1936

Aspects of Nationalism in the United States, 1815-1830

Drusilla Agnes Breen

Loyola University Chicago

Recommended Citation
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/65

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1936 Drusilla Agnes Breen
ASPECTS OF NATIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 1815 - 1830

A THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

IN

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY

CHICAGO

BY

DRUSILLA AGNES BREEN

JUNE
1936
PREFACE

Someone has said that whosoever can lend charm to a twicetold tale has no other need of an excuse for telling it. This statement should bar the amateur. Since I cannot lay claim to an ability to charm in story telling I should say rather that whosoever can find joy in investigating an interesting period of history and wishes to write about it should have no need of an excuse for the undertaking. My bibliography testifies that many have dedicated their efforts to the period and field that intrigued me, United States History 1815-1830, and that they wrote voluminously and entertainingly upon it.

The limits of this volume have prevented the elaboration of many points well worthy of fuller treatment. I found it exceedingly difficult to delimit Aspects of Nationalism in the United States 1815-1830.

I have kept in mind in this work the importance of regarding the development of American nationality as the outcome of economic and social as well as political forces. I endeavored also to make plain the attitude and influence of New England, the middle region, the south and the west. In
the interpretation of nationalism of the period I have inci-
dently and directly treated the colorful careers of many of
the great statesmen who identified themselves with national
life. The final chapter is given to "The Great Decisions of
the Supreme Court," because the work of the court was the
cementing of the otherwise loosely laid wall on which vigorous,
expansive nationality was to rise.

I cannot close these prefatory lines without a word of
grateful acknowledgement to Dr. Paul Kiniery of Loyola Uni-
versity who has given me the advantage of his wide and accurate
scholarship.

Drusilla Agnes Breen

Chicago, June 1936
Contents

Chapter I
THE UNITED STATES TARIFF OF 1816

The argument for protection to young industries.-The industrial history of the United States and protective legislation from 1789 - 1816.-The return of peace brings demand for a new tariff.-After war readjustment.-1808 the turning point in industrial history of the United States.-Cotton protection.-Woolen protection.-Iron protection.-Findings relative to the tariff of 1816.

Chapter II
THE ROMANCE OF AMERICAN EXPANSION - THE ACQUISITION OF FLORIDA


Chapter III
THE SETTLEMENT OF TEXAS AN EXPRESSION OF NATIONALISM

The United States acquires territory by negotiation and purchase.-Texas the exception to rule.-Racial and political background.-
Chapter III (Cont'd.)

American pioneers develop nationalism.-Texas open to the flood of the Westward movement.-Mexican apprehensions.-Texas -Louisiana boundary ill-defined.-Offers to purchase Texas.-Attempts to fix the boundary.-Russia menaces the Pacific.-Jackson has designs on the Southwest.-The rise of Jackson marks self-confident democratic spirit and the importance of the West.

Chapter IV THE MONROE DOCTRINE: A WALL OF NATIONALISM . 66


Chapter V THE ATTITUDE OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS TOWARDS NATIONALISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Chapter VI  
THE RELATION OF THE TARIFF LEGISLATION OF 1824 AND OF 1828 TO NATIONALISM  


Chapter VII  
THE SPIRIT OF NATIONALISM AS TRANSLATED BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.  

John Marshall's decisions lay foundation of American constitutional law.-The Supreme Court nationalistic in its decisions.-McCulloch vs. Maryland.-Authority of states defined and limited.-Power to create implies power to preserve.-Dartmouth vs. Woodward.-Basis of corporation law.-Daniel Webster counsel for alma mater.-Gibbons vs. Ogden.-Commerce defined in broad terms.-Brown vs. Maryland.-"Original package doctrine".-Nationalism Marshall's article of creed.
INTRODUCTION

THE NEW NATIONALISM 1815-1830

The news of the signing of the treaty of peace and of the great victory at New Orleans came to the administration of James Madison and to the people of the harassed nation like a reprieve from doom. Six months before, the secession of New England, the curtailment of national boundaries, and the virtual loss of independence had seemed by no means impossible. Now all was changed. The defeats, the disappointments of earlier years were forgotten, and no one cared that the treaty of peace did not mention the freedom of the seas which had been the object of the original quarrel. Men who had doubted the future of American institutions, breathed freely again, and spoke of the Constitution and the Union in terms which in other countries and other times have made the material of heroic legends. The central facts of the years after the second war with England were the emergence in many ways of the spirit of nationalism and the attempt to reconcile this spirit with the growing economic differences between the chief sections of a far flung people.

The most evident expression of this new spirit was the virtual disappearance of two parties. The practical necessities of national administration had led the old Republican party to give up little by little all real insistence on the strict construction of the Constitution. By the Louisiana purchase, the embargo, and various measures made necessary by war, national power had been extended even beyond the hopes of Alexander Hamilton. The Federalists had become a mere sectional group, entirely discredited by a policy of opposition in the face of a foreign enemy which had come close to the border of open treason. Patriotic Federalists like John Quincy Adams found it necessary to leave their old party allegiance and easy to join with opponents whose ideas had become so much like their own.

Congress gave legislative expression to the new nationalism by adopting a protective tariff designed to encourage the industries which had begun to flourish under the still more beneficent protection of embargo and of war. It was noteworthy that this measure received the support of Calhoun and of Madison, who in an earlier time had made valiant arguments for the principles of free trade. It was even stranger to find the party which still claimed Jefferson for a father creating a second national bank, very similar in organization and purpose to the one which Alexander Hamilton had sponsored in the early

2. Ibid., p. 269.
days of the Republic, and whose charter had been allowed to expire in 1811. The pressing economic demand for a sound currency and for an institution which should be able to check the issuance of worthless notes by state banks, served thus to destroy completely the old constitutional scruples. The only effective voice against this policy was that of the brilliant and eccentric John Randolph of Roanoke, who uttered unheeded warnings against the new nationalism in the name of a new sectionalism. His voice was half prophetic and half a ghostly reminiscence of the past.

The diplomatic situation of the period became complicated by the fact that the northern boundary of the Louisiana purchase from the Lake of the Woods to the Rocky Mountains had never been settled. The extreme American claims to Texas and to West Florida as parts of the Louisiana purchase had never been accepted by Spain and were shadowy at best. The genius of a master diplomat was needed to steer the course of American fortunes through the shoals of dissatisfaction foreign and domestic at this time. The man that was fitted by long diplomatic experience to carry negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion was the great John Quincy Adams.

The wall of nationalism that was proclaimed by the Monroe

3. Ibid., p. 341.
Doctrine had far reaching effects that were not easily discernible at the time of its promulgation. In this and many other issues Adams succeeded beyond his fondest dreams.

In this period also, the spirit of nationalism was translated by the Supreme Court under the able leadership of John Marshall into judicial decisions which laid the foundations of American constitutional law. He became Chief Justice at a time when the prestige and prospects of the judiciary were at their lowest ebb. John Marshall had the tact and personal charm which made it possible for him to win the complete confidence of the other members of the Court, and to dictate decisions which were accepted by his colleagues without dissent. He had the statesman's essential patience which allowed him to bide his time and to state a principle at a time and in a way in which it would meet with least opposition. The Supreme Court under Marshall set its face as a flint against sectionalism.

The United States at this period, by wrestling with "principalities and powers" abroad and at home was able to find herself. She escaped from a half-colonial position towards the Old World, and turned her energies to the necessary social, economic, political and international readjustments incident to the new national status she had acquired.

The history of this time of transition and re-creation, its forces, its men, and its important measures constitutes the theme of this volume.
Chapter I

The United States Tariff of 1816

There are many arguments in favor of protection, but none has been more frequently or more sincerely urged than that which is expressed in the phrase "protection to young industries". None has received so generally the approval of economists, even of those little disposed to acknowledge the validity of any reasoning not in accordance with the theory of free exchange.

The argument, in brief, is, that it may be advantageous to encourage by legislation a branch of industry which might be profitable carried on, which is therefore sure to be carried on eventually, but whose rise is prevented for the time being by artificial or accidental causes. The essential part of the argument lies in the assumption that the causes which prevent the rise of the industry, and render protection necessary are not natural and permanent causes -- not such as would permanently prevent, under a state of freedom, the growth of the industry. Let it be supposed, for instance, that the industry to be encouraged is the cotton manufacture. The natural advantages of a given country for the making of cotton cloths are good, we may suppose, in comparison with the
advantages for producing other things. The raw material is cheap, power for machinery is abundant, the general intelligence and industry of the people -- which, since they admit of but very slow change, must be considered natural advantages -- are such as to fit them for complex industrial operations. There is no permanent cause why cotton goods should not be obtained at as low cost by making it at home as by importing it; perhaps they can even be produced at lower cost at home. But the cotton manufacture, let it be further supposed, is new; the machinery used is unknown and complicated, and requires skill and experience of a kind not attainable in other branches of production. The industry of the country runs by custom in other grooves, from which it is not easily diverted. If, at the same time, communication of knowledge be slow, and enterprise be hesitating, we have a set of conditions under which the establishment of the cotton manufacture may be prevented, long after it might have been carried on with advantage. Under such circumstances it may be wise to encourage the manufacture by duties on imported goods, or by other analogous measures. Sooner or later cotton manufacture will be introduced and carried on, even without assistance; and the government's aid will only cause it to be established with less friction, and at an earlier date, than would otherwise have been the case.

A detailed examination of the industrial conditions of
our country during the earlier part of the nineteenth century will bring out more clearly why protection may have been useful. It may be well, however, to notice at this point the difference between those days and the present which must seriously affect the application of the argument under consideration. Even if we were to suppose the conditions of 1810 to exist now, if the country were beginning to attempt manufactures, and if a great revolution in manufacturing industry happened to make the attempt particularly difficult, then the obstacles arising from the force of custom, and from the want of familiarity with new processes, would be much easier to overcome than sixty years ago. The ties of custom in industry have become much loosened in the last half century; capital and labor turn more easily to new employments. The railroad, the telegraph, the printing-press, the immense increase in the facility of communication, the constant change in methods of production in all industries, have tended to make new discoveries and inventions common property, and to do away with advantages in production based on other than permanent causes.

During the twenty years that followed the War of 1812, the protective controversy was one of the most important features of the political life of the nation; and the young industries argument was the great rallying-cry of the protectionists.

It is of interest to examine how far protection of the kind advocated was actually applied and how far it was the cause, or an essential condition of that rise of manufactures which took place.

The Industrial History of the United States and the Course of Protective Legislation from 1789-1816

A definition of terms:

Tariffs are lists of articles with their import or export duties noted. The term is also used for the laws regulating the duties, and in many countries for price schedules.

The tariff history of the United States divides itself into two great periods. The first is before 1860. The second is after 1860. The period before 1860 may again be divided into three sub-periods, -- the first extending from 1789 to 1816, the second from 1816 to about 1846, and the third from 1846 to 1860.

The early economic history may also be divided into two periods. The first, which is in the main a continuation of the colonial period, lasted until about 1808. The embargo marks the beginning of the series of events which closed the first period. The second began in 1808 and lasted through the generation following. It was during the second period that the most decided attempt was made to protect young industries in
the United States and it is with this period this article will deal.

The Tariff Act of 1789 was the first legislative measure passed by the United States. The protectionists have pointed to it as a disposition of the first Congress to adopt at once a policy of protection; the free traders have pointed to it similarly as showing ground for their claim. The duties of the Act of 1789 were very moderate, and as compared with those which the United States had under any subsequent legislation, may be described as free trade duty or duties. On the other hand the spirit of the Act of 1789 was protective. Such, in the main, remained the situation until 1816, duties being raised from time to time in order to secure more revenue, but the spirit and general rate of duties not being sensibly modified.

After the close of the War of 1812, however, a new spirit and a new policy developed. A demand arose for two closely connected measures: protection to domestic manufacturers, and internal improvement.

Protection was demanded as a means both of aiding young industries and of fostering a home market for agricultural products; it was a part of the "American system". Some

2. Ibid., 562.
movement in the direction of lighter duties was manifested as early as 1816.

The general interests of the country up to the war had been commercial and agricultural, but a certain progress had been made in manufactures. Toward the close of the last century, spinning of yarns had been introduced from England, and this industry under force of new inventions, had not only extended the supply and cheapened the price of raw materials, but had also greatly reduced the cost of manufacturing by supplanting hand labor with marvelous machines. The weaving of cloth by machines had not, however, been undertaken, nor had the, in England, newly invented power looms been introduced. Glass, iron and earthenware were represented as flourishing to some extent, but when the war, following the embargo and non-intercourse acts, which threw the capital of the Middle and New England States out of commerce, took place, it found the country in great straits for want of the usually imported manufactures.

Ships were laid up. Capital sought a new direction, and manufactures offered the field for employment. This

4. Ibid., p. 12.
enterprise, undertaken during the war, formed an interest that thrust itself upon the notice of the government. The war had also disclosed the financial weakness of the federal government. Almost the sole means on which the government had to depend was borrowing. Credit was at a low point, and the continuance of the war would have presented accumulating difficulties. There was an imminent necessity for strengthening the hands of the government not by direct taxes, which could with difficulty be enforced, but by higher indirect taxes. This view was taken by John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, then a member of the House, and he favored the higher tariff of 1816, which met the views of the growing manufacturing interest.

The debates on the new tariff which became necessary on the return of peace were the first signs of the crystallization of party views upon the question of protection for protection's sake. Up to that time the protection extended to manufacturers' was confessedly incidental. The duties had been laid in the view to revenue and adjusted so as to give the largest amount while aiding manufactures without interfering with trade. As has been stated, the embargo, nonintercourse,

and the war combined to send enormous capital from the employment of commerce to those of manufactures.

This interest was now exposed not only to the goods that had during the war accumulated abroad, and which came to the United States at all hazards, but to the fact that those products were the production of new inventions and discoveries that had in England cheapened cost and improved quality. Against this triple combination, quantity, cheapened cost, and improved quality, the manufactures of this country were called upon to contend, and they required that their claims to government aid be recognized.

Those claims were contested by the shipping interests, which had also suffered by the war. Mr. Pickens of Massachusetts, contended that twenty-five per cent for two years was abundant protection for manufactures. Daniel Webster, then representing New Hampshire, proposed that thirty per cent should be the maximum duty, to be gradually reduced after two years. The great commercial and national interests of the country depended upon free trade. The defenses of the country depended upon the navy, which in its turn is born of commerce. Far more employment was given by a certain amount of capital employed in shipping than in the same amount employed in manufacturing.

7. Channing, p. 72.
8. Ibid., 72.
Mr. Smith of South Carolina proposed a reduction of the sugar duties claimed for Louisiana, and Mr. Wright of Pennsylvania, proposed to exclude from voting all members concerned in manufacturing. Mr. Randolph was in favor of encouraging individual or family manufactures, but not corporate. Mr. Calhoun of South Carolina stated that although his section had no direct interest in manufactures, yet upon national grounds he admitted the claims of the manufacturers.

The war had demonstrated the weakness of a country that depended altogether upon foreigners for its supplies, produce, and raw materials in exchange for goods. When hostilities rendered intercourse impossible, the produce could not be sold, and people suffered by being deprived of goods, while the government, distressed in its finances could get little aid from people whose produce was unsalable. Such an extent of manufactures as would employ a large part of the population in working up materials and food into merchandise that would employ a coasting trade in the interchange was indispensable to the national welfare, and the unity of the States.

---


The course of events in Europe had forced upon the federal government a line of policy of which the embargo and war were the necessary measures. That line of national policy had called into being a large amount of forced manufactures that were necessary to the country. Those manufactures had not sprung up in the ordinary course of national industry, but had suddenly resulted from the same national policy that had largely increased the public debt. Peace had come, as a matter of course, bringing with it the necessity of paying the debt and the danger of ruin to those manufacturers which had been called into being by the war. The duty of the government was in levying duties to pay its debts, also to protect those investments of manufacturers, which had originated in the same necessity as the debts. The manufacturers would be firmly established under the shield of the duty necessary for the discharge of the debt and by the time the debt was paid the protection would be no longer needed.

Along with liberal provision for natural defense and a new United States Bank Madison's Message of 1815 recommended a protective tariff. The war had taught him the importance of building up such domestic manufactures

"as would relieve the United States from a dependence on foreign supplies ... for articles necessary for the public defense or connected with the primary wants of individuals."

Here the Republicans were adopting Hamilton's policies.
Aid to manufactures for this very purpose had been advocated by him with little avail.

England, where the factory system was first established, thanks to the genius of the inventors of the steam engine and of power driven machinery, carefully guarded the secret of the construction of the machines which gave her preeminence; but it was the greater profitableness of agriculture and commerce which long prevented serious efforts at manufacturing in the United States. When the embargo, non-intercourse, and war cut off the accustomed supply of foreign goods and at the same time destroyed the shipping of the country, capital was diverted perforce into manufacturing to prevent actual want of necessities. By the end of the war very considerable sums probably amounting to a hundred million dollars, had found investment in manufactures of various kinds mostly textiles, which employed more than half this total. These new enterprises were located chiefly in New England and the Middle States, Rhode Island being the home of most of the cotton mills. Some factories were to be found in the towns of the Ohio Valley, where the difficulty of transportation across the mountains had much the same effect as the embargo and war on the Atlantic States.

12. J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Madison's Message of 1815.
The English were uneasy over this effect of the war. They had succeeded in retaining their American market after the Revolutionary War, but they were in danger of losing it now unless means could be found to destroy the infant industries of the States. As Lord Brougham said in Parliament,

"It is worth while to incur a loss upon the first exportation, in order, by a glut, to stifle in the cradle those rising manufactures in the United States which the war had forced into existence, contrary to the natural course of things."

The privations of the war had shown others besides Madison the importance of preserving the manufactures of America until they could stand alone in spite of foreign competition. Even Jefferson overcame his antipathy to them and wrote,

"There exists enough power to exclude us from the field of interchange with other nations..."

Then he continued, "We must fabricate for ourselves to be independent for the comforts of life. We must now place the manufacturer by the side of the agriculturist. He who is against domestic manufacture must be for reducing us either to dependence or for having us clothed in skins and to live like wild beasts in caverns."

The investments of the owners of the new plants were at stake, but their interests were not the basis of the demand for protective legislation by political leaders. For example, Calhoun professed to lay claims of the manufactures out of view.

15. Ibid., 334.
Economic independence was as essential as political; indeed, political independence was hardly a reality without economic self-sufficiency. As the War of the Revolution had been fought for one, so now it was proposed to win the other by the protection of home industry.

The Year 1807 Marks the Turning Point in the Industrial History of the United States.

