Relation of Mark Hanna to the Republican Party

A. Patricia Bortolotti

Loyola University Chicago

Recommended Citation

Bortolotti, A. Patricia, "Relation of Mark Hanna to the Republican Party" (1934). Master's Theses. 58.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/58

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.

Copyright © 1934 A. Patricia Bortolotti
RELATION OF MARK HANNA TO THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

BY

A. PATRICIA BORTOLOTTI

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Loyola University August, 1954
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter One
First Contacts With Politics
1867 - 1884

Biographical sketch of Hanna...Primary interest in politics...Good government meant Republicanism...Business man in politics...Hanna and the street railway...Business Meh's Marching Clubs...Interest in the Garfield campaign...Cowles opposes Hanna's candidate...Hanna defeated in local primaries...Hanna elected delegate at large.

Chapter Two
Hanna and Presidential Candidates
1884 - 1896

Hanna supports Sherman, 1884...Growing friendship with Foraker, 1885...Intimacy with Sherman, 1887...Foraker's hostility to Sherman suspected...Hanna, Sherman's manager, 1888...Hanna's break with Foraker, 1888...Hanna aids McKinley, 1891...Successful campaign for Sherman, 1891...Rescues McKinley from bankruptcy, 1895...Manager for McKinley, 1896.

Chapter Three
Hanna and Republican Principles in 1896

Convention assembles at St. Louis...Forming a tentative platform...Hanna's attitude toward gold...Discussion of the currency plank...Republicans adopt gold plank...Convention favors McKinley...Hanna plans 1896 campaign...McKinley's "front porch" campaign...Hanna must secure funds...Hanna's campaign of education successful.

Chapter Four
Hanna's Influence on the Administration
1896 - 1901

Hanna refuses cabinet position...Sherman becomes Secretary of State...Hanna appointed Senator by Bushnell...Legislature elects Hanna Senator...Hanna's activities, 1897-1900...Manages the campaign of 1900...Hanna's success on stumpng tour...Overwhelming victory for Republicans...Death of President McKinley...Hanna's friendship for McKinley.
Chapter Five
Hanna and Roosevelt Republicanism
1900 - 1904

Hanna opposes Roosevelt, 1900...Convention demands Roosevelt for Vice-President...Adjustments after McKinley's death, 1901...Hanna and the Panama Canal...Hanna suggested for the Presidency...Strained relations with Roosevelt, May, 1903...Hanna overwhelmingly reelected Senator...Hanna as a Presidential possibility...Death of Mark Hanna, 1904...Brief estimate of Hanna...Concluding remarks.
I, Amedea Aubryette Bortolotti, was born in Chicago on August 20, 1911. I attended John Marshall grade school until sixth grade, at which time, I transferred to Jacob Beidler School because of its Sight-Saving Department. I was graduated from that school in June, 1924.

I received my first two years of high school work at John Marshall High School, as a member of the Sight-Saving Department. At the beginning of my third year, I transferred to Providence High School. When I moved to Oak Park, I began to continue my education at Oak Park High School, but had a nervous breakdown and remained out of school almost a year. I returned to John Marshall High School for my senior years, and was graduated in June, 1929.

I received a scholarship from the State of Illinois, and one from Clarke College. I attended Clarke College for one year, and left intending to join a friend at the University of Indiana to pursue studies with the aim of becoming a journalist and writer. I was strongly advised to attend De Paul or Loyola. I selected Loyola University and received my Bachelor of Philosophy Degree in August, 1932.
PREFACE

In reading an article on Mark Hanna, I came across the sentence: "In the last days as in the first he was the symbol of the power of money to buy its way wherever it wished to go." I wondered if the statement was true, and if so, to what degree.

This thesis is a result of my study of Mark Hanna's relation to the Republican party. It is not an attempt to prove or disprove the statement mentioned. It is an effort to present the facts, in as correct a light as possible, of Mark Hanna's relations with his party in order to discover what Hanna accomplished, how he accomplished it, and what part money played in the accomplishment.
CHAPTER ONE

FIRST CONTACTS WITH POLITICS, (1867-1884)

Biographical sketch of Hanna...Primary interest in politics
...Good government meant Republicanism...Business man in
polities...Hanna and the street railway...Business Man's
Marching Clubs...Interest in the Garfield campaign...Cowles
opposed Hanna's candidate...Hanna defeated in local primaries
...Hanna elected delegate at large.
CHAPTER ONE

FIRST CONTACTS WITH POLITICS, (1867-1884)

It will be necessary, from the very beginning, to bear in mind that in this thesis I am presenting Mark Hanna only in relation to the Republican party. Consequently, my presentation of Hanna will be a limited one in the sense that it will not be a complete picture of Hanna's personality, the events of his life or an estimate of his entire accomplishments.

I do wish to present adequately the relation of Hanna to the Republican party. To do this completely, I shall have to consider Hanna as a business man, not in his business achievements or his relations with Labor, but merely to note how business experience and interests may have affected his political relations. Likewise, if I venture into the psychological, it will not be to discuss the personality or character of Hanna, but to point out why his political views may have been what they were because of the type of individual Hanna was, or to suggest how these views, in a man of Hanna's temperament, might result in certain activities. I shall only include, therefore, in this thesis, those ideas and facts which may explain Hanna's relation to the Republican party.

After considerable reading and careful consideration of the matter, I present what seems to be this relation.

Mark Hanna, of Ohio, was born in 1837 of pioneer stock of the second
or third generation. He entered business in Cleveland in 1858 in a wholesale grocery company.

Hanna laid his foundation in business at the same time that a group of important business men, including John D. Rockefeller, were making their start, and at a time when thousands of young men were being swept into the Union army because of their enthusiasm. Hanna was endowed with hard, practical, economic sense and hence refused to be swept by any force away from his post of business. At any rate, it was during these four years that Hanna made the beginnings of his great estate in coal, iron, oil, and merchandising.

Since 1865, Hanna had learned things in finance. He tried many ventures, among which were his building a refinery for petroleum, and his building the swiftest and smartest of Lake steamers, the La Belle. In years of extreme depression, Hanna made himself recognized as outstanding to his rivals as an energetic salesman of Rhodes and Company's coal.

Hanna's energy led him into many enterprises and he did well in them, mostly because of his ability and untiring work and partly because this was the period of industrial America following the Civil War. From 1865 to 1884, Hanna, beside his ventures in wholesale groceries, coal, iron, and oil, was owner of a Republican newspaper, the Cleveland Herald, and owner and director of a local railroad which developed under his control and was later valued at nine million dollars.

Hanna, continually, became a man of control. His energy seemed

3. Ibid., p. 77.
4. Since the Civil War, Charles Ramsdell Lingley, New York, 1921, p.356.
without limitation. Added to those interests already mentioned, he became director of several railroads and organizer and president of a bank, as well as the owner of a theatre.

This is sufficient for a brief biographical sketch of Hanna from his beginnings in business in 1858, until 1884. During this time of expansion Hanna was also interested in politics, but he did not give it as much of his time or energy as he gave to business. We have noted that Hanna was not a man to stand by while others accomplished. With his unbounded energy, would he be likely to seek new realms to conquer? After he made an immense fortune in business, might he not seek to use his energy and ability in another field that interested him, if there was such a field?

Hanna's success in business is often attributed to 'luck.' Like Beard, however, many historians have rejected this as an explanation for Hanna's success and have attributed it, instead, to his energy and ability which opened to Hanna a variety of industrial and commercial enterprises.6

When did this energetic leader of men, Hanna, become interested in politics? How did his relation to the Republican party start? In answering these questions, I shall base my opinions upon the conclusions of Hanna's biographer, Herbert Croly.

Since I shall base many of my opinions upon information from Croly, it is well to establish what kind of a biographer he is. Rhodes voices the general view in regard to Croly when he writes:

Popular knowledge of a man of action who left few letters, did not keep a diary nor write a book depends largely upon his biographer and, in this respect, Hanna was exceptionally happy. His son selected Herbert Croly who made the work a labor of love and has presented the real Mark Hanna with remarkable perspicacity and skill. Some of Hanna's friends on hearing of the selection, may have shuddered at the thought of an author with socialist proclivities undertaking the biography of a strong individualist... Even so was the choice of Herbert Croly to write the life of Mark Hanna. 

When does Croly say that Hanna's interest in politics began? He says that Mark Hanna was of the industrial pioneer type of character and took to politics instinctively, and therefore, that Hanna was always interested in politics. As this type of individual, Hanna believed that everyone should be interested in politics and take an active part. He did not believe that politics should be left to the professional politicians. Before Hanna's generation, every man had been interested in politics, and he disliked the new idea of specialization of politics. At first, therefore, he tried to make the business men, the only kind of men Hanna knew much about and those he thought capable of governing, take an interest in politics actively. Hanna's beginnings in politics were instinctive and grounded in the belief that politics should not be specialized.

What was Hanna's relation, in the beginning, to the Republican party? His motive was patriotic, for to a man of Hanna's type, there was but one one party, the Republican party, and good government to him meant Republi-


Perhaps it can be said that he accepted the Republican party as the only party, instinctively. Hanna's first relation to the Republican party, therefore, was patriotic.

Regarding Hanna's Republicanism, Croly writes: "Mark Hanna was a primitive Republican. His family had been anti-slavery Whigs." Hanna cast his first vote for Lincoln in 1860, and this was his first presidential vote. He was distasteful to his Democratic father-in-law only because he was a Republican. To Hanna, patriotism meant personal service to a political party and in his case, that party was and had to be the Republican party. Hanna's first relation to the party was patriotic in the sense that he interpreted patriotism, which was active, personal, party service. It is well to note that Hanna did not believe in controlling politics merely by paying for control and that, though from the very first he gave freely of his own money, he gave his personal service.

What other explanations are offered for Hanna's interest and entrance in politics? Are they logical as Croly's explanation? The following is typical of many of the reasons offered and I think needs no refutation. Lauer writes: "It is not surprising that Mr. Hanna should have been drawn into political work. He is of the earth, earthly, in the best and truest sense." Even if I would venture to offer an explanation

10. Ibid., p. 114.
11. Ibid., p.111.
15. Hanna, Croly, p.115.
of what this quotation might mean, it is surely not a clear or logical reason for Hanna's entrance into politics.

An explanation of Hanna's early interest in the party, Beard offers: "Mr. Hanna, like most of the new generation of northern businessmen, was an ardent Republican... In his early days, therefore, he participated in politics in a small way."

Beard goes on to say that Hanna served his country by serving the Republican party and did so just as he would serve his family or friends.

It has been said, of course, that Hanna entered politics in the interests of business. This explanation deserves due consideration and I shall consider it presently. I have tried to show why he entered politics, as I see it, and why he was a Republican.

I do not mean to imply that from the very first, Hanna gave a great deal of time to party service. He was very busy doing other things as can be seen from the number of enterprises he commenced, expanded and acquired. Flynn seems to believe that Hanna entered politics for business interests, but the following quotation shows that Hanna was active in politics very early and active in a personal way. Flynn states: "Hanna's own interest in politics had been for years quite casual. He could be found around the polls on election day and at ward meetings with the 'better element,' throwing his weight on the side of 'good government.'" This may not have been much, but it shows Hanna taking an active part.

Did Mark Hanna enter politics for business interests? It seems to me that Hanna's business interests did not lead him into politics. Business

was a primary interest with Hanna, as an industrial pioneer type of man. He went into politics because his expansive, energetic nature demanded that he live a full life, and business alone would not allow him to assert his ability or energy in its fullness. 19

Instinctively he took to business and politics, and in both, Hanna wanted results. 20 In the beginning, while his business was expanding, he did not pay as much attention to politics as later when his business had expanded and he had leisure to seek in his other primary interest, politics, new outlets for his energy.

Was he a business man in politics? Hanna was not a business man in politics in the sense that he controlled politics in favor of big business. Hanna, the business man, took to politics all the things that he had learned in business, and likewise he took his interest in behalf of business. But Hanna believed that business men should be active in politics, and not merely control politics by controlling the politicians. 21 He disliked the specialization of politics and business each to its own realm. 22 Hanna was not like those business men who found interest only in making a fortune. He finally even lost all interest in making a fortune. 23 Hanna was a business man personally active in politics.

Hanna used the same means to gain results in politics that he had used to gain results in business. He was known to be a keen, clear minded business man, energetic, quick and sound in judgment, vigorous, and aggressive. 24 He was a leader of men. 25 In politics, as in business, he

---

19. Hanna, Croly, p.113-114.
22. Ibid.
spent money, he controlled things personally, he had devoted friends and bitter enemies, he believed in using the advantage of publicity, he tried new ways to make secure his present hold, and to gain new ground. He was alert for opportunities, and used initiative.

Naturally, Hanna represented business interests in politics, for no man could be vitally interested in business and then exclude that interest when he entered politics. That is not the same as saying that Hanna entered politics for business advantages. Both interests were primary, a part of his character, and he could not suppress one any more than the other. It is well to remember that he was already very rich, and becoming more and more successful, when he began to count at all as a politician in 1880. At first his entrance in politics demanded time and money while politics afforded little gain. He might have gained more for business, at first, had he left politics to the professional political bosses, as did many of the business men of his generation, and controlled these politicians by his money. But, Hanna believed consistently in the fitness and responsibility of business men to carry on the politics of a country which was commercial in character.

In opposition to the statement made that Hanna entered politics for business interests, Croly states:

24. (continued from page 7) Hanna, Lauer, p.36.
25. Ibid., p.38.
27. Contemporary American History, Beard, p.245.
28. Ibid., p.245.
His business affairs had nothing to do with his entrance into politics, and he did not remain in politics in their interest. Quite apart from the evident fact that any benefit which his business would derive from his political connection would only be incidental, no one who understands the sort of a man Mark Hanna was can believe for an instant that his interest in politics could be derived from any source outside of itself.29

Another charge is made repeatedly, namely, that Hanna first entered politics because of his interest in his street railway and then gradually grew to like politics. Flynn makes the charge as follows:

Cleveland belonged to its iron, oil, gas, electric and street car interests, its banks and real estate promoters. Hanna became the recognized spokesman for these interests. They began to look to him to defend them. Thus led into politics by his railway company, he came to like it.30

In the first place, Hanna did not control these interests or become a recognized leader of these business interests until after he had showed interest in politics. Therefore, he was not thus led into politics. Hanna had no interest in the street railway until 1876 and was not manager of it until 1882, nor did his wife have any interest in it before 1876.31 Croly states that there is but one witness who lends any support to this explanation, that Hanna entered politics because of his street railway interest, and that this witness admits that he is prejudiced against Hanna.32 I shall discuss, presently, Hanna's political activities before 1884, and some of these activities show that Hanna was interested in politics before

31. Hanna, Croly,p.113.
32. Ibid., p.110.
In passing, it might be well to note that Croly thinks that Hanna's election as a member of the Board of Education of Cleveland in 1869 indicates that he had some political importance, and that Hanna's two years of service on this Board shows that he had some interest in politics. This may or may not be considered a sign of political importance or be listed as a political activity.

In consideration of the explanations offered, it seems correct to conclude, briefly, that Hanna did not enter politics for business interests, that he was primarily interested in politics as well as in business, that he was not led into politics by his connection with the street railway, and that Hanna's relation to the Republican party was not based on a desire for business gain but based on his instinctive conviction that Republicanism meant good government.

But Hanna was a business man in politics and used business methods in the political field. Of these methods, Flynn writes:

Hanna had to have his irons in many fires

...The other point of interest lay in this little considered fact, that while he was regarded as a representative of big business and great corporations, Hanna himself did not commit his own fortunes to the corporate form...Hanna never used other people's money. He was a builder and developer, a sound and able business man, who accumulated a large fortune and ended by losing interest altogether in acquiring any more.

In the account that will follow of Hanna's first political activities, it will be well to examine them for these characteristics of initiative, organization, and building, in order to appreciate Hanna's relation to the

33. Hanna, Croly, p.112.
34. Hanna, Flynn, p.38.
Republican party.

In order to give a brief survey of what has been written thus far, it is well to conclude this part with a passage from Beard which contains a famous, often repeated quotation. Beard writes:

The complete clue to Mr. Hanna's philosophy of politics is thus summed up by his penetrating and sympathetic biographer, Mr. Croly: 'We must bear in mind that: 1, he was an industrial pioneer and instinctively took to politics as well as to business; 2, that in politics as in business he wanted to accomplish results; 3, that politics meant to him active party service; 4, that successful party service meant to him the acceptance of prevailing political methods and abuses; and 5, finally, that he was bound by the instinctive consistency of his nature to represent in politics not merely his other dominant interest, but the essential harmony between the interests of business and those of the whole community.' In other words, Mr. Hanna believed consistently and honestly in the superior fitness of businessmen to conduct the politics of a country which was predominantly commercial in character. 35

After the revival of business in 1879, Hanna had more time to give to political activities. 36 The historians all agree that Hanna really began to count as a local politician in 1880. What were some signs that Hanna was interested in politics before 1876, the year of his partial interest in the street railway company? Did he begin to count as a politician overnight, or had he showed interest in politics and worked in some way for the Republican party before 1876?

In the seventies, a great part of Hanna's early political activity was spent in studying the power of the local, professional, petty bosses. 37

35. Contemporary American History, Beard, p.245.
37. Ibid., p.114.
Croly states that anyone familiar with the annals of Cleveland at this period will corroborate the statement of Mr. Myers that Hanna did fight the growing power of these bosses, and that Hanna went to the businessmen and tried to persuade them to take a more active interest in politics. But Hanna was not by disposition a reformer; he was by disposition a character who sought results, and therefore he gave up fighting against abuses which he was unable to correct. However, in this struggle against the bosses, Hanna made many enemies for himself, and though he ceased to fight them, his alliance with them never amounted to fusion for his purposes and methods differed from theirs. On the other hand, the politicians needed Hanna because he was personally generous and was an excellent collector of funds, but they never recognized him as their leader. This activity in the seventies must indicate interest in politics on Hanna's part. It does not show Hanna in politics for business gain, while it does show us Hanna giving time and money to Republican party service. Hanna's wife asserts that Hanna was always interested in politics and took part on election days. Indicating Hanna's interest and service before 1876, Croly writes:

Mr. Andrew Squire and Mr. A.C. Saunders recollect Mr. Hanna as an active party worker in the old ninth ward towards the middle of the seventies. He could always be counted on for presence at the polls and at the primaries, and for assistance in the task of getting the vote out and securing an honest count.
However, Hanna did not wish to aid in the election of unfit Republicans to office, but neither did he wish to aid in the election of an active Democrat. In the Spring of 1873, the Cleveland municipal elections were held. After a very short campaign, the Republicans nominated John Huntington who was unfit for office.\textsuperscript{43} Many Republicans, including Mark Hanna, determined to oppose Huntington’s election. They called a meeting at which Mr. Hanna was outstanding.\textsuperscript{44} They agreed to support Mr. Charles A. Otis, a Democrat, but as Croly writes, "not one who had been active in politics."\textsuperscript{45} Otis was elected but all the other Democrats were defeated. Croly considers this event of 1873 as a definite date before 1876 which shows Hanna’s interest and personal activity in politics.

His political interest and activity also indicate that Hanna did not become a politician overnight. After 1879 when he had more leisure to give to politics, his activities increased gradually. It is also said that Hanna suddenly saw the relation of business to politics and therefore, entered politics. A man of Hanna’s foresight and business acumen would know the relation of business to politics and not suddenly be startled by a realization of this relation, but these remarks about Hanna’s early activities in politics show that Hanna did not suddenly enter politics for business reasons.

In 1880 Hanna was not a noted local politician. He was merely beginning to count at all as a local politician. Of Hanna, at this time, Croly writes: "He emerges as one of a score of men who had become peculiarly prominent in Cleveland business: and almost simultaneously he began also to

\textsuperscript{43} Hanna, Croly, p.112.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p.112.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p.110.
obtain a certain prominence in local politics. How did Hanna increase his importance?

In 1880, Hanna organized the Business Men’s Marching Club. This was a new idea and the idea spread to other cities rapidly. In one of the parades, Hanna carried a torch. Hanna organized these clubs to gain the interest of business men in actively taking part in politics. The idea was a great success. Croly writes: "It is significant that in 1880 business men were first beginning to become conscious of their attachment to the Republican party and that Mark Hanna was associated with the first advertisement of the association. Hanna often tired of trying to make business men see the importance of voting in the primaries, and the idea of the Marching Clubs was based on a hope that they might be a means of generating vital interest in the elections.

At this time, Hanna held no public office and had no ambition for himself except to be a leader of the men associated with him in any undertaking. Hanna could be counted upon to give time and money, and to collect money from others for campaign expenses. Speaking of Hanna at this period, Foraker, Hanna’s future opponent, wrote: "He had large means at his command, was a generous contributor when help was needed, and apparently having no political ambitions for himself no jealousies were aroused against him.

Considering Hanna’s rise in politics and position in the party at this time, Rhodes writes: "Hanna pushed ahead until in 1880, the year of

46. Hanna, Croly, p.112.
49. Ibid., p.118.
50. Ibid.
the Garfield campaign, he was known as a reliable Republican and acquired a very considerable local prominence.\textsuperscript{52} Hanna was especially interested in this campaign because the candidate, Garfield, was not only a Republican from Ohio, but a Republican from the vicinity of Cleveland.\textsuperscript{53} In addition to this, Mark Hanna had still another reason for increased interest in the campaign, for in May of 1880 he had purchased the \textit{Cleveland Herald}, and he could use it as a mouthpiece for his ardent Republicanism.\textsuperscript{54} Croly remarks: "...In those days Republicanism was very ardent and very innocent...particularly when the Republican candidate lived in one's native state, not far from one's home town."\textsuperscript{55}

The Republican party was not at peace with itself. The large faction that had supported the candidacy of Grant at the convention was dissatisfied.\textsuperscript{56} Hanna knew of this sulkiness in the party and regretted it.

Mr. Hanna was placed in charge of the transportation of the Republican orchestra. With his usual initiative, without consulting anyone, he decided to take the responsibility and make his task useful to Garfield and to a united Republican party. He wished to cover the sulkiness of some of the Republicans, and show the country a united, satisfied Republican party. Another man might have merely transported the orchestra safely to its destination. Hanna was watchful of the welfare of the party. He could rise to an occasion which offered itself to his mind, and he was fine enough to take a risk to himself for the good of the party.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{52} McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, Rhodes, p.3.
\textsuperscript{53} Hanna, Croly, p.116.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Ibid.}, p.117.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Ibid.}, p.116.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Ibid.}, p.117.
Hanna arranged that the train should return from Warren, Ohio, by way of Mentor, Ohio. Garfield was at Mentor, receiving his loyal supporters.

After the successful meeting was ended in Warren, Grant and his friends were dining at the home of Senator Harry Perkins. Hanna called at the home of Perkins in Warren and entered the dining room. Croly continues the story as follows: "'General,' said he, addressing Grant, 'it has been arranged that we return to Cleveland by way of Mentor, and if you propose to stop and see General Garfield, we shall have to start in a very short time.' He made this announcement in public so as to bring the question straight to the attention of Grant. ..'We will go to Mentor,' he said to Mr. Hanna, and Conkling sullenly acquiesced."

In the years that immediately followed the Garfield campaign, Hanna's political interests broadened, and he became more and more influential in city and county elections. This was the period of his ownership of the Herald, and of his street railway interests. Both of these interests helped to involve Hanna more in politics. His part in the Garfield campaign is sometimes considered as Hanna's first appearance in national politics, and it is often claimed that Hanna began to count as a politician, therefore, in 1880.

58. Hanna, Croly, p. 117.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., p. 118.
61. Ibid., p. 118.
62. Ibid., p. 110 and 118.
In the Spring of 1883, George W. Gardner was nominated for mayor by the Republicans. Edwin Cowles, of the Cleveland Leader, considered the nomination of Gardner undesirable, apparently on no other grounds than Gardner's connection with Hanna, owner of the Herald. Cowles opposed the election, and Gardner was defeated. This was a defeat for Hanna in as much as Gardner was Hanna's intimate associate and the Herald's candidate.

