal sanction, suffered chastisement by being transferred to Tucumán. Once again García Ramón was appointed governor of Chile. In 1604 Chile, previously part of the province of Peru, was made a division of the newly founded Paraguayan province which included also Buenos Aires and Tucumán.

Recurring demands were issued by the king to curtail the war. Those in authority were interested in clearing up this situation which was becoming increasingly intolerable. The Conde de Monterrey, who had succeeded Velasco, Marqués de Salina, as viceroy of Peru in 1604, was especially pressed by the king to seek a cession of the expensive warfare in Chile. Hearing of Valdivia's discussions in regard to the causes of the war, he requested the padre to render a detailed account of the situation, clarifying especially those more vital grievances of the natives agravating them to hostility.

The memorial composed in compliance with this request declared personal service to be the underlying source of all the evils that had arisen in the

\(^1\)Molina, II, 261.
struggles between the Araucanians and the Spaniards; it justified the natives in their rebellion against such wretched subjugation.

To give consideration to this memorial a conference was held by the most notable personages of Peru including the governor elect of Chile, García Ramón, the alcalde de corte Acuña, the older Juan Videla, the former alcalde de corte and acaecor to the viceroy Padre Francisco Coello, and Valdivia. This junta, resolving to abolish personal service, allowed two years for the accomplishment of the transition from forced to voluntary labor, though it strongly urged that this transition be effected sooner.

Valdivia was delegated to accompany Luis de la Torre upon a tour of

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2Enrich, I, 100-101. Amunátegui y Solar, Las Encomiendas, II, 371, 373, stresses the fact that since the older Juan de Villela or Videla had presented a plan similar to that expounded by Valdivia, Valdivia should not be credited as the originator of the plan. This seems to be an unnecessary distinction. It certainly took no originality to recognize the evils that had resulted from the personal service system in Chile. It is thus not for the theoretical creation of the plan later to be known as guerra defensiva that it is referred to as Valdivia's plan, but for his practical fostering and initiation of it.

3Luis Tribaldos de Toledo, Vista General de las Continuadas Guerras Dificil Conquista del Gran Reino Provincias de Chile, in Colección Historiadores, IV, 95.

4Copia de Vna Carta del Padre Luys de Valdiuia Para el Fenor Conde de Lemos Presidente de Indias, Lima, January 4, 1607, photostat made by the Massachusetts Historical Society, November, 1929, Number 245, 2.
inspection in southern Chile to investigate the situation. Again Valdivia had the opportunity to practice his zeal in converting, civilizing, and protecting his Araucanians. With great joy he embarked at Callao, accompanied also by the new governor Ramon and two hundred soldiers. They docked at Penco March 19, 1605. It should be noted clearly that Valdivia was commissioned as a civil as well as ecclesiastical personage. His authority was substantiated by cedulas given him in Peru in the name of his Majesty. The phrasing of these credentials authorized him to enter into negotiations with "authority de Su Majestad" to terminate the war if possible.

At Penco García Ramón received his command, Valdivia immediately resumed his work of preaching and administering the sacraments to both Spaniards and Indians in the city. This particular juncture during which the new governor was charged with his duties was a time of even less discipline; the soldiers were in no mood and as yet under little compulsion to be subjected to any effective restraint, while the Indians sensed the disadvantages suffered by the Spaniards who were changing horses in the middle of the stream.

5Little mention is made of Luis de la Torre in the accounts of this journey or in the narratives concerning the decision of the junta although Valdivia wrote that it was originally intended that only Luis de la Torre be dispatched upon this expedition; when the junta considered the grievous injustices that were being inflicted upon the natives through the personal service system, the decision was altered. It was resolved to send Valdivia to Chile to remind the infractors of the instructions of the theological implications of their wrongs. Copia de Vna Carta del Padre Luys de Valdivia Para el Fenor Conde de Lemos Presidente de Indias, Lima, January 4, 1607, I.

6Astrain, IV, 696.
7Enrich, I, 103.
Instructions had been given Valdivia: 1) to offer a general pardon to the Indians for all their former misdeeds; 2) to make it clear that the king had never approved personal service as it was practiced in Chile and that he now demanded its cession; 3) to require tribute only in the form they were accustomed to pay in their own lands. This third point, considering the fact that in their own lands the natives paid no tribute except in times of war, would indicate that no tribute should be paid to the crown. The instructions were to be greeted with no joy on the part of the encomenderos and with far more than a grain of suspicion on the part of the Indians.

The task of spreading the report of the new disposition of the king to abolish the grievances of the natives and come to a peaceful understanding was begun. Rumors dispersed across the lands. Wherever the peace rumors were heard they were believed, doubted, and frequently taken for a hoax.

At Concepción Valdivia conversed with peaceful toquis in an informal junta. At Santiago he had striven to impress the thousand soldiers who had just arrived from Spain with their legal and moral obligation to refrain from further antagonizing the natives and to comply with the instructions of the king and viceroy.

Valdivia turned southward passing the Bio-Bio. At the fort of San Pedro he took part in another junta, this time with the caciques of Lagunillas. Similar juntas were held during all his travels. There was a willingness expressed by the natives to accept the Black Robes though they rejected the

8 Copia de Vna Carta del Padre Luys de Valdivia Para el Fenor Conde de Lemos Presidente de Indias, January 4, 1507, 2.
9 Copia de Vna Carta del Padre Luys de Valdivia Para el Fenor Conde de Lemos Presidente de Indias, January 4, 1507, 3.
military men. So suspicious were they of the good faith of the Spaniard that frequently the padre had to summon all his powers of persuasion to convince the native that the civil and military powers were cooperating with the fathers. Unfortunately while this cooperation was officially demanded the natives were not erring in their doubts. The military leaders merited suspicion by constant breaches of agreements.

Accompanied for the most part by friendly toquis, the padre was joined occasionally by the maestre de campo Pedro Cortés. Communicating his message of peace Valdivia travelled from Arauco through Taboleuo, Lapier, Mahuda, the estado of Catiray, down to Guadava, Puren, Catiray del Sur, to the fort of Nuestra Senora de Ala. He cultivated the friendship of the natives of Colcura, Penquienhue, Quedico, Quiapo, Tucapel, Lebuliencoya and Cayacupil declaring peaceful intentions and receiving reciprocal declarations from the natives.

Despite the many hazards Valdivia had crossed the sierras of San Jeronimo intending to again inspect the fort of Taboleu, or Taboledo, where Pedro Cortés had refused to relax his severity since he held that the natives would not cooperate with less harsh methods. Ignoring Pedro Cortés' warnings of the impending danger he determined to seek out the caciques of this territory.

10Don Vicente Carvallo i Goyeneche, Descripción Historico Geográfica del Reino de Chile, in Colección Historiadores, VIII, 283.
12Ibid., 4.
13Olivares, in Colección Historiadores, VII, 63.
14Enrich, I, 104-105.
Guided by the youthful son of Francisco Ortíz, he met the toquis of this province, reproved them for failing to abide peacefully with the Spaniards, and asked them to explain their lack of cooperation. The toquis defended their belligerent attitude saying that should they assume any other they would be forced to pay unwelcome tribute, serving in repartidos or encargados; such service would force them to leave their wives and children. With the outlook of such inevitable injustices, they desired no contact with the Spaniards.

Valdivia acknowledged their righteousness in rebellion against these abuses, but promised a rectification of such wrongs should a peace be concluded. He extracted their promise as well as the promise of the toquis of Conupulli to assemble at the fort of Catiray to discuss negotiations, assuring them of safe conduct.

His numerous duties necessitated Valdivia's departure for Yumbel. Thus he dispatched a letter to the chaplain of Catiray concerning the affairs which the former companion of Valdivia, young Francisco Ortíz, was to deliver. On his way from Taboleu to Catiray the youth was cruelly slain by Indians from Cunupulli, who, in all probability, were awaiting the padre also. The hostility toward the Spaniards was deeply rooted within the hearts of the Araucanians. The answer to this hatred was not, as was believed by Pedro Cortes, to crush the natives until they no longer had capacity for any feeling, but rather was to dispel their doubt through repetitious Christian docility.

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15 Carvallo i Goyeneche, Descripción Historico Geografica del Reino de Chile, in Colección Historiadores, VIII, 283.
16 Carvallo i Goyeneche, Descripción Historico Geografica del Reino de Chile, VII, 294.
Returning from the fort of Yumbel Padre Valdivia established himself in the fort of Arauco from where he eventually returned to Peru. He had satisfied himself that his conclusions as to the cause of the native belligerency were sound. In the latter part of April, 1606, he embarked for Peru.

In a letter written the following January, the padre clearly expressed his reactions to his investigation. He penned his great revulsion at the lack of respect shown the laws of God and of the king by the soldiers and the encomenderos of Chile. Especially disappointed was he in Garcia Romon whose hostile entreaties belied the governor's portent that he was attempting peaceful subjugation. In the odious abuses inflicted upon those Indians even when they had submitted to peaceful negotiations, he saw full justification for their rebellion. Again he denounced personal service as the crux of the whole disorder.

Following the death of the Conde de Monterey, the Marqués de Montes Claros became viceroy. It was with his encouragement and approval that the oidor don Juan de Villela and Valdivia wrote their memorials to Spain in June, 1607, intensifying their arguments regarding the imperative need for a cessation of the abuses resulting from the system of personal service in Chile. Again, in a letter of June 4, 1607, Valdivia forcibly expounded the

17 Ibid., VIII, 284.
18 Valdivia to Conde de Lemos, January 4, 1607.
19 Valdivia to Conde de Lemos, January 4, 1607, 6. Padre Valdivia summed up his report saying: "Quedan aora a los de paz en mayor feruicio personal, porq muchos de los que y ban antes aminas fean aplicado por yaconas a fus encomenderos juntos con losq tenian por efte Gouernador, el qual apubli­cado autos de nucuo en queda por efclauos a los indios de guerra q toman, y a Lima los traen vedidos (y con efta capa traen a muchos de paz) no auiendoles juftificado el cumplimiento de las cartas de fu Mageftad, cuyo cumplimiento es neceffario para la juftificacion de nra parte."
necessity of the abolition of personal service, the underlying cause of the
hatred of the natives. He enunciated the necessity for limiting the Spaniards
to the territory north of the Bio-Bío, advocating only defensive measures of
war and the abolishment of forced labor - in other words the system which was
to be known as "guerra defensiva," or defensive warfare.

Governor García Ramón was making no pretense at pursuing the type of
resistance advocated by Valdivia and approved by the viceroy. He dispatched
an order to marshall of camp Lisperjer to raise the southern boundary of the
Bio-Bío to Monterrey in order that Millapoa and Catiray might be included.
He requested another thousand soldiers. On April 12, 1607, he had written
to the king saying the Araucanians had killed more than four hundred persons,
that they respected no one, that they clamored against both cleric and
soldier; he sincerely hoped no serious consideration be given this theory of
Valdivia.22

Due to the numerous defeats of the Spanish troops the Crown directed
Peru to send two thousand regular troops to the Araucanian border.23 Natural
forces in Chile were joining in the destruction; the deluge of the Mapocho,
famine, and locust devoured fields adding to the misery of the natives as
well as to the expense of the Peruvian treasury in supporting the soldiers.24

On May 26, 1608, a royal cédula announced that all natives who should

20 Villela's letter was written June 3, 1607. Shortly after this Villela was
made President of the audiencia of Guadalajara. Astrain, IV, 694-696.
21 Ibid., 694-696.
22 Enrich, I, 113; Felipe Gomez de Vidaurre, S.J., Historia Geografica, Natural
y Civil del Reino de Chile, in Colección Historiadores, XV, 195.
23 Molina, II, 264.
24 Enrich, 113.
not accept peace within the following two months would be enslaved. Here indeed his majesty Felipe III failed to exhibit the mercy or clemency so often attributed to him in official documents. Since 1573 when Rodrigo de Quiroga had reduced hundreds of natives to slavery, transporting them to Coquimbo, his successors not only rivalled his harshness but frequently surpassed him. Following the revolt of 1598, ruthlessness in this regard had bounded beyond all reason. Garcia Ramon had followed Ribera's practice of condemning all rebellious Indians to slavery or death. The disaster at Borca, September 29, 1606, when more than one hundred Spanish soldiers perished, dispelled what qualms might have existed among the members of the Council of Indies concerning the cruelest of castigations. Under Merlo de la Fuente the enslavement cedula of 1608 was interpreted to pertain to all the natives of Chile, not only those on the frontier.

Meanwhile, the Jesuit Provincial Torres Bello, had written to the king pleading for abolition of "personal service." He requested further that a general pardon be extended to the natives absolving them from the punishment due any misdeeds they might have committed. So unsatisfactory was the progress with the king that Valdivia's ecclesiastical and civil superiors deemed it desirable to have the padre present the plan of "guerra defensiva"

25 Amunátegui Solar, Las Encomiendas, 184, 185-189, 189-196, 250; Rosales, II, 477-481.
27 Actos de Cabilla de Santiago, Colección de Historiadores, XXIV, 188-189.
28 Torres summed up his letter saying, "Todos los hombres pios y experimentados juzgan que la guerra minea se acabara, sino es siendo por algunos anos defensiva, fortificandose las dos buenos ciudades, i quitando el servicio personal jeneralmente, i dando a los indios libertad, i que con esto se puedan enviar religiosos entre ellos, de liven ejmeplo i suficiencia en la lengua. . . ." Amunátegui Solar, op. cit., I, 364-365. Torres became the
personally. So it was that Padre Valdivia sailed for Spain in 1609, reaching his destination in the middle of September or the early part of October to explain his plan in detail before the king and Council. 29

While there is no verbatim record of this private audience Valdivia held with the king, there remains no doubt as to the outline of the plan presented nor of the king's reaction to the presentation. Probably the most complete exposition of the padre's scheme of procedure, which he was called upon to amplify frequently and which many have interpreted in their own fashion, may be found in the padre's own explanation of the situation in a lengthy informado which was presented in Madrid probably in 1610. 30

In the first of the eight chapters of his tratado he dwelled upon the inconveniences encountered in persecuting an offensive war, focusing attention upon the fact that such a war not only impeded the evangelizing of the natives but was a source of lamentable moral degradation among the Spanish soldiers. He estimated that 2,600 Spaniards had perished in the war since 1606. 31 A comparable number of infidel natives who had perished without the opportunity of or desire for evangelization. 32 Nor were the pacified Indians spared the grief, but suffered from impoverishment, personal service, and attacks of hostile indians. Since the war had assumed such proportions, personal service had become more firmly and unjustly established regardless of provisions of the monarch. The padre did not hesitate to reveal the lack of cooperation

first provincial of Chile in 1608. Astrain, IV, 684.
29 Astrain, IV, 697.
30 Luis de Valdivia, S.J., Tratado de la importancia del medio, Que el virrey propone de cortar la guerra de Chile, y hazerla solamente defensiva, Madrid, 1611?, photostat made by the Massachusetts Historical Society, Feb.,'28, Number 264.
given by the authorities of Chile to the instructions of the viceroy in 1606 which directed the eventual abolition of slavery after a thorough investigation assisted by numerous conferences with jurists and theologians. 33 Aside from the spiritual loss, he recognized the tremendous waste the war wrought upon the king's Chilean domain. The salary of the superabundance of soldiers had mounted from three or four thousand pesos to eight thousand pesos annually since the entrance of García Ramón as governor. 34 Their lack of substantial success in offensive warfare served to metamorphise a paying project to an eternal debt.