The industrial situation changed abruptly in 1808. The complications with England and France led to a series of measures which mark the turning point in the industrial history of our country. The Berlin and Milan decrees of Napoleon and the English Orders in Council led, in December, 1807 to the Embargo. The Non-Intercourse Act followed in 1809. War with England was declared in 1812. During the war intercourse with England was prohibited, and all import duties were doubled. The last mentioned measure was adopted in the hope of increasing revenue, but had little effect for foreign trade practically ceased to exist. This series of restrictive measures blocked the accustomed channels of exchange and production and gave enormous stimulus to those branches of industry whose products had before been imported. Establishments for manufacture of cotton goods, woolen cloths, iron, glass, pottery, and other articles, sprang up with mushroom
growth. It is sufficient here to note that the restrictive legislation of 1808-1815 was, for the time being equivalent to extreme protection. The consequent rise of a considerable class of manufactures, whose success depended largely upon the continuance of protection, formed the basis of a strong movement for more decided limitation of foreign competition.

Some signs of the gradual growth of a protective feeling appeared before the close of the war. It was natural that the patriotic fervor which the events of the period of restriction and war called out for the first time in our history should bring with it a disposition to encourage the production at home of a number of manufactured articles, of which the sudden interruption in the foreign supply caused great inconvenience. Madison, whose views on this subject, as on others shifted as time went on and circumstances changed, recommended the encouragement of manufactures; and in some of Clay's earlier speeches we can see the first signs of the American system of the future.

The feeling in favor of the manufactures that had sprung up during the time of restriction obtained some clean concessions in the tariff of 1816.

The control of the policy of Congress at the time was in the hands of a knot of young men of the rising generation who had brought about the war and felt in a measure responsible for the results. There was a strong feeling among these that the manufacturing establishments which had grown up during the war should be assisted. There was little feeling, however, either in Congress or among the people, such as appeared in later years, in favor of a permanent strong protective tariff. Higher duties were therefore granted on those goods, textiles and fabrics, in whose production most interest was felt, but only for a limited period.

Cotton and woolen goods were to pay twenty-five per cent until after 1819; after that date they were to pay twenty per cent. A proviso, intended to make more secure this measure of protection, was adopted in regard to a minimum duty on cotton goods. These and other distinctly protective provisions were defended by Calhoun, mainly on the ground of making provision for the exigencies of another war; and on that ground they were adopted and, at the same time limited.

The general increase of duties under the act of 1816, to an average of about twenty per cent, was due to necessity of providing for the payment of the interest on the heavy debt contracted during the war.

18. Ibid., p. 238.
The United States adopted the first permanent system to protect native industry against foreign rivals. The period of restriction began in 1808; the importation of foreign goods was first impeded, and soon entirely prevented. The domestic manufacture extended with prodigious rapidity.

When the peace of 1815 was made, imports began again. The newly established factories, most of which were badly equipped and loosely managed, met with serious embarrassment. Many were entirely abandoned. The manufacturers petitioned Congress for assistance. They received in 1816 that measure of help which the public was then disposed to grant. The tariff of 1816 levied a duty of twenty-five per cent on cotton goods for three years, a duty considered sufficiently protective in those days of inexperience in protective legislation. At a time when the practice of appealing to Congress for assistance when in distress had not yet become common among manufacturers, the fact that careful and self-reliant men like the founders of Waltham and Lowell enterprises were most urgent in advising the adoption of the rates of 1816 may indicate that those rates were of service in encouraging the continuance of manufacturing. The duties on cottons in the tariff of 1816 may be considered a judicious application of the principles of protection to young industries.

Of the early history of the manufacture of woolen goods in the United States there are but scanty accounts, but these are sufficient to show that the general course of events was similar to that in cotton manufacture.

When the period of restriction began in 1808, the woolen manufacture received, like all other industries in the same position, a powerful stimulus. The price of broadcloth, then the chief cloth worn besides homespun, rose enormously, as did those of flannels, blankets, and other goods, which had previously been obtained by importation almost exclusively.

After 1815 the makers of woolens naturally encountered great difficulties in face of the renewed and heavy importation of English goods. The tariff of 1816 gave them the same duty that was levied on cottons, twenty-five per cent, to be reduced in three years to twenty per cent. The reduction of the duty to twenty per cent, which was to have taken place in 1819, was then postponed, and in the end never took place. No minimum valuation was fixed for woolen goods; hence there was not, as for cotton goods, a minimum duty. The scheme of duties, under the tariff of 1816, thus afforded no very vigorous protection.

Notwithstanding the very moderate encouragement given from 1816-1828, the woolen manufacture steadily progressed after the

crisis of 1819, and in 1828 was securely established.

It appears that direct protective legislation had even less influence in promoting the introduction and early growth of the woolen than of the cotton manufacture. The events of the period of restriction, from 1808 to 1815, led to the first introduction of the industry, and gave it the first strong impulse.

Those events may indeed be considered to have been equivalent to effective, though crude and wasteful, protective legislation, and it may be that their effect, as compared with the absence of growth before 1808, shows that protection in some form was needed to stimulate growth of the woolen manufacture. But, by 1815, the work of establishing the manufacture had been done. The moderate duties of the period from 1816 to 1828, partly neutralized by the duties on wool, may have something to sustain them; but the position gained in 1815 would hardly have been lost in the absence of these duties.

During the period of restriction from 1808 to 1815, the iron and iron products previously imported, had to be obtained as far as possible at home. The course of events was so similar to that already described in regard to textile manufactures that it need not be referred to at length.

In 1816, Congress was asked to extend protection to the manufacture of iron, as well as to other industries. The
tariff of 1816 imposed a duty of forty-five cents a hundred weight on hammered-bar iron, and one of one dollar and fifty cents a hundred weight on rolled bar, with corresponding duties on sheet, hoop, and rod iron. Pig iron was admitted under 'ad valorem' duty of twenty per cent, and was, therefore, but little higher than the rates of fifteen and seventeen and one-half per cent levied in 1804 and 1807. In 1818, Congress, by a special act, raised the duties on iron considerably, at the same time it postponed the reduction from twenty-five to twenty per cent on the duties on cottons and woolens.

After 1818 a system of increasingly heavy protection was applied to the manufacture of iron and for twenty years this protection was maintained without a break.

The three most important branches of industry to which protection has been applied have been examined. It has appeared that the introduction of the cotton manufacture took place in an era before protection, and that its early progress, though perhaps somewhat promoted by the minimum duty of 1816, would hardly have been much retarded in the absence of protective duties. The manufacture of woolens received little direct assistance before it reached that stage at which it could maintain itself without help, if it were for the advantage of the country that it should be maintained. In the

iron manufacture, twenty years of heavy protection did not materially alter the proportion of home and foreign supply, and brought about no change in methods of production. Detailed accounts of other industries to which protection was applied have not been taken into account, because there is little written about them. Agricultural commodities like sugar, wool, hemp, and flax also received protection.

The genius of the people for mechanical arts showed itself early. Naturally it appeared with most striking results in those fields in which circumstances of the country gave the richest opportunities; as in the application of steam-power to navigation, in the invention and improvement of tools, and especially of agricultural implements, and in cotton manufacture. The ingenuity and inventiveness of American mechanics have become traditional, and the names of Whitney and Fulton need only be mentioned to show that these qualities were not lacking at the time under consideration. The presence of such men rendered it easier to remove the obstacles arising from want of skill and experience in manufactures. The political institutions, the high average intelligence, the habitual freedom of movement from place to place and from occupation to occupation, also made the rise of the existing system of manufacturing production at once easier and less dangerous than the same change in other countries. At the same time it so
happened that the embargo, the nonintercourse acts, and the war of 1812 rudely shook the country out of the grooves in which it was running and brought about a state of confusion from which the new industrial system could emerge more easily than from a well-settled organization of industry.

The restrictive period may be considered one of extreme protection. The stimulus which it gave to some manufactures perhaps shows that the first steps in these were not taken without some artificial help.

"The intrinsic soundness of the argument for protection to young industries may not be touched by the conclusions drawn from the history of its trial in the United States, which shows only that the intentional protection of the tariffs of 1816, 1824, and 1828 had little effect." 22

The period from 1808 to the financial crisis of 1818-1819 was a disturbed and chaotic one, from which the country settled down, with little assistance from protective legislation, into a new arrangement of its productive forces.

The protective system of legislation which begun in 1816 was maintained until toward the end of the decade 1830-1840.

Chapter II

The Romance of American Expansion -- The Acquisition of Florida, 1819

It was entirely natural that the quickening of the national spirit and the growth of national consciousness throughout the United States in the period between 1815-1830, had, for one of their results, the extension of the territory of the United States, at some point or other, to its natural limits.

The element of physical geography always plays a large part in national political development. The natural territorial basis of a national state is a geographical unity. That is, it is a territory separated by broad bodies of water, or high mountain ranges, or broad belts of uninhabitable country, or climatic extremes, from other territory, and possessing a fair degree of coherence within. If a national state develops itself on any other part of such a territory, it will inevitably tend to spread to the natural limits of the same. It will not become a completely national state until it shall have attained such boundaries, for a completely national state is the sovereign organization of a people having an ethnic unity upon

a territory which is a geographic unity.

In the second decade of this century, and down to the latter part of it, the United States had not acquired the territory of the country as far as to the natural southern boundary east of Louisiana. This boundary was, of course, the Gulf of Mexico; but Spain held in quasipossession a broad strip, and then a long peninsula, of land along and within this boundary. In other words, the territory called Florida, or the Floridas, was, politically, a colony of Spain, but geographically a part of the United States. It was inhabited chiefly by Indian tribes. Spanish rule in this territory was, therefore, foreign rule, both from the geographical point of view and the ethnical point of view, Indian rule was not thought of in the nineteenth century. There was but one natural solution of the question. It was that the United States should annex this territory and extend the jurisdiction of the general government over it.

2. Alsace-Lorraine 1870-1914 is a case in point. This territory did not gravitate to the German Empire.


4. Ibid., 209.

The Treaty of Paris of 1763 was the first great international agreement which gave a fair degree of definiteness to the claims of England, France, and Spain, upon the North American continent. In this Treaty, France surrendered Canada, Cape Breton, and all claims to territory east of the Mississippi River. This year, 1763, Spain ceded Florida to Great Britain. By subsequent treaties and barterings Spain again held Florida....

British forces occupied East Florida during the course of the War of 1812. The Spanish governor either could not, or would not, prevent them from doing so. Florida became thus, in spite of its nominal neutral status a base of operations for the enemy of the United States. No more convincing evidence of the necessity for its annexation to the United States could have been offered. It was thus seen that not only the geography and the national growth of the Union demanded it, but that the safety of the Union, in case of war with any power, required it. The sea is the natural boundary of the United States on the south, and it was the "manifest destiny" of the Union to reach it.

The end of the war had by no means marked the end of

7. John Lee Williams, Territory of Florida p. 188
British influence in Florida. English officers, and especially a Colonel Nicholls, commandant of the garrison that Jackson had expelled from Fort Barrancas, lingered on the peninsula even after peace had been declared, and spent much of their time in exciting the Florida Indians, the Seminoles, to renewed hostilities against border settlers. Nicholls, in fact went so far as to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance between England and the Indians, rebuild and equip an old fort on the Apalachicola, and demand in the name of the Indians a surrender of the lands ceded to the United States by the Creeks as the price of peace. After his departure for England, in the vain hope of securing from his government official approval of these acts, the fort on the Apalachicola was seized by a number of fugitive slaves from Georgia and converted into a piratical stronghold of the worst description. They ravaged the country for miles across the border using Florida as a base. They destroyed property of their former masters, stole horses, rescued criminals, and killed all who resisted them. No doubt they could find some justification for their acts in the principle of retaliation, for the Georgians themselves were not models of law and order; but their brigandage and rapine soon

9. Ibid. 173.

became unendurable, and at the direction of the Secretary of War a message was sent by Jackson to the Governor of Pensacola demanding immediate action against them.

The Governor was either unable or unwilling to comply with this demand. The wrathful Jackson resolved to act on his own account.

"I have no doubt", he wrote to Gaines, who was then building stockades and blockhouses in the adjacent territory ceded by the Creeks, "That this fort has been established by some villains for the purpose of murder, rapine, and plunder and that it ought to be blown up regardless of the ground it stands on. If you have come to the same conclusion, destroy it and restore the stolen negroes to their rightful owners." 12

It so happened that Gaines had ordered from New Orleans some supplies that would have to be carried past "Negro Fort," as it was popularly called; and now instructed one of his officers, Colonel Clinch to proceed down the Apalachicola with a body of troops and level the fort to ground at first sign of an attack on the transports. Clinch fell in with a party of Seminoles who had their own grievances against the negroes, and he promptly pressed them into service and hurried on to the fort, near which he found the supply expedition. Excuse for the hostilities was ready at hand in the fact that a boat's crew, landing for water, had lost four men in an attack by the negroes. Forthwith Clinch demanded surrender of the fort, and

11. Ibid., p. 140.
12. Jackson to Gaines, April 18, 1816, in Fuller's Purchase of Florida, p. 228.
obtained in reply a defiant blast of cannonading; he then opened fire from a gunboat convoying the transports.

The first few shots did little damage, but victory came with amazing and shocking swiftness. In the fort's magazine some seven hundred barrels of gunpowder were stored, and a red-hot ball striking this caused an explosion that ended "Fort Negro" for all time, and cost the lives of almost all of its defenders. No fewer than two hundred and seventy men, women and children found instant death, while of those still living, after the smoke had cleared away, only a pitiful minority survived the torments of their wounds. It must be added, also, that at least two of the miserable survivors were handed over to the Indians to be cruelly tortured so long as a spark of life remained in their mutilated bodies -- an apt illustration of the truth that the inhumanity of those barbarous years of border warfare was by no means confined to the enemies of the United States.

This fearful tragedy was but the opening act in the second Jacksonian invasion of Florida. Fresh grounds for complaint against the Spanish authorities soon developed in a renewal of hostilities by the Seminoles, the climax coming when, in revenge for the burning of a native village by American troops,


the savages ambushed and massacred nearly fifty soldiers and settlers en-route up the Apalachicola. At news of this, the War Department sent orders to Jackson to raise a large force, take command in person and spare no efforts to bring about a lasting peace. But before these orders reached him, Jackson himself had addressed to Monroe, then President, a letter seething with indignation. It would be well, he declared, to seize the whole of East Florida and hold it "as indemnity for the outrages of Spain upon the property of our citizens". This he felt certain could be done "without implicating the government." And in conclusion, he roundly asserted:

"Let it be signified to me through any channel (say Mr. J. Rhea) that the possession of the Floridas would be desirable to the United States, and in sixty days it will be accomplished." 15

What reply, if any, was made to this letter will probably never be known. According to Monroe, he received it during an attack of illness, laid it away, forgot all about it, and did not even read it until after the war had come to an end. Jackson maintained, to the contrary, that the President had actually instructed Mr. Rhea (a Congressman from Tennessee) to write

15. This letter is printed in Jackson's Exposition" of his conduct in Florida, in Thomas Hart Benton's Thirty Years' View, Vol. I. pp. 167-180. The "Exposition" is one of the most interesting features of Benton's work, which contains much of value to the student of American expansion, especially in connection with the acquisition of Florida, Texas, Oregon, and California.
saying that his plan was approved, and that Rhea's reply was received by him before he crossed the border. Whatever the truth, across the border he went, in March, 1818, at the head of an army of about three thousand, including a thousand of his veteran Tennesseans and rather less than a thousand friendly Indians.

There were to be no half-way measures now. Writing to Captain Mc Keever, commissioned to co-operate with him by sea, Jackson designated St. Mark's as the first point of attack, instructed Mc Keever to meet him there and significantly added:

"You will... capture and make prisoners all, every person, or description of persons, white, red, or black, with all their chattels, goods, and effects, together with all crafts, vessels or means of transportation by water... Any of the subjects of His Catholic Majesty sailing to St. Marks may be permitted freely to enter the said river. But none to pass out, unless after an examination it may be made to appear that they have not been attached to or in any ways aided or abetted our common enemy." 17

The meaning of this language was plain enough. To blockade Spanish ports, to seize Spanish property, and to make prisoners of Spanish subjects—such was Jackson's program. Incidentally, he proposed capturing, if possible, certain English-

16. Professor Schouler has reviewed the controversy in detail in a paper contributed to The Magazine of American History, Vol. XII, pp. 308-322. His conclusion is that "Monroe neither read nor reflected upon Jackson's letter at all until after Pensacola had fallen."

men at whose door he laid the chief responsibility for the present uprisings, and who, he had reason to believe, were at St. Mark's together with two Indian chieftains who had proved especially troublesome.

Jackson hastened to St. Mark's, as did Mc Keever, the latter scrupling not to sail into the bay under the English flag, and by this disgraceful ruse lure aboard the chieftains for whose lives Jackson thirsted. Jackson's own course was openness itself. He frankly informed the Spanish commandant that so long as the struggle with the Indians lasted it would be necessary to occupy St. Mark's with American troops. He marched his men into the town, hauled down the Spanish flag, and raised instead the Stars and Stripes. No damage was done to person or property, and only one prisoner taken-- a Scotchman, Alexander Arbuthnot, an aged Indian trader who was suspected of having intrigued against American interests. The next day, without so much as the semblance of a trial, McKeever's native captives were hanged, a fate which they richly deserved; and a start was made at once for the Indian stronghold of Suwanee, far to the east and in the midst of swamps accounted impassable. A week of arduous marching and

the goal was reached, too late, however, to surprise the Indians, who had taken hurried flight, after being warned by a note that Arbuthnot had dispatched to his son, also a trader. After the destruction of the town Jackson went back to St. Mark's taking with him as prisoner an Englishman, Robert Ambrister, a gentleman of family but not of the best reputation, who by mischance had wandered into the American camp.

At St. Mark's once more, not a moment was lost in placing Arbuthnot and Ambrister on trial for their lives.

"It is all-important," Jackson had written to Mc Keever, "that these men should be captured and made examples of," and the failure of the expedition to Suwanee had not disposed him to modify in any way the merciless course mapped out in that letter. Arbuthnot stood charged with inciting Indians to war against the United States, supplying them with munitions of war, and acting as a spy; Ambrister was accused of personally making war against the United States, and aiding the enemies of the United States. There was no particularly strong evidence against either, yet the court martial that tried them sentenced both to death, Arbuthnot to be hanged, Ambrister to be shot. In Ambrister's case the sentence was afterwards commuted.

20. Ibid., p. 444.

by the court martial to flogging and a year's imprisonment, but Jackson, who seemed for the moment to have given way completely to the violence of his passions, ordered the original sentence carried out. Thus two British subjects perished, on the soil of a friendly Power, and at the arbitrary command of an armed representative of a third Power, with which both others were supposed to be at peace.