Gardner states that he suggested Hanna's name to the state committee as a member of the important committee of finance, and that Hanna objected to giving as much time as the position would demand. Hanna was finally persuaded to accept and served with success because he was such an excellent collector of campaign funds.

In the Spring of 1884, Hanna was defeated for delegate to the national convention from the Cleveland district. Two delegates were to be elected, and there were three candidates, including Hanna, in the field. Mr. A.C. Hord, candidate of the young Republicans, and Mr. Cowles, of the Leader, were elected.

This defeat which Hanna suffered in the local primaries, however, was only the prelude to a greater victory. When the state convention met in Cleveland, Hanna's services to the state organization stood him in good stead, and his friends urged him to be candidate for delegate-at-large.

63. Hanna, Croly, p.118.
67. Hanna, Croly, p. 120.
68. Hanna, Croly, p.121.
Hanna's friends thought that he had sufficient local and general support to assure his election. When nominations were called for, Parsons and Hanna were named. George A. Groot of Cleveland nominated Hanna, and W.S. Cappeller seconded it. Parsons received fifteen votes, and Hanna received twenty, which elected the latter. Foraker writes that the first time he ever heard of Hanna was when he read the report of these proceedings.

The period from 1869 to 1884 was Hanna's experimental period in politics, and he had not come to realize as yet the best ways and means of attaining success in this less familiar field. Croly says that his success in business was largely due to the formation of loyal and permanent human relationships, and that his success in politics was to be due to the formation of similar ties. The enmities he had made in politics, many of which resulted from his early opposition to the petty bosses, were more conspicuous at this period than Hanna's political friends. With a few exceptions the friendships of this period were not his permanent political friends. At the close of this period, Hanna had yet to learn what he could do in Republican politics and with whom he could do it.

70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., p.150.
72. Hanna, Croly, p.119.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
CHAPTER TWO

HANNA AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, (1884-1896)

Hanna supports Sherman, 1884...Growing friendship with Foraker, 1885...Intimacy with Sherman, 1887...Foraker's hostility to Sherman suspected...Hanna, Sherman's manager, 1888...Hanna's break with Foraker, 1888...Hanna aids McKinley, 1891...Successful campaign for Sherman, 1891...Rescues McKinley from bankruptcy, 1893...Manager for McKinley, 1896...
CHAPTER TWO

HANNA AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, (1884-1896)

Mark Hanna went to the Republican convention of 1884 as a delegate at large, and this was his first plunge into the deeper waters of national politics.\(^1\)

It was known that Hanna favored Sherman for Republican candidate for the presidency, and he went to the Republican national convention as an avowed supporter of Sherman.\(^2\) Sherman's candidacy was little in favor in 1884, and events proved that Sherman made a poorer showing in 1884 than in 1880 or 1888. Beer says that Hanna favored Sherman because Sherman was from Ohio and knew a great deal about business.\(^3\) There were two things about Sherman which the Republicans did not like: he was a poor showman and he was very critical of fellow politicians.\(^4\) Hanna did not heed, if he was aware of, these disadvantages of Sherman's candidacy. Croly says that Hanna favored Sherman for several reasons. Sherman was from Ohio, and at this time, Hanna was not interested in any candidate who came from outside of Ohio. In regard to business, Sherman had done much towards the government's adoption of a sound financial policy. Then, too, Sherman had a prolonged and varied experience in legislation and administration, and

\begin{align*}
1. & \text{Hanna, Croly, p.120.} \\
2. & \text{McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, Rhodes, p.4.} \\
3. & \text{Hanna, Thomas Beer, New York, 1929, p.92.} \\
4. & \text{Ibid.} \\
5. & \text{Hanna, Croly, p.124.}
\end{align*}
was equipped to be president.

Hanna's attendance at the national Republican convention of 1884 increased his liking for and interest in politics, and brought him into contact with William McKinley Jr. and Joseph B. Foraker. McKinley may have been known to Hanna, because he was prominent in that part of the state near Cleveland in which Mark Hanna operated coal mines. On the other hand, it is probable that Foraker, from Cincinnati, was only known to Hanna by reputation. Foraker specifically writes: "On my arrival at Chicago, I met for the first time Marcus A. Hanna and Charles L. Kurtz; both of these gentlemen were there to support Mr. Sherman, Hanna as a colleague and Mr. Kurtz as a personal representative of our candidate." Perhaps Foraker's and Hanna's joint support of John Sherman may be offered in explanation of their friendship which began at this convention and ripened quickly, while Hanna was less intimate with McKinley who supported Blaine. However, Hanna was not so much opposed to Blaine as he was inclined to support Sherman, and Blaine was Hanna's second choice. We shall see later how, when Blaine received the nomination, Hanna worked hard for his election. We shall also note how, though Foraker was in support of Sherman, he was also very much in favor of Blaine. The difference in opinion of McKinley for Blaine and Hanna for Sherman did not cause any alienation between these two delegates, and later, their friendship was to ripen into more lasting ties than Hanna's friendship for Foraker.

7. Ibid., p.122.
10. Ibid.
In the days immediately preceding the meeting of the convention, Hanna became more intimate with both McKinley and Foraker. Hanna, in June 1f 1884, shared a hotel suite with McKinley but did not think of him, at that time, as a presidential candidate. Mark Hanna became fond of and admired the popular, young orator and in 1885, the friendly and political ties were strengthened. However, McKinley was a supporter of Blaine, and for the time, Hanna became more closely united in work to Foraker. Foraker and Hanna were delegates at large and supporters of Sherman. Foraker writes: "These relations brought us into close contact and led to many conferences and much cooperative work in presenting the claims of Mr. Sherman to the different delegations, and in endeavoring to bring about combinations that would be helpful to our cause." Sullivan says that the convention of 1884 was a body of very able men, with Mark Hanna typifying the rising generation of captains of industry. Foraker, with a speech that has caused much conjecturing, placed Sherman's name before the convention. I am not concerned here with Foraker's motive, but in passing, I may state my opinion, that in view of what happened later, I think that Foraker was not whole heartedly in support of Sherman but rather considered Blaine as the possible victor. Hanna was genuinely interested and sincerely advocated the nomination of Sherman, and later events show Hanna as still devoted in Sherman's cause and Foraker even more dubious in his relation to Sherman.

13. Foraker, p.158.
16. Ibid.
The delegation from Ohio, of forty six votes, was divided almost in half, with the larger number for Sherman. On the first ballot Mr. Blaine received twenty one of the forty six votes, while twenty five went to Sherman, Ohio's "favorite son." But Sherman's name did not attract supporters from the other states, while Blaine's name did. After the third ballot, Foraker made an attempt to carry the convention by acclamation for Blaine, but this attempt was premature and failed. However, on the fourth ballot, the nomination went to Blaine, mostly because Illinois and Ohio rallied to him.

Hanna was a real supporter of Sherman, but a loyal Republican who worked for the party with energy. Rhodes speaks highly for Hanna's devotion to Sherman and work for the party, in the following account of the convention and after: "He opposed Blaine, yet, when the convention named him as its candidate, Hanna gained prominence in his party by his earnest and sincere efforts for Blaine's election; but no sooner was Blaine defeated than Hanna began to work for Sherman's nomination in 1888." Hanna's relation to his party, therefore, was one of prominent loyalty, but he did not desert his friends as long as a chance for their success remained.

Meanwhile, Hanna was gaining power in local politics. In March, 1885, Hanna sold out his newspaper, the Cleveland Herald, and thus, did not have Cowles as his enemy. From then on, Hanna was treated by the Leader as any other good Republican would be treated by Cowles. In 1885, Gardner, a

17. Hanna, Croly, p.122-123.
18. Ibid., p.123.
friend of Hanna, was elected mayor of Cleveland.

At this time, Mark Hanna was prominent enough in state politics to be mentioned for the gubernatorial nomination, but he was not deceived into trying for it by the glitter of the prize. Hanna had other plans. Croly writes: "He was seeking political power by means of close association with popular leaders; and for the time being, Mr. Foraker was the man of his choice." 21

Let us pause here to consider Hanna's relations with Foraker, from 1885 to 1889. We shall have to go a little ahead of our story, chronologically speaking, but it seems better to consider the matter now, as a unit. We shall not therefore dwell in detail upon Hanna's or Sherman's relations with Foraker, or with the convention of 1888, since we shall study these later. It is necessary to glance at these in passing in order to have a complete picture of Hanna's relations with Foraker.

It is natural that Hanna wished to become more friendly with Foraker since Foraker was the best speaker in persuading conventions of Republican principles, and in making others see the patriotism of Republican candidates. Foraker could likewise make others desire Republican policies and Republican administration. 22 On the other hand, Mr. Foraker found in Mark Hanna, who served on the executive committee, his most effective ally in and around Cleveland. 23 Each found in the other that for which he was looking.

It must not be forgotten that Hanna was a growing power in politics, as more of his friends, Gardner, Kimberley, and Foraker, came into office, while Cowles had ceased to be his enemy and the bosses, who would not

22. Ibid., p.125.
23. Ibid.
recognize Hanna as their leader, still needed his financial help and service. 24 In 1885, Gardner was elected mayor. David Kimberley, whom Hanna had treated well some years before, 25 and whom he now helped financially was elected county treasurer and later re-elected. 26 During these years, 1885 and later, Hanna was powerful as any one man in local politics and his influence was not due to a political machine behind him, but to the number of important men with whom he was connected. 27

Whether Foraker would have become governor without Hanna's assistance in money and service is not important here, but there is ample proof that Hanna was very influential in local politics, and that he was prominent in placing Foraker in office. Besides Croly and Foraker, Lingley states: "After he had attained a degree of business success, he became actively interested in politics and took a prominent part in placing Joseph B. Foraker in the governor's chair in Ohio in 1885." 28 In regard to the renomination for the office, Foraker wrote to Hanna, on April 7th, 1885, as follows: "Boyle was here yesterday... and told me of his visit to Cleveland, about meeting you and the many kind things you saw fit to say of me, particularly of your friendliness with regard to my renomination." 29

If Hanna gained anything, as a local politician, because of his friendship with Foraker, it was in prestige and not in the control of patronage. Though Hanna was consulted about important positions, his suggestions were seldom heeded by Foraker. 30 However, at this time, 1885

25. Ibid., Chapter Eleven.
26. Ibid., p.126.
27. Ibid., p.127.
28. Since the Civil War, Charles Ramsdell Lingley, New York, 1921, p.357.
29. Foraker, p.185.
1887, this did not cause any difficulty between the two politicians. Hanna was just as actively interested in Foraker's renomination and reelection in 1887 as he had been enthusiastic for Foraker's nomination and election in 1885. We have noted, from Foraker's letter, that Hanna spoke well of Foraker for renomination. Besides personal service, Hanna contributed money in 1887 for Foraker's campaign. Foraker tells us further of this donation of Hanna, as follows: "His 'compliments' to which I refer was a check for $1000 which he asked Mr. Kurtz to give me as a contribution toward campaign expenses. Foraker says that he mentions this fact because Mr. Croly speaks of the money given by Hanna as being needed at the time. Foraker claims that it was the only money that he ever received from Hanna and that he did express grateful appreciation. Croly admits that Foraker was most appreciative and does not say that Hanna ever gave Foraker any other money but merely that Hanna gave Foraker money when money was greatly needed.

In 1887, Foraker and Hanna exchanged friendly letters. They also visited one another. However, Foraker states that at this time, Hanna was becoming more friendly with Sherman and often went to Washington where he became friendly with members of Congress and others.

Hanna's break with Foraker is said to be due to difficulty over distribution of patronage, and finally, to trouble about the manner of securing tickets of colored delegates.

31. Hanna, Croly, p.126.
32. Foraker, p.319.
33. Ibid.
34. Hanna, Croly, p.126.
35. Foraker, p.315.
36. Ibid., p.315.
37. Hanna, Croly, Chapter Twelve.
In the matter of distribution of patronage, the first real difficulty between the two men was over the position of oil Inspector. Of this matter, Foraker writes: "My files show that before Mr. Hartshorn was finally installed in office, Mr. Hanna wrote me eight additional letters in which, among other things, he further urged that Hartshorn be taken care of...". Foraker goes on to say that it is interesting to note Hanna's insistence upon small matters which was later to be so characteristic of him in all larger matters also. Regarding the same matter, Hanna wrote to Foraker, December 3, 1887, as follows: "Old Hartshorn was here yesterday and he had a meeting with Colonel Smithnight. Everything has been arranged to suit the old cuss, and I hope you and I are through with him. I think McKinley is sick of him."

Foraker says that Hanna's activities with respect to appointments were not limited to those appointments about which he was consulted, and even went as far as to embrace those appointments of a judicial nature about which even Hanna admitted he knew little. Since Hanna was giving his money and service, and took nothing for himself, is it strange that he would want to control appointments or have a word about them? But Foraker says that he mentions all these things merely to show that Hanna was on sufficiently friendly terms with him to confer with him very freely on all such matters. I have tried to establish only the fact that trouble over distribution of patronage was an additional cause for friction between the two men.

38. Foraker, p.323.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p.322.
41. Ibid., p.323.
42. Foraker, p.323.
It may be well to glance briefly at the reason given for the final break between the Ohio politicians, namely, Foraker's disapproval of Hanna's purchase of tickets from colored delegates. I want the distinction understood that the incident at the convention of 1888 was the cause of the final break, and not the cause, I believe, of the real unfriendliness between Foraker and Hanna, which cause, I shall consider presently at some length.

This is important. Mr. Foraker admits bad feeling in the delegation in 1888 but does not attribute it to the cause which later will be discussed, but he very decidedly attributes the bad feeling to the purchasing of tickets from colored delegates which he relates as follows:

They brought their tickets to our rooms at the hotel, and Mr. Hanna in the presence of all, bought them. I protested against such methods, saying that it would bring scandal on the entire delegation and hurt Sherman's cause. Mr. Hanna and I had a spirited discussion over the matter and it resulted in my leaving the rooms and seeking apartments on another floor.

Croly admits that if Hanna bought tickets, that was to be regretted, but that this incident could not explain Foraker's hostility to Sherman.

At this point, it is necessary to go back chronologically to note Hanna's growing intimacy and friendship with John Sherman in order to contrast it with Foraker's hostility to Sherman. Does this throw any light upon the changed relations of Foraker and Hanna from friendly co-workers to political opponents within the same party? This change of relations with

43. Hanna, Croly, p.129.
44. Ibid., p.136.
45. Ibid., Chapter Twelve.
with Foraker is important in that it changed Hanna's later career and divided the Republican party into two factions until after Hanna's death.46 There was no division in state or national elections however, for the two factions kept their fight within the party and always showed a united front to the Democrats.47

Concerning the defeat of John Sherman at the convention of 1884, Hanna wrote to Foraker as follows: "I feel sure now in looking back over the results of the campaign that John Sherman would have been the strongest candidate; and I believe that he will be the strongest man in 1888."48 Croly thinks that due to the peculiar circumstances of Blaine's defeat in 1884, if Mr. Sherman had been the candidate, he might have been elected.49 Foraker states that Hanna had always cherished the hope that the failure to have Sherman the candidate in 1884 might be turned into a success in 1888.50 Not only did Hanna think Sherman would be the strongest man in 1888, but he believed that Sherman should receive the nomination because of his services to the party.51

Hanna, as yet, did not have any personal, political ambitions but did desire prestige. If he could gain prestige by helping to elect mayors and governors, how much more prestige could he gain by taking a big part in the election of a president?52 Concerning Hanna's growing interest in Sherman following the 1884 convention, Croly writes: "Throughout the next

46. Hanna, Croly, p. 126.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., p. 130.
49. Ibid.
50. Foraker, p. 257.
52. Hanna, Croly, p. 130.
few years the project of nominating Mr. Sherman grew upon Mr. Hanna. The idea appealed to him because of its apparent practicability, because of its peculiar desirability, and because the work demanded for its realization was suited to his opportunities and abilities."53 Sherman's personality was lacking in warmth and sympathy, but Hanna continued to think Sherman the only man for 1888. Croly thinks that Sherman's personality was notoriously unfavorable and that Hanna is to be praised highly for his continued devotion to Sherman's cause.54

Because of Hanna's competent, fervent and hard work for Sherman, he really made himself the leader of Sherman's forces.55 In 1887, Sherman and Hanna became even more intimate, and the cause of the intimacy was Sherman's coming nomination. As usual, Hanna contributed money to the campaign funds and secured money from his friends.56 Croly records the logical results, as follows: "Finally he was selected by the candidate as the manager of the campaign and as Mr. Sherman's personal representative at the convention."57

It has been mentioned that Foraker spoke of Hanna's growing intimacy with Sherman and of Hanna's visits to Washington. It would be difficult to state whether or not Foraker was jealous of Hanna's growing power in the Sherman forces. However, in 1887, Foraker was accused within the party of hostility to Sherman, whatever the cause of this hostility.58 There are

53. Hanna, Croly, p.150.
54. Ibid., p.124.
55. Ibid., p.131.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Hanna, Croly, Chapter Twelve, pages 132 and on.
several very long letters concerning the endorsement of Sherman as candidate for 1888, in which Hanna asked Foraker for his views. In July 1887, Foraker wrote at some length to Hanna stating that he, Foraker, had at first opposed a resolution which he considered foolish, but that when he had learned that Sherman desired it, he had assented.

It is important to note that Foraker wrote:

To sum up, Mr. Hanna took no part whatever in the ante-convention controversy about the endorsement of Mr. Sherman except to attend the conference at Canton with McKinley, Foster, Townsend, and others. He did not attend the convention but showed his satisfaction with its results by serving on the committee and making the contributions mentioned.

Therefore, Foraker had opposed something that Sherman desired. On the other hand, in contrast, Hanna had not opposed Sherman's wishes, but had given outstanding personal service and money to Sherman's cause.

As the convention grew near, friction between Sherman and Foraker increased, and the relations of Foraker and Hanna were affected. In addition, Droly writes: "He, (Foraker) resented the choice of Mr. Hanna as a leader of the Sherman forces and his own relegation to a subordinate position." During the May of 1888, the friction between Foraker and Sherman grew.

It is important to note that both the district and state conventions elected a united Sherman delegation, and that Hanna was sent from Cleveland with Myron T. Herrick to the convention. Speaking of this same matter, Flynn writes: "In the next Republican convention Hanna took the

59. Ibid., p.317. 63. Ibid., p.132. 60. Ibid., p.318. 64. Ibid., p.132. 61. Ibid., p.320. 62. Hanna, Croly, p.133.
lead as the campaign manager for old Senator John Sherman who was thought to have a fighting chance for the presidency. The Ohio delegation was pledged to Sherman. 65

Did Hanna neglect writing to Foraker about Sherman's candidacy? Foraker himself writes: "Mr. Hanna had time to write me a number of other letters after he received this about the rooms for the delegation and for myself at Chicago; that he had been 'appointed' Quartermaster for the delegation' and 'was to look after everything of that nature'; that Mr. Sherman's chances were 'daily growing better'; that 'encouraging reports were still coming in'; and that 'he had no doubt but what Sherman would be nominated'..." 66

I have established the fact that Hanna expected Sherman to be successful, and wrote to Foraker about these prospects of success. Furthermore, from Foraker's writings, it is known, that on May 21, 1888, Sherman wrote to Foraker. He told Foraker of the conference which he had with Hanna, Foster, McKinley and Butterworth. Sherman stated in this letter that Foraker would be informed by Hanna or Foster of everything but especially of what was expected of him. 67

The convention was now near at hand. Croly writes: "It was openly hinted in the newspapers that the Governor was not acting loyally, and that consequently he would not be allowed to make the speech placing Mr. Sherman's name in nomination." 68 Sherman's friends feared that Foraker would make

67. Ibid., p.336.
68. Hanna, Croly, p.132.
such an eloquent speech for Sherman that the convention would desire
Foraker. The hints about Foraker's disloyalty were so plain, that
Foraker gave several interviews stating that he was not a candidate for
first or second place. Croly wonders why, if Foraker were not cherishing
a hope, he was so 'disgruntled.' It is to be remembered that in For­
aker's speech for Sherman in 1884, many were suspicious of Foraker's
loyalty, and thought he was looking for other waving plumes.

Two conflicting opinions present themselves upon the question of the
outlook for Sherman's success. Foraker writes, June 16, 1888, as follows:
"On every hand men were talking for Blaine and urging that he was the
choice of the Republican party and that the nomination was due him and
that he would be more surely elected than anybody else: and if not Blaine,
some new man, and in this connection there was much favorable talk of
McKinley...In my first conference with Mr. Hanna I found that he was fully
alive to this actual situation and that he felt that success for Mr.
Sherman could be achieved, if at all, only by the most earnest efforts." In
review of what has been written of Sherman's chances, of Hanna's
expectancy of success, of the united Ohio delegation for Sherman, of
Foraker's suspicioned disloyalty to Sherman, does the following quotation
from Croly sound more likely to be the truth? Croly writes:

When the convention assembled the
outlook for Sherman continued to be
favorable. The voting began on Friday,
June 22nd, and on the first ballot,
Sherman received 229 votes, which was

70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., Chapter Twelve.
twice as many as his nearest competitor. On the second ballot, the number of his supporters ran up to 249...But his strength never equalled Mr. Hanna's estimate of 300 votes. 73

It is to be noted that Hanna had expected Sherman to receive 300 votes, not an outlook so tragic, and that Sherman's chances looked successful on June 22nd, while Foraker's opinions were of June 16th. It is likewise important to notice that the other candidates, offered by other states, among whom were --- Depew of New York, Rusk of Wisconsin, Alger of Michigan, Gresham of Illinois, and Harrison of Indiana, --- did not have any advantage in availability over Sherman and did have inferior titles to the nomination. 74 At the end of the second ballot, Sherman's chances looked good. Hanna wrote that during the convention, he and McKinley shared the same rooms, and worked day and night to find and use the best ways and means to have Sherman nominated. 75 On the other hand, Foraker wrote that Sherman expected support from other quarters but that he, Foraker, did not hear anything encouraging. 76 Does it seem that Foraker was trying to see, in all things, marks of unsuitability for Sherman's nomination? Flynn perhaps gives us a reason when he writes: "Foraker was governor, a rising figure, enormously ambitious, and with an eye on the presidency. Hanna suspected Foraker's loyalty to Sherman. He feared the Ohio governor would yield coyly to any boom for himself which appeared." 77 Nor is it

73. Hanna, Croly, p.134.
74. Ibid.
75. McKinley As I Knew Him, Hanna, Boston, 1904, p.48.
76. Foraker, p.367.
77. Hanna, Flynn, p.118.
to be forgotten that Hanna had enlisted Foraker and McKinley to aid him in nominating Sherman, and that McKinley was helping while Foraker was doing nothing but complaining of the sorry outlook.

From the first ballot until after the sixth, Sherman led his competitors. Meanwhile, Benjamin Harrison was steadily gaining. Sherman, after the second ballot, declined. On the eight ballot, Harrison was nominated. Croly thought that in nominating Harrison, the convention selected the next best man to Sherman.

Sherman's defeat and Harrison's nomination must be considered here in more detail. Of the convention as a whole, Croly writes:

The official proceedings of the convention were tame enough, but behind them was a seething cauldron of negotiation and intrigue. It exhibited at its worst the regular method of nominating presidential candidates, because in the absence of a strong popular preference for any one man, free opportunity was provided for the use of dubious methods and the action of equivocal motives.

There was an undercurrent of sentiment favoring Blaine, but Blaine did not give it open authoritative approval. The hope for Blaine ran high until late on Sunday, June 24th, 1888, but then, as the favor of Blaine was not general enough to nominate him, his supporters who had been waiting for a Blaine stampede began to turn their attention to other possible candidates, from whom they could gain most.