In the second chapter of his tratado Valdivia dealt with the general difficulties encountered in terminating the war through offensive tactics. The geographical problem in itself was insurmountable. The territory in rebellion covered almost one hundred leagues north and south from the cordilleras on the east to the Pacific on the west. Of these the northernmost forty leagues had been battling since the Spaniards entered Chile. 35 Successful conquest of the land would require countless substantial presidios. In the short distance of twelve leagues from Arauco to Tucapel and thence to Catiray seven or eight presidios were needed. 36 It seemed improbable that sufficient forts could be built to defend future conquests when the Spaniards were finding it difficult to retain those already made. Revolts in presidios,

31 Valdivia, Tratado de la importancia del medio, que el virrey propone de cortar la guerra de Chile, y hacerla solamente defensiva, 1.
32 Ibid., 2.
33 Ibid., 3.
34 Ibid., 4.
36 Ibid., 5. The presidios referred to were those of San Felipe de Arauco, Santa Margarita en Leico, the fort of Paicavi, that of San Jerónimo, of Nacimiento, of Monterey de la Frontera and that of San Pedro.
Tucapel for example, coupled with internal bickering among the soldiers offered a source of danger as it was.37 Already the captains were finding it difficult to discipline their soldiers within the presidios. Under such conditions it was impossible to found new cities and thus improve the royal hacienda of Chile. Without the friendly assistance of the surrounding natives there would be great difficulty in constructing the cities and no assurance against immediate destruction. The roughness of the land of war, the necessity of searching for the enemy upon his own ground, the absence of profit and the ever compounding expense contributed towards the futility of offensive warfare.38 A sufficient supply of horses would in itself prove a tremendous expenditure, though they proved ineffectual when in pursuit of the agile Araucanian who knew his land with all its crevices. Already the viceroy had sent from ten to twelve thousand pesos to Paraguay to purchase horses for the cavalry of Chile. The number, great as it was, was not effective.39 On the other hand, in defensive warfare it was the infantry, not the cavalry, that was far more serviceable as well as far less expensive.

Valdivia sought to analyze the purpose for which the army was inflicting its attacks. It seemed their object was to display military supremacy in all sections of the land regardless of cost or intrinsic achievement. They misinterpreted the desire of the king that the war be terminated to mean that the Indian be exterminated. Could such an objective be considered ethical it would still be impossible. When, in the early part of his second year as

37 Ibid., 5-6.
38 Ibid., 7.
39 Ibid., 8.
governor, García Ramón had waged war so ruthlessly pardoning no one, he did not seem to diminish the armies of the Araucanians to any appreciable extent. They merely dispersed themselves among the foothills and mountains. Yet despite their tactics, it was not the goal of the soldiers to annihilate all of the natives, since they would thereby lose a profit in the capturing of victims for personal service. Surely a labor shortage harmful to the encomendero was not their aim.40

Valdivia publicly censured the governors who forced the natives to depopulate their own land within a stipulated number of years, thereby not pacifying the natives, but driving them back to nurse their hatred to a renewed display of belligerency.

In summary the first five chapters of the tratado presented logically the desirability of discontinuing an offensive war, giving economic, social, and religious reasons. The last three chapters of the tratado concerned largely the outstanding events that had occurred during the war, a historical survey which concluded with an outline of the padres' procedure for effecting an eventual cessation of the war.

Valdivia urged that a general pardon be extended to the Indians for all their misdoings. Since the natives had been degraded and abused at the hands of the Spaniards, they could scarcely be expected to tolerate entradas of military men or of civilians; on the other hand they had shown themselves kindly disposed toward the men of the cross. Therefore the most convenient

40Ibid., 11.
and logical expedient would be to erect a border between the Araucanians and the Spaniards at the Bío-Bío, beyond which only the men of the cross would pass in order to Christianize the natives and instill true sentiments of friendship.

Captain Lorenzo del Salto had been commissioned by García Ramón to contradict any attempts to officially inaugurate the system fostered by Valdivia. In order to present the advantages obtained by the governor, del Salto stated that within the last two and a half years of Ramón's governorship nine hundred natives had been slain and more than three thousand taken prisoners - a fact that should instill fear in the hearts of the Araucanians and thus lead to eventual submission. 41

In the first session of the Council of Indies, January 2, 1610, but one member, the Marques de Villahermosa, expressed a doubt concerning Valdivia's plan; after studying the more detailed memorial he too voted in favor of "guerra defensiva". 42 The Council appointed a military committee over which the president of the Council, Conde de Lemos presided. Again Valdivia and Lorenzo del Salto were called upon to present their divergent opinions; again the padre's plan held a decided favorable balance. 43 Defensive warfare was adopted officially. 44 Forts were to be retained along the frontier of the Bío-Bío sufficiently guarded to be capable of resisting any attacks. Two hundred thousand pesos were to be paid from Lima for the support of the

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42 Enrich, I, 230.
43 Astrain, IV, 698.
44 Enrich, I, 231; Toledo, in Colección Historiadores, IV, 105.
army in Chile. Personal service was to be entirely abolished. Prisoners of
war were not to be enslaved. Just payments were to be made by the pacified
Indians to the king. Jesuits were to reside in the forts along the frontier
from where they would supervise the treatment of the pacified natives and
make their entradas into the Indian territory to convert the infidel.

The indulgences granted by Pope Paul V later in the year, October 13,
1610 in the "pastoris eterni" reveals the attitude of the pope towards the
negotiations during this conference. Concerned only with the spiritual
implications, these indulgences favored the method of "guerra defensiva".

When the plan had been formally accepted, the selection of the most
workable means of execution confronted the authorities. Both ecclesiastical
and temporal or civil authority had to be delegated. Upon first consideration
this would seem a less complicated matter than was the adoption of the plan
itself; still far more deliberation and consultation was required before the
final decision could be ratified. Since the Bishop of Santiago had among his

45 1) To each one who said a prayer for the conversion of the Indians of Chile
and their reduction to peace without the shedding of blood, was granted a
remission of the punishment due one third of his sins. A plenary indulgence
was granted on feast days, should the prayers be said after the sacraments
of Confession and Communion. 2) To each one, who, in order to accomplish
such a peace, convinced the Indians, or exercised other virtues of charity
or mercy or justice towards the natives, with the ordinary requirements
fulfilled, should receive a plenary indulgence. 3) Each person who helped
whether or not through a third party, in the conversion of the rebellious
Indians or in the mediating without bloodshed, toward the end of the sal-
vation of their souls, would gain a plenary indulgence of the punishment
due their sins. 4) Each one who should convert an infidel or baptize one
already converted, or preach the doctrine or administer the sacraments,
having said mass or confessed or received Communion should be granted a
plenary indulgence. 5) Each native who helped his brother hear the
Christian doctrine or sermon or mass, or who assisted in the ministry should
gain a plenary indulgence. 6) Whenever persons who had fulfilled any of
the above requirements should be in danger of death, he could gain a
numerous aversions a most pronounced animosity towards the Jesuits, it was impossible to expect his cooperation. This aversion was not necessarily created by Padre Valdivia for it had been evidenced before the padre had become so important. 46 The king strongly favored conferring the dignity of the Bishopric of Imperial upon Valdivia. 47 Felipe III was not alone in his selection. In a letter from the viceroy of Peru, the Marques de Montes Claros, on April 30, 1610, the king received the highest recommendation to this effect. 48 The viceroy lauded the ability, zeal, and integrity of the padre, expressing the opinion that as Bishop of Imperial he could best fulfill the new obligations and responsibilities of inaugurating "guerra defensiva." June 2, 1610 the name of Valdivia was formally proposed.

The Jesuit General, Claudio, was giving the matter of the possible episcopal appointment of Valdivia serious consideration. His letter, directed to the provincial of Toledo, bespeaks his conviction that the padre was well plenary indulgence by saying "Jesus", should he possess true contrition and be unable to make his Confession or receive the Holy Eucharist. 7) Each person who had gone to Communion and who prayed for a quarter of an hour mentally or vocally in behalf of the conversion of the natives of Chile would receive an indulgence. Carvallo i Goyeneche, in Colección Historiadores, VIII, 290-291.

46 Rosales, II, 531.
47 Molina, II, 266.
48 The viceroy wrote: "Y cierto que yo tengo hecho tan buen concepto del P. Luis de Valdivia, que aunque sea la pretensión contro su humildad i instituto de la Compañía, holgaría de verle Obispo de la Imperial y que asistein-eira en la Concepción mientras esta ciudad se poblase. Vuestra Majestad proveirá lo que más conviene a su serviero." Astrain, IV, 701.
qualified for the dignity.49 Two months later, however, Aquaviva expressed a doubt that the objectives of "guerra defensiva" could be most effectively attained by the assumption of this office.50 Never had Valdivia indicated an inclination to consider the dignity of the bishopric necessary or desirable. He had stressed not infrequently the importance of having the executor of this plan free from the jurisdiction of the bishop, and it cannot be said that he suggested that the bishopric be assumed by the individual who should direct the plan.51

In his letter to the secretary of the Council of Indies Valdivia stated four primary objections to the authority of the director of "guerra defensiva" being subordinated to the bishop of Imperial: 1) should the bishop refuse to entrust the administration of that frontier section of his diocese where the supervision of "guerra defensiva" should be controlled by Valdivia or by his companions, the purpose of their voyage would have been defeated; 2) were authority conferred upon him through the bishop, Valdivia or the director could not subdelegate power, for such a ruling existed due to the vast distance intervening between the colony and the mother country; thus through technicalities of organization might accomplishment be seriously impeded; 3) should the bishop die, negotiations would suffer unnecessary delay for without authority there would be a cumbersome state of indecision; 4) the grave problem of differentiating between the ecclesiastical and civil supervision would be accentuated.52 Due in large to his own protestations, Valdivia was

49Ibid., IV, 710-711.
50Ibid., IV, 711.
51Ibid., IV, 712-713.
52Ibid., IV, 704.
not made bishop of Imperial. He was, however, considered free from Jesuit
ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the New World when the General dispensed him
from all such supervision, holding him directly accountable to the General
himself. Various titles have been used in reference to Valdivia, among
which have been "vice-provincial" or "superior of the frontier missions";
the important fact, disregarding the formal title, lay in the free rein
given to him. While he was given exceptional freedom of action, the
weight of responsibility placed upon him was proportionately increased.

The very nature of the policy of "guerra defensiva" demanded a close
cooperation of Church and State and in this case a close union of the
religious and the political programs; therefore ecclesiastical as well as
civil powers were combined in the authority of the director of the new system.
At the formal meeting called to confer the necessary authority, December 9,
1610, Valdivia was intrusted with extensive and elastic powers to enable him
to arrange the inauguration of defensive warfare. He was to act as civil
visitador of Chile - equivalent to providing him with supreme political con-
trol over affairs of the Indian frontier. This appointment was subject to

53 Ibid., IV, 707.
54 José Toribio Medina, Diccionario Biografico Colonial de Chile, Santiago,
1905, 898, speaks of the padre as vice-provincial of Paraguay as does
Rosales, Astrain, following P. Lozano, holds that Padre Valdivia was made
official superior of the missions in Chile, IV, 706. All agree that he was
free from the supervision of any but the General.

Since Chile had been made a vice-province of Paraguay it is not unlike-
ly that Valdivia also held the title of vice-provincial. No one else held
the title at this time. Medina, Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena, I, 182.
55 Included in this junta were three who had been especially adamant in their
disapproval. Still the majority were in favor of conferring great power
upon Padre Valdivia. Astrain, IV, 705.
56 Olivares, in Colección Historiadores, VII, 72.
the approval of the viceroy; there was no doubt as to its ratification. Laden with official letters and credentials for the dignitaries of Peru and Chile, Valdivia completed preparations for his return voyage.
CHAPTER IV

INITIAL SUCCESS

Early in 1611 Valdivia, with nine Jesuits and two coadjutors, embarked at Cádiz.\(^1\) He outlined his procedure to his companions during the trip while also instructing them in the Araucanian language.\(^2\) Shortly after their arrival they dispatched the cedulas given the padre by the king of the viceroy, who thereupon convened a junta for a discussion concerning these notices. Unanimously in accord with the instructions, the junta decreed November 22, 1611, that offensive warfare should cease; the Spaniards were commanded to retreat to a line of defense along the Bío-Bío personal service no longer was to be inflicted.\(^3\) Further preparations were necessary before the expedition of padres was in readiness for their mission south of the border. Not until the latter part of March were these final steps nearing completion. Provision had been recorded by the Marqués de Montes Claros in which Valdivia, in the name of the king, should attend to the pacification and evangelizing of the natives through the initiating of guerra defensiva.\(^4\)

Both the king and the viceroy had expressed confident satisfaction in the ability of Valdivia to conduct the system which should reap so many advantages.

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\(^1\)Rosales, II, 531. Enrich, I, 231, refers to the dispatching of twelve padres, while Barros Arana, Historial Jeneral de Chile, Santiago, 1884-1902, IV, 33. Hereafter to be cited as Historia, says there were eight Jesuits and two lay brothers in Valdivia's group. Astrain, IV, 702, from the evidence in the Morla Vícuña collection at the Biblioteca Nacional in Santiago has given twelve names: P. Juan de Fuensalida, P. Juan Bautista de Rada, P. Mateo de Montes, P. Gaspar Fernández, P. Antonio de Villaja, P. Alonso de Espinosa, P. Gaspar Sobrino, P. Vicente Modolell, P. Jorge Fernández, and the lay brothers, Juan Martínez and Juan Ruiz.
for the crown. The governor and all the civil and military officials were instructed to cooperate with the directions of the padre.

On the 29th of March, 1612, the slavery law of May 26, 1608 which had condemned to bondage all natives not disposed to cease warfare, was abrogated. On September 8, 1610, a letter had been written by the king to gorgo the application of his 1608 ruling until "la guerra defensiva" should be put into execution, and then to apply it to all natives who should not desist from offensive warfare. These latter provisions indicated that all the natives who had been paying personal service but who should agree to defensive warfare should be given their liberty. On December 8, 1610, the king had given Valdivia a letter addressed to the "caacíques, capitanes, toquis, i indios principales de las provincias de Chile" in which the new policy of pacification was carefully explained. It was admitted that personal service was vexatious to these Chileans, to the point of arousing their righteous belligerency; therefore all previous hostile actions of the Indians against the Spaniards were forgiven.

Another order or provision was issued giving approbation to the dismantling and depopulating of all those forts unessential to the maintenance of the defensive frontier along the Bío-Bío. Henceforth the frontier would

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2 The exact date of departure is unknown.
3 Rosales, II, 534-535, 539-543.
4 Ibid., II, 531-532.
5 Ibid., II, 543-539-543.
6 Ibid., II, 535-536.
7 Ibid., II, 536.
8 Ibid., II, 533.
9 March 29, 1612, Ibid., II, 537-539.
be guarded by the forts of Cayuguano, Yumbel and Santa Fé to the north of
the Bío-Bío, and by Nacimiento, Monterrey, San Jerónimo and Arauco to the
south of the river. Each fort was to have a stipulated squadron of resident
soldiers ranging in number from seventy to one hundred fifty. It was
thought necessary to retain eighty soldiers in the fort of Lebo, fifteen on
the estancia of Buena Esperanza, twelve in the fort of San Pedro, fifty in
the cities of Concepción and Chillán, and one hundred in the lower city of
Castro and the fort of Chiloé. These statistics illustrate the compar-
atively few armed forces required for defensive war. The primary utility of
the fort of Angol had been to afford an advantageous stepping stone to
further offensive tactics; it was to be immediately dismantled while its
population was to retire to an appointed place. Similarly it was
unnecessary to preserve a fort in the province of Tucapel, across the Paicaví
river, since it too served as a springboard for Spanish attacks. On the
other hand the fort of Cayuguano on the frontier of the cordillera nevada
provided defense against hostile Indians as well as a shelter for friendly
natives who had been reduced; therefore seventy soldiers were assigned as
guards there. The fort of Yumbel, situated in the vicinity of unusually
fertile fields, was to be a type of agricultural supply house. For similar
strategic reasons certain of the other forts were retained.

