The Opinion of the Religious Press Towards Wilson's Mexican Policy

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THE OPINION OF THE RELIGIOUS PRESS
TOWARDS WILSON'S MEXICAN POLICY

BY
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VITA AUCTORIS


The following school year, September, 1940 to June, 1941, was spent at Iona College, New Rochelle. On June 20, 1941, he entered St. Andrew-on-Hudson Novitiate of the Society of Jesus, and was thereupon enrolled as a student of Fordham University, New York City. His final year of undergraduate study was completed at West Baden College, West Baden Springs, Indiana, where he was registered at Loyola University, Chicago, and from which he received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in June, 1946.

At the beginning of the Fall Quarter, 1946, he was enrolled in the Graduate School of Loyola University. While writing his thesis at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., he also attended the Graduate School at Georgetown University.

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INTRODUCTION

Wherever one looks, be it Russia, Spain or Mexico, the relation of Church and State holds the center of the stage. Nor is the United States any exception. Yet it has often been assumed by all too many Americans that the question of this relation of Church and State, which under other forms of political organization has proved so baffling, has been finally and forever settled in our country through the wisdom of the framers of our Federal Constitution. Unfortunately, the matter is not so simple. There are many points at which, in fact, the true relation proves difficult to define.

For many, relation in no way connotes complete separation. In Church and State, the Catholic sees not merely institutions, but the spiritual and temporal poles of all human life, individual and social, expressions of a duality to be found in every sphere, reflecting the concomitance of sense life and spiritual life in man. The distinction between them is never absolute, for they are made up of human individuals and reflect the complexity of human minds; their action is interweaving, the one consoli-
dating something of what the other conceives. Some Protestants too, are quite in agreement that Church and State cannot be divorced. For once a man confesses belief in God, and thus, in an absolute norm of morality, he should logically admit that politics and economics come under the moral law. Christopher Dawson in his Religion and the State, frequently reminds us that "business and politics belong to the sphere of the relative, while religion is the fixed pole on which human life revolves and to which all parts must be related".¹

In the United States, unhappily, our political representatives are too often oblivious of any connection between the spiritual and temporal orders. An iron curtain has been dropped between Church and State, separate fields of operation have been marked out for each of them. The Church to influence the State must now descend to the level of lobbying like any politician or big business agent, for the pressure of potential votes serves as a marvelous spur for moving a Congressional member to action. Fortunately, for the interest of religion and morality, the Church has the religious press at her disposal.

To obtain some appreciation of this indirect relation between Church and State, a definite period would have to be studied and all the elements examined as they are mixed into the political pot in which the governing power's policy is brewed. Many times, these elements, like the causes of a disastrous fire, are as indistinguishable ashes of the resulting ruin. The formula, however, of Woodrow Wilson's Mexican Policy has been sufficiently preserved through records, documents and newspapers, so that an analysis of it will reveal in large measure the political, economic and religious elements contained therein. Mexico, moreover, during this period of Wilson's Administration absorbed the interest of her northern neighbor, for its rich resources and unsettled condition served as a magnet to attract the exploiting capitalist and Protestant missionary, who dreamed of luring Catholic Mexicans away from the Faith of their fathers. In addition, revolution, religious persecution and the conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism forced the religious issue into a prominent position. Along with the interests of the statesman and capitalist, Wilson also had to consider those of the Churchman. There were, though, many sincere persons, both within the Church and
without, who with the best will in the world, conceived the interests of the Church differently. The Catholics and Protestants, by and large, ended up on the opposite sides of the fence, with the result that our President during the course of years was verbally pommelled from both sides, and was stranded without any avenue open for compromise. This division complicated the Church and State relations and considerably weakened any ultimate influence on the President's policy making.

To better understand the interplay of these different elements, a separate study of each will be made in the following chapters. After drawing the historical setting of the principal political and economic considerations, the conflicting views of the religious press will be sketched one at a time on the same canvas. The Mexican picture thus portrayed will enable us to view in a clearer light the interests and justified concern of the Church as well as its successes and failures in influencing State policy.
CHAPTER I

WILSON'S MEXICAN POLICY

Without a consideration of Don Porfirio Diaz, a study of any period of modern Mexican history would be incomplete, if not senseless. This leader chose the proper moment for jumping into the saddle, and once the reins were in his control, he alone, was the driver for over thirty years. These were the thirty years of the famed Porfirian peace. The nightmare of chaos between the downfall of Maximilian in 1867 and Diaz's accession in 1876 paved the way for the welcomed advent of a strong ruler. The Excelsior has well summed up that turn in Mexican government rule in one of its editorials:

When President Diaz took office for the second time, the Mexican people had lost faith in democratic institutions, in constitutional guarantees, in law and order...They had only one aspiration: to be protected from banditry on the high road and in politics. Therefore, they lay back in the arms of General Diaz.  

During the years of peace when the people "lay back in his arms", Mexico progressed until she became the leading re-

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1 Excelsior, Mexico City, Sept. 15, 1930. This was daily paper with capable editors, among whom was Salado Alvar-ez.
Diaz had his fingers on the pulse of the Mexican people as he shaped his policy to make Mexico a safer place for people to live. Foreigners too, were protected who would bring in capital and technical training to develop as quickly as possible "Mexico's fabulous resources and thus advance the standard of living, especially for the elite". His principle was one of expediency, with the Ten Commandments replaced by the creed of *laissez-faire*. Yet it would certainly be unjust to hold the great dictator personally responsible for all the ugly abuses inherent in the system: land distribution for instance. During his regime the number of individual holdings increased three hundred percent. So when President Wilson took over affairs in 1914, there were over 55,000 individual owners. As Toribo

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4 Toribo Esquivel Obregon, *Influencia de España y los Estados Unidos sobre México*, Madrid, Casa ed. Calleja, 1918, 322. Except otherwise noted, all the translation of Spanish works into English are the work of John Delmar, a resident of Mexico, who has contributed many articles to leading American periodicals.
Esquivel Obregon observes, such bright spots in the Diaz regime have frequently been smudged by the dirt of enemy propaganda:

Facts have been deliberately misrepresented for the purpose of obtaining sympathy and aid, more or less direct, from the Anglo-American government for revolutionary movements.6

Outside Mexico, though, Diaz's friends far outnumbered his foes. While still Theodore Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Elihu Root in an exchange of encomia in Mexico City probably sinned on the side of hyperbole in referring to President Diaz as "one of the greatest men to be held up for the hero worship of mankind".6 Taft, however, more sanely evaluated Diaz's real worth by saying, "My own impression has been that Diaz has done more for the people of Mexico than any other Latin American has done for any of his people".7 His achievements from a material standpoint command the extremest respect: In 1880 Mexico possessed but 430 miles of railroad, in 1911 it possessed

5 Ibid., 328.
7 Pringle, Taft, II, 700.
over 15,488 miles; imports increased from $19,793,493 to $205,874,273; exports skyrocketed from $27,318,788 to $293,753,638. The national income also naturally rose from $19,776,638 to nearly $100,000,000. The Mexican nation had prospered but a glance at the shameful wages indicated that the profits were going to someone else. And this "someone else" was the foreigner to whom Diaz had pawned his nation's resources. Such a regime was welcomed by the American financier seeking another Eldorado for his investments, and he was more than eager to invest his capital, effort and ingenuity in such a promising enterprise. Within a quarter of a century American investments totaled nearly a billion and a half dollars; English, German, French, Spanish, and others, together owned another half a billion dollars. "Indeed, foreign holdings totaled a greater value than native property, and of the foreign holdings citizens of the United States owned more than all other foreigners combined".

Americans owned 78% of the mines, 72% of the smelters, 58% of the oil; and 68% of the rubber industry, while the total Mexican wealth was just half of her northern neighbor, $792,187,242.  

Yet all was not well with Mexico, for a portion of the educated aristocracy was becoming irritated by the canker of foreign exploitation, especially when the influential and high-salaried positions were going to foreigners. Bemis well indicates their disturbed state of mind at the invaders boldness:

Their proprietary character, their dynamic energy, their protestant outlook, disturbed and alarmed some of the disinterested creole aristocracy, despite the excellence of diplomatic relations between the governments. With grossly exaggerated fears this patriotic elite felt that eventually Mexico might go the way of Texas.  

The older generation, with the exception of the above mentioned clique, had experienced the chaos that proceeded the dictator's regime, and they were content for the most part with conditions as they were, but their children wanted to realize their democratic political aspirations.

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11 House Doc., op. cit. 3322, 3313.
12 Bemis, 170.
yet the discontentment of the small group of aristocrats was sufficient to strike the spark that ignited the keg of political opposition among the younger generation against Diaz's despotic government. Diaz, now an old man, no longer could "play his supporters off against one another before they could develop sufficient strength to oppose him".13

The General admitted this in March, 1908, in the widely published Creelman interview which quoted him to the effect that the Mexican people were ready for democracy, and he went on to add:

...he would welcome the formation of a political party which should put forward an opposition candidate; that he would surrender the power to such a candidate if legally elected.14

The challenge was accepted and the "Democratic Party" was formed. Francis I. Madero, a member of the wealthy privileged class wrote a pamphlet entitled, La sucesión presidencial en 1910 (The Presidential Succession in 1910), stressing the feature of no re-elections for presidency. This little work not only won him the favor of the growing Democratic Party, but also the nomination for presi--


dency in the promised elections. 15 A platform was adopted stressing many democratic reforms long since abandoned, such as restoration of the Constitution, freedom of the press, promotion of education and wider suffrage.

However, when the time came, General Diaz did not retire from office, but the "Old Chief had let it be known that he would again respond to pressure and go through the form of another election in spite of the Creelman interview". 16 Even his enemies admitted his motives were patriotic, since no one could deny the hard truth of one of his former statements on the same issue:

I have tried to leave the presidency several times, but it has been pressed upon me and I remained in office for the sake of the nation which trusted me. The fact that the price of Mexican securities dropped eleven points when I was ill at Cuernavca indicates the kind of evidence that persuaded me to overcome my personal inclinations to retire to private life. 17

The masses still might have favored the dictator's reelection, if he had not committed a political error of the

17 Creelman, 237.
first magnitude in arresting Madero on the charge of plotting rebellion. Madero soon escaped over the border into the United States, where he formulated his revolutionary plans. When his plan of San Luis Potosi was issued, it gained many adherents, among whom were the bandits, Villa in the North, and Zapata, leader of the peons, in the South. The Federal troops were repulsed and the frontier town of Ciudad Juárez was taken on the ninth of May, 1911. General Diaz saw the handwriting on the wall and resigned with the announcement that he took "this step to spare the country bloodshed, the exhaustion of its credit, the destruction of its resources and the risk of international complications".

However, at the very moment when negotiations were going on in Mexico for peace before Diaz's resignation, "alleged" representatives of the Standard Oil Company were effecting a contract with the Madero revolutionary junta in Texas, and offering this faction a substantial loan of money. The details of this transaction have never been fully di-

19 Priestley, 398.
vulged. Numerous intimations and allegations have been made to the effect that the Standard Oil Company was responsible for the success of the Madero revolution—all based ostensibly upon this presumed deal. Testimony tending to confirm this suspicion was brought out in the Senate investigation of Mexican Affairs in 1919, but proof of collusion was distinctly lacking.

The first substantial inkling that there may have been a tie-up between Madero and the Standard Oil Company was brought out by the American Ambassador, H. L. Wilson, in a public address delivered on the night of January 6, 1914. On his own responsibility Wilson charged that

...it would be a big surprise in certain quarters if it should be known that certain international interests were suggesting the United States policy pursued during the last six months.21

The State Department Archives in Washington recently made available all the documentary material pertaining to the Madero Revolution. The secret reports to which the Ambassador refers have been located and carefully examined. These memoranda disclose the fact that certain dubious transactions were certainly made respecting the offer of between $500,000 to $1,000,000 by representatives of the Standard

Oil Company to the Madero insurrectos, but they do not indicate whether the money was ever received or forwarded by the Standard. It was a well known fact, however, that Madero entered into peace negotiations with the Diaz Government in order to stall for time. He desired to utilize the lull to reorganize his forces, and raise money, which was vitally needed for the continuance of the revolution. The mere prospect of a substantial loan, therefore, may have been sufficient to induce Madero to declare an end to all peace discussions. It is the timing of the loan which gives rise to the suspicions that there may have been an understanding between Madero and the Standard Oil Company.

The details of the loan transaction between the representative of the Standard Oil Company and the Madero insurrectos is contained in a memorandum written on April 19, 1911, by S. W. Finch, Chief of the Bureau of Investigation, and submitted to the Attorney General. Finch included in his memorandum extracts of a report of one of the special agents that undertook the investigation on the spot. The informant of the special agent disclosed the following:

Yesterday morning, in company with my brother, a party came to us in the Sheldon Hotel. I am personally acquainted with this party, but do not wish to give his name at the present time,
but will inform you of same later. I know him to be a representative of the Standard Oil Company. He asked me if I was not well ac-
quainted with the heads of the in-
surrectos. I told him that I knew a party here in El Paso who was very close to all the officers of all the insurrectos and then this party asked me if I did not know it to be a fact that the insur-
rectos were very short of money. He then stated that he was repre-
senting a company who would furn-
ish the insurrectos with from $500,000 to $1,000,000 on the con-
dition that the insurrectos would issue to his company 6% gold bonds and a certain concession which the company would ask of the insur-
rectos. I asked him what kind of a concession his company would ask, and he answered by saying, "You should know the nature of the con-
cession wanted by the connection". He then told us that if a meeting was brought by us between him and a party representing the insur-
rectos, and if they would agree mutually on this concession, he would make it pay us well for our time and service.22

The representative of the Standard, it was later revealed, was a person by the name of C. R. Troxel. The informant

22 Attorney General to Knox, April 23, 1911, State Dept. Arch. 812.00 Mexican Despatches, VI, (File No. 812.00 1503). Encloses Memorandum for the Attorney General written by S. W. Finch, Chief of the Bureau of Investigation, which contains extracts of a report of one of the special agents dated April 19, 1911.
relates that the matter was discussed by the Madero junta, and it was decided that an appointment should be arranged a few hours later at the Zeiger Hotel. J. V. Smith acted as the representative for the insurrectos. Smith and Troxel consulted alone at the latter's suggestion in Smith's room. Nothing is known of what took place. Troxel appeared satisfied and Smith being shown a letter from John D. Archbold of Standard Oil authorizing the contract was enthusiastic.23

Smith believed that Madero would approve of the transaction, and the whole matter would be consummated in a few days. The reason for Standard Oil's concern in the Mexican situation was explained by Smith. He stated that Standard's concessions recently had been cancelled by the Mexican federal government and "they were now operating through Waters Pierce Company". Unreasonable taxes, however, were being imposed upon Waters Pierce. "Consequently, the Standard Oil Company thought they would have better sailing under the insurrectos form of government".

Negotiations continued with Madero appointing his brother to represent his interests. Apparently, a contract was duly entered into and forwarded to Francisco Madero by Troxel through a courier. An answer was expected on the

23 Ibid.
night of April 28, 1911. The secret service reports do not state exactly what Madero's reply was. From all available information it is evident that Madero's reply would be in the affirmative. The next week, however; on May 7, 1911, peace negotiations were declared at an end and without results. It may have been sheer coincidence that the two events occurred at the same time, but apparently the State Department did not think so.

In view of these circumstances, Knox required an explanation from Standard Oil Company. Archbold, Vice President of Standard Oil, replied:

All statements of this character emanating from whatever source are absolutely without foundation and I desire on behalf of the company to register an emphatic disavowal...

Standard Oil also sent a man to Washington to clear up any particulars, but the investigation was never carried further and Madero was given continued encouragement from Washington. By October, 1911, Diaz was sufficiently out of the

24 Attorney General to Secretary of State, April 28, 1911, State Dept. Arch. (File No. 812.00/1542).
25 Knox to J. D. Archbold, May 10, 1911, State Dept. Arch. (File No. 812.00/1593).
26 Archbold to Knox, May 15, 1911, State Dept. Arch., (File No. 812.00/1796).
picture so that the promised elections finally took place and Madero was elected on a genuinely popular vote. One of the noteworthy aspects of this election was the spectacular rise of the Catholic Party in winning a large number of seats in Congress, but Madero's henchmen saw that "in the most shameful dirty, illegal and despotic manner, the majority of their votes were discredited and thrown out". This failure to respect suffrage rights was the beginning of the chain of Madero's broken promises that was to drag him from power; yet the overwhelmingly popular support of the newly elected president at the polls seemed to augur well for at least a few years of peace, and President Taft's immediate recognition of the new government was advised by many influential men. Taft, though, foresaw only chaos in Diaz's removal, as may be seen in a letter written to his wife a year previous:

It is inevitable, that in case of a revolution or internecine strife, we should interfere and I sincerely hope that the old man's (Diaz) official life will extend the limits of mine, for that trouble would present a problem of the utmost difficulty.28

27 Jose Lopez-Portilla y Rojas, Elavacion Y Caida de Porfirio Diaz, Mexico, 1921, 481.
Taft's prophecy was being fulfilled, for it looked like the United States would have to interfere, after Ambassador Henry L. Wilson's alarming reports of insurrection and destruction of foreigners' property. Troops were sent to the border under the guise of "maneuvers". Later, though, President Taft, in a confidential chat with Hart Lyman, the Managing Editor of the New York Tribune, Edward P. Mitchell, the President of the New York Sun, and Charles Hopkins Clark, the editor of the Courant of Hartford, Connecticut, revealed the reason for the government's misrepresentation of troop movements:

I was in a situation where I could not take the public into my confidence, because to do so would be almost a casus belli with the existing government of Mexico, which had minimized the insurrection in every way and had contemptuously denied all danger from it. So I allowed the War Department to report that the going of troops was for maneuvers... 29

Taft's military measures, however, were not the move of an alarmist. On the basis of the numerous and detailed reports submitted to the State Department for the President's consideration, it was clearly apparent that the Madero revolution was a popular uprising. It was also evident that the

strong anti-American sentiment was a threat to American investments which amounted to over a billion dollars. Previous to Taft’s decision, he had requested that a circular letter be sent to the consul resident in Mexico asking the

...fullest statement of conditions there in regard to the insurrection and its effect on American residents and American interests...It is essential that I should follow as closely as possible the conditions in Mexico with respect to taking proper steps to protect American lives and interests. 30

The circular letter was sent and the replies came in almost immediately. Salina Cruz reported: “Strong anti-American, anti-Diaz tendencies, with widespread pro-revolutionary feeling”. 31 Ninety-five percent of the district of Durango was stated to be Anti-American; seventy-five percent were pro-revolutionary. The revolution appeared to be gaining in strength, and the people were in sympathy with the movement. 32 Anti-American feeling was general in Chihuahua. 33

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30 Taft to Knox, March 20, 1911, State Dept. Arch., 812.00 Mexican Despatches, IV, (File No. 812.00/1045).
31 Haskell to Carr, March 19, 1911, State Dept. Arch., 812.00 Mexican Despatches, IV, (File No. 812.00/991).
32 Freeman to Knox, March 19, 1911, State Dept. Arch., 812.00 Mexican Despatches, IV, (File No. 812.00/992).
33 Leonard, Vice-Consul to Knox, March 19, 1911, State Dept. Arch., 812.00 Mexican Despatches, IV, (File No. 812.00/993).
jority of the people of Monterey were believed to be revolutionary.\textsuperscript{34} "My district is all anti-American", reported Donald Smith, Consul at Aguas Calientes, "and is ninety-three percent pro-revolutionary".\textsuperscript{35} And so it went. Revolutionary feeling was strong in San Luis Potosi,\textsuperscript{36} Vera Cruz,\textsuperscript{37} and Guadalajara.\textsuperscript{38} Consul Millar stated that in Mazatlan there was "practically unanimous revolutionary feeling".\textsuperscript{39} From Acapulco, the report came: "Revolution will succeed when its organization is perfected. Owing to abuses by the authorities populace would certainly welcome change in Government."\textsuperscript{40} Finally, it was reported from Mexico City that the "Student, middle and lower classes" were "strongly anti-American and pro-revolutionary". This was especially noticeable in the cities.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{34} H. Hanna to Knox, March 19, 1911, (File No. 812.00/995).
\textsuperscript{35} Donald Smith to Knox, March 19, 1911, (File No. 812.00/996).
\textsuperscript{36} Bonney to Knox, March 18, 1911, (File No. 812.00/998).
\textsuperscript{37} Canada to Knox, March 18, 1911, (File No. 812.00/1000).
\textsuperscript{38} Magill to Knox, March 18, 1911, (File No. 812.00/1001).
\textsuperscript{39} Alger to Knox, March 18, 1911, (File No. 812.00/1004).
\textsuperscript{40} Pangburn to Knox, March 19, 1911, (File No. 812.00/997).
\textsuperscript{41} Consul-General to Knox, March 21, 1911, (File No. 812.00/1029).
From his experience in the Philippines Taft knew what a thankless task and expenditure it was to intervene. And the recognition of a Government unable to keep its election promises in any form is a certain way of forcing the hand of intervention. Mere good intentions never carried an administration through, and Madero was to prove no exception to the rule. This Mexican President pleased no one; the peons cried for land reform; teachers were lacking to institute the promised educational reform; the foreign investors lost some of their concessions; Diaz's favorites were overlooked; but above all

...the success of the revolution had aroused all the military ambitions put under an anaesthetic by the vigor of Diaz. Now, however, all wanted a share of the spoils.42