Now word was brought to the still unappeased Jackson, that a large number of Indians said to be more than five hundred in all, had sought refuge at Pensacola, and were being sheltered there. He foamed with rage. He detached from his main body of troops a mixed force of regulars and Tennesseans, and set off to the West Floridian capital as fast as his troops could march. Nor did he halt on receipt of a letter from the Spanish Governor protesting in the name of the King of Spain against his invasion of that monarch's territory, and threatening to expel him unless he withdrew at once. Jackson's only reply was to urge his men to greater speed. He arrived at Pensacola; the Governor precipitately fled to Fort Barrancas. Jackson mastered Pensacola as he had mastered St. Mark's. He then

22. The evidence given at this trial will be found in American State Papers--Foreign Relations, Volume IV. pp. 580-596.

marched on Fort Barrancas and forced the Governor and three hundred Spanish troops to surrender. The American flag was raised and all was over. All Florida now lay at his mercy, prostrate and helpless. Jackson contented himself with leaving garrisons in the captured forts, he recrossed the border in a few days with the bulk of his army, confident that what he had already accomplished would be quite sufficient to bring Spain to terms. Jackson was now more than ever the idol of the army and the people of the Southwest.

He was hardly prepared for the storm that at once burst about his head. Not only in England, Spain and European countries generally was he denounced as a bandit, a murderer, and a high-handed violator of the laws of nations, but in his own country he found himself the target for unrestrained abuse. It mattered not that the public at large applauded his actions and sang his praises as a true American who would dare and do whenever national interests required. The President, the Cabinet, and Congress, fearful that war with both England and Spain was certain to eventuate, debated long and earnestly the best way out of what seemed to them an exceedingly bad business. Throughout the summer Cabinet meetings were held

24. McMaster, p. 446.


almost daily, and at these Jackson's sole defender was the 27 secretary of State, John Quincy Adams. All save Adams were for disavowing Jackson's conduct in toto and making suitable reparation; but Adams, with an inflexibility that would have done credit to Jackson himself, insisted that the necessities of the case amply justified Jackson's proceedings, and that, in the last analysis, the responsibility lay not at his door but at the door of the Spanish commanding officers in Florida. In the end, but only after a prolonged struggle, Adams won his point; and the United States made known to the world its intention of standing by the fiery warrior from Tennessee, whatever the consequences.

The consequences were the tacit approval of England of his execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister, and the cession of Florida by Spain. To the latter result Adams again contributed powerfully and most of all by a letter he wrote in November, 1818 ostensibly addressed to the American Minister at Madrid, but in reality being in the nature of an ultimatum to the Spanish Government. 29 Seldom indeed has an American penned a

27. Ibid., p. 114.
more noteworthy document. He reviewed in the fullest detail the long-standing grievances of the United States against Spain, the repeated breaches of neutrality, the outrages committed by Indians, fugitive slaves, and outlaws who found sanctuary in Spain's dominions, her toleration of acts of aliens like Nicholls, Arbuthnot, and Ambrister and her constant failure to fulfill treaty obligations....Adams declared bluntly:

"Spain must immediately make her election either to place a force in Florida at once adequate for the protection of her territory and to the fulfillment of her engagements, or cede to the United States a province of which she retains nothing but the nominal possession, but which is, in fact a derelict, open to the occupancy of every enemy, civilized or savage of the United States, and serving no other earthly purpose than as a point of annoyance to them....The duty of this Government to protect the persons and property of our fellow-citizens on the borders of the United States is imperative--it MUST be discharged."

30

There was no mistaking such language, and there was no denying the fact that so long as the United States held men like Andrew Jackson, Spain could not hope to keep her old ways. Alive at last to the situation, and well aware that it was impossible for her to maintain an efficient government in Florida, she announced her willingness to negotiate a treaty of cession. This treaty was finally concluded in Washington, February 22, 1819; its definite ratification, however, was delayed for

various reasons until two years afterwards. July 10, 1821, the United States formally took possession, having already fittingly enough, appointed as first governor of the new territory the victorious Andrew Jackson.

"The exchange of flags under this treaty took place on the 17th of June 1821, when General Jackson was appointed Governor of the Floridas with very ample legislative, judicial and executive powers." 32

It remains to be added that by the terms of this treaty the seed was sown for another harvest of trouble. In addition to the actual transfer of territory, the monetary consideration for which was five thousand dollars to be paid by the United States, not to Spain, but to American claimants having bills against Spain for damages dating back in some instances to the first Napoleonic war, the Florida treaty fixed for the first time the boundaries of the region acquired by the United States in the Louisiana Purchase. Here a distinct concession was made by the United States, which began negotiations with the claim that in the southwest Louisiana extended to the Rio Grande, but ended by accepting the Sabine as a boundary line in that direction. Thus to the intense

32. Williams, Territory of Florida, p. 207.
34. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV p. 422. Also United States Treaties and Conventions, 1016.
35. See Chapter on Texas of this thesis page.
indignation of the Western settlers, whatever title the United States had to the fertile plains of Texas was specifically relinquished. On the other hand Spain relinquished no less specifically her shadowy claim to the so-called Oregon country in the southwest—the vast expanse of territory bounded by the Rockies, the Pacific, California, and Russian North America. Both relinquishments, we shall see, were soon to prove disturbing elements in the political life of the American nation.  

36. Ibid., Also Perkins 163-177.
Chapter III

The Settlement of Texas an Expression of Nationalism

From the Treaty of Paris whereby our independence was formally acknowledged by Great Britain, to the other Treaty of Paris in 1898 which terminated the War with Spain, the territory of the United States, with one notable exception, was increased by the peaceful method of negotiation and purchase. Viewing the series of operations which began with the colonization of Texas and closed with the Gadsden Purchase as a single transaction, this one exception to the usual mode of procedure, which may be called the "Conquest of the Southwest", added the largest single increment to the original territory, not even excepting the Louisiana Purchase.

The whole proceedings may be described as the story of the spoliation of a weaker power by a stronger, and is the one serious blot upon our national history. The conduct of the United States was wholly indefensible in a large part of the operations about to be discussed, and no truly patriotic citizen can think of it without an abiding sense of shame. Nor can our mortification be diminished by our recognition of the fact that in many particulars the conduct of Mexico during the period was an affront to civilization.
There are three main methods of accounting for the Conquest of the Southwest. Each of these methods pointedly ignores the other. Briefly stated, one cause for the conquest was the desire on the part of the slave-holding states to add new territory to the Union out of which other slave-holding states could be constituted from time to time, as needed, thus preserving the balance of power as between the slave-holding and the free states.

The second cause was the jealousy, tyranny and misgovernment of the Mexican authorities; their refusal to permit the American settlers to enjoy the privileges to which from time immemorial they had been accustomed in England and the United States under the common law; the attempt to keep them under the operation of the Roman or Civil law; and the anarchical confusion and instability of the Mexican general government. These brought about the inevitable revolution of Texas against Mexico, in which the sympathy and more material assistance of the United States were freely given to Texas, in violation of international comity, but in conformity to natural relationship. The independence of Texas being assured, thereafter the resulting boundary line on the west was ill-defined, and the attempt by the United States, after Texas had been annexed, to delimit its territory by maintaining the extreme Texan claim, naturally produced war.

The third cause is admirable expressed by Theodore
Roosevelt, who says, with regard to our encroachments upon the boundaries of Neighboring powers, especially beyond the Mississippi and beyond the somewhat indefinite lines of the Louisiana Purchase.

"The general feeling in the West upon this last subject afterward crystallized into what became known as the 'Manifest Destiny' idea, which, reduced to its simplest terms, was: That it was our manifest destiny to swallow up the land of all adjoining nations who were too weak to withstand us; a theory that forthwith obtained immense popularity among all statesmen of easy international morality . . . . Recent historians, for instance, always speak as if our grasping after territory in the Southwest was due solely to the desire of the Southerners to acquire lands out of which to carve new slave-holding states, and as if it were merely a move in the interests of the slave powers. This is true enough so far as the motive of Calhoun, Tyler, and the other public leaders of the Gulf and Southern Seaboard States were concerned. But the hearty Western support given to the government was due to entirely different causes, the chief among them being the fact that the Westerners honestly believed themselves to be created the heirs of the earth, or at least of so much of it as was known by the name of North America, and were prepared to struggle stoutly for the immediate possession of their heritage." 1

For this spoliation, the United States has been condemned absolutely on the one hand, while on the other, with equal zeal, it has been entirely justified. It does not seem to have occurred to any one that all these motives for action worked together to bring about the end achieved. And it is undoubtedly true that, while the preponderance of wrong-doing was with us,

we were not entirely to blame, for there were some extenuating circumstances.

The United States resorted to iniquitous and unjust means to acquire Texas. Did the acquisition of additional territory in pursuance of that “Manifest Destiny” justify the action? It is no doubt true that the indefinite boundary line and certain shadowy and fictitious claims furnished the necessary pretext for aggression. It is also true that Mexico was rendered helpless by the war which left her an easy prey of the United States.

Nor may it be gainsaid, in the light of subsequent developments, that it was vastly better for humanity in general and for the conquered section in particular, that it should become a part of the United States rather than remain a part of Mexico. Mexico probably never could have administered and developed California and the West as we have done. And Mexico, now a homogeneous state south of the Rio Grande, has probably become much better able to work out her destiny without her lost territory - just as Spain really profited by losing her rebellious colonies in 1898.

All this, however, does not condone our method of acquiring the territory in question.

It is not amiss to say that Texas has experienced many changes in her political government:
First,

Claimed and controlled by the Monarchy of Spain by right of discovery.

Second,

Ceded by Spain to France in 1800.

Third,

Transferred by France to the United States by a treaty of April, 1803.

Fourth,

Exchanged for Florida and ceded to Spain by the United States under the treaty of February 1819.

Fifth,

Severed from Spain and made part of the Republic of Mexico by the Revolution.

Sixth,

Erected into the Republic of Texas by the Revolution of 1835-1836.

Seventh,

Annexed to the United States and became a State of the Union, February 1846.

Racial and Political Background

On the one side was the Anglo-American immigrant, blunt, independent, efficient, a rebel against authority, a supreme
individualist. On the other side was the Latin American master of the soil, sensitive, secretive, subtle and indirect in his ways, by training and temperament a worshipper of tradition and a creature of authority. With the political ascendancy of the two elements reversed the situation would have held no threatening aspects, but with the Mexicans in the political saddle conflict was certain.

Mexico gained her national independence from Spain in 1821, after three hundred years of subjection. She was poorly prepared for self-government. In practice, even more than in theory and in law, the Spanish Colonial system was rigidly centralized. The highest position in army, church, and civil service were reserved for Spaniards. Bancroft declares that from 1535 until 1813 only three Creoles became viceroys of Mexico, and he says that out of seven hundred and fifty-four individuals who in the same period held the highest civil and military positions in all Spanish America, only eighteen were born in the colonies.

In spite of their political incapacity, or perhaps because of it, the Mexicans after several false starts, declared in 1823 for the most complete form of government devised by man, and the next year promulgated the federal republican consti-

Greater contrasts in the political experiences of two peoples could scarcely be imagined than that presented by the Mexicans and their immigrants from the north. The English colonists came to America with a training in local self-government already centuries old. Roots of the precinct, the county, and trial by jury go beyond the dawn of English constitutional history. Parliament and the representative system were developed in all their essential characteristics before the great emigration to America in the seventeenth century.

Generation after generation of thrusting their way through the American wilderness renewed and strengthened the self-reliance and efficiency of the American pioneers. On every successive frontier adventurous individuals re-enacted, with necessary adaptation to time and circumstance, the experiences and expedients of the original immigrants. Stephen F. Austin, Sam Houston, and David Crockett were not less dependent upon their own resources than were Captain Smith's Englishmen at Jamestown.

Democracy was the breath of political life to Austin, Houston, and the early Texas pioneers. As they trudged west-

ward and ever westward to new homes in the wilderness, they shed
the property and religious restrictions of the tidewater states
on the voting franchise and established manhood suffrage.
Social equality went with political equality, universally as­
sumed in theory, and not commonly conceded in practice. Nation­
alism was a rampant concomitant. America and Americans were the
best. All foreigners were inferior.

When Spain in 1812, and Mexico later opened the door to
Texas the flood of the westward movement had carried American
settlement to the very threshold of the province. The census
of 1820 found more than two million inhabitants west of the
Appalachian Mountains, most of whom were carried there by emi­
gration from the Atlantic states and from Europe. The stages
of the movement are well indicated by the creation of western
states - Kentucky in 1792, Ohio in 1803, Louisiana in 1812,
Indiana, Mississippi, Illinois and Alabama from 1816 to 1819,
and Arkansas and Michigan were well on the way to statehood.

Along with the migration of the American people went a
 corresponding enlargement of the territorial boundaries of the
United States. In this rapid advance of boundaries and people
there was ample cause for alarm to a neighboring nation, and
Spain was not unwarned by her ministers in the United States.

5. Eugene C. Baker, Mexico and Texas, 1811–1835, P. L.
Turner, Dallas, Texas, 1928, p., 156.
Mexico condoned the Louisiana Purchase because she believed the United States a safer neighbor than Napoleon, however, she was not blind to the expansive tendencies of the Americans.

Onis, who negotiated the West Florida Treaty, believed, or pretended to believe, that nothing less than the two American continents, the West Indies, and the Philippines would satisfy the United States. The complacency and self-satisfaction of the people stimulated Onis to derision and ridicule:

"They consider themselves superior to the rest of mankind, and look upon their republic as the only establishment upon earth founded upon a grand and solid basis, embellished by wisdom, and destined one day to become the most sublime colossus of human power, and wonder of the universe. It is not only in the mouths of the enthusiasts or demagogues who seek to inflame the imaginations of the mob with seductive and exaulted ideas that this language is heard; it resounds from every side. The works of all the Anglo-American writers are strewn with these haughty sentiments, these brilliant predictions, suggested by an overweening vanity. Their public documents attest the excess of this pride and ostentatious confidence. The house in which the Congress hold their sessions they call the Capitol. A little rivulet near it, about three yards wide and a fourth deep, they denominate the Tiber. Many of the meanest settlements have the names of the most celebrated cities of Greece and Rome. Everything breaths extreme affectation and vanity."  

Spaniards did not view the growth of the United States as the result of a series of aggressions by a powerful and ruthless


7. Luis de Onis, *Memoir Upon the Negotiations between Spain and the United States of America*, etc. (Baltimore, 1821, 108, p. 120. The translation is by Tobias Watkins).
nation, arousing a species of wondering admiration by its very boldness. On the contrary it pleased them to picture the United States as a sneak thief, a sort of territorial purse snatcher working in devious and insidious ways to filch its neighbor's property.

As has been stated Mexico became independent in 1821. In the first flush of victory, saturated with the equalitarian doctrines of the eighteenth century French philosophy - liberty, equality, and fraternity - Mexican leaders turned hopefully, if somewhat hesitantly, to the model of the United States in shaping their own institutions. If republican government and free immigration had been, as many believed, the principal factors in making the United States great, could their adoption by Mexico fail to make Mexico equally great? Some were inclined to doubt that like institutions must beget universally like results. Thus we have the federal republican constitution of 1824 and the liberal colonization law inviting immigration from all the world.

The law had hardly passed, the ink on the imperial signature was scarcely dry when the newly established government was overthrown. The colonization law with all other legislation of the brief reign, was annulled. By special decree, however, of the Constituent Congress, which now assumed the government of...

Mexico, Stephen F. Austin's contract to settle three hundred families in Texas was approved in accordance with the terms of this law, but other contracts had to wait on further legislation.

The opening of Texas could hardly have come at a more opportune time to attract immigration from the United States. The westward movement had reached the international boundary, the flow of population was being held east of the line as if by a dam – as it had previously been held east of the Appalachian Mountains. The province was easily accessible; the people were at the door. Behind them was the habit of the westward migration; before them was the lure of free land – really free – a veritable farmer's paradise, as all contemporary reports confirm.

"Westward ho!" was the cry that filled the air, free land, accessibility! No further reasons need be sought to explain the settlement of Texas. Yet two other factors still contributed a powerful impulse. One of these factors was the panic of 1819, the other was the land system of the United States.

9. Eugene C. Barker, *The Life of Stephen F. Austin*, Chapter IV. Nashville and Dallas 1925, p. 120.
For clarity and emphasis:

1- The political experience and capacity of the Mexicans differed enormously from that of the Anglo-American colonists who settled in Texas. The very efficiency of the colonists caused the Mexicans uneasiness, while the chronic vacillation of the Mexicans created an atmosphere of annoyance and uncertainty for the colonists.

2- Powerful economic interests explain the Anglo-American migration to Texas without the necessity of our ascribing ulterior motives to the immigrants or their leaders. Before them was the attraction of desirable land, free and accessible. Behind them were the distressing effects of panic and the not so generous land system of the United States. Back of all was the momentum of the westward movement.

3- Except for the want of appellate courts of broad jurisdiction, local government gave colonists no concern, but the aberrations of the state government, and particularly the heavy ascendancy of Coahuila in the legislature, were a source of great annoyance. Exasperation and a sense of injury being once aroused agitators could and did use the chronically revolutionary condition of the federal government to swell the volume of discontent — which for the moment, no doubt was the end of their definite purpose. They could determine later whether to use the weapon thus fashioned to demand separation or to strike for independence.
4- Mexican officials were handicapped in all their dealings with the colonists by the Spanish heritage of fear and distrust aroused by the rapid - and as it sometimes appeared to them - unscrupulous - expansion of the United States. Starting with such a heritage, their apprehensions found much to feed upon both in their relations with the United States and their interpretations of events in Texas.

5- Finally there was an entire absence of contacts to bring the two peoples closer together. Geography held them apart. Their language, religion and civilization differed. The government was unable to balance Mexican colonies against foreign immigration; and, through a mistaken fiscal policy prohibited coastwise commerce between Texas and the southern ports and thereby prevented the formation of the only economic bond that ever at any time gave promise of developing.

Sober reflection upon the spectacle of American expansion soon aroused Mexican apprehensions for the safety of Texas. Fear of losing Texas - whether justified or not - explains the first important measures of the national government to check immigration from the United States. The fear found root in the western opposition to the Florida Treaty and was fed by the subsequent overtures of our government to negotiate a new boundary.

12. George J. Garrison. Texas, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1903. p. 120.
It is unnecessary here to review the early history of the Texas-Louisiana boundary. Interest of the United States in the question begins with the ambiguous definition of Louisiana in the treaty of 1803. President Jefferson and other public men of his day believed—honestly but mistakingly, that Louisiana included Texas. Their pretensions account for the temper of the Spanish representatives in Washington, already noted. By the treaty of 1819 the boundary between Spain and the United States was legally fixed by a zig-zag line, extending from the mouth of the Sabine to the thirty-second parallel; thence north to the Red River; ascended the south bank of the Red River to the hundredth meridian; followed the meridian north to the Arkansas River; ascending the Arkansas to its source; thence north to the forty-second parallel, and along the parallel to the Pacific.