79. Ibid., p.135.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
It is very important to note that on Sunday, June 24th, Sherman's chances were still good, for New York, on that day, might vote for Sherman or Harrison.\textsuperscript{82} Regarding Sherman's chances and his defeat, Burton's words were "At this convention, in 1888, the delegation from Ohio was for the first time unanimous for him. There were however rumors of lack of cordiality on the part of some leading members of the delegation which did much to diminish support from other states."\textsuperscript{83} Foraker was accused as one of these less cordial members but even though he defended himself, he did not convince Sherman's friends of his good faith and his behavior looked dubious.\textsuperscript{84} For instance, Foraker said in an interview in the papers of Sunday, June 24th, 1888, that Sherman's nomination was not a possibility.\textsuperscript{85} On Sunday, Sherman's nomination was a possibility. Foraker later repudiated the interview, but this did not convince Sherman's friends of Foraker's good faith. In this interview, Foraker stated that on Monday he would vote for Blaine. It is important to note also that there was a parade of members of the Columbus Club holding high the portrait of the governor, and wearing his badges. Some stated, says Croly, that the name of Blaine could be read on the other side of these badges.\textsuperscript{86} What I have been trying to show in these pages regarding the relations of Foraker to Sherman and Hanna is put significantly and clearly by Croly as follows: "These circumstances are mentioned, not because they
\textsuperscript{82}\textit{Hanna, Croly, p.138.}
\textsuperscript{83}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{84}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{85}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{86}\textit{Ibid.}
afford conclusive proof that Mr. Foraker was playing a double game, but merely to explain the convictions of his colleagues that he was not loyal to Sherman."87

Because Foraker places so much emphasis on the purchasing of tickets from the delegates by Hanna, it is necessary to look into the matter a little more, at this time, to see if the bad faith of Foraker might be due to disgust with the despicable practise instead of due to his hostility to Sherman. Foraker tells his own story as follows:

I had no personal knowledge of anything of the kind being done by anybody until a day or two before the balloting commenced, when I had occasion to go to Mr. Hanna's room to see him about something and found him there engaged in buying and paying for such tickets. There were a number of negro delegates in his room and he was taking their tickets and paying them there in the most open, businesslike way... I was greatly surprised by what I saw and ventured to express displeasure therewith. He defended his action as necessary because the same tactics were being resorted to by others.88

Do these words sound like a man of politics, unless that politician were trying to be very shocked purposely? It is a matter of opinion, no doubt. Can a man who is disloyal to the candidate he is pledged to, and who was not shocked at the parade with the badges bearing his name and Blaine's, be so very astonished at a man buying tickets from colored delegates openly for the candidate he is pledged to and has worked for earnestly? This is not to defend Hanna's action, for the end does not justify the means any more in politics than in any other phase of life, but this is to indicate to what an extent Foraker could be really shocked and surprised. Flynn

88. Foraker, p.364.
has this to say: "Foraker, who understood the dramatic values of opportune indignation, pretended to be shocked at this wholesale, direct cash bribery. He denounced it." But Foraker raged on, stating that Mr. Hanna did not deny the charge of buying tickets and that a glance at the votes of the southern delegates would show that Hanna did not allow many votes to get away from him. He further states that this purchasing of tickets caused much discussion. Foraker himself seems to be the only delegate causing the discussion. A glance at the votes of the southern delegates really can definitely prove nothing.

Mr. Croly states that members of the convention did state that Hanna had more tickets than he could have obtained in any way except by purchase from colored delegates. Croly added: "Such practices were common at the time; but they were indefensible, and if they evoked a protest from Mr. Foraker, he deserves credit for the protest." But Mr. Foraker was not satisfied with this. He disliked Croly's use of the words 'some truth' which Croly used in reference to Foraker's statement concerning Hanna's purchase of tickets, and the discussion caused by it in the delegation. Foraker did not approve of what he considered Croly's minimizing. Looking back at Croly's words, did he minimize? Is it not that Foraker wanted to center all the discussion on the incident as the cause of trouble, while Croly believed as follows: "The split in the delegation must, however, be traced to a wholly different cause. Rightly or wrongly, not only Mr. Hanna but the other leading members of the delegation believed that Mr. Foraker

89. Hanna, Flynn, p.118.
90. Foraker, p.364.
91. Hanna, Croly, p.137.
92. Foraker, p.365.
was secretly hostile to Senator Sherman's chance of success. 

The quarrel as Beer terms the difficult relations of Foraker and Hanna, increased and their alliance ended on the last day of the convention of 1888. Croly likewise agrees that the friendship between Hanna and Foraker, if the latter part of it could be termed friendly, ended in June 1888. When their intimate friendly relationship ended, they became opponents, with Sherman, McKinley, Foster, Butterworth, and Hanna on one hand, and Foraker on the other.

In conclusion of the discussion of Hanna's relations with Foraker, it is important to note, that Foraker was able to hold his own single handed as a leader against Hanna and his important leading Republican friends; that Hanna and Foraker subordinated their personal hostility to the good of the Republican party, dividing offices, and talking from the same platforms; and finally, that Foraker's ill-feelings toward Hanna often embarrassed, inconvenienced and even defeated some of Hanna's plans.

Sherman had been defeated through no fault of Hanna. Hanna's loyalty to John Sherman received much praise in the Republican newspapers at the close of the convention of 1888. There is much in Hanna's relations to Sherman, the presidential candidate of 1888, as well as of 1884, that is admirable, which has been indicated, however little Hanna may be admired in any other regard.

93. Hanna, Croly, p.137.
94. Hanna, Beer, p.112.
95. Hanna, Croly, p.137.
96. Ibid., p.139.
97. Ibid.
Because of Hanna's own loyalty to Sherman, perhaps Hanna's admiration for McKinley can be understood. McKinley's loyalty impressed Hanna.\textsuperscript{99} Olcott states that Hanna was bitterly disappointed at Sherman's defeat. Therefore, Hanna's admiration of McKinley's loyalty and Hanna's disappointment at Sherman's defeat, led Hanna to look to McKinley. Likewise, Hanna's break with Foraker left another vacancy in Hanna's life. If Hanna had remained intimate with Foraker, he probably would not have become so intimate with McKinley.\textsuperscript{100} Hence, Hanna turned to consider McKinley.

Did Hanna still desire to "make a president?" If so, would McKinley be the right man? In this connection, Olcott has the following to say of Hanna:

He began to realize that if the object of his life's ambition was to be the placing of an Ohio man in the presidential chair, he must begin by selecting a man who had the ability to place himself in that position. Moreover, he came to see that if the protective tariff was to be maintained for the benefit of the business interests of the country, which he ardently desired, the result could not be more certainly achieved than by putting into the presidency the one man who was recognized as its foremost champion. That one man was an Ohio man.\textsuperscript{101}

That sounds very logical and very business like in reasoning, and Hanna was a very logical business man.

Most of the better historians agree that Hanna did wish to place a candidate, his candidate, in the presidential chair. Flynn writes:

Hanna was sure now that John Sherman could never be named. He was also convinced that McKinley could have been named with a proper drive behind the effort. He had no notion of relinquishing his one

\textsuperscript{99} Hanna, C\textit{fo}ly, p.137.
\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{101} McKinley, Olcott, Vol. 1, p.264.
ambition...to name a president...and he resolved to devote himself henceforth to bringing about the nomination of McKinley. ¹⁰²

It is not worth time discussing whether or not McKinley could have been nominated. Hanna had been working for Sherman, whom, at the time, he believed the right man. But now, it can be agreed I think, Sherman's chances were at an end. Hanna's ambition remained. McKinley looked like the one man. Hanna admired him besides. What followed?

But before considering what followed in the actual intense efforts of Hanna in 1895, to make McKinley the president, it is necessary to examine in more detail the relation of Hanna and McKinley in 1889, and the events from then until 1895 which bound the two men together in a firm political and personal friendship.

Hanna seemed to be the man of the hour, as well as McKinley, but each in a different way. A campaign was about to be waged on a business issue, high tariff, and Hanna was a business man. ¹⁰³ Hanna had always believed that business prospered better under Republican administration and was ever ready to spend his time and money in order to have Republicans elected. ¹⁰⁴ He was an advocate of protective tariff and of a sound currency system. ¹⁰⁵ Now, in 1888, a tariff scare seized some parts of the country and Hanna, just the man for the task, was placed by selection as financial auxiliary to the Republican national committee. ¹⁰⁶ Hanna believed rightly that the business man, who prospered under Republican government, would aid. He

¹⁰³. Hanna, Croly, p.143-146.
¹⁰⁴. Since the Civil War, Lingley, p.358.
¹⁰⁵. Ibid.
raised about one hundred thousand dollars in Toledo, Cleveland, Mahoning Valley and adjacent territory.107 Hanna became even more interested in politics than before, and gave a great deal of money because he considered Republicanism worth-while.108

On the other hand, McKinley was the man of the hour also. It has been mentioned that Flynn believed that Hanna thought McKinley could have been nominated in 1888.109 Rhodes also states that Hanna realized, after Sherman's defeat, that McKinley might have been nominated under certain circumstances.110 Thayer thinks that McKinley could have received the nomination in 1888, because of his popularity, if McKinley had only consented.111 If McKinley's chances had been so favorable in 1888, what would they become later added to the facts of his growing popularity, his position in regard to the tariff, and the absence of any strong Republican to give him real opposition?112 Hanna and McKinley, therefore, found in each other a helpful friend, with the same goal in view, McKinley as President, and with principles in politics the same.113 It seems that most of the writers emphasize the part that protection played in the friendship of Hanna and McKinley. Hanna himself wrote: "His splendid work in the cause of protection as a congressman further attracted me."114 It is impossible, in this brief treatment of the subject, to enumerate or record all the passages regarding protection.

108. Hanna, Croly, Chapter Thirteen.
110. Rhodes, p.4.
114. McKinley As I Knew Him, Hanna, p.46.
To sum up the reasons for the friendship of Hanna for McKinley, it can be said that, first, he admired McKinley for his loyalty to Sherman and for his personality which was pleasing;\textsuperscript{115} second, McKinley was a staunch advocate of protection;\textsuperscript{116} and finally, he believed that the prosperity of the country depended upon the election of Republicans to office and Republicans who believed in protection.\textsuperscript{117}

Many have said and will continue to state that Hanna was looking for his own gain. Olcott hastens to Hanna's defense as follows: "A close examination of Hanna's record after the election fails to reveal a single fact to disprove this statement: He took no undue advantage of his position as the President's best friend, and such political preferment as he received came as the result of the revelation of an unsuspected ability."\textsuperscript{118}

I have included this here, that we may examine for ourselves Hanna's conduct and judge whether the reasons I have given for this interest in McKinley and the Republican party are the right reasons, and that we may note, as the facts are presented, whether or not Hanna took advantage of McKinley and the party for his own personal gain.

In November, 1889, Hanna went to Washington a week before the meeting of the fifty first congress to do what he could to have his friend, McKinley, become Speaker of the House but McKinley was defeated for the Speakership.\textsuperscript{119} McCall says that this was interesting and the first appearance that was really conspicuous of Hanna as the manager of the McKinley campaign.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{115} McKinley, Olcott, Vol. 1, p.303.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Life and Letters of John Hay, Thayer, p.135-136.
\textsuperscript{118} McKinley, Olcott, Vol. 1, p.303.
\textsuperscript{119} Life of Thomas B. Reed, Samuel W. McCall, New York,1914, p.222.
In 1889, politics might have been interesting to Hanna but the losses were great and the gains and successes were few. Foraker, on whom Hanna had spent some money and much time, was his opponent. Sherman had been defeated more than once and Hanna's efforts put to naught. McKinley was defeated. President Harrison either ignored or disliked Mark Hanna, for in this year, all of the suggestions he made on behalf of his friends were turned down. He made most of his suggestions through Sherman. In June, 1889, Hanna opposed Foraker's nomination for governor. Foraker was nominated, though McKinley had nominated someone else. However, Foraker was not elected.

In 1889 and 1890, Hanna received several letters regarding patronage from McKinley who was in Washington. McKinley, a very careful man, wrote few letters.

Hanna was active for his two friends in 1891. McKinley, unopposed this time by Foraker, was running for governor, while Sherman was running against Foraker for Senator.

Hanna gave most of his time and efforts to Sherman. He went to Columbus a week before the caucus and took personal charge of Sherman's campaign. Foraker said that the situation looked desperate but that it was saved for Sherman by Hanna's enthusiasm and work. Sherman received fifty three votes and Foraker thirty eight. Foraker stated that he did not wish to discuss the campaign that left Sherman victorious, but that

---

120. (continued from page 42.) Life of Thomas B. Reed, McCall, p.222.
121. Hanna, Croly, Chapter Thirteen.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
Hanna was openly accused of some indefensible practices, whether rightly or wrongly, Foraker knew not. However, Foraker, an opponent of both Sherman and Hanna, admitted that he did not know if the charges were true or not, and did not state what these charges were or by whom they were made. On January 9th, 1892, Sherman wrote as follows, to Hanna:

I feel that without you, I would have been beaten. If was your foresight in securing the Cleveland delegation that gave me the strongest support and made it possible to counteract the evil influence of Hamilton County delegation. You have been a true friend, liberal, earnest and sincere, without any personal selfish motives but only guided by the sense of what is best for Ohio and the country.  

Though Hanna, in 1891, gave most of his efforts to Sherman's campaign, he also gave a great deal of money to McKinley and helped raise money for his friend. Hanna felt that the state committee would take care of McKinley's campaign. Flynn states that McKinley never hesitated to borrow money from Hanna and concludes by saying directly: "His personal campaign expenses were paid by Hanna in 1891." Likewise, speaking of Hanna's work on behalf of McKinley in 1891, Haworth writes as follows: "It was largely through his efforts that the 'high priest of protection' became governor."  

This year, 1891, was a year of Republican defeat and Hanna's two candidates brought the only ray of brightness. McKinley had been elected by an unusually large majority. Thomas B. Reed, the former Speaker, wrote to McKinley and said that if McKinley ever wanted him, Reed, to do any-
thing, he should send Mark Hanna. 130

These victories in the Fall of 1891 were the first successful substantial fruits of Hanna’s political efforts. Should he push McKinley for candidate for the presidency in 1892? It was dangerous to oppose Harrison’s renomination, while if Harrison was renominated and defeated, McKinley would more than ever be the possibility in 1896. 131 Rhodes states that business difficulties distracted Hanna’s mind from politics from 1890 to 1892 and therefore, he did not take an important part in the 1892 convention; that some might have thought Hanna was losing his hold on politics but that in reality, he was merely biding his time. 132 Hanna, seeing that McKinley’s time had not yet come in 1892, kept McKinley in comment and attention at the convention. McKinley, as permanent chairman, though his name was not placed in nomination, received 182 votes in 1892. 133 Hanna contrived in the coming months to have McKinley deliver a series of lectures in places where he would attract attention. 134 Hanna was biding his time in placing McKinley’s name for nomination but clearing the ground and securing strategic points for his friend, using the same tactics in politics as he had used in business. Even Foraker, who decided with his friends that some new candidate ought to be nominated, says that he forgot his opposition to Hanna and consulted him about McKinley’s chances in 1892. 135 It is to the credit of both Foraker and Hanna that they worked in harmony concerning McKinley.

131. Ibid., p.166.
132. Rhodes, p.4.
133. Hanna, Flynn, p.120.
134. Ibid.
135. Foraker, p.448.
There was no real intention of nominating McKinley in 1892, for Hanna did not believe it to be a Republican year, but the first work for McKinley's future nomination in 1896 was done in 1892. Kohlsaat goes on to say: "Mr. Hanna's fear that 1892 was not a Republican year was realized. But the organization to nominate McKinley in 1896 was actively at work...Each man who declared himself favorable to McKinley's nomination was enrolled alphabetically under Hanna's supervision."

At the close of the year 1892, the outlook for McKinley as the most successful candidate for the presidency was bright. Platt said: "Hanna really began his campaign to make McKinley president, immediately after the defeat of Harrison in 1892. He had the South practically solid before some of us awakened." Hanna used the same foresight for McKinley that he used for Sherman in 1891. But the outlook was not bright for long, for in February 1893, something happened that Hanna could not foresee,---McKinley went bankrupt!

McKinley, in his youth, borrowed about $5000 from Walker to pay for his law studies, and later, when McKinley was governor, he endorsed the notes of Walker. One of these notes went to Herrick's bank. Herrick learned the story from McKinley and paid Walker the once borrowed $5000. But the endorsed notes continued to appear, amounting to $130,000, and finally, Walker's business was devoured in the depression. Croly tells the same story but places the amount of endorsed notes at $100,000.

137. Ibid., p.110.
140. Hanna, Flynn, p.121.
141. Ibid.
Rhodes places the sum, also, at $130,000 and says that McKinley had no other thought but that the money must be paid in full and hence his political future would be ended. 143 McKinley went to Herrick in distress.

At first, McKinley and his few friends who knew of it, thought the amount of notes endorsed was only $17,000. The Sunday morning Buffalo papers stated that instead of the $17,000 of the first despatch, 144 the endorsed notes amounted to $98,000, and Kohlsaat narrates that McKinley said: "I wish Mark was here." 146 Hanna was in Milwaukee but was coming to Chicago. 147 Kohlsaat, McDougal and Herrick had raised a fund to meet the first demands, but Hanna saved the situation, with the added aid of John Hay, Wade, Pope, Brush, Taft, and others. 148

The question is always asked—-did McKinley repay his friends either in money or in favors? Kohlsaat says that McKinley never knew who subscribed the money and that the list was refused him when, as President, he asked for it that he might pay the money from his salary. 149 Sullivan writes: "Hanna and some associates collected a fund that paid McKinley's debts and enabled him to remain in public life. Neither this nor any other aspect of the relation between the two men was sordid." 150 The same writer goes on to state at length that the business men favored McKinley because he was a believer in protective tariff but that Hanna admired McKinley. 151

143. Rhodes, p.11.
144. McKinley to Harding, Kohlsaat, p.11.
145. Ibid., p.12.
146. Ibid., p.113.
147. Ibid.
149. McKinley to Harding, Kohlsaat, p.16.
151. Ibid.
Regarding the reproaches that McKinley received in that he was indebted to his friends financially, Rhodes concludes: "But it does not appear that any of them asked for consideration or that anything was done for the raisers of the fund except for Hanna and Herrick who received McKinley's support on entirely different grounds."152 The outlook for McKinley was again bright.

The outlook for McKinley grew brighter as the year 1893 progressed. He was reelected governor of Ohio in November by the largest majority in that state since the Civil War.153 In the same month his name was placed on the editorial page of the Cleveland Leader as its candidate for President in 1896. In the same paper, the first cartoon of McKinley as the Rising Sun of Prosperity appeared on November 18th, 1893, and thereafter Hanna did his best to make good use of the idea and impress upon the mind of the people the connection between McKinley and prosperity.154 At Hanna's expense the Cleveland Leader was circulated widely.155 By the end of the year 1893, McKinley was being named as the logical candidate for president in 1896.

In 1894, things looked even more favorable for McKinley's chances. There was Republican majority in the House and the former McKinley bill became less odious because of the new Wilson bill which was a failure.156 Hanna firmly believed that the nomination of McKinley would restore American business to its normal state; and now that the triumph of his party would mean business prosperity, he decided to become more intimately associated with politics and less with business.157

152. Rhodes, p.11. 155. Ibid.
154. Ibid., p.172-173. 157. Ibid.
Hanna went to his brother in 1894 to announce his withdrawal from active service in business, that he might give more time to the nomination of McKinley.\(^{158}\) He went into his new work with fervor and unselfish motives, not seeking office for himself but ascendancy for his party.\(^{159}\)

There seems no reason to object to the statement of Hanna's good motives for leaving business and devoting his entire time to serving his party, which, in 1895, meant to Hanna the nomination of McKinley; but one writer after another records that Hanna left business, (as he told his brother in 1894), because he was weary of office routine and wished to amuse himself;\(^{160}\) that Hanna had become more and more fascinated with the game of national politics,\(^{161}\) until he came to the parting of the ways of equal interest in politics and business, and, absorbed in politics, he determined to give all his time to McKinley, whom he admired and who needed him.\(^{162}\)

I will use no space to show what others write of Hanna's skill and competence as McKinley's manager because it seems to me that the following pages of this thesis, and many of the pages so far, have indicated in Hanna's actions, his skill and foresight.

However, the insinuation is made that it was not Hanna's skill as a manager, or McKinley's popularity and position, that won victory for Hanna's candidate in 1896 but Hanna's money;\(^{163}\) or that, failing to get what he wanted by talking the other 'fellow' out, Hanna bought what he desired.\(^{164}\)

\(^{158}\) Rhodes, p.5
\(^{159}\) McKinley, Olcott, Vol. 1, p.259.
\(^{160}\) Strenuous Americans, R.F. Dibble, New York, 1923, p.34-341.
\(^{161}\) Fifty Years of Public Service, Shelby M. Cullom, Chicago, 1911, p.281.
\(^{162}\) Hanna, Croly, p.173-174.
\(^{163}\) Hanna, Lauer, p.125.
Beard says that this charge has never been sustained satisfactorily to his friends. Croly gives specific dates and letters when Hanna wrote saying that his agents should not buy votes and should only spend money in districts favorable to McKinley and spend that money carefully as he, Hanna, was hard pressed. Rhodes says that Hanna spent every dollar making it go the greatest way, and quotes Croly as stating that Hanna spent something over $100,000 for McKinley's nomination campaign. It is important to recall that Hanna was spending his own time and money, and Haworth says that Hanna spent both lavishly. I am not trying to show that Hanna never used corrupt methods but I hope to indicate that Hanna used more than money. His relation to the party at this time, or any other time, was not that of a rich man handing out gold, buying his objects, but was that of a competent, business like, skillful manager willing to give intense, enthusiastic, capable, personal service.

The first thing Hanna did, after he decided to nominate McKinley, was to secure the Republican national convention committee; therefore, he sent agents to the different members of this committee and thirty five of the fifty agreed to stand with the McKinley delegation.

In 1895, Hanna rented a house for five years in Georgia and invited governor McKinley there as his guest. Kohlsaat writes: "Mr. Hanna sent for a number of the Republican leaders in the southern states and had them

164. (continued from page 49) From Harrison to Harding, Arthur Wallace Dunn, New York, 1922, p.171.
169. From Harrison to Harding, Dunn, p.171.
meet McKinley, one or two at a time, in the beautiful sun parlor of the house. I think, without exception, they were delighted with the governor, and pledged their support in 1896, and most of them kept their pledge.\(^{171}\) Groly says that Hanna showed good judgment in this move, and later the tide for McKinley could not be stopped in the south.\(^{172}\) But while securing the south, Hanna did not neglect using every effort to secure northern delegates.\(^{173}\)

No story of the pre-convention campaign for McKinley would be complete without a brief discussion of the relation of Hanna and McKinley to the New York 'bosses.' In the Fall of 1895, Hanna was asked to go East to enlist Platt of New York and Quay of Pennsylvania for McKinley's candidacy.\(^{174}\) These Eastern 'bosses' were opposing McKinley, it was thought, because they themselves wished to be recognized and consulted.\(^{175}\)

In due time, Hanna returned with the terms and met Herrick and McKinley privately at Hanna's own home and announced these terms as the assured patronage of New York, of Pennsylvania, and of New England,\(^{176}\) with perhaps one or two cabinet positions.\(^{177}\) According to Kohlsaat's account, Hanna said: "They want a promise that you will appoint Platt Secretary of the Treasury, and they want it in writing."\(^{178}\) Hanna was inclined to agree, but McKinley refused,\(^{179}\) and Hanna immediately saw that McKinley was right and admired McKinley the more for refusing the bargain.

\(^{171}\) McKinley to Harding, Kohlsaat, p.23.
\(^{172}\) Contemporary American History, Beard, p.241.
\(^{173}\) Hanna, Groly, p.174-176.
\(^{174}\) McKinley to Harding, Kohlsaat, p.30.
\(^{175}\) McKinley, Olcott, Vol. 1, p.380.
\(^{176}\) Ibid.
\(^{177}\) Hanna, Groly, p.178-179.
\(^{178}\) McKinley to Harding, Kohlsaat, p.31.
when the refusal might cost him the presidency.\textsuperscript{180} It seems that, if nominated, McKinley would be in danger of losing New York's electoral vote unless the 'bosses' were propitiated, and that this opposition was made to McKinley to bring him and Hanna to terms.\textsuperscript{181} One account after another verifies the incident in Hanna's "dem," showing McKinley's refusal, Hanna's instant acceptance and admiration of the refusal.