Revolutionary leaders were to be found in every large district. When Madero appealed to the President of the United States to force American munition makers to cease shipping arms to the insurrectionists, Taft prevailed on Congress, as a means of restoring peace, to pass a joint resolution granting the president control of "such materials from the United States to any American country where conditions of domestic violence might exist".43 Even such a measure failed

42 Calcott, 201.
43 Bemis, 171.
to quell the rebellions in north or south Mexico. 44

After a *coup d'état* failed in early February, 1913, under the leadership of General Reyes, Felix Diaz, nephew of the former dictator, took over the command of the insurrectionists. As these forces gained in numbers and popularity, Madero made an effort to strengthen his army. Against his better judgment the President placed General Victoriano Huerta in charge of the palace guard and made him responsible for the security of the capital. 45 Huerta, fundamentally a man of Porfirian antecedents and sympathies, soon joined forces with Felix Diaz. Huerta, this new figure of Aztec parentage, believed in ruthless suppression of all opposition. 46

The revolutionists informed Henry Lane Wilson, the United States Ambassador to Mexico, of the forthcoming events. Wilson in turn immediately wired the State Department:

> Huerta notifies me to expect some action that will remove Madero from power at any moment; plans fully matured, the purpose of delay being to avoid any violence or bloodshed...I am unable to say whether or not these plans will materialize. 47

44 Priestley, 407.
45 Priestley, 411.
On February 18th, Huerta and Diaz seized the government. The world feared more bloodshed. "Apprehensive of what might ensue after the downfall of President Madero, I invited General Huerta and General Diaz to come to the Embassy to consider the preservation of order in the city", 48 was the Ambassador's assurance to Washington that the welfare of foreigners would be safeguarded. But before Wilson received an assurance of order, he had to threaten American intervention if Diaz and Huerta did not come to terms immediately. 49 Those terms were that "Huerta should be the Provisional President of the Republic and that Diaz should name the Cabinet, and thereafter he should have the support of Huerta for the permanent presidency". 50

Meanwhile the imprisoning of the ex-President and Vice President in the National Palace caused Secretary of State Knox to warn Wilson that:

...General Huerta's consulting you as to the treatment of Madero tends to give you a certain responsibility in the matter. It moreover goes without saying that cruel treatment of the ex-President would injure, in the

48 Ibid., 720, 721.
49 Henry L. Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium, and Chile, Doubleday, Page & Co., New York, 280.
50 Foreign Relations, 1913, 721.
eyes of the world, the reputation of Mexican civilization..."51

Huerta, therefore, "swore on a scapulary of the Virgin of Guadalupe and a medal of the Sacred Heart...that he would permit no one to attempt the life of Senor Madero".52

A few days later, on February 23, 1913, Madero and Suarez met their death trying to escape from an armed guard transferring them to the penitentiary. The American Press called it murder.53 Nevertheless, the Ambassador counseled Washington "to consider the deaths a closed incident" and "urged the recognition of the new government".54 The Taft administration, however, had refused to move precipitately in the matter of recognition, and soon drew rein upon the indiscreet Ambassador:

...you will...be carefully guided by the President's direction that for the present, no formal recognition is to be accorded those de facto in control, except upon specific instructions from the department to do so.55

Although Washington had been shocked by the deaths of Madero and Suarez; the real reason for the withholding of recognition seems to be that Taft, in departing from office, did not

51 Ibid., 725.
53 Foreign Relations, 1913, 747.
54 Ibid., 736.
55 Ibid., 738.
want to saddle his foreign policy, which might prove embar­
 rassing, on the incoming president.56

At this moment there appeared on the scene a man
 destined to have a drastic effect on the future of Mexico.
 A scholar and self-centered idealist, Thomas Woodrow Wilson,
 succeeded Taft as President of the United States. He was
 born, the son of a minister, at Staunton, Virginia in 1856.
 During those first trying years after graduation when the
 young lawyer has so much time on his hands waiting for cli­
 ents, Wilson devoted himself to the study of history and po­
 litical science. This interest was greatly responsible for
 his abandonment of the courtroom for the classroom at Bryn
 Mawr. After going to Princeton he soon became its President.
 His next promotion was the governorship of New Jersey, where
 he gained nationwide repute for his political reforms. His
 idealistic actions in this post paved the way for his Presi­
dential climb in 1913.57

The President-elect was not prepared for the task
 ahead as he himself admitted, stating, "that it would be the
 irony of fate if his administration had to deal chiefly
 with foreign affairs when his own preparations had been ex­

56 Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson, Life & Letters*,
clusively in domestic problems". 58 Yet he refused the advice of authorities on important matters, selected a cabinet of inexperienced politicians, and flung himself into the very depths of foreign entanglements from the very beginning, as is evident in Mexico. 59

By a statement to the press of his foreign policy on March 12, 1913, the world soon became aware of the attitude of the new President of the United States. While there was no direct reference to Mexico, his attitude toward Huerta could not be doubted:

Cooperation is possible only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force... We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own interests or ambition. 60

Ambassador Wilson wired Secretary of State Bryan on the following day hoping to prevent the President from issuing any unfortunate statement directly against the existing government which might incite rebellion, and he concluded that

...unless the same type of government as was implanted here by General Porfirio Diaz is again established, new revolutionary

58 Baker, IV, 237.
59 Ibid., 344.
60 Baker, IV, 68.
movements will break forth and general unrest will be renewed. With 80% of the population unable to read or write permanent democratic government cannot be established in Mexico. 61

While our Mexican representative was clamoring for immediate recognition, the British Government let it be known that Huerta would soon be formally recognized as "interim President". 62 Its action prompted many other governments, anxiously waiting such a move by a major power, to acknowledge the present de facto government. 63

If a government, even the smallest, is to continue to exist, recognition by foreign powers is absolutely essential, for "recognition is the assurance given to a new State that it will be permitted to hold its place and rank in the character of an independent political organism in the society of nations". 64 Before the nineteenth century European nations recognized governments only on a de jure basis, or in other words, only those governments which were established on the basis of legal succession. With the recognition of the United States of America, de facto governments were coming.

61 Foreign Relations, 1913, 776.
63 Calcott, 238.
into their own; yet in the first quarter of the nineteenth century the European powers were loath to recognize a *de facto* government. Under the influence of Metternich, the Central European nations put down insurrections in Spain, Naples and Piedmont, but when the central powers attempted to interfere with the establishment of the new republics in South America, they brought forth the Monroe Doctrine so ably supported by England’s Foreign Minister, Canning.  

That, nevertheless, by the middle of the nineteenth century *de facto* governments were accepted, is evidenced in the ready recognition of the Southern States in the Civil War.

President Pierce set forth the general policy of our government on May 15, 1856, when in discussing the question of recognizing a new government in Nicaragua, he said:

> It is the established policy of the United States to recognize all governments without question of their source, or organization or of the means by which the governing persons attain their power, provided there be a government *de facto* accepted by the people of the country...

When Porfirio Diaz came into power by revolutionary means in 1876, President Hayes added a new element of delay to our

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65 Bemis, 53-59.
66 Moore, I, 142.
policy, declaring that although the United States was:

...accustomed to accept and recognize the results of a popular choice in Mexico, and not to scrutinize closely the regularity or irregularity of the methods by which those results were brought about,...the United States would wait before recognizing General Diaz...until it is assured that his election is approved by the Mexican people, and that his administration is possessed of stability to endure and of disposition to comply with the rules of international comity and obligation of treaties.

It will thus be seen in the Wilson-Huerta controversy that it was not the mere fact of delayed recognition, but the meddling in Mexico's internal affairs, that was unprecedented. Naturally without recognition, revolution was encouraged by our government -- at least implicitly. But, due to the pressure of international powers concerned about their investments in Mexico, Wilson realized that he must indicate the policy of the United States in an official statement. It was at this critical moment that President Woodrow Wilson decided to intervene in Mexican affairs.

67 Foreign Relations, 1877, 404. F. W. Seward, acting Secretary of State, to J. W. Foster, May 16, 1877. Foster was our Minister to Mexico. In his Diplomatic Memoirs, I, 92, he states that Hayes' failure to recognize Diaz was an attempt to draw the public mind away from his questionable victory over Tilden by creating a Mexican issue.
passion", he declared, "is for the submerged eighty-five percent of the people of that Republic who are struggling now toward liberty". 68 From this statement, the Mexican Herald sarcastically remarked that Wilson thought "he knew the aspirations of the Mexican people better than the Mexicans themselves had ever known them". 69 His confidence in Ambassador Wilson was gone, and contradictory reports of the situation determined him to send a personal representative to make a report of conditions. 70 William Bayard Hale, an unfrocked clergyman and newspaper writer, was selected. The President, with the inexperience of the neophyte, thus began his policy of selecting representatives not only temperamentally unsuited 71 but ignorant of the task assigned.

Henry L. Wilson naturally resented Hale's presence in Mexico and he protested against the interference. His irritation was increased when his plan for recognition in return for a settlement of United States' grievances against Mexico received no reply. The long awaited reply

68 Baker, IV, 236.
69 Mexican Herald, June 2, 1913.
71 Baker, IV, 243.
was a "confidential note" to the Ambassador stating that recognition would depend on a fair election in which Huerta would under no conditions be a candidate. 72

While the Ambassador was urging military intervention to keep Huerta in power and restore peace, Hale was recommending armed force to put the dictator out. Hale's reports to Washington, consequently painted Wilson in most odious colors. How influential these notes were in Washington, and how instrumental they were in the recall of the Ambassador, is seen in one of the President's messages to Secretary of State Bryan:

The document from Hale is indeed extraordinary. I should like ...to discuss with you very seriously the necessity of recalling H. L. Wilson in one way or another, perhaps, merely for 'consultation' until we can have a talk with the man himself. 73

The opportunity came with the Ambassador's next note: "I am obliged to urge upon the President the pressing necessity of some action of a drastic and convincing kind". 74 The answer was an immediate call to Washington for "consultation". The meeting took place on July 28th, and on August 4th Bryan

73 Baker, IV, 255.
74 Foreign Relations, 1913, 808.
asked for the Ambassador's resignation, since the latter refused to place his Mexican policy in line with the President's. 75

Numerous accounts of the diplomacy of the Mexican Revolution have tended to emphasize the machinations of Ambassador H. L. Wilson, and attribute to him responsibility for the overthrow of Madero. While no attempt is made to minimize the rather discreditable role played by the American Ambassador, the State Department papers clearly reveal that he was merely fulfilling a basic desire of the Taft administration. The main responsibility in the course of events which followed appears to rest squarely upon the Department of State, and Taft, for both gave full support to Ambassador Wilson, and formulated the basic policy, which he carried out most faithfully and literally.

The Ambassador's friendship and connections with the oil men and other vested interests in Mexico proved to be one of the chief causes of friction with Washington. 76 In early May a group of financiers had almost convinced the President of the need of immediate recognition, 77 but

75 Wilson, H. L., 313.
76 Gruening, 561.
77 Baker, 245.
Wilson could not accept unasked for advice. By July, he was convinced that his opponents were the monied interests of Great Britain and the United States:

I have to pause and remind myself that I am President of the United States, and not of a small group of Americans with vested interests in Mexico.

With such a determined view the Ambassador's opposition could result only in resignation; and with the demand for resignation, the President could never recognize the government of Huerta.

The increase of chaos in Mexico, and the deepening of secrecy in the White House, were gradually turning the nation against Woodrow Wilson. He refused to take Congress into his confidence, because he believed the "more quietly we go about it, the more likely success will be". Yet something constructive had to be accomplished. The result was the choice of another personal representative to inform Huerta of the President's policy in a clear cut, concise and unmistakable manner. The whole aim of the mission was to establish free elections without Huerta running for office.

78 Charles W. Thompson, Presidents I've Known and Two Near Presidents. Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1929, 253.
Bryan's personal friend, the former Governor of Minnesota, John Lind, was selected as the new mediator. Lind was commissioned to instruct Huerta to present his resignation. Complete unfamiliarity with Latin American affairs, untried in diplomatic circles, not to mention his inability to speak a word of Spanish, made him the most unfit person who could have been sent. With such a background, Lind's appearance in Mexico naturally caused some "barking of shins".

Despite the insult to his government, Huerta received the new unofficial representative. On August 16th, two days later, Gamboa, Huerta's Foreign Minister, replied in courteous terms to Lind's message. Gamboa mentioned that the United States must consider Huerta as de facto President, since he was requested to arrange for an election. In addition, all the other charges were well answered, and the question of Huerta's candidacy "was to be decided only by Mexican public opinion expressed at the polls".

Again, on August 25th, Lind requested Huerta to withdraw his hat from the ring in the coming elections, offer-

81 Bemis, 176.
82 Thompson, 261.
84 Foreign Relations, 823-27.
ing as bait the guarantee of the President's assistance in procuring a loan from American bankers, but the dictator could not be bribed:

...the Government of the United States insinuates that it will recommend to American bankers the immediate extension of a loan... to the end, that, moved by petty interests we should renounce a right which incontrovertibly upholds us. When the dignity of a nation is at stake, I believe that there are not loans enough to...permit it to be lessened. 85

The failure of Lind's mission did not help in lessening the growing opposition to Wilson. Since the President's tariff bill in the Senate, and his currency bill in the House needed every possible bit of support, Wilson took Congress into his confidence on August 27th, by revealing the Lind instructions in an effort to gain adherents. 86 His "watchful waiting" policy was clearly stated:

There was no call for drastic action...clearly everything that we do must be rooted in patience...The steady pressure of moral force will before many days break the barriers of pride and prejudice down, and we shall triumph as Mexico's friends sooner than we could as her enemies. 87

85 Ibid., 835.
86 Baker, IV, 270.
87 Foreign Relations, 1913, Message to Congress, 820-23.
This talk to Congress surprisingly had a wonderful effect in restoring public confidence in the administration. In fact, Bryan was jubilantly confident that "things were going along quite well at present, and we only have to sit tight and await the election". 88

South of the border, however, matters were not quite so happy. Lind warned Bryan that Huerta was manipulating political strings which would force his puppets to keep him in office. 89 The dictator justified Lind's fears on October 18th, by dissolving the Chamber of Deputies with the aid of armed force, and by arresting one hundred and ten of the Congressman. "He didn't arrest members of the Catholic Party, who, for the most part, had been trying to sustain order through him; they are, after all is said and done, the conservative, peace-wishing element in Mexico." 90 This fact only added fuel to the ever growing fire of accusations that many of the clergy were assisting Huerta with both arms and money. 91

Immediately Woodrow Wilson wired the American

88 Baker, IV, 276.
89 Stephenson, 238.
90 O'Shaughnessy, 10.
91 Carleton, Beals, Mexico, an Interpretation, B. W. Huebsch, Inc., New York, 1923, 169.
charge d'Affaires, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, to notify the provisional government of Washington's reaction:

The President, shocked at the lawless methods employed by General Huerta is deeply distressed... The President believes that an election held at this time...and under the present conditions as they now exist would have none of the sanction with which the law surrounds the ballots... The President would not feel justified in recognizing a President so chosen. 92

Huerta replied by action: A typical Mexican election under his supervision, which provided for his reelection. Wilson had been defied. Within four days Bryan notified the diplomatic officers of leading foreign powers:

that it is his (President) immediate duty to require Huerta's retirement from the Mexican Government, and that the United States must now proceed to employ such means as be necessary to secure this result; and...we will not regard as binding upon the people of Mexico anything done by Huerta... The President hopes that the Government to which you are accredited will see fit to use its influence to impress upon Huerta the wisdom of retiring... 93

If Great Britain could be brought over to support

92 Foreign Relations, 1913, Bryan to Nelson, 838.
93 Ibid., Bryan to certain Diplomatic Officers, 856. The word, President, is the author's insertion.
Wilson's policy, the acquiescence of the rest of Europe was assured. Mexico, probably, could forthwith be reduced in reality to the statute of a protectorate of the United States. But "the British felt they had a cause" for complaint with the American Government, on the matter of the canal tolls; the American Government, on the other hand, felt that the British were hampering Wilson's policy in Mexico". Clearly a basis for bargaining existed. These considerations no doubt led the British to send Sir William Tyrell, secretary to Sir Edward Grey, to Washington, ostensibly to visit the British ambassador, in reality to discuss Mexico and Panama Canal tolls. On the following day, November 14, the British minister in Mexico, Sir Lionel Carden, in union with other diplomats advised Huerta to yield to the President's demands. Yet Englishmen were still a trifle baffled at Washington's support of Carranza and Villa, whose characters to all appearances were just as tarnished as Huerta's. Wilson, whereupon, declared that "Carranza was the best of the three, and Villa was not so bad as he had been painted".

After Europe's apparent turn about, Wilson became

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95 Baker, IV, 288.
96 Henrick, 204-5.
more confident in his "watchful waiting" policy, but the dictator knew the European powers were not opposed to him, and did not want him to accept their forced advice. 97 Huerta's continued negotiations with powers across the sea made Lind even more insistent on his plea for armed intervention or at least some support for the Constitutional forces, but Bryan strongly urged the President to continue his non-interventionist policy. As a compromise, Wilson gave his blessing to Civil War by lifting the arms embargo on February 3, 1914, for the benefit of the Constitutionalist forces. In fact, this meant that Villa and Carranza would now receive munitions openly from the United States. 98 In the violence that ensued, a British subject was killed and the United States was finding it more difficult to refrain from action.

The situation daily grew more tense, with the result that a slight indiscretion of a Mexican soldier developed into an international crisis. On April 9, 1914, at the port of Tampico a subordinate officer arrested seven American sailors stepping ashore from a tender to buy supplies for the U.S.S. Dolphin. Two men were also ordered out of the tender flying the American flag. The whole group was marched through the

97 Bemis, 177.
98 Ibid., 177.
town when they met a superior officer, who had them quickly released with an expression of regret, in which Huerta later joined. Admiral Mayo then demanded of General Zaragoza that he publicly hoist the American flag in a prominent position on shore and salute it with twenty-one guns, which salute was to be duly answered by this ship. Wilson gave his endorsement to this preposterous demand. Huerta's offer to arbitrate, in accordance with the provision of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, consequently was declined by the United States as "a subject in no circumstances fit for discussion by such a tribunal as that of the Hague".

At this crucial moment, April 20, 1914, President Wilson "entirely at his ease" appeared before Congress to ask approval for armed forces:

The incident cannot be regarded as a trivial one... I, therefore, ask your approval that I should use the armed forces of the United States in such ways and to such an extent as may be necessary to obtain from General Huerta and his adherents the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States.

99 Foreign Relations, 1914, 451-52, 474-76. Fletcher to the Secretary of the Navy. Wilson to Congress.
100 Ibid., 466. Bryan to O'Shaughnessy, 468. O'Shaughnessy to Bryan.
102 Foreign Relations, 1914, Wilson to Congress, 474-76.
The President outlined in detail the events which led up to the disturbances at Tampico. In so doing, he magnified the occurrences, and deliberately lied in order to strengthen his case against Huerta. In describing the Tampico affair Wilson stated that a few days after the incident had occurred, an orderly from the U.S.S. Minnesota was arrested at Vera Cruz while ashore in uniform to obtain the ship's mail, and was for a time thrown in jail. Wilson was aware, or should have been, of Admiral Fletcher's report, submitted April 16th, which indicated that the mail orderly had been immediately released by the Mexican judge, and therefore had never been in jail. The sailor was only taken to the jail because he could not speak Spanish to state his business to the officer in the street. "The attitude of the Mexican authorities", stated Fletcher, "was correct; there is no cause for complaint against them and the incident is without signifi

103

Congress was not at all enthusiastic in their re-

103 Admiral Fletcher to Daniels, April 16, 1914, Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 465. If Wilson ordered the troops into Mexico without reading Fletcher's message, his negligence is inexcusable; if he did read them, as he must have done, he deliberately lied in his message to Congress.
ception of the President's message. Although the resolution received an overwhelming vote, the preceding debate caused Wilson much concern as to the ultimate outcome. After the removal of the decorative frills, the real motive for the bombardment and occupation of Vera Cruz was evident. It was not any insult to the flag, but the message from Consul Canada of Mexico advising that a cargo of machine guns and ammunition, consigned to the Mexican Government, would be unloaded at that port on April 21st:

The thing that determined action... was the feeling that if the ammunition was landed it would strengthen the usurping president and increase the loss of life in Mexico and that later the guns might be turned upon American youths.

All contending factions in Mexico, including Carranza, represented this intervention. In fact, when the bodies of the nineteen bluejackets, sacrificed in this action, reached the United States, one wonders how Wilson could have been serious in stating before Congress: "The people of Mexico are entitled to settle their own domestic affairs in their own way...".

104 New York Times, April 21, 1914.
105 Josephus Daniels, The Life of Woodrow Wilson, 183.
Were it not for the Deus ex machina mediation offer by the three leading South American powers, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, Wilson would have found his policy terminating in the dead end alley of war. Eagerly Wilson and Bryan, in conjunction with the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, accepted this Latin American offer. The reaction at home and abroad, especially in South America, was unmistakably favorable. The Springfield Republican could not have been more enthusiastic:

The incident is worth hundreds of tours of South American capitals by our Secretaries of State, with innumerable speeches on Pan-American solidarity. It is worth dozens of Pan-American conferences. For an act like this crystallizes fine words and eloquent periods into a landmark of Pan-American diplomacy. It establishes a precedent; possibly it opens a new era.