John Quincy Adams, who conducted the negotiations of the United States with Onis, was one of those who believed that the claim to Texas as part of Louisiana was valid, and he signed the Treaty with reluctance. President Monroe and the rest of his cabinet approved the relinquishment of the Texas claim in exchange for Florida. Adam's reluctance was somewhat tempered by the acquisition of Spain's equity in the Oregon Country.


The treaty raised a storm of protests in the West. While the negotiations were in progress Thomas H. Benton contributed articles to his paper, the St. Louis Enquirer, invoking woe upon the statesman who dares to mutilate the Mississippi Valley.

"The people of the United States may indulge the hope", he wrote, "that their feelings will never again be shocked by the like proposition. The magnificent valley of the Mississippi is theirs, with its fountains, springs and floods, and woe to the statesman who undertakes to surrender one drop of its waters - one inch of its soil - to any foreign power."

After the announcement of the treaty other papers took up the cry. The Louisiana Advertiser, for example, declared that there was much opposition in the West to the cession of Texas, and dwelt, as Benton has done, upon the shame of dismembering the Mississippi Valley, by giving Spain the upper course of two of its best rivers.

"Texas", it declared, "is worth ten Floridas; it is larger and more fertile and more healthful than any state in the Union - in our possession twenty years from this date it would be populous, and wealthy and powerful." 15

Henry Clay, Speaker of the House of Representatives, offered resolutions in Congress:

(1) "That no treaty, purporting to alienate any portion of the territory of the United States is valid without the concurrence of Congress;"

(2) "that the equivalent proposed to be given by Spain . . . for that part of Louisiana lying west of the Sabine is inadequate; and that it would be expedient to make a transfer thereof to any foreign power." 16

Clay made it plain that in his opinion, that "part of Louisiana lying west of the Sabine" extended to the Rio Grande.

For reasons not necessary to recite, Spain so delayed its ratification that the Florida Treaty did not become effective until 1821. Almost simultaneously Mexico became independent. In the meantime, such denunciations of the treaty as have already been noticed lent plausibility to Onís' depiction of the extravagant territorial ambitions of the United States and awakened the anxiety of the Mexican government.

The first Mexican envoy to the United States reached Washington in December, 1822, and carried the instructions to propose the marketing of the boundary in accordance with the Florida treaty. He found the Monroe government non-committal and a strong disposition among congressmen and state legislators, as he thought to reclaim Texas. In the style of Onís he reported that the arrogance of the Americans led them to believe that Washington was destined to be the Capital of all the Americas. His successor discovered no reason for a different opinion of American intentions. The Monroe government continued to evade a definitive reply to the proposal to run the

17. Eugene C. Barker Mexico and Texas 1821-1835, p. 36.
boundary, and remarks which the minister claimed to have heard from General Jackson did not allay suspicion. He declared that Jackson said in his presence that the United States ought never to have lost the opportunity to obtain Texas, and moreover, that the best way to obtain a territory was first to occupy it and then treat for it. He thought it not unlikely that Jackson would be the next President of the United States, when, inferentially, he might try to carry out such a program. It may well be doubted whether Jackson would have allowed himself to make such statements in the presence of the Mexican minister, if at all; but the effect of the report upon the mind of the Mexican government did not, of course, depend upon its accuracy.

Adams, not Jackson, won the election of 1824, but the result was no more assuring to Mexico than the election of Jackson would have been. The man who time after time in the negotiations with Onis had asserted that the Louisiana Purchase carried the boundary of the United States to the Rio Grande was President; Henry Clay, who had opposed so bitterly the renunciation of Texas in the Florida Treaty, was his Secretary of State, and Benton was now in the Senate.

The expected happened. Three weeks after Adams' inauguration Clay instructed Joel Poinsett, our first minister in Mexico, to sound the Mexican government upon the subject of a line more suitable to the United States - the Brazos, the
Colorado, or the Rio Grande. He was not to press the matter, however, and if Mexico was averse to a negotiation for a new line he was authorized to conclude an arrangement for marking the boundary defined by the existing treaty.

Suggestions of a new negotiation under the best conceivable conditions could only have strengthened suspicion of the aggressive designs of the United States towards Texas, but the conditions that confronted Poinsett in Mexico were most unfavorable. On the day before his official reception, President Victoria had received H. G. Ward, the British charge d'affaires. Ward had been in Mexico six months, was in high favor, and set himself the congenial task of exciting the government's prejudice against the United States and at the same time of embarrassing Poinsett's relations in every way that his very considerable ingenuity could invent. His letters to the British Foreign Office recount his methods in detail and gloat over their evident success.

Poinsett immediately perceived the pro-British anti-American disposition of the Victoria government. A few days after his official reception he wrote Clay that the British have "made good use of their time and opportunities". He was convinced after a few tentative overtures that the government, though ready enough to revise the Florida Treaty by moving the

18. Ibid., p. 51.
boundary line eastward, would not consent to its movement westward. He dropped the boundary question, therefore, and concentrated on a commercial treaty.

Adams and Clay, however, were not so readily reconciled to the abandonment of the boundary negotiation. They renewed Poinsett's instructions in 1827 to press again for a revision of the boundary. Clay authorized Poinsett to offer a million dollars for the removal of the line to the Rio Grande or half a million for its establishment on the Colorado.

In obedience to these instructions, Poinsett courteously broached with the Mexican foreign office the subject of boundary revision, only to be told - what he already knew - that Mexico would not yield. On January 8, 1828, he wrote Clay what might be considered his final report on this phase of the subject. He said:

"I have taken great pains to ascertain what prospect of success there would be of the Congress ratifying the treaty if I could have prevailed upon the plenipotentiaries to alter the limits in the manner suggested by you, and am convinced that the attempt would fail and only excite an unfriendly feeling. I have therefore abandoned it altogether. In a private conversation with one of the plenipotentiaries, I hinted at a remuneration in money to the Mexican government as an inducement to extend our boundary to the Rio del Norte; but he assured me it would be impossible to obtain either the consent of the government or of the Congress

to such a means, because it would be considered
dismemberment of the Mexican territory, which is
prohibited by the Constitution." 20

Four days later Poinsett signed a treaty for marking the boundary in accordance with the Florida Treaty of 1819.

Supplementing a little later his reasons for abandoning Texas, Poinsett wrote Clay:

"This government and people have been kept purposely in a continual state of excitement upon this delicate subject. We have been represented by the agents of certain European powers as the natural enemies of Mexico; and our desire to make alterations in the treaty of limits concluded with Spain and to deprive them of a portion of their territory was constantly urged in proof of our bad faith and insatiable ambition." 21

Both governments ratified the boundary treaty of January 12, 1828, which Poinsett had signed, but unnecessary delay in Mexico prevented the exchange of ratifications within the period stipulated by the treaty. A new round of negotiations had to be undertaken, therefore, to extend the time for the ratification. This negotiation carried the matter into the administration of Andrew Jackson, and Jackson reopened the whole Texas question.

Monroe, as Secretary of State, in 1816, instructed the Minister to Spain that President Madison would consent to the Sabine from its mouth to its source as the boundary between the United States and the Spanish provinces.

When John Quincy Adams in 1819, was negotiating with the Spanish minister the treaty by which the western boundary of the United States was defined, he could get no encouragement from Monroe or any of his ministers to try to push the boundary westward. Monroe appeared to think that the United States would be weakened by including territory west of the Sabine. It was not long, however, before the slave-holding interests began to see the error of this view. After the Missouri Compromise was adopted, it appeared that the wild land for the formation of new free states was owned north of that line from the Mississippi to the Pacific, while south of that line similar land, available for new slave states, extended only to the Sabine and the 100-degree meridian. The Richmond "Enquirer", March 7, 1820 said:

"The southern and western representatives owe it to themselves to keep their eyes firmly fixed on Texas. If we are cooped up on the north, we must have elbow room to the west." 23

Only a few persons, however, as yet perceived this view of matter. On June 23, 1819, one James Long proclaimed the independence of Texas. In 1821 Austin colonized three hundred


families in Texas, by permission of Mexico. In 1826 some American immigrants at Nacodoches declared Texas independent. In 1824 the Emperor of Russia tried to establish exclusive control over the Northern Pacific and the intention of the most far-seeing statesman was drawn to interests of the United States in the Northwest and on the Pacific. It seems necessary to bear in mind, all through the annexation of Texas, the connection of that question with the acquisition of California, including the port of San Francisco, which was then the chief reason for wanting California. Adams, when President, in 1827, sent to Poinsett, minister of the United States in Mexico, orders to buy Texas for a million dollars. Poinsett did not make the attempt. He gave as his reason the danger of irritating Mexico by a proposition which was sure to be rejected.

In 1824 Mexico took the first steps towards the abolition of slavery. By a decree of September 15, 1829, slavery was definitely abolished. In the meantime, Americans had emigrated to Texas, chiefly from the southern states, and had taken their slaves with them. They resisted the abolition decree, and the Mexican government found itself forced to except the State of Texas from the decree. It united, however, Coahuila with Texas, as a means of holding the foreign and insubordinate settlers in check. The abolition of slavery by Mexico affected the

24. The attempt to buy Texas seems to have been Clay's Act.
southern states doubly: first, it lessened the area open to
slavery; second, it put a free state on the flank and rear of
the slave territory. The interest of the southwestern states
in the independence of Texas, or its annexation, was at once
aroused. A fanciful doctrine, in the taste of the southwestern
statesmen, was immediately invented to give a basis for stump
speaking in defense of a real act of violence. It was declared
that the United States must reannex what had once been maliciously
given away by a northern statesman. The gravity and care
with which re-annexation was talked about had its parallel only
in the theatrical legislation of nullification. In 1780 Spain
claimed that the eastern boundary of Louisiana was such as to
include nearly all of the present state of Alabama and the
Hiawasee, Tennessee, Clinch and Cumberland rivers, through what
is now Tennessee and Kentucky. Inside this claim she would take
what she could get. The boundaries to the west were still more
vague.

The anxiety about Texas was increasing just when Jackson
came into power. The south expected him to secure it.

"If the discussion of the acquisition of
Texas brings on the agitation of the slave question
as we are sure that it will, a rupture with the
northern states will become almost inevitable."

Irving, who had been minister to Spain in 1819, claimed to

25. Niles, Telescope Columbia, S. C. Nov. 6, 1829,
Volume 37, p. 213.
show to Jackson that he had at that time, laid the basis for a negotiation at Madrid which would have set the boundary at the Colorado, or even at the Rio Grande, but that the negotiation was transferred to Washington where American rights were surrendered. In the summer of 1829 Van Buren sent instructions to Poinsett to try to buy Texas, and five million dollars were offered for it. In 1830 Mexico, which had at first welcomed the immigrants, forbade the Americans to settle in Texas.

"A Dr. Mayo, who was a hanger-on at Washington during Jackson's time, wrote a book in which the Texas intrigue was laid bare, and it is to him that we are indebted for one of the best accounts available of it. Mayo was in the way of picking up certain information, and more came to by accident. He gives many documents. He was intimate with ex-Governor Samuel Houston, of Tennessee, an old companion in arms of Jackson, who came to Washington in 1829 to get Jackson's connivance at an enterprise which Houston had in mind for revolutionizing Texas. That Jackson did connive at this enterprise, just as he supposed Monroe connived at his own proceedings in Florida, cannot be established by proof, but it is sustained by very strong inference." 26

April 5, 1832, two treaties with Mexico were published - one of commerce and one of boundaries, - confirming the boundary of the Florida treaty.

In 1833 a revolution broke out in Mexico, which threw the whole country into anarchy, Texas with the rest. Santa Anna gradually established his authority. In the autumn of 1835 he

tried to extend it over Texas, but he met with armed re-
sistance, and was defeated. In July, 1835, Jackson authorized
an offer of an additional half million dollars if Mexico would
allow the boundary, after cession of Texas, to follow the Rio
Grande up to the thirty-seventh degree, and then run on that
parallel to the Pacific. All propositions to purchase failed.
After the Texans proved able to beat the Mexicans in battle, no
further propositions of that kind were made.

On March 2, 1836, a Declaration of Independence on behalf
of Texas, was adopted. On March 6th the fort of the Alamo was
taken by the Mexicans, and its defenders massacred. On the
27th Colonels Fannin and Ward, with other Texan (or American)
prisoners, were massacred. On the 17th of March the Consti-
tution of Texas was adopted. It contained the strongest pro-
visions in favor of slavery. The massacres aroused great indig-
nation in the Southwest, and hundreds of adventurers hurried to
Texas, where Houston was now chief in command, to help him win
independence. The decisive battle was fought at San Jacinto,
April 21st, when Santa Anna was routed and captured. He
promised everything in captivity, but cancelled his promises
after he was released.

In June 1836, Judge Catron wrote to Webster that the spirit
to march into Texas was abroad throughout the whole Mississippi
Valley. Perhaps the disposition to march was not so strong
elsewhere, but immense speculations in land had already been
organized, and great speculations in Texan securities soon after began, which enlisted the pecuniary interests of great numbers of people in the independence of Texas.

A correspondence now began between the representatives of the governments of the United States and Mexico, which certainly no American can read with pride. It would be hard to find an equally gross instance of bullying on the part of a large state towards a small one. Jackson had ordered that Gaines should enter the territory of Texas, and march to Nacodoches, if he thought there was any dangers of hostilities on the part of the Indians, and if there were suspicions that the Mexican general were stirring up the Indians to war on the United States. Here we have another reminiscence of Florida revived.

Gaines understood his orders, and entered the Mexican territory. He understood, no doubt, that the Jacksonian proceedings of 1818 had now been legitimized as the correct American line of procedure for a military officer, he called on the governors of the neighboring states for militia. Although companies were forming and marching to Texas under full organization, this "call" was over-ruled by the War Department. The energetic remonstrances of the Mexican minister finally led to an order to Gaines to retire from Texan territory, not, however, until after the Mexican minister had broken off diplomatic relations.
In July, 1836, both Houses voted, the Senate unanimously, that the independence of Texas ought to be acknowledged as soon as Texas had proved that she could maintain it. Texas was already represented by agents applying for annexation. Jackson recommended longer delay in a message of December 21, 1836. The fact was that the geographical definition of "Texas" was not yet satisfactorily established and it was not desirable to have annexation settled too soon. An act was passed by the Legislature of Texas, December 19, 1836, by which the Rio Grande was declared to be the Western boundary of Texas. In his message of December 22nd, Jackson submitted the report of his agent that the boundaries of Texas, before the last revolution, were the Nueces, the Red, and the Sabine rivers, but that she now claimed as her boundary the Rio del Norte to its source, and from that point eastward and southward the existing boundary of the United States. That is as if Maine should secede and claim that her boundaries were the Alleghenies and the Potomac. Jackson's message distinctly pointed out that in taking Texas then, or later, the United States would take her with her new boundary claims. That is as if Maine should join the Dominion of Canada, and England should set up a claim to the New England and Middle States based on the "declaration" of Maine above supposed. The policy was to keep the Texas question open until

California could be obtained. The Mexican War ultimately became necessary for that purpose, and for no other; for Texas, even to the Rio Grande, could have been obtained without it. Another reason for the delay was that opposition to the annexation of Texas had been aroused in the North, and there was not as yet strength to carry it.

May 25, 1835, Adams made a speech against a war with Mexico to conquer Texas, which had great weight in the North. Here we notice the influence of the slavery question, and the continued cleavage between the North and the South.

March 1, 1837, the Senate reorganized the independence of Texas 23 to 19. The House did not concur in full form, but did in effect.

In 1836 the government of the United States opened a new battery against that of Mexico in the shape of a series of claims and charges. The diplomatic agent of the former power, Powhatan Ellis, performed his duties in such a rude and pre-emptory manner that one is forced to suspect that he acted by orders, especially as his rank was only that of "charge d' affaires". The charges were at first fifteen in number, then forty-six, then fifty-seven. They were frivolous and forced, and bear the character of attempt to make a quarrel. Ellis abruptly came home. In August, 1837, the agent of Texas, Memucan

---

28. Niles, Volumes 50, p. 276. (The speech, a note says, was delivered without premeditation.)
Hunt, made a formal proposal for annexation. Van Buren declined it. Mexico next proposed a new negotiation, with arbitration in regard to the claims and charges against her by the United States. The opposition to annexation in the North had grown so strong that delay was necessary, and negotiations were opened which resulted in the convention of August 17, 1840. Mexico could not fulfill the engagements she entered into in that treaty, or in a subsequent one in 1843, and so the question was reopened, and finally was maneuvered into war. It appears that Van Buren had the feeling, which any president will be sure to have, adverse to any war during his administration. The Mexican war was forced on by a cabinet intrigue, and Tyler forced it on Polk.

The Texas intrigue and Mexican war were full of Jacksonian acts and principles. There were constant outcroppings of the "Old Seminole" war proceedings and doctrines. The army and navy were corrupted by swagger and insubordination, and by the anxiety of the officers to win popularity by the methods of which Jackson had set the example. The filibustering spirit, one law for ourselves and another for everyone else, gained a

29. W. G. Sumner, Andrew Jackson, p. 421.

30. Niles - Volume 28, p. 370 - In 1824 Commodore Porter was found guilty of an outrage at Foxardo, Porto Rico. When courtmartialled, he made an elaborate comparison of his proceedings with those of Jackson in Florida, by way of defense. He was cashiered.
popularity for which Jackson was much to blame. During the Texas intrigue, Jackson perhaps revealed his true personality. He engaged in private and personal correspondence on public questions with diplomatic agents, who were not always accredited.

The rise of Jackson marked the increasing importance of the West and the coming of a crude, but self-confident democratic spirit into public affairs.
The Monroe Doctrine: A Wall of Nationalism

The Monroe Doctrine was the fruition of an early American policy. There had been a deep-seated conviction on the part of the United States that the opportunities of a hard-won freedom would be threatened by the ambitions of European powers and that the aims of the new nation could be achieved only by keeping clear of the toils of European politics and strife. It was this conviction of the necessity of maintaining an independent position which led to the declaration of neutrality in 1793, despite the Treaty of Alliance with France which had sprung from the exigencies of the Revolutionary struggle. The words of Washington's Farewell Address were more than a solemn admonition; they stated cherished principles:

"The great rule of conduct for us", he said, "in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connections as possible .... Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the cause of which is essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence therefore it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships, or enmities." 1

The people of the United States had watched with deep sympathy the long struggle of their southern neighbors for independence. While Spain maintained a doubtful contest, it was regarded as a civil war, but when that contest became so desperate that Spanish viceroy s, governors, and captains-general concluded treaties with the insurgents virtually acknowledging their independence, the United States unreservedly recognized the facts. The Republic of Colombia was recognized in 1822, the Government of Buenos Aires, and the States of Mexico and Chile in 1823.