On January 7th, 1896, the bosses met in New York to decide how to defeat the nomination of McKinley and determined to put up favorite sons, Reed, Morton, Quay, and Allison.\textsuperscript{182} Hanna, in turn, and it was a master stroke, said that the bosses were opposing the wish of the people, McKinley's nomination.\textsuperscript{183}

On February 4, 1896, Harrison announced that he was not a candidate and McKinley gained Indiana. He had all the states west of the Mississippi except Iowa.\textsuperscript{184} On March 11, 1896, at the Ohio state convention, Foraker made the speech for McKinley, emphasizing the importance of protectionist legislation for the return of prosperity and dodged the money question except to declare that McKinley and the party was for 'sound' money.\textsuperscript{185}

Olcott, (and Croly is in agreement,) said that it was strongly believed that the endorsement of Illinois, following the other states already for McKinley, would assure his nomination.\textsuperscript{186} Charles D. Dawes, greatly interested in Hanna's success, offered his services free and deserves a great deal of credit for gaining the endorsement of Illinois for McKinley.\textsuperscript{187}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{180} McKinley, Olcott, Vol. 1, p.301.
\item \textsuperscript{181} Platt and His New York Machine, Gosnell, p.114.
\item \textsuperscript{182} Hanna, Croly, pp.178-181.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Stranuous Americans, Dibble, p.352.
\item \textsuperscript{184} Hanna, Croly, p.181.
\item \textsuperscript{185} Ibid., p.182.
\item \textsuperscript{186} McKinley, Olcott, Vol. 1, p.308.
\item \textsuperscript{187} For McKinley.
\end{itemize}
By the middle of April, 1896, Hanna was confident of success for McKinley in the coming June convention.

Flynn thinks that Hanna's rise to leadership was very fitting, as Hanna embodied and expressed a certain phase of public opinion, which could not be expressed completely by lawyers or politicians and which always distinguished Hanna from the ordinary political professional.

188. Hanna, Flynn, p.124.
189. Hanna, Croly, p.188.
CHAPTER III

HANNA AND REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES IN 1896

Convention assembles at St. Louis...Forming a tentative platform...Hanna's attitude toward gold...Discussion of the currency plank...Republicans adopt gold plank...
Convention nominates McKinley...Hanna plans 1896 campaign...
...McKinley's "front porch" campaign...Hanna must secure funds...Hanna's campaign of education successful...
CHAPTER III

HANNA AND REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES IN 1896

Dibble tells us that in "the actual making of a President by a private citizen" we are dealing with one of the most fascinating chapters in political history. He describes this private citizen, Hanna, as one "who was possessed of much money, more enthusiasm, and extraordinary ability as an administrator and political adventurer."2

By May 1896 Hanna had every reason to believe that McKinley's nomination was assured. McKinley and a few friends drew up a tentative draft of the statement of true Republican principles and policies.3

The convention assembled June 15, 1896 at St. Louis, and Pringle states that the nomination of Hanna's candidate had been conceded.4 Beer writes regarding the delegates at this convention: "They came to the convention knowing that this unknown monster of Cleveland had already secured William McKinley's nomination. His allies had caused the Republican conventions of nine states to pledge delegates to support Mr. McKinley, and the Southern Republicans...were loyal to the Major."5 Basset writes that protection was a persuasive argument when urged by Hanna, and that consequently Hanna was so successful in his quest for

2. Ibid.
delegates that he arrived at St. Louis with his pocket full of votes.6

Dunn states that the New Hanna method was more certain than the old method of securing delegates after they reached the convention city.7 He goes on to say that it was not until the convention was about to assemble that Reed and the other candidates realized the fact of Hanna’s work in the South, and that Hanna had a clear working majority.8

Thomas B. Reed had been a source of anxiety to Hanna, for he was the strongest of the other possible candidates, but Hanna had cultivated the demand for McKinley and had fought the idea of favorite sons even in state conventions.9 When the convention assembled, Reed was no longer an anxiety to Hanna, for Reed’s candidacy was too sectional, and McKinley had as much strength in New England, Reed’s section, as Reed had in all the rest of the states.10

Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana was temporary chairman of the Republican national convention of 1896, and Senator John Thurston of Nebraska was permanent chairman.11 McKinley’s name was placed before the convention by Foraker of Ohio, while Reed, McKinley’s closest rival for the nomination, was placed by Lodge of Massachusetts.12 Hanna had told Kohlsaat that they had over 530 votes pledged for McKinley and it only took 463 votes to nominate him.13 Croly states that on the first ballot, McKinley received 661 2/3 votes, while Reed, his nearest competitor,

7. From Harrison to Harding, Dunn, p. 173.
8. Ibid., p. 164-165.
9. Since the Civil War, Lingley, p. 360.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 190-191.
13. From McKinley to Harding, Kohlsaat, p. 36.
received 84\(\frac{1}{2}\) votes. 14 Kohlsaat writes: "McKinley actually received 564, which was 100 more than necessary in a total of 924 in the convention." 15

But the convention was not manageable in every respect, for in the important matter of the currency plank the hands of McKinley and Hanna were forced. 16 This made havoc of all the carefully laid plans of McKinley and Hanna. Warner explains it this way: "It was certain that the Republican National Convention would nominate William McKinley for the Presidency; Mr. Hanna had spent some years making that certain, but it was not certain what the attitude of the Republicans would be on the question of the free coinage of Silver." 17

What was McKinley's position in regard to this currency question? What had been his record in relation to money? If possible, did McKinley wish to stress the issue of protection? Was Hanna's position in regard to gold the same as McKinley's? There are various and contradictory answers to these questions and it may be well to examine some of them briefly.

Myers writes, "both McKinley and Hanna desired to make the tariff the main issue." 18 McKinley did not wish to see his favorite policy, that of protection, forced into the background into insignificance, and at the same time he did not wish to assume a precise attitude in relation to the currency question which he had always preferred to leave vague. 19

15. Kohlsaat, p.36.
McKinley thought that such a position would endanger his candidacy.

Haworth writes the following in way of explanation of McKinley's position: "McKinley's record regarding silver was by no means a consistent one, and for this and other reasons he and Hanna had paraded the tariff as the important issue." They wished, first of all, to secure the nomination for McKinley. Rhodes further explains the position when he declares that "McKinley and Hanna had been favorable to silver for eighteen years when it fell to them to decide the issue... And they both,...desired to have the paramount issue the tariff." This does not mean that Hanna was not now in favor of the gold standard as the basis of currency, but he had to consider McKinley's candidacy, and it was more prudent to make vague an issue that might harm McKinley's chances in any way. Flynn states that "Hanna's strategy was designed to suppress the silver issue" because McKinley's record on that point was bad, because the West was for bimetalism, while the East which was Republican and powerful was for gold. When Hanna was asked by the delegates and newspapers where McKinley stood in regard to the money issue, he replied that the convention and not the candidate made the platform. It was evident that Hanna did not wish to discuss the issue, but where did he himself stand in regard to the money question?

Croly states that as early, definitely, as August, 1895, Hanna was in favor of committing the Republican party to gold as the sole basis of currency. Hanna was enough of a banker to realize that the country was

23. Ibid.
suffering in business because of the lack of a certain decided standard of value.25 Croly says that Hanna's view differed from that of McKinley, and because McKinley was the candidate, Hanna allowed his view to prevail and also because this might gain some of the Western delegates for McKinley.26 Thayer agrees that "Hanna himself, as capitalist and financier, preferred gold;".27 Before the convention, there was a drift among the Republicans toward gold because of the movement toward silver among the Democrats. Of Hanna's position at that time, Bassett writes: "Hanna was personally for gold; the men to whom he appealed were for gold, but he dared not avow it too early lest it turn Western delegates from McKinley."28 Beer sums up Hanna's problems as follows: "He must conciliate the East, if he could. He must keep the Silver faction in the party, if he could. He must clearly have the convention declare for the gold standard in its published platform. A declaration for sound currency would be insufficient."29 What success did Hanna have in meeting these problems?

A great deal of controversy has arisen about the way in which the word 'gold' was placed in the currency plank.30 A detailed study of the claims of various men as the authors responsible for this insertion would not further the purpose of this thesis, and will be merely mentioned briefly. Hanna's relation to the gold plank is of importance. Did the plank he brought to the convention contain the word 'gold'? How did Hanna

26. Ibid.
29. Hanna, Beer, p.143-144.
deal with the men of the East who favored gold? How did he retain the votes of the Silver delegates or did he lose those votes by declaring openly for gold?

Olcott claims that McKinley's friends went to the convention as a unit in favor of the gold standard, and that these friends included such men as Hanna, Herrick, Fairbanks, Proctor, Merriam and other prominent Republicans.31 Millis claims that nearly a year before the convention, Hanna had announced his belief that the Republican party should be committed to the single gold standard.32 Lingley says that Hanna was ready to declare for gold just as soon as he was assured of the nomination of McKinley.33 In consideration of the various opinions, it seems fairly certain that Hanna was in favor of adopting gold as the single standard of value as a plank in the 1896 platform, if the opportunity presented itself and did not endanger McKinley's candidacy.

Among those who claim responsibility and credit for the insertion of the word 'gold' in the currency platform is Foraker.34 Croly admits that it is difficult to state just who really deserves the credit, and not very important, but that all the stories agree in certain fundamentals, and that from these facts upon which all agree, a story of the gold plank can be related with certainty.35 Foraker arrived at St. Louis about the Saturday before the convention met, and most of the work on the currency plank had been done by then.36 Proctor, Herrick and Osborne made up the group which first discussed the money issue, at the beginning of the week before the

33. Since the Civil War, Lingley, p.361.
36. Ibid., p.195-196.
convention assembled. Hanna did not give much time to discussion of the platform but knew what was going on. In the middle of the week, the group was enlarged to include Merriam, Stone and Payne. On Wednesday morning, Hanna gave a copy of the draft to Payne requesting revision by the conference, and that it be put into final shape. The discussion continued on Thursday, and Mr. Payne was asked to prepare another draft of the money plank for Friday.

Kohlsaat joined the group on Friday, June 12, and was the most insistent of all that the word 'gold' be inserted before the word 'standard.' Dunn says that the plank approved by Hanna finally would be the plank in the platform. On Friday, Hanna agreed to urge McKinley to accept the plank with the word 'gold' before standard. Alexander states that the word 'gold' had been inserted with Hanna's approval on that day, June 12. The draft of the currency plank proposed by McKinley and taken to the convention city by Hanna had declared for the use of silver along with gold, for McKinley believed at the time that such a plank would be best for his candidacy. In regard to this matter, Kohlsaat states that on June 7, he had gone to Canton to urge McKinley to declare for the single 'gold' standard, but that McKinley had considered it unwise. McKinley told Kohlsaat that Reid, editor of the New York Tribune, had advised against declaring for gold and had said: "If a gold plank is adopted we will not carry a state west of the Mississippi River."
Lingley says that as leader after leader came to the convention, it became increasingly evident to Hanna that he must be very cautious. He adds: "If McKinley committed himself to gold, the silveradvocates would balk at his candidacy, and perhaps unite on somebody else; if he committed himself to silver, he would lose the eastern leaders." Therefore, Hanna was cautious, but on Friday June 12, he urged McKinley to accept the plank, and Herrick telephoned McKinley and obtained approval. Olcott declares that McKinley was not afraid of a 'strong plank' and consented readily when advised by such friends as Hanna and Herrick. On the next day, the Saturday before the convention, it was understood by some that a gold plank would be included in the platform, for some of the silver men began to organize the movement to leave the convention. However, it was not generally known, as can be seen from the actions of the Eastern men who arrived Sunday.

The Eastern men, and Rhodes says that Senator Lodge may be said to have been their leader, were for gold, in the pre-convention days, while the men of the Middle West desired a plank that could be interpreted as favoring gold for the East and yet not condemning silver. Hanna had to please everyone, and therefore, he did not allow the Eastern men to know that on Friday a plank with the word 'gold' had been accepted and approved. Both Platt and Lodge claim to be responsible for the acceptance of the gold standard, but as Dunn knows, and Croly is in agreement, Platt arrived Thursday morning, June 11, and did not interest himself about the gold plank.

45. Since the Civil War, Lingley, p.362.
46. Croly, p.198.
47. McKinley, Olcott, Vol. 1, p.314.
49. Rhodes, p.15.
until Lodge's arrival on Saturday, June 13, and at this time, the word 'gold' had already been inserted and recognized by some. Kohlsaat states that Lodge arrived at St. Louis on Sunday afternoon, June 14, but this information does not change the fact that Lodge arrived after the plank had been accepted. On June 15, Lodge said: "Mr. Hanna, I insist on a positive declaration for a gold standard plank in the platform," and Hanna replied that Lodge had nothing to say about it. Lodge then said: "All right, sir; I will make my fight on the floor of the convention." Bruce Higginson said to William C. Beer: "I think Mr. Hanna was right to let it seem that the eastern end of the party forced his hand in declaring for the gold standard. Herrick and he had it all arranged when they came to St. Louis. Lodge never got there until Sunday. He came on the same train I did... I suppose he thinks he had something to do with it."

The Associated Press spoke of the plank as the Kohlsaat Plank, but Kohlsaat writes: "I had nothing whatever to do with writing the plank, except to put the word 'gold' between the words 'existing' and 'standard.' Everyone of the seven men present was a strong gold advocate, but some feared it would defeat McKinley if the offensive word was put in the platform." This does not stand as definite proof that Kohlsaat alone was responsible for the insertion of the word 'gold.' All accounts do not agree upon that fact. At all events, the word 'gold' was inserted and the

50. Dunn, p.178.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
55. Kohlsaat, p.36.
plank was accepted Friday, June 12.

The text of this much discussed plank as it came from the committee and appeared in the platform read: "The Republican party is unreservedly for sound money. It caused the enactment of a law providing for the resumption of specie payments in 1879. Since then every dollar has been as good as gold. We are unalterably opposed to every measure calculated to debase our currency or impair the credit of our country. We are therefore opposed to the free coinage of silver, except by international agreement with the leading commercial nations of the earth, which agreement we pledge ourselves to promote; and until such agreement can be obtained the existing gold standard must be maintained. All of our silver and paper currency must be maintained at parity with gold, and we favor all measures designed to maintain inviolably the obligations of the United States, and all our money, whether coin or paper, at the present standard, the standard of the most enlightened nations of the earth."56 Rhodes says that this was accepted by Senator Lodge and his associates and adopted by the convention.57

Alexander states that Hanna said to Mr. Kohlsaat: "I am just as strong a gold man as you are, but if I had been as outspoken as you, I could not have gotten the votes for McKinley."58 Kohlsaat says that Hanna added: "I want you to know I love you just as much as ever."59 Croly says that the salutary result was accomplished without a serious bolt because of Hanna's skillful work in getting the convention to declare itself which

57. Rhodes, p.15.
59. Kohlsaat, p.86.
60. Croly, p.204.
The only available account of Hanna's relation to the gold plank is contained in a letter from him to Mr. A. McClure written on June 28, 1900. Among other things, Hanna wrote in that letter: "I do not care to have go into print all that I told you personally in regard to the gold plank of the St. Louis platform...My part of the business was to harmonize all sections and prevent any discussion of the subject outside the Committee which would line up any factions against it, (except the ultra silver men). In that, I succeeded, and felt willing to give all the credit claimed by those who assisted. The original memorandum is in the possession of a personal friend, whom I do not care to name without his consent. The whole thing was managed in order to succeed in getting what we got, and that was my only interest." In politics as in business Hanna wanted results, worked in a businesslike manner to attain these results, and was loyal to his friends.

At the convention the role of the states was called, but there was no live demonstration until the clerk called 'Ohio'. McKinley received 661\(\frac{3}{2}\) votes, and was nominated therefore by an overwhelmingly large majority.

Beer states that the delegates then 'howled for Hanna' and people stood up for a first glimpse of this new leader. Hanna finally spoke and claimed that the nomination was made by the people, and added: "What

---

60 (on preceding page)
64. Alexander, p.255.
feeble efforts I may have contributed to the result, I am here to lay the fruits of it as the feet of my party and upon the altar of my country."66 Flynn seems correct in his judgment that Hanna was as experienced a political leader as any man in the convention.67 According to Pringle, Hanna was modest in receiving congratulations, but was certain that 'prosperity would soon return.'68 Croly states that the ovation given Hanna by the convention was but the first of many, but that Hanna never became conceited, and Croly relates some incidents to substantiate his claim.69 Because of Hanna's ability as a manager and his friendship with McKinley, he was marked as the director of the coming campaign. Therefore, Hanna was elected chairman of the national committee.70

Hanna had planned to take a vacation, a holiday and cruise along the New England coast, but the Chicago Democratic national convention which nominated Bryan for the presidency changed everything.71 Hanna wrote that the campaign would mean work and hard work from the start.72

Croly states that the Republicans never anticipated that by virtue of the currency issue, a period of economic depression could be used by the Democrats for their political profit.73 The people knew that the cause of the depression was not a Democratic president or the Wilson bill. They turned to Bryan because he provided them with a better reason apparently for the privation. Bryan's speeches took on an appeal that worried the Republicans. In July 1896, it was hard for the Republicans to estimate

69. Croly, p.207.
70. Ibid., p.206.
71. Rhodes, p.19.
72. _Our Times, the Turn of the Century_, Mark Sullivan, New York, 1926, p.194.
how far the ignorance of the people could be enlightened, or the impetus in favor of Bryan diverted. 74 Hanna agreed that if the Democratic con-
vention had been held in August or September, Bryan might have been elected in the Fall. The Republicans realized they had a sentiment and a cause to fight, and that Bryan, the leader of that sentiment and cause, was more convinced of the righteousness of his cause than presidential candi-
dates usually were. 75

Croly states that it was fortunate for the Republicans that Bryan's appeal of 'cheaper money' and 'free coinage of silver' was a sectional interest as well as a class interest. 76 Dunn writes: "However, there were enough advocates of and believers in the free coinage of silver to make it a dangerous issue." 77 Hanna's problem was most difficult and he realized it.

Between June 18 and July 3, public sentiment showed that the Republi-
can party, which had identified itself with gold, was in great danger of losing some of the Western states. 78 At this time, Hanna wrote: "I would have been glad to have escaped the responsibility of managing the campaign, but there was no way out of it and I feel that I am enlisted for the war and must win." 79 He declared also that the situation in the West was alarming, that business was 'going to pieces' and that the cry for 'free silver would be catching.' 80

The duty of the Republican national committee, with Hanna as its leader, was to explain fully to the voters the meaning of the Democratic

74. Croly, p.209.
76. Croly, p.211.
78. Rhodes, p.17.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., p.19.
platform and convince the voters of its error.\textsuperscript{81} Croly says that it was a case of undermining by thorough discussion and explanation the foundations of a dangerous mistake.\textsuperscript{82} Hanna was aware of the kind of campaign needed, but the difficulty was in organizing, equipping and distributing necessary information in the proper places within the limited time of campaign. On July 3, Hanna wrote: "I must get the work of education started...The fight will be in the Mississippi Valley States."\textsuperscript{83}

Usually the campaign was mainly carried on in a few dubious states, but in this campaign the field was enlarged to consist of half the country. Most of the work fell on the national committee, which became the staff of a whole army of state committees and Republican party workers.\textsuperscript{84} Croly says, and most writers agree, that Hanna was the real architect of the plan, the engineer of the machinery, as well as the source of energy of the campaign.\textsuperscript{85}

In this campaign, there were two headquarters, one at New York and the other at Chicago. Hanna spent most of his time in New York in order to raise money to meet the great expense of this campaign. The headquarters at Chicago attended to the educational part of the campaign. Hanna chose able men for the Chicago headquarters, Payne of Wisconsin, vice-chairman, Dawes, and Perry Heath who was in charge of the press matter.\textsuperscript{86} In New York, Hanna was aided by Quay, Manley, Clayton and Scott. There was also a new system of book-keeping to record a proper amount of the way in which the money was spent by the committee.

\textsuperscript{81} Croly, p.211.  
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., p.212.  
\textsuperscript{83} Rhodes, p.17.  
\textsuperscript{84} Croly, p.213.  
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{86} Croly, p.214.
Hanna needed a measure to counteract Bryan's stumping tour, and he decided that the people should come to McKinley. McKinley must be kept before the people. This was known as McKinley's "front porch" campaign, and Hanna worked the idea to the limits of propaganda and effective use. Olcott states that the danger of Bryan's gaining the voters because of his moving speeches was great, and that Mr. Hanna's greatest service to McKinley consisted in "the masterly skill with which he laid down the issues before the voters of the country." The "front porch" campaign was one of the ways in which Hanna kept the issues before the voters.

Werner says that when people heard Bryan they were impressed by the wonderful way he spoke but not by what he said, and that they voted for McKinley because they were impressed with what he expressed in his "front porch" speeches. How was this "front porch" campaign carried on by McKinley?

Rhodes sums up the "front porch" campaign as follows: "Probably the most effective speaker in gaining votes was McKinley himself. Declining to emulate Bryan in his 'whirlwind tour', he spoke from the veranda of his house in Canton to many deputations, some of them spontaneous, others arranged for, discussing mainly the financial question. He almost always knew what the visiting spokesman was going to say so that he was often able to revise his own address beforehand. These speeches of McKinley's were carefully prepared, as he well knew that he was addressing the newspaper-reading public of the whole country as well as the men who had travelled some distance to greet their candidates in person."

89. Bryan, Werner, p.120.
90. Rhodes, p.24-25
gives a detailed account of the way in which McKinley prepared to meet these delegations and answer them.91 These delegations included thousands of people carried to Canton by trains, and this involved great expense. The point to be remembered is that while Bryan's speeches deteriorated with time and repetition, and decreased in appeal as the campaign progressed, McKinley's speeches steadily improved with time, and as the campaign progressed the good sense and sound principles contained in many of them were received favorably by the people.92 Therefore, Bryan's chances for election lessened as the Fall approached and McKinley's chances became more favorable. It is fair to state too that the Republicans had more speakers who knew what they were talking about, than the Democrats.93 Croly states that the Republicans had 1400 paid campaigners who spoke and believed what they said.94 There was yet another phase of Hanna's plan of the campaign of education.