As the Conference at Niagara Falls with the ABC powers progressed, Wilson became more determined to dominate it:

The object of our conferences now is to find a method by which the inevitable can be accomplished without further bloodshed. By the inevitable we mean not only the elimination of Huerta, but the comple-

107 The Springfield Republican, April 28, 1914.
tion of the revolution by the transfer of political power from Huerta to those who represent the interests and aspirations of the people...108

Negatively the President was also an obstacle to the mediators by his refusal to use his influence in having Carranza cease hostilities during the Conference. On the other hand, Huerta was most cooperative. He offered to resign, providing his successor would be a neutral, and the ABC powers, at President Wilson's request, agreed to mediate, but an unexpected obstacle to this solution presented itself when Carranza refused to submit his pretensions to arbitration. "He would not accept the intervention or even the initiation of any foreign government in the internal affairs of the Republic."109 Bryan stepped in and by doubtful diplomacy saved the situation by backing Carranza. And when reminded that he had pledged himself to support the Mexican delegation in naming a neutral candidate, he replied:

When you can't keep a promise, you can't keep it, and that is all there is to it. I don't want to hear any more about it. 110

108 Foreign Relations, 1914, Bryan to the Special Commissioners, 506.
109 Excelsior, Dec. 2, 1925.
110 Ibid., Sept. 2, 1925, Editorial of Salado Alvarez.
When it was suggested that a civilian be chosen to fill the provisional presidency, Bryan became still more emphatic: "No! Carranza must be provisional president, and permanent president". Without a doubt the Secretary of State's stand was due to Lind's insistent demands that the temporary president be "an avowed Constitutionalist". Yet it is difficult to reconcile this method of filling an elective office with Wilson's passion to make the world "safe for democracy".

This unqualified support of the Constitutionalist leader was something of a mystery to the powers abroad, who criticized constantly the savage banditry of the Mexican leaders. Wilson, consequently, was at pains to rectify their notions:

The thing which seems to me most important now with respect to the Mexican business is that over there (Europe) the people should get a more just and correct view of Villa. Carranza I believe to be honest... a person who can be counted on to try and do the right things.

In time he would be forced to admit the rectitude of the European views.

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111 Ibid., Nov. 16, 1925, Editorial of Salado Alvarez.
112 Foreign Relations, 1914, 523, also, 505, 512.
The agreement which after interminable discussions was finally reached on June 24th was far indeed from carrying out Wilson's program, but it indirectly fulfilled many of his desires. War was avoided; Huerta resigned on July 15th; and the way was prepared for Carranza to step into power on August 21st; but more than all else, the ABC mediation powers, with the cooperation of the United States, helped to bring appreciably nearer a concert and harmony of the western world. 114

The world acclaimed Wilson for his diplomatic triumph and applauded his policy as a definite victory for humanity, but the President was not deceived. From July 1914, to October, 1915, Carranza, Villa and Zapata took turns in overrunning Mexico City. A vociferous minority in the United States gradually increased their cry for intervention to protect the life and property of Americans. Wilson foresaw that if the Mexican problem were not settled before the war in Europe ended, there would be solid grounds for foreign intervention. 115 As a last resort the President called again upon South America to advise on what regime to support as a provisional government pending honest election. "Mexico is ap-

114 Baker, IV, 350.
115 Bemis, 180.
parently no nearer a solution", Wilson tragically admitted, "than she was when the revolution was first enkindled."\textsuperscript{116}

The Ambassadors of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and the Ministers from Bolivia, Uruguay and Guatemala met with Secretary of State Lansing on October 9th, 1915, earnestly hoping to prevent the intervention Wilson was contemplating.\textsuperscript{117} Within two days the delegates decided that the Carrancista party was the only party possessing the essentials for recognition as the \textit{de facto} government, and they so reported to their respective governments. On October 19, 1915, the United States government recognized Venustiano Carranza as the Chief Executive of Mexico,\textsuperscript{118} in the hope that international support of his government would enable him to restore peace. Simultaneously President Wilson proclaimed an embargo on arms to Mexico, except for shipments made to the newly organized government.\textsuperscript{119}

Villa's reaction to such recognition was an indignation overshadowed only by his defiance against our country. He sought revenge by taking American lives on American soil, with the ulterior motive of causing armed intervention by the

\textsuperscript{116} Foreign Relations, 1915, 694.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 695.
\textsuperscript{118} Foreign Relations, 1915, Lansing to Parker, 771.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 760-82.
United States. His dream was to have all Mexico rally under his standard to beat off the Colossus of the North. When this outlaw murdered sixteen young American engineers working for Carranza, Congress was for armed intervention, but Wilson accepted the First Chief's worthless promise of justice. Villa's raids into New Mexico were the straw that broke the camel's back. When Wilson called out the militia to pursue Villa into Mexican territory, intervention became reality. Carranza bitterly condemned the American invasion on Mexican soil and he warned that "the move could easily lead to war".

In June, war was almost declared when several clashes occurred between some men of Pershing's command and Mexicans at Parral, and a collision with a force of Carranza's troops at Carrizal.

The United States President still determined to keep peace, adopted Lansing's suggestion of a joint Mexican-American commission to reach an understanding. The net result of the New London Conference was a victory for Mexican diplomacy: The withdrawal of American troops from Mexican territory; the restoration of full diplomatic relations between the two countries; and the decision to rigorously patrol the borders against further raids.

120 Bemis, 181.
121 Foreign Relations, 1916, 486.
122 Stephenson, 313.
When immediate difficulties were smoothed over, Wilson concentrated his attention upon the national campaign for the presidency. After his re-election, the break with Germany came. Step by step, the United States was gradually sucked into the European maelstrom. Wilson was eager to have an understanding with Carranza. When the Mexican Congress assembled as an electoral college and made Carranza President, and a new constitution was drawn up, Wilson quickly granted *de jure* recognition to Carranza by exchanging ambassadors on March 3, 1917. With the formal elevation of Carranza to the presidency and the adoption of a constitution which embodied many of the reforms of the revolution, Wilson rested content that his principal objectives in Mexico had been gained.¹²³ On April 4, the United States Congress declared war against Germany. For the next two years, the Mexican question remained in the background.

When the United States entered into the European conflict, it was more or less expected that Mexico would side with the allies and the United States, since Carranza's administration, after all, owed its existence to President Wilson and the United States. This was not to be the case. Far from it! Carranza came out almost immediately in favor of a

¹²³ Bemis, 182-183.
"most strict neutrality". The folly of President Wilson's policy soon revealed itself. The Mexican Ambassador at Washington, Bonilla, declared:

> Our chief aim is to remain neutral. To us this is not only a just but necessary policy. Mexico's position is not like that of other countries... If the question of national honor or Mexico's sovereign rights were involved, a deliberate policy of self-sacrifice might be necessary. But the belligerent countries have not given us cause for resentment, and our interests have not been injured, nor have they been seriously threatened. We cannot afford to participate in the war on one side or the other if we can possibly avoid it. Our policy is, therefore, one of peace and reconstruction as against war and ravage.124

Mexico, however, did not maintain a strict neutrality, but, in fact, lent a willing ear to German intrigue. Carranza, moreover, sought to undermine the influence of Wilson in Latin America, and issued decrees which brought down upon him the implacable enmity of American vested interests. For instance, at a time when the uninterrupted flow of oil from the fields of Tampico was essential, Carranza took steps to interfere in the oil industry by issuing edicts in pursuance of Article XXVII of the Constitution of 1917 which gave

direct dominion over subsoil products to the nation.\textsuperscript{125} This was to mark the great oil controversy between Mexico and American-British interests. The publication of the Zimmerman note also cast grave suspicions on Mexico's sympathies.

Such a policy was the expression of gratitude to the man and the nation that placed Carranza in power. Yet a statement of Theodore Roosevelt, perhaps a bit extreme, more justly shifts the blame from the First Chief to the White House Head whose efforts unhappily changed the course of a nation and later a world:

Mexico is our Balkan Peninsula, and during the last five years, thanks largely to Mr. Wilson's able assistance, it has been reduced to a condition as hideous as that of the Balkan Peninsula under Turkish rule.\textsuperscript{126}

For almost ten years, the financier, colonist and statesman were absorbed in this Mexican drama directed by Woodrow Wilson. Through the study of government documents, newspapers and the research efforts of historians, we have been able in this first chapter to obtain a clear enough perspective to justify critical judgments on the \textit{dramatis personae}, who appeared on the Mexican stage during the critical

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., 523-524.
years of that nation three decades ago. Yet the political and economic problems were not the only issues at stake. Revolution, and then, religious persecution added to the already existing complications. The Church could not remain silent, as long as the sword of injustice caused Mexican blood to flow.

The secular press, perhaps, was not completely aware that the majority of Mexicans were more concerned with policies infringing on religious liberty for themselves, than on concessions granting tax reductions to American capitalists. The religious-minded in the United States, too, quite naturally, anxiously regarded the moral implications of the two governments' policies. Thus, while a Chicago Tribune was blasting Wilson's wavering measures, or a New York World applauded the President's apparent strategy, the religious press was influencing the political views of its readers by the editors' criticism of the religious consequences of Wilson's Mexican policy. Since the Protestant press, however, beamed with approval on our Administration's rejection of the Catholic dictator, Huerta, while the Catholic papers vehemently disapproved of Wilson's friendship clasp with Carranza and Villa, the tools of anti-clericals, the policies of the religious press aimed at influencing po-
political action are deserving of a special study.
CHAPTER II

THE PROTESTANT PRESS ON WILSON'S POLICY

By 1910, the Protestant missionary was no stranger in Mexico. His first beachhead had been established, when he entered that land with Bible and tract in hand in the wake of the American armies in 1846. Progress was slow. Then, Diaz in the 1880's opened the Mexican gates to colonists, merchants and tycoons from the North. Soon, Sunday schools, churches, publishing houses and institutions of higher learning were found in the larger cities. By 1902, sixteen denominations had established camps to war on the Roman Catholic Church. In 1916, due to the favor of the revolutionary leaders, there were six hundred Protestant churches and places of regular worship and four hundred Sunday schools with a total enrollment of over forty thousand. While the number of conversions was insignificant in the light of the years of labor and money spent, yet the fact remained that the Protestants under Diaz had been tolerated and encouraged by some of the revolutionist leaders. The horizon seemed bright, even rosy, after Huerta's downfall and Carranza's rise to power. It was only natural then,
that the Protestants in the United States after investing so much in men and money in the Mexican missions should follow the political maneuvers during the revolutionary days with the keenest interest.

The whole world in fact watched with an interested and critical eye the apparent victory of absolutism over democratic institutions when General Diaz was sworn in on December 5, 1910, for the eighth time as President of Mexico. Yet all was not well, for the tremor of revolution could be felt. The ceremony indicated this as it took place quietly with none of the pomp and publicity usual on such occasions, nor were the people allowed to collect in crowds in the streets. A general air of uneasiness seemed to pervade the capital, when the Commissioners were sent to negotiate with the revolutionary leaders ways and means of bringing the present disturbance to an end.

Hardly had the echo of the inauguration died away when the presses of the world were set in motion to blare forth the event. Diaz once again came to the fore as thousands of editors favorably or unfavorably evaluated his life, his works and Mexico's future. Nor was the Protestant press silent. For as the editor of the Presbyterian Banner emphasized: "Protestantism has had place in Mexico only during
the last two generations".¹ This statement well explained the strong backing the paper had given the General in the July elections:

Government by the constitution was his platform. Mistakes were made, but Mexico was governed and prospered...No one can question that his rule has been far more efficient than any with changing Presidents could have been. He had encouraged democracy too, looking forward to the day when the nation might be really self controlling...The Administration of Diaz is not democratic. It could not be with the widespread indifference among the masses.²

The Baptists, who were also active in Mexico and knew on which side their bread was buttered, in the Standard loudly proclaimed Diaz as "the great general, the greater president".³ The refrain, however, was quite different on the editorial page of the Southern Methodist Review: "He (Diaz) educated people in helplessness - he is a short sighted and self blinded egotist".⁴

The growing revolutionary opposition at the time of the inauguration gave strength to the Methodist Review's

¹ Presbyterian Banner (Pittsburgh), Dec. 15, 1910.
² Presbyterian Banner, July 14, 1910.
³ Standard, (Chicago), Baptist, July 9, 1910.
attitude and indicated that, perhaps, Diaz's greatness was exaggerated. The Standard, though, was quick to explain that the unrest in Mexico was "not due to any failure of Diaz to serve his country well...but because a party believes that he has served his country long enough". The undenominational Christian Herald, always conservative until the direction of the wind could safely be ascertained, preferred to diagnose the revolt as "leveled less against Diaz personally than against the unrepublican and autocratic system he represents". In direct opposition to the Southern Methodists too, their northern brethren of the Christian Advocate could see no reason for being on the defensive:

The greatness of Porfirio Diaz is seen in the fact that he has taken oath as President of Mexico for the eighth time. Of course he exercised autocratic power at various times. Had he not done so confusion worse confounded would have been the result.

This optimistic note was sustained by the Presbyterian Banner in reporting that during one of the President's public appearances "...the air was also full of acclamation and applause. It was a genuine, spontaneous ovation". Emboldened by the

5 Dec. 3, 1910.
8 Jan. 5, 1910.
general press support, the Christian Herald became enthusiastic:

President Diaz in his ability and his official administration is one of the most remarkable men in the world... order will be speedily restored in the revolutionary districts and the nation will have continued peace and prosperity. 9

In his election platform Diaz had promised several democratic innovations, and when their fulfillment was delayed, the Independent cooled in its attitude toward the President. It thought that if "Diaz is convinced that justice requires a distribution of land, he should not wait for the revolutionists to lay down their arms, but should take measures at once to make the proposed reforms effective". 10 Within a month its policy became actually hostile when the editor remarked that "President Diaz did well for twenty or thirty years, but it is time that he stepped down from the Presidential chair". 11

DIAZ RESIGNS

In rapid fashion the Independent's wish came true, and Diaz's resignation was an accepted fact. The Protestant

9 Jan. 25, 1911.
11 April 24, 1911.
press changed horses rapidly, but the Christian Herald was not afraid to give the great ruler a final eulogistic farewell: "His rule has been that of the iron rod, but he had made Mexico a nation". But when anarchy, bloodshed and destruction continued to rule the day, the press now and again could not refrain from reminiscing about the peaceful prosperity under the despotic Diaz. "It is not too much to say", recalled the Standard, "that Mexico moved forward two centuries in her material welfare during the thirty-six years of Diaz's reign". While the Christian Century remembered that "under the benevolent dictatorship of Diaz the nation was held in restraint...but order and happiness were maintained among the people". Not even time, however, could mellow the tone of the Methodist Review towards Diaz, and years later, 1916 to be exact, while this paper was trying to win favor for Carranza, its readers were informed that:

...while Porfirio Diaz came into power as a liberal by means of a revolution; he ended his career as a reactionary and a favorite of the clericals and the foreign investors.

12 June 10, 1911.
13 Nov. 15, 1913.
14 Nov. 6, 1913.
Mexico has usually been cursed with bloodshed whenever there is a change of her first executive, and the effort to supplant Diaz was to prove no exception. With the consequent injury to foreign interests in life and property in Mexico, President Taft was being forced to take action. The sending of troops to the border under the pretext of maneuvers was his initial move. The Christian Advocate was among the first of the religious press to discuss this vital problem. Its editorial column implicitly told the President to send the troops into Mexico by holding that "the United States must protect the property of foreigners or forfeit the use of the Monroe Doctrine". The President too, received a nod of approval from the Standard "for his wise move in the sending of troops to the border, where they are ready to intervene if necessary". But what was most surprising was the vigorous support of the Christian Herald at such an early date:

The Christian Herald and its readers do not approve of war and we chronicle with reluctance anything in the nature of a warlike demonstration; but the present instance is one of a great power using its moral and material influence for the preservation of order and the protection of human life and property.

16 March 16, 1911.
17 March 18, 1911.
18 March 22, 1911.
Seldom does a Washington move meet with universal accord, and the Independent's reaction helped to make Taft's latest step no exception. While the necessity of sending troops to the border was fully acknowledged because Europe insisted on the protection of her investments, nevertheless, this paper asked "why did Taft attempt to disguise or conceal his sending of the troops to the border?" 19 This was the first step in the evolution of the Independent's isolationist attitude, which developed greatly within a month. Now, the Independent says that "peace depends on Diaz's resignation", yet strongly warns the President that

...this is the business of Mexico not for us. We have no present right to intervene and can anticipate no occasion which will require it...The days of war for territorial expansion ought to be past. 20

So desirous was the Independent for peace that Taft's efforts in early May to bring about a temporary armistice between Diaz and Madero brought forth an encomium of our President:
"It has been fortunate for both countries that the occupant of the White House is a patient and just man, having a sense of humor and well endowed with common sense." 21 Taft had won

19 March 24, 1911.
20 April 24, 1911.
21 May 4, 1911.
a new friend, and it was a difficult friendship to win. And so complete was this victory, that even when the armistice collapsed, the Independent was willing to consider the necessity of intervention because "we are confident that Mr. Taft will deal with the situation calmly and wisely".22

MADERO IN POWER

Generally speaking, the policy of the Protestant Press changed with the reversal of Diaz's fortunes. The editorials of the Christian Herald as usual were so tempered that later they could be interpreted as a defense for the winning side:

There is not a member of Madero's staff who does not overtop him in inches, but the silent little fellow is easily the leading and controlling agent among the turbulent spirits that surround. He is "Provisional President" but should the revolution succeed as now seems probable, Madero will step aside promptly for some one of more statesmanlike calibre and larger public experience.23

As the Madero movement gathered momentum, so did the Christian Herald's enthusiasm "for the great little Mexican, who yet may be hailed as the liberator of the South Republic from petty despotism and narrow ecclesiasticism".24 The Presby-

22 May 11, 1911.
23 May 24, 1911.
24 June 21, 1911.
The Christian Advocate, too, was most jubilant because "Madero had thus far demonstrated his sanity and strength" while "the Catholic attempt to form a national party failed".27 Although the Independent had advocated Diaz's resignation, not until Madero's success at the polls did it come around to admit reluctantly that "while Madero is not the greatest and wisest of men, he was the logical candidate of the revolution and he deserved to be elected".28 Nevertheless, one couldn't blame its editor for prophesying that "in addition to the difficulties of the situation, the failure to fulfill his extravagant promises would lead to Madero's downfall".29

25 June 29, 1911.
26 Aug. 4, 1911.
27 Oct. 19, 1911.
28 Oct. 5, 1911.
29 Sept. 7, 1911.
This inability of Madero to keep his extravagant election platform was the blow that aroused the opposition with consequent loss of life and property. Again the ugly head of intervention seemed ready to rise. The Christian Advocate again was early to raise the war whoop: "War would be bad, but our citizens must be protected". The peace loving Presbyterian Banner continued to urge all concerned "to give Madero two or three years to work out his reform". Madero was even interviewed by the Independent on the possibility of peace, but it was not able to share his optimistic view. Such pessimism became justified as 1912 drew to a close and conditions grew more unsettled, and the cry for immediate reform more vehement. The Independent was certain that Washington would "adopt a firmer policy". The forecast was literally fulfilled, when Taft in February, 1913, demanded prompt relief of the chaotic conditions caused by the revolt under the leadership of Reyes and Felix Diaz.

According to the Presbyterian Banner, this message was an "ultimatum". The Independent mournfully read the message

30 Jan. 4, 1912.
31 March 13, 1912.
32 Aug. 1, 1912.
33 Dec. 26, 1912.
34 Feb. 20, 1912.
in the same light, yet it hoped for the best because

Mr. Taft's attitude toward Mexico during the revolution...was characterized by patience and good judgment. Such is his attitude now, and we are glad to hear that the members of both parties in Congress are in agreement with him.

...Intervention in Mexico would mean war...We believe that war would be little short of a calamity...Every effort not forbidden by the dignity of a great nation and its regard for citizens abroad must be exerted to avoid such a conflict.35

Then it concluded with a wish that later did become a reality in the ABC Mediation Conferences at Niagara Falls:

...the cooperation of the unbiased South American Republics should be sought for any efforts to mediate or conciliate in Mexico.36

During these critical days the Baptist Watchman was satisfied with the policy of the Administration, which was holding out against

...some of those rash citizens who call for intervention in behalf of order...but fortunately the Government at Washington has not yet sought glory in that direction.37

35 Feb. 20, 1912.
36 Feb. 20, 1912.
37 Watchman, (Cincinnati), Baptist, Feb. 20, 1912.
HUERTA APPEARS

After February 18th, Mexico presented an entirely new problem: Generals Huerta and Diaz had overthrown Madero's government. Since there seemed to be a peaceful day dawning on the distant horizon, the Watchman hailed "this coup as one of the most sensible things that has been done in connection with the present uprising". But Huerta immediately lost all chance for favor when he murdered ex-President Madero and his Vice President Suarez. The Presbyterian Banner succinctly summed up the immediate reaction of many people: "The world is shocked at the evident foul taking off of Madero and Suarez and expects little of Huerta and his accomplices". The editorial of the Christian Advocate was merely an echo of that of the Banner:

The killing of Gustavo Madero under a fictitious charge, followed by the murder of Madero and Suarez under similar pretenses, has shaken the confidence of the world in the sincerity and honesty of General Huerta.