10 Ibid., 539-542.
11 Ibid., 538.
12 Ibid., 538.
Another viceregal address to the president, oidores, and the royal Audiencia of Santiago exempted Valdivia from their jurisdiction. In this document was the constant reiteration of the trust with which the king and the viceroy respected Valdivia's ability and prudence. The viceroy repeated the authority of Valdivia to abolish personal service, to procure peaceful settlement with the natives, and to administer the requirements of defensive warfare. Further cédulas or provisions prohibited with the assurance of consequent severe penalties for all transgressors of the law, the entrance of all the Spaniards except the padres into the Indian territory and pardoned the Indians for their misdoings in previous revolts. Any problem that should arise in the future was to be settled at the discretion of Valdivia who was now in complete civil and ecclesiastical authority on the troubled Indian frontier of Chile.

It is necessary at this point to review rapidly the situation of Chile during these days of discussion. The problem of the Araucanian had become annually more vexing. It became increasingly evident that this stock of aborigines was not to be subdued as had been the natives in the other sections of the Americas. Chilean Spaniards were howling for revenge upon the traitorous Indian who dared defy enslavement.

The royal Audiencia which had been suppressed thirty four years previously by an examiner who was a sort of colonial efficiency expert, had been reestablished September 8, 1609 with the governor García Ramón as president.

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13 Ibid., 543-544.
14 Toledo, Historiadores, IV, 105-111.
15 Ibid., II, 481-482; Molina, II, 264.
García Ramón had retained the governorship from 1605 when he had accompanied Valdivia from Peru. As governor he had balanced his victories with his defeats. He was in violent disagreement with those who resorted to barbarous savagery in their treatment of their victims; he sought rather to subdue with force since it appeared to him the only effective means to the end of pacification. In his treatment of the prisoners of war he had displayed a lack of vindictiveness as well as a lack of mercy. His objection to the May 26, 1608 slavery edict of the king illustrated his stand against the exploitation of the natives. Yet he failed to comprehend the practical utility of "guerra defensiva". He sincerely opposed its principles and practices. Gentleness of this Christian interpretation was not his answer to the hostility of the Araucanians. In his thoughts it seemed necessary to subject them by means of the sword before the sword could be placed permanently in the scabbard. Father Enrich points out that although Ramón did not request one Jesuit to accompany his army among the Araucanians after Valdivia's 1605-1606 tour of inspection, he accorded them cordiality and even generosity, not infrequently desiring them to accept the hospitality of his residence in Arauco. The governor Ramón had shown no disposition to dislodge the system of personal service. Technically under his rule the encomendero was expected to subject a third of the number of his natives to the extraction of gold, and should require eight months of intensive labor from each servant, after which the native should return to his pueblo for

16Olivares, in Colección Historiadores, IV, 331-332.
17Enrich, I, 179.
two years and four months. Only a stipulated proportion of the natives of the vicinity were to be held in encomienda at the same time. Such proportions were regarded as unimportant as the regulation to return the Indians to their lands.

Upon García Ramón's death in August, 1610, Dr. Luis Merlo de la Fuente, the gobierno interno, through a display of crushing severity continued the military operations of the late governor, attempting to effect rigid discipline over his soldiers who were prone to treat him as a substitute whose authority was of too short a duration to command respect. He repaired hastily to the frontier. Nor did he waste any time in inciting the Araucanians to a new high in hostility. It was he who made known the terms of the August 26, 1608 cedula of enslavement to the natives, disclosing the stipulations to Aillavilu, one of the most valiant Araucanian toquis, who made no effort to conceal his heartfelt contempt for these words. Although Merlo de la Fuente was not a professional military man, he encouraged the soldiers in their greed for the returns of the slave trade.

On the 4th of December, 1610, the fifty year old army man, Captain Juan Jaraquemada, set sail from Callao with two hundred men whom he had organized in Lima to assist the army in Chile. Arriving at the erstwhile promising city of Valparaiso on the first day of the new year, he was greeted by the ominous evidence of depopulation. Nor was this to be his only disappoint-

18 Amunátegui y Solar, Historia Social de Chile, 47.
19 De la Fuente had spent over twenty years in the royal service in the Indies of Spain. He had been alcalde de corte in Lima and held various commissions in Chile, Panama, Puertobelo and Cartajena. Finally he became oidor in the cabildo of Santiago. Barros Arana, Historia, IV, 7-8.
ment. Disorganization and corruption had eaten far into the vitals of the army. Eight days later he wrote to the king urging him to retract the cédula of May 26, 1608, and further requested a ban upon placing mulatoes in the army as a punitive measure. In another letter he bemoaned the lack of military discipline; as one of his complaints he avowed that each Spanish soldier required three Indians for his service and that six natives were forced to carry a load suitable for fifteen or twenty horses. Like García Ramón, Jaraquemada hoped for correction of abuses inflicted upon these pacified Indians yet he remained convinced that the sword was the sole tool of pacification. Since the encomenderos held their slaves through a grant of the king, and thus were bound only by royal cédulas which they heeded or disregarded, according to their own personal interests, any attempt made by a military governor to reform abuses was ridiculed or ignored. To effect a degree of improvement in the lot of the Indian auxiliaries Jaraquemada requested the Provincial of the Jesuits who had arrived in Santiago that January, to dispatch two padres to Arauco where they were needed to assist the natives and the Spanish soldiers who were degenerating deeper in the mire of moral laxity.

The comparative quiet of the year 1611 may be accounted for by the fact that it was quite impossible to consider further hostile entradas among the

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21Actas del Cabildo de Santiago, in Colección Historiadores, XXV, 194-198.
23Enrich, I, 180-181.
24Claudio Gay, Historia II, 234-244.
25Ibid., 234-244.
26Enrich, I, 181.
Indians until some military discipline should have been established in the Spanish troops. During this year Jaraquemada was busily concerned with the reorganization of his forces. This same year the toqui Aillavilú departed from his mortal existence leaving the Araucamians under a new general toqui. The presence once more of padres along the frontier had mitigated in some small degree the maltreatment of the captive Indians.

This peace, or rather interim in war during which further attacks were planned, was rudely shattered by the revolt of the natives in the February of 1612. The natives of Arauco, Tucapel, and Catiray staged a bloody insurrection. Houses were burned and Spaniards slain. Retiring to their hinterland the natives prepared for outright war.27 Concepción, so near the Bío-Bío, was enveloped in consternation at this new turn of events. The natives as far north as the rio Maule were evidencing a restlessness.

Amid the spirit of hostility which was liable again to mature into a reality of ruination, Valdivia and the new governor, Ribera, arrived.28

With Chile vibrating under her difficulties, the Jesuits were already becoming aware of increasing ill will of certain of their opposers. The battle waged against personal enslavement was, of course, not based upon the

27Toledo, in Colección de Historiadores, IV, 132; Rosales, II, 506-510.
28Though the friends of governor Jaraquemada had requested that he be allowed to remain in office during the initiation of the plan of guerra defensiva, padre Valdivia had expressed his preference for Alonso de Ribera. Rosales, op. cit., II, 546. In Ribera's appointment which he received in Tucaman the governor was directed to establish peace at once. Yet Ribera suffered at this time from an injury which prevented his mounting a horse; therefore his arrival at Santiago was delayed from January until March 27. On January 28, 1612, Jaraquemada wrote that Ribera was forced to travel by means of a hand barrow, and that for the rest of his life he could mount a horse only with the most painful difficulty; the following year, October 30, 1613, Captain Diego Flores de Leon wrote to the king of this same handicap.
personal theory of Valdivia, but was founded upon the basic principles of Christianity. Therefore, upon this subject of personal service there could be no compromise; it had been clearly displayed by the Chilean encomenderos that the system was one of enslavement. As the most vociferous denouncers of these conditions, the Jesuits as a group were the butt of the growing opposition of the soldiers and the encomenderos.

In 1608 the Jesuits had been deprived of what may appear a minor prerogative, but may also be regarded as the initial deprivation in a series of lesser persecutions which eventually culminated in the expulsion of the Society. The bishop of Santiago, Fray Juan Pérez de Espinosa, who never failed to snatch an opportunity to express his aversion towards the Society, and who had been unimpressed by Diego de Torres, provincial of Chile, in his attempts at reconciliation, had prohibited the padres from preaching in their churches on feast days on the grounds that they should permit the people to attend the cathedral. In answer to his report of this unnecessary restriction, the General, Aquaviva, reminded Torres that the Jesuits had suffered impediments in the prosecution of their duties hitherto; he added that since


29 Astrain, IV, 684. Medina recalls that during his bishopric Fray Espinosa managed to quarrel "... con todo el mundo, con los oidores y con sus clerigos, y que al fin concluyo por abondonar su diocesis e irse escapado a Sevilla." Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena, I, 183.
the cause for such action was beyond interpretation, the only course would be submission in silence.\textsuperscript{30}

Aside from this brunt of personal antipathy was the more understandable opposition of the encomenderos, who were becoming aware of the growing prestige of these padres among the natives. In the famed Jesuit Paraguayan reductions, where the padres had segregated the natives from the exploitation of the Spaniards, there was a vivid warning to the encomenderos of the possible menace to their economy which the padres might effect.\textsuperscript{31}

Torres related to Aquaviva, February 15, 1612, the struggle of the Jesuits against personal service, regretting the enforced labor of the Indians and their separation from their homes and their inability under such conditions to progress temporally or spiritually.\textsuperscript{32} He added that the official regulations which abolished such abuses on paper, and the exhortation of the priests, were woefully disregarded.

With great hope and satisfaction Torres greeted Valdivia, whose zealous labors he had always admired\textsuperscript{33} Not only was the stand of the Society against personal service opposed by the soldier and encomendero, but it was also met

\begin{itemize}
  \item Padre Aquaviva wrote: "Pena nos ha dado la diferencia que en Santiago de Chile ha habido con el Obispo, y no puede dejar de redundar en impedimento de nuestros ministerios el impedirnos predicar en nuestra iglesia por el coamino con que lo ha tomado, y no sabemos que sea buen remedio pasar por ello tonien silencio, como algunos nos escriben, no sin algún sentimiento. Aca nos ha parecido que se podría tomar otro acuerdo, y es, que no temanasa las fiestas, cuando se predica en la Catedral, que nuestra iglesia dejaría de ser frecuentada ni las almas defraudadas del seílento espiritual de los Nuestros." Astrain, IV, 684.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 684.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Pastells, I, 146-151.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid., I, 200, 203-207.
\end{itemize}
by the denunciations of those who were convinced of the futility of attempting conversion of these heathen souls. To them such gentle or humane methods of pacification as advocated by Valdivia bespoke an inability to face the reality of the situation. Under this delusion created by the men of the sword many clerics opposed the work of Valdivia and the Jesuits. There is the striking example of Fray Jerónimo de Hinojosa, a Dominican of notable prestige and a former companion of García Ramón, who arrived in Lima as a representative of the cities of Chile in order to dissuade the viceroy from continuing to sanction "guerra defensiva" and the suppression of personal service. In the presence of the Viceroy and audiencia he declared his intention to act contrary to the regulations given Valdivia; more thoroughly to express disapproval he added that at least in the city of Concepción the cabildo and a junta of all the leading personages had expressly denied that there was sufficient cause to adopt the plan. Another factor conducive of rabid opposition to guerra defensiva was pride in military achievement; especially did the blood of capitanes simmer at the ban placed upon aggression. Such an order savored too strongly of an admission that military pursuits, had been unsuccessful. Nor did the soldier wax too enthusiastic over the rigid restrictions the padres placed against immorality.

On May 13, 1612, Valdivia disembarked at Penco intending to continue toward Concepción. Shortly afterwards his companions joined him.
ing him were five Araucanians who had been released from bondage as the initial evidence of Valdivia's abolition of native enslavement. Torres, at that time in Santiago, dispatched a message to Valdivia offering him the service of three additional padres skilled in the Araucanian tongue and familiar with the lands. Valdivia lost no time in presenting his credentials to the cabildo of Concepción, where he received formal though insincere assurance of their cooperation. The padre sent word immediately to the superintendents of the regiments and the captains on the frontiers forbidding further entradas into Indian territory and demanding that mercy be bestowed those natives already taken captive. Valdivia concluded his official preliminaries during his conferences with governor Ribera and Bishop Espinosa.

Seven days after their arrival in Concepción Valdivia accompanied by his friend and companion Father Gaspar Sobrino, as well as by five liberated natives from Peru, headed for the Bio-Bío. Four leagues from Concepción and two from the fort of San Pedro they met one of the principal toquis, coronel by name, who expressed great joy upon seeing the padres. That same night they baptized five adults (of whom four were over eighty years of age) and three children.

IV, 44. Astrain, IV, 714, says that upon his arrival in Concepción Valdivia was admitted into the Jesuit residence there. Valdivia says that he and his companions were accorded the hospitality of the Dominicans in Concepción. Luis de Valdivia, S.J., Relación de lo que sucedío en el Reyno de Chile después a el Padre Luys de Valdivia, de la Compañía de Jesús en el con sus ocho compañeros Sacerdotes, 1612, 2.

39Enrich, I, 240.
40Ibid., I, 244.
Before the end of May Valdivia was active among the Indians of the frontier. Natives were dispatched to the interior to announce the new plan of Spain to the various toquis. In less than five days after his arrival in Arauco Valdivia was visited by Indians from Pengereguia, Millarapoe, Quido, Quiapo, Lauapie, Leuo, Taulero, Coloura and Arauco; natives had come to see what faith they could put in the rumors of peace from Molhuilli, Lincoya, Pilmayquen, Tucapel, Paycavi, Angolaco, Tokmolmo, Cavacupil and Ylicura.45

Meanwhile Valdivia had received letters from Ribera with further royal provisions attesting the powers of the padre. Parsimonious with his time among the natives Valdivia considered it sufficient to have Sobrino attend to this matter in Concepción in his stead.46

Heartened by the indications of interest the Indians had displayed, under the sole protection of friendly natives he journeyed throughout Arauco and Tucapel.47 Immediate was his success among the reduced Indians who had been dangerously restless since a revolt the previous February. The padre lent a patient ear to their multitude of grievances. Announcing the cédulas of the king to them, he offered assurance that their aggravations would cease. Native caciques had been sent by Valdivia to announce the new policy.

42 Valdivia, Relación de lo que sucedio en el Reyno de Chile, 1612, 1.
43 Ibid., 1.
44 Astrain, IV, 715.
45 Relación op. cit., 3.
46 Ibid., 4.
47 Ibid., 5.
to the toquis in Catiray. While awaiting a reply he found it necessary to return to Concepción to confer with Ribera. The day after he left, five or six armed caciques who had been advised of the proffered peace, arrived on the other side of the Bío-Bío from Arauco. Mistaking them for hostile natives, the maestre de campo Alvaro Nuñez went out to meet their challenge but found them concerned only with the verification of the reports disseminated through their lands concerning peace.

Upon Valdivia's return five caciques from Catiray came to him desirous of investigating these same reports. In order to establish complete confidence in his good will, Valdivia, accompanied by but two soldiers, one sagacious Indian from Lima and three toquis of Arauco, departed for the treacherous land of war in Catiray. Arriving the first night of their journey at Longonabal, they were received by eight Indians on horseback, who reciprocated the friendliness of the padre. Plans were made for a convention of the most important toquis from the vicinity which would take place at Nancu, near Catiray. The padre attended this junta, accompanied by Captain Pinto, "with cinnamon branch in their hands," the symbol of peace. Here the ten reguas of Talcamávida, Piremmahuida, Columbueno, Quileno, Taslevo, Ilicura, Lebo, Arauco, Pilumrehue and Curalevo were represented. For eight hours the junta wended its loquacious way. Valdivia exposed the prin-

48 Toledo, in Colección Historiadores, IV, 134.
49 Barros Arana, Historia, IV, 49.
50 Toledo, in Colección de Historiadores, IV, 134.
51 Valdivia, Relación, 1612, 5.
52 Ibid., 5; Toledo, IV, 136-137; Rosales, II, 549.
53 This symbol is expressed: "con un ramo de canelo en las manos."
54 Valdivia, Relación op. cit., 6; Toledo, IV, 139.
ciples of the plan, illustrating its advantages. He promised them that they would receive justice from the Spaniards. He reminded the natives of his position as a dual ambassador. First, he was the ecclesiastical representative, in which capacity he had preached to the Spaniards in order to remind them of their Christian obligations and the wrongs they were inflicting upon the natives. He recalled the fact that Christ had not died upon the cross for the preservation of Spaniards exclusively, but for all mankind. Thus the Araucanians were equal in the sight of the Lord and on that account in the sight of his ministers. Since the king desired that the principles of Christ be practised he had commanded the cessation of aggressive war and the abolition of personal service, desiring only that the natives share in the fruits of Christianity. Thus the king had appointed a new governor also, with instructions to live peacefully within the Spanish territory. Only in self defense would the Spaniards fight.

