Christian Humanism

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CHRISTIAN HUMANISM

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Loyola University.
VITA AUCTORIS

Aloysius Robert Amadeo Caponigri was born November 16, 1911, at Chicago, Ill. He was entered at Hawthorne elementary school in Oak Park, Illinois in the winter of 1922, where he remained until the spring of 1925. In the fall of that year he was entered at Saint Ignatius High School, Chicago, and in 1927 transferred thence to Campion Preparatory School, Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin. At his graduation from Campion in 1929 he entered the Society of Jesus and was at the Novitiate of that order at Milford, Ohio from 1929-33. In June of the latter year he was awarded the degree of Bachelor of Literature from Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio. He spent the year 1933-34 at St. Louis University Graduate School, transferring in the autumn of 1934 to Loyola University.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

"The history of humanism," wrote the late Abbé Brémond, "has not yet been written."¹ Indeed, we may venture to add that humanism has never been accurately and adequately defined. No other word, perhaps, in our tongue is so rich in associations and yet so vaguely apprehended in its radical and historical signification. At times it bears a mistily religious connotation as designating a mild apotheosis of man. Again, its import seems purely cultural, indicating the cultivation or possession of a certain broadness of mind and urbanity of manner, even, perhaps, the consciousness of a certain worldly wisdom, and in this sense it is frequently opposed to the "scientific" attitude of mind. Most commonly, however, its association is literary, and this association is sometimes so strong as practically to equate the terms "humanist" and "littérarète." The strict use of the word in this last association links it most closely with the study of the ancient classics. It is clear from this state of confusion that the first task of the future historian of humanism will be to clarify these usages, and this task can scarcely be accomplished more safely and more successfully than by a
comparative examination of the doctrines and opinions of men, both of the past and of the present, to whom the title "humanist" is generally given, or who themselves have claimed the designation. Such a comparative study, necessarily on a modest scale, is the aim of this essay.

For the purposes of our investigation, the works of three men of widely different culture to whom everyone will readily concede the title of "humanist," Plato, Longhaye and Irving Babbitt, have been chosen. The precise point at issue can be stated thus: Is the basic concern of humanism, historically considered, ethical or literary? The reply to this question is briefly, that to the minds of each of these men considered as humanists, the main issue is ethical, the literary issue secondary, and in each instance the humanist's chief literary tenets are strongly influenced, if not wholly determined, by his solution of the ethical issue.

I

Historically, those who have claimed the title of "humanist" have almost always been directly interested in the ancient classics. At one time, we are told, a mere knowledge of the classic tongues was sufficient to justify the claim. This interest, however, is a manifestation at best and by no means either necessary or infallible. The most ardent Ciceroanians among the Renaissance humanists, not to speak of
those scholars who were drawn to the Greek culture, clearly confirm this. The Classics, with them, were an occasion, not an end. What drew them to a love and study of ancient letters was the ideal of human life that they glimpsed beyond. As Babbitt says, "They actually caught a glimpse of the fine proportionateness of the ancients at their best."² Those who became studious of ancient sculpture and painting evidence this ulterior motive even more clearly. That is why we must admit that those who carried imitation of the ancients into the conduct of their lives, as well as into the style of their letters, were acting consistently. They were looking for models of conduct even more than of epistolary elegance. As we come closer to our own times this ulterior interest is more and more apparent. With Father Longhaye and the School he represents, the classics are definitely considered a means, and not an exclusive one, of developing a full and proportionate culture. Babbitt states absolutely the independence of his whole ideal from the classics, maintaining that it was achieved equally well in the Orient.³ The truth is that in proportion as men have been conscious of the potencies of human nature they have been drawn toward an ideal of its full, proportionate development and have turned with eagerness to whatever seemed to them to offer this ideal most completely. The important thing, in this connection, is the fact that the need for full, proportionate development is felt, for humanism is concerned with its satisfaction alone.
Such delimitation and dissociation brings out the main traits of humanism itself. It desires a full and proportionate development of the individual. These are its essential notes, far more basic than the desire of the glorification of human nature, which Abbé Brémond asserts to be absolutely fundamental. Not that this last can be dissociated from the ideal. The very desire to realize, culturally, the fullness of the human stature implies it. But it does not imply what the word "glorification" might seem to connote: the depreciation of something else, for instance, of the supernatural. Proportionateness, rightly understood, should really exclude any such depreciation, for a just evaluation of all things is of the integrity of proportionateness. The finished ideal might well be called, ethical poise.

The ideal of ethical poise is an answer to the universal question of the one and many in its most personal aspect, that of conduct. It is an attempt to satisfy the hunger of man's spirit for oneness, completeness, and permanence in a life of experience which is fragmentary, fleeting, and multiple. Against the flood of impressions borne in upon the individual and eliciting response from innumerable quarters, the soul sets its consciousness of a singleness of purpose: happiness through the complete and lasting satisfaction of the needs of human nature adequately realized and fulfilled. No one experience offers this satisfaction,
though each offers some little part of it. Experience brings fragmentary reports of reality beyond; man desires exhaustive knowledge. Experience puts man into contact with isolated realities; he desires permanent possession of the whole. Experience brings partial and transient satisfaction of individual powers; man desires complete and permanent satisfaction of his whole being, of the individual powers as constituents of the whole. The task before the individual is to lay hold on the principles of permanence and universality underlying experience.

Among his powers man must recognize the sovereignty of those which can most completely and universally bring him into contact with reality under its most permanent aspects. The lesser and auxiliary powers must align themselves in due subordination according as they contribute toward the attainment of this same end. When this order shall have been established, the relation of man to experience will be one of control rather than of mere passivity; of selection and direction rather than of indiscriminate receptivity and response.

There are those who maintain that it is not a goal beyond, but experience itself, which is the true end. To gain fullness in life, it is contended, is to increase and intensify experience, to cram every moment to the brim. Not subordination, but balance among the powers is to be sought, with a view to giving each the fullest range of experience.
possible. Permanence? They despair of it. We die.

"Not the fruit of experience, but experience, itself is the end. A counted number of pulses only is given you of a variegated, dramatic life."

Against them stand facts of experience, which most of us learn all too early in life: the easy satiety of every individual power, even of its keenest pleasure, and the consequent revulsion from the very object of satisfaction, and the inability of an indefinite number of distinct acts, which bring each its partial pleasure, to produce, in sum, happiness. As a matter of fact, such a series, were it possible, would lead to the same revolting satiety. Happiness is not the sum of pleasure; it transcends pleasure. It must consist in the single act of permanent possession of the one object which can satisfy the whole man. Our only chance for happiness is to bend all activity, qualitatively and quantitatively, toward the possession of this object. Ordered power, as opposed to indiscriminate intensity, in action, with all that "order" implies of direction, selection and purpose, is the key-note of humanistic poise.

With this, I believe, we have reached true bottom. It adequately covers the striking similarities in all presentations of humanism; it alone makes adequate provision for the even more arresting diversity. It can readily be seen how doctrines, which agree on this point, may differ "toto caelo." The details of the ideal will depend upon the view
taken of human nature itself and of man's place in the world. The positivist will elaborate this ideal in a way which the realist must, in part, reject. The pagan, born or self-made, and the Christian here will meet and part company and yet, within the terms we have laid down, the name "humanist" can be denied to none.

The humanists whom we shall study in the following chapters were chosen with this in mind. Their divergences are apparent to the most superficial reader; their similarity is even more apparent to one who studies them critically; and both similarity and divergence centers on the point mentioned.

II

Although the ethical issue is uppermost in the mind of each of these humanists, they are all, nevertheless, deeply concerned with the problems of literary criticism. In Babbitt's case the literary interest seems to have been the starting point of his speculation on the question which came eventually to supersede it in his mind. He came to give his chief attention to the ethical question because he saw that the true solution of many basic literary questions, in fact of the whole cultural issue, lay here. Plato, himself a poet and the prince of stylists, had ever the cause of literature at heart, and though he passes severe judgement on it at times this is only because, while recognizing the superior claims
of ethics, he could not see his way clearly to the settlement of some delicate points of adjustment between literature and morals. Father Longhaye brought to his speculation on literature a mind already formed along sound philosophical lines and for him the ethical issue was settled. But this in no way impeded his literary judgment. On the contrary, it gives him a distinct advantage because it enables him to disentangle and elucidate issues which to the mere littérat e are hopelessly muddled, and, to the thinker who is trying to reach a solution of the ethical issue from a basis in literature, present problems almost equally hopeless of solution. As a consequence, his conclusions, though sometimes rigid, are always lucid and for the most part irrefragable. Although our chief concern here must be an examination of the ethical doctrines of these humanists we shall, nevertheless, be better equipped by this very examination to understand more completely their critical opinions. We shall, therefore, venture to point out the associations between their critical and ethical views, and to trace, in the ethical, the roots of the literary. To examine the worth of the critical tenets themselves is obviously a further task beyond our present scope; some adumbration of where the preference would lie, however, even in the literary issue, cannot fail to appear in the examination of the ethical doctrines.

A word concerning the selection of the works examined
will not be out of place. The **Republic**, as the central and most dogmatic statement of Plato's thought upon many subjects, is an obvious choice. The **Belles - Lettres** of Longhaye recommends itself as obviously a more suitable treatise than either the **History** or **La Prédication**. In the case of Babbitt it has been no easy matter to concentrate upon a single work. Since his writings are mostly critical, the positive aspect of his doctrine must be gathered piece-meal from them all. **Rousseau and Romanticism** has, however, given yeoman service as a good summary of the substance of his teaching on this point.
REFERENCES

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

IRVING BABBITT'S

IDEAL OF ETHICAL DECORUM

The late Abbé Brémond wrote, with reference to the humanists of the Renaissance:

"The day is not far distant when a new humanism, less exuberant, but also believing, less tradioniste, than the earlier, will cause more serious disquietude."¹

From all indications, his prediction has been fulfilled in the doctrine of Irving Babbitt and his followers. That this new humanism is less believing, less tradioniste, than the earlier is apparent at a glance. That some disquietude has accompanied its rise is also true, and the judgment of Professor Mercier that it is a doctrine we may disapprove, but dare not overlook, finds a wide echo.² But, one may ask, to whom has it brought disquietude? On this point the prophecy of Abbé Brémond does not find so accurate a fulfillment. He thought that the champions of the traditional faith and of the elder learning would have most to fear, while, in fact, they alone can look with equanimity, even with some approval, on the infant philosophy. While the humanism of the Renaissance was the initial step on the road which ultimately led
to naturalism, the humanism which the Harvard professor advocates, with all the ardor of a consecrated apostle, is at its very core a protest against naturalism. The "conservative" and "traditional," not to say reactionary, schools have nothing to fear from such a creed because they have long since learned that between naturalism and supernaturalism there is no compromise. Unless the new movement beats a retreat to the naturalistic plane upon realizing this, we may hopefully expect the triumph of the full truth in the minds of those of its proponents who sincerely seek the truth.

I have spoken of Babbitt's humanism as a doctrine. It is just that, and has in this fact its essential marks of differentiation. Humanism in Plato was an immanent quality of soul. The humanism of the Renaissance, was an enthusiasm, an overflow of animal spirits. Of Christian Humanism, Abbé Brémond says: "It is essentially a temper of mind." The humanism of Irving Babbitt is a "gospel", professing to offer a complete philosophy of life and salvation to our age. Of course, it was not always so. The first volume he published was a collection of essays in defense of the humanities. Although these contain in embryonic form, as Mercier points out, the whole of his doctrine, Babbitt does not appear to have realized at the time the ramifications which would become necessary. His own development seems to be an instance in proof of his observation that the "economic problem would
be seen to run into the philosophic, etc.⁴ The defense of the humanities, he came to see, is but one small portion of the fight which must be waged against the solvent and liquefying forces of naturalism. He felt that he had come upon the basic fallacy of naturalism which vitiates its every conclusion. He struck, as he thought, at the root of the evil. But he did not strike merely to destroy. He had something to offer in place of what he had torn down. In each succeeding volume, as he worked out his theory into various fields, literary criticism, economics, morality, he came closer and closer to his final stand: a philosophy of life upon a humanistic principle. Upon this he seems to have rested, though it is said he had embraced a supernatural belief before his death. His writings do not reveal this ultimate development. As they stand they may, for our purpose, be considered as the final expression of his matured thought.

I

On one side Babbitt's position is a protest against the attempt to build a whole philosophy of life on a naturalistic foundation.⁵ The effect of naturalism in both its forms, he maintains, scientific and sentimental, is to level things off to a common basis. This is its answer to "the One and the Many." Scientific naturalism does away with the
distinction between man, as man, and nature, maintaining that man is but a part of nature and nothing more. Sentimental naturalism does away with the distinction between the higher and the lower self. With the help of its scientific counterpart, it answers the question of the "One and the Many" by lifting the many to a false unity in instinct and emancipating the expansive desires from an "anachronistic" power of control. Both these seem to Babbitt to be but sorry judgments, based on superficial observation and hasty reasoning. While it is true, in a sense, that man is a part of nature, it is just as true that his part in it is that of king. It is neither possible nor desirable, he admits, to deny altogether the claims of the natural man. But experience teaches that, unless subjected to some control, the natural desires bring havoc into the life of man.

The basic problem for one who would oppose naturalism, says Babbitt, is to find the best means of re-asserting the human law, as opposed to the law for things, that is, the law which must govern the life and conduct of man, if he is to achieve the end of his existence, as opposed to that governance in the physical world which suffices to bring unintelligent things to the fulfillment of their destined function. Naturalism has confused these laws even to the denial of the human law in favor of the law for things. It seeks to bring everything under the law for things. Only a vigorous re-
assertion of the fact that there is a distinct law for man can confute naturalism. But it is futile, Babbitt thinks, to turn to authority or tradition for such a re-assertion. Man has travelled too far along the experiential road for that. The whole naturalistic position is built on just this experiential ground, and much in it is true, though needing re-interpretation and completion. Naturalism claims to be positivistic and critical; it can be refuted and confounded only by a still more severe and positivistic criticism. Naturalism has been positivistic and critical, but only on the side of the natural as opposed to the human law. It has been pre-occupied with establishing, on critical and positivistic grounds, man's kinship to the brute. The new positivist must be critical on both sides; he must push on to the establishment of the human, as well as of the natural, law on a positivistic basis. Thus only will modernity triumph over pseudo-modernity and criticism confute sophistry.

The critical positivist, as Babbitt depicts him, is necessarily an individualist. This does not mean that the critical positivist will reject every exterior standard to make himself the measure of all things. It means that he assents to human standards on personally positivistic grounds, for human standards are nothing more than the embodiment of that element of oneness in life which is a matter of experience. It is the individualism of immediate, in the sense of
personal, perception of the normal and representative in human experience.

But what is the problem with which this individual, who would live by human standards, is faced? Ultimately, and in the widest sense, that of happiness; more proximately, the ethical solution of the problem of the "One and the Many." This last is a universal problem. It manifests itself, writes Babbitt, in every phase of life and nature. Now, ontologically, as the distinction between the elements of change and permanence; again, for the intellect, as illusion and reality, which correspond to change and permanence respectively; and, nearer at home, in man himself, ethically as the dualism of his nature: the multiplicity of his desires, and the unity of his power to say "no." Must the problem be attacked in all its aspects? No, according to Mr. Babbitt, for this would be futile. Because the element of change enters into man's very nature, he cannot solve the problem metaphysically at all. What reality he may know is always inextricably bound up with illusion. Illusion, change, enters into the very notion of personality itself, existentia propria. The only sane way out is to narrow the problem down to a question of the practical conduct of life. This means that we must decide whether multiplicity and unrestraint or unity and control will rule our lives. On whichever side the choice falls, the decision must be measured in human happiness, the ultimate
Naturalism has faced the same problem and decided in favor of multiplicity and unrestraint. Naturalism considers man merely as a part of nature and since nature is always changing and evolving, so too is man. The fixity toward which human standards aspire is incompatible with this view of man. Naturalism considers man little, if anything, more than a brute, and the only unity known to the life of the brute is the indiscriminate response to instinct. So in its conception of life naturalism holds up the unrestrained surrender to all elemental movements as an ideal. The fruit of naturalism, when weighed in the scales of human happiness, is found wanting. It is time to assert unity, the human law, which tells us that man is more than a part of nature and more than the sum of his desires.

In taking up this position, Babbitt goes on, one is none the less positivistic and critical, for the human law is matter of experience, "a fact of immediate perception, the presence of a power of control in the individual." This fact, coupled with another fact of experience, man's innate moral indolence, is at the basis of humanistic ethics. A man's spiritual vigor is measured by his exercise of the one and the vanquishing of the other. By the keenness of a man's perception of this dual fact is to be measured his insight into the human law. And the acceptance of this view binds him to the greatest possible effort. If he can exercise control, he must do so for his own happiness' sake.
But at this point the positivistic individualist finds himself confronted with the question of standards. It is one thing to be conscious of a power of control, another to formulate standards for its guidance. In general, there is the criterion of happiness. The humanist will consent to no curtailment of his desires which does not make for happiness. But something more specific is necessary. Consistency bids him turn to experience in this pass also. To his own experience alone? No, for that would precipitate him into the amorphous individualism of the naturalist. Furthermore, the consciousness of his own moral indolence ought to lead him to look with respect to those who, in the past, have in some degree reached the spiritual vigor towards which he strives. He will turn, then, to the experience of mankind to seek a model for imitation. In doing so he will not relinquish his critical and positivistic position, for he will accept it only as experience, and not as authority, and will subject it to the keenest analysis of which he is capable. Neither will he restrict the experience upon which he will draw, but includes in a generous gesture both East and West. Experience of life can be of three kinds, naturalistic, humanistic, and religious. Will he restrict his choice here? Yes, and that on the criterion of the fruits of each in the past. We have seen what naturalism does in the Romantic excesses. To pass too abruptly from the naturalistic to the religious level
has led man to much self-deception in the past. Human, secular experience seems to be the only solution, to Babbitt's mind.

The rejection of experience merely on the naturalistic level in the formation of standards seems amply justified by the evidence Mr. Babbitt has collected of the bitter fruit of Romantic naturalism. But what is the reason for his distinction between the human and the religious (supernatural)? Babbitt's preference for the human is tentative. Humanism needs religion, but not vice-versa, he says, because the ethical life is based on humility. They must be looked upon as different stages in the same path. One must be eased, as it were, from the trough of naturalism to the religious height, on the gentle incline of humanism. Consequently, humanism must possess some religious insight. It is possible for a humanist to be at once meditative and humble. Mr. Babbitt suggests a foundation for this humility in the doctrine, or rather fact, of moral indolence which, he says, in some way would resemble the Christian doctrine of original sin, with the added advantage, however, that it would not jar the sensitive ear of the man not yet wholly free from naturalistic prejudices. This, in addition to a respectful attitude toward the experience of the past, will furnish the religious insight needed.