The Independent referred to the incident as "an atrocious murder"; while the Christian Century doubted "if the

38 Feb. 27, 1912.
39 Feb. 23, 1913.
40 Feb. 27, 1913.
41 Feb. 27, 1913.
executors of such a treacherous plot could be moved by senti-
ments of civilized patriotism or humanity". As usual there
was a less damning attitude in the observation of the Christian Herald that the deaths occurred:

...under circumstances that indicate a deliberate assassination plot. The slim pretext that the shooting occurred during an attempted "rescue" by Madero's partisans has been put forth by the government but finds few believers.

This story was also quite indigestible for the Independent, especially when the commander of the "escort" accompanying the victims "was promoted"; and it became convinced of its suspicions when after "nearly six months have passed, Huerta still has refused to hold an investigation into Madero's death". Two years later, however, the Sherlock Holmes editor of the Presbyterian Banner condescended to explain to those still baffled that "in Madero's death you will find in the background the Roman Catholic Church using the adventurer, Huerta, as the cat's paw for the accomplishment of her own ends".

Madero was dead, yet the question of his greatness

43 March 5, 1913.
44 April 10, 1913.
45 Aug. 21, 1913.
46 May 27, 1915.
was still debated. "When time enough has passed to permit of a right perspective, we believe that justice will be done his memory" was the eulogy of the Independent. But most of the other papers preferred to "let time enough pass" before committing themselves to an evaluation of Madero. How impolitic it might prove to alienate oneself from Huerta! It was only after the dictator's power evidenced serious weakness that the Standard voiced its opinion "for Madero as an exceptional man... He died a martyr to the cause of humble natives".

The Watchman-Examiner took up the chorus in lamenting that "Mexico's greatest loss was in the foul murder of Madero, an unselfish patriot and a martyr to his efforts to redeem Mexico". A feature article in the New Age by Jose Castellot, the Grand Commander of the Masons in Mexico, leaves little doubt of its sentiments:

With the faith of the inspired with the fortitude of the Apostle, Madero scattered everywhere his Gospel of love, of community of good... But he was an apostle rather than a ruler, a dreamer rather than a statesman. Madero could not keep the promises made, nor check the natural

47 March 6, 1913.
49 Watchman-Examiner, (Cincinnati), Feb. 12, 1914; The Watchman was affiliated with the Examiner.
reaction caused by the disillusionment of the people. 50

INTERVENTION OR ANNEXATION

The downfall of Madero encouraged many people to believe that the only solution of Mexican problems was annexation under some form. The once peace-loving Independent, now completely dissatisfied with the anarchy south of the border, could see absolutely no reason why, if any portion of Mexico should be annexed it would have to remain as a subject of possession with no hope of admission to statehood. This would put an end to her problem. 51

The next week, however, the editors moderated their policy to an offer of United States' help in union with several South American nations, and it concluded in a manner quite baffling to its previous week's readers with the warning that "we must keep hands off, however much Americans may desire annexation and even intervention". 52 During the next week, just to maintain some consistency, it urged "President Wilson to follow Taft's policy of non-intervention". 53 But two weeks later, a flicker of the old light must have returned for the paper

51 Feb. 20, 1913.
52 Feb. 27, 1913.
53 March 6, 1913.
could not see "how it would be considered intervention, if the northern states wanted to secede from Mexico and become annexed to the United States". The Christian Century failed to see eye to eye with the Independent and offered a solution on an entirely different pattern:

During all this what has the United States done? She has done nothing worthy of her ideals or her precedents... Her diplomatic measures have been anything but creditable... if our government had played a stronger hand the life of Madero might have been spared, and the reforms which he advocated might have been substantially accomplished. It would not have required intervention... We do not favor war... Now only the churches can bring peace.55

S. G. Inman, the missioner, who later appeared before the United States Senate's Investigation Committee on the Mexican Affair, confirmed the Christian Century's policy in a special article stating that "intervention would not solve Mexico's problems any more than the 'iron hand' did - but only the religion of Jesus Christ". It is the same Mr. Inman, who is six weeks later featuring another article on the virtues of...

54 Mar. 20, 1913.
55 Mar. 20, 1913.
56 April 20, 1913.
Carranza, the new patron of his Protestant Institute in Mexico. 57

With Woodrow Wilson's inauguration in March, all eyes were turned towards Washington in expectation of a formal statement of policy. There were hints of opposition to Huerta given in his early addresses, but nothing was definite. By July, the press was impatient. According to the Christian Advocate's sense of justice

...it is an inconsistency for the United States to recognize the Chinese Republic, concerning the desirability of which there is room to doubt, while denying the same favor to Mexico. 58

The irritation of the Christian Herald at Wilson's failure to provide a Mexican program was put as forcibly as its conservative policy would allow at this early stage of the new Administration!

Our Government has been patient and forbearing - perhaps too long - but a point has now been reached where further tolerance ceases to be a virtue and the adoption of a firm and definite policy becomes an imperative duty. We owe it to other powers, no less than to ourselves...This does not necessarily mean intervention. 59

57 July 3, 1913.
58 July 10, 1913.
59 July 30, 1913.
While the Watchman deplored the Administration's inaction, yet it became alarmed at the report of Secretary Bryan's greedy desire to annex our southern neighbor, and if the report was true, it warned him of the "chimera" that would result. The only point the Standard wanted to insist on with the President was that "war with Mexico must be avoided at all costs". The Independent, however, still retained its patience with Wilson because

Presumably the Administration has complete knowledge of the elements in the situation. And it is the Administration, with the aid of Congress, that must decide what we shall do.

The diplomatic world was more than surprised when the action of the White House Head was restricted to sending a personal representative to Mexico to report secretly to him on affairs there. His choice was the unfrocked, divorced clergyman, William Bayard Hale. The Watchman, now disgusted, sarcastically referred to Hale as the diplomat, who

...having been in the country two months naturally knows all about the country, the people and the remedies needed. So President Wilson has taken his advice rather

60 July 30, 1913.
61 Aug. 16, 1913.
62 July 31, 1913.
63 In the original, the word was in italics.
than that of an accredited representative of the United States. 64

MISSION OF LIND

Hale's mission resulted in the recall of the Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, which the Presbyterian Banner considered as "the first step in President Wilson's Mexican Policy". 65 Enamored by the debatable achievement of his first representative, the President decided again to ignore the counsel of Congress, and instead, send another personal agent to Mexico, John Lind. His success in Mexico was most doubtful as far as the Independent could see:

Ex-Governor Lind of Minnesota, special representative of President Wilson and adviser to the United States Embassy, cannot be regarded as a man having exceptional qualifications for the mission... We presume that Lind was selected by Secretary Bryan, whom he greatly admires... It seemed to us that the work might better have been done by a commission of eminent Americans clothed with authority. 66

The Presbyterian Banner, nevertheless, believed that "things are more optimistic in regard to the Mexican situation now that Lind has arrived in Mexico City". 67 There was a hopeful note heard from the Christian Herald too, because

64 Aug. 21, 1913.
65 Aug. 7, 1913.
Lind is said to be a practical, clear-headed man; and although the sending of a personal envoy on such a mission is a striking innovation in diplomacy, the result of the experiment may prove it to have been wholly justified. 68

Two weeks later, though, the optimism of the Presbyterian Banner was considerably dampened when Huerta refused Lind's proposals. Sadly it quoted a Mexican Daily:

John Lind has come to Mexico to assure the election against V. Huerta...now there is not an honest Mexican soul, who will not vote for Huerta...President Wilson has taken it upon himself to crystallize the popularity of Huerta until he has become the incarnation of national dignity and sovereignty. 69

When the bright sun of peace failed to break through the blackness of anarchy two months later, the Independent looked on the appointment of Lind as "an irregularity...which was highly offensive to, irritating and humiliating to the Mexican nation. 70

To save face and his control of Congress, the President was forced to cover over the blotch, that was the Lind mission. His scheme was a message to Congress. In this

68 Aug. 20, 1913.
69 Sept. 4, 1913 - herein is quoted the "El Diario", Aug. 28, 1913.
70 Nov. 13, 1913.
talk he not only "took the members into his confidence, but he painted the reason for the Lind fiasco in the lively colors of a humane mission. This message was greeted by the Christian Herald as "the plain and unadorned recital of a humane and worthy effort which meets the general approval of the country". The Independent was also temporarily won over by the address: "The American people have reason to be proud of President Wilson's address to Congress...he counseled patience...we should do well to follow his advice". Even prouder was the Standard that

...at least one great nation can inaugurate a new kind of diplomacy in which moral considerations have a place, and we believe it will be ultimately successful.

Even after two months of no success, its exuberance was not lessened:

It is a noble policy. The President should be given a fair chance to work out the giant task he has set himself that the nation may be worthy of its motto, "In God we trust".

The boasting of the Christian Century sounded like a schoolboy, holding that "President Wilson in his dealings with

71 Sept. 10, 1913.
72 Sept. 4, 1913.
73 Sept. 6, 1913.
74 Nov. 8, 1913.
Mexico is standing upon a principle more advanced than has ever before formed the basis of international policy. The faith of the Independent, however, was greatly shaken in Wilson's purely humane intentions, when one of its special correspondents wrote from Mexico that the President was affiliating himself with Carranza. He asked:

Is Carranza in any way superior to Huerta? Has he not bloody hands? In refusing to ever recognize Huerta, the administration has violated our usage and the dictates of common sense.

In his dealings with Mexico, Wilson had placed great stress on the necessity of popular elections in that land. It was this aspect of his policy that caused the Watchman-Examiner to take pause; for if four-fifths of the nation was under the dictator's control, it seemed reasonable to advise "President Wilson not to urge popular elections now". Yet Wilson would not accept advice, and the elections were held. The editorial column of the Presbyterian Banner told the result: "The dread spectre of a dictator has arisen in Mexico".

The Independent wrote that "Huerta has made himself dictator ... there remains not even the pretense of constitutional gov-

75 Nov. 13, 1913.
76 Dec. 11, 1913.
77 Sept. 18, 1913.
78 Oct. 16, 1913.
The Watchman-Examiner now sat back with the "I told you so" attitude as it commented that "only 10,000 out of 80,000 voted"; it also added that "the Catholic Party had the majority, but the election was not constitutionally valid". And two issues later it referred to the elections as "a farce".

WAR THREATENS

The result of Huerta's defiance of Washington's order for a more democratic form of government by his controlled elections was to raise the intervention issue again. The question was asked, and an answer was given by the Independent:

What is the duty of the United States in this fateful crisis? Patience...to avoid war...Firmness in protecting property and persons...and disinterestedness of motive.

The Advance counseled its readers to "follow Wilson and Bryan who are disposed to do the right thing...yet let us be calm and pray for peace". The Christian Century was well
aware of the "critical situation", as well as our obligations to "protect the interests of Americans in Mexico", yet it reminded its readers that

...it is a good time for Americans to keep calm...We have been hurried into at least one war if not two, in response to men who showed more ability to shout than to exercise good sense".84

In the next issue the readers were warned against "the jingo press...and demands for war of big munition firms like Krupps, Armstrong, and Maxims,...as well as the sentiments of army and naval officers".85 The strongest of all warnings against intervention was that of the Christian Advocate, who frankly told Washington that "there has not, at this writing, appeared any excuse for the introduction of American soldiers on Mexican soil".86

With the advent of 1914, the nation as a whole was determined to have peace. And when the Independent heard that the Administration was considering a change of policy leading to intervention, it sharply admonished Washington that

Intervention means war. War means an expenditure of millions of dollars, the loss of untold lives, and a consolidated hatred.

84 Nov. 20, 1913.
85 Nov. 27, 1913.
86 Nov. 20, 1913.
on the part of all Latin American countries. Patience, and still more patience... must be our watchword... 87

The Christian Herald, though, felt that "while that nation stands for peace, it also stands for justice", and because we failed to take that attitude previously "entanglements in our diplomatic relations now prevail". 88

Wilson did change his policy and it was just as the Standard had foretold the previous November, when the editor "figured that the next step is inevitably lifting the embargo". 89 On February 3, 1914, the Standard's prophecy came true with the raising of the Embargo on Arms to Mexico, which thus enabled the border states, according to the Presbyterian Banner "to supply immediately 30,000 troops". 90 The act resulted in a mild furor, which was a juicy morsel for the hungry press. The Independent analysed

The President's order lifting the embargo... as a logical and natural and proper outcome of his policy towards that distant country... The President has removed the handicap which hampered the forces opposed to the blood-stained usurper in the capital... The United
States will continue its wise course of "watchful waiting".91

The Watchman-Examiner interpreted this move as Wilson's way of saying "now fight it out and may the best man win".92

"By this act of the President", the Christian Century dogmatically asserted, "we are actively allied with the rebels".93

Only sadness and sarcasm however could be found in the Christian Advocate's leading editorial:

In the year of Our Lord, fight on, is the practical significance of the President's proclamation lifting the embargo...it has kind of an ironical flavor in view of our boast that we are a Christian nation.94

The Christian Herald too, could see only "the tragic possibilities in the new situation not pleasing to contemplate."95

Common sense and hard-headed reasoning characterized the Advance's attack on the situation as it urged us "to pause and take out our pencils before we talk too much about war with Mexico or any other nation. War costs too much".96

This editorial was followed with proper acknowledgements by the Christian Century, which calculated that

91 Feb. 16, 1914.
92 Feb. 12, 1914.
93 May 14, 1914.
94 Feb. 26, 1914.
95 Feb. 18, 1914.
96 Feb. 26, 1914.
...the amount which the world pays for post war in interests alone...if gathered into one pile of one dollar bills would make a stack fifty-two miles high...97

War, too, was the fear of the Presbyterian Banner, for

...if Huerta admits his powerlessness to check the lawlessness of Carranza and Villa because of the help given to the Constitutionalists by our government, it would leave President Wilson no alternative but to intervene.98

The White House, however, was confident that if Huerta could be removed from power, there would be no need for intervention, much less war. It was common knowledge that England's support of the dictator was one of the main obstacles to making the President's plan a reality. Wilson, therefore, was determined to have his friends across the sea step into his line of policy. The string our wily executive pulled on this occasion to remove our British brethren from Huerta's support was the repeal of the free Panama Canal tolls for the coastwise steamers of the United States. Since such maneuverings smacked of backroom politics, few of the religious papers cared to associate themselves by comment, or were totally unaware of any connection.

97 Mar. 5, 1914.
98 Mar. 19, 1914.
between the Panama Canal and Mexico. The Presbyterian Banner was of this latter class, in addition to the fact, that it could not conceive of a Presbyterian President dirtying his hands in sordid politics. Its indignation then knew no bounds when Senator Jones of Washington accused Wilson of bargaining the Canal toll for British support of his Mexican policy:

"Mr. Wilson said even if he wanted to he could get no suggestion from the British Minister on the subject of Mexico with a "cork-screw"...His (Senator Jones)\(^9\) false statement traveled with seven league boots over the world and lodged in thousands of minds where it will never be overtaken by truth. Men in public places...should inquire into the truth of damaging rumors before spreading them.\(^1\)

The Christian Century, however, judged the affair in the light of good diplomacy, since

...the truth is that American and Great Britain need and are certain to need each other's friendship. Our relations with Mexico are far from satisfactory and Mexico and Japan are maintaining an appearance of friendship, which inclines the United States to make the most of its friendship with

\(^9\) Insertion of the proper name is the author's.
\(^1\) Mar. 6, 1914.
Great Britain... England can help us much with Japan because she is friendly with that nation. 101

TAMPICO INCIDENT

An incident, insignificant in itself, occurred that added just one more element to the Mexican mess, and resulted in serious consequences. On April 21, 1914, President Wilson asked Congress for troops to force Huerta to offer the demanded apology for the alleged flag insult. The Advance, caught in the wave of patriotism, upheld the demand that "the American flag receive an unconditional salute of 21 guns as reasonable and dignified and the refusal to comply would be a national affront". 102 It was a case of having your cake and eating it too, when the Watchman-Examiner made clear that "without a doubt the insolence of the usurper should be rebuked, but it will be a calamity if we are plunged into war". 103 The Christian Advocate was of the opinion that "the Government of the United States has been treated with intol-

102 April 23, 1914. The "flag insult" refers to the Tampico incident, where through misunderstanding, some Americans, sailors, were momentarily arrested. Admiral Mayo demanded an unjust flag salute, which Huerta refused to give. President Wilson backed his Admiral to the extent of asking Congress for armed forces. Cf. Chapter I, 37.
103 April 23, 1914.
erable contempt by Huerta and his menials". The issue was so grave in the eyes of the *Living Church* that the editor forgot its strictly religious policy for a moment to write: "If war must come, it will at least be agreed that the United States did not seek it". As was expected, the *Christian Herald* voiced its opinion against the dictator in the observation that "the time has come for us to draw the line. Huerta must mend his ways and begin by saluting the flag he had insulted". Even the *Christian Century* was willing to endorse the use of force "to run down the murderer and bandit who has heaped indignities upon the United States". In the next issue, the *Christian Herald* came out openly in the same strain and maintained that "while it was not an advocate of war... when it becomes inevitable, nothing remains but to face it". Another approach too, was offered to justify the mobilizing of armed forces in the *Standard's* reflection that "the saluting incident was a mere culmination. It was Huerta's attitude rather than a specific act...".

104 April 23, 1914.
105 April 25, 1914.
106 April 29, 1914.
107 April 30, 1914.
108 May 6, 1914.
109 May 9, 1914.
This fanatical patriotism in support of Wilson and the flag, however, was not universal. To the Presbyterian Banner goes the honor of attacking the patriotism of war advocates. Although in the beginning, it was almost apologetic: "There is some feeling, if intervention had to come, it would have been better to wait for a more worthy occasion";\footnote{110} when its editors, during the next week, saw how many papers were infected by this war fever, they felt it their duty, insofar as their Presbyterian loyalty to the President would allow, to reveal the awful truth that he had used the flag salute as a pretext for war:

\[\ldots\text{it was their regret that the President did not withhold his hand longer, especially as the immediate occasion of action was only an international ceremony.}\footnote{111}\]

The influence of these editorials spread rapidly. The Standard reconsidered its initial stand, and now "regretted the loss of life caused by the occupation of Vera Cruz, especially since ample apology had been given by Huerta at Tampico".\footnote{112} The Independent merely echoed the sentiments of the Banner:

Serious causes exist for a vital interest of the United States in Mexico...But are we to tell our children in years to come that the people of the

\footnote{110 April 23, 1914. }\footnote{111 April 30, 1914. The underlining is the author's. }\footnote{112 May 2, 1914. }
United States in 1914 had no better reason for entering a neighboring country and killing its people than a dispute about a salute... You do not need a steam hammer to crack nuts. 113

In a leading article of the same issue, the reason for the President's action is revealed:

...the President probably saw that his policy of "watchful waiting" was a failure when he heard that Huerta had received a loan of 60 million dollars. So he brought on a war by the seizure of Vera Cruz. 114

There was no surprise in the Christian Century's using another paper's policy, but it was amusing, after its last outburst, to witness the superior air it adopted, when it realized that "there was something pathetic about the wave of passion and war fever that has swept over the country because of the irritating and insulting conduct of a half-breed Indian". 115 And the following week it seemed to be laughing at itself, when it reflected that "as a matter of fact the Tampico incident was not deserving of such serious consideration and bluster". 116 The Advance, too forgetful of its previous war cry, now warned its readers "not to be egged on

113 May 4, 1914.
114 May 4, 1914.
115 May 7, 1914. Another example was given on p. 78.
116 May 14, 1914.
by loud mouthed politicians and by covetous capitalists". Later in an editorial on the eighteen blue jackets who died at Vera Cruz, its note was not a hollow sound, but a prayerful plea to all Americans to learn from their recent mistake:

Let there be no war, if we can have an honorable peace. Let the nation bare its head and ride in solemn and silent procession behind these eighteen coffins. If we shall have learned to pause and consider before taking some rash step that might plunge us into a preventable war, these eighteen will not have died in vain.

A B C Mediation

Whether the nation wished to send their sons to fight south of the border or not, these lads would have had to answer the bugle call of duty, except for the timely intervention of three leading South American Republics. Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the famed Mediation Board, offered to mediate the differences between the two nations. For the moment war was averted. Strangely, though, the Christian Advocate was not too enthusiastic about "the good offers of the South American Republics...which are well intentioned, but cannot accomplish all the sentimentalists

117 May 7, 1914.
118 May 21, 1914.
assume possible or probable". 119 It was pure expediency too that prompted the Standard to consider the offer "as a brief respite for our Government from its anxious predicament at Vera Cruz". 120 Fortunately, the other papers had cheerier outlooks. The Christian Herald expressed the confident belief that "although the task of the ABC Representatives was not easy...yet the friends of peace everywhere have reason to welcome the new development as a hopeful sign of the progress of the peace movement". 121 Satisfaction was manifested by the Advance with a pun on the "ABC mediation as being rather simple for so great a nation, but one can afford to begin with the alphabet for the sake of peace". 122 Yet none could touch the Independent in exuberance:

The splendid action of the ABC powers gives bright promise of a solution of the immediate problem of the avoidance of war with Mexico. It contains the germ of a possible solution of all the great problems that harass the people of Mexico...Wilson and Bryan in accepting the offer show a political genius equalled only by their humanity. 123

For the Christian Century "this board was - it is - the only

119 April 30, 1914.
120 May 2, 1914.
121 May 3, 1914.
122 May 7, 1914.
123 May 4, 1914.
The tone of the Presbyterian Banner was also mild as it "welcomed mediation"; but even that enthusiasm died down in the dread that "Carranza would prove to be the fly in the ointment". Again the Living Church departed from strictly religious issues to make clear to the mediators that

...the Tampico incident and that connected with Mr. O'Shaughnessy's mail are not the chief issues, but rather Madero's assassination due to Huerta and the welfare of our citizens.