It was a new thought that American colonies could establish themselves as independent and sovereign nations and this state of mind called for a definition of the attitude of these new nations toward the European powers. The idea underlying the Monroe Doctrine may be set forth as follows:

(1) **Two Spheres**

It was held that the world is divided into "two spheres", the eastern hemisphere and the western hemisphere. President Washington stated one side of that principle in his doctrine of "Isolation" which was that the United States was not called upon to take part in the affairs, and especially in the wars of Europe. The other side, as worked out by Adams and

---

Monroe, was that European powers aught not to interfere in the
affairs of Americans. They recognized that Great Britain had
large interests in Canada and the West Indies, and that France
and some smaller European nations had small interests in the
West India Islands and the coast of South America. As Monroe
put it in his message,

"With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere....But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States." 4

(2) Political System

Monroe wrote,

"The political system of the allied powers is essentially different...from that of America. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of the hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." 5


5. Ibid., p. 209.
(3) Colonization

In his message Monroe said,

"The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power." 6

(4) Peace

The purpose of Monroe and Adams was to prevent conquests in America, and especially to avoid wars. Peace with all nations was the first rule of the Monroe Doctrine; entangling alliances with none was the second.

The purchase of Florida in 1819 was important because it was a component part of our self-assertiveness, but more important than this expression of nationalism was the publication of the Monroe Doctrine. This pronouncement was a master stroke of a master statesman.

The Secretary in the cabinet of James Monroe was John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, who was fitted by the qualities of his mind and by long diplomatic experience to help unravel the tangled skein of diplomacy. He had patriotism, energy, and ability, but lacked the politician's capacity to win personal friends. He held in his two hands two trump cards of great

significance, however, and he fully understood and knew how to use them. The great European alliance which had been formed to defeat Napoleon in 1813, had now fallen under the influence of the Czar of Russia, and was being used to discourage representative institutions and to make Europe entirely safe for autocracy. England maintained her nominal membership in this group, but found herself increasingly out of sympathy with its aims, and in a position of dangerous isolation. Her commerce with the revolted South American colonies was essential to her recovery from the losses of the great wars, and she feared, and wisely feared, a joint movement by France and Spain to re-establish the power of the Bourbons over the old Spanish Empire. Spain too had her hands more than full. The great revolt against her authority had seemed likely to break down until in 1817 the situation had been saved by the brilliant military exploits of Bolivar and San Martin. Neither England nor Spain desired or could afford any further enemies, and the whole situation aided the diplomacy of the astute Adams.

In the meantime, the United States and England were sharply confronted by a new and common danger which tended to draw the two nations into a single diplomatic policy. Revolts


against autocratic power had broken out in Piedmont, Naples, and Portugal, and the Spanish had risen to compel Ferdinand the seventeenth to restore the old liberal constitution. In the face of this danger the rulers of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and France made common cause, legislation for the whole of Europe, and sent armies to suppress these dangerous insurrections. Greece was also in revolt against Turkey. This tended to disturb the carefully balanced arrangements of the Congress of Vienna.

At the Congress of Verona the policy of the Holy Alliance was definitely stated in terms which virtually compelled the withdrawal of England.

"The High contracting powers being convinced that the system of representative government is as incompatible with monarchical principles as is the maxim of the sovereignty of the people with the divine right, engage mutually, in the most solemn manner, to use all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative government, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced into those countries where it is not yet known."

France was specifically empowered to take an army into Spain and

13. Ibid., p. 42.
to re-establish the threatened power of the Bourbons. 15

In the late summer of 1823, an invitation was issued for a congress to meet in Paris and to consider the problems of South America. In the light of the declaration of principles which have been quoted, the purpose of such a meeting could not be misunderstood. On receiving this invitation, so ominous to British Commerce and to the balance of power, George Canning, the British foreign secretary, immediately called the American minister, Richard Rush into conference and suggested joint action by the United States and England to prevent the threatened conquest of the newly created South American republics. Rush hesitated because he did not have the authority to take so momentous a step and because England had not recognized the independence of these states. Such action, before recognition took place, might merely lead to a further virtual extension of the British Empire.

When the correspondence from Rush arrived in Washington, Monroe consulted with Jefferson and Madison and all three agreed that the time had come to abandon the traditional policy of American isolation, and in the face of a new danger, to make

17. Turner, 214.
common cause with England. With Russia in the northeast and with Spanish territories to the south, any movement on the part of the Holy Alliance would inevitably draw America into war. Jefferson especially felt that an agreement with England would be the surest way to prevent war. Such an agreement would be for an American and not a European purpose.

Against this view, were the opinions and the arguments of the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams. He believed that we could accomplish everything we desired without committing ourselves to joint action with England. Adams, therefore, only half approved of Canning's suggestion. He did not like, as he said, the idea that his country should "come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the British man of war." If we undertook to save the South American states, it was, he thought, more in keeping without dignity that we act on broad principles announced on our own initiative. Clay's continued appeals in behalf of a republican system in American with an eye to the recognition of the South American states had prepared the country to support such a policy as the secretary had in mind.

Adams' cautious policy prevailed, and Monroe was persuaded to state the American position in his message of December 1823, without any reference to the British invitation from which the original suggestion had come. The policy of

18. Ibid., p. 215.
20. Hart, p. 35.
preventing European encroachments in America was an old one. It had been the chief reason in the mind of Jefferson when he urged the purchase of Louisiana.

The phraseology of the document and the idea of preserving full liberty of action by making it a purely American declaration were due perhaps entirely to Adams. However, it took the courage of a fearless, self-poised, self-respecting executive to meet uncompromisingly an issue of international moment and make a pronouncement, the import of which was destined to lay the cornerstone of American foreign policy. The success of the Monroe Doctrine was immediate and lasting.

Henry Clay now came forward as the advocate of immediate recognition of the revolutionary republics of South America. In this he was undoubtedly swayed by a real sympathy with the cause of freedom and by natural instincts a man of the west where antagonism to Spain was bred in the bone. But his insistence upon immediate action was also stimulated by his opposition to Monroe and his secretary of state. Clay's great speech on recognition was made May 24, and 25, 1818. He appealed to Congress to support an American system by recognizing these sister republics, and argued that, both in diplomacy and in commerce they would be guided by an American policy and this would aid the United States to free itself from dependence on Europe. His motion was

21. Fish, p. 172.
lost by an overwhelming majority, but the speech made a deep impression.

In the two years that elapsed between the negotiations and the ratification of the Florida treaty, the president was several times on the point of recommending the forcible occupation of Florida, but withheld the blow, hoping that the liberal Spanish government established under the constitution of 1820 might be brought to give its consent to the cession. The impetuous Clay chafed under this delay, and on May 10, 1820, he broke forth in another speech, in support of a resolution declaring the expediency of sending ministers to the South American states. Charging the administration, and especially John Quincy Adams with subserviency to Great Britain, he demanded that the United States should become the center of a system against the despotism of the Old World and should act on its own responsibility.

"We look too much abroad", said he. "Let us break these commercial fetters; let us no longer watch the nod of any European politician; let us become real and true Americans, and place ourselves at the head of the American system." 24

Clay was steadily gaining support in his efforts to force the hands of the administration; his resolutions won by a fair


23. McMaster, 301.

majority, and again, in February, 1821, he secured the almost unanimous assent of the House to a resolution of sympathy with South America. Another resolution, expressing the readiness of that body to support the president whenever he should think it expedient to recognize the republics, passed by a vote of 86 to 68, and the triumphant Clay was placed at the head of a committee to wait on the president with this resolution.

Although the victory was without immediate effect on the administration, which refused to act while the Florida treaty was still unratified, Adams perceived that the popular current was growing too strong to be stemmed much longer; the charge of dependence upon England was one not easy to be borne, and Clay's vision of an independent American system guided by the United States had its influence on his mind. Five months after Clay's speech, Adams set forth similar general ideas in a discussion between himself and the British minister over the regulation of the slave-trade. By 1822 Florida was ours. The success of the arms of the revolutionists was unmistakable. Several governments of sufficient stability to warrant recognition had been erected; and it was patent to the world that Spain had lost her colonies. Monroe acted on these considerations and

25. Ibid., 2229, and II Sess., 1081, 1091; Adams, Memoirs, V., 268.

sent a message to Congress, March 8, 1822, announcing that the
time had come for recognition and he asked for appropriations
for ministers to South America.

In the meantime, the Secretary of State was confronted
with important diplomatic questions which complicated the South
American problems. As Spanish America broke away from the
mother-country, its possessions in North America on the Pacific
were exposed to seizure by the rival powers. In 1821 when
Stratford Canning, the British minister to the United States,
protested against a motion, in the House of Representatives,
that the United States should form an establishment on the
Columbia River, Adams challenged any claim of England to the
shores of the Pacific.

"I do not know," he said, "what you claim
nor what you do not claim. You claim India;
you claim Africa; you claim -------" "Perhaps",
said Canning, "a piece of the moon." "No", said
Adams, "I have not heard that you claim ex-
clusively any part of the moon; but there is not
a spot on this habitable globe that I could af-
firm you do not claim; and there is none which
you may not claim with as much color of right as
you can have, to the Columbia River or its mouth." 28

The time had come when Adams could use his well-grounded,
well-balanced familiarity with foreign diplomacy. He held
tenaciously to his firm belief that a new nation must assert

27. Richardson, Messages and Papers, II., 116.

its rights with vigor if it expected to maintain them. In his conduct of foreign relations he knew not the word compromise. The individualism, the uncompromising nature, the aggressiveness and natural love of expansion, which were traits of John Quincy Adams, became of the highest service to his country in the diplomatic relations of the next few years.

Shortly after Adams' defiance to England, he met the claims of Russia with a similar challenge. On September 4, 1821, the Russian Czar issued a ukase announcing the claim of Russia on the Pacific coast north of the fifty-first degree, and interdicting to the commercial vessels of other powers the approach on the high seas within one hundred miles of this claim. This assertion of Russian monopoly, which would in effect, have closed Bering Sea, met with peremptory refusal by Adams. On July 17, 1823, having in mind Russia's posts in California, he informed the minister, Barol Tuyl,

"that we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments." 29

It may be said in passing, that Russia concluded negotiations with the treaty of April 17, 1824, by which she agreed to form no establishments on the northwest coast south of latitude 54° 40', and the United States reciprocally agreed to make no

establishments north of that line. At the same time, Russia abandoned her extreme claim to maritime jurisdiction.

The Congress of Verona was the last of the joint meetings of the powers for the discussion of international affairs of state. It was here that England broke with the concert of European powers. It was natural that Great Britain should now turn to the United States. It is very likely that the next step of Canning was influenced by the dispatches of the British minister to the United States, who reported a conversation with Adams, in June, 1823, in which the secretary strongly set forth his belief that, in view of the virtual dissolution of the European alliance, England and the United States had much in common in their policy.

"With respect to the vast continent of the West", said he, "the United States must necessarily take a warm and decided interest in whatever determines the fate or affects, the welfare of its component members."

But he disclaimed any wish on the part of this country to obtain exclusive advantages there. He urged that England ought to recognize the independence of the revolted provinces, and he deprecated the conquest or cession of any part of them.

30. McMaster, 303.
31. Ibid., 14.
The first impression of the British minister, on hearing Adams' emphasis on the community of interests between the two nations, was that the secretary was suggesting an alliance; and it may well have been that Canning was encouraged by the American attitude to make overtures to Rush, the American minister, shortly after these despatches must have reached him. On August 16, 1823, and three times thereafter, Canning proposed a joint declaration by England and the United States against any project by a European power of

"a forcible enterprise for reducing the colonies to subjugation, on the behalf or in the name of Spain; or which mediates the acquisition of any part of them to itself, by cession or by conquest." 33

Canning was willing to make public announcement that recovery of the colonies by Spain was hopeless; that the matter of recognition was only a matter of time; and that Great Britain did not aim at the possession of any portion of them, but that it "could not see any part of them transferred to any other power with indifference." Canning desired that these professions of the United States and Great Britain, which had been mutually confided to each other, should be declared "in the face of the world." 34


34. Ibid., 26.
When John Quincy Adams heard of Canning's proposals he was engaged in a discussion with a representative of the Czar. This representative informed him of the refusal of Russia to recognize the Spanish-American republics; at the same time he expressed the hope that America would continue her policy of neutrality.

While the cabinet had Rush's despatches under consideration, Adams received a second communication from the Russian minister, expounding the reactionary ideas of the Holy Alliance. To the Secretary of State this was a challenge to defend the American ideas of liberty.

"The ground I wish to take", he said, "is that of earnest remonstrance against the interference of European powers by force with South America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with Europe; to make an American cause and adhere inflexibly to it." 36

In the cabinet he stood firmly against giving guarantees to England with respect to Cuba. He heartened up his colleagues, who were alarmed at the possibility of the spread of war to the United States; but at the same time that he dismissed this danger as remote he pictured to the cabinet the alarming alternatives in case the allies subjugated Spanish America: California, Peru and Chili might fall to Russia; Cuba to England; and Mexico to France. The danger was even at our

35. Reddaway, Chap. IV., p. 66.
doors, he declared, only a short time since the minister of France openly threatened to recover Louisiana. Such suggestions exhibit the real significance of the problem, which in truth involved the question of whether America should lie open to seizure by rival European nations, each fearful lest the other gain an undue advantage. It was time for the United States to take its stand against intervention in this hemisphere.

Among the fundamental rights of every state is that of independence. Now, independence means the right to be let alone. In the exercise of its independence each state deals with each other state as it sees fit: it fosters trade or restricts it; it quarrels or makes friends. This is the rule; interference in the affairs of another state is the exception, and needs to be justified. The necessity of self-defense is the most common excuse for such interference. The balance-of-power principle was based upon this, with the maintainance of the Ottoman Empire and the Triple Alliance as its latest manifestations. Intervention, to preserve the peace of Europe — such as that which carved a neutral Belgium out of the kingdom of the Netherlands — was based upon this. And it was this that called the Monroe Doctrine into being.

37. Ibid., IV., 207.
Monroe's Message:–

The Monroe Doctrine is comprised of two widely separated paragraphs in the message of December 2, 1823. The first, relating to Russia’s encroachments on the northwest coast, and occurring near the beginning of the message, was an assertion to the effect that the American continents had assumed an independent condition and were no longer open to European colonization. This may be regarded as a statement of fact. No part of the continent at that time remained unclaimed. The second paragraph relating to Spanish America and occurring near the close of the message, was a declaration against the extension to the American continents of the system of intervention adopted by the Holy Alliance for suppression of popular government in Europe.

The language used by Monroe is as follows:

1. At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiations the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal had been made by His Imperial Majesty to the government of Great Britain, which has likewise acceded to. The government of the United States has been desirous by friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in

39. J.B. Moore, 238.
which the rights and interests of the United States are involved that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. 40

2. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport without policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies and dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.

In the war between those new governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security. 41

The President's message reached England while the discussion in regard to the proposed congress at Paris was still

40. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II., 209.

41. Ibid., 218.
going on. It was received with enthusiasm by the liberal members of Parliament. Lord Broughman said:

"The question with regard to South America is now, I believe, disposed of, or nearly so; for an event has recently happened than which none has ever dispersed greater joy, exultation, and gratitude over all the free men of Europe; that event, which is decisive on the subject, is the language held with respect to Spanish America in the message of the President of the United States." 42

Sir James Mackintosh said:

"This coincidence of the two great English commonwealths (for so I delight to call them; and I heartily pray that they may be forever united in the cause of justice and liberty) cannot be contemplated without the utmost pleasure by every enlightened citizen of the earth." 43

The liberal Parliament members evidently had reference to the second clause alone, the one relating to South America. The other one against European colonization in America, seems not to have attracted much attention. Canning, however, saw the bearing of it and objected to the principle it set forth, which was directed against England as much as against the allies. He was a little surprised at the turn his proposal had taken. The President's message really settled the question before Canning had announced what action his government would take.

While Canning and Monroe acted independently of each other,

42. McMaster, 24.
43. Ibid., 26.
the expression that each gave to the views of his government was rendered more emphatic and of more effect by the knowledge of the other's attitude in the matter. Another point to be noted is that Monroe's message was made public, while Canning's answer was for some time known only to the diplomatic corps.

The determination of both England and the United States to oppose the intervention of the allies in South America had the desired effect. Conferences in answer to the invitation of Spain were held in Paris but they were participated in only by the ordinary representatives of the powers invited, resident in that capital, and their only result was to advise Spain not to listen to the counsels of England. Canning announces independent course of action.

All further discussion that took place between England and Spain in reference to recognition of the colonies by Great Britain was confined to the status of the revolutionary governments, and upon this point their views were so divergent that Canning finally announced to the Spanish government that,

"His Majesty would, at his own time, take such steps as he might think proper in respect to the several states of Spanish America without further reference to the Court of Madrid; but at the same time without any feeling of alienation towards that court, or hostility towards the real interests of Spain." 45

44. McMaster, 15.

45. Political Life of Canning, II., 54.
Great Britain decides on recognition.

It may be well to state in passing, that Great Britain determined to recognize Mexico and Colombia, December 14, 1824. This step was taken because French troops continued to occupy Spain after the time stipulated in a treaty. Canning sought an explanation from France, but without satisfactory results. On January 1, 1825, after the ministers had left England with instructions and full powers, the fact of recognition was communicated officially to the diplomatic corps and two days later was made public. That this recognition was a retaliatory measure to compensate England for the French occupation of Spain was understood at the time and was distinctly avowed by Canning two years later. In a speech delivered December 12, 1826, in defense of his position in not having arrested the French invasion of Spain, he said:

"I looked another way - I sought for compensation in another hemisphere, contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that, if France had Spain, it would not be Spain WITH THE INDIES (Spanish American colonies). I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old." 47

In spite of the great indebtedness of South America to Canning, this boast falls somewhat flat when we remember that the Spanish colonies had won their independence by their own valor and had been recognized as independent governments by the

46. Bigelow, 52 - 53.
47. Ibid., 52.
United States two years before Great Britain acted in the matter.

The United States received the message with approbation.-

The United States received the message with approbation. There was no doubt of the sympathy of the American people with its fundamental principles. Although Clay, from considerations of policy, withdrew a resolution which he presented to Congress (January 20, 1824) giving legislative endorsement to the doctrine. Together with the attitude of England, it put an end to the menace of the Holy Alliance on this side of the ocean, and it began a new chapter, yet unfinished, in the history of the predominance of the United States in the New World.

The real spirit and intent of the Monroe Doctrine was republicanism. It did not forbid the existence of monarchies here. It did not forbid any step that the republics themselves chose to take, but that which was forced upon them. It was the policy that fitted the hour and the occasion. It was opportunism. It was nationalism.

The American people received the Monroe Doctrine with approval, and in Europe it attracted a great deal of attention. It was understood everywhere to be a firm, dignified notice to the governments of Europe that they could not establish any new colony on the American continents or interfere in their

political affairs without assuming an attitude of hostility to the government of the United States. The Monroe Doctrine lost nothing in esteem through its vagueness. What would be done if any colony should be established or any American government interfered with, was not expressed by President Monroe, and could only be imagined. In England the doctrine was enthusiastically applauded as a bold assertion of American spirit. The Holy Alliance believed it threatened war, and undoubtedly it prevented any interference with the revolted provinces of Spain.