Hanna felt the responsibility and need of placing McKinley's forceful speeches, as well as other sound financial material, before the millions of people who could not go to Canton.95 Myers states that Hanna had a firm belief in the common sense of the voters, and believed that they merely needed to be informed to realize the sense of the Republican financial issue.96 The same writer claims that Hanna was completely successful in his undertaking because of his genius for organization, his power of direction, and his keen insight into men and affairs.97

91. Croly, p.216.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid., p.217.
94. Ibid.
95. Scott, Vol. 1, p.325.
97. Ibid.
Rhodes declares that Hanna knew the power of the weekly county journals on their readers, and therefore, he sent them specially prepared matter, ready prints and plates.\textsuperscript{98} Croly states that these country journals served 1,650,000 and that they received three and a half columns of matter every week.\textsuperscript{99} He supplied the country newspapers with 100,000 plates. Another class received ready made prints and buttons. Rhodes adds that nearly all the large daily newspapers, Republican and Democratic, were in favor of sound money.\textsuperscript{100}

Werner writes that it was estimated that the Republicans sent out 120,000,000 pamphlets, most of them on the financial question, in many languages, including Hebrew, French, German, Italian and Scandinavian.\textsuperscript{101} These were prepared by the national committee, but distributed by the state committees. These state committees were often not as energetic or intelligent as they could be.\textsuperscript{102} Croly agrees with the above figures of Werner, stating that 100,000,000 pamphlets were sent out from the Chicago headquarters and 20,000,000 from New York.\textsuperscript{103} The 'Free Coinage Catechism' written by Alexander Noyes, financial editor of the \textit{New York Evening Post}, was very popular, much in demand, and gladly supplied.\textsuperscript{104} Other pamphlets widely distributed contained speeches of Sherman, Carlisle, and McKinley. There were 275 different pamphlets distributed and most of these dealt with the question of sound money.\textsuperscript{105}

The 'front porch' campaign of McKinley, the army of paid Republican campaigners, and the actual campaign of education itself, in the preparation

\textsuperscript{98} Rhodes, p.26.
\textsuperscript{99} Croly, p.218.
\textsuperscript{100} Rhodes, p.26.
\textsuperscript{101} Bryah, Werner, p.102.
\textsuperscript{102} Croly, p.218.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., p.217.
\textsuperscript{104} Rhodes, p.24.
\textsuperscript{105} Croly, p.217.
distribution of campaign literature, involved great expense. Hanna had conceived the plan, but it was Hanna's task to supply the necessary money also. Hanna must find the means to pay for the campaign.106

Croly explains that Hanna was not well known at this time in New York, and that it was no easy task for him to collect campaign funds.107 Wall Street had not favored McKinley. Werner says that Hanna visited New York to raise the largest campaign fund ever used in the history of the United States.108 The clerk of the House of Representatives estimates the Republican campaign fund in 1896 at $16,000,000 while the fund of the Democrats of the same year he estimates as $425,000.109 Quotations like the following quotation from Cullom are well known: "Money was spent freely in characteristic Hanna fashion, his motto being, 'accomplish results.'"110 The statements are true, but the story of Hanna's attempts to secure the money is seldom related, and the impression is given that Hanna had always at his command an unlimited supply of gold. In August 1896, when the money was being spent freely, Hill met Hanna. Hanna was very discouraged because he did not have sufficient funds and was not personally known in New York. Hill and Hanna went together to collect money and in five days had enough for immediate needs.111 After that, Hanna needed no further personal introduction for he gained the confidence of those who knew him. Croly states that those who gave to him were

107. Ibid., p.219.
109. Ibid.
110. Fifty Years of Public Service, Shelby Cullom, p.273.
111. Croly, p.219.
certain that the money would be used honestly and efficiently to gain victory for the 'sound money' candidate.\textsuperscript{112} They had none of the qualms that they suffered when contributing to a political 'boss.'\textsuperscript{113} After this, Hanna always had a sufficiency of money. He appealed to bankers and business men, irrespective of party, because of the currency issue.

The bank assessment was levied at $\frac{1}{4}$ of 1% of the capital. The Standard Oil Company gave $250,000, and the Life Insurance Companies gave large amounts. The yellow journals exaggerated the amount collected to $12,000,000, but a better estimate is six or seven million dollars. Croly states that about half of this, or $5,500,000 was actually the sum collected and that all of it was not used and some of it was returned.\textsuperscript{114} Of this sum assessed, three million came from New York and its vicinity, while the rest was collected from Chicago and its vicinity.\textsuperscript{115} Croly gives the official figures as follows: "The general office cost about $13,000 in the salaries of the staff... The bureau of printed matter spent approximately $472,000 in printing, and $32,000 in salaries and other expenses... bureau of speakers was $140,000... The shipping department needed some $80,000... about $276,000 was contributed to the assistants... no less than $903,000 to the State Committees."\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{112} Croly, p.219.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p.220.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p.220-221.
The account of Hanna's work in collecting money for the campaign has been given from Croly for the sake of brevity and unity, but Rhodes, Beer, Sullivan and others narrate the same facts. Hanna has been severely criticized for his businesslike assessment for campaign purposes, but most of the historians agree with Croly that Hanna merely systematized and developed a system of collecting money that was sanctioned by custom and necessity. Beer claims that Hanna's work had been to use every means of propaganda to the fullest and every businesslike method of efficiency against Bryan's voice, bad logic and 'good intentions.' Rhodes states that many of the things said about Hanna and his use of money were most unjust, and that Hanna accomplished results not by money alone but because of his hard work and talents. Rhodes goes on to state: "Hanna paid the penalty of talking too frankly about the use of money, but no one knew better than he that money would not accomplish everything and, after he had gained power and influence, nothing perturbed him more than to be looked upon simply as an office broker." Croly says that it should be remembered that Hanna never contributed to both parties for exclusively business purposes, but was always Republican by conviction and gave both his own time and money to have Republicans elected. Hanna can not be blamed for the system, for he simply made it more effective by able expenditure of the money for a party, a cause and a candidate which he had

120. Croly, p.221.
121. Beer, p. 166.
122. Rhodes, p.7.
123. Croly, p.222.
124. Ibid., p.223.
At this time, Hanna received a great deal of abuse in the cartoons of some of the newspapers, sometimes as 'an image of mud stained with dollars.' Sullivan, who states that cartoons and headlines in newspapers are 'a detriment to completeness of truth', says that Hanna was pictured as 'Wall Street' and 'The Trusts.' Lauer claims that in a sense this universal recognition of Hanna was a compliment. Croly states that much of this caricaturing was due to the 'yellow journalism of Hearst' and especially of Homer Davenport, and that if Hanna would have protested, Hearst would have gained notoriety. Hanna was wounded by these things very deeply, for he had been used to an atmosphere of 'good fellowship' and 'fair play.'

In October, the Republicans felt the tide had turned and that the campaign of education was successful. By the middle of October, the enthusiasm was great, inspired by the energy and confidence of Hanna. The effect was cumulative, but the Republicans were ready a week before election, and feared they could not hold their ground. However, the electorats had been convinced, as well as enthusiastic, so the campaign of education had done its work well.

In the electoral college McKinley had 271 votes and Bryan had 176. A total vote of nearly 14,000,000 was polled, and McKinley received 7,111,607, while the vote for Bryan was 6,509,052. Concerning the election, Dibble pays the following compliment to Hanna: "It was not chance..."
or expediency that accomplished the election of McKinley; it was the indomitable purpose, tireless energy, the resourcefulness, in short, the genius of one man."134

CHAPTER FOUR

HANNA'S INFLUENCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION (1896-1901)

Hanna refuses cabinet position...Sherman becomes Secretary of State...Hanna appointed Senator by Bushnell...Legislature elects Hanna Senator...Hanna's activities 1897-1900...Manages the campaign of 1900...Hanna's success on stumping tour...Overwhelming victory for Republicans...Death of President McKinley...Hanna's friendship for McKinley.
CHAPTER FOUR

HANNA'S INFLUENCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION (1896-1901)

After the election of William McKinley, Mark Hanna occupied an enviable position.¹ Foraker states: "All who were in responsible relation to the campaign, and especially Mr. Hanna the Captain-General of the whole organization, were given unqualified praises for what had been accomplished. This made him at once a great man before the country and a leader of unusual influence in his party."²

Many of the cartoons of 1896 had insinuated that McKinley was dominated by Hanna. Myers claims that the relations of the two friends contradict the insinuation of these cartoons, for McKinley and Hanna remained loyal friends to the end with a friendship based on a proper thorough understanding of their positions. McKinley, Myers states, was jealous of his reputation and would not have tolerated the imputation that he was not his own master.³ Olcott states that the secret of the perfect understanding between McKinley and Hanna was "the disinterested spirit of Mr. Hanna, who demanded nothing, received only what he ought to have, and in all his requests and suggestions sought only the highest good of the country and of the administration of his friend."⁴

¹ Rhodes, p.30.
³ The Republican Party, Myers, p.329.
⁴ Olcott, Vol. 1, p.304.
All seemed to agree that one of the portfolios should be offered to Hanna. His party felt that he made a significant record as a politician, was square, efficient and resourceful. His opponents admitted that Hanna had earned the preferment.\(^5\) McKinley urged his friend to accept a cabinet position, but Hanna refused after due thought because he did not wish to appear to be accepting a mere reward.\(^6\) Croly states that if Hanna accepted a cabinet position, he would be receiving compensation, and that Hanna did not want compensation but did want an elective office in order that he might rise in the political world.\(^7\)

However, Hanna had cherished a remote wish, not an ambition, for a place in the Senate.\(^8\) Croly writes that in January 1892 Hanna had said to Mr. Dempsey: "I would rather be Senator in Congress, than have any other office on earth."\(^9\) Regarding this remote wish, Flynn states: "Hanna knew his limitations and had a kind of blunt modesty, and he never dreamed this wish could be fulfilled...He found himself rubbing elbows with many so-called statesmen and became aware that he was not so far behind them. Thus, the notion was born."\(^10\) Croly says that Hanna's strength in politics had been for those who had a good claim for office, and that before 1896, Hanna himself did not think that he had any valid claim, but that in 1896 Hanna believed that his services to his party gave him a valid claim.\(^11\)

Olcott declares that Hanna's judgment in refusing the offer of a cabinet position was sound because he had supported McKinley because of a genuine admiration and sense of duty, and because acceptance of such a

---

position would be misinterpreted by the public and might cause the President embarrassment. 12 But Olcott goes on to give other reasons for Hanna's refusal. Hanna had no inclination to settle down to the task of a cabinet position, but he did prefer a more independent position in which he could effectively use his skill as a leader. 13

For a time, however, Hanna did consider the post of Secretary of the Treasury, a position to which he was entitled, Rhodes thinks, and one which he would have filled admirably. 14 Rhodes gives Hanna's reasons for discarding this position, as follows: "On looking into the matter, however, he found the routine and confinement of the office objectionable; moreover, he aspired after the senatorship from his State...an office that would give him the influence he desired to exert, and effectually preserve his independence." 15 Kohlsaat claims that McKinley hesitated to give the office of Secretary of the Treasury to Hanna because it looked too much like paying a political debt, and because McKinley did not think that Hanna had the training necessary to fill the position. 16 The facts agree that McKinley only hesitated, that Hanna refused any cabinet position, and that Hanna did at this time cherish a desire to be Senator. McKinley particularly tried to get Hanna to accept the position of Postmaster General. He kept that position open for Hanna until thirty six hours before his own inauguration. 17 Hanna continued to refuse.

12. (On preceding page)
15. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 60.
As most writers agree the appointment of Hanna as Senator is a difficult chapter in politics, because of the part of the whole which involved John Sherman. Rhodes gives a brief account of the plan as follows: "He (Hanna) had conceived the idea of inducing the President to appoint Senator Sherman, Secretary of State and of being appointed by the Governor of Ohio to succeed him for his unexpired term in the Senate (March 4, 1899)... on January 4, 1897, the President-elect offered to Sherman the position...and this was promptly accepted."18 As it turned out, the appointment of Sherman was unfit because of the mental condition of Senator Sherman. It caused a great deal of excitement. Rhodes states, in regard to the criticism McKinley and Hanna received: "Wisdom after the event is the source of much criticism, and so it is in this case when the well-meant plan of Hanna and McKinley turned out badly."19 The matter cannot be considered here in detail, but certain phases of the question must be considered. Were there any grounds other than Hanna's desire to be Senator for Sherman's appointment? Had he any qualifications for that position? Did he accept readily or with hesitation and only to please Hanna? Were his chances for another term as Senator favorable? Did Sherman favor the appointment of Hanna by the Governor as his successor to the Senatorship? Did Hanna think Sherman would make a good Secretary of State? Was Hanna certain that Governor Bushnell would appoint him as Sherman's successor? In answering these vital questions, the story will be told by facts as far as possible, and opinions will be omitted as to what McKinley 'might have' done if Hanna had not wished a position in the Senate.

18. Rhodes, p.32
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
Hanna believed that Sherman was well qualified to be the Secretary of state, and thought that he was contributing to the success of the Administration by helping Sherman to the leading place in the new cabinet. 20

Hanna's regard and admiration for Sherman was not born of Hanna's desire to be Senator, for Hanna had twice supported Sherman for the presidential nomination. Rhodes states that Hanna had a high idea of Sherman's wisdom, not merely in finance but in foreign affairs, and Hanna had seen something of Sherman's work in the Senate as chairman of the committee of foreign relations. 21 Rhodes further states that Hanna's treatment of the stories that came to him of Sherman's mental failure was characteristic of Hanna, and that he ignored them because of his firm confidence in Sherman's ability. 22 He had always admired Sherman's clear comprehension of matters, and from what Hanna knew of Sherman's social life of moderate eating and drinking, he saw no reason to believe that Sherman would not be fit for the position.

Lingley holds that McKinley believed the rumors of Sherman's mental failing to be baseless, and thought that Sherman's long experience as a member of the Senate committee on foreign relations would be of advantage. 23 Croly says that the charge made against McKinley, that of appointing an unfit man for an important office, must be considered. Croly claims that it was a mistake but that it was not a serious mistake or an uncomprehenden- 20. (Preceding page)
21. Rhodes, p.32.
22. Ibid.
23. Since the Civil War, Lingley, p.380.
sible mistake at the time.\textsuperscript{24} Sherman was the most noted American statesman and his name carried great weight.\textsuperscript{25} Sherman had served also on the Committee of finance and would gain the confidence of the business men of the country. McKinley wished to gain this confidence of the business men. Even if Sherman was failing in health, and McKinley was not certain of it, the country would not suffer by it because the country knew nothing of Sherman's ill health.\textsuperscript{26} McKinley would give Sherman a very able first assistant secretary. McKinley was very interested in the domestic affairs of the country, and never very interested in the foreign affairs of the United States. Groly states that his mistake was not in appointing Sherman as Secretary of State, but in failing to comprehend the importance of the foreign relations of the country at this time.\textsuperscript{27} McKinley was for peace and did not anticipate any war with Spain.\textsuperscript{28} He believed he was doing the best for the United States, considering the domestic situation, by appointing Sherman as Secretary of State.

Myers claims that the charge made that McKinley appointed an unfit man as Secretary of State merely to make room for Hanna in the Senate is false, and that Olcott proves it to be 'entirely false.'\textsuperscript{29} In regard to Sherman's condition at this time, the following quotation from Rhodes is very important. Rhodes writes: "The \textit{Nation}, which became a severe critic of the appointment said in an editorial on August 20, 1896: 'Senator Sherman can make a great speech when he tries to do so. His speech at Columbus on Saturday was one of the best he has ever made.'\textsuperscript{30}"

\textsuperscript{24} Groly, p.337. 
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p.238. 
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p.239. 
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{The Republican Party}, Myers, p.342. 
\textsuperscript{30} Rhodes, p.35
McKinley wrote to Joseph Medill that the rumors about Sherman's mental failing were without foundation and were, "the cheap invention of sensational writers or other evil disposed or mistaken people."31 The letter continues: "When I saw him last (Jan. 15, 1897) I was convinced both of his perfect health physically and mentally, and that his prospects of life were remarkably good."32

Did Sherman accept the position in the cabinet willingly? Was it an advancement for him or were his chances at remaining in the Senate favorable and did he merely accept to please McKinley and Hanna? Rhodes writes in answer to these questions: "Sherman was glad to accept the Secretaryship of State. He exchanged two years in the Senate with a doubtful succession for apparently a four years' tenure of the Cabinet head of the new Republican administration, which was undoubtedly a promotion...but as matter of fact the prospect was attractive."33 Croly states that in 1892 Sherman had been elected Senator by a narrow margin and a costly fight, and that he would be re-elected only by a more costly and harder fight.34 Sherman wanted to end his career with a cabinet appointment. He was glad to accept the position, and glad that Hanna could be his successor in the Senate.35 On January 15, 1897, Sherman conferred with the President-elect at Canton, and it was agreed that he should assume the position.36

Sherman later withdrew from the cabinet with a degree of bitter feeling, because as Burton writes: "of his practical supersession...but also with a belief that he had been transferred to the Cabinet to make

Croly states that it must not be forgotten that Sherman had a part in the action, that he did not have to accept the cabinet position, that he did so willingly and that he wished to make room for Hanna in that he desired that his vacancy in the Senate be filled by Hanna. Was Hanna certain of being appointed Senator? Even Sherman felt doubt of this. Olcott writes: "Sherman, himself, who desired the appointment of Hanna as his successor, felt some doubt of it, as is shown in a letter to his confidential adviser, Captain J.C. Donaldson, dated Jan.10, 1897." After his resignation of the office of Secretary of State; (April 25, 1898), Sherman wrote in a private letter that he accepted "with some reluctance and largely to promote the wishes of Mark Hanna." It seems true that Sherman would have some regard for Hanna's wishes, in view of all that Hanna had unselfishly done for Sherman long before Hanna had any dream of the possibility of becoming a Senator. It does not seem sound to hold that Sherman accepted "reluctantly" or largely to promote the wishes of Mark Hanna. Hanna's wishes, with valid claim, carried weight, and did influence McKinley and Sherman, but Hanna's wishes did not constitute the entire plan. McKinley had reasons for Sherman's selection. Sherman had several reasons for accepting, Hanna's desire to become a Senator was a sound one not merely based on fancy, and not one of the three politicians were certain that Hanna would be appointed Sherman's successor. The plan in itself was a good one, and some of the unfortunate results of the plan could not be foreseen and were not foreseen by either

38. Croly, p.256.
40. Rhodes, p.32.
of the three friends.

Rhodes says that the important question was ..."would Governor Bushnell appoint Hanna?"41 Hanna and Bushnell belonged to different factions of the party in Ohio. Rhodes states, and it seems important: "Sherman used his influence to get the Governor to name Hanna as his successor...Nevertheless the Governor did not want to appoint a factional enemy and he authorized his personal and political friend, Joseph B. Foraker, to offer the place to Theodore Burton of Cleveland...who, however, declined it."42 Olcott shows that neither McKinley nor Hanna ever had the "slightest assurance" that Bushnell would appoint Hanna.43 McKinley was so uncertain of the outcome that he continued to urge Hanna to accept a cabinet position and kept a vacancy open for him until a short time before his own inauguration.44 Hanna was so uncertain of Bushnell's final action that he urged Foraker to use his influence with the Governor. Concerning this Foraker writes: "That Mr. Hanna would, under all the circumstances, ask such a recognition at the hands of Governor Bushnell and that he would appeal to me to use my influence with the Governor to secure it was unexpected."45 Foraker says that Bushnell's friends and all of his own friends were "displeased with the proposition."46 As the weeks passed, Hanna grew more anxious and wrote to Foraker. On January 29, 1897, Foraker wrote to Hanna as follows: "I appreciate your suggestion that you would like to know at as early a day as possible whether or not you are to be appointed,... but I am not able to do so; neither is anybody else, except the Governor, and he doesn't see fit

41. Rhodes, p.32.
42. Ibid., p.34.
44. Rhodes, p.35.
46. Ibid., p.504.
to say to me, ... or to anybody else, what he will ultimately do.

McKinley despaired, but Hanna was more persistent. Rhodes explains:

"Bushnell was a candidate for the Republican nomination for Governor who would be elected in the autumn of 1897, ... if he failed to appoint Hanna Senator, he would jeopardize materially his chance of nomination." From fear of losing the renomination, and because of the "unmistakable sentiment in the Republican party in Ohio that Hanna should have the place" in the Senate, Governor Bushnell determined to appoint Hanna. Bushnell still kept Hanna in suspense even two weeks before McKinley's inauguration. Croly says that Bushnell tried to appoint others but Hanna had many friends, and finally on March 5, 1897, the Governor gave Hanna the papers, very formally and without cordiality. Olcott states that the appointment was made without relish and because "he could not afford to resist the political pressure from Republicans in all parts of the State in behalf of Hanna." Hanna started immediately for Washington.

When it was finally known that Hanna was to come to the Senate, there was great discussion among the Senators. Dunn writes: "They did not intend to allow him to assume authority in the Senate such as he had exhibited during the short time he had been in politics." Discussing Hanna's appointment, Senator Davis of Minnesota remarked: "He will be made to know his place here, he cannot boss the Senate as he has bossed everybody outside. We have a method of our own in giving a man the cold shoulder.

47. Foraker, p. 502-503.
48. Rhodes, p. 35.
49. Ibid.
50. Croly, p. 239.
51. Ibid., p. 240.
53. From Harrison to Harding, p. 205.
We know the art of sitting down on a man. In spite of this,
Cullom declares: "He had the real ability naturally to assume his place as a leader. He assumed a prominent place more rapidly than any senator whom I have ever known. He took hold of legislation with a degree of skill and confidence that was remarkable, and carried his measures through apparently by his own individual efforts and energy. Thus, Hanna had influence enough in the party to become senator by appointment.

More than a year after his appointment as senator, Hanna desired to be elected senator by the legislature. Hanna thought that his prestige demanded it, and his success in being elected became a matter of great importance to him. His name was submitted for the old term, and for the new term to begin March 4, 1899. Hanna had to go on the stump and meet the voters face to face, and he had to do this without any previous experience as a speaker and with the risk of his position in politics in the future.

McKinley urged Hanna to write a speech and change it a little from time to time. Hanna tried it but tore it up. Hanna had the ability to think up a very good idea but did not have the ability to put that idea into good form. Stump speaking depended on the speaker's adaptability to the particular audience, and Hanna was fitted for this. Hanna's secretary, Elmer Dover, declares that Hanna never used notes of any kind, but usually planned the first sentence of his speeches. At first Hanna made

54. From Harrison to Harding, Dunn, p. 205.
55. Fifty Years of Public Service, Shelby Cullom, p. 281.
57. Ibid., p. 243.
58. Ibid., p. 245.
59. Ibid., p. 244-245.
60. Ibid., p. 245.
short speeches of fifteen minutes and was self-conscious. In time, he
grew to take pride in his success and could talk for an hour or more,
without a pause for a word or an idea and made three or four speeches a
day.\textsuperscript{61} Hanna's speeches do not read well, but they sounded well because
of his forceful personality and because they consisted of ideas that were
convictions of his life and not borrowed ideas from others. The speeches
were rambling, deficient in sentence structure and in sufficient discussion
of each single idea.\textsuperscript{62} Croly states that Hanna's personality gave con-
sistency and attachment to his sentences, but Croly declares that Hanna
was not any more of an orator than he was a statesman.\textsuperscript{63}

Hanna had been the most advertized man in the country, and the people
were curious to see him.\textsuperscript{64} In this campaign there were many attacks upon
him, and therefore, in his speeches he defended himself with indignation
but with good judgment. He attacked his opponents, and spoke a little on
the importance of government stimulating business in order to bring pros-
perity. He could not say very much as yet about prosperity for it was not
so evident.\textsuperscript{65}

His enemies saw that Hanna was becoming more popular, and determined
to defeat him. Hanna was not the only stump speaker touring the state.
Werner writes: "Bryan also toured Ohio, speaking against the re-election
of Mr. Hanna as Senator from Ohio... In one of his speeches Bryan said,
'Defeat Hanna and the whole world will rejoice; elect the Republican ticket
and every monarch on a European throne will be joyful.'\textsuperscript{66} Werner comments

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{61} Croly, p.246.
\bibitem{62} Ibid., p.247.
\bibitem{63} Ibid., p.247-248.
\bibitem{64} Ibid., p.248.
\bibitem{65} Ibid., p.249-250.
\bibitem{66} Bryan, Werner, p.119.
\end{thebibliography}
Some members of Hanna's own party wished to defeat him. A long discussion here is not necessary, since it does not show Hanna's influence on the administration, but a few facts ought to be indicated. McKisson, mayor of Cleveland, had been refused aid by Hanna because Hanna believed that McKisson had done nothing to gain the right to the position of mayor. McKisson built up his own machine and was disliked by the business men of Cleveland. McKisson, with Bushnell and Kurtz, led the Republican opposition to Hanna. A week before the Legislature met, Hanna went to Columbus and opened headquarters at the Neil House. Hanna's friends included Nash, Grosvenor, Squire and Burton. Bushnell was using state patronage to defeat Hanna. In the only published interview, Foraker merely stated that he was doing his best to keep out of the whole affair. At any rate, Foraker was doing nothing to aid Hanna.

In the voting of the first few days of the Legislature, Hanna fared ill. On Wednesday the Legislature adjourned to the following Tuesday, because the opposition could not agree on a candidate. On Monday, January 10th, McKisson was selected as the anti-Hanna candidate. This adjournment proved fatal to the success of the opposition. Hanna needed four additional votes, including that of Droste. Great efforts were made to capture these votes. Griffith had been taken from the Neil House.

68. Croly, p.252.
69. Ibid., p.254.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., p.255.
drugged or intoxicated, to the McKisson rooms at the Southern Hotel. 72 He was brought back to the Neil House and public sentiment was brought to bear on him in Hanna's favor. Hanna's strength was increasing.