Then when the avoidance of war for the time passed from the dream stage to reality, the Independent, whose confidence was never shaken in the Mediation Board in the darkest hours, surpassed all in sounding its praises:

The Niagara Falls Mediation Conference is likely to prove one of the most important milestones in the progress of New World civilization...The war is averted. But something even better has been accomplished. Not only do Mexico and all Pan-America perceive the disinterestedness of the United States...but the nations of America unlike the nations of Europe can work disinterestedly and in harmony for the mutual prosperity and peace of a hemisphere.

124 May 14, 1914.
125 May 7, 1914.
126 June 11, 1914.
127 May 16, 1914.
128 June 18, 1914.
CONDEMNATION OF HUERTA

Peace might be restored to Mexico, but it could only be temporary unless a leader was elected who had the confidence and control of the people. Huerta, Carranza and Villa were the three possible choices. The Standard was opposed to Huerta from the beginning, chiefly for his "crying favor with the Catholic Party and attempting to obtain its support...the official influence is being felt against evangelicals". By June, 1914, the Standard had stooped to mudslinging in its denunciation of Huerta as

...the drunken sot who is impossible even as a decent representative of a barbarous state to make no mention of him as the head of a semi-civilized government.

When the pressure from Washington finally resulted in the dictator's resignation, the Christian Herald, which had been quietly but persistently agitating for interference in Mexican affairs, expressed its satisfaction in that frequent half-assured manner: "What looks like a tremendous victory for the highest idealism in international affairs has been won by the final elimination of Huerta". After the world saw that the ex-president was sincere in his resignation, the

129 Mar. 13, 1914.
130 June 13, 1914.
131 July 29, 1914.
beaten dictator no longer provided press material except for those papers, whose delight is to bring a skeleton out of the closet. So one reads in the New Age of the following year that in Huerta was "the retrogradation toward military dictatorship so abhorred to the principles of modern civilization". The Baptists too found a great difficulty in forgetting Huerta, and the Standard conjectured that

...had the United States recognized Huerta we should have lying at our door today not only the grievances of Villa, but the accusations of 16 millions of Mexicans that we compounded a felony and shared in one of the greatest crimes of modern times.

Perhaps, the sharpest of all the attacks on the Mexican General was that of the Methodist Review, whose ulterior motive was to make the darkly tarnished Carranza appear brilliant by contrast:

Thanks to the sensitive conscience, the wise forbearance, and the superhuman foresight of the noble man seated in the White House at Washington, the red-handed Huerta was refused recognition by the United States...Huerta was another Diaz.

The tool of the autocrat, the blood-thirsty, spectacular

132 Feb., 1915.
133 Jan. 1, 1916.
Huerta surprised, shocked and finally terrified the great sober-minded masses of the United States, and they were not slow to approve of the policy of President Wilson. 134

It should be understood, however, that Victoriano Huerta was not a universal outcast. For shortly after the "flag incident", the Christian Century ran a brief series of pro-Huerta articles in the hope that these might lower in some degree the war fever heating the blood of the American people. The first written by a college Professor pointed out that

...as a matter of fact, Huerta has shown remarkable control. His conduct in his dealings with the United States and Wilson has been characterized by courtesy and a forebearance remarkable and praiseworthy. 135

The second was the work of a well known Mexican miner who showed that in his experience "the laborers have been content to have Huerta for their President...and as far as they are able to think on large questions, have wondered what the trouble is between Huerta and the United States". 136 The most positive appraisal of Huerta was the eulogy of the Presbyterian Banner, which frequently would print the truth, even

135 May 14, 1914. Fred Starr of Chicago U. was the author.
136 May 21, 1914. Irving Herr of Mexico wrote this article.
if it was contrary to its pet policies; and the following editorial was all the more positive, because it was an answer to the unjust tirade of the Standard against Huerta: 137

...Huerta was not less remarkable a man than Diaz. If anything he was more remarkable. But he lived at a later date... Huerta has been much misrepresented and much misunderstood. Not a few have supposed him part Indian and wholly an ignorant peasant and a drunken, brutal sot to boot. Throughout the past five months he has shown himself to be what he was, a gentleman, an aristocrat of the highest type. 138

CARRANZA, THE VICTOR

After Huerta resigned, the leadership of Mexico was left to Villa and Carranza to fight over and Zapista, a most unlikely choice. The silence of the Protestant press gave indications of bafflement; both the prospective candidates were bandits and unscrupulous ones at that. It became essential to back the right horse, for a wrong choice might prove disastrous to their future missionary work in Mexico. With the future of both of these men so uncertain in 1914, little was said of them in the papers, except for the Christian Century, which occasionally highlighted the favor shown by Car-

137 This is the June 13, 1914 editorial quoted on p. 87.
138 July 23, 1914.
ranza to the Protestant Biblical Institute. Once the
Christian Advocate went out to boost Carranza "as the most
capable of establishing a stable government in Mexico"; but in December it was calling him an "upstart". All Carran­za enthusiasts however were embarrassed by the Independent's query concerning "the blood on Carranza's hands". According to the Presbyterian Banner "Carranza was proving himself a most stubborn customer". Villa, too, during these days would have found it difficult to fill his scrapbook with clippings from the Protestant press. With the exception of the Watchman-Examiner, which looked up to him as "the man to bring permanent peace"; and the Standard's evaluation of him as "the ladder by which Carranza alone could rise", kind words were wanting. Several papers in fact looked down on "this barbarian".

Carranza, however, was going to find 1915 a banner year, because a combination of Washington propaganda, Villa brutality and the New London Conference provided him with excellent, but not too stable stepping stones to reach the reins

140 Sept. 24, 1914.
141 Dec. 3, 1914.
142 Dec. 13, 1914.
143 July 23, 1914.
144 Dec. 10, 1914.
146 Christian Herald, April 12, 1914; Christian Advocate, Oct. 1, 1914.
of power. Then, another factor came into play, which almost universally united the Protestants in his support. It was the Catholic opposition in the United States to the recognition of this persecutor. The Christian Herald was among the first to realize the significance of this new era, when it rejoiced that

...Carranza has urged all true patriots to combine their strength against any reestablishment of the Church...Mexico is getting free.147

The open Carranza support came after the New London Conference, when the United States, in union with a large number of South American Republics, recognized the First Chief as Mexico's new president. "Light begins to dawn" was the Presbyterian Banner's reaction;148 while the Watchman-Examiner now hailed Carranza as "most trustworthy".149 Now that the ground seemed secured with United States' recognition, the Christian Herald abandoned its conservative restraint:

The American people are glad to greet Carranza as President of Mexico...From all that can be learned Carranza stands for the people of Mexico...His success will mark

147 May 21, 1915.
149 Nov. 14, 1915.
not only the beginning of a new history of Mexico, but an advanced step in the history of liberty, democracy, clean business and clean government! Viva Carranza! 150

In its jubilation the Christian Advocate also managed to strike a sarcastic note against Catholics:

It is Cardinal Gibbons who sets the tone, and the wail has been taken up all down the line. Why is the good Cardinal pitying Mexico? ... Order has been restored to such a point that President Wilson and his advisors feel justified in recognizing the existence of a de facto government ... All signs point to a dawning of a new day. 151

Were it not for their agreement in endorsing Carranza's persecution of the Church, one would wonder if the Advocate and Standard were talking about the same man. For the Standard voiced the opinion that

...for other reasons (than the persecution of Catholics) 152 we are against recognition - Carranza does not control the country ... Carranza has become a white hope which is neither very white nor very promising. 153

150 Nov. 10, 1915.
151 Dec. 9, 1915.
152 Taken from the previous context of the article.
153 Nov. 13, 1915.
THE WILSON STAR WANES

The year 1915 too centered attention on Woodrow Wilson in the Mexican problem, but he would perhaps have preferred less notoriety. The nation was becoming irritated not only at keeping the Mexican sore open by his "watchful waiting" policy, but by causing it to fester with his occasional meddling, which in time would demand mediation from outside. In high rage the Independent thought "it high time the President took the country into his confidence and let them know what he has in mind".¹⁵⁴ Two months later when the situation was growing darker, the explanation demanded of Wilson by the Independent was even more difficult to give, for

why we send the American Navy to Mexican waters to demand a redress for an incidental insult to the American flag, and yet have done nothing to protect the lives and property of foreigners - American and otherwise - in Mexico territory.¹⁵⁵

Soon there was grumbling, when it complained that "Wilson in translating his convictions into action has fallen into serious inconsistencies".¹⁵⁶ On the other hand, the Advance preferred "to hold Woodrow Wilson in high regard", while it

¹⁵⁴ Nov. 30, 1915.
¹⁵⁵ Jan. 25, 1915.
¹⁵⁶ Feb. 25, 1915.
blamed "the Administration for holding a policy in Mexico marked by great unsteadiness of purpose and not a wholly open mind". Then, when the anarchy became so widespread during March, 1915, the Independent advocated a new policy:

...the time had come when a strong hand from without must be laid upon the clashing factions that peace may be restored...But it must be a Pan-American intervention.158

The Presbyterian Banner was in full sympathy with such a measure and was certain that "even the President is weary of his watchful waiting policy and is on the point of intervening". The return of the dread spectre of war was the straw that broke the back of the Christian Herald's patience with the President's policy, since it was convinced that

...the bloodshed in Mexico could have been prevented...for in the matter of foreign relations and in making decisions that might lead us into war, the Constitution...gives far too much opportunity of independent action to the President.160

The Protestant papers were momentarily won back by the President with his recognition of Carranza and the hope for peace; but such prospects soon vanished with new and more

157 Feb. 11, 1915.
159 June 3, 1915.
160 June 16, 1915.
vigorous attacks of Villa against the First Chief. The 
Christian Herald, however, as the newly recognized President's 
 staunchest supporter, begged that "Carranza be given a fair
and ample opportunity of his proving his ability to cope with
the situation". Yet after Carranza refused to cooperate
with us in preventing Villa's border town raids, the Standard predicted that

our unpreparedness in coping with
the situation is certain to be an
important factor in the popular
decisions next November as to who
will be the next President of the
United States.

The crisis actually became so serious after a skirmish be-
tween Carranza's soldiers and American forces, that even the
Christian Herald doubted Carranza's peaceful intentions and
admitted that

...once again the country has
been brought to the verge of war
...if it is war, let us face it
bravely and unflinchingly, know-
ing that we have sought nothing
but simple justice.

The continued insults of Carranza to our Govern-
ment were fast sacrificing him his popularity in the United
States. Nevertheless, he still had a few champions in the

162 May 20, 1916.
163 July 5, 1916.
northern republic, among them the Methodist Review. Yet when one considers the chaos in Mexico during this period, its editor made the Review appear quite ridiculous by allowing an article to be printed that heralded the

...gradual spread of the arts of peace under his leadership which is proving beyond all doubt that in Carranza we have a man of superior personal qualities and of lofty statesmanship.

The Christian Herald, however, was wise as well as loyal and it was well aware of the possible harm wrought to the cause by a direct defense. So it drew on the ever-rich reserve of favorable sentiment: It blamed Carranza's troubles on the misrepresentation of the Catholic Church:

The attitude of the revolution to the Church has been the subject of a long campaign of misrepresentation which forms the basis of a concerted attack by the Catholics of this country on Mr. Wilson's policy...An example: The atrocities of which the Carranzistas - these are insignificant and negligible.

It was only the world war that saved Carranza. The de jure recognition extended to our next door neighbor on March 3, 1917, was not an admission of Carranza's success in the Presidency, nor endorsement of Woodrow Wilson's policy -

164 July, 1916.
165 Aug. 9, 1916.
for we had just abandoned the pursuit of Villa a month ago in utter disgust with Mexican affairs - but it was a move of expediency to allow the President to devote his energies to Europe. The Protestant press, almost universally accepted with satisfaction the formal recognition as the finale of the whole sorry business. The Standard, though, could not fool itself, and an article in early 1917 summed up perfectly the result of Woodrow Wilson's years of meddling:

The Carranza movement which was hailed as the dawning of a new era, has but plunged the country deeper into the night of chaos, and utter hopelessness.166

That the Protestant press considered the Mexican crisis of great moment and our President's policy wise is a self-evident conclusion. The Catholic press too viewed the tragedy of our southern neighbor with concern, even a deeper concern, because the Mexican nation racked by revolution and overrun with anti-clerical politicians was traditionally Catholic. In the past, the Catholic press generally had refrained from editorials on political issues, but Wilson's support of the tools of the anti-clericals, Carranza and Villa, had exhausted the patience of even the most long-suffering of the Jobs, who edited the Catholic papers. An investi-

166 Jan. 13, 1917.
igation of these Catholic papers then, will enable us to examine the other side of the tapestry on which was woven the intricate and confusing pattern of United States-Mexican politics. 167

167 Since the tone of the Protestant press, generally speaking, was definitely anti-Catholic whenever the interest of the two conflicted, it is evident that the opinion of the Catholic press will differ. Examples of extreme bigotry in some editorials of a few of the Protestant papers have been included in the appendix.
CHAPTER III

THE ATTITUDE OF THE CATHOLIC PRESS

While the Protestant was a stranger to Mexico, the Catholic was at home, for the nation was Catholic. This phenomenon is easily understood, if one knows that the Spaniard had been the conqueror. This conquistador might have lusted for gold, but he also thirsted for souls. Wherever he raised the Spanish flag, the missionary planted Christ's Cross. Nor did the Mexicans refuse to take up His Cross. When our armies entered Mexico in 1846, they found the Faith still thriving in city Cathedrals and wayside shrines. Many Catholics in our armies found it difficult to fight against their brethren of the same Faith, and some even deserted.

The editors of the Catholic press in this country, nevertheless, were invariably in favor of the United States Government's policy, in spite of the fact that Whig Journalism consistently belabored the Administration and condemned the war. Most of the Catholic papers seem to have committed themselves, consciously or unconsciously, to somewhat the same policy. The principles underlying this policy can be grasped from the following representative editorial:
A press, particularly a Catholic press, to be free should have no communion with political parties; not even the most remote; for, if it has...the freedom of opinions under consideration becomes falsified, and is converted into a sort of trumpet for those who patronize the paper.

The Catholic press should, therefore, be as careful not to suppress public opinion against the abuses of "the powers that be", when they affect the rights and privileges of the Catholic body, as it is in not giving currency to crude and unfounded charges against it.

Concretely, though, the policy might briefly be described as being the publication, sometime at the beginning of the war, of an editorial in support of the government and stating the Catholic attitude. After that, however, there was little constructive effort on the part of the press to build up a spirit favorable to the war. This was not due to a change of attitude or a loss of interest. Possibly, it was the result of a more dispassionate and clearer consideration of the justice and necessity of the war by those who dictated the policies of the papers. Secondly, there was an honest regret that the war was being fought against a Catholic country.

Finally, the anti-bellum bias which was directed against the

1 *Catholic Observer*, Boston, June 5, 1857.
Mexicans by the sectarian and public press was a source of resentment. All three of these reasons may not have held in the case of each paper, but certainly, each of them had its influence upon some one paper. It must also be remembered that the Catholic press as such was comparatively young. Most of the papers referred to here had had a more or less short, or even a spasmodic career. It seems unwarranted to subscribe to the idea that the Catholic press aligned itself with the administration as a mere matter of policy. However, in view of the ordeals through which Catholics had passed very shortly before at the hands of religious bigots, who burned their churches and attacked their priests, it would not have been strange if the papers had felt disinclined to participate in any controversy.

The period between 1910-1917, however, presented an entirely different picture. Internal revolutions were Mexico's chief problem, until our meddlings threatened to engulf both nations in a war. As in the First Mexican War, a patriotic fervor swept over the Catholic press when our soldiers marched into Mexico. When the Washington Administration,

though, decided to mollify the Mexicans by abetting an anti-clerical government, even the papers, which previously had confined themselves to the recording of conversions, ordinations, church building, and local trivials, felt bound to raise their voice in protest. This growing consciousness of the Catholic editor's duty to protest against political policies, which threatened moral harm, marked out the Catholic press during this period.

By the end of 1910, the peace that Diaz had brought to Mexico was suffering from his despotism. At the turn of the century, the Sacred Heart Review had endorsed Diaz's regime, for "compared with New England towns in morality, home comfort, and well being, the Mexican towns make such a good showing", yet within ten years many young Mexicans were convinced that the democratic government of New England was preferable to many of their "essentials of well-being". The Ave Maria, being North of the Rio Grande, was able to express what many Mexicans judged better to keep in their hearts:

When one of the very great-est men of his time rules with wisdom and justice - it is cert-ainly employing the phrase to

3 Sacred Heart Review, Boston, Feb. 10, 1900.
signify what its very antithesis would better express. 4

Except for America and a few scattered editorials like the one above, little information on the Mexican situation, however, could be gleaned from the Catholic press. America sensed that Mexico, like an active volcano, was on the verge of eruption; and after it watched with a pitying eye the eighth inauguration of Diaz, it uttered a tragic forecast which was to be fulfilled to the letter:

In our opinion, the aged President did not know when to quit. He had made Mexico. When he came in the people welcomed him. He responded to their hopes, expectations...What lasting glory would have been that of Diaz if he had recognized the signs of the times and had gracefully bowed himself off the stage while the audience was still good natured or at least tolerant? And now in the bitterness of his heart, he hears the hurrahs of yesterday changed into the curses of today. 5

Yet there were still ardent admirers, who could not conceive of a defeated Diaz. America, though; could read the minds of the people, as they watched their oil and other resources leave the country under foreign management, and so it

4 Ave Maria, South Bend, Feb. 7, 1910.
bluntly remarked that "...many judge with misgiving the concessions to foreign capital". The confirmation of this observation came with the resignation of Diaz's cabinet early in 1911, and America concluded that even Diaz "recognized the evil" and "admits that there is now public opinion in Mexico". And when Diaz resigned, it bid him farewell with a sigh of relief: "Adios Diaz...Man can now speak".

As anarchy took a firmer hold on Mexico in the years that followed, the Catholic press, which by then had become far more alert to world issues, would occasionally in a reflective mood manifest more of an appreciation for the old peaceful days of Diaz's reign. An editorial in the Catholic Herald typified this trend, as it recalled that "under Diaz this one thing could be said - there was order, if there was very little law". The Month also echoed the refrain that "Diaz had been somewhat arbitrary in his rule, but he had kept the country in tranquillity and growing prosperity for over thirty years". Extension felt, though,

6 Dec. 24, 1910.  
7 April 15, 1911.  
8 April 29, 1911.  
that Diaz had destroyed Democracy by suppressing the nation's will which had once placed him in power, and consequently, the Mexican people could find expression only in the "Sword."

The shock of the Mexican revolutions, however, was felt around the globe, because of the immense amount of foreign capital invested in Mexican resources. In the United States the advocates of annexation were causing the murmur of intervention to become audible. America tried to convince itself that "these hazy and foolish dreams of conquest - if they exist...are entertained by irresponsible individuals to the exclusion of men in authority". By March, it was alarmed at these "irresponsible individuals", and the editor was of the belief that all reasonable precautions should be taken by our government in proper regard for our national dignity to "prevent our citizens from burying themselves too earnestly with the household affairs of our neighbor".

When the danger of United States' intervention had passed and revolutionary activity attendant on the resignation of Diaz had subsided, the Ave Maria expressed its gratitude to President Taft for

...having done all in his power to prevent a war. It is easy to

11 Extension, Chicago, Feb., 1915.
12 Jan. 7, 1911.
13 March 18, 1911.
see what might have happened in the circumstances had the occupant of the White House been a man of different training and temperament. 14

With the renewal of the war threat, the Sacred Heart Review, however, became indignant at "the Yellow Journals that took us into war against Cuba, and are trying to engage us in war against Mexico".15 And in November it continued the plea for peace identified with this weekly, as its readers were warned that if we fight Mexico, her divided factions will unite against us, and concluded with the nation's desire for peace: "The Great Body of American people don't want war".16

The Catholic Telegraph, however, stated that it would not comment on the trend of events, but that it would reprint a few paragraphs from a critique of the situation in the Baltimore Sun for December 11, 1911. In these, the Sun blamed Washington for hatching the revolution as a means of forcing Diaz into exile, and for permitting President Zelaya of Nicaragua to escape to Mexico in a Mexican vessel.17

MADERO IN POWER

With the resignation of Diaz, all eyes were focused

14 June 17, 1911.
15 Aug. 30, 1911.
16 Nov. 8, 1913.
17 Catholic Telegraph, Cincinnati, Dec. 14, 1911.
on his successor. While America had grown unfriendly to Diaz, from the very beginning it distrusted Madero:

But alas! Madero with the Presidential bee in his bonnet has furnished the occasion for a fresh source of suspicion and dissatisfaction against the United States...His recent revolutionary spasm called for a larger outlay than he could afford...the money came from an outside source.18

Yet reason, not prejudice, guided America's Mexican policy; the rational rather than the emotional element was preponderant in its editorials. This was well exemplified in its editorials full of grave doubts on the universal suffrage measures endorsed by Madero, which, generally speaking, received such acclaim in the United States. It felt that universal suffrage at that time was "not prudent", for the Mexicans in their intense patriotism are attracted by an "individual - not the system he stands for".19 Hence some petty military leader thus elected may dispel "all the roseate dreams of reform, liberty and popular government".20 America too, influ-

18 Dec. 24, 1910. In the June 17th issue, America printed an editorial in which the Madero Government claimed the revolution cost but $300,000. America's editor granted the possibility of the claim, yet as it was shown in Chapter I, America's suspicion was justified, and even correct, if the Standard Oil Company was guilty of attempting to finance the Madero Revolution.