The presidential message attracted much attention in France, both parts were condemned alike. At a dinner at Prince Polignac's, Rush complained that in upholding the principle of non-colonization he had to face the whole British Cabinet with the influence of Russia super-added. The sold official inference which France professed to draw from the Monroe Doctrine was that it would be improper to invite the United States to a conference on South America.

Metternich saw that the message was in exact conformity with the republican principles avowed and constantly acted upon

49. Reddaway, 93.

by the government of the United States. He prophesied the calamities the New World would bring upon the Old.

The Czar was ill at the time and the labors of his ministers were divided between urging Great Britain to attend the proposed conference at Paris, and upholding the Russian claims to the northwest territory of America.

The message gave great offense in Prussia. She had newly established commercial relations with Spanish America and she was fearful lest there should be a limitation placed upon this coveted privilege.

In the South American republics the doctrine was considered, if anything, a promise of aid and protection should any European government attack them. The immediate political influence of it there is hard to estimate, however, for, if the rank and file noticed the presidential message at all, the chances are that they read a transcript of it in some European paper. The declaration, it is safe to say, aroused no wave of affection for the people of the United States. One would almost think that the struggling republics should have heartily endorsed the element of prophetic inspiration in the utterance.


It rang through the world like a peal of thunder; it paralyzed the Holy Alliance, and defined, once and for all time, as far as Europe is concerned, the international status of the newly constituted American republics. It did remove their difficulties.

The Monroe Doctrine is in fact a formula of independence. It imposes no dominion and no superiority. Much less does it establish a protectorate or relation of superiority to inferior. It creates no obligations and no responsibilities between the nations of America, but simply calls upon them, with their own means and without foreign aid to exclude from within their respective frontiers the jurisdiction of European powers. The doctrine was proclaimed by the United States in the interest of her own peace and security. Other republics of the continent have in their turn proceeded to adopt it with an eye alone to their own individual welfare and internal tranquillity.

This moral consort of intentions and tendencies constitutes in itself alone great force without need of treaties or formal alliance or definite obligations. Thus understood the Monroe Doctrine, which in the end is nothing more or less than the expression of the will of the people to maintain their liberty, assures the independence of the states of that continent in respect to one another as well as in relation to the powers of Europe.
The principles proclaimed by Monroe have grown into a principle of American law, which received its solemn consecration in the Congress of the States of the South, reunited in Panama in 1826.

The Monroe Doctrine, in its pristine significance, stands accredited, approved, and adopted by all America. It has a tangible meaning. It is both geographically and politically American; its object is to safeguard the Western Hemisphere against territorial control by non-American powers. It was conceived in terms of colonial emancipation. It became a bulwark of new nationalism.

53. Reddaway, 102.
Chapter V

The Attitude of John Quincy Adams Towards Nationalism

No one but John Quincy Adams could have done the work of John Quincy Adams, and each of his unamiable qualities strengthened his fiber to do it. And if a man is to be judged by his fruits, Mr. Morse is justified in saying that,

"he was not only pre-eminent in ability and acquirements, but even more to be honored for profound immutable honesty of purpose, and broad, noble humanity of aims." 1

It might almost be said that the sixth President of the United States was cradled in statesmanship. He was born July 11, 1767, in Quincy, Massachusetts, the son of the second President, John Adams. When a little lad of ten he accompanied his father to France on a mission. Eighteen months elapsed before he returned, and three months later he was again upon the water, bound once more for the French capital. There were school days in Paris, and other school days in Amsterdam and in Leyden; but the boy was only fourteen, - the mature old child! - when he went to St. Petersburg as private secretary


and interpreter to Francis Dana, just appointed minister pleni­
potentiary to the court of the Empress Catherine. Such was his
apprenticeship to a public career which began in earnest in 1794
and with slight interruptions lasted fifty-four years.

He served as minister to the United Netherlands, to Russia,
Prussia, and to England. He was one of the commissioners
that framed the Treaty of Ghent which ended the War of 1812. He
was by turn State Senator, United States Senator, Secretary of
State, President of the United States, and then for many years
a Member of the National House of Representatives. He had a
full and fruitful life yet in his later years he pessimistically
wrote,

"My public life will terminate by the alienation
from me of all mankind....It is the experience of all
ages that people grow weary of old men. I cannot
flatter myself that I shall escape the common law of
our nature....To be forsaken by all mankind seems
to be the destiny that awaits my last days." 5

He said that he was paying in his declining years for the good
luck that had attended the earlier portion of his life.

While in the Senate he gave his support to the purchase of
Louisiana, although he disagreed with the administration upon

---

3. The Encyclopedia Britannica, Volume, I, Thirteenth
4. See Monroe Doctrine, Chapter IV, p. 76 of this thesis.
some of the ensuing problems, and also approved the embargo and non-importation acts. The support of these measures so unpopular in New England caused him to be hated by the Federalists and finally cost him his seat in the Senate. His successor was chosen several months before the usual time of filling the vacancy and Adams at once resigned. He was, however, so identified with the party in power that in 1809 President Madison appointed him Minister to Russia. While there he was named as one of the commissioners who were to act in connection with the mediation proposed by Russia, but which was made impossible by the declination of England. He was soon appointed, however, one of the five negotiators who concluded the Treaty of Ghent.

From that work Adams proceeded to London, where he served as Minister to England until his varied and remarkable diplomatic career was ended in 1817 by his appointment by President Monroe to the post of Secretary of State. The first place in the new cabinet was given to John Quincy Adams, the most experienced and able of American diplomats.

"It is highly gratifying now to look back upon the high spirit and independent temper uniformly displayed by Mr. Adams abroad and at home in all dealings with foreign powers. Never in any instance did he display the least tinge of

7. Ibid., p. 53.
8. This service was especially important and helpful to Adams because he more easily caught the Russian pulse in the Ukase of 1821 as a result of this experience. See Monroe Doctrine, Chapter IV., p. p. 85.
9. John F. Morse, Jr., p. 100.
boastful extravagance which so many of our diplomats have possessed. He had the happy gift of a native pride which enabled him to support in the most effective manner the dignity of the people for whom he spoke." 10

The independent and new national spirit of Americans was manifesting itself in many directions and nowhere more markedly than by an increased vigor and strength in foreign affairs.

It so happened that in Mr. Monroe's administration the heaviest burden of labor and responsibility rested upon Mr. Adams, the most important and perplexing questions fell within his department. Domestic breaches had been healed, but foreign breaches gaped with threatening jaws. War with Spain seemed imminent. Her South American colonies were waging their contest for independence, and naturally looked to the late successful rebels of the northern continent for acts of neighborly sympathy and good fellowship. Their efforts to obtain official recognition and the exchange of ministers with the United States were eager and persistent. Privateers fitted out at Baltimore gave the State Department scarcely less cause for anxiety than the shipbuilders of Liverpool gave to the English Cabinet in 1863-64. These perplexities as is well known, caused the passage of the first "Neutrality Act" which first formulated and has since served to establish the principle of international obligation in such matters, and has been the basis of all subse-

10. Ibid., p. 127.
quent legislation upon the subject not only in this country but also in Great Britain.

Adams' work as Secretary of State was concerned with the difficult negotiations which in 1819 ended the purchase of Florida, the more delicate relations with England with reference to the fisheries convention of 1818 and the conflicting claims of the Columbia basin.

Much of the discussion at Ghent had been devoted to the fisheries question. It was a critical issue between the United States and Great Britain. Two facts in the situation stand out clearly. First, the tremendous interest of New England in the fisheries, which were particularly profitable for twenty years before 1815, the exported fish being valued at twelve million dollars in 1814 - and no one knew better the importance and intricacies of this interest than the son of John Adams. Second, the two governments were unable to agree upon an interpretation of the third article of the treaty of 1783, in which it stated,

"that the people of the United States shall continue to enjoy unmolested the right to take fish of every kind in certain specified waters, and also that the inhabitants of the United States shall have liberty to take fish of every

11. The purchase of Florida and Adams' admirable diplomacy has been exhaustively treated in Chapter II, Florida, pp. 38-41.

kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use (but not to dry or cure the same on that island), and also on the coasts, bays and creeks of all other of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America; and that American fishermen shall have liberty to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays (specified) so long as the same shall remain unsettled." 13

The attitude of the British ministry briefly stated, was as follows: the war terminated the rights and privileges recognized by the treaty of 1783 - that is to say, there remained only to citizens of the United States the right of deep-sea fishing; the inshore fisheries and the privileges of drying and curing fish no longer belonged to Americans. The American contention was quite the opposite: the treaty of 1783 was not an ordinary treaty which could be abrogated by war; the independence recognized by the treaty of 1783 had not been brought in question; why then should other provisions of the same treaty be considered null and void? Such being the case, the United States still had both the rights which had been theirs as colonies, and which they had continued to have as independent states, and the liberties which had been guaranteed them in solemn manner by the treaty of 1783.

In the year which followed peace the British government

13. Sabine, Fisheries (reprint of 1853) p. 54; United States, Treaties and Conventions p. 377. Also Niles' Register, VIII., p. 384.

directed seizure of American fishing vessels operating on the Canadian coasts without a license; the words "warned off the coast by His Majesty's sloop, JASEUR, not to come within sixty miles" written on the license of a Barnstable fisherman in June, 1815, seem to indicate the British purpose was to exclude American vessels not only from the inshore fisheries and from the drying privileges, but from the wide seas frequented by the fish. It mattered little to the exasperated fisherman who was thus driven off that the British government disavowed the act of the captain of the JASEUR; the year's profit was lost. The presentation of the protest against the action of the British sloop led to a long and rather sharp correspondence on the whole question of the fisheries, extending through the years 1815-1817, partly between Mr. Adams and Lord Bathurst in London, partly between Mr. Bagot and Secretary Monroe in Washington. Meantime the orders to the British vessels remained practically unchanged; Sir David Milne, of the British North American Station, gave orders in May, 1817 to a subordinate to use "every means in your power for the protection of revenue, as also the fisheries on the coast, against the encroachment of foreigners. On your meeting with any foreign vessel fishing or at anchor in any of the harbors or creeks of His Majesty's North American provinces, or within our maritime jurisdiction, you will seize and send


such vessel so trespassing to Halifax for adjudication, unless it should appear that they have been obliged to put in there in consequence of distress." 17

When Adams became secretary of state he instructed his successor at the court of St. James, Richard Rush, lately attorney-general and acting head of the state department, to ask settlement of such old grievances as were fast becoming acute; for example, the termination of the fishing dispute and the settlement of the western boundary, including the title to the region at the mouth of the Columbia River. Great Britain consented to negotiate, and Gallatin, who since 1815 had been minister to France and the most experienced and adroit diplomat in the service of the United States, proceeded to London to assist Mr. Rush. Instructions to the American ministers provided that they might consent to certain limitations of "liberty" to take, cure, and dry fish within British jurisdiction, but they were not authorized to relinquish all their asserted rights and privileges at the demand of Great Britain.

The persistence of the Americans won for them more than had really been expected. The convention signed October 20, 1818, recognized the right of the citizens of the United States

19. Ibid., 468.
to fish along the southern, western, and northern coasts of Newfoundland and along the coast of Labrador, and gave them liberty forever to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays and creeks of the portions of the coast already designated. The United States on the other hand, renounced "any liberty heretofore enjoyed or claimed by the inhabitants thereof to take, dry, or cure fish on or within three marine miles of any of the coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors" of British America outside the limits just mentioned or specified -- "provided, however, that the American fishermen shall be admitted to enter such bays or harbors for the purpose of shelter and of repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood and of obtaining water, and for no other purpose whatever." 21

These provisions were supposed to settle once for all the disputed questions concerning American rights and privileges, and the convention of 1818 is still in force. As a matter of fact, the difference of opinion as to the method of measuring the three miles led ultimately to difficulties almost as threatening as those which prompted the negotiation of the treaty of 1818.

By the same treaty the boundary of the United States west of the Lake of the Woods was defined. The treaty of 1783 laid down a line from the most northwestern point of the Lake

of the Woods "on a due west course to the Mississippi"; but the source of the Mississippi proved to lie nearly due south from the Lake of the Woods. Furthermore, the northern limits of the Louisiana purchase remained undefined. Since 1803 the only line which could have been called a boundary was that which followed the watershed north of the streams tributary to the Mississippi. Various suggestions for settling this long-disputed question between the United States and Great Britain were made by King, Monroe, and Pickney during the negotiations of 1803 and later, and one of these suggestions was now adopted for determining the new line. Through the northwest point of the Lake of the Woods, as defined by the treaty of 1783, a north and south line was to be drawn. The boundary was to follow this line from the lake to its intersection with the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude, and thence along that parallel westward to the Stony Mountains.

The treaty dealt also with the rival claims of the two countries to Oregon, that vast region west of the Rockies extending roughly from the Columbia River to the fifty-fourth parallel. The British based their claim on exploration of its coasts by Captain Cook on his third voyage in 1787, and by


Mackenzie and Vancouver in 1793; on settlements on Nootka Sound recognized by Spain in the Nootka Sound Convention of 1790; and on posts established by the Hudson's Bay Company. The Americans, on the other hand, insisted that a valid claim was established by the entering and exploring of the Columbia River by Captain Gray, of the ship COLUMBIA; by the founding of Astoria in 1811 by John Jacob Astor; and by the restoration of this post by Great Britain after its capture in the War of 1812, in accordance with Article I, of the treaty of Ghent. The case was one for diplomatic compromise, but it was one which could wait for adjustment; for Oregon, with its posts on the Pacific Ocean, was indeed a far-off country and its value remote. Accordingly the third article of the treaty provided that for ten years the country claimed by either party west of the Stony Mountains should be jointly occupied

"free and open...to the vessels, citizens, and subjects of the two powers without prejudice to any existing claim."

The provision of 1818 was later extended for a second ten years, and finally superseded by the treaty of 1846.


29. United States, Treaties and Conventions, 416.
The people of the United States underwent a decided change in the decade or more that followed the close of the War of 1812. Population was increasing rapidly; the Western Movement was daily bringing new regions under the plow; the country could produce - and if necessary could manufacture - everything necessary for its own welfare and comfort. Our nation had grown strong. It could stand alone.

The people were proud of the nation; they were proud of their American citizenship; they were proud of the strength of the federal government. The protective tariff was accepted; the Second United States Bank was created; a long program of internal improvements was begun; the Monroe Doctrine warned Europe to keep hands off the American Continent; we had acquired additional territory.

The political and diplomatic effects of the new national spirit reached a sort of climax in the election of 1824. This election is so different from any which preceded it or which have followed it that it is worthy of notice in evaluating the events of the period.

The chief interest of the election 1824 lies in the fact that the method used to elect a President when none of the candidates had a majority in the electoral college is the one

which would still legally apply in a similar case and that it has not been used since that time on account of a tendency of political parties to concentrate on two and only two strong candidates. During the canvass in the House, the atmosphere of Washington seethed with intrigue and rumor. When Adams was chosen President and later announced that Henry Clay of Kentucky had accepted the post of Secretary of State in his cabinet, it was easy for the defeated partisans to convince themselves, and to announce without much proof, that the election was the result of a corrupt deal, and that Henry Clay had been bribed by an office to thwart the will of the people. In spite of angry denials and even threatened duels, the charge lived on and became the foundation-stone of a new party which was already determined to elect President in 1828 the hero of New Orleans. In the vitriolic words of John Randolph of Roanoke, who always showed a keen sense of other people's misdeeds, the administration of John Quincy Adams was the partnership of a "Puritan and a blackleg." In accepting the office of Secretary of State, Henry Clay had showed that his political sagacity was not equal to his eloquence and great personal

32. Ibid., pp. 34-35.
33. John F. Morse, Jr., p. 183.
magnetism. It was the first of many blunders which kept from him the great office which he coveted.

The satisfaction of John Quincy Adams with the result of the election was natural and profound. When the result was announced February 9th, he wrote in his ever faithful diary:

"May the blessing of God rest upon the event of this day! - the second Wednesday in February, when the election of a President for the term of four years from the fourth of March next, was consummated."

He received with satisfaction which he could not conceal the congratulations of his friends, and in the evening attended a reception at the White House, where he met and shook hands with the defeated candidate, who, to his evident surprise, "was altogether placid and courteous." Indeed, it was recorded by some observers, that Jackson was the more composed of the two. In the evening, Adams took time at the end of a busy day to write to his aged father and ask for his blessing and prayers on the event of the most important day of his son's life.

But it was not the most important day in the life of John Quincy Adams, as the event was to show. It was more nearly the end of a great career than the beginning, and today John Quincy


Adams is remembered more for the part which he played as Secretary of State and for the later part which he was again to play on the floor of the House of Representatives than for anything which he was able to accomplish as President of the United States. Fate plays curious tricks, and John Quincy Adams, who might well have succeeded earlier, with manners austere and rather forbidding, had become President precisely at a moment when democracy had become self-conscious. He was without the arts of the practical politician and found himself matched by the most astute political leader of the day, the newly elected Democratic Senator from New York, Martin Van Buren. As has been inferred, time changes perspectives! Martin Van Buren was once a follower of the waning fortunes of Crawford, but was now fully committed to the leader from Tennessee. Under the influence of Henry Clay, Adams sought to secure participation in the great Pan-American conference planned by Simon Bolivar, to meet at Panama, at the very time when the country was fully convinced of the wisdom of his own earlier policy of American isolation. He found himself urging the expenditure of funds for internal improvements and

36. James T. Adams, pp. 188-204.
37. MacDonald, pp. 34-36.
38. The Monroe Doctrine was probably dictated by Adams.
for the building of a great national university, when the tide of nationalism which had followed the war was beginning to run strong in the direction of economy and States' Rights. His very virtues, which were many and sincere, prevented success in the complicated politics of his day. For he refused to bow to the spoils system which was already familiar in the states. He retained in public office and even in his cabinet enemies who were already plotting his overthrow. The result could not long be in doubt, and, in 1828, Andrew Jackson, whose campaign had been ably managed by close friends, was carried on an overwhelming flood of sentiment into the office of which he was now convinced that he had been unjustly deprived four years before. "Let the people rule!"

Why was it that John Quincy Adams, of all men of his time, the most highly trained in statesmanship, and imbued with a lively national spirit was not pre-eminent as a chief executive? His presidency was a failure, he was never thereafter a political leader, yet will he ever live in the records of that time for his splendid diplomacy as Secretary of State and for his fighting qualities in the House of Representatives.

He loved only the society of good men and was content.