A detailed account of the securing of the votes is impossible here. James Garfield finally induced Droste to vote for Hanna on Tuesday morning. 73 Hanna had the 73 necessary votes, on Tuesday, January 11th, 17 in the Senate, and 56 in the Assembly. McKisson received 68 in all. The anxiety was not over yet, as the joint-ballot was necessary for the results. Hanna again received 73 votes, and McKisson received 70. The waving of a white handkerchief told Hanna that he was elected. 74

There were charges of bribery on both sides. On Sunday, January 9, the papers challenged Hanna of bribing J.C. Otis, a silver Republican. 75 This produced consternation among Hanna's friends, as they feared its effect, but the charge was not taken seriously by the public. Hanna denied that the man accused of bribery was his agent. 76

A committee was appointed to investigate the matter but Burke, a mal-content, was placed at the head of it and three Democrats were members of it, and Hanna would not recognize it, or testify or allow his agents to testify. All the evidence was, therefore, against Hanna and the results of the investigation were: "an attempt was made to bribe Otis;...an agent of Hanna's was the perpetrator of this attempt."77 This report was sent to the Senate and was referred to the Committee of Privileges and Elections.

72. Crely, p.257. 77. Ibid.
73. Ibid., p.259.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid., p.260.
This Committee of Privileges and Elections gave the report that "...evidence failed wholly to prove Hanna was elected Senator by bribery; ...that any agent was authorized by him to use corrupt methods; ...or that he had any personal knowledge of the facts of the Otis case." 78 Hanna's witness declares that he was not directly or indirectly sent by Hanna, and Otis and Campbell testify to it. 79 Croly says that there is as much doubt today, and that certain alleged witnesses are dead, that Hanna's friends accept the Senate report and that Hanna's enemies should realize that if Hanna had been involved the business would have been better managed. 80 If Hanna had wished to buy votes, he could have sent some of the Democrats out of the city, but he refused to buy votes. Hanna had sufficient friends and influence in his party to be elected Senator.

Too much of the history of McKinley's administration need not be given in this thesis, because the treatment would be inadequate; and the relations of Hanna to the Republican party and his influence on the McKinley administration can be indicated by stating his opinions from 1896 to 1900, some of his important activities, and his relations to McKinley and the Senate.

Most of Hanna's activity in the party had been in connection with elections, 82 and therefore, at first, in the Senate he said and did little because he realized his lack of training for the work. 83 The first problems in the McKinley administration were remote from Hanna's field.

78. Croly, p.269.
79. Ibid., p.261-262.
80. Ibid., p.263-264.
82. Hanna, Flynn, p.124.
Then, too, Hanna had to make friends in the Senate for his success in politics, as it had been in business, depended on the formation of close personal friendships. 84

Sullivan writes of Hanna at the beginning of the McKinley administration: "March 4, 1897, found McKinley President, with Hanna head of the Republican party...Hanna did not need to persuade McKinley to favor big business, to do that was McKinley's political religion rather more than it was Hanna's." 85 McKinley, jealous of his reputation, was not the man to allow Hanna to assume supreme control of the party. Hanna wanted power but he did not control McKinley, and it might be said that Hanna did not desire to control McKinley. The same author, Sullivan, who claims Hanna was head of the party, continues: "Hanna was not a man to stultify either the friend he was proud of or the Presidency for which he had an old fashioned sentiment...described...awed respect...Frequently McKinley would not do what Hanna advised, on which occasions it pleased Hanna to say, and honestly persuade himself to believe, that McKinley was wiser than he. Hanna would protest for an hour or so, and then embark on McKinley's alternative with as much enthusiasm as if it had been his own idea." 86 I have quoted at some length because Sullivan happens to express what the majority of the better historians hold in regard to the relation of McKinley and Hanna.

The ceremonies attendant upon McKinley's inauguration, March 4, 1897, were typical of Hanna's detailed, care-taking supervision. 87

84. Croly, p.273.
86. Ibid., p.376.
military review was carried out to the last particular very effectively. Lingley says that, "the Republican party was coming back to power as the party of organization, of discipline, of unquestioning obedience to leadership." Regarding McKinley's position as head of the party, in 1897, Rhodes writes: "Of a genial nature and possessing attractive manners, he commended himself to all sorts and conditions of men and, at this time, might sincerely have felt that his influence was second to that of no other man in the country. Not even Hanna." McKinley settled down to govern the country as President, and Hanna's first time was spent dealing with the problems of patronage. Office seekers swarmed to his office. McKinley's and Hanna's methods of patronage require some study and will be considered later. Hanna settled down to the business of being a Senator. It is incorrect to hold, as some do, that Hanna immediately controlled everything in the Senate. In the first session of the 55th Congress, Hanna did little. He introduced a bill to provide for a new public building in Cleveland, and introduced a number of private pension bills. In the second session of the same Congress, Hanna said nothing, voted with the majority of the Senate and with the Republicans for Lodge's Bill, voted in favor of seating Henry Corbett for Senator from Oregon, and voted with the minority of the Senate in favor of payment of all United States bonds in gold coin or its equivalent. Flynn writes: "Indeed for two years he followed faithfully the course of perfect regularity in his votes." Hanna was not given the

87. Since the Civil War, Lingley, p.377
88. Ibid.
89. Rhodes, p.43.
90. Hanna, Flynn, p.126.
91. From Harrison to Harding, Dunn, p.281.
93. Ibid., p.277.
94. Hanna, Flynn, p.128.
'cold shoulder' in the Senate, and Dunn, writing of this, offers the following partial explanation: "Hanna was a jovial, fun-loving man, with a keen sense of humor and good-fellowship standing out all over him."95 Discussing Hanna in the Senate, Beer writes, "nothing was too small to interest the Senator from Cleveland."96

One of the important discussions in the Senate, and problems of the first McKinley administration, was concerning the trouble in Cuba and the probability of war between the United States and Spain. McKinley's attitude toward the war might make a thesis in itself, and will not be discussed here. Hanna's attitude toward the war, and his influence, or lack of influence, on the policy of the administration regarding war, must be indicated. Sullivan states: "Hanna was strongly opposed to the Spanish War; McKinley went into it under pressure..."97 Flynn says that Hanna took no part in the discussions of the Spanish War problem.98 Hanna feared that war would check business prosperity and therefore, delay the plans for the return of former prosperity.99 The domestic problems lost importance as the Cuban troubles increased, but Hanna continued to desire the avoidance of war.100 Rhodes declares: "We may rest assured that if Mark Hanna had been President there would have been no war with Spain."101 Hanna stated: "I am not in favor of needlessly precipitating the country into the horrors of war."102 As late as April 5, Hanna wrote:

95. From Harrison to Harding, Dunn, p.205.
96. Beer, p1 235.
99. Croyly, p.278.
100.Ibid., p.274.
101.Rhodes, p.64.
102.Rhodes, p.56.
"The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations ought to pass a resolution giving the President some discretion; otherwise, war cannot be avoided, and even under the most favorable circumstances it must come unless Spain backs down, which I believe she will do."103 Dunn says that with an Administration intensely opposed to war, with the 'big six' of the Senate determined to avoid war, with Hanna and all the power of Federal patronage against war, still a majority in either House could not be controlled, and consequently war resulted.104 The 'insurgents' in the Republican party were numerous and united with the Democrats in favor of war.105 At all events, Hanna, with all the others to support his views, could not control either House. It is well to recall this fact when reading some writers who imply that Hanna completely controlled everything in the McKinley administrations. There were things, as a matter of fact, that even Hanna, plus many other powerful Republican leaders, could not do.

The war did not have the expected results. Instead of checking prosperity, the war brought about the revival of prosperity.106 McKinley and Hanna became convinced imperialists, and Croly thinks that this might have been due to the final understanding of the relation of the Republican party to the policy of national expansion.107

Millis states that Hanna heard in September 1898 that the Republicans were going to lose the House, and that in Maine and Vermont, "where early elections acted as barometers for the general election in November, the

103. Ibid.
104. From Harrison to Harding, Dunn, p.231.
105. Ibid.
106. Croly, p.279.
107. Ibid.
"The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations ought to pass a resolution giving the President some discretion; otherwise, war cannot be avoided, and even under the most favorable circumstances it must come unless Spain backs down, which I believe she will do." Dunn says that with an Administration intensely opposed to war, with the 'big six' of the Senate determined to avoid war, with Hanna and all the power of Federal patronage against war, still a majority in either House could not be controlled, and consequently war resulted. The 'insurgents' in the Republican party were numerous and united with the Democrats in favor of war. At all events, Hanna, with all the others to support his views, could not control either House. It is well to recall this fact when reading some writers who imply that Hanna completely controlled everything in the McKinley administrations. There were things, as a matter of fact, that even Hanna, plus many other powerful Republican leaders, could not do.

The war did not have the expected results. Instead of checking prosperity, the war brought about the revival of prosperity. McKinley and Hanna became convinced imperialists, and Croly thinks that this might have been due to the final understanding of the relation of the Republican party to the policy of national expansion.

Millis states that Hanna heard in September 1898 that the Republicans were going to lose the House, and that in Maine and Vermont, "where early elections acted as barometers for the general election in November, the

103. Ibid.
104. From Harrison to Harding, Dunn, p.231.
105. Ibid.
106. Croly, p.279.
107. Ibid.
Republican majorities had been heavily cut. But the congressional and state elections of the Fall of 1898 were favorable to the Republicans, for they retained a majority in the Lower House and gained the Senate.

In the third session of the same congress, Hanna introduced a bill, on December 19, 1898, to promote commercial activity and increase the foreign trade of the United States. It provided for auxiliary cruisers, transports, and seamen, for government use when necessary. The bill was much amended and was finally known as the Hanna-Frye Bill. The desirability of some government subsidy for the American merchant marines was a hobby of Hanna's. Discussing ship subsidy and the building up of the merchant marine, Cullom writes: "Senator Hanna, a ship owner himself, was deeply interested in that legislation. Senator Hanna and Senator Frye were devoted friends." It is possible only, in this thesis, to indicate Hanna's influence and not discuss the various fields of his activities.

It seems necessary to indicate how Hanna incurred the hostility of Quay. Croly says that Hanna must have believed that a Governor had no right to fill a vacancy in the Senate with a man whom the legislature might have elected, but instead deliberately took the opportunity of rejecting. There was no personal motive or quarrel. Dunn writes: "Quay lacked one vote of being seated. Mark Hanna was responsible for that vote." Hanna did not vote, but paired with Senator Depew, which had the same effect as voting against Quay.

110. Ibid., p. 280.
111. From Harrison to Harding, Dunn, p. 344.
112. Croly, p. 283.
113. Dunn, p. 332.
Ever since Hanna had become a Senator, he had been on the Committee of Naval Affairs. He entered in the debate about the price to be paid for armor plate. Flynn states the discussion briefly and clearly as follows:

The Senate proposed to limit the price to $445 a ton and if that price was not met it proposed to instruct the Secretary of the Navy to build the government's own armor plate foundry. The steel makers had been charging the government $545 a ton. He (Hanna) was then in the Senate three years. Hanna declared that $545 a ton was a low price. The Illinois Steel Company had offered to furnish plate for $540 a ton. Hanna called that a bluff. Former Secretary of the Navy Herbert declared it could be made for $192. 'I think I know as much about it as Secretary Herbert,' Hanna replied...

Croly states that Hanna believed that some of the Senators had jumped to the conclusion that the price was high without sufficient knowledge of the subject. Hanna pointed out that it would take five years to build a government manufacturing plant, and that the place would cost more than the price paid to Carnegie and Bethlehem, the two steel companies. Beard states: "Mr. Hanna's proposition was that the price of steel should be left, as the House had proposed, with the Secretary of the Navy." The matter again went to a conference for discussion. The price was to be left to the Secretary of the Navy, and if he failed to arrive at a satisfactory agreement, then a government factory was to be built. Hanna was in favor of this. Croly states that Hanna's participation in this debate, his breaking of his silence in the Senate, was the natural result of his economic and political creed. It is well to remember that Hanna never said...
that he did not represent good business interests in politics. 

Hanna had great influence in his party from 1898 until his death, and the open opposition within the party disappeared. In the Fall of 1898, he had made the congressional committee effective and indispensable. Hanna had raised money and used it mainly in Kansas, Nebraska, Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming. The Republicans lost in the east, and the House had been saved by the states west of the Missouri River. In Ohio, Hanna became very important, for McKinson failed at re-election, and Nash, Hanna's close friend, became governor of the state. The west was imperialistic, prosperity had returned, the Republicans were strongly united, and McKinley's renomination was assured.

Croly believes that Hanna deserves much credit for the distribution of patronage which became a source of strength to the Administration. He partially systematized and organized the distribution of offices, but his recommendations were not governed by personal interests or favoritism but were dictated by the welfare of the Republican party. Hanna did not ignore efficiency as a factor in his appointments and suggestions, but he did reward party workers, and often he added postscripts to his suggestions to ignore them if they would hinder the efficiency of the department or the party. As in business, so in politics, he allowed his first men to elect their own subordinates in order to receive better results. It is true that Hanna co-operated with the inefficient as well as the efficient.

121. Croly, p.288.  
122. Ibid., p.291.  
123. Ibid., p.293.  
124. Ibid., p.294.  
125. Ibid., p.295-296.  
126. Ibid., p.297-298.  
127. Ibid., p.299.
to keep harmony in the party and thought it his duty to do so, but whenever there was a choice he acted in favor of efficiency, and always acted for the harmony and strength of the Republican party. 128

Lauer says that Hanna's work in politics was, in Hanna's conception: "to build up commerce,...to encourage manufacture, to regulate the social machinery in the common interest" and not merely stand by and criticize. 129

As the campaign of 1900 approached, Hanna grew anxious because McKinley had not yet asked him to be chairman. Hanna was such an important figure in the party, that McKinley felt his own prestige was lessened by continual comparison with Hanna's, and this may be offered as a reason for McKinley's hesitation in asking Hanna to again serve as chairman. 130 Croly thinks that Hanna may have been over-anxious and over-sensitive, for McKinley asked Hanna in due time, and insisted that Hanna be chairman. 131 Rhodes states that McKinley and Hay were solicitous that Hanna should continue to be chairman of the national Republican committee, and that when Hanna decided to accept, McKinley wrote to him as follows: "I am delighted that you have accepted...It is a great task and will be to you a great sacrifice." 132

Due to the organizing power of Mark Hanna, and the harmonizing manner and sagacity of McKinley, the Republican party was firmly united and well prepared for the campaign of 1900. 133 Sullivan writes, concerning the eve of the campaign of 1900: "Hanna expressed not only his party's policy, but

128. Croly, p.300.
131. Ibid., p.320.
132. Rhodes, p.139.
133. Since the Civil War, Lingley, p.379.
his contentment in the words; 'All we need to do is 'stand pat.'" (Hanna was proud of the phrase, and by repeating it often and proudly, gave the Republican party a name that became a permanent symbol.) 134

Hanna was the most important man on the Republican side, with his executive ability, keen judgment and knack of raising money. 135 Dunn writes: "There was not much that was noteworthy in the campaign of 1900. It was a tame affair compared to that four years previous, when the same two men contested for the Presidency." 136 The party was confident of success.

Rhodes points out that as it appears now the election of McKinley was a certainty in 1900, but that to the important men of the party, including Hanna, success was not a certainty. 137 On September 25, 1900, Hay wrote to Henry Adams: "Hanna has been crying wolf all summer, and he has been much derided for his fears, but now everybody shares them. Bryan comes out a frank anarchist again in his letter of acceptance; and Mitchell with his coal strike has thrown at least a hundred thousand votes to him." 138

Croly says that there was not as much fear as in 1896, and therefore Hanna had a difficult time in making the party workers see that a fight was necessary. 139 They were over-confident. The 1896 methods were to be used, but less speakers were needed, less campaign literature sent out, only two and a half million dollars collected for the campaign fund, some of which was returned, and the work was to be cumulative in effect. 140

Writing of the issues of the campaign of 1900, Pringle states: "To
legislation against the trusts."\textsuperscript{141} Flynn says that the full dinner pail did what a civil war could not do, for Hanna had promised prosperity if McKinley was elected in 1896, and McKinley had been elected and prosperity came.\textsuperscript{142} Croly thinks that Hanna did not want merely victory for his candidate in 1900, but wanted the Republican party to be marked as the dominant party, wanted to gain a large majority in the Senate.\textsuperscript{143} Haworth praises Hanna for managing the Republican campaign with skill and indicates that Hanna gained many labor votes by "hoisting on high the full dinner pail."\textsuperscript{144} The campaign went smoothly and economically.\textsuperscript{145}

In this campaign, McKinley remained at Washington, but Theodore Roosevelt, who had been nominated for the vice-presidential office, toured the country.\textsuperscript{146} Hanna was in demand as a stump speaker. The fight was most difficult in the important states of South Dakota and Nebraska. Hanna's friends advised against his stumping tour in these states, on the ground that it might look like persecution of Pettigrew of South Dakota, and Bryan of Nebraska.\textsuperscript{147} In the middle of September, Hanna yielded, and arranged the tour so that it lasted a week, with just two days in South Dakota and Nebraska.\textsuperscript{148} Harper's Weekly, October 20, 1900, states that Hanna's tour has as its purpose that his audience may find that he is not a monster in appearance.\textsuperscript{149}

Hanna's tour was a great success. He made seventy-two speeches, no two of which were alike, and spoke to larger crowds than those McKinley
or Roosevelt had spoken to, in the same states. 150 The crowds were generally surprised to see that Hanna was not the person he was cartooned to be. 151 They were attentive and enthusiastic. 152 The election in the later months showed what a success his tour was, for Pettigrew lost his seat in the Senate and a Republican was chosen in his place, while Bryan lost his own state, Nebraska. 153

A few comments about Hanna's work on the stump may not be amiss. Olcott writes: "When Hanna became known, many were astonished to find him a gentleman, a shrewd but honest business man, and an able statesman." 154 In South Dakota, according to Beer, Hanna said that: "he was sick of being lied about, caricatured and called a knave...although he said little about the malignant orator" Pettigrew. 155

Hanna's audiences commiserated their unfortunate neighbors who did not have the opportunity of hearing and seeing him, for they considered Hanna one of the "greatest men" of the day. 156 Cullom says that there were more calls for Hanna than for any other campaign speaker, that wherever Hanna spoke he made friends for McKinley and himself, and that he became one of the most popular leaders in the Republican party. 157 Senator Dolliver of Iowa said:

I have never wondered...that Hanna suddenly developed into a great orator...in 1900...I had a glimpse of the colossal personality of this man which made a very profound impression on my mind...for one hour and thirty minutes fought an unequal battle with the genius of a single man; and at 10 o'clock, the audience calmed, controlled, fascinated, he began one of the most remarkable political speeches it was ever my good fortune to hear. 158
The effect of Hanna's personality upon this riotous mob at Chicago, and upon Senator Dolliver, seems to be the usual effect, for all accounts agree that Hanna was a success. As a whole, these speeches of Hanna in 1900, constitute the best expression that he ever gave to the political and economic problems of the day, and were based on his convictions.

In October, 1900, it was felt that the campaign was going very satisfactorily, and that Hanna's earlier fears were now groundless. Money was not hard to secure. In this campaign, Hanna's name became linked with the term 'big business' and with Wall Street. Hanna did represent in politics the essential interests of business, but never merely 'big business.' It is true that in 1900, politics brought Hanna more in contact with 'big business' than before, because money was more easily obtained, but Hanna represented all business by conviction. Hanna was not merely the tool of Wall Street, working in politics for the interests of 'big business.' Sullivan states: "As it happened Hanna had never had anything to do with Wall Street until after he became powerful in politics. He was the head of no trust and never had been a promoter...he scorned that quick path to wealth;" Hanna was a builder in business, and represented business, one of his primary interests, in politics because he believed that business men should take a great part in politics and that politics should aid business.
It was often said, in one address or another in 1899 and 1900, that the Republican policies of protection and "honest money" with the existing conditions of prosperity, were due more to Mark Hanna than to any other man in the country. Speaking of Hanna's prominence as Chairman of the national Republican committee, after Hanna was appointed and elected Senator, Foraker writes: "This political prominence, coupled with a strong mental endowment, sound judgment, zealous Republicanism and general devotion to duty, had won for him the esteem of all his colleagues and had enabled him to render services to the Senate, to both his party and his country that were of the highest and most valuable character." Thus, Hanna brought another campaign to successful conclusion.

Dunn states that the result of the campaign was a more pronounced victory than even that of 1896. The enthusiasm of the last week was not as great as that of the last week in 1896. It was the most overwhelming victory for the Republicans since 1872. McKinley received a clear majority of 443,000 in a popular vote of almost fourteen million, a clear mandate to govern.

McKinley, at the head of a united, powerful Republican party, entered upon his second administration. In Ohio, Nash was re-elected governor, and the Republicans had a majority in both houses of the state legislature. On September 5, 1901, McKinley made another of his usual speeches on the topic that the country should enter upon a more liberal policy.
On September 6, 1901, McKinley was shot by a demented anarchist, at Buffalo, and the wound was serious. However, McKinley appeared to be recovering, and his friends began to leave. Hanna left for the national encampment of the grand army of the Republic at Cleveland, for he had just been elected a member and wanted to command the favor of the grand army. The doctors authorized Hanna to say that McKinley had passed the critical point, and as Hanna went on the stage at Cleveland, he received a confirmation of this good news. A few days before, in a telegram to Kohlsaat, Hanna had said: "His condition this morning greatly improved. If this continues a day or two we may hope for speedy recovery." 

During the night which followed Hanna's speech in Cleveland, Hanna received word at two o'clock that McKinley's condition was worse, and at four o'clock was on a train for Buffalo. McKinley asked if Mark were with him, and Mark had been; but now the President's condition was critical. When the President's death was announced by Cortelyou, Hanna left the room and the house. Kohlsaat writes: "As the President (Roosevelt) and his cabinet seated themselves beside the casket, poor, broken hearted Mark Hanna limped in and took a chair at the foot of the coffin." Roosevelt tried to comfort Hanna.

A few comments are necessary concerning the friendship and relations of Hanna and McKinley. On a few occasions, the relation was strained, as when McKinley did not favor Hanna's stumping tour but the friendship

173. Ibid.
174. Ibid., p.359.
175. From McKinley to Harding, Kohlsaat, p.93-94.
177. Ibid., p.360.
remained and the difficulties disappeared. Croly states that a friendship endures in spite of difficulties and strained relations, but not because no such obstacles to friendship arose.\(^{161}\) McKinley was jealous of his reputation, and Hanna became so important and successful, that McKinley feared he might lose some of his own prestige in comparison to Hanna, and this was ground for strained relations.\(^{162}\) McKinley was considered by many the obedient servant of Hanna, and although this was not the case, yet the accusation was not flattering to McKinley.\(^{183}\)

However, the friendship of McKinley and Hanna remained firm and sincere. Roosevelt said that McKinley was Hanna's closest friend and political leader whom Hanna idolized.\(^{184}\) Sullivan states that Hanna's relationship with McKinley brought no material benefit, but brought satisfaction to Hanna's spirit.\(^{185}\) He continues: "Hanna exalted in it with boyish enjoyment that caused people to smile and like him.\(^{186}\) Rhodes thinks that the relations of Hanna and McKinley were so very intimate that Hanna might be called an alter-ego of McKinley, for what one could not do, the other always could.\(^{187}\) Kohlsaat pays the friendship a high tribute when he writes: There is an impression that Mark Hanna controlled William McKinley. That is not so...It was not the power that it brought Mr. Hanna that made him fight for McKinley's nomination and election; it was the love of a strong man for a friend who was worthy of that affection."\(^{188}\) Now, Hanna's friend is dead, and is Hanna's power at an end?