19 April 8, 1911.

20 April 15, 1911.
enced other periodicals; one of them was the Fortnightly Review, which also had little faith in the successful future of the new Mexican leader. For it, the new dictator was a weak character and his rise to power was a mere accident. "Viva Madero meant only down with Diaz, nothing more". 21

Yet strange to say, the following week, America, after a perusal of Madero's platform, changed its tone and enthusiastically exclaimed that

If Madero, the triumphant revolutionist, is indeed a dreamer and an enthusiast, his manifesto to his country is far from showing it...There is nothing of the fanatic and frenzied partisan in such advice. 22

After an overwhelming election made this man President, who twelve months previous was the leader of what seemed an impossible revolution, the Sacred Heart Review could not refrain from admiring him as "no ordinary man". 23

After his election, Madero struggled for two years to effect his proposed reforms, but Mexican patience had its limits, and the people's accustomed expression of political dissatisfaction was uttered by a volley of guns. The Catholic papers gave only casual mention to Mexican political affairs.

21 Fortnightly Review, St. Louis, July 15, 1911.
22 July 22, 1911.
23 Nov. 18, 1911.
The overthrow of the Madero government failed to cause any great stir, and even his murder provided editorial matter for but a few. The Sacred Heart Review, however, was evidently moved and seriously doubted Huerta's explanation to Wilson that Madero and Suarez were shot by their comrades in a rescue attempt. A few years later the Extension also voiced the opinion that "it was a crime to murder them".

The Monitor of San Francisco, though, had acquired evidence from another quarter and was convinced that

...whatever the facts of the Mexican situation, one point is clear: The Free Masons are determined to have the head of Huerta for his alleged killing of Madero. But those who know say Huerta is innocent. No matter his doom has been sealed in the lodge room.

Since the world at large refused to let the incident die of its own accord, the Fortnightly Review in 1916, felt obliged to print a defense of Huerta, testified to by a well known Mexican Bishop, who had personal contact with Huerta's cabinet. This paper held emphatically that

Huerta at a cabinet meeting positively and vehemently refused to

24 March 1, 1913.
25 Feb., 1915.
26 Monitor, San Francisco, Dec. 6, 1913.
listen to a proposal to kill Madero...After Huerta left, the Cabinet decided on Madero's death;

and it concluded with an explanatory note:

...Huerta did not punish them, because of a previous unguarded promise 'to stand by them'.

The deep silence of the Catholic press, generally speaking, during the first years of revolution, and especially after Madero's death, gave rise to the insinuation that the Church condemned the Revolutionist movement. America, though, saw the blessings in this adversity for "it sounded the alarm for the Catholics to rise from their lethargy of years". In real amazement the Extension wondered why the Church would be anxious for the downfall of a man, who had given Mexico some semblance of fair and honest elections and seemed to favor religious liberty. The Catholic News claimed reliable evidence that "the Catholic Church was entirely innocent of intrigue against the unfortunate Madero".

Madero's death was to prove no blessing for Huerta, for it brought down on his head the opposition of the Washington Administration. This stand was going to serve as the

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29 May, 1915.
springboard for the attack of the Catholic press in the coming years. Among the first of the weeklies which strove to convince Wilson of his error was America. As far back as May, 1913, it warned that "a failure to recognize the Huerta Government will lead inevitably to American intervention". Again it rose to Huerta's defense in answer to the serious charges hurled against him by the non-sectarian and Protestant presses:

Huerta's program is the only saving and reasonable one... The picture of Huerta is most reassuring. He seems to be the man of the hour and is far from the bloodthirsty usurper that he is presented to be by not wholly disinterested parties. 32

WILSON'S SPECIAL AGENTS

In Washington, Wilson replied to the cry for action, as we have seen, by sending a personal representative to Mexico. The silence of the Catholic press on William Bayard Hale's mission was broken by the Catholic Mind in an article, which proved to be a perfect mirroring of Catholic opinion. It contented itself in calling him

...a preacher of unenviable notoriety, who flitted through the country, associated with Masonry and priest haters and having re-

31 May 31, 1913.
32 Aug. 16, 1913.
ported to Washington, boasted in a published article that he has decided Wilson against Huerta... which accusation was never denied. 33

Hale's mission also resulted in the recall of the Mexican Ambassador, H. L. Wilson. While it did not commit itself either way on the President's action, America in fairness reported that the Ambassador in his appearance before the Senate investigation Committee had completely won over a prejudiced Senate. 34

The next step of the Washington Administration was not less unpopular: John Lind was appointed the new confidential agent of Wilson. In a most unconvincing manner America added that "it based hope on the Lind mission". 35 The Catholic press reaction was delayed, as was usual on the whole Mexican question. Then, late in 1914, the Catholic Mind in a fiery article was indignant at Lind's partisanship and breach of faith in siding the Constitutionalists with smuggled arms, as was proved by a series of editorials in the New York Herald Tribune. 36 The very same charge was reiterated by America, and it further demanded that "somebody must speak" in Washington.

33 Oct., 1914.
34 Aug. 9, 1913.
35 Aug. 16, 1913.
36 Feb. 1914.
ton to explain such action by one of its officials. 37 The Extension considered him a "bigoted representative" for his acquiescence and even encouragement of "exiling and murdering of nuns". 38 As the months passed the voice of this same periodical grew louder and sharper; in a year's time Lind was the target of some truly cutting sarcasm:

As long as he kept his mouth closed we surmised that there was much wisdom hidden somewhere in his head...when Mr. Lind opened his mouth to speak, he revealed the vacuity concealed in the sphinxlike solidity of his head. We have queer ambassadors these days. 39

While the criticism of the Catholic News was more dignified, it was not less sharp in describing Lind as "cutting a sorry picture". 40 In the estimation of the Brooklyn Tablet, all of Wilson's foreign troubles were due to the incompetency of his so-called diplomats. 41

Lind's mission ended in complete failure, when in October 1914, the dictator defied Washington's demand for a democratic election. The Ave Maria sensed that the President's pride had been injured and so it pleaded "on the part of wis-

37 July 4, 1914.
38 Nov. 14, 1914.
39 Feb. 1915.
40 July 2, 1915.
41 Brooklyn Tablet, Brooklyn, New York, Dec. 18, 1915.
dom...to heed the warning against intervention in Mexico". 42
In a brief editorial the Catholic Telegraph voiced approval
of President Wilson's previous efforts to avoid war and warned
the "Jingoes" that the horrors, destruction and cost of war
should give them pause before urging intervention, and urged
them instead to support the President's humane policy. 43

The President, however, altered some of the humane
aspects of his policy, when he lifted the Arms Embargo in
February 1914. Disapproval took a year to reach print, and
then, the Ave Maria accused our government of prolonging the
reign of terror by lifting the Embargo. 44 When the Catholic
News protested, it was far stronger, because in early 1916,
the United States seemed unable to avoid a Mexican war:

This murderer Villa, it may be worthwhile remembering, is the man
who with Carranza, in the early
days of the uprising against Huerta
was aided by Wilson's watchful
waiting policy that allowed arms
and ammunition to be shipped from
the United States. No doubt the
very guns which his followers shot
the Americans with last Monday were
those the Wilson Policy permitted
Villa to secure. 45

42 Nov. 21, 1913.
44 June 10, 1915.
45 June 15, 1916. The underlined words are those of the
thesis writer.
WAR CLOUDS APPEAR

The Embargo, however, did attract more attention to Wilson's policy, which the *Fortnightly Review* characterized as "that of watchful drift". Then, the Tampico incident occurred, which resulted in further changes in policy and the sending of troops to seize Vera Cruz. The concrete reality of war, blood and death, gave the Catholic press the sadly needed jolt required to wake it up. With one hundred percent support of our Government's action, the *Catholic Telegraph* declared that there was no other course but to apply force, and it was sure that "Mexico will come to understand that our action is a blessing in disguise...and based on fraternal solicitude...We support Wilson's diplomacy". The *Catholic News* also breathed deeply of the patriotic air and exhaled denunciation of Huerta's refusal to salute the flag as "humiliating to the United States"; then, in purest simplicity went on to boast that the first public utterance in support of the President has come from the Catholic Club of New York City, and it concluded with whole hearted support of the President's effort "to maintain the dignity and honor of our beloved country". It was a most reluctant editor of

46 April 15, 1914.
47 April 23, 1914.
48 April 23, 1914.
the Baltimore Catholic Review that joined in the flag waving as he informed his readers that patriotism demands support of the President, yet "we hope that further bloodshed will be avoided". That this editorial was inspired by a sense of duty to the country became evident after one read another editorial on the same page, which stated that "the right to intervene in Mexico...does not seem to be ours". In turn, the Brooklyn Tablet confined itself to pointing out some aspects of Catholic patriotism. The real high note in Wilson laudation, though, was sung by the editor of the Catholic News in commemoration of the eighteen blue jackets who gave their lifes' blood at Vera Cruz:

President Wilson has made an address that has thrilled the nation...It was the first step in the achievement of that noble aim that these young men honored fell last Monday.

An action, nevertheless, that might have meant war, was a sure source of irritation to a few such as the Sacred Heart Review, who were among the chief advocates of peace. It regretted that the Washington Administration "did not keep its temper a little longer", and then it indulged in sarcasm:

49 May 2, 1914.
50 May 2, 1914.
51 May 16, 1914.
52 May 16, 1914.
The resolution of Congress disclaims all hostility to the Mexican people; but a shell from a ten inch gun does not stop to differentiate between a number of the Mexican people and a follower of Huerta.

While the *Western Catholic* limited itself "to hoping and praying for peace", the *Michigan Catholic* perceived no reason for sugar-coating the truth:

*War! The ominous word has gone forth and some of our brave lads have already given their magnificent youths for—what? Few of us really know, while most of us regret Admiral Mayo's unwise haste...*

By 1916, the *Brooklyn Tablet* felt the same, as it pointed back to Vera Cruz "as Mr. Wilson's Waterloo".

Mr. Wilson would have discovered Vera Cruz to be his Waterloo long before 1916, if he had not been saved from a Mexican war by the timely intervention of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to arbitrate the two nations' difficulties. With this offer the *Sacred Heart Review* revived its peace hopes; while the *Catholic News* and *Fortnightly Review* rejoiced that a war had been averted.

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53 April 25, 1914.
54 *Western Catholic*, Quincy, Ill., May 8, 1914.
55 *Michigan Catholic*, Detroit, April 30, 1914.
56 July 1, 1916.
57 May 2, 1914.
58 May 2, 1914.
59 May 15, 1914.
Although the war threat had given place to peace hopes, the Catholic press, henceforth, became keenly interested in the Mexican question. Wilson's policy was now a common editorial topic; a subject of the most loyal defenses and the sharpest attacks. After May 1914, however, the defenders were few. It surprised nobody to find the *Sacred Heart Review* complaining that the punishment of Huerta for his refusal to salute the flag had been superseded by a so-called war of service.60 For the *Fortnightly Review* the Mexican horizon was brighter, yet it still doubted the wisdom of much of Wilson's policy.61 As for *America*, it could see absolutely no reason to compliment the

...President for his attitude towards Mexico, which has been a puzzle to the country at large. From the very beginning his friends and foes alike have been dissatisfied with his sphinx-like reticence...Neither equity nor law justified the sending of our army into Mexico. 62

The President's puzzling policy stirred up only more disfavor, when it proved powerless to curtail Villa's crimes. In exasperation the *Brooklyn Tablet* hoped that the protests from the British and French Governments would cause Wilson to

60 June 13, 1914.
61 June 7, 1914.
62 June 6, 1914.
realize that more definite action must be taken to preserve life and property in Mexico. 63 A warning, though, was America's message in its all too true prediction that Wilson, in receiving Carranza delegates, and in assuring them of sincere friendship, was going to find himself "in an extremely embarrassing position before long"; 64 while two weeks later it lamented that the Washington authorities have put themselves in such an awkward diplomatic position by "playing the part of the protecting aegis" to a rascally horde commanded by Villa. 65 These same outrages also were too much for the patient Indiana Catholic, which wished to arouse other papers to protest against the Wilson Administration for its responsibility in placing the Constitutionalist in power. 66 The opposite view, though, was still held by the Catholic Telegraph, Democrat in sympathy, which still believed that the moral influence of Wilson's policy in union with the ABC mediators would compel the Constitutionalist to show some justice to the Church. 67

If Wilson's effort to help Mexico in the fall of 1913 was the index of the Catholic press influence, it would have been a miserable failure. Yet this did not discourage

63 July 25, 1914.
64 Aug. 1, 1914.
65 Aug. 15, 1914.
66 Indiana Catholic, Indianapolis, Aug. 15, 1914.
67 July 30, 1914.
the papers from continuing to remind Washington of its duty. The Catholic Telegraph by September, 1914, was gradually losing its confidence in the panacea of Wilson's policy, so that it called upon the American Federation of Catholic Societies "to utilize its influence to the utmost to obtain effective action from Washington". To the Monitor, it seemed a contradiction that America prays for peace for a war torn Europe, while at the same time "she grasps in friendship the bloody hand that harasses the Mexican people". The Fortnightly Review pointed the accusing finger at our Government as being responsible for the Carranza outrages, which followed on the heels of Huerta's removal from power. A completely different aspect, however, was considered by the Extension, which shifted the blame from President Wilson to "ourselves", because our government is a representative organization.

PRESS PROTESTS INCREASE

As long as Woodrow Wilson preferred to overlook the atrocities committed by the followers of Villa and Carranza, his favor with the Catholic press continued to wane. Even the Canadian Catholics were disgusted with the President's failure

68 Sept. 24, 1914.
69 Oct. 17, 1914.
70 Oct. 15, 1914.
71 Nov., 1914.
to act. But one of their papers, the Catholic Record, became more annoyed with the passivity of the Catholic papers in the United States than with the President:

But so far with the exception of America and the protests of the Federation of Catholic Societies, and the feeble bleats from a few newspapers we have heard nothing. Perhaps, they don't wish...to embarrass the government or are too persistent in devotion to Job, their patron saint. 72

The following week a few more papers, perhaps stirred by the challenge, expressed their sentiments. Disgust colored the Boston Pilot's comment on our government's absolute indifference to the most brutal outrages taking place at our very door. 73 In this observation the Brooklyn Tablet, in contrast to the Catholic Record's charge, concluded that "the Catholic newspapers of the country seem pretty unanimously to have come to the conclusion...that the time has come...to voice protest to the Administration in Washington". 74 While out West, the voice of the Intermountain Catholic was heard complaining, because those in Washington failed to take notice that Catholic Americans were demanding protection of their co-religionists in

72 Catholic Record, London, Canada, Nov. 1, 1914.
73 Boston Pilot, Boston, Nov. 12, 1914.
74 Nov. 21, 1914.
Mexico. 75 The Newark Monitor, in its turn, attributed the source and continuance of Mexican anarchy to Mexican Masons rather than to Washington politicians. 76 The reply of the St. Paul Bulletin, however, asked why the papers were so silent, when reliable evidence had been offered to prove that priests were being murdered and nuns ravished by Villa and Carranza bands? 77 America, though, encouraged its readers with an optimistic forecast based on Secretary of State Bryan's promise that

...when the time arrives for recognition the Department of State assures you that the question of religious freedom in Mexico will receive due consideration. 78

After the President's annual message to Congress in December, 1914, the country's attention was again drawn to his foreign policy, for in this address he failed to mention the Mexican situation. Many of the Catholic papers began to doubt the President's sincerity. Just previous to the address, the Brooklyn Tablet let it be known that all were most anxious to know the President's foreign plans. 79 This inexcusable omission was immediately made the theme of the none too

75 Intermountain Catholic, Salt Lake City, Nov. 12, 1914.
76 Newark Monitor, Newark, Nov. 15, 1914.
78 Dec. 5, 1914. (This promise was never kept).
79 Dec. 5, 1914.
friendly Sacred Heart Review's next editorial:

Treating of our foreign policy the President says: "We are at peace with the world"...Mr. Wilson may congratulate himself and pat himself on the back...but this country represented is directly responsible for all the crimes...in Mexico, and the memory of them like the ghost of Banquo, will not down; it will not be hidden by fine phrases. 80

The President also received a quiet reminder from America that when we entered Mexico there was at least some semblance of law, but when we left it there was nothing but chaos. 81 Even the faithful Catholic Telegraph was alienated from the President:

...before God and the world Mr. Wilson is rightly held responsible for the regime in Mexico. While pursuing a course of 'watchful waiting' we earnestly hope that we will not be compelled to wait much longer. 82

Nor could the Denver Register interpret the message in any other light than that the Administration was trying to take refuge behind the excuse of non-interference. The editor then demanded that the Administration adopt immediate measures to undo the evil already perpetrated, or accept full responsi-

80 Dec. 12, 1914.
81 Dec. 12, 1914.
82 Dec. 10, 1914.
bility for the crimes of the Constitutionalists. 83

EVALUATION OF HUERTA

During the troubled days of 1914, however, Wilson was not the only personage connected with the Mexican story. There were also three leading Mexicans featured in the dramatic personae: Huerta, Villa and Carranza. The leading role was assumed by the dictator, Huerta, in the tragedy of his own fall from power. While our Administration was expending great effort to secure a change in the Mexican Government, the Extension suggested that it would do better if it spent more time asking itself "after Huerta - What, instead of after Huerta - Who". 84 The Sacred Heart Review, while far more sympathetic to Huerta than Wilson, nevertheless, was irritated at the narrow minded, rather than rational, editorials written by some of the esteemed Catholic correspondents, who have found reason for Wilson's opposition to Huerta...because he is a Catholic...and his tacit approval of Carranza...because he is anti-Catholic. Let us have some common sense in our comments on the President and his attitudes toward Huerta. His statesmanship may be at fault...He may have the Mexican bull by the

83 Denver Register, Denver, Dec. 26, 1914.
84 Feb., 1914.
wrong horns; but he deserves better than to have suspicions cast upon his good faith. 85

Our Government's treatment of Huerta during the Tampico incident served to tighten the bonds of friendship already existing between Huerta and several of the Catholic weeklies. Wilson was rubbing a sore spot in his unjustified opposition to Huerta. In the mind of the Brooklyn Tablet Huerta was no worse than those Mexican officials whom we were befriending. Therefore, the Administration should clean up Mexico thoroughly or allow Huerta to rule. 86 In the eyes of America, the Tampico incident boomeranged on the President, for

Our Government has refused to recognize Huerta...yet a nation was asked to make reparation through its chief officer. Here is recognition...Such a dilemma is embarrassing for the President. 87

The Baltimore Catholic Review judged it only fair to keep in mind Huerta's courtesy towards the United States, in spite of "all the ridiculous fuss...caused by that little 'tempest in the teapot' - the Tampico incident". 88

85 March 28, 1914.
86 April 25, 1914.
87 April 25, 1914.
88 Catholic Review, Baltimore, Aug. 1, 1914. Henceforth, only the title Catholic Review will be used.
Huerta's resignation found the majority of the Catholic papers also unable to join in the universal joy of the secular and Protestant press. The Catholic Review did not hesitate to throw the damp rag on such rejoicing by the reminder that the flight of Huerta was not the end of Mexico's trouble, but only an introduction to a worse state of existence under the government of Carranza and Villa. In an issue a month later, it appealed to the President's sense of fair play by asking him to go before the people and "admit his mistake".

Although its effort reaped no fruit, the Catholic press continued to defend Huerta in the hope of eventually convincing the President of his mistaken policy. To the Columbiad, it seemed that the Catholic press was failing to influence Washington because a greater power, the Masons, was interfering with any attempts to secure Huerta's recognition by Wilson. This opinion, too, was held by the Catholic Mind. In the opinion of the Sacred Heart Review, Huerta was no worse than the men whom our government favored; while the

89 Aug. 1, 1914.
90 Sept. 9, 1914.
91 Columbiad, New Haven, Oct., 1914.
92 Oct. 1914.
93 Nov. 14, 1914.
Catholic Standard and Times was disgusted with the Administration's support of two "ex-bandits of the most repulsive type".94 A positive approach, though, was adopted by Michigan Catholic, which quoted our diplomat, Nelson O'Shaughnesssey, as saying that "Huerta has been grossly vilified by the press of the United States...He is not the drunkard, he is made to appear".95 Even from across the sea Huerta was recognized as Mexico's man of the hour, who had been rejected.96

Huerta, however, was not considered the Mexican panacea by all Catholics. There were exceptions. With much delight would Wilson have read the Catholic Northwest Progress, which confirmed his policy:

There are some who think that Huerta was a devout Catholic and the protagonist of the Catholics of Mexico. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The United States did right in not recognizing him.97

The General was also soundly spanked by the pro-Wilsonian half of the sometimes divided Catholic Review's editorial staff, which spoke of him as

95 Nov. 21, 1914.
96 Month, Jan. 1915.
97 Catholic Northwest Progress, Seattle, Oct. 31, 1914.
...scoundrel, unworthy of the position he has usurped, full of savage instincts which he lets loose, and condemned by the President of the United States, Huerta must be eliminated.

While the Fortnightly Review opposed Carranza, it challenged the pro-Huerta papers to offer proof that the former dictator would have established a permanent peace, if they were going to make such statements. The dispute that followed added nothing of note to what was already known. Both the Catholic News, and the Month, however, strongly held that Huerta was "a just and competent ruler" and "would have brought order to Mexico".