Carampangui, the principal cacique, expressed an inclination to cooperate with the padre. He appreciated the exposition of this type of peace which differed so radically from previous offers of the Spaniards, but said they would consider an agreement of pacification only should they be permitted to

55 Much confusion exists among the various historians concerning the exact proceedings of many of these juntas attended by Valdivia; thus it is to Valdivia's own accounts that one should turn for more accurate details of the treatings. Valdivia wrote extensive relations of the year 1612 which have been photographed by the Massachusetts Historical Society: Relación de lo que sucedió en el Reyno de Chile después que el Padre Luys de Valdivia, de la Compañía de Iesúa, entró en el con sus ocho compañeros Sacerdotes de la misma Compañía, el año de 1612, describes the success of the system until December 14, 1612. Relación de lo que sucedió en la jornada que hizimos el señor Presidente Alonso de Ribera, Gobernador de este Reyno, y ye desde Arauco a Payeauí, a ocluyr las pazes de Elicura, ultima regua de Tucapel y las de Fueren y la Imperial covers the period from March, 1612 to
treat with the Spaniards as an independent nation. He admitted that the peaceful settlement of the war then seventy years in duration would be welcome. Also before peace could be concluded certain evils would have to be rectified and certain reforms assured. The first wrong demanding redress would necessitate the returning of the Indians who, seized along the border, had been shipped away from their native soil. It was agreed that a reciprocal arrangement for the return of Spaniards and Indians was highly desirable. The toqui demanded that the cédulas of the king be enacted justly, and that in the future those caciques guilty of violations of the agreement be judged and punished in their own territories. Carampangui added that, since the Spaniards disavowed intentions of further aggression, the fort of San Gerónimo, valued essentially as a foothold for assault upon the natives, was unnecessary. When the padre hinted that he preferred to consult with military authorities in regard to dismantling the fort a murmuring of discontent at the evasion arose. Valdívía hastily assured them, in the name of his Majesty, that the fort would be quitted.

From this assembly Valdívía returned to Santiago where he informed the audiencia of the fortunate beginnings he had witnessed. From there he went to the fort of Talcamahuyda where the governor had come from Concepción December 24, 1612. This was sent to his brother in Lima. Relación de la muerte de los padres escrita por el Padre Valdívía a 24 de Diciembre de mil sesientos y doce al padre Provincial de Lima is self explanatory in its title. It is to these three relations that constant reference must be made to clarify obscurities in the narrators concerning this year of 1612.

This first encounter with the Araucanians in the negotiations for peace took place during the middle of June. The Te Deum was sung in the Churches
and where Catirayan toquis, among whom was Carampangui, had assembled to treat for peace. They were accorded the ceremonious hospitality they deemed suitable to chiefs of their dignity. Reassurance was given the Indians by the governor that Padre Valdivia was fully authorized to materialize all the promises he had made, and that the padre should be given the full cooperation of the governor. Gratified, the toquis returned to their lands with favorable reports concerning their negotiations with the Spaniards. 60

Padre Gaspar Sobrino had rejoined Valdivia. The two worked out further steps towards the pacification of the Araucanians. Twelve influential toquis with three of the former captives from Peru were commissioned to the land of Puren to herald the new peace. 61 In reply Valdivia received numerous requests for a personal visit. He complied with these requests, attempting to lay the foundations of solid friendship and understanding. He sent letters as far south as Chiloé and the city of Chillán where numerous hostile Indians added an element of constant insecurity. 62 Concurrently he had initiated hopeful treatings with the toquis of Llico. 63 "Guerra defensiva" appeared to be accomplishing what "guerra offensiva" had failed to do for over seventy years.

of Santiago and solemn mass celebrated in thanksgiving for this initial success. Astrain, IV, 716-717.
60 Valdivia, Relación de lo que sucedió en el Reyno ..., 10.
61 Toledo, in Colección Historiadores, IV, 135.
62 Valdivia, Relación de lo que sucedió en el Reyno de Chile ..., 10.
63 Ibid., 11.
CHAPTER V

REVERTION TO UNOFFICIAL "GUERRA
OFFENSIVA"

By August general grumblings of discontent at the lack of activity were
becoming louder and more forceful. The military element was impatient to
resume its more hazardous and profitable performances. Nor was the bishop
content to see Valdivia exercise such authority, regardless of his accomplish-
ments.¹ To carry on his work most effectively Valdivia had established two
missions - one at Monterrey, the other at Arauco.² He had received the
assistance promised him by the Provincial, Torres. The padres Horacio Vehi
and Martin de Aranda were sent to Arauco where, to their surprise they found
not hostile infidels, but pacified natives desirous of further instruction
in the Faith.³ At the same time Valdivia sent Father Vicente Modolell and
Antonio de Aparicio to Monterrey. The initial efforts here were successful.⁴
Accompanied by soldiers and by many ambassadors from Illicura and from Puren
who had urged a conference with the father, Valdivia again took leave of Arauco. While on their way to a place appointed for a junta, Valdivia re-
ceived numerous messages from the natives, all indicating hope of peaceful
negotiations.⁵

¹Valdivia, Relación de lo que sucedio en el Reyno de Chile. ... , 12.
²Ovalle, Historica Relación del Reino del Chile, in Colección Historiadores,
XIII, 109.
³Rosales, II, 560-561.
⁴Ibid., II, 561.
⁵Luis de Valdivia, S.J., Relacion de lo que sucedio en la jornada que
hizimos el senor Presidente Alonfo de Ribera Gournador de te Arauco a Paycem
Among those who sought Valdivia travelling to Paicaví were Indians of Leuo, Lincoye and Pangue (two leagues from Paicaví) who were similarly interested in verifying the rumor of the regal proclamations which were said to be announced by Padre Valdivia. 6 One Indian toqui from Catiray, Lebulican, journeyed to San Gerónimo to voice his suspicions of the Spanish generosity, making no effort to dissemble his strenuous attempts to stir his people against peaceful treatatis with untrustworthy intruders. 7 Six toquis came from Puren (from the reguas of the coast - Rałommo, Calcuimo, Tirga, Claroa, Videregua, Lleulleu, and Rágaloe) with others from the reguas of Puren and from Ynaullillo and Pillaguen to inform the padre of their inclination to believe sagacious the distrust of Lebulican. Other toquis of Ilicura alligned themselves with those of Puren, and similarly many of the Aylla regua of Tucapel. Valdivia saw that he would have to work assiduously to dispel this deserved distrust founded upon seventy years of Spanish duplicity. While this negative sentiment was being voiced, Llacanague, the principal toqui of Molloco, and the Toqui General of the province of the Cordillera Nevada, arrived from Puren to conclude a peaceful agreement, with the stipulation that the fort of Angol be quitted. 8 Thus was Valdivia in a position requiring most delicate tact, an attribute he utilized far more readily among the natives than among the sons of Spain.

6 Ibid., 14.
7 Ibid., 14.
8 Ibid., 14.
Within the next three weeks a situation developed which though a patchwork was a culmination of many diverse events and elements. Tureulipe, a native toqui who had been held as a prisoner of war since his capture in 1611 by Don Alonso de Quesada, had recently cast off his shackles of bondage. His narrations of his painful captivity, his orations against any trust being placed in the Spaniard, his derision towards the mediation of Valdivia, carried weight among his people. So potent an influence did he exert that he was able to lead several toquis of Catiray as well as a goodly host of natives in an attack against Arauco. Not only did the Spanish forces successfully resist the assault, but the irate toqui was again taken prisoner. He finally consented to treat with the padre, who decided it would be best to dispatch an ambassador to the toquis of Catiray with generous peace offers. The same messenger was to contact the other toquis of Puren and Imperial to arrange for peace negotiations. Meanwhile Ribera and an impressive regiment entered Puren to watch for a movement that might change this stage of indiscision to one of war.

The noted belligerent toqui of Puren, Anganamon, agreed to sit in at a conference. Valdivia and his companion Sobrino were accompanied by the two padres from the mission of Arauco, Vecchi and Aranda, to Paicaví where they waited the arrival of Anganamon. Nor were they long in waiting. With

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9 Rosales, II, 559.
10 Ibid., II, 559.
11 Don Vicente Carvallo i Goyeneche, Descripción Historico Geográfica del Reino de Chile, in Colección Historiadores, VIII, 296.
Rosales, II, 561-562.
a guard of forty soldiers and with several ulmenes, Anganamon brought numerous Spanish prisoners whom he liberated hoping to receive a similar gesture from the Spaniards. He was received not only by the padres but by the governor and the principal officers who discussed possible terms of peace. Included in the necessary prerequisites was the establishment of the Río Biobío as a barrier between the two nations, permitting only the padres to cross into Indian territory. To all external appearances Anganamon was deeply impressed by Padre Valdivia's sermon on the possibilities of accomplishment through "guerra defensiva" and on the necessity of preparing in this life for a life after death. Arrangements were made for the exchange of prisoners of war (among whom were Don Alonso Quesada and Tureulipi); plans were formulated for a general junta of peace. Anganamon had requested the evacuation of the forts of Paicaví and of Arauco as essential provisions in a peace settlement; the first was promised without reservation, and the second was to be accomplished after the negotiations had come to a definite conclusive peace.

Anganamon departed. Meanwhile three of his wives, a Spanish woman Dona Maria de Jarquera and two Indians, with two of his children, escaped to the fort of Paicaví. Anganamon upon hearing of this communicated

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13 Molina, II, 267.
14 Rosales, II, 563; Carvallo i Goyeneche, in Colección Historiadores, VIII, 292.
15 Molina, II, 268; It was decided later to wait until the conclusion of this general junta before commencing the demolition of Paicaví. Barros Arana, Historia, IV, 57.
16 Molina, II, 268-269; Carvallo i Goyeneche, in Colección Historiadores, VIII, 297-298.
immediately with the Spaniards. As he was impatiently awaiting a reply, a meeting of theologians and jurists convened to settle the difficulty. The question was a vexing one. On the one hand was the inadvisability of withholding what to the toqui and the untutored savage was Anganamon's rightful property. To further complicate matters, the Spanish woman was a Christian while the other two Indian women and one daughter were either baptized or had expressed a desire for baptism. To return these Christian women to the polygamous toqui would be a violation of the principles of Christianity; to return the converted daughter would expose her to an atmosphere of barbarous paganism. An astonishing number of military men became indignantly righteous over this matter of upholding the Christian ethics. It was decided that Anganamon be given his choice among his wives, be reduced to Christianity, and contract a legal marriage in the Church. Such a decision was sent to the infidel chief, who understood only that these Christian Spaniards were refusing to return his property. Especially was he provoked over the refusal of the Spaniards to return both his daughters, instead of promising just the eldest who had not been converted to the faith of the Christians.

Meanwhile, another series of incidents occurred which revived hope of a satisfactory peace negotiation. There came to Valdivia the septagenarian Utiflame, a toqui of import, who hitherto had been among the most rabidly roused against the Spaniards. Now restraining the hatred he felt, he had

17Ibid., VIII, 297.
18Ibid., VIII, 297-299.
20Molina, II, 269. Valdivia, Relación de lo que sucedió en la jornada que hizimos... 15.
come to the padre seeking the release of his son who had been taken captive by the Spaniards. Valdivia's gentle treatment of the toqui and his mercy in granting the request so touched the haughty chief that he altered his judgment of the Spaniards. He turned his powers of influence from stirring bloody wrath against the intruders to mediation between his people of Ilicura and the Spaniards.

Valdivia met seventy leaders with an impressive number of toquis from Ilicura. Quick to follow the example of their neighbors from Ilicura, numerous toquis of Puren joined in this cooperation with the efforts for peace. So it was that Valdivia and the governor witnessed a peaceful congregation composed largely of recently most rabid enemies of the Spaniards. Striking the keynote of the discussion Utiaflame delivered an oration warmly advocating peaceful settlement. He asked the Spaniards to quit the fort of Paicaví, and to send padres to his country to evangelize his people, while excluding the military and civil men whose entradas, regardless of their intention, still kindled suspicion in the minds of the natives. He urged, cognizant of the bitterness the incident was provoking, that more lenient terms be granted Anganamon, and that the Spaniards dispense with all delays in returning at least the daughters. With the promise that the fort would be quitted without undue procrastination, Valdivia further agreed with Utiaflame.

21 Ibid., 15.
22 Ibid., 15.
23 Ibid., 16.
24 Ibid., 16.
that Anganamon should not be antagonized beyond endurance, though Christian standards could not be forsaken. Valdivia favored dispatching word to Anganamon announcing the immediate return of his eldest daughter, and explaining the motives behind the apparent Spanish injustice. With an exchange of promises to continue these preliminaries to permanent peace, the remarkable junta which, due to the Black Robes, witnessed words instead of war between the erstwhile most murderous enemies, drew to a close.\textsuperscript{25}

That night, December 7, 1612, an atmosphere of unrest hovered over camp. The officers were disgruntled. Valdivia prayed for many hours during the night that he might act prudently.\textsuperscript{26} The following day he announced the demolition of Paicaví should begin at once; he prepared to send two padres to seek out Anganamon in order to make the explanations discussed the day before, and in order to comply with the requests for padres made by the toquis of Puren.\textsuperscript{27} Work began immediately upon the destruction of the fort of Paicaví. Ribera retired to Arauco with his army; Valdivia remained in the fort of Lebu, which after the demolition of Paicaví served as the most useful outpost on the new line of frontier.\textsuperscript{28}

Fears were enunciated concerning the intended entrance of the padres into this land so recently rebellious against all things and persons Spanish. Such fears had been expressed before. Despite the opposition,

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., 17-19; Rosales, II, 378.
\textsuperscript{26}Barros Arana, Historia IV, 59.
\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., IV, 65. Barros Arana says that at this time Ribera and his captains knew of rebellious activities of the Indians of Catiray who were donning their costumes of war, but that they were forced to remain in the background since they wore held to their commands, adding sarcastically, "Por eso el gobernador i sus capitanes que conocian las condiciones i el
Valdivia deemed it wisest to comply with the requests of the toquis from Ilicura and from Puren lest an evasion of the opportunity result not only in the loss of countless souls but lest the Indians be aroused to doubt the good faith of the padres. Barros Arana has referred to the entrada of the padres as "utter folly". 29 He failed to take several factors into account: 1) the harvesting of souls of the infidels was the primary mission of the padres in the New World; 2) such an undertaking necessitated obvious risks, though proportionately rarely did these risks result in the obtaining of the crown of martyrdom. 3) Valdivia had exposed himself upon numerous occasions during the preceding years and had developed a sense of security midst the natives despite the warnings of the Spaniards. While the crown of martyrdom was an honor devoutly desired, fruitless perilous missions were not undertaken to attain the glory. It had always been the policy of the Jesuits to seek to live for their Faith, rather than to seek death for it. 30

The padres Vecchi and Aranda and the hermano coadjutor Diego de Montalbán were selected for this dangerous mission. 31 Accompanying them was

The sixteenth and seventeenth century knew a zeal difficult for the nineteenth or twentieth century mind to comprehend. So earnestly desired was martyrdom that many a religious constantly prayed for it as a token of God's love. Countless instances could be enumerated wherein this craving for the crown of martyrdom led to an unnecessary exposure to danger. The Jesuit Generals constantly warned against such misdirected zeal since their numbers were few when compared with the magnitude of the tasks they undertook.