\(^{161}\) Croly, p.362-364.  
\(^{162}\) Beer, p.234.  
\(^{163}\) Hanna, Lauer, p.iv.  
\(^{184}\) Croly, p.360.  
\(^{186}\) Ibid., p.377.  
\(^{187}\) Rhodes, p.13.  
\(^{188}\) Kohlsaat, p.96.
Although Hanna's friend and political ideal was dead, Hanna's power of leadership remained. Lauer says that Hanna, the man of great natural ability, knew that he would have a voice in the councils of the nation and that his voice would be heard. Croly states that if anything, the death of McKinley strengthened the power of Hanna, for the Republican party looked to him as its leader. Hanna had been abused more than any other man in the country, and he did not deserve this ill treatment. Hanna had up to meet one task after another, and his rare powers and intense industry demanded the admiration of those who knew him. Sullivan states that few men ever attained their ambitions so fully as did Hanna, and Sullivan gives the following reasons in partial explanation: "Nature had adapted him to power, for he was full-vigored; and to exercise power benignly, for he was generous, optimistic, loved to accept responsibility, and beamed when he carried it off brilliantly."

In the years following McKinley's death, Hanna's influence was shown most, and a further study of the ability of the man might not be out of place here. It is also necessary to inquire about Hanna, since Lauer tells us: "To those who dislike Mr. Hanna, Mark Hanna is a monster. He represents all that is worst in our civilization...He is the Boss Deity of the political Olympus, with countless legions of purchased angels to do his bidding."

Other men were as rich as Hanna, but few attained to such power or

190. Ibid.
192. Ibid., p.366.
exercised such influence. Few 'bosses' possessed the ability and talents of Hanna, or succeeded as well. Is it not plausible that Hanna's success was due to ability and concentration of talented energy, and to the fact that Hanna was disinterested, and never a 'boss,' such as Platt, in politics? Is it not that those who did not admire Hanna, did not really know the real Mark Hanna? It is one thing to dislike a man, and another to deny that he has great powers and abilities. That Hanna did possess ability and that he used it wisely and practically needs little amplification for in view of what has been thus far expressed in this thesis. Beard states: "He had an immense amount of shrewd practical sense and he divined a good deal more by his native powers of quick perception." 196 Lauer says that one is inevitably impressed with Hanna's great power of "application and concentration of mind." 197

The following two quotations sum up the majority of opinions concerning the man Hanna and the qualities which he possessed which gave him influence in the Republican party. Dunn writes: "A very remarkable man was Hanna. A man who had amassed a great fortune; strong mentally, jovial, kindly, generous, devoted to his friends, and ever active in their behalf; possessed of a charming personality, he made a friend of every man he met." Expressed differently, Lauer holds the same regarding Hanna, saying: "My own belief is that the influence of Mr. Hanna in American politics had been chiefly due to his own qualities as a man. His strength, sagacity, 196. Contemporary American History, Beard, p. 244. 197. Hanna, Lauer, p. 23. 198. From Harrison to Harding, Dunn, p. 396.
political insight, his force of character, his qualities of leadership, his intimate acquaintances with the business interests of the country, must all be taken into account." It seems to me, that whether we like him or not, after consideration, we can understand why he was influential.

CHAPTER FIVE

HANNA AND ROOSEVELT REPUBLICANISM, (1900-1904)

Hanna opposes Roosevelt, 1900...Convention demands Roosevelt for Vice-President...Adjustments after McKinley's death, 1901...Hanna and the Panama Canal...Hanna suggested for the Presidency...Strained relations with Roosevelt, May, 1903...Hanna overwhelmingly re-elected Senator...Hanna as a Presidential possibility...Death of Mark Hanna, 1904...Brief estimate of Hanna...Concluding Remarks.
CHAPTER FIVE

HANNA AND ROOSEVELT REPUBLICANISM, (1900-1904)

In order to better understand Hanna's relation to the new President, 1901, it is necessary to consider Hanna's attitude toward Theodore Roosevelt at the Republican national convention of 1900. A detailed account of the convention, with McKinley's or Platt's attitude toward Roosevelt, will not be attempted in this thesis, but those facts which have a bearing on Hanna's opposition to Roosevelt as a candidate for the vice-presidential office will be presented.

Usually the choice of a vice-president is of little important, but at the convention of 1900, the delegates were excited about it. There was no one favored candidate. Hanna preferred Bliss, and McKinley would have assented, but Bliss refused the use of his name. McKinley's choice was Allison. Other candidates were Theodore Roosevelt, Dolliver, Long, Fairbanks and Woodruff, with Roosevelt very much opposed to his own possible nomination and Woodruff very anxious to secure the office for himself.

Hanna had no plans and did not care who was nominated with the exception of Roosevelt. He regarded Roosevelt as "erratic" and "unsafe," as representing a new order of things. Platt desired Roosevelt's nomination for the same reason that Hanna opposed it, for Platt disliked Roosevelt's

independence as governor of New York, especially regarding the handling of the insurance department and the franchise tax bill. Platt wished to get 'rid' of Roosevelt by making him vice-president. Hanna wanted a vice-president who would make a good president, for he always feared death of the president with consequences like Harrison's death.

Neither McKinley nor Hanna wanted Roosevelt nominated, and Hanna went to the convention of 1900 at Philadelphia to prevent the nomination of Roosevelt. Roosevelt desired to be governor of New York again, and declared that he would not accept the vice-presidential nomination. He, also, went to the convention to prevent his nomination. A strong sentiment in favor of Roosevelt existed, stronger than either Roosevelt or Hanna realized.

In the papers of May 11, 1900, appeared an interview given out by Hanna in which Hanna said: "Governor Roosevelt will not be nominated for Vice-President, and has not been discussed in that connection by Party leaders, or those who might speak for the administration." On June 15, Hay wrote that Roosevelt went to Washington to state to McKinley and Hanna that he would not be Vice-President, and that Roosevelt found that only Platt dreamed of such a thing.

Quay knew that Hanna opposed Roosevelt's nomination, and when he arrived at the convention and found Platt anxious to have Roosevelt nominated, he agreed to join with Platt to this purpose. The agreement of Platt

8. United States in Our Own Times, Haworth, p.264.
and Quay threw two of the largest delegations of the convention for Roosevelt as vice-presidential candidate, and they knew that many of the western delegates would join with them.\(^\text{13}\) Because Hanna had not paired for Quay, Quay had not been seated in the Senate, but instead Quay had had to return to private life for two years. By that, Hanna had made a lasting enemy of Quay.\(^\text{14}\) Dunn states that Quay knew that of all men in public life, Roosevelt was the most "obnoxious" to Hanna, for Quay knew that when Roosevelt had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he had publicly and privately defied Hanna, and had done much to force the Spanish American war in spite of the wishes of Hanna and McKinley.\(^\text{15}\)

Emissaries of Platt and Quay were sent to McKinley, informing him that his own nomination was being endangered by Hanna's attitude of opposition to Roosevelt, because many of the delegates favored Roosevelt.\(^\text{16}\) Hanna was told that McKinley did not wish to force the convention against its will in the choice of a vice-presidential candidate.\(^\text{17}\)

Roosevelt arrived at the convention city on Saturday, June 16. Platt sent for Roosevelt and told him that he would have to yield and become vice-president.\(^\text{18}\) Roosevelt refused, and Platt threatened that Roosevelt would lose the re-nomination for governor.\(^\text{19}\) Roosevelt said he would take the aggressive, that he would have to refuse even more decidedly now that he had been threatened, whereupon Platt said that he would drop the whole plan.\(^\text{20}\)

\(^{13}\) From Harrison to Harding, Dunn, p.334. \(^{14}\) Ibid., p.335. \(^{15}\) From Harrison to Harding, Dunn, p.334. \(^{16}\) Ibid., p.336. \(^{17}\) Ibid. \(^{18}\) Croly, p.312-313. \(^{19}\) Ibid. \(^{20}\) Ibid.
But the tide of sentiment in favor of Roosevelt had increased. Hanna was enraged that Quay had started such a stampede for Roosevelt. Olcott narrates that Roosevelt immediately after emphatically declaring that he did not want the nomination added: "But, Senator, if they nominate me notwithstanding, what shall I do? How could I help it?" After a few sentences of explanation, Hanna replied further: "If you are nominated, all that you will have to do will be to rise in your place and decline the nomination...if you are nominated will you rise in your place and flatly decline?" Roosevelt replied, "I will, Senator," and they shook hands.

But all efforts to stop the popularity that the candidacy of Roosevelt had gained were in vain. The President had declared that the convention should not be forced in its choice, and the candidacy of Roosevelt had gained great popular strength. The demand for Roosevelt was so great, that it could not be trifled with, for it was the popular mandate.

Roosevelt had been sincere in declaring that he did not want the nomination, but he was staggered now at the insistence among the delegates.

Dunn states that McKinley saw that Roosevelt was the only man in the United States who might possibly prevent his nomination, and therefore did nothing to oppose the growing sentiment for Roosevelt. Rhodes writes: "And President McKinley in an unobtrusive way let it be known that he did not want Roosevelt as a running mate." McKinley received a telephone despatch late on Sunday evening, June 17, telling of the united

---

22. Ibid., p. 274-276.  
23. Ibid.  
24. Ibid.  
26. Ibid.  
27. Ibid., p. 315.  
New York and Pennsylvania delegations back of Roosevelt, supported also by California and Colorado. Two sentences of this message were: "The Roosevelt boom is let loose and it has swept everything...The feeling is that the thing is going pell-mell like a tidal wave."31

The President telephoned that even his closest friends should not interfere with the wishes of the convention, and when Hanna learned of the President's wishes, on Thursday, June 21, he abandoned his opposition to Roosevelt and favored unanimity.32 Gosnell writes, regarding the result, "It may be said in truth that Hanna bowed to public opinion and not to the 'bosses'."33

In 1900, Hanna had asked: "Don't any of you realize there's only one life between that madman and the Presidency?"34 In 1901, that madman, Roosevelt, was President. People pointed to Hanna and whispered that he was the man who had warned the convention not to make that madman vice-president, and they considered that Mark Hanna's power was at an end, now that the man he opposed was President.35 Beer states: "Of course Roosevelt would discard Hanna at once," was the general belief.36 In the first days of the Roosevelt administrations, many stories of a break between Roosevelt and Hanna were repeated, relating Hanna's grief at the loss of his friend, McKinley, and his chagrin that "that...cowboy" was President, and commenting on Roosevelt's complaint that Hanna treated him like a boy.37

31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p.135.
37. Pringle, p.238-239.
Leaving Buffalo on the McKinley funeral train, Hanna sat next to Kohlsaat, and said that he had known it was a mistake to nominate that 'wild man' at Philadelphia. Kohlsaat, narrating the story of the train ride, gives the following account of his short talk with Roosevelt: "I asked him if he realized what it meant if he and Hanna quarrelled, and told him Hanna held the Republican organization in the hollow of his hand; ...Roosevelt said; 'What can I do about it? Give him complete control of the patronage?' I said; 'Hanna would resent any such suggestion.' Kohlsaat then suggested that Roosevelt ask Hanna to be his friend, and said that he could count on Hanna if Hanna agreed.

Hanna replied to Roosevelt's request for friendship saying: "I will be your friend on two conditions; first, that you carry out McKinley's policies, as you promised. Second, that you quit calling me 'old man.'" Roosevelt agreed. Sullivan says that Hanna then found himself in the "repugnant role of political parent to Roosevelt." Hanna told Roosevelt that he would work hard to make the administration a success. After all, it was still Republicanism that Roosevelt represented.

Whenever possible, Roosevelt had the purpose of working with his party leaders rather than against them. Bishop states that Roosevelt, therefore, wrote to Hanna in October, 1901, requesting an early conference. Hanna was the man who could do most to bring about party harmony. According to Pringle, Roosevelt said: "I very earnestly desired his support... and felt that it would be a great calamity to the party and therefore to

40. Ibid., p.102.  
41. Strenuous Americans, Dibble, p.365.  
43. Dibble, p.365.  
the public if there was a break. In May, 1903, Roosevelt wrote to Hanna that he had relied on his judgment more than on that of any other man.46

Flynn says that in Roosevelt, Hanna faced a man as audacious and direct as himself.47 Concerning the relations of these two strong leaders, Barry writes: "Then the battle of the political giants began, but it shows the kind of stuff of which both Roosevelt and Hanna were made, that within a very short time each had come to appreciate the value and good qualities of the other and that they became warm political and personal friends."48

In response to Roosevelt's request for an early conference, Hanna replied that there were many important matters to be considered from a political standpoint, and he was sure that he and Roosevelt could agree on "the proper course to pursue," and that in the meantime Roosevelt should "go slow."49 Pringle states that Roosevelt accepted Hanna's advice that it was best to 'go slow.'50 Foraker writes that he and his friends were of the opinion that Roosevelt was sincerely, zealously and successfully carrying out the policies of McKinley.51 Concerning Hanna's part, Flynn states: "Roosevelt consulted him on every important point of policy and he was a frequent visitor at the White House.52 They worked hand in hand for the most part, especially in regard to the coal strikes and the Panama Canal route. Roosevelt said this of Hanna's cooperation and friendship:

47. Hanna, Flynn, p.127.
48. Forty Years in Washington, David Barry, Boston, 1924, p.245.
49. Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, Bishop, p.154.
50. Theodore Roosevelt, Pringle, p.244.
"Hanna had not a single small trait in his nature. I never needed to be in doubt as to whether he would carry through a fight or in any way go back on his word." 53

Lord Charnwood, who speaks of Hanna as the "much-abused potentate" and "the famous Senator" holds that Hanna represented that type of Republican whom Roosevelt respected but disagreed with on many matters. 54

In a sense, this seems true, for it would be incorrect to suppose that Hanna and Roosevelt agreed perfectly on every matter of government and politics. It must be remembered that Hanna considered Roosevelt a "madman" because of some of Roosevelt's reform ideas and political policies. The point is that these two men, of different schools of political training, worked harmoniously for the party, avoided a break, and admired one another for the good qualities that both possessed in abundance.

What of Hanna's influence at this time? Flynn writes: "His prestige with the country, indeed, seemed to reach its highest point during these years." 55 His power in the Senate, far from diminishing, increased. 56

Croly states that in the long session of 1901-1902, Hanna's activity and influence grew. 57

In this session, Hanna was the most energetic member of the Senate, and his speeches carried most weight. Many problems were discussed, and Hanna took part in those which concerned matter whereof he knew, and did not speak upon those subjects of which he had no experience. He said nothing about instituting a national system of irrigation, or about the

53. Rhodes, p.10.
54. Theodore Roosevelt, Lord Charnwood, Boston, 1923, p.86.
55. Flynn, p.127.
provision for a civil government in the Philippines. He did take an active part in discussions on continued exclusion of immigration from China, the founding of a department of commerce and labor, ship subsidy, and the construction of an Isthmian Canal. Flynn states: "His most noteworthy success was in the passage of the Panama Canal Bill...It was a good, clear and able presentation of a subject which he had really studied." Since Hanna's part in the Panama affair was his greatest Senatorial success, and because it is impossible to consider in so brief a treatment of his influence as this must be any of his other activities of the 1901-1902 session, a short account of this one work is given here. As the leader of his party, his viewpoint on all the subjects was that of the general welfare of the people. He could influence votes, but his power was not like that of a President, governor, 'boss,' for it had different elements, but was something like the influence of a prime minister.

The Nicaraguan route was the traditionally favored route for the proposed Isthmian canal. As early as 1876 a commission reported in favor of this route, partly because it was easier for the Americans to secure the rights. Those who favored the Nicaraguan route pushed their proposition with even more vigor when the French trial at Panama failed. From time to time commissions were appointed to investigate the subject. Public opinion demanded action, and another commission reported in 1897 in favor of the practicality and desirability of the Nicaraguan route.
last day of the short session of 1898-1899, the President authorized another
commission to investigate both routes thoroughly. 66

McKinley had heard the arguments of Cromwell in favor of the Panama
route, and had asked Hanna to listen. 67 Hanna was impressed by Cromwell's
arguments, and he later said to Roosevelt: "You had better be guided by
Cromwell; he knows all about the subject...you stick close to Cromwell." 68
In 1901, M. Varilla also talked to Hanna in favor of the Panama route.
Hanna said to Varilla: "You have convinced me. I must, in the service of
the nation, adhere to the same views." 69

A commission reported in 1900 that the Nicaraguan route would be less
practicable, because the Panama route would be cheaper, shorter, have
fewer locks, slighter curvature, and was preferred for engineering pur-
poses. The French company still had the rights in Panama. In January,
1902, the outlook looked favorable for the Nicaraguan route. Hanna faced
the problem, January, 1902, as a member of the committee on interoceanic
canals, and was the instigator of the minority report in favor of Panama. 70
Hanna thought the question should be considered on business grounds. He
was familiar with even the technical problems of advantage and disadvantage
of both routes. 71

Hanna made a thorough study of the Panama and Nicaraguan routes. He
secured books on the subject, called in experts, considered the technical
facts, examined study plans, sent for men who knew the grounds, and gave

66. Croly, p. 278.
67. Ibid.
69. Croly, p. 381.
70. Theodore Roosevelt, Pringle, p. 305.
his final decision, which was the decision of an expert, in favor of Panama. He did not hope to change the opinions of the committee but did hope to change the votes of Senators. He made his speech for Panama on June 5th and 6th. Croly states that Hanna had before him about fifteen lines, while his secretary had books and pamphlets ready for Hanna's call. Hanna spoke on the first day for about 2 hours, giving in a conversational way his arguments in favor of the Panama route. On June 18th, Hanna spoke a third time and said about the same as he did on June 5th. He spoke authoritatively, presenting clearly the arguments advanced by engineers, but adding the new light gained from letters of sailing masters of oceangoing ships in favor of the Panama route. Hanna's efforts received enormous success. He actually changed votes. Hundreds of copies of his speech were demanded, and congratulations were numerous. Platt said that Hanna's speech was one of the most practical addresses ever delivered in the Senate.

The story has been giving from Croly for the sake of brevity and continuity, but it seems important to add at this time, a number of statements about Hanna's success.

Rhodes considers Hanna's Panama activity his greatest effort in the Senate. Senator George Hoar, a good judge, states that Hanna was eloquent. Cullom wrote: "He changed the whole attitude of the Senate... We all generally favored the Nicaraguan route." Croly says that it is
easy to be misled by the overwhelming final vote to believe that the Panama route was widely favored, but that in truth, the Panama won by about a 42-34 vote. Many votes for it because they did not want to vote against a canal.

Barry states that Hanna prepared for his speech by exhaustively studying the question and bringing to bear upon his investigation all his business experiences. Hanna's speech was clear and contained such concrete statements as; "The Panama Canal route is 49 miles long as against 183 miles of the Nicaraguan route." Beer says that Hanna's victory was a business man's victory for, "he had sold the nation the better of two propositions." Croly states that there is no doubt now that Hanna saved the government from making a great error and from great loss. Cullom writes that he doubts whether the Panama treaty would have been ratified if it had not been worked for with such effort and influence by Hanna and Spooner. Haworth gives the credit to Hanna, as follows: "The main influence in bringing the Senate to make this decision, an eminently wise one, was wielded by Senator Hanna, whose keen business brain discerned the many advantages of Panama over Nicaragua." Pringle's view of the part played by Hanna is interesting. Pringle states: "It is difficult to apportion the credit for the victory of Panaman...Certain a major share must go to Mark Hanna...He viewed the waterway in the light of its effect on commerce, on American shipping..." Manna's part in the Panama affair
There was no anti-climax in the career of Mark Hanna. His influence continually increased. He gained the confidence of more and more of the people and of different classes of people. His power of leadership and his good faith was more widely accepted. Even his opponents respected him. A man of such influence in the party could not escape being hailed for the presidency.

Croly thinks that if McKinley had lived until the Fall of 1904, Hanna's nomination and election would have been probable; or if Hanna had been in good health in 1903 and the nomination had been offered to him by a majority of his party, Hanna would probably have accepted. Hanna did not work for his nomination and did not approve of the work of his friends for him. Hanna's prestige was due, in part, to the fact that he did not work for his own interests but for the interests of the party.

Then, too, there was opposition in the party to Roosevelt, and Mark Hanna was the person most considered as an alternative. Dunn states: "It seemed altogether likely that he might be put forward by the opponents of Roosevelt, by big business and other elements that were somewhat alarmed by the course the President was pursuing." This frequent mention of Hanna, with the possibility of Hanna's successfully receiving the nomination, caused Roosevelt considerable anxiety.

Vague stories were circulated that Hanna intended to seek the nomination, and tales were told of Roosevelt's jealousy of Hanna's prestige.

Pringle says: "Hanna repeatedly denied that he was a candidate for the
89. (continued from page 121.) Theodore Roosevelt, Pringle, p.307.
91. Ibid., p.412. 95. From Harrison to Harding, Dunn, p.390.
92. Ibid., p.413. 96. Ibid., p.372.
93. Ibid.
nomination. He happened to be sincere, but he paid the penalty for the traditional hypocrisy of politicians." 97

Lingley says that opposition to Roosevelt's nomination for a continuance of his term of office was to be expected, and that it was not surprising that the opposition should center with Senator Hanna. 98 Lingley continues: "Hanna had attained remarkable influence as a senator, was highly trusted by the business interests and was popular among southern Republicans." 99 From the beginning, The Sun demanded that the nomination be denied Roosevelt, and that the "standard" be given to Mark Hanna. 100 When Roosevelt's nomination became inevitable, The Sun continued to protest. After all, was not Hanna McKinley's logical successor, and had he not been in many respects almost President in power already? 101 Why not be President in fact?

John McCall, who was much liked by Hanna, refused to "bother" the Senator for he said that Mark was too "old" to be made a President. 102 Kohlsaat claims there was really little opposition to Roosevelt. Speaking of the possibility of Hanna as a presidential candidate, Kohlsaat writes: "He gave them no encouragement, first, because he was in poor health, and second, he believed Roosevelt was entitled to what was practically his second term." 103

That Roosevelt and Hanna seemed to be drifting apart troubled some Republicans, for together the power of Hanna and Roosevelt was immense.

97. Pringle, p. 327.
98. Since the Civil War, Lingley, p. 458.
99. Ibid., p. 459.
103. From McKinley to Harding, Kohlsaat, p. 151.
but if they openly differed and put up a fight, they would split the Republican party. In the Fall of 1903 a Mark Hanna Club was formed to organize a boom in favor of Hanna as presidential candidate. Hanna suppressed it and the club was named for Garfield. At the state convention of May, 1902, which met to nominate minor state officials, there was a great outburst in favor of Hanna for next president. However, this convention gave a cordial endorsement of Roosevelt's administration, and the President thanked Hanna. In 1902, Roosevelt consulted Hanna about patronage, and the two Republicans worked harmoniously concerning the matters of the Panama canal and the labor problem of the coal strike of 1902. Toward the end of the year 1902 the relations of Roosevelt and Hanna were a little strained.

Flynn states that as the year 1903 wore on, the drive to nominate Hanna gained force, but that Hanna was interested in being re-elected to the Senate in the Fall of 1903 by an overwhelming vote to clear any taint caused by his first narrow election. Therefore, in 1903, Hanna did not want any issue raised that would endanger an overwhelming victory for himself in the Fall. On the other hand, Roosevelt ardently wanted to be nominated for the presidency, and was anxious concerning the growing popularity of Hanna. In May, 1903, the opposition between Roosevelt and Hanna became public, and the occasion was the Republican state convention of Ohio which met in June. The story is told with the same viewpoint by Bishop, Rhodes, Croly and Sullivan in some detail, and is given here briefly, with particular stress on Hanna's part in the affair.