The critical positivist has yet the task of drawing
from the experience he has chosen a workable model for imitation. His attitude, we have seen, will have this much of humility, that he is willing to learn, and conscious of his own shortcomings; he is seeking standards according to which he will exercise the spiritual fire of his innate power of control. By what means is he to erect these standards from the dead material of the past and revivify it to the present? Reason, imagination, and the criterion of representativeness or normality, by which last can only be meant widespread recurrence and production of the greatest human happiness. When the critical humanist shall have formed these standards and have disciplined impulse to their measure he shall have reached his goal, decorum, which Babbitt defines as "the pulling back of impulse to the proportionateness which has been perceived." It seems necessary to examine at this point the part to be played by each of these faculties in the work of the erection of standards. This is by no means the simplest task in the grasping of Mr. Babbitt's position. He is careful to prepare us somewhat, in the preface to Rousseau and Romanticism, for the role he intends to give to the imagination. Ultimately, all seems to go back to his attitude toward the epistemological problem. For him, the problem is incapable of metaphysical solution. All the reality man can grasp is known through a veil of illusion. Therefore, the soundness of the only solution possible for him, the ethical
solution, rests on the right use of illusion, rests on the
proper use of the right kind of imagination.30

There is imagination and imagination, says Mr. Babbitt,
but every kind is not efficient for our end. It was by a
sheer mistaking of this much known, but little understood,
faculty that Romanticism was led into some of its most egre-
gious errors. Mr. Babbitt distinguishes broadly two kinds of
imagination: the classic and the romantic, and these are at
poles on every major point.31 The Romantic has at its core
the straining away from the actual; the classic finds in the
actual its center and point of departure, in a sense, its
norm; the romantic revels in the unique, the eccentric, the
erratic, the purely personal; the classic seeks to disengage
from the welter of the actual what is representative and
normal.32 The imagination which the critical humanist will
press into his service, in erecting from the experience of the
past a model for his own conduct, is the ethical imagination,
which is best defined as the classic imagination concentrated
on the human law.33 The humanist will seek to disengage the
normal and representative from the experience of the past
to be held up as a model for the exercise of the power of
control.

This is not a mirage, Babbitt goes on, for despite
the vast difference which may exist between convention and
convention as removed by time, etc., there are perceivable
in the flux a constant element, certain "unwritten laws of heaven."34 This is a fact of experience, for we find in writers of ancient times, and of conventions far removed from our own, truths of human experience which are valid today, maxims of conduct which are still vital.35 It is easy to see where the critical power must enter here. It will be the office of reason to keep the critical positivist, who is thus exercising the imagination, in touch with reality, first of all with the reality of the facts of past experience on which he is drawing, and secondly, with the reality of his needs in making the necessary adjustments to the present. For this work not every exercise of the reason will do. Here Mr. Babbitt distinguishes the meanings of "reason."36 He enumerates first, the mathematical reason, secondly, the reason of common sense, and lastly, imaginative reason. The mathematician's reason can help not at all. Good sense, which "may exist in many grades ranging from an intuitive mastery of some field to that of the ethos of a whole age," comes much nearer the need. But in the past this good sense has come to be conceived of as opposed to imagination.37 This error must be rectified before one has the kind of reason needed: the reason of good sense sublimated by union with that power whereby it is "enabled to go beyond the conventions of a particular time and country and lay hold... on the unwritten laws of heaven."38 It is the work of this reason, having
grasped the central facts of past experience, to relate them
to reality in the past, to prevent groundless idealizing, and
to fit these facts into the present. The work of the ethical
imagination is to mold these facts, on which the imaginative
reason has laid hold, into a permanent rounded model for imita-
tion. The imagination gives unity, the reason reality. For
what is unity without reality? The Romanticists found it and
ended in being completely submerged in its falseness. What
is reality without unity? Nightmare.39 But we must not
forget, while thus analyzing his position, that the critical
positivist ultimately takes his stand on insight, which Mr.
Babbitt defines as "the immediate perception of something
anterior to thought and feeling, known practically as a power
of control."40 This insight and the exercise of this power
of control is the measure of man's spiritual vigor. To give
permanence to the action of this power he must cultivate
habits in the line of control.41 A man who shall fulfill
these things shall be on the high road to the land of Heart's
Desire for the humanist: decorum, which is defined as "only
the pulling back of impulse to the proportionateness which
has been perceived with the aid of what one may term the
ethical or generalizing imagination."42

II

Babbitt's basic fallacy lies in his attitude toward
that aspect of the question of the One and Many which he calls the epistemological problem. He accepts the continuity of the flux. Life presents a oneness which is always changing. The element of oneness is always associated with reality, the element of change, "as every psychologist knows," with illusion. This ceaseless change is not a thing apart from man which, swirling about him, yet leaves him unmoved. He is himself a part of the flux, a oneness which is always changing. Oneness and change, reality and illusion are inextricably intermingled within man himself as well as outside him, so that "whatever reality man can know is inextricably mixed up with illusion." 

Illusion is an integral part of his intellectual life.

The first slip seems patent. Babbitt opposes the constant element to the element of change as reality to illusion. Yet on what defensible grounds? What is there to compel us to conclude that what remains is real, while that which passes is only a fiction of the mind? Let us take an example, prosaic enough in itself, but to the point, since it strikes, not only at this error, but at the one which follows immediately. In a growing child we see the one personality rapidly passing through stages of physical and mental development, from the night of inarticulateness and helplessness, through the beautiful dawn of consciousness into the noon of intelligent speech, purposeful activity and the vigor of
young manhood or womanhood. The oneness here cannot be questioned. We recognize that it is the same person who displays the various traits discovered day by day, as the personality unfolds itself. Nor would any one hesitate to associate this oneness with reality. But were these changes illusions or fictions, because they passed, shaken from the shoulders of the youth like outworn garments? Obviously not. Babbitt has failed to distinguish properly between substance and accident. An accident, which inheres in a subject for a time and then passes away, is not unreal because it is unlasting. A small boy's littleness is not a fiction of the mind because the boy will soon grow into a man and his smallness change to fullness of stature.

Consider the growing child in another light. He is not unique, but one of a large group, the members of which have a perfect resemblance to one another in some common note, here, the note of growing childhood. Considered so, he presents another aspect of the One and the Many which troubles Babbitt greatly. As an individual in a class he is but one example of something general and common to all the individuals of that class. But in reality, in things as they are, only the individuals exist; as Babbitt would say, only the many.

Babbitt's difficulty in either case lies in determining just what we can know. Led on by his predeterminations he falls into the positivistic trap and concludes, "only that
is real which is immediately perceived." All else is illusion. Obviously we cannot know illusions. In the first case we perceive, not the persisting, nor the changing element but a persistent element which changes. The change is associated with illusion and cannot be the object of knowledge. The proper object of knowledge here is, consequently, the persistent element grasped through the "veil of illusion." In the second case we perceive immediately only the individual. Therefore, we must deny reality to the common note. All we can know is the individual persistent element and that only as modified by illusion. No absolute universals; not even an absolute individual.

Some alleviation of this distress may come of a sketchy statement of the view of philosophy on these points. It is true that in things as they are the elements of change and permanence are inextricably intermingled, that the universal has but potential being in individuals. But one must, despite the psychology Babbitt invokes, deny that the changing element is to be associated with illusion and repudiate the groundless assumption that reality can be predicted only of objects of immediate perception. While in the ontological order these elements are indissolubly united, in the logical order they can be separated. The mind can disentangle and classify. The legitimate products of induction, general concepts, are valid and have reality, though they
exist in the logical order only, as universals. Their reality is founded in that perfect similitude existing in the ontological order between the individuals of any class. Man's knowledge is not limited to individuals, since the universal, verified in individuals, is real and the valid object of cognition; neither is all known reality bound up with illusion, nor even with change, for man knows essences, the essences even of the changing elements, and these essences are real, eternal in possibility, immutable in motion, necessary in constitution. 46

To dwell at such length on the epistemological difficulties involved in Babbitt's position would be inexcusable were it not that momentous issues affecting the soundness of his entire structure depend from them. His attitude here, it seems, gives immediate rise to the three most distinctive characteristics of his system: the unique (and exaggerated) view of the imagination, the insistence on a power of control as the basis of spiritual effort, an insistence which has led some to class him outright as a voluntarist, and the ultimate inadequacy of his finished ideal of humanistic decorum.

Taking his stand on the positivistic maxim, (quite undemonstrable, by the way, and that not because it is self-evident), that "only that which is immediately perceived is real," he is naturally led to seek some fact of immediate
perception upon which to found his re-assertion of the human law. This he thinks to have found in a dualism within the individual, and, more particularly, in one aspect of that dualism. It is a fact of immediate, individual experience that while each faculty is eager for its own satisfaction irrespective of any other, the eye of all seeing, the ear of all hearing, etc., man is capable of controlling this innate essential tendency. He can restrict the use of one faculty to favor the exercise of another, and can determine activity both quantitatively and qualitatively. This power is the one absolute. It is anterior and superior to thought and feeling and it is immediately evident. It is man's distinctive characteristic, which sets him a creature apart, lifts him above the flux, gives unity and purpose to his life. It is but logical and just that it should become the head of the corner in the new ethics.

No fault can honestly be found with this. This power is present, is distinctive, does give unity in a sense. It is to certain nuances, certain implications, even accretions, to which one must, in the name of common sense, take exception. The first springs from the depreciation of the intellect and consists in the assertion, sometimes explicit, sometimes implied, that the Higher Will is not only prior to intellect in dignity but, in some obscure way, prior in fact. It is the elusive, tantalizing assumption of this fact which has led
some to pronounce the condemnation of voluntarism upon him. He appeals to the East for a precedent in the matter, but to what avail? This is but to involve Eastern thought in his own condemnation. Nor need we make too much of the matter since he himself admits that the power must be used "intelligently." But it presents a real difficulty, unless we press this admission, and for clarity it is well to consult the teachings of philosophy upon the matter.

The dispute as to the priority between will and intellect strikes one as rather futile. The nexus between them is so close that one is tempted to waive the whole matter. But it is manifest, upon due reflection, that the will is certainly prior in dignity, since with it rests the ultimate posting of the human act. The intellect, however, is prior in activity, since it alone can present the alternatives between which the will must choose. We use intellect to mean, of course, the mind in the exercise of its powers both of analysis and synthesis, and not in the restricted sense in which we shall find Babbitt using the word. St. Ignatius Loyola well illustrates this necessary dependence of will upon intellect, at the same time ascribing to the will the liberty which becomes it and constitutes its dignity, when he urges upon his followers, not merely conformity of act, but also of intellect and judgment in the exercise of obedience, meaning that they should strive to grasp the Superior's point of view in any
given order, since "the will cannot for long obey against the understanding." By interpreting Babbitt's "intelligently" with generous latitude, we may point out the difficulty without exaggerating it.

A further defect which cannot be so happily disposed of, and which has its origin in the failure to appreciate the true relation of will and intellect, manifests itself in the opposition of the power of control to the "ordinary" will. The "ordinary" will is that native tendency of man, considered as a composite of faculties and powers, or of the powers considered in themselves, to seek full, unrestricted satisfaction and activity. This tendency is the real cause of the expansiveness of desire of which Babbitt speaks so frequently. The presence of this tendency is a fact of immediate experience. The power to control this tendency is also a fact of immediate perception. This power he calls the "Higher Will" and opposes it to the expansive tendency of desire as to a "Lower Will." Let us grant, for the moment, that a "Higher Will", just as Babbitt conceives it, does exist; it becomes immediately apparent that such a power cannot be opposed to the "ordinary" will. Both the "higher" and the ordinary wills, Babbitt would admit, tend toward the perfecting of man's nature, the "lower" blindly, the "higher" intelligently. The only ground upon which the supremacy of the "Higher Will" could be asserted is that the perfection of man's nature is
attained more fully or more easily under its guidance. In this case, the relation of the "Higher Will" toward the ordinary will should be one of directive co-operation, rather than of inhibitory opposition, since the ordinary will has the same end as the "Higher Will." Viewed in this way, there is some ground for the comparison which has been drawn between Babbitt's "Higher Will" and the rational appetite of the Aristotelians. But Babbitt himself did not conceive the "Higher Will" as directive so much as inhibitory. There is no room in human nature for a purely inhibitory power.

This failure to deal adequately with the relation between intellect and will leads to a further development, one which Professor Mercier hails with an enthusiasm it is hard to share. This is nothing less than a mild divinizing of the power of control. The argument as Professor Mercier sums it up runs thus: Man is conscious of a power of control over the expansive desire. But reason alone cannot impose this restraint. This was Plato's fallacy. Neither can the lower or ordinary will restrict itself. Yet, together, these exhaust the nature of man, "rational animal." So, Babbitt concludes, (and Mercier applauds), the higher power must be from without, must be divine. Man, as Professor Mercier puts it, is not merely a rational animal, but a rational animal plus this divine something. And he triumphantly concludes that Mr. Babbitt has established, on purely positiv-
istic grounds, the existence in man of a supernatural something akin to the Christian's grace of God. 53

With all respect to Professor Mercier, we must protest that he is going too swiftly. On Mercier's own statement, 54 not to call on Babbitt himself, the latter does not declare either for or against the existence of God because a declaration either way would be unpositivistic. To declare the presence within man of a divine power, while refusing to commit oneself on the existence of the source of such a power, is somewhat disconcerting. The argument against such procedure is that of Socrates against Miletus. The extravagance of this assumption is manifest in the light philosophy throws on the time relation of will and intellect, and Babbitt's arbitrary limitation of the word "reason", of which we shall speak, holds much of the explanation for the whole question.

The difficulties into which Babbitt is led by recalling Joubert's assertion that illusion is an integral part of man's life are not ended. Granting the power of control as he sees it, let us recall that he is careful to caution its intelligent use, its use, as becomes evident, in accordance with some intellectual norm. Such a norm, to be effective at all, must be universal in character. A measure which is useless, save in a particular case, is not a norm but an eccentricity. Babbitt concedes this. But his theory of knowledge precludes our grasping universal essence, the essence of good-
ness or righteousness, for example. It precludes these univer-
sal norms and, unless some expedient be found, condemns us to
sterility in the fruit of the "Higher Will." Babbitt thinks
to have found an escape in the very element of illusion. "The
solution lies in the right use of illusion." 55

At this point in his exposition he equates the term
"illusion" and "imagination" in a very confusing manner. 56
As a matter of fact, they cannot be equated at all if we aim
at any accuracy. Illusion denotes deception of the subject;
the object is not there; at least, is not there just as he
thinks he perceives it. In the activity of the imagination,
however, one is perfectly certain, under normal conditions,
that all is a mere representation. Obviously, illusion cannot
be what Babbitt means, and realizing the implications of the
word he shifts to the word "imagination" as more or less com-
monly understood in the actual elaboration of his idea.

Since imagination is to do the work usually ascribed
to intellect, we may expect to find strange powers attributed
to it. And we do. The norms for the exercise of the "Higher
Will" must be universal, at least flexible so, that is, they
must fuse into a unity the common element in the multiplicity
of experience. Reason, says Babbitt, since it can grasp only
the individual, is tied down to the many and must give way to
the imagination in virtue of the unifying power he ascribes
to the latter. 57 He is careful to distinguish the kind of
imagination he means: the ethical imagination, which may be defined briefly as the classical or selective imagination concentrated on the human law. It is opposed to the romantic, or expansive and sensuous, imagination and is characterized by a power to detect similarity and diversity and to unify or synthesize similars, not into an absolute universal, but into a standard, an embodiment of the normal, in the sense of the representative or loosely generic. Nothing is said of the power to determine whether the nature of the similarity be accidental or essential or merely apparent. Concentrated on the universal experience of mankind, this power will perceive the similar, normal phenomena, and gathering them into flexible unity, will provide a convenient norm for the exercise of the "Higher Will". It is the duty of reason, by virtue of its analytic power, to determine the immediate application of this norm in the present contingency. 58

It would appear that Babbitt, besides presenting an occasion for a vast amount of misinterpretation, must also be accused of degrading the intellect inexcusably. Much of the difficulty springs from an unwarranted restriction of the word "reason." Certainly, we possess the unifying power of which he speaks, or at least one very like it; and his description corresponds to what is called, in criticism, the "creative imagination." This, however, must be delicately defined. But to deal with "reason" first. It is a mistaken
opposition he would discover between reason and the classical imagination as analytic and unifying powers respectively, for on what grounds can it be justified? Certainly not on the ground of experience nor on that of sound terminology. Reason, as designating the intellectual element which specifies man, has always meant, not only the analytic power, which Babbitt would concede to it, but also that complementary power of synthesis which is an essential factor in intellectual progress. Babbitt recognizes that man has the power of synthesis. But he is constrained by his own definition to deny that it is the work of reason. Forced to look elsewhere, he is led by the quality of "creative" imagination which characterizes the world's great works of art to seize upon imagination as the faculty of synthesis.59

The phrase "creative imagination", as used in artistic criticism, needs careful attention. Do critics mean by it to ascribe to the imagination as such, the unifying, purpose-giving, directive power implied in the term "creative"? I think not. Those of the Aristotelian school, from Aristotle to Father Loughaye, could not do so without great inconsistency. The imagination is essentially the power of representing sensible objects independently of their presence. As such, its unifying power consists in the ability to represent in one image objects wholly distinct. The numbers, one, two, three, four, (1, 2, 3, 4,) written side by side, are
Certainly really distinct. The imagination, nevertheless, can represent the image of the number, one thousand two hundred and thirty-four, once the integers are perceived. Further, it can give unity of suggestive succession, one image following upon another according to some connection, whether in the manner or time or degree of intensity of other circumstances of antecedent sense perception. To unify into a congruous, and even a synthetical and beautiful, whole, would seem to be beyond the imagination and to demand a higher directive power. This higher directive power is none other than the intellect in its synthetic capacity. By it we select, unify, coordinate and direct the representations of the imagination. By its operation the landscape artist, from the panorama of nature, chooses those particular details which are suitable to the impression he wishes to emphasize and rejects the less effective, giving unity, purpose and meaning to what else were but detached and irrelevant details. It enables Homer, from the multifarious details of a scene of departure, to select and unify incidents, attitudes, moments, which make the sailing of Ulysses from the land of Alkinoos one of the most touching love scenes in all literature. It is by the intellectual element at work that the imagination of the great poet, composer or painter is lifted from the level of mere representation to the exalted plane of artistic creation.
Little would be lost if, while misnaming this power, Babbitt would yet by its agency achieve his end. This is impossible because the ethical imagination can achieve no universals based on the essences of things. Even though it should collate the experience of the past into a "standard" of ethical conduct, this would be found wanting. Babbitt asserts that the worth of any standard must be measurable by happiness, in other words, in terms of the good. But we must know the good in its essence before we can begin to use it as a measure by which to evaluate a standard of life; otherwise we are measuring the unknown by the undefined. The experience of the past cannot give us this knowledge; nor does he concede to the individual intellect power to grasp it. He limits our knowledge to the individual, the immediately perceptible; to this good thing, to that happy moment. Happiness and goodness must forever elude us. It is this denial which vitiates his final ideal, decorum, or moderation, into moral opportunism, for he turns from the metaphysical to the ethical problem, while the latter can only be dealt with in the light of our solution as to the former.

This will become clearer if we examine his use of the word "happiness." The ultimate criterion, to which the ethical inductionist is to have recourse in the evaluation of experience, is the fruit it has borne, and will bear if properly applied, in happiness. Is it not apparent that upon
the essential understanding of this word, placed in the key position of the structure, the soundness of the whole edifice depends? Yet Babbitt admits, at least implicitly, that we can never grasp this indispensable factor. For happiness is a universal essence. It does not mean a happy moment nor an object which can give happiness; it is limited neither to the individual nor to the immediately perceptible. It designates that very reality which is at the heart of every happy moment, and of every object that can give happiness and which, considered in its universality, is applicable to every individual and yet remains a unity. Only thus can it become a valid norm. And considered thus it cannot be identified with the individual nor lend itself to immediate perception. These last are the very conditions Babbitt imposes upon cognition and, as a consequence, he declares unknowable the very criterion in the light of which we are to pass judgment on the worth of past experience. The "ethical imagination" can offer but sweeping generalizations as to what, in the past, seems to have led people to a condition which seems to have been happiness. But we can never know.