31 Valdivia, Relacion de la muerte de los padres escrita por el Padre Valdivia, December 24, 1612.
the influential Utiflame and the toqui Paineguil. 32

Anganamon was in a ravage mood. Upon hearing of the presence of the padres within the lands of Ilicura, with one hundred Indians of Pellabuen he descended upon them, slaying the group without awaiting an explanation of their mission. 33

Those in opposition to "guerra defensiva" had been awaiting just one indication of possible failure. This was it. The protestations of the caciques of Puren and Ilicura that this crime was not of their doing - indeed not even the hundred who had followed Anganamon in this murdering were from their ranks - fell upon deaf ears. The military men and the encomenderos were little concerned with the fact that sufficient proof for their protestation was offered. 34 Valdivia and "guerra defensiva" were branded failures. The Society was held responsible for allowing the execution of this system which culminated in the outrageous slaying of the Jesuits and friendly toquis.

Revenge was demanded. Forgotten was the fact that within the short period of eight months under the direction of Valdivia peace had been established among the recent rebels of Arauco, among the inhabitants of Catiray who had been most fierce in their opposition, and those of Monterrey who had previously displayed successful resistance to all military force. Forgotten were all the toquis of Puren and Ilicura, save Anganamon whom they

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32 Ibid., 21.
typified as the native; ignored were the codulas which still authorized the special civil, military, and ecclesiastical authority of Valdivia. Once more the Spaniards reverted to the tactics which had proven futile for over seventy years. Governor Ribera soon discarded the qualities attributed to him by Valdivia when the padre had spoken for him as governor. His was the same vindictive spirit possessed by the majority of the military element. In a letter to the king immediately after the martyrdoms, Ribera pointed to the crime of Anganamon as certain evidence of the failure of "guerra defensiva."36

That the intrinsic value of a system cannot be determined by a single incident would seem pure and axiomatic logic. Valdivia and the Jesuits repeatedly reminded the populace that this one defeat sustained in the Jesuit martyrdoms should assume no significance of import when it was contrasted with the numerous and constantly increasing successes of the system of "guerra defensiva" south of the Bío-Bío. The soldiers and encomenderos, eager to draw their swords and fill their purses, were deaf to such reasoning. Innumerable attacks were made upon the Indians, provoking them to forsake hope of negotiation.37 Before the year of 1613 drew to a close the governor had directed twenty-two military expeditions.37a Anganamon grasped his opportunity in these hostile Spanish entradas to vindicate his actions and to persuade many of the Indians of Imperial to forswear what allegiance

The martyrdom's occurred December 14, 1612. The bodies of the Jesuits were buried at Lebu.

34Valdivia, Relacion de la muerte de los padres, 21-22.
35Gay, I, 269-272; Astrain, IV, 725-726.
36Vedina, Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena, I, 184-185.
37Rosales, II, 592-593.
37aVillahos, Grandezas de Indias y Estado Eclesiastico, Politico y Militar de America, in Coleccion Historiadores, XXIX, 20.
they had begun to develop toward the Spaniards. Both the nations of Imperial and of Puren were pitched to new depths of hatred and distrust of the Spaniards. 38 Now were the natives of the more friendly frontiers of Talcama and Aranco spared injustice, but were also the butt of the belligerent soldier. 39

Valdivia was travelling in desperation from toqui to toqui, trying to salvage the accomplishments achieved prior to this outburst; under these most difficult circumstances it seemed quite impossible to convey the thought that he still held his official capacity and that regardless of contrary demonstrations of the governor, the king desired the plan of "guerra defensiva" to be effective. 40 Resentful of the authority possessed by Valdivia which, though little respected, was still official, Governor Ribera wrote to Felipe III requesting a limitation of the jurisdiction of the padre. 41

Leaving the argumentation in the hands of the fewer and perhaps more sincere opposers of Valdivia, the soldiers and encomenderos were not slow to reap the profit they had feared to lose during the first months of the actual "guerra defensiva." Valdivia, Torres, the Society itself, were drenched in the torrent of public animosity in reward for endeavors to abolish personal service. Such murders as the martyrdoms should not be allowed to remain unavenged, was the cry of the opposition, or else ruination of all the

38Ibid., II, 593.
39Ibid., II, 593.
40Ibid., II, 616.
41Astrain, IV, 721, 724.
Spaniards in Chile would ensue. The ayuntamientos of Santiago and of Concepción sent joint memorials to the king voicing common indignation towards the entire plan fostered by the padre.

While ample discussion has been devoted to the more pragmatically motivated group in opposition to Valdivia, there was another minority group far more sincere in their protestations. The majority of Dominicans, Franciscans and Augustinians had been persuaded by the testimony of the soldiers who, having engaged in combat with the fierce Araucanians, had concluded that men of so savage a nature could only be subdued by armed force. To represent them in their protestations against "guerra defensiva" with its consequent ban upon personal service, the cabildos of La Serena, Santiago, and Concepción appointed the guardian of the convent of San Francisco, Fray Pedro de Sosa, to convey their case to Felipe III. Fray Pedro recently had been devoting his sermons to frantic denunciations of Valdivia's activities, intermingling personal accusations against the padre although he was unable to substantiate such libelous statements. So serious had his accusations become that the oidores found it necessary to ban such discussions being given from the pulpit.

As the notable and intelligent Fray Pedro was sent by the cabildos with the sanction of Ribers, Colonel Pedro Cortés was similarly charged by the

42 Evon Villabos, who was not inclined to support Padre Valdivia's plan, bemoaned the unnecessary slaughter which followed the martyrdoms. Especially did he condemn the suffering inflicted upon those natives faithful to the precepts of the Church and the rules of the king. Under such conditions the author opined that the war "durara siempre." Grandezas de Indias o Estado Eclesiastico Politico y Militar de America, in Colección Historiadores, XXIX, 21-22.
43 Astrain, IV, 724.
army men to represent their grievances against "guerra defensiva". The two embarked for Spain in April, 1613. Following suit, Valdivia dispatched Melchor Venegas to defend his case in Peru, and to Madrid he sent his close companion Gaspar Sobrino. Both were amply supplied with letters and memorials refuting all possible accusations.

While Valdivia was vainly attempting to drive back the tidal wave of weapons streaming under Ribera's orders, a war of words was waged in Peru and Spain. For two years, from 1614 to 1616, attacks and counter attacks were dealt in such abundance that to attempt a chronological description would prove hopelessly befuddling. It seems best, to indicate only the primary premises involved in the Fray Sosa-Pedro Cortes vs. Gaspar Sobrino case.

Cortés summarized his arguments in a memorial in which he accounted for all Chile's existing difficulties by the eight month experiment of "guerra defensiva." His accusation appeared pathetically illogical when Chile had been suffering acutely for over seventy years while "guerra offensiva" was the sole policy. He enumerated an impressive list of damages inflicted by

44Actes del Cabildo de Santiago, in Colección Historiadores, XXIV, 387-388; 400, 412.
45Medina, Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena, II, 155.
46Astrain, IV, 723.
47Amunátegui Soler, Las Encomiendas, I, 384.
48While Ribera was inflicting all possible ravages upon the natives in retaliation for the slaying of the padres, Padre Valdivia had sent messages throughout the land assuring the Indians that peace was still his policy. He even sent a message to Anganamon offering him pardon for his offense; but the toqui suspected such leniency and only replied that when he had attempted to treat he had merely lost his wives and daughters. Rosales, II, 596.
50ibid., II, 123-126.
the natives from the time of the slaying of Governor Loyola to the Jesuit martyrdoms of 1612. In order to prevent all further damage he requested 3000 armed men, 1000 arquebuses, 1000 musketeers, 500 vizcainas, 1000 azadones and 1300 infantry. This exorbitant demand illustrates, paradoxically enough, an excellent argument in behalf of "guerra defensiva." Further he opined that the natives were not decidedly dissatisfied with their lot but were afflicted with a tendency to revolt unreasonably. He added that it was quite impossible to retain the respect of the soldier or the native under humiliating leniency required in "guerra defensiva."

Far more difficult to hurdle than the simple statement of Pedro Cortés was the well organized argument presented by Fray Pedro de Sosa. Sosa declared defensive warfare to be not only ineffectual, but that its execution placed the Spaniards in actual danger by defensive action which invited the invasion of the Araucanians. To protect themselves as well as the Christianized natives, it was essential to continue consistently a military move southward through Araucanian territory; unless this were the practice the Araucanians would take the initiative of perennial attacks northward through Spanish lands. He scoffed at the possibility of attaining a static position with the Bio-Ric as a common divisor. Sosa failed to comprehend the plausibility of banning personal service. No tribute had been paid by those Indians who had been freed from bondage; the Indians could only adequately satisfy their obligation of tribute to the crown by paying such personal

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51Ibid., II, 125.
52Ibid., II, 126.
53Ibid., II, 160.
He was disinclined to inconvenience the encomenderos, whom he hailed as preservers of the peace and bulwarks of society, by forcing them to suffer the consequences of such an abolition.

His judgment upon the innate nature of the natives was unchangeable in its concept that they were violent, fickle savages. This conviction formed the foundation of his argument that should the Araucanians be given such freedom as fostered by Padre Valdivia they would abuse the liberty by reverting to their savage pattern of life, menacing the Spaniards and repelling all development of civilization and conversion in Chile. Only through personal service could the Indian be taught obedience to the kingdom of Spain and fidelity to the Faith. He attributed the rebellion of the Indians not to the abusive treatment of the Spaniards, but to this stormy streak of savagery in the natives. When the sword had cut away these evil characteristics, then would the path be clear for the cross. Deploring the native immorality even among those who were already pacified and under rigid supervision, he saw no hope of instilling Christian ideals unless they were subjected to severe discipline. Focusing attention upon the failures of the Franciscans and the Mercedarians among the natives, he was extremely skeptical that another order could accomplish what these zealous friars failed to do. To disprove a claim of accomplishment he too utilized what

54 Ibid., II, 170.
55 Ibid., II, 171.
56 Ibid., II, 171.
57 Ibid., II, 172.
58 Ibid., II, 178-189.
59 Ibid., II, 192.
60 Ibid., II, 133.
61 Ibid., II, 136.
was becoming the classic instance for all those disapproving "guerra defensiva," namely, the martyrdoms of the Jesuits at the hands of Anganamon.

He suggested that these Indians who had been forced to the more mountainous regions due to the war be taken under the protective scabbard of the Spaniards for which defense they should pay only personal service in repartimientos divided among the Spaniards. To rid the land of the more bellicose Indians he favored their deportation perpetually to Peru. He didn't offer any helpful hints as to how these elusive aborigines were to be captured in order to deport them, however; he simply expressed the opinion that such a transplantation would effect a speedier submission of those who remained in Chile. Thus, stripped of all oratorical or rhetorical force, were the arguments of the opposition.

In defense of the official though much transgressed policy of "guerra defensiva," Sobrino stated that according to Christian ethics it was the only desireable or permissable method of pacification. He refused to admit that the means of slavery and the sword, though during many years both had proven ineffective in attaining spiritual or temporal gain, could justify the end of peace. Aside from the religious implications, he recalled that Valdivia, through his methods, established peace in the hitherto rebellious

62 Ibid., 137-138.
63 Ibid., II, 192.
64 Ibid., II, 193.
65 Ibid., II, 140-154.
Arauco, Tucapel, and Catiray. Previous to the martyrdoms remarkable progress had also been made in Ilicura and even Puren. He regretted that the one incident, the slaying of the Jesuits by one enraged toqui with a comparatively small following, should be interpreted as a universal uprising against which the Spaniards should have displayed such vigorous vindictiveness. Sobrino made no attempt to whitewash the defects in the character or morality of the Araucanians. These people he painted as they were, untutored aborigines, liberty loving and brutal when deprived of liberty, suspicious after years of warfare, anxious to revenge unfriendly entradas, quick to resent unjust castigation. Their superstition, their pride, their powers of retaliation, made them difficult to deal with; yet the same characteristics should have illustrated the futility of force as a method of pacification. As to their immorality, he said, while these natives possessed what to the Christian should seem shocking vices, they were not hopelessly degenerate, but rather ignorant. Valdivia, he related, had travelled extensively in the hostile land, accompanied most frequently by but a single soldier, reducing many natives to peace while persuading others to give the matter consideration. Sobrino, who had also labored among these Araucanians, had witnessed evidence sufficient to convince him of the plausibility, advisability, and practicability of "guerra defensiva", if given a long enough chance. One factor bearing upon the authority of the debaters lay in the point that Sosa, who had spoken so strongly concerning the nature of the natives, had personally resided but a brief while in Chile during which time he remained in Santiago among the Spaniards, rarely coming in contact with the Indian of the vicinity and never with those farther
removed, whereas Sobrino had lived among these tribes, depended upon them as guides and friends, and travelled far into their lands with Valdivia who possessed a richer fund of direct knowledge concerning the Araucanians than any or all of his opponents combined.

Impressed by the logic of Sobrino, the Council of Indies and the king found no sufficient motive to discontinue "guerra defensiva". Thus on November 21, 1615, Felipe III issued a cédula directing the continuance of the policy. Following this cédula, January 3, 1616, he sent a letter voicing his approval of Valdivia's efforts. On paper Valdivia had won his point. Yet Chile was a goodly distance from the king and Spain; the royal cédulas and sanctions were disregarded.

66 Astrain, V, 627.
67 Enrich, I, 317.
CHAPTER VI
SUCCESS AND DEFEAT

As has been indicated, the Jesuit martyrs found a vociferous, suspiciously eager avenger in every soldier who suddenly shaken by a sworn duty to revenge the deed by the subjugation or slaying of each guilty or innocent native. Preparedness for an Indian attack meant an aggressive military entrada upon the Indians. For example, Captain Blas Perez de Esquilbias, with seventy soldiers, arrived at Concepción to reinforce the city. The enemy had made no attack upon Concepción. Therefore he sent fifty cavalrmen to the enemy at Cayreguano; from the reductions of the friendly enemies his soldiers carried all they could discover by looting. Other attacks with or without provocation of the natives were indiscriminately inflicted. While Valdivia sent messages from Nacimiento urging peace with the Indians involved in rebellion, other attacks or entradas were encouraged by the governor. Padre Valdivia was helpless in preventing the unofficial resumption of offensive hostilities.

The governor had substituted Gerónimo de Pedraza in the command of maestre de campo Pedro Cortés, charging him also with the estado of Arauco since Albaro Muñoz had requested to retire. Similarly he surrounded himself with men of his selection who would comply with his

1 Rosales, II, 605.
2 Ibid., II, 607.
orders in other posts of authority. Again such attacks upon the natives added nothing to the Spanish record other than debts. Regardless of the injustices they received, many natives who had been reduced by Valdivia and his companions retained an allegiance to the Spaniards to the extent of engaging in battles against rebellious Indian tribes. Such was the case when Tureulipe, with a quadrilla of Indians from Puren, attacked the reduction of Neculguenu. A battle resulted in which even Indian women and children united against the toqui in order to verify their disapproval of Tureulipe's absolute refusal to tolerate any semblance of peace with the Spaniards. The allegiance of the pacified Indian, however, could not balance the loss of trust of the borderline natives who had been verging upon a peaceful arrangement but who had violently retreated from the consideration upon witnessing the governor's retraction by action of the promises he had given verbally.