39. MacDonald, p. 34.
Chapter VI

The Relation of the Tariff Legislation of 1824 and of 1828 to Nationalism

The Tariff of 1824

The tariff struggle of this period reveals the spirit which arises when powers are asserted unfavorable to any section. The failure of the tariff bill of 1820 was followed by other unsuccessful attempts to induce a majority of Congress to revive the subject. The messages of Monroe favored a moderate increase of duties; but it was not until 1824, after the return of Henry Clay and his triumphant election to the speakership, that Congress showed a protectionist majority ably disciplined and led.

The tariff bill of 1824 was supported, not as a revenue, but as a protective measure. It proposed an increase of the duty upon iron, hemp cotton bagging, woolens, and cottons. Upon woolen goods the friends of protection desired to apply the minimum principle which the tariff of 1816 had provided for cotton goods. But the cheap woolens were mostly used for the

1. Babcock, American Nationality, American Statesmen Series, Chapter XIV.
clothing of southern slaves, and the proposition for an increase of duty met with so strenuous a resistance that in the outcome the cheap foreign goods bore a lower rate of duty than did the high priced products. Although the act somewhat increased the protection upon woolen fabrics as a whole, this was more than offset by the increased duty which was levied upon raw wool in response to the demand of the wool-growing interests of the country.

Another struggle occurred over the protection of hemp. This product was used both for manufacture of the ropes essential to New England shipping and for the cotton bagging used in the South. Thus the shipping and the slave-holding sections were brought into union in opposition to the provision. Nevertheless, this important Kentucky interest received substantial protection. The attempt to secure a marked increase of the duty on iron bars resulted in a compromise proposition which satisfied neither party and had little effect upon domestic manufacture, while it increased the cost to the consumer. The Senate amendments reduced the proposed rates on the most important articles, so that, on the whole, the extreme protectionists failed to carry their program, although the bill increased the duties upon articles most essential to the

shipping and planting sections sufficiently to leave great discontent.

In the debates upon this tariff, Henry Clay led the protectionist force, basing his argument upon the general distress of the country, which he explained by the loss of the foreign market for agricultural products, which he would remedy by building up a home market by means of the support of the manufactures—the creation of an "American System." "We must naturalize the arts in our country," he said. Not the least significant portion of his plea for protection was that in which he called attention to the great diversity of interests—"agricultural, planting, farming, commercial, navigating, fishing, manufacturing"—within the United States. Some of these interests were, as he said, peculiar to particular sections.

"The inquiry should be in reference to the great interests of every section of the Union (I speak not for minute subdivisions); what would be done for those interests if that section stood alone and separated from the residue of the Republic? If they come into absolute collision with the interests of another section, a reconciliation, if possible, should be attempted, by mutual concession, as to avoid a sacrifice of the prosperity of either to that of the other." 4


Perhaps the ablest speech on the other side was that of Webster who ridiculed Clay's discovery,

"This favorite American policy is what America has never tried, and this odious foreign policy is what, as we are told, foreign states have never pursued," he said.

He denied the existence of a general depression, although he admitted that profits were lower and prices considerably depressed. Webster's argument included an analysis of the theory of protection as against free-trade, in which he made a classical statement of the opposition to protection. In short, he represented the attitude of the commercial classes, particularly New England, whose interests were injured by any restraint of the freedom of exchange. As yet these classes exercised a dominant influence in Massachusetts.

Senator Hayne, of South Carolina, also argued the case against the tariff with a grasp and power of presentation that was hardly second to that of Webster. In particular he protested against compelling the planting regions to pay the cost of a protective system. Two-thirds of the whole amount of the domestic exports of the United States, he argued, were composed of cotton, rice, and tobacco, and from this trade the imports of manufactured goods which paid the revenues of the United States, and which the protective system rendered expensive and

burdensome to his section. He warned the manufacturers that the south would repeal the system at the first opportunity, regardless of interests that might accrue under the proposed measure.

In the speeches of some of the representatives of the South was a note of revolt not to be found in Webster's argument. For the first time in the discussion of the tariff, the constitutional objection was made prominent. It was argued that the power to impose taxes and duties was given for the purpose of protection. If not the letter, the spirit of the Constitution, at least, was violated, so it was charged, by this distortion of the power of taxation. The proceedings of the constitutional convention were recited to show that a proposition conferring the alleged power was voted down. To this Clay gave the reply that the clause on which the protectionists relied was the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.

Even the South, however, laid less stress upon the constitutional argument than upon the injustice to the section. McDuffie, for example, replying to Clay argued that no one of the great sections of the country, if it were a separate nation, could advantageously apply the system of protection. He warned the western states that the system would make them tributary to

7. Ibid., 223.
the Atlantic states and that they had more to lose by alienating the friendship of the South for a system of internal improvements which would facilitate the sale of their meat products to the South than by a union with the manufacturing interests....

The bill passed the House of Representatives on April 16, 1824 by a close vote of 107 to 102, and subsequently passed the Senate by a small majority.

On the whole the tariff of 1824 was distinctly a compromise measure. It aroused the opposition of the whole planting section and made the manufacturing section feel that its interests had been sacrificed. The tariff question was, in fact, only postponed.

The Tariff of 1828

"The Bill of Abominations"

The contest between the North and the South entered an acute stage in 1827 when a higher protective tariff was demanded by the Northern woolen and iron manufacturers. The demand was supported by a protectionist congress held in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

9. Ibid., 2423.
Adams and Clay were avowedly in favor of a protective tariff. The Jackson leaders were confronted with the fact that their allies in Pennsylvania and some other states wanted protection, while South Carolina and Georgia were becoming every day more violently opposed to it. The protectionist sentiment was persistent and in several Northern sections recommended new legislation to Congress. Therefore the next Congress was bound to have to deal with this political football, or better, bomb shell.

The political situation exercised a dominant influence upon the tariff legislation at this time. As the campaign between Adams and Jackson was approaching its end, the managers of Jackson faced the problem of how to hold together the forces of the south, which were almost to a man opposed to the tariff legislation, and those of Pennsylvania and New York, where protection was so popular. Jackson announced his belief in the home market idea, and perhaps reluctantly, with some reservations, committed himself to the support of the protective system. Jackson was an astute politician.

While the forces of Jackson were not harmonious on the tariff, neither was there consistency of interests between the

friends of protection in New England, the middle states and the
west. Under these circumstances certain Jackson leaders
devised a clever scheme by which to secure credit for pro-
tectionist sentiment without passing a bill, and to divide
their opponents....

The history of the tariff has always been the history of
the struggle to combine local and opposing interests into a
single bill. The silence of the New England president – Adams –
upon the tariff question, the "selfishness of New England's
policy", and the inducements offered to the middle region and
the West to demand protection for their special interests were
all successfully used to break the unity of the tariff forces.
Even protectionist Pennsylvania, and Kentucky home of the
champion of the "American System," gave a large share of their
votes against the bill. Although it passed the house (February
10, 1827) the Senate laid it on the table by the casting vote
of Vice President Calhoun, who was thus compelled to take the
responsibility of defeating the measure and to range himself
permanently with the anti-tariff sentiment of his section.

Hardly had the woolens bill met its fate when rival forces
began to reorganize for another struggle. From the south

14. Fish, p. 181.
16. Ibid., 258.
and from the shipping interests of New England came memorials in opposition to the tariff and in support of the theory of free-trade. At a convention which met in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, July 30, 1827, a hundred delegates from thirteen states met to promote the cause of protection. Finding it necessary to combine the various interests, the convention recommended increased duties both upon wool and woolen goods, and the establishment of the minimum system. This combination was made possible by the proposal of effectively counterbalancing the prohibitory duties on wool by such use of the minimum device as would give a practical monopoly of the American market to the domestic manufacturers in the class of goods in which they were most interested. To conciliate other sections the convention adopted the plan of additional duty on various other products.

When the twentieth Congress met, in December, 1827, Stevenson of Virginia, defeated the administration candidate, Taylor, of New York, for the speakership, and both branches of Congress and the important committees were put in the hands of the opposition to Adams. Rejecting the plan of the Harrisburg Convention, the House committee brought in a bill framed to satisfy the producers of raw material, wool, hemp, flax, and iron, and to deny the protection desired by New England.

17. Taussig, Tariff History of the United States, pp. 82-83.
18. Niles' Register XXXII, 369.
Protection was afforded to raw material even where the producers did not seek it; and in some important cases high duties were imposed on raw material not produced in this country. The committee refused to establish the increasing rate of duty asked for at Harrisburg.

Calhoun afterwards explained the attitude of the southern representatives as follows: "The South had the option of joining New England in securing amendments satisfactory to the section, or by resisting all amendment, force New England to join with the South in rejecting the bill, which would involve Adams in responsibility for its defeat, they chose the latter alternative. Assurances were given them by Jackson men that the two tariff interests would not be united by mutual concessions in the last stages of the discussion to insure the passage of the bill; and so the South consistently threw its weight against the passage of amendments modifying this designedly high tariff."

Jackson men in Pennsylvania, New York, and the West shifted their votes so as to deprive New England of her share in the protective system. When an amendment was proposed, striking out the duty on molasses - an article essential to the rum distilleries of New England, but obnoxious to the distillers of whiskey in Pennsylvania and the West - Pennsylvania and a

20. Ibid., pp 95-97.
large share of the delegation from Ohio, New York, Indiana, and Kentucky voted with most of the South against the amendment. On the motion to substitute the proposals of the Harrisburg Convention with respect to wool and woolens, almost all of the delegation of Pennsylvania, and a large portion of New York and Kentucky, as well as the members from Indiana and Missouri and the South, opposed the proposition. Thus the interests of the seaboard protectionists were overcome by the alliance between the middle states and the South, while the West was divided.

The vote, 105 to 94 by which the measure passed the House, April 22, 1828, showed all of the South in opposition, with the exception of certain districts in Maryland and the western districts of Virginia. The great area of the Ohio Valley and the middle region was almost a unit in favor of it. The lower counties of New York along the Hudson revealed their identity with the commercial interests by opposing the bill. New England broke in two; Vermont, New Hampshire, and Connecticut voted almost unanimously in favor of the proposition; while Maine cast a unanimous vote in opposition. Rhode Island was divided, and in Massachusetts only two districts - that of the Berkshire wool growing region and the Essex country area - supported the bill.


In the Senate, an amendment was passed making the duty on woolens and ad valorem rate of forty-five percent; but retaining the mimima. Various considerations induced some New England friends of Adams to support the measure. Webster defended his action in voting for the bill by declaring that New England had accepted the protective system as an established policy of the government, and after 1824 had built up her manufacturing enterprises on that basis. Nevertheless, in the final vote in the Senate, the five northern members who opposed were all from New England.

Thus the "Tariff of Abominations," shaped by the South for defeat, satisfactory to but a fraction of the Protectionists, was passed by a vote of 26 to 21 in the Senate, May 13, 1828, and was concurred in by the House. John Randolph did not greatly overstate the case when he declared that

"the bill referred to manufactures of no sort or kind, but the manufactures of a President of the United States;"

for, on the whole, the friends of Jackson had on this issue, taken sides against the friends of Adams and in an effort to make the latter unpopular had produced a tariff which seemed to better illustrate sectional jealousies and political intrigues.

24. Henry Cabot Lodge, Daniel Webster, (American Statesmen Series) Chap. VI.

25. Taussig, 100.
than the economic policy of the nation.

The passage of the tariff bill of 1828 was one of the most momentous events of the political history of our country; it had far reaching effects which were not disclosed at the time. This bill differed from the tariff of 1816 which was born of a united force against foreign competition. While it may seem that nationalism lost ground to sectionalism in the 1824-1828 period the writer holds that the contrary is true as revealed by the light of history four decades later. The Civil War had its roots in this period.

This was settled forever the question of "States' Rights". The doctrine of nullification and secession were dead. The arbitrament of the sword decided that no State, having once joined the Union, could ever secede. The rights of the states as defined in the United States Constitution remained as sacred as ever; but it settled for all time that the United States is one nation, rather than a league of sovereign states.

An event that definitely settles or brings about the settlement of an issue strengthens the issue, if the decision is favorable. The writer holds, therefore, that nationalism was strengthened in the tariff questions of 1824-1828.

Chapter VII

The Spirit of Nationalism as Translated by the Supreme Court

John Marshall, Chief Justice of the United States from 1801-1835, did more than any other man to establish the nationalist theory. He believed that the government of the Union is a government of the people and that the National Constitution is supreme within its sphere of action. He argued that the national government, "is the government of all; its powers are delegated by all; it represents all, and acts for all". The nationalizing tendencies of this great jurist can be seen in his court decisions.

McCulloch vs. Maryland, 1819:

In 1819 there came before Marshall the important case of MCCULLOCH vs. MARYLAND. Congress re-established the National Bank in 1816. There was a branch bank established in Philadelphia and various cities. Much opposition to the Bank and its branches was felt and several states passed laws taxing them. The cashier of the bank in Baltimore refused to pay the

tax imposed upon the bank by the Maryland legislature. When the case reached the Supreme Court two questions arose: Has Congress the power to create a bank? Has a state legislature power to tax a bank if created?

The McCulloch vs. Maryland was the third of the great causes to be decided by the Supreme Court in the memorable year, 1819. Although it was one of three cases it was of first importance, not only locally, but also in the place it holds in the development of the American Constitution. Furthermore, in his opinion in this case John Marshall rose to the loftiest heights of judicial statesmanship. If his fame rested on this one effort, it would be secure. Marshall in this decision laid the cornerstone for the existence of implied powers of the Constitution. Has the doctrine of implied powers justification? To this momentous question the court replied, without dissenting voice in the affirmative.

In 1818 Maryland's legislature required all banks in the state not chartered by the legislature to pay a stamp tax on their note issues. Mr. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch, was held for violating the state statute. Marshall declared,


"that Congress had the right to incorporate a bank. The government of the Union was a government of the people and its powers were derived from them. It was a government of enumerated and limited powers, but was supreme within its sphere of action, and, within this sphere, binding on its component parts." 5

While the establishment of a bank did not appear among the enumerated powers, no phrase excluded incidental or implied powers. The Constitution was expounded from the point of view of the general scope of federal powers granted by it, and should be viewed as a whole. Congress was authorized to make,

"all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States or any departments thereof." 6

Under this clause Congress might provide for the execution of those great powers on which the welfare of the nation essentially depended, because the clause was found among the powers of Congress, and not among the limitations on these powers; and also because its terms were intended to enlarge and not diminish the powers vested in the government. The bank was therefore, held to be a necessary function of the government. The power of Congress in this respect was classically expressed by Marshall in the following terms:

7. Ibid., p. 382.
"Let the end by legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but which consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." 8

The decision also expressly limited the authority of the states. Did Maryland have power to tax the local branch of the United States Bank? While not expressly prohibited by any constitutional provision, it was axiomatic that the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof, were supreme and that they controlled the constitutions and laws of the respective states. It was, therefore, settled that the power to create implied the power to preserve; that the power to destroy, wielded by a different hand, was hostile to, and incompatible with, the powers to create and to preserve. That the power to tax involved the power to destroy; that the power to destroy might defeat and render useless the power to create; that where this distaste existed, that authority which was supreme should control, and not yield to that authority over which it was supreme. That the tax on the operations of the bank was also a tax on the operations of an instrument employed by the government to carry its powers into execution, and should be regarded as un-


Marshall in effect rewrote the fundamental law of the Nation in this great decision, or perhaps it may be more accurate to say that he made a written instrument: a living thing, capable of growth, capable of keeping pace with the advancement of the American people and ministering to their changing needs.

The Republican organization of Virginia had anticipated that the Chief Justice would render a Nationalistic opinion; but they were not prepared for the bold and crushing blows which rained upon their frantically cherished theory of the sovereignty of the states.

The importance of the McCulloch vs. Maryland decision was at once appreciated and it was reprinted in full by many newspapers throughout the country irrespective of their concurrence in its doctrines. The reaction of the public was felt along sectional and political lines. Criticism of the pronouncement was at once wild and violent, but it defeated its purpose because the country at large declined to believe that the predicted disasters to its form of constitutional government would follow from the decision. The Court itself was neither intimidated, dismayed, nor deterred by the clamor raised against its decision. It used wise caution, however, in avoiding

10. Ibid., p. 344.
12. Niles' attack on the McCulloch vs. Maryland decision ran through several issues among which are; Niles', Volume XVI, p. 41; 65; 68; 105, and 145.
friction with the states and was exceedingly careful to avoid jurisdiction unless the record clearly showed a state of facts warranting exercise.

The Dartmouth College Case 1819.

**Dartmouth vs. Woodward**

The second great case decided in 1819, and nearly as important as the McCulloch vs. Maryland case, was Dartmouth College vs. Woodward. The New Hampshire legislature in response to the political feeling of the day, wished to get control of the college and amended its charter with that end in view and against the protest of the college authorities.

The Dartmouth College case is one of the greatest of Marshall's cases, great in its daring, great in its results. The bare legal proposition for which it stands, that a corporate franchise is a contract, and so, inviolate, and beyond the control of the state, has woven itself into the tissue of our law as has, perhaps, no other paper-made doctrine of constitutional law.

Daniel Webster, A Dartmouth alumnus, appeared among the


lawyers for the college when the case was brought before the Supreme Court. Is a charter granted to a corporation inviolate by the legislature? was the question. The court held that a charter was a contract and not to be recalled by the legislature provided the grantee observes the conditions on which it was granted. The decision became a precedent in all cases arising under acts of incorporation, a large part of modern law. Under it banks, manufacturing, and many other kinds of corporate companies have insisted that they could not be disturbed in their business relations. As Marshall laid down the principle, the companies seem to have had absolute immunity from interference, a position quite contrary to modern ideas that corporations should be under state control. This difficulty has been obviated by several subsequent decisions by which it is held that a legislature may modify a charter under the exercise of the police power, under its right to pass laws for good morals, and on other grounds. These later decisions have greatly modified the force of Marshall's ruling, but in ordinary cases that rule still remains the great principle for the government of corporations. It was, when made, a direct blow at the assumed right of a state to limit the action of an individual through the exercise of its sovereign power over

15. C. E. Martin and William H. George, p. 152.
It is highly probable that in the present state of our country's development, the Supreme Court would not decide that the contract clause so broadly protects corporate franchises as Marshall held a century ago. In considering the Dartmouth decision, the state of things existing when it was rendered must be taken into account. It is certain that Marshall was right in his interpretation of corporation law as it existed in 1819; right in the practical result of his opinion in that particular case; and above all, right in the purpose and effect of that opinion on the condition and tendency of the country at the perilous time it was delivered.

The court held that a charter granted by a state was a contract, and that any attempt by the state to alter it was unconstitutional, because,

"No state shall...pass any....law impairing the obligation of contracts." 17

The winning of this case, as counsel for the college, his alma mater, was a step in Daniel Webster's rise to fame.


Gibbons vs. Ogden, 1824.