VILLA, THE BANDIT

Huerta also shared the newspaper headlines during 1914 with the second lead in the Mexican tragedy: Villa, "a bandit without conscience, a bloody murderer for hire". Like two weights poised on a balance, he rose when Huerta fell. Strange to say, the reputedly clever Wilson was grooming this reprobate to take over the reins of government. This was too much for the Catholic Mind, which held that this likely com-

98 July 4, 1914.
99 April 15, 1916.
100 May 11, 1916; June 1, 1916.
101 Jane, 1916.
102 July 22, 1916.
103 America, Mar. 13, 1913.
testant for supreme authority was an "ignorant illiterate, a bandit and a murderer". If Wilson was really going to shake hands with Villa, America thought it should be called to the attention of our Government that a violent anarchist recently arrested in Spain had letters on his person, which proved he had been in frequent communication with the Mexican rebels.

What really worried the Catholic press, though, was the prospect of United States' recognition of Villa. The alarm was sounded by the Catholic News:

A government...with Villa as a dominating influence could not logically be recognized by the United States. Mr. Wilson, to be consistent with himself, could not shake hands with one who indulges in murder by wholesale. The future of Mexican Constitutionalism demands the elimination of Villa in a political quantity.

On the same day, too, the Baltimore Catholic Review sounded the same alarm. There were no bouquets for President Wilson for wise diplomacy either by the Catholic Bulletin, which frankly acknowledged that the United States knowingly or unknowingly, has allowed itself to be placed in a position of

104 June, 1914.
105 June 6, 1914.
106 July 4, 1914.
107 July 4, 1914.
abetting "the so-called Constitutionalists in their unholy war of rapine, murder and especially of aiding the cut-throat like Villa". 108 At the moment when Villa's star seemed to be setting over the White House, the Catholic Review's former meek disagreement gave way to a terrified scream. 109

The mention of Villa immediately brought up the associations of Carranza and the Constitutionalist cause. Thus Carranza was assigned a minor supporting role by the Catholic press during 1914. Yet his connection with the Constitutionalists would prepare his way for prominence in the coming years. At that time the Constitutionalists' outrages seemed to be leading to intervention. The Morning Star asked: "Shall such things be tolerated under the protection of the American flag?" 110 And when American Catholics became the subject of ridicule for their defense of the persecuted Mexicans, the Catholic News minced no words in informing the abusers that "since the Government of this country aided the Constitutionalist to gain the upper hand...It ought to interfere to prevent such barbarity as is practiced there today." 111

OPPOSITION TO WILSON

Villa and Carranza might be the immediate instru-

108 July 18, 1914.
111 Oct. 24, 1914.
ments causing all this chaos, but many felt as the *Month* did, that the President's apathy had furnished the moral encouragement and the material means of innumerable and unspeakable brutalities. This editorial served as an introduction and index of what the Catholic press had in store for the President during the coming year of 1915. Frequently he was going to find himself embarrassed by editorials like those of the *Fortnightly Review* which asked him what he was doing to prevent the outrages in Mexico; or why had he broken his promise made through Secretary Bryan to make religious freedom a prime consideration in extending recognition to Mexico? The London Catholic *Month* thought the only solution the President could offer would be intervention, and it proceeded to justify such an action on grounds quite novel to pagan America:

...It is a delicate matter for a British Journal in present circumstances to criticize any detail of the American Administration, but we are sure that those in the States feel as we do...While there was a prospect of restoring order in Mexico under the strong rule of Huerta, President Wilson brought pressure to have him dismissed and succeeded...Yet now the President

112 Jan. 1915.
113 Jan. 1, 1915.
wants to give them freedom in their own affairs... Wilson stands by and asks - Am I my brother's keeper? Just as the individual is bound to give help to the neighbor unjustly attacked, so the State must succour a neighbor state plunged in disorder which it cannot itself remedy. The Christian Doctrine on the subject was plainly declared by Pope Pius IX in 1860 when in the Encyclical Novos et Ante he condemned the principle of "Non-Intervention".

While this barrage of accusations was laid down, one of the good words spoken for the President presented an interesting aside. During this period of Catholic discontentment with existing Mexican policies, a malicious rumor spread rapidly and far that Wilson had insulted Cardinal Gibbons at an interview. The Baltimore Catholic Review, the official organ for Cardinal Gibbons, which always strove to keep the Catholic Mexican protest not only on a factual, but also a fair basis, gave front page prominence to the refutation of the charge of Wilson's disrespect. The article merely recorded an interview with Monsignor Russell, who accompanied the Cardinal to the White House:

I (Monsignor Russell) can say if the President addressed the Cardinal as "Mr."... For I

114 Feb., 1915.
was not more than two feet from the President during the whole interview...and I did not hear him.115

Just to prove its fairness, it allowed the pro-Wilsonian editor to write an editorial soon afterwards, which quoted the words of Cardinal Gibbons that "armed intervention must never take place. We who have the interest of the country at heart approve of the present Administration's course".116

The Catholic World, however, preferred to face the cold facts, and it told the President he must either intervene or remain out altogether and leave Mexico to the Mexicans.117 The President was also reminded by the Catholic News that it was no mere platitude that "no democracy can exist which to satisfy the tyrannical injustices of 2 per cent of its population, tramples on the dearest rights of 98 per cent as is being done in Mexico".118 Yet it seemed to the Brooklyn Tablet that the President was too timorous and wavering in his Mexican policy.119

CARRANZA CONDEMNED

The spotlight for 1915, though, was chiefly focused

115 Mar. 6, 1915.
116 Mar. 29, 1915.
117 March, 1915.
118 May 11, 1915.
119 May 22, 1915.
on Carranza, not Woodrow Wilson. Once Carranza gained a foothold, he rose swiftly. His rapid rise to power and the eventual headaches to the Washington authorities found no cause for sympathetic response from the Catholic News, because our Government had been responsible for his being in authority. America sketched Carranza as an "intolerant demagogue wedded to a blind tyranny, which will always find expression in acts of oppressive violence and vindictiveness". To the Brooklyn Tablet it seemed a thing of wonderment how the Constitutionalists could perform actions far more insulting to our flag, to human justice and decency than Huerta ever dreamed of committing, and yet have our government justify such behaviour.

The Carranza opposition truly grew in volume, when indications in Washington turned towards Carranza's recognition. Immediately the Mexican question was treated with graver concern in the editorials of the Catholic press. In mid May the Catholic Review decisively protested against such recognition. In its turn, the Extension, edited by the now famous Bishop Kelley, tried to drive home to the Govern-

120 Feb. 20, 1915.
121 Mar. 10, 1915.
122 April 10, 1915.
123 May 15, 1915.
ment the importance of such a step:

It is perfectly true that the American Government is the protector of Mexico; and that no other government in the world will act on the question of recognizing Mexico until Washington acts...The pledge of the Government on the question of religious liberty is a pledge that can be kept...It is a pledge that must enter into the question of recognition. 124

In early October, the Catholics' hopes began to change further, not to gold like the early autumn leaf, but rather to a November withered brown, when Secretary Lansing and the representatives of the South American Republics seemed agreed on Carranza as Mexico's presidential choice. When this report reached America's editor, he made no effort to soften his sharp admonition to Washington that such recognition would be against the principle of international law and in discord with the standard set by the United States. 125 While the editorial of the Catholic Review breathed disappointment, yet it concluded with a half-hearted, flickering hope that "the President's judgment would not bind to so ignoble a choice". 126 The Brooklyn Tablet, however, spoke forthrightly as it summed up the hard truth that

124 June, 1915.
126 Oct. 9, 1915.
...there is no dodging it, if the President recognizes the Carranza Administration, the only interpretation possible is that he openly ignores the wishes of sixteen million Catholic citizens and repudiates the promises made by the State Department last December...and has forgotten the principle on which our government is based.127

In its next issue the headlines flared:

Carranza Recognition Will Be Open Insult To Catholics in the United States.128

According to the conservative Catholic News one could only question Carranza's choice over the superior Huerta.129

On October 19, 1915, the recognition was a fact, but it was not so easily digested by the Catholic papers. It was then that bitterness crept into the Catholic News' comment, because Carranza's guarantees were more highly regarded in Washington than the word of responsible American citizens.130

Both the Catholic Telegraph131 and the Sacred Heart Review132 attributed this shameful recognition to the efforts of a group of powerful and influential Carranza backers in Washington.

127 Oct. 9, 1915.
130 Oct. 23, 1915.
131 Oct. 21, 1915.
Yet in a less polemical, but possibly more devastating attack, the Catholic World wounded deeply all of the Wilson advocates among its readers by the simple remark that after Carranza's recognition people had good cause to be disappointed in an idealist, who had abandoned his fundamental principle. 133

While in the mind of the editor of the Ave Maria, the recognition resolved the President's action into an embarrassing dilemma: "If President Wilson is informed about what Carranza has done in Mexico, his action is unaccountable. If he is not informed, his ignorance is without the least foundation". 134

Perhaps, though, the strongest criticism of Wilson's latest diplomatic venture was expressed in the Michigan Catholic:

The Chief Executive made a grave mistake in recognizing Carranza. The United States has no right to foist a government on the Mexican people, and I assert there is no evidence that the Mexican people want Carranza.

In the recognition... Mr. Wilson is setting up in Mexico a government which does not derive its power 'from the consent of the governed' but from the consent of Mr. Wilson.

He acted contrary to the spirit of our institution and the well grounded conviction of our people. And he is giving the support of his high office and name

133 Catholic World, New York, Nov., 1915.
134 Nov. 7, 1915.
to a principle which now our Congress is positively forbidden to embody in Law.

...We clearly await the day of election and in an orderly way record our disapproval at the polls. 135

Although Carranza's recognition was universally opposed by the Catholic press, nevertheless, a few of the weeklies deemed it the duty of good Catholics to submit to authority. The Catholic Review was among the first to accept the new decision and like an obedient son stepped in line: "We no longer kick...We obey the will of our Chief Magistrate"; 136 and it reiterated this message the following week in a stronger refrain:

It becomes our duty to acquiesce, to be submissive. We do not think the decision is wise. It is manifestly, though, not for us to berate and blackguard our President and his advisers for this decision...It is ours now to work with the President and help for the best in Mexico. 137

Although the Fortnightly Review 138 and the Little Rock Guardian 139 refused to acquiesce in the recognition, nevertheless, they thought it unfair to blame the Wilsonians entirely for this move, which was endorsed by several supposedly Catholic

135 Nov. 4, 1915.
138 Nov. 15, 1915.
139 Guardian, Little Rock, Ark., Vol. 5, #35.
nations of South America, and our representatives.

**TUMULTY SCHEME**

With the Presidential election soon coming up, Woodrow Wilson became alarmed at the growing hostility of the Catholic citizenry. His justified anxiety gave birth to a scheme that sadly backfired on its presidential inventor. The instrument used: The retiring Mr. Tumulty, the President's private secretary; the kernel of the scheme: Mr. Tumulty's letter to his obligingly inquisitive friend, in which the whole Mexican persecution is explained away as an over-exaggeration. The whole stupid plot was exposed in a few sentences by the *Brooklyn Tablet*:

We are not surprised at the action of Mr. Tumulty in trying to whitewash the President in his attitude towards Mexico and outraged nuns... Already he sees... the Catholic vote threatening his future ambitions. He must prepare to square himself with the Catholic population of the country. Who is a better tool than his secretary? The isolated Catholic in the White House has succumbed to the weight of the white-necktied category. The bolt has been shot, not by the Presbyterian President, but by the Catholic man, Friday. 140

The Catholic News, too, read between the lines of Tumulty's

140 Dec. 1, 1915.
letter and drew the same conclusion. Since it put on its rose colored glasses, as was customary when reading a Wilsonian document, the Catholic Review found some justification for Tumulty's cause, but thought it unwise of the Secretary to try to knock the foundation from the Catholic criticism by declaring his case rested on proven facts. While the Catholic Transcript, thundered out against such "small and unstatesmanlike tactics", the Fortnightly Review and the Extension predicted that this campaign document would cost him votes at the polls.

After the Tumulty schemes had died an unhappy death, the President learned from this experience that the Catholic press did have a strong voice, when raised in protest. He consequently decided it would be better to let events follow a more natural course. The Catholic News grew more annoyed with President Wilson's "amazing complacency" in treating the Mexican situation. The Church Progress also warned the President that he would have to answer for the further persecution of the Church in Mexico. Again the

141 Dec. 4, 1915.
142 Dec. 18, 1915.
143 Catholic Transcript, Hartford, Vol. 18, #25.
144 Jan. 1, 1916.
145 Jan. 1916.
146 Dec. 11, 1915.
147 Church Progress, St. Louis, Dec. 11, 1915.
cry of intervention travelled across the sea, as the Month called the President to task in dogmatic English phraseology:

It is quite unintelligible to the Americans how their President could be impelled to recognize Carranza...

We can understand the reluctance of Mr. Wilson to intervene in the affairs of a neighboring country. But surely there are limits to the principle of non-intervention, and those limits are reached when a neighboring state like the United States refuses to act though with abundant means to compel the submission of a few anarchists who are oppressing the country by violence.  

There was another source of opposition to the Carranza recognition, and that was not the pens of editors, but the bullets of a bandit, the bullets of a slighted Villa. It was the same Villa, who seemed to be forcing the Administration to fulfill the Month's desire of intervention. Without even seeking a pretext, Villa began taking the lives of American citizens. To add fuel to the fire, Carranza encouraged the war trend, when according to the Catholic News "he blocked the President's efforts to catch Villa"; and by April, it accused Carranza of openly aiding Villa to escape. After Villa's raids made it patent to all that Wilson's...

148 Jan., 1916.
150 April 29, 1916.
"placation of Carranza" policy was a complete fiasco, the Ave Maria quoted a scorching condemnation of it by Cardinal Gibbons, who no longer restrained himself by any over-patriotic defense of the Administration:

The ultimate destruction of all authority in Mexico is the logical result of the policy of the present Administration from its very inception: Only partisans or those who are hopeless blockheads will gainsay this; and it should be borne in mind.

How unlikely the deplorable conditions of Mexico is to improve under Carranza is plain from his acts...He is a wily rascal. Intervention will come in the end.151

The Fortnightly Review, however, was skeptical whether the interests of the United States would be secured by intervention;152 yet the Catholic News demanded some change in tactics because of the miserable failure of the present policy.153 Caution, though, was advised by the Ave Maria, due to hero worship of Villa by his considerable following.154

During this crisis in the first half of 1916, one paper, the Brooklyn Tablet, deserves a special mention for the keen interest shown, and the sharper criticism expressed,

152 March 25, 1916.
153 April 15, 1916.
154 May 13, 1916.
on the Mexican situation. In early January, intervention was
the theme running through its editorials. Carranza's insol-
ience should not go unpunished; a week later Villa's murder
of sixteen Americans would certainly force Wilson to abandon
his much ridiculed watchful waiting policy. As the win-
ter gave way to spring, it kept recalling to its readers the
seriousness of the situation. It conjectured that Carranza's
hope of remaining in power depended on Wilson's reelection.
Then, in June, the Tablet's attack took on new vigor as the
two governments ostensibly drew further and further apart.
When the Administration momentarily checked the official
pressure on Carranza, the Tablet rolled its tongue in its
cheek and ventured to explain that "politics has delayed this
week the development of a crisis...The National Democratic
Convention is in session".

Mexico continued to defy Wilson, and the Tablet
became openly disgusted at the President's willingness to be
insulted. The clash of Carranza's and Pershing's troops,
however, seemed destined to force Wilson to declare war.
With condescension varied only by acrimony, this paper assured

156 Jan. 11, 1916.
157 April 29, 1916.
158 June 17, 1916.
the President of Catholic loyalty and support:

With all your faults, we Catholics will stand by you...chief of which was forgetting what yesterday's policy was...You couldn't keep us out of war with the temporary truce you made.

...The newspaper men know, of course, that he never had a policy...He tried to keep us out of war only to plan us into it.

If you had known what was in the back of your mind in the several yesterdays of Villa, Carranza, Embargo, Vera Cruz, Blockade, John Lind, and other silent Murphys, the country would not be today in the mess of your meddling.

We Catholics, will fight for you against Catholics because it just happens that you are, thanks be to God, only a few months more President of the country of which we Catholics are loyal citizens.

If one reads the other Catholic papers during the same period, however, the Tablet appears far less radical, for even the Catholic Review accused the President of lying in "his condemnation of reports to be false...which he knew well to be true".

Although the most serious threat of war was averted in July, the Mexican disorder grew worse. Most of the Catholic papers had given up all hope of Presidential action. The Sacred Heart Review in a defeatist attitude complained

159 July 1, 1916.
160 July 11, 1916.
that Carranza's influence was greater in Washington than in his own country. The Catholic Press protests declined in number. The terrible reality of abandoning the Mexicans completely to the Constitutionalists, however, inspired the Ave Maria to write a final series of editorials in a spirited denunciation of Wilson and his dreaded policy. More and more each editorial bared the rancor concealed in its heart; sarcasm developed into bitterness; disgust turned into despair of governmental action. With the November 4th issue the series concluded with a summation of its previous arguments and reached a climax in a stinging rebuke aimed at the

...attempts of interested politicians to defend the Administration... which are as futile as they are dishonest... That the present Administration is largely responsible for existing conditions in Mexico is a fact of which the proofs are superabundant... Effort to conceal them is an insult to an intelligent voter... By recognizing Carranza... the Administration incurred the responsibility for Mexican anarchy - a responsibility which no amount of whitewashing can remove.

Although judged by the final results, the combined

163 Nov. 4, 1916.
efforts of the Catholic press seemed to have influenced Wilson relatively little, nevertheless, as long as he was a presidential candidate for reelection in 1916, its comments caused him many a sleepless night, if the Tumulty incident is an index. As a matter of fact this concerted disapproval of the President's policy did cause many good simple Catholics to wonder if in conscience they could vote for one who had aided a persecutor of the Church. The Baltimore Catholic Review took great pains to make clear that while it was permissible to vote for President Wilson, yet this did not prove the Catholic press' protest against Wilson's unjust Mexican policy wrong or unreasonable. Nor was it unusual to find some small town Republican politician exploiting this gold mine for potential votes. Such tactics, as far as the Fortnightly Review could predict, would hurt the Church more than it could possibly help it. The Brooklyn Tablet, however, with no sympathy for the Democratic leader, quietly slipped into an editorial on Mexico the suggestion that "Carranza's arrogant demands...may hurt Wilson on election day".

Woodrow Wilson, though, was reelected, and the Catholics still received little consolation from his foreign

165 March 15, 1916.
policy. The *Michigan Catholic* recorded that "the re-election of President Wilson has caused the calamity howlers to wail. Another four years of Woodrow Wilson's policies is not pleasing to those who would provoke our neighbors". 167 In his efforts to write off the whole Mexican headache Wilson gave recognition to Carranza on March 3, 1917, while distant thunder of World War cannons drowned out the voice of protest. America, nevertheless, like Banquo's ghost, returned to haunt Wilson and his colleagues; and yet it was more terrifying, for its editor still had a voice, a prophetic voice:

> All Americans who are not Democratic know that a particularly savage revolution has been in progress for several years... The Democrats will learn this fast as soon as the Republicans get into office. 168

The Republicans eventually did take over the reins of government, but the damage had been done. Unfortunately, all the Catholic press' prophecies of tyranny and destruction were fulfilled to the letter. From these experiences, the rather mild Catholic press of the turn of the century gradually discovered it had a voice. Unlike the secular press, though, its editors denounced government actions according to the norm of absolute principles, rather than submission to a

167 Nov. 16, 1916.
168 April 7, 1917.
party line. Although the Catholic press ultimately failed to prevent Wilson's recognition of Carranza, it did force him to make some honest efforts to try to procure religious as well as political liberty for the Mexican people.
CONCLUSION

United States diplomacy is, basically related to the protection and enforcing of American rights. These interests and rights, in turn, have been concerned chiefly with territorial desires, trade, commerce, economic development and the protection of lives and property. In Mexico, the dominant interest of the United States between 1821 and 1850 was territorial; after the Civil War, emphasis changed, and the dollar bill motivated the economic penetration of our citizens into Mexico. Under Diaz, foreign capital and colonists were so encouraged that Mexico by 1910 was in the process of becoming Americanized.

As a result of the enormous economic stake which our citizens have in this neighboring land, the United States has an important responsibility in the protection of those interests. These interests and rights as a rule have been most favored in Latin America, wherever a strong executive has wielded the big stick to stabilize his government. The threatened collapse of the Diaz regime, therefore, offered a direct challenge to our government. Under the circumstances, the Taft Administration contemplated direct in-
tervention to check the rising current of revolution. The presence of our troops on the border to awe the rebels into submission was as useless as tissue paper used to check a whirling spring flood, for Madero at the moment was riding high on the crest of the wave of popularity. By 1910, the disintegration of the political dam protecting the Diaz regime was too great to stem the tide of economic and social upheaval. Taft had to bow to the inevitable.