Babbitt speaks frequently of the qualitative difference between happiness and pleasure. But his denial of absolute universals handicaps him here because the distinction sought must be based on a knowledge of the nature of goodness, the quality common to happiness and pleasure. If the pleasant
as, in some sense, goodness, yet in a sense different from that in which it may be predicated of happiness, the only solution is to push back to the universal idea of goodness. Placing its specific note in suitability, we can validly distinguish a greater and a lesser, a true and an apparent good, on a basis of the dignity of the faculty to which they are suitable. That which becomes a common end or a total nature can be said to be a greater good than one that satisfies some particular end or some individual faculty. Happiness may be designated as the possession of that good which becomes man's rational nature in its entirety, considered in all its aspects and relations; pleasure, as complacency in the satisfaction of any particular power. The universal is the basis of the distinction; its denial involves confusion.

Considered in the light of these remarks, I think, the ideal of decorum as proposed by Babbitt loses its original appeal. Not that it is to be utterly repudiated as worthless. It is merely insufficient. It promises happiness upon moderation without pretending to tell us what happiness is, or why moderation is the way to it. "To be a humanist," he says, "is to be moderate, sensible, decent." But is this happiness? To pull back impulse to a vague and tenuous proportionateness, in the light of an indefinable goal, is certainly unsatisfactory. The whole ideal lacks compelling force. This compelling force, which should rest upon a grasp of the nature
of things, is naturally lacking in a system in which the power to know nature is denied us. In Babbitt's plan, our knowledge is limited to the individual perceived through a veil of illusion. As a consequence we are urged to relinquish aspirations toward the universal, the absolute, the metaphysical, and to confine our efforts to practical questions of conduct. But to solve these, some norm of oneness, of universality is needed. Since an absolute is denied, we are offered "standards" which are nothing more than generalizations of instances, making no pretense of plumbing things to their depths.

These standards are worth just what any hypothesis is worth until it is seen to be grounded in the nature of things. They may be convenient, and expedient; they may fit certain conditions and explain certain data. But here they stop. Any other hypothesis which fulfills these requirements, even though it be contradictory, is quite as valid. There is nothing in either of them to compel acceptance. Babbitt sees this, of course, and welcomes the fact. This lack of compelling force, he would counter, insures that flexibility of standards which is so necessary for the critical modern mind and the inviolability of the individual. As a matter of fact, the lack of compelling force in moral standards leads to moral relativism, pragmatism, subjectivism; anything but realism. It leaves room, not merely for the play of individuality,
but for caprice, little is gained by the appeal to the absolute of past experience. Strange conclusions can thus be drawn from the past, and, in some way, twisted into plausibilities.

To erect a sound system of ethics we must sound the nature of things. Until we can say of any moral standard that it rests upon man's nature adequately considered, that is, in itself and in its relation to God and other creatures, there is nothing to compel the individual to accept it as a norm for his own conduct. This is not to say, of course, that the compulsion to be moral comes directly from the validity of a norm; such compulsion is laid upon as creatures, conformably to the necessity of our nature, by the Creator. The unwritten laws of heaven are graven in the nature of things, of God, of man and of creation. The constants of experience are manifestations of that nature and constants because that nature is such as it is.

To come to this we must recognize the full range of man's intellect upon reality. Babbitt's initial error lies here; taking his stand with positivism he falls with it, and his ethical house of cards comes tumbling after. Yet, with all, there is much deserving of praise and acceptance in what he taught.

III

This statement must appear almost paradoxical coming,
as it does, after what may have appeared to be purely de-
structive comment. The only justification which can be offered is that the comment offered is based on sound principles, which make, of course, no claim to originality. Soundness of philosophic principles is far more desirable than originality. The commendation now to be bestowed is entirely sincere and can easily be substantiated from Mr. Babbitt's writings.

Let us begin at the beginning and take our stand with Babbitt on the fact of experience which he deems absolutely fundamental; the immediate perception, in the individual, of an element anterior and superior to thought and feeling, which manifests itself, practically, as a power of control. We shall prescind, for the moment, from the nature of this power, (which we considered above), to fix our attention on the position it holds in Babbitt's scheme of things. Ultimately, the assertion of the presence of the power is a re-assertion of dualism in man, a fumbling re-assertion and, as Dr. Bandas points out, inadequate, but a re-assertion, nevertheless, and one that is made at a critical moment. We are at the high tide of naturalism. We have seen its fruits, and since they are evil, we condemn the tree which bore them, to be cut down and cast into the flame. No more vital point at which to lay the axe could have been chosen than that at which Babbitt strikes in the re-assertion of this basic fact.

Naturalism, he demonstrated, tends to level things off, to
degrade man to a mere part of nature and to deny that war in
the cave between expansive desire and directive control which
is the surest mark of his superiority. The fact of this
conflict, whether it be conceived as the effect of original
sin or merely as innate moral indolence, is at the base of
ture ethics. From naturalism's denial of this conflict there
have followed principles most corrosive and destructive of all
morality. Among the more widespread of these principles we
may name the tenet that man is naturally good, in the sense
that when following the promptings of his nature he will
always and necessarily do good; that all elemental promptings
are necessarily good; that life must be unified by a complete
surrender to instinct. The denial of this conflict gave rise
to the myth of pre-conventional simplicity and spontaneity,
of pre-social incorruption; to the exaltation of pity, and
the exaggeration of the fraternal instinct as capable of
counteracting the urge to self-aggrandizement. This same
denial lies at the root of all that is objectionable, as
being sentimental and false to reality, in altruism and hu-
manitarianism. Upon it rests that individualism of unre-
straint and moral indifference which is sapping the vigor of
our generation. The cry of naturalism is that of Chateau-
briand's Chaotas: "Périsse le Dieu qui contrarie la nature,"
if we but understand God as being any principle of restric-
tion and control. What could be nobler or worthier of our
complete acceptance than the re-assertion of the vital fact of this conflict? And Babbitt does just that, with a personal conviction and a courageous disregard of personal popularity that shed a glow, almost of heroism, about his name. Professor Mercier's tribute finds a wide echo: "We may disagree, but we cannot disregard; and, even in disagreeing, we cannot but admire the courage of his stand." And we may add, its fundamental solidity.

Within this dualism is contained another of the most praiseworthy and promising points of Babbitt's creed, the "Higher Will." Not that his view of this power can be accepted unconditionally. I think we made that clear. But the significance of the assertion of such a power cannot be overestimated. As Babbitt conceived it, the Higher Will is essentially free and supreme in the individual. Moreover, in laboring to establish its presence he has always argued from experiential grounds. Thus, in the Higher Will, he has forged a weapon with which to attack the "unmoralists" on their own ground. The last claim to have freed man, on scientific grounds, from the moral responsibilities attaching to free will. Babbitt claims to have established, scientifically, that man is fully responsible for his life and conduct.

The gospel of the essential goodness of man as the sentimental naturalist preaches it also aims at the complete liberation from moral responsibility. But the claims of the
scientific apostles of behaviorism and mechanism seem even more plausible to the critical, self-assured "modern mind." They have, on biological grounds, sought to reduce men to a mere complexity of chemical and physical interactions, ruled by laws over which he has no control, indeed, of many of which he is still ignorant, and which work inexorable vengeance upon those who hinder their free operation. Absolute moral irresponsibility is held out in the name of these physical and chemical laws. In the name of these laws the mechanist and psychoanalyst preach nemesis upon control in terms of "repression complexes" and "inhibitions." They claim to propound this liberating doctrine from the solid platform of scientific experiment. To all such the "Higher Will" of Professor Babbitt spells confusion, for it is based, as well as the rest of their claims, not on authority or revelation or tradition, but on immediate experience. They would free man from moral responsibility on a positivistic rejection of its only basis, free will. In the name of the Higher Will, the presence of which he labors to establish on a basis of similar experience, Babbitt places the burden squarely on the shoulders of the individual. They would forbid control under threat of the nemesis of "complex." He preaches control under threat of the nemesis of a wasted, ruined life. In asserting this power, he has flung the glove in the face of all modern pseudo-science, championing the spiritual man
against degradation to the level of the brute.

A noted writer of our day enumerates, among the characteristics of our age, irreverence for the past. This may be applied with special emphasis and justice to America. Many influences have been at work to form this attitude in us. Our very national birth is a symbol of this spirit. We were brought forth in a struggle to shake off a "foreign" domination, and with it went much it would have been to our profit to retain. Our natural resources, which have made us the richest of nations, have also gone far toward making us the most contemptuous of the achievements of other nations, especially in the past; and the crass materialism of the civilization we have developed has trained us to look upon such finer and nobler achievements of the past as the arts, philosophy, and the fruits of culture generally, as incidental interests in life wholly subordinate to the supreme business of man, which, we were told, consisted in industrial enterprise and economic expansion.

Against this crude frontier spirit Babbitt launches a powerful and pointed attack, placing at the base of his ethical structure reverence and respect for the past. From its experience we are to draw our standards of the normal, representative, and central in life. It is not to form a background merely, cast against which the achievements of our age may stand out more boldly, but is to supply the very
molding stones of the "new" ethics, to furnish the vital 
promptings of our daily lives, the norms by which we measure. 
and since the experience of the past is preserved and en-
shrined in the works of art and philosophy which have come 
down to us, it is only by assiduous study of these precious 
heritages, that we can draw from them vital influence and 
nourishment from our own day. To turn to the past for stand-
ards means a return to all that is finer and nobler in life, 
to achievement which transcends material greatness, to works 
which still live on when once belching smokestacks will 
survive only as black and desolate monuments of a misguided 
culture. It means a turning to the inner spirit from the 
outer din, to reason from sophistry, to an evaluation of life 
according to its permanent elements rather than by the prog-
ress stages of a change-mad age. There are some as M. 
Maritain, 69 who cannot agree to a parity between the heritage 
and wisdom of East and West. There is a greater cleavage 
between the East and the West than Babbitt seemed to perceive, 
such objectors would insist. Moreover, the special claims of 
Christianity make it impossible for us to turn to any tradi-
tion other than that of the West which has recognized these 
claims. We cannot push aside the claims of Christianity; we 
must examine them as they are put forward. For the phil-
osophic thought of the West seems to soar much closer to 
reality, and Christianity, since its claims are demonstrated
to be true, must replace all that has gone before as God's own manifestation, final and irrevocable, of Himself. But none will deny Babbitt just acclaim for recalling America from its mistaken ways by reminding it, in no uncertain terms, of the nemesis which waits on those, who, in the headiness of youth or the sophistication of age, and on the crest of the wave of apparent achievement, scorn the wisdom that has gone before.

Anyone of these aspects of his doctrine would be enough to insure him the respect of thoughtful people. Combined, they merit sincere, though conditioned, approval. As a philosopher he has earned for himself a place far above the run of his contemporaries, the more so because he reasons to his conclusions from premises which they must grant, if they would be consistent with themselves. One need but make a mental comparison on one of many points between, say, Babbitt and Santayana, or Babbitt and Croce, or Babbitt and Dewey. A decision favorable to Babbitt seems almost certain. This can be said without seeming to condone his errors. In part he triumphs over his own mistakes.
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CHAPTER II

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5. p. x.


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8. p. xi.

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11. pp. xiv-xv; 372


13. pp. 27; xiv-xvi.


19 p. xviii.

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21 p. xvi.

22 p. xx.

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29 p. xiv.

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31 chapter II passim.

32 pp. 92, 102.

33 p. 359.

34 p. 175.

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38 p. 177.
39 pp. 363, 365, 185, 189.
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43 p. xiv.
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45 p. xiv.
47 pp. xvi-xix.
48 p. 172.
52 ibidem l. c.
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57 p. xv, p. 167, note
58 p. 167.
59 p. xv.
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62 de bono, cf. Saint Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 5, a. 3. etc.

63 pp. xx-xxi.


66 Atala: Le Drame

67 Le Mouvement Humaniste aux États Unis, l. o.

CHAPTER III

PLATO AND THE JUSTICE OF THE INNER MAN

The Republic, so patently a work of supreme artistry and touching in its vast scheme a world of varied topics, displays as many facts as a shapely gem, each of which casts back the light with its own peculiar lustre and attracts with a beauty proper to itself. The personality one feels breathing through every line of delicate poniard-like irony, of ardent censure, or of lofty aspiration, is enough to draw one back to the book again and again. To the historian, whether of literature or philosophy the insight it affords into the ethos of the time, though indirect, is invaluable. The rhetorician and stylist finds, in the rich and varied melody of its language, in the consummate skill of the dialogue, in the vivid narration, in the delicately suggestive and colorful imagery, and in the subtle argumentation, an inexhaustible treasure-house of beautiful thought and beautiful speech. To the student of Platonic thought it stands as the sun in the constellation of his dialogues, for it is, in the words of Paul Shorey,¹ "a positive, not to say dogmatic, exposition
of plato's thought." From this point of view there stand out from the multitude of questions raised, but not always answered, two dominant lines of inquiry, the twofold quest for justice in the individual and justice in the state.

Much ink has been spilled since the time of Proclus in a somewhat futile discussion of the respective importance of these themes. Did Plato mean primarily to elaborate the ideal state and only incidentally the individual just man, or conversely, first the individual and then the state, as his words would seem to indicate? Proclus held the latter view, according to Professor Shorey, while in recent times so eminent a scholar as Professor Jowett, although designating Plato as above all an ethical psychologist, devotes his introductory essay to a consideration of the Republic almost exclusively from the first point of view. This seems to be the more common view today owing perhaps, as Daniel Sargent suggests, to our interest and faith in sociology which makes a lodestone of every Utopia. As we might suspect, in such a case, the truest view seems to be the one which reconciles rather than opposes the two contentions. Indeed, the view expressed by Shorey and, long before by Zeller, is far more in keeping with Plato's spirit. Zeller's words are: "For the Greek, ethics and politics were closely bound up with each other. As long as the Polis existed, it was quite impossible to think of the individual as separate from the com-
The questions were, quite possible, of equal importance to Plato's mind, first, because he was a Greek and, secondly, because at the time of writing Athens was running a course to which he could not be indifferent, and the Sophists were preaching an individualism that he could scarcely let pass unchallenged. Is it at all remarkable that in the Republic, "the central work of Plato's maturity," these two questions should come to the fore, not on an equal plane merely, but inextricably intertwined, as, to the Greek mind, they seemed necessarily to be? The important thing for this investigation is that Plato actually desired to delineate, in some way, an ideal of development and conduct for the individual, and this is not difficult to demonstrate from the text itself.

It has been remarked above that in Plato humanism is an immanent quality; this is so, literally, and the word cannot be truly predicated of his doctrine until this fact is recognized. Humanism, it has been said, is basically the desire to glorify human nature. This interpretation is not conclusive, for the term admits of several legitimate interpretations. There are those who would glorify human nature, as Jorgensen says, by making it the acme of all perfection. This is not humanism, but pride; better, pitiful blindness. There are those who would glorify human nature by yielding
to what is highest in it the place of pre-eminence and dominion. Only these really love human nature. Only these are exempt from Léon Bloy's scathing denunciation of that love of mankind which longs for its damnation and seeks to bring it about. Among these humanists Plato must emphatically be numbered, in virtue of that native and burning aspiration which breaks through subtlety, irony, and humor to crystallize in such phrases as "No man is willingly deceived about that which is the truest and highest in himself." This is the humanism of Plato: the highest in man must be made the rock upon which his happiness is to be built.

I

The theme of the Republic is an investigation into the nature of human justice. But it is by no means a free inquiry. The conviction, (or shall we say intuition?) that whatever justice may be it must have its ultimate explanation in man's nature, and not in anything less fundamental, underlies the whole of Socrates' discourse. Man is just before he acts justly. Even more, the whole of the first great division of the dialogue is devoted to establishing this point of view, both negatively and positively, and in this light the doctrine set forth becomes a protest against the superficiality characteristic of mere traditionalism and half-skeptical pragmatism.
The negative assertion of Plato's conviction takes the form of a refutation of these two doctrines. The first definition of justice brought forward rests almost wholly on traditional teaching, and great effect is gained by putting it into the mouth of the young Polemarchus, who has just received it verbatim from his elder. Justice,\textsuperscript{11} maintains Polemarchus on the authority of the poets and sages of the past, means giving every man his due, good to a friend and evil to an enemy. This is shown to be a weak and an inadequate definition because it admits of contingencies in which anything but justice would result from its application. To do evil to an enemy, Socrates argues, would be to injure him in just that quality whereby he is a man. Such cannot be the effect of true justice. The poets could never have meant this. The second objectionable doctrine,\textsuperscript{12} for which Plato selects a worthy mouthpiece, is dealt with in a similar manner. Justice, fulminates Thrasymachus, is the interest of the stronger. How naive, thinks Socrates. Cannot even the stronger mistake his own interest? Where is justice then? Thrasy machus is pressed to admit a similarity between justice and the practical arts.\textsuperscript{13} If justice is similar to a practical art, reasons Socrates, like, let us say, the art of medicine, which consists in a certain aptitude and skilfulness in achieving an end, must it not like every other practical art serve the subject or recipient of its action principally?
or, does Thrasymachus believe that the primary object of medicine is the fattening of the doctor's purse?

During this discussion Socrates has been gradually gathering certain positive statements relating to his own view of justice by admissions gently extorted from his opponents. Justice is the distinctively human virtue; it is an immanent quality by which man attains the end of his nature. It dwells always with wisdom and goodness. It is to a large extent, or perhaps entirely, the determinant of real happiness.

Finally, in the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus, the point of inquiry is definitely fixed. After a thorough and an eloquent discussion, the view of those who place justice in acts and its real worth in something beyond itself and maintain that justice is only the result of a convention among men, is rejected as inadequate and untrue to fact. Justice, every reasonable man knows, is desirable for itself as well as for the peace it brings. Therefore an adequate definition must not rest with a description but must plumb the nature of justice. Socrates, in his own mock-humble fashion, reluctantly consents to undertake the investigation.

No mention of the state has occurred thus far. It is brought in at this juncture as an aid to the investigation of the nature of justice. Since justice is attributed to States and individuals alike, suggests Socrates, would it
not be advisable to study its nature in the larger unit first, as being the "same tale writ larger"? Then the findings could be applied to the individual. No actual state can serve as an example, since it is the ideal state alone of which justice can be predicated without qualifications. One must consequently be constructed to order, so to say, and Socrates proceeds to do so (incidentally, on a basis of expediency and mutual profit). The polities about him, nevertheless, furnish many of the details of the ideal state. This account of the origin of states, commentators hasten to inform us, is not intended to be historical. There is no need for this caution. We are not so naive as to believe this. Nor, do we think, was Plato.

The principle of the division of labor is the root principle of Socrates' polity.20 This principle rests on the natural insufficiency of any man to provide for all the needs of existence, strengthened by the fact that one man is more suited by nature for a given task than another. The fruits of labor, consequently, are multiplied and perfected by the entire devotion of the worker to the task for which nature has best fitted him. So men come together to form a polity for mutual profit.21 The process of evolution on this principle is carried by Socrates from the simple, loose union for the satisfaction of the barest needs of life to a complex and closely knit organization for the attainment of the
fullest possible life. The finished state, though complex in structure, is one in purpose. Its end is the true happiness of the whole.