Alonso de Ribera had contradicted the orders of the viceroy and the king by scoffing at the authority of Valdivia. He had made unfriendly excursions into enemy territory. He had prohibited Jesuits from entering the rebellious land, while he supervised further enslavement of the natives. In his infractions of the laws Ribera was given the warm support of the majority of Chilean Spaniards. With far less success Valdivia

3 Ibid., II, 604-605.
4 Ibid., II, 605-607.
5 Amunátegui Solar, Las Encomiendas, I, 389.
combatted the hostility of the Spanish opposition than that of the infidel Indian. Nor did this indignation apply only to Valdivia personally, but the Society was involved. Accusations supersaturated with calumny were hurled at the padres. Libel, regardless of public retractions, was ever falling upon ears anxious to believe. The interference of the Society in behalf of the natives had struck fear and anger in the hearts of the soldier and the encomendero who cried that matters such as labor should remain in the hands of the military and civil authorities while the padres should concern themselves only with religious matters. The primary aim of the Jesuits was to convert the natives. In order to accomplish this objective it was evident that certain evils had to be remedied. The prime evil was the abuses inflicted upon the Indian by the soldier in war and the encomendero on the hacienda. The Society could not condone these abuses. Since the term personal service euphemistically expressed a condition of servitude in its most despicable form, the padres sought to segregate the natives from the Spaniards. Since the padres were opposed to the system of personal service, they found themselves necessarily opposers of the encomenderos.

In January, 1617, Sobrino arrived in Lima, bearing dispatches of the king and Council which approved the continuance of "guerra defensiva". The recently appointed viceroy, Principe de Esquilache, was, as had been his predecessors, in accord with the instructions to carry on in the

6Enrich, I, : 277-278.
7Astrain, IV, 721-722.
attempts to establish peace through this system. Sobrino departed from Lima for Chile, where in March he delivered the dispatches to Valdivia. Among numerous complimentary notices, the king offered one mild admonishment to the padre, suggesting that he endeavor to effect through tact more harmonious relations with Ribera; this proved unnecessary since only a few days previous, on March 9, Ribera had doffed his mortal garb. On the 15th of March Valdivia had written the information of Ribera's death to the king. The governor, having died in Concepcion at the age of sixty, was reputed after his death to possess the virtues of prudence, affability, integrity, magnanimity, justice and mercifulness. The fact remains that during the last four years of his life Ribera had been the directing force behind the offensive war contrary to the commands of his superiors, displaying the characteristics so ascribed to him in surprisingly few instances.

Sobrino delivered other royal provisions. In essence these provided that: 1) the governor of Chile prosecute only defensive war; 2) Valdivia alone should interpret the definition of defensive warfare; 3) the padres should pacify the Indians; 4) the governor should at all times comply with the regulations of Valdivia in regard to the natives; 5) as many religious as Valdivia judges necessary were to enter the Araucanian territory; 6) missions should be established wherever Valdivia deemed wisest; 7) the viceroy of Peru should name a visitador general to inspect

8 Ibid., V, 623.
9 Rosales, II, 622-625.
11Astrain, V, 629.
the adherence given these regulations in Chile; 8) Spanish soldiers and
were to be banned from Araucanian territory; 3) all prisoners of war
agreeing to abide by the principles of "guerra defensiva" should be re-
leased; 10) all prisoners captured in the future should be held in cus-
tody with the object of exchanging them for Spanish captives. The vice-
roy had appointed the fiscal of the audiencia of Lima, Fernando Machado,
visitor to report the obedience given these commands.

Following the death of Ribera, the licentiate Fernando Talaverano
Gallegos, oidor of the royal audiencia of Santiago, was appointed governor.
Without delay he hastened to the frontier to review the situation. Dur-
ing May he inspected reductions, giving particular attention to the es-
tados of Arauco and Yumbel where he communicated directly with numerous
natives. Though formerly he displayed indications of a disapproval of
"guerra defensiva", he now evidenced his intention to give, without re-
servation, his full cooperation to Valdivia. With this attitude on the
part of Talaverano, and subsequently on the part of his successor, Valdi-
via once again picked up the gnarled threads of his former achievements.
With perseverance ballasted by hope he again sent messages throughout the
lands announcing the resumption of cordiality of the new governor and re-
peating the often uttered desire for peace. To substantiate these mes-
sages Valdivia declared free all those Indians who had been held in capti-
vity during "Ribera's War". He himself liberated thirty important na-

12Ibid., V, 638; Amunátegui Solar, Las Encomiendas, I, 389-390.
13Astrain, V, 629; Rosales, II, 621.
14Ibid., II, 619.
tives of Arauco who had been unjustly attacked. Concurrently, prisoners were freed from the fort of Lebo while visitador Machado liberated the prisoners held in Concepción.

Pelantara carried Valdivia's message to the toquis of Puren, one they had heard before, but which had been counteracted by the assaults of Ribera. Jubilantly the padre received replies indicative of a willingness on the part of the natives to renew peace negotiations. Toquis from the cordilleras visited him at Nacimiento revealing that despite the unpleasantness that had intervened, they still retained a confidence in his kind of peace. The recent Spanish raids resulted in a doubly strong insistence of these natives upon the exclusion of all Spaniards, save the padres whom they requested, from their lands.

Quite naturally many failed to see where the "mercy" of the king lay when in reality they were recognized to possess land which they had proven could not be taken from them. On the frontier of Arauco and similarly on that of Yumbel thousands of infidel Indians received the sacrament of Baptism. Christian marriages were contracted. Instruction in the Faith was avidly sought. The zeal of the padres was bearing bountiful fruit.

Twelve caciques sought Valdivia in Santa Fé to deliver the message

15 Ibid., II, 625.
16 Ibid., II, 625.
17 Ibid., II, 627.
18 Ibid., II, 628. Padre Valdivia remained in Nacimiento for several months.
19 Ibid., II, 629.
that in Puren and the neighboring territory the majority of toquis and natives, contrary to Tureulipe and Anganamon, were anxious to discuss terms of peace with the padre. At a large council held on the site of Lleolleo, October 5, caciques and toquis of the provinces of Ayllareguas or Puren had reached the decision to secure peace based upon the suggestions of Valdivia. Thus they had been sent not only as messengers but to act as plenipotentiaries who could negotiate a peace with Valdivia and the governor Talaverano.

Delighted with their message, Valdivia promised in the name of the king that there would be no transgression of the soldiers or civilians within their territory; reciprocally, they were to respect the Spanish lands. To prevent possible difficulty and still permit a degree of commercial activity the natives were to limit their trade route to a certain path to Nacimiento and were to enter only when they possessed a license issued by the captain of the fort. Further arrangements provided for the return of the wives and children of the Spaniards and an exchange of prisoners of war; a non-interference pact was agreed upon whereby neither Spaniard nor Indian was to interfere in the internal disagreements of the other.

Valdivia was ever on the alert to improve conditions within the

20 Ibid., II, 631.
21 Ibid., II, 632.
22 Ibid., II, 633.
23 Ibid., II, 633.
ranks of the natives. He organized a patrol of the finest Indian warriors to prevent the native highwaymen from entering Spanish land and to serve as a guard within their own borders. Especially serviceable were these squads in Puren. The natives gave enthusiastic support to this innovation. They had cooperated very little with the erstwhile toquis Anganamon and Tureulipe; now they were willing to organize to rid their territory of the harm wrought by these members of their tribe. Even the toquis of Pellagien where Anganamon had previously managed to solicit followers denounced him, following Pelantara instead in search of peace. They consulted the padre to determine the most suitable punishment that should be pronounced against Anganamon who had rebelled not only against the Span-

24 Ibid., II, 633-634.
25 Upon apprehending seven Indians who had come within Spanish territory to steal, an inquiry was held in which Padre Valdivia, the maestre de campo Alvaro Nunez de Pineda and Captain Alonso de Umana, who were in the fort of Nacimiento, investigated. The Indians said they had been among a group of fifty-eight who had come to steal horses, but that the others had retreated. They said further that they had been sent by Anganamon who worked without the knowledge or accord of the other toquis. They accounted for this change in Anganamon's stand from that of a toquis to that of a highwayman to the antagonism both he and Tureulipe bore towards Pelantara and the other toquis who desired peace. Unable to receive any cooperation against the Spaniards in Puren, these two rebels turned to the toquis of Imperial and again were refused. They were able in all to recruit only fifty-eight to carry out their threat to become foresteros. Ibid., II, 634-635.
yards but against all the toquis of the vicinity when they had expressed a desire for peace. Valdivia was far less harsh in his judgment than were Anganamon's former companions. In a message sent with an Indian named Inaullanco whom he had freed from prison and whom the padre was aware could seek out Anganamon, he pardoned the toqui for all his misdeeds, citing in particular the murder of the Jesuits. Thus did he hope to convince Anganamon of the existence of the Christian virtue of charity. Amazed at such clemency, the other toquis viewed this act not as one of laxity in justice, but understood its significance as a Christian symbol of forgiveness which they witnessed for the first time. Anganamon could not disband his fear of punishment for his crime. He could not believe that this message was anything but a hoax in order to seize him for retaliation.

In January, 1618, the viceroy chose as successor to Ribera, Don Lope de Ulloa y Lemos, a cabellero from Galicia noted for his adherence to Christian principles. Arriving at Concepción January 14, 1618, the new governor, accompanied by his servants and his wife, Doña Francisca de la Coba, hastened to the frontier to declare his intention of cooperating with Valdivia as had Talaverano. Having banished apprehension on this score, he retired to Santiago to be received as president of the

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26 Ibid., II, 636-637.
27 Amunátegui Solar, Las Encomiendas, I, 393.
28 Rosales, II, 638.
audiencia. Returning to Concepción he concentrated his attention upon the frontier problem, volunteering every assistance to Valdivia. Only once did the governor violate the agreement to refrain from trespassing upon Indian territory; in that instance it was to punish ladrones led by Turiculipe. Under the instructions of Valdivia the governor depopulated the fort of San Gerónimo, retiring the company that had been established there to Yumbel. He settled the torren of San Ignacio, congregating there Indians of Cayuguanu that they might be protected by Spanish arms. Defensive forts were established in Talcamavida while those along the cordillera from San Lupercia and Santa Elena were depopulated. Valdivia

29 The governor later received an admonition from the king because he had received the oidores without the formalities that, according to the custom of the day, were essential to the conduct of an official affair. Ibid., II, 639.

30 During the rainy season at the beginning of the winter in 1618, when the Spaniards were less vigilant, other ladrones entering the land of war travelled to the reduction of Colcura where they captured the cacique Cupil and his family. When the kidnapping of this loyal friend of the Spaniards was discovered, the governor took up residence in a fort called San Bartolomé de Ulloa at the foot of the hill of Villafragran around which congregated the Indians of Colcura so that all would be in preparedness should another such indignity be attempted. Other captains established themselves similarly in frontier forts. When the ladrones entered the friendly territory of Conilebo, near the fort of Negrete across the Biobio carrying away twenty women and children and killing one native, Sergeant Mayor Gimenez de Lorca entered in pursuit with eight cavalrymen, reaching Paillaguen where he knew the leader of the ladrones, none other than Turiculipe and the toqui Naguelpichon, would flee. Here a battle was fought in which the ladrones paid heavily for their attack. The Spaniards withdrew immediately after their victory. Ibid., II, 639-640.

31 Ibid., II, 640.
once more was rapidly achieving success, overcoming the enormous disadvantages caused by the devastation of the belligerency of Ribera.

The new governor did not acquire any popularity in his efforts to comply with the instructions of the viceroy. His attempt to enforce the substitution of tribute in lieu of personal service, so infuriated the encomenderos that in a letter dated May 20, 1618, Ulloa wrote that he did not have eight friends in the entire territory of Chile.

The cabildo of Santiago, composed mainly of encomenderos, resorted to active measures to renounce the abolition of personal service. On April 23, 1618, the licentiate Toro Mazote, the alcaldes ordinarios, and the procurador general of the city, Don Francisco Rodriguez de Manzano y Ovalle, approached the governor citing the cumbersome difficulties involved in complying with such an abolition. Unsuccessful in moving the governor by arguments that had been expounded and refuted since Valdivia first introduced his system, the cabildo determined to report to the king the miserable failure of "guerra defensiva". After dispatching regidor Juan de Ulgalde to the frontier to substantiate their tales of failure, they were disappointed to learn of the notable progress that was being achieved from Chillan to Concepción. They were forced to alter their mode of attack. In the latter part of August a cabildo abierto was arranged.

32 Barros Arana, Historia, IV, 138-139.
34 Amunátegui Solar, Las Encomiendas, I, 396.
35 Ibid., I, 396; Astrain, V, 630.
In this cabildo a decision to organize thoroughly against the abolition of personal service was enacted. During a following session the motion was adopted to communicate with all the corregidores of the bishopric of Santiago in order to swell the already impressive list of official objectors.

September 7, 1613, the cabildo designated don Pedro Lisperguer y Flores as procurator-general of Santiago. A month later Lisperguer departed from Chile to spread the cry against the system fostered by Valdivia. The cabildo of Santiago raged against the so-called Tasa de Esquilache, which provided that pecuniary payment be substituted for personal service. Undoubtedly such a substitution would prove unwieldy and perhaps unworkable for a considerable time. The natives had paid tribute to their own toquis only in times of great stress; they had never been required to contribute in the form of regular taxation, and would in all probability prove negligent and incompetent in the matter. Still the difficulty involved in enforcing the Tasa could not condone a reversion to personal service or slavery as it existed in Chile, regardless of what remuneration it offered to the encomenderos. As a matter of finance, however, personal service provided no profit for the royal treasury, but wrought a definite loss. Subjected to the bondage of personal service the

36 Actas del Cabildos de Santiago, Coleccion Historiadores, XXVIII, 74.
37 Amunategui Solar t.r, Las Encomiendas, I, 396.
38 Ibid., I, 398-3999.99.
Indians ran the gamut from dissatisfaction to bloody rebellion. Costly were such insurrections both in lives and cash. Therefore it seemed wiser to forego the attempt to profit by taxation of the natives, and be spared the expenditure of warfare. Similarly while the war was rampant, commerce could not thrive nor could Chilean industry. The regal coffers were far less important to the encomendero than his own personal and immediate fear of a possible disorganization of his hacienda should he be forced to seek voluntary labor. Aware of the organized enmity of the cabildo of Santiago Valdivia bluntly denounced its activities. The immediate reaction to this was the charge that Valdivia was attempting to take Chile completely under control.

Perhaps the most crushing of all personal opposition to Padre Valdivia was that of the members of his own Society. The opposition was directed towards the authoritative position retained by the padre in Chile which, they believed, involved him unnecessarily in the military and the political aspects of administration. Valdivia had no Jesuit superior in the Americas and, in the order, was accountable only to the Father General. This lack of local Jesuit supervision over the padre caused him to suffer severe criticism. Many padres of Peru, Paraguay and Chile were voicing their opinions that such exclusion from the usual system of subdelegation of authority was no longer essential. Valdivia, ceaseless in his acti-

39 Actas del Cabildo de Santiago, Colección de Historiadores, XXV, 356-357; Medina, Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena, II, 220.
40 Astrain, V, 630-631.
vities on behalf of the Araucanians, had accumulated a harvest of animosity among the Spaniards of Chile. Though he had labored splendidly blazing a spiritual path among the natives, his work could be carried on by other zealous Black Robes. At this juncture Valdivia's very presence in Chile was thought by some Jesuits to serve only as further aggravation of the Spaniards towards the Society. Among those who saw no necessity of such jurisdiction as Valdivia possessed was the successor of Aquaviva in the generalate, Mutius Vitelleschi. In a letter dated April 30, 1619, Vitelleschi placed Valdivia under the supervision of the provincial of Paraguay. In the conferences and difficulties arising over this technicality Valdivia was bound by the vow of obedience to abide by the decision of his superior.

In March, 1619, Valdivia proposed to go to Spain in order to report his progress to the king. He was refused permission by Vitelleschi to make this voyage.

Again it has been necessary to describe concurrent events in order to present a complete picture. While isolated for the purpose of clarification they must be correlated to understand the situation. At the moment Valdivia was enjoying increased success among the natives in their own territory. The Bío-Bío border was respected by the governor, Ulloa.