Sullivan writes: "Forsaker, more alert than Hanna,...seeing an opportunity to use Roosevelt's popularity to advance his own interests, determined to seize the credit for being the first Ohio leader to climb aboard the Roosevelt bandwagon."\(^{111}\) For this reason, his own increased prestige, and because of his antagonism to Hanna, Forsaker wished to force the issue of endorsing Roosevelt for the 1904 Presidential candidate.\(^{112}\) If Hanna refused to endorse Roosevelt, he would have against him the growing strength of Roosevelt.\(^{113}\) Forsaker forced the issue by giving out an interview in May 1903 in which, after praising Roosevelt, he added: "I do not knew any reason why Ohio should not also declare in favor of him...I think it would be very wise for the Republicans of Ohio at the approaching State convention...also to declare their intention to support him next year as our candidate for the Presidency."\(^{114}\) Sullivan states that if Ohio should act in the manner suggested, it should be decided by Hanna and not by Forsaker, so Hanna thought, for he was the "big man" of Ohio.\(^{115}\) Crely says that Forsaker raised the issue and then placed the blame on Hanna's friends.\(^{116}\) Hanna was anxious to win that overwhelming victory in the Fall to the Senate, and did not want to close the door of the presidential nomination to any other candidate, nor did he wish to state his own opposition to Roosevelt's nomination.\(^{117}\)

On May 24, 1903, Hanna wrote to the press, denying that Dover or any of his friends had anything to do with raising the question of endorsement of a presidential candidate, and saying that he, Hanna, did not think it

\(^{111}\) Rhodes, p.281.
\(^{112}\) Ibid., p.282.
\(^{114}\) Rhodes, p.282.
\(^{116}\) Crely, p.425.
\(^{117}\) Ibid., p.426.
proper for the state convention to do the endorsing. 118 Sullivan says that Hanna gave rather "lame" reasons why the Republicans of Ohio should not commit themselves a year ahead of time. 119 Hanna also specifically stated: "I am not, and will not be, a candidate for the presidential nomination." 120 Foraker, with a story that stands alone and is unreasonable, states: "The President knew the issue had not been forced upon Mr. Hanna but that his own friends had deliberately and with his approval...forced the issue upon the Republicans of Ohio." 121 That was Foraker's reply to the charge made against him of forcing the issue. It is unreasonable because neither Hanna nor his friends would force an issue which would only embarrass Hanna and which was the direct opposite of everything that Hanna desired. The President knew, likewise, that Hanna did not want the issue raised. Hanna sent Roosevelt a telegram saying that a letter would explain why Hanna had acted as he had regarding the forced issue. 122 Roosevelt replied to Hanna's telegram with a telegram in which he said: "Those who favor my administration and my nomination will favor endorsing both and those who do not will oppose." 123 To this telegram, Hanna replied: "In view of the sentiment expressed I shall not oppose the endorsement of your administration and candidacy by our State convention." 124 Any opposition, after Roosevelt's telegram, to the endorsement would like opposition to the President, and might split the party in Ohio. 125

Hanna had given his reasons for first refusing to endorse Roosevelt as the fact that he was at the head of Ohio politics that year and it would

118. Crely, p.424.
120. Ibid.
123. Rhodes, p.283.
124. Ibid.
as if he closed the door to other candidates, and because he, Hanna, wished a great victory in his re-election to the Senate with no other issues involved. After Roosevelt read Hanna's letter and thought things over, he wrote an apologetic letter, from Utah, May 29, 1903, thanking Hanna for "light" in the matter.

Writing of this incident and Roosevelt's letter of May 29, 1903, Flynn states: "Later Roosevelt explained in friendly fashion to the Senator why he had acted so. But Hanna never forgave him. His prestige had suffered." Sullivan likewise holds that in these dealings with Foraker and Roosevelt, Hanna's prestige dwindled. There is no question that Roosevelt gained by this controversy, but there was no change in the personal relations of Hanna and the President. Roosevelt had outmaneuvered Hanna and convinced himself that his conduct was entirely ethical. Speaking of this fact, Pringle continues: "To Roosevelt, seeking a term in his 'own right,' the Ohio Senator was an ogre. Actually, Hanna had done nothing since September, 1901, to thwart Roosevelt's hopes. He might have done a great deal. On the contrary, he assisted in the coal strike, in the Panama Canal matter, in irrigation and conservation legislation. He had even favored the creation of the department of Commerce and Labor." When the excitement was passed, an editorial in the New York Commercial Advertiser contained the following sentences: "Senator Hanna, with really marvellous agility, considering his years and his rheumatic afflictions, 126. Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, Bishop, p.246. 127. Creizy, p.426. 128. Bishop, p.247. 129. Hanna, Flynn, p128. 130. Sullivan, Vol.2, p.453. 131. Rhodes, p.284. 132. Theodore Roosevelt, Pringle, p.346.
stepped to his seat on the Roosevelt band-wagon yesterday, and should have done so before had he known that the band was about to begin to play and the procession to move. However, Hanna's influence was still great, and hope of his candidacy still remained with Hanna's friends and Roosevelt's opponents. Roosevelt had desired a fight or a clear field and had gained neither. Hanna had desired an overwhelming re-election to the Senate. Rhodes states that he received a majority of 91 on the joint ballot in the legislature. In this campaign Hanna, as usual, wanted to make things doubly certain and in his efforts to do so, he overstrained an already feeble heart. In the past, a tour on the stump had been refreshing, but in 1903 it was a cause of distress. But on November 3, 1903, Hanna's victory was great with a vote of 115 to 25. Rhodes says that this "very gratifying result" placed Hanna in the foreground as "a candidate for the presidential nomination."

Roosevelt complained that Hanna and the Wall Street men were working to prevent his nomination. Rhodes writes regarding this: "So far as Wall Street was concerned he was right. The financial interests were opposed to Roosevelt...But Hanna would give them no countenance, nor would he declare for Roosevelt." Hanna's advocates insisted that he favor his own nomination, and they pointed out that Alabama and Arkansas would be called on first, in the roll call of states, and would vote for Hanna which would start a tidal wave that would result in his nomination. Hanna refused. Beer states that "these feels who wanted Hanna to take the nom-

---

135. Crely, p.430.
136. Ibid.
139. Ibid., p.288.
"inflation" were stockholders and financiers. That is not entirely true.

There were many sincere friends of Hanna who desired his nomination because they favored his theory of politics, and believed in his leadership. Hanna was favored in the South as well as on Wall Street, by little business men as well as by "big business magnates." The breach widened between Roosevelt and Hanna.

Kohlsaat went to Washington and declared to Roosevelt that Hanna was "too old" and "too ill" to be a candidate. George Cortelyou, who had been private secretary to McKinley and Roosevelt, tried to bring Hanna and the President together. At the Arlington hotel, Hanna again declared to Cortelyou that he would not be a candidate. Cortelyou told Roosevelt, who was anxious, that Hanna had no intentions of being a candidate, and Roosevelt accepted Cortelyou's information as authentic.

Garfield also convinced the President of Hanna's good faith. Rhodes says that by the end of January 1904, Roosevelt was confident that he would receive the nomination. Bassett states that the opposition to Roosevelt was concentrated on Hanna, but "he was a millionaire, and no one believed he could be elected." Charles Washburn, a good judge of men, wrote: "Of course Hanna would not have been nominated...The old order which was incarnated in Hanna had not then passed away but it was passing." At the convention of 1904, Washburn as a delegate asked the man next to him, "What would happen if Hanna were living?" The man said in reply, "he would be nominated here today."
Whether Hanna would have been nominated, had he lived and had he become a candidate, remains a question for conjecture.

If Hanna did not approve of his own candidacy and did not offer another candidate, why did he not support Roosevelt? Why did he allow his own name to be suggested when he could have stopped this by endorsing Roosevelt? Rhodes offers a sound view as follows: "It is not difficult to understand Hanna's position. He did not believe in Roosevelt's policy toward the financial and business interests of the country. Had he been ten years younger and in good health he would probably have made a fight against Roosevelt for the Republican nomination."

Crely gives the same explanation as Rhodes, declaring that Hanna shared his friends' feeling against Roosevelt, for Hanna realized that Roosevelt represented a theory of public interests that differed from his own. Hanna did not want to give public approval to Roosevelt's theory. Roosevelt was bound to adhere to McKinley's policies in his present administration, but Hanna feared Roosevelt's activities when Roosevelt no longer had to adhere to those policies. By holding back his approval, Hanna gained personal independence and made Roosevelt see Hanna's power. He felt that conservative Republicanism must be kept independent in order that he might attain better results after Roosevelt's election. Likewise, Crely thinks that Hanna probably enjoyed the discussions of his chances. In regard to this last, Sullivan writes: "Hanna, therefore, was pleased with the movement to nominate himself, which could

---

149. Rhodes, p.287.
150. Crely, p.442.
151. Ibid, p.443.
152. Ibid., p.443.
New York and Pennsylvania delegations back of Roosevelt, supported also by California and Colorado. Two sentences of this message were: "The Roosevelt boom is let loose and it has swept everything...The feeling is that the thing is going pell-mell like a tidal wave." The President telephoned that even his closest friends should not interfere with the wishes of the convention, and when Hanna learned of the President's wishes, on Thursday, June 21, he abandoned his opposition to Roosevelt and favored unanimity. Gosnall writes, regarding the result, "It may be said in truth that Hanna bowed to public opinion and not to the 'bosses'." In 1900, Hanna had asked: "Don't any of you realize there's only one life between that madman and the Presidency?" In 1901, that madman, Roosevelt, was President. People pointed to Hanna and whispered that he was the man who had warned the convention not to make that madman vice-president, and they considered that Mark Hanna's power was at an end, now that the man he opposed was President. Beer states: "Of course Roosevelt would discard Hanna at once," was the general belief. In the first days of the Roosevelt administrations, many stories of a break between Roosevelt and Hanna were repeated, relating Hanna's grief at the loss of his friend, McKinley, and his chagrin that "that...cowboy" was President, and commenting on Roosevelt's complaint that Hanna treated him like a toy.

31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p.135.
37. Pringle, p.238-239.
give him the opportunity later to abdicate in Roosevelt's favor. Moreover, the movement was flattering to Hanna, the editorials in the conservative press, the fund raised to 'put him over,' the public declarations of important business and political leaders, all had the effect of heightening Hanna's prestige.\textsuperscript{153}

Why did not Hanna fight Roosevelt for the nomination? No man realized the strength of Roosevelt better than did Mark Hanna.\textsuperscript{154} Hanna saw clearly the results to his career and to his party if he accepted and failed. It would be a voyage without certainty against shipwreck.\textsuperscript{155} There would be many chances of shipwreck. Hanna realized that, at the easiest, it would mean a terrific fight, and Hanna was "old" and he was in very ill health. His fight might drive a wedge into the party which he had done so much to unite and strengthen. With his keen insight, Hanna made the best possible decision "for his cherished and patriotic" interests had he lived.\textsuperscript{156}

Hanna had been ill for some years, but in 1903, he had all the premonitions of a breakdown.\textsuperscript{157} His trouble was a legacy from typhoid fever which he had in 1867. He was subject to attacks of congestion which caused faiinte of several hours.\textsuperscript{158} Mark Hanna was too interested in his work to take precautions about his health. Crely says that if Hanna had been the kind of man to take precautions about his health, he would not have been Mark Hanna.\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{154} Crely, p. 444.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., p. 445.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., p. 446.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., p. 449.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., p. 448.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., p. 455.
His stumping tour of 1903 was strenuous, but after election, he was needed at Washington for an extra session of congress. On Tuesday, December 15, 1903, Hanna again became ill with severe grip. But on Thursday, he went to New York. After having a severe chill and raging fever, Hanna returned to Cleveland on Wednesday, December 23. Hanna kept going. His last public utterance was on January 12, 1904, at Columbus, when he expressed his gratitude for his re-election to the Senate. Hanna kept active until January 20. His complaint was found to be typhoid fever. At first the attack did not look fatal and would not have been if Hanna had taken care of his health previously and if he had not been in such an enfeebled condition. Hanna scrawled a note to the President, and the President's reply was never received by Hanna. Kohlsaat states: "Mark Hanna failed rapidly. I saw him a few days before he died, February 15, 1904. He told me the President came to see him and brought flowers from the White House." Hanna died on Monday, February 15, 1904. Senator Platt of Connecticut declared that when Hanna died "all the people mourned with a grief that was deep and unfeigned." The Congressional Record reads: "Resolved. That a Committee of twenty-five Senators, of whom the President pro tempore shall be one, be appointed by the presiding officer to take order for superintending the funeral of Mr. Hanna, which shall take place in the Senate Chamber at 12 o'clock a.m. Wednesday, February 17th instant, and that the Senate will attend the same...Resolved, That as a further mark of respect the remains

162. Ibid.
163. Ibid., p.453.
165. Rhodes, p.290.
be removed from Washington to Cleveland, Ohio, for burial, in charge of the Sergeant-at-Arms, attended by the Committee..."166 The memorial service, held in the Senate Chamber, was attended by the President, the cabinet, and all official Washington. 167 No man in the country had more friends, and 30,000 people visited the bier. 168

On February 16, 1904, Roosevelt wrote: "Hanna's death has been very sad. Did I tell you (Root) the last letter he wrote was one to me?"169 Roosevelt also wrote to Root, stating: "No man had larger traits than Hanna. He was a big man in every way and as forceful a personality as we have seen in public life in our generation."170 From the Congressional Record of February, 1904, I quote the following estimate of Hanna:

He is mourned by all his countrymen...by his political associates not alone because he was their organizing leader who repeatedly lead them to victory, but also and more especially because he had gained their affections and reigned in their hearts as a favorite; by his political opponents...because they recognized in him a bold and fearless statesman who commanded their respect and excited their admiration.171

I quote at length because a true estimate of Hanna's worth from his contemporaries is so little known.

After Hanna's death, his associates paid him high tributes, and it seems well to present some of these, in order to discover how Hanna was rated, and what part, if any, money played in his accomplishments. Did his associates, including his opponents, think that his power was the power of money alone, or did they believe that Mark Hanna was a forceful personality

170. Rhodes, p.289.
with talents of organization, keen judgment and untiring energy? Was he, as Foraker stated, "one of the really great men of his day and generation?"

Because Hanna has been misrepresented as a "money-maker" with dollars hanging upon his clothes, it is well to recall that he lost all interest in accumulating a fortune, and what fortune he had accumulated he had earned by initiative on his part and personal co-operation with his workers. Flynn states: "Hanna was wholly sincere. His record as an employer was good. He was the first man in the bituminous fields to recognise the union."173 Reverend Edward Everett Hale, chaplain of the Senate, said: "This man had at once as no other man had, the confidence of capital and labor. He could mediate between the man who provide the tools and the workmen who handle them."174 Hanna could win over to him audiences of working men who had previously been against him. Hanna was a builder. In business and in politics the words of Senator Fairbanks were true: "He possessed in full degree the power of great initiative."175 Hanna used none of the arts of a demagogue; his directness and bluntness in labor disputes won for him the respect of working men, while his frank, open advocacy of ship subsidies and similar things won for him the regard and admiration of his opponents."176

Hanna's relation to his party was one of devoted active personal service. By his power of organization and leadership, he united and strengthened the Republican party. Hanna's interest in the party did not

172. Rhodes, p.290.
173. Flynn, p.128.
175. Ibid.
allow him to permit his personal likes or dislikes to interfere with the harmony of that party. Although Hanna recognized Faraquer as his political rival, he worked with him and his associates to show to the country a united Republican party. Roosevelt said that the party and the country should be grateful to Hanna for the way in which Hanna worked with him after McKinley's death. 177

His power of organization has been noted in his campaign management. The characteristics of these were efficiency, foresight, economy, practicality and successfulness. His popularity has been seen in the demand for Hanna as a stump speaker and in his overwhelming re-election to the Senate. His loyalty and disinterestedness were demonstrated in his friendships. His senatorial services to the country can be judged by the part he took in the Panama canal discussion. Hanna was not a reformer in the party and did not spend his time fighting abuses. He organized more efficiently the elements he found in the party. Henry Pritchett, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology states: "He was a strong man, a man of noble parts, of splendid personal power and of high ability for service and he had played a great part as a leader in this country." 178

With Edward D. White, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, whom Rhodes considers a moderator between the eulogists and detractors of Hanna, I hold in high regard the "ability, honor and unselfishness of Hanna." 179

178. Rhodes, p.4-5.
179. Ibid., p.290.
Concluding Remarks

1. Hanna embodied in his life the social and economic traditions of the industrial pioneer.

2. As such, Hanna was aggressive, energetic, hopeful, with good will and good fellowship.

3. As such, Hanna believed that the government, as an agent of betterment, should assist the citizens to attain their personal ends.

4. Good government meant Republican government to Mark Hanna.

5. Business was a primary interest of men of the industrial pioneer days.

6. Politics was the other primary interest of Hanna, the industrial leader.

7. He believed the government should stimulate economic activities.

8. Hanna did not believe in the specialization of business and politics.

9. Hanna never became merely interested in accumulating a fortune.

10. Hanna did not enter politics for business interests, but in politics he represented the interests of business.

11. He aroused and united public opinion because he represented a traditional economic system. He was always distinguished from a political "boss."

12. If Hanna had been a representative of New York "big business" he would not have had such influence, but as a spokesman of American business he gained confidence.

13. Hanna used business methods in politics and perfected the old system.

14. Hanna was a great party leader and brought to it loyalty and adaptability.
CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

Marcus Alonzo Hanna, *His Life and Work*, Herbert Croly, Macmillan Company, New York, 1923: This is the most complete book about Mark Hanna. It is considered excellent and fair by the majority of better historians of the period. Unlike many biographers, Croly does not overpraise or condemn the character of Hanna. This is a very solid book and might not appeal to the general public as interesting reading. It will appeal to the student of historical biography as a careful and expert handling of a difficult subject.

Notes of a Busy Life, Joseph B. Foraker, Stewart and Kidd Company, Cincinnati, 1918: Both volume one and volume two of this work give the personality of Mark Hanna from the viewpoint of a Republican associate who was, at the same time, a political rival of Mark Hanna. The volumes are always interesting, but in many parts the prejudice of the writer is obvious. Foraker is very much in favor of himself, and not always fair to Sherman and Hanna. The books contain a number of records of official proceedings which are valuable. The work does not present a complete picture of Hanna.

Hanna, Thomas Beer, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1929: This is not a very scholarly work. It contains too much personal opinion and presents too intimate a picture of Hanna. It lacks dignity, cool judgment, reserve and soundness. It is not complete as a biography of Hanna.

The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations: James Ford Rhodes, Macmillan Company, New York, 1922: This is a very sound volume and extremely valuable in the study of the history from 1896 to 1904. It presents a complete story of the whole, with a very clear picture of the characters in history of the period. It is not too involved or heavy, but contains sufficient detail.

From McKinley to Harding, H.H. Kohlsaat, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1923: This was the most interesting and amusing of all the books. Kohlsaat presents a journalistically intimate picture of his friend, Hanna, which often calls for a smile but never repels or disgusts one. The book is particularly helpful in the matter of McKinley's debts, in the story of the 1896 campaign and concerning the train conversations after McKinley's death between Kohlsaat and Roosevelt, and Roosevelt and Hanna. For vividness of portrayal of character, this book is superior to the others. It does not give a complete story of Hanna's life.

Mark Hanna, Celen Lauer, Ohio Mike Publishing House, Cleveland, Ohio, 1901: Lauer claims that he wrote this short book because he "knew" something about Hanna and the public wanted to know something. The book is not at all scholarly and would not invite one's confidence in the judgment of the writer. It is not interesting and personal as Kohlsaat's work. It is sketchy, lacks unity of impression, and does not present a complete story of
any phase of Hanna's personality or work.

McKinley As I Knew Him, Mark Hanna, the Chapple Publishing Company, Boston, 1904: Introduction by J.M. Chapple: Hanna's short essay on his friend gives a fairly accurate picture of the esteem with which he regarded McKinley. The introduction by Chapple is full of praise of Mark Hanna.

How Presidents Are Made, Arthur W. Dunn, Fund and Wagnalls, New York, 1920; This was a good volume, particularly helpful in dealing with Hanna's relations with McKinley from 1891 to 1896.

Four Famous New Yorkers, De Alva Stanwood Alexander, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1923: This was very good; particularly useful in dealing with the conventions of 1896 and 1900.

Boss Platt and His New York Machine, Harold F. Gosnell, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1924: This was interesting, and useful regarding the convention of 1900.

The Republican Party, William Starr Myers, The Century Company, New York, 1928: This was good, and was helpful in a general way, particularly regarding McKinley's relations with Hanna.

Fifty Years of Public Service, S.M. Cullem, McClurg Company, Chicago, 1911: This book was very interesting and gave a personal slant on Hanna's senatorial appointment, election and accomplishments. It was especially good regarding the part Hanna played in the Panama canal discussions.

The Life of William McKinley, Charles S. Oclott, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, April, 1915: Volume one and volume two were both sound and fair works of McKinley's character, Hanna's personality, the relations of the two men, the incidents of policies and platforms and the friendship of these two Republicans.


Our Times, America Finding Herself, Mark Sullivan, Vol.2, Scribner's, 1927: Both works were very, very interesting, fairly complete, presenting the story well. Volume 2 was especially useful in handling Hanna and Roosevelt Republicanism.

From Harrison to Harding, Arthur Wallace Dunn, C.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1922: Volume 1: This was a valuable book, mostly for Hanna's activities in the McKinley administrations, 1896-1901.
The following books were all useful, all fairly good, none outstanding in interest of defects, and all presenting similar opinions.


**The Martial Spirit, Walter Millis, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1931.**

**Life of Thomas B. Reed, Samuel W. McCall, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1914** This was useful in dealing with chapter two, on the conventions of 1884 and 1888.

**Since the Civil War, Charles Ramsdell Lingley, Century Company, New York, 1921** This was very good for general information.

**Contemporary American History, Charles A. Beard, McMillan Company, New York, 1914** This was valuable in getting an estimate of Hanna's biographer, Crely, and also of forming an opinion of Hanna's value.

**Theodore Roosevelt, A Biography, Henry F. Pringle, Harcourt Brace and Company, New York, 1931** This was useful in dealing with Hanna and Roosevelt Republicanism.

**History of the President, Edward S. Stanwood, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1916, Volume 2** This was useful in writing of McKinley's nomination and election, 1896.

**The United States in Our Own Times, 1865-1920, Paul L. Haworth, Ph.D., Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1920** I used this throughout the writing of the thesis.

**John Sherman, Theodore E. Burton, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1906** This was useful in dealing with Hanna's appointment to the Senate, and Sherman's willing acceptance of the Secretaryship of State.

**Forty Years in Washington, David S. Barry, Little-Brown and Company, Boston, 1924.**

**Bryan, M.R. Werner, Harcourt Brace and Company, New York, 1929** This was favorable to Hanna, and useful in writing of the campaign of 1896, and also of Hanna's stump ing tour in 1899.

**A Short History of the United States, J.S. Bassett, Ph.D., Volume 3, 1865-1929, MacMillan Company, New York, 1929** This did not contain very much about Hanna, but was sound.

**Strenuous Americans, R.F. Dibble, Beni and Liveright Inc., New York, 1923** This was very good; Dibble is not enthusiastic over Hanna.

Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Volume 1, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1920: This is a very sound biography, and as a whole agrees with the views of Rhodes, Croly, Olcott and Beard.

The Republican Party, Francis Curtiss, Volume 2, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York; 1904: I didn't use this as much as the book of the same title by Myres.
The following articles from recent periodical literature are interesting and can be found on the second floor of the Oak Park, Illinois, Main Library.

"A Sketch of Mr. Hanna, Pen Picture," William Allen White, McClure’s Magazine, November, 1900, 16:56.


"From Opposite Points of View," Outlook, 65:480.


"Hanna Boom," Nation, 78:5-6, January 7, 1904.

"Hanna’s Place in History," Current Literature, April, 1904, 36:384-5.


"Mr. Hanna." Thomas Beer, Saturday Evening Post, April 13, 1928, 201:5-4.


"Mark Hanna, Big Business in Politics," John T. Flynn, Scribner’s Magazine, New York, August, 1933: This was a very lengthy article, well written, comparing Mark Hanna and his time with the present time. Flynn gives too much credit to the power of money, and not sufficient sympathy or understanding of the personality of Mark Hanna with his limitations or abilities.
This thesis, "The Relation of Mark Hanna to the Republican Party," written by A. Patricia Bortolotti, has been accepted by the Graduate School of Loyola University, with reference to form, and by the readers whose names appear below, with reference to content. It is, therefore, accepted as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

By: Paul Kiniery, June 19, 1934

Rev. Eneas B. Goodwin June 27, 1934