Structurally, the state is composed of three classes. The number and character of these is determined by the needs of the state on the principle enunciated. Each class is characterized by a more or less distinctive virtue. The lowest and by far the most numerous is that of the artisans and producers. Under this head are classed all gainful occupations, namely the professions and the trades. The second class, that of the warriors, is composed of fighting men, endowed by nature with courage and physical prowess. Its raison d'être as a political unit is the need of protecting the producers, and also to effect desirable expansion of territory. The smallest and highest class is that of the rulers.

The rulers, too, are endowed by nature for their task and hold power in virtue of this endowment. Even more, the virtue of the whole state derives from them in a definite manner. The virtue proper to the rulers is wisdom in counsel, consisting above all in a knowledge of both the greatest good of the whole and the means of attaining it. The courage of the warriors depends upon this wisdom of the rulers because it is, strictly speaking, the courage to defend the truths handed down by the rulers as requisites and conditions for
the happiness of the whole. Without this direction the
courage of the warriors would be but rashness or the exaltation of mere brutish superiority. No proper virtue is predi­cated of the class of artisans, but they are conceded a
share in the temperance which should characterize all the
classes in all their actions. Thus three of the cardinal
virtues, which are characteristic of both state and individual,
are accounted for. But what of justice? Where does it dwell
in this fair state? Not in any particular class, but in the
mutual harmony among all classes which is sure to follow
upon each one's tending to its own affairs and in no way
intruding upon those of another. Let each class, working
upon its proper level, seek earnestly the virtue and happiness
of the whole, and justice will have here a lasting abode.
Considered from the point of view of the separate classes,
justice might be called the virtue by which each is enabled
to keep its proper place; from the point of view of the body
politic, as a whole, justice might be said to consist in the
internal harmony of the social elements.

The application of all this to the individual, though
expressed as tentative, is complete and exact. Justice of
the individual, too, is found to be an internal harmony or
poise, which comes as the result of proper subordination and
cooperation among the elements of the soul. Of these Plato
distinguishes three, corresponding in nature and proper
virtues to the classes of the state. The least noble is the multiplicity of desires we all experience, rooted in the natural tendency of every power to complete satisfaction.27 This Plato calls the concupiscent element, and its only virtue is the temperance to which it is disciplined by reason. The spirited element,28 fount of so many generous impulses and that seat of courage in man, is far nobler. But it too derives its true nobility from the allegiance it pays to reason. Reason,29 or intelligence, sits godlike in the highest tower of the soul, ruling all else in virtue of its knowledge of the good of the whole, and the means of its attainment. It is the sun of individual existence, dispensing, as an effluence of its being, light and virtue to all the soul. When reason, in virtue of its superior knowledge, rules the activity of the other elements, duly subordinated, there arises in the soul true justice, the justice of the inner man,30 of which that other justice, predicated of the state, is but a shadow. He in whose soul this sweet concord reigns, is indeed the true philosopher, "the lover of the vision of truth."

In the ideal of the individual, Plato does not rest with a general explanation of the knowledge which gives reason its superiority. The philosopher is distinguished from other men not only in that he knows more, but because his knowledge is of a higher order and pierces to greater truth. The supremacy of reason, in the full sense of the phrase, rests
upon a grasp of the fundamental principle of existence and experience under its most absolute and unified form. The philosopher knows the ultimate knowable and he knows it as it is.

The distinctive quality of the philosopher's knowledge is universality.31 This does not mean that he knows everything as an accumulation of facts; it means that he grasps the unities or essences beneath the multiplicity of experience and, ultimately, the real unity, the ultimate essence of all things. This is the real meaning of the puzzling line Plato uses to illustrate graphically the grades or qualities of knowledge.32 It is to be observed that each step upward, or to the right, (according as the line is represented vertically or horizontally), is a step away from the physical, concrete many toward the abstract, universal one.33 Each succeeding level of knowledge is considered truer as it is more absolute, universal, and independent of physical reality as reported by the senses. The ascent is relentlessly maintained until the "eye of the soul" is brought to bear full upon the ultimate reality, the ideal of good.34

The idea of good is the proper object of "nous." In grasping this, man grasps the key to the universe, for in itself it contains the sum of all things. Its attributes and functions exhaust reality, and these Plato draws out in impressive array.
Primarily, it is the real or ultimate object of all desire. It is found upon reflection and analysis, that the true objects of desire are not the many which present themselves immediately to experience, but an absolute perceived, no matter how dimly, behind them all. No reasonable man but will answer, upon being interrogated, that he seeks this or that object because it contains some particle of, or shares in, some universal quality. He seeks this beautiful object because it is a tangible aspect of beauty which his soul seeks as something desirable and suitable to itself. So it will be found to be with all other objects of desire: they are sought for a universal quality they share. Even in these universals, the super-universal or transcendent quality of desirableness, suitability, is the real object of desire. Goodness, as this desirability is rightly called, in its purity is consequently the real object of all desire. People whose knowledge pierces no farther than the report of sense ever seek goodness under the manifold aspect it wears to sense. The philosopher, transcending by the action of "nous" the realm of sense-life, seeks goodness in its purity.35

This very trait leads us to see how the second function of the idea of good can truly be predicated of it. The idea of good, says Plato, is the determinant of the usefulness and value of all other things.36 Since we seek goodness itself in all, the use and value of all, in regard to the
attainment of pure goodness, will naturally and normally come to be determined by the share they have in pure goodness or by their intrinsic approximation to it. Thus the idea of good is the determining factor of use and value fundamentally. Yet, Plato goes on, how can we tell how closely any particular participates in or approximates pure goodness if we have no idea of what pure goodness might be? Thus the idea of good becomes a determinant in this respect, formally. Only the philosopher knows the idea of good, only the philosopher, consequently, knows the real use and value of life.

It is far more difficult to perceive what was in Plato's mind when he wrote that the good was author of being and essence, ὀ εἶναι ἔκατον ὑπὸ ὄσιαν of all things. To interpret his brief statement to mean that the goodness or suitability of the essence of any thing to that thing is the basis of its reality would be reading too much into his words. This same interpretation might more clearly be stated thus: unless the essence of a thing was suitable to, or good for that thing, the thing could never be a reality. It would, in other words, be a contradiction of notes, and consequently nothing. This interpretation sounds dreadfully like the schoolman's concept of intrinsic possibility, which consists formally in a non-repugnance of notae constitutivae. Inviting as this may seem, it is far better to pass it over and candidly admit that this idea in Plato is obscure. The statement
stands, however. The good is the author of being and essence.

From this it follows quite easily that the good is also the author, although indirectly, of intelligibility and knowledge. A thing is knowable conterminously with its reality or being, since obviously we cannot know nothing. The soul, moreover, is said to know when it is in conformity with that which is, or as Plato says, "when resting upon that on which truth and being shine." In regard to all else its condition is one of uncertainty, for the mind is determined by reality or being.

From all this it can readily be seen that the good is the principle of order in the universe. It is not itself that order, but imparts it. The philosopher who has grasped the good has obtained what Cardinal Mercurier says is the aim of all philosophy, "a complete grasp of the universe," in the light of a higher reality. It must not be supposed that the good is desirable as the principle of order. It is desirable for itself alone. Being most manifest in that order, however, it follows that the most immediate means of attaining the good is by a grasp of this order, and conformity to it. To know one's place and keep it is a constant theme in Plato.

But one more aspect needs consideration before the ideal is complete. It is the divine element in both the idea of good and the intellect "nous." The word "divine" as applied to anything in Plato is a treacherous term and one
need careful handling lest it confute what it is thought to sustain. This is so because Plato uses the term so frequently, and, frequently, so vaguely. As the Abbé Dies said, with pardonable impatience, "Tout est divine chez ce trop divine Platon." The most orthodox of commentators seem to agree that the word is certainly to be predicated both of reason and of the idea of good. In the case of the former there is actual textual support. "Nous" is that portion of man's soul which alone is created directly by the Supreme God himself, and is therefore itself also, divine and immortal. Moreover, the presence of this divine element is the distinctive mark of mankind. The argument for predicing divinity of the idea of good is not quite so simple. It is a conclusion which follows upon various statements and circumstances. That the idea of good is divine seems to follow upon its similarity to the Creator in the Timaeus. Divinity establishes the link between the books of the Republic as a fulfillment of the doctrine of the goodness of God prescribed in the treatment of the education of the young.

"Now we have already seen that the preliminary scheme of education was intended to pave the way for the later and more advanced, by inculcating in a categoric or dogmatic form, as it were, the reflection of philosophic truths which are afterwards to be apprehended in themselves by ratiocination and not by faith. It would accordingly seem that the Idea of Good, is the philosophic fulfillment of the doctrine of divine goodness already imparted at an earlier stage of de-
Lastly, there is the argument from book ten (597b), and the divinity ascribed to "nous", which last, as Adam notes, makes the separation of religion and philosophy impossible.

It is not difficult to understand the new character given the ideal by this consideration. The divinity of the faculty of knowledge makes the quest for the truth a religious aspiration. The divinity of the idea of good makes its possession a religious, as well as intellectual, fulfilment, and validates the fusing of the intellectual and ascetic or religious elements in Plato's thought. Its divinity also makes the ascent to the realm of being a religious ascent or conversion. We can now grasp more fully the meaning of the phrase applied to the philosopher, that he is, "the lover of the vision of truth." "Lover" designates the religious element in the philosophic character. The statement that the divine "nous," having for its proper object the divine idea of good, is the distinctive mark of man stamps the ideal as humanistic in a far higher sense than usually understood today. To be a humanist in this sense is to be true to the very highest in man and to the highest beyond him, God.

II

The lacunae within the Platonic system and the failure
of the system, as a whole, to cope adequately with the facts of experience upon which philosophy must be based, have been the subjects of treatment learned and elaborate enough to convict further discussions on our part of futility, and even of impertinence. But even a superficial consideration of the ideal of individual perfection which we have gleaned from Plato's writings, may not pass over unnoticed certain points in which this ideal fails to satisfy all the expectations we might justly entertain of an adequate ideal. We shall not go beyond the limits of the ideal itself, and to consider its weak points will but serve to throw into greater relief its many sound and noble aspects.

The most arresting inadequacy in the ideal is the failure to account for free will. The nexus is drawn immediately between knowledge, (a very certain kind of knowledge, to be sure) and justice, the distinctive human virtue. Justice, according to Plato, will come to dwell in the soul when reason, the organ of the highest knowledge, is supreme. The cave myth illustrates this. The ascent from the cave describes figuratively the passage from imperfect to perfect knowledge. With the attainment of perfect knowledge - intellectual perception of the good, νόμος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, justice will take up its abode in the soul as a necessary concomitant. Conversely, we may conclude that where justice does not dwell, ignorance holds sway. Perhaps this direct linking of know-
ledge and virtue has the advantage of eliminating the knotty
problem of the interrelations of will and intellect. To
neglect the will, however, is to leave unaccounted for the
most potent force in human nature. The price of the relief
gained by Plato's theory is too great.

It may seem a sufficient explanation to say that
Plato inherited this theory from his master Socrates, and
this is a true explanation to some extent. Philosophically,
however, it is to be traced to his conception of pure good-
ness as the object of desire. The object of desire, he tells
us, is not any particular modified object, but a pure quality
or substance. The object of thirst$^{48}$ is not a cool drink,
nor a warm drink, but just drink. The modifications depend
on circumstances extrinsic to thirst. The ultimate desidera-
tum of all desire is always pure goodness which is sought
under all circumstances.

If this is granted him Plato's stand is irrefragable.
It cannot be denied that the will is not free in regard to
pure goodness, (bonum ut sic,) in scholastic terminology. If
pure goodness be the real object of desire, then the will is
simply determined. Only let the intellect indicate pure good-
ness and the will at once will grasp it. If man wills aught
else, it may logically be said that he does so through igno-
rance. Exception must be taken to Plato's fundamental pos-
tulate.
It cannot be said without great qualification that
the object of the will is pure goodness. Considered in the
abstract, the human will is determined toward goodness as such.
In the concrete, the object of volition is always some good
thing. The actual exercise of volitional power is always in
the concrete. In the concrete, goodness becomes various. An
object may be a real or an apparent good; again, it may be a
rational, useful, or a pleasurable good. Among these the will
has a freedom of choice. These forms of good are not, of
course, mutually exclusive altogether. With full knowledge,
the will may choose the apparent, in preference to the true,
or a merely pleasurable, in preference to a rational good.
Its choice is always made, of course, sub ratione boni. We
sometimes speak of an abstract quality as the object of
desire, as when we say that someone always seeks his own
convenience. Analysis shows this to mean that he wishes every
single thing to be to his convenience. In exercising its
power of choice the will is normally under the direction, not
compulsion, of the intellect. We mention nothing more than
the fact of the will's freedom. The influence of circumstance
and other factors upon the exercise of freedom, is another
question. As a consequence of freedom of the will virtue
must depend not on a knowledge, but on the deliberate choice
of the highest actual good.49

Attempts have been made to explain away this difficul-
ty of the will in Plato's ideal, by an interpretation of the
glory of the knowledge the possession of which, Plato
thought, resulted in virtue. "Noesis," the knowledge proper
to the philosopher, it has been explained, means a perception
of reality so clear, so penetrating, so illuminating, as to
leave no shadow of doubt in the mind, and consequently, no
hesitation in the will. It is a fact of human experience,
however, that no mere intellectual perception can of itself
determine the will. If this is denied the freedom of the will
disappears. No clarity of intellectual perception can compel
the will. It may be probable, at times highly probable that,
granted a pure intention, the man who knows the truth will
choose it. But we have nothing more than probability, ante-
cedent probability as Cardinal Newman would say. Returning
to Plato himself, however, it is difficult to see how his
writings give any real support to the interpretation of
"noesis" as a knowledge so clear as to overwhelm the will and
render it incapable of an erroneous choice. The state upon
which justice will follow, according to Plato, is no more than
one of unclouded certitude as to the ultimate reality of
things. Though "nous" itself is said to be divine, no ex-
ternal supernatural influence is conceived to act upon it.
It is the intellect working on its natural plane. Conse-
quently we can only say that his theory fails to satisfy
adequately the facts of experience.
Plato's conception of pure goodness as the object of desire naturally leads us to consider his attitude toward sense knowledge. In his description of the philosopher's knowledge, "noesis", the proper object of which is the idea of good, Plato says that it is a state of pure intelligence entirely free from the influence of sense. The question pointedly stated is: What value does Plato ascribe to sense knowledge? Does he conceive of the universal ideas as abstracted from data of sense or as directly perceived by the mind and independently of sense?

In answer to the first question, we must say that Plato ascribed to the senses their full due. They put us into contact, he says, with the individual material object as it manifests itself to them, individually and collectively. No more and no less can be justly ascribed them. Plato simply rejected their testimony as insufficient to the needs of the soul. The real object of desire is pure goodness, of which the senses tell us nothing. Therefore, the soul cannot commit itself to their incompetent guidance.

To say that the senses can give us no concept of essences is not to say that we can in no way have knowledge of universals. Plato recognizes the fact that we have universal ideas. But it is a difficult step from the individual, material report of sense to the universal, spiritual idea. In seeking to account for the universal, Plato devised a scheme
in which abstraction, i.e., the disengaging of the universal essence from the individuals of sense experience by an operation of intellect, has no place. The intellect, as he conceived it, had immediate perception of the universal. To account adequately for the universal, he devised the whole platonic ontology. The abstraction of Aristotle and of the schoolmen solves the problem of universals just as it presented itself to Plato, without falling into his excesses.

The relevancy of this epistemological difficulty to the integrity and validity of the ideal of perfection is obvious. Had Plato not been mistaken in regard to the mind's power of abstraction he would have escaped many errors which impair the perfection of the ideal. Goodness as the real object of desire, the self-existence of universals, the neglect of free will, etc., would have been avoided.

No little perplexity is caused the reader by Plato's disconcerting use of the word "divine." This is especially true of the application of this word to "nous." When he uses the term (or its equivalents), in connection with the idea of good, we are not surprised. His whole line of discussion, the functions and attributes ascribed to the idea of good, its relations to all reality, has been leading toward such a predication. When he applies the term to "nous," however, his basic argument is unconvincing. "Nous," argues Plato, is the only portion of the soul directly created by
the highest God, and therefore is itself immortal and divine.\(^{52}\)

The inference does not follow. If it did, we should have to argue that the human soul, which is directly and individually created, (as Christian thought teaches), is divine.

From another angle, however, it is not difficult to see how Plato came to make this predication. The time in which he lived, as we have already remarked, was one of transition. Plato came definitely to reject the old theology. This does not mean by any means that he failed to recognize the religious element in man. Plato was too great a realist to make this egregious error. As Zeller puts the matter:

"The Platonic ethics, like the Socratic, is based absolutely on the autonomy of reason and is thus far completely independent of religion, that is, at least of the religion current at that time. Yet Plato's ethics is based on a religion, - his own."\(^{53}\)

Plato recognized the essential place of religion in man's nature, and the divinity of the idea of good and of "nous" is his provision for this essential need. The theory which seeks to explain the divinity of "nous" and the idea of good as a concession to popular prejudice in favor of religion shows how little its elaborators caught Plato's spirit. There is no diplomacy in Plato where truth is concerned. The divinity of the idea of good replaces the old anthropomorphic gods. The divinity of "nous" replaces the old worship of fear and propitiation with a worship of knowledge and virtue. But why must any portion of the soul be itself divine? The answer
lies in the autonomy Plato ascribes to "nous," the divine element. "Nous" by its own power has direct perception of the divine idea of good. The element of man's nature thus able to perceive the divine has about it something of divinity. Plato conceived of the relation of "nous" to the idea of good as the attraction of like to like. If Professor Adam is correct in saying that the Timaeus is nothing but an elucidation of the function of efficient cause, ascribed to the supreme idea in the Republic, the particular creation of "nous" by the highest God would follow as the natural explanation of why "nous" alone can directly perceive the good. The divine origin of "nous" and its power to know the idea of good thus form complementary aspects of this element of the soul.

But the greatest difficulty raised by the divinity of "nous," as far as the perfection of the ethical ideal is concerned, is yet to come. The divine "nous," says Plato, is the distinctive mark of man's humanity. At first glance this is simply baffling. How can a divine element in man's nature mark him distinctively as human? The answer seems to be that Plato appears to have recognized what may be called the supernatural potency of human nature.

This supernatural potency or capacity consists, according to scholastic philosophy, in this, that God can enable human nature to perform supernatural acts without
violating human nature. Quite the contrary, human nature by
its essence lends itself to such elevation, which becomes, as
a consequence, an intensification of the distinctive human
acts. Plato, of course, did not conceive anything as clear
and definite as this doctrine evolved by the Schoolman work-
ing twelve centuries after the Incarnation and with the nega-
tive guidance of theology to prevent their falling into many
errors. Plato does, nevertheless, seem to have hit the es-
sential fact, that human nature is capable in some way, either
of ascending or being lifted to a greater proximity to the
divine, and of acting conformably to such elevation or ascent,
not only without violation of its essence, but with an accre-
tion of dignity and power. He oversteps the mark, however,
when he posits in man's nature some constituent that is es-
sentially divine. This does threaten the humanity. The ex-
aggeration is quite understandable, but this truth is clear:
Man's very essence is sufficient reason for his capacity of
being elevated to a supernatural plane of action.

Each of the difficulties we have discussed presents
a distinct obstacle to the acceptance of Plato's ideal as it
stands. Collectively, they are fairly representative of the
errors of Platonism. Nevertheless, they do not dim the splen-
dor of the truths enshrined in the ideal of the "philosopher."
Balanced against each other, the truth of the ideal will be
found far to outweigh the error. Fairness to Plato requires
that at least a brief review of the points of merit in his ideal be attempted.