41 Ibid., V, 631.
42 Ibid., V, 636-637.
43 Ibid., V, 637.
It was north of the Bio-Bio that "guerra defensiva" was defeated. The abolition of personal service - one of the primary requisites of the system - was impeded at every turn by the encomenderos and the soldiers. As long as slavery of the native was continued, there would be lack of spiritual development among those enslaved. Attempts of the soldiers to further corral the human cattle through unfriendly and unofficial entradas was a constant aggravation to the natives. Efforts to segregate the Indians from Spanish exploitation even brought upon the Jesuits the accusation that they were merely trying to dissemble their own attempts at exclusive exploitation of the natives. Perhaps the presence of Valdivia - a personage so militantly associated with the defense of the natives through his labors among them and his well-publicised crusades in their behalf - served as additional fuel to the fire of antipathy that was being kindled towards the Jesuits. Believing this to be true, a growing number of padres thought it wisest to transfer the reins of control to less obtrusive hands in order to banish unnecessary aggravation. To resolve all these elements into their unhappy climax, Valdivia was confronted with another enemy he had battled before - his own discouragement. After unpleasant encounters with his superior, the provincial of Paraguay, Pedro de Oñate, Valdivia sailed for Lima in November of 1619, never to return to Chile and his Araucanians.

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44 Roseales, Historia General del Reino de Chile, II, 619.
CHAPTER VII
THE AFTERMATH

In a letter to the king written November 3, 1619, Valdivia excused his departure with the complaint that after his many years of labor among the Indians he had withstood tremendous opposition bitterly flavored with mendacious testimony against his character; now he could bear no further insult. In Lima, where he remained about five months, he poured out his grief to Padre Fírias Herrán, who soon afterwards became the Provincial of Peru, and to the viceroy, Príncipe de Esquilache. Both these friends sympathetically harkened to his woe and strove to console him. While in Peru Valdivia committed a grievous act of insubordination by giving vent to his indignation in two letters written to the Provincial, Oñate, in which he reflected seriously upon the judgment of his superior.

1 Medina, Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena, 1, 187.
2 Astrain, V, 640-641.
3 Ibid., V, 696-704. In these letters of April 20, 1620 and April 30, 1620 Valdivia referred to the desire of the viceroy to have him return to Chile, but that he would never return since he had been so grievously offended. Astrain brings out the fact that Padre Oñate had undertaken an investigation of Valdivia due to the constant mutterings hurled against the padre. Such an investigation degenerated into a third degree which the padre resented. Oñate was able to find no verification for the calumnious attacks but his attitude was still suspicious. Ibid., V, 637-639. With the final dramatic flourish one of the letters closed with a statement directed to the General, who the writer felt certain would receive the acrimonious notes, requesting forgiveness of Oñate's injustices. In these letters are the evidences of Valdivia's essential human imperfection. He had been accused and found guiltless of numerous more wanton frailties. These letters, however, betray his tendency to lack humility. He had experienced little restrictions for seven years in Chile where he had proved himself capable as prudent administrator. Still he should have accepted the supervision assigned over him by his General without these protestations.
Departing from Lima in the middle of 1620, Valdivia disembarked upon the Islas Terceras in the latter part of September, from which place he sent word of his arrival to Vitelleschi. Again when he landed at Cadiz he dispatched a message to the other General, who answered in a letter that clearly indicated that he did not choose to have Valdivia at the Spanish Court.

A prohibition upon Valdivia's conferring with the king would be difficult to require in the light of the padre's civil obligations and the interest of the king in the Chilean situation. Not only did Valdivia have an audience with the king, but he discussed the affair before the Council. On March 31, 1621, Felipe IV succeeded Felipe III; the former retained the identical court of his predecessor, continuing also the hospitality which Valdivia was offered. Vitelleschi became doubly anxious to remove the padre from the environment of the Court. In reply to the king's request to have Valdivia remain in Court, Vitelleschi stated that he felt Valdivia could best serve his God and his king outside of Madrid. With little more ado Valdivia was sent to the college of Valladolid, August 30, 1621. Realizing the imprudence of the letters he had written

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4Ibid., V, 642-643.
5Ibid., V, 643. There is no documentary evidence to substantiate the statement that Padre Valdivia was offered a place in the Council of Indies as is indicated by Ovalle, Colección Historiadores, XIII, 142.
6Astrain, V, 644.
7Ibid., V, 645.
8Ibid., V, 646.
to Oñate, Valdivia sought to rectify some portion of the insult by penning an apology to the Provincial of Paraguay. Vitelleschi was extremely gratified at this voluntary display of humility. On October 31, 1622 he wrote to Valdivia to comfort him and assure him that the charges and subsequent investigations endured by him in no way impaired his reputation in the Society. Valdivia was named prefect of studies at the college of Valladolid; he was received with great consideration by the provincial of Castile. For twenty years he conscientiously discharged his duties at Valladolid.

Valdivia heard the official pronouncements of the failure of "guerra defensiva". He knew of the continued slaveholding and slave-trading policy of the encomenderos and soldiers. He saw the triumph of the enemies of defensive as posed to offensive Indian war in Chile. His death, November 5, 1642, closed the sequel of his existence; his departure from Chile twenty-three years previously closed the chapter of his life among the Araucanians.

Upon his departure from Chile Valdivia had extracted the promise of Governor Ulloa y Lemos to continue his efforts to prosecute "guerra defensiva". Nevertheless additional partidos were being created with the consequent additional allotment of natives. Governor Ulloa y Lemos left no evidence of achievement in this regard when he ceased mortal pursuits in December, 1620. And the new governor, interno, Cristobal

9 Ibid., V, 642.
10 Ibid., V, 646; Domingo Amunátegui y Solar, Jesuitas, Gobernantes, Militares y Escritores, Santiago, 1934, 33.
11 Barros Arana, Historia, IV, 142; 12 Amunátegui Solar, Las Encomiendas, I, 405-408.
13 Barros Arana, IV, 139, 143.
de la Cerda, an oidor of the Audiencia, lost no time in awarding a number of partidos to those whom he deemed worthy corregidores.

The Tasa de Esquilache was a typical failure. This plan to ban obligatory service requiring in substitution a monetary tribute was formulated by the viceroy Príncipe de Esquilache under the guidance of Father Valdivia. It was submitted to the king March 28, 1620; on the 8th of December, 1622, it received royal recognition. The purpose of the Tasa was to free the natives of all expense that was necessary to maintain defensive garrisons for their own protection. Like all other efforts to sever the bonds of Indian slavery, this also met with the impenetrable opposition of the encomenderos. The octogenarian successor of Ulloa y Lemos, Pedro Osores de Ulloa, had been delegated to represent the undesirable limitations of the Tasa to the Council and king. Based upon the lack of probable native cooperation, coupled with inevitable discomfort or ruination of the interests of the encomenderos, the bulwark of society, the arguments of Osores de Ulloa carried weight. He was in theoretical accord with the plan of Valdivia, though he was convinced of the impossibility.

14 Actas del Cabildo de Santiago, Colección de Historiadores, XXV, 411-415, 429.
17 Ibid., I, 443-445.
bility of its practical application. With the proposal to reform the abuses existant in the contemporary infliction of personal service, he received the approval of numerous influential ecclesiastics of Spain. The tasa de Esquilache sank into the oblivion of defeat where it joined previous reform movements. Similarly doomed were future periodic attempts at legislative curbs of the encomendero who continued to enjoy the profits of exploitation.

The last ember of Valdivia's achievements was stamped out on January 24, 1626. On that date the royal cedula of Felipe IV was publicly proclaimed by Luis Fernandez de Cordova declaring the official abolition of the policy of "guerra defensiva". Not even legalities, ineffective though they had proven in restriction, were to impede the carnage of the Spanish soldiers and the abuses of the encomenderos.

Instantly the Spanish sword struck with vain hopes of effecting submission only to learn that the Araucanians who had come with the branches of cinnamon tree were still able to wield the macana with dexterity. The laurel wreath was not to be hung upon the scabbard of the Spaniard even after two centuries of bloody combat, for cessation of hostilities was effected only the latter part of the eighteenth century by a pact recognizing the Araucanians as an independent nation.

The defeat of "guerra defensiva" was a defeat socially, economically, and religiously of Spanish progress in Chile. Continual warfare resulted in...
in a developed sense of insecurity detrimental to colonial morale. The periodic successes quickly countered by defeats took their toll on the spirit of the inhabitants and the soldiers who, regardless of their profiteering, were discouraged at the lack of accomplishment. The predominance of the military uniform overshadowed that of the clerical garb or the civilian apparel; it is difficult to state when or if this predominance has subsided.

Remunerative though the slave trade proved to the soldier, his salary was not always as satisfactory. The maintenance of the enormous standing army was an almost unbearable expense. Frequent delays in recompensing the mercenary military was certain to evidence itself in discontent, disobedience, and desertion. Equally alarming to the encomendero was the number of epidemics and the increasing number of deserters among his slaves. Those economic ills predicted by Padre Valdivia had attacked Chile with full force.

Similarly did the spiritual or religious disadvantages foreseen by the padre materialize. The padres did manage to segregate many of the natives by establishing their own haciendas where the natives worked bound by the servitude of love for the padres and the spirit of brotherhood established by them.

The animosity evidenced towards the Jesuits during Valdivia's crusade for "guerra defensiva" was not to decrease but rather was nourished to an inordinate state of obesity by the padres' progress among the natives. This animosity was to become one of the factors influential in the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767.

24 Ibid., I, 458.
CRITICAL ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES

Of necessity the sources of information have been limited to the documentary evidence which has been published either in collections of edited manuscripts or in the volumes of secondary works. Doubtless there would be an appreciable intellectual gratification had the writer been able to burrow among the manuscripts of the Biblioteca Nacional in Santiago, Chile, or that of Madrid where the Archivo Historico Nacional would lend itself admirably to the investigation. The Jesuit archives of Rome would prove particularly illuminating. Despite this wishful travelling, the investigation has been conducted entirely within the confines of the Ayer Collection of Newberry Library in Chicago.

After mining through an incredibly extensive mass of the irrelevant, the desired documentary evidence has been extracted. While not infrequently found in collections of published documents, a great deal of pertinent primary evidence has been found in secondary sources. Therein lies the value of such works, which have been used not for their generalities or comments, but for their incorporation of helpful documents.

Photostat reproductions of certain extremely important writings of Padre Valdivia have been made by the Massachusetts Historical Society. In his analytical method of presentation, in his clearly defined and amply illustrated explanations devoid of philosophical filigree, Valdivia was not a child of his time, for the majority of his contemporaries were prone to dissemble their historical contributions with overabundant oration. These particular photostats cover the activities of Valdivia during his most criti-
cultural years. They clearly outline what Valdivia intended to do as well as his actual experiences. These are found under the titles:

Copia de una carta del padre Luis de Valdivia para el señor Conde de Lemos, presidente de Indias, January 4, 1607.

Relación de lo que sucedió en la jornada que hizimos el señor Presidente Alonso de Ribera Gobernador del Reino, y yo desde Arauco a Paycaui, a concluir las pazes de Micura, ultima regua de Tucapel y las de Pueren y la Imperial, December 24, 1612.

Relación de lo que sucedió en el Reino de Chile después a el Padre Luis de Valdivia, de la Compañía de Jesús entre en el con fus ocho companeros Sacerdotes de la misma Compañía, December, 1612.

Relación de la muerte de los padres escrita por el Padre Valdivia a 24 de Diciembre de mil sesientos y doce al padre Provincial de Lima, December, 1612.

Tratado de la importancia del medio, que el virrey propone de cortar la guerra de Chile, y hacerla solamente defensiva, Madrid, 1610 or 1611.

Of interest while not of comparable value to this investigation are the sermons of Valdivia which he composed and committed to memory since he found them most effective in teaching the natives. These have been edited by José Toribio Medina, Luis de Valdivia, Nueve Sermones en Lengua de Chile, Santiago, 1612.

Rodolfo R. Schuller has produced a work of interest in regard to the linguistic achievements of Valdivia: Discovery of a Fragment of the Printed Copy of the Work on the Millcayuc Language by Luis de Valdivia, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1913.

Certain collections of documents have served a purpose in this study. In the edition of Ricardo Beltrán y Rozpide, ed., Colección Acerca del Estado que Dejaban las Cosas Generales del Reino, Madrid, 1921, I, a collection made in compliance with a royal order, are found the memorials of D. Francisco de Toledo, of the Marqués de Salinas, of the Marqués de Montesclaros,
and of the Príncipe de Esquilache each of whom gives a general summary of the state of the viceroyalty at the end of his term. Claudio Gay, Historia Física y Política de Chile según Documentos Adquiridos en esta República Durante Doce Años de Residencia en ella y Publicada Bajo los Auspicios del Supremo Gobierno, Santiago, Chile, 1894, has in volumes I and II published documents which have been helpful. From the Archivo de Indias, Roberto Levillier has published Gobernantes del Perú, Cartas y Papeles. Siglo XVI, Madrid, 1621-1635, of which the last two volumes cover from 1588 to 1600 and thus are of interest since they relate to the viceroys Hurtado de Mendoza and Conde de Velasco who figure in the early endeavors of the Jesuits. One of the most helpful sources for this study of colonial Chile is the compilation of José Toribio Medina, ed., Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena (1523-1817), Santiago, Chile, 1897. The first two of the three volumes provides an abundant wealth of official correspondence between Valdivia and his opponents with the king and the Council. This has been one of the indispensable sources for this particular study. Volume I of Pablo Pastells, S.J., Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la Provincia del Paraguay (Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Perú, Bolivia, Chile, and Brazil) Segun los Documentos Originales del Archivo General de Indias, Madrid, 1612, has been useful in presenting extractions of documents wherein the activities of Valdivia were concerned; it has served more as an index for references than as a reference in itself.

The ever useful Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias, Madrid, 1775, which has codified the laws compiled during Spanish colonial times, spares the historian much confusion since it has summarized and indexed all the
cedulas and regulations issued by Spain in regard to her colonies. This work was begun during the final years of the reign of Charles V.

Forming an essential and basic source of information is the compilation made by Diego Barras Arana, ed., Colección de Historiadores de Chile y Documentos Relativos a la Historia Nacional, Santiago, 1881-1923. A summary of this collection is difficult to make since each volume merits distinct criticism. In general, however, it may be said that this collection contains the most pertinent narratives of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as well as the proceedings of the cabildo of Santiago which have been compiled by Medina in his Colección de Documentos Inéditos Para la Historia de Chile Desde el Viaje de Magallanes Hasta la Batalla de Maipo (1518-1818), Santiago, 1888-1902, 30 volumes. This latter work is put into the "also read" class for except for the occasional supplementation it affords to the collection of Barros Arana, it is unnecessary.

The following is an index to the Colección de Historiadores:

Volume I - The five letters of Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V and the acts of the cabildo of Santiago from 1541 to 1558. It is interesting to note that even in these first letters of Pedro de Valdivia are the fore-shadowings of the future difficulties with the Araucanians. The acts of the cabildo reveal the division of the natives on a wholesale scale.

Volume II - Historia de Gongora Marmolejo, Documentos (1536-1575)
This soldier, Alonso de Gongora Marmolejo, had witnessed the activities of the conquistadores from the time of Pedro de Valdivia to that of Rodrigo de Quiroga. The work deals with the military concerns though eyed extremely dispassionately, adhering to an account of facts rather than seeking literary appeal. Ericilla used this work as a source, though, as will be given further attention, Ericilla added a touch of his imagination.

Historia de Cordoba y Figueroa (1492-1717)
Again the military aspect of Chilean development is stressed by the maestre de campo don Pedro de Cordoba y Figueroa, whose ancestors fought in the ranks of Pedro de Valdivia. The author tends to degenerate into the ora-
ical when the historical is either unknown or disliked by him.