Madero, unfortunately, was a weak executive, and it was counter to the best interests of the United States to tolerate him very long. The diplomacy of the United States between 1911 and 1913 was at best one of half-hearted support. Daily, it became more evident that the Department of State would have preferred a stronger individual at the head of the Mexican government, and would welcome a change. The greatest complaint against Madero, however, came from Ambassador Wilson who had little use for the Mexican President. Henry L. Wilson actively looked around for the "strong executive", whom he found in General Felix Diaz and General Victoriano Huerta. When the disaffection in the army grew - an indication of the doom of any administration in Mexico - Wilson, translating the desires of the State Department most literally, gave his support to that element in Mexico, which he
believed would be most likely to support American economic interests. Accordingly, he overstepped the bounds of his functions as a diplomat and actively took part in the counter-revolution which caused the overthrow of Madero’s Administration.

When President Wilson assumed office in March 1913, he represented the antithesis of the policies pursued by Taft. The new President had an aversion to "dollar diplomacy", and economic penetration; he was deeply suspicious of Ambassador Wilson. His policy towards Mexico, therefore, was to be totally at variance with the previous administrations from Hayes to Taft. Since he would not tolerate the sanctioning of "military despotism" in the interests of American economic and financial expansion, he attempted to overthrow the "frankenstein" creation (Huerta) of American diplomatic policy, as he called it. At the same time, Wilson attempted to introduce "democracy" in a country which had never known the meaning of the word, but, by destroying the "strong" force in Mexico, Wilson inevitably weakened commercial and economic interests in the country.

The crucial mistake made by President Wilson was to oversimplify the Mexican revolution itself. The President narrowed down the conflict to a struggle between democracy and
despotism, whereas the revolution was a product of numerous diverse tendencies, which has little to do with democracy as such. A number of factional leaders, jealous of each other's power, pushed forward distinct and at times conflicting revolutionary programs. It was inevitable that American intervention, which supported one faction, would cause deep and lasting hostility among the other rival factions. This is precisely what happened. The deep and lasting stain, though, that further blotted the record of the Wilson Administration, resulted from supporting a faction led by barbarous bandits.

The net result of Wilson's policies in Mexico, therefore, was to weaken the country further, prolong the revolutionary disturbances, intensify the Catholic persecution, and create chaos worse confounded. In the long run, American interests and rights were sacrificed.

Such significant events naturally furnished the daily papers with spectacular headline and editorial fodder for years. The same was true also of the religious press. From the very first reports of the revolution, there were some Protestant papers which carried the "story". In the dawning days of the twentieth century the Protestant weeklies had large circulations and played an important part in influencing every day life. These papers could be found in the
city slum, the suburban mansion, or country farm. Many a large city daily envied the circulation of a paper like the Christian Herald of New York which sold over a million copies weekly; many a small denominational paper printed editorials that were accepted dogmatically by its readers.

The paper's policy was generally determined by the editor independent of any Church hierarchy. For example, the Southern Methodist Quarterly Review soundly condemned Diaz, while the northern Methodist brethren represented by the Christian Advocate predicted true greatness of the same man; and the Watchman was practically oblivious of the crisis south of the border until it became affiliated with another Baptist weekly, the Examiner. There were two factors, however, that did influence these editors: The incipient Protestant missionary movement into Latin America, and their foe, Catholicism. Any leader that favored Protestant activity was championed as the saviour of the Mexican nation. This factor helps to explain the fulsome praise of Diaz by the Baptist and Presbyterian papers, whose missionaries were actively engaged in this southern republic, and when Madero officially let it be known that Catholics would receive no favors, his Protestant support, too, notably increased. Al-
though Huerta's despotism in itself was cause for opposition, several editors considered his Faith an added crime. This was one of the reasons President Wilson's anti-Huertan policy found favor in the Protestant press, but as long as his diplomatic measures seemed destined to end in war, wholehearted backing was withheld. It was only natural, though, that the Presbyterian Banner would be in full agreement with Woodrow Wilson, a church member, yet by the time of Carranza's recognition, most of the weeklies were just as expressive of their approval of the President's diplomatic measures. In justice, therefore, one might claim a very definite relation between the almost unanimous Protestant praise of Wilson's recognition of Carranza and the equally unified Catholic disgust and opposition to the same policy. By 1916, though, the White House Executive had alienated some of his Protestant friends. And yet one might wonder whether the Baptist papers, the Watchman-Examiner and the Standard, abandoned the Wilsonian machine near election time out of sheer exasperation with the bungling results of the President's policies, or because the other presidential candidate, Charles Evans Hughes, was a devout Baptist.

A more objective treatment of the whole question, however, was attained by those papers, which did not repre-
sent an active missionary interest in Mexico. On this score, the policy of the Congregationalist *Independent* deserves notice. Its isolationist stand throughout these hectic years was paralleled only by the pacifist policy of the Catholic *Sacred Heart Review*. Except for the Tampico incident and the war clouds that gathered after Carranza's recognition, when the President was severely rebuked by the *Independent* for his frequent diplomatic blunders, its loyalty to Wilson could never be questioned. Such a paper with no interests at stake could afford to take an independent stand, if the occasion demanded.

For sheer influence, though, the most powerful of all the Protestant papers was probably the undenominational *Christian Herald* of New York which was read by at least two million people weekly. Since it was undenominational, no one Protestant sect was patronized or unduly favored in its editorial columns to the offense of other Churches. Thus, its policy in the early stages of any question was generally conservative until it could ascertain which way the wind blew for the majority of the Protestant brethren. It followed in saluting Diaz; then it recognized the leadership of Madero; it attacked Huerta; the editor held back momentarily in endorsing Wilson's Mexican policy, but eventually stepped in
line, and by the time Carranza was recognized, few more extreme backers could be found. The paper literally was a slow starter, but a strong finisher.

Although the Protestant press had no doctrinal unity to hold it together, in the major issues of the Mexican crisis, such as the resignation of Huerta and the recognition of Carranza, there was a fairly consistent and unified front. On the one hand, in view of the difference of opinion on Diaz and other questions of world interest where religion was not directly involved, and on the other hand, in consideration of the almost universal anti-Catholic trend characteristic of all the Protestant papers of this day, one could not go far wrong in holding that the editors favored far less Wilson's "watchful waiting" policy in itself than the anti-Catholic effects it would bring about.

The Mexican question, however, was of even more importance to the Catholics of the United States than to Protestants, for the Mexican Catholics were the scape-goats of the anti-clerical revolutionists. Religion then, rather than politics, explained the ever-mounting interest and eventually the liberal editorial space given to the Mexican chaos in the Catholic press. This position became evident beyond all doubt.

1 cf. author's note at the end of Chapter Two.
with the America editor's statement of the paper's Mexican policy which would have been unanimously accepted by the Catholic press:

The Mexican problem has a triple aspect, political, economic and religious. The last aspect only has been our concern.2

This factor helps explain the silence of the early revolutionary days, when the religious issue was not of paramount importance to the revolutionists. With the exception of weeklies like America, Ave Maria, and the Sacred Heart Review, coverage of strictly religious and local events characterized the news of the Catholic papers. The discovery of the proverbial needle in the haystack would be more likely than a strong editorial policy which might involve the censoring of a political move by these latter type weeklies. It was only after the Catholic press became conscious of the seriousness of our southern neighbors' troubles, that it found time to reflect on the Madero uprising and pass judgment.

The Catholic and Protestant press began definitely to part ways over the question of Huerta's recognition. Yet many of the Catholic papers, such as the Catholic News and the Baltimore Catholic Review, still refrained from opposing

2 America, Nov. 21, 1914.
Wilson's anti-Huerta policy, since they feared the Church would be tarred for its lack of patriotism if the Catholic press were politically found out of line; and there were a few Democratic papers, too, like the Catholic Telegraph that had a child's faith in the President's "watchful waiting" stand. The President's appointment, though, of unfit and anti-Catholic special personal representatives was fast wearing away any bonds of fear or loyalty which held a paper to support the existing policies. Yet when one considers the relatively large number of Catholic papers and periodicals, in the first days of 1914 there were few editorials dealing with the Mexican situation.

Then, the Tampico incident occurred. The interest of the whole Catholic press was aroused overnight. Suddenly its headlines and editorial pages became alive to the reality of the Mexican crisis. The threat of war could no longer be ignored. In the initial stages of the new crisis Wilson seemed to have scored a definite triumph as one after the other of these papers vied to acknowledge its support of his war call. The Catholic Review, the Brooklyn Tablet, the Catholic News, were just some of these promising 100% cooperation. Yet a few editors did not feel their patriotism was compromised by protesting against an avoidable war. Hence-
forth, the Mexican muddle provided important material for the Catholic press.

That the Catholic Press, as a whole, sincerely desired peace was evidenced in the enthusiastic welcome given to the offer of ABC Mediation Board. It also served as the opening wedge for many of the papers to oppose Wilson's war-provoking measures, which had been supported the previous month. As the year wore on and the notorious "watchful waiting" policy failed to heal the Mexican wound, an impatient note seeped into the editorial columns. Wilson's open approval of Villa and Carranza proved too much even for the most loyal paper. The cry of protest could now be heard in England, along the Atlantic coast from Maine to Florida, across the plains of the Middle West, even up in the Rockies where its echo reached Canada. The Catholic opposition increased proportionately to the Wilson Administration's patronage of Carranza. With Carranza's recognition, several papers felt it their duty as loyal citizens to assure the President of their acquiescence. When the true significance, though, of this strange recognition became evident, and loyalty meant handling the hatchet that was hacking the Mexican Church to death, Wilson looked in vain for Catholic support.
Woodrow Wilson suddenly awoke to the power of the Catholic press, as he saw his chances for reelection gradually vanishing as smoke in a summer breeze. The wild Tumulty scheme revealed his hidden fear. But this plan merely further deepened the Catholic disgust with the President's handling of the Mexican issue. The *Fortnightly Review*, *the Extension*, and others branded the effort as a cheap campaign trick. Villa's untimely raids on American property and life helped little in raising Wilson's political stock. In contrast with the Protestant press, the Chief Executive would find it hard to discover one friend among the Catholic editors. In fact, the *Michigan Catholic* and *Brooklyn Tablet*, to mention a few, openly counselled his defeat at the polls.

The entrance of the United States into the World War I buried the Mexican fiasco in complete oblivion for the time. Wilson thought he washed his hand of the whole affair by granting *de jure* recognition to Mexican President. He then turned the spotlight on Europe. The sincere patriotism of the Catholic press was proved by the diversion of its attention from the Mexican chaos to the new world wide crisis.

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3 Tumulty was Wilson's private secretary, who in a letter to a friend attempted to justify the President's Mexican policy. *Confer*, Chapter III, 41-43.
A set policy of the Catholic press is manifest if one includes the whole era of 1910-1917. In the early revolutionary days when a minimum of the religious element was involved, opinion was divided. But when the Church and justice began to suffer as a direct result of Wilson's policy, the opposition of the press then became unified. Those papers, which abandoned their pacifist policy to demand intervention, did so on the grounds that it was the only means for Wilson to unentangle the Mexican net knotted by his previous meddling. Nowhere could the opinion of the Catholic press after 1914 be more compressly found than in the words of America:

Under ordinary circumstances the Mexican would and should have taken care of their troubles themselves. In this instance, however, our Government, no doubt with the best intentions, made itself sponsor for the Constitutionalist party, thereby incurring certain duties. Among these not the least is the duty both of righting the wrongs and of preventing further crime. Unspeakably frightful crimes, wanton enough to make strong men shudder with horror, have been committed against priests, Sisters and lay people; and America feels that in justice both to itself and to American citizens who abhor brutality, our Administration should
bring every possible moral pressure to bear upon the Mexican criminals, who have time and time again said that they are acting under the authority of Washington.

After Carranza's recognition, though, the Catholic cause seemed lost, while the Protestant press was convinced that the right course had been followed. Yet that either of these presses had been able to exert any influence during Wilson's Administration is remarkable, and can best be explained perhaps by the willingness of many of the readers to follow their editor's policies, because of the religious denominational affiliation of the paper. For with a few exceptions such as America, Month, and the Christian Herald, the majority of papers and periodicals would be classified just above the level of amateur journalism. Since almost all these weeklies were limited in appeal to their own dioceses, they were by that fact condemned to small circulations and small revenue, and were thus barred from doing outstanding work. By and large they were edited by small and poorly paid staffs that were usually grossly overworked and had little time and energy for concentration on important matters or for striving after journalistic perfection. They seldom attempted to maintain professional journalistic standards, while

4 America, Nov. 21, 1914. The underlined words were italicized in the original text.
religious prejudice led them oftentimes into slanting their news stories, or mixing editorial comment with news. They also overpraised the mediocre, so when a Churchman or a Church institution did something outstanding, there were no words left to appraise it. Their editorials frequently showed signs of haste, and too often were superficial and wordy; too often, also, these editorials generated more heat than light. With few exceptions, the Catholic organs appeared to be on the defensive, when they should have been on the offensive. As a group they sought to interest only Catholics, when their true success as a pressure organ to influence the State depended on their reaching the non-Catholics and godless.

However, had the religious press, in spite of its weakness, been united, the world might well have witnessed a forward step in modern Church and State relations, for Wilson almost revamped his Mexican policy at the insistence of Catholics—if not out of respect for justice, at least due to the spectre of a solid religious bloc opposing him at the polls. But the support of the Protestant press relieved the pressure enough to enable the President to continue his policy and recognize Carranza. The Catholic press then had to rest content with the thought that the Washington Administration had at least respected its suggestions to the extent of
promising that Carranza's recognition would depend in some way on the guarantee of religious liberty. However, as time proved the worthlessness of Carranza's guarantees, and the tragic truth of the Catholic press' predictions of the tyranny, political upheaval and economic collapse consequent on such a recognition, the State perhaps must have regretted the deaf ear it turned towards the Church's pleas.
The publication of the Zimmerman note followed by our entrance into World War I convinced the Mexicans of the folly of a German-Japanese-Mexican alliance. Nevertheless, Carranza and his Constitutionalists made it extremely difficult for the United States to obtain sadly needed resources for our war effort. Relations were strained and the termination of the war made it possible to attempt forcing our Mexican brethren into line again. Strong demands for intervention arose and for a "new regime more complacent to American capital". In September, 1919, the Fall Committee released its reports on the investigation of Mexican affairs. These reports, which filled two huge volumes, represented an appeal for a drastic Mexican policy. Lansing appeared to be so drawn over to the side of Senator Fall and his group, which were behind the interventionist drive, that his impatience with President Wilson's policy became quite noticeable.

Lansing's opportunity came when somebody in northern Mexico seized William O. Jenkins, the consular agent of the United States at Puebla. The Secretary of State demanded his immediate release. The Mexican government re-
responded with a request for a delay, pending a judicial investigation. Intervention grew imminent. A resolution was drafted approving the "Action of the Department of State in reference to the pending controversy", and a demand for severance of all relations with Mexico. The resolution was immediately referred to the Senate and to the Committee of Foreign Relations. Wilson, who was now seriously ill, got wind of what was happening and called a halt to the move for intervention. Fortunately, Jenkins was released and the crisis passed without any mishap.¹

In 1920, the Republican Party came forward in vigorous defense of American investments. Its campaign program promised to prosecute American claims energetically. It was at this critical juncture that Carranza was overthrown by Alvaro Obregon, and the agitation for intervention died down.

By the end of 1921, President Wilson's Mexican policy had run its course. Fundamentally, it was a misguided policy. Instead of stimulating friendship and cooperation, it prolonged the Mexican revolution, and deepened the suspicion of Mexico as well as the other South American Republics of the ends and purposes of the United States. In the final analysis, therefore, Wilson's policies, although well

¹ Rippy, 358-364.
intentioned and sincere, must be written down as a complete failure.

These events literally fulfilled the tragic forecasts of the Catholic press, and revealed the wisdom of its stand against the recognition of an anti-clerical government. When the Protestant interests also began to suffer serious setbacks under Carranza's new Constitution, many of the Protestant papers began to echo the Catholic press' protests. For many, the halo of Woodrow Wilson now was no longer discernible.
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BOOKS (Spanish):


IV. PERIODICALS:


V. NEWSPAPERS (Daily):

Excelsior, Mexico City.
Mexican Herald, Mexico City.
Republican, Springfield, Mass.
NEWSPAPERS (Religious):

Note: The second and third chapters of this thesis are the result of evidence collected from the leading religious newspapers and periodicals. The period under examination was 1910-1917. In order to gain an adequate cross-section of opinion, both Catholic and Protestant sources were consulted, and the investigation was chiefly centered about editorials. Except where it has been noted, complete files of the different papers were examined.

While most of the religious press material was procured from the Library of Congress, a large section of the Catholic press sources were found in the Libraries of Catholic University and Georgetown University and the New York Public Library, as well as in the files of several individual newspaper offices.

PROTESTANT

BAPTIST:

Standard, Chicago.
Watchman, Cincinnati.
Watchman-Examiner, Cincinnati.

CONGREGATIONALIST:

The Advance, Chicago.
Independent, New York.

DISCIPLES OF CHRIST:

Christian Century, Chicago.

EPISCOPALIAN:

Living Church, Milwaukee.

MASONIC:

New Age, Washington, D. C.
NEWSPAPERS (Religious):

METHODIST:

Christian Advocate, New York.
Methodist Quarterly Review, Nashville.

PRESBYTERIAN:

Presbyterian Banner, Pittsburgh.

UNDENOMINATIONAL:


CATHOLIC

Arkansas.
Guardian, Little Rock.

California.
Catholic Herald, Sacramento.
Monitor, San Francisco.

Colorado.
Register, Denver.

Connecticut.
Catholic Transcript, Hartford.
Columbiad, New Haven.

Indiana.
Ave Maria, South Bend.
Indiana Catholic, Indianapolis.

Illinois.
Extension, Chicago.
Western Catholic, Quincy.

Louisiana.
Morning Star, New Orleans.

Maryland.
Catholic Review, Baltimore.
NEWSPAPERS (Religious):

Massachusetts.
Pilot, Boston.
Sacred Heart Review, Boston.

Michigan.
Michigan Catholic, Detroit.

Minnesota.

Missouri.
Catholic Progress, St. Louis.
Fortnightly Review, St. Louis.

New Jersey.
Monitor, Newark.

New York.
America, New York.
Catholic Mind, New York.
Catholic World, New York.
Tablet, Brooklyn.

Ohio.
Catholic Telegraph, Cincinnati.

Pennsylvania.
Catholic Standard and Times, Philadelphia.

Utah.
Intermountain Catholic, Salt Lake.

Washington.
Catholic Northwest Progress, Seattle.

Canada.
Catholic Record, London.

England.
Month, London.

Note: Those papers and periodicals which were not examined in their entirety from 1910-1917 are marked by the symbol "O". At least a sufficient number of copies were obtained from each paper, though, to establish the policy discussed.
APPENDIX

Author's Note:

In treating of the opinion of the Protestant Press, we omitted the frequent and abusive accusations against the Catholic Church as the cause of Mexico's trouble, except in a few instances where the charges directly concerned some issue of the United States' policy, e.g., in the recognition of Carranza.

For the sake of interest, however, a sample of some of these charges is included below:

Not until the horrible oppression of the ruling class and the superstitious teachings of the corrupt Roman Catholic Church are overcome by the spread of intelligence and of a pure form of Christianity, the light of knowledge, even though but a feeble glimmering at first, superseding the thick darkness of the people, may we hope to see fair play and honest elections, and good government. Until then, we should not expect too much.

Watchman-Examiner...Jan. 29, 1914.

Whenever the Constitutionalist army is victorious, one of its first acts is to close the Catholic Churches, confiscate the convents and advise the priests and nuns to leave the country.
Harsh treatment? Certainly. But these men know what they are about. They know from their own personal experiences and national history when the Catholic Church is in power...It is the desire of Rome that Mexico become part of the United States. What, then, are we to do? Let us do all in our power to assist the President in his present policy of peace.  

*Christian Century*...Aug. 27, 1914.

The land baron and the priest have continued their unholy alliance to keep the people in ignorance, superstition, and debt.  


Although the Catholic press usually ignored these bigoted accusations, periodically an editor felt that truth and justice demanded a rebuttal. A representative reply is found in the pamphlet, *The Book of Red and Yellow*, penned by the then Monsignor Kelley, editor of the monthly, *Extension*.

But we have, alas! by our own greed and our prejudice, made government a scorn and insult; of the old schools, that once were glorious, barracks and ruins. We listen and applaud when the "liberals" of every camp tell us that the Church is responsible for poverty, ignorance and lawlessness; but
we do not listen to the Church which gave to Mexico all the civilization she possesses, when she makes this gentle plaint over the noise of murder, debauchery and lust. You blame me for poverty; yet you took from me the endowments for my hospitals, my orphanages, my countless works of mercy. You blame me for ignorance when you closed my schools; stole my colleges and suppressed my universities, which first lit the torch of learning among this people. You say I have added nothing to science and art, but you destroyed the art I brought with me, burned my books and scattered the results of my labor for science to the four winds of heaven. You blame me for ignorance after forbidding me for fifty years to teach. You blame me for lawlessness, when you destroyed my missions among a peaceful and thriving Indian population, and gave, in my place to the people, the thirty pieces of silver with which you bribed them to murder their fellows. You took the cross out of their hands to replace it with a torch and a gun. Show me one good thing in Mexico I did not give you. Show me one genius for whom I was not responsible. Show me one step in advance I did not help you to take. Cut away from your country all that I put in it, and see what remains. You
may thrust me out, exile my bishops, murder my priests, again steal my schools, desecrate my sanctuaries and my virgins, but you cannot blot our history, you cannot erase the mark I have left on you - not in a century of centuries.

APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Thomas Ryan Byrne, S.J. has been read and approved by three members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

May 7, 1946
Date

Signature of Adviser

Charles H. Metzger, S.J.