III

The epistemological difficulty brought out above is of a delicate nature. It concerns what is recognized as the most difficult question in epistemology— that of universals. Plato's method of handling the matter differs from the methods of all modern schools, except scholasticism, in that he does not tamper with the universal idea. He never called into question the aptitude of the mind to know reality as it is. The universals, to his mind, have objective validity, and in seeking to account for their presence in the mind he holds intact the principle of sufficient reason. We know the essences of things, we have metaphysical certitude. This one point alone manifests amply his vast superiority to most modern thinkers and contains his message for them.

His stand upon universals is of vast importance to the ethical ideal. As we have seen in the case of Babbitt, when the validity of the universal is impugned the only alternative for the ethical positivist is to attempt a solution of the problem of conduct without metaphysics. The acceptance of this alternative would destroy ethics as a science, robbing its conclusions of all compelling force and rendering its
terminology devoid of meaning. Plato's ideal of life is based on reality as he sees it. Every aspect of the ideal is accounted for by an appeal to the nature of man, of other creatures, of God. The problem of conduct is attacked in the light of metaphysics.

The appeal to metaphysics is apparent from the beginning of the inquiry into the nature of justice. In response to Glaucon's request that justice be defended on the grounds of its intrinsic worth, Socrates suggests that the quest for the nature of justice be undertaken. He pursues the quest first by a psychological study of man in which he seeks the hidden springs of human activity. In evolving the theory of the tri-elemental soul Plato is preparing a way for a definition of justice of which it may be said, "This is true justice because man is what he is." A consideration of the nature of man, however, cannot be carried on without reference to reality about him. Consequently, Plato is led to touch upon all reality, since it influences man. Here, too, there is no hesitation about man's ability to know the essence of things. Plato definitely states that the nature of reality beyond man is such and such. The definite character of man's relation to reality beyond him is determined by his own nature and the nature of that reality. Of course, to inquire into Plato's conception of the nature of God and the physical universe is beyond our scope here. We have tried to consider all the
matter that referred immediately to the ethical ideal. The point to be made is that Plato definitely establishes his definition of justice on what he believes to be the nature of things, in other words, on a metaphysical basis.

The importance of this fact for the value of the ideal can scarcely be overestimated. It imparts to the ideal character of the philosopher that stability and solidity, that finality and compelling force without which it would be but another fine-spun theory. Because it rests on this basis, the ideal leaves no loophole of escape for a subtle and elusive individualism, more accurately, caprice. The individualism it fosters is one of stern responsibility. The only conclusion to be drawn from a sincere examination of the ideal is: "If this be true, if these be the facts, then I must live up to this norm, lest my own life be frustrated of its highest end." The only valid ground upon which the ideal can be attacked is to say that it deals inadequately with the nature of things as these manifest themselves to experience. This is the ground upon which succeeding philosophers have rejected it, not entirely, but only as a final solution to the ethical problem. They have accepted its many truths and sought, in the light of reflexion, to supply its omissions and rectify its errors. Even for the Christian the ideal holds much of value, not as something beyond what the Christian ideal possesses, but as a powerful presentation of such
truth as is common to both Platonic and Christian thought.

The metaphysical basis of the Platonic ideal of human perfection makes it difficult for such writers as Norman Foerster to substantiate the claim that their thought is the genuine progeny of Platonism. The autonomy of the inner authority which they preach differs vastly from the Platonic autonomy of reason. The latter is based on the ability of reason to know the nature of things; the former, on a diffidence in the power of man to know things as they are, either his own nature or reality beyond him. Plato wanted the fount of moral action to be the ordered interior of the individual, and its chiefest rewards, peace and righteousness of soul. But he never claimed that the satisfied conscience is anything more than a manifestation of conformity to the nature of things. Conscience neither creates nor ultimately ratifies the essential rectitude or depravity of human actions. In particular cases, it is true, even a mistaken conscience (provided one does not know that it is mistaken) is to be followed, in the event that no other source of information is to be had. The obligation to follow even a mistaken conscience, however, does not concern the intrinsic morality of the act, but only the disposition of the agent. A mistaken conscience is no measure by which to form general norms. The untainted conscience is a witness and expression of the law of man's nature and derives all its binding force from this source.
The ideal of the philosopher presents the true humanistic dualism most clearly. We suggested in our introduction that ordered power as opposed to indiscriminate intensity is the humanistic ideal of action. Babbitt's ethical ideal illustrates this; so too does that of Père Longhaye, as we shall see; but neither, so clearly as that of Plato.

To understand how this is true, it will be best to follow the genesis of the dualism of Plato's ethical ideal. We must turn aside for a moment to view, sketchily of course, the dualism of the Phaedo. Here we find the condemned Socrates insisting on a dualism between body and soul which in some aspects approaches the σώμα συμμορία doctrine of the Orphics.\(^\text{59}\) The body is depicted as the great obstacle to the life of philosophy, and death welcomed as deliverance from this impediment. We cannot understand the real advance over the Orphic ideas, contained in the dualism of the Phaedo, unless we note several points of Socrates' stand. First, as Paul Elmer More says,\(^\text{60}\) even here as early as the Phaedo Plato did not mean by "body" merely the flesh, but the entire host of blind unreasoning desires of which man is conscious. Indeed, in the Phaedo these desires are associated most closely with the flesh. But Plato was gradually drawing away from this association. Paul Elmer More is justified, in saying that the intense asceticism of the Phaedo is but a passing phase of Plato's thought. This view is verified in
the dualism of the Republic. The second point to be noticed is the introduction of knowledge into the idea of dualism. The body is the great hindrance to knowledge, and freedom from its thralldom will enable the soul to attain true wisdom. Lastly, we must notice that the charges preferred against the body are based upon a preference for unity and control in life as opposed to the multiplicity and looseness of organization characteristic of the life of the senses. The desires associated with the flesh are many, inter-conflicting, insatiable; the desire of the soul, one and all-sufficing. The senses can give but contact with the reality of particulars; the knowledge which the soul needs is unified and universal. We shall see these points finally developed and clarified in the Republic.

The new and generous appreciation of the body is perhaps the most striking point of the dualism of the Republic as compared with that of the Phaedo. It is not too much to say that the opposition to the flesh as such has completely disappeared. Plato no longer looks upon the body as a prison and an impediment, but as a positive aid to the soul in its ascent to fulness of life. In the system of education he sketches, gymnastics, which is to train the body to harmony, grace and proportion, not for its own sake, but for the soul, holds an important place. The proper disposition of the body can prepare the way for the soul's ascent, and the physical
harmony of the body becomes an image and reflection of the
harmony of the soul. From opposition Plato turns to coopera-
tion. He has come to realize that the flesh as such is
capable of no evil. Each faculty, in tending relentlessly
toward satisfaction, is but following the law of nature. Who
shall reprove the eye with seeing? To gain unity in life
the soul must not seek to escape the body but must itself
unify life by the exercise of control and direction over the
activity of the whole man.

Consequently, in the Republic the struggle is no longer
between body and soul, but within the soul itself, between the
rational and concupiscent elements. The aim of this conflict
is to reduce the concupiscent element to submission to reason,
and not to exterminate desire. The control which reason is
to exercise over desire is emphatically not a mere curb or
inhibiting influence, as Paul Elmer More would have it, but a directive and coordinating force as well. Limitation
of activity, whether by preference of one power to another or
by restraint of the intensity of the activity of a single
faculty, is certainly a part of control; but it is a minor
part, since the normal activity of the whole man is necessary
for happiness.

In the Republic, however, we find no change in Plato's
attitude toward the soul and the senses as organs of know-
ledge. The dualism of knowledge and opinion in the Republic
carries on the similar opposition of the *Phaedo*. The solution of the problem of universal ideas and sense-knowledge leaves reason autonomous in its perception of essence. The knowledge of the senses is not repudiated as false, but as insufficient. The knowledge of the autonomous reason is preferred because of its universality and certitude, the necessary conditions for unity and control in life.

It is clear from this, that the real dualism, to Plato's mind, exists not between body and soul, or between reason and desire within the soul, but between unity and control, as opposed to multiplicity and unrestraint, in life. Consequently, the elements of man's nature are conceived as opposed to one another as they make either for unity and control or multiplicity and unrestraint: reason is opposed to desire, the soul to the body, "nous" to the senses, as unifying powers to elements which tend to disunion and unrestraint. The philosophic character is built about the idea of order in power, the core of humanism.

Although Plato's rather importunate introduction of divinity into the scheme may cause some readers annoyance, we must recognize this insistence as his constant testimony to the fact that religion is an essential element in man's nature and must be accounted for in any adequate ethics. The ethical ideal Plato envisaged was a state of perfection for man conformable to his nature, and religion must have a cen-
tral place in the ideal. He could not countenance the traditional religion of his day, so he settled the matter as he thought it must be settled. His solution, in its detail, is unsatisfactory. If we consider the circumstances under which he labored, his ideal on the whole needs little apology. The point to be emphasized is that he realized the need of religion in life and sought to give it its rightful place. How this can be said to impugn the humanity of his ideal, it is difficult to see. On the contrary, the ideal becomes more human because of the place given the divine. It accounts more fully for the facts of our nature than any ideal which ignores religion in the name of humanity. Certainly, if the basic motive force behind all humanism be the desire to realize all the potencies of human nature, Plato deserves a place almost without peer among the truest humanists. The man who sets out to erect a "humanistic" ethics without God, religion and the supernatural is simply using words recklessly and, what is worse, misinterpreting human nature recklessly. We do not mean to say, of course, that Plato entertained any idea of the supernatural ideal of life as Christian revelation discloses it to mankind. But he emphatically did not preclude it from among the possibility of man's nature. On the contrary, as we noted above, the predication of divinity of "nous" may even be legitimately interpreted to mean that Plato recognized in an obscure way the basic apptitude
of man's distinctive power, reason, to act on a higher level than the natural plane of its activity. And to recognize this power in man is to recognize the natural basis for the supernatural, the factor that makes the supernatural truly an elevation and not a substitution of human nature. An ideal which deliberately excludes this power from among those of man's nature has no more right to claim the title "human" in the full significance of the word.

Even though we cannot accept Plato's ideal as it stands, we must recognize its worth and nobility. It refuted the sophistry of his day; it is an answer of more than two-thousand years standing to the sophistry of our own times. Aldous Huxley and his class are confounded before they speak for one who knows the Platonic ideal. So too, is Walter Pater. And the reckless use of "Platonic" to designate every vapid idealistic nostrum for the ills of humanity, is one of the long standing injustices in the history of human thought.
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CHAPTER IV

GEORGES LONGHAYE

AND THE IDEAL OF CHRISTIAN HUMANISM

The remark of Frank Jewett Mather, Jr., that a religion which is a mere appendage to a system of ethics is little worthy of the name and that a virile Christianity could dispense with humanism, holds much truth and an equal amount of error. Both the truth and the error of the remark spring from his use of the word "humanism." He uses this word only as it is applicable to the American humanism of our own day. Hence his conception of humanism as an independent, self-subsisting ethical system; hence, too, the truth of the remark about religion as a mere appendage to such a system. Indeed, it is just the kind of humanism which sets up an independent moral ideal and code that Christianity can, rather must, dispense with; Christianity has its ethics. The error of the remark lies in Mather's tacit assumption that his use of the word exhausts its meaning; so, by declaring Christianity above or beyond this humanism he implies (and elsewhere states explicitly) that it is irreconcilable with the very notion of humanism. Nothing could be more mistaken. Chris-
tian humanism is a fact, an ideal which lives today.

Christian humanism has as legitimate a title to the appellation as any other claimant. Even more, it more perfectly realizes the common aim of all humanism: an ideal of life which realizes man's proper perfection. This is true even if we accepted Brémond's opinion that the radical note of all humanism is the glorification of human nature. The glory Christian humanism ascribes to human nature is the glory God Himself ascribes to it. Christian Humanism desires the blossoming of all the potencies of man to the perfection God intended in creating man.

This is the humanism represented by the author we are about to study: Georges Longhaye, of the Society of Jesus. While almost our contemporary, he is the direct descendant in thought and ideals of culture of the long line of Christian humanists from Da Feltre through Salmeron, Ledesma and Richome, and has guarded intact his heritage, even adding to it from the riches of his own personality and experience. The ideal he represents in his life and in his writings may be summed up briefly as that of the cultured Christian leading the life of faith to the full.

It may seem remarkable that so apparently unpromising a title for our purpose as the "Belles-Lettres" has been chosen from among Longhaye's volumes. In what way, one might ask, does it enshrine the ethical ideal of Christian human-
ism? The answer is not far to seek. It lies in Longhaye's basic conception of literature. The literary art, to his mind, is "l'art d'exercer sur l'homme par la parole une action morale, puissante et ordonnée."² We know from the teaching of philosophy that an effect never exceeds its cause, and that a cause always produces an effect "sui simile." It is not otherwise in literature. The moral effect produced will be as the moral stature of the cause. It is the man behind the word that makes literature. Unless we pierce through the letter to the man we can never grasp more than surface truth. A knowledge of an author's view of life and man is necessary for a true grasp of his work. "La clef de tout system litteraire est l'idée même qu'on si fait de l'homme."³ Many besides Longhaye will grant this, partly. But few will go with him to the logical conclusion. Since the ideal of human life and conduct is one and universal in its moral aspects, only one type of man can write truly great literature, the man whose life realizes or approximates the true ideal. So, Longhaye rightly maintains, to study literature is to study man, and to erect, philosophically, a literary ideal is to concern oneself necessarily with the moral ideal of life.⁴ The Belles-Lettres is, above all, philosophical. Its aim is the erection, or better the discovery, of the true ideal of literature. It is necessarily concerned, consequently, with a moral ideal of life, and this ideal is
the ideal of the Christian humanist.

Indeed, the elaboration of this ideal is not so complete as we might wish. But the deficiency is amply compensated by Longhaye's statement that the principles underlying all his thought are those of the scholastic, and especially Thomistic, philosophy, and the teaching of the Catholic Church. Drawing on these sources we may hope to bring the ideal to satisfactory fullness.

Morality, writes Father Longhaye, is the regulation of the free acts of man toward his last end. Within the compass of this short sentence is packed the whole philosophic basis of the ideal of human life and conduct which stands behind the Belles-Lettres. Its analysis is all that is necessary to the elaboration of that ideal. In preface, however, we may remark that the strong point of the ideal is the cognizance it takes of man's nature. It is not designed for human nature, but deduced from it, as it manifests itself upon philosophic reflection. The ideal is realistic in the best sense of that much abused term, that is to say, it is based on the truth of things as they are. This accounts for the two notes most characteristic of the ideal. By thus sinking its foundation to the bed rock of human nature it is made impregnable to every attack save a negation of the conception of human nature upon which it rests. There is no question of detail here. If the nature of man is what sound philosophy
teaches it to be, all that follows logically must be granted. The issue is essentially philosophical. Moreover, this ideal combines the static and dynamic elements of life, for it is at once a metaphysic, (that is, based on metaphysics) and a discipline.

The term, "last end" (fin dernière) may well serve as the point of departure in the analysis of this definition. The fact that all activity is teleological is a datum of universal experience. The bird which appears among us in due season, and, selecting the proper crotch in the proper tree, proceeds with unerring instinct to gather just the proper material needed for its own kind of nest, is an example common enough to bring the fact home clearly to everyone. A similar phenomenon greets the biologist in his laboratory. The teleological nature of embryonic development is a marvel of precision and unerring coordination of parts to a common end when the activity of development is normal. It is in itself a devastating confutation of mechanistic and tropistic theories. Inanimate nature shares this characteristic, as science shows. But it is most apparent in the human act, because man is conscious of this aspect of his nature.

Indeed, we may state unequivocally that activity manifests intelligence. The intellect which guides action need not be present in the agent, but is always connected with the agent by the positive influence which exists between
the cause and its proper effect. This may be illustrated by
the example of the diverse activities in man. The human body
obeys all the chemical and physical laws of life, not by the
deliberate choice of the individual, but instinctively, nat-
urally, because God so constructed it. The intelligence be-
hind its activity is the Divine Intelligence guiding, so to
speak, the creative divine will. So, too throughout nature
activity proclaims the existence of Divine Intelligence. Man
has another field of activity, however, over which he himself
exercises dominion in virtue of free will. He may or may not
do certain things, and the intelligence which immediately
guides his choice is his own. The proper human actions are
deliberate and conscious, that is, man knows the end of the
action and his own power of self-determination in regard to
it.

This consciousness of purpose and freedom is the
specific difference between the activity of man and that of
all other creatures and places man in a sphere peculiar to
himself. When the bird builds its nest, and the seasons
change, the activity is carried on in blind obedience to an
implanted nature, and for an end unknown to the bird or to
the elements. They cannot do otherwise; their activity de-
serves neither praise nor blame; their activity is complete
and perfect in the fulfilment of the immediate end. In the
distinctive human act, however, the reverse is the case: the
activity inherently deserves reward or punishment; the end of the distinctively human faculties, will and intellect, is never merely immediate, but also ultimate. That is to say, man is responsible for his actions; and the intellect and will are truly frustrated unless they serve the ultimate purpose of the whole. Man must, at least in the last analysis, act toward an ultimate and human end, an end beyond which there is nothing and which is eminently suited to human nature.

The necessity of so acting is imposed upon him by his nature, which, because it is immutable, God Himself cannot change. Because man is intelligent he cannot rest short of the ultimate good of his nature; because he is free, he is responsible for the attainment of that good. Reflection shows him that in every action he is drawn to act by the desire to obtain or effect something which he apprehends as suitable to himself. It also shows him that the good of the whole is imperative even for the proper satisfaction of the part, because a part, from its very nature, cannot thrive truly and permanently if the whole is frustrated of its end. So the element of discrimination is introduced into human activity. The man who follows reason will not rush headlong to the attainment or effecting of everything which elicits his action, but will ask whether the satisfaction of the instant and the part will advance or hinder the permanent satisfaction of the whole; and conversely, thus consider-
ing, he will envisage more and more clearly a good which will
at once satisfy the whole, as a whole and in every part. His
mind perceives the infinite and ultimate good. And his will,
 limitless in its hunger for the good, follows after. Once
this ultimate good is perceived it must be willed. "We needs
must love the highest when we see it." And like Guinevere,
man blinds himself, or everts his attention to content him­
self with anything less, at the cost of inevitable frustration
and woe.\textsuperscript{9} That this ultimate end must be human, in the sense
that it eminently befits human nature as filling and satisfy­
ing its tendencies and capacities, is obvious. Effort toward
any lesser end is repugnant to reason.

The conclusion that man's activity must be directed
to an ultimate end which is the fulfilment of his whole nature
opens up the further question of the nature of the last end
itself. This new question presents two avenues of approach,
the subjective and the objective.\textsuperscript{10} What can the nature of
man, studied in itself, tell us of what his last end must be?
What light can facts external to man throw upon this matter?
Let us try to follow these leads in turn.

The question of the nature of man's last end is the
simplest and most subtle that can present itself to the human
mind. Any child, any savage, any super-cultured devotee of
all the muses will agree in the simple response, "Happiness."
Every philosopher has been drawn to this as to the ultimate
question of his science, and many a fair philosophic bark has
gone to pieces on the reefs which lurk beneath the apparently
quiet waters of this inquiry. Happiness is indeed the answer.
As Pascal says: "L'homme veut être heureux, et ne veut être
qu'heureux, et ne peut ne vouloir pas l'être." But this
answer only deepens the question.