Volume III - Cautiverio Feliz del Maestre de Campo Jeneral Don Francisco Nuñez de Pineda y Bascuñan y Razon Individual de Las Guerras Delatadas del Reino de Chile

The primary value of this work lies in the ability of the author to reduce his experience as a captive of the Araucanians to a study of the native in his own environment. Taken a prisoner of war by the revolted natives in May, 1629, he was held in "happy captivity" until the following November. Ploughing through what was either intended to be literary style or philosophical dissertation, a valuable byproduct of information is rendered. The author gives a detailed description of the habits of the natives, of their organization, their reactions to the abuses of the Spaniards, sympathizing with their attitude.

Volume IV - Miguel de Olivares, S.J., Historia Militar, Civil y Sagrada de Chile, part 1.

Olivares, a native of Chile, was engaged in missionary work in his own land. His innate ability and his scholarly use of the materials available to him in the Jesuit archives have combined to produce a work which is an essential reference in the history of Chile in the eighteenth century.

Luis Tribaldos de Toledo, Vista Jeneral de las Continuadas Guerras Dificil Conquista del Gran Reino, Provincias de Chile.

Toledo became the official chronicler upon the death of Herrera in 1625. He failed to achieve the historical eminence achieved by his predecessor. Toledo died in 1634 before he had completed more than a sketch of his assignment wherein he gave attention to the early success of the Jesuit pacification of the Chilean natives. Not until the eighteenth century was his manuscript brought to light; then it was through Don Juan Bautista Munoz, commissioned by Charles III to write a history of the New World, that the manuscript was discovered.

Volume V - Suarez de Figueroa, Hechos de Don Garcia Hurtado de Mendoza, Cuarto Marqués de Cañete.

This work is more of a treatise in defense of every action of Don Garcia, written by a resident of Italy who felt bound to defend the name and honor of the Mendozas.

Francisco Caro de Torres, Hechos de Don Alonso de Sotomayor.

This is little more than a calendar of battles.

Santiago Tesillo, Guerras de Chile, Causas de su Duracion y Medios para su Fin.

This work, written towards the middle of the seventeenth century, covers a decade beginning with 1629. Its interest rests largely upon its illustration of the lack of progress attained by the Spaniards against the natives.
Volume VI - Don Pedro Marino de Lovera, Crónica del Reino de Chile.
The soldier Lovera had witnessed the activities of conquistadores from Mexico to Chile. His narrative deals largely with the military expeditions of the sixteenth century. After his death the viceroy, Don García Hurtado de Mendoza, interested in utilizing the record of the soldier, placed it in the hands of Bartolome de Escobar, S.J., for amplification, not adverse to having his own governorship given eulogic consideration. The padre continued the work, not revising it in any way but merely adding to it some factual material and abundant verbal laurel wreaths as requested.

Volume VII - Miguel de Olivares, S.J., Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en Chile.
Olivares (see Volume IV) described the development of Jesuit activity from 1593 to 1736, making use of the sources so available to him. This work has been used as a source by all writers on the period since his time.

Volume VIII - Don Vicente Carvallo i Goyeneche, Descripción Histórica, Geográfica del Reino de Chile.
The author was engaged for a great part of his life in military service in the Spanish army. His first book treats the history of Chile from the entrance of the Spaniards to 1627. His appreciation of the work of the Jesuits among the Indians is always apparent. An appreciable amount of research substantiates his narrative.

Volume IX -
This is a continuation of volume VIII in which the author deals with the period from 1627 to 1789. He was extremely incensed concerning the suppression of the Jesuits.

Volume X -
Carvallo i Goyeneche's history is continued. This section of his work gives detailed descriptions of the various provinces as to the natural resources and the local tribes.

Joaquin de Villarreal, Informe Hacho al Rei Nuesto Señor don Fernando el VI sobre Contener i Reducir a la Debida Obediencia los Indios del Reino Chile.
This work serves as an epilogue to the many futile attempts at pacification by its intensification upon the "duties" which the natives did not respect with regard to their service to the king.

Don Cosme Bueno, Descripción de las Provincias de los Obispados de Santiago i Concepción.
The author, the official cosmografo mayor of the viceroyalty of Peru, wrote this cartographical sketch of the bishoprics.
Volume XI - Santiago de Tesillo, Restauracion del Estado de Arauco.
This description depicts the revolt of 1629; it may be considered a descrip­tion of any of the numerous aftermaths of revolts in colonial Chile.

Fray Juan de Jesus Maria, Memorias del Reyno de Chile i de don Francisco Meneses.
Here are only a few sketchy and almost worthless remarks concerning the conquest of Chile.

Jose Basilio de Rojas, Apuntes Hasta el Año 1672.
Written at the request of the Court, this work is precise in stating in sum­mary the important events in Chile from the first attempt at conquest to 1672.

Juan Ignacio Molina, S.J., Compendio de la Historia Geografica Natural y Civil del Reino de Chile.
This digest of Molina's work is not as satisfactory as the English transla­tion made by William Haley and H. Boyd, London, 1909. Molina was among the fathers expelled from Chile in 1767. Returning to Italy he wrote his work in Italian. While he used some original manuscripts, a great deal of his narration is based upon Olivares. His particular motive in writing this book was to intensify upon the good accomplished by his Society and the in­justice of the suppression. It was widely circulated throughout Europe.

Volume XIII - Alonso de Ovalle, S.J., Historica Relacion del Reino de Chile.
Ovalle, born of a captain general in Santiago, entered the Society in 1625, worked among the natives until 1640 when he was entrusted with the charge of procurador of the province of Chile in Rome. Arriving in Madrid in 1642, shortly before the death of Valdivia whom he visited in Valladolid, he presented a brief relation to the king. It was this work that he amplified shortly afterwards during his stay at Rome. In writing this relation Ovalle depended too strongly upon his excellent but humanly imperfect mem­ory. Thus it has errors in several trivial instances. While the purpose of this work was to present the causes for general failure south of the Bio­Bio, the prime importance of the work lies in the fact that it was the first general history of Chile to be published up to 1646.

Volume XIII -
This is a continuation of Volume XII.

Volume XIV - Felipe Gomez de Vidaurre, S.J., Historia Geografica, Natural y Civil del Reino de Chile.
Vidaurre, born of a presidio family, entered the Society in 1751. For twelve years he remained in Valdivia. The rest of his life he spent in Lima. His work is brief and at best may be considered only a compendium of the previous works of the Jesuits in relation to Chile.
Volume XV -
This second part of Vidaurre's work deals with the civil and military history of Chile to the middle of the eighteenth century.

Volume XVI - Alonso Gonzalez de Najera, Desenfreno y Reparo de la Guerra de Chile.
This narrative is interesting to the investigation since its author, a contemporary of Valdivia, was opposed to guerra defensiva on all scores. In these five relations he evidences all the characteristic arguments on behalf of offensive warfare. A soldier in Flanders, France, and Italy for over thirty years, he fought finally against the Araucanian. As first sergeant under Ribera he was encouraged by him to record the military successes and the futility of pacific measures of subduing the natives. With the ensuing difficulties encountered by Ribera in 1614 his former sergeant began to write in Italy on behalf of guerra offensiva and personal service.

Volumes XVII to XXI - Actas del Cabildo de Santiago.

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Volume XXII - Don Jose Perez Garcia, Historia de Chile, Book I.
The author, a military man who had known forty years of active service, manifests a marked inaptitude as a historian though he made laudable efforts to utilize authorities such as Olivares, Ovalle, and Figueroa. The first book deals with the evolving of the cabildo of Santiago and with the physical features of the Chilean provinces. The civil history is taken to the governorship of Pedro de Villagra.

Volume XXIII -
The second book of Don Jose Perez Garcia narrates the civil events from the rule of Pedro de Villagra through the rule of the governor interno Luis Munoz de Guzman.

Volume XXVI - Miguel de Olivares, S.J., Historia Militar, Civil y Sagrada de Chile, Book II. (See Volume IV)

Juan Ignacio Molina, S.J., Compendio de la Historica Civil del Reino de Chile, Book II. (See Volume XI)

Volume XXVII - Capitan Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo y Valdez, Historia General
The first official chronicler of the New World carried his history only through the journey of Amalgro.

Agustín de Zárate, *Historia del Descubrimiento y Conquista de la Provincia del Perú, y de las Guerras y Cosas Señaladas* en ella Acaecidos Hasta el Vencimiento de Gonzal Pizarro y sus Secucuases, que en ella se Rebelaron contra su Majestad.

Only the section dealing with the Amalgro expedition is given here, touching upon the abuses of the Indians.

Francisco López de Gomara, *Hispania Victrix*.

The first and second part of the general history of the Indies by the official chronicler mentions the journey of Amalgro.

Volume XXIX: Relaciones de Chile Sacadas de los Antiguos Cronistas de Indias y Otros Autores

Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola, *Conquista de las Islas Malucas* (fragmentary).

This sketch, printed for the first time in 1609 at Madrid, describes the voyage of Magellan to the stretch which was named after him.

Gabriel de Villalobos, *Grandezas de Indias ó Estado Eclesiástico, Político y Militar de América*.

This work touches briefly upon the activities of Valdivia when it expresses vague disapproval.

Fray Gil González Dávila, *Teatro Eclesiástico de la Primitiva Iglesia de las Indias Occidentales*.

Dávila, a Dominican, published his work in the middle of the seventeenth century. The chapters included here bear upon the succession of bishops in Concepción and Santiago from 1662 to 1655.

Pedro Fernández del Pulgar, *Historia del Origen de la América ó Indias Occidentales*.

Written by the cronista of the Indies and the canonigo magistral of the Church of Valencia, this treats mainly the military and naval aspects of the Spanish activities in sixteenth century Chile.

Diego Fernández, *Primera y Segunda Parte de la Historia del Perú*.

This account is too vague to be guilty of inaccuracy. The section printed here deals with the expedition of Pedro de Valdivia.

Inca Garcilasso de la Vega, *Primera Parte de los Comentarios Reales del Peru*.

Herein is much material on the maltreatment of the Indians under Amalgro and Pedro de Valdivia. Ercilla used this work as one of his sources.
Juan Díaz de la Calle, Noticias Sacras y Reales de las Indias Occidentales.
Book IX contains some valuable material dealing with the founding of the first cities in Chile.

Fray Gil González, memorials among which is Relación de los Agravios que los Indios de Chile Padecen. These memorials evidence the frenzy to which the fray aroused himself over the ill treatment of the Indians. While they savor a bit of the Las Casas style, they do indicate some actual wrongs.

Volume XLV - Los Holandeses en Chile. A collection of extracts and sketches pertinent to the expedition of Holland in Chile during 1642 and 1643 are contained in this volume.

SECONDARY SOURCES

In the criticism of each of the following secondary works little attempt will be made to evaluate the author in general, nor the work, except in regard to its direct bearing upon the subject of investigation.

Domingo Amunátegui y Solar, Historia Social de Chile, Santiago, 1932. The author has treated the same problem more fully in Las Encomiendas de Indígenas en Chile, Santiago, 1909 (2 volumes). His works are scholarly, indicating scrupulous insistence upon manuscript verification of each point of discussion. The various problems of the natives and the encomenderos, the causes and results of their conflict, are treated from the arrival of the Spaniards to the early republican period.

Domingo Amunátegui y Solar, Jesuitas, Governantes, Militares y Escritores, Santiago, 1934. The first word of the title refers to Valdivia. The article dealing with the padre is nothing more than a thumb-nail sketch of the chapters found in Astrain.

Antonio Astrain, S.J., Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la Asistencia de España, Madrid, 1912-1925, IV, V. This work has proven the most satisfactory bibliographical aid as well as an excellent general account of the Jesuits during these years. The scope of this work is the labor of the Jesuits in the New World from their arrival to 1757.

Diego Barros Arana managed to amass an extraordinary amount of noteworthy historical literature during his seventy seven years of life, terminating in 1907. His edition of Colección de Historiadores has already been outlined. Volumes III, IV, and V of the sixteen volume work, Historia Jenera
de Chile, Santiago, 1884-1902, have been helpful in their further compilation of documents but in his conclusions regarding the study made in this paper he does not seem to face the facts illustrated in the documents. Barros Arana is ranked as one of Chile's outstanding historians. It is the opinion of this commentator that Barros Arana's contribution does not lie in his writing of history, but in his compilation of documents which he has edited.

Erase from the work of Francisco Enrich, S.J., Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en Chile, Barcelona, 1891, his apologetic and eulogetic passages and one has a work which merits praise and censure on the same score. Although Enrich has worked through the writings of his Jesuit forerunners and has consulted numerous manuscripts from the archives of Chile and Seville, he has left gaps in his narrative which, considering the wealth of opportunity he had to tap original sources, he might well have filled in. Thus he is praised for the collection of documents he has used and printed, and censured for those he might have, but did not, use.

Cresente Errázuriz, O.P., Historia de Chile Durante los Gobierno de Don García de Mendoza, 1557-1561, Santiago, 1914.

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Histórica de Chile Durante los Gobierno de Francisco de Villagrán, 1561-1563, Santiago, 1915.

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Historia de Chile Durante los Gobierno de Pedro de Villagrá, 1563-1565, Santiago, 1916.

These three books are extremely valuable in their detailed description of the social policy of the conquistador governors, written by a reliable historian.

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Los Orígenes de la Iglesia Chilena, 1530-1603, Santiago, 1873.

Essential to this study is this work on the sixteenth century Church in Chile. Ample documentation and clarity of presentation characterize the study.

Alonso de Ercilla y Zúñiga, ed. by José Toribio Medina, La Araucana, Santiago, 1910-1918, five volumes.

This may be fine poetry. It is not good history. This poem, of which the first part appeared in 1569 and the last edition was reprinted in 1577, was the result of the author's personal experiences with the expedition of Don García de Mendoza in Chile, a smattering of reference work, and his own unlimited imagination.

Tomás Guevara, Historia de Chile: Chile Prehispánico, Santiago, 1925, two volumes.

No sounder or more scholarly work on the aborigines of Chile has been pub-
lished than these volumes. It complements in many respects the splendid composite work of José Toribio Medina, *Los Aborigines de Chile*, Santiago, 1882.


It is difficult to classify this work. The author, possessing remarkable discernment, excellent first hand experience, and editing copious transcriptions of documents to which historians have been referring ever since the publication of the work, has presented a combination primary-secondary history. Rosales was born in Madrid at the opening of the seventeenth century. In 1629 he entered the Society and journeyed to Chile. A resident in Arauco, he achieved notable prominence as a teacher, preacher, and counsellor. He accompanied both the governor Marques de Baliedes and the governor Don Martín de Mieszeca on numerous expeditions into the Araucanian land. As rector of the college of Concepción, superior, and finally vice-provincial of Chile, he reaped both spiritual and temporal achievements. Not until the latter half of the seventeenth century did he begin his history which covers the military, civil and ecclesiastical events from 1535 to 1672, two years before his death.

For biographical sketches and bibliographical aids, four works have been consulted:


Judging from a limited experience, this work lacks sufficient accuracy to be depended upon.

José Toribio Medina, *Diccionario Biográfico Colonial de Chile*, Santiago, 1905, three volumes.

This biographical dictionary is of incalculable assistance identifying every character of note throughout Chile from 1535 to 1818.

Juan Eusebio Nieremberg, S.J., *Varones Ilustres de la Compañía de Jesús*, Bilbao, 1889, IV.

Interesting enough, while the martyrs Veghi and Aranda are given mention, Valdivia is evidently not an ilustre, for he is conspicuously absent.


This work is a giant in scope and scholarship.
The thesis, "Padre Luis de Valdivia and the Araucanians", written by Beatrice Lorraine Blum, has been accepted by the Graduate School with reference to form, and by the readers whose names appear below, with reference to content. It is, therefore, accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Rev. Jerome V. Jacobsen, S.J., Ph.D. September 28, 1941
Rev. W. Eugene Shiels, S.J., Ph.D. October 14, 1941
Dr. Paul Lietz November 17, 1941