The Supreme Court decisions of 1819 clearly indicated a tendency to carry both the powers and limitations of the Constitution to new and unexpected uses, making the instrument itself capable of extension without the constant necessity of amendment.

The same tendency is still more clearly seen in the Gibbons vs. Ogden decision, written five years later, 1824. This is probably the most important judicial decision in the course of American history as it certainly was the boldest and most original expression of the political philosophy of John Marshall. At the time of the introduction of the steamboat, the inventors, Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston, had received from the legislature of the State of New York an exclusive grant of the right to use steam vessels within the waters of the state. This privilege had seemed unimportant at the time, but with the rapid extension of steam navigation, especially in the waters of the West, such monopolies, derived from legislative grants, might well become the basis of immense economic power. The New York monopoly had not passed unchallenged, and


had led to retaliatory legislation on the part of the neighboring states of New Jersey and Connecticut. The whole situation was still further complicated by the fact that licenses were granted to the steam vessels under an act of Congress.

The monopoly, amounting to a great property interest, had been in existence for a quarter of a century, when Ogden, one of the successors of the original grantees, sought to prevent encroachments on his exclusive rights. He had won in the New York courts a decision favorable to the monopoly. The celebrated Chancellor Kent spoke for the court. One who knew Marshall might perhaps have easily guessed his decision in McCulloch vs. Maryland and in the Dartmouth College cases. But here was a case where vested rights ran counter to national authority and to the integrity of national power. In this dilemma Marshall did not hesitate to choose, and to sweep away the power of the states to grant such exclusive privileges. Commerce was defined in the broadest terms to include intercourse and navigation. The power of Congress to regulate commerce,

"with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with Indian tribes" 24

---


23. Corwin, p. 137.

24. Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section VIII.
extends into the territorial waters of the various states:

"Every district has a right to participate in it. The deep streams which penetrate our country in every direction pass through the interior of almost every State in the Union, and furnish the means of exercising this right. If Congress has power to regulate it, that power must be exercised wherever the subject exists. If it exists within the States, if a foreign voyage may commence or terminate at a port within a State, then the power of Congress may be exercised within a State." 25

With characteristic caution, a caution which was soon justified by the complex nature of the subject, Marshall refused to go as far as his colleague Johnson or as the counsel for Gibbons. He did not say at this time that the power of Congress was exclusive. In certain circumstances, and for certain purposes, the various States might make laws which amounted to regulations of commerce, but he did decide that when Congress has spoken, the voice of the nation is paramount and all State grants must yield to the national system. Local shackles on national commerce were removed once for all, and the waters of the nation ran untroubled to the sea. Every succeeding event, especially the building of railroads, has justified the far-seeing wisdom of a great decision. The nationalistic creed of Marshall had again found expression. John Marshall had, perhaps more than any other figure of his time, the claim to the vision of a statesman.

25. Corwin, pp. 139-140.

Brown vs. Maryland, 1827.

In the case of Brown vs. Maryland, 1827, Marshall laid down his famous doctrine that so long as goods introduced into a State in the course of foreign trade remains in the hands of the importer and in the original package, they are not subject to taxation by the State. This doctrine is interesting for two reasons. In the first place, it implies the further principle that an attempt by a State to tax interstate or foreign commerce is equivalent to an attempt to regulate such commerce, and is consequently void. In other words, the principle of the exclusiveness of Congress's power to regulate commerce among the States and with foreign nations, which was advanced by way of dictum in Gibbons vs. Ogden, became in Brown vs. Maryland a ground for decision. It is a principle which has proved of the utmost importance in keeping the field of national power clear of encumbering state legislation against the day when Congress should elect to step in and assume effective control. Nor can there be much doubt that this result was intended by the framers of the Constitution.

27. Wheaton, Volume 12, p. 419.
In the second place, however, from another point of view this "original package doctrine" is only an extension of the immunity from state taxation established in McCulloch vs. Maryland for instrumentalities of the National Government. It thus reflects the principle implied by that decision: where power exists to any degree or for any purpose, it exists to every degree and for every purpose; or to quote Marshall's own words in Brown vs. Maryland,

"questions of power do not depend upon the degree to which it may be exercised; at the will of those in whose hands it is placed." 30

The attitude of the Court nowadays, when it has to deal with state legislation, is very different. It takes the position that abuse of power, in relation to private rights or to commerce, is excess of power and hence demands to be shown the substantial effect of legislation, not its mere formal justification. In short, its inquiry is into facts. On the other hand, when dealing with congressional legislation, the Court has hitherto always followed Marshall's bolder method. Thus Congress may use its taxing power to drive our unwholesome business, perhaps even to regulate labor within the States, and it may close the channels of interstate and foreign commerce to articles deemed by it injurious to the public health or morals. 31


31. Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906.
date this discrepancy between methods employed by the Court in passing upon the validity of legislation within the two fields of state and national power has afforded the latter a decided advantage.

The Constitution in its most important aspects is the Constitution as Marshall interpreted it. He did not work out completely the position of the states in the Federal system, but he did grasp and establish the position of the Federal legislature and the Federal judiciary. To appreciate his work, however, it is necessary to see that it was the work not only of a statesman but also of a judge. Had Marshall been merely a far-seeing statesman, while most of his important cases would have been decided as he decided them, his life-work would have been a failure. It was not only necessary that he should decide great constitutional questions properly, but also that the people of the United States should be convinced of the correctness of his interpretation of the Constitution. His opinions, therefore, had to carry to those who studied them a conviction that the Constitution as written had been interpreted according to its evident meaning. They fulfilled this prime requisite.

He had, in a wonderful degree, the power of phrase. He expressed important principles of law in language which tersely yet clearly conveyed his exact meaning. Not only is the Constitution interpreted largely as he taught the people of the United States to interpret it, but when they wish to express important
constitutional principles which he enunciated they use his exact words.

It would be an easy and pleasant task to point out other decisions of the period that affected the life of the republic, but the limits of my thesis forbid. The ones reviewed must suffice. As admitted by all careful students of history, the Supreme Court, whose organization and powers constitute the most striking and distinguishing feature of the Constitution, has been the most potent factor in shaping the course of national events. It stands today a quiet but confessedly mighty power, whose action all wait for, whose decisions all abide.

The sacredness of contract, the stability of institutions, and above all Nationalism in government, were to John Marshall, articles of creed as holy as any that ever inspired a religious enthusiast.
Investigation is the most difficult kind of historical study; but it is perhaps the most valuable sort of training, because it requires patience, and thoroughness in searching for material, judgment in selecting facts and a peculiar use of analytical powers in arranging and classifying it. The writer has at least obtained an appreciation of historical research in the preparation of this thesis.

The tariff history of the United States of the period under investigation, 1815-1830, is well written in primary and secondary material.

Source Material.

Niles' Weekly Register volumes XII to XXVIII is perhaps the best periodical material. Pertinent articles may be found by consulting the index. Volume XXVIII, p. 476, published in 1825, gives a critical account of the tariffs of 1816 and 1824 under the title "Our Tariffs". American State Papers, Finance, Volume II, p. 29-80; also page 427, Gallatin's Report of 1810 is helpful for an understanding of the 1816 tariff. American State Papers, Finance Volume III, pp. 82-84, Report of a Committee of Congress on Cotton Manufacture in 1816. A technical account.

Useful accounts are found in the following: Hunt's


General Works.

Marion Mills Miller, Great Debates in American History, Volume 12. This work was especially helpful in the tariff study of 1828. Current Literature Publishing Company, New York, 1913. Chapters II, III and IV. These volumes give valuable material on the attitude of Protection and Revenue in 1816. The "American System" in 1824, and Protection and Politics in 1828.


Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies of the Nineteenth Century, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1903. In two volumes. Volume one deals with the 1816 - 1828 period. Stanwood is an outstanding authority on the subject he has treated.


**The Romance of American Expansion -**

**The Acquisition of Florida, 1819.**

The sources from which the history of the Acquisition of Florida may be written are at once abundant, accessible and readily worked with gratifying results. The general histories of the period 1815 - 1830 almost without exception extend over earlier or later fields.

**Source Material**

Niles' Weekly Register is the best periodical material available. Every volume except the first and second, contains important matter respecting General Jackson's public acts. There are innumerable documents to be found in the "Register". The
history of Florida is the history of Jackson and his service to his country.

John Lee Williams, *The Territory of Florida; or Sketches of the Topography, Civil and Natural History*, New York 1837. This book has information respecting General Jackson's first and second invasions of Florida. *The Territory of Florida* was not indexed, nor did it follow the scheme of chronology; later books were better written and more valuable in the opinion of the writer.


**General Works.**


Theodore Lyman, *United States Diplomacy*, in two volumes, published in Boston, 1828 contains good material for a clear understanding of the diplomacy that was largely responsible for negotiating the purchase of the desirable peninsula of the southeast.


George Pierce Garrison, *Westward Expansion*. (The American Nation Series) Harper and Brothers, New York, 1906. *Westward Expansion* developed the theme that the most important modification of the expansion movement was that due to sectionism. Up to 1830 the drift of American political development was, on the whole, strongly nationalistic, because of certain permanent tendencies which exist among all progressive peoples.


**The Settlement of Texas an Expression of Nationalism**

In the preparation of *The Settlement of Texas an Expression of Nationalism*, I read a great many books and documents. In notes in the body of the work I have taken care to give references to the authorities for statements which were not of common knowledge.
Source Material


   These columns were examined cursorily, with, in the main, negative results.


These articles contributed specifically and atmospherically to the study. I explored Niles' Register of 1816 - 1836 period. The following were pertinent to Texas. Niles, Volume 37, p. 213, Columbia, S. C. Telescope, November 6, 1829, The Acquisition of Texas, a good discussion of the land frauds of the Jacksonian administration. Niles Volume 17, p. 31; Niles Volume 45, 101 and 201; Niles Volume 49, p. 78, 265, and 287. The American Annual Register, Volume 6 and 7. L. G. Tyler, Tyler's Tyler, The Letters and Times of the Tylers, Volume I, Richmond, 1884. Niles, Volume 50, p. 276, May 25, 1836, "Speech of John Quincy Adams in the House of Representatives". A burning denunciation of the handling of the Texas question. My primary purpose in the exploration was to discover such material as there might be upon the motives for migration. How was migration affected by political, economic, and social conditions; how influenced, for example, by the panic of 1819, by the establishment and operation of the Second United States Bank, and by the application of the cash system to the public land business of the United States?

General Works.

Ephriam Douglas Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, Chapter I, The Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1909. A good account of

Hubert Howe Bancroft, *History of the Pacific States of North America Volume XI (1808 - 1889); Texas*, published San Francisco 1889, *History of Mexico*, Published San Francisco 1888, are perhaps the best works in their field in either English or Spanish. Like all Bancroft's writings, they are based on exhaustive acquaintance with bibliography and are profusely documented. Volumes IV and V cover the Jacksonian period. References to this source are found in many works. Eugene C. Barker says,"Bancroft is the best authority on Texas". Cyrus Townsend Brady, *The Conquest of the Southwest, "The Story of a Great Spoliation"*, D. Appleton Co., New York, 1919. A critical study which begins with the Treaty of 1819 and closes with the Compromise of 1850.


Mrs. Mary S. Helm (who with her first husband Elias R. Wighman, founded the city of Matagorda in 1828 - 1829). *Scraps of Early Texas History*, Published Austin, Texas, 1884. This book contains a vitriolic attack upon the Catholic Church. The religious condition was of course a cause of some discontent and a great potential danger as may be inferred from Austin's public
and private correspondence. Austin is very much fairer than Mrs. Helm.

N. Doran Maillard, Esq., History of the Republic of Texas, Cornhill, London 1842. This is dry material, and does not well repay the reading. William MacDonald, Jacksonian Democracy, Published 1906, The American Nations Series, Edited by Albert Hart. The story of the "Old Seminole" is admirably told. John Bach McMaster, History of the People of the United States, Volumes 5 and 6, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1883 - 1913. The most convenient source of information on the Texas and Mexican question during the Jacksonian administration.

Frederic Austin Ogg, The Reign of Andrew Jackson, Yale Press, 1920. This work gives an interesting and valuable first-hand account of public affairs of the time. There was, however, no material pertinent to the Texas question. Justin H. Smith, The Annexation of Texas, Macmillan, New York, 1919. A painstaking study of public opinion. Attention was given to a number of subsidiary topics which throw a strong light upon American interests in the southwest. This is a comprehensive work.

William Graham Sumner, Andrew Jackson, Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1898, American Statesmen Series. Valuable material. Splendid bibliography. George Lockhart Rives, The United States and Mexico, 1821 to 1848, Volume I. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1913, presents a consecutive narrative of events covering the period when Mexico gained her independence from Spain through the events which culminated in the war of 1846 and the peace of 1848. This is one of the best accounts available.


Writings on Texas history prior to 1856 were for the most part frankly intended for propaganda, but this does not seriously militate against their value.

The Monroe Doctrine: A Wall of Nationalism

The materials for the preparation of this paper, "The Monroe Doctrine: A Wall of Nationalism", are voluminous,
diverse and widely scattered. The events of the period covered are recorded in the diplomatic history of the United States. The sources and my indebtedness to the same are indicated, I hope, with sufficient fullness in the footnotes. A wide reading, however, on any topic has an unmistakable influence and it is difficult for one to acknowledge honestly a changed or enriched perspective.

Source Material

A rich field for the statement of fact and contemporary opinion on international questions is found in the debates of various legislative assemblies and the accounts of the same in current periodicals of the period, or in the Annals of Congress.


Annals of Congress, 15 Congress, I Session II.
Annals of Congress, 16 Congress, I Session II.
Annals of Congress, 18 Congress, I Session I & II.


Allan Nevins, The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794 - 1845. Very readable. The diary is unusually full and abounds in valuable material for understanding the politics of the period and the character of Adams. He was biased and harsh in his judgment of contemporaries, but conscientious in his record.

Easily first in importance among the periodicals useful for the period from 1819 to 1829 is Niles' Weekly Register, edited by Hezekiel Niles. This course abounds in material, political

Secondary Material


**The Spirit of Nationalism as Translated by the Supreme Court**

No attempt will be made to give anything approaching a complete list of books which have been written upon the subject which I have touched. I am content to list a few books which I found useful for those who wish to know more about the matters which I have, inevitably, treated in merest outline.

**Source Material**

In all matters concerning the great decisions on constitutional questions, the court speaks for itself. The reports of the decisions of the supreme court during the period from 1790 - 1830 are usually cited under the name of the editor or official collector of the reports for any given group of years -
A. J. Dallas, 1781 - 1800, four volumes; W. Cranch, 1801 - 1815 nine volumes, and H. Wheaton, 1816 - 1827, thirteen volumes. The latter group was of invaluable assistance in the preparation of this chapter.


**Secondary Material**


Company, New York, 1885. A product of discriminating research
W. W. Story, Life and Letters of Joseph Story, two volumes, 1851.
Story's Story is highly valuable for the light which it casts
on the personnel and procedure of the court. John T. M.
Johnston, World Patriots, McIndoo Publishing Company, Kansas
City, 1924. Marshall's strategic place in the moulding of
nationalism is etched in about fifty pages of this volume.

The Lord Craigmyle, John Marshall in Diplomacy and Law,
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1933. - With an introduction
by Nicholas Murray Butler - A convincing and attractive portrait
of Marshall is presented. Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of
John Marshall, four volumes, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York,
1929. Beveridge's work is outstanding. He places Marshall in
the front rank of American statesmen. Charles Warren, The
Supreme Court in United States History, Little Brown and
Company, 1923. A standard work.

Charles E. Martin and William H. George, American Government
and Citizenship, A. Knopf, New York, 1927. An appreciation of
the court decisions of the 1815 - 1830 period. On the general
social history connected with this period John Bach McMaster,
volume four, is a standard work. Kendric Charles Babcock, The
Rise of American Nationality, Harper and Brothers, New York,
1906, The American Nation Series, Volume XIII. Well presented
history.

The Attitude of John Quincy Adams Toward Nationalism

The most convenient and useful guide to material upon John
Quincy Adams' long and honorable diplomatic career is based upon
Josephus Nelson Larned, Literature of American History, a
Bibliography Guide, 1902, which gives not only titles, but also
critical comment on contents and characteristics of the more
important books. There is necessarily much overlapping of
topics in this and other bibliographies of this thesis, for
instance, material used in the chapters on Florida, Texas, and
the Monroe Doctrine have been investigated also for this
chapter, therefore, will not be given again. Perhaps this
bibliography may seem less full, or somewhat shorter for that
reason. There is abundant interesting material on the colorful
John Quincy Adams.

Source Material

The Diary of John Quincy Adams may be said to begin in
1795 and continue with astonishing persistency and faithfulness
until within a few days of the writer's death; the latest entry
is of the fourth of January, 1848. It is a vigorous work and
deserves more than a passing comment here. He left a portrait
of himself more full, correct, vivid, and picturesque than has
ever been bequeathed to posterity by any other personage of the
past ages. This immense work, abridged as is in the printing,
ranks among the half-dozen longest diaries to be found in any
library, and it is unquestionably by far the most valuable. We
find side-lights, by no means colorless, thrown upon persons
and events of the time; public men of nearly two generations
figure in it. The Diary is an historical biography of rare
worth. Volumes III to VII of The Diary gave pertinent material
for the 1805-1830 period.

John Quincy Adams, The Jubilee of the Constitution, a dis­
course delivered April 30, 1839, New York. This speech marked
the semi-centennial of George Washington. Adams sets forth his
views on national revenue. He believed that an impost adequate
for "providing for the common defense and general welfare"
should be exacted, Worthington Chauncy Ford, Writings of John
Quincy Adams, Macmillan Company, New York, 1915, Volumes I to
IV, 1799 - 1816.

Adams shows a strong dislike for England, and expresses
himself caustically against English demands at Ghent. Munsey's
Titherington. Adams is given credit for drafting the portion
of Monroe's Message of 1823 which dealt with foreign affairs.

The Century Magazine, Volume 60, May to October, 1901, The
Century Company, New York. "Webster on the 'American System'
and the South Carolina Doctrine", John Bach McMaster, Pertinent
reasons why the tariff debate of 1824 was of no uncommon
interest is concisely presented in this article.

General Works

John F. Morse, Jr., John Quincy Adams, American Statesmen, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1910. This book is so largely written from the diaries, letters, and papers of the subject as almost to make the volume source material.


A satisfactory compilation of American history that gives the chief events which overcame inherent individualism and which have by necessity compelled co-operation from which nationalism evolved.


John Bach McMaster, A History of the People of the United States, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1924, Volumes III and IV, the work of an able historian.
The thesis "Aspects of Nationalism in the United States, 1815-1850," written by Drusilla Agnes Breen, has been accepted by the Graduate School of Loyola University with reference to form, and by the readers whose names appear below, with reference to content. It is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Paul Kiniery, Ph.D.                April 16, 1935