The main implication of the word "happiness" is satis-
faction. We are happy when we are satisfied, or, more
accurately, to be happy we must be satisfied. But not every
satisfaction can be said to bring happiness. Some satisfac-
tions cause what might almost be called pain because, it
would appear, there can be too much satisfaction, but, of
course, never too much happiness. The common-place "too much
of a good thing" hints at a deeper signification than is
usually ascribed it. The notion of goodness, when brought
into the consideration, opens a new vista of thought. The
essential note of goodness is suitability, and this encom-
passes both the idea of fulfilment and proportionateness.
Satisfaction may be present where suitability is not, and the
result is the surfeit we have noted. The appalling appetite
of a child for sweets is really being satisfied even when
indulged far beyond what is suitable and good for him as a
whole. The satisfaction which brings happiness must be, there-
fore, at once full, and proportionate to the capacity of the
recipient, considered as a whole. Man's happiness will con-
sist in the possession of a good which satisfies completely and proportionately all the capacities and potencies of his nature considered as a whole. At this point a seeming paradox appears. Proportion implies, at least negatively, moderation, and moderation is against the human spirit at least in its present state. I think it useless to deny this last, for the real solution lies in the fact that nothing less than the possession of the highest and best, as completely as possible, can really satisfy human nature fully and proportionately.

The satisfaction of each individual potency of human nature brings its proper delight, quietude in the possession of some good. But it is easily perceived that the satisfaction of any one capacity can never bring happiness. Neither, on the other hand, can the satisfaction of all the potencies, if this be achieved for them as individual and separate entities. To satisfy one potency alone would leave a gaping want. Fully to satisfy each one individually and separately would bring confusion and discord, for the full satisfaction of one at times conflicts with that of another. Happiness, then, can only be had when man possesses that good which satisfies the principal tendency of his nature primarily, and every other tendency in proportion as each subserves the full satisfaction of the principal. Subordinate coordination is the rule of happiness in man's life. This alone assures that fulness and proportionateness in the satisfaction of his whole
nature which is the condition of happiness. Happiness, which is the last end of man, subjectively considered, that is, the last end which his nature indicated, may be defined as the conscious possession of the highest good.

Objectively considered the last end of man is God, simply because there is nothing else adequate to the rôle. All the arguments for this identification hinge on the fact that man's last end must be something which will satisfy adequately, permanently, proportionately all the potencies and needs of human nature. Every system which denies or ignores this identification is unsatisfactory because it fails to appreciate man. But in approaching this consideration it seems necessary to caution a constant awareness of several facts if we are to appreciate the stand of the Christian humanist. The Christian humanist as such does not consider it incumbent upon himself to prove the existence of God. His philosophy does so, indeed; but his faith disposes of the matter even more conclusively. Secondly, his philosophy teaches that happiness consists in the possession of a concrete good. Lastly, that an argument from the nature of God, serves complementary-wise as an argument from human nature, since this last is contingent on the former.

The last end of man must be identified with God, because God is what He is; and this is to say, concomitantly, because man is what he is. Conscious of His own perfection,
God could not, without betraying His own nature, constitute anything other than Himself as the ultimate good and con­natural end of all creation and, therefore, of man. To do other­wise would be to act inordinately, which, in turn, would be a violation of His supreme sanctity and perfection, which demands that all His external activity manifest the supreme and essential order of things.

A further reason for this identification is adducible and one that is, perhaps, more compelling because it affects more clearly man's own interest and happiness. Only in God is that perfect good which the mind conceives and the will reaches out for as capable of perfectly satisfying human nature as a whole and all its parts proportionately, realized. The mind conceives this perfect good after the experience of lesser goods, as combining in itself all the perfection and appetibilities of this latter without its limitations and conflicts. This perfect goodness can be predicated only of God, because the whole reality, and consequently goodness and appetibility, of every object consists in its imitation of the Divine perfection. The perfection, goodness and appetibility of each, therefore, is found in Him supremely, eminently, flawlessly, intensified, and He shines forth as the "unum ultimum, omnino desiderabile" of man's will, in the possession of which alone is happiness and rest.

The foregoing discussion may seem to have led us into
a metaphysical darkroom, in which the original question is entirely lost sight of. Granted all that has been said, how does it affect the ideal of individual development we started out to consider? The answer is: directly. These metaphysical considerations lead to a very practical conclusion: life must be organized according to those considerations if it is not to be frustrated. The subordinated coordination which, we saw, is necessary to human happiness, when translated into action, means, for Father Longhaye, the recognition and maintenance of the essential hierarchy among the faculties of man.

The basis of the essential hierarchy of faculties upon which Father Longhaye lays such stress is, first of all, psychological. When considered psychologically, as a matter of fact, it leaves us cold. But when we come to consider it in the light of the attainment of the end of our existence, functionally, so to speak, and morally, we perceive that it is the natural and necessary foundation of the fruitful life. The academic aspect of the question vanishes, giving way to a very personal interest. One can quite dispassionately consider or nonchalantly waive aside (as temperament prompts) the problem of formal color. When brought into a true perspective of things, it really doesn't matter where color is. But it is a question of tremendous moment whether or not one is responsible for one's actions; whether the head or heart must rule life for the greatest happiness. It is thus that the hier-
archy of faculties is considered, as closely bound up with the moral question, the question of the attainment of the last end. Psychological discussion, save what is absolutely necessary to a clear understanding of terms, is out of due order here. "Essential" hierarchy may best be taken here as essential to the attainment of the goal of life. The rule of subordinated coordination holds sway, and we say that faculty is essentially nobler and more to be respected which makes most directly for the last end, or upon the action of which the last end depends. We may, consequently, speak of a subjective and an objective, of a moral, a cultural, and psychological priority among the faculties.

Father Longhaye's hierarchical scheme rests upon the dualistic conception of man as consisting of body and soul. The faculties can, therefore, be divided according as they derive from or pertain principally to the soul or the body, or to both at once. We say principally pertain or derive, because the actions and functions in this life are all, to some extent, of the composite. The spiritual faculties, intelligence and will, pertain to the soul, though extrinsically conditioned in action by the body. The senses are of the body, though animated and vitalized by the soul. Lastly, sensibility and imagination blend, as it were, the two - body and soul - and can be said to pertain wholly and only to the composite. The principle of subordination, we have said,
is functional and moral, that is, functional with regard to the last end of man.

The intellect is essentially superior to the imagination and the senses because ideas are "per se" universal and concerned with essences. The senses and the imagination are bound up essentially and wholly with the particular and material. The intellect, without violating or denying the particular and the physical, transcends them, piercing through to the essence and by abstraction molding the intentional universal. It thus gives man a grasp of the wider truth and allocates him more dominantly in reality. It is only by the knowledge of universal essences, such as goodness and the like, that man can come to understand his last end, the attainment of which alone can bring him happiness. Consequently the priority of intellect is valid, necessary, and essential.15

A parallel superiority establishes the supremacy of the will over sensibility. The one is essentially spiritual, the other a great part flesh and blood. Not that this last fact essentially degrades sensibility. It rather lays sensibility open to a certain instability connatural to the flesh. By the will man is made master, and controls; by sensibility he suffers and undergoes the movements of repulsion and attraction passively. As Fr. Longhaye wrote,

"--l'une est libre, l'autre est fatale. Je puis empêcher l'impression de prévaloir et de me dicter ma conduite; je me puis l'empêcher de naître et d'émouvoir."
The first clause of this contrast refers to the work of the will, the second to that of sensibility. In the orientation of life toward the last end, the will is the power which serves man far better than feeling. When the intellect has brought light to his soul, he wills the orientation of his life toward the proper end. Ultimately, it matters very little whether he is sensibly drawn or repelled by that end, though to be so drawn is a great help. If life were left to the guidance of sensibility a revulsion from the law of morality might wreck the only chance of happiness. The direction of life is a task for the stronger, more stable and dispassionate faculty of man, which is the will.16

In neither case, however, is there any hint of a fundamental and essential opposition between the higher and the lower powers. The end of all is common; they differ in ability to attain that end because the lower powers need the direction of the higher. This is subordinated coordination among the powers, a characteristic which the perfect man shares with all creation, in which

"les êtres inférieurs sont unis aux plus hauts pour concourir en sous ordre à la fin commune. Ainsi l'imagination est pour aider l'intelligence, la sensibilité, pour servir la volonté."17

This analysis of the philosophic basis of Fr. Longhaye's ideal should help to visualize more clearly the goal toward which the Christian Humanist is working. But we must not take the parts discovered in analysis for the whole.
It is the synthesis of these parts as they exist in the mind of the Christian Humanist which is the real ideal. The Christian Humanist envisages the complete, proportionately developed character, poised, assured, dominant over life because his principles of action are founded on a reality. The parts of this whole are not of value apart from the synthesis. The Christian Humanist is not the lover of any part for its own sake, but of all the parts for and in the whole. He wants not a man who lives by mechanical laws; who would look for a mathematical precision in the balance and proportionate development of powers; lumbering through life, as it were, like a great machine. He desires a man who lives in the light of the splendor of the whole, whose action is that of a vital organism, jealous of its own life and perfection, compliant and adaptable to all circumstances, not through weakness, but in pursuit and for the furtherance of its own perfection. It is the perfection of the whole which is sought, and the full perfection. Therefore the Christian Humanist refuses to exaggerate the worth of any one aspect of his nature, or on the other hand, to retrench from the fullness of his nature’s perfection by a false humility.

He maintains that the full and proportionate development of man’s nature is synonymous with happiness. He recognizes that happiness is not a word which can be defined in terms of the here and now without neglecting and frustrating
the finest and highest possibilities of human nature. The moral issue, therefore, even on purely philosophical grounds, becomes predominant in his mind. By the moral issue he means the regulation of his life to the attainment of the full development and happiness which his nature craves. Reason and faith tell him that in its pure idea, his nature can only be fully satisfied by the possession of God, in the exercise of that supernatural life, the potency for which is connatural to his essence. He does not seek to stop short, in a misguided humility, and blind himself to the full truth. God has deigned to offer him the means of actuating this potency for supernatural life, through Christ. The Christian Humanist gladly and gratefully avails himself of this offer because he is true to the basic idea of all humanism: the fullness of life for man.

Nevertheless he is not so fond, in his idealism, as to lose sight altogether of the hard facts of the actual contingency. He recognizes that, just as he is, man is capable neither of completely maintaining the hierarchy of powers, nor of living the supernatural life necessary to his full perfection. It has been well said that humility is at the basis of all ethics, and the recognition of these humiliating facts is the basis of Christian Humanistic ethics. For the Christian Humanist, (who, except for the recognition of these facts, would be on a level with the humanistic positivist and
agnostic), there is only one answer and solution, only one way to the attainment of his goal: the full perfection of his nature, is Christ, in Whom he sees God's own solution and remedy for the plight of man, and the path He has pointed out to the attainment of the perfection for which He destined human nature in creating it.

What has been outlined here is but the philosophic basis of Christian Humanism. But its real soul is in the Christocentric aspect. The Christian Humanist looks upon humanity philosophically, and sees in outline the potential beauty of its full stature; he looks upon it, as it is, and sees its impotence to achieve its perfection of itself; he looks upon Christ and sees in Him, and in the way of life He teaches, at once the full appreciation of the possibilities, of human nature and the strength to overcome its present disabilities. Only then can he cry out with Shakespeare, "How beauteous is mankind," but adding the significant clause, "since redeemed by God made man and raised by grace to supernatural perfection."

II

When Irving Babbitt wrote that humility is the base of all true and sound ethics, he very probably did not appreciate the full import of his statement. At least, it is capable of a deeper meaning than the one he ascribed it, and this deeper meaning Christian Humanism perceives as the only
true one. The humility Babbitt has in mind was the moral indolence he believed is an inherent weakness of human nature. The humility at the base of Christian Humanism is the humility that takes account of original sin, and differs from Babbitt's as a cause differs from a symptom.

We noted that the Christian Humanist, though a man of an ideal, is not so fond as to overlook the facts of the contingency in which his efforts toward his ideal must be made. The contingency will often modify, not the ideal itself, but the attitude toward it, turning mere aspiration to a salutary canniest for practical strategem for its attainment. To say, therefore, that the Christian Humanist takes cognizance of the circumstances under which he must strive to realize his ideal, is not to say that he retrenches from the loftiness of his ideal, but merely that he sets himself to a practical solution of the problems confronting him in its attainment. His ideal is true, because based upon the nature of man. But experience tells him that all is not as ordered as the Creator intended it to be. The arguments which lead him to the conclusion that a hierarchy of faculties is natural to man and essential to his happiness, are irrefragable. But in actual life he sees that this hierarchy is seldom appreciated and maintained, because the very elements which are to be alined seem to have no inherent tendency toward the necessary order, but rather a power of selfassertion, so to speak, which leaves war and
disorder where concord and subordination should reign. This discord manifests itself sometimes as indolence; sometimes much more forcibly as perversity. So it must be concluded, that some principle of disorder has been introduced into the human cosmos, which, like an unleashed world, tracks confusion in its wake.

This principle of disorder cannot be something entirely outside of human nature. Since man has free will, only a deliberate deflection from the law of his nature can really confound and confuse his life. But this deliberate deflection which alone can account for the confusion and insubordination in man's life cannot be the work of each individual since this confusion is manifest long before the activity of responsible choice begins. In other words, it has become in a sense con­natural, and is universal. Therefore, this confusion must have been introduced by deliberate act at some time and by the act of one of such a position in the race as to make the consequences of his act the heritage of his posterity. The rational man looks for an explanation which will cover all these facts. The Christian Humanist alone can find it, and he finds it in the teaching of the Church, in a word, in the Incarnation and all it implies.

"The theology of the Christian Humanist," wrote Abbé Frémond, "is that of the Church." The incarnation is the central and root dogma of Christianity, and the Christian
Humanist attributes to the word exactly the meaning given it by the living Church: the Second Person of the Holy Trinity, true God, assumed a true human nature, and, being born of woman, dwelt among man for their instruction and salvation. The Christian humanist finds both the noble conception of human nature he had formed by reason and the disorder in it experience discovers to him, verified in the fact and implications and connotations of this dogma of the faith. But even more, he discovers here also the ground upon which to build hope for the rehabilitation of man's nature, in the new life which the Incarnation opens to man. For not only does the Incarnation and all it implies verify what reason and experience show, but it goes farther, by pointing out the means by which the nobility of man's nature may be reasserted and insured.

The immediate object of the Incarnation was the redemption of mankind. Redemption presupposes a fall, and a fall postulates the native nobility and perfection of our nature, thereby explaining its actual disorder and imperfection. Redemption by God further implies that the nature of the fall was such that man could not himself regain his former status. This is easily understood since the will is the sole instrument of deliberate action man has. Disorder could come into man's life only by a positive deflection of the human will from the due order of things. The fall must have consisted
in the deliberate choice of a lesser good at a crucial moment. The result of this choice affected human nature somewhat as the desertion or treason of the leader would affect the morale of an army. Scattered and impaired, though not destroyed, such a disorganized body awaits a new force to revive its pristine spirit and discipline. So too human nature, disorder ed and weakened, waited for succor.

God seems to have waited a long time before realizing the plan of the Incarnation, to convince men that, alone, they could never bring about the rehabilitation of their nature so essential to happiness. Many men are not convinced of this yet. When man had exhausted all his resources in the effort to find happiness, God offered His solution of the problem: Christ.

The assistance Christ gives, strikes at the very root of our trouble. The central need in the restoration of our nature is the re-assertion of the supremacy of will and reason. These powers are degraded and debilitated by the disorder of sin: so that of itself reason finds it impossible to grasp many things, and the will is unable to exercise its proper function with vigor. By His teaching Christ brings the necessary light to the reason; by His grace, new strength to the will.

The Incarnation is, moreover, a heartening confirmation of the dignity and worth reason discovers in human nature.
God did not scorn to be man in order to save men. The nature He deigned to make His own is not to be despised. Not even the degradation of sin could make God overlook the essential worth of His handiwork and rest content to see it frustrated. In the realization of this fact the Christian Humanist finds the source of new certitude, courage, hope and strength to bend to the task of cooperation required of him in the noble work of re-habilitating and perfecting his nature.

But the effect of Christ's partaking of our nature is far deeper than all this. We need not enter here upon the details of the Church's teaching on the Christian's life in Christ. We need only state the fact. With the coming of Christ mankind was placed upon an entirely new footing toward God. From creatures men have become the adoptive sons of God, through their brotherhood with Christ. The fruition of the rights and privileges, the fulfilment of the duties of this sonship becomes the new destiny and life for man. The latent supernatural potency philosophy recognizes in man becomes now an intense positive need for man. Happiness has acquired a new and richer meaning. Contemplating these truths, which follow inevitably on the very notion of the Incarnation, the Christian humanist can say with the deepest conviction, "How beauteous is mankind since redeemed by God and raised to the supernatural plane by grace."

From the realization of the truths which follow upon
the Incarnation, there is born the noble individualism of the Christian Humanist. It is an individualism of personal responsibility. When the truths of his faith are taken out of the abstract, he sees that they have no other field of application than his own soul and life. If human nature has fallen, no individual is free from the effects of that fall, save by a special dispensation. If a native worth yet clings to that nature despite the fall, it clings in each individual. If God devised an economy to redeem the fallen human race, the factors in that economy are individuals, to each of whom a special and particular application of the divine plan is necessary. This application cannot be made without the cooperation of the individual. Individual, personal, willing and complete cooperation with the working of grace is the ideal which the Christian Humanist takes for his own, true to the basic note of all humanism, the fullness of life. This is the only true and sound Christian individualism, a personal responsibility of each man's in seeing that the work of Christ is brought to fruition in himself.

I am fully conscious that all this may seem the merest platitude to many. There is no better answer to those who would think so than to quote Abbé Brémont, who also was conscious that many would be so affected. He writes: "Indeed! Can it (Christian Humanism) show nothing newer and more original? But what more is wanted?" That is just it. What more
is wanted? Everything is here. A fulness of life which no
other ideal can offer. We may well say, what more is wanted?

III

The ideal of the Christian Humanist has been impugned,
sometimes bitterly, as wholly undeserving of the appellation
"human." It is not our purpose to carry on a polemic for it
here. Frankly the ideal needs no apology, once it is under-
stood; and indeed most of its critics, Irving Babbitt for
instance, really are attacking what they do not fully under-
stand. We shall, however, notice, only briefly of course, the
chief of the charges brought against Christian Humanism. A
consideration of these may serve to bring out the full mean-
ing of the ideal.

Christian Humanism, writes one critic, with typical
American scorn for distinctions, is a compromise: 18 And he
rests in that as though it were a devastating condemnation,
absolutely unanswerable. The same idea is expressed by Pater,
more delicately, as we would expect, but quite as clearly.

"No account of the Renaissance can be com-
plete without some notice of the attempt of
certain Italian scholars to reconcile Chris-
tianity with the religion of ancient Greece."
The grounds upon which these charges are made must be con-
sidered, before an answer can be attempted. Historically,
these critics maintain that Christian Humanism does not make
its appearance until after the real glory of the Renaissance had begun to wane, and even then it appeared, not as an indigenous bloom, so to say, but as a reaction on the one hand, to the sensualist aspect of the Renaissance, and on the other, as a concession to the new freedom the Renaissance had brought into life. The reaction was against men like Valla, let us say, paganism, the "reactionaries" were wise enough to realize, is always a step downward in these days. Yet these same reactionaries were too much the children of their times to be willing to relinquish entirely the new and wider life of sense experience opened by the Renaissance, and the liberty held out. The result was that general spirit of compromise, "jesuitry", which has been the object of so many attacks. The Ratio Studiorum of the Jesuits is brought forward as the embodiment of this spirit in educational ideals. And Paul Elmer More brings forward the "velut officiosa mendacia ecclesiae" the Catholic doctrine of evil, as the supreme example, in theology. Christian Humanism in this light is the supreme attempt to live the life of pagan Greece, while at the same time retaining the benefits of the Christian dispensation. The effort to reconcile the two modes of life is no longer the naive but candid effort of Pico della Mirandola, but the dark diplomacy of the Society of Jesus.

The misunderstandings upon which these notions rest are easily perceived. The basic fact that the humanism of
the Christian Humanist is not an independent doctrine, but a temper of mind, an attitude toward a doctrine already established, is not grasped. The Christian Humanist is a man of the Faith who takes a certain view of the facts of Christianity, a view which is founded on these facts even though it differs from other attitudes toward Christian teaching. He differs from, but must not be opposed to the Fathers of the desert, or the solitary monk of La Trappe. None is more Christian than the others. Each of them lays particular stress upon one aspect of Christianity, according as temperament or grace may lead. But all the aspects stressed are true. The ascetic is not mistaken because the humanist is correct. To oppose them is to misunderstand the motives impelling each. So, too, it is wrong to treat any of them apart from the body of truth upon which all found their ideals of life. To maintain the assertion that Christian Humanism is a compromise one must show positively that it adulterates the principles of Christianity. This has not been done and cannot be done. On the contrary, the staunch adherence of the best Christian Humanists to the full ideal of the Faith is manifest from a consideration of the life of any one of them. Christian humanism is above all, Christian.

The historical fallacy involved rests on a too narrow view of the facts. Christian Humanism, as an historical phenomenon, is emphatically not a (mere) reaction. It is much
truer to say that it is the real humanism, and the animalism of some Renaissance humanists a straying from the original path, or better, a fall from the original height. This last is the work of men, who would have gone the same way in any age, under some pretense or other. They made the revival of ancient culture an occasion for the expression and glorification of their own lusts under a mask of culture. The Christian humanism exists in its purity, in De Feltre, long before the appearance of the later, less noble type; it comes to flower in a host of others: Salmeron, Ledesma, Richome, Bellarmine, and continues to our own day in Father Longhaye and many more. But we are wrong in starting as late as Petrarch. This is to concede, at least by silence, another historical fallacy, that of the barrenness of the Middle Ages in ideals of culture. This fallacy is losing ground more rapidly every day. It is fifty years since one could write with impunity,

Filled as our culture is with the classical spirit, we can hardly imagine how deeply the human mind was moved when, at the Renaissance, in the midst of a frozen world, the buried fire of ancient art, rose from under the soil.18

Modern scholars, as Haskins and Taylor, have disproved this fallacy utterly. What, they simply ask, of Salisbury, and others too many to mention? In such men as these the ideal of Christian Humanism had already begun to show itself. The Christian Humanistic ideal is as old as the Faith and is its
legitimate progeny.

These misunderstandings which lead the opponents of Christian Humanism astray arise in large part from a narrow and mistaken view of Christianity. Christianity is looked upon as the religion of the σωμα σημα doctrine with a vengeance, which preaches implacable war on the flesh and is a blight to all earthly beauty. By contrast, ancient culture, as idealized by time, comes to be represented as a golden age of liberty, when human nature (by which is often meant man's animality) had come into its own.

Christianity would not be true to Christ if it were to preach the entire extinction of the life of man's lower nature. Christ came to restore, and not to destroy. His Church follows in His footsteps. Her aim and ideal is the restoration of order in human nature; the complete denial and destruction of nothing in man save errors of his mind and the perversity of his will. Christian restraint has as its aim only the perfection of the whole and the supremacy of the highest, in man's nature. Christianity does not preach war on the flesh as such. It is not so simple as to impute evil to the flesh, which is but the instrument of a higher power. It preaches war on that disorderliness of mind and will, which deliberately putting aside the final end, chooses the present and apparent good. The flesh is an agent of evil only when its satisfaction is sought to the neglect of that of the whole.
nature. When Paul Elmer More writes that Platonism, as opposed to Christianity, considers the concupiscent spirit, rather than the flesh, as the enemy of true happiness, he only shows how little he has grasped the true Christian point of view. Of that fallacy which depicts the pagan ideal as offering a life of liberty, fruition and poise which Christianity can never give, we need say nothing. The lives of those who have deserted their Christian heritage to make the ideals and aims of paganism the springs of action in their lives confute this fallacy, at least by the moral ineffectualness, if not by the absolute depravity of their lives. Wincklemann is example enough.

The charge that the ideal of Longhaye and his fellows violates the essential note of humanism by the introduction of the supernatural, appears, at first, quite plausible, but, in fact, points to a confusion of terms by some of those who make the charge, and to a complete misunderstanding by all the opponents of Christian Humanism, of the Christian doctrine involved in the question. The term "supernatural" as used by all those who accept the threefold division of life as outlined by Babbitt, More, and Sherman, is confused with 'spiritual' and 'divine'. Of course, argument is useless until some community of terms is reached, and the effort to clear these terms as used by the writers mentioned would be a task in itself. We shall attempt it in an appendix. In order to prove
the charge of betraying human nature brought against an ideal which introduces the supernatural, it would have to be shown that in this ideal the essential nature of man would be violated by activity on a supernatural plane. Christian Humanism is completely clear of this charge.

The Catholic Church teaches that in being elevated to the supernatural plane of activity, the nature of man is not violated, but perfected. By Christ's Incarnation, the supernatural life becomes necessary for the perfection and happiness of man. But man, as man, is destined to possess the supernatural end which becomes him as a child of God. The supernatural is not a new nature replacing human nature, but an elevation of human nature to a plane of life and action to which it could never attain by its own effort, but which is eminently suitable to and compatible with the very essence of human nature. The agent nature remains intact in elevation. It is the human agent which really performs the supernatural act and which will possess the reward of that act. Supernatural activity perfects human nature by giving the distinctively human faculties, intelligence and will, an essentially higher kind and wider range of exercise than that proper to their nature and natural activity. This has been the constant teaching of the Church, and the Christian Humanist accepts it completely. This doctrine has yet to be impugned by competent theologians and the acceptance of it frees Christian Humanism of the
charges of being untrue to human nature.

On the contrary, an examination of this charge makes it clear that the ideal of the Christian Humanist more completely provides for the full and proportionate satisfaction and activity of man's nature than any other that has been proposed. It recognizes that every natural faculty must play a part in the attainment of happiness and must be satisfied and fulfilled if happiness is to be complete. It introduces the ideal of subordinated coordination, which at once does away with a false violent dualism, and yet recognizes the need of discipline. It is not impeded by the false humility which would make some shrink from an "unhuman" ideal, for it does not confuse the vital terms, "human" and "supernatural". Above all, it is most solicitous of the full perfection of man and consequently may lay superior claim to a human appeal and a human doctrine.
REFERENCES

CHAPTER IV

N.B. References not otherwise marked are to the Théorie des Belles Lettres, by Georges Longhaye, S.J., Pierre Réqui, sixth edition, 1932.


2 p. 6.

3 p. 29.

4 p. 67.

5 pp. ix-x.

6 p. 71.


8 Collin: ibidem, l. c., et sqq.

9 Collin: op. cit., p. 199.

10 ibidem.


13 chapter II.

14 pp. 29-34.

15 p. 30.

16 pp. 30-31.

17 p. 29.
18 Babbitt: *Rousseau and Romanticism*.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The aim of this essay, as originally stated, is to answer the question, is humanism at bottom an ethical or a literary issue? The answer seemed clear. Its basic issue is ethical; the literary issue, though always present, distinctly secondary. The examination of the doctrines of several humanists confirmed this.

In the writings of two of the authors studied the moral and ethical question was raised as the immediate and primary issue to be dealt with. In the third, it is presupposed that the moral question has already been drawn out and settled, and the literary ideal expounded follows upon a particular resolution of the ethical question. The literary issue is always secondary to the moral issue. As Mr. Babbitt wrote: "Either beauty cannot be defined at all, or we must say that only is beautiful which seems so to the right kind of man - he whose whole view of life is correct - which is to say that the problem of beauty is inseparable from the ethical problem." Since the problem of beauty is the central issue of aesthetics, literary aesthetics included, the statement is to the point here. Moreover, this conviction is common to all three of the writers
studied. Some may protest that this is to stretch beauty on an ethical rack. Father Longhaye has foreseen this objection, and his answer is unhesitating and uncompromising. Speaking of those who would free art from moral obligation, and envisaging a case of conflict between the moral and the beautiful, he writes: "Périissent, en ce cas, toutes les beautés de la parole littéraire. Périisse ce qu'il faut payer d'un sacrifice d'honneur ou de décence. Qui admet une morale n'a plus droit d'hésiter." It is not for us to enter the conflict. We are studying facts, and this fact is clear; the ethical issue is uppermost in the minds of these representative humanists, and to think or treat of humanism as primarily a literary topic, is, consequently, wrong.

Yet the literary issue, as we have said, is everlasting for the humanist. In the case of the humanists whose ethical doctrines were examined the literary interest is decidedly to the fore. Each has propounded a theory of literature and their literary opinions have received much attention. It is a part of the aim of this essay to trace, however sketchily, the relation between the literary theory and the ethical teaching of each. But before doing so it seems well to summarize the latter briefly. This summary will also help to make clear the relation between their ethical and literary opinions by placing them in close juxtaposition.
Within the compass of a common desire for the full perfection of the individual, which was stated to be the base note of humanism, the ethical ideals evolved by the several thinkers considered might be expected to differ as the views of each vary on questions essential to the ethical problem. These questions, briefly enumerated, are the place of metaphysics in ethics; the question of dualism, and the religious question. The questions must be answered before an ethical ideal can be erected; the nature of ethics demands that they be. It will be our purpose to review the attitude of each of the writers studied toward these questions in turn, and venture to draw some conclusions touching humanism as a whole.

The question of metaphysics forces itself upon the ethical thinker simply because he is dealing with things as they are, with realities. He seeks to adjust realities one to another, and to do this in any satisfactory and permanent manner it is obvious that he must know the nature of the realities with which he is dealing, and metaphysics is the science of the nature of reality. Irving Babbitt, as we have seen, recognizes the metaphysical question, but in contemplating its solution he is impeded by grave obstacles. The first of these obstacles is his acceptance of the positivistic tenet that only that is real which is immediately perceptible. This
tenet closes the human mind to whole stretches of reality which are necessary for it to know. Babbitt argues that since we cannot know the essences of things, we cannot hope to have an ethics based on such knowledge. Thus the nexus between metaphysics and ethics is broken, and ethics becomes for him an empirical science. Plato and Longhaye, on the other hand, recognize the necessity of this nexus for the validity and compelling force of any ethics, and are careful to build their ethical ideals on metaphysical bases. But, despite this argument, they differ widely. As the realism of Plato is not the realism of Longhaye so the ethics of Plato is not that of Longhaye. It is beyond the scope of a brief résumé to enter into these differences. The important thing to notice is that they are both realists, that is, both recognize that the nature of things can be known, and must form the basis of a satisfactory ethics.

The difference of doctrine between positivistic and realistic humanism affects very deeply the ideal of life each offers. The ideals based on realistic philosophy have a compelling force wholly lacking to the positivistic ideal. If an ideal is founded upon the evident nature of things no reasonable man can excuse himself from conformity and assent to that ideal. He may deny that this or that particular ideal of life, which purports to be founded upon the absolute nature of things, interprets and represents that reality adequately.
But even in that supposition the basic truth is maintained; one who denies the adequacy of a given ethical ideal implicitly admits that if the ideal is based on reality he must conform to it, since, by his own admission, the only reason why he can exempt himself from conformity is that the ideal itself does not square with the truth of things. In the face of this charge the question shifts and is no longer ethical but purely metaphysical, and the ethics will bind just in so far as it can be demonstrated to be based on the evident nature of things. An ethics based upon a positivistic philosophy is never compelling. A really reasonable man will reject it for the very reason that so many readily accept it: its flexibility and its allowance for the free play of individuality. He sees that positivism makes ethics a man's private property, a doctrine, though inviting, yet false and dangerous. Its flexibility, which springs from its lack of contact with the nature of things, degrades positivistic ethics to moral opportunism. Thus the same conclusion is again forced upon us: ethics must be based upon the nature of things. On this we may venture to conclude that only the humanism of the realist can achieve satisfactorily the aim of all humanism: an ideal of life and conduct which will provide for the full and proportionate development of man's nature.

Perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of the
three ideals considered, when studied comparatively, is their common note of dualism. Irving Babbitt builds his whole structure on the immediate perception of a "Higher Will" able to control expansive desire. The most prominent, practical function attributed to "nous" in Plato's ideal is the guidance and regulation of the concupiscent element of the soul, and consequently of the destiny of the whole man. Father Longhaye's dualism is apparent in his very definition of morality as "the direction of the free acts toward the final end."

All are agreed that the fact of dualism is the basis of all ethics. All, further, are in accord in holding that the ethical aspect of dualism is an opposition of control to unrestraint in the conduct of life. Divergence comes in the allocation of the power of control and in the characteristics assigned it.

Babbitt is forced by his epistemological difficulties into a strained and unnatural position. The Higher Will, as a consequence, strikes one as being very arbitrary. It rules like a divinely appointed lord whose acts are not open to comment and whose counselors (in this case Babbitt's "standards") are made to feel that their counsel is merely advice. This trait of the "Higher Will" has earned for its discoverer the condemnation of voluntarism. Without going so far as to concur wholly in this last opinion, an effort has been here made to show above that his handling of the relations between
intellect and will is far from satisfactory. His chief failing is a tendency to depreciate reason, with a corresponding inclination to exalt the "Higher Will" unduly. The result for his ideal is anything but satisfactory. The reasonable man cannot give his sympathy to an ideal which deals so awkwardly with the facts of experience.

Plato, on the other hand, flies to quite an opposite extreme. He allocates the power of control in life in an autonomous reason. This disposition of the matter is also entirely unsatisfactory. It fails to account for the most potent factor in human nature, free will. The presence of this power is a fact of experience. Plato's theory fails, like Babbitt's, to account for existing facts.

Only in the third ideal studied do we find the elements of intellect and will harmonized and coordinated in a manner which satisfies experience adequately. We have free will; we are intelligent. But neither will nor intellect is autonomous; both are so constituted by nature as to require each other's cooperation. The light of intellect is the guide of the free will; the free will posits the human act. We are conscious that we can will nothing absolutely unknown to us. We are also conscious that the foreknowledge needed does not invalidate the free action of the will in any contingency. This cooperative activity is manifestly necessary for unity in life.

Consequently we may venture a second conclusion, which
(presupposing the first) may be formulated thus: only the humanism of the realist-libertarian offers an ethics which adequately accounts for all the facts of experience which must be taken into account in attacking the ethical problem.

It was stated that the motive which impels the humanist to erect his ideal is a desire for the full development of human nature. No little of the divergence between the ideals we have studied derives from the different interpretations of the phrase "full development of human nature." The point at issue throughout may be reduced to a single question: the relation of the human to the supernatural. Does the supernatural, when introduced into an ideal of life for man, make that ideal less human, i.e., less fitting to man, as man? Or does it make the ideal more eminently human?

In the preface to Rousseau and Romanticism, we are told that life is experienced on three planes, the natural, (which might better be called the animal), the human and the supernatural. In man, according to Babbitt, there is essentially an element of the purely natural, (animal), besides the human element. Therefore, he goes on, no strict line can be drawn between the two elements as far as the constitution of man is concerned. As far as activity is concerned, the purely natural activity must always be subjected to the distinctively human in man. The human level is characterized by the activity of the "Higher Will". The human and the animal considered
as one in the human composite, however, form a world in themselves, strictly opposed by Babbitt to the supernatural. Now in erecting an ideal of conduct for man it is obviously a retrogression to work on a principle which in itself is applicable to life only in the natural level. Likewise, according to Mr. Babbitt, an ideal based on a principle of life on the supernatural plane is unfitted to man. We must be careful to do justice to Mr. Babbitt's stand on this point. It would be entirely mistaken to represent him as violently opposed to the supernatural. In his own words, if it came to a choice between reducing life to the natural plane and seeking to guide life by supernatural principles, he would rank himself unhesitatingly with the supernaturalists. But such a choice is not at all necessary. What is necessary is to attempt to live a full life on a human plane, to "be human before trying to be superhuman." He would have man live on a bowing acquaintance with the supernatural and the religious.

Plato takes up quite an opposite position when he predicates divinity of "nous" and the idea of good. In the first place, he would never subscribe to this threefold division of life. Reason, he says, is the distinctive mark of man's humanity and is itself divine. The human cannot be adequately conceived as separate from the divine, and divinity is natural to the human in the sense that it becomes the human essentially when reason is supreme in life man has reached the full pro-
portionate life that naturally becomes him and lives this life in virtue of a faculty which is divine. The divine is essential, therefore, to the full human life. This may sound like sheer paradox, but how can any other meaning be taken from Plato's words? Reason is the distinctive mark of man's humanity (and therefore the faculty which must be supreme in the distinctively human life); but reason is itself divine; therefore the full distinctive human life has somewhat of the divine as part of its essence.

Father Longhaye faces the problem on the ground of scholastic philosophy. Consequently he would consent to the gradations of life that Babbitt enumerates only with qualifications. He would grant that there is a purely animal plane of life and that for man to guide his life by principles adjusted to this plane would be a distinct degradation. He will grant, too, that there is a distinctive human plane of life, but he would not grant its opposition to the supernatural plane. He would distinguish. For man to live his life on a principle which only the angels, because of super-human qualities, can follow, would be repugnant and unhuman; this he would grant. But if by the supernatural plane is meant a plane of activity in which the distinctive human faculties exercise an intense actuation of their powers, we must say that life on that plane would certainly be neither repugnant nor unhuman, but eminently becoming to man's nature. And this last is
exactly what the Christian Humanist understands by elevation to the supernatural plane.

The Christian Humanist's view may be more clearly and positively stated thus: elevation to the supernatural can only be repugnant to the humanistic ideal if by such elevation human nature would be violated or frustrated. Human nature can only be violated or frustrated if its essential and distinctive activities be so curbed or altered that the nature affected would no longer be human. Such would be the case if supernatural activity meant activity on the plane of the purely spiritual, the activity say, of an angel. If, consequently, elevation to a supernatural plane does not curtail or alter, but if it enhances man's distinctive activities, it cannot be a violation of human nature. If man's life were transmuted from human into angelic life, there would be no elevation but essential alteration. The new life acquired would not necessarily be supernatural; it might be a merely natural life on a higher level of existence and activity. Moreover, because the distinctive powers of human nature constitute all that is materially necessary for elevation to the supernatural plane, activity on the plane of the supernatural is eminently suitable to human nature. Any ideal of life which purports to aim at the full development of human life cannot overlook the supernatural potency of human nature and still be true to itself.
Christianity teaches elevation to the supernatural order in just this sense. It demonstrates from man's very nature his potency for such elevation. It teaches that this elevation is a free gift of God, given through Christ, and maintains that the full human life must, accordingly, include supernatural activity, as exercised in grace by faith. Christ is not to be received or rejected as the individual may see fit. The new life He brings is not man's to refuse with impunity. His happiness lies in a ready and complete acceptance of it.

We may venture on these grounds to draw the final conclusion. Since Christ came to earth, only the Christian Humanistic ideal can claim to achieve the essential aim of all humanism: the full and proportionate development, because it alone takes account of the new life which Christ wills that man shall live.

II

It would be unwise to be dogmatic about the relation in which the literary and ethical opinions of Babbitt, Plato and Longhaye stand to each other, so our discussion will be confined to tracing objective connections between them, for the most part connections pointed out by the authors themselves. But this is really a distinct advantage, for it saves us useless conjecture and keeps us always on the safe ground
of the author's own words.

A. Babbitt

Babbitt's opinion that the connection between art (and of course literary art) and morality is immediate and necessary is clearly expressed in this sentence from Rousseau and Romanticism: "Either that is beautiful which appears so to the right kind of man, the man whose view of life is correct, or there is no beauty." Beauty under some aspect or other is the object of literature, as of all art, but beauty itself must be interpreted in ethical terms. Beauty is in some way a relationship between man's soul and a certain quality of reality. In order that this relation be true its terms must be correct; man, for his part, must have a correct view of reality as a whole, and of his position in the world, before he can pronounce upon beauty either concretely or in the abstract.

The history of man's spirit both in philosophy and in art seems to Babbitt to be the record of an almost continual oscillation between monistic extremes. Reality appears to man as a oneness which is always changing, a living tissue woven of the one and many, of motion and repose. So closely intertwined are these threads of reality that only by a constant and prolonged effort can man disengage them, and even then but imperfectly. And he, weighed down by some connatural indolence of spirit, has, save at rare intervals, refused to
make this effort and sought refuge from this toil in some superficial half truth, some reduction of this living, composite reality to one or the other of its components, which of themselves are dead and meaningless. A false and foolish trust in his own intellect has led him to think that by a simple process, (so simple he might have suspected it from the first), he could abstract from manifold reality the eternal essences of things, and encompass, in a narrow formula, truth in its entirety. At other times his indolence has led him to deny that there is any unity or purpose, any oneness, in reality at all, because it is so difficult to perceive. Man has consistently refused to see, because to maintain this position demands constant effort and self discipline, that for him either extreme is untrue. Man has some perception of the unity of reality, but only through the veil of illusion thrown about it by the multiplicity and movement of experience. This element of illusion is essential to man's intellectual life. Intellectualism has led him to moral formalism, the casuistry of divines. Naturalism, the philosophy of the flux, has leveled off the distinction between man and the physical world and has identified the law of his life with the law of the physical universe. Only the recognition of the true, though limited, field of his knowledge can rectify these errors and put man on the road to human right living. While his mind is essentially bound to experience of the many, man yet has an intuitive,
though partial, perception of the oneness, the unity, purpose and law within the flux. Though he cannot look up all truth in his formula, neither can he dispense with these, for they embody his intuitions of the one. The wise man will see that the solution lies in the vital fusion of the one and the many. He must make a right use of illusion to help him to live purposefully, humanely. He will have standards, but they will be vital and flexible, capable of expanding and conforming to further reaches and new aspects of reality as these are revealed. The conduct of life by flexible standards alone is human, and free, in a degree, from the tyranny of illusion because it makes the right use of illusion. In ethical terms this means, for Babbitt, that the expansive tendencies of man's nature will be restrained and directed by the power of control which operates according to flexible, vital, moral laws framed on the experience of the past. ¹

The history of literary art has seen the same oscillation between monistic extremes; the same illusory reduction of all artistic reality to some false unity. Pseudo-classicism, the child of false intellectualism, placed the whole of beauty in form, and then fell into the egregious error, formalism. Form came to mean not living control in art, but wooden imitation by rule. Romanticism, at its core a revolt against pseudo-classic formalism, rushed to the other extreme and declared that all beauty is expression, the unrestrained irres-
istible outpouring of vital personal emotion. Again the humanist will see that such extremes are false and unhuman.  

To the humanist, Babbit explains, beauty is essentially composed of two elements, form and expression. Expression is the expansive, vital element, form the limiting, circumscribing element. But he does not understand form to mean a stolid, wooden frame-work into which the vital element of expression is forced. Just as in the true humanistic ethics the standards of conduct must be clear, yet flexible, so the formal element of beauty is flexible and vital because founded, not on mere rule and outer authority, but upon intuition of oneness in experience.

The conduct of life on a humanistic plane must of course precede the creation of a humanistic art, because art is the consequent and expression and, not the prime determinant, of a view and mode of life. A correct notion of beauty is born only of a correct ethical view of life. The humanistic view of life will lead to a humanistic conception of beauty and its embodiment in art, a view of life and art of which the essential characteristic will be selective control according to vital and flexible law based upon intuition of the oneness, unity, and purpose behind the flux of experience.
B. Plato

Plato occupies a unique position in the history of criticism as the first critic to raise, formally, the question of the relation between art and morality. This concern with the ethical aspect of criticism is quite what we might expect, in view of the ethical preoccupation of all his thought. His general view of this relationship, too, is quite what we might expect, for in common with all the ancient critics he holds that art should adhere strictly to the requirements of morality. As Father Longhaye expresses it, the ancients would have blushed at the thought of the "art for art's sake" of our day. But neither the preoccupation of Plato's thought with the ethical aspect of things, nor the general attitude of the ancients toward the relation between art and morality, will explain the sharp antagonism which, on ethical grounds, Plato displays toward the imitative arts in the tenth book of the Republic.

After delineating at length the ideal character of the "philosopher", and discussing the peculiar perfection embodied in this ideal, Plato reverts abruptly to the question of the imitative arts. The topic had already been touched upon in an earlier book where all but patriotic and sacred hymns had been forbidden in the ideal state. Now Plato seems eager to bring forward in support of this rejection the evidence which further discussion has revealed. At the opening of the book
Socrates says:

"Of the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our state there is none which, upon reflection, pleases me better than the rule about poetry.

To what do you refer?

To the rejection of imitative poetry which certainly ought not to be received, as I see far more clearly now that the parts of the soul have been distinguished."5

The relation between imitative poetry and the parts of the soul may be difficult to see at first, but when we recall just how important a role these "parts" of the soul play in Plato's ethical ideal, light begins to dawn.

Plato distinguishes three parts of the soul, the concupiscent, the spirited and the rational. Each of these is striving constantly to attain the good proper to itself - the concupiscent element for all the satisfaction of sense, the spirit for the benefits of power and glory, reason for truth and reality, ultimately, for the Idea of Good. But it is impossible that each of these elements should be satisfied indiscriminately, for it is clear from every man's experience that reason frequently opposes the desires of the senses and the spirited element, if unrestrained, often precipitates a man into actions he lives to regret as foolhardy. If peace is to reign in the soul one must regulate the satisfaction of each part by the good of the whole. Sense and spirit are blindly impelled by nature toward a good which is only partial, capable only of satisfying the desires peculiar to each. Only
reason sees clearly and desires the true and complete good which includes in itself, as what is perfect always includes, the perfection of the less perfect, the partial goods which sense and spirit seek; reason alone, consequently, is able to perceive and seek the good of the whole man. To it then should be given the supremacy over the powers of the soul to regulate and provide for the satisfaction of each one only in accord with the greater good of the whole man. Upon the maintenance of this supremacy will depend the peace and order and perfection of the whole man, and this supremacy, in turn, is understood to rest strictly upon the power of reason to know and desire the true good of the whole man. Imitative poetry, Plato charges, makes directly for the disruption of this order in the soul because it distracts reason from the pursuit of its proper good and because its inordinate appeal to the senses and the spirited element tends to strengthen these powers at the cost of the supremacy of reason.

The imitative arts, and, of course, poetry among them, prevent reason from attaining to truth and reality, that is, to the knowledge of the universal "ideas" because they concern themselves entirely with the realm of the individual and multiple. God, the maker of all things, Plato maintains, made only the true and universal reality of each kind of thing in the world. These are the "ideas", the universal and eternal realities which alone are true and perfect. The individuals
which exist in the world of sense are but imitations of these universal realities and have truth and reality only is so far as they imitate and reproduce in themselves the perfection of the ideas. And to these individuals, consequently, we do not ascribe the fulness of reality and perfection which we predicate of the ideas, but quite correctly speak of them as imitations, appearances, or reflections. The individual is the object of sense, the idea the object of the intellect. The imitative arts are concerned entirely with the individual. They treat and reproduce, not the eternal and universal reality of any object, but only an individual, a bed or a man or any other individual thing. And further, because of their media, they are incapable of grasping even the totality of the individual. They grasp at best only an aspect of the individual, an angle of a particular bed, or this man as he weeps or laughs, and never the totality and the perfection of the individual as it ought to be according to its eternal pattern. Therefore the products of art can rightfully claim to be no more than imitations of an aspect of an individual, essentially three removes from truth and reality in their fulness.

Now all this might be condoned if the imitative arts would recognize their limitations. But this they do not do. On the contrary, they pretend to represent reality, and men are asked to accept their products as authentic representations of truth. But it is madness to do so and if a man is enticed by
their pretentions he will forfeit any hope of attaining by the exercise of reason to the knowledge of the "ideas". And with this he will lose all hope of attaining to the perfection of his nature, for in giving himself over to the allurements of art he foresees the only guide which can lead him to that perfection, reason.

The imitative arts are further guilty of destroying the poise and order of the soul by their inordinate appeal to the senses. The order of the soul depends upon the proper subordination of the senses to reason. The imitative arts, because they are concerned entirely with individuals, appeal only to the senses and to the spirited element of the soul. They put forth their products as sources of satisfaction to the sight and hearing and the emotions without making any appeal to the reason to justify and approve this satisfaction. Quite the contrary, art asks us to put our reason in abeyance, as it were, for the space of time in which we take our pleasure in its works, for it asks us to enjoy its products as realities, although reason is loud in its protest. And in thus appealing to the senses and to the emotions in open defiance of reason the imitative arts tend to strengthen the power of the former at the cost of the latter and prepare the way for disorder in the soul. All that has been said applies with especial force to poetry which is the greatest and most powerful of the arts.
Thus Plato's opposition to poetry springs directly from zeal for his ethical ideal. Poetry threatens the very foundations of this ideal—the supremacy of reason among the powers of the soul in virtue of its knowledge of reality, ultimately of the Idea of Good. We must not of course overlook the fact that Plato seems to have utterly misunderstood the true creative processes of art, which are, in their way, as much universalizing processes as the activity of reason. But this consideration opens a question beyond our present scope. For Plato, poetry is anathema because, as far as he can see, it can not coexist with the ethical ideal which alone, he thinks, can insure men's happiness. And so he exiles poetry from his perfect state, because truth is greater than any man. But he exiles her with great reluctance and concludes the matter with the sad but eager words, "Shall I propose that she be allowed to return from exile on the condition that she make defense of herself?" And he lets us feel that, in the event of a successful apology, he will be among those eager to welcome her into the ideal city.

C. Longhaye

The worth of the ethical interpretation of literature for the purposes of criticism is often impugned on the grounds that to judge literature ethically is to force upon it norms of perfection altogether alien to its intrinsic nature and its
proper end. The great and only concern is beauty, it is argued, and the essence of beauty is pleasure. These are the only legitimate norms of literary excellence, beauty and pleasure. Moral right and wrong are simply beside the point in the judgment of literature. This view is held by men of great authority in the field. But critics of no less merit have taken their stand upon the ethical interpretation as the only logical basis for fruitful criticism, and among these Father Longhaye must be numbered. It is his counter-complaint, against those who oppose the ethical criticism, that they do not examine the whole question deeply enough.

An examination of the history of literature reveals that literature, as all art, is essentially the product of man as a moral being. The subject-matter of works of literature acknowledged commonly to be the world's masterpieces is almost without exception some aspect of man's moral life. The epics of Homer, the tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides, the tale of "Pius Aeneas", the Divine Comedy, the great plays of Shakespeare, the work of the nineteenth century in France, England and other European countries and contemporary literature in general bear eloquent witness to the common preoccupation of the art with the vital moral questions. If Homer was appealed to as the ethical monitor of Greece, it was because the Greeks recognized that the poet's chief concern was an ideal of right living and not mere plea-
The ultimate motive which enabled Dante to undertake and complete his tremendous task of composing the "poema sacra" was the conviction that he possessed vital moral truth to impart and that literature was the best channel for its popular communication. And who can fail to see that much of modern literature by its very flaunted amoral character is but offering another answer to the great persistent moral question? Moreover, the fact that the great poets and dramatists have most frequently avowed their moral aims cannot be overlooked. Euripides and Sophocles, Virgil and Dante openly affirm their moral purpose. The writers of the nineteenth century who were seeking a substitute for religion either in literature and art or in innumerable other soul-nostrums frankly admitted their purpose. And in our own day, could Eugene O'Neill, for instance, deny it? If he did, he could plead no valid reason for a line he has written. It may truthfully be said that every great literary artist has sought by his writing to influence the moral ideas and ideals of his contemporaries and of posterity. How is it legitimate to set aside the moral considerations of their work as the illusions of great men, dissipated by modern critical thought, as Benedetto Croce would have us do? If we are truly to judge the men, we must take their work as they wanted it to be taken.

With these facts before him the literary critic will hesitate to exclude moral considerations from his judgments.
If he does exclude them he will find himself vaporizing, and not criticizing, for he will have lost vital contact with his subject. It is evident that Father Longhaye realized the weight of the historical evidence from his very definition of literature, which he calls, "l'art de exercer sur l'homme par la parole une action moral, puissante et ordonnée." But historical evidence appears to him more corroborative than fundamental. An analysis of speech, written or spoken, will lead to the same conclusion, he maintains. Conceptual language is distinctive of man and directly indicative of the presence in him of intellect, indicative therefore of his soul. It is the soul of man that seeks expression through language, the soul of man which is made for union with a body which seeks intimate expression of itself in literature. And the chief, rather the only, real concern of man's soul, is its destiny, which is a moral issue, obviously. Though the powers of the soul may be turned to other purposes, their real end is to know and will man's true happiness. When, as happens in literature, the soul expresses itself intimately and sincerely, it is impossible that it should not speak of that which concerns it so constantly and so closely. Or, is it conceivable that in this intimate revelation of itself the soul should put aside this all engrossing interest to give itself over to the mere delight of the moment? Who can sincerely believe so?

Literature, as all other interests and activities of the human
soul, is naturally subordinate to that one supreme interest, the last end of man, and to its only important activity, the attainment of that end. The conception of a literature emancipated from the common service to the last end is unhuman, unnatural and suicidal.

But what is the purpose of this intimate self revelation of the soul? Is it simply to relieve the burden of the soul? Occasionally this may be true, but this would hardly explain man's continued effort at literary expression. The soul wishes by this expression to communicate itself to other souls, to share with them its reflexions and to stir them up to sympathy with its own affections. It seeks to arouse essentially moral activity in the recipient of its expression, that is, activity of the distinctive powers of the soul. To this end it bends all its powers, shapes all its means and methods. Literary history is naturally in this light the record of souls who seek to move the souls of others and to mold the subtle and beautiful instrument of language to this end. But why, it may be asked, should this expression take on so elaborate a form? Why does not intellectual soul speak to intellectual soul by reasoned thought alone? The answer is that the intellectual soul is not the man. Though the intellectual principle is the chief constituent of man, the body is also essential to human nature, and in our present state the activity of the intellect is in a sense conditioned by the
ministrations of the body. The soul which seeks to communicate itself to other souls knows that its message must pass through the hands of this minister. She speaks therefore not merely abstractions and universals but language which will attract and arrest sense and emotion also, reaching the higher by the lower. Sometimes the intellect does express itself in mere abstractions, but then it is not expressing its intimate self. Such expression is not literature but the symbolism of impersonal science.

Thus, philosophy and history join forces to support Father Longhaye's conception of literature: "l'art d'exercer sur l'homme par la parole une action moral, puissante et ordonnée." Further analysis of the constitution of man will explain the presence of the last words: "(action) puissante et ordonnée," and will enable us to see the genesis and force of the chief laws of literary expression according to Father Longhaye: power and order.

It is obvious that in order to achieve the end of self-expression, namely, to move other souls to sympathy with itself the soul must use powerful means. Language is its distinctive and only immediate and unequivocal medium of expression. Consequently it must make this instrument as powerful as possible by adapting it completely to the exigencies of expression, that is to the nature of both recipient and topic, as well as to particular circumstances. Above all, it should
try to leave no point of ingress to the other soul unattacked. If expression fails in this completeness of its appeal, all other precautions for its success will be futile. Sense, the emotion, intellect are all, so to speak, legitimate prey to the invading force. If this force is stopped at the very outposts by failing to effect the capitulation of the senses, it can never hope to gain the citadel. And if after passing the outworks it cannot pass the inner fortifications of sensibility its effort has been in vain. The condition of power of appeal is then a frontal attack on the recipient soul at every vantage point, sense, emotion and intellect. Thus only will the day be carried and soul be made to sympathize with soul.

Yet mere power of appeal is not sufficient, and in the advice to appeal to the whole man there lurks a great danger. Besides power, order is required to make the appeal to the soul effective and legitimate. Man is indeed body and soul, but the soul is vastly superior to the body. It not only receives the data of sense, but also passes judgment on them and rules her action in accord with her judgment. In order, then, to move the soul to action, the appeal to emotion and sense must not outweigh the appeal to intellect proper, but should be proportionate to it and selected with attention to its appropriateness in the circumstances. Unless this is so, the soul will be repelled rather than attracted and rendered sympathetic. She will rightly judge indiscriminate and ex-
travagant appeal to be meaningless and will not respond. The powerful appeal must then be ordered, seeking the aid, and not the interference, of the body. The appeal to the senses and emotion will be so moderated that the intellect will always be able easily and quickly to perceive the message meant for itself in the information brought to it.

Order is also required to make the appeal legitimate. The hierarchy of faculties in man is not merely a help, but is the absolute condition of the attainment of the last end of man. Disorder among the faculties is disastrous to the attainment of true happiness. Inordinate appeal to the lower powers tends to introduce disorder by strengthening them unduly. Consequently it is not legitimate to appeal to them, in literary expression, more than to the intellect. But, it may be objected, the soul of the artist has the right to use every means it can to gain its end. Hardly. No man has the right to introduce such disastrous disorder into the soul of another human being to gain sympathy there for himself. The soul which stoops to such means to gain its end is not deserving to be heard. Rather it deserves to be silenced. And so one is justified in saying that only the appeal that is ordered in accord with the true and essential order of the soul is legitimate and alone deserves to be received with approval. Though no one can prevent disordered appeals from being made, philosophic critics will condemn them as nothing short of criminal.
Father Longhaye's literary creed may be summed up in his definition of literature given above and in the two great laws of good literature he enunciates.

"Pour exercer par la parole une action puissante il faut déployer à la fois et constamment dans la parole toutes les facultés capables d'y concourir."

"Toutes les facultés doivent agir ensemble mais suivant leur hiérarchie invariable et les exigences variables de leur objet commun."

It is easily perceived from what has been said above how these follow from the basic characteristic of his ethical ideal, The fundamental characteristics of his ethical ideal, as we saw, were the dualism in man, the superiority of soul and the essential hierarchy of the faculties. From the first spring the conceptions behind the definition of literature itself, from the second the laws of good composition.
CHAPTER V

1 Rousseau and Romanticism; Intro., passim; The New Laokoon, pp. 186 sqq.
2 New Laokoon, pp. 192 sqq.
3 New Laokoon, pp. 217 sqq.
4 Republic, Bk. X, initio.
5 ibi., l. c.
6 Théorie des Belles-Lettres p. 15.
7 ibi., p. 27.
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